Investigating the syntax of speech acts: 
Embedding illocutionary force

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the notion of illocutionary force and whether it is embeddable by examining the syntax, semantics and pragmatic effects of a range of root-like embedded constructions. Though illocutionary force has long been considered a property exclusive to root clauses, the examination and analysis of English embedded inverted questions and other quasi-quotational constructions cross-linguistically show that this is not the case.

The contributions of this dissertation are three-fold: a refined definition of independent illocutionary force; a syntax for non-root complement clauses that carry independent illocutionary force; and a model for the discourse that captures the effects of these clauses. I also work towards understanding how the instantiation of independent illocutionary force in such constructions leads to their restricted distribution.

Illocutionary force may be represented both lexically and through syntactic processes such as verb movement. I argue that verb movement to Force\(o\) is an interface operation—it occurs in syntax but is directly linked to a specific discourse interpretation. Building on Krifka (2014), illocutionary force is the expression of who takes responsibility for asserting or responding to a proposition or set of propositions, according to a given modal base. When illocutionary force is independently expressed on an embedded clause, the perspective holder and responsibility taker(s) are unambiguous and not mixed. In contrast, standard embedded clauses may be ambiguous as to who takes responsibility and may contain multiple perspectives.

Clauses with independent illocutionary force have an expanded C-layer that is nonetheless smaller than that in true root clauses. An Illocutionary Act head selects for the embedded ForceP, determines illocutionary force and, obliquely, determines the restricted distribution of quasi-quotational constructions. A range of facts show that quasi-quotational constructions are truly embedded but are not direct objects of the matrix verb. Instead, they are in close apposition with a nominal direct object. This structure accounts for the properties of quasi-quotational constructions as entities that refer to a conversational move proffered in the relevant discourse, following Roberts’s (1996, 2012) Question Under Discussion framework.
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A PhD thesis, it seems, does not just come from one point of view, but is the product of several years of gently altering, metamorphosing and shifting perspectives. One guiding point of view throughout my years in York belongs to my supervisor George Tsoulas. He is not only been instrumental in bringing this thesis to completion, but also in showing me that academia and (something resembling) normal life can be woven together, and in making me a stronger, more resilient and more critical person. Ευχαριστώ, George.

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To my dad, Stephen, I acknowledge that I would be the second Dr Woods in the family if you had had the opportunities that you and my mum have provided for me.

This thesis is for them.
Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker’s intentions; it is populated - overpopulated - with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one’s own intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated process.

Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*
Author’s Declaration

This thesis has not previously been submitted for any degree other than Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics at the University of York. It is hereby confirmed that the thesis comprises my original work, except where otherwise stated. All contributions from external sources have been acknowledged and explicitly referenced.

Some of the work contained in this thesis has been presented to external audiences. The work on EIQs in chapter 3 was presented at the (Re)presenting the Speech of Others Workshop at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen in March 2014, the Linguistics Association of Great Britain Annual Meeting at the University of Oxford in September 2014 and the Questions at the Syntax-Semantics Interface workshop at University College London in September 2015.

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A summary of the core proposal comprising work from chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 was presented at the West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics 33 at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver in March 2015 and was published in the proceedings of that conference in February 2016.
Dissertation Haiku

For Robyn

Embedded questions
Have independent force when
Verb movement marks it.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Attempts to answer questions about illocutionary force and embedded root phenomena are prone to relying on logic which self-satisfies. An embedded root phenomenon is such because it is restricted to root clauses, except for the cases in which it is embedded. Illocutionary force is marked in clauses except those which have no illocutionary force.

This dissertation takes a group of constructions which I will refer to as quasi-quotational constructions. They are cross-linguistically very similar as they feature a range of embedded root phenomena in addition to a range of other characteristics, such as opacity to extraction and resistance to extraposition. I will show using a range of syntactic and interpretive tests what it means for these constructions to be both embedded and root and how this apparent tension obtains. This tension will be resolved by showing that only a specific subset of properties typically restricted to root clauses are embeddable and that this can be explained by examining how different properties effect change on discourse and the relationship between discourse participants. Moreover, I will build on the speech act phrase tradition growing out of Speas & Tenny (2003) by focusing on a subpart of this phrase, which I will call the Illocutionary Act phrase (IAP). I propose that the IAP is the highest possible projection in the embedded clause and that it encodes independent illocutionary force in that clause, along with information about the discourse according to which the embedded clause should be interpreted.

Chapter 2 contains a review of speech act theory from the philosophical tradition and its embedding into linguistic theory. I will also examine recent refinements of the concept.
of discourse participants as syntactic objects and of the concept of illocutionary force, particularly in embedded contexts. Recent examinations of left-peripheral phenomena such as discourse particles, their interpretation and their distribution have been useful in teasing apart how different types of speech act introduce different responsibilities for the discourse participants. However, I argue that it is necessary to look further into the utterance, into intrasentential syntax, to fully understand what it means to represent discourse participants in syntax.

Chapter 3 introduces the main datum of interest in this dissertation, namely the embedded inverted question in English dialects. Embedded inverted questions are a variant form of speech report which share some characteristics with indirect speech reports and others with direct speech reports. Their pragmatic utility arises from their ability to represent expressive and not-at-issue information from the original speech act without enforcing a verbatim requirement and that they presuppose a particular question under discussion. Their characteristics will be examined in detail and experimental results will be discussed.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide a structural analysis of the embedded inverted question. Chapter 4 focuses on the head of the IAP, how it encodes illocutionary force and its categorial status as a modal verb that also has n-like, specifically determiner-like, properties. The internal argument of the IA head is the embedded clause. I also propose that the IAP, due to the determiner-like properties of the IA head, ultimately is an entity rather than a proposition. Chapter 5 examines the external argument of the IA head, which is a complex of a situation pronoun and a perspectival monster operator. Data will be provided to support this analysis from a range of constructions in the Germanic and Romance language families whose characteristics show striking similarities with the English embedded inverted question. Along with other perspective-shifting phenomena, including embedded imperatives, this data suggests that the embedded clauses in these quasi-quotational constructions are referential in terms of their structure—the extra determiner-like functional projection—and their interpretation. Furthermore, the differences between two emerging groups in the family of quasi-quotational constructions will be discussed, specifically that one group of constructions is evaluated according to the original discourse context (embedded inverted questions and recomplementation clauses) while the other exhibits
perspective disambiguation in which the speaker is marked as the perspective holder, not the matrix subject (German and some Mainland Scandinavian embedded verb second). How quasi-quotational constructions affect the discourse into which they are introduced is also modelled, using a modified version of Farkas and Bruce’s (2010) approach to the Question Under Discussion framework.

Chapter 6 extends the investigation of the embedded inverted question to examine its restricted distribution, raising questions about how it combines, semantically and syntactically, with the matrix clause. I will show that the embedded inverted question is non-root but not selected by the matrix verb, in keeping with a recent line of scholarship questioning the syntactic relationship between clauses and the elements which dominate them. Instead, the IAP, which is the type of a nominal, is in close apposition with the true complement of the matrix verb—a null content nominal. Questions about the availability of quasi-quotational constructions in a given language will also be discussed along with speculation on reasons why certain languages such as Mandarin Chinese and Cuzco Quechua seem not to have quasi-quotational constructions.

Conclusions will then be drawn and areas for future work identified.

The questions posed here are not new, but by careful examination of embedded inverted questions and their similarities with better known embedded root phenomena insights emerge that help tease apart problems which have endured for some time, such as what it means to have independent illocutionary force and what that might entail for a clause, for the role that it plays within a discourse and for the discourse participants in terms of the commitments it demands of them. It also shows that, despite the important advances made by Hooper & Thompson (1973), assertion per se is not the key concept in understanding embedded root phenomena but rather who takes responsibility for the information in a clause and whose knowledge a clause is evaluated against.
Chapter 2

Representing Discourse Participants: The History of an Idea

2.1 Introduction

For a long time, the basic unit of language studied in generative linguistics has been the sentence, made up of clauses. Much study has focused on, and made great strides in understanding, the relationship between arguments in a clause, how these roles are codified and marked, and how complex sentences fit together. However, the role of a sentence in discourse is a much more recent consideration and one which is much less well understood than intra-sentential factors. In particular the way in which a given sentence encodes its role(s) within discourse has fallen in and out of fashion as a topic of scrutiny in generative linguistics. In the last twenty years, serious scholars in generative linguistics have moved towards considering utterances—or at least, sentences containing non-propositional material, rather than propositions alone—as a basic unit of language. That is to say that non-propositional content has been taken more seriously as interacting with the core proposition of the sentence rather than being simply an add-on, parenthetical option.

This has not necessarily been the case in other disciplines, which have long taken non-propositional material into account in the consideration of utterances, principally because of a difference in emphasis. Where generative linguistics has focused on relationships and processes within sentences alone, other fields such as philosophy and other linguistic
frameworks have focused on communication, from the expression of speaker intent to the construction of discourse. Taking philosophy as an example, Searle (1969) asserted that speech acts—sentences within the context of a discourse—are the basic unit of linguistic communication, and that they come with specific types of intentional behaviour attached. Searle argues that a study of speech acts is a study not only of Saussurian parole, use of language, but also of langue, the language itself, because, Searle claims, meaning and context have a bidirectional relationship. He says:

> For just as it is part of our notion of the meaning of a sentence that a literal utterance of that sentence with that meaning in a certain context would be the performance of a particular speech act, so it is part of our notion of a speech act that there is a possible sentence (or sentences) the utterance of which in a certain context would in virtue of its (or their) meaning constitute a performance of that speech act.

Searle (1969, pp.17-18)

In short, sentences may not have a one-to-one relationship with speech acts, but the meaning of the sentence is not independent of the effect the utterance of that sentence has in the discourse.

However, whilst it is important to consider meaning as being part of a discourse, it is also important to draw distinctions between the kinds of information recoverable from context and inference, and the kinds of information encoded within the language itself. To put it another way, which aspects of meaning are found within narrow syntax? Although Chomsky has long maintained that language is not essentially for person-to-person communication and that speech acts are not crucial for comprehending the meaning of a sentence (Chomsky 1998, pp.22-23), the fact that it has been used for communication for many millennia suggest that it is plausible that some communication-related elements have become part of the functional lexicon.

It is clear that there are elements of language that relate to the discourse context, but that are interpreted consistently in given syntactic contexts regardless of the speaker’s conversational aims. For example, point of view is represented through deixis, sequence
of tense phenomena, sentential particles, adverbs, honorific marking, allocutive agreement and many other lexical and functional means. Take as an example the case of allocutive agreement in Souletin Basque (Oyharçabal 1993, Miyagawa 2012). In declarative root clauses, the verb is marked for agreement with the addressee in the discourse: affixes exist for singular male addressees, singular female addressees and high-status addressees. There is no allocutive agreement in the case of plural addressees:

(1)  
  a. Pettek lan egin dik.  
     Peter.ERG work.ABS DO.PRF AUX-3.S.ABS-2.MASC.ALLOC-3.S.ERG  
     “Peter worked.” (to a male addressee)  
  b. Pettek lan egin din.  
     Peter.ERG work.ABS DO.PRF AUX-3.S.ABS-2.FEM.ALLOC-3.S.ERG  
     “Peter worked.” (to a female addressee)  
  c. Pettek lan egin dizü.  
     Peter.ERG work.ABS DO.PRF AUX-3.S.ABS-2.FORM.ALLOC-3.S.ERG  
     “Peter worked.” (formal, to a higher-status addressee)  
  d. Pettek lan egin du.  
     Peter.ERG work.ABS DO.PRF AUX-3.S.ABS-3.S.ERG  
     “Peter worked.” (to plural addressee)  

Allocutive agreement is true second-person agreement in that it is in complementary distribution with second-person subject/object agreement—allocutive agreement “loses out” and is impossible in clauses with second-person subjects and objects. It is also closely linked to the expression of C, such that when C is spelled out as a complementiser, allocutive agreement is impossible. On the basis of allocutive agreement being “true” agreement, Miyagawa (2012) shows that there must be some representation of the addressee in the syntax to act as the goal for which the allocutive agreement probe searches. As such, discourse participants are said to be represented in syntax and this representation does not interact with the conversational aims of the speaker, though exactly how the addressee is expressed depends on the discourse context (for the gender/status of the addressee, for example).

The aims of this chapter are as follows: I will discuss the first wave of speech act theory in both philosophy and linguistics in the 1960s and early 1970s and why the enterprise
died out, at least in generative linguistics (Banfield (1982) notwithstanding). I will then examine the re-emergence of discourse-related projections in syntax with the advent of the cartographic approach to syntax and ForceP, followed by the resurgence of proposals that there is a dedicated speech act projection in syntax. Certain key terms and the reasoning behind them will also be discussed in this section. In particular, I will consider what it means for a sentence to have ‘illocutionary force’ and what types of ‘force’ exist in natural language.

2.2 Early speech act theory: the philosophers

The speech act theorists of the 1960s made a big impact on the study of language from a philosophical point of view. The recognised “father” of speech act theory, J.L. Austin, investigated how words are used to provoke actions or to perform actions in and of themselves. In this way he focused neither on the truth-conditions of a sentence nor how its meaning is affected by context, but how sentences can be used to effect change in the world. He did, however, look to separate out layers within a sentence to determine the relationship between the sentence in isolation and in discourse.

To achieve this, Austin (1962) proposes a distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Austin’s focus lay on the middle category, illocutionary acts, as they lay between the plainly grammatical category of locution and the plainly social category of perlocution. He claimed that this three-way distinction, in particular in the introduction of the idea of illocutionary acts, would be superior to his earlier work on the difference between constative utterances—utterances which *say* something, such as statements and assertions—and performative utterances—utterances which *do* something, such as promises, bets, warnings. Austin noted that the constative-performative distinction did not distinguish between an utterance such as “The bull is going to charge” in terms of its simple meaning and in terms of the ways in which the speaker may choose to deploy such a sentence (Austin 1962, p.98). He therefore suggests that in uttering a sentence (a locutionary act), there is always an illocutionary act performed too, which he characterises as “the performance of an act *in* saying something as opposed to performance of an act
of saying something.” (Austin 1962, pp.99-100; original emphasis). This assertion alone leaves a lot of room for ambiguity, and it is not clear in isolation what the difference is between performance in saying something and performance of saying something. Austin elaborates on the difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in the following words and using the following examples:

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Locutionary</th>
<th>Illocutionary</th>
<th>Perlocutionary</th>
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<tr>
<td>“uttering certain sounds which one knows to be words bearing a definite sense and making definite reference to something” (1962, pp.92-93)</td>
<td>communicating the “force” of a utterance, the action which is performed in uttering said utterance</td>
<td>bringing about an effect on the hearer</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>Speaker to me: “Shoot her!” (1962, pp.101-102)</td>
<td>The speaker urged /advised/ordered/... me to shoot her</td>
<td>I was persuaded to or made to shoot her</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Categories in Austin’s Speech Act Theory (based on Austin 1962)

Based on the above table, the locutionary act is principally concerned with reference and so is concerned both with the structure of the sentence and its utterance in an appropriate context. The illocutionary act is concerned with the speaker’s points of view and intentions. Once again, structure and lexis as well as context are at play, though Austin is clear that the composition of the sentence does not bear on which kind of illocutionary act a sentence may perform. The perlocutionary act is concerned with the effect of the utterance made by the speaker on the addressee and as such is demonstrated by subsequent actions in the discourse and discourse context rather than being linked to any particular structure or lexical choice on the part of the speaker exclusive of context. Austin strongly claims the expression of illocutionary force to be conventional, meaning that it is based in the sentence structure and the interpretation the speech community attaches to that structure rather than context. He also claims that an illocutionary act constitutes an action over and above that of simple utterance.

But what is the nature of this action? How is the range of possible actions constrained?
Austin illustrates the line between illocutionary acts (the force of the utterance act itself) and perlocutionary acts (the effect of the act on the hearer) by examining whether or not the act can be described using explicit performative formulae. As examples, he notes that whilst “I argue that” or “I warn you that” are perfectly possible, “I convince you that” or “I alarm you that” are not. Though Austin uses the English lexicon as the basis for these claims, it is a fair assumption that similar distinctions exist in other languages. Moreover, this suggests that argument or warning operators are possible language but alarming or convincing operators are not. A prediction that this approach does not make is that a language that lacks a given lexical item or operator does not necessarily lack the ability to encode that act, though it might require periphrasis of some kind or the repurposing of another structure. However, Austin’s own examples suggest that using lexical entries to motivate types of illocutionary act may not be the most convincing evidence. A speaker can just as much fail to argue or warn something as they can fail to convince or alarm, whilst it is difficult to see how questioning or ordering acts can fail to occur if direct means are used. For these reasons, the need to more finely differentiate between acts instantiated by grammatical means and those that are dependent on convention to be accepted in a given discourse is apparent; in short, convention is not fine-grained enough as a concept to refine our understanding of different types of illocutionary force.

It is tempting to suggest that Austin’s three types of speech act are arranged in some kind of hierarchy based on the amount of material in them which is not context-dependent, but this would be to misrepresent Austin’s ideas. It is not the case that something is “added” to the locutionary act to produce the illocutionary act, or to the illocutionary act to produce the perlocutionary act, but they are intended to be understood as levels which occur simultaneously on the production of a given utterance. This leads to the kind of criticism put forward by scholars such as [Cohen 1964] that it is unclear what the role of the illocutionary act in Austin’s system in comparison with the locutionary and perlocutionary acts. It is intuitively clear that the speaker’s intentions, desires and so forth are as real as the effect of the utterance on the hearer, but Austin’s classes do not quite manage to distinguish between the two. For example, Austin’s class of expositives in table 2.2 appears to conflate speaker intention and effect on the addressee by use of terms like...
clarifying—that may be the speaker intention but it is also contingent on the addressee actually finding that the situation is clarified for him or her.

It is also interesting that, although Austin asserts that there is a conventional, syntax-internal aspect to illocutionary acts, he abstracts over syntactic differences in determining his classes of illocutionary acts. He claims that *asking* (typically expressed with an interrogative clause) and *informing* (typically expressed with a declarative clause) are both types of ‘expressive’ expositive act. Austin’s classes of illocutionary acts are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verdictives</td>
<td>“typified by the giving of a verdict[...], giving a finding as to something - fact or value - which is for different reasons hard to be certain about” (p.151)</td>
<td>acquit, convict, find, read it as, reckon, put it at, make it, assess, characterize, diagnose, analyse, describe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercitives</td>
<td>“the exercising of powers, rights, or influence” (p.151)</td>
<td>appoint, vote, order, urge, advise, warn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissives</td>
<td>“typified by promising or otherwise undertaking; they <em>commit</em> you to doing something (original emphasis, pp.151-152) and “the declaring of an intention” (p.163)</td>
<td>promise, undertake, covenant, contract, intend, plan, agree, consent, oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behabitives</td>
<td>“include the notion of reaction to other people’s behaviour [...] and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else’s past conduct or imminent conduct” (p.160)</td>
<td>apologise, thank, deplore, commiserate, resent, welcome, bless, toast, dare, defy, challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expositives</td>
<td>“acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments and the clarifying of usages and of references” (p.161)</td>
<td>affirm, deny, ask, remark, inform, testify, accept, concede, postulate, interpret, analyse, illustrate, mean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Classes of illocutionary acts (Austin 1962)

Criticisms of Austin’s characterisation of illocutionary force and his classes of illocutionary acts abound: Cohen (1964) notes that if illocutionary force can be represented so easily in the content of the utterance, then there appears to be no specific role for illocutionary force as a concept separate from the utterance and its content. This is a
criticism repeated in more recent literature such as Zanuttini & Portner (2003), who see clause type, often conflated with illocutionary force, not as a single syntactic feature but as a function of the presence of combinations of other independently motivated syntactic features. It is important that Austin attempts to constrain the kinds of illocutionary act that may occur in natural language, but the problems in his work lie in trying to explain why the acts in table 2.2 should be the basic categories. A more extreme version of this criticism is found in Graham (1977), who considers it “a curious fact that Austin and his commentators tend both to give verbal recognition to the diversity of illocution and still to see a general account of it” (p.108, original emphasis) in light of the fact that Austin recognises the possibility of thousands of different types of illocution based on performative verbs in the dictionary. This is where Austin’s reliance on English performatives to construct his metalanguage poses problems: if illocution is so heavily based on the lexicon of a language then it must vary greatly depending on the verbs available in said language, and will also differ greatly between languages. For example, the fact that there is no one verb in English encoding the meaning “try-to-persuade” and taking a CP complement does not mean that this cannot constitute a type of illocutionary force in another language.

Finally, although Austin is insistent on the fact that the illocutionary act is “constituted not by intention [...] but by convention” (Austin 1962, p.127; original emphasis), such convention is principally social convention. The illocutionary acts that he identifies cannot necessarily be performed simply “in” saying something, despite what Austin insists (1962, p.122)—instead they must be performed in saying that thing within the relevant speech community, making an important observation about the power of performative acts within structures of authority. Searle (1989) remarked upon this some years later, noting that the kinds of acts dubbed illocutionary acts by Austin largely depend on some kind of “institutional notion” (to use Searle’s term). This means that the saying of the utterance is not enough, but that extra-linguistic institutions and social rules are also necessary if one is to achieve true illocutionary uptake (Austin’s term), meaning that the illocutionary act

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1. Of course, distinguishing between clause type and illocutionary force is a crucial step which will be addressed in chapter 4.

2. Note that Austin distinguishes between illocutionary and perlocutionary force using the non-performative verb “persuade”, on the basis that a speaker can only aim to persuade, where only an addressee independently can achieve being persuaded.
will actually take effect.

In summary, Austin’s work addresses the constative-performative problem principally by showing that the former kind of utterance is just one type of the latter—that all utterances ‘do’ something and some sentences may do multiple things depending on speaker intention, effect on the hearer and use in context. However, by relying on overtly performative sentences for his metalanguage, the distinctions that Austin draws between his levels of speech act are not yet fine-grained enough, such that the general account towards which he strives remains elusive.

Inspired by Austin’s insights, John R. Searle addressed many of the issues raised by and proposals put forward by Austin in works spanning several decades. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Searle suggests that speech acts are the basic unit of linguistic communication and that they are defined by specific types of intentional behaviour. As he says in his 1979 work:

“I believe that speaking or writing in a language consists in performing speech acts of a quite specific kind called ‘illocutionary acts’. These include making statements, asking questions, giving orders, making promises, apologizing, thanking and so on. I also believe that there is a systematic set of relationships between the meanings of the words and sentences we utter and the illocutionary acts we perform in the utterance of those words and sentences.

Searle (1979 p.58)

Searle, like Austin, envisages illocutionary acts as an action performed by the speaker through language and does not assume that an illocutionary act must have a given effect in order to be successfully performed. Furthermore he links illocutionary acts to syntax and semantics more closely than to pragmatic effect. He elucidates this further:

[T]he speech act or acts performed in the utterance of a sentence are in general a function of the meaning of the sentence. The meaning of a sentence does not in all cases uniquely determine what speech act is performed in a given utterance of that sentence, for a speaker may mean more than what he actually says, but it is always in principle possible for him to say exactly what he means.
Searle therefore assumes that the derivation of the sentence determines to some degree the possible or at least the basic speech act(s) which the given sentence may constitute, suggesting a dependency between something in the syntax and the availability of a given speech act. Interestingly, Searle is clear about which aspects of syntax and semantics are not affected by the transition from sentence to speech act; he notes in Searle (1979) that predication and reference are separate from speech acts, as they remain the same regardless of ordering, questioning, stating, wishing, and so on. Searle also rejects Austin’s distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts—the idea that illocutionary acts are independent of the composition of the utterance—which suggests that Searle attributes a greater role to syntax and semantics in the formation of speech acts than does Austin. He distinguishes between sentences, reference and speech acts as separate acts in the speaking of an utterance as follows (Searle 1969, pp.23-24):

(2)  
  a. uttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing utterance acts  
  b. referring and predicating = performing propositional acts  
  c. stating, questioning, commanding, promising = performing illocutionary acts

Searle explicitly claims that the above acts are intrinsically linked; he notes that when (2c) is performed, characteristically the speaker is also performing (2a) and (2b). Searle also says, however, that propositional acts, i.e. (2b) cannot be performed alone (Searle 1969, p.25).3

This suggests that (2a), an utterance act, can be performed alone, and raises the question of what this would look like. Searle suggests in his essay of (1989) that it is perfectly possible to utter a sentence without intending to communicate its content. He uses an anecdote about getting stuck at the Yugoslavian border and becoming frustrated with the border guards who did not speak English—by subsequently vocalising his frustration in English, Searle was not possibly communicating anything through the utterance itself4 as

3There is some evidence that this is not the case, for example the case of conjunct clauses in languages such as Plains Cree (Algonquian). This will be touched on in chapters 3 and 6.

4Of course, Searle will have communicated plenty through his tone of voice, gesture and so forth in this
he knew the border guards could not understand him, though he was uttering sentences (Searle 1989, pp.143-144). It is not clear whether this anecdote applies here, however, not least because in voicing his frustration Searle will almost certainly have been making reference to, for example, the border guards specifically, and probably predicking all manner of things with regards to them; it is simply that the guards do not receive the meaning of the referring terms and the predicates that Searle—presumably entirely grammatically—is uttering. Arguably, Searle is in fact performing a propositional act in this utterance, but no illocutionary act. It is not therefore clear why Searle makes the distinction between (2a) and (2b).

It is interesting that Searle does not, in the first instance, consider the performance of perlocutionary acts as an integral part of issuing an utterance. Searle, like Austin, characterises perlocutionary acts as the consequences wrought upon the hearer by the speech act. This is supported by a later essay (Searle 1989) in which he categorically divorces the notions of representing an idea and communicating it, but does not have much bearing on his earlier work.

In terms of illocutionary force and how it might be represented, Searle (1969) asserts that any “semantic” distinction between types of speech acts should have some kind of syntactic analogue. He notes that an illocutionary force indicator and the ‘propositional indicator’ (or clause type) may be one and the same element, though he does not assume that a syntactic illocutionary force marker must be present in every sentence, mainly because the types of illocutionary force indicator that he identifies are so varied: from intonation to word order, stress to verb mood (Searle 1969 pp.30-31). It is important to note that the conflation of illocutionary force and clause-typing has been assumed in much of the more recent literature: Rizzi (1997) proposes the projection ForceP in the left periphery of the clause primarily (despite the name ForceP\(^5\) for the purpose of clause-situation, but the compositional meaning of the utterances made will not have been transmitted to the non-Anglophone guards.

\(^5\)It is not clear exactly why ForceP came to be the name for clause-typing position. Rizzi (1997) states that he uses the label ‘Force’ in keeping with Chomsky (1995). There is only a brief reference to Force in the latter work which is as follows: “Declarative C is one of the force indicators and therefore must be present for interpretation at the C-I interface” (Chomsky 1995, p.292). There is no further elaboration about what a force indicator is. Returning to Rizzi, he basically equates Force with clause type because he claims that Force and Fin are one projection unless forced to separate by activation of the focus-topic layer and because the possible Force heads he proposes include categories like relative and comparative. As
typing, but it has also been and continues to be referred to in the literature as the locus of illocutionary force because the spell-out of the Force head in the form of a complementiser in Indo-European languages largely correlates with a lack of independent illocutionary force (though there are many counterexamples to this). More recent work such as \cite{Han} and \cite{ConiglioZegrean} challenges this, however, as I will in this dissertation.

Working from the assumption that illocutionary force is syntactically encoded, Searle suggests that if all illocutionary acts can be reduced to a small number of basic illocutionary types, then “it would [...] seem somewhat more likely that the deep structure of a sentence would have a simple representation of its illocutionary type”, rather than having ‘illocutionary act rules’ of a more conventional type attaching to “some output of the combinatorial operations of the semantic component” \cite[Searle]{1969} p.64). At this point in his work, Searle lists 8 types of illocutionary act: request, assert, question, thank, advise, warn, greet, congratulate \cite[Searle]{1969} pp.66-67). This is despite recognising that the principles of distinction between acts are so various \cite[Searle]{1969} p.69) and that one or more illocutionary acts may be performed through the same utterance, despite the sentence only encoding at most one illocutionary force indicator\footnote{Presumably this applies to cases in which the illocutionary force indicator is not overtly spelled out, though this is not made clear. This kind of ambiguity, and such ambiguity between illocutionary types can be avoided, is examined in \cite{Woods}.}

Ten years after his 1969 work, Searle produced in 1979 a taxonomy of illocutionary acts based on a system of principled distinctions and a clearer definition of what constitutes illocutionary force. An illocutionary act breaks down into the illocutionary point, which contributes to but is not the same as illocutionary force, which is the second element \cite[Searle]{1979} p.3). For Searle, the illocutionary point consists of the discourse participants involved and how they interact. Illocutionary force “results from several elements”, such as the strength of the statement, relative position/status of speaker and hearer and differences in propositional content such as tense \cite[Searle]{1979} pp.3-8). He therefore divides up illocutionary acts not based on communicative predicates in English, as \cite{Austin} does, but by illocutionary point \cite[Searle]{1979} p.27), in part because some verbs are distinct from each other not in terms of illocutionary point, but other features of the illocutionary
act. He provides the example of **insist** versus **suggest**, which are distinct in terms of the strength they afford to the same act, i.e. assertion. The criteria for the different categories in Searle’s taxonomy include the discourse participants are involved, a sincerity condition which relates to how the proposition is expressed and a directional fit between world and words. Searle’s categories are therefore as follows:[7]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act</th>
<th>Formula</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Austin (1962)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assertives</td>
<td>$\vdash \downarrow Belief(p)$</td>
<td>“commit the speaker […] to something’s being the case” (p.13)</td>
<td>say, state, assert, insist, boast, complain</td>
<td>Expositives (Verdictives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directives</td>
<td>$\uparrow Want(H \text{ does } A)$</td>
<td>“attempts […] by the speaker to get the hearer to do something” (p.13)</td>
<td>ask, order, invite, advise, dare</td>
<td>Exercitives (Behabitives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissives</td>
<td>$C \uparrow Intend(S \text{ does } A)$</td>
<td>“commit the speaker […] to some future course of action” (p.14)</td>
<td>promise, vow, pledge</td>
<td>Commissives (with some exceptions, e.g. intend, shall, favour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressives</td>
<td>$E\emptyset(P)(S/H \text{ and property})$</td>
<td>“express [a] psychological state about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content” (p.15)</td>
<td>thank, condole, apologize, deplore, welcome</td>
<td>Behabitives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declarations</td>
<td>Declaration $\downarrow \emptyset(p)$</td>
<td>a successful declaration “brings about some alteration in the status or condition of the referred to object[s]” (p.17)</td>
<td>declare, promise (note the overlap with assertives; assertive declarations $= D_a \downarrow \downarrow Belief(p)$)</td>
<td>Exercitives, Expositives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Categories in Searle’s Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts [1979]

Searle succeeds in laying out specific criteria for his classes of illocutionary acts based

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[7]The arrows represent the fit between words and worlds: $\downarrow$ represents word-to-world fit, $\uparrow$ represents world-to-word fit, and $\downarrow\uparrow$ represents bidirection word-to-world fit.
on aspects of communication independent of lexicon. However, he does not avoid overlap between the categories, later claiming that assertions are derived from declarations. An example of the “assertive declarative” he proposes is a cricket umpire’s pronouncement “You are out”. This is a declaration in that it causes the batsman to be out of the game (which cannot be logically falsified), but it is also an assertion because the umpire may be unconsciously mistaken in believing the batsman to be out, for example if the ball did not actually come off the batsman’s bat, making his statement logically false. In this particular case, it seems that the assertion (the umpire’s stated belief that the batsman is out, which may or may not be true) actually gives rise to the declaration (the utterance of specific words which result in the utterance being unfalsifiable). This problem is compounded when we consider the formulae Searle proposes. Recall that assertives are formulated as:

\[(3) \vdash \downarrow Belief(p)\]

And declarations as:

\[(4) D \uparrow \varnothing(p)\]

Searle proposes the alteration of three factors to achieve an assertive declaration:

\[(5) D_a \downarrow \uparrow Belief(p)\]

The first change is the addition of the subscript \(a\), which “indicates the illocutionary point of issuing an assertive with the force of a declaration” (1979, p.20). It is not explained what “declarative force” is as compared with a declarative illocutionary act; presumably it is the fact that the addressee takes on a specific role with respect to the speaker. This is because a successful declaration requires authority from the speaker, such that, taking the cricket example, an utterance of “You are out!” by a player from the opposing team can only be an assertion rather than a declaration because only an umpire has the authority to deem a player “out”. Hence an assertive declaration has declarative force in that the utterer of an assertive declarative must have authority within the given situation.

What then does it mean for the illocutionary point of this utterance to be assertive,
yet still classed as a type of declaration? This is represented by the presence of both
word-to-world fit (as in the assertive) and bidirectional word-world fit. However, this is
tautological; the world must already be a particular way for word-to-world fit to apply,
but the ↕ representing the declarative suggests that this is not so. To take up the cricket
example again, the umpire cannot simply declare “You are out” at any time during the
match and make it so - those words must be uttered in response to an event of ‘getting
out’ which has already happened in the world, or more correctly, an event which has
already been perceived as an act of ‘getting out’ by the umpire to have happened in the
world. As such, assertive declaratives are always word-to-world fits. Arguably that is
true of all declaratives, as even those that are referred to as ‘pure’ declaratives such as
“You’re fired”—such utterances tend to be uttered in response to some event in the world.
However, the fact holds that it is the uttering of the words “You’re fired” that make it
so, just like a bride and groom are not married until the words “I declare you husband
and wife” are uttered, even if the rest of the ceremony and festivities have taken place.
Despite the appearance of a bidirectional fit in assertive declarations, these declaratives
are a formal confirmation of what is—a description, and therefore an assertive act—but
with declarative force in the sense that a certain relationship must hold between speaker
and addressee. Therefore, I suggest that these cases are not declarations modified to be
assertives, but assertives which are modified to be declarations.

Given his five groups of illocutionary act, Searle states that “if the distinctions marked
[between the five groups] are of any real significance, they are likely to have various syntac-
tical consequences” (Searle 1979, p.20). However, Searle focuses principally on embedded
cases, basing these syntactic differences on the kinds of complements selected by the perfor-
mative verbs he uses to illustrate the types of illocutionary act. In so doing, he implicitly
adopts a stance similar to Ross (1970) which assumes a silent performative verb above
every uttered sentence. His brief description of the syntactic differences between different
types of act is as follows:

(6) a. Assertive verbs select an S or small clause

b. Directive verbs select an S with a second person subject and periphrastic future
which is then deleted (following the contemporary theory of Equi NP deletion; the selection of S)

c. Commissive verbs select an S with a first person subject and periphrastic future which is then deleted
d. Expressive verbs require transformation of a VP with first or second person subject into a gerundive
e. Declarative verbs also select S or small clauses or nothing at all, themselves constituting the entire utterance (e.g. “I resign”)

Apart from the fact that the silent performative verb analysis has fallen out of favour, Searle’s analysis misses out several salient facts. For a start, questions (either explicitly performative or otherwise) fall into the category of directives, yet Searle ignores that many valid directive verbs also select an S, such as ask and enquire. In the case of declarations he also moves from expressing explicit performative sentences such as “I promise that Henry will be here next Wednesday” to sentences such as “War is hereby declared”, which is in the passive voice, complicating the analysis. He also attracts the same criticism as Austin by relying on the English lexicon and grammar.

Austin and Searle both made important inroads into better understanding how an utterance has layers of meaning and use; Austin argued for a level of meaning between the proposition and the effect of an utterance on the hearer, while Searle opened up a new approach to illocutionary force by uncovering the importance of the discourse participants and their relationship in determining illocutionary force. However, their analyses, particularly Austin’s, focus more on developing a metalanguage to illustrate these levels of meaning rather than looking to explain why certain types of illocutionary force are available in language while other conceivable possible forces are not. As a result, other philosophers such as Cohen (1964) and Graham (1977) have rejected the concept of illocution as unhelpful in philosophy, though the latter suggests that it might yet be a useful linguistic concept.

I will now turn to that field, linguistics, to examine how the concept of speech acts and illocutionary force have developed when different linguistic data is considered.
2.3 Linguists on speech acts and representing speech

2.3.1 Ross (1970) and Fillmore (1975)

Influenced in particular by the work of Austin and his proposal that every illocutionary act contains a performative verb in some form (Austin [1962] p.32), Ross (1970) suggested that speakers and addressees were covertly represented in syntax, at least in the context of performative verb constructions. He proposed this to account for a range of phenomena, most notably cases of reflexive pronouns which are grammatical despite lacking an overt antecedent, as in the following examples (from Ross 1970):

(7) a. This paper was written by Ann and myself (p.228)
    b. As for myself, I won’t be invited (p.232)

Ross also presents evidence from deleted arguments. He claims that in some dialects the following examples are acceptable and that the dropped arguments implicitly relate to a first-person discourse participant:

(8) a. Sid is coming with [me/us/*you/*him] (p.236)
    b. A friend [of mine/of ours/*of hers] is going to drop by (p.238)

Ross presents two possible solutions to this problem. His first solution, based on the behaviour of performative verbs, is that there is a phonologically null performative verb above all declarative sentences. The subject of this verb is first-person and the object second-person (Ross [1970] p.252). This is a purely syntactic solution which does not rely on semantic or pragmatic principles and which only extends to affirmative declarative clauses.

(9) I’ll be there = (e.g.) I promise you that I’ll be there.

His second solution, which he terms the ‘pragmatic analysis’, rests on an early interpretation of the syntax-discourse interface. Ross suggests that elements “in the air”, i.e. in

*The accent here represents prosodic emphasis which often occurs in this construction.
the discourse context, are available antecedents just like any element in the deep structure (Ross’s terms) and, by extension, relations between these elements “in the air” and those in the syntax are constrained by the same kind of hierarchical rules which constrain syntactic relations. Ross suggests that the pragmatic analysis might be preferable to the syntactic analysis as the former does not have any of the ‘tension’ of the latter in terms of matrix clauses being technically embedded beneath the covert performative phrase. It is unclear exactly how Ross conceives of the relationship between the speaker and addressee in this case; whether a predicate such as promise is one of the elements “in the air” or that some other more ‘core’ relationship holds.

However, Ross asserts that any elements called upon from the context would have to be “hierarchically grouped to form a structure which is exactly the same as that of a normal clause in deep structure” (1970, p.255). Although it would be possible to take elements from context as antecedents, it might not be possible to order them hierarchically as would be necessary to ensure the correct antecedent for a syntactic element. Therefore, an account of this kind could not be purely pragmatic but would have to call upon syntactic principles to form the necessary hierarchical structure. Though no kind of account was proposed by Ross or his contemporaries, the Discourse Representation Theory proposed by Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) to cope with cross-sentential anaphora could be used to achieve these kinds of aims, if it is assumed that there is still some kind of structured covert performative, albeit not one that directly embeds the overt utterance.

This was rejected by Fraser (1974), Gazdar (1979), Leech (1983) inter alia for a number of reasons: not all performative verbs have first-person subjects and second-person objects; there is no one-to-one mapping between utterances and types of speech act (as highlighted by Searle (1979)); it is possible to stack performatives, posing further problems for the interpretation of the subordinate clause, in particular deeply embedded subordinate clauses. It is also unclear how Ross’s hypothesis would apply to acts other than declarative acts, in particular acts in which the addressee appears to be more prominent than the speaker such as interrogatives and imperatives, and how it would extend to other languages which may have different lexical inventories or different ways of structuring speech acts.

Take languages in which the speech act is not determined by the verb, such as Navajo
Navajo has a matrix attitude verb *nisin*, which determines the attitude holder and the time relative to which the embedded clause is evaluated but not the kind of attitude that that person holds at that time. Instead, the attitude held, either an attitude of thinking or one of desiring, is determined by some element in the embedded clause. The kinds of elements which interact with *nisin* to specify its meaning include discourse markers (10a), tense markers (10b) and evidential markers (10c):

(10) a. [Mary hooghandi sidá laanaa] nisin
   Mary home.LOC 3SUBJ.be.IMPF PRT.wishful 1SUBJ.ATT.IMPF
   “I wish Mary were at home.”

   b. Mary [Kii ’atoo’ yił ’adooyi’il] nizin
      Mary Kii stew 3OBJ.3SUBJ.stew.FUT 3SUBJ.ATT.IMPF
      “Mary thinks Kii will eat stew” OR “Mary wants Kii to eat stew”

   c. Kii [nahaltin sha’shin] nizin
      Kii ArealS.rain.IMPF probably.INDIR-EVID 3SUBJ.ATT.IMPF
      “Kii thinks it is probably raining” / “Kii thinks it must be raining”

Moreover, *nisin* can be interpreted in two ways in the case of coordinated clausal complements. In (11), two separate interpretations for *nisin* are available for each conjunct even though it is only represented once.

(11) Alice [Bill Kinlánígóó ’íííná] dóó [bich’i desháál]
    Alice Bill Flagstaff.to 3SUBJ.move.PERF and 3OBJ.to 1SUBJ.go.FUT
    nizin.
    3SUBJ.ATT.IMPF
    “Alice thinks Bill moved to Flagstaff and she wants to go see him.”
Navajo provides evidence that the type of a speech act, or at least, a reported speech act, is not necessarily determined by a higher predicate, but by elements internal to its own structure. It is also suggestive that illocutionary force, such that it pertains to the desires and knowledge of the discourse participants, is not only a pragmatic or lexical notion but may also be marked syntactically.

Lewis (1970) takes a similar approach to Ross from a philosophy of language standpoint, though he formulates Ross’s intuitions about a covert performative quite differently. Using the term “paraphrased performatives”, Lewis suggests that the utterance of a sentence can be captured by a proposition—and hence a semantic object—of the type “The speaker tells the addressee P.” He recognises that this is problematic in that it means that P would be interpreted as true whenever it is uttered by a speaker to an addressee, so to counter this, he assumes that all types of speech acts other than assertions are paraphrased performatives (i.e. speech acts without clear-cut truth values). Whilst this might initially seem undesirable, I will show that a split between assertions and other types of speech act is apparent across languages. It will also become clear that languages behave differently in terms of the types of speech acts that they can embed, so Lewis’s intuition can be upheld to some degree. It is also interesting to consider how the fact of paraphrased performatives resulting in a semantic object means that there is little to stop them from being embedded, questioned in their own right, and referred to. Once again this will be shown to hold to some degree, but, as Kriika (2014) notes, such semantic objects are more restricted in their distribution than Lewis’s account would predict.

Moving away from the problematic proposal that a covert predicate exists, the concept
of speakers and addressees as points of reference is considered less contentious and was made use of by Fillmore (1975) to examine deixis in natural language. Though he focuses on explicit markers of deixis such as demonstratives, Fillmore notes that linguistic deixis extends far beyond spatial and temporal reference points to the encoding of personal, discourse and social relations between the interlocutors, though not all of these points are necessarily marked in grammar. Fillmore espouses a “mental projectionist” approach in which the interlocutors essentially project their imaginings of situations onto sentences in order to make sense of certain (implied) linguistic features (see also Ruthrof (2015) for an extension of this view). In this way Fillmore proposes a similar, if more extended, view to that of Ross’s pragmatic proposal; mental representations of interlocutors and discourse contexts are a crucial part of making sense of utterances in context.

2.3.2 Considering quotation: Partee (1973) and others

Another route taken by linguists interested in the representation of point of view is to examine different types of quotation and their properties.

Partee (1973a,b) presents early ideas about how a sentence’s syntax and semantics can differ from other almost identical sentences just on the basis that the former is or is in part a representation of a speech act. Her (1973a) work focuses on the semantics of verbs that take clausal complements and she makes a distinction between ‘standard’ verbs of communication such as say or tell, which take propositions as objects, and ‘manner’ verbs of communication such as holler or giggle, which take sentential objects (Partee 1973a, p.327). She distinguishes between the two types of objects by noting that the meaning of sentential objects comprises not only the combined meaning of the constituent parts, but also some notion of the form the sentence as it originally appeared. She says;

Linguists have […] accepted the tenet that the meaning of a sentence should be a function of the meanings of its parts, and have, I think, tended to construe that tenet rather narrowly. […] The interpretivists have been arguing against such a view, and I think that my arguments to the effect that the object of believe is a sentence rather than a proposition tend in the same direction. This
alternative view may perhaps be represented by the tenet that the meaning of a sentence is a function of the form and the meanings of its parts. (I believe that the earlier formulation could be read in this way, but sometimes is not.)

Partee (1973a, pp.331-332; original emphasis)

Partee further develops her ideas on the importance of form in her paper on quotation (1973b); she argues that direct speech reports do not add to the meaning of the overall sentence through their own meaning, but through their surface form. However, aspects of the quotation, for example indexicals, can interact with other parts of the ‘host’ sentence, suggesting that the quote is more than simply a phonological string. Interestingly, direct speech reports (or parts thereof) can be reduced to little more than dummy speech sounds, as Rooryck (2001, p.162) and Sudo (2013, p.4) note:

10

(13) John said, “I just can’t stand it anymore, it is too much, and blah blah blah.”

(14) John-wa dare-dare-no baka-ga ki-ta to itta.
John-TOP who-who-GEN stupid-NOM came-PAST QUOTE said
‘John said, “The stupid so-and-so came.”’

Rooryck (2001) suggests that (13) is an example of a direct speech report wherein the speaker is not particularly interested in (re)conveying the exact propositional content of John’s speech but focuses on what Rooryck calls “John’s longwindedness”. Similarly, in (14) Sudo notes that wh-doublets such as dare-dare (‘who-who’) are only permitted in direct speech reports and one of their functions is to express an attitude held by the one of the attitude holders in the sentence, much like “blah blah blah” in (13) In this case, the wh-doublet shows that “the attitude holder, John, has a depreciative attitude towards the embedded subject” (2013, p.4). Devices also exist that can be added to the host clause that reinforce faithful reproduction of the original speech in the quote, in particular pronominal ‘this’ or manner marker ‘thus’. Neither marker is compatible with indirect speech reports.

Other ways in which sentences marked as direct speech reports differ from other sen-

10Typically, sentences like John-wa Bill-no baka-ga ki-ta to itta (“John said that Bill came”) are ambiguous between interpretations as direct and indirect speech reports. However, (14) can only be interpreted as a direct speech report precisely because of the presence of dare-dare, according to Sudo (2013, p.4).
tences or clauses include the use of structures that are not part of the grammar of the quoter (15) and first-person pronouns that are coindexed with third-person DPs (compare (16a) and (16b))

(15) Charles said, “I can speak English better than youse all can,” proving that he could not. Partee (1973b p.416)

(16) a. [NP₁ The man who is talking to you] commands you: “Give mei/*him₁ some money!”

b. [NP₁ The man who is talking to you] commands you to give him₁/*me₁ some money. Baker (2008 p.127)

Direct speech reports also exhibit an opacity to extraction and semantic binding that is not found in indirect speech reports (cf. Quine (1960), Fodor (1970), Partee (1973b), Schlenker (1999) and Oshima (2006), inter alia), as illustrated in (17)-(21) adapted from Sudo (2013, pp.1-2).

(17) Long-distance wh-movement

a. *What₁ did Dave say “Mary should have read tᵢ?”

b. What₁ did Dave say that Mary should have tᵢ?

(18) Long-distance NPI licensing

a. *John did not say “Bill ever committed a crime.”

b. John did not say that Bill ever committed a crime.

(19) Long-distance semantic binding

a. *John told nobody’s₁ mother “Mary likes him₁.”

b. John told nobody’s₁ mother that Mary likes him₁

(20) De re readings

a. #John told me “The man drinking a martini is a beautiful woman.”

b. John told me that the man drinking a martini is a beautiful woman.
Dependent plurals

a. #The first-years’ tutors all said “They are the smartest student.”

b. The first-years’ tutors all said that they are the smartest student.

Based on these facts, it is clear that direct speech reports stand in an interesting position with regards to their host clause: they are opaque to most syntactic and semantic operations, yet the quotation or parts thereof can serve as antecedents for pronouns in the host clause; they need not be faithful reproductions of the propositional content of the original utterances but may be forced to be so by elements in the host clause; it is expected that the form of the quotation is a (more-or-less) faithful re-presentation of the original utterance in terms of indexicality and voice, though quotations alone license dummy speech elements such as “blah blah” and wh-doublets of the kind found in Japanese. While direct speech reports are root-like, they still differ from true root sentences in terms of being defined as both uttered by the original and by a reporting speaker. Moreover, the precise nature of the syntactic relationship between speech reports and host clauses remains unclear. Finally, as Partee (1973a) shows, it is not a clear distinction between direct speech reports on the one hand and indirect speech reports on the other; there is variation in both, suggesting that indirect speech reports are not limited to propositional content out of hand, and that there may be a role played by different types of matrix predicate in determining the extent to which the original speaker’s expression and the form of the original speech may be represented without resorting to direct speech reports and the restrictions they entail. However, Partee does not discuss the structural implications of her proposals, despite appearing to imply that indirect speech reports that express something of the form of the original are in some way structurally larger (Partee 1973a, p.335).

2.3.3 Returning to Ross? Banfield (1982) and Giorgi (2010)

The question of the structure of reported speech, in particular the idea that sentences are actually dominated by some projection relating to the point of view (PoV) expressed, re-emerges in the work of Banfield (1982). Banfield claims that there is a projection above the sentence that she labels the E(xpressive) projection, and that this projection permits the
adjunction of exclamations, topicalisation and PP imperatives such as off with her head. She claims that the E projection is exclusively available in root and direct speech contexts as it reproduces expression rather than just propositional content (Banfield 1982, p.41). The E projection is also responsible for the assignment of first-person PoV and temporal deixis, hence indirect speech reports that have no E cannot introduce speaker-oriented elements and any indexicals contained within the report must be evaluated with respect to the PoV of the E projection rather than the matrix clause arguments (Banfield 1982, pp.56-57).

Banfield also examines the literary phenomenon of Free Indirect Discourse (FID) in which the speaker is absent, so the E-layer must orient to the self, i.e. the internal PoV of the character narrating the story. Banfield notes that while FID is similar to direct speech in that the speaker of the utterance is not the PoV of the E in FID, there are many similarities between FID and indirect speech, particularly in terms of the kinds of elements and grammatical markers that are blocked in both FID and indirect speech. For example, she argues that in (22a), the illocutionary adverb honestly is not readily interpretable with a third-person PoV despite the literary character superseding the writer. In contrast, the epistemic adverb in (22b) is interpretable with a third-person (literary character) PoV (examples from Banfield 1982, p.117):

(22) a. Honestly, she was so pleased to see him - delighted!
    b. Certainly, she was so pleased to see him - delighted!

This contrast between first- and third-person selves is related to Banfield’s conceptualisation of direct and indirect quotation. To use direct quotation, she says, “is to ‘donner la parole’ to the original speaker”, hence the first person is used. Indirect speech, however, represents only the content of the speech and not the way in which it has been delivered (Banfield 1982, p.62). Like FID, indirect speech is expressed in the third person. FID also lacks imperatives (Banfield attributes this to the lack of an underlying ‘you’ or addressee), and forms of direct address such as vocatives (Banfield 1982, pp.113-114). FID differs from indirect speech in that the first-person is completely absent as it is incompatible with a
third-person ‘self’ of the kind represented in the E projection of FID.

I will show in this dissertation that Banfield’s insights, while both useful and pioneering with respect to understanding FID, are not quite precise enough. Firstly, there’s an element of stipulation about the proposal because it is not clear why the E projection cannot be embedded other than because embedded clauses differ from root clauses. Secondly, Giorgi (2010) highlights that the matrix subject’s perspective is not only syntactically represented but interacts with the speaker’s perspective, and I will show that there are constructions that are clearly embedded yet still permit direct speech-like elements such as speech act adverbs, topicalisation and imperatives. A range of data in chapters 3, 4 and 5 show that the divorce between ‘speaker’ and ‘self’ applies to more contexts than just FID (cf. also Broadwell 1991).

A much later assessment of FID was made by Giorgi (2010), who, like Banfield, analyses the mode as a divorce between the speaker and the self or PoV being communicated. Giorgi demonstrates that the the temporal coordinates of the speaker are contained on C, the leftmost projection in the sentence, allowing a bidirectional relationship to hold between syntax and pragmatics. The availability of both speaker and subject perspectives allow for double access readings of sentences such as (23):

(23) John said that Mary is pregnant.

\[= \text{Mary is pregnant at the time John spoke}\]
\[= \text{Mary is pregnant at the time of this utterance}\]

Double access readings are not allowed in all languages—Chinese, Japanese and Russian do not have double access readings—but only in those languages in which, Giorgi claims, the speaker’s temporal coordinates are present in the syntax. This allows the present tense event to be evaluated twice: according to the coordinates of the matrix subject and those of the speaker.

Furthermore, even though past tense morphology in the matrix clause marks information about the speaker’s location in time, it can be used to represent a future event relative to the speaker when in the embedded clause, given the coordinates of the matrix clause:
Even though the event of Mario being here is a future event for the utterer of (24), the past tense is used to express the event because it is in the past relative to the matrix subject Maria, the temporal coordinate on T being determined by the matrix subject. Following Giorgi & Pianesi (2001, 2004), she claims that speaker and subject must share responsibility for the content expressed in an embedded clause, hence grammars cannot permit purely indexical (i.e. speaker-oriented) temporal reference in embedded contexts. However, in languages in which double access readings are available, such as English and Italian, the speaker’s coordinate can be reset to the subject’s temporal location, in order to achieve the availability of past tense morphology in sentences like (24) even though the utterance event precedes the embedded event: the event is still evaluated twice but only with respect to the matrix subject. Subsequently, (23) can also be read with respect to the matrix subject alone, as a reading is available in which Mary is not pregnant at the time of the utterance, but was when John spoke. Giorgi does not propose a definitive explanation for how the speaker coordinate is reset, but suggests that there is some kind of link to counterfactuality, given that temporal coordinates are reset in cases in which the event in the embedded clause has not yet happened or no longer holds.

With respect to FID, Giorgi also proposes a shift from speaker coordinates to subject coordinates, but of a slightly different kind; instead of equating the speaker’s position with the subject’s, in FID the subject is promoted to speaker. This does not affect the indexicality of the pronouns in FID; in fact, third-person pronouns here signal the divorce between the speaker and the PoV being communicated. Giorgi notes that all first-person pronouns identify speakers, but the reverse does not necessarily hold (Giorgi 2010, p.190). She further claims that “it looks like they [third-person pronouns in FID, RW] cease to be real indexicals, in that the context that is relevant for their interpretation is not provided by the actual utterance event, but by the literary created context” (Giorgi 2010, p.191, original emphasis). Moreover, the necessary use of past tense in FID highlights dependencies between the availability of the speaker’s coordinates and certain morphosyntactic features
such as present tense marking. Giorgi follows Banfield in proposing that FID clauses are not embedded under a matrix clause oriented to the speaker, but that they are subordinate to an “informational layer” that triggers a shift from speaker to subject PoV (Giorgi 2010, p.210). Once more the mechanism of this is left unexplained.

To summarise, Giorgi claims that the speaker is abstractly represented as a bundle of features on C, of which she focuses on the temporal feature. This feature (or its absence) conditions the kinds of tense morphology and temporal indexicals that may appear in embedded clauses and the kinds of interpretation a given sentence can have. Moreover, this feature can be shifted in certain contexts, which has the effect of limiting the availability of certain types of morphological marking. Hence, variability in intrasentential syntax is evidence that a syntactic representation of the speaker is present.

Finally, a similar kind of proposal that addresses not temporal but relational deixis in the CP is that of Tsoulas & Kural (1999). Tsoulas and Kural, motivated by the observation that the reference of indexicals shifts according to the utterance context, propose that indexical pronouns are bound variables. Not all indexicals shift; Tsoulas and Kural identify ‘I’, ‘you’ and temporal expressions such as ‘now’ or ‘today’ as examples of indexicals that shift, in contrast with third-person pronouns and deictic expressions such as ‘that day’, whose reference does not change. They propose that the reference of shifting indexicals is established through an operator-variable relationship between (for example) covert speaker and addressee operators and first- and second-person pronouns as variables. They show that high adverbs take scope over variables to give a generic reading, which shows that indexicals do not refer directly in the same way that names do. Furthermore, the presence of covert speakers and addressees can account for PoV phenomena on relational nouns; for example in the sentence “Sue saw Mom at the airport”, ‘Mom’ can only refer to the mother of the speaker (and possibly addressee, if speaker and addressee are siblings), but it cannot refer to Sue’s mother (Tsoulas & Kural 1999, p.555). It must therefore be bound by a representation of the speaker (and addressee), such as the operators proposed by Tsoulas and Kural.

Tsoulas and Kural note that these operators will be syntactically represented above matrix CP, though they are not explicit about where or how they fit into the structure.
They also do not state whether the operators are always present or whether they only occur in certain types of sentences.

### 2.3.4 Speech acts in syntax: the revival

Although scholars like Banfield and Giorgi propose some abstract representation of speakers in the syntax, Ross’s (1970) ideas re-entered mainstream linguistic thinking through the work of Speas & Tenny (2003). Speas and Tenny envisage a syntactic representation of speaker and addressee operators motivated by a desire to bring together the intuition that discourse participants are required in the syntax with established restrictions on the role of pragmatic forces within grammar. The syntactic representations of the participants and the utterance are related via a speech act head, which is a kind of three-place predicate. As justification for a hierarchically-organised representation of discourse participants they present indexical-shift phenomena in languages such as Slavé (Athabaskan) and overt representations of speakers and addressees such as the overt addressee pronoun in Mupun (West Chadic, Frajzyngier (1985)). Although they refute Ross’s idea that certain speech acts are tied to certain clause types on the basis that illocutionary force and clause type are not in a one-to-one relationship, they propose that speakers and addressees stand in a different hierarchical relationship to each other in interrogative as opposed to declarative sentences.

The structure they propose to introduce speaker and addressee into syntax makes use of Cinque’s (1999) MoodSpeechAct projection. This projection is supposed to be overt in any language that contains overt clause typing such as interrogative morphemes and sentence particles (Speas & Tenny 2003, p.317). They propose that the head of MoodSpeechActP selects for three arguments, namely the speaker as external argument, with the addressee and utterance context as objects in an extended Speech Act shell structure. They state that the roles associated with these objects are not primitive, but are defined by their structural position. The structure for a declarative clause is illustrated in (25) with the structure for an interrogative clause in (26).

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Note that, according to Speas & Tenny, the CP is introduced lower in the structure, beneath EvaluativeP and EvidentialP.
According to (26) in the interrogative clause, the hearer is moved to a higher position in the tree analogous to dative movement of the indirect object in double-object ditransitives. The result of these differing structures is that the hearer is more prominent than the speaker in interrogatives. Their motivation for this is that the addressee must be the nearest argument to the rest of the clause in order to bind elements that orient to the discourse participants, which “flip” in interrogatives. An example of interrogative flip is the case of adverbs that orient to the speaker in declarative sentences but to the addressee in questions:
This proposal, whilst sparking a large body of recent literature, has also been subject to considerable criticism. Gärtn er & Steinbach (2006) examine the proposal from the point of view both of minimalist assumptions and older work on speech act theory. They note the following points (amongst others):

(28) a. Simpler, non-shell structures are discarded early on without discussion and reasons for this are not clear;

b. It is not clear what motivates the dative-like movement necessary to derive the interrogative from the declarative structure;

c. Speech act theory has not converged on a satisfactory classification of speech acts: is the postulation of an SA head therefore enough to explain the variation between different types of speech act?

d. The concepts of speaker, hearer and message are conceptual necessities for communication anyway: why should they lie within narrow syntax?

e. Possible conceptual problems if the SA head is required to be responsible both for feature checking (expression of illocutionary force) and separate licensing of overt morphology (on evidentials, pronouns or other items). This is uncommon in contemporary syntactic theory;

f. Furthermore, the HEARER argument does not c-command the UTTERANCE CONTEXT in declaratives, meaning that it cannot bind any variables contained within the UTTERANCE CONTEXT, suggesting that second-person pronouns will be uninterpretable in declaratives.

Further to this, if this conceptualisation of speech act participants as a three-place predicate is to hold, we might expect that the HEARER will be the goal, and so the higher of the two objects in the structure, with the UTTERANCE CONTEXT as the theme (cf. Bruening (2010)), but this is only the case in the interrogative structure and not in the declarative structure.
In short the criticisms against Speas and Tenny’s ideas focus on the complexity of the structure and the motivation for promotion of items within it, as well as questions over how it actually interacts with the main clause below it. However, Speas and Tenny’s work highlights data that suggests that some contextual factors do have syntactic reflexes, and as such should be accounted for in narrow syntax. Furthermore, they were the first to constrain possible classifications of speech act types in syntax according to configurational factors, and extended Ross’s work away from simple declarative performative sentences.

Since 2003, there has been a persistent body of work focusing on illocutionary force that has built on the advances made by Speas and Tenny. This work has concentrated on simplifying the structure in accordance with the rules and restrictions present in narrow syntax, as well as looking to identify overt realisations of the proposed SA head. Unsurprisingly, the efforts of different scholars and their differing priorities have resulted in a proliferation of similar but subtly diverging structures and claims about the potential power of the SA structure. These newer conceptualisations are discussed in two groups below: firstly, those conceptualisations that look to determine the identity of the speech act head(s), and secondly, those that develop the details of interaction between the speech act phrase and the clause.

2.3.4.1 Discourse particles as speech act heads

The most fruitful lines of enquiry with regards to the identity of the speech act head have involved analyses of discourse particles in a range of Indo-European languages.

Hill (2007) examines the behaviour of sentence-initial particles in Romanian such as hai (‘come on’). Rejecting the traditional analyses of such particles as interjections separate from the clausal spine, Hill shows that hai has a much more restricted distribution, that it only seems to be available in certain clause types and that it interacts structurally with exclamative and vocative DPs. It also inflects, suggesting that it is in some respect a verbal element with the ability to select arguments, but it does not match the criteria necessary for classification as a lexical or an auxiliary verb. Consequently, Hill proposes that such particles that interact with certain clause types are the head of the SA projection, which projects a shell-like structure to accommodate all three arguments (sp**eaker**, **h**earer and
then the utterance in ForceP). The structure she proposes is as follows:

(29)

```
SAP
  /\  
RoleP  SA'
     /\  
  speaker  SA
  \   /
   hai
```

The reader will note that it is minimally different from the structure proposed by Speas & Tenny (2003): the utterance context of Speas and Tenny has been jettisoned for direct selection of the utterance by the speech act head and there is no movement of the arguments, though there is upwards movement of SA analogous to V-v movement in the verbal complex. Hill also elaborates upon the syntactic identity of the arguments, proposing that they occupy some DP-like RoleP.

Haegeman (2014) takes a similar route in her work on discourse particles in West Flemish. She also examines their distribution with respect to vocatives and their positioning within the sentence, as she works with both sentence-initial and sentence-final particles. Her analysis differs from Hill’s in that she proposes that multiple SAPs are possible. This permits the inclusion of particles with different interpretations within the tree. She suggests that the higher SAP establishes discourse relations between speaker and addressee, whereas the lower SAP “consolidates” and reaffirms pre-existing speaker-addressee relations (Haegeman 2014, p.135). Furthermore, she suggests that representation of the speaker is not automatically given, in particular in the cases in which standardly clause-initial discourse particles appear in final position. Haegeman suggests that these particles are in some sense unaccusative, that they do not allow an external argument and hence
the utterance itself is promoted into the (empty) specifier of the highest SAP. Haegeman’s structure therefore differs from Hill’s as shown in (30).

(30)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PartP} \\
\text{Spec} & \quad \text{Part'} \\
\text{Part} & \quad \text{PartP} \\
\text{né} & \quad \text{VocDP} & \quad \text{Part'} \\
\text{Part} & \quad \text{CP} \\
\text{né} &
\end{align*}
\]

Haegeman and Hill both focus on verb-based particles that are distributed in a restricted manner, both with regards to the main clause and with regards to other peripheral material that identifies the addressee, namely vocative DPs. It is not clear, however, that Haegeman’s (2014) work sheds much light on interactions between discourse particles and syntax of the main clause rather than just representing relationships between discourse participants that are ostensibly interpretable based on context alone. As this dissertation will show, however, there are more directly grammar and clause-related phenomena that can shed more light on the nature of the relationship between a proposed speech act head and the interpretation of the main clause itself.

A similar proposal has also been developed by Martina Wiltschko and colleagues in a series of works (Lam 2014, Wiltschko et al. 2015, Wiltschko 2015, to appear). Wiltschko and colleagues claim that there are three separate projections in a speech act layer that is the interface between the syntax of an individual utterance and the discourse. Their primary motivation, like Haegeman (2014) is to distinguish between different meanings of homophonous particles and to determine ordering restrictions between particles. They conclude that the three projections in the speech act phrase above ForceP are as follows:
The Call on Addressee layer is the topmost layer and particles merged here express a request for a response from the addressee. This is a point of divergence from Haegeman’s work on West Flemish that Wiltschko and colleagues support using the early stages of experimental evidence from Canadian English (Wiltschko et al. 2015). The next layer, the Ground, is split into two. The Addressee layer is the point of merge for particles that express something about the Addressee’s state of knowledge with respect to the clause. The Speaker layer is closer to the clause and expresses something about the Speaker’s state of knowledge with respect to the clause. The ordering of Addressee and Speaker here is different from the approach taken by Haegeman & Hill (2013) and derives both from the ordering of particles (cf. Lam (2014) for Cantonese) and the intuition that the speaker is somehow closer to the utterance she makes than the addressee (M. Wiltschko, p.c.). Note also that, unlike in Speas & Tenny (2003), Haegeman & Hill (2013) and related works, Wiltschko and colleagues do not suggest that the discourse participants are represented as referential DPs in the structure, but are represented at a rather more abstract level in terms of their belief sets. They also build on earlier work by examining which parts of the articulated speech act layer might be available in embedded contexts; given the unavailability of Call on Addressee particles in embedded clauses—they obligatorily scope over the matrix clause—it is thought that this layer is unembeddable (S. Thoma, p.c.). Other scholars such as Zu (2013) have explicitly linked the lack of allocutive agreement in embedded clauses in Basque and Jingpo to the lack of specific speaker and addressee projections in embedded clauses; claiming that the full SAP itself is a root phenomenon.
Yet others, like Miyagawa (2012), attribute the availability of SAP in embedded clauses to selection phenomena; in Japanese, nonfactive verbs that embed the nonfactive complementiser *to* and express a genuine speech act (as opposed to a mental state) select for SAPs rather than ‘plain’ CPs.

Although arguments for SAP based on discourse particles show the importance of representing PoV in language and the recent experiment-based claims by Wiltschko and colleagues show ever more refined conceptualisations of the function of discourse particles, it is still unclear to what extent this kind of evidence sheds light on the relationship between putative representations of discourse participants and core syntax. While all these authors argue convincingly that discourse particles are part of everyday natural speech, they are so heavily dependent on context that they do not clearly illustrate the nature of the representation of speakers and addressees, nor how these representations vary or stay stable crosslinguistically.

### 2.3.4.2 Speech act projections: part of the clause

With regards to the extent to which the syntactic representations of speaker and hearer impact on syntactic phenomena in the main clause, opinion varies across scholars and across languages. Miyagawa (2012) follows closely in Speas and Tenny’s footsteps by proposing a syntactic relation between the representation of the hearer and nominal agreement. He examines allocutive agreement in Basque and honorific agreement in Japanese and claims that the syntactically represented *addressee* is the antecedent for this agreement. To do this he adopts Hill’s (2007) SAP structure in which both the speaker and the hearer c-command the utterance, and proposes that the allocutive probe on C (as already determined by Oyharçabal (1993)) moves up through the speech act heads to c-command its goal, the hearer. Moreover, by c-commanding everything in the structure other than the speaker, Miyagawa claims that the allocutive probe (which determines the verbal morphology) also has access to the correct information about the relationship between the speaker and hearer with respect to politeness, though it is not explained exactly how this is so. Miyagawa goes on to draw parallels between Basque allocutive agreement and Japanese politeness.
agreement in order to show that the SAP as he conceives of it can in principle be embedded. However, it can only be embedded in very restricted situations, specifically only under Hooper and Thompson’s (1973) Class A verbs, which includes verbs such as *say* and *tell*. Miyagawa notes that typical analyses of “root” phenomena such as topic-marking claim that they are also available under Class B verbs such as *think* and *suppose* and under Class E semifactive verbs such as *realise*, but that his analysis shows a split between true root phenomena (such as politeness marking) and phenomena that are merely restricted in embedded contexts (such as topic-marking). Whilst the details of Miyagawa’s analysis may be up for debate, and the mechanisms not entirely clear, his observation that analyses of root phenomena have depended on somewhat circular logic is an important one that will be further examined in this dissertation.

Leaving root phenomena behind, Sundaresan (2012) focuses on truly intrasentential interpretive phenomena, specifically the orientation of the anaphor *taan* in Tamil. *Taan* can be analysed either as referring to the subject of a main clause or to the subject of a directly superordinate clause that contains a speech verb selecting the *taan* clause. An example is shown in (32).

(32)  
\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{Seetha}_1 [CP \text{Maya}_1 [CP \text{taan}_{i,j} \text{ki} \text{ambiraa[ünû]}]} \\
\text{Seetha.NOM Maya.NOM self.NOM leave.PRES.3-FEM-SG.COMP} \\
\text{sonmaa[ünû]} \text{nenettaal,} \\
\text{say.PST.3-FEM-SG.COMP think.PST.3-FEM-SG} \\
\text{“Seetha}_1 \text{ thought that Maya}_1 \text{ said that she}_i,j \text{ was leaving.”}
\end{array}
\]

Sundaresan specifically examines the nature of the arguments projected in SAP. She proposes that SAP selects only for two arguments; one representing the point of view (PoV) in SpecSAP and the other being the utterance. She proposes that the PoV argument is a deficient DP denoting a variable that has no \(\phi\) features. As such this argument in SpecSAP cannot interact directly with the anaphor *taan* itself, but interacts with a Persp(ective)P above *taan* that contains a pronoun responsible for binding *taan*. Without entering into the specifics of Sundaresan’s analysis with regards to PerspP, she argues that only the discourse participant who provides the PoV for the utterance should be syntactically rep-
resented. She does not explore the availability of SAP or its structure in any other types of clause. It appears that the greatly impoverished nature of the external argument of SAP proposed by Sundaresan exists in order to avoid the problem of why this argument is not overtly spelled out and why it does not interfere with the determination of phi-features on indexical pronouns in the clause SAP c-commands. However, this leaves questions over how the argument in SpecSAP is coreferenced with any other argument; moreover, independent motivation for the PerspP structure above the anaphor is unclear.

2.4 Root phenomena and illocutionary force

Another aspect of the discussion about discourse participants and their role in syntax revolves around the expression of speakers' emotions and discourse aims. This relates to the earlier discussion about quotation insofar as the presence of expressive material seems to be blocked from embedded clauses and as such is only oriented to an entity other than the speaker when found in a quoted clause. However, there exists a long tradition of scholarship into the status of embedded root clauses that seems to feature expressive elements in embedded contexts, which leads to the ever tricky question of the nature of illocutionary force.

2.4.1 Hooper and Thompson (1973)

Building on Emonds’s (1969) work on root transformations, Hooper & Thompson (1973) show that a range of syntactic structures claimed to be unavailable in embedded contexts were in fact possible, but their distribution was restricted. These structures include negative preposing, VP preposing, locative inversion, topicalisation, adverb dislocation and tag questions amongst many others. Hooper and Thompson noted that these structures with restricted distribution are characteristic of a certain kind of sentential force or emphasis more generally, subsequently proposing that the restrictions on the syntactic structures listed above are determined by a semantic notion of assertion. This is because the discourse effects associated with these syntactic structures, for example emphasis, are incompatible with clauses that are not asserted such as as presupposed, imperative or interrogative
clauses.

Hooper and Thompson define assertion as follows:

The assertion of a sentence is its core meaning or main proposition. [...] The assertion of a sentence may be identified as that part which can be negated or questions by the usual application of the processes of negation and interrogation. It is usually assumed that all assertions are speaker assertions [...], however, [...] some embedded statements have the characteristics of assertions.

Hooper & Thompson (1973, p.473)

The original formulation of assertion by Hooper and Thompson, therefore, does not mention illocutionary force, although the term was already in use in philosophy. They link assertion to declarative clause types and appear to set assertion against questions, conditionals and exlamations in their conclusion, though they do not explicitly rule out the possibility of assertion in other types of clause.

The next stage of their work consists of dividing verbs that take that-clauses as complements into five classes. These classes are defined as follows, with a few examples in each category for illustrative purposes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A (nonfactive)</th>
<th>B (nonfactive)</th>
<th>C (nonfactive)</th>
<th>D (factive)</th>
<th>E ((semi)factive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>say</td>
<td>suppose</td>
<td>be (un)likely</td>
<td>resent</td>
<td>realise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>report</td>
<td>believe</td>
<td>doubt</td>
<td>regret</td>
<td>find out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exclaim</td>
<td>think</td>
<td>deny</td>
<td>be sorry</td>
<td>discover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>claim</td>
<td>imagine</td>
<td>be (im)possible</td>
<td>be surprised</td>
<td>know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4: Hooper and Thompson’s (1973) classes of verbs

Hooper and Thompson show that there are syntactic and semantic correlations between the types of verbs that allow Emonds’s root transformations, the notion of assertion, and verbs that are compatible with complement preposing. In brief, verbs from classes A, B and E permit (most) root syntactic structures[^12] and the presence of two readings (asserted and non-asserted) in the case of the semifactives in class E.

[^12]: Some variation is present. For example, tag questions depend on whether the verbs themselves constitute an assertion—Hooper and Thompson claim that class A verbs do, blocking tag questions, but class B verbs do not.
Hooper and Thompson are careful to show that presupposition and assertion do not form a binary distinction; a non-presupposed clause is not automatically asserted. Their entire piece is careful in its consideration of each root phenomenon across the five classes of verbs and they are perhaps not guilty of the mistake made by many scholars following in their footsteps of treating the concept of “embedded root phenomena” as a homogeneous group of structures. However, some of their argumentation is circular as noted by Green (1976); assertion is defined in some cases as the availability of a given root phenomenon when the former is supposed to predict the latter. Moreover, their work leaves a lot of questions open: what is the nature of assertion, particularly in respect to clause type and illocutionary force? Is factivity the most useful notion to use to distinguish between the five verb classes, or indeed any linguistic behaviour? And is assertion (and hence root phenomena) always and solely speaker-related?

2.4.2 Splitting hairs? Split CP hypotheses and splitting Force from Type

The body of work on embedded verb second (EV2) in the Germanic languages has proved a particularly productive field of enquiry that has both raised and tried to answer the kinds of questions listed above. I will not go into great detail about this background on this here, as the list of references is long, there already exist comprehensive reviews of the literature (in particular Heycock (2006)) and the construction will be more closely examined in this dissertation. A dedicated effort was made in the 1990s to reduce EV2 to a syntactic phenomenon as no single semantic concept seemed to accurately predict its distribution (Vikner 1995), resulting in a variety of scholars proposing split CP structures to account for both Germanic EV2 (cf. Iatridou & Kroch (1992), inter alia) and cases of embedded subject-auxiliary inversion (McCloskey 2006). However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that EV2 and similar phenomena cannot be reduced to a matter of syntactic selection. The exact conditions governing EV2 patterns remain elusive and many approaches rely on concepts such as assertion, presupposition and factivity, as in works by Wechsler (1991), Holmberg & Platzack (1995), Julien (2009, 2015) to name just a few. These kinds of accounts are under pressure given work by Wiklund et al. (2009), Wiklund (2010) and Heycock et al. (2012) that shows that semifactive predicates are not as resistant to EV2 as
was initially proposed. However, with the advent of a refocusing of scholarship on clause types towards the question of illocutionary force, a new approach (with its own new problems) is emerging to try to make sense of concepts like assertion in an independent, principled way that takes into account both syntactic and semantic concerns.

Green (1976) foresaw this line of scholarship when, in answer to Hooper and Thompson’s work, she noted that some root transformations were available under performative verbs such as bet, promise and predict. This observation weakened the argument that assertion as defined by Hooper and Thompson was the key predictor of the distribution of root phenomena. Green proposed a pragmatic explanation for root phenomena according to which they are licensed “just in case the proposition they affect, and therefore emphasize, is one which the speaker supports” (Green 1976, p.386) amongst other factors. In work by Han (1998) and a number of scholars based in Georgetown (Zanuttini & Portner 2003, Portner 2004, Pak et al. 2004, Zanuttini 2008) the question of what it means for a clause to have a certain type of force is raised. Han and many later scholars, based on Chomsky (1995), believe that force is syntactically encoded where the Georgetown researchers believe force to be the cumulative result of a number of syntactic and semantic features being present, but despite taking different stances on the problem, all these scholars bring the concept of speaker and addressee commitments and discourse effects familiar from Searle (1969, 1979) into play. In particular Portner’s (2004) characterisation of clause types as marking different basic sentential forces shows how semantic and philosophical ideas combine to relate to the syntactic concept of clause type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Denotation</th>
<th>Discourse Component</th>
<th>Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declaratives</td>
<td>proposition (p)</td>
<td>Common Ground Set of propositions</td>
<td>Assertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CG ∪ p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogatives</td>
<td>set of propositions (q)</td>
<td>Question Set Set of sets of propositions</td>
<td>Asking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>QS ∪ q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperatives</td>
<td>property (P)</td>
<td>To-do List Function from individuals to sets of properties</td>
<td>Requiring_A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TdL(A) ∪ P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5: Clause types and basic force (Portner 2004, p.238)
One strong argument for the Georgetown point of view and potentially against a syntactic representation of force in C is the fact that embedded clauses seem to lose their force. At this point we see a distinction between clause type and force, because clauses are still obviously typed despite being embedded. Han (1998) argues that force is a syntactic phenomenon and a root phenomenon, hence certain clause types that are more closely tied to illocutionary force cannot be embedded even if their meaning of demanding or commanding can be expressed in other ways. Han’s particular clause type of interest is imperatives, whose meaning can also be expressed through the embedding of subjunctives or finite clauses containing deontic modality. In suggesting that certain types of embedded clause are not specified for illocutionary force, Han claims that forceless root clauses are also possible, though she does not mention specifically what forceless root clauses would look like, nor the implications of this apparent optionality of force on the encoding of force and clause type in grammar. Other syntactic accounts for the lack of force in embedded clauses centre on the idea of ‘weak’ features on C, though again the details of the nature of such features is usually left vague.

Those who argue for a syntactic encoding of force recognise the need to explain the close relationship between force and clause type, resulting in analyses such as that by Coniglio & Zegrean (2012). With the aim of accounting for the distribution of discourse particles in German, Italian and Romanian, which encode a specific type of force while combining with a restricted range of clause types, Coniglio & Zegrean (2012) follow Roussou (2000, p.79), who advocates three C projections, and Haegeman (2006) by arguing that the C head should be split into separate force and clause type heads. Although the discourse particles they examine can be left out without affecting the grammaticality of the utterance, they show clear interaction with clause typing and tense, even carrying person marking in Romanian. They envisage the splitting of duties between the two heads as follows: while the clause type head interacts with finiteness, the illocutionary force head encodes the speaker’s intentions with respect to the discourse.

While Coniglio and Zegrean’s ideas seem a neat way of accounting for the distribution of discourse particles that cross-cut distinctions between clause types, some problems remain. In particular the circularity of the argument that illocutionary force markers are only
available in clauses with illocutionary force is repeated, without making it any clear what it means for a clause to have illocutionary force, or indeed how it is marked other than on this (covert) head.

And so we arrive at a similar state of affairs as that arrived at in the previous subsection: what it means for a clause to have force is an open question, definitions of root phenomena are difficult to separate from their own behaviour, and our understanding of how all of this links to discourse concepts is in constant flux.

2.4.3 Taking responsibility: Krifka (2014)

With the aim of clarifying the first two of the above points, Krifka (2014) takes a semantic approach to the meaning of illocutionary force. Building on work by Szabolcsi (1982) in which she proposes that illocutionary acts trigger a change in the world in which they are performed, Krifka proposes that illocutionary force centres on responsibility: specifically, that the illocutionary force of an assertion is the fact that the speaker is seen to take responsibility for the truth of the proposition in that assertion. The fact of the speaker’s taking responsibility for the truth of the predicate is not something which is evaluable at a given time in a given world, but is instead a change in the world both alongside and independently of the addition of the proposition to the common ground shared by the discourse participants. Crucially, Krifka makes the same kind of distinction as Austin between the intentions of the speaker and the effect of the hearer. Krifka shows that while the speaker must take responsibility for an assertion, speaker’s belief of the proposition is not key (hence we have lies and bullshit) and the acceptance of that assertion by the

\[\text{13} \] This change in the world could be conceived of as a change in a Stalnakerian common ground, though Krifka does not explicitly say this.

\[\text{14} \] Note that I will follow Clark & Schaefer (1989), Clark (1992), Ginzburg (1996) and Farkas & Bruce (2010) throughout this dissertation in assuming that an expressed proposition is not automatically added to the common ground, but will only be added if the addressee accepts it.

This way of thinking, according to which an assertion is not an addition to but a proposal to update the common ground, was not explicitly part of Stalnaker’s conceptualisation of the common ground, but has been made explicit and discussed by the aforementioned scholars since. However, the addition of the speaker’s taking responsibility for the proposition to the common ground is non-negotiable. This is a refinement of the suggestion Stalnaker made that the proposition “speaker said p” is added to the common ground whenever a proposition p is made. More than just the event of saying p is registered, namely the responsibility that the speaker takes for p in the course of the event of saying p.

\[\text{15} \] Krifka also shows that speaker belief and evidence are not really an essential part of making an assertion, due to the fact that lies (false assertions) and bullshit (assertions based on little to no evidence) are still assertions (Krifka 2014, p.65).
addressee is not a necessary part of making a successful assertion.\(^{16}\)

\(^{16}\)Farkas & Bruce (2010, pp.85-86) also deal with this divorce between assertion and addressee acceptance by proposing that the common ground is not the only set of propositions on which a conversation may be built, but that each of the discourse interlocutors also has a personal set of propositions to which they are publicly committed in the discourse. In this way, “agreement to disagree” can be modelled without affecting the coherency of the common ground.

(33) Believe it or not, I never cheated on you. \(^{\text{Krifka (2014, p.65)}}\)

Having proposed that assertive illocutionary force is the speaker taking responsibility for the proposition that she utters and that illocutionary acts effect a change in the world by marking this momentaneous taking-on of responsibility, Krifka notes that this characterisation of illocutionary force explains why illocutionary acts are rarely found to be embedded. Sharing reliable information and taking responsibility for that information could be said to be the principal aim of communication, hence these aims are not “typically fed back into the [linguistic] rules to form even more complex expressions” \(^{\text{Krifka (2014, p.76)}}\).

In modelling the semantics of illocutionary acts, Krifka introduces an assertion operator ASSERT which he describes as taking “an index \(i\), an addressee variable \(y\), a proposition \(p\) and a speaker variable \(x\), and yields the value \(\text{True}\) iff at \(i\), \(x\) is liable for the truth of the proposition \(p\) to the addressee \(y\)” \(^{\text{Krifka (2014, p.68)}}\). In this way ASSERT is predicate-like in the same way as Speas and Tenny’s (2003) SA head in that it takes three arguments. It differs from the SA head in that, as Krifka further specifies, ASSERT is a state predicate which “denotes the state of being liable for the truth of a proposition.” In making this specification by introducing the index \(i\) to the definition of ASSERT, along with an index-changing operation, Krifka makes a crucial distinction. This distinction is between the enactment of (another) speech act, which is an event lasting for the duration of the utterance, and an index change, meaning a momentaneous update of responsibility; a change of state of the speaker from holding no responsibility for the proposition to being responsible for the proposition. This distinction refines Speas and Tenny’s (2003) ideas, which are compatible with the suggestion that an embedded SAP introduces a whole new speech act with all that that entails of the speaker and addressee into the current discourse, and reduces the effect of an embedded illocutionary act down to an update in not-at-issue
content, namely who takes responsibility for the embedded clause. This refinement will be adopted in the analysis to follow and will be shown to be crucial in capturing the effects and contributions of an embedded illocutionary act to the discourse in which it appears.

2.5 Conclusion

From discussions of performative verbs via Ross’s performative hypothesis to discussions of embedded root phenomena, illocutionary force and the encoding of speaker-hearer relations in syntax are rich areas of philosophical and linguistic interest in which many questions remain.

Little is fixed in this area of enquiry; although the concept of a silent performative clause above every sentence has fallen out of favour, the complexity of proposals for what kind of structure might sit atop the clause increases as the amount of data considered grows. It is important that the data being considered clearly show an interaction between discourse participants on the one hand and narrow syntax and syntactic operations on the other. If discourse participants are silently represented in syntax then we expect to see the effects of their presence elsewhere in the clause depending on the form the silent elements take and the kind of relationships they can enter into. Otherwise, we are proposing to introduce into the derivation something silent with no effects; namely, something unacquirable. The recent focus on discourse particles that interact with other aspects of syntax, allocutive agreement, and the left periphery of embedded clauses can tell us more about where discourse participants and their attitudes may be represented than Ross’s data on reflexives because the former kind of data are consistent and constrained by well-formedness conditions in a way that the latter are not. They are also indicative of effects of discourse participants cross-linguistically, which is to be expected if they are truly syntactically represented. I am not convinced that discourse particles are the most revealing of data sets, though they have shown themselves to be useful by starting a conversation on whether all root phenomena are plausibly to be found in embedded cases.

17 Though Speas & Tenny suggest that they may be, in some cases, pronounceable, other scholars such as Sigurðsson (2004, 2011) suggest that they are always silent and only detectable through the syntactic relations they enter into.
They also present a principled reason for differentiating between those that may be and those that will not be embeddable.

The biggest question outstanding that I hope to work towards answering in this thesis is what it means for a sentence to have illocutionary force: what it means for the representation of speaker and hearer, what it means for the discourse prominence or interpretation of the force-bearing clause and how it interacts with clause type. In order to do this I will focus on a type of embedded clause that seems to feature a range of embedded root phenomena, that has a different distribution from both root and embedded clauses, and that cannot in any way be explained through a theory of assertion, given that it features embedded inverted questions.
Chapter 3

Embedded Inverted Questions as Embedded Illocutionary Acts

3.1 Introduction

In this and the following chapter it is proposed that embedded illocutionary acts exist; that is, clauses which are syntactically embedded but retain independent illocutionary force. The primary datum which will be examined to support this claim is the embedded inverted question (EIQ) from a range of English dialects. Other similar phenomena in other languages, namely embedded verb second in some Germanic languages and recompementation in Spanish and Catalan, will also be examined in the chapters to follow. This chapter focuses on the syntax and distribution of EIQs. Consideration will also be given to the pragmatic effects of EIQs in comparison with more familiar forms of speech report such as direct and indirect speech.

3.2 Key facts on EIQs

EIQs have most famously been studied by McCloskey (1992, 2006) and Henry (1995) in Hiberno English dialects. They are also used and accepted by speakers of a range of other British and non-British dialects, including North West England English (Woods 2014b), Tyneside English (Stringer 2015), African American English (AAE; Green, 2002), Indian English (Stringer 2015), Newfoundland English (P. Branigan, p.c.) and New York English.
Their most salient features are the presence of subject-auxiliary inversion in an embedded clause and the (general) lack of overt complementisers. Example (1) contains paradigm examples of the EIQ construction, which can contain either a polar or wh-question.

(1) a. I asked Jack was she in his class.
   b. I wondered how did they get into the building.

Irish English, McCloskey (2006)

EIQs have a highly restricted distribution. They typically appear under interrogative “bridge” verbs like those in (1) but can also appear under say, as illustrated in (2).

(2) a. They said what did we want to be [...] I said a library lady.
   b. I said did he take precautions [originally said to the referent of ‘he’]
   c. I know Richard Wigglesworth says what the hell do I know about rugby[
   d. They said oo, could we come over for coffee so we did [go over for coffee]

Note that the above examples under say are not from speakers of typical EIQ dialects,
but are from southern British English or Yorkshire dialects. The occurrence of EIQs in typically non-EIQ dialects is not infrequent and speakers of both EIQ and non-EIQ dialects are frequently unaware of their own use of EIQs. In my experience, speakers of non-EIQ dialects in particular will often be embarrassed by their production of EIQs if their attention is drawn to it and will refer to it as “slang” or “lazy English”.

Due to data like (2) and other variations on the EIQ that are widely attested and used in other dialects of English, it is tempting to avoid referring to EIQs as a dialect construction. However, there does seem to be a divide between speakers of EIQ and non-EIQ dialects in terms of their acceptance of EIQs when presented with them. This of course has profound implications for our understanding of and the importance we place upon grammaticality judgement tasks, but this is a well-known limitation of such tasks which many scholars in linguistics are increasingly sensitive to. As a result, however, I will continue to treat EIQs in the form outlined in this section as a dialect construction to reflect this difference in acceptance of EIQs between speakers of different dialects.

Returning to the characteristics of EIQs, irrespective of dialect they are blocked under factive verbs (as in (3)); a state of affairs reminiscent of discourse-related embedded verb second (EV2) contexts in German and Mainland Scandinavian.  

\[(3)\]
\begin{itemize}
  \item a. *I found out how did they get into the building.
  \item b. *I usually know who might they hire.
  \item c. *I remember clearly how many people did they arrest.
\end{itemize}

Irish Eng., McCloskey (2006, p.88)

\[6\]
\[7\]
\[8\]
\[9\]

---

\[6\] See section 6.2.5.

\[7\] Data on this can be found in the appendix.

\[8\] Although find out is included in (3) it will be shown that semifactive verbs such as discover are less easy to classify with respect to whether they are compatible with EIQs and EV2. This will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.

\[9\] Although most Germanic languages have some form of verb second phenomenon, not all of them permit EV2 and it is not a unified phenomenon in those that do. In this dissertation, I will not deal with the kind of “generalised” embedded verb movement found in Icelandic, Yiddish or Afrikaans, which does not appear to be licensed by discourse considerations. I will also leave Frisian to one side, as the distribution of EV2 in this language is notably different from other West Germanic languages, extending to clausal complements to nouns (de Haan 2001). I will concern myself with EV2 in standard German, Swedish, Danish and Norwegian in particular. In these languages, EV2 does appear to be discourse-related, in ways similar to EIQs as I will go on to discuss. However, these languages also differ subtly as to contexts in which EV2 is licensed and how it is interpreted, which I will discuss in chapter 4.
Unlike discourse-related EV2, however, EIQs can occur under factive verbs if the matrix clause also contains interrogativity (4) modality (5) negation (6) or imperative force (7). EV2 in languages like German is generally blocked under interrogation, negation and modality and in languages like Swedish such contexts may degrade EV2, even when the matrix verb is a canonical non-interrogative bridge verb such as say. The distribution of EIQs strongly indicates that the relationship between the EIQ and the matrix clause is not one of selection by matrix V because in that case, other operators in the matrix clause would not interfere. The question of what this relationship is will be raised in chapter 6.

(4) EIQs under interrogatives
   a. Do we know how were words chosen for the lists? New York Eng., attested11

(5) EIQs under modality
   a. I wanted to know could they do it for me. AAE, Green (2002)
   b. Me mam wants to know was me dad happy yesterday. Tyneside Eng., Stringer (2015)
   c. I needed to see could it be done. North West Eng., attested
   d. I can check train times, read twitter and find out who was that guy in that thing. Tyneside Eng., attested12

(6) EIQs under matrix negation
   a. He didn’t know why did they come. Irish Eng., Berizzi (2010)
   b. I can’t remember did you want to practise tonight. North West Eng., attested

(7) EIQs under imperatives
   a. Go over there and see did they bring my car in. AAE, Green (2002)

10 Of course, this also applies to the varieties of EV2 described previously, to which I will return in the next chapter.
11 Naturally occurring New York English data provided by Barbara Pearson.
12 Naturally occurring Tyneside English data provided by Laura Bailey.
Note that all of the examples above also feature complementiser deletion. EIQs are not compatible with immediately preceding complementisers, just as immediately successive complementisers are prohibited:

(8)  
   a. *I asked them if would they like a cup of tea
   b. *I asked them if if they would like a cup of tea. McCloskey (2006 p.105)
   c. *I asked them whether if they would like a cup of tea.

However, a complementiser may co-occur with the EIQ if there is an element in the left periphery intervening between the complementiser and the wh-word or auxiliary. McCloskey (2006) suggests that this element must be “substantial”, as in (9a) though syntactically simple adjuncts may also suffice, as shown in (9b):

(9)  
   a. Patsy asked him if, when he was sent to college, was it for a clergyman or a solicitor. Irish Eng., McCloskey (2006)
   b. I asked him if seriously would he cook dinner tonight North West Eng.

EIQs also have a range of other features which distinguish them from other types of speech report, though they also share some features with both indirect and direct speech reports. In common with the former, they show clear, non-selection-related dependencies on the matrix clause, such as indexicality and Sequence of Tense. In common with the latter, in addition to subject-auxiliary inversion, they display so-called “root phenomena” such as a (general) lack of overt complementisers, the presence of speech act adverbs and discourse particles, and the availability of topicalised arguments. This places EIQs in a hitherto little studied grey area between indirect and direct speech reports. I will argue that, while EIQs are syntactically embedded, like indirect speech reports, they actually represent a perspective shift to the original speaker—the matrix subject—and so can contain not-at-issue and expressive content which is evaluated with respect to the original speaker and not the reporting speaker.
3.3 Characteristics shared with indirect speech

The most salient syntactic characteristics of the EIQ as outlined above are precisely those in which the EIQ diverges from standard indirect question reports. Indirect question reports have obligatory complementisers, do not permit subject-auxiliary inversion and do not allow CP adjuncts such as temporal adjuncts or speech act adverbs.

(10) Obligatory complementisers
    a. I wonder if Jamie wants dinner tonight.
    b. I asked whether the boat was fixed.
    c. *I wonder Jamie will come to the party.
    d. *I asked the boat was fixed.

(11) No subject-auxiliary inversion
    a. *I wonder if does Jamie want dinner tonight.
    b. *I asked whether was the boat fixed.

(12) No high adjunction
    a. *I wonder if when he comes home Jamie wants dinner tonight.
    b. *I asked if seriously the boat was fixed.

However, there are many other ways in which EIQs do pattern with indirect speech reports. Firstly, they are phonologically similar in that they both lack “comma” intonation (Emonds 1976) compared with direct speech reports:

(13) a. John asked me if I would go to dinner with him last night.
    b. John asked me would I go to dinner with him last night.
    c. John asked me, “Will you come to dinner tonight?”

Correspondingly, it seems that the direct speech report in (13c) consists of two intonational phrases, whereas the EIQ and indirect speech report only consist of one. More sophisticated phonological analysis is necessary to confirm this but will be left for future research.
In terms of their syntax, as McCloskey (2006) notes, EIQs are clearly not independent root clauses preceded by some kind of parenthetical. Firstly, the EIQ can be very deeply embedded under a non-matrix clause with complex syntax:

(14) a. I don’t think I was ever asked did I see any Provos, Stickies, or anyone.

Irish Eng., McCloskey (2006, p.89)

b. I’ll remember Jo in the voting lobby in her cycling kit and wondering where did she get the energy.

Yorkshire Eng., attested

Also, as already mentioned, EIQs can be embedded under negated predicates, which is incompatible with a parenthetical analysis as parentheticals cannot contain negation:

(15) I don’t understand what was the utility of it

Indian Eng., attested

EIQs and indirect speech reports also share two particular properties which are indicative of syntactic embedding and are not dependent on syntactic or semantic selection, namely Sequence of Tense and dependent indexicals. EIQs and indirect question reports show Sequence of Tense effects, where direct speech reports do not:

(16) a. Last year, John asked me whether Mary was/*is pregnant

b. Last year, John asked me was/*is Mary pregnant

c. Last year, John asked me, “Is Mary pregnant?”

Indexicals in EIQs are also dependent on the matrix clause; they are evaluated with respect to the utterance speaker, not the original speaker. They are therefore like English indirect speech reports, and unlike direct speech reports, in that they do not show indexical shift:

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14 Thanks to Anders Holmberg for pointing this out.
15 Naturally occurring Indian English data provided by Jyoti Iyer.
16 There are many languages in which indexical shift occurs in normal embedded speech reports, but given that English is not one of them and there is no data to suggest that indexical shift operators are present in English, I shall assume that the lack of indexical shift in EIQs is indicative of their embedded status (even cases like Free Indirect Discourse, where the speaker and the attitude holder are not the same, do not show indexical shifting between matrix and embedded clauses in the sense that a first-person pronoun in one clause is coreferential with a third-person pronoun in a different clause).
(17) She had considered should she keep going or not. Scottish Eng., attested

(18) a. John asked me if he could come to see me this weekend
b. John asked me if he come to see me this weekend
c. John asked me, “Could I come to see you this weekend?”
d. John asked me, “Could he come to see me this weekend?”

In fact, in (18b) whilst the pronoun ‘he’ in the embedded clause could well refer to another salient male in the discourse, there is a preference for it to refer to John, which I will return to in section 3.4.

In terms of their syntactic dependencies, EIqs are like indirect questions as they cannot stand alone, while direct speech complements can.

(19) a. *If he would cook dinner for me.
b. *If he would cook dinner for me - that’s all I asked him!
c. *Would he cook dinner for me.
d. Would he cook dinner for me - that’s all I asked him!
e. “Will you cook dinner for me?”
f. “Will you cook dinner for me?” - that’s all I asked him!

The standalone EIQ in (19c) is ungrammatical and requires a follow-up such as “That’s all I asked him!”, as in (19d) to save its interpretation. I suggest that this is because without being related to a specific discourse or act-of-questioning, the EIQ loses its anchoring. This is partially due to the presence of dependent tense in the EIQ which requires a reference time in the matrix clause to be evaluated against (cf. Giorgi (2010)). It is also because the original questioner’s identity must be established for the original context of the EIQ and any perspectival elements in it to be situated. However, (19d) is reminiscent of another method of representing speech and thought, namely Free Indirect Discourse (FID), in that the speaker’s previous thoughts and co-ordinates seem to have completely subsumed her current ones. Note how (20), in which the ‘speaker’ is represented in the third person, is

\[^{17}\text{Retrieved from Olympic Sportofday, BBC Sport website, 7th Aug 2016.}\]
an improvement on (19d), and is familiar as an example of FID’s literary style of thought presentation.

(20) Would he cook dinner for her - that’s all she asked him!

The ordering of the “introducing predicate”—the expression of the subject and verb of speech or thought—and the clause containing the thought or speech is fixed in FID. If an FID sentence appears with an introducing predicate, that predicate must follow the FID clause—it cannot precede it, though it can intervene in it (Giorgi 2010, pp.205-6). In contrast, EIQs must appear with a main clause containing an appropriate predicate which precedes the EIQ and that main clause cannot be parenthetical in the middle of the EIQ. Examples of the fixed ordering between introducing predicates and FID clauses are in (21) and examples of EIQs are in (22) and (23).

(21) a. Sarebbe partita domani, pensò.
   would leave.FUT tomorrow, think.IMP.3SG
   “She would leave tomorrow, she thought.”  
   \textit{FID interpretation}

   b. #Pensò sarebbe partita domani.
   think.IMP.3SG would leave.FUT tomorrow
   “She thought she would leave tomorrow.” 
   \textit{Non-FID interpretation}

   c. Gianni, pensò, sarebbe partito domani.
   Gianni think.IMP.3SG would leave.FUT tomorrow
   “Gianni, she thought, would leave tomorrow.”  

(22) a. Mary asked me would I leave tomorrow.

   b. ?*Would I leave tomorrow, Mary asked me.

   c. *Would I, Mary asked me, leave tomorrow.

(23) a. Mary asked John would he leave tomorrow

   b. Would he leave tomorrow, Mary asked John.  
   \textit{FID interpretation only}

   c. Would he, Mary asked John, leave tomorrow.  
   \textit{FID interpretation only}

It is clear that there is a difference in grammaticality between (22b) and (23b) suggesting that the ordering between introducing predicates and embedded clauses is one way to distinguish between FID and EIQs. However, there are other effects in FID that are not
found in EIQs.

FID is used when the mental state being reported is not that of the speaker (or writer) but of another subject, and the access that the speaker has to this mental state is as privileged as the access she has to her own mental state. As [Giorgi (2010) p.182] puts it, “[t]he FID device […] might be taken to promote the subject, that is, the character of the story, to speaker.” So far, so similar to EIQs. The two constructions diverge in terms of their temporal indexicality, however: Giorgi notes that in FID, the speaker’s temporal coordinates are erased from the context and so the subject’s temporal coordinates are the only anchor for the temporal coordinates in the FID clause. Moreover, the actor to which temporal indexicals orient in FID can vary: they may be evaluated by a third-person narrator or another third-person character in the story rather than with respect to the speaker/writer’s coordinates [Giorgi (2010) p.191] suggests that in this way, temporal indexicals in FID might be said to cease being true indexicals). In contrast, temporal indexicals in EIQs may only orient to the reporting speaker, who is always first-person.\footnote{\textsuperscript{18}}\footnote{\textsuperscript{19}}

This is illustrated by taking the examples in \eqref{eq:23} and inserting temporal adjuncts. While \eqref{eq:24a} can only be interpreted with respect to the speaker (the silent “I”), \eqref{eq:24b} can have three interpretations: the same interpretation of the EIQ, which is to be expected if the anchor is the narrator; an interpretation in which the anchor is the narrator but the story is set at a different time to the current writing/reading context; or an interpretation in which the indexicals relate separately to two different third-person characters in the story, namely the narrator and another third-person character.

\begin{equation}
\text{(24)} \quad \text{Both of the sentences below are spoken/read on 5th May.}
\begin{align*}
a. \quad & \text{Mary asked John yesterday would he leave tomorrow.} \\
& \text{\textit{yesterday} = 4th May; } \text{\textit{tomorrow} = 6th May}
\end{align*}
\begin{align*}
b. \quad & \text{Would he leave tomorrow, Mary asked John yesterday.} \\
& \text{\textit{yesterday} = 4th May, } \text{\textit{tomorrow} = 5th May if anchor is third-person}
\end{align*}
\end{equation}

\textsuperscript{18}The analysis here might correlate with [Giorgi (2010)] in casting doubt on the idea that tense in English is pronominal, but I will not explore that claim further here.

\textsuperscript{19}As [Giorgi (2010) p.191] notes, first-person appears to be an attractor for temporal indexicality; if the narrator in a literary text is first-person, temporal indexicals must be evaluated with respect to this narrator.
Note that the re-anchoring of perspective in FID clauses, as in EIQs, does not extend to the anchoring of indexicals, which still orient to the speaker (or writer). In FID contexts, outside of direct representations of speech, all indexicals are third-person. First-person narration in literary contexts is a separate case again, in which the subject (the first-person narrator) and his coordinates, temporal and indexical, wholly replace those of the speaker/writer. This three-way split is illustrated by the differences in acceptability of root phenomena in the three constructions; FID is more restricted in terms of the root phenomena that it permits than EIQs, but first-person narration is even more permissive than EIQs. An example of the restrictions on FID was noted in Banfield (1982, p.117), repeated in (25), where she notes that some high adverbs, but crucially not the speaker-oriented speech act adverbs, are permitted in FID from a third-person perspective. We have already shown this not to be the case in EIQs, and this is illustrated again in (26) along with a case of first-person narration in (27).

(25) a. Certainly, she was so pleased to see him - delighted!

Certainly = third-person perspective

(Banfield’s (8)b, p.117)

b. Honestly, she was so pleased to see him - delighted!

Honestly = a non-explicit first-person perspective

(Banfield’s (8)a, p.117)
(26) I asked her honestly did she think she would ever get away with it.

*Honestly = “her” (third-person) perspective*

(27) Honestly, always was, ver-near divorce proceedings every time I went out with Emdy for a Campari after the country dancing...

BNC, B38 186 (imaginative written prose with first-person narration)

So although FID clauses are very similar to EIQ clauses in that they promote the perspective of the subject in some way, they are different in terms of the extent to which the subject’s perspective replaces that of the speaker. We can note that the kinds of contexts in which EIQs are seemingly used on their own or utterance-initially usually turn out to be contexts which favour FID and first-person narration, such as voicing introspection as in

(28a) Would he cook dinner for me? I often ask myself this question.

(28b) Would he cook dinner for me? Ask me one that I can answer!

So can EIQ clauses can appear in utterance-initial position? No—what looks like an EIQ in sentence-initial position is in fact an example of FID, which resembles an EIQ due to its sequence of tense and lack of indexical shift. However, the extent to which the subject’s perspective is promoted differs in EIQ and in FID: as we saw in (24) in FID the subject’s temporal coordinates completely replace those of the speaker which is not the case in EIQs, yet EIQs permit a wider range of root phenomena than FID contexts.

In summary, EIQs are like indirect speech reports in that they cannot be fronted to sentence-initial position. There are cases which look like sentence-initial EIQs, but these are in fact cases of FID, which are easily confused due to the many similarities they often share.

Relatedly, EIQs pattern with indirect speech reports in that they do not have the verbatim entailment associated with direct speech reports. However, consider the following
examples in the context in which Oedipus uttered the following precise words: “Will the Sphinx be waiting at the gates of Thebes?”

\[(29) \quad \begin{array}{ll}
\text{a. Oedipus asked if a monster would be waiting at the gates of Thebes} & \text{true} \\
\text{b. Oedipus asked if the Sphinx would be waiting at the gates of Thebes} & \text{true} \\
\text{c. Oedipus asked would a monster be waiting at the gates of Thebes} & \text{false} \\
\text{d. Oedipus asked would the Sphinx be waiting at the gates of Thebes} & \text{true} \\
\text{e. Oedipus asked, “Will a monster be waiting at the gates of Thebes?”} & \text{false} \\
\text{f. Oedipus asked, “Will the Sphinx be waiting at the gates of Thebes?”} & \text{true}
\end{array} \]

As the examples in \[(29)\] show, while EIQs do not entail that the content of the embedded clause is a verbatim reproduction of the original speech act, they are subject to a semantic \textit{de dicto} restriction insofar as it is not possible to substitute the DP ‘a monster’ for the DP ‘the Sphinx’ \textit{salva veritate}.

This effect is further demonstrated in the examples below, in which Oedipus does not know that Jocasta is his mother. The context is one in which Oedipus uttered the following precise words: “Will Jocasta come for dinner tonight?”

\[(30) \quad \begin{array}{ll}
\text{a. Oedipus asked if his mother was coming for dinner tonight} & \text{true} \\
\text{b. Oedipus asked was his mother coming for dinner tonight} & \text{false} \\
\text{c. Oedipus asked, “Will my mother come for dinner tonight?”} & \text{false}
\end{array} \]

In brief, Oedipus’s knowledge dictates that which is permitted in the EIQ, regardless of whether that aligns with how things are in the world or with the speaker’s knowledge.

In a similar vein, the matrix subject’s self-knowledge is key; the appropriate pronouns are obligatorily interpreted with a \textit{de se} reading in EIQs\[21\]

\[(31) \quad \text{Indirect speech report: John asked if the photos of himself had appeared in the newspaper}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{a. OK John asked if the photos of him, John, had appeared in the newspaper}
\end{array} \]

\[21\] Thanks to Jeremy Hartman for drawing my attention to this.
b. OK John asked if the photos of a man (who happens to be John) had appeared in the newspaper

(32) EIQ: John asked did those photos of himself appear in the newspaper.

a. OK John asked if the photos of him, John, had appeared in the newspaper
b. #John asked if the photos of a man (who happens to be John) had appeared in the newspaper

Why is it that EIQs do not have a verbatim requirement, yet cannot achieve a de re reading of quantified phrases? As already noted above, EIQs cannot appear overtly in utterance-initial position. I propose that they cannot appear utterance-initially covertly either, and so the movement of the quantified phrase to a higher position which would be necessary to achieve a de re reading is blocked. The unavailability of this movement, particularly for arguments, is further supported by the data on overt extraction from EIQs in section 3.6.

3.4 Characteristics shared with direct speech: syntax

The most salient syntactic characteristics of EIQs align with those of direct speech, in particular subject-auxiliary inversion and the lack of overt complementisers. EIQs and direct speech reports also permit high adjunction in their left periphery in the form of speech act adverbs, topicalised arguments, discourse particles and, as also illustrated in the previous two sections, temporal adjuncts.

(33) Speech act adverbs

a. Jane$_i$ asked him seriously$_i$/speaker would he cook her dinner.

b. Jane$_i$ asked him, “Seriously$_i$/speaker, will you cook me dinner?”

c. *Jane asked him if seriously$_i$/speaker he would cook her dinner.

(34) Topicalised arguments

$^{22}$The indices in (33) indicate whose perspective is being expressed by the use of the adverb. $^{23}$See also McCloskey (2006) for data like (33) (34) and particularly (35).
a. Mary asked (if) this book, was it really worth reading.
b. Mary asked, “This book, is it really worth reading?”
c. Mary asked if this book it was really worth reading.

(35) Temporal adjuncts

a. Molly asked when she got home could she have a biscuit.
b. Molly asked, “When I get home, can I have a biscuit?”
c. ?Molly asked if when she got home she could have a biscuit.
d. ?Molly asked when she got home if she could have a biscuit.

(36) Discourse particles

a. Jamie asked please would I help him.
b. Jamie asked, “Please, will you help me?”
c. *Jamie asked if please I would help him.

Another example of a speech-act related phenomenon permitted in EIQs and direct speech reports but blocked in indirect speech reports is the word again, used to mark repeated questions. Again used in this way does not express the iteration of an action, but is interpreted as a request to the addressee to answer for a second or subsequent time a question that, it is implied, they have already answered. An example is shown in (37); in this case again cannot refer to the iteration of the predicate, as someone can only die once, but implies that the questioner has already been told this information or should already be in possession of the information:

(37) When did he die again?

24 Note that this example, due to the lack of intonational break between the matrix and embedded clauses, is ambiguous between Molly asking the question when she got home or asking whether she could have a biscuit once home. It is possible to introduce comma intonation here, which disambiguates between the two readings and forces an embedded construal of the temporal adjunct. Note that comma intonation of this type does not improve the acceptability of (35c) indicating that the fronting of the temporal adjunct in the embedded clause can only occur in EIQs because their structure differs from indirect speech reports. See also McCloskey (2006).

25 See Yatsushiro & Sauerland (2013) for an a similar analysis of again as a speech act marker, along with some similar interesting data from Japanese.
= Tell me again when he died./When did he die: tell me again.
≠ #When did he die for the second or subsequent time?

Again used in this way is prosodically integrated into the utterance much like the iterative use of again. It can also be fronted, in which case only the speech-act meaning remains:

(38) a. Again, when did he die?
    b. Again, did she come to the party?

It does not seem principled to suggest that speech act again is formed by an ellipsis operation from “Tell me again” on the basis of the prosodic facts and the lack of any kind of overt antecedent for the elided material. Instead, it is a discourse-level particle expressing that the speaker should already be in possession of the information requested.

Subsequently, the fact that speech-act again can be embedded in EIWs and direct speech reports, but not in indirect speech reports, is further evidence that EIWs are more quotation-like and more closely linked to the original discourse than indirect speech reports.

26

(39) a. He asked me when did my cat die again.
    b. He asked me, “When did your cat die again?”
    c. He asked me when my cat died again

(40) a. He asked me was I coming to the party again.
    b. He asked me, “Are you coming to the party again?”
    c. He asked me if I was coming to the party again.

Examples (39a) is ambiguous between the matrix (iterative) and embedded (speech-act) readings of again while (40a) is three-ways ambiguous as the embedded iterative reading is also possible. Conversely, (39c) only contains the matrix reading of again while (40c) allows both the matrix reading of again and the embedded iterative reading.

26It appears that sentences such as (39) can be used to differentiate between the permissiveness of a given speaker towards embedded root phenomena; some native English speakers report that they can only get an iterative reading of again in sentences like those in (39a) and (39c) (P. Sells, pers. comm.).
The data in this section raise a more subtle question: is it the case that all discourse markers are available in EIQs that are available in root clauses and direct speech reports? The answer to this question is easily revealed to be negative.

Take for example the particle *huh*, which can be used to mark that the speaker expects an prompt answer from the addressee.\(^{27}\) It is typically found in contexts like those in (41)

(41) a. What are you going to say, huh?
    b. What are you going to do about it, huh?
    c. Did you hear what I said, huh?
    d. Where were you last night? Huh? \(^{28}\)
    e. A: You gonna take your truck in to the shop or what? I told ya I can give you a ride - huh?
    B: God damn man! Would you give me a second to answer you?
    f. Pretty cool, huh? \(^{29}\)
    g. So you like cheese, huh?

Abstracting away from the examples in which *huh* is used with declaratives and fragment utterances, *huh* in interrogatives marks a request by the speaker for a prompt response, whether that be a confirmation or a more informative response, from the addressee. However, it cannot be embedded in EIQs:

(42) a. *I asked him what was he going to do about it, huh.
    b. *I asked him had he heard what I said, huh.

It is also impossible to embed tag questions:

(43) a. She is going to the party, isn’t she?
    b. Mary told you she is going to the party, *isn’t she/didn’t she?

\(^{27}\)Note that, as with many discourse particles, this is not the only meaning that *huh* can impart, but it is the only one of interest to EIQs.

\(^{28}\)Taken from http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/huh; retrieved on 29th Apr 2015.

c. Is she going to the party, do you know?

d. John asked you is she going to the party, *do you know/didn’t he?

If we compare these examples with the examples of embedded please and again in EIQs, we see a difference in terms of the discourse demands that each particle puts on the interlocutors. Please and again refine the responsibilities that the speaker and the addressee share with respect to the question asked: please requires that the addressee take responsibility for undertaking a given action (which may or may not be linguistic, see Woods (2016)) while again expresses that the speaker take some responsibility for their lack of knowledge. Neither particle outright requires a specific linguistic response. The case with huh and with tag questions is exactly opposite; both require the addressee to confirm or correct the speaker’s speech act in their next turn.

The distinction in embeddability therefore seems to lie in the demand the particle makes on the addressee: if it does not in itself call on the addressee to respond then it is embeddable. If the particle’s meaning demands an immediate, specific response from the addressee, then it is not embeddable. We might also adopt Haegeman’s (2014) terms to describe higher discourse particles as dynamic and lower discourse particles as attitudinal, though the latter category will be differently defined in the analysis to follow.

Further details of the distinction between the kinds of discourse markers that may be embedded in EIQs and those that may not will be addressed and explained in chapter 4.

3.5 Characteristics shared with direct speech: semantics and pragmatics

Turning to the interpretive properties of EIQs, it is clear that they pattern with direct speech reports, although certain entailments in direct speech contexts seem to be “downgraded” to implications in EIQs.

Firstly, there are a number of ways in which direct speech reports are semantically

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30 A similar proposal was made from a semantic point of view by Truckenbrodt (2006) and has been made from a syntactic point of view by scholars from the Syntax in Speech Acts project at the University of British Columbia (Wiltschko et al. 2015, Wiltschko 2015). The proposal here differs in the detail that they distinguish between speaker and addressee commitment while I, like Haegeman (2014), do not.
opaque which also apply to EIQs. For example, reconstruction of an extracted element fails in direct speech reports and EIQs where is it available in indirect speech reports:

(44) a. ?Which of his\textsubscript{i/j} aunts does John\textsubscript{j} want to know whether each\textsubscript{i} boy loves \(t\)?
   b. ??Which of his\textsubscript{i/j} aunts does John\textsubscript{j} want to know does each\textsubscript{i} boy love \(t\)?
   c. ??Which of his\textsubscript{i/j} aunts does John\textsubscript{j} want to know, “Does each\textsubscript{i} boy love \(t\)?”

Note that all of the examples in (44) are degraded because they involve extraction out of (various types of) islands, but such that interpretations for each of the examples in (44) can be arrived at, it is clear that a bound variable interpretation can be achieved for his in (44a) which is unavailable in (44b) and (44c).

In his evaluation of quantification in Japanese speech acts, Sudo (2013) notes that semantic binding into direct speech reports is not generally available; the same result obtains in EIQs:

(45) a. John asked nobody’s\textsubscript{i} mother whether Mary likes him\textsubscript{i}.
   b. *John asked nobody’s\textsubscript{i} mother does Mary like him\textsubscript{i}.
   c. *John told nobody’s\textsubscript{i} mother “Mary likes him\textsubscript{i}.”

It could be argued that the above test fails on the basis of pragmatic plausibility; the negative universal quantifier phrase in the matrix clause creates an implausible context for the EIQ if the EIQ requires there to have been an original speech or thought act to be reported, as in direct speech reports. This putative requirement is not entirely clear cut and will be examined later in this section. In any case, the same result obtains when the universal quantifier phrase \textit{everybody} is inserted:

(46) a. John asked everybody’s\textsubscript{i} mother whether Mary likes him\textsubscript{i}.
   b. *John asked everybody’s\textsubscript{i} mother does Mary like him\textsubscript{i}.
   c. *John asked everybody’s\textsubscript{i} mother “Does Mary likes him\textsubscript{i}?”

\textsuperscript{31}As will be further discussed in chapter \textsuperscript{6} lack of reconstruction is also a feature of other quasi-quotational constructions, such as reacomplementation in Spanish, Catalan and European Portuguese (Villa-García 2012, 2015, Rathmann 2012). It also occurs in factive islands, and this will be important in our discussion of how the EIQ connects with the matrix predicate.
The same result is found in Spanish and Catalan recomplementation contexts (González i Planas 2014). As alluded to in the discussion of the restriction of the EIQs to *de dicto* interpretations only, the EIQ is referentially opaque and does not permit shifting reference. Therefore, while EIQs are compatible with a scenario in which many people are asked the same question, as in (47), they are not compatible with a scenario in which many people ask a question in which reference shifts depending on the addressee.

(47) Johni asked everybody’s mother does Mary like himi.

In fact, if we look at the binding facts in more detail we find more evidence that EIQs are neither like direct speech nor like indirect speech reports but form some kind of intermediate class. The fact that quantifiers in subject position can bind into EIQs—as in indirect speech reports—suggests that EIQs are truly embedded. The fact that a quantified indirect object cannot bind into an EIQ suggests that it is lower in the structure than the EIQ, and in this way EIQs pattern with direct speech reports. However, restrictions on the availability of inverse scope readings in EIQs patterns with the restrictions on overt movement out of EIQs, which means that inverse scope readings are available if the quantified element is a temporal adjunct rather than an argument.

(48) a. [Everyone]i wondered would Jack ask heri out.
   b. [Everyone]i wondered if Jack would ask heri out.
   c. *[Everyone]i wondered, “Will Jack ask heri out?”

   *Patterns with indirect speech*

(49) a. *Mary asked [everyone]i could she take himi to the dance.
   b. Mary asked [everyone]i if she could take himi to the dance.
   c. *Mary asked [everyone]i, “Can I take himi to the dance?”

   *Patterns with direct speech*

(50) a. Every boy wondered would Jack ask out a girl in the class.

   every⟩ a; *a⟩ every

   b. Every boy wondered if Jack would ask out a girl in the class.
Every boy wondered, “Will Jack ask out a girl in the class?”

Patterns with direct speech

Every girl wondered would Jack ask her out in a bowling alley.

Patterns with indirect speech

Every girl wondered if Jack would ask her out in a bowling alley.

Every girl wondered, “Will Jack ask me out in a bowling alley?”

I propose that this is ultimately because the EIQ represents a specific question under discussion (QUD) and so is referentially fixed. More precisely, EIQs refer to a conversational move; an act in a previous discourse that was made with respect to a relevant QUD in the original discourse. In order to assess and support the claim that EIQs constitute a conversational move with respect to a QUD, it is first necessary to outline the framework that I am using and my terms.

3.5.1 The Question Under Discussion framework

The QUD is, according to Craige Roberts and colleagues, “a semantic question (i.e. a set of alternative propositions) which corresponds to the current discourse topic” (Simons et al. 2010, p.316). The QUD is therefore an abstract semantic object and is usually implicit in a conversation, though it may be the same as an overt question asked in the conversation. QUDs drive the conversation insofar as they need to be resolved for the conversation to move forward. In this way, they determine what constitutes a felicitous conversational move: only moves that address the QUD by trying to resolve it are felicitous.

The first term to define, then, is move—what is a conversational move? Roberts (2012) is clear that a conversational move is not a speech act, but that speech acts use conversational moves; in other words, “a speech act is the act of proffering a move” (Roberts...
Moreover, the semantic objects in the QUD framework such as the QUDs themselves and conversational moves are not tied to particular syntactic structures or linguistic conventions in a given language.

A key reason why conversational moves are not the same thing as speech acts is that questions in particular can be implied by assertions made by the discourse participants. That is, a discourse participant can introduce a question into the conversation by asserting an answer without ever uttering the question itself. Roberts expresses this idea as follows:

> [a] question is not necessarily realized by a speech act but is only a question denotation in the technical sense that it proffers a set of relevant alternatives which the interlocutors commit themselves to addressing: it tells you what the discourse is “about” at that point in the discourse, and further, [...] it tells us where the discourse is going.

Roberts (2012, pp.6:8-6:9)

Of course, questions may be raised in the conversation overtly too, but typically they are implicit. It is also important to note that questions within a conversation tend to be interrelated: there is often one ‘big question’ to resolve, which can be a broad as “What’s happening?” However, conversation is generally broken down into more manageable sub-questions, whose answers ultimately entail an answer to the ‘big question’.

This notion of addressing a question through answers entailed by other answers requires us to be clearer about what it means to address a QUD. Simons et al. (2010) note a (non-exhaustive) range of ways of doing this: simple answers, which may be complete (52a) or partial (52b) assertions whose content contextually entails a partial or complete answer (53) or asking a question related to the QUD that is easier to answer in the first instance. This latter addresses a QUD insofar as its answer is at least a partial answer to the QUD, as in (54).

(52) Q: Which students are defending this semester? Simons et al. (2010) p.316

- a. A: Stefan, Nick and Tracy. Complete answer
- b. A: Stefan, and maybe some others. Partial answer
Common ground: the legal drinking age is 21.

Q: Is Avi old enough to drink?
A: He’s twenty-two. Simons et al. (2010, p.316)

QUD: What will Bill drink?
Q: Does Bill drink beer? Simons et al. (2010, p.316)

On the basis of such observations, Simons and colleagues define the notion of relevance to the QUD for assertions and questions:

(55) Relevance to the QUD

a. An assertion is relevant to a QUD iff it contextually entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD.

b. A question is relevant to a QUD iff it has an answer which contextually entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD. Simons et al. (2010, p.316)

They also go on to define at-issueness using these terms:

(56) Definition of at-issueness

a. A proposition $p$ is at-issue iff the speaker intends to address the QUD via $\neg p$ (whether $p$).

b. An intention to address the QUD via $\neg p$ is felicitous only if:

(i) $\neg p$ is relevant to the QUD, and

(ii) The speaker can reasonably expect the addressee to recognize this intention. Simons et al. (2010, p.323)

It is interesting that Simons et al. appeal to a notion of speaker intention in order to define at-issueness, though they recognise that this is a difficult notion to pin down precisely. I will go on in this thesis to show how context and speaker commitment, as opposed to
intention, can affect the interpretation of content as being at-issue (chapter 6).

Returning to the construction under discussion, the EIQ, the use of this framework is to more precisely characterise both their meaning and conditions of use. EIQs differ from direct speech reports as they do not carry verbatim implications, and they do not entail that a questioning speech act actually occurred. Take for example EIQs under predicates which do not typically express communication, such as *want to know*:

(57)  
a. Everyone wanted to know whether Joe could come to the party.
b. Everyone wanted to know: “Is Joe coming to the party?”
c. Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party.

The examples in (57) are mental state reports which differ as to the commitments they make about a prior accompanying speech act. The indirect speech act in (57a) is compatible with a situation in which no-one asked out loud whether Joe could come to the party. It is also compatible with a prior discourse in which the question of Joe’s coming to the party has not been overtly discussed at all, but it is known for other reasons that everyone has had the matter of Joe’s coming to the party on their minds. The direct speech act in (57b), in contrast, entails that the question “Is Joe coming to the party?” was asked in the relevant prior discourse. As such, the commitment made by the speaker’s use of EIQ in (57c) is intermediate between (57a) and (57b); it requires a prior discourse in which the question of whether Joe will come to the party was addressed in some form, but not necessarily asked as a question outright. In terms of the QUD framework discussed above, this means that some conversational move addressing the QUD “Is Joe coming to the party?” was made, which will have entailed a speech act of a some type. There is no conventional structure for proffering a conversational move so the speech act could be of a range of different kinds.

Note that the observation was made above that *nobody* is not a possible subject for the matrix clause above an EIQ because a relevant QUD or speech act must have been made. At first blush this seems at odds with the examples in (58a) and (58b) below:

(58)  
a. I didn’t ask were you coming last night.
b. I didn’t want to know was she coming.
However, the question in \(58a\) (whether ‘you’ were coming last night) is interpreted as an open question under discussion in some previous discourse context, even if the original speaker wasn’t the one to ask the question. Similarly, in example \(58b\) the question “was she coming” is still interpreted to have been at issue in the original discourse.

Note moreover that the use of the EIQ is incompatible with situations in which there is no available referent—that is, conversational move—for the EIQ. This explains the unacceptability of \(59b\) compared with the acceptability of \(59a\) where the standard embedded interrogative is not referential.

\[(59)\]
\[
a. \text{Everyone wanted to know whether Joe could come to the party, but no-one discussed the matter at all.}
\]
\[
b. \text{Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party, but no-one discussed the matter at all.}
\]

This is in contrast with with \(58a\), \(58b\) because at some point in the original discourse, the question “Are you coming?” (in the case of \(58a\)) and the question “Was she coming?” (in the case of \(58b\)) formed the QUD in the discourse. We can reframe the examples in \(59\) in similar fashion as follows:

\[(60)\]
\[
a. \text{Everyone wanted to know whether Joe could come to the party.}
“Can Joe come to the party?” need not have been the QUD
\]
\[
b. \text{Everyone wanted to know, “Is Joe coming to the party?”}
“Can Joe come to the party?” was at some point the QUD and was overtly asked in the discourse
\]
\[
c. \text{Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party.}
“Can Joe come to the party?” was at some point the QUD
\]

Note, however, that the EIQ always refers to a conversational move proffered in the relevant discussion and not simply the QUD as a kind of abstract conversational move itself. The fact that a speech act can convey the same value as the QUD directly should not obscure this fact, which is illustrated by the way in which the different types of embedded clause
in (60) can be refuted by the addressee on the grounds of *how* the original speech act was presented. Consider the following cases, corresponding to (60a), (60b) and (60c) respectively:

(61) A. Everyone wanted to know whether Joe could come to the party.
B. #But they didn’t say it like that!

(62) A. Everyone wanted to know, “Is Joe coming to the party?”
B. But they didn’t say it like that!
A. True, though they actually said “Is that bore coming to the party?”
A’. True, Mary said, “Is Joe coming to the party?” but Bill said “Is that bore coming to the party?”
A”. #True, no-one asked at all but Mary said she wanted to see him there.

(63) A. Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party.
B. But they didn’t say it like that!
A. True, they actually asked could that bore come to the party.
A’. True, Mary asked was Joe coming to the party but Bill asked was that bore coming to the party and Harry didn’t ask at all but talked about wanting Joe there.

While (61) cannot be evaluated for how the question was asked, (62) and (63) can. However, these last two also differ in that (62) still entails that a question was directly asked about Joe’s coming to the party, regardless of how it was asked, while (63) is compatible with the idea that one (or more) of the people wanting to know simply talked about Joe’s coming to the party rather than directly asking the question.

The reader may notice that all the EIQ examples discussed in this section include matrix predicates and refer to an original discourse context which temporally precedes the utterance time. However, it is possible for the EIQ to denote a conversational move with the same value as the QUD in the discourse in which it is produced, just like a root question. An example of this (7a) repeated below as (64)
This is expected if it is correct that an EIQ denotes a conversational move proffered in a given discourse: it should be able to proffer a conversational move in the current discourse if the current and original discourses happen to be the same. As will be shown in chapters 5 and 6, the effect of an EIQ that is evaluated with respect to the current discourse is similar to, though not quite the same as, asking an indirect question using a typical embedded interrogative.

3.5.2 Perspectives

The use of an EIQ also makes implications about the original discourse participants in the absence of overt information. While it is clear in direct speech contexts who the addressee is, as this person is referred to using second person pronouns, this is not straightforwardly the case in EIQs. However, there is an implication that referring expressions in the embedded clause will refer to the addressee. This does not necessarily hold in indirect speech contexts, as illustrated in (65).

(65)  a. I asked whether she was having an affair.  
      *Addressee may or may not be the alleged adulteress*  
    b. I asked was she having an affair.  
      *Implies that the addressee is the alleged adulteress*  
    c. I asked, “Are you having an affair?”  
      *Addressee is the alleged adulteress*  

In the case of EIQs, this is only an implication as it can easily be overwritten:

(66)  a. I asked John was she having an affair  
      *Addressee ≠ adulterer*

I assume that this is due to a close relationship between the participants in the main and embedded illocutionary acts in the EIQ which does not hold in the case of indirect speech reports. I will return to this point in section 3.7.

EIQs also pattern with direct reports of questions in terms of expressive elements in
that expressive elements in the embedded clause must be evaluated with respect to the
original speaker. This can be illustrated in an utterance such as (67) below:

(67) I mean, she just shouted at him would he just wake up already and help her find
her damn keys. She was completely out of order.

To further illustrate that this shift is obligatory, take the context in (68)

(68) Context: I think that Jane is lazy and wastes everyone’s time, but Mary is always
sympathetic to her. Mary is going out for coffee and says:

Mary: Will poor Jane be able to join me today?
Me: Mary asked if the lazy waster would be able to join her today.
Me: #Mary asked would the lazy waster be able to join her today.

Although the indirect speech report in (68) is acceptable as a report of Mary’s question,
because the attitude towards Jane can be easily attributed to the speaker, the EIQ in (68)
is not, as it must attribute to Mary attitudes towards Jane that she does not have.

Another attested example illustrates this claim with respect to discourse particles.
Assuming informally that the discourse particle oo in English expresses something like
excitement at a new idea, the example in (69) illustrates how it can be included in an
EIQ as an expression of the original speaker’s excitement. The context is that the original
speaker suddenly finds out that an old friend (the reporting speaker) and her family are
visiting the area:

(69) They said oo, could we come over for coffee so we did [go over for coffee]

Yorkshire Eng., attested 29th Dec 2015

The fact that the reporting speaker was in the area was not new to the reporting speaker,
so oo must orient to the original speaker. In addition to this, the emphasis in (69) marks a
stretch in the utterance during which the reporting speaker mimics the original speaker’s
voice, starting with oo.
This perspective shift\footnote{I will also refer to this as perspective disambiguation, as some elements may be evaluated with respect to the matrix subject in standard embedded clauses if the pragmatic context is right. However, only matrix subject orientation is available in EIQs, and a similar disambiguation effect will be shown to hold in other quasi-quotational constructions such as German/Mainland Scandinavian EV2 and Romance recombination.} is strictly limited to the embedded clause, however: any expressives in the matrix clause are evaluated with respect to the reporting speaker, just like in direct speech reports.

(70)  

a. The bitch\textsubscript{report} shouted, “Wake up already and help me find my damn\textsubscript{original} keys!”

b. The bitch\textsubscript{report} shouted would he wake up already and help her find her damn\textsubscript{original} keys.

c. The bitch\textsubscript{report} shouted that he should wake up and help her find her damn\textsubscript{report} keys.

The syntactic shape and expressive aspects of the EIQ are also accessible for further comment by others in the discourse, another similarity between EIQs and direct speech reports which distinguishes them from indirect speech reports. As a result, these elements of an EIQ can be directly questioned as well as its content. This can be seen in example (71), which is contrasted with the minimally-differing standard embedded question in (72).\footnote{It appears that some speakers who do not accept EIQs are still sensitive to the distinction between (71) and (72) (thanks to Caitlin Light for pointing this out). This raises the following question: what does it mean for such judgements to be available to non-native speakers of these dialects? I take this as further support for the idea that “non-EIQ” dialects may not actually exist, and instead there is a cline of acceptability that speakers place themselves on.}

(71) A: You asked me did I cook dinner for you.

B: No I didn’t, I asked did you make me a cup of tea.

B’: No I didn’t, I was much more polite about it than that!

(72) A: You asked me if I had cooked dinner for you.

B: No I didn’t, I asked if you had made me a cup of tea.

B’: #No I didn’t, I was much more polite about it than that!
3.6 Characteristics of EIQs only: syntax

In terms of extraction, EIQs appear at first blush to pattern with direct speech reports in that they are opaque to extraction (cf. Quine (1960), Oshima (2006), and many others). EIQs pattern with direct speech reports against indirect speech reports in blocking extraction of arguments, including those traditionally referred to as “D-linked”:

(73)  
   b. ?[Which book] did Dave ask whether he should read it?
   c. *[Which book] did Dave ask should he read it?

In general, extraction of adjuncts is disallowed too, though this is also blocked from the wh-islands created by interrogative indirect speech reports:

(74)  
   a. *How did Dave ask, “Did Jane see Mary it?”
   b. ?*How did Dave ask if Jane saw Mary it?
   c. ?*How did Dave ask did Jane see Mary it?

However, “where”/“when” adjuncts can be extracted from both EIQs and indirect speech reports according to my own experimental studies (on which more below), in contrast with direct speech reports:

(75) Island effects: weak islands?
   a. *Where did Dave ask, “Did Jane see Mary it?”
   b. ?*Where did Dave ask if Jane saw Mary it?
   c. ?*Where did Dave ask did Jane see Mary it?

In order to understand exactly what types of element can be extracted from EIQs, as well as indirect and direct speech, I conducted three short empirical studies.

The matter of extraction from speech reports, particularly from interrogative speech reports, poses a number of puzzles. Focusing on indirect speech reports, it has recently been argued that sentence-initial wh-phrases are strongly preferred to be associated with a ma-
trix rather than an embedded clause, if the reading is possible (Omaki et al. 2014) though past and contemporary research argues against this in the case of acquisition (de Villiers et al. 1990; Woods 2014) and in adult speakers (Weverink 1991, Weissenborn et al. 1991). However, embedded interrogatives are believed to be subject to the condition banning movement out of wh-islands. Moreover, inversion in the embedded clause is considered to be a complicating factor which prevents extraction from embedded clauses in adults, but not in children (Weverink 1991, using data collected by Jill de Villiers), though the stimuli used by de Villiers all concern the matrix verb *say*. To clarify the state of affairs with respect to the paradigm example of EIQs (involving the matrix verb *ask*) and with respect to the different dialects which contain EIQs, I ran three studies: two question-answer tasks and one grammaticality judgement task. The full methodologies, results and discussion can be found in the appendix, but it is most important to note the following points:

(76) a. The data showed that neither polar EIQs nor standard embedded polar questions are indisputably strong islands as both permitted extraction out of these contexts in more than 15% of cases (extraction from wh-EIQs and standard embedded wh-questions was minimal);

b. The data confirms the there is a clear argument-adjunct divide described above: speakers are much more likely to interpret *where* and *when* with an embedded clause interpretation than *who* and *what*;

c. In a three-way comparison, extraction of arguments from EIQs is judged better than extraction of arguments from direct quotes, but worse than extraction of arguments from standard embedded questions;

d. Speakers who accept EIQs in grammaticality judgement tasks permit less extraction from embedded clauses than speakers who do not accept EIQs in grammaticality judgement tasks in general, suggesting that they are more sensitive to the possibility of independent illocutionary force in embedded clauses. This is in line with the discussion in de Villiers et al. (2011).

Something that is clear based on these results is that even direct speech reports may not
be the strong islands\textsuperscript{34} they have always been taken to be. Whilst extraction out of them was clearly not judged wholly grammatical, it was not wholly rejected either. Furthermore, it is in fact possible to find dialogues in which extraction from direct speech reports occurs; the dialogue below is taken from a transcript of a recording of a maths tutorial. John is the teacher and Ruben the pupil; note, furthermore, that this is an example of extraction out of a directly quoted imperative:

(77) John: (unclear) squared it gets smaller and smaller. So that’s going to be nought point four.
Ruben: Mm.
John: So the gradient at that point is about two. Erm what wh– where were we (unclear) \textit{where did I say find the gradient}? Where X equal to three?
Ruben: Yeah.
John: Sorry (unclear) something wrong that.
Ruben: \textit{laugh}
John: So we’d be, oh, okay, that’s good cos you can do it.
Ruben: \textit{laugh} When X is three? \textit{BNC, J91 378 (speech)}

\textit{Sudo} \textsuperscript{2013} also notes that the opacity of direct speech reports is not as absolute as we may assume, and not just for extraction. He shows that wh-doublets, which he analyses as indefinites ranging over referring expressions, can appear in direct speech reports in Japanese and as such represent a kind of metalinguistic quantification into direct speech reports\textsuperscript{35}.

John-TOP Bill-NOM came COMP said “John said, “Bill came”.”

b. John-wa “dare-dare-ga kita” to itta.
John-TOP who-who-NOM came COMP said

\textsuperscript{34} For adults; many studies have shown that children are insensitive to quotes-as-islands (\textit{Weverink} \textsuperscript{1991}, \textit{Hollebrandse} \textsuperscript{2003, 2007} and freely extract out of them until around the age of 7 or 8.

\textsuperscript{35} Recall that (78a) is ambiguous as to whether it is a direct or indirect speech report, whereas (78b) must be a direct speech report due to the presence of the wh-doublet (\textit{Sudo} \textsuperscript{2013} p.4).
Similarly in English, elements of direct speech reports can be replaced with indefinites when the speaker wishes to report an utterance which she cannot remember verbatim. The example in (79) shows that not only nouns, but other lexical items can be replaced by terms like *something* in order to plug gaps in a half-remembered quote:

(79) What did I say, Scott then had the cheek to *something* me? Wish me, that was it, wasn’t it.  
BNC, KCE 3472 (speech)

It is also clear from natural speech that expressions which are presented as direct speech (or mental state) reports can also be “hijacked” by the reporting speaker who may unfaithfully report the original discourse or thought for some kind of discourse effect, as in the example below:

(80) Auntie Mary obviously went[^37] “I can’t just give a cheque as a wedding present, I’ll give them a shit piece of art as well.”  
Yorkshire Eng., attested, 28th Feb 2015

Assuming that Auntie Mary is fond of her relatives and would only give them presents she thinks to be good ones, it is unlikely that the quotation above accurately represents her thoughts and speech. Rather, the speaker has inserted her own thoughts and judgements into the quotation while still presenting it, to all intents and purposes, as a quotation and therefore as representative of Auntie Mary’s thought process. This suggests that direct quotation is not as opaque as we sometimes assume. Furthermore, the structure of the utterance above is clearly one of an attributed quotation in terms of indexicality, independent tense and the syntactic constraints it is subject to:

[^36]I have adapted slightly Sudo’s gloss to make the point immediately transparent to readers who are unfamiliar with Sudo’s paper; in fact, he refrains from equating terms like *whatsisname* to the wh-doublets due to their wider distribution.

[^37]“Go” quotatives are most often used to report the speech of third persons (Romaine & Lange 1991, p.243); in this case, context makes clear that it is her mental state that is being “reported”.
(81)  a. *What\textsubscript{i} did Auntie Mary say\textsuperscript{38}, “I can’t just give them a cheque as a wedding present, I’ll give them $t_i$ as well.”

Both the empirical and experimental data therefore suggest that EIQs fall somewhere between direct speech reports and indirect speech reports on some continuum of islandhood. As will be shown, this intermediate nature of EIQs extends to their interpretation and ultimately, the conditions in which they are used instead of indirect or direct speech reports.

3.7 Characteristics of EIQs only: semantics and pragmatics

EIQs also have properties independent of direct and indirect speech reports, in particular the implications which hold between the matrix arguments and the identity of the original discourse participants, i.e. the speaker and addressee(s) of the embedded question. An example of this, (65b), is repeated below as (82):

(82) I asked was she having an affair.

In the absence of an overt “addressee” (that is, matrix indirect object) in the EIQ, a referent in the embedded question is assumed to be the addressee. In the case that there are two referents in the embedded question, it is usually the subject, in these cases $he$:

(83)  a. I asked did he go to see her.
    b. I asked what did he show her.

Furthermore, if there is no overlap between matrix arguments and the original discourse participants, EIQs can be harder to interpret. In particular, EIQs with third-person matrix arguments and first- or second-person embedded arguments are hard to resolve if they are string-identical to direct speech and pragmatically unlikely to occur:

\footnotesize{The predicate is changed here as extraction over quotative predicates such as go and be like are independently ruled out (cf. Flagg (2007), Haddican & Zweig (2012)):

(i) What did he say?
(ii) *What did he go?
(iii) *What was he like?

\normalsize}
Without context it is easy to construe (84c) as a direct speech quotation because of its string similarity to direct speech reports and because it is slightly pragmatically odd that John would ask such a question of Mary and expect an answer. Context improves the ease of achieving this reading:

(85)    Context: John is my secretary, Mary is yours and we are overdue a meeting.

John asked Mary could I meet you at the weekend.

When the EIQ cannot be string-identical to direct speech (without assuming a fairly contrived context) the EIQ reading is easier to achieve:

(86)    John asked Mary did I meet you at the weekend.

It is not immediately clear why these facts should hold. It is evident that there is a very close connection between the embedded and the matrix event, in that the reporting speaker must have close knowledge of both the original speech act and the original discourse context in order to accurately use an EIQ; arguably, a better understanding of the discourse context in which the original speech act was made is needed to use an EIQ than is needed for a direct speech report, as suggested by the facts on substitution in section 3.3. It is also clear that the difficulties in resolving first- and second-person embedded arguments when the matrix arguments are third-person is no kind of syntactic constraint, but indeed relates to context and plausibility. This is not a unique phenomenon: there are other types of structure in other languages which link propositions to speech acts so closely that they prefer first-person agents or a strong contextual link between third-person agents and the speaker.

An example is the case of independent or indexical clause types in Plains Cree, an Algonquian language spoken in Saskatchewan and Alberta, Canada. Plains Cree, like the
other dialects of Cree, makes a distinction between independent and conjunct clauses. Clauses which are marked as independent are indexical as they are strongly bound to the current speech act situation in terms of temporal and spatial deixis and speaker commitment. Independent clauses are usually used in out-of-the-blue contexts; if they are used in narrative contexts, the topic of the clause will continually be reaffirmed as an overt nominal as anaphoric elements are blocked in independent clauses (Cook 2014, pp.71-72). Conjunct clauses, in contrast, are not so closely linked to the speaker but can be used to express distance from the speaker’s point of view; Cook (2014) analyses them as being anaphoric on previous discourse. Conjunct clauses are the only type of clause which can be embedded and generally appear in conversational, narrative and established contexts (Cook 2014, pp.139-140). Example (87a) illustrates a bare independent clause (an independent clause that does not have a left-peripheral marker for reasons outside the scope) and example (87b) a conjunct clause:

(87) a. Clare kíwê-pimohtê-w.  
Clare home-walk-3SG.INDEP  
“Clare walked home.”

b. Clare é-kíwê-pimohtê-e.  
Clare CONJ-home-walk-3SG.CONJ  
“…Clare walked home.” Plains Cree, Wiltschko (to appear)

Cook (2014) claims that both types of clause are equally complex in terms of structure—there is not one which has more structure than the other—but that independent clause marking ties the proposition to the speaker’s coordinates and commitments in a way that conjunct clause marking does not. Example (87a), for example, does not only convey the proposition that Clare walked home, but that the speaker knows it to be a fact and is stressing that it is the case. Example (87b) only conveys the proposition that Clare walked home and distances the speaker from any commitment to the proposition or taking any responsibility for its truth. Cook offers another example with a more subjective predicate, 39Cook (2014) and Wiltschko (to appear) note that the distinction between independent and conjunct modes does not map onto the distinction between embedded and matrix clauses; independent clauses must be matrix clauses, but conjunct clauses can appear in matrix or embedded contexts. This means that Plains Cree could be a valuable resource for determining the nature of the IAP in matrix clauses, though this will have to be pursued in future research.
which further highlights the role of the speaker in independent clauses:

(88)  

\[
\text{Context: consultants are asked to translate the English sentence “I like this chair.”}
\]

a.  

\[
m\text{iwy\text{"a}s}n \quad \text{o\text{"a}ma} \quad \text{t\text{"e}hapiwin}. \\
good.V\text{II} \quad \text{DEM.INANIMATE sit.ANIMATE-INTRANS.NOM}
\]

“This is a nice chair (to me).”

b.  

\[
\#\text{m\text{"i}wy\text{"a}s}k \quad \text{o\text{"a}ma} \quad \text{t\text{"e}hapiwin}. \\
CONJ.good.V\text{II} \quad \text{DEM.INANIMATE sit.ANIMATE-INTRANS.NOM}
\]

“\ldots This is a nice chair.” Plains Cree,  

From Cook (2014, pp.108-109)

Cook’s consultants suggest [88a] as an appropriate translation of I like this chair as the predicate miywâsi- is interpreted with respect to the speaker. Moreover, one of the consultants notes the following:

(89)  

“If you use miywâsin about something that someone else has, then the other person has to give it to you. It’s very powerful.”

The intuition in [89] suggests the strength of the connection to the speaker conveyed by the use of an independent clause. It is particularly relevant to the EIQ data shown in [85] that a strong connection is forged between the speaker and the proposition in independent clauses, just as there must be a strong contextual link between the matrix speaker and the question in the EIQ in [85] for the EIQ to be licit. Cook further notes that:

When the subject of [a] predicate is distinct from the speaker (e.g. a third person), the use of an indexical clause means that the speaker has some other relation to the proposition: the speaker may have experienced the event coded by the proposition, be epistemically committed to the proposition, or be providing an evaluation of the proposition.

From Cook (2014, p.109)

In contrast, the conjunct clause in [88b] shows no such connection between speaker and proposition; Cook’s consultants say that a conjunct clause would never be used to express the speaker’s own opinion towards the chair.

The EIQ data in [85] and the data from Plains Cree illustrate that natural language can use syntactic and morphosyntactic means to encode a close relationship between a relevant
discourse participant and a proposition or question. In the case of Plains Cree, clauses are typed according to whether the speaker and her situation are intimately related to the proposition (in the case of independent clauses) or whether the speaker is distant from the proposition (in conjunct clauses). In English, an EIQ is used to convey an intimate link between the reported question and the original questioner and can also imply that the reporting speaker has privileged knowledge of the original discourse. In contrast, indirect questions do not make any claims about the relationship of the reporting speaker to the original discourse, nor do they encode any details about the original discourse context.

3.8 Summary: EIQs as quasi-quotational structures

It is clear from the facts on EIQs that they are syntactically embedded due to the presence of Sequence of Tense effects, the lack of indexical shift and the binding facts. There is also no phonological evidence to suggest that EIQs constitute an independent clause or utterance. However, it is also clear that they are not selected by the matrix predicate under which they are embedded. Negation, modal and [+wh] operators in the matrix context are not expected to interfere in selection relations, yet they affect the compatibility of EIQs with certain matrix predicates.

On the other hand, EIQs are semantically and pragmatically much more similar to direct speech. They presuppose that the embedded question was at some point the QUD of the original discourse, regardless of the matrix predicate and whether or not it usually communicates an explicit questioning act. They can also contain expressive and perspectival elements contained in the original act, for example speech act adverbs and discourse particles. Finally, the exact content of the EIQ is restricted by the original speaker’s knowledge and common ground; if a given label for a particular referent is not connected with that referent by the original speaker, then the reporting speaker may not use that label in the EIQ. Yet EIQs differ from direct speech reports in that there is no verbatim requirement of the kind imposed on direct speech reports.

It is therefore proposed that EIQs are a kind of quasi-quotational structure. They are neither indirect nor direct speech reports. Instead, they combine aspects of both to
produce a structure which does not require the reporting speaker to repeat or reperform the original speech act verbatim but allows the reporting of expressive and not-at-issue content, content which cannot be expressed through the use of indirect speech reports. Neither are they strictly embedded speech acts, because there are phenomena such as *huh* as outlined in section 3.4 that can never be embedded. Instead, I refer to EIQs as embedded illocutionary acts due to these restrictions on exactly the type of so-called root phenomena that can be embedded in EIQs. EIQs are not the only exponents of quasi-quotation in natural language and other cases will be treated in the chapters to follow.

The reader may at this point ask whether EIQs are cases of “mixed” quotation analogous to the cases of Japanese imperatives examined by Maier (2009, 2010). According to Maier, mixed quotation “consists of an indirect speech report in which a part is quoted verbatim” (Maier 2010, p.3). In his system, indirect speech complements to verbs such as ‘say’ are of type t and direct speech complements to verbs like ‘say’ are of type u, an utterance type. Embedded clauses in mixed quotations are also of type t, but they contain some part that, whilst not an utterance of type u in itself, carries the presupposition of having been said verbatim. To use Maier’s key example, (90) is made up of an assertion and a presupposition:

(90) John said that this is “news to me”.

a. Presupposition: John used the expression ‘news to me’ to express some property P.

b. Assertion: John said that this has property P. Maier (2010, p.7)

Maier notes that in (90) ‘news to me’ is still a VP of type et rather than an utterance of type u, just as it would be in the following sentence:

(91) John said that this is news to me.

The differences between (91) and (90) are that the referent of the first-person pronoun is John in (90) but the speaker in (91) (Maier 2010, p.7). Moreover, the presupposition in

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40 As did Hotze Rullmann at WCCFL 33, with thanks.
(90) is like an anaphor in that the property of something being “news to X” exists that can be referred to in (90) but not in (91) (Maier 2010, p.9).

There are a number of reasons why I do not consider EIQs to be mixed quotation qua insertion of directly quoted elements into an indirect speech act, and also some reasons why Maier’s ‘mixed quotation’ class might not be a particularly helpful one.

Beginning with the second point, it is not entirely clear in Maier’s work how mixed quotation is distinct from indirect speech reporting in some cases, nor is it clear that that distinction is empirically justified. In his 2010 paper, Maier suggests that embedded imperatives in Japanese (and English and German) should be analysed as mixed quotation because the dedicated imperative form of the embedded verb used in such cases is the same as that used in matrix imperatives, but indexical elements of the embedded clause are determined by the current, and not the reported, utterance context. He claims that non-mixed quotation analyses can only account for this combination of matrix verb form and shifted indexicals by the insertion of a ‘monstrous operator’ in the sense of Kaplan (1989), despite these operators not being otherwise available in these languages.

However, Maier does not provide any strong evidence that the Japanese examples are not examples of embedded speech reports other than the presence of the imperative verb form and the inability to extract over the imperative verb form; he does not use other diagnostics such as the availability of wh-doublets (cf. Sudo (2013)) or the unavailability of NPI licensing.

What is more, he assumes that monsters in the Kaplanian sense are the only method of accounting for the lack of indexical shift; an intuition which runs counter to the usual analysis of monsters as operators in indirect speech reports which effect indexical shift, rather than mask it. As I intend to show, there are other structural ways of analysing the insertion of elements from the original context without resorting to a mixture of direct speech reporting plus monster operators. In fact, his account of mixed quotation leaves a lot of questions unanswered: he seems to propose a verbatim requirement on everything except indexicals, though sometimes these are reported verbatim too. He also suggests that free insertion of other elements deemed necessary by the reporting speaker is available. Neither of these points is incompatible with an analysis of imperative indirect speech reports such
as that proposed by Kaufmann (2015).

Finally, the elements which undergo shifting in EIQs (and in similar constructions) are much more constrained than would be expected under a mixed quotation account. If EIQs were a matter of mixed quotation, we would assume that speech act adverbs, for example, would optionally orient to the current speaker in cases in which they are not quoted, but this is not possible: in EIQs they obligatorily orient to the original speaker. The same goes for discourse particles and imperative verb forms in English; these all obligatorily orient to the original discourse participants and not the current ones. Moreover, temporal adverbials do not shift. This argument further extends to non-Indo-European languages which show a range of quasi-quotational constructions in which personal pronouns (of all syntactic roles, not just subject or object) or verbal agreement may shift perspective. This shift affects the availability of other elements in the clause, such as vocatives, which is directly conditioned by the presence of shifting. Crucially, all these phenomena are dependent on each other, which a mixed quotation analysis cannot predict due to its lack of constraints. In all these cases, mixed quotation is also freer than quasi-quotation, because as (85) shows, there must be some kind of connection between the matrix arguments and the embedded EIQ. Similarly, in languages like Manam 41 quasi-quotational constructions are only licit when the matrix subject is intimately involved in and affected by the original speech act (Aikhenvald 2008, p.397). This restriction does not apply in mixed quotation, however, as the original speaker Herman need not have any particular connection with or have ever conversed with Wanda in order to license mixed quotation in (92):

(92) Herman said that Wanda “hated her looks with all her heart and soul.”

In these ways the effects of quasi-quotation are much more constrained than mixed quotation, in which any element of the clause can potentially be quoted.

Given these issues, I do not see that Maier’s account actually shows that Japanese embedded imperatives are a real mixture of direct and indirect speech reporting, nor that the presence of the imperative verb form in embedded contexts is indicative of direct qua-

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41 An Ndu language spoken in New Guinea.
tation. Furthermore, given the lack of restriction on the mechanisms that Maier proposes, it does not seem that mixed quotation as Maier characterises it is a particularly helpful class which could be usefully extended to other languages.

However, there are elements of Maier’s analysis that will prove to be very useful in the following account of EIQs. In a sentence like (93), Maier considers mixed quotation to “induce a meaning shift, from the actual meaning of the words to the meaning that the reported speaker associates with those words” (Maier 2010, p.7).

(93) John said that this is “news to me”.

Maier states that use of the string “news to me” carries a presupposition that these quoted words are meant to express some particular property which belongs to something else in the speech report; in (93) the use of this string expresses that whatever “this” refers is new information to John, and that the reporting speaker felt this to be notable in her report. We have already seen above that the use of the EIQ over a standard indirect speech report also carries a presupposition, namely that the question contained in the EIQ at some point constituted a question which was at issue (discussed or overtly asked) in the original discourse.

Maier’s analysis aside, there are many other reasons to reject the idea that EIQs are examples of mixed direct and indirect quotation. Firstly, there is no requirement whatsoever that any part of the EIQ is a verbatim quote. To take examples from the previous discussion like (60) and (58a), repeated below as (94), there is no requirement that the questions represented in these EIQs were even asked as questions, though the question they represent must have been discussed in the original discourse. Nor is it clear which part of (94a) or (94b) could be said to be directly quoted:

(94) a. Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party.
   b. I didn’t ask were you coming last night.

Given that it hardly seems sensible to start considering individual lexical items in these examples such as party, Joe and coming as quoted items, it is unclear how EIQs could
definitely be considered mixed quotation, or even quotational at all, if quotation is contingent on some kind of verbatim reproduction. Other aspects of the behaviour of EIQs are intermediate between the behaviour of indirect and direct speech reports, such as extractibility of elements (as illustrated in section 3.4) the types of discourse markers which can be adjoined in EIQs (as will be illustrated in section 6.2). As such, it does not seem warranted to analyse EIQs as a mixture of direct and indirect speech reports, but instead to analyse them as a separate method of reporting questions altogether.

I will do this by retaining the spirit of McCloskey’s (2006) analysis of Irish English EIQs and proposing that the extra layer of structure that he introduces is a projection dedicated to encoding the illocutionary force of a clause. This projection is inspired by, but is an amended version of the Speech Act structures proposed by Speas & Tenny (2003) and Haegeman & Hill (2013). In this way not only the syntactic characteristics of the EIQ but also its interpretive characteristics may be accounted for.

3.9 Conclusion

EIQs provide speakers of English with a third method of reporting speech that is intermediate between direct and indirect speech reports. EIQs do not introduce the verbatim inference that comes with use of a direct speech report, most noticeably because indexical shift does not occur. However, like direct speech reports, EIQs allow the representation of (certain) not-at-issue and expressive components of the original speech act. In particular the EIQ expresses the relationship between the discourse participants to be one of true information seeking or true requesting, such that the original speaker’s stance and attitude with respect to the question is clear. Consequently, the EIQ represents an original speech act but does not reperform it. While it represents the discourse move made by the original question, it does not itself constitute the same discourse move in the new discourse. Furthermore, the EIQ refers to a conversational move made in order to resolve a question under discussion in the relevant original discourse. In the case of EIQs used under present tense predicates, it is proposed that the use of the EIQ effectively ends up denoting itself, though this proposal will be refined in chapter 5. Taking the syntactic and
pragmatic dependence of the EIQ together with its referential nature, we see that the EIQ can be analysed as an embedded illocutionary act in a less powerful way than in Krifka (2014), but with more pragmatic effects than the analyses of Henry (1995) and McCloskey (2006) can account for.

In the chapters to follow I shall discuss the syntactic structure of the EIQ, building on McCloskey’s (2006) analysis to incorporate new ideas about the differences between the two highest functional heads in the structure and how the structure can account for the syntactic and semantic characteristics of the EIQ. In doing this I will also bring in data on quasi-quotational structures in other languages, in particular Spanish, Catalan, European Portuguese, German and the mainland Scandinavian languages. I shall then discuss the syntactic relationship of the EIQ to the matrix clause, how this affects its distribution and how it fits into our understanding of clausal complementation more generally.

\footnote{It is only fair to note that McCloskey’s analysis, in noting the availability of adjunct phrases in EIQs, nods towards the discourse role of the EIQ—something that he explicitly makes mention to at the end of his paper (McCloskey 2006 pp.114-118). He does not develop this approach in the paper, however.}
Chapter 4

Analysis Part I: the Illocutionary Act Phrase

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter my focus will be on justifying an extra layer of structure that I claim is present in EIQs and on detailing the role(s) and representation of this extra layer. I will refer to this layer as the Illocutionary Act phrase (IAP) because, I claim, it instantiates independent illocutionary force in the embedded clause but is not the full Speech Act layer of Speas & Tenny (2003) and others.

I will also claim that the IAP is available in other quasi-quotational constructions, so in this chapter and the one to follow, I will bring in and discuss examples of such constructions. I will specifically consider recomplementation in Spanish, Catalan and European Portuguese, which occurs in embedded assertions and embedded questions, and discourse-related embedded verb second (EV2) in German and Mainland Scandinavian, which occurs in embedded assertions.

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1 This is in contrast with “generalised” EV2 as found in Yiddish (Diesing 1990), Afrikaans (Biberauer 2002a,b, 2015), and dialects of Icelandic (Rögnvaldsson & Thráinsson 1990), amongst many others. The typology of EV2 across Germanic is still only partially understood, and there are other languages with apparently discourse-related EV2 which I will not discuss in this thesis, including Dutch, Swiss German, Frisian and possibly Faroese.

2 These languages do not behave wholly the same with respect to EV2 (cf. Julien (2015)) and I will highlight the differences between German on the one hand and the Mainland Scandinavian languages on the other as they become relevant.
4.2 Motivations for extra structure

4.2.1 Refining and extending past analyses

I propose that an extra layer of structure, specifically an extra projection above ForceP, is present in the embedded clause of a quasi-quotational construction for the following reasons: the possibility of adjoining high material that is generally barred in clausal complements; the availability of V-to-Force\(^o\) movement that is not necessarily in complementary distribution with the presence of a complementiser (cf. obligatory complementisers in Swedish EV2, some EIQ examples in English); the islandhood of EIQs, EV2 and re-complementation clauses; and the special meaning of quasi-quotational constructions, in particular the obligatory disambiguation of perspectives. As I will argue in this chapter and the one to follow, this projection consists of a perspectival monster that disambiguates between potential perspective holders and is the argument to a functional head.

In many ways this proposal is a refinement and an extension of past ideas. It is heavily influenced by the CP recursion analysis of EIQs by McCloskey (2006). McCloskey claimed that the availability of root-like adjunction is due to the presence of a functional head—in his analysis a second CP—between the matrix verb and the embedded CP, thereby circumventing the Adjunction Prohibition to CP that he attributes to Chomsky (1986, p.6):

(1) Adjunction to a phrase which is s-selected by a lexical (open class) head is ungrammatical.  
 McCloskey (2006) p.93

The availability of high adjunction correlates with the availability of verb movement to \(\text{Force}^o\), so McCloskey argues that the extra functional head accounts for both phenomena following established principles on lexical and functional selection and also shows parallels with the distinction between embedded interrogatives that represent true questions and those that represent resolved propositions.\(^3\) Although McCloskey informally ties the avail-

\(^3\)McCloskey also claims that the availability of multiply realised complementisers, as in examples like (i), also provide evidence for a CP recursion structure (McCloskey 2006, p.104):

(i) My fervent prayer is that for the sake of the president and the sake of this nation that this matter

This intuition, though attractive, is not correct for a number of reasons. These will be discussed in chapter

\(^3\) I do not believe that this diminishes the strength of McCloskey’s analysis for EIQs however.
ability of the CP recursion structure to differences in illocutionary force, I will take this informal connection one step further to show that the co-occurrence of CP recursion and independently represented embedded illocutionary force is not solely pragmatic but has other syntactic reflexes. In so doing, I will also do away with the Complementiser Haplo- logy Filter that McCloskey requires to avoid multiply recursing CPs, instead concluding that the restriction of the CP recursion structure to just two positions results from the two functional heads being distinct and interacting with embedding predicates in specific ways.

This proposal is also a refinement and an extension of Speas & Tenny’s (2003) proposals that speech acts are headed by a three-place predicate containing a syntactically-represented speaker and hearer with a silent \([\text{ASK}]\) head (or relevant equivalent). Speas & Tenny primarily focused on matrix cases and some problems for their account have already been discussed in section 2.3.4. Postulating a whole three-place predicate with speaker and hearer in the case of embedded clauses with independent illocutionary force would immediately and rightly be subject to the criticism of redundancy, given the presence of the matrix clause.

However, a secondary element to their analysis may prove to be of use in cases such as that of quasi-quotational constructions. In addition to the three-place predicate described above, Speas & Tenny look to account for the highly restricted properties of phenomena like logophoric pronouns and evidentiality by proposing a further projection between their Speech Act phrase and the rest of the clause called SentienceP. SentienceP relates a \textit{Seat of Knowledge} in its specifier with an Evidential element in its complement (Speas & Tenny 2003, p.333). This SentienceP has a dual use; accounting for cases in which the perspective holder is not one of the discourse participants and accounting for so-called “interrogative flip” using framework-internal principles. Zu (2015) also uses this structure to account for verbal agreement in Newari (Sino-Tibetan), which varies depending on whether the perspective-holder is a discourse participant or an argument of the matrix clause. She argues that the verbal agreement is mediated via a logophorically-sensitive PRO in the specifier of SentienceP, which sits between the matrix clause and the complement CP.

I will propose a similar analysis to Zu’s in order to account for perspective disambigua-
tion in quasi-quotational constructions, which retains the insights of Speas & Tenny with respect to syntactically-represented perspective holders. My account will differ in terms of the representation of the perspective holder, which crucially is NOT a referential DP (à la Speas & Tenny) or PRO (à la Zu) but a perspectival monster that will be discussed in the next chapter. Moreover, I will extend Zu’s conclusion that SentienceP (in this work IAP\(^4\)) is embeddable by showing that only IAP is embeddable and that other discourse projections are not. This will account for the restrictions on the type of discourse particles that can be embedded in quasi-quotational contructions such as EIqs and EV2.

There are further reasons for postulating an extra layer of structure based on the specific data considered in chapter 3 and data from EV2. Firstly, it was shown in section 3.4 that discourse particles like *please* can occur as the highest element of the EIq. In Woods (2016), I show that there are (at least) two types of *please* in English. One of these is embeddable in contexts such as EIqs and is a verb-based, clause-initial, integrated functional head that interacts with but cross-cuts clause types. Its effect is to specify the illocutionary force carried by the clause it heads. This kind of *please* is only compatible with interrogative and imperative clause types (as shown in (2)) and specifies their interpretation such that they can only be interpreted as requests rather than information-seeking questions (3) or orders (4), respectively:

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(2)]
\begin{enumerate}
\item Please can I have a beer?
\item Please get me a beer.
\item *Please I’ll have a beer. (without prosodic break)
\end{enumerate}
\item[(3)]
\begin{enumerate}
\item Can you open the window? \textit{Request or information-seeking question}
\item Please can you open the window? \textit{Request only}
\end{enumerate}
\item[(4)]
\begin{enumerate}
\item Open the window. \textit{Request or order}
\item Please open the window. \textit{Request only}
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

\(^4\)Note that Speas & Tenny cleave quite closely to Cinque’s hierarchy of projections to guide their proposed structure and Zu keeps to their original terminology. I do not follow this line of thinking, not least because speech act adverbs can be embedded in EIqs without any evidence that a speech act projection with SPEAKER and HEARER is present. It is for this reason that I will not follow their labelling structure despite the similarities between our proposals.
As previously noted in section 2.4.2, Coniglio & Zegrean (2012) examine similar kinds of discourse particles in matrix clauses in German, Italian and Romanian. They claim that the way in which they cross-cut clause types is evidence that illocutionary force, which they define as the expression of speaker attitudes and intentions, is syntactically represented in a projection separate from any clause typing mechanism. They represent the relationship between Illocutionary Force, Force and discourse particles as one of agreement, in which a discourse particle, overt or covert, values an interpretable clause type feature on a lower Force head, and an interpretable “intention” feature on a higher Force head. They represent this relationship as in (5), using their original notation:

(5) \( \text{ILL. FORCE } [\text{ortyp} \ [\text{val}]/[\text{intent} \ [\text{val}]] - \text{ intentionality valued} \)

\( \text{CLAUSE TYPE } [\text{itype} \ [\text{val}]] - \text{ clause type valued} \)

\( \text{PRT } [\text{ortyp} \ [\text{val}]/[\text{intent} \ [\text{val}]] \)

Coniglio & Zegrean (2012, p.249)

The diagram in (5) illustrates that neither the clause-typing head nor the illocutionary force head that Coniglio & Zegrean assume enter the derivation with values for their respective features. These features are valued via Agree with a particle, a functional head that may or may not be spelled out in a given sentence.

Problems with this analysis include: the postulation of a null discourse particle in all sentences that do not contain an overt particle, which they claim is not spelled out due to the lack of “markedness” of its value, though it is not clear what they mean by “markedness” here; the fact that one discourse particle may be compatible with a number of different clause types; a lack of clarity as to how their system copes with realisation of multiple particles; and a lack of explanation as to how other processes that are dependent on or mark clause type, such as wh-movement, are triggered in their system.

Whilst I will follow Coniglio & Zegrean’s idea that illocutionary force and clause type are not represented on the same head, I will propose a very different analysis of how

\footnote{Some particles, in particular the German particles, are assumed to be base-generated in the Mittelfeld, others, such as Romanian \textit{oare}, are assumed to be generated in the C domain. Woods (2016) outlines reasons for believing that clause-initial integrated \textit{please} is generated as the overt instantiation of the IA head. The position of the discourse particle is not crucial to their analysis (Coniglio & Zegrean 2012 p.240) or to mine, though the possibility of overtly spelling out the IA head provides stronger evidence for its presence than apparently obligatory silence would.}
different types of illocutionary force are represented and how they interact with clause types.

4.2.2 Directly representing independent illocutionary force

In addition to the presence of high discourse particles that specify illocutionary force, there is another syntactic reflex that I will argue is directly dependent on independent illocutionary force, namely the overt instantiation of Force\(^6\) either by verb movement (EIQs, EV2) or repeated complementisers (recomplementation).

In order to argue this, it is necessary first to make clear my definition of independent illocutionary force. As alluded to in the previous chapter, independent illocutionary force is not a question of requiring or provoking a response from an addressee. This is a criterion for independent illocutionary force that seems to be used exclusively in discussions of embedded illocutionary force in non-direct speech reports, yet few would argue that direct speech reports containing questions lack independent illocutionary force, even though they do not require a response from the addressee to whom the report, not the original question, is addressed for the discourse to continue successfully. Moreover it is not the case that a clause must be the main point of utterance (MPU, in the sense of Simons (2007)) to have independent illocutionary force. There are myriad examples of clauses without independent illocutionary force that can be the MPU—standard embedded declaratives, for instance—and cases of main clauses which carry illocutionary force yet are not the MPU.

In fact, the main point of utterance is not even strictly tied to the most “speech-act”-like part of the utterance. There is a variety of reasons why an embedded clause may be the MPU rather than a matrix clause but that does not mean that the embedded clause constitutes a separate speech act. One reason that some EIQs may seem like main points of utterance (or main information requests, MIRs)\(^7\) is that they match the main clause type

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\(^6\)To foreground the discussion to come, my analysis of please in Woods (2016) shows that clause-initial please does not simply cross-cut clause types, but cross-cuts within clause types; it is only available with polar interrogatives and not with wh-questions. These facts suggest that Portner & Zanuttini’s (2003) assertion that clause type is a collection of features rather than a single feature on Force\(^6\) is the right approach to take, though the role of Force\(^6\) will also be shown to be of particular significance in marking clause type.

\(^7\)Simons does not address questions in her paper, though Haddican et al. (2014) define the Main Information Request (MIR), in similar terms to the MPU, as the question denoted by the utterance of an interrogative sentence in a given context (Haddican et al. 2014, p.100).
(cf. Haddican et al. 2014), that is to say that they are both interrogative clauses. Another trigger for MRI-hood appears to be tense. We see in (6) that neither (a) nor (b) invite a natural answer to the embedded question, even though one is a standard embedded question and one is an EIQ. Conversely, both examples in (7) invite a more natural—certainly a more co-operative—answer to the embedded than to the matrix question:

(6)  a. Did you know whether Mary was coming? \textit{Standard embedded question}  
     b. ?Did you know was Mary coming? \textit{EIQ}

(7)  a. Do you know whether Mary is coming? \textit{Standard embedded question}  
     b. Do you know is Mary coming? \textit{EIQ}

In fact it also seems that tense actually adds another layer of complexity to the acceptability of EIQs under certain predicates. If we substitute know in (6) with ask, suddenly the EIQ seems better-formed, even though (7b) is fine and we know that the acceptability of EIQs under factive verbs improves under interrogation.

(8)  a. Did you ask whether Mary was coming? \textit{Standard embedded interrogative}  
     b. Did you ask was Mary coming? \textit{EIQ}

I do not know why tense interacts with MPU/MIR in this way and will not try to account for it here. However, the relative acceptability of (6b) and (8b) indicates that although the EIQ need not be the MIR, it may be preferred that it is, at least in the presence of a second-person subject. The examples in (9) with a third-person subject do not seem to differ in acceptability.

(9)  a. Did she know was Mary coming?  
     b. Did she ask was Mary coming?

It is clear that the factors that influence the MPU-ness of a clause are many and interact in complex ways. It is also clear that independent illocutionary force is not contingent on the clause being the MPU. Instead, following Krifka 2014, I claim that independent
illocutionary force is the expression of responsibility being taken for the proposition/set of propositions in the given clause by a given discourse participant. Note that independent illocutionary force simply is not about the availability of attitudinal, expressive or not-at-issue material, though it is related to this. Like Krifka, I use the term responsibility rather than commitment, a term commonly used with respect to illocutionary force, because commitment can be described in terms of strength, which is a separate matter from illocutionary force. Though a speaker may not be strongly committed to the truth of a proposition, for example if they use a particularly weak evidential marker of some kind in a declarative clause, they are still responsible for the truth of that proposition; they take responsibility for the truth of the proposition in the conversation with the proviso that they only have weak evidence for it. Moreover, as detailed in section 2.4.3 Krifka (2014) shows how a speaker can take responsibility for a proposition despite not believing in it at all or being able to make any real commitment to its truth, for example in the case of lies and bullshit. In the rest of this dissertation therefore I will use the definitions of illocutionary force in table 4.1, which are based around the concept of responsibility. Note that the table below is by no means exhaustive and will be developed and elaborated on in the work to follow, but it is intended to provide a working definition of illocutionary forces upon which we can build our understanding of the syntax and semantics of quasi-quotational constructions:

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8Thank you to Manfred Krifka for discussing this concept with me and pointing me towards the relevant literature.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples of clause type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asserting</td>
<td>Speaker takes responsibility for the truth of the proposition (cf. <a href="#">Krifka (2014)</a>)</td>
<td>Declaratives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promising</td>
<td>Speaker takes responsibility for enacting a desired or required action (M. Krifka, p.c.)</td>
<td>Declaratives (in English), Promissives (e.g. Korean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questioning</td>
<td>Speaker expresses the desire for the addressee to provide a true answer to the question based on the addressee’s knowledge; the addressee takes responsibility for the truth of the answer</td>
<td>Interrogatives, some declaratives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requesting</td>
<td>Speaker expresses the desire for the addressee to take responsibility for enacting a desired action, linguistic or non-linguistic</td>
<td>Interrogatives, Imperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordering</td>
<td>Speaker expresses the requirement for the addressee to take responsibility for enacting a desired action, linguistic or non-linguistic</td>
<td>Imperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclaiming</td>
<td>Speaker takes responsibility for an attitude and making it public (S. Repp, via M. Krifka, p.c.)</td>
<td>Exclamatives, Interrogatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Table 4.1: Working definitions of types of illocutionary force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But to return to the original statement made in this section, I claim that the overt instantiation of Force\(^o\) either by verb movement (EIQs, EV2) or repeated complementisers (recomplementation) is directly dependent on independent illocutionary force. In fact the relationship is biconditional, because for independent illocutionary force to be present it must be unambiguous as to where the responsibility for the speech act lies, and this disambiguation effect only occurs when Force\(^o\) is marked either by verb movement or recomplementation.

### 4.2.3 Roadmap for this chapter

Having laid out the motivations for postulating extra structure and my approach to illocutionary force, the rest of the chapter focuses on the head of the proposed Illocutionary Act phrase (the IA head) and will be structured as follows. First I will discuss overt and covert representations of the IA head and how it encodes illocutionary force like a modal
verb but also displays some noun-like properties. To do this I will also bring in data from languages other than English, in particular data from EV2 in German and Mainland Scandinavian. I will also continue to clarify the meaning of independent illocutionary force and how this relates to filling $\text{Force}^o$, with particular focus on embedded verb movement and how independent illocutionary force affects the mechanism of V-to-$\text{Force}$. The details of the external argument of the IA head will follow in chapter 5.

### 4.3 Structure and representation

The extra layer of structure proposed here is represented in (10):

(10) a. I asked him [please would he make dinner for me]

b. 

```
IAP
  |  
PERSPECTIVAL situation MONSTER pronoun IA IA'
  |  
(please) Force ForceP
  |  
would he make dinner for me
```

Focusing on the IA head, as shown in (10) it can be optionally spelled out as *please* if the embedded clause is compatible with a request reading. In the case that it is spelled out as *please*, this overtly marks requesting force and the embedded clause can no longer be interpreted as an information-seeking question.

Further arguments for postulating clause-initial integrated *please* as an instantiation of the IA head are detailed in [Woods (2016)] and are recapped below:

(11) a. Only in its clause-initial position is *please* obligatorily interpreted as a request
b. Clause-initial *please* is only compatible with clause types that permit a request reading: polar interrogatives and imperatives

c. Clause-initial *please* is not a politeness marker (it is possible in non-polite contexts) but is inseparable from the meaning of requesting

d. With sentence fragments such as “Please Mum!”, *please* can constitute a speech act of requesting on its own; it is also interpreted as a request rather than a politeness marker, with the actual content of the request elided as it is recoverable from context

e. Clause-initial *please* is not used by children until they have reliably acquired CP, despite reinforcement by parents of the polite usage. This suggests that it is not fully acquired until all the relevant structure is in place

f. Clause-initial *please* falls into line with other discourse particles also analysed as illocutionary act heads (cf. Coniglio & Zegrean (2012)):

   (i) It cannot be modified

   (ii) It cannot be co-ordinated

   (iii) It is derived from a verb, namely to *please*

It is not simply enough to rely on one possible overt instantiation of the IA head, however; it is also necessary to understand its finer structure, especially when it is covert, and how it interacts with the Force head to bring about the syntactic reflex of verb movement.

The proposal made in this section is that the IA head is a modal operator that may be overt or covert and that takes two arguments: a clause (whether that be a proposition, a set of propositions or a property) and the relevant perspective holder(s). To do this, I will take Hacquard’s (2010) analysis of intensional modal operators in the syntax as a starting point and extend her analysis to suggest that similar operators are embeddable in precisely such cases as EIQs and EV2.

4.3.1 V-like structure

Hacquard (2010) argues that the meanings of modal verbs are related to events and de-
terminated by basic principles of binding and locality; they are interpreted according to the
closest event binder, be that a VP event, an event predicate in a higher clause or the
speech event. In proposing this, she claims that speech events are syntactically repre-
sented as modal operators and are therefore syntactic binders for variables just like any
other. Specifically, she proposes that there is one speech event operator per utterance in
the highest position of the clause and that this determines the illocutionary force of the
clause. Taking assertive events as her example, she proposes an ASSERT modal operator in
the style of [Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2010)] “which quantifies over the speaker’s
epistemic/doxastic alternatives and combines with a proposition” (Hacquard 2010, p.102):

(12) \[
[[\text{assert}]]^c = \lambda p. \lambda w. \forall w' \in \text{DOX}_{\text{speaker}} of c(w): p(w') = 1
\]

Hacquard then reworks the operator in (12) with respect to events. To do this she also
defines what the content (CON) of the event is—in the case of assertion, a member of the
set of the speaker’s doxastic alternatives:

(13) \[
[[\text{assert } e_0]] = \lambda p. \lambda x. \lambda w. \text{Assert}(e_0, w) \land \forall w' \in \cap \text{CON}(e_0): p(w') = 1
\]

where \( \cap \text{CON}(e_0) = \text{DOX}(\exists x \text{ Holder}(x, e_0), w); \exists x \text{ Holder}(x, e_0) = \text{speaker} \)

This modal operator differs from matrix verbs qua event binders in three ways: firstly, in
terms of the event doing the binding; secondly, in terms of whose alternative worlds are
being quantified over; and thirdly, in terms of being relativised to a given context. Below is
the definition of believe given by Hacquard, which is treated as “quantif[ying] over worlds
compatible with the subject’s doxastic alternatives” (Hacquard 2010, p.101).

(14) \[
[[\text{believe}]] = \lambda p. \lambda x. \lambda w. \forall w' \in \text{DOX}(x, w): p(w') = 1
\]

In event terms, believe is an “event predicate in terms of the experience, object and context
of the event […] where \( \text{CON}(e) \) denotes the content of \( e \).
The details of the differences mentioned above are as follows: firstly, the event in [[assert]] is bound by the default event binder (cf. Percus (2000)) whereas the event in [[believe]] is bound by the only other element in the sentence which introduces a new event binder, which is aspect (Hacquard 2010, p.99). It is important to note that while [[believe]] has an event argument, it does not introduce its own event binder. Secondly, the alternative worlds being quantified over in [[believe]] are those of the matrix subject—this is well understood and accepted. Thirdly, however, the speech context is introduced in [[assert]] but not in [[believe]] because of the clause in (13) in which the alternative worlds are evaluated with respect to a perspective holder, and that perspective holder is identified as the speaker.

Returning to the question of EIQs, we are concerned with the interpretation of context-dependent elements related to attitudes and knowledge that exclusively orient to the matrix subject in EIQs, despite not behaving uniformly in standard embedded questions. In standard embedded questions, such elements often receive a speaker-oriented interpretation despite being embedded under speech or attitudinal verb, and it can be hard to assign a subject-oriented interpretation to such elements. The behaviour of attitudinal elements in standard embedded clauses suggests that an analysis that relies on the matrix verb as the operator determining the interpretation of these elements in EIQs is not sufficient for several reasons. Firstly, it is not clear in that case why both speaker and subject orientation is available in standard embedded clauses—this is an ongoing problem that I will not address here. Secondly, we have already seen that the exact meaning of the matrix verb is unimportant with respect to the interpretation of quasi-quotational constructions: all EIQs have the same interpretation as referring to a conversational move in the original discourse, regardless of meaning differences in the matrix verb such as introspection or whether the matrix verb explicitly introduces a question or not. As Roberts (2012, p.5) puts it, “[conversational] moves [the items in the QUD stack, R.W.] are not speech acts but the semantic objects that are used in speech acts: a speech act is the act of proffering a move.” This is illustrated again below:
(16)  a. They were all asking would John come to the party #but no-one mentioned it.
   b. They were all saying would John come to the party #but no-one mentioned it.
   c. They were all wanting to know would John come to the party #but no-one mentioned it.

Regardless of whether the matrix predicate entails that a specific question was actually asked in the original discourse context, there must be a conversational move made that addresses a relevant QUD in the original context for the EIQ to refer to.

For these reasons I propose extending Hacquard’s analysis of speech event operators in matrix clauses to embedded clauses of the quasi-quotational type. In this way we can account for both the event-relatedness of EIQs and the fact of obligatory subject orientation, if we consider the role of the context, which is present in the modal speech event operator and not in the matrix verb qua operator. We can also begin to understand a difference not yet investigated in this thesis so far, namely that while perspective disambiguation also occurs in EV2, it is not the same as perspective disambiguation in EIQs. In fact, there are also differences across the EV2 languages I am treating here: in German, all attitudinal, epistemic and expressive elements in EV2 are evaluated with respect to the speaker, not the matrix subject, and the proposition expressed in the embedded clause is also interpreted as being asserted by the speaker. In Mainland Scandinavian, however, both fully speaker-oriented and fully subject-oriented EV2 clauses are possible (cf. Julien (2015)).

The primary focus of this section, however, is to detail the properties of the modal operator itself and how it interacts with its internal argument; I leave the discussion of the external argument for the next chapter.

4.3.1.1 EIQs: covert QUESTION or REQUEST operators

Turning first to the IA head in EIQs and interrogative recomplementation clauses, we cannot simply adopt Hacquard’s speech event modal operator because it deals with assertive

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9Thanks to Caroline Heycock, for ensuring more nuance in my arguments with respect to EV2.
and not questioning or requesting force. We must therefore consider the underlying representation of these kinds of forces. A full semantic explanation will not be attempted here but an informal description of its content will be given.

The first of the modal operators that can constitute the IA head in these constructions is the QUESTION operator. The QUESTION operator will be present in quasi-quotational constructions with questioning force, such as EIQs and interrogative recomplementation clauses. Remember that this is not the case with all EIQs; some will carry requesting force, specifically those that are compatible with overt clause-initial please. The QUESTION operator must do the following: it must quantify over the addressee’s epistemic alternatives—what the addressee knows to be true—and combine these with a set of propositions.

The fact of picking out the addressee is core to the QUESTION operator, as questioning force means that it is the addressee who is responsible for providing the true answer to the question. The QUESTION operator simply states that it is the addressee in the relevant context whose epistemic alternatives are quantified over; how the ‘correct’ addressee is picked out (the current addressee or the original addressee) will be explained in the next chapter.

It is also important that the QUESTION operator combines with a set of propositions rather than a singleton proposition. This part of its meaning ensures that the EIQ is restricted to “true” questions and excludes resolutive clauses, i.e. clauses containing wh-items that in fact represent propositions, such as the kind of ‘interrogative’ clauses selected by matrix verbs like know.

The composition of the QUESTION operator with the set of propositions is as follows; it takes a set of propositions of type \(t,t\)\(^{10}\) and returns an element of type \(s,e\); that is, an intensional type. What this means will be more fully explained in section 4.3.2.

The EIQ structure so far can therefore be schematised as below:

\(^{10}\)I am using non-intensional types here partially for simplicity, and partially because I will suggest that the situation pronoun (i.e. world parameters) does not enter the derivation until a later stage.
The REQUEST operator is somewhat different, even though it also combines with elements of type \((t,t)\). Firstly, it does not quantify over the addressee’s epistemic alternatives, but over the doxastic alternatives of the speaker. This is in line with our definition of requesting force in table 4.1 in section 4.2.2 as a matter of making the world how the speaker wants it to be—the responsibility for making the world so may lie with the addressee, but it is the desires of the speaker that provide the ordering source for the alternatives. This kind of characterisation of requesting force implies that speaker-orientation is encoded into the semantics of requesting force. This gives us desirable results, because “interrogative flip” does not appear to hold in interrogatives or imperatives with requesting force, as illustrated by the examples including speech-act adverb \textit{seriously} below:

(18) a. Seriously, please can you take a seat? \textit{Speaker is being serious}

b. Seriously, please take a seat. \textit{Speaker is being serious}

In (18a) and (18b) it can only be the speaker who is being serious, in contrast with (19) in which \textit{seriously} is interpreted as the addressee being required to be serious in their answer:

(19) Seriously, where did you take the seat? \textit{Addressee expected to answer seriously}
The fact that it is the speaker’s alternatives that are considered in requests and orders also fits well with the data on the availability of embedded imperatives that follows in chapter 6. However, it is necessary that the importance of the addressee is also recognised because it is the addressee that carries responsibility for carrying out the desired action. I will argue in section 4.4.3 that the addressee’s contribution is syntactically represented in addition to the semantic contribution of the speaker shown here.

As has already been mentioned, the REQUEST operator takes as its input a wider range of clause types than the QUESTION operator. As noted in table 4.1, it can combine with both interrogative clauses of type \(<t,t>\) and imperative clauses of type \(<e,t>\). I therefore propose that it does not take a specific type as its input, but that its input must be some complex type of the kind \(<\sigma,t>\). This prevents it from combining with declarative clauses, which are of a simplex type \(t\), which is what we want, but allows it to combine with both interrogative and imperative clause types.

The structure of an EIQ with requesting force is therefore as follows:

\[
(20) \quad \text{IAP} \quad \text{IA} \quad \text{ForceP} \quad \text{REQUEST} \quad \text{TP} \\
\quad \langle s,e \rangle \quad \langle \sigma,t \rangle \quad \langle t,t \rangle \quad \langle t \rangle \\
\quad \text{will} \quad \text{you come to dinner tonight}
\]

We also know that the REQUEST operator can be overtly spelled out as *please*, resulting in the structure below:

\[11\text{Here I follow Portner’s (2004) characterisation of imperatives as properties.}\]

\[12\text{The restriction of requesting force to polar interrogatives has another source which I predict to be pragmatic, but I leave the details of this for further research.}\]
4.3.1.2 EV2: a covert ASSERT operator

Moving onto the ASSERT operator that I claim is present in German and Mainland Scandinavian EV2, I will largely adopt the same approach as taken by Hacquard (2010). Asserting force as defined in section 4.2.2 is when the speaker takes responsibility for the truth of the proposition that they utter, regardless of the strength of their own commitment towards it. Therefore I adopt Hacquard’s formalisation of ASSERT, which is more precise than her informal characterisation, which states that it is worlds ordered according to the doxastic alternatives of the speaker (or matrix subject qua original speaker) that matter rather than worlds ordered according to the speaker’s/matrix subject’s epistemic alternatives.

ASSERT is similar to REQUEST but differs from QUESTION in that it quantifies over the speaker’s/matrix subject’s doxastic alternatives. However it differs from both in that the responsibility aspect of its meaning is evaluated with respect to the speaker, current or original. Exactly how this plays out forms the basis of section 4.4. It also differs from both REQUEST and QUESTION in terms of the type of its input; it will be no surprise that ASSERT requires a type t complement, which is the truth value that the speaker expresses responsibility for.

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The full details of all these structures, including external arguments, will be completed in the next chapter.

4.3.2 N-like behaviour

In the sections above I have shown that the IA head is verb-like in terms of having an argument structure and in terms of applying modal force to the clause it selects. I also showed that one of the possible overt instantiations of the IA head in English is a particle derived from a verb. However, it emerges that the IA head is also noun-like in some respects, which is a desirable outcome in order to fully capture the characteristics of quasi-quotational constructions. Relatedly, we need to develop the idea of what it means for an EIQ to be or to refer to a conversational move from the relevant previous discourse, as this must be captured by the make-up of the IA head. I shall briefly outline here previous analyses of embedded clauses as referential. I will then present my ideas on what it means for an embedded illocutionary act to be referential and on the nature of its referent.

4.3.2.1 Embedded clauses as referring expressions

Sheehan & Hinzen (2011) discuss the possibility that clauses can be referential, proposing that clauses with independent assertive force refer in that they hold extensionally, i.e. they refer to extensional truth. They also claim that embedded root clauses are referential as they also refer to an extensional truth rather than exhibiting intensionality; Sheehan &

\[^{12}\text{Like many other scholars discussing embedded illocutionary force, Sheehan & Hinzen restrict their analysis to assertive force.}\]
Hinzen analyse embedded root clauses as being more projected and extensional than typical embedded clauses, thereby behaving similarly to referential DPs, specifically proper names, both syntactically (with respect to islandhood) and semantically (with respect to having an extensional denotation). But these are not the only types of referential clause; they also claim that factive clauses are referential, comparing them to definite DPs. Sheehan & Hinzen draw a parallel between the presupposition of truth associated with a factive clause and the presupposition of existence associated with definite DPs (Sheehan & Hinzen 2011, p.22) and note the syntactic opacity of both factive clauses and definite DPs. The grammatical exponent of referentiality of factive clauses, they claim, is the complementiser that, which they analyse as a pro-form that picks out the “salient compatible contextual referent”—a fact (Sheehan & Hinzen 2011, p.23).

Rathmann (2012) in her examination of recomplementation in Spanish takes a similar tack to Sheehan & Hinzen (2011). She claims that, given the similar behaviour of factive and recomplementation clauses with respect to argument extraction and what she calls the “event-content” effect in factive emotives, both factive clauses and recomplementation clauses should be analysed as referential.

Let us first examine what she means by the “event-content” effect. She claims that there is a greater “emphasis” on the matrix event of saying or telling in recomplementation clauses than in non-recomplementation (standard embedded) clauses that she links to the obligatory shift in perspective that recomplementation brings about. However, she does not explain what it means to have more “emphasis” on the matrix event. Furthermore, she claims that the embedded clause of an emotive-factive modifies the matrix clause by describing the motivation for the matrix subject having that emotion, thereby “anchoring” it, and that recomplementation contexts are similar in that they provide the expressive content of the utterance described by the matrix verb as well as its propositional content.

(23)   a. I am happy that they gave the money to John

        \[I \text{ am happy} = \text{comment}; \text{that they gave the money to John} = \text{‘anchor’}\]

   b. Mary said that they gave the money to John

        \[Mary \text{ said} = \text{source}; \text{that they gave the money to John} = \text{comment}\]
c. Mary dijo que el dinero que a John que se lo dieron.
Mary said that the money that to John that CL.3PL CL.3SG gave
“Mary said that they gave the money to John.”

Mary dijo = comment; que el dinero... = anchor  Rathmann (2012) p.14

Note that Rathmann says of (23c) that “although the entire complement clause is pragmatically interpreted as the referential anchor (the cause/source of the comment), [...] the topic fulfils the semantic requirements for referential anchoring” (Rathmann 2012 p.14). However, given that it is never clear in Rathmann’s proposal what the recomplementation clause is referring to, it is hard to understand exactly what she means by referential anchoring here. Rathmann also downplays the differences between emotive-factives and recomplementation clauses and does not explain where her judgements about recomplementation come from. The comparison that she draws between emotive-factives and recomplementation is also very much at odds with judgements such as those reported in González i Planas (2014) for both Spanish and Catalan, the latter of which suggest that something more than just “lack of truth-conditional evaluation by the speaker” (Rathmann 2012 p.28) is happening in a recomplementation clause.

Rathmann explicitly rejects the idea that recomplementation clauses are asserted in the sense used in the embedded root phenomena literature. She suggests that by using a recomplementation clause, the speaker makes a choice to distance herself from the embedded clause and to express the perspective and attitudes of the original speaker. As evidence that a perspective shift holds in recomplementation, Rathmann notes that clitic left dislocation (CLLD) in recomplementation contexts differs from CLLD in non-recomplementation contexts. Where CLLD topics in non-recomplementation contexts must be both specific and definite, they are only required to be specific in recomplementation contexts, as shown in

(24) a. *María me dijo que unas manzanas las comieron en el coche.
Maria cl.1SG said..3SG that some apples cl.3PL ate.3PL in the car.
“Maria told me that they ate some apples in the car.”

b. María me dijo que unas manzanas que las comieron en el.
Maria cl.1SG said..3SG that some apples that cl.3PL ate.3PL in the
coche.
car.
“Maria told me that they ate some apples in the car.”

c. *Pablo me dijo que un coche lo compró ayer.
Pablo cl.1SG said..3SG that a car cl.3SG bought.3SG yesterday
“Pablo told me that he bought a car yesterday.”

d. Pablo me dijo que un coche que lo compró ayer.
Pablo cl.1SG said..3SG that a car that cl.3SG bought.3SG yesterday
“Pablo told me that he bought a car yesterday.”

Rathmann (2012, p.21)

Rathmann further notes that indefinite CLLDs are also blocked in factive clauses because for the speaker to presuppose the truth of the presupposition, she is required to subscribe to all the referential details of the presupposition—a clear difference between recomplementation and factives.

The effect of the data in (24) is to show that while the CLLD topics in recomplementation contexts are required to be specific, i.e. they refer to some extant apples in a context somewhere, the reporting speaker need not report them as definite because they are not necessarily definite in the reporting speaker’s context, but in the original speaker’s context.

Rathmann’s arguments seem to be underpinned by the idea that a clause may only ever be asserted by the current speaker. It is clearly a weakness of assertion-focused EV2 accounts that assertion appears to have the potential to be attributed to both speakers and matrix subjects but it is rarely made clear quite who is asserting the embedded clause, or indeed what it means to assert something (something Rathmann also fails to do explicitly).

However, I wish to argue that independent illocutionary force is not solely speaker-linked but that it may be matrix-speaker linked too, and that this interpretation is more fruitful in understanding the properties of quasi-quotational structures such as recomplementation.

As a result of the arguments above, Rathmann claims that recomplementation clauses contain a referential anchor that permits a referential reading of the clause and that this anchor is missing in non-recomplementation clauses. Moreover, she claims that the presence of this anchor must be somehow overtly marked precisely because not all complements of non-factive verbs can be interpreted as referential; hence the multiple complementisers
that are characteristic of recomplementation. She also notes that it is typical in other languages such as Gungbe for referential clauses to be nominalised (cf. [Aboli (2004)]), further drawing parallels between clauses with a referential interpretation and referential nominals. However, Rathmann does not explicitly explain what the referent of the recomplementation clause actually is.

The most interesting aspects of Rathmann’s work centre on her observations about overt marking and perspective shifting in recomplementation. I reject the idea that she perpetuates that assertions may only be attributed to the current speaker, but I adopt (in order to adapt) the idea that they are referential due to the kind of properties outlined in chapter 3. As introduced in chapter 3, I propose that the referent of a quasi-quotational construction is some overt conversational move in the sense of Roberts’s (1996, 2012) QUD framework. To recap, the QUD framework structures discourse according to a number of types of information. The entities within the QUD framework are assertions that make up the set of “payoff moves”, which contain propositions that all discourse participants have accepted into the conversational common ground, and questions that make up the set of “setup moves”, which all discourse participants jointly take responsibility for answering during the course of the discourse. Taking EIQs as an example, the denotation of an EIQ may be either a payoff move, when that payoff move relates to the question literally represented in the EIQ, or a setup move. This captures the expression of responsibility which quasi-quotational constructions have in addition to the proposition or sets of propositions they express in a way that Sheehan and Hinzen’s “extensional truth” approach cannot because it cannot cope with questioning force. Another reason for using a QUD approach is such an approach can unify assertive and non-assertive quasi-quotational constructions where a truth-centric approach cannot. Finally, the QUD approach is preferable to the idea that EIQs refer directly to a specific speech act in the way that a direct speech report does, because they may refer to a discussion centring on a question that may not have been overtly asked—that is, an EIQ whose embedded clause is interrogative-typed can be used to report a discussion made up solely of utterances involving declarative-typed clauses.
4.3.2.2 Determiner-like properties of the IA head

In sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2 I have claimed that the IA head has as its output an entity that is evaluated with respect to a relevant discourse. By taking an element of a type containing (properly or otherwise) t and returning an entity, the IA head resembles a determiner in terms of its semantic composition.

There is a strong recent tradition in claiming that clauses are in fact headed by nominal elements. Manzini & Savoia (2011) and Roussou (2010) are two notable examples of making this argument for Romance and Greek. Laka (1990) and Adger & Quer (2001) argue this for Basque and English, and Shim & Ihsane (2015) have developed a similar idea for Korean and English, even showing that certain complementisers that appear above the clause-typing morpheme in Korean are in complementary distribution with case-markers.

There is also evidence from quasi-quotational constructions, in particular Swedish EV2, for noun-like properties on the IA head. In Swedish EV2 the complementiser att is obligatory, where it is optional in typical complements. Att, like its English counterpart that, is etymologically descended from a demonstrative pronoun. Interestingly, it can, in EV2 constructions, co-occur with the standard definite pronoun det in matrix object position, suggesting that att is no longer pronominal in itself but that it has nominal properties that will permit a clause it heads to directly identify a pronominal object of a matrix verb.

(25) Han sa det att Gusten har faktiskt inte höns längre.
He said it that Gusten actually not has chickens any more
“He said that Gusten actually doesn’t have chickens any more.”

Petersson (2010, p.141)

In chapter 6 I will explain why appealing to an identification function to explain how quasi-quotational constructions relate to the matrix clause is not the most desirable route to take but that the true complement to the matrix verb is, in fact, a nominal.

As further evidence that quasi-quotational constructions are nominal-like, they are

\[\text{Note that the example in (25) is not extraposition because there is no prosodic break between det and att (Petersson 2010, p.141) and because det and att must be linearly adjacent for the sentence to be grammatical; no adverbial material may intervene between the two elements or between att and the rest of the embedded clause (Petersson 2010, p.140,142).}\]
strong islands like DPs and, as we will see in chapter 6, they can appear in copular constructions. Moreover, quasi-quotational constructions can be described in similar terms to nominals: they have their own properties such as niceness and nastiness and can be described in these terms. They can also be time-bound in that they can be resolved in a way that standard embedded clauses cannot—the propositions that standard embedded clauses contain do not come into existence or cease to exist, they just exist regardless of whether or not they are accepted into the discourse. Finally, there is evidence that quasi-quotational constructions are not predicational: they cannot appear in small clauses, they enter into equative constructions rather than predicational constructions and, crucially, they cannot be fronted (which is otherwise unexpected if quasi-quotational constructions are nominal-like).

It is tempting to claim, like Adger & Quer (2001) for their unselected embedded questions, that non-selected interrogative clauses can be headed by polarity sensitive determiners, as this appears to be a simple and elegant way of accounting for the distribution of EIQs under rogative (true question) predicates and negated responsive predicates. However, this idea quickly runs into problems when one considers that EIQs freely appear under *say, which does not license polarity sensitive items such as negative polarity items (NPIs). Moreover, it also fails to account for the paradigm cases of EIQs under verbs of interrogation such as *ask and *wonder. Though some scholars assume that the interrogative verb inherently licenses elements such as NPIs in its scope, it is hard to separate the effect of the verb of interrogation from the interrogative features in the clause it selects. Some evidence from the selection of DP and PP elements by verbs of interrogation as in (26) suggests that it is not the verb but some inherent property of the embedded clause that licenses NPIs:

(26)  
  a. I was wondering something.  
  b. *I was wondering anything.  
  c. I asked something.  
  d. ?*I asked anything.  
  e. I enquired about some tools.
f. *I enquired about any tools.

A similar analysis of EV2 clauses as positive polarity items also fails, as they are available under negation and negative verbs given the correct pragmatic context, as the Swedish examples below show:

(27) a. Det är väl ingen som tvekar på att dom gör det alltid för att få upp det försäljningen?
   “I bet nobody doubts that they always do it to raise sales.”
   Julien (2009)

b. ?Jag tvivlar inte på att den boken köper du.
   “I don’t doubt that you bought that book.”
   Wiklund (2010, p.83)

c. Vi upptäckte faktiskt inte att den bloggen läste han varje dag.
   “We actually didn’t discover that he read this blog every day.”
   Wiklund et al. (2009)

EV2 is also permitted under an interrogative main clause in both Mainland Scandinavian and German:

(28) a. Vet dere at jeg har aldri sett vinter før!
   “Do you know that I’ve never seen winter before!”
   Bokmål Norwegian, Julien (2009, p.6)

b. Wer glaubt, Peter geht nach Hause?
   “Who thinks Peter is going home?”
   German, Truckenbrodt (2006, p.296)

I do not have any new insights to add to the kinds of analyses given above, other than to provide more support through quasi-quotational data that (at least some) clauses have nominal properties and that polarity sensitivity is not key in determining the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions. Quasi-quotational clauses reflect their nominal properties in terms of their interpretation as referring expressions and, as it will be shown in chapter how they compose with the matrix clause.
4.3.3 Interim summary

This conceptualisation of the IA head as a modal operator with an internal and an external argument (though the latter is not spelled out here) not only avoids the redundancy associated with a Speas & Tenny-style three-place predicate but can capture many of the properties associated with EIQs, including their referentiality. It improves on Coniglio & Zegrean’s (2012) work by avoiding postulating a clause-type feature for which a corresponding feature on the illocutionary force head can be multiply valued. The analysis here also goes some way to showing that illocutionary force is made up of a combination of semantic type matching and syntactic feature checking.

4.4 Licensing embedded V-to-Force

In section 4.2 I argued that overt instantiation of Force via verb movement (EIQs, EV2) or a particular complementiser (recomplementation) is a necessary reflex of independent illocutionary force in the embedded clause. In this section I will show the mechanism for this, focusing on the syntactic relationship between IA and Force, and in so doing hope to shed light on the mechanisms behind subject-auxiliary inversion more generally.

4.4.1 The IA head as Phase head

The first assumption that I make is that the IA head is a Phase head. This assumption is motivated by the islandhood of quasi-quotational constructions, the fact that the IAP is obligatorily the highest projection in the EIQ, and the fact that ForceP cannot be topicalised because it has already been spelled out low. This brings with it the assumption that IAP is not simply one of the many Rizzian left-peripheral heads, but is an independent projection. The argument structure proposed for the IAP is consistent with this, as is the fact that the IA head also has determiner-like properties.

Taking islandhood first, we have already seen that the only wh-items that can be extracted from EIQs are the adjuncts when and where. Arguments cannot be extracted, nor the adjuncts how or why. I claim that the extraction of arguments is blocked because although they can move to SpecForceP, they cannot move up to the next phase edge.
because it is already filled by the Perspectival Monster:

When/where adjuncts, in contrast, can adjoin very high, as evidenced by data such as (30) in which the adjunct [when she got home] must have an embedded construal:

(30) At school, Molly asked when she got home please could she have a biscuit.

Examples like (30) and section 3.4’s (35) suggest that adjuncts are able to first merge above the IA head and as such may be moved higher into the matrix clause.

The presence of the IAP as a Phase head also accounts for the fact that EIQ cannot be extraposed as the complement of a phase cannot be extracted. Chomsky (2008) notes that T and V are not available for extraction in contrast to C and v, attributing this fact to the relationship of featural inheritance that holds between the Phase head and its complement. To preface the analysis of the EIQ’s relationship with the matrix clause in chapter 6 the entire Phase, in contrast, can appear to be extracted if the nominal complement it modifies
is extracted, hence utterances such as (31) are acceptable:

(31) The question would he come to the dinner party was asked of him several times.

More will be said about this in chapter 6.

The question of featural inheritance leads to the key motivation for characterising IA as a Phase head. While IA inherently carries illocutionary force features, these features are not primarily realised on IA per se but on Force (C), by way of verb movement to Force or realisation of Force as a particular complementiser (cf. the Japanese to/koto distinction). This does not prevent extra or exceptional realisation of illocutionary force features on IA as discourse particle please, for example, but this is not the primary method of representing these features, just as complementiser that, which is restricted to tensed declarative clauses, is optional in many complement clauses in English. To recap, just as T derives its phi-features from Force, so Force derives its illocutionary force features from the IA head. If T is not selected by Force then it will not carry phi-features and will not be able to attract a DP to Spec,TP. Similarly, if Force is not selected by IA then it will not carry illocutionary force features and will not be able to attract the verb to the Force head. Note that this mechanism holds for main clauses too; all main clauses are hypothesised to have an IAP above ForceP.

4.4.2 What does it mean to represent illocutionary force syntactically?

Let us then focus in on what precisely triggers the verb’s meaning to Force⁰ and how this movement affects meaning. The discussion of IA qua Phase head above implies that verb movement to Force is syntactically triggered, which I think is correct. However, we need to be clear about what the trigger is, where it comes from and also about the distinction between clause type and illocutionary force, a distinction I have been emphasising throughout this chapter.

In order to understand verb movement to Force we have to first look deeper into the embedded clause, because the left periphery of the clause is not the only position in which elements indicating illocutionary force can appear.
4.4.2.1 Tense and Assertion: not one but two clause-medial positions

As many scholars such as Coniglio (2009), Cardinaletti (2011), Coniglio & Zegrean (2012) and Struckmeier (2014) have noted, clause-medial particles that appear between T and v express a wide range of illocutionary forces with extra information about attitude, commitment and evidence, suggesting that illocutionary force is in some way represented clause-medially.

Other strands of research have also suggested that there is a projection related to illocutionary force (with a focus on assertive force) just above vP. Klein (1998, 2006) and Duffield (2007) discuss English data that suggest that the Tense node does not only carry tense but that it also carries Assertion. In the case of English these two elements are often conflated, but languages like Vietnamese appear to optionally spell out Assertion in precisely this position just above vP. Evidence for the proposed separation of Assertion and Tense and the structural representation of Assertion includes:

(32) a. Verum focus: contrastive intonation on finite auxiliaries asserts the validity of some claim irrespective of time or contrasts some component of time. Contrastive intonation on lexical verbs has the second function but not the first

Klein (1998)

b. Sentences can both carry tense without being asserted (typical embedded clauses in English, German, etc.) and be asserted without carrying tense (Mandarin Chinese and many others)

c. In languages that do not or cannot make use of intonation to express emphasis, word order is crucial to assert the correct part of the sentence, meaning that the element of emphasis must be in the correct configuration with respect to clause-medial Assertion

Klein (2006)

d. Vietnamese có, spelled out above vP, is interpreted differently according to the presence of (e.g.) wh-elements in the clause

Duffield (2007)

e. Other elements in Vietnamese, such as wh-indefinites, change interpretation depending on whether they scope below or above có. Below có they receive
an indefinite interpretation; above có they are interpreted as wh-phrases

Duffield (2007)

f. Certain elements such as temporal adverbs appear to be sensitive to their position in the clause relative to tense and aspect:

(i) John has been dead for two weeks.
(ii) *For two weeks, John has been dead.* Klein (1998)

Duffield (2007) proposes the following structure for both Vietnamese and English with AsrP as a separate Assertion node—(33) is adapted from (Duffield 2007, p.787):

(33)

```
TP
   |   AsrP
   T  
   |  Vietnamese: dâ
   |  English: did
   |  ⟨-NEG⟩
   |  ⟨+EMPH⟩
   |  ⟨-WH⟩
   .
```

I will not evaluate the finer details of Duffield’s structure here, in particular his feature specification for the Asr head, but I will go on to provide further evidence for Tense and Assertion splitting in English and how conceptualising Tense and Assertion as separate nodes can help us better understand V-to-Force movement in English, German and Mainland Scandinavian.
4.4.2.2 Splitting Tense and Assertion in child language

There is evidence from child language that Tense and Assertion can be separated in ways that the adult language does not permit.\(^{15}\) It is well known that English-acquiring children pass through a stage in which they produce non-adult word order in questions, namely, they either omit the auxiliary or fail to invert the subject and the auxiliary (Klima & Bellugi 1966, de Villiers 1991, Plunkett 1991, Radford 1994). The path taken by children varies; some gradually move towards the adult-like inverted structure while others exhibit a U-shaped curve in their use of subject-auxiliary inversion (Stromswold 1990, de Villiers 1991). Some also exhibit doubling of the auxiliary; though rarely picked up in longitudinal studies, auxiliary-doubling is well attested in diary data (Menyuk 1969 and others) and is frequently induced in high numbers in experimental studies (Thornton 1995, Rowland & Theakston 2009).

(34) a. Father: Do you want to go outside?  
Child: No! (to friend:) Do you don’t want to go outside?  
4;0, Roeper (2014)

b. Where are we are?  
3;8, Roeper (2014)

c. What food did the spaceman didn’t like?  
4;8, Thornton (1995)

d. Which Smurf did he didn’t drop any ones?  
4;8, Thornton (1995)

e. Which witch does that witch don’t have a very good broomstick?  
4;8, Thornton (1995)

f. Can Piglet can’t ride the bike?  
2;11-3;5, Rowland & Theakston (2009)

g. Is Piglet can push the pram?  
2;11-3;5, Rowland & Theakston (2009)

h. Won’t Piglet won’t push the pram?  
2;11-3;5, Rowland & Theakston (2009)

i. Is the boy who’s watching Mickey Mouse is happy?  
4;7, Crain & Nakayama (1987)

There are many ways of analysing these examples, of which the most widely proposed is that the copy of the moved auxiliary is spelled out in addition to the moved element itself\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) Thanks to Tom Roeper for all his help in discussing and developing the ideas in this section, and for all the Skype chats.
due to the processing complexity of subject-auxiliary inversion, especially in the presence of negation or relative clauses (Crain & Nakayama 1987, p.532,539). However, I propose that the contexts in which auxiliary doubling occurs suggest that auxiliary doubling is not simply an error, but may be used by the child as a strategy to ask a non-simple question, namely a cleft question, which in the adult language requires a much more complicated syntax.

What is the evidence for this? I have already noted that auxiliary doubling has been induced in large proportions in certain experimental studies. On examining the methodologies used in these studies, it is apparent that these methodologies, useful as they are, do not elicit non-biased naïve information-seeking questions. Instead, they involve to some degree the child asking an interlocutor about a situation that one of the two participants is already aware of. In Rowland & Theakston (2009), for example, where 41% of questions produced by children aged 2;11 involved auxiliary doubling, the child mediates between an experimenter and a puppet. The puppet can see a scene enacted, the experimenter tells the child what she thinks the scene shows, and the child asks the puppet the appropriate question to confirm or deny the experimenter’s guesses. Abstracting away from the fact that think is not interpreted in an adult-like way by children of the age that Theakston & Rowland were testing (see de Villiers (2007), Harrigan (2015) amongst many others), this is precisely the kind of context that might induce a cleft sentence in the adult language. In this case, there is an assertion by the adult that carries a presupposition of truth (modulated or not by the matrix verb think) that has entered the common ground of the discourse, the truth of which is subsequently questioned. Tellingly, in a separate experiment testing the production of polar questions with auxiliary be in Theakston & Rowland (2009), they used a different methodology in which both experimenter and child were equally naïve as to the true answer to the questions they were prompted to ask, and the rate of auxiliary doubling in this experiment was extremely low (less than 5%).

Similar methodologies to Rowland & Theakston (2009) are used in Thornton (1995) and Crain & Nakayama (1987): in the former, the child is again a mediator between an experimenter and a puppet but all three participants can see the scenario that the child is asking a question about; in the latter, the child asks a puppet a question about a picture
that the child can see before showing the puppet the picture. In fact, Crain & Nakayama entertain the idea that children may be using auxiliary doubling in a similar way to the French est-ce que (“is it that...”) question marking prefix, as an unanalysed marker of a cleft construction (Crain & Nakayama 1987, p.531).

The contexts in which auxiliary doubling occurs in naturalistic speech also lend themselves to a cleft question analysis. Taking example (34a) repeated as (35) below, it is reasonable to suppose that the child wants to preserve his assertion of not wanting to go outside, whilst simultaneously questioning whether this assertion holds for his friend too:

(35) Father: Do you want to go outside?
Child: No! (to friend:) Do you don’t want to go outside? 4;0, Roepen (2014)

(Adult version: Is it the case that you too don’t want to go outside?)

Example (35) illustrates why auxiliary doubling does not appear in longitudinal data with any frequency: it carries a very specific meaning requiring a specific kind of context, and it is related to a structure that is uncommon in adult language. In the Switchboard corpus, cleft sentences make up less than 0.1% of all sentences (Roland et al. 2007) and in the ICE-GB corpus, there are only 40 cleft sentences in direct conversation, or around 2.2 tokens per 10,000 words (Nelson 1997, Lange 2012). If we are right that auxiliary doubling is used as a clefting strategy in child language, then we would not expect to find a large amount of data, but when we do find it or elicit it, such contexts will be pragmatically appropriate for clefts.

It is therefore proposed that children are not simply “accidentally” spelling out both the moved auxiliary and its copy, but that the spell-out of the lower copy has semantic and pragmatic import. The mechanism is as follows. I assume that in adult English, the Tense and Assertion nodes are collapsed so that one single node carries both Tense and Assertion features. Hence in the case of declaratives with auxiliaries or dummy do, it is the auxiliary or do that carries tense. Moreover, if tense is not present in a clause, do is not possible, as its only other role is to carry assertion features and non-finite clauses in English cannot be asserted. Auxiliaries are permitted in non-finite clauses because they

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16 They may carry other kinds of illocutionary force, such as ordering or exclamative force, but may not
also carry information about aspect, for example. This kind of proposal is in line with the Split-INFL hypothesis of Pollock (1989) and others.

In adult-like non-biased questions requiring subject-auxiliary inversion, the tensed element moves (for reasons to be detailed in the next section) and the assertion element is pied-piped with it. However, in the case that the child wants to maintain the assertion as well as forming a question, she can use a non-adult-like structure to spell out the tensed element in both positions, marking both the separation of tense and assertion through maintenance of the asserted proposition.

Details of auxiliary doubling in child language support the claim above that assertion cannot be independently expressed in English and that do cannot be co-opted for the job: amongst all the examples of auxiliary doubling I could find, there were no examples of do doubling specifically, unless the bottom copy was hosting clitic negation (i.e. was spelled out for reasons independent from assertion). It can appear both as the tense-carrying element in Force or as an element bearing negation in the Tense position but examples like (36c) do not occur:

(36) a. Do it be coloured? (Roep \textit{1993} p.72)

b. Is Piglet doesn’t lift the basket? (Rowland & Theakston \textit{2009} p.1487)

c. *Do(es) she do(es) play tennis?

This result would be unexpected if children ever analysed do as a potential marker of pure assertion in English.

Moreover, it is not the case that children have “copying” difficulties with other kinds of syntactic movement as they appear to have with subject-auxiliary inversion: children do not experience difficulties with topicalisation in English, nor do German-speaking children struggle with V2, or Spanish-speaking children struggle with V-to-I movement in Spanish. I therefore claim that there is more to subject-auxiliary inversion than has typically been be asserted.

\[17\] The assumption is that the assertion element can carry a range of values, including minus values for assertion. See Roep & Woods [in preparation] and the next section for more details.

\[18\] Note that this does not preclude intonation from marking emphasis in English; I am only interested in the lexical spell-out of the Tense/Assertion position in this thesis.
suggested, namely that it is tied to the expression of the illocutionary force of the sentence—
its expression as a true question, assertion or command—rather than a simple marker of
clause type.

Given the evidence above for the specification of Assertion on the Tense node and the
possibility of separating Tense and Assertion, I will in the next section discuss the impli-
cations of this for V-to-Force movement. However, I will recast discussions of Assertion in
the terms used in table 4.1—that is, in terms of who is responsible for the truth, action or
attitude expressed in the clause.

4.4.3 V-to-Force: illocutionary, my dear Watson

In this section I will discuss the feature that the Force head inherits from the IA head,
which I will call [Responsibility]. This feature minimally has two values, [Speaker] and
[Addressee], following my definitions of illocutionary force as given in table 4.1. I will also
discuss the crosslinguistic variation in the realisation of [Responsibility] that leads to word
order differences.

Taking quasi-quotational phenomena first, we have already seen that verb movement
occurs in EIQs and EV2 only when independent illocutionary force is present; that is ques-
tioning or requesting force in EIQs and asserting force in EV2. Moreover, verb movement
is essential for independent illocutionary force to be marked, so it is more accurate to
describe the relationship between verb movement and independent illocutionary force as
bi-conditional

\[\text{This appears to be in contradiction with } \text{Wiklund (2010), but I will address this later in this section.}\]
[Responsibility:Speaker] so will only attract a T head that is also valued for [Responsibility:Speaker]. There is no [Responsibility] feature on T in relative clauses because they are not selected by IAP, so they cannot inherit [Responsibility] from the IA head. Hence, no verb movement occurs and it is directly interpreted as a presupposition for which no particular discourse participant takes responsibility.

A question arises here: if illocutionary force is as simple as feature checking, why is there no verb movement in English matrix clauses? Why are there no examples of embedded interrogatives with illocutionary force in German and Mainland Scandinavian? The latter case I will leave until the next chapter to explain, because I will claim that it is due to the mechanism for perspective disambiguation in the German-type languages. The former case relates to how the mechanism for V-to-Force works in matrix clauses, so I will turn to these now.

The most important assumption I will make about matrix clauses is that there is always an IAP present above them. In fact, that is not all that is present; I also assume that there is a second layer of structure above IAP of the kind postulated by Haegeman (2014) and Wiltschko et al. (2015); a layer that hosts the kind of discourse particles and discourse-oriented elements that demand immediate response from the interlocutor and that is not embeddable in any language. I will not develop a picture of this layer here, but direct the reader towards the aforementioned references.

Bearing this in mind, I claim that matrix Force always inherits [Responsibility] from the IA head in German/Mainland Scandinavian and that it will internally Merge the T head when it has the correct feature combination. Both [Responsibility:Speaker] and [Responsibility:Addressee] on Force attract the verb in German/Mainland Scandinavian as a way of overtly marking the presence of [Responsibility]. This means that there are two types of V-to-Force movement in German that are minimally different in terms of their feature specification but that present more or less identically. Illocutionary force then is marked by verb movement, and clause-typing comes about through the combination of this verb movement and other featural specifications of the clause. These include whether or not EPP is active to attract some XP to SpecForceP, whether or not [+wh] is present,

\[20\] This is basically the same idea as Bhatt & Yoon (1992), with slightly different terminology.
and whether or not the clause is in the subjunctive or indicative mood. Note that these features happen to congregate on and around Force$^0$, but do not merit postulation of one clause-typing feature. These features are independently motivated as separate features and are expressed as such; it is their simultaneous realisation that results in clause-typing. This is represented in the tree in (37) in which the greyscale Resp:Addressee feature on IA$^0$ represents that this has been inherited by Force$^0$.

Initially it seems possible to claim that there is a difference in English, namely that the presence of [Responsibility:Speaker] on Force invokes a different syntactic reflex from the presence of [Responsibility:Addressee]; the latter triggers verb movement while the former does not. To do this, one would need to assume that in English, [Responsibility:Addressee]

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21 The details of how the EIQ composes with the matrix clause will be detailed in chapter 6.
requires local checking of features via Internal Merge, whereas [Responsibility:Speaker] in English is weaker in the sense that it can be satisfied non-locally by Agree. In this way all declaratives are unified in English; embedded or unembedded, if [Responsibility:Speaker] is (able to be) present, no verb movement will occur. However, there are examples of emphatic assertions in English which do feature verb movement (such as fuck-inversion \cite{Sailor 2015, Sailor 2016}, which I will detail in chapter \ref{chap:6}) and would then need explaining. To do this we need to assume that [Responsibility:Speaker] also triggers verb movement in English. What about typical declaratives then? I claim that declaratives in English, both in matrix and in embedded cases, are unspecified for the responsibility feature, which entails that they are unspecified for illocutionary force. Through pragmatic processes they are typically interpreted as assertions for which the speaker takes responsibility, but this is not marked syntactically on Force$^0$\footnote{Discourse particles and other overt markers in positions other than Force$^0$ may privilege the interpretation of declaratives as assertions but the idea remains that assertion itself is not syntactically marked in these contexts.}.

The reader may be wondering about certain interrogative clauses that do not exhibit verb movement, for example echo questions that echo assertions. I argue that echo questions are an unusual example of an interrogative clause type (based on the presence of [+wh]) selected by an unspecified IA head (which is by default interpreted as an assertion). This is because the original proposition echoed in the echo question is conserved in the use of an echo question—“John bought what?” presupposes that John did buy something in a way that “What did John buy?” does not. The idea that echo questions carry some kind of assertive force is supported by the fact that they cannot be embedded under know (which can only embed presupposed content) but that they cannot be embedded as EIJs either:

\begin{enumerate}
\item [38] a. *I know that John did what.
\item b. *I know John did what.
\item c. *I asked John did what.
\end{enumerate}

According to the analysis in this section this entails that echo questions are unspecified
for Responsibility on their Force head. This is not as counterintuitive as it seems given that an echo question seems to show acceptance, if not assertion, by the speaker of the non-wh-part of an echo-question. I will not develop a full account of echo questions here as it is outside the scope of this dissertation, but my proposal seems compatible with an account such as that of Sobin (1990). I leave this for future work.

Returning to cases in which Responsibility is specified, our next task is to detail exactly how the asymmetry between matrix and embedded clauses with respect to subject-auxiliary inversion comes about.

The proposal I will make here emerges from previous accounts but it is recast in new terms and aims to explain why both typical embedded declaratives and typical embedded interrogatives lack independent illocutionary force. I claim that when Force is directly selected by the lexical verb, there is no way for it to derive the [Responsibility] feature because feature inheritance cannot take place between V, a non-Phase head, and Force. As it stands, then, nothing on Force probes for the [Responsibility] feature in the embedded clause so verb movement to Force does not occur. Consequently, neither illocutionary force nor, by extension, clause type is overtly marked in [-wh] embedded clauses via movement to Force. Another means of overtly marking clause type must then be found—assuming, along with Weerman (1989) and Bhatt & Yoon (1992) that clause type must be overtly marked in every clause—that does not relate to verb movement in the embedded clause and that ensures that the lexical verb selects the correct kind of complement. Bhatt & Yoon (1992) argue convincingly based on cross-linguistic evidence that Force carries a subordination feature when it is embedded; following this, I claim that Force in standard embedded clauses is specified for [Subordination] and that this feature can actually be valued either as declarative or interrogative. Again this results in overt clause-type marking without postulating a single unified feature specific to clause-typing; instead, clause-type is a value on a separately motivated feature both in matrix clauses (where it is partly a result of the value of [Responsibility]) and subordinate clauses (where it is a result of the value of [Subordination]).

I do not claim that triggering of movement by [Responsibility] is the only mechanism for verb movement in embedded clauses; I already mentioned that Icelandic and Yiddish
differ in how V2 behaves in both matrix and embedded clauses. There is also evidence that two types of V2 (illocutionary-force related V2 and non-illocutionary-force related V2) can occur in the same language—Biberauer (2015a) shows that Afrikaans contains both illocutionary force-driven EV2 as described for German and V2 word orders in embedded interrogatives and relative clauses that do not appear to be at all restricted by illocutionary force or the type of matrix predicate they are embedded under. This second type of EV2 is not the concern of this thesis and will be left for future research.

A question remains about the above analysis - is it problematic to postulate a responsibility feature, albeit clause-internal, in all clausal complements to verbs, especially given that they may be the ‘other’ kind of EV2 complement, or not quasi-quotational at all? I think that there is evidence for the presence of clause-medial [Responsibility] regardless of the left-peripheral characteristics of the clause.

Firstly, clausal complements have some kind of perspective attached to them, whether the pragmatic context privileges a speaker, a matrix subject, or even a general point of view. This distinguishes them from, for example, relative clauses, which are presupposed. It could be argued that this interpretation of a perspective comes from the lexical verb, and indeed it is difficult to separate out these two hypotheses in the case of verbs such as say or tell. However, Kratzer (2009, 2014) shows that clausal complements must contain some degree of independent modality because they can appear with verbs that do not typically select for clausal complements, in particular verbs of manner of communication:

(39)  
   a. Ralph sighed *(that) he had not seen Ortcutt at the beach.
   b. Ralph seufzte, dass er betrogen worden.
       "Ralph sighed that he had been betrayed."  [Kratzer (2014) slide 9]
   c. Ralph raged that they hadn’t informed him.  [Kratzer (2014) slide 8]
   d. Ralph tobte, dass man ihm nicht informiert habe.
       "Ralph raged that they hadn’t informed him."  [Kratzer (2014) slide 8]

Kratzer also shows that such complements appear to be syntactically different from typical clausal complements to verbs, as they are not amenable to extraction:
(40) *Who did Ralph sigh that he saw t at the beach?  

Partee (1973a) also notes this phenomenon, not only highlighting the obligatoriness of the complementiser, but also the fact that such clauses may take on a more direct speech report-like flavour by containing grammatical features present in the original speech act that do not form part of the reporter’s grammar (Partee 1973a, p.326):

(41) Jed hollered *(that) them brown cows was back in the corn patch again.

These clauses are not, however, exactly the same as the quasi-quotational constructions examined in this thesis. They only marginally permit speech-act adverbs and discourse particles (42) left-peripheral temporal adverbs do not receive an embedded interpretation (43) and there is not a complete disambiguation of perspectives like that which we see in EIJs (44):

(42) ??Ralph sighed that seriously he had seen Ortcutt at the beach.

(43) Ralph raged [around Christmas time] that he had seen Ortcutt at the beach

No embedded construal of temporal adjunct

(44) ??Ralph raged that honestly they hadn’t informed him.

I believe that there is a spectrum of quotationhood bookended by indirect speech reports and direct speech reports, and that there is a range of constructions in the middle. The constructions listed above from Kratzer and Partee are further along in the spectrum than indirect speech reports but, on the evidence of (42)-(44) above, not as far along as the quasi-quotational speech reports.

Similarly to the Kratzer and Partee examples, there exist examples of non-V2 constructions that nonetheless contain discourse-related elements. Wiklund (2010) presents the following examples in Swedish:

23 It is also possible that there are a couple of parallel spectra given the existence languages that show indexical shift, as it is not clear whether they should be considered more or less quotational than, for example, the quasi-quotational constructions described here.
(45) a. Hon sa att han fasen inte hade gjort ett skit.
   she said that he damn not had done a shit
   “She that he hadn’t damn well given a shit.
   b. Hon sa att han hade fasen inte gjort ett skit.
   she said that he had damn not done a shit
   “She that he hadn’t damn well given a shit.

(46) a. Hon sa att han ärligt talat inte hade förståt det.
   she said that he honestly speaking not had understood that
   “She said that, honestly speaking, he had not understood that.”
   b. Hon sa att han hade ärligt talat inte förståt det.
   she said that he had honestly speaking not understood that
   “She said that, honestly speaking, he had not understood that.”

(47) a. Vi upptäckte att de minsann inte hade kommit.
   we discovered that they indeed not had come
   “We discovered that they indeed had not come.”
   b. Vi upptäckte att de hade nämling/minsann inte kommit.
   we discovered that they had indeed not come
   “We discovered that they indeed had not come.” [Wiklund (2010)]

In addition to containing speech-act adverbs and swear words, the (a) examples in (45) (47) have similar syntactic restrictions to EV2 clauses as they cannot be topicalised, they resist wh-extraction and they can only appear under the kind of predicates that permit EV2. However, it is clear to see that they do not require EV2 to license these items and, furthermore, there is no disambiguation of perspectives.

Similar examples of discourse particles embedded in non-V2 clauses can be found in German (48) and Bavarian (49):

(48) Maria hat gesagt, dass Hein wohl heute hier ein Mädchen getroffen hat
    Maria has said that Hein PRT:probably today here a girl met has
    “Maria said that Hein has probably met a girl here today.”
    Adapted from [Zimmermann (2004) p.3]

(49) A: Mia miassn ned in’d Schui...
    we must NEG in.DET school
    “We don’t have to go to school…”

   B: Wei do scho Ferien san gä?
   because there already holidays are PRT
   because we’re already on holidays then, right?”
   S. Thoma, p.c.
As in the Swedish examples, the discourse particles in (48) and (49) are only available in contexts that optionally permit V2, even if that V2 is not realised. However, all of these structures lack the disambiguation of perspectives crucial to the quasi-quotational constructions and their expression of fully independent illocutionary force.

Wiklund uses the Swedish examples above to counter the idea that EV2 and illocutionary force are biconditionally related. However, Wiklund’s definition of illocutionary force (like many other scholars she focuses on assertive force) is, as she admits, somewhat imprecise: she defines assertive illocutionary force as “roughly the act of uttering a sentence with the intention of making the addressee accept the content of it and take it as part of the common ground” (2010, p.82). This is subtly different from my definition, which does not concern itself with the behaviour of the addressee. Moreover, she identifies any clause permitting speaker-oriented elements as being a clause with illocutionary force, even though it is not straightforward to see how this follows from her definition of illocutionary force. In fact, as I have claimed here, there is a distinction between the availability of discourse-related elements and the presence of fully independent illocutionary force, a distinction that Wiklund herself hints towards at the end of her paper. The account I propose here captures and develops Wiklund’s intuitions that EV2 is linked to evidentiality by claiming a stronger link between EV2 and illocutionary force, on the understanding that illocutionary force is (in part) the disambiguation of perspectives. Just as with the Kratzer and Partee examples, I propose that these examples are more quotation-like than indirect speech reports but less so than quasi-quotational constructions, from which it follows that these clauses also have a [Responsibility] feature realised somewhere in the clause, if not in the left periphery—note that all the discourse particles in the above Swedish and German examples are clause-medial, while the Bavarian example is clause-final. I propose that clause-medial illocutionary objects express a weaker version of illocutionary force than can be expressed by clause-initial operations. There is some precedent for the idea that realisation of the [Responsibility] feature clause-medially rather than clause-initially results in a weaker, but present, sense of quotationhood. Cardinaletti (2011) notes that clause-medial discourse particles in Italian are derived from adverbs, have a modificational role and interact with the CP level. In contrast clause-initial particles are derived from verbs
and interact with the material higher than CP, that is with discourse participants. I also show in Woods (2016) that clause-initial and clause-medial please in matrix clauses differ in terms of how strongly they convey requesting force—clause-initial please is strictly excluded from being syntactically integrated in declarative clauses but clause-medial please is available under deontic necessity modal verbs in declarative clauses; essentially, clause-medial please is to some degree dependent on the presence of a given modal force rather than providing its own:

(50) a. *Please ladies must remain fully dressed while bathing.
    b. Ladies must please remain fully dressed while bathing.

Attested, Woods (2016)

Struckmeier (2014) suggests that only a subset of features available on Force are available on clause-medial particles, explaining its weaker interpretation. In particular, the [Responsibility] feature in clause-medial position is interpreted differently because it is separated from other syntactic elements introduced by IA, such as the perspectival monster and its effects, and other elements potentially available on Force, such as [+wh] and other clause-typing features.

The realisation of the [Responsibility] feature and how it forges connections between Force and T helps us to understand the spectrum of quotationhood across a range of constructions. It has also enabled us to explain the matrix-embedded asymmetry of subject-auxiliary inversion as well as examining cross-linguistic differences in verb movement.

Much work remains to be done. We are yet to fully understand the structure of the Swedish examples in (45)-(47) or indeed the examples given by Partee (1973a) and Kratzer (2014). However, the proposal here takes the previous insights into embedded verb second and refines them, giving a detailed analysis of the role and representation of the functional head that others have proposed above ForceP. It also demonstrates how this head interacts with Force⁰ and ultimately with illocution-related features in a position just above vP, bringing evidence from both clause-initial and clause-medial discourse particles to bear on how illocution is represented in two positions but to different degrees.
4.5 Summary

In this chapter I have proposed that there is an Illocutionary Act Phrase (IAP) above ForceP whose head is a modal operator encoding illocutionary force. To do this, I have refined the concept at the heart of illocutionary force, namely responsibility, and proposed working definitions of a range of illocutionary forces on this basis. These definitions capture the modal quality of the IA head, which takes into account desire/necessity modality in addition to responsibility depending on the type of operator. I concluded that the IA head is a verb-like modal operator with an argument structure relating a perspectival element to a clause. It is also a Phase head, a property that I use to explain both the islandhood of the quasi-quotational constructions it heads and its relationship with Force\(^0\), which I likened to the relationship between Force\(^0\) and T. However, the IA head also has some noun-like properties in that it does not return a truth value or a proposition, but a discourse entity. Finally, I discussed the implications of the IA head and its featural make-up for an analysis of subject-auxiliary inversion.

In the chapters to follow I will develop two strands of the analysis that have been hinted at in this chapter but not developed. Firstly I will detail the role and representation of the IA head’s external argument, the perspectival monster. Secondly, I will discuss in greater detail how the IAP links the clause it contains to a relevant discourse, including a more detailed characterisation of the QUD framework.
Chapter 5

Analysis Part II: the Perspectival Monster

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter it was proposed that a functional Illocutionary Act head selects for a clause, passes a [Responsibility] feature onto Force in that clause and further specifies the illocutionary force of the clause by expressing an ordering source for possible worlds. That ordering source is the speaker’s preference or desire in the case of asserting and requesting force and addressee’s knowledge in the case of questioning force. The Illocutionary Act head also nominalises the clause. The IAP has the type of an entity, type ⟨e⟩ and denotes an abstract discourse object—a conversational move.

It was also proposed that the Illocutionary Act head has an external argument that specifies the perspective according to which the clause is evaluated. This chapter is devoted to detailing the representation of the external argument and how it interacts with material in the embedded clause, in particular the interpretation of expressive, not-at-issue, perspectival elements.

The chapter is structured as follows: I will present more extensive evidence that perspective shifting occurs in quasi-quotational constructions, bringing in data from embedded imperatives and reason clauses. I will claim that a Perspectival Monster fixes the context according to which perspectival elements in its scope are evaluated; essentially, the perspectival monster provides a connection between the embedded clause and the relevant context.
5.2 Evidence for a Perspectival Monster

In chapter 3 I outlined some evidence for perspective shifting to the original discourse participants in EIQs, in particular the shifting of typically speaker-oriented elements like speech act adverbs (section 3.3) and expressive elements such as swear words (as in section 3.5). In this section I will both explore questions of perspective shifting in general and present more evidence for perspective shifting in quasi-quotational constructions. I claim that EIQs and recomplementation clauses shift towards the original discourse participants and that German EV2 clauses shift to the reporting speaker. The state of affairs in Mainland Scandinavian is more complex, and will also be discussed.

5.2.1 Shifty predicates: a case of “coming” and “going”

Starting with the concept of perspective shifting in general, Bylinina et al. (2014, 2015) and Sudo (2016) build on observations by Fillmore (1975), McCready (2007) and others in noting that a range of items in natural language are sensitive to perspectives, and hence to perspective shifting. These items are determined by context—though not necessarily in the narrow sense of the utterance context—and their perspectical interpretation does not directly impact the truth of a sentence, as long as they hold from someone’s perspective. These items include relative locative directions such as left and right, relative socio-cultural expressions such as foreigner, logophoric items and predicates like come and go that make certain indexical presuppositions. Moreover, there are contexts in which these items are known to be especially prone to shifting, such as questions, embedded clauses under attitude predicates and conditionals, though they do not obligatorily shift in any of these contexts.

The analysis put forward of EIQs so far suggests that these shifty elements whose shift is only optional in the contexts above (Bylinina et al. 2014, pp.5-10) should obligatorily shift in EIQs—at least, they should only be evaluable according to the original and not the reporting context. This is borne out by the data below:

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[Bylinina et al. (2014) also identify a group of items that do shift obligatorily in the same contexts, including evidentials, epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste. As this latter group of items do not test my hypothesis of EIQs as obligatory shifting contexts, I will not concern myself with them here.]
Relative locative directions

a. Mary said that Bill is standing on the left.  
Left of speaker or Mary
b. Mary asked John if Bill is standing on the left.  
Left of speaker, Mary or John
c. Mary asked John was Bill standing on the left.  
Left of Mary or John

Relative socio-cultural expressions

a. Mary said that John was a foreigner.  
John’s nationality differs from speaker’s or Mary’s
b. Mary asked Bill if John was a foreigner.  
John’s nationality differs from speaker’s, Mary’s, or Bill’s
c. Mary asked Bill was John a foreigner  
John’s nationality differs from Mary’s or Bill’s

‘Come’ and ‘go’

Context: Guillaume is in France, Mary is in London and the speaker is in Leeds.

a. Guillaume said that Mary should come to his house in France.  
‘Come’ from Guillaume’s perspective
b. Guillaume said that Mary should go to his house in France.  
‘Go’ from speaker’s or Mary’s perspective
c. Guillaume asked Mary if she would come to his house in France.  
‘Come’ from Guillaume’s perspective
d. Guillaume asked Mary if she would go to his house in France.  
‘Go’ from speaker’s perspective
e. Guillaume asked Mary would she come to his house in France  
‘Come’ from Guillaume’s perspective
f. #Guillaume asked Mary would she go to his house in France  
No perspective available to evaluate ‘go’

We can also look to attested examples whereby ‘come’ is used in the case that the original speaker is already at the desired location and ‘go’ is used when the original speaker is not already at the desired location, regardless of where the reporting speaker is:
(4) They said *oo, could we come over for coffee* so we did [go over for coffee]
   Yorkshire Eng., attested 29th Dec 2015

(5) He mentioned [that there was another club opening across town], and [would I like
to go with him], and I said “Sure, I’d love to go with you.”

The perspective shifting we see in EIQs is not therefore the same as that examined by
Bylinina and colleagues but is more akin to indexical shifting: it is triggered by embedding
under specific attitude contexts; it is obligatory in those contexts in terms of how it is
triggered; and it is not only inherently “shifty” items that are affected but also expressive
elements, which are typically considered to be speaker-oriented by default.

5.2.2 Embedded imperatives

There is another type of embedded speech act that I have not yet dealt with in this thesis.
Embedded imperatives have only recently been accepted in the literature as possible in
natural language but are in fact widespread in languages like English, German, Japanese
and others. An attested example from a Caribbean dialect of English is shown in (6), in
which a cricketer discusses the mindgames he plays with an opponent.

(6) Stokes doesn’t learn, because they keep telling him do not speak to me because I’m
going to perform.

*They = Stokes’s teammates, the media; subject of the imperative = Stokes; me = the speaker*

Caribbean (Jamaican) Eng., *Metro*, Mon 4th Apr 2016, p.43

Embedded imperatives provide further evidence for the crosslinguistic differences in per-
spective shifting between English and German/Mainland Scandinavian. In English, the
covert subject of the embedded imperative is interpreted as the original addressee as in
whereas in German and Swedish it is interpreted as the addressee in the reporting context, as in (8). This is in addition to the shifting of other elements as mentioned above. That the subject of the embedded imperative is interpreted as the original addressee in German is illustrated by data from [Kaufmann (2015)]:

(7) I talked to a lawyer yesterday and he said speak to his sister

Interpretation: Lawyer advised speaker to talk to lawyer’s sister.

Adapted from [Kaufmann (2015), p.9]

(8) Context: On Monday, Magda tells Michael “Claudia should leave at 5, not 7.”

Michael tells Claudia, who intends to book the train at 7:

Magda hat gesagt fahr schon früher
Magda has said leave.IMP already earlier
“Magda said youClaudia should leave earlier.”

Adapted from [Kaufmann (2015), p.8]

Interestingly, Kaufmann notes that in the examples above and in the other languages she cites, no directive commitment is imposed on the addressee in the current discourse context, although they are interpreted as being the subject of the original command. This fits with the proposal advanced in this thesis that embedded illocutionary force is not a question of being the Main Point of Utterance, Main Information Request or, to coin a similar term for commands, the Main Direction for Action. This is further illustrated by the following attested example, in which the embedded imperative is embedded under

2Kaufmann claims that subjects of English embedded imperatives can be interpreted either as coreferential with the current addressee or with the original addressee; she further claims that example (i) prefers the former interpretation and example (ii) the latter:

Context: Peter’s visa is about to expire.

(i) Mary to Peter: “I talked to a lawyer yesterday and he said marry my sister.

Context: Mary lost her wallet.

(ii) Mary to Peter: “I talked to John and he said call his bank.

There appears to be a split in interpretations here; I and other native speakers of English who accept EI Qs do not interpret the imperative subject as the current addressee in either example, rendering the context for (i) odd. However, other English speakers (particularly at the department colloquium at the University of York) have noted that they do accept a current addressee reading for (i). Kaufmann marks the judgements she presents as tentative, so clearly more fine-grained work is needed here, particularly on a possible interaction between EI Q acceptance and the availability of a current addressee-as-imperative subject reading. Moreover, more careful examples are needed—in the case of “marry my sister”, it is quite easy to interpret this as a direct quote rather than an embedded imperative. Although this is strange in the context, both careful examples and more detailed contexts are needed to gain clearer judgement data on the issue.

3Thanks to Anders Holmberg for his judgement on the Swedish version of (8), which patterns with Kaufmann’s judgements for German.
an temporal adverb expressing frequent use of the imperative and the addressee of the utterance is clearly not the addressee of the imperative.

(9) The guard usually says wait for me but they often don’t [wait for me].

Subject of the imperative = onboard train guards; me = speaker

Tyneside Eng., attested 5th Feb 2016

However, Kaufmann notes that in German, an embedded imperative is only felicitous if the original addressee hasn’t already carried out the directed action and if s/he is in a position to carry it out. That is to say that the action is still possible and as such unresolved in the reporting context. These facts are important in considering how the modal IA head and the perspectival monster to be proposed interact: in order to achieve the meaning noted by Kaufmann, it must be the matrix subject’s doxastic alternatives that form the ordering source in the modal IA head, but a current discourse participant, specifically the addressee, that is identified as the holder of responsibility. As the [Responsibility] feature is in the scope of the perspectival monster that will be proposed, it will be subject to the perspective fixed by that monster operator, as I will show. Take the German example in (8) to work this through: the speaker Michael must recognise the direction contained within the imperative (that Claudia should leave) to be unresolved in the current discourse and recognises Claudia as his addressee, but Michael is not the one who requires Claudia to leave earlier so does not himself require Claudia to act in the actual context. He is still conveying Magda’s message, using a quasi-quotational rather than direct or indirect report so that he does not impose a directive requirement of his own but still communicates that the requirement on Claudia is unresolved. In this way embedded imperatives mirror the other quasi-quotational constructions we have examined and the reduced speech act structure that I have proposed in that they express the taking-on of responsibility but not the call on the addressee to respond.

We can add some more data to Kaufmann’s survey that continues to support both the analysis put forward so far and the proposal to follow that a perspective shift that is akin to indexical shifting occurs in quasi-quotational constructions. Firstly, when considering
Castilian Spanish, we might predict that the subject of embedded Spanish declaratives is the original addressee based on the shift to the original perspectives that we see in recompilation. Rivero (1994) does not state so directly, but she notes that an imperative like (10) is interpreted as a report that contains the illocutionary force of an imperative without representing an command independent of the original discourse.

(10) Dijo que a no molestarle.
    said.3SG that to NEG bother.INF-CL.3SG
    “He said don’t bother him.”

She also compares the embedded imperative in (10) with the Spanish indirect questions examined by Lahiri (2002), which were also interpreted as representing the discourse commitments from the original discourse rather than introducing new responsibilities into the reporting discourse. This is confirmed by native speaker judgements; the original addressee is obligatorily interpreted as the subject of the embedded imperative. We can therefore conclude that the subject in Spanish embedded imperatives is interpreted as the original addressee and not the addressee of the report.

A final example to support the connection between shifting orientation in quasi-quotational structure and shifts in covert perspectival elements is the case of Japanese. Kaufmann notes based on native speaker judgements that Japanese embedded imperatives are interpreted according to the original context (Kaufmann 2015). This is further backed up by the fact that the imperative form used in Japanese does not necessarily match the form that the speaker would use to make a demand of their addressee, even though the embedded clause is an indirect report based on the pronouns (Maier 2009, 2010, Sauerland & Yatsushiro 2014). Taking an example from Maier (2009, p.7), my boss says the following to me:

(11) Asatte made ni kono shigoto-o yare
    day-after-tomorrow until this work.ACC do.IMP.IMPOLITE

[4] Thanks to Ana Godoy, Jorge Gonzalez, Ángel Luiz Jiménez Fernández and other amigos hispanohablantes. My informants suggested that, in the absence of any other contextual factors, the fact of reporting the imperative carries the implication that the addressee in the reporting situation was also supposed to comply with the command but this does not take away from the fact that there is an obligatory link to the original addressee.
“Finish this work by the day after tomorrow!”

I then report this to my respected friend the next day as follows:

(12) [Ashita made ni sono shigoto-o yare to] jooshi-ni tomorrow until that work.ACC do.IMP.IMPOLITE COMP boss-by iwaremashita told.HON.PST
“I was told by the boss finish that work by tomorrow.”

Note that the temporal indexical, the demonstrative pronoun and the politeness marking on the matrix verb all orient to the reporting situation. However, the impolite marking on the embedded imperative orients to the original situation. If it were to orient to the current situation, the embedded imperative would not carry impolite marking because the current addressee, my respected friend, would merit polite marking on the verb. Maier (2009) claims that this is evidence of “mixed quotation” in Japanese and that there are effectively “silent quotation marks” around yare in (12). Apart from the fact that silent quotation marks are very difficult to test, this is an oversimplistic analysis that does not account for other kinds of perspective shifting both in EIQs/recomplementation (where there is no overt difference between shifted discourse markers and speech act adverbs, for example) or even other kinds of shifting in Japanese. Coulmas (1985, p.55) presents an alternative way of reporting (11):

(13) [Ashita made ni sono shigoto-o yaru yooni to] jooshi-wa tomorrow until that work-ACC do.IMP.ANTIHON PRT COMP boss-TOP iimashita.
say.HON.PST
“The boss told me finish the work by tomorrow.”

The presence of yooni, a particle used to mark imperatives in indirect speech, and its compatibility with yaru in the embedded clause suggests that yaru is not invisibly quoted but is genuinely shifted within the embedded clause. Sauerland & Yatsushiro (2014) also note that genuine mixed quotation in other languages tends to be prosodically or gesturally marked, which is not the case in examples like (12) or (13) that yare is the only part
of the sentence that may be “quoted”—the shifting of asatte (‘day after tomorrow’) to ashita (‘tomorrow’) is obligatory and cannot be interpreted as quoted—plus there are other aspects of the embedded imperative verb that cannot have been quoted from the original context. Sauerland & Yatsushiro (2014, p.197) use the example below, spoken by a male, to illustrate this:

(14) Hanako-ga [kanojo-no ie-ni sugu koi to] denwa-o
denwa-placing-came
kakete-kita. “Hanako called me up and said come right now to her house.”

The form of the embedded imperative verb koi in (14) is the form used only by male speakers of Japanese, so Hanako could not have actually used the form koi in her original speech. However, the use of koi marks the embedded clause in (14) as a quasi-quotational construction that makes completely clear that the command “come right now” was made of the original addressee and not of the addressee of the report.

As Kaufmann notes, the fact that the embedded imperative addressee is not always coreferent with the current addressee causes problems for theories of imperatives such as To-Do List theories (cf. Portner (2004)), because they show imperative clause-typing to be separate from imposing directive responsibility on the addressee. Furthermore, obligations can be imposed in one context on an addressee in a future context (Kaufmann 2015, p.11). It is clear that force and clause typing are once again separate but related processes and raises questions about exactly how the constituent parts of illocutionary force are represented such that the correct interpretation can be achieved after shifting (a process that itself is yet to be detailed).

5.2.3 Reason clauses

A final piece of evidence that the languages under investigation differ in terms of the interpretation of perspectival material can be found in reason clauses. Reason clauses are independently interesting because they are another licensing environment for EIJs, but this point will be left for the next chapter.
In their work on the syntax and semantics of situation pronouns, Florian Schwarz and Ezra Keshet bring to light a difference in the interpretation of reason clauses embedded under attitude predicates. In his 2012 work, Schwarz notes that he and Keshet differ in whether they judge the following sentences as accurate reports of the context in italics:

\[(15)\quad \text{Context: The teacher thinks the glasses A, B, and C, which contained a clear liquid, were filled with vodka (they actually contained water).}\]

a. The teacher thinks John should be punished because he drank glasses A, B, and C.

b. The teacher thinks John should be punished because he drank every glass with water in it.

\[\text{Schwarz (2012, pp.35-36)}\]

Schwarz claims that a transparent interpretation of the above scenario, as represented in \[(15b)\], is available, while Keshet rejects this, claiming that only the opaque reading in \[(15a)\] is available. The important point here is that Schwarz is a native speaker of German and Keshet is a native English speaker. An informal survey of 5 English and 5 German and Swedish speakers showed that the English speakers agree with Keshet while the German and Swedish speakers agree with Schwarz. While further systematic investigation is clearly needed, this is suggestive that the divide between English on the one hand and German and Swedish on the other in terms of attribution of perspective is not limited to quasi-quotational constructions, though it is clearly related to clauses embedded under attitude predicates. If it is found that English speakers and German and Swedish speakers differ fundamentally in how they attribute perspectives to different holders, this could have wider implications both for theory, in particular theories of perspectival operators and situation pronouns, as well as for first and second language acquisition.

\subsection*{5.2.4 Summary: a Monstrous path awaits}

Two kinds of shifting are possible in natural language: the shifting of overt phi-features from the current context to an original context, known as indexical shift, and a similar
but covert shifting of perspectival features. A recent and convincing analysis of indexical shift was presented in [Sudo (2012)] and developed in [Shklovsky & Sudo (2014)] for the shifting patterns in Uyghur (Turkic). According to this analysis, there is a syntactic monster operator in the high left periphery. The principal evidence for the syntactic representation of such an operator is the distribution of overt phi-feature shifting in Uyghur; there exists a hierarchical split within embedded clauses between arguments that show shifting (objects and low-positioned nominative-marked subjects) and those that do not (high-positioned accusative-marked subjects). Shklovsky & Sudo say nothing about the availability of embedded root phenomena in Uyghur embedded clauses, nor do they make any claims about the interpretative characteristics of shifted versus non-shifted clauses, though they note that embedded objects are ambiguous between shifted and unshifted interpretations in the case that the subject is accusative-marked due to the lack of overt markers of shifting in the left-periphery.

The parallels between indexical shifting and perspective shifting are clear: there are syntactic requirements as to the kinds of predicates that clauses must be embedded under and the scope of the element that effects shifting; moreover shifting is obligatory under the scope of the monster operator and hence all shiftable elements in its scope shift together (a property remarked upon by [Anand & Nevins (2004)]). There are two core differences between indexical shifting and perspective shifting. Firstly, indexical shifting only goes in one direction—towards the embedded context. There is usually no ambiguity in the interpretation of pronouns because shifted and non-shifted pronouns have different forms (except the ambiguity noted above in Uyghur). In contrast, perspective shifting does not tend to result in an overt shift but in an interpretive shift, and can go both ways; either the utterance or embedded context may be the target of shifting, and without shifting, both contexts are available to evaluate perspectival elements, even if one context may be pragmatically preferred.

The second difference lies in the kinds of elements that may be shifted. While only pronominal, temporal and locative indexicals may shift under indexical monster operators, 

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5 As [Sudo (2012)] discusses, not all temporal and locative indexicals shift even if the language shows pronominal indexicals. He claims that shifting depends on the lexical make-up of the temporal and locative expressions in these cases. He also attributes non-shifting of certain pronouns to lexical differences, claiming
the group of perspectival elements that can shift is more heterogeneous: covert imperative
pronouns, speech act adverbs, discourse particles, even topicalised phrases as in Romance
recomplementation.

Bylinina et al. (2015) claim that perspective-sensitive items are routinely evaluated with
respect to a context and that this forms part of their semantic value; perspective-sensitive
items are crucially distinguished from pronouns in that they do not carry an index. Indices
allow pronouns to refer to a potentially infinite number of possible referents—as many
possible referents as are in the context. In contrast, perspective-sensitive items can only
be evaluated by perspective holders with specific roles in the context (speaker, addressee) or
in the syntax (matrix subject, matrix indirect object). This approach retains Kaufmann’s
(2015) observation that context-dependence goes beyond the thematic roles associated with
the speech event, because speakers and hearers not represented in the utterance context
can still be represented in other contexts, for example the context generated by use of an
attitude predicate. Bylinina et al. (2015) then propose that there is a perspective operator
θ that does carry an index and is therefore pronominal-like; in the context of Bylinina et
al.’s work this allows the operator to pick up any salient person’s perspective, but leads
to in the same problem that postulating an index on the perspective-sensitive item itself
would result in—there is little to stop the operator from referring to any salient individual
in the context, which both their data and mine show would overgenerate (a fact they
acknowledge at the end of their paper).

Kaufmann (2015) too suggests that a shifting operator is available in the case of embed-
ded imperatives; she looks to extend the use of indexical monster operators to embedded
imperative cases by claiming that covert pronouns such as the second-person feature in im-
peratives in languages like English are shiftable indexicals, in contrast to overt pronouns
that do not shift. There are some potential problems with this account: it would necessi-
tate that all perspective-sensitive items contain a covert pronoun, which may or may not
be true, but again raises the problems mentioned by Bylinina et al. (2015) with respect
to the restricted reference of such pronouns. Partee’s (1989) concerns about a pronomi-
for example that the non-shiftable second person pronoun in Slavé is lexically specified to always refer to
the addressee in the utterance context.
nal explanation for perspective shifting also remain: firstly, that there is a lack of overt evidence for the presence of these covert pronouns; secondly, that when an overt pronoun can appear with a perspective-sensitive element, it is sometimes blocked by other factors in the sentence—in the case of (16) a habitual interpretation:

(16) In all my travels, whenever I have called for a doctor, one has arrived (*there) within an hour.

Requires an antecedent for ‘there’

Bylinina et al. (2015) p.73, adapted from Partee (1989)

A final argument against Kaufmann’s analysis is that the majority of the languages that she looks at are not languages that typically permit indexical shifting—Japanese is the only possible exception (cf. Sudo (2012)). Given that the shifting of covert elements according to context is far more widespread than overt indexical shifting, it is better justified to suggest that it is a separate process rather than that the lack of indexical shifting in the presence of perspective shifting is a lexical coincidence holding across a large number of languages.

Focus, then, should be put on the proper examination of the structure and semantics of perspective-shifting elements to determine how their sensitivity to perspectives is represented, but this is not the focus of this thesis. For the purposes of this work, I will assume that they are sensitive to a perspectival parameter in the context tuple without being sensitive to every parameter in the context. To explain how this perspectival parameter is shifted, the next section contains a proposal similar to that in Bylinina et al. (2015), namely that there is an operator, a Monster, that specifically determines the context according to which perspectival elements orient. I do not claim that this monster has its own index but that it can only draw on two contexts for its values: the utterance context or the original discourse context (cf. Hacquard (2010), Sudo (2012) and their proposals for matrix attitude verbs).
5.3 The Perspectival Monster

Some assumptions must be made and laid out before the syntax of the perspectival monster can be detailed.

I will follow Percus (2000), Hacquard (2006), Sudo (2012), Schwarz (2012) and others in assuming that silent situation pronouns exist in the structure and that these are bound by similarly syntactically present world binders. There is a strong and growing body of evidence to suggest that these situation pronouns are syntactically real; Percus (2000) shows that the quantified phrase *every semanticist* in (17) can be evaluated according to the actual context or to another salient context, resulting in two available meanings:

(17) If every semanticist owned a villa in Tuscany, what a joy this world would be.

   a. If every actual semanticist owned a villa in Tuscany, what a joy it would be
      (because I would own one/because we would have a close community...).
      \{w: every semanticist in our world owns Tuscan villa in w\}
   b. If every semanticist in this hypothetical situation owned a villa in Tuscany,
      what a joy it would be (because they’d all be far away/because they’d stay
      out of trouble...).
      \{w: every semanticist in w owns a Tuscan villa in w\}

As Hacquard (2010, p.99) points out, however, there are locality restrictions on such interpretations: if situation pronouns are in the restriction of a quantifier such as *every*, they may be bound by either the actual world binder at the top of the matrix clause or by a binder introduced by some modal element. However, if they are in the scope of a quantifier, they must be bound by the most local world binder. Hence we do not get a reading for (17) in which every semanticist, real or otherwise, owns a villa in the real world.

Hacquard’s own work builds on this locality restriction to illustrate how situation pronouns and how they are bound are crucial in deriving the interpretation of modal verbs, thereby deriving the possibility of interpreting a single modal verb in multiple ways from its position in the clause relative to different situation pronouns.
Finally, Schwarz (2012) argues that syntactically represented situation pronouns occur in limited environments. He argues that verbs do not combine with situation pronouns because they must always be interpreted according to the nearest situation binder. However, the interpretation of DPs is freer, so Schwarz claims that they do combine with a situation pronoun; specifically that the situation pronoun is an argument of the determiner head. He introduces this idea for a number of reasons, including to derive the locality restriction noted by Percus and described by Hacquard.

I will not take a particular stand on the issue as to whether verbs combine with a syntactically present situation pronoun or a solely semantic argument. What is important for the analysis to follow is that attitude verbs do introduce a new world binder.

Having assumed the availability of situation pronouns, we must then define situation pronouns and what they contain for our purposes. Sudo (2012) proposes that they denote a tuple consisting minimally of a speaker, a hearer and a world parameter. I add to this by proposing that the tuple also contains a perspectival centre parameter, i.e. the discourse participant or entity against whose perspective the sentence is evaluated. In the default case the perspectival centre parameter will pick out the speaker of the utterance, but there are many cases in which it will not; not only the cases that Bylinina et al. (2014) discuss but also in cases in which a general point of view is expressed. The perspectival centre is restricted as to the discourse participants or entities that it can pick out; it must pick out a speaker, a hearer, a syntactic argument with a thematic role or the general point of view. It cannot simply pick out any salient person in the discourse context, meaning that it is different from the case of third-person pronouns in that it is syntactically (and not just pragmatically) restricted as to its identity. The context tuple is represented below:

\( (18) \quad \text{A context } c \text{ for an utterance } U = \langle a_c, h_c, P_U, w \rangle \text{ where:} \)

\( a_c \) is the speaker in \( c \)

\( h_c \) is the addressee in \( c \)

\( P_U \) is the perspective holder for \( U \)

\( w \) is the world at issue in \( c \).

\(^6\text{Irrespective of the content of } U.\)
I assume that the perspective holder is determined by some factor in the utterance in order to capture the restriction on the perspective holder to the discourse participants, current or original, rather than the context at large. In the case of EIIs the IA head requires that the perspective holders are the original discourse participants. This also captures that utterances are subparts of contexts, such that the speaker, hearer and world at issue in a context can be kept constant across multiple utterances that may vary in the perspective that is taken. Distinguishing between events (here utterances) and worlds in this way is intuitively motivated and a commonly adopted tactic, for example by Hacquard (2010).

Taking these assumptions forward, then, it is possible to propose both how the quasi-quotational construction (IAP), which we have analysed as an entity, receives its strict interpretation, as well as the reasons why perspective-shifting is restricted to such quasi-quotational environments.

I will first provide an analysis for how the perspectival monster works in English and Spanish, then I will consider German and Mainland Scandinavian.

5.3.1 In English and Spanish

I propose that the English/Spanish IA head, already analysed as a determiner, takes a complex as its external argument composed of a perspectival monster and a situation pronoun, the latter of which is bound by the world binder introduced by the matrix attitude verb. I assume that all matrix verbs introduce a perspective holder parameter as well as a world parameter on the world binder because perspective shifting, as we have already seen, is optionally available under attitude verbs in typical clausal complements. The monster then acts in a similar, but not identical, fashion to Sudo’s (2012) indexical monsters: it takes the situation pronoun and switches its value for the perspectival centre parameter in instead of the value contained in the interpretation function, effectively fixing the value on the situation pronoun as the value against which all perspectives must now be evaluated. The important part of this is that the values for the speaker and hearer are not shifted.

The assumption is that the general point of view is available in any utterance context. I will also argue that this move captures the fact that the kind of perspective shifting we are interested in directly correlates with uttering acts. Clearly this leads to questions about how to deal with perspective shifting in DPs and PPs of the kind examined by Bylinina et al. (2014), but I will not address this problem here and will touch on it only briefly in the next section.
The effect of the monster is that when it scopes over an EIQ clause uttered according to an interpretation function composed of a context $c$ and an assignment function $g$, the EIQ clause itself is interpreted according to an altered interpretation function composed of a context $c'$ and an assignment function $g$.

(19) Where there is:

a. an utterance $U$ in context $c$ with the context tuple \{$a_c,h_c,P(U),w\}$ and

b. utterance $U$ contains an embedded illocutionary force operator e.g. QUESTION and

c. the matrix verb introduces a context $k$ with a context tuple \{$x,y,P(U'),w'$\}
   and

d. the embedded illocutionary force operator QUESTION introduces a Perspectival Monster $PM$ and

e. $i_k$ is a situation pronoun also introduced by QUESTION and

f. the interpretation function is composed of a context index and an assignment function $g$

Then: the denotation of $PM(i_k)$ applied to a clause $\kappa$ interpreted according to interpretation function $c,g$

$= \text{the denotation of } \kappa \text{ interpreted according to an interpretation function }$

$\langle a_c,h_c,P(U'),w'\rangle, \ g$

$= \left[[\kappa]\right](a_c,h_c,P(U'),w'), \ g$

This differs from the indexical monster proposed by Sudo (2012) in that the indexical monster shifts all parameters of the context $c$, such that anything in the scope of the indexical monster is evaluated according to an interpretation function composed of a context $g(i_k)$ and an assignment function $g$. Note that my addition of the perspectival centre parameter $PU$ to context tuple $c$ predicts that all cases of indexical shifting will also be cases of perspective shifting. There is some evidence for this in languages like Akɔse, (Bantu, in Aikhenvald (2008, p.399)) but this has not been looked into for the languages that Sudo studied such as Uyghur. This prediction will have to be left for future research.
The structure of the clause containing the monster is as follows:

(20)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\lambda w_0 \\
\vdots \\
V \\
said \\
\lambda w_1 \\
\text{IAP} \\
\text{MONSTER} \quad s_1 \\
\text{IA'} \\
\text{IA} \\
\text{I} \\
\text{QUESTION} \\
\text{Force} \\
\text{TP} \\
\text{I would} \\
\text{DP} \\
\text{T'} \\
\text{I would} \\
\text{V'} \\
\text{V} \\
\text{DP} \\
\text{visit} \\
\text{him}
\end{array}
\]

The semantics and syntax of the monster account for the characteristics of the EIQ as follows.

Firstly, the shift of the perspectival centre parameter results in obligatory interpretation of perspectival elements according to the embedded context because the change occurs in the interpretation function (following Sudo (2012)). This means that anything in the scope of the monster will be interpreted according to the altered interpretation function while anything above the monster will be interpreted according to the unshifted interpretation function. Given that the proposal is that the monster is above the illocutionary force operator, which is the head of the highest projection of the embedded clause, it is not

\footnote{I have simplified the structure where the EIQ meets the matrix clause for expository purposes; this will be discussed in chapter 6.}
possible to test this prediction on any material in the embedded clause. However, examples like (70) in chapter 3 repeated here as (21) show that two perspectives are available in utterances containing an EIQ: a matrix perspective and an embedded perspective.

(21) The bitch shouted would he wake up already and help her find her damn keys.

Bitch = from speaker’s perspective
Damn = from matrix subject’s perspective

In (21), the expressive element *bitch* cannot refer to the original discourse because it is not in the scope of the monster or the illocutionary force operator. However, *damn* can only express the emotions of the original speaker because it is under the scope of these elements. This is in contrast to the indirect speech report version of (21), shown in (22), where *damn* can either have an original or reporting speaker orientation:

(22) The bitch shouted that he should wake up and help her find her damn keys.

Bitch = from speaker’s perspective
Damn = from speaker or matrix subject’s perspective

If anything, *damn* in (22) is more likely to be interpreted from the speaker’s perspective, as it is typically an example of conventionally-implicated content (cf. (Potts 2005)) that is obligatorily speaker-oriented.

The obligatory perspective shift in EIQs also accounts for their *de dicto* reading. All items in the clause are interpreted according to the embedded perspectival centre and, though this was not explicitly mentioned earlier, the embedded world parameter. As such the only reading available is that which was said or asked in the original discourse; a reading with respect to the actual world is unavailable because the actual world parameter has been swapped out.

Moreover, *de se* readings of relevant anaphora are also obligatory for the same reasons—this is illustrated in (31) and (32) from chapter 3 repeated here as (23) and (24):

(23) Indirect speech report: John asked if the photos of himself had appeared in the
newspaper

a. OK John asked if the photos of he, John, had appeared in the newspaper
b. OK John asked if the photos of a man (who happens to be John) had appeared
   in the newspaper

(24) EIQ: John asked did those photos of himself appear in the newspaper.

a. OK John asked if the photos of he, John, had appeared in the newspaper
b. #John asked if the photos of a man (who happens to be John) had appeared
   in the newspaper

If a reflexive pronoun appears in the EIQ it must be evaluated with respected to the original
perspective holder and the world of the original discourse, such that it is not possible to
ascribe any belief other than that of self-ascription to the original discourse speaker.10

5.3.2 In German

As already alluded to, I propose that there is only one perspectival monster and that it is the
same across all the languages that show perspective shifting. What differs between English,
Spanish and Japanese on the one hand, and German and (most) Mainland Scandinavian
on the other, is not the monster but the lexical make-up of the illocutionary force operator.
This is desirable for acquisition considerations. Given that the illocutionary force operator
can potentially be overt and that its presence is always overtly marked, it is conceivable
that the child can build a stock of evidence that the presence of the IAP leads to a
certain interpretation, and the fact that this interpretation is fixed is due to the presence
of a perspective shifting operator. This is considerably less likely if it were a case of
distinguishing between types of monsters, which are always covert.

I claim that the illocutionary force operator in German reintroduces the current utter-
ance context. There are two ways in which this could happen. Firstly, we could claim that
the illocutionary force operator introduces its own world binder that, just like the topmost

10See Lewis (1979), Cresswell (1985) and Anand (2006) for more on the de se properties of contexts
introduced by attitude predicates, which also applies to the conceptualisation here of the illocutionary
force operator qua modal verb.
binder in the sentence, picks out the utterance context. This would lead to redundancy in
the system because there would be two world binders that pick out the same world; one
high in the left periphery of the matrix cause and one in the left periphery of the embedded
clause. However, this would ensure that the situation pronoun that the IA head takes is
not simply bound by the otherwise nearest binder, the binder introduced by the attitude
predicate, as this would lead to perspective shifting and would not account for the data.

The alternative is that the illocutionary force operator in German, as in En-
glish/Spanish, does not project a world binder but only takes a situation pronoun that
is co-indexed with the highest situation pronoun in the clause. However, it is not clear
why this one type of situation pronoun should come partially fixed when this does not
seem to happen anywhere else in natural language. We must therefore proceed with the
first option despite the redundancy it introduces into the system.

Taking this to be the case, the monster will take the perspectival centre and world
parameters from the reintroduced utterance context and switch them into the context
index in the interpretation function.

(25) Where there is:

a. an utterance U in context c with the context tuple \(\{a_c, h_c, P(U), w\}\) and
b. utterance U contains an embedded illocutionary force operator e.g. ASSERT
   and
c. the embedded illocutionary force operator reintroduces the context tuple c
   \(\{a_c, h_c, P(U), w\}\) and
d. the embedded illocutionary force operator also introduces a Perspectival Mon-
   ster PM and
e. \(i_c\) is a situation pronoun also introduced by ASSERT and
f. the interpretation function is composed of a context index and an assignment
   function \(g\)

Then: the denotation of \(PM(i_c)\) applied to a clause \(\kappa\) interpreted according to

\(^{11}\)This option may also have the advantage of explaining why the debate over German EV2 as parataxis
has endured, because on this analysis, German quasi-quotational constructions are both interpretively and
structurally closer to root clauses. This will be further discussed later in this chapter and in chapter 6.
interpretation function \( c,g \)

\[ = \text{the denotation of } \kappa \text{ interpreted according to an interpretation function} \]

\[ (a_c,h_c,P(U),w), g \]

\[ = \llbracket \kappa \rrbracket (a_c,h_c,P(U),w), g \]

The structure of the clause containing the monster is as follows for the sentence *Maria sagte, Peter wird spielen* (‘Maria said Peter will play’).\(^{12}\)

The reader will notice that the effect of the monster as stated above is only minimally different from the case without the monster. However, a key difference already been noted

\(^{12}\)I have simplified the structure where the EV2 clause meets the matrix clause for expository purposes; this will be discussed in chapter 6.
in this thesis is that typical embedded clauses that are not embedded under the IAP are generally ambiguous as to their interpretation. We have so far focused on the interpretation of expressive elements such as swear words and high adverbs and how they can orient either to the discourse participants or to the matrix arguments. This has so far been attributed to the possibility of the perspectival centre parameter denoting an actor within the utterance as well as the discourse participants. This is not available under the German-type ASSERT head because the perspectival centre parameter is fixed as the speaker in the current context.

The availability of both *de re* and *de dicto* readings has also been briefly considered. Assuming an equivalence between *de re* and speaker orientation and *de dicto* and subject orientation, we see that this is not the case in quasi-quotational constructions: focusing on German EV2, expressive elements orient exclusively to the reporting speaker, not to the matrix subject/original speaker. Also, following the discussion of *de dicto* readings in the case of EIQs, we predict that only *de re* readings will be available in EV2 cases if the perspective introduced and fixed by the IAP is that of the reporting speaker. This appears to hold, as shown by data pertaining to V2 relative clauses from Gärtner (2002):

(27) a. Maria möchte einen Fisch fangen, der kariert ist.
   “Maria wants to catch a fish that is checkered.”
   Non-V2


This is a slightly different case, as the relevant item is in the matrix clause, but in (27b) the only available reading is the *de re* reading, where both readings are available in (27a). But even in the cases of EV2 under attitude predicates that we have been examining, the *de re* requirement seems to hold\(^\text{13}\) in the example below from von Heusinger (1999), *ein bestimmtes Buch* (‘a certain book’) is interpreted as known within the speaker’s frame of reference rather than any of the other candidates in the matrix or embedded clauses:

\(^{13}\)Penner & Bader (1995) argue the opposite for Swiss German, that *de re* readings (loosely construed) are only available in verb-final clauses, but native speaker informants that I have consulted confirm the reading given here.
Du hast Malachias gesagt, Berengar habe Severin ein bestimmtes Buch gegeben.

“You said to Malachias (that) Berengar gave a certain book to Severin.”


It is clear that perspectives in German EV2 are fixed in the same way and same contexts and that they are syntactically marked in the same way as in EIQs. The locus of variation between EIQs and EV2 lies in which perspective is fixed; in this type of EV2, the monster fixes the perspective to which the clause in its scope can orient as the current utterance context because this is the input it receives, thanks to the situation pronoun introduced with the illocutionary force operator.

5.3.3 In Mainland Scandinavian

Mainland Scandinavian requires separate consideration from German because there are a range of differences in distribution and interpretation that is suggestive of a fine-grained difference between the two language groups at the level we are discussing here.

At the end of the previous chapter, I noted that Wiklund (2010) suggests that EV2 in Mainland Scandinavian has an evidential function, whereby it disambiguates whose perspective is being expressed. She claims that EV2 clauses mark only one perspective, that of the current speaker, whereas non-EV2 clauses are ambiguous between the speaker’s and the matrix subject’s perspectives. She makes this claim based on personal intuition and the behaviour of so-called speaker-oriented swear words, such as *fan-i-mig* (literally ‘devil in me’), in Swedish.

This claim is not uncontested, however. Stroh-Wollin (2011) examines different types of swear word phrases and formulae and claims that the behaviour of swear words does not support Wiklund’s (2010) evidentiality hypothesis. She conducted an informal survey using original speech-reported speech pairs as in [29] and [30] below:

(29) Han har fan-i-mig inte läst brevet.
    He has devil-in-me not read letter.DEF
    “He has bloody well not read the letter.

177
(30) a. Hon sa att han fan-i-mig inte hade läst brevet
she said that he devil-in-me not had read letter.DEF
“She said that he had bloody well not read the letter.” Non-V2

b. Hon sa att han hade fan-i-mig inte läst brevet
she said that he had devil-in-me not read letter.DEF
“She said that he had bloody well not read the letter.” V2, Stroh-Wollin (2011 p.97)

She notes that both word orders in (30) were judged acceptable and that the swear word
fan-i-mig is interpreted as expressing the original speaker’s point of view in both cases. It
is not clear how Stroh-Wollin presented the examples to her informants, and her findings
throw up interesting questions for analyses of conventional implicatures (e.g. Potts (2005))
if they are accurate. For these reasons, I do not think that Stroh-Wollin’s objections are
particularly damaging for Wiklund’s claims.

A more serious challenge comes from Julien (2015). She acknowledges the claims of
Wiklund et al. (2009) that V2 clauses under semifactive verbs cannot be challenged by
the speaker; the example below is a Norwegian version of a Swedish example presented in
Wiklund et al. (2009):

(31) Dei oppdaga at den bloggen las han alltid, #men det gjorde han ikkje.
they discovered that that blog.DEF read he always but that did he not
“They discovered that that blog, he always read, #but he didn’t.


However, she claims that under verbs like say, it is possible for the speaker to contradict
the proposition contained in the EV2 clause:

(32) Dei sa at den bloggen las han alltid, men det gjorde han ikkje.
they said that that blog.DEF read he always but that did he not
“They said that that blog, he always read, but he didn’t.

Julien (2015) p.169

She does not elaborate on what this means for the discourse status of the embedded clause,
other than to suggest that the EV2 clause “represents a (possibly indirect) assertion”
Julien (2015 p.169). She claims that the embedded clause in (32) is presented as the
matrix subject’s point of view and that “it does not make much pragmatic difference
whether or not the embedded clause is asserted in itself” (Julien 2015, p.169). I do not understand what she means by this because it appears to undermine an assertion account more generally if it is true, not least because it seems to suggest that V2 has no effect on interpretation compared with a non-V2 clause, which we know not to be true based on observations other than their distribution.

Regardless of this, we need to take the felicity of the continuation in (32) seriously and examine how Mainland Scandinavian EV2 can orient unambiguously to the matrix subject in certain cases. Note that the idea of perspective disambiguation in quasi-quotational constructions, including EV2, still holds, because Julien (2015, p.154) also shows that shifts in EV2 are comprehensive and involve the shifting of all relevant interpretations (as in the Shift Together constraint of Anand & Nevins (2004)).

There is evidence that Mainland Scandinavian may have two different types of perspective disambiguation from the distribution of Mainland Scandinavian EV2 compared with German EV2. Julien notes that there are a range of differences between the two sets of languages, which I illustrate here in a table for ease of reference:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Bridge” verbs</th>
<th>Likelihood/possibility</th>
<th>Causation</th>
<th>Preference</th>
<th>Relatives</th>
<th>Under modals/negation</th>
<th>Under interrogation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ger</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSc</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Distribution of EV2 in German (Ger) and Mainland Scandinavian (MSc)

There is an obvious reason why German has a more restricted distribution of EV2 than Mainland Scandinavian, as already identified by Gärtner (2001, 2016), Lohnstein (2016) and Meinunger (2006)—German has subjunctive morphology that can be used to demonstrate that the speaker is divesting themselves of responsibility for the embedded clause. This explains examples such as (33) which apparently contradict the table above—as Meinunger (2006) points out, the subjunctive can improve an EV2 clause in contexts where EV2 clauses in the indicative are blocked, as shown in the parallel example in (34):

Note that this is one of the few examples in Julien’s article that is constructed rather than taken from a corpus. This is not to suggest that the judgement is not supported, but suggests that the kind of utterance in (32) is vanishingly rare.
The examples above explain the relative scarcity of indicative German EV2 clauses under modals and negation, as they must be interpreted with respect to a perspective other than that of the matrix speaker.\footnote{There are other cases of German EV2 under negation that do not contain the subjunctive, which I examine in section \ref{sec:6.2.6}.} I claim that this also explains the relative scarcity of even subjunctive German EV2 clauses in such contexts, as they work against the specifications of the German IAP, as detailed in this chapter and the previous one.

In contrast to German, Mainland Scandinavian has to double up on existing structures to express matrix subject perspective, so it is unsurprising if it appears that those existing structures have a wider distribution in Mainland Scandinavian. I however predict that there are interpretive differences between EV2 clauses in different contexts, as I will explain shortly.

What about the cases in which Mainland Scandinavian EV2 is barred despite EV2 being permitted in German? There are independent differences in the language that could explain the lack of Mainland Scandinavian EV2 in relative clauses, such as the different etymologies of the relative pronoun in German (from a demonstrative pronoun) and the Mainland Scandinavian languages.\footnote{Thanks to Caroline Heycock for suggesting this reasoning.} As for the preference cases, I think it is necessary to conduct more fine-grained experiments in this area. As Truckenbrodt (2006, p.292) points out, only certain uses of preference predicates embed V2 anyway—those in which a preference is made relative to the way things are, rather than both states of affairs being hypothetical. It seems that Julien does not account for this carefully enough in the Norwegian examples she gives (Julien 2015, p.171), either by not controlling for the context or by inserting the adjunct “in the case” such that she biases slightly, but significantly,
away from the necessary reality-grounded context.

In terms of the effect of these facts on the structure of MSc, I claim that Mainland Scandinavian, given its lack of subjunctive morphology, makes use both of an English-type ASSERT head\(^{[17]}\) which like English-type QUESTION and REQUEST does not project its own world binder, and the German-type ASSERT head, which does project its own world binder. There is no surface difference between the two but there is an interpretive difference: when the English-type ASSERT head is used, the perspective represented is the matrix subject’s and the speaker may contradict it. When the German-type ASSERT head is used, the perspective represented is the current speaker’s. This leads to the prediction that only the English-type head will be used in those contexts in which German uses the subjunctive and where speaker-orientation is not available. Similarly, when there is no available perspective holder in the matrix clause, only the German-type head will be possible, for example under predicates of causation. This prediction requires experimental investigation to be supported.

Claiming that there are two different heads with identical surface manifestations may seem theoretically a little unsatisfying, but there are other examples in natural language of the same surface form achieving two different interpretations, for example Korean V-raising (Han et al. 2007, 2016). It is also a more accurate way of representing Mainland Scandinavian EV2 in terms of meaning and distribution.

5.4 Contexts and Conversational Moves

Having completed the description of the Illocutionary Act Phrase and the demonstration of how it achieves the interpretations we see in quasi-quotational constructions, it is now necessary to examine how perspective shifting in these constructions affects their impact on the conversation. I will argue that the Main Point of Utterance (MPU) framework of Simons (2007) is not a viable model to use and that a QUD-like approach that takes into account aims and coherency of the discourse as well as aims of the individual interlocutors

\(^{[17]}\) An English-type ASSERT head is available, as seen by the kind of matrix-subject perspective available in Romance recompensation and a form of embedded assertion in English that will be introduced in 6.3.1.
is preferable. To do this, I will adopt a model of the conversation based on Farkas & Bruce (2010), which I shall lay out first.

Farkas & Bruce (2010) in their discussion of responses to assertions and questions outline a conversational model whose aim is to maintain stable states within a given conversation. A stable state in a conversation is defined as a state in which nothing is “at-issue”, for example no question is unresolved or proposition unaccepted. Their model comprises five main components:

(35) a. A list of propositions in the discourse to which interlocutor A is publicly committed
   b. A list of propositions in discourse to which interlocutor B is publicly committed
   c. A Table to which discourse moves such as propositions, questions etc. are added and stacked
   d. A common ground consisting of a set of propositions to which all discourse participants are publicly committed (such propositions may have passed over the Table, or may follow from propositions that have passed over the Table)
   e. A projected set of common grounds that provides canonical methods for dealing with issues on the Table; its contents are computed according to the contents of the Table stack

Farkas and Bruce’s (2010) proposal is like other QUD proposals in that the driving force of the conversation is to settle all outstanding issues in a conversation, i.e. to answer all outstanding questions. Roberts’s (1996/2012) QUD framework assumes a specific set of questions that need answering such that they drive the conversation and cause certain conversational moves to be put forward; Farkas and Bruce assume that filling the common ground is the motivation for putting forward conversational moves. In either case, emptying the Table of conversational moves is the aim.

The principal difference between their proposal and other QUD proposals is the idea that every conversational move (an addition to the Table) comes with canonical methods
for response (a certain configuration of the projected set). The concept of the projected set will prove particularly useful in teasing out the difference between quasi-quotational constructions and the QUDs they represent and/or interact with, though I will go on to modify the concept of the “canonical” response.

An example from Farkas & Bruce (2010, p.91) as to how their system works is shown in table 5.2. The initial context state for a conversation is $K_1$ (where CG is the common ground and PS the projected set of common grounds):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG: $s_1$</td>
<td>PS: $ps_1 = {s_1}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.2: $K_1$: Initial context state**

Table 5.3 shows that A has taken public responsibility for the utterance she has placed on the Table, namely the words “Sam is home”, and the proposition those words convey. The common ground has not yet changed and the projected set shows that the canonical response to A’s assertion is that it will be accepted by B and so added to the common ground.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>$\langle&quot;Sam is home&quot;[D]; p\rangle$</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG: $s_2 = s_1$</td>
<td>PS: $ps_2 = {s_1 \cup {p}}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.3: $K_2$: A asserts “Sam is home” relative to $K_1$**

Two ways of responding to A’s assertion are shown below, one canonical in tables 5.4-5.5 and one non-canonical in table 5.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
<td>$p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG: $s_3 = s_2$</td>
<td>PS: $ps_3 = {s_2 \cup {p}}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.4: $K_3$: B agrees to commit to $p$ (Canonical move)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CG: $s_4 = \{s_3 \cup \{p\}\}$  
PS: $ps_4 = s_4$

Table 5.5: $K_4$: The CG is updated with $p$ (Canonical move)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>$\langle \text{‘Sam is home’}[D]; p, \langle \text{‘Sam is not home’}; \neg p \rangle \rangle$</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CG: $s_3' = s_2$  
PS: $ps_3' = \emptyset$

Table 5.6: $K_3'$: B denies $p$ (Non-canonical move)

Note that $ps_3'$ is the empty set because, Farkas & Bruce claim, there is now no possible common ground that is compatible with both $p$ and $\neg p$, so the conversation is in crisis. It can be resolved in two ways: either one of the participants can retract their assertion, and the other proposition is added to the CG in the way shown in table 5.5, or the participants agree to disagree, in which case lists A and B are updated but the CG is not, as in table 5.7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
<td>$\neg p$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CG: $s_4' = s_3$  
PS: $ps_4' = s_4'$

Table 5.7: $K_4'$: A and B agree to disagree relative to $K_3'$

Finally, they model polar questions in their system as in table 5.8 following Hamblin’s (1971) conceptualisation of polar questions as denoting a non-singleton set of propositions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
<td>$\langle \text{‘Sam is home’}[I]; p, \neg p \rangle$</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CG: $s_5 = s_1$  
PS: $ps_5 = \{s_1 \cup \{p\}, s_1 \cup \{\neg p\}\}$

Table 5.8: $K_5$: A asks “Is Sam home?” relative to the initial input context $K_1$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
<td>$\langle \text{‘Sam is home’}[I]; p, \neg p \rangle, \langle \text{‘Sam is home’}[D]; p \rangle$</td>
<td>$p$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CG: $s_6 = s_5$  
PS: $ps_6 = \{s_6 \cup \{p\}\}$

Table 5.9: $K_6$: B confirms $p$ in input context $K_5$ (Canonical move)
Regardless of whether B confirms or denies $p$, A’s list is then updated in the same way as in Table 5.4 followed by the clearing of the Table and the participants’ list with the update of CG as in Table 5.5.

In the work to follow I will largely adopt Farkas and Bruce’s system with one amendment in the domain of assertions. I will not assume, as Farkas and Bruce do, that there is a bias in the PS following an assertion towards confirmation. Farkas and Bruce’s suggestion that assertions privilege a future common ground in which that assertion is accepted is intuitively attractive and appears to have support in that the lack of direct response to an assertion is interpreted as acceptance of it. However, there are reasons to reject such a stark view of the effect of assertions on future common grounds. Firstly, it has already been shown in this thesis as in other work that an assertion carries information that a proposition alone does not; information about speaker responsibility for the truth of the proposition, speaker commitment towards the proposition, newness in the discourse and so on. An addressee may or may not have counterevidence for a proposition contained within an assertion that the speaker is not aware of, or the speaker may have very weak evidence for the proposition contained within the assertion but still wish to produce an assertive rather than a questioning utterance for some other reason. Secondly, unless we assume that the projected set for the discourse is controlled by the speaker, which is possible but seems undesirable for other reasons, it is therefore by no means to be assumed that the default response to an assertion is to accept the proposition it contains. Thirdly, Farkas and Bruce define a canonical move as “removing an issue from the Table [by] reach[ing] a discourse state in which the issue is decided” (Farkas & Bruce 2010, p.88). They also state that addition to the common ground is a canonical move where retraction is not (Farkas & Bruce 2010, p.85). Their motivations for this (over and above intuitive appeal) are not clear, especially as they mention Walker’s (1996) collaborative principle just prior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
<td>$\langle \text{Sam is home},[I]; , p, \neg p \rangle, , \langle \text{Sam is not home},[D]; , \neg p \rangle$</td>
<td>$\neg p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG: $s_6 = s_5$</td>
<td>PS: $ps_6 = {s_6 \cup {\neg p}}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.10: $K_6'$: B denies $p$ in input context $K_5$ (Canonical move)
to defining a canonical change. Walker’s collaborative principle, as summarised by Farkas and Bruce, states:

The principle requires participants to provide evidence of detected ‘discrepancy of belief’ as soon as possible in a conversation.

Farkas & Bruce (2010, p.85)

If this principle holds, then immediate denial of an assertion cannot be considered a non-canonical move, but a canonical one in the case of a mismatch in belief or knowledge state between speaker and addressee.

I therefore propose the following amendment of Farkas and Bruce’s model: the projected sets arising from both assertions and polar questions are non-singleton sets, but their constituent parts differ. I stick with Farkas & Bruce (2010) in claiming that the projection set arising from a polar question \( p \) or \( \neg p \) is \( \{ s_1 \cup \{ p \}, s_1 \cup \{ \neg p \} \} \). I diverge from Farkas & Bruce (2010) in that the projection set arising from an assertion \( p \) is \( \{ s_1 \cup \{ p \}, s_1 \} \). The impact of this on understanding responses to an assertion is that both confirmation and denial of an assertion are canonical moves, but that denial of an assertion results in vacuous updating of the common ground, which is dispreferred. Why this is so is illustrated below in Table 5.11: unlike Farkas and Bruce’s illustration of a denial move in 5.6 in 5.11, the projected set is not empty. This is because a “crisis” with respect to the contradictory propositions on the Table does not leave us with no possible coherent common ground; it leaves us with exactly what we started with—the current common ground as the projected set.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( p )</td>
<td>( \langle \text{‘Sam is home’}; p \rangle, \langle \text{‘Sam is not home’}; \neg p \rangle )</td>
<td>( \neg p )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG: ( s_{3^*} = s_2 )</td>
<td>PS: ( ps_{3^*} = s_2 )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.11: \( K_{3^*} \): B denies \( p \) in input context \( K_2 \) (Canonical move)

The crisis that exists is that the Table needs clearing of two contradictory propositions, meaning that either (a) one interlocutor must retract their commitment or (b) they must agree to disagree, just as Farkas & Bruce (2010) state. Until that time, the projected set can only be the common ground.
I will now show, using the system described above, that EIQs do not automatically constitute a conversational move separate from the root illocutionary act despite carrying independent illocutionary force. This will be shown to be because EIQs are related to a different discourse context. Conversely, German-type EV2 clauses do constitute a separate conversational move from the matrix clause because they are related to the same discourse context. The restrictions on German-type EV2 follow from the fact that conversational moves that reintroduce an already settled issue (that is, a proposition that has already been accepted into or is already present in the CG) are banned as they are redundant.  

5.4.1 EIQs in conversation

Implicitly understood in our version of Farkas and Bruce’s model so far is that only assertions made relative to the context K constitute conversational moves in K. Similarly, only questions made relative to the context K constitute conversational moves in K. Moreover, we have seen that a speaker who utters an EIQ need not be the original questioner in the utterance context, nor does the addressee assume responsibility for the answer the utterance context.

We therefore have to consider two important matters before proceeding. Firstly, how are embedded speech reports in general dealt with in this model? Secondly, what is the status of the utterance in this model?

The question about utterances is dealt with briefly by Farkas & Bruce (2010). They follow Stalnaker (1978) in noting that, “as a side effect of an assertion the common ground is automatically updated with the proposition that the author of the assertion has made the assertion” (Farkas & Bruce 2010, p.93). They do not represent this in their model. I will represent this in my model as the automatic addition of a proposition P to the common ground in any case that an illocutionary act made with respect to the current utterance context is uttered. P contains the details of the speaker, addressee, the type of speech act, the words used by the speaker and the context in which the speech act took place. P will

---

18 Note that this is different from the vacuous updating of the CG in 5.11 because neither of the propositions on the Table in 5.11 are already present in the CG.

19 No doubt there are many more matters not dealt with here, for example how wh-questions fit into the model, but I restrict myself to the most relevant pressing matters.
typically look something like (36)

(36) Speaker A asserts to Addressee B “I am not feeling well” in context C.

The question about embedded speech reports does not fall under Farkas and Bruce’s (2010) remit. I propose that sentences containing a declarative complement clause introduce two propositions onto the Table. Evidence for this includes the fact that both the overall and the embedded proposition can be challenged (as illustrated in (37)) and the fact that either the overall or the embedded proposition can be interpreted as the MPU.

(37) A: John said that phases were introduced in Chomsky 1995.
    B. He’s wrong, phases were introduced in Chomsky 2001.
    B’. You’re wrong, he said that phases were introduced in Chomsky 2001.
    B”. You’re wrong, Mary said that phases were introduced in Chomsky 1995.

The initial assertion in (37) is modelled as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>⟨‘John said that phases were introduced in Chomsky 1995’[D], ⟨‘phases were introduced in Chomsky 1995’[D]; q⟩; p⟩</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG: s7 = s1</td>
<td>PS: ps7 = {s1 ∪ {p}, s1}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.12: K7: A asserts “John said that phases were introduced in Chomsky 1995” relative to initial input state K1

The representation of an embedded polar interrogative is slightly different—where an embedded proposition is automatically added to the Table along with the main proposition, this is not automatically the case with an embedded polar interrogative. This is because an embedded polar interrogative does not put one proposition forward but two contradictory propositions. There are two ways of interpreting utterances containing em-

---

20 Neither do Farkas and Bruce model how not-at-issue content such as attitudes are treated in the discourse and I do not directly propose an answer to that here. I will assume for the purposes of this discussion that the proposition denoting the fact that a certain speech act was made contains information about how that speech act was made.

21 An exception to this is sentences with a factive matrix verb, as the proposition in the complement must be (interpreted as) presupposed. I leave the analysis of factive verbs aside for the purposes of this chapter.

22 Thanks to Norman Yeo for timely discussion on this point and for the examples below.
bedded interrogatives: if interpreted directly, the main point of the utterance is the overall proposition and the interrogative is effectively ignored. If interpreted indirectly, the main point of the utterance is the embedded interrogative, the contradictory propositions are interpreted as being on the Table and the hearer will be expected to confirm one of the propositions. This is modelled in Table 5.13 for the direct interpretation and Table 5.14 for the indirect interpretation.

As with the discussion in section 4.2.2, it is not clear how the speaker and hearer decide whether the set of propositions is on the Table or not, but I will leave that for future work.

An important point in terms of the difference between standard embedded clauses and quasi-quotational clauses is that a response by B that questions not-at-issue content, such as the way John said what he said, is not available. Neither is it possible for B to attribute the incorrect content to the speaker. Both of these facts are illustrated in (38):

(38) B”’ #He didn’t say it like that!

B”’ #You’re wrong, phases were introduced in Chomsky 2001.

This is because only the proposition contained in the embedded clause is added to the Table. No proposition P denoting the fact that a context-specific speech act was made by John has been added to the Table. Similarly, no proposition P denoting the fact that the speaker asserted that “phases were introduced in Chomsky 2001” has been added.

---

Table 5.13: \(K_{8}\): A asserts “Mary asked if Sam is home” relative to the initial input context \(K_{1}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(p)</td>
<td>(\langle\text{Mary asked if Sam is home}\rangle[D]; p)</td>
<td>(\emptyset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG: (s_8 = s_1)</td>
<td>PS: (ps_{8} = {s_{1} \cup {p}, s_{1}})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.14: \(K_{9}\): A asserts “Mary asked if Sam is home” relative to the initial input context \(K_{1}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(p)</td>
<td>(\langle\text{Mary asked if Sam is home}\rangle[D]; p \langle\text{Sam is home}\rangle[I]; q, \neg q)</td>
<td>(\emptyset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG: (s_9 = s_1)</td>
<td>PS: (ps_{9} = {s_{1} \cup {p, q}, s_{1} \cup {p, \neg q}, s_{1}})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to the Table. The speaker of the initial assertion in (37) expressed the content ‘phases were introduced in Chomsky 1995’ in that he uttered those words but did not assert the corresponding proposition.

In contrast, quasi-quotational constructions do introduce some proposition P that denotes the fact that a certain speech act was made in a certain context by certain interlocutors. As such, table 5.15 illustrates the effect of an EIQ relative to context k when uttered in context K:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>p; P_k</td>
<td>⟨'Jane asked me [would I visit her]_k[D]; p;⟩</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CG: s_10 = s_1 ∪ P_{K_{10}}

PS: ps_{10} = \{s_{10} \cup \{p\}, s_{10} \cup \{P_k\}, s_{10} \cup \{p, P_k\}, s_{10}\}

Table 5.15: K_{10}: A asserts “Jane asked me would I visit her” relative to initial input state K_1

In table 5.15, the CG is automatically updated by P_{K_{10}}, which is the proposition “A asserts “Jane asked me would I visit her” in K_{10}.” The Table consists of three things, listed in (39):

(39)  
  a. The syntactic structure of the assertion that, crucially, contains the syntactic structure of EIQ complete with subject-auxiliary inversion  
  b. The denotation of the sentence asserted (p, or ”Jane asked me would I visit her”)  
  c. A proposition representing the fact that some speech act denoted by the EIQ occurred in the relevant context (P_k, or Jane said some P in k)

Finally, the PS in 5.15 is the CG (complete with automatic update) plus two propositions to be accepted: the proposition contained within A’s assertion and the proposition that Jane uttered some P in k. Both of these propositions are up for debate and can legitimately be challenged or denied by addressee B.

However, Farkas & Bruce do assume that the fact of a speech act occurring is also registered in the CG. I assume that speech acts are automatically entered into the CG of
the context in which they are uttered, but any illocutionary acts that are presented but
evaluated with respect to another context are put onto the table to be accepted into the
CG separately. As table 5.15 shows, this means that in uttering an EIQ A is proposing
both a proposition and that an utterance took place in context k to be accepted into the
common ground.

As the utterance “She asked me would I visit her” adds and Pk to the Table in table
5.15 B may accept or deny both p and Pk. The conversational set-up is not one of a
questioning situation because there is no p on the Table that is not in one of the discourse
participants’ lists of public commitments, because p and Pk are not mutually exclusive, and
simply because p and Pk are both asserted. Note that this accounts for the bias towards
first and second person arguments in EIQs. The EIQ is asserted to have occurred so the
speaker must have some evidence for its having happened in order to assert it, and the
most natural way for the speaker to have evidence of a speech act having happened is for
the speaker to have been involved in it.

Similarly, when an EIQ is used inside a question like “Did he ask was it there yet?”,
the only proposition in question is the one contained in the matrix clause, because the EIQ
is solely represented as an utterance having happened in context k.

However, we have also seen that EIQs can appear to constitute the main information
request (MIR), for example the EIQ in (7b) in section 4.2.2, repeated below as (40):

(40) Do you know is Mary coming?

Whilst it is pragmatically more satisfactory to give an answer to whether or not Mary is
coming, the interpretation of polarity particles as responses to questions like (40) suggests
that the EIQ does not actually place an independent question into the conversation. When
used independently, polarity particles like yes and no can only be interpreted as a response
to the question “Do you know whether p?” In order for them to be interpreted as a response
to the question contained in the EIQ, yes and no must be accompanied by a repetition or
reworking of the proposition “Mary is coming.”

23By utterance, I mean an utterance of an expression of a relevant proposition or question, as appropriate.
We must however account for the fact that EIQs like “…is Mary coming?” can be used to indirectly ask a question in the current discourse. I propose that this is a pragmatic process based on the fact that the EIQ in (40) is also evaluated with respect to the current discourse context K—the EIQ is automatically accepted into the CG of K because it is presented as an utterance evaluated with respect to K. It is accepted as having been uttered without having been uttered independently because it is evaluated with respect to the current discourse context. This means that it is recognised as a conversational move made by a participant in the current discourse. However, it is not the only QUD, nor is it the primary QUD because it cannot be independently addressed using polarity particles. This is modelled in table 5.16:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Table</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>∅</td>
<td>‘Do you know is Mary coming’?[K12]’[I]; p,¬p, ⟨‘is Mary coming’[I]; q,¬q⟩</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CG: \( s_{12} = s_1 \cup \{P_{K12}, P_{K12}’\} \)

PS: \( p s_{12} = \{s_{12} \cup \{p,q\}, \{s_{12} \cup \{p,¬q\}, s_{12} \} \}

Table 5.16: K_{12}: A asks “Do you know is Mary coming?” relative to the initial input context K_{I}

We can therefore see by putting this information into the model used here that the EIQ-as-MIR is only a pragmatic effect. This is because the only \( p \) automatically at issue in the utterance context is the one in the matrix clause. The question “Is Mary coming?” is not directly asked despite there being two utterances that are marked as being evaluated with respect to the utterance context K.

Having put forward and developed this framework, let us now return to the claim in this thesis that EIQs denote a conversational move in the relevant discourse. What does this now mean in the context of this chapter? What it means is that the content of the EIQ passed across the Table of the relevant previous discourse, and that a proposition denoting the fact of a corresponding speech act was accepted into the common ground of that relevant previous discourse. Crucially, the EIQ does not need to represent a question in a previous discourse but the question it expresses must have addressed in that previous discourse, either partially or fully. For example, for an EIQ with the content \( \{p, ¬p\} \), p

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24This discussion once again highlights the difference between being a QUD and an MPU.
or \( \neg p \) must have passed across the relevant Table, and a proposition denoting the fact of that utterance will have been accepted into the common ground of that discourse.

### 5.4.2 German-type EV2 in conversation

German EV2 clauses (and Mainland Scandinavian EV2 clauses that are evaluated with respect to the current context) behave like (40) as examined in the previous section and are automatically accepted into the CG as an utterance made in that context. This is modelled in table 5.17:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( p, q )</td>
<td>( \emptyset )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \langle \langle 'Marga sagte, [Peter ist glücklich]'<em>K</em>{13}, [D]; p, ( ['Peter ist glücklich']_D; q) \rangle )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG: ( s_{13} = s_1 \cup { P_K_{13}, P_K_{13}' } )</td>
<td>PS: ( ps_{13} = { s_{13} \cup { p, q }, s_{13} } )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.17: \( K_{13} \): A says “Marga sagte, Peter ist glücklich” relative to the initial input context \( K_1 \)

Table 5.17 shows that the proposition “Peter ist glücklich” is added to the Table and the fact that A made the assertion “Peter ist glücklich” is added directly into the common ground. The effects of this will be discussed further in the next chapter.

### 5.5 Summary

In this chapter I argued that a perspectival monster in the specifier of IAP fixes the perspective and the world against that the clause in its scope is to be evaluated. The monster is obligatorily present whenever the IAP is present. The presence of the perspectival monster is motivated by the fixed interpretation not only of expressive elements, but of shifty predicates and covert arguments such as imperative subjects when the clause marks the presence of the IAP. Moreover, further evidence was produced for the different shifting patterns crosslinguistically, which are ultimately analysed to be a matter of lexical variation across languages rather than a proliferation of different types of perspectival monster.

A number of open questions remain, in particular how optional perspective shifting works in the case of typical embedded contexts and whether there is a method of accounting
for the German-type shifting pattern without introducing as much redundancy into the system.

With respect to the former problem, my suspicion is that it has something to do with different combinations of perspectival centre and world parameters. I do not think that the answer lies in monsters (contra [Sudo (2016)]) because there is little or no concomitant syntactic effect of optional perspective shifting, nor is there an obvious introducer for putative optional monsters. I leave this question for future research.

The latter problem may not be so much an empirical problem as a theoretical one. It is possible that the fact that these structures contain this kind of redundancy could partially account for some of the marginal judgements that some German speakers still give for EV2 constructions generally. Indeed, as [Krifka (2014)] notes, there is some intuitive resistance to the idea of having two types of illocutionary force in one utterance rather than presenting them separately as separate conversational goals. However, this kind of conjecture too requires further research and more careful experimental examination with a range of native speakers.

With respect to the wider question of what embedded illocutionary force is, it is clear by this point that I do not encode a change of state in the illocutionary force operator in the way that [Krifka (2014)] does. Instead, embedded illocutionary force is all about fixing the attribution of responsibility to a specific individual in the relevant discourse context who has the appropriate knowledge or attitudes to take responsibility for the proposition/set of propositions. However, if the monster dictates that the relevant discourse context is the current one, then we may see a change of state take place in the current conversation.

For EIQs, the monster fixes the interpretation of the embedded clause as the original discourse context because that is the input it is given by the illocutionary force operator $\text{IA}^o$. This means that there is no direct call on the addressee in the reporting context to respond to the embedded illocutionary act in the way she would a root illocutionary act because the embedded illocutionary act does not belong to the current context. The appropriateness of the next conversational move is still determined by the root act though the fact of the embedded act being a separate illocutionary act in a given context is added to the conversational common ground. To sum up: the use of an embedded illocutionary
act provides propositional information to update the common ground, as well as a reference to a (usually past) conversational move, but is not itself entered independently into the sequence of conversational moves in the reporting discourse as a root illocutionary act would be. It differs therefore from a typical embedded question without independent illocutionary force in that the latter is not automatically entered into the common ground as an uttered act, nor is its status (as an unresolved question) in the original discourse context expressed.

The case is slightly different in EV2; because the embedded illocutionary act does pertain to the same context as the utterance, then it is automatically marked in the common ground as a separate utterance from the main speech act. However, it still does not enter into the current discourse as a conversational move additional to that of the root illocutionary act; the embedded proposition is still contingent on the matrix proposition and the fact of the embedded illocutionary act being made is added straight into the CG. These facts also go some way to explaining the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions with respect to factive and semifactive matrix predicates, as the next chapter will show.
Chapter 6

Interfacing with the Matrix (Clause)

6.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the relationship between embedded illocutionary acts and the matrix predicates that may embed them. It is proposed that embedded illocutionary acts are not selected by the matrix verb as an argument. Instead, they non-restrictively modify a nominal that is the true argument of the matrix predicate. It will be shown, in the spirit of Reis (1997), that a non-selection-based account can better explain the distribution of embedded illocutionary acts and some of the restrictions on this distribution. I will then go on to discuss other contexts in which quasi-quotational constructions may appear, such as reason clauses, and whether these cases are directly parallel to the EIQs and EV2 clauses discussed in the previous chapters. Finally, cross-linguistic differences in the availability of quasi-quotational constructions will be discussed.

6.2 EIQ syntax is a matter of modification

6.2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters I have shown that the behaviour and characteristics of quasi-quotational constructions can be captured by postulating an IAP structure as the highest projection in the embedded clause. I have also shown the importance of context and context shifting on their interpretation and use in discourse. It remains to elaborate how
the extra structure of the IAP actually connects up with the matrix clause.

It was suggested in the previous section that the EIQ is not selected by the matrix verb and is not an argument to it. I propose that the matrix verb selects a nominal complement, specifically an attitudinal object that represents an act such as speaking, questioning, or thinking, and that EIQs combine with this nominal complement to express its content and form. This section focuses on the nature of the relation between the nominal complement to the verb and the IAP containing the EIQ.

Moulton (2009) examined in detail the clausal complements to nouns, concluding that they compose with the noun via Predicate Modification (PM). However, the EIQ, unlike a clausal complement to a noun, contains not-at-issue expressive information oriented to the original discourse in addition to a set of propositions. Moreover, I have proposed that it is an entity, type ⟨e⟩, which may not compose with another noun via PM. It will be shown in this section that EIQs are still in a modification relationship with the nominal complement to the verb, but that this relationship is similar to Potts’s (2005) proposal for the composition of apposition.¹

The first element of the proposal to explore is the range of ways in which the EIQ might be connected to the matrix clause.

6.2.2 Coordination

We can rule out coordination of the two clauses from the beginning. Coordination was proposed by Antomo (2012) as the method for combining German EV2 clauses headed by weil with the main clause. However, quasi-quotational constructions that appear as complements are not interpreted as modifying the event of speaking nor do they modify reasons for the speech event in the way that weil clauses do. They must merge with the matrix clause much lower down as they only modify the product of the speech/thought act, namely that which is said or asked or thought. Moreover, there is no morphological evidence in any of the languages surveyed in this work that coordination or morphemes derived from conjunctions are at play in quasi-quotational constructions.

¹ (Truckenbrodt 2006, fn13, p.286) mentions but rejects this route because Potts’s account explicitly excludes the content of the appositive clause from interacting with the at-issue content of the main clause, which is true. However, I will show that this is not insurmountable in the rest of the chapter.
6.2.3 Restrictive relative clauses

In the vein of Kayne’s (2010) ideas about factive complements, another option is to envisage the quasi-quotational construction as a kind of relative clause (see also Berizza (2010) and Sistrunk (2012)). However, it is unlikely that analysing the quasi-quotational construction as a restrictive relative clause will work for a range of reasons. Firstly, there is no gap or resumptive pronoun present in the quasi-quotational construction. Secondly, relative clauses are known to be strongly opaque for extraction\textsuperscript{2} yet to fully capture the facts of the quasi-quotational construction, restricted extraction of \textit{where}/\textit{when} adjuncts must be permissible. Thirdly, restrictive relative clauses are ‘truncated’ in Haegeman’s (2006) sense—they do not have an extended left periphery—and do not contain not-at-issue information (see also Potts (2005)), the latter point being a key characteristic of quasi-quotational constructions. Fourthly, relative clauses differ from quasi-quotational constructions in that temporal elements in the former need not be evaluated relative to the matrix clause time, whereas temporal elements in quasi-quotational constructions must be: see the example in (1) from Schwarz (2012) compared with the EIQ in (2).

(1) Hillary married a man that became president.  \hspace{2cm} Schwarz (2012 p.40)

Marriage = before utterance

\hspace{2cm} Becoming president = before utterance but after marriage

(2) I asked him would he cook tea for me tonight

\hspace{2cm} Tonight = after the original and reported utterances

Fifthly, the interpretation of restrictive relative clauses is different from that of quasi-quotational constructions; in the case of the latter, there is no set of speech acts of which one bears the characteristics detailed in the quasi-quotational construction, there is simply direct definite reference. Finally, although there are few studies on the acquisition of

\textsuperscript{2}Potts (2005) suggests that extraction from restricted relatives is marginally possible using data from Postal (1998):

(i) What, the police arrested everyone who saw t\textsubscript{i} was a video. \hspace{2cm} Postal (1998 p.9)

I do not share these judgments and have struggled to find other speakers who do. It is clear that this kind of extraction is much less acceptable than the extraction of \textit{where}/\textit{when} adjuncts in quasi-quotational constructions.
wh-relative clauses by children acquiring English, the data seem to suggest that children do not invert the subject of a relative clause and the auxiliary, despite often doing so in embedded interrogative clauses (Pozzan 2011). There is also evidence that children can distinguish between embedded questions and free relative clauses, especially if the matrix verb aids them in this (de Villiers & Roeper 1995, Clauss 2014). Acquisition studies of German also suggest that even if V2 occurs in embedded clauses, it does not tend to occur in relative clauses (Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. 1992). Once again, more work needs to be done, but these studies are suggestive that embedded questions and relative clauses are not confounded in child grammar.

6.2.4 Apposition

Non-restrictive relative clauses provide a more fruitful potential path. There are structural similarities with respect to linearisation between the appositive nominals and clauses that Potts (2005) analyses as being in a different speech dimension to the main clause, for example the fact that the EIQ must be adjacent to and to the right of the matrix predicate or a content noun. Potts’s analysis is not directly transferable to these cases, however: unlike appositive clauses, the EIQ is not ‘extra’ information, even though it contains not-at-issue information; in fact, as shown in previous chapters and by Wiklund et al. (2009) for EV2, it may constitute the main point of the utterance. In the same vein, they are not logically independent from the at-issue content. In their absence, the at-issue content is substantially altered. They also appear to interact with the at-issue content of the matrix clause, for example negation and modality. The intonation contour of a non-restrictive relative clause is also quite different from that of the EIQ; “comma” intonation holds in the former case but not in the latter.

However, it is possible to take too literally the suggestion that the EIQ might be a non-restrictive relative clause. In investigating the nature of CP ‘arguments’ to nouns as in “the claim that Mary stole the money”, Stowell (1981) suggests that CP complements to nouns are appositive modifiers for syntactic reasons (nouns do not case-mark, therefore

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3The German evidence is not entirely clear-cut: Schönenberger’s (2001) survey of two Swiss German-acquiring children found a number of non-target-like V2 relative clauses.
they do not take arguments per se) and for semantic reasons (the CP complement to a noun describes the content denoted by that noun). Moulton (2009) rejects the analogy that Stowell draws between CP complements and appositive modifiers on the grounds of differences in intonation, but agrees with Stowell that the CP is a modifier of, rather than an argument to, the noun. Moulton also notes that clausal complements to nouns are like relatives as they bleed Condition C effects (Moulton 2009 pp.19,49).

A similar approach that avoids the problem of intonation while maintaining the spirit of EIQ-as-appositive-modifier might be to draw an analogy with determiner spreading. The most well-known examples of determiner spreading are found in Greek: examples are shown below:

(3) a. i asimenia i pena
   the.FEM silver the.FEM pen
   “the silver pen”

b. i pena i asimenia
   the.FEM pen the.FEM silver
   “the silver pen”

   Lekakou & Szendrői (2012 p.108)

   c. o eksipnos o adelfos mu
      the.MASC clever the.MASC brother me.GEN
      Lit. “My clever brother”/Idiomatic “My brother the wiseass”

   Lekakou & Szendrői (2012 p.109)

Determiner spreading also occurs in some Germanic languages, most notably indefiniteness spreading in Swiss German [4] and some varieties of Dutch [5]. Double marking of definiteness is also a characteristic of some Mainland Scandinavian languages, such as Norwegian [6]:

(4) en so en guete Wii
   a such a good wine
   “a really good wine”
   Swiss German, Brandner (2012 p.2)

(5) a. Je bent een raar kind één.
   you are a strange kid one
   “You are a very strange kid.”
   South-Eastern Dutch, Barbiers (2008 p.6)

   b. Hij wil den dieên hebben.
      he want the that.DEF have
“He wants to have that one.”

Southern Dutch, Barbiers (2008, p.6)

(6) Den dyktige administrator
the accomplished administrator.DEF
“the accomplished administrator”

Norwegian, Anderssen (2006)

Close apposition in Greek is a very similar-looking phenomenon to determiner spreading, as illustrated in (7):

(7) a. o aetos to puli
the.MASC eagle the.NEUT bird
“The eagle that is a bird.”

b. to puli o aetos
the.NEUT bird the.MASC eagle
“The eagle that is a bird.”

Lekakou & Szendr˝oi (2012, p.108)

Determiner spreading is like close apposition in that there are multiple (obligatorily) definite determiners, an obligatorily restrictive interpretation of the adjective and the two parts both jointly contribute to reference; Lekakou & Szendr˝oi (2012) note that determiner spreading is used when neither subpart of the complex nominal “suffices to unambiguously determine the intended referent” (Lekakou & Szendr˝oi 2012, pp.111-112). They propose that the correct analysis for determiner spreading in Greek is the same as that for close apposition; a complex DP made up of two sub-DPs via identification of their Referential roles, in which one of the nouns is elided. As the meaning and structure proposed are tantamount to set intersection, they assume that DP in Greek is not of type ⟨e⟩, but type ⟨e,t⟩, and there is a further functional head that scopes above the (complex) DP that contributes definiteness. Their proposed structure for the sentence in (8a) is shown in (8b):

(8) a. To spiti to petrino
the.NEUT house the.NEUT stone
“The stone house”
This symmetrical structure is particularly successful at capturing the Greek data; it suggests that ordering between $\text{DP}_1$ and $\text{DP}_2$ should be free, which is the case; in fact, if there is more than one adjective, then all possible orderings are available. This is undesirable for the analysis of EIQs and EV2, however; the EIQ is obligatorily sentence-final and, in cases in which there is an overt content noun that is modified by the EIQ, the content noun must precede the EIQ. Moreover, as noted above in the critique of a restrictive relative account, it is not clear that set intersection is exactly the right characterisation of the relationship between the content noun and the EIQ. The EIQ does more than just restrictively modify the content noun; it identifies it in terms of at-issue content, form, not-at-issue content and discourse context.

### 6.2.5 Equation/identification

What other options are left to us at this point? Another context in which EIQs can be used will perhaps be of use: they can appear in post-copular position:

(9) a. Seems like Wilko is the bookies favourite for the England job when it becomes available. This is quite distressing news, but the question is would he take it if offered? 

   BNC, J1G 1639

   b. I asked (him) would he take it if offered.
a. The question is what did she truly take away from the culture?

b. I asked (her) what did she truly take away from the culture.

Note that in (9a) the clausal complement to question is used to introduce the content of that particular question into the discourse; the author may expect an answer of some kind but given the context (a post on a football club forum), it is not likely to be a very authoritative answer and the question is more likely to generate discussion than receive an authoritative answer. In this way (9a) seems to serve a similar purpose to the “paradigm” EIQs considered so far by representing a question in a discourse without introducing the kind of responsibilities that a questioning illocutionary act is typically assumed to introduce; that is, that the questioner expects her questionee to be able to return a reliable and true response. The same holds of the examples in (10).

Semantically, the EIQ in these examples is not a predicate: it cannot appear in a small clause, as shown in (11) and it cannot be fronted, as discussed in previous chapters.

(11) *I consider the question what did he think he was doing?

It is possible to interpret examples like (9a) and (10) as indicating that the EIQ serves to illustrate a possible identity for the nominal complement to the verb and structure for the relationship between the nominal complement and the EIQ. Question is a content noun that lexically implies an open question and the copula is used as an identity function. Example (12) below provides a clearer illustration of a possible structure even more clearly, as the noun question in this case is in fact an argument of the matrix verb ask and sequence of tense also holds:

(12) Seeking to translate this question of morality to local issues, I asked the question, did the candidates agree that it was morally wrong and perhaps a misuse of public funds for local councillors to claim that there was no money available to install gas central heating in the homes of elderly disabled people when they always found

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4 Taken from https://medium.com/@Dwavenhobble/cultural-appropriation-gamergate-and-why-gamers-had-to-die-e745cbebc574; retrieved on 28th Apr 2015.
money for hospitality allowances and trips abroad for themselves.

To illustrate a point already made, the relationship between the content noun and the EIQ is asymmetrical, as the EIQ must always follow the content noun:

(13) *I asked [did the candidates agree] the question.

So what is the relationship between the content noun and the EIQ? As Moulton (2009) points out, predicate modification is the most desirable mechanism for representing the relationship between a noun and its clausal modifier because he wants to avoid equating content nouns with propositions for a number of reasons (see Moulton (2009, p.36) for details): his only aim is to model how the proposition describes the content of the noun it modifies, not to identify the former as the latter. The important result, he writes, is “that the complement to the noun intersects with the noun’s denotation.” (Moulton 2009, p.37).

However, we have already determined that straightforward predicate modification might have undesirable consequences, and to some degree, equating more than just the content of the clause with the nominal is precisely what we want for EIQs, so machinery presented by Potts (2002) proves promising. His machinery involves the nominalisation of the clause, which I have already claimed is the function of the IA head, and identification of the nominalised clause with the nominal complement to the verb. This is achieved by a functional head that is sister to the nominal complement to the verb and takes the nominalised clause as its complement. As this functional head expresses an identity relation between the IAP and the nominal complement to the verb, the syntactic shape/expressive aspects of the EIQ are equated with the nominal complement and can be directly questioned as well as the content of the EIQ. This can be seen in example (14), repeated from section 3.5 which is contrasted with the minimally-differing standard embedded question in (15).

(14) A: You asked me did I cook dinner for you.
    B: No I didn’t, I asked did you make me a cup of tea.
B': No I didn’t, I was much more polite about it than that!

(15) A: You asked me if I had cooked dinner for you.
B: No I didn’t, I asked if you had made me a cup of tea.
B': #No I didn’t, I was much more polite about it than that!

In criticising Potts’s (2002) use of this mechanism for clausal complements to nouns, Moulton (2009) highlights those properties that are required for explaining some of the EIQ’s characteristics. For example, Moulton notes that propositions cannot be modified with regards to their qualities in the same way that content nouns can. However, by communicating not-at-issue content, EIQs are qualified with respect to the original discourse context and the perspectives of the original discourse participants, as (14) shows. Moulton also notes that content nouns “come into existence at particular times” in a way that propositions do not; similarly, EIQs refer to a conversational move that was brought into a particular discourse at a particular relevant point. As will be discussed below, that point may or may not be contemporaneous with the use of the EIQ. Arguably EIQs also cease to exist, a property that Moulton attributes to content nouns such as proposal, on the basis that the conversational move they refer to can be dealt with and removed from the conversational stack.

Another problem with Potts’s account that Moulton (2009) notes is that if CPs are of type \( \langle e \rangle \), then they require shifting to type \( \langle e,t \rangle \) to compose with nouns, and it is unclear why such a type-shifter should only be available with nouns and not in small clauses (cf. example (11)). A crucial difference between noun phrases like “The proposal that we destroy Alaska” that contain the CP as a predicate and the predicative relation in a small clause is that the former forms a constituent whereas the subject-predicate complex in the small clause does not form a constituent:

(16) a. He rejected the proposal that we destroy Alaska.
b. The proposal that we destroy Alaska, he rejected.
c. It is the proposal that we destroy Alaska that he rejected.
d. What he rejected was the proposal that we destroy Alaska.
(17) a. He considered the proposal stupid.
    b. *The proposal stupid, he considered.
    c. *It is the proposal stupid that he considered.
    d. *What he considered was the proposal stupid.

Similarly, despite not being able to run many of the standard constituency tests on EIQs, the noun plus EIQ complex appears to be a constituent on the basis of examples with an overt noun, such as in example (18):

(18) a. I asked him the question, what was the length of a piece of string in his day.
    b. It was the question, what was the length of a piece of string in his day, that I asked him.
    c. What I asked him was the question, what was the length of a piece of string in his day.

Consequently it seems that there is a syntactic constraint on the application of the putative type-shifter; it can apply in complements to nouns and in EIQs because the noun (null or overt) and the type-shifted clause then form a syntactic constituent. This suggests that the syntactic identity of the type shifter is akin to a relative clause head in that it creates a strong syntactic, and not simply a semantic, connection between the nominal and its modifier. It cannot apply in small clauses because the clausal and nominal objects do not form a constituent.

Lahiri (2002) also argues for a nominalising operator for the case of Spanish interrogative clausal complements headed by *que* recomplementation but takes a different tack from Potts. Lahiri (2002) claims that the entity correlate of a proposition (in the case of a declarative clause) or a set of propositions (in the case of an interrogative clause) is an utterance, i.e. a speech act. This is due to the fact that *que*-interrogatives are only permissible under speech act verbs, including verbs of manner of communication, but not under

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These are different from recomplementation contexts as there is only one complementiser and so they do not contain not-at-issue content, though they differ from indirect speech reports in factors such as their distribution, which is more like that of quasi-quotational structures though not exactly the same. I will not concern myself with these types of complements here.
mental state verbs. He proposes that _que_-interrogatives are actually question-utterances instead of standard questions, so they must undergo a coercion process to be interpreted as question-utterance complements to the classes of verbs that can take _que_-interrogatives, rather than being interpreted as basic question complements. The coercion process Lahiri proposes is illustrated in (19) (α here denotes some expression):

(19) Type-coercion to utterance
   a. \( \alpha \mapsto u [\text{UTT}(u,\alpha) \land C(u)] \)
   b. \( \langle s,t \rangle \mapsto e^U \)  

Lahiri defines UTT as a two-place predicate with the meaning “u is an utterance of the expression \( \alpha \) of the semantic type of a proposition” (Lahiri 2002, p.281). The existence of such an utterance u is captured by the inclusion of the definite description C(u), according to which the utterance is specified with respect to a context. Lahiri then shows how this process of coercion applies in the _que_-interrogatives by proposing the translation below for _que:_

(20) _que_ = \( \lambda Q u[\text{UTT}_Q(u,Q) \land C(u)] \)

Let’s think about the IA head in these terms: the IA head takes an argument S of a complex type \( \langle t,t \rangle \). It then returns a unique utterance Q that is of type \( \langle s,e \rangle \) such that the propositional content of Q and S are identical.\(^6\) To illustrate this concisely, I define the IA head as in (21):

(21) If \( S \in D_{\langle t,t \rangle} \) and \( Q \in D_{\langle s,e \rangle} \)
    \[ \text{IA} = \lambda S \lambda Q [\text{UTT}(S,Q)] \]

(21) makes use of Lahiri’s two-place predicate UTT to capture the fact that the interrogative clause S is an utterance of the question move represented by Q; UTT can in fact be replaced by the more specific operators QUESTION and REQUEST proposed in chapter 4. The result is that the interrogative clause S combines with the IA head to return an

\(^6\)Thanks to Norman Yeo for helping to clarify my thinking on this point.
entity equivalent to Q. In this way the IA head is very similar semantically to a definite determiner; where a definite determiner takes a property of type \(⟨e,t⟩\) and returns the entity with that property, the IA head takes an interrogative clause and returns the conversational move with the same propositional content. This is problematic because it appears to suggest that the EIQ always refers to a questioning act in the original discourse, but let’s ignore this for the moment.

Having achieved nominalisation of the embedded clause, the resulting entity is then checked against the relevant discourse context at the next stage by the perspectival monster-situation pronoun complex in SpecIAP; if the utterance that the entity has been identified with does not match the discourse coordinates on the situation pronoun then the whole utterance will not be defined as true. This is achieved through functional application, as the output of the combination of the perspectival monster and the situation pronoun is claimed here to be of the basic semantic type \(⟨s⟩\) (following von Fintel & Heim (2002, p.11)): it is effectively a situation anchored according to specific context. The complex intensional type returned by the IA head, \(⟨s,e⟩\) is applied to this to return a basic entity \(⟨e⟩\).

To illustrate all of the above points, the IAP and the types of its constituent parts are shown in the tree in (22)
Having established how the embedded clause becomes an EIQ of type $\langle e \rangle$, I return to the question of how this entity could relate to the matrix structure.

I assume that the true complement selected by the matrix verb is a simple content nominal that may be left unpronounced. This nominal cannot be directly identified with the IAP as it is of type $\langle e, t \rangle$ and the IAP is, as established above, of type $\langle e \rangle$. Why doesn’t the IAP simply compose via predicate modification with the DP that is complement to the verb? There are a number of reasons for this: firstly, the IAP is of the wrong type to engage in predicate modification; it cannot join via predicate modification precisely because it is not a predicate. Secondly, as described in the analysis of Greek determiner spreading, there is a strict ordering between the EIQ and overt nominal complements to the verb, so we should assume this holds when the nominal complement is covert too. This means that whatever the mechanism is that combines the nominal object and the IAP, it is not a symmetrical relationship. Thirdly, the EIQ need not combine with a definite DP; the EIQ may not be the only question posed by the questioner in the given discourse but is picked out as the specific question through the nominalisation function of the IA head and, of course, the specific reading of the indefinite determiner.

Examples of this with

\[7\] The reader may ask how this specific reading is achieved without movement, because as shown in section 3.3, the EIQ cannot be raised to have wide scope over the sentence. However, as Eng (1991) shows,
an overt content noun is shown below; the presence of key EIQ characteristics is clear, especially in \((23a)\)

\[
(23) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{We’re er I was asked a question earlier on today erm how many assignments} \\
& \text{will I be looking after in any one time and I just said one. BNC, JA3 46 (speech)} \\
\text{b. } & \text{I would like to ask a question, that if this particular rule isn’t necessary,} \\
& \text{then how does a branch go about appealing a decision made elsewhere in the} \\
& \text{union’s hierarchy? BNC, HUD 66}
\end{align*}
\]

Given then that the content noun is of type \(\langle e,t \rangle\) and the EIQ is of type \(\langle e \rangle\), composition must proceed via a functional head that I will call ToWitP in honour of the archaic locution that is a possible overt realisation of its function\(^8\). The function that ToWit\(^9\) represents is simple and is identifiable as the function often served by the copula; this is illustrated in \((24)\)

\[
(24) \quad \lambda x \lambda y [x=y]
\]

Possible support for an identificational operator is that ToWitP might be ‘pronounced’ in a number of ways if the nominal object to the verb is also overt: as to wit, as in example \((25)\) as the copula as illustrated in \((26)\) or as a pause as illustrated in \((27)\)

\[
(25) \quad \text{The question + to wit}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{I asked her the question, to wit, was she aware that she was under oath? Constructed} \\
\text{b. } & \text{[. . . ]the House proceeded with 20 minutes of debate on the question of consid-} \\
& \text{eration, after which, the Chair would put the question to wit: Will the House} \\
& \text{now consider the resolution? US House of Representatives\(^9\)}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^8\)Hat-tip to Eytan Zweig for the suggestion.

c. When I saw how narrow the display was, I raised the question, to wit, is there something unique about the Fuji XPro, did Fuji make an error, or are they just being super conservative?

dpreview.com\footnote{Taken from \url{http://www.dpreview.com/forums/post/51603383}; retrieved on 28th Apr 2015.}

(26) The question + copula

a. I think the question is how does she get out of the contract now? Constructed

b. Finally, Father McKenna said he had one last question to ask. The question was would Colm like his mother and father to get divorced.

\textit{BNC, A07 1180}

c. This is quite distressing news, but the question is would he take it if offered?

\textit{BNC, J1G 1639}

(27) The question + pause/null operator

a. I couldn’t help but ask him the question: what on earth possessed him to do it?

\textit{Constructed}

b. Therefore a court will ask the question was the restraint reasonable when it was entered by the parties?

\textit{BNC, J7B 275}

c. […] we find that just those same molecules are actually in the clouds in space, and these clouds are the basic raw material from which stars and plants form in the first place, so we might ask the question could they have got into the earth’s atmosphere without this intermediate process[…]

\textit{BNC, KRH 2929 (speech)}

d. Every show she went on, they asked her this question...Why did she settle her lawsuit?

\textit{tennisforum.com}\footnote{Taken from \url{http://www.tennisforum.com/showthread.php?p=16805002}; retrieved on 28th Apr 2015.}

There is also crosslinguistic evidence of the optional spell-out of this structure as either null or lexical: in recombination structures, the initial complementiser que can also be spelled out as a prosodic pause, in the case of fragment utterances:
(28)  a. Se le pidió una candidata y dijo: María
     cl him requested.3SG a candidate and said.3SG María
     “He was asked for a candidate and he said: Maria.”

     b. Se le pidió una candidata y dijo que María
     cl him requested.3SG a candidate and said.3SG that María
     “He was asked for a candidate and he said Maria.”  
     Brucart (1993, pp.97-98)

Crucially, as Brucart (1993) illustrates, the structure in (28b) can only be used in cases
where the question of finding a candidate was already under discussion, hence the unavail-
ability of the same structure in the out-of-the-blue context below:

(29)  a. De repente apareció en el aula y dijó: María.
     of sudden appeared.3SG in the classroom and said.3SG Maria
     “All of a sudden he appeared in the room and said: Maria.”

     b. *De repente apareció en el aula y dijo que María.
     of sudden appeared.3SG in the classroom and said.3SG that Maria
     “All of a sudden he appeared in the room and said: Maria.”  
     Brucart (1993 pp.97-98)

Following this line of argumentation, then, it could be proposed that the whole structure
from the matrix VP down is as illustrated in (30)
The tree in (30) cannot be our final proposal, however, for two reasons. Firstly, (30) suggests that the matrix verb selects not for a nominal or a clausal complement, but for a ToWit complement. It is both unclear what it would mean to select for a ToWit complement and perpetuates the selection problem that we are trying to solve. Secondly, we are not solving the asymmetry problem by using this co-ordination-like structure, so we would have to account for the fixed ordering between the overt nominal and the clause another way.

We could instead project ToWitP as a complement to the nominal head, introducing echoes of gapless relative clauses, in order to avoid the problem of the verb selecting for ToWitP:
Although the asymmetry and selection problems are solved in (31), a more serious problem is introduced, namely how we would represent the NP as null in this structure. The null NP is not something that we want to abandon, however. To this point, I have justified the presence of a null NP by analogy with the overt presence of nouns like question in contexts such as those in examples (25)-(27). It also reinforces the interpretation of the EIQ that it presupposes a question under discussion that the content of the EIQ goes some way towards resolving in the original discourse.

It is clear at this juncture that identification cannot possibly be the right analysis for quasi-quotational constructions like EIQs. This is not only due to the structural problems inherent in (30) and (31). There is also a semantic reason, raised with respect to adopting Lahiri’s type coercion operation: an EIQ does not necessarily denote a questioning act in the previous discourse, but can denote conversational moves more widely construed, either
“payoff” (typically assertions) or “setup” moves (typically questions) used to address a relevant QUD in that discourse. To claim that quasi-quotational constructions identify a previous speech act is to claim that they are closer to direct speech reports than is warranted, given the data in chapter 3.

6.2.6 A return to apposition

What options are we now left with for understanding the structure of EIQs? We want to retain the idea that there is a nominal complement to the verb and that the EIQ contributes the content and discourse effect of that nominal. The propositional content of the EIQ is not additional to or conjoined with the matrix proposition because an EIQ cannot be paraphrased as below:

(32) Jane wanted to know would he cook tea for her.
    \[\neq\] Jane wanted to know something and that something was the question “would he cook tea for her.”
    \[\approx\] Jane wanted to know something, namely would he cook tea for her.

The EIQ affects the at-issue content of the matrix proposition and the sentence without the EIQ is truth-conditionally different. The main difference is that “Jane wanted to know something” says nothing about whether Jane voiced any query or opinion on the something; in other words, it does not communicate the fact that Jane produces some relevant utterance act. More obviously, the EIQ contributes information about the content and manner of speaking that may be challenged by the addressee.

On this basis, it may seem surprising that I advocate returning to analyses of apposition to draw out the structure of the EIQ. Appositive clauses as examined by Potts (2005, 2007, 2012) are independent of the at-issue content of the main clause. For this reason, as already noted, Truckenbrodt (2006) rejects the idea of treating EV2 clauses as appositive clauses. However, I claim that the interaction between quasi-quotational constructions and operators in the matrix clause such as negation do not proceed in the same way as typical embedded clauses, such that considering a more ‘multidimensional’ approach is interesting.
Ultimately, I claim that matrix clause operators affect compatibility with quasi-quotational constructions rather than grammaticality directly, in line with Gärtner’s (2002) assertion that failure of an EV2 clause is due to semantic or pragmatic deviance.

The first piece of evidence for this is from neg-raising predicates like *think*. As is well known, the negation of predicates like *think* implies a second sentence in which the embedded proposition is negated. The example below is taken from Gajewski (2007):

\[(33)\]
\[
a. \text{Bill doesn’t think that Mary is here.}
\]
\[
b. \text{Bill thinks that Mary is not here.} \quad \text{Gajewski (2007, p.289)}
\]

These predicates behave differently in EV2 contexts as negation can only take wide scope:

\[(34)\]  
Hans glaubt nicht, Peter hat gewonnen, (er glaubt nur, dass Peter gut abgeschnitten hat).

“Hans does not believe that Peter has won (he only believes that Peter has done well).”

\[\text{Truckenbrodt (2006, p.296)}\]

Relatedly, in the case of EIQs, the quasi-quotational construction can be said to project past negation, as they are still interpreted as possible open questions in the relevant discourse but not to the matrix subject that has been identified. (58a) from chapter 3 is repeated below, with a continuation to illustrate the above claim:

\[(35)\]  
I didn’t ask were you coming last night (Mary did).

This is in contrast to sentences like (36) below, where neither (36a) nor (36b) are implied or entailed.

\[(36)\]  
a. → I asked if you weren’t coming last night.

b. → Someone asked if you were coming last night, but it wasn’t me.
Clearly, as we have been advocating, quasi-quotational clauses are not selected by the matrix verb, even in the indirect manner suggested by Truckenbrodt (2006). In his account, the EV2 clause (labelled CP) is the direct object selected by the verb, but it extraposes to right-adjoin to the VP, ensuring both its surface position and, Truckenbrodt argues, in order for the EV2 clause to interpreted according to the utterance context rather than the embedded context. This is illustrated in simplified form below:

Although Truckenbrodt’s account neatly accounts for the EV2 clause’s interpretation according to the matrix clause, it does not account for the facts shown above as it doesn’t explain why matrix negation has the effect that it has in (36b).

Before examining the claim that the failure of quasi-quotational construction under certain matrix operators is matter of infelicity rather than ungrammaticality, let us consider clauses as appositives and their interpretation, as well as the possibility that such appositives can contain at-issue information.

Potts (2005, p.128) suggests that when an appositive clause is semantically saturated, it behaves differently from other appositives in that it appears to contribute a separate proposition from the main clause. This separate proposition is connected to the matrix proposition, usually because it expresses an attitude towards or motivation for the expression of the matrix proposition (Potts 2005, pp.44,65-66). An example of this is the niched appositive in (38)
(38) Luke—and you’ll never believe this—ate 50 eggs!  

Note that despite the presence of “and” in (38) and the presence of two separate propositions, (38) cannot be paraphrased using a coordinate structure, much like EIQs:

(39) Luke—and you’ll never believe this—ate 50 eggs!

a. ≠ Luke ate 50 eggs and you’ll never believe this.
   b. ≠ You’ll never believe this and Luke ate 50 eggs.

This kind of appositive clause may be anchored to a DP in the matrix clause and shows similarities with embedded clauses in that a quantifier in that the appositive clause may appear in the nuclear scope of the quantifier (Potts 2005, pp.126,128). This is illustrated in (40), attributed to Kempson (2003):

(40) Most older people on the march, who left after Jesse Jackson, got home without too much trouble.

= There were more older people who heard Jackson and got home without trouble than older people who didn’t hear Jackson and didn’t get home without trouble.

In this case, an E-type strategy is used to interpret the free variable in the appositive, with the appositive itself being treated as a proposition-denoting element (Potts 2005, p.129). Interestingly, Potts implies that interpreting the kind of appositive in (40) as being in the nuclear scope of the quantifier most is non-standard and that this interpretation is only available to certain speakers. He does not provide any suggestion for why this construction is marginal, or for what kind of speakers it is marginal (Potts 2005, p.127). Potts calls such appositives isolated conventional implicatures and claims that the two clauses or the clause and the DP directly compose, but that only the matrix at-issue element “counts” for composition into the clause. He proposes the following structure, where the leftmost CP contains at-issue content (marked by the index a, for at-issue) and the right-most CP contains conventionally implicated content, marked by the index c. The node immediately dominating both is therefore determined by the at-issue content (note that the tree below
is a transposition of Potts’s ideas into (more or less) standard notation).

(41) \[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{CP}_a \\
\text{⟨t⟩}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{CP}_a \\
\text{⟨t⟩} \\
\text{CP}_c \\
\text{⟨t⟩}
\end{array}
\]

Potts is clear that this method of composition is only appropriate for a element with conventionally implicated content that is fully semantically saturated [Potts 2005, p.128]. However, these isolated conventional implicatures still share a number of characteristics with the typical type of appositives, including their ordering with respect to their anchor when their anchor is nominal (42) and the fact that they constitute the speaker’s perspective.

(42) *Most older people on the march got home without too much trouble, who left after Jesse Jackson.

(43) Most older people on the march, who left after Jesse Jackson, got home without too much trouble, # but they all left before Jesse Jackson.

So far, this seems like a viable option for understanding how EIQs compose with the matrix nominal object. They are unambiguous in their orientation to a particular context, they are fully semantically saturated, they denote a proposition-containing element, they must appear directly to the right of their anchor. Moreover, as Simons et al. (2010) note, these kinds of clauses can be interpreted as at-issue in the sense that they answer the QUD (the example below is a reworking on Simons and colleagues’ example on page 323:

(44) Q: Who’s coming to the dinner tonight?  
A: Well, I haven’t spoken to Charles—as if he’d come anyway!—but I spoke to Sally, who is coming.

Simons and colleagues suggest that this effect obtains because the answer A gives does not
directly answer the question asked by Q. As a result the challengeable content of A’s answer and the appositive are concerned with different QUDs so the appositive is not-at-issue with respect to the QUD that A’s answer targets only implicitly.

As will be clear by now, this is very similar to the situation that obtains in EIQs. Quasi-quotational constructions are commonly used in narratives (see examples such as [2] in chapter 3 and [6] in chapter 5), where the QUD will be something like *What happened?* or *What did X say?* EIQs however denote a conversational move targeting a QUD in the original discourse, which will be different. Even EIQs that are used as main information requests can be said to be targeting a sub-QUD which is more relevant to the current QUD, in a similar way to the appositive example in (44).

(45) Do you know is she coming to the party?

   a. QUD = What is happening; who is coming to the party?
   b. Sub-QUD = Is she coming to the party?

→ Can lead to a partial answer to the overall QUD.

The same holds in the case of speaker-oriented EV2 clauses like (46), for which the QUD and sub-QUDs are displayed in (47):

(46) Hans glaubt, Peter hat gewonnen.
Hans thinks Peter has won
“Hans thinks Peter has won.”

(47) a. QUD = What is happening; what is Hans thinking?
   b. Sub-QUD = Did Peter win?

How then are CI appositives and quasi-quotational constructions different? A key point is that quasi-quotational constructions *always* address or represent a particular QUD different from the main QUD, where CI appositives do not. In an example like (48) the appositive does not address a different QUD from the main at-issue content, but reinforces the at-issue content and provides extra, relevant but non-challengeable information.

(48) QUD = Who won the Tour de France this year?
A = Chris Froome, a Briton, won the Tour this year.

Understanding the difference between addressing a QUD and addressing a sub-QUD, as well as the obligatory QUD-addressing of quasi-quotational clauses, leads us towards understanding how the quasi-quotational clause *qua* appositive clause composes with the nominal complement (overt or covert) of the matrix verb. In Potts’s isolated CI account, the appositive clause is not considered in semantic composition precisely because it is CI content. It is not clear that this can be directly carried across to the case of quasi-quotational constructions because, despite their similarities with CI appositive clauses, they can still be directly challenged in a way that CI appositive clauses cannot. What they have in common, however, is that they are fixed in the way that they must be interpreted with respect to a given context. In the case of CI content, this is obligatorily by default the utterance context. In the case of quasi-quotational constructions, it depends on the make-up of the IA head and what it provides to the perspectival monster as input. I therefore claim that a clause with a fixed perspective according to which it must be interpreted composes with other material via the process advocated by Potts; only non-fixed material counts for semantic composition with other non-fixed material.

This leaves us with the following structure for the nominal complement to the verb and the quasi-quotational structure:
In (49) the IAP does not count in terms of determining the type of the result of its apposition to the nominal direct object *the question* because it is evaluated with respect to a fixed perspective.

This brings us back to my earlier claim that the failure of quasi-quotational construction under certain matrix operators is matter of infelicity rather than ungrammaticality. While CI appositives are not sensitive to operators such as negation in the matrix clause, they can still create infelicity through contradicting the at-issue content, for example.

(50)  #Chris Froome, who came second overall, won the Tour de France.

Given the interactions of quasi-quotational constructions and matrix clause operators outlined at the start of this section and the ability to improve such interactions through extra context, I wish to claim that quasi-quotational constructions that are unacceptable are semantically and pragmatically infelicitous rather than syntactically flawed. This fits with
the view that they are not selected by the matrix clause but that composition is mediated through semantico-pragmatic means, as I am advocating here. To illustrate this claim with specific reference to quasi-quotational constructions, I use an overt nominal direct object. Note that while (51a) and (51b) are both perfectly acceptable, know is only compatible if something is in apposition with a responsive clause of some kind, as in (51d) rather than (51c), where as want to know is compatible with questioning illocutionary force, as in (51e).

\[
\begin{align*}
(51) \quad & \text{a. I know something.} \\
& \text{b. I want to know something.} \\
& \text{c. *I know something, namely what are we doing tonight.} \\
& \text{d. I know something, namely what we are doing tonight/that we are going to the cinema tonight} \\
& \text{e. I want to know something, namely what are we doing tonight.}
\end{align*}
\]

I therefore conclude that quasi-quotational constructions are a type of appositive clause that expands on and contains more information about a nominal direct object to the verb. Their structure, including the matrix verb, is as follows:
As (52) illustrates, quasi-quotational constructions are not selected by the matrix verb and this is reflected in the way in which they interact with operators in the matrix clause. This appositive analysis reflects their similarities with conventionally implicated content, and their differences are accounted for by the syntax of the IAP projection as detailed in the previous chapters.

6.2.7 More on the EIQ as a definite description

Let us now consider what implications the structure proposed in this section has for the interpretation of the EIQ as a definite description of a conversational move in the relevant previous discourse. In many cases the EIQ denotes an overt question, particularly when not-at-issue and expressive content is included in the EIQ or when the EIQ appears under a predicate like *ask*. But there are weaker forms too, in particularly those under *wonder* and *want to know*, as illustrated below:

(53)  a. Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party.
      b. I was wondering could he come at six, rather than at seven.
The use of the EIQ in (53a) (originally presented as (60c) in section 3.5) does not necessarily denote a question that has been asked overtly, but a speech act or number of speech acts that pertained to the QUD “Can Joe come to the party?”. As a result, (53a) is only possible either when the question “Can Joe come to the party?” was overtly asked or overtly discussed. This set of circumstances is more broad than the circumstances which a direct speech report may convey and more restricted than those which an indirect speech report may convey. Similarly, (53b) may denote a question that has already been asked overtly or another speech act made in reference to the QUD “What time can he come?” Another alternative in the case of (53b) is that it may introduce a new QUD into the current discourse for discussion, due to the first-person matrix subject. Other examples of EIQs that introduce a new QUD into the current discourse include EIQs under imperatives such as (54) and EIQs under matrix predicates in non-past tenses more generally:

(54)  
(a) Go over there and see did they bring my car in AAE, Green (2002)  
(b) Find out does he take sugar in his tea Irish Eng., McCloskey (2006)

(55)  
(a) It’s gonna ask you do you want to make a transfer AAE, Green (2002, p.87)  
(b) I wonder if the mailman done passed AAE, Green (2002, p.87)

The appositive account laid out above not only captures the crucial features of the EIQ; it also serves to restrict and be more precise about the kind of root or matrix-like phenomena that we may expect to find in embedded illocutionary acts. The formal theory of QUDs as laid out by Roberts (2012) creates entailments between questions and subquestions, and as such encodes the commitments of the discourse participants with respect to shared information (the common ground) and conversational strategy in the broad sense. However, it does not encode anything about the specific kind of response that the speaker requires of the addressee. This is exactly the division between matrix-like and non-matrix like properties that we have already seen in the interpretation of EIQs—they are matrix-like in that they include information about shared information and discourse commitments,

\[^{12}\text{Progressive aspect may also play a role here but, as mentioned in section 4.2.2 we do not know precisely which factors lead to an embedded clause being interpreted as the main point of an utterance, and pursuing this question would require more space than is available here.}\]
but they do not in themselves encode information about the demand on or next move required of the addressee. In this way an EIQ denotes a conversational move in a previous discourse but does not constitute one itself in the current discourse. As for EIQs that are interpreted with respect to the current discourse, they still do not constitute an independent conversational move but via pragmatic reasoning may be interpreted similarly to indirect questions as in (56):

(56)  a. Find out if he takes sugar in his tea.
     b. I wonder if the mailman has already passed.

The structural analysis proposed also accounts for the ability to question the not-at-issue content of the EIQ separately from the at-issue content, as illustrated in (14)-(15). As the EIQ is not the object of the matrix verb, it is possible to question the content and expression of the EIQ without denying that something was said. Moreover, the fact that the perspective expressed in the EIQ is that of the original perspective holder makes this possible, as it is not possible to question not-at-issue content asserted by the current speaker.

As for illocutionary force, this is expressed by the IA head. For this reason, the content of the EIQ can only be identified as a question or a request, not as an asserted fact, even in cases in which EIQs occur under negated or modalised factive predicates. This is an example of how embedded illocutionary force can affect the interpretation of the embedded clause without meaning that it stands alone as a separate conversational move.

Let us now consider how a declarative EV2 clause refers to a conversational move. An EV2 clause denotes an unresolved assertion in the relevant discourse, meaning that the proposition it contains is not yet part of the common ground. In QUD terms, the assertion must be made in order to work towards resolving some QUD. If the QUD(s) that an EV2 clause might resolve are already resolved in the relevant context, this EV2 clause will not be licit.

This conceptualisation of quasi-quotational constructions as denoting a conversational move that aims to resolve some QUD accounts for the wider details of the distribution
of quasi-quotational constructions. It makes clear the unavailability of EV2 clauses (for example) under predicates like *doubt* and *deny*: if these negative predicates are used, the proposition they introduce is not a candidate for resolving the QUD at-issue, even as a partial answer, because the QUD they target is the negative version of the QUD at-issue.

The availability of EV2 under semifactive predicates such as *find out* and *realise* can also be accounted for in this way. These predicates suggest that the a QUD about the proposition contained within the EV2 clause has existed for someone amongst the discourse participants because they suggest that the acceptance of the proposition in the EV2 clause is recent or even, as in example (57b), yet to occur. This is in contrast to factive complements that must be accepted as true—that is, the relevant QUD must be resolved—for all participants. The idea that semifactive verbs refer to some kind of unresolved question is implicit in the name given to them as a group by some scholars, namely “response” verbs. This is highlighted by the fact that the kind of semifactives that can permit EV2 are compatible with the modifier ‘just’, which implies recent resolution, where those that never permit EV2 are incompatible with ‘just’. The examples below show EIQs as embedded under *realise* but blocked under *regret*:

(57)  

a. I just realised, would you consider the Euclid’s C-Finder a unique weapon?

funnyjunk.com\textsuperscript{13}

b. I just realised would it be ok to pack water pistols in our suitcase?

netmums.com\textsuperscript{14}

c. *I just regretted who did Mary see.

The fact that the QUD is unresolved for at least one discourse participant is appears to be sufficient to license the EV2 clause: as experimental work by Heycock et al. (2012, 2016) shows, EV2 clauses under semifactives were judged somewhat better than EV2 clauses under factives by 104 native speakers of Swedish in Sweden. Heycock et al. (2012, 2016) explore the idea that the availability of EV2 is determined not by the class of the predicate

\textsuperscript{13}Taken from https://www.funnyjunk.com/channel/fallout/New+vegas+unique+weapons+gra+edition+2/bhYaLou/15, 19th Jan 2016.

\textsuperscript{14}Taken from http://www.netmums.com/coffeehouse/house-garden-194/holidays-travel-emigrating-104/1335132-packing-water-pistols-all.html, 19th Jan 2016.
but by the discourse importance of the embedded clause; specifically, whether or not the embedded clause is the Main Point of Utterance (MPU) (Simons 2007), but they did not find any significant effect of embedded clause MPU on the acceptability of EV2. As has already been noted, there are some similarities between the concept of the MPU and the QUD framework, however, for the purposes of investigating quasi-quotational utterances, it seems that there are some advantages to using the QUD framework rather than an MPU model in trying to understand quasi-quotational constructions. Whilst the MPU model might be used to predict whether an EV2 clause may be accepted in a given context, it does not predict the general syntactic distribution of quasi-quotational constructions. For example, the fact that quasi-quotational constructions may not constitute the MPU makes it harder to understand why they are completely out under factive verbs, even more so when one considers that the clause embedded under a factive verb may in some cases constitute the MPU, as in examples like (58):

(58)  
   a. We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to commencement exercises. 
   Karttunen (1974, ex.26) 
   b. I’m afraid that your insurance policy is hereby cancelled. 
   Simons (2007, p.1051) 

EV2 is still blocked in these cases: German, Danish and Swedish informants\(^{15}\) say that EV2 is not available in translations of (58a)\(^{16}\)

(59)  
   a. Wir bedauern, dass Kinder ihre Eltern nicht in die Cafeteria begleiten. 
   “We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to the cafeteria.” 
   b. *Wir bedauern, Kinder dürfen ihre Eltern nicht in die Cafeteria begleiten.

\(^{15}\)Thanks to Moritz Hellwig, Eva Schraff, Elena Espinoza and Véronique Scheirs for their German judgements, and to Lasse Sorensen, Johanne Nielsen and the (mysterious and powerful) Danish Linguists Network for their Danish judgements, and Max Borg and Kajsa Djärv for the Swedish judgements. Extra thanks to Eva, Johanne and Max for the translations.

\(^{16}\)They also note that EV2 is blocked irrespective of the interpretation given to regret, i.e. whether the speaker is truly regretful.
Danish

a. Vi beklager, at børn ikke må følge med deres forældre ind i kantinen. (We regret that children not can follow with their parents in the cafeteria.)

b. *Vi beklager, at børn må ikke følge med deres forældre ind i kantinen.

Swedish

a. Vi beklagar att barn inte kan följa med föräldrarna till cafeterian. (We regret that children not can follow with adults to cafeteria.)

b. *Vi beklagar att barn kan inte följa med föräldrarna till cafeterian.

Interestingly, the German informants permit EV2 in the translation of (58b), but the Danish and Swedish informants do not:

German

a. Ich fürchte, dass Ihre Versicherungspolice in Frankreich nicht gultig ist. (I am afraid that your insurance policy is not valid in France.)

b. Ich fürchte, Ihre Versicherungspolice ist in Frankreich nicht gultig. (I am afraid that your insurance policy is not valid in France.)

Danish

a. Jeg er bange for, at din forsikring ikke er gyldig i Frankrig. (I am afraid of that your insurance not is valid in France)

b. *Jeg er bange for, at din forsikring er ikke gyldig i Frankrig.

Swedish

a. Jag är rädd att din försäkring inte är giltig i Frankrike. (I am afraid that your insurance not is valid in France)

b. *Jag är rädd att din försäkring är inte giltig i Frankrike.
It is unclear why this difference between German on the one hand and Danish and Swedish on the other exists. One of the German informants notes that *bedauern* (‘to regret’) is simply impossible without the complementiser *dass*, while *fürchten* (‘to fear’) does not have the same restriction. It is interesting that the German case that permits EV2 involves a single lexical verb, whereas the Danish and Swedish cases involve a copula and adjective. This might suggest that there may be cross-linguistic variation in the predicates that permit EV2 depending on how that particular language lexicalises a given predicate; however, Swedish does allow EV2 under predicates of likelihood, which have a similar structure to

Swedish, Julien (2015, p.171)

There is further evidence of fine-grained lexical differences across languages, however: González i Planas (2014) shows that while Spanish does not allow re-complementation under *lamentar* (‘to regret’), Catalan does if the embedded verb is in the indicative mood:

Spanish, Demonte & Fernández-Soriano (2009, ex. 50)

Let us now link this discussion of semifactives back into the discourse model outlined in

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the previous chapter. I claimed that EV2s evaluated with respect to the current discourse context automatically add into the common ground the information that two propositions, not one, were made by the current speaker. Hence, I claim that the EV2 clause containing a proposition $p$ is only compatible with those common grounds that do not already contain $p$, either on its own or as expressed by an utterance accepted into the common ground. In the cases of recent realisation, it is possible that $p$ is not yet accepted into the common ground even though it might already be part of the knowledge of individual discourse participants. Careful experimental research on this hypothesis is needed to confirm this claim but this must be left for future research.

### 6.2.8 Reason clauses (again)

In another example of a quasi-quotational construction being used to point to assertions, Steinbach & Antomo (2009) show that V2 in weil-clauses (‘because’ clauses) in German is used to make a comment on the context in which the main clause is uttered: for example, in example (67) below, V2 order is strongly preferred because the weil-clause provides a reason for the utterance of the main clause rather than a reason for the event expressed in the main clause:

(67) Es hat geschneit, weil die Straße ist ganz weiß.

it has snowed because the street is whole white

“It has snowed, because the street is completely white.”

Steinbach & Antomo (2009) p.15

In (67) it is very difficult to interpret weil die Straße ist ganz weiß as a reason for it having snowed; instead, it expresses the speaker’s reasoning behind her utterance.

A similar effect is found in reason clauses in English, where we find EIQs used in all kinds of reason clauses:

(68) a. What I’d say to the minister is, number one do we really need this order at all because why should we have extra seats just because Germany are getting more.

BNC, JSG 227
b. 7 times you just need to take charge in bed, because what are you waiting for?

c. I suggested to him he needs to put a picture in the uniform policy of what is acceptable because how should we know?

It seems that, in the examples in (68), the because-clause with the EIQ actually introduces the true topic of interest for the speaker, or at least their reason for uttering the preceding clause: in the first case the perceived need to “keep up” with Germany; in the second, lack of fulfilment; in the third, a perceived lack of knowledge. This kind of because-clause is also used out-of-the-blue to introduce a new topic into the discourse; it is a particularly popular way of captioning images on social media to justify the action captured in the image, as if justification has been requested:

(69)  a. Because what are we without five minutes ago?

b. Because why would you wanna live any other way ????

c. Because who hasn’t grammed tonight’s dreamy sundown in #Paris?

Reason clauses crosslinguistically allow root phenomena (Hooper & Thompson 1973, pp.492-493), in particular reason clauses that assert the reason for an action or a speech act. Like quasi-quotational constructions in complement position, they cannot appear as sentential subjects or fronted in the clause (see also Wegener (1993) and Antomo (2012) for German):

(70) *Because what is even the point eluded her.

(71)  a. *Because why not just live life, she went through with the bungee jump.

b. *Because why should you be left in the dark, the gossip is that Miss Jones likes

\footnotesize{17}Taken from http://www.bustle.com/articles/95801-7-times-you-just-need-to-take-charge-in-bed-because-what-are-you-waiting-for, accessed 24th Jul 2015.


\footnotesize{19}Taken from http://davidkanigan.com/2015/06/18/because-what-are-we-without-five-minutes-ago/, accessed 24th Jul 2015.

\footnotesize{20}Taken from https://instagram.com/p/O0xr9rEktz/, accessed 24th Jul 2015.

\footnotesize{21}Taken from https://instagram.com/p/lAuPOVEmAK/, accessed 24th Jul 2015.
Mr Smith.

   because the street is whole white, it has snowed
   “Because the street is completely white, it has snowed.”

The key difference between these reason clauses and quasi-quotational constructions in complement position are as follows: while the quasi-quotational constructions can only modify the matrix clause, reason clauses can modify either the matrix clause or the motivations for making the speech act though, as Antomo (2012) notes, V2 order is more widely judged acceptable in those clauses that modify the speech act. Hence, reason clauses tend to orient to the current speech situation as there is no other speech context to orient to. In the cases that reason clauses occur with a report of another speech situation, they will be interpreted like other quasi-quotational constructions in that language:

(72) John told Mary that her boyfriend was cheating on her because why shouldn’t she know what the bastard was up to?

Bastard = from John’s perspective

The reason clause in (72) not only gives the reason why John told Mary about her boyfriend, but bastard is also interpreted from John’s perspective rather than the reporting speaker’s.

Reason clauses are also different for a very basic reason in that they are all preceded by the functional word because. I claim that reason clauses have a different structure from EIQs which is more like that in (30) and Antomo (2012, p.13), with because spelling out a linking head:

(73) Do we really need this order at all because why should we have extra seats?
Because does not identify the content and form of a speech act but the motivations for an act or speech act. Like some EIQs/EV2 clauses though, in the cases where the because clause gives the motivations for a speech act, as in (73), it appears to introduce or pertain to a new sub-QUD. In (73), the set of QUDs is expanded from “Do we need extra seats?” to “Why should we have extra seats?” because the latter QUD bears on the former. In this way because is more like a coordinator than a head introducing a modification relation; two speech acts are coordinated so as to express a causal relationship between them similar to the causal relationship in (74).

(74) I called the Samaritans and I wanted them to help me.

= Means: Because I wanted help, I called the Samaritans

≠ Doesn’t mean: I called the Samaritans and in addition to speaking to them, I wanted them to help me

6.2.9 Comparison with factive complements

In the proposal given so far in this thesis, it is claimed that quasi-quotational structures are referential and have some kind of extra nominal structure. The key claim is that the quasi-quotational structures are inherently nominal in and of themselves. There is a second group of structures that are also analysed as nominalised clauses that are in some way referential, and that is factive structures. Rizzi (1990) and Kayne (2010) claim that the factive complement is not directly selected by the matrix verb but is actually complement
to a null FACT noun. This has been disputed by scholars such as de Cuba (2007) and de Cuba & Úrðgu (2010), who note that if factive islands are complex DP islands then no extraction should be available from them, contrary to fact. Moreover, as Kastner (2015) notes, it is not possible for even the most basic factive verbs to take an overt nominal complement:

(75) a. I know fact John is here.
   b. *I know the fact that John is here.

Kastner (2015) also claims that the silent nominal FACT analysis does not account for the different interpretation of complements to verbs depending on whether they are nominal or clausal. Focusing on a non-factive, non-presuppositional verb like explain, Kastner notes that if explain takes a nominal complement, the complement is understood as containing reasons why the relevant event represented by the nominal occurred. If it takes a clausal complement, the complement is understood as an explanation for some relevant event that may or may not be expressed in the same clause. This means that the speech act of explaining has very different content in each case. This is illustrated in (76):

(76) a. He explained [DP the building’s collapse.]
   = He said that the contractor was a crook, the supplies were bought cheap and safety regulations were flouted.
   b. He explained [CP that the building collapsed.]
   = He said “The building collapsed” (or similar) by way of explanation for why the street is closed.

These differences in interpretation do not entirely carry over to factive verbs:

(77) a. I regret Dan’s departure.
   b. I regret Dan’s leaving.
   c. I regret that Dan left.
   d. I regret the fact that Dan left.
In (77) there do not seem to be any differences in interpretation between the DP comple-
ments and the CP complements. In (78), though (78b) and (78c) contain more information
than (78a), the interpretation is the same. In both (77) and (78), all the options are inter-
preted like the DP complement in (76) in that they concern the event represented by or in
the complement rather presenting the complement as related to some second event.

Whilst the argument above is not a knockdown argument against Rizzi (1990) or Kayne (2010),
it is suggestive that all factive complements, unlike clausal complements to non-
factive verbs, are nominal in nature. But how does this come about? Kastner (2015) claims
that factive complements are selected by a determiner-like element that he calls δ, which
that has the effect of nominalising the clause—a strikingly similar proposal to the one
proposed here for quasi-quotational structures. Kastner shows that factive complements
are introduced by determiners in languages such as Hebrew (79) and (80) and have the
same distribution as DPs (in particular as sentential subjects).

Kastner (2015) claims that factivity relates to their status as definite
DPs that refer to a proposition in the common ground. Following Honcoop (1998), he
claims that factive complements, due to the presence of a definite determiner above CP,
do not introduce a new discourse referent (proposition) into the common ground and so
do not allow extraction across clauses, in the same way that cross-sentential anaphora

(78)  
  a. I forgot his name.  
  b. I forgot that he was called Paul.  
  c. I forgot the fact that he was called Paul.

(79)  
  a. hu hisbir še-ha-binyan karas  
      he explained COMP-the-building collapsed
      “He explained that the building collapsed.”
  b. hu hisbir et ze še-ha-binyan karas  
      he explained ACC this COMP-the-building collapsed
      “He explained the fact that the building collapsed.”  

(80)  
  Bill zoxer et ze še-Dani ganav et ha-ugiot  
  Bill remembers ACC this COMP-Dani stole ACC the-cookies
  “Bill remembers (the fact) that John stole the cookies.”  
  Kastner (2015) p.162

He also claims that the weak-islandhood of factivity relates to their status as definite
DPs that refer to a proposition in the common ground. Following Honcoop (1998), he
claims that factive complements, due to the presence of a definite determiner above CP,
to an indefinite is blocked if that indefinite is presupposed rather than if it introduces a new discourse referent (see Honcoop (1998), Szabolcsi (2006) and Kastner (2015) for details). It could also be argued that the weak-islandhood of both factive complements and quasi-quotational constructions derives from their selection by a definite determiner, as definiteness is well-known to degrade extraction (Fiengo & Higginbotham 1981, Manzini 1992):

\[(81)\]

\[\text{a. *Which man; did you discover [Mary’s poem about t_i]?
}
\[\text{b. ??Which man; did you discover [the poem about t_i]?
}
\[\text{c. Which man; did you discover [a poem about t_i]? Szabolcsi (2006, p.483)
}\]

Note that the possessed DP in (81a) strengthens the island compared with the simpler definite DP in (81b), which is relevant to the distinction between factive complements and quasi-quotational constructions.

Kastner’s account is compelling for a number of reasons: it dispenses with the problems of the null DP account such as the weak-strong islandhood problem and covers the fact that factive complements tend to pattern with DPs. However, semifactive verbs such as agree and deny are not compatible with DP complements:

\[(82)\]

\[\text{a. *I agree something.
}
\[\text{b. I agree to something.
}
\[\text{c. I agree that something should be done.
}\]

Kastner claims that as his proposed presuppositional determiner does not create a DP, but a \(\delta P\), that there is a more fine-grained selectional restriction on verbs like agree that permits \(\delta P\) and PP complements, but not DP complements. Kastner likens this to the selection of particular types of C by other verbs, for example verbs that only select overt and not null C, like resent, care and mind (Kastner 2015, p.183).

In short, Kastner takes a similar angle to de Cuba and colleagues by moving away from the idea of factivity being itself present in the syntax, instead focusing on presuppositionality, which he claims is present in the syntax in the form of a particular type of
If we are to accept Kastner’s approach to factive complements, let us then recapitulate and re-examine the analyses for factive complements and quasi-quotational constructions and how the similarities and differences between the two fall out.

The proposal is that factive complements are clauses nominalised by a determiner $\delta$ that selects for a CP. The resulting $\delta P$ is selected by factive and semifactive matrix verbs but cannot be selected by non-factive verbs such as *say* and *think*. The determiner $\delta$ renders the factive complement referential and its referent is a presupposed proposition in the common ground. Behaviourally, the factive complement has the distribution of a nominal: it can appear in subject position and is interpreted in the same way as other nominal complements to factive verbs; there is no nominal-clausal split in interpretation like that found with complements to verbs like *explain*. Factive complements are weak islands to extraction, unlike other clausal complements; it is claimed that this is due to their presupposed status.

Quasi-quotational constructions are like factive complements in how they relate to the matrix clause: factive complements, in particular factive emotives, seem to express the motivation or reason the matrix subject has for possessing the emotive or mental state encoded in the factive verb. Similarly, quasi-quotational constructions contain information about the relevant discourse participants’ motivations, perspective and commitment towards the act that the matrix verb encodes in a way that standard embedded clauses do not. There are also morphological similarities between factive complements and quasi-quotational constructions in some languages, for example the obligatoriness of the complementiser *att* in factives and EV2 clauses in Swedish (de Cuba [2006]).

Quasi-quotational constructions are also analysed in this thesis as nominalised clauses, with a determiner-like element in the head of the IAP projection that selects for the clause, but there the similarities end. They are not selected by the matrix verb but they are analysed as modifying a true nominal complement to the matrix verb, which may or may not be overt. They are not in themselves presupposed as they contain propositions or questions that are open and unresolved in the common ground, but they pick out a referent in the discourse, which has been argued to be a conversational move made to address or
propose a specific QUD. Moreover, the proposition or set of propositions is “at-issue” with respect to the relevant discourse; that which is at-issue forms the basis of a question under discussion in the stack, it is marked as not being presupposed and a resolution for that which is at-issue is being actively sought, either in the form of a question that requires an answer or an assertion that is put forward for inclusion in the common ground. To repeat (67) here as (83a) we see that the reason clause makes explicit why the speaker has made the assertion that they have made and hence the way in which the matrix clause fits into the discourse by expressing the speaker’s motivation for the assertion and by answering a sub-QUD. It disambiguates the role of the matrix clause in the discourse in a way that thinking of the V2 clause as simply “at-issue” does not.\(^{22}\)

(83) a. Es hat geschneit, weil die Straße ist ganz weiß.
   “It has snowed, because the street is completely white.”
   Steinbach & Antomo (2009, p.15)

b. QUD = What is it like outside?
   Sub-QUD = How do you know what it is like outside?

As has already been shown above, the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions is partly predictable on the basis of whether or not a matrix predicate is considered to be factive or not, but is refined by taking into account whether the quasi-quotational construction addresses a QUD still in the stack—that is, an open QUD—in the relevant discourse context.

Quasi-quotational constructions differ from factive complements in that even less extraction is permitted out of quasi-quotational constructions than out of factives—argument extraction is uniformly bad, for example. Both types of complements are definite and referring\(^{23}\) hence quasi-quotational constructions block extraction in the same way as was

\(^{22}\)It is also important to note, as do scholars such as Wiklund et al. (2009), that the idea that the EV2 clause is at issue does not exclude the matrix clause from also being at issue, or in our new terms, a proposition put forward as a possible answer for a QUD in the current stack. This was illustrated in the previous chapter too.

\(^{23}\)I assume that typical embedded clauses are not referential, meaning that they do not refer to a conversational move in the relevant context but to a proposition more generally, in the same way that bare nouns refer to kinds rather than individual entities.
described for factive complements above, if even more strongly due to the complexity of the highest projection in the quasi-quotational case. However, quasi-quotational complements have the added syntactic difference of not being selected by the matrix verb. As a result, when arguments are attracted up to the Spec, ForceP position in an embedded clause, they alone satisfy the \([+\text{wh}]\) feature on Force\(^0\) and so are no longer free for further extraction into the matrix clause.

Quasi-quotational constructions are in (almost complete) complementary distribution with factive clauses. Quasi-quotational constructions may not appear in sentence-initial position or as sentential subject \(^{24,25}\), they contain embedded root phenomena where factive complements cannot, and their content must be non-presupposed.

(84) \([\text{That the results were fantastic}]\), Albert denied/confirmed/knew \(t_i\)

\(^{24}\)It seems that in English, EIQs can appear as sentential subjects if the content noun they identify is overt:

(i) The question would he ever finish his PhD is one that played on John's mind at night.
(ii) ??The question when would he give me back my money is one I pestered John with frequently.

It is difficult to tell whether the element [would he ever finish his PhD] in (i) is an EIQ, an example of FID, or even a direct quote. The very marginal status of (ii), which the indexicality of the arguments shows to be an EIQ, suggests that it is not an EIQ but probably a direct quote.

\(^{25}\)Henry (1995) claims that EIQs can be sentential subjects in Belfast English:

(iii) Was he vegetarian was what was puzzling them.

Though (iii) could be interpreted as a direct quote, or even FID, it is less clear that (iv) is ambiguous. I do not know how to account for (iv) given that no other EIQ dialect seems to permit EIQs as sentential subjects and there are no other examples of this available either in corpora or in the literature.

(85) a. *Att hon hade inte gått hen upptäckte han forst igår
   that she had not gone home discovered he first yesterday
   “That she had not gone home, he discovered only yesterday.”

\(^{26}\)Recall that this is infelicitous on an EIQ reading but acceptable on an FID reading, as explained in section 3.3.

Note again that the fact that EV2 clauses cannot appear to the left of the matrix clause shows that their structure is not a simple matter of coordination of two matrix clauses, otherwise the impossibility of (85) would not be predicted.

These differences fall out from differences in the functional heads that select for factive
complements compared with quasi-quotational constructions. The idea that there are different factive and non-factive functional heads in the C-layer is not radical; evidence for this kind of distinction exists in overt morphosyntax in Japanese (the to–koto distinction). Given that the two different types of functional elements proposed here are silent (in English at least), I claim that there are two loci of difference that we can perceive. Firstly, they select for different projections in the extended left periphery of the CP: where the factive determiner selects for FinP, the quasi-quotational determiner selects for ForceP. This kind of selectional account has some advantages over Haegeman and Ürögdi’s (2010) operator movement account: the similarities between factive complements and quasi-quotational constructions can be accounted for; the nature and position of the determiners proposed both in this thesis and by Kastner (2015) are more clearly defined and have overt counterparts, which is not clear in Haegeman and Ürögdi’s account; and, as Bhatt (2010, p.175) points out, it is hard to see how operator movement results in referentiality and why it is incompatible with illocutionary force. Neither of these problems exist in a determiner account because the connection between the presence of a definite determiner-like element and referentiality is clear, and the complementary distribution of the factive determiner and illocutionary force (assuming that illocutionary force is syntactically represented in some way about FinP) is easily explained. It is also important to note that this definition of referentiality does not assume that referential CPs necessarily refer in the same ways as referential DPs do.

Another difference between the two determiners is that the quasi-quotational determiner—the IA head—has the perspectival monster-situation pronoun complex in its specifier that anchors the clause to a specific discourse and the questions under discussion in that discourse. In contrast, the factive determiner does not actively anchor its clause to a specific discourse context, though the clause it selects for must contain a proposition in the common ground of the utterance context. This results in an interpretation of presuppositionality because the referent picked out must be presupposed to be true in all worlds, not just at-issue in a specific set of worlds.
6.3 Thinking crosslinguistically

6.3.1 Distributional differences

So far in this thesis, three different distributions of quasi-quotational constructions have emerged: languages that only embed assertions and imperatives (German, Mainland Scandinavian); languages that only embed questions and imperatives (English) and languages that embed all three illocution types (Spanish).

With respect to English, we would not expect to find EV2 in English if we assume Ross’s (1973) Penthouse Principle, given that V2 is rare in matrix clauses. At first blush, this seems to be the case. If we consider the following embedded declaratives that do not have an overt complementiser (following the unavailability of overt complementisers in the embedded interrogative and imperatives) they do not show EIQ/EV2-like characteristics: in (86) we see that speech act adverbs, discourse particles and topicalisation of arguments is blocked; in (87) we see that null complementisers are permitted under a much wider range of predicates than quasi-quotational constructions; and (88) illustrates the well-known fact that extraction is licit out of embedded declaratives.

(86)  a. *He said seriously he understood the problem

(*on the low construal of seriously)

b. *He said he would like a drink please

(*on the low construal of please)

c. *He said that book, he would like to read

(87)  a. He knew he had to turn his life around. Daily Mail, 28th Mar 2015

b. He discovered he had won half a million Euros. Irish Examiner, 11th Jun 2015

c. He denied he had visited Mr McCann. Irish Times, 27th Jul 1996

d. He regretted he had not achieved what he wanted to do. BBC, 27th Sep 2013

(88)  a. What did he say he saw t_i?

b. Who did he say t_i saw her?
c. Where did he say he saw her?
d. When did he say he saw her?
e. How did he say he saw her?

Radford (2013) examines apparent recombination structures in English declaratives like those in (89):

(89) a. The party opposite said that if we cut 6 billion from the budget that it would end in catastrophe.

b. It’s something that off the pitch that we’ve got to help the players deal with.

Radford (2013, p.19)

However, these kinds of constructions have a very different distribution from quasi-quotational constructions—they do not shift perspective or permit root phenomena in the way that English EIQs or Spanish recombination do. Ultimately Radford analyses these structures as a kind of performance phenomenon that occurs when a particularly lengthy adverbial is fronted in the embedded clause in order to signal that the subject will follow (Radford 2013, p.43).

It seems that the crux of the problem relates to how embedded illocutionary acts and perspective shifting is overtly marked in English. The clause types that can be represented as embedded illocutionary acts are those that can be distinguished from indirect speech reports by the movement or presence of a verbal element in the left periphery. To be precise: EIQs feature movement of the verb into Force and embedded imperatives also feature the verb in the C layer. In Spanish recombination, there is either recombination que in TopicP (to follow Villa-García’s 2012, 2015 analysis), the exclamative marker qué or the preposition in the P+infinitive imperative construction. In contrast, there is no way in the examples in (86)-(89) of overtly distinguishing an English embedded declarative illocutionary act from a standard embedded declarative, and the same holds for embedded exclamatives.

However, as Sailor (2016) notes, there is evidence of verb movement in matrix clauses in some dialects of English that is innovative rather than residual and that is related to
strong assertive force. He has termed this type of verb movement “fuck-inversion” and it is illustrated below (examples from Sailor (2015 p.1):

(90) A: John is a nice guy.
    B: Is he fuck (a nice guy)—he stabbed my cousin!

(91) They’re all wearing kilts, but will I fuck be wearing one of them.
    = I definitely won’t be wearing one.

Sailor points out that fuck-inversion is reminiscent of canonical negative inversion, as in (92) which was also highlighted by Hooper & Thompson (1973) as a root transformation:

(92) a. They’re all wearing kilts, but under no circumstances will I be wearing one of those.
    b. Alice vowed that under no circumstances would she loan me the key.

Not all dialects that permit fuck-inversion can embed it, but those that permit EI Qs can also embed fuck-inversion clauses. Moreover, embedded fuck-inversion (henceforth referred to as embedded negative assertion) contrasts with embedded canonical negative inversion in exactly the same ways that EI Qs contrast with standard embedded interrogatives (judgements are mine from my North West England dialect):

(93)  

    *Compatibility with overt complementisers*

    a. He said (that) under no circumstances would he go to the party.
    b. He said (*that) would he fuck go to the party.

(94)  

    *Extraposition*

    a. Under no circumstances would he go to the party, he said.
    b. ?*Would he fuck go to the party, he said.  

(95)  

    *Availability in subject position*

    a. That under no circumstances would he go to the party was clear.
b. *Would he fuck go to the party was clear.

(96) Third-person/first-person clash

a. Mary said that under no circumstances would I go to the party.
b. ??Mary said would I fuck go to the party.  
   Requires context
c. I said that under no circumstances would Mary go to the party.
d. I said that would Mary fuck go to the party.

(97) Quantified matrix arguments

a. Everybody's mother said that under no circumstances would he go to the party
b. Everybody's mother said would he fuck go to the party

c. Nobody said that under no circumstances would she go to the party.
d. *Nobody said would she fuck go to the party was clear.
e. Mary told each boy's mother that under no circumstances would he be invited to the party.
f. *Mary told each boy's mother would he fuck be invited to the party.

(98) Wh-extraction

a. What did he say that under no circumstances would he do t?
b. *What did he say would he fuck do t?

(99) Orientation of expressive elements

a. John said that under no circumstances was Jo allowed to let the bastards in.

b. John said was Jo the fuck allowed to let the bastards in.

Embedded negative assertion therefore seems to provide a case of embedded assertive force in English, which is licensed by the obligatory verb movement to C. Importantly, this verb movement is not triggered by overt polarity in the way that inversion is triggered in canonical negative inversion, but via a mechanism which also licenses a strong assertive

27Of course, this is skipping completely over the question of how inversion is triggered in canonical negative inversion constructions, which is far from settled.
interpretation, such as the account given in chapter \(^4\)\(^{18}\). It seems, then, that the idea that overt marking is required is on the right track.

But in that case, why do languages with EV2 not have EIQs when they have matrix questions with inversion? Moreover, why do we have the situation in Mainland Scandinavian whereby EV2 can be used either for speaker or matrix-subject perspective, when in German it can only be the former? In answering these questions, it will be shown that German EV2 and EIQs, while similar processes, are fundamentally different in a way that is reminiscent of pronoun shifting in languages like Zazaki and Slavé (Anand & Nevins 2004). Recomplementation, on this account, patterns with the EIQ languages. Mainland Scandinavian EV2 will be shown to be slightly different again.

It is tempting to turn to the apparent polarity sensitivity of both EV2 and EIQs for an answer, but it cannot be as simple as the determiner in Mainland Scandinavian also being a positive polarity item or the determiner in English being a negative polarity item.\(^2\)\(^{29}\) We have already seen that EV2 in Mainland Scandinavian can occur under negation given the right discourse conditions, as well as English EIQs occurring under non-interrogative verbs such as *say*. Moreover, an polarity-sensitivity account does not explain the effect of modalisation on licensing EIQs under matrix factive verbs, given that modal verbs, lexical and periphrastic, do not typically license NPIs:

\[(100)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{He saw anyone.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{He might see anyone.} \\
\text{c. } & \text{He wanted to see anyone.} \\
\text{d. } & \text{He did not see anyone.}
\end{align*}\]

\(^{18}\)Sailor (2015, 2016) suggests that *fuck*-inversion and canonical negative inversion are both triggered by of focus-related operator movement into a high left-peripheral PolarityP, with the main difference being that the operator is overt in canonical negative inversion and covert in *fuck*-inversion. However, this does not account for the assertive force of *fuck*-inversion compared with the undeniably emphatic, but forceless canonical negative inversion (this is yet another example of the disconnect between illocutionary force and more vague, attitude-related terms like ‘emphasis’). Biberauer (2015b, 2016) also proposes a high left-peripheral PolarityP to account for a variety of phenomena in Afrikaans which also show interesting effects with respect to illocutionary force. Between these ideas and those that I will discuss below on polarity, it seems that polarity and illocution may be more closely linked than we have previously realised, but this requires much future work.

\(^{29}\)For an analysis of similar data along these lines, see Adger & Quer (2001).
Crucially, an NPI account does not easily cover the paradigm cases of selected questions or EIQs under interrogative predicates, given that we do not yet fully understand how interrogation licenses NPIs. One could take a position like that of Lahiri (2002, p.257), who states that it is some element in predicates like ask that license NPIs, rather than interrogation per se. However, this position logically assumes a Ross (1970) or Speas & Tenny (2003)-like performative analysis to account for matrix clauses, which is losing ground in the field of the syntax of speech acts for the reasons detailed in chapter 2.

Instead it is perhaps more fruitful to follow a similar line to that taken by Holmberg & Platzack (1995), Truckenbrodt (2006), Gärtner (2015) and the view outlined above that the predicates that combine with EIQs bear a particular relation to the information state of the original speaker. In the case of EIQs, the predicate must be compatible with a true open question because the EIQ represents a question that, in the original discourse context, was unresolved for the original speaker. The apparent polarity sensitivity of the EIQ follows from the non-veridical nature of the original question. In fact, it seems that the use of an IAP can ‘bleach’ the matrix predicate down to just its interrogative function or alternatively overrides other aspects of meaning usually contained in that predicate. Take for example the predicate see. When used in an imperative it can mean something like “try to achieve x”, as in (101). In this case, there is no requirement to report back to the speaker the success (or otherwise) of the endeavour; no ‘answer’ is required.

(101) a. See if you can finish that book before bedtime.
   b. See if Mary will help you.
   c. Soon you’ll see if it will work out.

This interpretation can hold in questions too:

(102) a. Can you see if you can finish that book before bedtime?
   b. Why don’t you see if Mary could help you?

It can also carry the implication that the speaker of the imperative wants to know the eventual answer: it is an information-seeking use of see that has an interpretation more
like “find out and report back”:

(103) See if it’s your friend is at the door.

   Speaker expects addressee to find out and tell her whether the addressee’s friend has arrived

When *see* is used with an EIQ, only the second reading is available:

(104) a. Go over there and see did they bring my car in  

#Speaker just wants addressee to try to find out if the car is in

   Speaker wants addressee to tell her if the car is in

b. *Can you see can you finish that book tonight?

#Speaker wants addressee to try to finish the book

#Speaker wants addressee to tell her if she can finish the book

If the IA head’s role is to turn the semantic question into a question-utterance this is to be expected; the identification of the IAP as a question rather than any other kind of interrogative act effectively disambiguates predicates like *want to know*, eliminating the possibility that they are solely a matter of internal reflection.

To address the question of cross-linguistic distribution, I propose that the difference identified between the types of IA heads in different languages select for results in the restrictions on the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions crosslinguistically. Languages with the German type of IA head ultimately have a kind of mixed interpretation across the original and current discourse contexts—the modal base is provided by the matrix subject and the responsibility lies was a current discourse participant. This is exactly what is needed to obtain the interpretation of embedded imperatives in German and Swedish, where the matrix subject’s doxastic alternatives determine what property should be made true in the world and the current addressee is responsible for making it so. However, this kind of mixed interpretation, which introduces a delay in transmission into the process of communication, when applied to embedded questions is incompatible with how questions work in discourse. True information-seeking questions require a response
for the conversation to continue successfully, so this indirect method of asking them is not compatible with normal discourse. It could be argued that EIQs should be available in German for precisely the kind of case where a question is being asked indirectly via a third person, though there do not seem to be any instances of this.

In contrast, the more ‘coherent’ pattern in Spanish and English, where both the modal base and the responsibility holder are provided by the original context, should permit all three types of embedded illocutionary act examined here. This is borne out by the data, with the caveat that there must be a method of overtly marking the fact that it is an embedded illocutionary act in the C layer. We also predict that we should find embedded interrogatives in the Mainland Scandinavian languages that also permit the ‘coherent’ pattern. This is borne out by the following data from Julien (2009), though she notes that the root-like word order in the examples in (105) is less frequent than the typical subject-verb word order in embedded interrogatives (Julien 2009, p.47):

(105) a. Jag bara undrar vart ska ni åka i sommar.
   I only wonder where shall you.pl go in summer
   “I’m just wondering where are you going this summer?”

b. Ja kommer att see kan vi göra undantag för gravida.
   I come to see can we make exception for pregnant
   “I’ll see if we can make an exception for pregnant women.”

c. Jag undrar kommer det nånsin att hända.
   I wonder comes it ever to happen
   “I wonder will it ever happen.”

   Swedish, Julien (2009, pp.47-48,53)

6.3.2 More on the nominal complement

6.3.2.1 A role for cognate nouns?

The analysis given in this chapter makes some possible predictions about the distribution of embedded illocutionary acts crosslinguistically. For example, to take a somewhat Austinian approach, it seems to predict that this kind of embedded illocutionary act (a representation of a conversational move) will be restricted to languages that allow verbs to take cognate or near-cognate nouns as their complements because these languages allow verbs like “ask”
to select for typical\footnote{As opposed to nominal complements like “something”, which show properties of both DPs and CPs.} nominal complements. The prediction would be that a language like French will not have embedded illocutionary acts but German and Spanish will:

(106)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text*{On demande la question.} \\
& \text{One asks the question} \\
& \text{“One asks the question.”} & \text{French} \\
\text{b. } & \text{Man fragt die Frage.} & \text{German} \\
\text{c. } & \text{Se pregunta la pregunta.} & \text{Spanish}
\end{align*}

Based on these three languages alone, the prediction is borne out insofar as German and Spanish have embedded illocutionary acts, but German does not allow interrogative quasi-quotational constructions. Let’s consider non-Indo-European languages now. Some languages that appear to have embedded speech acts do not strictly have verbs of asking, but construct asking predicates from a light verb such as \textit{do} combined with a noun meaning \textit{question}:

(107)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{shitsumon suru} \\
& \text{question do.pret.inform} \\
& \text{“One asks the question.”} & \text{Japanese} \\
\text{b. } & \text{cilmun-haki} \\
& \text{question-do.nom} \\
& \text{“asking”} & \text{Korean}
\end{align*}

From this cross-linguistic prediction may also arise an intra-linguistic prediction: the kinds of verbs that may embed embedded illocutionary acts are those that can take the relevant noun as an overt nominal complement when it is followed by a clause expressing its content. This may seem intuitively correct when we consider English: we can ask a question, but we cannot know a question. But this prediction seems to break down with predicates such as \textit{wonder} and \textit{want to know}. Some examples of these predicates taking \textit{question} as a nominal complement can be found, but they are marginal:

(108)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Mothers who are pregnant often wonder the question: is it safe to have}
\end{align*}
intercourse during pregnancy? newkidscenter.com  
b. Today I wonder the question “what if?” twitter.com  
c. So the fact that neither you nor a student would naturally wonder the question “How many dominoes would you need to knock over a skyscraper?” isn’t material to me. (I wouldn’t wonder it naturally either but once it was posed, I found it engrossing.) blog.mrmeyer.com  
d. Many people often wonder the question of what pressure washing can do for their home. pressurewashwr.com  
e. If you own a website […] you probably may have wondered the question, is maintenance for a website really needed. webdesy.com  
f. However, it is an industry-wide problem in the UK and I know you will all want to know the question are we done, are we done on conduct. nab.com.au  

This second prediction, however, still relies on the selection properties of the verb, and there are many other predicates that produce very natural EIQs but are not found with overt question+clause complements, for example not know. As such, it is perhaps too strong to assume that the overt content noun question is a perfect and necessary analogue for the null content noun identified by the EIQ. It is not uncommon that null nouns do not have exactly the same distribution as their overt counterparts; see for example certain types of null-argument languages and analyses of PRO.

However, the discussion of cognate objects leads us onto an interesting and potentially more fruitful path. Cognate objects seem to spell out the same event described by the verb. They may also represent the product of the act and as such can be evaluated as having certain properties, just as EIQs can (see the discussion in sections 6.2.5 and 4.3.2.2):

32 Taken from https://twitter.com/currygd/status/540563092308905984, retrieved 6th May 2015.
33 Taken from blog.mrmeyer.com/2001/3acts-domino-skyscraper, retrieved 6th May 2015.
a. John thought an interesting thought.

b. John dreamt a nice dream.  

In this way, cognate objects seem to spell out exactly what we want them to; an object that refers not to a speech act but to a more abstract by-product of speech acts that has both propositional content and other evaluable properties such as tone and emotion. However, they also have the disadvantage as identified above that their distribution are subject to lexical specifications of verbs, which does not match the distribution of the content noun present in EIQs.

However, there are other kinds of nominal objects that play similar roles to cognate objects without the problem of being tied to cognate verbs. Moltmann (2013) describes “special quantifiers” such as something, the same thing and the German Worte (‘[ordered] words’) that represent not a proposition, not a speech act, but an “attitudinal object” encompassing propositional content, intensional stance and illocutionary force (Moltmann 2013, p.133).

a. John asked something.

b. John asked the same thing Mary did.

c. Seine letzten Worte waren, dass alles vergeben ist  
   “His last words were that everything was forgiven.”  

Moltmann, focusing on attitudinal objects with some kind of propositional, rather than interrogative, content, notes that the concept of an attitudinal object as distinct from a proposition captures a number of properties found in natural language. In sentences such as (112)-(113) below, it seems that not only propositional content but also some kind of attitudinal force is shared by both John and Mary—they must have a similar attitude

\[\text{See example (111c) for an illustration of the use of Worte, but note that Worte and Wörter (‘[unordered] words’) differ in that the latter cannot refer to an attitudinal object but only to the words as objects. As such, the equivalent of (111c) is not acceptable (?? is the judgement given by Moltmann):}\]

(110) ??Seine letzten Wörter waren, dass alles vergeben ist.
   “His last words were that everything was forgiven.”

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towards the propositional content, hence the infelicity of the continuation in (113):

(112) a. John’s thought was the same as Mary’s.
    b. John’s claim was the same as Mary’s.  \text{Moltmann} (2013, p.140)

(113) Jane’s thought was the same as Mary’s - the bastard had to go, #though Jane thought he was misunderstood, really.

Furthermore, while a proposition cannot be shared, an attitudinal object (or instances of the same kind of attitudinal object) can be:

(114) a. John and Mary share the thought that S.
    b. The thought that S occurred to both John and Mary.  \text{Moltmann} (2013, p.140)

There are other ways in which attitudinal objects also differ from speech acts qua events:

as shown in (112), attitudinal objects can be treated as exactly similar but events cannot.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{38}This aspect of attitudinal objects fits in well with the conceptualisation of the EV2 as asserted by the speaker as well as representing the views of the matrix subject:

(i)Madsvåg’s thought—and mine too—is that in future not everyone can be engaged in everything.

A valid question to raise here is whether EV2 is completely blocked in the case of false belief on the part of the matrix subject. It is certain that EV2 is incompatible with this kind of scenario if it is expressed with a negated factive verb, as in example (115) below from Truckenbrodt (2006, p.299):

(115) *Hans weiß nicht, Peter hat gewonnen.
    Hans knows not Peter has won
    “Hans doesn’t know that Peter has won.”

I have not been able to find any attested examples of German EV2 being used in a situation where the matrix subject’s beliefs and those of the speaker clash, but \text{Julien} (2015) presents just such a case for Norwegian:

(116) Dei sa at den bloggen las han alltid, men det gjorde han ikkje.
    they said that that blog, he always read, but he didn’t.

A couple of notes on this: the example in (116) is one of very few in Julien’s paper that is constructed rather than naturalistic. This may not be a particularly damning point, however, given issues with sampling and the already rare nature of non-subject-initial EV2. She also notes that examples parallel to (116) that have a semifactive matrix verb such as oppdage (‘discover’) suffer from infelicity, so there are some cases of Mainland Scandinavian EV2 that must be speaker-oriented (as also noted above). Julien seems to need to suggest that the embedded clause in (116) is still asserted, but she says that “it does not make much pragmatic difference whether or not the embedded clause is asserted in itself” (Julien 2015, p.169). I am not sure what to make of this example or Julien’s analysis of it at this time, though I think that experimentation would be the best route to take next to untangle the problems it poses.
the time of the occurrence of an attitudinal object is accidental whereas it forms a key part of understanding a referring to an event; an event does not have satisfaction conditions in contrast to the inherent satisfaction conditions of an attitudinal object, namely that the attitude holder (often represented in a possessive DP structure) must hold or engage in the relevant attitude with a specific attitudinal or illocutionary force (Moltmann 2013, pp.133-134). This last point is parallel to the differences in satisfaction conditions of direct speech reports compared with EIqs; where the direct speech report requires a specific preceding speech act of a specific type, EIqs require that a particular QUD have been engaged with overtly by the relevant discourse participants.

On the basis of these considerations it is proposed that the null nominal is not a specific cognate noun but is an attitudinal object that can be overtly pronounced as an overt content noun depending on whether an appropriate lexical item exists and is compatible with the selectional properties of the matrix verb. Crucially, lexical considerations do not dictate which predicates may occur with EIqs or which languages may have EIqs.

### 6.3.2.2 Illocutionary force is in the embedded clause

A strong example to support the argument that it is not the nominal, but the properties of the embedded clause alone that carry illocutionary force, is the following attested example from a speaker of Canadian English, in which indirect, direct and quasi-quotational speech reports all co-occur:

(117) He mentioned [that there was another club opening across town], and [would I like to go with him], and I said “Sure, I’d love to go with you.”


In (117) the matrix verb *mentioned* is followed by a standard clausal complement headed by *that*. However, this complement is conjoined with the EIQ *would I like to join him*. The standard clausal complement and EIQ have matching intonation contours. That section is then followed by another matrix predicate preceding an example of direct speech (in the original speech act, the portion of (117) between quotation marks was marked by a change
in intonation pattern and pitch).

With respect to the EIQ [would I like to go with him], it cannot be conjoined at the level of the matrix clause because it cannot be a matrix clause on its own. It is unlikely that there is a silent ask matrix predicate preceding the EIQ as the identity condition required to license such ellipsis is not met. The EIQ must therefore be embedded under (though not selected by) the matrix predicate mention. However, though mention does not seem to convey much meaning independently of expressing a communicative act, it is notable that mention is not typically compatible with EIQs; examples (118a)-(118d) sound completely unacceptable to this author with an EIQ dialect and only (118e) with the overt DP complement to mention sounds marginally possible:

(118)  
   a. *I mentioned what did he want to eat.  
   b. *I mentioned would he like to join me.  
   c. *He mentioned who did I eat with.  
   d. *He mentioned would I like to join him.  
   e. ??He mentioned an invitation, namely would I like to join him.

Note that mention does not typically select for standard embedded questions under if either, though it may be compatible with the kind of unselected embedded questions examined in [Adger & Quer (2001)\textsuperscript{39}]

(120)  
   a. *I mentioned if Bill was coming to the party.  
   b. Did John mention if Bill was coming to the party?  
   c. John didn’t mention if Bill was coming to the party.

\textsuperscript{39}Adger and Quer do not have any examples of mention combining with unselected embedded questions in English, but gloss some Basque and Catalan examples as doing so:

(119)  
   a. [Hemen gaude-nik] aipatu dute?  
       here be.1PL.A-COMP mentioned AUX.3PL.E.3SG.A  
       “Did they mention about us being here?”  
   b. Han comentat si el pensen convidar?  
       have.3PL mentioned him think.IND.3PL.to-invite  
       “Did they mention if they are planning to invite him?”  
       Catalan, [Adger & Quer (2001) p.127]
What then is the status of the EIQ in (117)? I argue that it is still an EIQ like any other in that it is identified with a null attitudinal object, and that its use under mention is ameliorated by the presence of the first conjunct.

Mention, like many other verbs of communication, can take DP complements as well as CP complements. It can also conjoin CP complements with such DP complements:

(121)  a. He mentioned DP[something].
       b. He mentioned CP[that there was another club opening across town] and DP[something else].
       c. ?He mentioned CP[that there was another club opening across town] and DP[an invitation [namely IAP[would I like to join him]]].

Hence the proposed structure of the EIQ is perfectly possible under mention. How then does the first conjunct ameliorate mention? This is because it provides some context as to the fact that a questioning act occurred and why. Similarly, using the overt DP object [an invitation] as in (118e) slightly improves the use of the EIQ under mention because [an invitation] provides an appropriate context for something carrying the illocutionary force of a request or question.

More concretely, the overt DP [an invitation] can introduce into the QUD stack questions like Would you like to take up this invitation? that provoke conversational moves to which the EIQ can refer. Similarly, the embedded clausal complement [that there was another club opening across town] introduces into the stack QUDs such as What is happening there? as ways of structuring the discourse to resolve all propositions and questions in it.

Ultimately, given a context compatible with there being a relevant QUD, EIQs like that in (117) are possible because they contain their own illocutionary force and introduce their own modal domain against which the embedded question can be evaluated, and the matrix predicate in this case in interpreted simply as a light verb of communication. This is reminiscent of Bogal-Allbritten’s (2016) account of attitude complements in Navajo. It also explains why EIQs and embedded imperatives can be conjoined, as each contributes its own illocutionary force below the level of the matrix clause:
He said [what the hell did I think I was doing] and [leave him the hell alone].

6.3.3 Languages that don’t embed speech act phenomena

Having considered the cross-linguistic picture, it is also worth taking time to consider languages that do not seem to permit the embedding of any illocutionary material at all, in particular the famous cases of Mandarin \cite{LiThompson1981,Paul2014}, Cantonese \cite{SybesmaLi2007,Lam2014} and Cuzco Quechua \cite{Faller2002,Faller2003,Faller2014}. Other less well-known cases exist, for example Greek evidential particles, which seem to morphologically mark speakers and addressees \cite{Tsoulasinpreparation}.

What is particularly interesting about these cases is that they display a wide array of illocutionary material in the matrix clause—they are clearly languages that are sympathetic to encoding not-at-issue information such as evidentiality and speaker attitude morphologically, yet items like evidential morphemes and sentence final particles are not embeddable. Moreover, similar items—or at least, items that convey similar types of information—are embeddable in other languages, for example evidential markers in Tibetan \cite{Garrett2001} and St’át’cimets \cite{Matthewsonetal2007}.

So what is the difference in these languages? It is often the case that particles and other expressive material in languages that do not embed illocution are sentence-peripheral, in particular sentence-final, whereas embeddable particles in other languages are often sentence-internal, such as the second-position St’át’cimets and Tibetan evidentials. This is not always the case, however, as Cuzco Quechua evidentials can be quite deeply embedded in the verbal complex, and a number of the English discourse markers surveyed in this dissertation have been sentence-peripheral, such as \textit{please}, \textit{then} and \textit{again}.

It cannot be linked to whether or not a language is topic-oriented, as Japanese and German are both considered to be topic-oriented languages, yet embed orientation phenomena. Nor does it appear to be a typological phenomenon in the sense that it is linked to language families; Indo-European and Japanese data may have made up the bulk of this thesis, but surveys like \cite{Aikhenvald2008} have found similar constructions in a range of Bantu and Papuan languages.

Faller’s work on Cuzco Quechua \cite{Faller2002,Faller2003,Faller2014} already suggests that high
left-peripheral projections are not the only places that illocutionary meaning can be expressed. She suggests that perhaps there are sentential-spine evidentials and then other higher evidentials whose embeddability (or lack thereof) is not based on core meaning, but on other syntactic behaviour (M. Faller, p.c.). Bavarian German data has also shown that sentence-peripheral particles were not as readily embeddable as Mittelfeld particles (S. Thoma, p.c.). Yet other syntactic operations can render these particles more readily embeddable: S. Thoma (p.c.) suggests that the particle gā, which was not embeddable in typical Bavarian German embedded clauses, can receive an embedded interpretation in weil clauses, which are the only embedded clauses in Bavarian German that permit V2:

(123) A: Mia miassn ned in’d Schui. . .
     we must NEG in.DET school
     “We don’t have to go to school. . .”

B: Wei do scho Ferien san gā?
   because there already holidays are PRT
   because we’re already on holidays then, right?”

S. Thoma, p.c.

Thoma reports that gā is interpreted as scoping over the weil clause in B’s fragment answer in (123) rather than over the (elided) main clause.

It is difficult to identify a language-level reason why illocutionary material should not be embeddable—which of course does not mean that one does not exist, but that I have not been able to find one here. An alternative option then is that the reason is language-internal. This is the approach taken by Faller (2014); she suggests that certain Cuzco Quechua morphemes, in particular those that overtly morphologically represent speaker and hearer, are non-shiftable indexicals and as such cannot receive an embedded interpretation. This is in line with the analysis above that only covert morphemes shift perspectives in quasi-quotational contexts. A similar analysis could also fit Greek evidential particles, in which the vowel of the particle indicates whether it is evaluated with respect to the speaker or the addressee Tsoulas in preparation, and that cannot be embedded.

Perhaps, then, crosslinguistic differences in the embeddability of illocutionary material are not simply related to the position of the relevant element in the clause or the precise
meaning of that element, but to whether or not the particles are indexicals. Particles and morphemes that explicitly encode one of the current discourse participants cannot shift to be interpreted with respect to the IAP; only covert perspectival elements can.

6.4 Conclusions and wider consequences for linguistic theory

In this chapter I have followed recent scholarship in suggesting that both DP-like and non-DP-like clausal complements exist in natural language. I have examined the concept of referentiality with respect to clauses and presented two types of referential CPs: one is a FinP selected by a determiner that refers to a proposition that has been accepted into the common ground (a factive complement), and the other is an IAP that refers to a conversational move in the relevant discourse (a quasi-quotational construction).

I also examined the relationship between quasi-quotational constructions and the matrix clause, determining that it is not a relationship of selection. There are many reasons for this, most importantly the effect of scopal operators in the matrix clause such as negation, modality and interrogation and the way in which discourse factors such as the MPU and modifiers like ‘just’ can improve the acceptability of quasi-quotational constructions under, for example, semifactive verbs. I showed that quasi-quotational constructions are modifiers that specify the content of and expressive elements associated with an attitudinal object (Moltmann 2013) such as the NP “question”.

Finally, I showed that there are a number of similarities between contexts in Indo-European languages that permit embedded root phenomena that extend beyond this potentially circular diagnostic and beyond the similarities in their distribution. German/Mainland Scandinavian EV2, English EIQs and Romance recomplementation are all limited to post-verbal position, contain non-presupposed information, and have similar interpretative characteristics with respect to requiring a suitable conversational move as referent and the need for some contextual connection between the reporting and the original context. This not only provides strong support for attempting a unified analysis of these constructions, but also that there is a real link between phenomena traditionally
assumed to be root phenomena, such as speech act adverbs, discourse markers and hanging topics. A completely unified analysis of the Indo-European quasi-quotational constructions was not possible due to differences in perspective in German EV2 compared with English EIQQs and Romance recomplementation. Where the embedded clause determiner in the latter group effects a perspective shift to the original context, in the former group it reaffirms the perspective of the matrix speaker, even if the matrix subject is disjoint in reference. This difference is reflected in the interpretation of embedded imperatives in these languages, which are split along the same lines. This difference in perspective was suggested to be responsible for the differences in distribution between the two groups of quasi-quotational phenomena; the German EV2 type of determiner was proposed to be incompatible with interrogatives that require a coherent perspectival interpretation, hence German EV2 languages do not permit embedded interrogative illocutionary acts. Mainland Scandinavian EV2 shows both kinds of perspective disambiguation and embedded inverted questions were seen to be possible. The importance of overt marking was also highlighted; English can embed assertions, but only if they are marked through processes such as verb movement, as seen in fuck-inversion.

It was also shown that the distribution of quasi-quotational phenomena is not a question of assertion tout court; this is made clear by the similarities that English EIQQs share with German/Mainland Scandinavian EV2, and the presence of interrogative recomplementation in Spanish. Instead quasi-quotational phenomena are analysed as referential CPs that pick out a specific conversational move in the relevant discourse that contributes towards the resolution of a question under discussion. This is a more fine-grained distinction that the Main Point of Utterance framework because the QUD framework does not entail that the quasi-quotational construction is interpreted as the main point of the utterance but that it constitutes engagement with a question under discussion. It also tells

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40 This is not to say that there is no crosslinguistic variation in the “basic” size of a standard complement clause; it is clear that Italian and Spanish complement clauses are larger than English complement clauses as they routinely permit topicalisation of arguments, for example. There are also languages such as Mandarin Chinese that completely exclude discourse-related elements such as discourse markers, while permitting other CP-level elements such as epistemic adverbs, epistemic marker le and experiential markers such as guo [Biggs 2014]. This goes to show that there is still a lot of work to be done to determine how standard complement clauses are structured, including how the two pioneering analyses of left periphery in cartography, Rizzi (1997) and Cinque (1999), relate to each other.
us more about how the interlocutors are expected to commit to the resolution of the open question or proposition proposed by the quasi-quotational construction. In the case of German EV2, which links the embedded clause to the speaker’s perspective, this means that the embedded clause is put forward to be engaged with by the addressee and, if accepted, added to the common ground. Ultimately, therefore, the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions is dependent on whether it can be interpreted as new, unresolved information in the context it is evaluated with respect to—a refinement of the proposal by Green (1976).

The work above has wider implications for both linguistic theory and linguistic typology. In terms of linguistic theory, it has been shown here that clauses can be referential and the concept of what referential means in this context has been refined. In terms of linguistic typology, we can use the work in this chapter to work towards filling some gaps identified by Cook (2014). In her examination of Plains Cree, Cook notes that indexical clause types—clause types that are strongly connected to the speaker and the current speech act and that are morphologically marked as such—are strictly limited to matrix contexts, and she raises the question of whether other languages have the logically possible option of indexical clause types occurring in embedded position. This is related to Faller’s (2014) examination of what it means for speaker-oriented elements to appear in embedded clauses. I propose that the EV2 clauses in German represent a type of speaker-oriented embedded clause that cannot exist independently of its matrix clause, and that, unlike the Cuzco Quechua cases looked at by Faller (2014), speaker-oriented elements in German EV2 can scope solely over the embedded clause and reinforce the embedded clause, as well as potentially the whole sentence, as an unresolved proposition in the current discourse. It is important to restate the fact that these clauses must be overtly marked as such, just as indexical clauses are overtly marked using independent clause-typers in Plains Cree. However, the Mainland Scandinavian facts also show that perspective shifting per se is not the key to embedded illocutionary acts, but that perspective disambiguation is.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

In this dissertation it has been shown that an intermediate point on the indirect-direct quotation continuum is well attested, namely quasi-quotational clauses which contain embedded root phenomena such as topicalisation, speech act adverbs, expressive elements and (certain) discourse markers despite not showing full direct-speech-like indexical shift, independent temporal deixis, any verbatim requirement or independence of movement relative to the matrix clause. It was proposed that these clauses are nominalised by a determiner-like element which heads them. This element, in conjunction with the operator in its left periphery, licenses the root phenomena in the left periphery, provides a centre for evaluation for discourse-oriented elements and covert pronominals and accounts for the islandhood of these quasi-quotational constructions.

To this degree it was possible to unify German/Mainland Scandinavian EV2, English EIQs and Romance recomplementation. However, there are two groups within this class of quasi-quotational constructions; German and some Mainland Scandinavian EV2 clauses show reaffirmation of orientation towards the speaker where English EIQs, Romance recomplementation and other Mainland Scandinavian EV2 clauses show perspective shifting to the original discourse context. However, the important point is that illocutionary acts are not ambiguous as to their orientation in the way that indirect speech reports can be. How a given language disambiguates between perspectives in quasi-quotational constructions was also suggested to be the root of the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions across clause-types in that language; it was claimed that embedded interrogative illocutionary
acts are unavailable in German because questioning acts and their effect on discourse are not compatible with the ‘mixed’ interpretation across the current and original discourses that obtains in German EV2 and embedded imperatives.

Moreover, it was shown that quasi-quotational constructions in complement position are not selected by the matrix verb but are syntactic modifiers; specifically, they are in close apposition with and provide information about both the content and the form of the true complement to the matrix verb, which is an nominal attitudinal object. Quasi-quotational constructions are also available in certain contexts more typically identified as peripheral adverbial clauses (Haegeman 2006) such as reason clauses, in which they are interpreted as giving the motivations behind the matrix speech act. EIQs qua quasi-quotational constructions were shown to be widely available in reason clauses yet are restricted to certain dialects in complement position; this was proposed to be due to the variation in availability of null functional linking heads in different dialects of English. EIQs in general are more marginal than alternative forms of speech report such as indirect and direct speech. It was proposed that this is due to the tension of representing two illocutionary acts in one speech act without using other aids, such as prosody, to disambiguate between the shifts in perspective.

The proposal laid out here that the orientation of expressive and covert pronominal elements is determined by a perspectival monster operator combining with a situation pronoun is not uncontentious. However, by postulating the presence of the IAP projection (the projection containing the monster operator) we can explain other syntactic effects in quasi-quotational constructions, for example the strength of the islandhood of the quasi-quotational constructions in comparison with the (otherwise quite similar in structure) factive complements, for which an analysis along the lines of Kastner (2015) was espoused. Moreover, further evidence for differences in interpretation between covert and overt pronominal elements was provided in the form of Kaufmann’s (2015) data on embedded imperatives, augmented with some new data on Castilian Spanish. More work on a wider range of languages and more careful information-gathering techniques are needed, but there seems to be a compelling line of enquiry into the similarities and differences between determining overt indexicality and covert perspective anchoring.
With regards to the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions, it was shown that neither assertion nor referentiality (as conceived of by de Cuba & Úrógdi (2010) and others) can account for the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions. Instead a new definition of referentiality was proposed whereby quasi-quotational constructions are identified as referential clauses which refer to a conversational move in the relevant discourse. This was presented using the Question Under Discussion framework as conceived of by Farkas & Bruce (2010), with some amendments. This provides a more accurate characterisation of the denotation of a quasi-quotational construction than an MPU-led analysis because factors external to the quasi-quotational construction contribute to determining the MPU such that the MPU does not accurately predict the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions or effectively distinguish between quasi-quotational constructions and indirect speech reports. Moreover, it was shown that the MPU can be forced under factive verbs even where embedded verb movement—the key diagnostic of quasi-quotational constructions in English, German and Mainland Scandinavian—is blocked. The use of the QUD framework elucidates what it means for quasi-quotational constructions to be at-issue because it models an engagement on the part of the discourse participants to answer the question under discussion and a commitment to answering it. The QUD framework also captures a key characteristic of the quasi-quotational constructions qua nominals that is not dealt with by the concept of being at-issue and that differentiates quasi-quotational constructions from propositions (selected clausal complements): they can cease to exist when they are accepted, resolved and removed from the Table.

On a broader level it has been shown that speaker-oriented clauses are embeddable and that illocutionary force can be embedded, though in some sense “less” of it may be embedded than is available in the matrix clause. What this means is that the holder of responsibility for the embedded clause is clearly communicated, but any requirements for the current addressee to respond to the quasi-quotational construction do not hold in the embedded report of the original speech act.

The future directions for this research are several; firstly, more non-Indo-European languages should be considered with the aim ultimately of better understanding why quasi-quotational constructions seem to be absent from some languages, such as Mandarin Chi-
nese and Cuzco Quechua, or from dialects such as “Standard English”. There is also work to pursue in terms of better understanding exactly how quasi-quotational constructions, particularly those under semifactives, pick out the conversational move that they refer to. Finally, the consequences of quasi-quotational constructions for acquisition is a rich vein of work to pursue; there is evidence that children acquiring English dialects with EIqs are more adult-like in interpreting standard indirect questions than those who do not have EIqs in their dialect. Further work is required to better understand whether this relates to the perspective shifting property of EIqs, their structural properties, or a mixture of the two.
Chapter 8

Appendix

8.1 Study 1: question-answer task I

8.1.1 Participants and items

The first study took the form of a Google Form posted on Facebook. The spread of participants was therefore quite wide; of 73 respondents, 6 identified themselves as being from Northern Ireland, 56 from England (of which 21 from the North West region), 5 from the United States, 3 from Canada, 2 from South Africa and 1 from Scotland. Participation was entirely self-selecting and given the demographics of my Facebook page and those of the people who ‘shared’ it, most of the participants will have at least a bachelor’s degree.

The form contained 16 test items in the form of questions, each with an accompanying scenario. Participants answered the question in the free text box and were free to include as much or as little detail as they wished. The conditions were as follows: the embedded question was either a polar or a wh-question, either with or without subject-auxiliary inversion. There were four examples of each condition and the questions were randomised once so the same order was presented to all participants. Sample questions are shown below with polar questions in (1) and wh-questions in (2). All questions had the same form, in which the participants is one of the actors in the scenario:

(1) Your friend Olly works for a charity encouraging people to take on big challenges to raise funds. 2013 was a really hard year for the charity, so he spent the last months
of 2013 trying extra hard to recruit people. He knows you’re a good swimmer, so he tried to sign you up for a challenge to be performed in 2014. He asked you if you would give swimming the Channel a go in 2014.

a. When did Olly ask if you would swim the Channel?
b. When did Olly ask would you swim the Channel?

(2) Your friend Olly works for a charity encouraging people to take on big challenges to raise funds. 2013 was a really hard year for the charity, so he spent the last months of 2013 trying extra hard to recruit people. He knows you’re a good swimmer, so he tried to sign you up for a challenge to be performed in 2014. He doesn’t know whether you’d prefer to swim the Channel or the Thames, so he asked you what kind of challenge you would give a go in 2014.

a. When did Olly ask what you would swim?
b. When did Olly ask what would you swim?

8.1.2 Results

The free text results were coded as follows (using example responses to the polar sample items in (1):

(3) Short-distance: (At the end of) 2013.
   Both: He asked in 2013 if you would swim the Channel in 2014.
   Quote: Olly asked “Will you swim the Channel?”
   Other: To raise funds for charity.

The majority of answers overall were short-distance construals of the wh-adjunct, as expected, given the wh-island status of the embedded clause. However, one of the four conditions received notably more long-distance construals than the others, namely the polar non-inverted condition. The proportions of long-distance and both answers to the polar non-inverted condition are displayed in table 8.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question Type</th>
<th>Inversion (%)</th>
<th>No inversion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polar</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>24.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wh</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>4.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1: Total long-distance answers (long-distance + ‘both’ answers) by Question Type x Inversion (%)

### 8.1.3 Discussion

Long-distance construals of the wh-adjunct are more likely in polar questions regardless of inversion. Again, this is not surprising given that there is no overt wh-item to cross in these conditions. However, the fact that subject-auxiliary inversion seems to create almost as strong a barrier as the overt wh-item was a surprising finding. Furthermore, the fact that almost a quarter of the responses to the polar non-inverted condition are long-distance ones suggests that wh-islands without overt wh-items are not as closely respected as is assumed in the literature. The initial analysis of this finding was to suggest that EIQs are strong islands compare with indirect speech reports due to the extra structure that is assumed (and will later be motivated) for the EIQ.

There were, however, some problems with the experimental design. Firstly, all of the stimuli were presented in text. This visual presentation allows the participant to reread or reparse the question as much or as often as they like, without giving much or any insight to the researcher as to the mental “intonation” they impose on the structure. For this reason, despite the lack of punctuation indicating that the EIQ is a direct speech report, it is possible that participants without EIQs in their dialect confused the EIQs with direct quotation.

There was a second reason why the EIQs in this experiment may have been confused with direct speech reports, namely that the stimulus items use second-person pronouns in the embedded clause. Whilst the use of second-person pronouns is not indicative of direct quotation, it means that the string used in the inverted condition is string-identical with the corresponding direct quotation.

Finally, it was clear based on some of the answers returned that some of the pilot items were considered too oblique and that not all possible questions in the stimulus were necessarily answerable given the information in the accompanying scenario, in particular...
yes-no responses to the embedded polar questions. Though it was not expected that we would get any yes-no responses, they should at least be possible if the stimulus provides the correct information.

It was also clear that the question-answer task needed to be accompanied by a grammaticality judgment task in order to ascertain whether a given participant actually accepts EIQs, in order to distinguish between “native” users of EIQs and other speakers, who might even consider EIQs ungrammatical. These latter cases might render the data collected on the inverted stimuli less reliable as they are not native users of the construction.

8.2 Study 2: question-answer task II

8.2.1 Improvements on question-answer task I

As a result of the confounds in the first study, a second study with amendments was conducted. In this study, stimuli were provided auditorally as well as visually. The author (a native user of EIQs) recorded each of the stimuli using neutral intonation so as not to bias one reading of the question over another. The stimuli were adjusted to include only third-person pronouns (no first- or second-person pronouns); the scenarios too were simplified and amended to express fully self-contained stories, as well as ensuring that no particular answer is more salient in the context than any other. The 22 question-answer items (16 items plus 6 fillers) were followed by an acceptability judgment task. The new stimulus design is illustrated below:

(4) Scenario: Sam was very excited. He likes to visit the park at the weekend, but today was extra special - there would be lots of stands and people with things to sell there. He bounced out of bed and shouted really loud downstairs to his Mum, “Mum! Can we go to the park on our new bikes today?” She said, “Yes of course! But quiet down now Sam, or you’ll wake your baby sister!”

Question: How did Sam ask could they go to the park?

Many, many thanks are due to the Language Acquisition Research Center at UMass Amherst, along with Peggy Speas and my child pilot study participants, for their help in the development of these items.
Note that two different wh-words were found in initial position; in half of the test and filler items the extracted adjunct was *where*, in the other half it was *how*. No wh-arguments were used in initial position as they are generally considered to be more easily extractable from wh-islands but, as shown in section 3.3 they cannot be extracted from EIQs. The filler questions took the same form as the test questions, except that they contained the matrix verb *say*. In this way they did not contain wh-islands. They were included both to avoid perseveration and to see whether long-distance construals of the sentence-initial wh-word, now perfectly grammatical, were more or less common than short-distance construals.

### 8.2.2 Participants and dissemination

57 adult participants took part in the second study. Recruitment was a little more focused than in the first study; Facebook was again used, but the study was also disseminated amongst students at the universities of York, Manchester and Glasgow, the University of Central Lancashire and Queen’s University Belfast. As a result the participants remain a little WEIRD but come from a wider demographic than in the first study. Participants were entered into a draw to win a 20 Amazon voucher as compensation for their time. Take-up of the survey was lower than in the first study due to the length of the study and the requirement that audio equipment must be available. The breakdown of regional identity was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern England</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East England</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West England</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2: Answers to the question: “What region are you from?”

The study was presented online using surveygizmo.com and participants were obliged...
to listen to the audio recordings of each question as well as having access to the written versions.

8.2.3 Results

In this study, both types of polar question showed extraction. However, polar questions with inversion saw more long-distance extraction than those without inversion. Furthermore, Belfast English speakers only extracted out of embedded polar questions at about two-thirds of the rate that non-Belfast English speakers did. However, while Belfast English speakers clearly extract less than non-Belfast English speakers in general, they were almost twice as likely to extract out of polar inverted contexts than polar non-inverted contexts: a finding in contradiction with the results of the first question-answer task. Finally, non-Belfast English speakers were the only group to extract out of wh-questions without inversion, but at the very low rate of 4.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inversion</th>
<th>No inversion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polar</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wh</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.3: Total long-distance answers by Question Type x Inversion in Belfast speakers (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inversion</th>
<th>No inversion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polar</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wh</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.4: Total long-distance answers by Question Type x Inversion in non-Belfast speakers (%)

Further to the descriptive statistics illustrated above, an item effect was found; of the 4 polar-inversion items, there were far more long-distance answers to where items than to how items (see table 8.5) across all respondents.

8.2.4 Discussion

The results clearly show that both inverted and non-inverted polar questions may be extracted out of, contrary to the findings of the first question-answer task. Furthermore, extraction appears to be more acceptable out of inverted questions than non-inverted
Table 8.5: Long- and short-distance answers by Matrix wh-word x Inversion in all survey respondents (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Long-distance</th>
<th>Short-distance</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Where x No-inv</td>
<td>15.45</td>
<td>84.12</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where x Inv</td>
<td>26.05</td>
<td>73.53</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How x No-inv</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>89.32</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How x Inv</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>90.91</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

questions. Once more, this may be because there is an overt and unambiguous element in the non-inverted questions which marks the embedded clause as embedded—the complementiser—which is not present in the inverted case. This also suggests that whatever the structure of the EIQ, it does not in itself prevent extraction from inside the EIQ: the EIQ is not a strong structural island like a relative clause is, for example. Consequently, it seems that the islandhood of EIQs is more likely to be semantic in nature, like wh-islands and factive islands.

In this vein, there are two other effects that should be noted. Firstly, the item effect found in the second study is suggestive of the need for a semantic account of the islandhood of EIQs; it is similar to the extraction facts on factive islands, from which degree adjuncts are more difficult to extract than any other element, unless the context permits. This means that a better understanding of the extractability of different kinds of elements out of EIQs is required, as well as an examination of the kinds of context which favour extraction.

Secondly, the Belfast English speakers extract notably less out of three types of questions than the non-Belfast English speakers; they extract slightly more freely out of non-inverted wh-questions than non-Belfast English speakers at a rate of 4.17% to 3.4% notwithsstanding. This might suggest that Belfast speakers are more sensitive to the quotation-like nature of EIQs, but this does not explain why they do extract out of inverted polar questions in almost 1 in 4 cases. A complicating factor could be that Belfast English, unlike other EIQ dialects, overtly marks successive cyclic movement of a wh-phrase out of clauses embedded under verbs of saying by inverting the embedded auxiliary:

(5) a. [CP1 Who, did John hope [CP2 t₁ would he see tᵢ]]?

³See Abrušan (2014) for a compelling account of factive islands as semantic rather than structural islands.
b. \[ \text{What}_1 \text{ did Mary claim } [\text{CP}_2 \text{ t}_i \text{ did they steal } t_i]? \]

c. I wonder \[ \text{what}_1 \text{ did John think } [\text{CP}_2 \text{ t}_i \text{ would he get } t_i]\].

Henry suggests that this inversion effect could be related to the effect of successive cyclic movement of wh-phrases in Irish Gaelic, in which a different [+wh] complementiser is used in C° if a wh-phrase has passed through SpecCP. It does however mean that extraction over inversion more generally is licit in Belfast English, which might affect their performance on possible examples of extraction out of EIQs.

8.2.5 Extension to question-answer task II

Due to the item effect in the second question-answer task, a small scale follow-up grammaticality judgement task examined extractability of arguments out of indirect speech reports, EIQs and direct speech reports. 8 participants responded. They were given scenarios and three ways in which a question could be asked about that scenario. They were asked to rate each of the three questions on a 7-point Likert scale (1 being completely ungrammatical, 7 being perfectly grammatical). An example scenario and question are shown below:

(6) Scenario: Mary and David were watching their children play. Their friend Jamie walked past. David said hello but Mary was too engrossed in watching the kids. When David said that Jamie had walked by, Mary said, “Oh no, did I ignore Jamie?”

A: Who did Mary ask did she ignore?

B: Who did Mary ask if she ignored?

C: Who did Mary ask, “Did I ignore?”

There were six groups of items in total: two in which the extracted element was \textit{who}, two for \textit{what} and two for \textit{where}.

The results of the follow-up grammaticality judgement task show that judgements on the extractability of arguments out of EIQs fall exactly between the judgements on indirect and direct speech reports:

There are no great differences between the Belfast and non-Belfast speakers in this
regard, though the Belfast speakers seem to make a slightly stronger distinction between extraction out of direct and indirect speech. The number of Belfast speakers represented here is very small however (just three):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialect</th>
<th>EIQ</th>
<th>Indirect speech report</th>
<th>Direct speech report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Belfast</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.7: Acceptability judgments on Extractability of Arguments from Different Types of Speech Report x Dialect

What is notable is that all of the speakers distinguished between each of the types of speech report, with no individual participant judging any two constructions to be equivalent in their grammaticality. It is also notable that there is no real distinction in the judgements of the different extracted elements; regardless of whether who, what or where is extracted, extraction from indirect speech reports is judged better than extraction from direct speech reports, and EIQs are intermediate.

8.3 Study 2: grammaticality judgement task

Following the question-answer task, participants took a grammaticality judgement task. They were asked to rate sentences for their grammaticality using a 7-point Likert scale. Nine predicates were tested: two canonical EIQ-licensing predicates, ask and wonder; say; two predicates containing modality that have been attested as licensing EIQs, want to know, want to see; one imperative that has been attested as licensing EIQs, go and see; two predicates under interrogation that have been attested as licensing EIQs, did X ask and did X remember; and two factive predicates which do not license EIQs, know and find out.

The mean results for each predicate and each type of embedded clause (non-inverted or inverted, polar or wh) across all participants are shown in table 8.8.
As the table shows, participants of all dialects generally distinguish between the predicates which typically license EIQs and those which do not. In particular *ask*, *wonder*, *say* and predicates with modality were judged as more grammatical with an EIQ than predicates in the imperative or interrogative. At the very least they were not judged to be ungrammatical (in that a score of 4 is neither grammatical nor ungrammatical) apart from *wonder*, which just dropped below 4. This may be because EIQs are typically used to express overt speech acts or questions which have been overtly discussed. Moreover, *ask* and the modalised predicates averaged a score of higher than 4, and *say* averaged a score of higher than 5, or ‘marginally grammatical’ across all speakers.

Lower down the table, imperative and interrogative predicates were judged to be closer to grammatical than the factive predicates. These scores support the details in section 3.2 and introduces some nuance into them; modality improves the combination of a given predicate and an EIQ more than changing the type of the clause in which the predicate appears.

The scores with respect to *say* are particularly interesting: the respondents judged *say* to be more grammatical when followed with an EIQ than with a standard indirect embedded question. That the latter were not considered highly grammatical is not surprising, as *say* does not typically select for interrogative complements. It is more surprising, though, that the *say* sentences with EIQs were judged to be marginally grammatical. The fact that the EIQ sentences with *say* were not judged at ceiling suggests that they were not
interpreted as direct quotes but as EIQs (they were not presented with typical direct quote punctuation such as quotation marks to bias participants away from a direct quote interpretation). I conclude that participants judged *say* with an EIQ to be a possible sentence of English on its own merit, and that this perhaps reflects the data in (2) which shows that EIQs under *say* are produced in typically non-EIQ dialects of English.
Abbreviations

AAE  African American English
ABS  absolutive case
ACC  accusative case
ALLOC allocutive agreement marker
AUX  auxiliary
Asr  Assertion
ATT  attitudinal
BNC  British National Corpus
CG   Common Ground
CL   clitic
CLLD Clitic Left Dislocation
COMP  complementiser
CON  content
CONJ  conjunct clause type
DEF  definite
DEM  demonstrative
DET  determiner
DOX  doxastic
E projection  Expressive projection (Banfield 1982)
EIQ  Embedded Inverted Question
ERG  ergative case
EV2  Embedded Verb Second
PM Predicate Modification
PoV Point of View
PRES present tense
PRF perfect
PRT particle
PS Projected Set
QUOTE quotative marker
QUUD Question Under Discussion
SA Speech Act (head)
SAP Speech Act Phrase
SG singular
SUBJ subject marking/subjunctive
TOP topic
val value(d)
VOC vocative
V2 Verb Second
WEIRD White, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, Democratic
1 first-person
2 second-person
3 third-person
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