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MAADA JAMES KAILONDO
(The son of the founder of Luawa, the brother of P.C. Momoh Banya, and the uncle of ex-P.C. Sama Kailondo I Banya. See Appendix 7 of this thesis.)
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CHAPTER FIVE:

THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF BRITISH LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ON LUAWA, c.1908 to c.1931.
1. FABUNDEH'S LOSS OF SOVEREIGNTY

British local administration was formally introduced into Luawa only in 1912 (1), but the nature of that administration cannot be well understood without reference to some developments between 1896 and 1912.

In August 1896, the Freetown Government proclaimed that it was "best for the interests of the people in the territories adjacent to the Colony of Sierra Leone" (2) that they "should come under the protection of Her Majesty" Queen Victoria (3). By this Proclamation, the Freetown Government formally aggregated to itself sovereignty over the previously-independent polities of the Sierra Leone hinterland (4). Most hinterland rulers, however, only realized the significance of the establishment of a Protectorate when, in early 1898, District Commissioners began trying to collect House Tax (5); and the 1898 Protectorate War (6) represented an unavailing attempt on the part of the local rulers and their peoples to re-assert their independence (7). These events of 1896 to 1898 have been described in detail elsewhere (8), and do not require repetition here since Luawa remained largely unaffected. Luawa was in an exceptional position at this time because, first, Governor Cardew had peacably demonstrated in March 1896 that his Government was sovereign in the area, although the people of Luawa had not recognized the crucial nature of his actions at that time (9). Second, before the Protectorate Proclamation was made, it had become obvious that the greater part of Luawa lay within Liberian territory (10). Third, no attempt was made to collect House Tax in the Luawa area in 1898 (11). This would seem to make Luawa a 'special case'. Yet if other polities were examined in detail, no doubt other complicating
factors would come to light which would make many seem 'special cases' (12). Only from a Freetown (or London) perspective did the hinterland appear to be made up of uniform, scarcely-differentiated polities governed by rulers with almost identical policies and characters (13).

When Cardew arrived in Kailahun in March 1896 (14), he found that Kailondo had died fairly recently (15) and "the leading people there had not yet selected a successor ... and were awaiting my arrival for the purpose" (16). The Governor saw this as "a convenient opportunity for re-arranging the tribal limits of the Luawa and Bombali peoples, who were under Kai Lundu and of excluding therefrom certain Kissi towns which also paid him allegiance" (17). When Cardew learnt that "the principal persons in Kare Lahun [18] were agreed in selecting as chief, PA BUNDE" (19), the Governor interviewed the chosen leader. "I ... informed him", noted Cardew, "that I will approve of his appointment and will recommend it to you [i.e. to Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary,] on the condition that he confines his jurisdiction to the Luawa and Bombali districts and consents not to exact allegiance from KUNDO, KANGAMA, FUYA [20] and other Kissi towns which paid tribute to Kai Lundu up to the time of his death [21]. Pa Bunde has accepted these terms and I purpose this afternoon to publicly announce my approval of his having been selected as chief of Luawa and Bombali districts and hereafter to recommend his appointment to you should he loyally fulfil the conditions imposed" (22).

The Governor thus clearly showed the Luawa people for the first time that the Freetown Government was sovereign in Luawa: the appointment of the ruler and the limits of his jurisdiction would both henceforth be under the control of the British colonial authorities. It is improbable that Cardew considered his actions were a major new departure:
his behaviour to Kailondo in the previous year (23) indicated that already in 1895 Cardew thought of his Government as the ultimate authority in the area, even though he did not formally exercise sovereignty. It is equally improbable that the Luawa ruler and his kpakoisia were perturbed by Cardew's action in March 1896. The kpakoisia, out of respect for the English Governor, deliberately waited for him to arrive in order that he might confirm their choice of the new ruler; and on 10 March he gave his confirmation (24). He did not try to impose his own choice of ruler, but simply approved theirs. Their own decision to make Fabundeh the ruler was in accordance with Kailondo's express wishes (25), and in the last year's of Kailondo's reign, Fabundeh had undoubtedly been the 'Second Man' in the polity, the most powerful figure after the Mahawai (26). The great majority of the kpakoisia who had a part in the succession question apparently accepted that Fabundeh was the natural successor to Kailondo (27). So there was little political tension during the interregnum, and no objection was raised to Cardew confirming Fabundeh's appointment.

Moreover, Cardew's attempts to redefine the Luawa ruler's area of jurisdiction probably did not worry Fabundeh or his kpakoisia very much. They accepted what Cardew said because, according to local rulers of etiquette, it would have been most impolite to do anything other than agree with the opinions of the Governor (28). But the opinions he expressed on this matter carried little weight in practice. Whatever the Governor said, the extent of Fabundeh's jurisdiction depended on which patimahanga acknowledged him as ruler; and in fact most of the patimahanga from "KUNDO, KANGAMA, FUYA and other Kisi towns which paid tribute to Kai Lundu" (29) accepted the rule of Fabundeh (30). Cardew himself noticed that at the public proclamation of Fabundeh as ruler, "many Kisi Chiefs were present" (31).
Presumably he thought they were there simply to spectate, but the more natural interpretation is that they were there to give their allegiance to Fabundeh.

Thus the events of March 1896, which represented the de facto imposition of British sovereignty over Luawa (32), produced little sense of crisis or conflict among the people of Luawa. Painlessly, almost imperceptibly, sovereignty slipped from the hands of the local ruler and his kpakoisia. By the time the people began to realize what had happened, the state of affairs in the hinterland generally and in the Luawa area in particular (33) strongly suggested that resistance would not make sense (34).

If the Protectorate had been proclaimed in Luawa in August 1896, some Luawa kpakoisia might have realized where events were leading and some resistance might have occurred; but in fact no proclamation was ever made up-country (35). One special reason why, in any case, no proclamation could have been made in Luawa was that, by early April 1896, the geographical position of Kailahun had been precisely established for the first time—and the town was found to lie not in the British sphere of influence at all: it was in Liberian territory (36). The Anglo-Liberian boundary, never clearly defined in the Luawa area before 1896 (37), was generally accepted to run along the thirteenth degree of longitude west of Paris (38). As a result of calculations made by Major Grant, surveyor on Cardew's 1896 visit to Kailahun (39), it was established that this line of longitude ran just west of Mofindor and Kailahun, passing through Kenewa on the Pendembu-Kailahun road, and leaving all the major human settlements of Luawa (except Baoma, Ngiehun and Mende) in Liberian territory (40). Although Cardew did not withdraw the Frontier Police garrison from Kailahun, and wrote
enthusiastically about a "rectification" (41) of the boundary to include the whole of Luawa within the British Protectorate (42), yet he obviously could not set up British administration over Luawa as he was doing in other parts of the Protectorate. In fact in November 1896, the Liberian Government indicated that they were unwilling to discuss adjustment to the Luawa boundary (43), thus emphasizing that the British Government had no de jure sovereignty over that area (44).

The Freetown Government did not impose their House Tax on the outlying Districts of the Protectorate in 1898 (45), and for the next fourteen years the complicated boundary issue meant that British tax was collected only from the small British part of Luawa (46). Thus the grievance of House Tax, which may have provoked peoples elsewhere in the Protectorate to start anti-British military operations (47), was not present in Luawa in 1898 (48). No records have been found to indicate whether or not House Tax was collected from 'British Luawa' (49) in 1899; but presumably there, as elsewhere in the Protectorate, the British military expeditions of late 1898 and early 1899 impressed on the local people the futility of rising in armed resistance (50), and they were willing to pay their tax. Possibly in 1896, Fabundeh had thought in terms of possessing sovereignty for himself and complete independence from the British, though there is little evidence that he ever did so think (51). But his willingness to pay tax to the British in 1900 (52) suggests that by the turn of the century at the latest, he had given up all hope of complete independence. If he had once toyed with the idea of resisting the British by military force (53), by 1899 he had not only rejected that idea, but had adopted a policy of close cooperation with the new colonial rulers as being politically the most profitable course for him to follow (54).
Fabundeh's policy of co-operation with the British gave him some limited gains. He received some support against local opponents (55) and, after a delay of almost a decade, decisive action against Kafula of Wunde (56). After an even longer delay, the British were forced to accept Fabundeh's wishes on the international boundary issue (57). Yet even in the purely political sphere, the gains were limited (58). And in the socio-economic sphere the partially-detrimental impact of the British take-over was indicated in the decline of Kailahun town between the arrival of the first Englishman and the establishment of full British control, the town's size almost halved (59). From Fabundeh's viewpoint, however, the greatest problems associated with the coming of British rule resulted from his loss of sovereignty. His relationship with his subjects did not change radically (60), but he now found a new authority above him which he himself was forced to obey. Only in his successors' reigns did all the implications of this new situation become clear (61), but the new situation itself, in which sovereignty lay with the British and not the local ruler, was established before Fabundeh's death.

How, essentially, did the loss of sovereignty affect the position of Fabundeh as ruler? Perhaps the answer is best seen in what, at first sight, might seem to be an unimportant semantic change: the replacement of the word Mahawai by the word Ndoomahci as the usual title of the local ruler in the Mende language (62), a parallel change occurring in the Kissi language from Mass-chowo to Masa-kolcivo (63).

Maada James Kailondo affirmed that there were no 'Paramount Chiefs' or Ndoomahancisia before the imposition of British rule (64). Likewise, Rev. W.R.E. Clarke, who had a thorough knowledge of the Ko-Mende dialect before 1930 (65), believed that Ndoomahci was not a
traditional Mende word for the local ruler (66). The traditional word was Mahai (67), occasionally amplified to Mahawai ('overlord') to refer to a ruler like Kailondo who had extraordinarily great political power (68). In time of war Ke-mahai ('war leader') might be used (69), but the word Ndoomahai ('ruler of the land') was unknown before 1896 (70). It was introduced after the establishment of the British Protectorate in an attempt to translate the quite alien concept of 'Paramount Chief' which the British imposed (71). In employing the phrase 'Paramount Chief', British officials thought they were describing a traditional local institution which had existed 'from time immemorial' (72). But in fact the British failed to appreciate the political system which had operated in the Luawa area under Kailondo. Even a relatively sympathetic and sensitive observer like T.J. Alldrige could become involved in much confusion because he failed to understand the nature of sovereignty in the region during the early 1890s (73); and many subsequent British officials possessed neither the experience nor the interest of Alldridge.

It became clear to the Luawa people from the early years of the twentieth century that the British 'Paramount Chief' differed in several fundamentals from the sort of ruler Kailondo had been. First, a British Paramount Chief ruled a fixed, unchanging area of land, whereas the rule of Kailondo had been based on the personal submission of surrounding ko is a the area of land controlled by Kailondo thus fluctuated as his personal political power grew or declined (74). For the Mendebleisia sovereignty was a matter of personal relationships, whereas for the British it was a matter of territorial control. Secondly, the new 'Paramount Chief' could year by year make a variety of demands upon his subjects, but there were strict British-imposed limits to what he could do (75); by contrast,
Kailondo's demands upon his subjects depended solely upon the exigencies of the situation (76). Thirdly, each Paramount Chief was made, at the beginning of the colonial period, quite independent of every other, and all were given an equal status (77). Thus, in Kailondo's time, the ruler of the Upper Bambara mahawui had been closely under the influence of the Luawa ruler, and had been forced to do what the latter wanted (78). But Fabundeh found that the British treated P.C. Kutubu of Upper Bambara as a local ruler who had no connections with the P.C. of Luawa, was in no way responsible to him, and was not under his influence. Moreover, the British treated Fabundeh and Kutubu as though they occupied positions of equal political power and respect, although in fact the former was much more powerful than the latter (79).

One curious result of the British rulers' determination to make all Paramount Chiefs equal to each other was that Fabundeh found the British classed him as a peer of Tamne, Limba and Sherbro rulers, and treated him in the same way as them, although he himself almost certainly did not recognize any common links with them, and had never before been in any way associated with them (80).

Therefore, despite all these British innovations, colonial officials persisted in their belief that their 'Paramount Chiefs' were 'traditional rulers' (81). The Mende people, however, realized that these 'Paramount Chiefs' were in many ways unlike their pre-1896 Mahangeisia; and so they began to use the new word Njobmahai in an attempt to translate the new concept of the local ruler which the British had introduced. This British concept contained contradictions within itself (82), and it altered over the decades (83), so not surprisingly the peoples of Luawa did not fully understand British ideas about the role of the Paramount Chief. Thus, in different ways, both the local people (84), and the British
officials laboured under fundamental misapprehensions about the position of the local ruler in the colonial period. From these misapprehensions sprang much of the violence in 'Chiefdom politics' in the later years of colonial rule (85). This violence occurred partly because, although the basic loyalty of the ordinary people was to the Mahel, their mahawui, and the mahavci, it was the pre-1896 forms to which they were attached, not to the rigid, artificial and alien 'Paramount Chieftaincies' of British creation (86). The more the British struggled to 'improve' and 'modernize' the Paramount Chieftaincies (87), the more they unwittingly increased the divergence between the institution to which the ordinary people of Luawa were loyal and the actual behaviour of particular Paramount Chiefs (88). Eventually in the late 1940s, that divergence became so great that the ordinary people erupted into violent opposition against particular Paramount Chiefs, including the Chiefs of Luawa and Kissi Tungi (89).

Moreover, many of the weaknesses in the Protectorate Chiefdoms - weaknesses which became obvious in the 1930s and 1940s - were a direct result of innovations in chieftaincy which the British made at the time they appropriated sovereignty to themselves. For example, it was apparent by the 1930s that the Kissi Chiefdoms (like many others in the Protectorate) were too small to be viable; but it was the British themselves who had earlier divided Kailondo's Luawa up into four small Chiefdoms (90). Another common complaint of British officials in the 1930s was that the Chiefdoms and their Chiefs were politically stagnant (91); but again, it was the British themselves who had limited the Chief's ability to take initiatives and to be a real ruler (92). In some cases, the British rulers not only limited Chiefs but virtually nominated them to office in the first place. Sometimes, stated Governor Slater in a Memorandum of 1925,
the Tribal Authority (93) "must have a very shrewd idea that the Political Officer is hopeing that a particular man will be chosen, and in Sierra Leone the wishes of the District Commissioner or Provincial Commissioner have almost the force of an order" (94). Luawa provided many other examples (95) of ways in which British-imposed changes and limitations on the Mahangcisia in the late 1890s continued to have unfavourable repercussions into the second half of the twentieth century.

Fabundeh was known at different times as Mahawai, Paramount Chief, and Ndoomahc, but in a sense his own identity as continuing local leader was of more importance than changes in vocabulary: certainly there was no precise difference of meaning in the words. None the less, in the Mende language Ndoomahc replaced Mahawai in general use early in the twentieth century (96). The introduction of 'Ndoomahc' represented an attempt by the Mendelecisia to accommodate little-understood English ideas of political rule, while the use of 'Paramount Chief' represented an attempt by the British to accommodate little-understood Mende ideas of political rule. The two terms - Ndoomahc and Paramount Chief - were not nearly synonymous, though the one was used as a translation of the other. Both terms were artificial inventions in their respective languages. The common element was that they both denoted a mahava whose position had been altered by the colonial rulers in a way which the British themselves failed to recognize and which the Mandelecisia could not define. The meaning attached to both terms also varied according to time, place and character (97). The parallel substitution in the Kissi language of Masa-Kolcivo for Masa-Chowo (98) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries tends to confirm that the replacement of Mahawai by Ndoomahc did not simply by coincidence occur at the same time as the British were establishing their
local administration. Rather, the terminological change was in fact a consequence of the alteration in the position of the local ruler which the British made (99). And this terminological change provides a means of understanding many of the problems which developed in Luawa in the next sixty years (100). Even post-1961 local politics cannot be well understood without a realization of the way in which the British altered the role of the local ruler in the years after 1896 (101).
T.J. Alldridge visited Kailahun in 1908 after an absence of fourteen years (102). Eager as he was to collect evidence of improvement since his last visit (103), the retired British official could not discover any great socio-economic change in the Luawa area (104). He did note that Kailahun was no longer surrounded by war fences, and that the cluster of separate towns which had existed in Kailondo's day had now merged into one (105). There was also a meat market in the centre of the town (106); and as in Kailondo's day, Kailahun remained a "centre for surrounding countries". Kono, Gbande and other peoples were to be met with in the town as well as the Kissia and Mendeblaisia, the Mende language being the lingua franca (107). Yet what most struck Alldridge in Kailahun was the absence of those signs of 'transformation' which he had noticed in settlements along the railway line (103). "I found that a good deal of trading was going on there, but it differed in some respects from what I had seen along the railway route", reported the somewhat-disappointed British traveller. "As soon as I entered the town I felt the difference of its surroundings, especially in the absence of European traders; although in a small way European goods were brought across the frontier from Bailima, about twenty-four miles distant, upon which duty had to be paid to the Liberian Commissioner located in his quarters just outside the town" (109). In this statement, Alldridge unwittingly exemplifies the main axiom concerning socio-economic change in Ko-Mende during the colonial period: namely, where there was a nearby railway or road, some changes were apparent; but where there was no road or railway, everyday life of ordinary people was little affected (110).
The ex-Travelling Commissioner, however, noted one socio-economic change without realizing its economic significance. This change was "that very few imported articles find their way up here from the Liberian coast-line, everything apparently coming through the Sierra Leone Protectorate and so on from the railway terminus at Baiima" (111). Oral traditions concerning the 1880s, and Alldridge's own reports in the early 1890s, indicated that Luawa's external trade-routes were then either south to Sherbro, the Moa estuary, or the Loffa-St. Paul River estuaries (112); or alternatively, north to the Western Sudan (113). By 1908, the volume of Luawa's external trade had not greatly increased, but its direction had changed (114). The trade route from Kisi country to the coast still passed through Kailahun and continued across Luawa in a south-westerly direction (115), but on reaching Pendembu, it no longer followed the Moa valley south-south-west to the coast (116). Instead, the main trade route now passed along the road to Baiima, whence the railway carried exports due west to reach the coast at Freetown. Likewise, imports now came almost exclusively from the Freetown Colony, up the railway-line and through the terminus at Baiima (117). Some Luawa people still walked down to the coast at Lavanna, Mano Salija and Sulima in Chief Fabundeh's reign as they had under Kailondo, carrying hampers of produce on their backs (118), but as the railway was extended to Pendembu, this clearly became an unnecessary exercise. At the time Alldridge visited Kailahun in 1903, the railway-line was being extended to Pendembu, which became the terminus later in the same year (119), seven miles closer to Kailahun than Baiima (120).

As in the early 1890s, so in 1908 in Luawa, salt was still a chief import, being "brought from Baiima in 40lb. bags, a native carrying, if for himself, three of these bags as a load."
When this salt is brought into Kanre-Lahun for transport further on, it is repacked into cylindrical palm-leaf bundles weighing about eight pounds each, and then a quantity of these bundles are packed into the ordinary palm-leaf hamper" (121). The sale of guns and gunpowder, which Alldridge had noted as the other chief imports in the early 1890s, had apparently ceased in Kailahun by 1908 (122), but firearms were still freely available immediately to the east of Luawa. Le Mesurier described in 1909 how the local people around Foya (or Fuya) in Kissi Tengea were "armed with flint locks and cap guns, and obtain a plentiful supply of powder from Monrovia" (123) - as they had been accustomed to doing since at least the 1830s (124).

A report from British officials in 1907 (125) suggested rather more external trade was taking place with reference to Luawa than Alldridge described. "Large quantities of cottons, tobacco, trade spirits, and salt flow from Baiima the railhead towards Kanre Lahun and the northern Liberian territories", commented W.J. Lamont (126). "A counter stream of produce consisting chiefly of palm kernels and rubber sets steadily along from Liberia to rail-head" (127). There may, however, have been some exaggeration in such reports. Between July and December 1905, only 60 tons of palm kernels and 9 hundredweights of rubber were railed from Baiima, not all of which would have come from the Luawa area (129).

From 1908 onwards, there was a steady growth in Luawa's 'external trade'. The virtual removal of Liberian influence in that year (129), at least from the Kailahun area (130), meant the establishing of more settled political conditions favourable to the development of trade. The extension of the railway line to Pendembu meant that the terminus was now only one day's journey from Kailahun instead of two (131),
Moreover, the journey from Kailahun to Pendembu was made slightly easier by the widening and improving of the existing road (132). By 1908, this road was "cleaned and grubbed for a width of 33 feet", with a formed roadway 12 feet wide" (133). "Stick bridges over all water" were noted in 1911 (134). The official annexation of the 'Kailahun salient' by Britain in 1911 (135) meant that from 1912 onwards (when tax was first collected from the whole of Luawa (136) ) every householder was compelled to pay five shillings every year as tax; and virtually the only way in which the ordinary people could acquire money was through the sale of cash crops (137).

However, the extent to which Luawa's trade increased between 1908 and 1912 should not be exaggerated, nor should the social impact of the increase. Before 1912, only the people in 'British Luawa' (which represented but a small part of Kailondo's polity) were expected to pay the British House Tax (138). One bushel of palm kernels could be sold at this time for five shillings in Pendembu (139), so each household could meet tax requirements by producing just one bag of palm kernels annually. Palm trees existed in profusion in Luawa (140) and the technique of preparing the kernels was already known (141), so the production of one bag of kernels annually did not result in noticeable economic innovation or social stress (142). Most ordinary people had little incentive to produce more palm kernels than would provide enough cash to pay their annual House Tax; they had little need of the cheap cloth and trinkets which came up the railway-line from Freetown (143). The report of the Liberian Commissioner Lomax showed in 1909 how limited long-distance trade was in Luawa. "Cotton goods, gin & Rum, pots, Kerosene, soap and beads are the principal European commodities imported into the district from
Sierra Leone via BÂIMA which are sold mostly for cash. The principal exports are palm kernels & Cattle, but most of the later [sic., latter] remains in Kanre Lahun" (144). No new cash crops were introduced into Luawa during the first two decades of the twentieth century (145), the ordinary people continuing to depend on the sale of existing palm produce—oil and kernels (146). Thus, while British officials marvelled at the increase in Government revenue which resulted from the ever-growing volume of palm produce flowing down the railway line after 1903 (147), most people in Luawa were little affected in their everyday life by this development (148).

In one interesting detail, however, the Kissia responded to the arrival of the railway line at Pendembu. They began the habit of joining together in groups to head-load kernels down to the terminus (149) — a journey of some thirty miles from, say, Dia in KMMI Kama. Jimmi Kokoma, who spoke the Mende language and some Krio, often led such groups from KMMI Kama (150). Later, when the Kailahun-Pendembu road was being made motorable in 1915, it was noted that the Kissia "and others from some distance up Country, when stopping for the night do not go into the Mendi towns but make their fires and camp along the road; this was done to such an extent that it was necessary to provide some open spaces for their use in order to prevent the road surfaces being continually covered with ashes. Small areas of bush have now been cleared in various places near the Rivers to form halting places and have proved quite a success" (151).

Far more important to the ordinary people of Luawa than the annual demand to produce a bag of palm kernels was the political unsettlement which disturbed the area from the accession of Fabundeh until well into the second decade of the twentieth century (152). The economic
consequences of this unsettlement were indicated by the District Commissioner at Panguma in mid-1903: "There is practically no trade in Panguma District except in tobacco, cotton goods and spirits. The trade in native produce which used to come from Liberia is quite destroyed owing to the hostile attitude of the Kissi tribe. Several traders have lately left Panguma and are establishing stores at Bo" (153). The British occupation of Wunde in 1905 no doubt encouraged trade, but in the Luawa area the confusion created by the 'Lomax affair' in 1907 (154) offset this improvement, at least temporarily.

The decline in the size of Kailahun town during the first decade of the twentieth century is clear evidence of how deeply Luawa's ordinary people were affected by the political unrest: so badly were they disturbed that they were prepared to leave their homes in the town and start a new life elsewhere (155). Far from experiencing socio-economic 'improvement' (156), a developed urban community, one of the largest settlements in Ko-Mende (157), began to break up. In 1890, when Alldridge first visited Kailahun, he counted 482 houses altogether (158), with perhaps two thousand people living there (159). In 1911, there were only 250 houses (160), and perhaps a few more than one thousand people (161). This decline was not easily arrested, and in 1918 there were only 179 houses (162), with perhaps eight hundred people (163). It was only in the 1930s that Kailahun recovered from this setback to its development (164). This decline of Kailahun during and after Fabundeh's reign resulted from a reduction in the status of the Luawa Chief (165), military activity in the area (166), uncertainty about international boundaries (167), and the harassment of traders and residents by Liberian officials in 1907 and 1908 (168). If the assumption is accepted that whatever happened in Kailahun was usually
reflected at a less intense level in the rest of Luawa (169), then by 1912 there had been little beneficial socio-economic change in the polity since 1896; and rather, in some respects, deterioration.

Yet by the end of Fabundeh's reign, some new elements had entered Luawa society as a result of the British occupation, even though those elements had not made a great impact. The British military presence had slowly increased in Kailahun since the appearance of the first Frontier Police in 1891 (170), until by 1906 there was a full Company of soldiers garrisoning Kailahun and the surrounding area, with a white Officer resident in Kailahun (171). The people of Kailahun town, if not of Luawa generally, thus had opportunity to view at fairly close quarters a 'semi-European' way of life (172), and to examine its material paraphernalia in terms of housing and furnishing, food and clothing, daily routine and cash trading (173). Some townspeople must have benefitted financially through petty trading with the soldiers. Young Momoh Banya (later to become Paramount Chief of Luawa) was, during Fabundeh's mahayci, a frequent visitor to the British barracks (174), where he gained a fair knowledge of the English language (175). Presumably he was representative of many other young men who were less politically important.

Another new group of people who arrived in Luawa at this time were the Creole (or 'creolized' (176)) traders. They penetrated not only as far as Kailahun, but also into the Kissi areas further east. By about 1908, a "Creole-man" was living at Sandia, a Kissi village about ten miles north-east of Buedu (177). In 1907, when Liberian soldiers caused a disturbance in Kissi Kama near Dia town, the witnesses who were in the area at the time included "Lamina Kamara, a British subject, a Trader of Daru", Musa, an inhabitant of Kanre Lahun, Trader", and "Mohammed, a Trader of
Freetown" (178). There was still, however, no large trading store in any of the villages of British Luawa by 1908 (179). D.C. Maxwell attempted an explanation of this: "The natives find it better for them to bring their produce to the Railway and there is in consequence less encouragement for the small trader to settle in outlying parts of the District. He now finds it more profitable to take out one or more hawkers licences and to seek for trade by visiting a number of towns" (180). Thus, in the year 1908, a Creole (?) trader from Baiima, named S.T. Garlough, sent his "labourers" to sell goods at various towns in British Luawa such as Ngiehun and Baoma (181). The amount of trading these outsiders did in Luawa may have made less impact at this time than the simple fact of their presence in the area as black representatives of a different way of life.

Not only did 'strangers' come in to Luawa at this period. It also became possible for some few individuals from Luawa (mainly members of the politically powerful families of the polity) to travel all the way from Kailahun to Freetown. This had happened, it is true, to a limited extent during Kailondo's reign, with traders going from Luawa to the coast (182), and emissaries being despatched to Freetown (183). But these individuals had gone for a specific purpose and for a limited time. With the arrival of the railway at Pendembu, it became possible for wealthy citizens of Luawa (184) to travel down to the coastal capital, taking with them great expectations of self-improvement and remunerative work. Maada James Kailondo, a son of Fabundoh's predecessor, may have been one of the first to go (185).

However, by 1912, only a negligibly small number of Luawa people had made any significant contact with the way of life either of the Freetown Creoles or the new British rulers. In their basic daily
routine, most ordinary people of Luawa had hardly been affected by the imposition of British rule, although people near to Kailahun may have begun to experience the impact of two new imports - kerosene and matches (186). When a resident of Mano-Sewalu brought an Aladdin lamp into Kissi country, people came from miles around to see "the fire in a bottle" (187). Together, kerosene and matches provided the means for easier cooking, and also the possibility of lighting after nightfall (188).
When Major Le Mesurier was installed as District Commissioner over the Luawa area in March 1911 (190), he became part of a colonial administration which by that time was operating in other areas of the Protectorate within quite clear guidelines (191). British local administration as established in Luava did not differ basically from that which was already operating in the rest of the Protectorate (192). And the outlines of that local administration remained largely unchanged until 1937 (193).

Originally, in 1896, the Protectorate had been divided into five Districts, each under a British District Commissioner (194), but in 1906 (195) there had been a rearrangement of the Districts, increasing their number to six (196). All the country eastwards from Bo through which the railway line ran was placed in one large district known as Railway District (197), with its headquarters at Kenema; and until 1913 its substantive D.C. was J.C. Maxwell (198). Thereafter the British official whose name was most associated with Railway District was W.D. Bowden (199). When the whole of Luawa officially became part of the British Protectorate in 1911, it was attached to Railway District (200).

In 1920 there was a further rearrangement of Districts which greatly increased numbers; and three Provinces were superimposed on the Districts, each Province being under the control of a Provincial Commissioner (201). Luawa became part of Pendembu District, which assumed roughly the same shape as present-day Kailahun District (202). N.C. Hollins (203) became substantive D.C. of the new District, and remained so for the next decade (204). He was under the Commissioner of Central Province,
W. D. Bowden (205), who had his provincial headquarters at Kenema (206). Pendembu was chosen as District Headquarters presumably because it was the terminus of the railway line, a communications centre and a trading entrepot (207). It proved, however, a rather unhealthy place because of the large amount of surrounding swampland (208). Kailahun, after its temporary decline in the first decades of the twentieth century, became under P. C. Momoh Banya (209) once again the largest and most important town in the district, as it had been under Kailondo (210). So in 1929, District Headquarters was moved from Pendembu to Kailahun (211).

The complicated adjustment of administrative boundaries did not greatly affect the ordinary people of Luawa, except that as Districts grew smaller, the people probably saw a little more of British administrators (212). But the main point for the ordinary people was not the shape of the District, but rather the presence - and the personality (213) - of the District Commissioner. The 'D.C.' was the 'kingpin' of British local administration, and for the local Paramount Chiefs he was a considerably more important figure than the Governor in Freetown (214). In any discussion of District Commissioners and British colonial officials in Sierra Leone generally, it must be borne in mind that throughout the period, the country retained its reputation as 'the White Man's Grave' (215). Able administrators would not readily volunteer for service there, and mediocrity (in terms of ability, character and readiness for hard work (216)) was not uncommon among D.C.s. A contemporary British official noted that "the sort of officers, who came out in 1910 were all half dead with drink, when they started and got worse when they arrived" (217). This, however, is an exaggeration, and the first Confidential Standing Instruction to D.C.s, issued in 1909 (218), commented
on the "successful manner in which District Commissioners have controlled
the administration of the Protectorate" (219). Even so, a generation
later there were still many villagers who had never seen a D.C. or any
other British official. "During my journey through eastern Kailahun
[i.e. Kissi country]," observed the anthropologist Dr. Eberl-Elber
in 1939, "I was at first surprised to find that, although the most distant
villages are only about twenty-five miles away from District Headquarters,
many of the native people had never before seen a European" (220).

British local administration revolved around the
relationship of the British District Commissioner with the local Paramount
Chief, and the Standing Instruction of 1909 set out to explain the authority
of District Commissioners over Chiefs (221). In fact, the contents of the
Standing Instruction clearly demonstrated the theoretically impossible
position in which the local D.C. was placed. "The general principle
underlying the government of the Protectorate is that the administration
of the Protectorate Chiefdoms is left in the hands of Paramount Chiefs ....
The Government have also imposed by Ordinance certain laws upon the
inhabitants of the Protectorate, e.g. the House Tax Law, that part of the
criminal law which deprives the Chiefs of the power to hear and determine
serious charges, etc. District Commissioners as representatives of the
Government are consequently entrusted with the duty of making the natives
comply with the Government orders" (222). How could a D.C. possibly leave
administration in the hands of the Chief when he was clearly instructed to
intervene in matters of law and revenue, which were the central concerns of
a Chief's administration (223)? The Standing Instruction went on to make
the D.C.'s dilemma even more explicit. District Commissioners were to
induce Chiefs to carry out Government policy "by giving the Chiefs advice
with respect to such policy instead or 'ordering' the Chiefs in peremp-
tory manner, to comply forthwith with the orders of the Government. It
is obvious, however, that there are cases in which a District Commissioner
is bound to give definite, precise orders to natives in the Protectorate" (224). The D.C., then, was instructed in general to refrain from
ordering Chiefs, yet was told that in certain unspecified instances he
must order them. The P.C., for his part, was supposed to carry on ruling
his people as though he was sovereign, yet at any moment he might be counter-
manded by the British Commissioner. Since Government Instructions were so
contradictory, each D.C. developed for himself a working compromise,
depending on his own views and personality (225); but as a result, a P.C.
could never be sure when, or on what matters, his own instructions might
be overruled by the D.C. (226). In 1925, the Sierra Leone Assistant
Colonial Secretary stated that the D.C. was "at once the support of the
recognized native authority, the upholder of its prestige, and the protector
of the poor against oppression by their rulers" (227). On many matters, it
was impossible to foretell whether a particular D.C. would assume the role
of 'upholder of a P.C.'s prestige' (228) or would become the 'protector
of the poor' against the P.C.

The whole contradictory position of the D.C. was
reflected in the anomalous position which the Standing Instruction gave
to the D.C.'s executive arm, the Court Messenger Force. If Government
placed the D.C. in a theoretically impossible position, it was only to
be expected that the position of his Court Messengers would lack clear
definition. "The force of Court Messengers", the D.C.s were informed,
"is not intended to be an armed force. The utmost that Court Messengers
are expected to do in this direction is to suppress brawling, or to assist
(when so ordered by the District Commissioner) the Paramount Chief or Subchiefs to carry out orders made by such Chiefs. If a Paramount Chief refuses to comply with an order in spite of having been urged by brother Paramount Chiefs to comply with the order, there is no great risk in employing Court Messengers to enforce the order .... if the Paramount Chief appears to be supported by a considerable section of people in his Chiefdom, it is better not to attempt to enforce the order by means of the Court Messengers" (229). Thus, what the C.M.F. must and must not do was defined in the vaguest language; and in between the two poles of what was forbidden and what was required, there was a vast range of possible work which the Court Messengers might be asked to do at the D.C.'s discretion (230). The 1907 Ordinance, which constituted the Court Messenger Force, gave legal recognition to the fact that, in addition to duties normally "performed by a Civil Police Force", the C.M.F. could be employed in "assisting in such manner as may be required by lawful authority in the administration of the district" (231). The Court Messengers were "the District Commissioner's eyes, ears and fingers" (232), and a new D.C. with little knowledge of the local language was almost completely dependent upon them in his relations with Chief and people, for information, interpretation, and the carrying out of his orders (233).

The position of the C.M.F. was crucial to British local administration, because if the ordinary people of the Luawa area came into contact with colonial authority, it was not with the D.C. directly, but with the Court Messengers (234). And the indefiniteness of their 'constitutional' position meant that the Court Messengers could, if they felt so inclined, play an important role in local politics (235), and could lord it over the local people. The complete dependence of the D.C.
upon them in many ways, enhanced the power of both the Messengers over the local people, at the expense of the direct power of both the D.C. and the Paramount Chief. The Court Messengers were not "the chief's local agents", and they certainly did not "carry out his direct commands" (236). From the viewpoint of the ordinary people of Luawa, the central fact about the C.M.F. was precisely that they were not the agents of any local official at all except the white D.C., whose opinion they were in a position to manipulate. The ordinary people could gain access to the D.C. only through the help of the Court Messengers, and once in the D.C.'s Office, the average village farmer was still dependent on a Messenger to interpret for him (237).

If the village farmer strictly kept himself to the annual routine of his everyday life, then the town chief and the Paramount Chief would represent for him legal and political power (238), and he probably saw little of the Court Messengers. But if, for any reason, he had to have contact with the colonial authorities, it was essentially the Court Messengers with whom he had to deal. "There is hardly a Protectorate pie, in which the 'C.M.' thumb is not deeply embedded", was the conclusion of one D.C. (239). The present writer has discovered little evidence about how far the Court Messengers used, or abused, their unique position. The impression gained is that, though they were not the honest, naively "loyal disciplined" corps of D.C.'s imaginations (240), yet they did not generally misuse the power of their position to the extent they easily could have done.

Apart from performing police, messenger and guard duties for the D.C., both at headquarters and when the D.C. was "on patrol" (241), there was a multiplicity of other work. "Should a disturbance be
reported a 'C.M.' is sent to see about it, or as many as two, if the trouble is serious. The sight of the uniform usually checks the froward.

Complaints of injustice at the hands of the native authorities are often first probed by a member of the Force.

Should a murder, a suspicious death, a serious assault or theft occur a 'C.M.' proceeds at all convenient speed.

Should it be suspected that a village has made a short payment of house tax, the houses are counted in the presence of the headman by a representative of the Chief and a 'C.M.'

When smallpox appears, men of the Force see to the isolation of contacts and cases.

Should a native town require rebuilding after a fire, a 'C.M.' will be sent to help and give his own trim barracks as a model for the 'lay out'.

A 'C.M.' will aid in the building of native bridges and culverts, in the making of improved latrines and incinerators, the clearing of a cemetery or the erection of a resthouse.

The first request to the 'D.C.' by an engineer sent to make a motorable road is for one or more of his men to stop brawls among the labourers and for liaison with the chiefs.

When an inter-chiefdom boundary is 'jumped', a 'C.M.' soon arrives to collect facts and restrain the over-enterprising.

The men are also used to show the natives how to plant new crops, such as cocoa, and improved ways of growing old ones such as swamp rice and ginger.

They inspect motor and trading licences and keep an eye lifting for unlawful firearms. They collect intelligence and road reports.
A considerable part of their time is spent in the execution of distress warrants. A 'C.M.' is usually attached to officials travelling in the Protectorate to act as guide and interpreter, to explain his mission and take care of his baggage.

The District Medical Officer often borrows an orderly, who attends when out-patients are seen and has a useful chance to pick up a knowledge of the cleansing and bandaging of wounds. This list of C.M.F. duties was provided by Mr. N.C. Hollins, who was in the Sierra Leone Protectorate from 1910 to 1936, and who, as already mentioned, was substantive D.C. of Pendembu District throughout the 1920s. The list is valuable in showing how, through the Court Messengers' activities, the D.C.'s daily work might affect the ordinary people of Luawa. But although this list is comprehensive, it fails to indicate that by far the largest part of the daily work of both the D.C. and the C.M.F. involved the administration of justice.

From the very beginning of the Protectorate, the legal powers of the D.C. had been considered one of the most important aspects of his control over the Chiefs and their people. The Ordinances establishing the Protectorate and early accounts of a D.C.'s work give considerable space to the work of the Commissioner's Court and its jurisdiction. It was taken so much for granted that the greater part of a D.C.'s work would involve court cases, that until the late 1920s, Native Affairs Minute Papers were all printed in a form convenient to summarizing a legal dispute. The word "COMPLAINT" appeared at the head of the form, with a space for an entry; and the word "VERSUS" was also printed, with spaces for the names of the plaintiff and defendant. When the D.C. used 'N.A.M.P.s' for a
purpose other than a legal case, he had first to cross out the printed words. Judging from the Kailahun District Office Archives, the majority of cases brought before the D.C. in the first three decades of the twentieth century concerned either land disputes or 'women palavers' (250).

Petty lawsuits took up most time in the D.C.'s daily routine (251); the major annual event in the D.C.'s life was the tax collection. After the settling of litigation, most of the surviving files from the colonial period in the Kailahun District Office Archives concerned the House Tax (252). In 1912, the first year when House Tax was collected from the whole of Luawa, £2,577 - 5s. was realized (253), "more than double the next largest tax taken in the District" (254), and probably the largest amount for any Chiefdom in the Protectorate (255).

The fragmentation of Luawa into four smaller Chiefdoms makes it difficult to give comparative figures for later years (256), but in 1922 the grand total was £2,677 - 15s.: £1,269 - 15s. from the now-reduced Luawa Chiefdom; £369 - 5s. from Kissi Kama; £523 - 10s. from Kissi Teng; and £515 - 5s. from Kissi Tungi (257). 'Kailondo's Luawa' was divided into these four smaller units in 1919 (258).

The method of collecting the five shillings House Tax annually from every house in the Chiefdom was described by D.C. Maxwell in 1903: "The tax for each chiefdom was collected in the principal town of that chiefdom, each headman paying directly to the District Commissioner in the presence of his Paramount Chief & being given his own receipt. This is an improvement on the system of collecting through the Chief. It prevents an unscrupulous Chief keeping back some of the hut tax he had collected" (259). This system continued to operate for a generation, through into the 1940s, as was shown by F.E.J. Tengbe's description of tax collection in
Kailahun District in 1942. (Mr. Tengbe was at this time Chiefdom Clerk of Bandajuma Yawei Chiefdom.) He received a latter "from the D.C. Kailahun announcing the date of his coming into Bandajuma [headquarter town of Bandajuma Yawei Chiefdom] to come for Chiefdom Tax [which included the House Tax (260)]. When the time came, he came in. He arrived about 5 o'clock noon and he was tired and he warned the chief that the Chiefdom Tax would be collected the following day, so he should send to the whole chiefdom to be in and not to [be] late at all ....

The next morning we went into the Court-Barri for Tax-Collection. Every Village-Head and Town-Head came into Bandajuma with their taxes. The D.C. came in, who was in the person of Mr. D. Cox, Senior D.C. of Kailahun. In two hours time the whole tax was collected correctly, and everything agreed with my books, and the D.C. was pleased .... The D.C. heard complaints after Tax, and went to his rest-house" (261).

Although many British officials did not realize it until the 1950s, their system of tax-collection could easily be used to place heavy extra demands upon the ordinary villagers, over and above the official tax (262). The weakness in the system was the method of assessing the towns and villages of the Chiefdom for tax. The Chiefdom Clerk would go round with such officials as "the Chiefdom Speaker, two Chiefdom Messengers [263] and other members of the Tribal Authorities [264], who were representing the P.C." (265). "During this time", noted one Chiefdom Clerk, "I had nice presents from people, rice, meat and cash as well" (266).

The Chiefdom Clerk sometimes gained a position of considerable power in the Chiefdom administration generally (especially where the P.C. was illiterate [267]), and had "many good chances of
getting free gifts" (268), in addition to the opportunities which presented themselves at tax-collection time in particular. All this was over and above the Clerk's regular salary of, perhaps, £2 per month (269). As the century progressed, a venal attitude to office seemed to become more common among Chiefdom officials (270). In many Chiefdoms, venality affected even the Chief himself: oral tradition suggests that this was one of the characteristics of P.C. Bockarie Bundeh (Fabundeh's son and successor) which led to his deposition (271). This was not surprising because, on the one hand, the British colonial authorities viewed with suspicion and mistrust a strong Chief who showed initiative and foresight in seeking the public good of his people; the British wanted no rivals. On the other hand, the British Government had "greatly strengthened the position of Chiefs of very average capacity and has rendered the office more secure and attractive" (272). In pre-colonial days, even a strong Mahal like Kailondo had been aware of the dangers of assassination and rebellion, and defeat by external enemies (273), and had thus been encouraged to pay attention to the needs and desires of his subjects. Bockarie Bundeh was presented with none of these dangers which had faced Kailondo, and therefore Fabundeh's son was quite insensitive to 'public opinion' within Luawa: he simply concentrated on 'feathering his own nest'. In the end he was deposed because he went too far, but many other Chiefs of similar character were politically astute enough to stop short of behaviour which would cause their dismissal (274).

A Chief could impose heavy burdens on his people by extending and abusing his rights to "traditional communal labour" (275) and "voluntary customary presents" (276). The Government accepted that he should receive both of these as recognized perquisites of office.
The former included mending roads and bridges, building and mending the Chief's house and compound, carrying his loads when he travelled, making his farms for him, and also making him a special manja farm (277). The Chief was supposed to use the rice from this manja farm for entertaining strangers, feeding destitute persons, and providing any similar public service on behalf of the whole Chiefdom (278). Customary presents included annual tribute, voluntary gifts, and "levies on special occasions, as for example on a Governor's visit to the chiefdom, or a Chief's visit to Provincial headquarters, or when a boundary is being settled" (279).

In addition, "Court fees and fines are shared by the Chief and his advisers (assessors)" (280). The P.C. also received from the Government a House Tax rebate of 5% or threepence on every five-shilling house tax paid (281). In the case of the P.C. of a large Chiefdom like Luawa, the Chief's salary from all these sources together could be enormous (282), and it was not difficult for him to find semi-legal ways of increasing it.

The opportunities for a Chief to enlarge his personal gains from the Chiefdom were increased in the 1920s by Government approved agreements between Chief and people for the commutation of labour-service into annual cash payments (283). For example, in 1925 D.C. Hollins approved three similar tax agreements in the three Kissi Chiefdoms (284), by which the "Tribal Authority" agreed that the P.C. would "receive each year one shilling from each house at tax time and one bushel of clean rice from each farm at harvest time.

In return the Paramount Chief will not have a 'Manja' farm made for him and will himself pay the wages of the Chiefdom 'clerk' and the Bo School fees of his sons and will not make any other levy on the Chiefdom without the consent of the tribal Authority" (285).
In fact these tax agreements simply provided an excuse for Chiefs to increase their demands upon their people. The extra shilling for the Chiefs was collected annually along with the five-shilling house tax, but the Chiefs continued to demand from their people those perquisites of office which they were supposed to have given up by the terms of the agreement. By 1930, the D.C. had been compelled to hold an enquiry into the conduct of P.C. Bundor Bere of Kissi Kama, partly because he had failed to keep the tax agreement (286). In Kissi Teng, P.C. Musa Bandabilla had been making unlawful manja farms (287), and P.C. Fatorma of Kissi Tungi likewise "had an unlawful manja farm made in 1929" (288).

The Chiefs were not the only people to place heavy demands on the ordinary people. British officials could call on men to make and mend motor roads, build and mend houses in Government stations, and carry loads (289). "Until the end of 1935, the roads were maintained by forced unpaid labour at the rate of 2½ men per mile, though in practice this rate was never achieved and the average rate was slightly under 2 men per mile, with youths sometimes predominating.

To the great pleasure both of natives, political officers and Public Works Department this system was abolished at the end of 1935 and from January 1st, 1936, the roads were maintained by voluntary paid labour at the rate of one man per mile" (290). Up to the mid-1930s, then, the amount of 'free labour' which an energetic and 'co-operative' Chief might provide for the D.C. and departmental officials (291) was enormous. P.C. Momoh Banya, Chief of Luawa from 1924 until 1942, commonly supplied vast numbers of unpaid labourers for work on Government projects. This is implied in a letter from the local D.C. to the Executive Engineer at Bo in 1928: "Paramount Chief Momoh Banya tells me that he can supply
all the paid labourers needed for the new District Headquarters at Kailahun. I should be glad therefore, if you would apply to him in future for such labour, as in view of the amount of free labour he is supplying, he feels that his people should be given preference in the case of paid labour" (292). Even when labour was supposed to be paid, the actual labourers often never saw any cash (293). Although Kailahun District Headquarters was built in the late 1920s (294) with, supposedly, paid labour, the testimony of those who were in Kailahun at that time was that the labourers never received any payment (295). Thus were built the D.C.'s house, the Court House, District Offices and Court Messengers' quarters (296). It seems that the British officials paid the headmen or the Chief the sum of ninepence per labourer per day (297), but this was never passed on to the labourers themselves. Moreover, it seems that P.C. Banya provided altogether a much larger supply of labour than that for which he was paid. In the next section of this chapter, examples are given of how British officials also used a large amount of forced, unpaid labour for road-development in the Luawa area (298).

'Government by strangers', however well-intentioned or beneficial in results, is rarely appreciated by the governed. "I suppose", wrote Governor Cardew in a moment of clear vision, "subject races are very rarely truly loyal to an alien Government" (299). The people who lost most, politically, under British rule were the Mahangeisia, but eventually they found means of compensating themselves, as individuals, in the economic sphere (300). The ordinary people of Luawa lost less through the imposition of British rule, and in most ways their daily routine was little affected. Yet slowly they were burdened with increasing demands on their time, energy and material resources, imposed both by the P.C. and his
BRITISH COLONIAL OFFICIALS AT THE MOA BARRACKS, DARU
ON THE OCCASION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE COLOURS TO THE
WEST AFRICAN FRONTIER FORCE, MAY 1922 (?)

Officials shown in the photograph are, from left to right:

R.S.M., Staff. Sgt. Winward
- 
- 
J.C. Thompson (Private Secretary to the Governor)
Capt. Milne Hume (? Staff Officer to the Inspector General)
Col. Heywood, Inspector General of the W.A.F.F.
Mrs. N.C. Hollins
Mrs. Addison
Lt. N. McIvor (Adjutant)
Lt. R.M. Hall (?)
Mrs. A.R. Slater
Capt. J.S. Hopkins
- 
H.E. Sir A. Ransford Slater, Governor of Sierra Leone
Lt. S.H. Cave
Dr. R. Jackson, W.A.M.S.
Capt. May
Lt. Col. A.N. Ogilvie (O.C. S.L. Bn., W.A.F.F.)
Lt. Duke
Major R.M. Baynes
- 
W.A. Addison (Ag. Provincial Commissioner, Central Province)
Lt. Salter (?)
V.F. de Lisle (Principal, Bo School)
- 
N.C. Hollins (Commissioner, Pendembu District)
BRITISH COLONIAL OFFICIALS AT THE MOA BARRACKS, DARU

(May 1922 ?)
sub-chiefs, by the D.C. and his white colleagues. And the majority of the ordinary people received in return little by way of compensation.
4. THE ROADS TO KAILAHUN, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1912 TO 1931.

As has been mentioned earlier when dealing with socio-economic development in the Luawa area, dates are not easily found within which to contain the discussion (301); development tends to 'spill over' on either side of whatever dates are chosen. However, the year 1912 is a key date in that by then British local administration had just been established in the whole of the Luawa area, and the reign of a new Paramount Chief had just begun (302). Likewise, 1931 provides a meaningful and convenient terminal date. By 1931, the world economic depression had so affected commerce in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms (303) that, in some respects, a new economic situation was beginning to arise in the area. 1931 was also the publication date of the first detailed census information about the Kailahun area (304), which gave some indication of the state of socio-economic development. Moreover, 1931 saw the end of two decades of formal British rule in the area.

Since the days of Kailondo there had been a recognised road from Kailahun to Pendembu (305) - and possibly it had existed long before that (306). In the reigns of both Kailondo and Fabundeh it had been widened (307), and in 1914 work was begun to make it motorable (308). The first motor vehicle started running between Kailahun and Pendembu in 1917 (309). The 1915 Roads Report made it clear that the work between Kailahun and Pendembu did not involve the construction of a new road (though the reports of many other British officials would suggest this was the case): "The work consists of improving the lines and gradients of existing roads and the construction of permanent bridges of sufficient strength to carry any load likely to come upon them in future" (310).
Even so, this limited work demanded a huge expenditure of effort and manpower. For example, the heavy iron girders used in bridge-construction had to be dragged by gangs of local labourers from Pendembu to the bridging points (311). There were twelve bridges of 15 feet or longer to construct, including one of 35 feet and one of 40 feet (312). All the unskilled labour was provided free by the Chiefs of Luawa and Upper Bambara (313), and was supervised by Government gangers, with the Government also providing tools, skilled labour and materials required for the bridges (314). Although the unskilled labourers were paid nothing, they were fined if they were late to work at the beginning of the day (315), and flogged if they did not work hard enough (316).

"The average number of labourers", stated the official Report on the Kailahun-Pendembu road-works, "provided \( \sum \) each day by the Chiefs and engaged throughout the year \( \sum_{1915} \) has been about 550" (317). Presumably more than half of these labourers came from Luawa, which was by far the largest Chiefdom in the area (318). If the rule was kept that no one should work more than thirty days a year in unpaid labour for the Government (319), then altogether 6,600 men must have been involved in road construction during 1915. It may be roughly assumed that about 4,000 of those men were supplied by the Luawa Chief (320) and that the total population of Luawa at this time (after the separation of Kissi Chiefdom) was about 22,500 (321), of whom about 28% constituted the male working population (322). On this basis, about two-thirds of the male working population of Luawa were involved in forced labour on the Kailahun-Pendembu road for a thirty-day period sometime during the year 1915 (323). This estimate is, admittedly, fairly notional; but it gives some impression of the magnitude of the demand made on the people of Luawa.
By the end of 1916, all the earthworks on the road had been completed, but the road was not motorable because the War had held up supplies for four bridges (324). It was demonstrated during 1916 how dependent were the British officials on the co-operation of the Chiefs. In the first half of the year P.C. Bockarie Bundeh was deposed (325), the P.C. of Upper Bambara died (326), and as a result the average number of labourers supplied for road-work was reduced to an average of about 180 per day for January to July (327) - a reduction of about two-thirds on the previous year's daily average.

One of the expected results of making a motorable road to Kailahun was the arrival in the town of a number of foreign traders, for in up-country areas it was not so much that 'trade followed the flag' as that trade followed the roads and railways (328). Already by 1915, a European trader was established at Kailahun (329), and in 1918 a number of non-local "settlers" were listed as resident in Luawa: Nazib Mahaur (?), J.L. Cole, and J.W. Gabbidon in Kailahun; and A.B. Savage-Pratt in Sandialu (330). The first-named "settler" was almost certainly Lebanese (331), while the other three were probably Creoles from Freetown (332). Hassan Joseph (locally known as Lansana (333)) and Mr. Khalil (known as Gbandawa (334)) were among other Lebanese traders to settle in Kailahun before 1924 (335), together with at least one other Creole trader George Taylor (336).

By the time the Kailahun-Pendembu motor road was in service, in 1917, there were probably more Lebanese traders (locally known as "Syrians") than Creoles coming into the Luawa area. "During the last few years", noted W.D. Bowden in his Railway District Report for 1916, "a great increase in the number of Syrians settling in this District has taken place. Their advent has not been welcomed in all circles for they
are dangerous trade rivals, indefatigable in their work and frugal in their way of life. There has been more and more a tendency amongst them to make a temporarily home for themselves here and a very large number are accompanied by wife and children. Their standard of life though it may not be that of the better class European trader is by no means as low as it is attempted to paint it .... As a class they give very little trouble and are universally respectful and ready to listen to reason. None have as yet found their way into Government employ but it is quite possible that some of the minor positions of trust could with advantage be filled with them" (337). The only reason for 'foreigners' - Lebanese, Creole, or European - to settle in Luawa at this time was to do trading; buying kernels, and selling the same sort of goods as Alldridge had seen for sale at Baiima in 1908 (338).

Almost certainly the European who was mentioned as having settled in Kailahun by 1915 was R.G. Morton. He was the first person to put a motor vehicle on the Kailahun-Pendembu road (339). Maada James Kailondo recalled that Morton settled in Kailahun not only before any other European, but also before any Lebanese trader (340). He brought his wife and family with him (341), and in the late 1920s he opened another shop in Dodo-Cotuma, when the motor-road reached there (342). Also in the 1920s he took into partnership Mr. Metheringham, another European. By 1929 the printed heading at the top of their notepaper impressively - and accurately - described the scope of their business: Morton and Metheringham, African Merchants, Transport & Passenger Motor Service; Kailahun, also Pendembu, Giehun, Dodo (343). About 1930, Morton introduced on the Kailahun-Pendembu road the first charabanc (344): the opening of the Manowa ferry in that year (345) meant that the bus could travel not only to Pendembu but also on to
SCALE 1: 500,000

KEY

Boundaries of Kailahun District in 1932

Motorable roads in Kailahun District in 1932

Railway line

1915 Anglo-Liberian boundary

COMMUNICATIONS IN KAILAHUN DISTRICT IN THE EARLY 1930s.
Segbwema (346), crossing the River Moa at a point some seven miles west-north-west of Pendembu (347).

By about 1930, Rev. W.R.E. Clarke (who was then living in Kailahun) could recall a number of foreign traders who were resident in the District Headquarters town: Houri, a Swiss man, set up a shop near P.C. Banya's compound, as did the 'Syrian', Hassan Joseph (348); and there was at least one Creole with a shop. A German trader had also settled in Kailahun with his wife (349), presumably representing the German firm G.K.G. (350). At this time, in the early years of P.C. Banya's reign (351), many of the big European firms were opening depots in Kailahun - C.F.A.O., U.A.C., and G.B.O. (352). Apart from the traders, the only other foreigners resident in Luawa at this time were the District Commissioner and his wife; Rev. and Mrs. Clarke, who were Methodist missionaries; and a Public Works Department foreman, who was in charge of building a motorable road to Dodo-Cotuma (353).

All the traders living in Kailahun were, from 1929 onwards, severely affected by the great world-wide economic depression. Independent foreign traders, with only limited capital reserves were unable financially to cope with the crisis. Mr. Morton went Bankrupt, and he and his family had to be repatriated at Government expense as Distressed British Subjects (354). The depression did not, however, have such a serious effect on traders who were local Luawa people; several were developing a considerable business at this time, the most important being James Tangbe Combey of Ngiehun (355).

As for the ordinary people of Luawa, their geographical mobility was slightly increased by the development of motorable roads, together with the presence of the railhead at Pendembu, though most Luawa
FERRY OVER MOA RIVER, PENDEMBU-BUNUMBU ROAD.
people in fact made little or no use of this increased mobility and its importance must not be over-emphasized (356). Improved communications caused some expansion in the production of palm kernels, which was Luawa's sole significant cash-crop at this stage (357). The nature and amount of cash-crop production in the Kailahun area can be estimated fairly accurately by reference to the figures of the principal products carried by rail from Pendembu to Freetown (358); though unfortunately these figures are incomplete (359). Because of their comparatively large area, dense population, and geographical position, Luawa and Kissi country (360) were, together, almost certainly the source of most remaining up-country produce passing through the Pendembu railhead (361). In 1914, before the Kailahun-Pendembu road was motorable, 3,268 tons of palm kernels were railed from Pendembu and 106 tons of palm oil, the value of all this palm produce together amounting to £9,222. All the rest of the produce amounted to a total of only 60 tons and a value of £298, rice and kola nuts being the main constituents (362). The introduction of motor vehicles on the Kailahun-Pendembu road did not alter this basic pattern (363): the tonnage of palm kernels railed annually from Pendembu increased steadily until the economic collapse of 1929-1931, but the tonnages for all other produce remained petty, and no significant new crop or commodity made its appearance (364).

F.W.H. Migeod, a visiting British official (365), described commerce in the Luawa area in late 1924, and gave a similar impression to that conveyed by the figures of down-line produce sent from Pendembu. "Kailahun was a busy place and the trade in palm kernels was in full swing", he wrote. "Some are bought here and sent to Pendembu by lorry, but many of the Kissi who bring them prefer to carry them the remaining seventeen miles, a rise of sixpence over the price here making it worth their
while. Besides, if they wanted to buy anything there is a better assortment of goods at Pendembu. There was only one European trader at Kailahun, a Swiss [366]. This probably gives a reasonably accurate picture of the state of trade in the town at this time: a fair amount of buying and selling in a limited range of products and goods, but nothing which could be accurately described as an "Economic Revolution" (368).

A number of factors limited the impact on Kailahun of the opening of rail and road links with Freetown. Perhaps the main one was lack of an adequate number of motor vehicles on the road to connect with the railway system, and the frequent mechanical failure of those vehicles that were in service. In 1924, Migeod had to walk from Kailahun to Pendembu, taking just under five hours for the journey (369). Three years later (and a decade after the opening of the road as motorable), F.E.J. Tengbe's elder brother had planned to take him to Pendembu by lorry. "When we arrived in Kailahun", recorded the younger brother, "there was no lorry going to Pendembu, as the one lorry on that road has gone to Pendembu with palm kernels. This lorry runs once during the day, and twice in a week, as there was no lorry transport as it is now .... very late we were told that the lorry got broken on the road coming into Kailahun, and it would not come within four days time, as the damage done to it was very serious and heavy .... and my brother said that we should walk on foot to Pendembu" (370).

It was not surprising, therefore, that the amount of palm kernels railed from Pendembu did not increase nearly as dramatically as might have been expected after the completion of the motor road to Kailahun. In 1915, before the road was finished, 3,784 tons of palm kernels were railed from Pendembu (371): in 1918, after it was finished and after the arrival of Morton's first motor-vehicle, 3,814 tons were railed (372) - a negligible increase (373). Even in 1928, at the height of a trade boom, only 8,479 tons were railed (374).
Many writers have presumed that the construction of roads and the railway gave ordinary people the opportunity to travel much more freely over considerable distances (375). A few younger members of the wealthier families in Luava certainly seem to have taken advantage of this opportunity to travel to Bo, Freetown and elsewhere (376): but the majority of ordinary people had no such opportunity, principally because of the high cost of rail travel. In 1922, third-class passenger fares were 1½d. per mile, although later in that year they were reduced to 1d. per mile (377). In other words, in 1921 a third-class return ticket from Pendembu to Freetown cost about 57 shillings; and even in 1923 it cost about 38 shillings (378). Such high travel-costs were obviously prohibitive as far as most ordinary people were concerned, and in 1924, in a Report on Sierra Leone Railways, Colonel Hammond stated that the "bulk of the population living along the railway have never used it at all" (379). If this was true for ordinary people living on the railway line, it was certainly true for the people of Kailahun, living seventeen miles from the railhead; and many people in the Kisi Chiefdoms lived even further away, thirty miles or more being common (380). It is true that Kissa came regularly in large parties to Pendembu, head-loading their palm kernels to sell there (381). But having sold the kernels, they had no cause to travel any further, nor money even after their sales to waste on railway journeys.

Chief Fayia Jabba of Dia in Kisi Kama Chiefdom described how, when he was a young boy in the late 1920s and early 1930s, there was a Bambara-man (382) called Kulu Bali resident in the town (383). He was the only shop-owner in Dia at that time; and on several occasions, in order to save the expense of the train-fare, he walked all the way to Freetown (384). In the capital he bought such goods as cowries, necklaces,
and nails, which people could not buy in Dia. Less enterprising petty-traders walked only as far as Pendembu and bought goods from there to sell in Dia (385). But virtually no one used the railway.

Of more immediate significance to the Kissia than the railway was the decision to extend a motorable road from Kailahun into Kissi country. In 1927, a start was made on fitting the Kailahun-Dodo-Cotuma road for motor traffic, along with several other road projects. The real driving force behind these projects was P.C. Momoh Banya, who provided an immense amount of free labour. The amount of free labour given by the Luawa people was revealed in a minute made by Governor Slater during a visit to Kailahun in 1927. "P.C. Momo Banya has, on his own initiative, undertaken the widening [-to a width of sixteen feet (386)] of the Pendembu-Kailahun [road] - a work of considerable magnitude which, if I remember right, was estimated by the D.P.W. [387] to cost over £1000", reported the Governor. ".... He also got his people to make a motor road to the Bedu Agr. farm and Rest House (about 1/2 - 3/4 mile) and to clear and stump the 13 miles extension of the Pendembu-Kailan [sic.] road to Dodo with the result that much of the Liberian kernel trade is now coming through Kailan .... I consider these three sporting efforts - which saved Govt. much money - may well be rewarded by the dash [388] of a Ford lorry (with spares) and I wish the D.P.W. to purchase one and send it up to Pendembu for the Chief" (389).

For some months in 1927, a considerable proportion of the able-bodied men of Luawa and the three Kissi Chiefdoms were occupied in making the Kailahun-Dodo-Cotuma road. In August there were 1,000 men from Luawa working on the road (390), and a few months later over 300 men from the Kissi Chiefdoms (391). Yet, despite the great efforts being made,
as the work went on, P.C. Banya ceased to be satisfied with a motor road which went only to Dodo-Cotuma. Always eager for 'improvement', the Luawa Chief urged the Government to "consider the urgent necessity of extending the road towards the Liberian border from Dodo and develop the country with commercial activities. Besides this, the road leading to Dia through Mano [— Sewalu] should as well received [sic.] Government's consideration. For if these roads are made motorable feeder roads, there would essentially be greater development in the country and resources of the country increased" (392).

In 1929 the work of making the Kailahun-Dodo-Cotuma road motorable was completed (393), and by 1931 it had been extended a further three miles to reach Buedu (394), which was nearer the Liberian Boundary. It was only much later, however, that the road was made motorable right up to the frontier (395). Dodo-Cotuma and Buedu experienced a real but limited impact from the arrival of the motor-road; an impact similar to that which had affected Kailahun a decade earlier. R.G. Morton opened a store in Dodo (396), and Lebanese traders also arrived (397). No new cash-crops developed in the area for some time, though the production of palm-kernels increased, and more imported goods became available (398). Some Kissia found a greater geographical mobility (399). First Dodo, and later Buedu, became an entrepot with a hinterland stretching eastwards into Liberia (400). But for all that, the everyday life of most ordinary people in the villages of the three Kissi Chiefdoms was little changed. The village chief remained the immediate political authority, with the Paramount Chief as the more distant superior: few white men ever came near the village (401). Subsistence rice-farming remained the major economic activity in the course of the year; in 1939, a visiting anthropologist called rice the
"core of Kissi life" (402). Staple diet, clothing and housing were not changed for the ordinary people (403). Ceremonies connected with birth, initiation, marriage and death continued as before (404). Perhaps most important of all, just as Mende remained the one language understood and spoken by the people of Luawa, the Kissi language occupied the same position in Kama, Teng and Tungi Chiefdoms. Rev. Clarke once commented that the "language of a people is the shrine of that people's soul" (405); in Luawa and Kissi country that shrine was kept inviolate throughout the colonial period (406).

The very limited impact which improved communications had made on the Luawa area by the early 1930s was demonstrated when the general economic depression reached the country. The prices which Kailahun traders could give for palm kernels dropped in 1931-32 to as low as 4d. per bushel (407); the result was that the local people simply stopped bringing kernels in for sale (408). But this did not create any serious hardship for the ordinary people of Luawa and Kissi country, since they did not depend on the sale of cash crops for their livelihood, and felt no necessity to buy the goods which traders in Kailahun and Pendembu offered. The local people were still living, essentially, in a subsistence, not a cash, economy. "As a matter of fact", noted the 1931 Census Report in dealing with the effects of the economic depression, "for the indigenous native engaged in primary production for his living, conditions have changed very little. He is more dependent on seasonable weather and good rice harvests than on prices of export products and imported commodities .... He must expend the same amount of labour to obtain the same quantity of food. He is satisfied with very little other than the necessities of life .... As to his actual needs, he probably possesses (or has within reach) enough of actual requirements. He can, with little effort, acquire
By the early 1930s, then, there had been little basic economic change in Luawa and Kissi country, despite forty years of contact with the British and over a decade of improved communications. Although more difficult to document, the same would seem to be true of change in the social sphere, as regards the everyday life of most ordinary people in the area (as has already been mentioned [410]).

Two events occurred between 1912 and 1931 which did have a serious, immediate effect on the ordinary people of Luawa, much more so than improved communications. The first was the World War of 1914 to 1918. Chiefs were called upon to supply carriers for the Cameroon expedition, and D.C. Bowden noted in 1916 that Railway District "sent many hundred carriers a fair number of whom have given their life as well as their labour in this service" (411). Some of these carriers came from Luawa and Kissi country. Other men from the area volunteered as soldiers, and were trained at Daru Barracks (412). After the war, most returned to their own areas; for instance, in Giema - a large village of Luawa - it was remembered that two people went to the First World War, and later came back to their village (413). From Mano-Sevalu, three people went on the Cameroon expedition (414).

The second serious event was the influenza epidemic of 1918–19 (415). According to elders like Maada James Kailondo, this was the worst occurrence of the whole colonial period. "Some families were wiped out. In some cases it was five or more people who died, in a family of eight or ten; but where you have a man with his wife and about three
children, all of them died. There is a case of a woman whose husband died and all the children, and she remained alone. It may be in the case of men, the wife and all the children died and he was left. It is still very pathetic to remember" (416). Both Kailahun town and the villages were equally affected. In Dodo-Cotuma, so many people died that numbers were difficult to estimate. Throughout the area, the size of rice-farms decreased in 1919 because there were fewer people available to work on them (417), and there was such a scarcity of food in the area that it was described as a "famine" (418). Small cocoa-yams would be sold for three shillings each, and people for some time were forced to eat "palm cabbage" (419) - the growing heart of the palm-tree foliage. One of the Creole traders in Kailahun, George Taylor, set up a bakery in the town at this time, the price of flour presumably being cheaper than that of rice (420).

Although the influenza epidemic and its repercussions left such a deep impression on the ordinary people of the country, it is scarcely mentioned in the writings of colonial officials (421).

It has been assumed that the abolition of domestic slavery in 1923 had a considerable impact on the life of the Protectorate peoples (422). The evidence from the Luawa area suggests that this step was much less revolutionary than might have been expected. For many decades before 1928, domestics had been used to farming their own land, as well as working for their masters (423). "The number of domestics redeemed from servitude in 1914 was 229", wrote D.C. Warren, reviewing the question of domestic slavery in a Railway District Report. "The everyday life of these domestics differs very little from that of freemen. Ground is allotted them on which they can work for their own benefit two days out of the week, and as often as not the domestic is an honoured member of the family. So it is
not surprising that more redemptions have not taken place" (424). A
decade later, Governor Slater reached a similar conclusion: "'domestic
servitude' in a very mild form admittedly still exists, though it is
gradually dying out. There is no reason to suppose that these 'domestics'
generally are treated otherwise than considerately, and probably the
majority of them have the means to purchase their freedom and could free
themselves now if they wished to do so" (425).

British officials clearly had an interest in maintaining that domestic slavery in the Protectorate was very mild, but local
evidence from the Luawa area suggests that this was in fact the case. For
most of those 'freed' in 1928, the greatest economic improvement they
could expect was to farm a larger area for themselves rather than working
for their masters (426). This being so, the majority of the domestics
released in 1928 in Luawa and Kissi country seem to have decided voluntarily
to stay in their masters' households and to continue working for them (427).
For example, in Dodo-Cotuma, none of the ex-slaves moved out of the village.
They remained in the same households working for the same masters, though
the latter did not have the same autocratic control over their slaves as
formerly (428). The Cox Report later made the same point more dramatically:
the 1928 abolition meant "thousands of men, women and children were deprived
of 'home' and the means of sustenance; they had freedom but nothing else and
many returned to the houses and farms of their former proprietors there to
give free labour from time to time in return for the use of the lands they
occupy and the shelter they receive. These people exchanged legal serfdom
for economic serfdom" (429). In 1939, Dr. Eberl-Elber was told by one of
the headmen that "there were about three hundred men and nearly a hundred
and fifty women in the service of the Paramount Chief" of Kissi Tungi (430).
Presumably most of the three hundred men were ex-slaves who continued in their former master's service.

The ordinary people of Luawa and Kissi country remained, throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century, basically subsistence rice farmers, and were not dependent upon cash-cropping; but they engaged in a significant amount of local trading among themselves which was largely ignored by colonial officials (431). From the early years of the twentieth century, a large local weekly market was held near Koindu. "There is at Bwea [432], near the French Guinea border of Kissi, a native market which is held every Sunday", noted D.C. Warren in 1914, "and where kolas, rice, country cloths and cotton goods are sold, the currency consisting of iron bars of the value of a penny each. As many as 1,000 people may be seen at this market, and the scene is a very interesting and amusing one and is the only market of this kind in the whole of the Protectorate" (433). This sounds very similar to the Gbande markets which Alldridge had described in the 1890s (434), and presumably at Kpuya (Bwea) as in the Gbande markets, barter was common as a means of exchange in addition to the use of the Kissi-penny currency (435). Apart from the commodities mentioned by Warren, a variety of other foodstuffs and locally-made iron goods could probably have been bought at the Kpuya market (436): cassava, ochra, tobacco-leaves, plantains, maize, cocoa-yams, garden-eggs, dried fish; matchets and trinkets. Also there would have been livestock, pottery, hammocks and mats for sale (437). Tobacco and Kola nuts were among the most important products used in local commerce in these weekly markets (438). Salt was usually to be found in the weekly market, though this was not a locally-produced commodity. Similar, though smaller, weekly
markets to that at Kpuya were held at Kondoma near Dia (439) on Mondays (440); at Baiama in Kissi Teng on Tuesdays; at Kolo on Wednesdays and Vuahun on Fridays, both of these last two places being in Kissi Tungi (441). These towns were all in Kissi country. For some undiscovered reason, weekly markets did not become common in the Mende part of 'Kailondo's Luawa' (where they were known as ndoweisia) until the 1930s, during Momoh Banya's reign (442). Even in Kailahun there was no weekly market until 1936, when one was opened by the P.C. and his counsellors, the decision being that it should meet every Friday (443).

The daily market (niopowai in the Mende language) in Kailahun apparently developed from the meat market which Alldridge noted there in 1908 (444). The daily market remained essentially a place for the sale of perishable foodstuffs (445). The market was held in the large open space which in Kailondo's day had been the kobanai (446). Early in Momoh Banya's reign (447), he erected a covered market on that same area, on the east side of the Pendembu-Kailahun-Sambalu motor road (448). In the covered market people could set out their wares on stalls, protected from the rain (449).

The development of the daily and weekly markets in Kailahun were clearly a result of Momoh Banya's initiatives, together with his advisers, not a result of British officials' pressure (450). Likewise, the Kpuya weekly market, and the others in Kissi country represented indigenous initiative (451). In some aspects of socio-economic development, however, local initiative did not come so easily. This was especially true in disease-control and literacy. Concerning the former, some local herbal cures were effective for some illnesses — some, indeed, proved to be consistently more effective in certain illnesses than 'European medicine' throughout the colonial period and afterwards (452).
But there were some diseases and sicknesses which were incurable by herbal remedies. This was made clear by the first survey of human disease in the Luawa area, which was carried out by Dr. D.B. Blacklock in 1928-29 (453). Dermatitis, Gonorrhea and lesions of the soles of the feet were conditions from which about half the people he examined were suffering (454). Nearly two-thirds gave a history of yaws, and about a quarter carried smallpox scars (455). Over two-thirds were suffering from schistosomiasis (bilharzia), which was one of the most serious endemic diseases in Luawa and Kissi country. Dr. Blacklock discovered the schistosomiasis-carrying snail, physopsis globosa, in streams at Kailahun, Buedu, Kangama, Dia and Mano-Sewalu, and infection with cercarise of human schistosomiasis was established by dissection of snails at the two first-mentioned places. In the Primary School at Kailahun, eighteen out of twenty children were found to have ova of schistosomiasis present in their urine (456). Such information helps to explain why the infant mortality rate may have been as high as 50% (457).

Surprisingly, Dr. Blacklock did not report any cases of sleeping sickness (human trypanosomiasis). Evidence from Kissi country a decade later would indicate this was a very common and often fatal disease (458): in 1940-41, 20.3% of the total population in certain parts of the Kissi Chiefdoms were suffering from trypanosomiasis (though the incidence in Luawa was much smaller (459). Moreover, the Blacklock survey did not even attempt to examine the presence of some diseases which were later seen to be very common (460). These diseases included those relating to malnutrition like beri-beri; recurrent fevers like malaria; tuberculosis (461); jaundice, hepatitis and yellow fever (462); periodic outbreaks of infectious diseases such as measles (463); dysentery and worm infestations (464). Almost all the places at which people were examined during the
Blacklock survey were on the main road. The incidence of diseases might have been different (and probably larger as percentages of the total population) if the examination had been carried out mainly in less accessible towns and villages. For example, "villages situated immediately adjacent to the new motor roads probably do not encourage the presence of lepers of the invalid class, who therefore are compelled to retire to villages some little distance off the main thoroughfares" (465).

P.C. Momoh Banya, without needing to make a survey of human diseases, was well aware of the situation, and realized that considerable, well-qualified medical help was required. In July 1926, the P.C. wrote to the D.C. Pendembu, stating that he and his counsellors "appreciated the proposal of the Director of Medical & Sanitary Services during his last visit for the re-establishment of a dispensary at Kailahun [466] but regret forthwith the idea of placing on control an unqualified medical dispenser. This chiefdom was the first to be visited by Government Medical Practitioners years gone by ... which virtues were withdrawn during the disbandment of the detachments of the West African Frontier Force by Government to Daru, in the year 1922" (467). However, it was only a dispenser, and not a doctor, who was posted to Kailahun in 1927. In the same year, Momoh Banya erected a dispensary and dispenser's quarters with the help of communal labour (468). This dispensary was perhaps the first public building in the Luawa area to be given a roof of corrugated iron sheeting. The whole building cost about £114, being put up at the personal expense of the P.C. (469). "In 1928, 2618 new medical cases and 4888 old cases were treated in Kailahun; in 1929, 3688 new cases were treated and 9947 old cases" (470). These were impressive totals, but the Kailahun dispensary was really only scratching the surface of the need for medical services in Luawa and Kissi country (471).
ABOVE: MONOH BANYA'S ROUND-HOUSE
(This was built before he became Paramount Chief.)

BELOW: THE ORIGINAL KAILAHUN DISPENSARY
(This was later converted into the town's Post Office.)
The position as regards literacy in Luawa paralleled the situation in the medical sphere (472). Momoh Banya was all eagerness to have a Government school in Kailahun; he told F.W.H. Migeod in 1924 that he had "asked for a Government school" (473). But the Government was unable (or unwilling) to satisfy his desire, and in this area the P.C. could do little on his own without Government help. In 1931 he repeated the request to Governor Hodson when the latter visited Luawa (474). "There are many difficulties at present in the way of establishing a school in the Chiefdom", was the Governor's reply, "and ... more experience was needed in connection with the provision of Education facilities in the protectorate before further commitments were undertaken by the Government. His Excellency pointed out that schools were already established at Bo and Koyeima, and that the Wesleyan Mission had now started a School near to Kailahun" (475); all of which was true, but hardly touched the needs of the ordinary people in Luawa and Kissi country.

From 1922 onwards, in fact, there was a Church Missionary Society school in Kailahun, situated on the Baoma road (476). A Creole pastor was in charge of missionary work, and his wife (who had gained twelve years teaching-experience in Freetown) did the actual teaching in the school. The pastor complained to Migeod that "the buildings, mud houses, were dilapidated, which was true, and wanted me to ask the chief to do something, which I hardly felt inclined to do. He said the school had been in existence for two years, and the pupils were seventeen in number.

I did ask Momo Banya about it and why the attendance was so small. He said that the school had been conducted regularly for the past five months. There had been a break before that. He did not seem satisfied with it" (477). Migeod rightly believed that P.C. Banya as
a Moslem would prefer a Government school rather than a Christian mission school (478). Presumably this was why P.C. Banya was still pressing the Governor in 1931 to establish a Government school, even though the Wesleyan Mission had begun their own school in Kailahun by then (479).

The various Protestant Christian Churches working in Sierra Leone had come to an agreement in 1928 that rather than competing with each other, the Protectorate should be divided into various areas with a different denomination working in each area (480). The Pendembu District was part of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society's area (481). In 1928, that Society had asked Rev. W.R.E. Clarke to travel round and discover the most suitable place east of Segbwema. Jojoima and Bunumbu (482) which could be a centre for new mission work. He quickly came to the conclusion that Kailahun was the right place because it was the headquarter town of the largest Chiefdom in the area; Momoh Banya was the most influential Chief in the area; and Kailahun was a town where people of many different linguistic groups met (483). "Roads from Liberia, French Guinea and other parts of Sierra Leone converge here", wrote Rev. Clarke, "and, as would be expected, it is somewhat 'cosmopolitan', with its mixture of Mendes, Kisis, Mandingoes, Susus, Gbandis, Balus, Konos and Ko-Mendes" (484). In September 1930, on their return from leave in the U.K., Rev. and Mrs. Clarke were appointed to start work in Kailahun. In 1931 Mrs. Clarke opened the Mission Primary School in a simple barri near the mission house, with just ten boys and two girls. By 1938, the number of pupils had grown to about a hundred, a third of whom were girls (485).

Bo School, to which Governor Hodson referred during his visit to Luawa, was specifically meant for the sons of Chiefs (486), and it seems that only such children did attend the school from Luawa and
In 1915, five Kissi children were sent to Bo School: Nyuma Kongor, Brima Labun, and Kaitungi (from leading families of what later became Kissi Tungi \[491\]); Tamba Gbeyo (from the later Kissi Teng); and Tengbe Kpandia (from a leading family of the later Kissi Kama \[492\]). "We were the very first from the Kissi area to go for education", noted ex-P.C. Kaitungi. "In fact, when we went, we were so small that for the first three years we were not permitted to come home. We never came to see our families until 1918, because Government felt that if we came, our people would refuse to send us back" (493). He himself was then only seven or eight years old (494). After Kahunla Ngobeh was made P.C. of Luawa in 1916, several of his younger relatives were sent to the school, including Taplima Ngobeh and Gbessay Ngobeh (495). In 1918 S.K. Banya (Momoh Banya's eldest son) went to Bo (496), and was followed by a succession of younger brothers from 1924 onwards, after Momoh Banya became Paramount Chief (497). By
1931, then, a number of rulers' children from Luawa and Kissi country had gone through - or were still attending - Bo School: perhaps thirty pupils in all (498). There is no record of anyone attending Koyeima School at this stage, though there were perhaps a handful of children attending other primary schools such as those at Pendembu and Bunumbu (499). But the ordinary people of the Chiefdoms, and their children, had hardly benefitted at all.

What the ordinary people had benefitted from by the early 1930s were the more settled socio-political conditions of Momoh Banya's rule. The trouble over the international boundaries between 1896 and 1911 (500) had been followed by internal disturbances caused by Bockarie Bundeh's rule between 1912 and 1916 (501). These internal disturbances continued to have repercussions well into the reign of P.C. Ngobeh, who ruled from 1917 to 1923 (502). But the removal of the W.A.P.F. Company from Kailahun in 1922 (503) signalled British officials' belief that a permanent political stability had been achieved in the Luawa area. Momoh Banya confirmed that political stability by the way he ruled. He was ready to co-operate fully with British officials (504), and yet at the same time he did much to satisfy his own people (505). Although unimportant in itself, the fact that in 1927 the first Protectorate district agricultural show of the 1920s was held in Kailahun (506) provided tangible evidence of more settled conditions in Luawa. The first years of P.C. Banya's reign also coincided with a trade boom, and Luawa prospered. The Kissi Chiefdoms shared in the general prosperity, though there was a tendency for Kissi people to migrate westwards and settle further into Luawa (507). As previously, the condition of the country was reflected in the size of Kailahun: throughout the 1920s the town grew steadily until in 1931 it was the largest in the Protectorate, with about six hundred houses (508) and two-and-a-half thousand inhabitants (509).
P.C. Fabundeh died in 1912, and was succeeded by his son, Bockarie Bundeh (510). Before the imposition of British rule, a father-to-son succession was most unusual (511), but now it became common in the Luswa area (512). The alien British idea of a Chiefdom and its institutions as being rigid and static – that 'traditional rulers' had governed in the same way 'from time immemorial' – meant that once one particular family gained the chieftaincy, the members of that family had an inbuilt advantage over other candidates at a succession-time (513). Bockarie Bundeh had two further advantages. First, he had attended school and so could speak some English; in fact he was the only serious candidate for the succession who could speak English (514). He would thus naturally command more attention from the British officials than the other candidates. That this is indeed what happened is indicated by the way even an experienced official like Le Mesurier was ready to commend the new Chief at the beginning of his reign. "The Chief", wrote Le Mesurier about Bockarie Bundeh in 1912, "was formerly a bad character, but, having been banished to Koinadugu for three years, has now returned, and shows signs of being a very good Chief" (515). Bockarie Bundeh's second advantage was that he gained the support of P.C. Kutubu of Upper Bambara, who was regarded by the British as "one of the best Chiefs in the District" (516), and who, after the death of Fabundeh, was respected by the local people as the senior ruler in the area (517). By these means, Bockarie Bundeh gained the chieftaincy.

His rule, however, was unsatisfactory from the start. He despised the Kissia, and took every opportunity to insult them and their rulers (518). On one occasion he ordered Kongor, the senior chief in the
Kissi section of Luawa, to walk to Kailahun and back without being carried in a hammock. "So Kongor did it .... Then when he came [back] he called all the Kissi people. They met and swore together that they would never go under Luawa again. Then the following day they marched on to the Europeans [in Kailahun] and reported this matter" (519). Presumably it was only shortly after this demonstration that D.C. Bowden held a meeting in Kailahun on 22 July 1914 at which "the preliminary announcement was made to Chief Bockari Bundeh of Luawa and Chief Kongo of Damba that in future they would be independent of each other; the Kissi people would later be given an opportunity to select a Paramount Chief of their own and the boundary between the two countries would if possible be delimited before the close of the year" (520). Since Kongor was accepted as the senior Kissi chief in Kailondo's Luawa there was never any doubt that he would be made Paramount Chief of the new Kissi Chiefdom (521), and his formal election took place on 25 July 1915 (522).

This development was probably not unacceptable to the British officials, who still had some lingering fears of powerful Chiefs - fears acquired during the 1898 Protectorate War (523). The British had deliberately broken up the other most powerful Chiefdoms in Mendeland (Madam Yoko's Kra-Mende Confederacy, Nyagua's Panguma, and perhaps Mendegla's Geura [524], as well as Sanda, Tambakha and Kaliyang Chiefdoms in the North) (525). Consequently, the 1914 decision to separate the Kissia from Luawa was reported in an off-hand manner in British official documents, as though it was a perfectly natural and logical procedure which required no explanation. No reference was made at all to the discontent of the Kissia: "there are in the chiefdoms on the east of the district, Gola, Bandi, and Kissi tribes, but at present they do not form separate chiefdoms,
although it is proposed to form a distinct Kissi Chiefdom this year in the vicinity of Kanre-Lahun" (526). The emergence of the Chiefdom in 1915 was regarded by the local D.C., W.D. Bowden, as a sensible administrative development, irrespective of the wishes of the local populace. "Two new chiefdoms appear for the first time viz, Kissi and Gorama but these are not additions to the District, only the result of larger and rather unwieldy chiefdoms having been broken into two" (527).

Within two years of the splitting off of Kissi Chiefdom from Luawa the people of Luawa themselves rejected Bockarie Bundeh's rule, as a result of his continued maladministration and oppression (528). The person who probably suffered most from this oppression was the young Momoh Banya, of whom Bockarie Bundeh made impossible demands (529). Whether in pre-colonial days the deposition of the ruler had been possible is debatable (530); certainly there is no indication of such a deposition having taken place in the Luawa area during the half-century before 1916 (531). But in the half-century after 1916, there were six such depositions (532). As with the separation of Kissi and Luawa, the deposition of Bockarie Bundeh is referred to laconically as though it were a small matter in British official reports. "One unsatisfactory paramount chief ruling over a large area was deposed", noted D.C. Bowden in his 1916 Railway District Report, "after all attempts to persuade him to mend his ways had failed. A new and more suitable chief was elected in his place and the desired result has already in large measure been gained; peace reigns once more where strife was rampant and old quarrels are being forgot and new friendships formed" (533). Thus in 1916, as in 1914, British officials played down (and perhaps did not even recognize themselves) the importance of major changes in Chiefdom organization and local politics in the Luawa area. In 1914 the official report gave
no indication that the separation of Kissi from Luawa involved a major political upheaval: it was portrayed as a simple administrative improvement. In 1916, not even the name of the Chief or Chiefdom was given. This unwillingness to describe local political changes presumably represented a subconscious attempt to uphold the official British policy of allowing the local people to rule themselves under British supervision. To dwell on developments in Luawa between 1912 and 1916 would simply provide evidence to demonstrate how chimerical that policy was. It would be shown how untrue was the statement that "in general Government has preserved chiefdoms as they were in 1896" (534). In the Luawa area there was a clear dichotomy between the British theory of upholding the 'traditional' Mende system of government, and actual events.

In fact, in the 1916 Luawa election, although agreement was reached on a successor to Bockarie Bundeh, the nature of Sovereignty in Luawa Chiefdom had been so much altered since 1896 that there were signs of the kpakoisia having difficulty in knowing on what grounds a new Chief should be selected. "At first most of the people were in favour of Gobe, the late Kai Lundu's first cousin", noted D.C. Hooker who was in charge of the election, "and a few in favour of Banya, Kai Lundu's son, but after talking it over for a day, the Sub-chiefs and headmen, one and all, announced their unanimity in favour of GOBE, who was accordingly elected forthwith. It should be mentioned that Banya himself did not oppose Gobe's election, but announced his complete agreement with the country's choice" (535). District Commissioner Hooker's stress on "unanimity" sounds, however, a trifle artificial, and accounts given by the local people do not give the impression that there was complete agreement; rather these accounts suggest that the "unanimity" was engineered by the British official. "When D.C. Hooker
nominated Ngobeh as Chief", wrote Speaker Kongoneh in 1919 (536), "we were opposed to it, especially we who complained of Gpoonieh's Bockarie Bundeh's tyranny (sic.), to the Government. We told him plainly that to depose Gpoonieh and install Ngobeh, is to set up the same man again, for Ngobeh is Gpoonieh in another form, and that we were sure to experience the same tyranic treatment we had complained of. We were assured that this would never happen; and after a good deal of debate, not having the power of defying the D.C., demurely we consented" (537).

Momoh Banyya's willingness to stand down in favour of Ngobeh was probably crucial in an 'easy' election in 1916, because Ngobeh's claims to the chieftaincy were somewhat tenuous. He was a relative of Kailondo (538), had been one of his leading counsellors (539), and was the son of a Luawa kraoko (540). But one of his main claims to the chieftaincy was that his family had provided the Chiefdom Lavale or Speaker in Bockarie Bundeh's reign, and possibly at the end of Fabundeh's reign (541). However, the idea that the Lavale had grounds for being considered for the succession, and the very office of Lavale itself, were post-1896 innovations. Under Kailondo there was no one person who acted as Lavale, the mouthpiece of the Mahci. By the end of Kailondo's reign, Fabundeh was certainly the 'Second Man' in the polity but never occupied any formal office (542). When he became P.C., Fabundeh probably had no formally-recognised Lavale for most of his reign (543). Mr. N.C. Hollins recorded that in the last few years of Fabundeh's life, Kahunla Ngobeh was the Chiefdom Speaker (544), but it is doubtful whether this was a formal appointment (545). Under Bockarie Bundeh, however, there was a generally recognized Lavale; namely, Jusu Ngobeh, a close relative of Kahunla Ngobeh (546). Kongoneh (547) was made Lavale when Kahunla Ngobeh became P.C. of Luwa in 1916 (548), and in
the early 1920s, Momoh Banya succeeded Kongoneh to the office (549). When illness rendered Ngobeh incapable of administering Luawa, the kpakoisia naturally turned to Momoh Banya to act as Regent (550). Thus the newly-created office of Lavale developed rapidly in importance, until its holder was generally considered next to the Chief himself in power (551). A similar, though less clearly traceable, development occurred in Kissi country (552).

The election of Ngobeh as P.C. crystallized a further political innovation in Luawa, which was again paralleled by developments in the Kissi area; namely, the establishment of a set of 'ruling houses' in Luawa (553). As with the office of Lavale, British officials presumed that 'ruling houses' were part of the 'traditional' pre-1896 political system in Mendeland (554). This could hardly be true of Luawa, which had been created by Kailondo only in 1880 (555). The Bundehs and Ngobehs were among the kpakoisia of the area ruled by Kailondo, as were members of many other families (556), but they did not represent 'ruling houses'; nor did Kailondo (557). Yet from 1916 onwards, the Chief of Luawa was always chosen from within those three families (558).

In Kissi country, the establishment of an independent Chiefdom under Kongor did not solve all the problems. Kongor died in 1919 (559). According to official reports, it was impossible to select a successor to Kongor because the Kissi people could not agree among themselves; therefore in February 1919 (560) the three main contestants were each made into Paramount Chiefs of their own sections - Kama, Teng, and Tungi (561). The real cause of this new division was probably quite different. When Kongor
died, among the Court Messengers was one interpreter called Soli Koromba, who went round to Tengbe Jopolu of Dia, Siaffa Kangama of Kangama and Sahr Kallaŋ of Buedu and told them that he would make them all P.C.s., receiving from them large presents of money in return. Soli Koromba then convinced the D.C. that deadlock existed on the succession question, and the D.C. in turn advised the Provincial Commissioner that three Paramount Chiefs' staffs of office should be given to the three Kissi section-chiefs. This was done (562). Such was the power of an unscrupulous interpreter over his British employers, when the latter could not speak the local language, and when the local people could not speak English.

There may have been in Kissi Tungi yet a further 'twist' to this story of the creation of three Kissi Chiefdoms. Sahr Kallaŋ may not have been the real candidate for the Tungi chieftaincy at all. "The man who stood up for candidature, to be Chief, was played out", reminisced ex-P.C. Kaitungi. "His name was Sengbe Gbeior, but he wasn't very tricky 563]. Well, he had a tricky fellow here, in Buedu here, called Sahr Kallaŋ. Sahr Kallaŋ told him that, 'I'll be your mouthpiece and fight this battle for you. So when I succeed as Chief, if we succeed with the crown I'll hand it over to you'. Sengbe Gbeior agreed. He was favoured by all the people, so he told the people that they should support Sahr Kallaŋ, including even our own people 5 of ex-P.C. Kaitungi's family]. So when the Commissioner came, after having elected him, Sengbe Gbeior came to Sahr Kallaŋ to say, 'Well, according to our agreement, I've come for my staff'. Sahr Kallaŋ told him that, 'What are you doing?' So he sent a message to the Provincial Commissioner at Kenema to report that after the election, one man Sengbe Gbeior had come to say that he is no Paramount Chief, that he wants to take the staff by force. So the Commissioner sent for Sengbe Gbeior. Sengbe Gbeior was arrested, and sent to prison. He remained in
prison until he died" (564). And all this took place without the British administrators realizing what had happened.

It seems that British officials were not at all averse to the division of Kissi country into smaller divisions, Kissi Chiefdom having been the largest Chiefdom in Railway District even though it represented only a half of Kailondo's Luawa (565). The British rationalized this new division (as they had in 1914) in terms of administrative convenience; Kissi Chiefdom was too large and unwieldy to be ruled efficiently (566). It is, however, difficult to escape the conclusion that division of Kissi Chiefdom, although inspired by the behaviour of a Government interpreter, represented a palpable instance of 'divide and rule' by the colonial power.

This conclusion is confirmed by subsequent events during P.C. Ngobeh's reign in Wawa, where British officials were prepared at least to consider seriously requests for a further division of that Chiefdom. In June 1919, after Chiefdom Speaker Kongoneh of Sandialu had spent almost two years making complaints against P.C. Ngobeh (567), a crisis developed in Luawa as a result of a long letter from Kongoneh to the D.C. at Kenema. "By reason of unfair treatment and unjust dealings", stated Kongoneh, "I beg to ask with all humility that my own portion of the Chiefdom be separated and given to me" (568). (Kongoneh's section of Luawa was Gbeila, which contained the large villages of Dodo-Cotuma, Sandialu and Balahun, and was one of the largest sections of the Chiefdom [569]. To have set up Gbeila section as a separate Chiefdom would have terribly emasculated Luawa.) Kongoneh explained that after the election of Ngobeh as Paramount Chief in 1916, "as soon as the D.C. turned back, the chief [Ngobeh] ... began to device [sic.] means to avenge the deposition of
his nephew [Bockarie Bundeh] " (570). Kongoneh then described in considerable detail the ways in which he and his people had been "buffeted" (571), before returning to his original request. "I fought in aid of the Government no less than eleven battles; in one of which I was shot on the mouth by a French bullet and nearly lost my life, whilst other men were at their ease; nothing was done for me. If my services are appreciated by the Government, now that I am an old man, I beg (most humbly) for a consideration of my case .... I ask, Sir, that the complaints here-in made be investigated ... in order that you may see for yourself whether my above request (that I be separated from Loiwa [Luawa] ) is not justified" (572).
The D.C. rightly minuted in a marginal note against the last bracketted phrase, "Crux of the matter" (573).

The previous year, in March 1918, P.C. Ngobeh had, by contrast, complained about Kongoneh's disruptive influence: "at present that section belonging to the Bela people is quite in an unsettled state owing to this subchief's misinterpretation of things" (574). Ngobeh no doubt looked forward in June 1919 to the arrival in Kailahun of the D.C., who would surely deal firmly with Kongoneh in view of the latter's fissiparous activities and the disturbances which he had been creating for successive Paramount Chiefs for more than a decade (575). But on his arrival, the D.C. took a very non-committal attitude to the whole affair (576). Ngobeh was warned "not to let Bockarie Bundeh's people interfere with the Chiefdom + to summon Kongoneh to all meetings": Kongonah was instructed to drive Savage-Pratt (his amanuensis) from his section, which presumably put an end to Kongoneh's ability to write long letters to the D.C. (577). Kongonah was, however, encouraged by the D.C.'s attitude to go on making his complaints, apparently thinking that there was at least a possibility of achieving his
aim of becoming 'Paramount Chief of Gbeila Chiefdom' (578), and feeling assured that no British official would punish him for his disruptive behaviour.

Kongonah and other local politicians were obviously further encouraged in their efforts to achieve 'independence' by the division of Kissi Chiefdom into three tiny units (579). This proved true in particular of the Bombali krakoisi. (Bombali section, which comprised the southern section of Luawa Chiefdom, included the villages of Giema, Talia, Bunumbu, Mendekelema and Nyandehun [580].) In March 1919, Captain Ramsey, Officer Commanding the W.A.F.F. detachment in Kailahun, gave an account from P.C. Ngobeh's viewpoint of the 'conspiracy' of the Bombali chiefs (581). "It seems", wrote the W.A.F.F. Officer, "that sometime ago chief Josiah of Geima [Giema] told the Bombali people that they should desert chief Gobeh and have a separate chiefdom of their own under Josiah. Chief Gobeh got to hear of this and immediately proceeded to Kennema and reported the matter to the D.C. Some little time after D.C. Craven came to Kanrelahun to investigate the matter, on hearing the case Josiah admitted the charge + still maintained he wanted to break with Chief Gobeh. D.C. Craven told him that he needn't entertain the notion for a moment as it was quite impossible and further added that if he heard any further reports of this kind he would deal severely with him.

Knowing that D.C. Craven had gone on leave the ball started rolling again and the other day chiefs' Josiah of Giema, Gaba of Giehun, Korgonni of Sardiellu and Gaba Goray of Dodo held a conference in the latter's town where it was suggested that they should all break with Chief Gobeh and form separate chiefdoms of their own, they in addition tried to prevail on Chief Momo Gevah of Nyandehun to join the conference but without success.
On asking Chief Gobeh for the reason for this attitude on the part of the aforesaid chiefs he gives it that when Kissi was lately divided into 3 chiefdoms the discontented chiefs thought it was a good time to try once more for separation" (582). Despite D.C. Craven's apparent intransigence, in 1922 a senior British official (583) gave semi-official recognition to a document (584) in which the Bombali kpakoisia put their own case for being given a Paramount Chief's staff (585). "We ... hope most truly that our Paramount Chief Gobeh will live long", stated the Bombali kpakoisia. "When the occasion arrives for the appointment of his successor, we desire the Government to consider the splitting up of the Luawa Chiefdom into two parts permitting us to elect our own Paramount Chief for our Section, and the Luawa people their own Paramount Chief of their own Sections of the present Luawa Chiefdom which is too large, unwieldy and disquieted for proper administration according to our Native law and custom" (586).

It was the election in 1924 of Momoh Banya as Paramount Chief of Luawa which halted these fissiparous tendencies, and improved the whole complexion of local politics (587). He could exert pressures for good which the British D.C., an outsider dependent on his Court Messengers and ignorant of the intricacies of local politics, could never hope to exert. British officials, from their position of political supremacy, could easily destroy; but they never possessed the understanding of the local situation, or the deep influence at village level, to build up, either politically, socially, or economically (588). Naturally then, a generation of colonial rule beneficially affected the ordinary village people very little, in their everyday life (589). By contrast, Momoh Banya was able in the late 1920s partially to reverse the unconstructive political
trends of the previous decade. He established the judicial supremacy of Luawa's law-court over those of the Kissi Chiefdoms (590), and out of respect for his father, Kailondo, the Kissi Chiefdoms promised to pay him annually 6d. on every house (591). He also established his right to be present at the election of Kissi Chiefs (592). In at least one boundary dispute he was able slightly to increase the area of Luawa (593). His stabilising political influence had a beneficial effect on the Kissi Chiefdoms as well as Luawa (594). But not even Momoh Banya could reunite his father's Luawa as a single political entity. Kailondo's Luawa provided the one firm political foundation on which socio-economic development might have been built (595). In less than a decade of British rule, between 1911 and 1919, that foundation was destroyed for ever. And there was nothing substantial to replace it (596).
NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER FIVE

1. See Chap.4 of this thesis, pp.305-7,314 above for further details.

2. 'The Colony of Sierra Leone' or 'Sierra Leone' were names properly applied only to the Freetown peninsula at this time. "As for Sierra Leone proper", noted T.J. Alldridge, "it has been a Crown Colony for over one hundred years, having been transferred to the Crown in 1807 by the Sierra Leone Company, who originally, in 1787, founded Freetown" (A Transformed Colony, p.17).

3. CO271/7 fol. 325. Sierra Leone Royal Gazette August 1896, quoted in Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, pp.261-262. 'Protectorate' was an imprecise term which could mean virtually whatever the British wanted (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.541). Alldridge thought there was no difference between a Colony and a Protectorate; but in fact the nature of sovereignty assumed by the British Government over a Protectorate was rather different from that assumed over a Colony. For example, the local people of a Colony had definite rights and responsibilities under British law; the local people of a Protectorate had very few.

4. The Treaties of Friendship which had been collected by Alldridge and Garrett had not officially removed sovereignty from the existing rulers (see Chap.2 of this thesis, pp.109-40 above). The main point about the establishing of the Protectorate was that sovereignty was removed from the hands of local rulers.

5. The best account of the events of 1898 is to be found in Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp.558-591. The House Tax, later known as the 'Hut Tax', was levied from 1 January 1898 in Districts near Freetown and Bonthe on all houses in villages containing over 20 houses. Either 5/- or a bushel of rice or palm kernels was to be paid on each house annually (Fyfe, op.cit., p.550).

6. The 1898 War is usually called the Hut Tax War. But this title is open to a number of objections. It presupposes that the war was caused by the taxing of houses; it uses a pejorative term to describe homes in the Protectorate; it is applied to fighting in places such as Panguma where the Government had not attempted to collect House Tax in 1898, and had not planned to do so in that year.

7. In the Report of the Royal Commission, Chalmers argued that the imposition of the House Tax and the harsh methods used in its collection were the cause of the war; Cardew argued that the war resulted from a wide variety of causes, but the House Tax was not one of these. In a sense, both Chalmers and Cardew were wide of the mark. The war represented essentially an attempt by the local people to tear themselves free from the increasingly firm political grasp of an alien power.

8. See Note 113 pp.324-5 above, in Chap.4 of this thesis for a brief discussion of secondary material on the events of 1896-1898, and the 1898 Protectorate War in particular.
9. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, pp. 377-379 below for details. This was Cardew's second visit to Luawa, his first having taken place in 1895.

10. For the international boundaries issue in general, see Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 281-283 above.

11. At the suggestion of the London Colonial Office, Cardew agreed "to exempt the remote Panguma and Koinadugu Districts at first, and tax only Karene, Ronietta and Bandajuma" (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p. 550).

12. For example, many polities on the borders of the Protectorate must have experienced difficulties resulting from the creation of an international boundary. Luawa was not the only polity to be split into two parts by a new boundary running through the middle of it.

13. Cardew, for instance, saw little difference between one polity and another, one local ruler and another. His scheme for the Protectorate administration had been worked out within a few months of his arrival in Sierra Leone (C0267/409/Conf. 45; Cardew; 6.6.94), and took little account of local conditions, and none at all of such factors as political differences between the Mende and Temne peoples. In general, he classed all local rulers together as 'bad': "The rule of the District Commissioners and the Frontier Police as compared to that of the Native Chiefs is as the thickness of the little finger to that of the loins" (C0267/440/Conf. 75; Cardew; 20.9.93).

14. C0267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96. This was the Governor's third up-country tour.


16. C0267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96.

17. Ibid.

18. Cardew noted earlier in this same despatch that the correct spelling should be Kare Lahun, "not Kanra Lahun as stated in the map". For the spelling of Kailahun, see Note 7, p. 11 above, in Chap. 3 of this thesis.

19. C0267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96.

20. For Fuya in Kissi Tengea, see Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 11 above. For Kangama, chief town of Bomassalu 'section' of Kailondo's Luawa, see Chap. 3 of this thesis, p. 184 above. Cardew's despatch C0267/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96, and the map attached, clearly show that by Kundo, the Governor was referring to the Kissi town just north-east of Mofindor, across the Moa River.

21. For a list of the other Kissi towns and 'sections' giving allegiance to Kailondo, see Chap. 3 of this thesis, pp. 212-215 above.
22. C0267/424/Conf.19; Cardew; 10.3.%.


24. Customary rules of polite behaviour and political prudence would have prompted the Luawa k-oakoisia to await the arrival of Cardew, since he was soon expected in the area. It would have been an insult to the Governor not to wait for him before choosing a new ruler; and it might have weakened the new rulers position if he had been accepted as ruler by the local people before his appointment was confirmed by the Governor.

25. See Chap.4 of this thesis, Note 3, p.315 above.


27. Although not all the people of Luawa were pleased with the idea of Fahbundeh as ruler (see Hollins, "Short History", p.23), neither oral tradition nor written records suggest that there was any serious claimant to the lordship of Luawa except Fahbundeh.

28. A customary way of showing respect in Luawa (according to the present writer's experience in the 1960s) was to agree with the speaker's opinions, whatever one's 'real' feelings were about the subject. If one strongly disagreed with the speaker's opinions, the correct polite way to express disagreement was to remain quiet after the speaker had finished. Cardew, no doubt, took silence to mean acquiescence. Chalmers rightly pointed out that at meetings held by Cardew in 1896 to explain the Protectorate to the Chiefs, there were no "expressions of assent by the Chiefs; and when no assent is expressed no assent is meant" (Report of the Royal Commission, p.17).

29. C0267/424/Conf.19; Cardew; 10.3.%.

30. In 1908, Major Le Mesurier, the British official with most experience of Luawa at that time stated that the following Kissi-speaking 'sections' were still loyal to Fahbundeh: Sewalu, Kam, Toli, Kunyo, Lola, Bomassalu (Kangama), Tengea (Fuya), Luangkoli, and Tungi (C0267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.08, enc. Memorandum).

31. C0267/424/Conf.21; Cardew; 23.10.96.

32. Possibly no one, not even Cardew himself, realized the significance of his public announcement on 10 March 1896 that Fahbundeh was to be ruler of Luawa. But the present writer has not found any formal, public statement made by any British official on any occasion before 10.3.96 which could be interpreted as an official declaration of British sovereignty over Luawa. The signing of the 1890 Treaty was clearly not such an occasion (see Chap.2 of this thesis, ps. above). Moreover, by April 1896 Cardew had realized that Kailahun town was in fact in Liberian territory, and therefore no clear statement of British sovereignty over Luawa was made from that time until the final Anglo-Liberian settlement of the question in 1911. Of
course, in everyday practice as distinct from formal statements, many British officials from 1890 onwards behaved as though Britain possessed sovereignty over Luawa, and this continued even after Kailahun was found to be in Liberian territory.

33. For details, see Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 269-272 above.

34. The reasons why resistance would not make sense for Fabundeh and his people after 1898 were, briefly (i) the British had shown by the way they crushed the 1898 rising that they possessed superior military power (ii) Kafula of Wunde and others were, in the state of general unrest, proving such a serious nuisance to Fabundeh that the latter was eager to receive assistance from the British, and certainly could not afford to alienate them (iii) it was clear to Fabundeh and his counsellors that if the British did not annex the area, the Liberians (or possibly the French) would undoubtedly do so.

35. "The Protectorate Proclamation of 1896 was never proclaimed up-country" (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p. 553)

36. Neither at this time, nor earlier, was there a Liberian presence in the area (i.e. no officials from Monrovia), and international boundaries largely represented a paper partition.

37. Although an international boundary had been drawn on paper for the Luawa area in 1895, it had not been demarcated on the ground.

38. For details, see Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 281-283 above.

39. On 10.3.96, writing from Kailahun town, Cardew was still uncertain whether Kailahun lay in Liberian or British territory: "it is doubtful, Major Grant informs me, whether the true position of Kare Lahun may not be found East of the 13° West of Paris, but this he cannot determine exactly till he reaches the coast". (CO267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96). Four weeks later, having returned to Freetown, Cardew enclosed in a despatch a map which clearly showed Kailahun was in Liberian territory (CO267/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96).

40. See map opp. p. 414.

41. Even before he was certain whether or not Kailahun town was in Liberia or the Sierra Leone Protectorate, Cardew suggested a "rectification of that frontier, which will admit of the whole of these two districts [i.e. Luawa and Bombali] being included in British territory" (CO267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96).

42. Over the next 15 years, various interpretations were given to the phrase 'the whole of Luawa'. Cardew meant only the small Mende-speaking part of the territory which Kailondo had ruled. Probyn later implied a very much larger area (e.g. CO267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.03).

43. Cardew reported the unwillingness of the Liberian Government to discuss adjustment of the Anglo-Liberian boundary in CO267/427/Conf. 47; Cardew; 5.11.96).
44. Governor Probyn was later to argue that, although Kailahun and most of Luawa belonged incontestably to Liberia by international treaty yet Britain had various reasons for retaining control of Luawa: (i) Fabundeh and most of his people preferred British to Liberian rule (ii) the Liberians had shown themselves incapable of administering the area (iii) Britain had established a presence in the region long before the arrival of the Liberians.

45. See Note 11 above.

46. For details, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5 p. 396 below.

47. Care must be exercised in accepting the judgement of Chalmers that the House Tax and the methods used in collecting it were the cause of the fighting (Report of the Royal Commission, pp. ). Cardew's list of causes may be an even less reliable guide (ibid., pp. ). In Panguma, for example, which was considered to be one of the centres of the Mende War, no attempt was made to collect House Tax in 1898; nor were many of Cardew's supposed causes operative there. Note Mr. A. Abraham's opinion that the trouble in Panguma was caused more by the irresponsible aggression of European Officers than by Nyagua (the local Mahawa:) or his people ("Nyagua, the British, and the Hut Tax War", p. 97).

48. No attempt was made to collect House Tax in Luawa in 1898.

49. 'British Luawa' at this time referred to that part of Luawa west of the thirteenth meridian west of Paris. The largest settlements within this area were Ngiehun and Baoma.

50. For the impact of the British military expedition, 1898-1899, on the Luawa area, see Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 268-272 above. After this military expedition, the local rulers and people in the Protectorate generally paid their taxes "without murmur" (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p. 593) not only for 1899 but also their arrears for 1898.

51. Fabundeh probably did not take very seriously the limitations imposed by Cardew on his rule in 1896. But there is no evidence that he ever tried to regain that complete political independence which the Luawa ruler had known before the arrival of the British.

52. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 267-268 above.

53. There was a reasonably strong group of Luawa kpaoksisia who, in 1899, were in favour of joining in the Protectorate War against the British (ibid., pp. 260-262 above). Fabundeh resisted their attempts to make him join the war, but may have been strongly tempted to do so for some time.

54. Examples of Fabundeh's close co-operation with the British in 1899 and afterwards were (i) his combining with the British troops in various raids early in 1899 against the 'northern Kissia' (ii) his attempt to pay House Tax for the whole of Luawa in 1900 (iii) his acceptance of
the restrictions which the British imposed on his freedom of action - so that when the British instructed him to be friendly with the Liberian officials who were aiming to destroy him, the Luawa Chief tried to carry out British wishes.

55. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, p. 262 above.

56. Ibid., pp. 277-284 above.

57. Ibid., pp. 291-292 above.

58. Both at the time and since, British officials and historians stressed that the great political advantages of the imposition of British rule in the Sierra Leone Protectorate were the establishment of peace and of 'law and order'. But the burden of Chap. 4 of this thesis was that, at least until 1911, Luawa did not experience 'pacification' and 'law and order', but rather the reverse. The later sections of this present chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, show that the outworkings of the imposition of British rule continued to create political unsettlement in Luawa right into the 1920s.

59. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, pp. 392-393 below.

60. Historians, examining the political impact of British rule in up-country West Africa in the early decades of the twentieth century, often assume that the position of the Chief was radically altered. While this was true about the Chief's relations with the British, it was not true for the Luawa area about the Chief's relations with the ordinary village people. Before 1896, in the everyday life of most ordinary people in Luawa, the Mahawal had probably been seen essentially as the final arbiter in legal disputes about land, women, and property; he was still seen in this light throughout the first decades of the twentieth century. Here is one example of how the relationship between the Mahawal and his subjects was little altered by the imposition of British rule. If, then, one sees the imposition of British rule from the viewpoint of the Chief (as most West African historians have so far tended to do), the changes in the first decades of the twentieth century seem enormous. But if one sees the imposition of British rule from the viewpoint of the ordinary Luawa people, the changes in the first decades of the twentieth century seem much less significant. When describing the degree of change produced by the imposition of British rule, it is therefore crucial to ask, 'From whose viewpoint are we examining this question?'

61. For details of the outworkings of the imposition of British sovereignty in the reigns of Bockarie Bundeh and Ngobeh, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, pp. 433-443 below.

62. For more details of the translation into English of Mende titles, see 'Note on Political Terminology', pp. 42-43 above.

63. Masa-Chowo means war-leader. Masa-Kolaiwo has a territorial connotation and means 'ruler of the land'. Personal letter from Bundu, M.S.G.
21.5.71, Freetown: "It is interesting to note that just before the advent of colonial rule Kangama Ngeigulu was our strongest warrior chief. This was at Kailondu's time .... Kangama Ngeigulu [sic.], known simply as 'Masa-Chowo' before 1896, is reported to have gained the name 'Masa Koleiyo' after 1896".

64. Personal letter from Lahai, M.A., 19.9.71, Freetown, recording a conversation with Maada James Kailondo.

65. Rev. Clarke arrived in Sierra Leone in 1926, and went immediately to Koo-Mende country. The present writer has not found any record of any European who lived in this part of Mendeland before the 1920s and who spoke fluently this dialect of the Mende language. In 1920, Rev. J.R.S. Law went to Jojoima, and he was perhaps the first white-man to learn this dialect thoroughly. Rev. Clarke and Rev. K. Crosby were two missionaries who arrived several years later and who became proficient in the Koo-Mende dialect.

66. Int. 1.

67. None of the pre-1896 word lists of the Mende language give the word Ndoomahci. See, for example, Schon, J.F., Vocabulary of the Mende Language (S.P.C.K., London 1884). Under maha, Schon gives "king, chief, leader .... mahaya, kingship, chief power". Under ndolo he gives "world, country, kingdom, earth". Dr. K.C. Wylie in his article "Mende Chieftaincy" freely applied the term Ndoomahci to pre-1896 Mende rulers, but nowhere stated the evidence for a pre-Protectorate use of the word. Perhaps some of his informants used the term in their conversations with him as a conscious anachronism in order to simplify explanations (though among younger informants, the anachronism may have been unconscious). But it may simply be that Dr. Wylie was badly served by his interpreter.

68. Examples of such 'overlords' were Madam Yoko, Nyagua, Kailondo and Mendegla. Wa (we) in the Mende language simply means large or great. Mr. T.M. Tengbe and Rev. W.R.E. Clarke confirmed this use of Mahawa in pre-Protectorate days in personal conversation. Cf. Little, The Men of Sierra Leone, p.29: "it appears as if relatively large hegemonies or confederacies, grew up in certain regions. These were under the general leadership and control of a single chief or 'high chief', whom the local rulers acknowledged as their overlord".

69. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.5: "The chief, as a rule, did not enter into the actual fighting, unless things seemed to be going wrong. He was known as the Ko-mahci (War chief) and left everything in the hands of his Miji". The Miji was the leader of the troops. Thus when Ndawa and Kailondo initially joined forces in the Kpove War, "Ndawa is to be the Ko-mahci and Kai his Miji" (ibid., p.7).

70. 'Mahci' may be translated in English as country, world, ground, earth (Innes, Mende-English Dictionary). This is used as a prefix to mahci, and through elision of the letter 'l', the word is usually pronounced Ndoomahci. No written reference has been discovered to the term
Ndooamahel from pre-1896 days; and the most reliable informants were able to assure the present writer that there were no British-type 'Paramount Chiefs' before 1896, and that the term Ndooamahel was likewise not used before then (see Notes 64, 66 and 68 above).

71. See the following paragraphs of this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, to explain how 'Paramount Chief' was an alien concept. 'Paramount Chief' was an expression used by British officials in Freetown from the 1830s onwards, and Governor Hay's instructions to Alldridge included the phrase, "enter into treaties ... with the paramount Chiefs" (C0379/32/African No. 387, Conf. 7; Hay; 24.2.90, enc. Hay to Alldridge, 20.2.90). At least before 1896, British officials could not have clearly defined what they meant by 'Paramount Chief', except that it was a term applied to important local rulers.

72. Alldridge described how he "made many treaties with the paramount chiefs" in order that "the people would be able to enjoy life and be free from that shocking terrorism which was the perpetual condition of their existence until the creation of the Protectorate in 1896" (A Transformed Colony, p. vii). He apparently did not realize that (i) he may have misunderstood the nature of 'paramount chiefs' and of their rule (ii) Mende political institutions were in a state of flux in the late nineteenth century (iii) the British 'Paramount Chief' was quite unlike the local peoples' concept of their ruler.


74. In the decade after 1880, Kailondo's power was steadily increasing as more and more surrounding rulers made a personal submission to him. But between 1890 and 1895, Kafula rebelled and Kailondo lost control of Wunde. Note too that some minor rulers might acknowledge a degree of submission to several different opposing overlords.

75. The British required their P.C.s to collect annually a fixed amount of tax (though the P.C.s' officials could secretly extort more), and allowed their P.C.s to demand a number of customary services from the local people. But the British did not allow the P.C.s to decide serious law-cases, nor to impose serious punishments; and the British fixed limits to the amount of customary services a P.C. could demand.

76. Int. 10. Mr. Tamba Ngendu suggested that when no external wars were taking place, the people of Kisse Kama had few demands made upon them by Kailondo. But in time of war, Kailondo often asked the people (of each village?) to provide one bushel of rice and one goat every week until the war was ended, and on these provisions he fed his troops.

77. "Each chiefdom is entirely separate and independent, and although there is natural cohesion between chiefdoms composed of peoples of the same tribe and situated in the same locality, no Paramount Chief can claim pre-eminence over other Paramount Chiefs of the same tribe, either by reason of the area of his chiefdom, the wealth of his people, or the antiquity of his house .... The several chiefdoms are well defined and have no official inter-relationship whatever" (Goddard, The Handbook
of Sierra Leone, p.105). This appears to have been the view of British officials from 1896 onwards.

78. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 74-75 above.

79. Alldridge, in fact, in A Transformed Colony, ps. 176, 180-181, implied he had more respect for Kutubu than for Fabundeh, because of the former's "progressive" attitude and his "realising the necessity of implicit obedience to all Governmental instructions". Though there is no documentation, it must have been deeply shocking for Fabundeh to realize that the minor rulers of such areas as Fenguia and Dia (Baiwala), who had been insignificant compared with Kailondo, were now treated by the British as equal in status to the ruler of Luawa. Alongside this 'equalizing' of status, there were many instances of the British raising to the status of P.C. individuals who before 1896 had held only minor positions, or who had not been kaeikisia at all. Since the British did not understand local politics, it was comparatively easy for an ambitious, daring individual to achieve political power simply by ingratiating himself with the new rulers (see Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, pp. 176-177). This did not occur within Luawa before the death of Fabundeh, but for examples of the artificial creation of P.C.s in the Luawa area in 1914 and 1919, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, pp. 433-444 below.

80. To Fabundeh, the Temne people were probably almost as much 'foreigners' (hoteisia would be the Mende word) as the British. But British officials often so conflated Mende and Temne institutions that the Mende Lava le (or Speaker - an office which was institutionalized by the British themselves) was described as the Chief's 'Santiggi' - a Temne word for describing the second most important official in a Chiefdom (e.g. G0267/506/Conf.; Haddon Smith; 26.9.08, enc. Le Mesurier, 4.9.07, Daru).

81. For example, the first Standing Instructions issued to D.C.s implicitly posit that the British P.C.s may be equated with pre-1896 'traditional rulers'. "The general principle underlying the government of the Protectorate is that the administration of the Protectorate Chiefdoms is left in the hands of the Paramount Chiefs" (G0267/51/Conf.; Probyn; 9.6.09, enc. Farrar, 13.4.09, Freetown, "Authority of District Commissioners over Chiefs"). The more perceptive British officials recognized that the imposition of British rule had altered the position of the local rulers, but even they did not realize that the colonial concept of the P.C. was in fact largely a British creation (see Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.192).

82. The contradictions in British theories about the Chief's position are clearly seen in the relationship the D.C. was expected to maintain with his P.C.s. The D.C. was supposed to avoid 'ordering' the Chiefs in a peremptory manner, to comply forthwith with the orders of the Government. Rather the Chief was only to be given "advice", and was to be treated as the real ruler of his people. None the less, "there are cases in which a District Commissioner is bound to give definite, precise orders to natives in the Protectorate" (G0257/514/Conf.; Probyn; 9.6.09, enc. Farrar, 13.4.09, Freetown, "Authority of District Commissioners over Chiefs").
83. In the early years of the Protectorate, British officials were deeply concerned to reduce the power of important Chiefs like Madam Yoko, Nyagua and Fabundeh by fragmenting their polities. But in the 1930s a policy of merging Chiefdoms and 'modernizing' chiefly institutions to provide more effective local government was instituted through the N.A. system. The 1940s and 1950s saw the subordination of the N.A.s to District Councils.

84. The Kissia of Luawa were as confused as the Mendeleisias (see Note 63 above).

85. For further discussion of this violence in 1949-1951 in Luawa, see Chap. 6 of this thesis, pp. 514-21 below.

86. It is at this point that semantic differences became really important. In upholding 'Paramount Chiefs', the British were supporting a different concept from that to which the local people were loyal.

87. For British efforts at 'modernization', especially through the N.A. system, see Chap. 6 of this thesis, pp. 507-512. below.

88. In many ways the British reduced the power of P.C.s. But in some ways they made local rulers more secure in their positions, less easily dislodged by opposition and thus less responsive to the feelings of the ordinary people. For instance, the Chief's officials who were sent round to collect House Tax could easily demand more than was due, some to be given to the Chiefs, some to be kept for themselves. As annual tax demands increased, with the introduction of N.A.s (and, later, District Councils), so also did the extra demands of some Chiefs' officials, until in the end the people could bear it no longer (Report of Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, passim.). The point to note here is that it was British taxation arrangements which permitted the Chiefs to take advantage of their subjects in this way. The ordinary people remained loyal to the mahavei, but could not fail deeply to resent a Chief who had opportunity to cheat them like this.

89. The record of this violent opposition to particular Chiefs is most conveniently summarized in the Annual Reports on the Sierra Leone Protectorate of 1947 to 1954.

90. For details of the British division of Luawa, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, pp. 433-444 below. For later British criticisms of the small size of Chiefdoms, see, for example, Annual Report on the Sierra Leone Protectorate for the Year 1947, p. 7: "the greatest drawback to progress and development is undoubtedly the smallness of the individual Native Administration units, which makes everything petty and causes administrative charges to be a crippling burden".

91. By the mid-1930s it was seen that traditional authorities were "preserved in form but are not sufficiently active and growing.... It seems we cannot be absolved from trying to put life into the tribal authorities" (Fenton, J.S., Report on a Visit to Nigeria and on the Application of the Principles of Native Administration to the Protectorate of Sierra Leone (Freetown, 1935), p. 11, quoted in Kilsen, M.,
92. For example, perhaps the main function of Kailondo as ruler was to dispense justice. The British Protectorate administration severely limited the Chiefs' legal jurisdiction. For a summary of how the Chief was limited in this way by the 1930s, see Fenton, Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law, pp. 11-14.

93. 'Tribal Authority' was, before 1937, an imprecise expression used by British officials to describe the kaaksisla who surrounded the Chief (see Fenton, Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law (1933), p. 5). With the introduction of the N.A. system, a closer definition of 'Tribal Authority' was attempted in Ordinance No. 7 of 1937 (see Fenton, Outline of Native Law in Sierra Leone (1948), p. 6).

94. KDOA, Pendembu District, 217/1925, enc. Slater, R.E., H.E. the Governor's Memorandum on the "Best procedure to be observed by Political Officers on occurrence of vacancy in a Chiefdom of a Para Chiefship", 7.10.25.

95. See Chap. 6 of this thesis, pp. 433-444 below.

96. Curley, M., in Hidove (written in 1931), used the term Nolo mahel as the usual way of describing the local ruler, which suggests that by the early 1930s, this term was in general use in the Kailahun area. Probably, though, it had been in general use for nearly a generation before that.

97. Both for the British officials and for the people of Luawa, the positions of successive Chiefs of Luawa had little in common. Fabundeh, Bockarie Bunda, Monoh Banya and S.K. Banya were treated quite differently by British officials because of changes in understanding over the years of what 'Paramount Chief' meant. Their different personalities meant that the people of Luawa viewed each quite differently from his predecessor. And, as indicated in the Report of Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, p. 10, chieftaincy in Temneland was built on rather different concepts from that in Mendeland.

98. See Note 63 above.

99. In both Mende and Kissi country, the ordinary people apparently found it so incongruous to call the new British-created local rulers by pre-1896 titles that they preferred to use a new title, which was an attempted translation into their own languages of what the British appeared to mean by the term 'Paramount Chief'.

100. This is not only true of Kailondo's Luawa, but also of many of the other Mende Chiefdoms in the Protectorate. The present writer believes that studies such as Prof. Kilson's Political Change in a West African State suffer from not relating difficulties experienced at the end of the colonial period to changes which occurred at the time of the imposition
of British rule. These difficulties included Chiefdom violence, the failure of indigenous local government both by N.A.s and District Councils, political corruption, ordinary people's lack of interest in socio-economic development. Many of these difficulties may be traced back directly to British-imposed alterations of the mahwai, the mahayri, and the position of the Mahawa.

101. Right into the 1970s, the central problem of local government in Sierra Leone was the only institution to which the provincial peoples were attached was the Chiefdom. But the Chiefdom as it had been artificially altered by the British in the early twentieth century had ceased to be a viable unit of administration because (i) it was too small, (ii) it lacked initiative and 'drive', and (iii) its officials had no tradition of public service. But these limitations were all partially a product of the changes made in the Chiefdoms by the British; none of them were operative in Kailondo's Luawa.

102. Alltridge described this 1908 visit in his book, A Transformed Colony.

103. The title of Alltridge's book - A Transformed Colony - in itself indicated that in his 1908 visit, he was especially looking for evidence of beneficial change which had occurred since the establishment of British rule. "Quite recently I have visited much of the ground I went over in earlier times", he wrote in his Preface, "to find, in many cases, improvements that would have been inconceivable to me had I not witnessed them" (ibid., p.vii). It is a commonplace that a traveller discovers whatever he seeks to find, and that in this way his original prejudices are merely confirmed.

104. Alltridge believed that great political improvements had taken place in the Luawa area between 1890 and 1903 (though he had to admit an absence of evidence of much socio-economic change). He described how in the early 1890s, "the dread of the Sofa war-boys pressed heavily upon the people. All this now belongs to the past and is rapidly fading even from local memory. On my recent visit all that was changed" (ibid., p.175). However, Alltridge completely ignored the facts presented in Chap. 4 of this thesis, passim, which indicate that Kafula, and the Liberians between them had increased political confusion in the area between 1896 and 1903, so that on balance the political situation in Luawa in 1908 was considerably worse, not better, than it had been in the 1880s and early 1890s.

105. Alltridge, A Transformed Colony, p.181. The Government, from the early days of Cardew's governorship, had required the removal of all war-fences.

106. Ibid. The meat market was held in the middle of the kobangai. Unfortunately, the present writer failed to discover whether this sort of market had existed in Kailondo's day, or whether it was an innovation since Fabundehlo's accession. Alltridge does not say whether it was a daily or weekly market, but the former would seem more probable.

107. Ibid., p.182: "There are a very large number of people always coming and going from the adjacent countries, besides the resident population (ibid., p.181).
108. The signs of 'transformation' which Alldridge noted in the larger railway towns included:—
(i) the presence of European traders and the development of cash trading in cheap imported goods
(ii) European officials living in newly-built Government quarters and surrounded by locally-recruited helpers such as the Court Messengers.
(iii) the collection of palm produce for export
(iv) mission schools and hospitals
(v) 'improved' housing in the 'native towns', with wider streets and evidence of 'town planning'.

110. This point was made by Rev. Roger Smith, in April 1972, in Kailahun.
111. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.182.
112. See Chap.1 of this thesis, p. 29 above, and Chap.3, pp.198-203 above.
113. Ibid.
114. Note how Alldridge commented that European goods were brought into Kailahun from Baiima only "in a small way" (A Transformed Colony, p.182).
115. Sir Harry Johnston visited Kailahun in early 1907 (see Note 125 below) and commented on this route. "There is a large and important native town on the Liberian side called Kanre Lahun. Through this town passes a trade route from the north-east, bringing a very considerable amount of commerce from the Kisi country to the Sierra Leone Railway. It is impossible to ignore this trade or to forbid its passing from Liberia into Sierra Leone along a route that has been established for centuries" (C0267/499/F.0; 21.12.07, enc. Memorandum communicated by Sir H. Johnston, March 25, 1907).
116. See Note 112 above for reference to pre-Protectorate trade routes.
117. Alldridge did not mention any exports from Luawa, but oral tradition records that even when the railway terminus was at Baiima, some people carried palm kernels there on their heads from Luawa (see Ints.10 and 16).
118. Int.14.
119. By 1905 the railway "had been extended to Baiima, and in 1903 its present easterly terminus, Pendembu, was reached" (Goddard, The Handbook of Sierra Leone, p.170). The "tram line" extension to Pendembu had been completed by April 1908 (C0267/503/191; Probyn; 21.4.08).
120. The 1938 Wall Map indicates the distance by rail from Baiima to Pendembu as 7 miles.
121. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.182.
122. See Chap.3 of this thesis, pp.198-199 above.

124. See Chap. 3 of this thesis, p. 198 above.

125. In February 1907, Acting Governor Haddon-Smith visited Kailahun "in company with Sir Harry H. Johnston, Mr. W.J. Lamont of the Liberian Customs and Dr. Maxwell, the District Commissioner of the country bordering on that part of the Liberian frontier .... The object of our visit was to explain to the Chiefs and people that the country to the east of our Protectorate is Liberian" (CO267/492/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 3.3.07).

126. W.J. Lamont was a British official acting as Chief Inspector of Customs to the Liberian Government. He wrote a report on Trade in the Kailahun area after a visit to that area early in 1907 (CO267/499/F.O.; 19.4.07, enc. Lamont, 23.3.07).

127. Ibid.


129. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 303-5 above.

130. Disturbance continued until 1910 in the south-east of Luawa (ibid., p. 307 above).

131. 17 miles was probably a manageable day's journey with a heavy load, but 24 miles was too far.

132. Colonial officials tended to speak of the "construction" of roads (e.g. CO267/483/50; Probyn; 12.3.06, enc. Anderson, 1.2.06, Panguma, District Report for 1906, where he wrote of a road being constructed from Baiima to Ngiehun). But work on the Kailahun-Fendembu road (as with many others) represented only an improvement of the existing road.

133. CO267/501/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 17.7.08, enc. Le Mesurier, 13.7.08, Daru, Intelligence Report.

134. CO267/533/Conf.; Merewether; 16.10.11, enc. Gordon, 1.10.11, Daru, Intelligence Return, Road Reports.

135. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, p. 314 above.

136. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, p. 404 below.

137. Some few local people were in the employment of the W.A.F.F. contingent, and others no doubt gained some cash by selling rice and foodstuffs to the soldiers. But the majority of local people must have depended on the sale of palm produce to gain cash. The present writer heard the rather strange story several times while he was collecting oral
traditions that for the first year or two after the House Tax was imposed in the whole of Luawa, the British officials accepted a quantity of benniseed instead of 5 shillings in cash. The strangeness of this story lies in the fact that benniseed is not one of the major products of Luawa, and that no written records have been found to substantiate the story.

138. In 1903, the House Tax from British Luawa came to £256 (C0267/513/41; Probyn; 3.4.09, enc. Maxwell, 8.2.09, Kenema, Report on the Railway District for 1903). In 1912, the House Tax from the whole of Kailondo's Luawa came to £2,577 - 5s. (KDO&, loose papers, House Tax statistics 1912).

139. D.C. Maxwell gave £10 per ton as "an average price paid to the native" for palm kernels in 1910 (C0267/532/267; Marswether; 1.6.11, enc. Railway District Report, 1910). This would work out at 5 shillings for a 56 lb. bushel, which roughly correlates with the statement that, about 1912, a head-load of kernels would fetch 5 to 6 shillings at Pendembu (Int. 10). A head-load of kernels might weigh about 84 lb., and Pendembu prices were presumably slightly lower than average because of the town being far up-country.

All these sort of calculations are made immensely difficult because the term "bushel" was used to indicate volume rather than weight, an empty 4-gallon kerosene tin with the top cut off being used as the basic volume measure in the Luawa area during the colonial period (personal conversation with Mr. T.M. Tengbe, April 1972, Kailahun). Therefore a 'bushel' of rice would naturally be much larger by weight than a 'bushel' of palm kernels. This gives point to D.C. Maxwell's remark in 1909 that it had not been possible to enforce the use of a "standard bushel" (C0267/513/141; Probyn; 3.4.09, enc. Maxwell, 8.2.09, Kenema, Report on the Railway District for 1903). Even in the reports of early British officials, a 'bushel of rice' was sometimes used to indicate 56 lb. of rice by weight, sometimes to indicate 84 lb.; and further confusion was introduced because the rice might either be 'cleaned' (husked) or 'uncleaned' rice, which affected both volume and weight. Moreover, traders added their own confusion by doing their best to cheat the local people when they came to sell their produce.

140. The large number of wild palm trees growing throughout Luawa was one of the chief impressions which Allridge gained from his visits in the early 1890s (see C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Allridge, 12.5.90, Sulima, pp.116-117).

141. Ibid.

142. In some areas of tropical Africa, at the time when annual taxation was imposed by European rulers, cash crops and other methods of earning money were introduced, with severe repercussions on the social structures and peoples' way of life. This was not true in Luawa.

143. In A Transformed Colony, pp.165-166, Allridge gave a long list of imported goods which he found for sale at Baima. Of these, salt was almost a necessity: iron cooking pots and some of the other hardware was useful to the ordinary people of Luawa. For kerosene and
matches, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, p. 395 below. The cotton goods for sale were almost bound to be inferior to the strong, locally-made country-cloth, which was virtually indestructible. Most of the rest of the goods in Aldridge's list were either expensive luxuries or useless trinkets.


145. Cocoa was introduced into Luawa in the 1930s, and coffee in the 1940s, but neither became commercially significant until after the Second World War (see Chap. 6 of this thesis, pp. 521-35 below.

146. Palm oil is made from the fibrous outer layer of the palm nuts. The kernel is the centre of the fruit and is obtained by cracking the hard shell of the nut. From the first decade of the twentieth century, palm oil was much less important than palm kernels as a trading commodity. Traders were more interested in buying kernels than oil, and much of the oil was used locally for daily cooking. In July to December 1905, 60 tons of palm kernels were railed from Baiima compared with only 72 gallons of palm oil (CO267/485/183; Probyn; 22.6.05). In 1916 D.C. Bowden reported that "the trade in palm oil, much less important than kernels, does seem to fluctuate greatly" (CO267/507/83; Ag. Gov. Hollis; enc. Bowden, 29.1.16, Kenema, Railway District Report 1915).

147. From the viewpoint of British officials, and considering Sierra Leone's tiny annual budget in the 1890s, the figures involved in the developing palm-kernel trade were enormous. The Railway District D.C. reported that "in 1910 £157,240 was paid for the kernels shipped by the railway" (CO267/532/267; Merewether; 1.6.11, enc. Railway District Report 1910).

148. Ibid. In some parts of Railway District, April to September 1910, there was a great scarcity of rice and the distress was aggravated "by the fact that the natives had for a few years neglected the other forms of foodstuffs normally grown - cassava, sweet potatoes etc. and had devoted all their energies to the palm kernel trade". But this presumably referred to places on or very near the railway line. There is no evidence that in Luawa by this time the volume of palm kernel trade was large enough to have had such repercussions.

149. Int. 10. Mr. Tamba Ngendu said this practice began in F.C. Bockarie Bundeh's reign (i.e. 1912-1916).

150. Ibid. The habit of Kissia travelling in groups to Pendembu continued into the 1920s. When the young F.E.J. Tengbe got tired of life in Pendembu, c. 1928, he decided to "travel home with people that came to sell palm kernels .... as those who came on Saturdays and Sundays always return up the Kissi countries in very great number" (F.E.J. Tengbe's Biography, pp. 78-79).

151. CO267/530/86; Hollis; 7.3.16, enc. Protectorate Roads Department Report 1915.
152. The evidence presented in Chap. 4 of this thesis, passim, would indicate that the degree of political unsettlement, at least until 1909, was so great in some parts of Luawa that the everyday life of ordinary people was affected, trading and even farming being made difficult.

153. SLGA, MP743/1903, Trade Report 1903, enc. Anderson, 1.7.03, Panguma.


155. To leave one's own town and settle elsewhere was considerably more difficult in the early years of the twentieth century than it was to become later, when it became more common for people to go from their own area to live in Freetown and other towns. But even Chief Fabundeh himself seriously considered leaving Kailahun at one stage.

156. When Alldridge wrote of a 'transformed colony', and the 'changes' which took place between 1896 and 1908, he clearly indicated that he was referring to improvements. The virtually universal presuppositions of the British officials were that great changes were taking place and that these changes were for the better.


158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

160. 00267/533/Conf.; Merevether; 16.10.11, enc. Gordon, 1.10.11, Daru, Intelligence Return, Road Reports.

161. See Chap. 3 of this thesis, Note 47 p. 212 above, for the reasons why four is suggested as the approximate average number of people living in a town-house at this time. Kailahun even in 1890 probably had a slightly higher average number of people living in each house, possibly because it was the headquarter-town of such an important Mahsi, and this was perhaps still having an effect on patterns of residence even as late as 1911. Moreover, the average number of people living in each house rose during the twentieth century.

162. KDOA, loose papers, House Tax returns, 1918.

163. See Note 161 above.

164. See Chap. 6 of this thesis, p. 432 below. Also Chap. 6, pp. 542-3 below.

165. For details of how Lomax's behaviour in 1907 adversely affected the prestige of Fabundeh, see Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 242-6 above. British appropriation of sovereignty in Luawa also reduced the status of the Luawa Chief. After 1912, Bockarie Bundeh's behaviour further reduced the position of the Chief in Luawa (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, pp. 433-438 below).

166. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, passim.

167. Ibid., pp. 281-289 above.
168. Ibid., pp. 190-305 above.

169. The present writer realizes this is a large assumption to make. Yet the evidence put forward in this thesis, as well as personal experience of the situation in the 1960s, indicate its general truth in the political, social and economic spheres. The whole subject of town and country relationships in the Protectorate during the colonial period would make a fascinating study in itself.

170. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 105 above.

171. In January 1907, Lieut. R.H. Gill wrote from Kailahun about the arrival there of Lomax. Gill was commanding 'D' Company, which was resident at Kailahun (GO267/492/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 16.1.07, enc. Gill, 9.1.07, Kanre Lahun). Cf. The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force, p. 84: "One company had been stationed at Wulade and one at Kanre-Lahun in the Kissi country since the expedition there [in 1905]."

172. The way of life in the barracks may be described as 'semi-European' because (i) the European Officers in Kailahun lacked many of those material facilities which were integral to their way of life, and (ii) the people of Kailahun came more into contact with the African soldiers than with the Europeans, and the ordinary soldiers' way of life was only affected at certain points by 'European' concepts. For example, the soldiers had enforced on them a strictly timed and regulated working week; but their Officers did not attempt greatly to control or influence their soldiers' behaviour in leisure hours.

173. It may be presumed that the presence of soldiers with a regular wage and a little money to spare produced a growth of petty cash traders in Kailahun town. But there is no direct evidence of this.

174. GO267/506/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 26.9.08, enc. Statement of Banya, taken down by Capt. Gordon at Kailahun, 31.8.08: "Major Le Mesurier was in close friendship with Momoh Banya" (Int.20).

175. "Momo Banya's English was very good", noted Migeod in 1924, "and we used sometimes Mende to talk in, sometimes English. He had never been to school, but had opportunities of learning as there were troops here so long" (A View of Sierra Leone, p. 113).

176. Given the sparsity of evidence about traders coming into Luawa from the Colony, it is impossible to discover whether these traders were really Freetown Creoles, or whether they were Protectorate people who had lived for some time in the Colony and had assimilated some creole characteristics. The latter would seem to be the most probable. Though names of traders living in Kailahun at this time are difficult to find, the 'Lomax affair' provided evidence in passing of traders living in Kailahun.

177. Int.20.
178. CO267/499/F.D.; 17.6.07, enc.

179. CO267/513/141; Probyn; 3.4.09, enc. Maxwell, 8.2.09, Kenema, Report on the Railway District for 1908. British Luawa extended only as far west as Kenema, and did not include Kailahun.

180. Ibid. Maxwell, who was a medical doctor, became D.C. of Railway District on its creation in 1906-07, and remained substantive D.C. of the District until 1914.

181. CO267/506/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 26.9.03, enc. Garlough, 17.5.08. Garlough was almost certainly a Creole trader.

182. See Chap.3 of this thesis, p. 203 above.

183. Ibid., p. 212 above.

184. A person had to be wealthy to travel by rail, because passenger fares in Sierra Leone were almost as high as in Britain, and Freetown was over 200 miles from Pendembu. This was one reason why individuals from politically-powerful families in Luawa were most easily able to travel.

185. Int.20.

186. Both kerosene and matches were mentioned by Alldridge as being on sale at Baiima in 1903 (A Transformed Colony, p.166). He was surprised on this same visit to find kerosene also on sale in Mendekelama, 9 miles north-east of Joru (ibid., p.205).

187. Int.10.

188. During his first visit to Luawa in 1890, Alldridge lit his pipe with a match, and the peoples' reaction showed that they had never seen a match before (The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.198-199). It has been suggested that kerosene and matches were perhaps the most valuable benefits which the ordinary people gained from British rule (Smith, Rev. R., in personal conversation, April 1972, Kailahun).


190. The arrangement seems to have been that Le Mesurier was made a 2nd. Class D.C. with responsibility for Luawa, under the general supervision of Dr. J.C. Maxwell, who was District Commissioner for the whole of Railway District. Previously, Le Mesurier had been D.C. of the Frontier Force at Daru with the rank of Major. So here is a concrete example of how a transfer from a fairly senior position in the military service to a fairly junior position in the political administration was considered 'promotion'.

191. The despatches contained in CO267 give the impression that very little was done to lay down guidelines for the District Commissioners until the
early years of the twentieth century, but that under Probyn's governorship (1904-1911), the colonial administration rapidly became formalised.

192. Some of the information provided in this section, then is relevant to the rest of the Protectorate (and even to Luawa - especially British Luawa) before 1911. Most of the information for the years 1911 to 1936 is relevant not only to Luawa but also to the rest of the Protectorate. In discussing British local administration, it is in fact difficult to confine the discussion narrowly to one Chiefdom during a limited time-span because (i) detailed information on any one Chiefdom is limited, and (ii) much information which does exist relates to a slowly evolving system, spread over half-a-century and applied to some 200 Chiefdoms, rather than one particular Chiefdom over a set period. Therefore, the discussion in this section of the thesis is necessarily more diffuse in time-span and less particular in its detail than most.

193. In 1937, the introduction of the N.A. system brought some minimal changes in Chiefdom government. After 1945, more radical changes in local government were introduced, with the establishment of District Councils and the devolution of more authority on the local indigenous rulers; new socio-economic pressures also began to produce considerable change in some areas of local political life. But in the main, P.G. Momoh Banya's reign (1924-1952) was a period of political quiescence, and even in minor details of administration, the British system operated in 1936 in the same way as it had done in 1924, or even in 1911.

194. A convenient summary of administrative boundary changes 1896-1945 may be found in Clarke, Sierra Leone in Maps, pp. 30-31, where a map may be found of the 5 original Districts, as well as later changes. The map of District boundaries 1896-1906 is however misleading in that it superimposes these boundaries on a map of Sierra Leone showing international boundaries as they appeared only after 1911. The major part of Luawa before 1911, including Kailahun town, was not in any of the 5 Districts, but was in Liberian territory. Panguma District was contiguous to Luawa, and the D.C. at Panguma was geographically the nearest resident British official to Luawa in the years between 1896 and 1905. Occasionally in these years Panguma D.C.'s became involved in Luawa's affairs (the main instances have been noted in Chap. 4 of this thesis, passim), but instances were not numerous. In the early 1900s, the substantive D.C. at Panguma was Major d'Arcy Anderson, but since most of Luawa was never in the Panguma District, it is irrelevant to this present thesis to discuss the details of administration in that District.

195. For the creation of Railway District, see GO267/486/238; Probyn; 16.8.06, and GO267/438/394; Probyn; 6.10.06.

196. At first the new Railway District was known as Bandajuma District. See also GO267/489/Conf.; Probyn; 2.11.06.

197. For a contemporary map of Railway District, see Micholl, An Introduction to the Geography of Sierra Leone, p. 57. "The Railway District lies towards the east of the Protectorate, and has an area of, roughly, 7,000 square miles. The railway runs through the district from west to east..."
from a point 120 miles from Freetown.... The area to be administered is large and comprises the entire trade zone drained by the main line railway north-east of Bo, and quite 80 per cent of the entire railway freight comes from this area" (ibid., pp.61-62).

198. CO267/493/144; Haddon-Smith; 26.4.07, enc. Maxwell, 31.3.07, Kenema, Railway District Report 1907. In September 1906, Bandajuma was abandoned as District Headquarters, which was transferred to Kenema. To find the information about Maxwell, the present writer looked through the relevant official despatches in CO267. At approximately fifteen-month intervals, the substantive D.C. went on 6 months leave, and during his absence he had to be replaced by temporary, acting D.C.s.

199. To find the information about Bowden, the present writer looked through the relevant official despatches in CO267. Bowden was remembered by the older people of Luwa in 1972 as one of the most able British officials, though this was perhaps partly the result of a slight sense of nostalgia about the 'distant past'. See Sierra Leone Government Civil Service List 1929, p.16. Bowden was born 22.6.75, gained an M.A. at Edinburgh University, and was Assistant Engineer on the Sierra Leone Railway, 1901-1905. He was appointed a D.C. in 1905.

200. See Note 190 above.

201. For details of administrative organization in the 1920s, see Goddard, The Handbook of Sierra Leone, pp.99-106. Central Province was divided into 4 Districts; Pendembu District contained 19 Chiefdoms.

202. Ibid. The folding map at the back of the book clearly shows Pendembu District.

203. Int.3. Sierra Leone Government Civil Service List 1929, p.19. Hollins was born on 1.1.86, and gained a B.A. at Cambridge University. He was appointed to the Sierra Leone Civil Service in 1910.

204. Int.3.

205. Sierra Leone Government Civil Service List 1929, p.16.


208. KDOA, Pendembu District, 128/1927, enc. Hollins, 19.10.27, Kailahun, to C.C.P.: "Kailahun was healthier than Pendembu". See also Int.3.


210. See ibid., Chap.3, p.179 above.
211. KDOA, Pendembu District, 128/1927, enc. "NOTICE. The Headquarters of the Pendembu District will be moved from Pendembu to Kailahun on Sat. 28th December 1929".

212. Railway District 1906-1919 had been roughly the same size and shape as the whole of the new Central Province, which contained 4 Districts. Nevertheless, with an increasing amount of paperwork to do, it is doubtful whether D.C.s were able to visit most of the Chiefdom headquarter towns more than twice a year. Many smaller villages were never ever visited by a white man throughout the colonial period.

213. In conversations with the local people in 1972, the present writer found that the personality of the different D.C.s was of supreme importance. Each one was remembered for his behaviour and foibles, his temperament and his attitude to the local people. Alldridge (who was a Travelling Commissioner and not a D.C. when he visited Luwa in the 1890s) and Bowden were remembered with particular respect. Mr. Hollins was noted as an official who took a kind and lenient view of people and their shortcomings. Significantly, most of the post-Second-World-War D.C.s were remembered as young authoritarian and unsympathetic to the local people.

214. Ex-P.C. Kaitungi described how one P.C. instructed his sub-chiefs to gather and await the arrival of the Governor. They waited all afternoon in the hot sun, and finally the Governor arrived. One sub-chief afterwards approached the P.C. very crossly and said that he was going home; he thought they had been waiting for an important District Commissioner to arrive, but the only person who had turned up was "a common Governor" (Int. 22).

215. For a discussion of the title 'White Man's Grave' as applied to Sierra Leone, see Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, pp.

216. The C0267 despatches for 1899-1901 contain numerous reports of District Commissioners who resigned or who were dismissed. The present writer was provided with clear evidence by both Europeans and Africans that the sort of behaviour which caused these resignations and dismissals was not unknown in the succeeding sixty years, and some D.C.s proved less than satisfactory in this regard. The present writer does not subscribe to the view, current in some historical circles, that the detailed analysis of such information is generally valuable and enlightening. He was, in any case, restricted by the fact that (i) some of the people concerned may still be alive and (ii) some of his informants properly requested that he should not retail their comments on these matters.

217. Hollins, N.C., "1919 and 1936: Contrasts in Bush Travel in Sierra Leone". MS kindly given by the author to the present writer.

218. These were apparently the first Standing Instructions issued to D.C.s, though the Protectorate had been established for almost 13 years. Up to this time D.C.s had apparently simply improvised and followed their own inclinations in their relations with Chiefs.
219. C0267/514/Conf.; Probyn; 9.6.09, enc. Farrar, 13.4.09, Freetown,
Confidential Standing Instruction No.1 of 1909 to District Commissioners;
Authority of District Commissioners over chiefs.

220. Eberl-Elber, R., "Harvest and Magic among the Kissi of Sierra Leone"

221. C0267/514/Conf.; Probyn; 9.6.09, enc. Farrar, 13.4.09, Freetown,
Confidential Standing Instruction No.1 of 1909. Later, this became
Standing Instruction No.9 (C0267/524/Conf.; Probyn; 3.9.10).

222. C0267/514/Conf.; Probyn; 9.6.09, enc. Farrar, 13.4.09, Freetown,
Confidential Standing Instruction No.1 of 1909. This document contains
a fairly clear statement of what later became known as 'indirect rule' -
a theory of colonial government for which Lugard is usually held
responsible. But, in Sierra Leone, this theory was propounded and made
the basis of local administration a decade before Lugard's Dual Mandate.

223. The main part of Kailondo's work as Mahsi, apart from his ordering of
external affairs (which included the making of war and peace), was the
administration of justice, and the receiving and distributing of gifts.

224. C0267/514/Conf.; Probyn; 9.6.09, enc. Farrar, 13.4.09, Freetown,
Confidential Standing Instruction No.1 of 1909.

225. See Note 213 above.

226. There were, of course, some matters on which Government policy was fixed
(for example, a P.C. knew that any D.C. would make sure that the House
Tax was paid annually). But on many other matters, Government policy
altered over the years. For example, the economic pressures of the
Great Depression and the World Wars changed Government policy towards
the Chiefs; the introduction of N.A.s likewise marked a change of
attitude. In addition, each D.C. had his own particular emphases, and
D.C.s were moved fairly frequently from one District to another as a
rule. It was not surprising, therefore, if Chiefs felt D.C.s gave orders
in a very arbitrary manner.


228. At this time, "recognized native authority" simply meant the P.C. himself.

229. C0267/514/Conf.; Probyn; 9.6.09, enc. Farrar, 13.4.09, Freetown,
Confidential Standing Instruction No.1 of 1909.

230. It has been pointed out that one day a Court Messenger might be detailed
to go on his own, unarmed, to arrest a dangerous murderer; the next day
his duty might simply consist of carrying the D.C.'s wife's handbag a
few miles through the bush to the next Chiefdom's Rest House.

231. Ordinance No.31 of 1907, quoted by Hollins, N.C., "A Note on the History
of the Court Messenger Force", in Sierra Leone Studies (o.s.), No.18
(1932), pp.79-80. This short article also gives a good summary of the
development of the C.M.F. from a body of Government messengers in the early 1890s. Some Court Messengers were attached to each D.C. after 1896, and in 1902, when the Frontier Police were disbanded, the Messengers took over some extra duties, and their numbers were increased from 50 to 127 (C0267/459/304; King-Harman; 4.9.01. See also C0267/459/438; King-Harman; 18.10.01). Only in 1907, however, was the C.M.F. constituted by Ordinance "under the control of and at the disposal of the District Commissioner". The shape the C.M.F. then took was retained until its disbandment in 1954. The C.M.F. was an organization unique to the Sierra Leone Protectorate: no other British territory had such a Force. For further information, see Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.125-126; Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p.32; and Goddard, The Handbook of Sierra Leone, p.122.

232. Hollins, N.C., "The Court Messenger Force of the Sierra Leone Protectorate" (1937), p.6. This MS was kindly given to the present writer by the author.

233. The very great dependence of the D.C. upon his C.M.F. was shown in the comments of British officials when the Force was disbanded (see The Report of Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Provinces, pp.220-221).

234. Int. 21: "if the [C.M.F.] Sergeant-Major said you wouldn't see the D.C., then that was the end of your matter".

235. Ibid., for an estimate of the important role which Sergeant-Major Jibatch of Kailahun played in the 1943 paramount chieftaincy election in Luawa.

236. Finnegan, R., and Murray, D., "Limba Chiefs" in West African Chiefs: their changing status under Colonial Rule and Independence (ed. Crowder, M., and Ikimi, O.), p.418. There were a few Chiefdom messengers attached to the Paramount Chief, but they had little importance, being messengers and nothing more; and they had no connection with the Court Messenger Force.

237. The ordinary village farmer in Luawa could not speak English or Krio, and the D.C. would automatically use one of the Court Messengers to act as interpreter (see Int.21).

238. Mr. F.E.J. Tengbo in his Biography, p.187, indicated that even at the annual tax-collection (the most important annual activity in the D.C.'s official life) only Chiefdom officials sent by the P.C. went round each village of the Chiefdom making out the assessment. No Court Messenger was present even for this crucial annual event, but only Chiefdom messengers.

239. Hollins, "The Court Messenger Force of the Sierra Leone Protectorate", p.6. See also Int.3.

240. Ibid., p.4. Other ex-colonial officials with whom the present writer talked had largely the same impression about the C.M.F.
This curious expression was used in the Protectorate to describe a D.C.'s going on tour round part of the District, trekking on foot from village to village (see Hollins, "1910 and 1936", p.2).

A distress warrant is a document authorizing the legal seizure of a chattel, in order out of the proceeds of its sale to satisfy some debt or claim.

Hollins, "The Court Messenger Force of the Sierra Leone Protectorate", pp.6-8. This was written in 1937.

See Sierra Leone Government Civil Service List 1929, p.19, and Int.3

This list indicates the main activities of the C.M.F. at least up to 1936. The introduction of the N.A. system in 1937 in some ways altered the situation. Then in 1942 P.C. Momoh Sanya died, and his death marked the end of an era in Luawas: from then onwards new relations developed between the ordinary people, the Chief, and the British officials. Even before 1936, the list of C.M.F. activities is not entirely relevant to Luawa. For example, no Medical Officer was resident in Kailahun until the late 1930s, so the Court Messengers round Kailahun were not generally involved in any medical work.

In conversation with various British ex-colonial officials, the present writer found general agreement that a D.C.'s main daily work involved the settling of petty litigation.

The content of these Ordinances is conveniently summarized in Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp.541-545.

See, for example, Wallis, The Advance of our West African Empire, passim.

In his relations with Chiefs and ordinary people, the D.C. started a new file for each new subject, and these files were known as Native Affairs Minute Papers. In the Kailahun District Office Archives, a fairly complete set of files seems to have been preserved for each Chiefdom in the District for the 1920s and 1930s.

'Palaver' is a Krio word in general use up-country in Sierra Leone to mean dispute, difficulty, trouble.

Mr. Hollins kindly provided an outline of a typical working day in his District Headquarters during the 1920s and 1930s:

7.30, arrive at Office and start work.
13.00, break for lunch.
14.00 - 19.00, rest, relaxation and evening meal.
19.00, return to Office in order to deal with correspondence. Much time in his morning working sessions would be devoted to settling petty litigation. He aimed to spend about two weeks out of every four 'on trek' in the bush.
252. The number of files dealing with taxation and revenue vastly increased after 1937, as a result of the introduction of N.A.s. The present writer uses the expression 'surviving files' for two reasons: (i) it is clear that files on some subjects had been removed from the Archives, presumably before the end of the colonial period, and (ii) the Kailahun District Office Archives had, by 1972, been reduced in volume in various ways. Many bundles of files had been roughly handled, so that documents had become torn, crumpled, dirtied and jumbled, and were therefore unreadable. Other piles of documents had been so spoiled by insects as to be rendered illegible.

253. KDOA, loose papers, Kanre Lahun Hut Tax statistics 1912.

254. SLGA, Information Regarding Protectorate Chiefs, 1912, Railway District, Bokari Bundeh of Luawa [sic].

255. Full lists of tax figures, covering all the Chiefdoms in the Protectorate, are not easily uncovered, but the present writer found no record of any Chiefdom which even approached Luawa in the amount of tax collected.

256. For details of the fragmentation of Kailondo's Luawa into four Chiefdoms, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.5, pp.433-444 below.

257. SLGA, Pendembu District Decree Book, pp.392-410. By 1942, at the time of P.C. Banya's death the figures were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chiefdom</th>
<th>Tax 1942</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luawa</td>
<td>£2,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissi Kama</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissi Teng</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissi Tungi</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>£3,856</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(KDOA, loose papers Chiefdom Estimates 1942)

258. See Note 256 above.

259. G0267/503/179; Froby; 16.4.08, enc. Maxwell, 31.3.08, Railway District Report, 1907. 1907 was the first year in which this system was used. Dr. Maxwell had general supervision of the collection of tax from Luawa in 1912 and 1913.

260. By 1942 in Luawa, the three Kissi Chiefdoms, and many others, Chiefdom Tax was made up of 5 shillings House Tax and 4 shillings Native Authority tax.

261. Tengbe, Biography, pp.250-251. Mr. Tengbe was born in 1917, and went to primary school in Pendembu in the early 1930s. He nursed in Segbevema Hospital from 1933 to 1935, and was then trained as a teacher at Union College, Bunumbu, 1935 to 1936. He became a Chiefdom Clerk in 1938, and thereafter worked in all three Kissi Chiefdoms. He retired from local government service in 1959, and died in 1970.

262. The first occasion on which British officials generally were forced to face the weaknesses of the system from the viewpoint of the ordinary Chiefdom people, was after the Provincial disturbances of 1955-56. These
weaknesses were first detailed at length in *The Report of Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Provinces, 1955-1956*, pp. 112-128. The enormous increase in the amount of official tax paid by the ordinary people between 1936 and 1956, and the transmutation of the House Tax into a poll tax, had considerably exacerbated the corruption and weaknesses of the tax-collection system for the ordinary people by the mid-1950s (ibid., pp. 126-127). But discerning British officials had been aware of the corruption for decades. "A lot of tax", noted Mr. N.C. Hollins in 1936, "is at present illegally collected - the matter will surely have to be faced before very long" (Hollins papers, C.4/1935, Senior D.C. Moyamba, 19.11.35, Moyamba, Reorganization of Native Administration, enc. Hollins, 9.2.36, Moyamba).

263. See Note 236 above.

264. See Note 93 above.

265. Tengbe, Biography, p.187.

266. Ibid., p.219. To European eyes, this appears to be a clear statement of the existence of bribery and corruption. But this is not necessarily the case. Any traveller asking the tamahel for a night's lodging would by custom expect to receive hospitality. The Chief, or Chief's official, would also by custom expect to receive small gifts if he stayed in a village for a night; it would be a mark of impoliteness for the village people not to do this. In return, the villagers would expect their needs to be given consideration by the official. Between these customary marks of respect and bribery and corruption the distinction is very fine; but nevertheless that distinction is both real and important.

267. Ibid. Mr. Tengbe was not pleased to be transferred to Bongre Chiefdom in 1941 as Clerk, because P.C. Harry Baion of Bongre "was educated and no chance to get anything for nothing". See also Alltridge, *A Transformed Colony*, p.176.

268. Tengbe, Biography, p.219.

269. Ibid. Salaries for Chiefdom Clerks varied from £1 to £2 per month, in Mr. Tengbe's experience.

270. Specific evidence is difficult to find concerning the changing attitude of Chiefdom officials, but apart from anything else, the increasingly large circulation of cash would encourage a greater venality.

271. The other main objections to Bockarie Bundeh's rule seem to have been that (i) he persecuted his opponents, especially Momoh Banya, and (ii) he despised the Kissi people (see Ints. 9, 10, 19). For a fuller discussion, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, pp. 433-6 below.


273. These dangers are described in detail in Chaps. 2 and 3 of this thesis, passim.
274. See Note 271 above.

275. RH, MSS Afr. S. 672, Hollins, N.C., Sierra Leone 1921-1936, Advice to Chiefs (n.d. 1936 ?), mimeo. booklet, Chap.XII, "Public Work".

276. Fenton, Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law, p.8.

277. See Note 275 above. The Chief should not ask his people to do such jobs for more than a week at a time.

278. Fenton, Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law, p.7.

279. Ibid., p.8.

280. Ibid.

281. Ibid., p.9.

282. Int.18. Ex-P.C. S.K. Banya of Luawa said that at the beginning of his reign, in 1943, British officials were eager to reduce his salary considerably from that which his father had received, because P.C. Momoh Banya had possessed a salary which was larger than the salaries of some colonial officials. "My father was earning a salary, about, of £1,000 a year. In my time it was pegged on to £650".

283. Fenton, Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law, pp.7-8, deals with such commutation.

284. SLGA, Pendembu District Decree Book, pp.118-120. Such agreements were made over again several times in similar terms during the next decade. Presumably they had to be remade each time a new Chief was elected (see, for example, KDOA, NAMP, Pendembu District, 51/1930, Kissi Tungi Chiefdom, Agreement made by the Tribal Authority and big men of Kissi Tungi Chiefdom before the D.C. in February 1930).

285. SLGA, Pendembu District Decree Book, pp.118-120.

286. RH, MSS Afr. S. 672, Hollins, N.C., Sierra Leone 1921-1936, Pendembu District; Handing Over Notes, April 1st 1930.

287. Ibid.

288. Ibid.

289. See Note 275 above. By the 1930s, there was a rule that no one should do "more than 30 days such work per year, and should be paid by Government 6d a day for building work and 1d a mile for carriers". It seems, however, that this money was rarely received by the labourers.

291. The British departmental officials whom the Luawa people saw most of were those from the Public Works Department. In the late 1920s, there was a P.W.D. official actually resident in Kailahun (Int.1). Officials from the Agriculture Department also visited the area sometimes.

292. KDOA, Pendembu District, 128/1927, enc. Hollins, 8.10.28, to the Executive Engineer, P.W.D., Bo.

293. Manda James Kailondo said labourers employed on making the Pendembu-Kailahun road were paid (Int.19), but they apparently never received any money (Ints.18).

294. KDOA, Pendembu District, 128/1927.

295. Ibid. See also Ints.18 and 25.

296. KDOA, Pendembu District, 128/1927.

297. Ibid., enc. memo., Hollins, 14.3.28, to Executive Engineer, P.W.D., Bo. "What arrangements are you making to pay labourers on the new D.C.'s house at Kailahun?"

   2. These men in view of a recent decision should be paid the full market rates".

   Reply, 27.3.28: "Yes. The men will be paid at normal rate of 9/- per diem".

298. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.5, pp.412-419 below.

299. C0267/445/Conf.3; Cardew; 9.1.99.

300. The methods used by the P.C.s to compensate themselves economically for loss of political power are discussed fully in Kilson, Political Change in a West African State. Little reference has been made to this book because (i) it largely deals with the later years of colonial rule which are not the main concern of this thesis, and (ii) it generalizes about the Protectorate as a whole, whereas the aim of this thesis has been to look, as specifically as possible, at one limited area.

301. See Chap.3 of this thesis, pp.175-6 above.

302. P.C. Bockarie Bundeh's son, ruled from 1912 to 1916.

303. RH. MSS. Afr. S.672, Hollins, N.C., Sierra Leone 1921-1926, Annual Report on Pendembu District 1929, 'Trade': "The unfortunate collapse in the price of kernels militated against high figures - the price per bushel falling at one time as low as three shillings and sixpence". Mr. Hollins commented that low produce prices "first made themselves felt in 1928". Within three years, prices were to fall as low as 4/- per bushel in Kailahun.

304. Sierra Leone Report of Census for the Year 1931 (Govt. Printer, Freetown, n.d.).
305. See Chap. 3 of this thesis, pp. 202-3 above.

306. In 1907, Sir Harry Johnston commented, after a visit to Luawa, that the Kissi country-Pendembu trade route had been "established probably for centuries" (CO267/499/F.0., 21.12.07, enc. Memorandum communicated by Sir H. Johnston, March 25, 1907).

307. See Chap. 3 of this thesis, p. 202 above for the widening of the road by Kailondo; this chapter, Chap. 5, p. 340 above for further widening in Fabuncheh's reign.

308. RCS, Annual Report of the Railway District for the year 1914 (Warren, 28.1.15, Kenema, p. 8: "The completion of the Pendembu-Kanre-Lahun road will be a valuable addition in opening up the trade possibilities of the Luawa-Kissi country". The present writer has not discovered a definite starting date for the work of making the road motorable, but presumably it would have been mentioned in earlier reports if it had been started then.

309. See Note 339 below.

310. CO267/570/86; Hollis; 7.3.16, enc. Protectorate Roads Department Report 1915. The road was being formed to a width of 12 feet, but this meant no real widening was required along most of its length; it was already 12 feet wide by 1911 (see CO267/533/Conf.; Merewether; 16.10.11, enc. Gordon, 1.10.11, Daru, Intelligence Return, Road Reports.

311. Int. 18.

312. CO267/570/86; Hollis; 7.3.16, enc. Protectorate Roads Department Report 1915. The longest of these bridges was over the River Koya, and was situated about a mile south of Ngiehun.

313. If "the unskilled labour provided free by the Chiefs for the Roads from Pendembu-Kairo Lahun [sic.], Lago-Panguma and Moyamba-Sembenh were paid for at the usual rates of wages, the additional cost would have been at least £10,000" (ibid.).

314. Ibid.

315. Int. 18.

316. Int.


318. See Note 313 above. The road ran for about 6 miles through Upper Bambara; the rest of its distance - some 17 miles to the Moa River at Sambalu - was through Luawa.

319. The Government could call men to make and mend roads, but no one "should do more than 30 days such work per year" (Hollins, Advice to Chiefs, Chap. XII, 'Public Work').
320. Unfortunately the present writer failed to find any quota figures which would show what proportion of the labour force was provided by Luawa and what proportion by Upper Bambara. But considering that Luawa was the bigger Chiefdom and that the road ran for a greater mileage through Luawa, 4,000 men from Luawa and 2,600 men from Upper Bambara would seem probable proportions.

321. The earliest estimate of Luawa's population was given by Mr. Hollins in 1929, in his "Short History", p.10, where he suggested a total of 30,000. Rev. Clarke agreed with this in his Foundation of Luawa, p.2. House Tax returns for Luawa in 1915 were £1,358 - 5s., and for 1929 were £1,745 - 5s., which would suggest an increase of about one third in Luawa's total population (mainly it seems, by immigration in the first years of Momoh Banya's reign) between 1915 and 1930. Thus the figure of about 22,500 for total population in 1915.

322. The Report of the 1931 Census, p.155, noted that in 1931, per 1,000 of the population in Kailahun District, 279 were young and middle-aged males. Not all of these would work, some being disabled, sick, or members of the ruling elite. But these non-workers would be cancelled out by some old men and some of the older male children who should be added to the working population. There is no reason to think that the proportion of the male working population to the total population was any different in 1915 from what it was in 1931.

323. The exact percentage of the male working population of Luawa who were sometime during 1915 engaged in work on the Kailahun-Pendembu road, from the figures provided by the present writer, was 63%. But since the figures themselves cannot possibly be precise, the phrase 'about two-thirds' seems more apposite than 63%.

324. G0267/574/38; Wilkinson; 22.2.17, enc. Roads Report 1916

325. Bockarie Bundeh was deposed on 8.7.16 (SLGA, Pendembu District Decree Book, p.303).


327. Ibid. Enclosed with the report is an abstract showing the number of labourers supplied free of cost to the Government by the P.C.s for the Pendembu-Kailahun road for each month of 1916: 180 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 130 - 160 - 390 - 1000 - 1000 - 350 - 850. The average per day throughout the year was 447.

328. Rev. Roger Smith, in conversation in Kailahun, April 1972, made the important point that where there was a motorable road or a railway in the Protectorate, there was always change and an influx of traders; but people living in areas not within easy walking distance of motorable road or railway were hardly affected at all in their ordinary lives by British rule. It was noticeable how Lebanese traders moved up to Dodo-Cotuma and Buedu in the early 1930s, after a motorable road had been built to those places; and in the 1940s they moved up to Kangam and Koindu when the road was extended (see Int.21). It is therefore very
important to note that many writers on British rule in Mendeland largely considered places on roads and railways, precisely because such places were easily accessible. Yet places on or near roads and railways were not typical Mende settlements. For example, a network of motorable roads was developed in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms only in the 1950s.


330. KDOA, loose papers, House Tax; Chiefdom: Luawa, 1918.

331. A number of fairly detailed studies have already been published on the growth of the Lebanese (known in Sierra Leone as the 'Syrians') as a trading group in Sierra Leone. Alldridge noted how they arrived in ones and twos at the beginning of the twentieth century, but by 1908 they had already established themselves as an important commercial interest (A Transformed Colony, pp.81-84).

332. The three surnames are typically Creole.

333. Combey MS, p.19. See also Int.19.

334. Ibid.

335. Combey MS, P.19, indicates that all these traders came to settle in the reign of Ngobeh (1916 - 1923).

336. Ibid.


338. See Note 143 above.

339. Combey MS, p.19. R.G. Morton is here described as "a Birmingham merchant".

340. Int.19.

341. Int.1. He had three children in about 1930; a girl of about 14; a boy of about 11; and another girl of about 7. His shop was on the left-hand corner of Hospital Road.

342. Ibid. His wife and elder daughter lived on their own for considerable periods in this shop at Dodo. The Dodo road was begun in 1927 (KDOA, Pendembu District, 106/1926) and became motorable in 1929 (RCS, Sierra Leone Annual Report of the Public Works Department for 1929, pp.11-12)

343. KDOA, Pendembu District, NAMP 88/1929, enc. Morton and Metheringham, 17.10.29.

344. Int.1.
345. Sierra Leone Annual Report of the Public Works Department for 1929, pp.11-12. By the end of 1929 the Moa Ferry at Manowa was almost ready to put into commission.

346. Int.1. The 1932 Wall Map shows how a road has been constructed from Pendembu, across the Moa at Manowa Ferry, to join the Segbwema-Sefadu motor-road at Bunumbu.

347. See map opp. p.414.

348. Int.1. Cf. Int.18: "Khalil's shop was where it is now. Khalil was employed by another Syrian, 'Lansana' Hassan".

349. Int.1.

350. Int. 18 and 19.

351. Momoh Banya was elected as P.C. of Luawa in 1924.

352. Ibid.

353. Int.1.

354. Ibid.

355. Int.18. J.T. Combey was the father of B.N. Combey, who was later to become M.P. for Kailahun, and who wrote the History which has several times been quoted in this thesis. The present writer met Mr. J.T. Combey in Kailahun in 1972, but the latter declined to give an interview.

356. Ints. 1 and 19.

357. Cocoa and coffee only became significant as cash crops in the Luawa area after the Second World War.

358. These figures are sometimes to be found in the Annual Railway Reports and in the District Reports. Unfortunately the figures are not always given for individual stations.

359. Sometimes neither Railway nor District Reports give the relevant figures.

360. One of the great problems for a researcher in Luawa's history between c.1908 and c.1931 is to know how to refer to the area in a clear and simple way. From the final section of this chapter (pp.433-444 below), it will become clear that by 1914, 'Kailondo's Luawa' was split into Luawa Chiefdom and Kissi Chiefdom; and then in 1919, Kissi Chiefdom was split into three smaller Chiefdoms. In this present thesis, the style 'Luawa and Kissi country' has generally been adopted to refer to the whole area in the period 1908-1931. 'Kissi country' refers only to the area within the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, namely the present-day Chiefdoms of Kissi Kama, Kissi Teng and Kissi Tungi. This is not entirely satisfactory, but no better alternative could be devised of referring simply to the whole area as it disintegrated into smaller political units.
Chiefdoms west of the Moa could most conveniently send their produce down the Bandajuma-Segbwema road to Segbwema station: this road was motorable by the early 1920s (see 1921 map at the back of Goddard, *The Handbook of Sierra Leone*). Chiefdoms south of Pendembu would use Baiima or Daru stations. Produce railed from Pendembu thus came exclusively from Upper Bambara, Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms, and the nearby parts of French Guinea and Liberia. People came to Pendembu from Guinea within a radius as large as 100 miles, taking a week or ten days to travel down from beyond Gbékédu (Int. 10).

"At present", noted Mr. Hollins in 1928, "a large quantity of French kernels are entrained at Pendembu - some came by the Mofindo road to Kailahun; but the bulk via Dia .... A certain quantity of Liberian kernels come from the Kunjo Customs station, at the point where Sierra Leone, French Guinea, and Liberia meet - thence via Koindu to Dia, Kailahun and Pendembu" (*KDOA, Pendembu District, 113/1928, enc. Hollins, 31.5.28, Report to C.C.P.*). Despite this, most of the produce passing through the Pendembu railhead probably came from Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms.


See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.5, pp.411-419 below.

For the rise in importance of cocoa and coffee as exports of Luawa and Kissi country, see Chap.6 of this thesis, pp.524-535 below.

Migeod had worked as a colonial official in the Gold Coast, and had learnt the Mende language while he was there.

The evidence from numerous sources (see Notes 339 to 344 above) clearly indicates that R.G. Morton was established in Kailahun before the 1920s. Presumably, then, he was either on leave or 'out of town' when Migeod visited Kailahun.


The Economic Revolution in West Africa was the title of a well-known book written in 1926 by McPhee, A. (Routledge, London).

Migeod, *op. cit.* p.121.

Tengeb, *Biography*, p.58. Presumably this was R.G. Morton's lorry. The Ford lorry presented to P.C. Momoh Banya (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.5, p.419 below) was not, it seems, used regularly to run between Kailahun and Pendembu.


KDOA, Pendembu District, 113/1928, enc. Hollins, 31.5.28, Report to C.C.P.

Of course, the presence or absence of motor transport was not the only factor affecting cash-crop production.
In 1929, the effects of the great world-wide depression had started to make themselves felt, and only 7,142 tons of palm kernels were railed from Pendembu. It is true that the 1928 total was more than double the totals in 1915 and 1918, but considering there was more transport available on the road, that the road to Kossi country was being made motorable, and that there was a ready market and comparatively high price for kernels, the 1928 total shows a surprisingly small increase over the 1915 or 1918 totals.

An initial reaction of some scholars to the first drafts of this present thesis was that insufficient allowance had been made for the impact of the railway's arrival at Pendembu on the ordinary people of the Luawa area.

Hammond noted that "the fares in Sierra Leone are nearly as high as they are in England" (ibid).

The nearest large Kossi Town to Kailahun was Mano Sewalu, which was about 8 miles by road. Dia was 12 miles and Buedu 17. The Moa River crossing north of Koindu at Nongowa was 35 miles from Kailahun or 52 from Pendembu.

Chief Jabba Fayia explained that Kulu Bali walked to Freetown in the time of P.C. Momoh Banya; later he went by train.

The lorry was duly bought and handed over on 17.4.27 (enc. min. Page, 17.4.27).
390. KDOA, Pendembu District 106/1926, Roads - Kai Lahun to Dodo, enc. P.C. Banya, 26.9.27, Kailahun: "on the 4th of August there were 1,000 men on the road who completed the first 3 miles within that month .... the whole piece of work was completed on the 23rd September".

391. Ibid., enc. Hollins, 28.11.27, Dia: "I have seen the Kissi Chiefs and arranged an equitable labour supply according to sub-chiefdoms as follows: -

- Kissi Kama 60
- Kissi Teng 50
- Kissi Tungi 200 - until the present work is finished". See also ibid., enc. Executive Engineer, P.W.D., 22.11.26. Bo: "It would be a very great help ... if P.C. Momo Banya would give us a gang of from 50 to 100 men to carry on with the widening of the Pendembu Kanre Lahun road. The speed with which the widening was done suggested that the P.C. provided double or treble the upper number suggested. See again ibid., enc. Hollins, 16.4.28, Pendembu. There had been problems in finding enough labourers to work on the roads, and Mr. Hollins noted that the fact "the labourers are not paid is the difficulty".

392. Ibid., enc. P.C. Banya, 26.9.27, Kailahun, written to the Ag. D.C. Pendembu.

393. RCS, Sierra Leone Report of the Public Works Department for the year 1927, p.11. Work on the Kailahun-Dodo road "was started in July and by the end of the year seven-and-a-half miles of earthworks had been completed; bridges were completed for the first mile and bridgework was in hand beyond this point at the close of the year". Cf. Report of the Public Works Department for the year 1929, pp.11-12: the Kailahun-Dodo road, "fourteen miles in length was completed and opened to traffic".

394. The 1932 Wall Map shows the road completed as far as Buedu, which was 17 miles from Kailahun.

395. Even in the early 1970s, there was no really serviceable road to the frontier running due east from Buedu. Most traffic going into Liberia from Kailahun used the route through Koindu. This route was made motor-able in the 1940s (see Chap.6 of this thesis, pp.537-538 below).

396. Int.16.

397. Int.21. In the late 1930s there were at least three traders in Buedu: Nassif Hallil; Nicol Saad; and one other.

398. As a result of the making of the Kailahun-Dodo road, Governor Slater noted that "much of the Liberian kernel trade is now coming through Kailahun" (DKOA, Pendembu District, 32/1927, enc. min. Slater, 21.1.27, Kailahun). Presumably the Liberians bought imported goods to take back with them.

399. Mr. F.E.J. Tengbe in his Biography, pp. described how in Pendembu in the late 1920s and early 1930s, there was a little 'colony' of Kissis who had settled there, presumably after emigrating from Kissi country.
There was no attempt at this time strictly to control movement over the frontier in either direction. Liberians (and Guineans) could easily travel into Sierra Leone, and vice versa.

When the present writer visited Ngaudu, c. 1968 (only a mile west of the main Kangama–Buedu road), he was told that throughout the colonial period no white man ever slept in the village, and hardly any white man ever visited the village. Ngaudu was probably typical of most villages in the Kissi Chiefdoms.

Eberl-Elber, "Harvest and Magic among the Kissi of Sierra Leone", p.155. See also Hollins, Annual Report on Pendembu District 1929. Under "Agriculture", Mr. Hollins mentioned the introduction of cocoa and coffee, and the gathering of palm produce; but the main crops mentioned were upland rice and swamp rice, and these were clearly the crops which occupied people most of the time.

Rice remained the staple food, for which in the eyes of Kissia and Mendebia there was no substitute, and palm-oil was used to cook the meat and vegetables in. Ex-P.C. Kaitungi described how, when he became P.C. in 1942, a simple loin-cloth was the usual form of male dress in the villages (Int. 22). From personal observation in the late 1960s, the present writer discovered that in most Kissi villages (apart from those which were situated on or near motorable roads), houses were largely the same in shape, construction and building materials as those described by Alldridge in 1890 (see Chap.3 of this thesis, pp.180-1 above).

The ceremonies described as 'traditional' by Sawyerr and Harris in The Springs of Mende Conduct and Belief, passim, were noted by the present writer as still vital to village social life in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms in the 1960s. Some of these ceremonies which were legally binding were described as being important during the 1920s by Mr. J.S. Fenton in his Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law, passim. T.J. Alldridge, in his two books, also refers to rituals and customs which the present writer found still vital in the 1960s.

Clarke, W.R.E., Mende by Radio, MS, n.d., a series of thirteen talks which were broadcast on the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service, p.1.

The present writer found that, off the main roads, it was rare even in the 1960s to find an adult in a village either in Luawa or the Kissi Chiefdoms who could speak English fluently. It has been suggested that Krio is a lingua franca in Sierra Leone generally, but the present writer found that even in Kailahun only a minority could speak Krio. Effective communication in Luawa and Kissi country required a working knowledge of the Mende or Kissi languages.

Int.1. Rev. Clarke recalled sitting with R.G. Morton in his store in Kailahun in the early 1930s and working out that each bushel of kernels represented about 2,000 kernels, each of which had been extracted by hand. Yet Morton could only offer a price of 4d. per bushel.

R.H. Hollins, Handing-over Notes, Central Province, 31 Dec. 1930. The price offered for kernels was extremely low, and trade "in kernels was therefore stagnant".

410. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, pp. 418, 421 above.


412. Int. 19. One of those who enrolled with a number of Kissi people was Bangali Jibateh, who later became Sergeant-Major of the Kailahun District C.M.F. (Int. 13).

413. Int. 14.

414. Int. 15.

415. This was not simply a local outbreak, but part of a world wide epidemic. It lasted in the Kailahun area for about one year, with August and September 1918 (or 1919?) being the worst time (Int. 19).

416. Ibid.

417. Int. 16.


419. Int. 19.

420. Combey MS, p. 20.

421. The 1921 and 1931 Census Reports make no mention of the influenza epidemic, nor does Mr. Hollins' "Short History", nor Goddard's Handbook of Sierra Leone. Little reference seems to have been made to it in any British official documents. In fact, if the present writer had not collected evidence from the local people of the Luawa area, he might well have completely overlooked this epidemic, which for the ordinary people was perhaps the most traumatic event of the whole colonial period.

422. For the date of the abolition of slavery, see Fenton, Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law, p. 29: "Slavery in the Protectorate was finally abolished on 1st January 1928".

423. Lack of definite evidence from earlier than the 1890s prevents any estimate of the position of slaves further back in the history of Koo-Mende. But at least as far back as the first European writings about the area, slavery was an institution which contained many ameliorating factors.


425. C0267/603/166; 30.4.24; Slater.
426. Since the freed slaves had little capital, they could not easily move away from their own village; they had no money to take them on long rail journeys. In their own villages, they had at least a little land of their own to farm, and the plan which most ex-slaves apparently accepted as best was to try to add to the amount of land which they farmed in their own home.

427. In Ngiehun, it was thought that perhaps half the freed slaves stayed with their former masters (Int. 26), but in many places the proportion was much higher. The elders of Dodo-Cotuma said that in their village all the freed slaves stayed with their former masters (Int.16).

428. Int.16.


430. Eberl-Elber, "Harvest and Magic among the Kissi of Sierra Leone", p.159.

431. Mr. Cox-George, in Finance and Development in West Africa: the Sierra Leone experience (Dobson, London, 1961), pointed out that Mr. Childs' Plan of Economic Development for Sierra Leone (Govt. Printer, Freetown, 1949) envisaged economic development solely in terms of increasing the production of exportable raw materials; local trade is not even mentioned. This is typical of official colonial documents.

432. Bwea (spelt 'Buya' by Migeod, and 'Kpuya' on the 1969 Contour Map) lies about a mile to the west of present-day Koindu.

433. Annual Report of the Railway District for the Year 1914 (Warren, 28.1.15, Kenema), p.8. D.C. Warren's comments on Bwea market are repeated almost word for word in Michell, An Introduction to the Geography of Sierra Leone, p.115. Migeod (A View of Sierra Leone, p.103) mentioned the "great market" at Kpuya. "People come from a great distance from both sides of the river. On other days the place is deserted".

434. See Chap.3 of this thesis, pp.196-300 above.

435. Allbridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.216: "The chief currency was iron in long strips ... one strip of which I concluded to be equivalent to a penny. Salt was much valued; but everything passed in barter".

436. All the things in the list that follows were for sale at Koindu in the 1960s, from the personal observation of the present writer when he visited the market one Sunday late in 1969 (or early in 1970 ?). Since all these commodities were also listed by Allbridge as being for sale in the 1890s, they were presumably for sale in the intervening decades as well.

437. Pottery, hammock and mat-making were among the main 'cottage industries' of the area, after country-cloth production, dyeing and iron-work.

438. Michell (An Introduction to the Geography of Sierra Leone, p.63) noted that "a certain amount of trade in rice and kola nuts is done with the
natives from French Guinea and Liberia. "Tobacco is cultivated chiefly in the Koranko, Kissi and Yalunka countries, and the natives spend a good deal of time and care on its production. Much of it is used as currency between them and the natives of French Guinea" (ibid., pp.101-102).

439. SLGA, Pendembu District Decree Book, pp.392-394. Kondoma (spelt 'Gondome' by Migeod, and 'Kondoma' in the Decree Book) lies about 1½ miles south-west of Dia, on the Dia-Kailahun road.

440. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p.121.

441. Ibid. On the 1969 Contour Map, there is a market indicated at Vuahun, but none at the other places mentioned by Migeod in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefsdoms. Migeod further mentioned markets at Saru in Liberian Kissi on Thursdays, and Kpangame (Kpandeme ?) in Liberia on Saturdays. Almost certainly there were other weekly markets in the Luawa area from those listed by Migeod. For example, there was one at Foya-Kamala (Int.10). Cf. Int.15.

442. Int.16. The elders of Dodo-Cotuma said that in Mende country, weekly markets began not long ago.

443. KDOA, NAMP Luawa, 22/1934. Rules for Ndoweihun at Kailahun, 15.10.36.

444. Alltridge, A Transformed Colony, p.181. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p.111, noted the presence of "a small market" in Kailahun, and from the context he clearly meant a daily market.

445. In the 1960s, very little other than petty trading in perishable foodstuffs went on in the daily market. The sale of more expensive non-perishable commodities, and larger-scale trading in foodstuffs took place in the weekly market.

446. Alltridge, A Transformed Colony, p.181, implies (though he does not state) that the meat market was held on the site of the kohangai. Maada James Kailundo stated that the covered daily market was erected on the site of the kohangai (Int.19). See also Int.18.

447. The date has not been discovered, but Maada James indicated that the daily market was erected before the weekly market (Int.19); and the latter was established in 1936. Ex-P.C. S.K. Banya thought that the daily-market barrie was built in 1929 (Int.18).

448. Ibid.

449. Ibid. The market building was a 'barrie' with a concreted floor, and a corrugated iron roof supported on heavy timber pillars; there were no walls.

450. It is indicated by KDOA, NAMP Luawa, 22/1934 (Rules for Ndoweihun at Kailahun) that the desire for a weekly market came from the Chief and his advisers, as did the initiation of action to get it started.
British officials played little part in all this. P.C. Banya's building (at his own expense) the daily-market barrie showed how he was also eager to encourage the growth of the nipoai.

451. Neither British officials in their reports, nor local people in oral tradition, suggested that the development of the Kpuya market owed anything to British rule in this period. Some would argue that the British established the peaceful conditions which were a prerequisite for large-scale trading: but (i) at least in Gbande country, such markets were established before the arrival of the British, and (ii) up to c.1917, conditions were not peaceful in the far east of 'Kailondo's Luava', yet even so the Kpuya market was a major weekly event by 1914 (see Note 433 above).

452. From personal observation in the 1960s, the present writer discovered that, for example, local herbal cures for jaundice and hepatitis were often more effective than available 'hospital medicine'. This was reported to be equally true of yellow fever. When a young man fractured his wrist late in 1965 (or early in 1966?), the hospital sent him to a 'native doctor' rather than putting it in plaster. The 'native doctor' put it in splints and administered some herbal medicine, and in an amazingly short time the wrist was almost normal again.

453. Blacklock, D.B., Report on a Survey of Human Diseases in the Protectorate of Sierra Leone (Govt. Printer, Freetown, 1930). Dr. Blacklock himself emphasized that the figures he produced should be treated with caution. The survey was conducted between October 1928 and October 1929 in a series of field trips. One single journey was made through Pendembu District, the route taken being Pendembu - Kailahun - Buedu - Kangama - Dia - Mano Sewalu - Woroma - Sandaru - Bundu - Duyamaro - Gandohun - Segbwema. Only five out of these twelve places were in Luawa or the Kissi Chiefdoms. Yet this survey provides the only information of its type for the Luawa area in this period.

454. The lesions on the soles of feet were due "to the aftermath of a previous yaws epidemic. In some villages the whole male population seemed to have tender feet" (ibid., p.35).

455. Ibid., pp.23-25.

456. Ibid.

457. This is the figure which was accepted as somewhere near correct, by many writers and authorities, for Kpa-Mende in the 1950s and 1960s, though an almost complete lack of statistics means it is bound to be something of a guess. The infant mortality rate was unlikely to have been lower a generation earlier.

458. COL67/68/32025; Ramage; 1945-46, Medical and Health Services Annual Report for 1942. See also Int.4. Possibly Dr. Blacklock did not discover the high incidence of trypanosomiasis because it mainly affected the eastern margins of the Kisse Chiefdoms, which he did not visit. It is also possible that there was in fact an enormous increase in the incidence of trypanosomiasis between c.1929 and c.1940.
Dr. Blacklock had no opportunity to discover evidence about some diseases. For example, the incidence of recurrent fevers can best be established by frequent checking of the same individuals over a number of months, during which time the investigator must live in the same place.

The present writer was distressed to find in the late 1960s an elderly man in one particular village near Panguma who had tuberculosis and was infecting his close relatives with the disease. One death from tuberculosis occurred within a few months of the writer learning about the situation.

These three diseases cannot, in their first stages, easily be distinguished by a layman.

In 1966 (or early 1967?) there was an outbreak of measles in Kailahun which resulted in the death of many children. In one case, three or four little children died from the same family.

In 1966, the Kailahun Medical Officer gave it as his opinion that virtually everyone in the town suffered from worm infestation - roundworm being the most common.

The context indicates that the earlier dispensary was meant primarily for the W.A.F.F. soldiers garrisoned in Kailahun, and that periodic visits were made to the dispensary by the District M.O., who was resident at Daru.

The presence of a single dispenser at Kailahun was hopelessly inadequate to the needs of Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms, with a total population of between about 40,000 and 50,000 in the early 1920s (estimated by
multiplying House Tax returns by 4). The dispenser could not perform operations. A seriously sick person could not travel to Kailahun from Kissi country, or even from some of the Mende villages, and the dispenser certainly could not spare the time to make visits to their villages.

472. A clear distinction should be made between 'literacy' and 'education', in the present writer's view. For example, there was probably no literacy among the people of Kailondo's Luawa before the twentieth century. But children certainly went through processes of education to fit them for an adult role in society and to provide them with the knowledge they required for life in Kailondo's Luawa.


474. The Governor arrived at Kailahun on 27.8.31.

475. C0267/635/9694; Hodson; 1931. Governor's Tour in the Protectorate.

476. SLGA, Pendembu District Decree Book, Luawa Chiefdom, pp.406-410. In notes on the chiefdom written about 1922, under 'Missions and Schools', is the entry, "Church of England mission and school at Kanre Lahun 'Creole missioner". The present writer has unfortunately been unable to discover when the C.M.S. first began work in Kailahun. The school, and the Creole pastor's house, were both situated in Banyawalu (Int.18). See also Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p.115: the school was "a short distance along the Konno road over the stream".

477. Ibid., pp.115-116.

478. Ibid.

479. C0267/635/9694; Hodson; 1931, Governor's Tour in the Protectorate.

480. Foster, R.S., The Sierra Leone Church (S.P.G.K., London, 1961), pp.12-13: "Originally Daru, Gerihun, Panguama / sic./ and Kailahun were also Anglican mission stations, but these were given up to the Methodist Church after the agreements made under the United Christian Council of Sierra Leone in or about 1927 to limit the missionary activities of each of the constituent Churches to particular areas". Cf. Int.1; Rev. Clarke said this took place in 1928.

481. Ibid. The Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society was given all the area from Segbwema eastwards to the Guinea/Liberia border, except that the Sierra Leone Church would keep its station in Baiima (which it still did in the early 1970s).

482. Ibid. W.M.M.S. work had begun in Segbwema about 1913. In 1920, Rev. J.B.S. Law established work at Jojoima, and about 1926 work was begun in Bunumbu with the Teacher Training College.

483. Ibid.

484. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.2.
485. Int. 1: Mrs. Clarke joined her husband in contributing information.


487. After the Second World War, Bo School began to take in other students than the sons of Chiefs.


489. Int. 22. Ex-P.C. Kaitungi thus partially confirmed, for the Luawa area, the often-repeated statement that Chiefs at first were so suspicious of Bo School that they did not send their own favourite children, but instead sent perhaps the children of slaves.

490. Ibid. Mr. B.N. Combey, in the late 1960s, became M.P. for the Kailahun area. He favoured the present writer with an interview in 1972 (see Int. 25).

491. Int. 22. Kongor was from the family of Kongor, P.C. of Kissi Chiefdom, 1914-19. Brima Lahun contested the 1942 election of Paramount Chief for Kissi Tungi, but was defeated by Kaitungi. See also Int. 11.

492. Ibid. See also Int. 22. The first Paramount Chief of Kissi Kama was a Tengbe; Tengbe Kpandia was clearly a relative of his.

493. Ibid.

494. Ibid.


496. Int. 22. See also Int. 13 - an interview with S.K. Banya himself.

497. The fullest list is contained in Kulu-Banya's *History*, p. 18. After S.K. Banya, the next of Momoh Banya's sons to attend Bo School was Sama Kulu-Banya himself.

498. This figure was worked out from the information given in the various documents and interviews quoted in Notes 489 to 497 above.

499. By 1931, B.N. Combey was probably attending the Training School linked with Union College, Bunumbu (Int. 25). F.E.J. Tengbe was going to one of the Primary Schools in Pandembu (Biography, p. ). Pandembu and Bunumbu were both reasonably close to Luawa and Kissi country, and there may have been other children from Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms attending those schools by 1931.

500. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 280-284 above.


502. Ibid., pp. 436-438 below.
503. KDOA, Pendembu District 109/1926. Application for a Dispensary at
Kailahun, enc. P.C. Momoh Banya, 10.7.26, Kailahun. See also Hollins,

504. Int.18. Ex-P.C. S.K. Banya emphasized how his father (P.C. Momoh
Banya) was very pro-British, and the British treated him fairly (see
also Int. 25 ). The British officials themselves demonstrated this
in their own comments. Mr. N.C. Hollins described Momoh Banya as
"the honoured 'doyen' of my department and a chief, whom I have long
held in high esteem" (Hollins' papers, Senior D.C., Moyamba District,
20.6.32, to Commissioner, Southern Province).

505. Combey MS, pp.21-24, gives some indication, by a Kailahun citizen who
lived through this period, of the sort of work Momoh Banya did to
satisfy his people, and the large degree of success he achieved in this.


507. This westward movement of the Kissi is suggested by the House Tax
returns. House Tax in Luawa increased greatly from £1,289 in 1920 to
£2,037 - 10s. in 1937. In Kissa Kama the small increase was from
£444 - 15s. in 1920 to £474 - 15s. in 1938. In Kissa Teng there was
actually a decrease from £536 - 10s in 1920 to £472 in 1942. In Kissa
Tungi the small increase was from £553 - 5s. in 1920 to £723 - 10s. in
1938.

508. KDLt, loose papers, House Tax returns for Luawa, 1931. The actual
number of houses given for Kailahun in 1931 was 468; but this excluded
6 suburbs which were really part of the town, and which together
contained about 130 houses. In the House Tax returns for 1932, a
marginal note stated "Kailahun town 617 ho."

509. 1931 Report of Census, p.157. Several ex-colonial officials, with whom
the present writer spoke, believed that by 1931 Bo, and even towns like
Kenema and Moyamba were bigger than Kailahun in population. In the
1931 Report of Census, no definite figures are given for these towns.
Nevertheless, the implication in the Report, and in other sources, is
that Kailahun was in 1931 the largest town in the Protectorate. The
actual figure for Kailahun's population according to the Report was
2,545.

510. SLGA, Information Regarding Protectorate Chiefs 1912, Railway District,
enc. Le Mesurier, 4.4.12, Kenema: Bockarie Bundeh was described by Le
Mesurier as "the son of the late CHIEF FA BUNDEH". See also SLGA,
Pendembu District Decree Book, Luawa Chiefdom, pp.406-410; "Bockarie
Bundeh Elected 8.1.12 deposed 8.7.16".

511. For Cardew's comments about father-to-son succession, see Chap.4 of
this thesis, p. 251 above.

512. Note, for example, the following pattern in Luawa Chiefdom. Bockarie
Bundeh (1912-16) was the son of Fabundeh (1896-1912). Momoh Banya
(1924-42) was the son of Kailondo (1880 - 1895), and S.K. Banya
(1943-50) was the son of Momoh Banya. Alpha Ngobeh (1951-66) was the
son of Kahunla Ngobeh (1916-23).
513. The younger members of Chief's family had a better opportunity than anyone else to learn about the Chiefdom administration, and to become known in the Chiefdom. The Chief's family also held a considerable amount of Chiefdom patronage in their hands. The ruling Chief's wishes concerning the succession would, if he was a popular Chief, be seriously considered by both the British officials and the local people - and in the colonial period, as British ideas were somewhat accepted, a Chief would usually nominate another member of his own family, usually his son.

514. Momoh Banya could speak English, but at this time he was too young (about 33 years old) seriously. See Nigood, A View of Sierra Leone, p.112: "The principal reason for his being excluded from the succession for so long is that young men are not wanted as Chiefs. Any age under forty is rightly considered too young. Men of experience are needed". See also Int.18: Bockarie Bundeh "had gone to school - he did up to Standard 3 .... He was the only man who was able to talk English. So they accepted him".

515. SLGA, Information Regarding Protectorate Chiefs 1912, Railway District, enc. Le Mesurier, 4.4.12, Kenema.

516. Ibid.

517. Int.19.

518. Many stories are told of how P.C. Bockarie Bundeh deliberately annoyed the Kissa (see Ints. 9, 10 and 22). Some of them are perhaps apocryphal, but they are generally agreed that in particular Bockarie Bundeh seriously insulted Kongor, the senior Kissi Chief in Luawa, and this was the immediate cause of the separation of the Kissi part of Luawa as an independent Chiefdom.

519. Int.22.

520. SLGA, Pendembu District Decree Book, p.50. The document refers to a Confidential Minute Paper, c.60/14, which contained a minute by the Governor dated 26.6.14. Presumably information about such a serious matter as the large anti-Bundeh demonstration by the Kissia would be telegraphed immediately to Freetown, and the Governor would take immediate action on it. This would mean that the demonstration may have taken place around 20.6.14.

521. "Samolu Damba was also known as Kongor. At the time of Bockarie Bundeh he was a warrior greater than all the other Kissi warriors and chiefs. Everyone agreed that he should be P.C. All Kissi-men knew Kongor as a great warrior from the time of Kailondo" (Int.9).

522. SLGA, Railway Sub-District Decree Book 1906, p.289. The meeting was held at Dia in Kissi Kam, and Kongor of Damba in Tungi North was unanimously elected as P.C. in the presence of the D.C., W.D. Bowden.

523. This suggestion, about the fears of the British, was made by an ex-colonial official, and seems consonant with the facts.
524. As regards Madam Yoko's polity, "soon after her death the unwieldy Kpa Mendi Confederacy had to be broken up into its fifteen separate chiefdoms" (Easmon, M.C.F., "Madam Yoko: Ruler of the Mendi Confederacy" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.), No.11 (December 1958), p.167). As regards Nyagua's Panguma, after the 1898 War, it was "divided into three chiefdoms" (Simpson, D., "A Preliminary Political History of the Kenema Area" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.) No.21 (July 1957), p.58). See also Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.156: "Madam Yoko was succeeded by her brother Lamboi, who was the last chief of all Kpaa-Mende. He took ill of paralysis after two years, from which he never really recovered until his death in 1917. It was after his death that the Government decided to dismantle the confederacy, and not to recognise a direct successor to the whole of Kpaa-Mende". No research has yet been done on Mendegla's Gaura, but the tiny size of Gaura in the twentieth century, compared with the huge area which Alldridge described Mendegla as controlling (The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.168-175), would suggest a similar development.

525. Hollins' papers, Confidential /1935, enc. Hollins, 19.11.35, Moyamba, Reorganization of Native Administration. Mr. Hollins quotes these "instances of division of chiefdoms".


527. CO267/570/83; Hollis; enc. Bowden, 29.1.16, Kenema, Railway District Report 1915.

528. SLGA, Railway Sub-District Decree Book 1906, p.303; "LUAWA CHIEFDOM. Deposition of Paramount Chief BOKARI BUNDE, and appointment of new Paramount Chief. At a meeting held at Kailahun on the 8th July 1916". He was deposed as a result of "continued misgovernment and oppression of his people".

529. Kulu-Banya, History, pp.15-16. No doubt there is some exaggeration in this pro-Banya account of Bockarie Bundeh's reign. Nevertheless, oral traditions agree that Momoh Banya was badly treated by Bockarie Bundeh.

530. Mr. Arthur Abraham, in conversation in 1972, stated that the old Mende-men he talked to had ridiculed the idea that in pre-colonial days a Mahsi could be deposed, although several authorities have suggested this was possible.

531. If there had been such a deposition among the petty mahancisia who ruled Luawa in the decade or so before Kailondo's accession, it would seem likely that such an unusual event would have been recorded in oral tradition.

532. Bockarie Bundeh was deposed in 1916; Tengbe of Kissi Kama was forced to resign in 1922; Bundor Belle of Kissi Kama was deposed in 1954; S.K. Banya of Luawa in 1950; Kaitungi of Kissi Tungi in 1951; Alpha Ngoboh of Luawa in 1966.

534. Fenton, Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law, p.3.

535. SLGA, Railway Sub-District Decree Book, p.304. Ngobeh's election was confirmed on 11.7.16.

536. This was the same Kongoneh of Sandialu who was a kugba under Kailondo (see Chap.3 of this thesis, p.212 above), and who had been troublesome to Fabundeh (ibid., Chap.4, pp.302-3 above). He was made Chiefdom Speaker of Luawa after Ngobeh was made P.C. (Hollins, "Short History", p.25).

537. KDOA, Railway District 251/1919, Speaker Kongoneh of Sandayaru versus P.C. Gobeh, enc. Kongoneh, 30.5.19, Sandialu, the amanuensis being Savage-Pratt, and the letter being addressed to the D.C. Konema.

538. D.C. Hooker noted that Ngobeh was Kailondo's first cousin (see SLGA, Railway Sub-District Decree Book 1906, pp.303-304). But no other written record, nor any oral tradition gathered by the present writer, suggests a close relationship, though they may well have been distant relatives.

539. See Chap.3 of this thesis, p.212 above.

540. Int.29.

541. Int.19. See also Hollins, "Short History", pp.24-25.


543. Alldridge made no mention of any Speaker of Luawa during his visit there in 1903 (A Transformed Colony, ps.180-182); nor does he mention the office in relation to any other Mende Chiefdom. So if there was in fact a Lavale in the early part of Fabundeh's reign, that Lavale was not well noted.


545. In most oral traditions and written records, no mention is made of Ngobeh as Speaker. It may be that he was simply the most senior counsellor of Fabundeh, and the title 'Speaker' as employed by Mr. Hollins at this time (ibid.) is an anachronism. Earlier in Fabundeh's reign, Kongoneh of Sandialu was apparently the leading kuyakoi and soldier - counsellor of Fabundeh, but is nowhere given the title Lavale.

546. Ibid. See also Combey NS, p.17. After Bockarie Bundeh was deposed, noted F.W.H. Migeod, "Fabundeh's Lavari named Gobe succeeded" (A View of Sierra Leone, p.112). Cf. Int.19: Meada James implies, though he does not clearly state, that it was Kahunla Ngobeh who was Speaker under Bockarie Bundeh.

547. For Kongoneh, see Note 536 above.

549. SLGA, Pendembu District Decree Book, p.85, indicates that Momoh Banya was elected as Speaker of Luawa Chiefdom on 24.1.22. But he may have been acting as Speaker for some time before that. Cf. Hollins, "Short History", p.25: "In 1921 Gobe suffered a paralytic stroke ... Momo Banya at the time of the stroke had succeeded Kongani /Kongonah/ as speaker".

550. Hollins, "Short History", p.25. SLGA, Pendembu District Decree Book, pp.89-91: "We, the undersigned Sub-Chiefs and Headmen of the Luawa Chiefdom ... do hereby certify that in accordance with our native law and custom our Paramount Chief Gobeh being old, infirm and partially blind, a Regent is necessary for the proper administration of our Chiefdom. We hereby elect Momo Banya, the Speaker, as the fit and proper person to carry on such administration during the illness of our Paramount Chief".

551. In 1942, Braima Kormoh was Acting Speaker of Luawa. When Momoh Banya died in December 1942, "in virtue of his rank /as Speaker/, government at once accorded Brima Kormor recognition as regent" (Comboy MS, p.27). In other words, the Lavale was by this time regarded as a sort of deputy ruler of the Chiefdom.

552. The Speaker in the Kassi Chiefdoms came to be regarded as the ruler's official deputy, in the same way as happened in Luawa. In 1921, D.C. Hollins wrote to Speaker Yokah of Kassi Tungi that he was sorry to hear about the death of P.C. Sahr Kallan, and instructed Speaker Yokah, "I shall come myself next month. Meanwhile you should look after the country until a chief or regent is appointed" (KDOA, Pendembu District NAMP 152/21, Kassi Tungi Chiefdom, Death of Paramount Chief Sakara reported, enc. Hollins, 11.7.21).

553. In the Kassi part of Kailondo's Luawa, after the division into three Chiefdoms, the chieftaincy in each of the Chiefdoms was monopolized by two or three families. For example Fatorma, who became P.C. of Kassi Tungi in 1929, was the son of Sahr Kallan, the first Tungi Chief, and nephew of Seku Darowa, the second Chief, whom he succeeded (KDOA, Pendembu District NAMP 16/1929, Kassi Tungi Chiefdom, Election of Paramount Chief in the Kassi Tungi Chiefdom). P.C. Kenneh, who succeeded Fatorma, was a nephew of Kongor, the first P.C. in Kassi country (KDOA, NAMP 376/1; Maurice-Jones, 25.11.54, Kailahun).

554. Dr. Maxwell wrote on 'Native Law + Custom' in 1908: "Among the Mendis when a chief is appointed a 'speaker' is also appointed, he is known as 'Lavari'; his position is somewhat uncertain, he is sometimes merely the mouthpiece of the chief, sometimes the real ruler of the chiefdom". Dr. Maxwell was obviously in some difficulty when describing 'ruling houses': "In some cases in the past some of the families have missed their turn /in the chieftaincy/ & in the absence of written records & of reliable information it is frequently difficult to ascertain why this has happened" (G0267/503/209; Probyn; 25.4.08, enc. Maxwell, Native Law and Custom).

555. See Chap.1 of this thesis, pp.35-41 above.
556. Ibid., Chap.3, pp.209-212 above, for a list of some of the leading families. For the Bundeh and Ngobeh families, see Ints.32 and 28 respectively.

557. There is not even any good Mende translation for the English phrase 'ruling houses'. None of Kailondo's ancestors had been political rulers - a point which a number of oral traditions and written records make explicitly.

558. Kailondo's family, from the time of Momoh Banya onwards, was known in the Luawa area as "the Banyas". Between 1917 and 1960, the Banya and Ngobeh households both provided two Chiefs of Luawa, and the Bundehs, one Chief.

559. SLGA, Pendembu District Decree Book, pp.392-394.

560. KDOA, Pendembu District 87/1920, Luawa and Kissi Teng, enc. min. Hollins, 21.4.22, Kailahun: "I divided the old Kissi Chiefdom in Feb. 1919".

561. For Kama, Teng and Tungi as sections of Kailondo's Luawa, see Chap.3 of this thesis, pp.214-215 above.

562. Int.9. Pa Gborie Mima's information and judgements on other matters of local political history were accurate and balanced. Although he was the only informant to describe the Soli Koromba incident, it seems entirely credible and in keeping with other information which the present writer gained concerning the very powerful position the Court Messengers could secure for themselves (see Int.21). The fact that Pa Gborie was able to supply the name of the particular Court Messenger concerned lends further credibility to the story.

563. A 'tricky person' implies an astute diplomat, a person with foresight, a somewhat unscrupulous schemer. The present writer has attempted to spell 'Gbeior' in the way that seemed most appropriate.

564. Int.22. Ex-P.C. Kaitungi was the only informant to refer to this deception by Sahr Kal aid, and should therefore be treated with caution, particularly as the former's family was a politically interested party. Yet there is no reason to suppose that the story was invented, and ex-P.C. Kaitungi told it in the presence of several other elders who did not object. Ex-P.C. Kaitungi's forthrightness had become somewhat legendary in the Luawa area by the 1960s.

565. Kissi Chiefdom was in 1915 (the first year in which House Tax was collected from it as a separate unit) the largest Chiefdom in terms of revenue in the whole Protectorate. £1,573 - 5s. was collected from Kissi Chiefdom in that year, compared with £1,358 - 5s. from the truncated Luawa Chiefdom. The only other Chiefdoms in Railway District to render over £1,000 in 1916 were Bambara and Nongowa (C0267/11.4; Hollis; 26.4.17, enc. Railway District Report for the Year 1917, Abstract A).

566. Int.3. Mr. N.C. Hollins, who was in charge of the actual division of Kissi into three smaller units, gave as the reason for this division:
(i) the single Chiefdom was too big and unwieldy—it was convenient to have smaller Chiefdoms; and (ii) the people of the area wanted this division, as there was some friction between the different sections.

567. KD0A, Railway District 251/1919, Speaker Kongoneh of Sandayaru versus P.C. Gobeh, enc. Bowden, 14.4.17. In early 1917, D.C. Bowden had received complaints from Kongoneh about P.C. Ngobeh's decision to make Kabba Golay chief of Dodo-Cotuma. Kabba Golay was made chief "because all the people have chosen him", but Kongoneh was discontented because his "brother Gau has not been chosen". Letters in the file indicate that Kongoneh went on making complaints through 1918, and counter-complaints were also made by P.C. Ngobeh against Kongoneh.

568. Ibid., enc. Kongoneh, 30.5.19, Sandialu, the amanuensis being Savage-Pratt. The letter was addressed to the D.C. Kenema.

569. KD0A, loose papers, House Tax, Chiefdom: Luawa, 1918. Kailahun section brought in £269 in tax, Ngiehun section £166, and Gbeila was next in size with £149 - 15s. The Gbeila villages of Dodo-Cotuma, Balahun and Sandialu all contained more than 100 houses.

570. KD0A, Railway District 251/1919, Speaker Kongoneh of Sandayaru versus P.C. Gobeh, enc. Kongoneh, 30.5.19, Sandialu. 'Nephew', like 'cousin', was often used in the Luawa area in the 1960s to describe a broader spectrum of relationships than would be the case in a British context.

571. Ibid. The most serious complaints of Kongoneh were that (i) the headmen of Sewalu section were unjustly sent to prison, and (ii) he himself was put in prison for 6 months, allegedly for failing to supply labourers to work on the road.

572. Ibid.

573. Ibid. It is not certain which D.C. this was; possibly it was N.C. Hollins, who probably tried to settle the whole matter a month after Kongoneh wrote this letter (see Note 576 below).

574. Ibid., enc. Ngobeh, 16.3.18, Kailahun, the amanuensis being Chiefdom clerk Tamba Bundeh. The letter was addressed to Capt. J. Craven, D.C. Kenema. P.C. Ngobeh noted, "At present six cases are as it were hanging up owing to this subchief's influence by telling the people not to come to me for decision (sic.) at my court".

575. Kongoneh, on his own admission, had been one of the leaders in pressing for the deposition of Bockarie Bundeh (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, pp. 433-38 above). He had also come into serious conflict with Faburish (ibid., Chap. 4, pp. 102-103 above).

576. KD0A, Railway District 251/1919, Speaker Kongoneh of Sandayaru versus P.C. Gobeh, enc. min. ACTION TAKEN. The name of the D.C. who took this action is not certain. Probably it was Mr. N.C. Hollins, who was Acting D.C. of Railway District, January - July 1919; the 'Action Taken' note seems to be in his handwriting.
577. For Savage-Pratt, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 5, p. 453 above. He was apparently a Creole trader who moved to Sandialu early in 1919. Kongoneh was not literate, and so Savage-Pratt wrote his letters for him. The impression given in DKOA, Railway District 251/1919 is that Savage-Pratt would have been classed by British officials as 'a bit of a trouble-maker'.

578. Ibid. Further minutes indicate that Kongoneh went on complaining up until 1920, and the matter was then transferred to NAMP 90/1921. Kongoneh probably died in 1921.

579. Kissi Kama had an area of only about 50 square miles, and several sections of Luawa were larger than this. Kissi Kama, Kissi Tang and Kissi Tungi had once all been sections of Kailondo's Luawa (see Chap. 3 of this thesis, pp. 245 above), which had then been raised to the status of Chiefdoms; so there seemed no reason why the British would not allow a similar development for other sections of Luawa.

580. DKOA, loose papers, House Tax, Chiefdom: Luawa, 1918. Bombali was split up into two sections: Upper Bombali was centred on Nyandehun (92 houses), and Lower Bombali (sometimes known as Giema section) was centred on Giem (111 houses).

581. Captain Ramsey stated (in a letter to D.C. Hollins) that P.C. Ngobeh had visited him and asked him to write down the following information about the Bombali chiefs, and then to send the information to the D.C.


583. The British official was W. Addison, Acting Provincial Commissioner of Central Province.

584. The British official gave the document recognition - even approval - by having it included in the Pendembu District Decree Book. The Decree Book of each District contained, among other documents, resolutions and bye-laws which had been passed by the P.C. and the Tribal Authority of a Chiefdom and accepted by the British D.C. See Pendembu District Decree Book, pp. 89-91, Luawa Chiefdom, Administration of, during the illness of Paramount Chief Gobeh, 27.7.22.

585. The staff, which the British presented only to Paramount Chiefs, became for the local kpakoisia, an important symbol of the Chiefdom and the P.C. s authority.

586. Ibid. The local kpakoisia had clearly understood the sort of arguments for the division of a Chiefdom which were likely to appeal to British officials.

587. See Note 504 above for a British estimation of P.C. Nomoh Banya (see also Hollins, "Short History", pp. 25-26). For an appreciation of his reign by the local people of Luawa, see Combey M3, pp. 21-24, and Kulu-Banya, History, pp. 17-22. After all the political turmoil of the years
before 1924, there was only one slight disturbance (in 1932) during Momoh Banya's reign (ibid., p.19). See also Ints. 18 and 19.

588. Since the British had appropriated sovereignty to themselves in 1896, and in 1898 had demonstrated their power to enforce their decisions, whatever they proposed about Chiefdom boundaries, inter-Chiefdom relations, and the position of the Chief and his councillors, had to be accepted. But the D.C. and other British officials could not even communicate with ordinary villagers, and in fact most villages were, in this period, never visited by a British official throughout the year. 'Grass-roots politics' was not a matter of what happened at District level, nor even at Chiefdom level, as Prof. Kilson assumed ("Grass-roots politics in Africa: local Government in Sierra Leone" in Political Studies, 12 (February 1964), pp.47-66). Grass-roots politics concerned events at the town and village level, and of this British officials knew very little. And, apart from other considerations, their ignorance of the language, social structures and environmental difficulties, prevented them from doing solid, positive work at the grass-roots level. Of course, one reason for Momoh Banya's local political success was that he had the confidence and support of British officials; but on their own British officials could not have achieved what Momoh Banya achieved.

589. One main conclusion of this thesis (see Chap.6, pp.564-566 below) is that in their everyday life, most ordinary village people in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms were little affected by fifty years of British rule.

590. KDOA, Pendembu District NAMP 129/1930, Chiefdom; Kissi Chiefdoms, Appeals to Chief of Luawa. "Any parties aggrieved at the decision of the Kissi Paramount Chief", notes the document, "would have a right of appeal to the Paramount Chief of LUAWA, who would then have the right to release the case and decide independently of any judgement previously given".

591. Ints. 10, 18 and 19.

592. Hollins, "Short History", p.25. Mr. Hollins says this right, and the right to hear appeals from Kissi courts was granted to the P.C. of Luawa in 1914. Even if this was so, it was only in Momoh Banya's reign that these 'rights' took on any substance.

593. KDOA, Pendembu District NAMP 29/1924, Luawa-Upper Bambara Boundary. The dispute was over whether five towns (Gondama, Kangama, Senge, Sembehun and Giema) should be in Luawa or Upper Bambara.

594. Aggrieved parties in Kissi Chiefdom Courts could appeal to the Luawa Chief (see Note 590 above), and the latter's judgements were generally trusted and accepted. In other ways too, the Luawa Chief was able to help keep the political peace. For example, when in 1941 P.C. Bundor Belle had a disagreement with his Chiefdom clerk F.E.J. Tengbe, the matter was settled by P.C. Momoh Banya (KDOA, Kn. NAMP 356/20/1941, enc. Waldock, 11.8.41).
595. Kailondo's Luawa was a political entity of an adequate size to make a unit of local government, and to provide a base for socio-economic development. Kailahun provided a suitable town headquarters. Most important, Kailondo's Luawa gave the local people a strong political loyalty and unity, which was more than a personal allegiance to the person of Kailondo. This was seen in the way the polity held together in Fabundeh's reign, despite many difficulties.

596. The British destroyed the foundation quite simply, by allowing (even encouraging?) the division of Kailondo's Luawa into four separate units. The British-structured N.A. system, and the Freetown-inspired District Councils never inspired the loyalty of the people of Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms; rather they produced dissension, antagonism and annoyance. The District Council, especially, produced intense resentment in the 1950s, because of the financial corruption and lack of useful results which seemed to typify its working (Ints.18 and 26).
CHAPTER SIX:

THE SECOND GENERATION OF BRITISH RULE,

c.1931 to c.1961: A SURVEY.
In considering the last thirty years of British rule, two areas of difficulty emerge which may already have been somewhat apparent in the previous chapter. Firstly, written source material for the area becomes surprisingly sparse after about 1920, when it might be expected to become more prolific. A variety of factors account for this surprising development. One factor is that once the international boundary question was settled, the Governor ceased to send detailed reports on the local situation in Luawa to the Colonial Office in London. It is probable that in Freetown and the local District Headquarters as well, less interest was taken in writing, collecting and filing local reports. Moreover a fifty-year rule is maintained in Sierra Leone, thus prohibiting the inspection of even comparatively old official documents. Yet a more important factor making for the sparsity of written material is the silence of British officials from the 1930s onwards. Many of the first British officials and missionaries wrote at length about the state of the country and its people – the writings of Alldridge, Wallis, d'Arcy Anderson, Maxwell, Migeod, Hollins, Vivian and Clarke have all been used in the early chapters of this thesis (1). Virtually no colonial official or missionary provided similar material for the later years of British rule. The researcher is therefore largely dependent upon oral tradition, expressed by the older men of the area in interviews.

This dearth of written material may in itself be significant. It suggests there was little to write about, an absence of striking innovation. Officials lacked stimulus for descriptive writing, and had no desire to analyze.

A second area of difficulty, in discussing British rule and its impact after c.1931, is that the information which does exist
cannot easily be confined within separate chronological periods; and much of the information concerns a District as a whole, or even the whole Protectorate, rather than the Luawa area in particular (2). The impact of British rule on Luawa began in a small way in 1890, and continued without a break not only through to 1961 but right into the 1970s. Particularly after c.1945, it becomes virtually impossible to disentangle what was happening in Luawa and the Kisi Chiefdoms from what was happening in the rest of the Protectorate. Thus, neat division of the available material into 'sections', either chronologically or geographically, becomes much more difficult, and less meaningful.
1. LOCAL POLITICS. 1924 TO 1942: THE ERA OF P.C. MOHOH BANYA.

The first years of P.C. Momoh Banya's rule in Luawa were politically untroubled except for Chiefdom boundary disputes. In 1924 there was a dispute between Luawa and Upper Bambara over the Giema area, which was decided in 1925 in Luawa's favour (3). P.C. Banya brought further claims against Upper Bambara in 1931, but these were not accepted (4). A boundary argument between Kissi Teng and Luawa, involving the three large villages of Petema, Tangabu and Baïma (together with a substantial area of land) began before P.C. Banya's accession and dragged on until 1929, when it was decided in Kissi Teng's favour (5). Kissi Kama also put forward a claim to Tangabu which was discounted (6). Yet another dispute which arose in the 1920s was between Luawa and Kissi Tungi, and no easy solution to it was found (7). These disputes did not on the whole arouse "any unfriendly relations between the chiefdoms concerned" (8), but they provided yet another example of the internal local problems created by the imposition of alien British rule (9).

A more serious dispute than those involving Chiefdom boundaries arose in Luawa in 1932 - more serious because it sprang from indigenous grass-root politics rather than from the vagaries of foreign rulers. Internal dissension, like civil war, is usually more disruptive of a polity's well-being than external coercion. The year 1932 represented for Luawa perhaps the worst year of economic depression, and it would seem _prima facie_ that the political unrest sprang from dissatisfaction over the state of trade (10), although the present writer failed to discover any specific evidence to corroborate this. A small group of Luawa kpakolsia came out in opposition to P.C. Momoh Banya, their leader being Alieu Tokpo, patimahe of Mende section (11). His opposition seemingly originated from
a personal grievance against the Banya family, because they had once
demanded payment before they would transport him in their Government-
donated lorry (12). Not surprisingly, members of the Bunneh and Ngobeh
families joined in the opposition (13). The British imported emphasis on
'ruiling houses' (which was alien to Luawa) naturally made for the growth
of internal opposition factions: if the existing Chief could be dethroned,
there would be a good opportunity for one of the other two 'ruiling houses'
to gain the chieftaincy.

The Chiefdom Lavale or Speaker Yavana Toko (who had
been one of Kailondons counsellors and envoys [14] ) also became involved
in the anti-Banya campaign (15), as did a considerable number of the Luawa
sub-chiefs (16). One of the main charges which the opposition faction made
against their Paramount Chief was that he had embezzled cement from the
building-stores for the new District quarters in Kailahun, and had used the
cement in the construction of his own large three-storey house; but no truth
was found in the accusations by the investigating British Commissioner (17).
The other charges also proved impossible to substantiate, and the whole case
against Momoh Banya was dismissed in October 1932 (18). Several of his
accusers were imprisoned, and others were deprived of office, including
Yavana Toko (19).

At this point Momoh Banya acted with that statesmanship
which had characterized his father. In place of Yavana Toko he appointed as
Speaker Fatorma Gbondo, a son of P.C. Fabundeh and brother of P.C. Bockarie
Bundeh who had so greatly disturbed the young Momoh Banya (20). Fatorma
Gbondo was also a brother of one of the leaders of the 1932 discontent (21).
Yet the Luawa Chief set aside his personal antipathy in order to bring the
Bundeh family into his Chiefdom administration, and thus to stabilize the
political situation: there was no more political unrest in Luawa during his
reign.
P.C. MOMOH BANYA'S THREE-STOREY HOUSE IN KAILAHUN
In his relations with the Kissi Chiefdoms, Momoh Banya was able, unexpectedly, to re-establish some of the control which his father had possessed in Kissi country. "When Momoh Banya, the son of Kailondo, took the staff of office, he told the D.C. that as the people of Kissi Tungi, Kissi Kama and Kissi Teng used to come to his father to pay loyalty to him, so he would like them also to come to him in the same way. They agreed to this. They said they would not be able to make farms for him as they did for his father, but they would be happy to pay 6d. from every taxpayer .... Commissioner Bowden made an arrangement. He asked them, 'You say you are still a part of Kailondo, even though you are separate from the Luawa Chiefdom. What is your opinion? What are you going to do?' .... They agreed that every taxpayer should contribute 6d. This is what they used to collect" (22). The sixpence was collected annually together with the House Tax.

The situation in Kissi country was very different from that in Luawa. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the political instability of all three Kissi Chiefdoms underlined the fact that they were artificial British creations. The immediate cause of their political instability was the ineffectiveness of the Chiefs. D.C. Hollins' Annual Report on Pendembu District for 1929 made fairly typical comments: "The newly elected Paramount Chief Fatoma of Kisi Tungi got himself into difficulties at the beginning of his reign by trying to remove from their posts certain members of the Tribal Authorities. However, the difficulties were adjusted by Captain Page after careful enquiry .... There were difficulties also in the Kissi Kama and Kissi Teng Chiefdoms due to the inability of the two young Chiefs to realize the limits of their rights to free rice, etc." (23). The following year the situation had hardly improved. "Kissi Kama Chiefdom .... N.A. 31/1929", noted Mr. Hollins when handing over the District to his successor.
in 1930, "deals with the aftermath of the enquiry held by you in March, 1929 into the conduct of Paramount Chief Bundor Bere. As you will see I have made a new agreement re tribute etc. and list of the Tribal Authority made.

The chiefdom is more settled, but the Native Court is not very efficient and there are a fair number of N.A.s outstanding ....

Kissi Teng Chiefdom. N.A.113/1929 deals with the making of unlawful manja farms (24) by Paramount Chief Musa Bandabila, whose tribute this year was in consequence reduced from 1/- to 6d. per house. It also contains a new agreement re tribute. I am afraid the Paramount Chief is not energetic and there were many complaints at my visit in February - several involving delay in justice ....

Kissi Tungi Chiefdom. Things were better in February; but Paramount Chief Fatoma has not yet proved himself a successful ruler - he lacks experience in Court work and has little 'savoir faire' ....

He was found to have had an unlawful maja farm made in 1929. With Honourable Commissioner Central Province's approval his usual tribute in 1931 is to be reduced from 1/- to 6d. per house" (25).

In all three Kissi Chiefdoms, the natural difficulties resulting from the creation of these artificial political units were increased by the comparative brevity of the first Paramount Chiefs' reigns. In Kissi Kama, Tengbe, who was elected in 1919, was forced to resign "as a result of misgovernment" (26) in 1922. His successor, Jabba, reigned only until 1927, when he died, to be followed by Bundor Belle (27). In Kissi Teng, Bandabilla, the first Chief, died in 1925, and his successor, Tamba Yela, reigned little more than a year before he too died, after which Musa Bandabilla was elected (28). In Kissi Tungi, Sahr Kallaj, who was elected in June 1919, died in July 1921 (29). Davowa was elected in October 1921, probably died
late in 1928 (30), and was followed by Fatorma who reigned for little more than a year. Kenneh was chosen as the fourth P.C. of Kissi Tungi in September 1930 (31). A new P.C. probably required at least two years to 'settle in' to his complex position in colonial local administration as representative both of his own people and of the Government, and these frequent changes of Chief must have seriously hindered efficient organization in the Kissi Chiefdoms.

However, even when (in the 1930s) Kissi Chiefs had much longer reigns, the quality of administration did not seem to improve greatly. The Kailahun District Commissioner wrote to P.C. Kenneh after six of his twelve years' rule in Kissi Tungi (1930 to 1942), "I am not at all satisfied with the way in which your Chiefdom is administered. I get more complaints against your decisions and the actions of your people and messengers than from any other Chiefdom in the District" (32). Similarly, after almost four years' reign in Kissi Teng, Chief Musa Bandabilla's administration was censured by Mr. N.C. Hollins, who was Acting Provincial Commissioner: he noted that the Chief's conduct "has been unsatisfactory and is awaiting further investigation by the District Commissioner .... With His Excellency the Governor's approval I have taken away his staff and he is 'sitting down' in Kenema" (33). It was pointless to 'blame' the Chiefs for this state of affairs. As described earlier (34), the whole position of the Chief in the colonial system of local government encouraged venality and maladministration. In addition, in Kissi country the existence of the three Chiefdoms resulted from British officials' readiness to accept a division which was necessary only in the imagination of a Court Messenger (35). The three Kissi Chiefdoms had no reality as independent entities either in recent history or in the experience of the ordinary people (36).
In Luawa, by contrast, Momoh Banya inherited the grass-roots political tradition and organization of an independent polity which provided him with guidelines in his administration at village and town level: the Kissi Chiefs did not have this inheritance.

It was hoped in Government circles that the introduction of the Native Administration system into Sierra Leone (37) would eradicate the sort of maladministration which Mr. N.C. Hollins had noted in all three Kissi Chiefdoms in April 1930. Mr. A.H. Stocks, Southern Province Commissioner, described the implications of the N.A.s in his 1936 Annual Report. "The outstanding political event of the year was the gradual introduction of an improved type of Native Administration in certain selected chiefdoms. Mr. J.S. Fenton, O.B.E., Senior District Commissioner, was seconded for this work ... and he started with Upper Bambara Chiefdom, Kailahun District, which began to function on 1st April 1936, and opened a banking account in May. Preliminary meetings were held in other chiefdoms, viz. Luawa, Kisi Kama, Kisi Teng, Kisi Tungi, Mando, Jawi and Jaluhun in the Kailahun District .... There seems almost everywhere to be a keen interest in the new administration, which is most encouraging. Its chief features are that tribute in kind to the chief is now changed to one definite cash payment, that a chiefdom treasury is established, that the chief and other office holders of the chiefdom receive regular stipends payable out of this treasury, that balances will become available for works and social services within the chiefdom, that council meetings of the chiefdom will be held at regular intervals and that minor native courts are mostly suppressed in favour of the chiefdom Court, sitting at regular times, with court fees going into the chiefdom treasury and court members receiving their sitting fees out of the treasury" (38).
The N.A. system was duly introduced into Luawa and
the Kissi Chiefdoms in 1937 (39), but its effects were neither so far-
reaching nor so completely beneficial as Commissioner Stocks' report would
suggest. The establishment of N.A.s did not reduce the large influence
which the Luawa Chief had over the three Kissi Chiefs. When an election
was being held in Kissi Tungi during 1942, the Kailahun D.C. explained
that "Kai Tungi [one of the candidates for election] has protested against
either of the other two Kissi Chiefs being an Assessor on the grounds (and I
must admit I agree with him) that they are simply 'yes-men' and will say
whatever P.C. Momo Banya tells them to say" (40).

From the viewpoint of the ordinary people the main
result of the change in 1937 was that they had to pay nine shillings annual
house tax instead of five shillings (41). But as happened with the Chiefdom
tax agreements of the 1920s and 1930s (42), so with the N.A. Treasuries: the
ordinary people paid nine shillings but then found they were still being
made to pay extra (illegal) tribute to the Chiefs by Chiefdom officials.
Pa Gborie Mima of Dia explained succinctly that at first the British gave
power to the Chiefs, but when the latter misused their power it was reduced
under the N.A. system; yet (and this would seem the crucial point) some
Chiefs still behaved as they thought fit regardless of supposed restrictions
(43).

Although the ordinary people found the N.A. system
produced simply an increase in taxation with no real reduction in the amount
of tribute they themselves paid, the Chiefs themselves felt that 'their wings
were clipped' by being put on a salary. "They were more honoured and they
made more money", (thought P.C. Momoh Banya's successor) before the N.A. was
introduced (44). Ex-P.C. Kaitungi explained the difference the N.A. system
made from the viewpoint of a Chief: before 1937, "the Paramount Chief was
allowed free labour; free farming; they take his loads free; .... the
Government used to give the Chief a rebate after tax - one shilling and
threepence or 1/6. He used to pay his clerk: every house 1/6 rebate.
Then in addition to the rebate, they make farm for him. They build his
houses free .... And at the end of the year every man who makes a farm will
give a bushel of clean rice to the Chief. Any beef that is killed, you
have to bring certain parts of the carcass to him, to the Chief ....; andall the court fees used to go to the Chief and his counsellors. That is
how Chiefs used to get on". But after the establishment of the N.A., it
came "to a time when the administrative is against the Chief: any of these
things that you do they try to support the complainant. They exaggerate
it in such a way that it sounds either to cruelty or to maladministration.
Sometimes a boy like this [a small boy] can go and complain against the
Paramount Chief, and say that the Chief has extorted £1 - 10 from him
unlawfully, and so on. Well, he [the D.C.] calls a Court Messenger, if
he doesn't like that Chief. He says, 'Go to the Chief: tonight let him
arrive here!' The Court Messenger has to walk and meet you. If he meets
you at this hour [late in the afternoon], you have to go to Kailahun.
You have to pack up and go that night" (45).

Neither Chiefs nor people, then, were satisfied by the
new N.A. Treasuries: and from the viewpoint of British officials the
expenditure figures left much to be desired. As Professor Kilson has
demonstrated, an inordinately large proportion of the annual expenditure of
all N.A. Treasuries went on "Administration", which in fact meant the Chief's
salary, and salaries and emoluments for the Chief's kpakquis (46). On the
death of a Chief, British officials often tried to reduce the Chief's
salary. When, for example, P.C. Kenneh of Kisi Tungi died, Mr. D. Cox
(D.C. at Kailahun) wrote to the Provincial Commissioner on this subject:
"I have the honour to enquire at what rate you wish the salary of the next Paramount Chief of Kissi Tungi to be fixed.

2. In the case of Bongre, Malema and Peje West Chiefdoms the opportunity was taken when the Chief died to reduce the salary which was proportionately excessive.

3. I suggest that £156 per annum would be an adequate salary for the Paramount Chief of Kissi Tungi" (47). The present writer has failed to discover what P.C. Kenneh's salary had been, but even if the reduction was only small, the new P.C. (Kaitungi) could hardly fail to be antagonized by such a move. "The N.A. came and everything changed", said ex-P.C. S.K. Banya, who succeeded his father as Chief of Luawa in 1943. "Chiefs were stripped of their power. My father was earning a salary, about, of £1,000 a year. In my time it was pegged on to £650, by Cox and Taylor" (48).

The Ordinance establishing the N.A. Treasury was concerned only with tribute to the Chief, and it left the Chief free to require forced labour from his subjects for a limited number of tasks (49). But from about 1937 onwards, British officials became much stricter about illegalities committed by the Chiefs in using forced labour. Ex-P.C. S.K. Banya described how, during his own reign, "the British came and said, 'Everybody should be paid for whatever job he is doing'. So at any time you said to anybody, 'Do this for me', he said, .... 'where is the pay?'" (50). As a result, there arose a tension between Chief and people over whether labour should be 'voluntary' or paid. Chief Jalloh of Mano-Sewalu believed that from this tension, which began after the introduction of N.A.s, sprang the 1949-51 troubles in Luwa and the Kissi Chiefdoms (51).

From the British viewpoint, the N.A. system, and the ethos which developed with it in administration generally, represented the rationalization and modernization of local government. But from the viewpoint
of the ordinary village people, it simply introduced more confusion into
the hierarchy of authority. On the one hand, the village farmer, who had
looked upon his Chief unquestioningly as his political master, was now
urged by British officials to resist any demands made by the Chief for
any tribute over and above the annual four shillings Chiefdom Tax (52).
On the other hand, new officials representing the N.A. (and clearly
possessing rather more power than the old Chiefdom clerks) began arriving
in the village, each demanding 'presents' from the villagers (53). Not
only were some of these N.A. officials inefficient, but some were also
quite unscrupulous in their dealings with the ordinary village people.
For example, F.E.J. Tengbe's autobiography records various instances of
N.A. clerks in Kailahun District in the late thirties and forties who were
imprisoned for serious offences or moved from one Chiefdom to another as
complaints were made against them (54). Probably, many other offences
committed by Chiefdom officials went unrecorded.

The villagers also found that the patimahangcisia and
kpakoisia, whom Kailondo had firmly subordinated to a lowly position beneath
his own authority, now gained a higher status by virtue of being members of
the Tribal Authority - a body which was artificially given greater signifi-
cance under the N.A. system (55). Some patimahangcisia were able to compel
villagers to make manja farms for them, although this was officially illegal
(56). All this did not radically affect the ordinary villager, but it did
somewhat erode his understanding and acceptance of the authority possessed
by his superiors.

As regards the positive contribution of the Native
Administration system, some public works were executed in Luawa and the
Kissi Chiefdoms with money from the N.A. Treasuries; although it is doubtful
whether in Luawa after 1937 more was done from N.A. funds than Momoh Banya
had previously accomplished privately from his own purse (57). Kissi Tungi provided a typical example of what the N.A.s were able to do in the way of public works. Out of a total budget, for 1944 and 1945 combined, of £1,393, £363 was spent on public works (58). These works included a grant towards the construction of the Buedu-Dia road, and the upkeep of the Kangama dispensary. Provision was also made for the construction of a well and a public latrine in Buedu.

One further result of the establishment of N.A.s was the erection of an impressive concrete court-house, roofed with sheets of corrugated iron, in each Chiefdom headquarter town - Kailahun, Dia, Kangama and Buedu (59). In Kailahun, an N.A. Office block was also built (60). The N.A. buildings, especially in Kissi country, were important as examples of the new building materials which were now available. The court-houses were among the first buildings in the area on which reinforced concrete and corrugated-iron sheeting were used (61), and it was not long before the richer kpakoisia began to copy the new methods.

In Luawa during the last years of Momoh Banya's reign, perhaps the crucial political development was not the establishment of N.A.s, but rather the rise to power of one individual. Braima Kormoh was not a son of Luawa, but came from Mando Chiefdom (62). However, Momoh Banya developed such a high estimation of him that early in 1942 he was made Deputy Lavale of Luawa (63). "In August of the same year Fatoma Gbondo of the Chiefdom Lavale died and was succeeded by Brima Kormor though in acting capacity pending the formal approval by the tribal authority. In December of the same year, Momoh Banya died and, in virtue of his rank, government at once accorded to Brima Kormor recognition as regent" (64). Thus in the critical
early months of 1943, when the succession to the chieftaincy was being debated, Braima Kormoh was the key figure in Luawa's political affairs. The person next in importance to the Regent in those months (apart from the British officials) was probably Bangali Jibateh, the Sergeant-Major of the Kailahun District Court Messenger Force. He conferred a number of times with Braima Kormoh, and almost certainly exerted an unobtrusive but strong influence on the Kailahun District Commissioner, Mr. D. Cox (65). Sergeant-Major Jibateh was a Mandingo from Bamako in present-day Mali, who migrated from there to Kailahun around 1907, and who thereafter served in the W.A.F.F. for some years (66).

Thus arose a situation which would have been unthinkable to Sailondo and his kmakoisia fifty years earlier: the choice of successor to the deceased Chief lay largely in the hands of two hateisia, two strangers to the Chiefdom (67). And the most likely candidate for the chieftaincy was a young man who, though well-educated by English standards, "knew practically nothing about the set-up in the Chiefdom" (68).
Less than two weeks before he died, Momoh Banya attended in Buedu the installation of Kaitungi as Paramount Chief of Kissi Tungi (69). Kaitungi was the first P.C. in the Kissi Chiefdoms or Luawa to have been educated at Bo School (70). Whilst at school, he had come for a holiday to Buedu in 1918; and on his return he had taken back to school with him Momoh Banya's eldest son, Sama Kailondo I Banya (71). On 11 August 1943 (exactly eight months after Kaitungi's installation as P.C. of Kissi Tungi), Kailondo I Banya became Paramount Chief of Luawa, in succession to his father (72).

In Kissi Tungi, during the first years of his reign, P.C. Kaitungi fulfilled all the hopes which the Government had placed in Bo School of producing well-educated, public-spirited, progressive and energetic Chiefs (73). But in one particular, Kaitungi pursued, from Luawa's point of view, a destructive rather than a constructive policy: he succeeded in breaking the formal ties which had held the Kissi Chiefdoms to Luawa. By 1944 he had ended the custom by which the Kissi Chiefdoms annually collected 6d. per household to be passed on to the Luawa Chief (74). Even before he became P.C., he had tried to break the system by which an appeal could be lodged in the Luawa Chiefdom Court against the decision of a Kissi Court (75); and during the 1940s, this practice fell into desuetude (76).

All this presented serious problems for the new Luawa Chief. But P.C. S.K. Banya's most serious problems came from within his own Chiefdom. From the start, he was in a weak position. On the one hand, he was completely dependent on his father's advisers in his relations with the ordinary people of Luawa — and soon after the beginning of his reign the
most powerful of his counsellors, Lévahé Braima Kormoh, turned against him (77). On the other hand, he had the insurmountable disadvantage in the eyes of a new generation of British D.C.s of being 'a Bo School boy'.

Most documents written from a British viewpoint, from the mid-1940s onwards, blamed the behaviour of the Paramount Chiefs for the many Chiefdom disturbances which occurred in the decade after the end of the Second World War. Since in almost every case the disorders occurred in Chiefdoms ruled by P.C.s with a 'secondary education', British officials came to believe that there was "something lacking .... in the educational training which they [the Bo-School-trained Chiefs] had received" (78), and that such Chiefs were "out of touch with and less sympathetically disposed towards their people than chiefs who have not had the advantages of education" (79).

Ex-P.C. S.K. Banya, from a viewpoint diametrically opposed to that of the British officials, explained how during his reign, the new generation of colonial rulers did not seem to like a Chief with secondary education: "If they came to me, they would rather talk Creole to me than talk English to me. They feel I don't know how to talk English .... Well, we became angry men. They didn't like us and we didn't like them" (80).

S.K. Banya came to power just at the time when these new British officials were becoming more severe in their attitude towards 'maladministration' (81). The attention of both the British D.C.s, and the ordinary people of Luawa, was at this time directed especially towards the question of forced labour. As already mentioned, limits were imposed on the Chief's right to forced labour (sometimes euphemistically described as voluntary or free labour) when the N.A.s were established in 1937 in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms. Over the subsequent decade, British officials became increasingly ready to take action against Chiefs who illegally used
such labour. And, as ex-P.C. Kaitungi pointed out, the British authorities could manipulate the new N.A. rules so that these rules worked against a Chief with whom they were dissatisfied. In many cases the British could say to him, "'No. According to the present N.A. rules you have no right to do such' - if they are not in your favour. If they are in your favour, they will say, 'The N.A. is just introduced. That is customary law' - and then you are let off'"(82).

The ordinary people, for their part, found that they were still expected to give certain types of forced labour to the Chief and his kpakoisisa, even though British officials had told them that such forced labour was illegal; in particular, the making of manja farms for their Chief. According to several Luawa elders, the counsellors who were close to P.C. S.K. Banya encouraged him to do such things, and when he objected they told him, "Your father was doing that". They encouraged him to force people to make farms not only for himself but also for other Chief-dom officials (83) such as section chiefs and speakers, and village chiefs (84). When deposition proceedings were instituted against S.K. Banya, and later against Kaitungi, in both cases the first and most weighty charge which the British Commissioner of Enquiry considered was the use of illegal forced labour (85). Similarly, when P.C. Bundor Belle was compelled to resign in 1954, the main cause was his continual use of forced labour (86).

Chiefs who misused forced labour were shown very little sympathy by their subjects, by British officials, or by later commentators (87). Yet the Chiefs' behaviour was quite explicable and, to some extent, excusable. The colonial government itself had made heavy demands for forced labour on the people of the Luawa area up until 1936 (88). Forced labour only became entirely illegal in 1956 as a result of the disturbances in Temne country, and before then the division between legal and illegal
forced labour was always difficult to determine (89). Moreover, by the late 1950s, British officials had been compelled to recognize the necessity of some form of free labour. Government reports stressed the importance of 'local participation in community development', 'voluntary communal effort', and 'village co-operation in development schemes'. These phrases were little more than euphemisms for forced labour (90), and the evidence suggests, indeed, that some such voluntary labour was not resented by the ordinary people. How else could the village be kept clean and tidy, with the roads well scraped and brushed (91), except by free communal labour? The people of Kailahun cheerfully built the District Headquarters buildings in the late 1920s with free labour, knowing that it was to their long-term advantage to have the headquarters in their town (92). Similarly, in the late 1950s, many of the minor motor-roads in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms were built by the free labour of the people whose villages would thus be opened up to motor vehicles. Whatever the views of British officials, the local people did not object to all forms of forced labour. What the ordinary people did object to in the late 1940s and early 1950s was the large amount of forced labour expected from them, and the fact that it was almost solely for the benefit of their rulers rather than for the common good.

Political tension steadily increased in Luawa throughout 1949 (93). When all attempts to reach a settlement failed it became necessary for a Commission of Inquiry to be held under the Protectorate Ordinance into the conduct of the Paramount Chief.... The proceedings opened on the 24th of April, 1950. The evidence was so long-drawn out and voluminous that the inquiry lasted for five months at the end of which time the Paramount Chief was suspended from his office and jurisdiction pending notification of the Secretary of State's decision whether he should be deposed. During the period of his suspension he was ordered to live at
Koidu in Kono District.... The decision that he was to be deposed was received in November but was not in time to prevent an outbreak of rioting involving about 5,000 people at Kailahun on the 30th of October, 1950. The cause of the riot was a rumour that the Paramount Chief had been upheld and was to be reinstated in the chiefdom" (94).

In more detail, the events of the last days of October 1950 in Luawa were as follows: On Sunday 29th (95), a large crowd numbered in the thousands assembled in Kailahun, many people coming in from the surrounding villages. Court Messenger reinforcements from Kenema and police from the Colony were requested. On Monday and Tuesday there was rioting in Kailahun, ex-Burma soldiers quickly coming to the fore, since when the fighting began, trained military leadership was needed (96). By this time, the rioting had "spread from Kailahun to outlying towns and villages in the chiefdom with casualties and considerable damage to property" (97). There was some indiscriminate looting by unprincipled people exploiting the situation, and an unknown number of deaths occurred. Many people fled from the town.

On the afternoon of Tuesday 31st, there were serious rumours that Kailahun town was going to be burnt down by certain factions involved in the rioting (though what they hoped to gain from this arson is not clear). A good breeze was blowing through the town and the thatch roofs of the houses were very dry. When Pastor J.T. Rogers, the local Mende Methodist leader (98), reported this rumour to Rev. Leslie Wallace, the European missionary in Kailahun (99), the latter asked how such a disaster could be averted. Pastor Rogers said the only thing to do was to pray for rain, and so, even though it was well into the dry season, five Christians met together and prayed. By eight o'clock in the evening the town was saturated by a tropical storm, which not only prevented any possibility of
arson, but also literally dampened the excitement of the rioters (100).

By Thursday police from the Colony had arrived. (This was the first time police in uniform on active service had been seen in the Luawa area (101).)

By Saturday, 4 November, the situation was so much back to normal that the police were able to play a town team at football, which further helped to settle the atmosphere (102). There was no further serious trouble, though more than a year elapsed before British officials felt it was safe to elect a new Chief. Alpha Ngobeh, son of P.C. Kahunla Ngobeh, became Chief of Luawa on 18 February 1952 (103).

The growing tension in Luawa during the first ten months of 1950 may have helped to arouse similar agitation "in the neighbouring Kissi Tungi in October, 1950, directed, as in Luawa, against the administration and conduct of the Paramount Chief. A minor disturbance occurred at Buedu, the headquarters town of the chiefdom, on the 16th of October and the accumulation of complaints and allegations against the Paramount Chief, many of which were obviously well founded, made it necessary in this case for a Commission of Inquiry into the administration and conduct of the Paramount Chief to be ordered" (104). Kaitungi was "deposed from his office and removed from his chiefdom in March with the almost unanimous approval of the people of the chiefdom whose complaints had led to the institution of proceedings" (105).

Clearly a British administrator with little knowledge of the Kissi language, staying for only a few weeks in the Chiefdom (mainly in Buedu town), could not gauge whether approval was unanimous or not. But it does seem, from ex-P.C. Kaitungi's own statements, that at least a majority of the Kissi Tungi people came strongly to resent the rapid pace of development which their Chief had forced upon them. "They were extremely lazy", noted their ex-Chief. "So I ... forced everybody to make
a farm; according to the number of people you have in your house, you've got to plant a bushel of rice for one person per year ...; in addition to which, you've got to plant cassava and potato and other things - supplements, because when I came I found they were using palm cabbage. They hadn't food .... And that is one of the things that was against me - that I have worked them very hard. That brought me up some discontentment among my people, against me, and led to my deposition" (107).

However, there were other, more deep-seated causes than the pressures of forced labour, to account for the serious antagonism of the ordinary people towards their rulers, both in Kissi Tungi and Luawa and elsewhere. British officials realized this, and searched somewhat wildly for underlying explanations. It was suggested that the presence of a rowdy and unruly group known as the 'Young Men' generally seemed to spark off trouble in a Chiefdom (108). Inadequacies both in the Native Administrations and in British District administration were seen as other reasons for the disorders (109). Some colonial officials turned to less rational, covert-racist explanations: Mendeblisia were "easily led" (110); Chiefdom agitation was "infectious" (111); "professional trouble makers" were present (112); the disturbances were simply "a reminder of the primitive conditions" prevailing in much of the Protectorate" (113). The 1949-50 Protectorate Report, commenting on the 1950 riots in Luawa in particular, explained that "the prolonged inquiry, in which as many as four lawyers took part, engendered considerable heat, bitterness and tension, and that during the whole period of the inquiry the chiefdom was in a state of unrest" (114).

Yet at best, all these comments of British officials explained only the explosive violence of the outbursts, not their underlying cause. The sickness which affected Chiefdom administration in fact arose out of the very nature of that administration. In the early years
of the twentieth century, the British circumscribed and distorted the Mahawui and the mahayci: they usurped chiefly authority and imposed alien political concepts. The political function of the Mahel was re-shaped so that he became enforcer at the local level of often-unpopular Government decisions. Thus, for example, when British officials demanded the payment of a rice and palm-kernel quota during the Second World War, the local villagers blamed their P.C. for the hardship this produced for them, since they had received the demands for payment from the Chief, not the District Commissioner (115). Moreover, as a Government agent, the political scope of the Chief was limited to petty actions by which he could 'feather his own nest' at the expense of the Chiefdom people, whilst he carried out the D.C.'s instructions (116).

In the 1920s and 1930s, an experienced ruler like Momoh Banya could, within limits, work within this system not only for his own advantage but for the good of his people. In the 1940s, in a more rapidly changing situation (117), a less experienced ruler like S.K. Banya was unable to follow his father's example (118). Yet the central cause of the 1950 troubles in Luawa was not to be found in the personal inadequacies of individuals, nor in particular detailed deficiencies in the system, but rather in the whole British system of Chiefdom administration as it had developed since 1896. The main point to note about British 'indirect rule' in the Luawa area was not how it worked, but that in the long run it simply did not work: the system broke down (119).

Every other problem in post-war Luawa and the Kisi Chiefdoms was deeply aggravated for the ordinary people by a sharp rise in taxation. This increasingly heavy taxation largely resulted from the
introduction of the District Council, a post-war, British-imposed innovation in local government which the ordinary people came to detest (120). The Kailahun District Council was obnoxious to the ordinary people because, firstly, it demanded huge sums of money by means of taxation. The District Council's revenue came mainly from a precept on the G. A. Treasuries (121). As District Council demands increased, so the precept became larger, and total annual direct taxation had to increase. In 1951, taxation in Kailahun District amounted to ten shillings per house, an increase in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms of only one shilling since the institution of the G. A. system in 1937 (122). In 1952 and 1953, tax was fifteen shillings per house, and in 1954 it increased to £1 (123). At the beginning of 1955 the Government passed a new Local Tax Ordinance which altered the whole basis of taxation in the Protectorate: instead of tax being paid by each household, it now became a head tax, payable by each adult male. This brought thousands more people under obligation to pay tax (124). After the provincial disturbances of 1955-56 (mainly in Temne country, north of Mendeland in the Protectorate), the Government stated that twenty-five shillings should be the maximum local tax payable in 1956, and that this should remain unchanged in 1957 (125). In five years, then, local tax increased by 150%, and from 1955 onwards many more men found tax being demanded from them.

It was in some ways surprising that this situation did not produce in the Kailahun area the same sort of disturbances as erupted in Temne country in late 1955 (126). The reason for the comparative calm in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms was probably two-fold. First, between 1950 and 1954 there had been a change of Chief in Luawa and in two of the three Kissi Chiefdoms, so the ordinary people could hardly express their discontent in the way which had become normal since the end of the Second
World War; namely, to demand the removal of the Chief. Secondly, Luawa was one of the leading cocoa and coffee-growing Chiefdoms (127), and from the late 1940s onwards the prices paid for these crops increased enormously. In 1947, cocoa was fetching about 16 shillings for a so-called '56 lb. bushel', whereas in 1954 the equivalent price was £5-12-0. In 1947 coffee brought in about £1-4-0 per bushel, compared with £2-16-0 in 1952 (128). Those who had planted coffee and cacao seedlings in the late 1940s were therefore receiving yields of highly profitable cash crops by the mid-1950s, and were thus financially cushioned against the hardship which they would otherwise have experienced through steeply rising taxation.

A second reason for the antagonism which ordinary people in Luawa and Kissi country felt towards the District Council was its failure to provide a rapid and solid increase in amenities. The taxpayers looked for a large extension in public works, but the only positive development most of them could see by the mid-1950s was the construction of a poorly-built and poorly-bridged road from Kailahun south through Bandajuma and Gisma to Bewabu (129). Virtually the only other major tangible achievement of the Council was the erection of a District Council Office on the outskirts of Kailahun, just north of the Buedu road (130).

Most other District Councils in the Protectorate managed to achieve at least a little more than this. Some of the reasons for Kailahun Council's failure became clear when, in September 1953, a cash shortage of £742 came to light in the Council's accounts. "Thereafter the President [the District Commissioner] had to do most of the routine work of the Council and in the course of this uncovered a dismaying amount of muddle, inaccuracy and confusion" (131). The members of the Finance and General Purposes Committee - the most important group in the Council (132) - had been "apathetic and detached", and since five out of its six members
lived in the south-west of the District, meetings were often held at that end of the District, with the result that "the District Council Office received less supervision and control than it needed". Also, Council members tended to press for the appointment of individuals to the Council staff "who are well known to them and popular, but who may have little idea how to carry out their duties" (133). In the Kailahun District Council, noted the 1954 Provincial Report, neither "the Finance and General Purposes Committee nor the full Council have yet shown as high a sense of responsibility as could be wished .... The Council was fortunate in being able to secure the services of Mr. U.H. Koroma as Secretary and Mr. F.M. Allie as Treasurer, both seconded from the Central Government, but although the accounts of the Council are now being kept efficiently they naturally have not been able to make good the financial loss" (134).

A third cause of the ordinary people's antipathy towards the District Council was that they saw it as an unnecessary and costly addition to local bureaucracy. The Freetown Government had become accepted as a necessity by the ordinary people, and the Chiefdom was the essential object of their political loyalty (135). By contrast, the District Council appeared to be simply "a money-making racket" (136). The feeling amongst the ordinary people of Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms was almost certainly (137) much the same as that recorded by Sir Herbert Cox and his fellow Commissioners elsewhere in the Protectorate in 1956: "Witnesses before us have repeatedly asserted that they 'don't know District Council' or occasionally that they 'have heard of District Council but do not know what it is'.... Witness after witness has asserted that the amenities, which District Councils claim have been the objects of popular clamour, are not amenities which the witness would seek at any expense to himself" (138).

The central Government on the one hand, or the N.A.'s
on the other, could between them accomplish most of what the District Council was supposed to do. Central Government could more efficiently run schools, health centres and dispensaries than could a District Council; the same was true of building roads, maintaining protected forests and developing agriculture (139). The Chiefdoms could more easily attend to local sanitation, agricultural nurseries, community development, town planning, and the upkeep of roads, bridges and ferries (140). In the first flush of enthusiasm for District Councils, after the publication of the Davidson Report in 1953, the Government had planned to assign all these tasks to District Councils (141). But by 1956, at least some colonial officials had come round to the viewpoint commonly held by the ordinary people in Luawa and Kissi country. The Cox Report recommended that District Councils should be "used in local affairs only; they should not 'enjoy' the mandatory power to precept upon Chiefdoms except by the Minister's direction in unusual circumstances .... There should be a review of the transfer of former Government functions to District Councils and a retransfer of former Chiefdom functions which Councils at present perform" (142).

Perhaps the most valuable service performed by the Kailahun District Council during the 1950s was the broader experience of public affairs which it gave to local politicians who were to become national leaders after 1961. Also, the holding of District Council elections late in 1956 provided a preparation for the general election of the following year (143). At least two local men who later became national politicians gained their first election experience in 1956 (144). The other political body which prepared local leaders for higher office was the Protectorate Assembly (145), a body mainly composed of Chiefs which met annually at Bo from 1946 until 1955 (146). P. C. Kaitungi counted his membership of this Assembly as one of the most important aspects of his work as
Chief (147). Among the local leaders in the District Council and the Protectorate Assembly may be perceived some of the signs of that rise in 'nationalist' sentiment which has so fascinated historians of the post-war, Freetown-centric 'educated elite' (148). But for the ordinary people of Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms, such bodies as the Protectorate Assembly, or even the District Councils, were little-known entities whose work did not benefit their lives at all.

Constitutional changes at local and national level between 1946 and 1961 deeply concerned the Freetown Creoles, the Protectorate leaders, and constitutional historians. The changes looked impressive on paper, but they scarcely touched the lives of the ordinary village farmers in Luawa or Kissi country. For the ordinary people of this area, the most significant political events of the post-war colonial period were the depositions of their Paramount Chiefs, and the increase in annual taxation; and neither development benefitted the average village farmer. Perhaps the main effect of the Chiefdom disturbances was to shake the local structure of authority (which had already been weakened by the imposition of the N.A. system (149)) in such a way that the ordinary people became less sure of whom they should primarily obey. Certainly one main result for the ordinary people of the introduction of District Councils (and the Government's later withdrawal of support from them (150)) was a further increase in confusion about where real authority lay. This confusion was only to be expected. District Councils were part of an unsuccessful British attempt to solve the dilemma of whom and what to invest with authority as they themselves withdrew. It was a dilemma which, at least in the Luawa area, had no satisfactory solution, because the only viable unit of local government, which was Kailondo's Luawa, had been irrecoverably destroyed in the first decades of British rule (151).
The nearest kpakois, the town and section chiefs, the Paramount Chief, N.A. and District Council officials, and the British overlords all represented centres of political power to the village farmer. During the events of the 1940s and 1950s, the ordinary Mandeleis and Kissia were shown that all these powerful people had definite limits to their authority. Moreover, sometimes these rulers were in conflict with each other, and in such cases it was not clear where the ordinary person's political allegiance should lie.

The village of Qanyahun, near Kailahun, provided in October 1950 a concrete example of the dilemma (over whom to obey) which the ordinary village farmers might have to face. Some of the village kpakois supported P.C. S.K. Banya, some opposed him, and it was virtually impossible for any villager to maintain a neutral position (152). The British officials had by October shown fairly clearly that they had ceased to support the Luawa Chief (153), but then came a rumour that the British were going to reinstate him (154). In such a situation, it began to seem to the ordinary farmer that the only sensible course of action was simply to consult his own personal best interests, irrespective of any other considerations. Thus were sown, amongst the ordinary people, seeds of a new individualism, which was to have political, social and economic repercussions in the ensuing decades.
The palm kernel trade in the Luawa area, hit by the world economic depression reached its lowest ebb between 1930 and 1932. Thereafter, throughout the rest of the 1930s, there was a slow recovery. The price per bushel for palm kernels rose from 4d. in 1931 (155) to 3 shillings in 1935 (156). The standard price paid by the Government under the 'quota system' (157) in the last years of the Second World War was 5 shillings (158) - though presumably the 'free market price' would have been above this (159). By 1948 the price had risen to 10 shillings (160), and to 17 shillings and sixpence by 1952 (161).

This rise in palm-kernel prices was naturally welcome to the people of Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms, but of more long-term significance was the development of new cash crops. When F.W.H. Migeod toured Luawa and Kissi country at the end of 1924, he noted the beginnings of this development. At Nyandehun he observed "a cotton plantation ... which was a failure", and again at Dodo-Cotuma "the experimental cotton ... was a failure" (162). He delivered a letter from District Commissioner Hollins to the Chief at Buedu, and since the latter did not have a clerk, Mr. Migeod was asked to read the letter. "There was a printed booklet on how to grow swamp rice, which he [the Chief] seemed somewhat contemptuous about, as if he at his age did not know how to grow rice his staple food and that of his ancestors. There was a covering letter instructing him to read it to all his sub-chiefs, and another saying the French Company would buy any cocoa he had at 2d. a pound. The only cocoa I had seen were a few struggling plants lining the road for a few yards out of Dodo" (163). In Koidu, besides rice "only a little guinea corn and cassada are grown .... There was experimental cotton here too, but it had scarcely grown at all" (164). At Dia,
the people were trying to grow cocoa. "A lot had died, which was not surprising as it was on totally unsuitable ground. There was cotton near the rest-house, and that too was no good". The only encouraging development of a new cash crop was at Mano-Sevalu, where a cotton plantation "was really doing well" (165). Mr. Migeod did not record his observations about new cash crops around Kailahun town and the surrounding villages, but presumably he would have made a note if there had been a striking difference there from what he found in the rest of Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms.

The growing of exotic varieties of cotton, which was strongly advocated by the Government Agricultural Department in the early 1920s, was clearly a sadly misplaced venture as far as Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms were concerned (166). The comments of the Pendembu District Commissioner in 1929 showed that little solid advance had been made with any other cash crops (167), although in 1930, 10,704 cocoa seedlings and 3,000 coffee seedlings were planted out in the district.

By 1940, however, the situation had radically altered as regards cocoa in Luawa; by now it was rapidly becoming an important tree-crop in the area. There were, in 1940, 49 villages where cocoa was being grown, with 195 farmers involved in husbanding a total of 201 acres of cacao trees (169). "About 50 per cent of the cocoa plantations, however, were not yet in bearing in 1940, and thus were planted in 1934 to 1938", during which time there was no Agricultural Officer stationed in the area (170). In the same year, 1940, Mr. F.C. Deighton, a British plant pathologist in the Agriculture Department, undertook a painstaking and perceptive survey of cocoa-growing in the Protectorate. He reached a most interesting conclusion: "Though due credit must be given to the early work of Political Officers, and especially to the work and method of approach of Agricultural Officers between 1926 and 1933, the rapid extension of cocoa planting
between 1934 and 1938 must be regarded as chiefly due to the enthusiasm and initiative of the native farmers themselves" (171).

This rapid extension of cocoa-planting did not affect the Kissi Chiefdoms, where in 1940 a total of only 6 farmers were caring for just 6 acres of cocoa (172). This was not surprising, since Kissi country was unsuited to growing cocoa both in climate and vegetation. Cocoa in south-eastern Sierra Leone requires at least 100 inches of rain annually (173) and "permanent shade trees ... in addition to a lateral wind-break" (174). The hundred-inch isohyet crosses the 'Kailahun salient' (175) from west to east, passing roughly through Mano-Sewalu and Dambara (176), with all of Kissi Kama and most of Kissi Teng experiencing less than 100 inches annual rainfall. There are only a few stretches of high bush in the Kissi Chiefdoms which could provide adequate shade and wind-breaks for the cocoa, the vegetation in Kissi country being largely of the 'farm bush and guinea savanna' type (177). In addition, cocoa does not do well where there is a long dry season with strong harmattan winds, and as one moves east and north from Luawa into Kissi country the dry season becomes longer and the harmattan more severe (178). (Coffee requires basically similar conditions to cocoa [179], and for this reason the development of coffee-growing in Kailahun District in the 1940s and 1950s also largely bypassed Kissi country.)

What caused the rapid expansion in cocoa-growing in Luawa during the late 1930s? Mr. Deighton was convinced that it was not a result of pressure from British officials, since Mr. W.D. Bowden, the Provincial Commissioner of Central Province in the 1920s, was sceptical of its suitability for the area; moreover, the main expansion took place when there was no colonial Agricultural Officer stationed in the area (180). The main reason for the expansion was apparently that when market conditions made it financially worthwhile to develop a new cash crop which could do reasonably well in the area, the local farmers were well able on their own
initiative to get hold of seedlings and learn how to grow and care for the new crop on a large scale. They did this even though they had little previous experience of the crop, and were not literate so that they could not 'learn from books' about cocoa-growing. The extension of cocoa-growing, thought Mr. Deighton, depended "primarily on the price offered for cocoa .... The native farmer ... has at any given time a pretty shrewd idea which crop it pays him better to produce, and past experience has shown that though the farmer will not be 'forced' into planting cacao or any other crop, he will take up planting actively when he decides that it is to his economic advantage to do so" (181).

In other words, the ordinary people of the Luawa area acted as 'rational economic men'. They displayed both considerable ability to adapt to a changing economic situation, and also extraordinary resourcefulness in developing a virtually unknown crop which required care in choice of site, planting, and annual attention. In this way the ordinary village farmers of Luawa provided a striking contrast to the usual stereotype of the hopelessly conservative 'peasant-farmer'. This latter individual has been pictured as unadaptable, and unable to see the advantages of new crops, limited by illiteracy and by the weight of stultifying tradition - a person who would only budge slightly from traditional ways when the local District Commissioner made tremendous exertions to persuade him to do so. In fact, the ordinary Luawa farmer proved himself from the 1930s onwards to be more 'progressive' and less hidebound by tradition than some British officials. For example one British official, in an agricultural report of 1911 (revised and reprinted in 1922), noted that cocoa in the Sierra Leone Protectorate "cannot attain much success in the country generally on account of unsuitable climatic conditions and general ineptitude of most of the native tribes" (182).
As with palm kernels, though cocoa railed from Pendembu would not have been produced solely in Luawa, yet most of it was probably from there: certainly railments from Pendembu give a good indication of the extent to which cocoa production increased in the Luawa area over the years. In 1937-38, 44 tons of cocoa were railed from Pendembu, and in 1941-42, 76 tons. The war temporarily checked this expansion, and in 1942-43, only 66 tons were railed (183). "While it is probable that the plantings up to 1938 will have survived" noted Mr. Deighton, "the set-back due to the war (lack of expected demand for cocoa, low price, prior calls for rice, rubber and palm kernels, etc.) has probably done much harm to these and especially to more recent plantings. During the last two years (1942-1943), cocoa plantations everywhere have been allowed to go to bush, monkeys have not been driven off, and in fact the 1943-44 season harvest is likely (according to traders) to be considerably less than that of 1942-43" (184). Mr. Deighton's fears were realized. 1943 proved a "disastrous year ... when, owing to impossibility of shipping cocoa from Sierra Leone, the whole crop ... was purchased by Government for 1d. a lb. and burnt. The effect of this", commented Mr. H. Childs in his Plan of Economic Development, "coupled with the low price paid to producers over the next three years (during which the price stood at 1½d. a lb.), was to interrupt the rate of development which otherwise might have been expected. New planting stopped and many existing farms fell into neglect, with the result that when prices took an upward turn (they advanced to 3½d. a lb. for the 1946-47 crop; to 6d. a lb. for the 1947-48 crop and to 9d. a lb. for the 1948-49 crop), farmers were in no position to take the fullest advantage of the improvement" (185). Even so, railments from Pendembu increased to 95 tons in 1947 (186). Throughout the rest of the 1940s and 1950s, and beyond the end of the colonial period, there was a steady increase in cocoa production. In 1956, 2,881 tons of
cocoa were exported from the whole of Sierra Leone, compared with less than 500 tons annually in the late 1930s (187).

The expansion in the growth of coffee came later than that of cocoa, and significant coffee production only really began after 1945. In 1946, only 75 tons of coffee were exported from the whole of Sierra Leone - about the same amount as the tonnage of cocoa railed from Pendembu alone (188). But by 1948, 347 tons of coffee were exported from the whole of Sierra Leone, compared with a total of 1,379 tons of cocoa from the whole country (189). Thereafter, the high prices given for coffee encouraged an extension of coffee plantations which was even more remarkable than the earlier development of cocoa plantations (190). In 1956 (the first year in which the price per ton for coffee exceeded the price for cocoa) total exports of coffee from Sierra Leone exceeded those of cocoa (191). As with cocoa, coffee production continued to increase until after the end of the colonial period. In the late 1930s, coffee exports from the whole of Sierra Leone were negligible in quantity, but in 1957, 3,758 tons were exported (192).

Both Chiefs S.K. Banya and Kaitungi encouraged the development of cocoa, coffee and other profitable new crops in their Chiefdoms during the 1940s. "I saw to it", said Mr. S.K. Banya, "that everybody planted coffee and cocoa. Government [before this] had destroyed their own policy; they brought in cocoa, and after several years cocoa had no price. It had no price, so it was used like ochre [as a vegetable], you know. And people destroyed their farms in the thirties, before I became Chief. But I took particular note of that. Well, when I became Chief, I told everybody to start replanting; I used to work on the farm myself .... Mostly [the cocoa seedlings came] from the old trees .... There was coffee - very old trees in Hofindor; you know, the late chief Karimu, he had a farm
there. So when I became Chief, I encouraged them to nurse these seeds; and I used to leave here and work a whole day in the farm" (193). P.C. Kaitungi also introduced cocoa and coffee seedlings, as well as cotton and ginger, into his Chiefdom - developments which were somewhat interrupted by his deposition. But swamp rice was the new crop which the Kissi Tungi Chief concentrated on particularly. He bought about ten bushels of seed from the Government rice farm at Rokupr. "I used to gather the people", explained the ex-Chief: "we used to make large swamp farms - very large - and from it, at the end of the year, I see that they get quantities to seed. I showed them how to transplant it, myself used to go with them in the swamp and do it, both men and women, all children ... everybody is useful in swamp farming. Some carry the seedlings that they have rooted to meet the people, some are there to wash the roots, some are there to plant and so on" (194). Naturally, the other two Kissi Chiefdoms copied these new methods.

It would, however, be inaccurate to think of the development of cocoa and coffee plantations as an innovation which came about simply because of interest on the part of the Paramount Chiefs and knakoiaia. In Luawa in 1940, 93% of the cocoa producers owned farms of less than two acres, only 1% owned farms of more than 4 acres, and 49 villages had cocoa-plantations growing near them (195). This suggests that most cocoa in Luawa was grown on small-scale plantations by a large number of ordinary village farmers and thus wealth from cocoa-sales was distributed over a large number of families. This, in turn, meant that few individuals gained sufficient extra wealth to produce anything like a 'revolution' in their style or standard of living. The same conclusion was reached by Mr. Deighton for the cocoa-growing area as a whole. "The native cacao farmer", he wrote in summary, "is a peasant farmer relying on his own labour and that of his family, growing his own food-crops and
vegetables, making his own palm oil and his house, mats, baskets, and so on. There is no labour to hire, even if he wished to hire it. He may, however, get some help from relatives and friends for heavy farming operations, but in return he must give his own labour on their farms. Nor is cacao his only cash-crop: he probably has kola, possibly coffee, produces palm kernels, and sells any surplus rice or palm oil he may have" (196).

During the war-years, the Government attempted to stimulate production of rice and palm kernels by ordering each Chiefdom to provide annually a fixed amount or 'quota' (197). In 1946, for example, the rice quota for Kailahun District was 60,000 bushels, and the palm kernels quota was 296,825 bushels. The rice quota was paid in full, and marketed in the District, but only 197,670 bushels of kernels were collected (198). The rice quota was apparently calculated on the scale of one bushel per taxpayer every year, and the Government fixed the price to be paid at 9 shillings per bushel, and 5 shillings for palm kernels (199). If the ordinary village farmer did not have enough rice to provide his bushel, he might first have to buy rice at a market-price of around £1 per bushel (200), before selling it to the Government for only 9 shillings. "What the rice-owner charged you had to pay, irrespective of what amount you would get for it," stated Maada James Kailondo. "If even you took £1 to the Chief, the Chief wouldn't accept it. All he wanted was rice, and then you had to get 9/- for the bushel" (201). The rice quota was paid through the Chiefs, who were made responsible for seeing their people fulfilled the quota (202): this naturally tended to make the ordinary people (who could not understand why a quota system had been imposed, nor even, perhaps, who had imposed it) resentful of their Chief (203).
The rice quota certainly imposed some hardship on the village people. Chief Amara Jambeh of Dodo-Cotuma could remember having rice stored in a barn which he had to give up to pay the rice quota: at that time people had to cook the heart of palm trees for food (204). The rice and palm kernels quotas were abolished in 1947, 48,000 bushels of rice having been collected in Kailahun District during the first months of the year: "but in November and December 1947 large quantities of rice were purchased in the Kissi Chiefdoms [mainly Tungi, presumably] for the Government and Sierra Leone Selection Trust" (205).

The Second World War not only indirectly increased internal trade in the Luawa area through the quota system but also it increased external trade. As an emergency measure in the last years of the war, the palm kernel trade of southern Guinea was diverted from its normal outlet. Instead of being railed from the Kankan railhead to Conakry, the palm kernels were taken across the Moa on a temporary ferry at Nongowa, and through Kailahun to Pendembu (206). The road from Kailahun to Buedu had been extended northwards through Kangama and Koindu to the Moa boundary with Guinea during the years 1942 and 1943 (207). Thousands of tons of palm kernels were brought down to Pendembu on this road over the next two or three years (208). "In fact the convoy of French lorries was such that during the dry season, those lorries that were in the middle had to put on their lights because they came in convoy; there was so much dust. They came in a convoy. Sometimes about 20 or 30 lorries would come to Pendembu and empty — because they had a lot of palm kernels. I think probably for 2 years they had to stock the palm kernels, so they had to transport it all through Pendembu" (209).

As the motor road was constructed northwards from Buedu in the early 1940s, so Lebanese traders moved northwards with it, just as they had moved eastwards in the late 1920s when the road to Buedu was made
motorable. When vehicular traffic could reach Kangama, "Nassif Hallil moved from Buedu and established in Kangama", reminisced Mr. T.M. Tengbe. "And I think one other one followed; and I think Saad (the younger brother of Saad Rogers) also opened there" (210). Their trade was still largely in palm kernels in the 1940s, and they bought lorries with which to transport the kernels to Pendembu. In their stores, the Lebanese sold cotton goods, "caps, khaki, materials for wearing like khaki shorts, khaki trousers, salt, sugar, household utensils, pots, pans, buckets, cutlasses particularly for brushing, tobacco" (211). The Lebanese found a particularly good opening for trade at the Sunday market in Koindu.

From the mid-1940s onwards, when the road to Koindu became motorable and when lorry traffic to Kono and other parts of the Protectorate began to increase, there was a steady growth in the size and international importance of the Koindu weekly market (212), which was only checked in the early 1960s (213). In 1960, the Kissi Tong Chiefdom clerk noted the fairly simple organization involved in holding this market. Formerly the market "was under the control of the N.A. and all the Messengers (i.e. the Chiefdom Messengers - eight of them in all) were to go there each Sunday for the collection of the market dues.

Now the Market has been put under Contract and Mr. Samuel Foryor of Koindu is the Contractor and he is to pay £20 every week" (214). Koindu Market was probably the largest weekly market in the Protectorate, attracting crowds of perhaps four to five thousand people each Sunday in the late 1950s (215). As an international market serving parts of Liberia and Guinea, as well as the Sierra Leone Protectorate, it was unique. Several other smaller weekly markets were established in the Luawa area during the reign of P.C. Momoh Banya, including one on Fridays at Kailahun, where the whole Chiefdom was encouraged to "bring in all they had to sell,
rice, bananas, plantains, cocoa yams and all other agricultural produce" (216). Friday was chosen as the day of the week because this was the Moslem rest-day, and therefore fewer people would go to their farms (217). *Ndoweisia* (weekly markets) also developed in other towns of Luawa, such as Mano-Sewalu (218), at this time.

The Buedu-Koindu road was the only stretch of road to be made motorable between 1931 and 1945. Otherwise the motorable-road system remained in 1945 much as it had been in 1930 for the Luawa area: "There is a ferry open on the Pendembu-Manowa road. The following roads have a general width of 16 feet with permanent bridges, open for motor traffic -

Pendembu - Kailahun - Mafindo - Dodo = 37 miles
Dodo - Buedu = 4 miles
Pendembu - Manowa - Bunumbu = 17 miles (219). In the next five years, only one further sizeable section of road was completed - three miles from Sandialu down to the main Kailahun - Buedu road (220). The road-building 'boom' did not come until the late 1950s, and even then (with the exception of the District Council road to Bewabu (221)) the construction work was generally arranged and executed by the communal effort of the villages which would benefit most (222). The Mano-Sewalu to Dia road was a typical example. By 1956, a motorable road had been constructed as far as Mano-Sewalu. The Luawa people agreed to extend the road from Mano-Sewalu as far as the Chiefdom boundary at Mamoh, and the Kissi Kama people then continued it as far as Dia (223). But neither the Chiefdoms nor the District Council could find the money to provide permanent motorable bridges on this route, which would have provided a shorter and more direct route to Koindu than the road through Buedu and Kangama (224).

The other major roads constructed before the end of British rule in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms were the Pandobu-Nyandehun-
MAP EIGHT

Present-day boundaries of Kailahun District
Motorable roads in Kailahun District in 1968
Railway line

SCALE 1:500,000

KEY
= Present-day boundaries of Kailahun District
= Motorable roads in Kailahun District in 1968
= Railway line

COMMUNICATIONS IN KAILAHUN DISTRICT IN THE MID - 1960s.
Konjo-Dambalu road; the Kailahun-Baoma road; and the Buedu-Sandia road (225).

As regards the railway, the description by a Methodist missionary in 1930 (writing about transport for Rev. W.R.E. Clarke in Kailahun) remained accurate to the end of the colonial period: "The railway here, as you know, is both expensive and inconvenient and it will be a great advantage if Mr. Clarke can have access to those places [Bunumbu and Segbwema] by car" (226). If it was expensive by European standards, how much more to a village farmer whose total annual cash income might not reach double figures. Moreover, fares steadily increased, prohibiting ordinary village people from travelling very far very often. For example, in May 1944, third-class fares were increased from 1d. to 1½d. per mile (227), making the cost of a Pendembu-Freetown return ticket about £2-17-0; apart from which, for people in Luawa and Kissi country, there was still the cost in time, money and effort of first getting to Pendembu (228). In profit-making terms, the railway had never been a success, and by the late 1950s road transport was steadily increasing in popularity at the expense of the railway. Yet in the Luawa area it was only really in the early 1960s that 'lorries' became more common than 'trains' for the transport of passengers and goods up and down the country between Pendembu and Kenema, Bo and Freetown (229).

Even where there was a motor-road in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms, travel was often not easy. In October 1939, the District Commissioner, despite all his great local power, had to write to the Luawa Paramount Chief for assistance in the matter of communications. "Difficulty is often experienced in arranging transport to Buedu", noted the British official "Please send me word whenever you or any other lorry-owner in Kailahun are sending a lorry to Buedu" (230). If this was a problem to the D.C. himself, it was not surprising that it presented a serious difficulty to the local people. Mr. F.E.J. Tangbe, for example, was on one occasion
in 1942 stranded in Pendembu because of lack of transport: "after a while Mr. Alfred Ngobeh (late), a school-mate of mine, came into Pendembu from Buedu, being the only lorry from Buedu by that time as there were not many lorries in that area in those days .... We arranged fare and about four o'clock, we left Pendembu for Buedu. We did not reach Buedu [34 miles away] till midnight as we had a very bad time on the road as the lorry gave a lot of troubles to us" (231).

The situation had not radically improved two decades later, at the end of the colonial period. In Kailahun town in 1961, for instance, there were only four lorries, owned by Mr. J. Combey, Mr. Momoh Lamin, Mr. B.S. Comber, and Mr. Khalil (the first three men being local residents, and the last-named being a Lebanese trader). All these lorries were three-ton Austins and Bedfords. They rarely travelled beyond Pendembu, and there was just one small Austin van, driven by Mr. Kemoh, running a Pendembu-to-Segbwema service across the Manowa ferry. So to travel just to Kenema, the Provincial Headquarters, was a slow and arduous journey by road. Yet by train the journey was scarcely less difficult. Most travellers in 1961 took the early-morning lorry from Kailahun to Pendembu, and caught the 'express' or the slow train from Pendembu to Kenema. But it was virtually impossible to get back to Pendembu from Kenema on the same day, since the up-line 'express' only arrived in Kenema late at night, and sometimes did not arrive at all due to mechanical failures (232).

Such was the state of a basic element in the economic infra-structure at the end of the colonial period.
ABOVE:  WEAVING COUNTRY CLOTH

Social Change and the Ordinary People, c.1931 to c.1961.

During Kailondo's reign, and during the first decades of British rule, the impact of social changes in the Luawa area was felt mainly by the inhabitants of Kailahun. The same remained equally true throughout the period of British rule, with the one important difference that the inhabitants of the three Kissi Chiefdom headquarter towns also began to feel a similar impact. This was especially the case in Buedu under P.C. Kaitungi, who was determined to create a model headquarters town. At the beginning of his reign, a better and more healthy site was chosen for a new and carefully-planned Buedu town, the old site being abandoned (233). On the new site, it was arranged that people could buy a house for £2-10s. "But before a man gets an opportunity to pay for this house", explained ex-P.C. Kaitungi, "you must obtain a permit, signed by me as Paramount Chief, the town chief James Davowa, and the District Commissioner N.C. Weir, with the Doctor. After they have all signed these permits, you pay only 5 shillings. Then an area is measured, because I laid out the town to be built by compound system: sixty yards by eighty, in which a house is to be built, a latrine, and a kitchen ....

After surveying out the main streets I then selected prominent things which are public, like the market - I selected a site for the market, I selected a site for the school, where it is now. I selected a site for a hospital, very near the school. Then I selected a place for a church, and selected another place for the mosque. P.C. Kaitungi also marked out and built an impressive rest-house. So these houses were built. We used to get the labourers from the various sections; they come and build these houses, build it roughly. And I have to measure every house myself to see that it gets a window, parlour, ventilation, height, and so on; and prohibited building of any of these round houses - these mushroom houses,
which was all they were having in the Old Town” (234). About 1946, P.C. Kaitungi bought with his own money an £800 electricity generator, and installed it at Buedu making the town one of the first in the Protectorate to be electrified (235). Within a few years, Buedu had become famous as a symbol of progress. "It is laid out on sound principles of town-planning", wrote a British traveller in the early 1950s, "each house in its own compound with a separate latrine, the roads broad and awaiting only the growth of young trees to become shady boulevards. And it is lit by electric light from Buedu's own power station. Schools, cemented wells and dispensaries meet every requirement of welfare and health planning” (236).

Despite the changes made to Buedu in Kaitungi’s reign, it was still Kailahun town which was most altered in the second generation of British rule; most change in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms was centred on Kailahun town. In the 1930s, Kailahun gained some benefits from being a District Headquarters (237). A piped water-supply was constructed in 1930, with a small reservoir-tank on the hill-top near the District Commissioner's Office, and several public taps situated around the town centre (238). The postal service was improved and Kailahun was given a proper Post Office; the telegraph, which had been removed when the W.A.F.F. garrison left the town in 1922, was re-installed (239). In 1938, a small Government-built 18-bed hospital replaced the dispensary, and a Medical Officer, a qualified doctor, took up residence in Kailahun (240). P.C. Momoh Banya had re-built part of his family compound in the centre of Kailahun between the years 1930 and 1932, and had constructed the first three-storey building in the District; as late as the 1960s it remained the only such building in the area (241). The Chief used reinforced concrete for the walls of his new houses, and corrugated-iron sheets for roofing, as did the large firms and the Lebanese traders who set up stores in Kailahun. The use of these new building-materials
thus became commonplace in the town. Yet these developments scarcely touched the lives of the ordinary people in the villages around Kailahun. And in Kissi country, not even the Chiefdom headquarter towns possessed piped-water, postal services, or medical services in the 1930s. Perhaps the most noticeable change in the Kissi Chiefdoms during that decade was the slow introduction of new building materials. For instance, in Dia (headquarters of Kissi Kama Chiefdom), P.C. Bundor Belle was the first person to build a house with a corrugated-iron roof, followed by Kulu Bali, a Bambara trader in 1937 (242). After that, other people slowly began to copy their example.

During the 1940s and 1950s, ordinary people in the villages of Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms were slightly affected by various new social pressures, but still the people most affected were those living in Kailahun. This was particularly the case as regards literacy. The spread of 'European' education (243) was closely linked with the work of the Methodist Mission in Kailahun. "At Kailahun", wrote a visiting British missionary in 1936, "Mr. & Mrs. Clarke are rejoicing in the completion of their new school buildings - two - which have been made possible by a gift from the Chief there of £50. They have been well placed upon the Compound, and a splendid area around them has been cleared making a fine playing field for the scholars. The roll is already up to the limit of 60 boys and girls, and the work in general shows every sign of progress" (244). Just before this, there had been a disagreement with the Kailahun kpaakoia because Mr. and Mrs. Clarke had been teaching the children in the Mende language, and the local elders wanted the children to be taught in English from the start. From then on more teaching was done in English, and the £50 gift was a material indication that the Chief was satisfied with the new arrangement (245).
Although during the war years, from 1939 to 1945, there was no resident European missionary in Kailahun, the primary school established by Rev. and Mrs. W.R.E. Clarke continued to operate, first under the headmastership of Mr. S.A. Jenusa and later under Mr. Philip Jibao (246). Thus, under local leadership, a continuity was maintained through the war years which facilitated a large expansion in the number of schools during the early 1950s (247). In 1952, the first Methodist Primary School in the villages of the area was opened at Sandialu, and approval was gained for a school to be opened in Dodo-Cotuma. Another primary school was opened at Ngiehun by 1956, followed by others at Giema, Baoma and Bandajuma (248). But right up to the late 1950s, it was far easier for parents in Kailahun to send their children to primary school than it was for most parents in the villages. When the Methodist Church decided to open a secondary school in the area, naturally it was built in Kailahun, and was opened in 1959 (249).

In practice, the basic premise of the Methodist and other Christian Churches at work in the area seemed to be that education provided the best means of evangelism. Although this premise was rarely questioned, the results threw doubts upon its validity. In 1931, Rev. J.R.S. Law, a Methodist missionary, described the situation in Kailahun District: "We have very few effective preachers, and perhaps not more than two [local] men who can adequately train catechumens and maintain proper oversight. As Mr. Crosby said to me after some experience in Segbwema and Jojoima circuits, What most of our Mende Catechists need is conversion! Zeal for religion at all comparable with that of the Mohammedan teacher seems sadly lacking". Mr. Law referred to the "Mohammedan flood which is now really coming in", and noted, "No one wishes to be thought a heathen today. There are only three religions, Mohammedanism, the Government, and Christianity" (250). Although it is difficult to find acceptable historical standards to measure
religious influence, the situation seemed to change very little over the next thirty years. At least in Luawa, Islam remained considerably stronger in numbers of adherents than Christianity.

Christian mission did not spread into Kissi country until a number of years after the establishment of the Methodist Mission in Kailahun, since Rev. Clarke obviously had neither the time nor the linguistic knowledge to open work in the Kissi Chiefdoms. In Kissi Kama, the first Christian to live in the Chiefdom was Mamma Laura, a Creole woman trader who settled in Dia and learnt the Kissi language well: she arrived in Dia in 1933 and died there in 1953. The first Kissia to become Christians, however, were those who went to mission schools, like F.E.J. Tengbe (in the late 1920s), and Mr. T.M. Tengbe (in the early 1940s). In fact, the first Kissi person to come into Kissi Kama with some understanding of Christianity was Mr. F.E.J. Tengbe (251), who returned to Kissi country in 1938 (252). At that time, in the late 1930s, there were still virtually no Moslems among the Kissia: only 'strangers', like the Mandinka people, were serious about Islam in Kissi country (253). In fact, one of the most noticeable social differences between Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms up to the end of the colonial period was the rapid spread of Islam in Luawa and its small impact on the Kissi Chiefdoms.

In the early 1950s, indeed, it seemed that a widespread conversion to Christianity was developing in Kissi country through the agency of Methodist missionary activity. Kissia from Petema and other villages in the Kissi hills requested missionaries, so the work went up to Sandialu, Petema and Baiama: Aliu N'dow, a catechist from Sandialu, was one of the local leaders in this work, which took on the nature of a "minor mass movement" (254). This mass movement was not, however, sustained into the 1960s, except by Pentecostal Churches around Koidu (255). At the very end of the colonial
period, the Kissia also began to show interest in the work of the African independent 'Church of the Lord (Aladura)'. In Koindo in 1960 "the most prominent woman trader in the town, a Creole, gave hospitality to a disciple of the Aladura Church and lent him a building in her compound for use as a church" (256). From here the work expanded into other parts of Kissi country in a rather spasmodic manner in subsequent years (257).

By the mid-1950s, the Roman Catholic Church had also become established in the Luawa area, and had opened schools at Pendembu and Baiwala (258). By the early 1960s, Roman Catholic primary schools had been opened in Kailahun and several other villages in Luawa such as Mendie (259). The very first school to be built in the Luawa area outside Kailahun town was not, however, a mission school at all. It was opened in early 1948 at Kangama by the Kissi Tong N.A., which erected both the school and the teacher's house (260). By 1954, another N.A. school had been opened at Buedu (261).

The children of the richer kpakoista of Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms were able to travel outside the area to gain education. Bo School slowly became ready to take children other than those who were the sons of Chiefs, though for a time in the 1930s, numbers of children going there from Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms seemed to decline rather than increase. In 1936, for example, there were only 6 children at the school from Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms (262). Perhaps one reason for this decline was that from the 1930s onwards, it became a practical possibility for the richer parents of the Luawa area to send their children to the capital city for schooling. In the 1930s, Mr. B.N. Combey became the first boy from Luawa to receive full education in a Freetown secondary school (263), and the practice of sending children to 'finish' their secondary education
in the capital had become common by the 1960s (264). This tendency was reinforced by the concentration of 'Sixth Form' places in Freetown (265). If academically-minded young men wanted to go to the 'Sixth Form' outside Freetown, they were compelled to go at least as far 'down-country' as Bo. And the evidence shows that once young men had moved away from Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms (whether to attend 'Sixth Form' or for any other purpose) they rarely returned to live in the area of their childhood. For example, Gbesse and Taplima Ngobeh were the first of the Ngobeh family to be educated at Bo School. Gbesse joined the Sierra Leone Police Force in Freetown in 1923, and retired in 1945 with the rank of Sergeant. Taplima worked in the Sierra Leone Survey Department from 1928 until 1933, whence he joined Maroc Mines as Surveyor, and stayed at this job until 1942 (266).

The members of the Banya family who were educated at Bo School likewise found work in Freetown or places in the Protectorate away from Kailahun District. The eldest of Momoh Banya's sons, after leaving Bo in 1929, became a dispenser (267) and did not return to live in Kailahun until shortly before his father's death (268). A.K. Banya also became a dispenser like his brother; and a third brother, S.S. Banya, gained a Government scholarship in the 1940s to go to Britain to read medicine at university. Sama Kulu-Banya, the second son of P.C. Momoh Banya, entered the Forestry Department as a forester after leaving school in 1935 (269), and later joined the Protectorate administration (270). Several other sons entered the clerical division of the Civil Service (271).

None of Luawa's children who received a full 'secondary' education in the reign of Momoh Banya or before returned immediately to live in Luawa (272), though a few came back after a decade or more (273); and yet others retired to Luawa (274). The same pattern was discernable in the Kissi Chiefdoms when, in the 1950s and 1960s, secondary education became possible
for larger numbers of Kissi children (275). The result was that, right up to the end of the colonial period, there was no group in the area which could meaningfully be identified as a local indigenous 'educated elite'.

It has been argued that anyone who had attended school for even a year or two was in a sense part of a new 'educated elite'. But after two or three years at school some children were unable even to sign their own name (276), and such children could not sensibly be described as members of an elite. The Kailahun District Commissioner's figures in 1931, "excluding school children, showed that of the Mendes 0.3 per cent. were able to speak English and 0.2 per cent. literate; of the Kissi 0.3 per cent. and 0.4 per cent., respectively" (277). By 1963, the literacy rate had risen to just over 5% in Luawa and just over 2% in the Kissi Chiefdoms (278), though it was noted that literacy figures could be expected to show some upward bias. "In addition to the prestige element associated with literacy, there might also be a failure on the part of the respondent to understand that the ability to read a few words and to write even less, perhaps only one's name, should not be equated with reading and writing a language" (279). Surprisingly, fewer people in Luawa were literate in the Mende language than English: 483 people compared with 1,215 people respectively (280).

By the end of the colonial period there was a number of prominent Mendebusia and Kissia, living in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms, who possessed literacy. In addition to ex-P.C.s Kaitungi and S.K. Banya, there were several traders like M.G. Kormoh and A.K. Lamin (281); a number of clerks like Mr. Karim at the District Council (282) and F.E.J. Tengbe in the Native Administration (283); schoolteachers like Mr. T.M. Tengbo. But individuals like these were so disparate in their status, role, and degree of education that they could not in any meaningful way be described collectively as an 'elite'. It is also difficult to find any satisfactory standards
by which these literate individuals might be divided into an 'elite' and various 'sub-elites'. The whole question was complicated by the presence of in the town of a semi-permanent group of literate people who did not regard Luawa or the Kissi Chiefdoms as their home, and who were not regarded by the local people as one with them; the Creole and Lebanese traders. Then again, there were literate non-local people who made Kailahun just a temporary home: the Medical Officer, the District Commissioner and the Postmaster; the Assistant D.C. and Police Commanding Officer; some schoolteachers and Christian pastors; District Council officials (284).

Amongst the literate local people of the Luawa area it was hard to discern the presence of a 'nationalist pressure group' for the same reasons that it was difficult to distinguish an educated 'elite'. The individuals were so different that they possessed a large variety of political sentiments. In any case 'nationalism' was a misleading (in some instances, meaningless) term when applied to Protectorate politics. Perhaps the most that can be said is that nearly all of these literate individuals were eager to be free of British control, and resented the assumed superiority of British officials. In the same way, the most that can be generalized about their relations with the Chiefs was that these literate individuals generally recognized and deprecated the inadequacies of the Native Administrations.

As far as Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms were concerned, 'European medicine', like education, was available to only a few people in Kailahun town throughout the 1930s. Even in the 1940s, P.C. Sellu Tengbe of Kissi Kamu said that his people would not think of going to hospital. They were treated by their own 'native doctors' (285), some of whose herbal medicine was quite efficacious (286). When in 1951 Chiefdom Clerk F.E.J. Tengbe contracted yellow fever, he simply stayed put in his village of Kokoma
(1½ miles from Dia), getting no better for several weeks (287). "This time there was no road or motor-road in our area to go to the nearest Dispensary, and in fact there was no dispensary in the three Kisi Chiefdoms, but we had to go to Kailahun for treatments which was very far for a patient to travel" (288). Mr. Tengbe's statement was somewhat misleading in that there were Trypanosomiasis Centres at Kangama and Koindu in Kisi Teng which also acted as dispensaries, although they were not formally designated as such (289). Nevertheless, the significant fact is that even a European-educated official, who might have been expected to turn to 'hospital medicine' (290) in illness, felt when he was sick in Kisi country that there were no European-medicine centres within reach.

Yet from the viewpoint of British officials, by the late 1940s Kailahun District enjoyed "better and more numerous medical and sanitary facilities than any district in the Protectorate" (291). "Tryps and Yaws dispensaries contributed to by Native Administrations were operated at Koindu, Kangama, Dodo", and there was a Medical Officer in the District in charge of the Trypanosomiasis and Yaws campaign, in addition to the ordinary Medical Officer stationed in Kailahun (292). There was also a Methodist Mission hospital at Segbwema (293). Certainly during the 1950s, medical facilities expanded, bringing more people of Luawa and the Kisi Chiefdoms within reach of them. By 1954, an additional Tryps. and Yaws Centre had been established in Ngiehun (294); and by the early 1960s, four other Treatment Centres had been established at Bewabu, Nyandehun, Buedu and Baoma (295). Simple dressings and penicillin injections were perhaps the most effective large-scale treatments provided, the dispenser in charge not being qualified to deal with many more complicated problems. Even in 1961, however, many people in Luawa and the Kisi Chiefdoms were still in the position of F.E.J. Tengbe a decade earlier. For example, the people of Gondama village in the extreme
south-west of Luawa were seven miles from the nearest dispensary at Bewabu—too far to carry a very sick person along rough roads. And up to the end of the colonial period there were only 27 hospital beds in Kailahun hospital (296), to cater for a population in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms of some 60,000 (297).

In one respect, though, 'European medicine' did affect a large proportion of the ordinary people of 'Kailondo's Luawa'. The Trypanosomiasis campaign was one of the most significant works undertaken by the British rulers in the area during the whole period of colonial rule. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, "tax returns showed that some parts of Sierra Leone, especially Kono and Kissi country and Luawa, seemed to be losing population. Investigation revealed whole villages denuded of people. It was a sleeping-sickness epidemic, such as has ravaged this part of Africa periodically. It spreads; the tsetse (fly) can only get the virus from an infected human, and the more people have it the more get it. Then the population goes down, the tsetse itself acquires the virus less frequently, and the epidemic is over. The bush reclaimed the deserted farmland and renewed the fertility of the soil, and after a time the people, armed with axe, cutlass and fire, return.

To bring modern science to bear upon these debilitating sicknesses, the Endemic Diseases Control Unit was set up with the aid of Colonial Development and Welfare funds .... It can beat yaws with arsenic and bismuth injections, sleeping-sickness with pentamylene" (298). The effect of the Trypanosomiasis campaign, which began in 1939 (299), was startlingly good. In 1940-41, the proportion of the total population who were affected by trypanosomiasis was as high as 20.3% in parts of the Kissi Chiefdoms, and 5.8% in Luawa. By 1942, the figures were 4.9% and 2.6% respectively (300). By 1944, a survey showed the infection rate as 0.4 per cent with a total infection rate which includes relapses after previous
treatment of 0.55 per cent for the three Kissi chiefdoms .... In Liberia, the full extent of Sleeping Sickness is not known, but the incidence in many places near the Sierra Leone boundary is certainly much higher than in this country, thus forming a constant source of re-infection" (301). By 1944 also, yaws had been tackled, and re-surveys recorded its incidence as 0.1% for Kisi Tungi, 2% for Kissi Tang, and 3% for Kissi Kama (302). "Up to April, 1944," reported the Governor, "30,132 cases of yaws had been dealt with concurrently with the treatment of cases of sleeping sickness, which totalled 10,645. It is expected that the treatment of sleeping sickness on the present basis will be completed about the middle of 1945" (303).

After the completion of the Tryps. and Yaws campaign, the various treatment centres were used for the control of endemic diseases generally. This was in accordance with a suggestion made by one of the Medical Officers who worked on the sleeping sickness campaign (304). "The Trypanosomiasis Campaign", wrote Dr. R.D. Harding, "in the course of which whole populations of large areas have been examined for sleeping sickness and yaws by a medical officer, has brought to light the prevalence in certain regions of other serious endemic diseases, and of malnutrition and avitaminosis. Many of these were of course already known or suspected, but their severity and distribution were to a considerable extent unknown .... But even now detailed and accurate knowledge is scanty. It is therefore proposed that, during 1945 and 1946, surveys of such diseases as bilharzia, amoebic dysenters, hookworm, and perhaps gonorrhea, should be carried out in a number of areas, the dispensaries serving as bases" (305). Dr. Harding's suggestion by no means provided a full list of all the endemic diseases in the area. Smallpox, leprosy, tuberculosis, yellow fever, measles and, of course, malaria, could be added to the list, among others. For example, in February 1944 there was an outbreak of smallpox in Kailahun District, and by June when the epidemic
ceased, 343 cases had occurred (306), of which 77 proved fatal (307). By the end of British rule, none of these other endemic diseases had been controlled with anything like the success achieved against yaws and trypanosomiasis (308).

One factor which made disease control steadily more difficult in the 1940s and 1950s was the increasing geographical mobility of some sections of the population. This new mobility first became significant in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms during the Second World War. Few men had moved from this area during the First World War (309), but between 1939 and 1945, several hundred men were affected by the war. "I was Recruiting Officer here", noted Mr. S.K. Banya. "In all about four hundred men went from Luawa to fight in the Second World War. Most of them came back after the War - some died of course; others couldn't fit into their former background - they stayed in Freetown. Others were absorbed into the P.W.D. and different departments" (310). It was not only army recruits who travelled outside Luawa - even outside Sierra Leone (311) - during the Second World War. The Agricultural Department noted in 1942 that the greatest limitation upon rice production was "the large demand made by the Services" not only through the recruitment of troops but also through "labour for the building of various camps, wharves, airfields, etc. necessary for the prosecution of the war in Sierra Leone .... Since the number of farmers before the war was estimated to be about 383,000, it will be seen from information provided that there has been a total of some 20 per cent. to 25 per cent. of the male population, in the most vigorous years of their life, removed from production" (312). Presumably Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms, being in the far corner of the Protectorate, were less affected by this removal of labour than most other Chiefdoms: but all Chiefdoms must have been affected to some extent.
In the early 1950s, there was another and even more serious migration of young men from Kailahun District. The cause of this migration was the news that diamonds could be illicitly but fairly easily mined in Kono District. The presence of diamonds there was confirmed in the 1930s (313), but there was no 'rush' to mine them until after the Second World War. Possibly the increased mobility which many people discovered during the War was one cause of the 'diamond rush' in the late 1940s. In 1953, Mr. Roy Lewis described how men from other areas "come up to Kono country to work at night and in secret to pothole the workings and get the diamonds before the white men get them. They do not make much out of the work - about £1 per carat - but it is more interesting work than brushing the hills" (314). In the early 1950s, many young men went to Kono from Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms. So many young men went from Mano-Sewalu, for example, that the size of farms had to be reduced; and only one or two of the young men who went away ever came back (315). The same sort of situation was noted in Dodo-Cotuma (316) and Ngishun (317).

British officials tended to see the 'diamond rush', along with the social upset caused by soldiers returning from the War, as one of the main reasons for unrest in the Chiefdoms during the 1950s. "The [1955-56] disturbances were the culmination of a long train of events starting in the years after the war for which it would be quite unreasonable to hold the present Government responsible. As far back as 1943 there was evidence of unrest in the Southern Province and this became more marked in 1950 and subsequent years as a result of the unsettlement following upon the war, the decline of moral standards in general, the undermining of respect for law and order following on widespread discoveries of diamonds and the economic consequences" (318). This analysis does not hold good for the troubles in Luawa and Kissi Tungi in 1950, since they occurred before the
diamond-rush had really got under way, the main part of the 'rush' lasting from 1952 to 1957 (319). Moreover, ex-P.C. S.K. Banya believed that, although ex-soldiers were active during the disturbances against him in 1949-50, they were not themselves instigators of any trouble at all. "Those boys came back well-disciplined .... They [the British officials] used the boys against the Chiefs, but the boys of themselves, I'm telling you personally, there was not a boy from the army who would not jump to attention when he saw me" (320). And nobody could have been in a better position to judge the direction from which opposition was coming than the Paramount Chief himself.

Also, it is easy to over-emphasize in general the impact made on Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms by the increase in mobility and the social changes which occurred between the 1930s and the 1950s. Social changes occurred mainly in settlements near the railway or near a motor road, and reasonably good communications were the main prerequisite for the sort of developments which British officials (and many anthropologists) considered to be 'social improvements' (321). But in 1961, the provision of roads and transport facilities were very limited in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms (322). The second prerequisite for large-scale material development was an all-year supply of clean drinking water, many of the most common debilitating diseases in the area being water-borne. Worm infestations and schistosomiasis (bilharzia) were both extremely common in the Luawa area (323). Until the general level of the people's health was improved by the control of such diseases, the ordinary village folk had no surplus energy to spend on making material improvements. Yet no town in Luawa or Kissi country had a disease-free water supply by 1961 (324). Thus, by the end of the colonial period not even the infra-structure required for positive social change in the area had been laid (325).
Until recent years, historical studies of Sierra Leone tended to concentrate on the coastal capital or on areas untypical of the country as a whole (326). Also, most generalizations about the effects of British rule in Sierra Leone were mainly concerned with the Creole community and with a small urbanized, educated elite in the Protectorate; and attention was focussed on developments during the last fifteen years of the colonial period (327). But generalizations about a whole country during a time-span of two generations cannot be properly substantiated by reference only to small pockets of untypical territory, to a tiny 'Europeanized' segment of the whole society, or to a few years at the end of the period. Before the 1960s, moreover, Sierra Leone studies tended to divorce the period of British rule from what preceded it, assuming in practice that the Europeans came upon a *tabla rasa* when they entered the Protectorate area (328). By contrast, the present writer, in examining a small area over a considerable time-span, found it was impossible to isolate the colonial period from what preceded it, and from what followed it, without introducing serious historical distortion. This conclusion is consonant with the findings, over the last decade, of a number of other researchers in West African history.

In carrying out this regional study, the conviction grew, for the present writer, that Luawa may well provide a representative example of what was happening in Sierra Leone as a whole - even in West Africa as a whole - in this period. The reason for this conviction is that the majority of West Africans in the forest and guinea savanna belts probably followed a daily routine and basic way of life similar to the people of Luawa. They
found their livelihood within a subsistence agriculture; they lived mainly in closely-knit rural settlements; in the first decades of the twentieth century, the railway came near their area but did not actually touch it; they were over fifty miles from the nearest centre of European influence (which was Kenema in the case of Luawa (329)). From the viewpoint of the Freetown Government, Luawa was a far-away backwater - but then, so was most of the Protectorate; and so were most areas of West Africa in relation to the colonial capitals. The history of Luawa may be significant not because of unusual happenings there, but simply because on the whole its experience was so typical of what occurred under British colonial rule in vast areas of West Africa.

A surprising degree of continuity underlies Luawa's history between the 1880s and the 1960s; the break in 1896 was for the ordinary people more apparent than real. For them, the one decisive break throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries probably came in 1880 when Kailondo established his polity; for the first time in memory, they became part of a comparatively large political unit which was also a developing and well-governed polity. A century later, in the 1970s, the basic loyalties of the ordinary people of the area still lay within, and were directed towards, that same unit (or rather, the four smaller units into which it had been divided during the twentieth century (330)).

The continuity resulted partly from the considerable degree of initiative which Luawa's rulers and ordinary people were able to retain in some spheres, despite the presence of the British rulers. This continuing initiative linked development in the 1880s with development in the 1950s. Kailondo built up 'Greater Luawa', and between 1896 and 1911 Fabunkeh
helped to ensure that its heartland's territorial integrity was maintained. P.C. Momoh Banya, in the 1920s and 1930s, was responsible for a wide range of economic initiatives - improving communications and transport; using new building materials; developing town-planning and erecting public buildings such as the Mosque, the N.A. Court Barri, the Dispensary and the Daily Market Hall; planting new crops. By the late 1930s, such innovations as widespread cocoa-growing indicated that others were following his example. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the British began deliberately to delegate more and more authority in local government and development to the local indigenous leaders of the community. Especially, the few literate people in Luawa provided a lead in the Church and the Mosque, in 'European' education, in agricultural Co-operative Societies. Many Chiefdom 'sections' built their own motor roads.

The most convincing demonstration of continuity in Luawa's history was provided by the ordinary life of the village farmer, which changed little in basic outline between 1880 and 1961. Subsistence cultivation of upland-rice remained the predominant concern of the village people each year between February and November, with the production of palm kernels and oil coming next; consequently the staple food and general diet of the people remained the same. Domestic slavery and the kogubanga or armed forces of the Mahawai faded away under British rule, but most other social institutions remained strong and little changed. Ceremonies connected with the yearly routine, with birth, puberty, marriage, sickness and death, together with underlying religious beliefs, did not basically change (331). Clothing and housing did not greatly alter from what they were in Kailondo's day - at least, not until the 1950s. Life for most people of Luawa continued to revolve round the extended family and the village community under its tamahci. The British subverted the position of the Mahawai, but in a legal dispute
(the main occasion on which a villager might want to appeal to higher authority), the final decision still rested with the Mahawai as far as most ordinary villagers were concerned. Similarly in the matter of commerce, the ndowe or weekly market remained the chief agency of local trading. The weekly markets which were common throughout Kailahun District in the 1960s were similar in organization, and even in the type of articles for sale, to those which T.J. Alldridge had seen in Gbande country in 1891; their extension into Luawa was partly a result of Momoh Banya's encouragement. The Koindu international market was also not an entirely new departure, but was the development of an existing weekly market through the initiative of the local people, who realized that the new international boundaries (drawn in the early years of the twentieth century) gave their town a strategic position. Moreover, the language of the ordinary people remained either Mende or Kissi into the second half of the twentieth century, the languages absorbing foreign words to express new concepts and names of things. Arabic, English, and even Krio, were little used as means of communication. This was certainly a crucial factor in helping towards quiet continuity in the experience of the ordinary people from the 1880s right into the 1970s.

A second underlying element in Luawa's history during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the British failure to transform ('radically improve') Luawa politically. "Transformation" for writers like Alldridge had the connotation 'radical improvement', and was applied to British achievement in Sierra Leone during the first decades of the twentieth century (332). But British rule did not stimulate political development in Kailondo's Luawa; rather it did the reverse. It first distorted the politics of Luawa, and then ossified its own distortion into
a basically unchangeable system between about 1920 and 1950. The introduction of Native Administration in 1937 into Luawa and the Kissa Chiefdoms did not alter Chiefdom organization as much, nor as beneficially, as British officials believed: in fact there is some evidence to suggest that the long-term effects of the N.A.s were detrimental to the ordinary people (333).

The District Councils experiment was more clearly abortive, and hardly anyone shed tears over their demise when they were disbanded in the late 1960s. The only viable basis for local government was the pre-1896 mahavai: that concept alone had roots in the villagers' way of life, and it alone was accepted, understood and supported. But the crucial fact was that between 1896 and 1919 in Luawa, British officials so distorted the nature of the mahavai that the one viable basis for local government was permanently destroyed. The ordinary people and their local rulers were largely alienated from each other, and from English-type local government. And this was the ground from which sprang the disturbances of the late 1940s and early 1950s in Luawa.

Alienation of the ordinary people from their Chiefs resulted, in detail, largely from the latter's increasing extortion of cash, tribute and forced labour. Especially in the years after the Second World War, many Paramount Chiefs and their minor officials increasingly exploited the ordinary people for their own benefit. The Chief's position encouraged him to do so. Although he held the leading post in local affairs, his power to get things done depended on (and was often limited by) the District Commissioner. The Chief might well be prevented by the D.C. from executing radical policies in the interests of his Chiefdom, but he was allowed enough scope to pursue a negative policy of material self-aggrandizement at the expense of the ordinary people. The D.C.'s support might even encourage a weak, venal Chief to increase his exactions.
In Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms, then, although the Chiefs were allowed the forms and appearances of sovereignty, the reality of power belonged not to them but to the District Commissioner. The ordinary people, for their part, remained loyal to the institution of the mahayal as they had known it before British distortion, but were increasingly prepared in the 1940s to oppose and use violence against individual Chiefs whose behaviour and exactions were becoming unbearable. In the early 1950s the confusion resulting from the unrest of the ordinary people was confounded by the attempt to give local executive power to District Councils. Direct taxation spiralled upwards; District Commissioners, surrendering some of their powers to the Councils and losing the services of the Court Messengers, became apparently as impotent as the Chiefs; the Police Force was introduced into the Protectorate; inadequate officials in Council offices controlled comparatively huge budgets. The ordinary people of the Kailahun area might have reacted much more violently against all this if produce prices had not been so favourable at that period (334).

During the early 1890s, Luawa seemed poised for further political development, but this in fact did not occur. Probably the main reason for this failure was the imposition of British rule. Although T.J. Allridge argued that the creation of a British Protectorate "transformed a lawless and slave-dealing country into one of security and freedom" (335), a close study of Luawa has produced little evidence of this sort of radical political transformation in colonial days. Luawa was not "lawless" before 1896, and in the 1950s (and even in the 1960s) the economic and political "freedom" of the ordinary people was extremely limited. The story of Luawa suggests that the 'classic' period of colonial rule (c.1911 to c.1945) may best be seen as a comparative hiatus in political development; and the extent of political stagnation might be roughly correlated with the degree to which
Luawa's leaders were deprived of the ability to take initiative in their local affairs.

A third major aspect of the period c.1850 to c.1961 was slow and limited socio-economic development. Under Kailondo, long-distance trade seemed to be growing between Luawa and both the Upper Niger basin to the north and the Atlantic littoral to the south. The building of the railway as far as Pendembu in 1908 not only greatly increased Luawa's long-distance trade, but also determined that the direction of trade should be largely towards Freetown, rather than with other coastal towns or with the Upper Niger basin. The building of the railway probably benefited Luawa more than any other single undertaking in the colonial period, though its impact was less immediate and less far-reaching than Cardew's predictions and Alltridge's subsequent reports would suggest (336). By comparison with the railway, the improvement of Luawa's roads to make them motorable (from 1914 onwards) had less impact than might have been expected, at least until the time of the Second World War.

The slow disappearance of domestic slavery as a recognized institution, and improvements in medical facilities in Kailahun from the 1930s onwards, were other beneficial developments which may be directly attributable to the work of British colonial officials. Yet neither of these changes was as radical as it might seem at first sight. Slavery in the Protectorate had been a comparatively mild institution, and the slave generally had owned some land for himself on which he made a farm for two days in the week. In 1928 his legal status was altered, but not his economic position; so in fact he was still dependent upon his former master, and social relationships in the villages were largely unaffected by the 1928 Ordinance. As regards 'European medicine', the hospital which was opened in Kailahun in the late 1930s contained just
18 beds for a population in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms of fifty to sixty thousand people. In the 1940s, the hospital was enlarged to contain 30 beds (337). Like so many other 'improvements' which were pioneered by Europeans during the period of British rule, the impact of the Kailahun hospital was (at least outside Kailahun town itself) inevitably negligible, because the hospital was so tiny compared with the total population of the area. The one significant inroad made before the 1950s on prevalent diseases in the area was the trypanosomiasis campaign, which virtually eliminated the disease in the Kissi Chiefdoms during the early 1940s.

The trypanosomiasis campaign was exceptional. Most socio-economic developments in twentieth-century Luawa and Kissi country were not the direct result of British administrators' work. Some changes were introduced by energetic and wealthy indigenous leaders of the area; some by the ordinary villagers of Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms; some by white Christian missionaries, and some by Mandinka or Fula Muslim missionary-traders. Creole, European and (especially) Lebanese traders also stimulated change by the introduction of new consumer goods and by the relatively high prices they were able to pay for produce in the late 1940s and 1950s. The work of P.C. Momoh Banya has already been mentioned in these conclusions. The Christian missionaries opened European-type schools. The literate members of Luawa society clearly had special opportunities for leadership which have also been mentioned here. The people of Koindu worked for the growth of the unique international market in their town. The ordinary people of Luawa, largely on their own initiative, started sowing swamp rice and growing new cash crops (first cocoa, and later, coffee).

Thus, socio-economic development in Luawa was not 'introduced' by the British along with political control. Rather, development which was taking place in the 1880s continued through the colonial period and resulted
from a complex interaction between the activities of traders, colonial officials, ordinary Mendeleisia and Kissia of the area, missionaries and local rulers. Professor Kilson, on this subject, concluded that the "significance of colonial government to the social and economic development of African colonies cannot be overemphasized .... There is little doubt that had the colonial bureaucracy in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa not shouldered this development, the degree of social change would be much less than it was" (338). But in the Luawa area, the significance of colonial government certainly can be overemphasized. If a particular group is to be isolated as the most significant force for development (though it is probably better not to try this, but to leave the analysis in terms of a complex interplay of different forces), then the present writer would choose the local people and their rulers. This choice is confirmed by the way socio-economic development increased in the 1950s as the local people increasingly regained complete control of their own affairs. In fact the 1880s and the 1950s-60s may be contrasted with the intervening half-century when there may have been a slowing-down in the pace of socio-economic development. The effect of British rule in the socio-economic (as in the political) sphere may have been not to initiate, or even hasten, development but rather to retard it.

What about the mass of the people living in the Luawa area? How was the everyday life of ordinary village farmers changed between 1850 and 1960? Historians of West Africa have often neglected the ordinary people and have been preoccupied with the activities of Europeans in the area or (more recently) with African "elites". In this thesis an attempt has been made to see the period particularly from the viewpoint of the vast majority of the long-standing inhabitants of the land.
This vast majority was made up of Mende and Kissi village subsistence-farmers. What can be discovered about their attitudes, initiatives and responses to new situations in Kailondo's day and under British rule?

In the 1880s, the ordinary people experienced a number of radical political changes—a more settled peace and greater security through being incorporated into Kailondo's Luawa. The large majority of people in his heartland apparently supported Kailondo and were satisfied with his rule (339). By comparison, their real needs and aspirations were largely misunderstood or forgotten between 1896 and 1950 by their British overlords, and there could be no sense of identification between the ordinary people and their white rulers, the British having imposed their own rule by military force. The colonial rulers did not need to seek the support of the ordinary people, nor did they gain it. The inclusion of the Chiefs—the indigenous rulers—in the British system meant that they too could ignore the wishes of the people. The sense of alienation from both African and European rulers, which the ordinary people felt as a result, has already been mentioned. At least until the late 1940s, however, this sense of alienation did not dominate the ordinary people's experience in Luawa, because the imposition of British rule did not have any great impact on the routine or political life of the villages.

The situation began to change under the stimulus of the 1939-1945 War. Some individuals in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms profited from this changed situation, and this was especially true of those who could produce new cash crops like cocoa and those who were literate in English such as the N.A. clerks. But most people in the villages did not feel these changes deeply, and the ordinary people were largely a forgotten element. Even at the end of British rule the hospital in Kailahun was so small, the numbers of school-children were so few, and local communications were so
restricted, that the majority of local people had been little affected in their day-to-day living by the changes which went with these developments.

In Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms it was not moves towards self-government or economic development which altered the position; rather, change came for the ordinary people when they so reasserted their power in the Chiefdom disputes of 1949 to 1954 that the British and African rulers were forced to take them into account politically. Unfortunately for the ordinary people, however, the promise of a radically 'new deal' for them, which seemed to be present in the early 1950s, was never fulfilled. Everyday life for most ordinary village people was still basically the same in the 1970s as it had been in the 1880s (340): British rule had not caused much fundamental change (341).

How may the conclusions in this thesis make for a better understanding of the history of West African peoples from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries? What light does the history of Luawa throw on the nature and impact of British colonial rule in West Africa? The answers to these questions depend on the answer to a prior question: How far was Luawa typical of up-country West Africa in this period? Much more work needs to be done on many more small areas of West Africa before that question can be clearly answered. But it does seem that, for Sierra Leone at least, Luawa was typical of the Protectorate at large (with the exception of the area's entanglement in the international boundaries dispute between 1896 and 1917).

This study would suggest that some widely-accepted historical assumptions need careful re-examination. These assumptions may be put in the form of statements as follows:
"Beyond the rule of any large, well-established indigenous empire, constant warfare unsettled the lives of the ordinary African peoples before the establishment of colonial rule."

"When the Europeans imposed political control, they ended inter-tribal warfare, established lasting peace, and introduced law and order."

"The imposition of European rule was a turning-point in the history of West African peoples, because it resulted in a transformation (a radical improvement) of their political, social and economic life."

"The Europeans revolutionized the local economy of the ordinary people; they built roads, introduced cash crops, and through vastly increasing the volume of trade (both exports and imports), brought the local people into a "modern" cash economy."

"Because "traditional rulers" could not adapt traditional institutions and were naturally venal, they were inadequate to the changed situation of the 1940s and 1950s."

"The most significant feature in West African history in the first half of the twentieth century was the rise of a new educated elite, possessed with nationalist sentiments."

As regards Luawa, all these assumptions have been found to be either false, misleading, or at best fundamentally inadequate. Whether the same would hold true of other up-country areas in English-speaking countries of West Africa is a question which this thesis alone cannot answer.
NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER SIX.

1. Fairly extensive use has been made of almost all these writers in the earlier chapters of this thesis. Rev. W.R.E. Clarke and Mr. N.C. Hollins were separated from T.J. Alldridge by nearly a generation, but even these two former writers did not produce much new written material after the mid-1930s.

2. A further problem is that some of the available information is somewhat uncomplimentary to individuals who are still alive and active in public affairs, and the present writer felt it was improper to use such information.

3. KDOA, Pendembe District, NAMP 29/1924; Hollins; 1.11.24 mentioned this dispute to the Commissioner of Central Province. The dispute dated back to events in P.C. Fabundeh's reign. In September 1925, the C.C.P., W.D. Bowden, settled the dispute and explained what he had done in a long min., 11-12.9.25, Ngiehun.

4. Ibid. Further notes in the same file.

5. KDOA, Pendembe District, NAMP 87/1920; Despicht; 27.2.22 mentioned this dispute to the C.C.P. It was decided only in March 1929 by the C.C.P., W.D. Bowden (see enc. Bowden, 17-20.3.29, Petema Camp). See also R.H. Hollins, Pendembe District 169/21, Handing over notes, Sept.1921. Native Affairs. A boundary palaver was outstanding "between Luawa on one side and the Kissi Kama and Kissi Teng chiefdoms on the other (N.A.87/1920) - this is not urgent and in any case should be held over during Chief Gobeh's illness. The Provincial Commissioner should see the paper before action is taken".

6. KDOA, Pendembe District, NAMP 87/1920, enc. Despicht, 27.2.22: "Kissi Kama people claim it on the ground that it was formerly theirs but was pledged to Kissi Teng".

7. Ibid., enc. min. Hollins, 10.11.20: "There is a second dispute about a town between Luawa + Kissi Tungi".

8. Ibid., Despicht, 27.2.22.

9. British officials introduced into the Luawa area a strictly territorial concept of chiefdoms and chieftaincy which was alien and artificial; there had been few clear-cut boundaries in Kallondo's Luawa. Then between 1914 and 1919, British officials allowed the creation of new Chiefdoms in a fairly haphazard and arbitrary way, and thus introduced further confusion into the territorial division of the area. The international boundary disputes and the alteration of British administrative divisions complicated the matter still more. Politically ambitious P.C.s made the most of this situation in order to extend the area of their own Chiefdoms, and British D.C.s were sometimes at a loss to know how to deal with them.
10. British officials realized the dangers of economic depression causing political unrest. "The fall in their incomes has not affected the loyalty of the chiefs and the people," noted N.C. Hollins on 31.12.30; "but the difficulty of finding money for house tax is openly commented on. It may be as well not to hurry the tax this year (i.e. 1931) and to give the people ample time to find the money. As the year goes on the price of rice will rise. However there is always the risk of a further fall in produce prices" (RH, Hollins, Handing over Notes, Central Province, 31.12.30). Throughout 1931 the price paid for palm kernels was ridiculously low - around 4d. per bushel (Int.1). As late as 1935, the situation had not greatly improved, prices reaching only about 3s. per bushel (Hollins, Reorganization of N.A., p.20)

11. Int.19: Alien Tokpo was the leader of the patimahangeisia. See also Combey MS, p.23, and Kulu-Banya, History, p.19.

12. Int.19.

13. Kulu-Banya, History, p.19. Alpha Ngobeh (who became Luawa P.C. in the 1950s) was the son of Ngobeh Kahuna; and Fatorma Mbarkor was brother of Fatorma Gbondo, and brother of P.C. Bockarie Bundeh. Both Alpha Ngobeh and Fatorma Mbarkor were involved in the uprising against P.C. Banya. See also KDOA, Kailahun District, NAMP 132/1932, P.C. Momo Banya vs. Alpha Ngobeh & Fatoma Barka. The P.C. complained of these two as malcontents plotting against him.


15. Combey MS, p.23. See also KDOA, Kailahun District, NAMP124/1932, Speaker Toko vs. P.C. Momo Banya. The LawgJ2 apparently brought complaints against the P.C., but when J.C. Page, the District Commissioner, heard the complaints on 22.9.32, he found little of substance.

16. Kulu-Banya, History, p.19, thought that "nearly half of the chiefs of the sub-sections of the chiefdom" opposed P.C. Momoh Banya, but this may be an exaggeration. Mr. Kulu-Banya mentioned as malcontents Momoh Ngerau of Nyandehun, Upper Bombali (using the spelling 'Ngiva'), Bassie of Ngiehun and Tamba Dauda of Mano-Sewalu.

17. Int.19. The main accuser of the Banyas was Dauda (see Note 16 above), who was their relative. It became fairly obvious that his accusations were false when it was found that no cement was missing from the bags used in the building of the District Headquarters. The three-storey house must have been built c.1930-32, according to the information given by Ma daa James Kailondo (Int.19).


20. Ibid. Fatorma Gbondo's mark appears on many of the documents for the 1920s in the Pendembu District Degree Book as one of the 'big men' of Kailahun.
21. Kulu-Banya, History, p.19: Fatorma Mbarkor, one of the "originators" of the 1932 disturbance, was "brother of Fatoma Gbondo Speaker".

22. Int.19. See also Ints. 10, 18.


24. A mania farm was made by communal labour to provide the Chief with rice for the entertainment of strangers, poor relief, and similar public purposes (see Fenton, Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law, pp.7-9 passim).

25. RH, Hollins, Handing Over Notes, April 1st 1930.


27. See pp.420-5 below for a list of Paramount Chiefs.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid. The succession to the paramount chiefship (and general political history) is better documented for Kissi Tungi than for Kissi Kama or Kissi Teng both in KDOA and in oral tradition. One reason for this is the documentation provided by ex-P.C. Kaitungi before, during and after his period of office, and the correspondence which he stimulated.

30. The present writer has failed to discover the precise date of Davowa's death. But since his successor was elected on 15.3.29, and since there was almost always a gap of over three months between the death of one P.C. and the election of another, it is highly probable that Davowa died late in 1928.

31. Ibid. See also Int.22.

32. KDOA, Kailahun District, 20/1934, enc. Hancock (D.C. Kailahun), 23.4.36, to P.C. Kenneh, Buedu.


34. See Chap.5 of this thesis, pp.484-9 above.

35. Ibid., pp.486-9 above.

36. Even before 1880, it is unlikely that Kissi Kama, Kissi Tangi and Kissi Tungi were independent polities; more probably there were several independent mahangaiesia ruling in each of these areas. Under Kailondo, the Kissi area had a degree of self-government, but the evidence indicates there were still a considerable number of mahangaiesia, and not just three rulers who were responsible for sections approximating to the area of Kama, Teng and Tungi. Similarly, Le Mesurier's 1908 map and the 1912 House Tax returns for Luawa indicate many sections and patimahangaiesia in Kissi country, not just three.

37. Perhaps the best brief, published description of the establishment of the N.A. system in the Sierra Leone Protectorate is to be found in Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, pp.20-23.
38. KDOA, Annual Report of the Provincial Administration for the Year 1936 (Govt. Printer, Freetown, 1937), Southern Province, written by A.H. Stocks. Chiefdom-court members were drawn from the local kpankoisia.

39. KDOA, Chiefdom Estimates 1942 (Govt. Printer, Freetown, 1942) indicates that in all four Chiefdoms, N.A.s were established in 1937.

40. KDOA, loose papers relating to the election of a P.C. for Kissi Tungi Chiefdom, 1942; enc. Cox (D.C. Kailahun), 7-8.42, to the Commissioner, Kenema Division.

41. Int.2.

42. See Chap.5 of this thesis, pp. 407-8 above.

43. Int.9.

44. Int.18. Momoh Banya’s successor was his eldest son, S.K. Banya, who gave this interview.

45. Int.22.

46. See, for example, KDOA, Kissi Tungi Chiefdom Treasury 1945.

47. KDOA, loose papers relating to the election of a P.C. for Kissi Tungi Chiefdom, 1942; enc. Cox (D.C. Kailahun), 25.6.42, to Commissioner, Kenema Division. The Ag. Commissioner, G.P. Taylor, wrote back agreeing to Cox’s suggestion.

48. Int.18. See Note 47 above for Cox and Taylor.

49. For details of forced labour still permitted to the P.C. and the N.A., even in Chiefdoms where the N.A. system had been established, see Fenton, Outline of Native Law in Sierra Leone (1948) p.9.

50. Int.18.

51. Int.15. For the 1949-51 troubles in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.6, pp. 574-581 below.

52. British officials allowed some restricted cases in which a P.C. could make extra demands upon his people, which probably only served to confuse the issue still further for the ordinary people.

53. From the early days of the Protectorate, Chiefs had possessed clerks (see Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.176). But under the N.A. system, their position was more formally recognized, they were dealing with larger sums of money in the Chiefdom, and, most important, they became involved in visiting each village annually to deal with tax assessment. This last task gave them, naturally, an excellent opportunity to obtain 'presents', and to extort money and goods on their own account. After 1937, in Luawa and the three Kissi Chiefdoms, N.A. clerks probably became, after Court Messengers, the colonial officials of whom the ordinary village people saw most. The Cox Report of Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Provinces November, 1955 to March, 1956, pp.118-126, indicates the
54. Tengbe, Biography, passim.

55. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 203: "Officially under the N.A. system, it is now the Tribal (Chiefdom) Authority, i.e. the former Chiefdom Council, and not the Chief, which is responsible for the administration of justice, public disbursements, etc. The chief himself is merely the principal executive and judicial authority in the chiefdom". Cf. Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, p. 22: "The Paramount Chief in particular was looked upon, for all practical purposes, as the sole Native Authority; he was held ultimately responsible for the performance of the statutory duties imposed upon the Native Administrations".

56. The comparatively limited amount of forced labour which could be legally exacted from the people in a Chiefdom with an N.A. was described in Fenton, Outline of Native Law in Sierra Leone (1943) p. 9; and no such forced labour was allowed to sub-chiefs. During the 1950 Kailahun enquiry into the Chief's administration, the Assessor Chiefs noted, "There is no doubt the practice of making farms for the Section Chiefs, the Section Speakers, the Chiefdom Speakers, and sometimes village heads, plus the Paramount Chief, existed long before the reign of the present Chief".

57. See Chap. 5 of this thesis, passim, for the way in which, between 1924 and 1937, P.C. Momoh Banya on his own initiative widened and built roads, erected the daily market barri, the post office, the dispensary and dispenser's quarters, as well as voluntarily providing labour for much work on the District Headquarters buildings. There is little evidence of such varied and large-scale activity by the Luawa N.A. in the sphere of public works during the 13 years after 1937.

58. KDOA, Kin. N.A. 378/6. Kissi Tungi Chiefdom Treasury 1945. The figures were arrived at simply by adding the 1944 and 1945 estimates together. Cf. Chiefdom estimates for Luawa, 1960, provided in Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, p. 200. See also Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 204, for one large and one small Mende Chiefdom's estimates for 1945.

59. These were still in use in the 1970s.

60. The office block contained about 4 rooms, and was situated immediately to the north of the N.A. Court Barri, opposite the daily market.

61. Buildings of concrete construction, with corrugated-iron sheet roofs, were becoming common in Kailahun in the late 1920s. But in Kissi country, the first building in Dia with such a roof was built only in 1924, and the second in 1937 (Int. 12).


63. Ibid. See also Int. 19.
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64. Combey MS, p.27.

65. Int.21. Mr. T.N. Tengbe was living as a ward of Sergeant-Major Jibatch at this time and so was in a good position to estimate the influence of the head of the C.M.F. See Chap.5 of this thesis, pp.311-413 above, for a description of how dependent the D.C. was upon information supplied by his Court Messengers, and of how dependent the chiefdom people were in their relations with the D.C. upon the head of the District C.M.F.

66. Int.13, with Mr. K.B.S. Jibateh, son of the late Sgt.-Major Bangali Jibateh.

67. Note in the Mende language may be translated as 'guest', 'stranger', or 'foreigner', and described a person who was automatically debarred from participating in the 'deep matters' of the Chiefdom and community.

68. Int.18. This was the statement of ex-P.C. S.K. Banya himself. As eldest son of the deceased Chief, he was the most likely candidate of the Kailondo-Banya family, since Momoh Banya had no brothers who would gain support as candidates, and Momoh Banya had himself indicated S.K. Banya as the successor he desired. The only question was whether (given the British interest in other 'ruling houses') a candidate from the Ngoboh or Bunieh families might gain more support.

S.K. Banya was educated at Bo School. It may be objected that Bo School education was anything but typically English, because officially it was deliberately designed to prevent Protectorate boys becoming English 'public-school-types' who would make academics, clerks, or businessmen; the school's aim was to produce young men who were trained to lead their people as Chiefs. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in the long term, the school achieved results which were precisely the opposite of its objectives.

69. Kaitungi was elected on 11.12.42; Momoh Banya died on 20.12.42. Cf. Combey MS, p.29, where it is stated that Kaitungi was elected on 12.12.42.

70. P.C. Bockarie Bundeh of Luawa had received some elementary education, but almost certainly he never completed even a full primary course.

71. Int.11. See also Int.18, where S.K. Banya himself confirmed that he went to school in 1916, but this must be incorrect. The next of Momoh Banya's sons to go to Bo School Kailondo II Sams, Kula-Bangs, the writer of A History of the Kulu-Banya Family of Luawa. He went to Bo in 1924.


73. For Kaitungi's work in the socio-economic field, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.6, pp.531-454 below.

74. KDQA, Kln. N.A.378/6, Kisi Tungi Chiefdom Treasury 1945. In the original estimates for 1944, £62 was set aside as the usual grant to the Luawa P.C., but apparently this grant was not paid in 1944, and never thereafter.

75. KDQA, loose papers, min. by Ag. Commissioner Kenema Division, 22.12.40, Kailahun: "P.C. Momoh Banya has evidence that Kai Tungi has deliberately tried to wreck the Luawa-Kisi Group appeal court on several occasions".
By the 1960s, appeals from the Kissi Chiefdoms were not heard in Luawa. Combey MS, p.30, indicated that it was Kaitungi who broke this right of appeal to Luawa's Chief.

Mr. S.K. Banya himself stated that he was dependent upon his father's counsellors, and especially upon Braima Kormoh.

Report on the Sierra Leone Protectorate for the Years 1949 and 1950, p.4.

Int. 18.

Ex-P.C. Kaitungi noted (Int. 22) how easy it was for critical D.C.s to encourage complaints against Chiefs, and then to interpret the complaints as evidence of maladministration. Remarkably, the present writer found in interviews that the older generation of D.C.s, the educated Chiefs, and most of the koakoisig of the Luawa area, agreed that the District Commissioners coming out from the U.K. after c.1945 were generally less sympathetic to the Chiefs and the people than the pre-war British officials. This distinction between 'the first D.C.s' and the post-war D.C.s may be partly a myth: the distant past often seems more attractive than the recent past. But it was pointed out that from about 1945 onwards, most intelligent young men realized that with decolonization, there was little future in the colonial service; moreover, Sierra Leone ('the white man's grave') was always one of the least attractive colonies for a British official to choose to work in.

Kailahun Enquiry, 1950. The Assessor Chiefs at the 1950 Luawa enquiry realized the predicament of P.C. S.K. Banya concerning the people being forced to make farms for section chiefs and speakers, and village chiefs: "we could imagine what a displeasure the Paramount Chief would have incurred from his big men if he had decided not to adopt the practice". S.K. Banya would terribly annoy his koakoisig if he did not sanction the use of forced labour; but if he did sanction it, he would annoy the ordinary people.


Int. 9.

See, for example, Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, p.197: "One cannot overemphasize the extent to which the political ethos basic to Chiefs, with its view of government as a means for maintaining the status quo and benefiting those who prevail therein, hindered the performance of Native Administrations. In Sierra Leone and elsewhere in colonial Africa this ethos was deeply ingrained in the behaviour of the traditional elite".
88. See Chap. 5 of this thesis, passim, for the amount of forced labour given to the Government in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms before 1936. See Annual Report of the Provincial Administration for the Year 1936, p.14, for use of forced labour by the Government until the end of 1935.

89. As soon as the 1956 Cox Report had been considered by the Government, a public notice was issued, which was read by D.C.'s at all Chiefdom Headquarters, was printed in the Mende and Temne languages, and was given the widest possible publicity. The notice stated, "All demands for forced or compulsory labour by Chiefs or any other persons must cease forthwith and the necessary legislation will be introduced as soon as possible. No such labour need be performed by anyone .... Government wishes it to be clearly understood that a taxpayer's compulsory liability is confined to his local tax". Statement of the Sierra Leone Government on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Provinces, November, 1955 to March, 1956 (Govt. Printing Dept., Freetown, 1956) pp.1-2.

90. In order to get a whole village community to do some particular piece of 'development' work, with each person doing a fair share of the work, some element of compulsion was inevitable. Probably the village chief or the section chief would see that the unwilling or lazy people were forced to do their share.

91. 'Well-brushed' in local parlance describes the condition of an area when the undergrowth has been removed, and the grass cut to a uniform low level, giving a neat and tidy appearance. Scraping indicates the clearing of the road-surface.

92. Int.13. "When this barracks was being built, I was there; I was there when they put the first cutlass to brush the D.C.'s place; it was all forced labour .... But they were pleased to do it. They said, 'Puebla wama' [The white-men are coming]".


94. Ibid.

95. Ibid. Cf. Int.6, where Rev. Wallace stated this event occurred on the first Sunday in November. But comparison with the written report clearly indicates that it must have been the last Sunday in October. Rev. Wallace was present in Kailahun throughout the disturbances, and so was an eyewitness of the events he described in interview with the present writer.

96. Ibid. An ex-Burma soldier wielding a cutlass, and leading about 30 other men similarly armed, searched the Methodist Mission compound on the Tuesday morning. Most men from the Luawa area, who were soldiers during the Second World War, fought in the Burma campaign.


98. See Int.17 with Pastor J.T. Rogers, who by 1972 had retired, but was still living in the Pastor's house, immediately behind the Kailahun Methodist Church building.
99. Int. 6. Most of the detailed information in this section concerning the course of events in Luawa from Sunday 29 October to Saturday 4 November 1950 was supplied by Rev. Wallace.

100. This striking sequence of events so impressed Rev. Wallace that 20 years later, at the foundation-stone-laying ceremony for a new Methodist Church early in 1970, he referred to this sequence in the presence of P.C. Fabundeh III and the town elders, most of whom could verify what happened from their own memories.

101. The Police Force was not introduced into the Protectorate as part of the permanent governmental establishment until 1954, before which time, the C.M.F. was the only law-enforcement body.

102. The present writer was once jokingly told by a British ex-colonial official that the game of football was one of the greatest benefits which the British introduced into West Africa.

103. See Sierra Leone Protectorate Handbook 1954 (Chief Commissioner's Office, Bo, 1954), p. 6, for the date of P.C. Alpha Ngobeh's accession. See also Int.


106. Palm cabbage is the green growing-point at the top of a palm tree.

107. Int. 22.

108. 1949-1950 Protectorate Report, p. 4, noted that the disturbances in the Kenema District "all followed the same pattern. A rowdy group, known in the chiefdom as the 'Young Men', though by no means necessarily comprising only young persons - the term, like its forerunner the 'Young Party' means the democratic party - set themselves under a leader to demand with threats the removal from office of some office-holder in the chiefdom who had become unpopular".

Other 'underlying explanations' which British officials put forward as the cause of the disturbances included the following:

(i) mis-use of forced labour by the Chiefs
(ii) "the character and calibre of the Paramount Chiefs" (1951 Protectorate Report, p. 11)
(iii) the Bo School education received by most Chiefs in whose Chiefdoms the disturbances occurred. (See also Note 109 below.)

109. The 'Tribal Authorities' were "often 'Yes-men' who dare not oppose the wishes of the Paramount Chiefs" (1947 Protectorate Report, p. 8); moreover, a prerequisite for an efficient N.A. was "a good clerk" (1948 Protectorate Report, p. 6). There was also a "direct connection between an adequate British field staff and the avoidance of civil disorders. Effective touring and the patient hearing of complaints are still the Administrative Officer's most important duties, and when they are neglected misfortunes come" (1949-1950 Protectorate Report, p. 3).

110. Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid.

1951 Protectorate Report, p.3.

Not surprisingly, official British reporters were eager to make the point that "disturbers of the peace repeatedly showed by their conduct that they had no wish to quarrel with Government and were animated by no ill will towards the Administration" (ibid.). The present writer agrees that on the surface the 1950 troubles in Luawa and Kissi Tungi were not anti-Government. But see the following paragraphs in this chap. of the thesis, Chap.6, for a working-out of the argument that the disturbances were caused primarily by the whole British system of local government; and thus, although the rioters consciously directed their attacks against specific Chiefs, they were unconsciously hitting at colonial rule itself in its local manifestations.

1949-1950 Protectorate Report, p.5. The British emphasis on the existence of several 'ruling houses' in Luawa certainly exacerbated the situation. Although the idea of 'ruling houses' in Luawa was largely mythical, yet the leading families in the Chiefdom had found it advantageous to accept the idea. Thus had developed several factions within the Chiefdom, with the opposition faction always ready to capitalize on any widely-felt grievance against the existing Chief.

Int.15. The chief of Mano-Sevalu said he heard about the rice and palm-kernel quotas from the P.C., not the D.C. - the implication being that the P.C. was therefore to blame for the hardship caused by the imposition of these quotas. See also Int.16.

Both ex-P.C. Kaitungi and ex-P.C. S.K. Banya (Ints.18 and 22) felt that one reason for British antagonisms to them was that they tried to initiate positive politico-economic measures which would benefit the generality of their subjects (e.g. the opening of co-operative stores, the making of roads, enforcing the planting of greater acreages of rice). British officials were content if Chiefs quietly 'feathered their ova nests', but did not want Chiefs to take any such 'radical' local politico-economic measures, even though they might benefit most of the people in the Chiefdom.

For the more rapidly changing situation in the 1940s, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.6, pp.54-5 below.

No doubt a Bo School education increased the distance between the new Chief of Luawa, S.K. Banya, and his people; but this was an irritant, not the real cause of the Chief's problems (though many British officials thought it was the real cause). Sumbor Bella of Kissi Kama was not literate, but he was forced to resign as P.C. in 1954 for similar reasons to those which caused the deposition of S.K. Banya four years earlier. Kaitungi of Kissi Tungi had several years of local experience as section chief before becoming P.C., but this did not prevent similar complaints arising against him also.

Since the events of the late 1940s and early 1950s in Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms were comparatively recent, and involved people who were still alive, the present writer found in 1972 that the local people were
naturally reluctant to give information or express opinions about these events. Moreover, official documents relating to these events were still not open. The present writer's conclusions about the 1949-1951 troubles are therefore inevitably less well-documented than most other parts of the thesis.

120. In literally every interview with ordinary people which the present writer held in 1972 in Luwa and Kissi country, wherever the District Councils were mentioned there was an immediate and strong reaction against them and all their works.

121. Quite a lot of material has been published on the District Councils. Perhaps the most convenient summary of their development and position in local government is to be found in Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, pp.203-205. In the subsequent pages, Professor Kilson discusses the failure of District Councils to achieve what was expected of them. Cartwright, J.R., Politics in Sierra Leone 1947-1957 (Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1970), pp.81-82, comments briefly on both Prof. Kilson's findings and the Cox Report. Davidson, H.W., Report on the Functions and Finances of District Councils in Sierra Leone (Gouv. Printer, Freetown, 1953) was the report from which sprang the great expansion in the scope of District Councils' work in the early 1950s. The Cox Report of Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Provinces, November, 1955 to March, 1956 (Crown Agents for the Government of Sierra Leone, 1956) contains much material which describes the failure of District Councils (especially Chap.XXI). Although the Cox Report did not touch on Kailahun District, the present writer believes its evidence and conclusions were equally applicable to Kailahun as to other Districts in the Protectorate, and fairly extensive use has been made of the Report in this section of the thesis.

122. The House and Chiefdom Tax together in 1937 amounted to 9/- in all Chiefdoms. By 1951, although House Tax stayed at 5/-, Chiefdom Tax had increased to 5/- (1951 Protectorate Report).


127. See Clarke, Sierra Leone in Maps, p.20-31, and this chapter of the thesis, Chap.6, pp.529-535 below.

129. Int. The bridge over the River Keya just north of Giema was a solidly-built, reinforced-concrete structure; but most of the bridges were only of temporary palm-log construction. The original intention was to continue this road through Sengema, Gondama and Bomaru to Baiwala. The main achievement of most of the 12 District Councils was in the sphere of road-building.

130. Provincial Administration Report for 1952, p. The Office was nearly completed by the end of 1952.


132. Ibid., p.21.


134. Ibid., p.17.

135. One of the clearest conclusions which came out of the evidence presented to the Cox Report was that in the Protectorate as a whole, the Chiefdom was the primary - even the sole - political unit which commanded the allegiance of the ordinary people. "All our enquiries have demonstrated the respect in which the office of chief - if not the office holder - is held. Witness after witness has said that if the chief is kind the people will work for him and obey him. 'The chiefdom' or 'our chiefdom' have been the words on everyone's lips. There has been no suggestion that chiefs are outmoded or that the chiefdom is not an area with an intense feeling of cohesion. We find no evidence whatsoever that would support any contention that a unit of local administration other than the chiefdom should be adopted or is even possible" (p.150).

136. Int.18.

137. See Note 119 above for a description of the difficulty of determining the feelings and opinions of ordinary people in the 1950s.


139. The District Councils took over responsibility for primary education only in 1955 (ibid., p.216, Note 5). The Cox Report pp.215-217 noted some of the problems associated with this step, and experience over the subsequent decade proved how unsuitable were the District Councils for controlling local primary education. As regards health services, road-making and agricultural development, the District Councils lacked (i) any awareness of a nation-wide plan in these matters (ii) adequate numbers of skilled personnel to direct the work, and (iii) funds adequate to the large capital outlay required for a first-class road or a new well-equipped dispensary.

140. The District Council members and staff were often too remote from the ordinary villages (both figuratively in status and literally in geographical distance) to see to such mundane matters as whether a particular locality was kept clean and tidy, whether roads were kept free of grass and well brushed at the sides, whether a particular ferry was operating efficiently; but a Chiefdom official could attend to all these things.
141. Davidson, Report on the Functions and Finances of District Councils


143. Fyfe, A Short History of Sierra Leone, pp.173-178, gives a clear and simple account of the various constitutional steps on the road to independence. There had been an election by District for membership of the Legislative Council in 1951, but the electors were the members of the District Councils only. By contrast, the 1956 local government elections involved voting by secret ballot for almost all adult tax payers, as was the case in the 1957 general election.

144. The two men were Mr. T.E. Joanna of Kangama, who became M.P. for Kini country in 1973, and Taplima Ngobeh, who became Minister for Eastern Province in 1958, and was killed in a car crash on 14.10.63.

145. For the establishment of the Protectorate Assembly, see Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, pp.155-156.

146. For the demise of the Protectorate Assembly in 1955, see Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 - 1957, p.93.

147. Int.22. P.C. Kaitungi did not state this, but the importance he attached to membership of the Protectorate Assembly, and to its work, clearly indicate his opinion. P.C. Kaitungi was the only P.C. from Luawa or the three Kini Chiefdoms ever to be a member of the Assembly.

148. For a brief discussion of the concept of an 'educated elite' in the Luawa area before 1961, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.6, pp. below.

149. See Chap.5 of this thesis, pp.548-9 above.

150. The Government in 1956 partially accepted the Cox Report recommendations that the power of District Councils should be decreased. The Government Statement on the Report "accepted the recommendation ... that chiefdoms must remain the foundation of local government .... It has therefore decided to review the distribution of functions between the Tribal Authorities, District Councils and the Central Government .... The Central Government has decided to relieve the District Councils of their responsibility for the operation of dispensaries" (p.17). From this time onwards, right into the 1970s, the Central Government made continual attempts to adjust and reform the District Councils and fit them to be the main instruments of local government. In the present writer's view (though some other observers think differently) the District Councils consistently proved themselves incapable of matching up to the challenge with which they were presented. At the time of writing this thesis (1973), the future of the District Councils (and, indeed, of up-country local government as a whole) was a matter upon which Central Government had not reached any final decision.

151. See Chap.5 of this thesis, pp.431-444 above.

152. Int.6. Rev. Wallace, who was present in Kailahun at the time of the 1950 disturbances, provided the information that Janyahun was divided in this
way. The present writer saw, from personal observation during local political disturbances in Luawa 1965-1966, how difficult it was for an ordinary local person to remain neutral.

153. At the end of the 1950 Inquiry, which lasted from 24 April until September, "the Paramount Chief was suspended from his office and jurisdiction pending notification of the Secretary of State's decision whether he should be deposed. During the period of his suspension he was ordered to live at Koindu in Kono District" (1949-1950 Protectorate Report, p.5). All this left little doubt that the British intended to depose the P.C.

154. "The cause of the riot was a rumour that the Paramount Chief had been upheld and was to be reinstated in the chiefdom" (ibid., p.5).

155. Int.1


157. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.6,pp.535-6 below for details of the quota system.

158. Little, K.L., "The 'Barter' System in Sierra Leone", in Empire - The Journal of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (August 1946)

159. The price paid for palm kernels under the quota system was a 'Government-controlled' price - and it must have been less than the 'free market' price, otherwise the Government would have gained little from imposing the quota system.


162. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, pp.102-103. It is realized that this section of Chap.6 of the thesis is meant to begin with the world-wide economic depression of the early 1930s, and Migeod's observations were made six or seven years earlier. But it seemed best to include all the relevant material on the development of new cash crops together in one place in the thesis.

163. Ibid., p.104.

164. Ibid., pp.107-108.

165. Ibid., p.109. Migeod's observations bear out Mr. F.C. Deighton's remark about cocoa that "most plantations made before 1926 had been planted either on unsuitable sites or without adequate forest protection". Cacao in Sierra Leone Report (Govt. Printer, Freetown, 1945), p.3.

166. See Edwards, D.C. (late Agricultural Dept., Sierra Leone), "Cotton in Sierra Leone; an attempt to improve the native type", in The Empire Cotton Growing, VII (1930), p.91: "During the last few years attempts have been made to produce a cotton suitable for the European market,
and these have consisted chiefly in the introduction of various improved exotic cottons. None of these attempts, however, have so far met with any appreciable measure of success. In fact, this and subsequent experience led to the opinion that success was not likely to be attained from exotic cottons, and it was felt that the most hopeful line lay in the direction of an attempt by selection to improve some existing native type, and possibly afterwards to cross this with an imported cotton.

167. R.H., Hollins, Annual Report on Pendembu District 1922. "All, Cocoa. Progress was made with this crop. The Kiasis seem less keen on the crop than the Mendis — probably their country which contains less high bush than Mendi country, is less suited to it ... as more trees came into bearing production will increase.

IV. Coffee. A useful start was made in the introduction of this crop which may prove more suitable than Cocoa. It was not possible to do much owing to lack of seedlings as the Agricultural Department wisely decided to issue only seedlings grown under its own care. However nine hundred and thirty were planted in Luawa". See also Note 170 below.

168. R.H., Hollins, Central Province: Handling Over Notes, October 1929.


170. Ibid., p.4. In Central Province (of which Pendembu District was a part) the "Agricultural Department ... made nurseries and distributed seedlings between 1927 and 1935, and encouraged the native farmers to make plantations", yet it seems that in the late 1920s and early 1930s, cocoa-planting in general was actually held back in this area because "the Provincial Commissioner, Central Province, Mr. Bowden, was rather sceptical of the suitability of this area for cacao".

171. Ibid. Mr. Deighton, who was Plant Pathologist in the Department of Agriculture, wrote a personal letter to the present writer, 17.3.71.

172. Deighton, Cacao in Sierra Leone: Report, p.6. Four of these farmers, looking after 4 acres of cocoa, were in Kisi Tungi Chiefdom.

173. Rimmington, G.T., "Cocoa in South-Eastern Sierra Leone" in The Geographical Journal (The Record) (1961), p.134: "It is clear that cacao growing in south-eastern Sierra Leone requires a much heavier rainfall than it will tolerate in other parts of West Africa, such as the Ibadan-Abokuta region of Western Nigeria, where it has 45-55 inches per annum".


175. This was the useful shorthand title employed by Mr. N.C. Hollins collectively to Luawa and the three Kissi Chiefdoms ("Short History", p.10).

176. Rimmington, op.cit., map on p.134. The drawing of Sierra Leone's inochets varies enormously from one map to another. Cf. Clarke, Sierra Leone in Maps, p.21; and Nelson's Sierra Leone Atlas, p.3.

177. Clarke, Sierra Leone in Maps, p.15. The absence of stretches of high bush in the Kissi Chiefdoms was confirmed by the present writer in 1965-1970, and in 1972. The only area of the Kissi Chiefdoms in which there is a large stretch of high bush is the extreme south-east of Kissi Tungi.
178. Rimmington, op. cit., pp. 134-135: "Under optimum conditions cocoa grows where rainfall distribution is such that a high humidity rate is maintained throughout the whole year". See also Deighton, Cacao in Sierra Leone: Report, p. 15.

179. For a discussion of cocoa and coffee-growing in general, and for the conditions which they require, see Harrison-Church, West Africa, pp. 109-113. See also Morgan and Pugh, West Africa, pp. 474-479; and Clarke, Sierra Leone in Maps, p. 80.

180. Deighton, Cacao in Sierra Leone: Report, p. 4

181. Ibid., p. 20. "The chief stimulus resulting in the rapid extension of cacao planting since 1930", noted Mr. Deighton, "has probably been the sudden fall, to a very low level, since 1929 in the price of palm kernels and palm oil; while the cocoa price, though falling from over £30 a ton to under £20, made cocoa a relatively more profitable cash product for the native farmer. A further stimulus was provided by the high price of cocoa at the 1936 to 1937 harvest" (ibid., p. 4).


184. Ibid., p. 15.

185. Childs, A Plan of Economic Development for Sierra Leone (Govt. Printer, Freetown, 1949), p. 22. See also Int. 25 for the burning of the cocoa crop in Kailahun District in 1943.

186. SLGA, Provincial Administration Annual Reports 1947, Kailahun District.

187. Jack, D.T. Economic Survey of Sierra Leone (Govt. Printing Dept., Freetown, 1953), p. 13, for the 1956 figure. The Childs' Plan, p. 22, for figures for the late 1930s. In 1962, the year after independence, 4,705 tons of cocoa were exported from the whole country (see Clarke, Sierra Leone in Maps, p. 80).

188. In 1946, 73 tons of cocoa were raised from Pendembu (see SLGA, Provincial and District Annual Reports 1946 / Kailahun District /, pp. 77-83).

189. Childs' Plan, p. 22.

190. This expansion of coffee plantations continued until the early 1960s, when the price for coffee began to decline.


192. Ibid. for the tonnage of coffee exported in 1957. The Childs' Plan, p. 25, gives figures for the tonnages of coffee exported in the late 1930s.

193. Int. 18.

194. Int. 22.

196. Ibid., p. 20. As this quotation indicates, a fair amount of co-operation existed within the village community in the production of the new cash crops. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the Government gave considerable publicity to the value of establishing Co-operative Societies for the marketing of cocoa and coffee (see, for example, Hill, K.A.L., *Report on Co-operation in Sierra Leone* [Govt. Printer, Freetown, 1949]). Although many such societies were set up in the villages of Luawa, the present writer has found little clear evidence that they materially benefitted the ordinary village farmers. By 1954, there were Cocoa-Marketing Co-operative Societies in the following villages of Luawa: Ngiehun, Gbalahun, Dodo-Cotuma, Sandiallu, Mende, Giema, Namboma, Talia, Nyandehun, Bunumbu, Baoma, Banda Jama and Bobobu (Sierra Leone Protectorate Handbook 1954 [Chief Commissioner's Office, Bo, 1954], p. 58).

197. The nature of the Government-imposed quota varied from District to District. For example, a palm-kernel quota could obviously only be imposed in those Southern Districts where the oil-palm grew. See Cox-George, *Finance and Development in West Africa*, p. 243: "the collecting agents for the Government were the A.W.A.M. [Association of West African Merchants] firms and their sub-agents the Syrians. As part of this production drive the responsibility for organization was laid on the chiefs, who were required to see that their people fulfilled their respective 'quotas'". The quotas involved the reintroduction of the barter system on a large scale. "The farmer consumers of the Protectorate were required to barter their kernels and rice with the agents of the Government ... and their sub-agents ... to the extent of three-fourths of their value, leaving only one-quarter as a cash payment. Standard prices for produce were fixed by the Government. This was allegedly done to offset tendencies to inflation. In fact it did not do so" (ibid., p. 239). The rice-quota did, however, stimulate rice-production: in 1942 it was reckoned that each individual farmer had produced on an average 30% more rice that he did before the war, though there were fewer farmers altogether (CO267/693/320491; Stevenson; 1944-45, Agricultural Department Annual Report for 1942).

198. SLGA, *Provincial and District Annual Reports 1945*, Kailahun District. Two Chiefdoms did collect their full palm-kernel quota, and thus "earned the bonus of 2d per bushel".

199. Little, "'Barter' system in Sierra Leone".

200. Ibid. Prof. Little suggested that people might have to pay over 25 shillings per bushel. *Maada James Kailondo* (Int.19) implied that the price in the Luawa area was often about £1 per bushel.

201. Int.19.

202. Ibid. See also Little, "'Barter' system in Sierra Leone".

203. Ibid. See also Int.15.

204. Int.16. See also Int.18: Mr. Maya Kaikai, a Mende trader, and Mr. Saad Rogers, a Lebanese store-owner, were among the agents buying the quota rice in Kailahun.
205. SLGA, Provincial Administration Annual Reports 1947, Kailahun District.

206. There had been discussion for some time before this about the possibility of making a road link across the Moa between French Guinea and Sierra Leone. See Ints. 21 and 25.

207. Int. 21.

208. Int. 25.

209. Int. 21.

210. Ibid.

211. Ibid. "Khaki" refers to the cloth, not the colour.

212. Int. 24.

213. From personal observation and information gained at first-hand, the present writer found the growth of Koindu Market had been checked largely by the limitations and duties imposed by the Guinea Government of President Sekou Toure on exports and imports.

214. KDOA, Prov. Admin. Kailahun District 377/10. Kissi Teng Chiefdom; Tengbe, 1.9.60, Kangama to Mr. S.N. Bondi: Handing-over notes on Kissi Teng Chiefdom.

215. Int. 24. It is extremely difficult to estimate numbers of people patronizing the market, since some would come early and leave early; others would arrive later, and most of the Koindu townspeople would be involved. The market site is very extensive, which adds to the difficulty of estimating numbers.

216. KDOA, NAMP 22/1934, "Rules for Ndoweihun at Kailahun", 15.10.36. The establishment of this ndoweihun is also mentioned in Chap. 5 of this thesis, p. 426 above.


218. Int. 15. As late as 1924 there were, it seems, no such weekly markets in Luawa (Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p. 121).


220. Int. 18.

221. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 6, p. 523 above.

222. Int. 18: "after my time", noted ex-P.C. S.K. Banya, "villagers contributed, and they built their own roads themselves".

223. Int. 12.

224. Int. 15.
225. Surprisingly, the present writer found it very difficult to discover the precise years in which these roads were made. The greatest problem in maintaining these roads was to keep the bridges in good repair. By 1972, none of these three roads was easily motorable, because of the unsatisfactory state of the bridges.

226. MS, S.L. 1930-33, Original correspondence, S.L. (Chairman) Sept.1/30 - Feb.28/31; Juby (District Chairman), 18.10.30, to Wesleyan MS.


228. Koindu, for example, was fifty miles from Pendembu, and the difficulties of travelling from Kisi country to Pendembu should not be underestimated.

229. Int.8. Mr. Sam Hilliard noted how few motor vehicles there were in Kailahun and surrounding villages in 1961. Up-country in the Luawa area, buses, mini-buses, personnel carriers and vans only became reasonably common in the mid-1960s. Right into the 1970s, lorries were among the most common transport-vehicles for passengers as well as goods. The railway was finally phased out of existence in the late 1960s and early 1970s.


231. Tengbe, Biography, p.267.

232. Int.8. Mr. Sam Hilliard was a British-trained motor mechanic who arrived in Kailahun early in 1962. He naturally had a keen interest in transport, and a trained intelligent eye with which to view the situation. His testimony on this subject is therefore most valuable. The down-line express left Pendembu at about 4 a.m., so the "early-morning lorry from Kailahun" had to leave at about 3 a.m. !

233. Only one person refused to move from Old Buedu, and that was Pa Langama, who gave a useful interview to the present writer (Int.20) when interviewed in 1972, Pa Langama was living alone with his family in his old compound on the site of Old Buedu.

234. Int.21.

235. Ibid. Bo was being electrified at the same time, but there was no other town in Eastern Province which was electrified at this time, apart from Buedu.


237. See Chap.5 of this thesis, pp.41-32 above.

238. R.H., Hollins, Pendembu District: Handing Over Notes, April 1st 1930. "DCs lock-up has not yet been built at Kailahun, but water-supply there should soon be available". In July 1931, the Governor was able to
inspect the water-supply in Kailahun, together with the D.C.'s Office and the Court Messengers' barracks (GO267/635/9694; Hodson; 1931, Governor's Tour in the Protectorate). The same reservoir-tank and stand-taps were in use in 1972.

239. KDO&; Pendembu Dist. MP37/1922, Hollins, 6.1.28, to C.C.P.: "In connection with the removal of District Headquarters from Pendembu to Kailahun in 1929, I have the honour to request the replacement of the Pendembu-Kailahun telegraph ....

2. As you will remember this line was in existence, when Kailahun was a West African Frontier Force station and was taken down in 1922, when the station was closed.

3. The telegraph line will be of great service to the District Commissioner at Kailahun and to the increasing commercial community there....

4. On the removal of District Headquarters I presume that the present Postal Agency will be replaced by a Post Office. I recommend therefore that provision be made in 1929 for a combined post and telegraph office".

The construction of a new Post Office building was postponed in 1930 (ibid.), and in fact was never built in the colonial period. The dispensary which P.C. Momoh Banya built in the late 1920s is "the same house which they have turned into the Post Office" (Int.19). The restoration of the telegraph was delayed until 1939 (Combey MS, ps.22-23), presumably as a result of the fall in revenue in the early 1930s, which prevented the Government from undertaking new public works.

240. Kulu-Banya, History, p.19. Cf. Combey MS, p.22 which gives the date 1936 for the erection of the hospital. See also GO267/689/32385; Stevenson; 1944-45, Planning of Development and Welfare, where plans were made to enlarge the existing 18-bed hospital to 30 beds.

241. Int.19. The low bungalow next to the three-storey house was built at the same time. Before that, P.C. Momoh Banya had lived in the old round house which now stands in the centre of the Banya compound.

242. Int.12. See Chap.5 of this thesis, pp.418-419 above. Kulu Bali was also known as Kulu Balikeh.

243. Some history books give the impression that before the arrival in the region of Moslems who could teach Arabic and Christian missionaries who could teach English, the peoples of West Africa were education-less. It is true they were largely without literacy. But, for example, the young men of Mendeland needed quite careful instruction concerning the making of rice-farms, and the growing of a wide variety of other crops; and this instruction was clearly both provided and thoroughly learnt in Kailondo's Luawa.

244. The visitor was Rev. Dymond, Chairman of the S.L. District of the Methodist Church, who was touring in the Protectorate. See MS, SL 1935-36, SL Chairman Mar.1/36-Aug.31/36; Dymond, 13.4.36, Freetown.

245. Int.1. See also Kulu-Banya, History, p.20. Note also MS, SL 1935-36, SL missionaries correspondence; Clarke, 29.2.36. Kailahun; SL 1934-1939, SL Chairman, Sept.1/37-Feb.28/38; Mende Mission Retreat, July 1937, Educational matters.
246. Int.17. Mr. Jenusa subsequently became a lecturer at Union (Teachers') College, Bunumba; and Mr. Jibao became a Methodist Minister. In 1951, Mr. K.S.L. Kangoma took over as Headmaster of Kailahun Methodist Primary School, and remained in that position until the early 1970s.

247. This continuity of Kailahun primary school was important because, among other things, it meant that there was a nucleus of teachers there who were available for transfer to other schools; and other junior teachers came from among those who had been pupils in the school during the war years - Mr. T.M. Tengbe being an example (Int.21).

248. Int.6.

249. Ibid. The secondary school opened in a new building constructed in the primary school compound, under the temporary principalship of Mrs. Ken. Nicholson. It moved to its present site about a mile south-west of the town on the Pendembu road in 1961, under the principalship of Dr. John Burne.

250. MBE, SL 1929-1933 original correspondence, SL (Chairman) Mar.1/31 - Aug.31/31; Law, 20.6.31, Segbwema.

251. Int.11.

252. Tengbe, Biography, pp.182-186.

253. Int.11.

254. Int.6.

255. This was established through the personal experience of the present writer in the 1960s.


257. This was established through the personal experience of the present writer in the 1960s.


259. From the personal observation of the present writer, the R.C. schools at Mende and Kailahun were, by 1965, well-established.

260. SLGA, Provincial Administration Annual Reports 1947, Kailahun District. The school at Kangama opened on 12.1.48 (Questionnaire on Kangama).


262. KDOA, E5 - Education; Bo School; Principal, Bo School, 5.3.36 to D.C. Kailahun. Names of pupils in the Bo School from Luawa and Kissi Chiefdoms in March 1936 -

Kailondo iii, Luawa
Sama Kailondo, Luawa
Fayia Jabba, Kissi Kama
Kakas Lundu, Luawa
Tamla Kakao, Kissi Tungi
Komai Banya, Luawa.

263. Ints.11 and 25. Though no details have been discovered, it seems likely that some children had gone from Luawa to be educated in Freetown before B.N. Combey; but the lack of details about them and about their failure to achieve prominence in the area would suggest that either they did not return after completing their education or else that they never completed their education—perhaps doing only 2 or 3 years in a Freetown school.

264. The present writer, as a secondary-school teacher in Luawa in the 1960s, frequently experienced the phenomenon of parents wishing to 'transfer' their children to a Freetown school for the last few years of their secondary education.

265. In 1964 there were 6 'Sixth Form' schools in Freetown, attended by a total of 295 Sixth Formers. In the rest of Sierra Leone there were 3 'Sixth Form' schools attended by only 61 'Sixth Formers' (Sleight, G.F., The Development Programme in Education for Sierra Leone 1964-1970 (Govt. Printing Dept., Freetown, 1964), p.123).

266. Combey MS, p.20.
267. Ibid., p.23. See also Int.18.
268. Ibid. Mr. S.K. Banya noted that he returned to Kailahun to join his father, P.C. Momoh Banya, in 1941.
269. Kulu-Banya, History, p.22.
270. After independence, Mr. Kulu-Banya was for some time a District Commissioner.
271. Combey MS, p.23: "Four other brothers, K.S. Banya, B.S.K. Banya, K.H. Banya and S.Y. Banya are in the clerical division of the Civil Service in the Provincial and Public Works branches".
272. In this context, the eleven years which most Bo School boys (who went to Bo before the 1940s and who completed the course) spent in the school is taken to represent for them a full secondary education in addition to a primary education.
273. For example, Mr. B.N. Combey was resident in Kailahun by the early 1950s (Int. 25).
274. For example, by the late 1960s, Mr. Gbesse Ngobeh, Mr. S. Kulu-Banya and Mr. A.K. Banya had all retired to Kailahun.
275. Although a handful of children went to Bo School from the Kissi Chiefdoms almost as early as children from Luawa, and although the primary school in Kangama was the first village school to be opened in the area, yet the comparatively great geographical distance from Kissi country to Bo reduced the opportunities for education. The situation considerably improved when the secondary school was opened in Kailahun in 1959.
276. See Int. 21, where Mr. Tengbe explained that after a year at school, he had difficulty in signing his name. From personal observation, the present writer found that some children could spend up to four years in school without being able either to write a single coherent sentence, or even to sign their names. This was the result of large classes, taught by inadequately-equipped teachers.


279. Ibid., Introduction, p. xvii.


281. Int. 8.

282. Ibid.

283. Tengbe, Biography, passim.

284. The semi-permanent inhabitants of Kailahun, and the temporary residents, integrated with local literate (and non-literate) residents to a varying degree, depending upon their status and their temperament.

285. The term 'native doctor' (who used 'native medicine') was generally used by local people able to speak English, as well as British officials. It covered a wide range of very different individuals, ranging from those practising witchcraft, through sheer quacks preying on people's superstitions, to persons who possessed a good knowledge of the curative qualities of various herbs.

286. This was established through the personal experience of the present writer in the 1960s.

287. Mr. Tengbe attributed his cure to advice about a special diet given him by a passing visitor. There was much confusion among the people of the Luawa area between yellow fever, hepatitis and jaundice, all of which show some similar symptoms in their early stages.


289. A Dispensary in the post-war Sierra Leone Protectorate referred to a simple building, commonly consisting of a one-roomed surgery with the rest of the house providing accommodation for the Dispenser. The Dispenser was usually a qualified nurse who had received further training, and who would hold a surgery every weekday, and be available for emergencies. He had a limited drug supply and a perhaps more generous supply of dressings and bandages. He could give injections and even perform simple operations such as lancing an ulcer or stitching a serious cut. But he could not perform serious surgery, nor deal with an epidemic, or with uncommon or complicated illnesses. He could, however, diagnose and give medicine for the more common fevers and such ailments as stomach upsets. The Dispensaries in Kailahun District were under the supervision of the M.O. Kailahun.
'Hospital medicine' and 'European medicine' both denoted the whole range of treatments which a British-trained, qualified medical doctor would be likely to recommend.

SLGA, Provincial and District Annual Reports 1946. Kailahun District; Medical.

Ibid.

For an excellent summary of the growth of the Segbwema Methodist Hospital, see Annual Report of the Nixon Memorial Hospital, Segbwema, Sierra Leone, for the period 1954-55.


Clarke, Sierra Leone in Kano, p.67. Largely as a result of the Tryps. and Yaws campaign, Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms contained far more Treatment Centres than any other similarly-sized area of Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leone 1957 (H.M.S.O., London, 1959), p.73. A large new hospital was built in Kailahun in 1972-73, on a site along the Buedu road, just south-east of the District Council Offices.

1963 Population Census of Sierra Leone, Vol.1, p.4. The exact population figure provided for the four Chiefdoms was 59,675. Officially the hospital in Kailahun was meant for all the people of the District, but in fact most people living south and east of Luawa would go to the Methodist Hospital at Segbwema.

Levis, Sierra Leone, p.172. 'Sleeping sickness' is the popular name for trypanosomiasis.


C0267/584/32025; Ramage; 1945-46. Medical and Health Services Annual Report 1942.

Ibid., Medical and Health Services Annual Report 1944.

Int.22. Ex-P.C. Kaitungi mentioned Dr. R.D. Harding, the M.O. who made this suggestion, as one of the doctors who worked on the Tryps. and Yaws Campaign.

C0267/687/32271; Stevenson; 1944, Yaws Campaign. Proposal to combine sleeping sickness control with investigation of other endemic diseases - by Dr. R.D. Harding.
306. C0267/684/32025; Ramage; 1945-46, Medical and Health Services Annual Report 1944.


308. From sad personal experience the present writer was made aware of the widespread existence of tuberculosis, and of recurrent measles, in the area in the late 1960s.

309. In most of the larger villages where the present writer held interviews, only two or three people went to take part in the First World War.

310. Int. 18.

311. Many of the army recruits took part in the Burma campaign with the British forces.


313. The Sierra Leone Selection Trust, which was responsible for diamond-mining in Sierra Leone, began operations as early as 1935.

314. Lewis, Sierra Leone, p.199.

315. Int. 15.

316. Int. 16.

317. Int.


320. Int. 18.

321. The popular impression was that after 1945, deep social changes began to affect most people in the Protectorate. This impression was created partly because British officials, travellers and anthropologists tended to concentrate their attention on places like Moyamba, Bo and Kenema which were on or near both the railway and motor roads; therefore, there were many indications of considerable social changes occurring in these places. But the salient fact to note here is that only a small fraction of the Protectorate's total population lived in such places. The assumption was made by some British writers in the 1940s that social
changes, which were at that time affecting large towns such as Bo, would
spread within a decade or two to the rest of the Protectorate. In the
event, this assumption was proved incorrect. The present writer vividly
remembers visiting in 1970 a little Kissi village (Dambara?) within easy
walking distance of Kailahun, just a few hundred yards off the Kailahun
to Mano–Sewalu motor-road; and in every essential, the village
corresponded with Aldridge's 1890–91 descriptions of the villages of
Luwa.

322. Probably more than half the people of Luwa and the Kissi Chiefdoms in
1961 lived in settlements which did not have a motor-road passing through
them. But even where there was a road, the sparsity of lorries (there
were no buses and very few private cars) lessened its value. The rail-
way, of course, did not reach any part of Luwa or the Kissi Chiefdoms.
Transport facilities were, on the whole, probably better in Luwa than
in Kissi country in 1961.

323. The present writer has rarely seen it stated that adequate communications
and clean water are the fundamental requirements for social 'development'.
But his own experience in Kailahun District led him very definitely to this
conclusion. Clean water (i.e. chemically treated to remove carriers of
disease in the water) was important because serious worm infestations and
bilharzia so weaken a person that he becomes incapable of carrying on much
efficient physical or mental work. In this condition, however great the
incentive, a man may feel incapable of even producing the bare necessities
of life for his wife and family, let alone thinking of any sort of
'development'. And if there was no road or railway running through (or
near) the village, then the ordinary farmer might, in any case, scarcely
come into contact with any of those varied 'incentives' which might cause
him to think about 'development'.

324. Kailahun had a piped-water supply from the early 1930s, but it was not
chemically treated, and from that viewpoint was no 'cleaner' than water
from a local stream or well.

325. On the more positive side, were there any tangible 'European' innovations
during the period of British rule which may be isolated and be seen to
have produced a considerable social impact on the everyday life of most
ordinary village folk? As has been already mentioned in this thesis,
the introduction of kerosene and matches had perhaps the greatest tangible
impact, because together they revolutionized cooking, heating and lighting.

326. Even in Mr. Fyfe's magnificent History of Sierra Leone, considerably more
space is spent on events in the Freetown peninsula than on the rest of the
country (though until the late nineteenth century, the name Sierra Leone
was usually applied only to the peninsula). Professor Little's Monie of
Sierra Leone was written from research work which was mainly carried out
in Bo and nearby villages.

327. Although Professor Kilson, in Political Change in a West African State,
seeks to get down to grass-roots politics throughout the colonial period,
the major part of his book deals with Chiefs, elites, N.A.s, and District
Councils in the post-war period, rather than Chiefdom, town and village
politics under British rule.
328. 1896 and 1961 seem to provide such clear terminal dates, that it is difficult to break out of the artificial straight-jacket which such a periodization imposes.

329. Although Kailahun was a District Headquarters from 1929 onwards, it was hardly a centre of European influence. For the remainder of the colonial period, virtually the only British residents were the District Commissioner and the Methodist missionary. Kenema 1919 onwards, however, was the Provincial Headquarters from 1919 onwards; it was on the railway line, and grew steadily in European, Creole, Asian and local African population from 1919 through into the 1970s.

330. The Cox Report, passim, contains many statements of this loyalty to the Chiefdom rather than to any other central or local political institution among the ordinary people. The present writer found that same loyalty among the ordinary people of Luawa and Kissi country during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

331. Harris and Sawyerr, The Springs of Mende Belief and Conduct is the most convenient published summary of ceremonies and beliefs. Also Curley, Hindoveli, describes the situation in the early colonial period. Ceremonies and beliefs encountered by the present writer in Luawa and Kissi country in the 1960s accorded closely with those described in these works.

332. The classic statement of this belief in British achievement in Sierra Leone is Aldridge's A Transformed Colony. But later writers too, like Professor Kilson in Political Change in a West African State, have stated that British rule in Sierra Leone produced radical improvement.

333. The most important element in the N.A. system was the Chiefdom Treasury. If this was empty throughout almost the whole year, the entire system could bring little benefit to anyone. Moreover, N.A. officials were in a position to make their own demands on the ordinary people. At least until the violence in Luawa and Kissi country of 1950-51, it seems that the ordinary people were not only compelled to pay 4/- each year to the Chiefdom Treasury, but they also went on giving those customary services and tribute which the 4/- was supposed to replace.

334. In 1944, cocoa was fetching 7 shillings per bushel, but in 1954 the S.L.P.M.B. price for a bushel of cocoa was £5-12-0.


336. CO267/417/Conf.32; Cardew; 4.5.95. Railway Survey. See also Aldridge, A Transformed Colony, Chaps.12-15, 17-19, passim.

337. CO267/689/32385; Stevenson; 1944-45, Planning of Development and Welfare. No conclusive information was found to indicate how successful the yaws campaign had been; for the success of the trypanosomiasis campaign, see following sentences.


339. One indication of this satisfaction was the lack of rebellion within Luawa's heartland from c.1882 until the end of Kailondo's reign (c.1895).
The present writer saw for himself, in the late 1960s, and in 1972, that village life in Luawa and Kissi country was essentially the same as the life described in Alldrige's books and despatches. A person who, in the late 1960s, visited only Kailahun town might, it is true, gain the impression that British rule had considerably affected the Luawa area. But even if half the people of Kailahun were living, in the early 1960s, a basically different type of everyday life from that of their great-grandparents, they would only account for about 2,500 people. In other words they would represent only about 4% of the population of Luawa and the Kissi Chiefdoms.

This is a most undramatic conclusion, and represents a way of historical understanding which has already been pioneered by such writers as Professor M. Crowder and Professor J.F.A. Ajayi. The Addendum to the Bibliography lists some work, recently completed on West African history, which largely corroborates this same basic conclusion. Yet the implications of this conclusion have, perhaps, still not been squarely faced in general. Some historical writing, in its presuppositions about the colonial impact, continues in the euphoric vein of *A Transformed Colony*.