KAILONDO'S LUAWA AND BRITISH RULE
with Special Reference to the Period 1880-1930

MALCOLM McCALL
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CHAPTER THREE

KAILONDO'S LUAWA, 1880 TO 1896: INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT
The political events of Kailondo's reign are much better documented (1) than the political organization of Luawa in the same period; and information about the society and its economics is sparse indeed. Moreover, the evidence which does exist on Luawa's internal development is largely concentrated on a small number of topics; and some of the best-documented topics are of comparatively minor historical interest (2). This uneven spread of evidence leads almost inevitably to an imbalanced discussion of the polity's development under Kailondo - some aspects being discussed fully, and other important aspects being left out altogether simply because information is lacking (3). An imbalanced discussion seems preferable, however, to fanciful 'reconstructions' of Kailondo's Luawa which are not based on solid evidence (4).

Written records and oral traditions both strongly suggest that during the fifteen years of Kailondo's reign (1880 to 1896) considerable material development took place in Luawa, but unfortunately the degree of development is unquantifiable because so little information is available concerning the situation before Kailondo's accession (5). The extent of change within a period can only be assessed accurately if a fairly detailed picture can be built up of conditions at the beginning of the period and at the end; in the case of Kailondo's Luawa, the situation at the time he came to power in 1880 is largely unknown (6).

There is a further complication in discussing socio-economic development, which does not arise in the political aspects. Political change - reasonably well documented in Kailondo's reign - is marked by a fairly clear beginning in 1880 and an ending in 1896. But much social and economic change - although it is little documented in
the same period - clearly had its roots in the pre-1880 period and also had effects which were not fully felt until well into the twentieth century. The significance of Kailondo's rule for the internal development of Luawa is best seen in the context of the whole century from c. 1870 to c. 1970. The poverty of socio-economic evidence for Kailondo's reign likewise makes it necessary to consider a wider time-span, in order to provide any meaningful interpretation of that evidence: when available 'facts' within a short period are few, the best hope of interpreting them lies in relating them to other relevant 'facts' in the surrounding periods. For these reasons, information has been taken from a wide time-span in order to illuminate Luawa's internal development under Kailondo.
TOWNS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

A well-documented development in Luawa, which may be a pointer to one of the most significant changes during Kailondo's reign, was the founding of Kailahun. The name simply means Kailondo's town (7), and the Mahei established it in the early years of his rule (8). One account of Luawa's history states that the first village on the site of Kailahun was called Njaluahun, and was founded by Fagbandi Kpakila, one of the kpakoisía who handed the country over to Kailondo at the time of the Gbondou Conference (9). As the village grew, its name was changed to Sakabu (10). The village was destroyed in Ndawa's Kpove War (11), and when Kailondo rebuilt it, he called it Kailahun (12).

The Luawa Mahei's reasons for choosing the site of Sakabu for his headquarters town are not known, though he must have noted that it had a reasonable water supply (13) and was easily defensible (14). Mr Hollins thought the place was chosen "as being the centre of his chiefdom" (15). But the distance from Kailahun to Baoma, the westernmost of Kailondo's towns (16), was less than half that from Kailahun to Buedu, the easternmost of his towns (17): and the distance from Kailahun to Mofindor, in the extreme north-west of Luawa, was less than a quarter the distance from Kailahun to Gondama, in the extreme south-west (18). Nor was Kailahun at the middle point of those towns which sent representatives to the Gbondou Conference (19) - a place about ten miles further east, like Sandialu, would have been more central (20).

Kailahun was, however, strategically placed in one important respect: it was virtually on the linguistic boundary between predominantly Kisi-speaking country and predominantly Mende-speaking country (21), and this was perhaps Kailondo's main reason for choosing
the site. From Kailahun, Kissi country lay in all directions of the compass between due north and due east (22); and Mende country lay in all directions of the compass between due south and due west (23). A line drawn north-east from Kailahun passed through the Kissi heartland, and a line drawn south-west passed through much of the Mende heartland (24): Kailondo's town represented the 'pivot' on an axial line running through Mende and Kissi country. In other words - to continue the geometrical model without overstraining it - Kailahun was situated at the place where the north-western apex of Mende country met the south-eastern apex of Kissi country, and the town thus stood at the 'natural' meeting-place between the Mendeblisia and the Kissia (25).

Kailondo, as a Kissi-man, may have been less sure in the 1880s of the loyalty of the Mende people than of his own KiDsi people (26): certainly the only attempted revolt against his rule in the first decade of his reign came from the Mende-speaking part of his polity (27). Kailahun was a town from which he could supervise personally the whole Mende-speaking part of Luawa, all the large Mende villages of Luawa being less than 20 miles from Kailahun (28). Yet in Kailahun he was also physically in touch with an apparently loyal Kissi hinterland (29). Moreover, Kailahun lay on the natural communication route between all Kissi country and the Atlantic coast, down the Moa valley (30). Again, Kailahun was within easy reach of both Gbande and Kono country - the homelands of the two peoples nearest to Kailondo's Mende-Kissi polity (31).

There is a danger, however, in finding sophisticated reasons of strategy to explain why Kailondo might have made Kailahun his headquarters town, when he himself did not perhaps consider them.
The site of Sakabu might have simply attracted him as a healthy and pleasant place, near to his previous town of Mofindor (32), within easy reach both of Komalu (the home of his mother and of his childhood - 33) and of Lukono (his father's birthplace - 34).

By 1890, Kailahun had grown into a very large town by Mende standards: even at that date it was one of the biggest towns in Mendeland (35). It was the largest of all the towns which T.J. Alldridge visited in his up-country tours of the early 1890s, and therefore almost certainly the largest in the whole of Ko-Mende (36), and fortunately (from the viewpoint of our information) he provided a description of the place as it appeared to him in 1890, when it was still untouched by European influence (37). Kailahun was then made up of three (38) separate towns, each of which was walled by war-fences. Tongoyama had three war fences, Giibina had two, and Tawoveihun had four (39). These towns were situated very close together and there was also, apparently, an unfenced group of houses named Damba (40). In the centre of the three towns was the open space known as the kobaniai (41) where meetings and celebrations could be held (42). Alldridge counted 482 houses altogether and 32 barrios (43), but made no attempt to estimate the size of the population. The number of inhabitants would have been difficult to estimate since there were many non-residents constantly going in and out of Kailahun, visiting the Mahri. These non-residents would include people from the surrounding villages of Luawa, and from outlying areas and neighbouring polities (44). In time of war, the population was vastly swollen by the kogugbanga (45) and their dependents who would move into Kailahun: at those times, some houses may have
TWO WAR-FENCES SURROUNDING A TOWN
contained 20 or more people (46). Again, at harvest-time some families might live and sleep near their farms for several weeks, to save a long trek each day from the town (47). Allowing for these large and frequent fluctuations, an estimate of 2,000 for the average total population in about 1890 would seem reasonable (48).

Kailondo possessed houses in which he might sleep in all three section-towns of Kailahun, his lack of a fixed sleeping-place reducing the risk of assassination (49). Sometimes he even slept in one of the barries. A barri was an open-sided shelter, used especially by the menfolk as a place for relaxation and meeting. A family compound might possess its own barri, and with a fire lit in the middle of it on cool evenings, and hammocks slung round the sides, it would provide the setting for grandfather's evening tales (50). The larger, public barries in the town were used for important meetings. Kailondo and Alldridge held their 1890 meeting for the signing of the Treaty in what was presumably the main barri in Kailahun, and the building's structure considerably impressed the British traveller: the roof "was supported by 40 posts each about 12 feet high, and from 6 to 8 inches in diameter, of solid camwood, a sight which I had never previously witnessed, or believed, indeed, to be possible" (51).

Alldridge noted that the towns of Ko-Mende were very similar; and Kailahun was mainly different in being larger than any other. The houses were "all of the circular or oblong haystack shape, the walls being composed entirely of mud daubed on to wattles and covered by a roofing of palm-leaf thatching; openings being left in the mudding, one for an entrance, the other as a window, a mat being drawn down over each at night. These huts are certainly very cool, the solid
blocks of dry mud raised from the ground 12 inches, and are about 6 feet long by 3 feet wide, which are fixtures in the huts, and which are used as beds, being particularly so.

The huts are built as closely together as possible, the eaves of one hut frequently overlapping the eaves of another; this has hitherto been the fashion from a feeling of extra security in times of war" (52). While visiting the area, Alldridge encouraged the Mahangeisia to build houses further apart from each other in order to reduce fire-risk, and give the towns a more airy, pleasant appearance (53). Perhaps Kailondo took Alldridge's advice to heart, or perhaps he was already pursuing the housing policy the white man recommended, because in 1895 Captain Sharpe wrote that, although Kailahun was densely populated, it was "not built in quite such a crowded manner as usual, the houses, though small, having more spaces between them" (54).

The fences surrounding the towns were a defensive measure. Usually there was a double fence, like that surrounding Giibina, though sometimes there were four or more encircling the town, as in the case of Tawoyeihun. If one fence was taken in war, the attackers would be in the difficult position of still having more fences to scale, while being restricted and exposed in the narrow space between two fences (55). "These war fences were formed of live trees, the lower part being kept free from foliage, while the top was allowed to sprout. The stakes were thickly interlaced with a rude lattice of long, live canes that also sprouted, so that there was soon a dense mass of vegetation at the top of the fence, which as a rule was about fifteen to twenty feet high. The gate of the war fence was without exception a solid slab of hard
wood, cut from the buttress of a large tree, and so strong that it could never be broken in native warfare" (56).

As part of the defensive arrangements the vegetation just outside the fences, round the town, was allowed to remain so thick and thorny (57) that it was impenetrable, and so any attackers were forced to stay on the one narrow, easily-defendable pathway which led to the town gate (58).

The other towns and large villages of Luawa were defended in a similar way. For example, Ngiehun - which had been extended in the early years of Kailondo's reign, and which was perhaps the second largest town in Luawa - "had four war fences around it. It had two smaller towns close by, one of which had three war fences" (59). Baoma, which was built in the 1880s (60), could be described in 1895 as "a large double village, well placed and strongly fortified" (61). Kailondo himself had already built Mofindor before he became Mahi of Luawa (62). All these three towns were later known as 'section towns' of Luawa (63), and probably they were so in Kailondo's day (64); in fact this was probably one reason for their importance in the 1880s and 1890s. A 'section town' in the days before Kailondo would have been the home of an independent maha, whose rule would have extended over a few square miles (65) of territory, and was usually the largest town (66). From the time of Kailondo onwards the msanqisia of these 'section towns' ceased to be politically independent (67), but their towns remained the focal point for the country people for between about 2 and 6 miles around (68). These towns would act as defensive strongholds in the case of invasion by an enemy, the numbers of their fighting-men and the strength of their war-fences giving the possibility of resistance which a small defenceless village alone could not possess (69).
Kailondo's development of Ngiehun, Baoma, Mofindor and Kailahun probably represented a new departure in semi-urban settlement within Luawa; for these towns did not simply develop gradually under their own impetus (70), but were extended through the conscious effort of the ruler. The extension of these four towns was not, it seems, an isolated phenomenon, but was part of a general movement in Luawa, stimulated or perhaps even initiated by Kailondo, towards the establishing of new towns and the enlargement of existing towns (71). "Kailondo", Mr N.C. Hollins noted, "advised the people for their greater safety to build larger towns, which advice they heeded" (72). Unfortunately, as with so much else, little information can be obtained about the size of most of these towns. Random oral traditions suggest Bandajuma-Luawa contained 40 small houses in the 1890s (73), and Giema about 100 (74). Dodo-Cotuma contained perhaps 30 houses (75), and Mano-Sewalu 60 (76). If it is reckoned that each house was occupied by an average of about three people (77), and that in the 1890s some of these villages were among the biggest in Luawa (78), then any settlement of about 70 houses or about 200 people would have been considered large (79).

By the end of Kailondo's rule, almost all the main villages and towns of Luawa had been established (80). The period of British rule in Luawa had little effect on either the numbers or the siting of the larger villages; the pattern had already been established before 1896 (81). Kailondo's reign, however, probably played quite a large part in creating that pattern. When Governor Cardew travelled through Luawa in 1895 (82), he went from Vahun in Guma to Nyandehun (83), passing through Tawirama and Mendekalema on the way (84). From Nyandehun
he reached Kailahun by passing through Bunumbu, Nagbena, Pandobu and Bobo
bu (85). After his stay with Kailondo, the Governor trekked west through Potam,
Gbotoboyema and Baoma to cross the River Moa near Jumboworru (86), hav
ing traversed Kailondo's heartland. Every one of these places could still be locat
ed in the 1960s except Tawirama, the approximate site of which seems to have been occupied by the town of Laiehun (87).

Captain Sharpe, the Inspector-General of the Frontier Police (88), made the route map of the journey through Luawa, and in his report he singled out Nyandehun, Kailahun and Baoma as the three main towns on the route (89). Seventy-five years later, and a decade after the end of British rule, Baoma and Nyandehun were, after Kailahun, still the main towns on that route (90).

The pattern of settlement in Kailondo's Luawa differed between the Kissi east and the Mende west, Kissi settlements being generally smaller and yet more numerous. For example, in Kailondo's day, although Kangama (91) and Dia (92) were amongst the most prominent Kissi villages, each may have contained only about eleven houses (93): they were thus less than a quarter the size of many leading Mende settlements.

Yet small settlements may have existed in greater numbers in Kissi country than in Mende country (94). In the 1960s there were only two towns of over 1,000 inhabitants in all the three Kissi Chiefdoms of Sierra Leone (95); but, especially in Kissi Kama and Kissi Teng, there was such a concentration of small villages that this Kissi area was among the most densely populated areas in West Africa in terms of rural settlements (96). These small villages, which usually contained less than 35 houses each (97), did not seem to be concentrated on the most productive land (98)
even though almost all their inhabitants were subsistence farmers (99). This would suggest that rural settlement distribution in this area was controlled by socio-political rather than economic factors. Those same socio-political factors were probably operating in Kailondo's day to produce a comparatively high concentration of small villages (100).

The earliest comparative figures for the Mende and Kissi portions of Luawa, in the second decade of the twentieth century (101), give added proof that there were a large number of small villages in Kissi country. In 1916, the Kissi portion of 210 square miles (102) yielded a house tax of £1,652 5s (103); the Mende portion of 180 square miles (104), although it contained Kailahun and the other large semi-urban settlements already mentioned, yielded only £1,376 10s (105). Kissi country contained no large towns at all (106), but since these tax returns showed that Mende country and Kissi country contained almost the same number of houses per square mile (107), there must have been a far greater number of small settlements in Kissi country than in Mende country.

In Kailondo's reign there were possibly more small villages in the Kissi part of Luawa than was the case at the end of British rule - despite the general assumption that during the 'peaceful conditions' of colonial rule, the ordinary people "spread out over the land in a greater number of villages" (108). Mr Tamba Ngendu estimated that at the end of the nineteenth century there were about 76 villages in Kama 'section' (109); in the 1960s, it contained about 60 villages (110). This decline in the number of small villages in the area, from the time of Kailondo onwards, occurred as people were attracted away from the tiny villages by improved facilities in the towns (111). As regards
the larger villages in the Kissi part of Luwa, however, the pattern of settlement was already established by the end of Kailondo's reign and altered little in the succeeding seventy-five years (112). The main villages in Kissi Kama just before the British arrived were Dia, Dokossu, Kokoma, Mano, Njala, Ndenga (Ngainga?) and Kongorma (113). By the 1960s, after the departure of the British as rulers, Dia Ngainga and Kongorma were still among Kama's biggest villages, and only two additional villages of any size (114) had been established - Periwahun and Konioma (115).

The pattern of settlement, then, in Kailondo's Luwa was a large number of tiny villages in Kissi country, with no towns; and in Mende country, by contrast, a concentration of semi-urban settlements (116). By the end of the colonial period, seven of these semi-urban settlements had grown into towns of over 1,000 inhabitants (117). These seven towns, concentrated into a part of Kailondo's Luwa which represented only 0.64% of Sierra Leone's land area, made up 4.4% of all urban settlements in the country in the early 1960s (118). All the seven towns were mentioned as comparatively large settlements in Kailondo's day (119), so their existence within such a small area cannot be explained as an effect of colonial rule, or of economic pressures in the twentieth century (120). The explanation must lie mainly in the years before 1896, probably in the reign of Kailondo himself (121).

Considerable space has been devoted to the pattern of settlement in Kailondo's Luwa, partly because it is a crucial and frequently overlooked subject in its own right (122); but partly, too, because it is a well-documented example of continuity between pre-colonial
and post-colonial days. Such continuity, rather than discontinuity, is a feature of Luawa's history between c. 1870 and c. 1970 (123). Whatever changes occurred in the pattern of settlement under British rule, the basis of that pattern must have been laid already by the end of Kailondo's reign (124).

Kailahun was by far the largest town in Luawa in the 1890s. No single town had predominated in the area before the 1880s (125), but Kailondo, focussing authority in himself and settling in Kailahun, had made that town the centre of political activity in the Mahawui. The Mahci would bring to his town both visitors and prisoners from other places (126), "and this being the centre, people would come from all over to see him, and for other business" (127). This political centralisation had economic and social effects. When Alldridge walked through Kailahun in 1890, he came upon a Muslim leather-worker - an event which was unusual enough for the British traveller to comment on it (128). Leather-workers were not, apparently, to be found in most towns. This craftsman was presumably a 'stranger' (129) who had been attracted to Kailahun as a large central town. There was no great demand for leather goods, but the Muslim craftsman could "find plenty of employment" (130) as the practitioner of an apparently powerful religion, making charms and 'medecines' of various sorts for the local people. There was also a blacksmith in Kailahun who made a rough needle for sewing the sole of Alldridge's boot (131). This slim evidence would suggest that as Kailahun became the political headquarters of a comparatively extensive area, so 'strangers' with special skills were attracted into it, the town thus becoming an economic as well as a
political centre. Not surprisingly in the 1890s, Kailahun had become a destination for long-distance traders (132). The 'strangers' who settled in the town brought with them the promise (or threat) of far-reaching social change. For example, Alldridge's leather-worker was perhaps one of the people who introduced Islam to the inhabitants of the new headquarter-town.

An unusual type of settlement which was common throughout the area, and in Luawa, during Kailondo's day was the 'slave village' (133). Slaves captured in warfare or acquired in trade would be used mainly as labourers on the land (134). "For the sake of convenience the slaves were housed as close as possible to the fresh tracts of land they cleared on behalf of their masters and this gave rise to new villages inhabited entirely by populations of slaves" (135). Slaves living in such villages were presumably less well off than those who lived in their master's house. Slaves who had been with their masters for a long time - "domestics of the house" (136) - came to enjoy a number of rights and privileges (137). "They have been brought up in the house, given wives, raised children, and to all intents and purposes have become part and parcel of the house family" (138). Such a slave would be certainly allowed to farm some land for himself (139). "As a rule a slave will work for five days in the week for his master", noted C.B. Wallis (140), "and for the remaining two days he can work a farm of his own which his master has given him. I have known cases where a 'slave' has run away from his master, gone to Sierra Leone [i.e. the Freetown peninsula], and finding the outside world too hard for him, has, of his own free will,
In Luawa, the largest slave-owner was naturally the Mahei. It is recorded that at one time Kailondo had three hundred slaves to dispose of (141). Probably only the wealthier inhabitants of Luawa, the kpakoisia, owned slaves; and at this time political and economic power were rarely separated. As the supreme political authority, Kailondo was naturally the richest person in the Mahawui in slaves (142).
AGRICULTURE AND MANUFACTURES

Allridge's despatches contain disappointingly little specific information about the daily work and activities of the Luawa peoples (143). But he wrote at length about these aspects of life in Ko-Mende generally, and if Luawa had provided any exception, he would presumably have pointed this out. The Travelling Commissioner clearly showed that for most of the year peoples' energy went mainly into growing rice and cassava (144): there is no suggestion that war was "the principal form of activity" (145), nor anything like it. "Farming is carried on very extensively," reported Allridge in 1890: "the up-country natives are essentially agriculturists, and they certainly appear to take a real and lively interest in the raising of crops; taking into consideration the very simple implements with which they work the land, the small country-made hoe and short inbent matchet being their only tools, it becomes a source of wonderment how such successful results are obtained" (146). The white man's opinions on this subject were reinforced by his 1891 visit: "Within the limits of the Treaties the whole country continues at rest, there is much clearing of large tracts of bush for agricultural purposes, farming is universal towns are increasing wonderfully in extent the people seeming happy and contented" (147). Rev. W. Vivian, generalizing about Mendeland in the same period from his own up-country experience, reached the same clear conclusion (148). "Agriculture", wrote the missionary, "is now the chief occupation of the people" (149).

Allridge credited the universality of farming, and the peaceful state of Ko-Mende generally, to Governor "Hay's forward
policy: "your Excellency has reduced this country today to a state of tranquility, which I am of opinion it can never have enjoyed before. I can at all events state with certainty as to the 20 years which I have been connected with the country" (150). In fact, although Alldridge had worked since 1870 in the immediate hinterland of Sherbro, neither he nor any other Government official had any knowledge of conditions as far up-country as Luawa before 1890. Even the name Luawa was apparently unknown in 1890 to J.C.E. Parkes, who was probably the best informed of all Government officials about 'Upper Mendeland' (151). Just as Kailondo had probably never heard of Hay of his policy nor met anyone from Freetown, so also neither Hay nor any other Government official had ever come into contact with Kailondo or any of his people before Alldridge's 1890 visit. By no stretch of the imagination could the Travelling Commissioner's compliment to the Governor be considered accurate for Luawa, even if it contained some truth when applied to the Atlantic littoral (152). In any case, oral tradition clearly indicates that at least since 1880, the peoples of Kailondo's Luawa had experienced almost unbroken internal peace (153), as a result of their own ruler's policies.

The farming described by Alldridge was clearly part of a subsistence economy. The chief crop was rice (154), this being the peoples' staple food, and most of the people were involved in rice-farming for a large part of the year. Shift-cultivation was the method of farming, each family-farm consisting of an area carved out of the bush and planted with rice. The size of that area in any particular year depended on the social status of the family, its wealth and the amount
of human labour it could muster (155). Before sowing the rice-seed, which was usually done in April, the land had to be prepared: "The first operation is known as 'brushing farm', which consists in clearing away the small shrubs and undergrowth; then the larger trees are felled and allowed to dry; the whole is then fired and is called mortihun. Afterwards the place is gleaned of any pieces of wood that may be remaining, and the ground is ready for planting" (156). When the rice shoots have appeared weeding begins; and when the ears of rice begin to ripen, platforms are constructed in the farm, and children using slings drive away the birds (157). "To reap the rice a native-made knife is generally used, or the outer part of a bamboo cane which will take a good edge. When harvested it is tied up into short sheaves ....

Winnowing is performed by threshing or by treading out the ears by the human foot; when this is done the rice is put into water, where it remains over night, and next morning it is parboiled, taken out and spread on mats in the sun to dry. Then ... it is pounded by women in wooden mortars and continually fanned to remove the husks, until the rice is sufficiently clean" (158). Harvesting was finished by November (159).

This description of rice-farming by the first European to visit Luawa is of particular value in showing how the people devoted their energies to rice-growing for most of the year, and the techniques they employed. In 1970, eighty years after Aldridge's visit, and after the end of British rule, the people of Luawa were still engaged in rice production as their main annual activity (160) and still used the same well-tried agricultural methods and implements (161).
In 1890, with rice as by far the most important crop (162), cassava ranked second in importance (163); but the subsistence agriculture of the area was widely diversified. Agoo seed, benni seed and groundnuts were cultivated (164); and Kailondo presented Alldridge with some locally-grown tobacco and its seed (165). Among the tree crops, the oil palm was most valuable for its yield of oil which was much used in local cooking (166). As with rice-production, the method of winning the oil from the palm nut changed little between the time of Kailondo and the 1960s (167). Kola trees were also common, and the nuts were chewed as a stimulant (168). As regards fruit, pineapples, bananas, mangoes, guavas, oranges, limes and avocado pears were all grown in the Sherbro area (169); presumably these were also common in Luawa (170). This agricultural diversity was reflected in the variety of food products which were available at the local markets which the Travelling Commissioner visited (171).

In most cassava farms, between the cassava was planted cotton from which cloth was manufactured (172). The cloth was either turned into garments such as men's gowns, or simply left in the form of "country cloths" (173) - pieces of cloth which could be used as bedcovers, for example; a size nine feet by six feet was typical (174). Here again was an indication of a subsistence economy: the society was self-sufficient in clothing as well as food.

Cloth manufacture was unquestionably the "greatest industry which is to be met with" in Ko-Mende (175), and was carried on to "an amazing extent giving employment to men, women and children" (176). The picking and separating of the cotton from the seeds was undertaken
by children; the carding, spinning and dyeing by the women; the weaving, on a simple loom, by the men (177). In his travels up the Moa valley, Alldridge found that from the coast as far up-country as Luawa, the loom in use was "a very primitive contrivance a spindle being simply passed to and fro conveying the woof, the warp being usually stretched horizontally at a low distance from the ground" (178). However, at Gbandevulo, in the extreme south-east of Kailondo's Luawa, the British Commissioner discovered in 1891 "very good country cloths being made by a new description of loom, a vertical loom, at which the operator sat opposite to his work instead of sitting sideways as the people in the lower countries do. He also had a shaped shuttle with the bobbin inside; altogether it was a very superior and far more business-like machine than I had hitherto met" (179). This improved type of loom was the style Alldridge met from this point eastwards (180), and was probably copied from the type used by the Mandinka people (181). Luawa may thus have been the south-easternmost polity to be affected by Mandinka culture in all the country the British Commissioner traversed in the early 1890s (182).

Whichever loom was used, the cloth was "woven in a continuous strip of from 4 to 5 inches in width which is afterwards cut into the required lengths; these are then placed side by side and sewn together" (183). "The texture of this cloth is very durable," wrote Alldridge in unqualified approval, "and the colours, being all vegetable dyes, retain their brightness, however often washed" (184). Not surprisingly, the local people showed little interest in buying cheap Manchester
cotton goods; though British writers at the time, and historians afterwards, presumed a great eagerness on the part of up-country peoples to obtain such goods (185). "The up-country chiefs and people", admitted the Travelling Commissioner, "used as they are to a cloth that will really wear, somewhat despise such cheap and gaudy specimens of English cloth as they chanced to see in the hands of my carriers, and they have said to me that they were quite able to buy and pay for good cloth, if they could get it" (186).

Gradually during the colonial period European-made cottons became more acceptable, but in the late 1960s, country-cloth gowns were still preferred for 'best wear'; and country-cloth was still manufactured in the same way that Alldridge described in the 1890s (187). On the British official's arrival in Luawa in 1890, Kailondo presented him with forty-one of these country-cloths (188). In the photograph which Alldridge later took of the Luawa Mahel, the latter was wearing a beautiful gown of a most intricate design "entirely of country make" (189).

Pottery, matmaking, net-making and iron-work were other manufactures. As an example of iron-work, the British Travelling Commissioner referred to the "bright iron spear" which Kailondo possessed in 1890 (190); photographs in The Sherbro and its Hinterland show various other swords and spears used in the Luawa area (191). Apart from house-making, there were various other special crafts; ranging from the construction of long, narrow palm-leaf hampers (about five feet long by one foot wide) in which a person could carry produce on his back (192), to the carving of ceremonial masks (193).
MARKETS, TRADE AND COMMUNICATIONS

In his first visits to Kailahun, Alldridge gave no reports about markets and trade in the town. He described with interest the way in which a child would carry round the town some article of food or other product, such as a small quantity of rice, and would barter it with a prospective customer, perhaps in exchange for palm-oil, native-grown tobacco, or cassava (194). "But", the British traveller quickly added, "this is only in regard to the domestic requirements of the town; it is purely a local convenience, and is not to be considered in the light of trading; for I have never seen anything disposed of in this way except small articles of consumption" (195). Unfortunately he failed to indicate how large articles and non-edible products were marketed in Kailahun and the other towns of Luawa; but both from lack of information by Alldridge, and from oral tradition (196), it would seem doubtful whether there was a regular, organized market in Kailahun at this period (197).

However, Alldridge indicated that weekly open markets became fairly common in the country east and north (i.e. 'up-country') of Baiwala in Dia mahawu (198). These markets were held on the same day and in the same place each week, usually in an open space near a town—perhaps in the kobangai—under the shade of large trees (199). In 1891, during his second journey to Luawa, Alldridge described two of these weekly markets in considerable detail. Both were held every Monday (200) in Gbande country on the eastern edge of 'Greater Luawa', one being near Popalahun (201), and the other near Kolahun (202). On both occasions, the bulk of articles offered for sale were food products: rice, cassava, palm-oil, palm kernels and palm kernel oil were available (203). There
was also a remarkable variety of other food – Guinea corn, ground nuts, yams, bananas, okra, pumpkins, sweet potatoes and dried fish (204 – the last article being caught and dried locally, and not imported from the coast – 205). A variety of live domestic animals were for sale – cattle, fowls, goats and sheep – as well as different meats, and "dried rats on skewers", and dried flying ants (206). Amongst non-edible products on sale, locally-made country cloth, together with raw cotton and spun cotton, was perhaps the most common item (207). Locally-made iron and pottery were also easily available. Simple luxury-goods included locally-grown tobacco, agate beads, and mats (208). Not surprisingly in the light of this long list, Alldridge noted that the "Hinterland folks are practically independent of Coast supplies" (209). Salt and gunpowder were the only imported articles he came across (210).

The Travelling Commissioner reported from Yandahun in Vassa, just south-east of Luawa, which he visited shortly before reaching Popalahun in 1891, that "there was almost an entire absence of anything like imported cloth, even beads, which would seem to penetrate as far inland as any imported article, were scarcely to be seen" (211). Whilst Alldridge was in Yandahun, mahe1 Fabanna, the ruler of Vassa, "produced a block of rock-salt which he said had come down from the Kormendi country some seven days' journey further inland, and he added that this was what the people used up there with their food" (212). The 'Kormendi country' – which may be identified with the modern homeland in Guinea of the Konyanke people (213) – was probably about 100 miles further inland (214). Alldridge noted that this was "the only piece of rock-salt"
he had ever seen in the country, and it went to show that he was approaching "the limit of distance to which imported salt was carried" inland from the coast (215). Equally significant, it appears also as the limit to which rock salt, possibly mined on the southern margins of the Sahara (216), was carried southwards (217). Thus, although few articles of long-distance commerce were present in this period, and Luawa possessed a near self-supporting way of life, yet this area did represent the meeting ground of long-distance trade southwards from the Sahara and the Sudan (218), and of long-distance trade in European goods northwards from the Atlantic coast.

The salt imported from the Atlantic coast was carried up-country in "cylindrical bundles of palm leaf about three feet long by three inches in diameter, each containing some seven pounds of salt, the value for one package being twenty irons" (219). The other imported 'European' article in the Popalahun market -gunpowder - was arranged for sale "in little conical heaps of about 2 or 3 ounces in weight" (220). Unfortunately Alldridge did not indicate from which places on the coast the salt and gunpowder came. Presumably most of it was carried up-country by those Mendeleisisia and Kissia who went down with cattle and country cloths to the Moa estuary and Bonthe in order to trade (221); some may have come up from Monrovia into Gbande country (222), and this may have been particularly true of the gunpowder which Alldridge found in the country further east of Luawa. At the market in Kabawana, near Kolahun, Alldridge "noticed rather a brisk trade doing in gunpowder, which I had not observed before" (223) - the Kabawana market being further east than any other which he described (224).
In the following year - 1892 - when most of the mahangcisia in the area were at war (225), Alldridge described the main weapons of war as guns, swords, spears and arrows (226). The last three types of weapon could be made locally: the arrows, for example, were "a description of rattan [sic.] cane, from about two to four feet in length, with barbed iron spear heads" (227). But the guns, which included revolvers and even "breech-loading fowling pieces" (228), were imported. "There seemed to be a plentiful supply of gunpowder everywhere, guns being continually fired" (229). Alldridge thought much of the powder, together with many of the guns and swords, came from the Liberian littoral; but at Kailahun, Kailondo showed the Travelling Commissioner powder in bags "which he stated came overland from Sanga, being brought by the Susu people; some of the bags were stated to be more than one man could carry" (230). The context would suggest that 'Sanga' was a coastal town or district in Susu country, but unfortunately the present writer has been unable definitely to identify it. In Winterbottom's map of 1803 there is an area marked as the "High Land of Sangaree" just north of Matacong Island, at a point where Susu country is shown to reach the coast (231). In French colonial maps of Guinea, the coastal inlet at this point is named "Baie de Sangarea" (232).

However, total trade in the Luawa area with the Atlantic littoral was very small in quantity during the 1880s and 1890s. A young mabesi in the region told Alldridge that "although they made country cloths and palm oil, and planted tobacco and rice, they carried no trade down to the sea; but they exchanged their produce for iron and cattle" (233). Trading in the Luawa area was largely local involving
people of three or four neighbouring mahawuisia; but this internal trading was both considerable in volume and well-organized. There were about 500 people present at the market in Popalahun (234) and nearly 1,000 at Kabawana (235). "Notwithstanding the great concourse of people", wrote a rather surprised Alldridge, with reference to Popalahun, "there was no disorder of any kind everything been [sic.] conducted in a quiet and business like manner" (236). A week later (237), similar thoughts occurred to him when he looked round the Kabawana market: "there was an incessant din and hubbub but no confusion or disturbance of any kind and I was greatly pleased to notice with what order and genuine good feeling these large interior markets were conducted" (238).

The testimony of Alldridge regarding the situation in Luawa was corroborated in 1895 by Governor Cardew himself. "The country passed through continues to be very fertile and productive," noted the Governor, "large areas along the route appear cleared for cultivation, palm trees abound except between VAHUN and YANDAHU-MAMBABU [i.e. Nyandehun ], and kam wood and konta wood are plentiful. The other principal products are rice and kola nuts. The rubber vine exists but the natives do not gather the rubber; there is a large industry in country cloths the superior kinds of which are manufactured in the BANDEH country and also ivory is obtained there but owing to the remoteness of the districts in this neighbourhood few of the products find their way to the sea ports of the colony and such bulky articles as rice, palm oil, and kernels, never get there, in fact the nuts do not appear to be gathered except for domestic use. A few traders from the low country sometimes visit these parts but they generally deal in
country cloths; the little produce that finds its way down country
goes usually to SUJIMA and MANO SALIJA and is there exchanged for salt,
Manchester goods, and powder .... In certain towns in BANDEH markets
called DOWAI are held every seventh day where the products of the country
consisting of cattle, sheep, country cloths, gold, and ivory are
exchanged for salt, tobacco and the small quantities of Manchester
cotton which are sent up country. Rock salt from the interior (pro-
bably the towns of the Niger) is brought to these markets and also
French five franc pieces, which, on account of their size are much
coveted by the natives of these upper districts for neck ornaments and
for conversion into armlets which are extensively worn" (239).

Little has been discovered about the precise routes
used by long-distance traders, or about the means of communication (240)
between Luawa and the Sudan on the one hand, and the Atlantic seaboard
on the other. KISSIA and Mandebla from the Luawa area travelled by foot
to the Moa estuary and to Sherbro (241) along roads which, near the coast,
were surprisingly wide and well-made (242). As regards road construction,
once the bush had been cleared and tree stumps uprooted, the denuded
lateritic soil would rapidly weather down to a fairly hard, smooth
surface (243). But the effort involved in the initial clearing and
stumping, and then the continual outlay of manpower needed to keep the
road-way free of quickly-growing grass and undergrowth, must have been
enormous (244). Within Luawa, only narrow roads - paths might in
some ways be a preferable term in English (245) - were constructed, the
local people always walking in single file (246). An illustration in
The Sherbro and Its Hinterland of the road between Kailahun and Nyundshun
shows a narrow path entirely clear of vegetation for a width of about 2\ 1/2 feet, with undergrowth cleared away for about 3 feet on either side of it (247). This would seem typical of the roads within Luawa at this period, although in 1890 and 1891, the road from Pendembu to Kailahun was "scarcely visible" (248) and "in an unsatisfactory condition" (249), it having been deliberately neglected, for defence reasons, as a result of the political tension between Luawa and Upper Bambara (250): with the rapid growth of vegetation in the rainy season, a neglected road quickly degenerated. When Alldridge left Kailahun in April 1890, he was delighted to find that the Pendembu road "was now so well cleaned that I was enabled to proceed in comfort for a long way, using my double hammock" (251) - a wide hammock carried by four men walking two abreast in pairs (252). For such a hammock to be carried comfortably, the road would have to be cleared to a width of about 12 feet: an energetic Nake, able to call on a large labour supply, could thus turn a scarcely-discernable track into a reasonably wide road within just a few days (253).

"Generally", Alldridge, concluded on the subject of communication, "there is a very complete system of roads throughout the country and it is a matter of surprise how the directions of these roads and paths, from town to town with a network of cross tracks have been so correctly made it not infrequently happens that roads are travelled for 10 to 20 miles and more through the wildest vegetation without meeting a single fackie or town on the way" (254); a fairly good road existed all the way from Sulima to Luawa (255).

Within Luawa, the records of Alldridge's and Cardew's journeys provide much detail of the main communication routes during
THE KALLAHUN—NYANDEHUN—GRANDEWULO ROAD IN 1891

(Mount Mamba is seen in the distance.)
Kailondo's day. The major route into Luawa from the south and west was by way of Pendembu (256), passing through Ngiehun and Kenewa (257) — as remained the case throughout the colonial period and afterwards: the line of the path was followed closely by the later Pendembu to Kailahun motor road (258). Even in Kailondo's day, as later, this path or road continued through Kailahun town to Mofindor and on to Sambalu, where there was a ferry across the Moa River to Wunde and the rest of Northern Kissi country (259): this may have been in the 1880s and 1890s the main Moa crossing-point within Luawa (260). Another major route led from Kailahun to Gbandewulo through Bobobu, Pandobu, Nagbena and Bunumbu; Nyandehun, Konjo and Dambalu (261). From Gbandewulo it was easy to reach Gbande country, south-eastwards or eastwards (262). The motor-road made in the second half of the twentieth century as far as Dambalu largely followed the road of Kailondo's day (263); the same was true of the Kailahun to Baoma motor-road (264).

The conclusion from all this evidence is that the network of communication in Luawa was as dense during Kailondo's reign as it was after the end of the colonial period; and further, that several of the main motor-roads in the 1960s followed in detail the main lines of communication which were already established in Kailondo's Luawa. However, in one case a main road which became important in the colonial period did not exist in the 1890s, and that was the road from Pandobu through Gbalahun to Buedu, and on to Foya: there is no record of a road taking such a direction in Kailondo's day (265).
The emotive subject of slave-trading hardly arose in Alldridge's original despatches from Luawa, and he gave no details of the amount or direction of such trade within Luawa, but the subject received greater attention in *The Sherbro and its Hinterland* (266). In *A Transformed Colony*, however, slave-trading was portrayed as the terrible pre-1896 curse of the countryside, making life a "misery among the natives" (267) - a further indication that the colony's 'transformation' after a decade of British rule involved a change of attitude on Alldridge's part towards pre-1896 conditions rather than radical alterations in the Protectorate after 1896 (268). Yet the sale and purchase of slaves was an established feature of life in Luawa during the early 1890s. A young *mahoi* in the Luawa area told Alldridge that when "he had collected two hundred pieces of iron or seven country cloths, he bought a slave .... The slaves worked on his farm or they could be given to the chiefs in payment for their daughters, who became by country custom the wives of the purchaser" (269).

But exchange of slaves was not simply a matter of internal trade within the Luawa area. In 1894, when Governor Cardew arrived at Kintiballia, south-east of Mount Bintimani, near Kruto (270) he found a slave-dealer with three assistants who had been captured in the act of transporting seven slaves (271) from Kailahun (272) to Bumban (273). The ramifications of this trade involved places over two hundred miles away from Kailahun. The slave-dealer had bought a flintlock gun from a Port Loko man, and five kegs of gunpowder from another man who obtained them by bartering cows in Freetown (274). The slave-dealer took these articles, together with twenty small parcels of salt, two pieces of
cloth (presumably European-made), and a cutlass, to Luawa; there he exchanged them for the seven slaves (275). If Cardew's information was correct, the further and ultimate destination of these slaves would not have been Bumban, but Susu country north-west of the Scarcies Rivers in present-day Guinea, the principal traders being Fulas (276) - though the Governor did not indicate what happened to the slaves in Susu country; whether they were kept there as labourers, or were transported thence to even more distant markets (277).

In *The Sherbro and its Hinterland*, Alldridge discussed another case of a slave-dealer arrested with his human 'wares' during the Governor's 1894 tour. This trader had bought a man, woman and child near Mongheri and he also was transporting them to Susu country in French-claimed territory in order to exchange them for cattle (278). The Travelling Commissioner, in this connection, commented that in the early 1890s "the trade in slaves continued locally; and although they were not deported by sea, they could be transported overland for very considerable distances from one country to another" (279). Unfortunately, like Cardew, Alldridge did not state to which countries they were transported: perhaps the British officials were themselves unsure of the slaves' ultimate destination.

Cardew considered that the chief 'hunting ground' for slaves was "the GOLA country which lies along the left bank of the MANNO river and is in the hinterland of Liberia, but besides large numbers of slaves have hitherto been captured in the Korno, Kuniki and Kuranko countries" (280). The war waged by a number of the Ko-Menda mahancisia against the "Upper Gola" people early in 1892 (281) may well
have been essentially a slave-raiding expedition; certainly the *mahangisia* could not give Alldrige any good reason for their starting the war except that it involved "old time palaver" (282). If this was a slave-raiding war, the fact that Kailondo refused to join in (283) suggests that at this crisis-point (284) the Luawa *mahei* deliberately sacrificed his hope of gaining large numbers of slaves (285) in order that peace should be maintained in the area (286).

In addition to the slave-trading route north-westwards from Gola, Kono, Kunike and Koranko countries to Susu country, there was another route north-eastwards from the same 'hunting ground' into Samori's territory (287). The *kpankoisia* of Kissi Kama in the time of Kailondo used to sell people in Guinea, to the north, in exchange for gunpowder and guns (283). In the course of touring the 'protected area' with Cardew in 1894, the Travelling Commissioner "became painfully aware of the results of the Sofa wars, and of other tribal raids" (289). "The whole of this country", he later wrote about Kono, "had been entirely depopulated. For some days we travelled through a region where, with the exception of our own people, not a living soul was to be seen and where not a town nor even a hut was standing" (290). The British traveller believed that the wars "had no other cause than the furnishing supplies for the nefarious traffic in human beings which was then going on" (291). This opinion he stated even more vehemently in his later book, *A Transformed Colony* (292), probably thinking again of the destruction he had seen in Kono country (293). Alldrige was mistaken to think that the *sofas* were waging war simply to gain slaves (294) - but certainly in fighting in Kono, Kunike and Koranko countries, the *sofas* made many
captives whom they no doubt planned to take back with them to Samori's heartland. When, after the Waima incident (295), the British force under Colonel Ellis, having defeated the sofas at Tungea, finally routed the remainder of Forekere's force at Bagwema early in January 1894 (296), they found "from 400 to 500 captives, Konos, Mendes, Falaba peoples" (297).

All this evidence suggests that slave-trading in the Luawa area at the time of Kailondo consisted of several different types of interchange which had very little in common, but which were all classed together by British officials. First there was the giving of slaves by one mahel or kpakoel to another, as for example, a dowry-payment: this was probably not considered as slave-trading by the kpakoelia concerned. Secondly, there was the sale of slaves locally, which did not involve transporting them over long distances, the purpose of buying the slaves being largely to increase the number of farm labourers available to the slave owner (293). Thirdly, Susu, Fula and Mandinka traders bought slaves in the Luawa area and then transported them several hundred miles — or perhaps much further — across country: this was the sort of commerce which most Europeans understood by 'slave-trading'. Finally, in the early 1890s the sofas captured, during the course of their fighting in the region, a number of prisoners-of-war whom they intended to make into slaves.

These four types of slave-trading together were probably of considerable social and economic significance, but it has already been shown that Alldridge's account of the role of slave-trading in
A Transformed Colony contains considerable exaggeration when applied to Luawa (299). For instance, the sofa wars, while presenting Kailondo with a serious threat, did not seriously spill over into Luawa's heartland (300). Possibly the desire for more slaves encouraged mahangeisia occasionally to provoke local limited wars, but Kailondo possessed the foresight as well as the military strength to limit the extent of Luawa's involvement in such wars. As regards Kailondo's Luawa, long-distance slave-dealing was probably peripheral in the polity's economy. Most of the Luawa peoples were subsistence farmers (301), and only a minority kept slaves and were concerned with slave-trading (302).

Long-distance trade of all sorts from the Luawa area was small in volume and limited in value, country-cloth and livestock being probably the main articles of sale used by the local people (303). The peoples of Kailondo's Luawa were probably able to buy locally in near-by markets all their necessities: and except for salt and gunpowder, all those necessities could be produced locally (304).
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The main political change which occurred in Kailondo's reign was the centralising of authority in the hands of the Mahawa. Before 1880, there had been many petty mahangeisia ruling tiny areas of territory from their own small town or village (305). After Kailondo's accession, these mahangeisia were firmly subordinated to an overlord, a Mahawa, whose sovereignty was unquestioned throughout Luawa (306).

This sovereignty was, perhaps, most commonly demonstrated in the administration of justice. Kailondo's advice "was constantly sought in 'palavers', and his judgements strictly adhered to. Many times he was called upon to give his judgement in 'palavers' of outside chiefs who respected him as much as did his own people" (307). Under Kailondo, the petty Luawa mahangeisia "had no power of their own; they came ... to Kailondo for everything" (308).

In the colonial period, the officer next in importance under the Mahai was the Lavale or 'Speaker', but this office only developed under British rule (309). "Before the Europeans," noted Naada James Kailondo, "there was no Lavale. The elders were all of equal status, and were immediately under the leader [i.e. the Mahai]. For instance, if somebody came to the Mahai to issue a summons, the first elder he found with the leader would act as Lavale for that particular time" (310). The closest person to the Mahai was "automatically honoured by the people" (311). By the end of Kailondo's reign the person most honoured in this way was Fabundeh. He was Kailondo's "right-hand man" (312), and led Kailondo's armed forces in the last war of the latter's reign (313). Shortly after the death of Kailondo, in March 1896, Cardew described
Fabundeh as "Kai Lundu's prime minister and general and ... certainly the strongest man in the country" (314); and although the English concepts of "prime minister and general" had no Mende equivalents (315), Cardew's judgement on Fabundeh's standing in the country was probably accurate.

Surprisingly, Fabundeh did not affix his mark to the 1890 Treaty (316), and there is considerable doubt as to his position in the earlier part of Kailondo's reign. Confusion as to Fabundeh's position has been increased because British officials in the first half of the twentieth century accepted three 'family groups' as 'traditional ruling houses' of Luawa (317) - the Banyas (Kailondo's descendants), the Bundehs (Fabundeh's descendants) and the Ngobehs (318). Each family tried to produce the best claims to be 'traditional rulers' of Luawa, playing down the claims of the other families (319), historical evidence suffering severe distortion in the process (320). *Maada* James Kailondo insisted that Fabundeh was not even in Luawa when Kailondo became ruler: "Fabundeh really originated from Mandu, from a place called Jiwayihun .... Fabundeh had nothing of his own and depended wholly on Kailondo. There was even a song about it in this area - that Fabundeh had nothing of his own and depended entirely on Kailondo's help" (321).

By contrast, some traditions attempt to conflate Fabundeh with Bundu of Uanyahun: "The most immediate ruler before British influence, was ... Fabundeh" (322). In this tradition, it was Fabundeh (not Bundu of Uanyahun) who called the Gbondou Conference in which Kailondo promised to defend Luawa "on condition that a more dependable acknowledgement of his citizenship be made" and that he would have "the
right of accession to the chieftaincy in the near future" (323). Thereafter, Fabundeh was still king, Ngobeh was "the number two man of the land" and "chief adviser", Kailondo being simply "lord of the armed forces" until the time of his death (324). It would be unnecessary to spend more space refuting this interpretation, except that a variation upon it has appeared in print. Rev. Max Gorvie in Our Peoples of the Sierra Leone Protectorate stated that Fabundeh was the cousin of Bundu of Uanyahun (325), and when the latter was killed by Mbawulomeh (326), Fabundeh became the ruler of Luawa (327) with Kailondo under him: "both men became popularly acknowledged, Kai as war-chief and defender of the Luawa chiefdom while Fabundeh remained its chief and ruler" (328). The weight of evidence is against this interpretation. Both the Clarke and Hollins accounts mention Bundu of Uanyahun, but not Fabundeh, as the leader at the Gbondou Conference (329), and both indicate that Fabundeh became ruler only after the death of Kailondo (330). The accuracy of the Hollins and Clarke accounts in this matter is conclusively proved by the despatches of both Alldridge and Cardew in the 1890s: no doubt was left in the mind of either the Travelling Commissioner or the Governor that Kailondo was ruler of Luawa until his death (331). Even the accounts which insist that Fabundeh was the Mahawa give a larger place to the exploits of Kailondo than to anyone else before 1896 (332).

At least a little is known about several other leading counsellors of Kailondo, though no evidence has been found as to whether he possessed anything like a formal 'Council of State'. Saagba of Bobobu was perhaps next in importance to Fabundeh (333). Saagba was at the
Gbondou Conference (334), and also placed his mark next to the Mahawa on the 1890 Treaty (335). Ngobeh Kahunla - "the Organizer" (336) - was Kailondo's chief envoy and peacemaker (337), and on at least two occasions Kailondo sent him all the way to Freetown on foot to give messages to the Governor (338). Kpawo Bundu of Giema had taught the young Kailondo the arts of wars (339) and attended the Gbondou Conference (340); his seniority probably gave him an influence similar to that of Bundu of Amanyahun (341). Kpawo was probably killed in that same raid in which Bundu of Amanyahun died (342). Kongoneh of Sandialu, who was to become Fabundeh's right-hand man (343), was "a great warrior even under Kailondo" (344).

In the area of present-day Kissi Kama Chiefdom, Komala Dokossu was the leading figure in Kailondo's day, but as Komala became older, his son Tengbe Jopolo succeeded him (345). Samolu Damba (also known as Kongor) was the mahel further south, in Kissi Tungi, and was probably the leading political power in the Kissi part of Kailondo's Luawa (346). In the southern part of Tungi, around Gbandewulo, mahel Kai Kai was succeeded by Sembe Fawundu (1888-1893), and thereafter Koli Tungi became the local ruler (347). Ganawa of Kangama was another noted krako in the Kissi area (348), as was Bundor Foyoh (349). It seems that these Kissi leaders were allowed considerable freedom by Kailondo in governing their own areas (350).

Kailondo organized his polity into a number of patiisia or 'sections', each of which was under a patimaha or 'section chief' (351). Possibly it was Kailondo himself who first introduced the idea of patimahanga. "There were no patimahanga in the old days," observed Maada James.
Kailondo (352). The 'sections' had existed before Kailondo's time as tiny independent polities (353), but after his accession each 'section' was, it seems, rather more closely defined (354), and one kpakpo was recognised by Kailondo as its mahe (355). In most cases Kailondo seems to have accepted as its mahe the person generally acknowledged by the people of the area as their senior leader (356). Through the patimahanga, presumably, Kailondo received tribute from his people: when he was at war, the people were often asked through the patimahanga to provide provisions for his soldiers such as rice and livestock (357). Apart from this tribute, matawuisia or 'gifts of honour' were sent intermittently to the Mahawai (358): these included slaves, country cloth, palm oil, livestock, Kissi pennies, precious metals, elephant tusks, and leopards' skins and teeth (359). Debts, fines and law-court charges were also paid in these items (360). Just as Kailondo spent much time deciding legal cases and settling disputes (361), so also, presumably, the patimahanga became involved in judging and arbitrating between opposing parties in less serious cases (362).

The earliest written list of the patiisias in Kailondo's Luawa dates from 1912, the first year in which House Tax was collected by the British authorities from the whole of Luawa (363). This list may be compared with the 'chiefdoms' map of the area prepared by Major Le Mesurier, the British Force Commander at Daru (364), in November 1908 (365). The British imposed their own administrative control only in 1911 (366), and before that neither they nor any other foreign power had attempted to reorganise local government in Luawa (367); and throughout
his reign, from 1896 until 1912, Fabundeh was too preoccupied with maintaining the integrity of his heartland to spend time adjusting the administration (368). It may therefore be accepted that the 'sections' noted in 1908 and 1912 represented the divisions which existed in Kailondo's day (369). Many of the 'sections' noted in 1908 and 1912 are referred to in Alldridge's despatches of the early 1890s or in oral tradition concerning Kailondo's reign - a further indication that they were established before Kailondo's death (370). The 1912, Tax returns indicated that Kailahun itself was a 'section' headquarters town, and so were several nearby towns - Ngiehun, Mende, Baoma and Mofindor (371), though these were not marked as separate sections on the 1903 map (372). The map and the Tax returns agree on the existence of Sewalu (373), Gbeila (374), Bombali (375) and Gau (376) sections, all in present-day Luawa Chiefdom (377).

Further east, in Kissi country (378), were Kama (379), Toli (380), Lela (381), Kunio (382), Bomassardu (383) and Tungi (384) sections. Little is known about these Kissi sections because no European made a written report about them before the beginning of the twentieth century, and because many oral traditions of Kailondo's reign concentrated on the dramatic events which occurred in the more westerly part of Luawa. In 1903, however, the mahageisia of all these Kissi areas (together with the mehe of Tengea) stated that they had "always been under Chief Fa Bundeh and his predecessor Kie Lundu" (385).

The 1912 Tax returns further noted the existence of "Bendiabu" section, probably a mis-spelling for Bende-Bengu (386) which
was later accepted as a subdivision of Tungi Chiefdom (387), but which was not marked on the 1903 map. The Tax returns also divided the remainder of Tungi section into Tungi North and Tungi South (388). Thus, while the 1903 map showed just one 'section' (known as Tungi) in the south-east of Luawa, the 1912 lists indicated that the same area contained three 'sections'. This suggests that the division of Luawa into patiisia by Kailondo was not a rigid, highly formalised arrangement (389). Possibly, some people in Luawa thought of Tungi as a single section under Kailondo, with one natimahai (390), while others thought of Tungi as made up of three sections, each with its own natimahai — with one of the three patimahangoa probably recognized as the senior (391). Whether or not this was the situation, Kailondo clearly possessed no carefully structured administration, but rather had worked out a rough-and-ready solution to the novel problem of exercising political control over an area which would appear far too large for one man to administer effectively on his own in those days (392).

In the details of political, as of social, organization, the evidence from Kailondo's reign is altogether sparse and is unevenly spread. There is no information at all about some major questions. How large were Kailondo's armed forces in time of war, and how were men conscripted? What was the nature of judicial proceedings? Answers cannot properly be supplied by 'imagining' what conditions 'must have been like'; by large-scale extrapolation backwards from a later state of affairs (393); or by applying to Luawa information which is available for other areas of the Sierra Leone hinterland at this period (394).
Generalized accounts of Mende political organization in Kailondo's day may be of some limited value in providing an insight into the situation in Luawa (395), but the presupposition behind this thesis is that local history must be based on specific evidence from the particular local area. Where evidence is lacking, a gap must be left - and it is better clearly to indicate the gap than to 'paper it over' in the interests of 'literary balance' or 'comprehensive socio-logical description'. The little information available from Luawa would suggest that Kailondo's political organization was not sufficiently institutionalised, and had not been in existence for long enough at the time of his death, to be described as a 'bureaucracy' or 'hierarchy of officials'. Nevertheless, there was an organization adequate to maintain law and order, to provide regular tribute for the Mahawal, and to allow him closely to control his territory.
NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER THREE

1. Documented both in written records and oral tradition. The political events of Kailondo's reign are discussed fully in the preceding chapter, Chap. 2, passim.

2. For example, there is a fair amount of information on the physical size and appearance of Kailahun in the 1890s, but almost no information on the historically larger and more vital subject of markets and trading in the town during the same decade.

3. The uneven spread of information has affected this thesis in an even more radical way. It has meant that some chapters are much longer than others, simply because more information is available on some topics than others. Barzun and Graff, in their helpful book The Modern Researcher (Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1957) state that "it will generally be possible" to make chapters in a book "roughly equal without strain" (p. 235). But the uneven spread of historical evidence over the different major topics of this thesis have made it impossible, without serious distortion or the addition of 'padding', to keep the chapters roughly equal in length.

4. Such reconstructions might be produced by two methods:-

(i) drawing on information about better-known polities which existed in and around the Sierra Leone hinterland in the same period, and then positing that a similar state of affairs probably existed in Luawa as in these other polities. Boatswain's Bopolu and Madam Yoko's Kpa-Mende Confederacy were examples of such better-known polities

(ii) examining the well-documented state of affairs in Luawa during the first decades of the twentieth century, and then extrapolating backwards into the past to produce a picture of what Luawa 'must have been like' under Kailondo.

Both of these methods have been rejected by the present writer as being theoretically unsound and leading in practice to serious historical errors. For the dangers of the first method see Chap. 1 of this thesis, Note 282, p. 68 above; and for the second, ibid., Note 168, p. 60 above.

5. Ibid., p. 43


7. Kai = affectionate diminutive of the name Kailondo.

Ta Mendeyiei hi1 = town (t/l mutation; Innes, A Mende-English Dictionary).
Hu Mendeyiei hu = inside, in (ibid.,). The adding of a final 'in' to the name is an anglicization which has been accepted in this thesis because all present-day maps use this form.

In the treaty between Kailondo and Alldridge of April 1890, the form CONRAY-LAHOON was used as the spelling for the name of the town (CO267/382/182; Hay, 3/V/90: enc.), but by 1891 Alldridge was using KANRE-LAHUN (CO267/389/239; Crooks, 19/V/91: enc. Alldridge; 24/IV/91;
Bonthe), and this was generally accepted by British officials until the second decade of the twentieth century. Thereafter, the present form KAILAHUN became usual.

Although KARE-LAHUON was the most common spelling in the 1890s, alternative forms frequently appeared. Towards the end of 1891, L/Cpl. Coker, in charge of the Frontier Police in the town, used KAIRO LAHUN (GO267/390/434; Crooks; 22/XII/91: enc. Coker, 20/XII/91, Kailahun). In 1896 Cardew began a despatch in typically decisive style: "I have the honour to report my arrival at KARE IJHUN (not Kanre Lahun as stated in the map)" (GO/267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10/III/96). More significant, when a messenger from Kailondu accompanied Aldridge to the coast, in 1890, he was sent on to Freetown where he was interviewed by the sensitive and well-informed J.C.E. Parkes, Superintendent of the Native Affairs Department. Parkes, probably the second person to attempt a written form of the name, noted "Kai Lahoon is in LWAH country" (GO/267/382/202; Hay; 14/VI/90; enc. Parkes). Similarly, when Crooks was Acting Governor in 1894, he spelt the town's name KAILAHUN (GO267/403/75; Crooks; 10/II/94).

The only writer to have tackled the problem of these differences in spelling is Mr. A. Abraham: "As for the spelling *Kanre Lahun*, it is difficult to figure out exactly its origin as an alternative for Kailahun, but it seems that it arose out of a phonetic difficulty" (Abraham, A., The rise of traditional leadership among the Mende, MA thesis, Univ. of Sierra Leone, 1971, p. 89, Note 26). The present writer would agree with this explanation in the light of the evidence presented above.

8. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 10; Hollins, "A Short History of Luawa Chiefdom", p. 16. Neither of these writers give an exact date for the founding of Kailahun, but they suggest that it was early in his reign, because they both mention the founding immediately after recounting the events of c. 1880: Mr Hollins also gives in brackets the dates 1880 to 1885.

9. Kulu-Banya, A History of the Kulu-Banya Family of Luawa, p. 5, where Fagbandi is described as the brother of D'wawonjah, in the genealogy of the Kulu family. Fagbandi "returned to Yebeema, the first town founded by his Grandfather Gbangon when Kailahun - then called Sakabu or Njaluahun - was taken over by Kailundu". Possibly Fagbandi Epaalki may be identified with Fogbandi Fakoeh in Mr Hollins' list of *makoisia* attending the Gbondsou Conference (Hollins, op. cit., p. 13), because Fogbandi Fakoeh came from Yibema. The same person may also be identified with "Fagbandi of Sakabu", who joined Niawa against Kailondu in 1880 (Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 8) and who was executed for treason at the beginning of the Mbawulomeh or Gbande War (ibid., p. 12). See also Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 10-11 above.


11. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 70.

12. Ibid.

13. The Luawa Stream follows a winding course through Kailahun, and around the town site there are a number of springs which feed the stream. Any house within half-a-mile radius of the present-day daily market would be within
fairly easy reach of a water-supply which would be reasonable except in
the occasional very arid 'dry season'.

14. In the nineteenth century, the position of thick vegetation was an important
element in a town's defences. It is impossible to discover where there was
'high bush' round the site of Kailahun in Kailondo's day, and it is there-
fore difficult to reconstruct a picture of Kailahun's defences in that
period. Certainly, though, Kailahun's site possessed the following
advantages:

(i) the main road 'down-country' through Ngiehun and Pendembu was
easily defensible, especially just south of Ngiehun, where the
valley of the Koya stream and the steep hills south of it would
present an enemy with serious obstacles.

(ii) several hill-tops round Kailahun gave broad views of the surrounding
country, so that, at least in daylight, an enemy would have difficulty
in approaching the town unnoticed.

(iii) the whole area is hilly, so that a hill-top position—very much
favoured in Mendeland as a defensive site in the nineteenth century—
could easily be found on which to build the different towns which
made up Kailahun in Kailondo's day.

15. Hollins, op. cit., p. 16.

16. Baoma would, in European terms, be considered a village. But in Kailondo's
Luawa it seems to have one of the largest settlements (see this chapter of
the thesis, Chap. 3, pp. 182-3 below) and was generally referred to in the
Mende language as a to or 'town'. No other place of comparable size lay
west of Baoma in Kailondo's Luawa. See Map 7, pp. 414.

17. In various GO267 despatches for the early 1890s, reference is made to
various towns belonging to Kailondo, lying east of Buedu, Foya often being
mentioned (see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 82 above, and GO267/417/61;
Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kanre Lahun). But Buedu was the easternmost of the
towns lying within Kailondo's heartland, the area which is referred to in
this thesis as 'Kailondo's Luawa' (see Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 1 above).

18. See Map 5, opp. p. 73.

19. See Map 3, and Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 10-12 above.

20. Sandialu is about 8 miles due east of Kailahun in a straight
line. The distance by road is about 11 miles.

21. See Map 4. When Governor Cardew toured Luawa in 1896, and tried to dis-
cover the boundary between Kisi country and Mende country, he placed
Kailahun right on the boundary between the two countries (GO267/425/Conf.
22; Cardew; 7.4.96, enc. map). See Chap. 1 of this thesis Note 134. above.

22. For the present-day distribution of the Kisi people, see Paulme, Les Gens
du Riz, pp. 40-41. The map enc. in GO267/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96,
confirms that, at least for the country immediately north and east of
Luawa, the situation was little different in the 1890s. For a reconstruction

23. For the present-day distribution of the Mende people, see Clarke, Sierra Leone in Maps, pp. 36-37. Cardew's despatches concerning his 1894, 1895 and 1896 tours, together with the maps enc. in G0257/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96, confirm that, at least for the country immediately west and south of Luwa, the situation was little different in the 1890s. See also Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 8-21 above.

24. Since its foundation Kailahun has been known as a meeting-place of different peoples - even in the 1960s it was famous for this. Rev. Clarke (Int. 1) said that one reason why he wanted to establish a Methodist Mission in Kailahun was that it was a cosmopolitan town, with many different peoples meeting there. See also Clarke Foundation of Luawa, p. 2, where he wrote that not only Mende and Kissi people met in Kailahun, but also "Mandingoes, Susus, Gbandis, Balus, Konos and Ko-Mendes".


26. After his death, Kailondo became accepted as a Mende hero, but probably not all the Mende people of Luwa saw him in this light during the 1890s.

27. See Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 11-12 above, and Chap. 2, pp. 76-79 above.

28. Of sizeable Mende villages, the one within Kailondo's Luwa which was farthest from Kailahun was Sengema, about 17 miles due south of Kailahun. See Map 3, opp. p. 9.

29. It was only an apparently loyal hinterland because in early 1890 Kafula of Wunde revolted against Kailondo's rule. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 111-118 above. Yet the Kissi people in the east of Kailondo's Luwa (in present-day Kama, Teng, and Tungi Chiefdoms) remained loyal to Kailondo until his death.

30. For details of communications in Kailondo's Luwa, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, pp. 201-3 below.

31. See Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 9 above.

32. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 6; Gorvie, op. cit., p. 41; Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 59.

33. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 5; Gorvie, op. cit., p. 40; Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 59.

34. Refs. as for Note 33 above.

35. There were few towns in Mendeland at this period which were larger than Kailahun. Figures for town-size are difficult to discover for this period. It was reported in 1877 that Bumpe contained 9,000 people, which would have made it a much larger town than Kailahun; in 1890 the latter town had an
estimated population of 2,000 (see Note 48 below, and refer to the text of the chapter). Tikonko was made up of four towns, the largest town containing 805 houses; in 1890 all the towns of Kailahun together contained 482 houses (see Note 43 below, and refer to the text of the chapter). Largo, 25 miles south-east of Tikonko, was made up of nine towns, the largest of which contained 340 houses; so presumably this town, too, was larger than Kailahun. However, Bumpe, Tikonko and Largo were exceptionally large towns by Mende standards.

By 1931, Kailahun was the largest town in the Protectorate, with a population of 2,545 (Sierra Leone Report of Census 1931, p. 157—more accurately, Kailahun was the largest town of all those the population of which was given in the Report; presumably this means that Kailahun was the largest town in the Protectorate). Maada James Kailondo suggested (Int. 19) that in Mahai Kailondo's day the population of Kailahun might already have been around 2,000. Most major towns in Mendeland grew enormously in population between the 1890s and the 1930s, but Kailahun's population showed only a moderate increase. Therefore, since Kailahun was the largest town in the Protectorate in 1931, it may be deduced that it must have been one of the largest Mende towns in the 1890s.

36. Alldridge made a point of noting the number of houses in the towns he passed through. None was as large as Kailahun. Mendegla's Joru contained only 151 houses (C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima). Kabba Sei's Baima contained 233 houses (ibid.) and Momo Babahu's Pendembu contained 359 houses (ibid.) compared with the 482 houses of Kailahun (ibid.). It may be worth noting that as Alldridge travelled further from the coast, so also did the average size of towns increase.

37. Alldridge was the first European to enter Kailahun or travel anywhere near it. There is no indication of even indirect European influence in the town before 1890.

38. In The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p. 193, and in C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima, Alldridge writes about three towns; but in his first despatch from Luwa (C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. Alldridge, 17.4.90, Joru) he states that Kailahun "consisted of four towns". Cf. Int. 19, where three towns only are mentioned.

39. Ibid. Alldridge gives the names of the three towns as Tongoryamah, Gribbenah, and Couray Lahun. Maada James Kailondo (Int. 19) provided the names: Tongoyama, Giibina, and Tawoveihun — the last of these names meaning simply Old Town (Mendeyi hu) = town; wova = to become old (ng/w mutation); Innes, A Mende-English Dictionary. The names supplied by Maada James have been accepted because they make sense in the Mende language, and because the third 'section-town' would surely have had a name other than Kailahun, which was the name applied to the three section towns collectively. There seems to be some discrepancy between Maada James and Alldridge over the size of this third section town. By stating that it was surrounded by 4 war-fences, Alldridge suggested it was the biggest of the three towns, but Maada James said it contained "about six houses; it all got broken". Perhaps, however, Maada James was here referring to the time when it was first built by Fagbandi Kpakala, when it was known as Sakabu.
40. In C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. Alldridge, 17.4.90, Joru. Damba appears as a fourth town making up Kailahun with the three others. It may be deduced from Alldridge's writing that Damba was not walled. Damba is nowhere else mentioned by Alldridge or anyone else.


42. Cf. Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 89-90 above, where the Pendembu kobangai was used for a meeting of the Mahangeisia with Alldridge. See also Alldridge, *The Sherbro and its Hinterland*, p. 106.

43. C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. Alldridge, 17.4.90, Joru.

44. Int. 19.

45. Ibid.

46. Seasonal fluctuations of population of this sort were noted by Mitchell, P.K., "Matotoka: A Sierra Leone Chiefdom Town", *Sierra Leone Studies* (n.s.) No. 17 (June 1963), pp. 269-277. Mr Mitchell noted that the dry-season population of Matotoka was appreciably smaller than the wet-season population.

47. Until the late 1950s, British officials ordinarily estimated town and village size by counting the number of houses: the calculation of total population in a town or village from the number of houses is a very difficult business. Mitchell (ibid.) reckons an average of 6 people per house. The present writer has reckoned an average of 4 people per house for large towns and 3 people per house for villages in Luawa during Kailondo's time. By the 1950s, when new methods of house construction were affecting Luawa and were producing houses with several separate rooms, 6 people per house for large towns and 5 people per house for villages may be more appropriate figures. These figures are, admittedly, fairly notional, but they do seem to fit in accurately with what little data is available, as subsequent Notes will show. Figures in the Report of Census, 1931, p. 104, indicated that in 1931, in Kailahun District, an average of just over 4 people lived in each house in Mende Chiefdoms, and an average of just over 3 people in Kissi Chiefdoms. Clarke, *Sierra Leone in Maps*, p. 60, suggests that a settlement of 1,000 inhabitants could, in the early 1960s, be expected to contain approximately 200 buildings.

For the connotation of the word 'farm' in Mendeland, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, pp. 190-192 below.

48. Int. 19.

49. Ibid.

50. This description of a barri is based on the present writer's experiences in the 1960s. But references in such writers as Alldridge, *The Sherbro and its Hinterland*, suggest that the nature and use of a barri was very similar in the 1880s and 1890s.
51. CO879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulymah.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. CO267/417/Conf. 39; Cardew; 13.5.95, enc. Sharpe's report of the route followed during the tour in the Protectorate.

55. The nature of Mende warfare, and the centrality in most wars of the attack on the enemy's leading town, have been fully described in a number of printed sources. See Clarke, *Foundation of Luawa*, pp. 3-5; Malcolm, "Mende Warfare", for a description in greater detail of the war fences. Wallis, *The Advance of our West African Empire*, has a chapter on 'Bush Fighting' with detailed descriptions of warfare from the viewpoint of a junior European officer who was involved in the suppression of local resistance to British rule in 1893. See also Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp.33-34 above.


57. Some accounts suggest that thorn bushes were deliberately planted round the town just beyond the outside fence in order to make the bush near the town more difficult to penetrate, and this was part of the defensive arrangements.


59. Ibid., pp. 185-186. For the extension of Ngiehun, see Hollins, "Short History", p. 16.

60. Ibid.; Wylie, "Innovation and Change", p. 302. In his doctoral thesis (The Politics of Transformation, p. 83), Dr Wylie wrongly states that Baoma was on the road to Liberia. Baoma in fact was situated on one of the roads from Luawa to Kono country.

61. CO267/417/Conf. 39; Cardew; 13.5.95, enc. Sharpe's report of the route followed during the tour in the Protectorate.

62. Clarke, *Foundation of Luawa* (1933), p. 6; Gorvie, op. cit., p. 41. Abraham, *Traditional Leadership*, pp. 71-72, follows Hollins, "Short History", p. 16, in suggesting that Mofindor was founded only after Kailondo's accession. Combey, op. cit., p. 9, however, agrees with Clarke and Gorvie that Mofindor was founded before his accession.

63. KDO1, loose papers, "Kanre Lahun Hut Tax Statistics, 1912". This was the first year in which tax was collected from the whole of Fabunshi's Luawa, and Baoma, Ngiehun and Mofindor all appear as 'division towns'. The other 'division towns' mentioned in 1912 were Kailahun itself and Mendi. There were also 13 other 'divisions', but all these others were known by a name different from the name of any town within the division.
64. See this chapter of the thesis, chap. 3, pp. 212-5 below.

65. See chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 25-26 above.

66. Int. 19, p. 5. "The founders of towns and those whose towns became the largest were the owners of the country".

67. Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 34-7 above.

68. Ref. as for Note 64 above. A town like Mendi, west of Ngiehun, was the centre of only a small area, reaching out only about 2 miles from the town itself. Dodo, 'section town' of Gbeila Section, was the centre of a much larger area which included Sandialu and Gbalahun, both of which were towns about 6 miles from Dodo.

69. The smaller hamlets were not fenced at all. If an enemy attack seemed likely, the villagers would retire to the larger, fenced 'section town'.

70. Note, however, that most 'towns', and many of the larger villages, of Luawa had been established by 1830, before Kailondo came to power. See Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 26 above.

71. Rev. Clarke notes that before the time of Kailondo "there were certainly not so many towns" (Foundation of Luawa, p. 3), though he does not specifically state that Kailondo was responsible for the development of new towns. Mr Hollins agrees that before Kailondo's day, towns were "set more widely apart" ("Short History", p. 12).


73. Questionnaire on Bandajuma-Luawa.

74. Int. 14. The elders suggested that about 200 people lived in these 100 houses.

75. Int. 16.

76. Int. 15.

77. See Note 47 above.

78. The villages mentioned here are frequently referred to in oral traditions of Kailondo's reign. The tamahangeisia of these villages were among the most renowned of Kailondo's warriors e.g. Kpawo Bundu of Giema (see Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 10, 16 above). Some of these villages were also noted as amongst the largest in the area by the first European visitors late in Kailondo's reign and early in Fabundeh's reign.

79. Cf. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 3. "A town of 150 houses in those days would be considered very large, and it seems that the majority of 'chief' towns were well under the 100".

80. The one notable exception to this statement was the town of Koindu, which only grew up in the 20th Century. But if one lists all the main villages
and towns of Luawa as they existed in the 1960s, and compares that list with the towns and villages which have been mentioned in this thesis as existing before 1896, almost all the main villages and towns can be found before the end of Kailondo's reign.

81. Of course, house construction, town planning, and population size did alter between 1896 and 1961.

82. CO267/417/Conf. 39; Cardew; 13.5.95, enc. Sharpe's route map and route report on the 1895 Tour in the Protectorate.

83. From Vahum, the Rivers Mauwa and Magovi had to be crossed before Kailondo's Luawa was entered. There is not now any clear direct route from Vahum to Nyandehun. On Sharpe's map Nyandehun is spelt Yandahu (Bombre). In the text of this thesis, the more accurate present-day spellings are used.

84. On Sharpe's map, Mendekelema is spelt Manika.

85. On Sharpe's map, the places are spelt Bonubu, Nabeama, Bandobu, and Boabu. As far as Bunumbu, the present-day road from Laiehun through Nyandehun seems to follow precisely the footpaths which were used by Cardew's party. But north of Bunumbu, the footpath seems to have gone through the centre of Nagbena, whereas the present-day road passes just to the east of it.


87. The 1969 Contour Map. Possibly, the name Tawirama was simply changed to Laiehun; but evidence is lacking on this point. The 1969 showed that no new settlements of any size had been established since 1895 on the route used by Governor Cardew, and only 4 new hamlets had been founded. The new hamlets were Yaama (between Pandobu and Bobobu), Manjeima, Kpendema, and Njaama (all these last 3 being situated between Kailahun and Baoma). It is possible that even these 4 hamlets were already in existence by 1895, but Captain Sharpe simply failed to note them.

88. CO267/416/53; Cardew; 16.2.95, from Segbwema.

89. CO267/417/Conf. 39; Cardew; 13.5.95, enc. Sharpe's route report on the 1895 Tour in the Protectorate.

90. 1969 Contour Map. See also 1963 Population Census of Sierra Leone, vol. I, pp. 1-16. The map 'Town Size 1963' in Clarke, Sierra Leone in Maps, p. 49, marks all settlements of over 1,000 inhabitants as towns, but for the Kailahun area it needs to be read with caution as it contains several errors. Pendembu is named as Giehun, and the cartographer seems to have mistaken Bobobu for Bewabu. Gbalahun has been marked somewhat to the north-west of its true position.

If the same technique was applied to Alldridge's despatches of the early 1890s, comparing his route reports with settlements marked on a map of the late 1960s, similar results would be produced: namely, the numbers and the sitting of larger villages as they existed in the early 1890s had hardly changed at all by the late 1960s.
91. Questionnaire on Kangama.

92. Int. 12.

93. Ibid. P. C. Sellu Tengbe suggested that in the time of P. C. Bockarie Bundeh rather less than 100 people lived in Dia in about 15 houses. This would suggest that P. C. Tengbe was taking houses to mean 'family compounds' containing 2 or 3 buildings each.

94. It has been suggested to the writer that many interesting contrasts and comparisons may be derived from examining the differences between Kissi society and Mende society in Kailondo's Luwa. This may well be true (though the writer would doubt the existence of many major differences), but the insuperable problem standing in the way of such an examination is lack of evidence. Information on Mende social life in Luwa is very scanty before c. 1900; on Kissi social life it is virtually non-existent before c. 1900. The only subject on which the writer felt there was enough evidence to make contrasts and comparisons was the pattern of human settlement. In face of the scanty evidence, one problem, which the present writer felt unable to tackle was why Kailondo succeeded in establishing larger human settlements in the Mende part of Luwa, but failed to do so in the Kissi part.

95. Clarke, Sierra Leone in Mans, pp. 48-49. "Town Size"; and 1963 Population Census of Sierra Leone, pp. 1-16. The two towns were Buedu and Koindu.

96. Clarke, Sierra Leone in Mans, pp. 60-61, "Distribution of Rural Settlement". This fascinating and detailed map indicates a "densely settled area of small Kissi villages in Kailahun District". See also Ady, P. H., and Hazlewood, A.D., Oxford Regional Economic Atlas: Africa (O.U.P., 1965) pp. 96-99. By far the densest areas of rural settlement in West Africa occur in parts of Nigeria, and along the Atlantic littoral from Cape Three Points eastwards. But apart from these two areas, the three Kissi Chiefdoms of Sierra Leone are more densely populated with rural settlements than almost any other area in West Africa.

97. Clarke, Sierra Leone in Mans, p. 61.

98. Ibid. Careful examination of the "Distribution of Rural Settlement" map, together with the 1969 Contour Map, Sheets 72-74, shows that there was no particular concentration of towns on the fertile soils of the Moa valley: indeed Kissi Kama and Kissi Teng, where villages were most numerous, would seem to contain the least productive land in all of Kailondo's Luwa.


100. British officials only began to send in detailed reports from Kissi country during the first decade of the 20th century. As late as 1904, considerable "ignorance prevailed regarding the Kissi tribes [sic.], and our knowledge of their numbers and fighting spirit, their country and their defences was gathered more from conjecture and unreliable reports than from definite information or figures" (Davis, History of the Sierra Leone Battalion of
the Royal West Africa Frontier Force, p. 72). But between about 1905 and 1911 official reports proliferated. As with Cardew’s 1895 route through Luawa, if the towns and villages mentioned in those official reports are compared with settlements mapped in the 1960s, the tentative conclusion would be that the pattern of settlement observed in the 1960s had already been established by the beginning of the 20th century, and probably before the time of Kailondo’s death.

101. The comparative figures which become available in the second decade of the 20th century are not population figures: no accurate population census was taken in Kailondo’s Luawa until 1963 (see 1963 Population Census of Sierra Leone). The comparative figures from 1912 onwards concern the number of houses in each settlement, since the house was the unit of taxation. 1912 was the first year in which House Tax was collected for the whole of Kailondo’s Luawa, but the House Tax returns stored in K.D.O.A. are very incomplete before the 1930s.


106. In 1917, there were in all the Kissi part of Kailondo’s Luawa only two settlements of over 100 houses – Damba and Kangama (K.D.O.A. File: House Tax, Chiefdom: Kissi, 1917). By comparison, in 1918 there were eleven towns in the Mende part of Kailondo’s Luawa with over 100 houses (K.D.O.A. loose papers, House Tax, Chiefdom: Luawa, 1918).

107. Note that the number of houses per square mile cannot easily be converted into the number of people per square mile because –

(i) there is no way of determining accurately the average number of people living in a house in the area in the second decade of the twentieth century;

(ii) almost certainly, the number of people per house was higher in a town than in a village, since people were naturally drawn to the chiefs’ towns;

(iii) in the 1960s, houses in Kissi country tended to be generally smaller than houses in Mende country, with fewer people per house in Kissi country. Possibly the same situation existed 50 years earlier (see Note 47 above).


109. Int. 10.

110. The estimate of 60 villages was arrived at by simply counting each settlement marked on the 1969 Contour Map, Sheet 74, which was within the boundaries
of Kama Chiefdom. It is possible that in speaking of Kissi Kama at the end of the nineteenth century, Mr Tamba Ngendu was thinking of an area larger than that which Kama represented in the 1960s.

111. The details of population movement and general demographic change in the area in the twentieth century are difficult to discover and poorly documented. Some have seen quite a large-scale emigration from Kissi country south-westwards (e.g. Isaac, op. cit., p. 29), but the present writer has been unable to substantiate this. Clearly, however, the towns of Kailondo's Luawa grew in the twentieth century out of all proportion to any natural population increase; and the immigrants into the towns presumably included people who had previously lived in small surrounding villages.

112. See Note 100 above.

113. Int. 10.

114. Since all the villages of Kama were so small, a settlement of 20 to 25 houses, containing perhaps 80 to 100 inhabitants, would be considered a sizeable village.

115. This information for the 1960s was obtained from the 1969 Contour Map, Sheet 74, backed up by the writer's own observation in the area between 1965 and 1970.

116. 'Semi-urban settlements' is used in the context of late nineteenth century Mendeland, when it might apply to settlements of about 60 houses or more.

117. In both Clarke, Sierra Leone in Maps, p. 48, and the 1963 Population Census, a population threshold figure of 1,000 is accepted to mark out towns from villages. The 7 towns in Luawa Chiefdom in 1963 were Kailahun, Ngiehun, Baoma, Gbalahun, Bewabu, Nyandehun and Sandialu (see 1963 Population Census, Vol. I, pp. 25-26).

118. The information on which these percentages are based is largely to be found in the 1963 Population Census, vol. I, pp. 1-16, and much of it is repeated in Clarke, Sierra Leone in Maps, pp. 10, 48-49.
Land area of Sierra Leone: 27,925 square miles.
Land area of present-day Luawa Chiefdom: 180 square miles.
Number of places in Sierra Leone with over 1,000 inhabitants in the year 1963: 160.
Number of places in present-day Luawa Chiefdom with over 1,000 inhabitants in the year 1963: 7.

119. See Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 26 above for Ngiehun, Nyandehun, Sandialu, and Gbalahun. For Baoma, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, pp. 182-184 above and Note 89. Bewabu is also mentioned in the despatches of British officials by the time of Kailondo's death (e.g. G0267/426/Conf. 45; Cardew; 12.8.96, enc. Fabundeh, 29.7.96, Kailahun).

120. The concentration of several urban settlements within a small area in Sierra Leone in the twentieth century can often be explained in economic terms — mining in Kono country and down the Sewa valley; mechanical rice-farming in the Mambolo-Rokupr area; various job opportunities in the Freetown peninsula.
No such simple economic explanation can be applied to the cluster of towns in Luawa. The prevalence of cocoa and coffee as cash crops in the Luawa area is hardly a sufficient explanation, because of the 7 towns in Luawa, 3 were outside the main cocoa-coffee growing region, i.e. Sandialu, Gbalahun, and Nyandelun. See Rimmington, "Cocoa in South-Eastern Sierra Leone" in The Geographical Journal (The Record, 1961), pp. 134-137, which contains the best published map illustrating the topic. In any case, all 7 towns were established by the end of Kailondo's reign, long before many of the twentieth-century pressures had come into play.

121. Kailondo, as has already been noted, encouraged town-building, and himself developed Kailahun and some 'section towns'. Perhaps even more important was his creation of more settled conditions in Luawa than had been known for some time before (see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 80-81, 83 above.)

122. Many developments in Kailondo's Luawa during the twentieth century cannot be well understood without an appreciation of the underlying pattern or urban and rural settlement. Most studies similar to the one undertaken by the present writer seem to have neglected historical geography in favour of anthropology. In the case of late nineteenth-century Luawa, even if the present writer had wanted to write anthropology, the sort of evidence which an anthropologist requires simply does not exist.

123. See Chap. 6 of this thesis, pp. 557-559 below.

124. The fact of Luawa's 7 towns already existing as semi-urban settlements by the end of Kailondo's reign is a simple illustration.

125. See Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 25-26 above.

126. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 76 above, for how Kapeta, Mahi of the southern Kono people, was kept prisoner near Kailahun. Possibly Fobewuru was also taken to Kailahun (Chap. 2 of this thesis, Note 83 above).

127. Int. 19.


129. 'Stranger' is a translation of the Mende word Hota = stranger, guest (Innes, A Mende-English Dictionary). 'Stranger', however, also "has a special meaning which corresponds, to some extent, to the English term 'tenant'" (Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, pp. 92-93). In the 1960s in Kailahun, anyone who was neither Kissi nor Mende, nor whose family had lived in the town for several generations, was liable to be labelled as a hota. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp. 195-196 does not state that the Muslim craftsman was a stranger - neither a Mende nor a Kissi man - but he implies this.

130. Ibid., p. 195.


132. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, pp. 204-5 below, for details of a trader who had come to Kailahun from the Port Loko area, exchanging his goods in Luawa for slaves.
133. Unfortunately the writer was unable to find either in the oral tradition or in the written records of Luawa specific examples of such slave villages. But in conversations between 1965 and 1970, he heard the term used by local people about settlements in Luawa.

134. Vivian, W., "The Mende Country, and some of the Customs and Characteristics of its People", Journal of the Manchester Geographical Society, Vol. 12 (1896), p. 18: "Agriculture is now the chief occupation of the people... The work is accomplished chiefly by slave labour".

135. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 38.


137. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 38.


139. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 38.

140. The Advance of our West African Empire, p. 212.

141. Abraham and Isaac, "A Further Note on the History of Luawa Chiefdom", p. 72, give the story of how Kailondo once sacrificed 290 slaves on the banks of the Moa. Unfortunately they do not give the name of the informant who provided them with this information; the story might have been exaggerated by an opponent of the Banya family. Nevertheless, Kailondo certainly possessed large numbers of slaves.

142. Crosby, K.H., in "Polygamy in Mende Country" [Africa, Vol. 10, 3 (July 1937)] argues from evidence collected mainly in Kailahun District that in the days before British rule, there was a close connection between wealth, power, slave-owning and polygamy. "The greatness of a man was shown by the number of his slaves and wives and by the extent of his farms and riches. If a man had a large number of male slaves, then he must also have a large number of wives to attend to the ground the men prepared. The right proportion must be maintained. And if a man had a large number of wives, then he must also have a large number of male dependants to do the heavy work" (p. 252).

The scale of Kailondo's presents to Aldridge in 1890 provide some indication of the Maha's wealth (see Chap. 2 of this thesis, Note 250 above). Kailondo gave the British traveller far more presents than any other Maha whom Aldridge met on his up-country journeys in the early 1890s.

143. The two key 'summary' despatches are C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Aldridge, 12.5.90, Sulymah; and C0267/389/239; Crooks; 19.5.91, enc. Aldridge, 24.4.91, Bontho.

144. C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Aldridge, 12.5.90, Sulymah.

146. 231 346. C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulymah.

147. C0267/389/239; Crooks; 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bontehe. A point which has already been made about Alldridge's writings is that in his books, especially A Transformed Colony, he portrayed a very different picture of conditions in Upper Mendeland from that given in his original despatches. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 96-99 above.

148. Rev. William Vivian was General Superintendent of Methodist Free Church Missions in Sierra Leone. He spent 9 years in Mendeland from c. 1887 to c. 1896, during which time he went as far 'up-country' as Nyagua's Panguma. Professor Little described an article written by Vivian in 1896 (see Note 149 below) as the "first comprehensive description" of Mende life (The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 24). Vivian later published Mendiland Memories, Reflections and Anticipations.

149. Vivian, "The Mendi Country, and some of the Customs and Characteristics of its people", p. 18. Like Alldridge, Vivian presumed that this state of affairs was a fairly recent development, and that in "the old days planting was not so scrupulously attended to - raiding and plunder formed the chief fountain of subsistence" (ibid.). But, like Alldridge again, Vivian gave no evidence for this assumption, which seemed to be based on the prejudice that the arrival of the British must have produced improvement.


151. For Parkes' career, see Fyfe, op. cit., p. 479. In a Memorandum on Upper Mendeland which was drawn up early in 1890 by Parkes for the benefit of Alldridge, no mention was made of Luawa or Kailondo, apparently because Parkes had never heard of them (C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. Conf. 7 of 1890; Hay; 24.2.90, enc.).

152. The various expeditions sent out under Hay's Governorship in attempts to keep the peace, mainly within a 30 mile coastal strip, are recorded in Fyfe, op. cit., pp. 478-502.

153. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, passim; especially p. 83 above.

154. Alldridge noted in The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p. 92, that the "cultivation of rice throughout the country is of paramount importance, as it forms one of the staple articles of food for the people". See also C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulymah, where Alldridge notes that rice and cassava "are undoubtedly the principal crops raised".

155. Vivian noted that much farm-work was "accomplished chiefly by slave labour" (The Mendi Country", p. 18). The size of the farm would therefore depend on whether the farmer possessed slaves, and if so, how many slaves. The farm of the MAHCI would naturally be the largest (see also Note 142 above).

157. Ibid., pp. 93-94.

158. Ibid., p. 94.

159. Ibid., p. 95. In this description of the growing of swamp rice and upland rice, Alldridge seems to be mistaken in allowing only 2 months from the time of planting to the time of harvesting! In the present writer's own experience, rice sown in April may be ready for harvesting in September. Cf. C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulymah, where Alldridge notes that rice sown at the end of April or the beginning of May is "ready for cutting the following October".

160. This statement is based on personal observations by the present writer.

161. British attempts to 'improve' agricultural methods were largely a failure. Vivian noted in the early 1890s that the Mende people used only 3 implements: "the cutlass (k̄p̄to), like a primitive hedger's hook; the axe (k̄m̄j), much like a stonemason's chisel only broader at the blade end; and the hoe (k̄l̄), the shape of a tea-saucer, and provided with a tag to fit into the handle, which is about eighteen inches long ("The Mendi Country", p. 18). From personal observation by the present writer in Luawa during the 1960s, these three implements were still the only ones commonly used in farm-work.

162. See Note 154 above.

163. In his list of 'Cultivated Crops' (Chap. XI of *The Sherbro and its Hinterland*), Alldridge places cassava (he spells it 'cassada') immediately after rice. See also Note 154 above.

164. C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulymah, p. 117.

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid., pp. 116-117. For the use of palm oil in cooking, see Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 27-28 above.

167. A photo in Alldridge, *The Sherbro and its Hinterland*, opp. p. 66, shows precisely the same processes of oil-extraction taking place as the present writer was used to seeing in the villages round Kailahun in the late 1960s. Ibid., pp. 66-67, Alldridge describes methods of preparing palm-oil for sale which the present writer saw being used early in 1967 in a clearing behind Sandialu, except that a low trough in the ground was used instead of a dug-out canoe.

168. Ibid., p. 117. Alldridge notes (ibid., p. 73) that kola nuts grown round Sherbro were exported to The Gambia and Senegal, but presumably this did not apply to those grown in Luawa.

169. Ibid. pp. 87-91.
Kup, Sierra Leone, 1400-1787, p. 189, considers that bananas and limes already existed in the Sierra Leone area in the 16th Century, but that pineapples, guavas and oranges arrived in the late 16th or 17th Centuries; whilst mangoes and avocado pears arrived only in the 18th Century.

See this Chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, pp. 196-200 below.

Chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, pp. 146-200 below.

Alldridge notes that country cloths are "local currency, varying in value from a few shillings up to 3L". Rev. W. Vivian also gave a full description of this industry in Mendeland in "The Mendi Country", pp. 19-24.

The name "country cloth" was used from this time, throughout the colonial period, and afterwards.

This is the typical size of a country cloth as mentioned by Alldridge.

Alldridge uses "Upper Mendi" rather than Ko-Mende.

Ibid.

The name "country cloth" was used from this time, throughout the colonial period, and afterwards.


Easmon, M.C.F., Sierra Leone Country Cloths (British Empire Exhibition, 1924, printed by Waterlow and Sons Ltd., London), pp. 13-14: "The Mende loom is used by the Mendes, Gallinas, Krima, Konnos and Sherbros. This is a very simple loom consisting of a tripod (Sangamo) of three sticks from which are suspended the heards .... The Mandingo or Northern type of loom is the same in principle, but has a more complicated supporting structure. This is used by the Mandingoes, Limbas, Koranks, Upper Kisis, and Upper Konnos .... The supporting framework is more permanent and is generally erected under a shady tree, the sticks being fixed into the ground. The whole is square shaped, the worker sitting at one end facing the loom".


The significance of Luawa being possibly the limit of Mandinka influence is far-reaching in other spheres than the cultural. The Mandinka people were long-distance traders, and were also deeply affected by Islam; the Mandinka long-distance trader was also a Moslem missionary. See also Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 17-18 above.

Ibid., p. 118.

185. The presupposition of these writers was that, through contact with imported goods, Africans would quickly develop that materialistic and possessive individualism which was such a pervasive characteristic of European civilization.

186. Ibid., p. 139.

187. Personal observation by the present writer in the late 1960s. By this period, the more complicated 'Mandinka' loom was more common than the simple 'Mende' loom throughout Kailondo's Luawa.

188. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, Note 250 above.

189. See the photograph in Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, opp. p. 190. This photograph is reproduced as the frontispiece of this thesis. From what Alldridge wrote, it seems that the photograph was taken in 1891.


192. COS79/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulymah, p. 120. A picture of men carrying these hampers appears as the frontispiece to Alldridge's A Transformed Colony.

193. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, photographs opp. pp. 140 and 142 show the carved wooden masks of Bundu Society 'devils'.

194. Ibid., pp. 200-201.

195. Ibid., p. 201.

196. No oral tradition suggested there was a recognized regular market in Kailahun in Kailondo's day. Cf. Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 28-29 above. Possibly there were markets in some towns in Kiala country within Kailondo's Luawa.

197. Cf. Isaac, Traders in Pendembu, Sierra Leone: a case study in entrepreneurship, p. 29: "Local accounts of the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the present century insist that Pendembu did not at that time participate in large cyclical markets of the order that Alldridge (1901: Ch. XXI) describes for the country further north and east. Furthermore, the eastern region's famous indigenous money, the twisted iron rods known as 'Kissi Pennies', at no time was used in Pendembu".


201. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp. 215-217. Also see C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun; and C0267/389/239; Crooks; 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe.


203. C0267/389/239; Crooks; 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe.

204. Ibid.

205. Later, dried fish or 'bonga' from the coast - especially from Freetown - was one of the staples of internal trade. But in The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp. 215-216, Alldridge indicates by the context that the dried fish here referred to was locally produced and not 'imported' from the coast.

206. Ibid., p. 216.

207. C0267/389/239; Crooks; 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe. Of the market at Popalahun, Alldridge wrote: "Country clothes were there in quantities ... the country cloth industry was thoroughly represented".

208. Ibid.


210. Ibid.

211. C0267/389/239; Crooks; 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe.


213. See Chap. 1 of this thesis, Note 87 above. Migeod, op. cit., p.114, notes that the Kommende called themselves Koniaka - the modern spelling being Konyanke (Murdock, op. cit., in the map attached to the back cover). Although Migeod clearly distinguishes between Kaw Mende (that is, the Northern Mende people) and Kommondai (that is, the Konyanke people), there is little doubt that some British officials use the form Kaw Mende (or Kormendi or Ko-Mende) to refer to the country beyond Mendeland and to the north of Mendeland rather than as a term referring to the Northern Mende people themselves; and Alldridge seems to do this in The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.212. Even Rev. Clarke, in The Foundation of the Luawa Chiefdom, p. 2, seems to suggest that the "Ko-Mendes" came from beyond Luawa (see also ibid., p.14). There is thus the problem that although Ko-Mende properly refers to Northern Mende country (i.e. the Luawa area), some British writers use it to refer to the country (or people) north of Mendeland. This problem probably arose as a result of that confusion over spelling and pronunciation which not unnaturally affected Alldridge and his contemporaries - and, indeed, Government officials throughout the colonial period. As a consequence of difficulties in writing down the two names, British officials confused together the words Komjende and Ko-Mende.
Since Alldridge notes that Konyanke country was "seven days' journey further inland", this confirms that an average day's journey was around 15 miles. Cf. Chap. 1 of this thesis, Note 34 above.


See Church, *West Africa*, p. 148: "Salt. This has been worked for centuries in the Sahara at Trarza and Idjil in Mauritania, and at Taoudeni in Mali. Saline earths are dug at Kaeleck and St. Louis (Senegal) and at Bilma (Niger)". Ibid., p. 253: "Exploitation of salt has a long history and it was another staple commodity of commerce in past centuries ... At Taoudeni salt-rock is still cut in trenches, and brought by camel caravan to Gao and Timbuktu".

In many parts of West Africa at this time, slaves were still an important 'commodity' in long-distance commerce. The present writer has been unable to discover whether slaves from the Luawa area were taken north to join the terrible trans-Saharan traffic or not. The information which he has discovered about slave-trading in the Luawa area in the 1880s and 1890s is discussed later in this thesis chapter, Chap. 3, pp. 204-208 below.


Holsoe, "International Trade and Western Liberia", a paper read before the African Studies Association Meeting, Los Angeles, October 1968.

Alldridge visited the Popalahun market on 23.2.91, and the Kabawana market on 2.3.91.

In using the term DOMAI is making correct use of the Mende word ndowei (weekly market), which is distinguished from nipowai (daily market).
240. "Means of communication" includes not only the type of transport used, but also the number and nature of intermediaries between the Atlantic seaboard (or the Sudan) and Luawa.


242. See, for example, Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, Fig. 14 opp. p. 53.

243. Church, West Africa, p. 85: "Laterite may be defined as a ferruginous or aluminous crust, or a material heavily indurated with iron oxides. It may be present either as nodules, as massive ironstone or bauxite, or as a soft subsoil material that hardens on exposure to air. It is a rock rather than a soil". The constant passage of human feet would help this hardening process along the roads.

244. The present writer found from personal experience that the removal from the ground of a single large tree stump could be half a morning's work for a team of 4 or 5 strong young men. In the wet season, between May and October, the roadway would need to be scraped of grass and shrubs about once a month to keep it really 'clean'.

245. The objection to using the word 'path' in this section is that it suggests in English a narrow byway only several miles long; but in this section of the chapter, reference is being made to the main lines of trade and communication between Luawa and other areas over 100 miles away. In the 1960s, the Mende word pale was applied equally to a narrow 'track' through the bush and to a major dual-carriage motorway (see Innes, A Mende-English Dictionary). This demonstrates once again the great difficulty of translating concepts from one language to another. With regard to Kailondo's Luawa, a thoughtless use in English of the term 'road' would give the reader a highly misleading impression; but a thoughtless use of the term 'path' or 'track' would probably be even more misleading.

246. C0267/389/239; Crooks; 195.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe, p. 70. Alldridge was here referring to Ko-Mende in general, which included Luawa. In the 1960s, even on broad motor-roads containing no traffic, it was a common sight to see a family walking along in single file.

247. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, Fig. 61 opp. p. 207.


249. C0267/388/133; Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Alldridge, 12.2.91, Kailahun.

250. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 100-103 above.


Alldridge only arrived in Kailahun on 3 April 1890, so this 'transformation' of the road took place in just 6 days (see C0879/32/Africa No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima).

C0267/389/239; Crooks; 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe, p. 70. This was Alldridge's summary report of his 1891 up-country visit, and he was commenting on Kp-Mende in general, his description applying as much to Luawa as to any other area through which he travelled.

This was the way Alldridge approached Luawa on each of his visits (see, for example, C0879/32/Africa No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima). In 1895, Cardew noted that in travelling from Segbwema and Daru "the more direct and beaten route to KANRELAHUN is by KANGAMA BAMBARA (near Pendembu) and GAHUN LUAWA (Ngiehun), as shown on the map" (C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun).

C0879/32/Africa No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima - see attached "A complete list of all the towns and fackies (villages) passed through".

Compare the maps at the back of The Sherbro and its Hinterland, and Map of Sierra Leone compiled in the Intelligence Division, War Office, 1895 (I.D., W.O., No. 1118) with the 1969 Contour Map, Sheets 71 and 83.

Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p. 193: "From the large town of Mofindor I went on to look at the Sulima, or Moa river, which was only about a mile and a half off....I found that it was fully a hundred yards wide and that a ferry-canoe was plying to and fro". See also Cardew's map attached to C0267/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96, showing the road through Mofindor to "Swango" (i.e. Sambalu).

Sambalu was the nearest safe ferrying-point to Kailahun town across the Moa. Numerous official reports in C0267 for the 1890s show that this was the route northwards generally taken by British officials. Oral tradition also in several places noted how Kailondo went north of the Moa, or returned south across the Moa to Kailahun, "via Mofindo" (e.g. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa p. 13).

This was the route followed by Alldridge in 1891, as described in The Sherbro and its Hinterland, ps. 202-208. The Nyandehun to Kailahun route was further described in C0267/394/217; Fleming; 30.5.92, enc. Alldridge, 2.5.92, Sulima; 12 miles being given as the distance between Nyandehun and Kailahun. Cardew also travelled over the Nyandehun-Kailahun section of the road in 1895 (see C0267/417/Conf. 39; Cardew; 13.5.95, enc. map), but Captain Sharp, the route reporter, gave the distance as 10 miles. The distance on the 1969 Contour Map, Sheets 71, 83 and 84, is precisely 10 miles.

See the route map of Alldridge's 1891 journey at the back of The Sherbro and its Hinterland.
263. As Note 258 above, except Sheets 71, 83 and 84 of the 1969 Contour Map were used. See also Note 261 above: the fact that the route distance in 1895 was exactly the same as the road distance in 1969 would further indicate that almost exactly the same track was followed on the ground.

264. The same methods as used in Notes 258 and 263 above were used to establish this evidence concerning the Baoma road, except Sheet 71 only of the 1969 Contour Map was required. See C0267/417/Conf; 39; Cardew; 13.5.95, for road report of Captain Sharpe on the Kailahun to Baoma road.

265. See, for example, Map of Sierra Leone (W.O., I.D., No. 1118) 1895, where the route to Sandialu seems to pass through Gbondou village: this was not true in the 1960s. Captain Sharpe's route map, attached to C0267/417/Conf, 39; Cardew; 13.5.95, marks direct roads (i) from Nyandeun to Gbalahun, (ii) from Bunumbu to Foya, and (iii) from a point just a mile or two down the Kailahun - Bobobu road to Foya; none of these routes existed in the 1960s. The Kailahun - Buedu - Foya road left the Kailahun - Nyandeun road at Pandobu from the 1930s onwards, but there is no indication of such a road in any of the C0267 despatches of the 1890s, nor in Alldridge's books or articles.


269. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p. 217. The slaves were presumably exchanged as a bride-price or dowry, which was different from 'payment' in the ordinary sense of the word.

270. Kintiballia is marked in this position on the 1895 Map of Sierra Leone (I.D., W.O., No. 1118). The information on this map for the area N.N.W. of Luawa was based to a large extent on the 1895 up-country tour of Cardew (see Note at the foot of the map).

271. C0267/409/140; Cardew; 26.4.94, from Kintiballia.

272. Ibid., encls. No. 2, statement of slave dealer to Parkes, J.C.E. The slave dealer said he was coming from "Carray Lundoo's town HENIKUMA". No trace has been found of the name Henikuma in Kailondo's Luawa, but perhaps either Parkes or the slave-dealer himself misheard the name. Cardew noted of the slaves that "they had been brought from Kanre Lahun".

273. Ibid. Cardew spells the name of Bumban as "BUMPAN".

274. Ibid.
Ibid. The slaves, "in a very emaciated condition", consisted of 1 man, 4 women and 2 children.

276. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94. frpp Waima.

One might speculate whether, in Susu country, the slaves were sold to dealers involved in the trans-Saharan trade: the present writer has found no evidence of this.


279. Ibid.

280. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, frpp Waima.


283. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 88 above.

284. Kailondo's fear was, apparently, that the sofas would join in, and the war would escalate to such a degree that chaos would threaten Luawa and the whole area. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 88, 92-93 above.

285. If each individual slave was 'worth' about £1.25 (see Chap. 2 of this thesis, Note 475 above), the hope of gaining perhaps 50 slaves must have presented, by the standards of the area at that time, a serious temptation to Kailondo.

286. Since the other mahangesisia refused to follow the advice of Kailondo, he was unable to prevent the outbreak of a "sofa war"; but he at least made a determined attempt to maintain peace in the area.

287. See Alldridge, The Sherbro and Its Hinterland, p. 267, and A Transformed Colony, pp. 291-293. For 'Upper Gola', see Map 5. The Kono, Kissi, and Koranko countries were on the eastern and, northeastern borders of what was to become, in 1896, the Sierra Leone Protectorate. Kunike lay due west of Kono country.

The 'protected area' was the term used by British officials in the early 1890s to describe an area which was similar in extent to that proclaimed in 1896 as the 'Protectorate'.

288. Int. 11. Chief Fayia Jabba (Speaker of Kissi Kama Chiefdom in 1972) said that his own father used to sell people to Guinea in exchange for gunpowder and guns, in Kailondo's time.


290. Ibid.

291. Ibid.

292. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, pp. 291-293. See also Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 97-98 above.
Alldridge, *A Transformed Colony*, pp. 291-293, described the effects of a slave-raid without specifying the part of the Protectorate to which he was referring. But in *The Sherbro and its Hinterland* he suggests that the worst effects of slave-trading he ever saw were in Kono in 1894.

For the main aim of the sofas in this area in 1893, see Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*, p. 517, and Person, *L'aventure de Forekere et la danse de Waima*, pp. 256-257. See also Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 25-26 above.

Ibid.

Ibid.


See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, pp. 188-189 above.

See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 97-98 above.

Ibid., pp. 92-93 above.

See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, pp. 190-192 above.

Ibid., p. 169.

Int. 19,

See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, p. 197 above.

See Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 25-26 above.

During Kailondo's reign after 1880 there was only one attempted rebellion within Luawa, which occurred in 1889. This was led by Manjakewa and Jobo of Giema, and Fagbandi of Sakabu, all of whom were forthwith executed. Perhaps this summary treatment discouraged further attempts at rebellion. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 79 above.

Clarke, *Foundation of Luawa*, p. 11.

Int. 19,

'Speaker' is an English translation of the Mende word *Lavale*. Mada James Kailondo used the expression 'Second Man', which was precisely the position of the *Lavale* in the Chiefdom. See Chap. 5 of this thesis, pp. 87-8 below; also Int. 19,

Int. 19,

Ibid.
312. Clarke, *Foundation of Luwa*, p. 15. The word *valamamoi* is common in the Mende language and provides a precise synonym for the term 'right-hand man'. It comes from the root *fala* (f/v mutation; Innes, *A Mende-English Dictionary*) meaning 'to rely on, to depend on'. Cf. Kailondo *kez Nlaya* (1969), p. 31: "i ngi lli valamamoi, Fabunde lo yoyoni na".

313. This last war was the *Jewalehu-gai* in Liberia. See Clarke, *Foundation of Luwa*, pp. 14-15, and Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 63 above.

314. G0267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun.

315. In the colonial period, the *Lavale* was sometimes referred to as the Chief's Prime Minister, but the comparison may produce much confusion (see Chap. 5 of this thesis, pp.437-438 below). In any case there was no Lavale before the time of British rule (see Int. 19, ). As regards war-leadership, the Mende word *Mii* denoted the leader of the troops, whilst 'Commander-in-Chief' might be the best translation of the word *Ko-Mahel* (Clarke, *Foundation of Luwa*, pp. 4-7).

316. G0267/382/J162; Hay; 3.5.90, encl. Treaty. For further details about the Treaty and its signatories, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp.109-110 above, and this present chapter, Chap. 3, pp.211-212 below.

317. The idea of 'ruling houses' was in Luwa (and probably in many other cases) largely a fiction developed by British officials (see Chap. 5, of this thesis, p. 438 below). Cf. Fenton, *Outline of Native Law* (1933), p. 4: "Many chiefdoms now have two or more crowning houses. That may be because there are two almost equally strong clans in the chiefdom".

318. For further details, see Chap. 5 of this present thesis, p. 438 below.

319. The claims of the various families are bound to be suspect simply because Luwa as a single polity had no 'traditional rulers'. The whole idea of 'traditional rulers' was largely the product of British officials' presuppositions that before 1896 there was a virtually unchanging socio-political 'system' which had existed for centuries. In fact only a decade before Alltridge arrived, Kailondo himself had created Luwa as it existed in 1890 (see Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp.36-41 above).

320. It has already been pointed out that British official reports must be used with caution because they represent the views of an alien, conquering power. It is equally true that oral traditions from the local area must be used with caution because — among other reasons — each elder will probably be recounting history in such a way as to throw the most favourable light on his own family's role in the area.

321. Int. 19.

322. Combe MS, p. 7.

323. Ibid., p. 10.

324. Ibid., p. 12.

326. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 78-79 above.

327. Gorvie, op. cit., p. 45.

328. Ibid.


330. Ibid., p. 21; Clarke, *Foundation of Luawa*, p. 15.

331. See, for example, CO579/37/African No. 387, desp. 182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. Alldridge, 17.4.90, Joru. Also see CO267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun.

332. Gorvie, *Our Peoples of the Sierra Leone Protectorate*, pp. 40-48; Combey MS, pp. 8-16.

333. Int. 19,

334. See Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 10 above, and Note 257.

335. CO267/382/182; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. Treaty. The other mahai who made his mark was Gorleh of Baoma, but no further trace has been found of this name. Possibly, Gorleh could be a clerk's error for Lengor (who is mentioned by Maa James, Int. 19, as coming from Baoma) - or perhaps an error of Alldridge himself. In presenting the mahai, the Mende people would have said in their own language, "Lengor la". An alternative suggestion is that kpakoisia were often given different names and nicknames by different people - this was true in Luawa even in the 1960s (see Note 347 below). Different people could even identify the same person as being from two different villages - depending on whether the mother's home or the father's home was given. Perhaps "Gorleh of Baoma" could be recognized if he had been referred to by a different name in connection with another village.

336. Int. 19, Kahunla is now apparently an archaic word in the Mende language: most of the young people to whom the present writer spoke in Kailahun in 1972 had no idea what it meant.

337. Ibid.

338. CO267/416/Conf. 4; Cardew; 14.1.95; Cardew reported the arrival of messengers from Kailondo - "The messengers consist of KAN HULA, a brother of Chief KAI LUNDU and 3 others". See also SLGA, NADL 289/1895; from Parkes, J.C.E. (Supt. Dept. N.A.); 29.6.95; to Chief Ki Lundu - "I have seen your messenger KI HUNLA and your letter and the present which you sent". Possibly Ngobeh Kahunla was used as messenger on other occasions as well (for a list of times when Kailondo sent messengers to Freetown, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. above). Another messenger whom Kailondo apparently used was called Konuwah (see SLGA, NADL 197/1894; from Supt. Dept. N.A.; 14.4.94; to Chief Ki Lundu. See also SLGA, NADL 390/1895; from Parkes, J.C.E. (Supt. Dept. N.A.); 23.8.95; to Chief Ki Lundu). No other reference has been found to Konuwah.
339. Hollins, "Short History", p. 12; Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 59; see also Note 5, p. 87, where Mr Abraham noted the possibility of confusion arising between Bandajuma-Luawa and Giema-Luawa. Cf. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p. 117: the old chief of Bandajuma told Migeod that Kailondo "was a Kurugba or war leader here [i.e. in Bandajuma], but whether in the service of the town, or as a conqueror, was not stated." Presumably this was when Kailondo was a quite young man, in the service of Kpawo Bundu.

340. See Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 10 above.

341. For Bundu of Danyahun, see Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 35, 37 above.

342. Int. 14. For Mbawulomeh's raid, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 78-79 above. Maada James Kailondo also mentioned Kpawo (Int. 19).

343. For Kongonch, see Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 301-303 below. See also the note, apparently made by Lt. A. Becke in 1893 on the present writer's copy of the 1895 Map of Sierra Leone: "Pa Bundoo, paramount chief - KONKONI head warrior".

344. Int. 19.

345. Int. 9. Perhaps Komala was the same person as Maada James referred to as Kumela of Mano-Sewalu, one of Kailondo's kpakoisia (Int. 19). Mano-Sewalu was the nearest large village to Dia on the direct road from Dia to Kailahun. Komala also attended the Gbondou Conference (see Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 10 above.) Tengbe Jopolo was also known as Tengbe Kpangbe, according to Pa Langama (Int. 20). See also Int. 10.

346. Pa Gborie Mima (Int. 9) noted of Kongor that "he was a warrior greater than all the other Kissi warriors and chiefs. Everyone agreed he should be P.C. All Kissi-men knew Kongor as a great warrior from the time of Kailondo". Mr Tamba Ngendu noted that Kongor was a sort of 'section chief' for all Kissi country under Kailondo (Int. 10).

347. KDOA, loose papers relating to the election of a P.C. for Kissi Tungi Chiefdom, 1942: "Kai Tungi's claim". Here Koli Tungi was described as Fawundu's son, but in Int. 22 he was described as Fawundu's brother. See also SLGA, Decree Book Pendembu District, p. 438, "Luawa Chiefdom", see also G0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kailahun; and see Chap. 2 of this thesis, Note 31b above.

348. Int. 19, Ganawa of Kangama was possibly the same person as Kangama Ngeingulu. Mr Missa Bundu of Buedu wrote in a personal letter, 21.5.71, that the latter "was our strongest warrior chief", and that before 1896 he was known as Masa-Chowo, but after 1896 he gained the title Masa-Koleivo.

349. Int. 19. Bundor Foyoh was also at the Gbondou Conference (see Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 10 above.)

350. Combey, op. cit., pp. 6-7, suggests that Kailondo insisted only on co-operation in waging war and on the payment of tribute from Kissi-speaking country; otherwise he allowed mahannpisia like Kongor and Komala to manage their own affairs.
Hollins, "Short History", p. 16. "Kailundu ... divided the country into sub-chiefdoms, which divisions remain to this day".

352. Int. 19.

353. See Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 25-26 above. Cf. Lamb, Anthropological Survey of the Mende People, p. 71: "The life of the Mende centres round two focii: the family and the chiefdom. To take one of them first, the family, does not imply that the chiefdom, especially in its modern form, is a natural outgrowth of Mende life due to the coalescence of various families. In fact it is highly probable that the "section" is the natural unit formed from the development of the family." The present writer would accept this probability as the best interpretation of what happened in Luawa before Kailondo's reign.

354. It is misleading to state that Kailondo divided Luawa into sub-chiefdoms (see Note 351 above). At the time of Kailondo's accession, there were many tiny independent polities in the area, and these formed natural sub-divisions within Kailondo's Luawa. He did not create these sub-divisions. Rather he moulded them, it would seem, into a form which made them usable as administrative areas within his new state.

355. Probably the vital administrative innovation made by Kailondo was not to create sections (see Notes 353 and 354 above) in Luawa, but rather to create a group of subordinate rulers, all of whom had roughly equal status, under his jurisdiction. They derived their power from him, performed functions for him in their own sections, and were responsible to him (Int. 19). Clearly the idea of the patimahen as a subordinate ruler of this sort was introduced into Luawa by Kailondo.

356. This is demonstrated by the fact that so many of those who attended the Gboudou Conference (i.e. who were rulers of the tiny independent polities, or were people of paramount influence in those polities, before Kailondo's accession) were noted as patimahan later in Kailondo's reign. Such patimahan included Komala of Dokosu (Kama section), Kaikai of Gbandewulo (Tungi South section), Kpawo Bundu of Giema (Upper Bombali section), Towel of Foya (Tengea section), and Ngegba of Buedu (Tungi North section). However, Kailondo may not always have accepted as patimahen the person generally accepted by the people. For example in the Gbunde War, he killed the accepted ruler of Vasa mahawul, Teye of Kamotahun, and chose Fabanna Farra to replace him. But this action on Kailondo's part may have been exceptional in that (i) it was done in time of war (ii) it concerned an area which was not part of Kailondo's heartland.

357. Int. 10.

358. Record of conversation with Maada James Kailondo, enclosed in a personal letter from Lahai, M.A.; 19.9.71; to the present writer.

359. Ibid.

360. Ibid.

361. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, p. 209 above.
362. In 1933, Mr J.S. Fenton noted the existence of the sub-chiefs court (i.e. court of a patimahanga), as well as the town headman's court and the Chief's court (Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law, p. 10). Cf. Hollins, N.C. (Senior D.C., Moyamba) to the Honourable Commissioner, Southern Province, Reorganisation of Native Administration (Confidential C.4/1935), 19.11.35: "The power of sub-chiefs (i.e. patimahanga) depends to a great extent on whether the Chiefdom was formed by a synthesis of smaller units (of which one of the best examples is Luawa), or whether the chiefdom has been artificially divided into sections for convenience, apart of course from 'mother towns' which are the basic units". Mr Hollins, then, considered that in Luawa the powers of the patimahanga were quite extensive.

363. For the details of why House Tax was not collected for the whole of Luawa before 1912, see Chap. 4 of this thesis, passim. For 1912 House Tax records, see K.D.O.A., loose papers, Kanre Lahun Hut Tax Statistics, 1912.

364. C0267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.03, enc. map drawn by Le Mesurier, F.N., Major O.C., S.L. Bn., W.A.F.F., 16.11.08, Daru. This map represented the first attempt by British officials to draw a detailed map of the local political situation in the Luawa area. Le Mesurier had several years experience of local politics in Kailondo's Luawa by this time. The substance of the information provided on this map is to be found on Map opp. p.73 of this thesis.

365. C0267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.03. The map enclosed in the despatch bears the date 16.11.03; but in a letter enclosed from Probyn on 11.11.08 to Le Mesurier, the former referred to "the sketch map recently made by you". This suggests that in fact the map was drawn late in October 1903, or early in November.

366. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, p. 314 below.

367. For the failure of the brief attempt by the Liberian Government to impose administrative control over Luawa, see Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 240-305 below.

368. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, passim.

369. The present writer is not arguing that in every detail the 'sections' of 1903/1912 corresponded with those of Kailondo's day, but rather that they were broadly similar.

370. For details of references to these 'sections' in written documents concerning Kailondo's Luawa, see Notes 373 to 383 below. It must be admitted that if a particularly powerful patimahanga died and was succeeded by a particularly weak patimahanga, the geographical size of a 'section' would decrease; and vice versa.

371. K.D.O.A., loose papers, Kanre Lahun Hut Tax Statistics, 1912. Each of these towns is given with the words "& fakais" after it, indicating that not only is the town itself referred to, but also the immediately surrounding villages. Kailahun does not have the words "& fakais" attached to it, but the fact that the number of houses is given as 1123 indicates that the area surrounding Kailahun town was included.
372. CO267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.08, enc. map drawn by Le Mesurier, F.N., Major, O.C., S.L. Bn., W.A.F.F., 16.11.08, Daru. This reference, and the reference for Note 371 above, refer also to Notes 373 to 383 below.

373. The 1903 map indicated Yibema (spelt on the map 'Yegbima') as the main village in the section.

374. The elders of Dodo-Cotuma (Int. 16) stated that Dodo had always been the section headquarters town for Gbeila Section, but the 1903 map clearly indicated Sandialu (spelt on the map 'Sandyallu') as the section town, and Dodo was not even placed in Gbeila section, but in Tungi section.

375. Bombali section was one of the most frequently mentioned sections of Kailondo's Luawa in the 1890s. It is noted on the 1891 map of Allridge's up-country journey reproduced at the back of The Sherbro and its Hinterland, and is also referred to in the text, pp. 202-207. There is no doubt that the headquarters town was Nyandehun (spelt Yandahu in these early sources), but the 1903 map shows it as a much larger section than it became in later years. In 1908, Bombali extended from Goabu (near Dodo-Cotuma) in the north-east almost to Bewabu in the south-west, and it included Giema. Cardew's map enc. CO267/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96 indicates that Bombali extended over a similar area. Later (see, e.g. K.D.O.A., loose papers, House Tax. Chiefdom: Luawa, 1918) Bombali was split into two 'sections', Upper Bombali centred on Nyandehun and Lower Bombali centred on Giema.

376. The 1903 map indicated Bewabu (spelt on the map 'Boarbu') as the headquarters town of Gau section.

377. See, for example, K.D.O.A., loose papers, House Tax. Chiefdom: Luawa, 1937, for a list of sections as they existed after the boundaries of present-day Luawa had been established.

378. Cardew's map enc. CO267/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96 is accepted as providing an accurate boundary between Mende and Kissi country. It should be noted that according to this map, the whole of Sewalu section is counted to be in Kissi country.

379. For Kama under Kailondo, see Ints. 9 to 13.

380. The only town marked in Toli section on the 1903 map is Koindu (spelt on the map 'Koendu').

381. The only town marked in Lela section on the 1903 map is Fulawahun (spelt on the map 'Fulovahun').

382. The towns of Kusedu (spelt on the map 'Kussadu') and Turadu are marked as being in Kunio section on the 1908 map.

383. See Int. 19: "When the Kissi people say 'teng' they mean the 'middle' of something ... And Kissi Teng is right in the middle of Kissi Kama and Kissi Tungi. Kissi Teng in olden days used to be called Bomasalu". The 1903 map indicated Kangama as the headquarters town of Bomassardu section.
384. The 1908 map indicated the position of a number of towns in Tungi section - from north to south, Nafadu (spelt on the map 'Nafalu'), Dambara (spelt on the map 'Dambarras'), Dodo (see Note 374 above), Yamehun (spelt on the map 'Famahun'), Dambalu (spelt on the map 'Damballu'), and Gbandewulo (spelt on the map 'Bandiwurro'). For Tungi section, see also the following paragraph in this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, and Note 388 below.

385. The present writer has not discovered any written reference to any of the Kissi 'sections' (Notes 379 to 383 above) before the first decade of the twentieth century, with the exception of Tungi. In his 'Memorandum respecting results of an investigation into the Eastern boundary of the Kanre Lahun territory' enc. in 00267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.08, Probyn noted specifically that the chiefs of Tungi and Kunio were under Kailondo, taking it for granted that if these two were, the other Kissi chiefs to the west of Tungi and Kunio, and nearer to Kailahun, would certainly be under the control of Kailondo. Probyn also noted that the chief of Tengea said he had been under Kailondo.

386. In the 1914 House Tax returns for Kissi Chiefdom (K.D.O.A., File: House Tax. Chiefdom: Kissi, 1914) the main village in Bende Bengu section (there spelt 'Bendebu') is Fulavahun. This would seem to be the same village which in the 1908 map was marked as the main village in Lela section (see Note 381 above). The 1914 House Tax returns indicated Lela section consisted only of the more westerly part of that area which in the 1908 map was shown as Lela.

387. See, for example, K.D.O.A., loose papers, House Tax, Chiefdom: Kissi Tungi, 1938. By that time, the two largest villages in Bende Bengu section were noted as Sandia and Sundokoro Bendu.

388. Presumably the Keya River provided the division between Tungi North and Tungi South.

389. It has been sensibly suggested that probably Kailondo had to settle many land disputes which would be connected with the geographical extent of the different patilisia. The settlement of these land disputes would therefore automatically produce more formal, clearly-defined limits of the different patilisia.

390. In 1891, Alldridge noted that Sembe Fawundu was ruler of Tungi (00267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun, p. 3), but there is no indication whether Alldridge meant by Tungi all the area included in the section on the 1908 map, or whether Fawundu was ruler of only part of that area.

391. By 1915, there was no doubt that Kongor of Dambara was the senior patimahi in Tungi, and indeed in the whole of the Kissi-speaking part of Kailondo's Luawa, since he was chosen as the first Paramount Chief of British Kissi (SLGA, Decree Book Railway Sub-District 1906, p. 289).

392. Kailondo's Luawa (as defined in Chap. 1 of this thesis, pp. 1-2 above, contained perhaps 50,000 people and covered some 400 square miles.
393. The present writer has to admit that in this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 3, pp. 184-187 above, he himself could be accused of extrapolating backwards from a later state of affairs. He has, however, done this on a large scale, but confined his attention to one particular concrete problem (i.e. the distribution of human settlements in Kessi country). Also, this extrapolation is limited to a time-span of less than 20 years; the present writer is objecting to extrapolations which stretch back 50 or 100 years, and which involve much generalization.

394. See Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 33 above.

395. For example, Vivian, W., "The Mende country and some of the customs and characteristics of its people". Vivian gives some account of political organization among the Mende people, and Professor Little in The Mende of Sierra Leone made considerable use of this. But Vivian never travelled east of Panguma, and could hardly, therefore, have known or described the political situation then existing in Luawa.
CHAPTER FOUR:

FABUNDEH AND EUROPEAN 'PACIFICATION' OF THE LUANA AREA, 1896 TO 1912
FARUNDEH, RULER OF LUAMA c.1896 - 1912

(He is seated on the left of the photograph.)
Fabundeh succeeded Kailondo as Mahai with the approval of the majority of Luawa's knakoisia (1). Before he died, Kailondo told Fabundeh, "You are the next person to me. I've been going around with you. I leave in your care all my children, and the country itself, because my children are all small, my brothers are all old, and my mother is old. When my children are of age, give them back the country." (3). Since Kailondo had been such a powerful Mahawai, and had gained so much respect from his people, his express wishes about the succession would naturally carry great weight. At the time of Kailondo's death, Fabundeh was the right-hand-man of the Mahawai, holding second position in Luawa (4). It would have been very difficult to instate any other person as Kailondo's successor.

No wonder, then, that Cardew found "the principal persons in Kanre Lahun were agreed in selecting as chief, PA BUNDE" (5). The Governor added an explanation of why "no relative of Kai Lundu has been appointed", correctly making the points that Kailondo himself was "not an hereditary Chief", and that in any case "a chieftainship is not usually given to a son but more often to a brother or uncle" (6).

Chief Fabundeh (7) has usually been dismissed as a ruler of pleasant but weak character, with no great political or military aptitude. An unknown British official in the early 1900s described him in a typically patronizing way: "a good natured and happy person, but very averse to talk palavers or punish" (8). T.J. Alldridge, introduced to Fabundeh in 1907 (9), could only reflect on the greatness and intelligence of his predecessor, Kailondo, "whom I could not help missing sadly enough" (10). "Chief Fa Bunde had neither the personality nor the power of Kailundu," stated the author of the
first written history of Luawa. "His undue love of dancing and the fact that he owed his position largely to outside help, took away from his power. The outer parts of his chiefdom, Wunde and Bandi country, fell away or offered only a nominal fealty" (11). Mr. Fyfe suggested that "Fabunde was not a great fighter like Kai Lundu - he preferred dancing and enjoying himself. But with British support he could hold his own" (12). However, the record of the first few critical years of Fabundeh's reign provides a very different picture of his ability to withstand opposition. Even when British help was absent (13) or delayed (14), Fabundeh held his own, militarily and diplomatically, against external aggression and internal unrest. Indeed, a case could be made out to show that, far from helping Fabundeh, the British presence increased his difficulties (15).

Some contemporary British officials came to realize that, in an almost impossible situation, Fabundeh had on his own achieved striking success, quite apart from British help. Soon after the 1898 War (16), Captain Ferguson who had been D.C. at Panguma (17) and Inspector Sykes noted that Fabundeh was "much loved and respected by his following. His influence therefore within the boundaries of the Moa may be described as strong" (18). Governor Probyn described the Luawa Chief as "an extremely sagacious man" (19), an opinion shared by Major Le Mesurier (20) who probably knew Fabundeh better than any other white official (21). Within the Luawa heartland, Fabundeh was able to suppress local opposition. Outside this heartland, conflicting international pressures from France, Britain and Liberia limited his room for manoeuvre, and partly because of this he was unable to suppress Kafula's rebellion (22); yet even in the complicated
situation resulting from these pressures, Fabundeh displayed a strikingly large degree of political initiative (23).
1. LOCAL OPPOSITION TO FABUNDEH, AND HIS RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH, 1896 TO 1899.

The main local opposition to Fabundeh came from Mahai Kafula of Wunde (24) - but this was so serious and unremitting that it is examined separately (25). By contrast, some opposition was so slight and inconsiderable that it does not merit detailed analysis: the raid on eastern Luawa which was made by Momo Bahomi (26) a few weeks after Kailondo's death (27) falls into this category. There were, however, three 'crisis points' in Fabundeh's reign when the Luawa Mahai came into conflict with local enemies: first with Mbawulomeh (28) and the sofas (29), in 1896 and 1897; second with some of his sub-chiefs (30) who wanted him to join in the 1898 War (31); third with his sub-chiefs Gandi and Kongoni in 1907 (32). The last of these conflicts was intimately connected with the Liberian attempt to take control of Luawa (33), and will therefore be discussed along with that (34).

Mbawulomeh, after being defeated by Kailondo in 1899 (35), had remained in the area to the east of Greater Luawa (36), but had never again attempted a frontal attack on Luawa during Kailondo's lifetime. Fabundeh's accession prompted Mbawulomeh to take the initiative: presumably the latter hoped that Fabundeh would prove militarily weaker that Kailondo, and that Luawa would now present an easy prey (37). Probably Mahai Kabba Sei of Mando, for motives unknown, secretly encouraged this attack on Luawa (38); even in Kailondo's reign, the Mando Mahai's policy towards Luawa had been seen as compromising and unfriendly (39). In August 1896 (40), Mbawulomeh attacked Luawa
from Vahun, where he had been living (41), with a force estimated at about 2,000 men (42). Included in his force were some Kpelle people (43), and some of the Kpandeme sofæ (44) who had been such a nuisance to Kailondo (45). Mbawulomeh pressed northwards up the Giema road (46) until a considerable area of Fabundeh's country was occupied (47). Giema itself was burnt down (48), as were Batwoma, Bewabu (49) and Mendekelema (50), and Fabundeh's forces were defeated at Pandobu (51). Having driven the Frontier Police out of their substation at Bomaru (52), Mbawulomeh proclaimed his intention of "spoiling the whole of the English land" (53).

On 1 September 1896 (54), Fabundeh's troops under the leadership of Kongoni (55) counter-attacked against the invaders, Batwoma being the probable site of the battle (56). Mbawulomeh's forces were defeated (57), although they were receiving help from many surrounding mahangeisia (53). Looking back on this period, Major Le Mesurier later wrote accurately about Fabundeh's "very considerable power in the country" (59). The proof that his power did not depend on British support was that "except when Major Fairtlough punished the Chief of Vahun in 1896, the country was not patrolled by Frontiers, and they were not in any way used to assist the authority of Fa Bundeh" (60); yet within a few months of his accession, the Luawa Chief was able to defeat a formidable enemy invasion.

Captain Fairtlough (later promoted Major) was Commanding Officer of the Frontier Police Force detachment stationed at Panguma (61). He was so disquieted by reports of Mbawulomeh's activities that late in August 1896 he went to Luawa (62). On 1 September he left Kailahun with 50 Frontiers (63) and soon met up with Fabundeh's already -
victorious troops (64). Together they crossed the Mauwa River \textsuperscript{1}a difficult operation since it was in flood (65) \textsuperscript{2}, and arrived at Vahun on the morning of 4 September (66). The defenders in Vahun, whither Mbawulomoh had retired, put up a stronger resistance than was expected, but eventually the stockades were forced (67). Mbawulomoh was wounded and fled; Koigbatta, chief of Vahun, was killed; and the defence of the town collapsed (68). In the next weeks, pockets of resistance were broken up (69), 1,343 prisoners were taken (70), and Kabba Sei was captured and imprisoned (71). It was later decided that Chief Momo Babahu (72) of Pendembu had also supported Mbawulomoh (73). He was taken to Panguma, where he remained until 1898 (74), and his Chief's stipend was suspended (75). Kabba Sei was detained in Freetown until the same date (76). After the imprisonment of Kabba Sei, Fairtlough suggested that Nyagua of Panguma should superintend Mando Chiefdom (77), whilst Fabundeh should be in charge of the country eastwards from Baiwala town and the Mahimbe River as far as Vahun (73), and this arrangement was accepted for the next 2 years (79).

A few weeks after the capture of Vahun, Fairtlough informed the Governor in Freetown that, although the situation gave no cause for immediate anxiety, "still the presence of Bawurume close to our border with a large armed following, forms a constant menace to the safety of British territory" (80). It was military action by the forces of Nyagua and Fabundeh, not by Fairtlough's Frontiers, which rid the area of this menace. On 16 January 1897, Nyagua informed Fairtlough that his own forces, "joined with those of Fa-Bundo and other friendly chiefs, had captured and destroyed the towns of GOPEBU and KOLAHUN then occupied by adherents of Baorumeh \textsuperscript{1}i.e. Mbawulomoh\textsuperscript{2}" (81). This defeat largely broke Mbawulomoh's power. The ruler of Kpandeme, his
former ally (82), promised that if Mbawulomeh returned to Kpandeme town, he would be given up to Chief Nyagua (83), but in fact Mbawulomeh stayed in Liberian territory away from Kpandeme and was not captured (84).

Fabundeh showed considerable political ability in his handling of this first crisis of his reign. He was sensitive to the wishes of his British allies, and before taking any action against Mbawulomeh, wrote to the British officer at Panguma explaining the situation and emphasizing that "we know that if one disturbed us we are not to do anything" (85). This disarming letter apparently satisfied Fairtlough, who did not even seem to notice that Fabundeh twice took military action without specific permission from the British – first on his own, and then several months later in alliance with Nyagua (86). Fabundeh thus himself defeated his enemies, and at the same time obtained British support to prevent a resurgence of his opponents' power. Kabba Sei, one of his main rivals, was removed from office, whilst a policy of co-operation was maintained with Nyagua, the other powerful Chief of the area (87).

Towards the end of 1897, there were further somewhat confused reports that Mbawulomeh was collecting armed forces from the Kpelle and Gbande peoples and, again with the help of sofas, was planning to attack Toli of Kissi country (83). Captain Blakeney, who in September 1897 had succeeded Fairtlough as Acting District Commissioner at Panguma (89), travelled to Kailahun in December, and then went further east, beyond Sandialu, to examine the state of affairs (90). He found the land east of Luawa had been "laid waste" (91), but he attributed this destruction to the work of sofas, who had established themselves
at Kolahun (92). These sofas, according to Blakeney, were mercenaries hired by Mbawulomeh from "Chief Packarah", a sub-chief of Samori, who was "at present at the back of the Ivory Coast" (93), a fact which was substantiated by the report that "these Sofas have come from a great distance" (94). Subsequent reports suggested that Mbawulomeh - who was scarcely mentioned again - had little control over them (95). "The Sofas have declared their intention of invading British territory", wrote Blakeney, "they are at present advancing on a town called Foya (96), and, if they succeed in capturing it, will come to Sandyallu" (97). That the sofas presented a serious threat to Luawa was shown soon afterwards when they burnt Foya (93) and raided as far west as Goabu, on the edge of Mende country and within Luawa itself (99). They were driven back by Blakeney who pushed as far east as Kolahun in the first weeks of 1893 (100), and burnt down that town (101). This punitive expedition apparently succeeded in 'settling' the area east of Luawa for a time (102). As for Mbawulomeh, little more was heard about him in the next 5 years (103), and he was unable to cause trouble again in the Luawa area (104); his death was reported in 1903 (105).

However, the Luawa Chief was freed from the threat of Mbawulomeh only to face a more serious test during the 1893 Protectorate War (106), in which he encountered severe internal opposition (107). It seems that from the beginning of his reign, there was within Luawa a faction opposed to his rule (103). The presence of this faction did not necessarily indicate a tendency for Luawa to 'break up' under Fabundeh (109). Some sort of opposition is almost universal in politics; Kailondo had faced and defeated political opposition (110), and so did Fabundeh in the much more complicated circumstances of 1893. Fabundeh
kept his polity generally peaceful throughout 1898, and he himself remained thoroughly loyal to the Freetown Government. As a result, British official despatches contained little information about Luawa during the Protectorate War - attention being concentrated on the 'disturbed areas' - and it is difficult to piece together even a bare chronology of events in Fabundeh's polity for 1898. Nevertheless, there is no doubt about a number of crucial points.

By the beginning of 1893, the Luawa Mahri was ready to pay Cardew's House Tax, which was to provide revenue for the new Protectorate administration (111). "All preparations had been made by me to pay the Hut Tax", noted Fabundeh later, "as instructed by His Excellency Sir F. Cardew during his tour round the Protectorate. I was however informed later on that your Government has been pleased to grant us (in the Panguma District) a full year to make all necessary preparations to pay in the following year [i.e. for 1899]. Consequently I did not send in mine for that year [i.e. for 1898]" (112).

In Bai Bureh's Temne polity, and also in some areas of Mende country, there was a clear connection between the imposition of the House Tax and the outbreak of the 1898 War (113). Fabundeh's readiness to pay the tax (114), and the ability he displayed in the 1898 crisis to contain local opposition, suggest that even if the House Tax had been collected in Luawa in 1893, the people would not have taken to arms (115).

Before the War broke out in Mende country, many of the powerful Mende Mahangeisia sent messengers to beg Fabundeh to take part (116), but he refused, even though he must have been under considerable pressure (117). "I wisely told them of the existing Treaty between us", stated Fabundeh later, "and that I cannot and will not break any of the conditions in it" (118). And nowhere else has a better explanation
been provided of Fabundeh's determined loyalty to the British. Presumably he thought that his own position was too closely bound up with British authority for there to be any advantage in his revolting against the white-men. Perhaps he also realized that the British were militarily so strong that in the long run it would not be politically expedient to oppose them. Moreover, "Kailondo told Fabundeh that ... whenever the British came, either after his death or when he was alive, they should be allowed here, and should be given this place [Luawa]" (119). So Fabundeh was only following the wishes of his predecessor in supporting the British. Yet all this is largely conjecture; there is no conclusive evidence about the reasons for Fabundeh's loyalty to the British.

The Mende Mahanqeisia who did rise against the British warned Fabundeh that when Panguma had been captured (120), they would attack Luawa. Fabundeh later explained to the Governor that the other Mahanqeisia hated him not only because of his refusal to join in the War, but also "because (1) I have expressed my loyalty towards the British .... (2) I have built a barracks for your Government at Canray Lahoon which would greatly prevent them [i.e. the other Mahanqeisia] from making any plot against the Government .... (3) Because I not only assisted but went personally to the fight at Vahun when Capt: Fairtlough the then Ag. D.C. and O.C. routed the rebels" (121). This hatred of Fabundeh was also to be found among his own people. At the same as he faced external opposition, the Luawa Mahai had to counter unrest created within his polity by the faction opposed to his rule. The causes of this internal opposition are obscure. Both British and indigenous officials agreed that the British suppression of slave-trading annoyed many kpakoisia. "Fa Bundeh, Chief of Kanre Lahun
caused great discontent in his chiefdom during the rebellion by ordering it to support the Sierra Leone Government," wrote Governor Probyn, "which later was regarded with disfavour by a section of the native community on account of its policy of slave-repression" (122). Moses Allen, clerk to Chief Kutubu of Pendembu (123), was in a better position to get to the truth of the matter than most other informants who had their opinions recorded (124). He heard that some of Fabuhdeh's sub-chiefs were discontented when their ruler sided with the British in 1898, "chiefly because they knew that the Government was against slavery" (125). Possibly though, the slave-trading issue (126) was rather the pretext for opposition than the real reason. The sub-chiefs opposing their ruler may have simply believed that they would gain political advantage for themselves by opposing both Fabundeh and his supporters, the British. This would fit in with the suggestion that for his own part, Fabundeh remained loyal to the British partly because his own political future was inextricably tied up with their authority in the area. Thus, to support the British was to uphold Fabundeh as ruler; to oppose the British was to attempt to dislodge Fabundeh. The opposing sub-chiefs may also have been objecting to the limitations placed on their freedom of action by the imposition of British rule (127).

The geographical position of the opposition leaders' home-towns might suggest that the 'southern Kissi' (128) just south of the Moa River — round the towns of Mano-Sewalu, Dia, Kangama and Koindu — remained generally loyal to Fabundeh; whereas the Mende and Kissi people living to the south-east of Kailahun were unreliable in their allegiance (129). But even on this point, the evidence is not conclusive (130). The opposition faction which wanted Fabundeh to join in the fighting against the British was led by Sagba of Bewabu,
Ngewor Lengor of Baoma, Borbor Katewe of Bandajuma and Doissee of Ngiehun (131). Sub-chief Gandi of Dodo-Cotuma was also involved.

"There was actually a conspiracy against Fa Bundeh at the time", stated Moses Allen, "and Fa Bundeh sent to Major Blakeney for help: the ringleaders were sent down to Panguma, but Sub-Chief Gandi made submission to Fa Bundeh and was allowed to stop. This is the origin of the Gandi faction being desirous that the country should go to Liberia" (132). At the height of the 1893 crisis in Luawa, the garrison of fifty Frontier Police was withdrawn from the barracks in Kailahun (133): presumably they were recalled to Panguma to help Blakeney withstand the siege, the Frontier Police stores in Kailahun being placed under Fabundeh's care (134). For a few months, the Luawa Chief's position seemed desperate: "he nearly lost his life on several occasions" (135), and in one instance was actually taken from Kailahun and brought before the rebel chiefs at Ngiehun (136).

Fabundeh requested help from Blakeney and - presumably after British troops had relieved Panguma in June (137) - a contingent of Frontier Police was sent back to Kailahun. Five Mahangissia, including the leaders of the opposition faction who had been disloyal to Fabundeh (138), were arrested and sent to prison in Panguma (139). The Frontier Police stores which had been left in Kailahun throughout the crisis were found untouched (140) - a good indication that Fabundeh's control over his polity had never been broken. As Moses Allen said later, "Fa Bundeh ... was too strong so that the whole country ... remained loyal to the Government" (141). The rebels came very near to breaking the Chief's power, but never quite achieved it.

In late November and December 1893 (142), British troops were sent out from Freetown in three main sections to show the
flag (143) traversing the Protectorate by different routes. It was decided that Kailahun should be the rendezvous for all the columns of this Protectorate Expeditionary Force (144); and so late in January 1899, 78 Europeans with nearly a thousand soldiers (145) met in Kailahun. They spent the last days of January collaborating with Fabundeh's men against Kafula of Wunde (146) before they set out on the return march to Freetown. The presence of such a large force in Kailahun, clearly supporting the Luawa Mahawa, must have added greatly to his prestige - as well as taxing his material resources (147). But the 1898 War showed that, quite apart from British support, Fabundeh had in Luawa "sufficient authority in the country to restrain his people from joining it [i.e. the War] when all the country knew that there were no Frontiers available at that time to prevent them" (148).
Oral traditions are virtually unanimous in stating that Kafula's opposition to Luawa's rulers began only after the accession of Fabundeh (149); yet there is conclusive documentary evidence that Kafula was already in rebellion before Kailondo's death (150). An explanation of this apparent contradiction has already been suggested (151): before Kailondo's death, Kafula's opposition may have been inconstant and capricious, the behaviour of an erratic political opportunist (152); but after Fabundeh's accession, Kafula's opposition became total and settled, the main preoccupation of the Wunde Mahei (153).

The reason for the increased intensity of Kafula's opposition after 1896 seems clear: he wanted a larger share of Kailondo's estate (154), and probably his aim was to be ruler of Kailondo's polity. He was present at the funeral of Kailondo (155) and tried to take possession of the corpse (156). Before his death, the British had apparently given Kailondo a short staff (157) as an insignia of office. Everyone saw this staff, and believed it was very valuable (158). Presumably, too, both the Wunde and Luawa Mahangeisia considered the staff important as a symbol of overlordship over the whole of Kailondo's 'Greater Luawa' (159).

"This staff was with Kefu, Kailundu's mother", noted Mr. Hollins in his record of oral tradition (160), "at Kundo near Dukono, across the river Moa in Wunde. Chief Kafura ... advised her to hold it so as to keep the chiefship in her family" (161). If Kafula was wanting to become ruler of the whole area, it would have seemed to him obviously sensible to keep the staff on his side of the Moa River (162). Mr. Hollins added that Captain Fairtlough, the Frontier Police Officer at Panguma (163), arrested Kefu, brought her to
Kailahun and made her give up the staff, a move which greatly annoyed the people of Wunde, who threatened to fight against Fairtlough and Fabundeh (164). In his own despatches, Fairtlough made no mention of the staff dispute (165), but other evidence partly corroborates Mr. Hollins' account. "After Kailondo's death," stated Maada James Kailondo, "Kafula came and demanded the staff because it was the staff belonging to their relative. Fabundeh refused to give it. This is where the quarrel arose between Kafula and Fabundeh, because of this staff. This is how the war came about .... If Fabundeh had given it [i.e. the staff] to them [i.e. the Wunde people], there would have been no quarrel. They would not even have allowed Wunde to be part of French territory .... When we go there we ask our uncles to explain, and this is what they tell us" (166).

Seeing that Fabundeh was unwilling to give up the staff, Kafula began a series of raids against Luawa, destroying and plundering, and capturing as many as 30 women and children in a single raid (167). In March 1897 the Wunde Mahel invited Fabundeh to a conference at Sambalu near the banks of the River Moa (168). Fabundeh received information that Kafula's real intention was to kill him, and so for protection the Luawa Mahel took the Kailahun Frontier Police along to the meeting (169). Sure enough, Kafula appeared on the opposite bank with about 500 armed followers (170), and seeing that his stratagem had failed, "indulged in a great many threats against both police and Chief and stated his intention of destroying Kanre Lahun next month (April)" (171). Kafula's intention was shown as serious (172) when in April he began to construct a large number of rafts on the Moa River opposite Kailahun (173), with the obvious aim of invading Luawa. "Much alarm prevails at Kanre Lahun", reported Fairtlough, "and great
numbers of the inhabitants have fled [174]. I have in consequence been obliged to increase the detachment there to 9 men" (175).

Towards the end of April, Kafula's forces crossed the Moa and occupied several villages near to Kailahun, including Mofindor, "having driven out or captured such of the inhabitants as had remained loyal to him [i.e. to Fabundeh]" (176).

Fairtlough decided that the time had come to intervene and, having obtained permission from Cardew (177), he marched to Kailahun with Lieutenant Birch (178) and 50 Frontier Police (179). They arrived at Kailahun on 30 April, and this caused the Kissi people to withdraw north of the Moa (180). Fairtlough crossed the Moa himself, capturing and burning the towns of Kundo and Bompeh (181) before he returned to Kailahun. "As a result of this expedition a considerable number of the inhabitants of Kundo and Bompeh, crossed over the river and took refuge in Kanre Lahun, having resolved to resume their allegiance to Fa Bundo" (182) - an indication that at this stage the ordinary people of Wunde were not strongly opposed to the rule of Fabundeh (183). Even Kafula himself was not totally alienated from the Luawa Mahei, because after Fairtlough's return to Kailahun, Kafula "sent messengers down to Kanre Lahun, asking for pardon" (184). Kafula's apparent readiness for reconciliation would fit in with the oral tradition that the Wunde Mahei did not come seriously into conflict with the Luawa rulers until after a disagreement with Fabundeh in the early part of the latter's reign (185).

By October 1897, the opposition of the Wunde people to Fabundeh was growing more determined. Captain Blakeney, who had taken over from Fairtlough at Panguma (186), noted that Kundo had been rebuilt, the people were "threatening to raid the neighbouring
towns as soon as the dry season commences" (187), and a party of French soldiers had been seen in Kundo, though it was not clear in what capacity (188). Nevertheless, in early November (189), Sub-Inspector Taylor (190) was able to persuade Kafula and Fabundeh to meet each other at Woroma (191), and after the meeting the Police Officer confidently reported - as Fairtlough had done before him and as many others were to do after him! - that he had finally brought peace in the area (192).

There is very little documentary evidence or oral tradition concerning Kafula's relations with Fabundeh during 1898 (193), since the War within the Protectorate drew attention away from what was happening on the borders (194). However, when reports about Kafula's activities began again early in 1899 (195), they suggested that the Wunde Mahel's relations with Fabundeh had deteriorated rather than improved in the intervening year. In December 1898 the Wunde Kissi had invaded country west of the Mali River between Sandara and Kainkordu (196) and threatened the Frontier Police post at the latter town (197). Although this attack was not directed specifically against Fabundeh, it could hardly fail to affect him, since he was the leading Mahel in the area (198) - indeed, Fabundeh was deeply affected by all of Kafula's activities in these years. Blakeney associated the December 1898 invasion with the 1893 War (199). "This raid on the part of the Kissis", he reported to Cardew (200), "was probably due in the first instance to their having been invited by the insurgents in Panguma district to assist them against our Government." Blakeney explained that Bukowi (201), the Mahel of Woroma town (202), continued to be hostile to the British even after the collapse of Mende opposition round Panguma (203). When Frontier Police destroyed his town - presumably in late 1893 (204) - he fled to Kissi country, and
THE LUAWA AREA AS DEPICTED ON THE 1895 MAP OF SIERRA LEONE

The pencilled additions on this map were made by Lt. A. Becke, R.A., who went on the Blakeney-Atkins anti-Kissi expedition in December 1898 (see Chap.4, Note 196, p.333 of this thesis).
Clearly by early 1899 Kafu'a's forces were not only subdued, but were taking increasingly fierce military action against Fabundeh's people. One reason for this increased military activity may have been that since the arrest of Nyagua at Panguma "most of his i.e. Nyagua's chiefs have joined Kafre i.e. Kafula & help him in his attacks on the friendly chiefs i.e. chiefs friendly to the British" (220). These ex-lieutenants of Nyagua included Nyagua's son, Mogboi (221); his principal war-leader Woni (222); and "a notorious slave raider" Bundo (223). Kafula was also supported by some local Mende knakoisia, the leader of whom remained Bukowi (224).

The arrival of the main part of the British Expeditionary Force in Kailahun on 24th January 1899 (225) was the signal for even more extensive operations against the Kissi people. In the next few days several columns crossed the Moa River into Wunde and marched through the area (226). The culmination of this activity came at the very end of the month. "On 28 inst:" wrote Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, "a force under my command, consisting of 2½ Companies 1/W.A. Regt. (227) with a detachment R.A. & Maxim, marched to Kenhema (228), the turbulent chief Kafura's headquarters, & destroyed the town, only slight opposition being met with, thus showing the effect that the various columns traversing the country has had. The force returned here Kailahun on 30 inst." (229). Yamandu, possibly after Kissi Kenema the largest town in the Wunde area, was also burnt down by Cunningham's forces (230). The Expeditionary Force finally left Kailahun for Freetown on 3 February (231), and Cunningham was well-satisfied with the results of his work in Kissi country. "I don't think there will be further need of
another expedition against the Gissis", he reported, because "Kafura's power is broken" (232). Cunningham, however, was wrong. Like many military men, he presumed that if the enemy leader was defeated 'in the field', it meant he had been broken; but if the bulk of the people in his territory support the enemy leader, no amount of military defeats will break his power. So it was with Kafula (233). "One who was there" (234) enthusiastically described how "a permanent peace had been ensured" by the British Expeditionary Force, "and that too on the borders at all times notoriously difficult to pacify" (235). But even Cunningham recognized that the defeat of Kafula was not to be equated with the re-establishment of peace in the Luawa area; all he had achieved was an alteration in the local balance of military power, so that by February 1899, Fabundeh's forces were "operating single handed against the Kissis", whereas before they had been in "a state of trepidation" (236). 'Pacification' in the Luawa-Wunde area at this time was simply an illusion in the minds of Freetown and London officials, which had little or nor basis in reality (237).

Not surprisingly, then, before the end of March 1899, there was further 'trouble' from the Wunde Kissia (238). D.C. Ferguson at Panguma reported that he had inflicted "a severe lesson" on the Kissia in reprisal for a raid they had made (239); on his own initiative, he organized quite a large expedition of 25 Frontier Police and 100 'friendlies' under Ganawa, one of Fabundeh's sub-chiefs (240) to Koraro, "3 days' march into Liberia & about 20 miles further E. than Kenema" (241), burning 6 towns on the way (242). Ferguson's report, however, suggested that his own behaviour had precipitated this fighting as much as the behaviour of the Kissia. He stated that he organized his expedition after some Kissi people had gone "into the lower Konnoch
country & attacked one of Fa Bundu's towns i.e. Yomandu" (243). The only 'Yomandu' (or Yamandu) within or near to Luawa was a town in Wunde (244) which was not under Fabundeh's jurisdiction (245) and was officially in Liberian territory (246) - and almost certainly this was the place Ferguson was describing (247). So the Panguma DG's expedition was both technically illegal (248) and circumstantially unjustified (249). Acting Governor Nathan (250) in Freetown apparently recognized this and gave instructions "that these desultory British operations by small forces in Liberian territory should cease" (251).

Although Ferguson was unable to see that his own actions were fomenting disturbance in the area, he quickly - and rightly - concluded that "the almost daily encroachments of the French in this part of the country" (252) were producing precisely the opposite of 'pacification'. With 200 men posted at Kissidougou (253), the French were sending throughout Kissi country expeditions which had little positive result apart from increasing military activity in the area (254).

The French were tending to support Kafula against Fabundeh (255), whilst the British tended to support Fabundeh against Kafula (256). In April 1900 (257), according to a report by one of Fabundeh's spies (258), French 'native soldiers' in the Wunde area were declaring that "as Chief Farbunda is helping the English, Kurfarah i.e. Kafula, the Ghizi Kissi chief, says he is going to assist the French against the English" (259). Apparently the rift which had occurred between Kafula and the French late in 1896 (260) had been repaired by this time. Thus was created a situation in which neither of the two local rulers could achieve decisive military victory, though both were protected from complete defeat by their respective European sympathizers. The main losers in this state of affairs were, as usual,
the ordinary people of Luawa and Wunde, who found themselves caught up in the military operations of four different forces — those of Fabundeh and Kafula, and of the British and French (261).

This state of affairs remained basically unchanged for almost 6 years, from early 1899 until early 1905. Periodic reports indicated perpetual unrest in the area (262), caused by British and French actions almost as much as by Fabundeh or Kafula. Although the Wunde people were worse affected than those in Luawa (263), the latter also suffered. In June 1900, for example, Kafula raided and burnt four of Fabundeh's towns, taking away about a hundred prisoners (264); the following month, four more towns were burnt down (265). British officials withheld active military support from Fabundeh, but encouraged him to fight Kafula himself. Captain Legg, the D.C. Panguma, wrote to Fabundeh telling him that he was "quite justified in sending his war-boys to check this aggression of Kafula's Kissis"; but the Frontiers should take no part whatever" (266). Governor Cardew decided "to present Farbundo with 100 lbs of gunpowder to provide for the more effectual defence of his country" (267), and to strengthen the Frontier Police station at Kailahun to 20 privates so that it could be "defended if attacked" (268). Frontier Police should not, however, pursue Kafula's soldiers into Liberian territory, "leaving that to be done by Farbundo's warboys" (269).

18 months later (270) the position had not materially altered. After a tour through the Protectorate, Governor King-Harman (271) summarized the situation in the Luawa area in March 1902: "the country bordering on what is supposed to be the eastern boundary of the British Protectorate is in a very disturbed condition; owing to raids made by the tribe of Kissis which inhabit the country across the Meli river
in what is indicated in the map as Liberian territory .... I am careful to avoid any chance of collision with the French, and I am therefore unable to give adequate protection to the unfortunate people in our territory who are periodically raided and devastated by the Kissis .... French soldiery are marching about the country, and although I cannot positively state that they are assisting the Kissis, they undoubtedly afford them a certain amount of moral and material protection .... the French authorities do not appear to be specifically particular about the matter and their troops are met in parts of the country where it is exceedingly doubtful whether they have any right to be" (272).

As if to illustrate the Governor's point, Kafula's forces attacked Kouloumba, a small West African Frontier Force (273) post in the Moa-Meli interfluve, three times between March and May 1902 (274). In 1896, Cardew had accepted that Kouloumba was part of the territory ruled by Fabundeh (275), so Major Anderson, D.C. Panguma (276) and Captain Eames of the W.A.F.F. made a retaliatory raid against a nearby Kissi town on 16 May 1902 (277). But this did not prevent the Kissis fighting a determined engagement three days later (278), as a result of which W.A.F.F. outposts were increased in this area (279). Anderson believed that French 'native soldiers' were employed on the Kissi side (280), and his supportive evidence was fairly conclusive. A Kissi prisoner taken on 16 May stated that he had been one of about a dozen 'native soldiers' who had attached themselves to Kafuri a Kissi Chief and had "been assisting him in the raids for the past six months .... More soldiers have come down from Kissidougou lately " (281). This last statement was confirmed by another prisoner: "About three weeks ago Kafuri had sent to the French Commandant at Kissidougou for assistance and a party of French soldiers had just arrived" (282).
Anderson asked the Governor to "protest against the presence of French soldiers in Liberian territory" (283): the Panguma D.C. apparently believed that Kafula was able to cause so much disturbance partly because he "obtained assistance from the Commandant of Kissidougou(284)". King-Harman, however, saw that another factor was involved. Anderson and Eames "have been under the delusion", wrote the Governor (285), "that an armed expedition into Liberia for the purpose of punishing the Kissis was imperatively necessary .... and I am inclined to think that it has been the object of Captain Eames and of one or two others to endeavour to force my hand in this direction" (286). King-Harman thought that the seriousness of the disturbances was being deliberately exaggerated, and that possibly his subordinates were provoking the Kissia into an armed rising by unnecessary military activity.

Whether or not this was true of Anderson and Eames, the behaviour of some junior British officials left no one in doubt that they were deliberately stirring up trouble in the Luawa area in order to have the opportunity of engaging in the excitement of war for its own sake. For instance, Lieutenant Cockburn was left in charge of a garrison in Kouloumba in mid-July 1902 (237). By the end of the same month, in direct disobedience to orders (238), he had initiated a raid into Liberian territory against the Kissia, although they had offered no provocation (239). "It is very clear to me", reported Captain Warren, Cockburn's Commanding Officer (230), "that Lt. Cockburn fully made up his mind to have a fight with the KISSIES whatever happened" (291). Significantly, however, no report of Cockburn's atavistic behaviour ever reached the London Colonial Office (292).

Perhaps Cockburn was just one example among others in this period of British soldier-officials (293) who deliberately
precipitated warfare in the Luawa area with the hope of gaining an opportunity to demonstrate their military prowess (294). But when the fighting was over, no report was ever made — or at least no report ever reached senior British officials; and therefore no description of it occurs in the colonial histories to mar the account of British 'pacification'.

By mid-1903 the Wunde people seemed to have accepted that the French were their rulers, and that the Mali was the boundary between French territory to the east and British territory to the west (although technically the area east of the Mali was part of Liberia — 295). A 'native guide' explained to the British Lieutenant Cox (296) the extent of French influence in Wunde by 1903: "The French, he said, took taxes from ... all the towns in the neighbourhood to the east of the Mali. They came on patrol twice a year and went as far south as Kanema .... Kaffra [Kafula] himself paid tax, he said" (297). Wunde was a devastated area by this time, with towns deserted and farms overgrown (298). By comparison, Fabundeh's Luawa seemed a haven of peace. The villages of Sambalu, Mofindor, and Fanyahun (299) were "all prosperous and contented with their women and children sitting about on the farms, and active preparations everywhere in the fields for the sowing of the next crop; a more striking contrast could hardly have been devised" (300). This description was written by Captain H.D. Pearson, Anglo-Liberian Boundary Commissioner (301); like many other European officials he exaggerated the degree of peaceful prosperity on the one hand and anarchic devastation on the other (302). It is true that, largely through the efforts of Fabundeh (303), Luawa retained some of the prosperity and good order which it had known under Kai-londo: but the mahawai did not experience a settled peace.
Chief Fabundeh in late 1904 graphically described to the Panguma DC the disruption caused by Kafula in Luawa; and the DC transmitted the information to Freetown (304). "Chief Fa Bundoh has been so constantly raided and had so many people shot or carried off that he is quite unable to fix dates with any certainty except the following: In December 1904 (sic; presumably 1903 is meant (305)) the Kissis burnt Tamba Kundu and Sembahun (306). Many people were killed and taken prisoners, actual number uncertain. The same month they caught three people who have escaped since. In March the Kissis shot 6 people fishing in the Moa R. and three people were captured at Damballa (307). The Kissis are now constantly in ambush near the Moa R. firing and preventing people from crossing or fishing.

Fa Bundoh has had over 20 towns destroyed and has given me the names of 110 people killed or captured - he says this is only half the number" (308). In December 1904, Kafula made two more raids "in which several were killed and 18 people carried off by the Kissis as slaves" (309).

Naturally Kafula's raids mainly affected Fabundeh and the ordinary people of Luawa; but by 1904 the Wunde Mahsi was as eager for warfare against the British as against Fabundeh, and in the last days of the year, he attacked the WAFF outpost at Kouloumba, killing two people and wounding three others (310). A Kissi prisoner, taken on 29 December, stated, "Kafura wants war with the White Man, but says the white man does not agree to give him war" (311). By this time, Kafula had obtained "a considerable number of trade guns and powder" (312), and it was estimated that he "could put into the field some 5,000 war-boys, of whom 2,000 were thus armed" (313). British inactivity possibly encouraged Kafula to over-estimate the strength of his own position, and perhaps he also relied too much on French protection (314). Whatever the reasoning
behind Kafula's aggressive policy, his attacks on Fabundeh's territory in December 1904 proved to be a serious mistake. They galvanized Governor Probyn (315) - who was usually cautious to the point of timidity in making political decisions (316) - into initiating swift and decisive military measures against Kafula (317). He sent 300 soldiers of the WAFF into Kissi country in Liberia under Major Palmer's command (318), "with instructions to operate in a belt of country not exceeding 25 miles in width between deg. 8° 22' and 9° 3' of latitude, and to remain there until Chief Kafura is defeated or captured (319)."

I propose authorizing Major Palmer to give the friendly natives in that portion of Liberia a guarantee that they will be protected in future from Chief Kafura and his allies. This guarantee will involve troops remaining in that part of Liberia indefinitely" (320). This action could not have been pleasing to the French officials who, long before, had virtually annexed the area: but President Barclay in Monrovia agreed to the operation of British troops, and this area still belonged technically to Liberia (321), so there was little that the French could do.

The WAFF Kissi Field Force began on 25 March operations which ceased on 28 June 1905 (322). From the point of view of British officials in Freetown, Major Palmer conducted this 3-month campaign with efficiency and success (323); from the point of view of the ordinary people of Wunde, he simply added to the amount of warfare in the area and to their general misery by his "deliberate offensive movement" (324). "I have burnt 24 towns and obtained supplies in ample quantity for the force," noted the Commanding Officer on 4 April 1905. "Kenema (Kafura's capital) was taken and destroyed on 29 March, but Kafura himself escaped" (325). "I am pursuing the policy of destruction of towns and supplies beyond my requirements, in this manner bringing home in practical shape to the people and subchiefs the penalties of raiding English territory" (326).
By June, Palmer decided "to establish one garrison only in the Kissi country" (327) in order to maintain peace in the area. "The place selected is Wulade, a town of 56 houses, situated about one mile to the West of the Mafessa river, and commanding all the fords over that river. On the other side of the river, Kafura has taken refuge" (329).

Despite the British occupation, the majority of Wunde people continued to support Kafula - not surprisingly in view of Palmer's methods. The British failure to gain mass support in Wunde meant that in order to guarantee the authority of their 'puppet' chiefs (330) and the whole political settlement, a permanent military garrison had to be established in the area (331). Governor Probyn's comments in July, though optimistic in tone, indicated the shape of things to come: "considerable advance has been made towards forming a system of tribal government in the Kissi country antagonistic to Kafura and of sufficient strength to resist his return. Should the whole of the Frontier Force quit Kissi at this stage, there would be a grave danger that Kafura would return and finding that the new tribal government has not had time to become firmly established, would re-assert his old authority. It is therefore necessary that Major Palmer should remain in the Kissi country" (332).

Consequently, in 1906-07, the headquarters of the WAFF was moved from Freetown to Daru, at a point where the Moa railway bridge provided an easy river crossing: the railway line also provided reasonably good communications with Freetown (333). With headquarters at Daru, British troops could quickly enter Kissi country, which was the most disturbed part of the Protectorate at this time (334), in order to quell armed uprisings, and particularly in order to provide logistic support for the
British garrison at Wulade (335). The person who stood to gain most political advantage from this move to Daru was Fabundeh, who could now hope for British military support against Luawa's enemies; but, at least until 1911, that hope proved to be largely unfulfilled (336). Nevertheless, the establishment of a British garrison in Wunde and of the WAFF H.Q. at Daru meant that, after nearly a decade of disturbance, Fabundeh's Luawa at least ceased to suffer from the attacks of Kafula's Kissia. The Luawa Mahel still had to be on his guard. For example, towards the end of 1905 Kafula tried "to persuade some of the chiefs in the eastern part of Fa Bunda's country to help him get his country back .... Fa Bunda punished one chief severely who had accepted presents from Kafura" (337). But, with the British in control of Wunde, there were no more of the endless raids into Luawa from the north bank of the Moa.

The fortunes of the British garrison at Wulade after 1905 are not directly relevant to the subject of this study (338). Briefly, the British force fairly easily prevented the outbreak of serious fighting within Wunde over the next 6 years (339), but Kafula remained at large in the area outside British control (340) and gradually came into firm alliance with the French (341). The majority of the Wunde Kissia remained loyal to Kafula (342), partly because of the methods used by the British troops to enforce obedience to the 'puppet' chiefs they had created (343). In 1908, the whole situation was radically changed by the Liberian cession of Wunde to the French (344). The British recognized that they should withdraw their own troops from Wulade in favour of the French (345), though it was only 3 years later that the withdrawal actually took place (346). The British hoped that when they withdrew, the French would not allow Kafula to return to Wunde (347); but in fact within a short time Kafula's family was back in power (348).
The only positive achievement in Wunde between 1890 and 1911 was a 6-year period of peace, beginning in 1905, and even that was achieved only by the forcible removal from Wunde of the ruler who was recognized and supported by the majority of the people (349). Before that, from his accession until 1905, Fabundeh was faced with increasingly large raids on his territory resulting in growing unrest within Luawa due to Kafula's activities; and no one could believe that the colonial rulers had 'pacified' the area. Rather, Anglo-French competition in the area had provided Kafula with ideal conditions for his military aggression. Prior to 1895, before the arrival of the Europeans in force, Kafula was unable to cause serious disturbance within Luawa; but after 1896, partly by playing off one European power against another, Kafula gained a new impunity with which to raid Fabundeh's territory (350) and to cause the Luawa Nahi acute problems. However, the most serious threat to Fabundeh did not come from Kafula and the Wunde Kissia at all, but from the Americo-Liberians and their Government in Monrovia (351).
3. **LUAWA AND NEW INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES, 1896 -1906**

Until 1895 in the Luawa area, there were no international boundaries which were generally recognized by the Euro-Americans (352). By 1889 Anglo-French agreements had given some sort of definition to the north-western boundaries of the British 'protected area' behind the Colony of Sierra Leone (353); and in 1885 an Anglo-Liberian agreement had established the River Mano as the south-eastern boundary near the coast (354). But the 1885 agreement did not make clear how far the boundary line continued inland up the river valley — whether it could be produced as far as the Luawa area or not (355). Sir Harry Johnston noted that the continuation of the boundary line into the interior "was defined in such extraordinarily vague language that its purport could have been clear to no one" (356). In 1891, with British Government approval, T.J. Alldridge travelled as far east as the town of Kpandeme, seeking to make treaties with local rulers (357); although Kpandeme itself was situated well to the eastern or Liberian side of the Mano (358). In January 1895, however, it was accepted that longitude 13 degrees west of Paris \( \approx \) approximately 10 degrees 40 minutes west of Greenwich (359) formed the Anglo-Liberian boundary through the country ruled by Kailondo (360).

Several features of this 1895 settlement demonstrated at once what a crude and unsatisfactory boundary had been created. The frontier was simply a straight mathematical line, bearing no relation to the human or physical geography of the area (361): it would be difficult to demarcate on the ground (362) and impossible to police (363). Since no accurate astronomical observations had ever been made in the area, no one even knew, at the time when the settlement was made, precisely where
the boundary ran on the ground (364). The British had not really taken effective possession of their side of the boundary (366). The strangest feature of all concerning this new Anglo-Liberian boundary was that it was first defined in an Anglo-French Treaty (367) rather than in an Anglo-Liberian agreement. The Monrovia Government was simply informed later about the decision of the French and the British concerning the Anglo-Liberian frontier (368). The relevant passage in the Anglo-French Treaty read as follows:

"It is accordingly understood that from the point of intersection of the watershed separating the basin of the Niger on the one hand from the basins of the rivers flowing westwards to the Atlantic Ocean on the other hand, with the parallel of latitude passing through Tembi-kunda, the frontier of the Colony of Sierra Leone is formed by the said parallel as far as the 13th degree of longitude west of Paris, and then by that meridian until it meets the Anglo-Liberian frontier" (369).

If the Commissioners themselves understood the precise implications of this statement, it is doubtful whether, given the limited geographical knowledge of the area in 1895, very many other people did (370). No attempt was made in the map appended to the Treaty, to illustrate the territorial implications of the statement (371) which, without the help of a map, must have been almost meaningless.

Within a few months of the signing of the 1895 Treaty, however, its consequences for Kailondo's polity had become clear to British officials. On 13 May 1895, Cardew wrote about Kailondo's Luawa to the London Colonial Office, pointing out that "a large section of his district comprising perhaps the most important part falls within Liberian territory .... I venture to suggest that if practicable a readjustment be made of the frontier ... so as to include within British territory the whole of Kai Lundu's district" (372). Although Kailondo had signed an agreement with Alldridge in 1890 that the whole of his territory should be in friendship with the British (373), the 1895 frontier split Kailondo's Luawa in two, placing the major part (including Kailahun
town) in Liberia (374).

For several years the 1895 boundary settlement had almost no practical effects on the ruler and people of Luawa. No Liberian official arrived in Luawa (375); British administrators continued to visit the area (376), and the British Frontier Mice barracks (later the WAFF barracks) in Kailahun were maintained as before (377). Slowly, however, Fabundeh and his people were made aware that much of Luawa was officially in Liberia. By 1900, they had noticed two practical results: on the one hand, they were not asked to pay the British House Tax for any towns east of the 1895 boundary line (378); on the other hand, the British military forces were not permitted to protect the people from raiders who lived to the east of Luawa (379), since that area was in Liberian territory (380). But until 1903, the people of Luawa probably noticed French encroachments north of the Moa as the main change in the relations of the 'foreign powers' around their country (381).

By 1903, the Mendeleisia and Kissia in the area accepted that the River Meli marked in practice the boundary between British territory to the west and French territory to the east (382). As successive British Governors and up-country officials pointed out, the French had no legal right, south of the latitude of Tembikundo, to be anywhere near the Meli (383), since the French Government had accepted, in the 1895 Treaty, that "the frontier-line between the French possessions and the Republic of Liberia is fixed by the parallel of Tembi-kunda until it meets, at the 13th degree of longitude west of Paris, the Anglo-French frontier of Sierra Leone" (384). However, the French military officers at Kissidougou (385) showed little respect for this provision, and their soldiers traversed all the country as far south as the Moa, and as far west as the Meli (386). It required little foresight on the part of the Luawa people to understand that if the eastern part of their
polity was annexed to Liberia, within a few years the real rulers in that area would be the French. The French had previously refrained from encroaching on Luawa simply because of the presence of British troops there, not because of the theoretical sovereignty of the Monrovia Government over part of it (387).

In May 1903, the first Liberian officials to reach Luawa arrived with the Anglo-Liberian Boundary Commission in order to demarcate the boundary line (388), and the Liberian Commissioner, Captain Williams, took the opportunity to hoist the Liberian flag in Kailahun (389). He brought with him a hundred Liberian soldiers, though "they did not dare to march through their own country, but came all the way through the Protectorate" (390). For the next three years there was very little change in British and Liberian relations in Luawa. After Captain Williams' brief visit, it seems no other Liberian official visited Kailahun until 1906. Governor Proby in Freetown occasionally referred in despatches to the potentially difficult situation in the Luawa area and presented the London Colonial Office with a variety of solutions. Would serious consideration be given to the possibility of annexing part of Kissi country (391)? Perhaps the British Government would lease part of Liberian territory (392)? What about "the idea of a complete or partial partition" of Liberia between Britain and France (393)? The London officials treated the Governor's despatches with a mixture of scorn and irritation, and summarily dismissed his suggestions (394).

Probyn reported in June 1906 that the Liberian Government was trying to prevent the sale of Liberian rubber at Baiima, the terminus of the Sierra Leone railway (395); but "the Rubber Corporation of Liberia pay 1ld per lb for rubber for which the Mandingo traders at Baiima were previously getting 3/- per lb" (396). Yet the Liberian
officials were both unwilling and unable to exert much pressure in any
direction. "Mr. Quinton, an agent of the Corporation was recently at
Kailahun", reported Probyn in August (397), "and, as he did not attempt
to take any effective steps to enforce the rights of the Rubber Corpora-
tion, his visit was a pleasant one .... As long as the officials of the
Corporation and of the Liberian Government merely visit Kanre Lahun for
inspection purposes, I am confident that Major Palmer (398) will be
able to arrange that no trouble will take place". And provided no trouble
occurred in Luawa, British officials were reasonably content simply to
maintain the statu quo. This was not true, however, of Chief Fabundeh
and his people. They wanted a radical change of the 1895 international
boundary, because it divided Luawa into two parts (399), placing the
major portion under the control of a capricious and ineffective Government
(400), and also threatening entanglements with the French (401).

The Chief of Luawa pursued a double objective in his
relations with the all-powerful foreigners who had divided Luawa: first
to maintain Luawa as an undivided political unit; and second to prevent
Luawa being drawn into the Liberian sphere of influence. Fabundeh had
strongly supported the British ever since his accession, presumably
considering them to be the 'least of the evils' with which he was faced
(402): realizing he could not escape domination by one of the Foreign
Powers, he was determined to be ruled by the British rather than by the
Liberians or the French (403). More than that, Fabundeh was determined
to maintain the territorial integrity of his country as a single unit (404).

Chief Fabundeh made these objectives abundantly clear in
a series of at least four petitions (405), which he sent to the Freetown
Government in 1900 and 1906 (406). "May your rule", the Luawa Chief wrote
to the Panguma DC, "extend over all my country where thousands are desirous
of being as they were during the past 10 years loyal British subjects" (407). "We ... give our country to the English Government as we are in time past .... We sign our treaty with the English Government not with the American [i.e. Liberian] or with the French Government" (403). "I am quite sure that if England will not take my country I will not let Liberians sit down in my Country I will drive them. The land is mine and I will not give it to Liberia" (409). "Officials simply told us [in 1903] that a portion of our country was lying on the Liberian border and their not ascertaining to know from us what Government we belong to or to see our treaty made us to be more surprised as such an action was looked upon as being quite contrary to arrangement made with Mr. Alldridge" (410).

The first petition in 1900 was signed by 20 patimahanga (411), and this large number of signatories probably demonstrated the large amount of popular support which the Luawa Chief commanded among his own people (412). The signatories included a considerable number of the most outstanding Kissi leaders from the country to the east of Luawa (413) - Koli Tungi from Gbandewulo (414), Ganawa from Kangama (415), Kongo from Damballa (416), and Towed, of Foya (417). In view of later developments the inclusion of Gandi of Sandialu was noteworthy (418), as was the absence of Kongoni, Fabundeh's right-hand man and leading warrior (419). The list of signatories even included Faba of Kamatahun, one of the Gbande leaders (420). By contrast, the fourth and last petition contained only eight signatures apart from that of Fabundeh, and all those eight represented towns near to Kailahun and contained no Kissi signatory (421). This may reflect a real decline in the amount of support which Fabundeh could command. The impression of declining support for Fabundeh is confirmed in Probyn's
reply to the petition of November 1906 (422): "you must make friends with the many subchiefs who are now enemies to you, such as Kongonay [i.e. Kongoni], and get them all to combine with you in making the country strong and self-supporting" (423). Thus by the end of 1906, Fabundeh seemed not only to have failed to gain his objectives, but also to be losing much of his popularity among his own people (424).

As well as writing petitions, Fabundeh took action in several other directions in an effort to achieve his aims. In 1900, with characteristic astuteness, the Luawa Chief discovered a means by which even the payment of taxes could be turned to his own political advantage. Although the British demanded tax only for 'British Luawa' (to the west of the thirteenth meridian), Fabundeh volunteered to pay tax for various towns and villages within Liberian territory to the east of the international boundary (425). An unsuspecting DC (426) accepted this extra tax money from the Luawa Chief, who thus managed to foist on a reluctant Freetown Government some sort of responsibility for the eastern part of Luawa (427). By this clever means, Fabundeh was almost able to establish British possession over an area which British officials themselves had accepted as being part of Liberia. However, Governor Cardew was ultimately informed that it had been a mistake to accept so much tax money from Fabundeh (428), and the money collected from places in Liberian territory was returned to the Chief (429). In a despatch concerning this matter, Cardew explained that Fabundeh, "who is very loyal to the Government, possesses territory on both sides of the Frontier and was no doubt anxious to pay tax in order that he might receive full protection from the Kissi tribe on the Liberian side whose Chief Kafura is very hostile to him" (430). But the Governor's explanation was
incomplete. The need for protection was probably a less serious matter for Fabundeh than the question of which Power was to possess sovereignty over the part of Luawa east of the thirteenth meridian (431) - the existence of the polity being, after all, a more fundamental matter than its defence.

Having failed to achieve a British take-over by surreptitious means, the Luawa Mahei turned his attention to his own people and the dwindling support he was experiencing (432). Apparently it was especially in Kissi country that opinion was divided over whether to support Fabundeh and the British on the one hand, or the Liberians on the other (433). The Luawa Mahei gained the support of Kongo of Damballa (434), who was by this time the leading Kissi chief apart from Kafula (435), in calling a meeting of all the Kissi within and to the east of Luawa (436). The meeting was probably held in the first years of the twentieth century (437): certainly it took place at Konosu in Tengea (438). Ndawua, the chief of Konosu (439), was sent to the meeting as Fabundeh's representative in order to ask the people, "How are we going to manage? These two groups of people have come - the Liberians and the English: on which side shall we be? .... Let us build all together, the whole of Kissi on one side" (440). Unfortunately, however, during the festivities and dancing which accompanied this meeting, Ndawua accidentally shot a boy while firing a gun (441). This mishap caused the meeting to break up in disorder before any decision had been taken (442). Thus the Kissi people remained disunited, some supporting Fabundeh in his loyalty to the British, others opposing him (443).

Late in 1906, Fabundeh took the extreme step of announcing his intention to move his headquarters from Kallahun to Ngishun, the latter town being within British territory (444). The Luawa Chief no doubt hoped
to impress both the British officials and his own people with the seriousness of the situation. Governor Probyn was certainly disturbed by this announcement, and thought that as a result "in the Liberian portion of Chief Fa Bundeh's chiefdom, a serious unrest will be brought about, and also there will be an outbreak of tribal warfare" (445). In fact, however, Fabundeh never carried out his threat - realizing perhaps that such a move would further diminish his authority over his own people, while leaving the Freetown officials unmoved about taking action on the boundary issue (446).

By early 1907 it seemed that Fabundeh had no hope of keeping Luawa intact. His diplomatic bargaining power was negligible, and the 1895 boundary had been accepted by the three Foreign Powers, two of whom had recently demonstrated their power by dividing almost the whole of West Africa between them. In drawing international boundary lines, France and Britain had paid little or no attention to the wishes of local rulers infinitely more powerful than Fabundeh or Kailondo (447). Why, then, should they bother to pay any attention to Fabundeh's wishes? By the turn of the century, everyone concerned - except Fabundeh and his people - had recognized that by far the largest part of Fabundeh's territory, including his capital of Kailahun, rightly belonged to Liberia. In 1903 the existing boundary was clearly defined on the ground, and hence confirmed as final, by an Anglo-Liberian Boundary Commission (448). There was little reason for thinking that this boundary would ever be revised (449). The arrival in Kailahun of a Liberian administrator early in 1907 (450) seemed to drive the final nail into the coffin of Fabundeh's political hopes.
Between 1907 and 1911, Fabundeh gained his main political objectives. This achievement must rank as one of the most remarkable incidents during the European partition of West Africa; possibly it was unique (451). The significance of Fabundeh's achievement was not recognized either at the time or since because European administration and historians saw developments in Luawa as simply a struggle for political domination between Britain, France, and Liberia (452). This struggle certainly provided one element in the situation, yet ultimately the determining factor in the events of 1907 to 1911 was the inflexible will of Fabundeh and his people to stay united under British control. In those four crucial years, the Luawa Chief was able to win the political initiative in the whole situation to such an extent that the final settlement in 1911 was satisfactory to no one but Fabundeh and the Luawa people (453). For the British, the 1911 settlement represented a compromise (454), for the Liberians, a defeat (455); for the French, a disappointment (456); for Fabundeh and his people it was a victory, a vindication of their fifteen-year struggle to be a single united polity within the Sierra Leone Protectorate. To achieve this victory, the Luawa Mahai had to contend with considerable internal dissension within Luawa (457), in addition to all the various external pressures.

The arrival of the Liberian Lieutenant Lomax in Kailahun in early 1907 heralded the start of the four-year crisis which ended in such remarkable success for the Luawa Chief (458). Lomax had once before been in the Luawa area. "In 1901 I had a letter from a Mr. Lomax", noted
DG Anderson several years later, "who signed himself Lieutenant de Cercle Interieure and written from a town south of Kanre Lahun. I found out afterwards that he was a prisoner, and had been carried there by Chief Baromah ∫Mbawulomeh ∏ ∏ (459).

On 9 January 1907, Lieutenant Gill, commanding a WAFF Company in Kailahun, reported that "at 1.15 p.m. today a patrol of 40 Liberian soldiers under Command of lst. Lieutenant Lomax entered Kanrelahun .... I had previously warned the Chief Fa Bunda to offer him no opposition, and to let him have whatever rice he required. In Lieutenant Lomax I found a man of considerable education and inclined to be friendly .... I learnt that he is patrolling the Liberian frontier with a view to establishing a series of Military Posts for customs work. He started from Monrovia with 200 men but has left detachments here and there on his way .... He intends to commission a Paramount Chief here, to be selected by the local natives, under the Liberian Government. I think the local natives are practically certain to elect Fa Bunda, but as he does not wish to be subject to any rule but the British, the situation will require delicate handling" (460). Sir Harry Johnston, meeting Lomax in Kailahun several weeks later (461) was impressed by the Liberian's character in a similar way to Lieutenant Gill: "Lieutenant Lomax is one of the few Liberian officials I have met of whom I can speak in terms of genuine commendation. He is a young half-caste, with perhaps a larger proportion of white than of negro blood in his veins. He has received a good education at Sierra Leone, and has, I think, been in Europe also. His best qualification is his remarkable knowledge of native languages, and as the result he is a good deal liked and trusted by the native Chiefs .... Lomax is a person rather easily hurt in his susceptibilities, if any attempt is made to treat him as a negligible quantity. He was, however, so completely won over by the kindness of his reception at the hands of all the British officers in this region that he
showed himself completely amenable to our advice and suggestions ..." (462).

These estimates of Lomax are surprising in view of subsequent British and African reports about his behaviour.

Before the end of January, Lomax had started to come into conflict with the British and the local people. "Lieut. Lomax contends," wrote Gill from Kailahun, "that practically all goods coming into Liberia are dutiable and that certain goods, e.g. Spirits and tobacco, cannot be sold without a licence from the Liberian Government. He gave no notice of this to the inhabitants or traders coming here but, on any of these goods being brought here, they are seized by the first Liberian soldier who sees them and handed over to a receiving officer" (463). When Acting Governor Haddon-Smith visited Kailahun in February with Sir Harry Johnston (464) he was apparently able to settle the difficulties arising out of Lomax' actions; although, observed the Acting Governor, "the occupation of the town by two different forces, the one administering, the other evidently protecting, is an anomaly which, I am of opinion, should cease as soon as possible" (465).

If some of the Kailahun people at first favoured the Liberians rather than the British, they were soon alienated by the behaviour of Lomax, who became interested in one of Fabundeh's most-loved wives (466). "This man has come here", people reported to the Luawa Chief, "and is trying to convince you to be for the Liberians, but now he is tampering with your wives" (467). Moreover, Lomax' Liberian soldiers, whom Sir Harry Johnston described as "an undisciplined rabble of rascallions" (468), were quickly alienating an already - suspicious local populace (469). When five Liberians were sent to Koindu in Kissi country (470) in March 1907 to collect a debt, two were killed, one was wounded, and two were
taken prisoner (471), the Kissia insisting that "they didn't want any Soldiers, Susus or Mendis there" (472). The British Captain Bond of the WAFF "received complaints of looting and of illtreatment of natives by Liberian soldiers at Dea, Mano and Momosu (473)."

The soldiers are sent out in small parties from Kanre Lahun to collect debts and they take fowl and rice from the people without paying for them. Some enlist at Kanre Lahun solely with the object of collecting their private debts and go out armed for that purpose.

Chief Fa Bunda informed me that these soldiers are continually plundering and disturbing his country. His son Johnny was beaten at Kanre Lahun a few days before my arrival, by a Liberian Sergeant. Lieutenant Lomax heard the case and awarded Johnny £2 as compensation (474).

Another growing source of tension was the behaviour of the Liberian preventive officers attached to the two Europeans who represented the Liberian Customs Service: Mr. Hughes was stationed at Kailahun (475) and Mr. Macloughlan at Kabawana (476). The Liberian preventive officers used "their position as a means of oppressing and pillaging the natives" (477).

By May 1907, the behaviour of Lomax and his men seemed to be fomenting a serious crisis in the area. Major Le Mesurier, Commanding Officer of the WAFF battalion at Daru, noted that Lomax was then at Dodo-Cotuma, on the edge of Kissi country, and complaints were constantly being received from chiefs in the Kailahun-Dodo area (478). "These reports state that Major Lomax and his men compel the Chiefs to bring in supplies of rice, cattle, sheep, fowls etc., for which no payment is made, and that in consequence of this the whole district is disturbed, most of the people running into the bush .... Mr. Hughes states that trade is rapidly becoming paralysed .... It also appears that armed Liberian soldiers casually stroll
Major Lomax has enlisted a large number of local wastrels, who openly boast to our Frontiers that they enlisted solely for the purpose of being allowed to loot, knowing full well that Major Lomax seldom pays or rations his men (479). Le Mesurier accused Mr. Hughes of disturbing the Luawa people almost as much as Lomax (480). "Mr. Hughes' staff consists of 1 interpreter and some 20 to 30 messengers, all of whom have been picked up at Kanre Lahun without proper characters. Mr. Hughes hears all the palavers, and so has taken away a great deal of power from Fa Bunda, who bitterly resents it. Chiefs and people are brought up before Mr. Hughes, and fined, the whole conduct of the case being in the hands of these boys picked up at Kanre Lahun. The natural result is that corruption and fraud are rampant. Several cases of debt, over 15 years old, have been tried" (481). In explanation of Hughes' behaviour, Le Mesurier suggested that the customs had failed to realize expectations, and therefore Mr. Hughes had turned to issuing summonses and hearing cases in order to acquire more revenue (482). "Chiefs are sent for from all over the country, to answer charges of debt etc. Some, not understanding this regime, do not at once comply, particularly if they think Major Lomax will disapprove of their going. These latter are brought in and heavily fined. A great many Chiefs are at their wits end, not sure whether it is better to disobey Major Lomax or Mr. Hughes, for these two officials are not working together. Recently Mr. Hughes sent for Chief Gandi of Dodo to come to Kanre Lahun. The Chief never went, and on being brought in together with other Chiefs was heavily fined. Chief Gandi was living at Dodo with Major Lomax, so presumably the latter gave Gandi to understand he did not wish him to go, otherwise it is hard to imagine why he refused" (483).
Over the next few months, Gandi's relationship with Lomax was crucial to the course of events in Luawa generally, and to the position of Fabundeh in particular. Gandi of Dodo-Cotuna was one of the sub-chiefs who, in 1898, had opposed Fabundeh's supporting the British and not entering the Protectorate War (484), but when the other opposition ring-leaders had been sent to Pangum (485), Gandi made submission to the Luawa Chief and was allowed to remain in Dodo (486). Apparently, however, he felt resentment towards Fabundeh, and the arrival of the Liberians provided Gandi with an excellent opportunity to renew his opposition. Presumably Gandi hoped to become ruler under the Liberians of the whole of Luawa (487). Moreover, when Lomax arrived, he announced that "the Liberian Government did not forbid people having slaves" (488), which gave him considerable popularity with Gandi's followers (489), "and even some of Chief Bundeh's people became disaffected" (490).

"When Major Lomax came to Kanre Lahun", Fabundeh told Governor Probyn in August 1907 (491), "Gandi came and gave him bullocks, rice and cloths, and told Major Lomax that all the people were glad that the Liberians have come and that they did not like Chief Fa Bunda because he was in favour of the English Government .... While Major Lomax was in Kanre Lahun Gandi frequently consulted him in private although he was his i.e. Fabundeh's Sub-Chief: Major Lomax ignored his (Fa Bunda) position as Paramount Chief .... Gandi encouraged by the support from Major Lomax, used to mock him (Fa Bunda) in his own town and in Lomax's presence" (492). Gandi gained some support from other sub-chiefs. At the August 1907 meeting with Probyn, Fabundeh mentioned Kongoni of Sandialu (493), Mandawa of Nyandehun (494), Bonbone of 'Guraung' (495), and Dambesa
of Boabu (496) as Gandi's main supporters. James Kailondo insisted that Kongoni did not support Gandi (497), and clearly Kongoni was much less sympathetic to the Liberians than Gandi (498), yet later documentary evidence proved that Kongoni did oppose Fabundeh (499). Another opponent of Fabundeh was Koli Tungi of Gbandewulo, though his opposition seems to have taken place mainly after Gandi had been removed from the area (500).

In June 1907, a marauding band of Lomax's soldiers went from Dodo-Cotuma to the area east of Dia town, where they caused considerable disturbance (501). They killed a man at Kudu, and shot the chief, Goa, in the legs (502). By July the state of affairs in Fabundeh's polity had reached breaking-point. At the end of that month, Lieutenant Gill reported that Lomax's soldiers had attacked and burnt two villages near Dia town - Largo and Bambaru (502). The Kissia in these villages offered no resistance, but two were killed and one wounded (503). The Liberian soldiers also arrested the three head-men of Kangama town "and asked them why they had not sent men to build the Liberian barracks at Dodo. When they replied that they sat down to Fa Bunda and had received no orders from him the Liberians tied them and sent them to Dodo" (504). Throughout the whole area, any Kissi meeting a Libran was asked whether he was under Fabundeh or Gandi: in the event of his answering Fabundeh, he was almost invariably ill-treated (505). As a result, the Kissia of Kama and Tong (506), who acknowledged Fabundeh as overlord, were preparing for full-scale warfare against the Liberians. This represented a remarkable change of attitude from that which seemed to be prevalent amongst many Kissia at the end of 1906 (507), when their loyalty to Fabundeh was in doubt.

The readiness of many Kissia in mid-1907 to fight to the death for their allegiance to Fabundeh was crucial, because it forced the
British officials in the area finally to realize that either they had to intervene in accordance with the wishes of Fabundeh and the majority of his subjects, or else they would witness serious fighting, widespread destruction, and the disruption of the whole area. Once this realization had penetrated British officials' thinking, and once they had understood that those were the only possible alternatives, it was merely a matter of time before the British intervened.

The details of how Fabundeh managed to retain the loyalty of such a large proportion of the Kissia (despite the tendency to defection in late 1906) have not been recorded either in oral tradition or written records. The ultimate loyalty of the Kissia surely reflected, however, both Fabundeh's skill in local politics and the earlier success of Kailondo in developing a sense of unity within Luawa: the ordinary people would rather die than betray Kailondo's successor. Moreover, as already mentioned, the behaviour of the Liberians seemed calculated to alienate rather than gain the support of the Kissia (503). So, although the Liberians had taken over the country in force, and the British - telling the people that the land now belonged to Liberia (509) - had refused to take action against Lomax, the local people themselves were prepared to fight in order to be free from Liberian control, and to stay within Fabundeh's polity.

Writing on 1 August 1907, Lieutenant Gill reported that Kangama - the headquarters town of Kissi Teng - "was surrounded by and full of armed Kissis. In the central barrio alone I counted forty men with guns and many more with swords, bows and spears. I may say that almost every f'kai [i.e. hamlet] I passed had armed Kissis in it and I met many others on the roads. These Kissis were all quite friendly
Chief Banya of Kangama told Gill that Gandi of Dodo and Kongoni of Sandialu "sent the Liberians to fight in my country.... They say they are going to come back and attack Kangoma. If they do I shall fight. They say they will fight us and will burn all our towns unless we cease to sit down to Fa Bunda and obey Gandi.... The Liberians have looted and stolen here to a great extent.... I beg the British Government to send soldiers" (511). Two Liberian soldiers caused a disturbance in Mano-Sewalu (512). "The Liberians threaten to attack and burn my town", reported chief Sewa of Mano, "unless I sit down to Gandi instead of Fa Bunda" (513). Captain Murray, the Officer Commanding the Sierra Leone Battalion of the WAFF (514), felt the situation had become so serious that on 1 August 1907 he sent a note insisting on Lomax's withdrawal from Dodo (515).

Although probably no one realized it at the time, the despatch of Murray's ultimatum to Lomax represented the turning-point in Fabundeh's achievement of his aims. Previously, the British had refused to show support for Fabundeh against the Liberians, and had advised the Chief to make his peace with Lomax (516). But whatever happened from 1 August 1907 onwards, Murray's ultimatum virtually compelled the British to act in a way which would satisfy the Luawa Chief. If Lomax did not withdraw, the British would have to enter the Liberian part of Fabundeh's Luawa in order to drive the Liberian soldiers out. If he did withdraw, the British would be drawn into the power vacuum created in the area - a vacuum which the French might quickly fill if the British showed any reluctance in entering (517).

Murray moved into Kissi country on 2 August 1907 (513), distributed 140 soldiers between the towns of Kangama, Koindu, Dia and Kailahun (519), halted his men at a place near Dodo (520), and again called
on Lomax to withdraw (521). "The presence of my troops under Lt: Murphy at Kangama alone prevented an outbreak that would mean disaster to you", wrote Murray to Lomax. "My latest reports show 100 gun [sic.] and 600 men at and about Kangama alone" (522). Such information would suggest that Murray's actions were not the result either of panic or of sudden uncontrollable annoyance against Lomax, but rather they issued from an accurate military appraisal of the state of affairs. Pro-Fabundeh feeling amongst the Kissia had grown so strong that war was imminent, and even the British could prevent it only by doing what Fabundeh and his people wanted - namely, securing the withdrawal of the Liberians. Major Lomax, at last realizing the weakness of his position, withdrew from Dodo to Kamatahun on 3 August (523). He was faced by hostile British troops, and a local populace in arms against him: Dodo was within 25 miles of the Anglo-Liberian border, and in 1905 it had been agreed between the two Governments that no Liberian troops should operate within that zone (524). Chief Gandi, who clearly had no political future except with the Liberians, accompanied Lomax (525).

Although it was the British who had in fact compelled Lomax to leave by military force, yet politically the events of 1 to 3 August represented the 'winning of the initiative' by Fabundeh (526). The enforced withdrawal of Lomax had been the Luawa Chief's objective since the Liberian's arrival in January 1907, and was part of his larger aim of wresting his polity from Liberian control. When Murray sent the 1 August ultimatum, he was not pursuing 'British policy' in the area, but was simply reacting to events, trying to prevent the outbreak of large-scale warfare. Since it was Chief Fabundeh's followers who - exasperated by the Liberians - were preparing to fight, Murray's reactions were naturally aimed at satisfying the Luawa Chief and his people (527). Thus Murray's actions reflected
precisely the course Fabundeh's subjects had wanted the latter to take.

It was easy for Murray to take this course because there was no settled 'British policy' for him to pursue in the area during the crisis. Governor Probyn, who was in the best position to formulate policy, had very little idea of what to do about the Luawa problem. In July 1907 he wrote to London that he was unwilling to meet Kafula at Wulade simply because he would have to pass through Kailahun, and "Chief Fa Bunda and other Chiefs will naturally expect me to state clearly which Government they are to obey and what their obligations to such Government are" (530) - the clear implication being that the Governor himself was unsure about both the theoretical constitutional position in the area and the extent in practice of British authority. When he heard about the attacks by Lomax's men on the two villages at the end of July, Probyn telegraphed London: "I propose to act as agent for Liberian Government and arresting Lomax and men as rebels against Liberian Government" (531). However, when he heard of the quite different action taken by Murray, the Governor quickly congratulated the WAFF Officer (532). "Lomax and foreign troops have withdrawn in safety beyond the twenty-five mile limit", ran a telegram to London (533), "and were protected from attacks by natives owing to West African Frontier Force under Murray. Murray's conduct most praiseworthy" (534). The Colonial Office in London did not agree with Probyn (535). "It is not the business of our force to protect Lomax", minuted one official, "* if they do so, it is difficult to see how the local natives can be expected to believe that we 'wholly disapprove his action'" (536). But the London officials did little themselves to suggest a clear, consistent policy to be pursued in Luawa, despite Probyn's repeated and rather desperate requests for guidelines (537). Although it
sounds incredible, one London Official actually suggested leaving the local people themselves to take the military initiative: "It might not be a bad way out of the difficulty if the Chiefs were to attack Lomax + either wipe him out or hand him over to our officers. We can hardly suggest this, but ... we should not interfere if the Chiefs took measures against Lomax" (538). Far from pursuing a policy of 'pacification', senior British officials could find no solution to some of the problems they had helped to create in the area except by covertly wishing the chiefs to take violent action.

Unable to construct a consistent policy of their own, the British were slowly drawn into following Fabundeh's policy, and were swayed by his views. On returning from a visit to Kailahun in August 1907, the main concern expressed by Probyn was that the boundary should be altered in order that Fabundeh should be protected and satisfied: "for historical reasons, based on a Treaty, and followed by actual sacrifice by the natives, an injustice will be done to Chief Fa Bunda and the majority by whom he is supported, unless the boundary is rectified .... I ... urge that the boundary should be altered in spite of the financial loss which will result from the alteration [539], because I feel that it is a duty to protect Chief Fa Bunda and the majority from further mistakes by the representatives of the Liberian Government" (540). The boundary adjustment would bring little advantage to the British (541); it was desired, stated Probyn in September, "solely for reasons connected with one chief and one chiefdom" (542). At last, after years of indecision, Probyn had discovered a dear, attainable British policy to be pursued in the Luawa area. Amazingly, Probyn's newfound policy simply represented an acceptance of the two main aims which Fabundeh had been pursuing on his own with little apparent hope of success
for the previous decade: the maintenance of Luawa as an undivided political unit and its removal from Liberian control.

The months of July and August 1907 wore, then, for Chief Fabundeh the turning-point in the achievement of his aims. From September onwards there was a slow outworking 'on the ground' of the new British policy: given the strength of Britain (both militarily and diplomatically), it was purely a matter of time before the Freetown Government achieved its new aims. Governor Probyn soon made new boundary proposals which did not differ substantially from those made by Cardew in 1896 (543), although Probyn acknowledged that these proposals would emasculate Fabundeh's polity. Fabundeh's rule in practice extended some 16 miles east of the Moa-Mafessa confluence (544), but if Probyn's proposals were followed, the Luawa Chief would cease to rule any territory east of that confluence (545). In the end, proposals were worked out by which most of Fabundeh's Luawa would be transferred to Sierra Leone in exchange for an equivalent amount of territory in the triangle formed by the junction of the Mano and Morro Rivers (546). These proposals, however, were allowed to remain in abeyance whilst the Liberian Government had its hands full with matters of internal reform, on the clear understanding that the Sierra Leone Government would in the meantime undertake control and administration of the territory concerned (547). In April 1908, the British gave Fabundeh "the conditional assurance of support" against Liberian officials (548).

The new policy of the British after August 1907 made Fabundeh feel strong enough to take action against his opponents within Luawa. Gandi, who had been the centre of opposition, had left the area together with Lomax (549). But the Luawa Chief felt there was a threat from Kongoni of Sandialu, since he was a 'brother' of Gandi (550), and the second man
in the land, easily able to gather a strong opposition group around himself (551). Fabundeh summoned Kongoni to Kailahun and fined him "12 heads of moneh [sic.] at £3 a head, for which Kongoneh inquired the reason why. The reply was that because Mr. Lomax was residing at Dodo, Kongoneh's brother's town when he sent soldiers to Kangama (Chief Ki's town) who did the mischief which resulted in the death of the people of Kangama" (552). When Kongoni objected to this fine, Chief Fabundeh "summoned Ki of Kangama ... and other Chiefs and also Kootubu Chief of Pendembu [553] to sit with him in judgement against Kongoneh ... to bring him guilty of complicity with Lomax .... and Kongoneh's fine was increased to £25 payable in British coin, 3 cows of £5 each, one maiden of about 15 years of age, one gown and three native cloths" (554). Fabundeh threatened to take Kongoni's sub-chieftaincy away from him, and when Kongoni again objected, the Luawa Chief "went to the barracks of the frontiers and returned and Kongoneh was arrested and put in the guard-room" (555). Eventually Kongoni was reinstated as chief, but the absence (with one exception - 556) of any further reports of internal unrest during Fabundeh's reign, suggest that the Luawa Chief had been successful in quashing opposition.

The removal of Lomax from Luawa meant for Fabundeh the end of his more pressing difficulties, but this was not true for the British officials in the area. Other Liberian officials, though relatively powerless and dependent on the good pleasure of the British, were still stationed at Kailahun, and throughout 1908 they taxed the patience of the British WAFF Officers to the limit. For example, Mr. Hughes, the European who was Tax Collector for the Liberian Government in Kailahun, continued with his work after the departure of Lomax, and he became steadily less co-operative
with the British Officers (557). Late in 1907, Captain Gordon reported
that Mr. Hughes was making arrests in the area (558); and Major Le Mesurier
doubted very much whether the arrests were confined to smugglers (559).
Mr. Hughes' successor, a Libervian named Mr. Lamondine (560),
pursued a similarly obstructive policy (561), threatening Fabundeh that the
Liberians would take over the country and then things would not go well
with him. "Lamondine told me", reported the young Momoh Banya in August
1908 (562), "that 450 soldiers were coming to this country with Major Cadell,
who was English but was doing Liberian work.

Another day, about two weeks ago he told me that a letter had
come from Monrovia making him D.C. for this country" (563). In August or
September 1908 Gandi of Dodo was brought to Vahun, just south of Luawa, by
Monrovian officials, and this created serious concern among Fabundeh's
people (564). This concern was not surprising. "The Liberians will never
forgive Fabundeh for his unswerving loyalty to us", stated Le Mesuri4er,
"and from the first arrival of Mr. Lomax at Kanro Lahun, they have always
given out that on their taking over the country, Gandi should succeed
Fabundeh as paramount Chief in the country" (565). By early October, however,
Le Mesurier hoped that relations with the Liberian official had improved,
and the British Officer was able to tell Mr. Lamondine about the new
boundary which was to be made between Sierra Leone and Liberia: "The Southern
border will extend from the intersection of the Anglo-Liberian Border with
the Mauwa River, along the right bank of that river to a point North of
Vahun (to be shortly fixed). The Eastern border will extend from this
point in a N.N.E. direction through the country some 5 miles East of
Dambarra to the Kanyo country close to the Moa River" (566). In mid-
October, Mr. Hughes suddenly and unexpectedly returned to Kailahun (567).
"His presence at this juncture", wrote an exasperated Le Mesurier, "renders the situation more complicated, and if possible, more impossible than before" (568). Hughes' return was the last straw for Probyn who, at the end of October, telegraphed Le Mesurier to secure the removal of the Liberian Customs Post from Kailahun (569), which was done without opposition from the Liberians by 7 November (570). Thus was removed the last vestige of Liberian hold over the Kailahun area.

The Liberians having been removed, Probyn and Le Mesurier seriously addressed themselves to the complicated problem of working out a satisfactory Anglo-Liberian boundary by which the whole of Fabundeh's polity would be placed within Sierra Leone. The Governor re-emphasized that in altering the boundary, the position of the Luawa Chief was of primary importance. "One of the principal reasons which makes it necessary to insist upon the re-adjustment of the boundary is not that the cession of Kanre Lahun territory will be of material advantage to this Colony but that it is inconsistent with honour to leave Fa Bundeh, chief of Kanre Lahun, unprotected" (571). However, the simple statement of principle was difficult to interpret when it came to practical details. One difficulty in drawing a definite boundary line was that fluidity which had been one of the main characteristics of local politics since Kailondo's time (572). The arrival of the Liberians introduced a new pressure for change into the fluid local politics. Probyn identified this pressure in his exposition of the Luawa boundary problem in November 1909: "the power of Chief Fa Bunleh as Chief of Kanre Lahun has become so consolidated by the dread inspired by Liberian administration, that Gissi Chiefs who were hostile or indifferent to Fa Bundeh in September 1907, will, as stated by Major Le Mesurier, probably resent by force of arms any attempt to hand them over to the Liberian
Government" (573). As a result, Le Mesurier suggested the Moa as the northern and the Mauwa-Magowi as the southern boundary (which all concerned had in any case virtually accepted by this stage - 574). The eastern boundary, thought the WAFF Officer, should be constructed so as to include the whole of Tengea country in Fabundeh's polity (575). This suggestion would have given the Sierra Leone Government not only all the territory which it later acquired - the present-day Chiefdoms of Luawa, Kissi Kama, Kissi Teng, and Kissi Tungi - but also a continuous strip of territory further to the east. This long, narrow strip of territory - namely Tengoa Chiefdom - ran from the Moa River in the north to the Maia-Magowi Rivers in the south, and was rather less than 10 miles wide (576). The Luangkorli people, further east still, also wanted to be included within Sierra Leone; they were Kissi people, but Fabundeh was "unwilling to have the Luangkorli Chiefdom included within his territory" (577).

In addition to political fluidity, another difficulty in demarcating the eastern boundary of Fabundeh's polity was the lack of any convenient geographical feature such as a river, a watershed, or a prominent mountain range along which a border-line might satisfactorily be drawn (578). Moreover, though the British officials did not apparently realize this, there was no easily-followed boundary between the Kissi people and the Gbande people further east (579).

Le Mesurier's suggested boundary was considerably further east than the frontiers proposed previously by Cardew and Probyn (580), but the WAFF Officer had good reasons for including Tengoa within Fabundeh's rule. Ndawua, chief of Tengoa (581), had "all through been loyal to Fa Bundeh" (582). When the name of Fabundeh was once mentioned in the presence of Le Mesurier and Ndawua, the latter "at once went down on his
knees on the ground in an attitude of obeisance, saying 'Fa Bundeh, Fa Bundeh'" (583). A boundary drawn further west so as to exclude Tengea "(1) would not put an end to Frontier disturbances rather it would create the m. (2) It does not include all the country to which Fa Bundeh has a good claim. (3) It is not a tribal boundary, being only the border of some Chiefdoms. (4) It is not a natural boundary" (584). Nevertheless, in 1911 Le Mesurier's arguments were over-ruled and the international boundary was drawn along the western edge of Tengea rather than its eastern edge, thus excluding Tengea country from Fabundeh's polity and from Sierra Leone (585). Probyn and other British officials, while accepting Le Mesurier's arguments as accurate and cogent, sought a compromise solution to the boundary problem which would not make too large territorial demands of the Liberians (586). Yet Le Mesurier's warning, that a compromise solution was courting further trouble, proved accurate. Chief Ndawu's successor, Kanganya (587), refused to accept Liberian rule, and fought the Liberian authorities for seven years (588). He only gave up the struggle in 1915, when he was granted permission by the British authorities to settle peacefully within the Sierra Leone Protectorate. So this eastern boundary remained in a state of disturbance until mid-1916, almost twenty years after the declaration of a British Protectorate.
Although by the end of 1908, the Liberians had been forced to leave the Kailahun area (590), and Luawa was thereafter under British control, there was one further disturbance in the Luawa area before formal British annexation in 1911 (591). This disturbance took place at Koli Tungi's town of Gbandewulo (592), which was the one place within 'Kailondo's Luawa' where the Liberians maintained a small outpost after 1903. Koli Tungi, like Gandi, favoured the Liberians rather than the British (593). During 1909, British WAFF Officers brought the people of Gbandewulo into submission to British rule by a series of events which is only sketchily and somewhat obscurely described in their despatches to the Governor in Freetown (594). In an Intelligence Return for the first quarter of 1909, Captain Newstead reported that the area under temporary British control in Fabundah's territory was "slightly increased" at the end of February 1909, and since then had been bounded on the south by the Manwa, and on the east by "a line drawn parallel to the Anglo-Liberian boundary 1903 at a distance of 25 miles to the East. These boundaries are well-defined the former being a natural one, and the latter coincides with the Eastern boundary of the TENGEA Chiefdom. The Liberian post at BANDEWURO was abandoned at the end of February, an event which caused great rejoicing amongst the natives of the district, as they had been compelled to provide for this post without payment, and had been fined and robbed according to the usual custom of the Liberian troops.

The detachment of the Liberian troops at KAMATAHUN has been reduced to about 20 men" (595). These events are not referred to in any other despatch (596), and it seems peculiar that such an important development as the extension of British control in the area should be given only a
casual reference in the reports of those officials who were concerned 'on the spot'. Who authorized this extension of British control? How was it carried out? Why did the Liberians suddenly withdraw from Gbandewulo? On what evidence is it stated that 'the natives' rejoiced at the departure of the Liberians?

The British Colonial Office did not authorize this extension, because as late as December 1909, London officials were insisting that Kunyo, Tungi and Tengea sub-chiefdoms—which were all within the 25-mile limit and had already been occupied by the WAFF (597)—were "to be regarded as neutral until their status has been determined" (598). By implication, the three sub-chiefdoms should not be occupied by British forces. Similarly, British officials in Freetown thought until November 1909 that in fact these sub-chiefdoms were not occupied by any British soldiers: in that month, Le Mesurier wrote to Acting Governor Haddon-Smith, giving a summary of the position which had existed for most of 1909 without the knowledge of senior British officials in Freetown.

"I infer that His Excellency the Governor is unaware that Chiefdoms IX and XI [Tengea and Tungi sub-chiefdoms] have actually been occupied by us during the last nine months .... We are at present occupying all the chiefdoms I to XIII inclusive, except X [i.e. all the land between the Moa and Mauwa-Magowi Rivers as far east as the eastern boundary of Tengea sub-chiefdom]" (599). This despatch would suggest that it was Le Mesurier himself, the senior British official in the Luwa area (600), who had engineered this extension of British control. The tone of many of his despatches in 1909 suggested that he was by this time exercising such freedom from central government control that he could behave as a virtual dictator in the area (601); no doubt his freedom was increased by the
hesitancy of Governor Probyn, who was quite ready to allow other people to make decisions for him concerning the Luawa area. Le Mesurier was firmly convinced that it was desirable to extend British control eastwards as far as possible (602). He was also ready to take up that military role for which he was professionally trained (603). "He did not try to encourage people", noted Pa Langam, "he simply used force .... If Major Bull [Le Mesurier] had had the diplomacy of an Englishman, he would have been able to gain all of this area, but his actions showed that he did not have that diplomacy; perhaps Major Bull was German or Dutch or some other nationality [604]. If you were reported for being stubborn, he would not stop to make an enquiry, but would go straight away and burn your village for no reason" (605).

Le Mesurier was seriously provoked by the behaviour of the Liberians during 1909. In July, for example, "a small party of Liberian soldiers (said to be 8) crossed over the Maia river from Kamatahun and looted the town of Baiama (in the SE. corner of the Tengea Chiefdom...)"] (606). In November "a force of Liberian soldiers ... crossed the Makowi River, raided the town of Bandewuru and carried off Korritungi, the Chief of that part of the country as prisoner, and ... they were advancing against Konosho and Dambarr for the purposes of arresting the chiefs of those places" (607). But these raids were possibly an occasion rather than a reason for Le Mesurier to march troops into the eastern part of Luawa. Oral tradition would suggest that the Liberians did not capture Koli Tungi, but rather that he was in league with them - a fact which Le Mesurier could not easily have admitted (whether he knew it or not), since it would disprove his contention that all the sub-chiefdoms as far east as Tengea were eager to accept Fabundeh as Chief, with the British as overlords (603). But
Pa Langama of Buedu, one of the most reliable witnesses (609), described how Lomax gained the support of Koli Tungi: "Willie Lomax told Kaitungi's father [Koli Tungi] that if he allowed the Liberians to acquire Gbandewulo, then he would make him ruler of all this area" (610). Koli Tungi agreed and built barracks for the Liberians, presumably in late 1907 or early 1908. Soon afterwards (611), Kongor of Damballa, who was by this time the senior Kissi chief, held a meeting similar to the one called by Fabundeh nearly a decade earlier (612), to decide whether the Kissi people should opt for British or Liberian rule. Realizing, presumably, that most people would prefer the British (613), Koli Tungi failed to attend the meeting.

"Kongor then assembled the rest of the mahawui, and told them that Gbandewulo was part of his own area, and so it is strange that if he called one of his sub-chiefs he would refuse to come because Willie Lomax was his guest" (614).

Kongor then sent a message to Le Mesurier, explaining what had happened (615), and Le Mesurier arrived in the area in December 1909 (616). The WAFF Officer heard of the presence of "Bande marauders" (617) in the Gbandewulo area, and sent out a patrol to investigate. The "marauders" were caught at dawn near Gbandewulo, and 39 were killed or wounded (618). This patrol was followed up some days later by an attack on "Bande marauders" based at Gbandewulo and "actually occupying the town" (619). Le Mesurier, in his despatch, failed to explain how his men distinguished between "Bande marauders" and ordinary citizens of the town (620). He did note, however, the radical initiative he had taken to defend British-held territory. "To restore confidence and prevent raiding, a strong post with 80 Frontiers, has been established at FCIYA (South Centre of Eastern border) and two small posts at KOKOSSU and BAIAMA" (621). The fact that all these three places were in Tengea sub-chiefdom suggests that Le Mesurier was using a
small disturbance round Gbendewulo as an excuse for achieving his own aim of firmly establishing British control as far as the eastern boundary of Tengea (622). Moreover, the presence of "Bande marauders" in Gbendewulo may have simply provided an excuse for Le Mesurier to punish the people of that place for their known sympathy towards the Liberians (623).

Independent oral traditions concerning events in Gbendewulo corroborate each other to give a very different complexion to events from that provided in the official despatches (624). Major Le Mesurier, stated Pa Langama of Buedu, entered Gbendewulo early one morning, "which was a surprise to everybody. Every warrior came armed and dressed, but they were all surrounded by these soldiers who were mostly West Indians. They all came out, and then he enquired whether the treaties they had signed were for the British or the Liberians .... He asked where the chief was; they said the chief had gone to Kpekdu over the Magow [625]. One man said he was going to call the chief; he was the only one going to be saved .... The people said, 'Well, now that the chief is not here, let us go and consult, and come and give you the answer. As soon as they turned, they [the soldiers] opened fire on them. They killed the people and burned the town and returned" (626).

This oral tradition concerning Le Mesurier's attack on Gbendewulo is probably correct in broad outlines. Ex-P.C. Kaitungi, in his story of the incident, ascribed its cause to an argument between Koli Tungi and Fabundeh (in contrast to Pa Langama's account of a disagreement between Koli Tungi and Kongor). But in all other essentials, ex-P.C. Kaitungi's description confirmed that of Pa Langama (627).

The whole incident illustrates the vast difference in
understanding between colonial officials and the ordinary people of Luawa. The British Officers saw the Liberians departing, British rule extending, and thought the local people were rejoicing. In fact the local people, seeing the dead bodies of their relatives and the destruction of their town, found little to celebrate. The differing accounts of this 'Gbandewulo incident' further demonstrate the danger of relying uncritically on official colonial documents as evidence; these documents may provide a very eccentric view of events by maintaining silence at key points, or by passing lightly over them, or, on occasion, by introducing deliberate distortion. This incident also suggests that, in an area far up-country in the early years of the twentieth century, a determined colonial official could achieve such an independence from central control that, on the one hand, he could dictate local policy to government officials in the coastal capital (628); and on the other hand, he could temporarily disrupt whole local communities. The 'Gbandewulo incident' also shows what British 'pacification' could mean in practice. For T.J. Alldridge, Sierra Leone was by this time a transformed colony (629); for the people of Gbandewulo, British soldiers must have been a symbol of destruction, misery and death. They had added to the amount of warfare in the area by their various campaigns, but they had not given the local people of eastern Luawa protection from those raids from Gbande country which had always been their main problem (630). Haddon-Smith was quite explicit on this point when he visited Kailahun late in 1909. "I have ... impressed on Chief Fa Bundeh that although we may be in his country to afford him protection, yet he must consider that we are not there to relieve his men from performing police duties. I have further impressed upon his people the necessity of defending themselves against such raids" (631).
Sixteen months later (632), on 26 March, 1911, Haddon-Smith returned to Kailahun to hoist the British flag (633). Le Mesurier, with more experience of the area than any other British official, was seconded from his military post to become "Civil Officer in charge of the new territory" (634) - a position he retained until 1914 (635). It was decided to withdraw British troops from Tengea sub-chiefdom (636), which must have disappointed the newly-appointed Civil Officer, because the withdrawal amounted to an acceptance by the British that the international boundary should be drawn down the western rather than the eastern edge of Tengea, and that Tengea should remain in Liberian territory (637). In 1912, the British collected House Tax from the whole of Luawa for the first time (638), the power to tax being the touchstone of the colonial government's authority in any area (639).

"The Chiefs and people", wrote Governor Haddon-Smith, "were simply delighted and highly gratified at their territory being taken over by the British Government and there were great rejoicings throughout the country" (640). No doubt everyone enjoyed the festivities. Fabundeh and his people must have been overjoyed that, after fifteen years of troubles, they had gained international recognition that Luawa was a single, united political entity, and that it should not be subject to Liberian officials like Lomax (641). But what political advantages had the British Government bestowed on the area after two decades of contact? Not even the same degree of peace, and law and order, which the ordinary people of Luawa had known in Kailondo's day. One wonders whether the "great rejoicings" were not mainly an expression of relief at escaping from Liberian rule and from the 1895 boundary, rather than positive delight at coming under British sovereignty.
1. There was, however, an opposition faction, for details of which see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 260-262 below.

2. The number of children born to Kailondo has been the matter of some dispute. Le Mesurier in 1909 noted that "Paramount Chief Kie Lundu, on his deathbed, having no grown-up sons, named Fa Bundeh to succeed him, and he was accordingly elected by the people. At the same time Kie Lundu requested Fa Bundeh to take charge of his two young sons Banya and Babui, on the understanding that one of them should succeed Fa Bundeh as Paramount Chief on the latter's death. Banya, who has been head Santiggi at Kanre Lahun for some time, is generally looked upon as the man who will naturally succeed Fa Bundeh as Babui has always lived in retirement near Kanre Lahun" (C0267/515/Conf.; Probyn; 16.7.07, enc. Le Mesurier, 7.7.09, Daru). Cardew in 1896 observed that Kailondo only had "one son, named KAK(W, a youth of 15 years, who is quite unfitted to succeed" (C0267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun). Maada James Kailondo (Int. 19), speaking of the children of Kailondo, said that there were "many of us", and mentioned four sons - Aruna, Jombu Bendu, Momoh Banya and himself. It would indeed seem strange if Kailondo, with a large number of wives, left at his death only one or two sons behind him. Why then was Cardew given the impression that there was only one son? Perhaps the Luawa knagoisia were afraid that Cardew would take away Kailondo's children to Freetown: it is significant that the one son whom they pointed out to Cardew "requested to be taken to Freetown to be educated there" (C0267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun), and that he was quite unfitted to become the Mahawai. Perhaps the knagoisia felt it was inexpedient for a European to know all the details of Kailondo's heirs. By the time of Le Mesurier, many of Kailondo's children, like Babui, had moved from Kailahun; Maada James had probably moved to Freetown by this time (Int. 19).

3. Ibid. The precise words used by Kailondo vary from one oral tradition to another, although the traditions are in agreement about the import of the words. Cf. Gorvie, Our Peoples of the Sierra Leone Protectorate, p. 47, where Kailondo is recorded as saying, "Ji wumbu ba lema nva bonda ma" / Take this (sword). Do not neglect my people/. Combey, p. 15, "Ji wumbu, ba lema nva jangma ma" / Take this (sword). Do not neglect my children/. Hollins, "Short History", p. 20 noted that Kailondo "bequeathed his property to his Speaker Fa Bunde and handed to him his son Momo Banya, and bade him 'remember he is my son'. Kulu-Banya recorded that before Kailondo died, "he called all the people together and in their presence bequeathed all his property and his son Momo Banya to Fa Bunde's care and guardianship with the instructions to hand over everything to him when Momo Banya shall have become a man enough to manage his own affairs" (p. 15). See also Int. 19.

4. See Chap. 3 of this thesis, pp. 209-211 above.
5. CO267/424/Conf.19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun.

6. Ibid.

7. For the gradual change during Fabundeh's reign from the word Mahgag to the expression 'Paramount Chief', see 'Note on Political Terminology', pp. 42-43 above.


9. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.180, noted that it "was fourteen years since my last visit" to Kailahun; and that was in 1893 (CO367/495/Conf.; Probyn; 1.8.07, enc. Alldridge, Petersfield, UK)


11. Hollins, "Short History", p.23, Gbande country had never, in fact, been closely under the direct control of Kailondo (see Chap.2 of this thesis, pp. 106-107 above) and Kafula of Wunde had probably thrown off allegiance to the Luawa Mahgag before Kailondo's death (see Chap.2 of this thesis pp. 111-112 above)

12. Fyfe, A Short History of Sierra Leone, p.152.

13. British help was delayed in July-August 1896 when Mbawulomom was advancing into Luawa; and Fabundeh's forces defeated Mbawulomeh before the arrival of the British Capt. Fairtlough (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4 pp.254-256 below)

14. British help was absent in 1893 at the time of the Protectorate War; but Fabundeh kept control of his polity (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.4, p. 263 below)

15. Fabundeh's position was bound to be difficult because of conflicting Liberian and British claims in the area (see Section 3 of this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 231-239 below), and because of French pressure reflected through Kafula (see Section 2 of this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp.214-216 below). However, it may be argued that the British made Fabundeh's position even more difficult by - (i) not having a clear, consistent policy on the whole international boundary issue. They told Fabundeh that most of Luawa belonged to Liberia and that he should not oppose the Liberians, but they did not withdraw their Frontier Police (later soldiers) from Kailahun. (ii) telling Fabundeh not to take counter-measures against Kafula's attacks, but (at least until 1905) not providing effective protection themselves for Luawa against Kafula. It has been presumed that Fabundeh was in any case too weak to defend Luawa. The evidence in this chapter of the thesis, especially for the years 1896-99, suggests that if British officials had clearly and consistently given Fabundeh approval to pursue a 'strong' policy against Kafula's attacks and against the Liberians, he would have been able to protect his heartland from the advance of both forces.

17. CO267/446/Conf. 44; Nathan; 14.6.99.


19. CO267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.08.

20. See, for example, CO267/515/Conf.; Probyn; 16.7.09, enc. Le Mosurier, 7.7.09, Daru.

21. As early as March 1905, Le Mosurier was in Kissi country as a Captain in the West African Frontier Force; he was amongst the officers who made up Palmer's Kissi Field Force (Haywood and Clarke, The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force, pp. 78-79). He was constantly campaigning in the eastern part of Kailondo's Luawa and Kissi country from that time onwards. In February 1907, he was appointed to the command of the Sierra Leone Battalion of the WAFF, and was responsible for the actual transfer of H.Q. from Freetown to Daru on 3.6.07 (Davies, History of the S.L. Bn. of the WAFF, p. 85). He became District Commissioner with special responsibility for the territory which was taken over from the Liberians in March 1911 (CO267/530/Tel.; Haddon-Smith; 26.3.11). He was killed in Flanders in April 1915 (CO267/570/83; Hollis (Ag. Gov.)); enc. Railway District Report 1915. W.D. Bowden noted that Le Mosurier possessed "a particular knowledge of the newly acquired Kissi country which no one can hope to attain to for it was acquired after a number of years campaigning among the people themselves" (ibid.).

22. For further details, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 244-250 below.

23. For an indication of the degree of initiative he retained, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 291-303 below.

24. For Kafula's actions during Kailondo's reign, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 113-119 above. See Note 314 of Chap. 2 for a brief discussion of Kafula's career.

25. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 244-250 below.

26. For Momo Bahomi, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 92 above.

27. CO267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun: "within the last month MOMO BAHOMI, a BANDE chief from the Liberian side, attacked and burnt two towns in the Bombali district, one of which was YANDAHU [i.e. Nyandehun], in which I passed the night of the 8th inst."

28. For Mbawulomeh, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 78-81 above.

29. For the sofas, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 94-95 above.
30. For the gradual change during Fabundeh's reign from the concept of the mahe to the concept of the sub-chief, see 'Note on Political Terminology, pp. 42-43 above.

31. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 258-263 below.

32. For Kongoni, See Chap. 3 of this thesis, p. 112 above.

33. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 290-307 below.

34. Ibid., pp. 295-296, 302-303.

35. See Chapter 2 of this thesis, pp. 78-91 above.

36. Ibid., p. 82.

37. Mbawulomeh's aims in making this attack are nowhere clearly stated, but his earlier association with Ndawa, and his behaviour during Kailondo's reign, would suggest that his purpose did not extend much beyond a desire for personal material gain. Hollins, "Short History", p. 21 notes how Mbawulomeh "boasted that he would dip his sword in the Moa River". For Mbawulomeh's activities in Kailondo's reign, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 78-92 above.

38. GO267/426/Conf. 45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 4.8.96, Panguma: Koigbatta of Vahun "apparently instigated by KABA SAEZ of GONUN (GORAHUN) invited BACRUME, a notorious warrior from Liberian territory, to come down to VAHUN for the purpose of assisting him against the people of KANRELAHUN". Ibid., enc. Fabundeh, 29.7.96, Kailahun, to the Officer Commanding at Panguma: the Luawa Chief noted Kabba Sei as one of "the principal Chiefs that join with him / i.e. with Mbawulomeh/>. Ibid., enc. Fairtlough, 20.8.96, Panguma: "It is impossible for any of my patrols to get sight of Chief KABAR SAEZ of GONUN (GORAHUN!) and I have a very shrewd suspicion that he is at the bottom of the whole movement; BACRUMEH himself declares that KABAR SAEZ has hired him to destroy all the late KAI LUNDO'S people".

Cf. Comber, History of the Mende Chiefdom, quoted Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 32: "Mbawulomeh's action at Vahun was displeasing to Kabba Sei, but he had no desire for war. Moreover, having no jurisdiction over Mbawulomeh, he could not restrain him from Luawa. Unfortunately, the report which Fabunde, the Chief of Luawa, made to Nyagua regarding Mbawulomeh's action was distorted to the extent of placing the responsibility on Kabba Sei." Ibid., p. 179: "The misrepresentation which resulted in the deposition of Kaba Sei for a short time would have been refuted had Kai Lundo been alive at the time. He was one of the few friends who knew Kabba Sei and his qualities". (See, however, Note 39 below.) The weight of evidence is against Chief Comber's interpretation: it seems virtually certain that Kabba Sei was secretly supporting Mbawulomeh.

39. In 1892, Kabba Sei had encouraged the Gbande mbangcinia to forsake their allegiance to Kailondo (see Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 78 above); in 1895, Kailondo accused Kabba Sei of secretly supporting Mbawulomeh, and of giving Mbawulomeh the town of Vahun (See Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 116 above).
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40. C0267/426/Conf.45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 4.8.96, Panguma. From reports given to Fairtlough, it would seem that Giema town was burnt down on 1, 2, or 3 August.

41. Comber, History of the Magpie Chiefdom (quoted Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.32) noted that Mbawulomeh had "seized Vahun and compelled its inhabitants to do him homage. Encouraged by this success, he extended his raid to Kpombali in Luawa". In 1908-09, Vahun gave refuge to Gandi of Dodo-Cotuma, Fabundeh's leading opponent within Luawa.

42. C0267/426/Conf.45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 4.8.96, Panguma. /., 3. Ibid. Fairtlough spelt the name 'Berreh', and Cardow in a marginal note, gave the spelling 'Belleh'. Allridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.238, referred to them as cannibals. Murdock, Africa, map at back of book, indicates that their present-day homeland is in Liberia, around the St. Paul River. See also the map at the front of Ajayi and Espie, A Thousand Years of West African History.

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44. Cardew considered these sofas to be former adherents of Samori who had settled in Kpandeme (C0267/426/Conf.45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 4.8.96, Panguma, marginal note by Cardew). It would seem, however, that there was only a fine distinction, if any at all, between sofas who settled in Kpandeme and the Kpandeme people themselves (see Chap.2 of this thesis, p. 85 above).

45. See Chap.2 of this thesis, p.97-93 above.

46. C0267/426/Conf.45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 4.8.96, Panguma. Giema lay some 8 miles south of Kailahun. Fairtlough thought Giema was "as far as I can judge, well within British territory", but in fact it was east of the 13th meridian, and was in Liberian territory.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Hollins, "Short History", p.21, spells the names 'Botuoma' and 'Boabu'.

50. Ibid., p.22. Mr. Hollins, by inference, indicates that there were 2 separate raids by Mbawulomeh at this time. In the first he attacked Bewabu, Batwoma and Giema, but was repulsed by Fabundeh's men; in the second he attacked Mendekalema, and was repulsed by Fairtlough. Mr. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.77, largely follows Mr. Hollins' chronology. It is, however, difficult to fit this chronology into the account of events provided in Fairtlough's despatches. The present writer has largely followed Fairtlough's account, since it was written only a few days after the events, by a participant. Mr. Hollins' account was written nearly 30 years later.

51. C0267/426/Conf.45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 12.8.96, Panguma. Fairtlough spells the name of the place as "BUNDOBU". Pandobu is the town with the spelling most closely resembling this place: Pandobu is also a strategic town which an enemy would want to capture, since it commands the Keya River crossing on the Kailahun - Nyandehun road.
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52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., enc. Fairtlough, 18.9.96, Panguma.

54. Ibid.

55. Hollins, "Short History", p.22, spells the name "Kongani", and notes that he was Fabundeh's 'war-master'. It seems, however, that Kongoni was more than just the leader of the troops, but rather that he was Fabundeh's 'right-hand-man', acting in the same role as Fabundeh had earlier performed for Kailondo. In another decade or so, the British would describe someone in Kongoni's position as the Chief's Speaker (Lavale in the Mende language; Santiggi in the Temne language) - but it is doubtful whether at this time either the English or the Mende names would have been applied to Kongoni.

The translation into English of the Mende word kogugbanga presents problems. It has usually been rendered as 'warriors' (see the writings of W.R.E. Clarke, N.C. Hollins, etc.) but this word suffers in English from the same pejorative connotations as 'chief' and 'tribe'. It also invites such unhelpful comparisons as with North American Indians, or with the Picts and Scots of Roman Britain. Admittedly the words 'troops', 'soldiers', and 'armed forces' also have unhelpful West European connotations, but the present writer believes they convey the concept of 'kogugbanga' better than 'warriors'.

56. C0267/426/conf. 45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 18.9.96, Panguma. Fairtlough spelt the word "BATTUYMAH", but Cardew made a marginal note that it was "marked BATTUYAMA in the I.D. map". There is, however, a problem in identifying the place as present-day Batwoma. The 1895 Map of Sierra Leone marked Battuyama as south of the Magowi River (spelt "Maboyi" on the map), whereas Batwoma is north of the river. Was this a mistake on the 1895 map?

57. C0267/426/conf. 45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 18.9.96, Panguma.

58. Ibid., enc. Fabundeh, 29.7.96, Kailahun. Fabundeh named the chiefs helping Mbawulomah as "Chief Cabba Sei, Koy-Gbatah, Jaggaheonsh, Torboy, and Saibah of GUMAH country". Hollins, "Short History", p.22, added that "Chief Momo Bambawo of Upper Bambara who, as the result of an enquiry held at Pendembu by Inspector Taylor of the Frontier Police, was found to have sided with Ban-wuru-me, was taken to Panguma and kept there till the 1898 rising".

59. C0267/515/conf.; Probyn; 16.7.09, enc. Le Mesurier, 7.7.09, Daru. Le Mesurier's comments were made in answer to a report made by Lomax to the Liberian Government.

60. Ibid.

61. Fairtlough had been posted to Panguma by May 1895 (C0267/418/conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95). He served in the 4th Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and was promoted Captain in December 1892; he joined the F.P. in September 1894 (C0267/426/conf.45; Cardew; 12.10.96). Appointed as a District Commissioner in December 1896 (C0267/427/340; Cardew; 1.12.96), he was
promoted Major, and finally retired as 1st. Class D.C. in 1917 (Hollins, "Short History", p.21).

62. C0267/426/Conf.45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 18.9.96, Panguma.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid. Hollins, "Short History", p.22, noted that Nyagua of Panguma also accompanied Fairtlough on this expedition, but Fairtlough's despatches make no mention of this.
67. C0267/426/Conf.45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 18.9.96, Panguma. For a time the position of Fairtlough's Frontiers was critical, when they were attacked in the rear by large forces of sofa and Kpelle solders.
68. Ibid., enc. Fairtlough, 4.8.96, Panguma, where Koigbatta was named as the chief of Vahun.
69. Ibid., enc. Fairtlough, 18.9.96, Panguma. The British Officer proceeded to Bomaru from Vahun, finding Folima, Bunumbu and Bomaru had all been burnt. "any detached bodies of warboys whom we met on the road were quickly cut up and dispersed". A brief account of this expedition is to be found in Davies, History of the S.L. Btn. of the RMAFF, pp.30-31. Comber, History of the Mando Chiefdom (quoted Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.32) stated that "Kabba Sei, not wishing to embroil himself in war with the white man, took to flight .... His town was destroyed and all the cattle taken away".
70. C0267/427/Conf.52; Cardew; 21.11.96, enc. Fairtlough, n.d., Panguma.
71. C0267/426/Conf.45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 18.9.96, Panguma. As a result of the success of this operation against Mbawulomeh, Fairtlough was awarded the D.S.O. (Hollins, "Short History", p.22)
72. For Momo Babahu, see Chap.2 of this thesis, pp.74-75, 100-103.
73. Hollins, "Short History", p.22. Chief Momo Babahu (Mr. Hollins used the form "Bambawo") was found to have sided with Mbawulomeh, "as the result of an enquiry held at Pendembu by Inspector Taylor of the Frontier Police".
74. Ibid.
75. C0267/432/127; Caufield; 2.6.97, enc. Parkes, "Chiefs in Receipt of Stipends".
76. C0267/437/53; Cardew; 16.3.98. Cardew noted that Kabba Sei was released from detention in Freetown on 3.3.98.
For the gradual replacement of the concept of the mahimbe by the concept of the Chiefdom, see 'Note on Political Terminology', pp. 42-43 above.

For Fairtlough's spelling of the river name, see 'Note on Political Terminology', pp. 42-43 above.

Cardew approved of the measures taken by Captain Fairtlough to re-settle and tranquilize the invaded districts. But he stated that Fabundeh's occupation of the area from the Mahimbe River to Vahun should only be temporary because the country east of Bomaru may possibly fall within Liberian territory.

Fabundeh's occupation of the area from the Mahimbe River to Vahun should only be temporary because the country east of Bomaru may possibly fall within Liberian territory. Cf. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p. 541, states that Kabba Sai's chiefdom was divided between Nyagua and Kai Lundu, but Fabundeh had succeeded Kailondo by this time.

Since Mbawulomeh used sofas in his 1896 attack on Luawa, and since the sofas in this area were mainly settled round Kpandemo, it may be presumed that Mbawulomeh and the ruler of Kpandemo were acting in cooperation.

After his defeat at Vahun, Mbawulomeh got over to Liberian territory where he has since taken refuge.

For Nyagua, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 76-77 above.

Ibid. See Cardew's comments on the despatches for reference to Blakoney succeeding Fairtlough.
90. C0267/437/Conf.2; Cardew; 8.1.98, enc. Blakeney, 20.12.97, Panguma.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid. Blakeney spells the name of the town "Koloun", which reflects the normal pronunciation of the town's name.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid. The "back of the Ivory Coast" must refer to an area at least 200 miles east of Luawa.

95. Mbawulomeh simply disappears from the picture, and Blakeney's sole concern is with the sofas. In the absence of other information, Mbawulomeh's precise relationship with the sofas remains a mystery. The sofas' relations with the people of Kpandeme (and in particular with other sofas already settled in that town) are equally unknown. Another point on which evidence is lacking is whether the sofas allied with the surrounding Kpelle and Gbande people, or whether they fought against them. Cardew stated (C0267/437/Conf.2; Cardew; 21.2.98) that the sofas and the Gbande people were allied, but in the same despatch, Blakeney wrote that the sofas had "murdered the Chief" of Kolahun, who was presumably one of the leading Gbande rulers.

96. Foya was the chief town of Tengea, one of the Kissi mahawisia which had been part of Kailondo's 'Greater Luawa' (see Map 5, p. 73 above).


98. C0267/437/Conf.3; Cardew; 21.2.98, enc. Blakeney, 31.1.98: "we passed Fuya, which was now a heap of smouldering ruins".

99. Ibid. Cardew justified Blakeney's expedition into Liberian territory on the grounds that "the Bandes and Sofas had taken Fuya and had advanced up to Sandyallu, burning amongst other places en route the village of Goabu which is about 3 miles east of Sandyallu." Both Goabu and Fuya were "within the jurisdiction of" Fabundeh, and "an invasion of British territory was seriously threatened".

100. Ibid. Blakeney started from Sandialu on this punitive expedition on 19.1.98.

101. Ibid. Cardew noted that Kolahun was "the base of operations of the Bandes and from which point they have all along been menacing British territory". Blakeney, by contrast, noted that Kolahun had been made into "a large camp of Sofas" who had killed the Gbande Chief "called Bumboo who had a treaty with the English Government" (C0267/437/Conf.2; Cardew; 8.1.98, enc. Blakeney, 20.12.97, Panguma). Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.250, noted that he made a Treaty at Kolahun in 1891 with Gbande Chief Gbongoi (see also C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91 enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kailahun).

102. The 'settled condition' of the country round Luawa in 1893 may have been partly the result of both local people and British officials being distracted by the Protectorate War.
In November 1898, Governor Cardew minuted that reports had reached Capt. Fairtlough 'through native sources that there was a big war coming down from over the Eastern Frontier; that the sofas, Golas, and Bauwurume's people were coming down over the border'. A similar report made by Fairtlough is to be found in CO267/441/Conf.86; Cardew; 21.11.98, enc. Fairtlough (DC Ronietta), 12.11.98, Kwalu. However, Blakeney (Ag. DC Panguma), nearer to the scene of the supposed trouble, reported in December that there was no serious threat of raids (CO267/441/Conf.96; Cardew; 26.12.98, enc. Blakeney).

Proposed return of warrior chief Barameh to the Protectorate. Maswulomeh by 1902 had not only ceased to cause trouble in the area, but was so reconciled to Fabundeh's rule that he applied for permission from the British authorities to settle in the Sierra Leone Protectorate. This permission was, however, refused.

I have received information of the death of BARAMEH in Liberia.

For references to the Protectorate War of 1898, see Note 113 below.

See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.4, pp.261-262 below.

"Not all the people of Luawa wished him (i.e. Fabundeh) to be 'crowned'!"

For an expression of the opinion that Luawa began to break up under Fabundeh, see Hollins, "Short History", p.21 (already quoted in this chapter of the thesis, Chap.4, p.251 above).

See Chap.2 of this thesis, p.79 above.

Either taxation must be enforced or the Protectorate left practically to its resources, merely under Police control, without jurisdiction, judicial, administrative or fiscal, and without the means for development - a most unsatisfactory state of things". Cardew had originally proposed "an annual tax of 10s. on houses in the Protectorate with four rooms, 5s on houses with less, to begin on January the 1st 1898" (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.543). Later he modified his proposals, so that when collection began early in 1898, the District Commissioners in Kareno, Ronietta and Bandajuma Districts demanded a flat rate of 5s. per house, villages of under 20 houses being exempted. A bushel of rice or palm kernels was accepted instead of cash (ibid., p.550).

"Chief Fa Bunde's protest against a portion of the Loawa Country forming part of the Liberian Territory".

Concerning the exact relationship between the imposition of the House Tax and the outbreak of the 1898 War, there was much controversy at the time and this controversy has continued ever since. Chalmers, the Royal Commissioner who examined the causes of the War, came to the conclusion that the "Hut Tax, together with the measures used for its
enforcement were the moving causes of the insurrection" (Sierra Leone. Report by Her Majesty's Commissioner and Correspondence on the subject of the Insurrection in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, Part I, p.73).

Cardew replied in a long despatch (ibid., pp.99-136) listing a wide variety of causes of the War, but insisting that the imposition of House Tax was not one of them. Possibly there were differences in causes between the Bai Bureh war in Temne country and the Moné rising. For more recent opinion, see Hargreaves, "The Establishment of the Sierra Leone Protectorate and the Insurrection of 1898"; also Denzer, "Sierra Leone - Bai Bureh" in West African Resistance (ed. Crowder, pp.233-267). Miss Denzer rightly notes that "in the minds of the chiefs, therefore, the main issue was not the tax, but where authority lay" (ibid., p.240); "they were prepared to respond with war if this were the only means left them to retain their independence" (ibid., p.264). However, at least in the case of Bai Bureh the fact that the fighting began when he refused to pay the House Tax would suggest that the imposition of the Tax was the 'immediate cause' of the outbreak of the War, even though there were many other more serious 'deep-seated' causes. Equally true from a different viewpoint was the comment of who took part in the Protectorate military expeditions in late 1898 and early 1899: "It is a sine qua non that to govern peacefully you must conquer first. The rising was bound to come sooner or later" ("The Sierra Leone Protectorate Expedition", p.535).

The literature on the subject of the 1898 War is far too extensive to be listed here. The present writer found of interest the impressions of the following officials who shared in the events of 1898: Wallis (The Advance of our West African Empire, passim); Crooks (A History of the Colony of Sierra Leone, pp.325-341); and Alltridge (The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.304-333). As usual Mr. Fyfe (A History of Sierra Leone, pp.558-595) provides a full and clear chronology of events. See also Hargreaves, J.D., "The establishment of the Sierra Leone Protectorate and the Insurrection of 1898" in The Cambridge Historical Journal, XII, (July 1956), pp.56-80.

114. For further evidence of Fabundeh's eagerness to pay the tax, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.4, pp.167-168 below.

115. Since Luawa was not caught up in the War against the British, and showed little sign that it would have been even if the Hut Tax had been imposed there in 1898, it seems unnecessary to include in this thesis a detailed description of the course of that War in other areas of the Protectorate.

116. SLGA, NAMP 505/1901: "Immediately before the Insurrection of the rebels in 1898-1899 I was waited upon by nearly all the powerful Chiefs; who sent Messengers to beg me to take part in the Rising". Hollins, "Short History", p.22: "Lower Bambara (Chief Nyagua), Jaluhum, Faye, Upper Bambara and other chiefdoms rose .... Fa Bundeh of Luawa kept loyal to Government in spite of a call for help from Chief Nyagua".

117. CO267/515/Conf.; Probyn; 16.7.09, ens. Le Mesurier, 7.7.09, Daru: "Many chiefs in the Protectorate sent to Fa Bundeh to try and get him to join the rising, and it would have certainly been a popular move
on his part, but his good sense prevailed, and, although it must have been with the greatest difficulty, he succeeded in keeping his country quiet".

118. SLGA, NAMP 505/1901. Mr. Abraham, "Nyagua, the British, and the Hut Tax War", pp. 97-98, noted that fighting occurred at Panguma on 4 June 1898, "with twenty-seven chiefs participating, among whom were Fa Bundeh of Kailahun". Later Mr. Abraham returns to this piece of information. "Blakeney had already reported that Fa Bundeh was among the chiefs who had taken part in the attack, and he was virtually the only chief as influential as Nyagua in upper Mende country. Yet he was not arrested while Nyagua, who was merely suspected of duplicity and who had not participated in the fighting, was. We can only assume that there was no objective reason for Nyagua's arrest". However, the evidence presented in documents referred to in Notes 112 to 117 above, and Notes 119 to 148 below conclusively shows Fabundeh refused to take part in the 1898 War, and was nowhere near Panguma in 1898. Blakeney was understandably 'jumpy' at this point, and presumably accepted as truth the gossip of his Frontiers, who were probably as nervous, frightened, and ignorant of political realities in the surrounding area as was the white man. Blakeney's report is a good example of the unreliability of second-hand information gathered by colonial officials, most of whom were not fluent in the local language, and were therefore totally dependent on their informants' accuracy and their interpreters' integrity.

119. Int. 19.

120. SLGA, NAMP 505/1901. Presumably the other Mahangosia sent this message to Fabundeh when they were already besieging Panguma in mid-1898. Panguma was never captured, but was relieved by Fairtlough towards the end of June 1898 (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p. 585).

121. SLGA, NAMP 505/1901. Fairtlough was Acting District Commissioner and Officer Commanding the Frontier Police post at Panguma.

122. CO267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 1.11.03.


124. Alltridge, A Transformed Colony, p. 176, noted that Moses Allen was Chief Kutubu's secretary and interpreter. As interpreter, Allen must have had a reasonable grasp of the Mende language, and thus have been able to understand what the local Mahangosia said about the 1893 War. As Chief's secretary he would have met often most of the leading elders of the area. He must also have been literate in English, and able to speak English fairly fluently, which meant that more easily than most local officials he should have been able to grasp the sort of information the white men wanted.

126. Both Probyn and Allen indicated that the British Government opposed slavery in the Protectorate (see Notes 122 and 123 above). But Cardew and his colleagues in the late 1890s, while trying hard to suppress slave-trading in the Protectorate, left slavery as a local institution almost untouched. Slavery as an institution was legislated against only in 1927 (see Chap. 5 of this thesis, pp. 415-415 below).

127. In any discussion of local people's desire for 'freedom' in the late 1890s, great care must be taken not to read back into the situation and into the minds of the chiefs either West European ideas of 'democracy' or West African ideas of 'nationalism'. Probably the freedom which most concerned chiefs and people in the 1890s was economic freedom.

128. The expression 'southern Kissi' does not reflect any locally-recognized distinction between different groups of Kissi people, though the expression 'Lower Kissi' does appear in the writings of the first British colonial officials (e.g. Alldridge). The expression 'southern Kissi' is used in this thesis simply as a means of referring to all those Kissi people living south of the Moa River, to distinguish them from the Kissi people who lived north of the Moa River and who never offered their allegiance to Fabundeh.

129. As a rough generalization which could be applied to the whole period 1880 to 1912, the Kissi people of the Mano-Sevalu - Dia - Kangama - Koindu area were most reliable among the peoples of Luawa in their allegiance to the Mahawai; and the Mende and Kissi people to the southeast of Kailahun were the least reliable. In this connection it may be noted that:
   (i) Gandi of Dodo-Cotuma (E.S.E. of Kailahun) opposed Fabundeh both at the time of the 1898 War and again in 1907 when the Liberians arrived in the area (see Note 132 below),
   (ii) the people who opposed Fabundeh most determinedly were mainly those who lived in or near Gbande country (and the Gbande markets). But the present writer has failed to work out any correlation between these two facts.

130. For example, one of the opposition leaders in Luawa in 1898 was Ngewor Lengor, a Mende-man from Baoma, to the west of Kailahun.

131. Int.19.


134. Ibid.


136. Ibid.
137. C0267/445/15; Cardew; 17.1.99, enc. Report on Disturbances by Col. Woodgate. On 10 June, Capt. Fairtlough set out from Kualu and relieved Panguma on 23. "Captain Blakeney had been closely invested since April, but after the relief of his station, the insurgents' force dwindled away and disturbances ceased throughout the district".

138. Int.19.


140. Ibid.

141. C0267/495/Conf.; Probyn; 16.8.07, enc. Statement by Chief Kutubu & Moses Allen, 8.8.07, Pendembu. In the Krio language, "too strong" has the same force as the expression 'very strong' in the English language.


143. Ibid., p.535: after the crushing of Mende and Temne opposition in 1898, "it was determined to consolidate the victory by a peaceful demonstration of the power of the white man". Davies, History of the S.L.Btn. of the RMAFF, p.46, notes there were 4 columns, but the "Headquarter Column" was largely a supply train, and simply followed the route taken by the "Panguma Column".

144. "The Sierra Leone Protectorate Expedition", p.538. The decision to rendezvous at Kailahun was taken only after the columns had left Freetown, after reports of trouble on the borders around Kailahun.

145. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.591. There were altogether 995 soldiers, 56 Officers, and 4,295 carriers in the whole expeditionary force. See also Davies, op.cit., p.48.


147. SLGA, Records of Paramount Chiefs 1899, ps.209-210: when the 3 columns arrived in Kailahun early in 1899, "Chief Fa Bundeh made great efforts to meet the requirements of this large force & succeeded in giving every satisfaction to the officers concerned".


151. Ibid., pp.114-115.
152. Ibid.

153. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 265-266 below.

154. GO267/434/Conf. 52; Cardew; 28.12.97, enc. Taylor, n.d., no place mentioned. Taylor organized a meeting between Kafula and Fabundeh at Woroma, and concluded that the dispute between them "was only for the estate of the late Chief KIDONDO / i.e. Kailondo /" (see below, p. 265).

155. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 115 above.

156. Clarke, Foundation, p. 15.

157. 'The staff' became a recognized symbol of a Paramount Chief's authority in the colonial period. It was a cane about 5 feet long, surmounted by a brass knob inscribed with a number. The present writer has found no references to a 'short staff' in official documents; presumably it was a similar but shorter piece of regalia, issued by the British in the years immediately before the declaration of the Protectorate.

158. Int. 19. The shiny brasswork might have suggested gold to the Luawa people.

159. The people of the Luawa area are quick to appreciate the symbolic value of a material object; and physical possession of the staff would therefore be considered to give the possessor, in some sense, a degree of sovereignty throughout the area. Ownership of the staff was thus a serious matter.

160. Hollins, "Short History", p. 21. At the beginning of his article (p. 10), Mr. Hollins noted that his history was based on "facts given by Paramount Chief Momo Banya and Elders of the Chiefdom" - in other words, on oral tradition.

161. There is a divergence here between Mr. Hollins' record and that of Maeda James Kailondo. The latter stated that the Fabundeh-Kafula quarrel arose because Kafula wanted to be given the staff, which was in the possession of Fabundeh (Int. 19). Mr. Hollins wrote that Kafula started to fight when Capt. Fairtlough took the staff away from his people (from Kailondo's mother) who were in possession of it at Koundou when Kailondo died (p. 21).

162. This desire of Kafula to have the staff as a symbol of political authority was apparently the heart of the quarrel with Fabundeh; and this remains the central point whether he wanted to take it from Fabundeh or whether he already had possession of it and did not want to give it up (see Note 161 above). For the position of Wunde in relation to Luawa, see Map 5, p. 73 above; roughly speaking, Wunde was north, and Luawa south, of the River Moa.

163. See Note 61 above.

165. Fairtlough's relevant despatches are enc. C0267/434/Conf.52; Cardew; 28.12.97.

166. Int.19. The divergence in detail between this account and that of Mr. Hollins has been referred to in Note 161 above. Mr. Hollins goes on to mention that Fairtlough "took Kefu and the staff to his headquarters at Panguma" ("Short History", p. 21); so Fabundeh, according to Mr. Hollins, did not even have possession of the staff at this point. Maada James implies, however, that at this time the staff was still in the possession of Fabundeh. Whichever is the case, Kafula's wrath seems to have been directed equally against the British and Fabundeh. There is considerable evidence (see Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 345 above) that before Kailondo's death, Kafula was already in alliance with the French, and probably by the time of Fabundeh's accession, the French had too tight a grip on Wunde for Kafula to throw them off.

167. C0267/434/Conf.52; Cardew; 28.12.97, enc. Fairtlough, 3.4.97, Panguma.

168. Ibid.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid. From Fairtlough's report, it would seem that Kafula's plan was to cross over to Sambalu with as many armed men as possible, and seize or kill Fabundeh. When Kafula saw the Frontier Police, however, he declined to cross over. Cf. Int.19: "Kesai Fabundeh then assembled the whole of this country, and told them what was happening. He sent a messenger to go and call Kafula so that they can meet at the river. Kafula refused to come. Then war broke out."

171. C0267/434/Conf.52; Cardew; 28.12.97, enc. Fairtlough, 13.4.97, Panguma.

172. Ibid. Associated with Kafula in making these threats were mahril Katewe of Kundo, Baowa (or Mbawa) and Panda (see Sub-Insp. Taylor's report enc. C0267/434/Conf.52; Cardew; 28.12.97).

173. Ibid., enc. Fairtlough, 13.4.97, Panguma. Fairtlough noted that his 'constables' discovered these rafts "in the Moa river close to Bompeh" and destroyed them. From a map enc., Bompeh would seem to be near Kouloumba: indeed Bompeh may have been another name for Kouloumba, which was about 1\frac{1}{2} miles N. of the Moa, and 4 miles N.W. of the Moa crossing at Sambalu.

174. For details about the reduction in size of Kailahun in this period as a result of the perpetual fear of raids, see Chap. 5 of this thesis, p. 392-393 below.

175. C0267/434/Conf.52; Cardew; 28.12.97, enc. Fairtlough, 13.4.97, Panguma.

176. Ibid., enc. Fairtlough, 15.5.97, Panguma. Fairtlough was given this news by Fabundeh when he arrived in Kailahun on 30.4.97: "the Kissi..."
people were at that time in occupation of Mafend [sic.], Benduma (a village about 3 miles N. of Baoma) and other villages lying close to Kanre Lahun". It must be admitted that this situation, unlike Fabundeh's defeat of Mbawulomeh's forces, suggested a certain lack of military ability on Fabundeh's part.

177. Ibid.
178. Ibid. Lieut. Birch was again in the Kailahun area 2 years later (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, Note 180 below).
179. CO267/431/Conf. 52; Cardew; 23.12.97, enc. Fairtlough, 15.5.97, Panguma. Fairtlough's aim in taking this force to Kailahun was "to effect the arrest of Chief Katewa".
180. Ibid. Fairtlough suggested that all the Kissi people from this area withdrew to the north of the Moa, he probably meant that all the invaders from Wunde withdrew, leaving in the area those Kissi people who were faithful to Fabundeh. 2 years later, Lieut. Birch (by then Capt.) wrote: "When Captain Fairtlough and I attacked the Kissis, Bokowi a sub-chief of Nyagwa's informed the Kissis that we were coming and also the strength of our force" (CO267/446/Conf. 41; Nathan; 1.6.99, enc. Birch, 18.5.99, Panguma).
181. Fairtlough encountered some opposition at the Moa crossing: "whilst engaged at this work [of constructing rafts] my labourers were fired upon by the natives, but without effect" (CO267/434/Conf. 52; Cardew; 23.12.97, enc. Fairtlough, 15.5.97, Panguma). The people of Bompeh also offered some resistance at first, before fleeing into the bush. See also Int. 19 Maada James noted that it was during this period that the British "went and captured Kouloumba and put a detachment there".
182. CO267/434/Conf. 52; Cardew; 28.12.97, enc. Fairtlough, 15.5.97, Panguma.
183. Even when a wide variety of sophisticated techniques are used in modern industrialized societies, it is notoriously difficult to discover the views of the 'silent majority', the ordinary people. The task is made difficult to the point of impossibility in the Kailahun area at the end of the nineteenth century because much of the historical evidence is contained in the reports of European officials who did not even speak the local language and had little contact with the ordinary people.
184. CO267/434/Conf. 52; Cardew; 28.12.97, enc. Fairtlough, 15.5.97, Panguma. Kafula also expressed a desire to see Fairtlough, but in fact the Wunde Mahsi did not come to meet him.
185. If Kafula had been completely alienated from the rulers of Luawa and from the British as early as 1891 (which is what some official despatches suggest) it is unlikely that as late as 1897 he would have still been ready to send begging letters to Kailahun. But if the Luawa Wunde dispute only developed slowly after Fabundeh's accession in March 1896, it is not surprising that in October 1897 Kafula still hoping that reconciliation could be achieved by his sending a begging letter.
186. See Note 89 below.

187. C0267/434/Conf.52; Cardew; 28.12.97, enc. Blakeney, 2.10.97, Panguma. 'Neighbouring towns' presumably meant villages south of the Moa in Luawa.

188. Ibid. Blakeney mentioned that "at present French soldiers are said to be in Kundoo", but apparently he had no further information about them.

189. Ibid., enc. Taylor, n.d., and no place mentioned. The date of the meeting is presumed to have been as early as November because Blakeney's covering letter (ibid., Blakeney, 25.11.97, Panguma) was written late in November, and in his own report, Taylor stated that he "proceeded at once to WORMA, and arrived there on the 1st. instant".

190. Charles Taylor was a Creole Sub-Inspector in the Frontier Police. His name occurs in a variety of situations concerned with the Kallahun - Panguma area in this period (see, e.g. Note 73 above). He helped in the defeat of the sofas in late December 1893 after the Waima disaster, and was responsible for the death of Forekere (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp.520-521).


192. Ibid. Taylor decided that the dispute between the two Mahangisias was caused by nothing more than a disagreement over the division of Kailondo's estate. The Sub-Inspector may have been wrong about the cause of the dispute, but his opinion accords with oral tradition: presumably he spoke the Mende language and was accustomed to the local people, and therefore had more hope of unravelling the dispute than would a European official. Taylor persuaded Kafula and Fabundeh to promise on oath that they would not fight each other. Taylor recorded his gratitude to Nyagua of Panguma who had taken "an active part in the meeting, he always send his messengers night and day in the Kissi country to fetch Kafra down". The fact that even in late 1897, Nyagua was vigorously supporting British Government officials adds further weight to Mr. Abraham's argument that Nyagua did not join in the 1893 War, and was arrested and deported simply because of Blakeney's suspicions ("Nyagua, the British, and the Hut Tax War", pp.97-99).

193. C0267 contains no reports about the Kissi threat from Kafula between the end of 1897 and the end of 1893. In C0267/441/Conf.96; Cardew; 26.12.98, enc. Blakeney, the Ag.DC Panguma reported that there was no serious threat of raids from the Kissi. Neither Rev. Clarke, Mr. Hollins, nor Msada James give definite information about the Wunde Kissia in 1893.

194. It seems likely, considering the resistance which Fabundeh met within Luawa for refusing to join in the 1893 War (see pp.240-242 above), that the Luawa Mahai was as much preoccupied by that war as were the British officials or Mahangisias like Nyagua or Madam Yoko. In that case Fabundeh would have had little time to concern himself with Kafula.
unless the latter made a direct attack on Luawa. The evidence on pp. 267-270 above would suggest, however, that if the Wunde Kissia made any contribution to the Protectorate War against the British, it was directed more against the Frontier Police H.Q. at Panguma than against Luawa.

195. The first of these reports of Kissi activity are contained in CO267/445/10; Cardew; 16.1.99; and CO267/445/Conf.6; Cardew; 17.1.99.

196. CO267/445/10; Cardew; 16.1.99, enc. Report of Blakeney and Atkins. The Kissia had occupied "Jama, Sokuru, Konkonani and other towns in British territory". One of the officers who went on the subsequent Blakeney-Atkins expedition against the Kissia was Lt. Becke, R.A., who was in charge of the Maxim and its 4 gunners. The present writer is in possession of Lieut. Becke's map of the Protectorate which he apparently used during this expedition, and on which he marked in pencil various additional towns. The additional towns include Sokuru (i.e. Sukudu), Jama and Konkonani, and next to each of these is a 'crossed swords' symbol (اتفاق). See also Map 5, p. 13 below.

197. Davies, History of the S.L.Btn. of the RWAFF, p. 47.

198. After Nyagua's arrest in mid-1898, there could be no doubt that Fabundeh was the leading chief in the Panguma District of the British Protectorate.

199. CO267/445/10; Cardew; 16.1.99, enc. Report of Blakeney and Atkins. The report was apparently written jointly by Blakeney and Atkins. In view of the rather wild statements which Blakeney was tending to make at this stage (see Note 118 above), too much reliance should not be placed on his judgements.


201. CO267/445/Conf.6; Cardew; 17.1.99, enc. Blakeney, 16.1.99, Freetown (Blakeney was leaving the country for the UK). Blakeney spelt the name 'Bookorowu'. The spelling Bukowi is given in CO267/445/Conf.17; Cardew; 27.2.99 (see Note 224 below).

202. Woroma is in present-day Pejewa Chiefdom, almost due west of Kailahun, and about a mile west of the Moa River. It was the eastern-most town over which Nyagua had control.


204. Ibid. Blakeney gave no specific date for these events, except that it was after "the late insurrection".

205. Ibid.

206. See Note 103 above.
207. No specific title seems to have been given to the columns of soldiers who marched through the Protectorate in late 1898 and met in Kailahun early in 1899. In C0267 they are often referred to as "the Protectorate Military Expeditions" (see, e.g., C0267/446/100; Cardew; 24.3.99). The title applied to all the columns together - the Protectorate Expeditionary Force - is an invention which the present writer found necessary in order to refer succinctly to these columns.

208. Davies, op. cit., p.46.

209. Ibid., p.47. Also C0267/445/10; Cardew; 16.1.99, enc. Report of Blakeney and Atkins. The column marched through the area between 14 and 20 December, 1898.

210. Ibid. Also Davies, op. cit., p.47. Davies mentioned that there was a battle at Gara, and on Lt. Becke's map (see Note 196 above) Gara is marked in pencil as the site of a battle. See also "The Sierra Leone Protectorate Expedition", pp.536-537.


212. Ibid. The further expedition was led by Captain Goodwyn and Major Moore. The best description of this operation is to be found in "The Sierra Leone Protectorate Expedition", pp.536-537. Captain Goodwyn left Panguma on 27 December, and relieved Kainkordu on 1 January 1899. Major Moore joined Captain Goodwyn's column on 3 January. After further fighting, the column returned to Panguma on 12 January. The Kissi forces were pursued and defeated between 3 and 12 January, and several towns were burnt down by the British troops. "Major Moore gave me to understand", reported DC Ferguson, "that they had pulled (burnt) 'Fandallah' (a small town N.E. of Kainkordu 6 hrs. March from same on the banks of the Meli R.)" (C0267/445/Conf.10; Cardew; 8.2.99, enc. Ferguson, 21.1.99, Panguma). Blakeney noted that the following villages were destroyed: Sokuru, Jama, Konkonari, Karumbah and Koundou (C0267/445/Conf.6; Cardew; 17.1.99, enc. Blakeney, 16.1.99, Freetown). Lt. Becke's map (see Note 196 above) indicated battles at or near all of these places except Koundou. See also Davies, op.cit., p.47.

213. C0267/445/Conf.10; Cardew; 8.2.99, enc. Ferguson, 21.1.99, Panguma. Major Moore made this remark to Ferguson when they met at Kuranko (about 10 miles S.W. of Kainkordu) on 6.1.99. Major Moore was returning to Panguma from Kainkordu with 2 Companies of the W.A.R. after completing his expedition, and Ferguson was on his way to inspect conditions around Kainkordu.

214. Ibid. Ferguson styled himself H.G. de Lavalotte-Ferguson.

215. Ibid. Ferguson took charge of Panguma District as Acting DC from Blakeney on 1.1.99. Blakeney then travelled to Freetown.

216. Ibid. Moore had been in the area in the first days of the new year; Ferguson travelled the same ground between 7 and 10 January.
217. Ibid. The discrepancy between Moore's report and Ferguson's report demonstrates once again the general unreliability of documents written by early British officials. Moore wanted to prove that his military expedition had achieved useful results. Similarly, when he went on leave, Blakeney produced a report to show that he was leaving a district in reasonably good order (C0267/445/Conf.6; Cardew; 17.1.99, enc. Blakeney, 16.1.99, Freetown). Ferguson, newly arriving full of enthusiasm, was critical of both Moore's and Blakeney's work, and gave the impression that there was much work (and fighting which he obviously relished) to be done before the district would be 'settled'.

218. C0267/445/Conf.10; Cardew; 8.2.99, enc. Ferguson, 21.1.99, Panguma. Ferguson had previously crossed to the east (left) bank of the Mali, so was approaching Kailahun through Wunde, passing through the town of Koundou on his way southwards.

219. Ibid. Ferguson noted, "I was lucky in catching a man who I had wounded slightly with my revolver; this man confessed that they were Chief Kafret's war-boys & had been trying to get across the river, to get into Fa Bundu's country when they were fired into by some Frontiers from the Kanrelahun outstation. I marched into Kanre Lahun next day & had this story verified by Sergt. Scott in charge of that station".

220. Ibid.

221. C0267/445/Conf.6; Cardew; 17.1.99. Cardew spelt the name Mogbi, but Mogboi is most likely a better spelling. The latter is a fairly common name in the Mende language, and means 'red-skinned'.

222. Ibid. Cardew spelt the name Wouni. See Notes 238 and 265 below.

223. Ibid. In April 1899, Nathan noted that "Moogby (Nyagwa's son), Bundu, Boymah-Gandi (of Dodo) and Wunni" had still shown no sign of submission (C0267/446/Conf.33; Nathan; 15.4.99). In July 1900, Legg (DC Panguma) noted that Bundu was taking part in raids against Luawa (C0267/453/Conf.36; Cardew; 14.7.00, enc. Legg, 7.7.00, Panguma). In October 1900, Bundu and Woni were still in league with Kafu (C0267/454/Conf.65; Cardew; 10.10.00, enc. Warren, 22.9.00, Panguma).

224. C0267/445/Conf.17; Cardew; 27.2.99, enc. Intelligence Report by Major Stuart from Kailahun, 12.2.99: "Bukowi, the Chief of Woroma (Bambara Mendi country), who is held by Fabunda to be the real head of the insurgent Mendi Chiefs, sent, on the 2nd. inst., to the District Commissioner to offer to submit". However, this submission never took place. In May 1899, Birch (who had taken over from Ferguson as DC Panguma) wrote "Bokowi is now with the Kassis as also is Wanni who was Nyagwa's principal war boy, thus showing the friendly feeling between Nyagwa and the Kassis" (C0267/446/Conf.41; Nathan; 1.6.99, enc. Birch, 18.5.99, Panguma).

226. Ibid. Also Davies, op.cit., pp.47-48, and Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.591. "The Sierra Leone Protectorate Expedition", pp.538-540, contains the fullest description of these events. The chronology of events in the Kailahun area for the last days of January and the first days of February was as follows:

25 January: Col. Cunningham with 2 Companies of the W.A.R. went to Yamandu and back.
26 January: Major Blunt went to Yamandu and slept the night there.
27 January: Major Blunt still in Kissi country.
29 January: Major Blunt returned from Kissi country to Kailahun. Col. Cunningham reached Kissi Kenema. Col. Marshall's column from Falaba was by this time marching through Kissi country.
30 January: all troops assembled in Kailahun, including Col. Marshall's column.
31 January - 2 February: rest period for the troops in Kailahun.
3 February: Panguma and Falaba columns started homewards to Freetown, the Falaba column again marching through Kissi country.
4 February: Bandajuma and Headquarters columns started from Kailahun for Freetown.

227. The West African Regiment (W.A.R.) was formed in 1898, as a result of the need for more soldiers which the Protectorate campaigns required (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.565). "By September over 800 Protectorate men had enlisted in the West African Regiment" (ibid., p.587).

228. Kissi Kenema was by this time recognized as Kafula's headquarters (see Map 5). This town was, however, on the edge of Wunde, in Lingo - Gengo country, and it is probable that this was not the original 'headquarters town' of Wunde. Kafula possibly moved to Kenema in the early 1890s, as his political power increased. One reason for such a move might have been to be nearer the French in Kissidougou, and to be further away from the power of the Luawa Mendi.

229. C0267/445/Conf.15; Cardew; 15.2.99, enc. Cunningham, 31.1.99, Kailahun. Cf. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.591: "When the three columns converged on Panguma in February 1899, they took the offensive into the Kisi country". But in the end the columns converged on Kailahun, not Panguma as had been originally planned, in January 1899, and before the end of that same month the anti-Kissi offensive had been completed.

230. "The Sierra Leone Protectorate Expedition", p.540. For Yamandu, see Map 3; also Chap.1 of this thesis p.10 above.

231. The Force left Kailahun over the two days 3-4 February (see Note 226 above). The various columns marched back to Freetown by different routes.

232. C0267/445/Conf.17; Gore; 27.2.99, enc. Cunningham, 12.2.99 (i).

233. Ibid., enc. Cunningham, 12.2.99 (ii). Cunningham's evidence to show that Kafula's power was broken did not amount to very much. "The Luawa Mendi (Fabunda's tribe) [note the vague use of the word 'tribe']
are now operating single-handed against the Kissis. This is noteworthy, as when troops first went out from Kanre Lahun on January 25th, they were in a state of trepidation when acting as friendlies. This fact appears to show conclusively that Kafura’s power is broken”.

The judgement of the present writer is that throughout the period under discussion (1896-1912), Kafula retained the support of the majority of the Wunde people. Specific evidence on the attitudes of the Wunde Kissis in this period is naturally sparse. But it is unlikely that he could have kept the whole area in a state of unrest for so long if he had not won the loyalty of the majority of the Wunde people. The evidence for this whole section on Kafula makes sense most easily if it is accepted that he had the support of the bulk of the Wunde people. Even Le Mesurier had to admit in January 1907 that the British had failed to persuade the bulk of the Wunde Kissis to withdraw their support from Kafula.

234. The writer of the article “The Sierra Leone Protectorate Expedition” does not give his own name; he describes himself simply as “One who was there”.

235. Ibid., p.541.

236. CO267/445/Conf.17; Gore; 27.2.99, enc. Cunningham, 12.2.99 (ii).

237. 'Trouble' in Wunde broke out again even before Cardew had sent off to London Cunningham's final reports on the Protectorate Expedition; the Governor having commented on the reports that he hoped the Kissis would now keep quiet "for a long time" (CO267/446/100; Cardew; 24.3.99).

238. CO267/446/Conf.44; Nathan; 14.6.99, enc. Ferguson, 14.4.99, Panguma. The Kissis were led, reported Ferguson, by Wonni Fungbah, who had been Nyagua's war-leader (see Note 222 above).


240. Ibid. For Ganawa, See Chap. 3 of this thesis, p. 212. above.

241. CO267/446/Conf.44; Nathan; 14.6.99, enc. Ferguson, 14.4.99, Panguma. The Kenema referred to here is clearly Kissi-Kenema, Kafula's capital.

242. Ibid.

243. Ibid. No trace of any "Yomandu" has been found in "Lower" or southern Kono. In any case, even Kailondo's Greater Luawa (the area over which Kailondo exercised some direct, consistent, recognized control) had not included any country in which Kono was the predominant language (see Map 5).

244. Yomandu is frequently mentioned in both oral tradition and written records for the reigns of Kailondo and Fabundeh as a town in Wunde (see Map 3 and Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 70 above); the present writer has not found any reference to a "Yomandu" within Luawa in either oral tradition or written records, nor does any sizeable
settlement of that name exist within present-day Luawa and the Kissi Chiefsdoms (see map enc. C0267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun).

245. In theory, Cardew had excluded the area north of the Moa, where Yamandu was situated, from Fabundeh's jurisdiction (C0267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun). In practice too, Kafula's rebellion had taken Yamandu out of Fabundeh's control: the town was probably the second-biggest settlement controlled by Kafula (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, p. 247 above).

246. For the details of the international boundaries, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 231-9 below.

247. See Note 244 above.

248. The British, in May 1896, had managed to secure Liberian agreement on the right of British troops to pursue marauders across the international boundary into Liberian territory. The Liberians gave "facilities to Great Britain to pursue and capture Princes or Chiefs of Aborigines whose states or portions of them are placed in the territory belonging to Great Britain and who after causing disorders in the British sphere take refuge in the territories recognised as belonging to Liberia" (C0267/426/Conf. 45; Cardew; 12.8.96). "A special clause in the Franco-Liberian convention of 1892 authorizes the French to pursue and capture fugitives from her territories who take refuge in Liberia. A similar power is secured to the Government of Sierra Leone by an agreement made in 1896" (C0267/454/Conf. 65; Cardew; 10.10.00, memorandum by C.O. official attached: Memorandum on the Present Position of Liberia). But Ferguson provided no evidence that in March 1899 any part of Luawa had been marauded in order to justify his crossing into Liberian territory.

249. On many occasions both before and after March 1899, an anti-Kafula raid by British troops could have been justified on the grounds that it was relieving pressure on Fabundeh's Luawa. But in March 1899, as a result of the Protectorate Expeditionary Force's actions, Fabundeh was under little immediate pressure.

250. Cardew went on leave to the UK. in March 1899, and Major Nathan was seconded temporarily to act as Governor (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p. 594).

251. C0267/446/Conf. 44; Nathan; 14.6.99.

252. C0267/446/Conf. 33; Nathan; 15.4.99, enc. Ferguson. The Panguma DC noted that the French had been seen at Koundou, one day's march NE of Kainkordu on the left bank of the Mali River, and at Zoworo, in S. Kissi country.

253. C0267/445/Conf. 26; Cardew; 9.3.99. Captain Mackey, who was demarcating the Anglo-French boundary, was given the information about the post at Kissidougou by Captain Gaden, the French demarcator.
254. Ibid. "Captain Gaden informed him [i.e. Mackesy]", reported Cardew, "that an expedition was to start from Kissidougou ... along the Liberian Frontier, and I also understood him to say that Captain Gaden complained of the Kissis raiding into French territory".

255. CO267/446/Conf.44; Nathan; 14.6.99, enc. Birch, 14.5.99, Panguma. Birch, who replaced Ferguson as DC Panguma in April, noted that the messenger sent to Kafula by Ferguson had met 2 French soldiers at Kafula's town of Laingadu. The 2 soldiers asked the messenger to "go and tell the sergeant at Kanre Lahun that they did not come to fight with him we were only sent for by Kafura". See also Chap.2 of this thesis, pp.113-114 above. In September 1900, Warren (DC Panguma) reported that "Denkadugu the town where Kaffra sits down is also occupied by the French and consists of 16 soldiers and frequently visited by a French officer from Konemi" (CO267/454/Conf.65; Cardew; 10.10.00, enc. Warren, 22.9.00 Panguma), and this had been the case since 1899.

256. British support of Fabundeh can be seen particularly in the retention of a Frontier Police post (later a WAFF contingent) in Kailahun. Although in some ways British soldiers in Luawa made Fabundeh's position more difficult, they did provide a visible indication of British support for the Luawa Mahei.

257. CO267/453/Conf.34; Cardew; 6.7.00, enc. Legg (Ag. DC Panguma), 3.5.00, Panguma. Since Legg's report was made in May 1900, it may be presumed that the spy brought back his news in April.

258. Ibid. The spy was sent to Captain Legg at Panguma by Fabundeh.

259. Ibid. The spy reported that there were 40 French 'native soldiers' quartered at 'Sengahu'; but the spy did not accurately describe the position of Sengahu ("about one and half days march from Kanre Lahun"), and the present writer has been unable to locate it. Legg suggested that it was the same place as Nyandehun - Mambabu ('Yandahun'), but this is most unlikely, as no such large French force ever entered Luawa before or after this time, let alone being "quartered" there. If there had been such a large French force so near to Kailahun, it would surely have provoked a violent response from Fabundeh. A 1½ days march would represent a distance of 20 to 30 miles, and Nyandehun is only about 10 miles from Kailahun.

260. See Chap.2 of this thesis, p.45 above, for a description of the development of this rift in 1896.

261. Many towns and villages in Luawa were never the subject of attack by any of these 4 forces. Yet every time an armed force passed through the area, the ordinary people would suffer in various ways; some people would be so afraid that they would run away; others would be compelled to act as carriers; an enormous amount of food would be demanded by the armed force. And in the first decade of Fabundeh's reign, the passage of an armed force through the country was probably a much more common occurrence than it had been in Kailondo's reign. For example, the Frontiers at Kailahun were regularly 'patrolling' the area.
In mid-1900, Cardew described the area as being "eternally in a state of unrest through these raids of the Kissis" (C0267/453/Conf.36; Cardew; 14.7.00).

Wunde was the only area which, in the first decade of Fabundeh's reign, suffered from punitive raids made by all 4 of the groups of armed forces in turn.

The towns were named as "Konkissi - Shehina - Folima - Gbafale". They would appear to have been in the Kisi part of Kailondo's Luawa. There are several villages to the east of Buedu named 'Konkissi'; and Folima is a village on the present-day Gbalahun-Dodo motor road. The present writer has been unable to suggest any possible locations for the other two places.

Yandahun might refer to Nyandehun; Bengo is a common Kissi village name. Stewart noted that the names of the Chiefs making the raids were "Woni-fumba, Bundo, Bokowi, Gpow and Bambi".

Very few reports were made by British officials about the activities of the Wunde Kissis during 1901. In May, Mr. Greaves, the DC Panguma, reported a raid by Panda of Kumantandu (in present-day Ponguia Chiefdom) against Fabundeh of Luawa; in June, the DC had destroyed Kumantandu and 3 other towns (C0267/458/246; King-Harman; 16.7.01). Panda was probably in alliance with the Wunde Kissis, though this is not specifically stated in Mr. Greaves' report.

Cardew left Sierra Leone towards the end of 1900, and was replaced by Sir Charles King-Harman, who made several tours in the Protectorate soon after his arrival (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.605).

The Frontier Police Force was reconstituted in November 1901 as a purely military body under the title "the Sierra Leone Battalion of the West African Frontier Force" (generally referred to in this thesis simply by the initials WAFF). For a more detailed description of the constitution of the WAFF in 1902, see Davies, op. cit., pp.65-67. The Court Messenger Force, which was directly under the control of the District Commissioners, took over policing duties in the Protectorate (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.606). See also Chap.5 of this thesis, pp.399-403 below.
274. C0267/425/Conf.22; Cardew; 7.4.96, enc. map. Cardew decided that the Moa-Meli interfluve should be part of Fabundeh'e's territory for the practical reason that it would be inconvenient to have "such a re-entrant on the frontier".

275. C0267/463/Conf.31; Henstock; 11.9.02.

276. Anderson became DC Panguma early in 1901, and remained substantive DC in charge of the Luawa area (being replaced only temporarily by Acting DCs when he was on leave) until the end of 1906, when local administrative changes placed the Luawa area in Railway District under Dr. Maxwell. Most senior British officials in Sierra Leone endorsed King-Harman's estimate of Anderson's temperament: "Major Anderson is a most excitable man whose reports on most trivial matters are generally very highly coloured".

277. C0267/463/Conf.31; Henstock (Ag. Gov.); 11.9.02. The town was called Yengema, 2 hours march NE of Couroumba, and therefore probably in Liberia, though the British officials concerned insisted it was within British territory.

278. Ibid. Anderson came to this conclusion "both from the reports of natives, and also from the fact that some parties of the enemy fired volleys, like disciplined troops, and apparently used modern weapons with smokeless powder. It is, of course, possible that such parties may have been composed of deserters from the French Colonial Forces". Captain Eames came to a similar conclusion: "the firing was by volleys, and it was evident from their nature and precision of delivery that they were being fired by disciplined troops + not mere natives" (SLGA, MP Conf.38/1902, enc. Eames, 27.5.02, Kamiendo). The statements of both Eames and Anderson were thus based partly on the unjustified assumption that the "more natives" in Kafula's forces would never be able to maintain disciplined rifle fire. However, see Notes 281 and 282 below for more conclusive evidence of French help to Kafula.

280. C0267/467/Conf.; King-Harman; 3.3.03, enc. Anderson, 24.5.02, Kamiendo. Facts elicited from the prisoners taken. This statement was made Douge, a Kissi prisoner. It is not clear why there was a delay of almost a year in sending Anderson's report on from Freetown to London.

281. C0267/467/Conf. ; King-Harman; 3.3.03, enc. Anderson, 24.5.02, Kamiendo: Facts elicited from the prisoners taken. This statement was made Douge, a Kissi prisoner. It is not clear why there was a delay of almost a year in sending Anderson's report on from Freetown to London.

282. Ibid. This statement was made by "Dangall captured on 19th instant wearing trousers usually issued to French native troops".

283. Ibid.

284. SLGA, MP Conf.38/1902, enc. Anderson, 26.5.02, Kamiendo.

285. C0267/467/Conf.; King-Harman; 3.3.03.
286. The Governor's comment shows an awareness that his control over up-country officials was much less firm than he would have liked (cf. Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 95-96 above.)

287. SLGA, MPConf. 38/1902, enc. Warren, 28.7.02, no place of writing given.

288. Ibid., attached copy of Warren's instructions to Lt. Cockburn, 16.7.02, Panguma. Warren had instructed Cockburn "not to proceed further East than TOROBO and MANGMA". But in his military expedition, this is precisely what Cockburn did, travelling "due EAST to FANGAMANDU, which would carry him well into LIBERIA" (ibid., enc. Warren, 8.8.02). In fact Fangamandu was only about one mile east of the Anglo-Liberian boundary; but Cockburn clearly disobeyed his orders in travelling east at all. Acting Governor Henstock, commenting on Cockburn's later explanations of his action, concluded that they were "eminently unsatisfactory + in some respects almost, untruthful, in that there is an obvious suppressio reris" (ibid., minute by Ag. Gov. to Sierra Leone Colonial Sec., 24.10.02).

289. Ibid. Cockburn's justification for his action was that the Kissa "were reported to be massing at a town called FANGAMANDU", and so he attacked the town even though there had been no fighting or disturbance, nor even any confirmation of the report. Indeed, Cockburn's despatch to Capt. Eames on his expedition (ibid., Cockburn, 25.7.02, Couroumba) provides little proof that the Kissa had in fact been massing at Fangamandu.

290. Capt. Warren was at this time Officer Commanding the Sierra Leone Battalion of the WAFF.

291. Ibid., enc. Warren, 8.8.02, no place of writing given. Warren's evidence for his statement about Cockburn was that Cockburn ordered the NCO i/c Kailahun to meet him at Couroumba and to bring with him Fabundeh and all his war-boys - which showed that Cockburn was organizing a military expedition before he received any information at all to justify it. Cockburn stated that Fabundeh and the NCO Kailahun just happened to be at Couroumba, and he met them there, mentioning nothing about his own letter.

292. Two despatches to London touch on these troubles on the border (C0267/463/Conf.31; Henstock (Ag. Gov.) 11.9.02 and C0267/457/Conf.; King-Harman; 3.3.03). Neither of them mention Cockburn or his behaviour.

293. Virtually all the British officials who entered Luawa between 1890 and 1911 were soldiers by profession, T.J. Aldridge being the one notable exception. Fairtlough, Blakeney, Ferguson, Birch, Legg and Anderson were all military men. The first civilian DC appointed to the area for any considerable time was Dr. Maxwell in 1907, but the Luawa area was virtually 'ruled' by Le Mesurier and his WAFF officers until 1911.

294. For example, there is evidence of similar behaviour on the part of Major Le Mesurier (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 308-313 below).
295. For details of the international boundaries in 1903, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 281-284 below. Since the Liberians had no effective control of this area at this time, the French like the British, largely ignored their rights in it.

296. G0267/468/Conf.; King-Harman; 11.7.03, enc. Pearson, 10.7.03, Freetown. Lieutenant Cox was Assistant British Commissioner in the Anglo-Liberian Boundary Commission which worked its way southwards from Tembikundu to the Moa River in June and July 1903, demarcating the 13th degree of longitude west of Paris as the Anglo-Liberian international boundary.

297. Ibid.

298. Ibid. Captain H.D. Pearson, who provided this information was British Commissioner on the Anglo-Liberian Boundary Commission.

299. Ibid. Pearson spelt the names "Sambowi, Mafindo, Nwyown".

300. Ibid.

301. See Notes 296 and 298 above.

302. This tendency to exaggerate may have been reinforced by the nature of the Sierra Leone climate and the speed at which wild vegetation grows during the wet season. A farm or village left untended for a few weeks quickly takes on a dilapidated appearance. The place becomes overgrown, any buildings look unfit for human habitation, wild animals take up residence. But it is equally true that a few days hard work can transform appearances, and make the farm seem well-tended, the village carefully looked after. To build a whole set of new houses is the work of only a few weeks.

303. It has already been shown how Fabundeh's authority held Luawa together and at peace in the 1893 crisis (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 260-3 above). For further examples of his diplomatic skill in preserving the integrity, peace and prosperity of Luawa, see p. below.

304. Little information was provided in officials' reports for 1903 concerning the state of the Luawa area. However, Anderson was DC Panguma from 1901 onwards (see Note 276 above), and the implication behind this report (G0267/473/311; Probyn; 16.12.04, enc. Anderson, 27.11.04, Panguma) and others (e.g. G0267/475/48; Probyn; 1.2.05, enc. Anderson, 19.1.05, Panguma; Report on Panguma District 1904) is that Fabundeh's territory had experienced continuous unrest ever since he took over as DC.

305. The report was written by Anderson in November 1904 (see Note 304 above), so it could hardly refer to events which happened in December 1904.

306. These towns have not been traced.

307. Damballa is presumably the town in present-day Kisi Tungi, some 5 miles NE of Buedu.

309. C0267/475/48; Probyn; 1.2.05, enc. Anderson, 19.1.05, Panguma; Report on Panguma District 1904. No indication is given as to which towns were affected by these raids. For a different and more detailed description of raids by the Kissia in late 1904, see Davies, op.cit., pp.69-71.

310. C0267/475/5; Probyn; 5.1.05. Kafula's attack on Couroumba was made on 29.12.04. Cf. Davies, op.cit., pp.72-73.

311. C0267/475/Conf.; Probyn; 7.1.05.

312. Davies, op.cit., p.68. Presumably the Fabundeh-Kafula conflict prevented the Kissia from trading much with Freetown. It is unlikely that they could easily obtain arms from the French, who were intermittently various sections of the Kissia. This would suggest, by a process of elimination, that the Kissia mainly obtained their weapons through various intermediaries from Monrovia. This would agree with the implications of Alldridge's remarks on trade in gunpowder in the early 1890s (see Chap.3 of this thesis, p.M8-9 above.

313. Davies, op.cit., p.68. By comparison, the Sierra Leone Battalion of the WAFF at this stage numbered less than 600 men (ibid., p.67). It may be doubted whether Fabundeh could have put an army of 5,000 men into the field.

314. C0267/473/311; Probyn; 16.12.04, enc. Anderson, 27.11.04, Panguma. The Panguma DC noted that "Kaffurie now boasts that he is a very powerful Chief that the English soldiers fear to fight him in his own country. He has become so arrogant and has so many supporters that there is absolutely no hope in the idea of obtaining a pacific termination to the war".

315. Probyn replaced King-Harman as Governor in 1904.

316. Probyn's reluctance to take any sort of initiative without first writing to the London Colonial Office for instructions frequently aroused the sarcasm of Colonial Office officials, who seem to have disliked Probyn on several other grounds as well. C0267 despatches received from Probyn were often peppered with critical minutes by Colonial Office officials.

317. C0267/476/Conf.; Probyn; 18.2.05.

318. Major Palmer, O.C. of the Sierra Leone Battalion of the WAFF, no doubt influenced Probyn's attitude by a strongly-worded Memorandum. He suggested that "nothing short of a drastic punitive expedition will effect the pacification of the frontier. The policy of small detachments crossing the border and burning a town or two has been tried and has failed.

It is therefore necessary to employ 300 men as a striking force sufficient to overcome any resistance... Such an operation cannot therefore truly be characterized as a 'pursuit', but is
rather a deliberate offensive movement against a masterless tribe, who have continuously for three years been the terror of the British subjects this side of the border" (Davies, op. cit., p.70). Palmer was OC of the Battalion from April 1904 to February 1907 (Haywood and Clarke, The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force, p.286).

319. British troops were thus operating from the Moa River northwards to the latitude of Tembikundu, in an area which was certainly much larger than that covered by Wunde Chiefdom, and possibly larger than the area over which Kafula's influence extended (see Map 5).

320. CO267/476/Conf.; Probyn; 18.2.05.

321. Ibid. For the international boundary at this time, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.4, p. below. It seems that the French Government was slow to object to the sending of British troops. In April 1907, the London Colonial Office and Foreign Office officials were preparing a reply to a French note on the subject. The London officials tried to explain "the unrest which has prevailed in the country / i.e. Wunde/ in terms of "the presence of the French troops" (CO267/499/F.0.; 11.4.07; Draft reply of Sir E. Grey to M. Cambou).


323 Palmer's efficiency and military success is brought out clearly, for example, in Davies' account of the expedition (see Note 322 above). See also the laudatory tone of Probyn's despatches on the expedition (CO267/478/Conf.; Probyn; 5.7.05). See also Davies, op. cit., pp.74-75.

324. See Note 318 above.

325. CO267/477/Conf.; Probyn; 20.4.05, enc. Palmer, 4.4.05, Lokoma (Liberia).

326. Ibid. For more details of this campaign (which is not relevant to this study) see Davies, op. cit., pp.74-81. Also see Haywood and Clarke, op. cit., pp.78-79; Hollins, "Short History", pp.23-24; Ints.19 and 20 passim.

327. CO267/478/286; Probyn; 28.6.05.

328. The Mafessa flows almost due southwards on the eastern side of Wunde, and joins the Moa due N of Koindu town (see Map 2).

329. CO267/478/386; Probyn; 28.6.05.

330. Palmer described his political settlement in CO267/479/332; Probyn; 21.7.05, enc. Palmer, 6.7.05, Wuladé. Palmer presided over a meeting of the Wunde Kiasia; and 2 men who had been driven out of Wunde by Kafula, Bava and Kimbo, "were elected by the unanimous vote of all chiefs present to be the principal chiefs of the two sections of WUNDE country into which it had formerly been divided". Clearly Palmer must have had a great influence in this election-meeting; and he fairly
obviously favoured the 2 chiefs mentioned particularly because they would be strongly anti-Kafula. The whole area was divided out among the following chiefs:

"BAWA  - for eastern Wunde
KIMBO  - for western Wunde (adjoining the Protectorate)
FURAMOI - for KAMARA (former chief)
BERI  - for TORI (former part chief)
YIGBO - for LINGO BENGU (former chief)

Two small tracts of country viz TUNGI and YUMBO remain to be settled". This list indicates what a large area of country Kafula had ruled over by late 1904.

331. Many contemporary and historical parallels could be made with similar situations, where a foreign military power entered an area to impose on that area a political settlement favourable to itself. But, because the 'puppets' who are put into authority cannot gain popular support, the foreign military power is compelled to stay on indefinitely in order to uphold the 'puppets'. After a whole year in Wunde, Palmer had to admit that there was "no lack of those who, did they dare own it, would pronounce unhesitatingly for the return of Kafura .... I believe a time will come when it will be possible to evacuate Kissi country, but that time is not yet, without disastrous consequences, and perhaps will not arrive until Kafura's death or capture is effected" (CO267/483/Conf.; Probyn; 3.3.06, enc. Palmer, 23.2.06, Yardu Makumbe).

332. CO267/478/Conf.; Probyn; 5.7.05.


334. In the despatches contained in CO267 for the years 1905-1907, the disturbances in Kissi country are probably given more attention (from the point of view of both the length and the number of despatches) than any other subject. Kissi country was the only area where troops manned a permanent garrison, and since the 1893 War, it was the only area in which there had been serious fighting.

335. Daru was about 70 miles from Wulado. The usual route followed by troops between Daru and Wulado was through Pendembu, Kailahun, and Mano-Sewalu, crossing the Moa River near Dia in present-day Kissi Kam. Oral traditions from Luawa indicated that these troop movements left a deep impression on the minds of the ordinary people of Luawa (e.g. Int.10). This was not surprising, as the officers in charge of these soldiers were the first Europeans that many of the ordinary people had seen.

336. For the amount of disturbance suffered by Luawa after 1906, mainly from the America-Liberians, and the failure of the British troops to provide adequate protection, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.4, pp.190-6 below.

337. CO267/480/Conf.; Probyn; 30.11.05, enc. Le Mesurier, 12.11.05, Freetown.
When the Kissi Field Force ceased operations late in June 1905, a garrison of 200 men, or 2 Companies, was left in Wulade (Davies, op. cit., p.80). In Chap. 1 of this thesis, p.1 above, it was stated that this thesis would concern itself with the heartland of Kailondo's polity - 'Kailondo's Luawa' - which was defined as the three present-day Kissi Chiefdoms and Luawa Chiefdom in Sierra Leone. Until 1905, Kafuila so deeply affected Kailondo's and Fabundeh's Luawa that the Wunde Mahsi's activities are an integral part of the history of Luawa. From 1905 onwards, however, Fabundeh and his people were only slightly affected by events in Wunde.

There were occasional small outbreaks of trouble and fighting. For instance in September 1906, Captain Murray reported from Wulade that Chief Bona, a sub-chief of Yigbo (see Note 330 above), was in revolt against his superior (C0267/483/Conf.; Probyn; 4.10.06, enc. Murray, 29.9.06, Wulade). Such trouble was, however, quickly and fairly easily crushed by the force of British arms (C0267/483/Conf.; Probyn; 24.10.06, enc. Palmer, 23.10.06, Freetown).

Kafuila seems to have stayed in Kissi country just east of the Mafessa River (see C0267/478/286; Probyn; 28.6.05).

The French were rapidly extending their influence in the area east and north of Wulade in 1906. Major Palmer noted that reports "of French soldiers patrolling the country and exacting tax (in kind) come in almost daily and they have on more than one occasion penetrated into that portion of Kissi country which is at present under my jurisdiction .... It is reported that Kafuila is living at Beckadu (B) with Sapuyo" (C0267/486/Conf.; Probyn; 26.7.06, enc. Palmer, 15.7.06, Wulade).

5 weeks later Captain Murray reported the presence of a French patrol also at Gbekedu (C0267/487/Conf.; Probyn; 30.8.06, enc. Murray, 23.8.06, Wulade). A report was circulated through Wunde that the French were marching in to reinstate Kafuila. This all suggested a close liaison between Kafuila and the French. In March 1907, Lt. Delassalle (Commandant le poste de Bamba) wrote to Le Mesurier at Wulade that Kafuila "désirait ... rester toute sa vie le fidèle sujet de la France" (C0267/493/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 14.4.07, enc. Delassalle, 16.3.07, Bamba). By the end of 1907, Kafuila's close connection with the French was a well-known fact. Captain Norman wrote that during some disturbances in French-controlled Kissi country, "chefs Sapuyo and Kafuila remained loyal to the French throughout and gave them every assistance" (C0267/493/Conf.; Probyn; 28.12.07, enc. Norman).

In January 1907, Capt. Le Mesurier (O.C., Sierra Leone Battalion, WAFF) presented a report which provided a clear indictment of British policy in Wunde over the previous 2 years (though Le Mesurier himself probably did not recognize this). He stated that Kafuila's return "as Chief over that part of Kissi country (Wunde) he possessed previous to his being driven out in 1905, would, so far from disturbing the present peace in the country, rather tend to improve matters. The reason for my stating this is that after the operations in 1905, Chief Kimbo of Navoo, a Chief in the Protectorate, was placed by us as Chief
over the Wunde country. He is an old man and too sick to look after his country, and in addition, has always been a great friend of Chief Kafura, with whom even now he corresponds. I have good reason to suppose that he would have no objection to handing the Wunde country back to Kafura. There is no doubt that the people of Wunde would welcome Chief Kafura with open arms and the peace of the country would be assured" (C0267/492/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 5.2.07, enc. Le Mesurier, 24.1.07, Wulade).

343. In his story, Pa Langaura (Int.20) called Le Mesurier "Major Bull". Pa Langama's testimony is rather confused at this point, and possibly he was confusing Le Mesurier with Palmer, the previous CC of the Sierra Leone Battalion, WAFF. Nevertheless the main point of his testimony is clear. "Major Bull ravaged that country. He built a barracks at Wulade. He killed a lot of people there. The bush was not very big there, so it was easy to set fire to it. He was about to gain control of that area there in Guinea, but he killed too many people. Major Bull was a bad man. He did not try to encourage people, he simply used force". See also Note 339 above. There was a further engagement on behalf of Chief Yigbo against Chief Bono (or Donna) in the last days of 1906 (see C0267/492/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 4.1.07). See also Davies, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

344. C0267/504/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 17.7.08, enc. Intelligence Reports: "This tract of country [i.e. Wunde and the whole area between the Meli and Mafessa Rivers] has been ceded to the French by the Liberians, but the former have not yet taken actual possession".

345. Ibid. This was accepted implicitly in the Intelligence Report.

346. C0267/533/Conf.; Merewether; 26.9.11. British troops were still stationed at Wulade at this time, but it was proposed that the modification of the boundary to make the Moa-Meli the Anglo-French frontier should come into effect on 6.10.11. Cf.Hollins, "Short History", p.24: "the present boundary, the rivers Meli and Moa, was not fixed till 1912, up till which year Wulade was occupied".

347. C0267/521/Conf.; Probyn; 21.2.10. The French agreed that when they took over Wulade and the area occupied by the British troops, "Kafura would remain perpetually banished from the country".

348. Hollins, "Short History", p.21, stated that Kafula was "the father of the present Chief Nyandekoi of Wunde". So by the 1920s, Kafula's family was back in power.

349. See Note 342 above.

350. Kafula's playing off rival French and British forces was not the only factor giving him a new impunity. Another factor was that although Fabundeh had some ability as a military leader, he almost certainly did not possess the same reputation or degree of ability as Kailondo. Also, it seems that after 1895, Kafula came to maturity as a leader, gained an ascendancy over all the south-eastern Kisi people, and thus increased
his own political power. Moreover, between 1896 and 1905, the British accepted that most of Wunde was part of Liberian territory, and so made no attempt either to establish their authority there or to 'subdue' Kafula's territory: so for 10 years the Wunde Moh was allowed to remain, in general, inviolate within his own country from any attacks by British troops or Fabundeh's forces. Despite other factors such as these, however, the evidence presented in this section of the thesis suggests that Kafula benefitted considerably in his relations with Fabundeh and the British from the protection he persuaded the French to give him.

351. See especially this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 290-294 below, concerning the difficulties caused by Lt. Lomax for Fabundeh.

352. The creation of international boundaries in Africa in the late 19th Century is often described in such a way as to suggest that there were no recognizable frontiers between different peoples in Africa before the European 'Scramble'. But obviously political frontiers existed in Africa before the European partition, though these were more fluid and less clearly defined geographically than frontiers in Europe. Even in the Luawa area, which has sometimes been characterized as an area without organized states before the advent of the Europeans, the boundary between Kailondo's Luawa and Nyagua's Panguna was quite clearly drawn by the time the first European arrived (see Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 106 above); so was the boundary between Nomo Babawo's Upper Bambara and Kailondo's Luawa.

353. In 1882, an Anglo-French Boundary Commission accepted a frontier between the Scarcies and Melakori Rivers, but although a Convention was signed in June, it was never ratified (Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p. 427). However, the British Government accepted this frontier in principle, and the 1832 delimitation was preserved in an Anglo-French Agreement of 10.8.39 (ibid., p. 486). "It provided for Boundary Commissioners to fix a frontier dividing Melakori and Scarcies basins, then continuing inland beyond the Melakori source along the Great Scarcies, giving Bena and Tamils to France, Tambaka and Tala to Britain, as far as the 10° North latitude" (ibid). When an Anglo-French Boundary Commission started work on the ground in December 1891, the two sides quarrelled before they finished surveying the Scarcies, and the French gave up (ibid., p. 504). The work of demarcating the Anglo-French boundary was finally undertaken only after the signing of a new Anglo-French Agreement on 20.1.95 (see Note 350 below), and was carried out in 1896 (Fyfe, op. cit., p. 540).

354. In 1882, Governor Havelock had suggested the Mano River as the Anglo-Liberian frontier, but this had produced much protest in Monrovia (Fyfe, op. cit., p. 431). However, in 1834 the Liberian President decided to accept this frontier, and a Convention was signed on 11.11.85, fixing the frontier at the left bank of the Mano. Governor Rowe formally ratified this Convention in Monrovia in 1836 (ibid., p. 457).

355. The Anglo-Liberian frontier was only "roughly fixed in 1836" (Fyfe, op. cit., p. 540) in the sense that the Mano was agreed to be the boundary at and near the coast. Dr. D.N. Foley, writing of the 1835 Anglo-Liberian
agreement noted that the "provisions of the treaty for extending the boundary into the interior were necessarily vague, for the area had never been adequately explored and no authoritative maps were available. The convention merely stipulated that the boundary would follow the left bank of the Mano, or a prolongation of this line in a northeasterly direction, until it intersected Liberia's still undefined interior boundary with the French territories to the north" (British Policy in Liberia, 1862-1912, unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of London, 1965, pp. 78-79). The relevant article of the 1885 Treaty (Article 2) is quoted in full in Johnston, Liberia, Vol.II, p.280.

356. Ibid.

357. G0267/389/239; Crooks; 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe. Alldridge crossed the Manna (or Mano) River just east of Kolahun, and then travelled east for 2 days before reaching Kpandemo, which was situated about 20 miles east of Kolahun and the Mano. As Chief Sosor of Kpandemo "shewed no disposition to either enter into a Treaty or to render me any assistance in my further advance into the interior I was unable to advance beyond this point". Neither Alldridge himself nor any other British official seemed to notice that in travelling east of the Mano in 1891, the British Commissioner was in fact trespassing on Liberian territory. In 1890, Alldridge had been warned in his instructions not to infringe the rights of Liberia, and had been told (in accordance with the 1885 agreement) that the Liberian boundary was a "line marked at low water on the south-eastern or left bank of the Mannah river until such line, or such line prolonged in a north-easterly direction, intersects the line, or prolongation of the line marking the north-eastern or inland boundaries of the territories of the Republic, with such deviations as may hereafter be necessary to place within Liberian territory the town of Boporu" (G0879/32/African No.387, Conf.7, Hay, 24.2.90).

358. See Map 5, p. 73 above.

359. In 1900, a London C.O. official minuted that "the frontier follows the meridian 10° 40' W. of Greenwich (13° W. of Paris)" (G0267/454/Conf.65; Cardew; 10.10.00 attached Memorandum on the Present Position of Liberia). This statement seems to have been generally accepted as accurate by British officials; in fact, however, the approximate equivalent to 13° W. of Paris is 10° 36' W. of Greenwich.


361. For example, north of the Moa, the River Meli provided an obvious clear boundary line, and one which was very close to the 13th meridian W. of Paris. The Meli also marked the approximate boundary between the Kissi and Kono peoples. The 13th meridian, by contrast, divided Wunde into two parts, and further north left a fragment of Kono country (east of Kainkordu) in Liberian territory.
The straight mathematical line was easy to follow on a map, but almost impossible to follow on the ground, especially south of the Magowi River, among the hills and dense vegetation of the Gola Forest (though the attempt was made in 1903—see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, p. 2.54 below). Another difficulty was that some villages in Luawa, like Kenewa (on the Kailahun-Pondembu road) were cut in half by the frontier. Mr. Hollins (op. cit., p. 23) says the frontier also passed "in the midst of Mofindo town"; but in fact the 13th meridian passed just to the west of that town.

363. Both in the colonial period and after, it was found impossible to prevent free movement of local people (and articles of trade) across international frontiers in this area, even when there was a clear geographical feature, such as the Moa River, acting as the frontier (and, incidentally, as a natural obstacle to free movement).

364. As late as March 1896, Governor Cardew was uncertain whether Kailahun lay in British or Liberian territory (CO267/424/Conf.19; Cardew; 10.3.96). The first definite statement that Kailahun was in Liberian territory was apparently made by Cardew on 7.4.96 (CO267/425/Conf.22; Cardew; 7.4.96), in the light of astronomical observations made by Major Grant, who accompanied Cardew as surveyor on his 1896 up-country tour. Major Grant was not sure which side of the boundary Kailahun was on until he had returned to Freetown at the end of the tour.

365. In January 1895, the only British-man who had ever been to Luawa was Aldridge, who had made 4 brief visits. There was a small Frontier Police station in Kailahun, but no British official was permanently stationed within a hundred miles of Kailahun.

366. There is no record of any official from Monrovia having ever entered Luawa before the end of the 19th Century. In 1888 the explorer Benjamin Anderson had trekked north from Bopolu to 'Musadu', a capital town of the Mandinka people, which must have been situated east-north-east of Kailahun (Johnston, Liberia, Vol. I, p. 252). No other traveller from Monrovia had ever been anywhere near Luawa. The term 'Liberian' as used in both written records at this time and oral traditions referred to the settlers in Monrovia and other towns of the coast who were 'black Americans'.

In this thesis, the term 'Liberians' refers to the black American settlers since (i) throughout the period under consideration they held a virtual monopoly of political power in the Liberian Government (ii) the Liberians who entered Luawa in the first decade of the 20th Century were all identified with the Government in Monrovia.

367. See Note 360 above. The reason for the Anglo-French announcement about the eastern frontier of the Sierra Leone Protectorate was presumably the fear of both French and British Governments that until a clear statement of boundaries was made, there was always the possibility of
another 'Waima'. The French and British had already accepted in 1891-92 that the 13th meridian W. of Paris was to be the east-west boundary between their respective possessions (see Note 360 above), and in 1892 the French and Liberians had agreed on the parallel of latitude of Tembikundu as the north-south boundary between their possessions (ibid). The 1895 Treaty therefore introduced no new principle but merely worked out to their logical conclusion the practical implications of these two earlier agreements. Even so it was an extraordinary fact - and a fact of which very few contemporary commentators or later historians seem to have been aware - that the first clear statement which defined the Anglo-Liberian boundary over its full length was made in a diplomatic document to which the Liberian Government was not a party.

368. The present writer has not found any document in which the British Government specifically informed the Liberian Government of the 1895 boundary settlement on the east of Sierra Leone, though presumably Monrovia received details of the 1895 Anglo-French Treaty through normal diplomatic channels. The first official transactions between London and Monrovia in which both sides implicitly accepted the 13th meridian W. of Paris as the international boundary may have been the 1896 agreement by the Liberians to allow British troops to pursue marauders, who raided the British Protectorate, into Liberian territory (see Note 248 above).

369. See Note 360 above.

370. The unusually puzzled and uncertain tone of Cardew's despatches in March 1895 on the subject of the Anglo-Liberian frontier suggests that the Governor himself was not sure of the implications of the 1895 Anglo-French Treaty. Writing from Kailahun, Cardew noted that he had compared the 1895 Treaty with the 1885 Anglo-Liberian Treaty, and from this comparison he had drawn his own (correct) conclusions (CO267/417/61; Cardew; 1.10.95, from Kailahun). The very need which the Governor felt to discuss the subject at length in his despatch showed his uncertainty about the line of the frontier; and his despatch may represent the first serious discussion of the implications of the 1895 Anglo-French Treaty for the Anglo-Liberian boundary. As late as 1900, a London C.O. official noted: "There is some doubt as to which of the two confluent of the real Mannah (or Mano) River was intended by the Anglo-Liberian Convention of 1885, but the 'Mano or Bewa' River ... best answers the description" (CO267/454/Conf.65; Cardew; 10.10.00, attached Memorandum on the Present Position of Liberia).

371. In the map attached to the 1895 Anglo-French Treaty (see Note 360 above), no boundary line was shown west or south of Tembikundu.

372. CO267/417/Conf.40; Cardew; 13.5.95. See also CO267/421/F.0., 5.9.95. The London C.O. officials were quite sympathetic to the difficulties which Anglo-Liberian frontier created for Kailondo. The rectification of the frontier was again suggested by Cardew in a more detailed form, together with a map, in April 1896 (CO267/425/Conf.22; Cardew; 7.4.96). In November 1896, Cardew reported that the Liberian Government was unwilling to consider such a 'rectification' (CO267/427/Conf.47; Cardew; 5.11.96).

374. It was not clear until 1896 that Kailahun town was in Liberia, not the British Protectorate (see Note 364 above and Notes 399-400 below).

375. See Note 366 above.

376. The first two sections of this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 254-272 above, passim, give a good indication of the names of the British officials - mainly soldiers on active service - who visited this area in the last years of the 19th Century.

377. When Cardew realized that the 1895 Anglo-Liberian boundary ran through Luawa, he withdrew the Frontier Police from stations east of Kailahun and Vahun. But the Frontier Police station at Kailahun was retained (Go267/417/Conf. 22; Cardew; 20.4.95), and in fact the Police were at no time withdrawn from there. In 1902, on the disbandment of the F.P., the Police were replaced by a detachment of the WAFF. In 1903, the Anglo-Liberian Boundary Commission fixed Kailahun on the Liberian side of the frontier, but Governor King-Harman noted, "I do not propose, with your [i.e. the British Colonial Secretary's] approval, to take any steps to withdraw the detachment of the West African Frontier Force until the report of the Boundary Commission has been accepted by His Majesty's Government" (Go267/492/Conf.; King-Harman; 22.5.03). H.M.G., however, never formally accepted the 1903 boundary (see Note 448 below).

378. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 217-218 below for details of how tax collected by Fabundeh was returned to him by British officials because it represented taxes from villages which were officially in Liberian territory.

379. As early as May 1895, Cardew had noted "we are unable, without violation of so-called Liberian territory to assist a loyal Chief [Kailondo] who is pressed by numerous foes, and have to tolerate warfare on our confines which ruins the trade of the country" (Go267/417/Conf. 40; Cardew; 13.5.95).

380. See Note 248 above for details of an arrangement which was eventually accepted by the British and Liberian Governments, and which gave the British Government some limited freedom to quell disorders east of Luawa.

381. For French activities in the Wunde area in 1895-96, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 111-114 above. Kafula was apparently in alliance with the French in 1895, but in Sept.-Oct. 1896 there was some disagreement: Kafula drove the French out of Kenema, and they came back and burnt down Kafula's town. As early as November 1896, Cardew reported that "the French are ignoring the integrity of Liberian territory", and that French 'native' soldiers had been observed 50 or 60 miles south of the official Franco-Liberian frontier (Go267/427/Conf. 54; Cardew; 26.11.96). These reports were repeated in 1897, by which time Kafula was once again, it seems, in alliance with the French (Go267/434/Conf. 52; Cardew; 23.12.97, enc. Blakeney, 2.10.97, Panguma). See also Note 382 below.
382. In mid-1903, Captain H.D. Pearson, British Commissioner on the Anglo-
Liberian Boundary Commission, made a report on the state of affairs
in the area immediately to the north of the Moa. "I learnt from Mons.
Lescure [a French official helping to demarcate the short stretch of
boundary from Tembikundu to the 13th meridian W. of Paris] that they
considered their boundary to the east with Liberia to be the parallel of
latitude of Tembikundu, but he practically acknowledged that they had
posts to the south of this, mentioning one at Kissidougou. Three posts
only, he said that they had to the south of the parallel of Tembikundu,
the object being the collecting of customs ... The net result of Lt.
Cox's [Asst. British Commissioner's] enquiries in the villages along
the right bank of the Mali River, certainly points to the prevailing
idea, among the natives to the north, being that the Mali was the
boundary; on the right bank was British territory, on the left French,
and this idea existed as far south as Saimma about the 8.49 parallel
of latitude" (C0267/468/Conf.; King-Harman; 11.7.03, enc. Pearson,
10.7.03, Freetown). This state of affairs was already in existence
as early as 1899. In March 1899, Governor Cardew reported the observa-
tions of Captain Mackesy, who was demarcating the Anglo-French boundary:
"the French at the present time consider that the west bank of the Mali
river is British territory and they confine themselves to the east of
the river; he has also mentioned to me in conversation that Captain Gaden
[French demarcator] informed him that an expedition was to start from
Kissidougou, where there is a French post of 200 men, along the Liberian
frontier" (C0267/445/Conf. 26; Cardew; 9.3.99). Captain Mackesy commented
that "the Mali river would form an excellent natural boundary for the
Protectorate ... as it runs nearly parallel to the 13th meridian" (ibid.).
See also this chapter of the thesis, Chap.4, pp. 271-275 above for French
relations with Kafula (a clear statement of Kafula's alliance with the
French by 1900 is to be found in C0267/454/Conf. 65; Cardew; 10.10.00, enc.
Warren, 22.9.00, Panguma).

383. See for example, King-Harman's comments in C0267/462/Conf.16; King-
Harman; 18.4.02.

384. Agreement between Great Britain and France .... January 21, 1895. See
letter No.2, from the Marquis of Dufferin to M. Hanotaux, 22.1.95, Paris.

385. See Note 382 above.

386. See Notes 381 and 382 above.

387. The French disregard for Liberia's sovereignty was demonstrated clearly
by their advance into Wunde in the last years of the 19th Century,
Wunde being indisputably part of Liberian territory at that time.

388. C0267/468/Conf.; King-Harman; 22.5.03.

389. Ibid.

391. CO267/483/Conf.; Probyn; 26.1.06: If trouble developed in Kissi country and spread to the Protectorate "the only method whereby peace can be permanently maintained will be for a portion of the [Kissi] country to be placed under the direct rule of this Government".

392. CO267/483/Conf.; Probyn; 28.3.06: "The terminus, Baiima, of the Sierra Leone Railway is situated 12 miles only from the Liberian frontier. It seems to me that a country owning a Railway in Africa is the natural overlord or suzerain of the country situated within say 50 miles of the Railway .... Could an arrangement be made whereby as much of the Liberian territory as is within a radius of 50 miles from Baiima be released? The system of leases has been recognized by the Powers in the case of China".

393. CO267/486/Conf.; Probyn; 26.8.06. "It would be better, on grounds of humanity, and also for reasons of trade, that France, and not the Liberian Republic, should be the neighbour of this Colony. This view naturally leads to the idea of a complete or partial partition of the territory of the Republic".

394. See Note 316 above.

395. It was only in 1903 that the railway line was extended as far as Pendembu, which then became the terminus.

396. CO267/484/Conf.; Probyn; 12.6.06.

397. CO267/486/Conf.; Probyn; 16.8.06.

398. See Note 318 above.

399. See the map of the Sierra Leone-Liberia Boundary made in 1903 by Capt. H.D. Pearson, R.E., and Lieut. E.W. Cox, R.E., British Commissioners, Anglo-Liberian Boundary Commission. A copy of this map is to be found in Johnston, Liberia, opp. p. This shows that the 1895 boundary line ran just east of Bomuru near the Magowi River; it passed through Kenowa on the Kailahun-Pendembu road, leaving Kailahun and Mofindor in Liberia, and Uanyahun just in the British Protectorate. Sambalu, on the bank of the Moa, was also just inside British territory.

400. The only large human settlements left in the British Protectorate by the 1895 boundary were Ngiehun, Baoma and Mande; all the rest were in Liberia. Only between 10% and 20% of the total area of 'Kailondo's Luawa' (i.e. present-day Luawa and the 3 Kissi Chiefdoms) was in the Sierra Leone Protectorate; the remaining area was in Liberia. It was only in 1907 that Fabundeh and his people discovered just how capricious and ineffective was Liberian rule. Yet the petitions he presented in 1900 and 1906 indicated that even before 1907, Fabundeh realized something of the nature of Liberian rule.

401. The French clearly showed from 1895 onwards that they had no respect for Liberia's territorial rights. Between 1895 and 1905, occasional French patrols penetrated Liberian territory as far south as the Moa River, 50 or 60 miles south of the official southern limit of French
territory in this area (see Notes 381 and 382 above). Fabundeh and his advisers must have been able to see clearly that if the Liberians took over control from the British in Kailahun, it would probably not be long before the French advanced south of the Moa, and began exacting taxation, and in practice began governing Luawa. The behaviour of the French, British and Liberians in this area between 1895 and 1911 provided little encouragement to the people of Luawa. But Chief Fabundeh had even less to gain from alliance with the French or Liberians than from the British (see Note 402 below).

402. Since Kailondo had signed a treaty with the British, the French tended to side with Kafula (see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 41-44, and this chapter, Chap. 4, pp. 271-275 above). This meant that from the beginning of his reign, Fabundeh could not expect any benefit from an alliance with the French, and since there were no Liberian officials in the Luawa area before the beginning of the 20th Century, the only possible course open to Fabundeh from the start of his reign was continued alliance with the British. Before his death, Kailondo had heard some rumours of the Liberians as well as the French entering the area, and advised Fabundeh to stay in alliance with the British (Int. 19). By the early 20th Century, the Liberians had realized that Fabundeh supported the British, and therefore they came to oppose the Luawa Chief. The group opposing Fabundeh within Luawa (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 240-3 above) gave their support to the Liberian cause, against Fabundeh (ibid., pp. 254-256 below). So Fabundeh could only lose by switching alliance from the British to the Liberians in the early years of the 20th Century.

403. See Notes 401 and 402 above.

404. Part of Luawa, of course, was already under British rule, but it was such a tiny part (see Note 400 above) that Fabundeh could never be satisfied with the 1895 boundary. The alteration of the 1895 international boundary was thus vital to the achievement of both Fabundeh’s objectives.

405. Fabundeh may have in fact written more than four, but these are the only ones which have been unearthed by the present writer.

406. Two petitions were written in 1900 and two in 1906 (see Notes 407 to 410 below).

407. SLGA, MP505/1901, Subject: Chief Fa Bunle’s protest against a portion of the Loawa Country forming part of the Liberian Territory. The petition was sent to the Ag. DC, Panguma, in December 1900. It was written down by “T. J. Nicola, Missionary”.

408. CC267/453/Conf.36; Cardew; 14.7.00, enc. petition from Chief Fabundeh to DC Panguma, 30.6.00, Kailahun.

409. CC267/486/Conf.; Probyn; 21.7.06, enc. petition from PC Fabundeh, “Chief Glenda Ba, Chief Fowah”, 4.7.06, Luawa country. Written down by A.C. Macauley.
410. G0267/489/Conf.; Probyn; 21.11.06, enc. petition from Fabundeh, 5.11.06, Pendembu. Written down by M.S. Allen, clerk to Chief Kutubu of Pendembu.

411. G0267/453/Conf.36; Cardew; 14.7.00, enc. petition from Chief Fabundeh to DC Panguma, 30.6.00, Kailahun.

412. Ibid. The 'Mende' towns from which the signatories came were Bandajuma and Gisma from south of Kailahun; Mofinikor from north of Kailahun; Bobobu, Nyandehun, and Mende-Kalema from east of Kailahun; and Baoma from west of Kailahun. Apart from the Kissi towns referred to in Notes 414 to 417 below, Mano-Sewalu was also represented. Other towns which were represented among the signatories were Vovahun, Gearamah, Gondela, and Tasamah; the location of these towns is uncertain.

413. Ibid. These Kissi leaders came largely from present-day Kissi Tungi, Kissi Teng and Kissi Kama Chiefdoms within Sierra Leone. The only Kissi leader who can be identified as coming from further east was Towei of Foya. See also Note 420 below.

414. G0267/453/Conf.36; Cardew; 14.7.00, enc. petition from Chief Fabundeh to DC Panguma, 30.6.00, Kailahun. Koli Tungi seems to be mentioned twice among the signatories: first as 'Koleh' of 'Tongie'; and later as 'Koli' of 'Bandivoroo'. For further details of Koli Tungi, see KDO&, Loose papers relating to the election of a P.C. for Kissi Tungi Chiefdom, 1942: "Kai Tungi's claim" (see Vol. II of this thesis, pp.417-9); see also Int. 22.

415. G0267/453/Conf.36; Cardew; 14.7.00, enc. petition from Chief Fabundeh to DC Panguma, 30.6.00, Kailahun. In the list of signatories the name is spelt 'Ganawahl'. For more information on Ganawa, see Chap.3 of this thesis, Note 348 above.

416. G0267/453/Conf.36; Cardew; 14.7.00, enc. petition from Chief Fabundeh to DC Panguma, 30.6.00, Kailahun. In the list of signatories, the spelling is 'Kongo' of 'Dambarra'. He later became first Paramount Chief of Kissi Chiefdom (see Chap. 5 of this thesis, p.343-5 below). See also Chap.3 of this thesis, Note 346 above.

417. G0267/453/Conf.36; Cardew; 14.7.00, enc. petition from Chief Fabundeh to DC Panguma, 30.6.00, Kailahun. In the list of signatories, the spelling is 'Toweht of 'Foyah'. Towei of Foya was one of those rulers present at the Gbondou Conference in 1880, and so by this time he was presumably quite an old man.

418. Ibid. For the story of Gandita's bitter opposition to Fabundeh in 1903, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp.115-6 below.

419. G0267/453/Conf.36; Cardew; 14.7.00, enc. petition from Chief Fabundeh to DC Panguma, 30.6.00, Kailahun. For Kongoni, see Chap.3 of this thesis, p. 212 above. For Kongoni's opposition to Fabundeh, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.4, pp.216-6,312-3 below. See also Note 423 below.
420. C0267/453/Conf. 36; Cardew; 14.7.00, enc. petition from Chief Fabundeh to DC Panguma, 30.6.00, Kailahun. The list of signatories gives the spelling 'Fabahun' of 'Kamatan'. This can hardly be anyone other than Fabanna of Vassal (see Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. 90 above) - Kamatahun being a town in Vassa (see Map 5).

421. See Note 410 above. The earlier petition in 1906 had been signed by Chief 'Glanda Ba' (see Note 411 above), who is almost certainly the same person as Bandabilla, who was a Kissi-man and later became Paramount Chief of Kissi Teng (see Chap. 6 of this thesis, p. 605 below). He was the only Kissi leader to sign the earlier petition in 1906.

422. C0267/489/Conf.; Probyn; 21.11.06.

423. Unfortunately, the reasons for why many subchiefs had become Fabundeh's enemies are not given here, nor in any other written or oral records. Presumably one reason for the increasing opposition from subchiefs was Fabundeh's firm loyalty to the British, even though the British, apart from the 1905 occupation of Wundo, were clearly not giving much help to Fabundeh. Mr. Hollins noted that "Fa Bunde loyally helped in the collection of house tax in the British half of his chiefdom, whereas his popularity suffered" (op. cit., p. 23). There was also the influence of fissiparous tendencies within Luawa. Cf. Int. 19, where Maada James Kailondo stated that Kongoni did not agree to oppose the British (and therefore by implication, he did not oppose Fabundeh either).

424. The opinions of the 'ordinary people' in history are, of course, notoriously difficult to assess. They leave no records behind them to indicate their ideas and feelings. Even oral tradition is largely concerned with the great deeds of famous men; it is a common fallacy of African history that by studying oral tradition the historian will achieve an understanding of the ordinary people. However, it is generally accepted in the Luawa area that even today the majority of people in a town or village will follow the opinions of the town or village chief; presumably this was even more usual in Fabundeh's day. And by 1906 Fabundeh had clearly lost the support of many of his subchiefs.

425. C0267/453/185; Cardew; 5.6.00. The "sum incorrectly collected amounts to £265.13.0.11

426. Ibid. The DC was Captain Carr.

427. The British, like the other European powers, generally accepted that the touchstone of colonial authority in an area was the ability to tax. It was therefore naturally difficult to avoid the corollary that in areas where tax was collected, there that particular European power was bound to accept some sort of responsibility. Fabundeh was perceptive enough to grasp the significance of this for his own polity.

428. Ibid. Cardew does not state who informed him of Carr's mistake in accepting the tax money. Presumably it was Captain Legg, who succeeded Carr as DC.
429. C0267/453/Conf.36; Cardew; 14.7.00. Captain Logg sent a copy of Fabundeh's first petitioning letter with a despatch which Cardew enclosed. "With reference to this petitioning letter", noted Cardew, "Captain Logg opines that it has been written in consequence of my instructions to him to refund to Farbundo the tax collected from his towns situated in Liberian territory ... and that Farbundo is under the impression that the refunding of the tax means the Government are not going to assist him any longer".

430. C0267/453/185; Cardew; 5.6.00.

431. The primary aim of Fabundeh in collecting tax was to have his polity included in British territory, not to gain British help against Kafula. This was well expressed in Fabundeh's second petition to the British in 1900: "You Petitioner has made preparations to pay the hut tax for 1901 for Conray Lahoon and the other towns for which the amount was refunded me this year. I humbly pray you to allow me to pay for those afore named towns .... May your rule extend over all my country where thousands are desirous of being as they were during the past 10 years loyal British subjects" (SLGA, MP50/1901, Subject: Chief Fa Bunde's protest against a portion of the Loawa Country forming part of the Liberian Territory).

432. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.4, pp.286-28 above.

433. Cf. Combey, op. cit., p.7; "During and immediately after his (i.e. Fabundeh's) incumbency, the (Kissi) country was Liberia-inclined, and it is hard to gainsay that such inclinations should never have been altered, were it not for the indescretionate perpetrations of certain Liberian officials which resulted in a wholesale massacre by the Boyle-Tweh expedition, an act which aroused no common degree of indignation in government and public circles in the Liberian capital, resulting in drastic measures against the perpetrators. This massacre of poor and unarmed natives drove Koli Tungi into a mutual and military alliance with Luawa directed against any combination of Liberian authority". Mr. Combey also argued that the Kissi-speaking part of Luawa had always retained a considerable degree of independence from the Mende-speaking part. Presumably the behaviour of Kafula was a disturbing influence on Kissi people generally. For further discussion of Kissi opposition to Fabundeh, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.4, pp.244-26 above. It should be noted, however, that the most serious internal opposition to Fabundeh came from Gandi of Dodo-Cotuma, who was probably a Mende-man.

434. See Note 416 above.

435. Probably, just as Kafula was the strongest Kissi leader of the Moa, Kongor was the strongest Kissi leader south of the Moa.

436. The sole source of information concerning this meeting was Pa Langama (Int.20). It seems, however, a natural stop which a diplomat like Fabundeh could be expected to take; and Pa Langama had no reason to 'make up' the story of this meeting. Pa Langama, who was one of
the present writer's most reliable informants, noted that the
following 'polities' were represented at this meeting: Kissi Kama,
Teng, Tungi and Tengea, and Luangkorli. Representatives from Wham
did not arrive in time to share in the meeting.

437. Ibid. Pa Langaram said the meeting took place before Lomax entered
the area (i.e. before 1907). He also said that on the day of the
meeting, he was still a boy, and carried 5 bundles of 'Kissi
pennies' on his shoulder. Pa Langaram could not have been more
than about 80 years old in 1972, at the time of the present writer's
interview with him, and a boy of less than 8 years old could not
easily have carried so many bundles at once, which strongly suggests
that the meeting took place after the turn of the century.

438. Ibid. The details given by Pa Langaram about the place of the meeting
are self-consistent, and also correlate with what is recorded in
written documents about Konosu and Tengea.

439. Ibid. See also Chap. I of this thesis, p. 11 above, and Chap. I, p. 54 above.

Notes 43, 45.

440. Int. 20.

441. Ibid.

442. Ibid.

443. For further details, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 286-297
below.

444. G0267/489/Conf.; Probyn; 6.11.06. "... in spite of efforts having been
made to dissuade him from taking the step, Chief Fa Bundeh is moving
his headquarters from Kenre Lahun to a spot within that portion of his
chiefdom which lies in the Protectorate". The only large town in
Luawa which lay W. of the 13th meridian was Ngiehun.

445. Ibid.

446. In general Fabundeh seemed to have a common-sense approach to political
problems. He did not do things which would be politically unprofitable.
Perhaps it was this element in his policy which gave him the reputation
of being a lazy man.

447. For example, the Empire of Samori Touré extended over about 100,000
square miles at its greatest extent, whereas Kailondo's 'Greater
Luawa' at its largest extended scarcely 1,000 square miles.

448. See Note 388 above. See also G0267/514/Secret; Probyn; 15.6.09, min.
by 00 official. The 1903 boundary delimitation had never been formally
accepted by the British Government, though this did not perhaps seem
very important at the time.
449. The only faint hope of a boundary revision lay in the fact that the frontier demarcated in 1903 did not follow any clear geographical features, but was simply a mathematical line. However, between 1903 and 1907 it is doubtful whether this was considered as a serious possibility.

450. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, p. 290 below

451. There were a number of examples in southern Africa of African rulers who, by taking political initiative, substantially altered the shape of European-made international boundaries; Moshesh is probably the most famous example. But the present writer has not found any other example in West Africa of an African ruler significantly influencing the course of the new boundaries as a result of his own initiative.

452. For example, this approach is taken by Dr. Foley (op. cit., passim) in his discussion of Liberia's boundaries. Much earlier, Sir Harry Johnston, also writing about Liberia's boundaries, took much the same approach in his book Liberia. Mr. Hollins noted how Fabundeh's "chieftain was how he fell a victim to the 'Scramble for Africa' being placed just where the three powers — France, Great Britain, and Liberia — met" ("Short History", p. 23).

453. Although a proportion of the Luawa people in fact opposed Fabundeh — at least in the years 1893 to 1907 — the majority of the people continued to support the Luawa Chief and his aims; and if they had not done so, his position would have become untenable.

454. On the one hand, the British did not gain all the territory from Liberia which they wanted. In a Memorandum of November 1903, Probyn wrote: "Were it not for the practical difficulty ... of asking the Republic to assent to alienation of the greater area, it would be better in the interests of the inhabitants of the district, and also in the interest of peace, if the eastern boundary could be fixed so as to include Chiefdom IX. is. Tongea, which in fact remained part of Liberia" (CO267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.03, enc. Memorandum). On the other hand, the British gained a most peculiarly-shaped 'horn' of territory — Kallondo's Luawa — which required extended lines of communication and which would be almost impossible to defend.

455. The Liberians, much against their will, had to give up their rights to Kailahun and the whole of Luawa, after it had become a point of honour with the Monrovian Government that Liberia should retain possession of Kailahun.

456. If Liberia had retained nominal control of the Luawa area, French troops would no doubt have gradually moved further south, and might have taken over control of Luawa. British officials like Probyn and Palmer strongly felt that this would be the case (CO267/500/12.2.07; Individuals — Probyn, L. & Palmer, Major G.E.). With the British installed as rightful owners of Luawa, there was no hope for the French of such a take-over.

457. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 215-6 below.
The first indication of Lomax' arrival in Kailahun came in January 1907 (C0267/492/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 16.1.07, enc. Gill, 9.1.07, Kanre Lahun).

Sir Harry Johnston reported that "two or three years ago Lieutenant W. Lomax, a Liberian official, was sent by President Barclay as Special Commissioner to visit the regions of the French frontier and enter into friendly relations with the native Chiefs" (C0267/499/F.O., 21.12.07: Memorandum communicated by Sir H. Johnston, 25.3.07).

C0267/492/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 16.1.07, enc. Gill, 9.1.07, Kanre Lahun.

C0267/492/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 3.3.07, Haddon-Smith went with Sir Harry Johnston, Mr. W.J. Lamont (Liberian Customs official) and Dr. Maxwell (DC Panguma) to Kailahun at the end of February, and it was then that they all met Lomax in Kailahun.


C0267/492/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 5.2.07, enc. Gill, 27.1.07, Kailahun.

See Note 461 above.

C0267/492/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 3.3.07.

Int. 20.

Ibid.

C0267/493/Conf.; Probyn; 31.5.07, minute by London GO official.

The people's suspicion was no doubt caused partly by a natural fear of strangers, partly by the brutality with which they had seen French and British soldiers (and Frontier Police) acting.

See Map 7, opp. p.414 below.

C0267/493/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 28.3.07.

Ibid., enc. statement by McCarthy, W., Liberian soldier, 19.3.07, Kailahun, taken down by Lieut. R.H. Gill.

Dia is the headquarters town of present-day Kissa Kama Chiefdom. Mano is presumably Mano-Seevalu. The Liberian soldiers were causing disturbances particularly in Kissa country presumably because the presence of British soldiers in the west of Luawa provided a check on the behaviour of the Liberians.

C0267/493/Conf.; Probyn; 31.5.07.
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476. Ibid. "There are two Liberian Customs Officers stationed at or near Kanre Lahun, viz: Mr. Hughes and Mr. M'Laughlan, who is also a European and is stationed at a post on the Liberian frontier which is about 15 miles south of Kanre Lahun". This place south of Kailahun was Kabawana (see Map 5), in fact about 21 miles south of Kailahun by road. Cf. Johnston's 1907 Memorandum (see Note 462 above).

477. C0267/493/Conf.; Probyn; 31.5.07.

478. Ibid., enc. Le Mesurier, 23.5.07, Wulade.

479. Ibid.


481. Ibid.

482. Ibid.

483. Ibid.


485. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, p. 242 below.

486. See Note 484 above. Moses Allen, Chief Kutubu's clerk, made most of the statement. He was a literate person, mentioned by Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.176, with a photograph of Chief and clerk on the opp. page.

487. Later, the Liberians managed to gain the support of Koli Tungi of Gbandewulo by promising that when they took over the country, he would be made Paramount Chief of the whole area.

488. See Note 484 above. Allen noted that he was present when Lomax made this statement.

489. See Note 484 above. In his statement, Allen mentioned "the Gandi Chiefs" (presumably the town chiefs under section chief Gandi) and "the Gandi people". For a discussion of the importance of Gandi's Dodo, see Chap. 3 of this thesis, Note 481 above, p. 124.

490. See Note 484 above.

491. C0267/495/Conf.; Probyn; 16.8.07. Probyn went up to Kailahun early in August 1907 (see C0267/495/Tel.; Probyn; 2.8.07), at which time Fabundeh made his statement publicly to the Governor.


493. Ibid. See Note 419 above for Kongoni.
494. See Note 492 above. The name of the town is spelt 'Yandahun' in the document, but this is commonly the spelling used by early British officials for Nyandehun.

495. Ibid. 'Guraung' is probably an attempt at spelling Golahun, but this town has not been located. Presumably it was somewhere near Dodo.

496. Ibid. 'Boabu' might refer either to (i) Goabu near Dodo, or (ii) Bewabu south of Giema, or (iii) Bobobu on the later Kailahun-Buedu road.

497. Int. 19.

498. British officials' correspondence on the subject (e.g. the mass of enclosures in C0267/495/Conf.; Frobyn; 13.8.07) makes little mention of Kongoni while frequently referring to Gandi.

499. See Note 552 below. The evidence against Kongoni is particularly strong in that it was provided by Kongoni's sons, who were trying hard to defend their father from Fabunje's punishment, but they had to admit he had some compromising connections with the Liberians.

500. Gandi left the area in August 1907 with Lomax (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, p. 199 below). Koli Tungi's opposition was noted in 1909 (ibid., pp. 310-312 below).


502. Ibid. Cf. Int. 20. A valuable sidelight on the accuracy of some of Luawa's oral tradition is gained by comparing the 2 sources. The oral tradition notes that the chief disturbance occurred in Kua, the town chief of which was Goa. The written document stated that the climax of the trouble occurred when 'Gooa', chief of 'Kodoo' was shot in the legs.

503. C0267/495/Conf.; Frobyn; 13.8.07, enc. Gill, 29.7.07, Kailahun. Later correspondence enc. in this despatch contains Lomax's 'explanation' of this incident. Naturally the Liberian official placed responsibility for the fighting on the Kissia in these villages.

504. Ibid., enc. Statement of "BUNDOO a Kissi living at Deoma near to Kangama", 29.7.07, Kailahun.

505. See Note 503 above.

506. The central town of Kama was Dia; the central town of Tang was Kangama.

507. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp. 284-8 above.

508. Ibid., pp. 192-6 above.
509. As late as February 1907, British officials were continuing to tell Fabundeh that he must simply accept Liberian rule (e.g. CO267/492/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 3.3.07).

510. CO267/495/Conf.; Probyn; 13.8.07, enc. Gill, 1.8.07, Kailahun

511. Ibid., enc. statement by "Banya Chief of Kangoma and district", 31.7.07, Kangama.

512. Ibid., enc. statement by "Seiva Chief of Mano", 1.8.07, Mano. 'Seiva' is a mis-spelling of the name Sewa.

513. Ibid.

514. Murray first went as Captain to Wulade in January 1906, and quickly created a favourable impression with Major Palmer for his good and judicious work (CO267/486/Conf.; Probyn; 26.7.06, enc. Palmer, 15.7.06, Wulade).


516. Fabundeh made a public statement in early August, in the presence of Governor Probyn (who could not deny what the Chief said): "The Chief said he remembered the caution given by the Governor that he was to be friendly with the Liberians. The action of Major Lomax and his men have been such that the people in the country would not have endured but would have fought. Why they did not fight was because he, Chief Fa Bunda, remembering the Governor's caution, exercised his restraining influence as Chief. Chief Fa Bunda explained that he and his Sub-Chiefs blame the Governor for having given the advice (CO267/495/Conf.; Probyn; 18.8.07, enc. Meeting at Kanre Lahun - summary of proceedings of).

517. In mid-1906, Major Palmer reported that French patrols had penetrated into Liberia as far south as the latitude of Wulado, and "their nearest post is no more than two days' march from this post in an easterly direction" (CO267/486/Conf.; Probyn; 26.7.06, enc. Palmer, 15.7.06, Wulade). Palmer also noted how "the French have spread and are spreading their influence so rapidly throughout the country" (ibid.). In August 1906, Captain Murray reported "that a French patrol with 2 officers had arrived at Wam in the Tingia country. I wrote off at once to the officer in command, pointing out that the country he was patrolling was for the time being under British protection .... On the 20th inst., I received a reply in which the officer commanding the patrol stated that the country he was then patrolling was part of that zone wherein it was his duty to maintain order. This letter is dated from Sapuyo's town (Beckaduf) [the modern Gu6k6dou]" (CO267/487/Conf.; Probyn; 30.8.06, enc. Murray, 23.8.06, Wulade).

518. It is difficult to reckon the exact date, because the relevant correspondence is in several key instances undated. But the alternative dates of 1 and 3 August present more difficulties in terms of reconciliation of evidence than 1 August.

520. Ibid. The place was 'Guraung' (see Note 495 above) which was somewhere near Dodo, but has not been located.

521. Ibid.

522. Ibid. Cf. Int. 20: "When Willie Lomax heard that Major Bull [i.e. Le Mesurier] was chasing him, he went to Kamatahun".


524. Ibid., enc. Murray, 1.8.07, Kailahun, to Major Lomax, Dodo.

525. Ints. 19 and 20. See also C0267/514/Conf.; Probyn; 19.6.09, where it is stated that Gandi was still living with the Liberians at that time.

526. To use a 'school-textbook' distinction, the 'immediate cause' of Lomax' departure from Dodo was Murray's ultimatum, but the 'long-standing cause' was the opposition to Lomax shown by Fabundeh and his people.

527. It is true that Murray had himself been severely disturbed by Lomax, and was no doubt quite eager to take action against him. But he only took action when Fabundeh's people were on the verge of starting a war. And the action which Murray then took was action which he knew would satisfy Fabundeh's people.

528. The Governor's role was to formulate policy for Sierra Leone in accordance with CO guidelines. He alone had sufficient authority and sufficient 'on the spot' knowledge to formulate policy, in theory.

529. C0267/495/Conf.; Probyn; 24.7.07.

530. Ibid. Kafula himself solved Probyn's dilemma by refusing to attend a conference at Wulade.

531. C0267/495/Tel.; Probyn; 30.7.07.


533. C0267/495/Tel.; Probyn; 7.8.07.

534. Ibid. See also Note 532 above.

535. It has been noted before that many CO officials seemed to take every opportunity to criticize Probyn, and oppose his views.

536. C0267/495/Tel.; Probyn; 7.8.07, min. by CO official.

537. Probyn's urgent request by telegram for instructions on 2.8.07 was typical of many others which he sent on various subjects at different times: "Murray reports natives collecting for operations of war. I am going up. Pending receipt of your reply to my telegram I am in great difficulty" (C0267/495/Tel.; Probyn; 2.8.07).
538. Ibid., min. by CO official.

539. CO267/495/Conf.; Probyn; 15.8.07. In order to persuade the Liberian Government to agree to a boundary alteration, the Governor envisaged granting Liberia navigation rights on the Mano River. This in turn would make it "necessary for the Sierra Leone Government to spend about £1,000 per annum in preventing Liberian traders on the left bank or eastern side of the river from smuggling goods into the Protectorate". Probyn did not expect to recoup the £1,000 from Luawa and other territory ceded to Sierra Leone by Liberia. Hence the boundary alteration would mean some financial loss to Sierra Leone.

540. Ibid.

541. Ibid. "From a commercial point of view, neither the Konnoh country nor the Kenre Lahun territory or the Manoh River is of any great importance".

542. CO267/496/Conf.; Probyn; 10.9.07.

543. Ibid.

544. Ibid., enc. map. Fabundeh's rule extended in fact as far east as the Moa-Maiyo confluence some 15 miles east of the Moa-Mafessa confluence (the Maiyo being a tributary which enters the Moa some 8 miles West of the Moa-Wam confluence).

545. Ibid., enc. map.

546. CO267/506/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 26.9.07, min by CO official, 17.10.03.

547. Ibid. See also CO267/501/Conf.; Probyn; 22.4.03.

548. Ibid.

549. See Note 525 above.

550. CO267/501/Conf.; Probyn; 2.1.03, enc. Saunders, Baiima. "Mr. Lomax ... proceeded to Dodo the chieftain of Gande - brother of Kongonoh". Brother, however, may not mean that Kongoni and Gandi had the same parents. It may mean that they were, for instance, distant cousins; it could mean that they were friends and associates, or only that they came from the same town or the same area. Dodo is the present-day headquarters town of Gbeila section, which includes Sandialu (Kongoni's town); and the elders of Dodo (Int. 16) insisted that always in the past it had also been the headquarters town.

551. Since the British did not establish a civil administration in Luawa before Fabundeh's death, and since it was the British who introduced the office of Lavale (Speaker), it is unlikely that Kongoni was ever known by that title. He was, however, known as the Head Warrior of Fabundeh soon after the latter's accession (see Chap.3 of this thesis, p.244 Note 343 ), and the frequency with which he is mentioned thereafter, suggest that he was, after Fabundeh, politically the most powerful person in the area.
was presumably an English or Creole trader at Baiima; he wrote down the complaints of Jaimie, Konnoh, Koyama and Mom, four sons of Kongoni of Sandialu (Saunders spells the names 'Kongonnoh' and 'Sangiaroo'). These sons themselves admit that:

(i) Kongoni gave a larger present to Lomax than Fabundeh did, when the Liberian Commissioner arrived in Kailahun. Fabundeh gave one bullock; Kongoni gave 2 bullocks and 6 bushels of rice.

(ii) Kongoni had close associations with Gandi of Dodos; they were 'brothers'.

(iii) other chiefs, besides Fabundeh, including the respected Kutubu of Pendembu, agreed that Fabundeh had just cause for fining Kongoni.

Kutubu was a Chief respected alike by local people and the British. Alldridge noted that he was 'a highly intelligent personage' (A Transformed Colony, p.176). MaJa James Kailondo noted that after the death of Fabundeh, "Kutubu at Pendembu was now the head of all chiefs in this area" (Int. 19).

The British officials in the area until 1911 were all WAFF Officers, not civilians.

The exception was the opposition of Koli Tungi at Gbandowulo. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, pp.310-2 below.

The British officials in the area until 1911 were all WAFF Officers, not civilians.

By this time, Le Mesurier probably had a better understanding of the state of affairs in Luawa than any other British official.
569. Ibid.

570. C0267/507/Tel.; Probyn; 7.11.08.

571. C0267/506/Conf.; Probyn; 29.10.08.

572. For the fluidity of the political situation in Kailondo's Luawa, see Chaps. 1 to 3 of this thesis, passim.

573. C0267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.08.

574. Ibid. The Moa had been accepted in principle at this stage as the boundary between French-controlled Wunde and British-controlled Luawa. The Mauwa-Magowi Rivers provided a southern boundary which was (i) easily distinguishable and (ii) fairly accurately marked the limit in practice of Fabundeh's authority. In October 1908, Le Mesurier noted that Fabundeh had control over Vassa and Bombulu countries south of the Magowi, but the people in those areas "being chiefly Bandis and not having seen Fa Bundeh for many years, were somewhat alienated from him", and their rulers were not eager to remain under Fabundeh (ibid., enc. Le Mesurier, 10.10.08, Panguma, Notes on map enc.) (iii) an ethnic frontier, at least in the S.E. of Luawa between the Gbande and Kissi peoples. Le Mesurier noted that most Vassa people were Gbande and not Kissi people.

575. The description of Tengea Chiefdom is based on Le Mesurier's 1903 map (C0267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.08, enc. map), which probably represents the earliest documentary attempt to indicate in detail the position of Tengea. Luangkorli was represented as an even narrower strip of territory to the east of Tengea, perhaps only 5 miles wide. Present-day administrative arrangements in Liberia group these two old chiefdoms into one single Chiefdom, itself less than 15 miles wide, containing almost all the Kissi people in Liberia, and stretching from the Moa River in the north to the Magowi-Moa in the south (Gnielinski, S. Von, Liberia in Maps (Univ. of London Press, 1972), pp.36-37/). This helps to confirm the estimates of Le Mesurier on the shape and size of the two old chiefdoms.

576. See Note 575 above.

577. C0267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.03.

578. Ibid., enc. Le Mesurier, 10.10.03, Panguma, Notes on map enc. "I understand that although there is no decided natural feature to mark the eastern border of Tengea country, yet it is an old and well recognised boundary".
For instance, Luangkorl probably contained substantial numbers of Gbande people, though it was recognized as a Kisi Chiefdom.

The main previous boundary proposals were by Cardew in 1896 (G0267/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96, enc. map), and Probyn in 1907 (G0267/496/Conf.; Probyn; 10.9.07, enc. map).

Ndawua, who came from Konosu, had been one of the knakoisia who gave the country to Kailondo at the Gbondou Conference of 1880 (see Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 11 above). Ndawua had also been Fabundeh's representative at the Conference of Kisi people which Fabundeh called in the first years of the twentieth century (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, p. 288 above). Le Mesurier spelt the name "Dawa".

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Ibid.

Ibid., enc. Le Mesurier, 12.11.03, Bo. Le Mesurier was here contending against Probyn's suggestion that the international boundary might run along the western border of Kissi Tungi and Kunio (the area round Koindu town). But presumably these same objections would have been equally valid for any boundary line which excluded Tengoa from Fabundeh's polity, as far as Le Mesurier was concerned.

See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, p. 314 below.

The earlier proposals for boundary adjustments made by Carlow and Probyn (see Note 530 above) had foundered on Liberia's unwillingness to give up any of her territory.

Chief Ndawua was still alive in 1903 (see Note 582 above). Pa Langama noted that Kanganya fought for 7 years against the Liberians before settling in British territory (Int. 20). DC Bowden decided that Kanganya, who had been "Chief of Tengia in that portion of Kisi country now within Liberia", should have permission to settle in British territory in July 1915 (SLGA, Decree Book Railway Sub-District 1906, p. 288).

It was only on 23.11.15 at Foya that it was finally announced by British and Liberian representatives to the people of Tengoa that they were to be in Liberian territory. 6 months were allowed for "the people of the Tengoa Chiefdom to decide upon which side of the boundary they desired finally to settle". Significantly, on the one hand the British Commissioner announced that "no further parties would be permitted to seek shelter in British Territory and from there raid over in a hostile manner into Liberian territory" - an indirect admission that this had been happening during the previous few years. On the other hand, the Liberian Commissioner implied that he realized many people would prefer to leave their homes in Tengoa and move into British territory rather than live under Liberian rule.

SLGA, Decree Book Railway Sub-District 1906, p. 288, 293. It was only on 23.11.15 at Foya that it was finally announced by British and Liberian representatives to the people of Tengoa that they were to be in Liberian territory. 6 months were allowed for "the people of the Tengoa Chiefdom to decide upon which side of the boundary they desired finally to settle". Significantly, on the one hand the British Commissioner announced that "no further parties would be permitted to seek shelter in British Territory and from there raid over in a hostile manner into Liberian territory" - an indirect admission that this had been happening during the previous few years. On the other hand, the Liberian Commissioner implied that he realized many people would prefer to leave their homes in Tengoa and move into British territory rather than live under Liberian rule.

See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, p. 305 below.
592. Ibid., pp. 311-312.

592. The present writer has been unable to find evidence on precisely when the Liberian post was set up at Gbandewulo.

593. See Note 433 above.


595. CO267/513/Conf.; Probyn; 29.4.09, enc. Newstead, 3/09, Daru; Intelligence Return.

596. The reason for only one casual reference being made to this increase in British control may have been a desire by WAFF Officers in Kailahun to avoid attracting the attention of Freetown officials to the extension of British control, and to avoid arousing the opposition of senior Government officials.

597. CO267/513/Conf.; Probyn; 29.4.09, enc. Newstead, 3/09, Daru; Intelligence Return.

598. Rightly or wrongly we have been in virtual occupation of the country west of the green line on the Map which is under reference" (i.e. the map enc. CO267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.08. The "green line" ran down the eastern boundary of Tengea sub-chiefdom).

599. Ibid., enc. Le Mesurier, 21.11.09, Kailahun.

600. There were no British civil administrators east of Panguma. La Mesurier was Officer Commanding at Daru, and thus the senior British military official. Also by 1909, he had spent more time in the Kailahun area than any other British official.

601. Le Mesurier's despatches in 1909 are often noteworthy for (i) their failure to provide detailed accounts of events (ii) their comparative infrequency (iii) their descriptions of quite far-reaching decisions which Le Mesurier took and acted upon without even consulting the Governor and senior officials in Freetown. Le Mesurier seems to have taken more and more initiative upon himself and paid less and less attention to Freetown.

602. Le Mesurier's desire to extend British control, at least as far eastwards as to include Tengea sub-chiefdom, was clearly expressed in his encs. in CO267/517/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.08.

603. Until the outbreak of the First World War, almost all the British officials who had much to do with Luawa were army officers. Le Mesurier, however, was in the extraordinary position of being, for 3 years (1907-1911), the de facto British Government administrator in Kailahun, and at the same time commanding British troops in the area as an active army officer.
604. Int. 19; "He [Le Mesurier] used to say that his father was a Frenchman, and his mother was English."

605. Int. 20.


607. C0267/517/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 19.11.09. "Konosha" was probably Mekai Ndawua's town of Konosu in Tengea sub-chiefdom. "Dambara" may refer to the town of Dambalu in present-day Tungi Chiefdom, on the road to Nyandehun-Mambabu, or possibly to Dambara, the town of Kongor, later to become PC of Kissi Chiefdom.

608. C0267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.08, enc. Le Mesurier, 12.11.08, Freetown.

609. Where Pa Langama's statements could be checked against written evidence, they were generally found to be correct. Pa Langama (Int. 20) and Meads James Kailondo were able to give much more detailed accounts of events than any other elders who were interviewed.

610. Int. 20. One of Kaitungi's opponents in the Kissi Tungi elections of the 1930s and 1940s made the point that Kaitungi's father had favoured the Liberians and in the end had defected to them (KDOA, Loose papers).

611. Since Le Mesurier's forces struck against Gbandewulo late in 1909, as a result of a note sent by Kongor to the British Officer after the Kissi meeting (Int. 20), Kongor's meeting must have been held earlier in 1909.

612. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, p. 588 above.

613. After Lomax's departure from Dodo, taking Gandi with him, and after Fabundeh's punishment of Kongoni, support for the Liberians seems to have been largely quashed in Fabundeh's polity.

614. Int. 20.

615. Ibid. There was a literate Creole staying at Sandia who acted as amanuensis for Kongor.


617. Ibid. Gbande country bordered on Tungi sub-chiefdom near Gbandewulo, the Rivers Magowi and Maia being the approximate boundary. Kamatahun, some 9 miles S.E. of Gbandewulo, was a main town in the Gbande Chiefdom of Vassa. Le Mesurier did not explain how he established that the trouble was caused by 'marauders' from Gbande country.

620. The Gbande 'marauders' were obviously not in uniform! In the general unrest which was disturbing the Gbandewulo area at this time, no one would venture far unarmed—also some form of weapon was needed as a defence against snakes and wild animals. So the possession of weapons could not be a criterion on which to decide who were the raiders. If the 'marauders' were in possession of the town, it would certainly be impossible in the heat of an attack for anyone to distinguish between Gbande aggressors and the ordinary people of Gbandewulo.

621. Ibid. Kokossu is presumably a mis-spelling of Konosu (see Note 607 above).

622. See Note 602 above.

623. Fabundeh must have known from Kongor the attitude which Koli Tungi had taken up; and presumably Fabundeh would pass this information on to Le Mesurier.

624. The description of the incident provided by Pa Langama (Int. 20) was substantially confirmed in another interview with ex-MC. Kaitungi, a son of Koli Tungi. He said he had been a tiny baby at the time of the incident (Int. 22).

625. i.e. south of the Magowi River. The suggestion is that Koli Tungi had gone voluntarily into the area more closely controlled by the Liberians.

626. Int. 20.

627. Int. 22. Although details may have become confused, there seems no reason why Pa Langama and ex-P.C. Kaitungi should have 'invented' this incident. Le Mesurier briefly refers to the fact that an attack was made on Gbandewulo (see Note 619 above), and in such an attack it would be probable that at least as many inhabitants of the town would be killed as Gbande 'marauders' who may have been occupying the town. It does seem that in his official despatches, Major Le Mesurier passes over the Gbandewulo incident in an unsatisfactory and deliberately sketchy manner, whereas oral tradition provides a coherent and detailed sequence of events.

628. See Note 601 above.

629. Alldridge's A Transformed Colony was published in 1910. In 1907, Alldridge had visited Kailahun, but he diplomatically avoided all mention of the trouble over the international boundary, stating simply that Luawa was divided between Liberia and the British Protectorate, with Kailahun in Liberia (p. 180).

630. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 81-93 above.

632. During the period February 1910 to March 1911, there seems to have been little trouble in the Kailahun area. There were, in this period, virtually no official despatches sent to Freetown and on to London (i.e. P.R.O. Series C0267 contains no such despatches).

633. C0267/530/Tel.; Haddon-Smith; 26.3.11. See also C0267/530/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 9.4.11.

634. C0267/530/Tel.; Haddon-Smith; 26.3.11.

635. C0267/570/83; Hollis (Ag. Governor); Bowden 29.1.16, Kenema; Railway District Report 1915. Le Mesurier left Sierra Leone in autumn 1914, and was killed in Flanders in April 1915.

636. C0267/530/Tel.; Haddon-Smith; 8.3.11. C0267/530/Tel.; Haddon-Smith; 26.3.11. C0267/530/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 9.4.11. "Up to the present there has been a detachment of the Sierra Leone Battalion at Foya now in the Tengeh i.e. Tengee Chiefdom .... With the signing of the Convention and the hoisting of our flag, I have issued instructions for the detachment of the Battalion to be withdrawn from Tengeh".

637. Le Mesurier had always argued that Tangea was part of Fabundeh's polity, and should be included within British territory (see Note 602 above).

638. See Chap. 5, of this thesis, p.404 below.


640. C0627/530/Conf.; Haddon-Smith; 9.4.11.

641. For the way in which Fabundeh had worked from the beginning of his reign to achieve these ends, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 4, p.235 above.