The Wrong Side of the Frontline: Exploring the Utilisation of Civilian Investigators by Police Forces across England and Wales

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Thesis Abstract

The Wrong Side of the Frontline: Exploring the Utilisation of Civilian Investigators by Police Forces across England and Wales.

The key aim of this thesis is to examine the roles being undertaken by non-warranted civilian investigators (CIs) in relation to those of warranted police detectives (DCs) working within police forces across England and Wales (E&W). Formally introduced by the Police Reform Act 2002, CIs are non-warranted members of police staff charged with assisting warranted officers with their investigative enquiries. Specifically, the research examines the extent to which CIs can be considered in terms of being a ‘junior partner’ or a ‘paraprofessional’ role to that of their warranted detective counterparts. The study employed a mixed methods research design and drew upon data collected via a series of semi-structured interviews with police officers and police staff, observation and a semi-structured survey which was sent to all of the 43 police constabularies across E&W.

Findings point to the widespread yet inconsistent uptake of the CI provision by police forces across the country. Overall, CIs were found to be contributing to the investigation of most crime types including the most serious in some instances (e.g. murder, rape and domestic abuse). However, the research also draws attention to a high level of disparity in the utilisation of CIs between forces. The research found that in some units CIs have become increasingly utilised in tasks outside of their intended ‘supportive’ remit and, in some cases, are in fact being afforded a role which is almost identical to that of warranted police detectives. Despite the evolving nature of their role and evidence of continued ‘mission creep’, findings suggested that CIs continue to enjoy a secondary and in some respects outsider status within the police organisation, enjoying only marginal valuing and limited integration. These conditions are currently being sustained by the ‘civilian’ designation of CIs alongside powerful actors in the field of policing and politics and the weakness or absence of any alternative (or convincing) narrative on how effective investigation might be achieved.

This research provides a much-needed insight into the impact of recent civilianising trends on ‘core’ areas of police service provision. It also contributes to a growing body of information on the increasing significance of the role now being played by private security in public policing and more specifically, to the blurring of occupational and sectoral boundaries with regard to the provision of ‘professional’ criminal investigation in E&W. The thesis concludes by arguing that the utilisation of CIs may be instigating a renegotiation of the boundaries surrounding the role of the warranted police detective and in turn, the dilution of professional orthodoxies in the investigative specialism. The uncertain future trajectory of the CI role may, in coming years, encourage disputes over the title and role of the ‘detective’, as recognition of the proficiency of CIs continues to call into question the legitimacy of the warranted detective’s claim to professional jurisdiction in respect of contemporary criminal investigation.
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Despite its enduring popularity as a staple of popular literary fiction and topic of fascination amongst the British general public, criminal investigation and the world and work of police detectives continues to exist as one of the least researched topics in the field of police/policing studies (Stelfox, 2009). While efforts have indeed been made more recently to rectify this current gap in knowledge (cf Bacon, 2011; Hallenberg, 2012; Innes, 2003; O’Neill, 2011; Westmarland et al., 2012)\(^1\), much of what is ‘known’ about the detectives and detection continues to be based largely on fictional narratives which promote ‘old regime’ notions of criminal investigation and detective work as an instinctive ‘art’ and intuitively learned ‘craft’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006). While entertaining, such depictions have done little to counter the stereotypical picture of police detective work which has built up around the idea that investigation is reactive, reconstructive and perhaps most importantly for the concerns of this thesis, a task which is exclusively performed by police detectives (Maguire, 2003: 367). Consequently, very little is known about the true nature of detectives’ work and, within the body of literature that does exist on investigative work by the police, few have sought to explore the significant contribution now also being made by non-warranted police staff.

Like most police services across the world, the police in England and Wales (E&W) have made considerable investment in the ‘civilianisation’ process over the last three decades as the need for specialist skills/expertise and cost-effective policing has taken precedence. At the time of writing\(^2\) this thesis there were approximately 207,140 full-time equivalent members of police personnel working within the forty three police forces across E&W. Of those, 61 per cent (126,818) are police officers and 39 per cent (80,322) are police staff\(^3\) (Home Office, 2015: 6-7). That means that currently, over a third of those who work for the police organisation are not warrantied police officers. While there now exists a general consensus of opinion on ‘the need for a professional, dedicated and highly skilled police staff component in modern policing, there is less consensus regarding the scale and

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\(^1\) See also, Harris (2013) for an interesting account of homicide detectives working in France.

\(^2\) Figures correct as of March 2015 (Home Office, 2015).

\(^3\) Figure is inclusive of Police Community Support Officers, Designated Officers and Traffic Wardens.
extent of their direct involvement in operational service delivery’ (HMIC, 2004: 28) - particularly in those areas of work considered ‘core’ to the police business (e.g. investigation, patrol, custody etc.).

Traditionally considered the sole preserve of warranted police officers, criminal investigation is one area of core police work where police staff have come to occupy a progressively significant position. Many specialised and strategically important roles (e.g. crime/intelligence analysts, forensics personnel, Criminal Investigation Department (CID) unit managers etc.), requiring high levels of professional competence and considered central to the effective functioning of the investigative process, are now reserved for operation by non-warranted individuals (cf Wilson-Kovacs, 2014). Despite their comparatively low profile, in many ways non-warranted individuals make a vital contribution to the contemporary criminal investigation process and are charged with making decisions and undertaking tasks as part of their role which directly influence the strategic direction and overall success of contemporary police investigations. The increased significance and centrality of the roles now being undertaken by non-warranted individuals within the police more generally, naturally raises important questions about the role and legitimacy of the police, the professional ethos of detectives and the future of investigatory practice in E&W. While useful empirical studies do exist on the role and occupational experience of a range of non-warranted police staff and/or civilian types (cf Atkinson, forthcoming; Cosgrove, 2011; Ludwig, 2012; O’Neill, 2014; Wilson-Kovacs, 2014), most have either been impact oriented (Chatterton and Rowland, 2005; Crawford, Blackburn, Lister and Shepherd, 2004; Crawford and Lister, 2004) or have been concerned with the capacity of police staff to improve equality and diversity within public policing (Johnston, 2006). Within the small body of work that does exist, none to my knowledge has sought to explore the valuable contribution now being made by civilian investigators (CIs)4 to the criminal investigation process.

4 It should be noted that while the Police Reform Act 2002 refers to CIs as ‘investigating officers’, it seems that the police organisation itself generally refers to these individuals under the arguably less indistinct title of ‘civilian investigator’. Thus, this is the title that has been used throughout this thesis. However, it is also important to note that following the recent publication of the Home Office consultation report, ‘Reforming the Powers of Police Staff and Volunteers’ (published online on 20th January 2016) - which (amongst other things) sets out the police’s and Government’s response to the consultation on reforming the roles and powers available to non-warranted police staff and police volunteers - the role of Investigating Officer, Detention Officer and Escort Officer is proposed to be amalgamated under the role/title of ‘Policing Support Officer’ (Home Office, 2016: 6-7).
Put simply, this thesis is about the world and work of non-warranted CIs and their contribution to the police criminal investigation process in E&W. Formally introduced by the Police Reform Act 2002, CIs are non-warranted individuals charged with assisting warranted police detective constables (DCs) with the investigation of crime. CIs are most often found operating within the CID and, alongside Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), Detention Officers (DOs) and Escort Officers (EOs), are one of the newest members of the ‘police extended family’ (Crawford and Lister, 2004). This study provides an in-depth exploration of the lived experiences and identities of CIs, their work and their overall value to the police organisation. In so doing, the research seeks to challenge some of the prevailing assumptions about the nature of criminal investigation and the world and work of warranted DCs. The utilisation of CIs not only highlights the pervasiveness of contemporary civilianisation within the police, but also raises important questions about the changing nature of contemporary criminal investigation and the centrality/hegemony of the role being played by DCs.

The guiding rationale for this research therefore is that there is a major gap in our knowledge and a subsequent lack of appreciation of the important roles now being performed by non-warranted individuals within the police organisation. To date, no empirical work has been undertaken into how the role being performed by CIs ‘fits’ within the contemporary CID and in relation to that of their warranted DC counterparts. In this sense, the original contribution to knowledge I offer in this thesis is an empirically informed critical insight into the world and work of CIs and of their role and value as a resource within the contemporary CID. This thesis asks how and to what extent CIs are being utilised across E&W and what can be inferred from their utilisation about the changing nature and character of criminal investigation. At a theoretical level, and drawing on work by Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971, 1972), Hoogenboom (1991) and Bourdieu (1990), this study also examines the degree of ‘blurring’ inherent to the CI role when compared with that of DCs and, with that, whether or not CIs are, in practice, performing a ‘junior partner’ (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1972) role compared to that of DCs. This research is unique for a number of key reasons:

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5 It is important to note that a number of police forces did make use of police staff as investigators prior to the Reform Act. What the Act did was to formalise the role and allow the Chief Constable to designate police type powers to CIs at their individual discretion (HMIC, 2004: 158).
First, very little research has been undertaken on the growing involvement and occupational positioning of non-warranted individuals within core areas of policing. Like the expanding use of police staff more generally, the deployment of CIs has been allowed to occur in a notably ad hoc fashion providing a marked level of disparity with regard to their numbers and also the ways these individuals are being utilised between and even within constabularies. Such lack of uniformity has also resulted in a failure to properly evaluate the financial aspects of CI use and their overall impact on operational service delivery beyond that of immediate and short term gains. As such, hardly anything is currently known about the working practices, skills or significance of CIs to the undertaking of effective criminal investigations. This is of particular significance given the recent 20 per cent reduction in the police’s budget as part of the Coalition government’s post-financial crisis ‘Comprehensive Spending Review’ (HM Treasury, 2010) which has had, and may continue to be having, a significant impact on the job security of many police staff.

Second, with the exception of the work such as that by Micucci (1998) and Singh and Kempa (2007) concerning private policing cultures and the limited body of work in the area of public policing (cf work by Cosgrove (2011) on PCSOs, Atkinson (forthcoming) on civilian intelligence analysts (CIAs) and Ludwig et al. (2012) on Crime Scene Examiners), studies of police cultures have been disproportionately concerned with warranted police officers (Cain, 1971; Manning, 1997; Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 1999), including DCs (Hobbs, 1988; Innes, 2003; Young, 1991). This study therefore provides a valuable opportunity to examine the occupational identity of non-warranted CIs within the broader occupational and organisational culture/s of the CID. It will therefore provide an original contribution to existing theoretical knowledge and understanding of police (sub) cultures.

Third, the increasing marketisation of police services (in particular security) in recent decades coupled with steady privatisation at the margins of the function (e.g. forensics,

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6 Of that research which does exist, most has sought to explore the role and occupational identity of PCSOs (cf Cosgrove, 2011) providing only a limited picture of the current situation with regard to the working practices and occupational culture/s of non-police officers (particularly non-warranted police personnel).

7 ‘Marketisation’ refers to the introduction of incentive structures (such as market competition) in public service provision.

8 Private security is now far more likely to be found policing shopping malls and sports events than the police although (since the Police Act 1964) the police are able to charge for ‘special services’ such as the policing of football matches.
vehicle maintenance, police training etc.), arguably points towards a developing public-private interface in regard to the provision of roles previously undertaken by warranted officers. This research will help to uncover the extent to which such privatising trends have impacted on core areas of police work - namely criminal investigation - at an operational level. Is the role of CI being viewed as a marketable commodity within the current context of austerity? Is, for example, the acute need to ensure significant economies in all areas of the police’s business encouraging the buying-in of CIs from private security agencies? These are both questions which this research seeks to uncover. Recent developments in public police-private security relations, particularly with regard to custody provision (Skinns, 2011; Skinns, Wooff and Sprawson, 2015; White, 2015), are arguably suggestive of a move towards the greater involvement of private security in core areas of police work. This research therefore seeks to draw attention to the potential impact of this development and in doing so, seeks to critically explore the idea that a more integrative, collaborative model of investigation may be emerging (Hoogenboom, 1990).

Fourth, the influence of CI use upon the professional ethos of warranted police DCs is an issue which could ultimately have potentially serious implications for how we comprehend the nature of the criminal investigation process in E&W, an understanding which currently is largely built upon old regime notions of investigative art and craft (Tong and Bowling, 2006) (see Chapter Two, section 2.3.4 of this thesis for a more detailed discussion of this issue). It is therefore a central aim of this thesis to explore the extent to which the professional ethos of warranted DCs may be being contested by the use of paraprofessional CIs.

In consideration of the above, the empirical research sought to answer two main research questions:

1) What is the role being undertaken by CIs working in police forces across E&W?
2) To what extent can CIs be considered to be performing a junior partner role when compared to the role of warranted detectives?

The aims and objectives of the study are as follows:

- Develop knowledge and understanding of the CI role - their experiences, working practices, occupational identity and positioning and sense of value.
• Critically explore the influence of organisational factors upon CI working practices and occupational identity.
• Examine relationships between non-warranted CIs and warranted police DCs and in so doing, explore the drivers and inhibitors to integration and effective investigative practice.
• Survey trends and level of consistency in the numbers, coordination and utilisation of CIs by police forces across E&W.
• Develop insights with regard to the future trajectory of the CI role and the criminal investigation process in E&W.

In the broadest sense, civilianisation was selected as an area of study because it fulfilled the criterion of being a policy area in which there has been substantial change over recent years and in which, given the current context of austerity, there is likely to be continued (and substantial) alteration. Civilianisation also importantly highlights three central issues about the nature of the organisation of the police. First the employment of non-warranted individuals to undertake roles and tasks previously performed by warranted officers and traditionally considered the sole preserve of the police, undoubtedly calls into question popular understandings of the police role, the significance of the warranted constable, and also raises questions about what the core functions of the police actually are. Furthermore, with regard to the supposed value-for-money which is offered to the police through engagement with civilianisation, it raises the question whether the police function is in any way unique and distinct from that of other public services? Second, civilianisation raises important questions about control and accountability of policing provision and with that, the potential social implications of emerging ‘policing networks’ (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.4). As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter (section 1.2.2), civilianisation has in more recent years given way to a degree of privatisation which has not only served to blur long existing boundaries between the public and the private sectors with regard to the provision of policing and security, but also raises the possibility of increasing influence/involvement by private security in public policing provision. Third, distinctive terms and conditions of their employment from those of warranted officers mean that non-warranted police staff have the right to join a trade union and also to take industrial action. While this issue is sometimes rather melodramatically argued, given the scale of police staff presence and nature of their use (often in highly specialised areas of
work), it may well be that the impact of their removal may currently be being underestimated.

1.2 Matters of Substance

1.2.1 Police Officers and Police Staff

Within most police organisations there exist two distinct categories of personnel, police officers and police staff. Police officers are unique in terms of their warranted or attested status which affords them with a diverse range of powers not held by the general public, namely, powers of arrest, search and seizure and of course, the ability ‘to use reasonable force when and wherever necessary’ (Bittner, 2010: 123). In addition, officers are also vested and trusted with the ability to exercise a wide degree of discretion when exercising their role (Banton, 1964; Ericson, 2007; Skolnick, 1966; Van Mannen, 1973; Wilson, 1968). Another key difference relates to the fact that every officer serving in E&W does so under the ‘Office of Constable’, a title which affords them a constitutional status which is peculiar to English common law (Lustgarten, 1986). Bearers of the Office of Constable do not have the legal status of employees, although employment law is increasingly being applied to them. As a Crown status, the position brings with it a number of benefits for officers including protection from redundancy. However, these are also balanced by a number of restrictions such as having no right to strike and not being permitted to overtly demonstrate political affiliation (HMIC, 2004: 29).

In this thesis the terms ‘non-warranted’, ‘police staff’ and ‘civilians’ are used interchangeably when making reference to those members of police personnel who work within the police organisation but who do not have the attested status of a constable. This may include those individuals who are employed by the police organisation and also those who work for the police but who are employees of private security agencies (the recruitment of CIs from private security agencies is an issue discussed later in this

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9 In policing, discretion refers to the availability of a choice of options or actions which individual officers may take in a given situation, namely, whether or not to make an arrest and/or enforce some other form of action (Waddington, 1999: 38-9). The need for officers to be able to exercise a level of discretion is widely accepted in the UK as a necessary and inevitable part of policing (Reiner, 2010: 207).

10 Such restrictions are of course not unique to police constables. For example, prison officers have effectively no right to strike (section 127, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) and civil servants are not permitted any overt political affiliation.
The term ‘police staff’ was adopted across the service in 2003 in preference to the variety of other labels which were frequently applied to this body of people, including ‘civilian’, ‘support staff’ and ‘civil staff’ (HMIC, 2004: 29-30). The decision to adopt the term was, in large part, driven by growing recognition of the need to reflect ‘the wide range of roles performed by police staff within today’s police service and in particular the fact that many such roles are very much ‘frontline’ rather than ‘support’ in nature’ (HMIC, 2004: 30). According to HMIC (2011: 18), ‘frontline’ policing includes roles undertaken by ‘those who are in everyday contact with the public and who directly intervene to keep people safe and enforce the law’. The range of roles now being performed by police staff can broadly be grouped into five distinct categories: those performing manual, clerical and administrative roles; those who undertake supervisory and managerial roles, including as members of senior and chief officer teams; those who occupy professional positions such as in Human Resources (HR), Finance and IT; those who perform specialist roles that are unique to the police service (e.g. crime and/or intelligence analysts); and those who undertake frontline, operational support and operational roles such as scene of crime officers, traffic wardens, PCSOs and communications centre staff (positions most of which until relatively recently would have been exclusively carried out by police officers) (HMIC, 2004: 30).

Increasingly and as alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, police staff can be found performing roles which traditionally have been passionately defended by the organisation and its representatives (e.g. Association of Chief Police Officers12 (ACPO) and the Police Federation) as the sole preserve of warranted police officers and as core areas of the police function (e.g. custody, patrol, criminal investigation). Furthermore, the role and remit of certain police staff members may now also be supplemented at the behest of Chief Constables by the addition of powers of enforcement13 comparable to those afforded to warranted officers under the Office of Constable14. The increased blurring of police

\[\text{11 Following the recent outcome of the consultation into extra powers for police volunteers and extended powers for non-warranted police employees (Home Office, 2016), the scope of the term police staff may now be extending to also include a growing number of police volunteers operating within a wider range of operational roles and, potentially, with an accompanying (but limited) range of police type powers.}

\[\text{12 At the time the research was undertaken ACPO was in the process of disbandment and was subsequently replaced by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) in 2015.}

\[\text{13 Please see Appendix 7 for a full list of the powers available for designation to ‘investigating officers’ under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002.}

\[\text{14 As will be discussed in more detail later in this thesis, powers afforded to civilians are limited and fundamentally, do not include the authority to engage in the legitimate use of force in any given situation and the ability to arrest outside of a police station.}\]
officer and staff roles and responsibilities without doubt ‘raises important questions about the traditional division of labour and indeed the ‘unique’ status enjoyed by police officers’ (HMIC, 2004: 30). However, it also draws attention to the enduring saliency and relevance of the existing stark distinction between officers and staff - which is embodied in the Office of Constable - and with that, raises more fundamental questions about the extent to which current distinctions can (and should) still be considered ‘valid and appropriate to the requirements of policing in the 21st century’ (HMIC, 2004: 30-31). Together these questions lie at the heart of the issues subject to consideration in this thesis in relation to the function of criminal investigation and the role of DCs and as such, will be a recurrent theme.

1.2.2 Civilianisation

Traditionally defined as ‘the direct replacement of police officers by non-warranted staff to perform roles previously undertaken by officers’ (HMIC, 2004: 31), civilianisation is a trend which has increased in both style and scope. Despite growing interest in the overall impact of civilianising trends on the police organisation in recent years, the roots of civilianisation are in fact traceable back to the earliest days of the police organisation when forces employed a number of civilians in ancillary and clerical posts (Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1994). As Jones et al. (1994: 168) note, for example, ‘The Metropolitan Police Act 1829 recognised that the Commissioner could employ civilian clerks which he did from the early days of the force’. Further to this point, Loveday (1993) also refers to a strong ‘civilian influence’ in quite senior positions within the police before the 1950s with a number of Metropolitan Police Commissioners being appointed from outside the police service. He adds that during this period, civilians were also appointed to senior positions in most provincial forces, many of which were ex-military personnel (Loveday, 1993). The use of non-warranted personnel within frontline police roles is indeed a well-established trend whose lineage can arguably be traced back to Special Constables. Police Specials (unpaid volunteers with police uniforms and accompanying powers) have been present in their various guises within E&W for a significant period of time (the first statute to deal with Special Constables was the Act of Charles II in 1667 (Critchley, 1967: 60; Seth, 1961)). However, historically, it would appear that the majority of civilian staff working within the provincial forces have been largely confined
to clerical or ancillary posts and it was not until the post war years that civilian employment really began to expand in scope (Jones et al., 1994).

Although a particularly important part of policing policy in the 1980s when administrative, ancillary tasks not requiring the training and full powers of police officers were routinely ‘hived off’ to non-warranted police civilians (Jones et al., 1994; Department of Environment, 1983), since the second world war, UK legislation has increasingly allowed for not only an increase in absolute numbers of police staff, but also changes in the kinds of tasks they are employed to do. Thus, police staff are increasingly found in higher grade positions within the police organisation and carry out tasks which were traditionally the preserve of warranted officers (e.g. patrol, detention, investigation etc.). Additionally, developments in new technologies and ways of dealing with crime have resulted in an increased demand for specialist skills and non-traditional professional expertise within the organisation. This has in turn resulted in the creation of entirely new civilian posts which have never been filled by police officers and which are arguably now of central importance to effective policing in E&W. It has also been a key factor encouraging the emergence of a range of new key support roles in connection with operational policing (e.g. PCSOs, CI). In the broad sense then, civilianisation now means more than simply the transfer of tasks from police officers to police staff, but more generally the increasing importance of the civilian element within the police organisation (Jones et al., 1994: 166).

Since the 1980s - a period of heightened scepticism about the police and their ability to provide efficient and effective service (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.4) - civilianisation has in many respects become a necessary condition to the granting of increases to the authorised establishment (Cabinet Office, 2003; HMIC, 2004; Home Office, 1988a, 1988b; Jones et al., 1994: 171). The alleged cost-effectiveness of employing police civilians to undertake tasks previously performed by their more expensive warranted colleagues has been a recurrent theme in the rhetoric of civilianisation post-1945 and has

15 It should also be noted that official interest in the policy also appeared well before the 1980s. For example, the Oaksey Committee (Oaksey, 1949, cited in Jones et al., 1994: 168) report on police, pay, pensions and other aspects of police service conditions made recommendations that ‘police establishments in general should be thoroughly overhauled with a view to releasing policemen for police duty wherever possible by the employment of civilians’.

16 In this thesis, ‘cost-effectiveness’ refers simultaneous to: a) the fact that non-warranted individuals are cheaper to employ than their warranted counterparts and b) that non-warranted individuals are said to free-up the time and expertise of officers who can then return to the policing ‘frontline’.
been a key factor encouraging the police’s notable investment in civilianisation from the 1980s onwards (Bullock, 2008)\textsuperscript{17}.

The two decades subsequent to the appointment of Margaret Thatcher as Conservative party leader and Prime Minister are perhaps best characterised by a reform process focused upon social market principles. For the police organisation, part of this involved attempts to determine the ‘core’ functions of the police with a view to shedding auxiliary roles to non-warranted police civilians. Many of the centrally inspired policy developments during the latter half of the 1980s into the 1990s and foreshadowing the passing of the Police Reform Act 2002 were driven by the desire for improved efficiency. This thread subsequently formed a major plank of Home Office policy during the period, and was mainly translated as a concern over ‘value for money’. Home Office interest in value for money increased after 1979, when the Conservatives were elected on a platform of bringing new management disciplines borrowed from private enterprise to the public sector. Under the umbrella title of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) many of the managerialist accoutrements of private sector management were introduced into the public sector. These included fixed-term contracts, performance-related pay, competitive tendering, league tables and (key) performance indicators (Newburn, 2007: 231). While value for money appeared a common theme to all public services after 1979 - when it took on various doctrinaire aspects under the guise of ‘Thacherism’ or more generally, managerialism - the police were, almost uniquely, treated differently. Indeed, overall police funding actually increased during the period, primarily as a result of the Conservative’s commitment to ‘law and order’ as a policy\textsuperscript{18}. The National Audit Office calculated that the police in fact enjoyed a 50% real increase in funding between 1979-80 and 1989-90 - five times higher than education, for example (National Audit Office, \textit{Promoting Value for Money in Provincial Police Forces}, 1991). However, while the police might be considered a special case when it came to pay and resources, they were by no means exempt from general public sector reform.

\textsuperscript{17} See Jones et al. (1994: 168-173) for a detailed commentary on the historical development of civilianisation 1945-1988.

\textsuperscript{18} Exempting the police from budget cuts also helped elicit loyalty to the government, a loyal police force being seen as essential to defeat the ‘enemy’ within in the shape of militant trade unionism and other resistance to the economically polarising consequences of free-market economies.
Increasingly the police had to justify themselves in terms of the three Es - 'effectiveness, efficiency and economy' - eventually implementing NPM policies of privatisation and civilianisation. Much of the concern over value for money and the police’s effectiveness and efficiency centred on expenditure and the notable increase in spending on the police between the years of 1979-80 and 1989-90 (National Audit Office, 1991) following the result of the Edmund Davies Committee, when police officer pay became linked to the national average (which included the earnings accrued by the mushrooming private sector during the following decade) (Jones et al., 1994: 170-171), and the Conservative party’s commitment to crime reduction. Given the context of a government committed to drastic reduction in public expenditure, this, according to Loveday (1993), made further civilianisation somewhat inevitable. Indeed, increased government concern over the ability to maintain the rate of increase quickly manifested as did concern over the seemingly limited impact increased expenditure (mainly reflected in an increase in personnel) was having on crime statistics (also related to the increased degree of specialisation in the police which was emerging during this period and absorbing personnel). This led to the publication of Circular 114/1983, *Manpower Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police*, which addressed both of these issues and stipulated that ‘value for money’ should be an overarching consideration when resourcing police work. However, alongside its potential attractiveness to those seeking ways to reduce police expenditure, civilianisation was also increasingly coming to be recognised as a valuable means through which to improve the overall operational efficiency of the organisation. Increased levels of training coupled with the demands of paperwork and growth of specialist units during the 1980s meant that, despite the rapid escalation in police expenditure during the period (Home Office, 1983), a degree of discrepancy continued to exist with regard to total officer numbers and those actually available for operational duties and/or who were suitably skilled to deal with the increasingly complex nature of crime (Loveday, 1993). It is in this sense that the policy of civilianisation found renewed

19 Indeed, ‘value for money’ dominated much of the debate about policing over the final two decades of the twentieth century, replacing the more overtly political debates about accountability in the earlier decades of the twentieth century (Marshall, 1978).

20 The Circular was subsequently expanded upon and refined: Circular 105/1988, *Civilian Staff in the Police Service*, and Circular 106/1988, *Applications for Increases in Police Force Establishments*. Both helped pave the way for further developments in civilianisation and a growing emphasis on value for money.

The need for greater scrutiny of applications to increase the police establishment was established and new ‘bidding criteria’ proposed which required Chief Constables be more specific and strategic in their requests. For the public police organisation, the managerialist apparatus of NPM rapidly became an everyday reality of policing as well as an essential focus of management if funding was to be successfully secured (Skinns, 2011). Home Office Circular 114/83 therefore put civilianisation firmly back on the police agenda by linking future increases in police establishment to the civilianisation of posts which did not require police powers or police training. Thereafter, Home OfficeCirculars 105/88 and 106/88 were to provide detailed guidance on further civilianisation and also identified procedures for establishment applications from individual forces. Circular 105 in particular not only emphasised the need for civilianisation, but also set out to delineate the duties that civilian staff may perform (e.g. clerical and administrative tasks, data entry and processing, driving and training etc.). Following a slowing down of the civilianisation programme during the latter half of the 1980s, the Audit Commission (1988) (which conducted national value-for-money police studies and, until March 2015, was responsible for the financial audit of police authorities and auditing best-value performance plans) argued that disincentives to civilianisation were caused by anomalies in the system for financing the police. Whereas the Home Office policing-specific grant was paid on all police-related local authority expenditure, since 1987, the police element of the Department of Environment Revenue Support Grant was related only to police officer establishments. Thus, although the Home Office was encouraging the increased use of civilians there was a financial incentive for forces to concentrate on increasing police establishments. However, in 1993, and resulting from growing concern over police governance and the nationalisation and politicisation of Police Authorities, the White Paper, Police Reform: A Police Service for the Twenty-First Century, made recommendations for reforming Police Authorities and the autonomy of Chief Officers in making decisions about the structuring of force establishments. The Authorities were proposed to be ‘restructured, reduced in size and become freestanding bodies comprising of 50% councillors and 50% amalgam of magistrates and independent local people
nominated by the Home Secretary’²¹ (Martin, 2004: 34). The Paper also proposed that Chief Constables should be allowed greater freedom to manage the resources at their disposal.

Despite concerns voiced by ACPO that such reforms of Police Authorities would allow for greater central control by government, most of the proposals outlined in the White Paper were subsequently set in place by the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 which granted Chief Constables greater management powers and financial autonomy with regard to deploying resources, including personnel (and thus, responsibility for police staff), within their police forces. There was an expectation however that this would result in increased efficiency and improved performance. The Police Reform Act 2002 later continued this trend by authorising the Home Secretary to set annual performance targets which the Police Service was expected to meet.

As Cockcroft (2013: 95) has discussed,

> ‘at a symbolic level, *Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police* (Circular 114/83), represented an unequivocal statement of the future direction that senior officers and police authorities would be expected to take in quantifying the level of quality that they delivered in return for the funding that they received’.

It may also be considered the point at which a notable transformation in the formal organisation of police governance began to take hold (with the usual emphasis upon economy gains at the same time as the achievement of customer satisfaction, proof of which must be measurable). The arrival of NPM saw the emergence of an intensified form of police governance and greater use of the language of performance indicators, monitoring, audit, value, efficiency and effectiveness, all of which found expression in the plethora of subsequent reports published by the Home Office, Audit Commission and HMIC during the 1990s. Spearheaded by Kenneth Clarke and Michael Howard - ‘architects of the mid-1990s police package’ (Reiner, 2010: 13) - the proposals for reform consisted of the 1993 White Paper on Police Reform (Home Office, 1993), the 1993 Sheehy Report into the potential restructuring of police ranks and remuneration (from the

²¹ Reducing the size of the Authorities was primarily because their size and structure were seen as inhibiting them from being effectual.
1992 Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards, the 1994 Police and Magistrates Courts Act and the Home Office Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks (Home Office, 1995)\(^{24}\)\(^{25}\). In the managerialist agenda of the early 1990s, the ‘entire package was premised on an official definition of the police task as “catching criminals”, a reverse of the notion of the priority of preserving public tranquillity as advocated by British police tradition from Peel to Scarman’ (Reiner, 2000: 209). The reforms were clearly directed at imposing the disciplines of the marketplace on policing (Reiner, 2000: 209).

Subsequent debates about alternative ways to deliver core police services in a more effective and efficient fashion - in particular, patrol and community reassurance - led to the production of numerous reports and reviews of police duties and tasks in the 1990s. The Operational Policing Review (JCC, 1990), for example, examined a range of issues including civilianisation, stressing the need to take a longer-term view of the impact of the process and highlighting a range of unresolved matters. Similarly, the Audit Commission in particular was a central component of the government’s managerialist reform programme\(^{26}\) and turned its attention to the police during the 1980s onwards, as one of the significant and growing sources of local spending. The Audit Commission subsequently produced a series of supporting reports in the 90s concerned with police performance, effective management and value for money. Of particular significance for

\(^{22}\) The terms of reference for the inquiry considered rank structures and conditions of service, in particular, whether flexible systems of rewards for performance existed and to ensure adequate remuneration in order to recruit, retain and motivate officers (Home Office 1993: I). The final (Sheehy) report in turn, presented a series of recommendations; these included reducing the ranks structure (by eliminating some ranks e.g. chief inspectors) to dissolve a top-heavy management structure, establishing fixed term appointments for all ranks, the introduction of performance related pay and the abolition of certain allowances.

\(^{23}\) The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 afforded Chief Officers greater freedom to manage their budgets and their staff. It also meant that they were thus, held far more to account for their use of resources and performance. Combined, both pressures to be more efficient and productive were intended to drive greater innovation in civilianisation.

\(^{24}\) The Posen Inquiry was another major inquiry to impact upon the police and was set up to ‘examine the services provided by the police, to make recommendations about the most cost-effective way of delivering core police services and to assess the scope for relinquishing ancillary tasks’ (Home Office 1995: 1). Arguably, the primary intention behind this review was to identify potential ways of contracting out policing tasks and privatisation.

\(^{25}\) Aspects of the managerialist philosophy are most evident in the Audit Commission’s, Police Papers No.8: Effective Policing (Audit Commission, 1990), the Home Office White Paper, Police Reform (Home Office, 1993) and the (Sheehy) Inquiry into Policing Responsibilities and Rewards (Sheehy, 1993). However, it was not until the introduction of the Police Act 1996 that ‘value for money’ became a major plank of Home Office concern over the promotion of efficiency and effectiveness in policing providing a statutory footing for managerialist and ‘best value’ changes.

\(^{26}\) The Audit Commission was a significant instrument of facilitation of police reform for the government throughout the 1990s and ‘was used by central government to introduce a performance culture into the police service’ (Savage et al., 2000: 37-38).
the concerns of this thesis, these included, *Fine Lines: Improving the Traffic Warden Service* (1992), *Helping with Enquiries* (1993) and *Streetwise; Effective Police Patrol* (1996), each of which sought to draw attention to police performance and potential ways of improving ‘best value’ in policing and laid firm footings for progressive explorations of civilianisation. In particular, *Streetwise*, which criticised the effectiveness of some aspects of ’community policing’ (namely the fact that increased patrol officer numbers did not necessarily lead to increased clear ups for crime) while also recognising public demand for visible patrol, notably provided scope for the subsequent formulation of the PCSO role in E&W. Supported by the Home Office’s *Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks* (Home Office, 1995) and subsequent *Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Roles and Responsibilities of the Police* (Police Foundation/Policy Studies Institute, 1996), these developments all drew clear attention to the roles, responsibilities and ultimately, cost of the policing. In particular, the reports highlighted employment conditions (including contracts of officers) and overall cost of all areas of policing, including those roles traditionally considered ‘frontline’ or ‘core’ to the police mission. This, in turn, also quickly drew attention to potential new ways of organising work and of structuring the police workforce which may allow for ‘best value’ and further experimentation with civilianisation in core areas of work (e.g. criminal investigation).

However, despite the relatively consistent push from government towards civilianisation (and NPM more broadly) from the late 1980s onwards, not everyone viewed this move to a new form of management quite so positively. Indeed, attempts to produce change were by no means clear-cut, primarily because of resistance by the police, its related representing bodies and Local Authorities.

In relation to workforce reform, the Sheehy Inquiry (Sheehy, 1993) provoked the greatest level of opposition, with concerns being voiced from every quarter of the police ranks. At the highest level of these, ACPO and the Police Superintendents’ Association believed that, if accepted, the proposals for changes in rank structure and the introduction of performance related pay would result in adverse consequences for the police service in terms of recruitment, retention and the morale of police officers (Leishman, Cope and Starie, 1996: 14). John Burrows, the President of ACPO at the time, argued that the introduction of contracts and performance related pay for officers would turn the police ‘into just another job, with people coming in and out, rather than giving dedicated service
over many years and would affect the nature of the police force and the job it does' (Daily Telegraph, 19 July 1993, cited in Martin, 2003). At the other end, the Police Federation - representing those officers of rank lower than Superintendent - organised a rally at Wembley on 20th July 1993 to show their anger at the proposals and to air their objections to them. This unique spectacle consisted of 17,000 police officers and was addressed by the then Shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair, and also marked a concerted effort on the part of Labour to actively reach out to the police. The police campaign was without doubt effective in its ability to influence the media and, in turn, a number of Conservative MPs, and ultimately led to the recommendations of the Sheehy report being abandoned by October 1993.

The subsequent Cassels Inquiry, which was set up in 1993, looked at the role and responsibilities of the police and, in particular, the significance of the patrol function (Police Foundation/Policy Studies Institute, 1996). Controversially, one of the options put forward by Cassels who chaired the independent inquiry, was based on the Dutch Stadswacht (city warden) and Politiesurveillant (police patroller). The Stadswacht operate in Dutch cities and are charged with providing high visibility uniformed patrols, assist with crime prevention, deal with minor public enquiries, minor anti-social behaviour, provide public reassurance and generally act as the eyes and ears of the police (Thomas, 2014: 21). A large number of Stadswacht are managed by the police, although they do not possess any police powers and thus, do not operate as law enforcers. ‘The Politiesurveillant on the other hand operate in several large Dutch cities, where they also provide high visibility uniformed patrols’ (Thomas, 2014: 21). The Politiesurveillant operate at a rank which is above that of the Stadswacht but below that of a constable and have the powers of a constable, albeit that these are somewhat restricted (Police Foundation/Policy Studies Institute, 1996). The inquiry proposed a similar approach to that adopted in some parts of continental Europe and thus (alongside the Audit Commission paper, Streetwise: Effective Police Patrol (1996), which also made similar claims) laid the foundation for the formulation and later emergence of PCSOs under the 2002 Act27.

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27 The inquiry also noted that private security or special constables had carried out some very successful patrol work in the past although the report did not make overt recommendations for a system of patrol outside the direct control of the local Chief Constable.
A similar campaign was launched against the Posen Inquiry (Home Office, 1995) (commissioned to review police core and ancillary tasks) but assumed a lower profile, with ACPO increasingly adopting a position of trying to influence the Inquiry from the inside. Somewhat expectedly, ACPO were more muted in their opposition that the lower ranks. Generally during the period, proposed reforms which were opposed by the police (in particular, ACPO) were more often obstructed and/or diluted while those reforms which appeared more favourable to the police were left relatively unscathed (Leishman et al., 1996: 36). Somewhat ironically, an interesting consequence of the increasing managerialism of the police was the enhanced ability of ACPO, in swaying the outcome of the Conservatives’ reform agenda (Newburn, 2003: 94).

Indeed, like the Sheehy Inquiry before it, the NPM agenda of the Posen and Cassels Inquiries were not able to be fully accomplished. Leishman et al. (1996: 17) put this down to the fact that ‘an attempt to bring markets into networks and consequently redistribute power, may encounter resistance from entrenched interest within police policy networks, thus blunting the thrust of reform’. In his analysis, the capacity of the police to elicit sympathy and support from the public allowed them to be highly vocal and resistant against central government plans (Leishman et al., 1996). The most recent and well-documented example of this may be seen following the introduction of PCSOs (Caless, 2007), with the Police Federation initially leading criticism of the PCSO concept, also refusing to grant them membership initially28.

Probably the most important efficiency document oriented to criminal investigation and the world and work of police detectives was the Audit Commission report of 1993, *Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively*. In the context of urging a re-emphasis on core tasks of prevention and detection of crime, it argued that police should spend less time on a reactive strategy of responding to reported incidents and more time developing intelligence-led strategies including the proactive targeting of known offenders. The Audit Commission was worried that rising crime would overwhelm reactive policing: Police would spend all their time reacting to reported incidents and serious offenders would not be caught and there would eventually be a fall in public

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28 No specific information exists with regard to the reactions of either of the forces in which fieldwork was undertaken (Newtown and Shorewick) (see Chapter Three, section 3.6) to policy developments and associated reports/inquires undertaken within the political landscape of NPM during the latter half of the twentieth century.
confidence. The Commission therefore advocated a shift in focus from targeting the crime (reactive) to targeting the offender (proactive) and as part of this, a greater use of informants. Growing recognition of the administrative burden of the task of policing on warranted officers, coupled with growing incentives to explore the greater use of police civilians undoubtedly laid the foundation for CIs who were proposed on the basis of freeing-up the time of detectives allowing them to focus on proactive detection.

Following New Labour's election in 1997, the new government were seemingly just as favourable to much of the NPM agenda as the previous Conservative government, and continued to implement the ‘business-like’ reform agenda with at least as much rigour as the Tories had (Savage, 2007: chaps. 3, 5). Their commitment to this was signalled early on by the 1999 Local Government Act and its ‘Best Value’ scheme which ‘raised the culture of performance management to another level altogether’ (Savage, 2007: 110). According to Reiner (2010: 104), ‘The collection and analysis of performance indicators and the league tables they generated became ever more rigorous and sophisticated’. The government’s subsequent White Paper, *Policing a New Century* (Home Office, 2001), which preceded the more general *Justice for All* (Home Office et al., 2002), made clear its intentions of ‘slimming down bureaucracy and reassigning tasks in a way that frees up police officers to do their real job more effectively’ (Home Office, 2001: foreword). The White Paper called for the modernisation of employment terms and conditions which were considered a bar to contemporary needs and efficient, effective policing. The paper thus also focused upon extending the police family, in part, through the ‘more flexible use of support staff’ (Home Office, 2001: 15) and, in many ways, provided firm footings for the Police Reform Act 2002. Indeed, the report also made explicit reference to CIs (under the title of ‘civilian investigator’ rather than ‘investigating officers’ as they are referred to in the 2002 Act) who, it was envisaged, would be used to increase capacity in specialist areas of investigative provision (Home Office, 2001: 4). The White Paper adopted a progressive stance with regard to CIs, recognising their potential for increasing

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29 As Loveday (2008: 137) highlights, ‘Career progression for all officers is through the ranks by way of promotion usually following paper-based examinations’, with pay rewards being traditionally linked to rank rather than responsibility. It is for this reason, according to Loveday, ‘that the patrol function (visible policing) has never proved to be a way to achieving professional career success’ (Loveday, 2008: 137). As Loveday continues, ‘This perception has been encouraged where police forces have traditionally placed greater emphasis on specialised functions and services and this was perhaps best reflected in the rise of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) where the number of senior posts available was always greater than within the uniformed service’ (Loveday, 2008: 137-138).
specialist skills within the CID and also proposing the extended career trajectory of CIs within the police organisation (Home Office, 2001: 44).

While much of the drive towards civilianisation in the latter half of the twentieth century has been rooted in the alleged cost-effectiveness of police staff – a rationale which itself has been born out of popular perceptions of the traditional image of police staff work as being predominately support in nature and therefore complementary to that of warranted officers, - as will be explored in this thesis in regard to the work of CIs, the roles which are now being undertaken by many non-warranted personnel within the police may in fact have moved beyond that which can be conceived as complementary. Furthermore, at an operational level, the use of police staff is also said to reduce bureaucratic burdens and free-up the time of experienced warranted officers who can then be re-deployed to supervise and perform frontline duties such as arrest (HMIC, 2004: 168). It is under this logic that the more recent and controversial developments in civilianisation have been allowed to occur, namely extensions in police staff use in core areas of police work and the subsequent growth of key support roles in connection with operational policing.

The introduction of the Police Reform Act 2002 marked something of a watershed in the evolution of the civilianisation agenda. Alongside the introduction of CIs as part of a package of new frontline civilian categories30, section 38 of the Act also includes provisions allowing for the designation of these individuals with a limited but expansive range of police type powers. Under the Act, the powers exercisable by those deemed by ‘suitable’ and/or ‘qualified’ for designation are dependent upon their role/job title and are subject to the discretion of the Chief Constable of each police force. However, generally speaking, a designated person is able to exercise a range of powers comparable to those bestowed upon their warranted colleagues, which include the power to apply for and execute search warrants, to arrest at a police station and to interview a suspect under caution.

According to the most recent available figures, designated individuals currently make up around six per cent of the total number of police staff31 working within the police organisation (Home Office, 2015: 8). The introduction of CIs represents one of the latest and arguably most momentous developments in the civilianisation agenda and is directly reflective of both the growing need for specialist expertise within the contemporary CID

30 PCSOs, DOs and EOs.
31 Figure includes PCSOs, traffic wardens and all other non-warranted police personnel working within the organisation.
and the police’s need to ensure cost-efficiencies in all areas of its business. CIs are also, to some extent, demonstrative of a new era in police workforce modernisation in which roles previously considered the sole preserve of warranted police officers are also being formally offered for operation by non-warranted police personnel.

1.2.3 Pluralisation and the Mixed Economy Workforce

Despite a notable shift in focus within the sociology of policing from a preoccupation with the police, to a broader concern with policing over the last few decades (see Chapter Two, sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 for further detail), both symbolically and literally, the police and the ‘intuitive notion of what the police are’ (Reiner, 2010: 3) continue to dominate popular conceptions of policing. Generally speaking, the police are ‘the body of men and women employed by the state who patrol the streets, deal with crime, ensure order and who undertake a range of other social service-type functions’ (Button, 2002: 6). However, as the complex nature of crime has emerged in the late modern era, so has the varied totality of policing provision (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.4) and with it, our understanding of the role and functional and geographical parameters of the public police. The police are now generally accepted to operate alongside and in conjunction with a varying assortment of ‘others’ in their drive to ensure effective and efficient crime control (Flanagan, 2008) (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.4). Explicit reference is now made within the police/policing studies literature to the mixed economy of policing, plural policing, the police extended family, security partnerships and policing networks which together, have replaced older notions of police omnicompetence and the idea of the police as the monopolistic (even if only in a symbolic sense) guardians of security, public safety and order (Crawford, 2011: 147). As Jones and Newburn (2006: 1) note:

‘…policing is now authorized and delivered by diverse networks of commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental regulatory agencies, as well as the public police’.

However, despite increased academic interest in the plurality of organisations, agencies and individuals now routinely engaged in policing in E&W (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Jones and Newburn 1998; Loader, 2000), for the most part, the literature documenting the

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32 This being the traditional idea that a police constable is both able and willing to deal effectively with any and every policing eventuality and as the sole entry point into the police ‘profession’.
developing mixed economy in policing has tended to pay less attention to changing arrangements and emerging divisions of labour within the police organisation itself. Indeed, as Crawford (2011: 152) makes clear, ‘the pluralisation of policing is a trend which is evident within as well as beyond the police organisation [emphasis added]’.

Increasingly, police organisations are experimenting with a more diverse and flexible mix of personnel. Growing demand for specialist policing provision has for the most part, ‘exposed the rigidity of the idea that the basic training and experience of a constable is the sufficient and appropriate basis for the complex array of tasks demanded of modern police’ (Crawford, 2011: 153). Under the ideologically fuelled rhetoric of workforce modernisation, the police extended family has been allowed to flourish, giving rise to a more complex and fragmented division of labour in policing (Crawford, 2011: 147) and creating new spaces and professional spheres of activity within the police organisation in which warranted officers have little stake (e.g. forensics) and/or where they have, over time, relinquished their claim (e.g. control room staff, escort function etc.). The trend of pluralisation has been apparent in most areas of police work but perhaps none more so than in regard to criminal investigation where a broad shift from a reactive to proactive investigative approach, coupled with developments in science and technology have encouraged an opening up of the CID to a range of new faces33. Many specialised and professional roles (e.g. intelligence analysts, scene of crime officers, CID unit managers etc.), requiring high levels of professional competence and considered central to the effective functioning of the investigative process, can now also be subject to operation by non-warranted police staff and civilians (cf Wilson-Kovacs, 2014). For example, the production of intelligence - considered the bedrock of the proactive approach - is a complex role requiring specialist knowledge of various analytical techniques and software packages. It is similarly a function which is also being regularly undertaken in some forces by police staff (CIAs) (Atkinson, forthcoming). However, despite often performing an increasingly important and often essential role in shaping the strategic direction and ultimate success of investigations in E&W (as in the above stated example), the significance of the contribution now being made by police staff continues to be largely overlooked at the organisational level.

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33 It should be noted that the Police Advisory Board’s (Home Office, 1967) report, ‘Police, Manpower, Equipment and Efficiency’, which made recommendations for an increased use of civilians within the police force generally, also advocated the employment of CID clerical assistants, scenes of crime assistants, civilian fingerprint takers and photographers.
In addition to the increased recruitment of police staff, policy reforms have also increasingly allowed for the growing involvement of private security in public policing. The steady marketisation of policing since the Police Act 1964 which allowed the police to charge for ‘special services’ such as the policing of football matches, has seen the police engage more extensively in both the buying and selling of services (Ayling, Grabowsky and Shearing, 2009). Along with the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994 which also allowed the police to charge more generally for goods and services and the contracting out of police officer time, the Police Reform Act 2002 in many ways guaranteed the trend towards the ‘privatisation’ of police services and functions. While most often referred to within popular political and media discourse as ‘privatisation’, for the most part previously referred to within popular political and media discourse as ‘privatisation’, for the most part, much of what has happened with regard to the growing involvement of the private sector in public policing provision in recent years can be understood more appropriately as ‘outsourcing’ or ‘contracting-out’. Like many other areas of the public sector, the post-Thatcher period has seen an exponential growth in the outsourcing of partial and/or entire parts of the police’s business to the private sector including those areas traditionally considered frontline, core police functions (White, 2014). This can perhaps be seen most patently with the provision of custody where, in some instances, the entire provision of this service has been outsourced to private sector providers (Skinns, 2011).

However, in the case of CIs, unlike outsourcing - a specific type of public-private engagement in which partial or entire parts of a function are contracted out for tender to the private sector - the recruitment of individuals from private sector recruitment agencies as ‘agency workers’ (under the control and direction of the police) is perhaps rather more suggestive of a new style of privatisation in which non-police personnel are being used to undertake roles and perform tasks traditionally considered frontline and solely operational by warranted police officers. The introduction of CIs therefore provides a significant contribution in further diversifying the network of policing and adding to an already established mixed economy (Crawford, Lister, Blackburn and Burnett, 2005). Furthermore, not only is the use of CIs - whose role is arguably suggestive of the civilianisation of the DC role to some degree - somewhat indicative of both the pervasiveness of civilianising trends, as will be demonstrated and discussed in later

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34 Previously a function undertaken by government-owned Forensic Science Service (FSS), the provision of forensic science has since 2010 (following the closure of the FSS), been largely contracted out to the private sector.
chapters of this thesis, it may also be pointing towards a possibly increasing level of cooperation between the public police and private security in regard to the provision of criminal investigation. As in many other areas of the public sector, the police - faced with mounting budgetary pressures - may be being increasingly drawn to the flexibility and potential lucrateness of formalised (contractual) engagement with the private sector for the supply of a variety of resources - including staff. In this sense, CIs, who may be employed via contracts agreed with private security providers (e.g. G4S), might be seen as providing police managers with a reserve body of auxiliary investigators who can be drawn in to assist the CID to cope with operational crises and periods of exceptional demand, such as during a major criminal investigation or other critical incident.

While the powers which may be afforded to CIs employed directly by the organisation are not currently available to those employed by private security agencies, potential for the extension of this provision to agency CIs has been made more likely by the creation of Community Safety Accreditation schemes (also introduced by the Police Reform Act 2002, section 40) which allow for the granting of limited powers (namely the issuing of fixed penalty notices\(^{35}\)) to employees of non-police organisations (e.g. community wardens (employed by local councils), security guards (employed by shopping malls) etc.) (Grace, 2014). Recent developments in civilianisation therefore not only bring to light the changing nature of the police workforce demographic, namely, the nature of policing and the respective roles of police officers and police staff, but increasingly, ‘also raise concerns about the dangers of ‘creeping privatisation’ and emergence of ‘two tier policing’’ (HMIC, 2004: 28). Furthermore, alongside questions about effectiveness and coordination, the advent of the mixed economy workforce in policing and security also undoubtedly raises important normative and ethical considerations regarding the interests served by developing security networks and how exactly democratic values of justice, equity, accountability can be ensured (Crawford, 2011: 194; Lister and Jones, 2015). As Crawford (2013: 185) suggests, we are now standing ‘on the brink of a possible new dawn in relations between private security and the public police in Britain’ (at least in some

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\(^{35}\) Alongside the ability to issue fixed penalty notices and penalty notices for disorder for a range of offence types (e.g. dog fouling, littering, graffiti, riding a bike on a public footpath etc.), a person accredited under a Community Safety Accreditation Scheme may also be designated an additional number of powers including the ability to confiscate alcohol from young people and ability stop a vehicle for purposes of inspection (Grace, 2014).
police force areas), a development which may (or may not) have implications for criminal investigation as a public good.

1.3 Existing Research on Police Staff - A Brief Review

Despite receiving far less academic attention than work conducted on the police - particularly on the world and work of the rank-and-file (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1967; Fielding, 1988, 1995; Manning, 1977; Young, 1991) - interest in the varying styles of contribution now being made by non-warranted members of police staff to the police organisation is starting to grow. Arguably most notable is the emerging body of evaluative research which has sought to examine - both directly and indirectly - the role of non-warranted PCSOs 36 (Accenture, 2005; Chatterton and Rowland 2005; Cooper, Anscombe, Avenell, McLean and Morris, 2006; Crawford et al., 2004; Greig-Midlane, 2014; Hearnden, 2004; Long, Robinson and Senior, 2006; Singer, 2004).

Since their introduction in 2002, PCSOs have been a popular focus of interest for academics keen to assess the impact of this ‘new breed’ of civilian on the police’s reassurance agenda. A key driver behind the introduction of PCSOs was the public’s seemingly insatiable demand for visible police patrols and, with that, perception of the declining ability of the police to secure confidence in their ability to deliver effective and efficient policing (HMIC, 2002). Despite enduring testament of the inefficiency of foot patrol in deterring crime (Audit Commission, 1996), public demand for ‘more Bobbies on the beat’ coupled with a changing political and economic climate in the early twenty-first century meant that PCSOs were invited to join the police family as auxiliary patrol officers. Since their arrival the role of the PCSO has developed and they are in many ways considered the ‘paraprofessionals of patrol’ (O’Neill, 2014). There now exists a growing body of empirical work which, broadly speaking, has sought to move beyond the body of impact oriented work conducted on PCSOs, towards the advancement of theoretical

36 PCSOs are non-warranted, uniformed members of police staff who are employed by the police and who were introduced in order to satisfy demands for increased police visibility and accessibility and restore public confidence. According to Cosgrove (2011: 12-13), the primary purpose of PCSOs was ‘to provide visibility, deliver public reassurance and tackle lower level disorder through the provision of dedicated foot patrols’. It is therefore important to note that PCSOs ‘are not able to draw upon the same range of powers as police constables, are not equipped with the same protective equipment and, as such, are not expected to engage in tackling criminal behaviour, its investigation or control due to the increased risks to personal safety and the high level of skill and working knowledge that such activities entail’ (Cosgrove, 2011: 13).
understandings of the role and what can be inferred from this with regard to contemporary patterns of policing, its implications for the role of the police, the legitimate basis of their authority and the distinctiveness of the police ‘brand’ (Crawford, 2011: 175-176). For example, Cosgrove (2011) explored the working practices, decision making and occupational culture of PCSOs in one Northern city. This research found that the pull of the performance culture in the police coupled with high public demand for visible beat policing encouraged a shift in the remit of PCSOs away from reassurance and towards reactive policing. The findings of the research also point to the emergence of a PCSO occupational culture which, due to the civilian status and frontline role played by PCSOs, was found to be both distinct and similar to that of warranted uniformed officers (Cosgrove, 2016). Qualitative research undertaken by O’Neill (2014) also points to the valuable contribution being made by PCSOs to the project of Neighbourhood Policing, both in terms of both their capacity to improve the performance and overall legitimacy of the police. However, the research also found that in some areas PCSOs continue to be poorly trained, are offered limited opportunities for career progression and suffer from conflicted operational direction.

While research on the role and occupational experiences of PCSOs arguably dominates extant literature on the various roles of police staff in E&W, a number of scholars have also sought to take account of the variety of other non-warranted individuals currently working within the police organisation. As part of her study into the occupational and organisational dynamics of contemporary custody provision in E&W, findings by Skinns (2011) also examined of the role of designated DOs (employed by the police) and custody assistants (CAs) (employed by private security companies) including limited information on their individual orientations to work, working relationships with officers and cultural attributes. The study not only found that both DOs and CAs ‘undertook virtually the same tasks’ as jailors37 (warranted police constables) (Skinns, 2011: 49) but also that, due to their permanence within the custody area, both DOs and CAs had accumulated specialist skills which made them ‘invaluable to the police custody process’.

Extant academic interest in the world and work of non-warranted individuals within the police organisation has also begun to take stock of the valuable roles now being

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37 This included collecting biometric data, carrying out cell checks, looking after the welfare of suspects in the cells (e.g. responding to their requests) and accompanying suspects to and from their cells (Skinns, 2011: 49).
undertaken by police staff working within the CID. Work by Wilson-Kovacs (2014) for example, explored the occupational dynamics of Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs) working within forensic scene examination teams in English police forces. The research found that, like police officers, CSEs displayed a strong sense of mission and set of professional values. However, findings of the study also pointed towards a lack of formal recognition of the value of the role being played by CSEs by their warranted colleagues which was itself framed by the general scepticism of officers towards forensic science. More recent research conducted by Atkinson (2013, forthcoming) also explored the role and occupational and cultural positioning of CIAs working within Scottish police forces and who, up until this point, were an otherwise unknown body of police personnel. Atkinson found that patriarchal responses to the introduction of CIAs by officers had resulted in the ‘infantilisation’ of the role and emergence of a ‘them and us’ culture between officers and CIAs. Together, these valuable pieces of empirical work draw attention to the growing significance of the non-warranted element within the contemporary police organisation and with that, some much needed recognition of the important contribution being made by police staff to core police work - including criminal investigation.

1.4 Thesis Structure

This thesis is structured into eight chapters. Chapter Two provides a critical review of the existing literature in relation to the emergence and development of CIs. This chapter sets the scene for subsequent discussion of the findings in later chapters and provides contextual grounding to the overall aims and objectives of the research. It begins by providing a brief historical account of the development of the police, policing and criminal investigation in E&W, before going on to discuss changing theoretical traditions which take account of ‘policing beyond the police’. The chapter then moves on to explore extant debates on the development of private security in E&W and with that, its increasing significance as a key player in the changing policing landscape. Drawing upon relevant literature, the chapter then explores the impact of pluralising trends on the police profession and, in particular, on the professional ethos of warranted police DCs before providing the reader with a substantial review of key debates and new directions in understandings of police culture(s).
In Chapter Three consideration is given to the research methodology used to access the inner world of policing and study the routine, day-to-day working realities of CIs and their contribution to the contemporary criminal investigation process. To begin with, this chapter reflects broadly upon the epistemology and ontology of the research before discussing the methodological approach adopted by the study. The chapter pays particular attention to debates on mixed methods research, data collection and analysis techniques and ethical issues experienced throughout the research.

Chapters Four to Seven present the findings of the study. Chapter Four sets out an overview/profile of the structure and make-up of the CID units visited as they existed when the fieldwork was undertaken. The Chapter begins by presenting a general overview of both police forces and the people encountered during fieldwork before going on to discuss in relevant detail, the arrangement of the individual units in which fieldwork was undertaken at both sites. Chapter Five presents findings from a semi-structured survey which sought to broadly examine the extent and nature of CI deployment within police forces across the country. Information presented and discussed in this chapter includes the extent of power designation, varying views of police senior management, degrees of variance in regard to levels of training and supervision provided to CIs and the extent of engagement of participating forces with private security agencies. This chapter therefore places the utilisation of CIs in a national context and explores variation and similarity with regard to CI deployment between forces. Chapter Six provides an empirical account of the role currently being undertaken by CIs within the police organisation in E&W and discusses a range of issues relevant to their introduction and current use at the occupational level. This chapter draws upon interview data, field observations and personal reflections of CIs during interviews to examine the occupational position of CIs in relation to that of their warranted DC colleagues. The chapter is structured thematically and takes account of varying issues central to the research including the identity and occupational status of CIs, levels of motivation, commitment and resilience, acceptance and integration of CIs within the CID, where CIs ‘fit’ within the existing police and DC cultures and how the role being undertaken by CIs may (or may not) be impacting upon

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38 The current study is broadly framed by a post-positivist epistemological stance and is rooted in a critical realist approach (Bhaskar, 1975; 1998) which argues that choice of methods should be dictated first and foremost by the nature of the research problem (see Chapter Three, section 3.2) for a more detailed overview).
the legitimacy of the police. Building upon the findings presented in Chapter Five and again drawing upon relevant empirical data (for both the forces studied in depth and those gleaned from the survey), Chapter Seven examines the relationship of CIs with the police organisation. This chapter explores the range of related structural features currently impacting on the employment experience of CIs and includes discussion on CI career progression, powers of enforcement, remuneration and job security.

The thesis concludes in Chapter Eight, in which the central themes presented in this thesis are discussed in relation to the overall aims and objectives of the study. Chapter Eight provides a much broader discussion of findings presented in Chapters Four to Seven and, in particular, pays attention to their implications for our understanding of emerging (re-emerging) patterns of policing and in particular, what can be inferred from current practices with regard to the utilisation of CIs about the future of criminal investigation and standing of the DC.
Chapter Two: Criminal Investigation in Context

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the key literature on the changing nature of policing, the police role and police culture. In doing so, it illustrates the background from which the introduction and utilisation of CIs has developed and provides some critical discussion of extant debates on recent shifts in patterns of policing in E&W, in particular, the civilisation and privatisation of policing. Specifically, this chapter ‘sets the scene’ for subsequent critical discussion of the study’s findings presented in Chapters Four to Seven, by tracing the introduction and deployment of CIs in the light of their emergence within an increasingly pluralised and fragmented policing and security landscape. This chapter focuses predominately on literature concentrating on E&W and subsequently draws upon only a limited body of relevant comparative literature.

This chapter will begin with a concise discussion of key developments within the sociology of policing, taking into account the gradual pluralisation of policing and the impact of this changing policing landscape upon popular theoretical understandings of the role of the police. This will then be followed by a short and selective overview of the historical, socio-political and economic context within which the deployment of CIs has taken place and of which their introduction can be considered broadly reflective. The chapter will then move on to provide brief discussion of what has been termed the ‘rebirth’ of private security (Johnston, 1992) in E&W since the Second World War and with it, the growing ‘privatisation’ of public policing. Attention will then be given to the ongoing pursuit of professionalism by the public police with particular focus afforded to assessing the impact of growing civilisation and of ‘policing beyond the police’ upon the occupational parameters of police work and identities of warranted officers. Finally, this chapter will conclude by providing a detailed overview of extant debates in the field of police culture/s. This last section will explore key scholarly work on the topic of police cultures and will also provide a brief summary of relevant literature related to the development of fragmented cultures within the public police CID.

As well as ‘setting the scene’ for the following discussion, it is also the intention of this chapter to set forth the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis. Key theories and/or concepts discussed include Kakalik and Wildhorn’s (1972) ‘junior partner’ theory,
Bourdieu’s (1990) work on ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ and Hoogenboom’s (1991) work on the ‘policing complex’\textsuperscript{39}. Each of these key theoretical works have been applied in combination within this study, in an effort to adequately conceptualise the varying related facets associated with the world and work of CIs in relation to that of DCs and other warranted members of staff. They have also been drawn upon in an effort to explore the potential impact of CI utilisation on investigative practice more broadly, particularly with regard to the potential for further ‘blurring’ of the public-private divide in relation to operational level investigative practice.

As this study is the first (to my knowledge) attempt to empirically examine the role/s currently being performed by CIs since their formal introduction in 2002, there is an obvious need to locate their emergence and subsequent deployment within relevant debate and theory. The scoping/exploratory nature of this study has thus necessitated the author delve into a wide body of relevant literature from a diverse range of fields. This has been done so as to situate the significance of CI introduction within wider debates about security governance, police professionalism and police cultures. It is hoped that in providing such a comprehensive review of the literature, the true value and significance of the role/s potentially being played by CIs may come to be realised.

2.2 Police, Policing and Criminal Investigation

2.2.1 Early Policing in England and Wales

The ‘modern’ period in policing history is generally accepted to have been marked by ‘a general growth in the bureaucratic regulation of the population’ associated with the establishment of the ‘new police’ following the passing of the Metropolitan Police Act in 1829\textsuperscript{40} (Maguire, 2008: 432). Prior to this legislative reform, policing had been a diffuse activity operated via varying auspices and practised by a variety of rudimentary ‘public’ and ‘private’ actors. In eighteenth century E&W, policing, investigation and prosecution

\textsuperscript{39} Each theory/concept will be discussed and its relevance to the current research explained in turn within this chapter. Discussion of Kakalik and Wildhorn’s (1971) ‘junior partner’ theory takes place in section 2.2.5, Bourdieu’s (1990) ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ in section 2.3.4 and Hoogenboom’s (1991) ‘policing complex’ in section 2.2.5.

\textsuperscript{40} This new policing model was hugely influential and slowly spread throughout the land, culminating in the County and Boroughs Police Act 1856, which made the creation of a police service obligatory on all the counties and incorporated borough of E&W.
were primarily the business of self-governing, responsible local communities and individual citizens (Dixon, 1997: 50-51; Stelfox, 2009: 27). Suspicion of central state control ensured that the system of law enforcement in place during this period remained somewhat ad hoc in nature (Johnston, 1992: 8).

The Statute of Winchester (1285) formalised and developed a number of established mechanisms of policing including the hue and cry and the system of watch and ward (otherwise referred to as the night watch system). The night watch system originally consisted of unpaid men who served on rotation or by appointment as ‘watchmen’ and who patrolled the streets of larger English cities and towns, ‘reporting fires, dealing with runaway animals … caring for street lamps and raising a general alarm upon discovering criminal activity’ (Winright, 2001: 12). The Statute of Winchester also established the ‘Office of the Parish Constable’ (for the most part, private citizens who were elected annually to serve as part of their civic duty), the bearer of which was responsible for organising and supervising the watch. The parish constable was, in effect, the primary metropolitan law enforcement agent of the period. In 1326 the ‘Office of Justice of the Peace’ was created to assist the Shire reeve in controlling the county. Eventually, justices of the peace - individuals elected or appointed by constituents of a county to keep the peace - took on judicial functions in addition to their role as peace keepers. ‘The local constable became the operational assistant to the justice of the peace, supervising the night watchmen, investigating offences, serving summonses, executing warrants and securing prisoners’. This system helped delineate the relationship between police and the judiciary, which has continued for more than 600 years. In keeping with the notion of the populace policing themselves during this period, from the latter half of the seventeenth century onwards, individuals could also be sworn in by the King as ‘Special constables’ to aid in the quelling of public disorder, later emerging as the more generalist volunteer organisation which still exists today.

In addition to these early ‘public’ forms of policing, most of which were unpaid posts considered civic responsibilities rather than professions41, ‘private’ and profitable forms were also in routine operation by the seventeenth century. Some of these can be seen as developments of older, unpaid mechanisms of policing. For example, by the mid-

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41 Justices of the peace did however charge fees and constables could reclaim costs incurred during their year of service (Johnston, 1992: 8)
eighteenth century, the parochial night watches had (in wealthier parts of London at least) become tantamount to professional law enforcement agencies, operating essentially as a fully paid, private force (Beattie, 2012: 2) (largely the result of the growing tendency of wealthy citizens paying deputies to serve in their place on the watch42). This was also similarly the case with some parish constables (Dixon, 1997: 53-4; Beattie, 2012: 2) who, prior to 1829, within many villages, were being paid via levied tax money and in some cities, effectively emerged as paid enforcers of the law43.

Alongside these semi-public forms, new forms of private, monied police also gradually gained footing within the emerging policing market. These ‘private’ policing actors were able to profit both legally and criminally from the lack of formal police organisation and in the period prior to the formation of the new police, the market for private gain in crime control was ‘extensive, innovative and elastic’ and ‘driven by the provision of rewards, immunities and exceptions’ (McMullen, 1996: 89). Men known as ‘thief-takers’ were private police agents - not entirely dissimilar from the bounty hunters of the Wild West - who policed for profit rather than civic duty or public spirit. Engaged in the business of detection and prosecution, these individuals were prepared to recover stolen property for a reward announced by the town crier (Rawlings, 2002). They were ‘universally corrupt, taking profits not only from catching and informing on criminals but also from theft, receiving stolen property, intimidation, perjury and blackmail’ (Siegel, 2010: 201). Since thief-takers also routinely paid indigents to thieve so as to claim the reward for the apprehension of stolen goods, systems of rewards (including statutory rewards after 1689 when Parliament introduced a reward of £40 for the conviction of offenders charged with offences causing public anxiety - robbery on the highways and the streets of London, burglary and coining (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 16)) served only to exasperate the problem (Dodsworth, 2004: 207).

As Zedner (2006: 84) discusses, ‘In some areas, thief-takers enjoyed a virtual monopoly of policing, protected by their clients and effectively licenced by the manipulation of pardons and rewards to determine which thieves enjoyed immunity and which did not’. Such was their power that, as Rock (1983: 214) observes, ‘they appeared to engage in the

42 The duties of the Watch were onerous and unpaid and householders had to undertake the duty alongside their usual employment.
43 Emsley (1996) also notes how, in London, the formalisation of patrols and the use of paid officers occurred over the course of the eighteenth century.
business of wholesale crime-farming, carefully reaping the profits from cultivated areas of rule breaking’. Moreover, as Johnston (1992: 8) has noted, it was also common for justices of the peace to encourage victims ‘to seek out intermediaries to recover their property’. Furthermore, ‘the state’s trade in warrants and pardons linked the judiciary to the private thief-taking sector’, in effect, an early form of public-private partnership in crime control or, to take a more cynical view, an early version of the ‘commercial compromise of the state’ (Johnston, 1992: 8). Policing and justice pre-1829 according to Rock (1983: 203) came to manifest as ‘a market place in which an elaborate trading economy developed’ (Rock, 1983: 203) and in many respects, can be considered not entirely dissimilar to that arrangement which exists today (Zedner, 2006).

This pluralised, multifaceted arrangement continued until the consolidation of modern, ‘professional’ policing in the form of ‘new police’ in 1829 when Peel made policing the statutory responsibility of the state (this is not to say that other forms did not persist)44. Commentators have differed in their interpretations of the history and development of policing and the police in E&W and can generally be located within one of three broad categories. *Orthodox* ‘liberal’ theorists (Critchley, 1978; Reith, 1956) view rising crime rates - and to a lesser extent public disorder - during the period of the industrial revolution45 as the principal causal antecedent for the formation of Peel’s new police in 1829; ‘professional policing’ by this view, was allowed to emerge in the interests of all members of society. However, in contrast to this rather ‘cop-sided’ view, *revisionist* historians/theorists (Brogden, 1982; Hay, 1975; Storch, 1975) emphasise the motive for police reform as being ‘the maintenance of order by the capitalist class’ (Reiner, 2010: 51) whose control over policing enabled them to ensure that the attention of the police was directed at all areas which threatened to disrupt it, ‘crime, riots, political dissidence

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44 Older parochial mechanisms of policing continued to exist alongside the ‘new police’ in London and in other parts of the country post 1829. Regional police forces only began to take form after the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 and later County Police Act 1839. It was only by 1856 following the passing of the County and Borough Police Act of the same year that all counties were obliged to organise their own police force marking the start of the modern police service (Hart, 1955).

45 The advent of industrialisation and subsequent urbanisation in the late eighteenth and into the early nineteenth centuries, transformed the means through which policing was delivered. Within agrarian societies which typified the majority of towns and villages pre-revolution, values which are important to a community were generally maintained through community vigilance alongside a range of informal sanctions ranging from public rebuke to ostracism (Becker and Dutelle, 2013: 4), and were ensured by low levels of transience. However, processes of urbanisation and industrialisation encouraged the movement of individuals, seeking employment, across county borders and into the inner cities, many of which developed into industrial centres. Lenski, Lenski and Nolan (1991) note that such transience destroyed the effectiveness of kinship groups that had up until this point ensured a modicum of social and moral order was maintained within individual communities.
and public morality’ (Reiner, 2010: 51). As Storch (1976) discusses, it was in this latter sense that police officers came to be depicted as ‘domestic missionaries’ whose purpose was to coach the behaviour and moral habits of the proletariat. Nevertheless, generally speaking, it was the law enforcement and order maintenance functions that continued to be considered the core activities of the new ‘Bobbies’. While both orthodox and revisionist models provide useful insight into the history and development of contemporary policing, neither interpretation offers a once-and-for-all means of understanding police development; a ‘neo-Reithian-revisionist synthesis’ model has since been advanced by scholars such as Reiner (2010) in response to this issue. Reiner argues that a better interpretation lies somewhere between these two opposing perspectives: whereas the Reithians ‘neglect the implication of the police in the structural conflicts associated with particular relationships of class and privilege’ (1985: 34), the revisionists ‘pushed aside the aspects of policing concerned with universal interests in social order, cohesion and protection’ (Reiner, 2010: 57). In reality, both interpretations are likely to be correct to some extent.

2.2.2 The Evolution of the Investigative Function

As Beattie (2006: 15) discusses, ‘of the two crime-fighting functions of policing - surveillance on the one hand, detection and prosecution on the other - only the first has had a long history in England’. Order maintenance and crime prevention through coordinated street patrol was indeed the primary orientation of the new police in 1829 (Emsley, 1996). Beyond this, constables called to the scene of a crime or watchmen coming upon an offence in progress could be called upon to assist the victim in apprehending the offenders and taking them before a magistrate. But as Beattie (2006: 15) discusses:

‘…there were severe limits as to the help victims of crime could expect to receive from such officials … Such men were never likely to take more on themselves than custom demanded, and neither they nor the night-watchmen had ever been expected to provide more than immediate help to victims of property crime or violence’.

46 Indeed, in this pre-industrialised society the police gradually came to adopt a broader ‘service’ function which included the inspection of nuisances, dairies, contagious diseases, explosives and bridges (Jones and Newburn, 1998: 6), the operation of fire and ambulance services (Critchley, 1978) and, most notably, the ‘knocking up’ of people for work (Jones and Newburn, 1998: 6).
There was therefore no expectation that such officials would help victims to identify, locate and apprehend perpetrators; ‘In a system of prosecution that depended fundamentally of the energy and resources of the private citizen, detective work was very much left to the victim’ (Beattie, 2006: 15).

As was the case with the policing function more generally, in the late seventeenth century, responsibility for criminal investigation gradually began to shift away from the community and into the hands of dedicated semi-professionals with the required know-how and authority. Concern over rising crime and a growing recognition of the limitations of existing responses\(^{47}\) paved the way for the first small unit of plain-clothes semi-professional detectives known as the ‘Bow Street Runners’ and furthered the argument that the best deterrence for crime was the certainty of speedy detection (Birzer and Roberson, 2012; Gaskill, 2000; King, 2000; Rawlings, 2002). Eager to rid themselves of the reward payment system and the significant and thus, unpredictable costs involved in this, the Pelham administration (1743-1754) looked to Henry Fielding and his men for a solution. Essentially the first quasi-official\(^{48}\), semi-public funded thief-takers, the ‘Bow Street men’ were available for private hire by victims, but also acted as state-sponsored officials who could be sent to locate and apprehend offenders at no cost to the victim when judged by Fielding to be in the public interest (Beattie, 2012: 3). Nevertheless, the combination of state payment and private rewards allowed for some level of income security, encouraging continuous and permanent service amongst the Runners (Beattie, 2006). The relative success\(^{49}\) of the Bow Street Runners undoubtedly served as the guiding principle for the way policing was to develop over the next eighty years; Bow Street was a manifestation of the move towards increasing professionalisation and state control of street life.

\(^{47}\) Henry Fielding expressed strong views with regard to the causes of and potential solutions to the ‘crime wave’ which plagued the eighteenth century, views he expressed most notably in a pamphlet published in 1751 entitled ‘An Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers’. In this wide ranging publication, Fielding most notably criticised the way the criminal law was administered (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 17).

\(^{48}\) The Bow Street Runners were formally attached to the Magistrates Office.

\(^{49}\) Sampson Wright said in 1783 that the Runners had been ‘enabled to procure a very comfortable livelihood and with reputation to themselves and benefit to the public’ (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 23).
The reign of the Runners in Bow Street and in the half-dozen other offices run by stipendiary magistrates created in the years following the Middlesex Justices Act 1792 continued with relative proficiency during the period prior to the arrival of the new police. While the establishment of the ‘new police’ from 1829 was clearly a deliberate break from past arrangements, it did not overnight introduce fresh or standard levels of investigative expertise. The Runners continued to function for a period alongside Peel’s ‘Bobbies’ (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 4) and even at the moment of their abolition at the end of the 1830s ‘there were no serious plans on the table for any detective establishment within the Metropolitan Police’ (2006: 4). Indeed, it was some thirteen years later (1842) before the first small unit of ‘professional’ detectives emerged in the Metropolitan police (Mattassa and Newburn, 2007: 43), although there is evidence of a detective branch in Birmingham earlier, in 1839 (Morris, 2007; Wade, 2007). This delay owed much to the association between ‘detective work’ and that of the agent provocateurs and informers associated with the feared continental-style policing (Ascoli, 1979; Critchley, 1978; Emsley, 2005: 241). This same concern meant that expansion of the plain clothes detective department was slow (Emsley, 2005: 241). However, growing concern over rising street crime during the 1870s alongside popular media coverage of a number of sensational murder cases which highlighted the deficiencies of the current uncoordinated, preventative system helped secure a more substantial and autonomous CID in 1877 within the Metropolitan police consisting of over 250 detectives (Matassa and Newburn, 2007: 43). This was gradually followed by the development of similar plain-clothes units in the counties.

Despite early years blighted by scandal - a time when three out of four Chief Inspectors of the detective branch were found guilty of corruption (Ascoli, 1979: 143-6; Hobbs, 53

50 The Middlesex Justices Act 1792 created seven additional ‘public offices’ which were modelled on Bow Street and also introduced an administrative system that has left a complete run of financial accounts (Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, 2006: 20-21).
51 Even in the years which followed the formation of the first plain clothes detective units within the new police, private sector detectives continued to work (as they do today) alongside the public police, conducting inter alia surveillance work for divorce cases following the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 which amended the law of divorce making it an option for more people than was previously the case.
52 The 1842 murder of an unnamed woman by Daniel Good in London and the media coverage associated with the case which highlighted the failure of the police to capture the suspect has been cited as a catalyst for the more formal establishment of a detective branch (cf Flanders, 2011: 144-145; Wade, 2007: 19-20). This case in particular very clearly pointed to the shortcomings of the preventative system and the lack of specialists (Wade, 2007).
53 The Turf Fraud Scandal 1877 also known as ‘The Trial of the Detectives’ exposed the corrupt practices of a number of senior police officers (Moss and Skinner, 2013) and also led to the appointment of Sir
centralised crime investigation rapidly emerged as a major plank of the policing agenda, with the CID quickly establishing itself as the ‘owner’ of its core elements, these being the identification and questioning of suspects and the construction of case files. As Maguire (2008: 432) discusses, ‘senior CID officers took every opportunity to portray detectives as possessing a monopoly on expertise in these areas and to free themselves of any ‘interference’ or control by the uniform branch’. These early organisational and cultural divisions were furthered by the emergence of specialist squads and the subsequent development of expertise in certain areas of investigative police work, some key examples including currency fraud, obscene publications and art and antique thefts (Morris, 2007: 23). In later years, threats against the establishment, believed to be from the American-based Fenian Brotherhood who acted in support of an independent Irish Republic (Wade, 2007: 70), saw the swift launch of the Irish Bureau, which became the Special Irish Branch and eventually, the Special Branch in 1881-3. This further separated the detectives and created additional specialism within detection in the form of an early anti-terrorism unit. The development of specialist units was not only important as a key strategy for dealing with ‘crime epidemics’ in the modern state as Rawlings (2002: 21) rightly notes, but was also significant for its use in extending the reach and influence of the CID and, also, for helping to secure the CID’s claim to unrivalled proficiency in investigation. Technological advancements at the start of the nineteenth century, including the development of an effective fingerprinting system and the establishment of the Criminal Records Office (both in 1801), were something of a milestone for the investigatory process and further helped to facilitate the trend towards specialisation and professionalism in investigation (Hobbs, 1988: 43) and, in turn, helped to consolidate the CID’s monopoly over the investigative function.

The tendency of the CID to distinguish themselves from their uniformed counterparts progressively led to ‘a divided force’ (Hobbs, 1988: 41) with rigidly defined functions - a ‘firm within a firm’ (Emsley, 1996: 72-72). In his short history of the police, Rawlings (2002: 176) concludes that such real and imagined structural, operational and cultural differences stem from the fact that the investigative function undertaken by detectives, ‘did not fit easily into the idea of preventative policing in which crime was deterred by arrests for petty offences and by the presence of uniformed officers on the street’. Instead,

Howard Vincent as director of the new CID in 1878 which was established following reorganisation of the detective branch following the trials.
detectives were secretive and bargained for information by paying informants or by ignoring minor breaches in the law. Moreover, while in theory uniformed officers were supposed to be detached from the communities they policed, the reverse was true for detectives whose work often required them to circulate within the criminal underworld (Hobbs, 1988). The distinction between the detectives and their uniformed colleagues was bolstered by a number of highly celebrated cases and the arrival of popular fictional characters that began to emerge as public interest in forensic enquiry and murder narratives increased during the period. This new fascination stemmed largely from the popularity of ‘penny dreadful’ magazines as well as publications such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘Sherlock Holmes’ which helped stimulate public interest in the idea of the police as a professional force of men in pursuit. It was this same ideal which helped to simultaneously raise the profile of the investigator as a ‘gifted individual’ and helped to consolidate the hegemony of the detective.

The notion of the investigator as possessing a talent or flair for the role is something which has framed the process of criminal investigation for much of its history. It is an idea which stems from the long-held tradition of detective skill being learned, almost exclusively, through practice and the wisdom of experienced investigators (Monckton-Smith et al., 2013: 5). Pragmatism and informal apprenticeship ruled the early years of the CID and resistance to formal detective training continued well into the twentieth century: it was not until 1938 that a formal training structure for detectives was first introduced (ibid). The success of detectives in their resistance to formal training was in large part due to perceptions of the nature of crime during the period, as then Chief Police Commissioner Edmund Henderson put it:

‘The real practical fact is that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred cases of crime, the detection is most humdrum work, and it only requires just ordinary care and intelligence. You do not want a high class mind to do it at all’ (Metropolitan Police, 1878: Q 5251).

54 In 1919 the Desborough Committee report - the first major review of policing since the 1850s - which recommended against the provision of specialist training for detectives on the basis that such requirement might ‘adequately be met by experience and practical work’ (Desborough 1919-20: Part II, para. 115).
Nevertheless, the notion of investigation as an artisan craft continued to be promoted through the memoirs of officers whose growing self-consciousness as a distinct occupational group helped to delineate the investigative function as a specialist field.

However, the increasingly complex nature of crime and necessary responses to it has encouraged a fundamental shift in both the role of investigation and of the police investigator. While the core role of the police - ‘bringing offenders to justice’ - arguably remains, in more recent decades social, structural and technological changes have served to both significantly alter the policing landscape and broaden the aims of the investigative function. Victim care, community reassurance, intelligence gathering, disruption of criminal networks and the management of crime risks are also now seen as fundamental objectives of the process. Further to this and, as Stelfox (2009: 2) notes, ‘all of these developments have increased the complexity of the task of criminal investigation and mean that those who engage in it require high levels of professional competence if they are to perform their role effectively’. This realisation alongside developments in science and technology (in particular DNA profiling and forensics), changes in legislation and the general need for the process of investigation to be more effective both functionally and in terms of cost and resources, has encouraged further specialisation and the broad development of a pluralised, ‘multi-agency’ policing model which now dominates across E&W. Within this increasingly fragmented organisational context, those individuals now working within the contemporary CID are involved in the business of professional investigation which may or may not require specialist skills and/or knowledge, much of which is often not the preserve of the warranted police detective (e.g. crime analysts, scene of crime officers etc.).
2.2.3 The Police and Policing

'A cardinal principle for the understanding of police organisation and activity is that the police are only one amongst many agencies of social control’

(Banton, 1964: 1).

Policing is an aspect of formal social control which has been variously defined by those who have sought clarification of this complex and highly contested term. For Reiner (2010: 5), policing can be best defined as ‘a set of activities aimed at preserving the security of a particular social order’. Button (2002: 7) similarly refers to policing as ‘a function of society that contributes to a particular social order that is carried out by a variety of different bodies and agents’. While diverging somewhat in their opinion on the extent to which policing preserves and/or contributes to existing patterns of social ordering, both definitions are clear in their assertion of the relative distinctness of policing as a specific form of the analytically vague concept of social control. They both also demonstrate recognition of the variety of styles of provision and range of individuals who may be collectively and variously engaged in its delivery. As Reiner (2010: 5-6) discusses:

‘Policing may be done by a variety of agents: professionals employed by the state in an organization with an omnibus policing mandate … or by state agencies with primarily other purposes … Police may be professionals employed by specialist private policing firms - contract security - or security employees of an organisation whose main business is something else - in-house security … Policing functions may be performed by citizens in a voluntary capacity within state police organizations … or in completely independent bodies (such as the Guardian Angels and the many vigilante bodies which have flourished at many times and places …) Policing may be carried out by state bodies with other prime functions, such as the Army, or by employees (state or private) as an adjunct of their main job (such as concierges or bus conductors). Policing may be carried out by technology, such as CCTV cameras … [or] may be designed into the architecture and furniture of streets and buildings … All these policing strategies are proliferating today, even though it is only the state agency with the omnibus mandate of order maintenance that is popularly understood by the label ‘the police’.

The origins of the term ‘police’ are traceable back to the early 18th century French school of thought on order and governance and also, to the ‘police science’ (Polizeiwissenschaft) movement which developed in Prussia during the late 17th and 18th centuries with the aim of maintaining and promoting the happiness and prosperity of the population and
furthering the public good (Brodeur, 2010; Napoli, 2003). This older notion preceded the arrival of what has been popularly termed modern policing, this being the point at which the idea began to be intimately associated with the exercise of state authority and linked with the activities of the public police; a socially recognised body of personnel charged with undertaking specific functions and ascribed specific powers to aid them in their undertakings. As detailed previous in this chapter, the birth of the modern police in E&W occurred following the passing of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 which was largely ushered in by Sir Robert Peel. Subsequent to this, the term ‘police’ has largely tended to be used when making reference to the public police: ‘the body of men and women employed by the state who patrol the streets, deal with crime, ensure order and who undertake a range of other social service-type functions’ (Button, 2002: 6). While an activity which, for many, is considered to be synonymous with law enforcement and the roles, responsibilities and processes of the police, it is important to draw a clear distinction between policing as a process and broader social control phenomena and the police as an organisation. This is not least because policing is now (and always has been) a process of preventing and detecting crime and maintaining order which may be engaged in by any number of state and non-state agencies and individuals (Crawford, 2011: 147-176) and which, as an activity, may also take markedly different forms across time and place (Bayley, 1985, 1994; Reiner, 2010).

For the most part, the distinctiveness of the public police from other organised forms of policing is widely recognised to lie not in their performance of social control functions or the fact that they are agents of the state, but rather in their capacity and/or authority to use ‘coercive force in situations where its use is unavoidably necessary’ (Bittner, 1970: 122). While it is true that not all police work involves the use of force (e.g. the use of handcuffs, batons or firearms to physically restrain or incapacitate an individual), it is the threat of force and the capacity of the police constable to engage in its legitimate use which undoubtedly exists as a central tenet and defining feature of the police’s authority. While it is important to note that a range of non-police public and private individuals and organisations have also always been entitled to employ force in certain circumstances (e.g. parents, landowners and private security firms) the defining characteristic of the police remains that they alone are ‘equipped, entitled and required to deal with every exigency in which force may have to be used’ (Bittner, 1974: 35; see Manning, 2003: 33-
43 for further discussion). Building upon Bittner’s thesis, Brodeur (2007: 34) suggests that while this may have been the best understanding of the role of police during the period in which he was writing, Bittner’s definition fails to sufficiently capture the assortment of policing agencies and the scope of extra-legality in policing. It is in this vein that Brodeur (2010: 130) draws attention to the role of ‘policing agents’ who, he argues, may be better defined as being ‘part of several connected organisations authorised to use in more or less controlled ways diverse means, generally prohibited by statute or regulation to the rest of the population’.

While enduring in their importance to the study of the police function and policing more generally (Reiner, 2015), providing tangible ‘benchmarks’ for further critical enquiry - such classic studies in the early sociology of policing tended to follow the tradition of analysing what policing is in terms of what constabularies do and it is only more recently that this tradition has begun to change. Since the 1960s scholarly attention has gradually directed its focus towards the police and more recently, policing. A growing desire to both understand and theorise the nature of the police role and police culture has since allowed for the rapid expansion of both the sociology of the police and sociology for the police (Banton, 1964). Early work by Banton (1964), Cain (1973) and Smith and Gray (1983) arguably set the parameters for much of the subsequent discussion on the police and policing. Banton’s (1964) classic study, ‘The Policemen in the Community’, was the first major attempt to explore the world and work of officers operating on the frontline in the fight against crime. In his study, Banton compared the police he observed in Edinburgh with a department in North Carolina and drew an important distinction between the police as ‘law enforcers’ and ‘peace keepers’. Wherever possible, the latter would use their discretion to keep the peace and maintain order without recourse to legal sanctions. In doing so, the officers would use words and wisdom to communicate with the people and act in accordance more with the norms and values of the policed.

While not seeking an all-encompassing definition of policing, Bittner’s conceptualisation of the police role helps delineate what is distinctive about the contribution of public constabularies to policing. ‘It is the fact that the police are available to deal with all manner of emergencies [and their legal capacity in which to do so] that sets them apart from other bodies concerned with law enforcement’ (Jones and Newburn, 1998: 13).

For example, the majority of stop and searches carried out by the public police and searches carried out by private security guards operating on private property are of a consensual nature (Button, 2007: 38) and thus require no recourse to legislative powers (providing, of course, that such powers have been legally bestowed upon the individual enforcer). Private security officers may also be afforded various other rights of property owners and employers, one of the most common being wheel-clamping which takes place on the private property of many organisations (Button, 2007: 41).
community than the rule of law. It is in this sense that popular perceptions and political rhetoric about the roles and responsibilities of the police have tended to vary over time, fluctuating between the idea of the police with a primary function of enforcing the criminal law and the idea of the police as a public service. Subsequent work by Cain (1973, 1979) - which was heavily influenced by Banton - also sought to explore the functional definitions of police work, arguing that the police ought to be defined in terms of their key practice - the maintenance of order. In contrast to the developing body of work which focused on the police function in the early years (what the police do), work by Bittner (1974) rather focused on what he considered the more realistic aim of conceptualising the police’s role in terms of the legal capacity of officers and their inclusive occupational remit:

‘...the police are empowered and required to impose or, as the case may be, coerce a provisional solution upon emergent problems without having to brook or defer to opposition of any kind, and that further, their competence to intervene extends to every kind, and that further, without any exceptions whatever. This and this alone is what the existence of the police uniquely provided, and it is on this basis that they may be required to do the work of thief-catchers and of nurses, depending on the occasion’ (Bittner, 1974: 18).

In reflection of the apparently increasingly complex division of labour, recent years have witnessed a marked shift in focus towards studies which allow for the fact that in practice, policing has always been done by ‘others’ in addition to the police. The sociology of policing has emerged as ‘a popular framework through which the ‘policing’ activities of public, private and other policing agencies can be considered, without automatically distinguishing public from non-public bodies’ (Jones and Newburn, 1998: 18). Recent years have indeed seen much greater attention paid to the role played by private security and to the range of ‘hybrid’ policing providers that operate somewhere between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ spheres (cf Johnston, 1992; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Jones

57 Understandings of the central role of the police vary considerably between time and space and, generally speaking, tend to exist somewhat dubiously in accordance with perceptions about the roles and responsibilities of the police as an organisation with the primary function of enforcing the criminal law or as a public service (as part of their role the police are routinely required to deal with a diverse range of tasks, from quietening noisy neighbours to investigating murders (Bayley, 1996; Cain, 1973)).
58 Bittner argued against defining the police in terms of their functional role within society (compared to that of other organisations/agents whose primary function is also law enforcement (e.g. health inspectors, truant officers etc.) in that the ‘potential’ duties of police officers are so broad that ‘it compels the stronger inference that no human problem exists, or is imaginable, about which it could be said with finality that this certainly could not become the proper business of the police’ (Bittner, 1974: 250).
and Newburn, 1998; Shearing and Stenning, 1987; South, 1988). Much of this work has emerged in acknowledgment of the failing legitimacy of public constabularies and, as Reiner (2010: 256) notes, the growing recognition that ‘police and policing cannot deliver on the great expectations now placed on them in terms of crime control’.

Given the wide variety of activities and processes which may be variously located under the broad remit of ‘policing’ (if understood in the most general sense of the term - the public police organisation being included within this conceptualisation), providing a definition of ‘policing’ which satisfies all of the relevant ambits remains highly problematic. This issue cannot be resolved by recourse to ‘social control’ which remains an inherently analytically vague concept, nor can it be solved through the notion of policing as including all order maintenance and rule enforcement, including the most informal as well as those whose primary focus is to enforce the law. With this in mind and drawing upon existing definitions provided by Button (2002: 6) and Bittner (1970: 122) in this thesis the term ‘police’ is used when referring to the body of men and women (warranted and non-warranted) who work for (and may be employed by) the centrally organised, state-located institution commonly referred to as ‘the police’, who (if warranted) are bestowed with the power to use ‘coercive force’ force and ‘who patrol the streets, deal with crime, ensure order and who undertake a range of other social service-type functions’. Similarly, in this thesis ‘policing’ is conceived as a specific form of social control and, in keeping with the definition offered by Jones and Newburn (1998: 18-19), is defined as ‘those organised forms of order maintenance, peacekeeping, rule or law enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of investigation and associated information-brokering - which may involve a conscious exercise of coercive power - undertaken by individuals or organisations, where such activities are viewed by them and/or others as a central or key defining part of their purpose’.

2.2.4 Plural Policing and the ‘New Sociology of Policing’

As alluded to in the previous section (2.2.3), the birth of the public police is widely accepted to have signalled the point at which policing came to be firmly located within the functions of the state, a development which is widely acknowledged to have given rise to the fallacy that the police alone are responsible for the provision of crime control and order maintenance. Reiner (2010: 3) devised the term ‘police fetishism’ to describe
the willingness with which modern society has ascribed to, ‘the ideological assumption that the police are a functional prerequisite of social order so that without a police force chaos would ensue’. It is this popular conception that has led ‘policing’ to be for the most part, synonymously linked to the activities of the state-located public police (Cain, 1979) and the special powers they bring to the task (Bittner, 1980). Such a preoccupation with ‘issues relating to the administration of security and justice by states’ (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 10) resulted in the relative neglect of analysis of the governing capabilities of miscellaneous forms of non-state policing (including many of the pre-existing forms of self-regulation, community-based systems of order and justice and private policing provisions (Emsley, 1996; Rawlings, 2002)). However, over the past three decades or so there have been a number of notable changes in the character and texture of policing in the UK that have served to obscure the pattern of delivery of policing and security.

Most obviously, recent decades have seen explicit reference to ‘plural policing’ and ‘policing beyond the police’ (Crawford et al., 2005) as the state has seemingly sought to detach itself from matters of policing and security. Spurred on by a growing realisation that much of the research conducted on the subject of policing has not reflected the wide diversity of bodies engaged in this process (Johnston, 2000; Reiner, 2010), the fashion for what has been termed ‘late modern policing’ has sought to illustrate the significance of the role played by ‘others’. While debates continue about the extent to which recent changes in the patterns of policing (namely the growing plurality of providers) can be considered truly transformational or epochal in nature (Brodeur, 2010; Jones and Newburn, 1995, 2002; Zedner, 2006), they are nonetheless suggestive of the fact that some kind of change has indeed occurred. Generally speaking, state institutions are now more accepting of their limitations and consciously acknowledge (and in some instances encourage) the potential contribution of non-police providers in their varying forms (e.g. the general public, commercial bodies, voluntary sector etc.). As Newburn (2007: 230) illustrates, ‘put most simply, if there was a period when it was possible to assume that policing was largely provided by state agents, that time has passed for good’.

While few would deny that the state’s monopoly on matters of policing and security has always been something of a myth - albeit a powerful one - it is only in more recent decades that this myth has come to be revealed. Cohen (1989: 353) noted that in privileging the
formal state apparatus of social control we had collectively ‘bullied ourselves (and others) into thinking social control is synonymous with state control’. Without doubt, a key driving force behind the growing pluralisation of policing has been the inability of the police to maintain the levels of public satisfaction and legitimacy enjoyed by the organisation during the ‘golden years’ of the 1960s - a period in which ‘policing by consent is said to have been achieved to the maximal degree it is ever attainable’ (Reiner, 2010: 70). Generally speaking, recent developments in policing and crime control can and have been controversially viewed more broadly as the direct outcome of the changing relationship between society, state and the police where the state’s traditional monopoly of power has been severely eroded by societal change, growing insecurity and consequential failing police legitimacy (Reiner, 2010). It is this crisis of legitimacy according to scholars such as Bayley and Shearing (1996: 587) that has given rise to the ‘general recognition that crime is too extensive and complex to be dealt with solely by the police’.

This same rationale has also given birth to the ‘desacralisation thesis’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003) in which some commentators have subscribed to the view that the public police now operate within a ‘permanent crisis of legitimation’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003: 6). A once seemingly ‘Teflon service’ (Reiner 2010: 67), the police have been forced to relinquish their strong tradition of ‘constabulary independence’ (Savage, 2003: 172: 3) whereby the organisation has remained impervious to reforms set forth by earlier governments to remain a powerful political and cultural force. Accompanied by a long standing and exaggerated belief that the state and the state alone is able to deal effectively in matters of crime control - what Felson (2002: 3) calls the ‘cops-and-courts fallacy’ - the legitimacy of the police has gradually been eroded. This, it can be argued, is the direct result of a range of important and interrelated factors. First, rising crime rates during the post war period led to a rapidly emerging ‘demand gap’ (Maguire and John, 1995) in policing in which the demand for service significantly outpaced any increase in the resources available to the police. Coupled with the decline of the visible face of policing from the mid-1960s onwards, this has had a marked impact on public confidence in the

59 The limited implementation of the ‘Sheehy Report’ (1993) (its official title being, ‘Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards’), which, amongst other things, sought to introduce performance-related pay, cuts in overtime and fixed-term contracts, provides one example of the resilience of the police organisation which continued well into the late twentieth century. However, it should also be noted that the then Conservative government did not drive through all of the reforms to the degree that they perhaps could have due largely to the help the police provided during the miners’ strikes in the 1980s.
police’s ability to police. Increased pressure for service on the police also encouraged the gradual decline in preventative patrol and later, also saw the visible drop in numbers of ‘Bobbies on the beat’.

Second, the politicisation of crime during the 1970s coupled with the rise of mass media over the last fifty years or so (Reiner, 2010: 177) has helped raise the salience of crime, ‘institutionalising’ public concern and bringing awareness and thus, fear of crime\textsuperscript{60} into people’s everyday lives. As Van Steden and Jones (2010: 294) discuss, populist anxieties about crime and victimisation have since emerged in many ways as a proxy for the diverse range of social angsts ‘such as dog dirt in the street, Islamic fundamentalism, unruly youngsters, to uncertainties about the future’.

Third, the emergence of numerous highly discrediting cases and high profile instances of police malpractice in E&W (Cox, Shirley and Short, 1977; McAlary, 1994; Scarman, 1982) have drawn attention to the failure of the police to adequately meet the needs and expectations of an increasingly diverse and multicultural populace. The murder of Stephen Lawrence and subsequent ‘Macpherson report’ (1999) famously exposed the Metropolitan police as an ‘institutionally racist’ organisation and served to further erode the legitimacy and thus, confidence of the English population in the police’s ability to deliver adequate and effective policing provision for all.

Finally, since the Second World War, processes of ‘detraditionalisation’, ‘democratisation’ and ‘desubordination’ are said to have encouraged the emergence of a society more willing to scrutinise and question (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003) and an overall decrease in deference to authority and declining trust in social institutions (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003), including the police. Together, these factors have cumulatively led to an overall decline in public esteem for the police over the past 30 years or so (FitzGerald, Hough, Joseph and Qureshi, 2002; Hough, 2007) and have proved influential in initiating a fundamental change in the dynamics of police-public relationships (Reiner, 2010; McLaughlin, 2007; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003) and thus, the style and texture of contemporary policing provision.

\textsuperscript{60} Fear of crime is most frequently and consistently measured by the British Crime Survey (now the Crime Survey for E&W). It is important to note that recent research (Farrall, Jackson and Gray, 2006; Jackson, Farrall and Gray, 2007) has sought to analyse the nature of such recorded ‘fear’, differentiating between everyday worry and a more common diffuse or ambient anxiety about crime.
While existing as key precursors to the development of pluralised policing in many western democratic countries, much of what has happened in regard to the changing socio-economic context of policing and security and the changing role of the nation state (Garland, 1996; Jessop, 1993; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Rhodes, 1995; Strange, 1996) can also be more broadly attributed to the arrival of ‘late modernity’. Late modernity is a term used (in part) to describe an intensified form of modernity in which globalisation and the increased pervasiveness of risk-based thinking are endemic features (Garland, 2001). Generally speaking, globalisation refers to the increasing interconnectedness of nations and practices (Held and McGrew, 2003; Loader and Sparks, 2002) and can be defined as ‘a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power’ (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999: 16). The term ‘time-space distanciation’ was coined by Giddens (1984) to describe the stretching of social systems across space and time and declining geographical and spatial constraints. This process has been encouraged at a foundational level by innovations in science and communication technologies (e.g. television, internet) which have resulted in the world now appearing as a much smaller place. Within this increasingly globalised world, the ‘logic of risk’ (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997) has quickly emerged as a pervasive feature and has since assumed a dominant position within sociological and criminological theorising. Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) attribute the shift towards risk based thinking as being reflective of contemporary (late modern) dispositions to crime, security and danger in which ‘good’ normative ends such as equality or justice cease to be pursued and security - what Beck (1992) calls ‘preventing the worst’ - becomes the somewhat elusive goal. As noted by Van Steden and Jones (2010: 294) ‘the flipside of expanding prosperity and freedom is a widespread sense of increasing fragility and insecurity, which manifests itself in demands for more security’.

In regard to the developing crime and policing landscape, the pervasiveness of risk based thinking and concomitant globalising trends (in particularly ‘hard’ and ‘soft’

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61 Douglas’s (1992) ‘cultural theory of risk’ for example, draws attention to the way in which risk has become a ‘way of thinking’ throughout society.
technological advancements such as commercial air travel and the internet) have all but revolutionised the perceived contemporary context of criminality and with it, have encouraged a heightened recognition of the need for security and an altogether new and increasingly more sophisticated, joined-up and highly skilled response. The technical skills required when dealing with developments such as complex fraud and internet crime, the growing threat and increased sophistication of multi-national terrorist groups and the unique skills required when dealing with child protection issues are all recent developments which have also added to the erosion of the state’s mythical monopoly over policing. The advent of risk based thinking is also a key factor encouraging what has been referred to as the broad shift towards the separation of ‘reactive’ and ‘proactive’ policing approaches (Bacon, 2011: 233), which built upon early community policing models and rudimentary forms of surveillance and use of informants, to promote a more strategic approach to policing practice and provision.

A major driver in the shift from a reactive to a proactive approach (and pluralisation of policing and the dispersal of responsibilities for crime prevention more generally) has been the impact of neo-liberal inspired reforms that have sought ‘to rearticulate the relationship between state, market and civil society’ (Crawford, 2011: 152). Neo-liberalism - referring to the ‘the re-assertion of market disciplines’ (Garland, 2001: 98) and resulting in greater economic freedom and greater individual choice for most but not all - has contributed to a new variant of managerialism which entered the police lexicon in the 1980s and variously encouraged the development of what has come to be labelled as the ‘mixed economy’ of policing, ‘plural policing’, the ‘extended policing family’, ‘security partnerships’ or ‘policing networks’ (Skinns, 2011: 134). Reiner (1993) suggests

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62 Recent developments in criminal justice technologies may be broadly divided into two categories: hard technology (hardware or materials) and soft technology (computer software, information systems). The former of these categories incudes new materials, devices, and equipment that can be used to either commit crime or prevent and control crime (e.g. CCTV cameras, metal detectors, bullet proof teller windows at banks, tasers, mace, lifeline/emergency call mechanisms, new policer weapons, new technology-enhanced police patrol cars etc.). On the other hand, the latter of these categories involves the strategic use of information to prevent. Soft technology innovations include new software programs, classification systems, crime analysis techniques (e.g. predictive policing technology, the development of risk assessment, and threat assessment instruments) and data sharing/ system integration techniques (Byrne and Marx, 2011: 19).

63 Generally speaking, this refers to the shift from traditional, reactive, ‘fire-brigade’ style responses to calls from the public to a more proactive, intelligence-led approach which promotes targeted operations and the development of forward-looking aims. This shift occurred during the 1990’s alongside the more general repurposing of punishment from the diagnosing and rehabilitation of individuals to the management of offender populations (Feeley and Simon, 1992).
that in recent times, a shift in paradigm has occurred with regard to accountability. Marshall's (1978) two models of accountability (the 'explanatory and cooperative' and the 'subordinate and obedient') have largely been abandoned in favour of a mode which is best described as 'calculative and contractual'. Unlike earlier models, the 'calculative and contractual' mode which emerged first during the 1980s, gave precedent to fiscal concern, competition and neo-liberal techniques of governance (such as 'responsibilisation'64 and auditing). This shift in paradigm was arguably signalled by the distribution, in 1983, of 'Home Office Circular 114 (Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service) which introduced 'value for money' as a key consideration, with specific emphasis being placed on the three E's - economy, efficiency and effectiveness. As has already been discussed in this section, this, it was soon to be revealed, was to be achieved through the introduction of a more vigorous form of managerialism - sometimes referred to as 'hyper-managerialism' (Jones and Newburn, 2002).

Together, the various socio-economic and political developments have served to markedly alter both the style and nature policing and security provision in E&W and have cumulatively allowed for the relocation of responsibility for policing and security within 'self-organising, inter-organisational networks' (Rhodes, 1997: 53). The increasingly complex nature of late modern criminality coupled with enduring budgetary pressures on police spending has, without doubt, encouraged a growing recognition of the need to look 'beyond the state' when it comes to matters of crime control and security:

"Crime control is 'beyond the state' inasmuch as the institutions of the criminal justice state are severely limited in their crime control capacities and cannot by themselves succeed in the maintenance of 'law and order'. But it is also 'beyond the state' inasmuch as there are crime control mechanisms operating outside the state's boundaries, and relatively independently of its policies" (Garland, 2001: 123).

64 In 'The Culture of Control', Garland (2001) introduced the term 'responsibilisation' in acknowledgement of the (re)discovery of the idea that responsibility for security and crime control, if it is to be truly effective, must be distributed amongst the government, non-state actors and organisations. According to Garland, such an approach can be best implemented through 'preventative partnerships' or a 'network of more or less directed, more or less informal crime control, complementing and extending the formal controls of the criminal justice state' (Garland, 2001: 124). He suggests this is one of the most important lessons of the twentieth century.
With regard to the focus of the current study, CIs may be employees of the police organisation and thus, are very much within the state. However, as explored in this research, budgetary constraints may also have encouraged the recruitment of CIs from private security agencies - individuals who work under the direction and supervision of the police (state) but who are employees of the private security agencies and in this sense, may be considered as existing outside the state. Such complex security arrangements within late modern economies has prompted some scholars to adopt new theoretical perspectives on policing, variously locating it within the broader frameworks of ‘regulation’, ‘governance’ and ‘security’ (Braithwaite, 2000, 2008; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Loader and Walker, 2004; Rhodes, 2007; Wood and Dupont, 2006). The provision of policing has now widely come to be understood as taking place as part of the broader ‘governance of security’ (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) and is recognised as a more general form of social control which may also be effected by any number of agencies, organisations and individuals as part of an ever-growing extended policing family (Crawford and Lister, 2004; Crawford 2013). The concept of ‘nodal governance’ has emerged as commentators such as Shearing (2001) seek to take account of and examine the current late modern policing landscape and the need to look beyond the apparatus of the state and towards the increasingly diverse ‘network of power’ in policing and security (Castells, 1997: 304). This network of power extends responsibility for matters relating to the provision of policing and security beyond direct provision (and supervision) by institutions of national and local government to a host of ‘others’. Advocates of the nodal governance theory recognise that citizens are ‘governed by different sets of state and non-state agencies according to the rules and standards that are set by both state and non-state auspices’ (Shearing, 2001: 217). According to this perspective no set of nodes is given conceptual priority; this ‘networked model’ presupposes a level of integration, co-operation and co-ordination between the

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65 As was discussed in Chapter One (section, 1.2.3) and in the current chapter (section 2.2.3), the rhetoric of ‘policing’ is now more broadly understood as a process through which crime is both detected and prevented and order maintained (Mawby, 2008: 17).

66 Johnston and Shearing (2003) introduced the term ‘security governance’ in an attempt to counter what they view as the ‘state-centred strait jacket’ in which policing has been unduly placed.

67 For example, as Loader (2000: 321) discusses, this could be to private forms of policing secured through government; to transnational police arrangements taking place above national government; to markets in policing and security services unfolding beyond government; and to policing activities engaged in by citizens below government.
varying nodes rather than competition: the state is conceived as a partner (and a potentially equal player) and should no longer be thought to carry the mantle, for it constitutes one node amongst many engaged in the broader governance of security (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 25-26). In the light of the limited roles and resources of the state, it is argued that it is neither possible nor appropriate for the public police to seek to be the sole or primary provider of policing with the position of dominance in respect of the ‘locus of power/control’ being subject to variation across time and space (Skinns, 2011: 32).

Naturally the idea of state withdrawal is not supported by everyone (Crawford, 2006). For example, starting from the position of security as a public good, Loader and Walker (2001, 2006, 2007: 170) argue that the state has a pivotal, indispensable and distinctive role to play with regard to governance within its territories and the production of security. Through their concept of ‘anchored pluralism’ they argue that the state should retain the most prominent role in governing security to enable it to act, for example, as an arbiter in decisions about public security and that this is in the interests of ensuring that security remains for all to enjoy equally. Furthermore, the empirical evidence on the emergence of ‘security networks’ and ‘multi-agency partnerships’ indicates that there is still a long way to before we see horizontal relationships (cf Skinns, 2011). In their research on the developing mixed economy of public and private policing provision in England, Crawford et al. (2005: 90) found ‘little evidence of a networked model of policing as a dominant or prevailing reality’. Their research also found plural policing relations to be inharmonious and poorly organised, which indicates that the routine assumption that many agencies are better than one lacks a firm evidentiary base.

In his subsequent work, Crawford (2006: 466 cited in Skinns, 2011: 34-35) points to the fact that with regard to the governance of policing and security, the state may in fact play

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68 This conception of security governance is undeniably linked to the earlier work of Foucault (1991[1977]) and Cohen (1979) and the analysis of the ‘disciplinary society’ and the dispersal of mechanisms of control across an ever broadening surface of social space (what Foucault (1991[1977]) famously dubs the ‘Carceral Archipelago’ of modernity). Indeed, as Foucault illustrates: ‘the term ‘police’ does not signify at least not exclusively the institution of police in the modern sense; ‘police’ is the ensemble of mechanisms serving to ensure order, the properly channelled growth of wealth and the conditions of preservation of health in general’ (Foucault, 1980:170).

69 This governance arrangement, powerfully articulated in the 17th-century writings of Hobbes, Locke and their followers in the liberal tradition, came to have a profound influence upon the state-building process taking place across Europe and its colonies during the 18th and 19th centuries, in the process giving rise to the first modern police forces (Emsley, 1991).

70 The following list has been adapted from that presented by Skinns (2011, 34-35).
a variety of roles which broadly, can be illustrated by his useful five-fold categorisation of context/time dependent relationships between the state and other policing providers:

- The *monopolistic* model, whereby forms of policing are integrated within the immediate policing family. The state retains primary responsibility for policing provision. This is illustrated by the proliferation of PCSOs and, with regard to the focus of the current research, CIs (if employees of the police organisation), who are non-warranted police staff, but who are paid and directed by the police.

- The *steering* model, whereby the police seek to ‘govern at a distance’ the policing activities of others. This involves state agencies mobilising and making use of non-state resources, for example, individual citizens and private security officers. A key element of the strategy is the accreditation and licensing by police of the policing activities of others. Perhaps the best example of this is the Police Reform Act 2002 which introduced provisions for Community Safety Accreditation Schemes and, in certain circumstances, the granting of limited powers to accredited members of those schemes.

- The *networked or nodal* model, whereby state and non-state providers link in provision/co-production of policing through horizontal alliances. No node within this network is given priority. What differentiates a networked/nodal model from a market model is that the former presupposes an element of coordination and cooperation, whereas the latter presupposes competition.

- The *market* model, whereby potential competition (and conflict) structure relations between the different providers. As is necessary, the police might ‘contract-out’ their services (e.g. to football matches) or ‘buy-in’ services from the private security agencies (e.g. CIs in police CID). This model suggests a need for the development of an independent regulatory agency above and outside the competing contracted parties to ensure fair competition, appropriate standards and

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71 It is important to note that this is a broader trend than within policing (e.g. the raising of children - the state seeks to organise the internal conduct of the family not based upon coercive mechanisms such as laws, decrees and regulations, but through the expertise associated within disciplines like family guidance, welfare, counselling and pedagogy (Rose, 1985 cited in Tait, 2016: 90)) and viewed with suspicion by strong state countries like France and Britain (for example) as being symptomatic of a ‘weak state’ model.

72 Arguably, only in the procurement process, not in operation when contracts have been let.
safeguarding of the public interest. However, it is important to note that this could also be provided by the buyer of the services e.g. the state.

- The **private government** model, whereby policing by the state is shut out or partly shut out of providing policing (e.g. within businesses, mass public space and gated communities) or has relinquished its responsibility (and expertise) for an area of policing to non-state actors and organisations. This has been the case with many types of fraud investigation for example.

Whatever the position of the state police within contemporary policing arrangements, in terms of provision, it would appear no longer possible (if it ever truly were) to recognise policing provision as the sole prerogative of the state as exercised by a single state institution (the police). Within existing systems (at least in E&W) private security has emerged as a key player within the developing mixed economy of policing.

### 2.2.5 Private Security and the Public Police - A Developing Mixed Economy

As suggested in the previous section of this chapter, much of the early sociology of policing tended not to allow its gaze to stray far beyond those functions and activities being undertaken by the public police. Recent years have however seen much greater attention paid to the policing and security related activities of non-state agencies and individuals as well as to the range of policing providers that lie somewhere between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ spheres (cf Hoogenboom and Morré, 1988; Hoogenboom, 1991, 2010; Johnston, 1992; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Nalla and Newman, 1991; Shapland and Van Outrive, 1999; Shearing and Stenning, 1987; South, 1988). Much in keeping with the early sociology of the police, initial writing on private security in E&W tended to concern itself with the function/s of the sector, more broadly, on the position of this industry in the overall policing division of labour. While discussion of emergent phenomenon of ‘private security’ and ‘private justice’ can certainly be traced back to the early 1970s at least (cf Farnell and Shearing, 1977; Scott and McPherson 1971; Spitzner and Scull, 1977), it would be far from contentious to suggest that concerted criminological interest in contemporary matters of private security was decisively stimulated by the publication (and reception) of Shearing and Stenning’s 1981 article, ‘Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications’. In this piece the authors sought
to explore the increasing significance of the private security industry in Canada and identified what they termed a ‘quiet revolution in the policing and social control systems of many countries of the world’ post Second World War (1981: 193). Generally speaking, the incremental expansion of private provision of services that largely focused upon ‘protection against depredation’ (Shearing and Stenning, 1981: 195) - what in more recent discussion has been characterised as the shift towards a preventive logic of action (Zedner, 2007) - characterised the ‘revolution’ in private security. For Shearing and Stenning (1981) such developments were indicative of a redemption of the original Peelian dream of ‘a truly preventative police force’, albeit manifested ‘through private security rather than the public police’ (Shearing and Stenning, 1981: 217).

In the UK as in other parts of the Europe\(^3\) (in particular in Belgium, France and the Netherlands), interest in the development of private security (and private policing specifically) has notably grown over the last few decades (Cools and Verbeiren, 2004; Cools, Ponsaers, Verhage and Hoogenboom, 2005; De Waard, 1993, 1999; Mulkers and Haelterman, 2001; Nogala, 1995; Nogala and Sack, 1999; Oequeteau, 1993; Ogliati, 1993; Van Steden and Sarre, 2007). Early works by Van Outrive (1988, 1995), Hoogenboom (1988, 1991), Hoogenboom and Morre (1988) and Boon (1993) for example set a firm precedent for much of the work on private security which has developed in the UK (and elsewhere), laying the necessary theoretical and empirical groundwork for scholars such as Gill and Hart (1997a, 1997b, 1997c), Button (2002, 2007) and Wakefield (2003) to name but a few. Hoogenboom (1988) for example was the first to draw attention to the private aspect of policing in the Netherlands with his work on the role of private investigators\(^4\) (and subsequent work on ‘grey policing’ (Hoogenboom, 1991)). This was followed by comparable work in the UK conducted by Gill and Hart (1997a, 1997b, 1997c). Similarly, studies by Van Outrive (1988) and Boon (1993) (and more recently by Cools and Verbeiren, 2003) drew attention to the world of private security and guarding in Belgium and were likely of influence to scholars

\(^{3}\) This is not to discount important studies also being undertaken in other parts of the world in the same period, in particular, in the US (cf Cunningham et al. 1985; McCrie, 1988; South, 1988) and Canada (cf Shearing and Stenning, 1983, 1987).

\(^{4}\) Boon (1993) also conducted work on private investigators in Belgium as has Cools et al. (2005) more recently.
reflecting upon the UK experience (cf. Button, 2002, 2007; Wakefield, 2003; White, 2010 etc.).

Many of the existing studies (conducted both in the UK and elsewhere) on private security were (and continue to be) unanimous in their assertion that - when conceptualised in terms of numbers of personnel - the private security industry could outnumber the public police by as many as two to one (Draper, 1978; George and Button, 2000; Grabowsky and Braithwaite, 1986; Jones and Newburn, 1998; South, 1988). While few would deny that a ‘quiet revolution’ (Stenning and Shearing, 1980) in private security has indeed taken place, there exists little consensus about the true size of the industry.\(^{75}\) Research has however consistently pointed to the fact that the private security industry employs more people than the public police in many countries (De Waard, 1999; Jones and Newburn, 1995) and is responsible for undertaking a wide range of tasks\(^{76}\) (Cunningham, Strauchs, Van Meter and Hallcrest Systems Inc., 1990; De Waard, 1999; George and Button, 2000; Jones and Newburn, 1998), many of which are also routinely undertaken by the public police (Gill and Hart, 1997a).

The expansion of the private security industry (broadly understood for the purposes of this study to mean separate companies providing security personnel and/or services for a fee\(^ {77}\)) over the last forty years or so has seen rapid development not only in terms of the numbers of individuals working within the industry, but also in the types of functions and spaces which it has come to fill. In some contexts, private security personnel now routinely comprise the visible frontline of policing and protective services (Wakefield, 2003). There has been a long debate in academic, legal, policy making and industry circles over what constitutes private security (and private policing) (Draper, 1978; George and Button, 2000; Prenzler, 2009; Manunta, 1999; Sarre, 2005; Shearing and Stenning, 1981; South, 1988) with definitional differences tending to include the focus on tasks, the influence of profit and the client and the inclusion of products, such as the manufacturing,  

\(^{75}\) Ambiguities surrounding the definition of private security and in more general sense, due to the definitional complexities associated with both the concept of ‘privateness’ and the activity of ‘policing’ (cf. Jones and Newburn, 1998; Wakefield, 2003) mean there is less consensus about precisely how big the private security industry is (Jones and Newburn, 1995).

\(^{76}\) All of the functions undertaken by the public police (namely, tackling and preventing crime, upholding the law, bringing justice to those who break the law, protecting, helping and reassuring the community) are also now undertaken in varying degrees by private policing personnel.

\(^{77}\) This is distinct from ‘corporate security’ which refers to the policing and security activities of individuals carried out on a contractual commercial basis or within private firms/organisations.
distribution and installation of equipment and technology (Cunningham et al., 1990). While there continues to exist little consensus amongst commentators about how exactly to best define and/or conceptualise private security, for the purposes of the current study, the definition provided by George and Button (2000: 15) will be used:

‘The term ‘private security industry’ is a generic term used to describe an amalgam of distinct industries and professions bound together by a number of functions, including crime prevention, order maintenance, loss reduction and protection; but these functions are neither common nor exclusive to all the activities of the private security industry, though the more that apply to a particular activity the more clearly it can be considered as private security. To be included within the industry, personnel must have a primarily security role, whether this is full-time or part-time, and there must also be an employment relationship, whether as an employee or self-employed’.

As Prenzler (2009: 241) makes clear, the delivery of private security provision may, in practice, take a number of divergent and increasingly ambiguous forms. Generally speaking, private security provision may fall within one of three broad categories, the first and arguably the largest of these being ‘contract security’ - whereby an independent security firm supplies security services direct to clients. Those engaged in the purchasing of ‘contract security’ may include other private organisations (e.g. supermarkets, night clubs etc.) as well as public sector organisations such as government departments, resulting in a mixed mode of public-private delivery. The contract security industry includes a multitude of services and may be divided into two sections: the manned or ‘staffed’ services sector\(^{78}\) and the security hardware sector\(^ {79}\) (Wakefield, 2003: 2). Private security also includes ‘in-house’, or ‘proprietary’ security (also often referred to as ‘corporate security’) which may constitute a separate department within a larger organisation, servicing the organisation but whose services are not subject to hire by others (e.g. store detectives, forensic accountants, security guards etc.). There has also been an incremental marketisation of policing in the UK (as in other parts of Europe e.g. the Netherlands (cf Van Steden and Jones, 2010: 292-293)) which has seen the police become involved more extensively in both the buying and selling of services. While the Police Act 1964 allowed police forces to charge for ‘special services’ such as the policing

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\(^{78}\) This includes the provision of guards, mobile patrols, private investigators, store detectives, door supervisors, bodyguards as well as security consultative work, private custodial work and the transport of cash in transit etc.

\(^{79}\) This includes the supply and installation of locks, alarms and surveillance devices.
of football matches, it was the Police and Magistrates Act 1994 that presented the police with an opportunity to enter the marketplace via the contracting out of police officer time on a more general basis.

Private policing is generally considered to exist as one element/function (and arguably the most conspicuous) of private security. In its broadest sense, private policing can be understood to incorporate any policing activity carried out on a private basis (i.e. by non-police personnel). It may include those policing activities performed by unpaid volunteer community groups on a commercial or voluntary basis - e.g. citizens’ self-policing through ‘responsible citizenship’ (such as traditional Neighbourhood Watch) or through ‘autonomous citizenship’ (such as vigilantist self-policing and citizen patrol activity) (Johnston, 1992). It may also include specialist and non-specialist employees in private and/or not-for-profit organisations who engage in some police-like activity as a part of their duties, private armies, as well as commercial security-related enterprises more broadly (for-profit commercial enterprises that provide some aspect of security/policing services e.g. hired guards, private investigators, locks and alarm companies etc.). However, most commonly, reference to private policing in the literature concerns ‘the various lawful forms of organized, for-profit personnel services (e.g. door supervision, manned guarding etc.) whose primary objectives include the control of crime, the protection of property and life and the maintenance of order’ (Joh, 2004: 55, emphasis added).

A variety of reasons have been put forward to explain the apparent ‘rebirth’ of private policing and growth in demand for private security services (Johnston, 1992) in the post Second World War period. These can broadly be divided in two theoretical categories:

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80 Not including the Special Constabulary.
81 Specialist employees in private or not-for-profit organisations (‘in-house’ employees who have specialist policing, security or risk-management roles within organisations whose core mission is something other than security (e.g. security service officers employed by universities to patrol university buildings and/or property, security officers employed by retail establishments as store detectives or by the owners of other commercial premises (e.g. shopping malls etc.) Also compliance officers, security directors and risk management personnel.
82 Non-specialist employees in private or not-for-profit organisations (employees with more general duties who are nevertheless asked to pay attention to security issues e.g. insurance adjusters, garage attendants, janitors, shop assistants watching for shop lifters, flight crew members observing for suspicious behaviour etc.
83 May also be referred to as commercial security-related enterprises (for-profit commercial enterprises that provide some aspect of security/policing services e.g. hired guards, private investigators, alarm companies etc.).
‘fiscal constraint’ theories and ‘structuralist’ or ‘pluralist’ theories. Scholars of each perspective have, generally speaking, sought to variously conceptualise the relationship between private security and the public police in terms of the distribution of power and/or the division of labour (Jones and Newburn, 1998). Those who advocate the ‘fiscal constraint’ perspective have tended to explain the growth of private policing in terms of the inability of the state to meet the demands for services, which has led to the private sector filling the ‘fiscal gap’. In the case of policing, the steep rise in crime experienced by many countries, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, encouraged a rise in demand for the services of the public police which has outstripped the resources available and, as a consequence, the private sector has stepped in to fill some of the gaps in provision. This state-centric perspective is closely linked to public insecurities about levels of crime and risk of victimisation which (despite declining or stable crime rates from the 1990s) continues to feed demand and bolster the ‘reassurance gap’ in public policing.

From this perspective, private security can be considered a complementary entity in terms of its provision of policing and security services. Probably the first (and most significant) study associated with the growth of private security as understood by advocates of the fiscal constraint approach is Kakalik and Wildhorn’s (1972) research as published by the Rand Corporation. In particular, this work illustrates the significant role private security plays in preventing crime against corporations. It also importantly emphasises the public police’s supportive and complementary role in this area of work, promulgating the idea of private security being the ‘junior partner’ in such areas of policing. According to this theory private security maintains a functional distinction between itself and the public police with private security operating as ‘full service providers of visible crime prevention’ (Bayley and Shearing, 2001: 19), thus securing its role as the ‘junior partner’ of the latter. In the current study the junior partner theory is utilised broadly to explore the extent to which the role being performed by CIs can be considered complementary

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84 With regard to criminal investigation more specifically, evidence would indeed appear to support the idea that a ‘glacial drift’ (Morn, 1982) from detection to protection mentality has taken place during the course of the twentieth century in respect of private policing more generally, especially when considering much of the work undertaken by private detectives (cf Gill and Hart, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). There is indeed evidence which suggests the public police lack the skills, knowledge, time and financial resources to deal effectively with cases of corporate theft and fraud. As Gill and Hart (1997a: 565) conclude, one of the key reasons private detectives are sought is due to the lack of any formal legal provision. Furthermore, it would also appear that many large corporate organisations consciously choose not to involve the public police in criminal matters due to fear of the impact this may have on company reputation and stakeholder confidence.
and/or junior to that of their warranted DC counterparts, both in terms of the tasks they undertake and also in terms of their occupational position within the organisation (relative to that of warranted detectives). This theory is also applied (along with work by Hoogenboom, 1991, 1994) to examine the functional role of private security in relation to the public police in regard to the provision of criminal investigation. Specifically, to what extent can the use of agency CIs (i.e. CIs who work for the police via contracts agreed by their employer e.g. G4S) be considered to be blurring the boundaries between the public and the private sectors in regard to the provision of public police investigations and with that, the complementary position of private security?

Until the publication of Kakalik and Wildhorn’s (1971a, b) work, private security had been conceptualised as either a potential ‘private army’ or had been dismissed as being unimportant. At the moment the liberal democratic perspective seems to dominate both UK and US thinking about private security with governments on both sides of the Atlantic seemingly viewing the private security industry as a resource that should be developed and improved, with active partnerships and strategic work alliances/relationships being encouraged between the public and the private sectors. However, as Shearing and Stenning (1983) note, assumptions about the relatively subordinate position of private security have historically served to marginalise and trivialise emerging discourse and questions of accountability, the result being a legacy of ‘soft’ regulation of the sector (in the UK particularly). It is on this point of contention that theoretical developments regarding plural and nodal governance can be said to have come to dominate popular scholarly understandings of contemporary patterns of policing (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Jones and Newburn, 2002; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Zedner, 2006).

Advocates of a ‘structuralist’ or ‘pluralist’ perspective however emphasise the fragmentation of power as a key precursor to the growing visibility of private security in recent decades. Shearing and Stenning (1981) (amongst others cf Wakefield, 2005) have attributed the proliferation of private security over recent decades to changes in land use and property relations, most notably, the privatisation of public space through the growth of ‘mass private property’ (e.g. shopping centres, sporting facilities etc.). Indeed, as Wakefield (2005: 529) makes clear:
‘Urban space in Britain has been privatised to such an extent that most sectors of the population now regularly spend time in publicly accessible spaces controlled by private interests. Such spaces are dotted through our towns and cities, forming venues for our leisure time (the shopping mall, the leisure park or the cultural centre), working hours (the business park or large office complex) and the facilitation of travel to other places (the railway station, bus terminal or passenger airport)’.

Mass private property is a term which has been used when making reference to those facilities which are privately owned but which the general public have access such as shopping malls, leisure centres and recreational grounds. The proliferation of mass private property - which has been accompanied by increased prosperity with more private property and consumer goods to protect and enlarged legal obligations for the protection of visitors - has witnessed an ever increasing amount of ‘public space’ which is located on private property and policed by private security companies. Through the advent of mass private property, private corporations have been provided with the legal space and economic incentive to pursue their own policing agendas. This has in turn led to the emergence of what has been termed ‘neo-feudalism’ (Shearing, 2001: 211) whereby, in some areas, corporate auspices of government have emerged as ‘private governments’ (Macauly, 1986) pursuing ‘private orders’ that are often in conflict with state objectives (Shearing and Wood, 2003).

According to Shearing and Stenning (1983), the arrival of mass private property has not only brought about a change in the ‘hands of policing’ but also in its style and nature: ‘Policing changed as its location changed’ (Shearing, 1992: 423). Arguably their most significant research finding was to draw attention to the distinction between the strategies and orientations of private (commercial) security guards (which reflect those of the owners of the company) and those of the public police with those of the private guards appearing differently moral to those of public police. As work by Shapland (1995: 272-273) has shown, the word ‘crime’ itself may be foreign/less relevant to retail companies who may prefer the terminology of ‘risk’ or ‘risk management’, ‘loss’ or ‘lost profit

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85 As discussed by Shapland (1995: 272), ‘‘Crime’ has moral connotations and, for most people, is indissolubly linked with ideas based on the criminal law and associated with the criminal justice system’. In the retail sector the relevance of these moral frames of reference is however less clear (Shapland, 1995). One might argue that private companies are responsible to their shareholders, employees and customers, and that that is what morality should mean for them, rather than the rather vague public interest criteria for the police (which are actually based on governmental and sectoral views).

86 Stenning (1989) also argues that most business people do not see ‘crime’ as a useful label for dealing with the problems they and their business face.
opportunity’ or ‘shrinkage’ when referring to instances (or potential instances (e.g. fire)) of action identified as impacting on profit margins and the overall financial viability of the business (cf Braithwaite and Fuller, 1992). These terms undoubtedly have different connotations with regard to the paths which might be followed if a ‘crime’ or ‘lost profit opportunity’ should be discovered. They are also suggestive of a more proactive rather than reactive approach to problem-solving or ‘risk management’. Generally speaking, private security providers ‘tend to be concerned with loss prevention and risk reduction rather than with law enforcement or the detection and conviction of criminals’ (Crawford, 2014: 174). In this respect, the growth of private security can be somewhat fundamentally linked to the emergence of mass private property (Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1983) and (stimulated by the liberalisation of alcohol consumption and changes in licensing laws) the necessity for public order related security provision which has been spurred on by the emergence of the night time economy (Hobbs, Hadfield, Lister and Windlow, 2003).

This observation regarding the relationship between shifting economic forces and the relative weighting of state and private security providers has been central to the composition of the nodal governance model (discussed earlier in this chapter in section 2.2.4) (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Johnston, 1992; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Loader, 2000; Loader and Walker, 2004, 2006, 2007; Shearing, 1992; Wood and Shearing, 2006). Nodal governance theorists contend that it has become increasingly necessary to conceptualise those responsible for directing security strategies (auspices) and those responsible for delivering security services (providers) in a flexible manner. In regard to private security, this means with no set boundaries between the functions of the state and private security actors within the security sector. For instance, Bayley and Shearing (2001: 3) note that ‘auspices may be either public (governmental) or private (non-governmental); so, too, may providers’ and as a consequence, ‘they may be combined in four ways - public/public, public/private, private/public, private/private’. In this sense, all actors in the security sector network, be they public or private, are dependent upon one another for the realisation of their objectives - no single actor, in other words, has the capacity to exercise a monopoly over security provision. The flexibility provided by this

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87 It has been found that companies do not necessarily rely on the criminal justice system to deal with the offenders they uncover - and that calling crimes ‘losses’ and so forth may naturally promote the use of civil law (e.g. dismissal, suing to regain money stole through fraud etc.) or internal company measures’ (Shapland, 1995: 275) (cf Walker, 1994).
distinct theoretical framework has allowed for a growing recognition of the high degree of ‘boundary blurring’ which can be observed between the public and the private sector and thus, the increasingly complex nature of the public-private divide in policing and security provision.

Traditionally understood and illustrated by reference to the ‘governmental sector’ (services provided for all by government and funded through taxation) and the ‘market sector’ (consumers purchase services from firms motivated by profit) and considered one of the ‘grand dichotomies’ of Western thought (Bobbio, 1989), the public-private distinction is now widely considered to comprise ‘not a single paired opposition, but a complex family of them, neither mutually reducible nor wholly unrelated’ (Weintraub and Kumar, 1997: 2). Debates over what constitutes ‘publicness’ and ‘privateness’ are now common within popular discourse on the topic of private policing and security (and have been for some time, cf Benn and Gaus, 1983) as scholars have come to recognise that any discussion of the issue must first take account of the increasingly indistinct nature of the two sectors. Jones and Newburn (1998: 30) describe four key factors which they consider of central importance when seeking to conceptualise the two sectors. These are: mode of provision (provision provided by the state vs. provision of services through organisations operating in the open market); source of funding (either through taxation on the public side or through payment of fees to the providing body on the private side), the nature of the relationship between providers and users (based upon contracts and competition or on a monopoly of supply which is frequently provided universally) and the employment status of the personnel who deliver the service (many public officials hold special powers whereas private individuals have no special employment status).

Early work by Hoogenboom (1991) for example, examined bodies which are not part of state constabularies but which nevertheless undertake ‘policing’ functions. He found over 40 different bodies in the Netherlands with over 20,000 employees with controlling and regulatory powers. Hoogenboom viewed the growth of such bodies as symptomatic of the expansion of the welfare state in Western economies, with the ‘welfare complex’ beginning to undertake social control functions more usually associated with the ‘repressive complex’ of the state, (for example, the activities of benefit fraud investigators). He predicted the development of a ‘policing complex’ consisting of a combination of the official police, these kinds of regulatory bodies (involved in what he
terms ‘grey policing’ and private security firms. In the current study the concept of ‘policing complex’ is drawn upon in an effort to conceptualise the significance/impact of the current nature of CI utilisation on the future of the criminal investigation process. Specifically, to what extent might the utilisation of non-warranted CIs - who may be employees of private security agencies - be considered evidence of a developing policing complex in regard to the provision of criminal investigation in E&W?

South (1988: 127) had previously suggested the potential usefulness of establishing a shared project of social control in which ‘both the public and private contributors exchange expertise, key personnel and, importantly, accommodate each other’s shifting parameters of operation and priorities in action’. Crawford et al. (2005: 45) have similarly drawn attention to the degree of ‘cross-fertilisation’ of styles of policing provision which have resulted from the closer working relationship between the police and members of the wider policing family. This, it is alleged, has caused a further ‘softening’ of the traditional sectoral distinctions with private security becoming increasingly more involved in the management of crime as part of their role and through cooperation with the police. Roycroft (2014) has also argued in favour of the development of a ‘blended policing’ model, whereby some functions remain the province of the public police (e.g. covert surveillance, undercover work, family liaison, emergency response etc.) but other activities (e.g. custody duties, transporting prisoners, routine statement taking, managing police call centres etc.) maybe undertaken by the private sector or through a collaboration of the two (pp192-194). According to Roycroft (2014: 200), a blended model of policing provision would therefore ‘see a clear separation between the tasks to be undertaken by the public police, those that can be privately contracted and those where there would be a collaboration between public and private with a public accountability model’ (p200). With regard to the focus of the current study, it is possible that the CI role brings with it potential for the further softening of sectoral boundaries thus allowing for the emergence of a more blended style of criminal investigation.

The increasing fuzziness of the distinction between public and private policing bodies in many instances has resulted in the emergence of ‘hybrid’ auspices and providers of

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88 Hoogenboom (1991: 18) defines ‘grey policing’ as ‘informal forms of co-operation between different social control agencies for which traditional mechanisms of accountability seem obsolete’.

89 For example, through the adoption of quasi-policing functions, such as passing on information, incident reports and CCTV footage to the police or other public authorities and to a limited extent, working beyond the geographical boundaries of the private contracted area) (Crawford et al., 2005: 46-48) and the public police’s greater emphasis on crime prevention, risk management and proactive policing.
security which are now widely accepted to exist as part of ‘amorphous’ assemblages that exhibit different degrees of ‘publicness’ and ‘privateness’ (Dijkstra and Van der Meer, 2003). Notions of boundary ‘blurring’, ‘grey policing’ and ‘hybridity’ (Hoogenboom, 1991: 24) have all arisen in an effort to conceptualise the increasingly ambiguous and fragmented nature of the contemporary policing division of labour.

Within such debates, a great deal of attention has - in more recent years - been afforded to the degree of ‘privatisation’ of policing which has taken place in the UK and in other parts of the Western world (Forst and Manning, 1999; Gans, 2000; Johnston, 1991; Prenzler, 2004; White, 2010, 2012) and with that, what has come to be most commonly referred to as the developing (and increasingly complex) mixed economy in policing. Saunders and Harris (1990: 58) describe privatisation as ‘a confused concept which carries many different meanings’. Put most simply, privatisation in its broadest sense refers to ‘a process in which government-owned assets or services are wholly or partially transferred to private companies’ (Wakefield and Fleming, 2009: 243). According to Johnston (1992) the ‘privatisation mentality’ which took hold in UK government policy from the late 1980s onwards90, has encouraged intensifying marketplace developments as new commercial opportunities have come to be realised. Johnston (1992) identifies three trends in policing which can be variously located under the umbrella term of privatisation. The first of these is termed ‘load shedding’, where certain areas of policing are consciously supplemented or replaced by the commercial security sector. In some instances, the police can be seen to have shed themselves of certain functions altogether, for example, they no longer escort most cash-in-transit vehicles which they once did routinely (Cownie, Bradney and Burton, 2013: 227). In the case of cash-in-transit escort and in many other areas of work (e.g. CCTV, searches of visitors), private security has stepped in to undertake the policing activity. It should be noted however that Johnston also makes use of this term when referring to instances of police actively encouraging or ‘responsibilising’ third party action, as in the case of neighbourhood watch schemes, as well as situations when some police functions are ‘usurped’ by voluntary action.

A second category of police privatisation is ‘contracting out’ or ‘outsourcing’, whereby police enter into contracts with third parties to purchase goods or services from them for

90 While the concept of privatisation was in use before 1979 (Pirie, 1988), the intensified form in which it emerged during the Thatcher and New Labour era was very much a product of the managerialist movement which swept through industrialised countries since the 1980s in the drive for greater efficiency in public sector management.
a fixed/limited duration. In such arrangements, services may still be directed/organised by the police but a contractor is used to supply that service. While this has been a longstanding and uncontroversial practice in the procurement of ancillary services such as cleaning and catering, other areas of police work or the police organisation more generally are now increasingly subject to outsourcing. Work by Skinns (2011) for example, discusses the growing privatisation (through ‘outsourcing’ arrangements) of police custody provision by police forces across E&W. Through outsourcing, whole new areas of business are potentially being opened up to the burgeoning private security industry
d including those traditional considered ‘core’ areas of police business. White (2015: 283-284) attributes the ‘exponential growth’ in outsourcing over the last five years or so to the post-financial crisis ‘politics of austerity’ which has seen the pressing need to cut public expenditure to level out the budget deficit. Combined with a pro-market Coalition government intent on significantly reducing the size of the state, this strategy has seen over 20 per cent reductions in the Home Office police budget which were initially intended to take place over six years (2010-2016) as part of the government’s flagship Comprehensive Spending Review. Such conditions have thus prompted many forces to consider new styles of outsourcing including key services areas (e.g. custody) to the private sector on an unprecedented scale in hope of achieving the required savings.

Johnston’s third category concerns the levying of charges for certain police services, or ‘user pays’ policing, a further form of ‘contractualism’. Police services can be sold to other public institutions as well as commercial interests. In the UK context, one example of this could be the expansion of community policing through the sale of additional patrol services (including PCSOs) to other public institutions such as local authorities. Such a

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91 This is not just a trend in policing but also extends through the criminal justice system, for example, to electronic monitoring and private prison services.

92 In addition to the original planned 20 per cent cut in central funding proposed for the 2010-2014 period, in June 2013, the Coalition government revealed an additional 4.9 per cent central police budget cut in real terms for 2015-2016, thereby deepening the already severe financial crisis in the policing sector (HMIC, 2013: 106). However, as of November 2015 (following the Chancellor’s ‘Spending Review’), further cuts to police budgets have since been suspended until 2020.

93 ‘Contractualism’ in policing is ‘the practice of police entering into agreements (often contracts) with third parties (e.g. other public sector agencies, businesses, community organisations and individuals) for the purpose of providing goods or services to them or obtaining goods or services from them’ (Ayling, 2009: 54). While the police have from time immemorial entered into contracts to purchase some goods and services from outside their ranks (such as stationery, uniforms, and services such as janitors, and builders) new forms of contractualism are now developing in which various services that were previously provided from within the police ranks are increasingly being outsourced (e.g. aspects of forensic investigations such as fingerprint and DNA analyses, custody and detainee transportation etc.).
practice sees the police effectively engaging in active competition with alternative service providers such as local authority employed wardens or private security. A further and particularly interesting example concerns the financing of the British Transport Police, responsible for the policing of the railways and underground rail systems (as well as the investigation and prosecution of the vast majority of offences with which they deal (Lidstone, Hogg and Sutcliffe, 1980: chap 7)), provided mainly through charges for services made to the private franchises of the rail network. Despite the increased pervasiveness of the privatisation mentality since the 1980s\textsuperscript{94} which saw the Home Office propose the privatisation of what were to be identified (by its ‘Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks’ (1995)) as ‘ancillary’ tasks, operational policing has, by and large, remained largely immune from deliberate policies of privatisation or marketisation/commercialisation. However, as can be seen with the provision of custody in particular, the rapid growth in demand for private security has witnessed a gradual move towards the de facto privatisation of some core areas of policing which has significantly altered the conditions of policing and how it is being done. Furthermore, in some forces the growing civilianisation of some roles has been largely complemented through the formation of strategic business partnerships\textsuperscript{95} with the private sector. In some areas of work such ‘public-private partnership’ arrangements have allowed forces to accrue significant financial savings (HMIC, 2013; White, 2014), while at the same time,

\textsuperscript{94} Areas of police work suitable for outsourcing were first outlined by the Adam Smith Institute in 1984 and later reflected in the terms of reference of the Home Office’s ‘Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks’ in 1995.

\textsuperscript{95} These may take the form of unusual staffing arrangements (e.g. the use of agency staff to undertake roles previously performed by warranted officers (e.g. call handlers), arrangements enabled through contract which usually apply on a fixed-term or open-ended basis) or innovative building/facility developments and/or operations for example, a contract for the building/maintenance/operation/management of a police custody suite is made available to the open market for tender. The successful bidder enters into a contractual ‘partnership’ with the public police for the length of term of the contract which may or may not be subject to renewal at a later date. These ‘partnerships’ are distinct in both kind and ethos from traditional policing partnerships as they rely on a relationship which is based on contractual arrangements and agreements (they are structured by relations of exchange usually involving payment for services - price and competition). A true partnership refers to two unanimous bodies who work together towards a common goal (which is of benefit to them both), they are structured by common purpose, shared values, reciprocity and trust. The private sector can be a party to non-contractual partnerships (for example, statutory partnerships and also those partnerships between the corporate sector and the police, where they do exist, can be regarded as ‘true’ PPPs) but less often does so. There are also statutory partnerships (e.g. Community Safety Partnership’s) by which the private sector is compelled to work with the public sector, formally, on statutory basis. The fact that the relationship is based on statutory obligation is of little significance - it is still a partnership as it involves two autonomous entities working together towards a common goal (and most importantly one which benefits them both); it just confirms that it is a solid partnership and that government really wants the two entities tied together. Another good example of this is the statutory need for banks to submit Suspicious Activity Report’s (SAR’s) to the National Crime Agency since the arrival of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
enabling them to redeploy warranted officers to duties more in keeping with their skills, capabilities and legal powers/authority. With regard to the concerns of the current research, it is possible that the introduction of CIs may, in some instances, have provided the police with a new marketable commodity which may see the expansion (in style and scope) of public police engagement with private security in respect of direct investigative provision.

The growing privatisation of security has given rise to what Crawford et al. (2005: 7) refer to as a mixed economy of policing in which ‘officers have been joined by a diversity of Community Support Officers, neighbourhood and street wardens, municipal rangers, private security guards and vigilant citizens’. While some members of this extended policing family although technically not police officers, are part of the state system of policing (e.g. publicly employed CIs, PCSOs etc.), others such as private security personnel and vigilant members of the community are clearly not part of the state apparatus. This makes the combined issues of governance and accountability not only hugely pertinent, but also the task of disentangling the various tiers of responsibility increasingly more difficult. Increasing formal interaction between the public and the private sectors in regard to matters of policing and security through public-private partnership arrangements has rendered the line of accountability particularly elusive. However, given the popularity of plural orders of policing in present-day systems of social control - particularly those formal and/or informal arrangements which straddle the public-private divide and which have seen the public police effectively lend their legitimacy to private providers of security (e.g. through Community Safety Accreditation Schemes) - it is arguably ever more important to direct attention towards developing ways of connecting them to proper accountability mechanisms, be this to existing democratic structures of governance (e.g. via links to local councils or Parliament), through fiscal accountability mechanisms (i.e. via contracting) and/or through human rights accountability mechanisms (i.e. to the rule of law) (cf Crawford, 2006; Loader and Walker, 2006, 2007; Stenning, 2009; Van Steden, 2009).

96 Arguably, the state is best placed to act as final arbiter is decisions about public security and justice and in doing so, is able to ensure equitable, fair, just treatment for all and that security remains a public good for all to enjoy equally.
As Loader (2000: 324) suggests:

‘The questions ... that have long vexed discussions of police policy and (mal)practice in liberal democratic societies press themselves with renewed force under the altered conditions of plural policing’.

Indeed, as Lister and Jones (2015: 197) point out:

‘...if the contested nature of police ‘governance’ and ‘accountability’ relations gives rise to complex and daunting challenges, they become even more so when considering the complex ‘policing web’ (Brodeur, 2010) of public and private agencies and actors ... Where police - at both the individual and institutional level - in E&W are rendered accountable through a series of principle-agent relationship chains that link them to elected political structures, offering a symbolic as well as a functional element of democratic responsibility for, and control over, local policing, there is no equivalent apex of authority governing plural policing networks’.

The emerging pluralised and marketised policing landscape has rather given rise to ‘a more diversified set of horizontal accountability relations’ which together, ‘have served to undermine reliance on traditional vertical chains of political accountability which have typified the culpability relations most commonly associated with state-based, monopolistic formations of policing’ (Lister and Jones, 2015: 197). Increased levels of interaction between the public police and private security therefore raise acute regulatory challenges (Greve, 2008) which, considering the tendency of privatisation towards the outsourcing of ‘frontline’ roles, must now extend beyond traditional contractual forms of governance which have characterised typical managerial accountability mechanisms, ‘relating to costs and outputs, rather than deeper questions of resource allocations, priorities and policing styles’ (Lister and Jones, 2015: 197). The instrumental and client-defined mandate of private security (Shearing and Stenning, 1983) without doubt raises concern over the ability of the state (the police) to ensure that public-private partnership arrangements in whatever form they may be manifested, remain responsive to and considerate of the wider public interest.

The Private Security Industry Act 2001 which established the Security Industry Authority (SIA) and the compulsory ‘licensing’ of those working within particular sectors of the industry, including static guards, door supervisors, wheel-clampers, bodyguards, private
investigators and security consultants. Employment in these specified sectors requires a licence, which is contingent on both training and criminal records vetting. The Act makes it an offence to work without a licence or to employ someone without a licence. While limited in scope (e.g. significant sectors of the security industry such as security systems installers and in-house guards remain exempt from licensing (White, 2010)) and arguably amounting to little more than a model of ‘self-regulation’ (Button, 2002), this development does indicate an albeit arms-length attempt at regulating and thus legitimising some of the activities of the private security industry. It is also arguably suggestive of an attempt to improve standards of competence and professionalism in the industry as the state concedes to the idea of a networked approach to policing and security provision in which the services of private security may (or may not as the case may be) be harnessed to advancing the public good.

2.2.6 Summary

This section has reviewed literature relevant to the introduction of CIs in E&W. In doing so, it has laid the necessary contextual and theoretical groundwork for later discussions of this thesis. In particular, this section has focused on the changing landscape and territories of policing and, within that, the rise in presence and significance of private security to contemporary policing provision. It discusses how, since before the formation of the public police organisation, policing has been operating within a plural context. Growing reference to the ‘governance of security’ or ‘security networks’ by various scholars draws attention to the renewed significance of such trends for contemporary policing provision. However, as this section made clear, recent developments in pluralisation have occurred within as well as beyond the police organisation as the growing presence of non-police personnel (employed by the police and by other public and/or private agencies/organisations) has become ever more apparent. In this sense, CIs may represent one of the latest additions to the ever growing policing family and, given their potentially hybrid status as employees of private security agencies, may be further obscuring traditional distinctions with regard to the role of the police and private security.

97 While provisions are contained within the Act which also allow for the licensing of private investigators, at the time of the research private investigators are not subject to regulation by the SIA.
The following section will examine the extent to which recent developments in the contexts and patterns of policing (most notably, the declining legitimacy of the public police and recent pluralising trends) have led to a blurring of the boundaries between professionalism and managerialism (Dent and Whitehead, 2002: 1) and consequently, the redistribution of workloads between professional officers and paraprofessional staff. Within the contemporary CID, the ‘professional’ police detective must now negotiate his/her role in conjunction with that of a range of ‘others’ including a host of non-warranted policing paraprofessionals. However, as the following section will explore, while CIs may at first blush be conceptualised as paraprofessionals given their intended complementary function to that of warranted DCs, in reality, their occupational position may in fact be more ambiguous. The following section therefore critically examines how recent changes in the contexts and patterns of policing (discussed in this section and also in Chapter One) have impacted upon the trajectory of police professionalism in E&W and specifically, on notions of professionalism in criminal investigation.

2.3 The Policing Profession - Changing Detective Roles, Identities and Professionalism in Investigation

Much has been written in the discipline of sociology on work, occupations, professions and organisations. Within this growing body of work profession, professionalism and professionalisation have emerged as key concepts. These terms have also, in more recent decades, grown in their significance within the field of police studies. However, despite their relatively general use, both in colloquial and written form (often as a shibboleth), the concepts remain somewhat ambiguously defined, particularly in relation to policing. Establishing hard and fast definitions for each of the terms has been made even more difficult in recent years with the changing nature of work. Recent decades have seen a number of societal and policy developments and changes which have in turn led to increased complexities in the contexts and environments for professions. Some long established boundaries are becoming blurred. For example, there is no longer a clear differentiation between the public and private sectors of professional employment.

98 In many respects NPM may be viewed as an attempt to reformulate professionalism around managerial culture (Evetts, 2003). According to Fyfe (2013: 411), such a move ‘has been facilitated in policing by the requirement for police performance frameworks monitoring a range of indicators, from response times to detection rates, as a way of distinguishing strong from poorly performing police forces and holding them to account’.
Private funding is now embedded within public sector workplaces and the public sector is increasingly electing to engage with the private sector, be this through formal public-private partnership arrangements or simply as a result of new staffing arrangements which have emerged as a necessary requirement within contemporary working arrangements in the UK (e.g. contracting-out) (Evetts, 2014: 30).

In E&W the police, like many other professions, have been subject to a rapid process of reorganisation and consolidation in recent years (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2008) which has in turn, called into question the occupational identities and professional roles of police officers (Hughes, 1958). Such alteration, it has been alleged, has occurred alongside a general ‘loss of faith’ in the police by the British public99 (Reiner, 2010), a trend which has also initiated a drive towards ‘professionalising’ the police100. Recent changes in the terrain of policing - most notably the pluralisation of policing and the growing significance of ‘policing paraprofessionals’101102 - have served to amplify uncertainties about the status of policing as a profession and the sustainability of the foundations on which the discourse of police professionalism has historically been built. Sworn-officer status remains the bedrock of the police ‘profession’ but, as will be discussed in this section, entry points and career paths are becoming more diverse, with growing numbers of specialist and police staff roles. The result of this has seen the increased blurring of the boundaries between professionalism and managerialism (Dent and Whitehead, 2002: 1) and consequently, the blurring of occupational identities and increased role confusion within the policing profession (Moller and Harber, 1996).

Guided by research on professions and expertise (for example, Abbott, 1991a, 1991b; Freidson, 2001; Evetts, 2013), this chapter examines issues relating to the evolving discourse of police professionalism in contemporary policing and investigation in E&W. It will explore the extent to which professionalism is changing and is being changed by

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99 Successive waves of the British Crime Survey would appear to testify to this (Jansson, 2008; Roberts and Hough, 2005).

100 Previous policing and security research has explored the professionalisation of the public police (Chan, 2003; Sklansky, 2011, 2014) and professionalism within police services (Manning, 1997).

101 In the broadest sense a paraprofessional can be defined as ‘a person who possesses fewer than the minimum professional requisites and whose job description involves tasks and duties which were once performed by the professional’ (Love, 1981: 368). Other areas of work in which paraprofessionals can be found operating include law (e.g. paralegals), education (e.g. teaching assistants) and nursing (e.g. health care assistants).

developments in the contexts and environments of work and the effect these developments may be having on traditional understandings of police work and culture. Most significantly, this chapter will seek to explore the extent to which the developing nature of criminal investigation in E&W can be said to be instigating a renegotiation of the boundaries surrounding the role of the warranted police detective and, in turn the dilution of professional orthodoxies in the investigative specialism.

2.3.1 Defining the Field

2.3.1.1 The Rise (and Fall) of Professions

Before moving on to discuss the issue of police professionalism and, in particular, the impact of recent trends in police modernisation (particularly pluralisation and the growing significance of police staff) on the ‘detective profession’ specifically, it is first important to define the field. What makes a profession different from an occupation? Why is professional status so desired? In order to answer these questions a brief appreciation of the historical significance of the professions is required. The history of and emergence of the professions in Britain is notably peculiar and distinct from that in other parts of the world (Johnston, 1982). In continental Europe for example, professionals generally have been and are mainly employed in the public sector, closely connected to and controlled by state authorities (Torstendahl and Burrage, 1990). By contrast, the Anglo-American ‘ideal type’ stresses the freedom of self-employed practitioners to control working conditions (Collins, 1990) and, with regard to professionalisation, focuses on the establishment of ‘private government’ within an occupation rather than on the political struggle for control within an elite bureaucratic hierarchy as can be seen in Continental type processes of professionalisation (Collins, 1990). The relative distinctness of the ‘mixed economy’ British experience owes much to the historical antecedents for contemporary professions which, as Macdonald (2000) explains, can be traced back to the fifteenth century and the governing capabilities of the Crown and, more specifically, its success in securing a unified political order which, in part, relied on the support of towns who were in turn rewarded by charters which gave them a measure of autonomy.

103 As a ‘mixed economy’ Britain may generally be conceptualised as falling somewhere in between the extremes of capitalistic, free-market oriented states (e.g. the United States) and state-controlled command economies such as that of the former USSR (Perkin, 1996)
This balance according to Macdonald (2000: 72) ‘was the basis of a culture in which occupations were able to achieve a measure of self-government and, in contrast to more centralised and autocratic regimes elsewhere in Europe, were able to defend their independence and carry it through to the modern period’.

As professions such as law and medicine gradually became more organised and further established during the pre-industrialisation era – ‘operating with distinct interests, memberships and bodies of knowledge and beginning to form a stable and intimate connection with training and examination’ (Larson, 1977: 2) - so they began to acquire a monopoly, or at least licensure (Macdonald, 2000) in defence of their occupational jurisdiction amidst the transition from a community-oriented to a market-oriented society. Within this context, ‘a collective effort was needed on the part of the actual or potential sellers of services to capture and control expanding markets’ (Larson, 1977: 10). Concern over regulating competition and therefore the terms of access to marks of professional fitness thus typified this period of pre-industrial transition; the professional entrepreneurs of the period were gradually able to secure relative exclusivity in work, a central component of this being the ability to solicit state protection and state-enforced penalties against ‘unlicensed competitors’.

Since the early nineteenth century the professions in Britain have gradually developed amidst incremental advancement of knowledge through specialisation and developments in technology and concomitant differentiation in the division of labour (Larson, 1977: xvi). Together, such developments have not only afforded established professions the authority to attain a greater level of power and esteem but, as the complexity of such knowledge has become apparent, have also allowed for the growth of new professions (e.g. accounting, surveying, civil and mechanical engineering). Despite gaining power in numbers and societal/cultural importance, a decline in deference to authority over the last

104 However, the historical roots of most modern-day professions are traceable back to the nineteenth century or later, with most professions coalescing in the twentieth century (Jennings, Callahan and Wolf, 1987).
105 This agreement has come to be called the ‘regulative bargain’ with the state (Cooper, Lowe, Puxty, Robson and Willmot, 1988), in which monopoly of the profession over its area of work is achieved through the support of government, usually through licensure of some form (Macdonald, 2000).
106 The most obvious example of this being the consolidation of the medical profession following the Medical Act of 1858 which established the General Medical Council and the Medical Register, a public list of all recognised medical practitioners) (Stacey, 1992; Witz, 1992). Medicine was successful in securing state sponsorship for monopolistic control partly because it was able to justify its value within the arena of vital concern for individual, community and state (Larson, 1977).
50 years or so (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) has seen the professions fall under greater scrutiny as unparalleled availability of information following as exponential growth in information technology in the past quarter century has rendered their claim of status and expertise increasingly open to negotiation. The Thatcher years in particular saw even greater scrutiny of the professions (e.g. medicine and teaching in the first two terms of office and the legal profession in the third term), focused on challenging the legal monopolies of professions and, in particular, on strengthening the public regulation of professional bodies (Klein and Day, 1996). This was often achieved through the separation of the professional body from the associated regulatory body for professionals (e.g. as can be seen with the split between the Royal Colleges/General Medical Council for doctors, Bar Council/Bar Standards Board for barristers, Law Society/ Solicitors Regulatory Authority for solicitors etc.) which in turn allowed for the emergence of new professions (e.g. licenced conveyancers and patent agents) (cf Collins, 2006). Coupled with the general retreat of the state (Cook and Stevenson, 1996) - as privatisation changed corporate markets and government-business relations in the UK throughout that period (Harris, 1999), - the steady rise of legislation and regulation in Western societies during this time (cf Majone, 1994) could be interpreted as a backlash against professional independence/restrictive practices which had become characteristic of professional status and which had come to be afforded to the professions in acknowledgement of their privileged position of trust (promise of integrity) and discernible knowledge and expertise.

One key impact of managerialist control (alongside the debateable degree to which it improved efficiency) has been the reduction in autonomy for professionals as some of their authority has been gradually transferred to managers and administrators (e.g. doctors working within the NHS) (Oni, 1996). As Evetts (2013: 1) notes:

‘…increasingly, professionals (such as doctors, lawyers, teachers, social workers etc.) now work in employing organisations. For example, lawyers and accountants often work in large professional service firms (PSFs) and sometimes in international and commercial organisations; pharmacists can be found operating within national (retailing) companies; and engineers, journalists, performing artists, the armed forces and police find occupational control of their work and discretionary decision making increasingly difficult to maintain and sustain’.

With regard to the police and their tenuous relationship with professionalism, this may also be evidenced in regard to the decrease in autonomy of bearers of the office of
constable, for example through the introduction of legislation such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) (PACE) and the Regulation of Investigatory Procedures Act (2000) (RIPA) (this issue will be discussed in more detail later in the following section).

Despite a general decline in the esteem of the professions during the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the allure of professionalism continues to entice. Indeed, the twentieth century in particular has witnessed an increasing trend for occupations to identify themselves as professions, and to aspire to characteristics and behaviours which are generally regarded as professional with even more ‘new’ professions emerging during this period (e.g. journalism, nursing etc.). However, notwithstanding the colourful history of the professions and growing body of literature in the sociology of work on the development of professional work, the notion of professional as distinct from non-professional occupation is far from clear; there are several ways in which the phenomena of professions and professionalisation may be understood.

2.3.1.2 Profession, Professionalism and the Professionalisation of Policing

There is an entire body of academic literature on professions, which naturally represents many different ways of thinking about what makes an occupational group a profession. As such, there exists no single agreed upon definition of ‘profession’. Generally speaking, the concept is used to define a distinct category of occupational work and, in the Anglo-American literature, has traditionally been used to represent the category of privileged, high status, high income, self-regulating occupational groups (e.g. medicine, law and theology) which were seen as callings founded on ethical codes and usually focused on serving others (Roddenberry, 1953: 109). While what constitutes a profession has arguably changed over time with definitions remaining largely open to debate107, the idea of ‘profession’ nonetheless carries with it various connotations about

107 Understandings of the professions and professional behaviour vary historically and cross-nationally and are not fixed to a particular set of occupational tasks or the fields in which they are performed (Scuilli, 2009). Scuilli (2009: 51) points out how ‘none of these listings of empirical characteristics distinguishes professions unambiguously from middle class occupations on any invariant basis, ideal-typical or analytical’. Burrage, Jarausch and Siegrist (1990) argue that such a listing provides, at best, a ‘yardstick’ from which one group of occupations might be distinguished from others.
occupational characteristics, function in society, engagement with the market and other occupations, power, status and reward. The issue of whether or not policing can be classified as a profession has been addressed by a number of writers over the years (Etzioni, 1969; Goode, 1969; Hall, 1968; Rohl and Barnsley, 1995: 237; Vollmer and Mills, 1966; Wilensky, 1964) and has presented a troubling issue for many scholars. Commentators such as Neyroud and Beckley (2001: 74) have drawn attention to the fact that, when approached from a strict taxonomic angle, policing typically falls short of a number of the elements widely considered necessary to qualify for full professional status (cf Freidson, 1983). The police have traditionally have not been guided by a written code of ethics; the body of knowledge they do possess has not traditionally been theory based knowledge gained from education and/or resulting in qualifications; they possess a dubious degree of professional autonomy (both as an organisation and as individual 'professionals'); and the extent to which they are governed by a professional regulating body remains subject to debate.

Within the literature, professionalism is vaguely defined\(^ {108} \) as encompassing the occupational features of a closed group of specialists who ‘apply abstract knowledge to particular cases’ (Abbott, 1988, 8). The idea of closed groups and the notion of abstract knowledge are themes which run through almost all publications on the topic of professionalism (cf Freidson, 2001; Larson, 1977; Noordegraaf, 2007; Wilensky, 1964). All other aspects variably thought relevant to the term however remain subject to debate.

Within the literature, the concept of professionalisation is broadly regarded as the process to achieve the status of profession and has been interpreted as:

‘…the process to pursue, develop and maintain the closure of the occupational group in order to maintain practitioners’ own occupational self-interests in terms of their salary, status and power as well as the monopoly protection of the occupational jurisdiction’ (Evett, 2014: 34).

Efforts to define professionalism have most often resulted in the listing of a number of traits considered indicative of the professions and which set them apart from occupations (Freidson, 2001: 32; Greenwood, 1957; Moore and Rosenblum, 1970; Niederhoffer, 1969;)

\(^ {108} \)According to Lanyon (2009: 248), *professionalism* is ‘an ideology subscribed to by individuals aspiring to professional status within either an occupation or recognised profession’.

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Wilensky, 1964). Characteristics generally considered indicative of professional status have traditionally been based on classical interpretations of professionalism and generally speaking, can be considered to include six central elements:

1. a service orientation;
2. a strict code of ethics;
3. a degree of theory-based knowledge (usually gained from education and associated qualifications);
4. a high degree of autonomy and professional discretion;
5. monopoly over services and possession of specialist expertise;
6. governed by a regulating professional body.

With regard to the first of these core characteristics, the possession of a service orientation, Kleinig (1996: 31) describes how:

‘…the traditional professions of law, medicine, architecture, education, and theology … have been thought to offer a valuable public service. Their practitioners have provided highly skilled and knowledgeable assistance in respect to some of our most important interests – our negotiations with others, our bodily integrity, our need for shelter, our intellectual development, and spiritual destiny’.

Miller (2002: 43) similarly attributes to the professions an orientation towards ‘the satisfaction of certain fundamental needs, such as justice and health’. With regard to policing, most would agree that in a democratic society, policing should have a fundamental service orientation although it should be noted that there is disagreement about what precisely this is (Waddington, 1999). For example, while law enforcement and crime prevention continue as central themes in most accounts of the role of the police, the promotion of public safety and order, reducing fear, protecting rights, mediation and social engineering can now also be considered central to understandings (Kleinig, 1996: 23-24; Neyroud and Beckley, 2001: chapter 2). Like policing more generally, definitions of the core role of criminal investigation also vary, ranging from the collection and dissemination of intelligence to risk assessment, to the disruption of criminal networks.
Regarding the second core characteristic, because services provided by the professions are intimately intertwined with people’s most important public and/or private interests\(^{109}\) (e.g. their health, spiritual destiny and liberty) and thus require a great deal of trust/reliance on ethical integrity (as the services provided by professions are characteristically distinct/intangible from goods sold by manufacturers, merchants or retailers), professionals are generally governed by a strict code of ethics. It is the collective adoption and strict adherence to such a code that is often taken as a sign of a vocation’s or occupation’s true professional status (Kleinig, 1996: 33). According to Kleinig (1996: 33) efforts to introduce a code of ethics for the police in the UK have ‘been largely coincident with endeavours to professionalise the police’. Most recently, the new College of Policing, ‘a new professional body for the police service’, has been established to advance many ideals commensurate with the move to professionalisation. Amongst others, this has included the formulation of a revised Code of Ethics (College of Policing online, 2014)\(^{110}\). However, given the intrinsic relationship between the state and the police, it is arguably difficult to recognise any code of ethics which may be promulgated by the police as being independent from those core values of the state and which the police - as servants of the Crown - are ultimately charged with upholding.

A third characteristic commonly considered indicative of professional status concerns the issue of specialist knowledge based on theory and skills that are most often peculiar to their profession and are generally thought to be beyond the understanding and/or ability of those outside of the profession. Sometimes (and increasingly so), this specialisation will encompass those with access to the tools and technologies which are vital in the profession (e.g. medical equipment). Often a key component of such theoretical

\(^{109}\) With regard to criminal investigation, as Westera, Kebbell, Milne and Green (2014: 1) discuss ‘detectives are entrusted with a serious and onerous role. The investigations they conduct are relied on to identify and convict those guilty of inflicting the most serious of crimes’.

\(^{110}\) The police Code of Ethics was launched on 15\(^{th}\) July 2014 as part of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and sets out nine policing principles and ten standards of professional behaviour designed to guide decision making for everyone in policing (College of Policing, Online). Combined with the standards of professional behaviour, the Code will encourage officers and staff to challenge those who fall short of the standards expected. It is through this Code of Ethics then that professionalism in policing (at the level of the constable) is envisaged to be achieved through ‘high expectations’, ‘through laying down the law: serving notice that slack performance, unkempt appearance, rude manners and loose ethics will not be tolerated’ (Sklansky, 2014: 344). This is the sense in which Peel’s Metropolitan Police are often said to be the first ‘professional’ police service. The central logic of this form of professionalism is the hope that through using the discourse of professionalism as a ‘disciplinary logic’ a network of accountability can be created through which autonomous professional practice can be governed at a distance (Fournier, 1999: 280).
knowledge is that such knowledge has been attained through education and qualifications rather than pure experience. As Kleinig (1996: 35-36) discusses:

‘…the practical expertise of the professional is often said to be embedded in theory, in a group of the general principles governing the service, and not simply in the practical knowledge and skill of the craftsman … This is what distinguishes the architect from the draftsman, the engineer from the mechanic, the educated from the merely trained’.

In this respect, the police officer has traditionally differed from members of professional groups because much of the police’s expertise is traditionally accepted to be experience-based and therefore largely intangible. Indeed, the academic requirement for entry into police work has generally been no more than secondary school level education and a short period of academy training. However, increasingly police expertise has emerged as something which is reflective and knowledge-based as opposed to that which relies on common-sense, intuition and innate talent (Sklansky, 2014: 345). Recent years have seen a notable drive towards greater input from academics who study policing and crime control (Neyroud, 2011: 14; Weisburd and Neyroud, 2011) and through the incremental development of ‘a new more productive relationship with Further and Higher Education services’ (Neyroud, 2011: 45). There have been significant developments in academic-police relations over the past twenty years or so, which have taken many different forms (cf Johnston and Shearing, 2009; Cordner and White, 2010; Murji, 2010; Fyfe and Wilson, 2012; Bryant et al., 2013; Engle and Henderson, 2014). Most recently, these can be evidenced with regard to changes in the entry requirements for new recruits (Neyroud, 2011: 85) and in relation to criminal investigation, in the recent introduction of the Professionalising Investigation Programme (PIP) and, to a lesser degree, the input from academics in police ‘Murder Manuals’.

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111 The quest to make policing more effective in tackling crime and to enhance levels of accountability and legitimacy has driven important changes in the relationship between police organisations and the research community (Stone and Travis, 2011).

112 Discussions around academic-police collaboration have emerged as something of a ‘sub-field’ of police studies in recent years (Murji, 2010). In-service (programmes of study for serving police officers), pre-service (organised around the training of new recruits), and initial-service (programmes that aim to meet the same learning requirements of an initial programme that can be completed prior to joining the police) training programmes for officers and recruits are now delivered by a number of universities across the UK (Bryant, Cockett, Tong and Wood, 2013: 386).

113 PIP was originally conceived as a major learning and development programme for investigators and aims to ensure that officers and staff are trained, skilled and accredited to necessary level to be able to undertake relevant investigations. PIP level 2 (and 3) investigators are likely to be delegated their own caseload of investigations including those of a serious and/or complex crime nature (see Schedule 1 of the
Fourth, professions are also said to be characterised by a high degree of autonomy and professional discretion. The idea that professions have obtained social closure (Murphy, 1988), a monopoly (Larson, 1977), or jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988) over certain tasks and autonomy over the performance of these tasks are well-documented characteristics of ideas about professional status (Burrage et al., 1990). At the organisational level the police maintain a degree of autonomy through the tradition of constabulary independence, that being freedom from direction and control by government114 (Lustgarten, 1986). Nonetheless, the recent establishment of the College of Policing in place of ACPO and introduction of elected Police Crime Commissioners (against the will of the police) could be considered evidence of a further shift towards greater (more direct) external regulation (albeit at arm’s length) by the state.

Police officers also operate a significant degree of professional discretion (i.e. the autonomy of the individual professional rather than the autonomy of the professional body itself) in their day to day interactions and decisions. Discretion is widely accepted to be an integral and ubiquitous part of the work115 of police officers which is necessitated by the complex and often contradictory nature of the problems faced by officers on a daily basis. Indeed, within the context of policing, the law and discretion are considered two sides of the same coin (Tata, 2012), with discretion existing as an inevitable corollary of legal rules which seek to guide and account for any type of work which is not easily amenable to general rules. Discretion is also a fundamental aspect of the Office of Constable (i.e. that which separates the police officer from the ordinary citizen and therefore provides them with the legitimate authority to use force wherever and wherever necessary and the right to remove liberty), thus making their role unique within society (Lustgarten, 1986). In his recent assessment of ‘professionalism’ in policing, Sklansky (2014: 343-354) reflects on the idea of police professionalism as ‘internalised norms’ - i.e. when actions guided by occupational pride rather than rules enforced by a bureaucratic command structure are used to advance an agenda of integrity. In viewing police

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114 This being distinct from accountability which refers broadly to the requirement to account for one’s decisions which, since the 1980s in particular, has ensured a sustained and pervasive process of organisational reform.

115 But of course discretion is not unique to the police. As Stenning (2009) noted, discretion pervades common law systems of criminal justice at every stage (through arrest, prosecution, trial and sentencing), and may be contrasted with the ‘principle of legality’ that supposedly seeks to limit discretionary justice, more or less, in many continental European civil law systems.
professionalism in this way, Sklansky takes account of the complex and subjective nature of police work, recognising the importance of ‘professional judgement’ and, with that, the disparate nature of professionalism as it applies to individual officers and to the police organisation itself.

While the work of detectives has always been characterised as containing a high level of autonomy and information control and low level of visibility (Ericson, 1981), as Ericson and Haggerty (1997) point out, such traits may have been exaggerated. Developments in communication rules, formats and technologies through which police knowledge is distributed (and marketed) in fact make police work highly visible, both to police management and to outside organisations (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Furthermore, in more recent years, legislative developments (e.g. RIPA, PACE) coupled with a managerialist, audit-driven work culture and an increasingly critical public have also seen greater restrictions placed on both the level of operational autonomy and degree of individual discretion exercisable by individual officers. RIPA has placed statutory restrictions on conduct in regard to the interception of communications, surveillance and the use of covert human intelligence sources thus, further curtailting the autonomy of individual investigators.

Fifth, the notion that professions hold a monopoly over the expert labour market and with that, exclusive professional practice of services based on specialist knowledge or expertise, is central to several definitions of a profession. Traditionally police work was not considered specialist because it was perceived as based on ‘common-sense’ practical knowledge which is, to some degree or another, available to all (Kleinig, 1996: 34-25). However, police officers are now increasingly required to master complex technologies and possess knowledge and expertise in scientific techniques of investigation and, in this sense, can be considered highly skilled service providers. Yet viewed in the context of plural policing and the ongoing history of police reform and ‘modernisation’ (Savage, 2007), the police’s market monopoly on their expert services appears to have become progressively more tenuous (if such dominance ever was anything but symbolic (Jones and Newburn, 2002)) although, so far they retain their monopoly on state supported coercive power possessing the capacity and/or authority to use force in any situation in which such intervention may be required (Bittner, 1970: 122). Within some areas of the
police service (e.g. specialist units such as financial investigation) the knowledge and expertise required may be more like that characteristic of the traditional professional.

Finally, most professions have associated professional bodies charged with setting and maintaining standards of knowledge and of entry (e.g. the General Medical Council). The establishment of a regulating professional body is widely considered to be one of the distinguishing features of the professions and is somewhat inextricably linked to the notion of professional autonomy or self-regulation\textsuperscript{116}. While at first blush, the claim of professions to self-regulation may seem strange (as Lieberman (1978: 90) contends, ‘We don’t ask non-playing members of football teams to referee games involving their teams’), it is also unsurprising given the incentive to preserve quality standards (through the establishment of restrictions imposed on professionals), thus ensuring the status and reputation of the profession.

It is in the feature of self-regulation - through the establishment of an independent professional body - that the police’s pursuit of professional status has historically been lacking. Both the now disbanded ACPO and NPIA fell short of the required standards needed to qualify as a professional regulating body. As Neyroud\textsuperscript{117} (2011: 48) argues, although set up to be a ‘police owned and police led’ body, NPIA was an agency of the Home Office (and dependent on it) so ultimately lacked the necessary freedom to act as a central professional body for the police. The College of Policing, introduced in 2012, which in part replaced the NPIA and advances many of the ideals of professionalism (namely education, training, standards and evidence-based knowledge), was envisaged as the new professional body of the police. Indeed, it is envisaged that eventually the new College will be replaced with a statutory professional body, a body that will potentially ‘raise the professional status of police officers and police staff, allowing them to gain greater recognition and reward for accredited levels of expertise’ (Home Office, 2012). However, while the operational independence of the police has long been considered a

\textsuperscript{116} With regard to policing, this being the idea of the police as an operationally independent organisation in a similar way to that of the medical or legal professions.

\textsuperscript{117} It should be noted that Neyroud’s version of operational independence differs from that promoted by the mid-twentieth century American reformers in that it centres on ‘standards of competence and achievement administered by a self-regulating professional society, together with a body of accumulated expertise - knowledge and best practices - over which the society and its members take collective responsibility’ rather than on ‘freedom from political second guessing’ (Sklansky, 2013: 345).
‘fundamental principle of British Policing’ (Home Office, 2010: 12), the police nonetheless continue to exist as an extension of government control and, therefore, can never be independent of it. While the recent restructuring of the tripartite system may ‘transfer power back to the people’ and ‘away from government’ (Home Office, 2010: 3), it is unlikely to change that fundamental fact. As such, any desire for self-regulation by the police is arguably flawed.

A further, and more recent, addition to the criteria of characteristics considered by commentators in the field to be indicative of professional status within the context of late modernity (Giddens, 1991) and one that is central to modern policing techniques and practices and discourses of professionalism concerns the centrality of the narrative of ‘risk’. For Evetts (2014: 33), professions can also be characterised as:

‘…the structural, occupational and institutional arrangements for dealing with work associated with the uncertainties of modern lives in risk societies … Professionals are extensively engaged in dealing with risk, with risk assessment and, through the use of expert knowledge, enabling customers and clients to deal with uncertainty’.

According to Beck (2006: 33) ‘modern society has become a risk society in the sense that it is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself has produced’. This has permeated many areas of work, including police work where the management of intelligence and knowledge is now considered to be a crucial aspect of the work of policing (Ibrahim and Rowley, 2010: 612). In their book, ‘Policing the Risk Society’ (1997), Ericson and Haggerty argue that as society has become more fragmented, the focus of police work has shifted from traditional forms of crime control and order maintenance towards a more proactive orientation. Such an approach to the provision of policing and security by the police has been mediated through the use of surveillance technologies designed to identify, predict and manage risks including undertaking risk assessments for themselves (e.g. public order policing) and for others (e.g. in civil

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118 In 2010, a government white paper titled ‘Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting Police and the People’ commented on ‘the long held principle of operational independence, where those operating in the Office of the Constable are able to make independent decisions on how to use their legitimate coercive powers on behalf of the state will continue to remain the cornerstone of the British policing model’ (Home Office, 2010: 12).

119 Policing is inherently political in the sense that it is an institution ‘created and sustained by political processes to enforce dominant conceptions of public order’ (Skolnick, 1972: 41).

120 Strategic threat and risk assessments (STRA) are proactive assessments of risk to public order which are undertaken by the police and which usually examine and aim to mitigate risks from individuals or groups where there is intelligence that they might have the capability and/or intent to cause disorder in E&W.
emergencies or road traffic accidents). The authors go on to argue that the police should be viewed as ‘knowledge brokers’ due to the fact that much of police time is now spent gathering and disseminating knowledge of risk to other social institutions concerned with security. For Evetts (2002), risk is included as a qualifying characteristic of professional status within the modern context and is certainly integral to the way policing and ideas about professionalism in policing are constructed.

While the ‘core’ characteristics of professionalism discussed above continue to be variously drawn upon by commentators and practitioners in their attempts to discern what is professional work (e.g. Freidson, 2001), it is now more commonly accepted that differences between the professions and occupations exist as differences of degree rather than kind. Most writers on the subject of the professions would agree with the opinion of Parsons (1968: 536) that ‘the boundaries of the group system we generally call the professions are fluid and indistinct’. It has also become increasingly common for attention to be focused on discussing the many similarities of the two social forms (Olofsson, 2009), with many choosing to subscribe to the definitional stance taken by Becker (1972), that is, simply, any work which succeeds in getting itself called such, should be regarded as a profession.

Nonetheless, as professionalism endures in its allure in many areas of work\textsuperscript{121}, so do attempts to distinguish professions from occupations (Freidson, 2001). The appeal to professionalism has been a strong current in the development of the police organisation in the UK\textsuperscript{122} and, generally speaking, has been a theme underpinning many of the reforms which have been directed at the police in recent decades. Recent societal and policy changes have caused increased complexities in the contexts and environments for professions which consequentially have led to increased boundary blurring within long established areas of professional work. With regard to policing, pluralising trends such as

\textsuperscript{121}Within contemporary parlance the concept of professionalism continues to be utilised in a variety of ways, for example; as a marketing slogan in advertising to attract customers (Fournier, 1999), in occupational recruitment campaigns, in company mission statements and organisational aims and objectives to motivate employees, in managerial literature including in training manuals, and even occupational regulation and control (both internal and external forms). All these are now explained and justified as means to improve professionalism in work (Evetts, 2009: 19-20).

\textsuperscript{122}The significance of the discourse of police professionalism can also be identified in relation to the development of police organisations in other countries. For example, see work by Fleming (2013) for an account of the development of the police in Australia.
the growth in private sector policing and security providers and processes of
civilianisation have cumulatively called into question the sustainability of professional
policing orthodoxies - namely the belief of policing as an intuitively learned, artisan craft.
This in turn has instigated the emergence of a new vision of police professionalism as the
police seek actively align themselves with many of the traditional characteristics of
professions in order to assert their jurisdictional monopoly within this new and
increasingly fragmented field of policing and security provision.

2.3.2 The Discourse of Police Professionalism - The Enduring Allure

Discourses of 'professionalism' have long had a strong resonance in relation to the
police as an occupational group and, as will be discussed below, are frequently invoked
to support, or resist, fundamental changes to the ways in which they work. The
establishment of Peel’s ‘new police’ in 1829 heralded a new era of ‘professional policing’,
in that it was distinguishable from earlier forms by its ‘specialisation, professionalism and
publicness’\(^\text{123}\) (Rowe, 2008: 24). It brought with it a shift from an ‘amateur’ system of
policing to a ‘professional’ force of constables (Storch, 1999; Reiner, 1985), who were
centrally controlled, uniformed, empowered by legislation and funded by the state
(Mawby, 2008)\(^\text{124}\).

In policing, the discourse of professionalism has been a key driving force behind many
of the reforms that have been directed at the police in recent years and which have served
to alter both the shape and texture of policing in E&W. The drive for professionalism has
been motivated by a complex variety of factors, including aspirational need for higher
socio-economic status and strengthening police legitimacy (Hallenberg, 2012: 96)\(^\text{125}\).
However, it is also likely to have been influenced by the changing nature and character
of policing in recent decades. Indeed, if it is the warranted officer who is to be seen as the
professional, perhaps such developments can also be viewed as a strategic repositioning

\(^{123}\) The extent to which the establishment of the ‘new’ police marked a sharp break with past practices must
not however be overstated (Fyfe, 2013: 408).
\(^{124}\) See section 2.2 of this thesis for a more detailed discussion of the history of the police, policing and the
police detective.
\(^{125}\) With regard to legitimacy, as Stone and Travis (2011: 14) argue, recent decades have seen greater
recognition of the fact that legitimacy is not only something which is conferred by the law and democratic
politics, but is something which must also be earned by the police adhering to professional standards in
their contact with the public.
of the police within their field of influence as the contemporary policing landscape becomes ever more crowded? Although significant steps have been made to professionalise the police occupation, many of which have been in line with characteristics considered indicative of the professions (as illustrated in the previous section), the process has been far from straightforward (Sklansky, 2013: 344). It is clear from the work of Sklansky (2014: 344) that there is something protean about the nature of police professionalism. Clearly, professionalism ‘means different things to different people and at different times and serves various purposes’ (Chan, 1999: 5; Fyfe, 2013). This is true not just between organisations but within them, with interpretations of professionalism also often existing at both the occupational and organisational levels.

The commitment to professionalism within the police organisation also varies between ranks (Manning, 1977). As Sklansky (2014: 356) notes, such definitional ambiguity can easily turn a debate about police professionalism into a debate about semantics. However, as Tilley and Laycock (2014: 370) discuss, when we talk of ‘professional policing’ here in the UK, generally speaking:

‘…we mean it to refer as in medicine, to the application of an established body of knowledge and the completion of high quality work with a considerable amount of delegated authority for staff following high standards of professional ethics which stress personal integrity and public service. A professional organisation supports this service in valuing equity, non-discrimination and in monitoring the work of members to ensure that standards are maintained’.

In his recent ‘Review of Police Leadership and Training’ (2011) Peter Neyroud places heavy emphasis on the development of ‘a new and vibrant professionalism in policing’ (p14), arguing that the time has now come for the police to move ‘from an organisation that acts professionally’ to ‘a professional service’ (p11). While the language used suggests that there may be something qualitatively different about the emerging style of police professionalism compared with that which has gone before, the foundations of Neyroud’s ‘formal professionalisation’ can broadly be traced back to older notions of professionalism as expertise and self-regulation. Indeed, in Neyroud’s vision of police professionalism, the need for which he attributes to ‘the developing nature of the

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126 Evetts (2009: 23-24) defines ‘occupational professionalism’ as ‘a discourse constructed within professional occupational groups and incorporates collegial authority. It involves relations of practitioner trust from both employers and clients. It is based on autonomy and discretionary judgment and assessment by practitioners in complex cases. It depends on common and lengthy systems of education and vocational training and the development of strong occupational identities and work cultures. Controls are operationalised by practitioners themselves who are guided by codes of professional ethics which are monitored by professional institutes and associations’.
knowledge requirement and skills development within the [police] occupation’ (Neyroud, 2011: 45), professionalism can be achieved through the development of a professional policing body with a responsibility for providing:

‘…clearer standards, a service-owned qualification framework, greater focus on professional development across all roles and, as a result, a new more productive relationship with other providers such as Further and Higher Education’ (ibid).

Growing interest in police pre-employment training and education over the last five years or so\(^{127}\) suggests that while policing continues to fall short of recognition as a ‘regulated profession’\(^{128}\) in the UK, an attempt to instigate debate around this issue may be underway.

The persistent pull of professionalism in policing begs the question, why? Why is it that occupations such as the police strive to ascend to professional status? What is it about the professions that give them their enduring appeal? This is an issue that has been dealt with on numerous occasions in the sociological literature on work and professions and, for the most part, the allure of professionalism has been attributed to jurisdictional monopoly coupled with the degree of social elevation offered to those who wear the mantle (Abbott, 1988; Larson, 1977).

Manning (1977: 12) argues that the rhetoric of police professionalism ‘is the most important strategy employed by the police to defend their mandate and thereby to build self-esteem, organisational autonomy and occupational solidarity and cohesiveness’. Since its beginning, (and in a fashion comparable to other now well established professions such as social work) the police, like many other occupations, have struggled ‘for an exclusive right to perform certain types of work’, and have found themselves in ‘constant conflict with other groups over issues of boundaries, clients, resources and licensing’ (Weiss, Spiro, Sherer and Korin-Langer, 2004: 288). Like other occupational groups, the discourse of police professionalism allows the police a discourse through which to defend their status from competing interests (e.g. from other occupational groups, government and their clients) (Macdonald, 2000; Popple, 1985).

\(^{127}\) It should be noted that some universities have been offering pre-service training programmes for police officers for a number of years now (e.g. Canterbury Christ Church University has had its programme in place since 2002 (Bryant et al., 2013: 386)). Furthermore, although arguably connected to the drive for increased professionalism in policing, this development may also be representative of the will of government to outsource the risk and cost of police training.

\(^{128}\) A regulated profession is one ‘where access to or practice of a profession is restricted by national law to those holding specific qualifications’ (UKNCP, 2015).
From this perspective, changes in the discourse of police professionalism can therefore be interpreted as efforts by the police to preserve their mandate during periods of socio-economic and political disorder which potentially threaten their domain. As Chan et al. (2003: 6) have argued, ‘The new push for police professionalism may have arisen from the need to control ‘police work’ in a climate of jurisdictional competition and interagency rivalries’ (Chan et al., 2003: 6). This can be evidenced most clearly with regard to changes in the context of policing and security (e.g. the proliferation of specialist policing agencies and the expansion and regulation of the private security industry\textsuperscript{129}) and in the dominant approaches to policing over recent decades. For example, typically, traditional conceptions of police professionalism have rested on three broad concepts: the idea that crime control is the dominant function of the police, the belief in the police as an objective, efficient and scientifically organised bureaucracy and as a centralised organisation independent of local social conflict (Sklansky, 2011: 2). However, the uptake of community policing which began in the 1970s marked a fundamental shift in understandings of police professionalism and, to a great extent, demonstrated a clear rejection of the older notions of police professionalism (Sklansky, 2011; Stone and Travis, 2011: 8-12). Rising crime rates and failing police legitimacy (furthered by the emergence of several high profile examples of police incompetence or mismanagement (cf Neyroud and Beckley, 2001) and corruption), necessitated the implementation of a model of policing that improved police-community relations and strengthened police legitimacy (Tilley, 2003). This in turn, required a reconceptualisation in the discourse of police professionalism, from professionalism as the ‘thin blue line’ to professionalism as ‘not going it alone’ (Sklansky, 2011: 2). Since then, a more proactive, intelligence-led policing approach has emerged, instigating a return to the three central elements associated with ‘old police professionalism’; it makes crime control the dominant function of the police, police tactics and objectives are seen to be more objective and scientific and the importance of centralising much of the handling and analysis of data above the department level has been emphasised.

\textsuperscript{129} Private security has increased in status over the last few decades and has, to some extent, also sought to achieve a level of professionalism in its work/operations. For example, many private security actors/organisations now possess specialised knowledge (often gained through higher education, particularly at the senior level) and possess a level of professional autonomy (e.g. the establishment of the Security Industry Authority in the UK). However, whether private security qualifies as a profession remains controversial, can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis and is largely dependent upon the degree of ‘service ideal’ exhibited by the individual/organisation (Hess, 2009: 33-35).
As with the arrival of community policing, the emergence of the intelligence-led approach coincided with major changes in socio-political and economic context, most notably, the arrival of NPM and its associated pressures. More recently still, the planned transition from the police service’s traditional post-employment training model to a pre-join system which is detailed in both the Neyroud review (2011) (‘Review of Police Leadership and Training’) and the Winsor review (2011/2012) (of police officer and staff remuneration and conditions) testifies to a developing formal style of professionalism which is being driven by a mixture of socio-economic and political factors. For example, against a backdrop of austerity, pre-employment training provided by further and higher education institutions has become increasingly appealing as it shifts the burden of the cost of training onto the individual wishing to join the police, something that was recommended by Flanagan (2008).

As has already been discussed in this chapter (see sections 2.2.4 - 2.2.5), the changing terrain of policing over the last three decades or so has led to increased complexities in the varying contexts and environments of police work. Organisational changes, specifically changes in the police workforce demographic (namely through the growing significance of the private, voluntary and third sectors to policing provision in the UK and more specifically, through the buying-in and contracting-out of police tasks to non-warranted individuals) have led to a blurring or hybridisation of the boundaries with regard to professionalism in policing and its associated tasks. As in many areas of work (e.g. law, medicine and education) the use of paraprofessional personnel by the police has increased as decreasing budgets, expanding calls for service and a changing policing landscape (necessitating increased specialisation and an increasingly more diverse and flexible skills set) have required an increase in both manpower and specialist skills which are often distinct from those of officers. This has in turn instigated a partial shift away from the ‘omnicompetence’ model and the growing significance of (non-warranted) paraprofessional personnel within the police organisation. Generally speaking, paraprofessionals perform similar work to professionals, possessing some of the traits broadly considered to typify a profession (Parsons, 1954) namely, the possession of specialist knowledge and expertise, a variable degree of professional discretion and a service orientation, but essentially without equivalent power and status. It is worth noting

130 Faulconbridge and Muzio (2008) use the notion of ‘hybridity’ where different strands of professionalism and other organisational principles coexist and co-penetrate each other, producing new hybrid arrangements.
that while professionals have always had employed staff (e.g. doctors have nurses and receptionists), only some of these auxiliary occupational groups (e.g. nurses) have since emerged as professions in their own right. With regard to the central focus of this study, the extent to which CIs can be said to be operating in the role of a paraprofessional to professional police detectives remains largely unknown. In some areas of work (e.g. criminal investigation or patrol), a split-force team model may be developing. However, as will be explored in this thesis, processes of modernisation are likely to continue to transform long established arenas/dimensions of work within the police (e.g. CID), and the police paraprofessional may come to adopt a progressively more established position within the organisation.

2.3.3 The Rise of the Paraprofessional

There are an increasing number of policing paraprofessionals operating within the police organisation and also beyond it (e.g. street wardens). Initially, through the process of civilianisation, non-warranted individuals were recruited to assist police officers in their work (see Chapter One, section 1.2.2 of this thesis), freeing them up to return to operational and frontline duties such as patrol and investigation (HMIC, 2004: 39-40). Within the milieu of NPM and increased demand on the police, civilianisation provided a cost-effective solution to the issues of the period. However, as work by Abbott (1998: 72) illustrates, it is during such circumstances that a profession’s claim to jurisdictional control over a particular area of work is open to debate and can be vulnerable to claims by other occupational groups. In this sense, the growing presence of non-warranted individuals within the police organisation could be interpreted as an ‘assault on professionalism’ (Freidson, 2001; Krause, 1999) as tasks which were previously undertaken by professionals are ‘standardised’ and redistributed to less qualified workers. However, as Abbott (1998: 72) goes on to discuss, it is also possible that through the creation of subordinate groups that are capable of handling ‘dangerously routine’ professional work, professions are able to guard themselves against such vulnerability. Guyot (1979: 272) supports such claims suggesting that:

‘A common step in the process of raising an occupation to professional standing is the shedding of routine tasks from the occupation and assigning them to paraprofessional occupations’.
In this sense, the growing use of non-warranted individuals within the police organisation might also be itself considered a direct attempt by the police to professionalise the organisation. However, in more recent years, the role of the paraprofessional has evolved and in many areas of work the role of these individuals is progressively encroaching on that of professionals. Within the contemporary police organisation, non-warranted ‘paraprofessionals’ can now be found managing major functional areas of police work (e.g. the production and management of intelligence). Furthermore, as has also been the case in many other areas of professional work (e.g. teaching, parole, probation), despite being initially conceived as providing supportive assistance to professionals, the role of policing paraprofessionals has progressively expanded and now (as will be seen in the results of this research) includes many ‘frontline’ duties (e.g. patrol and investigation) and tasks (e.g. interviewing suspects) considered fundamental to the effective functioning of the police organisation and traditionally exclusively police (officer) operational.

Research on the subject of paraprofessional involvement in professional work is extensive and has examined areas of work both within the criminal justice system (cf work by Love (1981) on the role of paraprofessionals in the parole and probation services and Schindler and Brawley (1987) on paraprofessionals in social care) and external to it (cf work by Morris (2001) on the developing role of teaching assistants). Study of the expanding role of paraprofessionals in policing is sparse and tends to focus on their involvement in patrol work (cf O’Neill, 2014). The designation of professional tasks to paraprofessionals, what Silvestri and Crowther-Dowey (2008: 147) refer to as ‘downward hierarchical theft’, where the roles and responsibilities of criminal justice professionals are being handed down to those whom professional groups perceive to be relatively under-qualified or unqualified and inexperienced people’, raises significant questions about the contemporary nature of professionalism within the police organisation. For example, as Freidson (2001: 17) argues:

‘…the two most general ideas underlying professionalism are the belief that certain work is so specialised as to be inaccessible to those lacking the required training and experience, and the belief that it cannot be standardised, rationalised or, as Abbott (1991b: 22) puts it ‘commodified’.

For the police, the jurisdiction of warranted officers in the ‘core’ areas of police work such as criminal investigation is assumed to stem from their specialist knowledge and skill in that particular area of work. As Turner (1987) has shown, knowledge is crucial to
a profession and central to the struggle by professionals to resist the ‘routinisation’ of their work and its fragmentation to groups of paraprofessionals. However, if the work being undertaken by paraprofessionals is being directed and managed by the professional (in the case of the police this would be the warranted officer), does the utilisation of paraprofessionals within the police necessarily matter for recognition of the police as a profession and of warranted officers as the professionals? Furthermore, while the growing use of paraprofessionals in areas of work traditionally considered solely ‘police operational’ does raise questions about the nature of the police knowledge base as it has been habitually conceived\textsuperscript{131}, this is perhaps only significant to understandings of the warranted officer as professionals if the paraprofessional is being afforded autonomy in doing/managing their own case and/or undertaking their own enquires.

Within the contemporary CID, the question now is whether detectives should retain their position at the apex of the CID hierarchy. Indeed, many of the skills now considered essential to the effective functioning of the police, such as analysis and the production and management of intelligence, have been ‘in-sourced’ to non-warranted civilian specialists (e.g. intelligence analysts). Indeed, according to the 2001 government White Paper, \textit{Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform}, which preceding the introduction of the Police Reform Act 2002 in parliament, one of the primary reasons for introducing CIs was to bolster the specialist knowledge base of the CID:

‘Money laundering, fraud, intellectual property theft, and other crimes are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Information technology and communications systems are both the means of crime and its object – and at the same time vital investigative tools in the fight against criminals. Too few officers currently have the necessary skills to deal with the most complex it based crime. Even with more specialist detectives we will not be able to guarantee an adequate capacity in most specialised fields. We must be able to attract career specialists in these areas to work as part of police investigative teams. Chief Officers can already appoint civilians from these backgrounds, but they are unable themselves to exercise police powers necessary to pursue an investigation; and they have limited career opportunities open to them. Civilian investigators must be able to function as a full member of a police investigating team’ (Home Office, 2001: 44).

\textsuperscript{131} The main skills of police work have been described as ‘craft’ skills, not based on theory, but on the ‘dirty work’ of managing the boundaries of respectability (Waddington, 1999). Furthermore, much of that craft remains to be validated (Bayley and Bittner, 1984).
Competition from private providers has also grown substantially in recent years (Johnston, 2000) with many now also offering alternatives to several of the police’s core services (e.g. patrol, investigation etc.). Together, these developments suggest a blurring and hybridisation of occupational and sectoral identities within the police organisation and, with regard to criminal investigation, render the claim of detectives to professional jurisdiction in their work open to debate.

2.3.4 The ‘Professional’ Knowledge Base of Detectives

The idea of policing as an intuitively learned craft skill is the central logic underpinning much of that which is ‘known’ with regard to the ways and means by which police officers investigate crime. This notion continues to be promoted by an ever-growing body of fictional work on the police which tends to favour depictions centring on this old regime ideal. For police detectives, it is this notion of investigation as an artisan craft that secures the foundations and legitimacy of their profession as well as their occupational identity. The enduring discourse of police professionalism has placed the investigative skills of officers under scrutiny, rendering the importance of expert, tacit and experiential knowledge and expertise more open to challenge (Olofsson, 2009; Verpraet, 2009).

For much of its history, the detective role has been safeguarded from the most pervasive of police reforms due to the assumed peculiar nature of the knowledge base from which the ability of officers to investigate is traditionally said to derive. The dominance of the old regime perspective (i.e. the idea of criminal investigation as an intuitively learned artisan craft) has ensured such orthodoxies remained unchallenged allowing the police detective an unusual degree of cultural and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986)\textsuperscript{132}. As Kleinig (1996: 34-37) discusses, like police work in general, the defining characteristic of the profession of detective is arguably the possession of special knowledge and

\textsuperscript{132} In his ‘Theory of Practice’ Bourdieu distinguishes between four types of capital: economic capital, such as money, land, employment; social capital, such as various kinds of valued relations with significant others; cultural capital, mainly legitimate knowledge, such as education, of one kind or another; and symbolic capital, such as prestige, social class, and social honour (Bourdieu, 1977: 171-183; Jenkins, 2002: 85; Thomson, 2008: 67).
expertise. However, in the case of the detective, this special knowledge and expertise relates to a specific type of police work and is not available to all police officers.

In many respects, detective work can be considered an ‘intellectual specialism’ in that it requires ‘the use of a circumscribed body of knowledge and skills thought to gain productive ends’ and encompasses tasks in which discretion or fresh judgement must often be exercised if they are to be performed successfully’ (Freidson, 2001: 18). Speaking on intellectual specialism, Freidson (2001: 23-24) notes:

‘Whatever the case may be in reality (and that may be a matter of opinion), the tasks and their outcome are believed to be so indeterminate … as to require attention to the variation to be found in individual cases. And while those whose occupation it is to perform such tasks will almost certainly engage in some routines that can be quite mechanical, it is believed that they must be prepared to be sensitive to the necessity of altering routine for individual circumstances that require discretionary judgement and action. Such work has the potential for innovation and creativity’.

Like police work more generally, the occupation of a detective, by its very nature, is one of social enterprise in that it requires practitioners to be sensitive to the variable and diverse nature of their work. Detectives can be said to be creative in that they ‘make crime’, using their discretion and knowledge of the field to convert ‘social reality’ into ‘legal reality’ (Ericson, 1981). There are competing perspectives regarding the nature of detective work and, in turn, in what sense the knowledge and skills used by detectives should be conceived. The terms ‘art’, ‘craft’ and ‘science’ are variously drawn upon in research to help characterise the process by which detectives undertake their work (cf Carson, 2009; Innes, 2003; Repetto, 1978; Tong and Bowling, 2006). Debate has suggested that in undertaking investigative work, detectives may draw on any one to a combination of all three of these approaches, with each approach using a different range

133 From the period of the Industrial Revolution and the publication of Smith’s ‘The Wealth of Nations’ in which he used the term ‘division of labour’ to characterise the specialised enterprises of the workers he observed, ‘there has been a continuous increase in specialisation in the pursuit and application of complex, formal knowledge and technique’ (Freidson, 2001: 21). In characterising the different types of specialisation in existence today, Freidson (2001: 23-24) makes the distinction between manual/mechanical specialisation (i.e. work which is performed by semi-skilled workers which is routinised, repetitive and which has been specifically organised to minimise individual discretion) and what he calls ‘discretionary’ or ‘intellectual’ specialisation (i.e. work which encompasses tasks in which discretion or fresh judgement must often be exercised if they are to be performed successfully).
of skills and accompanying knowledge, which can be both formal and informal in character.

‘Some are codified in texts, or otherwise described clearly and systematically in the course of training and work and, as such, become ‘explicit knowledge’. This information can be formulated in words or symbols and, therefore, can be stored, copied, and transferred by impersonal means, such as in written documents or computer files’ (McKenzie and Spinardi, 1998: 215) (e.g. PACE).

Others, however, can be communicated informally, through an extensive process of socialisation and, as such, are tacit in character, ‘remaining unverbalised, perhaps even unverbalisable, but in any case not part of a formal corpus of codified texts’ (Freidson, 2001: 25). The detective makes use of both knowledge dimensions simultaneously in the performance of his/her role but it is the more abstract, tacit category of knowledge which has arguably ensured the detective a degree of sovereignty with regard to the practice of criminal investigation for a considerable period of time. It is also the tacit category of knowledge which is referred to as the ‘art’ and ‘craft’ of detective work - the instinctive, experience dependent and culturally approved mechanisms that guide the application of knowledge (Tong and Bowling, 2006).

Ericson (1981) and Sanders (1977) argue that the art of policing lies in the ability to read criminal behaviour, separate ‘the false from the genuine’ (Sanders, 1977; Ericson, 1981) but also in identifying effective and creative lines of enquiry. It concerns intuition, instinctive feelings and hunches towards problem solving in an investigative capacity and is derived from experience of time spent ‘on the beat’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006: 324), a ‘gift’134:

‘The depiction of detective work as an ‘art’ aligns closely with the popular conception of a detective having innate, non-concrete, characteristics, such as intuition and instinct, that training and education can do little for’ (Westera, Kebbel, Milne and Green, 2014: 2).

The old regime perspective of the seasoned detective also highlights the notion of detective work as a craft which is thought to be rooted in experience gained while ‘on the

134 See Lioger (1993, 1996) for an interesting case study of French dowsers and their gift. This is an individual attribute which cannot be learned in the classroom or routinely acquired by experience and is perhaps even divine.
job’. Such necessary craft skills are considered to provide detectives with an understanding of the role of suspects, victims and witnesses as well as an ability to organise a case file in a manner deemed appropriate by the detective (Hobbs, 1988)\textsuperscript{135}:

‘The use of manipulation and negotiation with suspects, victims and witnesses, police managers and supervisors to achieve either organisational ends or a form of justice considered appropriate by the detective may all be seen as relevant characteristics of the craft of detective work’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006: 324).

This depiction of detective as artist and craftsman furthers the belief that detectives possess a breadth of innate, non-concrete qualities, many of which only experience can provide, as theory in classrooms and books does not help the detective read the streets (Simon, 1991; Reppetto, 1978). As Tong (2009: 8) makes clear, ‘The failure of the police service to clearly articulate and develop the detective ‘art’ of investigative decision making has led to the belief that only some detectives can be recognised for their brilliance within the detective hierarchy’. It is also a central theme safeguarding the detective’s privileged status both within the police organisation itself and also within wider society, amongst the general public and to some degree, for the state. It is the detective’s practical working knowledge of investigation which is considered to afford them the ability to ‘construct or redefine a problem that experience or hunch suggests will facilitate a solution or enable the application of a preferred mode of problem solving’ (Scribner, 1986: 21-22). As Freidson (2001: 25) notes, ‘to solve an abstract problem, one must not only have command over the body of knowledge connected with the problem, but also the rules of discourse and the capacity or skill to employ them so as to arrive at an acceptable solution’.

The art and craft of detective work can therefore be understood as a type of skilled practical thinking which is marked by flexibility, ‘solving the same problem now one way, now another, each way finely fitted to the occasion’ (Scriber, 1986: 21-22). Indeed, as Simon (1991: 18) identified:

‘Inside every good detective are hidden mechanisms - compasses that bring him from a dead body to a living suspect in the shortest span of time, gyroscopes that guarantee balance in the worst storms’.

\textsuperscript{135} As will be discussed in the following chapter on police culture(s), what is a successful and acceptable solution to an investigation is determined largely by the occupational culture of detectives.
A belief in the ‘hidden mechanisms’ that are said to help guide detectives as they go about their work is a theme also evident in other areas of investigative work taking place outside the police organisation. For example, speaking of the work of forensic accountants, Williams (2014: 59-60) notes how:

‘One of the recurring images of forensic accountants circulating in news articles and trade magazines is that of the financial sleuth tracking down and ferreting out fraud. This professional mythology is bolstered by descriptions of accounting as a specialised and well-defined body of expert knowledge rooted in specific competencies and skill sets’.

He goes on to discuss how:

‘These claims to expertise combined with the personal attributes of dogged determination and an eye for detail are essential to the ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu, 1989, 1991) or ‘regulatory authority’ (Reichman, 1992), and thus legitimacy, of forensic accounting professions as well as of the industry itself’.

In the crime fighting model of policing, the officers who carry the most symbolic capital (i.e. accumulated prestige or honour) are those who bring in the ‘good pinches’ (Van Maanen, 1978: 304), who can be trusted to protect others and who have experience or rank. With regard to criminal investigation more specifically, the symbolic capital of detectives is directly related to old regime ideas about detective work as an inexplicit, experience-based and intuitive craft. However, as Williams (2014: 60) has discussed in relation to investigators in the field of forensic accounting, what the view of forensic accountant as ‘super-sleuth’ overlooks, is how much:

‘These attributes are the product of an extended process of professional claims-making. It is through this process that accountants have claimed professional jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988) over the practice area of fraud detection and investigation defining it in ways that best suit their own professional interest, skills, and competencies’.

New visions of policing, such as community policing and problem-oriented policing, have introduced alternative sources of social and cultural capital (i.e. knowledge, skills and other cultural acquisitions such as educational or technical qualifications) which are based broadly on the capability to solve problems, to work with members of the community and to provide service and, in this sense, are seeking to change the
predominant ‘habitus’\textsuperscript{136} of the police. In many instances action which is guided by habitus ‘has the appearance of rationality but is based not so much on reason as on socially-constituted dispositions’ (Van House and Sutton, 1996: 139-140). However, due to the inextricable and (with regard to CIs and DCs) often compounded link between the habitus and ‘the field’\textsuperscript{137} (referring broadly to social space in which action takes place (Bourdieu, 1977: 72-73)), any change in the habitus of the police must also take account of the conditions, values and relational/structural positioning (and power) of actors operating within the field itself. As with other physical and social environments, the logic of the field in regard to the police is applied differently for different individuals, depending on their position (Bourdieu, 1977: 122). With regard to the field of medicine, for example, the position of doctors is different from that of nurses. With regard to the CID, the occupational position of DCs (as the dominant class or ‘players’) may be seen as distinct from that of CIs. However, as will be explored in later chapters of this thesis, the nature of the field in which CIs and DCs operate and interact (the CID) may be changing. The emergence of a range of new players in the form of non-warranted police staff, many of who are performing important (often specialist) work as part of their roles, is likely to instigate a renegotiation in the habitus of the police with regard to criminal investigation provision including access to specific resources in the form of capital (be it symbolic, social, economic or cultural).

Chan (1997)\textsuperscript{138}, who employed Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and field in her analysis of police cultures, drew attention to how wider organisational and political changes in the policing field can influence, and be influenced by, police officers’ habitus. The introduction of CIs as part of a longer trend in police workforce modernisation is therefore likely to have impacted on detectives’ habitus or ‘feel for the game’ to some extent. UK government policy has encouraged a shift away from a ‘general practitioner’/omnicompetent model of investigative provision towards increased specialisation often involving new technologies and, thus, new types of knowledge and

\textsuperscript{136} ‘Habitus’ refers to ‘a system’ of cultural dispositions (determined by past experience) that creates a tendency towards certain behaviours and choices (Bourdieu, 1977: 81-82; see also Maton, 2008: 50-52) and is arguably the main concept in Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’.

\textsuperscript{137} Chan astutely argued (1996: 129-130) that the reasons that ‘apparently dramatic changes’ to a police force in Australia failed was because they were directed at the habitus and not the field.

\textsuperscript{138} Habitus refers to one’s personal orientation and experiences, a ‘feel for the game’. Chan (1997) refers to the policing field as the ‘rules of the game’, and officers use their various types of organisational knowledge (their habitus, the police culture) to navigate this field. Thus as field and habitus can be changed as well as change each other, police culture is likewise open to modification.
expertise. However, as highlighted in the opening chapter of this thesis, there is currently a lack of clarity regarding the impact that such changes to traditional working practice might be having upon the overall provision of criminal investigation by the police and on popular understandings of professionalism in this field. This is due in large part to the ambiguous nature of detective work which, according to traditional interpretations of the criminal investigation process, relies on innate craft skill and thus serves to afford detectives a significant level of cultural authority and jurisdiction within their area of work\textsuperscript{139} (Tong and Bowling, 2006).

As budgetary pressures continue to enact organisational restructuring of the police organisation, professional boundaries within the police may subsequently need to be renegotiated/redrawn. The increasing presence and significance of paraprofessional personnel within the police is, in some part, suggestive of a decrease in formal role demarcations between warranted officers and non-warranted police staff (particularly in areas of work considered ‘core’ to the police function). However, with specific regard to the contemporary CID, the presence of paraprofessionals is also recognisably symptomatic of the growing need for specialist expertise and knowledge within the organisation. While in some instances CIs may be undertaking work which might once have been carried out by detectives, it is likely that many of the roles being performed by these individuals have in fact never been the preserve of the detective constable. It is in this sense that CIs may in fact be strengthening the CID’s claim to professional jurisdiction of criminal investigation. However, as will be explored in the following section, CI’s absence of foundational knowledge gained from time spent working the beat continues to hinder their full admission to the rank of ‘professional’ investigator at a cultural level.

\textsuperscript{139} Within the contemporary milieu of ‘police professionalism’, a shift from a reactive to a more proactive approach to policing has seen approaches to criminal investigation and those practices employed by the venture become progressively pre-emptive and scientific. This approach has also come to be seen as increasingly relevant with the growing influence of forensic science and investigative psychology (Westera et al., 2014: 2). Indeed, ‘In the perspective of detective as ‘scientist’ investigators are skilled in scientific approaches, crime scene management, the use of physical evidence, investigative interviewing, informant handling, offender profiling and managing the investigation process’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006: 325). Tong and Bowling (2006: 326) argue that ‘the scientific approach to detective work points to a potentially evolving ‘professional’ detective significantly different from the detectives in the past’.
2.3.5 Summary

Police professionalism is not a new phenomenon and opinions on whether or not it is truly achievable continue to vary. Promoters of any professional model of policing maintain that police officers are experts through training, accreditation, education and experience and, thus, should be regarded as professionals in every sense of the term. A large part of this section was devoted to assessing the claim of the police to professional status in terms of the characteristics of professions, and I argue that the police can be seen to meet most of them to a considerable degree. Recent drives for improved professionalisation have, in large part, reflected the police’s desire to improve their overall legitimacy; professionalism (in some cases) may offer an antidote to corruption and underperformance. However, accompanying (and related to) the decline in police legitimacy, more recent years have also witnessed the rising significance of paraprofessional personnel working within the police organisation. Faced with budget constraints, the paraprofessional employee has emerged (in part) as a potential solution to many of the police organisation’s strategic and economic troubles. The development of the police paraprofessional role can thus generally be considered to have been instigated by two factors. First, there is the need for an increasingly more efficient workforce which has mandated the redistribution of workload between professional officers and paraprofessional staff. Second, growing recognition of the necessity for progressive specialisation within the organisation (in particular, within the CID) has required the recruitment of individuals with specialist skills and expertise from outside the organisation. However, in allowing for the utilisation of policing paraprofessionals in areas of work generally considered to be ‘frontline’ (e.g. patrol, criminal investigation and custody), the police have in turn arguably afforded scope for the blurring of occupational identities and increased role confusion within the policing profession (Moller and Haber, 1996). This issue becomes even more apparent when considering the growing significance of private security to public policing provision.

The utilisation of such individuals no doubt raises important questions about the trajectory of police professionalism in the coming years; established professional and sectoral boundaries may need to be redrawn as the role now being played by ‘unlicensed’ individuals within the organisation acts to dilute professional orthodoxies in policing and, specifically, in the investigative specialism. This is one of the key areas to be investigated.
in the current research. At the most fundamental level, the growing utilisation of police staff in ‘core’ areas of work such as criminal investigation begs the question, is it in fact the police or the task of policing which should be regarded as the profession? While recent moves to professionalise policing have largely resulted in the relative dominance of a ‘credentialist’ definition of professionalism, like Chan et al. (2003: 5) I would argue that police professionalism might be best conceived as ‘a multifaceted and dynamic concept’. While there is not the space in this thesis to explore this issue in detail, such an idea nonetheless draws attention to the complex nature of professionalism in contemporary policing and security provision and, within that, who (if anyone) should be considered as operating in the role of the professional within the realms of the contemporary CID.

As relative ‘outsiders’ to the occupational world of the CID, CIs must learn the accepted ‘values, norms, perspectives and craft rules’ that inform conduct and professional practice with regard to criminal investigation (Reiner, 2010: 117-118). However, just as the transmission of police culture to new recruits should not be regarded as a one-way street, neither should the acculturation process for CIs. It is considered next how the introduction of CIs and the role/s they may be currently undertaking in relation to that of warranted detectives may both be affected by and be effecting change in the culture of the CID.

2.4 Civilianised Investigations: A Cultural Perspective

‘Cultures are the complex ensembles of values, attitudes, symbols, rules, recipes, and practices, emerging as people react to the exigencies and situations they confront, interpreted through cognitive frames and orientations they carry with them from prior experiences’ (Reiner, 2010: 116).

The closed occupational world of the police has been identified by numerous scholars (Bittner, 1967; Crank, 1998; Reiner, 2010; Skolnick, 1994) and is a subject that has received mounting attention is recent years (Reuss-Ianni, 1993; Lahneman, 2004; Loftus, 2009). In Britain the police are marked by a strong degree of localism and a tradition of constabulary independence (Savage, 2003: 172-3). As an occupation dependent on mutual support and trust (Barton, 2003: 350), the police possess a deep-rooted and complex occupational culture. The topic of police ‘culture’, or ‘cultures’ as it
has more recently come to be referred, has been a stubbornly reoccurring theme within the field of police research for some years now. Since the first scholars cast their conceptual lenses onto the police organisation in the 1960s (Banton, 1964; Skolnick, 1966), the role that informal norms and values play in shaping the everyday decisions of officers have been the focal point for every imaginable type of literature, film and television. The importance of the police and its culture has even been linked to the idea of nationhood and collective identity more generally (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003). Police culture has been viewed as exerting influence over the way officers think about and interact with the public as well as standing as a robust barrier to reform and the implementation of effective accountability measures (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997; Silverman, 1999). All of this makes police culture a topic of enormous interest for researchers.

However, as Loftus (2010: 2) has noted, classic accounts of police culture (Banton, 1964; Cain, 1973; Manning, 1977; Punch, 1979; Reiner, 1978; Skolnick, 1966) reflect the culture of an earlier-and-different-milieu. It is now essential that researchers of police studies extend the cultural lens to the examination of cultural variance which acknowledges the growing significance of non-warranted individuals operating within the organisation. CIs are but one example of how, within the current climate of austerity, non-warranted police staff are increasingly being used within frontline police roles traditionally considered the preserve of warranted officers (e.g. patrol, custody, investigation etc.). As such, these non-warranted individuals are increasingly occupying positions in which the role they play inherently influences the strategic direction and ultimate success of a ‘job’ and also, the overall legitimacy of the organisation. In recasting the cultural lens onto this previously neglected group, I provide a novel insight into how police cultures/subcultures shape and are shaped, not only by distinct experiences associated with a specific organisational assignment, but also how assumptions, values and modes of thinking and acting associated with a distinct police subculture may also vary between individuals as a result of their distinct occupational position.

The first part of this section begins with a review of the key literature on the topic of police culture providing a platform upon which to empirically explore how CIs might ‘fit’ within the traditional ‘detective culture’ in later chapters of this thesis (see Chapter Five, section 5.5). Here what is meant by the term police culture is explained, before moving
on to examine how police cultures are transmitted to new members of the occupational group - a process referred to as ‘acclamation’. This section then moves on to examine the existence of a separate detective culture and how this might be further distinguishable between the plethora of units (and teams) which operate as part of the arena of specialism that is the CID. Space is then afforded to exploring relevant literature regarding the development of fragmented cultures within the police CID as a result of changing/developing contexts and environments of work (specifically in policing) over the latter half of the twentieth century. Here attention is drawn to the pressing need for researchers to adopt an ever more nuanced approach to the study of police cultures/subcultures which acknowledged variation not only with regard to function, rank and location, but also with regard to employment status. This section concludes by examining the impact the growing significance of private security may be having upon established cultures and orientations to work amongst those operating within the contemporary police and, in particular, within the CID.

2.4.1 What is Police Culture?

The role that the informal norms and values associated with the rank-and-file play in shaping the everyday decisions and practices of officers has long been noted in research and reflection centring on the police. Studies which focus on the existence of a discernible police culture have spanned several decades and continue to occupy a prime position as a key topic of interest amongst scholars of police studies (Banton, 1964; Cain, 1973; Holdaway, 1983; Loftus, 2009, 2010; Punch, 1979; Skolnick, 1966; Westley, 1970; Young, 1991). As Loftus (2010: 1) illustrates, ‘these studies have highlighted the usefulness of police culture in understanding the many facets of policing, including how officers learn the craft of the job, use their time and interact with different people’. Moreover, this extensive body of research has identified a set of recurrent features which appear to persevere over time and space. It is now considered cliché to refer to what Reiner (2010: 118-132) has described as the ‘core characteristics’ of police culture - a sense of mission, action-oriented behaviour and cynicism; suspicion, isolation, solidarity, pragmatism and authority; masochism, prejudice and conservatism - a list now generally accepted as possessing the status of ‘sociological orthodoxy’ (Loftus, 2012: 1). While there is a pressing need for a new analysis of police traits in the light of the many reforms
that have occurred over the last few decades, Reiner’s famous typology offers researchers a foundation upon which to examine the police culture of a changing world.

Despite the wealth of literature devoted to the topic, police culture remains one of the most contested and loosely defined concepts within criminological and sociological discourse (Chan, 1996: 111). This is not least due to the fact that recent years have seen a shift in direction away from understandings of police ‘culture’ and towards police ‘cultures’ as scholars have come to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of contemporary policing provision and extent of diversity within the police workforce. Regardless of this difficulty, police culture, ‘cop culture’, or ‘canteen culture’ as it has been variously described, is one of the few academic terms to emerge from police studies to enter common idiom (Westmarland, 2008: 253). Another problem is that, in recent decades, ‘police’ and ‘policing’ have become diverse terms, with ‘the policing family’ being extended to include a variety of other uniformed officers and police staff (see sections 2.2.3-2.2.5). Nonetheless, Baker (2007: 322) offers a comprehensive description of police culture:

‘It is the shared mentality concerning how the police see themselves, security rivals and the public; it is the shared values that motivate and integrate the police and sustain their self-esteem; it is the shared assumptions that determine the meanings they attach to things and the attitudes they adopt or reject; it is the shared organised knowledge about why and how things are done (and of what was done before) that provides the model for their habitual actions’.

Since the 1960s research into the police acknowledged the existence of shared occupational values and attitudes between officers that influenced their perception of their role and in turn, their interactions with the general public (Loftus, 2010). With this in mind, police culture is generally understood to be the ‘range of informal assumptions, values and accepted practices’, which officers adopt and operate unconsciously and which act as a means through which they make sense of, manage and adjust to the strains, demands, ironies and contradictions inherent within police work (Chan, 1997: 12; Van Maanen, 1974: 85). In ‘Justice without Trial’, Skolnick (1966) argues that the unique role and responsibilities held by a police constable combined with the pressures associated with their operation within two distinctive working environments - the occupational and the organisational - leads to the development of a ‘working personality’ that cannot be found in other occupations. This working personality can be categorised as consisting of
three key features or ‘coping mechanisms’ - suspiciousness, isolation and solidarity - features which arise from the combination of three key strains relating to the nature of police work, the constant risk of danger, their designated authority and capacity to use force and the pressure to operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. Officers must negotiate these two policing environments and their associated strains on a daily basis and as such, lead ‘something of a schizophrenic existence; they must cope not only with the terror of an often hostile and unpredictable citizenry, but also with a hostile even tyrannical - and unpredictable bureaucracy’ (Brown, 1988: 9). Bacon (2011: 183) therefore likens police culture to an Elastoplast, ‘holding together the organisation and supporting officers in the performance of their duties’. It acts not only to guide officers in their routine decision making, affording them with practical knowledge and commonsense understandings of how and why policing should be done in a given situation (Manning, 2004: 41), but also provides methods for dealing with strains inherent in the work.

This thesis does not offer a radically new definition of police culture as the understanding of the concept adopted by the researcher in this study accords, by and large, with that of general academic consensus. However, although the meaning and relevance of the concept in relation to CIs will be reflected upon in this thesis in the light of research findings to assess whether the culture of CIs is likely to be a variant of an existing culture/s identified in previous literature or whether it is something entirely new. Nonetheless, as this chapter will discuss, it is now important, considering contemporary policing arrangements and given the significance of the roles now performed by non-warranted police staff within the police organisation, for understandings of police culture to extend beyond the examination of those shared mentalities, assumptions and knowledge associated with the warranted officer grouping. The cultural lens must now extend its gaze in order to examine potential variance in cognitive and behavioural responses which result from the working environments of unwarranted individuals who can now be found routinely performing tasks and functions traditionally recognised as frontline roles and the sole preserve of warranted officers - most notably, custody, escort and criminal investigation.
2.4.2 Acculturation

Reiner (2010) suggests that police culture/s involve a set of shared values, norms, perspectives and craft rules, which are shaped through the experiences of those involved and the environment within which they work. The ways and means through which police culture is learnt by new recruits to the service is a process that begins early in the career of a police officer; both Chan et al. (2003) and Sherman (1978) amongst others have shown how police recruits are socialised into the profession from their initial training. During these early stages, new officers not only learn the skills necessary to undertake their job, but also concurrently learn the norms and values which help them become accepted and ‘survive’ within the organisation. Shearing and Ericson (1991: 491) suggest that in their ‘street talk’ ‘police officers use stories to represent to each other the way things are, not as statements of fact but as cognitive devices used to gain practical insight into how to do the job of policing’. As Denov (2004: 71) similarly notes, ‘through their routine activities, police use informal verbal exchanges as critical sources of information about customs, procedure and departmental lore and to create a way of seeing and being’. The occupational culture is said to ‘live’ through such ‘street talk’ which often takes the form of jokes and storytelling (Holdaway, 1983, 1997). Through the regular telling of anecdotes, values are shared which advise officers on how to view the world and act within it (Chan, 1996). As Meehan (1986: 91) suggests:

‘In such common conversational activities such as bitching, bantering, complaining and telling ‘combat stories’ officers assemble, disseminate and hence create a stock of knowledge about local individuals and situations’.

From his study of trainee officers and new recruits to the police service, Fielding (1988: 9) infers that officers must:

‘…translate the formal (by the book) accounts of policing relayed during initial training into practical accounts which enable them to deal with real situations on the street. These practical accounts are learnt during the process of occupational cultural reproduction, yet are always inflected, more or less, by the officers’ own attempts to reflexively construct a unique self-identity’.

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140 Research on the common characteristics of the police recruit (cf Reiner, 1978; Van Maanen, 1973) suggests that, as a profession which attracts individuals of a similar mind-set (ambitious, conservative etc.) and social background, the process of learning the police culture may in fact begin even before officers join the service.
Despite such evidence, the vast majority of the literature in the field has failed to consider the impact of individual actor agency on police culture, although there are some noteworthy exceptions. Chan (1997: 74-75) for example, notes how ‘structural conditions’ such as police work and agency:

‘...do not completely determine cultural knowledge, and cultural knowledge does not totally dictate practice. Working within structural conditions of policing, members have an active role to play in developing, reinforcing, resisting or transforming cultural knowledge. They are not passive carriers of police culture’.

Fielding (1988: 10) similarly considers the individual officer to be the ‘final arbiter or mediator’ of the structural and cultural influences of the occupation. While the culture he/she is being assimilated into may be powerful, it is nevertheless up to the individual to accommodate or resist its influence:

‘One cannot read the recruit as a cipher for the occupational culture. The occupational culture has to make its pitch for support, just as the agencies of the formal organisation exert their influence through control of resources. The stock stories of the occupational culture may be effective as a means of ordering perception which maximises desirable outcomes. If they contradict the recruits’ gathering experience they are likely to be dismissed’ (Fielding, 1988: 135).

In thinking more specifically about acculturation into the CID, upon exiting the uniformed branch and entering the world of the detectives, new detectives are said to exist in a ‘cultural vacuum’ where they are yet to absorb the culture of the CID (Hobbs, 1991: 599). Recruits are then gradually assimilated into the CID culture, with varying degree, through ‘a quiet system of patronage’ (Young, 1991: 81). In his work, Collinson (1995) found that ‘big busts’ and other exemplary displays of detective work were embellished and savoured in the folklore of the unit as a symbolic representation of what ‘real’ detective work (in particularly here, what drug law enforcement) was all about. Once inside the CID, ‘the new detective will quickly meld into the departments style, pursuing its rituals to form a new link in the tradition of the CID’ (Young, 1991: 81). The extent to which CIs can be said to have been melded into the culture of the CID and specifically, within the occupational culture/s of warranted detectives is yet to be realised and will be explored in Chapter Five.
2.4.3 Towards a Nuanced Approach

The idea that police officers have distinct cognitive and behavioural responses as a result of their working environment is a theme that arguably emerged in Britain in the work of Banton (1964) and Skolnick (1966) and which continued to be expanded upon throughout the 1960s and onwards, leading to the emergence of a body of literature which focused on the identification of a discernible ‘cop culture’. Reiner (2010), who cites Skolnick’s (1966) work as the ‘locus classicus’ for studying police culture (2010: 118), adds that like many of the now ‘classic’ studies which followed, Skolnick’s work failed to critically reflect on the universal nature of the concept. Furthermore, police studies more generally has failed to acknowledge the potential academic worth that could perhaps be gained from the examination of occupational cultures that exist outside of the police organisation in the wider world of work - in particularly those occupations which exhibit similar characteristics to those associated with the police e.g. solidarity, omnipresent potential for danger and ‘risk’ etc. (cf work by Kitada (2011) which focuses on the occupational culture of seafarers)[141].

Indeed, until relatively recently, understandings of police culture in the UK relied heavily on a set of revolutionary ethnographies dating back to this early period which stressed the existence of a distinct police culture (Banton, 1964; Chatterton, 1975; Manning, 1977; Punch, 1979; Reiner, 1978; Skolnick, 1966). Taken together, this body of work constitutes the core foundations of the concept. Arguably[142], up until the seminal work of Cain (1973), which explored how policing conditions and styles differ between rural and city areas, police culture generally continued to be portrayed as a singular, one-size-fits-all concept - a conception which most notably predates the various ‘transformations’ which have taken place within the late modern period and which have had an indelible impact on the police organisation (see section 2.2.4 of this chapter)[143].

[141] Indeed, there is much research illustrating how alienation from the public or fellow workers leads to a strong sense of solidarity amongst certain occupational groups such as amongst dockers (Turnbull, 1992), firemen (Smith, 1972, 2002), miners (Fitzpatrick, 1980), steel workers (Blyton and Bacon, 1997) and high steel ironworkers (Haas, 1977). Also in the criminal justice field, there is a growing body of useful literature which examines the occupational culture of probation (Mawby and Worrall, 2011) and prison officers (Crawley and Crawley, 2008).

[142] It should be noted that Banton’s, ‘The Policemen in the Community’ (1964), which compared policing in Scotland to that in the US, provided the foundations on which a move towards a more nuanced approach to police culture could built.

[143] It should be acknowledged here however that Reiner (2010: 135) also describes Wilson’s (1968) study, ‘Varieties of Police Behaviour’, as being the ‘locus classicus’ in considering difference in the styles of
Moreover, early conceptions of police culture tended to base their understanding on observational studies of uniform patrol officers which may have led to a mistaken notion of the pervasiveness of a single, dominant culture (Maguire and Norris, 1992). In more recent years however, work by Hobbs (1988), Young (1993) and Westmarland (2001) amongst others, have shown that despite sharing a number of what Skolnick (2008: 35) considers to be the ‘universal, stable and lasting features’, the police ‘as an organisation does not possess a ‘common culture’ when viewed from the inside’ (Manning, 1978: 244). While generally accepted to epitomise the core pervasive features of police culture, Reiner’s (2010: 118-132) ‘core characteristics’ of ‘cop culture’ are now acknowledged to vary considerably within and between forces and departments. Nonetheless, these cultural commonalities can still be found in almost all areas of police work and continue to be communicated and reinforced in varying degrees according to orthodox conceptions, through on-the-job socialisation and they arise as officers adapt to the demands of the job (Loftus, 2009: 2).

Despite the continued significance of these ‘core characteristics’, as Reiner (2010: 118) has gone on to suggest, when considering the changing nature of police work, police culture can no longer be discussed as being ‘monolithic, universal nor unchanging’ (Reiner, 2010: 132). It has now become essential, as Hobbs (1991: 606) illustrates, for researchers to:

‘…tease out variations in policing styles rather than promote the perverse practice of identifying similarities across departments, cities, regions and countries. The assumption that there is something called ‘police culture’ is at best naive, and results in crude generalisation in the quest for common characteristics’.

Research-based evidence has shown there to be variance in police culture/s which are dependent upon the differing patterns and problems associated with different policing environments and ‘the way we do things around here’. Alongside the seminal work of Cain (1973), subsequent work from the 1980s onwards also began to formally whole police organisations. In his study Wilson distinguishes between three departmental styles: the ‘watchman’ style which emphasised order maintenance and the patrolman perspective—a style which afforded the patrol officer an almost unlimited level of discretion during this pre-bureaucratised, pre-professionalised period; the ‘legalistic’ style which operated a law enforcement approach attempting to impose universalistic standards impartially on all communities; and the ‘service’ style which emphasised the police as a helpful service, with officers choosing to caution rather than prosecute (but not ignore) (Reiner, 2010: 135).
acknowledge the existence of sub-cultural variation within and between police services. For example, work by Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983) explored the existence of sub-cultural variation between ‘street cops’ and ‘management cops’ whereas work by Hobbs (1988) testified to the existence of a specific ‘detective culture’. Similarly, work by Ericson and Haggerty (1997) identified cultural variation between police organisations resulting from differences in the concerns and priorities of that particular service. Work by Young (1993), like Cain (1973), explored how policing conditions and styles differ between officers in rural areas and those ‘in the sticks’, while Innes (2003) and Westmarland (2001) identified the distinct culture/s of specialist departments. Such work brought to light the need for a reconceptualisation of traditional notions of police culture which have concurrently become exposed as outdated, overly deterministic and lacking in flexibility.

The growing realisation during this period with regard to how variables such as an officer’s gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation as well as the type of police work officers perform may influence both practice and attitude, has led scholars to move discussion away from the existence of one police ‘culture’ and towards the idea of multiple ‘cultures’. Indeed, recently emerging literature is replete with discussion of the existence of ‘subcultures’ and other terms such as ‘patrol culture’, ‘headquarters culture’ and the ‘the cardigan squad’ (Heidensohn, 2003: 569), the latter referring to the ‘soft’ and ‘fluffy’ perception of the child protection department. In addition, research also suggests that at an individual level, existing cultures can be adapted to suit an individual’s own identity, circumstances and experiences (Fielding, 1988; Loftus, 2008). This suggests that not only does cultural variance exist between different groups/units/forces, but also that cultural variation exists at an individual level, between officers within the same group/unit/force.

In their edited collection of essays, O’Neill, Marks and Singh (2007) present an assortment of the most recent research on the topic of police occupational culture/s and revisit the meaning of police culture in the light of key late modern developments in the field of policing which have had a dramatic impact on the policing landscape and in turn, the cultural ideologies of the police. Key developments discussed in the edited collection include: the drive towards better educated officers (Punch); impact of police unions (Marks) including black police associations (O’Neill and Holdaway); the development of ‘nexus’ policing (Marks); and recognition of distinctions between public and private police cultures (Singh and Kempa). This welcome addition to the literature offers new
insights into police cultures/subcultures which, until now, have otherwise been overlooked. Police culture has therefore come to be viewed as being much more fragmented, fluid and changeable than it was originally conceived. The existence of different police functions (e.g. patrol vs. detective work), difference between levels within the organisation (e.g. rank and file, middle management and senior leadership) and variation in workforce demographic (e.g. different ethnic or gender groups amongst police officers, warranted vs. non-warranted employees etc.), are all potential areas where sub-cultural variation within the police organisation is likely to exist. While a more nuanced approach is clearly beginning to emerge, further empirical exploration in these areas is needed. In particular, there is a clear need to further academic enquiry in relation to detective work generally and perhaps more specifically, into the existence of cultural variation within the CID in light of recent changes in workforce mix.

However, as Loftus (2009: 188) is right to argue, despite the obvious changes which have occurred over the last quarter century with regard to the policing landscape and in turn, the cultural ideologies of the police, ‘the manifest continuities with older patterns should not be overlooked’. In ‘Police Culture in a Changing World’, Loftus (2009) stresses that while policing and the police in the new millennium are markedly different from that of earlier generations, the concept of police culture endures because ‘the fundamentals of the police role remain unchanged ... the police remain in the unique position of enforcing the law in a liberal democratic society’ (2009: 199).

2.4.4 ‘Detective Culture’ and the Criminal Investigation Department - A Firm within a Firm?

Joining the CID and ‘moving into clothes’ (Fielding, 1988; Hobbs, 1991) can be considered one of the clearest indicators of the existence of multiple cultures within the police organisation. Entering the CID has traditionally been considered one of the most prestigious of all police advancements not least because it assumes an acceptance at an operational level of the exceptional investigative capacity of some officers over that of others. It could be argued that this advancement in itself implicitly suggests that there may be something special and perhaps more ‘professional’ about this particular group of
officers and their knowledge base and accompanying skills set\(^{144}\). However, despite evidence which testifies to the existence of a separate ‘detective culture/subculture’ (Hobbs, 1988), to date, markedly few empirically-based studies have been conducted, particularly in Britain, into the existence of a specific ‘detective culture’ - although there is useful material to be found in the works of scholars such as Sanders (1977), Smith and Gray (1983), Hobbs (1988), Young (1991) and Bacon (2011). In ‘Doing the Business’ (1988), Hobbs’ renowned ethnographic account of the cultural distinctiveness of London’s East End and the work of police detectives in relation to it, Hobbs forwards the argument that the form of entrepreneurialism endemic to this specific area represented ‘a specific economic and cultural order’ (1988: 197). While detective culture/subculture is generally recognised as exhibiting the same ‘core’ characteristics as the general ‘cop culture’, research (e.g. Hobbs, 1988; Sanders, 1977) would appear to suggest that some aspects are heightened amongst detectives, resulting in a ‘radicalised and concentrated’ version of it (Innes, 2003:14). A number of distinguishing features can be drawn from this literature with regard to the occupational world of police detectives. The most prominent of these features according to Maguire and Norris (1992: 20) include:

‘...even greater secrecy and defensiveness to outsiders (including police outsiders), but, in contrast to the ‘solidarity’ of the uniform shift, a largely individualistic and entrepreneurial approach in which loyalties are fragmented and sometimes restricted to just one or two ‘partners’’.

This is reflected, according to writers such as Hobbs (1988) and Young (1991), in ‘a general reluctance to share information, jealous guarding of the names of informants and competition to take personal credit (or ‘glory’) for high status arrests or clearances’ (Maguire and Norris, 1992: 20)\(^{145}\). Suspicion is a fundamental element, a ‘healthy attitude or sixth sense’, essential to any police work but which is heightened even more so in the world of the detective.

Another distinctive feature said to be characteristic of detective culture is what Bayley (1994: 56) terms the ‘privileges of detectives’. By virtue of being recognised as a

\(^{144}\) ‘Skill’, according to Freidson (2001: 25), refers to ‘the capacity to accomplish a task, which may be kept analytically separate from the substantive knowledge connected with the task itself’. In simple terms, it is the specific means by which a task is undertaken.

\(^{145}\) It would also appear that such tendencies are not new. Wensley (1931: 76) writes of detectives ‘inclined to keep themselves to themselves’ and of those ‘with a streak of vanity that impels them to adopt a pose at the expense of those who have really done the work’. 114
specialism, investigative work enjoys a higher status than that of patrol. Indeed, as Young (1991: 281) has explained, both 'structurally and symbolically the work of the CID is much more valued than uniformed police activity, which can be attributed to the largely unquantifiable nature of beat patrol work'. The privileges of detectives include: wearing 'civilian' clothing, being managed rather than supervised and in essence the joining of an 'elite club'. The detective role typically affords officers with even lower visibility\(^{146}\) and greater autonomy (Ericson, 1981) alongside less direct supervision and a personal case-load (Irving and Dunninghan, 1993) and, in this way, can indeed be considered as special and different to traditional uniformed patrol work. For a significant period of time, criminal investigation has been considered a specialism of which only experienced warranted officers could partake. As Bayley (1994: 57) notes, both inside and outside the police organisation, the work of detectives is considered ‘police work par excellence’. As a result of their special status, detectives develop a powerful interest in maintaining the status quo and tend to be even more acutely resistant to change (Bayley, 1994). All of this makes for an interesting conceptual base upon which to examine the impact of the introduction of CIs has had on established cultures, divisions in labour and understandings of criminal investigation process within the CID.

From the earliest years of its establishment, the Metropolitan police was said to be ‘a divided force’ with rigidly defined functions and the plain clothes CID was considered by many a ‘firm within a firm’ (Emsley, 1996: 72-72). In his short history of the police, Rawlings (2002: 176) concluded that such real and imagined structural, operational and cultural difference stem from the fact that the investigative function undertaken by detectives:

‘...did not fit easily into the idea of preventative policing in which crime was deterred by arrests for petty offences and by the presence of uniformed officers on the street. Instead, detectives were secretive and bargained for information by paying informants or ignoring minor breaches in the law ... Moreover, while, in theory, uniformed officers were meant to be detached from the communities they policed, the reverse was true for detectives’.

The ‘entrepreneurial’ role of the detective, bargaining for information through the payment of informants, was a trend which continued until relatively recently. Indeed, as

\(^{146}\) Shapland and Vagg (1988) report that most beat officers see a supervising officer on average only once a day.
Hobbs (1988) describes, in the East End relatively closed communities in which criminal families were well known, demanded a certain amount of power and even respect in their communities which meant a situation which required the detective move within the criminal underworld, doing deals to secure information on suspects. For Hobbs (1988: 205) the CID officer was ‘an autonomous entrepreneur of law and order’ using his knowledge of both the art and craft of detective work to conduct his investigations.

The old regime approach therefore affords police culture a fundamental role in shaping the investigative process most notably in relation to determining the role played by the police, victims and suspects in the minds of officers. What is interesting here is the extent to which the art and the craft of detective work still hold contemporary relevance in the light of key late modern developments which have changed the face of criminal investigation in E&W. Indeed, in recent years, the shift from a reactive to a proactive approach to investigation alongside developments in science and technology (e.g. DNA, fingerprinting etc.) has witnessed a move towards understanding detective work as not only an art and a craft but also as a science. The increased value and prominence of scientific methods within the investigative process challenge traditional approaches and understandings of investigative work and policing more generally. As Tong, Bryant and Horvath (2009: 9-10) go on to discuss:

‘In the perspectives of detective as ‘scientist’, there is an inherent expectation that many will be able to attain the status of detective, as science can be taught to exact principles in the classroom and the workplace. Essentially, detective work as a science arguably removes some of the mythical and cultural barriers to learning and practising detective work’.

In addition to changing conceptions of the nature of the detective role, portrayals of police detectives have traditionally suggested that the CID is a ‘bastion of ‘macho’ values’ associated with the hard-working, hard-drinking, fornicating and swearing crime fighter (Innes, 2003: 15). Overall, the culture of the CID is commonly referred to as being intensely pragmatic, concerned with getting the job done expeditiously and as being underpinned by values which are conservative, masculine and action-oriented (Heidensohn, 1992; Holdaway, 1983; Young, 1991). These values are reinforced by a

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147 Unlike the cultural perspectives of detective as artist in which it is implicit that only a chosen few will possess the necessary qualities and attributes for the role.
much more acute suspicion of ‘outsiders’ and pessimism about human nature, together with a heightened awareness of potential dangers and a general sense of social isolation (Innes, 2003: 15). While elements of the above characteristics are still likely to exist within the contemporary CID, they do so perhaps, in a less conspicuous form. Indeed, in their work carried out in the early 1990s, Norris and Maguire (1992, cited in Innes, 2003: 15) concluded that ‘the trenchant machismo of detective culture is waning’. Nonetheless, as Innes (2003: 15) has indicated, while this may be the case, this trend is by no means uniform with distinct variation in the pace with which such characteristics are fading.

In his recent work, ‘Investigating Murder’, Innes (2003) offers a unique insight into the processes and practices developed and employed by detectives in the investigation of murder. Innes’ work introduces a moral dimension to investigations in which detectives ascribe moral identities to those with a role in the murder with the victim as ‘innocent’, ‘good’, ‘worthy’ or ‘morally tainted’ (2003: 197-168). This ‘moral career’ approach (Innes, 2003: 170) is developed and reinforced through ‘talk’ amongst detectives. Such knowledge and ways of working are then passed on through discussion of the various motives for, and types of murder, to develop a case narrative which both new and long serving detectives can draw upon to aid them in future cases. Overall, while Innes’ work raises a number of themes which can be traced across other studies of detective work (for example, their suspicion of victim and witness accounts (Simon, 1991), the cachet associated with the role of detective and the work they perform (Sanders, 1977), and disagreement over the nature of detective work and whether it is better understood as a craft or a science (Repetto, 1978)), he also importantly highlights the difference between detective work in general and that of murder detectives specifically. Innes’ work therefore draws attention to the existence of cultural variation within the CID and as such provides the empirical foundation on which a more nuanced approach to ‘detective culture’ might be developed.

148 However, it must be noted that the idea of the moral character of victims appeared much earlier in work by scholars such as Christie (1986) and Miers (1978). In her work into the ‘ideal victim’ stereotype, Christie (1986) identifies six key attributes of the ideal victim status: first, the victim is ‘weak’ (female, sick, old, very young or a combination of these qualifications); second, the victim was acting ‘virtuously’ i.e. going about their legitimate daily business; third, the victim is ‘blameless’; fourth, the victim is ‘unrelated’ to the ‘stranger’ to the offender (implies offender must be a person and not a corporation for example); fifth, the offender is unambiguously ‘big’ and ‘bad’; and sixth, the victim possess the right amount of power, influence and sympathy to elicit victim status (cited in Dignan, 2005: 17). Similarly work by Miers (1978) has illustrated how notions of victimisation and ‘vulnerability’ have historically been fundamentally shaped and determined by politicians and professionals.
2.4.5 Beyond Police Cultures - Towards a Multi-Cultural Approach to the CID

In the same way that ‘cop culture’ has been criticised as being a relatively static, universalistic term, to speak of one ‘detective culture’ is also perhaps naive, especially on consideration of the huge variation in personnel now operating within the CID. Over recent decades the CID has become an arena of specialism. Public Protection Units, Intelligence Units, Major Incident Teams and Fraud Squads are just a few examples of the many specialist units which collectively make up the late modern CID. As such, the modern police service can no longer be considered as exploiting the ‘omni-competent’, generalist constable ideal. The concept has been abandoned in recent decades in favour of specialist functionality and explicitly defined remits (Roberts and Innes, 2009: 339). The creation of numerous specialist departments has consequentially resulted in a multitude of CID subcultures (Loftus, 2009: 85) which Glomseth and Gottschalk (2009: 3) suggest are affected by the tasks performed. In their survey, Holdaway and Parker (1998) identified the existence of cultures within cultures with regard to the CID, with child abuse work for example, being regarded as lower in status than other areas of CID work. However despite the fragmented nature of the CID, as Bacon (2011: 190) highlights, such nuanced academic enquiry remains rare in the UK with hardly any sociological studies being conducted which examine the distinct experiences associated with working in specialist units or of how different crime and disorder problems may affect the mindset of an officer or police staff member with regard to how they view their world and work.

In addition to and in many respects an accompanying development of the emergence of specialist units, recent decades have also witnessed the arrival of a whole host of ‘new faces’ within the CID and police organisation more generally. As noted in Chapter One (section 1.2.3) of this thesis, pluralisation (i.e. the growing involvement of an increasingly complex array of public, private and municipal bodies in the provision of policing and security) has meant that ‘the police now also find themselves within a mandate to work in partnership with a wide spectrum of groups and organisations, form highly organised and multi-national security companies to local individuals and voluntary community security groups’ (O’Neill and Singh, 2007: 2). A significant part of this broad

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149 Innes’ (2003) work which focuses on detective work and the police response to criminal homicide is a notable exception, as is work by Sanders (1977) which looked at the work of detectives operating in US.
pluralisation of policing has been the civilianisation and privatisation (in the form of the ‘contracting out’ and ‘buying in’ of officers and staff to and from the private sector) of the function. Non-warranted members of police staff now make up a considerable percentage of the police workforce and many of these individuals can now be found performing roles and undertaking tasks previously considered police operational (see Chapter One, section 1.2.2).

However, despite their growing significance within the police organisation, little academic attention has been afforded to this group with regard to the topic of occupational culture. In ‘An Inside Job’ - a fascinating account of life as a British ‘Bobby’, Young (1991: 223) illustrates how police staff (referred to here as ‘civilians’) were frequently reminded that they were not police officers. Young also documents what he describes as ‘the constant tendency to use the term ‘civilian’ in a ‘pejorative or derogatory manner’ (1991: 223). In a recent and (to my knowledge) unique piece of research titled, ‘Civilianising the Blue Code’, Wright (2010) looks directly at both the differences and similarities that exist between warranted police officers and police staff in relation to the issues of corruption and misconduct. In his research, Wright not only concludes that a separate culture exists between officers and staff, but also proposes that the ‘blue wall of silence’ may be even more impenetrable amongst police staff. Wright (2010: 353) offers two potential reasons for this: first, lack of ethics and integrity training by some services may lead to a lack of awareness amongst staff as to the existence of procedures for reporting internal misconduct; second, a greater degree of trust and solidarity may exist amongst the warranted ranks leading to greater willingness to promptly report instances of internal misconduct. While such work not only provides evidence of the existence of sub-cultural variation between warranted officers and staff, it also illustrates the significance of police staff cultures/subcultures for contemporary police work, particularly with regard to police accountability, legitimacy and decision making. Indeed, as work by O’Malley (1997: 21) and more recently by Westmarland (2005: 162) suggests, despite possessing a clear understanding of professional integrity, officers may still continue to place a higher value on their loyalty towards colleagues rather than their own honesty. Work by Wright (2010) also suggests that some elements of traditional ‘cop culture’ may perhaps be even more pronounced in the culture of non-warranted staff.

150 Work by Westmarland (2005: 162) indicates a distinction between the ‘acceptability’ of certain behaviours. For example, those actions which amount to ‘acquisitive crime’, such as the taking of money...
The late modern CID is a knowledge-intensive and time-critical environment (Glomseth, Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther, 2007: 100). Within this environment, success is largely dependent upon efficient and effective communication and the sharing of knowledge (Glomseth et al., 2007). Police culture has been assumed to influence both knowledge sharing (Glomseth et al., 2007: 105; Luen and Al-Hawamdeh, 2001) and performance (Fraser, 2004) in policing. As has been highlighted previously in this chapter, work by scholars such as Norris and Maguire (1992: 20), Hobbs (1988) and Young (1991) has shown that unlike the solidarity evident in the uniform shift, the traditional performance of ‘detective work’ is shrouded in competition, the jealous guarding of the names of informants and a general reluctance to share information. Given recent changes in the way in which criminal investigation and policing more broadly is to be undertaken— as effectively and efficiently as possible—such feelings, if still present, are a likely obstacle impeding the effective sharing of knowledge between officers and staff within the CID.

The reengineering of the investigative process and the broad application of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) in recent years has meant that the police organisation now operates a business model in all areas of police work—primarily concerning the strategic allocation of resources. New practices such as NIM are being seen as a possible way to reduce ‘risk’ and efficient and effective knowledge sharing is undoubtedly an essential element of the model and one which ultimately determines its overall success. As Glomseth and Gottschalk (2009) highlight, the recent economic downturn in the UK has meant that policing institutions are experiencing higher demands on performance while working within tighter resource constraints, making the relationship between police culture and performance even more critical.

Practitioners within the late modern CID can therefore be considered as working within a business environment, a development which has required them to adapt their behaviours

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151 The ‘professionalisation’ of policing in recent years has witnessed the introduction of codes of practice and new legislation which must now be adhered too if an investigation is to be successful. For example, PACE, placed limits of the length of time an individual can be held in detention and is likely to have impacted on the culture of the CID in terms of time criticalness.

152 Broadly speaking, the National Intelligence Model is a ‘business process’ introduced by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) in 1999, which is used by the police organisation to generate ‘intelligence’ which provides individual police services with strategic direction. NIM allows senior police managers to make informed decisions relating primarily to the tactical allocation of resources. The NIM allows for greater consistency between police services across the E&W, enables the establishment of key crime priorities and targeting of key prolific offenders, and informs the improved management of ‘risk’.
and practices in accordance, with officers playing the role of ‘knowledge workers’ (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 19). This is likely to have had an impact on those cultures/subcultures which exist within the CID. As work by Glomseth et al. (2007) has demonstrated in relation to officers based within police ‘investigation units’ in Norway, the existence of a ‘team culture’ has a significant impact on knowledge sharing in police investigations. However, due to a current lack of empirical exploration in the area, the level of integration between police staff within such a police ‘team culture’ remains largely unknown. This issue becomes even more salient if one considers the level of operational involvement and key roles with regard to criminal investigation now being undertaken by police staff within CIDs across E&W\textsuperscript{153}. CIs, who operate within mixed teams alongside warranted police detectives, can be considered as playing a pivotal role in the criminal investigation process, influencing the strategic direction of an investigation and in turn, the determination of its ultimate success. However, despite the significance of the actions and decisions made by these individuals on a day-to-day basis alongside the existence of research-based evidence which testifies to the likely existence of police staff subculture/s (Young, 1991; Wright, 2010), very little research exists on how these individuals ‘fit’ within existing police occupational and organisation culture/s. Chapter One (section 1.3) discussed recent attempts to fill this gap in knowledge and with that, to take account of how recent processes of civilianisation (and privatisation) may have impacted on established cultures within the police organisation (cf Skinns, 2011; Atkinson, 2013, forthcoming; O’Neill, 2014; Wilson-Kovacs, 2014). However, despite growing recognition of this otherwise neglected body of personnel, empirical study on the cultural attributes and orientations of this particular group remains limited, particularly with regard to the CID. I would argue that this is somewhat remarkable considering the significance of the role/s now being played by non-warranted staff and the plethora of research-based evidence which bears witness to the intrinsic role informal norms and values play in shaping the everyday decisions of officers (Chan, 2007; Innes, 2003; Loftus, 2009). It is to this end that this research, it is hoped, will be a timely addition to the current body of knowledge in the area.

\textsuperscript{153} Alongside CIs, many other police staff also work within the late modern CID and operate what can be considered as ‘key roles’. Amongst others these include Crime Analysts and/or Intelligence Analysts, Crime Scene Managers and Disclosure Officers etc.
In addition, similarly little consideration has also been given to the growing body of private and ‘hybrid’ individuals working within the police and the particular cultural qualities and characteristics they bring to the task\textsuperscript{154}. I would argue therefore that the time has now come for researchers to extend the cultural lens to better consider those police cultures/subcultures which exist not only beyond the police officer, but also beyond the police organisation itself. Indeed, within the context of late modernity, policing has developed into a more formalised inter-agency occupation with improved cooperation between agencies traditionally associated with the public and private sectors (see section 2.4.6).

The Police Reform Act 2002 marked a watershed in fostering greater engagement with private security. The Act introduced Community Safety Accreditation Schemes under which individuals from non-police organisations (e.g. local authority employees or housing association employees), and often from the private sector (e.g. security guards employed within shopping malls), may be accredited with limited powers such as the issuing of fixed penalty notices\textsuperscript{155}. The Act also formalised the use of CIs who, as made clear in the introductory chapter of this thesis, may also be employees from the private sector\textsuperscript{156}. The use of agency CIs undoubtedly brings an interesting dynamic to traditional understandings of police occupational culture/s which have previously focused predominantly on those individuals employed directly by the public police organisation. In her work Wakefield (2008: 159) illustrates how ‘the diversity of policing subcultures extends beyond the public police’\textsuperscript{157}. In this respect, it may now be more appropriate for researchers in the field to begin to explore the existence of police subculture/s which transcend sectoral boundaries. This also begs the question in relation to agency CIs; could

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\textsuperscript{154} In her ethnographic study of three private security teams operating within semi-public space (shopping malls), Wakefield (2008) compares a number of cultural features of private policing with those typically associated with the public police (Reiner, 2010: 118-132).

\textsuperscript{155} Community Safety Accreditation Schemes give Chief Constables authority to accredit a range of non-police (including private security guards) who meet a prescribed standard of professionalism with some police powers. However, caution should be taken not to overestimate the significance of such provisions. For example, data collected by ACPO found that by the end of 2010, across 26 participating forces, there were 2,219 accredited persons (ACPO, 2011), most of whom were local authority employed wardens and anti-social behaviour enforcement officers suggesting limited support from either the police or the private security industry.

\textsuperscript{156} Alongside CIs, the Police Reform Act 2002 also formally introduced EOs, PCSOs and DOs. Like CIs, each of these new designations can be employed by the police authority directly and can also be contractually employed from the private sector. Under the Act, these individuals may also be designated with limited police type powers.

\textsuperscript{157} The issue of private security occupational culture will be explored in more detail in the following section of this chapter.
we perhaps be witnessing the formation of a ‘hybrid’ or ‘blended’ police culture which exhibits characteristics of both the public police and private sectors in regard to the provision of criminal investigation?

It is undeniable that changes in the character and texture of policing in recent years - in particular the move towards specialism and emergence of mixed economy staffing - has served to encourage variance with regard to the cultures and subcultures that exist within the police organisation. However, what has failed to be explored in any great detail within existing literature is the extent to which changes in late modern policing arrangements have posed any significant threats with regard to established police dispositions and practices when it comes to the investigation of crime more specifically. In addition, in relation to the detective role more generally, empirical enquiry has largely failed to explore the perseverance and continued dominance of individual elements of traditional detective culture which undoubtedly have been challenged with the arrival of a more proactive approach to investigation. In short, the question remains, to what extent do traditional understandings of detective culture hold true today in the light of the civilianisation and privatisation of the role? Answering these questions is vital if we are to develop a more nuanced sociological understanding of what policing culture currently looks like in today’s policing climate and each will be explored to some degree in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

However, what is clear is that as the police organisation is forced to adapt to the changing and increasingly complex nature of policing within the late modern state, their need to rely on the expertise of ‘outsiders’ and unconventional means of staffing will increase. However, integrating ‘experts’ and those individuals who have not entered the organisation through the traditional route may require a restructuring of the organisation, for example, ‘growing information technologies has resulted in organisations based on networks, rather than more traditional hierarchies’ (Cope, 2004: 198-199). As Cope (2004: 199) discusses, ‘For the police, this means recognising the individuals for their role, rather than rank, which would require a fundamental cultural shift in how warranted and unwarranted roles are conceptualised’.
2.4.6 Private Security Subculture(s)

Studies of police work have a long ethnographic tradition which has generated a wealth of research on the cultural characteristics of the public police. As earlier sections of this chapter have demonstrated (see sections 2.4.3-2.4.5), there exists a diversity of sub-cultures within the public police, with differences arising between distinct types of police officers (Waddington, 1999). For example, there are variations between rural and urban police (Cain, 1973), ‘management’ and ‘street’ cops (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983), community constables and officers on routine patrols (Fielding, 1995), specialist groups such as detectives (Hobbs, 1988) and officers of different gender groups (Doran and Chan, 2003; Silvestri, 2003) and ethnic minorities (Holdaway and O’Neill, 2004), to name just a few. In drawing attention to the far from monolithic nature of police culture(s), the major contribution of this body of literature has been the uncovering of layers of ‘informal occupational norms and values operating under the apparently rigid hierarchical structure of police organisations’ (Chan, 1997: 43). This has included the identification of negative aspects of an occupational culture that has often been seen ‘as both a cause of police deviance and an obstacle to police reform’ (Chan 1997, jacket synopsis). Together, this body of work has contributed to a greater understanding of the realities of police work which in turn has been important in the evolution of the public police. However, while few would deny the significance of this body of work to the development of the public police and policing more generally, there is an obvious need for new, empirical research which seeks to explore new directions. This has become ever more apparent following recent changes in the terrain of policing which have seen the emergence of pluralising trends whereby in many Western democratic societies the primacy of the police has begun to diminish with the proliferation of alternative service providers, prompting a reconfiguration of the policing task around an extended policing family (Home Office, 2001).

Private security has emerged as an increasingly prominent member of this extended police family. As nodal governance scholars have sought to illustrate (cf Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Kempa et al., 2004; Shearing and Stenning, 1987; Van Steden, 2007), many of the nodes present today in advanced democratic societies are occupied not only by public sector institutions such as the police, but also by private sector institutions such as private security providers (White, 2012: 92). Furthermore, many of the roles performed by
private security actors involve the use of coercive and increasingly punitive measures (Monaghan, 2002). However, despite the growing significance of private security and the potential impact of its growing presence on our understanding of policing cultures, there exist only a limited number of empirical studies of private security officers using interviews and observational techniques. Somewhat unsurprisingly, there have been even fewer attempts to explore the cultural aspects of security work - ‘aspects that reveal many of private security’s defining features’ (Wakefield, 2008: 659). As has been discussed earlier in this chapter (2.4.1 and 2.4.3), for the most part, police literature has tended to focus overwhelmingly on those occupational cultures which exist within the police service, in recognition of the concentration of organisational power amongst the lower ranks and thus the social importance of the constable’s role. While some exceptions do exist (cf Atkinson, 2013; Button, 2007), the academic lens has rarely extended its gaze far beyond discussion which centres on the occupational culture(s) of warranted police officers (for example, to contracted private security staff) or furthermore, beyond those employed directly by the public police organisation (for example, to police staff). Moreover, as Singh and Kempa (2007: 314) explain:

‘...the existing literature has tended to address the development of public police cultures in isolation from relationships with other security agencies ... In an era where academic and practitioner commentators point to the ‘networked’, ‘nodal’ and ‘partnership’ orientation of contemporary policing, the study of the culture of any of these organisations must also take into account their relationships with other actors in the security landscape’ (see further, Wood, 2006).

Recently the role of door supervisors has been subject to increased attention and studies in this area have revealed much about the occupational culture of this group of individuals (Hobbs, Hadfield, Lister and Winlow, 2003; Winlow, 2001). The central occupational characteristics of door supervisors have been identified as including a preoccupation with the body (bodybuilding), the techniques of using the body (fighting techniques) and discourses including violence (Monaghan, 2002). However, as Button (2007: 154) illustrates, the significant structural variance inherent in the role, where they operate and the challenges they are faced with, means that door supervises cannot be regarded simply as private security officers who work in pubs and nightclubs. As such, research in this area paints only a partial picture of security officer culture(s).
While empirical studies which examine the roles and occupational culture(s) of private security officers more generally are indeed limited, there are a few notable exceptions. One of the first studies to address the issue of private security operational practices and occupational subculture(s) was that undertaken by Rigakos (2002). In his detailed ethnographic account of a Toronto-based contract private security company (‘Intelligarde’), Rigakos found that the private security officers assumed ‘parapolicing’ identities, responsibilities and attitudes at both the level of rhetoric and practice, with many exhibiting a ‘wanna be cop’ mentality. Many of the cultural traits exhibited by the private security officers in Rigakos’ study bear resemblance to those core characteristics of police culture discussed by Reiner (2000), in particularly, action-oriented behaviour, a sense of mission, solidarity and isolation. He also identified a number of additional characteristics including status frustration\textsuperscript{158}, a perceived lack of respect from the public and the police and hyper-masculinity. Rigakos observed similarities in the way that this dominant culture appeared to permeate the private policing organisation in a very similar way to that observed in public policing organisations: aggressive cultural traits and values were communicated through ‘on-the-job’ socialisation, with storytelling acting as a key mechanism through which this socialisation was enabled’ (cf Shearing and Stenning (1991) especially for similar cultural diffusion processes within the public police).

Like Rigakos, Button (2007) also identified a ‘wannabe culture’ amongst the private security officers he observed in his ethnographic study of two private security firms or ‘nodes of governance’ - ‘Pleasure Southquay’ and ‘Armed Industries’. However, unlike the wannabe culture identified by Rigakos in which private security officers were identified as aspiring to join the police, in Button’s study, this tended to be more a case of ‘wannabe somewhere else or doing anything else’ (2007: 155). Again, like Rigakos’ study, Button (2007) also identified a number of key cultural traits of private security staff which bear resemblance to those identified in the growing body of literature on police occupational and organisational culture. In particular, these included challenging working conditions, feelings of solidarity, isolation and inferiority, suspicion and displays of machismo (Button, 2007: 159-167).

\textsuperscript{158} In their recent work Lofstrand, Loftus and Loader (2015) compared how private security officers in the UK and Sweden draw upon occupational culture to deflect scorn and reframe their ‘tainted trade’ as important and necessary (cf Loader et al., 2014).
In her article, ‘Private Policing: A View from the Mall’, Wakefield (2008) builds upon the earlier work of both Rigakos (2002) and Button (2007) to provide a broader deconstruction of the security cultures at three research sites (‘Arts Plaza’, ‘Quayside Centre’ and ‘City Mall’), each of which involved interviews and observation with security officers operating in semi-public space. In her analysis she incorporates the organising features of security work and security functions as well as some of the personal characteristics of the security personnel in an effort to provide a broader deconstruction of security cultures. Like Rigakos (2002) and Button (2007), Wakefield identified similarities and difference between the personal characteristics and orientation of the police and of the private security officers she studied. Wakefield identified evidence of isolation, suspicion, conservatism and machismo. She also identified evidence of an ‘old boy’s network’, that being the enduring influence of the earlier police career of many security officers and managing directors leading to the fostering of a more inclusive, inter-agency relationship between the Arts Plaza and Quayside centre security teams. However, she also found a number of cultural features which were markedly dissimilar to those exhibited by the police, the most obvious distinction being a lack of solidarity amongst security officers which Wakefield attributes to a weaker socialisation process for the security personnel in comparison with that of the police. It could also be due to the fact that the private sector agency/ies from which private security staff originate, unlike the public police, are not an agency of last resort where coercion is central.

Indeed, one of the most significant differences between the culture(s) of private security agents and public police officers is the longevity of the career and in turn, their commitment to the security ‘profession’. Work by Wakefield (2003), Michael (2002) and Button (2007) draw attention to the high turnover of staff and low commitment to the job of those working for private security companies. Indeed, as Wakefield (2003: 674) notes, most of the security officers over the three sites she visited had served in their jobs for less than two years. The site identified as having the lowest turnover of staff (City Mall) was also the site Wakefield observed as being the most cohesive. Wakefield also found that in one of her research sites (Quayside) the previous shared employment history of

159 Rigakos (2002) discusses the ways security officers regulate conduct by exploiting ‘old boy’s networks’, which allows them to more easily extract sensitive information from the police than security personnel with no previous police connections.
the private security officers had a significant bearing on the fostering of a more unifying culture:

‘At the Quayside Centre there appeared to be a more obvious culture of banter and joke playing which, the officers explained, was typical of the local factory culture within which many of them had previously worked’ (Wakefield, 2008: 675).

A number of other empirical studies have contributed to the emerging picture of private policing culture, both internationally (cf Manzo, 2004; Micucci, 1998; Singh and Kempa, 2007) as well as in the UK (cf Wakefield, 2003). Arguably, one of the most significant contributions of this growing body of work has been its importance in underlining the point that security forces are not necessarily harmonious wholes. As in the case of public policing agencies (cf Bayley, 1994; Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983), private security organisations may also be divided into distinct assemblages that engage and endorse distinct worldviews and work styles which are not always consistent with the preferred objectives and aims either of the security firm or of the security client. Indeed, as Singh and Kempa (2007: 301) illustrate:

‘There are an ever increasing number of private security firms operating in a variety of distinct environments and to differing standards of practice. Security officers can be found in armoured cars protecting cash, in shopping centres and shops where they apprehend shoplifters, at airports searching passengers and their baggage, to officers often working alone guarding factories at night’.

Alongside the significant range in the types of duties undertaken by private security officers, other factors are also likely to affect the culture(s) of private security actors. These could include, for example, the types of personnel involved (including their occupational background), the varying environments in which they operate (e.g. contract vs. proprietary security\textsuperscript{160}) security, as well as the subsequent challenges they face as they undertake their work.

Earlier work into the police by Reiner (1978) identified the ‘Bobby’, ‘uniform carrier’, ‘new centurion’, and ‘professional’ models. Other academics have also made attempts to construct their own typology of officers based upon their varying cultural orientations (cf Broderick, 1973; Brown, 1981; Foster, 2003; Walsh, 1977). The degrees of variation in

\textsuperscript{160} Where a private firm has its own security unit ‘in-house’ (Dorn and Levi, 2007: 214).
private security work and private security staff mean that there are likely to be even more models that apply to security staff. Michael (2002) identified four types of security officer largely based upon their employment orientation. First she identified ‘the casual’, usually a younger security officer undertaking security on a temporary basis. Second there was the ‘time server’, who tended to be an older employee using security work because it is often non-ageist in recruitment. ‘The uniformed pensioner’ was the third category she discussed. This category included older security officers from the armed forces who were using security work to supplement a pension. Finally, there was the ‘police wannabe’ who was generally a young security officer oriented towards crime control who intended to join the police (Button, 2007: 168).

Other attempts at distinguishing private security officers also exist in the literature. For example, McLeod (2002) distinguishes between three types of security officer. The first model he called the ‘night-watchman’ or ‘warm bodies’. These were low skilled, low status security officers - who could not get some of the better paid jobs in society - undertaking basic security functions. The second model he called ‘low profile’ or ‘guards with blazers’. These officers were found in more prominent locations where interaction with the public was required. The officers were more presentable and had more extensive security functions, but still saw the job as transitory. They were also more oriented towards observing and reporting incidents. The third model was defined as ‘parapolicing’ or ‘private law enforcement’. These were characterised by high profile, well trained professional security staff prepared to engage in dangerous incidents and they were closer in orientation to the police. It is possible that the latter of these security officer types most resembles the orientations of agency CIs given their working relationship with the police although this remains to be confirmed.

Generally speaking, each of the private security officer ‘types’ discussed above can be understood as existing somewhere on a continuum which runs from a ‘watchmen’ orientation to a ‘parapolice’ orientation (Button, 2007: 168-172). The former refers to the desire to avoid conflict and activities that might put them at risk. These individuals aim primarily to observe and avoid interaction wherever possible. The latter has strong similarities to the trait in police culture that Reiner (2010) identified as a sense of mission, action, cynicism and pessimism. The individuals who fall within this category are preoccupied with ‘real work’ which is often more dangerous and involves the use of legal
tools\textsuperscript{161}. While useful for illustrating the likely existence of caveats of subcultures with regard to the field of private security, for the most part, such cultural complexity (as is suggested by the continuum model) tends to be overshadowed principally, by the idea of market versus public good mentalities - these being the distinct and often conflicting rationalities guiding private security and police actors in their everyday interactions with one another and with the public.

\textit{2.4.6.1 For Profit or for Public Good?}

There is indeed evidence to suggest that private security encounters with the police are often shaped by a set of market rationalities. For example, White and Gill (2013: 14) illustrate how private security agents market logic is revealed in relation to ‘their promotion of business skills in the creation and delivery of security commodities - which is directly contrasted with police command structures - and their ability to identify and take advantage of profitable opportunities in the process of selling their commodities to police consumers’. Similarly, it would also be reasonable to assume that the police operate in accordance with public good rationalities and there is indeed also evidence to support this assumption. For example, Crawford (2006: 463) observed that, rather than recasting themselves as ‘equivalent partners’, on occasions when public police actors are contracted out to the private sector on a ‘user-pays’ basis, they often assume the position of ‘honest broker’ - or independent third parties - in their interactions with localised private security actors. However, as this section seeks to demonstrate, this picture is likely to be far more complicated: As Singh and Kempa (2007) point out, almost all of the functions performed by the public police are now also being performed in some manner or to some degree by private security agents, with the private security industry now employing a wide array of coercive techniques and in many cases operating punitive strategies for controlling crime and maintaining social order. In the UK, the preventative and punitive strategies employed by private security can most often be observed in relation to the modification and influencing of an individual’s behaviour and movements.

\textsuperscript{161} There are a number of legal tools which private security officers may draw upon to assist them in their work. Referred to as ‘any person’ powers in legislation, such powers include: the right to ask (e.g. to search a bag), the power to arrest (see Chapter Six, section 6.3 for more detail), the power to use force, the right to remove someone from private property and the ability to search (with consent) (e.g. as condition of access to private property) (see Button 2007: 31-44 for further detail).
which, in turn, affect human bodies themselves (e.g. increased surveillance). However, as Singh (2005) discusses, other punitive strategies which cause the actual sensation of pain can also be identified, for example, barbed wire and electric fences may also be used.

Some years ago, Johnston (1992) criticised the distinction commonly made by scholars between ‘loss prevention’ and ‘crime control’ on the reasoning that understanding public policing and private security motivations in such a way obscures the increasingly complementary nature of the two objectives within an increasingly marketised (i.e. neo-liberal) political economy. As Singh and Kempa (2007: 299) note, private security agencies can now be seen often to market themselves as ‘Security AND Loss Control’, providers making a clear distinction between the two motives and in turn, implying that they do not view security purely as a matter of loss control. Nevertheless, academic discussion continues, for the most part, to assume that private security focuses principally, if not wholly, on loss prevention. It is only recently that commentators have begun to detail the crime control and other coercive responsibilities of private security, resulting in suggestions - notably by South (1997) - that punitive measures may now at the forefront of private security activities.

Generally speaking, this distinction has been presumed on the basis of findings obtained by a number of studies on shop theft and store detectives and which have highlighted the loss/crime distinction (cf Ekblom, 1986; Farrington et al., 1993; Gabbard, Montang and Leonard, 1986; Shapland and Wiles, 1989)\textsuperscript{162}. Furthermore, Rigakos’ research draws out the similarities of Toronto’s ‘parapolice’ to the contemporary public police in functions and aspirations. This was particularly evident with regard to the private security officers’ apparent commitment to ‘law enforcement ideals - ‘good pinches’’ (2002: 127). Rigakos concludes by arguing that ‘private and public can refer to little more than the official designation of the policing service in question’ and that ‘this tells us very little about their operations’ (2002: 149, original emphasis). He questions the notion that ‘the public and private police’ in late capitalist society have different goals, seeing them in fact as having similar roles. In their article, ‘The Transformations of Policing’, White and Gill (2013) also raise the issue of public good vs. market rationalities with regard to their effect on

\textsuperscript{162} Later research on the growth of mass private property (e.g. shopping malls) has tended to bring out the space limited nature of private security staff’s work (i.e. only on their premises) but also draws attention to the many different motives and roles which include social order.
relations between private security and police actors in Britain. Reflecting on the key threads of argument put forward by Bayley and Shearing (1996) in the ‘transformation thesis’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003), the authors discuss the extent to which private security and police actors do actually have definite rationalities or world views which are exclusively based on either public good or market logic. In their article the authors contend that, ‘rather than witnessing a marked shift from a public good-orientated system of policing to a market-orientated one, we are in fact seeing a complex blurring of relations and rationalities, with both private security and police actors drawing upon a mix of public and private scripts to inform their actions’ (White and Gill, 2013: 74-75).

In the body of policing literature, it is now commonplace for commentators to make reference to studies of cop culture (cf Loftus 2010; Reiner 2010: 115-38) and security governance ‘mentalities’ (cf Berg, 2010; Johnston and Shearing 2003: 29-30). The ascendance of constructivism (Gergen, 2009) has encouraged commentators to explore the likelihood that different social actors possess diverse and variable - as opposed to fixed - rationalities when undertaking their day-to-day work. As Crawford (2006: 464) remarks, there is consequently a pressing ‘need to develop conceptual parameters for thinking about both the publicness of private forms of policing and the privateness of the public police’. This is of particular significance to understandings of the culture(s) of both the public police and the private security which have traditionally been envisaged in terms of the market versus public good rationalities.

White and Gill (2013: 5) also remark how:

‘The majority of the criminology and security governance literature examines private security actors from an (often implicit) economic perspective, in which they are regarded as market actors whose operations should be framed primarily as responses to fluctuations in supply and demand’.

It is therefore somewhat unsurprising that this literature also tends to reproduce the assumption that private security actors operate in line with market rationalities. However, the limited (but growing) number of those culturally orientated studies which seek to draw attention to the rationalities of private security actors suggest that these actors do not always draw upon consistent market rationalities to guide their actions. White (2010, 2012), for instance, has shown how the executives of many private security companies
frequently act as political strategists alongside their more conventional role as businessmen and, in doing so, seek to align their company’s operations with the popularly held expectation that domestic security ought to be provided by state actors as a public good (White and Gill, 2013: 5). \(^{163}\) While the authors rightly recognise that most of the time, such political strategising is guided by a desire to maximise company profits, they nevertheless illustrate the fact that for many private security executives, market and public good rationalities are far from mutually exclusive (White and Gill, 2013: 5).

In another recent study Thumala, Goold and Loader (2011) have similarly discovered that private security actors often draw upon non-market rationalities in their day-to-day activities, observing that:

‘...what is most striking about the way security players spoke about their industry in interviews with us, and speak to each other about it in the trade press, is just how infrequently they seek to justify its existence and value, or enhance its reputation, using principles and arguments drawn from ... the ‘market world’’ (Thumala et al., 2011: 297).

Instead, they found, these actors regularly borrow from the symbolism and discourse of the public sphere when framing their activities in an effort to legitimate their ‘tainted trade’. What is particularly interesting about this research is that, in the view of Thumala et al. (2011) these borrowing activities are not driven solely by a desire to legitimate their trade to potential purchasers of their products and services, but also by a desire to legitimate their trade to themselves. This relates to White’s (2010: 175-6) point that private security actors do not exist in an ‘ontologically separate realm’ from those who may be considered to have more moral (or at least traditionally moral) concerns about the provision of security as a private good. It is perfectly possible for them to share these concerns while simultaneously working in the industry - that is, they can be guided by divided and internally inconsistent rationalities.

Together, these studies suggest that the lines separating public good from market rationalities may be more blurry and overlapping than was initially conceived. They

\(^{163}\) This issue is further bolstered by the increasing need for large corporations to adopt corporate social responsibility policies (cf Kelly, Martin and Johnson, 2010; Sankar and Bhattacharya, 2001). For example, in a worldwide survey conducted in December 2005 by management consultants McKinsey, only 6 per cent of the 4,238 executives surveyed agreed that the sole purpose of business was to produce high returns for shareholders; 84 per cent thought high returns had to be balanced with contributions to the broader public good (McKinsey, 2006: 33-39).
suggest that far from operating in accordance with clear-cut market rationalities, private security actors frequently draw upon a combination of market and public good rationalities to guide their actions (cf Berg 2010; Rigakos 2002). Further empirical study of private security actor rationalities in any given territory is much needed, as is the effect of market rationalities on the public police — particularly given the context of pluralisation and increase in partnership working etc. This is particularly true when one considers the neo-liberal reform of police institutions in line with NPM principles since the 1980s which were designed to inject the logic of the market into police operations (McLaughlin, Muncie and Hughes, 2001; McLaughlin and Murji 2001). Without doubt these reforms serve to complicate police rationality, as Ayling et al. (2009) remark:

‘...police are facing the singular challenge of being required to function in a business paradigm while still trying to provide a ‘public service’ which delivers ‘justice’ and does so equitably and coherently’ (Ayling et al., 2009: 11).

As such, it is likely that police actors and private security actors do not operate on the basis of unified rationalities, but rather operate elements of both. This hypothesis is supported by work by Loftus (2010) and Button, Williamson and Johnston (2007) who together draw attention to the continuity of the underlying world view of police officers which ‘continues to exert considerable influence over day-to-day police work’ (Loftus, 2010: 3). It is therefore likely that the ‘working personality’ of police officers and security officers is one of a dual nature. The dichotomy of market and public good rationalities is increasingly likely to be further complicated at an operational level by the growing use of agency staff (i.e. those who have been bought in from private security agencies to work for the police on a fixed term basis) for which CIs may be one example. These individuals may thus bring with them the market rationalities of their private sector employers but their behaviour and thought-process may also be being influenced by wider notions of public good and furthermore, the crime control mentality of their public police colleagues whom they work alongside. This issue will be explored in greater detail later in later chapters of this thesis.

2.4.7 Summary

In summary, this section has discussed literature related to the topic of police occupational culture/s. Overall, this section has argued in favour of extending the cultural
lens beyond the study of warranted officers to non-warranted police staff. Despite their long-established position in many police forces, police staff groups have been largely excluded from existing cultural accounts. Given the context of profound and on-going organisational reform and the significance of the roles now being variously undertaken by non-warranted individuals, I would argue that the time has now come for greater acknowledgement of the impact of non-warranted personnel presence for understandings of police culture/s. It may be that police staff represent a new type amongst the ‘multiplicity of police culture(s) for understanding the construction(s) and meaning(s) of police work and police identity(ies)’ (Silvestri, 2003: 15). As made clear in this chapter, increased specialisation and ongoing budgetary constraint has meant that the decisions and actions undertaken by police staff may now have significant implications for the overall legitimacy of the police. However, with regard to the focus of this study, what remains to be identified is the level of autonomy and discretion in decision making which is afforded to CIs and with that, the extent to which traditional ‘detective culture’ can be said to be facilitating/influencing the way they operate their role.

Furthermore, as discussed in the final part of this section, the advent of the mixed-economy model of policing provision and in particular, the increased significance of the contribution now also being made by private security to public provision policing suggests a need to extend focus even further, to the study of ‘policing culture/s’ which exist beyond the police organisation itself. Work by White and Gill (2013) (amongst others) has drawn much needed attention to the emerging ‘hybridity’ of policing rationalities and with that, the merging of occupational and sectoral identities within the police organisation and beyond it. While differences in individual orientations to work might be distinguishable along sectoral lines they maybe becoming increasing less clear-cut as the police find themselves operating within a shared policing and security context. With regard to the focus of current study, the extent to which the utilisation of agency CIs is likely to impact on the public good orientation of investigative work by the public police remains to be seen as is a key area of consideration in the current research.

2.5 Concluding Summary

Overall this chapter has reviewed a breadth of literature considered pertinent to the introduction of CIs in 2002. It should be clear from the above critical review that, as
a topic of discussion, the utilisation of CIs presents a number of interesting issues for wider consideration, in particular, how recent pluralising trends may be starting to blur long established occupational and professional boundaries both within and outside the police organisation. What is clear from the above discussion is that the landscape and territories of policing may once again be shifting as the effects of unprecedented cuts to the police budget - in particular, on the police workforce, its composition and its relations with non-police partner agencies in both the public and private sectors – continue to be realised. Such a trying occupational context may serve as a stimulus for experimentation that affords or offers possible economies. If viewed strictly in terms of their cost-effectiveness in relation to warranted detectives, CIs may prove a lucrative investment for the police and the CID. Indeed, as police forces face competing pressures to maintain/improve efficiency in all areas of their work while also making savings to their budget, it is likely that they will use their operational autonomy to look towards more innovative means of utilising CIs beyond their primary ‘supportive’ capacity. There is a clear potential for ‘mission creep’ to occur within the CI role and this may have serious implications for detective’s claims to jurisdictional autonomy and thus, for their status as professionals within the police organisation. As in many areas of professional work, the division of labour in policing is becoming increasingly more complex as technological advancements, increased specialisation and need for fiscal stringency necessitate a more economically flexible and diversely skilled workforce. The utilisation of CIs therefore raises important questions about the trajectory of professionalism in relation to criminal investigation in the coming years. Furthermore, it is likely that the rise in presence and significance of private security to contemporary policing provision will serve to redefine the role to be performed by professional police officers on the frontline. For detectives, CIs may present a potential threat to their claims of professional expertise in the field of criminal investigation. They also likely challenge deep-seated assumptions about the nature of the detective knowledge-base and, with that, the centrality of the detective role to contemporary criminal investigation.

The final section of this chapter applied a cultural lens to the introduction of CIs and, in doing so, has explored the extent to which their utilisation may have effected change in established cultures that exist within the CID. Recent changes in patterns of policing (most notably, shifts towards greater civilianisation and privatisation) have encouraged dramatic changes in the composition of the police workforce, with more specialised and
frontline work falling within the occupational remit of non-warranted police staff. The intermingling of private and public policing in recent years also draws attention to the potential for the overlapping of values and occupational cultures. The hybrid occupational status of agency CIs in particular raises important questions, not only about the potential blurring of boundaries between the public and the private sectors in regard to the provision of criminal investigation, but also concerning the impact of such developments on the orientations of officers and staff towards their work. It could be that CIs, as a new variant of the extended policing family, may be encouraging the formation of dual-rationalities within the contemporary CID. The overall impact of such blurring on practice and, in particular, on the role of the warranted detective however remains to be seen.

Before moving on to discuss the methodology employed in the research, I feel it is important, given the breadth of discussion covered in the previous sections, to conclude this chapter by drawing the reader’s attention back to the aims and objectives of the study which are as follows:

- Develop knowledge and understanding of the CI role - their experiences, working practices, occupational identity and positioning, and sense of value.
- Critically explore the influence of organisational factors upon CI working practices and occupational identity.
- Examine relationships between non-warranted CIs and warranted police DCs and in so doing, explore the drivers and inhibitors to integration and effective investigative practice.
- Survey trends and level of consistency in the numbers, coordination and utilisation of CIs by police forces across the country.
- Develop insights with regard to the future trajectory of the CI role and the criminal investigation process in E&W.

Hopefully this review of the literature has suggested some directions for exploring these questions.
3.1 Introduction

Blumer (1969: 28) defines research methods as being the ‘mere instruments designed to identify and analyse the obdurate character of the social world and, as such, their value exists only in their suitability in enabling this task to be done’ (Blumer, 1969: 28). As such, the formulation of a suitable research design\textsuperscript{164} is an essential part of any social research project and one which is determined by the overall research methodology adopted by the researcher, which in itself is informed through consideration of the nature of the research being undertaken. The study in question adopts a mixed methods research methodology and, in doing so, draws upon a number of data collection techniques in an effort to answer the central research questions of this thesis.

Through the adoption of a mixed methods approach, the aims of the research are two-fold. First, the researcher seeks to capture the ‘social meanings and ordinary activities’ of research participants as they are exhibited within a ‘naturally occurring setting’ (commonly referred to by ethnographic researchers as ‘the field’ (Brewer, 2000: 10)). Second, the researcher aims to broadly map the nature of the deployment and demographic of CI use across E&W. For this project, data collection techniques primarily included the interviewing of police detectives (DCs) and police staff alongside some observation work, both of which were undertaken concurrently as the researcher accompanied participants during their daily business both within and outside of the police CID. This study was designed to explore the nature of the role played by CIs relative to that of warranted DCs within CIDs across E&W. Through the use of a mixed methods approach to data collection, as complete a portrait as possible of the world of police officers and police staff operating within CID units was constructed.

This chapter is concerned with outlining the research process and overall approach to research utilised by this study, providing some context for clarification of, and justification for, each chosen method adopted by the study. This chapter discusses the

\textsuperscript{164} In this research the term ‘research design’ is employed in accordance with the definition provided by Bryman (2008: 698) which refers to ‘a framework for the collection and analysis of data’. Research designs involve the intersection of philosophy (e.g. the theoretical framework and motivation of the researcher with regard to the research), strategies of enquiry (e.g. qualitative strategies such as ethnography) (also been referred to in the literature as approaches to enquiry (Creswell, 2007), or research methodologies (Mertens, 1998)) and specific methods (e.g. interviews, experiments, surveys etc.).
research settings in which the fieldwork was undertaken, the varying methods of data collection employed in the mixed methods approach utilised by the researcher, the approach to data analysis employed by the study and also some of the practical and ethical challenges faced by the researcher while negotiating her way through the data collection process within the closed occupational world of the CID.

3.2 Epistemology and Ontological Considerations

As with any research, it is important to clarify the ontology and epistemology of the current study and to reflect upon and provide reasoned justification for the chosen approach vis-a-vis competing philosophies, theories and analytical traditions (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Generally speaking, epistemology is about ‘how we know what we know’ (Crotty, 1998: 8) or ‘the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 201). In the case of the current study this may, for example, include ways of ‘knowing’ about the CI role as it is understood and experienced by those social actors. Different epistemological positions provide different explanations about the nature of reality and are fundamentally concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kind(s) of knowledge is possible and how we ensure it is adequate and legitimate (Maynard, 1994).

Epistemology is related to ontology which, broadly speaking, refers to ‘the study of being’ (Crotty, 1998: 10) or ‘the nature of reality’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 37). Ontology focuses on questions such as ‘whether or not a social reality exists independently of human conceptions’, ‘whether there is a single shared social reality or multiple context-specific realities’ and, ‘whether or not social behaviour is governed by immutable or generalisable laws’ (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 11). Every researcher applies their own set of epistemological and ontological assumptions when conducting their investigations and it is important that these are taken into account by researchers when designing and undertaking social research.

Opinions are divided amongst researchers with regard to what constitutes legitimate enquiry and warrantable knowledge in specific situations. Indeed, there appear to be two generally opposing views. On the one hand there are those advocates of the ‘experimentalist’, ‘positivist’ approach who posit a general belief in the existence of an objective, quantifiable reality. On the other hand, there are those who take a more ‘naturalistic’, ‘interpretative’ approach, furthering the theoretical belief that reality is
complex, socially constructed and fluid. As such, what we know is always negotiated within cultures, social settings and relationships with other people. From this perspective, validity or truth cannot be grounded in an objective reality (Henwood and Pidgeon 1992: 15). As will be discussed in more detail in the following sections of this chapter, a mixed methods research design was employed by the researcher in the current study. The decision to adopt this research design was informed by the epistemological and ontological stance of the researcher alongside primary consideration of the research questions, objectives and context (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003, 2009).

The current study is broadly framed by a post-positivist epistemological stance and is rooted in a critical realist approach (Bhaskar, 1975; 1998) which argues that choice of methods should be dictated by the nature of the research problem. The adoption of a critical realist approach allows for simultaneous recognition of the existence of knowledge independent of individuals but also the socially embedded and fallible nature of scientific enquiry, therefore positioning itself somewhere between positivism/objectivism and constructionism/relativism. It is the basic assumption of critical realists that an objective, measurable reality does indeed exist but that all measurement and observation of that reality is fallible due to the inherently theory-laden and biased world views of individuals; science is a social practice and scientific knowledge is a social product. Rather, critical realists propose that there is more than one way of understanding/perceiving reality, each of which may be equally valid (Lakoff, 1987: 265). In other words:

‘Even if one is a realist at the ontological level, one could be an epistemological Interpretivist … our knowledge of the real world is inevitably interpretive and provisional rather than straightforwardly representational’ (Frazer and Lacey, 1993: 182).

Critical realists thus retain an ontological realism (there is a real world that exists independently of our perceptions, theories and constructions) while accepting a form of epistemological constructivism and relativism (our understanding of this world is inevitably a construction from our own perspectives and standpoint). From a critical realist standpoint, as researchers our understandings of these perspectives of reality can only ever hope to be more or less correct; some theories approximate reality better than
others. The ultimate goal of research therefore is not to identify generalisable laws (positivism) or to identify the lived experience or beliefs of social actors (interpretivism); it is to develop deeper levels of explanation and understanding.

Like constructivist/relativist thinking, critical realism sees the social world as being mediated through social interaction and interpretation and social phenomena as concept-dependent. However, unlike interpretivism, it does not exclude causal explanation (Sayer, 2000) choosing rather to acknowledge the existence of causal mechanisms which may or may not be observable but which still exist alongside social actors. Mechanisms may include things, such as social systems (e.g. cultural, political etc.); social structures (e.g. police organisation); and specific interventions (e.g. government legislation etc.) and with specific regard to the current research, can be broadly understood to exist as the vehicles through which the CI role is experienced and understood by individuals within the police CID.

Critical realism offers a robust framework for the use of a variety of methods in order to gain a better understanding of the meaning and significance of a phenomenon of interest (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie, 1998; Bhaskar, 1978; Mingers, 2004). As this study seeks to provide both breadth and depth of understanding with regard to the current use of CIs across the country, the collection of qualitative and quantitative data via a mixed methods research design was undertaken and resulted in triangulation taking place at the design, method (through ‘connecting’ and ‘merging’ (see section 3.12.1)) and interpretive levels. This decision was made for purposes of completeness allowing for complementary perspectives and a greater level of detail than could be obtained from using either data source alone. The adoption of a critical realist approach by the current study has also allowed the researcher to take account of the significance of social context (particularly the socio-occupational and organisational contexts and social mechanisms present within the CID and within which CIs were located) when building knowledge about the reality of the CI role.

The adoption of a critical realist approach has enabled the various ways by which research participants interpret their experiences within their given position to be explored providing ‘thick description’ of the realities of the CI role (Geertz, 1973). It also enabled
focus to be directed at the various understandings that different individuals have, in this instance, CI’s and DC’s conceptions of the nature of their role within the criminal investigation process; while at the same time taking account of how associated concepts - in this case, for example, how individuals learn how to become ‘professional’ criminal investigators - are viewed and addressed. Furthermore, for this mixed methods study, the adoption of a critical realist perspective has allowed for the criminal investigation process and subsequently, the role of the warranted detective, to be viewed as a product of interpretation. This therefore means that their role may be subject to renegotiation by social actors within the CID while at the same time, enabling a view of reality as also being that which, to an extent, persists and antedates the participation of particular people and therefore shapes their perspectives and so, to a degree, is objective and measurable (Becker, 1982: 521). Equally, for the current study, the implementation of a critical realist ontology also allowed for breadth as well as depth of enquiry via the administration of a semi-structured survey which explored similarity and variation in the use of CIs between police constabularies across E&W. This in turn resulted in the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data which enabled a more complete picture of the phenomenon to be determined.

3.3 Mixed Methods Research

This study employed a mixed methods (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003) research design, which broadly speaking, is a procedure for collecting, analysing and ‘mixing’ both quantitative and qualitative approaches into the research methodology of a single study, in an effort to understand a research problem in a more holistic fashion (Creswell, 2002). Over the last half century or so, there has been a distinct shift in the social science literature towards the promotion of methodological pluralism. The desirability of the mixed methods approach has been underscored by the recognition of the inherent strengths and weaknesses of single method designs. Increasing reference has been made in the literature to the emergence of mixed methods as the ‘third methodological movement’ (an intellectual and practical synthesis) alongside the longstanding discourses of qualitative and quantitative research methods. This emerging third paradigm\textsuperscript{165} has

\textsuperscript{165} The use of the term ‘paradigm’ in this section of the thesis is reserved for ‘the philosophical intent or underlying theoretical framework and motivation of the researcher with regard to the research’ (Mackenzie
been referred to under many names. Some of these include multiple operationalism (Campbell and Fiske, 1959), triangulation (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest, 1966: 3), blended research (Thomas, 2003), integrative research (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004), multi-method research (Hunter and Brewer, 2003; Morse, 2003), triangulated studies (Sandelowski, 2003), ethnographic residual analysis (Fry, Chantavanich and Chantavanich, 1981) and mixed research (Johnson, 2006; Johnson and Christensen, 2004). More commonly however, the term ‘mixed methods research’ has been used to describe this movement although there is an argument that the broader term ‘mixed research’, as well as ‘integrative research’, is more appropriate as it does not suggest a limitation of mixing to methods only (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, Turner, 2007: 118).

Several definitions for mixed methods research have emerged over the years. Greene, Caracelli and Graham (1989) defined mixed methods research designs as those that include at least one quantitative method and one qualitative method. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) indicated a broader understanding, that being that mixed methods research is the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study. However, for the purposes of the current study, mixed methods research is understood in accordance with the definition posited by Johnson et al. (2007), that is, mixed methods is assumed to be:

‘...the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration’.

Unlike mono-method research designs which adopt a single approach to research (e.g. quantitative approach) and which derive from distinct epistemological and ontological foundations - that is, each type of research operates with a different set of assumptions about the definition of reality (ontology), the acknowledgement of reality or ‘how we know what we know’ (epistemology), and the ways in which reality is understood (methodology) (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) - mixed methods designs embrace both

and Knipe, 2006: 139-205). Others have referred to this as worldviews (Guba, 1990: 17), epistemologies and ontologies (Crotty, 1998), or broadly conceived research methodologies (Neuman, 2000).
approaches in the construction of research designs based on pragmatism (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998), holism and continuity (Schulenburg, 2007: 2-3).

Several debates or ‘wars’ (Datta, 1994) have raged in the social sciences regarding the issue of methodological pluralism. These debates have been instigated by ‘purist’ critics on both sides (positivists and interpretivists) and have tended to fall within one of two indistinct camps: the general belief in the superiority of one methodological approach over the other, and the overall incommensurability of the two research methods due to their being derived from fundamentally different epistemological positions (e.g. positivist vs. constructivist orientations) - what has come to be termed the ‘incompatability thesis’ (Howe, 1988). However, more recently these ‘wars’ have been replaced by a ‘paradigmic soup’ (Buchanan and Bryman, 2007) and methodological pluralism has become a dominant part of the research landscape. ‘Pacifists’ such as Greene and Caracelli (1997) further the ‘multiple world-views’ perspective i.e. the idea that researchers may use any number of philosophical foundations to justify the use of mixed methods. Scholars such as Patton (1990), Murphy (1990), Cherryholmes (1992) and Morgan (2007) alternatively advocated a ‘pragmatist’ approach to knowing whereby forced choice between either methodological approach is rejected in favour of ‘what works’. Arguably the most important consideration prior to designing and conducting a mixed methods study, or study of any kind for that matter, is whether the method and associated data collection techniques to be employed, best addresses the research problem and the research question(s) of the project. The decision to adopt a mixed methods approach in the current study was fundamentally based on this logic and on the opportunity it provides the researcher to explore and analyse different aspects of a phenomenon (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In the current research, this relates most obviously to the ability to study the nature of the CIs role while also exploring the scope of their use at a national level.

A number of commentators have advocated the mixed methods approach, often choosing to list reasons supporting the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Rossman and Wilson, 1985). For example, work by Sieber (1973) outlined how such a combination can be effective at the research design, data collection and data analysis stages of the research process with the strengths of one
approach offsetting the weaknesses of the other\textsuperscript{166}. During the data analysis stage, for example, quantitative data can facilitate the assessment of generalisability of the qualitative data and can shed new light on dense qualitative findings, providing focus or what Fielding (2012: 127-128) refers to as ‘illustration’. Alternatively, during the data analysis stage, qualitative data can play an important role in the interpretation, clarification, description and validation of quantitative results. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003, cited in Hall, 2008: 124) list three key areas in which they argue mixed methods are superior to mono method approaches:

1. \textit{Mixed methods research can answer research questions that the other methodologies cannot} - Combining methods enables researchers to access the best features of each so they are able to answer a wider range of questions, such as confirmatory and exploratory questions, in the same study.

2. \textit{Mixed method research provides better (stronger) inferences} - Mixed methods provide a wide variety of data sources to assist in understanding complex phenomena. They enable multiple inferences that complement one another.

3. \textit{Mixed methods provide the opportunity for presenting a greater diversity of views} - Inferences from mixed methods can reflect different voices and perspectives and this can lead to re-examination of the ways in which the field of study has been conceptualised.

Fundamentally, the techniques employed in a mixed methods research design ‘should be mixed in a way that has complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses’ (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003: 16)\textsuperscript{167}. By examining published research, Greene et al.

\textsuperscript{166} Quantitative methodologies are weak due primarily to their decontextualizing effect on human behaviour and subsequent failure to address the ‘why’ of a phenomenon (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007). Similarly, qualitative methodologies are often criticised for their level of subjectivity and ensuing researcher bias (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007). It is the central premise of the mixed methods approach that using quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007: 35; Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 1989; Rocco et al., 2003: 21; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998), in turn, providing researchers with the most informative, complete, balanced and useful research results (Johnston et al, 2007).

\textsuperscript{167} It is important to note here the view of some commentators who suggest that far from freeing researchers from the restrictions of paradigms and the strife of paradigmatic struggle, mixed methods can actually serve to reinforce categorical differences. Giddings (2006: 195) for example, argues that ‘the use of the terms ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ as normative descriptors reinforces their binary positioning, effectively marginalising the methodological diversity within them’.

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(1989: 259) identified five purposes or rationales for the utilisation of a mixed methods approach:

1. **Triangulation** - looks to see if there is convergence, corroboration, correspondence of results from the different methods.

2. **Complementary** - looks to see if there is elaboration, enhancement, illustration, clarification of the results with the results from one method with the results from the other.

3. **Development** - looks to see if the results from one method can be used to help develop or inform the other method, where development is broadly construed to include sampling and implementation, as well as measurement decisions.

4. **Initiation** - looks to see if there is paradox and contradiction, new perspectives of frameworks, the recasting of questions or results from one method with questions and results from the other method.

5. **Expansion** - looks to see if the breadth and range of enquiry can be extended by using different methods for different enquiry components.

In the current research, data from the quantitative component of the study have been used to ‘flesh out’ qualitative findings, providing much needed context and ‘analytic density’ (Fielding, 2012: 128). This method is not uncommon in the social sciences (e.g. Clarke, 2003), allowing researchers greater scope and as such, providing a wider and deeper picture of the phenomenon from all angles (Shih, 1998: 633). However, generally speaking the quantitative component of the study was utilised as an adjunct to assist in the interpretation of qualitative findings, improving the depth and quality of the findings as well as any inferences which may be drawn. While not necessarily equal in its positioning, the quantitative component also invariably contributed to knowledge regarding the phenomenon under study in its own right and looked at CI use across E&W. Based on the above discussion and typology of rationales proposed by (Greene et al., 1989) the current study can be thought to possess elements of triangulation (it seeks to extend the scope of enquiry through the utilisation of different methods for different
enquiry components), *expansion* (it also seeks to enhance and elaborate on the findings obtained via alternate data collection techniques) and *complementarity* (it also seeks convergence and corroboration of some of the findings). Together these rationales also enhance the potential generalisability of findings/conclusions (e.g. extent of utilisation of CIs in major crime, quality of training provided to CIs).

According to Creswell, Plano-Clark, Gutmann and Hanson (2003), a number of key questions should be addressed by the researcher at the planning stage of any mixed methods study. First, the researcher must take into account what sequence he/she wants the qualitative and quantitative data collection to be implemented. Data can be collected either *sequentially* (i.e. one data collection method follows after the other) or *concurrently* (i.e. both data collection methods (qualitative and quantitative) are collected at the same time). Based on a pragmatic rationale relating the nature of the central research questions of this study (see section 3.1), the decision was made by the researcher to adopt a three stage sequential approach to data collection. Quantitative data were initially gleaned from Home Office generated statistics which detailed the numbers of police staff in operation within CID generalist and CID specialist units within police forces across E&W (see Appendix 1). This data directly influenced the selection of the fieldwork sites (see section 3.7) within which qualitative data were then collected via semi-structured interviews and observation conducted with CIs and DCs (and a number of ‘others’). This was subsequently followed in the final stage of the data collection process by quantitative data collection via the sending of a semi-structured survey which was subsequently administered electronically (via email) to all of the 43 police constabularies in E&W (see Appendix 5). This research study can be considered exploratory in nature as it ‘generates information about unknown aspects of a phenomenon’ (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009: 25). Information hoped to be generated in the current exploratory study related broadly to: (a) the nature of the role and type of work being performed by CIs within CID across E&W; (b) how the role being performed by CIs has impacted on the professional ethos of warranted police DCs; and (c) what the current situation with regard to the deployment of CIs across E&W currently is. As in a traditional sequential exploratory design, the data collected in both the initial quantitative and qualitative stages of the research directly informed the development of the subsequent stage/s of the research.\(^\text{168}\) Initial quantitative

\(^{168}\) However, unlike traditional sequential exploratory designs, the current study involved three stages of data collection.
findings aided the selection of appropriate fieldwork sites for the qualitative data collection stage. In the case of the qualitative results, the data collected via the interviews and observation aided the construction of the survey carried out in final stage of the data collection process (e.g. appropriate terminology and who to address it to).

A second consideration for researchers when choosing a mixed methods design is whether or not one research method will have priority or greater emphasis than the other in the study (e.g. QUAL → quant\textsuperscript{169}). The qualitative-quantitative continuum presented in Figure 1, draws attention to the variable and overlapping nature of mixed methods researchers and types of mixed methods research. In the current study the quantitative components were utilised as adjuncts to the qualitative data as this allowed for both the necessary depth and scope of research and the relevance/generalisability of findings. The decision to afford priority position to the qualitative component was based first and foremost on decisions made as the design phase relating to the best way to address the central research questions of this thesis.


\textsuperscript{169} Notation proposed by Morse (1991). In her system, the main or dominant method appears in capital letters (QUAN, QUAL) whereas the complementary method is given in lowercase letters (quan, qual). The notation ‘+’ is used to indicate a simultaneous design and the arrow ‘→’ stands for sequential design.
Third, integration - i.e. when and how to integrate the different data components and how they inform one another - must be accounted for. Fielding (2012) argues that the issues relating to integration are bigger than simply when it happens:

‘Integration is really the heart of the whole mixed methods exercise because the purpose of mixing methods is to get information from multiple sources and so the issues in bringing together the information are crucial. It is not so much the stage when integration occurs but additionally what types of data are being integrated and how we integrate them’ (Fielding, 2012: 127).

In the current study data were integrated at the analysis and interpretive and reporting stages of the research. Decisions about these things rest fundamentally on our decision to implement a mixed methods approach, the general rationale for which has been discussed above (issues relating to the integration of data in the current study is discussed in section 3.12.1 of this chapter).

Fourth, mixed methods studies may be underpinned by a theoretical perspective that influences the selection of a particular research design and shapes the research process (Creswell, 2003). Some feminist scholars for example, argue that the quantitative approach is inherently unsuitable for research conducted in this field because they neglect the emotions of the people being studied (Jayaratne, 1993: 121). The current study is underpinned by the junior partner theory (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.5) argued by Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971, 1972) which, generally speaking, draws a clear line between the work of the public and private sectors with regard to the provision of policing and security which, according to the thesis, are not in competition with one another in terms of the jurisdictions of their work. As was discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, this theory is utilised broadly in the current study to explore the extent to which the role being performed by CIs (be they employed directly by the police organisation or via contracts agreed with private sector agencies e.g. G4S) can be considered complementary and/or junior to that of their warranted DC counterparts. Arguably, the most appropriate data collection technique which can be utilised to explore this issue would need to involve

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170 Increasingly Women’s Studies has however come to acknowledge that debates which allege the unsuitability of the quantitative approach in feminist research may, in reality, be less about the techniques of enquiry being unsuitable and are more about academic feminists seeking their own epistemological approach in an attempt to ‘professionalise’ their discipline (cf Oakley, 1998: 716).
direct communication with active practitioners (i.e. CIs and police officers) (e.g. through interviews) as well as time spent by the researcher within the field itself (e.g. observation).

3.4 Mixed Methods with the Police - Rationale

The study of the organisation, practice and (sub) cultures of the police has had a long and distinguished history in criminology (Chan, 1997; Hobbs, 1989; Innes, 2003; Loftus; 2009; Manning, 1977). Although field observation and more specifically the adoption of an ethnographic approach is often purported to be the most appropriate and fruitful way of gaining an in-depth understanding of day-to-day policing and in particularly, the elusive police occupational culture (Punch, 1979: chapter two; see also Marks, 2004 and Noaks and Wincup, 2004: chapter ten for further discussion), researchers of the police have also made use of other research methodologies which, generally speaking, have included the variable mix of formal interviews or questionnaire surveys to supplement, or replace, field observation (e.g., Fielding, 1988; Huey, 2007). For example, in his longitudinal study of police socialisation, Van Mannen (1975) chose to adopt a mixed methods approach which incorporated qualitative interviews, observation and also employed the aid of a structured questionnaire to collect data relating to the attitudes and experience of new recruits to the police over a five year period.

Chan et al. (2003) similarly sought a mixed methods approach in their longitudinal study of the occupational culture and socialisation of recruits in an Australian police organisation. The researchers here made use of a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods which included multiple rounds of questionnaire surveys, interviews and field observation over a two-year period, together with a ten-year follow-up study. Schulenberg (2004) also utilised a mixed methods research design to examine the organisational processes that occur in police decision making in Canada. Her research design consisted of semi-structured interviews undertaken with police officers and statistical and documentary data (obtained primarily from provincial and municipal government agencies and the Census). The data gleaned from semi-structured interviews alongside relevant documentation (e.g. policies and protocols) formed the primary qualitative aspect of the study. Reflecting on the methodological approach adopted by the research, Schulenburg (2007) considers some of the key issues that arose when using a
mixed methods research design to address police decision making and ponders the factors influencing her decision to adopt this research approach. Most notably, Schulenburg (2007: 19) notes the influence of the existence of theory and research relating to the topic of police discretion which includes both post-positivist and constructivist elements (Doob and Chan, 1982; Klinger, 1997).

In the current study, field observation was supplemented with formal and informal interviews and a semi-structured survey on the rationale that this particular combination of data collection techniques would provide the most valid and reliable depiction of reality with regard to the use of CIs in E&W. The decision to adopt the mixed methods research design employed by the current study was also bolstered by two other factors: the demanding nature of the work performed by those operating within the units where observation was undertaken coupled with the fact that much of that work required participants remain office-based for large portions of the day, meant that fieldwork was dependent entirely on the availability of CIs and DCs. This meant that observation work was inconsistent and restricted to the availability of officers and staff according to their line managers. Furthermore, the study necessitated the researcher operate within a number of different fieldwork settings over the course of the fieldwork period. This meant that the researcher was only afforded a limited amount of time in which to develop rapport with participants. Together, this meant that an ethnographic approach to enquiry was not viable. In ethnographic research, researchers seek to immerse themselves in the fieldwork setting, often spending a long period of time with one group of participants. This methodological approach is arguably more likely to capture typical behaviour due to difficulties associated with keeping up false appearances over time. This is an advantage not available for the current study as the decision was made to sample shifts and participants to ensure a more representative coverage. The use of multiple sources of data was one way to improve the validity of findings.

Second, in order to meet the fourth aim of the current research - ‘Survey trends and level of consistency in the numbers and coordination of CIs across E&W’ - and in doing so, provide context to the qualitative component of the study, a semi-structured survey was deemed necessary and most appropriate. This data collection technique allowed for the generation of a deeper, more inclusive picture of the current use of CIs across E&W, also enabling the subsequent identification of patterns and trends in deployment.
Alongside the various rationales discussed in section 3.2 of this chapter and those considerations given here, the overall decision of the researcher to undertake a mixed methods study to explore the role played by CIs within the police CID, is, generally speaking, largely based on belief similar to that of Sammons et al. (2005: 221), that ‘complex and pluralistic social contexts demand analysis that is informed by multiple and diverse perspectives. Our conclusions, or rather our ‘inferences’, are therefore stronger for having applied a mixed method approach’.

3.5 Reflexive Research

‘Without some degree of reflexivity any research is blind and without purpose’.

(Flood, 1999: 35)

Reflexivity necessitates the researcher to be aware of his/her effect on the process and outcomes of the research and is a concept which is based on the premise that ‘knowledge cannot be separated from the knower’ (Steedman, 1991) and that, ‘In the social sciences, there is only interpretation. Nothing speaks for itself’ (Denzin, 1994). In carrying out qualitative research, it is impossible to remain ‘outside’ our subject matter; our presence, in whatever form, will have some kind of effect. Reflexive research takes account of this researcher involvement and requires researchers engage in explicit ‘self-aware meta-analysis’ when going about the collection and analysis of data (Finley, 2003).

Broadly speaking, reflexivity refers to ‘the interpretation of interpretation’ (Alvesson and Skolberg, 2000) and generally speaking, requires researchers to reflect ‘on the way in which research is carried out and understanding how the process of doing research shapes its outcomes’ (Hardy, Phillips and Clegg, 2001). However, three key types of reflexivity can be distinguished (Anderson, 2008). These are ‘introspective’ reflexivity (Finlay, 2002), ‘methodological’ reflexivity and epistemological reflexivity (Johnson and Duberley, 2003).

**Introspective reflexivity** focuses on the self-awareness of the researcher and can take the form of either reflexivity as deliberate and conscious reflection as part of a post-hoc rationalisation of events, or, as it did for Schön (1983), can also take the form of ‘reflection-as-action’, i.e. reflection is incorporated into the everyday activities of the research. **Methodological reflexivity** can be interpreted as a more technically-oriented
type of reflexivity. In other words, focus is afforded to the method utilised in the research as well as the role of the researcher. Finally, *epistemological reflexivity* sets out to question the epistemological or meta-theoretical assumptions that underpin the research. Consciousness here is not so much of self per se but of ‘becoming more consciously reflexive by thinking about our own thinking’ (Johnson and Cassell, 2001: 127).

During the fieldwork period I regularly reflected on my experiences, methods and interpretations both while in the field and shortly after leaving. As such, reflexivity most often took the form of introspective reflexivity although all three types of reflectivity were drawn upon by a researcher at various stages in the research process in an effort to improve reflexivity and as such, the validity of the data and clarity of the overall approach employed. This approach allowed the researcher to be continually aware of her research practices and assumptions, which exposed many of the limitations of sociological research and afforded a deeper understanding of the researcher’s role in the construction of data and knowledge. Furthermore, this approach helped me to develop an acute sense of self-awareness which in turn, helped to minimise the negative impact of my subjective influence on the researcher context. When analysing and reporting on the findings of the study, reflexive field note entries also acted as useful memory aids and allowed for added depth to explanations of events set down on paper.

### 3.6 Research Settings

To study the contribution of CIs to the criminal investigation process and the impact the introduction of this group of paraprofessional investigators has had on the professional ethos of police DCs and culture of the CID more broadly, fieldwork was undertaken sporadically within two English police force areas between April 2013 and April 2014. Site selection was informed by the general presence of CIs within each of the constabularies targeted for fieldwork in January 2013 as well as through review of relevant policy documents available at the time. CI numbers were identified from a review of official data collected by the Home Office which detailed numbers of ‘police staff’ operating within police CID across E&W (Dhani, 2012, see Appendix 1). While many forces (including those targeted for fieldwork) had yet to formulate specific cost-saving
for the then current and anticipated future cuts to the police budget at the time the fieldwork sites were selected, limited information was nonetheless available to the researcher at this point in time in the form of relevant HMIC reports. In particular, force specific summary reports were published from data gathered for the July 2012 report, ‘Policing in Austerity: One Year On’ (HMIC, 2012). These reports provided an overview of the strategies of each force for making the required savings and, while broad in their focus, highlighted important similarities and differences in the anticipated approach of both forces targeted for fieldwork. In particular, both forces were planning significant reductions in their workforce and were anticipating the majority of this change from the reduction of numbers of police staff. However, while Newbank planned to increase its frontline workforce volume, Shorewick, by contrast, planned to make a significant reduction to theirs (above the national average of 6%) (HMIC, 2012: 30). However, there were no specific published policy documents on the use of CIs available in the selected forces (or indeed, obviously, for other forces) nor documents on the particular reaction of police unions or other workforce bodies, at the time of selection of forces.

The decision to undertake fieldwork within two forces was based on the likelihood of variations in the use of CIs at divisional level by each force. For the sake of anonymity, pseudonyms of ‘Shorewick’ and ‘Newbank’ have been used in this thesis in place of the actual names of the chosen constabularies. Each fieldwork setting was coterminous with the geographical boundaries of the district of the associated police force and was primarily targeted on the basis of CI presence within the varying (generalist and specialist) CID units (see Appendix 1).

Fieldwork commenced in Shorewick at the beginning of June 2013 and ended in April 2014 and commenced in Newbank in July 2013 and ended in April 2014. Within these two locations fieldwork was undertaken within six police CID units and within eight distinct teams. Each research site (CID unit) was selected with the assistance of an appointed Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) at both Newbank and Shorewick who acted as research facilitator throughout the course of the study. A mixture of snowball and

\[171\] Neither of those forces targeted for fieldwork had made available information/policy documents specific to any plans for reductions in CI numbers at the time sites were selected (provisional documents were accessed by the researcher for plans to reduce the number of CIs working in Shorewick MIT). While the researcher was made aware of plans to reduce numbers of CIs working at Shorewick during the fieldwork, these plans were still in the process of being formulated (alongside changes in management structure within the CID) and, as such, had not yet been finalised at the time of the fieldwork.
purposive sampling was used to gather participants during the qualitative stage of the research (these techniques will be discussed in more detail in section 3.8 of this chapter).

Being a mixed methods study of a limited number of cases, any inferences drawn from the current project are limited in their generalisability to a wider context. However, although I remain cautious in making broad statements regarding the representativeness of findings, I am in firm agreement with Bowling (2010: 19) that ‘it is the task of the social scientist not simply to document and explain patterns of policing in a specific village or city but to generalise to all such rural or urban settings simply enough for the data collected in one place to provide the basis for descriptive or explanatory lessons to be drawn elsewhere’. It is the aim of this study therefore to generate descriptions and interpretations that can act as a resource for reader to understand similar situations in similar settings.
3.7 ‘Newbank’ and ‘Shorewick’

3.7.1 The Police

The police service in E&W consists of forty-three police constabularies, each of which is funded by the Home Office and local authorities through Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). These police constabularies are comparable, although owing to differences in history and territory there are both slight and considerable variations in size, structure and resources. For example, all police constabularies share the same rank structure with the exception of those based in London (see Table 1).

Table 1. Police Service Rank Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Provincial and Metropolitan Constabularies</th>
<th>The Metropolitan Police Service</th>
<th>City of London Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Federal Ranks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practitioners</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>Constable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>Inspector</td>
<td>Inspector</td>
<td>Inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Inspector</td>
<td>Chief Inspector</td>
<td>Chief Inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Superintending Ranks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Managers</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Superintendent</td>
<td>Chief Superintendent</td>
<td>Chief Superintendent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The National Police Chief Council (NPCC) Ranks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Commissioner</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Managers</td>
<td>Deputy Chief Constable</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Constable</td>
<td>Chief Commissioner</td>
<td>Commissioner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Mawby and Wright, 2008: 34)

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172 Exclusive of British Transport Police (Chief Constable), Civil Nuclear Constabulary (Chief Constable), Ministry of Defence Police (Chief Constable), National Crime Agency (Deputy Director General, Director General), Royal Military Police (Provost Marshal) and College of Policing (Chief Executive Officer).
Both Shorewick and Newbank can be considered typical police constabularies in terms of their style of organisation, size and bureaucratic command structure and furthermore, for their general valuing of technical efficiency and cost effectiveness. With the exception of Shorewick Major Incident Team (MIT) which was force level, each of the other CID units within which fieldwork was undertaken were relatively small (15 or less) and were located within small rooms based within moderately large stations at Basic Command Unit (BCU) level. BCUs (also known as boroughs, districts and divisions) deliver basic policing service - patrol, response, investigation and partnership working - within a fixed geographical area. Alongside the main force headquarters which houses the strategic managers and a number of operational and organisational support departments and whose personnel are responsible for monitoring and allocating resources to the BCUs (Bacon, 2011: 42), each BCU also operates its own headquarters within which the middle managers and a number of divisional operational and organisational departments - as was the case in Newbank - can be found. Local policing units (based in smaller geographical areas e.g. a village, district or town centers) tasked with delivering response and community policing can also be found operating from each BCU.

Likewise, the organisation of the CID in both Shorewick and Newbank was also similar to that of most other police constabularies, both employing approximately (at the time of study) over 450 individuals (officers and staff) and being divided into a varying number of distinct units and teams which were split between BCUs. With the exception of the Shorewick Domestic Abuse Unit who were managed by a civilian unit Manager, all CIs and DCs working within the various CID units and affiliated teams within which fieldwork was undertaken operated under the management of a Detective Sergeant (DS) who reported to a Detective Inspector (DI) who reported to the superintendent (Supt) in charge of divisional operations. All of the units operated as mixed teams with CIs operating alongside DCs and PCs on a daily basis. Given that the CIs were situated within an organisational context their world and work featured regular interaction with a range of other actors.

The focus of this study was on CIs, the role they play within contemporary criminal investigation and their subjective experiences of the CI role. In Shorewick, fieldwork was carried out within five CID units each of which housed a variable mix of CIs, DCs, other police officers and other police staff. Similarly, in Newbank fieldwork was undertaken
within four units. In total, 23 interviews were carried out in Shorewick and 13 in Newbank. Of these, 13 were conducted with CIs at Shorewick and 5 with CIs at Newbank. In total, 8 DCs\textsuperscript{173} were interviewed at Shorewick and 5 at Newbank\textsuperscript{174}. Further details of the CID units within which fieldwork was undertaken and relevant information on interviewees are listed below\textsuperscript{175}.

Table 2. Units within which fieldwork was undertaken

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shorewick CID Unit</th>
<th>Research Method</th>
<th>Number of Interviewees by Gender</th>
<th>Total in Operational Positions</th>
<th>Total in Managerial Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>Interviewed</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive Unit (Generalist)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Incident Team</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Crime Unit (Fraud and Financial Investigation Team)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Protection Unit (Domestic Abuse Unit)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Protection Unit (Child Protection Unit)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Management Unit</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{173} Number includes DCs in management roles.

\textsuperscript{174} The remaining 4 interviewees were police constables (1 in Shorewick Public Protection Unit, Domestic Abuse Team, 1 in Shorewick Crime Management Unit, Diary Team, and 2 in Newbank Generalist Reactive Unit).

\textsuperscript{175} All of the interviewees were of White British nationality and while the age of CIs in both forces was found to range from the late twenties to the early sixties, individual participants were not all asked to provide their age.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Management Unit (Diary Team)</th>
<th>✓</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newbank CID unit</th>
<th>Research Method</th>
<th>Total Number of Interviewees</th>
<th>Total in Operational Positions</th>
<th>Total in Managerial Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reactive Unit (Generalist)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Protection Unit</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Crime Unit (Fraud and Financial Investigation Team)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converter/Diary Team</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other CID Management</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.7.2 Gaining and Maintaining Access

For the researcher, gaining initial access to the field proved to be a much less arduous task than had been initially anticipated\(^{176}\). Despite occupying the position of an ‘outsider outsider’ (Brown, 1996) - i.e. the researcher had no personal connection to any participant and no official status that would have mandated police co-operation - gaining access to the field, both at Shorewick and Newbank fortunately proved to be a relatively straightforward task. After deciding on potentially suitable fieldwork sites\(^{177}\), formal letters addressed to the Chief Constable were sent to each force. Two days after the letters were sent, a DCI, who was later to become the primary research facilitator at Newbank, responded with a request to meet to discuss the research in more detail. A week or so after the response from Newbank, a DCI at Shorewick who again, would subsequently act a primary facilitator for the research at this site, also got in touch to request a face-to-face meeting. Aware of the fact that, regardless of these encouraging initial interactions, access had not yet been wholly granted, the researcher prepared for what was anticipated to be the inevitable researcher interrogation. However, both of these face-to-face meetings were both surprisingly pleasant and informative. Both DCIs volunteered to support and facilitate the research and also kindly offered me their own account of CI involvement within their individual force. The responsiveness of the police and encouragement offered to the researcher by both DCIs at this earliest stage of the study is something for which the researcher remains particularly appreciative of.

The researcher credits her positive experience of the ‘gaining access’ hurdle to two key factors. First and perhaps most significantly, the time of the research happened to coincide with the broad restructuring of the police organisation in E&W. In 2010, the coalition government introduced their national Comprehensive Spending Review which placed firm expenditure limits on public sector spending. This was, in large part, driven by a desire to cut the budget deficit. Part of this review concerns the police whose budget, it

\(^{176}\) Gaining access to study police officers has notably proven difficult in the past (Marks, 2004; Pogrebin, 2010; Punch, 2010; Weatheritt, 1986). As Hallenberg, O’Neill and Tong (2016: 113) note, ‘Compared to other areas of policing, gaining access to research detectives can be even more difficult due to the sensitive nature of the work’. They go on to argue that this is likely due to ‘the special, revered status of detective work’ which ‘increases its symbolic value to the organisation and therefore the level of protection accorded to it against outsider scrutiny’ (2016: 113). A number of scholars have made reference to the difficulties they faced when trying to access the world of detectives (cf Bacon, 2011, Innes, 2003)

\(^{177}\) Decision was based on review of Home Office data during initial stage of the research (see section 3.3, Appendix 1).
was intended, was to be cut by 20 per cent by 2014/2015. As such, the police were
understandably keen to review their current officer/staff deployment in an effort to
provide value for money - the effects of which I indeed experienced in action during the
fieldwork. It is likely therefore that the topic of the current study may have sparked the
interest of senior police managers who perhaps viewed the current study as something
which might aid in the reviewing of the police staff/officer workforce mix. Second, the
University of Sheffield is fortunate to boast a long-standing reputation based on an
enduring commitment to high quality, professional research. I am without doubt that this
fact helped ‘secure the deal’ for the research.

However, as Reiner (2010) has highlighted, the negotiation of access is not a one-off
event but rather a continuing process throughout fieldwork. This proved to be the case for
this research. Although access to initial settings had been secured at senior officer level\textsuperscript{178},
as the researcher became more familiar with the layout and structure of the CID, access
and initial approach was made by the researcher and as such, often required further
negotiation. This involved, not least, sometimes explaining again the intentions of the
research and of the researcher. Securing this access sometimes involved ceding a little
control over the fieldwork. Inevitably, for example, at the beginning of each observational
shift, decisions about which officers the researcher was to accompany tended to be made
by the Sergeant and/or Inspector on duty. Reallocations to other officers during shifts had
to be re-negotiated with the same Sergeant and/or Inspectors:

\[\text{(Newbank, Observation notes)}\]

Furthermore, formal access to the organisation and relevant CID units certainly does not
translate into a backstage pass of guaranteed acceptance and assistance by the rank-and-
file. To quote Van Mannen (1978: 311):

\[\text{‘Entry into the police system is no guarantee that one will be allowed to remain,}
\text{or, perhaps more to the point, it is no guarantee that one will be able to produce}
\text{useful or enlightening data while there’}.\]

\textsuperscript{178} For the purposes of clarity, I use the term senior police officers throughout this thesis when referring to
any officer rank of Sergeant or above (unless stated otherwise).
When in the field, it is impossible to remain a constant researcher and it should arguably be the duty of the researcher to view participants as people rather than purely as contacts or sources of data to be exploited. Reflecting on her own research, Marks (2004: 881) indicates that the personality of the researcher is ‘key to the stories that are told or hidden, and the exposure the researcher will be afforded in the everyday lives of those whom he/she is studying’. Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, the researcher found herself to have more in common with female participants with whom discussions ranged from favourite foods to concerns over their child’s school report. However, it was the relative willingness of a number of male participants to discuss issues relating to problems they were having at work, with colleagues and managers and also, the openness with which incidents of a potentially legally and ethically litigious fashion were recalled that was most surprising to the researcher. Having sometimes only spent a matter of hours in the company of participants, it would be wrong to attribute this relative level of ‘openness’ inclusively to the development of rapport or trust. Rather, it is the belief of the researcher that her non-threatening demeanor (e.g. young, female, polite) and communication and interpersonal skills helped to facilitate such candidness, alongside a willingness to listen to such stories while assuming ‘an open-mouthed expression of wonderment’ (Hobbs, 1988: 6).

When in the field the researcher chose to frequently play up her student identity and, on occasion, claimed to be far less knowledgeable about the various processes and practices of police work than was actually the case. While admittedly, not entirely honest, this approach proved particularly lucrative in that it encouraged participants to adopt the role of teacher on many occasions and at the same time, also helped reassure participants who, despite being initially apprehensive of the intentions of the researcher, eventually came to view her as a naive and unassuming student, what Lofland (1971) termed an ‘acceptable incompetent’.

The conspicuousness of the researcher within the various units also proved to be a useful tool for attracting new participants and data; it did not take long for people to know who I was and on a number of occasions, officers and staff actively went out of their way to speak with me:

179 See section 3.13 on ‘Ethics’ for further discussion on this issue.
During my visit to Newbank Public Protection Unit (PPU) today I was fascinated to see the rapidity with which notice of my presence became spread through the department. Alongside the usual stares and hushed conversations within the unit, on this particular occasion it appeared that a number of officers and staff went out of their way to ‘visit’ PPU to see who exactly I was. An hour or so into the fieldwork, a youngish (early 30s) male entered the unit dressed in a white shirt and tie with collar number (out of place in the CID where only occasionally I had observed a uniformed presence). ‘Oh he’s here again’ joked a couple of the officers and staff in the unit. After rebuffing such comments, he made his way toward the desk I was sat at next to Jess (the CI that I was accompanying that day). ‘Who are you then?’ ‘Where are you from?’ ‘What are you doing talking to her?’ and ‘Who’s paying for you to be here?’ were the key questions as he began what can only be described as a mild interrogation. After five or so minutes of wary conversation and now, seemingly satisfied with my answers, he left following a request over the public address system from custody. After, I asked Jess, ‘So who was he?’ ‘Oh that was just the Custody Sergeant. He’d just come to see who you were. Don’t worry about it, he’s just a nosey sod’ she informed me.

(Newbank, Observation notes)

3.8 Interviews

The study involved a total of 35 semi-structured in-depth interviews which were variably spread over the two research settings and between the different CID units. All those CIs the researcher came across during the fieldwork were interviewed. Interviews were undertaken alongside observation within each research setting over a duration of 12 months. Interviews were undertaken with a number of individuals who can be broadly located within one of five distinct groups:

- civilian investigators;
- police detectives;
- police constables;
- senior police officers;
- civilian managers.

For the most part, interviews were undertaken formally (i.e. they were pre-arranged, digitally recorded and were aided by the use of a pre-constructed interview schedule (see Appendix 4). The rest were undertaken informally (i.e. they were undertaken ad hoc while in the field and were not digitally recorded). Interview participants were typically sampled purposively, that being, ‘A form of non-probability sampling in which decisions
concerning the individuals to be included in the sample are taken by the researcher, based upon a variety of criteria which may include specialist knowledge of the research issue, or capacity and willingness to participate in the research’ (Oliver, 2006: 245). Decisions made about whom to interview were based upon a variety of criteria including specialist knowledge of the research issue or context and capacity and willingness to participate in the research. Snowball sampling was also utilised by the researcher during interviews and observation. Described by Atkinson and Flint (2004: 1043) as ‘a technique for gathering research subjects through the identification of an initial subject who is used to provide the names of other actors’, this method proved particularly effective in helping to identify participants whose opinions and experiences did not necessarily reflect the view popularly purported and encouraged by management. Despite its effectiveness as a tool for uncovering further participants, the researcher was aware of the limitations of snowball sampling, namely, it’s potential to produce a biased sample and results (i.e. a sample may include an over-representation of individuals who share similar characteristics and viewpoints).

‘Formal interviews’ predominantly took place in the police station although due to the hectic nature of the CID, some were also undertaken while accompanying DCs and CIs in the field (e.g. in police cars). These ‘formal’ semi-structured interviews lasting between 30 minutes and two hours were conducted with both police DCs and police staff of varying seniority/rank, yielding further more detailed data. The majority of these interviews were recorded using an electronic voice recorder, a strategy which allowed the researcher to focus her full attention on the participant rather than on the writing of field notes. With the exception of those interviews which took place unexpectedly, upon chance meetings or on brief visits to other units, interview schedules were used (see Appendix 4). These schedules were relatively loosely structured and consisted of a broad range of pre-determined discussion topics as well as specific questions relating to the central research aims of the study. Interview schedules were piloted on academic colleagues, family and friends to ensure questions were clear and functional. Schedules and questions naturally evolved during the course of the research process to take account of experiences and knowledge gained while in the field and on reflection of data obtained.

\[180\] Specific questions detailed on the interview schedule were not always directly asked in interview and thus acted more as prompts for the researcher to redirect conversations centring on the topic headings where necessary.
from other interviews. This evolutionary process was undertaken by Beardsworth and Keil (1992: 261-2) who discuss how, ‘the open-ended, discursive nature of the interviews permitted an iterative process of refinement, whereby lines of thought identified by earlier interviewees could be taken up and presented to later interviewees’.

The second form of interview employed within this research occurred alongside the generation of data from formal accounts and observation and was that of more informal ‘interviews as conversations’ (Burgess, 1984). These informal, ad hoc discussions added spontaneity and naturalism (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 99-103) to the research as the majority of questions were asked during the flow of naturally occurring conversation (some of which I consciously instigated or attempted to subtly direct towards a specific topic of interest). These relatively ad hoc conversations proved particularly revealing in relation to discerning the occupational culture of those officers and staff working within CIDs, providing valuable insight into the cultural world of the ‘firm within a firm’ (Hobbs, 1988). Thankfully, the police officers and staff I was fortunate enough to be ‘shadowing’ were more than accommodating with regard to my research, thus allowing me to both openly discuss my topics of interest and also offering me the opportunity to uncover new areas of interest relevant to the research. However, conscious to maintain my role as ‘observer-as-participant’ (Gold, 1958), I was mindful of asking too many questions and consciously refrained from the asking of probing questions until after a marginal degree of rapport had been established.

Burns (2000) highlights a number of advantages of semi-structured interviews. For example, they provide an opportunity for the respondent to explore and discuss their own perspective rather than the perspective of the researcher being imposed on the respondent. Furthermore, the respondent is also able to interpret the research area and lines of enquiry within their own framework of understanding and through their own language which may increase the validity of the research process (Legard, Keegan and Ward, 2003) as new forms of knowledge are produced or created. Semi-structured interviews can also help to promote reflexivity and can be tailored to reflect the experiential context of each respondent resulting in a rich data set which, when used in triangulation with other methods, can increase validity and help refine the development of themes181 and concepts.

181 ‘A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 83).
Interviews, both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, proved to be an essential component of the current study’s research strategy for three key reasons. First, they enabled the gleaning of depth of knowledge with regard to the underlying reasonings’, values and attitudes held by CIs and DCs which could not be obtained through observation alone. Second, as identified by Waddington (1999) interviews were a means of comparing participant accounts of what they ‘say’ they do, during interview, with what they ‘do’ in practice, as measured during observation. Third, undertaking individual interviews enabled CIs and DCs to express themselves without the presence of colleagues who might hinder their participation and responses.

It must be noted however, that due to the capricious nature of the CID and inquisitive character of those working within, on a couple of occasions, the researcher was required to interview participants in the presence of colleagues which did prove difficult at times:

\[I\text{ had an interesting experience today during the inadvertent group interview of two CIs one of whom was an ex-DC (participant A), the other possessing no previous police experience (participant B). The pre-arranged interview began with participant A, who, on the topic of non-warranted CI involvement in core areas of investigative work, began to discuss an experience he had recently had involving a fellow CI who was not an ex-police officer. Participant A recalled undertaking a home visit accompanied by said colleague and described how, due to what he believed to be his colleague’s lack of previous experience of police work, the CI in question did not know how to act when discussions became heated during the visit. While recalling this incident, participant B entered the room. Having heard from his line manager of my presence he had kindly come to offer his contribution. Keen not to refuse additional data, I asked participant A if this would be ok and he agreed. As participant B took a seat and asked, ‘So, what are we talking about?’, participant A began staring at me intently in what I immediately realised to be a semi-discreet effort to communicate his true feelings with regard to the arrival of participant B. I quickly realised that participant B had in fact been the subject of participant A’s story. I hurriedly fumbled a response, something along the lines of ‘Oh, we were just talking generally about the CI role and how it differs if at all from what DCs do?’ After the interview, I was approached by participant A who continued to ‘congratulate’ me on my ability to ‘read’ the situation. I thought you were going to drop me in it for a sec there. You did well’ he announced.\]

(Shorewick, Observation notes)

Despite the strengths of semi-structured interviews, as with any data collection technique there are also a number of inherent disadvantages or associated risks. In particular, this relates to the imbalance in power between the interviewer and interviewee. While efforts were made to encourage participants to lead the interview and on a number of occasions
(familiarity had usually already been established through time spent in observation), as Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) note, the act of questioning alone inherently creates a power asymmetry between the researcher and the participant that shapes the knowledge produced. Not only does the researcher determine the flow of questions, deciding which responses to pursue for elaboration and those to leave, but the interview itself is an instrumental dialogue whereby the researcher interprets the interviewee’s statements in a way that supports their own agenda. This unavoidable power differential may have had a number of undesirable effects including withholding information, inhibiting the flow of conversation and interviewee’s giving socially or organisationally desirable answers - the latter of these points was particularly the case in interviews with some senior police officers.

As a result of the time spent in the field during observation, DCs and CIs were more often than not, willing to aid my understanding of their role within the criminal investigation process via more formal interviewing. I wanted the interviewees to speak as freely as possible about the topics under discussion, giving honest and unhindered accounts of their experiences and opinions. As a result of this aspiration, interview schedules in reality acted more as an aide memoir illustrating a series of directive prompts, ensuring that during the course of the interview, conversation did not stray too far away from the key issues which the study sought to address in relation to the research aims and objectives. The semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed me to stick broadly to the questions that needed to be answered, while also affording me the flexibility to follow up lines of enquiry and discuss topics which had not been anticipated and which arose during the course of the observation or interview itself. It also allowed me to probe participant’s answers to questions to both clarify issues and elicit more conversation on the topic. The semi-structured interview conducted in this way allowed participants the opportunity to discuss issues which they felt were significant without the presence and influence of their colleagues. DCs were interviewed about their opinion on what makes a ‘good detective’ for example, CIs about their experience of their role in relation to their warranted counterparts and senior officers and staff about how tasks relating to their investigations were distributed and organised.

It is the view of Marks (2004: 870) that interviews ‘may not provide an adequate tool for understanding deep-level organisational culture. Assumptions are often not readily available to one’s conscious thought and, as a result, one-off interviews can fail to tap
into deeper levels of cognition'. As a result, wherever possible, observation was also carried out with interview participants in an effort to generate a source of data which could be used to corroborate and contradict findings obtained from interviews.

3.9 Observation

The study involved a total of 61.5 hours of observation which were variably spread over the two research settings and between the varying CID units. Observation was undertaken independently alongside interviews within each research setting over a period of 6 months. Periods of observation varied in context, scope and duration; CIs and police DCs were observed while in the station - both within the CID unit and police custody suite, on home visits with members of the public and during routine, out of station inquiries. CIs were observed when working individually for the most part but were also observed when working alongside DCs as part of a team within the CID suite. Individual periods of observation were chiefly determined by the availability of participants as judged by their line manager (usually, but not restricted to, a DS) - most determinably whether or not their individual workload and personal working timetable (e.g. annual leave) allowed for a visit from the researcher. Variation in the shift patterns alongside the nature of the work being undertaken by CIs and the CID unit more broadly also meant that time spent in observation could not be carefully controlled. These determinant factors along with the capricious and predominantly office bound nature of the work of participants selected by the study meant that the number of hours spent by the researcher in observation within each unit varied.

Several types of participant observation are identified in the research methods literature, the most commonly cited being Gold’s (1958) classification of roles in sociological fieldwork:

- Complete participant - the researcher is a functioning member of the social setting/ground and his/her true identity is not known to the members.
- Participant-as-observer - the researcher is a functioning member of the social setting/group, but the members are aware of his/her true identity.
- Observer-as-participant - the researcher is not a functioning member of the social setting/group, they observe and interview.
• *Complete observer* - the researcher does not interact with the members of the social setting/group.

For the purposes of this mixed methods study, the role assumed during fieldwork was that of ‘observer-as-participant’. This decision was based on two key factors: first, since the primary concern of the study was to gain an appreciative understanding of the working practices, occupational position and the structural contexts under which CIs operate within the CID, an observer-as-participant role was deemed most appropriate; second, this decision was also made based on issues relating to ethics - the researcher does not have the training or expertise needed to operate as a functioning member of the police service. Observation is defined in this thesis as ‘the process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the research setting’ (Schensul, Schensul and Lecompte, 1999: 91) and is used broadly to refer to the supplementary and complementary observational aspect undertaken in the qualitative stage of the research.

In the role of observer-as-participant, the researcher functions primarily as an observer and interviewer and refrains from active participation and participants are aware of the researcher’s presence. After operating this role in his own research, Norris (1993: 126) describes how he as the researcher concentrated on gathering two types of data: ‘naturally occurring inter officer talk’ and detailed descriptions of how officers handled ‘live’ incidents. Although it was not possible for me to act as ‘participant-as-observer’ - whereby the researcher becomes a fully functioning member of the social group, but the members are aware of his/her identity as a researcher - there were occasions during fieldwork when the lines between these two observational role categories became blurred. The details and implications of these are discussed later in the ‘Ethics’ section of this chapter (section 3.13).

Given the ‘closed setting’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1995) in which the study was undertaken, while in the field, the researcher role adopted was unavoidably one of an overt nature. This approach had its advantages as well as its disadvantages. One obvious advantage in that the researcher is able to openly record and discuss any observation with participants without potentially ‘blowing cover’. This in turn allows for clarification and the documentation of key details which may be forgotten if not recorded *in situ*. However, one major disadvantage concerns the observer effect by which the behaviour of
participants alters as a result of the researcher’s presence. This is an unavoidable fact inherent in overt observation, particularly that which is conducted within a closed setting and is a disadvantage which can only be lessened through time spent in the field and fostering of trusting relationships with participants.

As has already been mentioned, the timing of the project coincided with a major restructuring of the police organisation as a direct result of a twenty per cent cut in the police national budget as part of the current government’s wider Comprehensive Spending Review. This, at times acted as a particularly significant fieldwork hurdle, as some shift supervisors, officers and in particular police staff became suspicious of the researcher’s intention in observing their work. Some participants also expressed their anxiety that the researcher might have been a ‘spy’ working for Professional Standards, or some performance evaluation project sponsored by management. The researcher’s practice of note-taking only added to the paranoia of officers who were concerned about what was being recorded. Much like that described by Chan et al. (2003: 55-6), the researcher’s fieldwork experience was varied with officers’ and staff reactions to the researcher generally ranging from ‘indifference, simple curiosity, genuine interest and support, through to suspicion, abrasiveness or rudeness’ (Chan et al., 2003: 55-6).

Since the research was concerned with delineating the working practices and occupational position of CIs relative to that of DCs, recordings were made in relation to working environments, particular activities and incidents, interactions and conversations between CIs and between DCs and other police officers, decision making practices and use of discretion and designated powers and emotions, attitudes and values expressed by CIs and their DC counterparts. Following the example set by Holdaway (1983: 11), when initially in the field, ‘I worked on the basis of the straightforward premise that as much as possible should be observed and recorded, even the seemingly routine and insignificant’. Broadly speaking, this approach involved the watching and describing of formal and informal processes, interactions and routines in which DCs and CIs engaged in daily as part of their work. This position was adopted initially under the belief that when analysed as part of the bigger picture, even the most seemingly trivial and mundane of details may prove important in assessing the complexities of social interaction (Bacon, 2011: 60). The focus of observation somewhat inevitably shifted as the research progressed, from a more general overview, to a narrower focus on the detailed, concrete and contextual aspects of the situation (Walsh, 1998). Where practical, the researcher
sought to clarify her interpretations of events, actions and interactions with CIs and DCs to check for clarity and to increase validity.

Perhaps the most valuable strength of observation as a technique of social enquiry, particularly in the case of the current study, is its allowance for greater researcher confidence in the validity of findings when utilised as a supplementary data collection technique. This issue became clear to me very early on in the research when attempting to identify the way in which the roles and responsibilities of CIs differed to those of the warranted DC. On paper and very much the ‘official’ understanding (presented in staff role profiles), the CI was presented in a ‘deputised’ role to the warranted DC in which case file preparation, the reviewing and recovery of CCTV footage and basic statement taking (amongst other duties) appeared as key responsibilities of CIs. However, following further discussions with DCs and CIs, it quickly became apparent that the role of the CI in these settings extended far beyond this narrow remit.

Observation also afforded the researcher a greater level of sensitivity to context through which the behaviour of participants could be fully mapped out (Bryman, 2008: 466). This is of particular significance with regard to the aims of the current research which sought broadly to understand how the role of the civilian CI ‘fits’ within the investigation process. It is the overriding belief of the researcher that when used alongside other data collection techniques in a mixed methods design, observation acts to improve the overall quality of data collection and interpretation (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002) allowing for the most valid and reliable representation of reality.

3.10 Survey

A survey is a research method which is used to collect information from a selected group of people using standardised questionnaires or interviews. While many people discuss surveys synonymously with questionnaires, the questionnaire is in reality just one part of the survey process. Surveys also require selecting populations for inclusion, pre-testing instruments, determining delivery methods, ensuring validity and analysing results. Nesbary (2000: 10) defines survey research as ‘the process of collecting representative sample data from a larger population and using the sample to infer attributes of the population’. The decision to employ a survey for the purposes of the
The current study was based on three key reasoning’s: first, the survey was intended to provide scope to the research enabling limited generalisation of findings; second, the survey was intended to generate context to the qualitative findings (interviews and observation); third, the survey was intended to provide corroboration of qualitative findings in a number of key areas (e.g. for example, issues surrounding training of CIs).

The survey was administered electronically (via email) to the Detective Chief Superintendent (DCS) of each of the 43 police constabularies across E&W. Surveys were sent along with an accompanying cover note which briefly detailed the purpose of the survey, an estimate of the time required for completion, the confidentiality policy and contact information of the researcher. This electronic method was deemed most appropriate for the requirements of the current study for two key reasons. First and foremost, this method is very economical and fast allowing large numbers of participants to be surveyed very quickly. Second, in utilising this form of survey, geographical boundaries are no longer an issue, an important consideration for the researcher when attempting to engage with all 43 police constabularies across the country.

The semi-structured survey employed in this study (see Appendix 5) was intended to collect information relating to the deployment of CIs in across E&W. Due to the range of information hoped to be collected by the survey, the decision was made to split the questionnaire into two sections. The first section sought general and more specific information regarding the use of CIs and was aimed at the DCS of each police force. The second part of the survey sought more general, administrative style information on the current use of CIs (e.g. number of CIs, contract lengths, contracts held with private sector agencies (for the supply of CIs), numbers of CIs designated etc.) and was therefore intended for completion by the appropriate member of the targeted constabularies’ HR department. It was envisaged that the Detective Chief Superintendent (DCS) would forward the survey on to HR via email after completing the first section.

Broadly speaking, the design of the survey followed a number of distinct stages:

1. **Decide what information is required** - here the researcher referred back to the original research proposal in order to identify the key objectives of study. A decision was then made with regard to the type of information that would be required in order to fulfil the research objectives.

2. **Make a rough listing of the questions** - here the researcher roughly laid out a comprehensive list of potential questions to be included in the questionnaire.
3. **Refine the question phrasing** - at this stage, questions were refined and where necessary, developed so as to ensure they would yield the required information.

4. **Develop the response format** - it was decided that the questionnaire would be predominantly of a closed nature (i.e. the respondent was provided with a pre-coded list of answers would be provided) although space was also left for the respondents to add verbatim comments where necessary and appropriate.

5. **Put the questions in an appropriate sequence** - to ensure logic and flow of the questionnaire, the ordering of the questions was carefully thought through. Questions were separated into two parts so as to gather the most appropriate and accurate data.

6. **Finalise layout** - at this stage, the overall design and layout of the questionnaire was assessed for its appropriateness and coherence. Where required question ordering was altered and question wording clarified. This included ensuring that the survey formatting was both correct and user friendly.

7. **Pre-test and revise** - this stage enabled the researcher to test initial design decisions in practice and, if necessary, the opportunity to make any necessary revisions.

Questionnaires were sent to all of the 43 police constabularies across E&W on three successive occasions over a four-month period (September 2014 to December 2014). Questionnaires were sent on three occasions in an effort to improve the chances of the questionnaire reaching the intended recipient and thus, the overall response rate of the survey. Names and contact information (email addresses) of DCSs in each force were identified through extensive online searching of relevant news articles and force web pages. This information was further supplemented (and confirmed) by phone calls made directly to each of the 43 police constabularies. Recipients were requested to complete the questionnaire and to return it to the researcher via email as soon as possible.

### 3.11 Data Recording

The vast majority of data recorded while in the field took the form of field notes. Generally speaking, field notes refer broadly to those notes created by the researcher during the act of qualitative fieldwork. These notes aid researchers in their ability to recall pertinent events, behaviours and other features of an observation setting. Clifford (1990) elaborates somewhat on this definition discerning between three classifications of field notes:
1. Field notes as inscription - textual representations of events as seen or heard in the field. Ethnographers here privilege their own interpretive conventions and become the singular observer-recorder-interpreter-author of events.

2. Field notes as transcription - concerns the recording of the inscriptions of meanings others have. Here researchers privilege the accounts and interpretations of others.

3. Field notes as description - Researcher tries to adopt as neutral a position as possible, restricting writing to simply describing the social world as directly observed e.g. numbers of people, type of clothes worn etc. This type of field note may however, also reflect the inner experiences of the researcher.

The researcher acknowledges the value of each of the above stated field note types and each method of recording was utilised at various points during the course of the fieldwork. In an effort to provide the most accurate representation of events as observed, field notes were recorded as near to the time and place at which an event/observation occurred as was possible. As such, field notes were written more or less contemporaneously with the events, experiences and interactions they describe and recount (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2001: 353). However, in an effort to lessen the impact of the researcher’s presence on the behaviour of those being observed, for the most part, field notes tended to be cursory, recorded hastily while in situ in the field. These ‘scratch notes’ (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002) or ‘jotted notes’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 90) frequently took the form of abbreviations, key words and word associations that were then utilised as memory triggers for more detailed writing of field notes following each period of observation. Field notes are therefore inevitably subject to the discretion of the researcher and what he/she deems interesting or worthy of annotation. For Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 142), what is recorded ‘will depend on one’s general sense of what is relevant to the foreshadowing research problems, as well as on background expectations’.

Wherever and whenever possible (usually immediately after observation sessions were over or whenever I was left unaccompanied), more descriptive notes were recorded in an effort to document a running description of daily life as observed within the research setting and as reflected upon outside of the research setting. Wolfinger (2002) suggests there to be two principal approaches to writing field notes: the ‘salience hierarchy’, in which only those issues considered pertinent to the focus of the research are recorded, or ‘comprehensive note-taking’, in which everything that is observed is systematically and comprehensively noted. The researcher’s strategy incorporated some elements of both
approaches. From a very practical perspective, it was not possible or always appropriate to physically note everything that was occurring within any given context and interaction and so, inevitably, some selectivity utilising prior knowledge of literature did occur. For example, during fieldwork the researcher became aware of her tendency to look out for the ‘core characteristics’ of police occupational culture identified in the classic police studies (Reiner, 2010: 118-132). Furthermore, from an ethical perspective, some more sensitive observation and core details relating to details major cases for example could not be noted down. While the practical realities of fieldwork arguably necessitate researchers use their tacit ‘professional’ knowledge to provide a ‘significance filter’ regarding what to focus upon during observation and what to make notes about (Tjora, 2006: 433), it is essential that research is not burdened or blinkered by the ‘preconceived ideas’ of the researcher (Malinowski, 1922)182.

The researcher chose to follow a similar schema to that adopted by Mulhall (2002: 311) and as such, field notes documented a variable mix of things, ranging from structural and organisational features of the setting itself, people, dialogue between officers and staff, key/notable events of the day as well my own personal feelings, interpretations and criticisms of the observations I had made183. The notes served as a powerful memory aid, prompting recollection of events and encouraging a reflexive approach to analysis - how the researcher as ‘the instrument’ has affected the direction and focus of data collection. All of the jotted in situ field notes along with their more descriptive counterparts were organised in securely kept folders and password protected personal computers.

Following the advice of Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995), field notes and interview transcripts were routinely analysed contemporaneously with their collection, a method known as ‘in-process analytical writing’ (Emerson et al., 1995: 105). Like Emerson et al. the analysis of my field notes took three key analytical forms - ‘asides’, ‘commentaries’ and ‘in process memos’. Asides are ‘brief, reflective bits of analytical writing that succinctly clarify, explain, interpret or raise questions about some specific happening or process described in a field note’ (Emerson et al., 1995: 101). Asides formed the bulk of the initial data analysis conducted both while in the field and also in the hours following

182 The research subscribes to the view that there are no ‘theory-neutral’ facts (Layder, 1998); all researchers inevitably approach their research/empirical observations from some kind of theoretical understanding.
183 The addition of any critical comments and personal feelings on events/observations always took place outside of the research setting.
my exit of the research setting, often while the ‘jotted notes’ collected during observation sessions were expanded upon. A *commentary* is defined as ‘a more elaborate reflection on some specific event of issue; it is contained within a separate paragraph and set off with parentheses’ (Emerson et al., 1995: 102). Commentaries as contained within my field notes were both longer and more elaborative than asides and often linked my findings to other issues and theory relevant to the research. *In-process memos* are the ‘products of more sustained analytic writing [which] require a more extended time-out from actively composing field notes’ (Emerson et al., 1995: 103). This third analytical form was utilised wherever possible when in the field but most often, took place after observation sessions were completed.

To ensure the documentation of a complete and accurate record of all that was said, the vast majority of interviews were recorded using an electronic recording device. The researcher is under no illusion that the electronic recording of interviews is likely to have inhibited the flow of conversation and induced self-censorship on some occasions. However, given the nature of the research questions and practical constraints of the field work, the decision was made to persevere with this method which, in reality, did not appear to be a particularly detrimental issue in the current study.

The use of an electronic recording device allowed the researcher to focus her attention on the questions being asked as well as the body language of participants allowing for an accurate account of what was discussed to be recorded. The quotations that appear throughout this thesis are therefore mostly written as verbatim extracts taken from these interview transcripts. However, a number are also presented as extracts and interpretive commentaries taken from field notes and therefore reflect more of a précis of what was said. On a number of occasions, I contacted participants to clarify various points of uncertainty and validate their comments and accounts of events.

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184 Bachman and Schutt (2014: 180) note how ‘It is almost always a mistake to try to take comprehensive notes while engaged in the field; the process of writing extensively is just too disruptive’.  
185 Field notes were also taken during the formal interviews to record participant body language and to remind the researcher to return to certain issues.
3.12 Data Analysis

3.12.1 Triangulation

Triangulation is a term which is used in the social science literature to refer to a number of different things. Denzin (1978) for example, outlined the following four types of triangulation: (a) data triangulation (i.e. use of a variety of sources in a study); (b) investigator triangulation (i.e. use of several different researchers); (c) theory triangulation (i.e. use of multiple perspectives and theories to interpret the results of a study); and (d) methodological triangulation (i.e., use of multiple methods to study a research problem). Denzin also distinguished within-methods triangulation (1978: 301), which refers to the use of either multiple quantitative or multiple qualitative approaches (e.g. for qualitative data collection techniques such as observation, these multiple comparison groups (Glaser and Strauss, 1965: 7) could be used to develop more confidence in the emergent theory), from between-methods triangulation (Denzin, 1978: 302), which involves the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Generally speaking, triangulation refers to an approach that uses ‘multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of data and methodologies in the study of social phenomena (Denzin, 1978: 304). This thesis includes data and method triangulation, but obviously had only one researcher.

The term triangulation will be used in this section to refer to data triangulation, i.e. the point at which and strategy used to integrate two sets of methodologically distinct research findings. The process by which data integration can be achieved in mixed methods studies has been a topic of debate for some time (cf Caracelli, 1993; Fetters, Curry and Creswell, 2013; Fielding, 2012) and broadly speaking, is understood to be a process which can occur at either the interpretation stage of the study (when both data sets have been analysed independently), or at the analysis stage of the study (both data sets are analysed concurrently). Generally speaking, approaches to integrate qualitative and quantitative data take three forms: (1) integrating through narrative-weaving, contiguous and staged; (2) integrating through data transformation; and (3) integrating through joint displays (Fetters et al., 2013: 2142-2143). A number of techniques have been described for the integration/triangulation of qualitative and quantitative research findings, which, generally speaking, require researchers to consider where findings from
each method agree (convergence), offer complementary information on the same issue (complementarity), or appear to contradict each other (discrepancy or dissonance) (Erzberger and Prein, 1997; Foster, 1997).

The ‘triangulation protocol’ (Farmer, Robinson, Elliot and Eyles, 2006) is arguably the most detailed description of a technique of data triangulation/integration which, although developed for multiple qualitative methods, can also be applied to mixed methods studies. The triangulation protocol requires the researcher to display findings emerging from each component of the study on the same page, in a ‘convergence coding matrix’ (O’Cathain, Murphy and Nicholl, 2010). From this, the researcher is then able to identify agreement, partial agreement, silence, or dissonance between findings from different components. Significantly, according to O’Cathain et al. (2010), this technique for triangulation is the only one to include silence - where a theme or finding arises from one data set and not another. Some silence might be expected because of the strengths of different methods to examine different aspects of a phenomenon, but surprise silences might also arise that help to increase understanding or lead to further investigations. The triangulation protocol technique moves researchers away from thinking about the findings related to each method and towards the generation of ‘meta-themes’ (Farmer et al., 2006) that cut across the findings from different methods. Morgan (1998) describes the move towards the generation of meta-themes as the ‘third effort’ because it occurs after analysis of the qualitative and the quantitative components.
A second technique for the triangulation of findings relates to what Moran-Ellis et al. (2006) refer to as ‘following the thread’. Unlike the ‘triangulation protocol’ (Farmer et al., 2006) in which data integration takes place at the interpretation phase of the study, this triangulation technique takes place at the analysis stage of the research process. It begins with a preliminary analysis of each component to identify key themes and questions necessitating further investigation. Then the researchers choose a question or theme from one component and trace it across the other components – they call this the thread. As Moran-Ellis et al. (2006: 54) discuss:

‘This, in effect, is an analysis led in the first instance by a grounded inductive approach but developed through a focused iterative process of data interrogation which aims to interweave the findings that emerge from each dataset. The value of this integrative analytic approach lies in allowing an inductive lead to the analysis, preserving the value of the open, exploratory, qualitative inquiry but incorporating the focus and specificity of the quantitative data’.

Finally, in contrast to the idea of data triangulation through the identification of themes (e.g. violence, sex, racism etc.), is the idea of triangulation based on the identification of cases (e.g. individuals, groups, organisations, geographical areas etc.). Here, all of the
data is examined at the analysis stage together, in detail and on the basis of each case (rather than variables and themes) and can be summarised and displayed in a matrix (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007; Wendler, 2001) along the lines of Miles and Huberman’s (1994) ‘meta-matrix’. O’Cathain et al. (2010) discuss how the utilisation of a ‘mixed methods matrix’ aided their analysis of data obtained from their earlier (2008) study, allowing for a better understanding of the relation between types of team working and the extent of integration in mixed methods studies in health services research. The triangulation/integration of data using this technique allows researchers to pay attention to revelations and inconsistencies between different types of data on a single case and then look for patterns across all cases in a qualitative cross case analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

As data were triangulated at the analysis and interpretive and reporting stages of the research\(^{186}\), methods have therefore been accordingly integrated through ‘connecting’, and through ‘combination’ and/or ‘merging’. Integration through connecting occurs ‘when one type of data links with the other through the sampling frame’ (Fetters et al., 2013: 6). In the current study, data were integrated through connecting at the initial quantitative data collection stage with these data being used to determine the fieldwork sites for the qualitative data collection stage. ‘Merging data’ (Fetters et al., 2013) - refers to the integration of qualitative (in the form of texts or images) and quantitative data (in the form of numeric information) through combination i.e. the reporting of results together (also referred to as integration through narrative - weaving, contiguous and staged). This approach can be achieved in a number of ways for example, by transforming one dataset (e.g. counting the occurrence of themes in a qualitative dataset) so that the transformed qualitative results can be compared with the quantitative dataset (Sandelowski et al., 2009). Finally, this type of integration can also occur through the use of tables or figures that display both the quantitative and the qualitative results (i.e. joint data displays). When merging, both data types are brought together for analysis.

\(^{186}\) Initial early analysis of qualitative data were undertaken contemporaneously with fieldwork (e.g. during observation sessions) and inferences were noted down in field notes. This method allowed for the identification of emergent themes while observing which in turn, enabled the researcher to shift her attention and focus in ways that fostered a more developed investigation.
In the current study, data were also merged through combination and, as such, are reported together in the results of this thesis. Having initially organised the qualitative and quantitative data in a format based on thematic relevance to allow merging (see following section (3.12.2) on ‘Thematic Analysis’), a narrative approach was employed and both quantitative and qualitative data described thematically. The specific type of narrative integration utilised is weaving, because the results are connected to each other thematically and the qualitative and quantitative data weave back and forth around similar themes or concepts. The narrative provides intragroup comparisons of the results from the scales about opinions that are supported by text from the qualitative database. In this sense, the researcher sought broadly to ‘follow the thread’ (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). Regarding the ‘fit’ of the quantitative and qualitative data (i.e. the coherence of the quantitative and qualitative findings), the integration resulted in an expansion of understanding and insight with regard to the phenomenon being studied. The qualitative comments gleaned from interviews with participants provided information about the experiences of CIs relating to various key issues inherent to the role. However, the survey data were also particularly illustrative showing disparity in deployment as well as polarisation of opinion at a senior level (DCS) with regard to key issues relating to the use of CIs in their varying constabularies.

3.12.2 Thematic Analysis

Qualitative data were first analysed in the current study using the method of thematic analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006: 79) define thematic analysis as, ‘A method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data’. In their 2006 article, Braun and Clarke (2006: 77) describe how ‘thematic analysis is a poorly demarcated and rarely-acknowledged, yet widely-used qualitative analytic method’ and go on to present a helpful six phase step-by-step guide for doing thematic analysis. According to the authors, the process of analysis starts when the analyst/researcher begins to notice and look for patterns of meaning and issues of potential interest in the data - this may be during data collection. The method of thematic analysis chosen for this research is based on the work of Braun and Clarke (2006) and generally speaking, followed their proposed systematic six phase guide (although each stage was not engaged with in a straightforward, linear fashion, within the current study):
Phase 1: Familiarising yourself with the data.
Phase 2: Generating initial codes.
Phase 3: Searching for themes.
Phase 4: Reviewing themes.
Phase 5: Defining and naming themes.
Phase 6: Producing the report.

In the current study, thematic analysis involved a constant moving back and forward between the entire data set, the coded extracts of data that were being analysed and the analysis of the data that were produced. The first stage of the post-fieldwork analysis involved detailed readings of the collected data (i.e. field notes, interview transcripts and documentary sources). This allowed the researcher to become fully immersed in the data. Transcription of formal interviews, while time-consuming and at times frustrating, proved vital to this familiarisation phase (Riessman, 1993) and also greatly aided the second phase of analysis. Extensive notes, commentaries and interpretations were first added to the margins of transcribed interview transcripts and anything of interest in the field notes and documentary sources were also highlighted at this stage. This was a subjective, iterative process which allowed the researcher to make judgements about the significance of events, behaviours and commentaries (Van Maanen, 1988).

Braun and Clarke (2006) maintain that the coding process can be done with a data-led approach or with a theory-led approach. While coding was initially led by broad themes identified in the literature, noted by the researcher during interviews, when listening to recordings or during the transcription process, subsequently a data-led approach was applied to the transcripts and field notes. While some researchers taking a data-led approach work with a grounded theory approach and so advocate tackling the data with no prior influences or preconceptions (cf Glaser, 1992), others encourage the use of relevant knowledge (Hutchinson et al 2010; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The latter approach was taken in the current study, primarily as a literature review was essential in identifying an appropriate focus for conducting semi-structured interviews in a time-limited setting where the researcher would be unlikely to be able to return to conduct subsequent interviews. However, as Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 163) are right to note, it is important to remember that any pre-existing ideas which are drawn upon to aid
the coding process ‘do not take the form of prejudgements, forcing the interpretation of data into their mould, but are instead used as resources to make sense of the data’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 163).

Initial codes were then identified. Codes according to Charmaz (1983: 186) act as ‘shorthand devices to label, separate, compile and organise data’ and refer to ‘the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon’ (Boyatzis, 1998: 63). The identification of codes was undertaken manually and in a systematic fashion, with full and equal attention being applied to each data item. After initial coding was completed, codes were also assessed for their commonality with other codes and were subsequently matched with data extracts from interview transcripts and observation field notes.

After all data had been initially coded and collated, codes were then sorted into potential themes and all relevant coded data extracts were further collated under each theme (see Appendix 6, ‘Coding Framework’). As Braun and Clarke (2006: 92) discuss, at this stage you are essentially, ‘starting to analyse your codes, and consider how different codes may combine to form an overarching theme’. It is at this stage that interpretative analysis of the data occurs and arguments about the shape and meaning of the phenomenon being examined are made (Boyatzis, 1998). Themes were then refined i.e. each initial theme was examined in detail and its strength, significance and distinctness reassessed. Some themes emerged as key themes with substantial incidences of the codes from various participants and observation field notes. Others emerged as subthemes, relevant to the overarching themes. For example, ‘professionalism’ is a key theme of this thesis, of which there are various subthemes such as ‘dealing with the public’ and ‘training’.

Key themes and subthemes were then further defined and refined in an attempt to isolate the true essence of the theme. Although themes had already been assigned working titles, the researcher employed the advice of Braun and Clarke (2006) at this point in the thematic analysis process and, where necessary/appropriate, further thematic refinement and eventual renaming was undertaken. This method of thematic refinement ensured that subsequent titles were concise and immediately gave the reader a sense of what the theme is about. Connections were then drawn between the themes and subthemes and patterns and explanatory theories identified. Although trained and practised in the use of the qualitative software program ‘NVivo’, the researcher preferred to manually construct
separate thematic documents. These documents contained data that had been broken up and reorganised by the researcher in accordance with the themes and subthemes identified and were then printed off for further annotation.

3.12.3 Survey Data Analysis

The data gathered by the survey were analysed via a process of examining the returned surveys for correctness and completeness, careful coding and inputting data into a database in Statistical Package for the Social Scientists (SPSS) and performing an analysis of descriptive responses where appropriate according to frequency distributions and descriptive statistics. Univariate analyses of the data were carried out and where appropriate, corresponding tables (including frequency tables) and graphs were constructed to display results with respect to the research questions and aims and objectives allowing for ease of interpretation and understanding. Due to the sample size of the survey and nature of the information gleaned by the questionnaire, methods of bivariate analysis (e.g. contingency tables) were not deemed appropriate. The coding framework for the analysis of the survey data is reflected in the section headings contained within Chapter Seven.

3.13 Ethics

The value of research depends as much on ethical veracity as on the originality of its discoveries. How can one trust in the findings and results of research if there are any doubts about the honesty of the research and integrity of the methods employed? Ethics are codes of conduct in research which guide the manner by which research is carried out; to ensure the integrity of any findings generated by the research. Like all research conducted with human participants, mixed methods studies which involve the utilization of observation and/or interviews, raise a number of significant ethical issues which should be considered by the researcher both prior, during and after the research has taken place (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001).

In order to ensure research integrity, researchers are obliged and often required to adhere to strict ethical guidelines set forward by their academic institution and funding body. As such, for this research, the ethical guidelines were determined by the University of
Sheffield (academic institution) and the Economic and Social Research Council (funding body) and also accorded with those ethical guidelines set out by the British Society of Criminology’s code of research ethics. In order to receive ethical clearance to conduct research with human participants, the University of Sheffield required the submission of an in-depth ethics application. This application was detailed and considered the potential risks associated with the proposed project and also contained the relevant documents which would be given to participants during any empirical work (e.g. participant information sheet (Appendix 2) and participant consent form (Appendix 3)).

One of the key issues covered in the ethics application for the current research concerned informed consent and the assurance of confidentiality with regard to any individual participant and organisation involved in the project. The assurance of anonymity and confidentiality is an integral part of any research in which the researcher is seeking to establish a relationship with participants based upon trust. Before consent was obtained, participants were made aware of the subject and purpose of the research to which they would be contributing and also, how their anonymity would be ensured. This promise of anonymity was reiterated on a regular basis, particularly when the researcher sought to instigate discussion around topic areas that had the potential to involve some controversial issues (e.g. occupational culture etc.). Data were made anonymous as soon as possible so as to ensure that participants were not directly or indirectly identifiable. Pseudonyms have been used in place of participant’s actual names in this thesis and these were randomly assigned by the researcher. As the sole researcher working on this study I occupied the position of custodian for the data produced during the course of the project. When not in my personal possession, the data were physically locked up or stored on a password protected USB stick. All the analysis work was undertaken on private and secure locations. As required by the Data Protection Act 1998, the data will be destroyed when the project is complete.

While the researcher was not naive to the less than clear-cut and often contradictory nature of issues relating to ethics when operating within the field (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001: 347), the difficulty of this fact was lessened through the adoption of the approach advocated by Miller and Bell (2002: 67) - the idea that keeping a constant record of decisions made while in the field can act as a good way of safeguarding against sloppy thinking and inadvertent overlooking of ethical issues.
Norris (1993: 137) argues that conducting research with the police will ‘lead the researcher into a quagmire of ethical considerations. Inevitably one is faced with contradictory and competing choices and it is impossible to satisfy them all’. Fletcher (1966) introduced the concept of ‘situational ethics’, a flexible approach to social research ethics which recognises the often complex nature of fieldwork ethics and the consequential need to judge ethical standards on a case-by-case basis. On this rationale, action depends on the circumstances surrounding such action and no decision is therefore intrinsically good or bad. Punch (1986) advocates a reliance on the common sense judgements of researchers alongside academic convention and discussion. For the researcher, this involved regular (monthly) meetings and conversation with supervisors along with additional support and anecdotal advice from other obliging researchers in the department. The following sections of this chapter describe some of the ethical dilemmas and issues faced by the researcher while in the field.

3.13.1 Informed Consent

It is the widely held belief within social science that research participants ‘must consent to being researched in an unconstrained way, making their decision on the basis of comprehensive and accurate information about it; and that they should be free to withdraw at any time’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 210). With the exception of covert observation, whereby the researcher does not make his presence or research intentions aware to participants, the obtaining of informed consent is considered of paramount significance to the ethical integrity of a study. Information was provided to all potential research participants prior to the commencement of the research, ideally in writing but otherwise verbally. Sufficient time was then provided to participants to consider their response. Throughout the course of the study, participants were encouraged to ask questions with regard to the role and intention of the researcher. Along with the anonymous nature of their participation, the right of participants to refuse and/or withdraw from the study was also made particularly clear. Given the fact that I had been

187 Most police participants were provided with an information sheet (Appendix 2), which informed them of the following: who was undertaking and who was sponsoring the research project; the aims and objectives of the research project; the reasons for requesting involvement and what participation would entail; the right of each participant to refuse to participate in/and or withdraw from the research at any stage and for whatever reason; an assurance of strict confidentiality; the contact details for myself.
imposed upon the rank-and-file at the behest of management and at a time when suspicion of ‘outsiders’ by officers and non-warranted staff was heightened due to police budget cuts. I felt that it was particularly important to emphasise their freedom of choice whenever appropriate.

When asked for my identity and intentions, I was more than happy to discuss the aims and objectives of my research with anyone in the field, although I was rarely asked to explain the subject of my study in much detail. On occasions where I was pressed for greater detail on the specifics of my project, I opted to explain myself in the most general way possible. Like Van Maanen (1978: 34), I did not feel it ‘ethically necessary’ or ‘methodologically sound’ to divulge some sorts of information relating to the intentions of the research. This decision owed much to potentially negative impact ‘revealing all’ could have on the validity of findings and in turn, the overall conclusions of the project.

Roth (1962) suggests that all research falls on a continuum between the completely covert and the completely open. Despite the overt nature of my presence within the field, as Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 211) describe, in attempting to ensure the validity and reliability of findings, the researcher may on occasion be forced to withhold information which may be considered necessary for informed consent. For example, in attempting to ensure the consistency of collected data with that of actuality (e.g. interactions which occur within the research setting when the researcher is not present), the decision was made relatively early on the research design that participants would not be informed specifically of my intention to observe the ‘occupational culture’ of DCs and civilian staff. This decision was based upon the existence of negative connotations that are associated with the term and in turn, fear of altering the behaviour of participants and so providing a false (invalid) representation of the social world. However, the level to which this withholding of information regarding the nature of my research is ultimately dependent upon the extent to which my presence as a researcher becomes accepted and to some degree, overlooked.

188 Chan et al. (2003) face a similar issue with regard to the timing of their study into the socialisation of new police recruits which coincided with a major Royal Commission inquiry into police corruption. The authors note how this resulted some shift supervisors and officers became suspicious of outsiders observing their work (Chan et al., 2003: 53). Apart from concerns about the Royal Commission, the authors also discuss how officers were also anxious that researchers might have been 'spies' working for Internal Affairs, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, or some performance evaluation projects sponsored by management.
In an organisation such as the police it is physically impossible to obtain informed consent from everyone (Punch, 1986). Police officers are busy people and police CID departments are particularly busy places. During fieldwork, there were days where I advertently and inadvertently observed entire departments (this was particularly the case with MIT). Not wanting to disrupt the routines of police work - as well as the flow of the research process\(^\text{189}\) - in such instances I chose to be selective over who and what I observed and who I spoke with. This was an unavoidable reality of the nature of the research setting within which the researcher found herself. As a result, not everyone upon whom my research was based was fully aware that their actions were being studied.

### 3.13.2 Potential Harms

When undertaking research involving people there is always a possibility that some harm could befall a member of the research process in some way (Bacon, 2011: 76). As Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 214) note, at the very minimum ‘being researched can create stress and provoke anxiety, especially if the research is believed to be evaluating one’s work, one’s life and oneself’. This is even more so the case when the research is dealing with potentially sensitive topics. Arguably the most effective solution to this issue is the development of a researcher-participant rapport (Ceglowski, 2000; Goodwin, Pope, Mort and Smith, 2003; Grbich, 1999; Liamputtong-Rice and Ezzy, 2005; Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell and Alexander, 2000; Payne, 1994; Taylor and Bogdan, 1998). The development of rapport also encourages participant disclosure which is a central intention of qualitative research. Concern has been raised by a number of feminist authors with regard to the level of disclosure achieved in some research interviews (Finch, 1984; Oakley, 1981; Reinharz, 1992). Kvale (2007: 28) echoes this point, stating that the ‘interviewer should also be aware that the openness and intimacy of the interview may be seductive and lead subjects to disclose information that they may later regret’. While the topic areas covered in this project through both interview and observation with participants were not of a particularly sensitive nature, the researcher does recall feeling surprised by the willingness of some participants to disclose some information and in

\(^{189}\) Bell (1977: 59) makes reference to the potentially disruptive effective for the research of the continual need to issue ‘some sociological equivalent of the familiar police caution, “Anything you do say may be taken down and used as data”’.

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turn, how quickly a level of rapport and trust developed. This was particularly the case when discussions involved open ‘bitching’ about fellow colleagues (including managers) by participants who were aware, would be subsequently interviewed by the researcher at a later date and also with regard to the anecdotal disclosure of instances of professional misconduct on the part of police officers and civilian employees.

On two separate occasions information was disclosed to the researcher of examples where officers and civilian employees had acted in a litigious fashion. When discussing the issue of designation of powers to non-warranted staff, one CI told of a colleague who, ‘in the early days’ (i.e. the years immediately following the introduction of the Police Reform Act 2002), unaware of the limits of his powers, had taken to ‘arresting’ suspects outside of the police station and bringing them into custody. This, it was alleged, went on for around three months before the issue came to the attention of management. Similarly, upon interview with a police constable, the researcher was made aware of an instance when he confessed to having been ‘a bit heavy-handed’ with a repeat male perpetrator of domestic violence. What became perhaps the most significant ethical issue for the researcher with regard to the latter of these examples, was the fact that, based solely on the description of the circumstances provided by the officer, I found myself agreeing with his actions. Should I have reported these ‘confessions’ to the ‘appropriate authorities’ and in doing so, jeopardise the future of the current research, my career as a researcher and perhaps most unforgivably, access to the same/similar field for future researchers in my discipline? The answer is of course no. Although it must be said that had I personally witnessed anything (stories are not evidence) of a similar nature, particularly with regard to the latter of the two examples, my decision would have been different.

As Bacon (2011: 76) points out, ‘At any stage of the fieldwork the researcher can be exposed to things that shock their personal sensibilities and cause them to question their ethical integrity’. In particular, the often chaotic lifestyles and poor living conditions observed by the researcher while on home visits with police officers and police staff left me feeling saddened, shocked and sometimes angry. Only twice during the fieldwork did I consciously have to suppress my emotions. The first of these occasions was during the interview of a child as he recalled in detail the abuse he and his mother had suffered for some years at the hands of his alcoholic father - the whole time through which his mother sobbed into her hands at the side of me on the couch.
The second occasion involved a visit to the home of a lady who I was informed before visiting was ‘well known’ to the police for making false accusations and also, as I was to discover, for the condition of her home. It was also on this particular home visit that I was treated to a taste of police initiation rites:

‘Make sure you take your shoes off won’t you when we go in. It’s important that you do that because it makes us cops look bad if we trail mud and shit into people’s living rooms. We get them phoning up to complain and then I’ll get bollocked’.

(Newbank, ex-officer CI, (Observation notes)).

After knocking for a good couple of minutes we were eventually invited into the property. As I began to remove my shoes as instructed by the CI (ex-DC), I happened to catch the smell of dog faeces which, after glancing up to inspect, I realised was coming from the living room of the house and more specifically, from the sullied sofa that we were being ushered towards. I caught the attention of the officer who had on display a child-like grin. Suffice to say my shoes stayed on. While personally challenging, these experiences were invaluable to the study, allowing the researcher a first-hand glimpse at the day to day realities of the work and culture of CIs.

Most of those fieldwork activities undertaken by the researcher did not carry much in way of enhanced risk. For example, a large portion of my observation time was spent within police stations, in the various CID units and as such, was not particularly risky - a consequence of the nature of the CIs role. However, the researcher does appreciate that a few activities did carry an enhance risk, in particular the observation of arrests and the execution of search warrants. The police carried out risk assessments on all operations on which I accompanied them. Potential risks were minimised in a number of ways, namely by only going near the arrestee or entering the premises after they had been secured by the police. When on home visits with officers and staff, the researcher was sure to maintain close proximity to the participant.

3.14 Summary

This chapter has detailed the research process and overall approach to research utilised in the current study. A mixed methods approach has been used to achieve the
aims and objectives of the study as it allowed for both breadth and depth of understanding to be achieved with regard to the phenomenon being investigated. This chapter has thus provided reasoned discussion and justification for the data collection techniques employed and methods used to analyse and integrate the collected data and finally, has detailed some of the key practical and ethical issues encountered by the researcher while undertaking the research. Together with Chapters One and Two, this Research Methodology chapter has hopefully provided a substantive foundation to the discussions which follow. The findings of the study outlined in the following four chapters (Chapter Four-Seven) of this thesis provide a detailed exploration of the realities and challenges faced by CIs in undertaking their role in a hierarchically driven and rapidly changing organisational context.
Chapter Four: The Police

4.1 Introduction

It is the intention of this chapter to set out an overview/profile of the structure and make-up of the CID units visited as they existed when the fieldwork was undertaken. This has been done so as to enable the reader to locate the substantive discussions of the thesis in their organisational context. Please bear in mind that the CID units discussed below may no longer exist in exactly the same form and as I write the reform agenda continues apace.

4.2 A General Overview

The CIs encountered during the course of this research project performed a range of tasks and occupied a number of positions of varying degrees of authority. CIs were identified as being involved in the investigation of a wide range of crimes including burglary, assault, domestic abuse, shoplifting, vehicle theft, arson, fraud and homicide (amongst others). The capacity with which CIs were engaged in police investigations differed between force areas and also between units. Furthermore, the degree to which CIs were involved in investigations was, for the most part, largely dependent on the type of crime being investigated. Generally speaking, tasks identified as being undertaken by CIs included: taking complex statements from victims and witnesses, interviewing suspects, managing exhibits, undertaking disclosure, preparing case files for court, family liaison and risk assessment. CIs were most often observed working in mixed teams alongside police detectives and other police officers although the ratio of CIs to officers differed somewhat markedly between units. CIs were also observed working alongside/in conjunction with other members of police staff including crime indexers and analysts as well as in multiagency settings, in particular, alongside social care, domestic violence advocate services and charities such as Women’s Aid. CIs were also identified as being in direct, regular contact with a number of outside bodies including, the banks, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Serious Organised Crime Agency
(SOCA)/NCA, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the Probation Service and Prison Service.

The degree of autonomy/agency afforded to CIs with regard to their role and contribution to investigations also varied between force areas and units. CIs in a number of units typically worked autonomously on their own caseloads in the same way as their warranted counterparts. This appeared to be particularly the case with those CIs working within Public Protection Units and Reactive CID. In other units, such as the MIT for example, CIs were more restricted in their level of autonomy and the extent to which their actions impacted on the strategic direction and overall result of investigations. However, some CIs were also observed supervising other CIs and warranted officers with some occupying the role of office and/or unit managers and others working as supervisors although in an unofficial capacity. The process by which workloads were allocated to CIs differed between the different units within each force although generally speaking, this was done by a Detective Sergeant (DS) or a civilian equivalent. The degree to which CIs had been designated with powers under the provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 2002 also differed between forces and units, for example, Newbank Public Protection Unit (see section 4.5.3) housed CIs who had been fully designated whereas at Shorewick MIT (see section 4.4.5), none of the CIs there had been designated.

Of those CIs identified during fieldwork, retired ex-police generally outnumbered those with no previous police experience. Most of those CIs encountered were retired detectives although a number had retired as uniformed police officers in more senior ranks including retired police Sergeants, Inspectors and Superintendents. Of those CIs who were not retired police officers, two were medically retired and a large number had worked for the police organisation previously as members of police staff, the most common of these being ex-PCSOS and ex-front desk staff. The majority of non-ex-officer CIs encountered notably had some previous knowledge and/or experience of the criminal justice arena or simultaneously, had experience of working in a field which had afforded these CIs with some broad ‘investigative’ knowledge and/or skill. For example, a number of non-ex-officer CIs encountered who had come from outside the organisation had previously worked for the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), HMRC and the Borders Fieldwork was undertaken prior to the division of the Probation Service into the National Probation Service (NPS) and Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs). Under the new arrangement, CRCs (which can be outsourced to private sector agencies) manage lower and medium risk offenders leaving the NPS which is managed by the National Offender Management Service to deal with the higher risk offenders.
Agency. Of all the CIs encountered during fieldwork, all but two were employed on a full-time basis and all but two were employed directly by the police organisation on a permanent basis. Those not employed on a permanent basis were agency staff working for the police for a fixed term via a contract agreed with their employer, the private security agency G4S.

4.3 The People - An Overview

Amongst the CIs at Newbank police, there was a fairly even spread of ages, from the late twenties to the sixties, while most of those at Shorewick were aged over forty. All of the CIs encountered at Shorewick were employed directly by the police organisation and all but two were employed by the police at Newbank. The two CIs not employed by the police organisation were employed by the private security agency G4S but worked for the police on a full time basis. The working backgrounds of the CIs identified working at both Shorewick and Newbank were wide-ranging, although most had previously worked for the police organisation as either warranted officers or members of police staff. Generally speaking, there was a relatively even split between the total number of ex-officer CIs and the total number of non-ex-officer CIs identified working at both Newbank and Shorewick CIDs. In total, twenty-two of those encountered at Shorewick and six of those at Newbank were retired police officers (including two at Newbank who had been medically retired). The career histories of ex-officer CIs were equally wide ranging including retired DCs, Sergeants, Inspectors and Superintendents. In comparison, a total of twenty CIs encountered at Shorewick and seven encountered at Newbank were not ex-police officers. Of these, most had previously worked for the police organisation in a variety of police staff roles including ex-PCSOs, ex-police enquiry desk staff, ex-indexers, HR managers etc. A number of those CIs identified working at both Shorewick and Newbank were also new to the police organisation having previously worked in a variety of outside occupations. These included, DWP, Borders Agency and HMRC. Levels of educational attainment amongst CIs were not routinely explored, though it emerged that a number of CIs encountered at both Newbank and Shorewick also held university degrees. In all of the CID units visited CIs were identified working in mixed teams alongside warranted officers, albeit to varying extents.
4.4 Shorewick

4.4.1 Fraud and Financial Investigation Team

The Fraud and Financial Investigation Team (FFIT) was based at a Shorewick BCU headquarters and consisted of a total of approximately twenty-two personnel at the time fieldwork was undertaken. The FFIT contained a total of fourteen FIs\(^{191}\) and was split into two distinct but interrelated units, the first being the fraud squad and the second being the financial investigation team (the FI team). The fraud squad was a mixed team consisting of five FIs and two DCs. All of the FIs working within the fraud squad were retired police detectives who had previous experience of working on investigations into financial crime. The financial investigation team was further subdivided into money laundering and asset recovery and contained a total of nine FIs. The asset recovery sub-team was staffed entirely by non-warranted personnel and contained seven FIs, two of whom were ex-police officers. The money laundering sub-team was a mixed team containing two FIs who worked alongside approximately five warranted DCs. Those FIs who were not ex-officers had come from varying related areas outside of the police organisation including the DWP and the Borders Agency. One had previously worked for the police organisation in an admin role and had a degree in accountancy. At the time of the fieldwork, all FIs identified as working within the FFIT were employed directly by the police on full-time permanent contracts.

The FFIT was headed by a Detective Inspector (DI) who was responsible for the overall management of the unit as well as its general output and efficiency. Beneath him were two Detective Sergeants who were responsible for the allocation of work to each of the sub-teams, for the direction of investigations and for overseeing investigations being undertaken by their individual teams. The DSs identified within the FFIT were also responsible for identifying/maintaining the training and accreditation of personnel within the unit as well as the professional conduct of each of the teams/sub-teams.

The purpose of the FFIT was two-fold; the fraud squad investigated cases to identify whether or not anything criminal had occurred and the financial investigation team conducted investigations to specifically identify and recover the proceeds of a crime. The

\(^{191}\) In the current study FIs have been conceptualised as a specialist division of the CI role.
role of FIs working within the fraud squad was almost identical to that of their warranted colleagues. FIs here were afforded a range of tasks including the retrieval of evidence, production and management of exhibits, collation and submission of papers to the court, conducting interviews with victims and perpetrators, searching property and seizing relevant items. FIs working within the financial investigation team differed from those working in the fraud squad in that they did not directly investigate the offence/potential offence. The role of FIs within the financial investigation team was to investigate the extent to which a perpetrator, after they had been found guilty by the court, had benefitted from their crime i.e. whether or not the benefit accrued by the perpetrator equates only to the value of the charge or if the benefit extends beyond this (e.g. over a period of years). These investigations were undertaken by FIs through communication with other relevant bodies including the banks and HMRC which was in turn assured by their accreditation as FIs and subsequent listing on the Financial Intelligence Gateway. Once the extent to which the perpetrator had benefitted from their criminality had been established, it was then the task of the FI (and DC) to locate/identify and recover assets belonging to that individual which equated to the monetary value or estimated monetary value of the benefit accrued by that individual as a direct result of their criminality. FIs in the FFIT were able to draw upon a range of powers and provisions afforded to them under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Police Reform Act 2002, Drug Trafficking Act 1994, Criminal Justice Act 1988 and Finance Act 2007 to aid them in their investigations. These included cash seizure powers, restraint powers, confiscation powers, powers to obtain and execute search warrants and powers to seize evidence (mainly documentary). FIs working within the FFIT were also in regular contact with SOCA/NCA as well as FIs operating in other force areas. FIs working within the FFIT could also be drawn upon to assist in a variety of other CID investigations for example, missing person cases, kidnappings, murders, blackmail etc.
4.4.2 Public Protection Unit

Unlike all other units visited during the fieldwork, the Public Protection Unit (PPU) at Shorewick was not sited within a police station or a facility that was owned by the police. Rather, it was located within the offices of a local authority (council) building which was based in one of Shorewick’s BCU areas. Shorewick police shared the building with a number of other public and voluntary sector organisations and agencies including the Independent Domestic Violence Advocacy Service (DVAs), Domestic Abuse Case Workers (DACs), Community Adult Learning Disability Team, the Safeguarding and Standards Unit (part of the National Youth Advocacy Service) and social care including Barnardo’s social workers. The building also housed a Professional Development Centre which could be hired by outside organisations and agencies for staff training purposes.

The PPU sub-units visited at Shorewick included the Domestic Abuse Team and the Child Protection Unit. Investigations undertaken into allegations of rape and sexual assault (of adult victims) were dealt with by a specialist force level unit which was located in a neighbouring BCU headquarters. The researcher was informed that this unit was staffed entirely by (mainly female) warranted officers.

4.4.2.1 Child Protection Unit

The Child Protection Unit (CPU) was relatively small in size taking up one medium sized room within the building. At the time visited, the unit as a whole consisted of a total of eight members of personnel, all but one of who were warranted DCs. The CPU was also split 60/40 with regard to gender with females being the majority. The unit was co-located with social care (two social workers). Only one CI was identified working within the unit alongside the warranted officers and was employed directly by the police on a full-time permanent contract. The unit was supervised by one DS who was responsible for the overall management of the team, allocation of work to personnel, for the professional conduct and development of the team and for the overall output of the unit.

The CPU was split into two interrelated sub-teams the first being the child abuse team and the second being the child sexual exploitation team (CSE). Personnel working within
the child abuse team dealt with investigations into the abuse (be this physical, sexual and/or psychological) of children, although two officers located there also dealt specifically with investigations into the abuse and exploitation of vulnerable adults. The CSE team dealt solely with referrals regarding children who were being, or who were at risk of sexual exploitation. However, the CPU also dealt with ‘causes for concern’ where no crime had taken place. In this sense, the CPU was both a proactive and reactive unit. It was reactive in that incidents/allegations of abuse and sexual exploitation which had been reported to the police were investigated. However, it was also proactive in that through referrals made to the unit by uniformed officers or via social care, children/vulnerable adults were identified as ‘at risk’ of abuse and/or sexual exploitation. It was the responsibility of the unit therefore to work with the relevant agencies to prevent future abuse and/or sexual exploitation from occurring.

The role of the CI working within this unit was proactive in that they were involved in preventing the future abuse of children. Following a ‘cause for concern’ referral which could be made to the unit via either social care (Sec 47) and/or a uniformed officer (via a Gen 117), a ‘Strategy for Protection’ meeting (or STRAP meeting) would be held to discuss/review the case and devise an initial intervention strategy. These initial meetings were multiagency and were attended by a warranted child protection officer (usually a member of the child abuse team), alongside other relevant bodies including social care, probation etc. If the terms agreed at the initial STRAP meeting were not met (e.g. parents fail to attend parenting classes) or if the child was judged at the meeting to be at risk of significant immediate harm, the case would be moved to a ‘Child Protection Conference’. If a case proceeded to conference, it would only then become the responsibility of the CI identified working within the unit. The primary task of the CI was to investigate the criminal history of parents/carers or anyone in immediate, regular contact with the child (e.g. mother’s new partner) and, following this investigation, to disclose at conference all relevant information (convictions, cautions etc.) held by the police on that/those individuals. The CI therefore acted as a representative for the police at these conferences and as such, had full access to the relevant police systems including the Police National Computer (PNC), the Crime Management System (CMS) and Case Administration and Tracking System (CATS).

The role undertaken by the CI in question was predominantly office based in nature. Contact with members of the public was therefore reduced to that which occurred during
participation in child protection conferences which were attended by relevant family members (and the child where appropriate) and also included those professionals most involved with the child and family. This included social care (social worker) who would also chair the conference, school or nursery staff, probation officer, health worker/s, drugs worker/s, domestic violence officer etc. It was the task of the conference to decide whether there were significant risks to a child, what those risks were and what needed to be done to reduce or remove those risks. Following discussion, an agreed ‘Child Protection Plan’ is put in place. Review conferences would then be undertaken at regular intervals to ensure the terms of the agreed plan were being met. The CI identified working in the CPU at Shorewick was supervised/managed in the same way as their warranted colleagues and was also held to account in the same way. The CI in question had also not been designated with powers under provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 2002.

4.4.2.2 Domestic Abuse Unit

The Domestic Abuse Unit (DAU) or ‘murder prevention’ team as it was colloquially referred to by participants, was relatively small in size taking up a small room on one floor of the building and containing only five personnel at the time the fieldwork was undertaken. The unit was staffed by a mixed team of warranted and non-warranted personnel. These included one police constable, three Domestic Abuse Officers and one non-warranted Domestic Violence Manager. The unit was split 60/40 with regard to gender with females occupying the majority. All those working within the unit were employed directly by the police organisation on full-time permanent contracts. The team was supervised by a non-warranted Domestic Violence Manager who was responsible for the overall management of the team. The Domestic Violence Manager was also responsible for the allocation of work to the team, for the professional conduct and development of the team and for the overall output of the department.

Unlike the majority of other units visited during the fieldwork, the DAU was a proactive unit in the sense that it was the role of the DVOs there to conduct risk assessments and work with victims to reduce the risk of future domestic abuse and potential domestic related homicides. Broadly speaking, DVOs were responsible for putting interventions
into place so as to prevent future instances/potential for domestic abuse. The level of intervention required and therefore, tasks undertaken by DVOs, were dependent upon the risk categorisation of the incoming case. The unit dealt only with cases of domestic abuse which had been ‘crimed’ by attending officers through the central Crime Recording Bureau. Domestic abuse related crimes were then placed on a DVA risk assessment list where they remained until an initial risk assessment using the Domestic Abuse, Sexual Harassment and Honour Based Violence (DASH) checklist had been undertaken. Non-crimed cases were risk assessed by the Central Intake unit (CIU) and crimed cases by the DAU personnel. Cases/crimes were assessed as being either, low, medium or high risks. The DAU dealt only with crimes assessed as medium or high risks. If assessed as a medium risk, DVOs were required to make contact with the victim either via phone call or face-to-face contact so as to signpost to other relevant agencies and offer support to the victim providing them with an assigned point of contact within the police. If assessed as being high risk, DVOs were tasked with investigating the circumstances and situation of the victim so as to prevent further harm to the victim and future calls for assistance to the police. DVOs were assigned their own victim who they would work with to develop an appropriate intervention strategy. This would involve DVOs paying visits to the homes of victims to assess their circumstances/situation.

DVOs also had full access to all relevant police information systems, chiefly, CMS and CATS. Personnel within the DAU worked closely with Domestic Violence Advocates who were funded by the local council and who, at the time of the fieldwork, were located just down the corridor from the DAU team. During the visit the researcher was informed that the Domestic Violence Advocates were in the process of being co-located with the DAU. DVOs worked with relative autonomy with regard to their assigned jobs, making independent risk assessments and devising strategies of intervention for victims. None of the DVOs in the unit had been accredited with powers under provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 2002.
4.4.3 Crime and Incident Team

Located within a BCU level police station in Shorewick, the Crime and Incident team (CIT) consisted of over twenty personnel at the time fieldwork was undertaken. The unit was staffed by mixed teams of warranted and non-warranted personnel. These included police constables and six CIs. No DCs were identified as working within the CIT. All six of the CIs identified as working within the CIT were employed directly by the police organisation. At the time of the fieldwork however, one CI had been detached to reactive CID. The CIT was split into three teams: 1) the Diary Car team was a mixed team of around three police constables (usually on light duties) and two CIs. The Diary Car team was responsible for the management of victim’s appointments with the police; it was the job of the diary car team to attend scheduled appointments which were not immediate priorities to take a statement/statements, record a crime and then pass it on to the relevant team to be developed. 2) The Prisoner Processing Unit was a team of approx. 6-10 police constables and two Domestic Violence Officers. This unit dealt with most of the detainees (held in custody) who were arrested for less serious or complex offences following the handover of investigations from other officers (often the arresting officer/s) who were then free to return to patrol and other duties. 3) The CIT support team was a team of four CIs and two PCs on light duties. This unit dealt with a range of volume crime types including, theft, assault, criminal damage (except with intent to endanger life), burglaries, harassment (except involving an element of domestic violence), making off without payment and some fraud (unless serious or complicated) and some vehicle crime. It was the responsibility of CIT support personnel to develop a case up to the point of arrest/interview when it would then be handed over to the relevant unit (warranted officer) for conclusion.

Each of the CIs working within CIT support was identified as having been designated with their own individual areas of work. One CI specialised in shopliftings, one (the part-time CI) specialised in ‘drive-offs’ (making off from a petrol station without payment), the third dealt with burglaries and other miscellaneous thefts and the fourth, with assaults. When workload was high and/or personnel were off (on annual or sick leave), it was common for CIs to take on the additional work even if not directly related to their particular area of expertise. CIs were also identified as having, in previous years, been asked to take on/be involved in additional and often more serious/complex areas of
investigation e.g. fraud. CIs identified working in the CIT support team at the time of the fieldwork operated with relative autonomy on their own caseloads for which they were solely responsible. Their relative level of autonomy meant that their role often took them outside the police station and involved regular engagement in face-to-face contact with members of the public including victims of crime. Retrieving CCTV and circulating images for identification purposes, taking victim and witness statements and retrieving and cataloguing any evidence were key tasks undertaken by the CIs identified working within this unit.

The CIT was headed by a Detective Inspector who was responsible for the overall management of the unit as well as its general output and efficiency. Beneath the Detective Inspector were three Detective Sergeants who were responsible for the allocation of work to each of the three sub-units/teams, for the direction of investigations and for the overseeing of investigations/work being undertaken by each team. The DSs identified within the CIT were also responsible for identifying the training and accreditation of personnel within the unit as well as the professional conduct of each of the sub-teams/units. Those CIs identified working within the CIT were supervised/managed in the same way as their warranted colleagues. They were also held to account in the same way. None of the CIs identified as working within the unit had been designated with powers under provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 2002.

4.4.4 Generalist Reactive Unit

Located within a BCU level police station in Shorewick, the Generalist Reactive Unit (GRU) consisted of approximately fifteen personnel at the time fieldwork was undertaken and was almost exclusively staffed by warranted officers. These included mainly DCs and some PCs undertaking training to become DCs. Only one CI was identified as working within the GRU at Shorewick. This CI was employed on a full-time permanent contract with the police and had been seconded some months previously from CIT (CIT support team). The GRU was split into two teams each of which was headed by a DS who was responsible for the overall management of the unit. DSs acted as the first point of contact for all incoming jobs and were responsible for the allocation of work to their team, for undertaking daily briefings and for the overall direction/management of investigations. DSs were also responsible for identifying the training needs of staff and
for the professional conduct of personnel. The unit was headed by a Detective Inspector who was responsible for the overall management and efficiency of the unit. The CI identified working within the GRU was supervised/managed and held to account in the same way as their warranted colleagues. The identified CI had also not been designated with any police type powers under provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 2002.

The role of the CI identified as working within this unit involved a range of tasks and responsibilities. These included the taking of more complex victim and witness statements, retrieval of CCTV footage and retrieval and cataloguing of any exhibits. The CI in question had also been afforded the role of police single point of contact (SPOC) for the county Ambulance Service. As the SPOC for Shorewick Ambulance Service, the CI was also in regular contact with paramedics, coroners and other criminal justice staff (e.g. prison officers). A key part of the CI’s SPOC role involved taking complex witness statements as part of a wider serious investigation, usually involving a death (e.g. death of an inmate in prison). The CI also possessed the power to complete data protection/data sharing requests on behalf of Shorewick Police (and if requested to do so by a warranted officer leading the investigation) to share necessary information which might be of significance to an investigation (e.g. recordings and transcripts of 999 calls, Patient Report Form completed by attending paramedic/s). Following such requests for information, it was then the responsibility of the CI to download the requested information onto a disk and exhibit it. Alongside statement taking, the CI was also primarily responsible for compiling evidence to be presented in court - this involved downloading, viewing and documenting hours of CCTV footage which the CI would later assemble into a package to be used by officers as evidence in court. This role also meant frequent liaison with other members of police staff working in specialist units e.g. ‘Info-Tech’ team etc.

4.4.5 Major Incident Team

Shorewick Major Incident Team (MIT) was the only force level CID unit encountered during the research. The MIT was housed within Shorewick’s main police training centre which was owned and managed by the police and was located within one of its BCU areas. The MIT was the largest of all the CID units visited with an entire floor
of the training centre reserved for this purpose and at any one time, housed around one hundred and thirty members of staff. The MIT investigated all Major Crime within the Shorewick area and at the time of the fieldwork, was divided into four separate teams. These teams were mixed, consisting of Detectives, CIs and Major Incident Room staff (indexers) who were responsible for operating the HOLMES2 (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System) computer system (including processing, researching, analysing and inputting information onto a database which has been set up to assist in the investigation of a major incident. Each team or sub-team was managed by a DS who was responsible for the immediate allocation of work to his/her team as well as the general management of the team. Above them was a Detective Inspector who was responsible for ensuring investigative strategies were communicated and maintained. Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) (usually a Detective Superintendent) occupied the top position in the chain of command within the MIT and were responsible for developing the overall investigation strategy and outcome of investigations being undertaken by each team. MIT Resource Managers, who might be either police staff or police officers, (alongside SIOs) were responsible for the allocation of staff to each investigation team based on the overall strategy and requirements set forth by the SIO.

The majority of operations undertaken by the MIT involved the investigation of homicide of a particular complex nature. These were separated into two distinct types or categories, the first being category A murder investigations and the second, category B murder investigations. However, the MIT was also responsible for the investigation of a range of other types of major crime including investigations into offences of kidnap, rape and large corporate investigations which might result in serious charges such as manslaughter. At the time of the fieldwork the MIT also housed the Cold Case Review team whose responsibility it was to review unsolved, historic criminal cases. Although in the process of disbandment during the fieldwork due to budget cuts at Shorewick, when visited by the researcher, the Cold Case Review team based in Shorewick MIT was small in size and consisted of a variable mix of serving and retired police officers (CIs).

At the time at which fieldwork was undertaken at Shorewick MIT, a total of sixteen CIs were identified as working within the unit. Of these, thirteen were retired police officers from a range of backgrounds including ex-DCs, a retired Chief Inspector and a retired Family Liaison Officer (FLO). Only three CIs identified operating within the MIT were
not retired officers instead coming from backgrounds involving a degree of policing and/or investigative knowledge or experience. The professional backgrounds of these individuals included a former PCSO, a former Department of Work and Pensions Investigator and a former private security escort officer. All CIs identified working within the MIT were employed directly by the police on full-time permanent contracts. No CIs from private security agencies were present within the MIT at the time of the fieldwork although the researcher was informed that private security personnel had been ‘bought-in’ to assist on investigations for fixed (short) periods of time in previous years.

Due to the often complex and large-scale nature of major investigations, CIs (like DCs) were not allocated individual caseloads within the MIT. CIs were rather allocated individual tasks/roles as part of the wider investigation which they were required to undertake and oversee throughout the entirety of the investigation. CIs were available to be utilised on all investigations undertaken within the MIT including category A and category B homicides and all other major investigations, although CIs were only involved in homicide investigations at the time of the fieldwork. Roles undertaken by CIs within the MIT generally mirrored those being undertaken by DCs and included the management of exhibits, undertaking disclosure, retrieval of CCTV footage, taking statements from witnesses (outside enquiries), interviewing suspects and undertaking the role of FLO. CIs were allocated roles by the SIO on the basis of their previous experience/skill-set as well as individual performance in previous MIT investigations. On this basis, CIs working within the MIT might occupy the same or different roles on each investigation, for example, a CI might work as disclosure officer on one job and as exhibits officer on the next or as CCTV reviewer on one job and as CCTV reviewer on the next. The extent to which CIs were required to venture outside the MIT was dependent largely on the role allocated to them on each investigation. One CI was also identified as operating in a supervisory capacity, occupying the position of CCTV coordinator for the MIT.

Given the scale and complexity of major investigations and if relevant to their allocated role/task, CIs were also required to engage with other specialist departments. Some examples identified included Scientific Support (forensics), Tactical Support (Specialist Search and House to House officers) and Hi-Tec Crime staff who were utilised to examine computers, mobile telephones and other technical devices. Additionally, MIT CIs were also required to engage with local policing teams and neighbouring police forces. None
of the CIs working within the MIT had been designated with any of the powers contained within the Police Reform Act 2002.

**4.5 Newbank**

**4.5.1 Generalist Reactive Unit**

Based in the headquarters of a BCU in Newbank, the GRU was the first unit visited during fieldwork at Newbank. The unit was small, consisting of a total of only six personnel at the time of the fieldwork and was staffed by a mixed team of warranted and non-warranted personnel. These included one DC, two PCs, two CIs and one DS. The unit was also split 50/50 with regard to gender. Of the two CIs working within this unit, one was employed directly by the police on a full-time, permanent police contract. The second CI however was employed via the private sector recruitment agency G4S and worked for Newbank police via a contractual arrangement with G4S. The CI who was employed on a police contract had previously worked for the police as a front enquiry desk officer. The CI employed by G4S was an ex-police detective having recently retired from a neighbouring force after serving his full thirty years’ service. One of the PCs present within the unit was completing her Professional Development Portfolio (PDP) and as such, was in the final stages of fulfilling the process to becoming a DC. The second PC working within the unit had been seconded there from the uniform branch on a short term basis to help out with high workload and also to gain experience of the type of work involved in the CID having expressed an interest to her managers of possibly becoming a DC in the future. At this stage however she had not begun the formal process of advancement. All personnel working within the unit were employed on full-time, permanent contracts with the police with the exception of the CI who was employed by G4S who was working for the police on a fixed term (6 months) basis. The CIs working within this unit were also supervised on the same basis as their warranted colleagues, by a DS who was responsible for the overall management of the unit. He acted as the first point of contact for all incoming ‘jobs’ and was responsible for the allocation of work to the team, for undertaking daily briefings and for the overall direction/management of investigations. The DS was also responsible for identifying the training needs of staff and
was the person responsible for the overall output of the department as well as the professional conduct of his team.

As with all the reactive CID units encountered during fieldwork, the GRU was fast-paced and extremely busy with high workloads. As a generalist unit, the team working here were required to deal with a range of crime types, namely, violent and acquisitive crime. Some examples observed during fieldwork included, cash machine ram raids, vehicle theft, assaults, robberies, an investigation into a suspicious death and burglaries. The role of both CIs identified as working within this unit appeared almost identical to that of their warranted colleagues; no type of crime and/or task was identified as being specifically reserved for undertaking by a detective. Following on from this, tasks undertaken by CIs were generally identical to those undertaken by warranted personnel within the unit and generally speaking, involved the recovery of CCTV footage, taking statements (simple and complex), interviewing witnesses and interviewing suspects. CIs were allocated their own caseloads for which they were solely responsible in the same way to that of their warranted colleagues. As such, CIs were expected to undertake all relevant investigative work on their assigned case and were required to follow these cases ‘from cradle to grave’. CIs were also found to be in regular contact with the CPS and other relevant members of the criminal justice system such as the probation service. CIs also had full access to all relevant information systems including PNC and CMS.

The role of CIs identified working within this unit involved a lot of time spent outside the police station undertaking enquiries. This meant that CIs had regular contact with outside bodies such as local council CCTV offices as well as the general public. Enquiries were, for the majority, undertaken autonomously by CIs in the same way as warranted colleagues although warranted accompaniment was identified as necessary on a couple of occasions, for example, when CIs were required to visit prisons in order to charge for further offences. Furthermore, each of the CIs identified also operated relative autonomy with regard to decision making relating to their own caseloads or jobs. There was no requirement for CIs to call in for permission, for example, for the decision not to seize CCTV footage. In the absence of the DS, the CI who was employed by the police was also identified as largely taking on the role of office manager and supervisor in an unofficial capacity, allocating work and advising other personnel on the likely best course of action. The CIs identified working within this unit had also been designated by the Chief Constable with all of the police powers available to CIs under section 38 of the
Police Reform Act 2002. As was the case in the majority of units visited during fieldwork within which CIs were identified as operating, no formally acknowledged role profiles were available for the CIs working within this unit leaving the distinction between their role relative to that of their warranted colleagues somewhat open to interpretation.

The GRU at Newbank was also co-located with the Convertor Team, previously the Volume Crime Team. It was the task of this team to convert all volume crime forensic output to detections and hence, convictions. This meant personnel paying regular visits to interview offenders in prison and detainees in custody where, through interview, they would aim to maximise the opportunities for bringing offences to justice and in doing so, reduce the number of unresolved recorded crime incidents. The Convertor Team was small in size, consisting of only five members of staff. At the time of the fieldwork, four of these staff members were warranted officers and one was a CI who was employed on a full-time permanent contract with Newbank police. When workload in the GRU was particularly high, the convertor team would assist on investigations being undertaken by GRU personnel. The co-location of the Convertor Team within GRU was also practical as the work of both units could overlap which proved quite often to be the case.

4.5.2 Fraud and Financial Investigation Team

The Fraud and Financial Investigation Team (FFIT) was based at a Newbank BCU police headquarters and consisted of a total of twenty-four personnel. Within the FFIT, CIs were identified as working in mixed teams alongside warranted police detectives. The FFIT was further split into two distinct but interrelated sub-units, the first dealing with fraud investigations (the fraud squad) and the second, with financial investigation (the FI team). The FFIT housed a total of seven CIs, or as they were referred to in the FFIT, financial investigators (FIs). The FIs were split between the two sub-units: six within the FI team and one within the fraud squad. Of the seven FIs identified working within the FFIT, three were retired police officers and four were not. Two of those FIs who were not retired police officers had previously been employed by the police organisation as members of police staff. One of the remaining two non-ex-officer FIs had previously worked for the DWP and the other, for Capital One bank. All FIs identified as working within the unit were employed directly by the police on full-time permanent contracts.
The structure of the unit was comparable to that identified at Shorewick in that it was headed by a Detective Inspector who had overall responsibility for the management (including ensuring its overall output and efficiency) of the unit (both teams). Beneath him were three DSs, two working on the fraud squad and one working on the FI team. On the FI team there was also a non-warranted police manager who like his Detective Sergeant colleagues was responsible, alongside the Detective Sergeant located within this unit, for the allocation of work to both teams. The primary role of the office manager identified working within the FI team was to organise and supervise all administrative and clerical arrangements within the FI team and generally speaking, ensure the unit ran smoothly. Alongside being responsible for the allocation of work, DSs were also responsible for overseeing investigations being undertaken by the FFIT and for identifying/maintaining the training and accreditation of personnel within the unit as well as the professional conduct of each of the sub-teams. As at Shorewick FFIT, the fraud squad at Newbank FFIT investigated cases to identify whether or not anything criminal had occurred and the financial investigation team conducted enquiries intended to identify and recover the proceeds of a crime.

As identified at Shorewick, the role of FIs working within the fraud squad was almost identical to that of their warranted colleagues. Tasks FIs were required to undertake included retrieving evidence, production and management of exhibits, collation and submission of papers to the court, interviewing victims and suspects, searching property and seizing relevant items. As was also the case at Shorewick, FIs working within the financial investigation team differed from those working in the fraud squad in that they did not directly investigate the offence/potential offence. The role of FIs within the financial investigation team was to determine the extent to which the perpetrator had benefitted from their criminal activity (in financial terms). As at Shorewick, financial investigations were undertaken by FIs through communication with other relevant bodies including the banks and HMRC which was in turn assured by their accreditation as FIs and subsequent listing on the Financial Intelligence Gateway. Once the extent to which the perpetrator had benefitted from their criminality had been established, it was then the task of the FI (and DC) to locate/identify and recover assets belonging to that individual which equated to the monetary value or estimated monetary value of the benefit accrued by that individual as a direct result of their criminality. Like those FIs working at Shorewick, FIs in the FFIT at Newbank were able to draw upon a range of powers and
provisions afforded to them under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Police Reform Act 2002, Drug Trafficking Act 1994, Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Finance Act 2007 to aid them in their investigations. These included cash seizure powers, restraint powers, confiscation powers, powers to obtain and execute search warrants and powers to seize evidence (mainly documentary). FIs working within the FFIT were also in regular contact with SOCA/NCA as well as FIs in other force areas. FIs working within the FFIT at Newbank could also be drawn upon to assist in a variety of other CID investigations for example, missing person cases, kidnappings, murders, blackmail etc.

4.5.3 Public Protection Unit

Based in the headquarters of a BCU in Newbank, the Public Protection Unit (PPU) was the second unit visited during fieldwork undertaken at Newbank. The PPU was divided into three smaller sub-units. Generally speaking, the first unit dealt broadly with investigations into domestic abuse, forced marriage, honour based violence and hate crime. The second unit dealt with investigations into rape and sexual assault cases. The third sub-unit dealt with investigations into the neglect and abuse of children and vulnerable adults. These units were not rigidly defined in terms of investigation/crime types with some investigations overlapping a couple or even all three of the sub-teams’ broad remits. CIs were only identified working within the first of these sub-units which predominately dealt with investigations into domestic abuse. This sub-unit, which for purposes of clarity will simply be referred to as PPU henceforth, was medium in size, consisting of a total of thirteen personnel when visited. The unit was staffed by a mixed team of warranted and non-warranted personnel at the time of the fieldwork. These included one detective constable, six police constables, four CIs and two DSs. The unit was also split 70/30 with regard to gender with the majority being female personnel. All of the CIs working within this unit were also female and were employed directly by the police on full-time, permanent police contracts. Of the four CIs identified working within this unit, two were retired police officers and one had previously worked as a member of police staff in a variety of roles. The fourth CI was the only CI to have come from outside the police organisation having previously occupied other roles in the wider criminal justice system. All six of the PCs working within the unit were in the process of becoming DCs and were waiting to undertake their qualifying examination as part completion of
their PDP. The unit was split into two teams which were each headed by a Detective Sergeant who acted as the first point of contact for all incoming jobs and was responsible for the allocation of work to the team, daily briefings and overall direction/management of investigations. The DSs were also responsible for identifying the training needs of staff and for undertaking staff Performance Development Reviews (PDRs). The unit was supervised overall by a DCI who was responsible for the overall output and efficiency of the department as well as the professional conduct of the personnel within.

Within the PPU, the role of CIs appeared almost identical to that of their warranted colleagues; no type of crime and/or task was identified as being specifically reserved for undertaking by a DC. However, the researcher was made aware during fieldwork that CIs were not currently being utilised in the other two PPU sub-units and as such, investigations into allegations of rape, sexual assault and the potential neglect and abuse of children and vulnerable adults were arguably reserved for operation by warranted officers at the time of the fieldwork. Where identified in operation within the PPU however, it did appear that tasks undertaken by CIs were generally identical to those undertaken by warranted personnel within the unit and generally speaking, involved the recovery of CCTV footage, interviewing witnesses, interviewing victims and interviewing suspects. CIs were allocated their own caseloads for which they were solely responsible in the same way to that of their warranted colleagues and they were expected to follow these ‘from cradle to grave’. As such, CIs were also identified as being in regular contact with the CPS and other relevant members of the criminal justice system such as the probation service and child protection services. They were also identified as in regular contact with staff members from the charitable organisation Women’s Aid who were found to be working from an office located within the BCU headquarters, down the corridor from the PPU. CIs also had full access to all relevant police information systems, chiefly, CMS and CATS.

The role undertaken by the CIs in this unit involved a lot of time spent outside of the station on enquiries and this meant regular contact with victims as well as the general public. Enquiries were, for the majority, undertaken autonomously by CIs in the same way as warranted colleagues although warranted accompaniment was identified as necessary on a couple of occasions. For example, when a suspect suffering acute chest pains needed to be accompanied to hospital, the CI had to wait for a uniformed officer’s assistance as this was not something she was able to do autonomously as an un-warranted
CI. Following on from this, each of the CIs identified also operated relative autonomy with regard to decision making relating to their own caseloads or jobs. There was no requirement for CIs to call in for permission from a DS. The CIs identified within this unit had also been designated by the Chief Constable with all of the police powers available to CIs under section 38 of the Reform Act 2002. As was the case in the majority of units visited during fieldwork and within which CIs were identified operating, no role profiles were available for the CIs working within this unit leaving the distinction between their role relative to that of their warranted colleagues relatively open to interpretation.

4.6 Summary

This chapter has set out an overview/profile of the structure and make-up of the CID units visited as they existed when the fieldwork was undertaken. This has been done so as to enable the reader to locate the substantive discussions of the thesis in their organisational context. As described in this chapter, CIs were found to be performing a range of tasks and were involved in the investigation of a wide range of crimes including those of a serious, specialist and complex nature. However, the capacity with which CIs were engaged in police investigations was found to differ between force areas and also between units suggesting the existence of local variations in the utilisation of CIs as a resource. The degree to which CIs were involved in investigations was, for the most part, largely dependent upon the type of crime being investigated suggesting the existence of a more well-defined division of labour between CIs and their warranted colleagues in some units than in others. While the ratio of CIs to officers differed somewhat markedly between units, CIs were most often observed working autonomously in mixed teams alongside police detectives and other police officers. As such, CIs observed working at both Shorewick and Newbank were afforded a noteworthy degree of autonomy with regard to their operational decision making. A number of CIs were also found to be undertaking roles which required them to exercise a notable degree of authority over both their warranted and non-warranted colleagues although as will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, this was not always formally acknowledged by the organisation.

While the majority of those CIs encountered at both sites were found to be ex-police officers, this particular demographic differed between forces with CIs working at Shorewick found to be more likely to be ex-officers than those working at Newbank (this
issue will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters). The degree to which CIs at both sites had been designated with powers under the provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 2002 also differed between forces and units suggesting varying uptake of the provision by Chief Constables. While only two agency CIs were encountered working at Newbank during the time fieldwork was undertaken, as findings presented in subsequent chapters will show, both forces were found to have made use of agency CIs in the past.

Overall, CI utilisation at both Shorewick and Newbank was expansive and is indicative of an uneven uptake of the CI by police forces. Information presented in this chapter shows that, on a number of occasions and at both forces, CIs were operating a role which requires them to make decisions which could determine the strategic direction and ultimate success of an investigation. In many units, the role being performed by CIs went beyond that of a member of support staff and, as will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, may come to present a significant challenge to the long established professional ethos of the detective and prestige of the CID.
Chapter Five: The Daily Life of Civilian Investigators

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an empirical account of the role currently being undertaken by CIs within the police organisation in E&W and discusses a range of issues relevant to their introduction and current use. Drawing upon interview data, field observations and personal reflections of CIs during interviews, this chapter offers an empirical account of the daily life of those CIs found to be operating within Newbank and Shorewick police. This chapter has been divided thematically into five sections. The first section seeks to examine how CIs construct and assert their occupational identities within the unit, namely, the extent to which the role being undertaken by CIs at both Shorewick and Newbank can be considered support. The second section of this chapter examines the motivations of CIs for applying for the role, their level of commitment and their impact on resilience. The third section explores the degree to which CIs have become integrated within the units in which they work and discusses the value currently attached to the role by CIs themselves and others. The fourth section seeks to examine the impact of CI utilisation on established cultures/orientations to work within the CID. Specifically, this section examines the degree to which CIs can be seen to have aligned themselves with the traditional cop culture and more specifically, detective culture. The final section of this chapter deals with the issue of public perceptions, in particular, concern over the impact of CI utilisation on public confidence in the police and the CID and with that, detective’s ability to maintain projection of their desired ‘legitimate’ identity.

5.2 Identity and Occupational Position of CIs

In a fashion comparable to that of PCSOs (O’Neill, 2014), when CIs were first introduced in 2002, there was a great deal of confusion over what they were meant to do within police forces and how they would fit into the CID both practically and culturally. The perceived failure of the police to adequately communicate information to personnel relating to the initial introduction of CIs and their intended role, was frequently reflected on by participants at both Newbank and Shorewick and also appeared to be a major factor affecting the occupational identity and integration of CIs within the CID at both sites. In keeping with the broad national rhetoric surrounding civilianisation, CIs were first
introduced to warranted personnel at both sites on the premise of being support staff who were envisaged to free-up the time of experienced detectives who could then return to frontline tasks. The following quote can be considered typical of the experience of most warranted officers with regard to the way the CI role was communicated initially:

When they first arrived we were told that they were just support staff here to assist us with investigations doing the sort of lesser tasks if you know what I mean, things like CCTV recovery, viewing and cataloguing of exhibits and what have you.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

In the traditional sense, conceptions of support staff are typically imbued with feminine connotations - which arise from the past recruitment of (mainly) female staff to undertake ‘back office’ clerical and administrative roles - and which stand in stark contrast with patriarchal dispositions of officers associated with cop culture and suggest a division of labour in which those assigned the support label (in this case, CIs) have little to no impact on the main task at hand. However, the power of the performance culture in the organisation coupled with congested organisational demands on the police meant that CID unit managers were under pressure to use CIs in diverse ways which often stretched their remit beyond that which could be strictly considered support. Diverted from their primary supportive role, CIs may become increasingly involved in operational police work and in tasks associated with the role of a fully-fledged detective. Indeed, in most units where CIs were observed working alongside warranted officers, their remit had advanced far beyond that which they were initially intended, some to the point that they were being utilised in an almost identical capacity to their warranted colleagues. Referred to as ‘mission creep’ by Crawford et al. (2005: 45) in relation to PCSOs, the expansion of the role of CIs beyond that which they were initially intended was found to be a common trend amongst CIs working at both Shorewick and Newbank CIDs (particularly at Shorewick MIT, Newbank PPU and Newbank GRU192). Skinns (2011: 73) also found evidence of mission creep in relation to non-warranted DDOs who, despite ‘originally been employed through Home Office funds to drug-test suspects’, in practice, ‘authorised suspects’ detention, read them their rights and used force when they were not supposed to’. With regard to CIs, this ‘creep’ or ‘drift’ in mission was found to be being encouraged

192 Although as will be discussed subsequently, the extent to which this was the case at each unit was largely dependent upon a range of other factors (e.g. working background of CI).
by a mixture of factors. First, some CIs encountered a drive to prove themselves to their warranted colleagues and, in doing so, their overall worth to the unit. This drive itself was fuelled by a mixture of performance culture within the CID and ubiquitous awareness amongst CIs of impending budget cuts and subsequent concern over their job security. While not always welcomed, CIs admitted to reluctantly accepting ad hoc extensions to their remit/role (not matched by benefits) in an effort to appear ‘keen’ and/or ‘valuable’ to unit managers (this issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six).

Second, CIs drift in their mission was also importantly encouraged by an overbearing pressure on supervisors to manage congested organisational demands and, in doing so, ensure organisational outcomes/output within the units. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the boundary separating the occupational remit of CIs and warranted officers appeared most blurred in relation to ex-officer CIs as the following quote illustrates:

I think the thing with our role is that it’s just sort of grown legs and ran and the bureaucracy hasn’t been able to keep up. I don’t think there was much clarity with regard to how we were supposed to be used when we first came in. I definitely felt like that anyway. But as times gone on and they’ve seen what we can do and that we’re capable of doing most of the stuff... It’s just progressed. It’s definitely true for us ex-cops because we already have that knowledge and those skills so it was easy to see how that role might expand.

*(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)*

At both Shorewick and Newbank, initial recruitment of CIs had tended to favour the recruitment of ex-officers over non-ex-officers. Unlike non-ex-officer CIs who, crucially, had never served their time ‘on the street’, ex-officer CIs arguably bring with them a wealth of relevant experience and craft skills. Police managers at both sites made reference to the perceived advantages in employing ex-officer CIs who were alleged to be able to ‘hit the ground running’ and who also, arguably negate the need for expensive and lengthy training packages saving the organisation both time and money while at the same time, increasing its resources and overall resilience. For some officers, the transition from cop to CI was immediate and often resulted in them performing an almost identical role to that which they were required to undertake as a fully warranted officer. As the following quote suggests, the recruitment of ex-officer CIs has contributed towards a legacy of poor communication about the role at force level resulting in its piecemeal implementation which has subsequently led to the ad hoc evolution of the CI role for both ex-officer and more recently, non-ex-officer CIs:
I think when we first came in they didn’t know what we were about and what we were for and how to use us and because some of us were ex-cops that were literally, one day there, retired overnight, the next day they were back at there, sat at the same desks doing the same job. They literally just went from a cop to a CI overnight. So they used that and when we came in as non-cops, they were kind of like ‘Well, what do we do with them?’ ‘They’re doing that job (ex-cop CIs) so surely they’ve got to do the same job?’ So there wasn’t any sort of clarity and they didn’t know what to do, so they just treated us that way and that’s how we’ve sort of just gone along and evolved and they’ve just left us to it.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

As evidenced in the above quote, where they were observed working in mixed teams alongside warranted officers, much like their ex-officer colleagues, the remit of non-ex-officer CIs had also often advanced to include many of the tasks traditionally considered the preserve of their warranted colleagues. For example, at Shorewick MIT one non-ex-officer CI had previously undertaken the role of Family Liaison Officer (FLO) and also, had acted as second interviewer during a suspect interview. At both Newbank PPU and Newbank GRU, non-warranted CIs were also observed interviewing witnesses and suspects and were responsible for their own caseloads.

Within the units in which fieldwork was undertaken, the evolving nature of the CI role had resulted in a notable degree of disparity between the rhetoric and the reality of the role in some units. This somewhat understandably led some participants to question the intrinsic nature of the role, namely, the extent to which the CI role can and should be understood as one of support:

Years ago we were called support staff and I always use the phrase ‘we are here to assist and support you, not do your job for you’. Because that was the initial idea behind us, that’s what we were brought in for, to do a lot of inside roles so that the officers could be outside on the streets doing the arresting and the investigating and we would be on the inside. Since I’ve been here that’s changed somewhat and I think we do a lot of their job for them now, rather than supporting them.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

When we first started, we came in as support staff working with, generally, seasoned detectives, ‘I’ll tell you what to do because I’m the seasoned detective’. It doesn’t matter what experience you’ve got beforehand like I’m the lead for this one ... ‘Give it to the detectives because they’re only support staff’. But then, they get to know who you are and what your capabilities are and very soon you start getting put into little niches. He’s good at that job and she’s good at that, we’ll put them into that. And you realise then that your civilians are quite good
at most major roles. The older detectives retire and we’ve got a lot of new detectives in, not seasoned detectives, and your finding that we as civilian investigators we have now got the expertise in dealing with most aspects, CCTV, exhibits, disclosure, statement taking, coordinators, house-to-house coordinators, applying for warrants, these are all things that now civilian investigators are doing and not the officers.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

When I applied for the job the idea of the investigators was to be a supportive role, to assist them, because the detectives usually went out in pairs, taking statements and doing inquiries and stuff like that. But the role very quickly took on a different direction and we’re now being used in a very similar way to the cops. Because they’ve basically realised we’re cheap labour aren’t we? It’s the ‘three for two’ thing isn’t it; you get three of us for the price of two cops.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

The marked lack of transparency surrounding the intrinsic nature of the CI role had seemingly served to provoke a type of occupational identity crisis amongst some CIs and some officers. For some warranted officers - detectives in particular - the often equivocal remit and occupational positioning of CIs within their unit appeared to cause them to question their overall worth as specialists and professionals in their field. As the following quote illustrates:

It does make you think sometimes, is it taking away the value of the (detective) role so to speak? You know, it’s supposed to be the crème de la crème of police work isn’t it, investigation. But then you’ve got people coming in from outside and doing it, some, like I said earlier, even interviewing suspects.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

For some CIs, the tendency of the organisation to portray/treat CIs as support staff while at the same time, allowing their role to evolve to include tasks typically considered the preserve of their warranted colleagues, led them to question their occupational position within the CID (i.e. the extent to which they considered themselves support staff and how they chose to interpret the support label). As the following quotes demonstrate, most CIs encountered did not identify with the support staff label:

In my mind I’m not support staff. Not at all. I do the same work as the DCs here. When people ask me what I do I say ‘What detectives do but for a lot less money’.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)
I don’t know if you could really call this a support role. I know they (the police organisation) do but I’m not sure whether what I do at least can be classed as support. Other than actually going out and arresting a suspect, there’s very little difference between the roles in here.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

The extent to which participants (officers and CIs) believed the role of CI to be support was a central topic of interest explored by the researcher in the current study. Participants cited a variety of views on the subject with some seeming to acknowledge and accept a more support style occupational position to that of their warranted colleagues within the CID:

I wouldn’t say I was junior I would say I was more support. It might be different talking to other investigators like, I’ve certainly been asked to contact people and take statements from people where I’ve thought, ‘Ooo! Ok’. Go and see a consultant and take a statement from him for a suicide. Should I be doing that? But then, I can do it. I have to go and think about it but I can do it so I’m supporting the detectives in their role.

(Shorewick, GRU, ex-officer CI)

However, what is important to note is how the notion of support was interpreted and understood by individual CIs and how they chose to apply this label to their individual role. Most CIs encountered at both Newbank and Shorewick drew a clear distinction between the notions of ‘support as junior’ and ‘support as teamwork’. For some, being referred to as support staff was implicitly tied up with the idea of the CI role being operationally and occupationally lesser or more junior to that of DCs. This interpretation was undoubtedly linked with the traditional notions/conceptions of support staff as fulfilling a peripheral role. For others, the notion of support was understood in rather more general terms, as being an inherent aspect of working as part of a team; ‘we all support one another’ being a regularly cited phrase. Generally speaking, CIs at both sites tended to reject the support label in terms of their role being occupationally junior as this interpretation often was not thought to adequately or truthfully reflect the reality of the role and the work being undertaken. Indeed, in some instances CIs were found to play a role in leading and/or ensuring the strategic direction of investigations with many also possessing their own individual caseloads. The following quotes are illustrative of the general feeling amongst CIs:
No. We’re not support. We’re support to the force because we’re financial investigators and we can do things that other police officers can’t do. So I’ve always thought that we are a support to the force however, we’re not support staff even though we’re officially labelled as ‘support staff’, we have a lot of responsibility.

(Shorewick, FFIT, ex-officer FI)

No it’s not a support role at all; quite the opposite. And it’s paid as a support role as well but it’s not a support role … You are the main investigating officer, there’s nobody else. There’s no detective above me overseeing my job and who takes the responsibility for my job. It’s on me. Ultimately if I don’t investigate it properly it’s on my neck isn’t it, not theirs.

(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI)

Well in my job description and contract it says I’m there to support and assist however, the actual, general feeling is not, not at all. It’s not like that in any way. Some other departments may be different, they may just assist like homicide for obvious reasons, but our role is very much on par with what detectives do.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

However, evidence suggests that the extent to which CIs viewed their role as being support is likely to be largely dependent upon their working background. CIs interpretation of the support label appeared to show some correlation with their working backgrounds and was notably distinguishable between ex-officer and non-ex-officer CIs at both sites. All of the non-ex-officer CIs encountered rejected the support label in the sense of it being operationally and organisationally junior to the role being undertaken by warranted officers, choosing rather to apply the term in the more general sense; as ‘support as teamwork’. However, in comparison, findings suggest that ex-officer CIs were more likely to view their role in terms of it being ‘support as junior’:

I feel that we are obviously junior. We are a junior role. If there was a pecking order, we would come way below a DC status.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

I think it probably is. I mean certainly in terms of pay it’s a junior role and I think a lot of people see it as a junior role. A lot of police officers see it as a role less than a warranted officer.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

Such findings are also suggestive of the existence of differential understandings/conceptions of ‘team’ between ex-officer and non-ex-officer CIs. Years
spent working for the police organisation mean that, for most ex-officer CIs and warranted officers, conceptions of team are imbued with broader notions of hierarchy and rank structure. In this sense, ‘team’ does not equate to a team of equals working towards a common goal but rather, is a team based on clear division of labour and formal power relations which fundamentally determine the role one is able to play and places limits on the degree to which one is able to contribute.

While findings suggest that ex-officer CIs may be more likely than non-ex-officer CIs to view their role and occupational status/position within the CID in terms of ‘support as junior’ when compared to that of their warranted colleagues, it is important not to overstate the pervasiveness of this trend. It is possible that the changing demographic of the police workforce (namely in terms of age) may be driving a change in the attitude and opinion towards the role and occupational status/position of CIs and simultaneously, that of detectives. The researcher found that in the units with a younger age demographic, CIs were generally less likely to be viewed (by their warranted colleagues) and view their role as ‘support as junior’:

They’ve (civilian investigators) been used in here doing what they’re doing now really since I joined the CID so for me, they’re just sort of part of the furniture if you know what I mean and I think they do a good job … I just view them as part of the team really.

(Newbank, PPU, PC (trainee DC))

No I wouldn’t say I view them as junior. Maybe that’s because I’m younger in service though and some of the ones we have here have been doing it longer than I have.

(Shorewick, GRU, DC)

A lot of them don’t and certainly a lot of the younger generation of officers see it as the same sort of role really … we’re lucky because our SIO is a younger SIO and I think he’s very open to the fact that, well if somebody can do the role, then let them do it. Whereas you get an older, possibly someone who is nearing their thirty years and they think ‘no’, because it’s always been done like that, that must be right. They really will resist.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

Second, the willingness of CIs to ascribe the ‘support as junior’ label to their role was identified as being largely dependent upon the unit in which they were located and the
nature of the role and type of crime being investigated. For example, when asked the same question in interview, an ex-officer FI based at Newbank FFIT explicitly rejected the label of support in the sense of it being junior; ‘I am not a supporting officer. I do not support other people. I have my own case load same as the detectives and we do the same work’. This also appeared to be the general feeling amongst CIs at Shorewick FFIT. As the following quote demonstrates:

We’re responsible for submitting our own file papers, we go to meetings with council… we have complete responsibility for our jobs in terms of how we are going to deal with them and whatever. We’re also responsible for doing restraint on peoples’ assets. We have a workload that is individual to us. It’s not supportive of somebody else. We have large jobs where benefits can be in the millions and we have small jobs which can just be a few hundred quid but we are responsible for them. We’re not there just to support. We have the responsibility. If you think about barristers and people like that, they take our advice in relation to confiscation and financial investigation, and they have to because they often haven’t got the knowledge.

(Shorewick, FFIT, ex-officer FI)

Similar sentiments were also expressed by the CI identified working at Shorewick PPU CPU:

I think my role is one on its own. I’m not junior to anybody. I work alongside the child protection officer and at the moment I am asking her for her advice and I think I always will be because she’s really, really experienced and she knows her stuff, but no, I think I don’t view my role as junior and although I’m part of a team, I do that on an equal level to everybody else.

(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI)

The evidence presented here suggests that the opinions of CIs regarding the extent to which their role can be considered support depends somewhat fundamentally upon three key issues: whether or not they have responsibility for their own caseloads; whether or not the role they undertake is comparable to any other being undertaken by warranted officers in their unit; and whether or not the role being undertaken involves specialist skills and/or knowledge and accompanying powers and/or privileges that other detectives do not possess. It is also demonstrable of the value placed on autonomy and the accompanying sense of identity that comes with specialisation and exclusivity.
For the majority of warranted officers, the extent to which they considered the CI role to be a support role was to be determined on a case by case basis and was dependent largely upon the working background and knowledge/skills set possessed by the individual, as the following quotes demonstrate:

There are some people who I’ve worked with who are civilian investigators that I don’t see as being support, in fact they had a lot more knowledge in some areas than I do about certain things.

(Shorewick, GRU, DC)

No. Definitely not. Karen is brilliant at what she does. She knows what she’s doing and she does the same as us. It’s definitely not a support role. Not for her anyway.

(Newbank, GRU, PC)

Interviewer: Do you see CIs here as fulfilling a support role?

Interviewee: No not particularly, I don’t … I don’t really see that they’re utilised very differently (to detectives) a lot of the time.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

Like lower ranking warranted officers, for police managers the extent to which the CI role was to be viewed as support appeared subject to negotiation and was a matter to be determined on a case by case basis, and was largely influenced by the working backgrounds and/or knowledge/skills set possessed by individuals and, thus, the tasks they were able to undertake. This was found to be the consensus of opinion amongst all police managers encountered during the fieldwork, as the following quotes demonstrate:

I make sure that we have somebody fully trained doing the witness interviews, you know, someone trained to that next level. If it’s ex-police officers (CIs), I’d give them that next tier down of taking statements. If it’s people that are new to the organisation who haven’t had any of that training, you would probably only ever get them to take very basic statements. So it’s more… we don’t do it consciously, although we do do it consciously, there’s no pecking order but you give people what they’re capable of. I mean you could say that and you can’t say it for everybody. Somebody coming from outside in, you might say I wouldn’t give them a complex statement to take. However, one of the investigators we’ve got came from, I think he was a bank, fraud officer that used to take complex statements. So you would give them that. So it’s all on a very personal basis to be honest. It’s just knowing your staff and knowing what they’re capable of.

(Shorewick, MIT, SIO)
No, they (FIs) have got a specialist role, they’re specialists in the same way as a Scene of Crime Officer supports an investigation they do a specialist role in it. An officer couldn’t do that. Financial Investigators do the same. They support investigations but it’s not a support role.

(Newbank, FFIT, DS)

They did initially come in to support but they have grown and become full-fledged investigators so we don’t label them as support. They are investigators who are attached to the MIT, but if you asked me to say what they did, yeah they support investigations because really, there are only four people investigating. That’s your SIOs. Everyone here (including the DCs) is supporting my investigation.

(Shorewick, MIT, SIO)

The ones who work in CID and Financial Investigation, I would say, are performing a very similar role. Yes, they’re supporting because they’re part of the team but I wouldn’t say they’re just here as a support function. I think they’re part of the bigger team. For me, and this is my opinion and a lot of people’s opinions now, the majority of them do as good a job as a detective constable and do the same job.

(Newbank, DCI)

Together, the findings presented here suggest that, as with the CID more generally whereby rank or formal position is rarely used to define social relations (Corsianos, 1999), fine status distinctions based on skill and experience likely exist in the units/teams in which CIs were identified working which shape/determine their individual occupational standing/position.

5.3 Motivation, Commitment and Resilience

There exists a relative wealth of national and international research on the motivations for becoming a police officer. Early research on this issue highlighted several consistent themes (although primarily based on the motivations of white male officers), in particular, the attraction of people with authoritarian personalities - seeking authority, power and authority - to the profession (Lester, 1983; McNamara, 1967; Niederhoffer, 1993. This finding is well evidenced in the detective literature (i.e. status determined by skill and the ability of officers to undertake tasks with ‘flair’ (Fielding, 1988; Hobbs, 1991).
1967; Rankin, 1957). Job security was also often cited in early writings on the topic as an important motivator. For example, Westley (1970) found that thirty five per cent of police officers in his study cited job security as the number one reason for joining the force (see also Lester, 1983). The opportunity to help people and the desire to enforce the law were also commonly cited reasons for becoming a police officer (Cumming, Cumming and Edell, 1965; Lester, Arcuri and Gunn, 1980). The research also suggested that many police officers simply wanted to work in a profession that is perceived as important and adventurous and that this was something that they had always wanted to do (Harris, 1973; Van Maanen, 1973). In some cases, however, individuals entered policing out of convenience or because it was easy (Alex, 1976), while others drifted into the profession after failing in other occupations (Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969; Harris, 1973; Westley, 1970). Recent study on the subject of police officer motivations for entering the police has been comparatively sparse, however, research that was undertaken generally confirms much of the work conducted in the 1960s and 1970s.

It would not be entirely unreasonable to assume that the reasons non-warranted individuals have for applying to work for the police would be similar to those of their warranted counterparts, particularly given the fact that many of these individuals can now also be found undertaking tasks considered frontline such as investigative work and patrol. Cooper et al. (2006), Johnston (2006; 2007a) and Cosgrove (2011) found that, with regard to PCSOs, their reasons for applying to work for the police organisation were also based predominantly on altruistic and career reasons, with a general belief in the role acting as a ‘stepping stone’ or as allowing them to ‘test the water’ before applying to become a warranted officer.

All CI participants encountered during the course of the fieldwork were asked for their motivations for applying/reapplying to work for the police as a CI. The reasons provided by participants were wide ranging and showed some correlation with both the working background and age of participants. The motivations of CIs for applying for the role were also notably distinguishable between ex-officer CIs and non-ex-officer CIs at both research sites. Ex-officer CIs generally cited three key reasons for choosing to return to work for the police. These were: financial need/desire, familiarity with the work and an enduring love of the job which was often underpinned by altruistic sentiments.
Financial need and/or desire to supplement their police pensions with additional income was arguably found to be the primary motivating factor influencing the decision of ex-officer CIs to re-join the police as CIs. Referred to as ‘double-dipping’ by one detective at Shorewick MIT, the re-hiring of retired police officers into non-warranted positions within the police organisation appeared to be a common trend at Shorewick and Newbank - although a greater percentage of ex-police officer CIs were found to be working at Shorewick. The majority of ex-officer CIs encountered at both Newbank and Shorewick admitted to a strong financial incentive influencing their decision to reapply to work for the police organisation. At the time the research was conducted, all the ex-officer CIs had joined the police before 6th April 2006\textsuperscript{194} and as such, were members of the Police Pensions Scheme 1987. Under the old scheme, the earliest date that a police pension can be paid is fifty years old. This was however dependent on length of service\textsuperscript{195}, for example, if an officer has thirty years pensionable service, they may retire with an immediate pension before the age of fifty. These stipulations alongside the appeal of a generous retirement package meant that many of those ex-officer CIs encountered during the fieldwork had retired while still relatively young. This was also coupled with more recent enforcement of the A19 regulation which allows constabularies to forcibly retire officers who have served thirty years on grounds of ill health, age and effectiveness and efficiency. In turn, many of those interviewed expressed an overriding ‘need to work’ in order to support young families. One ex-officer CI based at Shorewick MIT described his reasons for returning to work as being typical of many of his colleagues:

> I mean there’s no secret. I know it’s the same for a lot of ex-cops who come back. I retired at 48, I was a boy policeman at 18 and that meant that my thirty years was done quite early and I’d still got two boys, one who’d just started at university and another one a few years back looking for university. So being able to hop over jobs, it gave me financial security and meant that I could help support them both.

*(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)*

> I need to work. My daughter graduated from university last year but I’ve raised her on my own since she was five years old so I needed to work.

*(Shorewick, GRU, ex-officer CI)*

\textsuperscript{194} The New Police Pension Scheme (NPPS) was introduced in 2006 at sets the normal minimum pension age to 55 and includes a range of modern benefits including survivor pensions for nominated unmarried partners.

\textsuperscript{195} All ranks can choose to take their pensions immediately once they have 25 years’ service and are over 50 years old or, if they are under 50 and have 25 years’ service, they can take their pensions from age 50.
Interviewee: One of my friends, he’s one of them (agency CI); he’s one of the civilians that does it. He retired about seven years ago and he’s still at Shorewick BCU and he just deals with shoplifters.

Interviewer: He must enjoy it?

Interviewee: Needs must I think. He’s going through a divorce so he needs the money I think. He needs his money (laughs).

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

However, as the following quote illustrates, familiarity with the work also likely factored into the decision making of ex-officers when initially deciding to apply for the CI role and was likely to be intimately tied up with financial need/desire:

I think the bottom line is when we talk about pensions and things like that, the bottom line is, I’ll be honest with you, you finish after thirty years and your pensions a thousand pound. Now that’s a good amount of money but when you’ve finished and you’ve been earning a considerable amount more than that you’ve got used to a certain standard of living and when, at fifty-year-old, that’s what you’ve got, you’ve got to go out and find another job and people like myself who have nothing on a CV apart from being in the police, it means you’re limited on what you can do.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

While the issue of money and the need to maintain financial security post-retirement proved to be a key driving factor behind ex-officer CIs decisions to re-join the police, a number of ex-officer CIs also described feeling simply ‘not ready’ to retire. When asked directly for their reasons for choosing to apply for the CI role after deciding to take their retirement, for these individuals the primary factor influencing their decision to apply for the CI role centred on an overriding love for and fascination with the occupation. This can be evidenced in the following quotes:

I love it. It is interesting and that’s why I do it and people say to me you know, ‘You’re a retired Inspector, you can afford to retire’. Yeah, I can but, I always said, if I stop enjoying it I will pack it in but until such time when I stop enjoying it comes, I’ll keep getting up in the mornings and coming to work and enjoying it. I’m fortunate, I realise that I’m fortunate.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

I wasn’t ready to go. It’s as simple as that really. I felt I was still able to do my job and I still had the desire to do my job so when this position came up I thought, ‘great’. I applied and that was that.

(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI)
There are just some people who won’t give up. They just love it and they keep loving it.

*(Shorewick, MIT, SIO)*

Furthermore, it was brought to the attention of the researcher that for some ex-officers, the decision to return to work for the police organisation was also likely fuelled by feelings of disillusionment or dissatisfaction with retirement and subsequent difficulty adjusting to life as an ‘outsider’ after a long career in the police. It was described to the researcher by one participant at Shorewick MIT as being like ‘a kind of grief’. In the following quote one CI made reference to the structured/routinised nature of the police and also hinted at culture as being defining factors fuelling his desire to return:

> I missed it; the structure and the routine and the stress of it as weird as that sounds. I missed the people too and not being part of it anymore. It’s a certain type of personality and humour that you don’t get anywhere else.

*(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)*

This was also later confirmed in interview with a DC at Shorewick:

> I think a lot come back because they miss it. It comes as a bit of a shock to them to realise that being a cop is not what they *are* it’s just what they *did*. The only way I can describe it is being a bit like when soldiers leave the army.

*(Shorewick, MIT, DC)*

In likening the police organisation to the army, the DC in the above quote draws attention to the comparable degree of social isolation (Van Maanen, 1978) suffered by both officers and soldiers with regard to their work and also illustrates how officers typically view their job as a vocation. This orientation can make the readjustment officers’ must go through as they shed their warranted identity a particularly difficult experience and, as the following quote suggests, is likely to be a factor prompting the decision of some ex-officers to return to work for the police as CIs.

### 5.3.1 Non-Ex-Officer CIs

While the issue of money was also a likely factor in the decision of non-ex-officer CIs when deciding to apply to work for the police, it quickly became apparent that three
other factors also likely influenced participants’ motivation to apply: interest in the field, familiarity with the work and career progression. Like ex-officer CIs, these driving factors were not mutually exclusive and were often discussed synonymously by interviewees suggesting that, for the majority of non-ex-officer CIs, their decision to apply for the CI position was most likely influenced by a mixture of all three of these factors.

However, when asked directly, the most common reason cited by non-ex-officer CIs with regard to their decision to apply for the role centred on a long held fascination with the work of the police and specifically, of investigation work. A number of CIs at both Shorewick and Newbank described working for the police (not necessarily as a police officer) as being something that they ‘had always been interested’ in or had ‘always wanted to do’. This was supported by the fact that all of the non-ex-officer CIs identified during the fieldwork had previously either worked within the police organisation as members of police staff or in a related policing or investigative field outside the police organisation (see Chapter Four). The below quote is broadly representative of the response provided by the vast majority of non-ex officer CIs:

I’ve always been interested in the police and how crimes are investigated and I’ve got an enquiring mind so when I saw that I could work actually investigating crimes and, as it was advertised at the time, ‘support detectives with their investigations’. I thought that’s definitely something I’d like to do.

(Newbank, GRU, non-ex-officer CI)

For other CIs, the decision to apply to work for the police as a CI was also strongly influenced by their pre-existing knowledge of the field and possession of relevant transferable skills. As alluded to above, the working backgrounds of many non-ex-officer CIs meant that most possessed some discernible working knowledge of policing and/or had limited knowledge or experience working in an investigative capacity. As such, for many non-ex-officer CIs encountered, the CI role appeared also as a ‘natural progression’ in their career. This was particularly true of those non-ex-officer CIs who had previously worked for the police organisation in a non-warranted capacity and who generally viewed the role as a kind of advancement in their career, arguably in a similar way to the way uniformed officer are said to ‘move into clothes’ when joining the CID (Hobbs, 1988: 210). As the following quote demonstrates:

Before this I worked on the front desk downstairs as a civvie. I enjoyed it but it was limited in terms of job satisfaction, whereas in this role, it was sort of a step
up for me because I get to deal with actual crime. You feel like you’re making a
difference.

(Newbank, GRU, non-ex-officer CI)

When asked directly, most non-ex-officer CIs agreed that they viewed the CI role as a
career rather than simply another job. This suggests that for some non-ex-officer CIs the
decision to apply for the role of CI was therefore directly influenced by a strong desire to
build a successful career with the police organisation. The CI role was therefore viewed
by the majority of non-ex-officer CIs as part of a longer term strategy to enhance/develop
a career in the criminal justice field. This in turn, was likely informed by an understanding
of the police as being a notoriously hierarchical and highly bureaucratic organisation
within which possibilities for advancement were considered to be perhaps more
achievable. As the following quote demonstrates:

“This is my career, you know. It’s what I want to do and I want to do a good job.
I want to make something of it. I thought there would be more of a chance for
progression with the police.”

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

However, for the most part, non-ex-officer CIs described feeling ‘satisfied’ in their
position as non-warranted individuals working within the CID with many describing how
the similarity of their remit to that of their warranted colleagues often left them feeling
‘like a cop anyway’. The researcher found little evidence to suggest that any of the non-
ex-officer CIs identified working at either Newbank or Shorewick harboured any burning
ambition to become warranted officers and even less to suggest that this was a pivotal
reasoning behind their decision to apply for the CI role initially. This contradicts previous
research on the motivations of other groups of non-warranted police personnel (cf work
on PCSOs by Cooper et al., 2006; Johnston, 2005) and suggests that CIs are unlikely to
view the role as being a ‘stepping stone’ to a career as a warranted police officer. That
being said, one SIO interviewed at Shorewick MIT described how, ‘We do have CIs who
go on to join the police, so, that’s their prerogative isn’t it’. Furthermore, while none of
the non-ex-officer CIs encountered during the research overtly expressed a desire to
eventually join the police as a warranted officer, some non-ex-officer CIs did evidence a
‘wannabe cop’ mentality in the sense that they were willing to accept ad hoc extensions
in their work remit. This was found to be particularly the case when such extensions
meant that the CI role would encompass more and more of those investigative tasks and functions considered core and largely police operational (e.g. interviewing suspects):

I’ve been asked to assist on suspect interviewing a few times which is fine with me because I love it. I love doing that. That’s my favourite bit... I will do any role, I don’t mind. It doesn’t really bother me that they’re (officers) on more money.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

Another non-ex-officer CI based at Newbank PPU also described being asked to assist on a recent arson with intent to endanger life investigation that was being led by another ex-officer CI. She explained how, while feeling somewhat overwhelmed, she ‘loved’ working on this particular case due to the fact that it was interesting and allowed her to learn and develop new investigative skills which she hoped, ‘might encourage them (senior police officers) to give us (CIs) more serious stuff in the future, because they can see we are capable of doing it’. Also, in those units where police type powers had not been granted to CIs, it was only found to be non-ex-officer CIs who expressed a willingness to be designated. In the following quote a non-ex-cop CI based at Shorewick MIT describes not only how she would welcome the additional powers but also, how she had/was still considering plans to actively seek these out:

Interviewer: So would being designated with powers be something you would be interested in if it was offered to you?

Participant: Oh absolutely. Yeah. I mean I have actually thought, and it is still a consideration of mine, of becoming a Special Constable because then I would have the power of arrest and I think it would work in this role but it’s… when I look at it, it’s committing the time to it and I think, ‘can I actually do it?’ I don’t know and I don’t want to commit to something that I can’t do but it is something that I’ve definitely looked at.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

Evidence was found to suggest that, despite possessing an alleged valuable wealth of skills and experience, ex-officer CIs were more likely to exhibit lower levels of commitment and motivation than their non-ex-officer colleagues. This opinion was found to be shared amongst warranted and non-warranted participants, both of whom held reservations about the enthusiasm of some ex-officer CIs towards the role. When asked for their opinion on the recruitment of ex-officer CIs, police managers at both sites made reference to the potential issue of low commitment amongst some ex-officer CIs compared to that which was perceived to be typically exhibited by non-ex-officer CIs:
I can give examples where clearly you’ve got people coming into this organisation as investigators from outside the police force who have never worked in the police arena, who are absolutely excellent … You’ve equally got ex-cops who have come in as civilian investigators that aren’t so good so maybe it’s because they’re… It sounds awful but I can talk about two that I’ve got who are sort of older, retired cops in their late fifties who are just doing a job to tide them over in retirement and clearly they’re not as enthusiastic and as dynamic and some younger people who come in at an early level, not from a police background, who really want to learn and do a good job.

(Newbank, DCI)

We’ve got some rubbish in our MIT and I don’t mind sharing that with you. ‘Rubbish’ might be being a bit unfair, but we have got some that need more work than others and they’re police officers who have come back as civilians. Although the cop presents himself in interview to be an investigator as, ‘Well I’ve got this background right’, there are a couple of issues that fall out of that. The first one is that these are officers who are now financially secure. So the urge to be here isn’t that great. So their devotion to duties is not as good as it was when they were police officers. We do get that, in other words, people come here and then its foot off the gas. It’s, not ‘pin money’ because that’s an awful phrase, but you understand the term yeah? It’s just, this is another holiday for them etc. and you can see that in the way that they work.

(Shorewick, MIT, SIO)

While it is likely that some ex-officer CIs may exhibit lower levels of motivation/commitment to the role than some of their non-warranted colleagues, evidence presented elsewhere in this chapter does not support the presumption of the SIO in the above quote regarding the financial security of ex-officer CIs and thus, its causal link to low commitment/devotion amongst this group.

The orientation of some ex-officer CIs to their work - namely their lack of motivation and reluctance to go beyond that which can be considered support - appeared to cause frustration amongst non-ex-officer CIs due to the detrimental effect this attitude/behaviour was likely to have for the overall standing of CIs within the units in which they operate. The issue of ‘double-dipping’ and its association with poor motivation in particular was raised by a number of interviewees at both Shorewick and Newbank. As the below quote demonstrates:

Some of the investigators who are ex-police are lazy because it’s … I think they think they’ve had their thirty-year career and they’ve now come back to a job, stepped into a role where they’re getting decent money and they are lazy. And that’s not just my opinion I mean senior officers will also tell you that. It is annoying and it is so apparent and I don’t mean to be speaking about people in
that way but it is apparent and I think that brings the role of a CI down and I think that makes people view them as ‘Well they’re just turning up for extra money. They’ve got their pension and now they’re getting all this money as well’. And I think that probably needs to be weeded out … It can be annoying, especially if you get paired with that person and they’re lazy and you’re doing all the work. It is annoying, yeah. But I think that was the thing. I think when MIT was set up, it was all ex-cops who were brought into the role and I think the two or three of us (non-ex-cops) are probably the hardest working because it is our career. It’s what we want to do, it’s not just that we’ve come to the end of our policing career and thought, ‘Oh well, we’ll just do that as well now’. It’s what we want to do. I mean don’t get me wrong, I like these people, they’re nice people but you know, when I’ve talked to them and they’ve said, ‘Well, I could pack it in next month because I don’t really need the money’ and you just think, ‘Oh great’.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

For a lot of them it’s a case of, ‘Well my kids are at university so I’ve got to support them through university’. Yeah, my daughter’s at university but she’s supporting herself, she’s working! Or ‘I’ve got to buy my son a flat’ or ‘I’ve got to rent my son a flat while he’s at university so I need to work’. It’s a huge difference from me picking my daughter up once a month and paying for her big shop at ASDA. So it is … and it does, sought of, stick in the clack a bit that people still have that attitude of ‘Oh, I’m coming back to work’ and thinking they can just walk back into a job and they’re just doing it to bide their time because they don’t want to paint and decorate for the Mrs. That era, the ‘Life on Mars’ era, obviously there is still that attitude after thirty years.

(Shorewick, GRU, ex-officer CI)

It’s more the ex-cop civilians who aren’t as interested in working overtime as the not-ex-cop ones. Don’t get me wrong, when a job comes in everyone just generally does whatever but yeah. For whatever reason, probably not as interested … you can understand it though I suppose when people have got their pension coming in as well and they don’t necessarily want to work the same hours because its advertised, or it was, as a support role … I know the older timer ones I’ve got are very much ‘don’t want to stay on overtime’ and you can’t force them because that’s what the contract says. They don’t want to put themselves at risk which I totally understand. They’ve come to do that support role to keep them ticking over in retirement, for want of a better work and I don’t mean that nastily but that’s what they’ve done.

(Newbank, DCI)

While most participants acknowledged that the level of commitment to the role displayed by ex-officer CIs was largely dependent upon the individual, for some, the variable level of commitment amongst this group was considered endemic of the fact that for most ex-officer CIs, the role was viewed as a job rather than a career:

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I still think as an organisation we should be going for people a lot younger than that. That’s an easy way out (recruiting ex-officer CIs). Someone that you can mould. Because they’re (ex-officer CIs) keen as mustard when they come back for a short burst but you know very well that if they were here longer, they’d be sat with their feet up and having too many cups of tea and being on the internet too long and then fall into that way of life because it’s not a career.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

Alongside the issue of potentially differing commitment levels between ex-officer and non-ex-officer CIs, a number of participants also drew attention to the valuable knowledge-base of both groups and its potential impact on overall resilience of the CID. With specific regard to the issue of resilience, in some instances CIs were found to be undertaking tasks and/or were involved in the investigation of particular types of crime from which police officers had generally withdrawn, such as risk assessment, victim/follow up contact work and specific areas of volume crime (e.g. shoplifting, drive-offs). This in turn meant that CIs had built up a valuable body of knowledge with regard to prolific offenders and repeat victims, which also had allowed them to form close working relationships with local businesses and third sector organisations. Such occupational and operational specialisation had also arguably enabled CIs to ensure both high clear-up rates and a consistent high level of service delivery making them a particular valuable CID resource.

5.3.2 Agency CIs

When asked to explain their reasons for choosing to apply for the role, both of the private security agency CIs encountered working at Newbank GRU expressed comparable motivations to those of their ex-officer CI colleagues who were employed directly by the police organisation. This can be considered somewhat unsurprising given the fact that both agency CIs were also ex-police officers. When asked directly, both described their reasons for returning to work as CIs as being motivated by a mixture of two key factors: familiarity with the work and financial need. Of the two, financial need was clearly the dominant influencing factor with both explicitly citing an overriding ‘need to work’, as the following quotes demonstrate:

The main reason I applied for this job was because I can’t afford not to work. I don’t have that luxury unfortunately.

(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency))
I’ve still got young lads and my wife doesn’t work so I need to work.

(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency))

Like their ex-officer CI colleagues employed by the police, familiarity with the work also understandably factored in the decision of both agency CIs to apply for the role and can be evidenced in the following quotes:

This job just seemed like the natural progression for me really. I’ve been a police man all my life and I worked as a detective for a large part of it. I’m not sure how good I’d be doing anything else.

(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency))

It’s not too taxing because I know what I’m doing, other than the systems are a bit different here, and they’re a nice bunch of people that I work with so that helps. So it was really easy for me to just sort of slot back in.

(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency))

However, given evidence to suggest that most, if not all agency CIs are also ex-police officers, in reality it is likely that a mixture of both financial need/desire and familiarity with the work cumulatively serve to motivate agency CIs to apply for the role in the same way as their publically employed ex-officer colleagues. However, unlike their publically employed ex-officer CI colleagues, neither of the agency CIs identified explicitly cited a ‘love of the job’ as being a key factor influencing their decision to apply to work as CIs. Both CIs alluded rather to a lack of opportunity for employment with their preferred organisation at the time of their retirement which, coupled with financial need, had compelled them to enlist with private sector recruitment agencies. As such, both CIs viewed their current employment situation as a temporary or transitory measure. For the first agency CI, the role was temporary/transitory in the sense that it was being undertaken until a full-time permanent position became available with the police organisation:

Ideally, I want to work for Newbank police again because it’s more stable employment. I had a chat with the Chief Super about it this morning actually and he said there should be some positions coming up soon so hopefully I’ll get one of those.

(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency))

For the second CI, the role was temporary/transitory in the sense that it was being undertaken as a ‘filler job’ until a suitable opportunity became available in the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (now National Crime Agency (NCA)):
I want to work for SOCA. That’s what I really want to do. So I saw this advertised and I knew of people doing this role in the police before I retired so I knew what it was about and just figured I can do that until something becomes available.

(Newbank, GRU, ex-officer CI (agency))

Scholars writing on the subject of private security have similarly made reference to the often temporary/transitory orientation of some private security officers to their role (McLeod, 2002; Michael, 2002). Work by Button (2007) and Wakefield (2003) also draws attention to the high turnover of private security officers, suggesting low commitment to the role. However, while the attitude of both agency CIs encountered with regard to their motivations for choosing to apply for the role could, in some respects, be interpreted as low commitment and devotion amongst this group of CIs, I would argue that it is more suggestive of a desire to become permanent members of the police organisation. This issue was addressed by one ex-officer CI at Shorewick and draws attention to the importance of the association between belonging and commitment/loyalty and with that, occupational diligence:

I think you’d have a lot more commitment if you’re working for a company or an organisation. If I was working here as an agency worker and I went to take a statement, I’d take a statement, I’d hand it over, I’d go home and I’d forget about it. Whereas if I was employed by that company, I’d have a little bit more loyalty.

(Shorewick, PPU, DAT, ex-officer CI)

Findings presented in this section suggest that feelings of support were not shared across the service; some of the initial scepticism towards CIs will remain with officers who do not work with them and/or have been in service for a long period of time. This highlights the importance of the role which pragmatism plays in the policing occupational culture, in that ‘deeper acceptance and adoption of new ways of working and diversification of roles within the organisation come from experiencing the benefits first hand’ (O’Neill, 2015: 84).

5.4 Acceptance and Integration of CIs.

Findings suggest that CIs were providing a valuable contribution to the CID teams in which they were located. However, a legacy of poor implementation and lack of clarity
about the role had served to fuel anxieties amongst warranted officers regarding the impact of CI utilisation on the role and title of detective. Such anxieties had, somewhat understandably, had a marked impact on the integration of CIs within the police family and the units in which they work. Indeed, when questioned directly on how their role had been received by the warranted colleagues, a number of more experienced CIs were able to recall specific instances of hostility towards the role of CIs within their unit in the months and years following their initial introduction. As the following quotes demonstrate:

I was out on a job visiting another division a while back and I bumped into an old friend of mine who I got to know when I was a cop. I made the mistake of asking whether she had any jobs going in her Prisoner Handling unit. She basically said half joking but serious as well, ‘No there f****** aren’t! We don’t want any of your lot here taking our jobs’. I couldn’t believe it. And this was someone I’d known for years!

(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI)

I’ve heard, I’ve actually witnessed someone shout to a civilian investigator, and she was a cop, ‘You’re coming here, you’ve got your pension and now you’re taking my overtime’ and going on and on … we don’t come across it as much as we did at the beginning but there are some of them that still think that and I think a lot of them do still think that.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

No such overt displays of hostility towards CIs were observed during the course of the current research and the general consensus amongst CIs encountered at both sites was that the level of integration had improved in their unit over time. However, despite improvements in relations and a developing sense of teamwork and collegiality between CIs and officers, evidence was found to suggest that in some units CIs still only enjoyed a marginal level of integration and continued to suffer resistance to their role as a result of their secondary civilian employment status. The status of civilian as understood within the police has been noted by a number of other scholars as being a significant impediment to their integration within the organisation (Atkinson, forthcoming; Loveday, 2007). This is not least due to that fact that CIs present a challenge to an otherwise hegemonic detective culture which privileges experiential knowledge and traditional old regime conceptions of detective work (Hobbs, 1988; Tong and Bowling, 2006). The secondary status of CIs was found to be being simultaneously reinforced by the failure of the police
organisation to properly acknowledge the true nature of the role now being undertaken by CIs.

Generally speaking, CIs appeared to be well integrated within the units/teams in which they were identified working within the CID at both Shorewick and Newbank. This was aided greatly by the fact that they, like their warranted counterparts, did not wear police uniforms and as such, were largely indistinguishable from one another when working together within the units. Most CIs also described a strong sense of collegiality and teamwork between CIs and warranted officers. Indeed, when asked for their opinion on CIs, warranted officers generally professed their support citing that they viewed their non-warranted colleagues simply as ‘part of the team’. However, where CIs were identified working in mixed teams alongside warranted officers, the degree to which they had become integrated was found to differ between Shorewick and Newbank with distinctions generally appearing more pronounced at Shorewick than at Newbank. For example, where CIs and officers were identified working in mixed teams at Shorewick (the MIT being the exception), there appeared to exist a more distinct separation between the activities/role of CIs and that of their warranted colleagues. At Shorewick GRU and CIT, CI participants were found to be undertaking a more traditional ‘support as junior’ orientation and were charged with a more limited number of tasks, namely, the recovery of CCTV, basic witness statement taking and preparing case files for court. At Newbank however, the distinction between warranted officers and CIs appeared far less pronounced and more open to negotiation.

In units where their role appeared to be most indivisible (such as at Newbank) to that of their warranted colleagues (operationally speaking), CIs appeared to enjoy the highest degree of integration. For example, at Newbank, CIs and warranted officers were jointly referred to under the arguably more inclusive title of ‘investigators’ by police managers and, as subsequent sections of this chapter will demonstrate (see section 5.5), the CIs working here appeared to display the most notable adherence with dominant police cultural traits. Furthermore, as an external observer it was clear that individual CIs who demonstrated independence, judgement and commitment to the role - key traits associated with being an ‘effective detective’ (Smith and Flanagan, 2000) - were more likely to win the recognition and respect of their warranted colleagues and feel an integrated member of the team than those who did not.
However, CIs at both sites felt that the level of integration they were able to achieve within the CID was being fundamentally undermined by the continued failure of the police organisation to recognise and appreciate the role now being undertaken by CIs ‘on the ground’ (this issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six).

The civilian nature of the CI role results in a secondary and, in some respects, outsider status similar to that identified by Mulcahy (1995) in documenting the stigmatising identity of Internal Affairs Officers. These conditions are currently being maintained by powerful actors in the fields of policing and politics (like the Police Federation and the media) and the weakness or absence of any alternative (or convincing) narrative on how effective policing and, specifically investigation, may be achieved. However, the sense of ‘otherness’ and, in some cases, inferiority experienced by some CIs was also found to fuel a drive to prove themselves and their worth to their warranted colleagues. This is comparable to work on trainee detective constables (cf Cassan, 2005; Fielding, 1988; Tong, 2004) who have been found to show similar a drive to assert/prove their competence in relation to operational work and, particularly, their proficiency in managing the art and craft elements of detective work. This was particularly found to be case amongst most non-ex-officer CIs, who when asked, admitted to feeling under pressure to succeed and prove themselves to their warranted colleagues and managers, as the following quotes illustrate:

You’ve always got to work that bit harder as a civilian to prove yourself which puts you under extra pressure.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

I come up against it yeah, because police officers think they’re the be all and end all ... A lot of police officers don’t think like that and you always have, as support staff, especially in a supervisor’s position, you have to prove yourself before you get respect. There is a big stigma about it and I have had a real battle.

(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, non-ex-officer CI)

When we first started me and Julie would run around like blue arsed flies trying to get everything done as best as we could, probably because we felt like we had something to prove being the only civvies in the officer. I definitely think that helped us to be accepted, because they (officers) know they can rely on us to do a good job.

(Shorewick, CIT, non-ex-officer CI)
When asked, non-ex-officer CIs in particular generally agreed that they felt under pressure to prove the worth and value of their role to their warranted colleagues. This was achieved by non-ex-officer CIs in two key ways: for those CIs identified working in units where their role/remit was largely indivisible to that of warranted officers (Newbank PPU and GRU), only by extending their remit to include more duties did they feel able to secure a stronger occupational identity and greater level of integration. For those CIs working in units where their role was more clearly defined (namely Shorewick GRU and CIT), partial acceptance into the police culture and integration into the organisation was achieved through exceeding expectations and through optimum fulfilment of their ‘support as junior’ status. Both approaches to achieving a level of integration/acceptance by their warranted colleagues were further facilitated by the ability of the individual CI to demonstrate their value and contribution to crime control objectives.

However, it was proposed to the researcher that for those seeking integration through advancement of their role/remit, such efforts may serve only to further marginalise the group. Indeed, as the following quotes suggest, achievements of CIs likely draw attention to the existence of deficiencies in skills, knowledge and motivation amongst some members of warranted personnel resulting in resentment towards CIs. This can be evidenced in the following quotes:

A few years back one of the Sergeants we had here said something to me. She wanted to know something about a case, some procedure for it, I can’t remember exactly what it was but anyway, she was asking all the DCs and no one knew and I did. So I just said, you know, part of the team, I said, ‘Oh, you just need to do this and this’. Well, she stood up in front of everyone and said, ‘I can’t believe out of everyone in this room I had to get the answer from someone like you!’ meaning a civilian. I was so shocked. I felt this big, you know. But I realise it was just because I, ‘the civvie’, knew something she didn’t and I think she felt a bit put out by it.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

There are a lot of lazy people. It’s a place to hide is the MIT. There are some real superb people and there are lots of lazy people who are rubbish. And sometimes, invariably, it’s the rubbish people who turn round and have a go which I find quite bizarre … I think they can feel embarrassed that they don’t know something and that can manifest as bitterness towards us (CIs).

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)
There was somebody only recently who had submitted a forensic application for an exhibit who was a detective but had never done the role of exhibits officer before so I asked him if he wanted me to look over it for him before he sent it off. Well! He goes off, ‘I'm a detective and I've got twenty-eight years’ experience and I don’t need you to look over it’. So I thought ‘right’, and I let it go. And lo and behold, it came back with lots of mistakes which, he couldn’t have known that because he’d never done the role before. But instead of just saying, ‘Yeah, would you mind looking it over for me?’... So I thought … I was quite pleased actually because it was like, hmmm (laughs).

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

Where evidence of latent antipathy and/or resistance to the role being undertaken by CIs was identified in the current study, it was generally found to be in relation to one of four key areas of concern. Generally speaking, warranted officers appeared most concerned with the impact of CIs on overtime availability, their salary, public perceptions of CI use and confidence in the police and, at a more fundamental level, on the overall character and prestige of the detective role. Furthermore, despite generally professing their support for the CI role, when asked directly for their opinion on the utilisation of CIs in their unit, it became clear that for some warranted officers CIs were considered most valuable in terms of their alleged cost effectiveness and, where divisions were most pronounced between the roles, in terms of their potential for freeing up the time of officers. As the following quote demonstrates, this view is also likely also shared by some senior police managers:

If money didn’t come into it at all, if you were given a choice you would pick police officers because you can do everything with them and they’re very flexible. But in terms of balancing your finances and everything to go with it, then I think definitely there’s a good place for CIs.

(Newbank, DCI)

Moreover, a number of warranted officers also made reference to the perceived benefits in employing ex-officers in this role:

I think CIs are very valuable, yes. I mean with ex-cops; I see hardly any disadvantages there. It’s a pool of experience and knowledge that’s being tapped which makes sense in the current climate.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)
They’re a very valuable asset; like it or not the organisation is under pressure to tighten the purse strings in all areas isn’t it so the CIs allow them to do that.

(Newbank, GRU, DC (Observation notes))

Such responses suggest a rather limited appreciation and valuing of the role being undertaken by CIs by some of their warranted colleagues and also hint at continued resistance, in particular, to the recruitment of non-ex-officer CIs. Indeed, for some warranted officers, the recruitment of non-ex-officer CIs appeared to be the biggest cause of concern, particularly with regard to fears over how the role being performed by CIs may be perceived by the public and in turn, affect public confidence in the police:

How would you feel if you found out the person interviewing the suspect on the murder of one of your family members had no proper training or experience doing it? You’d be a bit miffed I’d imagine. I know I would be. That is happening and I don’t personally think it should be.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

Somewhat unsurprisingly given the serious nature of the work, evidence suggests that concern over the impact of CI utilisation on the detective role and title was found to be most likely at the MIT. This was arguably due to the fact that investigative work into homicide, the most serious and high profile of all violent crime, is also largely still considered to be the most prestigious amongst detectives (Innes, 2003). As has been demonstrated in the Chapter Four, CIs were found to be undertaking a range of tasks within the MIT which included acting as second interviewers in suspect interviews alongside a number of other more specialist roles (e.g. as FLOs, search coordinators, CCTV coordinators) which were generally restricted to trained warranted officers. Some CIs were even found to have previously led suspect interviews at the MIT as the following quote demonstrates:

I’ve interviewed as a crime investigator, when you interview a suspect for murder which is what we were doing I worked with a DC young in service. We were given someone to interview over three days. I did about 13 interviews, I cautioned, I did lead all the way through, and he got 25 years. You know, what more power do I want?

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)
CI involvement in suspect interviewing appeared to be the most obvious cause of resentment towards CIs within the unit. For the most part, such antipathy appeared to be founded on a privileging of experiential knowledge and the resulting craft qualities traditionally associated with an old regime approach to detective work (Tong and Bowling, 2006). This can be evidenced in the following quote:

They’re (CIs) being given key roles, exhibits officer, disclosure officer, interviewing. They’re all massive things, massive things for a murder investigation, and definitely not support roles … We work on a traffic light system here and we’ve been on red now for the last few months so the SIOs and Henry (civilian office manager) are under pressure to fill the posts, so you end up with civilians doing more than they should to a lot of the time … Interviewing suspects is something that I think is completely wrong! They first started using them in suspect interviews as second interviewers simply because they ran out of detectives. It’s a skill that can only come with experience - how to treat them, when to bring things up and when to leave them until a bit later on. Like, I always make a point of saying ‘Hi. I’m Helen and I’m the DC who is going to be looking after you today’. It’s things like that. Things that can’t be taught, how to talk to them, how to build rapport, shake their hands even if it’s a horrible crime like rape or child molestation that you know they have done. It’s just doing the job. Not judging them. Being able to spot a way in. Not setting a barrier between you and them. It’s important and it’s not something I think they (CIs) should be doing.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

Such anxieties are also suggestive of a more fundamental concern, namely, the degree to which CI use (particularly the direct entry of non-ex-officer CIs) serves to undermine/challenge traditional approaches and understandings of investigative work and the centrality of the detective. Furthermore, as Crawford et al. (2005: 60) notes, ‘there is a fine line between relieving officers of unwanted duties and taking away police officers’ work’. The lack of clarity, at a strategic level, regarding the roles and responsibilities of CIs compared to that of warranted officers implies the notion of ‘policing on the cheap’; that this new grade of police staff may be replacing fully trained warranted detectives. It is in this sense that one ex-officer CI drew attention to the comparable experience of CIs to that of Special Constables during their peak of use during the 1960s (cf Gaston and Alexander, 2001):

We are the same as Special Constables. I know you’ll not remember it but if you could go back to the sixties, Special Constables were hated! Absolutely hated! Because they were coming and doing a job that police officers were doing but
they weren’t getting paid and police officers were on low pay. I was a Special Constable for six months before I joined, that was my way in, so I experienced it first-hand. Bobbies hated specials and it’s the same thing now with civilian investigators.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

A number of CIs encountered at the MIT also felt that their civilian status limited the degree to which they could be viewed/accepted as full members of the police team. This can be evidenced in the following quotes:

I’ve been really disappointed by how people have viewed us as a whole and how they’ve spoken about us because I don’t see myself as a CI. I just see myself as part of the team. The mistake that they make is that they don’t see us enough as part of the team. And that is such a shame.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

Ever since I first started I’ve not been liked because I’m a civilian. It has got slightly better in recent years but as Colin mentioned, only recently when we went to (that other BCU), even as an ex-Bobby, you’re a civilian first. You really are and I’ve had it all my time because you are ‘only a civilian’.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

However, when questioned on whether they felt that a ‘them and us’ culture existed within the MIT, the general consensus amongst CIs and warranted officers was that this was not the case. As the following quotes demonstrate, pressure on the MIT in terms of workload and a collective awareness of the severity of the crimes being investigated was generally found to foster a pervading sense of collegiality amongst CIs and officers:

No. It’s definitely not a ‘them and us’ thing because we’re all under one roof and we’re all doing one job and everyone knows that when it really is busy it’s all hands to the pump and you can’t afford to have an ‘us and them’ culture.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

If you get it wrong here, a murderer can walk free. Everybody feels the weight of that including the civilian investigators.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

No. Not at all. We come up against a bit of resistance every now and again but it’s not a case of ‘them and us’... I think you quickly learn who to ask because there are some officers who, like I said to you, they fear civilian investigators because they might take over a policing role. But there are a lot of supportive
officers absolutely. A lot of people who are more than happy to work alongside you and don’t really treat you any differently.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

This finding is a marked departure from findings of comparable studies into alternative police staff groupings. For example, Atkinson’s (2013, forthcoming) study of civilian intelligence analysts (CIAs) found that CIAs experience ‘patriarchy, gender order and infantilisation’ from warranted personnel when undertaking their role leading to a ‘them and us’ cultural dynamic (Atkinson, forthcoming). The subordination experienced by the CIAs in Atkinson’s research was similar to that experienced by the PCSOs involved in Cosgrove’s (2011) study in which they too suffered hostility to their role from reactive officers - although unlike the CIAs, this was considered ‘part of a wider rejection of and lack of value associated with community oriented policing within the police culture’ (Cosgrove, 2011: 295). Current findings therefore suggest that CIs may be experiencing a distinct employment experience when compared to other members of police staff - including those operating in other frontline roles (e.g. PCSOs). This may in part be due to the specialist nature of the roles being undertaken by CIs in some forces but may also result more generally from their location within the relatively closed world of the CID.

5.5 Civilian Investigators and ‘Cop Culture’

We have a saying here, ‘Why shouldn’t the Chief Super look out of the window in the morning? Because he’ll have nothing to do in the afternoon!’

(Newbank, GRU, DC)

‘Cop culture’ as it has been referred to (Reiner, 2010: 118), has been acknowledged as playing an important role in impeding efforts of civilian police staff integration within the police organisation (Loveday, 2007). Cop culture refers broadly to that complex of values, beliefs, attitudes, expectations and norms shared between police officers - in particular the uniform branch rank-and-file - and which can influence their approach to policing and their professional practices (Fielding, 1994; Loftus, 2009; Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 1999). This cop culture ‘is formed in the crucible of a police officer’s early and shared experiences of uniformed, street-policing’ (Atkinson, forthcoming) and is shaped by both the external occupational milieu and the internal
organisational environment. In the same way as more general police occupational culture (Fielding, 1988; Innes, 2003), acquisition of detective culture happens through active processing of informal and formal socialisation. As has been discussed in more detail in earlier sections of this thesis (see section 2.4.4), CID subculture is assumed to exhibit largely the same features as the general cop culture (e.g. mission and action-orientation, isolation, conservatism, machismo, strong internal solidarity, pessimism, cynicism, suspicion of outsiders, and the institutionalised triad of racism, sexism and heterosexism (e.g. Foster, 2003; Holdaway, 1983; Reiner, 2010; Young, 1991)), though research (e.g. Hobbs, 1988; Sanders, 1977) suggests that some aspects may be heightened among detectives (Innes, 2003).

This section explores the ways in which CIs have attempted to align themselves with the traditional characteristics of the police culture in order to promote integration and foster a greater sense of value from their role. In the current study CIs at both Newbank and Shorewick were found to endorse a number of the above stated ‘unyielding core’ characteristics (Holdaway, 2013: 218) to varying degrees. However, observational and interview data demonstrated particular adherence to three main characteristics amongst CIs, these being: suspicion (Rubinstein, 1973; Skolnick, 1966; Skolnick and Fyfe; 1994), solidarity (Manning, 1995; Paoline, 2003), and a sense of mission and love of action (Chatterton, 1983; Holdaway, 1977; Reiner, 2010; Westley, 1970). Generally speaking, the degree to which CIs were found to endorse each of these police cultural characteristics was found to depend largely upon a number of key factors: the unit in which CIs were located, the nature of their remit and the working background of the individual. In those units where the CI role was found to be largely indivisible from their warranted colleagues and where their role required them to engage with members of the public, CIs were found to exhibit the above stated qualities most obviously. Furthermore, non-ex-officer CIs, having never served their time on the street, were limited in the extent to which they could participate in cop culture. The characteristics typically associated with traditional cop culture were thus found to be much less embedded within the orientations and practices of this particular group.

Ex-officer CIs at both sites appeared to demonstrate a number of the characteristics typically associated with the police occupational culture most apparently. While it is
important to remember here the issue of individual agency with regard to the degree to which individual officers subscribe to the police culture (Fielding, 1988; Loftus, 2008), it is likely that many of the associated characteristics are indeed carried over by ex-officer CIs to their new role and as such, are likely to form a key part of the occupational culture and ‘working personality’ of CIs (Skolnick, 1994). Evidence to support this was identified in the current study:

Yeah, you do hear a lot about this issue of police culture. For me, it’s just part and parcel of working in this environment. It does make you suspicious of people. It’s definitely something you learn quickly as a cop and it does become a part of your personality so it’s hard to shake off.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

One ex-officer CI at Shorewick MIT described police officers as being ‘a different animal’ due to what he perceived to be their possession of a different outlook and a heightened sense of awareness of the potential for physical harm. When pressed further on what exactly he meant by this, the CI in question explained:

They’re (warranted officers) a different animal … They’re different to people out there or anyone I know. Obviously I know a lot of cops and it’s the way they think and I think it comes down to, most of the time they see the bad side of things and so they’re always very, very careful and always very suspicious. You can tell most cops in a pub. A cop will stand at the bar with his back to the bar facing the door. He sees everybody that comes in. A good cop should anyway. You’ve got to be aware of everything that’s happening around you. I think it’s the self-preservation thing, when you’re out on the streets you’ve got to be aware of everything around you for protection.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

The wealth of police cultural studies draw attention to the functional benefits of suspicion (Rubenstein, 1973; Skolnick, 1966; Skolnick and Fyfe, 1994) and solidarity (Manning 1995; Paoline, 2004) as means of coping with the demands of police work. The ad hoc evolution of the CI role in many units means that CIs often shared their occupational remit with warranted officers and were required to engage in tasks which required them to become attentive to suspicious activity and the threat of violence within the situations they faced. For some CIs, like police officers, suspicion (Rubenstein, 1973; Skolnick, 1966) appeared to be an integral component of their role. CIs observed working in roles which required them to regularly venture outside of the police station to undertake inquiries generally displayed the most obvious suspicious tendencies. Of all the units
visited, CIs working within Newbank GRU, Shorewick DAU and Newbank PPU appeared to exhibit suspicion most obviously, as the following quotes demonstrate:

You learn quickly not to take everyone and everything on face value. Things aren’t always as they seem and people do lie. It can make you a very suspicious and cynical person, but I realise that’s probably a lot to do with the fact we only ever really see the bad things people do and we spend a lot of our day getting lied to.

(Newbank, GRU, non-ex-officer CI)

One of the first jobs I had, I remember going to this house to talk to this victim who was laid on this bed looking all dishevelled and we were talking about her boyfriend who had assaulted her a few days before. Well, they had been fighting with each other really, they were known for it. And anyway, she’s saying ‘Oh I’ve not seen him since it happened. I’ve got no idea where he is’. And then I see two feet sticking out from under the bottom of the bed (laughs). So you always have to be thinking whether or not someone is actually telling you the truth because there are limits to how much we can help if they won’t help themselves.

(Shorewick, PPU, DAT, non-ex-officer CI)

It’s hard to know when someone is telling you the truth and it’s sometimes really hard to believe them even when you’re pretty sure they are. Sometimes it’s obvious but, like with her (a young female detainee the CI was observed interviewing); I’m 99.9 per cent sure she’s being honest there.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

As is the case with warranted officers, suspicion of the public can be considered a pragmatic strategy or coping mechanism (Innes, 2003) which CIs may also variously adopt to help them deal with the uncertainty, and often, the unpleasant aspects of their role and emotions associated with this. Innes (2003) describes how such distancing strategies (cognitive and behaviour techniques such as language and cynical humour, comparing police work to a ‘game’) help detectives to deal with the stress, pressure and emotions linked with the job. For many DCs, their ability to deal with crises and the ‘ontological insecurities’ (Innes, 2003: 263) they evoke form a key part of their professional role and identity. This is also likely to be the case with CIs. Cynical humour was also evidenced as being a popular distancing strategy amongst CIs:

I have to say that working with the Bobbies is the most fun I’ve ever had. There is a certain sense of humour that only people who work in this field will understand and it’s sick. But that is because of what you deal with, the things that you see and the things that you hear every day. You have to deal with it by laughing.

(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI)
We all have a laugh here. I think you have to sometimes because, as I’m sure you can imagine, it can get a bit depressing dealing with murder nearly every day. It sounds strange but you need to make sure you keep a sense of humour about it too otherwise things can get to you.

*(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)*

Humour was also found to foster a sense of solidarity amongst CIs and between CIs and DCs within a number of the units visited. All of the CIs encountered at both research sites said that they felt part of a team and that this team mentality played a pivotal role in ensuring job satisfaction and integration of CIs within the unit, as the following quote illustrates:

I have never felt like such a big part of a team. You might always feel a little bit below everybody else but it’s like a big family in some teams. You work late into the night; you sit at a desk for sixteen/seventeen hours a day sometimes. I’ve worked overnight, and you’re all sat there, you’re all absolutely shattered, but because you spend so much time with one another, you know each other, and you get so involved in one another’s lives, that’s why there so many flipping affairs! But you get to a point where you do know each other really well because you’re sat next to somebody for a long time every day and there’s only so long you can go without saying, ‘You know, I had a right argument with my other half last night’. So I think that’s definitely worth mentioning. There is a bond between people.

*(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI)*

Feeling like an integral and valued member of a wider occupational grouping understandably had a direct impact on the degree to which CIs expressed feelings of solidarity and loyalty to their warranted and non-warranted colleagues (as well as to the organisation itself). As has been discussed previously in this chapter, CIs at both Newbank and Shorewick generally described feeling that their role and contribution was valued by their colleagues. While it is true that CIs operated under distinct terms and conditions to those contained within the contracts of their warranted colleagues which mean they could not be made to work overtime, the strong sense of team work and solidarity within each of the units visited between CIs and warranted officers meant that this distinction was rarely an issue:

They can tell officers, ‘You’re not finishing at four o’clock. We’re ordering you to stay on’. Well at four o’clock if I’m a civilian I can go home. But I never would. I wouldn’t dream of it. If my team are staying on because there’s a job, unless I really, really have to go, I wouldn’t leave.

*(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI)*
I always work through my dinner, all the time and I don’t get paid for it. But I’m not going to turn around and say, ‘Hang on, I need my thirty-six minutes now’. You don’t, you just, no, you don’t. You’re part of the team and you’re needed so you do it … We do work a lot of overtime yeah. I mean, last year I think I earned nearly £5,000 in overtime, so it was a lot. It depends on the murder that comes in really. You can work over time for a week and then it’ll all settle down again. It might be a month where you’re just working ridiculous hours and also depending on the role you’re given. If you’re suspect interviewing, you can be interviewing until midnight for three days. Exhibits officer you tend to work a lot of overtime because you’re shuttling things from forensics, back down and chasing up results. So yeah, you do. But you don’t have to work it. I think you’d be frowned upon if you didn’t to be honest. They can’t make you do it but I don’t think you’d be looked upon that favourably because it’s important. At the beginning of an investigation it’s important that you get as much done as quickly as possible.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

No, that’s not the case. You’re part of a team and if I’m needed I’ll always stay. Like tonight I’m staying on because I’m needed.

(Newbank, GRU, non-ex-officer CI)

However, as evidence presented earlier in this chapter suggests, the sense of solidarity and team ethic is perhaps likely to be weaker amongst some ex-officer CIs who may feel less obliged to work beyond their contracted hours. However, when asked, none of the ex-officer CIs encountered at either research site explicitly stated that they would not be willing to ‘stay on’ if the team/unit required this of them. The extent to which police managers appeared to rely on the good will of CIs in this respect, while not explored in depth in the research, was noted as a potentially important factor affecting the continued resilience of CID teams in the light of recent cuts to the police budget.

In addition to danger and the prospect of hostility from an ever demanding public, CIs shared experiences with warranted officers enabled them to have an appreciation of the inherent challenges in police work (namely complex case preparation and time constraints) and the prosecution of offenders that is not held by individuals outside of the organisation. The traditional crime fighting ethos present within the police performance culture of the organisation was found to exert a powerful influence upon CI occupational identities and orientations to the role. Indeed, a number of CIs in the current study displayed a ‘sense of mission’ and an action-oriented outlook towards their work, although pressure to adopt this perspective was identified most clearly amongst some
non-ex-officer CIs who appeared keen to feed into crime control activities and prove themselves to their warranted colleagues. While their civilian designation and nature of their remit ultimately placed limits on the degree to which CIs could entertain a commitment to crime control, CIs did appear to ascribe great pride to their role and a number of participants also described feeling that a key tenet of their role was to help people and make them feel safe.

However, in some instances CIs also appeared keen to distance themselves from some of the traditional cultural traits associated with officers and in doing so, differentiate their individual paraprofessional identity from that of their warranted colleagues. This was particularly noticeable with regard to the display of patriarchal attitudes by officers as can be evidenced in the following quote:

"We’d been asked to assist another force because they were swamped and a detective there criticised us and said, ‘We don’t want you going and asking for more actions’. ‘But wait a minute, we’ve got nothing to do!’?, and do you know what he said? ‘Well do what we do, have a drive around the centre and look at the local talent’. And that was a senior DC that. You can’t go around saying stuff like that nowadays. It’s unprofessional. I like to work, I’m a grafter, you know, and I think they were shocked when we rolled up, no complaining, just the civvies, you know, and we were getting five or six actions out a day. They’ll give a Bobby – and it happens in this force – one action per week!"

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

The drive of some CIs to consolidate their individual claim to value as independent investigators and thus, the overall worth of the CI role to the organisation, helped facilitate the rejection of such patriarchal attitudes on the basis of their ‘unprofessional’ nature. This particular finding also points to an emerging distinction between the cultural attributes of CIs with those of their warranted colleagues and also draws attention to the fact that in some instances, CIs orientations to their work may be strengthening their claim to professional proficiency in investigative practice.

5.6 Public Perceptions

Public perceptions of the police rest somewhat fundamentally on the level of confidence held by the public with regard to the ability of the police to ensure the provision of effective and legitimate policing within a given jurisdiction. While there exists a wealth of research on public perceptions of the police relating directly to the
issues of confidence and legitimacy (Bradford, Jackson and Stanko, 2009; Innes and Fielding, 2002), comparatively little exists on public attitudes and perceptions of the use and expanding role/remit of non-warranted staff by the police organisation, particularly in those areas of police work considered core functions. There does however exist a body of literature which has predominately looked to survey public perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the growing use of PCSOs since their introduction alongside CIs in 2002 (Cooper et al., 2006; Crawford et al., 2005; Hill, 2010; Johnston, 2005, 2006, 2007; Paskell, 2007). Generally speaking, and in a fashion that appears to mirror findings in the present study in relation to CIs, the results of such studies suggest a marked lack of clarity amongst the public with regard to the role to be undertaken by PCSOs and also, with regard to their individual powers.

In the current study CIs felt they were received well by those members of the public they encountered during the course of their daily duties. This included victims, witnesses and suspects. However, concern over public attitudes towards the ambiguous utilisation of CIs and in particular, towards their expanding remit and involvement in more serious investigations was cited as an issue of common concern in interview by a number of warranted officers at both Shorewick and Newbank. While often based on individual speculative assessments of public perceptions of CI use, generally speaking, most warranted officers were generally found to be in agreement that, if given the option, most members of the public would choose and, furthermore, expect a warranted officer to be investigating their case. This was generally found to be the case amongst detectives in all units as can be seen from the following quotes:

I don’t think the public really, if they were given a choice, would really want a civvie investigating their case. Definitely not the more serious stuff anyway. Would you?

(Newbank, GRU, DC)

I don’t think the public really want CIs taking their statement. They want a cop.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

I can see how members of the public might have a problem with CIs. You know, you get this ‘policing on the cheap’ thing thrown around in the media and that’s
what people see and there’s always a chance they could think that’s what this is. And that’s got to reflect badly on the organisation

(Newbank, PPU, DC)

I think they’d expect a DC to come. I think that’s what they’d expect but again I think if someone went to visit who wasn’t a cop, it would depend on the individual as well but I think yeah, there would be expectations that it would be an officer ... I think it could be perceived by the public as policing on the cheap. I think it’s a difficult one.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

However, as the final quote above indicates, for some warranted officers at least, CI competence was often judged on a case by case basis by their warranted colleagues and arguably was factored largely upon the personality, experience and working background of an individual. Ex-officer CIs were viewed by some warranted officers as being less of a threat to levels of public confidence in the ability and capability of the police to effectively investigate crime due to their previous experience and knowledge of policing. ‘Policing on the cheap’ was a phrase regularly cited by warranted officers as well as some CIs particularly when discussing their concern over how the expanding CI remit could be viewed by the public and the potentially negative impact this could have for public confidence in the police’s ability to effectively investigate crime. Concern over the viewing of CIs as a type of policing on the cheap by the public also appeared to be intimately tied up with the issue of power designation which, it was regularly cited by warranted officers and also some CIs, had the potential to negatively impact on the overall legitimacy of the police and particularly, CID officers:

I think it’s fine so long as they’re not dressed up to be something they’re not. They were supposed to be assisting but then they’re talking about giving them certain powers and I think they (police organisation) need to think how that might look to the public.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

I don’t know if you’d be minimising the role of the police officer. I don’t know ... I think it could be perceived by the public as policing on the cheap. I think it’s a difficult one.

(Shorewick, GRU, DC)

The CIs we have working here have been designated and that works fine and there’s never been any instances that I know of where a member of the public has said something to them because they’re not a cop. But I can see how in some units, giving them powers might come across as a bit like that. I mean, I can see
how that might look to the public, like we, as an organisation, are trying to palm them off maybe? I don’t know.

(Newbank, GRU, DC)

Concern over the potential for CI use to be perceived by the public as ‘policing on the cheap’ was also raised by police managers at both Shorewick and Newbank. Generally speaking, police managers were found to share comparable reservations to lower ranking officers with regard to the expanding role/remit of CIs, particularly in those units that dealt with more serious and complex crime investigations. This can be evidenced in the following quotes:

It’s about perceptions isn’t it? If they sat down and found out the person they were speaking to had never been a police officer, has got no police investigation experience, yeah there could be some negative perceptions from the public, potentially.

(Newbank, DCI)

I think there could be a concern about the way CIs are being perceived by the public. The ones I have here are fantastic and I’ve never had any issues but I can see how it might perhaps be more of a concern for colleagues working in the MIT for example, where the public might be more likely to expect a warranted officer to show up.

(Newbank, GRU, DS)

I’ve never come across it personally. I can see how some people might think that and we of course have to always think about how we as an organisation appear to the public. I think it also depends a lot on the unit that they’re working in and the way they’re being used. The intention behind CIs was that they were supposed to support and assist and that’s ultimately what they should be doing.

(Shorewick, GRU, T/DI)

However, in contrast to lower ranking officers, for police managers, concern over public perceptions of the utilisation of CIs appeared to be more focused towards their potential involvement in leading investigations. For the senior officers interviewed at both research sites, the leading of investigations was considered to be something which should only be undertaken by warranted officers. However, as the following quotes demonstrate, the restriction of the leading of investigations to warranted officers was again only discussed in relation to the most serious of crimes, particularly those which fell within the remit of the MIT:
It’s the public perception of who’s actually doing the job and who’s in charge. I think there’s a difference between skills-sets and perceptions. Skills-sets, any of my staff could take a job to court, any of them. But perception wise, if I wasn’t the SIO and there was someone else that wasn’t a police officer, would the public be happy with that? Would you be happy if, and these are the words that have been used, ‘We can’t even be arsed to turn out a police officer for a murder’, the most serious of crimes? That’s a quote from a talk given by the head of crime from another force. He says, ‘If we can’t do that then we’ve lost what we’re doing, we’ve lost our way’. And I’ve got to say, even though that quotes not mine, I think I agree with it. If the Chief Constable wasn’t the Chief Constable, let’s say he’d been superimposed by, I don’t know, the head of Next, I’m not saying that the head of Next hasn’t got the skills to be able to do the job I’m sure they have, but there is a perception that it needs to be police-led and there will be that culture issue. Unless there’s a sea-change to say that the head of the police is no longer a Chief Constable, it’s a chief exec. That’s the only time that you would change it.

(Shorewick, MIT, SIO)

I think about this from a member of the public’s perception and you’ve already said this. Say, one of their really close family members gets murdered and they know, and I can think of some very national and recognised SIOs in this country that have investigated lots of murders and lots of child murders over the years and have got a very good reputation nationally, and you were told they were investigating the murder of your close family member. You’d be a lot happier than them saying, ‘We’ve just got this chap in who’s come from Boots and who’s just joined the police, he’s been here a few months and he’s going to investigate your mothers murder’. I’m not sure how that would sit in a … I’m not saying that person isn’t a great person but how would that sit? If I was a family member, I wouldn’t be happy if that was my mother. You can’t become an SIO overnight, you just can’t do it.

(Newbank, DCI)

Alongside an awareness of the reservations held by some officers and police managers with regard to the expanding role/remit of CIs and its impact on public perceptions, it quickly became apparent to the researcher that such concern was central to the decision of the organisation to formally restrict the involvement of CIs to certain areas of work and within that, certain tasks. Rape was the only crime identified as being solely police operational at both Shorewick and Newbank, although at Newbank CIs from the PPU were able to assist the specialist rape team with their investigations although none of the CIs encountered had ever been asked to do so. When questioned directly on why this was the case, an awareness of high levels of concern amongst the public specific to rape and serious sexual assault was cited by participants as being a key factor impeding the
expansion of the CI remit into this particular area of investigation. As the following quotes show:

I wouldn’t put it past them to try and put it (rape investigation) on me but I doubt that they would to be honest with you. I think there’s some concern over the public reaction to CIs being involved in rape investigations if they found out so at the minute it’s just specialist cops. Like I said I’ve dealt with minor sexual offences, minor sexual assaults but not anything like the more serious stuff, no.

(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI)

Well I’ve dealt with exposures and minor sexual assaults, but I’ve not actually taken statements for rape. I think that’s very much still something that the cops deal with here.

(Shorewick, CIT, non-ex-officer CI)

For rape, I think they’d (the public) expect a DC to come. I think that’s what they’d expect but again I think if someone went to visit who wasn’t a cop, it would depend on the individual as well. But I think yeah, there would be expectations that it would be an officer.

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

Yeah, I get why they haven’t decided to use CIs there because there’s a lot of publicity and public concern over rape.

(Newbank, DCI)

However, despite a general appreciation of the apparent tendency of the police organisation to restrict the investigation of rape and serious sexual assault allegations to warranted officers on the basis of potential negative public reaction, it appeared that even this was ultimately subject to the discretion of police managers. As the following quote illustrates:

The problem with a serious investigation such as rape, and there’s a lot of public protection around … you’ve got to imagine the training again, you can’t just put a CI into it, without the training and the work based experience. I know this sounds bad again but, unless they’re an ex-cop who’s come out of that world and has come back as a CI, who has had all of that training and experience, then yeah you could probably hit the ground running again, potentially, if they’re good enough.

(Newbank, DCI)

Despite the obvious reservations seemingly held by most of their warranted colleagues, when questioned directly by the researcher during interview, none of the CIs encountered at either Shorewick or Newbank CIDs described having personally experienced any
hostility and/or negative reactions to their presence/use by members of the public. When pressed further on the issue of public perceptions towards their use and in particular, their expanding remit, some CIs noted how public demand for the police to deliver a rapid response and professional service following calls for assistance, was generally thought to supersede any concern over the designation of the individual sent by the police organisation to investigate their case. This appeared more the opinion of CIs identified working in the units that dealt with lower level crime as can be evidenced in the following quotes:

I don’t know. Some people are always going to say ‘No, send a police officer’. But in this day and age, most people are just glad that somebody has actually turned up and they can tell them what’s happened and as long as you’re from the police they don’t care.

(Shorewick, CIT, ex-officer)

Nope. Because I think, at the end of the day, if you treat them decently and like a victim, with respect, I really think that’s all they’re bothered about. I don’t personally think it matters whether you’re in uniform … CID aren’t in uniform. I really don’t think it does matter, I think it’s more about how you are with them. If you give them confidence that you are going to investigate their crime to the upmost of your ability, I think they’re happier with that, personally.

(Shorewick, CIT, ex-officer CI)

The opinion of CIs with regard to their views on public perceptions of their role was found to depend largely on the unit in which they worked. For example, as in the above quotes, CIs working within units where they were found to be contributing to investigations into lower level crime types (namely both GRUs and CIT), were less likely to view public perceptions towards CI use as a notable area of concern with regard to the issues of public confidence and legitimacy. However, CIs working within units where they were observed contributing to the investigation of more serious crimes (namely MIT and PPUs) were found to be generally more concerned over the expanding remit of CIs and the potentially detrimental impact this could have on public perceptions and confidence in the police to deal with (and effectively manage) more serious and complex investigations (e.g. homicide investigations, rape investigations etc.), as the following quotes show:

I can see why they’re sort of more hesitant to let us be involved in rape investigations because it can be such a sensitive and high profile area and you’ve got to have the experience and knowledge around public protection which we don’t have.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)
I think they maybe need to think more about how that (the interviewing of murder suspects by CIs) could look to the families and to the public.

*(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)*

In a similar way to their warranted counterparts, opinion amongst CIs with regard to public perceptions of their role/remit was also found to vary between CI participants and in particular, appeared to be divided between ex-officer CIs and non-ex-officer CIs. Generally speaking, ex-officer CIs appearing more concerned with the expanding remit of CIs on public perceptions of the police and the CID than non-ex-officer CIs:

Yes. Not so much some crimes, but again, I would say it’s down to personality. Certainly, we’ve gone back to police officers now, but the Burglary Scene Attenders for a long time were support staff. I think some people would say, ‘I’m not talking to you. Send really Bobbies’. I personally, if I reported a burglary and they sent a PCSO round which can happen, I would be saying, ‘Err no!’ I wouldn’t want that.

*(Shorewick, CIT, ex-officer CI)*

For some ex-officer CIs, the limited degree of authority afforded to the role coupled with a frequent lack of experiential knowledge gained from policing the streets amongst non-ex-officer CIs, led to concern over the ability of some CIs (non-ex-officers) to assert authority in their encounters with the public. In the following quote one ex-officer CI draws upon Reiser’s (1974) ‘John Wayne Syndrome’ mentality, when discussing the importance of experiential knowledge in ensuring the overall legitimacy of the police:

Most investigators are ex-police and have been out there and they know about meeting an angry man or angry woman, and it’s how you deal with that situation. Whereas the investigators who are coming into the service who are not ex-police have never come across an angry person, who has threatened them, who they’ve had to fight with, who they’ve had to overcome. And it’s just the way you treat people. You’ll find most police officers, although they’re fair, are also firm and will not budge. They know exactly what’s got to be done and most importantly, how it can be done. If someone’s threatening, it’s very rare nowadays, or should I say very rare then, you’d see a cop back down. Your investigators (CIs) that come in who are ex-DHSS or other external agencies coming into the police, never had that, they back down. And I know we talk about, you’ve probably heard of it, John Wayne Syndrome, right, cops tend to have John Wayne syndrome - ‘I’m not gonna back down no matter what’. Of course there are times when you should back down but, you find your civilian investigators that have not been in the police service, will back down instantly. Ex-officers don’t. And, those out there, the criminals, see that as a sign of weakness and I don’t think we can afford to let them see that. As soon as they realise who they’re talking to and
what they’re talking to, their attitude changes and I’ve seen it and I’ve experienced it while I’ve been on the MIT. I’ve been out with an investigator, non-police, and myself. This particular lad flared up became very aggressive. This other investigator wanted to back off straight away and get out of the house. As an ex-cop you’ve come across it before, you talk to them, show them you’re not going to back down and they calm down. When we’d finished, this lad would speak to me but he wouldn’t even acknowledge the other one. I don’t know whether it’s just a respect thing or what.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

In his much celebrated work, ‘The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life’, Goffman (1959, 1990) draws attention to the way in which the individual in ordinary work situations presents himself and his activity to others (1990: 9): ‘Within the walls of a social establishment we find a team of performers who co-operate to present to an audience a given definition of the situation’ (1990: 231). For Goffman, individuals engage in performance of self in their interactions with others. Information about an individual’s character is both presented and absorbed through these performances (1990: 13) with the result being a desired projection of identity (1990: 15-16). It is in this sense that the non-ex-officer CI in the above quote can be considered to be spoiling the performance of the ex-officer CI and in doing so, is drawing attention to the limited authority of CIs. The above quote also thus hints at a potential distinction between the working personalities and cultural characteristics of ex-officer CIs compared to their non-ex-officer colleagues.

The ‘buying-in’ of CIs from private security agencies was found to be a common area of concern amongst warranted officers and CIs (employed by the police authority) at both research sites with regard to public perceptions of the CI role. There appeared to be particular concern over how these individuals can and should be held to account and subsequently, how the utilisation of these particular individuals might impact on the overall legitimacy of the police:

All of the CIs that have come in from private companies to help out when we’ve been busy have all been ex-cops. So they have the experience and they can sort of hit the ground running which is what you want. But that doesn’t change the fact that it’s still a private company isn’t it that’s getting involved and after the Olympics there’s been a lot of negative press around it so I think they (police
organisation) have sort of seen that and there’s definitely been a rowing away from that a bit now.

*(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)*

I think the big concern over using agency staff in this role is to do with control and how it looks to the public.

*(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)*

However, the researcher found that where CIs were/had been bought in for fixed periods from private agencies, they were generally being used for lesser roles. However, as the following statement from a police manager at Newbank shows, the level of responsibility and type of role afforded to an agency CI may also depend on the working background and experience held by that individual:

I wouldn’t use them for exhibits and disclosure because they’re long term jobs. They would get used for CCTV, witness statements … again it depends on the individual and that’s why G4S would send us, really the CVs of the people, and often we know them because they’re local ex-cops, so we’d generally look at them and say, ‘Oh yeah, that person is really good, that person is really good, we know them’. So, again you can pick and choose what you use them for. I mean I had a cold case running that needed to be progressed but I didn’t have the staff to do it and I had about six investigators that came and worked on that and they all left the country for me doing investigations.

*(Newbank, DCI)*

I don’t have a problem with them. They came in, they worked hard, but some of them because they were capable, they were getting really key things to do. Real proper key areas of work. And again, some of the other DCs got their noses pushed out, they were funny about it.

*(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)*

In addition to the reservations held by some CIs with regard to public perceptions of their expanding role/remit, a number of CIs were also keen to draw the researcher’s attention towards what they perceived to be inherent benefits associated with the unwarranted status. Broadly speaking, the main contention of these CIs was that their non-warranted status ensured them a degree of organisational non-partisanship and occupational legitimacy in the eyes of some members of the public which was not enjoyed by warranted officers. The following quotes are illustrative of this view:
You judge the situation and sometimes I find that it’s actually beneficial to me to tell people I’m not actually a cop. They can respond to you better. You know, some people have had bad experiences in the past and some just hate the police, there’s nothing you can do about that. So me going in and saying, you know, ‘I’m not a police officer, I’m just here to take your statement and make sure you’re alright’, or, ‘I’m not a police officer but I just need to ask you a couple of questions about this incident yesterday’, they can be, not always, but sometimes, it can help.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

When we go to jobs I make a point of saying I’m not a police officer, because I think that might put people at ease sometimes because people have preconceived ideas don’t they about police officers sometimes, so yeah I think it’s beneficial sometimes.

(Shorewick, PPU, DAT, non-ex-officer CI)

I’ve only ever turned up twice when the perpetrators been there and to be honest I’ve never had any problem. I think more than a couple of times it’s been the victims that have been more scary. Some victims have been quite aggressive but they soon come down because they realise … the big point to put across to victims, you know if they’ve had a bad time with the police, if the police have come and, not because of anything the police might have done but maybe how they have reacted to it, they maybe had had a drink and have become quite aggressive, they associate us with the police because we obviously work for the police but I always make a point of saying that ‘Yeah, I do work for the police but I’m not a police officer and I’m all about supporting you. I’m not dealing with the crime side of things. It’s just about what we can put in place for you and if you want that, then I can help you. If you don’t, then that’s fine’. We can’t force them to have that support.

(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, non-ex-officer CI)

Having sat both sides of the fence, I would say, you got better treatment from the public. They could be a bit aggressive with you when you were a police officer but when they find out, actually I’m just a statement taker, I’m just support staff … for some reason you tend to build up a better rapport with your victims and your witnesses because you’re not actually a police officer. So I’ve found that they would give you more information sometimes purely because they didn’t think you were the cops. They will just chat to you as you.

(Shorewick, GRU, DC and ex-civilian)

Regardless of the apparent operational benefits of being civilian members of staff, in failing to resist the pull of mission creep, in some forces at least, CIs have likely emerged
as a new type of ‘policing on the cheap’. In this sense, CIs have the potential to impact somewhat detrimentally upon public confidence in the competency of the police to deliver effective and efficient investigative provision.

5.7 Summary

This section has afforded an account of the daily life of CIs at both Shorewick and Newbank and has presented some key findings from the current study. This section has argued that while CIs play a valuable role within CID units in which they were working, their contribution is currently being overlooked by the police organisation. Poor communication about the role has resulted in a lack of consistency in CI use between forces as well as between CID units. The result has seen the rapid evolution of the role/remit of CIs far beyond that which can be considered support. While on the one hand the evolving role of CIs might be seen as an innovative and effective use of CIs as a resource, particularly given the fact that a significant proportion are also retired-police officers, on the other hand it clearly represents a significant degree of mission creep. For those keen to establish a career with the police organisation, progressive occupational drift and boundary blurring was welcomed as it presents an opportunity to achieve a sense of professional identity and, in doing so, demonstrates the value placed on autonomy and the sense of identity that comes with specialisation and exclusivity in work. For others however, this drift was less welcomed, serving primarily to highlight the existence of deficiencies in skill, knowledge and motivation and, at a more fundamental level, presented a significant challenge to the long established character and prestige of the detective role and title.

The motivations driving the decision of CIs to apply for the role were found to be wide ranging and differed somewhat between CI groupings (ex-officer, non-ex-officer and agency CIs), showing some correlation with working background and age of participants. Generally speaking, CIs motivations for applying for the role included: financial need/desire, familiarity with the work, interest in career progression, a longstanding interest in the field underpinned by altruistic sentiments and an enduring love of the job/or organisation. Overall levels of commitment were generally found to be high amongst all CIs encountered although, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, a pervasive
sense of insecurity amongst CIs resulting from awareness of imminent budget cuts was found to cause low morale and, in turn, likely affected their motivation and/or loyalty to the organisation. CIs were generally found to feel valued as part of the team in which they worked but somewhat fundamentally, not by the organisation itself.

Despite testimonies of improved relations and a developing sense of collegiality amongst CIs and their warranted counterparts since their initial introduction, CIs were found to enjoy only a marginal level of integration and continued to suffer resistance to their role as a result of their secondary civilian employment status. As a result, the degree to which CIs were found to have become integrated within the CID units was fundamentally restricted and was found to differ somewhat markedly both between and within Shorewick and Newbank CIDs. A legacy of poor implementation and lack of clarity about the role had served to fuel anxieties amongst warranted officers at both sites. Such anxieties were found to centre on three key issues, these being: the impact of CI utilisation on overtime availability within the CID, concern over public perceptions of the role appearing as ‘policing on the cheap’ and its potential impact on public confidence, and the degree to which CI use (particularly the direct entry of non-ex-officer CIs) serves to undermine/challenge traditional approaches and understandings of investigative work and the centrality of the detective. As a result, CIs were found to enjoy a secondary and in some respect outsider status, enjoying only marginal valuing and integration and limited authority. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, these conditions are currently being maintained by powerful actors in the field of policing and politics (like the Police Federation and the media) and the weakness or absence of any alternative (or convincing) narrative on how effective policing and, specifically, investigation, may be achieved.

The civilian designation of CIs means that they are fundamentally limited in the extent to which they are able to participate/align themselves with the detective culture. While found to depend largely on the unit in which CIs worked, the nature of their remit and working background of the individual, CIs in the current study were nonetheless found to display notable adherence with a number of dominant police cultural traits. This was particularly true of those CIs observed working at Newbank where CIs appeared most integrated within the teams/units in which they were located and often exhibited the traits of an ‘effective detective’ from a cultural perspective. This is also indicative of the potential
benefits of mixed team working with regard to the integration and acceptance of CIs (Allport, 1954). Furthermore, not discounting the issue of individual agency with regard to the degree to which officers both subscribe to and endorse the police culture, ex-officer CIs undoubtedly carry over to their new role many of the characteristics typically associated with police occupational culture. In a marked departure from the findings of previous work on the uptake of police cultural traits by non-warranted individuals (Atkinson, forthcoming; Cosgrove, 2011), little evidence was found to suggest the existence of a ‘them and us’ culture between CIs and their warranted colleagues. Generally speaking, a pervading sense of collegiality was found to exist within the units visiting during fieldwork and was founded on a collective sense of mission and awareness of unique pressures relating to the degree and nature of the CID workload.

While none of the CIs at either Shorewik or Newbank described encountering any resistance to members of the public with regard to their civilian status, a number of participants did raise their concerns over the potential for CI use to appear as ‘policing on the cheap’. For the most part, such concern was intimately linked to the issue of power designation and, to a lesser extent, to private security involvement and its potential impact on public confidence in the police. However, for some warranted officers the utilisation of CIs - particularly those with little to no previous experience of the peculiar demands of police work - in some areas of work was resented for its potential to ‘spoil the performance’ of the detective role and the CID more broadly. It is in this sense that the professional ethos and identity of the detective is being threatened at a fundamental level by non-warranted CI involvement in investigative work traditionally undertaken by the CID. This section concludes by arguing that despite clear evidence of progressively more receptive attitudes towards CIs and recognition of their value by warranted officers, further effective integration and acceptance of CIs requires not simply the reform of detective culture, but the transformation of the ‘field’ itself. It is on this basis that discussion now shifts to take account of the relationship between CIs and the police organisation itself.
Chapter Six: CIs and the Police Organisation

6.1 Introduction

Building upon the findings presented in Chapter Five, this section seeks to examine the relationship of CIs with the police organisation and thus, explores the range of related structural features currently impacting on the employment experience of CIs. As was discussed in Chapter Five, while CIs encountered in the current study generally professed to feeling valued by their warranted colleagues and line managers within the units in which they worked, most admitted to feeling unappreciated by the organisation itself. This was largely attributed to the perceived failure of the organisation to acknowledge at a formal level the role and contribution now being made by CIs. As findings presented in this chapter will demonstrate, these conditions are currently being reinforced by the police organisation through marked distinctions in pay, training and opportunities for progression which, in many instances, do not sufficiently reflect the nature of the role being performed by CIs.

The first part of this section explores the related issues of training and career progression for CIs and, in particular, explores how the civilian support status afforded to CIs has impacted upon the perceived authority and legitimacy of their claims to training and/or opportunities for progression. The second section deals with the issue of CI powers and examines how inconsistency in the designation of enforcement abilities to CIs by Chief Constables between forces may be serving to engender confusion and frustration amongst CIs and their police colleagues. The third part of the section considers the issue of CI remuneration and draws attention to the perceived inadequacy of current framework/structure of pay for CIs in light of their evolving role and remit. The final section of this chapter examines how the present conditions of financial restraint and the rigidities of the unique conditions which apply to police officers have placed the burden of job losses unduly on police staff. It therefore considers the implication of such working conditions on the overall employment experience of CIs and furthermore, considers evidence which suggests that, in some forces, a move towards reverse-civilianisation within the CID may now be taking place.
6.2 Training and Progression

Reflecting the research findings of Bayley and Bittner (1984), Fielding (1988) and Van Maanen (1973) in their studies involving police officers and Cosgrove (2011) and Cooper et al. (2006) in relation to PCSOs, generally speaking, CIs did not perceive the induction training they received as instructive to practice. Instead it was conceived more as a means of introducing them to the organisation and providing basic guidance on the technical and/or administrative aspects of their role, for example, information systems (e.g. HOLMES, CATS, PNC etc.), health and safety, the use of police radios (where applicable), first aid, police driver training etc. However, evidence of role specific training was also identified in a number of units although this was limited and often not task based or related to the practical realities of the role. With the exception of those FIs working at Shorewick and Newbank FFITs\(^{196}\), CIs at both sites unequivocally agreed that the level of training and guidance they had received for their role was lacking. When asked to describe what formal training they had received for the role, the majority of CIs described a somewhat sporadic delivery with little obvious consistency between Shorewick and Newbank and between the units in terms of their approach to the training of CIs. Some CIs described receiving no formal training for their role. This tended to be most common amongst ex-officer CIs who, due to their working background were presumed already to possess the necessary working knowledge and skills relevant to the role. The following experiences can be considered typical of most ex-officer CIs encountered:

Training? What training? We haven’t had any. I retired on the Friday and came back on the Monday, sat at the same desk doing the same job.

(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, ex-officer CI)

As a crime investigator training has been appalling. It’s been absolutely appalling … I know some people have been on a few training courses but they’re only basic ones. I think some have been on an exhibits one and some have been on a disclosure, some have been on telecoms. So there are some out there but nothing much.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

\(^{196}\) The NCA has responsibility for training, accrediting and monitoring FIs who work in the police service, HMRC, DWP and local authorities e.g. Trading Standards. As such, non-warranted FIs receive the same level of role specific training as warranted officer FIs. Training is delivered through the Proceeds of Crime Centre (PoCC) which is responsible for accrediting and monitoring the performance of all FIs in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.)
As discussed in more detail in Chapter One, at both sites there appeared to be a tendency in police organisations to favour the recruitment of ex-officers on the basis that these individuals already possess the required training and skills necessary to be able to undertake the role. On this logic, ex-officer CIs thus arguably negate the need for expensive and lengthy training packages saving the organisation time and money. Evidence suggests that in the initial years of CI recruitment following their formal introduction in 2002, there likely existed a lack of consideration of the limits of officer redeployability and the existence of disparities in skill-sets and knowledge base of officers resulting from variations in their previous roles and rank within the organisation. The result of this was the early presumption amongst some managers that ex-officer equals ‘good investigator’. However, as can be evidenced in the following quotes, this was not always the case:

I started on the Monday morning. I was given some photocopies by the sergeant of burglaries, statements. I went for lunch and came back and was given some car keys and told to go take a statement for a burglary at [a Shorewick BCU]. I said ‘I haven’t taken a statement for 17 years!’ They just said, ‘you’ll be alright’.

(Shorewick, CIT, ex-officer CI)

The mistake was that they perhaps took too many ex-cops on because some of them, even some of the ex-cops who they brought back, didn’t have the investigative skills themselves. Just because you’re an ex-cop doesn’t mean you’re going to be good at this job (CI). We’ve got an Inspector, a guy who retired as an Inspector who spent most of his last 15, 20 years working in a communications centre. Now he had an important job when he finished in there but he didn’t take statements, didn’t deal with members of the public face to face, he hadn’t done any of that for years, so you know, he hadn’t got any real relevant skills.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

The tendency of police managers to assume the skills and capabilities of ex-officer CIs as a result of their ex-officer status alone appeared to have been a common problem historically with regard to the recruitment of CIs and in particular, with regard to their level of motivation and ability to perform. In the following quote, one ex-officer CI at Shorewick draws attention to what he regards to be the ‘mistake’ of the large scale, indiscriminate recruitment of ex-officers during the initial years of CI recruitment:

The mistake that Shorewick made was, they decided to go down the line of, we’re going to recruit about 15 in one go, crime investigators that is. Now we don’t want to be training people who don’t know what they’re doing, so we’ll
look at ex-cops. So they chucked the net out and then if you’d have gone down the list, if I’d have gone down the list I’d have probably gone, ‘no’, ‘no’, ‘maybe’. You’d got people who’d not done a ‘hands on’ role in a CID office, some of them never, and others, for 10, 15 years! When you’re recruiting Inspectors and Sergeants, the bottom line is, if they’ve been an Inspector or a Sergeant for 5, 10 or even 20 years, they don’t take statements because they’ve got somebody to do it for them, they don’t put files in because they’ve got someone who does that too. They supervise. So then these guys, and they were guys apart from one female Inspector, these guys come here and they’re fish out of water and then they’re scared. So when they’re being told ‘we want you to go and do this and you to go and do this’, thinking that oh, these are skilled guys, you know, they’re ex-detectives or Detective Sergeants or whatever, they’re scared to death. They don’t know what they’re doing. So they’re the people then who go ‘We’re not paid enough to do that. We’re not supposed to do that’. It’s because they haven’t got God damn clue what they’re doing!

*Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI*

Another participant made a similar remark with regard to the limits of redeployment, specifically raising the potential issues arising from the recruitment of ex-officers who, previous to their retirement, had spent a long period of time working at divisional CID level:

If you’ve got an ex-DC who’s been working in divisional CID for years and years and years, then coming here, they wouldn’t know … they probably could pick it up quite quickly, but they’re not necessarily aware of this department and what policies and procedures have changed since they were last trained. And it’s not fair to assume that of those DCs either.

*Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI*

However, in the current study no evidence was found to suggest that this presumption of competence with regard to the recruitment of ex-officer CIs persists. In fact, when questioned directly on the subject, police managers at both Shorewick and Newbank demonstrated not only their awareness of the issue but also their commitment to avoiding comparable future recruitment problems. At both sites police managers described how the recruitment of CIs had, since their initial introduction, progressed so that now only those found to possess demonstrable operational skills and an accompanying up-to-date awareness of relevant legislative developments are able to ‘make the cut’ as CIs. As illustrated by the following quote, recognition of this skills-gap was also found to inform
the recruitment of ex-officers from even the most senior of ranks indicating the
detachment of police managers from the realities of everyday police work:

In the last round of applications that I looked at for CIs coming in, one of them
was an ex-Assistant Chief Constable. I remember because, I thought, why on
earth you’d want to come back to work on their pension, I don’t know, but they
wanted to come and basically be an investigator (CI) and it was exactly that. I
looked and they’d got no recent relevant experience of taking statements,
watching CCTV, you know, and all the other stuff with it so, there was no
assumption there that that person would come and be a good investigator and
they didn’t get an interview because they didn’t even tick the essentials criteria
never mind the desirables.

(Newbank, DCI)

Early attitudes towards the recruitment of CIs coupled with the rapid nature with which
initial recruitment waves occurred meant that there was little time or recognised need for
the formulation of an appropriate training package for CIs. The result of this has been the
ad hoc and inconsistent training between forces and units which is observably dependent
upon the working backgrounds of individuals and units in which they work. It would also
appear clear that as patterns of recruitment have progressed to include those with no
previous experience working as a warranted officer, the need for the development of
consistent and role appropriate training is now arguably more pressing than has ever been
the case before. Indeed, evidence collected during the current study suggests that as an
organisation the police have only taken marginal steps to accommodate the specific
training needs of non-ex-officer CIs:

When I first came onto the MIT, day one it was like, ‘Right, here’s a pen. Off
you go’ and it was like, ‘What!? This is murder!’ you know? I expected a training
package in place but there wasn’t one.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

I did a MARAC training day which was really more of a knowledge day to
understand what MARAC is about and what the point of it is. Then I’ve had
some training on basic systems which everyone gets. There’s been no specific
training on how to deal with victims. Oh and I had a two-day thing a few months
after I started, a Domestic Abuse Awareness training course which was delivered
by the council where they showed you a PowerPoint, they talked about the
different dynamics of domestic abuse and there was a lot of other stuff like team
building exercise and what have you, then, it was a bit of a suck it and see really.

(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, non-ex-officer CI)
When I first started I was sent on an interviewing suspect course, but it was cancelled after two days and they just told me I passed it. But I’ve not had any how to take statements, PEACE model interviewing, the continuity of exhibits, I’ve not had anything like that. I’ve just learnt on the job mainly. Someone will show me; hope I get it right. Learning experiences of how it’s gone wrong and not to do it again. Just making sure you’re thinking and because we do it every day, you just hope you’re getting it right. There are areas that I’m weak at like I’m not a very good statement taker; I don’t think I ever will be. I’m not very good at continuity of exhibits just because I get a bit confused. Like when we had to go for this arson and take swabs. It was like wet swabs, dry swabs, control swabs, this, that, the other and I was like ‘Arrgh’. So I did get myself in a bit of a tizz but no, it was alright.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

As in the final quote above, a number of CIs encountered at both sites confessed to employing a ‘trial and error’ approach to their work and most CIs admitted to learning the realities of the role through experience ‘on the job’ and also through informal mentoring by warranted or more experienced CI colleagues. While participants at both sites somewhat enthusiastically described how efforts had been made in the past to implement a formal mentoring system for non-ex-officer CIs, growing budgetary pressure and limited resources has meant that this now no longer occurs in a formal capacity. When asked for their feelings on mentoring, all non-ex-officer CIs supported the idea and also admitted to having one or two warranted colleagues who they tend to ask for advice and/or who they would go to for information if needed. Like new recruits to the police, non-ex-officers learned the realities and necessary skills of policing via experience and in observing each other and the working practices of more experienced colleagues rather than through the formal training process. This was even more so the case with investigative work, much of which, according to proponents of the old regime perspective, cannot be taught and requires investigators develop their own ways of working and style of operating. Operating within such a partnership therefore would not only enable non-ex-officer CIs to learn the craft skills necessary for the role but would also mean that CIs would be less likely to make mistakes or jeopardise presentational strategies utilised by the organisation to reinforce legitimacy, control and, in relation to criminal investigation, promote the professionalism of the CID and specialism of detectives (Goffman, 1959; Manning, 1997).

Much of the argument against the use of non-ex-officer CIs relates to the issue of breadth of experience and redeployability. Non-ex-officer CIs have not spent time ‘on the streets’
and thus, are limited in their knowledge and skill relating to other areas of police work beyond that with which their unit deals. This issue was acknowledged by CIs, as the following quote shows:

The people that I work with have obviously done their basic policing, so they’ve obviously got a much broader experience of crime than me as my knowledge of crime is limited to murder, manslaughter, kidnapping. I don’t know about, well I do know about but only because I found out about things like robbery and assault. I’ve never been taught those crimes.

*(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)*

However, as mentioned previously in this chapter, this also appeared to be an issue for some ex-officer CIs who, despite having spent their time ‘on the streets’, also had to learn the relevant procedures, legislation and craft skills necessary for the role of CI, which were often specific to the unit in which they had to work.

Evidence was also found to suggest that while the police organisation may be willing to accept informal extensions in the CI role/remit, they were not equally as willing to acknowledge this at a formal level through the provision of relevant, role specific training. For example, at Shorewick MIT, CIs were found to be undertaking the role of FLO although only one ex-officer CI (who was also the FLO coordinator for the unit) was doing so in an official capacity. As the CI in question explained:

When I retired I was probably one of the most experienced, well I was the most experienced, they had a decision. They could have said ‘Right, Barry, you can’t do it anymore. Thanks ever so much but we’ll not use your experience, we’ll not use you to train anybody anymore’ but they didn’t. They made a decision that they would allow me to do it and that meant a change in policy. It’s just been, for me, what they’re saying now is, well what they did say was that to be a FLO now, you need to be accredited and you need to be a DC because it takes a special qualification. I had that qualification from what I’d done before, so they said, ‘because you were a DC before and you’ve been on detective training course before …’ they call it grandfather rights. So you take those rights with you. But again that’s just rubbish. There isn’t anybody who couldn’t be trained, it’s a simple course; it isn’t difficult. And they always say, ‘Oh, what if you have to arrest somebody?’ Well, I’ve never had to arrest anybody.

*(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)*
However, as the following quote from another ex-officer CI based at Shorewick MIT suggests, while convenient for the organisation, making use of existing skill-sets of ex-officer CIs arguably set a precedent for CI involvement in Family Liaison work:

He was a longstanding FLO as a Bobby and he retired on the Friday and came back on the Monday as a civilian, they moved the goal posts a bit didn’t they, and he was allowed to carry on as an FLO. But we weren’t allowed to do it before then. Once they let Barry do it they opened the flood gates so to speak. You can’t allow one person to do it but nobody else. If I said I wanted to be an FLO they’d have to train me up whereas with Barry they don’t. He’s already got it hasn’t he which, right or wrong. I don’t know.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)

Indeed, at Shorewick one non-ex-officer CI had also previously worked as a FLO for the MIT on a number of previous ‘jobs’. However, despite having already being assigned the role and having the full support of her SIO, the CI in question had been refused formal training for the role on the basis of her civilian status:

I wanted to become a FLO, a Family Liaison Officer, and it’s a role I’ve undertaken with another FLO as a second FLO with her a lot, and it’s a role I really enjoy doing. So I asked, ‘Can I be trained as a FLO?’ My SIO said straight away ‘Absolutely, I want you in that role’. But he was knocked back as he was told it has to be an accredited PIP detective who does that role. So, I don’t understand the reasoning behind it, if I’m honest. I know one of the arguments was well if ... cos quite often in a murder investigation somebody from within the family can be responsible or can be implicated and what one of the reasonings’ was, ‘Well if a civilians doing that role and information’s found out, they can’t arrest this person’. But really that’s very similar to if I go and interview someone or if I go and take a statement from someone. If they give me information that implicates them in that murder, I can’t arrest them, but I can make arrangements for them to be arrested. So I don’t really understand that argument. And it’s something that I will take further, definitely. I will speak to the ACPO lead on Family Liaison investigation because ... I was quite annoyed that I was sought of knocked back for that course, especially as I’ve already done the role, I’ve been put in a position to do the role ... I’ve not really had a proper explanation for it ... it’s very blurred at the moment I don’t really fully understand the reason. But I know it was an ACPO decision which is why I will contact the ACPO lead for Family Liaison and just see whether or not there can be any movement or not because that’s quite frustrating the fact that I do the role, or I’ve done the role in the past, and now I want the training for it but I can’t have the training. It doesn’t really make sense.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)
As suggested by the CI in the above quote, it is likely that on some occasions, ex-officer CIs were being provided with a more expansive occupational remit as a direct result of their working background - in this instance, the role of FLO. This same work was also seemingly being denied to non-ex-officer CIs on the basis of their perceived lack of training and/or experience. It also suggests a continued observance of, and desire to, uphold traditional understandings of detective work which are based on ambiguous notions of art and craft. These conditions were thus being maintained by powerful actors in the field of policing, in this case, ACPO (now The National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC)). This also hints at a developing difference in attitudes towards the use of non-warranted staff amongst some operational police managers working ‘on the ground’, compared to that held by those in the most senior positions of authority within the organisation. This can be evidenced clearly in the quote below:

On this particular job at the moment, my FLOs, they’re all police officers but normally I’d use civilian FLOs because they don’t need warranted powers for that role.

(Shorewick, MIT, SIO)

Despite the arguably frontline nature of their remit and potential for danger and/or confrontation often inherent in their role, few of the CIs encountered in the research (including those whose role required regular autonomous engagement with members of the public) had been provided with any form of self-defence training. Where training in self-defence had been provided to CIs it was often only a one-day course and levels of competency were not found to be being maintained with consistence at either Shorewick or Newbank with any real rigour. At the MIT for example, CIs were required to undertake self-defence training annually, although as one ex-officer CI described, ‘it usually starts at 9 o’clock and we’re done by lunchtime. They show you videos on how to talk to people who are aggressive towards you and that’s your training’ (Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI). Furthermore, a number of CIs also remarked upon the inappropriateness of some of the training they had received:

Yeah but it was only a one-day thing and it wasn’t appropriate training anyway it was for PCSOs. It wasn’t specific enough for us at all! It was highly inappropriate the course that they put us on, it wasn’t applicable to us at all so we shouldn’t have been there.

(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI)
Furthermore, where training in self-defence had been provided to CIs, this was often at the request of CIs following potentially dangerous and/or intimidating experiences. As the following quote from one CI shows:

I asked for self-defence a few years back. I was in a situation in a house ... it was a Friday afternoon, easy job in quite an affluent area, gorgeous big house with big iron gates. Start talking to her (victim), repeat ‘high’ so easy-peasy really, everything’s in place. And then she said to me, ‘Last time he was on bail, he actually hid in the loft for three days and then came down and raped me and beat me’. And I’m sat there think, ‘Holy beeeep!’ At that point I thought if he’s in here now, what the friggin hell would I do? How would I get out of here? I remember it was near Christmas and I was thinking, right dramatic, ‘Oh my god I’m going to die. I’m supposed to be taking my little one to see Father Christmas today!’ This is all going through my head because that’s just me being dramatic but I did go back to my Sergeant on the Monday morning and say, I would have been snookered. If that bloke would have been there and had of come down, electric gates were closed behind me, the door was locked because I’d told her to lock it because it’s part of the safety planning, you know. No police radio, no self-defence training, and that was a big affluent area of (Shorwick BCU) in a big posh house. You know, you expect to be pretty safe somewhere like that.

(Shorwick, PPU, DAU, non-ex-officer CI)

This also raises fundamental questions about the nature of the CI role, specifically, whether or not the organisation should be placing CIs in situations which warrant self-defence training and without also providing them with the accompanying defensive equipment (e.g. CS spray, batons etc.). It also suggests that CIs’ civilian status alongside a continued perception of the role as support may be hampering the perceived legitimacy of their claim to training and/or relevant and necessary equipment (e.g. police radios).

Furthermore, it became clear to the researcher that the provision of training to CIs was dependent somewhat fundamentally on the formulation/establishment of a formal career structure and opportunities for progression for CIs. This can be evidenced clearly in the following quote from one DCI based at Newbank:

The detectives go through the PIP process and there currently isn’t an equivalent of that for CIs. You can be signed off as a PIP but what’s the incentive to do that? They’re going to be doing the same role anyway if that makes sense whereas your police officer, there is an incentive for them to do that because they may not be here forever. They might want to get a promotion and move laterally or upwards. It’s in their interest to fasten that down.

(Newbank, DCI)
This suggests that until there is a formal career progression structure in place for CIs, there will not be an immediate need and/or incentive for investment in their training.

Furthermore, for some CIs, the lack of an established training package coupled with a legacy of (largely) indiscriminate ex-officer recruitment was also found to have had a marked impact on the degree to which CIs were able to achieve integration within the units in which they worked. For example:

My DS sometimes forgets, actually I have no police training, so he’ll ask me to do something and I’ll have to be like, ‘I don’t know how to’, and that’s tricky because then you’re highlighting what you’re wanting people to forget. Does that make sense? So that’s hard sometimes … It can be annoying when you have to sort of wave off half of your unit because they’re all going on a training course that, really you should be going on too because you do the same role, but because you’re a ‘civilian’ … You may as well have a flashing sign above your head.

*(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)*

For some CIs the differential in training and pay (CI pay will be discussed in more detail section 6.4 of this chapter) in particular left them feeling like second class citizens within the organisation. One CI described how she felt ‘let down’ by the organisation with regard to its failure to meet the training needs of CIs while continuing to use them in ways that went beyond support. Other CIs also described how, while often willing to accept ad hoc extensions to their work remit, sometimes they felt ‘abused’ by the organisation for similar reasons:

Yeah, sometimes I do feel a bit like that [abused]. I mean they don’t invest in us but they expect the same from us as they do the DC’s. And it does make your job more stressful because you kind of hope you’re doing it right … Sometimes they give you something like this arson with attempt to endanger life and I was like ‘Arrrgh’, you know, ‘What are you doing to me?’ And she (DS) was like, ‘It’s just criminal damage’. I said ‘yeah but what have I got to do forensically? I don’t know what I’ve got to do forensically. Have I got to send this off? Have I got do this? Have I got to do that?’ It’s the different things I have to do in relation to a serious job like that because I’m sure if CID dealt with it, they’d have probably dealt with it differently to the way I did it. I don’t know. So sometimes somethings I feel are a bit over my head.

*(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)*

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197 This is supported by work by Atkinson (2013, forthcoming) in relation to CIAs.
Training is my biggest gripe … My DS gives me jobs I’m unsure about and haven’t had the training for and when I complain she just says ‘You can deal with it’.

(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI)

Absence and/or lack of training also arguably affords weight to suggestions that CIs represent a type of ‘policing on the cheap’ which may in turn also have potentially negative effects on public confidence in the effectiveness and/or legitimacy of the policing capacity to investigate. Poor levels of training provision for CIs were also intimately linked to conflicting understandings of the nature of the CI role and, in particular, whether or not the role is one of support. As the following quote shows, the CI remit is being fundamentally restricted by their lack of training which is in turn, being maintained largely by traditional understandings of the CI role as being one of support:

I think I’m always mindful of putting them into dangerous, complex places. So for instance, we’ve just had a murder inside a prison. I would feel, rightly or wrongly, reluctant to send them into that environment, in terms of dealing with people, because we’ve got all of the things about, you know, your self-defence, your possession of all of your protective equipment and things, and again, it is something that we could do because PCSOs are trained in all of that, but the CIs aren’t. So for me in here, I couldn’t use them for certainly a bit part of that investigation.

(Shorewick, MIT, SIO)

As will be discussed later in this section, reluctance on the part of the organisation to afford CIs with adequate practical training for their role (including regular refresher courses) was also related, at a somewhat fundamental level, to the issue of financial constraint.

In a fashion comparable to other non-warranted police designations, for example PCSOs (cf O’Neill, 2014), despite in many ways existing as the ‘heir apparent’ to DCs (CIs worked in close teams alongside DCs, neither wore uniforms, often used the same radios, attended the same briefings, used the same cars and did much of the work of the traditional DCs), currently CIs faced limited opportunities for promotion and this had a significant impact on their employment experience. At the time fieldwork was undertaken opportunities for progression at both Shorewick and Newbank were limited to one of three options: remain as a CI indefinitely; apply to join the police as a police officer; leave to
pursue another career option. While opportunities for what was referred to by managers as ‘lateral progression’ were observed (although themselves limited), opportunities for CIs to progress vertically were almost non-existent.

That being said, a number of CIs encountered during the fieldwork were found to be undertaking supervisory style roles in both formal and informal capacities. For example, at Shorewick PPU DA unit, the line manager was non-warranted and performed a supervisory role equivalent to a sergeant. At Shorewick MIT, one CI had been assigned the role of CCTV coordinator and another, Family Liaison Coordinator. Furthermore, the MIT also had a civilian officer manager who (while not engaged in management at an operational level) was responsible for the organisation and management of all administrative and clerical arrangements within the MIT as well as the allocation of available resources to each of the teams. CIs were also observed undertaking supervisory style roles in a more informal capacity. For example, at Newbank GRU, one non-ex-officer CI was considered the ‘acting-up sergeant’ for the unit and in times when the unit sergeant was away on training, ill or on leave, the CI in question would take on the role of office manager, allocating workloads and or supervising/advising the work/actions of less experienced members of personnel (including some detectives).

Despite existing as a key motivating factor in non-ex-officer CIs’ decisions to apply for the role, limited opportunities for progression at both Shorewick and Newbank were cited by a number of participants as being a potential cause for concern with regard to levels of commitment amongst non-ex-officer CIs and also for the overall resilience of the unit. The following quote can be considered the typical response of participants when asked their feelings on career progression for CIs:

There’s a young guy here who went to university, he’s 28 and you think, what has he got in Shorewick now? There’s nowhere for him to go! … I don’t think it’s going to be that long before we start to lose experienced financial investigators like Tony who’s a young lad at 28. There’s another guy who’s got two young children as well. They’re going to be looking for something else. They’re going to want to go to a different organisation where there is a chance to move up the ladder, to move up the banding and where there is the possibility of supervisors or managers or whatever. It’s a bit different for me because I’ve already done thirty years and I might do another 5 or 6 years but I’m happy in my role as a financial investigator but it’s not the same for young people who are looking to buy a house, they need something to aspire to and we haven’t got that here at the moment … It’s been a very difficult time for Shorewick and I suppose other forces are exactly the same and are going through the same issues.
but it’s been very difficult here and I’m not so sure that it’s not going to come back and bite them at some stage.

*(Shorewick, FFIT, ex-officer CI)*

During the fieldwork Newbank were found to be in the process of trialling a new two tier model of CI recruitment. Under the new model CIs would be recruited as either ‘Level 1s’ or ‘Level 2s’. Level 1 CIs were envisaged to undertake a support style role comparable to the way the role had initially been conceived. This would involve tasks such as preparing case papers, ensuring file completeness, taking basic victim and witness statements, conducting house to house enquiries, securing and preserving forensic (and other relevant) evidence, attending court and giving evidence in relation to those aspects of any investigation which are within the post holder’s personal knowledge and undertaking a case load (where appropriate). By comparison, Level 2 CIs were envisaged to undertake the same tasks as part of their role although they would be involved in the more specialist areas of investigative work (e.g. domestic abuse) and would also be required to undertake more complex victim and witness statements and also conduct suspect interviews. Level 2 CIs would also be designated with a range of relevant powers under provisions contained within the Police Reform Act 2002 whereas those recruited at Level 1 would not. Level 2 CIs would also be placed on a higher pay banding than Level 1 CIs, although at the time the research was undertaken, this had not been decided. This new model of CI recruitment was envisaged to provide CIs with an opportunity to progress within the role and also arguably lays the foundations for the development of a type of hierarchical rank type structure for CIs. One CI interviewed at Shorewick CIT described how, upon learning of this new model of recruitment at Newbank, she had encouraged her daughter away from recruitment with Shorewick:

My daughter has actually just taken a position (as a CI) at Newbank. She wanted to apply here (Shorewick) but I told her not to bother because she’s young and there’s nothing here for her career-wise. There’s nothing for the younger generation in this role at the moment; nowhere for them to progress to. I mean for me its fine, I’m not bothered about progression but for the younger ones, there’s definitely a ceiling.

*(Shorewick, CIT, non-ex-officer CI)*

The following quote is also taken from an interview with an experienced ex-officer FI who was in the process of leaving Shorewick police in order to work for Newbank:
That’s why I decided to apply for something else and I know when I went for my interview and the Chief Inspector said, ‘You must really want to leave Shorewick?’ I said, ‘Well I want to be part of something that is going forward, not going backwards’. The problem is, if you look now in Shorewick, there is no progression for any financial investigators. Previously, because I was a manager and then there were financial investigators who were on a band E, financial investigators who were on a band D, which were newly, I say new, they’d been here probably 2, 2 and a half years, but there was progression for them, for the people who were on a D to progress up to an E when somebody left or retired. Also, when I retired there was also a civilian manager’s post which is no longer there now. So you’ve got to think, what is there?

(Shorewick, FFIT, ex-officer FI)

For those individuals seeking to build a career with the police as a CI (or ultimately as a warranted officer), it is vital that they are offered opportunities to develop within the police force, otherwise the organisation will lose the skills and knowledge these CIs have gained over the years (possibly to other more forward looking forces and/or organisations).

Another possible development with regard to CI progression is the introduction of the ‘tutor CI’ role parallel to a tutor police officer. Experienced CIs were taking responsibility for mentoring and inducting new CIs but with no financial reward and establishing such an incentive would seem sensible in dealing with a key disparity between police officers and CIs, while also giving CIs a more formalised development opportunity.

Like their warranted colleagues, CIs were entitled to receive an annual Performance Development Review (PDR). The purpose of the PDR was to assess an individual’s performance against their current role and determine where development could/should facilitate improvements. It is also used to enable line managers to focus staff in working towards reaching their full potential, including information in respect of vertical/lateral career progression. Following the publication of Home Office Circular 006/2015, all forces in E&W must have an appraisal that allows for officers’ progression through the pay scale to be linked to performance. This appraisal process supports the Professional Policing Framework (PPF) and is currently based on the ‘Assumption of Competence’ model - it recognised that the majority of staff, once trained and experienced, usually perform their role to a high standard. However, while CIs were able to progress up the pay banding/scale each year in the same way as warranted officers, opportunities for
progression and training provision were fundamentally restricted and were often determined/justified on the basis of the civilian designation of CIs and their alleged support role, than on the practical, everyday reality of the role as it was being played out ‘on the ground’.

6.3 Powers

At the time of their introduction, the specific powers of enforcement granted to police employee CIs (as outlined under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and detailed in Appendix 7) were designated at the discretion of the Chief Constable of each force as a means of granting operational flexibility in their deployment. Shorewick and Newbank subsequently varied rather considerably in terms of the powers they chose to assign to CIs whereby those selected depended on perceived operational needs and senior officers’ varying interpretations of the CI role. The discretionary nature with which Chief Constables have drawn upon these optional powers in relation to CIs has resulted in a piecemeal approach which, in turn, has served to exacerbate inconsistency and ambiguity between police forces with regard to CI use and role.

With the exception of FIs who possessed additional role specific powers afforded to them under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, only those CIs encountered at Newbank were found to have been designated with powers. None of the CIs encountered at Shorewick were found to have been designated with police type powers under the Police Reform Act 2002, although CIs identified working at Shorewick CIT had recently been afforded powers to implement direct restorative justice measures and during the course of their day-to-day work where appropriate. Where designated (at Newbank), CIs had been afforded the complete package of powers at the Chief Constable’s disposal. However, despite the relatively expansive range of powers at their disposal, CIs at Newbank appeared to be often unclear about the nature of their abilities as a designated person. Indeed, as with their role more broadly, there appeared to exist a distinct lack of clarity

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198 Powers afforded to FIs under the Act (if trained and accredited under section 3 of Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and if within a category specified in an order issued by the Secretary of State under section 453 of the same Act) include power to apply for and execute: production orders, search and seizure warrants (power expanded to include FIs as part ‘appropriate person’ designation by Serious Crime Act 2007), customer information orders, account monitoring orders disclosure orders (Part 8) as well as confiscation and restraint orders (Part 2 and/or 4).
surrounding the issue of powers amongst CIs and, in particular, the limits of their enforcement abilities. This ambiguity was the result of a number of key factors but primarily, was considered to have arisen due to poor communication about the role following the initial years of CI recruitment at Newbank. However, as the following quote demonstrates, the degree of clarity about their enforcement abilities was also found to differ between units suggesting discrepancy in awareness of CI abilities between police managers:

I think it was different at homicide. I think homicide have always had a list of their powers that they can do and I think fraud did but we never did, we kind of got overlooked. I don’t know if that was just an administrative thing but it was just like ‘Yeah, you can do that, off you go’. So it’s just wing and a prayer I suppose, and again I hope I get it right, I hope I don’t get it wrong, have I got the power to do that, can I do that can we do this. It’s never properly been clarified.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

One CI at Newbank PPU described to the researcher how such ambiguity with regard to enforcement abilities of CIs following their initial introduction had led to some rather concerning ‘teething problems’:

When we first started, one of the cops who retired one day and started the next day was told you can arrest at a police station. So he was getting people to come to the station then arresting them. But we haven’t got that power. That wasn’t made clear. So he was wrongfully arresting people. But we can’t do that anyway cos really under PACE, if someone has come to the station on a voluntary basis you shouldn’t really be arresting them. So this ex-cop was in a bit of a flap because he’d been wrongfully arresting people.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

Under the provisions of the Act, CIs can be afforded the power of arrest on the conditions that this provision is only drawn upon by the designated person within a police station and, if the individual being arrested has already been arrested by a warranted officer for a previous offence. As the following quote demonstrates, it is likely that such ambiguity still exists amongst some CIs and also amongst their warranted colleagues resulting in only a partial understanding of the conditions restricting a designated CI’s ability to arrest:

Detective: Can you arrest in interview then?

CI: Yeah. I don’t even have to be in interview. Once somebody’s liberty has been taken away and they’ve been arrested, I can arrest over and over again no
matter where I am really. As long as they’re already under detention, then that’s fine.

(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI)

Unlike warranted officers whose powers are bestowed upon them as part of their status as Crown servants under the Office of Constable, powers afforded to non-warranted police staff are role specific and thus, are not transferable between roles. However, in discussion with some non-ex-officer CIs who had previously worked for the organisation in various police staff roles, this fact did not appear to be clear:

I’ve been designated with powers from the enquiry desk, yes but not since. From the enquiry desk I’m warranted as a process server, so I can actually report and summon.

(Shorewick, CIT, non-ex-officer CI)

I was a PCSO before this so I have my training and powers relating to that but we’ve not been designated anything as part of this role, no.

(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, non-ex-officer CI)

Evidence was also found to suggest that overlapping legislation affecting the CI role may also be causing confusion amongst some CIs with regard to their enforcement abilities. In an interview undertaken with two CIs at Shorewick MIT (where none of the CIs had been designated with powers under the 2002 Act), both CIs when questioned appeared hesitant as to the statutory basis for their enforcement powers, in this instance, their ability to seize property:

Interviewer: Do you not need to be designated to seize things?

Interviewees 1 & 2: Nope.

Interviewee 1: It comes under CPIA (Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996) doesn’t it?

Interviewee 2: The way it’s worded in PACE is something like, ‘a police officer or designated person or ...’ I can’t remember. I should know it! But it’s worded to take account of non-police officers anyway.

Interviewee 1: If you think there could be something of an evidential nature, then you’ve got the powers to seize it.

Interviewer: Oh right, so that’s under which legislation specifically?
Interviewee 1: I think it’s the Criminal Procedures Act. I’m sure that’s what it comes under. But if you think something’s evidential you’ve got the powers to seize it.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer and non-ex-officer CIs)

Under PACE, section 16 (2), a search warrant may authorise persons other than police officers to accompany the constable who executes the warrant and seize anything to which the warrant relates (2Ab). PACE codes of practice for search and seizure of property (Code B, 2.11(c) and Note 3C) also recognise the power of civilians authorised to accompany police officers when entering and searching premises under a search warrant to exercise the same powers as the police. While these provisions do not allow CIs any right to force entry, it does give them the right to be on the premises during the search and to search for or seize property without the occupier’s permission. The 2002 Act extends many of the powers of search and seizure available to constables under PACE to CIs ‘as if he were a constable’. This includes power to apply for and execute search warrants under sections 8 and 6 of the 1984 Act, seizure of computer information under section 20 and also affords CIs the same powers as a constable under section 19 of the 1984 Act with regard to general powers of seizure.

Inconsistency in CI use between forces coupled with an ever-present and obvious lack of confidence/clarity in the legislative basis for and extent of their enforcement abilities, can undoubtedly serve to undermine CI claims to authority in certain situations. This was found to be particularly true with regard to awareness and treatment of CIs in the wider criminal justice system as the following quote demonstrates:

I had another job when I was sat in court waiting to make sure someone got remanded for the safety of the victim and this defending lawyer stood there and said, ‘If this incident was so serious, why was the matter not dealt with by a specialist firearms or tactical unit? It was not. Was it dealt with by a serious and organised crime department? It was not. Was it even dealt with by a DC or even by a PC? No. If this matter was so serious, why was it dealt with by a mere civilian investigator?’

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

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199 This includes any suitably qualified or skilled person or an expert in a particular field whose presence is needed to help accurately identify the material sought or to advise where certain evidence is most likely to be found and how it should be dealt with.
However, lack of awareness and inconsistency with regard to CI use between forces and the limits of their powers can also have the opposite effect in that CIs can imply, or let members of the public assume, that they have more powers of enforcement and authority than they actually do. This highlights not only the distinction between police ‘power’ and ‘powers’ with police power reflecting the notion of the police as the embodiment of state authority, but also shows how CIs are able to manipulate consent to avoid having to draw upon powers that they do not possess. As is implied in the following quotes, in some circumstances, CIs may rely upon the public’s lack of awareness of the designation and their authority in order to undertake their role:

You don’t necessarily need to know where the line is. If you’re in someone’s house and you say ‘right we’ll take that off you’ and you say you can, then you can. Who knows more about the law, them or you? And then if I take it and then find out I can’t take it I’ll say right you can have it back now (both laugh).

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

With PCSOs it’s different because the public know who they are, they’re in different uniforms and it even says it on their backs, P-C-S-O. With us it’s different because the cops here don’t wear a uniform. There was an older cop here a while back who was transferred from another division to us and it was only when I wasn’t asked to go on cuff training that he realised I wasn’t a cop. ‘I thought you were a cop’, ‘Err, No’ (laughs). So unless we tell them, you know, ‘I’m not a cop’, how do they know what we can and can’t do.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

At Newbank CIs had recently been provided with additional powers which included the ability to undertake section 18 searches of properties, something which they had previously been told they were not able to do. Such periodic changes to CI powers and the range of optional powers arguably contribute to a degree of confusion about what they can and cannot do, which extends to their police officer colleagues and the public in general. One CI based at Newbank PPU told the researcher how the existing lack of clarity with regard to CI powers made her job ‘more stressful’ as it meant a need to frequently assert authority in situations where her role as CI led her into communication/dealings with practitioners based in the wider criminal justice:

If you go to the wider CJ system we’ve got to start getting respected out there too. Getting magistrates to take us seriously is sometimes difficult. It’s important that the solicitors know who we are and what we are capable of and what we will
do. It is horrible when they’re saying ‘who are you? ‘Oh, a case investigator’. ‘Do you have a collar number?’ ‘Yes I do’. ‘And do you have the right kind of powers to do this?’ We get that one quite a lot. ‘Can you do that?’ ‘Yes I can. Yes, I can and yes I will.’

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

Furthermore, it quickly became clear to the researcher that CIs had differing feelings towards being designated with powers. There appeared to be a notable distinction between the working backgrounds of CIs with regard to their feelings towards being designated with powers, with ex-officer CIs appearing as most resistant to the idea. As the following quotes demonstrate:

No. I personally wouldn’t want powers. I came here to be a support staff member not frontline. We don’t get paid enough for that (laughs).

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

Absolutely not. That’s not what I signed up for and, that’s the work that the Bobbies should be doing. That’s what they’re being paid for otherwise we’re doing their job for them.’

(Shorewick, GRU, non-ex-officer CI)

You’re joking aren’t you!?! I’m off to Savers down the road when I’m done, not getting paid half the wage to do basically the same job … I know of other forces where they’ve given their CIs powers like officers. That’s not support in my book, its policing on the cheap and I’m not interested in that but obviously it’s different for different people.

(Shorewick, CIT, DC)

For other (mainly ex-officer) CIs the issue of power designation was somewhat fundamentally linked to their feelings on pay and/or the nature of the role and level of responsibility being afforded; with power comes responsibility which was something that not all CIs were happy to have bestowed upon them. As the following quotes demonstrate, not all CIs were keen to be designated with powers:

Me personally, I wouldn’t want to do that. I’m support staff. If you want people to start rolling about with people then let detectives do that. No. I personally wouldn’t want powers. I came here to be a support staff member not frontline. We don’t get paid enough for that. If the pay reflected that then I’d probably say yeah but I can’t see that ever happening. Not for us on MIT.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)
I’m not that particularly bothered about powers or doing anything more than supporting because, for example, interviewing suspects, you do work some stupid hours. If you’re interviewer, you can be interviewing at 2 or 3 o’clock in the morning some mornings. When you’ve got people in custody you’re against the clock. It’s very intense being an interviewer and I particularly don’t want that. I don’t want that responsibility. Leave that to them who get paid a lot more than me (laughs). And it is a very responsible job that. It’s a very specialist role and it is very intensive as well, you have to know your legislation. The work they have to put in, even though they might just say ‘no comment’ at the end of the day, the actual work and the planning that they have to do for interviewing these days, which again, is another thing that you never used to get. You never used to get interview plans. You used to just go in, sit down and talk to people. Have a cigarette and a cup of tea and talk to them and eventually somebody would get charged. But now it’s all very professionalised. For me, the pay we get as civvies doesn’t match the responsibility of that role so I’m not bothered.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

When discussing the issue of power designation, a number of CIs made reference to ‘any person’ powers which are available to all police staff (and members of the public), in particular, the power to make a citizen’s arrest and to engage in the reasonable use of force (when/where necessary). As the following quotes illustrate:

I mean obviously you can arrest people as a civilian can’t you? Everybody can if someone’s a civilian, but we haven’t been designated any other powers. We haven’t got powers of entry or anything like that.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

There’s always the citizen’s power of arrest isn’t there. You’ve always got that. So it’s not like we’re completely powerless.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

Both the power of arrest and use of reasonable force (without warrant) are indeed statutory powers available to any person ‘other than a constable’ which are laid down in section 24 (4) and (5) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (subsequently amended by section 110 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005) and section 3 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967. These of course exist in addition to a non-warranted individual’s ability to arrest for breach of the peace under common law. However, while

\footnote{Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 provides clarification of the operation of the existing common law and statutory defences in relation to use of force/self-defence powers. Section 76, section 76 (9) in particular, neither abolishes the common law and statutory defences nor does it change the current test that allows the use of reasonable force.}
the law provides general powers that allow any person to make a citizen's arrest, the circumstances under which such an arrest may be undertaken are limited. For example, a non-warranted individual is only able to arrest where it does not appear reasonably practicable for a police constable to make the arrest and the person making the arrest has reasonable grounds to believe that such an arrest is necessary to prevent the person being arrested from: (a) causing physical injury to himself or any other person; (b) suffering physical injury; (c) causing loss of or damage to property; or (d) making off before a constable can assume responsibility for him or her.

Existing literature has shown how police PCSOs and security officers (cf Button, 2007) rely on an ambiguous amalgam of designated, accredited, statutory and common law powers (amongst others) for aspects of their jobs. However, the apparent confidence with which some CIs appeared willing to draw upon such legal tools undoubtedly raises some concern about the potentially dubious legality of CI actions in some instances (and regularity with which this may be taking place). This, in turn, raises fundamental questions about both the nature of the role currently being undertaken by CIs in E&W and also the extent to which CIs could potentially impact on the overall legitimacy of the CID. In particular, it raises fundamental concerns about the potential for misconduct, but in a broader sense, also draws attention to the contemporary (and highly civilianised) character of the police frontline. In this sense, the availability and willingness of some non-warranted individuals to enforce the law and with that, their authority as enforcers of the law, may also serve to call into question the overall competency of the CID.

The capacity of CIs to secure respect and legitimacy from their warranted colleagues is hindered at a fundamental level by their lack of shared experience with officers with regard to training and initial time spent policing the streets. However, their limited and in some cases complete absence of enforcement powers undoubtedly further inhibited their integration within the CID, leading to the denial of their legitimacy and credibility as investigators in the eyes of some of their warranted colleagues. This was found to be

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201 The range of powers available to PCSOs under the Police Reform Act 2002 differs somewhat from those available to CIs, EOs and DOs. Provisions contained within the Act allow PCSOs power to detain an individual for a specified period of time, power to search, seize and retain and power to use reasonable force (in order to detain a person). Provisions contained within the Act (Schedule 22A) only afford powers of detention and use of reasonable force to CIs in respect to individuals detained within a police station.
reinforced by the organisation through discrepancies in training, opportunities for progression and also in terms of pay and level of job security afforded to CIs.

However, for some the necessity for those working within the CID to be designated with powers of enforcement was in itself, subject to debate. As the following quote from one police manager based at Shorewick MIT illustrates:

We don’t use our police powers daily here like patrol or custody. Your next question is, well why have you got police powers then and why have you got people working here with police powers? Someone has to use police powers. Yes, we arrested our suspect on this particular investigation but we could have imported the arrest, as in we could bring a police officer in to make the arrest. Yeah that’s a fair point to do that but we did use it on here because just it was easier. But day to day our boys and girls aren’t using warranted powers at all. So for that reason they don’t need to have warranted powers. But someone has to … There is a time and a place where we want someone to use warranted powers and that’s what I call frontline, when they’re having to go out there and use warranted powers. Our investigators don’t need to do that.

(Shorewick, MIT, SIO)

While the opinion of the police manager demonstrated in the above quote with regard to the need for powers within the CID is likely framed by a view of the work carried out within the MIT, it is nonetheless evidence of a shift in attitude amongst some warranted officers with regard to their understanding of the police frontline and with that, the role of the detective.

6.4 Remuneration

Despite generally citing that they felt valued by their colleagues in the units in which they were found operating, most CIs encountered felt that there was a lack of valuing and appreciation of their role at force level which could be seen to be reflected in their lack of training for the role and opportunities for progression but most specifically, in the level of pay they received for the role. One ex-officer CI described how the distinction in CI pay compared to that of warranted officers made her feel like ‘the poor relative of the office’:

I feel like part of the family, but a less than equal part. We don’t get treated the same, the same privileges. Pay is the best example; we get paid much less for doing the same work.

(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI)
Like other members of police staff, CIs are generally paid according to the local employment market rate. In the current study those CIs who were employed directly by the police organisation at both sites received a starting wage of around £21,000 - £24,000 depending on experience and the nature of the role, namely, whether or not the role was deemed to be specialist. This is a higher starting rate of pay than that of many other police staff, for example, PCSOs, whose starting wage (at the time the study was undertaken) could range anywhere between £16,500 to £21,000 and was arguably reflective of the prestigious and perceived specialist nature of the work being undertaken by the CID. Interestingly, both of the agency CIs encountered at Newbank received a higher rate of pay per hour (£14.60) than their publicly employed counterparts. At the time the fieldwork was undertaken, DC pay began at around £24,000 and could rise to up to £40,000 with pay increments depending upon length of service, experience and skill202.

In addition to their wage, CIs were also found to be in receipt of a range of other pay entitlements and allowances which supplement their basic pay. These included shift allowances and weekend working pay, equivalent to 22 days annual leave initially (and rising to 30 days (depending on service)), on call/standby allowance and a career average pension. CIs were also paid at an enhanced rate if asked to swap shifts and only given 5 days’ notice, a benefit their warranted colleagues were not afforded. Distinctions in pay were also found to exist between CIs on the basis of the type of work they were engaged in and the nature of their employment status i.e. whether or not they were employed directly by the police organisation or whether they were employed via contracts agreed with a private sector recruitment agency. For example, CIs working on the MIT were found to be being paid a grade higher than other CIs identified working at Shorewick suggesting a pay hierarchy between CI roles, a distinction that was found to be resented/rejected by other CIs at Shorewick as the following quote illustrates:

I know the MIT investigators are on a grade higher than me, which, that does stick in the clack a bit because they get an action plan, go do this, go to them. And they're a grade higher than me, whereas I have to think more.

(Shorewick, GRU, ex-officer CI)

202 This was amended following recommendations set forth in the Winsor review (2011/2012) and subsequent legislative amendments which link officer pay to type of work/performance rather than length of service and assumed skill.
A similar structure was also found to be in place at Newbank and proved to be a key point of aggravation amongst some CIs, particularly those identified working in the PPU who perceived their role to be more frontline in nature, even more so to that of some warranted officers. As the following quote demonstrates:

I don’t understand how they can justify somebody, a case investigator on other roles, paying them more money than they do us. The risk attached to the job that we do has got to be the highest in the whole force!

(Newbank, PPU, ex-officer CI)

Furthermore, CIs who were employed directly by the organisation were afforded sick pay - should it be required - whereas agency CIs (at Newbank) were not. Similarly, stipulations in the contracts of agency CIs meant that they were paid for their lunch breaks (36 minutes) whereas those employed directly by the organisation were not:

Yeah we get paid overtime which is time and half and on a Sunday its double time. But then for things like bank holidays; I wouldn’t get anything extra for bank holidays whereas an officer would get extra money, a day back in lieu. And when you’re sat there on Christmas Day thinking, I’m getting paid plain time for this, what the hell am I doing. I’m sat eating a Pot Noodle while my mum and dad are eating Christmas dinner, and the Bobbies next to you on four times as much as you anyway because they’re an officer plus the overtime rate plus the day back. It’s just doesn’t seem right.

(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI)

As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the distinct employment status of CIs compared to that of their warranted colleagues was considered by some to be a major obstacle impeding their integration within the unit. As the following quote illustrates, structural differences between CI and officer roles alongside their civilian employee status, left some CIs pessimistic as to the extent to which they could become integrated within the CID:

I think it’s always there. Civilians will NEVER be police officers and will never be treated the same as police officers either. I think when the force treats you differently to a police officer, and then they expect the same from you without giving you the same things as they do a police officer… You know, I’ve worked Christmas days, I’ve worked Christmas Eves alongside police officers who have been getting 3, 4 times the amount of money I’ve been getting. And I’ve been on a normal shift. Even though I’ve come in on a bank holiday, I don’t get paid
any extra for a bank holiday whereas a police officer might get 3, 4 times as much as they usually would. So they expect you to come in on that Christmas Day but they don’t want to give you the same privileges. And I think it will always be … when people introduce you it’s always like, ‘Oh yeah, Claire’s a civvie’. I’m the civilian that works in this office. And it’s always been like that.

(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI)

As mentioned previously, a number of CIs encountered were also found to be undertaking a supervisory role in both a formal and informal capacity. Even where these roles were formally acknowledged by the organisation, in some instances civilian supervisors and/or managers were still being paid less than some of the warranted officers they supervised and also, less than their publicly employed counterparts. For example, Shorewick DAU was headed by a civilian manager who was being paid at a rate both less than that of the warranted officer identified working within her team and also less than that of her warranted equivalents (Sergeants) in other force areas:

I’d rate Hannah higher than some of the police sergeants I’ve worked with because even though she’s not getting paid as much as them which is a detriment to the force really because they should be paying her for what she’s worth … She’s an asset to the unit because she’s been doing that role for so long, she can rattle through assessments like they’re going out of fashion.

(Shorewick, PPU, DAU, police officer)

Where CIs were found to be undertaking supervisory style roles in a less formal capacity (e.g. at Shorewick MIT (CCTV coordinator and FLO coordinator) and Newbank GRU), these roles were not being matched in terms of appropriate pay. This can be evidenced in the following quote:

Keith (Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI) - In my role, you are ultimately supervising staff as a CCTV coordinator. But I get paid no extra money for it. The people you’re supervising are getting paid more than you are! Which isn’t right? And so from a civilian point of view you cannot be, like you can get someone (officer) acting up to be sergeant or acting up to be an inspector, you cannot act up to the next role as a civilian. But what they can do is pay you! If what you are doing is over and above your role profile, they can pay you what they call an honorarium, either on a monthly basis or as a one off payment if it’s something that you’ve just done for a short term. Now I’ve been and asked for that and said, ‘Right. There’s my role profile. That’s a band E which is the band above me and it’s pretty much the same except it says here about supervising staff and checking staff’s work and this that and the other? Now that’s what I’m doing as far as I can see but they wouldn’t let me have it. They said I didn’t
qualify for it. Because unbelievably in this force, there are supervisors in other places who get paid less than the staff they supervise. Now surely that can’t be right? It’s like have a sergeant getting paid less than the DCs isn’t it? Surely responsibility should equate with pay? But no apparently because there are others in this force where the supervisors get paid less than those they supervise … I’ve said in a meeting with a DI, I’m not doing it anymore. And I basically got very bluntly told, ‘You’ll do as you’re told otherwise you’ll be out on your ear’ type of thing. So it puts you in a difficult position doesn’t it?

Mike (Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI) - Yeah and when it comes to him re-applying for his job again who do you think they’re going to pick? ‘Yes sir’, ‘No sir’ or ‘three bags full sir’?

The evidence presented above is also suggestive of potential for the abuse of power by some senior officers/managers with regard to the CI role. As will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section (6.5) of this chapter, the current research was undertaken at a time of significant organisational restructuring and thus, CIs were found to be acutely aware of how this would likely impact on the security of their role and position with the organisation. As the above quote suggests, in some instances this may have resulted in CIs feeling under pressure to accept extensions to their remit which might stretch their role beyond that of support without receiving corresponding pay. Furthermore, the distinct lack of clarity about the role of CI and absence of up-to-date role profiles within a number of the units visited, allowed for a rather substantial degree of operational flexibility with regard to the deployment of CIs which may have been exploited to a degree by some unit managers.

Unlike their warranted counterparts whose employment conditions (in particular, concern over issues relating to their remuneration) are fervently defended by the Police Federation, the civilian status of CIs currently excludes them from membership of this ‘professional body’. They are however able to secure representation through membership of trade unions (namely UNISON) (which is prohibited for their warranted colleagues) and at the organisational level through the Police Staff Council (PSC) who negotiate national agreements on basic pay and conditions of service for all police staff and PCSOs.

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203 The PSC is the organisation that brings together unions and employers for the police staff workforce to negotiate pay and conditions. The PSC represents PCCs, Chief Constables and the Home Secretary of E&W and the employees of police organisation. The PSC consists of fourteen members, seven from ‘the employer’s side’ and seven from ‘the Trade Union side’ (Police Staff Council, 2015) and was, until 2004, referred to under the title of Police Staff Support Council. The national agreements of the PSC are only binding if PCCs and Chief Constables agree to incorporate them within the contracts of employment of their employees.
in E&W (excluding the Metropolitan Police). However, the national agreements of the PSC are only binding if PCCs and Chief Constables agree to incorporate them within the contracts of employment for their employees. Forces are free to choose to implement only certain elements of PSC decisions, or none at all. Furthermore, representation of police employees is likely to be further weakened in the coming months and years as marked distinctions in employment terms and conditions between officers and staff disproportionately affect the job security and bargaining power of police staff. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the following section (6.5).

6.5 Job Security

During the time fieldwork was undertaken at both Shorewick and Newbank, the police organisation was in the midst of a large scale spending review and was facing intense pressure to cut its existing budget by 20%. This amounted to cuts of around £2.4 billion between March 2010 and March 2015. Efforts to accommodate these cuts included forces initiating an extensive overhaul of current practices and a large scale, rigorous restructuring of the organisation which involved making savings through reducing both pay and non-pay costs. Pay savings include salaries and overtime whereas non-pay savings may include ‘temporary and agency costs, injury and ill health costs, other employee costs, premises, transport, supplies and services, third party payments, and capital financing’ (HMIC, 2012: 75-76). As noted by Ellison and Brogden (2013: 63) ‘such economically-induced ‘downsizing’ [of the scale by which recent (and continuing) drives have taken place] has no obvious precedent in modern societies (except, perhaps, during wartime emergencies)’. No common standard of cuts exists and there is much variation between forces with regard to their individual strategies for cost reduction (HMIC, 2012: 27) with some forces appearing to make greater pay savings than others. Such variation was also observed between Shorewick and Newbank and will be discussed in this section in relation to the issue of CI job security.

As employees of the police organisation, responses provided by CI participants were noticeably framed by an acute awareness of imminent budget cuts and thus, the impending threat to their job security. Unlike their warranted counterparts who are
protected by stipulations in their contracts against redundancy, CIs, like other members of police staff, remain the only viable option for those police managers tasked with an unenviable job of selecting those whose positions were subject to review. This was understandably found to have had a significant impact on the day to day working experiences and overall employment experience of CIs. A number of CIs at both Shorewick and Newbank described feeling ‘let down’ by the organisation and ‘disappointed’ by the lack of consideration and the perceived appreciation/valuing of CIs. As the following quote demonstrates:

‘We’ve all been let down recently with the reviews because we’ve taken the brunt of it because they can’t get rid of officers. A lot of people have given a lot of loyalty to this force and … so when the review came and it was like, well actually you’re just a civilian and you’re just a number, then that hurt a bit. I’ve only been here 8 years but I worked with people who had worked here 13, 14, 15 years and they were made redundant as easy as anything because they were just a number, yet they’d worked here longer and had as much if not more experience in this particular area than some of the Bobbies.

(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI)

The current drive to make substantial financial savings meant that in some instances, CIs were being required to reapply for their positions with the organisation. For some CIs, this would be the third time in which the organisation had required them re-interview for their existing position in recent years. The degree of uncertainty surrounding the stability of the CI role was understandably found to be a key factor affecting the day-to-day and overall employment experience of CIs and was found to be a common trend at both sites. However, anxiety about the future of their role and employment with the police organisation appeared most notable at Shorewick whose strategy of cost cutting included a more stringent approach to the reduction of numbers of personnel. As discussed earlier in this section, this was based on the logic that officers can be redeployed if needed, to other parts of the organisation, allegedly improving its overall resilience. However, in stark contrast, at Newbank CI recruitment was in fact found to be a key part of the force’s

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204 The relationship of a police constable with their force is regulated by both statute and the common law. There is no contract of employment between a police officer and his force which would allow the force to terminate the officer’s appointment by giving notice. Instead, the circumstances in which a police officer’s appointment may be terminated for those up to and including the rank of chief superintendent, are set out in regulations made under section 50 of the Police Act 1996, in relation to misconduct and poor performance, or section 1 of the Police Pensions Act 1976, in relation to compulsory retirement on the grounds of age, disablement or the efficiency of the force (Winsor, 2011: 182).
current drive to ensure cost-efficiency and value for money. Rather than facing redundancy, as was the case at Shorewick, CIs based at Newbank were being used to replace retiring officers with new recruitment waves taking place during the course of the fieldwork. However, regardless of this, some CIs remained apprehensive as to the degree to which their role as civilians within the organisation could ever be completely secure:

Well, we keep getting conflicting messages. We were being told first that we were being kept until the Olympics and then we could go so there’s that sort of uncertainty. And then I was told by someone higher up that the future of the police service is going this way (more civilian recruitment) and you’ve got nothing to worry about. But even so, our job descriptions and contracts, they can get rid of us a lot quicker than they can a cop but for the moment, cops seem to be going at first, the older cops, because of the nature of the money saving, under the A19 ruling, so they’re going first. Their contracts are being ended after 30 years and we’re kind of filling in the gaps left by those who are going. So if it keeps going that way, we should be fine but you just don’t know.

(Newbank, PPU, non-ex-officer CI)

The civilian and employee status of CIs arguably act to maintain a pervading level of concern and/or anxiety amongst CIs with regard to the security of their employment with the police organisation, particularly within the current climate of austerity. As stated in the above quote, the employment terms and conditions contained within CI contracts as employees of the organisation were fundamentally distinct from those afforded to warranted officers as sworn, independent servants of the Crown. This in turn also likely served to perpetuate the secondary status of CIs and their role within the organisation compared to that of officers. Furthermore, the strategy being employed by Newbank with regard to efforts to cut costs raises significant questions about the likelihood of continued (and further) mission creep at Newbank amongst CIs. If CIs are to take up roles previously undertaken by warranted officers, is it not likely that they will inevitably become drawn into work that is beyond their existing remit and which requires additional training? This in turn arguably gives weight to arguments that the utilisation of CIs is simply a type of ‘policing on the cheap’. Evidence presented in this chapter also suggests that a rather inconsistent approach to cost cutting may be taking place which will likely result in even further inconsistency between police forces with regard to the utilisation of CIs (and other non-warranted members of police personnel).
Impending cuts were also found to be a key concern for participants in the current study with regard to the future resilience of the organisation. As one CI (Shorewick, CIT, non-ex-officer) expressed during interview: ‘There are just cuts and cuts and cuts and cuts and it makes you think, at what point do things start collapsing?’ In stark contrast to the approach adopted by Newbank, at Shorewick costs were hoped to be lowered through implementing an immediate ban on recruitment (warranted and non-warranted)\(^\text{205}\) and through the large scale removal of individuals (warranted (where applicable) and non-warranted) from posts. As the following extract from interview with one police manager at Shorewick MIT illustrates, the rationale on which this strategy had been devised was fundamentally grounded in the perceived need to maintain resilience through the retention of multifunctioning, re-deployable personnel:

> When we’ve all sat down and had some sort of consultation about shrinking the MIT, you know, we all went, and for the right reasons, with having more officers than support staff, whereas under the old structure there were a lot more CIs there but because we’ve … I couldn’t tell you the exact numbers, but say if we had on hundred and it was 50/50 for instance, we would now be going to 80/20 because we’re shrinking so small that we need our staff to be multifunctioning. We could go to the training but that’s more cost again so you know, we are balancing the finances.

*(Shorewick, MIT, SIO)*

As one CI discussed, this approach signified a notable U-turn in attitudes and/or approach of Shorewick towards civilianisation in recent years:

> It’s the cuts that have thrown things back. When I first started they were civilianising loads of roles because they were wanting police officers to be police officers. They wanted them to go out and be on the streets and deal with witnesses and victims so that it looked like there were more police officers whereas there were police officers who before, were being used as typists and things. They were getting paid a hell of a lot more than a civilian typist could be and they were bringing in a lot of civilians. Now, because of the cuts, they’ve got rid of them all and we seem to be going back to the way it was before.

*(Shorewick, PPU, CPU, non-ex-officer CI)*

However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, CIs have developed a valuable wealth of knowledge and expertise in their role with regard to certain key tasks (e.g. disclosure) and also with regard to their working relationships/affiliations with the victims (including

\(^{205}\) The only exception to this was the recruitment of Special Constables although even this had been restricted due to costs of training.
businesses), offenders and other local bodies/individuals (e.g. council CCTV operators). These networks of communication and trust are valuable to the organisation in terms of resilience, efficiency and also in terms of public confidence and satisfaction in the police. It is important therefore that, in these trying times, the police as an organisation does not discount the significance of the CI role and in turn, does not overlook the potential impact of their wide scale removal. Concern over the potentially negative impact of reductions in CI numbers were cited by a number of participants at Shorewick with regard to the issue of resilience and the value of CI expertise. This can be evidenced in the following quote:

I think as well that the problem at the moment is that it’s all to do with saving money without any contingency plan. I think if you look at the MIT teams, they got rid of nine or ten retired police officers didn’t they? And then they’re advertising for detectives to go in the MIT teams! You’re thinking those people (CIs) who they’ve let go were all once DCs or DSs with a lot of experience that they were getting for a lot less money than they will be paying a detective. It just doesn’t make sense. It’s been a very difficult time for Shorewick and I suppose other forces are exactly the same and are going through the same issues but it’s been very difficult here and I’m not so sure that it’s not going to come back and bite them at some stage.

(Shorewick, FFIT, ex-officer FI)

During the course of the fieldwork undertaken at Shorewick, the MIT was subject to review and was in the process of formulating a reorganisation strategy with regard to its current structure and numbers of personnel. Once implemented, the results of this review would see CI numbers drop from 16 to just 6.

The current climate of austerity and associated methods of financial constraint being employed by the police in an effort to satisfy pressure from above meant that private security involvement with regard to the provision of CIs had all but ceased at both Shorewick and Newbank. This was found to likely be a strategic decision made by the Chief Constable of each site:

We did have agency. We had G4S working with us last year for quite a bit when we were inundated but I think the Chief Constable has said this year that were not employing any because of the budget cuts.

(Shorewick, MIT, non-ex-officer CI)
Due to the differences in pay and employment conditions between publicly employed and agency CIs (discussed above), agency CIs were perceived as less cost-efficient than their publicly employed counterparts who were paid less and who, due to added benefits of their employment with the organisation - in particular sick pay - were alleged to be more malleable with regard to their deployment:

The problem with CIs is that they have different regulations to police officers and I know there’s some issues which I’ve come across, some of the agency staff that were on agency contracts, couldn’t do certain jobs, for example I’ve got a secure hospital, so there’s a lot of very, very poorly people in there and it can be quite a dangerous place to go into and some of the CIs, because we have a lot of crimes, that we have to go in there and investigate and incident, a lot of the CIs would say, on and agency contract, ‘If we go off sick or get injured as a result of something on duty, we don’t get sick pay’. So a lot of the work that I’ve had to deal with mine on agency contracts have had to be risk assessed, what they can and can’t do.

(Newbank, DCI)

This suggests that, as part of their remit, CIs may sometimes be being encouraged to enter into compromising situations within regard to their safety and/or wellbeing and for which they may not possess the relevant training.

Furthermore, a number of participants (warranted and non-warranted) raised their concern over the likely impact large scale reduction in CI numbers could potentially have on the efficiency by which investigations are undertaken and also, for the resilience of the CID overall. A number of participants made reference to the potential emergence of a ‘demand gap’ within the CID which would struggle to be filled by DCs alone. This concern was found to be being exacerbated by acknowledgement of the fact that, despite the lure of pay and prestige, the appeal of ‘moving into clothes’ may not be as pronounced as it perhaps once was for some eligible PCs. As evidence presented below suggests:

They’re having problems recruiting detectives now because none of the younger cops want to become DCs because of the unsociable working hours. I don’t blame them really.

(Newbank, GRU, DC)

Yeah we get paid more (than PCs and CIs) but there are drawbacks to the job too (being a DC) that the younger ones are becoming aware of as well like we have to work stupid hours if there’s a big job on and you can get called out any time of day or night here. If there’s a murder at 2 o’clock in the morning and you’re needed you have to go and you might be working over all that week. It’s
not for everyone and I know they’re having some trouble getting young Bobbies to want to come and do their training and get their accreditation cos it’s not what they want when they’ve got young families. It’s not like it used to be in the ‘Life on Mars’ era when most of cops were men and they had wives who stayed at home and looked after the kids. It’s not like that anymore so when they’re weighing it up; other than the pay it’s not really that appealing for them is it?

(Shorewick, MIT, DC)

As was the case at Shorewick MIT, busy periods often resulted in the agreement of fixed term contracts with private security agencies for the short term supply of personnel and, as the following quote describes, in the more recent ad hoc utilisation of special constables to assist with CID enquiries:

The murder that came in last weekend, we’re using special constables now. That was unheard of twenty years ago! You would never have thought of drafting in special constables to do, you know, unpaid work, to do enquiries. They’re assisting on house-to-house enquiries, where you would normally have police officers going round knocking on doors asking questions, it’s now special constables that are doing that. So the financial constraints are just, everything is just cutting down, cutting down. We’ve got to do it but whether the investigation is going to suffer ultimately, only time will tell.

(Shorewick, MIT, ex-officer CI)

Furthermore, should numbers of CIs continue to decline through strategies of reverse-civilianisation in some forces as pay savings take hold, it is somewhat inevitable that warranted DCs will resort to taking on even greater workloads which in turn will likely impact upon the quality of service and efficiency of the CID overall. It is also likely that more specialised work including work whereby CIs have come to build up a degree of expertise and/or social capital (as was seen particularly at Shorewick CIT), may be absorbed by those less qualified/knowledgeable and/or with inefficient training in that particular area of investigative work. This was found to be the case during fieldwork at Newbank:

We’ve had it recently where some of those in process of becoming DCs but who have not yet passed their exams are being used to investigate rape cases! But that’s just the kind of pressure we’re under here.

(Newbank, GRU, PC (trainee DC))
This finding is similar to that identified by Chatterton (2008: xii) in a report conducted on behalf of the Police Federation and in which he concluded that trainee detective constables (TDCs) are frequently ‘not treated as trainees, are given a full crime-load immediately (sometimes before they start their course) and they are not mentored as well as they should be’. Conflicting organisational demands coupled with increased budgetary pressures renders both warranted and non-warranted personnel vulnerable to mission creep and boundary blurring. However, the current nature of austerity is such that ‘staff cuts relate not to essential competence by civilians but according to pragmatism and local/organisational politics’ (Brogden and Ellison, 2013: 62). This of course then begs the question, who will (and can) be drawn upon to conduct that ‘civilian work’ in the future? Furthermore, as discussed previously, civilian employees do not have the same defined trade association influence as do officers through their membership with Police Federation. ‘Nor can they be identified in public mythology as crucial to ‘the fight against crime’’ (Brogden and Ellison, 2013: 70). Together, these factors place the CI on the wrong side of the frontline and with that, their role in a precarious position within the CID.

6.6 Summary

There is no doubt that CIs have added valuable capacity to CID teams and, in terms of the work that CIs do, they have had a great deal to offer the organisation and the public. The CI role has come a long way since its introduction and CIs are now involved in a myriad of investigative activities as part of their remit. However, the role of CI continues to be undermined at a fundamental level by the police organisation leaving CIs feeling undervalued and unappreciated by the organisation as a whole. The civilian designation of CIs fundamentally limited their pay, training and opportunities for progression which also served to perpetuate their secondary status within the CID. Furthermore, continued lack of clarity about the role/remit undoubtedly allowed managers a rather substantial degree of operational flexibility with regard to CI utilisation which is likely currently being maintained by the organisation as a strategy of coping with high levels of demand. While noteworthy efforts were being made in some police forces (Newbank in the current study) to clarify the role in light of organisational restructuring and provided CIs with regular, appropriate training for the role, in too many instances practical training remained ad hoc and secondary to administrative training. In choosing
to make use of CIs in ways that go beyond that which can be considered support without providing adequate training, the organisation was arguably opening itself up to potential scrutiny by the wider CJS and media. Furthermore, CIs were limited in their opportunities for promotion and this has had a significant impact on their employment experience resulting in some CIs feeling unfulfilled and unchallenged in their role.

At different levels of the organisation, police forces need to confront the often unintended signals sent out that police staff such as CIs are less valued or less capable than their warranted colleagues. Debates regarding the extent to which it remains necessary to have two different sets of terms and conditions within the police service, namely police officers governed by national statutory regulations and police staff members established by locally determined contracts, are likely to continue in the coming years. There is arguably a need to move away from the current twin-track approach to the recruitment, training and progression and towards the development of more structured and flexible career pathways for CIs both within the role and within the wider police organisation. Doing so would foster a sense of value for CIs which, in turn, would work to enhance the quality of service and the performance of the CID. Furthermore, if CIs are to be utilised as more than support, formal consideration/recognition should be given to this with regard to appropriate remuneration and powers/protection. A 'harmonising' of officer and staff pay would help to improve long-term commitment to the role and would also serve to further consolidate CI integration within the units. The Chief Constable’s ability to implement a range of optional powers seemed to engender confusion and frustration for CIs, the public and police colleagues and served to perpetuate inconsistency with regard to CI use between forces. Like the CI role more generally, a marked degree of ambiguity was found to exist with regard to the enforcement powers of CIs amongst participants at both Shorewick and Newbank which, if left unaddressed, has the potential to impact significantly on the overall legitimacy of the organisation.

At present, forces do not have the same range of instruments at their disposal with regard to the management of officer workforce as they do with police staff workforce. Of necessity, these differences in treatment place disproportionate burden on police staff.

\[206\] Winsor (2012: 19-20) recommended that in the near future, police officer and police staff terms and conditions of employment should remain separate on the basis of discretion and personal responsibility although they may move closer together over time.
members whose employment can be much more easily terminated. This imbalance in conditions of service could lead to reverse-civilianisation in some areas (as appears to be the case at Shorewick), where officers are moved into jobs which were previously done more efficiently and, in many cases, to a higher professional standard, by skilled and experienced police staff. To indiscriminately remove CIs would be a detriment to the CID and wherever possible, CIs numbers need to be maintained to retain the gains made. Evidence presented in this chapter also suggests that a rather inconsistent approach to cost-cutting may be taking place which will be likely to ultimately result in even further inconsistency between police forces with regard to the utilisation of CIs.
Chapter Seven: Survey Findings

7.1 Introduction

To achieve breadth of understanding with regard to the utilisation of CIs and also provide additional context to the qualitative component of this study, data obtained from the qualitative stage of the study were supplemented by data gathered by a semi-structured survey. This chapter presents and analyses the results of the survey (with chapter sub-headings reflecting the coding frame used to analyse the survey data), highlighting findings of particular interest in relation to both the qualitative data gathered during fieldwork and also, in relation to the overall aims and objectives of the research (see Chapter One, section 1.1). The survey (see Appendix 5) was administered via email and was addressed to the Detective Chief Superintendent (DCS) of each of the 43 police constabularies across E&W. As such, data collected and presented in this chapter reflect a top down, management view of life and thus, findings are not necessarily comparable to those presented in chapters Five and Six. The survey was broadly intended to assess the deployment of CIs between police forces and aimed primarily to gauge the consistency of current practices with regard to their numbers and use across the country. The survey was also intended to corroborate and/or discredit where relevant data gathered from the qualitative stage of the study and in doing so, aimed to assess the typicality of CI use in E&W and thus, the potential generalisability of the study’s overall findings.

Questionnaires were sent to each force on three separate occasions over a two-month period. This was done so as to ensure the best possible rate of response for the survey. In total 15\textsuperscript{207} questionnaires were returned from 14 of the 43 police forces nationwide providing an overall response rate of 33 per cent. The 14 forces that volunteered their participation in this part of the study were as follows: Avon & Somerset, Bedfordshire, Cumbria, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, South Yorkshire, Suffolk, Sussex, Warwickshire and West Mercia. It is also important to note that all of those police forces who responded were based in

\textsuperscript{207} Three questionnaires were returned from Sussex, one for each of its subdivisions: Brighton and Hove, East Sussex and West Sussex. Data from Warwickshire and West Mercia were reported and returned together on one questionnaire.
England and as such, survey findings are not necessarily representative of CI utilisation within Welsh police forces.

Of the 14 police forces that responded to the survey, data provided by four (Sussex, Hertfordshire, Warwickshire and West Mercia) required additional noteworthy interpretation. The reasons for and details of this are as follows:

- Sussex returned three individual questionnaires, one for each of its subdivisions: Brighton and Hove, East Sussex and West Sussex. For ease of analysis, data from each questionnaire returned from Sussex were combined and were reported simply as Sussex’s general response. Where relevant information provided by each subdivision has also been reported individually in this chapter and this has been made explicit where necessary.

- It is important to note that data provided by Hertfordshire in response to the questionnaire also included information pertaining to the deployment of 10 CIs who, at the time the survey was undertaken, worked in collaborated units such as Major Crime which covered Bedfordshire, Cambridge and Hertfordshire. Data therefore may not be entirely representative of Hertfordshire as an individual force.

- At the time the survey was undertaken, Warwickshire and West Mercia constabularies were involved in a strategic operational alliance and as such, data in relation to the deployment of CIs within each of these forces were largely combined and reported in one questionnaire. For the purposes of analysis and also, to ensure the most accurate reporting of the survey data, data supplied by Warwickshire and West Mercia in relation to Section One of the questionnaire were interpreted as being the inclusive response of both forces. This is however with the exception of Section Two of the questionnaire in which both Warwickshire and West Mercia were able to provide force specific data with regard to numbers and contract terms of CIs working at both these forces. As such, where n=13 forces in this chapter, this is where Warwickshire and West Mercia have been reported as combined. Similarly, where n=14, this is where both these forces have been reported individually.

With these acknowledgments in mind and owing much to the scoping nature of the study and overall aim of the survey, brevity is favoured in this chapter; the main role of these data was to substantiate where necessary and provide context to findings obtained in the
qualitative stage of the study. Findings of the survey are structured around the following topics or themes which arose from the results:

- Extent and nature of CI utilisation;
- attitudes of management towards CI utilisation;
- accountability and management of CIs;
- engagement with the private sector.

As stated previously, data collected by the survey were intended primarily for descriptive purposes. However, it was originally envisaged that should a response rate of 50 per cent or higher be achieved, inferential statistics may also be used to draw conclusions relating to the generalisability of findings. As the overall survey response rate for the questionnaire did not reach 50 per cent (it was 33 per cent), descriptive statistics were used to analyse the data, providing an overall summary of findings. Findings presented in this chapter are supported by relevant statistical commentary and where appropriate, by tabulated and graphical description.

7.2 Numbers of CIs

A key aim of the survey was to try to assess the degree of consistency with regard to numbers of CIs currently working within police forces throughout the country and in doing so, address research objective four of the study: Explore the degree of consistency with regard to CI deployment and utilisation between forces. All 14 of those police forces that responded to the survey stated that they currently employed CIs within their individual force, although as Figure 3 illustrates, an obvious degree of inconsistency was found to exist with regard to the numbers of CIs working within the participating forces.

10 of the 14 forces that responded to the survey were able to provide exact numbers of CIs working within their individual force at the time the survey was undertaken. While unable to provide exact figures, both Hampshire and Kent constabularies did make available approximate data suggesting large scale utilisation of CIs in both these forces (see Figure 3). Two forces (Avon & Somerset and Northamptonshire) declined to provide information relating to specific numbers of personnel and thus, have not been included in the subsequent analysis and findings presented in this section.
Of all the police force areas surveyed, Cumbria was found to employ the fewest number of CIs with a reported total of six. The force with the highest exact number of CIs was Warwickshire with a total of 67, followed by Nottinghamshire who, at the time the survey was undertaken, employed a total of 61 CIs (a mix of public and private sector agency personnel). 11\(^{208}\) of the 14 forces surveyed stated that their force employed part-time CIs. Of those forces that were able to provide exact numbers of CIs\(^{209}\) working on part-time contracts in their force (a total of eight forces), 37 out of a total of 329 CIs working at those forces were found to be employed on a part-time basis suggesting that the vast majority of CIs were employed on a full time basis. The mean number of CIs found working within those police forces that chose to provide information in response to this section of the survey was 51. Findings are therefore generally indicative of the wide scale and inconsistent usage of CIs by police forces across the country. They are also perhaps suggestive of varying approaches/strategies of coping with the practical realities of policing post-spending review in E&W.

**Figure 3. Numbers of CIs identified working within participating police forces**

\[\text{Bedfordshire, Cumbria, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Nottinghamshire, Suffolk, Sussex, South Yorkshire, Warwickshire and West Mercia.}\]

\[\text{Bedfordshire, Cumbria, Hertfordshire, Nottinghamshire, South Yorkshire, Sussex, Warwickshire, West Mercia.}\]
7.3 Types of Work and Tasks Undertaken by CIs

The survey also intended to gauge whether there was any discernible consistency with regard to the types of work (areas of investigation) and specific tasks CIs were required to undertake between forces. Of the 14 police forces that responded to the survey, 12 said they had role profiles for CIs working within their individual force suggesting that the CI role may be being informally negotiated in the other forces. Gloucestershire was the only force to explicitly state that it did not hold role profiles for CIs at the time the survey was undertaken. Kent answered ‘don’t know’. As is evidenced in Table 3, findings suggest that the type of work being undertaken by CIs in police forces across E&W was wide ranging and are also suggestive of wide scale CI involvement in key areas of investigative work.

Findings from the survey show CI utilisation was most concentrated in four key areas of work: ‘burglary’, ‘fraud’, ‘rape and sexual assault’ and ‘theft’. In comparison and as evidenced in Table 3, CIs were least likely to be involved in ‘kidnapping’, ‘child abuse’, ‘arson’ and ‘murder’ investigations. At Hampshire CIs were also identified to be involved in ‘paedophile online investigation’, ‘economic crime investigation’ and ‘road traffic death investigations’ suggesting CI involvement in proactive investigative work. Findings are also suggestive of a high degree of CI involvement in rape and/or sexual assault investigations; in 10 of the 14 forces that responded to the survey, CIs were found to be involved in this particular area of work. However, it was made explicit to the researcher in the response provided by Sussex that CIs working in this force were restricted to involvement in ‘over clothing sexual assault’ cases and were not involved in rape investigations. As such, the researcher acknowledges that data presented in this section in relation to CI involvement in ‘rape and sexual assault’ investigations may be slightly misrepresentative of the true nature and extent of CI involvement in the investigation of this particular crime type. However, data collected by the survey and presented in this section are nonetheless suggestive of large scale CI involvement in sensitive and specialist investigations. Collected data are also indicative of notable local variances in CI utilisation in regard to operational practice between forces and in particular, of

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210 Avon and Somerset, Cumbria, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Suffolk, Sussex and Warwickshire and West Mercia. Warwickshire and West Mercia are reported combined in this section and thus, make for a reported total of 13 forces/cases in Table 3 and Table 4.
differential attitudes/orientations towards CI involvement in the more serious crime investigations by some senior police officers and managers.

Table 3. Types of work CIs were identified as being engaged in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of work</th>
<th>Number of responses (forces)</th>
<th>Per cent of cases (%) (forces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape and Sexual Assault</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Abuse</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Offences</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Assault</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Abuse</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: n = 13</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Much like the types of work CIs were found to be most regularly involved in, survey findings also show a rather expansive range of tasks which CIs may be required to undertake as part of their role. The range and extent of CI engagement in certain tasks can be seen in Table 4. ‘Taking statements’ and ‘Exhibits management’ were the most common tasks CIs were found to be most regularly undertaking. Tasks CIs were less likely to be involved in included ‘HOLMES (data set analysis)’, ‘Prisoner Processing’ and ‘Indexing’. The lesser extent of CI involvement in ‘HOLMES (data set analysis)’ and ‘Indexing’ was generally anticipated given that these particular tasks would largely only be undertaken by CIs (and warranted officers) working on large scale, major incident investigations such as serial murder and serious frauds. CIs were found to be equivalently likely to be involved in the interviewing of victims and suspects although the provision of the task of interviewing generally was found to differ between forces. For example, a
total of nine of the forces that chose to participate in the survey stated that CIs working within their individual force were involved in the interviewing of victims. Of the remaining five forces, Cumbria noted CI use only with regard to victim interviewing, whereas for Suffolk by contrast, CIs were only used only in relation to suspect interviewing. South Yorkshire, Kent and Gloucestershire stated that they did not use CIs for interviewing purposes.

Table 4. Tasks CIs were identified as being involved in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks undertaken</th>
<th>Number of responses (forces)</th>
<th>Per cent of cases (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taking statements</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibits management</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect interviewing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim interviewing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclosure</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner Processing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOLMES (data set analysis)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: n = 13</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participating forces were also asked to provide details of any other types of crime and/or tasks which CIs working within their constabulary were involved in undertaking and which were not listed on the survey. South Yorkshire, Bedfordshire and Hampshire each provided information describing a number of areas of work in which CIs were also regularly involved. These can be found presented in Table 5:

---

Table 5. Additional types of work CIs were found to be involved in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating Force</th>
<th>Additional types of work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Yorkshire</td>
<td>‘Telecommunication data enquiries, training, CCTV trawl, recover and viewing, accompany warranted officers on both enquiries and execution of warrants’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
<td>‘Volume crime offences’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>‘We have one who is a family liaison officer, surveillance loggist, RIPA, communications data applications, intelligence profiles/searches, CCTV coordinator’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participating forces were also asked to provide information as to any areas of work where CIs were not currently in use in their constabulary and in which they would likely be of benefit if introduced. Police representatives from Suffolk, Gloucestershire and Sussex each provided information in response to this question. Details of these findings can be found presented in Table 6 below:

Table 6. Areas of work in which CIs were not found to be being currently used but which their use could be beneficial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating force</th>
<th>Areas of work not listed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>‘Murder investigations and general assistance to CID’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>‘CID, rape and serious sexual offence investigations, domestic abuse teams’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>‘Advanced interviewing’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings suggest that at the time the survey was undertaken CIs were not in use within the CID in Suffolk, Gloucestershire or Sussex. All three forces made explicit reference to the CID (and key areas of investigative work undertaken by the CID e.g. rape and sexual assault) as being one particular area in which CIs would likely be of benefit if introduced (see Table 6 above). These findings are suggestive of a persistent and high level of cultural resistance to CI utilisation (and progression/development) by the CID specifically in some forces. This was also corroborated by additional comments made by one survey respondent:
A good interviewer does not have to be a warranted officer. I have some first-rate investigators who knock the spots off some of my warranted officers regarding interview skill. Uniform colleagues recognise this - the real cultural resistance to civilian investigators and them being PIP 2 accredited (detective trained) comes from CID.

Finally, participants were also asked to provide information relating to any areas of work in which CIs could be considered to be operating a supervisory style role in their force. Participants from seven forces were able to identify such areas of work. Details of these can be found listed in Table 7. While some forces were more specific than others with regard to the information they were able to provide in response to this question, it is clear that in at least seven of those forces that responded to the survey, CIs were afforded duties which extended their role beyond that of a purely supportive nature.

**Table 7. Supervisory style work**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating Force</th>
<th>CI supervisory work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northamptonshire</td>
<td>‘Lead investigator digital images’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yorkshire</td>
<td>‘Specialist role (CCTV/exhibits, disclosure) rather than supervisory, i.e. they may manage strategies but not staffing’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>‘There are CI supervisors managing teams in the Custody Investigation Unit’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avon &amp; Somerset</td>
<td>‘The role of “police staff” is fully integrated at all levels of the constabulary from the ground, to all supervisory levels to the most senior level’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>‘There are a number of supervisory roles where CIs are employed. These are too numerous to list here but include supervision of the telephone crime investigation bureau, supervision of the image recognition unit (which includes CCTV) and forensic crime scene investigation supervision to name but a few’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>‘CCTV coordinator’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex (East)</td>
<td>‘Yes, police staff supervisors. They supervise crime work on a team; they make case disposal decisions and supervise general investigations ensuring traction with enquiry’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex (West)</td>
<td>‘We already employ civilian investigators as supervisory officers called case directors who oversee mixed civilian/police teams to investigate volume crime’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex (Brighton and Hove)</td>
<td>‘I have 3 investigators (they are all retired police sergeants) and they supervise police officers and staff investigators (including their investigations)’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4 Powers

Survey findings suggest that of the 14 forces that responded to the survey, at least 12 Chief Constables had chosen to designate CIs working within their individual force with various powers contained within the Police Reform Act 2002 (see Appendix 7). Cumbria and Kent both declined to provide any information with regard to the extent of their CIs enforcement abilities and thus, are not included in the results presented in this section. Unfortunately it is not possible to know with certainty the basis of Cumbria and Kent’s decision not to provide information in response to this question; the decision of both forces not to respond could be indicative of their forces’ decision not to designate CIs working within their constabulary at the time the survey was undertaken, or simply that participants were unsure in their response. Furthermore, and as made clear in the introductory section (7.1) of this chapter, results (from Section One of the questionnaire) for Warwickshire and West Mercia were combined and thus, have been both analysed and reported as such in this section.

Of the 12 forces (11 respondents) that chose to provide information in relation to the designation of their CIs with limited powers (question 5), 10 indicated that CIs working within their individual force had been designated with the power ‘Access and copying evidence seized by constables’. Nine of the 12 forces that responded to the question on CI powers also stated that CIs working within their force had been designated with ‘General power of seizure’ making this the second most common power afforded to CIs. Seven respondents stated that CIs working within their force had been designated with the ‘Power to enter and search after arrest’. A total of six forces stated that their CIs had been afforded the following powers: ‘Power to apply for a search warrant’, ‘Power to arrest at a police station for another offence’ and ‘Power to request an arrested person to account for certain matters’. Finally, ‘Extended power of seizure’, ‘Power to transfer persons into custody of an investigating officer’ and ‘Access to excluded and special procedure material’, were found to be the least common powers afforded to CIs with four forces (Avon & Somerset, Hampshire, Nottinghamshire and Sussex) indicating the designation of their CIs with all three of these powers.

212 Participants were asked to ‘leave blank’ any check boxes they were unsure of re powers designated to CIs (see Appendix 5).
As can be seen from the results presented in Table 8, the extent to which individual forces (Chief Constables) were found to have made use of such provisions appeared rather inconsistent. At both South Yorkshire and Gloucestershire, CIs were only found to have been afforded the power of ‘Access and copying’ whereas at Avon & Somerset and Hampshire constabularies, CIs were found to have been designated with the full range of powers available. Findings are also suggestive of localised variations in the operational and enforcement abilities/capacities of CIs even where they had been designated. For example, it was made explicit that at Sussex (East), CIs were only able to make use of the power of ‘Enter and search after arrest’ - which had only recently been afforded to CIs working within this force - when accompanied by a warranted officer. It may be that individual force and/or BCU policy/practice is placing limitations on the operational capacity of CIs resulting in the types of tasks they are required to undertake being fundamentally restricted at the ground/operational level.

Table 8. CI power designation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powers</th>
<th>Number of responses (forces)</th>
<th>Per cent of cases (%) (forces)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access and copying evidence seized by constables</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General power of seizure</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power to enter and search after arrest</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power to apply for a search warrant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power to arrest at a police station for another offence</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power to request an arrested person to account for certain matters</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power to transfer persons into custody of an investigating officer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended power of seizure</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to excluded and special procedure material</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: n = 12</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.5 Improvements in CI Contribution and Opinions of Management

This section presents findings obtained by the survey in response to questions 7, 8 and 15 which sought to identify the working arrangements of CIs and detectives and the opinion/attitude of police managers with regard to the utilisation of CIs by their force.

CIs were identified as working in mixed teams alongside warranted officers in 11 out of 14 police forces that responded to the survey. As made apparent earlier in this chapter, findings suggest that CIs were not in use within the CID at a number of forces at the time the survey was undertaken and therefore, did not work alongside police detectives. This fact was made explicit by one police manager respondent in his/her response to question 7 and is suggestive of existing cultural divisions and also of a limited degree of career progression/development for CIs in some forces:

They work alongside uniformed officers. I think CID would see that as a step too far and would resist at all costs. My investigators are viewed as a valuable part of the team and it works really well. So much so that the force has recognised their contribution and have increased the number working within volume crime investigations. My view would be - PIP 2 accreditation and train the best as advanced interviewers. CID won’t like it but tough, it makes sense and creates a positive workforce.

For question 8, participants were presented with a total of six proposed measures aimed at improving the overall contribution of CIs to the performance of the constabulary. Participants were then asked to select all that applied. With the exception of Cumbria and Warwickshire and West Mercia who declined to provide any information, of the 11 forces that did respond, 10 agreed that ‘Improvements in training’ would in fact improve the overall contribution of CIs. Bedfordshire was the only force to explicitly disagree with the statement. Eight of the 11 forces that responded to this question agreed that ‘More responsibility to be given to civilian investigators’ would improve the overall contribution of CIs and performance of the constabulary overall. However, Avon & Somerset, Kent and Hertfordshire constabularies all disagreed with this statement. Only two of the 11 forces that responded to this question agreed that ‘Improvements in equipment’ would improve the overall contribution of CIs. Seven out of the 11 forces that responded to this question felt that ‘Greater recognition of civilian investigators in the constabulary’ would positively benefit the contribution of CIs working within their constabulary. Four of the 11 forces felt that ‘Improvements in management’ would improve the contribution of CIs.
Finally, four of the 11 forces that responded to this question also agreed that ‘Greater cooperation between police and civilians’ would positively benefit the contribution of CIs and performance of the constabulary overall.

Question 15 (Section One) of the questionnaire sought to gauge the personal views/opinion of police managers with regard to the utilisation of CIs within their constabulary. Participants were presented with a series of Likert scale style response questions and were asked to indicate their level/degree of agreement with 10 statements (see Table 9) on a five-point scale basis with 1 = ‘Strongly agree’ and 5 = ‘Strongly disagree’. Participants were also afforded the option to mark ‘N/A’. In accordance with assurances made to forces and as detailed on the information sheet which was sent in accompaniment to the survey (see Appendix 5), names of individual participants and participating constabularies that chose to provide information in response to this question will not be made identifiable in this section.

Participants expressed a range of opinion with regard to their feelings on CI use within their constabulary and specifically, in their extent of agreement with a number of the specified statements. All 14 forces that responded to the survey chose to provide information in relation to this question although police managers from five participating forces chose not to provide any information or marked ‘N/A’ against a number of statements. The anonymised results of the survey are displayed in Table 9. In some instances, additional useful information/conclusions can be confidently inferred from such a response. For example, despite both claiming to have CIs working within their force, two police managers marked ‘N/A’ against the statement, ‘The CID is more efficiently run as a result of employing civilian investigators’ - suggesting that CIs may not be working within the CID at either of these forces at the time the survey was undertaken. A further police manager also stated that it was ‘too early to respond’ to this particular statement (statement 2) suggesting that CIs may have only recently been introduced to the CID at this particular force. Two respondents also stated ‘N/A’ in response to statement 4 - ‘The use of civilian investigators free up detectives to perform frontline duties’ - perhaps suggesting a more rigidly defined division of labour (and tasks) between CIs and detectives working within this constabulary. One of those same police managers also chose to mark ‘N/A’ in response to statement 8: ‘There is scope in my constabulary to better integrate constables and civilian investigators’. This supports
earlier data provided by this force in relation to the question, ‘Do your CIs work in mixed teams alongside warranted officers?’, the response for this question being ‘No’.

For ease of analysis, where forces failed to provide information for any statements, the decision was made to code these responses as ‘N/A’. Rather than indicating his/her opinion response to the statements as requested and specified by the researcher (on a five-point scale basis with 1 = ‘Strongly agree’ and 5 = ‘Strongly disagree’), one police manager chose to indicate their response as ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. The decision was made to code these responses as Agree and Disagree as it is not possible to gauge the degree of agreement and/or disagreement from this response. Responses provided by police managers at each Sussex division have not been included in the analysis presented in this section of the chapter. The decision to exclude Sussex from the analysis was based on concerns relating to assurances of anonymity made to respondents in respect of their individual responses to question 15. However, it can be said that data provided by Sussex in response to this question did demonstrate general consensus of opinion amongst managers working within this force. As such, only data collected from 13 forces (12 respondents) are presented and analysed in this section.

Table 9. Opinion of management – CI utilisation (number of responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Most civilian investigators do a good job</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The CID is more efficiently run as a result of employing civilian investigators</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. There is a serious need for civilian investigators, no matter how serious the offence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

213 Responses provided by the police manager for Warwickshire and West Mercia were combined (as per the returned questionnaire) and are reported as such in Table 9.
4. The use of civilian investigators frees up detectives (and uniform constables) to perform ‘frontline’ duties

| 2 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 |

5. Civilian investigators with specialist skills are needed for jobs within the constabulary

| 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

6. Civilian investigators should be ‘contracted in’ from outside agencies

| 0 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 0 |

7. The main reason for using civilian investigators is that they are cheaper than detectives

| 4 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

8. There is scope in my constabulary to better integrate constables and civilian investigators

| 1 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

9. The training of civilian investigators in my constabulary could be improved

| 1 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 |

10. Civilian investigators are an essential part of the modern criminal investigation process

| 2 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

As can be seen in Table 9, responses to statement 6 - ‘Civilian investigators should be contracted in from outside agencies’ - show a rather substantial degree of differing opinion amongst police managers. Most participants were found to disagree with this statement to some extent with four respondents stating that they ‘Strongly Disagree’. A
total of four police managers were found to ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ with the statement suggesting perhaps that respondents may feel that agency CI use is necessary/required on some occasions but not always, or simply that participants were yet to make up their mind on the issue. Only one police manager stated that they agreed with the statement. The statement with the greatest degree of discrepancy between police managers with regard to their extent of agreement was statement 7: ‘The main reason for using civilian investigators is that they are cheaper than detectives’. Four of those police managers that responded to this question ‘Strongly Agreed’ with this statement while only one stated that they ‘Strongly Disagreed’. The police manager at this force also chose to provide additional information in support of his response:

Yes, they are cheaper BUT it is not just about that. It is about creating a skilled mixed workforce who delivers. Civilian investigators can be better interviewers and better at prisoner processing than some of my warranted officers.

These findings are particularly suggestive of the existence of varying (and potentially hostile) attitudes to CI utilisation and also differing degrees of valuing of the CI role by police managers.

Police managers from six forces agreed to some extent with statement 3: ‘There is a serious need for civilian investigators, no matter how serious the offence’. Three managers however stated that they disagreed with the statement suggesting that in some forces, CIs may continue to undertake a more supportive style role. This is maintained by data provided by individual forces in response to question 3 (types of investigations CIs were found to be involved in) and to some extent by fieldwork findings at Shorewick.

A total of nine police managers indicated that they agreed to some extent with statement 5: ‘Civilian investigators with specialist skills are needed for jobs within the constabulary’. This is the second strongest overall affirmative response to the listed statements and suggests that in some forces, CIs are likely to be being recruited on the basis of their existing skills and specialist knowledge. Only one respondent was found to disagree with this statement.

Seven police managers agreed to some extent with statement 8: ‘There is scope in my constabulary to better integrate constables and civilian investigators’. Only one respondent stated that they disagreed with this statement suggesting that cultural divisions
may in fact continue to exist within some forces with regard to CI use and working arrangements in relation to their warranted colleagues. This is further supported by additional information provided by one police manager respondent:

We must ‘break’ the culture within the CID re the use of civilian investigators and see mixed teams conducting investigations.

The majority of police manager respondents were also found to agree to some extent with statement 9: ‘The training of civilian investigators in my constabulary could be improved’. This is generally corroborative of findings from the qualitative stage of the study in relation to training and career development for CIs at both Shorewick and Newbank. However, three of those police managers also stated that they disagreed with this particular statement suggesting differential attitudes towards CI utilisation and training provision between forces. It is also likely to be suggestive of a potential lack of awareness by police managers of CI utilisation ‘on the ground’. Respondents from the two remaining forces neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement.

A total of eight of those police managers who provided information in response to this question stated that they agreed to some extent with statement 10: ‘Civilian investigators are an essential part of the modern criminal investigation process’. Only one police manager was found to disagree with the statement. This is suggestive of acknowledgement on the part of police managers with regard to the economic necessity for CIs and, taking into account responses to statements 5 and 7, is also potentially reflective of the need for investigators with specialist skills and an increased valuing of the applicability of specialist knowledge and skills-sets which may have been developed outside of the police organisation.

### 7.6 Supervision and Training

All of the participating forces\(^{214}\) provided information relating to the supervision of CIs working within their constabulary. CIs were found to be supervised most often by either a Sergeant or a Detective Sergeant (depending on the unit) with CIs found to be being supervised by either one in all of the forces that responded to the survey (see Table

\(^{214}\) Warwickshire and West Mercia reported in this section as combined.
However, this was also found to be dependent on the unit in which CIs were located. In three of the forces that provided information (Suffolk, Kent and Sussex), CIs working in certain units could also be supervised by non-warranted (civilian) investigator supervisors on a day to day basis. For example, at Kent CIs were supervised by CI supervisors in both the ‘Civilian Investigation Bureau’ and ‘Image Recognition Unit’. However, those working within the Major Crime Unit were supervised by a Detective Sergeant suggesting the existence of clearly established divisions in the management of CIs at some forces which was likely to depend on the severity of the crime being dealt with. 11 of the 13 forces that responded to the question stated explicitly that the role of CI line manager also fell to a Sergeant or Detective Sergeant (depending on the unit). However, at Suffolk ‘Civilian Police Supervisors’ and at Sussex, non-warranted ‘Investigator Supervisors’ and/or ‘Civilian Case Directors’, were also found to act as line managers for CIs. At Nottinghamshire the role of line manager for CIs was undertaken by an Inspector or Detective Inspector. With the exception of Kent and Bedfordshire, both of whom responded with ‘don’t know’, the 11 remaining forces were able to confirm that their internal complaints procedure also applied to CIs employed directly by the police organisation.

Table 10. Supervision of CIs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating Force</th>
<th>CI supervision (day to day)</th>
<th>CI supervision (line manager)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avon &amp; Somerset</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
<td>Sergeants (prisoner handling, uniform)</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumbria</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant or Sergeant (although while being tutored i.e. until independent, their tutor will likely take on this role.)</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant or Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hertfordshire</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>Depends on unit. Detective Sergeant (major crime), Civilian Investigation Bureau (Civilian Investigator Supervisor who are in turn supervised by Detective</td>
<td>Depends on unit – mixture of Detective Sergeants/Sergeants and Civilian Staff Supervisors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 13 respondents who chose to provide information in response to this question, 11 explicitly stated that their CIs were provided with some form of induction training in order to prepare them for the role (Question 10). Cumbria and Gloucestershire were the only forces to state explicitly that they did not offer new CI recruits any formal induction training for the role at the time the survey was undertaken.

Data obtained by the survey show an inconsistent approach to training between participating forces with some forces demonstrating a better established and/or more comprehensive training programme for CIs working within their force than others. Evidence suggests a variable mix of role specific (‘instructive to practice’) and more general (‘introduction to the organisation’) style training for CIs although as was found to be the case at Warwickshire and West Mercia, it may be that some forces continue to assume the suitability of ex-officers for the role. Those forces that answered affirmatively to the question, ‘Are the CIs working in your constabulary required to undertake any induction style training for the role?’, were asked to provide specific details of the
training afforded to CIs within their force at the time the survey was undertaken. Of the 11 forces that did state that their CIs were provided with training in preparation for the role, 10 of those (the exception being Northamptonshire who were ‘unsure’ as to the details of the training provided to CIs in their force) were able to provide additional details which are presented in the table below (Table 11):

Table 11. Details of CI training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating Force</th>
<th>Training Elaboration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Yorkshire</td>
<td>‘Specific training bespoke to the elements of major crime i.e. disclosure in line with Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act, Home Office Large Major Enquiry System awareness, exhibits etc. as part of the general integration into the major crime team as per all staff. Supported both in major crime and district by master class events and street skill training, access to National Centre for Applied Learning Technologies (online learning programmes) and other bespoke training provided by the force on an as required basis’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottinghamshire</td>
<td>‘Initial - 4-week training programme - covering health and safety, professional standards, theft, burglary, exhibits, safeguarding, domestic abuse, sexual offences, criminal damage, road traffic, anti-social behaviour, harassment, fraud, robbery IT systems and data. PEACE (planning and preparation - engage and explain - account clarification and challenge - closure - evaluation) 'free call model', interviews, hate crime, self-defence and criminal attempts, Hepatitis B jabs. For some CIs later on - As above also including Model of investigations, adversarial system, crime scenes, public order, witness interviews/structure, child protection, vulnerable adults, file build, suspect interviews, role of legal advisor, special warning bad character evidence. The initial Level 2 attendees have a development programme portfolio in line with PIP accreditation for detectives. This is being introduced in force and currently College of Policing is reviewing all aspects of investigation, role profiles and training requirements’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
<td>‘Induction course that involves witness/suspect interviews, file building and local procedures’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>‘We have created an induction pack and provide in house as well as learning and development supplementary courses’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avon &amp; Somerset</td>
<td>‘Training appropriate to the role which is diverse’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>‘Law training, procedure relevant to the role’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hertfordshire</td>
<td>‘Legal powers, PIP standards, risk assessment’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>‘Weeks 1-3: Introduction to the force, pocket notebooks and force IT systems and airwaves, conflict management, custody and riles, role of Police Staff Investigator and designated powers, role of a tutor and completion of police staff investigator development’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
portfolio, law - points to prove/offences (theft and robbery, burglary and aggravated burglary, criminal damage, taking without consent, vehicle interference, fraud, assaults, public order, offensive weapons and bladed articles, sexual offences, drugs), core investigative doctrine, cautions/significant statements/special warnings, Proceeds of Crime Act codes of practice, forensic awareness, house to house, searching, intelligence interviews and intelligence management, giving evidence at court, identification procedures, communications enquiries, interview records/transcripts, Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act and disclosure.

Weeks 4-5: victim and witness interviewing, suspect interviewing’.

Sussex

‘Week 1: Admin, types of offences, ‘points to prove’, theft and burglary, Police and Criminal Evidence Act powers of search and seizure, disposal options, file building, criminal damage, assaults, exhibit handling, drugs offences and drugs awareness.

Week 2: PEACE co-operative (witness) theory, PEACE witness practical, PEACE un-cooperative (suspect) theory, PEACE suspect interview practical, statement writing.

Week 3: Personal safety training, National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPSIS), victim personal statements, criminal justice system, investigation scenarios and custody procedures, special measures, tutorials, crime and intelligence management system intel - creating intelligence logs, giving evidence’.

Warwickshire & West Mercia

‘There is initial induction training, mainly to familiarise the investigator with the local IT systems. Most are ex-police officers and bring their previous skills and training with them’.

7.7 Private Sector

Participating forces were asked to provide some specific information relating to the extent of their engagement with private sector agencies for the supply of CIs. Of the 14 forces that responded to the survey of the 13 (93 per cent) provided information in response to this particular set of questions (Part 2b, Questions 19-22). Northamptonshire was the only force that declined to respond to this question. Avon & Somerset and Kent both stated ‘Don’t know’. Of the 13 forces that did respond, three (Gloucestershire, Hertfordshire and Nottinghamshire) stated that their constabulary held a contract/s with a private sector agency for the supply of CIs at the time the survey was undertaken.

215 Warwickshire and West Mercia were able to provide force specific information in response to this question and thus, have been reported as two separate forces in this section.
Nottinghamshire was found to employ the largest number of agency CIs at a total of seven whereas Gloucestershire and Hertfordshire both employed a total of three each.

The typical length and type of contract for agency CIs was also found to vary between each force with Gloucestershire employing agency CIs on a fixed period of six months, Nottinghamshire at a typical length of twelve weeks and Hertfordshire on an ‘open ended’ contract basis. Both Nottinghamshire and Gloucestershire stated that they held contracts with Adecco and Hertfordshire with Reed (at the time the survey was undertaken). Two of those forces (Gloucestershire and Hertfordshire) stated that they had held contracts with private sector agencies for the supply of CIs in the past. This included the addition of past contracts held between Gloucestershire constabulary and Servoca. Two forces (Avon & Somerset and Kent) responded with ‘Don’t know’ to this section of the questionnaire meaning that it is possible that agency CIs may also have been in use within both of these constabularies at the time the survey was undertaken, although this is not possible to know for certain.

### Table 12. Private sector engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of participating force</th>
<th>Total number of agency CIs working at force (at time of survey)</th>
<th>Contract/s held (at time of survey)</th>
<th>Contract/s held (in the past)</th>
<th>Name/s of private sector agency (at the time of survey)</th>
<th>Name/s of private sector agency (in the past)</th>
<th>Typical length of contract held</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Adecco</td>
<td>Adecco, Servoca</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hertfordshire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Reed</td>
<td>Reed</td>
<td>Open ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottinghamshire</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Adecco</td>
<td>Adecco</td>
<td>12 weeks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All three forces that made use of agency CIs at the time the survey was administered and/or in the past (Gloucestershire, Hertfordshire and Nottinghamshire) also provided information relating to the types of work agency CIs were required to undertake within
their constabulary. Nottinghamshire was found to make the most expansive use of agency CIs who were involved in ‘Burglary’, ‘Domestic Abuse’, ‘Rape and sexual assault’, ‘Serious Assault’, ‘Child Abuse’ and ‘Robbery’ investigations. Gloucestershire was found to use agency CIs for comparatively fewer types of crime investigations. These included ‘Domestic Abuse’, ‘Fraud’ and ‘Murder’. Hertfordshire was found to make use of agency CIs in ‘Rape and sexual assault’ investigations only although the respondent for this force stated that agency CIs might also work within the Public Protection Unit and specifically, were involved in ‘the management of sexual offenders’.

Of the three forces found to hold contracts with private sector agencies both at the time the survey was undertaken and in the past, two (Nottinghamshire and Gloucestershire) were able to confirm that their constabularies internal complaints procedure also applied to agency CIs working within their force. When asked whether or not their agency CIs had been designated with powers, all of the forces that participated in the survey responded with either ‘No’ or N/A. There was evidence of hostile attitudes towards the utilisation of agency CIs by some senior officers, as the following quote from one respondent shows:

Not to my knowledge. We have employed them ourselves and long may that last. The thought of money making private companies making profit from investigating crime is something I find unacceptable and immoral.

### 7.8 Summary

This chapter has presented empirical findings obtained by a semi-structured survey which was undertaken during the second quantitative stage of the study. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, findings presented in this chapter are reflective of the top-down view of life and CI utilisation as observed and understood by senior police managers. Nonetheless, findings do go some way to demonstrating the breadth of CI utilisation across the country and also reveal a number of interesting points worthy of further consideration.

Arguably the most significant observation that can be made on reflection of the findings presented in this chapter is the sheer prevalence of CI utilisation. While generally speaking little consistency was found to exist with regard to the number and types of work
and tasks CIs were found to be undertaking, the fact remains that CIs were found to be working in all of those forces that responded to the survey and often in large numbers. Furthermore, CIs were found to be involved in the investigation of most types of crime including the investigation of more serious offences including assault, rape and murder (although to varying extents). They were also found to be undertaking a range of specialist areas of investigative work such as fraud and child abuse suggesting that the kind of investigations that would have once been reserved for officers working within the CID are now also been given to CIs. Together, data provided in relation to both the types of work and tasks CIs were involved in at the time the survey was administered also suggest that CIs may be undertaking a variable role within forces; local variations in CI utilisation mean that in some forces the nature of the CI role may be more representative of that of a member of ‘support staff’ than in others. In forces where the CI role was more in keeping with that of ‘support staff’ or where CIs were restricted to the investigation of low level volume crime, the results suggest that this is likely to be being maintained by cultural resistance to CIs, in particular by the CID.

While the extent of CI designation with powers was also found to differ somewhat substantially between participating forces, survey findings are nonetheless suggestive of the large scale uptake of the provision by Chief Constables across the country. Coupled with findings relating to the tasks being undertaken by CIs and the fact that CIs were more likely to work in mixed teams with warranted officers, such findings are also indicative of potentially large scale blurring of warranted and non-warranted roles. With regard to the supervision and training of CIs, data from the survey suggests that CIs were most likely to be supervised by a Detective Sergeant and/or Sergeant (depending on the unit in which they work). However, in some forces they might also be being supervised by non-warranted (civilian) supervisors suggesting potential opportunities for CI progression and also for their involvement in leading investigations. Data obtained by the survey also evidence the undertaking of similar supervisory style roles by CIs in a number of forces although these may not have been formally recognised and/or satisfactorily acknowledged in terms of pay in all forces. Training provision for CIs was also found to differ somewhat significantly between those forces that responded to the survey with data showing an inconsistent approach to training between participating forces. Some forces were found to operate a more well established and/or comprehensive training programme for CIs working within their force than others with evidence suggesting a variable mix of
role specific (‘instructive to practice’) and more general (‘introduction to the organisation’) style training for CIs.

Where the opinion of individual police manager respondents was sought in the questionnaire (questions 8 and 15, see Appendix 5), participants provided a range of views suggesting a variable (yet generally positive) mix of attitudes towards the utilisation and training of CIs by senior officers. Findings in relation to these questions were also suggestive of a potential lack of valuing of the extent to which the CI role has developed as well as a concurrent lack of awareness by police managers of the role being played by CIs ‘on the ground’. It was also clear from police manager responses that a general recognition of the need for CIs with specialist skills is likely to exist along with better scope to integrate CIs and warranted officers. Finally, evidence presented in this chapter is also suggestive of limited engagement with private sector agencies with regard to the supply of CIs which is likely to be being resisted by some forces and, in some instances, rather successfully by the CID.

Overall, the survey was successful in its primary intention of providing context to the qualitative findings presented in earlier chapters. This chapter has demonstrated not only wide-spread and inconsistent utilisation of CIs between police forces across the country, but findings are also indicative of the fact that CIs may be operating a role that extends far beyond that of a ‘junior partner’. Many of the kinds of investigation that once would have been given to CID (and to detectives) are now being given to CIs. This suggests a sharp break with the past and indicates that CIs may indeed have a large ‘foot in the door’ in respect of their position as investigators within the contemporary CID. These issues and their potential implications for criminal investigation provision and for warranted detectives will be explored in greater detail next, in Chapter Eight.
Chapter Eight: Discussing the Role of the CI: A Shift in the Terrain

8.1 Introduction

I have in this thesis endeavoured to provide an original contribution to knowledge by producing an authentic account of CI utilisation as it was at the time the research was undertaken. In doing so - and in the absence of any previous empirical research documenting the experiences of CIs - this exploratory study has endeavoured to inform extant debates on the civilianisation of core areas of police work by exploring the world and work of an otherwise unknown body of police personnel. By drawing upon extensive fieldwork and relevant literature, this thesis offers a theoretically and empirically informed insight into the contribution being made by CIs to the contemporary criminal investigation across E&W. After setting the scene in Chapter Four, Chapters Five to Seven explored in considerable detail the occupational and organisational milieu in which CIs were found to be operating. Within these chapters the analytical themes that emerged from the analysis were outlined and discussed and were supported through reference to the primary data gathered during fieldwork. This final chapter will provide a much broader discussion of these findings and their implications for our understanding of emerging (re-emerging) patterns of policing and in particular, what can be inferred from current practices with regard to the utilisation of CIs about the future of criminal investigation and the detective role and title.

In this section I want to consider in more detail the extent to which the role being played by the CI has impacted upon organisational and occupational dynamics within the CID. In doing so, this chapter will draw upon relevant theoretical works (see Chapter Two, sections 2.2.5 and 2.3.4) - in particular those of Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971, 1972), Hoogenboom (1991) and Bourdieu (1977) - in order to reflect upon the potential implications of CI utilisation on the detective role and the future character of criminal investigation. The deployment of CIs can - and will throughout this chapter - be considered in the context of extant debates concerning the socio-cultural significance of the police (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1970; Freiberg, 2001; Goldsmith, 2005; Innes, 2004; Loader, 1997; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Manning, 1997; Skolnick, 1966; Walker, 2000) and police organisational change (Bradley, Walker and Wilkie, 1986; Chan, 1996; 1997; Manning, 1977; 1979; Punch, 1983; Wood, 2004). The discussion that follows provides
reflections on the current utilisation of CIs, explores the potential future trajectory of the CI role within a climate of economic austerity and examines the potential impact of CI use on the contemporary criminal investigation process. Consideration is also given throughout this chapter to the central research questions and aims and objectives of this study which were stated initially in Chapter One and which are as follows:

1) What is the role being undertaken by civilian investigators working in police forces across E&W?
2) To what extent can civilian investigators be considered to be performing a junior partner role when compared to the role of warranted detectives?

- Develop knowledge and understanding of the CI role - their experiences, working practices, occupational identity and positioning and sense of value.
- Critically explore the influence of organisational factors upon CI working practices and occupational identity.
- Examine relationships between non-warranted CIs and warranted police DCs and in so doing, explore the drivers and inhibitors to integration and effective investigative practice.
- Survey trends and level of consistency in the numbers, coordination and utilisation of CIs by police forces across the country.
- Develop insights with regard to the future trajectory of the CI role and the criminal investigation process in E&W.

8.2. The Wrong Side of the ‘Frontline’?

This study has demonstrated that CIs have a different experience of police work and of working within the police organisation than that of warranted police officers. At a fundamental level the limited authority and restricted enforcement abilities of CIs placed somewhat inevitable limits on their sense of value and status within the units in which they worked. As seen in Chapter Five, it also reduced their capacity to engage in the dominant detective culture within the CID and thus, restricted the degree of integration they were able to achieve. For the most part CIs felt valued by their colleagues within the units in which they worked but not by the police organisation itself. This was largely attributed to the perceived failure of the organisation to acknowledge, at a formal level,
the role and contribution now being made by CIs. As findings presented in this thesis (see Chapters Five and Six) suggest, these conditions are currently being reinforced through a twin-track approach to the pay, training and opportunities for progression which are currently being afforded to CIs and which, in many instances, do not sufficiently reflect the nature of the role being performed in practice.

Preceding chapters of this thesis have presented evidence to suggest that a move towards the civilianisation of the detective role is indeed taking place on the ground in some police forces in E&W. The prevalence of CI utilisation by police forces is perhaps one of the most striking features of this research and reflects recent changes in the socio-political context in which the police, like other public sector organisations, have been subject to increased scrutiny and reform (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.4). Concerns have long been expressed about the cost-effectiveness of the police, and the introduction and permissive evolution of the CI role was itself firmly circumscribed by their usefulness to police budgets, as well as for their allowance for operational specialisation and overall expeditiousness of the CID. Introduced with a view of supporting the work of detectives, CIs were originally conceived as the junior partners of their warranted colleagues and thus, were envisaged as undertaking a complementary role. However, as discussed in detail in Chapters Five and Six, the power of the performance culture in the organisation is such that CIs were found to have become increasingly utilised in tasks outside of their support role and remit, providing evidence of mission creep (Caless, 2007).

Diverted from their primary supportive role, CIs have subsequently become increasingly involved in frontline police work and in tasks traditionally considered as requiring the specialist and peculiar skills-set of a detective. In many cases, the evolution of the CI role had resulted in a notable degree of blurring between the CI designation and that of detectives. This meant that a marked degree of disparity existed between the role as it was initially conceived (and often, how it was still defined on paper e.g. in role profiles) with how it was actually being effected ‘on the ground’. The result of this was that, as discussed in Chapters Five and Six, in some instances CIs were being drawn into types of work and/or duties for which they had received little to no formal training and in which their personal safety and/or emotional wellbeing was sometimes being compromised. Furthermore, despite persistent political rhetoric/parlance suggesting otherwise (Green,
2013), CIs were found to have been afforded a marked degree of agency and autonomy with regard to their role with some occupying the position of supervisors and/or CID unit managers. While not always found to be being formally acknowledged and/or financially recompensed by the organisation, in this sense, CIs were commonly being afforded responsibility for determining the strategic direction and ultimate success of investigations including those of a more serious and complex nature. Together findings suggest that, in terms of their duties at least, CIs had often adopted a role more representative of an equal partner than that of junior partner.

The ability of organisations to change and make decisions is bounded by their context (Clark, McLoughlin, Rose and King, 1988; Nee, 1998; Pettigrew, 1987; Wischnevsky, 2004). Features related to the police organisation itself may help to explain the variation in the utilisation of CIs across forces. Indeed, alongside the notable prevalence of their use, the research also identified a significant degree of inconsistency with regard to the deployment of CIs between forces across the country. Work by O’Neill (2014) suggests this to be a trend much in keeping with the sporadic deployment of PCSOs who now, in many respects, can be considered the paraprofessionals of police patrol. A number of subtle variables can be considered as having given rise to such striking variance in CI use; first, at a fundamental level the enduring principle of constabulary independence means that, in effect, 43 police constabularies continue to operate in 43 different ways. In this sense, the utilisation of CIs can be viewed as the latest development in a historic trend of inconsistency in civilianisation. Second, the nature of police funding is such that levels of reliance upon central government contribution differs somewhat markedly between forces, the result being that while some forces were confronted with 10 per cent budget cuts, others had to produce more than 25 per cent savings (HMIC, 2013: 28). Third, not all forces had the same amount of ‘fat to trim’, with annual force expenditure per head of population ranging from £150 to £250 (HMIC, 2013: 36)\(^{216}\). This was particularly found to be the case at Newbank which, in comparison to Shorewick, was a much ‘leaner’ force. Fourth, as noted by Gill (2013), senior police officer attitudes towards civilianisation - in particular non-warranted involvement in core areas of police work - continue to vary

\[^{216}\text{For example, Lincolnshire Police who were facing a relatively modest 16 per cent funding gap as a result of the Home Office budget cut were already an extraordinarily lean force with the lowest annual expenditure per head of population and the lowest total workforce numbers per head of population across all forces (HMIC, 2013: 36, 153).}\]
considerably, ranging from ‘embracers’ and ‘pragmatists’ to ‘sceptics’. This was also found to be a prime variable on which the decision to circumvent utilisation of agency CIs was premised at Shorewick and was also a key factor encouraging discrepancy in enforcement abilities afforded to CIs between forces. Fifth, like other members of police staff, CIs were introduced on the assumption that they would free-up warranted officers from duties and tasks not requiring their expertise and/or powers of enforcement, who could then return to the frontline. Although no fixed definition exists, frontline officers and staff are generally considered as being involved in the public crime-fighting face of the force. This includes neighbourhood policing, response policing and criminal investigation (HMIC, 2011: 15). Police managers were also found to vary somewhat in their understanding of the term frontline and its applicability to CIs who in many instances were found to be performing a highly comparable if not identical role to that of warranted officers.

Without doubt, increasing marketisation, policies which enhance and embrace the idea of multi-agency collaborative working and an economic climate in which the biggest spending cuts since the Second World War are being felt across the public sector imply testing times for the police organisation and those professionals/paraprofessional working within. Warranted police detectives face multifarious challenge, not purely in terms of how they execute their role, but fundamental questions around their values, sense of salience and professional identity: provoking questions around what it means to be an effective detective in the 21st century. Similar to Silvestri’s (2003: 2) analysis of women in leadership positions in the police, the utilisation of CIs can be viewed as ‘both a symbol of and indeed a measure of organisational change [italics added]’. The CID like many other areas of the organisation can be presented as a ‘shifting arena’ in which new and existing organisational territories and occupational boundaries are being redrawn as warranted officers struggle against emerging new ‘players’ within the existing ‘field’ for access to specific resources and associated capital (Bourdieu, 1977; Jenkins, 2002: 84). The result has been the emergence of a more complex set of identities and working practices within the CID, meaning that the current situation is more dynamic and fluid than is often suggested by fixed organisation charts and job descriptions. 

[217] The multi-agency nature of the contemporary CID (for example, as can be seen with multi-agency public protection arrangements in relation to serious and sexual offenders and joint working arrangements between the police and other public and/or third sector workers including the co-location of social workers within
Emergent new professional identities have allowed new forms of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1990) to enter the fray which may be considered symptomatic of clear diversification of the workforce and the dilution of pre-existing binary (CI/DC) task based divisions within the CID. Indeed, in those forces in which fieldwork was undertaken, CIs and DCs were found to be constantly renegotiating the divide with regard to the ‘core’ elements of their work as they each struggled to maintain a degree of ‘ownership’ over their role and thus, their occupational identity. Furthermore, in many areas of work the CI and detective role had ‘blended’ (Whitchurch, 2009) to the extent that what can be described as a freewheeling approach to investigations had developed, paving the way for the rise a more broadly defined and conceived ‘professional investigator’ role. Drawing upon Bourdieu’s (1990) celebrated work on the relations between ‘habitus’ (cultural knowledge) and ‘field’ (structural conditions), what is clear from the findings presented in this study is that social/power relations within the CID were changing as ‘professional’ warranted and non-warranted investigators struggled to affirm their respective positions. Within this shifting terrain, access to specific resources was the aim of the game as CIs struggled to accumulate valuable social, cultural and symbolic capital in the form of valued relations, specialist skills and/or experiential knowledge and prestige.

The use and subsequent evolution of the CI role marks a noteworthy shift in the terrain with regard to the undertaking of criminal investigations to an extent which is unprecedented in the history of the CID. The use of CIs (as with other police staff working in the CID e.g. intelligence analysts, crime scene examiners etc.) has also created new spaces and professional spheres of activity in which warranted officers have little stake and/or where they have, over time, relinquished their claim. With monopoly over duties and knowledge as key to recognition as a professional (Abbott, 1988), in some cases the CI’s jurisdiction appears to have been firmly secured as their technical and tacit knowledge and increasingly diverse skill-set have provided specialist expertise. It is now clear that in order for the modern criminal investigation process to be effective, it must draw upon a varied range of expertise which may also be gleaned from other sectors than policing and/or agencies/areas of ‘professional’ work. For example, risk assessment, fraud and/or financial crime investigations and investigations into child exploitation and

the child protection teams and Domestic Violence Advocates within public protection units) coupled with the move towards an increasingly more scientific and proactive approach to investigation has seen the arrival of a host of new ‘players’ within the CID. Such developments have, in part, helped to solidify the broadening remit/orientation of the contemporary police ‘service’.
abuse are areas of work in which it is entirely possible to develop applicable and transferable skills and expertise in professional arenas which exist outside of the police organisation. CIs therefore may bring with them new bodies of knowledge that challenge the traditionally perceived hegemony of professional expertise held by detectives - although somewhat crucially, this may only be true with regard to non-ex-officer CIs. The limited transferability of such specialist expertise extends the claim of CIs (in some instances) to cultural and economic capital within the police organisation and often to an extent which is not necessarily attainable by their warranted counterparts. In this sense, CIs (as with the civilianisation process as an aspect of the police organisation more broadly) have become ‘institutionalised’ within the units in which they were located in that their use has seemingly come to be considered both necessary and appropriate for the overall efficiency and legitimacy of the contemporary CID (Kostelac, 2008; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983: 26).

Where CIs were not able to legitimate their claim as fully fledged ‘professional’ investigators, alternative means of achieving such status were often sought e.g. adopting prescribed cultural characteristics of police DCs. Although largely dependent on the unit in which they were located and nature of the role being undertaken, for the most part the ‘working personality’ of CIs generally reflected that commonly associated with DCs (Skolnick, 1966). Given the often overlapping nature of their remits, such cultural characteristics also acted as a pragmatic strategy or coping mechanism (Innes, 2003) for CIs and, like their warranted counterparts, formed a key part of their professional role and identity. CIs displayed an obvious ‘sense of mission’ and generally possessed an action-oriented outlook towards their work which aligned with the traditional crime fighting ethos of the police organisation. While exerting a powerful influence over CI occupational identities and orientations to the role generally, pressure to adopt a crime control-oriented perspective was most clearly observed amongst non-ex-officer CIs who appeared keen to engage with this approach in an effort to prove their value to their warranted colleagues. By ‘proving themselves’ to be competent and trustworthy or through the acquisition of experiential knowledge, CIs were able to absolve themselves of their civilian status to a certain extent. Furthermore, as was discussed in Chapter Five, in some instances the civilian status of CIs was found to afford them a degree of organisational non-partisanship and occupational legitimacy in their interactions with members of the public and in this sense, also enabled them to convert their occupational deficit to a valuable advantage.
Police managers at both forces maintained the firm belief that unlike CIs, warranted officers were able to ensure a fixed degree of operational flexibility and resilience within the CID. The reality of this popular conviction however is subject to question and will be considered in more detail later in this chapter. Nonetheless, the supposed degree of operational flexibility believed to be offered by warranted officers was posited on two key factors; first, a pervasive awareness was found to exist amongst managers with regard to the perceived potential strategic benefit of having a body of personnel whose contracts place limits on their degree of operational agency (e.g. officers can be ordered to remain on duty if needed whereas police staff cannot). Second, the alleged functional redeployability of those officers working within the CID was also frequently referred to by police managers when discussing the value of and distinction between warranted officers and CIs (this will be discussed in more detail subsequently). The latter of these known ‘facts’ was itself grounded in the notion of operational omnicompetence (Stelfox, 2009), a belief which was found to afford officers a great deal of added value as a resource when compared to CIs. CIs by contrast were considered to be more unyielding in terms of their potential for relocation within the CID and between units and thus, were often regarded as less desirable from a strategic point of view. While managers and officers saw the value of CIs in terms of their alleged cost-effectiveness and specialist expertise (in some cases), CIs were fundamentally limited in terms of the degree of integration they were able to achieve within the units in which they worked by their status as ‘civilians’. For those CIs with no prior policing experience, this was further bolstered by their perceived lack of experiential knowledge of the field and thus, their concomitant illegitimacy as ‘professional’ investigators within the organisation.

With the exception of ex-officers, CIs had not undergone the same process of screening and training as their warranted colleagues and, perhaps most importantly, had not served their time ‘on the streets’. For managers and officers, it was the procurement of this valuable experiential knowledge which ultimately afforded warranted officers preferential status over CIs. While undoubtedly of value, the centrality of this body of practical ‘craft’ knowledge and experience to the undertaking of effective detective work remains subject to debate and/or clarification. The perceived legitimacy of CIs was also further (and somewhat fundamentally) undermined by the fact that, as ‘civilians’, their actions and/or judgements when operating in the field were not supposed to be predicated on the same degree of independence and impartiality as officers. As bearers of the ‘Office
of Constable’ and servants of the Crown, officers are bestowed a status of neutrality which presupposes integrity and diligence in judgement beyond that afforded to ordinary ‘employees’. However, with regard to CIs, the issue of their operational independence and thus, their theoretical legitimacy and accountability as ‘law enforcers’ was less implicit. This issue was further complicated when considering the ad hoc fashion through which CIs can - and indeed were at Newbank - be afforded an extensive range of police type powers of enforcement comparable to those afforded to warranted constables. While the powers afforded to CIs (by the 2002 Act) did not extend to arrest (outside of a police station) and/or the use of force, they did afford CIs a degree of agency with regard to their operational decision making which had the potential to impact directly on the perceived legitimacy of the CID.

Furthermore, the potential value of this ‘base’ knowledge and experience was often bolstered by an implicit belief in its enabling of the redeployability of officers. While theoretically possible, the ease with which detectives can be redeployed in practice, to undertake other areas of investigative work within the CID, may be being overstated in some instances. To view detectives as a homogenous, redeployable resource on the basis of their warranted status and implicit within that, their wide-ranging experiential knowledge, is to perhaps overlook the increasingly complex, multifaceted and specialised remit of the contemporary CID. Nevertheless, the crucial fact remains that, unlike CIs, warranted officers are trained in the use of force and, because of police development, are also generically trained to undertake public order duties (to Level 3). They can be called upon (at any time) to aid in the quelling of urban unrest and, most fundamentally, remain the only body of individuals who possess the capacity to engage in the open-ended and legitimate use of force (both violent and incapacitating) in any given situation (Bittner, 1970). With this in mind, it could indeed be argued that while CIs may in some instances be undertaking roles and duties which place them far outside the territory of the paraprofessional, in terms of their organisational/occupational position and value as a resource, CIs by their very nature must somewhat inevitably acquiesce to a junior partner

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218 Level 3 public order training is the lowest level of public order training given to all police officers in E&W. It is part of the basic training package provided to constables during their initial training period. As well as facilitating peaceful protest, this training covers cordon work and how to implement other police tactics. Officers trained to Level 3 are not routinely trained and are considered the police’s reserve in the event of serious disorder. Officers can be trained to subsequent levels (Level 2 and Level 1) to deal with serious disorder and are provided with more specialist training on the use of impactful tactics (e.g. use of armoured Land Rovers).
status. However, I would argue that this may only be the case in so far as arrest and violence are necessary for investigation. For the most part the power to deprive an individual of their liberty most commonly occurs at one of two stages in the investigatory process; either at the initial stage, in the period immediately following committal of the offence, or at the culminating point of an investigation when a suspect has been identified. At both points (and with the exception of arrests made by DCs during voluntarily questioning at a police station), the initial arrest of a suspect is most commonly made by a uniformed officer. Indeed, as evidence presented in Chapter Six suggests, not all kinds of investigation necessarily require investigators - whether warranted or non-warranted - to routinely enforce the power of arrest and/or engage in the use of force. Furthermore, the significance/importance of having DCs who are trained to assist in the management of large scale disorder is also debateable. Both the likelihood and overall viability of DC deployment to deal with incidents of disorder is likely (in some cases) also being overstated. This raises the related questions: is public order training needed by those working within the CID? Would the adequate provision of self-defence training be sufficient for their needs? Is the ability to arrest a fundamental requirement of those undertaking ‘detective work’ within the CID? While important for consideration in the light of the findings of this study, the word limits of this thesis do not allow for a more thorough consideration of the potential significance of these questions here. However, what the findings of this study appear to suggest is that in many ways, the role played by the warranted officer in the criminal investigation process may in reality be more representative of a powerful allegory than an irrefutable prerequisite of the criminal investigation process.

For the most part, the ‘professionalism’ of detectives and their assumed hegemony over the criminal investigation process is grounded in tradition and the legitimising ‘myths’ of ‘art’ and ‘craft’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006). In the current study, the currency of these traditional notions/processes of detective work were found to being maintained by powerful actors/groups in the field of policing (namely ACPO but also The Police Federation) whose concern over the utilisation of CIs was seemingly motivated less by rational/technical concerns with improving effectiveness and efficiency and more with how their deployment might affect the perceived sovereignty of the detective role and

219 At least so much as in the cultural sense.
title. As an organisation the police are of course responsive to the institutional environment (Bittner, 1970) or ‘surround’ (Goffman, 1974) which, according to institutional theorists such as Scott (1995), is composed of powerful ‘sovereign’ groups such as the media, politicians, public action groups and other influential external forces. These sovereigns control important resources for organisations, including not only tangible resources such as money but also less tangible resources such as legitimacy, reputation and prestige. From this perspective, organisational attributes can be viewed as ‘manifestations of powerful intuitional rules which function as highly rationalised myths that are binding on particular organisations’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 343).

Furthermore, for the most part understandings of the police have been based on normative assumptions about the way things are and should be done. Drawing upon Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power, such assumptions can be considered to rest largely on preconceived durable dispositions - what Bourdieu (1990: 52-65) terms ‘habitus’ - that incline people to think in certain entrenched ways about the role and nature of the police and police work. According to Loader and Mulcahy (2003: 42), these dispositions operate at the level of what Bourdieu often refers to as the ‘doxic’220, or at that of what Gouldner (1976) terms the ‘paleo-symbolic’221. In the case of the British police, they suggest that these predispositions ‘habitually and unquestionably lead people to construe the connection between crime, social order and policing as obvious, natural and something that ‘goes without saying’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003: 43). In many respects, the same can be said about detectives and their ‘ownership’ of the criminal investigation process. The relative ‘obviousness’ of the connection between crime investigation, the CID and the warranted detective is reinforced on a routine basis by a litany of idealising and eulogising media portrayals (Loader, 1997) and within the police itself, has become ‘institutionalised’ to the point that its significance is rarely discussed or subject to definition and/or challenge by alternatives (Zucker, 1983). As a ‘core’ part of the work of the police, criminal investigation represents a position of notable significance with regard to lay sensibilities and popularly held dispositions about the police and their role within society. Within this, ideas about the role of the detective run deep within the

220 The interplay between the habitus and the field - the collective knowledge of the social life of the field which, by its very nature, is intuitive, internalised and serves to both ‘generate and delimit people’s attitudes, perceptions and practices’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003: 42).

221 Refers to the ‘restricted communicability’ of such beliefs and sentiment, but speaks as well (in a fashion that eludes Bourdieu) of the emotionally compelling character of that which seems to be at stake - what Bauman (1990: 43) nicely refers to as ‘the feeling which precedes all reflection and argument’.
collective national consciousness and occupy a salient position within conceptions of the ‘police force of the imagination’ (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003: 315).

Of course, popular media portrayals of policing and detective work in particular continue to ensure populist perceptions of the police’s reputation and degree of prestige. This particular sovereign body also plays a noteworthy role in determining the authority of detectives as ‘experts’ in their field. The taken-for-granted idea that there is a natural connection between the detective and criminal investigation (as there is also often assumed to be between crime, social order and policing in a more general sense) is reinforced on a daily basis in the narratives of most police procedurals (Sparks, 1992; Colbran, 2012). Through these, popular discourses about detectives and their role are produced/reproduced and help to project a particular view of the world which accords by and large with that which is (to some extent) coveted by the British public. However, CI utilisation, at a fundamental level, contests the established ratio of indetermination to technicality with regard to the practising of detective work; CI use arguably raises the ‘technical’ profile of the criminal investigation process (Robinson, 2003: 594). It suggests, furthermore, that the ‘performance’ of the detective role and associated skills may in fact be something which can be taught to ‘outsiders’ who may be new to the organisation. However, as the current research shows, this continues to be framed by cultural perspectives of detective work and the degree to which individual CIs were able to satisfactorily demonstrate the necessary ‘feel for the game’ (Bourdieu, 1993) and were judged to exhibit a crime control orientation. Nonetheless, civilianisation within the CID has exposed the detective profession to competition from deputies in the form of paraprofessional CIs - a threat that was found at both sites to be being further amplified by developments in information technology, the growing centrality of science to investigative procedure and the delineation of key tasks/duties necessary for PIP accreditation.

As key players or ‘sovereigns’ within the institutional environment in which the police must operate, the collective opinion or ‘national mood’ (White, 2015) of the British public

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222 Indetermination refers to ‘Those aspects of practice that are based on specialist knowledge, its interpretation and the use of professional judgement’ (Robinson, 2003: 594).

223 ‘Technicality’ is a theoretical construct that derives from the work of Jamous and Peloille (1970) which, in the context of professional practice, refers to those aspects of the work which can be prescribed, ‘programmed’ or subject to routine practices.
ultimately must factor into the operational and strategic decision making of police managers with regard to the utilisation of CIs. In this sense, CI utilisation poses new challenges for the police organisation in terms of their ability to maintain their ‘image’ - particularly that of the CID - and thus their legitimacy while at the same time ensuring fiscal stringency and an appropriate degree of specialisation. Continuing to allow CIs and their role to expand and be involved at an operational level which is comparable to the detective in the investigation of crime risks going against the accepted, appropriate and ‘correct’ way of doing things and thus, has the potential to impact negatively on the legitimacy of the police as a whole. That being said, it may also be true that in allowing for the expanding use of CIs, the police may also be strengthening their claim to ‘professionalism’ in investigation (in some areas at least). Given the often specialised and ‘scientific’ nature of the work/tasks being undertaken by some CIs as part of their role - in particular, those involved in fraud and financial investigation - their use could actually serve to bolster the image of police legitimacy. Furthermore, CIs confuse the established point of entry into the CID and to some extent, lessen the degree of prestige associated with ‘moving into clothes’ (Hobbs, 1991). While the research found that CIs had only been afforded limited opportunities for career progression, their current position within the CID undoubtedly offers the potential for the development of an ascendant professional trajectory for CIs which, given the recent move to direct entry for police management, is indicative of the emergence of possible new future points of entry into the detective ‘profession’.

Together, these findings suggest that a change in the cultural tide may be taking place with regard to the undertaking of criminal investigation and the CID. Indeed, in the current research negative sentiment towards the utilisation of CIs was mostly found to be confined to the ‘old guard’ with most (particularly younger) officers, themselves possessing varying degrees of experience, conveying mixed views about CIs which broadly ranged from outright support to relative ambivalence. This suggests a change in

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224 Like CIs, other members of police staff have the potential to render positive attributes for crime investigation (e.g. role of Crime Scene Investigators in forensic work).

225 The Inspectorate’s 2004 report, ‘Modernising the Police Workforce’, made comprehensive recommendations to establish a framework in which best use could be made of non-warranted staff. The report acknowledged the existence of a prevalent ‘second class status’ amongst non-warranted individuals working within the organisation and proposed this be addressed by such means as clear career pathways for all staff and the possibility to move between warranted and non-warranted posts (HMIC, 2004; Loveday, 2006: 116; Savage, 2007: 123-126). However, such plans have yet to be realised.

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the ‘doxa’ of officers with regard to their understanding of the role and status of CIs within the units in which they were located. Nonetheless, the fact remains that in many respects CIs by their very nature are spoiling the performance of detectives with regard to media inspired popular perceptions of their role within the CID (Goffman, 1959). In doing so, CIs are inadvertently revealing what some might regard as one of the last remaining bastions of ‘professional territory’ within the police to be a deeply embedded figment of the national imagination.

With regard to CIs, inadequate training and insufficient experiential knowledge has the potential for mismanaged performance which in turn, poses a significant threat to the legitimacy of the CID. This threat is made more apparent through the plain clothes nature of the CID itself. As such, greater importance/reliance is placed on the manner by which the ‘personal front’ of CIs is maintained; in order to ensure that their role is not discredited by their warranted colleagues and, most importantly, the public, CIs must project a degree of authority which, given their ‘civilian’ status and absence of and/or limited enforcement abilities afforded to them, is often of greater significance than the collective performance given by detectives.

The notion of CIs as ‘junior partner investigators’ implies a degree of ‘policing on the cheap’; that these new pioneers in investigatory practice may be replacing fully trained warranted officers through a ‘cut and paste’ style approach to civilianisation which threatens the job security of police officers (Crank, 1989: 167). However, as the current research has demonstrated, civilianisation now means more than simply the transfer of police tasks to non-warranted staff, but more generally the increased importance of the role now being played by these individuals within the police service (Jones et al., 1994: 166). As has already been mentioned, CIs possessed personal autonomy, were responsible for determining the strategic direction of investigations and were found, in many cases, to have developed a specialist knowledge base and skills-set which afforded them high degrees of cultural and social capital within the units in which they worked - although this may also be due in large part to the fact that, unlike warranted officers, CIs were able to stay in the same role/area of investigation for longer periods of time. Nonetheless, in this sense then the role being performed by CIs in practice was often far from that which

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226 Goffman (1959: 24, 27) draws attention to the significance of the ‘personal front’ - consisting of appearance (e.g. uniform, insignia of office) and manner (e.g. demeanour, authority) - for the identity of the performer and thus, for the ‘collective representation’ of the individual/group performance.
can be considered junior and in many instances, CIs had emerged as professional investigators in their own right. This suggests that while the cultural and symbolic significance of the warranted officer remains firmly entrenched within the criminal investigation process, the locus of operational responsibility for the undertaking and ultimate success of investigations has now, in many instances, extended beyond the warranted officer to CIs.

8.3 Cost-Benefits and the Private Sector

Alongside the alleged cost-benefits associated with the recruitment of CIs, the popular uptake of the role by forces as was shown by the results of the survey (see Chapter Seven, section 7.2) was in part also motivated by the degree of economic freedom it provided police managers, particularly with regard to the desired number of personnel working within the CID at any given time. To some extent CIs as a resource provided forces with the opportunity to expand their workforce (and at the same time, distribute the CID workload) for fixed periods of time during spells of high workload. Forces were able to contract in CIs from private sector recruitment agencies to ‘assist’ officers (and those CIs employed directly by the police organisation) with investigations and this provision had been adopted at both Shorewick and Newbank. CIs were, in this sense, conceived as a marketable commodity by managers who often viewed agency CIs as an emergency pool of resources from which ‘extra bodies’ could be drawn at times of high demand. Despite the recent U-turn in police budget cuts announced by the Chancellor George Osbourne in the wake of the 2015 terror attacks in Paris (HM Treasury, 2015: 2), the drive for fiscal restraint is nonetheless likely to continue to loom large over future debates about CI utilisation and the CID workforce more broadly, both in terms of its composition and relations with non-police agencies and private security. In many respects, CI utilisation offers police managers a new platform for experimentation that affords or offers possible economies. Indeed, for some police managers, it offers justification of hastening private sector involvement as a means of making cost efficiencies in the CID in the face of considerable cuts in police budgets. However, findings from the current study suggest that at present, a notable degree of caution is

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227 For example, grant settlements announced for forces in December 2015 do not accommodate planned increases in national insurance, pay and pensions are predicted to impact the force from 2016 onwards.
likely being maintained by individual forces with regard to their recruitment and decision whether to make use of CIs from private security agencies. Nonetheless, within the current financial climate, the pull of the private sector is likely to become more acute; as mentioned in more detail in Chapter Six, officer contracts curb the ease with which their employment can be terminated making the lure of fixed term private engagement ever more appealing in the coming months and/or years.

Discussions with police managers at both sites showed that the decision to recruit only ex-officers as CIs from private sector recruitment agencies was based predominantly on two key logics which can be broadly grouped under two headings; economic logics and rationality logics. First, the recruitment of only ex-officer CIs from private sector recruitment agencies owed much to the perceived expediency through which they could be made operational; ex-officers were envisaged to be more economical in that they were perceived to be able to ‘hit the ground running’ with regard to their extant knowledge and experience of the police organisation, its procedures, practices, various computer systems and, most importantly, the law. Indeed, police officers and CIs in the research frequently pointed to the importance of PACE 1984, Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996 and Criminal Justice Act 1988 legislation in informing their decision making in relation to their operational abilities and practical judgements. In an equally practical sense, recruiting ex-officers as CIs theoretically negate the need for relevant training thus making this body of men and women more desirable from an economic (cost-effective) point of view. However, managers also posited their preference for ex-officer agency CIs on the basis of their rationality which, despite their current status as employees of private security agencies, was alleged to be fundamentally rooted in an ingrained ‘public good’ orientated approach to policing. This, it was presumed, made the use of agency CIs more palatable for currently serving officers and also for ACPO who, at the time the research was being undertaken, retained influence over the development of police policy and organisational structure. Perhaps more significantly, the recruitment of ex-officer CIs from partnering agencies was also believed to make the police’s engagement with private security less ‘risky’ in terms of the potential for errors in judgement/procedure which could in turn be extremely damaging for the legitimacy of the CID.

Together the findings presented in this thesis suggest that, while private security may appear to have gained a firm footing in the practice of public criminal investigation,
currently this arrangement is only being allowed at arm’s length with responsibility for overall control and management of investigatory practice remaining firmly ‘anchored’ to the state (Loader and Walker, 2006). Findings from the research also suggest a separation may be taking place between those who authorise (strategically manage) investigations and those who ‘do’ them with the state retaining its position as the primary authority in the enforcement of the law. Furthermore, under the current regulations only CIs who are employees of the police organisation may be designated with powers suggesting the existence of clear dividing lines between the ‘role’ of the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ police employee.

Nonetheless, in its broadest sense the utilisation of agency CIs suggests a broadening recognition and appreciation of private security for its potential utility as a broker of operationally eligible staff and, with that, a potential strengthening of the public-private interface with regard to operational policing and criminal investigation more specifically. It also undoubtedly begs the question: to what extent might private security come to be involved in the provision of criminal investigation in the future? Formal (statutory) linkages between the public police and private security already exist in regard to the provision of operational policing. As Johnston (2007b: 290) points out, the Police Reform Act 2002 makes the accreditation of commercial security companies ‘a key element in the project to establish a ‘police extended family’, such partners being conceived as key partners in the future delivery of what Brodeur (1983) has called ‘low policing’’. The Act’s allowance for the designation of powers to CIs (along with PCSOs, DOs and EOs) also marks a potential ‘test-bed’ for the designation of powers of enforcement to non-warranted police employees operating ‘core’ police roles. That being said, further extension of any such provision to private security employees working for the public police would require not only a more cognisant understanding of how existing intra-organisational modes of accountability might take into account these novel policing forms, but also, a fundamental shift in cultural attitudes and sensibilities towards private security companies.228. However, though the recently reported U-turn on cuts to police budgets (which have been ‘ring-fenced’ until 2020) appear as if they will not lead to cuts to individual forces, they still may. Many police forces continue to suffer the effects of the

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228 White (2010) provides a detailed history of private security in Britain from 1945 onward and reveals the decades-long obdurate refusal by the Home Office to recognise the significance of private security industry.
final tranche of savings\(^{229}\) and individual forces may be required to allocate some of their funds to a central pot to combat things like terrorism (HM Treasury, 2015; May, 2015). This prompts the related question: can police forces continue to bridge their current (and future) funding gaps without turning to outsourcing and private security\(^{230}\)? Indeed, as the following quote by Home Secretary Theresa May (taken from a speech delivered at the Police Reform Summit on 8th December 2015) suggests, it is likely that the police will still need to find significant savings in the years to come:

‘…to those who think the Spending Review gives you breathing space to relax the reforms we started five years ago, you could not be more wrong …. I can tell you now that - just as you had planned to do a month ago - every force will still need to make savings year on year. The overall policing budget is protected. But not the wasteful and inefficient spending that we all know still exists. Because if we are to meet the challenges that lie ahead, and if we are to ensure money is well spent, then further changes will need to be made. So this settlement is not a reprieve from reform. It does not let you off the hook or mean you can slow the pace of change. Nor does it insulate you from the need to make further efficiencies. Quite the opposite. Now - more than ever before - there is no excuse not to deliver. Instead, we must redouble our efforts, force a more urgent pace, and deliver a more radical and more sustained period of police reform than we saw even in the last Parliament’.

(May, 2015)

Drawing upon the ‘multiple streams’ approach originally advanced by Kingdon (1984) in relation to policy development - and most recently applied in relation to the ‘privatisation’\(^{231}\) of policing in the UK by White (2015) - it could be argued that current trends towards the civilianisation and subsequent ‘privatisation’ of aspects of the detective role may be more appropriately conceived as the result of the recent alignment of three key concepts: the ‘politics stream’ (national mood and party ideology), ‘problem stream’ (sudden events, pressing indicators or feedback) and ‘policy stream’.

\(^{229}\) Particularly following the Coalition government’s announcement in 2013 of an additional 4.9 per cent central police budget cut for 2015/2016 (HMIC, 2013: 106) which has, in part, been fulfilled.

\(^{230}\) Given the increasing number of official initiatives designed to support police privatisation, particularly through outsourcing, (e.g. the National Audit Office (NAO) in collaboration with HMIC has recently published ‘Private Sector Partnering in the Police Service: A Practical Guide’ (NAO/HMIC, 2013)), it is difficult to imagine a future in which a more cooperative relationship between private security and the public police does not develop.

\(^{231}\) In his application of the term ‘privatisation’ - this being the selling off of public services to the private sector - White (2010: 3) draws attention to the need for scholars writing in the field of policing to make the clear distinction between ‘outsourcing’ and ‘privatisation’, the latter suggesting a far more extensive degree of market penetration than has usually been under consideration in the policing sector.
(acceptability and feasibility of options available). Together these three ‘streams’ presented fast moving police ‘entrepreneurs’ with an unprecedented ‘window’ of opportunity with regard to outsourcing of ‘core’ areas of police work to private security. However, as acknowledged by White (2010: 3), the power of ‘police fetishism’ (Reiner, 2010: 3) endures as the legacy of the liberal state-building process, which emerged out of the early enlightenment political thought and continues today, ensures that most citizens in today’s liberal democracies are from an early age, socialised into thinking that policing functions ought to be delivered by the state. Such a rationale has ensured a pervasive degree of latent (and antagonistic) national scepticism with regard to the way by which the logic of the market conspicuously enters into the policing sector which has in turn, served to limit the degree of market penetration. While it is safe to say that the G4S Olympic fiasco coupled with the ‘anti-privatisation’ manifesto pledges put forward by PCCs during their first election (Crawford, 2013: 184) might have derailed the ‘privatisation’ initiative in the short-term, it did nonetheless demonstrate the manner in which contemporary British society has seemingly come to accept the pivotal reliance on the private sector in delivering security - as well as the precarious nature of public opinion with regard to the spectre of privatising police functions.

Findings presented in previous chapters of this thesis suggest that, in the light of such developments, the window of opportunity and thus, the national mood with regard to privatisation may in fact be shifting once again. The utilisation of agency CIs can perhaps therefore be considered within broader debates about how the economic laws of supply and demand are decisively shaped and limited by the moral and political values attached to policing and security in liberal democracies (cf Loader, Goold and Thumala, 2014; Thumala et al., 2011; White, 2010, 2012). It could be that the utilisation of CIs, in particular agency CIs, remains a step too far away from the police force (and detective) of the national imagination. Indeed, for some, the market also has a more emotional impact, shaking their understanding of how the world around them is constructed. As Loader (1997: 6) comments, ‘rendering the police symbolically less important to the maintenance of social order may for many require a significant re-organisation of the self’. As such, the market for policing frequently encounters a form of cultural resistance which, at any given point in time, may range from diffuse ambivalence and unease to open hostility (White, 2015). Such feelings generally coalesce around an antagonistic critical discourse which is rooted in ‘a determination to stop money from undermining the

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guarantee of equality that is foundationally associated with the good of security in liberal democratic politics’ (Loader et al., 2014: 8-10). In the cultural sense then, the market remains very much the junior partner to the public police and, given the deep-rooted nature of cultural resistance to any degree of market involvement in policing (the products and services on offer are generally regarded as being second best to comparable ones delivered by the police (cf Audit Commission, 1996; Crawford et al., 2005; Rowland and Coupe, 2014)), it is difficult to envisage a time in the near future where these well-established dynamics may alter.

However, with regard to the police’s engagement with private security in the broader sense, as predicted by Crawford (2013: 174):

‘The contemporary confluence of ‘electoral answerability’ in the form of the new governance of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and ‘fiscal austerity’ could prove to be a volatile mix; resulting simultaneously in pressures upon greater private sector involvement in the delivery of police services’.

This may or may not involve a renewed interest in the potential feasibility of outsourcing the frontline (White, 2015: 293). The apparent institutionalisation of government support for outsourcing coupled with ongoing budgetary constraints and the absence of any recent high profile media debate surrounding police privatisation suggests that a second - and perhaps even more pervasive - police outsourcing window may be about to open (White, 2015: 296). The use of agency CIs denotes a degree and style of engagement with private security at a level which is unprecedented in the history of the English police. However, while it is indeed important to recognise the significance of using employees of private security agencies to assist at an operational level in the undertaking of public police investigations, it is also important to note that this is fundamentally distinct from ‘outsourcing’ (as has been the case with some peripheral functions e.g. HR or finance); agency CIs somewhat fundamentally remained under the command of the warranted and in this sense, current arrangements reflect only peripheral private sector engagement (although this may be staring to occur at the margins of the function232). Nonetheless, the

232 For example, from April 2013 individual police forces were no longer required to deal directly with fraud investigations. Reports of fraud are now instead made and/or will be passed on to Action Fraud, a specialist one-stop-shop for advice and reporting of fraud and cybercrime which was set up in 2009. Following reporting of an alleged fraud made to Action Fraud, victims are given a crime reference number and their case is passed on to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) which is run by the City of London’s police. Action Fraud is a quango which is run by Broadcasting Support Services (BSS). BSS is a
nature of their involvement in public police criminal investigation perhaps calls for a reconceptualisation of the parameters of investigative work not just in terms of the role of detective, but also in terms of its potential for strengthening the interface between the public and the private in regard to the provision of criminal investigation. It points to a developing appreciation of the potential role of the private sector in the delivery of policing at an operational level and with this, the shifting focus on the role of the nation state and centrality of ‘stateness’ in relation to investigatory provision. Indeed, as Crawford (2013: 185) has suggested, we may now be standing ‘on the brink of a possible new dawn in relations between private security and the public police in Britain (at least in some police force areas)’, a development which may (or may not) have significant implications for criminal investigation as ‘a public good’.

With the previous discussion in mind, the extent to which the utilisation of CIs can be considered evidence of an emerging ‘policing complex’ (Hoogenboom, 2010) in regard to the undertaking of criminal investigation remains to be seen. The utilisation of agency CIs suggests a degree of formal integration/collaboration between the public police and private security in relation to criminal investigation. It lays the foundations for the potential emergence of a ‘hybrid’ style investigator whose employment status and working orientations blur long established boundaries between the public and the private sectors in relation to the provision of criminal investigation. While academic work (McManus, 1995) has long demonstrated the existence of well-established organisational relationships between the police and private security firms - at least at the tactical and operational levels - such arrangements have rarely extended to the private investigative sector specifically. However, as argued in Chapter Two (sections 2.2.5 and 2.4.6) this is not to assume that such associations do not exist - they do, especially on an informal basis. Indeed, in their analysis of the investigative services sector in the UK, Gill and Hart (1997a, 1997b) demonstrated that many private investigators are in fact former police officers, a number of whom admitted to occasionally benefitting from information

private not-for-profit organisation whose call center employees provide advice to victims and screen calls to report fraudulent activity before passing those cases which fulfill pre-set criteria on for investigation by the NFIB.

233 According to Sparrow (2014: 4) the concept of ‘stateness’ ‘reflects the view that only state (civic) institutions can be trusted to provide security while judiciously balancing the multiple and often conflicting rights of different groups or individuals’. From this perspective, ‘only state (‘civic’) institutions can be trusted to reflect the broad societal values required to carry out such functions. The particular interests of private clients and the for-profit motivations of commercial providers will inevitably distort the public agenda to some extent’ (Sparrow, 2014: 9).
supplied, both legitimately and otherwise, by the ‘old boy network’ (Rigakos, 2002) - what Hoogenboom (1991) refers to as ‘grey policing’. Nonetheless, the fact remains that in a criminal justice system which for more than a decade has been dominated by ‘partnership’ and ‘multi-agency’ models of provision, little if any, consideration has been given to the enhanced role of private investigators.

The scope for future collaboration and/or more formalised cross-fertilisation is further bolstered when one considers the current Government’s plans to extend regulation via the statutory licensing of various private security agents (through the SIA) to private investigators234 (Home Office, 2013). This proposed legislative development gestures a degree of formal recognition and approval of the private investigation industry by the state and suggests the emergence of the status of private investigator as a ‘protected title’ (Home Office, 2013: 9). Establishing standards for qualification and conduct through licensing ensures that the private investigative sector is afforded a degree of governmental quality assurance which, in turn, ensures the industry a marketable stamp of approval. It also affords the investigator credibility and goes some way to legitimising the role of the private investigative sector in the view of the public235. It is of course only possible to offer tentative speculation as to the likely effectiveness of the proposed measures both in terms of ensuring a degree of standardised, ethical practice and also, in terms of raising the overall standing of private investigators in the minds of the public and the police. However, the regulation of such a complex enterprise is no trivial matter and it would be somewhat ironic if, should greater police engagement with private security with regard to the provision of investigation be realised, so too were long-held suspicions about state ‘snooping’ and fears about society under surveillance.

In many respects the use of CIs, in particular those contracted to work for the police from private sector recruitment agencies, signals the potential for developing new frontiers in policing and specifically, in the provision of investigative practice. It points to dramatic changes in the ‘architecture’ of the CID and shifting attitudes of the public police towards engagement with private security at an increasingly operational level. The police do have

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234 Regulation of private investigation activities was anticipated to come into force by the end of 2015 (Home Office, 2013) however, at the time of writing this thesis, the private investigative sector continues to enjoy no formal regulation in the UK.

235 It also instigates a renewed trust in the ability of competitive markets to sort out the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ providers.
a great deal to gain from an increased professional relationship with private security in regard to the provision of criminal investigation. Indeed, in a society which is increasingly preoccupied with pre-emptive risk based thinking (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 3), the private sector could prove useful. While the contemporary conditions of policing paint a rather bleak picture of the future of the CI in the immediate term, the style and texture of their utilisation has no doubt laid the foundations for a more exhaustive style of outsourcing/contracting-out of operational level investigative work to the private sector. This has of course already occurred in regard to forensic services and it is not entirely unreasonable to envisage a time in which police detectives come to further share their ‘business’ with private security. However, while there is certainly a case - arguably now so more than ever before - for such matters to be debated, it is vital that within these debates rigorous regulation remains the quid pro quo of any extended involvement of private investigative firms in public policing. This is for two key reasons. First, while corruption occurs in both the public and the private sectors, the penalties for corruption for those engaged in private investigative activities are far less severe than for those operating in the public sector. This means that there currently exists less of an incentive and/or stringent consideration of the ways through which potentially corrupt practice can be effectively prevented and/or addressed in the private sector compared to the public. Second, without any thorough system of inspection in place, the scope for incompetence is undoubtedly greater in the private sector than is the case in the public. Barring contractual obligations and reputational harm, the incentives for the private sector to ensure consistency in its operational effectiveness and accuracy are much less clear than those in the public sector. Furthermore, even in those parts of the criminal justice apparatus in which the private sector is subject to regular systematic review/inspection on a comparable basis to the public (e.g. as is the case with HMIP inspections of privately run prisons), concerns over the potential for ‘corner-cutting’ and malpractice remain perhaps more plausible. With this in mind and given the nature of the task at hand, I would argue that the need for greater forms of accountability is nowhere more imperative than with the provision of criminal investigation (Gill and Hart, 1997a: 563).
8.4 Concluding Thoughts and Some Words of Warning

This research has examined the contribution of CIs to the contemporary criminal investigation process and, with that, the extent to which their role can be conceptualised as that of a junior partner to warranted detectives. While it was never the intention of this study to decide whether the utilisation of CIs is a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ thing, I can say with some confidence that CIs have come to play an important role within the criminal investigation process and utmost caution should be exercised by those now contemplating their future with the organisation. Current rhetoric surrounding the use of CIs and their working relation with detectives assumes a clear division of labour and subsequent level of certainty and stability which, in reality, often does not exist in practice. Recent proposals by Government to amalgamate the CI role/title (along with that of DOs and EOs) under the inclusive civilian designation of ‘Policing Support Officer’ (Home Office, 2016) suggests an ongoing lack of understanding and appreciation of the often specialist and far from complementary nature of the work now often being undertaken by CIs ‘on the ground’. The practical reality is that the divide between CIs and DCs in terms of their duties and responsibilities is by no means hard and fast and, furthermore, is subject to regular change/negotiation. In many areas of investigative work CIs have emerged as expert investigators in their own right, possessing valuable skills and expertise which may not be contained within the ‘tool kit’ of the warranted officer.

What is patently clear from the findings presented in this thesis is that the CI designation has grown in significance since its initial introduction, both in terms of their overall number and also the roles and responsibilities now often being regularly afforded to these individuals. Despite pointing to the widespread and arguably institutionalised nature of CI use suggested by findings presented in Chapter Seven, there exists a striking degree of inconsistency in CI utilisation between forces which is only set to be exacerbated in the coming months and/or years, as financial pressures are likely to continue to alter the shape and character of the contemporary policing landscape. CIs are not warranted officers and should not be treated as such; CIs are well placed to provide an important complementary role in the contemporary criminal investigation process. While these are indeed challenging times for the police service, if best use is to be made of CIs then the temptation for mission creep should be resisted and managers should avoid using CIs as a ‘means of coping’ with financial restrictions, however this may manifest. Faced with
conflated organisational demands and tight budgets, one can surely sympathise with the situation in which many Chief Officers and PCCs now find themselves. Few would envy the difficult decisions that must now be made if the police are to ensure their continued legitimacy and financial solvency in the years to come. However, the fact remains that substantial savings must be made and regardless of the fact that CIs may in fact be more effective (both in terms of their cost-effectiveness and efficiency) in some areas of investigative work than warranted DCs, their civilian status continue to render them (as is the case with police staff more generally) a viable option for budget reduction. It would however be somewhat bitterly ironic if, in their drive to ensure their continued effectiveness, the police failed to anticipate the potentially significant detrimental impact of large scale reverse-civilianisation on the overall efficiency and legitimacy of the organisation.

What is very clear from the research findings presented in this thesis is that it is no longer possible (if it ever truly was) to think of criminal investigation purely in terms of what detectives do. While it was far from the intention of the research to diminish the standing and enduring centrality of detectives to the investigatory practice - their wealth of experiential knowledge and ‘craft’ skills remain, without doubt, of enduring value - findings do draw attention to the valuable contribution now also being made by non-warranted individuals. This is of particular significance to those ‘frontline’ areas of work now being performed by non-warranted individuals and in which officers have a limited role and/or where they have all but relinquished their claim. For example, in the current research, control and management of risk assessment and investigation of domestic abuse had, by and large, fell to non-warranted CIs. This was also found to be the case with some types of acquisitive crime - in particularly shoplifting - in which CIs had, over time, accumulated a wealth of knowledge and social capital which enabled them to process investigations in a notably expeditious fashion.

Furthermore, while detectives are undeniably aided in their work by a valuable reserve of experiential knowledge, so too have CIs come to learn the investigative trade. While it remains imperative that the value of experiential knowledge and the significance of the elusive detective ‘art’ is not overlooked, the fact remains that detective skills including craft knowledge can and indeed is being taught (and learned) by individuals who are new to the organisation and/or practice of policing. CIs developed and/or gained a range of
important and highly valuable skills and abilities during the course of their employment - to a greater or lesser degree depending on the nature of their role. A key argument of this thesis is that much of what is currently being done by warranted detectives is now also being done by non-warranted CIs. While this is by no means the case in all forces, it is not possible to conceptualise CIs purely in terms of undertaking a support role and, with that, as operating the position of junior partner to detectives in an operational sense. The findings presented in this thesis therefore not only bring to light the significance of the roles now being undertaken by non-warranted individuals within the contemporary police organisation, but also draw attention to the changing face of criminal investigation across E&W. Findings also point to a separation between those that authorise (and strategically manage) investigations and those that do them with responsibility for ‘doing’ being somewhat dubiously split between ‘professional’ and ‘paraprofessional’ investigators - the latter of whom may or may not be employees of the private sector.

The utilisation of CIs has potentially significant implications for the future of the criminal investigation process which, by and large, has remained an activity which is synonymous with the role and title of the warranted detective. It undoubtedly suggests that the role may be ‘opening up’ to individuals who may not possess the level of experiential knowledge and/or ‘professional’ recognition which, traditionally speaking, has been associated with ‘moving into clothes’ (Hobbs, 1991). In this sense then, the utilisation of CIs arguably paves the way for direct entry into the CID and the role of detective. The current use of CIs also points to a greater degree of blurring between the public and the private sectors with regard to the provision of criminal investigation at an operational level. The utilisation of agency CIs undoubtedly lays the foundations for the establishment of new more formalised channels of communication and potential avenues for greater strategic collaboration between the public police and private investigative sector. The apparent ‘hybridisation’ of criminal investigation - as with policing more generally - undoubtedly brings to light important questions about the linkages between legitimacy, authority and state power (Crawford, 2008: 175). Alongside the likely impact of CI utilisation on the manner in which the public symbolically invest in the police and, with that, the image of the detective, the utilisation of agency CIs also draws attention to the increasingly muddled nature of the public-private interface in policing provision. This issue is given more weight when considering the fact that through current arrangements the police are, in effect, lending their legitimacy to non-police providers through such
public-private partnership arrangements. Simultaneously, while provisions allowing for the designation of powers to CIs does not currently allow for their affordance to agency CIs, the transfer of limited public powers beyond those of the ordinary citizen to non-warranted police actors also undoubtedly raises central issues about the legitimate basis of authority and - should these be extended to agency CIs in the future - the distinctiveness of the police ‘brand’ (Crawford, 2011: 175-176).

While findings presented in this thesis suggest that currently, the use of agency CIs is largely restricted to low level investigative work, the potential for this be expanded in the future is apparent. Whatever the future for CIs and private sector involvement in public policing, the public police will have an important role to play in influencing future arrangements and in making sure those arrangements serve the public. It is arguably the responsibility of the police to look ahead - to not just mourn the part/s of traditional police function that might be ‘lost’ to the civilianising and privatising agendas of the twenty-first century, but also, to be prepared to explore new, potentially fruitful avenues of practice and the legitimate role to be played by private security with regard to investigative provision. This will, in turn, undoubtedly require the police concern themselves not only with the need for more effective co-ordination of diverse policing efforts, but also that developing practices/arrangements ensure an equitable distribution of security in a manner which can be rendered accountable and harnessed to the public good.

While the emerging skills gap within the contemporary CID also undoubtedly influenced the formulation of the CI role in its initial form (Mawby and Wright, 2008: 237), the overarching justifications for the introduction and subsequent evolution of the CI role were managerialist. CIs were thought to offer a more time and cost effective means of investigative provision that would ultimately free-up warranted police detectives to spend more time undertaking frontline duties requiring their peculiar skills and powers. The extent to which the association between civilianisation and value for money has been realised in practice was not the focus of this study and remains to be seen, as does the relationship between civilianisation and performance - although compelling evidence of its potential does exist (Independent, 2009; Skinns, 2011). Nonetheless, at both Newbank and Shorewick and most of those police forces that responded to the survey, police managers were keen to stress the value of CIs and were unanimous in their assertion that
their introduction had generally had a positive impact upon the overall efficiency of the units in which they were operating. However, as evidence presented in Chapters Five and Six in particular has shown, in many instances CIs have now emerged as expert investigators in their own right, often operating an almost identical role to that of their warranted detective colleagues. This suggests that, far from fulfilling a support role which is complementary to that of warranted detectives, in many instances, CIs have been allowed to emerge as a new type of ‘policing on the cheap’. In affording CIs a role comparable to that of the ‘professional’ police detective while at the same time continuing to allow for the current twin-track approach to the recruitment, training provision, remuneration and promotion of CIs, the police run the very real risk of damaging not only their legitimacy as providers of efficient and effective criminal investigation, but at a more fundamental level, their claim to professional authority in their field.

It is therefore of priority that the police organisation now considers ways to clarify the current division of labour and in doing so, address the blurring of CI and detective roles. Given the legacy of poor implementation and uneven uptake of the CI provision by individual forces, this, I would propose, could be most effectively addressed through the development of a model of CI utilisation which allows for the transferability of the role between forces. This could be realised through establishing a degree of consistency in terms of the training and opportunities for career progression for CIs at the national level. This would in turn help not only to ensure a consistent employment experience for CIs, but would also undoubtedly allow for their better integration and improved recognition/appreciation from the organisation and wider criminal justice system. In this sense, there is arguably a need to move towards the development of a more flexible, osmotic career pathway for CIs. It is suggested that, of priority, the organisation develops a dedicated career development strategy for CIs which provides real opportunities for lateral career progression - something which currently is only being offered to CIs on an informal and/or ad hoc basis.

Evidence presented in Chapter Seven shows that in many forces CIs were operating ‘supervisory style’ roles and, based on the findings of this research, all effort should now be directed at developing a national recognised and transferable system of portfolios for CIs which is of appropriate equivalence to the PIP undertaken by warranted detectives. It
is only fitting that if detectives are becoming policing professionals, that these professionals are supported by a team of recognised and capable paraprofessionals. This development would help to foster a greater sense of value for CIs which in turn, would help to improve quality of service and the overall performance of the CID. However, findings presented in this thesis suggest that current conditions are being maintained by both powerful actors in the field of policing and the police organisation itself, both of which have ensured that the burden of austerity has been disproportionality placed on police staff whose employment can be much more easily terminated than that of their warranted colleagues. Evidence presented in this thesis suggests that in some instances at least, this imbalance in conditions of service is leading forces towards a trend of reverse-civilianisation which, in the case of CIs (and many other police staff roles), has potentially huge implications for both the future effectiveness and efficiency of the police organisation overall.

The research therefore questions whether the contribution currently being made by CIs to the contemporary criminal investigation process is being fully appreciated by the police organisation? There is no precedent for the current cuts to the police budget and as such, no telling of the potential impact the removal of CIs will ultimately have on the provision of effective and efficient policing. As with police staff more generally, CIs are currently being viewed as a dispensable resource by the organisation and I would argue that this is neither fair nor appropriate. CIs have a great deal to offer the police in terms of their varying skills and/or knowledge of the field. However, beyond their immediate efficacy as a resource, CIs also present the police with a valuable opportunity for experimentation; they offer the police the chance to do things differently and in a way which may prove both economically and operationally beneficial. In their current form CIs are undoubtedly best placed to provide complementary assistance to warranted detectives however, for those who wish to progress, consistency in training coupled with the formulation of clear pathways for progression remain key. Such developments would improve the level of ‘job satisfaction’ and sense of value CIs were able to derive from their role, but also, would help to resist the somewhat inevitable and potentially damaging pull of mission creep.

Criminal investigation now exists as ‘a highly complex’ endeavour which ‘spans a massive range of activities requiring a similarly extensive range of skills and competencies in those taking up the challenge’ (HMIC, 2004: 173). The contribution now
being made by CIs is significant both in terms of the scale of their use as demonstrated by the findings of the survey (see Chapter Seven, section 7.2), but also with regard to their valuable breadth of expertise which may or may not be born out of time spent working within the police organisation. Omnicompetence is no longer a viable option for the police but I would argue that this is nowhere more apparent than in the CID. The complex and diverse nature of crime coupled with the contemporary ‘scientific’ and technological basis of investigative work negates the practicality of this vision.

This leads us to question why omnicompetence is so desirable and whether or not it is something that we actually want (and need) in regard to criminal investigation. I would argue that, rather than focusing on the significance and nature of DCs experiential knowledge (which undoubtedly remains important), with regard to the provision of contemporary investigation, it may matter somewhat more significantly that those undertaking the role of ‘investigator’ have the relevant and necessary specialist skills to be successful. As with experiential knowledge, the acquisition of specialist skills and/or expertise takes time. In this sense, I would advise strongly against any hurried or ill-considered moves towards the removal of CIs from the police in the coming months/years, the potentially detrimental impact of which is currently being overlooked as financial pressures continue to bite.

However, when considering the future of CIs and the criminal investigation process in the broader sense, the enduring cultural power of the super sleuth should not be underestimated. The police detective - much like the Dixonian ‘Bobby on the beat’- is a deeply embedded symbol of British policing which itself, is so iconic that it has been harnessed as a key part of the cultural myth of ‘Englishness’ or ‘Britishness’. This mythologising further strengthens the role of the DC as a tool to sustain frameworks of legitimacy and consent for policing and, in particular, for the CID. As with policing in the more general sense, doing things differently in respect of criminal investigation means more than transforming how we understand the police ‘frontline’. It will also require challenging long held and deep-seated assumptions about the nature of detective work, challenging established cultures, spaces and divisions in labour in respect of policing and specifically, of criminal investigation. The enduring climate of austerity may see further ambiguities arise in regard to policing roles and added blurring of professional boundaries in the provision of criminal investigation more specifically. What is clear from the
findings presented in this thesis is that criminal investigation is changing, with greater dependence on the skills and expertise of non-warranted members of personnel. Disputes over the title and role of ‘detective’ are likely in the coming years as recognition of the proficiency of CIs is likely to call into question the continued legitimacy of warranted detective’s claims to professional jurisdiction in respect of criminal investigation. However, the police’s less than uniform response to the ‘politics of austerity’ means that the future trajectory of the CI role remains largely uncertain. These are indeed challenging times for the police and for policing more generally. While difficult decisions must no doubt now be made, it is of upmost importance that any such decisions relating to criminal investigation also take account of the significant and valuable contribution now also being made by CIs to contemporary criminal investigation.
References


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Appendix 1A – Police Staff Data (Table)

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Appendix 1A – Police Staff Data (Table) continued

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### Function | Definition & Guidance
---|---
CID | • Staff mainly employed in plain clothes or supporting those employed in plain clothes in the investigation of crime.
• Staff who predominantly investigate crime or support the investigation of crime and who are not shown under other specific squad headings.
• Includes members of a squad set up on an ad-hoc basis to deal with a temporary or local problem. These are included under their normal category.
• Includes officers formerly recorded as "CID Assistants / Trainee Investigators", i.e., include officers temporarily seconded to CID but not those on short attachments for familiarisation or assessment purposes.
• Includes staff who are predominantly employed on administrative, clerical or other support duties on behalf of general CID, asset confiscation, burglary, drugs, fraud, stolen vehicles, vice or other permanent CID squads. Includes those officers/staff in supporting roles.
CID:Specialist Units | Includes any specialist squads or units, analysts or administrative assistants employed not specifically mentioned elsewhere e.g. Robbery, Major Crime Units.

Appendix 2 – Research Information Sheet


Information Sheet

I am a PhD research student from the University of Sheffield. As part of my current doctoral research which is funded by the “Economic Social Research Council”, I have kindly been granted permission to visit your department to see how civilian investigators currently operate and assist in the investigation process.

My research will seek to identify the key resources civilian investigators currently require to perform their job to the optimum level, and in what capacity they are best placed to assist in the investigation process in a way that complements the work of warranted police detectives. I hope that my research will contribute to a better understanding of the process of criminal investigation in England and Wales and how the ‘civilian investigator’ is currently being utilised within varying CiD departments across the country.

I wish to assure you from the outset that my research aspires to be of benefit to both warranted police officers and staff. My research has been reviewed and approved by the University of Sheffield’s Research Ethics Committee and has been designed in alignment with the British Society of Criminology’s code of research ethics. I also wish to make clear that my research is CONFIDENTIAL: on no occasion and in no way will any person, service or individual district/area be made identifiable by name or otherwise.

I must also stress that whilst your participation in the study would be greatly appreciated, it is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate or discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you may be otherwise entitled.

If you do have any concerns or issues with regards to the project that you would like to discuss, please do not hesitate to approach me or contact me on the details provided below. I am very happy to discuss my intentions in more detail, and on a one to one basis should you wish.

I wish to sincerely thank you for your cooperation and assistance in advance.

Lindsey Rice
Email: lirice@sheffield.ac.uk
Appendix 3 – Participant Consent Form

Title of Research Project: ‘The Wrong Side of the Frontline: Exploring the Utilisation of Civilian Investigators by Police Forces across England and Wales’

Name of Researcher: Lindsey Rice

Participant identification Number for this Project:

Please initial box

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.

3. I understand that my participation in the research is strictly anonymous and that my name will not be linked with the research materials. I understand that neither myself, force or district will be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research.

4. I agree to this interview being recorded and understand that the data collected from me may be used by Lindsey Rice in her future research.

5. I confirm that I have received a copy of this consent form which has been signed and dated by the researcher.

6. I agree to take part in the above research project.

Name of Participant Date Signature

Lead Researcher Date Signature
Appendix 4 - Interview Schedules

Appendix 4A: Interview Schedule (CIs)

Opening:

A. (Establish Rapport – If interview prearranged by line manager) [shake hands] My name is Lindsey and I am a PhD researcher based at the University of Sheffield. Your line manager suggested that you might be a good person to speak to with regard to my research which is looking at how civilian investigators are currently being used by police forces across the country and the impact of their use on the role of the detective and on the criminal investigation process more broadly.

B. (Purpose – If interview prearranged by researcher) Just to remind you about the research, I am conducting this research as part of my PhD which I’m doing at the University of Sheffield. I’m undertaking some research which looks at how civilian investigators are currently being used by police forces across the country, how CIs and others feel about the role they currently play and what impact the introduction of CIs has had on the teams and units in which they work.

C. (Confidentiality and timeline) The interview should take around an hour and is completely voluntary, so if you want to stop at any point or if there are any questions you don’t want to answer then that’s fine – just let me know. All your responses will be confidential, so you won’t and your force won’t be identified in any reports or any form of publication which may arise from this research in the future. Are you happy for me to record the interview? And, before we start, do you have any questions about the research project?

(Transition: So, it would be really helpful for me if we could start with you telling me a little bit about you and your background if that’s ok?)

A. (Topic - General information)

Q1) How long have you worked in the CI role?
   ➢ What brought you to the role?
   ➢ What kinds of things influenced your decision to apply to become a CI?

Q2) When you initially applied for the CI position, can you recall what kinds of attributes and/or experience the organisation was looking for in applicants?
   ➢ Investigative and/or knowledge/experience etc.?
   ➢ (If can’t recall) What types of knowledge/experience did you already possess (any stand out experience)?

B. (Topic – Changing workforce structure/demographic)
Q3) (If long serving CI e.g. ex-officer CI) In your opinion, has the police organisation changed in the time that you’ve worked for them/within the organisation?
   ➢ In what ways? (structure/workforce mix (civilisation, privatisation, partnerships), practices, focus? etc.)
   ➢ Has the investigative process specifically changed a lot in that time?
     o In what ways?

Q4) (If ex-officer CI) – Did you ever encounter CIs as a warranted officer?
   ➢ (If yes) How did you feel about their introduction at the time? How did others view them? The same/differently?

Q5) (If long serving CI e.g. ex-cop) Has your role developed at all since you began working at this force? (e.g. tasks and duties afforded to CIs)

C. (Topic - CI role and responsibilities and distinction from DC role)

Q6) (If not already covered in response to question 1) In your own words, could you explain the role you play within the unit?
   ➢ What specific duties/responsibilities do you undertake on a day to day basis?
   ➢ (If particularly specialist area e.g. fraud) – What kinds of investigations are you involved in?
   ➢ Are there any types of investigation or any tasks which you would not be involved in?
     o Why?

Q7) In your opinion, what are the marked differences between your role as a CI and that of a warranted detective/officer?
   ➢ In terms of roles and responsibilities?
   ➢ In terms of ‘professionalism’?

Q8) Is there a level of role blurring between warranted officers and CIs?
   ➢ How? In what areas/ways is this most obvious?
   ➢ How do you feel about that?

Q9) (If not fully addressed in response to question 6) To your knowledge, in what capacity are CIs being used in your force/unit?
   ➢ What categories/types of crime are they involved in?
   ➢ What roles/duties are they afforded (e.g. in other units)?
   ➢ To your knowledge, are there any tasks/duties CIs at your force are not involved in/able to undertake?

Q10) In your opinion, are there any types of crime that CIs should not/cannot be involved in?
Q11) In your opinion, are there any marked advantages to employing ex-officers as CIs?
   ➢ Any disadvantages?

Q12) Are there any notable advantages to employing people from ‘outside’ the organisation, who have never worked for the police before, as CI?
   ➢ Any disadvantages?

D. (Topic – Public/Other agencies/organisations’ perceptions of CIs)
Q13) Has your non-warranted status ever proved to be an issue when dealing with members of the public?
   ➢ In your opinion, are there any areas of investigative work that you think the public could have a problem with CIs undertaking/being involved in? (e.g. rape, murder/most serious crime types)

Q14) Does your role require you to have any interaction or regular communication with other units or outside bodies (e.g. banks etc.)?
   ➢ (If yes) What does that interaction involve?
   ➢ How do other units/outside bodies respond to you as a CI?

E. (Topic – Private sector involvement and designated powers)
Q15) Do you know of any CIs working at your force who have come from private sector agencies (currently and in the past)?
   ➢ (If yes) In what units/areas of investigation are they being used?
   ➢ For what tasks/roles
   ➢ Which agencies?
   ➢ Ex-officers or not?

Q16) How do you feel about the police organisation potentially ‘buying-in’ CIs from the private sector?

Q17) How do you feel about being (or the potential for you to be) designated with powers similar to those of warranted police officers?
   ➢ (If not currently designated) Is this something that you would like/welcome?

F. (Topic – Detective skill – art, craft science?)
Q18) (If ex-officer CI) In your opinion, is detective work and the accompanying skill-set needed to be successful in the role something which can be taught to people with no previous police investigative experience?
(If yes) Is there anything unique about the personality of the people?
(If no) Is there something unique about the personality/skills of detectives? What?

Q19) Do you think there’s potential for ex-officers (particularly ex-detectives) to be afforded more leeway in terms of the types of responsibilities they are afforded and the types of things they are allowed to do? (E.g. suspect interviewing?)

(If yes) How do you feel about that?
(If no) Is there a taken for granted assumption that ex-cop means good investigator?
(If yes) Has that changed at all (over time)?

G. (Topic – Training and progression for CIs)
Q20) Did you receive any training when you started the role?

What did this training involve?
Do you feel that the training you were provided with was enough/appropriate for the role you are undertaking?

Q21) Is there much opportunity for promotion/progression in your role?

E.g. is there a supervisory/team leader rank?

H. (Topic – Occupational status of CIs)
Q22) Do you feel valued in your role?

By your colleagues (warranted and non-warranted)
By the organisation as a whole?

Q23) I’m interested to know if you consider the role you play and your involvement in investigations as being ‘junior’ to that of detectives?

What does junior mean to you?

Q24) On the same issue, would you also consider your role to be that of a member of police support staff?

(If yes) In what sense? How do you understand support?
(If no) Why not?

I. (Topic – Occupational culture and CI ‘fit’)
Q25) Is there a good sense of team spirit within the unit/team in which you work?

How much do you feel that CIs are viewed as part of the team within the unit? By warranted detectives? By line managers/supervisors?
Q26) Have you ever experienced any resentment/animosity from your warranted colleagues in this unit or in any other units/forces you’ve worked at?

➢ (If yes) what was the nature of this?
➢ How does this make you feel?
➢ Has this improved at all (over time)?

Closing:

A. Finally, is there anything we haven’t discussed that you’d like to talk about or think is important or that you’d like to talk about?

B. It’s been a pleasure talking with you today and I appreciate the time you have taken out of your day to answer my questions and the information you’ve given me is very valuable to the current study.

C. If necessary, would you mind if I contacted you (via email, telephone) if I need to clarify anything we’ve discussed today with you further down the line?

D. I should have all the information I need and thank you again.
Appendix 4B: Interview Schedule (DCs)

Opening:
A. (Establish Rapport – If interview prearranged by line manager) [shake hands]
   My name is Lindsey and I am a PhD researcher based at the University of Sheffield. Your line manager suggested that you might be a good person to speak to with regard to my research which is looking at how civilian investigators are currently being used by police forces across the country and the impact of their use on the role of the detective and on the criminal investigation process more broadly.

B. (Purpose – If interview prearranged by researcher) Just to remind you about the research, I am conducting this research as part of my PhD which I'm doing at the University of Sheffield. I'm undertaking some research which looks at how civilian investigators are currently being used by police forces across the country, how CIs and others feel about the role they currently play and what impact the introduction of CIs has had on the teams and units in which they work.

C. (Confidentiality and timeline) The interview should take around an hour and is completely voluntary, so if you want to stop at any point or if there are any questions you don’t want to answer then that’s fine – just let me know. All your responses will be confidential, so you won’t and your force won’t be identified in any reports or any form of publication which may arise from this research in the future. Are you happy for me to record the interview? And, before we start, do you have any questions about the research project?

(Transition: So, it would be really helpful for me if we could start with you telling me a little bit about you and your background if that’s ok?)

A. (Topic - General information)
Q1. How long have you worked in the DC role?
   - What made you decide to join the CID in the first place?
     - What kinds of things influenced your decision to apply to become a DC initially?

B. Topic - Changing workforce structure/demographic
Q2. In your opinion, has the police organisation changed in the time that you’ve worked for them/for the organisation?
   - In what ways? (structure/workforce mix (civilianisation, privatisation, partnerships), practices, focus? etc.)
   - Has the investigative process specially changed a lot in that time?
     - In what ways?

Q3) (If working for police organisation before 2002) When do you first recall knowing of CIs? Working alongside them?
What did you think of them then/their initial introduction?  
Has your opinion changed?

Q4) Has the role being played by CIs developed at all since you began working at this force? (E.g. tasks and duties afforded to CIs)

C. (Topic - CI role and responsibilities and distinction from DC role)

Q5) To your knowledge, in what capacity are CIs currently being used in your force?

- What categories/types of crime are they involved in?
- What roles/duties are they afforded (in your unit and in other units)?
- To your knowledge, are there any tasks/duties CIs at your force/in your unit are not involved in/able to undertake?

Q6) (If not addressed in response to question 5) In your opinion, are there any types of crime that CIs should not/cannot be involved in?

- Why?

Q7) (If not sufficiently covered in response to question 5 and 6) In your opinion, what are the marked difference between your role as a warranted detective/officer and that of a CI?

- In terms of roles and responsibilities?
- In terms of ‘professionalism’?
- Are there any areas whereby the role of DC and that of CIs can become blurred in your force? Where?
- How do you feel about that?

D. (Topic - Opinions on power designation and training for CIs)

Q8) How do you feel about CIs being designated with powers similar to those of warranted police officers?

- Any advantages?
- Any potential issues?

Q9) What is your knowledge of/opinion on the current level of training CIs receive before taking up the role?

- Was the training provided enough/appropriate to the role?

E. (Topic - Public/Other agencies’/organisations’ perceptions of CIs)

Q10) Do you know of any CIs working at your force who have come from private sector agencies (currently and in the past)?

- (If yes) In what units/areas of investigation are they being used?
Q11) How do you feel about the police organisation potentially ‘buying-in’ CIs from the private sector?

- Any advantages?
- Any disadvantages? Potential issues?

Q12) How do you feel about CIs potentially being designated with powers similar to those of warranted police officers?

- Do you think there are any issues that may arise from that?

F. (Topic - Detective skill - art, craft science?)
Q13) In your opinion, is detective work and the accompanying skills needed to be successful in the role something which can be taught to people with no previous police investigative experience?

- Is there something unique about the personality/skills of detectives? What?

Q14) How do you feel about the recruitment of ex-officers as CIs?

- Any advantages?
- Any disadvantages?
- Do you think ex-officers (particularly ex-detectives) are given more leeway in terms of the responsibilities they are afforded and the types of investigative work and tasks they are able to undertake (e.g. interviewing suspects)?
  - Is there a taken for granted assumption that ex-officer means good investigator?
  - (If yes) Has that changed at all (over time)?

G. (Topic - Occupational status of CIs)
Q15) To what extent would you say that CIs make a valuable contribution to the efforts of the unit/team?

- Is there contribution valued by everyone (officers, managers, the organisation?)

Q16) I’m interested to know if you consider the role being played by CIs in your force to be that of a member of police support staff?

- (If yes) In what sense? How do you understand support?
- (If no) Why not?

Q17) On the same issue, would you consider the role being played by CIs in your unit to be junior to that of warranted police officers?
H. (Topic - Occupational culture and CI ‘fit’)

Q18) Is there a good sense of team spirit within the unit/team in which you work?

- How much do you feel that CIs are viewed as part of the team within the unit? By warranted detectives? By line managers/supervisors?

Q19) Do you think there could be any feelings of resentment/animosity from warranted officers working in this unit (or in any other units/forces you’ve worked at) towards CIs?

- (If yes) Why? For what reasons?
- Have you ever been witness to or heard of this happening?
- (If long serving DC) Has this improved at all (over time)?

Closing:

A. Finally, is there anything we haven’t discussed that you’d like to talk about or think is important or that you’d like to talk about?
B. It’s been a pleasure talking with you today and I appreciate the time you have taken out of your day to answer my questions and the information you’ve given me is very valuable to the current study.
C. If necessary, would you mind if I contacted you (via email, telephone) if I need to clarify anything we’ve discussed today with you further down the line?
D. I should have all the information I need and thank you again.
Appendix 4C: Interview Schedule (Senior Officers/Managers)

Opening:

A. (Establish Rapport – If interview prearranged by line manager) [shake hands]  
   My name is Lindsey and I am a PhD researcher based at the University of Sheffield. Your line manager suggested that you might be a good person to speak to with regard to my research which is looking at how civilian investigators are currently being used by police forces across the country and the impact of their use on the role of the detective and on the criminal investigation process more broadly.

B. (Purpose – If interview prearranged by researcher) Just to remind you about the research, I am conducting this research as part of my PhD which I'm doing at the University of Sheffield. I'm undertaking some research which looks at how civilian investigators are currently being used by police forces across the country, how CIs and others feel about the role they currently play and what impact the introduction of CIs has had on the teams and units in which they work.

C. (Confidentiality and timeline) The interview should take around an hour and is completely voluntary, so if you want to stop at any point or if there are any questions you don’t want to answer then that’s fine – just let me know. All your responses will be confidential, so you won’t and your force won’t be identified in any reports or any form of publication which may arise from this research in the future. Are you happy for me to record the interview? And, before we start, do you have any questions about the research project?

(Transition: So, it would be really helpful for me if we could start with you telling me a little bit about your role within the unit if that’s ok?)

A. (Topic - General information)

Q1) How long have you worked in police management?
   ➢ What brought you to your current role originally?
   ➢ What did you do before?
   ➢ What are the main challenges of your role?

B. (Topic – Changing workforce structure/demographic)

Q2) In your opinion, has the police organisation changed in the time that you’ve worked for them/within the organisation?
   ➢ In what ways? (structure/workforce mix (civilianisation, privatisation, partnerships), practices, focus? etc.)
   ➢ Has the investigative process specifically changed a lot in that time? In what ways?

Q3) Do you recall when CIs were first introduced?
C. (Topic - CI role and responsibilities and distinction from DC role)
Q4) In what capacity are CIs being used in your unit?
   ➢ What categories/types of crime are they involved in?
   ➢ Are there any types of crime investigation work that CIs are not/cannot be involved in in your unit?
   ➢ Why? Why not?
Q5) Has the role being undertaken by CIs changed/developed in your unit since their initial introduction/since you took up this position?
   ➢ (If yes) What factors have contributed to this development?
   ➢ Have any issues arisen due to this?

Q6) In your opinion, what are the marked differences between the role of your DCs and that of CIs?
   ➢ Are there ever any occasions where the CI and DC role can become blurred in practice?
   ➢ (If yes) How/where/when?

D. (Topic – CI demographic)
Q7) What are some of the types of experience and personal attributes that you would look for in candidates applying for the CI role?
Q8) Have any/all of your CIs been designed with police type powers under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002?
   ➢ As a manager, how do you feel about CIs being designated with powers similar to those of warranted police officers?
   ➢ Any issues that arise from this?
Q9) How do you feel about the police organisation ‘buying-in’ CIs from the private sector?
   ➢ Any advantages?
   ➢ Any potential issues?
Q10) Roughly, what is the ratio of ex-officers to non-ex-officer CIs working in your unit?
Q11) How do you feel about recruiting individuals to work as CIs from outside the police organisation (who have never worked for the police organisation before)?
Are there any advantages/disadvantages to recruiting CIs from outside the police organisation/who have never worked for the police organisation before?

Q12) How do you feel about recruiting ex-officers to work as CIs?

➢ What are the advantages/disadvantages to this?

D. (Topic - Detective skill – art, craft, science)

Q13) (If not addressed in response to question 12) In your opinion, is detective work and the accompanying skill-set associated with those undertaking this role something which can be taught to people who do not have a police background?

➢ How about those who have investigative experience from outside the police organisation?
➢ Is there any part of the investigative process which cannot be taught?

E. (Topic - Occupational status of CIs)

Q14) I’m interested to know if, from a management perspective, whether you consider the role that CIs are currently undertaking in your unit to be junior to that of warranted detectives?

➢ (If yes) What does junior mean to you?

Q15) On the same issue, would you consider the role your CIs are undertaking to be that of a member of police support staff?

➢ (If yes) In what sense? How do you understand support?
➢ (If no) Why not?

F. (Topic - Training)

Q16) How do you feel about the nature/type of initial training the police organisation provides CIs when they first arrive?

➢ Do ex-officer CIs also go through the same training process and non-ex-officer CIs?
➢ (If No) Why not?
➢ Is the training they do receive appropriate/enough to prepare them for the role?
➢ Do ex-officers also receive this or any other ‘refresher’ style training?

G. (Occupational culture and CI ‘fit’)

Q17) Finally, as a manager, I’m interested to know if you’ve ever come across any resentment towards the use of CIs in your force by warranted members of staff?

➢ Any staff ever reported incidents of resentment/hostility towards CIs?
➢ Potential for this to happen in the future?
Closing:

A. Finally, is there anything we haven’t discussed that you’d like to talk about or think is important or that you’d like to talk about?
B. It’s been a pleasure talking with you today and I appreciate the time you have taken out of your day to answer my questions and the information you’ve given me is very valuable to the current study.
C. If necessary, would you mind if I contacted you (via email, telephone) if I need to clarify anything we’ve discussed today with you further down the line?
D. I should have all the information I need and thank you again.
Appendix 5: Survey

Exploring the Role of Civilian Investigators Working within Police Forces across England and Wales?

You are being asked to take part in a survey as part of a doctoral research study which seeks to explore the role currently played by civilian investigators within police forces across England and Wales. Since their formal introduction as part of the Police Reform Act 2002, the use of civilian investigators has rapidly developed within police constabularies across the country. However, there currently exists a diversity of practice and an accompanying lack of information with regard to the way these individuals are being used between constabularies. It is hoped therefore that this survey will provide an important evidence base from which the police and others can see how civilian investigators are being deployed across the country. The research, which is being funded by the Economic Social Research Council, is being conducted by Lindsey Rice (BA, MA) who is a doctoral research student currently working at the University of Sheffield and has received full ethical approval from the University of Sheffield Ethics Committee. The study is being supervised by Professor Joanna Shapland and Dr Layla Skinns.

You have been invited to take part in this due to your knowledge with regard to staffing information and the structure and operation of the Criminal Investigation Department within your police constabulary. Your participation is entirely voluntary. Providing you have all the relevant information to hand, it should take less than 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire. *This research is strictly anonymous in that names of individual participants will not be made identifiable in the research. Names of participating constabularies will however be made identifiable, except for in question 15.* This decision has been made on anticipation of the potential benefits for police constabularies in sharing this information with one another (allowing for the generation of a substantial evidence base from which constabularies can compare their use of civilian investigators with other constabularies nationally).

The information you provide is of great value to the study in question and will be used in the final thesis write-up. It may also be used in subsequent academic publications. After the study has ended, all related information and data will be deleted as soon as possible. At the end of the research, a summarised report of the study’s overall findings can be obtained from Lindsey Rice whose contact details are given below. If you would like to know more about this study, please contact Lindsey Rice on 07734359955 or lrice1@sheffield.ac.uk.

**Ideally, this survey should be completed by the Detective Chief Superintendent.**

Job title/s and or rank of participant/s:  Click here to enter text.

Name of police constabulary:  Click here to enter text.

Date:  Click here to enter date from the drop down menu.

Section 1. (To be completed by the Detective Chief Superintendent or whoever is most appropriate)
1. Do you currently use civilian investigators within your constabulary?  
   Click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

2. To your knowledge, have you ever used civilian investigators within your constabulary?  
   Click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

3. What types of investigative work are civilian investigators currently involved in at your constabulary?  
   (Please select all that apply by clicking the relevant boxes. If unsure, please leave blank.)

   - Burglary ☐
   - Domestic violence/abuse ☐
   - Arson ☐
   - Fraud ☐
   - Drug offences ☐
   - Robbery ☐

   Burglary ☐
   Domestic violence/abuse ☐
   Arson ☐
   Fraud ☐
   Drug offences ☐
   Robbery ☐

   Kidnapping ☐
   Rape and sexual assault ☐
   Theft (including theft of a motor vehicle) ☐
   Serious assault ☐
   Child abuse ☐
   Murder ☐

   If any others, please state. Click here to enter text.

4. What tasks do your civilian investigators undertake?  
   (Please select all that apply by clicking the relevant boxes. If unsure, please leave blank.)

   - Taking statements ☐
   - Victim interviewing ☐
   - Disclosure ☐
   - Exhibits ☐

   Taking statements ☐
   Victim interviewing ☐
   Disclosure ☐
   Exhibits ☐

   Suspect interviewing ☐
   HOLMES (Data set analysis) ☐
   Prisoner processing ☐
   Indexing ☐

   If any others, please state. Click here to enter text.

5. Have any of your civilian investigators been designated with any of the following powers under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002?  
   (Please select all that apply by clicking the relevant boxes. If unsure, please leave blank.)

   - Access and copying evidence seized by constables ☐
   - Power to apply for a search warrant ☐
   - Access to excluded and special procedure material ☐
   - Power to enter and search after arrest ☐
   - Power to arrest at a police station for another offence ☐
   - Power to request an arrested person to account for certain matters ☐
   - General power of seizure ☐
   - Extended power of seizure ☐
   - Power to transfer persons into the custody of an investigating officer ☐
6. Can you identify any areas of work where civilian investigators are not currently in use in your constabulary and in which you feel their use would be beneficial? Click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

If yes, please elaborate. Click here to enter text.

7. Do your civilian investigators work alongside warranted police detectives in mixed teams? Click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

8. Which, if any, of the measures below do you think would improve the contribution of civilian investigators to the performance of your police constabulary? (Please select all that apply by clicking the relevant boxes. If no improvements are necessary, please leave blank and move to question 9.)

- Improvements in training
- More responsibility to be given to civilian investigators
- Improvements in equipment
- Greater recognition of civilian investigators in the constabulary
- Improvements in management
- Greater co-operation between police and civilians

9. To your knowledge, are civilian investigators currently working within your constabulary able to perform supervisory style roles? (E.g. CCTV coordinator etc.)? Click here to select and answer form the drop down menu.

If yes, please elaborate. Click here to enter text.

10. Are civilian investigators who work for your police constabulary required to undertake any initial or induction training relevant to the role? Click here to select an answer form the drop down menu.

Briefly, what does this cover? Click here to enter text.

Accountability

11. Who supervises the day to day work of civilian investigators? Click here to enter text.

12. Who occupies the role of line manager for civilian investigators in your constabulary? (E.g. who does their review?) Click here to enter text.
13. Does the internal complaints procedure in your constabulary also apply to civilian investigators who are directly employed by your constabulary? Click here to select and answer from the drop down menu.

14. Does the internal complaints procedure in your constabulary also apply to civilian investigators who are employees of the private security agencies but who work for your constabulary as agreed in contract? Click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

15. This section of the questionnaire seeks your personal view with regard to a number of key statements.

The names of constabularies as well as individual participants will NOT be made identifiable in this section.

Please select by clicking the appropriate box 1 – 5 from the drop down menu next each statement with 1 being ‘Strongly Agree’ and 5 being ‘Strongly Disagree’. If any of the statements are not applicable or you would prefer not to say, please mark as such.

1. Most civilian investigators do a good job. Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

2. The CID is more efficiently run a result of employing civilian investigators. Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

3. There is a serious need for civilian investigators, no matter how serious the offence. Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

4. The use of civilian investigators free up detectives to perform ‘frontline’ duties. Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

5. Civilian investigators with specialist skills are needed for jobs within the constabulary. Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

6. Civilian investigators should be ‘contracted in’ from outside agencies. Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

7. The main reason for using civilian investigators is that they are cheaper than detectives. Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

8. There is scope in my constabulary to better integrate constables and civilian investigators. Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

9. The training of civilian investigators in my constabulary could be improved. Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

10. Civilian investigators are an essential part of the modern criminal investigation process. Please click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.
Section 2. (If you are unable to provide the answers to the following questions yourself, please could you forward the survey to an appropriate member of HR or Business Force Manager for completion)

2a) General Questions

16. How many civilian investigators currently work in your constabulary?  
   Click here to enter text.

17. Of these, how many part-time civilian investigators currently work in your constabulary?  
   Click here to enter text.

18. To your knowledge, does your constabulary hold any official job description/role profiles for civilian investigators in any of its CID departments?  
   Click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

2b) Private Sector Involvement

19. At the moment, does your constabulary have a contract(s) with a private sector agency for the supply of civilian investigators?  
   Click here to select an answer form the drop down menu.

a) Which private sector agencies?  
   Click here to enter text.

b) What is the typical length of contract(s) for individual civilian investigators employed by private security agencies in your constabulary? (E.g. 6 months, 1 year, open contract).  
   Click here to enter text.

c) What types of crime are those civilian investigators employed by private security agencies involved in investigating? (Please select all that apply by clicking the relevant boxes. If unsure, please leave blank.)

2. Domestic violence/abuse  ☐  8. Rape and sexual assault  ☐
3. Arson  ☐  9. Theft (including theft of a motor vehicle)  ☐
4. Fraud  ☐  10. Serious assault  ☐
6. Robbery  ☐  12. Murder  ☐

If any others, please state.  
   Click here to enter text.

20. Have any of those civilian investigators employed from private security agencies been designated with powers under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002?  
   Click here to select an answer form the drop down menu.
21. If possible, please provide the total number of private security employees performing the role of civilian investigator within your constabulary currently.
   Click here to enter text.

22. Has your constabulary held contract(s) with private security agencies for the supply of civilian investigators in the past? Click here to select an answer from the drop down menu.

   a) Which private sector agencies/companies?
      Click here to enter text.
   b) What was the length of contract(s) agreed with these companies?
      Click here to enter text.
   c) Were any designated with powers under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002?
      Click here to enter text.

Thank you for completing this questionnaire. It would be helpful if it were possible to contact you should I need to clarify any of the answers provided. If possible, please provide your name, email and contact number.

Click here to enter text.

If you have any further comments, please use the space provided below to elaborate.

Click here to enter text.
Appendix 6: Qualitative Coding Framework
Appendix 7: Powers Available for Designation to ‘Investigating Officers’

The following details the powers available to Chief Constables for designation to ‘Investigating Officers’ under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and explained in greater detail in Chapter 30, Schedule 4, Part 2 of the same Act.

The information provided in this appendix in regard to the powers exercisable by CIs has been reported as displayed on legislation.gov.uk as of July 2016.

Search warrants

16. Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person—

(a) he may apply as if he were a constable for a warrant under section 8 of the 1984 Act (warrants for entry and search) in respect of any premises [whether in the relevant police area or not];

(b) the persons to whom a warrant to enter and search any such premises may be issued under that section shall include that person;

(c) that person shall have the power of a constable under section 8(2) of that Act in any premises in the relevant police area to seize and retain things for which a search has been authorised under subsection (1) of that section;

(d) section 15 of that Act (safeguards) shall have effect in relation to the issue of such a warrant to that person as it has effect in relation to the issue of a warrant under section 8 of that Act to a constable;

(e) section 16 of that Act (execution of warrants) shall have effect in relation to any warrant to enter and search premises that is issued (whether to that person or to any other person) [but in respect of premises in the relevant police area only] as if references in that section to a constable included references to that person;

(f) section 19(6) of that Act (protection for legally privileged material from seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person by virtue of sub-paragraph (c) as it has effect in relation to the seizure of anything by a constable;

(g) section 20 of that Act (extension of powers of seizure to computerised information) shall have effect in relation the power of seizure conferred on that person by virtue of sub-paragraph (c) as it applies in relation to the power of seizure conferred on a constable by section 8(2) of that Act;

(h) section 21(1) and (2) of that Act (provision of record of seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person in exercise of the power conferred on him by virtue of sub-paragraph (c) as if the references to a constable and to an officer included references to that person; and

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sections 21(3) to (8) and 22 of that Act (access, copying and retention) shall have effect in relation to anything seized by that person in exercise of that power, or taken away by him following the imposition of a requirement by virtue of sub-paragraph -

(i) as they have effect in relation to anything seized in exercise of the power conferred on a constable by section 8(2) of that Act or taken away by a constable following the imposition of a requirement by virtue of section 20 of that Act; and

(ii) as if the references to a constable in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 21 included references to a person to whom this paragraph applies.

16A. Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person—

(a) the persons to whom a warrant may be addressed under section 26 of the Theft Act 1968 (search for stolen goods) shall, in relation to persons or premises in the relevant police area, include that person; and

(b) in relation to such a warrant addressed to him, that person shall have the powers under subsection (3) of that section.

16B. Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person, subsection (3), and (to the extent that it applies subsection (3)) subsection (3A), of section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (powers to search and obtain evidence) shall have effect as if, in relation to premises in the relevant police area, the reference to a constable included a reference to that person.

Access to excluded and special procedure material

17. Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person—

(a) he shall have the powers of a constable under section 9(1) of the 1984 Act (special provisions for access) to obtain access, in accordance with Schedule 1 to that Act and the following provisions of this paragraph, to excluded material and special procedure material;

(b) that Schedule shall have effect for the purpose of conferring those powers on that person as if —

(i) the references in paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 12 and 13 of that Schedule to a constable were references to that person; and

(ii) the references in paragraphs 12 and 14 of that Schedule to premises were references to premises in the relevant police area (in the case of a specific premises warrant) or any premises, whether in the relevant police area or not (in the case of an all premises warrant);

(bb) section 15 of that Act (safeguards) shall have effect in relation to the issue of any warrant under paragraph 12 of that Schedule to that person as it has effect
in relation to the issue of a warrant under that paragraph to a constable;

(bc) section 16 of that Act (execution of warrants) shall have effect in relation to any warrant to enter and search premises that is issued under paragraph 12 of that Schedule (whether to that person or to any other person), but in respect of premises in the relevant police area only, as if references in that section to a constable included references to that person;

(c) section 19(6) of that Act (protection for legally privileged material from seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person in exercise of the power conferred on him by paragraph 13 of Schedule 1 to that Act as it has effect in relation to the seizure of anything under that paragraph by a constable;

(d) section 20 of that Act (extension of powers of seizure to computerised information) shall have effect in relation to the power of seizure conferred on that person by paragraph 13 of Schedule 1 to that Act as it applies in relation to the power of seizure conferred on a constable by that paragraph;

(e) section 21(1) and (2) of that Act (provision of record of seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person in exercise of the power conferred on him by paragraph 13 of Schedule 1 to that Act as if the references to a constable and to an officer included references to that person; and

(f) sections 21(3) to (8) and 22 of that Act (access, copying and retention) shall have effect in relation to anything seized by that person in exercise of that power or taken away by him following the imposition of a requirement by virtue of sub-paragraph (d), and to anything produced to him under paragraph 4(a) of Schedule 1 to that Act—

(i) as they have effect in relation to anything seized in exercise of the power conferred on a constable by paragraph 13 of that Schedule or taken away by a constable following the imposition of a requirement by virtue of section 20 of that Act or, as the case may be, to anything produced to a constable under paragraph 4(a) of that Schedule; and

(ii) as if the references to a constable in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 21 included references to a person to whom this paragraph applies.

Entry and search after arrest

18 Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person—

(a) he shall have the powers of a constable under section 18 of the 1984 Act (entry and search after arrest) to enter and search any premises in the relevant police area and to seize and retain anything for which he may search under that
(b) subsections (5) and (6) of that section (power to carry out search before arrested person taken to police station and duty to inform senior officer) shall have effect in relation to any exercise by that person of those powers as if the references in those subsections to a constable were references to that person;

(c) section 19(6) of that Act (protection for legally privileged material from seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) as it has effect in relation to the seizure of anything by a constable;

(d) section 20 of that Act (extension of powers of seizure to computerised information) shall have effect in relation the power of seizure conferred on that person by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) as it applies in relation to the power of seizure conferred on a constable by section 18(2) of that Act;

(e) section 21(1) and (2) of that Act (provision of record of seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person in exercise of the power conferred on him by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) as if the references to a constable and to an officer included references to that person; and

(f) sections 21(3) to (8) and 22 of that Act (access, copying and retention) shall have effect in relation to anything seized by that person in exercise of that power or taken away by him following the imposition of a requirement by virtue of sub-paragraph

(i) as they have effect in relation to anything seized in exercise of the power conferred on a constable by section 18(2) of that Act or taken away by a constable following the imposition of a requirement by virtue of section 20 of that Act; and

(ii) as if the references to a constable in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 21 included references to a person to whom this paragraph applies.

Entry and search for evidence of nationality after arrest

18A Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person—

(a) sections 44 to 46 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (entry, search and seizure after arrest) shall apply to that person (with any necessary modifications) as if a reference to a constable included a reference to that person, and

(b) a provision of the 1984 Act which applies to constables in connection with any of those sections shall apply (with any necessary modifications) to that person.

General power of seizure

19 Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person—

(a) he shall, when lawfully on any premises in the relevant police area, have the same powers as a constable under section 19 of the 1984 Act (general powers
of seizure) to seize things;

(b) he shall also have the powers of a constable to impose a requirement by virtue of subsection (4) of that section in relation to information accessible from such premises;

(c) subsection (6) of that section (protection for legally privileged material from seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) as it has effect in relation to the seizure of anything by a constable;

(d) section 21(1) and (2) of that Act (provision of record of seizure) shall have effect in relation to the seizure of anything by that person in exercise of the power conferred on him by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) as if the references to a constable and to an officer included references to that person; and

(e) sections 21(3) to (8) and 22 of that Act (access, copying and retention) shall have effect in relation to anything seized by that person in exercise of that power or taken away by him following the imposition of a requirement by virtue of sub-paragraph

(i) as they have effect in relation to anything seized in exercise of the power conferred on a constable by section 19(2) or (3) of that Act or taken away by a constable following the imposition of a requirement by virtue of section 19(4) of that Act; and

(ii) as if the references to a constable in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 21 included references to a person to whom this paragraph applies.

Access and copying in the case of things seized by constables

20 Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person, section 21 of the 1984 Act (access and copying) shall have effect in relation to anything seized in the relevant police area by a constable or by a person authorised to accompany him under section 16(2) of that Act as if the references to a constable in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 21 (supervision of access and photographing of seized items) included references to a person to whom this paragraph applies.

Arrest at a police station for another offence

21 (1) Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person, he shall have the power to make an arrest at any police station in the relevant police area in any case where an arrest—

(a) is required to be made under section 31 of the 1984 Act (arrest for a further offence of a person already at a police station); or

(b) would be so required if the reference in that section to a constable included a reference to a person to whom this paragraph applies.
(2) Section 36 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33) (consequences of failure by arrested person to account for objects etc.) shall apply (without prejudice to the effect of any designation applying paragraph 23) in the case of a person arrested in exercise of the power exercisable by virtue of this paragraph as it applies in the case of a person arrested by a constable.

**Power to transfer persons into custody of investigating officers**

22 (1) Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person, the custody officer for a designated police station in the relevant police area may transfer or permit the transfer to him of a person in police detention for an offence which is being investigated by the person to whom this paragraph applies.

(2) A person into whose custody another person is transferred under sub-paragraph (1)-

(a) shall be treated for all purposes as having that person in his lawful custody;

(b) shall be under a duty to keep that person under control and to prevent his escape; and

(c) shall be entitled to use reasonable force to keep that person in his custody and under his control.

(3) Where a person is transferred into the custody of a person to whom this paragraph applies, in accordance with sub-paragraph (1), subsections (2) and (3) of section 39 of the 1984 Act shall have effect as if—

(a) references to the transfer of a person in police detention into the custody of a police officer investigating an offence for which that person is in police detention were references to that person’s transfer into the custody of the person to whom this paragraph applies; and

(b) references to the officer to whom the transfer is made and to the officer investigating the offence were references to the person to whom this paragraph applies.

**Powers in respect of detained persons**

22A Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person, he shall be under a duty, when in the course of his employment he is present at a police station—

(a) to assist any officer or other designated person to keep any person detained at the police station under control; and

(b) to prevent the escape of any such person, and for those purposes shall be entitled to use reasonable force.
Power to require arrested person to account for certain matters

23 Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person—

(a) he shall have the powers of a constable under sections 36(1)(c) and 37(1)(c) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33) to request a person who—

(i) has been arrested by a constable, or by any person to whom paragraph 21 applies, and

(ii) is detained at any place in the relevant police area, to account for the presence of an object, substance or mark or for the presence of the arrested person at a particular place; and

(b) the references to a constable in sections 36(1)(b) and (c) and (4) and 37(1)(b) and

(c) and (3) of that Act shall have effect accordingly as including references to the person to whom this paragraph is applied.

Extended powers of seizure

24 Where a designation applies this paragraph to any person—

(a) the powers of a constable under Part 2 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (c. 16) (extension of powers of seizure) that are exercisable in the case of a constable by reference to a power of a constable that is conferred on that person by virtue of the provisions of this Part of this Schedule shall be exercisable by that person by reference to that power to the same extent as in the case of a constable but in relation only to premises in the relevant police area and things found on any such premises; and

(b) section 56 of that Act (retention of property seized by a constable) shall have effect as if the property referred to in subsection (1) of that section included property seized by that person at any time when he was lawfully on any premises in the relevant police area.

Persons accompanying investigating officers

24A (1) This paragraph applies where a person (“an authorised person”) is authorised by virtue of section 16(2) of the 1984 Act to accompany an investigating officer designated for the purposes of paragraph 16 (or 17) in the execution of a warrant.

(2) The reference in paragraph 16(h) (or 17(e)) to the seizure of anything by a designated person in exercise of a particular power includes a reference to the seizure of anything by the authorised person in exercise of that power by virtue
of section 16(2A) of the 1984 Act.

(3) In relation to any such seizure, paragraph 16(h) (or 17(e)) is to be read as if it provided for the references to a constable and to an officer in section 21(1) and (2) of the 1984 Act to include references to the authorised person.

(4) The reference in paragraph 16(i) (or 17(f)) to anything seized by a designated person in exercise of a particular power includes a reference to anything seized by the authorised person in exercise of that power by virtue of section 16(2A) of the 1984 Act.

(5) In relation to anything so seized, paragraph 16(i)(ii) (or 17(f)(ii)) is to be read as if it provided for—

(a) the references to the supervision of a constable in subsections (3) and (4) of section 21 of the 1984 Act to include references to the supervision of a person designated for the purposes of paragraph 16 (or paragraph 17), and

(b) the reference to a constable in subsection (5) of that section to include a reference to such a person or an authorised person accompanying him.

(6) Where an authorised person accompanies an investigating officer who is also designated for the purposes of paragraph 24, the references in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of that paragraph to the designated person include references to the authorised person.