THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES OF THE GAZA STRIP

By

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.
To the Palestinian Refugees
whose struggle has shaped
Palestinian history

"Not everything that is faced can be changed; but
nothing can be changed until it is faced."

James Baldwin
This thesis examines the political and socioeconomic consequences of Israeli policies of resettlement on the Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip. It does so by arguing that the resettlement schemes undertaken by the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip are part of a continuous policy to further disperse the Palestinian refugees. This policy has its roots in Herzl's early call to expel Palestinians from Palestine, and materializes in the 1948 exodus.

The thesis argues that political, military and socioeconomic measures undertaken by the Israeli authorities do not conform with their humanitarian claims to improve the living conditions of Gaza Strip refugees. Israeli measures can instead be seen to conform to a type of modern counter-insurgency doctrine, promoted by security forces, in response to revolutionary guerrilla warfare or insurgency. The concept of resettlement, it is suggested, is an integral part of this doctrine.

The primary research findings demonstrate that the "civic action" projects, ostensibly designed to improve the living conditions of Gaza Strip refugees, have not succeeded in meeting their real purpose, that of pacification. Instead, the repressive military and political measures used by the Israeli military authorities have sharpened the military and political consciousness of all Gaza refugees. Indeed, by maintaining the cohesive cultural and political identity, the refugees relocated to the housing projects have thwarted the Israeli policy of divide and rule, contributing as much to the strength of the Palestinian national movement as their compatriots remaining in the refugee camps.
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ACRONYMS

AHC  Arab Higher Committee
APG  All Palestine Government
ARR  Arab Report and Record
CCP  Conciliation Commission for Palestine
GA  The General Assembly
GCR  General-Commissioner Report
GS  Gaza Strip
ICRC  The International Committee of the Red Cross
JP  The Jerusalem Post
JPS  Journal of Palestine Studies
NGCs  The National Guidance Committees
NLG  The National Lawyers Guild
NYT  The New York Times
OTs  Occupied Territories
OAU  Organization of African Unity
PRs  Palestinian Refugees
PIO  Public Information Office
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC  The Palestinian National Council
PNF  The Palestine National Front
PNM  Palestinian National Movement
RR  The Right to Return
RRC  The Right to Return or Compensation
SAI  Statistical Abstract of Israel
SC  Shati Camp
SR  Sheikh Radwan
UN  The United Nations
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNL  Unified National Leadership
UNRPR  United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees
UNRWA  The United Nations Relief & Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNTSO  United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
WB  West Bank
WBGS  West Bank and Gaza Strip
Territory occupied by Isnel in 1967.

Territory acquired by Israel in 1948 beyond U. N. Partition Plan.

Palestine, Israel, and Israeli Occupied Territories
Part One:

1948 Exodus: Exile or Expulsion?
INTRODUCTION

This study on the resettlement of refugees from the Gaza Strip (GS) fills a gap in the literature on Palestinian refugees (PRs). It brings to light an undocumented, unresearched and important side of the PRs; it is the first study to focus on the proposals for resettlement, some of which have been implemented partially by the Israeli state in an attempt to break the Palestinian socio-political fabric. It is also the first work to examine how refugees’ continuous rejection of resettlement has been strengthened through solidarity and collective consciousness of this stateless group. This thesis demonstrates how opposition to resettlement helps galvanise and promote Palestinian national struggle for statehood. Indeed, resettlement has to be perceived as a major issue in itself, offering a deep insight into the formation of national struggle, against the counter-insurgency strategies employed by the Israeli authorities to quell resistance and undermine the solidarity of the Strip’s refugees.

Gaza Refugees: A Unique Case

The Israeli sponsored housing projects which the authorities had started constructing in the early seventies in the GS have raised a lot of controversy among both the PRs and the Israeli authorities. One source of that conflict relates to the aims and objectives behind plans for resettlement. The Israeli authorities claim the aim is mainly humanitarian - to provide better housing conditions for the PRs in the congested camps of GS -. Yet, there have also been other Israeli statements regarding the objectives of such projects, such as "to normalize the dream of return" of the refugees, and to reduce their national struggle in the GS. Issues of demography, resistance and security are what really lie behind the construction of the Israeli sponsored housing projects in the GS, together with a hope that they can be used as propaganda to improve Israel’s world image. When it became clear in the late 1970s that these projects and their inhabitants failed to live up to Israel’s expectations, their construction was halted. Indeed the strong militancy of Palestinians in Gaza is seen by Israeli officials as gallant, heroic and the "most sensitive symbol of the Arab-Israeli dispute."

There has been a continuous debate about the future of the GS in Israeli circles, which started in 1949 and was revived in the aftermath of the 1967 war. The roots of Gaza’s problems’ lie in the combined issues of demography and security. The Strip is inhabited by the highest percentage (87.2 %) of refugees, divided between 8 camps, with a very high birth rate which reached 53.8 per 1000 population in the year 1990. The population is condensed into an area of only 360 square kilometres, giving a population
density of over 1,944 people per square kilometre, the highest in the world.

An examination of the history of the PRs in Gaza reveals that they have resisted every attempt to resettle them, in a way that no other Palestinian refugees in other locations have done. This raises the question as to what distinguishes them from their compatriots elsewhere. In attempting to answer this, many stages of resistance by the Gaza refugees are examined, since "the first Intifada" of 1955, which erupted in response to the Egyptian-UNRWA plan to resettle GS refugees in Sinai. Yet, a better understanding of Gaza refugee militancy has to be perceived in the context of the nineteen years of the Egyptian rule over the GS from 1948-1967, and its consequences, in terms of the political, military, and socio-economic processes attacking refugees. This offers some insight into the military training that the refugees got under the Nasserist regime and the revolutionary ideology that they were taught in schools. We will also tackle here the impact of the Israeli raids in Gaza in the 1950s, and the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1956/1957. Added to this the high rate of unemployment among the refugee population; and the banning of immigration outside the Strip by the Egyptian Administration, suggest a uniqueness to GS refugees which ultimately provides a logical explanation as to why they are different from other Palestinians, and why their resistance and provocative opposition to Israeli forces sets them apart from refugees in other parts of the world.

This thesis, therefore, examines the scale of resistance of the GS refugees since the Israeli occupation in 1967. It examines the Israeli assumption that the resettling of the P.Rs in the GS would weaken or dismantle their collective consciousness, national identity and resistance, which they have managed to build through the past four decades. In fact, their political assertiveness has been growing rapidly in the post-1967 era, in terms of their demand for political rights as refugees and the right to self-determination and sovereignty as a people and a nation. This has made of the Palestinian refugee "problem" a unique case among international refugee issues, since it has moved from being primarily a humanitarian problem to a primarily political issue, and has occupied a central position in regional and world affairs. It is the combination of the cultural and the political factors which facilitate the consolidation of the Palestinian national movement (PNM) and the collective political consciousness and identity of the Palestinians; this is despite the multiplicity of internal and external forces of oppression which have been used to try to undermine Palestinian nationhood.

The importance of the refugee "problem" was underlined by the plight of 350,000 Palestinians who fled from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) during and in the
aftermath of the 1967 war, about half of them for the second time in 20 years. The early years of occupation and the Israeli demolitions in the camps in GS, ostensibly to quell resistance, present a watershed in Israeli policies towards Gaza refugees, together with the Israeli measures against the camps and the refugees since the Intifada (Uprising) began. The camps also have been targets of conflicting Palestinian political forces, more so in refugee camps in the host countries than in the WBGS camps, where solidarity has been maintained in the face of one foe. Yet, PRs in the host countries, and especially in Jordan and Lebanon, did not escape the Israeli/Jordanian/Lebanese attacks, either through military raids by Israel on Palestinian camps in Lebanon, or by massacres committed through collaboration of the three of them (Chomsky, 1983:20-3).

Israel's Only Solution

The resettling of refugees cannot be discussed in isolation from Israeli measures against the Palestinian people in general, and the refugees in GS in particular. Of course, none of these measures employed by the Israeli authorities, whether harrassment of the P.Rs or attempts to resettle as many of them as possible, can be explained in isolation either from Zionist\ Israeli ideology, policy and planning. This began to manifest itself in various forms at the beginning of the century. While that ideology may not always have been unified, it did lead to political and military action of occupation and Israeli statehood which resulted in the 1948 exodus of Palestinians from Palestine. Zionist ideology and policy found support from the imperialist powers - Britain and then the US - who had vested strategic and economic interests in the area, and completely disregarded the demands of the Arabs of Palestine. The alliance between Zionism and the West found its roots in the age-old conflict between the Occident and the Orient, where Islam prevails. Zionism manipulated this idea to achieve its goal in Palestine, promoting "racial distinctiveness" or "racial superiority" and thus permitting discrimination by the Jews against the non-Jews. This was further developed in creating a dehumanized image of the Palestinians. This contempt for the East was even extended to the Oriental Jews, a fact which is clear in Israeli society today in terms of the differential treatment of Western and Oriental Jews in many respects. This contempt springs from the desire to see in Israel a modern European society, which the presence of Oriental Jews - with their Arab culture - adulterates. The implementation of such racially motivated policies has created a human tragedy for P.Rs, who have been paying a high price for it since 1948.

Anxious to block the return of the PRs to their homeland in the aftermath of the
1948 exodus, the Israeli authorities refused to acknowledge any right to return. This is despite the UN Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, which recommends their return or payment of compensation to those who do not wish to return. Israel's refusal to allow a return has been based on a number of explanations and measures. They include: Israel's version of the exodus; patterns of exodus and the continuous expulsion of Palestinians even after the establishment of the state of Israel; creating a new category of "internal" refugees; destruction of Arab villages; the Law of Return for Jews; and Israel's unwillingness to pay compensation for PRs, partly based on the pretext that the property of Iraqi Jews left in Iraq after their immigration to Israel compensates for the property left by Palestinians in Palestine after their flight in 1948. This thesis examines these explanations to provide a background of the Israeli position regarding the return of refugees. It will be argued that this position cannot be understood solely in terms of justice, but that it also has practical implications. If Israel does not allow any refugees to return, it has to choose whether to live alongside a Palestinian polity, or at least abolish the many restrictions imposed on the camps, which include, for instance, building restrictions, thus allowing refugees the right to improve their housing conditions. The only solution that Israel has and does envisage for the refugee problem is their resettlement or integration in other Arab countries. This proposal is echoed in others made by various Western states and bodies as a solution to a problem which they perceive as economic. As such, they argue that it could be solved through the establishment of development projects and the provision of employment for refugees. However, it is actually a political problem, requiring that political rights be restored for those who were dispossessed. There have been various economic development programmes envisaged and some partially implemented for refugees in the host countries. However, as we will discuss below, projects such as irrigation have been unsuccessful, mainly because of the refugees' resistance to resettlement, detecting in such projects an attempt to negate their political Right to Return (RR) to their homeland.

**UNRWA and Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees**

The refugees consider their life in the camps as a temporary settlement only. Indeed, notions underlying the planning and organisation of the camps by bodies such as The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) reveal that they also perceive them to be temporary, resulting in minimum standards in practically every aspect of life. UNRWA's policy has repeatedly been hindered in their view by "lack of funds." UNRWA's pre-1967 efforts and plans to resettle the PRs
were fruitless, due to the strong rejection by refugees. Since 1967, UNRWA's position towards the Israeli sponsored housing projects in the GS has not been clear; while condemning the demolition of camp shelter (an Israeli precondition for relocation), their general stand remains neutral. The question to be asked, is whether UNRWA's stand regarding PRs resettlement in GS is compatible with its relationship with: the PRs; the Israeli authorities; and its contributors, especially the latter (mainly the United States) who have been dictating the Agency's policies and operations since its inception. The sample survey included a question about the refugees' attitudes towards UNRWA's position regarding resettlement in GS.

**Facets of Refugee Resettlement**

The PRs insistence on return, and rejection of any attempt to resettle them, stems from a deep conviction of their rights and the righteousness of their cause. Where they agree to move out of the camps to the Israeli housing projects in the GS, they perceive this as Ta'ahil (rehabilitation) rather than Tawtin (resettlement). Moreover, resettlement is taking place on Palestinian soil, in contrast to all the resettlement proposals outside Palestine which they rejected previously.

This thesis examines the pros and cons of the Israeli sponsored housing projects in the GS, in terms of their existence on the Palestinian soil and their importance in keeping Palestinians on the land. It will be argued that the expropriation of Palestinian land for military or Israeli settlement purposes serves to enhance the sumud (steadfastness) of Palestinians in seeking to remain on the land. The Israeli authorities have developed and implemented a wide range of policies to force the Palestinians to cede land in targetted areas, which are reviewed in full. For example, Israeli town planning schemes are documented, which were intended to move all camps away from urban areas to rural enclaves. These operate in conjunction with Israeli Military Orders inhibiting building in camps, as well as restrictions on building permits in towns, and the demolition of Arab houses under the pretext of unlicensed buildings or for punitive reasons. Such policies serve to obstruct development in the occupied territories (OTs), and help to explain why their infrastructural base is so weak, and why in particular the refugee camps are characterized by a high density of population per house, poor facilities, and a housing shortage for low income groups.

Despite the PRs' awareness of the political motives of the Israeli resettlement schemes in the GS, it is evident from the empirical data that their relocation has not altered
their adherence to their refugee identity, their role in the national struggle, and demands for political rights. In fact, the relocated refugees showed even more assertiveness than some refugees in the camp. Their resistance to the occupation has been as strong as those in the camps, especially since the Intifada began. Where resistance is somewhat diminished, respondents in both the camp and the housing project explained this in terms of a variety of physical factors, and did not think that it reflected a diminution of the struggle.

This thesis also examines the socio-economic and psychological impact on refugees in the SR housing project. It reveals the unforeseen fragmentation of extended kinship ties, brought about by the initial dispersal strategy of the Israeli authorities, which caused problems for family reunification. Social stratification has been exacerbated between the refugees in camps and those in the housing projects, and even between refugees in the same housing project. Some "depeasantization" of a traditional sector of the community has been fostered, through the incentives offered by the authorities in the form of business grants to encourage others to move out of camps.

The particular procedures of resettlement and its various stages will be discussed, and compared with the experiences of other refugee experiences in third world countries. This raises more general questions about the concept of resettlement, what goals, motives and strategies are involved; what advantages and disadvantages does it offer to refugees; and what difficulties are encountered by refugees in terms of adjustment and assimilation?

Any solution of the refugee problem is fraught with difficulty. The Refugees' Committee of the Middle East Peace Talks demonstrates Israel's hard-line position on this issue. Following a refusal to attend the first three meetings, Israel has now participated, but is adamant that there should be no return of any kind.

The Difficulties of Refugee Research

There are many difficulties encountered by researchers into the issue of refugees. This, as Baker explains, is due to a serious neglect of such a major international problem, and,

The absence of systematic and cumulative research into the refugee experience, and the effectiveness of programmes created for refugees, (which) represents a crucial gap in our knowledge about what works, with whom and why, and what has proved unsuccessful. Responsibility for this lack of 'institutionalised memory ' must rest with a wide range of people: policy makers, social planners, politicians, social scientists, administrators, agency directors (statutory and voluntary) and workers in the field (Baker,1985:9-10).
Stein further described the difficulties faced in refugee research, by writing:

Refugee research extends across many disciplinary lines. The lack of an easy disciplinary fit combined with the common view that refugee problems are unique, atypical, and nonrecurring has produced both a scholarly neglect of refugee research possibilities and special research difficulties when one does undertake a project (Stein, 1981:331).

The overall importance of this research should be understood in relation to many crucial factors, which include the following:

1) The impact of Israeli policies on the conduct of academic research in the OTs. The endeavour of researchers in the OTs has never been easy, and since the Intifada their work has been even more severely hampered. The Israeli authorities have imposed a number of restrictions on researchers in the territories. Palestinians conducting research risk arrest for an indeterminate period of time if their research becomes known to the authorities. On a day-to-day basis, Israeli measures can seriously affect the research process. Curfews, roadblocks, checkpoints, and the Israeli military troops' prolonged presence -especially in camps-stifle freedom, including the freedom to move and to collect data. This places the researcher in an unenviable position, and raises serious questions about research under occupation and its role. The particular influence of these measures on the conduct of my work will be apparent in the main text.

2) There has been an absence of studies on the PRs, in terms of conditions of life in the camps. There are particularly significant gaps in studies about the experience of those relocated to Israeli sponsored housing projects in the GS - their new life conditions, and the political, psychological, and socio-economic effects of relocation. A survey of the ASLIB Index for doctoral dissertations from 1981-1991 elicits only five theses on the PRs. It is important to study the PRs because they differ from the non-refugee population and other refugee experiences (except Armenians) in four vital respects. First, the nature of their uprootedness when the majority of Palestinians became refugees, which Weinstock described as, "a deviant pattern of colonization" (Weinstock, 1973:50), and which Sir John Glubb considered "bears no resemblance to any other war [1948] in modern history" (Glubb, 1967:41). Second, their insistence on return which gave them a unique posture, since they saw themselves not as refugees but as very temporary absentees, whose situation could be rectified not through resettlement but only through restitution (UNRWA, 1986:6). Third, their unique collectivity which they have managed to maintain, evolving around the Palestinian idea - culturally and politically. Fourth, through their struggle and persistence they fueled Palestinian nationalism by asserting the broad collective will of an entire people.
for independence (Migdal & Kimmerling, 1993:278). This unique character of the PRs thus requires a new approach for studying their conditions, other than the descriptive studies already done. In this respect, field study could be considered to be the most appropriate method to understand the refugees’ background, experiences and attitudes.

3) There is a necessity to record the Palestinian experience in its various aspects and stages. As Migdal noted, "Despite the impact they (the Palestinians) have had on current world events, (they) remain a relatively "understudied" group;...(of which) "...a neglected subject has been Palestinian society itself, its interaction with the regimes under which the Palestinians have lived, and the impact of social change on their politics" (Migdal, 1977:329-330). The most effective way of redressing the balance is by collecting personal oral evidences from the Palestinians themselves. Such evidence is an important documentation of Palestinian history in the long run, by being based on live sources rather than written sources. As Samuel and Thompson write:

For every life story is a potential evidence for the subjective, and even the unconscious... Oral memory offers a double validity in understanding the past, in which, as still today, myth was embedded in real experience: both growing from it, and helping to shape its perception " (Samuel & Thompson, 1990:6).

Given this background, it is of importance to explain thereafter the phases of the fieldwork I conducted in the GS during the period from 28 March - 30 July, 1991.

**Methodology and Information**

The bulk of this research was first hand, done through personal interviews in the two-case study areas: the Shati camp (SC) and the Sheikh Radwan Israeli sponsored housing project (SR), both located in Gaza city (See Appendix 1). The SC is considered the largest in population size (47,160 persons) after Jabalya (59,795) and Rafah (56,264) camps in the GS (See Appendix 1). It lies on the Strip’s coast just north of Gaza city, from which it has derived its name, and was established by UNRWA in 1951. Its area is about 519 dunums (one dunum = 0.22 acres) and the camp is divided into 12 residential blocks.

The location for the other sample survey was the SR project which is adjacent to the SC. Almost all residents in this project come from the SC. This sample provides a comparison between the former pattern of life of ex-residents of the SC and the current one. The SR commenced in March 1973 and is considered the second largest rehousing project for the resettlement of camp refugees in the Strip. The project covers an area of about 622 dunums, and was populated by some 12,279 inhabitants at the end of March 1991,
as given by UNRWA/Gaza. The project is divided into five blocks, with a total number of houses 2,008.

**The Sample Coverage and Selection**

The sample in SC covered 142 households chosen randomly from the 12 residential blocks which accommodate a total of 1428 units. The number of units in each residential block varies, ranging from 202 in Block L to 26 in Block F (See Appendix 2). In the SR a total of 90 households were randomly sampled from the five residential blocks, and there the number of the houses in each Block varies, from 302 in Block 66 to 596 in Block 69 (See Appendix 3). For the purpose of interviewing, households were selected by using a systematic method to cover the number of households required in every residential block in both locations. The systematic sample allowed a more even spread of the sample over the population in the camp/project, according to the number of households in each residential block.

The questionnaires in both locations were addressed to one of three categories of the household population. These were: the head of household, or the eldest son (in absence of head), or the housewife. It can be seen from the sample surveyed that housewives interviewed comprised 45.8% of the SC sample survey, and 50.1 in the SR. This is attributed to the timing of the interviews, held during day, when heads of households are usually absent. It was impossible to conduct any interviews after 7 p.m., due to the imposition of night curfew throughout the Strip from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m.

It was hoped that the sample would allow some assessment of the linkages between residential histories in and out of the camp, housing conditions, attitudes towards resettlement and aspirations. It was also hoped that information from the questionnaire about residents’ housing histories might indicate the size of the housing problem in GS refugee camps, and what impact future Palestinian rule and UNRWA policies for low-income groups might have in the camps and the poor quarters of Gaza town.

**The Questionnaire**

The structured questionnaire comprised 62 questions for SC refugees and 87 questions for SR refugees. It included open and closed questions, and was preceded by three pilot studies (See Appendices 6 and 7). The questionnaires’ main focus was to gauge:

a) The socio-economic conditions of camp residents and any changes that might have occurred due to relocation.
b) To derive the attitude of the camp’s and project’s population towards the subject of the Israeli resettlement policy and procedures.

c) To examine the magnitude of the political awareness & mobility among camp and housing project residents.

d) To derive the attitude of refugees to a range of proposed solutions to the Palestinian question in general, and the refugee issue in particular.

**In the Field/Interviewing**

Since the subject under research was sensitive and controversial, a face to face approach was deemed to be preferable, and was conducted by the author only. The author was nevertheless accompanied after the first week of interviewing in the SC by an escort from the camp, this was necessary, in order to gain entry into houses, to avoid suspicion on the part of the interviewees that the author was working in favour of one side or the other, and to prevent being mistaken for a government representative whose mission was to collect private information. In spite of such precautions, however, many problems relating to culture and police/military presence in the two locations were encountered.

In addition to field data collected from the sample survey, the thesis is based on detailed interviews with some of the national leadership in GS and of UNRWA officials, and a review of archival material in Palestine, and UK.

In undertaking this work, the reader must remain aware that even though this thesis is concerned with the evolution of refugee resettlement between 1967 and 1991, it is unavoidable to talk briefly about the current developments with regard to PRs situation in general and the OTs' refugees in particular. By the same token, the PRs question could not have been tackled without setting it in the historical-political context of the Palestinian national movement and society as a whole. Thus, the essence of such link and continuity led Strauss to write that "in the development of nationalistic movements, and in the nationalism of nations, the past may be recreated in the image of the desired present and future." He continued to write that "....personal identity is meshed with group identity, which itself rests upon an historical past" (Strauss, 1969: 167, 173).

**The Thesis Structure**

The thesis is divided into the following sequence of Parts and Chapters: Part One provides an introductory background to the thesis. It contains two Chapters. The first Chapter provides factual and historical information; it illustrates through numbers,
destinations, and distribution of PRs in camps the immensity of the problem. This Chapter also discusses the importance of a definition of a refugee, given the multiplicity of definitions provided by organizations involved in this field. Focus in this Chapter is on the GS camps and refugees, their growth and distribution, given that the demography issue in this area had become so politicized, and the weight of numbers came to play a dominant role throughout the period following the 1949 exodus. Chapter two is central to understanding the roots of the PRs problem. The context for the emergence of the PRs cannot be understood in isolation from external influences which Palestinians came under during the British mandate and the Zionist settlement in Palestine pre-1948. Political Zionism's ideology, policies and plans backed by Britain's discriminatory policies will form an integral and underlying part of this Chapter as these forces had deepened the cleavage between the Palestine Arabs on one side and the Zionist-British on the other. It thus concludes that while these conditions posed tremendous political challenges and pressures for the Palestinians; the understanding of their source should be perceived within the framework of the Zionists' ideology, methods and tactics which facilitated the exodus; in which the majority were uprooted by the minority (the Jews), and the creation of the state of Israel.

Part Two focuses on the policies and proposals drawn by the various parties, and Israel in particular, for resettlement of refugees during the period from 1948-1967. Chapter three demonstrates with regard to Israeli policies a permanent position of 'no return' of PRs. It prepares the way by explaining why Israel advocated resettlement rather than any other solution, and indicates how this position was joined by practical measures and political intrigues to block return. It examines the PRs stand and reasons for rejection of all proposals for resettlement in this period. It thus focuses on the GS refugees' position and strong rejection to UNRWA and Egyptian plans to resettle them in Sinai, their "first Intifada" of 1955 thwarting such a solution. At the same time the Chapter examines the roots of GS refugees' militancy, which began in the mid 1950s in reaction to the Israeli raids and occupation of GS.

The common theme of Part Three, containing Chapters, 4, 5, and 6, is an assessment of Israeli policies and proposals for resettling PRs of the OTs following the 1967 war. Chapter 5 deals with the resettlement process and procedures as implemented in the GS. It is primarily focussed around discussion of new field-data from the two case study areas, the SC and the SR Israeli sponsored housing project. GS refugees' understanding of resettlement and the Israeli objectives are assessed, together with criteria and reasons for
relocation.

Chapter six assesses UNRWA's position towards GS resettlement schemes. It does so by examining UNRWA's policies and budget for improving camps shelters. It also examines the Agency's relationship with its contributors; with PRs; and finally with the Israeli occupying authorities.

Chapter seven and eight focus on the impact of resettlement on refugees. The survey findings in both locations provide the substance for such assessment. Yet, this has to be examined within the socioeconomic and political context of life under Israeli occupation, and the authorities apparatus of control - formal and informal -, in both economic and political spheres. Chapter seven deals with the socioeconomic impact in comparison with previous life in the SC. It further examines the dialectic relationship between resettlement and economic development which the Israelis initially linked together when the resettlement schemes were started in GS.

Chapter eight focuses on the political impact of resettlement. This is gauged in terms of the scale of resistance in both locations and the Israeli reaction to it. The reasons behind the strong militancy of Gaza refugees is examined fully in this Chapter, for it will provide an insight as to why the authorities embarked on such schemes in Gaza first as a measure of counter-insurgency, and not out of concern to improve living conditions for refugees. It finally explains the reasons behind Israeli violations of human rights in the GS within the framework of maintaining its own nationalism,- supported by its American patron and inside agents-, while at the same time denying the Palestinians theirs. The conclusion assesses refugees' perception of their political role in resisting resettlement and promoting a national identity for Palestinians. The Epilogue concludes the thesis. It assesses briefly the impact of the new developments on the future of PRs following the "Gaza-Jericho First" Deal of September 13, 1993.
CHAPTER ONE: THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE POPULATION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Since its inception, the Zionist movement has been led by two streams of thought with regard to the Palestinian Arabs living in Palestine. These are, first, that there are no Palestinians, they do not exist as a nation, and secondly, if facts indicate and the assertion is made that Palestinians do exist, then they should be transferred to the neighbouring Arab countries or "resettled elsewhere in order to liberate the land for Jewish nationalisation" (Waines, 1977:62). These two streams cannot be discussed in isolation of other factors in the Palestine-Israeli Conflict, which make of this conflict a unique phenomenon in the world history of colonialism.

To solve the Jewish question of ingathering the exiles in one state, another was created, that of the PRs. Hannah Arendt has portrayed this as follows:

After the Second World War it turned out that the Jewish question, which was considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved - namely, by means of a colonized and then conquered territory - but this solved neither the problem of minorities nor the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually all other events of our century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of the stateless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people (Arendt, 1973:290).

The proper context for dealing with the emergence of the Palestine "refugee problem" is the study of Zionist thought both on a cultural and a political level, which paved the way for Jewish colonization and the establishment of the Jewish state. Chapter two examines the policies and the practices which the Zionist movement has used, to promote the goals which where set out in Herzl's book, *The Jewish State*, published in 1896. Herzl called for the expulsion of the existing population across the borders, a policy which continued into the 90s when the Israeli state has continued to expel and deport the young Palestinian leadership from the OTs. Land and the people of Palestine were the core targets of the Zionist movement endlessly. This Chapter examines the conditions of the Palestinian Arabs who later became refugees; where they came from; where they went and how? The focus is on GS refugees, their distribution, numbers and growth; particular attention is given to refugees in the SC and the SR housing project, where the fieldwork was undertaken.

The Chapter outlines the various definitions of a refugee, in general, and the Palestinian refugee in particular. In the Palestinian context, the importance of a definition has to be linked to two aspects: of repatriation and of protection. These two aspects have conferred the PRs'
case a unique position compared to other refugees elsewhere.

The Chapter examines also the existing literature regarding the issue of resettlement of PRs in general and GS refugees in particular. This brief examination enables us to assess the importance of studying the issue of PRs resettlement and highlights therefore, the contribution that this thesis is making to Palestinian refugee research. It is hoped that this new study will provide a foundation for further research to be carried out in the future in this area.

1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the establishment of the state of Israel numerous studies have been published on the Palestine-Israeli conflict. However, these have often tended to either neglect or under research important areas of the plight of the PRs. In particular, their political, socioeconomic and psychological conditions.

Much existing work on the effect of the creation of the state of Israel has not focused on the PRs. While, UNRWA has created an extensive body of statistics and operational literature on PRs, most of these data are unsystematic and therefore difficult to use. The absence of a base for research is problematic for researchers who embark on studies about PRs. This is especially because there are considerable difficulties of access and security to collecting new data.

There are significant gaps in the existing literature on the PRs in terms of analytical studies, and the experiences of the refugees, both in Palestine and in other Arab countries. There is particularly a striking gap as regards the issue of resettlement especially in the period after 1967.

Between 1948 and 1967, a few authors did publish studies on the resettlement proposals, suggested mainly by British and American official and non-official bodies. Studies and reports in this period tend to fall into three main groups. First, there are those which focus on the nature of the proposals themselves, who generated them, where and how they were to be carried out and the costs involved (Thicknesse, 1949; Schechtman, 1952; Gneim, n.d.). Israel’s Knesset debates during this period emphasized resettlement as a solution to the Palestinian ‘problem’ and could also be classified here, however, very few of these are yet available in English (Lorch, 1993).

Second, there are a few studies offering a critical perspective on the resettlement proposals, of which Fayez Sayigh’s work of 1959 on the Hammarskjold’s resettlement proposal is prominent. It provides an analytical picture of the latter proposal, including statements issued by all the refugee conferences held to condemn this scheme and insist on the right of PRs to be
repatriated or compensated. During this period the Arab Higher Committee's journal *Filastin* (Palestine) reflected the Palestinians' voice in rejecting resettlement in the Arab countries as a proposed solution to the PRs question. Other work all emphasized the role played by the refugees in GS (who were affiliated with a number of Arab political parties) to thwart the Sinai resettlement scheme approved by the Egyptian government and UNRWA in 1955 (Abu al-Nam, 1979; Basisu, 1980; Abu Amru, 1987).

Third there are, UNRWA studies which deal with proposals for the integration and resettlement of refugees, available for the period 1948-1967. That series of studies demonstrated that UNRWA's initial planning in dealing with the PRs was in terms of their rehabilitation by means of long-term settlement projects aimed at integrating them into the host countries (UNRWA, 1986). In 1959, that policy changed (as a result of refugee resistance to resettlement) and the emphasis became more oriented towards a mixture of relief and long-term support programmes: health; education; self-support programmes; and vocational training (UNRWA, 1986).

This thesis is a contribution to begin to fill many of the gaps in the literature on PRs. Very little has been written on the issue of resettling the PRs of the WBGS. A recent article by Marx (1992) discussed briefly the issue of resettlement of GS refugees and emphasized the fact that through resettlement the refugee identity has been enhanced. Wiegert (1975), in his small study of the relocated refugees in the GS, briefly described their new life in the projects briefly and expressed his belief that the refugees "will never look back."

Most information about the Israeli sponsored housing projects in the GS tends to be brief and descriptive in nature. Such as the work published by Locke and Stewart, 1985, and those in *The New York Times, The Guardian, The Independent*, the East Jerusalem Press and the Israeli Press covering the early stages (1970s) of the establishment of these projects. Another source in this respect is the Israeli reports on Judea-Samaria and the GS issued by the Ministry of Defence.

UNRWA quarterly reports include statistical data on refugees relocating to the projects, but, such data is limited in that it does not include all refugees who moved out of the camps, and there is a lack of access to data from the Israeli Housing Department in the Strip. The General-Commissioner annual reports (especially during the 1970s) reported on the conditions of the relocated refugees, thus, stressing in every report that Israel has to desist from resettling refugees and the demolition of their camp shelters. UNRWA's position on the Israeli resettlement policy is tackled briefly by Viorst in his work on UNRWA of 1989.

Despite such limitations, UNRWA data is used by researchers. For example, a
Palestinian writer (Subani, 1991) used it to give figures on refugees in the existing housing projects in GS. In fact, this thesis also relies heavily for background material about the housing projects in GS on UNRWA data. Use was made of data on relocated refugees from UNRWA files in the Accommodation Office in UNRWA /Gaza, for the period from the early 1970s to 1991.

This thesis now seeks to fill some of the gaps in knowledge about the resettlement schemes and relocated refugees in GS. The sample survey conducted in the SC and the SR project is the first study which compared the conditions of refugees in both locations on the political and socioeconomic issues. It is also the first study to measure the attitudes of GS refugees mainly in respect of the intertwined relation between resettlement and the RRC and other political rights. It is also the first study to document the actual living conditions in both locations and the effects of Israeli policies on refugees.

This research situates the issue of resettlement into a new political and socioeconomic context. Conducting the research with these issues in mind have enabled me to illuminate, for the first time, the fact that the resettlement of GS refugees, is one part of a policy to control Palestinians by the state of Israel and to prevent Palestinian struggle and to impede a sound socioeconomic development in the OTs.

1.3 THE SCALE OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES "PROBLEM"

By the end of the British Mandate, the Jews were able to possess only 5.76% of the whole area of Palestine (Hadawi, 1963:25). The largest part of these acquisitions were sold to Jews by non-Palestinian landlords. This fact was confirmed in the Shaw Commission Report in 1930, where it was stated that only 10% of land purchased by Jews was sold by the Palestinian peasants, while the rest was purchased from landlords living outside Palestine (Ruedy, 1971:134). Possession of land by Jews, had nevertheless reached 80% by the end of the 1948 War, and exceeded the area that was allocated to them in the Partition Plan proposal by the United Nations in its Resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947 (Cattan, 1973:37).

That plan proposed Palestine to be divided into an Arab State and a Jewish State. Cattan assesses the Plan and the form of injustice it entailed to the Arabs:
What did the Partition Plan do? It attributed to Jews - who were less than one-third of the population, largely foreigners, and owned less than six per cent of the land - an area exceeding 14,500 square kilometres and representing 57 per cent of the area of Palestine. This meant that the Jews were given a territory which was ten times the area owned by them in the whole of Palestine. Moreover, the territory allocated to the Jewish state included the coastal plain extending from Acre to Isdud and other fertile lands, while the Palestinians were left with mountainous and sterile regions. In other words, this was not a partition, but a spoilation. Its iniquity is obvious (Cattan, 1973:55).

Estimates of the population in Palestine were based on the 1931 British Mandate census. This recorded a total population of 1,908,775 of whom 1,157,423 were Muslim; 589,341 were Jewish; 146,162 were Christian; and 15,849 were "other" (Abu-Lughod, 1971:155). Other estimates for the population of Palestine were given by various writers and bodies, as shown below in Table 1.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimates</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Government of Palestine, 1947</td>
<td>1,908,775</td>
<td>589,341</td>
<td>1,319,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(30.9)</td>
<td>(69.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Rowly, 1947</td>
<td>1,933,673</td>
<td>614,239</td>
<td>1,319,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(31.8)</td>
<td>(68.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Jewish Agency, 1945</td>
<td>1,840,000</td>
<td>592,000</td>
<td>1,248,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(32.0)</td>
<td>(68.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1946</td>
<td>1,743,000</td>
<td>554,274</td>
<td>1,188,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(31.8)</td>
<td>(68.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

a. Government of Palestine, 1947  
b. Rowley, 1947  
c. Jewish Agency  

Table 1.1 indicates that the Arabs of Palestine constituted the majority of the population in Palestine prior to 1948, almost 70% in comparison with almost 31% of Jews. The number of Arabs could have been in excess of 1, 400,000 at the time of their expulsion, as Abu-Lughod pointed out in her studies on the population of Palestine (Abu-Lughod, 1971 and 1986). The number of the Palestinians who became refugees during and in the aftermath of the 1948 war...
is disputed by various parties involved in the conflict, the issue being compounded due to its political character. The allegation is that the Arabs’ interest is in inflating the number of refugees, whereas the Israelis’ interest is in deflating these numbers (Shbeib, 1985:115). Some of the disagreement might be due to the various definitions of a "Palestinian refugee" given by the various parties involved in the conflict.

1.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF A DEFINITION

Refugees have been defined in different ways at different points in human history. The most common definition used was designed for refugees in the post-WWII era by the UN in 1951. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), in its 1951 Convention and its Protocol of 1967, defines a refugee as:

Person who is outside his/her country because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, 1988:11).

This definition could be considered too narrow, since war victims and those fleeing generalized violence or starvation tend to fall outside it. The Convention's definition has an obvious shortcoming with regard to PRs, since it defines a refugee as one who is "unable or ...unwilling" to return to the country of his nationality or former habitual residence, which is not the case for the PRs, who despite their inability to return, because of the many external factors which impede such exercise; have since 1948 been seeking repatriation and clinging to this right as endorsed in UN Resolution 194(III). (See Appendix 4)

Moreover, Article I(D) of 1951 Convention excludes persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the UN other than the UNHCR - protection and assistance. Clause 7(C) of the Statute of the Higher Commission of Refugees indicates similar exclusion of a person "who continues to receive from other organs or agencies of the UN protection or assistance" (UNHCR, 1988:7).

Since 1950, the PRs have been under the protection of UNRWA. But, UNRWA's protection has been inadequate, failing to provide protection during and after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and for the refugees in the WB and GS (WBGS) since the start of the Intifada. This is due largely to the lack of a formal mandate for UNRWA to protect refugees. It is an operational agency, unlike the UNHCR whose universal humanitarian mandate retains more international authority and provides legal protection for refugees.
UNRWA's mandate is twofold. First, a humanitarian dimension, to provide urgent services to those refugees in need. Second, a long term aspect to do with rehabilitation of the PRs, which was the main mission of UNRWA at least in the first 8 years of its work. In order to put pressure on the refugees to accept proposals for resettling them, political questions, whether concerning a solution to the conflict or matters of repatriation and compensation, were specifically left outside the scope of UNRWA's tasks and delegated to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP), a body which had been set up in December 1948 to enforce compliance with UN resolutions (Hadawi, 1967:158).

PRs are therefore recognized as refugees under the Convention and Statute of the UNHCR, yet, they are deprived of the rights under them. The UNHCR's omission of the PRs from its mandate in 1950 was because it was feared that the political nature of the Palestine question would interfere with the purely humanitarian role envisaged for the new office (The Independent Commission, 1986:50-51). Yet this interpretation seems to have led to a lack of equity in provision of protection and assistance by the various agencies dealing with refugees. As a result, PRs have been dealt with as refugees and not refugees at one and the same time. The failure to provide international protection has created a legal vacuum. Israel's refusal, meanwhile, to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which governs the protection of civilians under military occupation, has highlighted the importance of protection for Palestinians' lives in the OTs. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention concerning refugee problems of 1969, has by far the widest definition of a refugee, within the other existing 20 regional instruments. The OAU's definition incorporates that of the 1951 UNHCR Convention but is extended to apply:

...to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events..., is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality (UNHCR, 1988:194).

A more recent definition, broader still than the OAU view, covers not only victims of man-made disasters, but, also victims of human rights violations. In the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, some South American groups proposed the extension of the term "refugees" to cover:

Persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by ....massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order (Nash, 1988:30).

This extension to encompass victims of human rights violations "suggests a norm *de lege ferende* rather than a widely accepted norm" (International Review of the Red Cross, July-August(1988):361-362).
Moreover, the ICCR and RC movement have been recommending that the term "refugee" be broadened and unrestricted, so that it would meet contemporary needs (Ibid.:356).

The OAU and Cartagena definitions do apply to the PRs whose flight resulted from occupation and foreign domination, which compelled them to leave their habitual residence to seek protection and safety. As Grahl-Madsen states:

It does not matter in what way or in which circumstances he has left the said country. The main thing is that the person concerned is outside his country of nationality, or, in appropriate cases, the country of his former habitual residence (Grahl-Madsen, 1972:94).

The many definitions of a refugee given in international law have given rise to two conflicting views. The first of these holds that the multiple definitions are important to prevent fraud and abuse (Nash, 1988:191); and for the:

safety of the refugees themselves, for the receiving nation, and for the sending nation...the decision of whom to include and whom to exclude as refugees thus has consequences far beyond the immediate questions of "who gets in" (Ferris, 1985:5-7).

The second view, in contrast, argues that those multiple definitions have been an exercise in semantics when compared with the urgency of the need of those seeking protection. As Keely argues, the question of "who is a refugee?" is the wrong question. "The starting point should be how to deal with people displaced by war....(who) struggle for independence, not efforts to stretch and trim a definition from another context" (Keely, 1981:25).

Definitions of PRs do vary from that given by UNRWA, the PLO and Israel. The first UNRWA definition of a Palestine refugee was "for working purposes." In 1950, the first interim report of UNRWA's Director defined a Palestinian refugee as: "a needy person, who as a result of the war in Palestine, has lost his home and his means of livelihood" (UNRWA, 1990:6).

This above definition was later refined, and the current definition used by UNRWA is:

A Palestine refugee is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood and took refuge in 1948 in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition and the direct descendants of such refugees are eligible for Agency assistance if they are: registered with UNRWA; living in the area of UNRWA operations; and in need (UNRWA, 1990:6).

UNRWA's definition does have serious shortcomings. The definition excludes refugees who did not register with UNRWA for various reasons. In other words, eligibility is conditional upon need, as well as upon loss of home and means of livelihood. Gabbay
explained a number of reasons which rendered decision on eligibility a difficult task - these involved social, financial, and political factors (Gabbay, 1959:172-174). It seems clear from this definition that it is designed solely for the determination of eligibility of UNRWA assistance, and not for any sort of protection whatsoever. Moreover, it should also be noted that other categories of refugees were excluded in this definition. These are, in particular, the well-off class and professionals who left Palestine following the Partition Plan, and who were not in need; Buehrig noted that this category of refugees, according to UNRWA estimates, constituted some 20% of the exodus in 1948 (Buehrig, 1971:31). Also excluded are those who were outside Palestine for more than two years, for reasons of study or otherwise, and thus lost their eligibility for assistance. The exclusion of refugees who fled and who are not residing in the UNRWA's areas of operation, e.g. in Kuwait, are denied assistance, and have not been counted as refugees in UNRWA's statistics. Accordingly, as UNRWA itself warns, its records do not contain wholly accurate data (UNRWA, 1986:4). To the UNRWA's definition, however, is added three other categories which arose as a result of the conflict. These are: Border-line cases; Frontier villages; and bedouins (Pinner, 1959:11-14). UNRWA has always affirmed that even persons who "ceased to be regarded by UNRWA as a refugee for the purpose of receiving relief, may still qualify as a refugee within the meaning of the UN Resolution 194(III), (UNRWA, 1986:67). In this case, all Palestinians who are residing outside the historical land of Palestine, are considered refugees and are entitled to return whenever a solution is reached.

Edward Said gave a description of the Palestinians condition as being in a state of "exile." He characterized exile existentially as a "condition of terminal loss" caused by "a discontinuous state of being" (Said, 1984:49 and 51; Abu-Lughod, 1988:61).

UNRWA's definition does however, have an important positive element. It considers the direct descendants of 1948 refugees as eligible also; while the right to refugeehood is denied to descendants according to the Israeli authorities definition (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967). Hence, in the sixties, the Palestinian themselves rejected the term refugee in the belief that "refugeehood" and nationhood are mutually exclusive:

Between 1948 and 1969, Palestinians were almost uniformly treated by West Europeans and American spokesman as "refugees", and from that time on the "misunderstanding" was perpetuated. Even the United Nations in its annually reaffirmed resolution granting the "refugees" a right to return to their former home and to compensation for their lost property and I did not admit to the reality that these refugees constitute a "people" (Bassiouni, 1981:177).

In the sample surveyed, it was noticeable that the refugees avoid using the term refugee, and substitute it with the term muhajireen (exiles); the reasoning is that refugeehood implies permanency, whereas the term exile gives them more hope to demand right for repatriation.
Similarly, the term *mukhayam* (camp) is substituted by the word *mu’askar* (lit. ‘military camp’), where the latter term denotes an ongoing mobility rather than rigidity.

Like most other large dislocations of modern time, the exodus of the Palestinian people arose in the context of warfare. Those who fled their homes are now outside their habitual residence. The PLO’s definition of a Palestinian refugee is stated in Article (5) of the Palestinian National Charter. It reads:

The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father - whether inside Palestine or outside it - is also a Palestinian (Cobban, 1984:267).

Article (5), reinforces Article (4), which defines Palestinians’ identity:

The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential and inherent characteristic, it is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership of the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them (Cobban, 1984:267; Harkabi, 1974:52).

The above Articles refer to the Palestinians as: firstly, a people with an independent identity, that does not disappear, but is transferred from one generation to the next; secondly, as a people who are part of the Arab world as a whole (Palestinian Arab people). This label could be interpreted further in a wider context related to the growth of Arab nationalism or Pan-Arabism and the influence of Gamal abdel-Nasser at the time. In fact, the Arab states have always agreed on the centrality of the question of the refugees itself - despite their disputes over it (Hudson, 1971:336). The issue of defining who is a refugee transcends concern with terminology. All refugees are considered as "victims of circumstances beyond their control and are in need of protection and assistance" irrespective of how they are classified and the terminology used for describing them (*International Review of the Red Cross, July-August* (1988): 365).

It is vital when discussing the issue of terminology to assert a method for characterising why and how refugees emerge. In doing so it is crucial to emphasize the question of survival in refugees’ experience. The forms and range of strategies for survival adopted by refugees to cope with the constrained conditions they live in are enormous. As D’Souza and Crisp’s have noted: "The "refugee dilemma" is not just of intellectual or even humanitarian interest - it is a question of survival" (D’Souza and Crisp, 1985:15).
1.5 NUMBER AND DESTINATION OF PALESTINE REFUGEES

The contentious nature of the relative population size has meant that it is always difficult to give statistical estimates for the Palestinian population. This difficulty is compounded by several other factors. These are: the forced expulsion in 1948 of the Palestinians; the offering of Jordanian citizenship to Palestinians living in Jordan- refugees and non-refugees; the geographical dispersal of the Palestinian population; the poor statistical bureaux in the host countries; and the unreliability of refugee registration figures by UNRWA. UNRWA itself has cast doubt on the reliability of the Agency's records as mentioned in the General-Commissioner Report (GCR) of 1979:

> These statistics (of refugees) are based on the Agency's registration records, which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as unreported deaths and births, false or duplicate registrations or absence from the area of UNRWA operations (UN, 1979:59).

The influx of refugees into neighbouring countries began to emerge as a result of the unrest in Palestine as early as 1947. The first to leave for safer parts, following the General Assembly Resolution on 29 November, 1947 to partition Palestine, were some 30,000 Arabs of the upper and middle classes, who sought a safer place, in the hope that they would return soon. Khoury observed that "The loss of so many key people led to a serious breakdown in communications and economic and administrative services among the Palestine Arab community once the British began to leave" (Khoury, 1968:123). Those remaining were invariably left to the mercy of rumour, anxiety, and fear. The mass movement can be dated from the period between April and August 1948.

The movement of refugees could be said to be of sporadic and unorganized character. In general, those from Galilee and the north coastal cities of Palestine fled to Lebanon and Syria. Others sought the nearest Arab-controlled territory in Syria and Transjordan. Some sought relatives and friends. The professional, business and former administrative people usually congregated in the larger cities of Beirut, Damascus, and Amman. Only few were able to carry personal effects and some money. Flight was generally disorderly and with almost no possession. Many went on foot, some by ship, cars, and trucks. In certain cases, entire villages kept more or less together (de Aubin, 1949:252).

Various estimates of PRs who were displaced in 1948 were given by various individuals and bodies, ranging from 630,000 to 780,000. UN Clapp Mission gave an estimate of 726,000 displaced refugees in 1949, which was close to Palestinian estimates given by Hadawi (750,000) and Abu-Lughod (770,000-780,000), but exceeded an Israeli estimate by Pinner of 539,000 refugees at the end of 1948. 5

Moreover, refugees from Jaffa and the Gaza and Beersheba districts of the south
crowded into GS. Most Arab inhabitants of Ramleh and Jerusalem districts fled to the hilly country on the WB of the River Jordan. About four-fifths of the refugees from the coastal area settled on the WB, while the remainder continued on to Jordan, finally coming to rest in the Amman and Zarka areas. (See Map 1.1). About 150,000 of the Arab population of Palestine remained behind in the new state of Israel, but those among them who had their houses destroyed or lost their livelihood found themselves quite as dependent on relief as those who had left the country. Initially they were assisted by UNRWA, but in 1952 the Israeli Government accepted responsibility for them (UNRWA, 1986:3-4; UN, 1952:3).

The remaining portions of Palestine - WBGS- have received the greatest numbers of refugees, followed by the neighbouring Arab countries. Many refugees moved further afield in search of work or better living conditions, to places as far away as Iraq and the Gulf countries, particularly Kuwait and Bahrain. Table 1.2 below illustrates the distribution of refugees into the neighbouring countries in 1948.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>272,692</td>
<td>324,035</td>
<td>398,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>198,227</td>
<td>255,542</td>
<td>311,814</td>
<td>367,995</td>
<td>469,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>506,200</td>
<td>613,743</td>
<td>506,038</td>
<td>716,372</td>
<td>899,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>82,194</td>
<td>115,043</td>
<td>158,717</td>
<td>209,362</td>
<td>272,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>127,600</td>
<td>136,561</td>
<td>175,958</td>
<td>226,554</td>
<td>294,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>914,221</td>
<td>1,120,889</td>
<td>1,425,219</td>
<td>1,844,318</td>
<td>2,334,637</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNRWA, 1990

These figures indicate the residential stability and the limited movement of the camp dwellers, compared with the Palestinian population as a whole. This could be attributed to their particular conditions and lack of means.
Map 1.1: Destination of Palestinian Refugees in 1948

EXODUS: 1948 and 1967
- Centres with large Arab population prior to exodus
- Areas of Major Arab Abandonment
- Territory Occupied by Israel in 1967
- 1948 Movement
- 1967 Movement

Source: Epp, 1976:50
1.6 DISTRIBUTION OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS

One-half of the Arab Palestinian population is said to be dispersed and living outside the borders of Palestine. Table 1.3 below shows the distribution of the Palestinian population from 1952-1988, showing variations from one source to another throughout the period presented.

TABLE 1.3 Palestinian Population Distribution in the World from 1952-1988 (000) (various estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>2,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf and Arab States</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other States</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,598</td>
<td>2,198</td>
<td>2,649</td>
<td>2,841</td>
<td>3,455</td>
<td>4,513</td>
<td>5,044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These figures represent Palestinians resident in WBGS as of June 1, 1967.
** These figures represent Palestinians resident in WBGS as of end of December 1967.

h) From Al-Quds (Jerusalem), 27 July, 1989.

The scope of subsequent population redistribution is suggested by the figures in Table 1.3. In 1975, only 45.5% of the Palestinians according to the estimates of Abu-Lughod, lived in the historical land of Palestine (Israel, WB and GS) as against 76% in 1952. Conversely, 54.5% of the 1975 Palestinian population lived in areas outside Palestine, compared to only 24% in 1952. The percentage of the Palestinian population living within the historical boundaries of Palestine had declined still further by 1984 to 40.2%, while those who lived in the areas outside increased to 59.7%. These changes could be attributed to several factors, mainly the second exodus of the Palestinians from WBGS as a result of the 1967 war. As shown in Table 1.4 the Palestinian population in Jordan had swelled from 466,000 at the beginning of June 1967 to 730,600 at the end of December 1967.

As at 30 June 1989, there were 61 Palestinian refugee camps with a total population of 2,334,637. Table 1.4 shows the distribution of camps and their population in the host countries. (See Map 1.2).
Map 1.2: Distribution of Palestinian Refugee Camps

TABLE 1.4 Distribution of Refugee Camps in the Host Arab Countries (000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of camps</th>
<th>Total camp Population</th>
<th>Registered Persons not in camps</th>
<th>Percentage of Population not in camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>294,272</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>145,538</td>
<td>148,734</td>
<td>50.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>272,778</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>69,015</td>
<td>203,763</td>
<td>74.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>899,811</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>190,847</td>
<td>708,964</td>
<td>78.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>398,391</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>104,977</td>
<td>293,414</td>
<td>73.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>469,385</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>253,970</td>
<td>215,415</td>
<td>45.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,334,637</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>764,367</td>
<td>1,570,27</td>
<td>67.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNRWA, 1990

The above figures indicate that the camps encompass 32.75 per cent of the total refugee population in the host countries. Whereas, 67.25 percent of those refugees reside outside the camps in the respective states and regions. As for the refugees residing in the camps, GS has the highest number (253,970) in 8 camps, followed by Jordan, Lebanon, WB and then Syria. This situation in Gaza, where the majority reside in the camps, reflects a high rate of residential stability; in other words, it means that the economic mobility of refugees in terms of changing place of residence and relocation outside the camps is very limited; this economic immobility contrasts with their political mobility. The explanation of this phenomenon - of economic immobility and high political mobility - will be discussed in the remaining of the thesis.

According to al-Qutub, the PRs in 1988 constituted 53.6 per cent of the total number of the Palestinian population now living in the host Arab states, including WBGS (Al-Qutub, 1989:93). Earlier estimates by the PLO Central Bureau of Statistics for 1980 and 1984, accounted for 42% and 40.3% respectively of the total Palestinian population (PLO, CBS, 1980 and 1986). The High Commissioner for Refugees reported some 200,000 evacuees from the WB and at least 25,000 from GS who fled to the East Bank by August of 1967 (Abu-Lughod, 1980:24-25). Abu-Lughod's estimates for residents of the WB who were forced to flee during the war is between 250,000-300,000, a number which is quite consistent with the results of the Israeli Defence Census taken in September 1967 (Abu-Lughod, 1986:9). Moreover, in its report for the month of May 1968, the High Ministerial Committee for Refugee Relief in Jordan gave an estimate of 361,000 evacuees from WB and 38,000 from GS (Arab Palestinian Documents, 1968:442-444). Adding to this the voluntary movement of the Palestinians from the OTs since 1967, as a result of the Israeli authorities policies and measures, gives a migration of 200,000 Palestinians between 1967 and 1981 (Filistine al-Thawrah, 1982:184-187).

1.7 GAZA STRIP: CAMPS AND REFUGEES

Our main concern throughout this thesis is GS refugees, in both residential areas -
camps and housing projects. Before proceeding to deal with refugees in GS, it is important to define the area geographically. The term GS first appeared, according to the Egyptian basic law number 55, in 1955. Prior to this date—from 1949-1954 it was called "the submissive Palestinian under the supervision of Egyptian military forces", as agreed upon in the first Rhodes Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel on 24 February 1949 (Current History, 1949:232-36). This term was created to distinguish it from the surrounding area with which it had long been associated under the British Mandate, and which was known as the Gaza sub-district of Palestine (one of its 18 sub-districts). (See Map 1.3). Its boundaries enclose a roughly rectangular area of 363 square kilometres, or 142 square miles, that stretches 45 kilometres from north to south, but is only 8 kilometres wide at its northern end, 5 kilometres at its narrow waist, and a maximum of 12 kilometres in the south. On the north and east it adjoins Israel. (See Appendix 1). Although it was created as a zone of military occupation, Gaza has acquired contemporary political significance, and continues to have strikingly different demographic, social and economic patterns from its surrounding areas.

Gaza is one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. It served as a major junction along the ancient coastal road, with other roads branching eastward to Jerusalem, Hebron and Beersheba. It also served as a major port, and briefly as a railway and airline hub. Gaza population, however, has fluctuated greatly, as a result of its decidedly mixed fortunes in the course of history (Ben-Ariel, 1975:60-61). Even in this century, during the British siege of Gaza in 1917, most of its 42,000 inhabitants were forced to flee (Raphaeli, 1968: 44). Its population rose to 17,480 in 1922 (Statesman’s Yearbook, 1925:185). Climbing by 1945 to 73,000 (Village Statistics, 1945:31), it tripled again after the 1948 influx. Since 1948, GS has had the largest Arab population of any city in the former Mandate area. As the capital and first municipality of the Southern district of the Palestine Mandate, it was the only one in the south to have elected mayors, although this applied only to the period from 1935 to 1948.

As mentioned above, those who fled from the southern part of Palestine poured into GS, and a small proportion went into Egypt. By the end of 1947, the indigenous population of GS which came under Egyptian rule was estimated variously to be 80,000 and 88,000, with the influx of refugees into GS, who numbered 200,000, including about 30,000 Bedouin from the Negev, the population increased threefold (UNRWA, 1986:3; Khluosi, 1967:41).
Map 1.3: Sub-Districts of Palestine before 1948

Source: Dahlan, 1987:18
The refugees settled near their occupied land, confidently expecting to return to their homes within a few weeks or months. Table 1.5 below presents various estimates of the scale of population displacement into GS following the May 1948 war.

TABLE 1.5 The Palestinian Population Displacement into the Gaza Strip, 1948 (various estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Estimated Displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayigh</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efrat</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu-Lughod</td>
<td>201,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kossaifi</td>
<td>185,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clapp's Mission</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above figures demonstrate that GS, with its small area, had absorbed a major part of the refugees, compared to the situation on the WB. On the WB the percentage of refugees relative to the indigenous population was 27.5 per cent in 1952, whereas, this percentage reached 200 percent in GS in the same year (Hilal, 1974:19). As a result, the density of population in GS reached 920 persons per square kilometre, while it was 580 person only on the WB (Hilal, 1974:15). (Figure 1.1)

Table 1.6 below illustrates the type of habitation of refugees and its relation to the host population in GS, as of the end of December, 1958.
Figure 1.1: Proportions of Refugees to the Host Population, June 1951

Source: United Nations, 1951:36
TABLE 1.6 GS Population by Type of Habitation, at End of December 1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle location</th>
<th>Host population</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza city</td>
<td>53,342</td>
<td>45,631</td>
<td>98,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shati camp</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,415</td>
<td>22,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabalya</td>
<td>5,179</td>
<td>3,834</td>
<td>9,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabalya camp</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,482</td>
<td>23,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazla</td>
<td>1,884</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Lahiya</td>
<td>2,448</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir el Balah</td>
<td>3,808</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir el Balah camp</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,055</td>
<td>6,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureij camp</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,820</td>
<td>11,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuseirat camp</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,255</td>
<td>15,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughazi camp</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,107</td>
<td>8,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>16,863</td>
<td>23,341</td>
<td>40,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Yunis camp</td>
<td></td>
<td>19,334</td>
<td>19,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bani Suheila</td>
<td>4,712</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abasan</td>
<td>3,503</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikhza'a</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>3,365</td>
<td>11,223</td>
<td>14,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah camp</td>
<td></td>
<td>35,512</td>
<td>35,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18,981</td>
<td>15,912</td>
<td>34,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>115,605</strong></td>
<td><strong>241,921</strong></td>
<td><strong>357,526</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Table above strikingly demonstrates that the refugee population in GS was double the number of the indigenous population. Yet UNRWA services covered refugees inside and outside of the camps equally. In addition, UNRWA provided for some who were categorised as economic refugees (notably 182,000 frontier villagers in Jordan, 100,000 non-refugees in Gaza, 11,000 Bedouin, 14,000 impoverished people in Jerusalem), because they had lost their livelihood but not their homes, and therefore did not meet UNRWA criteria (UNRWA, 1986:68-69).

UNRWA figures of 30 June 1990 showed that the total registered refugees in the GS were 496,339. They were approximately 70% of the total population in the Strip (estimated at 700,000), compared to the 200,000 refugees and 80,000 indigenous population in 1948. Many of the refugees who poured into the GS were of rural origin (47%); 29% being urban; and 24% bedouins (Abu al-Namel, 1979:300). Out of the 271,938 registered refugees, (59,091 families), approximately 55% were living in the 8 camps there, together with 4,675 persons unofficially registered. The PRs in GS camps are distributed among 8 camps in the three zones. Table 1.7 provides enumeration of refugees as at 31.12.1990.
TABLE 1.7  Total Registered Camp Population of GS as at 31.12.1990 (000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Official Families</th>
<th>Registered Persons</th>
<th>Unofficial Registered Persons</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jabalia</td>
<td>13,108</td>
<td>59,194</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>59,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shati</td>
<td>10,578</td>
<td>46,710</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>47,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuseirat</td>
<td>6,943</td>
<td>31,577</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>33,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureij</td>
<td>4,282</td>
<td>19,060</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>19,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir el Balah</td>
<td>2,471</td>
<td>11,101</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>11,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghazia</td>
<td>2,866</td>
<td>12,665</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>12,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>8,366</td>
<td>37,050</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>37,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>12,181</td>
<td>55,623</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>56,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gr Total</td>
<td>60,795</td>
<td>272,980</td>
<td>4,717</td>
<td>277,697</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As can be seen from Table 1.7, the SC where the field work was undertaken rates third in population size after Rafah and Jabalia camps. The only camp that exceeds in size those of Jabalia and Rafah is the Baqaa camp in Jordan with a population of 60,845 persons (UNRWA, 1991:9). In this context, it is noteworthy that the eight GS camps have the highest population (277,697 persons) compared to other areas; Jordan’s 10 camps (225,335); Lebanon’s 13 camps (156,636); WB’s 20 camps (112,855); and Syria’s 10 camps (83,726) (UNRWA, 1991:8). Each camp in GS has an average of 34,712 persons compared to an average of 6,440 in each Lebanese camp. The camps as, al-Qutub asserts, constitute small urban communities in the demographic and ecological sense, and they require a special classification in the study of urban societies in the Middle East, as they are all of a unique urban pattern (al-Qutub, 1989:96, 107).

Population growth of the camps increased during the period of Egyptian rule (1948-1967) (See Table 1.10). From 1961 to the end of June 1967, the growth rates of the camp refugee population reached a rate of 4.67% per annum. The population in GS in 1990 recorded a birth rate that reached 52.32 per thousand, the highest fertility rate in the world, or 33,142 living births, an increase from 23,375 in 1988 and 32,463 in 1989 (WHO and the Gaza Health Services Research Centre, 1990:1,2). The population of the GS is overwhelmingly young: 51.7% of the residents and 37% of the total registered refugee population are under age fifteen (Okasha, 1990:23; UNRWA, 1990:15).

The high growth rate exacerbated the density of population in the GS, which reached 920 persons per square kilometre in the early 1950s (when it was only 580 persons on the WB) (Hilal, 1974:15). (Figure 1.1).
An UNRWA worker hereunder gave an account of the conditions of Gaza refugees in 1951, who were distributed among the various villages and towns of GS. They were often sheltered in private homes or placed temporarily in public buildings: eventually schools, convents, and former army barracks that were all put to use. She said:

It is difficult to give a real picture of the situation of the refugees scattered about in mosques, schools and unfinished houses. One has to see for one's self to realize what it is to be a refugee, driven out of his tent by the howling winds and hailstorms to take shelter under any roof that affords some protection, carrying his luggage and his children under the lashing rains. The only shelters available at that time were the mosques of the town... It is lucky that Gaza has 17 mosques, large and small.... In every room about five or six families are installed. They put up some sort of partitions between them but as the space given to each family is only about two metres square, they have no room to shelter themselves properly. They sit in the corners where there is no room to stretch, looking like statues of misery...... The conditions of these refugees is pitiable and their needs are great. They need everything: housing, clothing and food (King, 1981:16-17).

These conditions were also reported by the director of UNRWA in his first report to the General Assembly of 1951 (UN,1951:4); and by the former head of the Social Welfare Department at UNRWA Gaza (Interview, 27/7/1991). Mr. Majdalawi, a refugee himself, explained how he and his family camped under trees for a few days until they found shelter in one of the former British army barracks in Nuseirat. They spent a year there until The American Friends' Service Committee began its services on a volunteer basis; this was later coordinated with the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR), which began its operations in January 1949. Other non-governmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies joined in the relief programme. Supplies of food and shelter (blankets and tents) were provided, and medical care was administered by the American Friends’, the latter hereafter turned its attention to education (King,1981:18). 12

The American Friends’ Service Committee helped in establishing and supervising the refugee tented camps in GS - still in existence today - until the UNRWA was established upon recommendation of the General Assembly (Resolution 302 of 8 December 1949, paras 4 and 7 (UNRWA,1986). UNRWA assumed all the relief functions of UNRPR and the other voluntary agencies involved, on 1 May 1950.

UNRWA services were very limited, however, as reflected in the money spent on each refugee in its charge, which averaged less than ten pence a day. Of this, five pence went on rations and other forms of relief, such as housing, a penny on health, and four pence on education (Mazzawi,1968:12;Hilal,1974:25-26). Lack of funds has been the explanation given
by the Agency's General-Commissioner in every single report to the UN, since the establishment of UNRWA.\textsuperscript{13}

By 1950, only one-third of all UNRWA registered refugees lived in the Agency-organized camps; a proportion which, interestingly, has remained constant until the 90's (UNRWA, 1986:80). In GS all tents had been removed by the year 1953 and replaced by huts. This replacement came as a result of the winter storms of 1951-1952, during which 5,120 tents were completely destroyed and almost twice this number were badly damaged, leaving in one nine-day period in December 56,000 refugees shelterless who had to seek refuge in mosques, schools, requisitioned buildings or with their more fortunate neighbours (UN, 1952:4). Nevertheless, such removal in other fields progressed slowly, and tents were only fully replaced by the year 1959 (UNRWA, 1986:83).

The size of shelters varied from one camp to another, but in general a family of four to five members had one room of 12 square metres, while a family of six to eight had two rooms. The area of land on which a hut was built usually did not exceed 80-100 square metres. The occupants were permitted to grow vegetables or erect additional rooms on this land as the family expanded by birth and marriage (UNRWA, 1986:83). The report of the Director of UNRWA of 1951 described the type of habitation which GS refugees occupied in 1951. It totalled 199,789 persons; 43.76\% in tents; 7.59\% in barracks; and 48.65\% in towns and villages (UN, 1951:23).

In the late 80s, with the third generation of refugees reaching adulthood, the camps have become heavily congested (UNRWA, 1986:83). There is still a very substantial proportion whose living conditions are far from adequate. Okasha's figures for 1989 indicate that housing density in the GS refugee camps is still very high, since camp refugees have been living in what is internationally defined as overcrowded conditions, i.e. more than three persons per room. In 1989, 40\% of camp refugees in GS lived in overcrowded conditions. Okasha further explains that the median room densities for 1989 in GS camps were 3.1 persons per room (Okasha, 1990:27). (See Chapter 7).

The overcrowded conditions in GS camps (were) and are in part due to the unwillingness of some of the refugees to accept anything but the most temporary and transient type of accommodation, presumably because they have been led to believe that an improvement in their living conditions would somehow prejudice their chances of eventual repatriation. It is in part due also, as UNRWA stated, to the fact that the Agency has been unable, both because of shortage of funds and because of the unavailability of suitable sites, to provide accommodation in camps for many refugees who need them (UN, 1954:2).
The belief is still strong among many refugees that any sign of possible permanency conflicts with their determination to return to their homeland. These refugees have refused to move out of the camps to the Israeli housing projects or other locations in GS. This issue and the conditions of the housing stock in the refugee camps of GS will be dealt with fully later in the thesis.

As regarding the economic conditions of GS refugees, the first GCR of UNRWA estimated that only 20% of GS refugees were self-supportive; 50% were considered hardship cases; and 30% were in need of partial assistance (UN,1951:23). Although there are no references providing figures of the GS refugees of working age population, it was estimated by Okasha that in 1990 the GS population of working age was 379,360; 197,400 males and 181,960 females (Okasha,1990:32). The economically active population estimated at 148,730, 139,410 males and 9,320 females (Ibid.) The low female participation rate can be attributed to the influence of socio-cultural factors.

The poor performance of the GS’s economy is reflected in the large number of workers who were engaged in the Israeli economy, some 32.36% in 1990 (Ibid.:46), although this has been decreasing in the aftermath of the Gulf war. As regarding the occupational distribution of the active population, Okasha’s figures for 1990 showed that there has been a general shift from production sectors into services and a downward trend in agricultural employment, from 31.6% in 1970 to 18.6% in 1988 in GS itself. (SAI, various issues). The services sector in GS has always been the main employer of GS workers, accounting for about 38.24% in 1990 (Ibid.:49); whereas, the construction sector in Israel has always been the main employer of GS workers, accounting for about 47.9% of the GS labour force inside Israel in 1989 (SAI, various issues). (See Chapter 7).

1.8 Gaza Strip Refugee Population Growth

GS is well known for having a high rate of population growth, made worse by the inflow of refugees in 1948. For example, population development during the British Mandate on Palestine, over the period from 1922 to 1946, indicated a rise in population in GS from 19,000 to 71,000, with an average annual growth rate ranging from 5.8% in 1922 to 25% in 1946; compared to those of 2.5% in 1922 and 10% in 1946 in WB (Gabriel and Sabatello,1986:247). This population increase could be attributed mainly to the composition of the population. The last 1931 Census in Palestine (later estimates of population up until 1947 were based on that census) shows that 37.4% of the total population in Palestine was urban and 62.6% was rural. The Muslims constituted 188,075 and the Christians 69,250 of the urban
population, compared with 128,467 Jews; while, of the rural population in Palestine the Muslims formed a majority (571,637), there were 22,148 Christians and 46,143 Jews (McCarthy, 1990:159-160).

These features of urban vs. rural distribution of the Muslim community in Palestine is a result of the fertility and mortality levels for this group before 1948 and after. As Thicknesse observed, despite the majority of the Palestinian population being rural their standard of living as a whole was higher than that of Arabs in other Arab countries, except perhaps Lebanon. He stressed that this is particularly true of the peasant and labouring classes and difficulties will be raised if their resettlement (after they became refugees) is undertaken in areas with a very low standard of living (Thicknesse, 1949:12).

However, population change in GS in the aftermath of the 1948 exodus, and during the Egyptian rule in the Strip (1949-1967), grew from 280,000 in 1948 to 454,900 in 1966 (See Table 1.8). The annual growth was 2.7 per cent, with a population density of 1,250 persons per sq. km., and a high natural increase, averaging 3.0 percent during 1950-64 (Dahlan, 1989:241-244). Even in the fifties, Palestinian Moslem families were estimated to have the highest birth rate in the world, 54 per 1000 (Lerner, 1958:307).

### TABLE 1.8 Population Change in GS, 1945-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End of Period (000)</th>
<th>End of Population period (000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948 280.0</td>
<td>1958 357.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 288.1</td>
<td>1959 351.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951 294.9</td>
<td>1960 360.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952 299.3</td>
<td>1961 370.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953 306.3</td>
<td>1962 382.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954 312.8</td>
<td>1963 397.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 318.7</td>
<td>1964 412.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 336.0</td>
<td>1965 427.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 345.8</td>
<td>1966 454.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Between 1948 and 1967 emigration from the Strip was very limited compared to the WB, due to the Egyptian administration restrictive measures. In order to leave the Strip, Gazans were required to obtain financial guarantees and the consent of the All-Palestine and Egyptian governments. In addition to these problems, GS residents (half of whom were refugees together with their descendants) lacked an internationally-recognized passport, (carrying instead an All-
Palestine Government travel document which many countries refused to receive. Whereas, refugees who fled to the WB and Jordan were granted the same passports as Jordan citizens according to the Jordanian Parliament resolution of April 24, 1950, which announced the unification of the WB and the East Bank (Mansour and Kossaifi, 1990:820)

The restrictions imposed by the Egyptian government on Gazans wishing to leave Gaza were protested against by Palestinian students in Cairo in March 1955, led by Yasar Arafat, Salah Khalaf, Zuhair al-Alami, and others who were members and leaders of the Palestinian Students Union. A sit-in and hunger strike at the Union took place and the Egyptian authorities were presented with three demands: the abolition of the visa system imposed on Palestinians entering and leaving Gaza; the resumption of a train service between Cairo and Gaza; and the introduction of obligatory military training for Palestinians to enable them to defend themselves against Israeli attacks. Their demands were met (Brand, 1988:69).

Emigration from the Strip continued until 1955 at a very low rate. Refugees with money or skills left the Strip, leaving behind the dispossessed villagers who had no alternative but to stay. In 1952, the first exit permits were issued for 2000 labourers and teachers from the Strip to go to Saudi Arabia. While Migdal and Kimmerling argue that those who left were unskilled labour and homogeneous illiterate, this latter argument is contestable because the Arab states economy at the time was in need of skilled and not unskilled labour to build their infrastructures (Metzger, 1983:183; Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993:200-1).

The emigration of people from the Strip could be largely attributed to scarcity of employment for refugees and lower-class residents. For the latter the only source of livelihood was through the Egyptian public works projects, UNRWA jobs, fishing, and seasonal agricultural labour, supplemented by UNRWA rations and by remittances from family members who were working abroad. Citrus growers took advantage of the abundant supply of labour to pay low wages to workers. Per capita gross national product (GNP) in 1966 was only $80 (Lesch and Tessler, 1989:227).

The 1967 war generated a second exodus of the Palestinians, some of them for the second time in their life. The mass migration from the OTs following the 1967 war, did not come to a halt until 15 March, 1970, when the Ministry of Interior in Jordan took a decision to let in migrants from WB, and particularly from GS, in only exceptional circumstances (The Arab Palestinian Documents, 1970:149-150).

This was further enhanced by a decision by the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee which had been formed at the end of 1978, to support the steadfastness of the people in WBGS. In its decision of 1983 it imposed restrictions on Palestinian emigration, especially the youth.
who would otherwise be eligible for military conscription. This decision might seem a prudent one, as Kossaifi calculated, in order to prevent the draining of WB population (Kossaifi, 1985:89). A third exodus of the Palestinian population is said to have taken place before and after the Gulf war in 1991 from Kuwait. As stated by the PLO representative in Kuwait, the Palestinians decreased from 350,000 to 90,000 before the Iraqi intervention in Kuwait in August 1990 (al-Quds, 26 July, 1991).

The population change in GS resulted from the emigration of Gazans, mainly towards the East Bank of Jordan during and in the aftermath of 1967 war. The only full enumeration of the population of OTs is the Israeli census of September 1967. The principal purpose of the 1967 census was "administrative." The aim was to establish the de facto (actually present) population (Schmelz, 1977:78). The results from this census have been used as the base for all the subsequent official Israeli estimates of the number of the Palestinians living in WBGS. Thus, the growth of the Palestinian population is calculated by adding births and subtracting both the estimates of deaths and the balance of population movement out of the OTs. Roy (1986) in her preface to Gaza Survey (1986), argued that the official population statistics and demographic predictions are unreliable because the only official census of GS was conducted in 1967 (See also, Benvenisti, 1984:1).

Okasha also argues that the growth rates of GS population since 1967, as given by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics are not reliable due to lack of real reportings of infant births and deaths. It is clear that another census is imperative (Okasha, 1990:9). In his statistical survey of GS population and labour force, Okasha incorporated official unpublished data and data published by the Central Bureau of Statistics. As assessed by various researchers and demographers, this survey is said to be the most reliable about the population of GS. Table 1.9 shows these estimates of GS population and the sources of its growth since 1967.
### TABLE 1.9  GS Population Estimates and Sources of its Growth (000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population at beginning of year (1)</th>
<th>Natural increase of year</th>
<th>Balance of population growth (2)</th>
<th>Percent annual growth</th>
<th>Population at end of year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967(3)</td>
<td>389.700</td>
<td>1.300</td>
<td>-12.200</td>
<td>-6.300</td>
<td>380.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>380.800</td>
<td>16.113</td>
<td>-32.300</td>
<td>-8.143</td>
<td>364.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>364.613</td>
<td>15.428</td>
<td>-3.900</td>
<td>1.778</td>
<td>377.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>377.140</td>
<td>15.958</td>
<td>-1.400</td>
<td>1.501</td>
<td>383.798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>389.798</td>
<td>16.493</td>
<td>-2.400</td>
<td>3.951</td>
<td>403.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>403.891</td>
<td>17.090</td>
<td>-4.000</td>
<td>3.189</td>
<td>416.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>416.981</td>
<td>17.644</td>
<td>1.700</td>
<td>4.534</td>
<td>436.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>436.325</td>
<td>18.033</td>
<td>-1.800</td>
<td>3.653</td>
<td>452.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>452.558</td>
<td>18.704</td>
<td>-3.500</td>
<td>3.104</td>
<td>467.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>467.762</td>
<td>19.333</td>
<td>-4.200</td>
<td>3.184</td>
<td>482.895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>499.953</td>
<td>20.663</td>
<td>-4.700</td>
<td>3.143</td>
<td>515.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>515.916</td>
<td>21.323</td>
<td>-4.800</td>
<td>3.152</td>
<td>532.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>532.438</td>
<td>22.006</td>
<td>-5.100</td>
<td>3.126</td>
<td>549.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>549.344</td>
<td>22.531</td>
<td>-5.300</td>
<td>3.088</td>
<td>566.576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>566.576</td>
<td>23.238</td>
<td>-3.100</td>
<td>3.492</td>
<td>586.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>586.714</td>
<td>24.064</td>
<td>-1.000</td>
<td>3.855</td>
<td>609.778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>609.778</td>
<td>25.010</td>
<td>-4.800</td>
<td>3.260</td>
<td>629.988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>629.988</td>
<td>25.839</td>
<td>-2.900</td>
<td>3.576</td>
<td>652.927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>652.927</td>
<td>26.780</td>
<td>-3.600</td>
<td>3.488</td>
<td>676.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>676.106</td>
<td>27.435</td>
<td>-3.000</td>
<td>3.507</td>
<td>700.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>750.473</td>
<td>30.453</td>
<td>-4.100</td>
<td>3.451</td>
<td>776.826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Okasha, 1990: 22.

Out of the 750,000 persons at the end of 1989, the refugees in GS are estimated at about 450,000 persons, in camps and outside camps. The camps' population growth has been on the increase during the Egyptian rule of the Strip. On 30 June 1961, the total population of the camps amounted to 155,592. This figure rose by 28.04% to reach 205,946 by the end of June 1967, a rate of 4.67% per annum, and 260,782 by the end of September, 1989. Table 1.10
indicates the evolution of the camp refugees in GS since 1967 to 1989.

### TABLE 1.10 Gaza Strip: The Evolution of the Camp Refugees as Given by UNRWA Registration Data, 30 June 1961 - 30 September 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jabalia</td>
<td>28,669</td>
<td>41,417</td>
<td>41,062</td>
<td>41,427</td>
<td>43,640</td>
<td>51,225</td>
<td>56,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beach</td>
<td>24,721</td>
<td>33,468</td>
<td>33,155</td>
<td>35,450</td>
<td>33,854</td>
<td>40,359</td>
<td>44,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuseirat</td>
<td>16,152</td>
<td>19,993</td>
<td>18,861</td>
<td>20,347</td>
<td>21,664</td>
<td>26,400</td>
<td>30,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureij</td>
<td>11,142</td>
<td>14,944</td>
<td>12,316</td>
<td>12,435</td>
<td>13,224</td>
<td>16,057</td>
<td>18,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir el-Balah</td>
<td>12,316</td>
<td>14,944</td>
<td>12,316</td>
<td>12,435</td>
<td>13,224</td>
<td>16,057</td>
<td>18,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghazi</td>
<td>7,964</td>
<td>9,985</td>
<td>9,037</td>
<td>8,434</td>
<td>8,975</td>
<td>10,506</td>
<td>11,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kh.Yunis</td>
<td>21,250</td>
<td>30,002</td>
<td>28,813</td>
<td>29,694</td>
<td>29,816</td>
<td>33,269</td>
<td>36,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>38,984</td>
<td>48,354</td>
<td>45,198</td>
<td>41,656</td>
<td>42,994</td>
<td>48,816</td>
<td>52,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>155,592</strong></td>
<td><strong>205,946</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,898</strong></td>
<td><strong>197,549</strong></td>
<td><strong>202,841</strong></td>
<td><strong>236,486</strong></td>
<td><strong>260,782</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A striking feature of Table 1.10 above is the decrease in the refugee population from the 30 June 1967 enumeration, which resulted from out-migration from camps towards Jordan, during and in the aftermath of the 1967 war. The 1971 Israeli authorities’ road-widening operations in the large camps in GS, to end the armed revolt that took place in the Strip after 1967, also caused some decrease in camp population (See Chapter 4), as did the relocation of refugees to the Israeli sponsored housing projects (See Chapter 5).

However, despite these decreases, the refugee population from 1979 onwards recorded an annual increase amounting to: 2.70% in Jabalia; 2.80% in Shati; 3.51% in Nuseirat; 3.26% in Bureij; 2.11% in Deir el Balah; 2.95% in Maghazi; 2.03% in Khan Yunis; and 2.10% in Rafah (Llewelyn-Davies Planning, 1990, Table 2.4).

SC shows an increase of 19,588 persons during the period from 1961 to September 1989, (the third highest after Jabalia and Rafah camps). Given that 450,000 of GS population are refugees, the figures above would indicate that the birth rate is very high in this region.

A recent study on the number of births in GS indicates that, the number of live births in the Strip between the start of the Intifada on 9 December, 1987 and until 31 October, 1992 was 158,814. Official statistics also indicate that three thousand births occur in the Strip every month. The study concluded that for every shahid (martyr) who falls victim to the Israeli army in GS (since the Intifada began 432 were killed in the Strip, 86 of whom were children under the age of fourteen) 367 were born (al-Quds Press, 25 November, 1992). In WB refugee camps the number of live births increased by 25% (18,046 births) during the period from December 1987 to October 1988, as the Jerusalem UNRWA office declared. Some WB doctors explained this increase as a result of the long curfews imposed by the authorities, particularly in refugee...
camps *(al-Quds, 15 October, 1988).*

A significant observation about the age structure of GS population is its youthfulness. More than 50% of the population is under the age of 15. Though the Israeli statistics after the 1967 census do not distinguish between refugees and non-refugees of the Strip, it is accepted that 450 out of 750 thousands are refugees. Table 1.11 below gives estimates of GS population by sex and age at the end of 1989 as given by Okasha.

**TABLE 1.11** The Percentage Distribution of GS Population, by Age and Sex, end of year 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Thousands</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>78.21</td>
<td>72.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9</td>
<td>59.08</td>
<td>52.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 14</td>
<td>47.32</td>
<td>44.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>43.70</td>
<td>38.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>38.53</td>
<td>36.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>31.03</td>
<td>28.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>18.29</td>
<td>15.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>14.74</td>
<td>14.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>9.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>12.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 54</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>13.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 59</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>9.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 64</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 +</td>
<td>13.58</td>
<td>6.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>390.23</td>
<td>360.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.11 indicates that the bulk of the population lies between the age groups 0-4 and 5-14. Okasha's estimates indicate that 47.11% of GS population is below the age of 15; whereas, Israeli estimates gave a higher percentage of 49.48% in 1988 *(Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1990:709)*. The second most common age group 15-19, and the third is 25-34. In the 1967 Israeli census the refugee camp population was enumerated separately. This population in the age groups below 15 years was 88,534 (51.7%); whereas, the age group 15-64 was 43.6%, and the age group 65 and over was 4.7% *(Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967 Census).*
The 51.7% of the camp population which is less than 15 years of age is higher than is encountered for the same age group in the villages (50.8%), and the cities of the Strip (49.1%) as given in 1967 census, which brings the percentage of the whole GS population below the age of 15 to 50.6%.

According to the statistics given by the "Demographic Problem Committee" in Israel at its conference of 1 August 1988, the number of Arab children less than 8 years of age in Israel and the OTs is 630,000, while it reached 590 thousand for Jews in the same age category; in the year 2000 the number of Arab youths below 18 years of age will reach 1.4 million as against 1.3 million Jews (al-Quds, 3 August, 1988).

Regarding the composition of age and sex of registered refugees in GS camps, Table 1.12 provides the latest estimate of the refugee population in the various age groups. It indicates that registered refugees less than 15 years of age amount to 37% of the total registered refugee population; whereas, the second most common age groups are those between 15-24 which amount to 19.4%.

### TABLE 1.12  Age and Sex Statistics of Registered Refugees of the GS as at 31.12.1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups</th>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>28,837</td>
<td>26,616</td>
<td>55,453</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9</td>
<td>35,825</td>
<td>33,547</td>
<td>69,372</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 14</td>
<td>31,572</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>61,072</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>27,273</td>
<td>25,007</td>
<td>52,280</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>23,802</td>
<td>22,347</td>
<td>46,149</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>23,742</td>
<td>21,632</td>
<td>45,374</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>16,350</td>
<td>15,336</td>
<td>31,686</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>13,836</td>
<td>12,705</td>
<td>26,541</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>15,347</td>
<td>13,358</td>
<td>28,705</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>13,019</td>
<td>11,220</td>
<td>24,239</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 54</td>
<td>8,246</td>
<td>8,277</td>
<td>16,523</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 59</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>9,049</td>
<td>15,549</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 +</td>
<td>15,216</td>
<td>19,027</td>
<td>34,243</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>259,565</td>
<td>247,621</td>
<td>507,186</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from: UNRWA Registration Statistical Bulletin for the Fourth Quarter 1990:15.

In Israel, and mainly for the "dovish" Zionists, too many Palestinians would create" a demographic problem" and a threat to the Jewish character of the state of Israel. As Peres stated, demography is becoming a more dangerous problem than geography (al-Quds, 26 October, 1987). The numerous youth among the Palestinian population, have been taking a leading role and proving to be the most militant in resistance to occupation, despite the authorities' repressive policy. In this respect, the Minister of Economics and Finance in Israel stated that "... the coming of age of the first generation born under occupation and the "iron
fist" policy launched in August 1985 all contributed to the Palestinians' growing militancy" (Johnson, 1990:32).

Transfer proposals, deportation of the young leadership from the territories, imprisonment of youth, the enforced separation of families and refusal of applications for family reunification, etc., are among the measures which the Israeli authorities implement to meet its objectives of having fewer Palestinian people on the historic and of Palestine. This policy also extends to include the Palestinian Arabs living in Israel, who are considered Israeli citizens in the legal sense, but who face discrimination in every single aspect of their daily life in Israel. The aim of introducing the issue of demography here is to stress that for the Palestinian population the demographic issue has been always a central theme in their struggle against Israel. Awareness of the demographic balance in Palestine emerged with the flow of Jewish immigration to Palestine during the British Mandate on Palestine. This political awareness has continued, especially after the doors of the ex-Soviet Union were opened for the Soviet Jews to migrate to Israel. In its report of 1990, the Israeli Statistical Bureau reported that 350,000 Soviet emigrants have migrated to Israel since 1989, of which 265,000 moved in 1990 alone, bringing the percentage of emigration to its highest level (6.7%) since the last Jewish flows to Israel from 1948-1951 (al-Quds, 7 September, 1991). However, a specialist in Jewish demography has argued that with every group of 100,000 new Jewish immigrants (net of emigrants) equalization of the number of Jews and Arabs in the territories will not occur until around 2014 (DellaPergola, 1990:27). Thus, in East Jerusalem, as statistics between 1983-1985 showed, the Jews almost caught up with the Arab growth for the first time since 1967, the respective figures being 2.2 and 2.4, aided by the Arab migration from the city (JP, 22 May, 1987).

The fear among Palestinians over the demographic issue stems from two major factors. First, the connection between the number of incoming Jewish immigrants and their demand for Palestinian land. Between 1967 and the end of 1990, Israel had confiscated 3049,118 Dunums of land, 2895,643 in WB, and 153,475 in GS (al-Quds, 9 August, 1991). Second, expropriation of land is connected to another factor, and that is the setting-up of settlements in OTs; The number of settlements that have been set-up in the OTs reached 145 by the end of 1991; of those, 128 were in WB, 17 in GS. By November 1987, some 8 percent of the total area of GS, and half of the vacant state land, had been given to the Gaza Coast Regional Council for settlement (JP, 6 November, 1987).

The number of Jewish settlers in OT's has been on the increase, as the Bulletin for Settlements Councils in WBGS shows. This figure reached 112,125 settlers at the end of
November, 1991; with an increase of 16,000 compared to January 1991 figures (96,000) (al-Quds, 24 January, 1992). According to the Israeli government plans the number should reach 500,000 settlers by the year 1995 (al-Bayader al-Siyassi, 1991:22); and a million settlers by the year 2000 (Davar, 13 September, 1991). In that case, the Palestinians' fear has it roots in long-standing Israeli policies and plans towards the people and the land of Palestine. The debate on this issue and its relation to the issue of dispersing PRs will be dealt with in detail throughout the study.

To sum up, it is clear that the rate of growth of the GS refugee population has been increasing since 1948 to the present day. The analysis shows that more than 50% of the GS population is under the age of 15. This is despite the population losses caused during and after 1967 war, which have been estimated at 115,100 persons (between 1967 and 1968).

The concern of this Chapter was to provide the statistical and the conceptual framework which has comprised the Palestinian refugees. It has set the tone for what follows in the proceeding Chapters of the thesis. In the PRs experience, the weight of numbers has been of influence in two aspects: first a political one, their collective cohesion and determination to return having shaped their political consciousness to such a degree that almost all proposals to resettle them outside Palestine have been thwarted; second, a socio-economic one, which could be seen in the overcrowding and poor housing conditions, making GS one of the most densely populated areas in the world.
NOTES:

1. 1931 British Mandate census formed the basis for subsequent Palestine population estimates until March 1947.


3. This Convention was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session (Addis Ababa, 10 September 1969), given the name 'the OAU Convention Covering the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa'. For the full text, see, ibid.: 193-200.

4. This was agreed upon at the fourth Palestinian National Council meeting in July 1968.


6. Eviction of Palestinians from the southern coastal plain, in particular from the Majdal town to Gaza Strip, took place in the early 1950s. For details on the eviction, see: Benny Morris, 1990: 257-269.

7. The Egyptian military administration in GS lasted from 1949-1967, was terminated by the war of June 1967. Excluded was an interlude of Israeli occupation of the Strip between 29 October 1956 and 7 March 1957 as a result of the Suez military campaign (Khlousi, 1967: 45; Castel, 1984: 1).

8. The Gaza Strip is a part of the Palestinian coastal plain stretching from Haifa in the north to Rafah in the south. The Strip is divided into three zones: the Northern Zone, Central Zone, the Southern Zone.

9. Ben-Ariel provides an estimated Gaza population of 8,000 in 1800, 12,000 in 1840, 16,000 in 1882, 36,000 in 1897; making it the second largest town in Palestine during most of the century.

10. Raphaeli notes that Gaza did not regain its pre-1917 population level until the 1948 refugee movements.

11. The Yearbook shows that Gaza was, despite its population losses during the First World War, the fourth largest city in the Mandate of Palestine. It has remained the fourth largest city in the former Mandate area, exceeded only by three cities: greater Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv/Jaffa, Haifa.


14. For detailed information on the restrictions imposed on Gazans' emigration prior to
CHAPTER TWO: PALESTINIANS: CHANNELS FOR EVICTION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Yitsak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, was prohibited by a censorship board from including in his memoirs a first-person account of the expulsion of 50,000 Palestinians from Lod and Ramle near Tel-Aviv during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Rabin was puzzled by the prohibition, but obeyed Israeli law. The deleted section was leaked by the book's translator and was published in NYT of 23 October, 1979.

...Allon repeated his question (to Ben-Gurion and Rabin): What is to be done with the population? B.G. waved his hand in a gesture which said, Drive them out!... Driving out is a term with a harsh ring. Psychologically, this was one of the most difficult actions we undertook. The population of Lod did not leave willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots in order to make the inhabitants march the 10 to 15 miles to the point where they met up with the borders... Great suffering was inflicted upon the men taking part in the eviction action. Soldiers... who had been inculcated with values such as international brotherhood and humaneness. The eviction action went beyond the concepts they were used to.

The example of Lod and Ramle's reveals part of the truth about the expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs in 1948. Asking why this deletion was made sheds light on the contradictory statements given by the Zionist/Israeli leadership regarding the land of Palestine and its people, and the plight inflicted on them, and moreover, the kind of solutions proposed to solve the PRs issue, either by Israel in the post-1948 period or by Western countries.

This Chapter discusses the two conflicting versions which have been given as the cause of the exodus. The Zionist's version and the Palestinian/Arab version give different interpretation as to the cause of the Palestinians' plight. Furthermore, these conflicting versions of who was responsible for the exodus give rise to another issue: who is responsible for finding a solution to the PRs' question? This is not to ignore recent interpretations given by "the new historians" in Israel. Their investigations about the exodus have revealed part of the truth as to who caused it, which partly supports the Arab version of the exodus. These "new historians" have chosen to disregard "the purity of arms" legends that surrounded the Israeli version of the 1948 exodus (Gilmour, 1987:10).

An understanding of the 1948 exodus needs to be studied in the context of the Zionist movement's ideology, policies and plans throughout the first half of the century. This is because it reveals in practical terms how the movement's apparatus was used in the goal of establishing a Jewish state, which carried out various forms of discrimination and denial of
Palestinians' right to land and independence. It argues that the Zionist/Israeli policies and plans to expel Palestinians from their land in the period pre-1948 and post-1967 did not change, but, they reflect continuity, which have been taking new forms: deportations, calls for transfer, and dispersion of Palestinians.

The focus of this Chapter is to look at the development of the Zionist movement policies and plans. Its purpose is: to examine the nature of Zionist ideology; to show how it differs from other colonial schemes; to explain how and why it was able to achieve its goal in Palestine; to examine the crucial interrelationship between Israel's policies and plans to block return of PRs and the issue of resettlement; for the interlink between return and resettlement pose opposite questions and problems.

Thus, some of the central questions being asked are: Why have Zionists been inconsistent regarding the exodus? Can the exodus be perceived as one born by design rather than by war? How did Zionism's relationship with the imperial powers help nurture its scheme? How did the political, socio-economic elements in Palestine Mandate, along with the push and pull of external factors beyond Palestinian control, coalesce to influence the subsequent history of Palestine and Palestinians?

It is necessary to raise these questions, because the answers to them provide the background for a long-rooted Israeli policy of "no return," concomitant with their ongoing call to resettle PRs in the Arab countries, outside its borders, which the rest of this Chapter focuses on.

2.2 THE CONFLICTING VERSIONS

For nearly forty-five years the root causes of the PRs question have been disputed over, mainly by the two sides involved. The Israelis' claim that the exodus was partly ordered by the military leaders of the Arab High Command, who promised a quick victory and possibility of quick return. This version has been adopted as the official Israeli thesis, and by Zionist apologists abroad. They further argue that the war launched by the Arab states triggered the refugees to leave and is considered the second most important root cause.

Addressing the Knesset Committee on 4 December 1949, Ben-Gurion claimed that the coverage of the expulsion of Arabs were "fabrications designed to defame the state," since the Arabs left on orders from the Arab leadership. He thus called a Knesset Committee to seek ways of combatting "such disgraceful allegations" (Segev,1986:56). Ben-Gurion went even further to state that the creation of the problem "Was an organized plan by Arab states or
British or both" (F.R.U.S., 1949:903).

Other reasons were given by Israel for the flight of PRs: that the exodus resulted from panic created by fighting in Palestinian communities; by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or expulsion (Cited in Kuhnhardt, 1984:13).

The Palestinian/Arab thesis alleges that the atrocities committed by the Zionist forces, of which the massacre of Deir Yassin was exceptional in causing panic and flight, and the terror activities of Zionist underground groups such as Irgun and Stern, had lead to a crusade battle to conquer Arab cities prior to the establishment of the state of Israel in order to create a fait accompli, linked to mass expulsion and mass flight. This was further combined with skilful psychological warfare. From the very beginning it was the aim of the Zionists to clean up the area of all Arabs.1

The other allegation raised by Palestinians was that the British Mandatory authorities were responsible primarily for the panicky flight of the Arabs from Palestine. In a letter published in the Palestine Post on February 2, 1949, Elias Koussa, a distinguished Arab attorney and member of the Arab National Committee of Haifa, wrote that the British administration had laboured "to create an atmosphere permeated with fear and alarm...The idea that the Arabs should quit their homes was advanced, sponsored and propagated by the British." He continued to say that: "...It was the British, and not the Jews, who first put into effect the dislodgement and deportation of the Arab population." When conditions in Tiberias became acute in an area where friendly relations between Arabs and Jews formed a bright illustration of the possibility of the two communities cooperating, the British authorities forcibly transported the Arab inhabitants en masse to Transjordan. Another influence of British authorities policies was seen in the Arab flight from the Haifa area, when the British informed the Haifa residents that they would not protect them (Schechtman, 1952:12-13).

The British role with regard to the flight of PRs could be seen also in connection with the British government decision to withdraw its Mandate from Palestine on 14th May 1949. Rees Williams, Under-Secretary of State for the colonies, considered this withdrawal without handing over responsibility to any other responsible authority "is unprecedented in the history of our Empire" (Shlaim, 1987:50). Walid Khalidi further argued that, at the time of British withdrawal, the balance of power was in favour of the Zionists in Palestine, and considered that such withdrawal" was an open invitation for a Zionist military take-over of the country," and further "increased the fragmentation of the Arab scene while it furthered the cumulative consolidation and extension of Jewish power" (Shlaim, 1987:51-52; Pappe, 1992:99-101).
Literature about the conflict covers fully the two conflicting versions of the exodus. Yet, the Israeli version has been particularly accepted (Said, 1988). This is despite the investigations that took place in the sixties to refute the Zionist claims. Ershkin Childers and Walid Khalidi were the first scholars to investigate the Israeli claims. They have screened Arab documents - newspapers and radio broadcasts in particular and come to the conclusion that no plans for self-imposed evacuation or orders for self-evacuation were reported. On the contrary, they found evidence that official and non-official institutes in the Arab world, including Palestinian groups, had taken a hostile attitude towards those who fled their homes. Accordingly, they called upon Palestine Arabs to stay in their homes and jobs, they even threatened to punish severely those who were planning to leave. Refutations of Israeli claims made by Arab scholars were based on the strategies, tactics and plans carried out by the Jewish military organizations and the Israeli army later on.

It was difficult to investigate those plans without obtaining the secret documents held by the Jewish/Israeli Defence Departments. This material was opened for researchers at the beginning of the 80s, when thousands of documents related to the 1948 war and the circumstances encircling the expulsion of the Palestine Arabs became available. This led to the emergence of what is called "the new history," especially in Israel, where the "new historians" have been taking a new role in investigating both versions of the exodus, and the circumstances that surrounded the first Arab-Israeli war.

2.3 THE "NEW HISTORIANS" INTERPRETATION OF PALESTINIAN EXODUS

Benny Morris is considered the most prominent of the "new historians" and published the results of his investigations on that subject firstly in 1986. Other Israeli historians have also been tackling the subject, and have shown empathy with the PRs, and sometimes the Israelis who are victims in their own society. Among those are, Tom Segev, who debated the issue of discrimination against the Oriental Jews by their Western fellowmen; Simha Flapan, who has written about the 1948 war and the fabricated Israeli claims of Arab power and attacks; and Avi Shlaim, who researched the personal relationship between the Zionist leadership, Britain and King ‘Abdullah of Jordan.

Morris agreed with Khalidi and Childers with regard to the absence of evidence to support the Israeli claims of the exodus, and in particular, in relation to the myth of the radio broadcasts. A summary of Morris’s argument is that the expulsion happened as a result of the Israeli military operations, and not because of a systematic plan to expel Arabs from Palestine.
In his introduction to *The Birth*, he wrote: "It cannot be stressed too strongly that while this is not a military history, the events it describes - cumulatively amounting to the Palestinian Arab exodus - occurred in wartime and were a product, direct and indirect, of that war" (Morris, 1987:3).

The Palestinians refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. It was largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterized the first Israeli-Arab war; in part, it was the result of deliberate, not to say malevolent, actions of Jewish commanders and politicians; in smaller part, Arab commanders and politicians were responsible for its creation, through acts of commission and omission (Morris, 1991:114).

Morris's explanation that the causes of the exodus were not pre-planned but rather the outcome of conditions of war does not always stand up to examination - even in his own contradictory arguments. Having based his explanation on the war only, he goes on to write: "In April-May, and indeed, again in October, the "atrocity factor" played a major role in certain areas of the country in encouraging flight" (*ibid.*:288). This was the period in which the Jewish military gangs had committed several massacres in Arab villages-Deir Yassin, Nasser el-Din near Taiberis, and Ein el-Zaitoun near Safad (Morris, 1987:287-8).

It is difficult to see that how the expulsion of about 800,000 within such a short period of time does not result from a pre-planned systematic policy of expulsion. Morris's interpretation of the exodus has been criticized by many. Among these are Norman Finkelstein and Nur Masalha (*JPS*, 1991). Norman considered Morris's argument as one of the "happy median", in which the old myth was substituted by a new one. He wrote: "The results of Morris's research thus apparently belie the most damaging Arab claims and exonerate Israel of any real culpability for the catastrophe that befell Palestine's indigenous population in 1948" (Finkelstein, 1991:67). Masalha argued that Morris's research ignored the "inherent link between the "transfer" of the Arabs and the acquisition of their land on the one hand and Zionism's long-advocated imperative of accommodating millions of Jewish immigrants in the Jewish state on the other" (Masalha, 1991:97). As a Palestinian scholar Masalha joins other Palestinian scholars who consider Morris's arguments to be more dangerous than the general Israeli version of the 1948 exodus (*al-Mithaq*, 23 April, 1988). For a clearer understanding of how the evacuation happened, we need a review of the Zionist movement's ideology, policies and plans which were mobilized during the 1948 expulsion.
2.4 ZIONISM'S INSTRUMENTS TO SHAPE HISTORY

In representing their case to the West, the Zionist movement based its propaganda around two issues: the people and the land of Palestine (the territory they decided would become Israel). These have been the main factors in the conflict between Palestinians and Jews/Israelis since the beginning of the century.

2.4.1 The "Empty-Uncultivated" Land

Zionist apologetics portrayed Palestine to the West as being a backward province, a largely uninhabited territory, where Jews, with their biblical right to the land, and as representatives of Western civilization could reconstitute a Jewish homeland and bring back civilization to it; a notion, which was stressed by Herzl in his novel "Altneuland" (Old-Newland), and by Weizman in his letter to C.P. Scott (editor of the Manchester Guardian) (Said:1980:23-24; Waines, 1977:21; Ro'i, 1968:204; Flapan, 1979:25-26; Hirst, 1977:17). Yet, it was a view at odds with the descriptions given to the land of Palestine by various visitors to it (Said, 1980:11; Waines, 1977:31-32; Barbour, 1946:32). In addition, Zionist presence in the Middle East would protect European interests - mainly Britain's - in the area.

This concept of the 'empty territory', which the Zionist movement adopted from the West, had earlier found its first expression in Alphonse de Lamartine's writings (Said, 1980:9). The view of the 'empty territory', which was conceived in the 19th century, was exploited by the imperial powers for their own ends (Rodinson, 1968:14); and the idea formed the cornerstone of "Political Zionism", as Weinstock observed. He explained:

This modernized version of the original Zionist mystique, now stripped of its initial religious and quasi-messianic content and remoulded in the spirit of contemporary nationalism, is commonly called 'Political Zionism'. It carried obvious implications for the inhabitants of Palestine, since they were scheduled to become aliens in their own country - assuming they were to be allowed to remain where they were - without ever being consulted (Weinstock, 1973:51).

The distortion about the barrenness of the land of Palestine which the Zionist apologetics often conveyed was carried out with the ultimate aim of colonizing it. Believing that their dignity and honour flowed from the land and after having been confined to ghetto life and city occupation land ownership had an aura of permanence to them. A critique of this myth came from Asher Ginzberg (pen-name Ahad Ha'Am) a Russian Jewish writer and a strong advocate of the bi-nationalist idea (see below). After his visit to Palestine in 1891, he wrote:

We abroad are accustomed to believe that Palestine nowadays is almost entirely desolate: a barren desert where anyone can buy land to his heart's content. In
fact that is not so. All over the country it is hard to find arable land that is not cultivated... (Cited in Garaudy, 1983:38-39).

*The Palestine Royal Commission* report of 1937 gives a good account about the cultivability of the land. It showed that the export of citrus fruits alone (most citrus plantations were owned by Palestine Arabs) in 1935, constituted 84 per cent of the total exports. The total area of citrus groves grew from 28,000 dunums in 1919 to about 300,000 dunums in 1936 (213-214).

It remains to examine the validity of the Jewish claim that this advance has been largely due to the introduction of new technological methods in cultivation in Palestine by Jews. Alexander Scholch, a German historian, researched thoroughly the economic and social history of Palestine for the period extending from 1856 to 1882 and asserted that "Palestine experienced a remarkable economic upswing in the two and half decades following the Crimean War... (when) it became more and more export oriented;" primarily as a result of the extension of the area under cultivation and not by introducing improved methods of production (Scholch, 1982:17,55).

It is not surprising to see the lust for the land which Herzl's diaries revealed when published twenty-six years after his death in 1904. He believed that in the acquisition of the land of their choice, Zionists should resort to armed conquest (Khalidi, 1971:115). This notion was later adopted by the Revisionists of the Zionist movement. This essential component in his strategy to acquire land was further associated with a clever tactic: to purchase land from the Arabs while "we (Zionists) are not going to sell them anything back" (Cited Hirst, 1977:18).

Yet, despite all the tactics used by Jews to purchase land in Palestine, with huge amounts of money offered; and the British authorities pressure on Arabs to sell their lands, the Jews were able to possess only 5.76% of the whole area of Palestine by the end of the British Mandate in 1948 (Hadawi, 1963:25). The largest part of these acquisitions were sold to Jews by non-Palestinian landlords, as confirmed in the Shaw Commission Report in 1930, which stated that only 10% of land purchased by Jews was sold by the Palestinian peasants, while the rest was purchased from landlords living outside Palestine (Ruedy, 1971:134).

### 2.4.2 The Palestine Arabs: A Distorted Picture

Amidst these issues, the Arab Palestinian was ignored and treated as a non-entity. But, "when it was necessary to deal with him, they made him intelligible, they represented him to the West as something that could be understood and managed in specific ways" (Said, 1980:25-26). It is no wonder then to see the West ignoring Arab aspirations to independence after
WWI, despite the promises given by McMahon to Sharif Hussein.⁶

Promises by the Allies to the Arabs and the Jews proved to be of a double-standard: despite their role in the war with the Allies against the Ottomans, Arab independence was still denied. At the same time they promised Palestine to the Zionists, by issuing the Balfour Declaration on 2nd November, 1917, ⁷ even though the population of Palestine was at that time about 90% Arab, and only 8% Jews. This was further supplemented by complete disregard to the Arab wishes in selection of a mandate (Monroe, 1981:66).

This was despite the fact that Article 2 of the Mandate asserts 'the safeguarding of the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.' It has to be noticed that the Palestine Arabs were not mentioned by name in the Mandate Articles in any way;⁸ nor were their political rights of any concern to the Mandate designers, or in the Balfour Declaration, which guaranteed only the "civil and religious rights" of "the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." Edward Said sees the relation between Zionism and the West as follows:

Between Zionism and the West there was and still is a community of language and of ideology; so far as the Arab was concerned, he was not part of this community. To a very great extent this community depends heavily on a remarkable tradition in the West of enmity toward Islam in particular and the Orient in general (Said, 1980:25-26).

Zionists, in planning for the achievement of their goal, had manipulated this idea; which found its roots in the age-old conflict between the Occident and the Orient, where Islam prevails. The idea was used by successive leaders from Herzl and up until today. Israel's mission was seen as "a device for holding Islam - and later the Soviet Union, or communism - at bay " (Ibid.:29).

The West perceived the Arabs of Palestine from a Zionist perspective, where Zionists assumed for themselves a superior position. This campaign which the Zionists carried out successfully embraced political motives as observed by Alan Taylor:

The dehumanized image of the Palestinians which the Zionists developed and propagated was instrumental in displacing the moral issue and establishing an aura of legal justification around Zionist goals and activity (Taylor, 1974:48).

The Arabs were regarded as simply nomads. From a colonialist perspective they were counted "as merely part of the flora and fauna." In addressing the people of Palestine, King George V described the Arabs of Palestine not by name, but as the "general population" of the country. For the first Jewish settlers in Hadera settlement in Palestine, the Palestine Arabs were termed as "Barbarians." Moreover, in the terms of the British Mandate (Article VI), they were
described as "the other sections of the population," and in the Balfour Declaration, they were referred to as the "existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."

Thus, in whatever documents or statements used, behind the minute selection of such terms was a well-planned policy, going back as far as the time of Herzl and involving the removal of the Palestine Arabs. Herzl views on this issue were reflected in his diaries:

We shall try to spirit the penniless population (Palestine Arabs) across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it an employment in our country. The property-owners will come over to our side. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly. Let the owners of immovable property believe that they are cheating us, selling us things for more than they are worth. But we are not going to sell them anything back (Cited in Hirst, 1977: 18).

This idea, however, cannot be divorced from the idea of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. So, when the question of removal is posed, discussion of Zionist policy towards the Palestine Arabs in terms of labour, land purchase, calls for transfer and resettlement, and other discriminatory policies have to be considered in depth, which will lead us to the central argument of why and how the Palestinians have now become refugees, and why their return has been blocked by Israel since their dispossession.

2.5 TRANSFERRING THE PALESTINIANS: PAST AND PRESENT SCHEMES

2.5.1 Pre-1948: Transfer, Favourable Solution

There is a definite link between Israeli state policy to accommodate new Jewish immigrants and the expulsion of Palestine Arabs, throughout the history of the Palestine/Israeli conflict the justification of such ideas was that the Palestine Arabs "had no particular attachment to their homes, to the land" compared with "the Jews who had been exiled from it 2000 years ago" (Chomsky, 1983: 51).

Before 1948, Ben-Gurion was the strongest advocate of the transfer of Palestinian Arabs. In his view, the whole idea was not 'morally and ethically' wrong (Flapan, 1979: 261). His commitment to a Greater Israel (and not a partial Jewish state) was reflected in his view on dealing with the Arabs, either by 'mutual agreement' or requiring "to speak to them in a different language" (he meant force) (Chomsky, 1983: 162). In his memoirs he asserted that,

Every hesitation of ours in regard to the necessity of transfer, every hesitation over the possibility of putting it into practice, every doubt of ours in respect to the justice of the idea, may result in our losing a historical opportunity (Cited in Flapan, 1979: 260).
This idea was further reinforced by Sharett, Berl Katzenelson, Joseph Weiss and others. It is claimed that Ben-Gurion's attitude was shaped by the proposal of transfer put forward by the British during the period of the Peel Commission in 1937. At that time, the partition of the country and the establishment of two states, one Jewish and one Arab, was being discussed. The proposal stressed the necessity to obtain an agreement for the exchange of land and population between the two states, as had happened in the exchange effected between the Greek and Turkish populations on the morrow of the Greco-Turkish War of 1922. This proposal was initiated by Nansen who was awarded the Nobel Prize for his exchange plan (Palteine Royal Commission Report, 1937:390-1). But, as Flapan argues, the debate on the transfer of Palestine Arabs was at the back of Ben-Gurion's mind long before the Peel Commission's investigation (Flapan, 1979:261).

Transfer of the Palestine Arabs became the main debating issue after the 1937 Partition Plan and during the Zionist Congress in Basle. Zionist leaders were divided between those in favour of the transfer, represented by Arthur Ruppin, Sharett, Weizman and Golda Meir, the latter stating that, "The Arabs had vast territories, in which the Arabs of Palestine could settle" (Ibid.:262), and those against it, such as Rabi Hillel Silver, who concluded that the transfer was "impractical and cannot be justified on moral grounds" (Ibid.). This rejection of the transfer was voiced too by the more right-wing circles in Zionism (at a time) who considered it to be impractical rather than immoral (Ibid.:264).

However, Zionist lobbying on the transfer issue outside Palestine proved to be successful. Weizman's remark to colonial secretary William Ormsby-Gore is said to have led the way to the British Labour Party resolution of 1944 which suggested that "efforts be made to encourage the Arabs to move out of Palestine and made room for the Jews" (Epp, 1970:166; Louis & Stookey, 1986:80). In this respect, Weizman explained that "The whole success of the scheme depended upon whether the government genuinely did or did not wish to carry out this recommendation (Peel Commission's recommendation). The transfer could only be carried out by the British government and not the Jews" (Hirst, 1977:130).

On the American scene, ex-President Hoover called for the Palestinians transfer to Iraq. This was denounced by the American Zionist Emergency Council when they declared that: "The Zionist movement has never advocated the transfer of Palestine's Arab population... nevertheless when all long-accepted remedies seem to fail, it is time to consider new approaches" (Ibid.:131).

The above discussion indicates that the intention to dispossess the Palestine Arabs and the achievement of a Jewish majority was not much of a secret but manifested itself in various
forms. The King-Crane Commission (1919) revealed this fact in its report. They said:

The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionist looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine by various forms of purchase” (Epp, 1970:142).

2.5.2 The Palestinian Refugees Post-1948: Resettlement, Another Form of Transfer

Since 1948, calls for the return of the PRs to their homeland and properties has been a central demand by PRs themselves, the Arab states and the international community (Shahin, 1981:58). As a result of pressures from the various parties to allow their return, Israel's position began to crystalize with regard to the question of return. At the local level, the Israeli decision makers made every attempt to create facts about land rights aimed at hampering the refugees' return. At the external level, Israel tactics aimed at delaying a solution, in order to maintain the status quo of the new regional and demographical situation.

For the Israeli leadership, the Palestine refugee question was considered marginal in comparison to the establishment of new settlements on occupied Arab land to absorb the huge numbers of Jewish immigrants, finding a solution to the economic and living conditions, and getting admission to the United Nations (Lorch, 1993:vol.1). In his address to the first Knesset on 8 March, 1949, Ben-Gurion made no mention of PRs and their rights. Yet, focus was on their foreign policy programme: in striving to attain an Arab-Jewish alliance (socio-economic, cultural, and political cooperation with the neighboring Arab countries) within the framework of the United Nations, and in guaranteeing the right of all Jews to leave their countries of residence and settle in their historic homeland (Lorch, 1993:376). The ingathering of exiles (Jews) was further facilitated following the issue of the twin laws: the Law of Return and the Nationality Law (Lorch, 1993:611,613).

The Palestinian exodus was considered by Sharett "the most spectacular event in the contemporary history of Palestine, in a way more spectacular than the creation of the Jewish state, is the wholesale evacuation of its Arab population ...." (Segev, 1986:29). Moreover, Chaim Weizman was not alone when he described it as "a miraculous simplification of the problem" (Gabbay, 1959:110). Evacuation of Palestine Arabs from Palestine has been considered a historical turning point for Israel and a solution to what Zionist ideology calls "the Arabs' question."

In this respect, the question of PRs return was made clear by Sharett and Weizman and Ben-Gurion, the latter wrote: "... we cannot permit them [the refugees] to return to the places which they left....I don’t accept any formulation that we should encourage their return: their
return must be prevented...at all costs" (Flapan:1987:17).

In the Knesset session of 1 August 1949, the Foreign Minister Sharett reconfirmed the basic stand on the refugee "problem",

that the solution lies primarily not in returning them to Israel but in settling them in other countries....[and] that within the framework of a comprehensive peace [the government] would be ready to make its contribution to settling the refugees by taking a certain number of them back (Lorch,1993:525).

In practical terms, this policy had translated itself in the formation of the "Transfer Committee" at the initiative of Yusef Weitz of the Jewish National Fund, just two weeks after the establishment of the state (Morris,1986:531). The committee outlined its proposals for action, which can be seen to be a cornerstone of Israeli policy towards refugees return and included the following:

1) Preventing the Arabs from returning to their places.
2) (Extending) help to the Arabs to be absorbed in other places.

The first activity subdivides into a number of aspects:

1) Destruction of villages as much as possible during military operations.
2) Prevention of any cultivation of land by them(refugees), including reaping, collection (of crops), picking (olives) and so on, also during times of ceasefire.
3) Settlement of Jews in a number of villages and towns so that no "vacuum" is created.
4) Enacting legislation (geared to barring a return)...
5) (Making) propaganda aimed at non-return (Ibid.:531-32)

To change the former physical structure in Palestine, the "Transfer Committee" took a decision to destroy "deserted" Arab villages so as to prevent their former inhabitants from returning to them. The destruction of Arab villages by Israel proceeded on a large scale, irrespective of Count Bernadotte’s protest to these actions (Cattan,1969:41-42). It was reported that as a result of this decision, only 88 Arab villages remained out of the 434 large and small villages which existed before the war (Kamen,1987:457;Morris,1987:155-175).11 That destruction was executed with the full approval of Ben-Gurion (Morris,1987:532-3), although it was a verbal approval only, and lacked formal government authorization. Ben-Gurion aimed at staying anonymous, as if the Committee implemented the policy on its own, so that no harm could come to the foreign policy of the state (Morris,1986:536). On 28 July 1948, the Ministerial Committee for Abandoned Property replaced the former one, thus, its emphasis was on the transfer of refugees out of Israel by resettling them in the neighboring countries
These policies and measures reflected a continuity of pre 1948 policies whose aims were to prepare the scene for expulsion of Palestine Arabs; post-1948 they aimed at blocking PRs return, by calling for their resettlement in the Arab countries. The submission of proposals for the settling of Palestinian of the Land of Israel in the Arab states was the task of a third committee appointed by Ben-Gurion on 29 August 1948, aimed at barring return (Morris, 1986:546-7). The new Committee in the autumn of 1948, urged the Israeli Defence Forces to expel Arabs and move refugees away from the new, expanding borders..." (Ibid.:549).

In its first monthly report to Ben-Gurion on 26 October 1948, the new Committee put its suggestions in relation to PRs. It recommended that: refugees be resettled in the host countries, preferably Iraq because it didn't have a border with Israel, followed by Transjordan and Syria, with assistance from UN and international aid; but, if Israel faced pressures to allow return it would be permitted to self-supported refugees or for family reunification purposes (Ibid.:550; Thicknesse, 1949:29).

The committee was selective about who would be allowed to return - only self-supporting and skilled persons - Israel was introducing discrimination. Discrimination was also showed along religious lines. In a conversation among USA officials and Eliahu Epstein Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel, on 29 January 1949, Epstein said that: "The Israeli Government would welcome back the Christian Arabs..." He implied that "such a welcome would not be accorded the Moslem Arabs..." (F.R.U.S., 1949:709).

When considering the immediate administrative, educational, and other costs for the return of Palestinian refugees compared with the absorption of Jewish immigrants, discrimination was obvious. An allowance of only £100 was made for every Palestinian refugee compared with £600-£900 a head spent on a Jewish immigrant (Thicknesse, 1949:29).

The assumptions and work of the "Transfer Committee" and the other Committees which were established to carry out the transfer policy reflected an overt Israeli policy with respect to the refugee question at the time, which set the basis for a continuous Israeli policy towards the question of refugees. Practically, the policy took the form of destroying Arab villages, confiscating Arab properties, harassing and deporting the refugees away from the Israeli borders to the neighbouring Arab countries. While these were seldom a declared policy, these activities aimed to prevent a return to the previous demographic and geographic situation of the new state.
2.5.2.1 "Israel's Justification of the "No Return" Policy

Israel's rejection of return of PRs formulated despite international legitimacy in endorsing this right as represented by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, allowing the PRs return or providing compensation for those who did not wish to return (See Appendix 4).

The Israeli state criticism of Resolution 194 (III) was based on that:
1. The resolution encompassed four approaches to solve the refugee problem: return to their original place; resettlement; economic and social rehabilitation; and or the payment of compensation. To stick to one solution only - repatriation- which the Arab states advocated, was not acceptable to Israel, and it did not apply to all refugees.
2. Any return should not be the refugees' choice. Israel wanted three preconditions to be met by those who choose to return: to live in peace with their neighbors; to recognize the existence of Israel; and to recognize the new political and national status quo. In fact, Israel linked up the legal right of return of refugees with reaching peace agreements with the Arab countries (Thicknesse, 1949:22-26; Shaheen, 1981:61).

Israel's preconditions could be understood as an indirect method of refusing to discuss the refugee question or to reach a solution to it. It was a pragmatic approach involving a negotiated settlement with the Arab countries, aimed at reducing pressures from the UN, USA and world public opinion by alleging that the Arab states were responsible for the plight of the refugees, since they would not accept a peaceful settlement with Israel.

However, while the majority in Israel showed opposition to the return of refugees, there were a number of voices which questioned the policy of successive Israeli governments towards the refugees. The Diaspora Jews were also conscious of this moral issue which one journalist called "the moral millstone around the neck of world Jewry" (Jewish Newsletter, 9 February 1959). Rabbi Benjamin, for example, wrote:

In the end we must come out publicly with the truth: that we have no moral right whatever to oppose the return of the Arab refugees to their land ....that until we have begun to redeem our sin against the Arab refugees, we have no right to continue the ingathering of the exiles....The fact that the Arab refugees fled in panic ....is no excuse for depriving them their homes, fields and livelihood...(Jewish Newsletter, 1 December, 1958).

The position of the Israeli political parties - right, left and religious - towards the refugee question met with the official stand of the government and was based on a Knesset resolution of 11 November, 1961 (Lorch, 1993:1268). Their perception of the problem was as a humanitarian economic one rather than a political one. Israel's rejection of return was
based on four aspects: "historical, political, security and economical."

2.5.2.2 The "Population Exchange" Myth

The Israeli leadership considered the PRs issue as no different from any other refugee movement around the world, resulting from the formation of new political settings. An example of population exchange which Israel regarded as similar to its own was the one between Turkey and Greece after the IWW, and the one between Pakistan and India after the establishment of the two states in 1945 (Gabbay, 1959:296; Schechtman, 1952:105-107).

Based on this theme of "two-way population shift," Israel saw in integrating refugees and resettling them amongst their own Arab brothers the best solution to be reached. It became important for Israelis to talk of "one single Arab people" because that made it possible for them to evade Israel’s need to assume part of the burden and make its contribution to the solution of the refugee issue. The argument was that it was a matter of Arabs who fled and wandered from one Arab country to another but remained in the large Arab homeland (Gabbay, 1959:297).

Israel’s talk of "population exchange" is but an excuse "to hide one of the blackest stains on its record" - the expulsion of Palestine Arabs -. The "double exodus" is a myth because, in fact, the two movements of population are not comparable. The Arabs from Palestine were true refugees; their exodus was, by and large, an involuntary or enforced movement. Most of the Oriental Jews arriving in Israel from Arab countries were emigrants, not refugees; their exodus was, by and large, a voluntary movement" (Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation, n.d.:9). 12

Sir John Glubb, former Officer Commanding the Arab Legion, commented on the Israeli claim that the Arab exodus was voluntary. He wrote:

The story which Jewish publicity at first persuaded the world to accept, that the Arab refugees left voluntarily, is not true. Voluntary emigrants do not leave their homes with only the clothes they stand in. People who have decided to move house do not do so in such a hurry that they lose other members of their family - husband losing sight of his wife, or parents of their children. The fact is that the majority left in panic flight, to escape massacre. They were in fact helped on their way by the occasional massacres - not of very many at a time, but just enough to keep them running (Glubb, 1957:251).

Yet, Israel did not openly admit the tactics used to force Jews living in the Arab countries to emigrate to Israel. Zionist agents were active through several schemes such as: "Operation Magic Carpet" and "Operation Ali Baba" whose goals were to recruit Jewish settlers for Palestine on lands that the Palestine refugees left behind, so as to prevent their return.

The case of emigration of Iraqi Jews was distinguished; some Israeli sources including
evidence that:
agents provocateurs exploded bombs in a synagogue and other places frequented by Jews in Baghdad, in order to convince Iraqi Jews that they would have to leave. These acts compromised many innocent Jews all over Iraq; Jews who refused to emigrate ... were labelled as traitors to their country [Israel]...


2.5.2.3 Palestinian Refugees: A Security Threat

The second factor which Israel relied on to prevent the return of refugees was the security factor. Israel's fear stemmed from the risk that refugees returning would form a "Fifth Column" inside Israel as stated by Shertok at the knesset session of 28 July 1948 and at the UN in November 1950; or a time bomb as stated by Golda Meir in the early 1960's (Lorch, 1993:230,534; Flapan, 1987:24-25; Gabbay, 1959:300). Israel accused the Arab states of using the problem as a political weapon against Israel (Lorch, 1993:1027), fearing that the hatred of the returnees towards Israel, united by ties of blood to the neighbouring countries and not to Israel, would be suicidal.

Earlier, on 5 April, 1949, Sharett stated in a conversation with the Secretary of State Acheson and Dean Rusk that:

...security in Israel is indivisible...(and) Israel could not give up the minimum security which it had won with so much blood and expenditure by reintroducing large number of refugees into the very areas from which Israel had been seriously threatened (F.R.U.S., 1949:892).

In the early 1960's, Israel's fourth Prime Minister Golda Meir, claimed that repatriation of the PRs would mean the placing of a time bomb inside Israel (Flapan, 1987:24-25). Israel's preoccupation with national security became even stronger with the Arab governments' insistence on the return of refugees, and other Arab policies towards Israel, such as the economic boycott of Jewish products inside and outside the Arab World; the closure of the Suez Canal by Egypt to Israeli shipping, - challenged Israel's existence in the region (Palestine, 5 February, 1949, & 28/29 March, 1952)
2.5.2.4 Lack of Economic Infrastructure

The economic conditions of the new state formed the third justification to block return of refugees. Sharett and Epstein argued that the economic infrastructure of the PRs has been destroyed, their houses had been either destroyed or filled with "Israeli refugees" and their herds no longer existed and emphasized that the new state was engaged in settling new Jewish immigrants, unable to take on a double economic burden (F.R.U.S.,1949:709).

Every possible measure was therefore taken to prevent mass repatriation, including rumor-mongering, activated by Commitment Dayan, aimed at discouraging the refugees from even contemplating a safe return. Meanwhile the Jewish National Fund, with the government's assistance, turned the empty Arab villages either into agricultural plots or into a no-man's land in order to prevent repatriation (Kamen,1988:68).

The economic difficulties of the new state and its security were two overriding considerations as explained by Weizman president of Israel in a letter to president Truman on 24 June, 1949, used as a pretext to prevent re-admission of PRs. Instead their resettlement in the congenial surroundings of an Arab society was suggested (F.R.U.S.,1949:1172-3).

A warning was raised by Abba Eban, the Israel representative to the United Nations on 27 November, 1957. He said:

That one cannot repatriate people in geography alone. To live in a modern state is to live not only within its landscape but also within its tradition and culture, its religious heritage and linguistic expression; its community values and its special impulses of patriotism and nationhood...In this sense resettlement in Israel would be not repatriation but alienation from Arab society and transference to the only State in the area in which Arab loyalties do not predominate (Cited in Gabbay, 1959:292).

Surprisingly, a similar warning was raised by the Conciliation Commission. It warned that refugees would find different conditions to what they have left (Gabbay,1959:302,304), despite the fact that its task entailed making every effort to implement UN Resolution 194(III).

The Israeli leadership went even further in portraying the return of the "primitive Arab fellah (peasant)," as an obstacle to the progress the Israelis had made in agriculture, industry and commerce (Ibid.:301-2).

The Israelis considered repatriation "unrealistic, unjust and injurious to Israel, to the welfare of refugees themselves and to ultimate peace and stability in the Area" (Cited in Ibid.:285). This same stand had been adopted as a systematic policy by Israel, especially when the return of 1967 war refugees was posed, as well as over the issue of family reunification in the OTs as discussed below.

If there was a lack of economic infrastructure this was due to the Israeli measures taken
in confiscating Palestinian Arab properties. As Segev put it,

The urge to grab has seized everyone, the government Custodian as well as civilians; In the State Archives in Israel, files containing information on the plundering and looting of Arab properties are still closed... [but] the index titles tell about the content: Plunder of Abandoned Arab Property; Looting; Possession without Permit; Robbery (Segev, 1986:70, 72).

Segev further described the actual scenes of Jewish looting of Arab possessions (Ibid.:79); and Don Peretz (1972:310) explained how valuable Arab possessions became for new Jewish settlers. Even the land belonging to the 180,000 Arabs who remained in Israel after 1948 became the subject of official expropriation in 1953. "The Land Acquisition Law of Israel" passed in the Knesset on March 10, 1953, legalized the acquisition by the state land belonging to Arabs living in Israel, without their consent. The pretext given for possession is given in Article 2; was for Israel's: development, settlement or security (The Middle East Journal, 1953:358-360). This law legalized the confiscation of a million dunums of land between 1948-58, from the Palestinians who remained in Israel (Jiryis, 1976:77-90).

Israel's position of no-return was and still is aimed at repudiating the Palestine problem in general and the Palestine refugee question in particular, in the framework of resettling them in the Arab countries (Lorch, 1993:525).

2.5.2.5 Israel's Foreign Policy and Palestine Refugees

Israel was aware that adopting a hardline stand towards the repatriation of refugees would jeopardize its relations with the United States - a member in the CCP -. Thus, Israel's foreign policy towards return of PRs was characterized as being vague and pragmatic, essentially for political reasons; and it was manifested during Israel's dealings with Count Bernadot, and in its position in the CCP conferences.

This pragmatic position became clearer after Israel's admission to the United Nations. That was considered a big success for the Israeli state and where UN Resolution 273 stated: "That Israel is a peace-loving State which accepts the obligations contained in the Charter and is able and willing to carry out those obligations" (UN, 1978:53). Following its admission, Israel's policy towards the refugee problem and its readiness to allow the return of 100,000 refugees, as declared in Lausanne Conference, began to change. This was despite assurances given by the Israeli representatives Abba Eban and Elath in their meeting with the Secretary of State, Acheson, and other USA officials, that Israel accepted to allow return for "a good number (of refugees) to non-strategic areas" (F.R.U.S., 1949:945).

Even though Israel signed the Lausanne Protocol of May 1949, this was only in order
to get admission to the United Nations, as revealed by the Israeli representative to the Lausanne Conference Walter Eytan. He said: "My main purpose was to begin to undermine the protocol of 12 May, which we had signed only under duress of our struggle for admission to the UN..." (Pappe, 1992:212).

The CCP's report to the United Nations in early 1952 explained the reasons behind its failure to solve the refugee question during the Lausanne and Paris conferences (1951). Its tasks were unachievable because of the different priorities set by the Arab states and Israel. Israel sought to give economic incentives to the Arab states (Perla, 1990:116), while, "the Arab states urged that the refugee question, as the most urgent issue, be settled first, but Israel insisted that this be linked to a territorial settlement in a peace treaty. Therefore, CCP's efforts (in its two conferences in Lausanne and Paris) to link the two questions were unsuccessful" (United Nations, 1978:51).

In the aftermath of the CCP's failure Israel adopted new tactics, beginning to separate the refugee problem and the conflict with the Arab states. Israeli officials argued that the refugee problem required a humanitarian solution, backed by Western states in the UN. Sharett declared Israel's readiness to pay the refugees minimal compensations, under the supervision of UN trustees, in order to demonstrate Israel's positive contribution towards a solution to the refugee plight. However, the preconditions for compensation included: holding peace treaties with the Arab countries; considering Israel's economic capacity; receiving an international aid or loan; and compensation exempting Israel from any other obligations, such as over the properties of refugees. Israel's contribution, with other aid was to be used to integrate refugees in the Arab countries, and was a sum to be deducted from this contribution to compensate for frozen Jewish property in Iraq.

This was so due to UN Resolution 394 of 14 December 1950, which did not emphasize the return of refugees as it appeared in Resolution 194(III) paragraph 11; but, demanded that the host governments of refugees should treat them well without discrimination (United Nations Resolutions on Palestine (1947-1972), 1973:22); and to a previous Resolution 393 of 2 December 1950, which for the first time had recommended "the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement" (Resolution 393(V), Assistance to Palestine Refugees, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 2 December 1950). Israel received support in resisting return from the US, Britain and France, who in May 1950 declared that Israel's border must be protected (Nasser al-Din, 1982:153).

Resolutions 393 and 394 represented a big shift which suited Israel's policy and basic
position, and so, It proposed the compensation project. However, the minimal compensations proposed would not never meet the real losses which the PRs had sustained and would never be accepted by the refugees themselves (Peretz,1954:403-408). 17

UN Resolution 512 was used by the Israelis to ban the discussion of the Palestine problem as a separate item on the General Assembly agenda. In this they were successful, despite Arab opposition, the annual report of the Director of UNRWA, replacing the Palestine problem on the General Assembly agenda from October 1952 until the 28th session, which started in December 1973 (Kirisci,1986:7).

In the light of the above claims and policies given by Israel to block return, it is interesting to examine the stated policies against incorporating GS and all its refugees, as proposed by Ben-Gurion in 1949 and reiterated by him in 1955 and 1957.

2.5.2.6 Trading Refugees For Territory

In a meeting in Tiberias on April 18, 1949, Ben-Gurion surprised his companions - Mark Ethridge the US representative to the UN, and other members - by stating:

(The) present Gaza Strip might become autonomous like Luxembourg. If Egypt did not want Gaza because of (the) refugees therein, Israel would accept and permit those refugees to return to their homes. Transjordan could have (access to the Mediterranean) without (a) corridor but with right to free passage (F.R.U.S.,1949:926-7).

He confirmed this stand formally again in Lausanne in May 1949. When Ben-Gurion made his proposal, he had in mind the border problem, rather than an attempt to find a solution to the refugee problem (Gazit,1987:233). This Israeli stand was favored largely by US diplomats in the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) who were surprised by the offer. In late May they had opposed Israel's intention to hold on to territories not allocated to her in the Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, but by the beginning of June they favored awarding the Strip to Israel, and set three stipulations: Israel had to guarantee equal rights to refugees and non-refugees in the Strip; must not make any change in the refugees' status; and Israel had to make "equitable territorial compensation to the Arabs in return for the Strip" (F.R.U.S.,1949:1090,1096). Ben-Gurion's offer was a watershed, especially with regard to the refugees of Gaza Strip. His dream was to establish the Third Israeli Empire (Tuma,1974:197). Three motives compelled Ben-Gurion to take this position: Jordan's interest in including the coastal Strip into its territory; the Egyptian military presence which was conceived as a threat to Israel's security; and the establishment of an All-Palestine Government there (Ibid.:225).

In seeking to remove the Egyptian presence, Ben-Gurion's proposal was a departure
from the Israeli position with respect to refugees' return. Just a few days before this surprising offer, Ben-Gurion stressed that resettling the refugees in the Arab countries was a more humane approach than their return to Israel. However, his offer still rejected the concept of freedom of choice for refugees, as called for in Resolution 194(III), which he viewed as a serious danger to Israel (Ibid.:226-7).

Israel's incorporation of GS was an attempt to avoid further pressures to absorb refugees. It was opposed by the Arab state representatives at Lausanne, especially from Egypt, as a move to "trade refugees for territory" (F.R.U.S.,1949:1097), which was uncooperative and unconstructive in solving the PRs question (Ibid.:1181-2).

The Israeli leadership admitted later in August 1949 that the Gaza proposal had done more harm than good. Israeli-American negotiations on the Gaza proposal shifted to the issue of returning 100,000 refugees, in return for the peace Sharett wanted (Ibid.:238). Sharett hoped that with time the large number of refugees in the Strip would be depleted and an arrangement could be reached between Egypt and Israel (Ibid.:242). However, the return of the 100,000 did not materialize too, despite the pressure the Truman Administration imposed by suspending the loan from the Export-Import Bank to Israel. The Israeli's argued that they were willing to have half-a-million Arabs in their state, as detailed in the Partition Plan of 1947 (Ibid.:243).

The refugee issue in Gaza could be seen as the core cause for the abandonment of the Gaza proposal. Sharett hoped that they would deplete; Ben-Gurion, motivated by security, changed his original plan to return all Gaza refugees to Israel to a number a fraction of the original. Israel feared that allowing Gaza refugees to return would cause refugees from Lebanon and Jordan to be transferred to Gaza (Ibid.:240). Consequently, the Gaza proposal came to an end. It had represented, however, a deviant strand in Israel's official policy towards refugees. In March 1955, Ben-Gurion proposed in a Cabinet meeting conquering the GS, but it did not pass (The Economist,1957:267). He also raised this desire in response to the General Assembly resolution which called upon Israel to withdraw from the Strip. Addressing the Knesset on 23 January 1957, Ben-Gurion stated that Gaza had to remain in Israel's hands. He added that the GS was never Egyptian, and that the inability of the UN to prevent the incursion of the "Fedayeen being organized by the Egyptian rulers" requires us to stay for the "benefit of its inhabitants as well as of their neighbors across the borders" (Lorch,1993:1027). These same reasons were cited by Ben-Gurion in the Knesset on 15 October 1956 prior to the Suez war.
2.5.3 Post-1967: Scenarios For Transfer

The stand of the right-wing circles (before 1948) on the question of transfer is quite similar to the mainstream thinking of the right-wing parties in Israel in the 1990's. Shlomo Gazit in the late seventies emphasized that "the solution (to the Arab problem) must be found outside historic Eretz Israel" (Cited in Chomsky, 1983:117). Former Deputy Minister Michael Delek believes that it is "the Western states (who) have the political and moral obligation to tend to the transfer of the Arab population from Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) to the Hashemite kingdom. Only a (population) transfer can solve the Palestinian problem" (Ha 'aretz, 27 July, 1987). Moreover, Israel Meidad sees in the "transfer of population a principle and humane solution to political problems" (Said, M., 1990:11).

Ariel Sharon, former Defence Minister, expressed his: "hopes to evict all Palestinians from the WBGS and drive them into Jordan" (Chomsky, 1983:49). A more extreme campaign on the transfer was launched by a political party called Moledet (homeland) who won two seats in the 1990 Israeli elections. Rehavam Ze’evi’s (Ghandi) proposal calls for transfer of the Palestinians in the WBGS to the Arab countries (Said, M., 1990:11; Brown, 1989:47). Similar extremist campaigning was carried out by Rabbi Meir Kahane and his supporters. In his book They Must Go, he explains why the Palestinians should be driven out and the means to implement it.

Ze’evi saw in transfer a moral idea, although others stressed its role in preventing war and providing the people of Israel with security. He continued to argue that:

If it isn’t moral, then Zionism and Zionist practice over the past century is not moral. The settlement enterprise in the land of Israel and the War of Independence were full of operations for the transfer of Arabs from villages - was it moral then but not now? (Ha ‘aretz, 17 August, 1988).

Moreover, he attacked the left in Israel for not supporting "transfer" and he indicated that the leftist movement Hashomer Hatzaer had established 75 Kibbutz on Arab villagers’ land after they expelled their inhabitants from their homes. He advocated more expulsion through imposition of economic restrictions and by preventing Arab labour from working in Israel (al-Hayat, 2 July, 1990; al-Quds, 9 December, 1988).

The irony is that not only extremist right-wingers as Ze’evi and others are considered strong callers for transfer but such racist calls were also heard from the head of the High Court of Appeal in Israel - a prestigious religious institute -, a legislative magistrate Dov Lie’vi. Israel Zamir commented strongly on Lie’vi statements in al-Hamishmar of 13 February 1992, especially that they were from such a prominent figure. Lie’vi, meeting with a number of Rabbis, said: "We must take all the Arabs whose age ranges from 16-60 years, from either
Gaza and Jenin (a town in the WB) and transfer them to somewhere else...to Eden paradise" (al-Quds al-Arabi, 15/16 February, 1992). The High Rabbi of Rohovot Simha Cook commented on Li’evi statements by saying:

By mentioning paradise, Lie’vi meant that Arabs will be transferred to what might be considered a paradise to them, such as to Saudi Arabia or Egypt, in fact, he meant expulsion, which is a policy that could be carried out by the security departments (al-Quds al-Arabi, 15/16 February, 1992).

2.5.4 Expulsion: A Method to Quell the Intifada

With the stepping up of the Intifada in December 1987, public frictions in Israel between the various parties and within the one party itself were highlighted, and, more importantly, within the political and military organization. One example of this friction is the statement given by the Israeli Chief of General Staff, Dan Shomron, who admits that the Intifada is an expression of a national struggle and could not be quelled (JP, 11 January, 1989).

Rabin and Shomron also declared that the Intifada "cannot be solved by purely military means, and that the solution can only be a ‘political one’" (JP, 27 January, 1989).

The expulsion of Palestinians was suggested as a method to quell the Intifada. In the first nine months of the Intifada, 33 persons were expelled from the OTs, and an expulsion order was issued for another 25 persons (ICCP, 1988:5,7-8). Yosef Goell, a member of The JP editorial staff, wrote in this respect:

My own impression is that expulsion is the single punishment that is most feared by Palestinian nationalists, for both symbolic and pragmatic reasons. It should have been resorted to much more frequently, and in much larger numbers...it is an eminently reversible act, certainly when compared to being killed, or maimed by bullets and truncheons (JP, 27 January, 1989).

New scenarios for the transfer of Palestinians from the OTs were designed on the fringe of the Gulf War. In an article in the JP of 8 January, 1991, Shlomo Gazit - ex head of Israeli Military Intelligence - wrote that: If Iraq hits Israel, it is assumed that the Intifada will be strengthened in the WBGS, and as Israel will be in a state of war, all moral and legal restrictions will be lifted and the army will use maximum violence, leading to a mass expulsion of the Palestinians from the OTs to the East Bank of Jordan. Designed by Gazit’s, this scenario should not be analysed in isolation from Israeli leadership aspirations to see that happening, exploiting the out-break of war and the diversion of world attention to carry it out.

Surveys conducted in Israel during the Intifada showed a similar tendency. Tel-Aviv University’s survey showed that four out of ten Israelis support the idea of "transferring the Palestinians out of the territories" (The Observer, 12 June, 1988). Whereas, in another survey
with 2,277 high school students in Giva'tiam, it was found that 40% support transfer of Palestinians from the OTs (al-Quds, 25 April, 1991). An earlier survey following the Mount Temple massacre in November 1990 showed that 20% of the sample surveyed are for the expulsion of Palestinians (al-Quds, 14 November, 1990). In the midst of the argument over the transfer of Palestinians lies the question of the demographic balance in Israel. The fear of the Gentiles is implanted in the minds of the youth from an early age. Commitment Menuhin, in his book *The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time*, wrote explaining how:

All through the years of our studies at the Gymnasia, we daily imbibed an endless harangue about our sacred obligations towards Amaynooh, Arzaynooh, Moladtrynooh (our nation, our country, our fatherland). It was drummed into our young hearts that the fatherland must become ours, 'goyim rein', (clear of Gentiles-Arabs); that we must dedicate our lives to serving the fatherland and to fighting for it (Cited in Grollenberg, 1980:21).

2.6 "DEMOGRAPHIC THREAT": A REFLECTION OF A MORE SERIOUS BATTLE

The interrelation between Jewish immigration and birth rate of Palestinian Arabs is what the Jews/Israelis have been preoccupied with under the slogan of "demographic threat" or "demographic problem." The Arab birth rate is feared most by the Israelis. The questions remains as to whether or not is Israel demographically outnumbered? And, if so, what is the real justification behind this "demographic threat"? As Janette Abu-Lughod noted issues of demography have been a major problem for the two major parties involved in the Palestine-Israeli conflict. And,

have created a level of tension seldom seen in the staid field of population statistics - an indication that statistics are serving as a surrogate for or at least a reflection of a more serious battle (Abu Lughod, 1986:1).

In this context, it could be argued that the core of this "problem" lies simply in Israel's preoccupation with security and guilt. This Chapter has argued that the Zionist ideology of dispossession or transfer of Palestine Arabs - pre-1948 or post-1967 - provides the context for a better understanding of the "demographic threat". It become clear that the conflicting statements given by Zionist/Israeli leadership, together with their discriminatory policies, were all aimed at achieving one goal, to expel Palestinians.

The Likud position on demographic issue is linked to the debate on the future of the OTs. This is further linked to the ongoing debate on settling the new Soviet immigrants in the Israeli settlements in the OTs. Shamir sees in the flood of the Soviet Jewish immigrants an imperative to hold on to the OTs. He declared on 14 January 1990: "big immigration requires Israel to be big as well, we need the space to house all the people" (JP, 15 January, 1990).
The Palestinian Arabs in Israel are not excluded from these policies, the most extreme open policy in this respect being the "Koenig memorandum of 1976", calling for measures to "thin the concentrations of existing Arab population, reduce employment and educational opportunities for Arabs and otherwise encourage their emigration - policies that some Israelis described as reflecting "fascist values" (Chomsky, 1983:149; Hirst, 1977:343).

The Likud seems to be ready to ignore the "Palestinian human deluge" which has so frightened the various sections of the Israeli society, giving way to mounting pressure from the Labour's Party to withdraw from heavy areas with Arab population. These fears which intellectuals, youngsters, and (mainly) extremists of the Israeli polity have been voicing, could be seen to have one single racist motive - whether the group who articulates them - is official or unofficial, right or extremist, the call is that there is no room for the Palestinians amongst us and they should leave. This sort of policy has been further extended to cases of family reunification for Palestinians from the OTs, an issue that deserves examination.

Between 1967 and 1987, 140,000 requests for family reunification were submitted to the Israeli authorities, but only 9,000 were granted (B'Tselem, 1989:101). Israeli officials have acknowledged that family reunification is limited for demographic and political reasons, and requests for family reunification are granted only on a restricted basis, as mentioned in the US 1988 Country Report on Human Rights Practices (Cited in Whittome, 1990:10). According to the Israeli government, Palestinian family reunification is considered a privilege and not a natural right: cases are only considered on "exceptional" humanitarian grounds or because it is deemed in the interests of the Israeli military authorities to grant a permit (Ibid.:1990:28).

The denial of family reunification permits to Palestinian families must be considered in the light of the Israeli policy to grant the right of Soviet Jews to settle in the OTs

Under international law, an occupying power is not permitted to change the demographic composition of the region occupied. Why then, Israel is applying a double standard in terms of citizenship for the Palestinians and the Soviet Jewish immigrants or those from any other country? The latter are granted Israeli citizenship as soon as they arrive, Palestinians residents who were born in the WB and the GS are denied that and only granted an Israeli identity card. Therefore, Palestinians in the WBGS stand to lose their right of residency. 19

The Israeli authorities have been trying to defeat the Palestinians in various ways; at an individual level by using humiliating methods to break people's dignity; and at a collective level by attempting to destroy the cohesive unity of the Palestinians as a whole. Having a history of negating Palestinian rights to return and to sovereignty and self-determination, the Israelis
are also trying through their policies and measures to stop the Palestinian voice from demanding those rights, and yet calling for their transfer and resettlement outside Palestine.

"Security is always invoked to justify humiliating, barbaric attacks on the subjugated population" (Levidow, 1990:23). To illustrate this concept, Hirst concluded that "In security's name (Israel) found justification for military exploits which only deepened the encircling hatred-hatred which, in turn, engendered still more such exploits, and necessitated more and more arms to carry them out" (Hirst, 1977:175). Based on this interpretation of the causes of Israel's security, one could assert Edward Said's explanation that the ongoing debate on the "demographic problem" used by the Israeli leaders is just a scandalously racist framework (Said, 1990:13). For the question is not the number of Arab population, whose transfer is necessary on both military and demographic levels (Ha'retz, 22 July, 1988). The real threat to Israel comes from the claims for legitimate rights (which every nation is entitled to) from a people (Palestinians) inflicted with injustice and repression. As Michael Adams has stated:

The Israelis, since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, were motivated by two considerations, both of them inherent in the history of the Zionist struggle to gain possession of Palestine. One was the appetite for land on which to extend and consolidate their physical presence in Palestine; the second was a preoccupation with their national security. The two, of course, were closely linked; the more they could extend their territorial occupation, the more the Zionists believed they would be able to make themselves secure against a possible counter-attack. And since every further extension of their occupation of Palestine also sharpened Palestinian resentment and desire for revenge, the Israeli preoccupation with security was a real one. Precisely because they knew they had deeply injured the Palestinians, the Israelis knew also that they must face the danger of Palestinian counter-action, and the more the injury was compounded, as it was in 1967, the greater that danger would become, unless the Israelis could destroy the Palestinian sense of nationhood and tear out at the roots any incipient movement of Palestinian resistance. It was on this dual aim that the Israelis based their policy towards the OTs after 1967 (Adams, 1977:32).

Another type of internal insecurity which the Zionist enterprise faces is through the counter-migration of Jews from Israel, which is said to cancel out any demographic benefits achieved via immigration. This counter-migration, if analyzed from a Zionist perspective, indicates the erosion of the state on both political and ideological levels. This is considered a real threat to a country which was established to ingather Jewish exiles in a safe refuge. An issue of concern to the Knesset on June 12, 1990 was the quality and quantity of those emigrating. A great number of those emigrants are academicians and scientists; two-thirds are within an age-range of 21-32 years (Garaudy, 1983:126-7; al-Hayat, 14 June, 1990). According to Uri Gordon, head of the Jewish Agency's Immigration Department, 19,000 Israelis emigrated
in 1988 and more than 20,000 were expected to leave in 1989 (Israel and Palestine, 1990:14).

Addressing a conference of the World Zionist Movement in 21 June, 1987, Rabin disclosed his fears with regard to Jews who choose to live outside the Jewish state. He stated: "for 2000 years we have been a people without a land, and since 1948 we established our state, but, only 25-30% of world Jews choose to live here". He added: "we have become now a land without a people" (al-Quds, 22 June, 1987). For Joseph Quzick from the Israeli Immigration Department, counter-migration is an ideological problem, Israeli youths not knowing the meaning of having a homeland after living 2000 years in the Diaspora (al-Quds, 9 September, 1988). The fear among officers in the Absorption and Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency in Israel, is that Israel will become a transit point for Jews to migrate to USA and the West (al-Quds, 13 August, 1991).

For those leaving, Israel is no longer a safe refuge. Since the establishment of Israel, the number of emigrants reached 400,000 Jews, leaving mainly to New York and Los Angeles’ which absorbed 200,000 Israelis (al-Hayar, 17 July, 1990). Given this, one could explain the benefits and the importance of the immigration of the Soviet Jews to Israel today, irrespective of all the surrounding problems of housing, employment, education, culture, etc., that they might face. What is of primary concern for the Palestinians is the Soviet Jews that will tip the balance in Israel’s favour.

This Chapter has surveyed the important historical background to the character of Zionism and Israeli state formation which crucially shaped Israeli thinking on resettlement of PRs. We can now examine in Chapter three the detail of two issues in particular. The first is the Western countries advocacy of resettlement as a solution to the PRs question, a position to coalesce with the Israeli position. The second is the PRs forms of rejection to such a solution, with particular emphasis on the role played by GS refugees under the Egyptian rule.
NOTES:


2. Walid Khalidi (1959) & Erskine Childers (1961 & 1971) refuted this myth which had elicited a lot of comments by various Arab and Jewish scholars; for comments on Ershkine's, see: The Spectator: May 26; June 2, 9, 23, 30; July 7, 14, and 21, 1961.

3. His first article was in 1986; he further elaborated on his arguments in his books of 1987 and 1990.

4. Plan Dalet was the plan designed and implemented by the Haganah to control and destroy the Arab towns and villages after expelling their Arab inhabitants. The Plan was directed against those villages which were located within the area allocated for the Jewish State in the Partition Plan of 1947. For more information see: Walid Khalidi, "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," JPS Autumn (1988): 4-70; Michael Palumbo, 1987: 34-46; Ilan Pappe, 1992: 87-99.


6. This came in a letter from Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt to Sharif Hussein of the Hijaz on 24 October 1915. For the full text of this letter see: Khoury, 1968: 359.

7. The Balfour Declaration which was issued on November 2nd, 1917, was addressed in the form of a letter to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, a leading English Jew in sympathy with Zionist aspirations. See: (Khoury, 1968: 360).

8. For more details on these correspondence and discussions, see: Ingrams, 1973: 94 - 104.


10. For more details, see: Lorch, 1993: 372-450.

11. For more on the destruction or emptying of villages and those which remain, see Shukri'Arraf, al-Qaryah al-'Arabiyyah al-Filastiniyyah (The Arab Palestinian Village). Jerusalem: Arab Studies Society, 1985: 163-279.

13. United Nations Resolution 194(III) involved also the establishment of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine composed of three Member States of the United Nations (France, Turkey and the United States). The Commission was given broad authority to carry out the functions previously entrusted to the UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte for Palestine and was instructed to assist the governments and authorities involved in the Palestine conflict with the purpose of achieving a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them. For more details, see: Mallison, 1979.


17. The CCP's estimate of abandoned Arab land was at about £P100 million and of movable Arab property was £P20 million. Whereas, the Arab League estimate was about £P2 billion. For the debate on the variation in estimates, see, Taqreer 'an Ba'iyh Amlak al-Lajeen al-'Arab bi-Wasitat al-Haras al-Israeli (A Report on Sale of Arab Refugees Abandoned Property by the Israeli Custodian). Cairo and New York: The Arab League and The Palestine Office for Refugees, 1955.


20. The main reason behind out-migration has been the high unemployment rate in Israel, according to the Central Bank of Israel in 1991.
Part Two:

The Historical-Political Context for

Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees
CHAPTER THREE: REINFORCING THE STRATEGY OF DISPERSAL

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous Chapter we dealt with the historical background and reasons for the Palestine refugee "problem", firstly, to understand the emergence of the refugee "problem" within the historical, socio-political, and economic context; and secondly, to debate the Israeli position with regard to finding a just solution to PRs based on UN resolution 194(III), which called for return or compensation.

Protagonists for each view antagonise each other and fuel the content of the issues. Allegations raised by the two main parties to the conflict have been always centred around who was responsible for the exodus, since the party responsible must pay the price and solve the problem of refugees.

This Chapter examines the proposed positions and solutions to the Palestine refugee question as given by the different groups between 1948 and June 1967. In particular, we examine the positions of the Arab countries, the Western countries and the Palestinians themselves.

The Chapter demonstrates through historical and political analysis that the expulsion or dispersion of Palestine Arabs did not occur as a result of war as Morris argued, yet, it was carried out and still is according to a systematic strategy and tactics, which advocate transfer of Palestinians from their own land.

It was debated that the blocking of return of PRs and calls for their resettlement in the Arab countries are parallel, by which both aim at reinforcing dispersion rather than repatriation and the finding of a just solution to the refugee question. Justifications such as the "demographic threat" are not convincing in concealing the plight of the PRs and the feeling of guilt which Israel tries to evade.

As a result of the General Assembly failure - through the CCP - to implement UN resolutions, and in particular Resolution 194(III); and its failure to enforce Israel to achieve a just solution to the refugee question, the US and Britain made a shift towards finding a humanitarian and economic solution rather than a political one. Thus, proposing reintegration and resettlement projects in the Arab countries.

This Chapter examines the refugee forms of rejection to resettlement schemes during the period from 1948 to 1967. The position of GS refugees are particularly assessed. Because of the specific historical events and experiences they faced while under the Egyptian
Administration. These included, a strong rejection of resettlement and to the first Israeli occupation of GS in the 1950's. Their case and experiences are distinguishable compared with other refugee communities in the host countries; and the influence of their distinctive experiences was formidable, shaping Gaza refugees political and military performance thereafter.

3.2 RESETTLEMENT PROPOSALS: POLITICAL RIGHTS OVERLOOKED

All resettlement proposals for Palestine refugees addressed the problem as economic, requiring economic solutions (Cattan, 1969:142-3), and the political aspects of the problem were neglected. The Palestinian refugees despite the miserable conditions they were living in, remained aware of the political implications of proposals to resettle them and saw in proposals deemed humanitarian even involving resettlement amongst their brethren in the Arab countries, an attempt to liquidate their status as refugees and their loss of Palestine (al-Abed, 1969:54-55).

3.2.1 United Nations Plans

The UN passed resettlement proposals, and proposed its own plans at the same time. Secretary-General Hammarskjold's Report of 15 June 1959 became official General Assembly document no. A/4121. Hammarskjold's plan did not differ much from earlier initiatives arguing that the political and psychological difficulties of the refugees could be resolved through economic development of the region, and their real economic integration. He stressed in his report that economic integration of the refugees should not and would not prejudice any rights established by the UN Resolution 194(III), recognizing the right of the refugees to choose between return to Israel or settlement in the Arab countries. He was in favor of an economic solution first, which he believed through continued efforts would solve the political problems, not only for the refugees but also to remove the obstacles in the way of the region's economic development. In other words, in his report he subsumed the political matters into those of economic development. He saw in the refugees not a "liability but an asset for the future," a reservoir of manpower, which with the economic potentialities of the area, could contribute to raising the standards of living in the whole region (Sayigh, 1959:36). Hammarskjold's report corresponded to a previous recommendation made by President Eisenhower to the GA on 13 August 1958.

The shortcomings of the Hammarskjold plan were that: it overlooked the national rights
of the Palestinians; it dealt with regional economic development, which would result in economic cooperation with Israel and then political cooperation, of benefit to Israel in ending the boycott; his report did not include any indication of whether the money needed was available or where it would come from; he did not indicate in his report where the refugees could be reintegrated, other than in the region generally (Sayigh, 1959:41).

Arab acceptance of this plan, with no guarantees would have been tantamount to giving up their rights, economically as well as politically. Hammarskjold had exceeded his legal limits when he submitted this plan, for his mission had been to give suggestions to the Fourteenth session on ways that the UN could continue to care for Palestine refugees (Ibid.:53-54). His report separated the economic aspect of the refugee problem from the political and humanitarian aspects, and ignored the fact that the economic factor was a result of the political conflicts. It also separated the refugee problem from the conflict as a whole which was one of nationhood (Ibid.:71).

3.2.2 Plans by Other Groups and Organizations

Other plans were submitted to the UN by groups and organizations in the United States, but their content did not differ from those submitted previously by UNRWA.

3.2.2.1 U.S. Proposals

Perhaps the first official suggestion to resettle refugees was made by Ambassador Stanton Griffiths in Egypt, head of the Refugees Committee. He suggested that former camps evacuated by Jewish immigrants in Cyprus could be used for the resettlement of PRs. The CCP agreed to his suggestions, and discussed them with British officials and Arab officials (JP, 18 February, 1950).

Another proposal was submitted by a group of church leaders and politicians in the United States, advocating the resettlement of refugees in the Arab countries. Water projects on rivers in Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon were to be carried out for the benefit of these states and Israel. $800 million was suggested as a budget, and a policy of no-return for refugees to Israel was stated; this would disrupt the economy and security of the new state. This proposal, like the Kein Plan, suggested Iraq as a country that could absorb three-quarters of a million refugees. It was reminiscent of Ben Gurion's suggestion favouring of Iraq for refugee resettlement, because it did not have borders with Israel so refugees would not seek to infiltrate and return to their properties (Palestine, July(1961):21; Gneim, n.d.:75-76).

The American Friends of the Middle East Society's plan of January 1952, published
in the American press, advocated the resettlement of the refugees in the places where they live and donations were required from members to construct experimental villages for this purpose. The Johnston Plan of 1953-1955, considered one of the most important, sought to carry out water management projects in the River Jordan valley, which would create employment opportunities for resettled refugees (F.R.U.S., 1958-1960: 36). However, Johnston himself believed that the project was not designed as the answer to the refugee problem (Ibid.: 209).

3.2.2.2 Joint British-U.S. Stand Towards the Refugees

Official U.S. policy towards resettlement of the refugees can be perceived through Department of State activities. John Foster Dulles (The US Secretary of State) made proposals on 1 June 1953 and 26 August 1955 suggesting the resettlement of refugees in the Arab states, through the development of water management projects and with the US as a major contributor; payment of compensation for lost property; return of a limited number of refugees to Israel; and the solution of the border problem between Israel and the Arab states. In brief, the Dulles proposals could be seen to favour Israeli interests, and they failed mainly due to Egyptian and Syrian opposition (al-Din, 1982: 153).

Eisenhower proposals of 5 January 1957 and August 1958 following the Suez War also emphasized an economic solution to the refugee problem through regional economic development. This development would serve two objectives: improving the living standards of the people in the Arab countries (although the Palestine problem was not specifically mentioned); and curbing Communism (al-Din, 1982: 153).

The last official US plan to resettle refugees was that of Joseph Johnson on 2 October 1962. He suggested that refugees be given a choice of return or compensation from UN and US funds, maintaining Israel’s right to refuse returnees on security grounds. The failure of this proposal led the US on 20 November 1963 to request the revival of the CCP as a last attempt to solve the refugee question. The CCP reported to the GA in December 1963, advocating an economic solution which the Arab representatives refused to have any part in (al-Din, 1982: 154).

Joint conversations between the US and British officials on the refugee issue - mainly from the Foreign Office -, favoured resettlement as a solution. Robert McGhee, the US coordinator on Palestine Refugees matters, was the most active member. It was felt that "Transjordan, Syria and Iraq, in that order offer the best opportunities for refugee resettlement; only token contributions could be expected from Lebanon and Egypt", and that
"the best approach to Arab governments would be to stress the development aspect for their benefit and not to stress the refugee aspect" (F.R.U.S., 1949:908).

In submitting policy papers to the State Department, McGhee believed that absorption of the refugees into the economies of the Arab states on a self-supporting basis could only be achieved through raising the economic potential of the countries involved, by an increase in amount or productivity of arable land, development of new industries, improvement in transportation, and so on. (F.R.U.S.,1949:936;Pappe,1988:141-2)). He went on to emphasize that,

The questions of economic development and of the solution of the refugee problem are indivisible, and both must be taken fully into consideration and carefully coordinated in any overall plan which is evolved. This would also apply to US assistance to the Near East through the "Point Four" Program (F.R.U.S.,1949:937).

Putting it in simple terms, the British Ambassador to Egypt, said:

Although (the refugees) have a very natural desire to return to their local fig tree and vine, it should be possible, if they had a reasonable prospect of acquiring some other fig tree and vine elsewhere, to maintain their morale and to put tools in their hands for their own salvation (F.R.U.S., 1949:837).  

3.3 SMALL PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED

In addition to the Israeli sponsored resettlement schemes implemented in the GS in the early 1970s, small resettlement projects were carried out in some of the Arab host countries in the pre-1967 period. The project initiated and conducted by the Arab Development Society in the Jordan Valley in Jericho marked the first and only attempt to rehabilitate PRs and provide employment and housing for them on the remaining land of Palestine. The importance of the project (as an experimental village) was seen in two aspects: in enhancing self-reliance among refugees', and of being executed by Palestinian Arabs and not outside forces (Hourani,1951:501).  

Other projects were set up outside Palestine. In Syria the first resettlement project in Arab countries came into being in April 1953. Land was provided for UNRWA to set up an agricultural project for the resettling of refugees and by 1954 400 refugees settled there. The shortcoming of the project were that it lacked a route of transportation, refugees were unable to reclaim the land, and, moreover, it was a project outside Palestine (Gneim,n.d.:77-78).

October 1961 witnessed the opening of the first section of the East Ghor Canal in
Jordan, a US-AID financed the project together with the related East Ghor Rural Development Project (Sutcliffe, 1973:471). Economically, its goal was seen as increasing agricultural productivity through the expansion of irrigated farming. Politically, it was important because 61% of the people in the project were PRs. The Jordanian government tried to hide the fact that the East Ghor Canal was in fact a refugee resettlement project, for two reasons: to avoid being seen to depart from general Arab policy on the issue of PRs resettlement; and to avoid the protest the refugees would make if it was announced as being a resettlement project (Sutcliffe, 1973:472-473). A survey conducted in the project in 1966 showed that as a refugee resettlement project, it was a political failure, i.e. it failed to change the project farmer's political identity, and 52% of project farmers - not highly significant statistically, but certainly highly significant politically-, were more concerned with Palestine than with any other national problem. The refugees continued to define themselves as Palestinians rather than Jordanians, evident in the involvement of some in the Palestinian guerrilla movement before the 1967 war, particularly in the attack on Moshav Beth Yosef across the Jordan River on the night of April 27, 1966 (Sutcliffe, 1973:480-81).³

This experiment of PRs resettlement proved the futility of the theory that the improvement of living conditions would reduce nationalistic tendencies towards the cause; an assumption - as we will discuss in Chapter 8 - which the Israeli authorities made when they carried out the resettlement projects in the GS.

3.4 RESISTING RESETTLEMENT

Neither Israel nor the US ever had the power to compel resettlement and the PRs and the Arab states were successful in resisting it. The refugee position was to completely reject any sort of permanent settlement outside Palestine (Ward, 1977:26). For them, the only solution to their diaspora was a return to their homes and properties, a view generally, although not always, echoed by other Arabs.
3.4.1 The Arab Position Towards Resettlement

The position of the Arab states towards the refugee problem was that of an insistence on return or compensation, based on Resolution 194(III). Their stand was represented by the Arab League, which aimed at uniting the Arab countries into one bloc to curb Israeli and Western efforts to overlook a just solution to the refugee problem. In consequence, their official stand towards resettlement was to reject it completely, despite the prospects of economic development. The first protest by the Arab League was made to the CCP, against UNRWA work programmes aimed to resettle refugees, and adhered to Resolution 194(III) as a solution (Palestine, 20 April, 1951).

The Arab governments believed that the West had supported the creation of Israel, and so the West should extend assistance to the refugees. They made that position clear in their response to the Clapp Mission's recommendation to end relief and embark on resettlement (Forsythe, 1971:31). In particular, they stressed that the weak socio-economic infrastructure of the Arab states could not cope with the huge numbers of refugees, which they perceived as an additional economic burden (Lenczowski, 1980:415).

Jordan was the only country to show some flexibility towards the resettlement of refugees, the small projects it implemented reflecting this. Jordan was the most interested in having the refugees in its midst, contrary to other Arab states which considered them an economic burden. Although Jordan maintained its position in line with the other Arab states regarding repatriation, in principle it accepted the resettlement of refugees not wanting to return (F.R.U.S., 1949:963).

McGhee, the US coordinator of Palestine refugee matters, concluded in his policy papers to the State Department that Transjordan "appears to see in the refugees an opportunity to improve its political and economic position, (whereas) the Arab states are reluctant to accept refugees for permanent resettlement for political as well as economic reasons" (F.R.U.S., 1949:935). It is no wonder then, that Jordan responded positively to the Blandford plan; embarked on the Yarmouk-Jordan River project with UNRWA (although after signing the agreement UNRWA withdrew and the project was shelved), backed the Johnston plan which aimed at finding a consensus between Syria, Jordan and Israel regarding the use of the Yarmouk-Jordan waters; embarked on the East Ghor Canal Project; and approved the Alami's project in Jericho. Some other small resettlement projects were carried out by Jordan, with UNRWA or US funding; these included: constructing 150 housing units in Ghor Nimreen (Palestine, 30 May, 1951). The Truman's project "Point Four" in Jordan (an agreement signed between the US and Jordan in June 1951, to be funded by both countries equally)
aimed at resettling refugees in Jordan (Palestine, 7 June, 1951). Moreover, Jordan provided 1300 Dunums of land in Beit Qad near Jenin to UNRWA, which started a housing project for refugees to settle 100 people (Palestine, 10 February, 1952).

Jordan’s interest in resettling refugees may have resulted from its need for cheap labour in the 1950s and 1960s to build its economic infrastructure. Indeed, in most host countries as Rouleau wrote, refugees became the "ready for export" labourers, and provided a cheap and eager workforce at the disposal of Arab economic forces without securing tangible improvements in the living conditions in the camps (al-Qutub, 1989: 98). As refugees in Jordan became politicized and involved in PLO factions, Jordan’s position changed to one of enmity rather than the alliance seen in the 1950s and 1960s.

The Arab states’ collective stand towards the Blandford Plan and Johnston and Hammarskjold’s resettlement projects was clear, they were fully aware of the ulterior political motives which the projects carried. Protests were made by the Arab Syrian and Iraqi representatives at the UN; and Lebanon and Syria expressed opposition to resettlement and to Blandford himself during his visit in February and March 1952. Only Saudi Arabia agreed to Blandford's scheme (Palestine, 23, 24 January; 10 February, 21 March, 1952).

In response to the Johnston plan, the Lebanese Parliament on 26 July 1955 took a firm decision not to cooperate in losing a drop of water from Lebanon’s rivers (AHCP, 1955: 48). A statement by the Ba’ath Socialist Party in Palestine and Jordan warned Arabs of the consequences of such a project and demanded their rejection of it (AHCP, 1955: 51). The Syrian government refused to cooperate with Israel over common water usage (Peretz, 1955: 397-412); and Egypt’s official stand towards the Blandford plan and the diversion of water from the Nile for the development of part of Sinai was that it "did not feel that the Nile's water could yet be spared" (United Nations Review, 1953: 46). Although Egypt did later sign an agreement with UNRWA in the framework of the Blandford plan for Sinai, it did not come to fruition because of strong opposition by GS refugees.

The Arab press and media played an important role in condemning the Johnston Project, seeing only a political and economic benefit for Israel. They stressed that it would solve the water problem for Israel; put an end to the Arab boycott of Israeli products; lead to economic cooperation between the Arabs and Israel, which naturally would be followed by a political settlement. The consequences would be to secure the existence of the Jewish state; resettle the refugees where they are and to block their return; and arrive at a peaceful settlement between the Arabs and Jews (AHCP, 1955: 37).
3.4.2 The Palestinian Refugees Rejection of Resettlement

The PRs rejection of resettlement took two forms. The first was active verbal and written protests and condemnation in the host countries. The second was the promotion of the collective identity of Palestinians in exile, as a survival strategy in the face of external socio-economic and political pressures, deepening and enhancing their insistence on return as an exit from the state of dispossession that was imposed on them (Sayigh, 1979:103; Tibawi,1963:507-526; Hirst,1977:265-276).

Fawaz Turkii, a Palestinian poet and writer and a refugee himself, wrote explaining that phenomenon among Palestinians:

....I did not feel I was living among my "Arab brothers." ....I was a Palestinian. And that meant I was an outsider, an alien, a refugee, burden. To be that, for us, for my generation, meant to look inward, to draw closer, to be part of a minority that had its own way of doing and seeing and feeling and reacting (Turki,1972:8).

The General-Commissioner reports reflected the bitterness of refugees and their insistence on return. The refugees collectively remained opposed to certain types of self-support projects which would mean permanent resettlement and the abandonment of hope of repatriation (UN,1955:5;UN,1957:1).

3.4.2.1 Reaction to Proposals: Official and Unofficial, Verbal and Written

In reacting to the proposals made by the Clapp Mission and the Blandford (See Chapter six), Johnston and Hammarskjold’s plans for resettlement, the refugees as well as the official organizations that represented them, voiced their protests by holding conferences. Statements and communiques were distributed by the executive committee of these conferences condemning the proposals and criticizing their initiators. The first reaction which marked refugee opposition to resettlement was opposition to the work programmes proposed by UNRWA, based on the Clapp Mission’s recommendations in 1950. Strikes were organized by refugees and work was refused. Food rations were rejected in Lebanon and Syria, and the work programme was labeled an "Anglo-American imperialist scheme." UNRWA reported that the vast majority of refugees did not get involved in the strikes and violence, and believed that those actions by refugees and the bitter criticism in the Arab press of UNRWA’s motives and personnel, were closely related; yet, in the same report they indicated the refugees tiredness of uprootedness and insistence on return (UN,1951:5). This opposition forced UNRWA to end its works programmes in 1951 (Don Peretz,1975:13).

The Communique of the Executive Committee of the Refugees Conference held in Gaza in 1952, in reaction to the Blandford resettlement plan, condemned the scheme for addressing
the refugee question as a "socio-economic problem" only and for Blandford's wish that the refugees would not develop "a professional refugee mentality." They further criticized UNRWA's complaints of a lack of budget, pointing out that US $200 million had been committed to the resettlement plan. The Committee made it clear that the only solution to the refugee issue would be repatriation based on UN resolution 194(III). (Executive Committee Communiqué, 1952:1-4). A similar position was taken by the Executive Committees of refugees in Syria (26 March, 1952) and Bethlehem and Hebron Districts camps (8 February, 1952) in conferences they held to respond to the Blandford plan (Palestine, 9 February; 21 March; 27 March, 1952).

Official Palestinian opposition was voiced by Izzat Tannous in Beirut on 20 March, 1952, and by the communique of the Palestine Refugee Conference held in Jerusalem on 20 July 1955 in response to the Johnston Project (Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, 1955:49). The Refugees' Conference held in Gaza regarded the Johnston project as a solution to Israel's water problem at the expense of the refugees' RR (Ibid.:50-51).

The official stance of the Palestinians, represented by the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, corresponded with the refugees' demands. The Committee criticized UNRWA for its initial support of the Johnston project, pointing out that it had exceeded its mandate - which is humanitarian - by getting involved in the political aspect of the Palestine problem. The Johnston Project would lead to cooperation between the Arabs and Jews, the liquidation of the Palestine problem, and the solution of the refugee question through resettlement outside Palestine. Thus it would provide protection to the Jewish state and in supporting it. UNRWA proved to be a political organization biased towards imperialism and Jews. The Committee gave evidence of UNRWA's bias in this respect, in terms of UNRWA's cancellation of funding for the Yarmouk project, which only brought benefits to the Arabs, and replacement by the Johnston project which served Israel (AHCP, 1955:31). 5

The Arab Palestine Conference in Beirut on 26 June 1959, rejected the Hammarskjöld's project totally, and adhered to the national rights and demands of the Palestinian people. The Conference asked the Arab states and the Arab League to curb the plan and to accelerate efforts to revive a Palestinian entity, calling for the convention of another conference on 12 July 1959 to discuss and further such a plan (Sayigh, 1959:89-92). The 12th of July conference reconfirmed the earlier recommendations with one addition, the denouncement of UNRWA's past and present rehabilitation and emigration projects. UNRWA was asked to cease the latter, on the grounds that they would lead to the liquidation of the Palestine problem, and the non-cooperation of the Arab states with UNRWA was
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sought in this respect (Sayigh, 1959:93-96).

In a press conference in Beirut on 17 July 1959, Sayigh stated that Hammarskjold had
concentrated in his report on the results of the PRs question and ignored the reasons.
Moreover, he had only tackled one result and ignored the rest; that the conditions of the
refugees today are a result of Palestine being usurped, of Palestinians being dispossessed, and
of Israel blocking their return, despite UN resolutions in this respect. The discussion of the
refugee problem should not be separated from the mother problem -The Palestine Question -
, he argued, should be tackled within this context (Sayigh, 1959:106-107).

3.4.2.2 Refugee Infiltrations

Border infiltration by refugees in the 1950s was a reflection of the refugees’ insistence
on return. In the early years of the exodus their actions lacked an organized frame. Their
crossings were to their original houses and properties during harvest time to sow wheat, to
bring back some of their herds, or to retrieve some of their left assets. However, these
infiltrations were more than socio-economic, having a political dimension because the
refugees were infiltrators on land occupied by Israel. As infiltration became a subject of
discussion among refugees, admiration shown for the courageous acts of those who crossed
the borders and returned with some of their assets, so the myth of Israel’s power come to be

However, it was only in the early 1960’s that a greater cohesion and identity, and a
stronger tendency to assert political rights through organized action began to emerge among
the refugees. They began to resort to military means to achieve the liberation of their
homeland, groups of Palestinian militants forming guerilla organizations to harrass and
undermine Israeli power and authority in Israel proper.

Israel’s retaliation against infiltrations involved military attacks and raids on Arab host
countries; Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Gaza Strip, of which the latter was a major target.
Between Israel and the Arab countries there was only a Truce or Amistice Agreements and
not peace in the technical sense of international law (Burns, 1969:22). 

Infiltrators were also targetted by Israeli forces and many were killed (Cattan, 1969:62; Lenczowski, 1980:424-5; Palestine, 5 February, 1949; Burns, 1969).

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization’s (UNTSO) functions included the
supervision of the cease-fire and the truce between Arab countries and Israel and
investigations of incidents involving breaches of the Armistice Agreements
(Burns, 1969:22,27). However, UNTSO faced difficulties in carrying out its responsibilities
due to continuous incidents on the borders between Israel and the host countries (Lenczowski, 1980:366). In July 1954 the United States, Britain and France proposed a Demarcation of the frontier and the erection of barriers as a measure to prevent infiltration and reprisals.

The Israelis considered the truce lines as their own borders. Attacks and raids on Arab countries were carried out with two objectives; first, for expansionist purposes over the rest of the Arab land, and secondly, to force the Arab countries to surrender to Israel’s political conditions.

Moshe Dayan doubted that infiltrations across the borders from Jordan and Gaza were conducted by destitute refugees. He considered them to be carried out by "highly trained gunmen acting on paramilitary lines, (for) the raids have been well synchronized and carefully planned military operations executed with a high degree of precision" (Dayan, 1955:260-1).

If Dayan’s argument was true, it could be considered an appraisal of the Palestinian’s raiders’ effectiveness; but, it was more likely an invention used to massage public opinion. Cattan differs from Dayan with regard to the military character of the operations. He explained:

The violations (of the Truce lines) attributed to the Arabs were not acts of governments but the acts of individuals or of Palestinian commandos....In contrast, Israel’s raids against its Arab neighbours were organized military operations undertaken by regular forces, often on a large scale... (Cattan, 1969:61-65).

3.4.2.3 Arab Governments Position Towards Infiltrations

Neighbouring Arab governments discouraged infiltration, fearing another war. Their commitment to the Armistice Agreements entailed forbidding military or non-military forces to cross the borders and they took strict procedures to inhibit infiltrations, to control refugee camps, and disarm refugees (Smith, 1984:152). In Lebanon, for example, stern restrictions were imposed to prevent infiltrations; a refugee camp was transferred from the frontier area to the centre of the country, etc. (Lenczowski, 1980:366).

Incidents across the borders between the Gaza Strip and Israel were of a distinctive nature. The unique character of GS refugees and the effect of Israeli reprisals will be examined in the following section.
3.4.2.4 Israel's Justification For Reprisals

Israeli raids violated the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution of July 15, 1948 (Burns, 1969:21) and Israel's raids on Qibya on 14-15 October, 1953 and Nahalin in March 1954 (villages in the West Bank) and later on Gaza on 28 February, 1955 were condemned by the Security Council. Israel justified the raid on Gaza as "necessary to force Egypt to respect the armistice agreement... (and) to prevent their civilians from crossing the demarcation line- "infiltrating," as it is called" (Burns, 1969:21).

Addressing the Knesset on 15 October, 1956, Ben-Gurion considered the UNTSO to be incapable of compelling the Arabs to abide with the armistice agreement. He justified Israeli reprisals by saying: "We had no choice but to take action to defend ourselves...this was, rather, our national duty..." (Lorch, 1993:947-8). Yet, the Security Council had not taken any resolution condemning Arab countries for violation of armistice agreements (al-Nims, 1979:85).

Burns believes that the Israelis learned how to practise reprisals from the British, since the latter conducted punitive measures against rebellions in Palestine and the north-west frontier of India and elsewhere (Burns, 1969:62).

Seeing itself after the 1948 war as the powerful regional actor, Israel sought recognition from the Arab countries through military actions. Dayan's statement in The JP of 4 September, 1955 is typical in this respect: "If the Egyptians did not declare war after the Gaza clash, or the Jordanians after Nahhalin, it is an indication that they and the other Arab countries were unable to defeat Israel." He continued, "Retaliatory actions were punitive actions, not revenge. They were also a warning that if the government concerned did not itself impose discipline on its citizens and prevent their transgressions in Israel, Israel forces would play havoc across the border" (Burns, 1969:63).

3.5 GAZA REFUGEES: THE FIRST INTIFADA, BACKGROUND AND CONSEQUENCES

On the morning of March 1, 1955 hundreds of thousands of refugees from Rafah to Beit Hanun, took to the streets shouting: "No settlement! No relocation! Oh, you American Agents!"

So Mu'in Basisu wrote describing the first Intifada of GS refugees against the joint UNRWA-Egyptian project to resettle them in the Sinai Desert; and in reaction to the Israeli raid on Gaza the night before. One of the leaders of the demonstration shouted: "They wrote
the Sinai project in ink, and we shall erase it with blood" (Basisu, 1980:31-2). 8

The Gaza Strip has always been prioritized when the issue of refugee resettlement was posed, due to the socio-economic problems there, the large concentrations of refugees in that limited geographical area, and the high population density. Yet the Sinai project was the first to be planned and thus to be implemented. The refugees rose against UNRWA and the Egyptian government which had cooperated to implement the project. "We want arms not food" shouting and attacking and damaging UNRWA installations and food supplies worth $70,000 (Abu al-Namel, 1979:50-51; UN, 1955:8; Palestine, 3, 4 March, 1955).

The Project preparation had extended from October 1952-1955, and entailed the transfer of 50 hectares of land in North-West Sinai to agricultural land and the resettlement of 20,000 refugees from Gaza as an initial experiment, others to be relocated later (Abu al-Namel, 1979:82-87; Basisu, 1980:29; Palestine, 8, 18, 21 March, 1952). The leaders of the first Intifada succeeded in obtaining a copy of the project written by UNRWA’s experts, described by Basisu as an appalling document. He wrote:

In spite of the Agency’s [UNRWA] engineers’ admission that it would be impossible to live in that piece of hell due to the lack of water and the prohibitive cost of reclaiming the desert, and in spite of the doctors’ forecasts of the diseases that would plague the refugees, especially those resulting from the effect of dust-saturated air on the lungs and eyes of the children - in spite of these reservations, the report carried the Agency’s experts’ approval (Basisu, 1980:29).

The Egyptian Administration resorted to harsh measures to force refugees to relocate. Sa’ad Hamza, military governor of Gaza used to go to the camps and shout at the refugees: "if you do not go to Sinai in these trucks, you will go there on foot!" (Ibid.:23).

Rejection of the project took many forms, and for the first time a unity between the two conflicting parties - the Communist Party and the Moslem Brothers - against Egyptian rule, and against the Sinai project took place; and both were behind the success of the first Intifada (Abu Amru, 1987: 19-20; Abu al-Namel, 1979:72;).

The peasant farmers formed the nucleus of rejection to the project, despite their receiving secret police threats. Only some Mukhtars (village presidents) supported it. Cells in the camps were formed, and leaflets of the report were distributed from Beit Hanun to Rafah, playing a big role in the history of Gaza (Basisu, 1980:25-30). These protests saw the Sinai project defeated, and "the illiterate masses of Gaza felt that they had been responsible for its defeat " (Basisu, 1980:39).

The eruption of the March Intifada in the GS is best understood in terms of two interrelated factors. The first was the Egyptian Administration’s policies towards refugees in
the GS; and the second was the Israeli raid on the Strip on February 28, 1955. The outcome promoted fundamental changes for Palestinian refugees in the GS, and in Egyptian Arab and foreign policy, marking a turning point in contemporary Arab history as a whole.

3.5.1 Gaza Strip Refugees Under the Egyptian Administration

"The Palestinization of Egypt's conscience began with the Gaza raid on February 28, 1955, and it was seemingly completed in 1967" (Love, 1969:696). Since the June Revolution of 1952, the Egyptian policies had not identified strongly with the Palestinian cause, as reflected in Egypt's involvement in the Sinai project with UNRWA in 1953 (Abu Amru, 1987:16; Abu al-Namel, 1979:61). Indeed, Egypt's decision to exile Haj Amin al-Husseinni from Gaza to Cairo on 17 October, 1948, and forbid his return to Palestine, came just five months after the 1948 war. He headed the "all-Palestine Government" (APG) in Gaza which was approved by the Palestine National Council held in Gaza town on 30 September, 1948 and functioned in linkage with the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine in Cairo, never developing into a political force of any consequence and being officially terminated in 1963 in 1963, after nine years of representation in the Arab League (Brand, 1988:23-26).

The Egyptian Administration's action towards the president of the APG could be attributed to two reasons. First, the Egyptian government's intention to hold armistice agreements with Israel, and second, the fear that the presence of the Mufti in Gaza would further incite the refugees, given the popular atmosphere prevailing then to return and liberate Palestine (Abu al-Namel, 1979:24). Similar fears were voiced by Israel, that the Mufti would exploit the situation of crowded refugees in Gaza to carry out raids on Israel (Gazit, 1987:225). Moreover, Egypt, in common with the other Arab states hosting refugees, took stern measures to stop infiltrations of refugees. In the Strip the Palestine Holy War Forces were amalgamated with the Egyptian army as a step to liquidate these forces; arms were withdrawn from refugees; yet, the Egyptian Administration did not hesitate at a time to employ infiltrators to gather military information about the new state (Abu al-Namel: 1979:112-113).
3.5.2 Gaza Raid: Event, Reactions, Repercussions

The effect of the Gaza raid of 28 February 1955 contributed in great part to the creation of the first militia in the Palestinian Resistance movement in 1965. Gazans demonstrating on the 1st of March, 1955, voiced their demands to the Egyptian government which included, besides the cancellation of the Sinai project: "that Palestinians in the camps be trained and armed so that they can defend themselves against Israeli raids; that freedom to assemble, publish and strike be protected; that amnesty be granted to all those who (were arrested in the demonstrations)...." (Basisu, 1980:36-37; Love, 1969:83; Palestine, 6 March, 1955). The Gaza demonstrations and demands by refugees were concomitant with other strikes and demands by the Palestinian Student Union in Cairo. The Palestinian students in Cairo insisting on discussing their demands with Nasser, which included "the introduction of obligatory military training for Palestinians (in the Gaza Strip) to enable them to defend themselves against Israeli attacks" (Brand, 1988:68-69).

The Egyptian Administration approved the refugees' demands, and an official proclamation was issued that: "the camps would be armed and general military conscription would be declared soon" (Basisu, 1980:38). That was a great victory for the Palestinian refugees in the Strip. The leaders of the first Intifada in Gaza and in the Palestine Student Union in Cairo later became official leaders in the PLO, such as: Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir etc. (Ibid.:64-84).

Prior to the event of 28 February, 1955, the Israeli press was seen to be inciting the public on the effect of the infiltrations of refugees which was accelerating, and threatening retaliation if the crossings did not stop (Ibid.:70).

The February 1955 raid on a military camp in Gaza had been preceded by others: an attack on 28 August, 1953 on Bureij camp in GS left 20 dead and 62 wounded (Love, 1969:276) and another on 14 August, 1954 destroyed the water pumping station in Gaza which supplied all Gaza residents with water. The latter raid was perceived as a warning to the Egyptian government over its stand against the Western plans to form a Middle East Defense Alliance (Abu al-Namel, 1979:90; Lenczowski, 1980:283).

The February raid of 1955 marked the climax of the Egyptian -Israel border incidents since the armistice. Sharret who authorized the raid was astounded at the scale of the casualties, especially on the Egyptian side, most of whom were Palestinians (Stephens, 1973:156; Palestine, 2 March, 1955). 9

The cause of the February raid could be seen not only in the result of the Gaza refugee infiltrations to Israel, but also in two other affairs which exacerbated Egypt-Israel relations
between November 1954 and February 1955. The first was Israel's frustration over the Egyptian refusal to allow the Israeli vessel Bat Galim to pass through the Suez Canal, which Egypt had blockaded. The second was the trial of a number of Jews in Egypt for espionage and sabotage (Stephens, 1973:3-4, 15; Burns, 1969:73-75; Love, 1969:12). The US, France and UK were also frustrated over Egypt's rejection of a Middle East Defence Pact, and sympathized with Israel in that matter.

The raid on Gaza came only three days after the signature of the Baghdad Pact, which Egypt had refused to sign. To many Egyptian commentators the raid was a "deliberately coordinated double blow designed to humble Egypt and force peace on Israel's terms ..... Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact narrowed still further his slim chances of modernizing Egyptian armaments from the West" (Love, 1969:200-201). Britain and the US refused to supply Egypt with arms, compelling Nasser to resort to the Eastern bloc (Love, 1969:225). For Russia the deal outflanked the "Northern Tier" siege line of the Baghdad Pact and established Russian influence in the heart of the Middle East. It was a diplomatic triumph for the Kremlin on the scale, not of ephemeral months or years, but of centuries...[since it was blocked] by the Mongol Empire (Ibid.).

Ben-Gurion justified the Gaza raid of February 1955 as was "the first step in a stronger security policy of "active defence" destined to develop eventually into a "preventive war" against Egypt" (Stephens, 1973:156). The political character of the raid was obvious; to curb the new positions of the Egyptian revolution (Ibid.:156).

The Gaza raid brought about unexpected repercussions in Egyptian internal and external politics. Before the raid Egypt was seen by the US State Department as the "Arab country most likely to lead the way to a realistic settlement with Israel. It was the biggest Arab State and Egyptian public opinion was thought to be less emotionally involved in the dispute with Israel than public opinion in other countries" (Ibid.). Yet, Nasser's position had changed from seeing the war with Israel as counterproductive in 1955, to supporting Palestinian insurrection in Israel after the Gaza raid (Nasser, 1955:210-211; Burns, 1969:19). The Egyptian government became more flexible towards infiltrations and Fedayeen commandos were trained to launch military attacks inside Israel. In addition, Nasser's stand towards peace changed to one of Pan-Arabism and nationalism and realizing that he had to build up Egypt's defences to face Israeli aggression, Nasser shifted his economic priority from development to rearmament (Love, 1969:225). Linking the arms deal with Russia to the Gaza raid, Nasser called it "a turning point" in Egypt's modern history" (Ibid.:100-101). This "turning point" was affirmed on July 26, 1956 when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and the blocking of
Israeli shipping in it coincided with the *Fedayeen* raids inland. On October 23, 1956 Nasser signed a military alliance with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in rejection of the Baghdad Pact (Edelman, 1964:172). The military training of Palestinians in Gaza began by Egyptian Lieutenant Colonel Hafez. However, not all Egyptian policies in this period were in the interests of Gazans. The Teachers Union for refugee schools, whose members had played a big role in the first *Intifada* was dismantled; the Egyptian Administration prohibited demonstrations and strikes, and curfews were imposed at certain times in the Strip (Abu al-Namel, 1979:103-105).

The number of trained Palestinian Fedayeen (commandos) reached about 1000 between 1955 and 1956 (Abu al-Namel, 1979:114). They consisted of 1936 and 1948 veterans who knew the geography of Palestine well, were literate and knew the Hebrew language or other languages. It was reported that during the period from 5 December, 1955 to March 1956, 180 military operations were launched in Israel proper by *Fedayeen*, either individually or collectively, an average of 2 operations per night (Burns, 1969:139).

Protesting again to the Security Council on March 14, 1956, Israel condemned the *Fedayeen* attacks, whilst making no mention of the massacres Israel committed on 31 September, 1955 in Khan Younis in Gaza on 5th April, 1956, which resulted in a great number of casualties on the Arab side (Burns, 1969:140; Abu al-Namel, 1979:119). The Security Council took no resolution to condemn these Israeli massacres, but passed a resolution calling on both parties to abide with Article One of the armistice agreement and bring tranquility to the area. Burns explained why no condemnation was undertaken by saying: "This was no doubt due to the aversion which the *Fedayeen* campaign had excited, and possibly also to the feeling that the Egyptians were as much to blame as the Israelis..." (Burns, 1969:91).

Israeli military retaliations were accompanied by two other campaigns, on the political level and at the propaganda level. In the first, Israel tried to use the border conflict to raise other conflicts with the Arabs, such as the peace settlement, the refugee problem, the Fedayeen incursions and Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal (Ibid.:106,146). In the second, it used the Arabic word *Fedayeen* as "synonymous with marauders, cut-throats, murderers," [adding] "It used to have an honourable connotation" (Ibid.:85). "The Israeli authorities and press concentrated on the various crimes [the *Fedayeen*] perpetrated, conveniently forgetting to mention anything about the dead and wounded Arab civilians in Gaza (Ibid.:141). Israel portrayed itself as the victim, trying to put all the blame on the Egyptian side, without mentioning the Palestinians. To prove their allegations, they forced *Fedayeen* prisoners during
interrogation to give testimony "which substantiated the Israeli contentions that many raids into Israel were organized by the Egyptians" (Ibid.:86-87). The Israeli propaganda aimed at damaging the relationship between the Palestinians and the Egyptian, trying to hide the fact that the Fedayeen were Palestinian and not Egyptian (Ibid.:86).

In an attempt to further its political damage Israel attributed the killing of Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Hafez-, whose duties included recruiting Fedayeen from the Gaza refugees and who was killed by a bomb sent by the Israeli intelligence service on July 13 1956 -, to the refugees who "have become embittered by Hafez strong-arm methods of recruiting Fedayeen, and the fact that many of the young men so recruited were captured or killed by the Israelis." But, that was refuted in the killing by a bomb (sent by the Israeli intelligence service) of Colonel Salah Mustafa on July 14 1956, whose duties included organizing Fedayeen raids from Jordanian territory (Ibid.:164).

Though the Fedayeen raids in Israel proper stopped following the Suez War in 1956, the refugees gained a new image, other than being dependent only on charity. Their actions laid out the corner- stone for a coming organized resistance movement which appeared in 1965. Through these raids, the relationship between the Nasserrist regime and the Palestinians was enhanced, contrary to the intentions of the Israeli propaganda-machine.

3.5.3 The Israeli Occupation of Gaza Strip

Israel's forces invaded Egypt's territory on October 30, 1956, and left on 3 November, 1956. Israel's official explanation was that it aimed at annihilating the Egyptian Fedayeen concentrations in the Sinai Peninsula (Lenczwoski, 1980:432). However, this was only part of the truth. Israel feared the process of unification between the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian states of October 25, and the threat that would bring to her existence. Israel was also concerned to secure free passage in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba for her ships, being denied access by Egypt. Finally, Israel's political objective was to obtain recognition for her existence from the Arab countries by reaching a formal treaty of peace. Israel believed that such objectives were realisable in view of two favorable developments: the Suez Canal nationalization crisis, which led Paris and London to consider punitive action against Egypt; and the approaching Presidential elections in the United States, which would tend to paralyze American diplomacy (Ibid.:532-3).

With the Israeli occupation of the GS which lasted until 12 of March 1957, an era of terror began. The UN General-Commissioner Report of December 1956 described the brutal measures committed by the Israeli occupiers against the population, to demoralize them
and force Gazans to surrender and accept an Israeli solution to the Palestine problem. Israeli massacres in Gaza on 1 November, 1956, in Khan Yunis on 3 November, 1956 and in Rafah on 12 Nov. 1956, indicate the brutal measures undertaken by the Israeli forces. The Palestinian casualties during the period of the Israeli occupation of Gaza Strip were 930 killed, 215 lost, and 716 wounded (UN, 1957: 14). Israeli measures included: psychological warfare, torturing those charged with belonging to or hiding Fedayeen, and seeking to demoralize the Palestinian people by raping Palestinian women. Such measures did not come to a halt until all refugees took a collective stand against them. Basisu commented on that by writing:

Palestinians’ had learned from 1948 disaster not to separate between land and honour, in which one cannot save his own honour and leave the Israeli occupiers to violate the honour of the land (Basisu, 1981: 46).

Other Israeli tactics included pressuring the leadership to collaborate with the Israeli occupiers and encouraging emigration (Ibid.: 52). In response to these Israeli measures, an underground resistance movement began to formulate. "The National Front" and "The Popular Resistance Committee" aimed at raising Gazan morale and awareness in the face of the Israeli policies. "The National Front" later declared the importance of starting contacts with Jewish progressive forces in Israel, causing some ideologues not to join it. This strategy (contacts with Jewish progressive forces) was adopted by the Palestinian National Council in its 1977 session (Basisu, 1980: 53-54). Both movements rejected Israeli propaganda to internationalize the Strip, and called upon the Egyptian Administration to return to the Strip. Both adopted methods of civil disobedience and boycotted contacts with the occupiers. Both fronts were hit by the Israeli occupiers in January 1957, and their activities stopped completely (Yassin, 1991: 38).

Some other movements also appeared such as the "Youth of Revenge" who acted strongly against collaborators. Resistance of Gaza refugees to occupation led to the imprisonment of many of the leaders, including the mayor of Gaza, Munir al-Rayyas, Dr. Haida Abdel-Shafi, head of the Health Sector in GS at that time, and others (Gaza Massacre, n.d.: 141).

The Palestinian resistance during the Israeli occupation of GS in 1956/1957 was civil and not military resistance, since most of the military trained troops - Fedayeen -, secretly left the Strip for East Jordan at the beginning of the occupation and continued their operations from there (Ibid.: 13).

Withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza on March 12, 1957, followed the announcement
of Golda Meir, - Israel's Foreign Minister - on March 1, 1957 in the General Assembly of Israel's intention to comply with the February 2, 1957 GA resolution and previous GA resolutions (Burns,1969:252). The 2nd. of February GA resolution and other resolutions had emphasized the need for Israel to withdraw from the Strip, and "called upon the governments of Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement, and stated that the maintenaance of the armistice agreement, after the Israel withdrawal, required the placing of the UNEF on the Armistice Demarcation Line, and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report" (Ibid.:247-8).

Meir's decision in the GA had been preceded by a number of sessions in the Knesset on the issue, which had rejected withdrawal for various reasons. Ben-Gurion had spoken thus on 21 February, 1957 Knesset session: "Egypt must not return to the Gaza Strip, either directly or indirectly; an arrangement must be found which will guarantee Israel's security....the rehabilitation of the permanent settlers (refugees), who were impoverished during Egypt's occupation, and the resolution of the refugee problem by the UN, Israel is prepared to help in all this...." he continued, "...Israel cannot withdraw without a guarantee of freedom of navigation (in the Suez Canal). " He further added : "...Any attempt to impose a perversion of law upon us will encounter the undaunted opposition of the Israeli nation" (Lorch,1993:1042-4).

According to the GA resolution of February 2, 1957, UNEF was to take over from Israeli forces. Israel had rejected the idea of withdrawal and the resumption of Egyptian civilian or military control of Gaza, requesting that a de facto UN administration be placed there (Burns,1969:252). However, only 48 hours after the Israeli withdrawal, the Egyptian Administration returned to Gaza, in response to strenuous efforts and demands by the Gazans to have it back (Ibid.:264).

Week-long demonstrations by the Gaza population over UNEF attempts to internationalize the Strip after the Israeli withdrawal could be looked upon as the second Intifada in the Strip. The Gaza population were united in one national front against the internationalization conspiracy (Basisu,1980:55-56), and also brought about the failure of the conspiracy to incorporate GS with Jordan, led by Sa‘di al-Shawwa who contacted King Hussein through Habis al-Majjali (Ibid.:56). However, one demonstrator was killed in the demonstrations by UNEF guard, trying to replace the UN flag on the Egyptian Administration Headquarters with that of Egypt (Burns,1969:262-3).

The General-Secretary of the General Assembly had commanded the internationalization
on the ground that "It will guarantee good civilian administration and foster the economic development of the territory and its people" (Ibid.:251). However, extending UNEF functions to civil administration in the Strip, could also be seen as an attempt to control infiltrations from the Strip to Israel and prevent the Israelis crossing demarcation line and firing on Arabs (Ibid.:272-4).

In April 1965 compulsory military training of Palestinians began, followed by a popular training. The number of those given popular training in the Strip reached 20,000 by 1966 according to the first head of the PLO, Ahmad al-Shuqairy (Al-Yawimayat al-Filistinniye, from 1/7-31/12/1967:193). This training, plus the political awakening of the Gaza refugees as a result of the Israeli occupation and other militant experiences, made the Strip refugees unique compared with all other refugee concentrations in the host countries, enhancing their insistence on the right to return and their support for a Palestinian entity.

3.6 FAILURE OF RESETTLEMENT STRATEGY

In all the negotiations held, and the proposals issued for resettling refugees, refugees were perceived not as a "liability but an asset for the future," a reservoir of manpower, which, combined with the economic potentialities of the area, could contribute to raising the standards of living in the whole region. However, on the political level they were perceived as a threat to stability and peace in the area, which could be exploited by Communism and radical movements (Thicknesse, 1949:8).

The places proposed for resettlement schemes were invariably arid areas, with no water or transport routes, and needed intensive manual labour. Thicknesse and Schechtman give full details of the schemes proposed for resettlement in the Arab countries - Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and other non-Arab countries such as Turkey and South America, and explain the socio-economic and political difficulties faced in implementing such projects (Thicknesse, 1949:33-58; Schechtman, 1952:77-94).

In all the proposals the self-determination of the Palestine refugees and non-refugees was overlooked. For the West, the refugee question was not a priority on their agenda, and was not perceived as an immediate political problem, which caused the problem to be dragged on.

Because neither Israel nor the US had the power to compel resettlement, the Palestinians and the Arab states were successful in resisting it. As a result of the failure of the resettlement strategy, UNRWA - as the tool of UN - "ceased to be prominent in the capitals of the affluent West." It was even raised in the US Congress that "UNRWA's relief was
helping to subsidize Palestinian Commando groups...but the main politics of the refugee situation were well beyond UNRWA's purview or control" (Forsythe, 1983:97). Conflict emerged between the American Congress and the Foreign Office on the question of funding UNRWA, despite their similar approach to the refugee question (Pappe, 1988:140, 159).

With the acceleration of Fedayeen activities and military training for Palestinian refugees, it became clear that resettlement as an option had become a dead letter, and there was no turning back to it as a solution, no matter how great the number of refugees became. If the refugees had been resettled, and reintegrated in the Arab states, the Palestinian problem would have died a long time ago; instead, the Palestinians continued to insist on their own political rights and thus challenge the legitimacy of Israel.

3.7 IS HUMANITARIAN AID POLITICIZED?

Given UN and US and UK foreign policy on the Palestine refugee issue it must be asked whether humanitarian aid is politicized? A senior official of one major donor government stated in 1983:

Refugee policy always has been and always will be part of foreign policy...like the other arts of foreign policy, refugee policy involves persuading governments to cooperate with our purposes and objectives (The Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (ICIHI), 1986:27).

As discussed in Chapter two, the West mainly the UK and US gave support to the Zionist movement and Israel in order to maintain a foot in the area, using Israel to guard their interests. By the same token, the West's approach to the Palestine question has been undertaken with their military, political, and economic interests in mind. For the West, the refugees were perceived as a threat and a source of instability in the area, which would effect their own interests. It is thus, not surprising to read in every report of the General-Commissioner of UNRWA a statement which indicates that UNRWA exists to help keep stability and peace in the area. Moreover, the unity of the Arab states over the Palestine problem was also considered a threat; the West preferring a disunited Arab world which it could more easily control. The nationalistic and revolutionary awareness raised in the Arab world in the aftermath of the 1948 war was seen as a threat to Western interests, which sought to benefit from the undeveloped economies of the Arab world, much as the Soviet Union did. Early US hopes of reaching a political solution were soon abandoned and the West aimed at liquidating the refugee question through resettlement and reintegration in the economy of the area, connecting this goal with water management projects involving Israel.
and ending what Ben-Gurion called Israel's "water-battle". The proposals suggested by the US corresponded with its interests and Israel's interests, at the expense of the political rights of the Palestinians.

The West, led by the US - as the large contributor to UNRWA - did not try to persuade and or pressure the Arab governments into accepting resettlement, leaving the Arab governments to set terms for UNRWA's operations in their territory that effectively forestalled resettlement. When an Agency programme ran counter to repatriation-oriented Arab policies, friction between UNRWA and the Arab states followed (UN, 1956:6). For as Forsythe argues, the US is in need of consent of Arab governments for UNRWA to operate on its lands, and this consent is an effective diplomatic instrument to "win friends and influence" in the Arab world (Forsythe, 1971:40). America's support of UNRWA and its search for consent in order to win friends in the Arab world contrasts with the Soviet bloc position. The Soviet Union managed to establish close diplomatic, economic and military liaisons after 1955 with the Arab governments, despite assuming few financial responsibilities for the Palestinian refugees (Ibid.:41).

Donor governments which include major foreign powers, have, through the provision of assistance tried to reinforce their authority in the Palestinian conflict (ICIHI, 1986:125-126). This politicizing of humanitarian assistance can make existing crises more intractable, as William Shawcross argued in respect of the Kampuchean relief operations after 1979:

Cambodia is a dismal drama, the playing of which began years ago. During this act nearly all the players used humanitarianism as a fig leaf for either the poverty of the ruthlessness of their politics. The humanitarian instincts of people around the world, and the mandates of the organizations that are supposed to protect and implement our collective conscience, were exploited by almost all sides for political ends " (ICIHI, 1986:29-30).

It cannot be denied that all refugee problems reflect political problems; indeed, as suggested by the 1984 World Refugee Survey, "the failure to address the political dimension of refugee situations is itself a recognition of their overriding importance (Nichols & Griffin, 1985:19).

Humanitarian action cannot solve anything in itself and cannot claim to provide definitive solutions to the fundamental problems which are at the source of conflicts. All that can be achieved by it, as stated by the president of the ICRC in 1984; is that:
....Humanitarian action, if properly understood and 'intelligently used' by
governments, may allow them breathing space in which to seek - in a spirit of
peace and conciliation - political solutions which will themselves eradicate the
humanitarian problems (International Review of the Red Cross, July/August
NOTES:

1. For more details on British foreign policy toward the P.Rs question compared with that of the US, see: Pappe, 1988:124-161.


5. UNRWA's support and funding of the Yarmouk project was through two agreements signed with Jordan, and 200,000 refugees were to benefit from this water management project. After work began UNRWA cancelled the agreements and the project failed. Later in 1953 UNRWA proposed a more comprehensive project for River Jordan water, to benefit Israel as well as Jordan. For more details see, *Palestine*, The Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, 1955:28-30.

6. Armistice Agreements or Truces were held between Israel and Egypt on 24 February; Lebanon on 23 March; Jordan on 3 April; and Syria on 20 July, 1949. The agreement with Egypt was cancelled in September 1956; all the rest were cancelled following the 1967 war.

7. It was reported that between 1949 and 1966 Israel launched tens of attacks on the Arab countries and caused hundreds of killings and injuries. Those attacks were condemned by the Security Council fourteen times, as well as by UNTSO (Cattan, 1969:62).

8. For more on the demonstration by refugees see Basisu, 1980:32-40.

9. Casualties on the Egyptian side were: 36 soldiers and 2 civilians killed; 29 soldiers and 2 civilians wounded. On the Israeli side: 8 were killed and 9 wounded (Stephens, 1973:151-2). For more details on the raid see Love, 1969:5-20; Burns, 1969:17-21).


11. For more details on the Fedayeen operations in Israel proper, see Burns, 1969: 136-149.

12. The April 1956 massacre resulted in fifty-six Arabs being killed and 103 wounded, men, women and children (Burns, 1969:140).


Part Three:

The Israeli Occupation Authorities and

Refugee Resettlement in the Gaza Strip
CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLANNING FOR RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the period from 1948-1967, the Israeli position towards PRs emphasised their resettlement/rehabilitation, rather than return or payment of compensation. After the 1967 war, Israel was confronted with a major problem, finding itself facing about 600,000 refugees in the WBGS. The search for a solution/s to this "problem" began in the early months of the Israeli occupation.

The plans and proposals drafted by the Israelis reflected a continuity of pre-1967 policy, rather than change. The rigid situation which the refugees had been confined to since 1948 was a result of each side's assumption that to change the status quo was against its own interests, whatever it might have done for the refugees. For the Arabs, resettlement would have been an admission that a return "home to Israel" was not the only solution. For the Israelis, resettlement in advance of a peace treaty seemed to pose insoluble problems of "where?" and "how?". However, the Israelis sought an end to the refugee camps, which represent a visible reminder of the refugees' plight in 1948; and are a focal point of Palestinian identity and militant resistance, requiring constant army surveillance. By breaking up the concentrations of refugees, the Israelis assumed that they would be able to sever the refugees' link with their homeland and their desire to return to it, i.e. their sense of nationhood and right to self-determination.

This chapter discusses Israeli policies regarding the refugees of the GS, reflecting on the dilemma which the Israeli parties were and still are facing over finding a solution to the refugee issue. It focuses on GS and not WB because the Israeli resettlement schemes were only implemented in GS, and because conditions in Gaza are far worse than anything in the WB, or any other Palestine refugee community. The proposals and procedures of the Israelis, and the repercussions of their actions, are all examined in some detail.

4.2 EARLY PHASES OF RESETTLEMENT

The GS has always been considered a unique area compared to other areas of Palestine, because of its poverty and lack of infrastructure and potential. "Nothing I saw in South Africa (in Soweto) can compare with Gaza in misery, in confinement and racial discrimination, in sheer oppression" (Said,1992:53). Such sentiments are echoed in the words of former Israeli
Foreign Minister Abba Eban after a visit to Gaza, who said:

... It would take a Dante to give an adequate literary expression to the intense concentration of dejection, bitterness and despair crowded into a small, squalid enclave of gloom. It must be a long time since anybody smiled in Gaza (The Observer, 7 February, 1988).

Since the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967, policies, measures and confrontations between the population in the Strip and the military authorities have taken a different form from those on the WB, especially relating to the role of refugees. This is not to undermine the role of the refugees in the WB, and the daily harassments and confrontations they face from the authorities. It is to recognize instead the very special situation in GS.

The overcrowdedness of the camps in the GS and the militancy of its youth have been of major concern to the Israeli authorities. The authorities' operations in "thinning out" the camp population in the GS could be considered as being the first step in a long-term policy aimed at finding a partial or final solution to the refugee "problem". Policy has been a mixture of maintaining security in the Strip advocating and implementing resettlement schemes at the same time, which would not have been possible to implement if the security pretext had not been used. Since the early days of occupation, the Israeli military authorities have used two methods to "thin out" the GS's refugee population: encouraging emigration; and the road-widening operations in the camps.

4.2.1 Encouraging Emigration

The first method adopted by the Israeli authorities was to encourage the emigration of a large number of the Strip's population to Jordan. This "clean surgical operation", as the Israelis like to call it, saw the GS population fall tremendously after the 1967 war, from 450,000 on 1 June 1967 to 346,000 as of end of December 1967. This fall was not, as Ann Lesch concluded, the result of flight during the war, since Gaza residents were bottled up in the Strip with no place to flee. "Rather, it was a result of a systematic Israeli policy of encouraging people to leave in the months following the war."

It was reported that various inducements were offered to the refugees. Free transportation was provided across Israel and the WB to the bridges leading to Jordan; provided - in some cases - the refugees signed a document stating that they were leaving of their own free will (Lesch, 1984:6; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 19-26(1967):22215). A payment of 50 Israeli pounds, or $14, was made to to each family that agreed to leave for the East Bank, to help cover the travel expenses to Amman, through the offices Israel had set up in the refugee camps (NYT, 31 July, 1968). However this inducement was stopped after Gazan's
complained to the delegation of the ICRC (The International Review of the Red Cross, September(1970):456).

Such inducements were accompanied by repressive measures undertaken by the Israeli authorities to force Gazans to leave, particularly in the largest camp in Gaza - Jabalia (Palestinian Documents,1968:614-5). Some of those who left were women and children who wanted to join their husbands working abroad; others were afraid to remain under Israeli rule. In contrast to this exodus, a mere 5,000 persons were allowed to return to the GS during the six-year period from June 1967 until 1973 under the "family reunion" scheme (Lesch,1984:6).

The influx of GS's refugees to Jordan did not come to a halt until July 1968, when under pressure from Arab nationalists in Amman, the Jordanian government began returning refugees stopped at the Allenby Bridge. The Jordanian government then raised the issue in the United Nations, in mid July 1968 accusing Israel of forcing the refugees to emigrate. Jordan's decision, and that of the other Arab states, was aimed at preventing the draining of the OTs population and in support of their sumud (NYT,31 July,1968;27 September,1968). Israel rejected Jordan's accusation concerning expulsions of refugees, claiming that, "measures had been adopted to ensure that passage from the WB to the East Bank would be permitted only to those who requested it in writing from the mayor of their community, the head of their village, or other local authority." It was also claimed that the Israel Defence Minister Dayan, during his visit to the Allenby Bridge, had pleaded with the Arabs not to be hasty and, if they finally decided to go, to delay their departure until the bridge was in better shape" (Keessing's Contemporary Archives,August 19-26(1967):22215).

Israel's denial of Jordan's accusations was insufficient to conceal its desire to see the refugees leave the densely populated Strip. In August 1971, Gen. Shlomo Gazit, the military administrator of the OTs, stated that, "...the intention is to remove (tens of) thousands of people for whom the Strip is too narrow and too poor." That was further confirmed by former Prime Minister Rabin in February 1973. He called for, "a natural shifting of population to the East Bank ... The problem of the refugees of the GS should not be solved in Gaza or al-Arish but mainly in the East Bank..." (Cited in The National Lawyers Guild Report (NLG),1978:22,24).

The Israeli official line towards refugees was reinforced by Israeli individuals. For example, Gabriel Stein, a Professor of physical chemistry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and former Chairman of the Israel Academic Society, suggested that: necessary means should be provided to enhance the emigration of refugees, especially in the case of the GS. This could be through granting a sum of money to each family ($6,000), derived from the International Fund, irrespective of the eventual political form which the GS will assume (Stein,1968:16-17).
The official declared policy and actions were in contradiction with the assurances made by the Israeli representative at the UN to the General-Commissioner of UNRWA, Mr. Laurence Michelmore. The Israeli Ambassador noted, "it was not the policy of the Government of Israel to expel Arab inhabitants of the occupied areas" (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 19-26, 1967:22215). The difference between declared policy and actual policy is explicable, Israel's covert policy towards refugees never intentionally being unveiled by the authorities. Despite all means used to encourage the emigration of GS refugees, however, the uprooting of the whole refugee population that some Israeli extremists sought was not achieved.

4.2.2 The Road-Widening Operations

Failing to encourage the emigration of the largest number of the Strip's refugee population, the Israelis also failed to quell the resistance movement in the Strip, despite the measures undertaken to do so, either through repression or persuasion. One of the methods attempted to persuade the Gaza-based guerrillas to give up resistance was the circulation of a pamphlet in Arabic asking them to surrender and promising them a lenient treatment if they did so (al-Quds, 3 August, 1971; ARR, August 1-15, 1971:426). By 1970, with the escalation of resistance in GS, the Israeli government openly discussed the need to "thin out" the Gaza refugee population and embarked on a new programme to do so by coercion. This programme was, it could be argued, the first enacted policy regarding the resettlement of the GS refugees, began in the early 1970's and put into practice by the middle of 1971 with the beginning of the road-widening operations in GS camps. Because the refugees would have opposed anything which smacked of "resettlement", it had to be done by a "backdoor" device. What may have started as a limited security operation later developed into a comprehensive resettlement programme.

So far as there was a policy, it was to move out one in five of the people who occupy the Gaza camps, in an attempt to fight the escalating resistance in the Strip. This was confirmed by Schlomo Gazet, the former Coordinator for the OTs, who stated in a press interview that: "the intention is to evacuate one-third of the Strip's refugee population, about 60-70,000 to new places in the Strip (al-Quds, 22 August, 1971; The Times, 22 July, 1971).

In July 1971, Israel began systematically destroying homes in refugee camps, forcibly removing thousands of Gaza residents to al-Arish in the Sinai Desert, to unoccupied camps in the WB, and to smaller Strip camps. As to the circumstances under which the refugees were removed, an Israeli official claimed that all had been given 24 to 36 hours' notice and offered
an option of where they should go (The Times, 3 September, 1971; NYT, July 22; 20 & 31 August, 1971).

The authorities' plan worked in phases: first to evacuate the effected refugees to the already available accommodation in al-Arish, as well as in smaller Strip camps, then, once the empty al-Arish flats were all occupied, future transfers would all be to the Strip. Israeli sources indicated that for every home demolished in the camps, another home of at least the same standard was offered. A high ranking Israeli official said the "evacuees are free to take it or leave it and the Military Government arranges transport to the destination named by the evacuees" (JP, 17 August, 1971).

The demolitions and evacuation in Gaza, involving about 15,000 people, was the first phase in the Israeli plan and began in July 1971. The second phase started in January 1972, the so called "the Spring Phase"; and the third phase started in 1976.

The transfer of refugees was of a forcible nature and violated Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits "individual or mass forcible transfers...regardless of their motive" (International Review of the Red Cross, September (1970): 456). The absence in the O.T's of a "protecting power," in the form of a state, on behalf of the Palestinians, represented in the UN on equal grounds with other member states, made it impossible to ensure compliance with the Geneva Convention.

4.2.2.1 Reasons Given for the Crackdown on Camps

The main reason given by the authorities for the road-widening operation was "security." In breaking up the larger camps, the "security" element was both a genuine reason and a pretext. It was genuine because driving wide roads through makes it harder for Fedayeen to hide, or to dominate the population, and dispersed refugees are easier to police than when they are crowded into camps. It was a pretext because, as The Guardian commented at the time, "naked resettlement would have been fiercely opposed by the United Nations", which ran the camps. The Guardian continued, "moving occupied populations also infringes the Geneva Convention, to which Israel is a signatory. All this can be got round in the name of security" (The Guardian, 19 August, 1971).

There were also other contradictory reasons given by the Israeli officials for the crackdown. Schlomo Gazet, former Co-ordinator of the OTs, stated that security and military reasons were behind the road widening operation in Jabalia camp. He said that the operation was not part of a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem, and did not intend to improve the refugees living conditions, but it sought to enhance the military authorities' control over the
camps (*al-Quds*, 1 August, 1971; *The Times*, 31 July, 1971; *NYT*, 29 July, 1971; Cohen, 1972, 1). This combination of security and resettlement was thus confirmed in the Ministry of Defence report on the OT’s: "The slackening of terrorist activities in 1971 made possible the implementation of Israel’s rehabilitation programme" (*Ministry of Defence*, 1983: 56).

Peres, Minister-in-Charge of refugees affairs, believed that a partial solution to the refugee problem was beyond driving wide roads through the Jabalia camp (*al-Quds*, 2 August, 1971). Moshe Dayan’s view was that the operations in Rafah, Jabalia and Shati camps were carried out for humanitarian reasons and not political ones, aimed at improving the living conditions of refugees, who got new houses to replace those demolished in the camps as well as financial aid and employment (*al-Quds*, 2 August, 1971; 29 December, 1972). On occasion, however, the punitive element in the new policy emerged. In a reply given to a delegation of Gaza leaders asking him to stop evicting people from the camps Dayan said: "I will do so when you start doing your jobs and keeping your areas quiet" (*The Guardian*, *al-Quds*, 19 August, 1971). The same response was given by the Strip’s Military Governor to Jabalia camp’s Mukhtar (village president) when the latter protested about the demolitions, the Governor adding that: what we have done is nothing compared to King Hussein (*The Observer*, 1 August, 1971). Emanuel Marx emphasized that Israeli policy in the camps during this time served as a collective punishment against the Strip’s inhabitants (Marx, 1988: 11).

Dayan complained that the Fedayeen in Gaza were still able to defy him. Prompting him and Barlev to direct Sharon to "establish order" in Gaza. The "crackdown" followed an attack on an Israeli family by the Fedayeen, which resulted in the murder of two children and the wounding of their mother, and most Israelis believed that it was a direct result of the Aroyo murders. However, approval for the operations was given by the Cabinet on 20 December - a fortnight earlier (*The Observer*, 1 August, 1971).

Erial Sharon, the head of the Southern Command in GS at that time, planned this programme systematically, assigning it to an elite Israeli officers. A quote attributed to Sharon began to make the rounds, that "the only good" terrorist" is a dead "terrorist." "It is claimed that within seven months Sharon and his men ended "terrorism" in the GS (Benziman, 1985: 115-116; Aronson, 1987: 46-7). The operations in the camps were accompanied by other measures by Sharon had undertaken. He dismissed the mayor of Gaza, Ragheb al-Alami (who had been appointed by Egypt in 1964) and removed the entire municipal council; he deported 12,000 members of families of suspected Fedayeen to detention camps in Abu Zeneima and Abu Rudeis in Sinai (Halabi, 1985: 77-81; *Palestine Affairs*, April(1972): 196).

Sharon’s strategy and programme was not his first attack on refugees in the GS; in
March 1954 he had attacked al-Bureij camp in the Strip, to halt infiltrations from the GS and the Sinai Desert to Israel, with lethal results. His reply to critiques of the operation was "...If we don't act forcefully against the refugee camps they will turn into comfortable nests for murderers" (Benziman, 1985:49). Moreover, it was Sharon who had led the massacre of Palestinians in Kibya in October 1953, and this pattern of excessive violence and uncontrolled behaviour also showed itself in Lebanon in 1982, with regard to the Sabra and Shatilla massacres (Benziman, 1985:263).

Other reasons given for the eviction of refugees came in a response to Carol Johnson, MP, and her colleague, from a high Israeli official who said that "the destruction of homes was an interim measure - the camps were too large and must be reduced in size. In the "near future" the refugees would be allowed to return and a process of re-education would begin "to teach them to wake up to 1971" - in new villages to be built for the purpose." That observation contrasted with another reply to a question Carol Johnson posed to the Israeli representative in London, who noted that, "what is happening in the camps is "resettlement and construction work" (The Times, 3 September, 1971). The former Israeli UN representative in his reply to U Thant's protest about the operations in the camps, claimed that they had been carried out to make Gaza inhabitants safe from Fedayeen' activities (al-Quds, 30 September 1971). Major Amir Cheshin, information officer for the Israeli military command in charge of the GS, said: "a solution to the terror would not have been found without opening roads." (NYT, 24 November, 1974).

The above Israeli statements demonstrate that even the Israelis themselves were in two minds as to what they were about. They emphasised the security problem, and further stressed the humanitarian aspect of the operations. Yet, at the same time they argued that it was necessary for the refugees to "wake up to 1971." What they probably meant was that refugees should start to lead an independent life away from UNRWA, to improve their living conditions, and settle down more permanently; implying that a return back to their previous home and land was unviable. These contradictory statements nevertheless provide ample evidence of the ulterior motives of the policy to impose control over the refugees community and to quell their resistance to occupation. The major concern of the Israeli authorities was to retain the Strip, but, with the minimum of refugees (NYT, April 2, 1973).

The delegation of the NLG concluded that Israeli policy in Gaza had three objectives. The first was to reduce the large, unwanted Palestinian population within its desired borders by resettling a portion of the Palestinian Gaza population beyond the Strip. The second was to remove and transfer the population in order for Israel to claim that the refugee problem had
been eliminated. The third objective was to neutralize UNRWA by depleting the refugee rolls (NLG, 1978:27). The Israeli leadership further assumed that separating the refugees from UNRWA would be one way to diminish their refugee identity and break their connection with the past (Locke and Stewart, 1985:62).

4.2.2.2 Explaining the Israeli Crackdown in Gaza

The Israeli crackdown on camps and refugees in the Strip is widely regarded as the first reversal of the so-called "liberal" policy of occupation instituted by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan in the first days after the June 1967 war. Several internal and external factors lay behind the crackdown. The first of these was Israeli military authorities' fear of the escalation and domination of the Palestinian resistance movement in the Strip. That resistance prohibited an Israeli civil presence and promoted the need for more than just minimal military presence (al-Quds, 6 January, 1971). The fear could be attributed to the specificity of the situation in the Strip with regard to the level of militancy among its population. Daily confrontations between the two opposing sides - the resistance movement and the Israeli military forces - allowed no place for a third party. Each side was trying to liquidate the existence of the other and enhance its presence on the land.

The resistance movement caused a reduction of the Israeli civil presence in the Strip, in contrast to other occupied areas. As a result of the resistance Israeli soldiers in GS were not allowed to walk alone but in groups, with their Ouzi guns. The escalation of Fedayeen activities in the Strip in the last months of 1970, led the Israeli Cabinet to vote for an even more stringent security policy on January 3, 1971 (NYT, February 2, 1971; Palestine Affairs, November (1971):232-233). In a further attempt to tighten control of people's movements, from the beginning of July 1971 the Government has forbidden camp dwellers to leave their areas without special permits.

Keen to reach a permanent settlement - in a hurry - for the Strip and its refugees, the Israelis adoption of a new policy of resettlement coupled with economic expansion was a variation on an old theme, the "carrot" and the "stick" clearly visible. However, the manner in which they acted was recognized at the time to be storing up more trouble for the future (see chapter seven) (The Observer, 1 August, 1971).

A second reason for the crackdown was the simultaneous crackdown on the Palestinian resistance in Jordan, often called "Black September," which drove the Palestinian armed resistance out of Amman to Jarash and Ajlun in the northwest. The refugee camps were the main target, and casualties were substantial there, where the fiercest resistance had been
launched. July 1971 was the month when the Jordanian authorities completed their crackdown on Palestinian resistance, at the same time giving encouragement to the Israeli military authorities to crush the Strip’s resistance and enact their "iron fist" policy. A reliable and independent source in Gaza confirmed that it was the Israeli intention to break up the large camps as quickly as possible before opposition, either external or internal, mounted (The Observer, 1 August, 1971). The Israeli press played a great role in calling upon the military authorities to "emulate the Jordanian regime in crushing Palestinian Fedayeen", and to "implement what King Hussein had done in the East Bank in the GS." The Israeli authorities exploited the negative effects which the "Black September" events left on the Strip’s population, and circulated pamphlets in Arabic calling upon the Fedayeen to surrender (Palestine Affairs, November, 1971: 232).

A third reason for Israeli policy in Gaza related to the relative tranquillity on Israeli borders on the Suez and River Jordan. As a result of the calm following cease-fire agreements, Israel began to enjoy peace on all its fronts except "the only front" in the GS. Schlomo Gazet revealed the effect of the cease-fire upon Israel in dealing with the camps. He stated: "We do not have to forget that the cease-fire had facilitated so much the issue of dealing with the camps. The cease-fire made it possible for us to mobilize more forces and allocation of funds etc, and this was not possible a year ago" (Ma’ariv, 20 August, 1971). The cease-fire enabled the Israeli authorities to double the army garrison in Gaza, and deploy a tough "border police" called the Green Berets in Gaza town, armed with truncheons (Palestine Affairs, November, 1971: 232-233).

4.2.3 Voices of Opposition

The camp operations demonstrated an action without precedent against the refugees of the GS by the military authorities. These operations evoked protest among various circles, including official and civil Israelis; Palestinians inside and outside; and the Arab states, represented by the Arab League.

4.2.3.1 Israeli Protest

There was both official state and civilian opposition in Israel to operations in the camps. In Tel-Aviv, 80 Israelis demonstrated in protest at the policies in the OTs and the demolition of houses in GS camps and the evacuation of refugees, organized by the Israeli Human Rights Committee and leftist elements (al-Quds, 24 August, 1971).

Criticism of the operations was also heard from two faculty members of the Hebrew
University who carried out a study on the UNRWA operations in the GS and the WB. They wrote:

First, the evacuation was carried out almost over night, with an advance warning of only few hours; second, the transfer to al-Arish cuts off the evacuated refugees from their former livelihoods; third, the Arabs are not used to living in multi-storied buildings. As a result, a large part of the evacuees never reached al-Arish. They "got lost" on the way, at the homes of relatives and acquaintances in the Strip, etc., and many who did arrive have left. They, thus concluded that, Israel's policy towards refugees especially towards the Gaza refugees," is a combination of errors and omission and moves like that were too few and too mistaken (Magen,1972:37).

Their criticism it must be noted reflected concern with the humanitarian position of the refugees rather than with the political repercussions.

Direct opposition to Sharon's operations from official circles was expressed by Lt.-General Yitzhak Pundak, a former Commander of the Gaza region, who argued for the reduction of all police and military involvement in the GS. Pundak advocated an alternative policy to Sharon's use of force and fear, calling for the improvement of living conditions and the material welfare of Gaza's population. He also saw the importance of normalizing relations between Israel and the local population, thereby reducing the attractiveness for Gazans of joining in the "terrorist" and other underground operations. Sharon's approach was the antithesis of Pundak's. Even Pundak's men - the senior officers on assignment in the Gaza region - found themselves trapped "between implacable foes and conflicting orders," when implementing Sharon's strategy (Benziman, 1985:117).

It was not only Pundak who voiced his opposition to the Sharon programme in the Strip. Yitzhak Abadi, the former senior field commander charged with implementing Sharon's programmes, joined Pundak in opposing the military actions carried out by Sharon in the Strip, and the hostility it was engendering among the population. He attributed the populations involvement in resistance to the worsening economic conditions of Gazans and thus he proposed, like Pundak, to try and give economic support and compensation to the innocent majority of Palestinians in the Strip. However, his voice remained unheard and he resigned. Explaining his resignation to Dayan, Abadi said that, "he could no longer be a partner to Sharon's reign of terror." In fact, Sharon's reign of terror ended after Abadi's resignation, when Dayan decided to transfer responsibility for the GS from the Southern Command - headed by Sharon - to the Central Command (Benziman,1985:118).
4.2.3.2 Palestinian Protest

Palestinians inside the Strip protested against the operations in the camps in many ways. Mukhtars of the camps and outstanding figures requested the Defence Minister to halt the operations, but Dayan refused. He refused to meet the Mukhtars, until they carried out their responsibility in a way he viewed as proper and stopped resistance to the occupation (al-Quds, 4 August, 1971). The mayor and municipality members of Gaza also sent a memorandum to the Defence Minister condemning and requesting the halt of the road-widening operations and the evacuation of refugees (al-Quds, 18 August, 1971). Residents of Jabalia camp demonstrated at UNRWA headquarters in Gaza in protest at the forceful movement of 30 families from Jabalaya camp to al-Arish. Those families had their personal IDs confiscated by the authorities, and were transferred in 50 trucks (which belonged to Arabs) to al-Arish (al-Quds, 28 July, 1971).

To protest against the operations and the dispersion of refugees, two guerrilla organizations, the Popular Front and the Liberation Front for the Liberation of Palestine, called for a seven-day general strike in the Strip. The Israelis believed that local leaders, rather than guerrilla organizations, were behind the strike. Political opposition to the removal of refugees arose when it became apparent that Israel's objectives went beyond mere "security". Most of the Palestinian workers from the Strip who commuted daily to Israel were stopped by the strikers from going to work. Only about 500 people went to work, a tenth of the normal total (al-Hadaf, March(1971):20; Palestine Affairs, November(1971):234).

The Israeli counter-measures against the strikers involved intimidation and the violation of civil and human rights. Shops which participated in the strike were welded shut. Licence plates were stripped off from 20 taxis whose owners joined the strike (al-Quds, 15 August, 1971; The Guardian, 16 August, 1971). There was strong Israeli press reaction to the response of the Strip's population to the strike called by the Palestinian organizations and the Israeli press began to call into question the Israeli "iron fist" policy in the GS. Al-Hamishmar Supplement of 6 August, 1971 reported that,

the "iron fist" policy is not generating miracles, which would liquidate the guerrillas of today, and also those who will grow up tomorrow.... The youths of Jabalia, Shati, Bureij, al-Maghazi and Nuseirat camps, who are throwing lemons today-- which resemble hand grenades-- on Israeli army, will throw tomorrow real grenades, and will substitute sticks for Kalashnikov guns.

The article's prediction regarding the youth of Gaza seem to have been fulfilled in the historical events of the Intifada. Other Israeli reaction argued that the success of the resistance movement in the Strip was attributed to the very strong links between the resistance movement and the people as a whole. Ha'olem Hazeh of 3 August, 1971 reported that it is impossible to
separate between the people and the *Fedayeen*, the people themselves are potential *Fedayeen*... and this is the reason for the emergence of five *Fedayeen* in the place of a killed or imprisoned one (*Palestine Affairs*, November (1971):234).

Benziman saw this strong link between the resistance movement and the people in GS in a different light. He claimed that, "the local Palestinian population was trapped between the terror of the IDF and that of the PLO. Local PLO leaders used flagrant torture and the most horrifying forms of murder to intimidate the locals from any show of cooperation with the conquering forces of their enemy" (Benziman, 1985:117).

Benziman's claim received publicity in the early years of the *Intifada*, when the killing of collaborators by nationalist militants in the OTs was reported under the slogan "Arabs are killing Arabs." A more realistic interpretation of the phenomenon is given by Rabbani. He wrote:

Discussion of collaborators in the OTs should be removed from the "Arab kills Arab" vacuum to which it has been consigned and proceed from the realization that the reproduction and elimination of collaborators has been part and parcel of every struggle for freedom from colonial rule. Put in proper perspective, the current situation forms an indictment rather than justification for Israeli rule, and similarly allows for a more serious evaluation of the problem (Rabbani, 26 1992:16).

Another communique by the PFLP associated activities in the Strip with efforts to liquidate the Palestinian movement in Jordan. Condemning the evacuation of the Strip's refugees, it attributed the authorities' measures to two goals: to annex the Strip by evacuating as many people as possible to reduce population density in order to diminish the revolutionary aims of the Palestinian movement and replace refugees with new Israeli settlers; to create an atmosphere and environment of hatred among the Israelis for the Palestinian national movement (*al-Hadaj*, 6 March (1971):20).

On the official level, Yasar Arafat protested about the operations in the camps and considered them to be more brutal than the Israeli attack on the Strip in 1956 and 1967. He called on international public opinion, the Arab nations, the humanitarian and political organizations, and liberation movements in the world to act in order to stop the Israeli authorities' measures and violations of human rights against the Palestinian population (*al-Dustour*, 31 January, 1971). The same calls were made by the Palestinian Red Crescent to international organizations (*al-Dustour*, 6 February, 1971) and the International Committee of the Red Cross also expressed concern about the forced transfers and urged that rehousing and compensation be accelerated and intensified (*International Committee of the Red Cross*, 1971:51).
al-Ittihad newspaper described the operations in the GS camps as brutal war-crimes, similar to those committed in Vietnam by forces of North America (al-Ittihad, 10 August, 1971). Individual Palestinians protested at the transfer of refugees to al-Arish by the authorities. They argued that, "if they want to transfer us from here they have to ask us where we want to be transferred. I am ready to be transferred to my home in Hamameh" (a village in Palestine), and another refugee said, "I am ready to go from here but to Jaffa" (Palestine Affairs, September (1971): 213).

The irony was that despite terrible living conditions in the camps, for the Palestinians living there, many of whom had been there for 45 years, it was their home. The camps became like rooted villages. How was it possible to estimate levels of compensation for a vine that has taken 15 years to grow? And how do you restore the pride and dignity of a people who have put two decades of their life into making a decent home for themselves and their families?

The evacuated refugees voiced other grievances than the loss of their old houses. By being moved away they faced transport problems in commuting to work, and facilities in the smaller camps were unlike those found in larger camps. The evacuated refugees also lost proximity to families and relatives (The Observer, 1 August, 1971). The Palestinians believed then that it was only the latest phase in a long campaign of harrassment designed to drive the refugees out of the GS forever, in preparation for Israeli annexation, and discounted the urgency of the security problem, which the authorities reiterated.

4.2.3.3 The Arab States Protest

In a conference on Palestine refugee affairs convened in Cairo in 1970, attended by members of the Arab League and the PLO, recommendations were made to support the steadfastness of the people in the OTs, and to stop their emigration. It was demanded that UNRWA should not cooperate with the Israeli authorities in changing the status of the refugee camps and evacuating of the refugees (al­Quds, 6 February, 1970). Sixteen Arab states, prompted by the Arab League, requested the UN to send a fact finding mission to GS (al­Quds, 19 September, 1971). Furthermore, the Egyptian government, the former administration of the Strip, asked the UN to intervene immediately to protect the inhabitants of the GS from Israeli plans to evacuate them from their homes to other areas. Mr. Riad, Egypt’s Foreign Minister, stressed in a message to the UN Secretary-General that the situation in the GS was deteriorating. Together with the Arab League, Mr. Riad considered the expulsion of the inhabitants a "brutal and inhuman crimes" that should be halted (The Guardian, 17 August, 1971; NYT, 20 August, 1971).
4.2.4 Procedures and Repercussions of the Operations in the Camps

To pacify the GS, the authorities altered the structure and form of the three big camps, Jabalia, Shati and Rafah, under the pretext of security, as follows:

1) "The clearing of a security perimeter around the camp that would effectively isolate the built-up area from its surroundings and render it impossible for anyone to enter or leave the camp without being noticed. 2) The division of the large camps into smaller units or quarters, each of which could be entered and searched with relative ease. 3) The paving of roads in the camps to enable the security forces to enter the camps in their vehicles, travel rapidly, and without fear of land-mines. 4) The introduction of street-lighting to facilitate control of the camps after dark" (Yoge1973:28;JP,25 August,1971).

The circumstances in which the refugees of the three effected camps were removed reflected the harsh policy of the authorities. An Israeli official confirmed that the refugees were given 24-36 hours notice; and they were offered an option of where they should go (The Times,3 September,1971). The options offered were: al-Arish, the WB, and smaller camps in the GS. A Palestine Affairs report gave the number effected families as 2,009 some 346 of those were transferred by the authorities to al-Arish, and 28 to the WB, while the others found houses in smaller camps in the Strip, or in towns of the Strip (Palestine Affairs,November(1971):233).

Ma'ariv also reported that, the military government established a unit named "Yasheh" (Housing of Gazans Unit) in the early seventies. The unit constructed two housing projects: one between Jenin and Nablus, (Fahma), and the other near Ramallah in the WB. About a hundred families were transferred, after being paid a small amount of money and given a house, this small number reflecting, according to Vardi, the former WB commander, the Gazans unwillingness to move to the WB (al-Quds, 25 March 1988; 4 August,1971).

Other refugee families from Jabalia and SC were transferred by the authorities to Shweikah village in Tulkarem area in the WB, where they were accommodated in houses belonging to the Custodian (al-Quds, 16 August, 1971). Dr. Haider Abdel-Shafi, an eminent physician and the official head of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, believed that the goal of the authorities was to reduce the Strip's population. He described the steps taken in the demolition of houses. One soldier paints a large "X" on houses and shops in the camps to identify those to be demolished, and another soldier tells the family they have to move. This
was done in a complete arbitrarily way without consulting the residents (NLG Report, 1978:25; NYT, 20 August, 1971). (See Plate: 4.1). As a result of demolitions in the camps, houses were in great demand by evacuated refugees in the GS. In consequence, the rent increased from 20-30 Israeli Liras to 70-80 IL per month (al-Quds, 3 August, 1971).

*Ha'aretz* and *The Observer* reported on the maltreatment and force used on the refugees faced during the evacuation of camps:

Many Palestinians were brought to hospital with broken bones. At army aid stations, it was seen that many people had been flogged on their bare backs, resulting in blisters. Search patrols pulled down houses, destroyed furniture and property. Members of patrols and Border Guards, claiming they were searching women, stripped them and left them naked in the streets. The Red Cross protested against the treatment, with the result that later women were stripped in side streets and refugee camps rather than in the main streets. Israeli security men prevented doctors from taking the injured into hospitals (NLG Report, 1978:25; *The Observer*, 1 August, 1971; ICRC Annual Report, 1971:50-51).

The forced immigration of parents and families of *Fedayeen* was carried out by the authorities, and they were taken to detention camps in Sinai desert like Abu Znemah, Kaseemah, Nakl, al-Tur, and al-Arish, and to camps in Saint Catherine (Moses Mountain). Abu Znemah camp was closed at the end of November 1971 under pressure from the Red Cross (*Palestine Affairs*, April (1972): 196; Halabi, 1985: 81). The Israelis claimed that if some (refugees) were moved against their will, "it was because the Arabs had no way of knowing that better lives awaited them in their new surroundings...and resettlements should become attractive to them" (*NYT*, 18 December, 1971). However, this was refuted in *The Guardian* comments of 19 August, 1971, which reported that houses were given at random and that made it worse for the refugees. "Where some families were offered spacious middle class house in el-Arish, others were put into hovels far worse than the huts they left behind." The Israeli authorities sealed off Jabalia and Gaza SC from the outside world by declaring them "military areas." It was explained in Jerusalem that the camps where closed "to prevent people from demonstrating for the benefit of foreign journalists" (*Ibid.*).

The activities in the camps were part of Israel's new plan to tame the turbulent GS. But neither the carrot (inducements such as one-way exit permits, jobs in the WB and more work opportunities in Israel) nor the stick (the heavy-handed repression on camps in 1971) worked. The steady pulse of violence, both against the Israeli soldiers and Arab collaborators, did not
Plate 4.1
Heap of rubble of demolished houses in the Shati Camp, July 1971.

This destruction of people's homes raises the question of who runs the camps. It is quite clear that the Israeli authorities start planning to control the camps, through the different measures of apartheid undertaken against the camp population.
diminished. "Gaza is the only place where the Palestinian resistance ("terrorism" to the Israelis), at a terrible cost and with suicidal tenacity, is worthy of the name" (The Observer, 1 August, 1971). Yet, the forcible transfers did not end in 1971, it was reported in Ha'aretz in July 1975 that new methods were adopted to obtain "voluntary" relinquishment of property rights (NLG Report, 1978:23).

Figures on the number of demolished shelters in the three camps affected by the road-widening operations reveal the magnitude of the issue under discussion, although they differ from one source to another. According to the JP report, 1,807 shelters were demolished altogether (JP, 31 August, 1971). The UNRWA office in Gaza gives a figure of of 10,794 rooms, with 3,941 affected families (24,067 persons) (UNRWA, 1991). The Palestine Affairs report meanwhile, gives a number of 2,009 shelters: 1,011 houses in Jabalia, which compromised 924 families (6,503 persons); 598 in Shati, compromising 591 families (4,020 persons); and 400 in Rafah camp, compromising 400 families (2850 persons) (Palestine Affairs, November (1971):233).

The demolition of camp shelters by road-widening, under the pretext of security continued throughout the years, at a slow pace. In all, the road-widening operations in the camps, are reported to have resulted in the demolition of 10,000 shelters between 1967 and 1984 (Locke and Stewart, 1985:59).

Annual Reports of the General-Commissioner give details of the housing situation of the affected refugees by the 1971 demolitions. The last, of 1984, indicated that many families were still living in unsatisfactory conditions, some of them in real hardship; while some had moved into new Israeli housing projects, and others had voluntarily purchased plots of land in the Israeli housing projects. The agency is said to be continuing to pursue these cases with the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UN, 1984:26). The affected refugees, found themselves with of two options: to purchase new houses in the Israeli sponsored housing projects or to move to shelters vacated by others opting for the new housing (UN, 1975:11).

One of the features of the operations in the camps was that the refugees transferred to al-Arish were removed from the providing hand of UNRWA. They lost their entitlement to its services, despite the Israeli officials' assurances that their status as refugees would not be affected and their future needs would be attended to (NLG Report, 1978:27; The Times, 3 September, 1971).

This destruction of people's homes raises the question of who owns the camps. It is quite clear that the Israeli authorities exert complete control over the camps, through the different measures of harassment undertaken against the camp population.
UNRWA's lack of executive authority over the camps was starkly apparent. They have no means of appeal. Some of them have building permits issued by UNRWA before the Israeli occupation but these are no longer valid. If there are houses where the Israelis do not want them, then they will be removed (Locke and Stewart, 1985:60).

In fact, the original shelters belong to UNRWA, built on land provided by the Egyptian administration on unused governmental and Miri land. Some camps in the middle zone of the GS were built on private land, the owners compensated, or the right of ownership was maintained until UNRWA's mandate terminates. So UNRWA "ownership" of lands or houses, then, is no more than a figurative expression, indicating the housing-land and the buildings provided by UNRWA, and distinguishing these from private or freehold lands and houses.

UNRWA protested at the operations in the camps. UNRWA complained about the short notice it received from the authorities before the demolitions were carried out, and asked that the demolitions should be halted, not only because of the extent of the hardship and distress suffered by the refugees, but because destruction of shelters was much in excess of the alternative housing available (UN, 1973:7). UN GA Resolution 2792 C (XXVI), of 6 December 1971, called upon Israel to desist from further destruction of refugee shelters and from further removal of refugees from their present places of residence and to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation (UN, 1973:7).

General-Commissioner reports do not give a clear indication of whether the Agency got reimbursement from the authorities for the demolitions of 1971 or not. But in 1974, a reference was made to a construction programme of new shelters in small camps like Maghazi and Nuseirat with reimbursement by the Israeli authorities, to replace shelters demolished by road widening in these camps. There was no mention of the 1971 demolitions, but the events of 1974 did raise a question about possible compliance between the authorities and UNRWA to "thin-out" large camps (UN, 1974:20).

To sum up, the military authorities' crackdown on the camps was carried out with security in mind, despite the different pretexts given. The security pretext could be said to have served the authorities on two counts: to exercise more control on camp population; and to disperse refugees. The aim behind the liquidation of the refugee camps and the refugees as a category was to negate their characteristics as refugees, which forms the hard nucleus of the whole Palestinian problem, and to attempt to promote the Israeli resettlement schemes in the long run. One might, given the above discussions, assume that the measures taken by the Israeli authorities against the camps and its population in the GS would be likely to lessen the
Palestinian will to resist. However, the result seemed more likely to be to deepen hatred and stiffen resistance than to improve security.

4.2.5 Future of Gaza: A Fundamental Dilemma

Since the creation of the state of Israel, the fate of the GS has been an insoluble politico-military problem. The link between the future of the Strip and the future of the refugees has always been a controversial issue, especially in the post-1967 period. Various contradictory statements were given by Israeli officials with regard to staying or leaving the Strip. Their conflict on this issue was very much effected or related to the existence of a huge number of refugees, whose growth and militancy was perceived as a threat to Israel's security. The fundamental dilemma over the Strip is that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians knew what its future was going to be. The former, worked on the pragmatic basis of holding on to what they have and the latter resisted anything that smacked of turning that operation into a permanent Israeli presence.

In Gaza, as in Jerusalem, politics and planning has always gone hand in hand. The difference, of course, was that whereas Israel claims to have annexed East Jerusalem, Gaza remains a surviving pocket of Palestine, unclaimed by Egypt, or Jordan or even Israel itself.

In the early seventies, the Israelis believed that to improve their image in the Strip, economic integration and development programmes should be developed. They thought that the inhabitants in GS suffered so much from the Egyptian administration and they had ended the Egyptian curfew on them. In the early days of the aftermath of the 1967 war, Levi Eshkol, former Prime Minister of Israel, stated that Israel intends to keep the former part of Jerusalem and the GS (JP, 10 July, 1967). The Alon Programme also recommended the annexation of the GS to Israel; a similar stand was taken by Golda Meir and Galili, who also suggested the establishment of permanent settlements in the Strip and in Sinai (al-Quds, 4 February, 1969; Flapen, 1972:22; Karawan, 1973:13). The most important statement in the early years of occupation was by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, in an interview with the Israeli TV. He called for the annexation of the GS to Israel, and the absorption of the refugees there, to ensure stability and security in the Strip. He added that the GS's population preferred an Israeli rule. He went further to suggest that the government should take a decision to make the Strip's population Israeli citizens, in order to solve the problems they face, particularly unemployment (al-Quds, 24 January, 1971; Karawan, 1973:22).

Dayan's comments contradicted the general thesis at the time, which was that the Gaza refugees were a threat to Israel's security, and it was affirmed that the "thinning out" of the
Strip's population was implemented with security in mind. At a later stage, Dayan stated that the Israeli government should operate as a permanent government in the OTs. He indicated that the setting up of the Israeli housing projects for refugees in the GS was an example of a government which wanted to stay, and Israel needed to regard itself as the "permanent government" in the area. In a later visit to the Strip on 25 April, 1972, he confirmed his stand towards the Strip and added that GS's population should be treated as equal with Israeli citizens, despite them being considered foreigners (al-Quds, 26 April, 1972). He went further to say that what was going on in the camps (the road-widening operations) was not the solution to the refugee problem, but just an attempt to improve their living standards. His statements were criticized by government colleagues (al-Quds, 22 August, 1971; The Times, 3 September, 1971; The Economist, 11 September, 1971).

Was Dayan flying kites to test the wind when he proposed annexation of the Strip? Did he use the issue to learn about the reaction of his fellow Israelis with regard to the future of the GS? Or was his order to Sharon to carry out the operations in the camps, the first step to a solution of Gaza's problems? Gaza refugees certainly posed a big problem for the Israeli authorities. Dispersing them and setting up Israeli settlements was seen as a first step in a long-term solution to the Strip if it was to remain under Israeli control. Therefore, as discussed above, the claims of Dayan and other Israelis that the operations and the resettlement of refugees were carried out to improve the living standards of the refugees could be considered a complete fallacy.

The Israeli parties also differed with regard to the Strip's future. Members of the Labour Party in Israel voiced their position with regard to the future of the Strip and, although differences did appear in their statements, they agreed to keep the Strip. Some stated that the GS was part of the state of Israel and should remain under Israeli control, a position which met with the Likud's aims (Aviram, 1969:45). Other ministers in Mapam advocated first solving the problem of the refugees of GS before deciding on its political future (Karawan, 1973:38 & 40). Still other ministers in the Mifdal and Gahal stated that the WB and the GS and the Golan Heights have to be annexed to Israel, and Israeli law be implemented there (al-Quds, 6 August, 1971; 28 March, 1972; Flapen, 1972:22; Karawan, 1973:43 & 49). The same stand was taken by the Israeli expansionists, who wanted the GS for themselves but were worried because the refugees were being "spread out" and encouraged to take root (The Observer, 1 August, 1971).

A shift in the Israeli parties' position towards the GS began to appear after the eruption of the Intifada, their statements reflecting the confusion and the inconsistency they were in.
Facing the turbulent GS during the Intifada, the Doves and the Hawks in Israel have considered a solution to the problems which Gaza presents. A call has been around since late December 1990 that "Gaza comes first," as suggested by Knesset member Yussi Belin from the Labour Party, and Professor Yaer Hirshfield, from Haifa University, and initially rejected by both the Labour Party and the Likud Party (Israel Yearbook, 1990:256-7). Beilin suggested that a Palestinian demilitarised state should be established in GS with complete sovereignty. He suggested that if the Palestinians accepted this offer they would receive international aid to improve the Strip's economic situation and the resettlement of refugees. This state could be used later to carry out the rest of the peace negotiations (al-Quds, 3 & 15 January, 1991).

Explaining the "Gaza-first" solution, Beilin said: "Israel has no historical attachment to the GS and achieves no security gains by retaining it and its 700,000 Palestinian inhabitants....The Palestinians, in turn, would realize their right to self-determination in Gaza and acquire an immanent interest in achieving peace with the Arab countries" (Israel Yearbook, 1990:256). Withdrawal from the GS was also proposed later by the Shinui and Ratz movements, as a way of maintaining Israel's security (al-Quds, 3 July 1991).

Belin's call corresponded with a recent statement by Rabin and other ministers in the Labour Party in 1993. Rabin stated his wishes "that GS will disappear in the sea," because no one is willing to take it, which reflected the dilemma which the Israelis were in over the Strip. They believed an urgent political solution - through withdrawal - should be found for the Strip, ending a source of trouble to the authorities and for the safety of Israeli soldiers. This position was also agreed upon by the Likud members, especially following the escalation of resistance during the Intifada (al-Quds al-Arabi, 14 September, 1991; Ha'aretz, 30 March, 1993).

Likud's agreement to withdrawal from the Strip, after initially rejecting it, could be seen as one contradiction of its ideology which calls for establishing "Eretz Israel." The shift in the Likud's position was even voiced earlier - in the second year of the Intifada. Dan Meridor, a Likud Knesset member, said that Israel has made a big mistake by occupying the GS, which Egypt and Jordan refused to take (al-Quds, 28 July, 1988).

The dilemma which the Israeli leaders were in over the future of the Strip reflected itself in their statements. During a visit to the Strip Moshe Arenz, former Defence Minister, stated that the GS and Israel would form an all-inclusive economic entity, whatever the future political solution would be (al-Quds al-Arabi, 16 January, 1992). Foreign Minister Shimon Peres also suggested recently that the implementation of autonomy in the GS first, - a similar call to that of Rabin on 23 May, 1993 -, would serve as an example, after reaching a formulation with
the Palestinians (*al-Quds al-Arabi*, 8 June, 1993). Whereas, in December 1992 Rabin said that Israel would not withdraw from the Strip, for fear that the Palestinians would kill themselves (*al-Quds al-Arabi*, 15 December, 1992). The irony, is of course, that Rabin's fears have no grounds when daily killings in the Strip are undertaken by the Israeli soldiers through a systematic design.

The paradoxical approach adopted by the Israelis towards the future of the Strip raises the question as to whether these statements reflect the real stand of the Israeli government in power then and today? Or are they just used for internal consumption and to meet partisan interests, regardless of the wishes of the Palestinians and the efforts which should be made towards a peaceful settlement?

**4.2.5.1 Palestinians Stand Toward the Strip's Future**

For the Palestinians, the status of the Strip as part of the OTs is of the same importance as the other occupied lands. It cannot be separated from the WB. As Faisal Husseini and Abdel-Shafi negotiated in the peace process in 1993, GS has to be part of a comprehensive agreement with Israel (*al-Quds al-Arabi*, 18 June, 1993). This same stand was also voiced with regard to Beilin's Gaza-first solution (*Israel Yearbook*, 1990:257).

Palestinian attitudes towards the Strip and its future have been consistent. This was obvious in the Gazans' reaction to the authorities' early statements to annex the Strip; especially after the opening of the borders between Israel and the GS. For example, al-Shawwa - Mayor of Gaza in 1972 -, said that the only option for us is to appeal to the UN to help us, and for the GS to be placed under international supervision until resolution 242 is implemented and Israeli withdrawal from the OTs is undertaken, to allow the Palestinians the right to self-determination (*al-Quds*, 21 & 27 April, 1972; *Ma'ariv*, 21 April, 1972).

Further condemnation by the Gaza Municipality was voiced, in response to the decision of the Foreign and Security Committee of the Knesset to annex the Strip. Cables were sent to the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, Defence Minister and Military Governor of Gaza, and a copy was sent to the UN General Secretary (*al-Quds*, 20 February, 1977). Moreover, the conclusion reached by the delegation of the NLG in its report was that "Israel’s objective of road widening was not to alleviate overcrowded conditions in the camps, nor to facilitate access and lighting for security patrols, but the objective is greater: to lay the foundation for its annexation by and incorporation into Israel" (*NLG Report*, 1978:24).

The agreement between Israel and the PLO of 13 September 1993 will give the Strip and the town of Jericho a degree of autonomy. This is the first step towards reaching a final
settlement for the Palestine-Israeli conflict in a five-year interim period. This thesis will not
deal in detail with the agreement of 1993, but will refer to some of the possibilities it raises for
refugees, in the concluding Chapter.

The Israeli explanation of withdrawal from the Strip is given by Peres. Talking to a
Jewish audience in "Park East" Synagogue in Manhattan New York, on 27 September 1993,
he said: "What is there in Gaza? Poverty, lack of resources, 35,000 births per year and the
refugee camps, we have nothing to look after in Gaza; who says that Gaza is for us, he/she is
not a Jew (al-Quds al-Arabi, 28 September, 1993). It is of importance to consider Peres's
words in the light of the above debate about annexing the Strip and the big change in the Israeli
policy on withdrawing from the Strip. It is a policy shift promoted by the militancy and the
high birth rate of its refugees, and the persistent resistance to occupation and the tensions from
decades of under-development.

4.3 THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS FOR RESEITLING REFUGEES 1967 –

This section discusses the various suggestions and official proposals given by Israeli
officials concerning resettlement of the WBGS's refugees since 1967. Their propositions and
debates highlighted the conflict among the various Israeli parties, as was the case in the pre-
1967 war. As emigration of refugees from the OTs did not meet the wishes of the Israeli
authorities, new suggestions were made, which it is important to tackle here. They reflect a
continuity of policy, aimed at breaking the concentration of refugee camps and at dispersing
refugees in an attempt to break their collective identity and militancy.

In the aftermath of the 1967 war, the question of the PRs in the OTs imposed itself
enormously on Israel and the state was compelled to find a solution to the refugees under its
control. This section tackles the positions of the main Israeli political parties with regard to
refugees and propositions for their resettlement. Their solutions ranged from a complete transfer
of refugees to other places, to resettling them where they live and to find a just solution to the
problem. The importance of these suggestions is that they enable us to trace the different fault
lines which distinguish Israeli thinking with regard to the refugees "problem" and highlight links
of continuity and discontinuity in the Israeli state's relationship with PRs. They also highlight
the struggle between Israeli forces and PRs and emphasize that the Israeli state policies and
agendas were not set out in a vacuum.

In the first days after the end of June 1967 war, the refugee question was discussed at
Prime Ministerial level in Israel. Allon's proposal of July 1967 was the first to suggest a

Although the idea of transferring a large number of the GS’s population was not new, it came under the spotlight as the struggle between the resistance movement and the military authorities reached its peak, specifically in the Strip at in the early 1970’s. The idea was expressed by Knesset members in debates on the refugee issue, and appeared in the form of several projects suggested by Israeli officials.

4.3.1 The Early Debates

During the early years of occupation, the first stage of debates on the PRs began in the Knesset. These debates highlighted the conflict among the various Israeli parties, as was the case in the pre-1967 period. Four schools of thought appeared with regard to refugees in the territories. Opposition to any form of resettlement; the transfer and resettlement of GS refugees in the GS and WB villages and towns; improving the refugees’ conditions where they lived and allowing their integration to the general life of the territories; and, finally, adherence to UN resolutions. The first three views were all offered without the recognition of the PRs the Right to Return.

The first school included Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (who was the leading figure in opposing resettlement) and Rafi Party members, who were against the resettlement of refugees within the borders of the territories, and the denial of Israel’s full responsibility for the problem. Voluntary emigration was seen by Eshkol as an exit to the problem; whereas Rafi argued that it would be an exchange of population between Arab Jews who immigrated to Israel and Arab refugees who left Palestine (Ha’aretz, 13 November, 1992; Karawan, 1973:21).

Though a large number of Palestinians emigrated from the territories during and in the aftermath of the 1967 war, Eshkol’s assumptions remained unreliable, since refugees in GS remain a majority. Hesitancy towards resettlement was also voiced by Mapai for security reasons, and it advocated international co-operation to solve the problem (Karawan, 1973:23).

In the second school, a small group in the Mirach advocated the idea of transferring all the refugees and resettling them in the WB. This idea was supported by Ranan Weitz, the head of the Settlement section in the Jewish Agency, who was famous for his project of resettling refugees in al- Arish (Karawan, 1973:21).

Other parties in the Knesset - Liberals; Ha’Olam Hazeh; Free Center; and Mafdal -, advocated the resettlement of refugees in towns and villages of the territories and compensation for those who wanted to leave, so as to eliminate the phenomena of the refugee camps.
Mafdal and the Free Centre saw the payment of compensation as a parallel to resettlement of refugees, - mainly GS refugees which compromised one-third of the population. They saw in this policy a method to facilitate control over the territories (Karawan, 1973: 43). The Platform Committee of the National Religious Party proposed and advocated the transfer of PRs from GS to Arab countries and called for their resettlement in "Judea and Samaria" and in the Arab countries. Thus they approved a clause that the responsibility for the creation and non-solution of the refugee problem lies with the Arab countries (JP,6 December, 1987). Furthermore, Mapam’s Peace Proposal of 11 December, 1969 and August 1972 called for the integration of refugees in the general life of the territories, through the construction of housing projects, the adoption of a new socio-economic policy to improve living conditions, and provision of employment in agricultural, industrial and public services sectors (Younis, 1979:111; al-Hur and al-Mousa, 1983:110). Mapam’s idea was supported strongly by the Prime Minister Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, who were against the return of refugees to Palestine proper (Karawan, 1973:15 & 23). The Mirach (a coalition of the Labour Party formed in January 1968, itself an amalgamation of the Mapai, Ahudat Havoda, Rafi and Mapam parties in 1969) were divided over how to deal with the refugee problem. The Mapam recommendation was considered, and approval given to a "main project" prepared in 1968 and in 1969 by a social-economic planning team consisting of engineers, sociologists, and experts on water and electricity. The project involved the liquidation of the biggest camps in the Strip, starting with Rafah camp, which had a population of 40,000 people. The plan suggested the evacuation of 2,400 of the 6,000 families which lived in the camp. The team suggested further offering economic incentives to the camp residents, for example, housing at a symbolic price in urban regions and the improvement of public services in the new locations. With regard to the provision of incentives, the team’s programme explained that,

The incentives are meant to hasten the process of evacuating the camps as part of the general change. Caution must be observed to prevent the impression among the refugees that the evacuation policy will liquidate their status as refugees or undermine its two basic principles - the rights to the return of property and to draw food rations and other UNRWA amenities. The supply of housing or any other assistance was not to be linked to the matter of compensation for property in Israel or with giving up the refugee ration-card (Zakin, 1972:62 & 66).

Officials in the military government in the territories advocated resettlement of refugees in the territories. Belonging to the third school, Alexander Aviram, - the man responsible for the Civil Administration at the beginning of the occupation -, suggested that the government could make an experiment by issuing an international tender to build housing - in the first stage
in the GS. The Israeli government could pay its share from the absentee property funds and there would be an appeal to the nations of the world to contribute for this purpose. Aviram suggested "that the Israeli Government or the Zionist movement (I think Dr. Goldmann would agree) could appeal to world Jewry to help build peace by contributing for this purpose in order to remove the shame with which the Arab countries have been making capital for 20 years" (Aviram, 1969:46).

The Ha"Olem Hazeh, Rakah (the Israeli Communist Party) and Matzpen (the Israeli Socialist organization) represented the fourth school of thought. Supporting UN resolution 194 (III), payment of compensation or return was seen as the way towards solving the refugee problem. Uri Avniri, the voice of the Ha'Olem Hazeh movement proposed in March 1968 that the solution should be coordination between the Palestinian people and the Israeli people after ending the situation of war between Israel and the Palestinian republic that would be established. Israel would not be responsible to resettle refugees who chose to return - not necessarily to their former homes - with international funds (Karawan, 1973:57).

Rakah emphasised that no just peace would prevail in the area and for the people of Israel, without recognizing the national rights for the Palestinian people alongside the national rights of Israelis (Younis, 1979:111-113; al-Hur and al-Mousa, 1983:160; Karawan, 1973:58). Matspen, who consider Israel a colonial regime and have been condemning the authorities' measures in the territories argued that the non-Zionist Israeli state should compensate those who wanted to return and those who did not, through a willingness to withdraw from some parts of the territories where the Palestinians could have their own independent state if they wished (Karawan, 1973:60).

4.3.2 The Crystallization of Plans

Initial debates were distinguished by confusion over the issue of PRs. The period between 1968 and 1976, a second stage in the process, witnessed intensive discussions of the refugee issue and proposals were crystallized, submitted and named after those who suggested them. These proposals are discussed below, with the exception of the Ben Porath Plan which brought a great internal and external outcry, and appear to converge on a number of points. Whereas Israel pre 1967 was talking about refugees outside its borders and control, in the post 1967s it was forced to deal with those within its borders. In some proposals by Israeli officials one can detect a slight change over where to resettle refugees and how.

Weitz, Dayan, Galili and Allon agreed to reduce the density of the camp population in the GS by resettling them in the WB and al-Arish, in housing projects that would be set up for
that purpose after the dismantling of the camps. As Allon put it, a model village was to be constructed in order to prove to the world Israel's good intentions (Younis, 1979:115-116; al-Qabas, 13 November, 1988). They believed that the refugee problem would be solved only through the rehabilitation of the refugees and not by giving them their legitimate rights as Anwar Sadat declared, which implied the return to Ramlah and Yaffo (al-Quds, 19 March, 1971).

Weitz even suggested how the rehabilitated Palestinians were to be employed; 10% in agriculture and the rest in new industrial enterprises and public services. Similar calls were made by Peres in 1970, when he recommended that centres of trade and industry be established near the new locations to enable refugees to earn a steady living, and raise their standards of hygiene, welfare and education (Zakin, 1972:64). Weitz further recommended payment of compensation to refugees in need, to enable them to buy houses in the housing projects. He believed that through resettlement of refugees the gap in living conditions between the refugees and non-refugees might be reduced (al-Hur and al-Mousa, 1983:158). However, this project was rejected by the government at the end of 1969 (al-Qabas, 13 November, 1988; Palestine Affairs, September (1971):213). Weitz's eccentric idea appeared in his second proposal for a peace settlement of December 1972, when he retreated from the idea of resettling refugees at al-Arish and instead advocated their resettlement in Rafah, because he viewed the refugees as a "different" ethnic group than their Arab brethren (Karawan, 1973:31).

The Galilee Document, entitled "Rehabilitation of Refugees and development in the WBGS", suggested the allocation of funds for a four-year plan to rehabilitate refugees and for development. The foundations of this plan were changes in the living conditions of the refugees (by setting up new housing projects besides their camps, and the renovation of camps), plus the integration of refugees within the nearby towns, to be under municipalities' responsibility (Davar, 16 August, 1973; Karawan, 1973:33).

The Eban and Peres proposals coincided with regard to seeing a solution to the refugee problem in the context of a comprehensive peace or regional settlement. Earlier in 1969 both doubted the possibility of relocating refugees to a new life, since circumstances and facilities for such projects were lacking in Israel which was in a state of war (Younis, 1979:113; Karawan, 1973:26). Nonetheless, Eban called for the convention of an international conference, in the presence of the Middle Eastern countries, of states that contribute to the UNRWA and the specialized committees at the UN. Both Eban and Peres agreed upon the idea of integrating refugees living outside the OTs in the productive cycle of the societies they live in (Salman, 1975:161; al-Hur and al-Mousa, 1983:111; Younis, 1979:113).

Allon's comprehensive and thorough proposal of 1972 argued that a solution to the
refugee "problem" could be achieved in the framework of autonomy rule for the Palestinians in the territories. He affirmed that the seeds of the Palestinian entity had been rooted since the 1967 war and a political phenomenon named Palestine would soon emerge on the world map. However, the government did not agree (Karawan, 1973:29). Israel Galili’s committee called for a partial solution to the refugee problem, until peace treaties were reached with the Arab countries (al-Quds, 9 August, 1971).

Outstanding public Israeli figures also voiced their views with regard to resettlement of refugees. The president of the Bank of Israel called upon the Israeli government to allocate funds for the rehabilitation of PRs within the context of a peace treaty. He said that this could be carried out and funded with the establishment of an international fund with Israel as a contributor (al-Quds, 2 December, 1971). The suggestion of tendering for housing, discussed earlier, was made by Alexander Aviram, the man responsible for Civil Administration at the beginning of the occupation (Aviram, 1969:46).

The first practical action began in February 1970, adopting some of the proposals of the social-economic planning team set out in 1968 and 1969. Peres was vested with responsibility for the rehabilitation of the refugees outside the camps (Zakin, 1972:64) and set up a secret trust fund (Trust Fund for the Economic Development and Rehabilitation of Refugees) in May 1970 for this purpose. Contributions from philanthropists abroad, both Zionists and non-Jewish, reached IL 7 million in the first half of 1972 (Zakin, 1972:64-5). The trust was secret because, as Peres told The Observer's correspondent, "the chance of success is in inverse proportion to the amount of publicity." Peres's hoped that, through resettlement of Gaza refugees, the military government could replace UNRWA's works (JP, 22 September, 1971). The trust was used to improve the infrastructure of camps - IL 522,000 being allocated for the improvement of four Gaza camps; IL 220,000 for improvements in five refugee camps on the WB; IL 300,000 for improvement of the Shifa Hospital in the GS; and IL 22,500 for the electricity network in Jenin. The funds were spent without revealing the ultimate political goal, of resettlement (The Observer, 1 August, 1971; Zakin, 1972:64-5).

4.3.3 Ben Porath Plan: A Multiplicity of Intentions

The largest plan, which provoked a lot of protest by the refugees and those in other circles, was unveiled by Minister Ben Porath on November 20, 1983. It covered all refugees and seven years after the 1976 Weitz proposal. Ben Porath chaired a committee on refugee resettlement while serving a minister without portfolio in the Begin government in the 1970s. He argued against the official UN position that a just solution to the refugees required their
repatriation or, at least, their compensation for lost property.

His programme was costed at $1.5 million and involved rehousing in the society at large 30,000 refugee families (about 250,000 people) over a five-year period. Refugee status was to cease for those who fled from their homes as a result of the Arab-Israeli wars. The Ben Porath plan suggested the dismantling of the camps in the WBGS and the resettling of their inhabitants, on a voluntary basis, in better housing in the towns and cities.

Porath described the Israeli intention to erase the camps as humanitarian and voluntary and without political implications. "The main motif of the plan is that an exchange of population has occurred in the Middle East." He was precise in his indication that this governmental proposal would not prejudice any future Arab-Israeli political negotiations. He stated in a press conference that resettlement of GS refugees should be an example/model to resettle other refugees in other locations (al-Hourriah, October (1985):17; JP, 21 November, 1983). In answer to a question on the timing of the plan's announcement, he said: "this is connected with the situation which the PLO is passing through - after the 1982 invasion of Lebanon" (al-Talia'h, 24 November, 1983). He failed to indicate how his scheme could be implemented, except that American aid was to finance the programme, fuelling Palestinian suspicion that it was only the prelude to expulsion of a substantial percentage of the refugee population. However, when efforts to raise American funds failed, the plan died as official policy (Viorst, 1989:109-110).

Though Ben Porath plan was not disclosed fully by the government, Israeli officials revealed the proposed places for resettlement of refugees. The Jordan valley (Fasayel area) was given a priority; and Qalandia and Shufa'at camps in Jerusalem were suggested as the first for clearing (al-Awdeh, December (1983):35; al-Hourriah, October (1985):16). Jericho was suggested, where refugees could fill empty camps, the inhabitants having deserted during the 1967 war (al-Bayader al-Siyassi, November (1983):28). Ben Porath himself, at a press conference in West Jerusalem, was unclear as to whether the refugees would be resettled near their homes within the "Green Line." He said: "if we do so, then we will have to send the Jewish refugees who came from the Arab countries to their own homes" (al-Fajr English, 25 November, 983). The irony in Porath's answer, is that, despite its vagueness, it still implies denial of the right of the Palestinians to live where they want on their own land, while new Jewish settlers in the territories are given priority to live wherever they want.
4.3.4 Reactions To Ben Porath Plan

4.3.4.1 Palestinian Refugees' Reaction

The refugees in the OTs unequivocally rejected the idea of Ben Porath plan. The Ben Porath plan has been criticized as an attempt to create Bantustans along the South African model for the Palestinians. Collectively and individually, protests by the refugees was stronger than ever before. On the collective level, coordination committees were formed from representatives of the 20 camps in the WB to frustrate the implementation of the plan, and raise awareness among the camp population about Israeli plans to resettle refugees (al-Awdeh, November (1983):20; Locke and Stewart, 1985:62).

In a press conference in West Jerusalem at Beit Agaron on 21 November 1983, organized by the Israeli Committee in Solidarity with Birzeit University, residents from Dheisheh camp (near Bethlehem) challenged the Israeli press attending the conference to go and ask the refugees their opinion regarding the resettlement plan. Dheisheh camp residents were the most active against the plan; since their camp was nominated as the first to be dismantled. In this conference, the chairman of the Social Youth Centre in Dheisheh camp said, "we in Dheisheh camp reject Ben Porath's settlement plan because we do not want to improve our living conditions but rather look for a historical political solution based on UN resolutions;" other residents of the camp asserted that harassment had increased since the Ben Porath plan was presented (al-Quds; al-Fajr; 22 November, 1983).

Furthermore, several communiques were issued by representatives of PRs on the WB dealing with this issue. On 21 November, 1983 residents of Dheisheh camp issued a statement rejecting the plan, and calling upon all parties, institutions and progressive individuals both inside and abroad to work for a speedy end to the policy of resettlement and repression (al-Awdah, November (1983):3). Individual refugee protest and rejection of the plan was as intensive as the collective voice. Their stand stemmed from the strong belief that a solution to their problem should take place in the framework of a comprehensive peace, with no separation between them. Further to that, some accepted resettlement, but, only in a Palestinian state. In the words of a Gazan refugee: "The Israelis aim to create new facts. By destroying the camps, they hope to destroy our yearning to return to Palestine and our status as refugees" (MEI, January (1984):11; al-Awdah, November (1983):38). In protesting at Ben-Porath's plan the PRs saw a link and connection in the timing between his proposal and the call by the Israeli Settlements Council in the OTs, to impose "order" on the WB camps, through the demolition of houses located on the main roads so as to facilitate the movement of settlers and Israeli army
personnel. The refugees attributed this call to the escalating Palestinian resistance, particularly among camp residents (al-Talia'h, 24 November, 1983; al-Awdah, November (1983): 37). The Arab states, in reaction to Ben Porath plan, persuaded the UN General Assembly in 1983 to denounce the Israeli idea as "a violation of (the refugees') inalienable right of return" (Viorst, 1989: 110).

Shamir's initiative of May 14, 1989 formed the next official stand towards a solution to the refugee question after Ben Porath's proposal. The initiative was launched almost six months after Arafat recognized Israel's existence and renounced terrorism, encouraged by the American administration who saw in it possibilities for moving the peace process forward. Article 4 (c) of the initiative reads:

Israel calls for an international endeavor to resolve the problem of the residents of the Arab refugee camps in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district in order to improve their living conditions and to rehabilitate them. Israel is prepared to be a partner in this endeavor (New Outlook, August (1989): 37).

From the Palestinian point of view, the initiative was perceived as one of addressing the Palestinians, "not as a people, but as a hindrance in what is called Judea and Samaria, and it overlooked the two-thirds of our people who are in exile ", as put by Faisal Husseini in an interview with New Outlook (New Outlook, August (1989): 16). The focus on rehabilitating refugees in the territories only implies a denial of their right of return together with those who live outside Palestine, as Resolution 194 (III) entails.

4.3.4.2 Alternative Israeli Reaction

The Israeli progressive forces' position towards the plan was voiced in the Beit Agoron conference by representatives of the Solidarity Committee with Birzeit University. Their argument was that the refugee problem cannot be reduced to the living conditions of refugees only; the Palestinian problem is not merely a refugee problem, and the refugees should remain in their camps until a comprehensive settlement for the whole Palestine-Israeli conflict is found (al-Quds, 25 November, 1983).

Another critical Israeli voice came from Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem and a well known writer on the O.T's. He called the plan "a storm in a tea cup", adding "the fate of the plan will be similar to the fate of at least 10 other supposed plans aimed at "improving" the conditions of the Palestinian refugee camps." He continued to say that, if it is aimed to create new facts, as the 1971 camp operations in GS, then it is a bad plan (al-Fajr, 25 November, 1983).
4.3.4.3 The Americans: Reaction or Collusion

The American comment on Ben Porath plan was given by John Hewes, the spokesman for the State Department. He stated that the Reagan administration objected to any Israeli plan to relocate refugees unwillingly from their camps in the WB. Hewes abandoned the idea of absorbing ten of thousands of PRs in the US, as discussed at State Department level, in early July 1983. He added that, if Israel submits this plan to Washington, the US position will stem from the refugees' position themselves; and UNRWA's position, being responsible for refugee affairs. He emphasized that refugee participation in the Ben Porath plan has to be voluntary not enforced, and in coordination with UNRWA (al-Quds, 15 August, & 24 November, 1983).

This American position is completely different to its general position on the refugee question pre-and post-1967, when it had advocated resettlement of PRs in the Arab countries. It also contradicted a secret American Project discussed and promoted in Richard Murphy's files, which became available to some European and Arab sources. Under the pretext of "improving quality of life" in the OTs, Murphy revealed that the American administration insisted on resettlement of refugees as the only solution to the refugee problem. Thus, recommending the liquidation of the refugee camps in the OTs, and regular Israeli attacks on the refugee camps in Lebanon, to force the Palestinians there to emigrate. In fact, since 1982 the US has opened its doors to PRs in Lebanon, as have Canada and Australia (al-Mithaq, 3 April, 1986). Claude Julian, in his book America's Empire, described Murphy as a counterfeit of the "merchant of Venice." In each trip to the Arab capitals, he tried to sell one basic purchase - a secret American plan aimed at resettlement of PRs where they live, after the dismantling of the camps, and by integrating refugees with the indigenous population (al-Mithaq, 3 April, 1986).

The question to be raised is, could Ben Porath's plan be seen as part of the "American Orchestra" which aims at systematic liquidation of the refugees and their camps? And, in that case, how truthful was the American reaction to the Ben Porath plan? Israeli-American coordination could be further seen within the framework of George Shultz's proposal, when he was the American Secretary of State, for what he called the "quality of life" (Viorst, 1989:111). In 1986, a "new policy" by the Israeli authorities to "improve the quality of life" in the territories began to see the light. This was seen via the appointing of new Palestinian mayors in the municipalities to replace Israeli generals. Moreover, the American-Israeli coordinated project, which was presented under economic cover, found a third partner. Jordan's Five-Year Plan for Development in the East and WB of October 1986, was perceived in association with the American-Israeli programme. This Jordanian plan for the two Banks was given out despite the disintegration of political coordination between the PLO and Jordan on
The American-Israeli-Jordanian coordination for a new "development" policy in the territories was seen by the PLO as reinforcing Israeli occupation on Palestinian land. For the PLO, such a coordination could serve the Israelis in future peace negotiations. The Israeli-Jordanian coordination aimed at curtailing PLO power in the territories, by establishing an alternative leadership. "The Village Leagues" were the embodiment of this coordination; formed from former Jordanian officials living in the WB. These Leagues were short-lived, due to the massive support of the WB population for the PLO (Shahin, 1986:142-3; Peretz, 1986:98-100). 10

Having discussed all this, it is important for us to note that the Israeli authorities stand and dilemma over the PRs issue post-1967 was, and still is, a replica of its position in the pre-1967 era, discussed in the previous Chapter. Analysis has enabled us to see the link and continuity in Israeli policy and plans towards refugees. These reflect denial rather than recognition of political rights, and thus a continuity in their dispersal strategy. This position is further linked to the PRs natural increase and militancy, especially in the GS, where resistance to occupation has been of unique nature, as has the Israeli response to it.
NOTES:

1. Similar descriptions were given by Sir Anthony Parsons in a conference in Oxford in 1991.

2. Jordan’s aim to prevent emigration did not meet with what was reported by the NYT correspondent, who wrote that barring their admission was on the "ground that it relieves Israel of a burden and creates added problems for the strained Jordanian economy (NYT, 31 July, 1968; 27 September, 1968).

3. The Kibya massacre resulted in the killing of fifty-three persons who were in no way directly responsible either for Jordan’s policy or the acts of the infiltrators. The operation was immediately denounced by Britain and the United States, and the Security Council voted Israel as an aggressor. The Kibya incident opened a new page in Arab-Israeli relations; with the Jordanians - and the entire Arab world - crying for revenge.

4. For more details on the events of "Black September", see: Brand, 1988:171.

5. In GS, and before Sharon carried out the operations in the camps, the authorities established two commands: one to deal with security and the other with civil affairs. For details, see: Palestine Affairs, July(1971):175.

6. The methods used were of a coercive nature to force owners "concede" their land. For example, "people who worked as teachers or in other government service jobs are fired because they refused to sell their land...etc." (NLG Report, 1978: p.25).

7. The term Miri refers to the rural land in the Ottoman empire which was not "owned" in the Western sense of the term but was held hereditarily on a usufruct basis. The term Miri has been in use since then. For more details on the land-tenure questions see: Doreen Warriner, "Land tenure problems in the Fertile Crescent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries," in the The economic history of the Middle East, 1800-1914: A book of readings, Charles Issawi (ed.). Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966 : 71-78.

8. During the period from 1968 to 1973, the following proposals were submitted by Israeli officials towards solving the refugee problem, mainly in the Gaza Strip. Ra’anan Weitz proposals of 1967, 1969 and 1976; Abba Eban proposal of 8 October, 1968 before the General Assembly; Yigal Allon proposals of 1968 and 1972; Shimon Peres proposal of 1969; Israel Galili proposal of 1971 and 1973; Moshe Daya proposal of 1971; Ben Porath proposal of November 1983; Shamir’s Initiative of May 1989.

9. Ra’anan Weitz was the head of the settlement’s section in the Jewish Agency, 1963-1984, who always advocated P.Rs resettlement. His role continued in the post-1967 period.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE RESETTLEMENT PROCESS: POLICY AND PROCEDURES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter provides a detailed analysis of the issue of resettlement in GS. It relies on data obtained from the sample survey, in addition to some statistics from UNRWA regarding the camp shelters.

The first section of the Chapter tackles the aims of the authorities in carrying out resettlement schemes, and awareness of these aims by the refugees. It is revealed that the refugees have a very clear idea of Israeli aims and policies, regardless of their educational attainment.

This Chapter offers details of the criteria for relocation. These are: a down-payment; residency in a refugee camp; the demolition of camp shelter; and the signing of a contract. It is argued that the demolition of camp shelters is a particularly serious precondition for relocation when perceived in the wider context of the socioeconomic conditions of refugees. The refugees' lack of means enhances their residential stability or immobility, compared with other sectors of the Palestinian society.

A critical perspective is brought to bear on the Israeli claim that the resettling of GS refugees aims to improve their housing conditions. This is difficult to sustain. The demolition of camp shelters aggravates the housing crisis in the camps, instead of alleviating the problem. Rather than being carried out in order to ease overcrowding, as the Israelis claim, the demolition of camp shelters is undertaken for reasons of security and in order to suppress Palestinian resistance.

The final section of the chapter draws on field data to examine the reasons behind removals from the SC to the housing project. It is demonstrated that relocation was not undertaken by the refugees as a gesture of support for the Israeli schemes, but to alleviate overcrowding in their camp shelters, made more acute by the absence of new construction by UNRWA and the building restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities on camp residents.

Furthermore, an important feature of the findings from the two case study area is that it illuminates an important political aspect with regard to the reason for accepting to move out from the camp, which can be understood in the context of reinforcing a national goal by staying on the Palestinian soil and the enhancement of their sumud (steadfastness) as a collectivity.


5.2 AIMS OF RESETTLEMENT

A pattern can be discerned in the Israeli authorities' explanations of the aims behind the crackdown on the camps in 1971 and the establishment of the housing projects in the GS, characterized by giving conflicting statements when both issues were posed. The humanitarian claims made by the Israeli authorities did not convince the refugees, whose understanding of the aims of resettlement is discussed below.

5.2.1 Refugees' Awareness of Aims

The proper context for a better understanding of the attitudes of the refugees towards the aims of resettlement is the relationship between refugees and the Israeli authorities. Since 1967, this relationship has been one of enmity rather than amity. For GS refugees this enmity dates to the first Israeli occupation of 1956/1957. The Israeli efforts to win "the heart and mind" of GS refugees by setting up the housing projects, following the crackdown on the camps in 1971, did not improve its image among refugees.

Refugee awareness as to the real motives behind resettlement are shown in Table 5.1. The majority of refugees, 72.5% in the SC and 74.4% in the SR project, consider the aim of resettlement to be political. This seems to be because respondents understood the Israeli policy to be the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, and the elimination of the term refugee and his/her status, by dismantling the camps. Other respondents, in informal discussions, mentioned that the authorities want to dismantle the SC, to make way for their "Riviera" complex of hotels and restaurants. Some refugees in the SR project confided to the author that the publicity element has a role, the authorities using the projects as a model to show the foreign visitors their good intentions in trying to solve the refugee problem through providing more humane housing conditions. The element of publicity was also emphasized by Dr. Haider abdel-Shafi, serving Israel in improving its image vis-a-vis the issue of PRs (Interview, 28/7/1991).
TABLE 5.1 Refugees Attitudes on the Aims of Resettlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>SC Frequency</th>
<th>SR Frequency</th>
<th>SC Percent</th>
<th>SR Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economical</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>142</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The 1991 Sample Survey*

The awareness of the political motivation of Israeli policy was revealed cross-sectionally among the refugees, in both locations and irrespective of their educational status, even being noticeable among the illiterate respondents (see Table 5.2).

TABLE 5.2 Aims of Resettlement by Level of Education in both Locations (in numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech. College</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The 1991 sample survey*

This awareness could be attributed to three factors: firstly, the politicized atmosphere in the GS and its effect on the population, mainly in refugee communities. These communities are part of the broader Palestinian society, in which the politicization process is as old as political Zionism. That was observed by the Shaw Commission of Inquiry which came to Palestine after the 1929 rebellion. It reported that the Arab *Fellaheen* (peasantry), despite a high rate of illiteracy, were "highly conscious politically and, in fact, were more politically-minded than many Europeans" (al-Kayyali,1970:254). The second factor promoting an understanding of the political nature of resettlement was the role played by the Youth Clubs and Committees in the camps in stirring the national consciousness and enlightening the refugees about the resettlement schemes, and later about the Ben-Porath project; Thirdly, the *Intifada* enhanced the political consciousness of the Palestinians in the OTs, taking a non-class character, being mainly due to the escalation of the "iron fist" policy by the authorities against the population. (See Chapter 8).

Moreover, the PLO call at the beginning of the housing projects in the early seventies
might also be a factor in the rejection of resettlement. It forbade the refugees to accept the offer and move out, and for more than a year no families did (Viorst, 1989:110).

It could be argued that the goal of providing alternative housing may be legitimate, given the poor conditions in the camps; the Israelis apparently have a further motive in pursuing that policy. It is linked to the attempts to separate camp people from their community and from their refugee status.

5.2.2 Conflicting Israeli Aims

Israelis claimed that humanitarian motives were behind the setting up of the housing projects. Major Amir Cheshin, former information officer for the Israeli military command in charge of the GS, told a NYT correspondent "that the idea behind the projects is less security and more humanitarian" (NYT, 24 November, 1976). The same was said by Brig. Gen. Freddi Zak, the Deputy Coordinator for the OTs. He argued in a seminar on the government housing projects on 10 July 1989, that they are very important humanitarian schemes which offer the refugees the chance to improve their standard of living by moving away from the miserable conditions of the camps (UNRWA Records, PIO, 19 July 1989).

In contrast to these views, a Defence Ministry official, when questioned about the demolition of camp shelter, as a pre-condition to moving to the housing project, said: "Of course we demolish them. The whole point of the projects is to get rid of the refugee camps" (JP, 19 October, 1988). Additionally, we might consider the Minister of Defence report on the achievement gained: "As the refugee changes his status, he becomes a local and urban resident, with equal rights" (Ministry of Defence, 1983:57). Therefore, the elimination of the camps and the refugee status could be seen as twin political motives behind refugee resettlement schemes.

In the early stage of the projects, Dayan, the then Defence Minister, explained, "The purpose of the project is to improve the standard of living...we have no designs on their political status as refugees. But in the meantime, they will live a better life." Whereas, in an earlier statement, he said, that the result of such policy is to make GS refugees "refugees in name only" (NYT, 2 April, 1973).

5.3 THE EXTENT OF ISRAELI HOUSING PROJECTS IN THE GAZA STRIP

UNRWA reports were the only source on refugee resettlement in GS. This was because it was impossible to have access to information from the Rehabilitation of Refugees' Division in Gaza. The UNRWA records differentiate between two type of projects, even if they carry
the same name and are in the same location. The differentiation is based and related to the authorities policy with regard to the schemes, as mentioned below - the stage of offering houses, and the stage of offering plots of land. Regarding the first stage, the first project to be established was Canada Camp or project before 1973 (named after a multinational peacekeeping contingent stationed there in the 1960's). It is of importance to give some detail about this project since it is a unique case in the Strip. This project was left in Egypt after the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in 1982, as part of the original Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel.

In June 1989 there were 891 families (5370 persons) in 488 houses, in the Canada Project (UNRWA, 1989:1). They live divided by a high security fence in Rafah (town in GS). In June 1985, the Egyptian and the Israeli government negotiators agreed on the gradual return to the GS of the refugees stranded in the Canada camp. The Egyptian government apparently agreed to pay "compensation" to the refugees to the extent of US$ 8,000 per nuclear family; while the Israeli government would make available 500 plots of land in the Tel Sultan housing project in Rafah, for an estimated 750 families, and would also issue Israeli identification cards (UNRWA, PIO Records, 3 June 1985; The Middle East, 1988: 17).

The implementation of the return was delayed until June 1989 when the first group, comprising 20 families (105 persons) was allowed to return. Some technical points, which were agreed upon later between the Egyptians and Israelis, delayed the return. One of these was compelling, in that the Israelis made it a condition that "the 20 returning families have to sign undertakings to abide with the Israeli rules and regulations while the Egyptians said it should be the prevailing rules and regulations" (UNRWA, PIO Records, 5 June, 1989). Since June 1989, families have been returning from the Canada project in stages.

The delay was partially attributed also to the opposition raised by the Israeli settlers in the GS, who in 1986 voiced their protestations against the Egyptian-Israeli agreement; and later in 1989 camped on the allocated site for the returnees. Their opposition was revealed by Zvi Handel, chairman of the settlers council, when he said: "For the last seven years, the PLO has operated a branch office in the Egyptian Canada district, and they trained those Arabs due to come over here to be terrorists" (NYT, 8 December, 1989; al-Quds, 11 and 12 April, 1986).

The other projects established - of the first stage type - were as follows: 1) The Shuqairi project in Khan Yunis which commenced in March 1973; by June 1989 it had 135 families (848 persons) in 128 houses; 2) The Brazilian project in Rafah started in April 1973, in June 1989 it had 436 families (2820 persons) in 422 houses; 3) The SR project in Gaza town commenced in March 1974, it had 790 families (5029 persons) in 806 houses; 4) Al-Amal
The project in Khan Yunis commenced in May 1979, it had 802 families (4853 persons) in 842 houses. Houses in the first stage type project are of three categories: houses with 2 rooms, houses with 3 rooms and others with 4 rooms; houses also are of two, four or five storeys.

The second stage type where plots of land were offered started in September 1974 in Nasr Site in Gaza town. By June 1989, 36 houses were constructed on 36 plots of land, with 36 families (186 persons). The SR project, of July 1976, where 1000 plots were allocated, of which 126 were under construction in June 1989 was composed of 741 houses and 1186 families (7190 persons). Beit Lahia project in Jabalia, which commenced in October 1977, saw 700 plots allocated; by June 1989 it had 30 under construction, and consisted of 472 houses and 832 families (5280 persons). Tal Sultan project in Rafah started in April 1978, with 1600 plots of land allocated, 72 of which were under construction, and has 943 houses with 1041 families (6399 persons). Al-Amal project in Khan Yunis commenced in July 1979, 200 plots were allocated, 8 were still under construction, and had 184 houses with 343 families (2084 persons). Rafah Brazilian project, also commenced in July 1979, with 109 plots allocated, and consisted of 109 houses and 161 families (1038 persons). The last of the projects set up was Nazleh Site in Gaza town in April 1981, where 180 plots were allocated. It consisted up to June 1989 of 168 houses, accommodating 163 families (1195 persons).

In all, the number of houses of the first stage type reached 2686, accommodating 3054 families (18,920 persons) by June 1989; whereas, the second stage totalled 6642 allocated plots of land, of which 250 were under construction, and consisted of 5428 houses and 6905 families (42,798 persons) (Calculated from UNRWA, Accommodation Office, June 1989).

### 5.4 Criteria for Relocation

Any refugee living in a camp is eligible to apply through the Housing Department in the Civil Administration in Gaza to obtain a house or a plot of land in the Israeli sponsored housing projects. Applications could be submitted to the military government through the mayor in his/her area. This open procedure emerged in the late seventies, to distinguish it from the first period of the housing projects in which relocation was done in complete secrecy and carried out by a "backdoor" device.¹

Several conditions must be met in order for a refugee family to relocate to the housing project: A down-payment; residency in a refugee camp; and demolition of the camp shelter. These are considered below.
5.4.1 A Down-Payment

A down-payment of IL 24,000 was required in the first stage, when the authorities used to offer three-room houses (Type A) of an average area of 42 square metres, and built on a 250 square metres plot of land, on 99-year leases as given in the contract. The cost of the housing units was heavily subsidized. In a later stage, and until 1976, the houses offered were two-room houses (Type B). Since then very few vacant houses have been offered to refugees. The price in the second stage ranged from IL39,000 to IL42,000. The family was generally required to pay IL 21,000 as a down-payment, and could arrange a mortgage through the Housing Department (The Branch of Refugees Rehabilitation) for the remaining amount, as had been announced by the Civil Administration in 1977.

Houses in the projects were constructed by either the Public works Department, local contractors or Israeli contractors.

For those who relocate to the housing project, infrastructure is provided by the Civil Administration at nominal cost. The authorities claim that grants of about $20,000 were provided to each refugee family, in services and cash to relocate (UNRWA Records, PIO, 19 July, 1989; Ministry of Defence, 1983:56).

The houses offered were of very poor quality. Refugees relocated "hated the tiny, box-like flats that Israelis like, hot in summer and cold in winter and no space to absorb expanding families" (The Independent, 18 July, 1989).² (See Plate 5.1). The rebuilding of these poor-quality houses from scratch was undertaken by some refugee families, who had remittances from sons in the Gulf, others made patchy repairs to survive rainy winters (Locke and Stewart, 1985:60)

In the SR project, 40% of the sample survey indicated that they had bought a house; whereas, 60% had bought a plot of land. The sample survey also showed that 35.6% received a two-room house; whereas 4.4% received a three-room house. Out of the total households sampled in 1991 at the SR project, 40 received houses, of which 20 (22.2%) added rooms to their housing units and 10 (11.1%) demolished their houses and rebuilt them from scratch on a multi-storey style, and 60 (66.7%) built their houses directly, since they received vacant plots of land from the GS Housing Department. Plate 5.1 shows multi-storey buildings bordering the old type of houses provided at the first stage of the project.

The authorities shifted their policy in 1976 from offering houses to offering plots of land of 250 sq.m. to each refugee family. A family was entitled to build its own house from the ground on that land, and it was stipulated that it should be a concrete building of one or two stories. In 1978, the price of each plot of land (200 sq.m.) was IL20,000 according to the
Plate 5.1 Type of old houses given for refugees at the first stage in the Sheikh Radwan Israeli sponsored housing project.

Photo: The author, 1991

Refugees; yet, the Ministry of Defence report stated that the land was provided free of charge. Refugee families were given two options in assistance for the construction of their houses: first, a loan of $30,000, which would be repaid over 10 years with an interest rate of 14% percent. The authorities, from 1977 on, and the future for the project. Regarding land of plots of equal size, and this was made. The number of married without any children in the camp on the project, especially those in the camp. Also, the houses in the camp are much more spacious than the housing units surveyed in the SH project, especially those in Birkat Al-Adina. This is the result of the various stages and various policies undertaken by the authorities to allocate a house or a plot of land. The first stage could be
refugees; yet, the Ministry of Defence report stated that the land was provided free of charge. Refugee families were given two options in assistance for the construction of their houses: first, a loan of IL30,000, which would be repaid over 10 years with an interest rate of 14%; second, a grant of IL10,000 (UNRWA Records, Accommodation Office, Gaza, 5 April, 1978; Ministry of Defence, 1983:57).

In 1977, the size of the plot of land was further reduced to 125 sq. m. The authorities attributed this shift to the shortage of land suitable for building purposes. So, from 1977 onwards two-storey buildings were constructed on each plot, to accommodate two families on each parcel of available land (Ibid.:58). However, this Israeli justification regarding land shortage in GS has to be examined against the authorities' policy to pave the way for future projected expansion of Jewish settlement in the Strip. Table 5.3 indicates the size of plots of land received by refugees in the SR sample survey.

**TABLE 5.3 Size of Plot of Land Received by SR Residents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>125 sq.m.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 sq.m.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 sq.m.</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 sq.m.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>375 sq.m.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450 sq.m.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 sq.m.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey.

Fifty two of the residents interviewed (57.8%) received 250 sq.m. plots, and might have relocated during the period 1978-1982, before the reduction in the plot size was made. It was explained by respondents that land was allocated according to the number of married sons in the family. For example, an extended family with four married sons would receive 500 sq.m. plots of land.

The plot of land offered is "four times the size of the plot...lived on in the camp" as Freddy Zaq, Deputy Co-ordinator for the OTs, claimed in a seminar on the housing projects on July 10, 1989 (UNRWA Records, PIO, 19 July, 1989; Ministry of Defence, 1983:56). Yet this is difficult to sustain. Some of the households surveyed in the Shati camp are much more spacious than the housing units surveyed in the SR project, especially those in Blocks 68 and 69 where houses have asbestos roofing - like in the camp -, the rooms are very narrow, and no space is available for expansion. The variations in type of houses and size of plots of land in the project are very obvious. This is the result of the various stages and various policies undertaken by the authorities to allocate a house or a plot of land. The first stage could be
called the "publicity stage," which aimed at promoting the schemes and encouraging refugees to relocate, through giving incentives.

The land upon which the housing projects were set up is considered by the authorities to be the government's land. However, many Palestinians raise the question of the legality of the purchase of land by a refugee family from an occupying authority which does not have clear title to the land. That is particularly crucial as this issue concerns the refugees' ownership of this land in the eventuality of a settlement. As one refugee from the SR project said in response to the question of whether he was grateful to the government for offering new housing, "We have no reason to be grateful. The government has done nothing except to allow us to build houses on land that is not theirs to sell anyway. By using it we stop Israel using it" (JP, 19 October, 1988).

5.4.2 Residency

The second condition for relocation to a housing project is residency in a refugee camp. Housing in the projects is not open to refugees who are not currently living in a refugee camp. Furthermore, a family residing in a refugee camp can only move to the housing project nearest their camp. For example, a family living in the SC can only move to the SR project. The family cannot choose to move to al-Amal project in Khan Yunis.

In spite of that condition, some non-refugee families interested in settling in the housing projects purchase a house in the camp and demolish it, to become eligible for resettlement. Israeli official estimates indicate that 25% of the shelters in GS camps are now occupied by non-refugees (Marx, 1992:288). (See Table 5.4). But the meaning of these figures is questionable. They are dubious especially because there has not been a census of the population since 1967 in the OTs (including, of course, the refugee camps). In addition, UNRWA records or enumeration are not very accurate, due to discrepancies in registration of newly born and deceased refugees.

Refugee families living outside the camps who are interested in living in the housing projects follow this same method, as confirmed by some respondents in the sample. The authorities are aware of this fact; Major Cheshin told NYT correspondent: "We find out that refugees who long ago left the camps are buying rooms in shelters inside the camp just to be eligible for the new projects" (NYT, 24 November, 1976).

In 1972, Moshe Dayan put the movement to the Israeli housing projects down to rise in income among refugees, a view also emphasized in the Israeli Ministry of Defence's report (al-Quds, 14 December, 1972; Ministry of Defence, 1983:57).
Refugees living in spacious houses in the camps and willing to move out to a housing project are aware of the land problem and the demand for houses in the Strip. Thus, as one respondent from the SR told the author, they sell their large house in the camp for a very high price, and buy a small one for a low price and demolish it to meet the authorities' condition for relocation.

TABLE 5.4 Resettled Families and Persons in the Housing Projects, by Status of the Population, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of the pop.</th>
<th>Houses built by the Govt.</th>
<th>Plots of land housing built by refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Houses</td>
<td>Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>2,666</td>
<td>3,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Refugees</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,686</td>
<td>3,054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is clear from the Table above that the majority of the housing projects residents are refugees (22,946 persons). Previous residence of the SR’s sample survey confirms this, as shown in Table 5.5.

TABLE 5.5 Former Residence of the SR Project’s Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Residence</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey

Those who come from the SC constitute 80 (88.9%) out of the sampled survey; whereas, the remaining 3 (3.3%) come from Jabalia and Deir el Balah camps in the Strip - a minimal number, which contravene the stated conditions for relocation set by the authorities.

5.4.3 Demolition of the Camp Shelter

A third condition set by the authorities for relocation to the housing projects is that the camp shelter of the family be demolished. The demolition of the shelter is generally carried out by the families themselves. The shelter is inspected by the authorities, who have no direct involvement in the demolition, and should be destroyed within twelve months of the agreement. In consultation with the authorities, UNRWA are informed of demolitions done so that the "facts" of the demolition can be properly recorded. The demolition of the shelter weakens the structure of the remaining adjacent dwellings. Camp shelters are constructed in
eight room units which share a common roof. These shelters are allocated in one or two room individual family dwellings. UNRWA helps the affected destitute families in carrying out the repairs and claiming compensation from the authorities (UN, 1982: 21). The authorities, however, disclaim this fact. A report of the Ministry of Defence ascertains that, "Since the rehabilitation project is based on the goodwill of those residents interested in being rehabilitated, areas are being vacated in the refugee camps haphazardly and do not necessarily adjoin each other." The report in justifying demolition of camp shelter indicates that, "there is no continuous stretch of land available for construction of another housing project. The areas in the camps should, however, be taken into account when planning to relieve the distress concerning available land in the region" (Ministry of Defence, 1983: 58).

After demolition of the camp shelter, building permits are granted by the local municipality. Building permits for refugees to build houses in the housing projects are easy to obtain, in contrast to the restriction on building in the camps, as discussed below. Obviously, this could be counted as other evidence of the authorities policy which carries political implications, to evacuate the camps and eliminate them completely in the long-run.

UNRWA's protests against shelter demolitions in the camps, and the authorities' response, are tackled in Chapter 6. Despite protestations at the UN level, this pre-condition for relocation has not been cancelled. However, one justification given by the authorities for the demolition of shelters which might explain this fact is that the refugees extricate building stones from the rubble for use in adding rooms to their new houses in the project (NYT, 2 April, 1973; UN, 1977: 23, & 1987: 17).

During the Intifada, a new phenomenon began to arise. This was to do with the spaces caused by the demolition of shelters in the camps, upon relocation. Camp residents have been making use of this space by expanding their own shelters, though in a shoddy way, as Plate 5.2 illustrates. The authorities have not done anything to halt it, due to the prevailing political circumstances in the Strip.

Table 5.6 indicates that the large camps: Jabalia, Shati, Khan Yunis and Rafah-, had the largest number of demolitions. This is because these four camps have housing projects adjacent to them, where refugees are allowed to relocate.

The issue of receiving compensation for destroying the previous lodging in the camp, has been one of contention between the authorities and the refugees who moved out. Compensation is paid to refugees by the authorities only for the demolition of privately built rooms and additions, and not for UNRWA - built rooms. This is an issue which has been pursued by the Agency, with little success.
Plate 5.2: Space in Demolished Houses in the SC as Used by Camp Residents

Photo: The Author 1991
One respondent told the author that the authorities threatened to imprison him if he did not come to collect the compensation, which he refused to take because it was too low. He was ultimately forced to go and take it.

When raising the question of compensation for the sample survey in the SR project, respondents showed hesitancy in replying. The same attitude was shown by refugees when the issue of income was raised. Fear among refugees or other people under survey stems from their suspicion that those who are interviewing them may be tax employees. Also, some did not know the exact amount received, as they mixed that with the mortgage payments they had to pay. Some 66 (73.3%) affirmed receiving compensation, while 20 (22.2%) said that they had received no compensation. The explanation given by some respondents for not receiving compensation was that their residence in the project was not organized through the Housing Department, but by purchasing a house in the project from previous tenants; and, accordingly, they did not sign a contract or receive compensation.

Usually the authorities assess the camp shelter, and refugees are paid the assessed value. At the same time, the refugees are asked to sign bills of exchange for the compensation value of the demolished camp shelters, which will be cancelled later when the demolition is carried out.

Only 9% of the 1991 sample survey conducted in the SR project indicated they were in any way satisfied with compensation payments, their dissatisfaction relating to the value they received. The fieldwork showed that 54 (60%) of the compensated households received compensation below 5% of the value of their former shelter; whereas, 12 (13.3%) received between 10% and 30% of its value.

Some UNRWA reports show that some refugee and non-refugee families from outside the camps moved to the housing projects without demolishing former shelters. This could be seen as another contravention of conditions for relocation, in addition, to the aforementioned...
contravention of being a refugee (See Table 5.7).

**TABLE 5.7**  
Refugee and Non-Refugee Families Relocated to the SR Project Without Demolition, Up to December 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Houses Allocated</th>
<th>Lands Allocated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>2 -</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3 -</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- 15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>- 9</td>
<td>- 9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>7 -</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>19 13</td>
<td>2 -</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>- 18</td>
<td>3 18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29 13</td>
<td>33 18</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Calculated from UNRWA, Accommodation Office, Gaza, 1991.*

As UNRWA reports show, those who relocated without demolition to the SR project came mainly from Gaza town and the local area, while only 3 families out of the 93 came from Jabalia camp.

This type of demolition, enacted in conjunction with relocation, is not the only form undertaken against camps and refugees. Other forms of demolition, as Table 5.8 showed, have taken place since the 1967 occupation of the WBGS. These have been carried out under several pretexts, mainly to maintain security and public order.

**TABLE 5.8**  
Demolition of Rooms and Affected Families and Individuals in GS Refugee Camps, as of June 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause of Demolition</th>
<th>Cum. no. of rooms</th>
<th>Cum. no. of affected families</th>
<th>Cum. no. of affected persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967 War demolition</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>3,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 Road widening</td>
<td>10,794</td>
<td>3,941</td>
<td>24,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contravention</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town planning</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>2,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border line</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>1,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punitive cases</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>2,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary demolition for</td>
<td>7,764</td>
<td>4,917</td>
<td>27,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resettlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,411</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,517</strong></td>
<td><strong>62,173</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Calculated from UNRWA, Accommodation Office, Gaza, 1991.*

The demolitions are in violation of international law and conventions, and can be interpreted as being used by the authorities as a form of collective punishment against Palestinians.
5.5 A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

In addition to the three conditions set out by the authorities for relocation, refugee families are asked to sign a contract written in Hebrew, I obtained an Arabic text of this contract. The provisions of the contract are meant to organize the relationship between the tenant and the landlord.

A precise reading of the contract would imply that it has been outlined for the landlord's (the Israeli authorities) interest, not for the tenant. Provision 23 reads: "the law of tenants protection or any other legislations which could lead to protect the tenancy is invalid on this contract according to the rules of ordinance No. 253 (GS and North Sinai) issued in 5729-1969, concerning the invalidity of the legislation of tenants protection in specific cases." This provision is clearly to override the tenant's right of protection from the landlord. Moreover, provision 24 indicates that the contract can be made invalid by the authorities on instructions issued by the military command; it further confirms that the "legislations of the State of Israel are valid on this contract and the jurisdication court of Beer Sheva is the only court specializing in dealing with what is related to or results from this contract."

The data from the SR project showed that 79 (87.8%) of households had signed a contract when relocated; whereas 3 (3.3%) said they did not; and 8 (8.9%) households said they did not know. Moreover, knowledge of the duration of the contract was patchy. Some 57 (63.3%) of the 90 said that the duration of the lease is for 99 years, whereas 27 (30%) said they did not know exactly; and 2 (2.2%) said they did not know at all. Actually, the contract does not indicate the period of tenancy, the only mention of duration is in the term "agreement of development and long tenancy," giving the landlord full authority in designating the duration he wants.

The conditions of the rehousing agreement are not very well known to refugees, and neither is the way in which the agreement could be revoked. Some respondents said that during the process of signing the Housing Department did not give the refugees time to read the Arabic translation; they even, refused to give them a copy of the contract, and they were asked instead to go to Jerusalem to obtain a copy: many as a result gave up. The SR sample survey showed that only 16 (17.8%) of the refugees knew what the provisions of the contract entailed; whereas, the majority, 60 (66.7%), did not know what it contained at all; and 3 (11.1%) said that they were not sure. Knowledge or ignorance of the provisions of the contract has nothing to do with the educational level of the respondents, as shown in Table 5.9. It is obvious from this Table that, 33 out of 86 residents, whose level of education ranges from
preparatory to university, do not know the content of the contract. Thus it is the method of contractual procedure (as dealt with above) undertaken by the authorities, and not the ignorance of the second party, that is the reason for the lack of knowledge of contract provisions.

**TABLE 5.9 Knowledge of Contract By Level of Education Among the SR Residents (in numbers)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge of contract/ Educational level</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech. College</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey

The inter-relation between signing the contract and deprivation of political rights is what the refugees do have some doubts about. The majority of respondents in the SR sample survey (37.8%) said that they were not quite sure whether this contract has an effect on their political rights; whereas, 29 (32.2%) said it has an effect; and 21 (23.3%) said it will not deprive them of their political rights. The cause and effect relationship between resettlement of refugees and deprivation of their political rights will be elaborated upon in full detail in Chapter 8.

The question to be raised here is that, from a legal point of view, Israel as an occupying power has no right to implement its legislation and jurisdiction on the people under its control: Israel stands in violation of international conventions and the Fourth Geneva Convention (See Chapter 8). Yet, this might be considered only one of many breaches of law enacted by the authorities in the OTs where Israel tries to implement the law that best suits its interests, and when this does not apply issues military orders. Up to December 16, 1992 there have been 1369 Military Orders on the West Bank (Rabah & Fairweather, 1993).

### 5.6 RELOCATION: REASONS, FORMS AND ATTITUDES

This section examines the form of relocation which the refugees have undertaken. It further shows the reasons behind relocation, which has not necessarily been out of support for the Israeli resettlement schemes, but, rather out of necessity to alleviate overcrowding in the previous camp shelter. Assessing housing satisfaction is tested here through the attitudes of the relocated refugees towards their new housing in the project. It is to be noted that during the
Intifada relocation of refugees has slowed down a great deal, which could be attributed to the bad economic conditions of the refugees, and the prevailing political circumstances (See Chapter 7).

5.6.1 Does Voluntary Relocation Imply Support?

Even though the majority of the sampled survey in SR indicated that their movement was voluntary, they objected overwhelmingly to the policy of resettlement as a whole.

TABLE 5.10 Attitude of SR Project and SC Residents Towards Resettlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>SR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support strongly</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't support</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey

Those who did not support resettlement form the majority: 43 (47.8%) in the SR project and 100 (70.4%) in the SC. Whereas, those who support resettlement come in second place, 18 (12.7%) in the SC and 33 (36.7%) in the SR project. The disapproval of resettlement was for various reasons. For 17 (18.9%) resettlement is not the political solution to the refugee problem; while 6 (6.7%) indicated that living in the project is insecure, in terms of tenancy and provision of services by UNRWA. Another 7 (7.8%) of respondents in the SR project, 7 (7.8%) said that it was overcrowding which obliged them to move out of the camp; and the remaining 11 gave various answers: more taxes have to be paid in the project, dissatisfaction with the quality of building, no UNRWA protection, and fewer social contacts among residents.

Rejection of resettlement by refugees has always been linked to resistance to their exile. Mere mention of resettlement and construction of permanent shelters in camps was always met with strong opposition. In their life in camps, refugees developed a sense of impermanence which "became a mark of the emerging Palestinian consciousness" (Migdal & Kimmerling, 1993:194; Ward, 1977:26).

It is this stand by refugees which made the Israeli authorities question the feasibility of the resettlement schemes in GS prior to 1972-73. They were faced with the following questions: would the refugees living in the camps agree to leave them, and would the refugees agree to accept the Israeli administration's housing solution, after many years of hate
conditioning against Israel who they regard as directly responsible for their situation? A study conducted in 1952-1953 showed that only 10% of refugees accepted resettlement as a permanent solution. In the minds of the refugees, acceptance of permanent resettlement meant "acceptance of permanent defeat and of permanent expatriation." Their precondition for accepting resettlement, was that it has to be carried out through an inter-Arab cooperation, with extended Western and economic assistance (Bruhns, 1955:132-33).

Residents in the SC also gave their reasons against resettlement. The main one was concern to maintain their identity as refugees (21.1%); while, 25 (17.6%) considered living in the project insecure, relating to tenancy and access to UNRWA services. Another 18 (12.7%) indicated that resettlement was not the political solution to the refugee problem; 12 (8.4%) regarded resettlement as a method to eliminate camps and liquidate the refugee problem; 7 (4.9%) did not support resettlement because it broke social ties with families and relatives; 4 (2.8%) showed no support with respect to the pattern of buildings in the project (multi-storey) which are unsuitable from a social perspective; and the remaining 4 (2.8%) gave other answers or did not know.

An interesting explanation for not supporting resettlement was given by one respondent, the Mukhtar of the Falloujah, a village in Palestine of 1948. He said that refugees who left a lot of property and land behind in 1948 rejected the idea of moving out of the camp and accepting 200 or 100 sq. m. of land in the project, while this was acceptable to those who had no property or land. The validity of this assumption could be checked against responses given by SR respondents regarding left property in Palestine 1948. Their responses indicated that only 33 households out of 90 had left no property behind; while the other 66 households had left a lot of property and land, in some cases as much as 500-800 dunums of land.

It is clear then, that political reasons were behind the unsupportive stand for resettlement among most residents in the two case study areas: 42.2% in the SC and 18.9% in the SR project respectively. When the sampled survey in the SC was asked to give three situations in which they would accept resettlement, the results showed that 50 (35.2%) would accept it in the framework of a comprehensive political solution to the Palestine problem; 35 (24.7%) said they would accept it if faced by pressures from the authorities; 28 (19.7%) gave the narrowness of camp shelter as a reason for acceptance; 21 (14.7%) said they would not accept it at any rate; 18 (12.6%) said they would accept it if means were available; 10 (7.0%) said they would accept it if there was a collective decision to move out; and 9 (6.3%) gave other reasons.

Moreover, the majority of residents in the sample survey of the SR project, 65.6% and
37.3% in the SC, think that the refugees in general do not support resettlement schemes. Only 21.1% in the SR project and 13.4% in the SC think that refugees support it, the remainder in both locations saying that they don't know.

The SR sample findings suggested that the refugee disapproval of resettlement in general is mainly related to their fear of loss of political rights. For 90 (100%) of the respondents gave this answer as a first priority (out of three answers); 9 (10%) said that their lack of support stemmed from the fact that resettlement is a temporary solution and not a permanent one to their problem; 13 (14.4%) thought that the refugees' lack of financial means lay behind their disapproval; 8 (8.9%) gave tenancy insecurity as a reason for disapproval among refugees; whereas, 5 (5.6%) attribute disapproval to lack of social cohesion in the project. It seems that neither levels of education nor employment influenced respondents' support for or resistance to resettlement.

TABLE 5.11 Support for Resettlement by Level of Education in the SR Project & SC (in numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for resettlement/Level of education</th>
<th>Strong support</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Don't support</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SR</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>SR</td>
<td>SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech. College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey

As indicated in Table 5.11, 21 out of 43 in the SR project who have a lower educational attainment do not support resettlement; whereas an almost equal number 22 out of 43 in the project who have a higher educational level gave the same response. The same is true of the SC, where 47 out of 100 with low educational level are unsupportive of resettlement; and 44 in secondary and preparatory level gave the same response. This would imply that the educational level of a person as a variable has no effect on his/her support or otherwise for resettlement, as was the case with knowledge about the aims of resettlement (Table 5.2).

The same is true of the interrelation between employment/job and support for resettlement. Table 5.12 below illustrates this point.
TABLE 5.12 Support for Resettlement by Employment in the SR Project and the SC (in numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for resettlement/ Employment</th>
<th>Strong support SR</th>
<th>Support SC</th>
<th>Don't support SR</th>
<th>Support SC</th>
<th>No answer SR</th>
<th>No answer SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey

Housewives comprise the largest number of those who do not support resettlement, 24 in the SR project and 41 in the SC. Of the remaining number of those who do not support resettlement, 11 in the SR and (40) in SC work in categories between clerical and transport jobs the remaining 8 in SR and 20 in SC include students, unemployed, retired, and disabled. Those who have moderate support for resettlement, as the Table shows, are in second place among all categories while, those who do not support it come in first place.

We now move to compare the attitudes of the SR sample survey to those of the SC with regard to moving out of the camp. Responses of the sample survey in the camp showed that 59 (41.5%) gave a yes answer; whereas, 83 (58.5%) answered no. The 59 respondents gave the following preferences for places they would like to move out to. 15 (10.6%) preferred the SR project; 35 (24.6%) wanted to go to any place better than the camp with its unhealthy environment; 3 (2.1%) wanted to move only to their original town in Palestine of 1948; 5 (3.5%) to a bigger house in the camp itself; 1 (0.7%) gave other reasons. In sum, their decision to relocate is taken in order to accommodate themselves in more adequate housing, recognizing that their present shelter cannot be improved to satisfy all their requirements.

The reasons for their desire to move out of the camp are given in Table 5.13.
TABLE 5.13 Reasons for Willingness to Move Out of the SC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narrowness</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities harassment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unhealthy environment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecure tenancy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of privacy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High pop. density</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey

Narrowness of the camp shelter is given as the main reason for intention to move out by respondents; this result corresponds with the answers given by the residents who had already moved out to the SR project already (Table 5.11), 77.8% giving the narrowness of shelters as the main reason behind their relocation. Table 5.13 shows higher rates of mobility and the strong relationship between intention to move and the size of household which, through household overcrowding, only indirectly involves the physical size of housing. As each family grows, it outgrows the shelter space and prompts the need to move. The unhealthy environment of the camp is the second most common reason while the authorities’ harassment against the camp population comes in third place.

Those in the sample survey in the SC gave the reasons for their unwillingness to move out shown in Table 5.14.

TABLE 5.14 Reasons For Unwillingness to Move Out of the SC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stay close to family &amp; relatives</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain refugee identity</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of means</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All above reasons</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>83</strong></td>
<td><strong>58.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey

The reasons for staying put given by the 83 respondents have socio-economic and political implications. Moreover, as Muth noticed, every decision to move from one location to another entails various costs and benefits. Costs include both direct monetary costs like moving expenses, fees, registration fees, and indirect social costs such as the cutting of social ties and friendships, and the need to adjust to a new environment (Muth, 1973:56).

It is also noticeable that there is a weak association between the educational level and employment and the reasons for staying put given by the 83 respondents (Table 5.15).
5.6.2 Voluntary vs. Compulsory Relocation

Movement of the refugees since the commencement of the housing projects has been of two types: compulsory or voluntary. The compulsory nature of their relocation is not admitted by the authorities, who claim that all relocation is on a voluntary basis. Yet, as we have documented, the indirect methods used by the authorities to disperse refugees, such as the demolition of camp shelters (Table 5.9), indicates a very coercive impetus to the housing projects.

An example of the considerable coercion used in achieving relocation is the case of the 415 families in SC (General-Commissioner Report of 1977). Between April and the end of June 1976 the Israeli authorities carried out a survey of 415 families in the camp, who were later told by the authorities that their shelters were listed for demolition. The only option for them was to purchase houses or land in the SR project or move into vacated shelters alongside other refugees which the authorities could allocate to them (UN, 1977:23). It is important to note that this survey was carried out just a year after the commencement of the SR project, which suggests the likelihood of the forced removals being part of a policy to promote Israeli resettlement schemes.

There are two dimensions to the Israeli policy of resettlement. On the one hand, it leaves a narrow option for refugees to reaccommodate themselves, and thus promotes the
purchasing of houses/land in the housing project; and on the other hand, by allocating vacated shelters in camps, the authorities are making themselves responsible for camp accommodation, which could be considered a derogation of UNRWA's functions in this respect, and has been seen as evidence of UNRWA's lack of jurisdiction over the camps. This raises the question of the legality of such procedures by the authorities in relation to UNRWA's mandate, given that such procedures are not carried out by a "proper" host government but by an occupying authority.

Moreover, one more indirect way to pressurise refugees to move is cited in the General-Commissioner's Report of 1987: "There are some cases where refugees are placed under pressure to persuade them to move. For example, in Jabalia and Rafah camps bulldozing activities have left shelters isolated and completely surrounded by mounds of sand higher than the shelters themselves, thus making it extremely difficult for the families to remain and live a normal life" (UN, 1987:17).

The form of relocation undertaken by the relocated refugees in the SR sample survey is showed in Table 5.16.

**TABLE 5.16  Form of Relocation by SR Residents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The 1991 sample survey*

The reasons behind relocation were given as follows:

**TABLE 5.17  Reasons for Moving Out to the SR Project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security demolition</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road widening</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town planning</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 war demolition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrowness of camp's shelter</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement in income</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve social status</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political considerations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The 1991 sample survey*

The movement of refugees to the SR project was out of necessity to alleviate
overcrowding, made more acute by the absence of new construction by UNRWA and the building restrictions imposed by the authorities on camp residents.

Those who moved out to the project were typically young married sons who lived within the extended family in the camp and due to overcrowdedness left the old behind. The old lived in the remaining room/s of the shelter, the authorities usually requesting the demolition of one room, if one son from the extended family moved out to the project.

This Chapter has demonstrated that the Israeli aims for setting up the housing projects are far from humanitarian, and more for security reasons. The refugees' awareness of the political motives behind these projects was very high. Moving out to the housing projects was mainly due to overcrowding in the camp shelters and the unhealthy environment, rather than to support Israeli schemes. The Israeli policy toward the camps has aggravated the housing crisis further. By imposing building restrictions in camps, and the demolition of camp shelter as a precondition for relocation; the authorities are increasing the housing crisis, and leaving a very narrow chance for refugees to resist the Israeli resettlement scheme. Yet, the refugees believe that by staying on the Palestinian soil they are reinforcing a national goal through their *sumud* (steadfastness) as a collectivity.
NOTES:

1. Methods used included, visits by collaborators employed by the authorities to refugee households in the Shati’ camp trying to convince them to relocate by promising incentives, e.g. low price for a house and long-term mortgage. Later on those collaborators were killed by the Fedayeen in Gaza. For more details on the subject see, *Palestine Affairs*, December (1972):234-237; & April(1973):220-222).


3. 216 families in Rafah camp, and 167 families in Khan Yunis camp, whose shelters were demolished in connection with the widening of roads and related housing projects, are other cases in point. The option opened to them was similar to those families affected in Shati camp (UN,1974:20).
CHAPTER SIX: UN AND UNRWA POSITION TOWARDS RESETTLEMENT OF GAZA STRIP REFUGEES

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter assesses UNRWA’s position on the issue of resettlement in the GS since the 1970’s. The discussion below shows that UNRWA’s proposals to integrate and resettle refugees into the productive life of the area have been seen by the refugees as an anathema. Failing to achieve any success at this level, UNRWA shifted the balance towards other services, specifically health and education. It was believed that UNRWA’s educational programmes would give refugees the skills necessary for productive participation in whatever society they lived, regardless of the political situation. Yet, this chapter reveals that the emphasis on education served the integration policy indirectly. The issues of resettlement and reintegration have not been raised again by UNRWA officials, for fear of pressures from its clients.

This chapter also discusses UNRWA’s housing policy in connection with its budgetary policy. The operational literature which UNRWA provided from its archives lacks precise statistical data and information about UNRWA’s shelter assistance programme, this programme having little priority in the Agency’s operations compared with those of education and health. Indeed, building restrictions have been imposed in the camps by the Israelis, as part of wider schemes in the OTs aiming to curtail development. Planning has been used as an instrument of collective punishment, affecting Palestinian prospects of nationhood (Coon, 1992:10).

The attitudes of refugees concerning UNRWA’s role in resettlement were collected in the two case study areas. It is shown that such attitudinal responses have to be understood within the framework of the refugee-UNRWA relationship. This relationship has been shifting to cope with the new circumstances during the Intifada, and UNRWA has departed from its original mandate, which was confined to relief and other services. The Agency’s shift in policy has been criticized by the Israeli authorities, whose own actions caused those changes to take place.

6.2 THE AGENCY’S MANDATE

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established according to G.A. Resolution 302 of 8 December, 1949 (Article 22). It began its operations on 1 May 1950. Its mandate includes the care of refugees - inside
and outside the camps -, with relief services, shelter, social assistance, health and education care. These services apply to the five field offices where UNRWA operates; Jordan; Lebanon; Syria; the WB and the GS; known as the host countries. Two premises are the basis for UNRWA operations: one, that consent of the state where UNRWA operates is required, and the other, that UNRWA has to adhere to the mandate given to it by the UN to safeguard its interests (UN, 1986:25).

Legal responsibility for administering the camps is not within UNRWA’s mandate; nor is eliminating the camps. The host governments remained responsible for the maintenance of law and order and similar governmental functions as part of their normal responsibilities towards the population within their borders (UN, 1984:25). Camp leaders appointed by UNRWA run the camps, since UNRWA, for political and practical reasons, found it necessary to disengage from even the appearance of running the camps. Thus, it has exercised no police or land control over them at all since 1969 (UNRWA, 1986:84).

No changes in the ownership and tenure patterns have occurred in the camps since their establishment. Residence in the camps is voluntary, as is leaving them. Yet permission is needed from UNRWA to join a camp or to transfer between camps. Refugees’ perception of the ownership of SC shelters is that they belong to UNRWA (Table 6.1).

### TABLE 6.1: Shelters by State of Tenure in the Shati Camp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of tenure</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA property</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The 1991 sample survey*

Purchasing and renting houses in the camps is another issue; this is carried out by some refugees (illegally), who own a shelter in the camp but do not actually live in it.

### 6.3 UNRWA: BUDGETING FOR SHELTERS

A useful way of assessing the shortcomings of UNRWA’s housing policy in the camps is to examine its budget for this activity during the 43 years of its existence. Sections on camps and shelters in the General-Commissioner reports from 1950-1992 reveal developments in this area. UNRWA’s policy towards improving or developing camps shelters deteriorated from the early 1960s. Only poor and hardship cases had their shelters repaired at the Agency’s expense. Therefore, the following questions must be asked. Does UNRWA’s policy towards camp
improvement in general - and not just for hardship cases - reflect a long-term strategy of the Agency? Does this policy complement the refugee refusal of a state of permanency in their camps? Is an understanding of this policy better achieved in relation to a long-term strategy of finding a solution to the refugee problem and elimination of the camps?

Examining UNRWA’s budget indicates a decrease in the field of shelters, as illustrated in Table 6.2, compared with budgets in other areas of expenditures.

**TABLE 6.2: UNRWA’s Expenditure in the Fields of Relief, Shelter and Education in US Dollars (various years)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Relief</th>
<th>Shelter</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51/52</td>
<td>16,046,242</td>
<td>1,059,628</td>
<td>167,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54/55</td>
<td>22,281,630</td>
<td>1,890,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60/61</td>
<td>13,274,464</td>
<td>678,109</td>
<td>10,055,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>12,300,997</td>
<td>379,934</td>
<td>14,597,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>12,148,336</td>
<td>252,127</td>
<td>20,602,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>28,839,558</td>
<td>372,133</td>
<td>53,918,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>31,744,369</td>
<td>557,095</td>
<td>95,773,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,929,321</td>
<td>544,248</td>
<td>114,341,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3,201,482</td>
<td>621,937</td>
<td>117,316,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5,098,295</td>
<td>1,259,065</td>
<td>118,993,946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: General-Commissioner Annual Reports, various issues*

Table 6.2 indicates that expenditures on shelter construction or improvement are lower than those on relief and education, except in the early years of UNRWA, when the camps were under construction. UNRWA’s explanation for the slow rehabilitation and construction of shelters has always been a lack of funds. The Deputy Director of UNRWA in GS explained that "improvement of camp shelters is confined to hardship cases only for lack of funds, and UNRWA has no ulterior motives in this respect as some refugees think" (Interview with D.Kelly, 30 July 1991). In general, the maintenance and repair of the camp shelters in which the refugees live is the responsibility of the refugees themselves. The Agency shared with the host Governments the cost of maintaining and improving the infrastructure, such as roads, in some camps (UN, 1976:8-9).

It is noteworthy also that UNRWA made a shift from relief to other areas after 1982. Emphasis was placed on education in the early sixties, following the failure of the integration policy proposed by UNRWA in the first decade of its life.

A large number of refugees in this sample survey saw a link between UNRWA’s policy of cutting rations and services for refugees and the issue of resettlement. UNRWA’s decision to end its basic rations programme was made in September 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon which UNRWA claimed required a shift in funding priorities. The rations since then have been limited to "special hardship cases". In 1990, out of the total refugee population
in the five areas of operations, only 138,000 received food rations (UNRWA, 1990:17; Viorst, 1989:56-58).

Palestinian organizations and refugees have questioned the motives behind the decision to cut rations, educational and health services. Their questions have especially referred to the cut coinciding with the activities of the Israeli Ben-Porath Committee, set up in 1983 to dismantle the refugee camps in the absence of a political solution. The Federation of Professional Unions in the WB condemned the Ben-Porath resettlement proposal and expressed their apprehension about this issue (al-Quds, 13 December, 1983; al-Hourriah, 6 October, 1985:17; al-Mithaq, 19 October, 1983; Tariq al-Shararah, January 1985:9).

It has also been observed that the cut in rations was accompanied by increasing interference by the authorities in the camps’ affairs. For example, funds from the authorities have been allocated to build a kindergarten in al-Far‘ah camp in the WB. Such a project, and others, were originally UNRWA’s responsibility (al-Talia’h, 8 January, 1987). 1

It is argued that UNRWA generally recognizes the bitter miserable living conditions of GS refugees; to which the previous UNRWA Commissioner - General Giacommelli attributed the emergence of the Intifada. The repressive measures of the Israelis led Giacommelli to say: "Our impression is that the unrest has been dealt with in a way that may serve to create more turbulence rather than improve security..." (UNRWA News 147, January 1, 1988:2; Viorst, 1989:112). Therefore, one could assume that priority would be given to improving camp shelters. But, along with the persistent claim of lack of funds, UNRWA has directed its construction programme towards building new schools, clinics, and other infrastructural facilities, rather than making real improvements in camp shelters (Viorst, 1989:113).

While there is a substantial contribution by Arab countries, especially by Syria and Jordan, the increase shown in the 1990 relief budget is attributed to the expanded programme of assistance established by UNRWA in 1988. A target figure of $65 million was agreed, which was intended to improve living conditions in the OTs and which was endorsed as a result of the deteriorating situation in OT’s since the Intifada.

Accordingly, and with $33.6 million received or pledged by 30 June 1991, the expanded programme was developed during 1988 and 1989 and covered shelter rehabilitation, including reconstruction, upgrading, repair and maintenance of shelters belonging to special hardship families; and improvement and expansion of health services, including construction for various UNRWA’s programmes. During the 1990/91 period, it was reported that 60 construction projects were under negotiation with potential donors (UN, 1991:24-25).
In GS, for example, 124 shelters were repaired (28 in Shati camp) during the first six months of 1991, from funds from Kuwait ($714, 283) & Italy ($327, 780). As explained by engineers in the Shelters Rehabilitation Unit at UNRWA office, Gaza, shelters improvements are intended for hardship cases only, and from contributions donated for this purpose.

The answers and claims given, irrespective of whose responsibility, do not justify the continuation of the poor housing conditions in which the refugees live. The existing conditions of impoverishment among the refugees - especially in the GS camps -, stand in violation of the right of people to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families, including adequate housing. The inadequate housing conditions of the Palestinian people in the OT’s were of concern to the Commission on Human Settlements at the GA in its twelfth session (of 24 April-3 May 1989) (UN,1989:26). ²

Denial of an adequate standard of living and adequate housing for the PRs could be further seen to conflict with their basic requirements for social and economic development which General Assembly Resolution 41/128 (Declaration on the Right to Development) of 4 December 1986 lays down. Recognizing that fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent, so the promotion of development for individuals as an inalienable human right should be carried out by virtue "of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized (UN,1987:366).

6.4 UNRWA’s POSITION ON RESETTLEMENT

For a comprehensive picture on UNRWA’s position towards resettlement of PRs in the GS, the issue has to be placed in its historical and political context. That will enable us to gauge similarities or differences in the Agency’s policy towards the issue under discussion, throughout the period from 1950 to the present.

6.4.1 UNRWA’s Plans For Resettlement: A Historical Background

UNRWA was used as a tool by UN diplomacy to set the scene for resettlement of PRs. UNRWA’s budget provided the scapegoat; lack of international assistance for relief being given as an excuse for difficulties in promoting resettlement. UNRWA’s survival depended on its contributors, with the US as the most powerful actor involved. The view is that the US considered UNRWA an "interim solution" to the refugee question, as the US spokesman stated in 1981 at the General Assembly (Forsythe,1983:99).
Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December, 1949, paragraph 5, emphasized the change-over from a relief programme to one of works development. (These recommendations were inconsistent with the final report of 1949 of the Economic Survey Commission (Clapp Mission) appointed by the CCP). To promote the work programmes in the Arab countries, Howard Kennedy, the director-general of UNRWA, visited the host countries to seek financial and moral support. Burqa in Libya was suggested as a location for settling refugees, Sinai desert in Egypt, and Ghor Nimrin in Jordan (Palestine, 14 February, 1, 22 March, 14 April, and 5 May, 1951).

The first UNRWA plan for reintegration, was the Blandford Plan of 11 December 1951, named after the director and head of the Advisory Commission, and which was based on Clapp Mission’s report of 1949. This plan sought to promote economic development and improve water management in the Arab states, which would help the reintegration of the refugees in the economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis and assure them better living conditions, without prejudice to Resolution 194(III) of 11 December, 1948 (UN, 1951: 12; UNRWA, 1986: 14).

A fund for reintegration of refugees ($200 million) was recommended and endorsed on January 26, 1952 by the General Assembly, for a three-year programme (UN, 1951: 5; Cattan, 1969: 142).

Another UNRWA plan to resettle refugees had been made by Mr. Kein the Deputy Director of UNRWA, suggesting that the Arab countries carry responsibility for solving the refugee question, with $300 million to do so from the UN, and advocating the transfer of 100,000 refugees from Gaza and other places to Iraq and Libya, but this came to nothing (Palestine, July, 1961: 21; Gneim, n.d.: 76-77).

However, the architects of the Blandford plan had ignored the warning issued by the head of the Commission, Gordon Clapp. He wrote in his final report:

The region is not ready, the projects are not ready, the people and Governments are not ready, for large-scale development in the region’s basic river systems or major undeveloped land areas." He continued to say, "To press forward on such a course is to pursue folly and frustration and thereby delay sound economic growth (Cited in Peretz, 1972: 287-8).

Why, then, did the Western powers seek to solve the refugee question through reintegration and rehabilitation, against Clapp’s advice and in the face of rejection by the refugees and the Arab states, and given the economic constraints of the countries involved? The answer must lie in Western patronage of Israel. The architects of the reintegration programme had three central concerns: with the economic significance of the programme for the Near East countries; with the threat to peace and stability which refugees filled with human misery and suffering would constitute, and the risk that they would become the tools of pressure...
groups wishing to exploit their misery for political or other reasons; and with the impact of refugee life and future uncertainty on the minds and morale of the exiles, which would create and reinforce a professional refugee mentality (UN,1951:5,13-14;UN,1952:3).

UNRWA's concerns and fears, if taken at face value could be seen as genuine. However, the assumptions of American diplomacy: that economic development projects would raise the living standard of refugees, and thus reduce their desire to return to Palestine explain PRs and the Arab host countries skepticism of the political implications of those schemes.

Attempts by UNRWA to reintegrate refugees between 1949 to 1959 did not succeed, the obstacles being more serious than had been anticipated. The General-Commissioner admitted that:

....UNRWA should not again attempt works projects designed to settle the refugees. From this experience one should not conclude that economic development is not wanted by the people of the region on the contrary, it is wanted and at an accelerated rate ...and should proceed independently of UNRWA, but not in the context of refugee resettlement (UN,1962:2; UN,1964:2).

Subsequent Commissioner-General Annual Reports reflected that reality, and emphasized that the only acceptable solution for the refugees was a return to their homes (Cattan,1969:143-147).

6.4.1.1 Another Form of Dispersion by UNRWA: Emigration Encouraged

In an interview with the Arab Broadcasting Agency, the director of UNRWA announced a new project, involving UNRWA's readiness to cover the expenses of emigration for refugees who obtained visas to any country in the world. Every refugee would be paid $150, in addition to a transfer allowance which would enable him/her to start work and settle down in his/her new residence. The director further mentioned that $112 million had been committed to carry out the project and make it a success (Palestine,23 June, 1951).

Canada accepted UNRWA's project and showed willingness to receive refugees who could support themselves; and the Canadian Parliament reconfirmed this position later in 1955. A similar stand was declared by Ecuador president Galo Plaza, in a press conference in New York (Palestine,23,30 June,1951).

To encourage emigration to Burqa in Libya, UNRWA opened an office there in November 1951. Registration offices were also opened in Beirut, Damascus ,Jordan and Egypt for refugees interested to emigrate. The Libyan government agreed in the early stages to allow in 200 refugees, peasants and professional people; and on 23 November 1952 to accept 2500 refugee families, UNRWA paying $2 million to the Libyan government. King Idris refused
ultimately to approve it, unless the agreement between UNRWA and Libya include assurance of the refugees’ RR (Gneim, n.d.: 82-83; Palestine, 25 July, 1961: 22).

UNRWA additionally tried to promote the emigration of PRs to Europe, Brazil and to Mecca by providing financial incentives, and UNRWA General-Commissioner reports during the period from 1954-1960 report on those who emigrated at UNRWA’s expense (UN, General-Commissioner Reports, 1955-1960; Palestine, 25 July, 1961: 22; Gneim, n.d.: 85).

Missionary organizations from Europe and the US assisted UNRWA in encouraging emigration of PRs. They promised them “a better living” in the foreign countries and hundreds were attracted by the offer, to escape miserable conditions (Gneim, n.d.: 85-86; Palestine, 16 April, 1955). However, many of those who emigrated to Brazil wrote to the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine asking for help to go back, due to a lack of employment, police repression of wage labour and frustrating living conditions (Gneim, n.d.: 85-86).

UNRWA’s reason for encouraging emigration was perhaps a blend of two motives. First, the dispersion of refugees and the normalization of their return through reintegration in other countries outside Palestine; second, to move towards the Clapp recommendation to terminate relief.

Attempts by Israel between 1967 and 1968 to transfer Gaza refugees to Libya and Brazil met with no success. An official document in the Israeli archives confirms that land for this purpose was bought in Libya, and is still registered in Israel’s name (Khamis, 1991: 8).

6.4.1.2 Would Education Promote Resettlement?

In 1959, on the basis of the failed resettlement and emigration experience by UNRWA, the Agency embarked on a new programme

... to launch an adequate, interrelated programme of education, vocational training, and individual assistance ... The talents of maturing refugee youths can be salvaged and put to constructive use by a well-planned and promptly executed programme for improving general education ... and for expanding specialized types of training that fit young people for employment in an era of technological progress (UN, 1960: 3).

Since then, training and education have been the focus of UNRWA's activities with refugees (see Table 5.27 (UN, 1991), serving the PRs on two counts. On the one hand, this programme was and is, an individual incentive for the refugees to improve their status in the labour markets; and on the other hand, "[it] was entirely counter to the idea of resettlement, for the schools reaffirmed and strengthened Palestinian nationalism" (Forsythe, 1983: 93). An UNRWA official described this process:
One of the byproducts of the UNRWA/UNESCO education programme has been its contribution towards the preservation of the PRs' identity with the Palestine culture and within the wider context of Arab culture. This is partly because so many of them have been able to attend schools in which almost all the children are Palestine refugees and virtually all of the teachers are also Palestinians (Dickerson, 1974: 128).

In Gaza, a blend of UNRWA's education programme and Nasserist revolutionary themes have with other factors, played a role in shaping the unique political and militant character of the Strip's refugees.

One negative aspect of UNRWA's education and training programme, however, has been the migration of skilled labour away from the immediate region of crisis, thus achieving the aim originally defined in the 1950s. The question is, was UNRWA's shift to education a well-planned policy aimed at serving a long-term strategic goal of dispersing refugees, under the pretext of improving living conditions? Or was it the outcome of UNRWA's responses to forces shaping its policy (e.g. US) in which it operated with Israel?

### 6.4.2 UNRWA's Position on Refugee Resettlement in Gaza Strip

The UNRWA and the UN position towards refugee resettlement in the GS has been to oppose "the fact that people are being forced to move from the camps," as stated by Ronald Davidson, former deputy director of UNRWA in 1976 (NYT, 24 November, 1976; Ma'ariv, 28 November, 1976). The position of ICRC also towards forced transfer of GS refugees by the Israeli authorities was similar to that of UNRWA (ICRC, 1971: 50-51).

Yet, despite this overt criticism of Israeli policy, UNRWA's actions regarding the resettlement of refugees into the new housing projects are equivocal. For instance, the Deputy Director of UNRWA in Gaza Office, Mr Desmond Kelly, in an interview on 30 July, 1991, commented:

As far as we are concerned we neither encourage or discourage the refugees to move from one location to another. Our job is only to provide services to refugees wherever they live.

This statement meets with UNRWA's official reaction to the Ben-Porath proposal of 1983 to resettle refugees of the WBGS. As Viorst wrote: "UNRWA’s anxious not to discourage a migration to better (living) conditions," because it shares the concerns of the Israelis - though not necessarily their motives - about living conditions in the camps. Therefore, UNRWA did not distance itself completely from the Israeli proposal, but opposed it on the grounds that the UN could not consent to "any attempt to coerce refugees into compliance". However, UNRWA "would not oppose measures voluntarily accepted by the refugees," thus confirming the Agency's belief that better living conditions "would neither deprive Palestinians
of their identity nor divert them from their nationalist goals" (Viorst, 1989:110 & 112). This latter statement proved valid, as the findings of the sample survey have shown (See Chapter 8). The refugees in the housing projects in GS have been even more active during the Intifada than their compatriots in camps.

UN resolutions have condemned Israeli resettlement schemes. In the General Assembly on 23 November, 1976, a resolution was passed overwhelmingly in which the United States joined with 117 other nations in calling on Israel to halt refugee resettlement efforts in Gaza and to return immediately all the Palestinian refugees of Gaza to their old camps. Chaim Herzog, the Israeli delegate to the UN addressing the General Assembly members, said that by approving the resolution, "You will make yourself the laughing stock of the world" (NLG Report, 1978:25; NYT, 24 November, 1976; Ma'ariv, 28 November, 1976).

In a later UN General Assembly Resolution of 12 December, 1983, with 146 in favour and no abstentions, Israel was criticized for its reported plans to resettle refugees on the WB, following the announcement of the Ben-Porath programme. In passing the resolution, the Assembly confirmed Security Council Resolution 237, of June 1967, calling on Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security" of inhabitants of OTs. Expressing its alarm at Israel's plans to remove and resettle PRs, destroying their camps in the process, the General Assembly called on Israel, "to abandon its plans and to refrain from the removal and from any action that may lead to the removal and resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the WB and from the destruction of their camps" (UN, 1969:1).

Furthermore, General Assembly Resolution 41/69, of 3 December 1986, considered Israeli measures to resettle PRs in the GS and their displacement to constitute a violation of their inalienable RR, as entailed in Resolution 194(III); thus, requesting Israel to desist from the removal and resettlement of refugees in the GS and from the destruction of their shelters (UN, 1987:243). This issue has also been a particular concern of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on its 9th of June session in 1988 (Council of Europe, 9 June, 1988:2). One of the main criticisms by UNRWA regarding resettlement of refugees was with respect to the demolition of the camp shelter as a precondition for the provision of a new house in the project. In the annual reports of the General-Commissioner, emphasis is placed on this issue rather more than on the difficulties which the refugees face due to relocation; UNRWA's protest, as voiced by Davidson, former deputy director of UNRWA, is that such shelters are UN property, and that they are needed for the growing refugee population, and their demolition would intensify the housing shortage in the camps (NYT, 24 November, 1976; UN, 1978:23; & 1987:17; Ma'ariv, 28 November, 1976).
Davidson’s charges about forced relocation and demolition of shelters were admitted by Major Cheshin, the Israeli liaison officer for Gaza. An official response to these complaints from the Defence Ministry was "Of course we demolish them. The whole point of the project is to get rid of the refugee camps" (JP, 19 October, 1988). Commander Major Hassin, spokesman for the WB, replied to UNRWA’s criticism by saying:

If we had done nothing to rehabilitate the refugees or build new houses, wouldn’t the housing shortage in the camps be even more intense? Has the UNRWA allocated any funds to solve the housing problem? (Ma’ariv, 28 November, 1976).

In addition, the Israeli Government’s position was that materials from demolished shelters be used by the refugees in new construction, and congestion in the camp is also relieved (UN, 1987:17).

6.5 UNRWA - REFUGEE RELATIONS

Table 6.3 indicates how refugees in the sample from the Shati camp and the Sheikh Radwan housing project view UNRWA’s role in resettlement.

**TABLE 6.3 : Refugees’ Attitude Towards UNRWA’s Role in Resettlement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>SR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major role</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor role</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No role</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: the 1991 sample survey*

The majority of refugees in both locations saw no role for UNRWA. Responses seemed to be on the basis that UNRWA had not improved the housing conditions of refugees in the camps and that the excuse that UNRWA lacked suitable funds was unjustified. One refugee from the SR project was particularly angry at the level of conspicuous consumption by the UNRWA GS office which provided expenditure for 500 air-conditioners and transport. Another respondent saw a link between American support to Israel and the former’s major contribution to UNRWA, which is one of the highest, the dialectic relationship between the two dictating the kinds of policy and solutions proposed for the refugee problem.

Moreover, the Palestinian refugees saw another linkage between resettlement and the issue of orders restricting construction in the camps. In a public announcement issued by the
Civil Administration of the GS with regard to "Israeli Building Regulations in the Refugee Camps of the GS" it was stated that any change in the camp shelter in whatever form was prohibited and violators would be penalized accordingly (See Appendix 5). UNRWA's position in relation to the Israeli building restrictions in camps was given by the Deputy Director in Gaza office. He said: "The Civil Administration made their rules, we have no bearing on their making decisions. They don't consult us and we don't have any role in that" (Interview, 30 July, 1991). Although this answer is improbable, it begs the question of what constitutes UNRWA's role?

The same is said about the WB camps. A case in point is the four camps in Nablus area, which in 1986 the authorities were added to the municipality by the authorities. Much development took place thereafter, but recently the authorities deleted that annexation, development was frozen, a system of roads to allow rapid deployment of military vehicles to the refugee camps was built, and the area has mostly been expropriated (Coon, 1992:95). Yet, "improvement of refugee camps (or their removal) has not been addressed in any of the outline plans in the WB" (Coon, 1992:97,131-2).

As well as the refugees, UNRWA is also subjected to construction restrictions in the GS. Co-ordination is required between UNRWA and the Military Government, and has been since early 1981. Permits have to be obtained from the authorities for school construction, including additions and changes to existing schools, according to Military Order No.654 of July 1980. Other UNRWA projects are affected, such as the project for disabled refugees within the Khan Yunis camp, which was obstructed in May 1982 according to the General-Commissioner despite detailed co-ordination of the project some time before with the Military Government (UN, 1983: 12-13).

What cannot be understood or explained is that almost a year later, in October 1983, UNRWA issued similar regulations for the WB camps, forbidding residents to build a second storey onto their existing shelters. That policy was condemned and protested at by the refugees in the WB camps. Letters of protest were sent to the UNRWA director, which connected the procedure with the cut in services and the Israeli resettlement programme aims in the long run of liquidating the refugee problem (al-Quds, 18 October; al-Mithaq, 15 & 19 October, 1983).

Building restrictions, either by Israel or UNRWA can be better understood within a broader context. The refugees themselves are not against any construction programmes and improvement of their living conditions, as they declared to the Commissioner -General, if these are carried out by UNRWA and not by the Israeli authorities, whose projects have clear political implications (Viorst, 1989:112). Fear of refugees stems from the fact that the Agency might be
used in an attempt to keep them in permanent "refugee" status, for, as Nabil Sha’at has put it, many see UNRWA "as an agent for humiliating them with charity while it white-washed the international community" (Viorst, 1989:117). As one refugee noted, "[UNRWA] is giving us morphine injections, its creation was a conspiracy of reactionary right-wing governments.... They have made beggars out of us" (Cossali & Robson, 1986:122). Similar views were expressed by 55.6% of respondents in a survey conducted in six refugee camps in Lebanon, and among PRs in Lebanese towns 60% saw UNRWA as damaging for the refugees on political, psychological and living levels (JPS, 1973:35-37).

The Agency was seen by refugees to reproduce colonialist attitudes towards refugees, for its structure consisted of two separate hierarchies, one "international" made up of former Mandate Government officials, and the other "local", each with different status, conditions and pay levels (Sayigh, 1988:19). It is ironic that the majority (70%) of the international staff are Americans and Britons, when the PRs perceive their countries to be the most responsible for their plight and its aftermath (McDowall, 1981:11).

Refugee confidence in UNRWA only recovered after the PLO obtained observer status at the UN in 1974, and after UNRWA began to identify its goals with those of the organization and a rapprochement with the Palestinians followed. The PLO, since the mid-70s, has encouraged Arab countries to contribute to UNRWA's budget. In November 1992, at the second round of the refugee talks in Ottawa, the head of the Palestinian delegation Dr. Hallaj considered the participation of UNRWA in the talks to be important. He said that it represents the international community's concern for the PRs' plight, and it embodies the efforts to be undertaken to find the proper mechanisms to deal with the refugees, until a just solution is reached (Filastin al-Thawrah, 1992:14).

UNRWA was brought back into its original role of being a provider of emergency assistance as a result of the Lebanon crisis, the deteriorating situation in OTs, and the consequences of the Gulf conflict, which have effected the Palestinians economically and morally. This was despite the fact that UNRWA's emphasis in the first 25 years of its existence was in helping refugees build a future for themselves, through obtaining educational skills, self-help projects and income-generating schemes. UNRWA's role has been transformed by these three factors, and its new high profile in the territories among refugees has helped it to reinvigorate itself.

The provision of emergency assistance by UNRWA, however, has included both refugees and residents. Commissioner-General Iter Turkmen said in his opening statement at the Informal Meeting of governments in Vienna on 5th of June 1991:
(the consequences of the Gulf crisis) erased much of what was left of a disparity in conditions between refugees and residents...the distinction...has become academic. In humanitarian and practical terms it is no longer feasible to use such concepts.

The new task of UNRWA in response to the Intifada has also exceeded its original mandate, which was based on provision of humanitarian assistance, to that of "general assistance" to protect refugees. This rejuvenated mandate was put into practice in April-May 1988, on the recommendation of US Under Secretary of State Marrack Goulding who, after a visit to the territories, requested the introduction of "extra international staff within the Agency’s existing administrative structures". As a result, nineteen "guardian Angels" (so called by Jansen) were appointed in the WB and GS offices. The appointment of the 19 Refugee Affairs Officers was criticised by the authorities, because they interpose themselves between Palestinians and the Israeli army, and "their presence alone acts as a deterrent and this has made Israeli troops hostile" (Jansen, 1989:9; Schiff, 1989:70).

The adoption of a new flexible position by UNRWA towards the changing conditions and the camp community it serves in the OTs, was facilitated by UNRWA’s "pragmatic, action-oriented" structure, as Turkmen said. Yet this view, together with UNRWA’s changing stance, is contrary to the findings of a study done by some members of the faculty of the Hebrew University. Examining UNRWA’s operations in the WBGS, they applauded its success, which they attributed to "the sense of mission of its top-level officials", yet they found that one of its defects lay, in its being, "a static organization which finds it difficult to adjust to changing circumstances" (Magen, 1972:35).

6.6 HOUSING NEEDS

The Israeli building restrictions in the camps can be seen as an indirect attempt to force residents to move out to the housing projects. These projects are the only alternative for refugees because of the limited availability and high prices of land and houses, and the continuous increase in house-rents in the Strip. The housing problem in the OTs is illustrated by the following Table:
Factors behind the housing shortage are related to the Israeli authorities' restrictive measures on construction and building, a general policy which serves the strategic goals of the Israeli settlements policy, and the future of the OT's. Sixteen Military orders on the WB alone were issued since 1967 which deal with supervision of construction and urban and rural planning, which under occupation has been seen as a matter of political debate. All these orders relied on "security purposes" as a pretext to give jurisdiction to the authorities to carry them out (Rabah & Fairweather, 1993; Coon, 1992:40).

This Israeli policy for restructuring an adequate supply of housing in the OTs dovetails with the overall strategy of controlling as much land in the territories as possible under the pretext of maintaining "public order and security, or for public purposes". Barriers to construction development in the OTs are related to Israeli planning schemes for a large number of Palestinian villages and towns throughout the WB and the GS. The Palestinians, as a report for the US Government states: "are not permitted to participate in significant public policy decisions concerning land and resource use and planning" (Coon, 1992:39). East Jerusalem residents are the most to suffer from Israeli planning policies, and the problems over obtaining building permits are often insurmountable. As admitted by the advisor to the mayor "...Young Arab couples have no opportunity to build new homes" (Coon, 1992:93).

The first scheme for planning was known as the Partial Regional Master Land Use Scheme No.1/82 of 1982, it covers an area of 446,279 Dunums. It includes 49 towns and villages, plus seven refugee camps in the WB (Daqqaq, 1983:9). While these and other unpublished schemes for physical planning, by the Israeli Higher Planning Council, were not "deposited legally", 6 the authorities have been implementing them. As Coon put it, "For the Palestinians the planning system is of vital concern because it affects not only their prospects of future prosperity, but their prospects of nationhood." He added that: "the apparatus of town planning can be a powerful force for the good of a community...(and) it could be an even more powerful means of oppression" (Coon, 1992:3,10). This has been done through the issuing of military orders, often to the detriment of the Palestinians. Aware of the motives of such
planning schemes, the Palestinians hence protested in various ways - by holding press conferences, reporting to the UN, the Israeli High Court, and the High Court in Lahai (al-Jarbawi & Abdel-Hadi,1990:40 & 43).

Under the planning process, the Palestinians are paying a high price: denial of building permits; demolition of houses which the Israeli authorities claim were "illegally built" and expropriation of land for settlements. More recently, the Planning Council has become a major player in the Israeli war against the Intifada. Planning has been used as an instrument of collective punishment against villages which have an active role in the Intifada. Such was the case of the village Idna near Hebron, where the army notified 114 Palestinian families, during a three-week military siege, that their homes would be demolished because they lacked building permits. Another case is the village Kisan near Bethlehem. In 1982 the Israelis destroyed 26 homes in this village, ostensibly because they were built without permits. Yet, the real intention was revealed six years later with the confiscation of 50,000 dunums of Kisan land and the setting up of Ma’aleh Amos settlement on it (al-Fajr English,26 December, 1988). A study of lands held under the control of Jewish settlement showed that 95% of such land had been privately owned (Cited in Coon,1992:203). International condemnation of Israel’s policy on Palestinian building permits, while muted, did lead UNCTAD to say:

The restrictive practices of the occupying authorities, in terms of administrative obstacles of issuing building permits and the transfer of funds from abroad...have stifled local efforts and effectively barred a potentially large number of families from procuring decent housing." (Sadler and Abu Kishk,1983:38).

Denying the Palestinians the right to development and planning could be further seen in the light of Israeli settlement policies in OT’s and the intention "to allow full scope for the colonisation of the WB by Jews" as Coon put it (Coon,1992:204). Jewish settlement in the OTs carries with it political motives, as explained by a former Israeli minister who described settlement "... as the backbone of the Zionist movement, and...the only means to defeat any peace initiative which is intended to bring foreign rule to Judea and Samaria " (Saleh,1990:347). As in the early years of the Zionist movement, the current Israeli settlement policies in the OTs are attempting to achieve the same advantages of both concentration and dispersal as Coon said. He quoted the three principles of Halabi, Turner and Benvenisti’s: " (a) interconnection between existing Jewish areas to create continuity, (b) fragmentation of existing Arab settlement, and (c) concentration on powerful new Jewish settlement blocs" (Coon,1992:175).

This craving for land by Jews is further aggravated by another Israeli policy towards the population of the OTs, in which the Israelis "do not recognize most Palestinian ownership
rights," as explained by Coon:

The Israelis have stopped the process of land registration - so most Palestinian land is not formally registered - so the Israelis do not recognise ownership rights to that land - so they do not allow subdivision of that land - so they refuse development permits (Coon, 1992:114).

Given this, one can argue that the Israeli building and construction policy towards the refugee camps should be considered in relation to the general Israeli policy of construction and planning applying to the OT's as a whole.

6.7 UNRWA - ISRAEL RELATIONS

Between 1967 and December 1987 UNRWA strove not to lose its neutral image by carrying out its mandate without political involvement. Yet, in a totally politicized environment, it has been impossible for it to be apolitical, especially since the start of the Intifada.

Relations between UNRWA and the Israeli authorities are based on an agreement of 1967, between the Commissioner-General and the Israeli political advisor to the Foreign Minister Michael Comay, that UNRWA would operate in the OTs in the same manner as when the areas were under Egyptian and Jordanian rule (Viorst, 1989:40;UNRWA, 1990:39-40).

However, in the particular situation of the OTs, UNRWA has been presented with new long-term challenges. This was best described by Schiff, who wrote:

The requirement for coordination, given the adversarial relationship between Israeli authorities and the refugees, means that almost any UNRWA initiative can be expected to stimulate criticism from partisans of either side of the conflict. Because it is under the control of neither the refugees nor the Israelis, it is also a convenient target for venting frustrations by critics on both sides (Schiff, 1989:64).

He continued to say, "UNRWA treads a thin line between collaboration and advocacy because the interests of its clients and of the occupation authorities are in conflict" (Ibid.:67).
181 in the WB in the period from 1 July, 1989 to 30 June, 1990 (UN,1990:29). Moreover, Israel retaliated against UNRWA's efforts to help refugees by no longer paying port and transportation costs for commodities destined for UNRWA use in the OTs. According to UNRWA estimates, this signified additional costs to them of $800,000 a year, which came at a time of tight budget restrictions (UNRWA Reports 6,1988:2).

UNRWA's existence has always been an embarrassment to the Israelis, as one employee in UNRWA/Gaza stated. "They hate that word "refugee" because people ask, "a refugee from where?" "They also hate seeing UNRWA reports being discussed in the UN and UNRWA's mandate being extended year by year. They are trying to see UNRWA's services run down by encouraging and forcing resettlement" (Cossali and Robson,1986:120-121).

That was Israel's wish in the immediate period after the 1967 war, when the Israeli government sought to end UNRWA's mandate as Israel established a top level committee, in the hope that it would be able on its own initiative to resettle many of the refugees under its control (Khoury,1969:203). Israel hoped that by doing away with the camps, they would remove the ugly evidence which exposed as a lie the Zionist slogan that Palestine was "a land without people for a people without land."

The Israeli officials expressed their wishes on different occasions that UNRWA should invest more in improving conditions in camps, and co-operate with the Israelis. That was a petition also proposed by George Shultz, - former US Secretary of State, who advocated that to improve "the quality of life" in the OTs, would lead to a decrease in "terror" (Viorst,1989:111)

Israel has criticized UNRWA for not stopping distribution of rations to the refugees (on the grounds that they gain good wages in Israel), and for spending the money instead on housing construction inside and outside the camps, as a spokesman for the territories stated (Ma'ariv,28 November,1976). UNRWA has replied that the Israelis have not been helpful in providing information, nor in giving precise numbers of Gazans employed in Israel, in order to help them to screen ineligibles (MT,24 November,1976).

Recent Israeli criticism is that UNRWA pours funds into the camps, thus inhibiting the outward movement of refugees (JP,6 July,1989). While trying to terminate UNRWA's mandate, Israel has always sought the cooperation of UNRWA in resettling refugees. Israel's explanation for seeking co-operation is that it lacks the means for such a big project (US $1.5 billion). Accordingly, Ben-Porath stated in a press conference that his proposal would be implemented in co-ordination with specialized UN organizations and mainly UNRWA (al-Quds, al-Fajr,22 November,1983). UNRWA's position towards Ben-Porath's proposal is that it wants
no association with it, and no involvement in its execution is envisaged, as General-Commissioner stated (MEI, 1984:11).

Moreover, UNRWA has always been against forced relocation to the projects (as mentioned earlier). The Israeli authorities deny the forceful relocation of refugees and claim it is voluntary; but, some official Israeli statements have emerged to reveal the truth. Major Cheshin, the former liaison officer for Gaza, in response to Davidson's accusations admitted the facts of forced relocation and demolition of shelters (NYT, 24 November, 1976; NLG Report, 1978:25).

UNRWA has not been allowed to instal any of its services in the projects, so refugees are increasingly dependent on the government. They are still eligible for UNRWA schools and clinics, but often their distance precludes their using them. One more criticism from the Israelis is UNRWA "perpetuates the Palestinians' refugee- consciousness, preventing positive change,...and it is carrying out counter-productive activities." At the same time Palestinian critique is that, "UNRWA undermines efforts to mobilize the refugees politically," an argument which has been refuted by the major role of the refugees in the Intifada (Schiff, 1989:69; Marx, 1992:292). Accordingly, calls have been made by some Palestinian thinkers that UNRWA "must cease if the Palestinian community is to mature both politically and socially" (McDowall, 1981:11). Since "camp residence, poverty and dependence on UNRWA rations had a ghettoising effect" in Lebanese camps, as Sayigh argues, (Sayigh, 1988:28), the same is true for camps on the WBGS, isolated from the urban areas. Mary Khas - an outstanding Palestinian figure and Director of The Early Childhood Programmes at the Quakers Office in the Strip - stated in an interview with the author on 30 July, 1991 that in her discussions with UNRWA directors in Gaza, she always denounced the dependency of refugees on UNRWA and recommended a shift of UNRWA's policy towards developmental projects.

But it could be argued that the refugees' stance is one of inconsistency in their relationship with UNRWA. This inconsistency is very much related to external circumstances which have an effect on the refugees living conditions, particularly in the economic sphere. Variables such as, labour market, the increase in unemployment, devaluation of the dinar, curfews, arrests and heavy fines, affect the refugees' dependence on UNRWA, despite its very minimal assistance. As John Davis, former UNRWA director put it,

....the maturing refugee boy has been and is at a serious disadvantage. This is not, however, because he is being held as a hostage, or because he does not want to work, but to a serious degree he, too, is unemployable in the existing labour market....and it is for this reason, above others, that they continue to be forced to live the life of dependent refugees (Davis, 1968:64).
In this context, the PRs have an ambivalent view of UNRWA - on the one hand they are seeking help from it and on the other, they know that the major contributor to UNRWA is the USA, which does not support their political rights. This put them in a dilemma, but they have no alternative for assistance offered.

GS refugees are a particularly interesting case, the harsh economic restraints imposed on them making their dependency on UNRWA a unique phenomenon compared to other refugees in other areas.
NOTES:

1. The Arab states saw in UNRWA's decision to end the basic rations programme, a first step to abdicate its responsibility towards PRs, see: Viorst, 1989:56-58.


3. The Executive Director was called upon "to devise a national housing development strategy for the year 2000 for the Palestinian people based on the Global Strategy for Shelter to the year 2000 in co-operation with the PLO, including the housing requirements of a future independent Palestinian State and to submit this report to the Commission at or before its thirteenth session (UN,1989:26).

4. The legality of plans for construction in the West Bank is based on procedures set out in the Jordanian Town and Village Planning Law of 1966. After 1967 the Israeli military authorities have amended certain laws by issuing various military orders to exert control and regulate planning and building in the West Bank. Those military orders are said to lack legal basis.

5. For more details on the critic's charges against UNRWA by both sides Israelis and Palestinians, see: Benjamin Schiff, 1989:60-75; NYT, 24 November, 1976.

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Part Four:

The Socioeconomic and Political Impact of

Refugee Resettlement in the Gaza Strip
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT AND IMPACT OF RESETTLEMENT

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Having discussed in the previous chapters the issue of resettlement in the GS, and examined some of its procedures together with the PRs' and Israelis' perspective of it, our focus in this chapter, is on the socioeconomic impact of resettlement on refugees. The impact on refugees in this sphere cannot be dealt with in a vacuum, but has to be linked with Israeli policies and measures in the OTs during the 27 years of occupation.

The purpose of examining the socioeconomic impact is to create an empirical foundation for the examination of changes which occur in the life of relocated refugees compared with those who remain in the SC. It is also to monitor the critical components of social and economic life as they appeared at one point in time.

The Chapter begins by examining the working conditions and household income of refugees in the sample survey in both locations. The aim is to examine whether the stated Israeli policy of "economic development" has any credibility. It is argued that there is an inconsistency in the policies undertaken by the Israelis towards the population in the OTs, economic measures being used to control the population politically and not to promote development. Political control forms the skeleton of the Israeli policies in the OTs.

In this context, the question is raised as to whether the Israeli authorities are genuine in improving the living conditions of the Palestinians. The sample survey data illustrates that both the camp and the housing project in Gaza are characterized by a massive refugee population and very high population density, there being very little difference between the two locations. Gaza is also distinguished by severe labour market problems and few migration possibilities. These peculiar features of the GS leave their marks on the living conditions of refugees and it is shown that the relocated refugees are particularly affected, since mortgages and bills make work a necessity.

This Chapter demonstrates that political control by the authorities is not only manifested in the dispersal of refugees through resettlement, but is also combined with other spheres of everyday life in the OTs namely health and education. During the Intifada access to health and education have been used as a collective punishment to quell resistance to occupation.

The Chapter also draws out from the field data the importance of having a large family.
Evidence suggests that motherhood is being used to reproduce political cadres rather than for economic or religious reasons. Motherhood in this sense has become a public duty as well as heroic one; this is, to meet the requirements of the national struggle and the increasing number of new Jewish immigrants, the latter factor being a threat to Palestinian existence on the land, and is seen as part of Israel’s expansionist policies.

A range of data were collected on the patterns, processes and conditions of resettlement, including the interaction among refugees in SR and between SR and SC; and refugee perceptions of the similarities and differences between life in SR and their previous camp life in SC.

The indicators demonstrate that little improvement has occurred in the life of SR residents. Indeed, data from the empirical research in SR reveal that new problems have been experienced, such as feelings of alienation, especially by the older generation.

The final section of the chapter examines the willingness of refugees to return to the camp.

7.2 EMPLOYMENT IN ISRAEL: ANOTHER FORM OF CONTROL

As discussed in chapter four, the road widening operations to reduce the fedayeen (Lit., "self-sacrifice") activities were one technique used by the Israeli authorities to tranquillize the GS. These operations fostered the implementation of the resettlement schemes for refugees, as made clear in the Israeli Ministry of Defence Report: "The slackening of terrorist activities in 1971 made possible the implementation of Israel’s refugee rehabilitation programmes" (Ministry of Defence, 1983:56). According to Israeli claims, resettlement or rehabilitation of Gaza refugees has been designed to raise the standard of living of the population in the GS, within the framework of "economic development" or improving the "quality of life." Providing work opportunities for Palestinians in Israel has to be seen alongside these claims.

Dayan’s call, in the aftermath of 1967 occupation, for the complete economic integration of the OTs with Israel, was favoured over other trends of thought at the time. Dayan saw the implementation of integration, as Tamari noted,

"..through three institutional mechanisms - infrastructure, labour and markets. These three central control mechanisms were the foundation on which Israel constructed its political hegemony over the region, undergirded of course by Israel’s monopoly of coercive force and a pervasive intelligence network (Tamari, 1988:24).

In pursuing its economic interests, Israel’s economic relationship with the OTs began
to develop, and as Tamari and Zureik noted it "... was very similar to that developing 'between the metropolitan economy and its colonial satellite'" (Tamari, 1980:96; Zureik, 1980:61).

These three mechanisms - infrastructure, labour and markets - must be seen as the institutional building blocks for Israel's political control of the territories. Ultimately, Israel's control over the territories is political and military, and not socioeconomic (Ibid.).

Political control of the territories was emphasised by Shlomo Gazit when he wrote in 1985 summarizing the Israeli economic policy at the beginning of the occupation:

'Political and security' considerations should be placed above economic considerations; while planning for economic activity in the territories, priority should be given to the needs of the Israeli economy; there should be no Israeli investments in the economy of the OTs; the Palestinian economy should have safety valves (open bridges, work in Israel, etc.) (Bishara, 1990:225).

The net effect of those features has been to render authority or control over the population in the O.T's. Keehn sees a close alliance between the concept of authority and the concepts of compliance and support. He wrote:

Since authority is based upon consent, reciprocal exchange helps create the consent that facilitates governing. The capacity to confer benefits, especially economic welfare benefits is playing an important source of legitimacy....So long as resources are limited, the potential for exercising control is concomitantly limited. Power is an essential element of authority (Keehn, 1974:337-8).

As a result of the exercise of authority over the OTs population, Zureik observes: "Israel's occupation of the WB and Gaza has created a different system of relationship to the Palestinians. To all intents and purposes, the OTs are Zionism's 'Bantustan' regions" (Zureik, 1980:61).

7.2.1 Replication of Claims

By drawing the refugee population into wage labour in Israel, the Israelis expected to achieve two aims: first, to weaken the sense of identity among refugees - the only identity that enhanced their collectiveness and cohesiveness - and second, as one Israeli official stated: "If they're picking strawberries in Israel, they're not throwing grenades in Gaza" (Graham-Brown, 1986:230; O'Neill, 1978:92). Thus the real motives behind the authorities' claims of improving the standard of living of the population in the OTs become clear, and resemble those behind setting up the housing projects in GS.

An examination of Israeli measures to quell the Intifada through economic as well as military means belies their mission of improving the standard of living for the population in the OTs. They mobilized every means at their disposal to hurt Palestinian residents in the WBGS
in their stomachs and pockets (Awartani, 1991:18); a situation which was aggravated further by the consequences of the Gulf War. What can be perceived is an implementation of Gazit and Dayan’s ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ policy in the OTs. By depriving the population of economic facilities, the authorities sought to pacify Palestinian resistance to occupation (Gazit, 1986:228, 232). Given that the authorities must have known that no alternative work was available, an element of economic punishment at a collective level is obvious here. The question remains, has the occupation succeeded through economic means to crush resistance?

A recent survey by FAFO in the OTs shows Gaza refugees to be the most deprived socio-economic group in terms of employment (Ovensen, 1993:194). Employment in Israel has been especially important to Gazans. By the end of 1987, 46 percent of the GS labour force had their main employment in Israel, a large increase from the 4% in 1968. By 1991 this proportion had dropped somewhat to 38% (Ovensen, 1993:201; al-Fair, February 19, 1988).

In 1991, the unemployment rate had reached an all-time-high of around 30% in the WB and 35% in GS. Gaza workers have been more affected by Israeli measures during the Intifada, attributed to the ‘magnetic card’ policy, by which a tangible number of workers have been deprived of entry across the Green Line (Awartani, 1991:21).

The present socioeconomic conditions of GS refugees have roots in the pre-1967 period. Due to the paucity of the local economy (mainly agricultural), GS refugees, unlike those on the WB, were not absorbed into productive employment, thus, their living standards witnessed very limited improvement (Van Arkadie, 1977:30). Evidence from the field data indicates that the poverty of GS refugees has been maintained.

7.2.2 Gaza Refugees in the Labour Force

Table 7.1 below shows the numbers and percentages of workers employed in Israel compared to other places of work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Work</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The WB</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The GS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is commonly assumed that Israel is the main employer of Gaza refugees, yet Table
7.1 refutes this. There are two main reasons for this: the timing of the sample survey (a month after the Gulf War when an UNRWA study estimated that 40% of the Palestinian labour-force in the OTs became unemployed) (UNRWA, 1991:13); the inclusion of a large number of housewives, and a smaller number of students, retired and disabled residents, as shown in Table 7.2 below.

TABLE 7.2 Occupational Distribution of Employed Refugees, both locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>SC No.</th>
<th>SC %</th>
<th>SR No.</th>
<th>SR %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The bulk of refugees in SC are employed in the public services sector (60% compared to 24% in the SR). Irrespective of location, however, the real issues are those of income and working conditions and their effect on the living conditions of the refugees in GS.

7.2.3 The Issue of Income

For Gaza refugees, wage income is the major source of family income. Changes brought about by the Gulf War and Israeli restrictions on Arab labour mobility to Israel caused a decline in household income mainly in the GS and refugee camps. This was further aggravated by the lack of remittances from family members abroad, and the cut-off of Arab aid to the PLO. The restrictions imposed on Gaza labour in Israel have, as the FAFO survey showed, resulted in the GS having a lower share of households receiving income from labour activity than in the WB and Arab Jerusalem (Ovensen, 1993:177). As the field data showed, household incomes have been declining in GS since the *Intifada* began. This finding corresponds with FAFO findings that two out of three households in the OT's reported a decline in income while only one out of twenty households experienced an increase, with the highest decline in Gaza and refugee camps (Ovensen, 1993:166-7).

In my sample survey the question raised to measure differences in household economic
resources was 'to what extent does household income covers the essential needs of the household'? The results are shown in Table 7.3. The use of an indirect approach to income relates to respondents' fear of taxation and their concomitant suspicion of strangers asking direct questions about economic affairs.

TABLE 7.3 Income Sufficiency by Household in Both Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of Coverage</th>
<th>SC No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>SR No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No income</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

The Table indicates that less than 10% of all the households sampled reported sufficient income for essential needs. About 48% of households sampled in the SR and 60% in the SC reported incomes covering only some of their essential needs, while 33.3% in SR and 18.3% SC said that their income covers nearly all essential needs. By the end of the first year of the Intifada, income losses for the 100,000 Arab workers in Israel were estimated at US$ 158 million (Shunar, 1989:53). Indeed, data collected at the end of 1989 show that personal income for many families in the GS had dropped by as much as 75% from its 1987 level (Roy, 1991:61).

The alarming drop in living conditions in GS camps since 1985 contrasts sharply with the generally agreed increase in such conditions in the 1970s. Van Arkadie attributed 50% of WBGS income-growth since 1967 to increased wages in Israel (Van Arkadie, 1977:144). During the periods 1970-1973 and 1982-1985, Israeli statistics indicated that Gazans' GNP per capita increased from an average of US$450 to one of $649, compared with an increase from an average of $519 to one of $919 on the WB for the same period. Despite such increases, however, it must be stressed that these figures are well below the GNP per capita applying to Israel in 1986 ($4,950) and to neighbouring Jordan in 1984 ($1,119.7) (Abdullah, 1988:49-50). In 1985 the standard of living of the Palestinians in the WB remained lower than the Israeli standard of living by a ratio of 1:4 (Benvenisti, 1986:17).

The rise in income on WBGS from the 1970s was clearly evidenced by a number of indicators related to private consumption, housing conditions, and ownership of private cars and household durable goods. Benvenisti argues that these improvements in living standards continued until 1981, and since then there have been decreases. Awartani has argued,
meanwhile, that private consumption per capita continued to rise until 1986 at an overall rate of 5% per annum (Awartani, 1991:17). Yet, it should be noted that the rise in living standards following the onset of Israeli occupation,

....was not founded on a genuine growth in the domestic economic base, rather, it has been precipitated as a consequence of parasitic subordination to the Israeli economy.....and there is a clear indication that consumption has considerably outstripped domestic production' (Awartani, 1991:17).

During the Intifada there has been a drop in personal consumption. For example, in the month of September 1992 it was estimated at US$ 888 for a Palestinian family of four members, or about half of the per capita private consumption for a comparable family in Israel ($1,683). This rate has to be understood in relation to an average wage for Palestinians of $228-323 only, and the absence of the kind of income support which an Israeli worker can obtain if he/she earns less than $513 (Quds Press, 28 November, 1992). And also in relation to the poverty line in the OTs in February 1992, of $500 compared to about $1000 in Israel, which indicates that almost most workers in the OTs are under the poverty line (al-Quuds-al-Arabi, 24 February, 1992).

Initially it was the consumption of luxury goods and services that was cut, but, as economic pressures mounted, consumers have had to reduce their consumption even of some basic goods. Israeli authorities estimate the decline in the standard of living at a minimum of 30 percent (Roy, 1991:61). For the first time in two decades, malnutrition and poverty are observed in wide sectors of the Palestinian population, particularly among GS refugees. Indicators of deterioration include, as Roy observed: increases in child labourers, 75% of whom come from the GS; refugee and non-refugee demands for emergency food relief; increases in the number of children in UNRWA supplementary feeding programmes (Roy, 1991,62). It is clear that any increases in living standards since the territories were occupied have not been maintained.

7.2.3.1 Detrimental Influences Over Income

The lack of or decline in income relates to other factors which affect the living conditions of GS refugees. The high prevalence of part-time work in Israel is one such factor, especially detrimental for workers relocated to the housing projects who need long hours in order to pay mortgages and municipality electricity and water bills. Many such workers mentioned that the necessity to raise money had compelled them to sell their wives gold jewellery. The FAFO survey showed that the GS region has a lower percentage of married women in possession of saleable jewellery (37%) than the WB (55%) and Arab Jerusalem (71%)
The wealth of households is very much related to the number of workers per household, the subject of the following table.

**TABLE 7.4 Workers Per Household in Both Locations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The majority of households in the SC (62.7%) and 41.1% in the SR have only one worker in the family. Reasons explaining this are, in addition to Israeli restrictions on employment in Israel: the lack of work opportunities in the Strip; the high density of population combined with very little natural resources; the high dependency ratio in the Strip; and the low female participation in the labor force. Figures for 1989 showed that from a total of 379,360 people aged 16 and over 217,180 are not in the labour force; thereof, 48,670 thousands were males and 168,510 were females (Labour, 1990:32).

The other relevant factor influencing the low level of participation in the active labour force is the high proportion of young people attending schools and universities both within the WBGS and abroad. Labour's figures for 1989 show that 47.11 percent of GS population are under 16 year of age (*Ibid.*:23); and 21.53 percent of the GS population aged sixteen and over were involved in education in 1989 (*Ibid.*:50). These features would lead a worker in Gaza to seek any work in Israel to earn a living for his large family, despite his awareness of the inequitable work conditions. Political measures also have a detrimental influence on the living conditions of refugees. The number of working days was estimated to average only 18 per month in 1991 in the GS refugee camps (Awartani, 1991:21), as a result of the imposition of curfews and strikes, disrupted transportation facilities, and administrative detention. An UNRWA estimate - based on interviews with workers about their wage levels prior to the Gulf war - showed that wages of US$ 47,600,000 were lost during January, February and March 1991 (UNRWA, 1991:3), as a result of the war curfew which prohibited workers from entering Israel between January 16 and late February.

The problem which Gaza refugees face in terms of employment in Israel is further compounded by increasing competition from the new Soviet migrants and other foreign workers.
As Lifshitz has commented:

When an immigrant from Russia or Ethiopia competes for a job with a worker from Gaza, not only the Israeli Right, but the humane, stuttering Zionist Left as well, will prefer the immigrant and the Israeli unemployed over the Gazan (Lifshitz, 1991:37).

This has further increased unemployment problems for Arab workers, and in the early 1990s, "overqualified Palestinians - the products of the expanding educational system - and overqualified Soviet Jews eyed the same low-level jobs" (Migdal and Kimmerling, 1993:259).

7.2.3.2 Loss of Remittances

In addition to the aforementioned direct influences on Palestinians' household income, indirect factors have also had a role, such as the decline - and the cessation - of remittances coming from family members working in Kuwait and other Gulf countries.

Before the Gulf war remittances from abroad helped to pull household wealth upwards, enabling investments in housing and the education of children. According to the FAFO survey, remittances constitute up to 1/3 of private disposable income in the OTs, the northern and central parts of the WB rating higher than other regions (Ovensen: 1993:173). In 1987, as Roy reported, total remittances from the Gulf countries reached $250 million, or 10% of the territories' GNP (1991:62). Refugees abroad sought to maintain an exile culture through obligations to aid their relatives in dire straits in the homeland.

The loss of remittances since the Gulf War was aggravated by a decision of the Gulf Cooperation Council to cut off aid to the PLO. The losses of $480 million in direct aid and $62.5 million in revenue from the "liberation tax" formerly levied on Palestinians working in the region and turned over to the PLO, have been affecting the Palestinians' living conditions, since some funds were funnelled to the territories (al-Tali'a, 19 April, 1991).

At the end of 1989 residents of GS living temporarily abroad to study or work reached about 86,000 (Labour, 1990:29), compared with the 27,697 measured by the Israeli Census of population in 1967 (Van Arkadie, 1977:58). The sample survey in both locations shows the following figures (Table 7.5).
TABLE 7.5 No. & Percentage of Households With Family Members Living Abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Persons</th>
<th>SC No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>SR No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - 10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

Nearly one-fifth (16.9%) of the 142 households in the SC have 1 or 2 members of their families living abroad, and over one-quarter (26.7%) in the SR. The majority of households in both locations have no family member living abroad. Unlike the WB, GS refugees - other than those who immigrated at the time of the 1967 war and its aftermath - have exercised more residential stability, because of a lack of means and skills.

Only 17 (12%) of households in the SC project get remittances from abroad; 125 (88%) receiving no remittances, comparable figures for SR being 10 (11.1%) and 80 (88.9%) respectively. This paucity of remittances could be attributed to the new dispersion of the Palestinian communities living in the Gulf during the period following the invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf war and the harsh treatment of Palestinian migrant workers.

The direct and indirect measures imposed on the Palestinian refugees in the OTs leave them with no alternative other than complete dependency on the Israeli economy to maintain their living. Yet, the asymmetrical interdependency between the two has been creating new contradictions. As the disparity between them has expanded it has formed the basis for the nationalist fervor which culminated in the eruption of the Intifada in December 1987.

7.3 CREATING NEW CONTRADICTIONS

7.3.1 Forms of Socioeconomic Oppression

By opening its doors to Arab workers, under the pretext of "economic development", Israel has in fact been creating new contradictions. Israel’s full awareness of these contradictions became evident with the losses incurred on its economy during the Intifada.

Palestinian workers in Israel are vulnerable to economic and political fluctuations, as they are the "last hired, first fired" (Ovensen,1993:207) due to a lack of job protection. The
consequences of this vulnerability have to be understood against several discrepancies between the Arab worker and the Israeli one.

A man from Gaza working in Israel knows he is treated much worse than an Israeli worker, that he does not earn enough to support his family on (sic) a reasonable standard and the conditions in which he must work are inhuman (Ryan, 1974:17).

Israeli officials and economists argue that the wage level of Palestinians working in Israel is higher in real terms than before 1967, resulting in the noticeably expanded purchasing power of a significant section of the population in the OTs (Budeiri, 1982:57). But, as Van Arkadie argues, commuting labourers are either enjoying the benefits of a high income or they are underprivileged by being relegated to the bottom of the economic ladder (Van Arkadie, 1977:41-42). The fact is that WBGS Palestinians are the lowest-paid group in the Israeli wage structure. Bregman's Bank of Israel study emphasized that when reporting:

Gross data indicate that a sizeable gap exists between average wages paid to Israelis and the average paid to area residents working in Israel; it stood at 50 percent in 1972. In 1972 the average gross monthly wage of a WB or GS resident was about 500 Israeli pounds compared with 918 pounds for an Israeli (Van Arkadie, 1977:65)

Besides the undeniable gap in wages between Palestinian workers from the WBGS and Israeli workers, other differences also exist. These include: the deductions (30-40%) of Palestinians' wages to labour contractors; 2 income tax payments at the same level as Israeli workers; and social security payments and pension contributions. Yet, Palestinian workers - with the exception of workers from Jerusalem are denied welfare services of the kind enjoyed by Israeli workers. In addition, their working-day lasts for twelve hours as they have to commute daily to and from work, incurring transport costs (Budeiri, 1982:57). Moreover, the Palestinian workers in Israel have been serving the capitalist interests of the Israeli economy. The OTs can be seen to be the periphery of a "developed" Israeli core, the former subjected to the latter. Tamari argues that the purpose of the integration of Arab labour was dual. It reduced the level of unemployment among the Arab population and it also allowed Israel to develop capital intensive industry and to restructure Jewish labour (Tamari, 1988:245).

According to a Bank of Israel report, "unskilled jobs have come to be considered the preserve of workers from the Administered Areas" (Cited in Budeiri, 1982:62). Palestinian workers, cheap and mobile, provided "a free labour force in the classical economic sense" (Farjoun, 1980:110). Between 1968 and 1973 the highly elastic and relatively cheap labour force from the OTs played an important role in the expansion of the Israeli economy (Van Arkadie, 1977:61-63). Davar of May 18, 1976 expressed the flexibility which the Arab workers
lend to the Israeli economy:

...an Arab worker is exceptionally mobile, can be dismissed without notice and moved from place to place, does not strike and does not present demands. From many economic considerations, workers from the territories are a bargain for the Israeli economy...responding in an economically healthy manner to the demand of the Israeli economy. They exist when and where required and make a full contribution to the production cycle.

7.3.2 Controversy Over Interdependency

Israel's dependency on this "reserve army of labour" has been a source of controversy among the Israelis - especially during the Intifada - as well as the Palestinians. Tactics used by the Palestinians during the Intifada - strikes, boycotts, refusal to pay taxes - have aimed at mobilizing as many people as possible in the struggle and have transformed the occupation into an economic burden for Israel.

7.3.2.1 The Zionist/Israeli Argument

From the Zionist/Israeli Orthodox point of view, relying on cheap Arab labour including children "... threatened to undermine the pioneering ethos of Zionism and gave credence to Arab propaganda concerning Israeli 'colonialism'" (O'Neill, 1978:70). Pragmatic Israelis see in the Arab workers cheap labour that should be exploited for Israeli domestic demands, thus, emphasizing the colonial aspect of Israeli occupation (Shunar, 1989:21-23). However, by modelling itself along the apartheid structures of South Africa or the old Rhodesia, Israel is, according to some, increasingly making a mockery of the Zionist claim of 'normalisation' of Jewish social structure. As one Israeli social scientist argues, Israel is becoming a 'nation of bosses' (Zureik, 1980:60-1).

However, the hardship faced by Israelis as a result of the Intifada and the boycott of work in Israel, in addition to the Palestinian boycott of Israeli products in the first four years of the Intifada, has alerted some to the urgent need for restructuring of the Israeli economy to lessen dependence on the neighbouring territories, whether as a source of cheap labour or as hostage backyard markets (Awartani, 1991:19; Shunar, 1989:28-35).

According to the Governor of the Bank of Israel report in March 1988, Bruno stated that 20% decrease was witnessed in the number of Arab workers in Israel, affecting mainly the agricultural and construction sectors but generally not at the macroeconomic level (Haaretz, March 11, 1988). The Arab labour shortage is much higher according to other Israeli officials, being estimated at 42% by the Likud's former Minister of Labor Moshe Katsav (JP, March 1, 1988); and 40% by Ariel Sharon, Minister of Trade and Industry (al-Quds, March 11, 1988).
Israeli economic losses as a result of work absences by Arab workers in the first year of the Intifada were estimated at US$600 million; indeed if all Arab workers boycotted work they would be $1.5 billion (Shunar, 1989:53). Thus "Palestinian workers in Israel save about $500 million for Israeli employers in lower labor costs", in addition to unpaid social security benefits which are deducted from their paychecks, by which total net revenue for Israel reached more than $1 billion (Cited in Bishara, 1990:226). Added to this the taxes collected from the OTs by Israel every year which, being $383 million, well exceed the $240 million allocated for expenditures (Bishara, 1990:225). According to Benvenisti, Israel had made $600 million profit from taxes in 19 years of occupation of the WBGS (Cited in Sabella, 1990:92).

To compensate for its economic losses, Israel called for the importation of workers from other foreign sources, mainly to prevent the construction and agricultural sectors from collapsing. During the first months of the Intifada, losses in construction reached $200 million and in agriculture $1.5 million (Ha'aretz, July 27, 1988; JP, January 1, 1988). In May 1988 Rabin supported the idea of importing 3-8,000 workers from abroad for the construction sector. He commented that "[the Palestinians should] understand that work in Israel is an advantage that we provide, not a favor that they extend to us" (Cited in Bishara, 1990:227).

Gaza workers were the first to be punished by Israel's counter-reaction to the boycott of work in Israel. In May 1989 Israel decided to prevent Gazans from working in Israel for the first time since the 1967 occupation. This decision had far-reaching consequences since the income of such workers formed 54% of the GNP in the GS, compared to 18% in the WB (al-Quds, 16 June, 1989). Political and security aspects were also involved, the aim being to tame the Gazans through economic control and to disrupt the plans of the organizers of the Intifada. The consequences of such a decision was mainly seen on the Gazan workers, one of whom said: "You are killing us without guns, killing us with regulations, forms, and orders" (Lifshitz, 1991:38). Ultimately, Gazans repetition of the phrase that they are going through a slow death - as reported by Edward Said during his visit to GS - is valid (Said, 1992:54). Lifshitz noted that with the massive unemployment in the GS it is rapidly turning "... into a disaster area on the brink of hunger and beyond". He continued:

The thousand arms of the (Israeli) government perform a thousand actions, innocent or less innocent, with blind indifference. The result is the systematic starvation of the residents of the GS (Lifshitz, 1991:37-8).

A brief review of Israel's losses due to the boycott of products would further clarify the extent of dependency on the OTs as main importing markets, and there is enough evidence to suggest the magnitude of this cost is probably greater than that incurred by the Palestinians.
For example, in 1987 Israel's exports to the OT's were valued at $900 million; by the end of the first year of the Intifada the figure decreased to $600 million (Ma'ariv, December 16, 1988). The same year, the OTs exports to Israel which had amounted to $304 million decreased to $170 million. Two sectors were especially hard hit: textiles and food products which decreased between 10% to 25% (Abdullah, 1990:6-7).

However, for Israel, disrupted economic relations with the two territories are less likely to impart long term adverse consequences, given the aid granted to Israel from the US and world Jewry. This is not the case for the Palestinians in the O.T's.

7.3.2.2 The Palestinian Argument

For the Palestinians, controversy over work in Israel was first raised by the Gaza fedayeen in the second year of occupation. Their argument was that every Arab working in Israel released an Israeli for the front and workers going to Israel were attacked by the guerrillas to prevent them from work, as well as collaborators with the authorities (JP, 6 October, 1969). Despite awareness of economic need, as one Palestinian official put it, the "economic opportunities provided the Palestinians gave them something to lose if they supported the fedayeen, a fact not lost on the guerrillas" (Free Palestine, July 1971:5).

The Palestinians' economic resistance to Israel reached its peak during the Intifada campaign of civil disobedience, which took the form of boycotting Israeli work, products and taxes.

In Communique no. 3 of January 18, 1988 the Unified National Leadership (UNL) called upon workers to stop working in Zionist projects:

... By our uprising we will not lose anything but the chains of oppression and exploitation imposed upon us. Let the Israeli wheel of production be paralysed, injuring the Israeli economy. Deepening the Israeli economic crisis is one of the measures we use in order to regain our rights to repatriation, self-determination and an independent national state (Ibal, 1989:20).

In order to examine the extent to which the UNL communique was heeded, worker respondents in both locations were asked whether they commute to work on strike days. Their responses are shown in Table 7.7.
TABLE 7.7  Workers Commuting to Work on Strike Days by Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>SC No.</th>
<th>SC %</th>
<th>SR No.</th>
<th>SR %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

As indicated above, the majority of workers who replied do not work on strike days, whether in Israel or in the GS. This result reflects the collective stand of refugees in response to the UNL of the Intifada calls, irrespective of their location. The high rate of non-response is attributed to categories of the sample survey who are out of the labor force, as explained above.

Communique no. 6 of February 2, 1988, called the Palestinian masses to promote the national economy and reduce consumption, in support of the uprising and as a step toward finding substitutes for Israeli products, which must be boycotted in order to bolster sumud (steadfastness) (Ibal, 1989:32) The responses of the sample survey in the two case study areas regarding boycott of Israeli goods showed that 86 (95.6%) in the SR and 128 (90.1%) in the SC boycotted Israeli products, compared to 4 (4.4%) in the SR and 14 (9.9%) in the SC who did not. The degree of boycotting is shown in Table 7.8.

TABLE 7.8  Nature of Boycott of Israeli Goods by Persons in Both Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Boycott</th>
<th>SC No.</th>
<th>SC %</th>
<th>SR No.</th>
<th>SR %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

The survey data show that the majority of respondents partially boycott Israeli products. The partiality of the boycott relates to the unavailability of alternative local products, as a result of an Israeli policy to keep the OTs in a subordinate position economically and simultaneously facilitate political control. In this context, the issue of the economic development which Israel talks about for the OTs could be seen as superficial or false and not real. The workers’ role in boycotting work in Israel was an effective political weapon which affected the Israeli economy heavily. Yet, the loss incurred on the Palestinian workers income was also high. It amounted
to at least $238 million in the first year of the Intifada (Shunar, 1989:53). This loss, and the partiality of the boycott, may be attributed to the lack of a local alternative, which the Intifada had failed to provide for several reasons beyond the scope of this study.

At the same time, the boycott policy has defeated the notion that the physical, economic and infrastructural integration of the WBGS into the body of the state of Israel creates irreversible facts. Indeed, the concept of separation along the lines of Palestinian sovereignty is becoming a very clear-cut option for the future (Tamari, 1988:27). On Israel’s side, the economic losses incurred as a result of these forms of boycott have transformed the occupation from an economic asset into a liability. Yet the following questions must be raised. Could Israel afford to stop employing Palestinian workers in Israel? And could Palestinian workers afford to quit work in Israel?

Israel’s preoccupation with security and public order in the territories makes such a decision unapplicable in the short run. Even though its capacity to import foreign labour and introduce high technology could be an exit from dependence on Palestinian labour, it would create new socioeconomic problems and losses.

There is a thin line between economy and security as far as the Civil Administration and the Israeli authorities’ policy in the OTs goes. The hiring and firing of Arab labour is linked to Israel’s policy to maintain colonial rule and dependency. They want the population in the OTs to know that Israel is the only source of living for them, and those who resist occupation have to pay a high price. On the other hand, they know that if a very high rate of unemployment in the territories emerges, Palestinian resistance to occupation will escalate, as was the case during the Mandate period, when poor unemployed Palestinian peasants contributed to urban unrest and the discontent which fed the fires of nationalism and xenophobia leading up to the 1936-9 revolt (Ward, 1977:6-7). Israeli policies towards Palestinian labour also relate, however, to their needs in the construction and agricultural sectors, and Israel continued to hire labour to meet its economic interests even during the Intifada. It is this combination of conflicting economic, political and security factors which helps explain the graduated restriction of Arabs’ work in Israel.

As a result of the economic control over the refugees in particular, refugee camps have become centres of service rather than production, which explains why camp refugees are found in the lower categories of socioeconomic status. The refugees in this case fit the definition of a proletariat depending for living on wage labour - either in Israel or at home - a status which has been aggravated by their separation from the means of production through dispossession, rather than by economic and market forces (Graham-Brown, 1986:241).
7.4 PALESTINE: UNIQUE ASPECTS IN ITS PROCESS OF CHANGE

In the context of the economic crisis which the Palestinians encounter in the OTs, three questions can be raised. Is the economic crisis which the refugees encounter a new phenomenon in the socioeconomic history of Palestine? Has this crisis led to structural transformation of Palestine's economic situation and why? What consequences have this transformation brought, with regard to the social fabric and conditions of refugees? There is also a fourth question relating to the political and nationalistic impact, the answer to which will be dealt with in the last chapter of this study.

7.4.1 The Repeat of Palestinian History?

The dispossession of their land and their dependency on work in Israel is not a new phenomenon in the socioeconomic history of Palestinians. The transformation of peasants to wage labour has to be seen in a broader context. Zureik's observation in this respect is that:

The peculiar process of rural proletarianisation, became a distinguishing feature of Palestinian social structure, and was further aggravated during the British mandate and the Zionist colonisation of Palestine (1980:51)

The Palestinian peasants' dispossession from the land goes back to the 1850s, as Zureik argued. Since then there has been an increase in the size of Palestine's rural proletariat as was the case in the Levant region as a whole (Ibid.:49). The increase in the rural proletariat, according to Smilianskaya, resulted from European penetration in the Levant and their incorporation into the orbit of international capitalism (Cited in Ibid.:50).

The external penetration by British and Zionist forces in Palestine under Mandate was at the expense of the local Palestinian socioeconomic structure; similar to the present situation in the OTs which creates a Palestinian economy dependent on foreign forces (Migdal, 1977:342-3).

It could be noticed from the discussion above, that the interaction between the internal and the external structures and forces in the Palestinian experience have placed the Palestinian labour force since the Ottomans, British, Zionism/Israel under the mercy of foreign enterprises. Moreover, these external forces have impeded the emergence of a sound Palestinian economic infrastructure, thus, emphasising a state of dependency /subordination rather than independence.
7.4.2 Structural Transformation of Economy

The major dispersal of the peasantry in Palestine took place in 1948, when most of the refugees who fled and sought relief were peasants. The sudden separation of a whole class of people from their land and consequently from their sources of livelihood created a new landless proletariat within the Palestinian society; and refugees in particular became dependent on relief for their physical survival (Smith, 1984: 145).

The common saying that "he who has no land, has no honour" clarifies the importance of land and the family farm for the worker peasant, not merely as an expression of patriotic attachment, but because it, as Tamari argues,

Constitutes the worker's physical and symbolic link with his immediate community, and hence with peasant culture in general .... his relationship with his brothers, sisters, parents and cousins, as well as his family's visible source of livelihood, revolve (Tamari, 1981: 11).

In the GS, the high population growth resulted in the transfer of large areas of agricultural land into building areas or housing areas. Moreover, the confiscation of land by the Israeli authorities for Jewish settlements, and the issue of military orders related to agricultural activities, had led to a decline in the peasantry working on the land (Abu Amru, 1987: 13), pushing them into wage labour in Israel. The shift of labour from agriculture to wage labour has meant "the land ... has shifted from being a source of income through agricultural production to being a source of value as real estate" (Tamari, 1981: 11).

A brief reading in statistics over the drop in agricultural workers and agricultural land clarifies the scale of the problem. A report by the US Congress has estimated that the amount of land which has gone out of production is in excess of 100,000 acres on the WB (Cited in Budeiri, 1982: 54); whereas, statistics from the Agricultural Department on the WB show a decrease of 43% in agricultural land on the WB (Cited in Alawaneh: 1991: 117). The number of those employed in agriculture has fallen substantially, dropping from over 40% in 1970 to only 17% in 1987 on the WB (Coon, 1992: 30). This shortage of agricultural labour on the WB under occupation has made even more acute a problem in the agricultural sector before 1967. The drop in land and workers in agriculture is reflected by the national income in the OT's. In the GS income from agriculture dropped from 28% in 1968 to 20% in 1974 and to 12% in 1986; while the drop on the WB was from 53.5% in 1968 to 17% in 1986 (Statistical Abstract of Israel, different issues).

Certain social strata - unskilled labour - benefited from the integration of the Israeli economy with the OTs, whereas other groups have experienced an erosion of employment possibilities. As a result of "depeasantization" of the Palestinian workers there has been an
increased marginalization of the family farm - mainly in the rural areas of the WB. Although wage labor was not the only determinant, it was a major factor (Tamari, 1981:7-8).

The other factors which influenced the transformation of the labor force in the OT's could be seen in the immigration and loss of skilled migrants (See Chapter one), which has had a conservative effect on village society as a whole since it removed the most innovative and educated segments that might otherwise have been a force for change in rural society (Moors, 1990:8). This phenomenon is obvious where whole village communities, as well as residents of refugee camps, became completely dependent for their survival on employment in Israel as unskilled labour.

Tamari notes that remittances could have a negative effect and that they become the most crucial variable in alienating family members from their agricultural land, since the sums sent allow the remaining members to become village entrepreneurs, or in some cases, to engage in businesses in the district centre (Tamari, 1981:24).

Given the aforementioned debate, the question that emanates is whether this transformation had a negative or positive influence on the standard of living of the PRs in the GS.

7.5 RESETTLEMENT VS. CONTROL

For a better understanding of the Israeli resettlement policy in the GS, it has to be perceived within the scope of the Israeli "economic development" policy for the population in the OTs. As we discussed above, the Israeli policy tends to keep the OTs in a subordinate position economically and simultaneously facilitates political control. In this context, the "economic development" which Israel talks about for the OTs could be seen as superficial or false and not real.

There is a thin line, between economy and security as far as the Civil Administration and the Israeli authorities' policy in the OTs goes. The hiring and firing of Arab labour is linked to Israel's policy to maintain colonial rule and dependency. This policy is obvious in almost every aspect of the socioeconomic fabric of Palestinian society. The authorities want the population in the OTs to know that Israel is the only source of living for them, and those who resist occupation have to pay a high price. At the same time, however, the authorities know that if a very high rate of unemployment in the territories emerges, Palestinian resistance to occupation will escalate, as was the case during the Mandate period, when poor unemployed Palestinian peasants contributed to urban unrest and the discontent which fed the fires of
nationalism and xenophobia leading up to the 1936-1939 revolt (Ward, 1977:6-7).

Work, income and consumption were discussed above in some detail, since work and income form the core of socioeconomic mobility. In the context of human development, measurement of the level of living conditions in full has to combine "the dimensions necessary for human physical and psychological welfare and those required for a sense of human empowerment, productivity and self-respect" (Heiberg, 1993:13). Living standards, as internationally understood today, do not rely only on material goods as an indicator, but are:

Concerned with human capabilities and how such capabilities are used. They try to examine the degree to which people can participate in social, political and economic decision-making and can work creatively and productively to shape their own futures (Heiberg, 1993:13).

Our concern in this study is housing, since it is relevant to the issue of resettlement as undertaken in the GS. Yet an examination of other socioeconomic indicators are also vital to gauge living standards; these cover: demographics; health; and education. The importance of examining these indicators is that they enable us to understand the issue of resettlement in a wider context, and to judge whether resettlement serves the Israeli claims of "economic development" in the OTs, or meets other objectives of control and collective punishment.

On the demographic level, one of the reasons compelling the Israel to carry out its resettlement policy in the GS is the high growth rate among camp refugees (see Chapter 1). One of the Israeli aims for resettlement has been to reduce the growth and density of the refugee population in the GS (Jordan Data Base Project for the West Bank, 1976:44). The question that emanates is what impact relocation has on refugees in terms of growth, compared to refugees in the SC.

7.5.1 GS Refugees: Demographically - Politicized

The questionnaire raised three questions regarding the preferred size of the family, so as to gauge whether improved living conditions have led families to have less children (see Appendix 6, and 7). What is increasingly revealed is not only the oft-cited economic reason for large families, in terms of the assistance that children might provide, but the crucial dimension amongst political refugees of the importance of supplying political cadres. The responses given to the question on the preferred size of the family are given in Table 7.9 below for both locations.
TABLE 7.9 Preferred Size of Family in Both Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of children</th>
<th>SC No.</th>
<th>SR No.</th>
<th>SC %</th>
<th>SR %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 - 4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 6</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - 10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 +</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

As Table 7.9 indicates, respondents in both locations have a preference for a large family (11+ children), 38% in SC and 40% in SR Housing Project expressing a preference for such a family size. The second most common preference lies in the category 9 - 10 children (19.7% in SC and 23.3% in SR). The refugees who moved to the SR comprise the third generation of refugees who have started a nuclear family pattern compared to the extended family pattern which prevails in the camp. Yet, a patriarchal pattern is still a main feature. However, this does not necessarily mean that there are not some extended families living in the housing project. These findings contrast sharply with the Israeli assumption that the relocation of refugees would reduce refugee population growth.

The reasons given by the sample surveyed for their choice of the number of children are illustrated in Table 7.10 below. The variables given indicate the impact of the socio-economic, religious, and political factors upon the preference for a large family.

TABLE 7.10 Reasons for Preference of a Large Family, in Both Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>SC No.</th>
<th>SR No.</th>
<th>SC %</th>
<th>SR %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All 3 above</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The relationship between political reasons and desire for a large family gained the highest response from respondents. The explanation for this might be the impact of the Intifada’s slogans and ideology on the camp population, together with the nationalistic call to reproduce to meet the increasing numbers of new Jewish immigrants and the expansionist policy on land of the occupier.
Economic and religious reasons have always been of priority for large families in the Middle East, the Arab or Middle East culture in general giving a high value to having children, especially sons. Both Islam and Christianity encourage the adage to "be fruitful and multiply". To refuse to have children because of economic considerations is to express a lack of faith in God, who would always provide (Goode, 1970:111).

In the sample survey conducted in SC and SR for this thesis, the political reason for large families was given priority. The refugees interviewed were asked why they had chosen this factor as a reason for their desire for a big family. Their responses are shown in Table 7.11 below, which emphasizes the strong relationship between political reasons and women's reproduction. The controversy on this issue among Palestinian intellectuals has been of paramount importance recently, and some have rejected the idea that the Palestinian woman's role is through motherhood, which has become a public duty as well as a heroic one, in reproducing children for the continuation of the struggle. One argument is that "just making more babies is not enough," as stated by the Palestinian intellectual Sari Nusseibeh. "No one in Israel will be concerned by that alone. We have to put Israel on the spot. The demographic bomb will never explode without a fuse. The fuse will be our demand for equal rights" (NYT, 19 October, 1987).

TABLE 7.11 Reasons for Choosing the Political Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SR</th>
<th>SC %</th>
<th>SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continue the struggle</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excel demographically</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation for</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intifada martyrs</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support future state</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

Table 7.11 indicates that 26.7% of respondents in SR and 22.5% in SC believe that continuation of the struggle is the first reason for having a large number of children. SR relocated refugees give this variable a priority. This could be attributed to various elements. Firstly, the age structure of the population in the project, which consists of the second generation of refugees, who are more militant and politically mobilized, and more educated; secondly, the influence of the Intifada on those living at the project, whose resistance to the occupation was negligible before the Intifada compared to the camps, indeed the SR project, as mentioned by some of the interviewees, was called "the peace camp". Compensation for those killed in the Intifada rates second in both locations, 20.4% in SC and 20.0% in SR;
giving this reason. For the SC respondents, to excel demographically comes third (19.0%), while for the SR respondents, the support of the future state comes third (13.3%).

The link between the four most common responses indicates a high standard of political awareness among respondents, irrespective of their location or level of educational attainment.

7.5.2 Constraints on Health Development

Household income is normally considered to be significantly related to health status indicators, since it is likely to be associated with various other factors which influence health, such as water supply, crowding, sanitation and education. It could be presumed that within the refugee community in the GS, fluctuations in income would lead to fluctuations in health status. Although the survey did not deal with the health conditions of refugees directly, certain data were collected in both locations concerned with infrastructural amenities and their impact on the health status of the refugees. This and the other aspects of the health situation in GS will be elaborated upon below, in the hope that they would add to the argument about the standard of living of GS refugees; and demonstrate that even the health sector does not escape the restricted and repressive policies of the occupiers.

UNRWA health services are particularly important for camp refugees in the GS. UNRWA is the main provider of other services for the refugee community, who have the least resources. The other provider for the GS population is the government sector.

The military government spends US$30 per capita per year on refugee health care in the GS, while UNRWA spends an estimated $16 (Roy, 1986:112; UNRWA, 1986:26). These figures are well below the estimated $350 per capita per year that the Israeli government spends on health care for its citizens (Roy, 1986:112).

The military government expenditure on the health sector in the GS could be viewed within the context of the overall policy for public expenditure in Gaza (Table 7.12).
Table 7.12 Estimated Public Expenditure Versus Income from Taxation of Gazans: 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Public Expenditures</td>
<td>$52.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue from direct taxation</td>
<td>$35 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue from Social Security and Health Insurance payments</td>
<td>$30 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from Value Added Tax</td>
<td>$50 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL INCOME</td>
<td>$115 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Estimated from Roy, 1986:77.

The figures above suggest that less than half of the income raised through direct and indirect taxation of the people of Gaza is returned to the GS in the form of service provision through public expenditure. This implies that the main constraint on the development of the public sector in the Strip, rather than being strictly financial, is the result of a policy on the part of the authorities not to use locally raised funds, in order to keep the health sector as well as other economic sectors in full dependency on Israel.

This constraint on health services caused by the Israeli authorities is exercised despite the bad health status of the refugees in GS, where the infant mortality rate had reached 26 per thousand live births in 1990 according to Israeli statistics (WHO and the Gaza Health Services Research Centre, 1990:3), and 42 in GS refugee camps, according to UNRWA (al-Quds, 3 & 4 September, 1991). Deaths of this kind are poverty related and can be prevented by better housing and environmental sanitation, health education programmes and access to appropriate health facilities. Malnutrition has the highest reported rate among the refugee population in the GS compared to refugee camps in Jordan, the WB, Syria and Lebanon, as an UNRWA-WHO 1984 nutrition survey showed, and has not decreased over the past 10 years (UNRWA, 1986:21; Jabra, 1984). Presumably it is being aggravated today by the poor economic situation in the GS. Moreover, preventable blindness is common in the Strip, caused by poor hygiene but readily treated at an early stage if facilities are available (Thomson & Chumley, 1984:598-602).

Refugees in the SR are entitled to UNRWA health services, but the distance of some refugees from UNRWA dispensaries makes them use the government clinic and they are covered by the government health insurance scheme. A clinic was established at the SR project in 1979. The head of the clinic reported that there has been a 50% drop in the number of people enrolled in the scheme as refugees have gone back to UNRWA clinics (Interview, Dr. Abed, 11 May, 1991). A similar fall was emphasised by Roy (Roy, 1986:107).
7.5.2.1 Other Health-related Aspects

Having discussed the UNRWA and governmental health care programmes in the Strip, another health-related aspect that cannot be ignored is the symptoms of distress or the mental health of GS refugees. The importance of this aspect stems from the Palestinian experience of living in a "warlike situation" throughout the twenty-seven years of Israeli occupation.

In this respect, FAFO survey findings are surprising, indicating that the people in GS reported fewer symptoms of distress compared to the WB and Arab Jerusalem (Giacaman, 1993:124). The explanation given by the researchers is that the population of GS has a:

clearer sense of collective meaning and common purpose. A greater sense of cohesiveness, originating in a more traditional family structure, as a protective factor. The population of Gaza may enjoy greater protection against distress as the perception of an external enemy becomes exceedingly strong (Ibid.)

Alternatively, it may be that Gaza residents are less prone to recognize and express symptoms of psychological distress. Researchers further explain that it is the geographical area that influences the degree of distress and not the refugee status, so living in camps does not make a difference in itself. However, people in rural camps in the WB report higher degrees of distress than others do (Giacaman, 1993:124-5). The question remains, if social cohesiveness results in a lesser degree of distress among the GS population - irrespective of whether they are refugees or non-refugees -, could distress be explained within a socioeconomic context rather than a political one?

A study done by Sarraj, the head of the Gaza Community Mental Health Centre, supports the FAFO survey's notion that social cohesiveness reduces stress. As Lazarus and Folkkeman wrote: "The meaning of the event - and the sense of social cohesiveness - is crucial in determining how stressful a situation is to each individual (Cited in Giacaman, 1993:119). The issue of social cohesiveness among refugees will be elaborated further in the section on social contacts and the sense of influence.

Sarraj's unpublished study of 1980 compared the level of nervousness among children in the housing projects and the indigenous population in the GS, and showed the children in the housing projects to display a higher rate (Cited in Qutah, 1985:148). These symptoms resulted, as Kuo explains, from social isolation, cultural shock, stress to reach the goal and cultural changes as a result of migration from one place to another (Ibid). This might not apply fully to the SR population as a whole, but some symptoms given by Kuo do exist, mainly
Yet, the daily confrontations between the population in GS and the Israeli soldiers, together with the restrictions imposed, have been leaving scars on refugees, specifically children. The imposition of lengthy curfew for several days or weeks in a row, mainly in the camps, constitutes a major interference with the provision of medical care, feeding, education etc. The report of Physicians for Human Rights (an American organization) described exhaustively the consequences of repression on Palestinians in the WBGS, following a fact-finding mission in February 1988 (See, New Outlook, June (1988):17-21)

During the Intifada, refugees in particular were exposed to various forms of repression by Israeli soldiers. The use of tear gas in confined areas has exacerbated the bad health situation that refugees are living in. In the period between 12 December 1987 and 2 August 1988, 63 persons died from the inhalation of tear gas, 38 being residents of the Strip’s camps. Moreover, the exposure of pregnant women to tear gas causes abortion or intra-uterine fetal death. A Dutch Human Rights Project investigation in GS on this issue found that following an Israeli raid on the refugee camps in GS during the night of 7 to 8 March 1988, during which tear-gas was used on a large scale against the inhabitants (under curfew), 12 women who were in the third trimester of their pregnancy gave birth to dead babies (five were from the SC) (Alofs, 1988:29). The Israelis seek to justify the use of tear gas, as demonstrated in the words of an army spokesman:

"The tear-gas used by the Israel Defence Force (IDF) meets the safety and health requirements necessary, so that if it is breathed in by an IDF soldier, as it is in most cases, it will not be detrimental to his or anyone else's health...But I believe that a tremendous amount of tear-gas, for someone with a heart problem, might have a poor effect" (Cited in Alofs, 1988:28).

Children's exposure to repression by the Israeli soldiers has led to a rise in the degree of stress. A survey conducted by the Gaza Community Mental Health Centre, among 1,600 children aged 8 to 15, indicated that 60% were hyperactive, 60% bed-wetters, 50% violently act out their aggressive tendencies, and 46% suffer night fears. Many cannot go to sleep without their mothers by their side (The Toronto Star, March 1, 1992).

To sum up, it is clear that the two major health care institutions - the military government and UNRWA - do not provide adequate services, the former being part of the apparatus of occupation and the latter being a relief rather than a development agency. Moreover, the six non-governmental organizations who are working in health-related fields in the Strip, are closely controlled by the military authorities, who have placed restrictions on the development of a wide variety of activities, and try to interfere in their everyday management...
Moreover, since the beginning of the \textit{Intifada}, according to the Association of Israeli and Palestinian Physicians for Human Rights (AIPPHR):

The Civil Administration and the Israeli Government (the ministries of Defence, Finance and Health) joined together in order to punish the Territories' population, by collective punishment, in order to try and suppress the uprising. In contradiction of medical ethics and the codes of human morality, denial of medical treatment was used as a whip against the population (AIPPHR, 1989:30)

\subsection*{7.5.3 Obstruction of Education}

The collective punishment policy as exercised by the Israeli authorities in the OTs has been leaving its scars also in the educational sphere. The Israeli occupation authorities have been particularly severe on educational and cultural institutions and activities. This practice, which has been carried out since the early years of Israeli occupation, became even more severe with the advent of the \textit{Intifada}. The Israeli authorities deny Palestinians the right to learn. Schools, universities and even kindergartens have been shut down for extended periods and even popular education was forbidden. Yet the closure of academic institutions constitutes collective punishment and is forbidden by laws which Israel has endorsed. Proper learning was made impossible even when education institutions have been permitted to open, as a result of lengthy curfews and new travel restrictions. Since the \textit{Intifada} began in 1987, Israel has combined military action with the systematic disruption of education. Israel's aim in using these policies is to pressure the Palestinians into giving up their resistance and struggle to occupation. The UNICEF report of July 1992 describes the school closures, as follows:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{The Estimates of Average Percentages of School Loss (1987-1991)}
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
\hline
Gaza & 35\% & 46\% & 35\% & 43\% \\
WB & 75\% & 50\% & 50\% & 35\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

The fact is, after four years of continuous disruption, Palestinian education is in deep crisis, with consequent dangerous repercussions for the future development of Palestinian society. All this should be understood against the great value which Palestinians place on education as a universal solution, and as a means of survival - a method of sustaining social and cultural values and of providing a sense of coherence and security, for a people who possess little else. The pursuit of education by the Palestinians is an important feature of the complex inner struggle to continue to exist as a people with a particular message and responsibility. "In
inner struggle to continue to exist as a people with a particular message and responsibility. "In the camps the experience of landlessness, poverty, and impotence has been a powerful incentive to use education as means of escape" (Graham-Brown, 1986:245).

Households in the sample survey in the SC were asked to place in priority the variables shown in Table 7.20, that could guarantee a better future for their children.

### TABLE 7.20  Future Security as Seen by Refugees in the SC (by priority)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Priority one</th>
<th>Priority two</th>
<th>Priority three</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House ownership</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 142 100.0 142 100.0 142 100.0

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

It is obvious from the Table above that education was given priority by the majority of respondents, 126 (88.8%); while house ownership rates comes second with 117 (82.4%) responses, and employment was given a third priority by the majority of households, 101 (71.1%).

The stress on education by refugee families will let them go sometimes to extraordinary lengths to send their children, especially their sons, through school and university or professional training. The remittance economy has played a very important part in making this possible. As a result education has engendered great social mobility in the refugee community.

Education has also been viewed as an investment in human resources for the future. Such an approach has meant that, until recently, Palestinians formed one of the world’s most highly qualified communities, with high levels of literacy and particularly impressive levels of post-secondary qualifications; 18/1000 compared to 14/1000 in Israel as reported in the 1993 UNESCO report (Bala’awi, 1994:20; The Guardian, 15 May, 1976; Zahlan, 1977:103-112; Shaat, 1972:80-95).

Harassment of Palestinian educational institutions, restrictions on research activities (see introduction), and cultural strangulation by the military authorities are enormous and beyond the scope of this section. In this context, I think UNESCO was correct in concluding that "the Israeli authorities are adopting policies in the WB and GS designed to paralyse Palestinian culture" (see, Graham-Brown, 1984:88-92; Shehadah and Kuttab, 1980:89-95).

These measures and many others in the cultural field, inflict severe difficulties on
fundamental human right, but also a vital tool for development and future prosperity, as Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights entails:

> Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Buergenthal & Tomey, 1976:48).

Restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities are not only confined to education and cultural life in the OT's, but the critical sectors of health, economy and social services face the same fate.

However, the level of education of Palestinians has to be looked at within the context of the economic infrastructure in the OT's. The correlation between level of education, employment and income is not strong in the Palestinian society, because of a high rate of unemployment and the lack of a sound economic infrastructure due to Israeli measures to curtail development in every sector. The effect of these conditions impedes the socioeconomic mobility of Palestinians in general and GS refugees in particular.

The above debate on the living conditions of Palestinians and GS refugees specifically leads to the question as to what kind of development needs to be encouraged in the GS? In the OT's some change has already started with the Palestinian grassroots organizations (agricultural, medical, women etc.) having the potential to create alternatives and produce changes to meet the needs of the community (Barghouti, 1989:125-130). This is despite the overwhelming and increasingly systematic measures taken by the Israeli authorities that to render the development of every socioeconomic sector almost impossible, and the manipulation of economic decisions in the context of a broad 'carrot and stick' policy aimed at sealing control over the OT's.

Addressing the UN International NGO meeting in Vienna in September 1989, the head of the Medical Relief Committee stated the kind of development the Palestinians need. He said:

> Palestinians are not in need of any kind of development. They are in need of the development that would facilitate and support their resilience and resistance to the occupation, and which tends to further Palestinian self-reliance and independence (Bargouthi,1989:3).

To achieve this goal, the future state will be faced with a major handicap in building a sound national economy, which the people have been deprived of for a long time. It is necessary both to allow development of the economy and to satisfy the immediate needs of this deprived population, an effort that will require capital, effort, and time (see, Abed,1989:55-63).

This examination of the socioeconomic conditions of Palestinians has suggested that political motives have been at the heart of Israel's implementation of resettlement schemes in
the GS and its proposed "economic development" of the OTs. The question that now remains to be answered following this discussion is how the physical environment of the Strip and mainly the refugee camps influences the population, especially the overcrowding and the inadequate infrastructural amenities. The 1991 sample survey examined these aspects in relation to housing conditions in the two case study areas, in order to gauge improvements in this sector.

7.5.4 What Changes in the Housing Conditions?

The forms and procedures for the relocation of refugees to the Israeli sponsored housing projects were discussed in Chapter five of this study. Our concern in this section is to gauge any changes that have occurred in the SR project regarding housing conditions compared to former habitation in the SC. Table 7.13 below makes a comparison between new and former habitation in terms of the number of rooms for those who received built houses.

### TABLE 7.13  SR Residents' Present Shelter Compared to their previous One in Camp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Rooms</th>
<th>In Camp</th>
<th>In Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One room</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two rooms</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three rooms</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four rooms</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five rooms</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six rooms</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven +</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey.

Table 7.13 indicates that 26 (28.8%) of the relocated refugees left behind a bigger house in the camp; furthermore, those who received three rooms in the project were less than those who owned three rooms in the camp. The explanation that could be given for this is that, refugees with economic means look for better, healthier housing conditions, e.g. the availability of sewage system, compared to those in the camp, rather than more space.

A major problem for the refugees stemmed from the density of the population in the refugee camps which reflects the overcrowding of its residents. UNRWA figures as at 30 June 1985 showed that there were 236,486 refugees living in the eight refugee camps in the Strip (UNRWA,1985). The average density was 14,799 persons per sq.km., SC rating second overall with 20,180 persons per sq.km. after Nuseirat camp with 26,400 per sq.km. and the
overall with 20,180 persons per sq.km. after Nuseirat camp with 26,400 per sq.km. and the
lowest being in Mughazi camp with 8,541 persons per sq.km. While this may be attributed to
the high birth rate among the refugee population, rather than inward movement into the camp,
the problems were not eased by the strategy imposed on the camps by the authorities. As seen
in Chapter five, overcrowding in the camp was the main reason behind relocation 70 (77.8%).
The question is, does relocation to the SR alleviate the problem of overcrowding? Tables 7.14
and 7.15 make a comparison between households in the two case study areas in terms of
density.

TABLE 7.14 Number of Rooms, and Persons in Households of the SC (in numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rooms in shelters</th>
<th>Household No.</th>
<th>Total of residents</th>
<th>Density:persons per room</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey

TABLE 7.15 Number of Rooms, and Persons in Households of the SR (in numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rooms in shelters</th>
<th>Household No.</th>
<th>Total of residents</th>
<th>Density:persons per room</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven+</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

Most of the serious overcrowding was found in shelters consisting of two to four rooms in the SC; while overcrowding in the SR is found in households with six or seven rooms. The
average housing density in SC was 2.96 persons per room, while it was 2.74 in the SR project. This indicates that overcrowding in the SR did not decrease much compared to SC, probably due to the patrilocal pattern which persists in the two or in multiple-storey houses in which the family builds a large number of rooms to accommodate themselves and their sons’ families or future families.
The problem of overcrowding is best revealed by examining the number of families crowded into one shelter, being an extended family or a nuclear one (Table 7.16).

TABLE 7.16 Families Per Household in the SC & SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of families per household</th>
<th>SC No.</th>
<th>SR No.</th>
<th>SC %</th>
<th>SR %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

Refugee satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their living conditions in the project was also surveyed. The reason for raising such questions was to assess the rate of improvement that took place in their lives on the socio-economic and cultural levels. Table 7.17 shows the rate of satisfaction and dissatisfaction among the residents of the SR.

TABLE 7.17 Level of Satisfaction with Life in the SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of satisfaction</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied to a degree</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied totally</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey

As can be seen from Table 7.17, 38 (42.2%) are satisfied with their new living conditions in the project; 32 (35.6%) are satisfied to a certain degree; while, 18 (20%) are dissatisfied; and 2 (2.2%) are dissatisfied totally. The dissatisfaction of the last three categories, as indicated by the respondents, arose from the fact that their present housing had been imposed on them, given the overcrowding in the previous camp shelter on the one hand, and the lack of alternate housing on the other hand.

Asked if they had the desire to return to the camp, their responses are shown in Table 7.18.
TABLE 7.18: Desire to Return to the Camp of SR Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It depends</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 sample survey

As shown, the majority 53 (58.9%) showed no desire to go back to the camp; they explained to the researcher that their return would be impractical, especially after all the money and effort spent on building their houses in the project; others complained about the unhealthy environment of the camp. However, 20 (22.2%) showed willingness to go back to the camp if they were given the chance; while 15 (16.7%) showed a desire to go back if certain conditions were met.

These conditions were elicited in a further question: 12 (13.3%) said that they would return to the camp if provided with a big house; 1 (1.1%) said: if a better environment was available; and 2 (2.2%) said that they would return if their present accommodation became overcrowded.

Given the aforementioned analysis, an important question should be raised as to what constitutes housing satisfaction. Several studies done on the subject have demonstrated that housing satisfaction is a product of the inter-relationship of many socio-cultural, political and environmental factors. It is, therefore, difficult to measure, for what is regarded as habitable shelter in one place may not be considered so in another. Indeed, even when these varied factors are enumerated and measured, it is difficult to know how to weight one factor against another to judge overall levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction objectively (Fraser, 1969:145; Western et al., 1974:43).

Moreover, housing standards are highly reliant upon an external infrastructure of electricity grids, sewage disposal systems, sanitation facilities and, in the modern world, telecommunications. The survey collected data on infrastructural amenities in order to measure the difference between the two case study areas on the one hand, and to look at the potential impact of these services on the health of the refugees on the other hand.

Based on the 1991 sample survey in the SC, 88 (62%) of all the sampled households were suffering from an acute problem of sewage disposal, waste water being disposed of into open alleys between shelters. The remaining 54 (38%) were satisfied with using cesspits as a temporary solution to the problem. (See Plate 7.1), although inadequate collections have led
to the discharge of raw sewage onto the roads and public areas, creating a sanitary nuisance and posing a very severe hazard to public health. Regarding the SR, 84 (93.3%) of the sampled households indicated that they do not suffer from a sewage problem. This finding could be seen to affirm an Israeli Defence Ministry report, which wrote that infrastructures constructed in the housing projects conformed with Israeli standards including a modern underground central sewage systems, water, earth-moving, roads, electricity, educational institutions, etc, investments divided between the residents and the Israeli administration (Ministry of Defence, 1983:56).

The question is, if a modern central sewage system was constructed in the SR, how can the Israelis explain the large pools which has formed over many years in the centre of the project, where the underground sewage networks flood into them, and which have become a significant mark of the project and a source of insects and disease for residents (especially those living nearby) and cause for complaint (al-Talia'h, 19 July, 1991) (see Plate no. 7.2). During the conduct of my survey in the SR, huge spots of smelly black waste were noticeable on various roads in the project, caused by leaking sewage pipes and unmaintained pits. Such evidence refutes the Israeli claims of a modern sewage system.

UNRWA's limited efforts to reduce the effect of the sewage problem in the camps in 1983, by building open concrete channels and drains for waste water, were stopped by the Israeli authorities. Objections by the authorities to any improvement of life in the camps are commonplace. In 1980, plans by the Community Development Foundation, an American aid agency, to build sewers in Rafah camp were rejected by the Israelis (Locke and Stewart, 1985:54).

These objections raise the question of a paradoxical policy by the authorities, and would further assert the political motives behind setting up the housing projects while depriving the camp community of any improvement in their living conditions. Economic development in this context should not be differentiated for camp refugees and project refugees. Another acute problem which causes a health hazard for refugees in both locations is the inadequate refuse collection, leaving perpetual piles of rubbish festering in the street. The 1991 sample survey indicates that 97 (68.3%) of all sampled households in SC, and 54 (60%) in SR were suffering from this problem. The households surveyed attributed the inadequate sanitary situation to an UNRWA and municipal shortage of public services and finance in this sector. 53 (58.9%) of households in the SR indicated that the municipal services in the project are less than that in the town, compared to 35 (38.9%) who saw no difference. The main complaint by the 51 (56.7%) of households surveyed in the SR is about the slow collection of refuse. These Plate
Plate 7.1: Shati camp: Waste water running in the open channels between shelters, which have been constructed by the refugees, either at their own expense or with materials provided by UNRWA.

Photo: The author, 1991
Plate 7.2: Sheikh Radwan project: household sewage water is collected by underground sewage disposal system to the above shown open pool in the north of the project.

Photo: The author, 1991
findings come in contrast to the Israeli Minister of Health report which claimed in 1988 that garbage disposal in GS was "vastly expanded and modernized...and disposal sites have been increased in number with improved management practices" (Ministry of Health, 1988:37).

Refugee awareness of the problems that might be caused by inadequate refuse collection in the SC, caused them (at the time I was conducting my survey) to take the initiative collectively to clean up the camp and improve the environmental health conditions. Hundreds of refugees joined in, and much was achieved over two consecutive days. Their work in the third day was stopped by the authorities, who claimed that the assembly of such a large number of people would bring about political disturbances.

As regarding water supply in both locations, 140 (98.6%) in SC and 86 (95.6%) in SR have no problems with water supply; whereas, 2 (1.4%) in SC and 4 (4.4%) in SR were suffering from shortage of water. Refugees in the camp get free water from wells constructed by UNRWA when the camp was established; whereas, refugees in the SR have to pay high bills after they have been connected to the "Mekorot", the Israeli National Water Company since the 1970s, 95% of households having piped connections. As a result, running water reaches 75% of homes in the Gaza area in 1985, as compared to 13.9% in 1974 (Ministry of Health, 1988:7)

Yet the problem with water in the Strip in general lies in its high salinity, which exceeds the limit recommended by the World Health Organization of 200 mg., ranging between 100 and 400 mg. chlorides per litre. The salinity of water is associated with problems of fluorosis and hypertension (Dahlan, 1985:328).

In addition to the amenities already mentioned, electricity supply was considered by all refugees in the SC and SR to be sufficient. This corresponds with the Israeli Ministry of Health report for 1988, which shows that 92.8% of GS population have electricity for 24 hours/day compared to 63.1% on the WB (Ministry of Health, 1988:7).

Given the inadequate infrastructure in the GS in general, the findings above show that the health situation in SR compared to the SC has not improved completely, as Israel claims.
7.6 THE SOCIAL CONTEXT

7.6.1 Rural vs. Urban

Following the above discussion on the structural transformation of economy and its effect on the living standard of GS refugees, what changes did this transformation bring in relation to the social fabric of the refugee community in GS?

The Israeli Ministry of Defence report of 1983 stated that one of the results that has been achieved through rehabilitation/resettlement of refugees in the GS was: "As a refugee changes his status, he becomes a local and urban resident, with equal rights" (Ministry of Defence, 1983:57).

This statement has to be examined against some concrete facts about refugees: such as their distribution by social class, rural-urban origins, and social ties with their compatriots. In 1949, Thicknesse reported that the refugees may be roughly classified into four groups: (1) A relatively small group (about 8,000, i.e., about one percent) of well-to-do capitalists, landowners, and professional families; (2) A much larger group (250,000, i.e., 35 percent) of varied occupations from villages and towns and registered for the free refugee rations; (3) Refugees in caves who do not receive UN refugee supplies (30,000, i.e., 4 percent); and finally (4) Refugees living in camps (430,000, i.e., 60 percent) (Thicknesse, 1949:32-33).

As regarding GS refugees, most of them originated from the southern districts of Palestine, which was then considered rural. Thus, they formed a large part of Palestine's rural population which was 62.6% in 1947 (See Chapter one). Calculations from the Egyptian Administration statistics of 1958 on the origin of refugees in the GS showed that, 112,383 persons came from 77 villages; whereas, 57,718 persons came from 16 towns in Palestine (Egyptian Official Statistics for GS, 1959:7-11).

The refugee population in the GS constitutes 2/3 of the total, and about one out of two refugees live in (mainly urban) refugee camp. In 1967, 80 percent of the Palestinian in GS were urban - one of the highest rates in Asia (Migdal and Kimmerling, 1993:198). Gaza's ratio of rural to urban population is about 1:5, whereas 62% of West Bankers are rural. This indicates that Gaza is overwhelmingly urban, with 75 - 80% of the population living in the Gaza-Khan Yunis-Rafah conurbations (Tamari, 1993:23-4; Abu Libdeh, 1993:41). As Chapter one shows, the eight refugee camps of GS are located in towns, and are considered urban camps, or what might be characterized as "urban slum areas" or camp cities. Qutub argues that the average population per camp city varies from 30,005 in the GS to 4,856 in the WB, and an overall average of 12,698 persons per camps as in 1986, reveals that:
the camp cities, both small and large, can be considered as urban conglomerations in the demographic and ecological sense...an consequently requires a special classification in the study of urban societies in the Middle East (Qutub, 1989:96,107).

On the basis of the above information, one could refute the Israeli claim of camp refugees becoming urban or local through relocation to the housing project. Moreover, the issue of equal rights is questionable here, especially since as the above sections revealed, the GS population in general - refugees and non-refugees - face the same economic and political restrictions and measures imposed on them by the Israeli authorities, as does the WB population, which have denied them civil and political rights.

7.6.2 The GS Social Strata

The lack of a productive base in the Strip to absorb the majority of the work force, similar to the period prior to 1967 occupation, has delayed the emergence of the social classes defined by classical analysis, and prevented new social forces from arising. Indeed, the scientific concept of class has limited applicability to the society in the Strip (Abu Amru, 1987: 1; Graham-Brown, 1986:227).

Refugee camps in GS - as mentioned earlier - have become centres of service rather than production, and the proletarianization of refugees has further led to "declassment" of this dispossessed population. Thus, "class consciousness" as understood in the West is lacking within the refugee community in GS (Graham-Brown, 1986:227,244).

Camp residence, and not refugee status in itself, is the vital determining factor of deciding socioeconomic status. This explains why camp refugees of GS are found in the lower middle and low categories of the social strata, even though, prior to the Intifada, the rise in income among unskilled workers in Israel meant their earnings tended to be higher than schoolteachers - who are considered privileged members of the community. This situation created gaps between individual or family economic status and social standing in the community and as a result changes occurred in social status along wealth and stratification lines, which people perceive as forms of competition within a community (Ibid:244).

With the new types of labour, new forms of social acquisition have been rising among refugee wage earners. Land as the primary indicator of economic wealth was replaced by the acquisition of consumer durables as a prime indicator of economic well-being; in addition, substantial resources were pooled into housing, which reflects the status of the family within the local community. Through Housing the Palestinians sought collective family security; moreover, it was considered a safe area of investments in an otherwise uncertain world (Ugland & Tamari, 1993:224).
Education is another area in which the refugees sought social mobility. Yet, as indicated above, the demand for unskilled labour by the Israeli market and the lack of employment in the local establishments or abroad, mean that education is not the vehicle it used to be, and the OTs became saturated with high school and graduates seeking employment. Moreover, in Palestinian society education seems so far to have done little to erode ascribed status as the prime determinant of authority. Men continue to have more influence than women, the middle aged more than the very old or the young (Heiberg, 1993:145; Qutub, 1989:99).

Despite the economic transformation brought about by the Israeli occupation and its effect on the living conditions of the refugees, the instability of income due to unemployment - either in Israel or in GS -, leaving the Palestinian workers without security, social cohesiveness has been buttressed by two major aspects. First, it can be observed in camps that the decomposition or desocialization of the family which is frequently provoked by the poor living conditions has not affected the organic ties of solidarity among GS refugees. Second, new form of class structure have appeared which tend to be organized along the lines of national identity rather of class.

The first aspect regarding the absence of desocialization among refugees has resulted from the special geographic circumstances which the Palestinian labourers have found themselves in. They commute daily to Israel and are not allowed to stay overnight inside the Green Line, therefore, this "has not had the same socially-destructive consequences witnessed in other parts of the world where adult male population migrated over greater distances" (Van Arkadie, 1977:69).

By living at home the refugee labourers maintain a normal family life, a situation which is in contrast with the general notion of proletarian classes of rural origin, whose integration into the market economy and wage-earning would provoke social decomposition along with degradation of the population, as is the case with South African migrant workers (see, Meillassoux, 1983:50-61).

The maintenance of strong organic ties among refugees is seen also on another level, as Roy observed:

Perhaps the most dramatic development in the social structure of the GS since 1967 has been the formation of certain alliances across classes, who, before 1967, were totally isolated from each other. There alliances are political in nature, based almost exclusively on nationalist politics. Although they have not affected the isolation of Gaza’s social classes on an economic level, alliances have brought together members of Gaza’s elite, farmers, petit bourgeoisie and working classes in a common stand against the political consequences of the occupation (Roy, 1986:84).

These alliances come in spite of the Israeli authorities’ support for class divisions on
economic level (Roy, 1986:86). And these same alliances could be seen behind the low rates of social conflict potential in the GS compared to WB and Arab Jerusalem, as the FAFO survey ascertained, and the low distress rates discussed in the health section above. The low social conflict potential in GS contradicts the hypothesis that deprived socioeconomic conditions may be expected to intensify perceptions of social conflicts. Three tentative explanations are given. First, that perceptions of conflict are related strongly to locality and the conditions of life, which override other considerations of an occupational or hierarchal nature. Second, that potential internal conflicts between social groups may be externalized towards an external foe, and internal dissension can in fact be repressed, and hostility focused on collaborators or social outcasts. "This externalization may also enforce a consensual ideology, which underplays the magnitude of conflict (real and imagined) within the society, and focuses on differences with the outsider". A third explanation is that a system of patronage and kinship networks modifies the intensity and direction of status differences; these networks in the context of Palestinian society "... are likely to make themselves felt in modes of political behaviour and political mobilization " (Ugland & Tamari, 1993:241-3).

7.6.3 Maintaining Social Cohesiveness

The condition of exile, which has affected more than one half of the Palestinian, has made its mark on the collective consciousness, cultural trends as well as the political behaviour of Palestinians throughout the Middle East and in the diaspora.

The PRs fall into the category of majority-identified refugees, who are firm in their conviction that their opposition to the events is shared by the majority of their compatriots, rather than that of events-aliensated refugees and exiles or self-aliensated persons. Moreover, their attitudes towards displacement place them in reactive fate-groups rather than purpose groups; refugees belonging to the former category are characteristically the refugees of wars, sudden revolutionary changes and expulsions, the nature of whose flight is reluctant, without a solution in sight; and in reaction to an intolerable situation (Kunz, 1981:43-4).

The continuing state of dispossession of PRs, their statelessness and lack of rights leaves them consequently insecure. Hannah Arendt explained the many problems faced by the stateless. The most significant is the loss of their homes, which means "the loss of the entire social texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the world." Moreover, "even their acceptance by the indigenous populations of the countries they migrate to is problematic and poses problems for sociological, economic, and cultural reasons" (Arendt, 1973:293).
Over the years, despite all the difficulties which the Palestinian refugees face, they have rejected permanent resettlement in the host countries, which has been seen as giving up their historical rights to their homeland - often seen as providing the enemy the moral victory it seeks (See Chapter three). And, as Chapter eight will demonstrate, with the passage of time their yearning to return becomes more stronger.

As observed by Bruhns, the problem of the Palestinians is basically one of social uprootedness. They have experienced a shocking severance of their personal and traditional ties of home, family, relatives, and community which "constitute the primary relationships on which their society, so much more than Western society depends." So, the refugees "feel uprooted to a much greater extent socially then they do economically." To them, leaving their homes "is profoundly disturbing, even with the prospect of economic betterment" (Bruhns, 1955:133). The question that emanates, is what mechanisms the Palestinian refugees rely on to reconstruct their community?

The Palestinians who were exiled in 1948 were a highly family-oriented society that gave precedence to informal and personal ties. The family as an influential unit is seen as a critical part of the informal politics in the Middle East, and is considered the dominant group structure (Leiden and Bill, 1984:77). It remains "at the centre of social organization in all three Arab patterns of living (Bedouin, rural and urban) (Barakat, 1984:28). Palestinian family, as part of the Middle East culture, proved "impossible to rupture or break." This "invisible skeleton" has been the means and the motivator by which the Palestinians were able to respond to the conditions of their exile and crisis, and to maximize their chances for survival (Leiden and Bill, 1984:90). Through such a society, bound together, Palestinians, as Said observed, have been able to "survive the ravages of our history, its tragic mistakes, misfortunes, and the destructive course of Israel's policies" (Said, 1992:54).

The social ties of the peasants who fled from Palestine consisted almost entirely of links with their fellow villagers who had suffered a similar fate (Smith, 1984:145). The interaction among them had eliminated any class boundaries, and under the pressures of camp life all become equal. This experience in turn reinforced their sense of solidarity and the traditional familial and village ties as means for continuity and identity and in response to insecurity. Giel notes how "the confined, prison-like space of the GS" imputes not only "suffering and sacrifice" but a territorial sense of identity (Cited in Usher, 1991:4).

In refugee camps in the GS, with the absence of a structure of production, community solidarity and cohesiveness of traditional community is buttressed by a strong network of family connections based on the extended kinship group, where the individual is conspicuously
absent. The family-based Palestinian household constitutes a strong network of economic obligations and privileges. For Palestinians, the extended family "refers to a framework of continuity and support from all family members living in the same proximity" (Habash, 1989:16). This system of relationships is seen as the vehicle of social mobility, by which investment in housing and educating of children are major duties. In Gaza, particularly, extended families sometimes build small apartment blocks, in which several nuclear families can live, so reinforcing these ties.

This type of social network was reinforced through various channels: by GS being cut off from the influences of other national cultures during the 19 years of Egyptian rule, they developed their own distinctive subculture which might be called a camp society; for unlike WB refugees who assimilated in Jordanian society, most Gaza refugees failed to accomplish a similar feat (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993:198,243). Furthermore, community solidarity is strengthened by the common fate refugees face in terms of severe Israeli curfew and other measures; and the collective expressions of a common dilemma among Palestinian camp refugees were made possible by a reconstructed community which reflected former agglomeration according to town or village of origin in the camp. In GS in particular, this trend was materialized by three parties: the Palestinians themselves, who made every effort to reinvigorate the old social institutions of family, clan and town/village in their life in camp; the Egyptian officials; and the Quaker relief workers, who, following the refugee influx, "struggled to re-establish village groupings and administer programmes through the old village leadership. The very process focused attention on the life that had been lost" (Migdal and Kimmerling, 1993:202).

The field data in both locations mirrored this reality, 22 (15.5%) of the households surveyed coming from Hamammeh village; 20 (14.1%) from Majdal town; 13 (9.2%) from Jaffa; town; 11 (7.7%) from Harbia village; 10 (7.0%) from Jorah village; 8 (5.6%) from Asdud village; 6 (4.2%) from Yabna village; 6 (4.2%) from Barbarah village; 5 (3.5%) from Jirja village; 4 (2.8%) from Falloujah village; 4 (2.8%) from Kirtyah village; 4 (2.8%) from Zarnoukah village; while of the remaining number of households (28), 22 come from 16 different villages; and 6 come from 4 towns in Palestine. In the SR, concentration of refugees from the same village/town is not as high as in the camp. The findings showed that 15 (16.7%) of households come from Hamammeh village; 14 (15.6%) from Majdal town; 14 (16.7%) from Jaffa town; 6 (6.7%) from Barbarah village; and 4 (4.4%) from Herbiyah village; while of the remaining 37 households surveyed, 36 come from 21 different villages, and 1 household comes from Ramleh town.
The agglomeration of refugees in the camps has kept their memory of the homeland and Palestinian heritage alive, and thus fostered their resistance to assimilation. This memory becomes the Palestinians' only condolence during their statelessness. In short, their life has been a replication of another time and place in the miserable environment of the camp, with the notion prevailing that as the group survives, so the culture continues.

The correlation between crisis and challenge faced by Palestinians and the cohesiveness of camp community tends to be high, as indicated in the findings of the FAFO survey above. In the Palestinian context it is only the family who remain intact, in times of intense measures of repression and institutional destruction.

As survivors, it is not only the social dimension which stateless Palestinian families managed to bridge - through the creation of new social networks - but, the family has also provided the means by which Palestinian nationalism is protected and preserved. This was important especially in the absence of self-determination and statehood, and, as Fanon put it, it is part of social psychology that the oppressed - through communal practice - "develop in themselves a sense of conscious self-determination that is based on the discovery of their social needs - food, shelter, work" (Bhabha, 1987:84).

Political education becomes the responsibility of the family, which is considered the "foremost among agencies of socialization into politics" (Hyman, 1959:69; Jennings & Niemi, 1968:169-184). This is mainly evident among refugee children (and even among Palestinian children living abroad) who identify themselves with their parent's former villages and towns. Thus, identification with Palestine, and the growing of Palestine-consciousness has been a cyclical reaction to the post-1948 era, where new Palestinism was created and by which the Intifada became a watershed of the new meaning of Palestinism, led by the young leadership and the children (Sayigh, 1979:124-8; Turki, 1972:39; Farah, 1977:90-102).

The Israeli writer, Amos Elon, has described the astonishment Israeli soldiers felt on discovering the strength of social ties among refugees after they overran several refugee camps in the WB in June 1967:

Upon entering a refugee camp one young soldier discovered that the inmates were still organized into and dwelled as small clans or neighbourhood units according to the town, and even the street they had lived in prior to their dispersion in 1948....Beersheba, Zaraga, Ramlah, Lod, Jaffa (Elon, 1972:339).

Given the complex of factors resulting in the creation and preservation of a distinctive consciousness and collectiveness among Palestinians, it is reasonable to assume that people within any community differ in their sense of identification with their surroundings and in the
degree of intensity with which they share prevalent majority beliefs. Our question is, did the process of resettlement of GS refugees to the SR sustain/maintain their social cohesiveness and familial links, or did relocation or the dispersion strategy by the Israelis give rise to new social trends? The extent to which existing social ties are maintained in both locations are what the field data reveals below.

7.6.4 Dispersal vs. Concentration

To gauge the change in terms of agglomeration of refugees from the same town/village in Palestine in SC compared with the SR, two questions were asked. Tables 7.21 and 7.22 reveal differences between the two locations.

### TABLE 7.21 Refugees from Same Village/Town of Origin in SC & SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>SR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

As Table 7.21 indicates, 136 (95.8%) of the households surveyed in SC compared to 43 (47.8%) in SR have people from their towns/villages of origin in the same place. Only 6 (4.2%) in the SC said they haven’t, but in SR a much higher 45 (50.0%) of households said that no one from their towns/villages of origin resides in the project. This latter fact emphasises one element of resettlement policies, which explicitly aimed at achieving a scattered distribution of the refugee population (Desbarats, 1987:310).

In the GS refugee context, what is more important is how social ties between people from same towns/villages were substantiated. Visiting is considered another activity that recharges the Palestinian family network, mirrored in the visiting patterns of the Middle Eastern family in general (Geertz, 1979:335). The tradition of visiting, be it associated with death, marriage or another occasion, strengthens the network of relationships that contribute to family unity, solidarity, and cohesiveness. Was this effected by relocation to SR? (See Table 7.22).
TABLE 7.22 Interaction With People From Same Town/Village of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>SR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes in a year</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a year</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

The results indicate that interaction with those from origin villages/towns in the SC occurs daily for 45 (31.7%) compared to only 13 (14.4%) in the SR, which is a consequence of dispersal as shown in Table 7.21 above. While 25 (17.6%) in SC and 18 (20%) in SR visit weekly; 26 (18.3%) in SC and 17 (18.9%) in SR visit monthly. However, strikingly, both locations showed similar responses in terms of visits sometime in a year, 30 (21.1%) in SC and 31 (34.4%) in SR. This latter result could be attributed to the prevailing circumstances in the Strip, economically and politically, by which the lack of general mobility as indicated by many respondents has a negative influence on the traditional fabric of society and its cohesiveness since it affects social visits, recreational activity and ritual social duties (prayer, attendance of seasonal festivities, and pilgrimage).

Fragmentation of extended families through relocation, brought about by the initial dispersal strategy, raised concern of family reunification among SR refugees, who seek others of the same village/town in order to form new patterns of concentration. Respondents were asked if they prefer people from same town/village to live in the project, and the overwhelming majority of households 71 (78.9%) gave a yes answer, while 19 (21.1%) answered no. (Table 7.23).

TABLE 7.23 Preference to Live with Refugees from Same Village/Town in SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

The reasons for this preference are given in Table 7.24 below.
TABLE 7.24 Reasons for Preference to Live with Refugees from Same Village/Town

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Know them (not strangers)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better coherence</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

In the Palestinian context, Sayigh observed that:

It is important to realize that the splitting up of families was not a once and for all explosion, but an ongoing process of 'redistribution' set up by Zionist domination in Palestine. This centrifugal pressure, which is both political and economic, splits up nuclear families as well as larger clans (Sayigh, 1979: 128).

7.6.5 Adjustment

One of the most important factors for satisfactory resettlement of refugees is the cultural compatibility between the refugees' background and the society which is confronted. Lack of compatibility in terms of language, values, traditions, etc., means that refugees will become isolated and that could cause psychomatic illnesses and withdrawal from human contacts (Kunz, 1981: 46-47). Our question is, did the refugees in the sample survey of SR face compatibility problems? The initial strategy of dispersion was carried out by the Israeli authorities for a variety of political and logistical reasons, and the break up of extended families were justified on such grounds, but the refugees remained within the big Palestinian family, and shared language, values, traditions, religion, political views and solidarity are factors which accelerated the integration process. This is in contrast to resettlement processes experienced, for example, by Lithuanian and Vietnamese refugees in the USA (Haines, 1981: 310, 313; Baskaukas, 1981: 282-3).

It could be argued here that the Palestinian refugee experience with resettlement in the GS does not fall in the same category as resettlement of refugees in other countries, their experience being considered unique. The difficulties faced by other refugees have been due to resettlement in an alien environment to their past, while the Palestinian refugees' case of relocation happened on the same Palestinian soil and with the same people, a factor which has been given by the refugees to explain their acceptance of resettlement, though such attempts were completely rejected in the past.

Yet, the field data illustrated a different kind of problem encountered by refugees in the SR. Respondents were asked about similarities and differences between their life in the project
compared to their former life in the camp. (Tables 7.25; Table 7.26; Table 7.27)

TABLE 7.25 Life in SR Compared to Life in SC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The same</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differs</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

TABLE 7.26 Similarities Between SR and SC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same social traditions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same life under occupation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing cases</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

TABLE 7.27 Differences Between SR and SC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better services</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better living standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation feelings</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More secure</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccepted buildings</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More financial burdens</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

As indicated in the three above tables, 79 (87.9%) of households surveyed in the project saw a difference between camp life and the one in the project. 39 (43.4%) of respondents gave positive differences - better services, better living standards, and more security -; whereas, 40 (44.5%) gave negative differences, the most striking of all being the feeling of alienation among refugees given by 26 (28.9%). This could be attributed to two factors: the type of architecture in the project, which does not allow the same mixing between refugees as in the camp; and the fragmentation of refugees along town/village of origin. Those who mentioned that the building type is unaccepted complained about the multi-storey buildings with one entrance, which is against the segregation of sexes; and the way multi-storey houses are adjacent to others with one storey, which interferes with the privacy of residents in the latter, and with residents also living in multi-storey houses opposite to each other. This problem has been partially reduced by
people using big sheets of cloth to maintain privacy.

In response to direct questions on difficulties encountered regarding assimilation and adjustment in the SR, 61 (67%) of refugees gave a no answer, compared to 29 (32.2%) who gave a yes answer. The sort of difficulties encountered are shown in Table 7.28.

TABLE 7.28  Type of Difficulties Encountered by SR Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social isolation</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

The majority of refugees 19 (21.1%) showed that alienation is the major difficulty faced. This result corresponds with the findings in Table 7.27. As a result, one could assume that if relocation continued on a large scale, the acceleration of this phenomenon would raise some apprehensions regarding the political solidarity of GS refugees. An examination of the reason-effect relationship between relocation and political solidarity is given in Chapter eight. This complex interaction between forces of dispersal and forces of concentration is seen to shed some light on the resettlement policies of the Israeli authorities, illustrating the spatial antagonism between a constrained resettlement process designed to foster population dispersal and voluntary individual decisions generating population concentration. Further, it clarifies the spatial consequences of the contradictions that have developed between the principles of resettlement policies and the realities of resettlement practices.
NOTES:


2. Arab workers in Israel are employed through two methods; legally and illegally, for more details, see: Budeiri, April (1982).

3. Prior to the Intifada, Arab workers' accounted for 52.8% of employees in construction; 17.7% in agriculture; 16.7% in services; and 12.8% in industry (Abdullah, 1990:10).

4. Similar pools for collecting waste water are found in the Beit Lahiya (Gaza) and Tal el-Sultan (Rafah) Israeli sponsored Housing projects.
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT AND IMPACT OF RESETTLEMENT

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous Chapters have laid the ground for the political analysis dealt with here. Since the flight of PRs in 1948, their rejection of resettlement was based on a belief that permanent settlement outside Palestine would desecrate their RRC, as endorsed in UN Resolution 194(III) of December 11, 1948. Clinging to the return, PRs developed a unique solidarity and character which reinforced their political consciousness.

The fieldwork data collected on the relationship between resettlement and the RR, are the first available on this sensitive issue. They reflect a unanimous commitment to the RRC by refugees, despite the years of dispossession and all the forces of oppression which fashioned the collective experience of the PRs in general, and GS refugees in particular, with special elaboration of the period following the Israeli occupation of the WBGS in 1967. The central question is how these forces (especially in the context of the Israeli authorities' counter-insurgency measures in the OTs), coalesced to influence the political consciousness and resistance of refugees in the housing projects in GS?

The analysis in the previous Chapter confirmed the fact that the Israeli strategy behind the setting-up of the refugee resettlement schemes in the GS has failed. It reflects a belief that most political problems can be reduced to social problems. However, data from the sample survey in the SR have refuted this Israeli assumption. It is demonstrated that refugees in both locations have a high rate of political mobility, location in this respect being unimportant. If some slight differences appear, these are as a result of environmental variables rather than a decline in political commitment.

Several indicators were used to show the magnitude of Israeli repressive measures, such as the arrests, house raids, injuries and demolitions that the survey population had experienced. These illustrate that Israeli repression remains unchanged, as does the continuity of the PRs national struggle.

The comparison held between the two case study areas offers, in the light of the discussion given in the last four Chapters, a new insight of PRs collectivity and national struggle in GS. Drawing on empirical survey data, other than the aforementioned issues raised - an attempt was also made to understand refugee perception of a solution to their "problem". Findings suggest adherence to their RRC and at the same time the right to independence and sovereignty. That position reflects a dual commitment by PRs, one, to the international
legitimacy represented by the UN resolutions and the other to the PLO programmes. This indivisibility between the two rights, however, reveals the dynamics of PRs struggle and their continuous rejection to be resettled outside Palestine. Elaboration on these issues is given hereafter.

8.2 THE EVOLUTION OF A PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The political process that facilitated the birth of the Intifada, the consolidation of the Palestinian national movement and the crystallization of Palestinian national consciousness, has to be perceived within the framework of political mobilization of the Palestinian people and the development of a distinctive national identity (as opposed to Arab or Jordanian), since the beginning of the century.

In the case of the PRs, despite the profound changes generated by a continuous state of exile and statelessness, a sense of common Palestinian identity has remained throughout their diaspora, and they have succeeded in forming what Ghabra has called a cross-national identity (Cited in Kimmerling & Migdal, 1993:206). That could be attributed to a strong sense of shared cultural identity, which as Sayigh observed, provides a community that shares a situation of oppression and discrimination with protection against alienation and societal inequality; thus allowing it to restrain its internal differentiation, and to enhance cohesion among its members, which usually increases in proportion to a sense of shared identity (Sayigh, 1977:18-20). Smith has further argued that national identity is multi-dimensional, it includes: ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political components; or as Sayigh put it, it is a result of a combination of adverse external factors - war, expulsion, etc. and internal factors - a rich inner ‘ethno’ history (Smith, 1991: 15; Sayigh, 1977:76).

The question remains, to what extent did developments on the Palestinian scene disrupt the collectivity and distinctive culture of Palestinians? And what components or features helped shape Palestinian nationalism and mass character - which in a later stage helped provide a programme of action and an ideology as an answer to the disaster of 1948?

Any analysis of the growth of the Palestine national movement and Palestinian identity has to be traced or examined in relation to three distinct periods in Palestine’s political history: the first, from the beginning of the century to 1948; the second, from 1948 to 1967; and the last from 1967 to the present.

The focus will be on the third period, because the remaining areas of Mandate Palestine - WBGS - constituted an important arena for the development of the political struggle waged
by the national movement. Recently, these developments have found expression through a number of concrete organizations, institutions and activities. Yet, it is of importance to point out that the early and spontaneous forms of resistance, compared to the more organized forms which developed at a later stage, were a result of several interrelated processes which changed the forms of resistance through the course of struggle, thus shaping Palestinian national consciousness, and consequently, intensifying their ongoing struggle for independence and self-determination. Edward Said's words offer an explanation in this respect, "Our truest reality," he writes, "(that we are) a nation in exile and constantly on the move," provides, "the deepest continuity of our lives" and thus reminds us that "movement need not always be either flight or exile" (Said, 1986:164-5). Thus, the change and continuity in Palestinian lives are two sides of the same coin, aimed at finding a place for themselves under the sun.

8.2.1 The Roots of Palestinian Nationalism: 1900-1948

The development of Palestinian political consciousness can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century. It was then that Zionist intentions to convert Palestine into a Jewish state were manifested in a large influx of Jewish immigration under the British Mandate of Palestine, together with the conquest of labour and land. Fear of Zionist immigration was expressed as early as the 1880s, when there were outbursts of Palestinian Fellahin (peasantry) militancy against it (Sayigh, 1977:28). The Mayor of Jerusalem in 1899 wrote to the Chief Rabbi of France saying; "in the name of God, leave Palestine in peace."

In principle, the stand of the Palestinian Arabs stemmed from their opposition to any foreign domination over them. As Maxime Rodinson concluded:

...the Palestinian Arabs desired domination neither by the British nor by the Zionists. They wished neither to become Englishmen nor Israelis,... They wanted to keep their Arab identity...and they consequently hoped to see an Arab state in Palestine (Rodinson, 1968:217f).

In the centre of the struggle against Zionism were the landless proletarianized peasants, who were living in urban poverty having been dispossessed or displaced by Zionist colonization activity in Galilee involving land purchases and the Arab labour exclusion policies of the Jewish National Fund (Khalidi, 1988:228). This sector of the Palestine population were the first recruits to the Palestinian guerrilla groups and organized armed struggle (1933), a forerunner of Fatah. The latter was started and led by Sheikh Izz al-Din-Qassam, who has since been glorified as the founder of Palestinian Arab resistance. As a symbol of national identity, the native headcloth or Kafiya was adopted by the guerrillas (and is still used by present day Palestinian commandos). Al-Qassam's death (in combat with British troops) "electrified the Palestinian
people" whose message under the slogans of militant pan-Arabism, anti-Westernism and anti-Zionism was spread in every town and village in Palestine (Khalidi, 1988:228; Ward, 1977:16-18). The 1936-1939 revolt in Palestine marked the peak of the Palestinian national struggle under Mandate, and was preceded by strikes and riots during the period from 1920-1935.

The traditional social distance between Muslims and Christians was considerably lessened, by a common opposition to the two non-Arab foes - the British rulers and the Zionist establishment (Ward, 1977:6-9,13). Weinstock attributed the failure of the Palestine national movement under Mandate to: "Palestinians lacking dynamic bourgeoisie and a powerful working class, either of which would have been able to provide a genuine leadership for the struggle" (Weinstock, 1963:60).

By the end of the 1936-1939 revolt, the Palestinian national movement witnessed an absence of national leadership, which lasted until the Partition Plan of 1947. The British restrictions on Palestinian political activities were embodied in the (Emergency) Defence Regulations of 1945 which were implemented differently on Arabs and Jews.

8.2.2 Post-1948: Forces of Consolidation vs Forces of Oppression

With 1948, the Palestinian people were dubbed Arab refugees. Their society was fragmented and its people scattered. Since then they have been deprived not only of statehood, but also (and concomitantly) of the physical and moral resources which come with formal authority. As a result of these events new developments in the Palestinian struggle and national identity were inaugurated. These were further crystallized and consolidated after the 1967 Israeli occupation of the WBGS, which was indeed a turning point in the history of the yet novice Palestine national movement. The complex interaction between the forces of consolidation and the forces of oppression, two dialectical forms of each other, can be seen to have affected the evolution of a distinctive Palestinian political consciousness. The refugees' experience of economic exploitation and discrimination helped in radicalizing them, and thus strengthened their determination to find for themselves a survival strategy which could enhance their identity in the face of attack (Sayigh, 1979:113-124).

In the period from 1948 to 1967, as we discussed in Chapter three, the refugees collectively opposed any type of permanent resettlement outside Palestine, for fear of loss of political rights and in particular their right for repatriation. This collectivity resulted from a combination of cultural and political factors - internal and external - that shaped PRs political identity, hence forcing them to anticipate events rather than reacting to them.
8.2.2.1 Does Resettlement Precludes Return?

A number of internal factors, which Sayigh above referred to as 'ethno' or cultural, together with external political influences, played a role in reinforcing the PRs identity which has enhanced their solidarity from 1948 to the present day.

During the "middle trip", a term used by Turki to refer to the transitional period between 1948 and the establishment of the PLO in 1964 or the decades of 'burial' and 'non-existence' as camp Palestinians called it - refugees were robbed of their national identity. During this period, the sense of suffering a common fate and injustice helped preserve and reshape a solidarity evident even on the level of constraining social conflicts (See Chapter 7).

Identifying with the land of Palestine has been building up in refugees' spirit since 1948. The Ghourba (exile) in this sense meant to the refugee communities not necessarily an exile from the country, but displacement from their original homes, villages, neighborhoods, and lands - a social uprootedness - as observed by Bruhns (Migdal and Kimmerling, 1993:187; Bruhns, 1955:133). The state of expectation and impermanence which refugees of all ages experienced has developed among the Palestinian a diaspora mentality which centres around the vision of return (Ward, 1977:26).

The refugees resistance - individually and collectively - to their exile and insistence on return based on UN Resolution 194(III) was evident throughout the period, as they vehemently opposed the construction of permanent shelters in refugee camps. It took UNRWA officials a long time to persuade them that "construction of weather proof shelters did not mean abandonment of 'the right of return'... [since] mere mention of resettlement has been sufficient to undermine any of the numerous refugee rehabilitation projects" (Ibid.:26).

In general, the desire to return to Palestine precluded willingness to resettle elsewhere. It may reasonably be asked whether there is a relationship between resettlement of GS refugees and their desire to return. Since the establishment of the Israeli sponsored housing projects in GS, the general perception among the camp population has been that resettlement precludes RRC in the long run. The attitudes of refugees in both locations were sought during the field research by raising several questions concerning these issues. The questions deal with whether refugees see any link between their RRC and resettlement; if resettlement precludes Return; and SR respondents were further asked about their entitlement to RRC (Tables 8.1; 8.2; 8.3).
Table 8.1 shows a sharp difference in the ‘yes’ response between the two samples. It suggests that a higher percentage of respondents in SC (38%) thought that a relationship did exist compared to only 11.1% in SR; while 77.8% in SR said that no link exists between the two. It may be that this response by the SR residents can be seen as justification for their relocation. However, it is noticeable that quite a number in the SC gave a ‘don’t know’ answer (26.1%), which reflects confusion among refugees of a possible loss of their RRC because of relocation to the SR project.

In this respect, another question was asked pertaining to refugee opinion as to whether they agree or disagree that resettlement precludes Return or Compensation (Table 8.2).

Table 8.2, disagree responses by SR residents were as high as in Table 8.1 above; 83.3% and over half the sample in SC (50.7%) gave the same response. Only 5.6% said they agreed, compared with 26.8% in SC. Furthermore, a larger number of respondents in the SC 31 (21.8%) than in the SR 10 (11.1%) said they are not sure.

Moreover, the findings of the sample survey in both locations indicate that there is a strong correlation between cancellation of the RR and resettlement by educational level, disagreement rising as the level of education increases (Table 8.3).
TABLE 8.3: Resettlement and Cancellation of the RRC by Educational Level, SC & SR (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Can. of Return/ Educational level</th>
<th>Agree SC</th>
<th>Disagree SC</th>
<th>Agree SR</th>
<th>Disagree SR</th>
<th>Not sure SC</th>
<th>Disagree SR</th>
<th>No answer SC</th>
<th>Disagree SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech. College</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

Over half (50.7%) in SC and a very high percentage in SR (83.3%) disagree with the notion that resettlement cancels the RRC; this disagreement was obvious among illiterates as well as those who have attained preparatory and secondary education.

In addition to the indirect questions asked on the link between Return or Compensation and resettlement, the SR refugees being the segment of refugees who moved out from the camp, were asked a more direct question as shown in Table 8.4.

TABLE 8.4: Perceived Entitlement to the RRC, in the event of a Solution to the Palestine-Israeli Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The SR answers show a very pessimistic outlook and a strong belief in their RRC without any reservations. In short, refugees attitudes in both locations and especially in SR, contrast with the Israeli assumption that through the resettlement of refugees in the GS a normalization of the dream of Return will take place. This assumption was clear in Dayan's statement of June 1973, which identified the refugees continuous demand to return to their original homeland as a major goal of the "alternative housing" policy. He said:

As long as the refugees remain in their camps...their children will say they come from Jaffa or Haifa; if they move out of the camps, the hope is they will feel an attachment to their new land (*JP*, 13 June, 1973).
Dayan's statement denotes two contradictory assumptions. On the one hand, he was right in assuming that Palestinian children will long for return as much as their parents, as shown by the refugee youngsters of today, who proved to be the leading forces of the Intifada despite the fact that they had never lived in Palestine before 1948 (See Chapter 7). On the other hand, Dayan's assumption that moving out of camps would allow the refugees to forget their original homeland and a desire to return to it is a false assumption, as the findings from the SR revealed.

Israeli attempts to normalize the Return among OTs' refugees could be seen to date from the first year of Israeli occupation. Old refugees showed me their Israeli IDs, pointing that their town/village of origin was not been mentioned under place of birth, despite such information being provided by them when the 1967 Israeli Census was conducted. Instead, two terms were used to replace the town/village of origin: Israel or, in Hebrew, 'Lorashom' meaning not registered. By eliminating the original place of birth from the identity card the authorities thought that the refugees would forget their attachment to their towns/villages. One respondent also told how the authorities gave new titles to the camp Mukhtars. The name of the village (in Palestine 1948) which a Mukhtar represents was replaced by the name of the block in camp. It is not surprising, then, to see the Israeli censors also banning the word ouda (Return) in the Arab press. Kapeliouk commented on this when he said:

The Arabic word 'ouda' means 'return'. It signifies the return of the PRs to their homeland and it is a word that terrifies many Israelis...This word does not threaten Israel's existence, but rather [that it] makes Israelis feel guilty (Kapeliouk, 1981:6).

The question therefore remains of how in the context of a final solution to the conflict, Return is to be exercised, and under what limitations; this is one area which will demand a great deal of exploration in the negotiation stage.

One can now begin to appreciate the importance which Palestine refugees place on their UNRWA refugee card. The card for them carries a symbolic meaning; it has become the emblem of a political identity, rather than refugee alone.

According to my sample, 135 (95.1%) in the SC and 85 (94.4%) in SR hold a refugee card. Refugees were asked what the card means to them and over half in both locations 55.6% in SC and 58.9% in SR consider that the card asserts their identity and their rights as refugees, reinforcing their collectivity. The high percentage of SR respondents who answered in this way affirm the argument which Emanuel Marx raised. He argued that by setting up the Israeli sponsored housing projects in GS, a new incentive was given to revive the value of being a refugee (Marx,1992:292). Rights, as mentioned by a large number of refugees, have both a
short-term and a long-term rights dimension. For the refugees the short-term rights are services offered to them by UNRWA, especially the provision of a shelter after they lost all their properties; "this shelter is all what [sic] we have in this world after our dispossession" said one refugee. Obtaining free UNRWA services was explicit in the responses given by 33.9% in SC and 30% in SR. For other refugees, the long-term rights are those of RRC, which they hope to achieve through maintaining the collectivity in the camp life; "the camp will be our grave, until we can go back to Palestine 1948, I want the sand in my town. The air. It is enough," said a refugee from the SR.

Given this background, it is useful to consider the fear of the refugees when UNRWA introduced a new refugee card (single Registration card) in GS in 1982 (in addition to the ration card). This new card was cancelled in 1983, because refugees in other UNRWA areas refused to take it, yet was reissued for all refugees in the five UNRWA areas of operation in 1992. Refugee fear stemmed from them seeing a connection between the issue of new cards and attempts to resettle them against their will. However, these fears have no grounds, as explained by the UNRWA director in Amman and by the Accommodation officer in UNRWA Gaza (Alayan, 1992:23-4).

8.2.2.2 The Right to Return vs Self-Determination

Let us now turn to another argument by Kimmerling and Migdal, which reinforces my view regarding the political mobilization of PRs. They argue that the culture which the refugees generated in the camps:

Laid the basis for a major change; from the right of return to the development of a true Palestinian nationalism. The rights of an aggrieved group to a national movement asserting the broad collective will of an entire people (Migdal and Kimmerling, 1993:278,187).

This argument asserts the fact that the high level of politicization and militancy among camp refugees transforms their role to one of producing events rather than simply and always reacting to them. This is evident among GS refugees in particular, and further explains the Israeli authorities' resettlement schemes being operated in GS only, rather than on the WB, under a triple pretext of security, geography and demography.

However, Kimmerling and Migdal seem to separate Palestinian nationalism and the RR, whereas, as will be debated below, the latter forms an integral part of the former. An examination of this argument would be better verified against the responses given by the refugees in the sample survey. Refugees in both locations were asked about their perception
of a solution to the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The questions (direct and indirect) meant to cross-question the strong desire to Return or Compensation against the refugees attachment to and acceptance of the new developments undertaken by the PLO in its 19th PNC session of 1988, discussed below (Tables 8.5; 8.6; 8.7; 8.8).

TABLE 8.5: Perception of a Solution to the Palestine-Israeli Conflict, SC & SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SR</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC 19th Session Resolutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation of all Palestine</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other solutions</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

Table 8.5 shows that the majority of refugees in both locations support the resolutions undertaken by the 19th PNC session, which has its roots in the Phased Programme adopted by the PLO in 1974 (See below). However, those who believe in the liberation of all Palestine still constitute a fairly high percentage of the sample surveyed. The responses given in the following Tables, 8.6 and 8.7, shed more light on the refugees' position in relation to this issue.

TABLE 8.6 Do You Support a Palestinian State in the WBGS, SC & SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SR</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

A further question in relation to the above was asked because it has a specific and direct relation to the refugees' desire to return to their homeland (Table 8.7).
TABLE 8.7: Support for an alternative state even if it Excludes 1948 Land?, SC & SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>SC No.</th>
<th>SR No.</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>72.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

The responses given in Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show, surprisingly, overwhelming support for a Palestinian state in the WBGS, even if it excludes refugees' land in 1948 Palestine. On the one hand these findings assert the refugee attachment to the PLO programmes of 1974 and 1988; and on the other hand they reflect a dual commitment on the refugees side: one to their desire to return as expressed above and two to their desire to a state and independence, these being indivisible according to UN resolutions and statements on the question of Palestinians as refugees, their RR and their claims to just compensation. In the case of the Palestinian people,

The individual or personal right of return assumes a special significance for, without its restoration, the exercise of the collective or national right of self-determination, itself guaranteed by a variety of international instruments, becomes impossible (UN, 1978:1).

The most recent position of the Israeli government towards the refugee problem has to be read through the negotiations held in the Refugees' Committee in the multilateral talks. Israel refused to attend the first talks held, but attended the subsequent two meetings. In the second multilateral talks on refugees, on 11 November 1992 in Ottawa, the head of the Israeli delegation, Schlomo Ben-Ami, stressed that the talks should concentrate on improving the living conditions of refugees in the camps or resettling them in places near their camps; he pointed to the housing projects that Israel set up in the GS to resettle refugees (al-Quds al-Arabi, 14 November, 1992).

8.3 POST-1967: RESISTANCE OF GAZA STRIP REFUGEES

Our discussion in Chapter three revealed that the GS camp community experiences were unique compared to other concentrations of Palestinians. Their experiences sharpened their sense of identity and political consciousness and they developed a sub-culture of their own. The preservation of refugees in the GS could be understood in relation to the conditions of refugees under the Egyptian administration. Restrictions on out-migration until 1962; the strict
separation between refugees and locals encouraged by the Egyptian authorities; lack of employment and limited income resources; their isolation from outside national and cultural influences; the effect of refugee school, and other factors helped to fashion their unique character (See Chapter 3). Added to the above factors, the Egyptian government did not make any move to annex Gaza (Brand, 1988:50), unlike the situation on the WB, which was annexed to Jordan in 1950 and its inhabitants granted Jordanian citizenship including camp refugees becoming the only refugees to obtain a citizenship (Brand, 1988:231).

The foundation of *Fedayeen* strength was in the refugee camps. Refugees formed the skeleton of the resistance movement. Armed struggle on the WB took the form of "hit-and-run' raids across the cease-fire lines as their main mode of operation" (Jabber, 1973:189). The limited scale of armed struggle on the WB was a result of a number of factors. The WB refugees are more settled than GS refugees. Generally, they have been better-off economically, and were concerned not to jeopardize their homes and livelihood; additionally, the harsh measures of the Israeli authorities, especially in 1971, deterred them from giving support to the *Fedayeen*.

The years 1967-71 were the peak of armed struggle in the GS. Armed struggle went hand-in-hand with political mobilization against the Israeli occupation. The huge arms cashes left by the Egyptian army when it was driven out of Sinai and the GS provided the *Fedayeen* with a bountiful source of arms, ammunition and explosives. The Palestinian army units which were created in 1964 (See Chapter 3) were broken up after the 1967 defeat, but the cadres remained, together with the veterans of 1955 *Fedayeen* in the GS. These provided the nucleus for resistance and the natural basis for the formation of clandestine organizations opposed to the Israeli occupation after 1967. Added to these elements, the effect of the Nasserist revolutionary ethics, the accumulative experience of oppression by the Israeli forces over Gazans during the first Israeli occupation of the GS in 1956/1957 (See Chapter 3), and Israeli calls to annex the Strip (See Chapter 4), all came together and enabled the *Fedayeen* to act. The *Fedayeen* blended into the population and sought refuge in the refugee camp and poor areas or hid in the thick orange groves. Just three months after the occupation of the GS (on 2 November 1967), a civil disobedience campaign of demonstrations, strikes, and the boycott of Israeli products was launched (Yassin, 1991:37-39; Lesch, 1985:55).

Resistance in the GS between 1967-1971 took the form of grenade attacks on Israeli targets. During this period, the GS was controlled by the *Fedayeen*, as *Ha'aretz* of 8 August, 1969 reported, and it became the centre of Palestinian resistance. The number of *Fedayeen* operations during this period amounted to 1,364, with casualties totalling 370 Israelis (45 being
killed in action) and 131 Fedayeen (77 killed), as calculated from O'Neill (1978:237-242). It was reported that from June 1967 to May 1969, Israeli military courts in the GS tried about 7,000 Fedayeen; 200 of this number being tried in the first two months of occupation (Yassin, 1991:38-39). Collaborators and workers in Israel were also targets of the Palestinian Fedayeen in the GS during the first four years of occupation. The case of Theeb al-Harbity - a refugee from the SC - who was executed by the Fedayeen on 11 February 1973, was mentioned by a number of respondents in the sample survey, who spoke of his collaboration with the authorities to annex the SC to Gaza municipality and his attempts to convince refugees to move out to the housing projects (O'Neill, 1978:92; al-Husseini, 1974:71; Palestine Affairs, April (1973):221-2).

The Israeli response to the armed struggle in the GS reached its peak in 1971, when it carried out the road-widening operations in the largest camps as steps to counter subversion and to pacify GS refugees. "To win the heart and mind" of refugees, the authorities embarked on a new strategy, planning and constructing new housing projects adjacent to the refugee camps. The authorities believed that overcrowding in the camps and the low standard of living lay behind the high militancy among refugees (See Chapter 4). Thus, urbanization of the camps and the provision of work in Israel would, they believed, help to dismantle the unity between the Fedayeen - mainly from refugee camps - and the rest of the population who provided protection for them. Kapeliouk explained: "the Fedayeen are controlling the population, while the Israeli forces have control on land" (in al-Husseini, 1974:68).

However, on the Palestinian level, the crushing of the armed struggle in the GS at the end of 1971 brought about a new stage in the Palestinian national struggle in the OTs, in which the "political struggle began to challenge armed struggle as a tactical approach for dealing with the realities of the occupation" (Roy, 1989:259). This was enhanced through the geographical unity - under occupation - of the WBGS, enabling Palestinians to resume contacts for the first time after 19 years of isolation.

8.3.1 The Occupied Territories: The Growth of the National Struggle

In the aftermath of the crackdown on GS camps in 1971, a number of internal and external factors came into play. Their impact on the development of the PNM was felt on every level. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to cover in detail all these factors, but a brief picture of these would provide an answer as to why the PNM had embarked on an independent political agenda.

Two kinds of external factors have had an influence on the growth of the PNM in the OTs
and the crystallization of political consciousness: the first has to do with the PLO leadership outside the OTs and its influence on Palestinians inside the OTs; the second relates to the threats and defeats of the PNM and armed struggle in the diaspora at the hands of the Arab regimes.

With regard to the internal and external Palestinian relations, it was the year of 1973, which witnessed the first joint political effort between the PLO and the political forces in the OTs, following the Palestinian National Council (PNC) session of August 1973. Its programme included support for political and cultural activities as tools to strengthen the struggle against occupation. It announced that:

The PNF (is) an integral part of the Palestinian national movement as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization. (to support) Mass organizations, such as trade unions, students' and womens' federations, religious and social clubs and associations, in their efforts to defend the interests of the groups they represent, and (to mobilize) their energies for the struggle against the occupation. (Culturally), to protect (Palestinian) culture and history from Zionist manipulation and distortion...to revivify popular heritage and the literature of the Resistance as being an embodiment of (the Palestinians') attachment to their land and their heroic struggle to defend it (International Documents on Palestine, 1975:459-60).

Emphasis on their political means of struggle against Israeli occupation was adopted in the 12th session of the PNC in 1974. The new political programme identified the political objective of Palestinian nationalism as the establishment of a Palestinian state in a part of Palestine. It called for the establishment of a Palestinian "authority" in any part of Palestine "liberated" from Israel; which explicitly meant a commitment to the two-state solution, and showed the importance of the people's role in the OTs to attain this goal. It has been known since then as the "phased programme".

In the same year (1974), several other events helped reinforce the Palestinian will to resist. Firstly, the Rabat Arab Summit Conference in October 1974 resolved that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, with the right to establish an independent national authority in any Palestinian territory that is liberated (International documents on Palestine 1974,1977:525). This declaration elevated the role of the PLO in the diplomatic configurations of the Middle East. Secondly, "The Question of Palestine" was included in the General Assembly agenda for the first time since 1952, and the PLO was invited to participate as an observer in the Assembly's work, a status later extended to all other UN organs (UN,1979:26). Third, that same year the General Assembly gave full and formal recognition to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and
sovereignty and return to their homes (UN, 1979: 26). Fourthly this recognition was followed by Arafat's address in the Assembly on 13 November 1974 -the first leader of a national liberation movement to receive such an honour - (Hirst, 1977: 334-338; UN, 1979: 27). The cumulative effect of all these factors helped to affirm the Palestinian identity and deepened their struggle against occupation. On the other hand, the occupiers also began to intensify their suppressive policies in the OTs.

The PNC's 19th session in Algeria on November 12-15, 1988, was entitled "The Intifada meeting" and declared independence or statehood on the basis of Resolution 181. It resolved: the implementation of resolutions 338 and 242, rejection of terrorism, and willingness to negotiate directly with Israel (Said, 1990: 17-18). The positive effects of these developments on the PNM helped enhance the crystallization of a distinctive Palestinian identity.

The consolidation of the PNM and the crystallization of political consciousness in the OTs has been further enhanced by two major aspects: the threats from the Israeli authorities to destroy Palestinian nationalism by every means; and the qualitative changes within the PNM itself. The organizational and political changes which the PNM adopted since 1975 were reflected in the path of struggle within every sector and segment of the society. On the organizational level, the PNM started to incorporate all sectors of the society into Palestinian institutional life. Open frameworks for political, social and cultural action became the amplification of mass participation in political activities. The emergence of mass organizations and the expansion of the universities were the most significant developments (Taraki, 1990: 60).

The emergence of young nationalist leadership was also witnessed in the erosion of the traditional leadership represented by the Mukhtars (village president) in the camps, in particular those the Israeli authorities were manipulating against the new nationalists, an issue which we will discuss in some detail below. The emergence of mass organizations which proved to be the most resilient - those of women, workers, students, etc.- contributed to the crystallization of the Palestinian consciousness in the OTs. Their effectiveness was seen in their ability to recruit and mobilize progressive and young people who were more capable of a flexible response to the challenges faced by Palestinians under occupation. One of their distinctive feature is the class character of both their leadership and constituency: the vast majority are from peasant, refugee, and lower-middle-class urban backgrounds.

The overlap of internal and external factors and their impact on the PNM have all played a significant role in the process of political mobilization of the Palestinian community at large. To complete the picture, a closer examination of the Israeli system of political and
juridical control in the OTs, and especially in the GS, is necessary. This is because the Israeli focus of control permeates the tempo of daily life for every individual in the territories, especially the refugee community whose high contribution to the struggle has made them the particular target of Israeli repressive measures.

8.4 THE ISRAELI SYSTEM OF POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL CONTROL

The Israeli Military Government (MG), and since 1981 the Civil Administration (CA), acquired immense powers over the lives of residents in the OTs, beginning with the first week of occupation in 1967. Military order No. 2 (June 7, 1967) concentrated these powers in the hands of the Military Governor:

All powers of government, legislation, appointment and administration in relation to the Area or its inhabitants shall henceforth be vested in me alone and shall be exercised by me or whoever shall be appointed by me to that end or acting on my behalf (Article 3 (A) (Peretz, 1986:80).

Since 1981 the bulk of these powers have been transferred to the head of the Civil Administration in the WBGS. These powers are based on three sets of laws which the Israeli authorities are applying over the OTs. The various legal systems include the following: (1) Regulations issued on a day-to-day basis by the military commander of the occupied areas. There have been over 1500 military orders promulgated since 1967, affecting every aspect of Palestinian life including how deep wells may be dug, and if a well may be dug at all, and what crops may be grown, where they may be sold, whether a building may be constructed, what an individual may read, where a person may live, what associations or organizations he/she may belong to, and much more. (2) British Mandatory Defence (Emergency) Regulations. These were imposed in Mandated Palestine in the aftermath of the Arab revolt in 1936-39, but were later used against Jews in Palestine. When they were invoked against Jews, Zionist leaders condemned them as violations of the "basic principles of law, justice, and jurisprudence". (3) Jordanian and Egyptian law is invoked when its purpose suits the Israeli authorities.¹⁶

None of these laws give the Palestinians the legal rights that Israeli Jews enjoy, the issue of family reunification discussed in Chapter two being a case in point. While, settlers residing in the OTs enjoy preferential rights, Palestinians on their own land are denied rights and have "a second-class status...not only during sojourns into Israel" (Migdal & Kimmerling, 1993:253-4; Coon, 1992:203; Drori, 1982:44-80). The presence of Jewish settlers in the midst of Arab towns and villages threatens the very existence of Palestinians and make them insecure on their own land, especially since the Jewish religious settlers are armed, and believe that to settle and
defend the land they are fulfilling God's commandments, such that everything has become a
divine manifestation (Gorry and Auerbach, 1979:27; Levenberg, 1976:12). The massacre in
Abraham Mosque in Hebron on 25 February 1994 - when about 60 Palestinians were killed by
a settler from Kiryat-Arba (a nearby Israeli settlement) - is strong evidence of the increase in
violence carried out by Jewish fundamentalists in the OTs, whose desire, as Baruch Merzel, a
Kach activist said is, '"[to] pursue their 'dreams' until one day the mosques will not be there"
(Palestine Times, 1993:3). The presence of settlements and settlers in the OTs has to be
perceived as being political in nature and as serving a political role (Coon, 1992:174). 7 A
leading Israeli civil rights lawyer, Avigdor Feldman, stated that:

there is no doubt at all that an apartheid regime already exists in the OTs. There is a
total and sophisticated separation between the system applied to Jewish and Palestinian
residents ( in Bindman, 1992:525).

The problem, as Evron noted, is that the "Judical system (in Israel) itself has become
an appendage of the machinery of oppression" (Evron, 1988:8-9). B’tselem (Israeli Information
Centre for Human Rights in the OTs) has been reporting discrepancies in sentencing between
Arabs and Jews for comparable offenses (Ibid.)

The failure to challenge racial discrimination and extend the rule of law fully
to the WB and the GS undermines the integrity of the legal system, just as in
South Africa skilful and often humane judges lost credibility by their failure (or
inability) to challenge barbarous security laws, so in Israel, a legal system
which does not protect a large segment of the population against serious abuses
(including torture) is drastically compromised (Bindman, 1992:525).

Given the juridical forms of Israeli control over the Palestinians in the OTs, one needs
to address more fundamental questions still, which will enable us to comprehend the
multifaceted channels of Israeli politico-military control in the OTs. A fundamental question
is, could refugee resettlement be seen as a strategy of control? What kind of systematic patterns
have been used by Israel to combat Palestinian resistance? Who are the patrons and the agents
in this process? Why has Israel been launching this battle or campaign against the Palestinians?
Simply to state these questions is to indicate the difficulty of answering them in full. However,
one simple conclusion is that the only way out of the repressive conditions of life under Israeli
occupation is the Palestinian right to exercise their full national sovereignty on their land, as
endorsed in UN resolutions, and as a basic right to all nations.

8.5 RESETTLEMENT: AS A COUNTER-INSURGENCY MEASURE

It has become clear that the impetus of settlement and resettlement schemes comes from
outside - e.g. a foreign rule - and even if 'voluntary' it is rarely initiated from within the group
involved. Yet, irrespective of the objectives given behind establishing such schemes - whether developmental for national planning, e.g. dam or farming resettlement schemes, or for counter-insurgency purposes - an element of coercion is involved (Sutton, 1978:60). Our discussion above and in Chapter seven revealed that the cultural and social identity of Palestinians in general and of Gaza refugees in particular has been maintained despite all sorts of repression. The authorities have embarked on a new technique to thwart GS refugee militancy, in the form constructing new housing projects, in the hope that through dispersion of the camp population, they would be able to quell their resistance to occupiers. This technique is best understood in a context of a guerrilla insurgency comparable to those set up for national development. To better understand why the Israeli authorities embarked on creating resettlement schemes in the GS, it is necessary to look to the military-political aspects of resettlement, which the remainder of this section will address.

The Malayan "New Villages"; the "Strategic Hamlets" in Vietnam; the "aldeamentos" in Angola; and the "douars" in Algeria, are just a few examples in resettlement history, carried out by Britain, the United States, Portugal and France respectively. All of them were carried out within the framework of a counter-insurgency strategy. It could be argued that the Israeli policy of refugee resettlement in the GS has modelled itself along these lines in response to the escalation of Palestinian resistance.

The roots of modern counter-insurgency date to the period from 1900 and 1945. This is considered a transitional period which laid the foundations for a more politically motivated insurgency after WWII, in which counter-insurgency became a recognized doctrine and "an integral part of the training and practical service experience of armies" (Beckett, 1988:8,15). It is no accident to learn that the beginnings of a more modern counter-insurgency technique before WWI were found and practised by the British authorities in Palestine during the 1936-1939 revolt. It was officer Wingate who pioneered the concept of "counter gangs", while combining these techniques with the principles of colonial policy, which became "a feature of post-1945 counter-insurgency, and also provided invaluable military experience to a number of future Israeli military leaders" (Ibid.:8,31,37). Yet, these British techniques, as Beckett observed, failed to respond to Jewish insurgency in Palestine after 1946 (Ibid.:1988:13). In principle, the ultimate objective of the counter-revolutionary strategist is "control of the population through counter-organization...to suppress the revolutionary threat to the extent that counter-organization can be accomplished "(McCuen, 1966:128). Accomplishment on the level of the governing power entails the annihilation of the rebels and the "preservation of its own bases, populations, and forces" (Ibid.:51).
From the revolutionary point of view, the primary objective is "not only annihilating the enemy, but more important, of preserving the existence of the revolutionary forces", by which this "allows (them) to consolidate their control of the people and make the government bases not only useless but a liability" (Ibid.:51-2). The outcome of such a situation is that the governing forces and the insurgents get involved in an unfinished battle. One way used by the security forces to alter the situation of confrontation has been the separation of the civilian population from the insurgents. To ensure such separation, two methods have become customary since 1945:

either by erecting a physical barrier against guerrilla infiltration in the manner of the French 'Morice Line' in Algeria, the American 'McNamara Line' in Vietnam, or by resettlement of the civilian population (Beckett and Pimlott, 1985:11,59).

Resettlement as a concept was known in the 1890s as reconcentration - "the gathering of a population in guarded locations to deny guerrillas in the field ready access to food and support." The Spanish campaign in Cuba, the policies that the British used against the Boers in South Africa between 1900 and 1902; and the actions of the USA in 1900 in the Philippines are examples of a strategy which was revived by the British in Malaya (1948-60) (Beckett, 1988:9-10).

In the context of counter-insurgency strategy, resettlement is perceived as being part of a "civic-action" to counter-organize the population after destruction of guerrilla organization (McCuen, 1966:152-166). It is a policy that follows the French concept, which emphasizes that "destruction must be followed by construction" (Ibid.:128). The aim of initiating resettlement programmes is to regain the confidence of the population through developing a convincing "hearts and minds" policy. To achieve such a goal, 'civic-action' projects designed to improve the material condition are a requirement which imply pacification policies (Beckett, 1988:10). O'Neill commented on the importance of "civic-action" during resettlement:

Resettlement of sections of the population is another form sought by colonial regimes or government to sever the links between the insurgents and the populace...particularly when terror and/or guerrilla attacks persist and are attributed, at least partially, to support rendered the insurgents by portions of the population. Civic action and political organization are extremely important during resettlement; indeed, they are often viewed as concomitant of that technique (O'Neill, 1978:31).

Disadvantages of resettlement as emanated from experiences of the British in Malaya and the French in Algeria included the initial alienation of the population and the substantial expenses involved. Advantages outweighed disadvantages in these countries and included: maintaining security; curfews; isolating the guerrillas from the population; and offering better
living condition for the population (McCuen, 1966:231-34). However, the British resettlement in Malaya aimed at achieving a combination of goals: control of communities in centralized, defensible areas, and the reclamation of land by using improved agricultural methods (McCuen, 1966:155).

The use of resettlement as a counter-revolutionary technique has not been without its critics: "it is a policy fraught with potential danger for the government (Britain in Malaya), which may be accused of oppression", unless it is carried out humanely (Beckett and Pimlott, 1985:22). The 410 "New Villages" which the British set up in Malaya in 18 months to combat the Chinese communists; "were little more than well-organized shanty-towns" according to McCuen. Another angle of criticism was raised against the stringent measures of control over the population, and the collective punishment policies which made this experience a success compared to others elsewhere which proved failures (McCuen, 1966:162-6; Beckett and Pimlott, 1985:11, Clutterbuck, 1977:39).

By contrast, the 12,000 "Strategic Hamlets" set up by the Americans in two years in Vietnam (1960-1962) had failed by the end of 1963, because the peasants resented being removed from their ancestral lands (Beckett and Pimlott, 1985:94; Clutterbuck, 1977:45). Resettlement in Angola by the Portuguese was a failure also, the 150 aldeamentos first established in August 1961 were resented by the Angola tribes as "disrupting tribal society;" additionally, the divisions among the Portuguese authorities between those viewing resettlement primarily as a measure of population control and those regarding it as an opportunity to stimulate native development caused this failure (Beckett and Pimlott, 1985:147).

In Algeria, observers from inside and outside France criticized the French regroupment policies where "a million and a half men, women, and children have been torn from their houses by force of their own fear", and displaced "around the cities and towns (in) clusters old sheet-metal shacks" (McCuen, 1966:232-3).

This kind of analysis highlights the real motives of the Israeli refugee resettlement in the GS. These resettlement schemes - as discussed in Chapter four - came after the crackdown on the Fedayeen in 1971 through Sharon's road-widening operations in the large camps. The Israeli authorities' plan for improving the living conditions of refugees through economic development and resettlement - the carrot of their policies - aimed at isolating "the Fedayeen from the rest of the citizenry" (O'Neill, 1978:96). Without the security of the population, the authorities believed that Fedayeen could never be counter-organized or controlled. But the authorities did not recognize then that the strength of the Fedayeen came from among the local population - refugees and non-refugees - a fact which led the Israeli press to question the
effectiveness of the Israeli policy in GS camps: "It is impossible to separate the Fedayeen from the locals, for the locals themselves are potential Fedayeen" (Ha'olom Hazeh, 3 August, 1971; Ha'aretz, 1 October, 1971), in contrast to the WB where the insurgents were infiltrators rather than part of the local populace (O'Neill, 1978:94).

While it can be argued that the Israeli authorities successfully adopted the military requirements of counter-insurgency, they were less able to develop a convincing "heart and minds" policy to win the support of the Gazan refugees as a whole. The security measures adopted by the authorities did not deter refugees from giving support to the struggle, as the survey findings will show below. Nor did these schemes fulfill an Israeli wish to depopulate the camps, for those who move out constitute only 18.4% of the total refugee community in the Strip (al-Ittihad, 9 December, 1988). Moreover, the number of relocated refugees hardly exceeds the number by which the refugee population grows every year through natural increase. Critique of the resettlement schemes in the GS, as discussed earlier, focused on both the political and physical level; they offered poor quality housing (especially in the first stage of resettlement) and have been contributing to the revival of refugee political identity.

8.6 OTHER VARIABLES OF CONTROL

Control of insurgents is not only limited to repressive security measures undertaken by the governing authorities, and other environmental elements have to be considered. O'Neill identifies nine aspects which have an impact on insurgency. These are: "terrain, climate, the road and communication network, ethnicity, religion and culture, size of the country, and the size and distribution of the population" (O'Neill, 1978:25). The nature of the terrain or geography affects the movement of insurgents from their main base. Vast and rugged terrain works in favour of the guerrillas, providing hideouts and expanding their area of operation. Severe climate could favour the guerrillas by preventing government attacks, but it does not have a direct effect on insurgent success. Communication networks, if highly developed, work in favour of the authorities, enabling them to "move about expeditiously and make better use of their technological superiority". In contrast, poor roads favour the guerrillas, e.g. narrow alleys in GS refugee camps help the Fedayeen side. The size and distribution of the population affects the level of insurgency: "where the number of people is small and concentrated, it will facilitate government efforts to control the population and sever their links with the guerrillas." Similarly, "if a society is mostly urban, it is easier for a government to control the people and to prevent the establishment of guerrilla bases." In the case of GS, it
is the popular support for the *Fedayeen* that made their protracted warfare a success, regardless of their being urban or rural, although, as discussed in Chapter seven, one of the authorities aim to resettle refugee was in order to make them urban. Lastly, if the population if from a different ethnic, religious and/or language group differing than the authorities, this helps guerrilla elements to clique together and support each other (O'Neill, 1978:25-28).

Although these variables of control may become disadvantageous for the guerrillas if the authorities manifest strength and counter-insurgency policies, e.g. collective punishment, a highly organized and politically mobilized population could offset these handicaps and carry on the struggle effectively. This begs the question, as to what extent these variables have a bearing upon the insurgency of SR refugees compared to the SC refugees?

SC refugees assessed the rate of political mobilization of SR refugees. The survey posed the questions in Table 8.8, 8.9 and 8.10. For the purpose of cross-examination, attitudes of the SR refugees in this respect were also sought.

**TABLE 8.8** Evaluation of Political Activities of SR Refugees? SR Residents Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above average</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below average</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The 1991 Sample Survey*

**TABLE 8.9** Evaluation of Refugee Participation in Political Activities With SC Refugees? SC Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>142</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The 1991 Sample Survey*
As the Tables above indicate, a very high percentage of the respondents in both locations consider the participation of SR refugees in political activities to be very high, some 70% in SR and 62% in SC. However, however, what is notable is that in SC 21.8% gave average as an answer compared to only 10% in SR. Table 8.9 shows that nearly all SC respondents (97.2%) affirm that SR refugees are as politically active as SC refugees. These findings support further the Palestinian view that relocation does not reduce political mobility, as stated by all the leadership interviewed, some of whom pointed to the poor quarters in Gaza town as being more active than camp refugees. A number of respondents in the SC labelled the SR as: "the new camp by contrast to the old camp (SC)"; "a family which has been divided into two"; "SR son/daughter of the SC". Some refugees in the SR further asserted that "the feeling of belonging and political struggle does not change whether we live in a hut or in a palace."

The Israeli strategy for setting-up the refugee resettlement schemes in the GS is self-serving. It reflects a belief that most political problems can be reduced to social problems. Hence their shock over the resettled refugees' role during the Intifada: "it is a real change in attitude," said a Defence Ministry official (JP, 19 October, 1988). A couple of refugees in the SR described how the Civil Administration officer (Arieh Ramot) in GS, in a meeting with notables from the SR, expressed his anger and disappointment over the participation of SR refugees in the Intifada. Both refugees further explained that the SR was the second place after Jabalaya camp - the camp where the Intifada began - in terms of the number of confrontations with the authorities, even though the SR was called "the village of peace" (Kfar Shalom) for its quietness prior to the Intifada.

Respondents in both locations explained the reasons for the high level of participation of SR refugees in political activities. Surprisingly, refugees in both locations listed almost similar reasons, of two types. The first related to the socio-political orientation - same struggle, strong ties - and the second related to outside factors. Surprisingly, some of the

---

**TABLE 8.10 Level of Political Participation, SC Residents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above average</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below average</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>142</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** The 1991 Sample Survey
answers in relation to the latter set of reasons correspond to some of the environmental variables mentioned earlier designed to curtail resistance, such as smaller population, wide roads compared with the narrow alleys in the camps (See Plates: 8.1 & 8.2). These findings further confirm that these schemes were designed with a counter-insurgency strategy in mind (See Tables 8.11 & 8.12).

### TABLE 8.11 Explanation for Level of Political Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same struggle</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong ties</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide roads</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less population</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same harassments by the authorities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_**Source:** The 1991 Sample survey_

### TABLE 8.12 Explanations for Level of Political Participation. SC Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same struggle</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong ties</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide roads</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better control over children</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less population</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same harassments by the authorities</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better living conditions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_**Source:** The 1991 Sample Survey_

Given this background, it is of significance to view the practical side of the Israeli political-military control, by which the refugees in general, and GS refugees in particular have been seen as the main contributors to the struggle and hence the target of the Israeli measures.

### 8.7 GS REFUGEES' MILITANCY AND ISRAELI REACTION

With the rebirth of Palestinian nationalism, the Palestinian identity changed from refugee to revolutionary (Sayigh, 1977:34). In challenging their designations in the face of all hardships in the host countries and under Israeli control, they emphasized their role in the struggle in various ways, thus enhancing their political identity rather than refugee identity and leading the PNM from one of armed struggle to calls for independence and sovereignty (See
Plates no. 8.1 & 8.2: The narrow alleys in the Shati camp are in marked contrast to the wide roads in the Sheikh Radwan project, the latter facilitating the movement of Israeli military vehicles.

Photo: The author, 1991
above discussion). Throughout this long path of defeats and triumphs, the Palestinians developed three heroic images, as Kimmerling and Migdal wrote:

- The Feday (Lit.: "one who sacrifices himself") was a modern metamorphosis of the holy warrior....The image of the survivor...a more passive hero, demonstrating sumud or steadfastness...he confirmed his sumud by staying on the land at all costs - a bitter lesson learned from 1948...the survivor's counterpart was "the child of the stone," often exemplified through portraits of the shahid, or martyr, offering his life for the national cause by fighting against all odds... (Kimmerling & Migdal, 1993:211-2).

- The particular aspects of life under occupation in the WBGS and the Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights in the OTs have been the vehicles towards the development and thus affirmation of these three images. These facts were confirmed by the Minister of Economics and Finance in Israel, who stated: "...the coming of age of the first generation born under occupation and the "iron fist" policy launched in August 1985 all contributed to the Palestinians growing militancy" (Johnson, 1990:32).

- The politics of camp refugees, even though it is an echo of Palestinian nationalism in general, "have their own characteristics: intensity, radicalism, violence and dedication" (Yahya, 1990:93). These characteristics have been a distinctive feature of refugees struggle against occupation since the early months of the Israeli occupation.

In dealing with Israeli measures in the GS, our concentration will be on camps and refugees, especially in both locations in the sample surveyed. Several indicators were chosen to measure the political involvement of refugees in SC and SR and the Israeli response to them, e.g. arrested, and injured members in the household and others (See Tables below). For the purpose of our study, a valid question is whether refugees in the housing projects are as involved in the struggle as to their counterparts in the camps, or have their new living conditions stemmed their militancy? The data above, on the level of political mobility, asserted that SR refugees are as active as their counterparts in SC. In practical terms it is the results of the field data below, which speak for themselves, which provide an answer to the Israeli officials' assumptions that during the Intifada resettled refugees" were less involved in the rioting" (Israel Yearbook 1988:145). This statement is based on a general Israeli assumption that, as Brigadier General Fredy Zach, former deputy co-ordinator for Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District, put it: "When the Palestinians have something to lose, they will think twice about terror. The army's policy is to try to decrease terror by improving services" (Cited in Viorst, 1989:111). It is those twin policies of Dayan - the carrot and the stick - which the authorities believed would reduce resistance and enable Israel to sustain its control indefinitely.

Israeli violations are multifaceted and extend to a number of areas, and all are carried
out in the name of security, whether collectively or individually. The range and scope of violations of human rights in the OTs as direct means to control the population are enormous, and beyond the limit of this thesis. But a brief picture of the kind of suppressive measures and restrictions that Palestinians face in everyday life - with the emphasis on refugees - is of significance here, especially during the Intifada period. Dealing with such manifestations or indicators will throw some light on the actualities of the conflict, and thus provide an answer to the question of the effectiveness or futility of Israel's strategy to meet force by counter-force.

8.7.1 Political Imprisonment and Administrative Detention

Israeli soldiers have the right to detain any person if they have "grounds of suspicion" that the person in question may have committed an offense. In practice, this means that anyone can be arbitrarily taken into custody at any time. Another form of detention is what is known as the "administrative detention", where persons may be held in detention for a period of six months without trial, this repeatedly extended at the end of six month period, merely at the whim of the military authorities. Dedi Zucker, an Israeli Knesset member noted that one "out of every 200 men over the age of 18 from OTs were imprisoned without charge or trial" (Cited in al-Haq, 1988:151). During the period of detention individuals are subjected to a punitive and humiliating regime, often including torture, the methods of which are too numerous to cite here.

According to the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights (B'Tselem), in its report of 1991, there were 75,000 Palestinians who were held in prisons for various terms during the first three years of the Intifada. In GS alone the number of detainees during the first year of the Intifada ranges between 25 - 30,000, of which 4000 were administrative detainees; and this increased to around 46,000 by the end of December 1990, with about 7000 in administrative detention (al-Ittihad, 8 December, 1989; 10 January, 1991). Respondents from Block H in the SC reported that at one point during the Intifada all the men in the Block were under arrest.

Those who are detained are young people, who constitute a unique demographic indicator: one out of five young Palestinians in the OTs has been arrested at least once since 1967 (Sabella, 1991:10). It is difficult to determine the percentage of refugees detained in GS in general, but the survey findings reported that the percentage of households with a member/s who have experienced arrest are higher in the SR (54.4%) than in the SC (47.9%). This is despite the difference in population size in the two locations (Table 8.13).
TABLE 8.13  Arrested Members in the Household, SC & SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No. SC</th>
<th>No. SR</th>
<th>% SC</th>
<th>% SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

Over the three-year period of the Intifada, SR residents reported a higher percentage of detainees per household (47.7%) than the (42.3%) in the SC (Table 8.14). It is to be noted that a member of a household might be subjected to arrest more than once, similarly, one or more members in a household could be arrested, as was reported by refugees.

TABLE 8.14  Number and Percentage of Arrested Members in the Household, SC & SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No. SC</th>
<th>No. SR</th>
<th>% SC</th>
<th>% SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967-1987</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1987</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1990</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

The actual arrest of household members by the Israeli forces takes place during house raids, search operations and curfews. On November 13, 1992, for example, UNRWA reported that one hundred people were detained in Khan Yunis camp during a search operation by Israeli soldiers (UNRWA News, 26 November, 1992) "Town Arrest" is another form of arrest that is carried out by the Israeli authorities, involving an individual’s physical movement being restricted by administrative fiat, usually of six months but able to be extended indefinitely.

8.7.2 Curfews, Area Closures, Travel Restrictions

The GS camps have been the most affected by the imposition of lengthy curfew. Curfews are imposed on camps so as to isolate them and prevent them from affecting neighbouring regions. Refugee camps, in many respects, have "borne the brunt of Israeli curfew policy" (JMCC, 1991:11). The number of people affected ranges from a few thousand to several hundred thousand. Though the Israeli authorities have constructed an image of curfew as a humane alternative to other more overtly violent means of quelling activities thought to threaten Israeli security, they have been ignoring international legal standards. The use of curfews as a form of collective punishment was admitted by the Israeli justice minister:
It is not desirable but sometimes there is no choice. In normal society, criminal punishment is only inflicted on people at the margins. During a period of war, however, you need greater deterrence (Ibid:5).

Curfews are frequently used by the Israeli authorities for "re-asserting their control over and subjugating the rebelling Palestinian population" (Ibid.:6). Every day between 9 December 1987 and 31 December 1990, an average of 134,431 Palestinians in the OTs were confined to their homes by curfew (Ibid.:1). The hardships faced by camp refugees in the GS due to curfews are much more harsh than in any other areas. This is because of the overcrowding - the density per household when entire families are confined to their homes, in many cases no more than a single room. The GS refugee camp population (36% of the total Strip’s population) was subject to 75% of the curfew incidents and 65% of the person-days recorded, while on the WB the refugee camp population (8% of the total WB population) was subject to 43% of the curfew incidents and 30% of person-days recorded (Ibid.:2). (See Figure: 8.1).

Figure 8.1  Gaza Strip Curfews (Dec 1987-Dec 1990)


Figure 8.2 below shows the number of days spent under curfew in the SC during the first three years of the Intifada, and indicates that over three months of each of the three years,
Figure 8.2: Shati Camp Curfews (Dec 1987 - Dec 1990)

Total Curfew Days: 291

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HAVE NO CONTENT
TABLE 8.15  The Frequency of House Raids During the Intifada, SC & SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Times</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SR</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 &amp; more</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the 1991 Sample Survey

8.7.4 Injuries in the Camps

UNRWA figures on the injuries of GS refugees are relatively accurate, although they only report those cases which have been treated by UNRWA medical staff in the Agency's health centres (UNRWA, PIO, Gaza, March 1988). Underestimation in the number of injuries is also caused by the suspicion and fear of the refugees to give personal details, leading them to seek treatment outside 'official' channels; and by the restrictions imposed by the Military Governor on 13 December 1987 to staff at government hospitals prohibiting them from releasing information to outside agencies regarding patients (UNRWA, PIO, Gaza, March 1988).

Israeli military sources revealed that from the beginning of the Intifada until September 3, 1990, injuries reached 13,104 (al-Quds, 6 September 1990); while the al-Ittihad report of 10 January, 1991 gives a figure of 63,785 injuries; and UNRWA figures up to March 1990 reached 40,170 injuries (UNRWA, PIO, Gaza, April 1990). In GS itself, UNRWA documented 44,738 cases of injuries among refugees between 9 December 1987 and 28 February 1991; 6,499 of them in the SC and 2,592 in the SR, 19,715 involving children of 15 years and under. Many of the injuries were caused by live rounds 8,449; tear-gas caused 8,422; plastic-coated metal bullet 4,814; rubber bullets 1,431; and over 28,000 injuries were caused by beatings, using hands, clubs, rocks, and firearms (UNRWA, Operations Section, Gaza, March 1991).

The practice of beating was intensified in response to Rabin's new-old policy of January 19, 1988. He stated that: "the first priority is to use force, might and beatings". The authorities considered the policy of beatings more effective than detention. JP of January 20, 1988 reported that, A detainee will be freed after eighteen days; he may then resume stoning soldiers. But if troops break his hand, he won't be able to throw stones for a month and a half.

The survey population in the two case study areas told about incidents of beatings during house raids by Israeli soldiers. In one typical incident, the head of the household told
how soldiers locked the whole family in one room, while keeping his only teenage son outside. They then started beating him in brutal way, his family left watching from the window and unable to protect him. According to the survey findings, 112 out of 142 households in the SC reported that one or more members of the household were injured during the Intifada, compared to 69 households out of 90 in the SR. The number of persons injured in SC and SR households are shown in Table 8.16, the findings of which indicate that households in both locations have almost equal percentages of injured members in the family.

TABLE 8.16 No. of Injured Members in the Household, SC & SR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>SC No.</th>
<th>SR No.</th>
<th>SC %</th>
<th>SR %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967-1987</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1987</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1990</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1991 Sample Survey

8.7.5 Deportation

Deportation and expulsion is another measure used by the authorities since 1967 and which remains controversial. Deportation is banned under Article 49 of the Geneva Conventions, but Israel has usually given as reasons for deportation incitement, subversion and membership of illegal organizations (i.e. the PLO).

In addition to the mass eviction which took place during and in the aftermath of the 1967 war, Israel has continued to expel Palestinians from the OTs, in an attempt to evacuate the area of its active and young leadership. Some 1,156 Palestinians were deported from the OTs between 1967 and 1977. There was a decrease in deportees between 1978 and 1985, but with the "iron fist" policy in the OTs introduced by Rabin in 1985, 42 persons were deported between August 1985 and December 1987 (al-Haq,1991-143-4) and a further 78 have been deported since the Intifada began in December 1987. The mass deportation of 415 alleged members of Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement), in December 1992 to southeast Lebanon was considered one of the largest campaigns, after the expulsion of villagers from the three villages in Latrun in 1967 and the expulsion of all refugees from Aqbat Jaber camp in Jericho and GS refugee displacement in 1971 (Hallaj,1982:96). Some 250 deportees of Hamas were returned, but, Palestinians insist on the return of all deportees since 1967 to date, linked to the right to return of the PRs of 1948 enshrined in UN Resolution 194 and that of the PRs of 1967 detailed in UN Resolution 337.

Of the 59 deported during the first year of the Intifada, twelve were camp residents,
over 20% and an indication that refugees have been providing a leadership on the national level (al-Haq, 1988:144) 13

8.7.6 Demolition of Houses and Sealings

This is used as a frequent punishment for suspected acts of resistance to the occupation. A family whose home is demolished is not permitted to rebuild it. Within ten years of the occupation, "upwards of 15,000 houses have been destroyed (in the OTs) since June 1967" (Adams, 1977:37). During the first eighteen months of the Uprising, 199 houses were demolished by the Israeli authorities, and as a result 8,000 people in the OTs lost their homes, considered one of the harshest measures to end the Intifada. The demolition of camp shelters in the GS, for a variety of reasons shown in Table 5.9, has been a precedent compared to other occupied areas. 14

The sealing of houses, shops, and streets is also a standard policy of the Israeli authorities. During the three years of the Intifada, the authorities in GS closed off 34 mosques, 146 schools, 160 streets and alleys and 42 workshops and shops (Sarah, 1991:65). The scope of measures in this field could be scrutinized from a report made on Israeli violations of human rights in GS by the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law (GCRL), which is an affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, covering a period of six months of the second year of the Intifada (See Table 8.17).

TABLE 8.17 Demolished and/or Sealed off Places in GS by the Israeli Occupying Authorities, During the period 9 June-8 December 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business stores sealed off</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market places (vegetables) sealed off</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses totally demolished</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses partially demolished</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses totally sealed off</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses Partially sealed off</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walls of residential and/or buildings of public and/or private educational,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business and/or social institutions, associations demolished</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrances, streets and/or lanes sealed off</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosques sealed off</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools, UNRWA and/or Government sealed off</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops and/or supermarket sealed off</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GCRL, Gaza, 1991

The residents of the refugee camps suffer when entrances of the camp are sealed off by the security forces as a counter-insurgency measure to control their movement. The sealing takes the form of blocking the way by the use of barrels (See Plates: 8.3 & 8.4). Figures on
the sealing off of houses in SC and SR are unavailable, yet, according to one interviewee in the SR, the second and third storey of her house was sealed off by the authorities after the detention of her brother-in-law, and as a result three families of 23 persons were cramped into three rooms only.

8.7.7 Martyrs or Wilful Killing of Civilians

The killing of civilians is another measure which the Israelis have been carrying out since 1967. The latest method used is by special forces, often dressed as local Arabs, who attempt either to arrest or kill the wanted Palestinians. These undercover units use live ammunition in "fatal fire only", a clear breach of directives to explore other, less lethal, methods to apprehend "wanted suspects", as reported by the Israeli Human Rights Organization (B'Tselem). According to the report, 86 people have been deliberately killed by such units since the Intifada began. The military authorities justification for methods used by the undercover units is that there is a war in the territories, and therefore the IDF functions as on the battlefield.

According to a report by al-Haq (The Law in the Service of Man), a WB affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, 1070 Palestinians were killed in the OTs from the beginning of the Intifada in December 1987 to mid-1992 by Israeli soldiers and the special units. Moreover, in an UNRWA report of the GS casualties since the beginning of the Intifada in December 1987 to the end of February 1991, a total of 291 were killed, 246 of them refugees and 56 of those killed children 15 years and under (UNRWA, Operations Section,Gaza, March 1991). By the end of the third year of the Intifada the number of martyrs in GS reached 338, the refugee camps, 30 from the SC and 18 from SR (al-Itihad, 10 January, 1991). In the survey sampled five households reported having five martyrs during the Intifada, compared to three households in the SR.

The Israeli army’s actions reflect its impatience and its lack of respect for Palestinian life and property. One of the reasons for the rise in casualties among Palestinian children is the fact that many of these children’s brothers are likely to be in jail. But the danger to Israeli soldiers from stones thrown by children is almost negligible. They need only shields-not live ammunition- to protect themselves.
Plates no. 8.3 & 8.4: Two Shati camp entrances which have been sealed off by the Israeli authorities to restrict the movement of refugees & thus exercise better control over them.

Photo: The author, 1991
8.8 THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF ISRAEL’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY

8.8.1 The Legal Aspect

Violations like the above would not have been enough to precipitate political Palestinianism, despite Israelis claims that its practices in the OTs are implemented according to the "rule of law", as required by the Universal Declaration, and not the Geneva Conventions, which are concerned with the protection of civilians during wartime conditions. Israel has claimed that the Geneva Conventions are not applicable to the WBGS, based on her declaration of those territories as "administered territories" or "liberated territories" as called by the Orthodox Jews, and not "enemy territories" (Efrat, 1970:1; Morrow, 1988:17). The reluctance of the occupying forces to use the term "occupation" relates to two reasons, as Roberts observed: Firstly, "fear of having to apply the full range of the law on occupations"; and secondly, the fact that "occupation" is almost synonymous with aggression and oppression" (Roberts, 1984:301). Despite the early and continuous assertions made by UN Resolution 2443 in 1968; and repeated assertions made by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that the Convention is applicable, Israel has refused to accede to this view (UN, 1968; ICRC, 1970:427-8).

At this stage one might well ask: what is the purpose of having Conventions for Human Rights? What machinery do these Conventions establish for preventing breaches? Is the machinery adequate? Actually, the Hague Regulations do not contain any preventive measures. The Geneva Conventions, on the other hand, envisage a system of supervision in which a "protecting power" oversees the application of the Conventions in an occupied territory (Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 9). In the case of the OTs, the absence of a "protecting power", in the form of a state working on behalf of the Palestinians and represented in the UN on equal grounds with other member states, has made it impossible to ensure compliance with the Geneva Convention.

It should, however, be noted that the Geneva Conventions apply to "all" situations of partial or total occupation of territory. They thus apply to the facts of an international conflict and not to its merits as interpreted by Israel. Professor Mallison observed that:

The negotiating history makes it clear, since the application of the Conventions is mandatory, that questions as to de jure titles to territory are not involved and that the Convention must be applied in occupied territory whatever the claims concerning the de jure status of that territory (Cited in Tillman, 1978:77).  

In order to be able to deal effectively with violations of human rights in OTs, it has
been said that:

The issue of Palestinian rights cannot be properly addressed by cataloguing an endless series of violations: a deeper understanding of the nature of the State of Israel is necessary (Moleah, 1981:16).

The question to be answered is why does Israel behave in a manner that is an "affront to humanity"? (UN, 1980:24-25). It was thus categorized by the UN Commission on Human Rights when describing Israeli violations of human rights in the OTs. Israel's persistent disregard for world opinion and the international community, and its continuous harassment of the Palestinians at home, cannot be seen as sporadic violations of a despotic regime, but as systematic attempts to destroy a human society and the demolition of the material and moral foundations of Palestinian nationhood. It is the aim of the final section of this chapter to discuss the Israeli position with regard to acknowledging the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism within the framework of its own legitimacy.

8.9 THE POLITICAL GROUNDS OF ISRAEL'S COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY

8.9.1 The Intifada: Losses vs. Gains

In an attempt to maintain its control over the Palestinians in the OTs, Israel combined its military measures with other political actions. The growing support for the PLO inside the OTs, and its recognition as a legitimate movement of national liberation and self-determination at the international level, has become a source of worry for Israel. Inside the OTs, the various national and mass organizations organized along the political factions of the PLO reflect the high degree of coordination between the inside (OTs) and the outside (PLO). The support for the PLO can be elicited from various opinion polls conducted in the OTs. The joint opinion poll conducted in the WB in September 1986 by the Jerusalem daily al-Fajr and the U.S. daily Newsday, on a number of political issues, showed almost universal (93.5%) support for the PLO (al-Fajr, 12 September, 1986). The Communiques of the UNL of the Intifada made it clear that they consider themselves part and parcel of the PLO. An independent opinion poll conducted in the OTs prior to the signing of the deal between Israel and the PLO on 13 September 1993 indicated that 65% of Palestinians supported the agreement (The Independent, 13 September, 1993).

This political weight inside the OTs has been of crucial importance for the evolution of Palestinian nationalism, especially after the 1982 war in Lebanon, when the PLO's infrastructure was destroyed for the second time, the first being the crackdown in Jordan in 1970. The Intifada, the climax of Palestinian struggle inside OTs with its new character and
scale, surprised the Israelis, who thought it was the PLO which was instigating it - which would be considered an attestation of the PLO capability to mobilize the whole population. Yet, as Rabin said, the Intifada was spontaneous, and it couldn’t be viewed within the context of past waves of ‘disturbances’ (Israel Yearbook 1988,1989:150). It was "the work of long years of frustration and festering wounds of unresolved Palestinian nationalism" (Tamari,1990:132). Israeli official statements that it would be crushed within a few days ignored the new attributes of the UNL of the Intifada. Although secretive and underground, the major attribute of the UNL lie in its grassroots nature. It represented the political unification of PLO factions, and the unity among the various sectors of the Palestinian society adapted and followed UNL decisions (in the communiques). Recognizing the political weight inside the OTs, the Intifada shifted the direction of the inside-outside relationship:

Where the external PLO leadership once led the internal movement under occupation, today the internal movement sets the tone for the formulation of Palestinian politics outside" (Tamari,1990:133).

The Intifada’s political gains for the PNM were the strengthening of the political bargaining cards of the PLO, which led the US to start searching for a political solution. The Palestinian problem for the first time "headed the world political agenda", as Shalev in Israel Yearbook of 1988 noted (Shalev,1989:155), and further weakened King Hussein’s standing in the OTs. It put an end to a long-history of Jordan’s representation of the Palestinians and, more significantly, it led the PLO to embark on what Daqqaq called "a peaceful attack", by announcing the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in the November 1988 PNC session. Edward Said observed that:

The PNC meeting (of 1988) was considered as a beginning that signals a distinct break with the past, as an assertion of the willingness to make sacrifices in the interests of peace, as a definitive statement of the Palestinian acceptance of the international consensus (Said,1990:19).

On the Israeli side, the Intifada "proved harmful to Israel." While the Intifada scored a major media success for the Palestinians, Israel’s image in world public opinion continued to suffer and do political damage (Shalev,1989:153,159). Inside Israel, the effect of the Intifada was that it generated public debate, heightening polarization among the various political parties regarding the OTs, and for the first time the main issue in the Israeli elections of 1988 was the Palestinian question (Ibid.:155; Bishara,1988:20 & 1990:222). The political losses incurred by Israel during the Intifada were compounded by economic losses, and also by losses on the moral level, particularly among the Israeli army and civilians. "The Palestinian uprising dealt the final blow to Israelis who believed in an
"enlightened" occupation" (Spiro, 1988:19). The Israeli soldiers found themselves in a moral dilemma, compelled to start questioning the policy they were carrying out in the OTs. The same discontent was found among the Israeli reserve soldiers, based on the gradual loss of their sanctity as a societal institution. This sanctity has been shaken after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and with the brutal and unabashed aggression toward the inhabitants of the OTs during the Intifada.¹⁹ As a result of this awakening consciousness among Israeli soldiers, they organized themselves into several movements. One such is Yesh Gvul (There is a Limit), the objective of which is to end all violations of human rights in the OTs, for these actions violate basic norms and values of democratic societies and entirely contradict their human consciences. Their voices of opposition, however, like those before them, have not been strong enough to tip the scale against state policy (Spiro, 1988:18-20).²⁰ Warnings concerning the cost of the occupation to Israel on the moral and social levels has been heard since 1967 by Jews and Israelis inside and outside Israel. One of those warnings was that of Professor Amitai Etzioni during the early years of the occupation (1968), who said:

The Israelis are getting accustomed to dominating another people and to ignoring their national rights and aspirations for the sake of security or even for the taste of domination and the possible material advantages. Is Israel on the way to becoming neo-colonialist? (Nahumi, 1972:33).

Meron Benvenisti, who served for a time after 1967 as deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, wrote about the clear decline in moral standards in Israel when he said in the Israel newspaper Ha'aretz of June 27, 1979:

Occupation by its very nature corrupts the occupier. The harm that twelve years of occupation has caused the Israel’s moral fabric is nothing to the damage it will cause in the coming period when protest and its suppression, violence and counter-violence, are intensified in the occupied territories and the situation deteriorates to the point of civil rebellion which will be answered by severe repression. By this the Military Government and the Defence Establishment will have to pay the price of the annexationist policy.

Benvenisti's prophecy of a 'civil rebellion' came true with the Intifada in December 1987. The Intifada's long-term objective is to put an end to Israeli occupation and establish an independent state in the WBGS. In doing so its aim is to translate achievements on the ground into political gains (Shalev, 1989:147-8).

The Israeli authorities' counter-measures to quell the Intifada "only poured oil on the flames", as Shalev noted (Ibid., 1989:153). Israel, "the greatest military power in the Mediterranean, ultimately, can no longer subdue the spontaneous defiance of a civilian population whose only armament is street stones and lack of fear" (Tamari, 1990:133). Shalev
wrote about the 'irregularities' of the soldiers, which only expanded the struggle (Shalev, 1989:153). During the past 44 years Israel has been advocating "fighting rather than talking" or, in Churba's words, it has been "grappling with the effect rather than the cause of the problem" (Cited in Nassar, 1991:210). Indeed, there is one lesson which Israel learned from the Intifada, that, it cannot continue to rule over more than 1.5 million people without reaching a political solution. The question is thus, what political approaches has Israel resorted to, to maintain its "sanity" between 1948 to 1987? And who are the sponsors and the agents in this process?

8.10 Israel's "Self-Serving Delusions"

Since the beginning of the century - as demonstrated throughout the thesis - Zionist/Israeli policies to dehumanize Palestine Arab, deny their existence and thus, their political and civil rights as a people, who are entitled to independence and self-determination, were and still are the basis by which the Israeli state has been trying to consolidate its existence.

Certainly, these attempts to crush the Palestinian national identity are not found in a vacuum, but, are interlinked to a systematic pattern of negation of the "other" (the Palestinians), through various means - political as well as military -. This had continued in the post-1967 occupation of the WBGS, where Israel persuaded itself that the benefits of occupation since 1967 - cheap labour and economic integration - would continue. Similarly, Israel believed that its repressive measures to destroy the growing PNM would maintain its "sanity" as Benvenisti noted, which have been based on "self-delusion" (Benvenisti, 1989:78). This is because as Rodinson observed, Zionist nationalism is distinguished from all others. Choosing the land of Arab Palestine to establish their homeland and thus disperse its people "led the Zionist form of nationalism in the direction of oppressive nationalism," its final result being "practices of subjection and expulsion (of Palestinians)" (Rodinson, 1984:19). Rodinson concluded that:

It should be obvious to every mind free of ideological camouflage—that Zionist nationalism whatever opinion one may have of the legitimacy of a plan for a Jewish state purely as a plan, took concrete and practical form in the oppression of another people. Consequently, it must be admitted that the Palestinians' resistance to this process falls into the category of nationalist movements of oppressed peoples who deserve support (Ibid.)

Attempting to find about the elements that reinforced Israel's self-serving delusions, which found expression in two forms: militarism vs. victimization; and their adverse connotations of moral dilemma vs. lack of structural harmony within the Israeli society. Tackling these two forms would enable us to comprehend Rodinson's observation above in more
depth, and thus see in a new light, the Israeli policy towards PRs of "no return", and why the refugee camps in the OTs, - which remain the only witness to the tragedy inflicted on Palestine Arabs - have been the target of Israel's repressive measures, in a more intense way than any other locations.

8.10.1 The Nature of Zionist/Israeli Nationalism

Rodinson argued that nationalism is a particular example of a militant ideology. Zionist/Israeli and Palestinian nationalism are militant ideological movements. "Every militant ideological movement idealizes its cause, and 'demonizes' the enemy...and throws suspicion on every effort to understand the other..." (Rodinson, 1984:17).

Bearing in mind that Zionist nationalism is also the nationalism of an oppressed people, does not justify the subjection of other nations (Ibid.:18). At the same time, by dominating other people Israelis are betraying their Jewish heritage; for, as Shimon Peres put it, "the aim in Jewish philosophy is to dominate ourselves...whoever tries to subjugate somebody else is endangering himself. All the empires that ruled over us have disappeared" (Servan-Schreiber, 1988:45). Similarly, Rabbi David Hartman emphasized that by controlling the Palestinians the Israelis feed this destructive urge (the Intifada), "There is a vicious dialectic that must be broken: in trying to control them, we lose ourselves" (Ibid.:203).

When there is injustice, there are two groups, the oppressor and oppressed, and the former is not more free than the latter. The truth of the matter is that with the PLO embarking on "the peace attack" it sought true justice for Palestinians and Israelis on an equal footing, rather than submission to injustice. By so doing, it attacked further the Israeli consciousness and exposed injustice to a new light.

The PRs' plight represents the roots of injustice caused by the Zionist/Israel nationalism. Yet, other ongoing patterns of injustice have been confronting Palestinians. Prejudices against the Palestine Arabs in the early stage of Jewish colonization in Palestine are rooted, as we have discussed, in Zionist ideology which promotes "racial distinctiveness" or "racial superiority" and thus permits discrimination by the Jews/Israelis against the non-Jews, irrespective of its grounds, biological or cultural. These prejudices have since then been developed along systematic lines and have been made permanent by their embodiment in the fundamental laws of the Israeli state, which in turn justify any form of racism against the non-Jews. This discrimination has been working against Jewish heritage as Peres said above, emphasizing the colonial nature of the state.

Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburg said that "the people of Israel must rise and declare publicly
that a Jew and a non-Jew are not equal, God forbid...." He asserted that considering them
equal "is a total travesty of justice" (Cited in Greenstein, 1990:18). In this context, let us
consider the findings of a recent survey conducted among 2,399 Israelis by the Louis Gotmann
Research Institute. Some 68% of the sample surveyed are convinced and believe that Jews are
'the chosen people'; while 31% have doubts about this issue; moreover, 59% have a 'negative'
attitude towards Arabs (Ashraq al-Awsat, 5 January, 1994). The reasoning behind such a position
towards Palestinians could be attributed to a combination of biblical, ideological and political
elements which have shaped the Jewish character for ages.

The process of dehumanizing non-Jews (Palestinians) is leading to a process which
Israel Shahak describes as "a process of Nazification of the Israeli-Jewish society" and Professor
Leibowitz, "the conscious of Israel" has spoken of the development of a Judaeo-Nazi mentality
for the Knesset) shows, 60% indicated that the Israelis are no less hostile towards Palestinians

Thus, Israel militarism provides the contextual ground for its violations of human and
political rights for Palestinians in the OTs. The foundation of Israel’s militarism lies in the
state’s preoccupation with security (See Chapter 2).

8.10.2 Israel: A "Nation-in Arms"

By occupying the WBGS, Israel is considered "the most long-lived instance of
belligerent occupation since WWII" (Coon, 1992:37). Israel’s continuous ambition to stay
in the OTs and to stay the most powerful military state in the Middle East has reflected itself
in two ways. First, that Israel, as Ben Halpern wrote, is really a "nation-in-arms" (Cited in
Johnson, 1972:347). The role of the military is an integral part of the economic, social and
educational aspects of life in Israel, and most important in defense and foreign policy. Israel,
if fully mobilized, has more than 500,000 armed forces (Sadowski, 1992:3). The high prestige
acquired by the army, for its role in the creation of the state together with its success in
different wars, make the army’s influence in Israel a powerful one. Israel was a nation created
by force and still depends upon its army for protection. The destruction of the army means the
destruction of the state (Permutter, 1969:70). Thus, everything in Israel is military. This is
made more conspicuous at a time of war when domestic cars, houses, property and possessions
become dedicated to war. In this regard, civilians have become militarized. Second, Israel’s
defence expenditures reflect the other side of militarism in Israel. Israeli military expenditure
from 1972-1988 amounted to 19.6% of GDP, the second highest in the Middle East after
Oman (23.2%). It was also responsible for the second highest arms sales in the Middle East, from US in the year 1991, spending US $ 2,956,340 compared with 16,021,204 Saudi Arabia’s (Sadowski,1992:7,13). Militarism and occupation are two sides of the same coin. Roberts notes that:

At the heart of almost all treaty provisions and legal writings about occupations is the image of the armed forces of a State exercising some kind of coercive control or authority over inhabited territory outside the accepted international frontiers of their State (Roberts,1984:255).

Since 1967, the Israeli authorities have talked of security as being the reason for their intransigent measures; for retaining the OT's; and said that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the WBGS would be tantamount to the destruction of Israel (Israel Yearbook 1990:270-288). Yet, Israel’s equation of territory with security is illusory, as Sahliyeh observed. He continued; "security through occupation cannot and will never solve Israel’s strategic-needs...[and] Israel alone cannot have a monopoly on security needs and ignore the security fears of others" (Sahliyeh,1981:18).

8.10.3 Victimization: The Reverse of Militarism

However the Israeli conscience has not been dormant, as we discussed in Chapter two. Support for the Zionist scheme and ideas of expulsion of Palestinians are not unanimous among the Jewish masses. Rodinson observed that "For a very long time, the principle enemies which the Zionists had to overcome were Jews" (Rodinson,1984:20). As we discussed above, the Israeli authorities' policy in the OTs after 1967 gave fresh impetus to conscious Israelis.

Throughout their historical experience, the Jew/Zionist/Israeli response to feelings of helplessness or powerlessness could be seen in number of definable patterns, which as Katzenstein argued, are extending "from Biblical times to modern Israel." He talked about the "invisible" response to helplessness, which role led to a condition of victimization. Living in ghetto-like conditions, non-assimilation with the surrounding culture, and the rise of anti-Semitism against Jews in Eastern Europe enhanced this feeling. In response to the Holocaust, the invisible-victim role was replace with one of the aggressor, the powerful, "one who can win wars (1948 war), expand borders and defend territory against the enemy, from whatever side that enemy might arise" (Katzenstein,1979:31-32). To be a strong nation, military means have been used, as Katzenstein argues as a way out of the feeling of helplessness:
...the use of force is required to constantly reassure himself (the Israeli) by the acquisition of more power through the displacement of his "enemy". No matter how far this is pushed, the core feeling of powerlessness signals the necessity of ever more use of power. In short, one can be an absolute victim, but never an ultimate aggressor. There will always be another potential enemy (Ibid.:33).

The following statement by Peres is one repeated by many Israeli leaders to perpetuate the "victim" image: "We are too small to be dangerous...we cannot endanger any other country" (Servan-Schreiber,1988:45). The danger always come from the other "enemy", being Arab the state or Palestinian. The Palestinian if not a refugee but a "terrorist", whose demand for return is seen destructive to the Israel. The "terrorism" in the Middle East, as President Bush stated, revolves "around the issues of a Palestinian homeland, Israel's existence and policies.. and religious extremism" (Cited in Ruwayha,1990:299). Yet, Edward Said and Noam Chomsky question the Israeli claims of "purity of arms" and Simha Flapan writes that "Zionists in the pre-state period established the pattern of terrorism adopted 30 years later by Fatah" (Said,1988:1-19;Chomsky,1983:73-4).

After all, resolutions of the General Assembly provide the legal permissibility for Palestinian "terror." GA Resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960, provides the basic rights and principles to self-determination to all peoples under colonial countries. Subsequent applications of this resolution to Algeria, Angola, and Namibia confirmed that this right is established in law. Methods to achieve this right are provided in GA resolution 3070 of 30 November 1973. The Resolution, after reaffirming the inalienable right to self-determination of all people under alien subjugation, reaffirms "the legitimacy of the peoples struggle for liberation from...alien subjugation by all means including armed struggle" (UN,1979:43-6). The American Revolution which relied upon armed struggle to achieve self-determination, made this method permissible (Ibid.:46). In the Palestinian situation, where the right to self-determination is denied to its people by armed force, "the right to regain it by armed struggle is considered permissible under article 51 of the Charter concerning self-defence" (Ibid.:46).

As Palestinian "terror" had banished now, after it was renounced by the PLO in 1988. Israel's new approach to maintain sympathy for its scheme has been going in other directions,- which the last section of this chapter will tackle with some detail. With the phasing out of anti-Semitism at the universal level, the Zionist movement and Israel, realizing the crucial relationship between the survival of the Zionist enterprise and anti-Semitism, have been concentrating on two elements to maintain its support and sympathy. First, a focus on the guilt of all Germans for the Holocaust, and the West's silence towards that; second combating the
assimilation of Jews in their communities abroad, by regenerating their sense of loyalty to Israel. Addressing American Jews, Golda Meir stated that immigration to Israel would rescue Jews from the danger of assimilation (*Israel Today*, 21 January, 1970). Earlier statements by Ben-Gurion showed that he considered immigration as a religious movement and a criteria of Jews’ loyalty to Zionism and Judaism (Barakat, 1982:42) (See Plate Chapter 2).

A critical survey of Jewish conditions in the West will show that anti-Zionism has replaced anti-Semitism as a factor to enhance the ‘distinctive’ characteristic of Jews. It is not anti-Semitism which makes a Jew a Jew but his/her loyalty to the state of Israel. As Toynbee noted:

Zionism and anti-Semitism are expressions of an identical point of view. The assumption underlying both ideologies is that it is impossible for Jews and non-Jews to grow together into a single community and that therefore a physical separation is the only practical way out (Cited in Hadawi, 1976:49).

That phenomenon is aimed at unifying the Israeli ‘society’ where friction exists between two political camps (the religious and secular). It is these divisions which make Israel a ‘unique’ phenomenon, as Michael Jansen stated:

Because the two cultures bisect the society and because the members of the two cultures retain their ethnic pasts, because they remain at heart Russians and Poles and Ukrainians or Yemenis and Moroccans and Kurds (Jansen, 1987:14).

Chaim Herzog, former President of Israel, expressed his distress about this situation in his inaugural address in May 1983. He said:

Physical and verbal violence, intolerance, fanaticism and the repudiation of democratic values may prove more dangerous than the threat from Israel’s Arab enemies. (He continued): This real enemy...is within us. It exists within every one of us citizens of Israel-Jews and Arabs, religious and secular, right-wing and left-wing, Sephardim and Ashkenazim (Jansen, 1987:15).

The election campaign in Israel of May 1990 witnessed severe clashes between the Likud and the Labour Party (which are divided along ethnic lines as well as political programmes). This has been criticized by Herzog who accused "the country’s politicians ‘of making an absolute mockery’ of Israeli democracy" (*The Guardian*, May 1, 1990).

The alliance in Israel between the various forms of militarism and victimization has not been serving its function, but creating more and more self-serving delusions, in a way which affects its structural harmony. The cohesivity of the organizational, ideological and political foundations of Israel have been shaken.
8.11 EXTENSIONS OF POWER

The "Masada complex," a besieged mentality, preferring collective suicide to surrender, is still running deep among the Israelis according to Ullman (1975:288). Prime Minister Golda Meir admitted this fact by saying: "It is true. We do have a Masada complex. We have a pogrom complex. We have a Hitler complex" (Morrow,1988:18).

Ullman went further to question the effect of these complexes on Israel's behaviour towards its "enemies":

> who knows what the Israelis might do if they feel they are being, or will be overwhelmed?...they would not, in extremis, hesitate to destroy targets such as the Aswan Dam, oil facilities,...and the great Arab cities of Beirut and Baghdad...if they felt threatened with destruction themselves? (Ullman,1975:288)

In fact, the question which is relevant and needs to be asked here is how Israel behaved in response to the threats to its power and control in the OTs, challenged by the escalation of resistance especially during the Intifada? The military measures discussed above have been combined with political measures to form the other arm of control. Israel's attempts to combat support for the PLO in the OTs are seen in the establishment of the Village Leagues; and its support for the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS-IRM), as alternatives to the PLO leadership, but have proved fruitless. Chomsky wrote about the head of the Village Leagues (Mustafa Dudin), one of whose demands to the Israeli authorities was the return of PRs, mainly from Lebanon. However, Israel's position on this issue is well known: "no return" (Chomsky,1983:61). The power which HAMAS acquires now in the OTs has been initially nurtured by Israel; indeed, there were cases in GS and inside Israel where the Israeli security establishment collaborated with the Muslim current to fight Palestinian nationalist leadership and institutions (Tamari,1990:137;Legrain,1990:175-189). In so doing, the Strip with the most political-religious fundamentalism has become "polarized by secular and religious trends to an extent that has not been witnessed before" (FAFO,1993:29).

To stem the tide of resistance when the Intifada broke out, the authorities used many means. These included reliance on local collaborators and informants about Palestinian activists. Although this method had borne fruit before the Intifada, it lost its effectiveness during the Intifada as a result of Palestinian counter-measure to put an end to this phenomenon which had plagued the resistance movement for long. The authorities turned to the village Mukhtars and the old leadership to help it quell resistance (Aronson,1987:324). Some of these Mukhtars were appointed by the military government, and institutionally they became "the hub of an informer system run by the occupation authorities who used it skilfully in the interests of
the status quo" (Viorst, 1989:24); As the Egyptian Administration had done in the GS pre-1967, the Mukhtars in the camp were given the power to maintain order and security and hinder refugee infiltration across the borders (Budeiri, 1990:47). An explanation of the Mukhtars' vulnerability to collaboration with the authorities was given by a refugee, who said: "it is not because they are unnationalistic, but because they fear the new revolutionary generation which is threatening their influence...they work together against the new current" (Sayigh, 1979:168).

The cultural war waged by the young leadership against Mukhtars (traditional leadership) is what Smith called the war of the "sons against the fathers" (Smith 1991:67-8). The Mukhtars' role, whose legitimacy dates back to the Palestine villages from which they fled in 1948, was maintained in the refugee camps along village and hamula (clan) lines. The decline in their authority, came as young militants assumed a political and military role, especially during the Intifada. The young saw the Mukhtars "as part of the system of control, imposed on them by the authorities" (Viorst, 1989:24).

The decline of the Mukhtars' authority was evident in the findings of the sample survey, which showed that not a single respondent from either location refers to the Mukhtar for political advice, which inevitably confirms the decline in their political influence. Some 75.4% in SC and 72.2% in SR reported that they refer to Mukhtars only for the ratification of official documents, e.g. travel permits.

The Israelis also use traditional values as a weapon against us. This is seen in the area of women's role in the national struggle. They aim at undermining women's role by generating conflict between fathers/brothers/husbands and their daughters/sisters/wives. For example, a father/brother/husband would be called to the military government offices to pay a fine or take his daughter/sister/wife who was caught during a riot by the soldiers, during which he will be scolded for allowing her to participate in the riot, by focusing on women's honour and rightful role as a housewife only.

The Israelis could hardly believe that the Palestinians in the OTs were leading a mass rebellion. In an attempt to weaken the Intifada, the Israeli intelligence (Shin Bet) published forged leaflets signed by the UNL, to disrupt the genuine instructions given by the UNL Communiques and confuse the Palestinians over strike days; one Israeli leaflet called for a continuous seven-day strike, an unusually long shutdown, "in the hope that Arabs would be unwilling to give up their livelihood for an entire week [and] would lose their faith in the uprising’s organizers" (Melman & Raviv, 1990:35-7). Yehuda Litani, in the JP of 17 June, 1988 wrote of the tens of thousands of leaflets distributed by the Israeli Defence Forces in the OTs, of which one read "1936 equals 1988" referring to the 1936-1939 revolt which was
crushed by the British and the Jewish underground organization (Haganah).

The formation of special units of Israeli soldiers in civilian dress, assigned to mingle with the local Palestinians, was another tactic to combat resistance. The "death squads" as they were called, were responsible for the killing of a big number of Palestinians in OTs (Melman & Raviv, 1990:38-9).

On the economic level, to counter-measure its losses in tax revenues and military costs, the authorities resorted to new procedures to obtain new revenues. A variety of measures undertaken by the authorities secured a substitute for economic losses. These included: issuance of new Israeli ID-Cards, for which people had to pay NIS 23 (one NIS = 0.25 Pence); re-issuance of licence plates for some 25,000 vehicles, where each driver had to pay NIS 100 or NIS 500 depending on the model of car; issuance of "entry or magnetic cards" for Israel, at a cost of NIS 20. By the end of June 1988, about 15,000 cards were issued for GS workers, according to The JP, the revenues to be used for funding protective shields for the settlers' cars in the GS. Fines paid by parents whose children had been arrested for throwing stones range from NIS 500 and 2000, and as reported by the Israeli Defence Ministry, fines collected during the first three and-a-half years of the Intifada amounted to NIS 23,348,760 (al-Darb, 28 June, 1991; UNRWA, 10 July, 1989). US backing and financial aid to Israel, have tightened further the grip of the Israeli occupation. This backing has its roots in the pre-1948 period, as noted by Adams in Chapter one. Chomsky calls those supporters "supporters of the moral degeneration and ultimate destruction of Israel" (Chomsky, 1983:3). Yet, the Americans began to shift their attitude against Israel during the 1982 war in Lebanon, and again since the Intifada began. A survey of Americans conducted in April 1988 showed an erosion of pro-Israel sympathy among the public (Moughrabi, 1988:3).

The official American position and support for Israel is based on American interests in the area, Israel being a "strategic asset" for the U.S. (Chomsky, 1883:20-23). American vetoes in the Security Council and the General Assembly in relation to any resolution condemning Israeli violations in the O.T.'s are just one case in point, confirming the duality in resolution-making, whereby in the end decisions are made according to the interests of the various blocs. This position and support to Israel by the American office-holders since 1950, comes in contrast to its stand towards the Palestinians, who they have referred to as "not as possessing "rights" - which connotes entitlement - but rather as having only "interests" - which might or might not be legitimate" (Tillman, 1978:71).

The counter-measures undertaken by the Israeli authorities have had some success in substituting for economic losses and indicate that the authorities are committed to maintaining
control over the Palestinians in the OTs. However, the challenge of the *Intifada* has made it clear to Israel that the Palestinians cannot be contained through the use of force. In both the political and military spheres, Israel’s awakening has come. The polarization in the Israeli society is seen in a drift towards the right on one hand; and on the other what Peres called a "New Zionism", a more far-seeing form of "Zionism offering peace, making peace, structuring a peace that should be as meaningful to our neighbours as it is to ourselves." Peres continued: "we have to see the Promised Land in a different light" (Servan-Schreiber, 1988:77-8). Does this entail the beginning of the end of Zionist/Israeli oppression and aggression toward Palestinians? Or is it the end of the beginning of the Palestinians’ right to statehood?
NOTES:

1. The policies of the Arab regimes and the treatment of the PRs' and their national movement pre-1967 and after have been a crucial element in reinforcing the distinctive identity of PRs. For more details on this issue, see: Sayigh, 1977 and 1979; Ward, 1977:30-43; Turki,1976; Brand,1988; and Quandt,1973.

2. The aims of issuing this new refugee card were given by the UNRWA Director of Relief and Social Services in UNRWA News, No.260.

3. Revival of Palestinian consciousness was enhanced by UNRWA refugee schools explicitly socialized refugee students into Palestinianism. The UNRWA/UNESCO education programme's contribution to the preservation of the Palestinian refugee identity was one of the programme's by-products, which has been taking place within the wider context of Arab culture (Dickerson,1983:128). Emanuel Marx sees that a dual responsibility lies behind the preservation of the refugee identity: that of UNRWA and the that of the Israeli authorities which are "allowing UNRWA to run its own affairs" (Marx,1992:292). For an overview about this issue, see: Tibawi,1963; Ward,1977:27-28.


5. For an overview of the features, agendas and their importance for the national movement, see; Liza Taraki,1988.


10. For a full discussion of the legal and administrative aspects of the various areas of Israeli violations of human rights in the O.Ts, see:AI-Haq,1988.

11. For a full analysis on Israel’s curfew policy and the international legal framework, see: JMCC, 1991.

12. On the GS childrens’ role in the Intifada and the traumatic effects of Israeli repression on them, see: Caroline Moorehead, "Territory where fear starts from birth", The Independent,20 November,1989.


15. For an overview of the concept of military occupation and Israel’s arguments regarding the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV to the O.Ts, see: Roberts, 1984:249-305.

16. For an overview about the international recognition of the PLO, see: Nassar, 1991:40-44.


19. Refusal to serve in the O.Ts by Israeli soldiers, along with those who are committing suicide, and other phenomena have been on the increase, see: The *JP* Magazine, 16 September, 1988; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 10 January, 1990; *Yediot Ahronot*, 8 April, 1989 translated in *al-Quds*, 10 April, 1989.


21. For more detail on the concept of belligerent occupation and the other types of occupation, see: Roberts, 1984:261-2.

22. Tax revenues from the O.Ts reached a total of $393 million in 1987, of which only $240 was spent on services there.
The resettlement of refugees in the GS did not emerge in isolation from the historical and political developments in Palestine and between Palestinians and the state of Israel. Israel’s policies in the camps have been shaped by a number of factors, not least the split and divisions within the Zionist movement and the political parties in Israel since 1948. Yet, the thesis has demonstrated that a major factor in shaping Israeli policy has been the emergence of a specific cultural and political identity generated in the refugee camps by Palestinian struggle after 1948. Individually and collectively, the refugees insistence on return laid the basis for a major change: from the RR to the development of a Palestinian nationalism.

In so doing, the PRs could be seen to have fulfilled early Palestinian and Israeli prophecies. As early as 1949, Ben Gurion was warned by his colleagues of the ramifications of the PRs’ exile. The Minister of Agriculture, Aharon Cizling advised:

We still do not properly appreciate what kind of enemy we are now nurturing outside the borders of our state. Our enemies, the Arab states, are a mere nothing compared with those hundreds of thousands of Arabs who will be moved by hatred and helplessness and infinite hostility to wage war on us, regardless of any agreement that might be reached (Cited in Segev, 1986:31n).

Yet, the official Israeli speculations about the future of PRs were that they would "manage." As they put it:

The most adaptable and best survivors would manage by a process of natural selection, and the others will waste away. Some will die but most will turn into human debris and social outcast and probably join the poorest classes in the Arab countries (Cited in Segev, 1986:30).

The content of this latter quote transgresses the basic human and political rights of PRs. It is this speculation which Israel apparently based its decree of "no return" policy on. Yet, at the same time ignoring the unifying power of exile and homesickness that would nurture and strengthen the PRs national consciousness, and hence diminish the chances of resettling them in the Arab countries (Segev, 1986:37-8).

It was, al-Tha’ar (The Revenge), the first Palestinian independent voice, which recognized this unifying power of exile, as published in its 1955 issues. It foresaw in the PRs:

an effective force which would determine their fate and that of usurped Palestine, if led by dedicated youth; and which could impose its will and partake in drawing the future of the Palestinian people (Sakhnini, 1973:125).

Since 1948, resettling of PRs in the Arab countries has been the favourite solution as
far as Israel and the Western states are concerned. Resettlement in the classic sense means integration and full participation in the social and economic life of the host society, and is one of three durable solutions to refugee problems. The other two are: repatriation to original homeland; and resettlement which "involves moving refugees from their country of first asylum to some other country (a third country) after their homeland and land of first asylum" (Stein, 1983:190). In this sense, Israel calls to resettle PRs have been in advocacy of two forms of resettlement only as a durable solution. The first form applies to PRs in the host countries since 1948 to date; the second, relates to PRs in the WBGS after 1967, whom Israel wished to see them outside the borders of Palestine (in a third country) (See Chapter 2). Adoption of these two solutions by Israel highlights a long-rooted Zionist/Israeli strategy to disperse Palestinians, based on the Herzelian original notion to expel the local population outside the borders (See Chapter 1). This materialized in the 1948 exodus, when the minority (Jews) uprooted the majority (Palestinians) from their country by force and occupied their lands, homes, towns and cities (Weinstock, 1973:50). The removal of a nation to be replaced by another lends the PRs' experience and struggle its unique character (Glubb, 1967:41; Flapan, 1979:169).

To better understand the history of Palestine and the fate of its people, the multiplicity of internal and external variables that shaped and determined the course of Palestine and PRs have to be taken into account. Three periods could be distinguished throughout Palestine's course, the common denominator of which has been the attempt to destroy the socio-political fabric of the Palestinian society. Palestine's course was different to that of Arab and Third World countries, where colonial domination, nationalism and decolonization, and the subsequent colonial legacy, constitute a classical pattern of colonization. The Palestinians' misfortune is that they lost their country at the time when everyone else was getting their own. Since 1948, Palestinians have been building other people's homes but not their own.

Under the mandate, political Zionism used propaganda and links with imperialism to prepare the scene for the 1948 dispossession of the Palestinians. Distortion of facts with regard to the people and land of Palestine; conflicting statements in respect of a Jewish homeland or a Jewish state; the Hebrew labour policy; Jewish immigration - legal and illegal -, were just some of several policies and plans leading up to the exodus of 1948. Add to this Britain's nurturing of the Zionist movement and the effect of its colonial policies on the Arabs of Palestine which shaped the outcome of Palestinian politics and society during the mandate period.

The second period, from 1948-1967, saw Israeli policies designed to enhance the
dispersal of PRs. Israel sought to block their return and advocate resettlement in the Arab countries. They hoped by this to normalize the refugees longing for return, and help in developing the economies of the Arab states. During this early period, an Israeli-Western collusion began and the economic approach to the PRs problem was promoted. It was Robert McGhee (the advisor on refugee problems in the State Department) who suggested a "Marshall Plan" for the Middle East; the resettlement of PRs in the Arab states was to be an integral part of the Plan; in addition, it was intended to achieve a high standard of living in the area and combat Communism's infiltration (Pappe, 1988: 124-5). It is as early as 1949 that the economic rather than the political solution to the PRs problem began to emerge, though it did not crystallize until the mid 1950s.

This was further associated with other claims and measures undertaken inside Israel to create new demographical and physical facts on the land, especially evident in the destruction of 385 Arab villages. Israel Shahak decried the Israeli government's action which intended to "authenticate the Zionist propaganda that Palestine was a "desert land" before the creation of the State of Israel," which he brands as a grave falsification of the facts, "repeated to visitors" and "taught at Israeli schools" (Cited in Cattan, 1982:44). Israel maintained this stand and was successful because it had no direct contact with the dispersed refugees, a situation that changed after 1967 war when it found itself face to face with thousands of refugees in the WBGS.

Israel's Western partners supported the resettlement policy. They were the main contributors to UNRWA and thus dictated its policy. By so doing, they are seen to have politicized the humanitarian aid provided. UNRWA's role in this period towards integrating refugees should not be undermined; the shift to education in the late 1950's had indirectly served the original calls for integration. By the same token, UNRWA's neutral position towards the Israeli resettlement schemes in GS, and its policy towards camp improvement of camp shelters' could be seen to be in compliance with the Israeli and Western trend. While Britain and the US foreign policy towards the PRs had merged since the mid-1950s, unlike the early years after the exodus, they differed in their position over contributions to UNRWA. Britain's precondition for donation was that funds would have to be used for resettlement and not relief; this was in contrast to the initial American stand which favoured return, seen by Israelis to have intensified the refugees' hopes of return. Thus, the Americans were labelled as adopting the Arab view, whereas the British supported the Israeli concept (Pappe, 1988:157,161).

During this period (1948-1967) the Arab states stand towards refugees was characterized as pragmatic, monopolizing them economically, especially in Jordan, and at the same time
fearing them politically as a threat to their regimes. Only Jordan was in favour of PRs resettlement on its land. Two combined factors supported this stand: one economical and the other political (See Chapter 8), despite apprehensions that resettlement could lead either to "Jordanization of the Palestinians" or "the Palestinization of Jordan." Jordan cooperated with the West - Britain and US - in implementing some resettlement projects for PRs, yet these were very limited in conception and quality. More importantly, the unified stand by refugees towards all resettlement schemes outside Palestine proved the futility of such a solution, irrespective of who was proposing them, UNRWA, the Arab states, the US or British.

In GS, the situation of PRs contrasted with other PRs elsewhere. It is not surprising that the first Intifada (1955) erupted in GS, and that the second Intifada (1987) also began there. A combination of the weight of PRs numbers in the GS; the destitution of the economy; the unifying power of helplessness and exile, and the Israeli occupation of the Strip (1956/1957); in addition to the military training and the revolutionary ideology under Nasser's regime, were the forces which shaped the militant character of GS refugees in a way which led to the emergence of a sub-culture of their own. The first Intifada of 1955 was a watershed, GS refugees rejecting resettlement in Sinai. The accumulation of these experiences helped sharpen their political consciousness to a degree where "Gaza became one of the most revolutionary parts of the diaspora, breeding successively an enthusiastic Nasserism, then Palestinianism" (Sayigh, 1979:100).

During the early 50s, with the influence of internal and external factors, the PRs' cultural and political identity began to crystallize. The collective consciousness they developed evolved around their diaspora and longing for return to their homeland.

In the misery of the camps - in the permanence of temporariness - refugees developed a powerful new nationalism. Its fuel was longing and injustice, humiliation and degradation - bitterness and hatred towards Jews, the West, other Arabs, and the cosmic order itself. In the camps, refugees formed the foundation of the new Palestinianism, the 1967 war returned the focus to the reunited territory of the old Palestine Mandate (Migdal & Kimmerling, 1933:279).

Frustrated over the Arab regimes' policies and the host population's treatment of them, PRs in the mid-60s embarked on a distinctive path of Palestinianism which found ground in Gamal Abdel-Nasser's comment to the Palestinians in 1967. He told them: "Don't ever believe that any Arab leader, including myself has any plan to liberate Palestine" (Cited in Shiblak, 1991:122). Nasser's honesty contrasted with Saddam's manipulation in the 1990s, which marked the peak of Arab regime's "championing" of the Palestinian cause. It was not surprising to hear refugees - when conducting my pilot survey before the Gulf war - building
hopes that Saddam would liberate Palestine and defeat Israel. Saddam was seen as bringing *al-Faraj al-'Arabi* (the Arab salvation), as Emile Habibi - an outstanding Palestinian writer and activist- put it (Makiya, 1993:269).

Moshe Arenz, the Israeli Defence Minister at the time, in addressing a meeting with notables in GS expressed his protest over GS PRs behaviour during the Gulf War as reported by one of the interviewees who attended that meeting (interview, 30/7/1991). Arenz complained that refugees used to rush up onto the rooftops rejoicing, whistling, *zagharit* (ululating), when Iraqi missiles were thrown on Israel. A Palestinian intellectual from the WB offered a good interpretation from her diary of 11 February, 1991:

...some may feel this is unacceptable behaviour. However, if looked at within the proper context it is not. It wasn't an indication of wishing individual Israelis hurt - rather it was wishing them to feel in some tiny measure the massive pain and suffering they have been inflicting on Palestinians and Lebanese during the past 45 years or so. It was happiness that at last an Arab leader had managed to "attack" Israel when we have become used to being attacked (*Ibid.*:268).

The economic and political consequences of the Gulf War on the Palestinians inside the OTs have been and are too numerous to account here. Certainly the war aggravated the old hate-and-love relationship between the Arab states and the PLO.

After occupying the WBGS in 1967, Israel found itself face to face with about 600,000 refugees. This reality made Israel less able to continue to ignore the issue, as was the case pre-1967. The Israeli authorities focussed attention on the GS refugees. The politico-military situation of the GS put the Israelis in a similar position to that of 1949, when the call for annexing Gaza with its refugees was repeated. The Israeli authorities offered the GS refugee population incentives to migrate, similar to those made by UNRWA in the 1950s, but these were fruitless. Nor did Israel's crackdown on the camps in 1971 meet the long-term strategy to destroy GS refugees' militancy; though it served an immediate goal of dispersing about 25,000 refugees, and the demolition of 2,009 camp shelters, and causing a decline in armed struggle. The escalation of Israeli repressive policies brought resistance back to its pre 1971 stage again with the resurrection of the Intifada. As a result, Israeli annexation calls shifted to those of withdrawal; the call of "Gaza First" began to make the round during the Intifada; this call had finally materialized into a plan of complete withdrawal according to the "Gaza-Jericho First" deal of 13 September 1993.

Israel's forms of control over the GS took two directions: the "stick" and the "carrot" policy. Both forms are devised to deny Palestinians the right to development, but to keep them in total dependency on Israel economically and under its control politically. The Intifada
unmasked the fallacy of the Israeli "economic development" policy in the OTs. This policy involved employing Palestinian workers in Israel, opening-bridges, funding governmental institutions, etc. and it was these areas which were hardest hit by the collective punishment policy of the Israeli authorities during the Intifada. GS refugees, who are the most destitute sector of the Palestinian society, have been the main group to suffer, given that no employment alternatives are available for them. On the Israeli level, the economic losses incurred by Israel by the Intifada revealed the interdependency between the two groups, and made of occupation a liability rather than an asset. Israel’s military losses were also high, reaching NIS 460 million per year in the first three years of the Intifada, as military sources revealed (al-Quds, 6 September, 1990).

The Israeli authorities’ efforts to maintain control over the OTs and make up for the losses in tax revenues and military costs of the Intifada led to new procedures to obtain new revenues as we discussed in Chapter 8. The Israeli refugee resettlement schemes in the GS were set up in response to such aims, and under the pretext of "raising the standard of living" of refugees. That placed this type of resettlement in a different category from those which usually followed as a durable solution for refugee problems. The authorities’ conflicting statements and inconsistency in identifying the aims of the resettlement schemes in GS indicate the hidden agenda for constructing them. Nevertheless, the majority of refugees in the sample survey identified Israel’s aims as being political rather than humanitarian. Some Israeli officials did reveal the actual motive, which was to effect counter-insurgency regaining the exercise of control over the refugee population. Through resettlement they aimed at curtailing the relationship between the local population and the Fedayeen.

The resettlement projects’ infrastructure had been set up with a counter-insurgency strategy in mind. The wide roads compared to the narrow alleys in refugee camps, in particular, facilitate control by military forces. Yet, the significance of the resettled refugees’ involvement in the national struggle on an equal footing with camp refugees, as the sample survey findings demonstrated, proved that the projects were not isolated from the camps. This is despite the Israeli soldiers ability to apprehend resettled demonstrators more easily than in camps, partly because refugees had been carefully screened before being admitted into the projects and partly because the militants would want to stay in the camps.

Notwithstanding Israeli control policies over the resettled refugees, their role in the national struggle and their feeling of belonging has not been depreciated by having better housing conditions. On the contrary, political mobilization was sustained, thus, the Israeli counter-insurgency strategy has proved counterproductive.
The environmental components of the counter-insurgency strategy, as the findings of the sample survey showed were not of much effect on refugees' mobility in the SR. Only 15.6% of SR and 14.8% of SC respondents gave the variable of wide roads as an impediment to greater mobility.

Yusuf Farah, the former Field Services Officer in Gaza UNRWA, emphasized that "GS as a whole is one single camp, irrespective of where a refugee lives, in an Israeli housing project, in an UNRWA camp or elsewhere." The national struggle, he continued, "has united all" (Interview, 30/7/1991). The solidarity among the refugee community in GS, and the strong family ties, are attributes of the high political mobility among refugees. This is despite the high residential stability in GS camps and the economic immobility of refugees. The cultural aspects of the diaspora, combined with the revolutionary ethics after 1965 and the Israeli repressive measures in the OTs, had nurtured the political identity of refugees. The old town/village remained live in their memories; and in their quarters in the camps. The new generation, "the revolutionaries" and the "children of the stones" are the end-product of the synthesis between family socialization and the political ethics of Palestinianism.

The low level of symptoms of distress and social conflict among Gazans compared to those Palestinians in the WB and East Jerusalem, are the result of a strong sense of social cohesiveness (FAFO, 1993: 124). The assumption that poverty, overcrowding and high unemployment would create social conflict and distress proved fruitless in the GS context. Yet, with relocation some new social symptoms and disruption of social relations have emerged. Feelings of alienation among the old generation, the disintegration of village/town community/quarters - as in camps -, and the fragmentation of the extended family, are some symptoms that would precipitate apprehension of the situation on the social level in a generation's time.

The situation of PRs in GS invites a new and unique aspect in the Israeli process of counter-insurgency and resettlement, for the circumstances of the Israeli resettlement process embarked upon by the authorities and different from those of Algeria and Malaya. First, the Israeli authorities did not recognize that the unity between refugees and non-refugees, between Fedayeen and non-Fedayeen, was inseparable in GS. Second, resettlement experiences in other countries show that it was undertaken by isolating the "New Villages", the "Strategic Hamlets", from the locals through defensible borders. Yet, the scarcity of land in GS did not permit resettling refugees in promoted areas. Instead, the housing projects were constructed adjacent to the camps (See Appendix 1), which has maintained to a high degree the link between camps and projects. Third, one more shortcoming of the Israeli resettlement schemes is that
"improving housing conditions" has never been an alternative to a political solution; nor a means to thwart resistance, for as the historical experience of PRs shows, repression exacerbates resistance, regardless of residential location. Gaza leadership interviewed emphasized the fact that improving living conditions for refugees in GS will serve the national struggle better, especially because as one interviewee said: "living in a tent or in inhuman conditions or a palace, do not enhance or lessen national struggle and political consciousness; political consciousness has different components than type of housing" (Interview, 27/7/1991). This theory is affirmed by SR refugees, 95.6% of whom believed that their conception of and contribution to the national struggle is as strong as prior to relocation.

The GS refugees who rejected all previous resettlement proposals outside Palestine did not, however, resent resettlement on the Palestinian soil. However, they did not support it as a long-term solution to their political situation, as indicated by the majority in the sample surveyed: 70.4% in SC and 47.8% in SR. Their adherence to their political rights embedded in the RRC and for an independent state and self-determination confirm this stand. By staying on the land, the GS refugees believed that they are achieving a number of goals. These are: enhancing sumud (steadfastness) of the refugee community and maintaining collectivity, as confirmed by 94.4% of SR respondents; especially in the face of the authorities' policies of land confiscation and Israeli settlement policy in the OTs.

Given the various restrictions - Israeli and UNRWA - on expansion of camp shelters; the element of coerced involved, with the authorities' imposing new economic burdens on refugees; the limited choice that remains for them, is between living in adequate housing or not living adequately. Nonetheless, as the findings of the sample survey showed, the density of persons per room in SR remained high (2.74), compared to 2.96 in SC. The Israeli authorities' aspiration, that through relocation "urbanization" or "depeasantization" of refugees, their numbers - which have been a "threat" to Israel - will decline has been challenged. The authorities ignored the fact that refugee population growth in the Strip has become demographically-politicized.

Based on this analysis, the case of GS refugee resettlement may help indicate a new set of conceptual lenses for understanding some of the specific circumstances of resettlement other than similar experiences in other parts of the world. It is the unique character of GS refugees, who felt the burden of occupation more than any other areas in the OTs, and the role the Israeli control in sharpening and consolidating their collective cultural and political identity which enables them to hold their ground in the face of attacks during the Intifada. This resistance has been generated in mukhayam al-ouda (the camp of return) - a name given to Jabalia camp-, to
mark the climax of the Palestinian struggle since the beginning of the century.

In this sense, the prophecy of *al-Tha'ar* above, could be seen to have been partially fulfilled. In the long history of the Palestine-Israeli conflict, it was the *fellaheen* (peasants) of Palestine who were dubbed camp-refugees after 1948, who were and still are the fuel of the Palestinian national struggle.
Following the Israeli state recognition of the PLO in 1993, preceded by the PLO recognition of the existence of Israel in 1988, Palestinians optimism centred on their ability to restitute their rights for a state, return and self-determination, after decades of confrontation and conflict. The PRs - particularly those in the diaspora - perceived this new development as the beginning of the end to forty-five years of dispossession. With the "Gaza-Jericho First" deal of 13 September 1993, the PRs remained sceptical, doubting that Israel would actually allow the repatriation of old (1948) and new (1967) refugees, and withdrawal from the OTs. Their scepticism found roots in a long history of Israel denying them the Right to Return, and adequate economic and social rights. They are critical of the absence of an explicit stipulation in the first deal regarding their situation. In contrast, to the firm official Palestinian stand towards PRs Right to Return and independence evident came in the Palestine Declaration of Independence of November 1988, and the stand of the Palestinian delegation to the Refugees' Committee in the Peace Talks; in the deal, the future of the PRs, the heart of the Israeli-Arab conflict, was left to a later stage of the five-year transitional period negotiations (in the third year), as stipulated in Article V, with focus on 1967 refugees only.

The PRs dissent stems from the PLO's failure to satisfactorily address their issue. Marches of protest in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza refugee camps reflected a dismay over the deal, which, as far as refugees' speculations go, entails resettlement and not repatriation. The "sign of goodwill" by Israel is seen in its approval to accept return of tens of thousands of 1967 refugees to the WBGS, but it looks as though this right is to be denied to 1948 refugees. Yet at the same time, Israel is allowing the return of thousands of Soviet immigrants.

As a result, the PRs recognize that neither Lebanon nor Syria want them to stay; while Jordan wants only a proportion of them so as to maintain a delicate balance between PRs and Jordanians. For the PRs who have been fueling the Palestinian national struggle, making sacrifices in every sphere of their life, the deal may be, as E. Said wrote in The Guardian of 9 September, 1993:

The final dispossession (for PRs). Their national rights as people made refugees in 1948, solemnly confirmed and reaffirmed for years by the UN, the PLO, the Arab governments, indeed most of the world, now seem to have been annulled.

One might argue that it is impossible to implement Resolution 194(III) en masse, a reality recognized by the PLO in its Declaration of Independence, predicated on UN Security
Council Resolution 181 of 1947, which called for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, and acceptance of the existence of the former logically precludes the implementation of the "return" element of Resolution 194. Moreover, some PRs may not want to return, either to a Palestinian state or to Israel proper, for having established themselves in the host countries. Yet, this should not mean that they have ceded their rights to compensation as a second choice, as endorsed in UN Resolution 194(III). Many do want to return, however, despite Israeli claims (official and non-official), that PRs have no desire to do so. Making such claims corresponds with the policies and plans that Israel has been carrying out to prevent return; which, as stated in The Israel Yearbook of 1990, will be "the future nightmare for Israel." Thus, Israel has argues that as Jewish "refugees" were resettled in Israel, a fair and equitable solution to the Arab refugee problem will necessarily require relocation in nearby Arab countries.

In historical and political terms, these new developments on the Palestinian-Israeli scene with regard to PRs simply mean that the issue has been brought back to the 1950s; when the issue was dealt with as being one of economics rather than politics. This is evident in the economic plans and aid stipulated in the deal, the end result of which would be to fulfill an old Israeli dream of dominating not only the political scene, controlling land, water, overall security and foreign affairs in the areas of Palestinian autonomy, but also, being the leading nation in the "knowledge economy" in the Middle East as stated by Shimon Peres, through the creation of the "Middle East Market."

It has become clear that Israeli policy in respect of the PRs has been and continues to be defined by what it does not allow rather than by what it does. Although these above points might be arguable, they beg a number of question. Would the PRs accept resettlement in the Arab countries? This also works in the other direction, would the Arab states assume responsibility to resettle them on their land? How can one prevent PRs from returning if they wish to return, in view of the Israeli stand on this issue? Who will return, how many, from where and to where? What are the economic needs for their absorption in the WBGS? An answer to these questions is difficult to provide. But, it is vital that the refugees should be heard, and they should have an active participation and representation in any negotiations to be conducted. In the last analysis the only ones really interested in a just solution are the refugees themselves. Since the economic solution and resettlement is not the answer to their aspirations, one might then question whether the deal represents, as Mouin Rabbani put it, "the first strategic retreat by Zionism on the road to Palestinian self-determination, or rather the final nail in the coffin of the Palestinian struggle"? Time will tell.
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2. Official Publications


3. Books and Chapters in Books


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*Palestine and Trans-Jordan.* London: Naval Intelligence Division, 1943.


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5. **Newspapers**

*Foreign press*

- The Guardian (London)
- The Independent (London)
- New York Times (USA)
- The Observer (London)
- The Times (London)

*Arab Press*

- Attali’a (Jerusalem)
- al-Dustour (Amman)
- al-Fajr English (Jerusalem)
- Filastin
- al-Hayat (London)
- al-Mithaq (Jerusalem)
- Nidal al-Sha’ab (Jerusalem)
- al-Qabas (Kuwait)
- al-Quds al-Arabi (London)
- al-Quds (Jerusalem)
- Quds Press (London)
- al-Sharq al-Awsat (London)
- Tariq al-Shararah (Jerusalem)

*Israeli Press*

- Davar
- Ha’aretz
- Ha’olem Hazeh
- al-Hamishmar
- al-Ittihad
- The Jerusalem Post
- Ma’ariv
- Yediot Ahronot

6. **Interviews**


Appendix 1: Gaza Strip Palestinian refugee camps, resettlement projects, and Jewish settlements

Settlements
1. Al-Arafa
2. Neve Sura
3. Harsani
4. Tel
5. Tel Moncar
6. Nezersam
7. Kfar Qarom
8. Nahal Qais O
9. Nezer Hazani
10. Qais
11. Ganen Tal
12. Neve Dekalim
13. Qadic
14. Gat Or
15. Bedouin
16. Arazona
17. Mezieh Almona
18. Morag

Refugee Camps
A. Jabalya
B. Shai (Beach)
C. Nudra
D. Burek
E. Mughran
F. Dav al-Balan
G. Khan Yusis
H. Alaman

Refugee Resettlement Projects
AA. Ha Sheha Radwan
BB. Haza
CC. Amal
DD. Swedish Village
EE. Tel al-Sultan
FF. Canada Camp
GG. Brazil Camp
HH. Dehnya (Bedouin)

Key:
- Old road
- Israeli built or improved road
- International border
- Armistice line
- Israeli settlement zone

Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, No.57, Autumn 1985:50
Appendix 2: Shati Camp, divided into 12 residential blocks

Appendix 3: Sheikh Radwan Israeli sponsored housing project, divided into 5 residential block

Appendix 4: UN GA Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, on Right to Return or Compensation of PRs

Text of Resolution 194 (III)
The Palestine Question
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
On 11 December 1948

The General Assembly,

Having considered further the situation in Palestine,

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and

2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:

   a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;

   b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;

   c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. Declares that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission:

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. Calls upon the Government and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 18 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. Resolves that the Holy Places — including Nazareth — religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most easter of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motza); and the most northern, Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control;

Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date.

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maxi-
Resolution 194 (III) -- continued

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall cooperate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area:

9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;

14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.
Appendix 5: Israeli Building Regulations in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip

The Civil Administration of the Gaza Strip

-Announcement for the Public-

To:

Address:

In execution of the competence authorized to me as the Director of Welfare Affairs and Refugees, in accordance with ordinance No. 4 of 1960. It has to be made known to the public the substance of resolutions relating to organizing the constructions and building affairs in the refugee camps; and according to what has been provided in the minutes issued by the officials for refugee affairs on the 3rd May 1958 and the 1st June 1960, we issue the below mentioned regulations:

One: If anyone may try to sell, buy, rent, mortgage, or transfer his place of living to another person in the camps area, shelter should be withdrawn completely from the two parties without having the right to claim any compensation.

Two: It is forbidden to construct any buildings or constructions, and to add to or extend the existing shelters, or to demolish the existing shelters so as to set up a new one, or to make any other construction in the refugee camps area without obtaining a permit from the Director of Welfare Affairs and Refugees or from his authorized deputy.

Three: Whoever has the desire to relinquish his shelter in the refugee camps area must submit an application form to the refugee rehabilitation office in order to implement the procedures.

Four: It is forbidden to move from one camp to another without a pre-permit granted by the authorities in accordance with legal requirements.

Five: Whoever may violate these orders is required to remove the building at his own expense, otherwise the building is taken from him, or he will pay a fine in cash or be imprisoned, or he may be subject to both penalties. Besides, the building should be removed at the expense of the violators (completely and administratively).

Rawi Sadeeh

Head of Refugee Rehabilitation Branch

Director of Welfare Affairs and Refugees

Date: 29/12/1982

Original copy in Arabic
Appendix Six:

Questionnaire For Gazan Refugees
Case Study: Shati Camp

1-3 Interview number _____________

Date of interview _____________

Time interview started _______ Ended _______

4. Person interviewed
   1. Head of household
   2. Housewife
   3. Eldest son

5. Sex
   1. Male
   2. Female

6. Age
   1. 16-19
   2. 20-29
   3. 30-39
   4. 40-49
   5. 50-59
   6. 60 and over

7. Marital Status
   1. Single
   2. Married
   3. Widowed
   4. Divorced
   5. Separated

8. Number of families in the shelter?
   1. 1
   2. 2
   3. 3
   4. Over four

9. Number of persons?
   1. Male
   2. Female

10. Number of immigrant family members?
    1. 1 - 2
    2. 3 - 4
    3. 5 - 6
    4. 7 - 8
    5. 9 - 10
    6. No one
11. Number of years living in the camp?
   1. Less than 5 years
   2. 5 - 9
   3. 10 - 14
   4. 15 - 19
   5. 20 - 24
   6. 25 - 29
   7. 30 - 34
   8. 35 - 39

12. Town/village of origin in Palestine?

13. Shelter ownership?
   1. UNRWA
   2. Private
   3. Others

14. Number of rooms in shelter?
   1. 1
   2. 2
   3. 3
   4. 4
   5. 5
   6. 6
   7. 7 and more

15. Did you add any rooms to the shelter?
   1. Yes
   2. No

16. If yes, how many rooms?
   1. 1
   2. 2
   3. 3
   4. over 3

17. Do you suffer from:
   1. Shortage of water supply
   2. Inadequate electricity
   3. Sewerage problem
   4. Bad sanitation
   5. Others

18. Level of education:
   1. Illiterate
   2. Elementary
   3. Preparatory
   4. Secondary
   5. Vocational and teachers institutes
   6. University
19. Occupation:
  1. Scientific workers
  2. Administrators
  3. Clerical workers
  4. Sales workers
  5. Service workers
  6. Agricultural workers
  7. Production workers
  8. Transport workers
  9. Other unskilled workers
  10. Unemployed
  11. Housewife
  12. Student
  13. Retired
  14. Disabled

20. Place of work
  1. In the West Bank
  2. In the Gaza Strip
  3. In Israel
  4. Abroad (specify)
  5. Others

21. Number of employed persons in the family:
  1. One
  2. Two
  3. Three
  4. Four and more
  5. No one

22. Does income cover essential needs?
  1. Enough
  2. Most
  3. Some
  4. No income

23. Do you receive any remittances?
  1. Yes
  2. No

24. Do people from your town/village of origin live in this camp?
  1. Yes
  2. No

25. How often do you meet people from the same town/village of origin?
  1. Everyday
  2. Once a week
  3. Once a month
  4. Sometime in a year
  5. Once a year
  6. Less than once a year
26. When do you refer to the Mukhtar?
   1. Never refer
   2. For family affairs
   3. For ratification of documents
   4. Political affairs
   5. Others

27. Do you hold a refugee card?
   1. Yes
   2. No

28. What does this card mean to you?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

29. Future security for children (by priority)
   1. Employment
   2. Education
   3. House ownership

30. Would you like to move out of the camp?
   1. Yes
   2. No

31. Where would you want to move to?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

32. Why do you want to move out?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 
   4. 
   5. 

33. Why do you want to stay put in the camp?
   1. Stay close to family and relatives
   2. Maintain refugee identity
   3. Lack of means
   4. All above reasons

34. Do you support the resettlement of refugees?
   1. Support Strongly
   2. Support
   3. Don't support (go to 35).
   4. No answer

35. Why don't you support resettlement?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

36. In general, do you think refugees support resettlement?
   1. Yes
   2. No

37. When would you accept resettlement?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

38. What are the aims of resettlement?
   1. Humanitarian
   2. Economical
   3. Political
   4. Don’t know

39. Do you think that the resettlement schemes were a success?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don’t know

40. What is UNRWA’s role in resettlement?
   1. Major role
   2. Minor role
   3. No role
   4. Don’t know
   5. No response

41. Do you see any relationship between resettlement and the Right to Return or Compensation?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don’t know

42. Do you agree or disagree that resettlement might cancel the Right of Return or Compensation?
   1. Agree
   2. Disagree
   3. Not sure
   4. No response

43. What reasons do you think caused refugees to move out?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 
   4. 

44. Do refugees in the housing project (SR) participate in the political activities you undertake?
   1. Yes (go to 45)
   2. No
   3. Don’t know
45. What is the level of their participation?
   1. Very High
   2. Above average
   3. Average (go to 68)
   4. Below average (go to 68)
   5. Don’t know
   6. No answer

46. Why do you think they rate such?
   1. ----------------------------
   2. ----------------------------
   3. ----------------------------

47. Are there martyrs in the household?
   1. Yes (go to 48)
   2. No

48. How many?
   1. From 1967 - 1987
   2. From 1974 - 1987
   3. From 1987 - 1990

49. Are there arrested persons in the household?
   1. Yes (go to 50)
   2. No

50. How Many?
   1. From 1967 - 1987
   2. From 1974 - 1987
   3. From 1987 - 1990

51. Are there injured persons in the household?
   1. Yes (go to 52)
   2. No

52. How many?
   1. From 1967 - 1987
   2. From 1974 - 1987
   3. From 1987 - 1990

53. Have you experienced house raids by Israeli soldiers during the Intifada?
   1. Yes (go to 54)
   2. No

54. How many times has your house been raided?
   1. 1 - 5
   2. 6 - 10
   3. 11 -15
   4. 16 - 20
   5. 21 and more
55. What solution do you favour for the Palestine - Israeli conflict?
   1. Implementation of PNC resolutions (19th session)
   2. Liberation of all Palestine
   3. Other solutions
   4. No answer

56. Do you support a Palestinian State in the WBGS?
   1. Yes (go to 57)
   2. No

57. Do you support it even if it excludes 1948 land?
   1. Yes
   2. No

58. What type of leadership do you want to see for the future state?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

59. What is your preferred size of family?
   1. 1 - 2
   2. 3 - 4
   3. 5 - 6
   4. 7 - 8
   5. 9 - 10
   6. 11 and more

60. What are your reasons for preferring a large family?
   1. Social
   1. Social
   2. Economic
   3. Political (go to 61)
   4. All three above
   5. Others

61. Why have you chosen the political variable?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

87. Do you think your conditions are well known and written about?
   1. Yes
   2. No
Appendix Seven:

**Questionnaire For Gazan Refugees In The Housing Projects**  
**Case Study: Sheikh Radwan Project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Interview number</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Time interview started</th>
<th>Ended</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-3</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Person interviewed
   1. Head of household
   2. Housewife
   3. Eldest son

5. Sex
   1. Male
   2. Female

6. Age
   1. 16-19
   2. 20-29
   3. 30-39
   4. 40-49
   5. 50-59
   6. 60 and over

7. Marital Status
   1. Single
   2. Married
   3. Widowed
   4. Divorced
   5. Separated

8. Number of families in the shelter?
   1. 1
   2. 2
   3. 3
   4. Over four

9. Number of persons?
   1. Male
   2. Female
10. Number of immigrant family members?
   1. 1 - 2
   2. 3 - 4
   3. 5 - 6
   4. 7 - 8
   5. 9 - 10
   6. No one

11. Number of years living in the project
    1. From 6 - 11 months
    2. From 1 - 3 years
    3. From 4 - 7 years
    4. From 8 - 11 years
    5. From 12 - 15 years
    6. From 15 - 18 years

12. Previous residence
    1. City.Camp (go to 13)
    2. Camp (go to 13)
    3. Others (specify)

13. Name of camp
    1. Jabalya
    2. Shati (Beach)
    3. Bureij
    4. Nusirat
    5. Maghazi
    6. Deir el Balah
    7. Khan Yunis
    8. Rafah

14. Town/village of origin in Palestine

15. House ownership
    1. Private
    2. Rent
    3. Don’t know

16. Number of rooms in shelter
    1. 1
    2. 2
    3. 3
    4. 4
    5. 5
    6. 6
    7. 7 and more

17. Did you receive:
    1. A built house (go to 18)
    2. A plot of land (go to 22)
18. How many rooms did you receive?
   1. 1
   2. 2
   3. 3
   4. 4 and more

19. Did you make alternations to the new house?
   1. Yes (go to 20)
   2. No

20. If yes, how many rooms?
   1. 1
   2. 2
   3. 3
   4. 4 and more
   5. Demolishing the house, and rebuilding as multi-storey
   6. Others

21. How many rooms were there in the previous house?
   1. 1
   1. 1
   2. 2
   3. 3
   4. 4
   5. 5
   6. 6
   7. 7 and more

22. What area of land have you received?
   1. 250 sq. m.
   2. 125 sq. m.
   3. Others (specify)

23. Do you suffer from: Yes No
   1. Shortage of water supply
   2. Inadequate electricity
   3. Sewerage problem
   4. Bad sanitation
   5. Others

24. Level of education:
   1. Illiterate
   2. Elementary
   3. Preparatory
   4. Secondary
   5. Vocational and teachers institutes
   6. University

25. Place of work
   1. In the West Bank
   2. In the Gaza Strip
   3. In Israel
   4. Abroad (specify)
   5. Others
26. Occupation:
1. Scientific workers
2. Administrators
3. Clerical workers
4. Sales workers
5. Service workers
6. Agricultural workers
7. Production workers
8. Transport workers
9. Other unskilled workers
10. Unemployed
11. Housewife
12. Student
13. Retired
14. Disabled

27. Number of employed persons in the family:
1. One
2. Two
3. Three
4. Four and more

28. Does income cover essential needs?
1. Enough
2. Most
3. Some
4. No income

29. Do you receive any remittances from family members employed abroad?
1. Yes
2. No

30. Form of relocation
1. Voluntarily
2. Compulsory
3. Others

31. Why did you move out to the housing project?
1. Security demolition
2. Road widening
3. Town planning
4. 1967 War demolition
5. Narrowness of camp's shelter
6. Improvement in income
7. To improve social status
8. Political considerations
9. Others

32. Did you receive compensation for your previous camp shelter?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
33. How satisfied were you with the compensation received?
   1. Very Satisfied
   2. Satisfied
   3. Fairly satisfied (go to 34)
   4. Dissatisfied (go to 34)

34. Why are you not satisfied?
   1. Because percentage of compensation was below 5% of house value
   2. 10 - 19%
   3. 20 - 29%
   4. 30 - 39%
   5. Over 40%

35. Did you sign a contract when you moved to the project?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don't know

36. What is the duration of the contract?

37. Did you know the provisions of the contract?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don't know

38. Do you think that this contract deprives you of your rights as a refugee?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Not sure
   4. Don't know

39. Do people from your town/village of origin live in this project?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don't Know

40. How often do you meet people from the same town/village of origin?
   1. Everyday
   2. Once a week
   3. Once a month
   4. Sometime in a year
   5. Once a year
   6. Less than once a year

41. When do you refer to the Mukhtar?
   1. Never refer
   2. For family affairs
   3. For ratification of documents
   4. Political affairs
   5. Others
42. Is living in the project similar or different than camp life?
1. The same (go to 443)
2. Differs (go to 44)
3. Don’t know

43. What are the similarities?
1. ____________________________
2. ____________________________
3. ____________________________

44. What differences?
1. ____________________________
2. ____________________________
3. ____________________________

45. Are you satisfied with your life in the project?
1. Satisfied
2. Satisfied to adequate
3. Dissatisfied
4. Dissatisfied completely

46. Do you prefer to live in the project with people from the same town/village of origin?
1. Yes (go to 47)
2. No
3. Don’t know

47. Why do you have that preference?
1. ____________________________
2. ____________________________
3. ____________________________

48. Did you find any difficulties?
1. Yes (go to 49)
2. No

49. What difficulties?
1. ____________________________
2. ____________________________
3. ____________________________

50. Would you like to return to the camp?
1. Yes
2. No
3. It depends (go to 51)
4. Don’t know

51. What does it depend on?
1. ____________________________
2. ____________________________

52. Do you receive similar services as the indigenous population?
1. Yes
2. No
3. How do they differ?
54. Do you hold a refugee card?
   1. Yes
   2. No

55. What does this card mean to you?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

56. Do you support the resettlement of refugees?
   1. Support strongly
   2. Support
   3. Don't support (go to 57)
   4. No answer

57. Why don't you support resettlement?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

58. In general, do you think refugees support resettlement?
   1. Yes
   2. No (go to 59)
   3. Don't know

59. Why do you think they do not support it?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

60. What are the aims of resettlement?
   1. Humanitarian
   2. Economical
   3. Political
   4. Don't know

61. Do you think that the resettlement schemes were a success?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don't know

62. What is UNRWA's role in resettlement?
   1. Major role
   2. Minor role
   3. No role
   4. Don't know
   5. No response

63. Do you see any relationship between resettlement and the Right to Return or Compensation?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don't know
64. Do you agree or disagree that resettlement might cancel the Right of Return or Compensation?
   1. Agree
   2. Disagree
   3. Not sure
   4. No response

65. Do you see yourself entitled to the Right of Return or Compensation when a solution comes up?
   1. Yes
   2. No (go to 66)
   3. Not sure (go to 66)
   4. No response

66. Why do you think you are not entitled to it?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

67. What level of political activities do refugees in the housing projects have?
   1. Very High
   2. Above average
   3. Average (go to 68)
   4. Below average (go to 68)
   5. Don’t know
   6. No answer

68. Why do you think that their activities are decreasing?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

69. Does national struggle mean less to you?

70. Do you feel that Israeli soldier harassment of you is less in the project?

71. Do you believe that resettlement in the projects reinforces the steadfastness on Palestinian land?

72. Are there martyrs in the household?
   1. Yes (go to 73)
   2. No

73. How many?
   1. From 1974 - 1987
   2. From 1987 - 1990

74. Are there arrested persons in the household?
   1. Yes (go to 75)
   2. No

75. How many?
   1. From 1974 - 1987
   2. From 1987 - 1990
76. Are there injured persons in the household?
   1. Yes (go to 77)
   2. No

77. How many?
   1. From 1974 - 1987
   2. From 1987 - 1990

78. Have you experienced house raids by Israeli soldiers during the Intifada?
   1. Yes (go to 79)
   2. No

79. How many times has your house been raided?
   1. 1 - 2
   2. 3 - 4
   3. 5 - 6
   4. 7 or more

80. What solution do you favour for the Palestine - Israeli conflict?
   i. Implementation of PNC resolutions (19th session)
   2. Liberation of all Palestine
   3. Other solutions
   4. No answer

81. Do you support a Palestinian State in the WBGS?
   1. Yes (go to 82)
   2. No

82. Do you support it even if it excludes 1948 land?
   1. Yes
   2. No

83. What type of leadership do you want to see for the future state?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

84. What is your preferred size of family?
   1. 1 - 2
   2. 3 - 4
   3. 5 - 6
   4. 7 - 8
   5. 9 - 10
   6. 11 and more

85. What are your reasons for preferring a large family?
   1. Social
   2. Economic
   3. Political (Go to 86)
   4. All three above
   5. Others
86. Why have you chosen the political variable?
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

87. Do you think your conditions are well known and written about?
   1. Yes
   2. No