International students in UK policy from 1999 to 2013: rationales for recruitment and representations of students

Sylvie Elise Lomer

Education Doctorate

School of Education

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Abstract

International students have had an increasingly significant presence in UK higher education since the 1980s. Government policy has intentionally encouraged their recruitment, from the Prime Minister’s Initiative in 1999 to the Coalition Government’s 2013 International Education Strategy. This study establishes how public policy discursively creates problems, solutions and representations of international students through textual analysis of over 90 documents. It uses Carol Bacchi’s (2009) ‘what is the problem represented to be’ framework to uncover problems, solutions, assumptions and silences in the policy discourses. The analysis revealed that policy justifies international student recruitment in terms of anticipated gains for the UK, namely: increased diplomatic influence, educational reputation, and income. In a field of global competition, these perceived benefits address the implicit problems of addressing the declining power and status of the nation. International student recruitment is undesirable when students are in ‘academic deficit’ and contribute to negative popular discourses around immigrants. Thus, rationales are made both in favour of and counter to their recruitment. In these rationales, students are discursively represented as immigrants, conduits for income, consumers, arbiters of quality, creators of international education, ambassadors, and fundamentally Other. They are valued for the benefits they bring to the UK and are not constructed as individuals with agency. These representations and rationales are important because they have the power to modify institutional and national practices, change individuals’ self-representations and relationships. This thesis contributes to an enhanced critical awareness of how national policies rationalise and represent international students, a necessary precursor to an ethical pedagogical engagement in international higher education.
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List of Acronyms

ATAS - Academic Technology Approval Scheme
AGCAS - Association of Graduate Careers Advisory Services
BIS - Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
BCECS - British Council Education Counselling Service
BC - British Council
CAQDAS - Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
DCMS
DfEE / DfES – Department for Education and Employment/ Department for Education and Skills
DIUS - Department of Innovation Universities and Skills
EU - European Union
FCO - Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GATS - General Agreement on Trade in Services
GDP - Gross domestic product
GSM - Global student mobility
HE - Higher Education
HEA - Higher Education Academy
HEFCE - Higher Education Funding Council for England
HEI – Higher Education Institution
HESA - Higher Education Statistics Authority
HSM - Highly skilled migration
HSMP - Highly Skilled Migration Programme
HTS -Highly Trusted Sponsor
ISB – International Student Barometer
IES - International Education Strategy
IEC - International Education Council
IELTS - International English Language Testing System
IPPR - Institute of Public Policy Research
IPS - International Passenger Survey
ISB - International Student Barometer
MAC - Migration Advisory Committee
NAO - National Audit Office
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation
NSS - National Student Survey
PBS - Points-Based System for visas
PMI - Prime Minister’s Initiative to recruit international students
PMI2 - Prime Minister’s Initiative for International Education
TNE - Transnational education
TNHE - Transnational higher education
OECD - Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development
UN ESA - United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNESCO - United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization
QAA - Quality Assurance Agency
UKBA – UK Border Agency (now UKVI)
UKCOSA – the UK Council for Overseas Student Affairs (became UKCISA in 2007)
UKCISA - the UK Council for International Student Affairs
UKTI – UK Trade and Investment (Government department)
WPR - What is the Problem Represented to be?
WTO - World Trade Organisation
Introduction

The UK has recruited and welcomed international students into higher education for a long time, and government policies have played varying roles in encouraging or limiting this. The last 20 years have seen an intensification of marketing of UK higher education overseas, and an increase in the international student population. They have also seen national policy level interventions into the field, in differing forms. These policies have made a range of arguments for, and occasionally against, increasing international student recruitment. In the course of making these arguments, policies represent international students, depicting them in various ways and shaping how they are perceived. This thesis aims to map international student policies in the UK, to expose discourses regarding their recruitment, and identify how students are represented.

At the London School of Economics in 1999, Tony Blair declared that the UK needed to recruit more international students. He claimed a range of benefits from their presence and kick-started a multi-million-pound programme known as the Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI) to do so (Blair, 1999; British Council (BC), 1999; 2000a). In 1997-98, there were 116,840 non-EU domiciled students in the UK (HESA, 1998). The aim was to increase the number of higher education international students by 50,000 students over 6 years, by 2005 (BC, 1999), and to make Britain “the first choice for quality” (BC, 2003, p. 14). It launched a brand (Educ@tion UK) (BC, 1999), encompassing all higher education institutions (HEIs) in the UK and many further education institutions and language colleges as well (BC, 2000a, 2003). This “package of measures” also included revisions to the student visa system to facilitate applications, relaxing limitations on work during degree courses; and the expansion of scholarship schemes (Blair, 1999). A substantial increase in international student recruitment and revenue for the UK followed (BC, 2003); the targets were exceeded by 43,000 students in both higher and further education (Blair, 2006), and the brand was widely recognised (BC, 2003). This was claimed as a success, although the UK had simultaneously lost 3% of its market share internationally (Böhm, et al., 2004).
Two years later, the PMI was re-envisioned with the aims of improving the quality of experience for international students, employability and embedding partnerships (Blair, 2006; DfES, 2006). This was entitled ‘the Initiative for International Education’. This change of title reflected a change in focus, moving away from recruitment targets into a more sophisticated and multifaceted endeavour to embed the increases in international recruitment in a broader network of partnerships and institutional activities (DIUS, 2009).

In 2010, the Coalition Government was elected, with a promise from the Conservative Party (the majority partner) to reduce net immigration to “the tens of thousands” (The Conservative Party, 2010). This closely followed the bogus college scandal where several language colleges were offering substandard education to provide illegal access to work for their registered students (Home Affairs Committee, 2009). Subsequently, HEIs were required to monitor more closely their international students (UKBA, 2011a; 20011b; Jenkins, 2014). While there was “no cap” (Home Office, 2011; BIS, 2013a; Cameron, 2013) on the international student numbers, the UKBA (2010, p.3) also made it apparent that “the Government’s aim to reduce net migration will not be achieved without careful consideration and action on the non-economic routes including students”. Thus, despite apparently rolling out “the red carpet” (Cameron, 2011a and b) to international students, this suggests that they are impacted by wider migration policy.

In 2013, the Coalition International Education Strategy (IES) was published (BIS, 2013a). It highlighted the value of international students in the UK, but also privileged transnational education (TNE), the provision of education and qualifications by UK HEIs to students physically located elsewhere, and the role of other education exports such as publications and technology. By 2012-13, there were 299,970 international students in the UK (HESA, 2013), a 256% increase from 1998, before the PMI. By this time, one in eight students in the UK was from outside the EU (UUK, 2014). According to the IES, these students make a “massive contribution” economically, educationally and culturally to the UK, and this is why their presence has been valued (BIS, 2013a).
This brief description demonstrates firstly that UK policy on international students exists as a field. It covers policy on the economy, migration, culture and heritage, science and technology, and education policy (Knight, 2004). Secondly, it shows that there has been a range of different positions on international students and change over time. While studies on particular dimensions of such policies have been done (Healey, 2008; Dodds, 2009; Humfrey, 2011; Karram, 2013; Tannock, 2013; Geddie, 2014; Jenkins, 2014; Walker, 2014), there has not been a single study to pull together all dimensions of this policy field. This thesis intends to contribute to this literature with a more holistic approach.

**International education in the UK: a brief history**

The internationalisation of higher education is not an exclusively modern or Western phenomenon (Altbach, 2004). Ancient Egyptian empires educated the young elites of its vassal kingdoms (Wilson, 2014). The pre-medieval libraries and scholars of Arabic Damascus, Baghdad, Byzantium (Sidhu, 2006; Rizvi, 2011), Fez (Trahar, 2010), and Timbuktu were centres for scholarship in the Arabic world and beyond. Later, the universities of medieval Europe attracted scholars from all over Western Europe and beyond (Humfrey, 2011), in which the UK played a minor role. In the 19th century, the UK hosted more international students, training bureaucrats to administer the Empire (Walker, 2014) and to sell British goods and services (Sidhu, 2006). Sidhu (2006) suggests that education offered a moral salve for Britons’ conscience in colonial relations. At this stage, as universities became increasingly important to the manufacturing industries, they began to be considered of public benefit, and the first grant to universities was made in 1889 (Humfrey, 2011).

After decolonisation in the 1950s, the prestige of UK degrees and subsidization of fees continued to attract students (Walker, 2014). The UK HE sector was what Humfrey (2011, p.652) characterises as “haphazardly international” and Belcher (1987, p.127) goes further: “Britain does not really have anything like properly developed and comprehensive policy in this area”, except that students were generally welcomed. This informal policy echoes the 1950 Colombo Plan, in which Australia agreed to subsidize students from the Asian regions in the stated interests of reducing poverty (Burke, 2013). Such education for development projects were
also thought to contribute the diplomatic stature of host countries (Sidhu, 2006). Similarly, the British tradition of subsidizing the fees of overseas students was rooted in rationales of development and diplomacy (Belcher, 1987; Dodds, 2009; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010).

In 1979, this policy of vague amiability came to an abrupt end. The burden on the tax-payer of subsidising international fees was increasingly seen as problematic, despite the £250 differential fee levied since 1967 (Belcher, 1987; Humfrey, 2011). The public good argument was seen to be weaker for overseas students than for home students, challenging their subsidy (Healey, 2008). Full-cost fees were therefore introduced in 1979 under the Thatcher Government. This decision was made apparently without consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) or the Department for Education (Belcher, 1987; Walker, 2014). It precipitated a backlash, as the UK was seen to be reneging on its commitment to international education and its obligations to the Commonwealth (Belcher, 1987); and student numbers dropped considerably, particularly those from lower income countries (Walker, 2014). In mitigation, the Pym Package of scholarships and funding through the FCO and Overseas Development Agency was introduced (Belcher, 1987). At the same time, university funding was considerably reduced, leading to increasing dependency on income from international fees (Belcher, 1987).

The period which followed was “one of rapid and confused change” (Belcher, 1987, p.132) when universities began engaging actively and enthusiastically in commercial overseas recruitment (Belcher, 1987; Walker, 2014). Throughout the 1980s, there was still no comprehensive policy framework, and indeed, was not until the PMI (Walker, 2014). The policy of viewing overseas tuition fees as a way out of a dilemma on how to publicly fund mass domestic higher education without deregulating home fees was, in Healey’s (2008) words, “arguably dysfunctional”. Yet the dominant view of international education in this period was as trade, not aid (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010), as formalized in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a World Trade Organisation agreement, which recognises education as a service to be freely traded across national borders (Tilak, 2008).

This marketised model of higher education spread worldwide, with a global trend towards accepting higher education as a private good, rather than a public good (Naidoo, et al., 2011). Marketisation rests on the knowledge economy model, where
national economies are considered to profit more from industries which require and produce high levels of knowledge and skills, such as technology and research and development, rather than industries relying on natural resources such as agriculture. In the knowledge economy, individual workers are considered to possess degrees of capital (Olssen and Peters, 2005): economic and educational, which can be exchanged for value in the labour market (Marginson, 1997). This means that it is the responsibility of the individual to engage in their personal development by ‘up-skilling’ and ‘up-educating’ themselves, to compete. It is this logic which permits the introduction of ‘user-pay’ systems of higher education. The successful (in economic terms) implementation of such a system for international students, Walker (2014) suggests, made possible the introduction of tuition fees for home students in 1997 in the UK. Marketisation is also apparent in the liberalization of certain aspects of the international higher education market, such as the use of agencies on behalf of national sectors such as the British Council Education Counselling Service and EduFrance (Dodds, 2009). These agencies have undertaken the marketing and advertising of higher education overseas (Sidhu, 2002; Askehave, 2007), in much the same way as traditional products are advertised and marketed.

**Global student mobility**

Student mobility has been increasing globally: by 2007, 2.5 times as many studied abroad as in 1975 (UNESCO, 2009). 1.7 million people travelled for tertiary level study in 1999, and over 4 million in 2012 (UNESCO, 2015a). The increasing presence of international students in the UK is, therefore, part of a wider pattern of increasing mobility, where students travel from poorer, less developed countries to the Global North and West (Altbach, 2004; Marginson, 2006). In 2000, the top 10 destination countries accounted for over 70% of globally mobile students, which decreased only slightly to 67% in 2012 (UNESCO, 2015a). Six OECD countries (Australia, Canada, the USA, the UK, France and Germany) host over 75% of globally mobile students, a proportion which has remained stable over the last twenty years (OECD, 2014). These main host countries are also often ex-imperial centres (Sidhu, 2006), with the debatable exception of the USA. English-speaking countries receive almost 80% of globally mobile students (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010).
The rapid increases in global student mobility (GSM) have come disproportionately from developing countries where access to domestic higher education is limited, as shown in Figure 1 (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002; Healey, 2008). This contributes to “brain drain”, where educated skilled people leave developing countries to reside in developed nations (Ziguras and Law, 2006; Naidoo, R., 2007). Contrasting Figure 1 with Figure 2 below also reflects the unequal flow of resources into already comparatively wealthy countries through market mechanisms.

This rapid growth is concurrent with demographic changes, namely a significant increase in the population of undergraduate age in developing countries (UNESCO, 2015b). Simultaneously, the middle classes of key sending countries have expanded. In 2000, the EU and USA combined constituted 60% of the global middle class and Asia, Japan, China and India combined 20% (Kharas, 2010). However, this pattern is
shifting such that Kharas (2010) argues that by 2030, Asian, Indian and Chinese middle classes, as calculated on the basis of consumption patterns, will outweigh those of the EU and the USA combined, as Figure 3 shows.

![Figure 3: Changing distribution of middle-class consumption (Kharas, 2010, p.29).](image)

With an increasing middle class comes an increased economic capacity to engage in international education, and the motivation to thereby acquire positional gains (Marginson, 2006; Xiang and Shen, 2008), in line with the knowledge economy model mentioned above. This may explain why, as in Figure 2, significant proportions of international students originate from these countries.

The numbers of students enrolled in higher education worldwide have grown along with GSM. Although gross enrolment rates are also increasing, only a small proportion of eligible students actually travel for their higher education, so domestic enrolment is still globally the norm (World Bank, 2015; UNESCO, 2015b).
As Figure 4 shows, while the absolute numbers of globally mobile students are considerable and growing, GSM is not a widespread trend, including less than 1% of the undergraduate aged population.

In the last two decades, new models of international education have developed, including the establishment of branch campuses overseas (Altbach, 2004), and the provision of higher education at a distance through transnational higher education (TNHE) (Marginson, 2006). Also, traditional importers of higher education such as Singapore, Malaysia, India and Japan are now entering the market as providers (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). In the UK, however, internationally mobile students remain the most visible indicator of participation in international education.

**A UK policy context**

This period has also seen a number of changes in domestic higher education policy. League tables, rankings, and the Research Excellence Framework have taken on increasing power (Hazelkorn, 2011), and have contributed to the increasing stratification of the system, where resources are concentrated in high ranking institutions (Filippakou, et al., 2010; Filippakou, et al., 2011; Shattock, 2013). This has also encouraged an increased emphasis on the student experience (Sabri, 2010).

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1 This calculation is based on the sum of outbound internationally mobile students from UNESCO regions, as a proportion of the global population aged 15-24, to reach an estimate of the proportion of the global population who actually engage in international education. This is a very approximate measure, and UN data contains a number of missing data points. It also excludes mature postgraduate students who constitute a significant proportion of globally mobile students, and may be aged over 24.
and on learning and teaching with the establishment of the Higher Education Academy (HEA) and of Centres for Excellence in Teaching and Learning (Filippakou, et al., 2010). An internationalisation agenda has encouraged many institutions to adopt different teaching and learning practices in the interests of internationalising the curriculum (Humfrey, 2011), as well as recruiting international students.

These changes have also been associated with increasing presence of quasi-state organisations, such as the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) (Filippakou, et al., 2010). The importance of quasi-state organisations has been seen by some to represent structural changes leading towards a more government dominated higher education landscape (Kogan and Hanney, 2000; Shattock, 2008; Trow, 2006). They cite “political weakness of universities” (Trow, 2006, p.78), combined with the absence of academics from policy-making (Sabri, 2010), has enabled more central control, which has pushed the sector towards liberalization. Others (Filippakou, et al., 2010) argue that these agencies may at times push back against central government policies and complicate sector-state relationships.

Marketisation has occurred in a context of systematic reductions in state funding since 2009. The Russell Group (2010) suggests that insufficient capital investment has been made over the previous decade in the UK relative to other developed countries, yet Tilak (2008) suggests this is a global pattern. In the UK, and England in particular, a key indicator of marketisation is the introduction £1,000 fees to home students in 1999 (Shattock, 2013), which increased to £3,000 in 2003 (Filippakou, et al., 2011) and was couched as a ‘Graduate Contribution Scheme’ (Shattock, 2013). This was later raised to £9,000 from 2012 (ibid.). However, the increases in fees have led to significant protest and opposition (Tannock, 2013). The higher education sector in England now is characterised by multiple sectors which occupy different market positions and relations to the state (Filippakou, et al., 2011) and by an increasing focus on consumerism apparent in the choice mechanisms such as Key Information Sets (Naidoo, et al., 2011), and the evaluation of consumer satisfaction through the National Student Survey (Sabri, 2011).
Simultaneously, a target for 50% participation in higher education was set, to be achieved by 2010 (Leathwood and O’Connell, 2003; Parry, 2006; Shattock, 2008), and this went in tandem with widening participation policies seeking to rectify underrepresentation of particular groups on the basis of gender, ethnicity, schooling, disability and family background (Filiappakou, et al., 2010). It also served to support industry in a knowledge economy model by developing the workforce (Molesworth, et al., 2009), apparent in the changes in vocational higher education (Parry, 2006). These policy drivers also help to explain the introduction of domestic fees.

**International students in the UK: previous research**

This, then is the context in which the study begins: increasing global mobility, an appetite for international education among the middle class of developing nations, an increasing marketisation of the sector, a need for additional funding to respond to domestic policy imperatives, increasing international activities in the sector leading to institutional competition, and an inherited absence of formal policy on the area.

There is considerable research, mainly small-scale and institutionally bound, on aspects of international students’ experience from educational and market-oriented perspectives in the UK (e.g. Russell, 2005; Barnes, 2007; Pereda, et al., 2007; Goode, 2007; Montgomery and McDowell, 2009; Hart and Coates, 2010). There is also literature on international students from a mobility perspective, understanding the causes and implications of global border-crossing for educational purposes (e.g. Tremblay, 2005; Findlay et al., 2012; She and Wotherspoon, 2013). There are, however, few studies which address the structural forces which impact on international students in the UK, of which national policy is one.

Policy on international students potentially includes education, migration and mobility issues, social dimensions, economic implications, and governmental concerns. Therefore, much of the existing literature focuses on one dimension of policy; those that take a more holistic approach tend to be primarily descriptive (e.g. Humfrey, 2011). In consequence, this emerging field of research is disjointed. Walker (2014) and Humfrey (2011) take historical approaches, presenting policy changes regarding international students. Tannock (2013), on the other hand, takes a strongly critical stance on current policies from a social inequality perspective. Jenkins (2014) is also critical, highlighting the disciplinary effect on HEIs of the
increased controls of migration through the UKBA. Geddie (2014) approaches international student policies from a policy-making perspective, exploring the global diffusion of policies in this area between the UK and Canada. Karram (2013) includes the UK in her study of policy and support services discourses on international students. Finally, Dodds (2009) has compared the work of government agencies in the recruitment of international students, arguing that they promote liberalization of higher education. While these studies are certainly mutually complementary, there is as yet no study which analytically unites these different policy areas and approaches.

This study draws together previous work with empirical research, to develop a systematic, holistic analysis of UK policy on international students from 1999-2013. The aim is to explore the discursive representations of international students, by mapping policy developments and changes. The aim is to explore whether policy discourses construct images of international students which may constrain their potential actions.

Why discursive representations?

Policy can be understood as discourse, as a site for the interaction of language and power to shape, codify and limit potential imaginaries and, crucially, social representations (Foucault, 1972; Fairclough, 1989; Sidhu, 2006). Because policy is written by the powerful, the concepts and language used therein are likely to become part of entrenched, dominant discourses, and therefore to have the capacity to influence how people are thought about. When this concerns populations and groups of people who lack social power, the effects of discursive representations may be profound. International students are one such population, as they have no democratic voice in the countries in which they study and are marginalised in this sense, as well as in others (Devos, 2003; Marginson, et al., 2010; Robertson, 2011).

Discursive representations of international students have been found to present them as “a recruitable, marketable population”, rather than “stakeholders”, actors or partners in a system (Karram, 2013, p.8). They have frequently been represented as passive recipients of services, care and support provided by institutions, typically universities (Askehave, 2007; Leyland, 2011; Robertson, 2011; Karram, 2013).
Students are seen as “a source of contempt (for their inadequate English language skills), resentment (that we have to accept them at all)” (Devos, 2003, p.164). They have been constructed as “cash cows”, powerful inasmuch as they are consumers (Leyland, 2011; Robertson, 2011), active when they are ‘recommending’, ‘choosing’ or ‘accepting’ (Askehave, 2007). International students have been dehumanized in policy discourses (Gildersleeve and Hernandez, 2012), and securitised as a risk (Ewers and Lewis, 2008). They have been simultaneously framed as desirable skilled migrants, and as workers with deficits (Robertson, 2011). Students have also been portrayed as active citizens making valuable contributions to the countries in which they study (Robertson, 2011; Burke, 2013). They have been represented both as elite, associated with the trappings of symbolic cultural capital (Sidhu, 2002), and in academic deficit (Bullen and Kenway, 2003; Koehne, 2006).

These studies on discursive representations of international students have variously taken as their subject discourses of media (Devos, 2003; Robertson, 2011; Burke, 2013), institutional marketing or publicity (Askehave, 2007; Leyland, 2011), national education brokers’ marketing (Sidhu, 2002; Dodds, 2009), policy (Ewers and Lewis, 2008; Robertson, 2011; Gildersleeve and Hernandez, 2012; Karram, 2013), support services (Karram, 2013) and academic research as their focus (Bullen and Kenway, 2003; Koehne, 2006). Of these studies, only Askehave (2007), Leyland (2011), Sidhu (2002) and Karram (2013) included the UK, two derive from the USA (Ewers and Lewis, 2008; Gildersleeve and Hernandez, 2012), and the remainder from Australia. There is little sense of the representations of international students in UK national policy discourses, because, with the exception of Karram (2013) and Geddie (2014), studies in the UK noticeably focus on promotional genres. This is important because Koehne’s (2006) study found that academic discourses did impact international students, who variously internalized and resisted them. If academic discourses do so, policy discourses are likely to have still greater impacts given the structural power they can exert.

Studies on policy in other countries, and in media and marketing discourses in the UK, have demonstrated the potential discursive power of social representation. However, no study has done so with regards to policy concerning international students in the UK, which thus forms the second aim of this study: to establish how students are represented in policy discourses.
The study and its scope

Two research questions guided this study:

1. What is UK national policy on international students? How has it changed between 1999 and 2013?
2. How do policy discourses represent international students?

A text-based approach was adopted to access public policy discourses (Sidhu, 2002; Askehave, 2007; Robertson, 2011). Publicly available policy documents relating to international students were identified. These included a range of different types of documents, which were coded thematically and inductively, using NVivo software. Carol Bacchi’s (2009) ‘what is the problem represented to be’ (WPR) analytical framework was then applied to the results of the qualitative analysis to establish how policy problematised and represented international students.

Rather than conducting a traditional, free-standing literature review, previous relevant research has been reviewed and discussed in each chapter. Where available, research specifically relating to international students has been identified and included, and it is noticeable that many of the representations identified through this analysis have been replicated and disseminated through this literature. At other times, they have challenged policy problematisations and offered alternatives. This approach is in keeping with that of Carol Bacchi, and indeed of Foucault’s writing, in drawing on previous research both to instantiate the discourses under examination and to support critical interpretations. Writing in this structure reflects the analytical process: I took an inductive approach to the data, looked for literature which discussed it, and then used this literature to support the WPR analysis.

For the purposes of this research, I use the definitions of international students as they are used by policy actors in the field. Firstly, for higher education reporting purposes, international students are defined on their fee-paying status, which is determined by their place of permanent residence in a country outside the European Union, prior to starting the course (HESA, 2015). Secondly, international students are defined by the Home Office as non-citizens from outside the European Economic Area, requiring a visa to study in the country (Rivza and Teichler, 2007). On this
basis, European Union students are excluded in this study, as European mobility policies are a distinct policy field (Papatsiba, 2005). These two definitions are not precisely synonymous, as British citizens, for example, who have been resident abroad would be categorised as “international” under the former definition, but not the latter. The definition also does not identify students who may have studied at secondary school in the UK and continued into tertiary education (Rivza and Teichler, 2007). This thesis works within this discrepancy, instead of resolving it, because such contradictions are key windows into the discourses. The term ‘international students’ should, therefore, be taken throughout to read ‘people identified as international students in policy discourses’, not as a category with any ‘real’ intrinsic defined nature.

In geographical terms, this study refers to the UK, with an emphasis on England. While higher education policy is a devolved matter (Bruce, 2012), most of the policy documents refer to the UK as a whole. In part, this is because the process of devolution has been in progress between 1999 and 2013. Thus, this research does not attempt to discuss distinctions between English, Welsh and Scottish policies on international students, adopting the terminology present in the documents, which does not always reflect devolved responsibilities. This is consistent with a discursive approach, revealing the piecemeal and contradictory nature of the policy-making process in the UK (Bird, 1994).

The thesis is divided into two parts and structured as follows.

In Part 1, I introduce the context, approach and central concepts which have informed the design and conduct of the study.

Chapter 1 maps the policy on international students in the UK from 1999 to 2013. It covers three main eras of policy, from Tony Blair’s Prime Minister’s Initiative to the Coalition Government’s International Education Strategy, as well as key elements of migration policy.

Chapter 2 explains international education as a globalised policy field and presents the rationales for engagement in international education that have been identified in previous literature. In essence, these rationales offer solutions to problems represented in policy.
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual approach which informs the study. It explains the key concepts of discourse, problematisation, and subjectification which have been used in the design of the study and in the analysis. It situates policy within a discursive approach and explains how representations of problems are central to policy.

Chapter 4 presents the methods and procedures used in identifying, selecting, coding and analysing the policy documents. It explains how the conceptual approach of policy as Discourse was operationalised into a textual analysis.

In Part 2, the results and discussion are presented.

Chapter 5 presents the global diplomacy rationale, showing how international alumni and their experiences are represented in ways that are interpreted to foster the UK’s diplomatic interests overseas.

Chapter 6 explores the educational rationale: that international students constitute an asset for the internationalisation, increased quality and reputational gains. International students are represented as consumers, and educational assets sometimes in deficit.

Chapter 7 explores the economic rationale, demonstrating how marketisation of international higher education represents international students as economic resources, as vectors of income, who also contribute to the labour market.

Chapter 8 explores how discourses around migration have shifted towards representing international students negatively, constructing them as a source of concern and risk.

Finally, the conclusion establishes common threads between these rationales and representations and suggests directions for future research.
Part I: Context and concepts
Chapter 1 - Mapping international student policy

Policy on international students in the UK underwent significant changes and development from 1999 to 2013. Throughout this period, rationales for and against increasing recruitment of international students to the UK underpin policies. This chapter presents the key policy touchstones, connects them with migration policy and in doing so illustrates the policy formation process in UK international higher education.

Policies on international students in the UK can be broadly grouped into 3 main stages. Firstly the Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI) ran from 1999-2004. It was followed by the PMI2, the second phase of the Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI2), which ran from 2006-2011. Finally, the Coalition’s International Education Strategy (IES), published in 2013 marked the beginning of a new period. These eras and key changes are presented in Figure 5 below, which also details key changes to migration policy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>International student policy events</th>
<th>Migration policy events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI) to recruit more international students</td>
<td>PMI launched; market research for Education UK brand begun</td>
<td>Immigration and Asylum Act passed; Visa applications for students made easier; right to work part-time on student visas established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Quality strategy launched</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>New Labour: PM Tony Blair</td>
<td></td>
<td>Recruitment targets reached; SHINE international student award launched</td>
<td>Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act; right to work post-graduation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right to recruit international students restricted to accredited institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crackdown on ‘suspect colleges.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Initiative for International Education (PMI2)</td>
<td>PMI2 launched: focus on student experience, employability, partnerships</td>
<td>Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act; Points Based System introduced; students’ right to appeal restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education UK brand ‘refreshed’</td>
<td>Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Funding for pilot projects to improve student experience; Teaching International Students project</td>
<td>Tier 4 system introduced; Review of Tier 4; Bogus college scandal’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>New Labour: PM Gordon Brown</td>
<td>Coalition Government: PM David Cameron</td>
<td>PMI2 officially ends Launch of Britain is GREAT campaign</td>
<td>Reforms to Tier 4: Highly-trusted status introduced; right to part-time work restricted; English language level raised and restricted to secure tests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy to reduce net migration levels introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Coalition International Education Strategy</td>
<td>International Education Strategy (IES) published; first industrial strategy for economic growth</td>
<td></td>
<td>Post-study work route (Tier 1) closed; right to recruit restricted to HTS; minimum salaries for international graduates required; border interviews expanded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Landlords and employers required to check immigration status of tenants and employees respectively</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI)

The PMI, as mentioned in the introduction, aimed to attract 50,000 additional higher education international students to the UK within 6 years (British Council (BC), 1999), and to make Britain “the first choice for quality” (BC, 2003, p. 14). This was to be achieved by a “package of measures” (Blair, 1999) including: revisions to the immigration rules for students (Roche, 2000); the development of the Education UK brand as part of a professionalised approach to marketing higher education; (Roche, 2000); and the expansion of the Chevening scholarship scheme (Blair, 1999). Immigration changes simplified visa procedures, by granting a visa for the duration of a programme of study, instituted a right to work alongside full-time study (Roche, 2000) and facilitated switching between visa categories to work after graduation (Home Office, 2002). These changes occurred in the context of a number of significant legislative initiatives to gain control of the asylum and migration system (Seldon, 2007).

Targets were also set for further education recruitment, and English language schools and independent schools (BC, 2003). Led by the British Council, the PMI pulled together four government departments (“Education and Employment, Trade and Industry, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence” (BC, 2000b, p.20), the Scottish and Welsh devolved assemblies, and the British Council (BC, 1999) to develop an integrated policy approach (BC, 2003) (see Figure 6). This was organised under the leadership of the Department for Education and Employment (later Department for Education and Skills), with the British Council managing the Education UK brand, and the Foreign Office retaining control of the Chevening Scholarship scheme (BC, 2003).
The Education UK brand development was a major touchstone of the initiative. Based on a programme of market research, the perceptions of potential students, of staff and agents and HE institutions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the UK HE sector were synthesised into what was claimed to be a coherent vision and brand. The brand “footprint” identified was of British Education as meaning “a dynamic tradition; the new world class; being the best I (international students) can be” and is “responsive; welcoming; alive with possibilities” (BC, 1999, p.1).

The aim of this process was to develop an umbrella identity for Britain, which could be marketed overseas by the British Council and by individual institutions within it, to differentiate the UK from other competitor countries such as Australia and the USA and particularly to shed some of the negative perceptions of the UK. It comprised advertising campaigns, scholarship programmes, student awards like the SHINE International Student award, and competitions such as the “Real UK campaign…designed to inspire and inform prospective students and challenge negative or stereotyped perceptions of the UK” using celebrities and an emphasis on creative industries to reinforce the “cool Britannia” image (BC, 2003 p.16). Perceptions of the UK as a nation, and consequently its HE, as part of the “old world order”, alongside a “lack of professionalism” in HE marketing and recruitment are cited as contributing to the UK’s vulnerability in the face of increasing competition (BC, 1999).
To this end, the ‘Education UK brand’ was developed under the PMI (BC, 1999; BC, 2000a). It was initially created to increase direct recruitment and by emphasising UK HE’s “affordability, dynamic tradition, new world class, diversity (and) welcome for international students” (BC, 1999, para.65), with a “clear definition of excellence that UK education provides” (Blair, 1999). This is argued to be necessary due to a “blurring of the attractiveness factors of the UK and major competitors as national and institution brands become increasingly global” (BC, 2003, p.7). This brand includes visual identities, logos, advice for institutions on marketing, a database of education agents, and promotional materials (BC, 2003; BC, 2010). “The brand is designed to convey both the educational benefits of studying in the UK and the range of social, cultural and career advantages that a UK education offers. Crucially, it also positions the UK as a powerful partner and source of expertise in education more generally” (BC, 2010, p.13, emphasis mine). This underscores the shift in focus away from direct recruitment and onto strategic collaboration, positioning the UK as the world’s paid HE consultant, prioritizing “system-to-system” engagement, direct cooperation between governments aimed at developing domestic higher education systems, for example through partnerships.

In order to make Britain the “first choice for quality” (Blair, 1999), the British Council Education Counselling Service developed a quality strategy for institutions to develop, to improve their overseas reputation (BC, 2000a, p.13).

3. Quality strategy
The institution recognises the strategic importance of matching the prospective student’s abilities and aspirations to the institution’s offering in the following key areas:

- Academic experience
- Accommodation and welfare experience
- Lifestyle experience
- Career opportunities

Therefore the institution undertakes to:

- Develop an explicit statement of what the prospective international student can reasonably expect to receive or aspire to in the above key areas
- Demonstrate its long-term commitment to improving the quality of the international student’s total experience through active quality control and the implementation of appropriate development strategies in these key areas
- Use its best efforts to develop career enhancing opportunities for the student
- Reflect the appropriateness of different learning and assessment styles to different student groups
This strategy evolved from the programme of market research which led to the Education UK brand development and targeted marketing professionalism in institutions (BC, 2000a). However, the emphasis on developing a reputation for quality meant that institutions were expected to demonstrate a commitment to “improving the quality of the international student’s total experience” (BC, 2000a, p.13). In part, this meant establishing clear expectations, but it also appears to suggest changes to teaching, learning and support services.

The 91% increase in international student numbers by 2002, within 3 years of the launch, was presented as a successful solution to the problem of competition (BC, 2003). By 2005, the PMI had succeeded in its stated objectives: the recruitment targets were exceeded by 43,000 students in both higher and further education (Blair, 2006). However, the rapidly changing context of international higher education meant that the work done on the Education UK brand, for example, was rapidly imitated by competitor countries (UKCISA, 2011a), in particular, Holland, New Zealand and Malaysia (Geddie, 2014). In fact, despite the rise in absolute numbers, the UK’s market share actually declined from 1997-2003 by 3% (Böhm, et al., 2004). The increase in numbers may instead be attributed to the overall increase in global student mobility (see Introduction). Trends like transnational education, e-learning and private education providers, amongst others, are described as contributing to a “rapidly evolving world market” (BIS, 2010, p.2), in which the goals set by the PMI were no longer adequate. Therefore, its aims were refined and expanded in the PMI2 – the Prime Minister’s Initiative for International Education.

The Prime Minister’s Initiative for International Education (PMI2)
The change of title in PMI2 reflected the development from recruitment targets into a more sophisticated, longer-term endeavour to embed the increases in international recruitment in a broader network of partnerships and institutional activities (DIUS, 2009), demonstrating a more nuanced understanding of the education marketplace. The management of PMI2 also changed and was led by a board jointly chaired by the British Council and the Joint International Unit, which represented the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’s (BIS) international education activities (BC, 2010), as detailed in Figure 7 below. In addition, the Home Office was consulted on those areas which affected migration policy. It is apparent that the
Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office are not included in the management of PMI2, unlike the PMI. Yet the introduction of the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) in 2007 was overseen by the Foreign Office, suggesting they remain involved in key areas. The ATAS requires students in “certain sensitive subjects” (such as biotechnology, engineering, and computer science) to obtain permission to study, in the interests of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Kemp, 2008, p.69). Given that the Points-Based System for migration management was also introduced during this period (UKBA, 2008), this suggests that migration policy was seen to be more separate under the PMI2 than under the PMI.

Figure 7: Management of PMI2 (DIUS, 2009; BC, 2010)
While recruitment targets of 100,000 international students were still set in PMI2, it also aimed to double the number of countries sending significant numbers of students to the UK, improve student satisfaction ratings, change perceptions, improve employability and grow partnerships (DIUS, 2009; UKCISA, 2011a). Some scholarships were also funded (DIUS, 2009), although these constituted only approximately 5-8% of annual expenditures from the total PMI2 (DTZ, 2011). Each of these key areas is explored in more detail below, and key dimensions of migration policy follow.

*Marketing and communication strategies* remained largely the responsibility of the British Council and the Education UK brand (DTZ, 2011). The Education UK brand was sustained through the continued expansion of the Education UK website, the issue of trademark licences to UK universities, the development of a network of agents, and a range of marketing campaigns in priority countries (DTZ, 2011). The brand is described as “built around a ‘tradition of innovation’” (BIS, 2010, p. 11), emphasising the UK’s modernity in contrast to its perceived traditional, elitist image. It was intended to articulate a shared vision of the distinctiveness of UK HE (BIS, 2009). It also situated the UK as an expert partner for other countries (*ibid.*). Campaigns sought to approach and ‘inspire’ students directly through social media and indirectly through training agents (BIS, 2010).

*Diversification of markets* aimed to double the number of countries sending over 10,000 students by 2011 (DTZ, 2011). Reliance on a few key countries, namely China, India and Nigeria for the majority of students appeared to render the sector vulnerable to unpredictable shifts. Yet in executing the marketing and promotion strand above, these key countries actually took priority (BIS, 2010), perhaps because they were predicted to be the biggest source of growth (Böhm, *et al*., 2004). This target was not achieved (DTZ, 2011).

*Improving the student experience* was one of its main aims of the PMI2 (BIS, 2009; DIUS, 2009), as student feedback collected during the PMI suggested that this was a weakness for the UK. It was measured in national level surveys under the PMI2 (UKCOSA, 2004; Ipsos Mori, 2006; Archer, *et al*., 2011). The student experience encompasses the “academic experience” (interactions with tutors, in classrooms, independent learning and flexibility of courses), “the living experience” (social life
and accommodation), and support services (counselling and careers centres) (Archer, et al., 2011). Thus, “soft issues such as host culture, social activities, informal welcome atmosphere, local orientation and friendship, together with matters relating to money” (Bone, 2008, p.3) take on greater importance relative to education. PMI2 funded several projects to “explore ways of making life easier and more rewarding for international students in the UK” (BC, 2010, p.20) managed by UKCISA (2010a). These were claimed to have contributed to improving ratings obtained under the International Student Barometer (ISB - a proprietary tool run by i-graduate) (Archer, 2010a), and positive evaluations were incorporated into marketing messages. The academic dimensions of student experience came under particular focus, as did finance and accommodation (UKCOSA, 2004; Hyland, et al., 2008), and social and cultural integration (Archer, et al., 2010b). Student experience projects, such as intercultural mentoring, skills podcasts (UKCISA, 2010) and the ‘Internationalising Student Unions’ project (DTZ, 2011), were funded.

While satisfaction was found to be high, expectations often clashed with reality (Archer, et al., 2010) particularly with regards to application, arrival and study. Several intervention projects, therefore, sought to resolve this dissatisfaction with the provision of information to manage such expectations (Archer, 2010b; UKCISA, 2011a; QAA, 2012). For example, the International Student Calculator (UKCISA, 2011a) addressed financial concerns by offering a more accurate prediction of expenses (UKCOSA, 2004; Ipsos Mori, 2006; UKCISA, 2011a). Other PMI2 projects such as the Teaching International Students project conducted with the Higher Education Academy (HEA) sought to enhance the cultural awareness of academic staff and thereby improve classroom experiences of international students (Ryan, 2010; DTZ, 2011). Other projects aimed to encourage greater integration and value diversity among students, at least in part to offer cross-cultural experiences as part of a high quality, inclusive education for both international and home students (Ipsos Mori, 2006; Hyland, et al., 2008; Archer, et al., 2010b; QAA, 2012). Shortly after the official end of the PMI2, the QAA (2012) published guidance for HEIs on supporting international students, which consolidates much of the information acquired through the student experience strand of the PMI2 for staff and institutions.
Developing partnerships and distance learning meant establishing collaborative arrangements including “teaching programmes, student exchanges and strategic links at institutional level” (UKCISA, 2010 p.4) and developing distance learning and transnational higher education opportunities through technology (BIS, 2009). These developments did not lead to the physical presence of international students in the UK, however, so will only be touched upon here, and in subsequent sections.

Employability became a significant element of the PMI2, framed initially as part of the student experience, but later as a distinct agenda. A UK higher education is presented as “an entry ticket to the best paid employment and a preparation for a globalised world of work” (BIS, 2009, p.26). In essence, it is considered that international students choose to study in the UK to gain an advantage in the labour market through a British qualification, as a “return on investment” (PMI2 Strategy Group, 2006). The PMI2 sponsored research and projects, managed by the Association of Graduate Careers Advisory Services (AGCAS), intended to develop international employability for graduates (BIS, 2010; AGCAS, 2011; UKCISA, 2010). It ran a series of events to train careers staff, engage employers and support students directly, for example by publishing country specific employability guides and running a virtual career fair (AGCAS, 2011).

Figure 8: Non-departmental agencies involved in implementation of PMI2
In sum, PMI2, with its key themes of employability, student experience, partnerships, and marketing, still sought to increase recruitment of international students. But it did so with a longer-term, more nuanced understanding of the factors which influence student decisions than did the PMI. The increasing project activity and greater involvement of the sector in the governance suggests a more networked, diffuse approach to policy development and implementation in this period. In parallel, significant changes occurred within migration policy which impacted international students.

Migration policy changes under PMI2

Alongside the PMI2, significant changes to migration policy were made. In 2006, the Points-Based System (PBS) was introduced, which sought to make the visa decision-making process more consistent and transparent (Home Office, 2006). It aimed to “to increase the skills and knowledge base of the UK” (Home Office, 2006, p.14) by quantifying qualifications, experience, and income, and correlating this with labour market needs. The independent Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) was established in 2007 to offer advice based on expert knowledge of the economy and labour markets, in particular in compiling lists of occupations in which the UK has a labour market shortage (Public Bodies Reform Team, 2014).

The PBS ‘tier’ relevant to international students, Tier 4, was introduced in 2009, and included the following changes:

- education providers, known as sponsors, taking responsibility for the student while they are in the UK (Home Office, 2006);
- issuing licenses to educational sponsors (HEIs primarily but also language colleges) (UKBA, 2008);
- restricting which students would be considered eligible, to “guard against the risk of bogus students” (ibid., p.6);
- UKBA relying on documents for checking of applications; and
- UKBA undertakes “active checking” while students are in the UK.

Tier 4 is the Study route under the Points-Based System. Other ‘tiers’ are designed to accommodate different ranges of skills and employment situations. Tier 1, for example, is intended for highly skilled workers and Tier 2 for skilled workers with a job offer (Home Office, 2006). Under this system points are allocated for experience, qualifications, English language, and in the case of students, finance.
Students earn points by having an offer from an eligible HEI and sufficient financial funds to live and pay fees during their studies (Home Office, 2006). An increased burden of record keeping and administration was placed on the sponsors, and adult students were from this point on expected to have qualifications before arriving. In practice, however, it appears that many students still experienced issues with this system (UKCISA, 2009), including perceptions of excessive cost (exceeding £1,000 in some cases), delays, difficulty proving funds, and confusion about the application form and process.

Alongside the introduction of the Tier 4 system, a scandal broke around “bogus colleges”, when a number of institutions (mostly private language colleges) were found to be “operating courses which (were) really a means to low-skilled employment” (UKBA, 2008, p.4). In 2008, an unknown number of students were found to be studying at unregistered or inadequately resourced colleges due to the lapses in licensing procedures (Home Affairs Committee, 2009). Such colleges were operating with very limited teaching facilities, falsifying attendance data and diplomas (ibid.). Students were found to be working considerably more than 20 hours a week, often in black market employment (Home Affairs Committee, 2009). It was argued that the new Tier 4 regulations would rectify this situation (UKBA, 2009). Among other modifications, the number of institutions permitted to offer places to international students (henceforth, Highly Trusted Sponsors or HTS) was restricted (Johnson, 2010). Procedures for inspection and monitoring were discovered to be flawed and new processes, such as the “highly trusted sponsors” register, were introduced (ibid.; Gower, 2010; National Audit Office (NAO), 2012). English language requirements were raised, rights to work were restricted, and acceptable language tests were limited to “secure tests” (Johnson, 2010). Without justification, Common European Framework of References for Languages level B2 is set as the minimum requirement: “B2 in listening, reading, speaking and writing is the appropriate level for those coming to study at level 6 (undergraduate) and above” (Home Office, 2011, p.11). Despite these reforms, the Tier 4 system was widely criticised by the media as a “weak point in Britain’s defences” (Gower, 2010). Although it is evident that “suspect colleges” were being investigated in 2005 (Blair, 2005), blame was laid at the door of the PBS.
In summary, then, migration policy impacts students by regulating their access to visas and aspects of their experience while in the UK, such as part-time work, and by making the UK a more or less attractive destination.

Figure 9: Migration policy governance and implementation

Migration policy is primarily executed by the Home Office, on advice from the MAC and policy guidance from the Cabinet, and administered through the UKBA at the level of visa issuing and border controls (see Figure 9).

Coalition migration policy

Significant changes are apparent in migration policy from the New Labour governments of Blair and Brown to the Coalition government of 2010. The Blair policies, while still oriented towards reducing illegal migration, emphasised making student migration easy and attractive, by targeting part-time work, application procedures, access by dependants, and post-study work opportunities. This included the introduction of the PBS. In contrast, the Brown government began a process of tightening up requirements around English language, eligible HEIs, and part-time work (Johnson, 2010). The Coalition Government continued this process, under the broader aim of making substantial reductions to net migration.

As part of the 2010 election campaign, Conservatives pledged to reduce net migration “to tens of thousands rather than hundreds of thousands” (Home Office, 2010), as it was seen to be “out of control” and causing negative social impacts and a
lack of public confidence in the system (May, 2010a). Though contested by Liberal Democrats members, it became a defining tenet of the Coalition administration (Gowers and Hawkins, 2013). Students were a major target of this reduction, as they are the biggest group of immigrants (UKBA, 2010). While consistently acknowledging the contributions of “genuine students” (May, 2010a; Green, 2010), a succession of changes were made to student visa routes (see Figure 5 for details) in consequence, aimed at reducing “abuse of the system”. These changes were expected to “cut the number of student visas issued by around 80,000 a year” (Cameron, 2011a).

This policy shift had consequences for students and the sector. Students were particularly dissatisfied at the closure of the Post-Study Work route, and confused by the frequent changes in rules and guidance (UKCISA, 2011b). This has led to a reduced sense of the welcome afforded to international students in the UK, potentially making the UK vulnerable to competition from more welcoming destinations (UKCISA, 2013a). Universities found the burden of compliance under Tier 4 significant (Higher Education Better Regulation Group, 2013), with major impacts on student advisers (Warren and Mavroudi, 2011). Yet Prime Minister David Cameron (2011) has argued that this package of reforms would “do nothing to harm Britain’s status as a magnet for the world’s best students” and “reject(s) the idea that our policy will damage our universities”. Whilst the reforms were primarily aimed at the FE and English language sectors, full-time student numbers from outside the EU fell by 1 percent in 2012-2013 for the first time since the 1980s (Marginson, 2014).

It is in this context that the International Education Strategy was introduced.
**Coalition International Education Strategy**

The International Education Strategy (IES), published in 2013, was the first of a series of industrial strategies (BIS, 2013a), and was released with an ‘accompanying analytical narrative’ (BIS, 2013b). This policy aims to increase the income resulting from ‘education exports’, and creates an equivalence between international education and education exports. It is a plan for the UK to capitalise on the economic opportunities available. The IES argues that the UK’s history, “global names”, and “education brand” place the country in a strong position. Education exports include: international students; transnational education (TNE); English language teaching; education technology; and partnerships with other countries and emerging powers in particular; publishing and educational supplies; research and development; and further and higher education as well as schools and colleges (BIS, 2013a). The policies to achieve growth across these areas are as follows.

**Policies for growth**

Firstly, the IES aims to provide a “warm welcome” for international students, to support the predicted increase in numbers. This is to be achieved by offering “a competitive visa system” (BIS, 2013a, p.36), with no cap on student numbers which is nevertheless working towards “eliminating the immigration abuse and poor standards which affected international students in the past” (ibid., p.37). Students are also to be protected unscrupulous agents, political or war crises at home, and visa problems. Syrian students affected by the recent crises are mentioned as an example. Large scholarship programmes organised with emerging powers such as Brazil, Indonesia and China are to be welcomed. Finally, relationships with alumni and UK graduates are to be sustained to maintain engagement.

Secondly, a new approach to “building the UK brand” is outlined (BIS, 2013, p.58). The Education UK brand is brought under the centrally co-ordinated Britain is GREAT campaign. This is described as “providing a single, recognisable and distinct identity for the whole of the UK …(to) promote excellence beyond attracting international students via the Education UK recruitment service to cover all education exports” (BIS, 2013a, p.57, emphasis mine). The GREAT campaign
attempts to establish a national brand identity for the UK, to promote tourism and industry, as well as education.

The GREAT campaign is supported by UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) and is led by the national tourism agency, Visit Britain. It was also linked with the London Olympics in 2012, and with tourism and industrial promotion campaigns, linked through a visual campaign associated with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS, 2011). The Education UK Unit, a joint BIS/UKTI initiative, is charged with identifying opportunities for education exports in key markets, and supporting UK providers to take advantage of them (BIS, 2013a).

The remaining policies address the support for TNE and its quality assurance, education technology, commercial relationships, improving the mutual recognition of qualifications, promoting outward student mobility, and education for development (BIS, 2013a). These policies are presented as responding to a list of apparent challenges, namely a lack of coordination between agencies, institutional structures which inhibit growth, visas, new providers, increasing national competition, and “changing customer relationships” (BIS, 2013a, p.34). These are further detailed below.

The lack of coordination between agencies and institutions is presented as a barrier to growth (BIS, 2013b), and this strategy establishes a plan for “central co-ordinated activity” through the International Education Advisory Council, in which institutions will “actively consent” (BIS, 2013b, p.71). Figure 10 details involvement in this council. It appears superficially similar in intent to the organisational structure of the PMI2 but is led by a government body, rather than a quasi-independent agency like the British Council, representing a centralisation of control. UKTI also takes a more significant role, positioned as organising “brokerage and support” for partnerships and “high-value opportunities” in international higher education (BIS, 2013a, p.38).
A lack of capacity for extensive growth due to governance structures is the next major barrier. The IES proposes to stimulate traditional universities into competitive responses by facilitating the entry of private providers into the market, described as “disruptive new business models” (BIS, 2013a, p.31). Charitable status and the institutional desire to avoid diluting their brand through excessive expansion are cited as reasons why institutions may resist expansion (BIS, 2013b, p.71). Planning constraints are also mentioned with regards to physical infrastructure availability, particularly in London. However, institutions continue to predict a growth in international student numbers of 6.8% on average (HEFCE, 2013). The accompanying analytical narrative also mentions the possibility of establishing new institutions (BIS, 2013b). While no comprehensive solution is offered to remove this obstacle to sector growth, the implication is that higher education institutions will be moved towards an increasingly marketised model, in which they will be expected to expand to sustain national economic growth.

Misperceptions of the visa system constitute another barrier to growth. The strategy suggests that the UK visa system reforms in 2011, as mentioned above, have led to
the UK being wrongly perceived as “not welcome(ing) students as warmly as we used to” (BIS, 2013a, p.28), and that changing these negative views is essential. The message for international students is that there is “no cap on the number of students who can come to study in the UK and there is no intention to introduce one” (BIS, 2013a, p.35). There is no allusion here to the drive from the Coalition Government to reduce net migration or to how that might impact perceptions (see above).

*Competition* is still presented as a significant challenge, as with both the PMI and PMI2. In the IES, however, the emphasis is on increasing income in the sector overall, whereas the PMI stressed improving market position in international higher education. The IES also emphasises the threat to traditional providers from new types of providers, such as for-profit online universities (BIS, 2013a). The policy, therefore, suggests that “established UK providers” - meaning state-sponsored universities - need to imitate the “autonomy, flexibility and entrepreneurial approach” typical of new types of providers (BIS, 2013a, p.32). It also highlights competition for overseas students, both by new and existing destination countries. However, the prediction is for an expanding market, in which the UK can increase its absolute student numbers, matching the offer from competitors rather than gaining market share (*ibid.*).

“Changing customer relationships” is listed as the sixth and final challenge (BIS, 2013a, p.34). This does not refer to individual students, unlike the PMI, but rather to strategic partnerships with emerging powers. Examples are given of new relationships between countries supplying and demanding education, and a list of eight priority countries is given. The Accompanying Analytical Narrative explains the demographic and economic reasoning behind these choices (BIS, 2013b).

The International Education Council has met only four times to date and appears to focus through working groups on barriers to growth, “attracting legitimate international students” (i.e. visa system issues), education technology and the international student experience (International Education Council, 2014). These working groups made recommendations, but as yet there is no evidence of impact.
Under the Coalition IES, new relationships between policy actors are established. In this era, it is the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) which takes the lead. Figure 11 summarises these relationships.

Figure 11: International student policy actors for England under the Coalition

It seems that the Prime Minister’s Office was less involved during the Coalition IES than during the PMI and PMI2. Similarly, although the DfES was involved particularly during the first era of the PMI, it is not directly involved with the International Education Council (see Figure 11). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office was also involved under the PMI, but not under the PMI2, and is represented by their non-departmental public body, the British Council. While the British Council took the lead on policy development and implementation under the PMI and PMI2, this responsibility appears to be reclaimed by the BIS under the Coalition. Similarly, while the UK Council for International Student Affairs (UKCISA) had significant responsibilities under the PMI2 for funding research and projects, it seems less central to policy development under the Coalition. Non-departmental bodies under the aegis of the BIS play some role in different areas of international student policy, namely the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), and the Higher Education Authority (HEA). Under the Coalition, relations with devolved authorities of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland also become less evident. Governance of international
student policy is, therefore, a complex area in the UK and one where there is little research. This chapter demonstrates the dispersed nature of policy in international higher education: until the publication of the IES in 2013 (BIS, 2013a), there was no ‘formal policy’ (Marshall, 2012), but there were state-sponsored activity and discourses in the field. In keeping with Ball’s (1993) conception of policy as discourse, this grey policy (research reports, funding activities, speeches, and so on) is argued to also constitute policy.

In sum, while international students are mentioned first, the policy prioritises transnational education (TNE) and education exports such as technology and publishing. While mentioned under PMI2, these aspects of international higher education are foregrounded in the IES. The emphasis in the IES on those education exports where students are not physically present in the country may be linked to the targets to reduce net migration. However, it is important not to exaggerate the differences between the Coalition policy and the PMI. There is significant continuity, in that all three policy eras stress the importance of recruiting and attracting more international students, by offering a warm welcome. They acknowledge the benefits of international students and overlap with migration policies. The shift towards privileging TNE and strategic partnerships is already apparent in the PMI2; the IES consolidates it. The policies are differently positioned: Tony Blair introduced the PMI as a foreign policy and diplomatic initiative, whereas the IES is squarely positioned as an industrial strategy. This economic narrative is present in the PMI, where the financial benefits of international students are mentioned from the outset, but comes to dominate in the IES. Thus policy changes are not abrupt, but gradual, and trends established under one administration are upheld, reinforced and developed in subsequent governments. The consensus that international students should be recruited to the extent that they benefit the UK, however, does not change radically.
Chapter 2 - International higher education discourses

International education is a field of globalised policy discourses, with multiple power differentials. The national policy changes presented in the previous chapter have taken place not within a vacuum, but in a global context, impacted by ideas, logics, and shared assumptions. Participation in international higher education, and particularly the capacity to attract and host international students has come to be seen as desirable for governments. Commitment to international higher education is part of a globalised discourse, which presumes benefits to host nations, students and the world as a whole. Thus, policy offers multiple rationales for participation in international higher education and in particular for the recruitment, attraction and hosting of international students. They become a “privileged policy instrument” (Vincent-Lancrin, 2004, p.221) which nations deploy in rhetoric to further their self-interest.

Policy actions proposed by governments and the rationales offered for them can be understood as means of solving implied problems (Bacchi, 2009). Governments and other policy actors seek to legitimate their actions and power through discourse, drawing on ideological consensus to generate a shared understanding of the object. The creation and solution of problems fosters such legitimacy. Thus, policy rationales expose underlying representations of problems, made apparent by advocating particular solutions and reasons. In so doing, these rationales incorporate and generate multiple representations of social subjects. When policy encourages the attraction and recruitment of international students, justifications and reasons are given in rationales.

This chapter explores key aspects of globalised international higher education discourses. First, it explores how the globalised education policy field is sustained, and the key dominant discourses therein. Second, it reviews the rationales made for engagement in international higher education, demonstrating how the global policy

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3 This discussion is premised on Marginson and Sawir’s (2006) distinction between internationalisation and globalisation, where the former is understood as relations between nations and the latter as diffuse networks of interactions on multiple levels, including but not limited to nations.
field influences these rationales. Finally, it explores how globalised discourses and policy rationales generate subject representations of international students.

**Globalised education policy field**

Higher education, as discussed in the introduction, has a long tradition of internationalism. Global student and academic mobility, international curricula, and global structures all create a policy space where nations and institutions collaborate and compete, but most importantly where they participate in shared discourses. While international education governance is underdeveloped (Marginson, *et al.*, 2010), participating states acquiesce in certain norms, structures and rules. In international student mobility, these norms are predicated on mutual acquiescence to a view of higher education as a tradeable service, which consumers cross borders to obtain. This is enforced by the GATS agreement, established by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Enders, 2004; Tilak, 2008). Countries comply with the value judgements implicit in these through funding arrangements, provision of data and so on.

The field of international higher education is disciplined by multiple intersecting structures. International higher education is entrenched in neo-colonial power flows (Sidhu, 2006; Rhee, 2009; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). The inequalities between nations and universities, for example, lead to predominant flows of students from East-South to West-North (Marginson, 2006; Sidhu, 2006), although this is starting to shift gradually (Becker and Kolster, 2012; UUK, 2014). English language dominates as a medium for study and publication (Marginson, 2008). League tables and ranking mechanisms help to structure the field by generating differentiation between nations and institutions, influenced by the practices of Western Anglo-Saxon nations (Marginson and van der Wende, 2007). Nations and institutions respond to this complex, multi-level globalised context, taking action and exerting influence (Marginson and Rhoades, 2002; Saarinen, 2008c). Rankings, publications and funding generate power for institutions and states; therefore, they compete for resources.

Increasingly, policy discourses are taking place on a global, as well as a local or national scale (Rhee, 2009; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010), with discursive interventions through globalised mass media and neo-imperialism exerted through power
structures (Sidhu, 2006; Shahjahan, 2013). Policies can travel, through borrowing of particular initiatives (Geddie, 2014) and discursive interventions from transnational non-governmental organisations (NGOs) by creating conceptual models or naming phenomena (Saarinen, 2008b). Such borrowing can be rational-technical in approach, but can also be the consequence of accepting particular normative frameworks. Capitalist markets, and their ideological foundations, have been the primary vehicle for disseminating global neo-liberal Western norms and values of governance (Tikly, 2003). International education is a site of such governance.

These global interactions reflect the importance of shared rationalities and logics of governance (Rose and Miller, 2008). The concept of governmentality identifies technologies and ways of thinking involved in governing people. In particular, Foucault (1977) highlights the role of knowledge accumulated for the purposes of controlling the ‘body politic’, through statistics about the population. These shape conduct and the relations between the state and its subjects (Sidhu, 2007). In particular, Rose and Miller (2008) argue that the contemporary trend of disassembling state activities, ‘governing at a distance’, makes governmentality more relevant than the state’s coercive role. Power is exerted through persuasion, rather than force (van Dijk, 1996), because the aim is not to defeat the populace but to make it productive and govern through the processes of production (Sidhu, 2006).

In the absence of a pervasive centralized state, essential services are delivered by third-parties or quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (QUANGOs).

In the UK, higher education is governed at a distance through agencies such as the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), the Higher Education Academy (HEA), and the British Council (Dodds, 2009). As depicted in the previous chapter, these agencies engage in globalised education fields, respectively through distribution of funding, quality assurance in TNE, encouraging aspects of internationalisation in the UK, and promotion of the UK as an international higher education destination. In this context, governing is done “through a range of technologies that install and support the civilizing project by shaping and governing the capacities, competencies and wills of subjects yet are outside the formal control of the ‘public powers’“ (Rose and Miller, 2008, loc4599). Counter-intuitively, in the case of higher education, this governing
at a distance through organisations which demand oversight and accountability is actually argued to reduce the autonomy of institutions and the sector (Kogan and Hanney, 2000; Shattock, 2008; Trow, 2006; Brown and Carasso, 2013). As Marginson et al. (2010, p.261) put it, “Responsibilisation...does not subtract from authority or control”. Instead, control is exerted discursively, through shared logics.

Taking “educational policy as a discourse of the state” (Tikly, 2003, p.166) therefore provides a window on governmentality. Through this window, national responses to global governmentalities of international higher education can be identified. Governments as policy actors interpret, translate, reproduce and at times resist these globalised policy discourses (Saarinen, 2008c; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010); they are not universal, but certain discourses could be said to be hegemonic, particularly marketisation.

Marketisation dominates globalised international higher education policy discourses. International higher education is understood as a global marketplace (Dill, 1997; Marginson, 1997; Sidhu, 2002, 2006; Olssen and Peters, 2005; Molesworth, et al., 2009; Robertson, 2011; Slaughter and Cantwell, 2011; Shu, 2012; Brown and Carasso, 2013). Marketisation is premised on the neoliberal economic model, in which individuals are seen as economically self-interested, and free markets are seen as the most efficient method to distribute resources (Olssen and Peters, 2005) and effectively depoliticizes international higher education (Sidhu, 2006). Marketisation is closely associated with commercialisation, and represents a shift away from the representation of higher education as a public good. As a private good, HE augments individuals’ human capital (ibid.; Marginson, 1997), representing a codification of knowledge and skills which can be exchanged for labour market value. In human capital theory, higher levels of skills and knowledge confer higher value, on both an individual and a national level. In the knowledge economy model, nations benefit from a more highly educated and skilled populace, as well as from an economic structure which generates high value knowledge through research and innovation, and generating income through the provision of high-level services like education. Organisations like the WTO (Sidhu, 2007), World Bank (Robertson, 2009), and the OECD (Shahjahan, 2013) reproduce these normative frameworks, shaping higher education as an economic instrument. International higher education becomes implicated in national policy responses to these intersecting discourses as both a site
for augmenting national human and knowledge capital, and an internationalised service industry.

Nations respond to these globalised policy discourses by seeking competitive national advantage. In the marketised model of international relations, countries behave like corporations, seeking to maximise profits at the expense of other countries (Cerny, 1997; Brown and Tannock, 2009). The competition state attempts, through marketisation, to make national economic activities internationally competitive (Cerny, 1997). In higher education, even in a free-market model that seeks to limit state intervention, the role of the nation in investing and resourcing institutions remains critical (Marginson and Sawir, 2006). Thus, making higher education internationally competitive constitutes a national advantage. These profits are not necessarily purely financial. Advantage also accrues from reputation and influence, which are seen to enhance the nation’s status (Anholt, 2006). A world-leading higher education sector adds to the nation’s reputation and potentially to its global influence. Higher education is therefore implicated in the project of making the nation-state globally competitive (Yang, 2002). Nation-states make multiple rationales based on gaining competitive advantage for engagement in international higher education, which assimilate and respond to dominant global discourses.

Rationales

Kehm and Teichler (2007, p.262) characterise internationalisation in higher education as “a highly normative topic with strong political undercurrents”; in other words, some stakeholders are committed to international higher education because of their principles and ideals. Similarly, “internationalism” (Altbach and Knight, 2007), a commitment to a perceived international community as intrinsically good (Amit, 2010), is often espoused. Policy, while subscribing in part to these ideologies, also offers more instrumental accounts of why nation-states should engage in international education, and in particular, attract and recruit international students. These rationales respond to and incorporate the globalised discourses highlighted above.
Rationales for internationalisation are frequently grouped into four categories:

- Political;
- Socio-cultural;
- Educational or academic;
- Economic.

The political or geostrategic rationale argues that hosting international students creates influence over other countries. This is seen to constitute a source of “soft power” (Nye, 2004; Ma, 2010; Trilokekar, 2010), cultural or political influence exerted through attraction and reputation. Students are seen to become sympathetic to the culture and values of their host country (Belcher, 1987; Knight and de Wit, 1995; Vincent-Lancrin, 2004). Regional mobility schemes within Europe are political similarly seek to promote a sense of European citizenship, which Papatsiba (2006a) terms a “civic rationale”. The political rationale also includes arguments relating to diplomacy, international aid and development, and mutual peace.

The diplomatic rationale argues that international students are good for foreign policy and relationships between countries. International students may create informal diplomatic channels (Ma, 2010), and maintain “international cultural relations” (Trilokekar, 2010). They act as “young ambassadors” for their region when they study elsewhere (Papatsiba, 2005), and generate influence on behalf of the country in which they studied (Qiang, 2003). On global levels, Knight (2004) suggests that student mobility may contribute to bilateral “strategic alliances” between countries, creating positive diplomatic relationships (Belcher, 1987).

The international aid and development rationale positions international education, and the welcoming of international students as vehicles for aid and development to developing countries (Belcher, 1987; Harman, 2004; Trilokekar, 2010; Rizvi, 2011). The aid rationale was particularly characteristic of national policies in the post-colonial period when countries like the UK and Australia engaged in schemes such as the Colombo plan to encourage development in ex-colonial countries (Harman, 2004; Sidhu, 2006). In this logic, sending students overseas for their tertiary education allows developing countries to import higher education at low cost (Altbach and Knight, 2007; Ma, 2010), and it is the responsibility of more
developed nations to help subsidize this (Trilokekar, 2010). This labour force can then contribute to nation building (Knight, 2004). Traces of this rationale are still apparent in programmes such as the Commonwealth Scholars. While superficially altruistic, the aid and development rationale implies long-term political advantage as a result of such engagement. Its importance has decreased in recent years, however, and has largely given way to the economic rationale (Harman, 2004; Knight, 2004).

_Mutual understanding and peace_ is also argued to be a consequence of internationalisation generally and to foster national security agendas (Yang, 2002; Qiang, 2003; Knight, 2004; Rivza and Teichler, 2007; Ma, 2010). When they study abroad, international students gain an understanding of the host country and culture, bridging ideological divides upon their return home. In the long term, this is argued to generate a cosmopolitan, global sensibility, contributing to sustained peace and political stability (Papatsiba, 2005). Studying abroad is considered to foster a sense of global citizenship (Amit, 2010). Vincent-Lancrin (2004) describes this as the traditional foundation for internationalisation of higher education. The normative elements of internationalism are particularly evident in this rationale, as benefits are seen to be distributed globally rather than nationally; in other words, it is not a competitive rationale. Neither is it entirely altruistic, however, as nations are still seen to benefit (de Wit, 1999).

The _socio-cultural rationale_ argues that international academic contact, and in particular the presence of international students, enriches the culture and society of the host country (Burke, 2013; Harman, 2004; Knight, 2004). In this narrative, international students are positioned in an educational role within communities and societies. It also includes a dimension of soft power, as influence can be gained through international students’ understanding of the host country’s culture and language (Qiang, 2003; Ma, 2010). As Knight (2004) suggests, this rationale has lost a degree of influence relative to the economic and political rationales.

The _educational or academic rationale_ is a significant motivator for international student recruitment. This suggests that an international classroom and student body stimulates critical thinking and a global outlook (Knight and de Wit, 1995; Ma, 2010). Internationalisation thereby enhances academic standards and quality
Thus an internationalised education is a sign of a good education. This rationale assigns an “instructional role” to international students with regards to domestic students (Burke, 2013), offering them knowledge and a global perspective. For Yang (2002), an international approach is fundamental for many disciplines for research as well as for teaching, and he suggests that these are the “genuine values of internationalisation” (p.87), as opposed to economic agendas. In the case of the Erasmus European exchange programme, Papatsiba (2006a) found that student mobility through this programme was implicitly intended to develop a “European standard” for higher education. In this model, it is international collaboration or cooperation that generates improvements in academic quality; conversely it is sometimes argued that international competition enhances quality, by incentivizing institutions to keep up with global pedagogical leaders (Luijten-Lub, et al., 2005). Internationalisation discourses argue that universities must respond to globalised fields of work and consumption by internationalising classrooms and curricula to prepare students for life in a globalised world (de Vita and Case, 2003; Healey, 2008). Humfrey (2011) observes that the quality of student experience has become synonymous with an international experience, creating an expectation that institutions will provide these global opportunities for interaction to satisfy students. Improving educational quality also enables institutions to build their reputations (Knight, 2004, 2015), which may be extended to a national level rationale with the development of national brands and agencies for higher education (Sidhu, 2002; Dodds, 2009). Quality discourses place HE systems in global competition and comparison with other countries, in the interests of making nations more attractive (Saarinen, 2005). Approaches to quality therefore converge (Marginson, 2008), while competing. International rankings structure and reinforce this rationale.

Finally, the economic rationale is probably the most prevalent and widely observed (Knight and de Wit, 1995; de Wit, 1999; Qiang, 2003; Harman, 2004; Knight, 2004; Vincent-Lancrin, 2004; Luijten-Lub, et al., 2005; Papatsiba, 2005; Rivza and Teichler, 2007; Knight, 2015; Geddie, 2014). It is seen by some to be an instrumentalist or utilitarian approach (Papatsiba, 2005; Amit, 2010), with its roots in the marketisation discourse described above. Hosting international students is seen to generate revenue directly, creating an “education export” stream of income.
both institutionally (Bolsmann and Miller, 2008) and nationally. International higher education therefore leads to economic growth (Knight and de Wit, 1995; Harman, 2004; Knight, 2004; Vincent-Lancrin, 2004; Luijten-Lub, et al., 2005; Rivza and Teichler, 2007; Becker and Kolster, 2012; Knight, 2015). In the highly commercialised environment of modern international higher education, fee payments from international students constitute a significant source of revenue for countries. Set within a broader context of other international and TNE activity, such as institutional partnerships, franchise programmes, e-learning and publishing, the ‘sector’ takes on an even greater economic significance (Altbach and Knight, 2007).

Indirect economic benefits are also seen to accrue from international students’ contributions to research and development and technological progress (Knight and de Wit, 1995). For many nations, and for regions such as Europe (Papatsiba, 2005), international students are seen to bolster the labour market, thus encouraging economic growth (Qiang, 2003; Vincent-Lancrin, 2004; Tremblay, 2005; Ziguras and Law, 2006; Amit, 2010; Geddie, 2014; Knight, 2015). They are seen as skilled workers, acquiring valuable international knowledge and abilities, potentially filling gaps in the knowledge economy (Vincent-Lancrin, 2004; Ziguras and Law, 2006). In the case of Europe, this constitutes a long-term contribution to a unified labour market (Papatsiba, 2005, 2006). In other cases, international student mobility is a way for countries to recruit into particular jobs in the short-term, and in still others, as a long-term route into citizenship (Geddie, 2014).

In addition, benefits to the student are frequently listed alongside benefits to the host country (Knight and de Wit, 1995). Such benefits include broadening horizons, developing professional knowledge and skills (Papatsiba, 2005), and “self-cultivation and transformation” (Amit, 2010, p.13). When they work, they gain experience, which is supposed to bolster their employability and human capital (ibid.). However, for this study, the main focus is the rationales for national policies on attracting and recruiting international students.

I have endeavoured here to distinguish clearly between these rationales, but the reality in policy discourses is that they are “fuzzy” (Papatsiba, 2005; Ma, 2010;
Kehm and Teichler, 2007) in their conceptualisation and usage. Amit (2010, p.9) observes a “self-conscious insistence on the synergy between transactional and altruistic notion of internationalisation”, suggesting that the boundaries between economic, socio-cultural and educational rationales are increasingly and deliberately blurred. For example, as Figure 12 illustrates, under the assumptions of the educational rationale, the presence of international students improves education. This then enriches culture and society, thereby enhancing the national reputation and the educational reputation. Reputation increases future student numbers, returning to the economic rationale. With economic power, and cultural attraction create political influence. Therefore, approaches such as the PMI outlined in Chapter 1 represent a holistic policy approach consistent with these intersecting rationales, positioning international higher education as related to economic and foreign policy, as well as education (Becker and Kolster, 2012).

Figure 12: Interactions of rationales

Rationales against international student recruitment are less frequently identified, the prevailing discourse being in favour of internationalisation. When mentioned, the potential negative impact on educational quality as a result of overexpansion constitutes an obstacle (Sidhu, 2002; Devos, 2003; Rivza and Teichler, 2007). This may be related to accepting students without sufficient qualifications (Belcher,
Students are occasionally highlighted as being implicated in wider debates about immigration (Harman, 2004; Urias and Yeakey, 2009; Becker and Kolster, 2012; Geddie, 2014; Jenkins, 2014), or as being restricted by strict immigration policies (Ma, 2010). While concerns are raised by institutions and individuals about cultural homogenisation (Marginson and Sawir, 2006) these do not appear to pose significant obstacles in national policies.

Thus international students are impacted by globalised education discourses and feature in policy rationales which depict them as advantageous to host countries on political, financial, academic, socio-cultural and reputational grounds. More rarely, they are seen as problematic. Both perspectives construct subject representations of international students and problematise their recruitment.

**Subject positions in international education**

Discourses, particularly dominant discourses made from positions of power, such as national or global policies, affect people by establishing subject positions. By representing people in particular ways, depicting aspects of their experience or value, discourses can impact how people are perceived and alter or limit the actions they can take. These rationales construct multiple representations of international students, generating subject positions for them.

In the knowledge economy and human capital models, international qualifications act as positional goods, conferring distinction on graduates (Marginson, 1997; Waters, 2006; Xiang and Shen, 2008). They are read in labour markets and social networks as signs of particular dispositions, of membership in cosmopolitan elites (Waters, 2006; Kim, 2011). In this sense international education constitutes cultural capital, as well as educational capital (Bourdieu, 1984), facilitating upward social mobility by indicating appropriate knowledge and behaviours appropriate to the aspired class (Marginson, 2006). It also entrenches existing inequalities by privileging the already capital-rich (Tannock, 2013). This global cultural capital encompasses educational capital as well as taste, attitude and lifestyle, “understood as exclusive resources that designate one’s class and status, globally operate, circulate and exchange” (Kim, 2011, p.113). These resources enable members of the
cosmopolitan elite to engage effectively in competitive, high-status fields of work (Weenink, 2008). Yet mobility can disrupt agency by distancing students from social and cultural bonds, changing conditions of power interactions (Marginson, et al., 2010).

In a neo-liberal economic discourse, failure in the labour market is attributed to the individual (Mulderrig, 2003; Sidhu, 2006), rather than systemic inequalities: “it’s your own fault if you don’t succeed” (Brennan and Naidoo, 2008, p.294). If considered as a disciplinary technology (Tikly, 2004; Asgharzadeh, 2008), international education incorporates “a discursive logic that distills human relationships, dreams, visions and aspirations into the language of value (which) is indicative of the tenacious hold of a market-based instrumentalism on the intellectual imagination” (Sidhu, 2006, loc762). In other words, by teaching international students how to be good workers, by making them employable and desirable for professional recruitment, international higher education constructs them as objects and they learn how to subjectify themselves. International education can be understood as a site for the development of a neo-liberal globalized subjectification in which students are taught to discipline and brand themselves and to embody the dispositions of a human commodity (Sidhu, 2006; Rhee, 2009).

Because national policy discourses are powerful, the representations of international students therein have the potential to substantively impact self-subjectifications. Therefore, while a critique of methodological nationalism could be levelled at a study of national policy discourses, international students’ lived experiences are at least in part significantly shaped by them, given that they spend significant time and attention focused on the country in which they study. That is why this study focuses on UK national policy discourses.

**Conclusion**

National governments interact with globalised policy discourses, rationalising their involvement in international education, and particularly their efforts to attract international students. The necessity of attracting and recruiting international students becomes a discursive object, a shared reality enmeshed in a web of beliefs. This implies that policy-makers are seeking legitimacy for their actions (Saarinen, 2008b; Bacchi, 2009), gaining power through national positional advantage by
hosting international students. Unspoken, implicit problems are ‘solved’ by such policy interventions. In these rationales, particular assumptions are made, and transformed into fact (Rose and Miller, 2008) through their reproduction and widespread acceptance as “common sense” (Fairclough, 1989).

In order to understand how international students are represented, this study draws on the concept of Discourse, understood as a system for making meaning in social contexts. Policy is therefore understood as Discourse, and as a set of discourses with particular power, particularly because it can mediate representations of people as social subjects. They are represented in multiple, overlapping images. The next chapter introduces the conceptual foundations for these key ideas.
Chapter 3 - Conceptual approach: what is the problem represented to be?

The concept of Discourse, after Foucault (1965, 1972, 1977), depicts relationships between knowledge, language, power and the creation of the social subject. By representing certain aspects of the world, and silencing others, it has the capacity to change perceptions, modify actions and circumscribe knowledges. In doing so, Discourse is a tool of social power (Fairclough, 1989, 2003), representing people as social subjects. Policy is a locus of especially potent discourses, because of how it affects people (Ball, 1993). Problematisation explores how policy discourses represent problems and people within problems (Bacchi, 2009). These are the conceptual tools which assist in analysing how students are discursively represented in policy.

This chapter begins with an outline of the concept of Discourse, then explains why policies can be seen as Discourse. Next, it presents Carol Bacchi’s “what is the problem represented to be” framework and explains each question with its conceptual foundation.

**Discourse(s) and policy**

Through both language and knowledge, discourses⁴ represent aspects of the world, and structure and imagine the world, changing it in line with particular ideologies (Fairclough, 2003). Rules and regularities develop which create a code of knowledge about a subject (M’Balia Thomas, 2013), often around the people, theories, systems and techniques for defining and acquiring it (Rose and Miller, 2008). They define and “police the boundaries” of acceptable statements and debate (Devos, 2003, p.157). Discourses are dynamic, applied, interactive social processes of production and reproduction of knowledge and reality (Fairclough, 1989). These affect what it is possible to say about an object, and consequently, discourses can be understood “as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972, p.4).

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⁴ I distinguish between Discourse in the singular as a concept, and discourses in the plural, representing the individual instances of language used in particular social contexts. Discourse-the-concept is a singular abstraction. Discourses-the-practices are multiple, actual and contextualised.
p.54). The material object, its “ground”, is therefore not the focus of analysis because the discourse in question actually creates the reality it talks about.

A discourse is a collection of formations, practices and events within which “a group of statements...constituted its object” (Foucault, 1972, pp.35-6). Discourse comprises both the language and knowledge about an object and, therefore, establishes the logic and rules for that which is possible to be said (Foucault, 1965, 1972). Discourse goes beyond describing reality: by “enabl(ing) and constrain(ing) the imagination and social practices” (Sidhu, 2006, loc944), it helps to create and constitute reality. There may be multiple or even contradictory understandings of an object, for discourses are not homogenous, but make meaning in social contexts (Bacchi, 2000; Iverson, 2007).

Therefore, the notional object is problematic. What is called, for example, ‘madness’ may in different eras refer to substantially different understandings, and further, the same term may be used in different discourses (juridical, religious, etc) in the same era with different points of reference (Foucault, 1965). Miller and Rose (1990, p.5) emphasise Discourse as a “technology of thought”. Knowledge of an object requires inculcation in particular procedures and techniques, such as statistics, experimentation, and so on, such that objects are talked about in particular forms. This limits the potential for objects to be talked about or known differently. Discourse therefore shapes epistemology, by determining socially which objects are appropriate focuses of activity, and how they can be known. As social practices, discourses are culturally conditioned tools for thought, which make it impossible to escape the ‘web of beliefs’ (Moscovici, 2000) without accessing shared knowledges or to speak from outside a discourse (Foucault, 1972). But these discursive representations are real, not illusory, in as much as they are a shared system of social practices. In other words, the discursive representation has a reality independent of the object it purports to represent.
Discursive analyses examine policy as social practice, action, and as Discourse (Ball, 1993; Saarinen, 2008a). As a social practice, policies are understood to be created through discourses, embedded in meaning systems with particular assumptions, values and signs, producing ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ from a position of power (Ball, 1993). They are discursive formations in their own right but also create, reproduce and disseminate discursive formations which migrate into other domains. Bacchi (2009) considers that all policy is derived from (though not determined by) particular discourses and creative of particular discursive formations. An understanding of policy which treats the text as a transparent description of a real problem (Saarinen, 2008a), akin to Ball’s ‘policy as text’ approach (1993), precludes consideration of the policy’s discursive framework and context of production. Instead, Rizvi and Lingard (2010) understand public policy as the actions and normative positions taken by the state and its attendant institutions. Policy therefore extends beyond the document and includes the actions and justifications made around the text.

What the problem is represented to be

A discursive approach to policy investigates how certain topics become policy objects (Foucault, 1972), for which problematisation is a useful concept. Problematisation explores how something becomes “an object of concern, an element for reflection, and a material for stylization” (Foucault, 1988 p.24). Discursive formations such as policy are understood as social practices characteristic of particular times and places, so discourses and social representations can be deprived of their common-sense status (Foucault, 1982; Fairclough, 1989; Filippakou, 2011), because they have been different in other times and places. The goal is to look for the “rules by which a particular statement has been made” (Foucault, 1972, p.30), identify how it excludes other statements of possibility, and “examine the interplay of (the) appearances (of concepts) and dispersion” (Foucault, 1972, p.37). Problematisation begins from the premise that the nature and content of discourses, and of policy discourses in particular, could be different, that their form and substance are not inevitable or natural. Nor, however, are they arbitrary, for their nature and content reveal power dynamics. Instead, they are determined by normative frameworks.

The construction of a ‘problem’ is a particular characteristic of policy discourses (Bacchi, 2009), wherein it becomes a real object. Governmentality and policy
studies often focus on problems for problematisation (Rose and Miller, 2008; Bacchi, 2009). Government involves the creation of problems, and their solutions, which confers legitimacy on the ruler; the agent who identifies or names the problem positions themselves as having the power to solve it (Saarinen, 2008b). Bacchi (2009) argues that the problematisations embedded in the policies reveal the mode of governance. Problems, as represented in policy, rely on particular assumptions of knowledge and reality, which can be challenged and contested: “what starts out as claim comes to be transformed into a matter of fact” (Rose and Miller, 2008 loc1473). The way that problems and solutions are framed and represented is indicative of the logics of governance (Rose and Miller, 2008). For instance, Foucault distinguishes between sovereign and disciplinary power, where the former uses pomp and ceremony to rule, and the latter uses techniques of surveillance and discursive normalisation (Foucault, 1977). Typically, modern modes of governance are hybrid, employing both sovereign and disciplinary modes (Bacchi, 2009). In policy, it is primarily the disciplinary mode which is of relevance.

Hence Bacchi’s (2009) ‘what is the problem represented to be’ (WPR) approach (Figure 13) provides a framework of questions to structure an analysis of discursive problematisations, beginning with ‘what is the problem represented to be’. Often the problem may be implicit, and may be read back from the solution presented, to explain why certain things are thought and how these representations are created (Webb, 2014). Problematisations are often plural or nested within a single policy, and may be contradictory (Bacchi, 2009; Webb, 2014). In Bacchi’s framework, there is a double problematisation: firstly, the policy constructs the problem; and secondly the analyst problematises the problem representation.
The WPR framework provides a mid-level theoretical structure for analysis. Bacchi’s framework has been applied in critical social policy studies (Spanger, 2011; Widding, 2011; Svender, et al., 2012; Lancaster and Ritter, 2014; Stevenson, 2013; Loutzenheiser, 2014) and has been influential in a number of others (Lombardo and Meier, 2009; Zoellner, 2012). All of these studies were text-based and applied Bacchi’s questions to a qualitative reading of a collection of texts. However, no studies were identified that apply Bacchi’s framework to UK higher education policies, or to international higher education. Therefore, this approach constitutes a conceptual contribution to higher education policy studies.

One potential criticism of this approach is its depersonalisation and decontextualisation. It does acknowledge discourse and policy as social practices, the extent to which individuals may influence the outcomes or the terminology or discourses used, which is consistent with the emphasis on agency accorded by Fairclough (1989), as well as Foucault (1982). However, the WPR approach (Bacchi, 2009) does not pay much heed to the authors of texts or to the policy creation process – it does not ask ‘who represents the problem in this way’. Instead, texts are treated as discursive events in their own right.
Assumptions

Dominant discourses can naturalise certain ideological assumptions as common sense (Fairclough, 1989) because they limit and shape what can be imagined (Sidhu, 2006). This leads certain discourses to become hegemonic, reducing the usual plurality of contradictory discursive alternatives (Foucault, 1972). In van Dijk’s (1996, p.85) words: “dominant groups or institutions may influence the structures of text and talk in such a way that as a result, the knowledge, attitudes, norms, values and ideologies of recipients are - more or less indirectly - affected in the interests of the dominant group.” This suggests that, while the plurality of discourses is important, studying dominant discourses, such as political and state discourses, is more likely to reveal imbalances of power.

Thus, Bacchi’s Question 2 asks what premises or assumptions are required to accept this problem representation, what is taken for granted or common-sense (e.g. Spanger, 2011; Stevenson, 2013; Lancaster and Ritter, 2014). This explores the logic of the discourse, its judgements, reasoning, and necessary precursors (Foucault, 1965). These premises are the background knowledge or beliefs that the reader must have to make meaning of the text (Saarinen, 2008b; Loutzenheiser, 2014), revealing the underpinning discursive structures which are shaped by governmentality (Bacchi, 2009).

Public discourses such as mass media and policy texts often address an ideal subject or reader, forcing readers into a particular position or sharing assumptions to understand the text (Fairclough, 1989; Saarinen, 2008a). Implicitness can be used to create ideological common ground between the text producer and the reader (Bacchi, 2009), reducing the space for disagreement or competing voices and reflecting existing power structures (Fairclough, 1989). The reader is thus incorporated at least temporarily into the discourse community of the policy text, for if they do not share in those assumptions, the text loses coherence. This is not to say that disagreement and rupture are impossible, but rather to highlight that the most powerful effects of policy discourses are likely to be those least spoken about for this reason – that disputing essential presuppositions causes the texts and actions to lose meaning. In particular, these may be found in specific understandings of social representations,
relationships, and narratives, and can be operationalised by looking for keywords. Bacchi (2009) also identifies key ‘binaries’, oppositional dichotomies that underpin problematisations such ‘licit / illicit drugs’. These tend to simplify complex relationships or gradations by reducing them to binary categories which reveal the operation of conceptual logics.

In essence, this question operationalises Foucault’s archaeological approach (1972), creating a window on discourse rules which determine what can be said. This involves exposing the metaphorical layers of concepts which have shaped how an object has come to be viewed, and what the conditions are that make the emergence of a policy problem possible (Gale, 2010).

**Power and silences**

Access to powerful, dominant discourses is limited, such that those with political power can define the discourses of the state (van Dijk, 1996). This means that the ‘idealized schemata’ created will necessarily include certain dimensions and exclude others, along lines which sustain the interests of the dominant group (Foucault, 1972; van Dijk, 1996; Rose and Miller, 2008). Power is not unilaterally exercised, however (Sidhu, 2006). Instead, it is deployed through a series of routine micro-practices, in a heterogeneous range of institutional contexts (ibid.). Where contributions to the discourse are made by less powerful participants, they are shaped by more powerful participants (Fairclough, 1989). Indeed such contributions can only be made in adherence to the rules of the discourse. This means that the content, relations between concepts and subject positions will be primarily defined by the most powerful participants (ibid.). Silences are created in these exclusions: “The manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this ‘not-said’ is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said” (Foucault, 1972, p.28).

Bacchi’s question 4 asks what is left unproblematic, not discussed or could be thought about differently (Bacchi, 2009). Exposing silences shows what and who is marginalised in the process of policy creation and text production, and alternative ways of knowing (Tikly, 2004; Taylor, 2004; Spanger, 2011; Stevenson, 2013). Silences may be issues not discussed, often to do with inequalities or power relations (Bacchi, 2009), and particular subjects or indeed different discourses (Spanger,
Powerful discourses will tend to silence the discourses, assertions or representations of the less powerful (Lombardo and Meier, 2009).

It is this focus on the power relations implicit within discourse which generates the critical potential of a discourse approach (Fairclough, 1989; Foucault, 1965, 1972). There is some disagreement about whether such criticism is intended to produce real world changes. Foucault’s (1972) position is that it opens space for alternative ways of thinking and speaking, that it “seeks difference and complexity” (Webb, 2014, p.369), and given that discourses are real, that this constitutes real world change. In this sense, policy activism can consist of re-working and re-interpreting texts strategically (Taylor, 2004). In the idiom of policy and policy research, this lack of an ‘answer’ may appear inadequate. However, it is consistent with the philosophical assumptions of a discursive approach wherein any attempt to provide a definitive account of policy, or how it should be, would necessarily be specious and partial. Instead, the creative critical potential of this approach is to throw the familiar practices and assumptions of policy into question (Webb, 2014), to open discursive spaces to alternative representations, and to reveals shared understandings and social practices as a precursor to developing ethical alternatives (Tikly, 2004).

**Subjects and social representations**

Discourse constitutes the object (Foucault, 1972), and for people, this means establishing subject positions, such that they can only take meaningful action within these positions. Paradoxically, this is also what empowers them to act as social agents, by defining social practices) they can perform (Fairclough, 1989; van Leeuwen, 1996). Discourses create people through categorical subject positions, such as ‘victim’ or ‘criminal’, ‘husband’ or ‘wife’, ‘worker’ or ‘manager’ (Spanger, 2011; Widding, 2011; Svender, *et al.*, 2012). As Ball (1993, p.14) puts it, “we are the subjectivities, the voices, the knowledge, the power relations that a discourse constructs and allows”. Because identities are embedded in discourses, people speak from social categories. Indeed, Hacking (1999) argues that the act of naming a group of people creates an identity for that group, which people come to fit. He suggests that developing a category (he gives homosexual as an example) causes bureaucrats and academics to recognise people who fit that category, where previously they
would have described them differently (for example, as deviant). This ‘making up people’ then defines what is possible for people to do, say and act out in their lives, because description allows action; if we can describe a thing or a person, it can be done. If it cannot be described, it cannot be conceived. Therefore, mass media can affect people powerfully because it creates through narrative formulae for how to live, the “habits of conduct” (Rose and Miller, 2008, loc3098), which can be internalized.

In creating problematisations, policy discourses construct images of political subjects contingent on power relations. This is Bacchi’s (2009) Question 5: “what are the effects of this representation?” This question emphasises the creation of subjects through Discourse (Tikly, 2004; Widding, 2011; Svender, et al., 2012). Indeed, Loutzenheiser (2014, p.107) revises this question to focus entirely on subjects: “who is the subject implied (to be)?”

Social categorisations represent objects and people conventionally, establishing a model or an ideal type for people to fit into (Moscovici, 2000; Fairclough, 2003), which can marginalise them (Rose and Miller, 2008; Van Leeuwen, 1996). They set people in opposition to each other, or divide their own consciousness, an effect known as “dividing practices” (Foucault, 1982; Moscovici, 2000; Bacchi, 2009). Many are “problem categories”, such as non-participants (Stevenson, 2013), resistant or in deficit (Bacchi, 2009). Such discursive representations discipline people by limiting possibilities for action and identity (Moscovici, 2000).

They can also be discursively marginalised in other ways. People can be described generically or specifically (Fairclough, 2003), or aggregated as statistics, a key mechanism by which people are rendered calculable and governable (Rose and Miller, 2008). Counting reifies people, turning them from agents into objects. Further, people can either be active agents in grammatical terms (the person who carries out the action) or passive (Fairclough, 2003). This is not necessarily intentional manipulation, but it can have material and discursive consequences (Bacchi, 2009), and tends to reinforce existing structures of power.

However, this discipline is never total, and there are always possibilities for agency and struggle (Foucault, 1982; Moscovici, 2000). A single individual may occupy multiple subject positions (Loutzenheiser, 2014), and opt in or out of certain
positions. People interact with these narratives and discourses creatively, recombining them innovatively, and overtly resisting them (Foucault, 1982; Fairclough, 1989; Rose and Miller, 2008). “Individuals and groups, far from being passive receptors, think for themselves, produce and ceaselessly communicate their own specific representations and solutions to the questions they set themselves” (Moscovici, 2000, p.30). Because power in a Foucauldian sense is productive and diffuse, it can rest with the individual, offering them the agency to create positive outcomes (Sidhu, 2006). Thus, although Discourse may be at times read from a structuralist perspective, emphasising the rules and institutional deployment of discursive formations, because people have autonomy over what they say and how they say it, it can also be read as agency (Fairclough, 1989).

Self-subjectification is a particularly powerful dimension to this process (Bragg, 2007), meaning the acts of individuals to create themselves as social subjects (Foucault, 1982), sometimes by conforming to the idealised expectation of the category or opposing them. Self-subjectification refers to:

those intentional and voluntary actions by which men (sic) not only set themselves rules of conduct but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an œuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. (Foucault, 1988, pp.10-11).

In other words, people choose how to live their lives and how to define themselves, and do so in reference to particular values and norms. This process makes individuals responsible for their “choices”, discursively amplifying certain behaviours and minimising others (Rose and Miller, 2008). In viewing oneself as a project, everybody is an administrator or regulator of their conduct and lives (Marginson, 1997). Responsibility for who we are then falls on of the individual. Therefore, every moral decision is an instance of self-subjectification because it refers to the “unified moral conduct”, the broader social system of rules (Foucault, 1988, p.28).

Discourse is a particularly effective tool of power because it operates on cognitive and linguistic levels below consciousness (van Dijk, 1996), enabling consent to be manufactured through definitions and limiting possibilities (Fairclough, 1989).
These indirect techniques of control mean that discourses can be internalised, affecting individual thought, action and self-identification (Lukes, 2005). Subordinate or marginalised groups or individuals can train themselves out of desires and beliefs which fall outside the discursive norm for their group or identification. This has particular relevance in a neo-liberal capitalist context, where the professionalization and training of subjects for superior performance in the workplace becomes a “personal development” project (Rose and Miller, 2008). In this model, *homo economicus* is rational, making decisions as an individual, not in a social context, where the skills and knowledges they acquire are commercialized, comprising their ‘human capital’ (Marginson, 1997). The augmentation of this capital entails “becoming an entrepreneur of oneself” (Tikly, 2003, p.164). However, this project of self-work means adopting and internalising the values and behavioural norms of free market capitalism.

Although the structural focus of a Foucauldian approach may appear negatively deterministic, it is also critically productive and radical. It shows how power works through discourse in social representations, thus undermining power and opening up space for alternative representations and discourses, offering a tool for agency and resistance. Therefore the discursive effects which may close off different options for agents, and the power of dividing practices are significant and worthy of study (Bacchi, 2009), which is the focus of this thesis. I acknowledge and value students’ agency, but it is not the object of study. Instead, I focus on the structures of policy discourses in the interests of exposing critical issues therein.

**Genealogy**

Genealogy explores that which has gone before, to write “a history of the present” (Foucault, 1977, p.31). This entails understanding the historical conditions which allow an object to be constituted in discourse, as well as the institutional relations and social processes which impact or are affected by the object (Foucault, 1972). For example, in *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault (1965) explores the relationship between economic crises, indigence and imprisonment in the context of the development of the asylum. Discourses change with power relations in social structures. Because power enables influence over discourse, and discourse legitimizes power, there is an inherent conservativism that makes change gradual rather than frequent and/or abrupt (Fairclough, 1989). Foucault’s (1977) description
of the shift towards a disciplinary rather than a punitive approach to crime, for instance, spans centuries.

Bacchi’s questions 3 (“how has the representation of the problem come about”) and 6 (“how/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and defended?”) explore genealogical dimensions of problematisation. Conducting a genealogy, exploring how the representation of the object has come about, exposes how it might have happened differently and therefore destabilizes it (Bacchi, 2009). This involves looking at the specific decisions and historical context that contribute to the representation of the problem, and in particular the categories or binaries which underpin it (Foucault, 1988). As with Foucault’s historical approach (Bacchi, 2009), this question examines how shifts in conceptual logics occur (Lancaster and Ritter, 2014), how policy settlements are reached (Gale, 2010), and what practices and processes have made this problematisation dominant (Bacchi, 2009).

In this research, attention has been paid throughout to practices contributing to discursive dominance, and to conceptual antecedents where apparent. However, a full historical investigation on a Foucauldian scale has not been attempted. The historicity of particular assumptions and discourses is drawn out only where relevant and is not a major focus. Where possible, potential origins or influences are indicated, and critical, disruptive alternatives are highlighted.

Therefore, Questions 1, 2, 4 and 5 have been foregrounded in the analysis. This permits a focus on how key assumptions and silences support representations of the problem, and generate subject representations. This is consistent with other applications of Bacchi’s framework, which have also focused on particular questions (Spanger, 2011; Lancaster and Ritter, 2014). For each rationale, the policy discourse has been analysed to explore the often unspoken problem, read from the proposed solution or intervention (Bacchi, 2009). Then, relevant literature has been used to help excavate the presuppositions on which the problematisation rests. Throughout, silences, omissions and alternative representations are highlighted. This analysis allows subject representations of international students to be revealed.
Conclusion

In conclusion, Carol Bacchi’s framework offers a way to operationalise a Foucauldian discourse analysis by focusing on problematisation. In this approach, policy problems are unpacked by asking what the problem is represented to be, what assumptions and silences are necessary to this representation, and what the subject effects are. This permits the analyst to investigate how social subjects are represented through policy as Discourse, and in so doing, to critique imbalances of power which result in the marginalisation of particular groups.

Thus, understanding policy as Discourse facilitates the examination of a diffuse policy field such as UK policy on international students. Using Bacchi’s framework allows an historical approach to be taken within the period, and to excavate the assumptions made within the policy. Finally, it offers a way to systematically examine how international students are represented through policy discourses.
Chapter 4 - Methods

This thesis is based on the critical analysis of publicly available policy documents relating to international students. Carol Bacchi’s WPR approach provides a bridging framework to mediate between Foucault’s high-level theory (1972) and the policy texts themselves. Without sacrificing the complexity of a discursive analysis, her framework of questions provides a structure on which to hang a potentially nebulous enquiry. However, Bacchi’s approach is typically employed in relatively coherent and well-defined policy areas, often with single texts or single genres of policy document. This study operates within a diffuse policy with multiple fields and multiple genres. As Knight (2004, p.17) suggests, on a national policy level international higher education policy includes “(e)ducation and other national-level policies relating to international dimension of higher education; other policy sectors include cultural, scientific, immigration, trade, employment, and culture.” Therefore, I have conducted a preliminary qualitative analysis to make sense of the policy field before applying Bacchi’s framework.

The qualitative analysis used NVivo software to facilitate an inductive thematic coding. Relationships between these themes were organised around rationales for or against recruiting international students. These rationales constituted the starting point for Bacchi’s (2009; 2012) “what is the problem represented to be” (WPR) analysis. This framework was then applied to identify how international students are discursively represented in policy.

This chapter explains firstly how documents were identified and selected, secondly how documents were coded and how NVivo was used to supplement the process, and finally how the qualitative analysis related to the WPR analysis.
The texts

In keeping with the discursive analytical approach described in Chapter 3, a text-based method was used. Texts are understood here as snapshots of policy discourses, selectively constructed and socially produced, such that the choices around language and content reveal ideologies.

Selection

Policy documents were included if they:

2. Had international students as their main object or potentially impact them;
3. Was published by a central government agency or centrally funded quasi-governmental organisation (classified as primary), or was referenced frequently in such documents and, therefore, understood as influential in policy formation (classified as secondary)
4. Were publicly accessible or available.

Below, I expand on each of these criteria.

1. The documents were selected to illustrate the period between 1999 when the PMI was launched, and 2013 when the Coalition International Education Strategy (IES) was launched, in order to identify significant differences in policy. In this period, governments and political parties changed, as did changing international political contexts. These two discursive events indicate turning points in policy and have therefore been used to delineate the scope of the study. Other documents published before 1999 or after 2013 have been mentioned to support the discussion and offer context but are not part of the primary analysis.

2. The second criterion for inclusion was reviewed in the initial phase of the study and was expanded to include texts that impacted international students, in addition to those which had international students as their main topic. The impact here is understood as limiting or facilitating actions international students may take, from acquiring a visa, to working, studying or altering classroom practices.
3. The third criterion also changed to reflect the nature of policy formation, which involves a range of quasi-governmental organisations (QUANGOs) and non-departmental public bodies, as described in Chapter 1. Texts were included from any organisation which implemented, led or influenced these policies. This is consistent with applications of Bacchi’s approach incorporating documents from a range of policy actors (e.g. Lombardo and Meier, 2009; Spanger, 2011; Loutzenheiser, 2014).

4. The last criterion is that the documents be publicly available (Ashwin, et al., 2015). Because the focus is on policy discourses, internal documents such as emails, memos or information obtained through interviews would not illustrate the way that international students are talked about in public policy fora. Therefore, access to archives or privileged information was not sought. This is in keeping with Bacchi’s approach (2009; 2012) to seeking to understand how the public is governed by the discursive production and creation of problems in policy. This corpus can therefore not illustrate the mechanisms behind policy processes, the personalities or motivations involved. However, it can, through imposing these strictures, shed light on those discourses most likely to filter into everyday discourses and therefore to impact students and those who interact with them.

Because the corpus is restricted to public discourses, the ethical issues were few. With no primary informants, no informed consent needed to be sought. Anonymity was not granted to those public figures named in the primary documents, as in publishing documents or making speeches, consent was presumed. Other ethical issues have been taken into consideration here. For instance, although all information may be publicly available, it is nonetheless essential to accurately represent all statements. While it is unlikely that this research could negatively impact for any individuals named here, there is no implication of personal responsibility. Rather, they are understood to be agents within an institutional and discursive context, participating in its formation, but not personally or solely responsible for its existence. The major ethical concern in this study has been how the findings may be used to perpetuate structural inequalities, given that the thesis is a discursive event itself. The aim is to explore whether policy discourses construct images of
international students which may constrain their potential actions. It can only be an ethical study if it reveals, rather than perpetuates, the workings of power within discourse and policy.

Documents were identified through a combination of web searches, database searches, and use of the National Archive. Figure 14 presents the keywords used. This method resulted in small, though highly relevant, core sample of documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sites</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK Government Web Archive</td>
<td>‘international students’</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/adv_search/">http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/adv_search/</a></td>
<td>‘overseas students’</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘foreign students’</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK Government site <a href="http://www.gov.uk">www.gov.uk</a></td>
<td>‘Prime Minister’s Initiative’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Engines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News sites</td>
<td>Above + UK + policy/government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk">www.bbc.co.uk</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.google.co.uk/news">www.google.co.uk/news</a></td>
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**Figure 14: Initial text identification**

In addition, references and inter-textual links were followed up, so that when one document mentioned another, I would locate and include the second document by a full title search on the above sites, or organisational home pages. For instance, the Vision 2020 report (Böhm, *et al.*, 2004) was mentioned in multiple documents (DfES, 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Bone, 2008, Conlon, *et al.*, 2011), so I subsequently included it, on the grounds that it appeared to have been influential in policy discourses. Throughout the study, new documents were identified through this approach, until saturation was reached.

**Classification**

A range of different genres which represent and refract policy differently were included (Bacchi, 2009): press releases, speeches, research reports, evaluation and impact reports, and House of Commons minutes (see Appendix 2). Although many studies which apply Bacchi’s approach restrict their sampling to a single genre (Iverson, 2012; Svender, *et al.*, 2012; Lancaster and Ritter, 2014), others take a more eclectic approach (Lombardo and Meier, 2009; Spanger, 2011; Zoellner, 2012;
Stevenson, 2013; Loutzenheiser, 2014). This study is consistent with the latter, a valid choice given the diffuse nature of the policy field as highlighted in Chapter 1. A comprehensive list of the final corpus and their provenance can be found in Appendix 2.

To create a fine-grained analysis, acknowledging the importance of provenance, documents were categorized as either primary or secondary. Documents were classified as primary if they were part of central policy initiatives, either on the basis of the position of the publishing organisation in the policy process, receipt of government funding, or the genre of the text. As such, primary documents are understood as policy. Thus, the International Education Strategy is a primary document, because it is published by a government department (provenance) and because it is a formal strategy (genre). Similarly, Tony Blair’s various speeches are considered primary because they are written by the Prime Minister (provenance), although the genre is less formal.

Secondary policy documents are those which express, reflect, or evidence policy discourses but are not published by policy making bodies. For example, House of Commons Select Committee evidence and reports are included in the corpus because they offer a window into public policy discourses, and are classified as secondary because they are not central to the policy process. The Select Committees can publish findings and recommendations, but the Government is not obligated to abide by them. Similarly, research reports conducted on behalf of UKBA or BIS may reflect and inform policy discourses, but do not necessarily determine policies themselves.

In certain cases, funding and governance changes during the period (see Chapter 1) mean that provenance from the same organisation leads to different categorisation in different years. For example, certain British Council documents were classified as primary where they related to implementing PMI and PMI2 because they led the initiative and received Cabinet Office funding to do so. After the PMI2 concluded in 2011, British Council reports were classified as secondary because they were no longer central to the policy process, although they are often influential. A list of the
institutional policy actors and their responsibilities is included in Appendix 1, and Appendix 2 lists full document details with provenance and categorisation.

While greater attention has typically been given to the primary policy documents, differences and contradictions from the main narrative have been highlighted (Kuckartz, 2014) to illustrate the discursive complexity of the field. Because the research aimed to capture public policy discourses, voices from the HE sector and student organisations are incorporated in discussion and analysis, but were excluded from the data collection.

**Procedures**

The analytical procedure followed is depicted visually in Figure 15 and explained in more detail below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document collection</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First reading (manual, on paper)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Initial open coding (CAQDAS, digital)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second order coding (merging, renaming, creating hierarchy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selective coding (identifying the relevant concepts)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Problematisation analysis (Bacchi’s 6 questions)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 15: Stages of the research**

First, I read the texts in detail to identify the sections relevant to international students. The purpose of this initial reading was to establish a chronology of policy discourse. It also raised my awareness of key themes for initial open coding.

Then I coded the documents inductively, based on emerging themes. Inductive thematic coding is a common choice for qualitative data analysis, as it allows the researcher to approach the data with fewer preconceptions than a deductive framework (Braun and Clark, 2006). In essence, inductive or open coding involves assigning codes as they emerge from the data, and is ‘data driven’ rather than theoretically driven (Gibbs, 2008). Not all codes from this stage were retained in the final analysis, such as ‘Other sectors’, which included reference to English language teaching and TNHE. While deductive coding has been used in combination with Bacchi’s framework (e.g. Iverson, 2012), initial experimentation suggested that this
would be unfruitful for this study. These policy documents often keep the problem implicit, emphasising solutions instead. Problems and silences must therefore sometimes be inferred from their absence (Bacchi, 2009) and it is not always possible to identify them in the text through a deductive coding system.

A Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) programme, NVivo, facilitated the analysis. NVivo facilitates developing a hierarchy of codes, allowing certain codes to become ‘parent nodes’, main themes, and others ‘child nodes’, which retains differentiation within the hierarchy. It allows qualitative researchers to establish an electronic filing system, by tagging portions of text and assigning them a code. Reports can then be produced which compile all extracts with the same label. Its main utility is therefore to facilitate the retrieval of information attached to codes. It also makes simultaneous coding easier. Another essential function was text searching, used to supplement manual coding. These advantages enabled a large volume of documents to be included in the corpus: 103 documents in total were included, with over 3,000 pages. NVivo also helped to maintain consistency in coding because previous code reports can be quickly checked and changed without difficulty.

A research diary was kept throughout (see Figure 16).

![Research diary](image)

Figure 16: Research diary
I kept notes of observations made during the coding process, and reminders to myself of additional documents to follow up and cross-checks to do later. Evernote (a web application) was used to record analytical insights (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). These were organised into notebooks and tagged with keywords. Relevant entries were then retrieved during analysis either by tags or by word searching. This research diary also allowed me to track where I stopped work on a given day and what I had left to do. Example entries are included in Appendix 4.

**Coding**

The documents were coded using an open, inductive approach in two principal stages.

**Initial coding**

In the first stage of coding, after a preliminary reading for familiarisation, extracts were coded if they related to the research questions, like Ashwin et al. (2015). Sentences which reiterated background already coded from the introduction were excluded, for instance, as were background sentences which did not directly relate to international students, and research report methodologies. Sentences relevant to the research questions were established by examining regularities, disjunctures, and attention to discourse (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). For example, in the following extract, the first two sentences were coded (simultaneously to ‘satisfaction’, ‘experience’ and ‘teaching’), where the last (underlined) was not:

Students’ academic experiences depend largely on good teaching. A new project, Teaching International Students, funded jointly by PMI2 (through UKCISA) and the Higher Education Academy...

For more information on all the projects listed above, please go to www.ukcisa.org.uk/pmi www.studentcalculator.org.uk/international www.prepareforsuccess.org.uk. (BC, 2010, p.21).

The underlined information refers readers to the websites for more information and does not contain any information pertinent to the research questions. This demonstrates the type of information that was not coded at all.

**Open coding** began from the primary policy documents, then proceeded to the secondary policy documents, to establish codes from the most central documents. Within each category (primary and secondary), I worked in chronological order to
gain a sense of changes over time, enabling constant comparison (Gibbs, 2008). Codes names were assigned descriptively or In Vivo (Saldana, 2009). I coded ‘close to the documents’, using open coding and labelling the sections of text with language and terminology derived from the documents themselves (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). Many codes became more descriptive as the coding structure evolved, starting off with a phrase taken directly from the documents, and gradually being modified to become more widely applicable. However, certain codes were retained with their original In Vivo phrasing where this was particularly relevant, such as ‘the brightest and the best’, as this phrase was frequently used. Where this differentiation was thought significant, the original code was retained as a child node under a broader parent node.

*Inductive coding* meant that when new codes were added, previously coded documents needed to be reviewed for relevance to these codes. I used text searches to find these. This enabled the constant comparison that Gibbs (2008) argues is essential to good qualitative analysis; it maintained consistency and ensured that the same codes were used throughout the study. In Nvivo, text searches can be produced in either ‘narrow’ (see Figure 17, for example) or ‘broad’ context (see Figure 18).

![Figure 17: ‘Narrow view’ of a text search for ‘teaching’](image)

The ‘narrow context’ was often found to be inadequate to determine relevance. Instead the ‘broad context view’ was used (Bazeley and Richards, 2000), to decide whether the phrase matched the parameters of the new code.
For example, in the case of the ‘teaching’ code, I set the parameters as ‘teaching international students’. Broad context results presented in Figure 18 emerged from Chapter 4 of the White Paper *The Future of Higher Education* (DfES, 2003) and were generic to all students and, therefore, matches were not coded to the ‘teaching’ node.

![Figure 18: ‘Broad view’ of a text search ‘teaching’](image)

Where the broad context proved inadequate, NVivo permitted the navigation directly to the result in situ in the original document through the hyperlink in the report. This is a positive argument for the use of CAQDAS in contradiction of early critiques that such analysis removes text from its context (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013).

*Automatic coding* was occasionally used to identify relevant key phrases, such as ‘the international student experience’ and ‘the best and the brightest’, which were used frequently verbatim. Automatic coding was used to ensure that all instances were coded. Reports were then checked to remove irrelevant results. It was not used otherwise, in order to preserve the integrity of an inductive approach.

The *unit of coding* varied according to the document, either line-by-line or a whole paragraph, depending on the document (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Saldana, 2009). Line-by-line coding occurred in the thematically dense areas, which were also often simultaneously coded where a particular sentence incorporated several themes. This lent a sense of the richness of the data (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). It was more common to code by sentence units because the main body of most texts usually dealt
with a single issue or theme at a time. In some texts, the same code was applied to several sequential sentences or whole paragraphs, in what Bazeley and Jackson (2013) call a ‘lumper’ approach, a broad-brush sorting. For instance, in coding the Home Affairs Select Committee report on bogus colleges, the majority of the document was coded to the single code ‘bogus colleges’ because although a number of more specific issues were raised in this document, these were not pertinent to the research questions. Bazeley and Jackson (2013) suggest that this should usually be a first-order approach to coding, and a finer-grained analysis is certainly possible of these excerpts. However, for the purposes of this study, ‘bogus colleges’ was thought to be a sufficiently nuanced code in reference to the research aims of this study.

**Second order coding and revisions**

‘Second order’ or ‘axial coding’ involved reviewing each code individually for consistency. It also established relationships and connections between codes expressed through a hierarchy, reviewing redundant nodes, and renaming codes for consistency (Gibbs, 2008). During this review, codes were merged, and hierarchies of parent and child nodes were further developed (Saldana, 2009; Bazeley and Jackson, 2013).

*Codes were merged* when very similar meanings or patterns of coding were apparent. Simultaneous coding was reduced to occur only when two nodes which are organised under separate parent codes, such as ‘export earnings’ and ‘student visa system’ can both be applied to the same statement. Compound queries were used to check the comprehensiveness of coding. For example, I checked whether all mentions of ‘visas’ in the primary policy documents had indeed been coded to the ‘migration’ parent code by excluding any that matched both criteria.

*Internal consistency* of codes was reviewed by exporting the reports and checking them manually. Given that I was the only coder, Bazeley and Jackson (2013) suggest the transparency of the analytical process must replace second coders as a measure of reliability. To this end, a selection of code reports are included in Appendix 5. My supervisor reviewed a small selection of code reports to confirm the value of the concepts emerging, which added an external perspective. A time lapse of 3 months
or more between initial coding and reviewing was left, to lend another measure of objectivity and catch any ‘definitional drift’ (Gibbs, 2008). As an example, Figure 19 below illustrates a portion of the report for the code labelled ‘enhance global diplomacy’. This was defined as ‘referring to promoting the UK’s foreign policy or political interests through international students or alumni’. Initial coding had identified ‘influence’, ‘global ambassadors’ and ‘soft power’ separately, which were incorporated under the parent code ‘enhance global diplomacy’ in second order coding.

Figure 19: Code report of ‘enhance global diplomacy’ node.

Codes were categorised as rationales for or against recruiting international students; and descriptions of international students. This corresponds to grounded theory’s ‘selective coding’ (Gibbs, 2008), where codes are deleted, retained and re-grouped. These were recorded in NVivo using either ‘issues’ or ‘enhance’ or ‘benefits to indicate rationales against and for recruitment respectively. During the qualitative analysis, I compiled a list of the codes which related to each rationale. For example, the rationale describing how international students enhance the UK’s influence, this included the codes: ‘soft power’, ‘enhance global diplomacy’, international students as ‘ambassadors’, ‘alumni’, ‘scholarships’, and ‘development and aid’. I then printed
and annotated these code reports to integrate the data, as Strauss and Corbin (1990) put it. The full final coding hierarchy is included in Appendix 3 for reference.

The quality of a qualitative analysis relies on the transparency of the analytical process, reflexivity, evidence of its grounding in the data (Gibbs, 2008), its internal coherence, as well as whether the thesis proves convincing (Kuckartz, 2014). This section has explained precisely how the analysis was conducted, and further details may be found in the appendices. Evidence of a reflexive approach may be found throughout, in the discussion. To ground the conclusions in the data, the prevalence of particular themes is captured in citations. To provide a rich description of the entire corpus (Braun and Clark, 2006; Gibbs, 2008), quotes are used frequently, and contextualised where possible. This demonstrates the analytical integrity of the approach and facilitates subsequent work which may build upon this methodology.

**Implementing a WPR analysis**

Once the codes were organised into rationales for or against recruiting students, Bacchi’s “what is the problem represented to be” (WPR) framework of 6 questions was applied to each rationale, as illustrated in Figure 20.

1. What’s the ‘problem’ (for example, of ‘problem gamblers’, ‘drug use/abuse’, ‘gender inequality’, ‘domestic violence’, ‘global warming’, ‘sexual harassment’, etc) represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal?
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’?
3. How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’?
6. How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disrupted and replaced?

*Figure 20: ‘What is the problem represented to be’ (WPR) framework (Bacchi, 2012, p.21).*
For example, Chapter 5 explains the argument that international students should be recruited to enhance the UK’s diplomatic influence through soft power, which can be generated through the goodwill created when students study in a foreign country. This rationale incorporates an implicit understanding of a problem, a proposed solution, and a number of assumptions. Because there are several rationales with overlapping and competing discourses, Bacchi’s framework is applied to each separately. Bacchi demonstrates the power of her questions in an integrated narrative, rather than a rigid march through each question individually, particularly as smaller problematisations may nest within larger ones. This is consistent with Foucault’s earlier work (1965, 1977), in which he identifies key concepts within the broad research study and within each explores the historical development, ruptures and silences. Literature is used to highlight assumptions and offer alternatives.

Conclusion

In the following chapters, the qualitative analysis will be presented first, followed by an interpretive discussion which applies Bacchi’s WPR framework. The WPR analysis draws on literature to support the interpretation of the data, highlight problematisations and assumptions. The primary data is presented as citations, so that ‘BIS, 2013a’, for example, refers to the International Education Strategy, published by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Full titles and document information with the citation is presented in Appendix 2 for reference. The same citation style has been used for both documents used in the main data analysis, and for literature. To clearly delineate between the data (i.e. from the textual analysis) and literature, each chapter presents first the qualitative analysis, followed by the WPR and literature.
Part II: Findings and Discussion
Introduction

Policy discourses were found to relate almost entirely to the recruitment of international students. The capacity of the UK HE sector to attract international students is explicitly valued: “Higher education has a fundamental value in itself and our universities are, in many ways, world-class: in research; in attracting international students; and in contributing to the economy” (BIS, 2011, p.7). This may seem an obvious, indeed a ‘natural’ point (Foucault, 1972), but there are other possibilities for policy: it could relate to discrimination, racism and insecurity experienced by students (Marginson, et al., 2010); it could speak to inclusive practices and multiculturalism; it could seek to engage students as temporary citizens. That UK national policy discourse does not speak to these issues is not ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’; it is the culmination of a policy process of selection, prioritisation and discursive formation which have made certain statements ‘unsayable’, naturalising certain assumptions (Fairclough, 1989) and instituting silences.

This section critically analyses these assumptions, and is organised around four key rationales relating to international student recruitment:

- International students increase the UK’s global influence;
- International students increase the quality of UK higher education and its reputation;
- International students increase income to the UK;
- International students are less desirable when they are seen as migrants.

Within these rationales, international students are represented in a range of different ways:

- As ambassadors;
- As educational resources;
- In cultural deficit;
- As financial resources;
- As migrants.

The following chapters present each rationale, giving the findings of the textual analysis, and then explaining the WPR analysis.
Chapter 5 - Influence: a political rationale and international alumni as ambassadors

“Education is a method by which the UK can influence other governments diplomatically, leading to political and trade links” (DTZ, 2011, p.46).

Attracting international students is argued to increase the UK’s influence in global diplomacy, as graduates of British education are considered to be more knowledgeable and appreciative of “British values”. This rationale is apparent throughout the period in documents from both the Blair and Coalition administrations, although it is the least prevalent in the corpus. It is present in key texts, including Blair’s launch speech of the Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI), the final Prime Minister’s Initiative for International Education (PMI2) evaluation report (DTZ, 2011), and the Coalition International Education Strategy (IES) (BIS, 2013a and b). For example, in Blair’s first PMI speech (1999), he argued that “(p)eople who are educated here have a lasting tie to our country. They promote Britain around the world, helping our trade and our diplomacy.” In this excerpt, Blair argues that international students can increase the UK’s influence overseas, as well as sympathising with UK interests.

The Coalition IES evokes the same rationale (BIS, 2013 a, b), referring to “soft power”, the capacity to influence through cultural attraction, as opposed to hard power, in the sense of military capacity or force (Nye, 2004). The IES (BIS, 2013a, p.23) explicitly states that “(e)ngagement in international education, both in the UK and via TNE, enhances the reputation and brand recognition of UK institutions and helps project the UK’s soft power” (emphasis mine). Although Blair and other PMI documents do not refer explicitly to soft power, they do refer to the role and contributions of international graduates in achieving the UK’s diplomatic ends through influence. This suggests significant continuity over changes in political parties in government.

This chapter analyses the narrative which positions the increase of the UK’s global influence as a rationale for international student recruitment. The first section presents the qualitative analysis, and the second section examines the problematisation underlying the rationale.
A global political rationale: international students generate influence for the UK

In policy documents, the fundamental premise appears to be that the UK will benefit from overseas alumni who retain “ties” and “links” to the UK, as well as the increased “knowledge and appreciation” of Britain, its culture and “values” (Blair, 1999; Roche, 2000; BC, 2003; Böhm, et al., 2004; DfES, 2003, 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Blair, 2006; Home Office, 2006; Kemp, et al., 2008; UKBA, 2008; BC, 2010; Conlon, et al., 2011; DTZ, 2011; Home Affairs Committee, 2011; BIS, 2013a, b, c). International education is seen as a policy tool for the UK to build diplomatic relations: “using education to strengthen our relationships with partner countries and build a platform for many other activities to our mutual benefit” (BIS, 2013a, p.61). The Wider Ambitions White Paper describes the UK HE brand as being aligned “with the Government’s diplomatic and cultural agenda” (BIS, 2009, p.93). Thus, international students are seen as a source of soft power (Böhm, et al., 2004; DTZ, 2011; Home Affairs Committee, 2011; BIS, 2013a, b; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). They are expected to

return home with an enhanced appreciation of British life, ideas and values, culture and institutions, and a good command of the English language;

(and) As they rise to positions of influence in their professions, their experience is likely to predispose them to look to Britain for ideas, technology, trade and investment (UKBA, 2008, p.4).

There is an implied understanding of diplomacy as incorporating trade activities, as well as more traditional diplomatic and cultural activities. International students are considered to “have a higher level of trust in the people of the UK” (BIS, 2013a, p.34), which is presumed to lead to an increased willingness to “do business with” the UK (Blair, 1999; BIS, 2013a, p.36). This offers an opportunity to communicate ‘British values’ overseas (BIS, 2009).

The influence and soft power of alumni

In the global influence rationale, international graduates are thought to exit from UK HE willing and able to “promote Britain around the world” (DfES, 2003, p.65). Alumni are seen as “ambassadors” for institutions and departments (BC, 2000a, 2003; Archer, 2010b; Kemp, et al., 2008; BIS, 2009; DTZ, 2011; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). The BIS (2013a) therefore suggests that alumni networks should be used to “maintain relationships” between universities and graduates, and between
graduates and the UK. This continues the PMI2’s encouragement of HEIs “stay(ing) connected with their alumni as international alumni will promote the UK’s reputation abroad” (Archer and Cheng, 2012, p.96). Education UK describes them as “long-term advocates” (BC, 2003), and the BIS as “unofficial ambassadors” (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). A research report on the wider benefits of international education in the UK suggests that such graduates “promote and help to facilitate educational, cultural, developmental and business links and collaborations” (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013, p.38) with other countries. Likewise, the IES suggests that:

UK alumni have created a network of people in positions of influence around the world who can promote British foreign policy goals, including by opening doors to people, resources and information we would not otherwise have been able to access (BIS, 2013a, p.39, emphasis mine).

This implies that international alumni will be so closely aligned with British interests that they will actively work to realise them. It is supposed that “(m)ost graduates are likely to have some degree of influence in their home countries (or elsewhere)” (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013, p.13). This capacity to influence other countries through cultural means, or soft power, is presented as deriving from the UK’s reputation and “brand recognition” (BIS, 2013a, b) (see Chapter 6). In Coalition documents, it is argued that international education increases both. While the focus in the IES is often on institutional or systemic partnerships, rather than direct student recruitment, both are considered essential to creating and sustaining soft power. International alumni “generate goodwill” for the UK, creating long-term reputational benefit (Home Affairs Committee, 2011).

Scholarship programmes are one way in which such influence is developed. The Chevening Scholarship Programme, for instance, has over 41,000 alumni, described as ‘influential’, in more than 150 countries, including key strategic countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and China (BIS, 2013a). “FCO funds the Chevening scholarship programme, aimed at those whom we believe will become future leaders and decision-makers” (ibid., p.53, emphasis mine). This scheme is funded primarily by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (and supported by host institutions, although this is not mentioned here), which demonstrates its importance as a political
tool for the UK. Thus, scholarships are considered part of the strategic plan to increase the UK’s educational status (Blair, 1999; BC, 2003). However, the proportion of students on such scholarships is considerably outweighed by the proportion of self-funded students (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). The emphasis in the policy documents on the diplomatic weight of programmes such as the Chevening is, therefore, noteworthy in and of itself, given that it does not reflect the distribution of funding of the actual student population. The discursive positioning of scholarships as a tool for global diplomacy is evident throughout the corpus, but the PMI and PMI2 sought to increase funding available, whereas the Coalition IES has not done so. It is apparent, however, that both the PMI and Coalition policies share the rationale of increasing engagement in international education for the sake of diplomatic influence, albeit through different means.

**Mutual understanding and relationships**

There are two characteristics of the global influence rationale which appear in earlier texts and are later marginalised. The first is a more idealistic, cosmopolitan vision of globalisation, based on reciprocal relationships and understanding (DfES, 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; DTZ, 2011). In this discursive formation, alumni’s ‘promotion’ and ‘advocacy’ is argued to “foster mutual understanding” between the UK and other countries (DfES, 2004). According to the chair of the British Council in the PMI2 press release (DfES, 2006), “international learning builds international understanding as well as opportunity, creativity and liberty”. Promoting a “global citizenship agenda” (DfES, 2004; DTZ, 2011), which fosters intercultural understanding and positive attitudes to international exchange, also feeds into this discourse. These rationales are much less frequent than those that focus on the benefits to the UK, but they are apparent in earlier documents and not in the primary IES documents. In these later texts, this concept appears to be replaced by that of trust and soft power (see below).

The second distinction is the emphasis on emotional bonds and relationships, which is apparent in the primary PMI texts (Home Office, 2002; BC, 2003; DfES, 2004; Home Office, 2006; DTZ, 2011) but in Coalition texts appears in secondary rather than primary policy documents (Miller, 20013; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). For example, Professor Gilligan, who was commissioned to conduct a programme of market research on the HE sector for the British Council (2003), comments that “(i)t
is though only too easy to forget the longer-term political, social and economic benefits to the country of the *relationships* that can be developed and how these represent a long-term investment in our future” (p.29, emphasis mine). The DfES (2004) highlights the “affection” that international students hold for the UK, and Tony Blair (2006) writing for the Guardian argues that the “friendships and links (that) are forged” are important. These relationships are considered significant because they contribute to economic advantage. While the IES (BIS, 2013b) does state that “the experience of students in UK education helps to create good relations” (p.61) the relations in question are those between the UK as a state and future “global leaders”. The emphasis in PMI documents foregrounds personal connections between individuals, in addition to national diplomatic links. Some secondary Coalition policy documents do highlight significant emotional attachment and affection for the UK among alumni (Mellors-Bourne, *et al.*, 2013). Yet this is not commented on in the IES and other primary policy documents, perhaps because it is most evident among the scholarship holders, and the main emphasis in the IES is on the economic and transactional relationship between international students and the UK (see Chapter 7).

Whilst aid and development work are important tools for public diplomacy, and have in the past been associated with international education (Humfrey, 2011; Walker, 2014), the two do not intersect significantly with this corpus, in line with Knight’s (2004) analysis. Education is acknowledged to be associated with development (BC, 2003; BIS, 2013a) and the Department for International Development (DFID) undertakes considerable work in this area (BIS, 2013c). Indeed, “(s)upport for the education and training of students from developing countries is an integral part of HM Government’s overseas development policy” (UKBA, 2008, p.4). However, the discussion of international students in the UK only intersects with this work in reference to scholarships, such as the Science without Borders scheme (BIS, 2013a). This scheme facilitates Brazilian Ph.D. students in the sciences to study in the UK and is presented in the IES as part of a reciprocal partnership for international development (BIS, 2013a). However, in the next sentence the IES goes on to promise that the Government will “explore opportunities to create similar schemes with other emerging powers” (p. 53, emphasis mine). This emphasis on
emerging powers demonstrates that the eventual aim of this scholarship scheme is to increase the UK’s influence, such that development is a secondary rationale.

Under the Blair administrations, diplomatic influence was also presented as a benefit from short-term “controlled migration” (Roche, 2000; Home Office, 2005, 2006; UKBA, 2008), as well as specifically from international students. The presence of migrants in the UK is considered to “create a huge and invaluable source of goodwill for Britain abroad” (Roche, 2000). Proposals for the points-based immigration system suggest that by “Identifying and attracting migrants who will . . . act as ambassadors for the UK on their return home” (Home Office, 2006, p.9, emphasis mine), the UK can gain influence. Immigration is thus imagined as a tool for diplomacy (UKBA, 2008). This logic is not evident in Coalition policy documents, where the potential for migrants to act as ambassadors is not apparent.

The global influence rationale for recruiting international students explains the role of soft power and how overseas alumni are seen to enhance it for the UK. The next section applies Bacchi’s “what is the problem represented to be” framework to enable a more critical reading.

The UK’s declining global influence: ‘what is the problem represented to be’ analysis

The rationale for recruiting international students to enhance the UK’s global influence was analysed using the “what is the problem represented to be” approach (WPR) (Bacchi, 2009). Bacchi’s first question is what is the problem represented to be. She comments that, while many policy texts follow an overt “problem-solution” structure, in others the “problem” is not explicitly addressed, but must be read into the solutions presented. Reading into the proposed solution - to augment the UK’s political influence via international student recruitment - the problem is represented to be the UK’s diminishing influence on a global stage:

The Government is responding to the economic growth and expanding political influence in the South and East by strengthening relationships with the powers of tomorrow to increase Britain’s prosperity and security. It is working hard to take advantage of new opportunities and build closer relationships with emerging powers through more active engagement across Government, to allow the UK to thrive in this changing environment. International education has an important role to play in this (BIS, 2013a, p.53).
The reference here to “expanding political influence in the South and East” implies that in a zero-sum global power game, the UK’s power is waning, or changing in a new world order, which constitutes a problem for governance and policy. This interpretation is confirmed by the House of Lords Select Committee Report on Soft Power (2014), which highlights how changes in the modern world such as hyper-connectivity and an increase in the influence of non-state actors have fundamentally changed the diplomatic sphere. The report points to a decline and decentralisation in state power, and in the UK’s power relative to the “increasingly assertive” developing countries, particularly Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The solution offered is for the UK to increase its use of soft power to adapt, through international cultural relations (Trilokekar, 2010; BC, 2012a). Recruiting international students is one way to do so; thus students are represented as a vessel for British influence in this problem representation. Figure 21 below depicts the results of the WPR analysis in sum and is further explained below.

![Figure 21](image)

**Figure 21: ‘What is the problem represented to be’ analysis of the political rationale**

Bacchi’s (2012, p.21) second question is “what presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the problem?” The key assumption is that a state-level problem (i.e. the waning influence of the UK) can and should be addressed by individuals and in particular by international students. This premise leads to other secondary pre-suppositions. Firstly, time abroad is presumed to lead to an increase in positivity towards the host country. While it is sometimes acknowledged that such positivity is contingent on experience, it is assumed that most students do have
positive experiences. Thirdly, once students emerge with this affinity for the UK, it is assumed that this will lead them to exert influence in favour of the UK in business and foreign policy objectives. Fourthly, it is presumed that during their career, students will be in positions of influence where they can act in the UK’s interests. Finally, it is supposed that their fee-paying status is irrelevant; that scholarship recipients and self-funded students are tacitly assumed to adopt similar subject positions. These assumptions are rarely explicitly stated, and when they are, do not appear to relate to real students as individuals, with an understanding of all the human messiness implicit to a conceptualisation of people as agents. Rather they appear to rely on totalising abstractions, representing “the international student” as a meaningful, generalisable entity.

The following sections take the assumptions as their starting point and use them to structure the WPR analysis. Because I have taken an integrated approach to the WPR analysis, Questions 3-6 will emerge through discussion of the assumptions, and will be signalled by questions in abbreviated form, such as Q2, indicating Question 2.

**Attitudes in international students**

The first and second assumptions (Q2), that time abroad increases positive attitudes towards the host country and is based on positive experiences, is a common one both in policy and in the literature on soft power in higher education (Scott-Smith, 2003; Kramer, 2009; Atkinson, 2010; O’Mara, 2012; Wilson, 2014). It is an underlying rationale of regional mobility programmes like Erasmus (Papatsiba, 2005), as well as some of the most prestigious international education exchanges, such as the Fulbright and Marshall Scholarship programmes (Scott-Smith, 2003; Wilson, 2014). Exposure to a country, its people and systems, is accepted by policy discourse to impress visitors with its superiority (O’Mara, 2012, p.590). This is shared in wider public diplomacy initiatives, as the British Council report *Trust Pays* (2012a, p.3) indicates when it argues that exposure and experience generate trust in the country and its institutions.

Bacchi’s (2012, p.21) fourth question is “what is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the problem be thought about differently?” (Q4). The lack of empirical grounding for such claims suggests that the problem can be thought about differently, and research undermines these
assumptions. Erasmus students, for instance, found that their views and sense of European identity did not change during their time abroad, largely because they were already positively disposed towards the host country prior to choosing to study there (Papatsiba, 2006b; Wilson, 2014). In this sense, mobility programmes may be self-selecting. The same is true of the US “International Visitors” programme of the 1960s and 70s (Scott-Smith, 2003), the Entente Cordiale programme, the Fulbright (Sidhu, 2006), the Commonwealth Scholarships, and the Chevening programme (Wilson, 2014), in that participants were already positively predisposed. This selection bias could be argued (Q4) to negate the potential for adding value by changing attitude (Scott-Smith, 2003). Similarly, self-funded students choose destinations for study to which they are favourably pre-disposed (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002). By extension, fee-paying international students, are likely to be a self-selecting group with higher than normal positive disposition towards the host country which does not, on average, change substantially as a result of their time abroad (Wilson, 2014). International students are likely to report positive experiences (e.g. Wu and Hammond, 2011), but not necessarily more positive about the UK and its values than they were already pre-disposed to be.

When changes in disposition do occur, it appears to be contingent on exposure to host country and culture through “deep” social interactions, and is maximised by a shared sense of community (Atkinson, 2010). Whereas in educational exchanges like Erasmus where students are essentially left to fend for themselves, they can lead “cloistered existences” (Wilson, 2014) or “cocoons” where most friendships are with co-nationals or third country nationals rather than with host country nationals, at least at first (Papatsiba, 2006b). This social isolation is frequently identified in the literature on cultural adaptation (e.g. Bamford, et al., 2006; Brown, L. 2009a; Sovic, 2009; Montgomery, 2010; Wu and Hammond, 2011) and may constitute a negative experience, although intense relationships are not necessarily a requirement for many students (Papatsiba, 2006b). As Chapter 6 will explore, the concept of the student experience is a crucial tool in the construction of a reputation for quality in UK HE. In this context, it has more in common with the ‘experience’ of the customer than with the deep, transformative interactions which rhetoric around international education often presumes.
The importance of deep cultural and social experiences to generate attitudinal shifts is not foregrounded in policy rationales (Q4). In contrast, many students report finding the international study experience stressful, lonely and highly challenging, rather than positive (e.g. Brown, L. 2009a). It could be concluded, with Wilson (2014), that even if positive experiences translate into positive attitudes for some students, the reverse is just as probable so that the aggregate change is likely to be null. Negative experiences, or changes in attitude for the worse, are mentioned very little in the corpus, except as a further problem to be solved (the Wider Benefits report by Mellors-Bourne, et al. (2013) is an exception). In the context of soft power, there are no instances of student voice representing an unhappy experience or a negative attitude to the UK, which suggests a silence (Q4). The policy discourses construct instead a totalising, idealised image of the international student, which does not encompass individual variations.

**Changing political attitudes**

So, available research challenges the policy discourse assumptions that overseas students universally or generally experience the UK positively and that their experiences change their attitudes towards the UK (Q4). Further, its findings can be used to challenge the presupposition that it is educational experiences which generate changes in political orientation, fostering a commitment to ‘Western liberal democratic values’ (Q2) or a more cosmopolitan outlook (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). Here it is important to distinguish between political dispositions and identity. Mobility experiences may alter patterns of identification, encouraging students to self-identify with the host country. Political disposition refers to the political and ideological beliefs, related to but not coterminous with identity. The assumption in the discourse is that if a student identifies with the host country, then they will necessarily share its political and ideological orientations (Q2). In Europe, a favourable political predisposition towards the EU as a political institution may be seen, in some cases, to translate into a social identification as a result of mobility experiences (van Mol, 2013). However, van Mol (2013) points out that this was more apparent in students from countries more fully embedded in Europe, such as Belgium and Italy, rather than students from Norway and Poland (more distantly and recently affiliated with the EU, respectively). The transition from a positive political disposition to a social identification, therefore, varies by region, individual
(Papatsiba, 2005), and country. But the positive political disposition is a prerequisite for participation in regional mobility (Papatsiba, 2005; van Mol, 2013; Wilson, 2013), rather than a necessary outcome. Therefore, mobility may consolidate existing political views, such as a positive pre-disposition towards a regional integration like Europe (Papatsiba, 2005; van Mol, 2013; Wilson, 2014), but the evidence does not indicate that it can turn an ideological opponent into an ally. Furthermore, extrapolating conclusions from regional mobility schemes such as Erasmus to global higher education networks and postcolonial power relations is not necessarily legitimate.

Further, even within such mobility programmes, political or identity change is not a given. For instance, Papatsiba (2005) concludes that the aim of Erasmus to generate a sense of European identity depends on a “random result of experiential learning…on situations, on encounters, as well as on the individual’s psychology” (p.183). Similarly, Wilson (2014) showed that among both Marshall Scholars⁵ and Erasmus students, political views were little altered by their international experience. As Rizvi and Lingard (2010, p.205) put it, “the proposition that study abroad programmes promote a more cosmopolitan outlook among students, leading them to become more culturally sensitive is, for example, often asserted but seldom demonstrated”. While Erasmus students gave culturally touristic accounts of their experiences and sought to demonstrate their enhanced cosmopolitan outlook, for two-thirds of students sampled, this account was primarily one of personal development rather than relational (Papatsiba, 2006b). Therefore, students do not necessarily substantially change their outlooks as a result of international experiences, but may instead acquire a veneer of cosmopolitan sensitivity.

Yet in light of the weight placed on educational exchanges, particularly by the USA during the Cold War period, this seems surprising. Bacchi’s (2012, p.21) third question is ‘How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?’ (Q3). The dominance of the model wherein students change political attitudes during study abroad appears to derive from Cold War American policies (Kramer, 2009; O’Mara, 2012). They were politically oriented exchanges, widely believed to be effective in “winning hearts and minds”. As Kramer (2009, p.780-781) puts it, “international

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⁵ A scholarship scheme for 40 American students to study in the UK for up to a year (Wilson, 2014).
students in the United States have been imagined ... as potential instruments of U.S. national power, eventually on a global scale”. Examples of such programmes include the Fulbright Program, the Peace Corps (O’Mara, 2012), and the International Visitors Program (Scott-Smith, 2003). These programmes positioned themselves as cultivating and exporting an elite class of enlightened scholar-leaders who returned home with a positive view of the United States and a willingness to evangelize about the advantages of American culture and democratic governance (O’Mara, 2012, p.597).

These were seen as one-way exchanges (Kramer, 2009); it was not supposed that American exchange students would return as converted Soviets. Nye (2004b, p.44) argues that education exchanges with the US “played a tremendous role in the erosion of the Soviet system”, palpably contributing to American foreign policy goals. The replication of this problem representation suggests that the UK’s international education policy is heavily influenced by a particular narrative derived from US Cold War policies (Q3). So it seems remarkable that there is only limited evidence of changes in political views as a result.

If there is no evidence to support the claim for changes in political views or positive attitudes, it seems unlikely that students will support the UK’s foreign policy objectives (the third assumption highlighted above). Policy documents do not account for (Q4) what influence students who maintain their political outlook during study abroad may have. In addition, this representation is silent on how globalisation has impacted the political imaginaries of international students (Q4). Instead of emerging from a Soviet cocoon of propaganda and ideological indoctrination, modern students are more likely to have grown up in (at least a nominal) democracy, with access to press significantly freer than was the case in the 1960s and 70s, in countries implicated in a capitalist free market system. The environment they enter in the UK may be institutionally and culturally different, but will no longer represent an ideological chasm. Enacting change in political attitudes, therefore, takes careful study and agency from the students, and structure from the institution and society. If students choose not to engage with this project, their attitudes are unlikely to change. Equally, if institutions do not take on this project, political attitudes are unlikely to change radically. These limitations to the project of changing political attitudes are silenced in the policy discourses (Q4).
Influence of international alumni

The fourth assumption is that students will be in positions of influence in their home countries: “The experience of students in UK education helps to create good relations that will enable successful engagement with the next generation of global leaders” (BIS, 2013a, p.23). Students are represented to be the “next generation of global leaders” or the “new world class” or “the brightest and the best”. For example, The catchy piece of data that in 2011 27 world leaders were UK graduates (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013) has been widely refracted in subsequent texts and discussions (e.g. The House of Lords, 2014). This appears to imply that international students are academically or in some other way exceptional students. However, while it is perhaps accurate to think of international students as the “new elite” (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013, p.13), this is more a comment on their social status at home than their leadership or academic potential (Q4) (Tannock, 2013). For example, international students are more likely to come from middle or upper classes in China (Xiang and Shen, 2008) and Hong Kong (Waters, 2006). If this is true of two major source countries of international students for the UK, it is likely true of other source countries as well, but the potential ramifications of exacerbating global inequalities are silent in the policy discourse (Q4).

Bacchi’s (2012, p.12) sixth question asks “How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and defended?” (Q6). If, as implied, “the new elite” refers to talent, not social status, it would be reasonable to suppose that visa requirements would reproduce such exclusivity. But the UKBA immigration requirements show that the only limitations on acquiring a student visa, far from being the “best and the brightest”, are only the offer of a place at a university and adequate funds (UKBA, 2008), and a minimum English language level (Home Office, 2011). It is incumbent on universities, as sponsors, to assess academic potential, but most universities apply minimum entry requirements. The absence of more stringent merit-based requirements subverts the pre-supposition that these students will be either the “best”, the “next generation of global leaders” or in positions of influence in their home countries: the requirement is set neither by universities as sponsors nor by immigration authorities as a proxy for the state. A further silence (Q4) is evident: the voices and perspectives of those who are likely
the majority of international students who do not achieve significant positions of power or influence. While they may work in the UK’s interests, in smaller ways, they could also, if disappointed by the promise of UK HE to help elevate them to such positions, become resentful or bitter, and work counter to the UK’s influence. The corpus is silent on their potential impact, and emphasises rather what Wilson (2014) calls the “multiplier effect” - the increased influence assumed to result from positive attitudes held by the powerful, which cascades out through their networks to change in perceptions and attitudes in their home countries (Scott-Smith, 2003; Kramer, 2009).

It is possible, however, to construct an alternative representation of international students’ role(s) in the generation of soft power (Q4). Firstly, they may not be in significant positions of influence and, therefore would be incapable of promoting the UK’s soft power, or only doing so in diffuse, nebulous ways. Secondly, the principle of multiplier model may be challenged (Wilson, 2014). Therefore, even if international students were in positions of influence, Wilson argues that this may not generate significant soft power for the UK. Finally, if international students’ agency is acknowledged, they may choose not to promote the UK’s interests, whatever their influence. Given that one of the aims of UK HE is to produce independent learners and critical thinkers, its alumni may be represented as independent, critical agents. Even if they have strong ties of affection and positive experiences, they may decide not to support British policies. They may, as the Lords Select Committee (2014) implies, access information about the UK and its policies, some of which may be critical, from which they may reach their own conclusions. An alternative understanding, then, would represent international alumni as capable of understanding a country’s interests and motivations, and of being able to think independently about the UK’s foreign policy objectives before they support them. It would not assume a permanent state of compliance in graduates.
International students’ funding

Finally, the soft power benefits to the UK are assumed to be the same for self-funded students as for those on scholarships (Q2). The majority of the evidence listed in support of a body of influential alumni working in the UK’s interests is predicated on scholarship holders. For instance, the Wider Benefits report (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013, p.40) states that it is “(T)he elite Chevening scholars (who) articulate their ambassadorial role most clearly, and many will enter careers in which this mindset may have strong and wide influence”. Furthermore, this research report deliberately oversampled scholarship recipients - 33 out of 100 interviews conducted, where only approximately 2% of tuition fee income is covered by scholarships (my calculation based on data from Conlon, et al., 2011). There is also an inherent response bias in such studies, as students are more likely to agree to participate if they have had positive experiences (Wilson, 2014). Therefore, it is probable that the conclusions regarding even the scholarship holders’ strong feelings of obligation and ties to the UK may not be representative of the international student body as a whole. It appears that much of this global diplomacy rationale has echoes of the US Cold War rhetoric as illustrated above. As Bacchi’s third question (Q3) - how has the representation of the problem come about - highlights, the genealogy of problematisations can reveal key assumptions. In this particular case, it is the solution rather than the problem which is foregrounded. If Cold War style solutions are being proposed, it suggests an understanding of modern geopolitics informed by similar concerns - an extreme sensitivity to threat and a sense of vulnerability to an ideological opponent.

The problem, however, can be thought about differently (Q4). Most of the 50s and 60s era US educational exchanges were funded by the US government, and such literature as does exist in support of the diplomatic benefits felt through international students relies on the evidence from scholarship programmes (Atkinson, 2010; Wilson, 2014). As the Wider Benefits report acknowledges, the inclination to act as ambassador is “perhaps directly related to a perceived obligation to “pay back” to the UK” (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013, p.96). This echoes Papatsiba’s (2005) findings regarding the Erasmus programme, of students who received regional grants feeling a “moral obligation” to engage with the rise of regional potential. But the IES draws no distinction between self-funded students and scholarship recipients in claiming
that UK alumni have the influence to foster British foreign policy (BIS, 2013a, p. 40). Even the attractive statistic referred to above - 27 world leaders studied in the UK - needs to be deconstructed: of the 13 listed by name in the IES, 11 graduated before full cost fees were introduced in 1979. Britain’s free international HE, barring living costs, may have generated substantial goodwill and consequently political influence. However, it is tenuous to extrapolate from this assumption that such influence will also be generated in an era of intensive marketisation and high-cost education. Indeed, Walker (2014) points out that the 1979 introduction of full-cost fees paid a heavy public diplomacy cost, in response to which the Chevening Scholarship scheme was established. Scholarships were doing the public diplomacy work that free education had previously done; today it seems that fee-paying students are being assumed to make the same contribution (Q2). Another way to understand the relationship between international students and the UK (Q4) is as a transaction through a lens of marketisation (Marginson, 2006; Walker, 2014) (see Chapter 7).

**The subjectivation of international students**

The effects of this problem representation (Q5) are to create a set of expectations about who international students are and how they will behave, while in the UK and afterwards. In essence, the target international student is interested in the UK’s culture as well as education, intends to participate in the academic and local community, building an understanding of ‘British values’ and a knowledge and awareness about life in the UK. They are expected to have a positive experience, to make friendships and ‘lasting ties’ both with staff and students and to develop a political affinity with the UK’s interests. Students are expected to return home after they complete their studies, and to exert influence on their return, or at least after they reach the peak of their career. Students are expected to stay in touch with the UK and their host institution. These expectations are reproduced and disseminated in policy, and through alumni and institutional networks (Q6). Sidhu (2002) comments on similar constructions of typical student behaviour and attitudes in British Council publications. In particular, the efforts of the British Council, in promoting the Education UK brand and marketing UK HE internationally through efforts such as the SHINE international student awards (BC, 2011), help to create a vision of the ideal international student.
Students can be represented differently, however (Q4). Taking into consideration the actual entry requirements of the UKBA and many universities, the silent majority of students are unlikely to become major political or economic actors. They are self-funded rather than on scholarship, have a satisfactory but not transformative experience including some unpleasantness, and are positively pre-disposed to the UK but not infatuated. While some students may form ties and personal relationships with Britain and British people that last a lifetime, others may form networks primarily with other international students and co-nationals (see also Chapter 6).

**Conclusion**

The global diplomacy rationale suggests that international students are of long-term benefit to the UK, because, during their time in the country, they develop positive attitudes and lasting ties which lead them to exert influence in their own country in the interests of the UK. Students are assumed to develop an understanding and appreciation for ‘British values’, the existence or content of which is left unproblematic. They are supposed to become more positive throughout the course of their stay, and yet to return home when their studies conclude. When they return home, they are assumed to occupy positions of influence. Thus, the UK can gain soft power through networks of influence and cultural attraction in a landscape of changing relationships between global powers, using its identity and reputation as a tool for public diplomacy (Anholt, 2006).

This problematisation is based on a Cold War logic prevalent in the USA, which led to funded scholarly exchanges with the USSR, and continued with the Franco-German exchanges and EU-wide programmes such as Erasmus. Such scholarships have been a key tool for the development of soft power and diplomatic influence throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods (Rizvi, 2011). However, the current marketplace in international higher education (see Chapter 7) primarily relies on self-funded students, and scholarships are only a minor part of overall funding. Yet the influence exerted by international alumni, discursively established with reference to scholarship holders, is supposed to extend in the same way to self-funded students. Here, the soft power discourse appears to be at odds with the marketisation discourse.
In other ways, the two problematisations complement each other. References in the soft power narrative to making it easier for British trade and businessmen, encouraging life-long brand loyalty to the UK, and so on, speak to the intersections. But with regards to the representation of international students, there is a tension between the imagined ‘alumni as ambassador’ and ‘student as an economic resource’. There are no guarantees that latter will necessarily develop into the former, particularly in the context of increasingly negative portrayals in migration discourses.
Chapter 6 - Reputation: a hybrid educational-commercial rationale and students as consumers

“Education exports also bring a number of indirect benefits, including strengthening the quality and reputation of the UK education sector,” (BIS, 2013a, p.23).

In order to attract international students, a “reputation for quality” is considered an essential part of the UK offer. The initial target, often repeated, of the PMI was to “make Britain the first choice for quality” (Blair, 1999; BC, 2000a; BC, 2003; DfES, 2004). The associations between student choice of study destinations and quality are made from the outset, and became key to the “brand footprint” developed to enhance the UK’s competitive position (BC, 1999). This is sustained throughout the corpus, in the Coalition IES (BIS, 2013a) as well as the PMI. While the UK is represented as having a strong tradition of high-quality higher education (BC, 1999; BC, 2000a; DfES, 2006; BIS, 2009; BC, 2010; BIS, 2011; BIS, 2013a), this is argued to no longer be adequate to remain competitive in a modern marketplace. To compete effectively, reputation must be managed and enhanced: “Maintaining and enhancing our reputation for high-quality higher education provision is crucial for the UK’s image as a destination of choice for international students” (BIS, 2011, p.39). This model of competitive higher education relies on discourses of marketisation, wherein HE is a tradeable service or product, which providers need to ‘sell’ to consumers.

In addition to being a sign of a high-quality reputation, international students are also seen to enhance this reputation. By promoting UK HE through word of mouth, students act as brand ambassadors (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). Therefore, it is essential that international students have positive experiences during their studies, and are satisfied when they leave; otherwise, they will not contribute to the UK’s reputation: “The UK’s reputation for international education is defined by what students experience - and what they say to others - this year, each year, in real time” (Archer, et al., 2010a, p.2). Also, students are seen to “strengthen the quality ... of the UK education sector” (BIS, 2013a, p.23). International students are seen as vehicles for internationalisation, which is seen as a sign of high-quality education (BC, 2010; DTZ, 2011): “UK higher education has a strong reputation. Evidence of this comes through the number of international students who choose to study here (BIS, 2009, p.70)”. When present in HE classrooms, international students are seen
to help make education international to the benefit of all students and home students in particular (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). In turn, this enhances the UK’s competitive market position in international higher education. There is a virtuous cycle in the creation of a reputation for quality, as Figure 22 illustrates.

**Figure 22: The cycle of international perceptions of quality**

This chapter explores the rationale for international student recruitment which argues that their presence enhances UK HE by diversifying the classroom, making it international, and thereby improves the reputation of the sector and country. The first section presents the qualitative analysis which links the argument for enhancing educational quality with enhancing reputation. The second section is an account of the WPR analysis underlying this rationale.
A hybrid rationale: international students enhance education and reputation

This rationale is a hybrid, in what Amit (2010, p.9) calls a “self-conscious synergy” of rationales between the commercial, marketised aim of creating reputation to generate business, and the educational or pedagogical rationale which argues that the intrinsic quality of education itself is improved by recruiting international students. Qualitative analysis revealed that reputation, satisfaction, quality, expectations, and internationalisation were key inter-related concepts in this rationale.

Internationalising education

International students are seen to enhance education as vectors of internationalisation within the classroom (Blair, 1999; Böhm, et al., 2004; DfES, 2004; Blair, 2006; DfES, 2006; Home Office, 2006; Ipsos Mori, 2006; Bone, 2008; Hyland, et al., 2008; Kemp, et al., 2008; UKBA, 2008; QAA, 2009; BC, 2010; UKCISA, 2010a; DTZ, 2011; Home Affairs Committee, 2011; QAA, 2012; BIS, 2013a, b and d). Their presence is thought to benefit UK students by exposing them to different viewpoints (DfES, 2004), which can “enhance their intellectual experience” (Bone, 2008, p.4) or “broaden(ing) the educational experience of the UK students they study alongside” (BIS, 2013a, p.4). UK students “gain from the window on the world which contact with international students gives them” (Blair, 1999). This, it is argued, prepares all students for “careers in the global economy” (DfES, 2006). The presence of international students will “inspire and educate home students about the wider world” (Ipsos Mori, 2006, p.4). “Encouraging more talented students from overseas to come here will make the UK a stronger, brighter and better place to learn, for all our students” (Blair, 2006). Learning experiences are considered better if they are international (BC, 2010, p.3): “the real value of internationalisation is in the way it enhance the learning experiences of both our international and home students”.

International students contribute to education merely by their presence, and “bring(ing) diversity to the education sector, helping to provide an international dimension that benefits all students” (BIS, 2013a, p.24). Indeed, their presence is one of the metrics used by international rankings (Home Affairs Committee, 2011), such
that diversity is a sign of quality (BIS, 2013b, p.5). Students with nationalities or countries of residence other than the UK are counted as a measure of diversity (Böhm, et al., 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Hyland, et al., 2008; Kemp, et al., 2008; BIS, 2009; DIUS, 2009; Archer, et al., 2010b; BIS, 2013b; Lawton, et al., 2013; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). Diversity is primarily understood as a direct result of cultural differences based on nationality (Böhm, et al., 2004, p.39).

Typically, international students are described as a single entity, diverse in comparison to and differentiation from UK students (UKCOSA, 2004; Hyland, et al., 2008; Archer, et al., 2010b; Cameron, 2011b; Home Office, 2011; QAA, 2012; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). While the diversity of the international student body itself is often mentioned, it is rarely described or discussed. For example, the IES claims that “(i)nternational students in the UK bring diversity to the education sector, helping to provide an international dimension that benefits all students” (BIS, 2013a, p.24). The “diversity of people” (Hyland, et al., 2008) is taken to refer to people who come from different countries and, therefore, contribute “cultural diversity” (Archer, et al., 2010b; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). Institutions are argued to be “enriched” by the “new ideas, attitudes and experiences” (UKBA, 2008, p.4) of diverse student bodies. They are seen as an asset: “International students are potentially a great resource for all students in the class to learn cross-cultural team-working skills, in particular, and institutions are missing a trick if they fail to capitalise on it” (Ipsos Mori, 2006, p.7).

The same rationale - that diversity confers a resource - is also apparent with reference to broader communities, where international students are seen to confer social and cultural benefits on the UK (Roche, 2000; Home Office, 2002; BC, 2003; Böhm, et al., 2004; Blair, 2006; Home Office, 2006; Kemp, et al., 2008; UKBA, 2008; May, 2010; HM Government, 2010; Home Office, 2010; Home Office, 2011; DTZ, 2011; Gowers and Hawkins, 2013; BIS, 2013a, b, c and d). Diversity through increased immigration, in general, is frequently said to “enrich and enhance culture” through the contributions of migrants (Roche, 2000; Home Office, 2006; May, 2010a; Cameron, 2013) to “(o)ur literature, our music, our national sporting teams” (Blair, 2004). Students, in particular, are seen to contribute to and enhance local communities (Böhm, et al., 2004; DfES, 2003; Home Office, 2006; BC, 2010; UKCISA, 2010b; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). Typically, however, these claims are
background to the economic and financial claims and they are noticeably less prevalent, though still present, under the Coalition IES than under the PMI.

**Changing perceptions of quality**

While diversity is seen to intrinsically improve education quality, it is the *perceived* quality of higher education, or reputation, which counts for recruitment (Mellors-Bourne, *et al.*, 2013).

Perceptions of the UK as having a high quality education system with good teaching are identified as essential to continue attracting international students (Blair, 1999; BC, 1999; BC, 2000a; BC, 2003; Böhm, *et al.*, 2004; DfES, 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; DfES, 2006; Ipsos Mori, 2006; Hyland, *et al.*, 2008; Kemp, *et al.*, 2008; Home Affairs Committee, 2009; BC, 2010; Archer and Cheng, 2012; DTZ, 2011; QAA, 2012; BIS, 2013a; BIS, 2013b; Mellors-Bourne, *et al.*, 2013; Lawton, *et al.*, 2013; Mellors-Bourne, *et al.*, 2013). In essence, “(t)he popularity of UK HE relies, to a large extent, on the quality of its provision” (QAA, 2012, p.2). This view is present throughout the study. In the launch speech of the PMI, Blair (1999) stated that international students “chose Britain because we offer high quality further and higher education.” At the end of the corpus, the Coalition IES claims that “(o)ur schools, colleges and universities have a long history of excellence and innovation, and a global reputation for quality and rigour” (BIS, 2013a, p.6). However, in the Coalition IES, most of the discussion about quality refers to TNE, rather than HE within the UK. The construct of reputation as attraction emerges also in debates on migration. One of the main arguments in favour of tightening visa controls was to maintain perceptions and experiences of quality of UK education (Home Office, 2006; Home Affairs Committee, 2009; Home Office, 2011). Finally, the importance of quality education is also essential for employability and graduate careers:

(s)tudents appear to be attracted by the reputation and quality of courses provided by the UK education system as well as the reputation of specific institutions and a belief that employment and earning prospects will receive a boost (DTZ, 2011, p.51).

Employability and quality are mutually reinforcing components of reputation: high-quality education is believed to lead to higher employability, and higher rates of
employability are construed as indicators of high-quality education (AGCAS, 2011; Archer and Cheng, 2012). Both are positioned as necessary for a strong reputation.

To attempt to control reputation, therefore, the key goal of the Education UK Counselling Service was to “(p)osition the UK as the leading brand in terms of its reputation for quality and relevance with potential students, employers, governments, advisors and influencers” (BC, 2003, p.23). Similarly, one aim of the PMI2 Programme was to “deal with the specific perceptual concerns of students (on the value of UK education), providing thought leadership on the quality of the student experience and employability agenda” (DTZ, 2011, p.52, emphasis mine). This suggests an attempt to influence and, by “leading thought”, define students’ perceptions of their experiences to enhance reputation. The link between student experience and reputation is formed on the understanding of alumni’s power to influence reputation (UKCOSA, 2004). If the experience of international students is not positive, they are said to be unlikely to positively promote UK higher education upon their return home (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). Alumni are constructed as a “marketing resource” promoting higher education in the UK generally and their institution in particular (BC, 2003; Kemp, et al., 2008; Miller, 2013, p.31) is considered a valuable attribute. Thus, the aim is to improve competitiveness by enhancing reputation through the international student experience: “The only way to differentiate convincingly from rivals around the world is to deliver a better student experience” (Archer, et al., 2010a, p.2, emphasis mine). Therefore, in order to enhance reputation, ‘the’ student experience must be improved.

**Measuring satisfaction with the learning experience**

Reputation is understood as intrinsically linked to international students’ experiences of UK HE, and consequently, their recommendations of the UK to other potential students. Thus an important part of policy discourses is devoted to the analysis of and interventions in student experience (BC, 1999 and 2000; Blair, 2006; Bone, 2008; BIS, 2009; DIUS, 2009; BC, 2010; UKCISA, 2010a; AGCAS, 2011; Archer, et al., 2011; BIS, 2011; DTZ, 2011; QAA, 2012; BIS, 2013a). While “the student experience” is understood to encompass both academic and social experiences, I will focus here on the academic dimensions. While evident during both New Labour and Coalition administrations, this discursive node has greater weight under the former, and in the secondary policy documents.
“The learning experience”, or “academic experience” is a broader concept than either “learning” or “education” both of which replace education in the policy discourses. It appears to comprise teaching, course content and facilities, as Figure 23 shows.

Figure 23: Components of the academic experience (UKCOSA, 20014, p.26)

Teaching is particularly emphasised: “(s)tudents’ academic experiences depend largely on good teaching” (BC, 2010, p.21). Library access, facilities and other resources are noted elsewhere to also play a large role in students’ learning (Archer, et al., 2010b). As evidence of the success of PMI2, it is noted that most UK HEIs “have responded by enhancing the student experience across all dimensions of study and encouraging a culture of continuous improvement among staff” (Archer, et al., 2010a, p.2). UKCISA (2010, p.11) claimed that “(u)niversities, colleges and students’ unions have indeed offered new services, developed new opportunities and enhanced existing activities to improve the quality of the international student experience”. It is also apparent that the keyword ‘learning’ throughout the corpus is used far more frequently to refer to the actions of institutions, to lifelong learning, distance learning and technology-based learning, and to “teaching and learning”, than to describe what international students might learn. Thus, the “quality of education” is redefined to refer to the “quality of the learning experience”, to reflect how students feel about their learning, rather than what they learn.
Therefore, the object of interest is international students’ perceptions of their ‘learning experience’, rather than both ‘learning’ per se or a concept of intrinsic pedagogic quality. International students “certainly value the British educational experience and the UK educational brand” (BIS, 2013a, p.5). Here the brand and the experience replace education or learning as the object. The Education UK brand under the PMI intentionally repositioned the concept, “redefining “quality” to include quality of student experience, facilities, welcome and livability, as well as education per se” (BC, 1999, para 37-38). This move away from a view of quality based on what students learn and how they are taught emphasises “enjoyable achievement” (ibid.), “a rich life experience and enhanced career prospects, as well as high-quality education” (BC, 2010, p.6). Privileging experience over intrinsic educational quality is part of developing a “reputation for quality” and justifies the use of student satisfaction as a measure of quality.

‘Satisfaction’ is frequently employed as a metric for quality and interpreted as evidence of success in international education (UKCOSA, 2004; Ipsos Mori, 2006; BC, 2010; Archer, et al., 2010a; Archer, et al., 2010b; AGCAS, 2011; Archer, et al., 2011; DTZ, 2011; QAA, 2012). For example, “(i)nternational student satisfaction remains high at 81%” (Archer, et al., 2010a, p.1); “(S)ince 2006, international student satisfaction at UK universities has increased on average by 9 percentage points, from 72% to 81%” (Archer, et al., 2011, p.3); and “eight out of 10 international students are satisfied with their overall experience of studying in the UK” (QAA, 2012, p.5). It is made explicit that student satisfaction leads to reputational gains in the higher education marketplace (UKCISA, 2011b; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). This relationship is more important during the PMI2 than the PMI and virtually disappears under the Coalition IES. The PMI2 (DIUS, 2009) set the goal of making “demonstrable improvements to student satisfaction ratings in the UK”. Given that ‘demonstrable’ here means ‘quantifiable’, significant investments were made during the PMI in ‘tracking’ and ‘measuring’ international students’ satisfaction, primarily through a proprietary index known as the International Student Barometer (ISB) (BC, 2010). This investment does not appear to have continued in the IES, as there is no mention of such data after 2011. Student satisfaction still appears to be accepted as a proxy for measures of quality, however (BIS, 2013a). The construct of student as consumer begins to emerge from the satisfaction-quality conflation.
Meeting needs and expectations

In order to satisfy students, it is considered essential to “manage expectations” and meet their “needs”. Student satisfaction is acknowledged to be influenced by expectations, particularly of support (BC, 2000a, 2003; Böhm, et al., 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Ipsos Mori, 2006; Kemp, et al., 2008; Archer, et al., 2010a, 2010b; AGCAS, 2011; Archer, et al., 2011; DTZ, 2011; UKCISA, 2011b; BC, 2012b; QAA, 2012; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). One of the key challenges cited in the initial branding documents is that “customer expectations are becoming increasingly sophisticated” (BC, 2003, p.8) and that expectations affect perceptions of experience, particularly when they are not met (ibid., p.19). This is traceable to the Vision 2020 report, widely cited in the corpus: “students are becoming increasingly demanding and discriminating” (Böhm, et al., 2004, p.37). The report emphasises the importance of responding to these changing expectations to sustain competitiveness. Later on: “international students expectations have never been higher. And in times of economic uncertainty, delivering on the promise has never been harder” (Archer, et al., 2010a, p.2).

There are clear connotations of a marketised view of education, and of students as consumers here. This is reinforced by the description, albeit in scare quotes, of education as a purchase: “for those students paying full fees this is a ‘luxury purchase’ and with this comes the expectations associated with this type of purchase” (BC, 2003, p.31). These expectations are not further explicated. Price and fees are explicitly associated with expectations elsewhere: “The new fee regime in the UK will inevitably raise expectations among home students” (Archer, et al., 2011, p.2). Similarly, with regards to research students, Kemp et al. (2008) comment on increasing power and new expectations and institutional guidance highlights the importance of “managing expectations” from an early stage (Archer, et al., 2010; QAA, 2012).

In addition, international students are frequently represented as having important “needs” (BC, 2000a; BC, 2003; DfES, 2003; Böhm, et al., 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Ipsos Mori, 2006; Hyland, et al., 2008; Kemp, et al., 2008; QAA, 2009; Archer, et al., 2010b; BC, 2010; BIS, 2011; DTZ, 2011; UKCISA, 2011b; Home Affairs
Committee, 2011; QAA, 2012; BIS, 2013a and b; Home Office, 2013a; Lawton, et al., 2013). Therefore, they are vulnerable (UKCOSA, 2004; Archer, et al., 2010b; DTZ, 2011; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013; Miller, 2013; UKCISA, 2013c). Overseas students are said to “have different needs to British students” (BC, 1999, para. 8). These needs are primarily pedagogical: for support with language (BC, 1999, para 11), employability skills (DTZ, 2011), “educational and cultural needs” (QAA, 2012, p.26; also in Hyland, et al., 2008; UKCISA, 2010a), research skills (QAA, 2009), study skills (QAA, 2009), group work and discussion (Archer, et al., 2010b), and transitioning between learning and teaching styles (UKCISA, 2011b; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). They are also constructed as vulnerable with regards to personal safety and security (BC, 2007, 2013). It is suggested that institutions should provide support to assist with: shortfalls in personal finance (UKCOSA, 2004; Ipsos Mori, 2006; Archer, et al., 2010b; Miller, 2013), difficulty obtaining refunds or deposits subsequent to complaints (UKCISA, 2013c), information provision (DTZ, 2011; QAA, 2012), and counselling (Bone, 2008). This reflects a deficit model of international students, in apparent contradiction to the value placed on them as educational resources.

Indeed, the Brand Report (BC, 1999) makes a virtue of this characteristic by evoking the “rite of passage” myth, where students experience an ordeal and therefore develop self-knowledge and become adults. Yet secondary policy documents acknowledged that students are largely self-sufficient, and frequently do not access support services, preferring to rely on their social networks (UKCOSA, 2004; Archer, et al., 2010b). This contradicts the dominant representation in the primary policy discourse of a needy student in deficit requiring major support. Nor do they comment on the Ipsos Mori (2006, p.11) findings that “(i)n terms of the actual studying there are no more problems reported by international students than UK students”.

However, meeting many of these expectations would be resource intensive (DfES, 2003; UKCOSA, 2004; Archer, et al., 2010b; UKCISA, 2011b). This occurs in a context of reduced funding for HEIs, particularly in England, and, in the latter half of the PMI2, economic recession. The Brand Report concludes that institutions and the sector “have to make them feel guided and supported while they are with us and validated when they get back home” (BC, 1999, para.52, emphasis mine). The
change is in influencing perceptions, not resources or institutional provision. Therefore, it is suggested that resources be strategically allocated to key areas of the student experience (Archer, et al., 2010a), to manage expectations rather than alter material experiences. The QAA guidance (2012) and two of the PMI2’s most heavily promoted pilot projects, Prepare for Success\(^6\) and the International Student Calculator\(^7\), rely on the provision of information (UKCISA, 2010a), not investment in facilities or staff time. An alternative response, rather than offering support for the apparent lack of English language, is to increase the minimum standards of English for visas (Gower, 2010; Johnson, 2010; UKBA, 2011; Home Affairs Committee, 2011; Home Office, 2011; UKBA, 2011b; UKCISA, 2011a; Conlon, et al., 2011; Home Office, 2012, 2013; NAO, 2012). This obviates the need for linguistic support from the institution: “(r)aising the language bar will act as evidence of a student’s fitness to complete the course in English, as well as assisting with their integration with other students and wider society on arrival in the UK.” (UKBA, 2010, p.12).

Meeting the apparent needs and expectations of international students is therefore argued to be an essential part of maintaining and enhancing their “learning experience”, which facilitates their contributions to enhancing and internationalising UK HE. The quality of UK HE is thereby materially improved, and students are satisfied. Satisfied students contribute to promoting the UK and thereby enhance its reputation for quality, necessary for success in a competitive marketplace.

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\(^6\) A website offering study skills information pre-arrival  
\(^7\) A tool to help students to plan their finances
Creating a reputation for quality in a competitive environment: WPR analysis

The account of the rationales given above presents an interlinked set of solutions, designed to address the implicit problem of intense competition in global higher education markets (Q1). In order to build a reputation for high-quality HE, the solution is to devise a measure of quality, which can be controlled and widely disseminated in promotional materials, and to make higher education better by internationalising. Thus, the “learning experience” is substituted for “education”, such that the “quality of education” can be assessed using satisfaction with the learning experience. Because international education is seen to be better, internationally diverse classrooms are read as a sign of quality. Consequently, high international student numbers and satisfaction are taken as indicators of the quality of UK HE. But relying on diversity to provide an internationalised, and, therefore, high quality, education, generates its own problematisation: international students are viewed as unable to engage in such internationalisation, due to their ‘needs’ or deficit.

Bacchi’s second question is ‘what assumptions underpin this representation’ (Q2). Firstly, it is assumed to be legitimate to equate the “learning experience” with “education” in discussions of quality. Secondly, it is assumed that quality can be measured by student satisfaction. Thirdly, diversity is assumed to be equivalent to nationality. Fourthly, diversity is presupposed to mean an intercultural education, which is considered to be necessarily good. Fifthly, when international students do not effectively engage in such intercultural education, their deficit is assumed to be the reason. The fundamental assumption is that knowledge and behaviours can be read from culture, which can be read from national origin. These assumptions form the basis of the WPR analysis which follows, where these assumptions and the other WPR questions will be explored in an integrated analysis. The results of this analysis are summarised in Figure 24.
Figure 24: ‘What is the problem represented to be’ analysis of the reputational rationale

Multiple nationalities: a sign of quality

The first key assumption (Q2) is that the physical presence of students who have ‘other’ nationalities constitutes diversity:

To justify claims that an institution provides a true international education, and to attract top students from around the world, it is necessary to clearly demonstrate a strong physical global footprint; a sizeable body of international students (16 percent of all students in the UK are from abroad) and lecturers ... a strongly internationalised course content; and a suitable number of opportunities for exchange and overseas study (BC, 2012b, p.10).

This conceptualisation of diversity, “trapped within a set of nation-centric assumptions” (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010, p.194), however, is left largely unproblematic (Q4) in the primary policy documents. Other dimensions such as religion, social background, wealth, prior education, disability gender, or age, are rare (Marginson, et al., 2010). Religion, for example, is mentioned in conjunction with international students only in secondary policy documents by students themselves (UKCOSA, 2004; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013).

Where international students are not disaggregated by nationality, they are represented generically, in terms of their difference: “overseas students have
different needs to British students” (BC, 1999, para.8), and a PMI2 sponsored mentoring project “had given them (staff) a better understanding of cultural differences and issues facing international students” (DTZ, 2011, p.18). This is also replicated in students’ perceptions (Hyland, et al., 2008, p.21). This establishes a dividing line between an aggregated body of “international” students and “home students”.

The contrast between the unproblematic use of the term ‘diversity’ as a proxy for ‘different national culture’ in primary documents and the more nuanced analyses of certain secondary policy documents (Archer, et al., 2010b; Miller, 2013) highlights the totalising nature of this concept in primary policy discourse. In domestic policy discourses, such as those around widening participation in the Higher Ambitions White Paper (BIS, 2009), diversity takes on a wider meaning to encompass class, culture, language and family background (e.g. Crozier, et al., 2008). In contrast, policy on international students reduces this to a single dimension: different nationalities. From a governmentality perspective, inasmuch as such a definition is held and replicated through quasi-governmental agencies such as HEFCE and the QAA (2012), it is likely to impact the behaviours of institutions (Q5), persuading HEIs to become ‘diverse’ in compliance with this definition (Sidhu, 2006; Rose and Miller, 2008). It is this understanding of diversity which underpins the dominant model of intercultural learning.

Although diversity is invoked to legitimise and value difference, such discursive framing has the paradoxical effect of highlighting difference and setting one group of people (home students) against another (international) (Marginson, et al., 2010). This creates a binary of social identification between the two groups, which reduces the complexity of individual lived experiences (Bacchi, 2009). In this sense, diversity as a discursive object works as a dividing practice (Foucault, 1982; Moscovici, 2000; Bacchi, 2009) categorising students as either international or ‘home’, and arguably, therefore, marginalising (Rose and Miller, 2008) or Othering them (Asgharzadeh, 2008; Anderson, 2009; Marginson, et al., 2010). Subtleties of personal history, cultural identification, minority status, and so on are not encompassed by the discursive representation of diversity as national origin, particularly as the official definition of international relies on residence, not nationality (see Introduction, p.9). One possible explanation for this reduction may
relate to cultural capital (Waters, 2006; Kim, 2011). National diversity is cosmopolitan and elite, representing high symbolic cultural capital, whereas, for example, diversity of language, age, personal experience or minority cultural status carry no particular exchange value. Internationally diverse classrooms can, therefore, be understood as symbolically important to the reputation of UK HE, denoting high-status interactions.

Intercultural learning experiences

The pedagogic benefits of a multicultural classroom and campus, with its potential to prepare students (UK and international) for a globalised working life, are taken for granted in the corpus (Q2). It is assumed that institutions do not need to adapt to accommodate the integration of international students (Marginson, et al., 2010). However, this contrasts sharply with research on experiences of integration in the classroom. Several studies have found that rather than “enhancing intellectual experiences”, many UK and international students have difficult interactions and tend not to form friendships (Turner, 2009; Wu and Hammond, 2011). UK students are often resentful of the burden perceived to be placed on them, particularly in assessed group-work (Seymour and Constanti, 2002; Cathcart, et al., 2006; Henderson, 2009; Barron and Dasli, 2010). Friendships formed are often superficially polite ‘hi-byé’ interactions (Sovic, 2009) with UK students often unwilling to accommodate international students (Barron and Dasli, 2010). Turner (2009, p.245) comments that “HE classrooms remain configured according to implicit local norms that silently privilege home students over others” (Q4), calling the nature of the presumed multicultural classroom into question.

Mutual stereotypes emerge, with UK students seen by international students as intolerant, confrontational and stuck in their ways (Turner, 2009), and international students seen by home students as in language deficit, lazy, silent and unprepared for UK HE (Cathcart, et al., 2006; Henderson, 2009). Therefore international students tend to form stronger bonds and friendship networks with other international students, sometimes with co-nationals, and often with other international students (Seymour and Constanti, 2002; Montgomery and McDowell, 2009; van Mol, 2013). While a “lack of integration” is addressed in the policy documents (BC, 1999; BC,
the implications for intercultural learning are not (Q4). This “suggests that none of the students are benefiting as much as they could from the potential for learning offered by a heterogeneous student population” (Seymour and Constanti, 2002, p.8). Where deeper integration and intercultural learning have emerged, it was the result of structured, frequent interactions (Sovic, 2009; Caruana and Ploner, 2010). This is also consistent with the findings from funded mobility schemes such as Erasmus (Papatsiba, 2005), as described in the previous chapter. The simple presence of international students is unlikely to result in intercultural learning without more active interventions from staff and institutions. Therefore, the presupposition that international learning experiences are inherently superior is questionable.

Subject effects emerge from this discursive formation (Q5). Internationalising the classroom is sometimes represented in both the textual data and the literature as an empowering, inclusive project which respects the knowledge that (international) students bring to the classroom, moving away from uni-directional, mono-cultural knowledge transmission (Hyland, et al., 2008; Caruana and Ploner, 2010). However, in this corpus, internationalisation in the classroom is generally represented as fundamentally passive, achieved by the simultaneous presence of diverse people, requiring no particular action or agency from them.

Finally, promoting the idea that passive internationalisation results in intercultural learning constructs an image of international students as teaching assistants or ‘resource’, endowed with a responsibility to communicate their cultural knowledge to UK students (Q5). Yet when the experiences of both UK and international students collide with an idealised narrative, this conflict is silenced (Q4). The ethos of inclusion, respect for prior knowledge and active student engagement - for deep pedagogic collaboration - may be experienced by students as exploitative if poorly or superficially implemented in the classroom, and left unproblematic (Q4).

**Learning experiences: a sign of quality**

While traditional views of educational quality have emphasised the knowledge and aptitudes acquired by students (Ashwin, et al., 2015), this policy discourse represents students’ experiences as the primary indicator of quality. Similar conclusions were reached through research on the National Student Survey in the UK (Johnson, 2000;
Sabri, 2013), the National Survey of Student Engagement in the USA (Kuh, 2009), and the Course Experience Questionnaire in Australia (Ramsden, 1991). These researchers all document, with varying degrees of criticality, the increasing authority of national survey instruments which report on the student experience. This suggests that state policy approaches to domestic and international students replicate the same pattern of conflating quality of education with experience (Q6).

Accepting quality of experience as a proxy for quality of education places the student as the primary judge of their own learning (Ramsden, 1991, p.131). Framing students as “best placed” (Sabri, 2011) to comment on their learning and the teaching they have experienced leads to such data being used as the primary and sometimes the only indicator of the quality of education. Confounding variables or context which may impact students’ evaluations are left silent (Q4). Yet students have been found to be impacted by other unrelated factors, such as age, gender and attractiveness of lecturers, as well as grades received (Zabaleta, 2007). This suggests that it is possible to think differently (Q4) about what students are actually evaluating with regards to their perceptions of teaching and by extension to their learning experiences. In identifying students as the primary arbiter of quality, other potential sources of knowledge on learning are silenced: namely lecturers, institutions, and experts in the curriculum (Q4). There is, therefore, the potential for education to become focused on delivering an enjoyable experience in preference to a challenging or demanding education (Furedi, 2012) (Q5), the quality of which is determined by experts (Q4). This problematisation is replicated when institutions, QUANGOs and league tables accept student satisfaction metrics as legitimate and primary indicators of quality (Q6).

**Quality can be measured through satisfaction**

Accepting experience as a proxy for quality enables its measurement through satisfaction, rationalising the domain of international higher education and making it susceptible to evaluation (Rose and Miller, 2008). Quantifying the quality of experience also permits the ready dissemination of key numbers as signs of quality, crucial for building the brand. The reproduction of such statistics suggests they are key discursive objects, embodying rich representations and generating intense media
and social interest (Sabri, 2013). These representations focus the public gaze on certain aspects of the HE experience (those that are measured) and not others (Johnson, 2010; Sabri, 2013). What is being measured is not the intrinsic quality of these dimensions (for instance, measures of the resources provided in the library), but rather students’ satisfaction with them. The subjectivity of this measure is left unproblematic in the policy discourse (Q4) because the ultimate aim is the improvement of reputation, the perceived quality of experience. While the quantification of student satisfaction may appear discursively hegemonic, there are criticisms in the literature on the domestic uses of student satisfaction surveys, which also apply to international student satisfaction (Johnson, 2000; Sabri, 2011, 2013). In addition, alternative approaches to understanding the interaction between student feedback and academic quality are possible (Q4). Critical pedagogy, for example, could be an alternative way to reunite political and the pedagogical motivations for encouraging student engagement (Buckley, 2014). These approaches would be less susceptible to deployment for reputational advantage.

How the quantification of satisfaction as an indicator of quality has come about (Q3) may be understood through a lens of governmentality. An apparent consent on the validity of measuring student satisfaction has been manufactured (Fairclough, 1989), which became subject to state action (Foucault, 1977) in sponsoring its measurement. Because perceptions of quality generate status and income for the sector and the nation, there are significant vested interests at work in the measurement of satisfaction as an indicator of quality, which are embedded in the policy discourses. The ISB, for example, was funded centrally through the PMI, demonstrating that, although the implementation was done at a distance (i.e. carried out through a non-governmental body), the weight of government was behind the principle. Institutions who chose to opt out of the ISB would therefore likely suffer reputational damage through lack of comparison in international league tables (Q5). This is consistent with a neo-liberal, managerialist governmentality (Rose and Miller, 2008) which increases state power and centralisation through a push towards public accountability through quality assurance (Shattock, 2006; Filippakou, 2011). This is likely to have variable effects across the sector, depending on the institutions’ capital. While it is argued to be important for the UK HE system to be transparent in reporting international student satisfaction ratings, the implications of this transparency for the autonomy of the sector are not discussed (Q4). So through
discursively re-defining quality as satisfaction, and introducing key metrics associated with resource allocation which prioritise student satisfaction, institutions are encouraged to conform.

**Cultural deficit**

Not all students are satisfied with their learning experiences, however, and when they are not, responsibility is transferred to the international student (Q5) (Marginson, *et al*., 2010). As described above, international students are represented as vulnerable, needy, and in academic deficit, particularly in the secondary policy documents. While institutions are supposed to offer support for these needs (QAA, 2012), the deficit discourse permits dissatisfied students to be marginalised.

Underpinning discussions of students’ various academic deficits is an unspoken assumption of ‘cultural deficit’, which becomes apparent when national and regional origin are used to explain aspects of international students experiences. This includes: information seeking behaviours (Ipsos Mori, 2006; Kemp, *et al*., 2008), study habits (BC, 1999), involvement with social activities (Kemp, *et al*., 2008; Archer, *et al*., 2010b), motivation for studies (Kemp, *et al*., 2008; Archer, *et al*., 2010b; Mellors-Bourne, *et al*., 2013), whether they work or not during their course (Archer and Cheng, 2012), and their choice of subjects (Mellors-Bourne, *et al*., 2013). By implication, it is the students’ nationality that predicts different ‘needs’, behaviours and attitudes (Q4). This model presents students as ‘needy’ (Henderson, 2009, p.406). Goode (2007, p.592) suggests that “students who do not ‘fit’ this profile are seen as in deficit. They become subject to a negative moral discourse surrounding ‘dependency’, via infantilising them as immature learners, rather than as agentic students acting rationally”. This resonates with Ecclestone and Hayes (2009) description of the therapeutization of higher education, creating the student as a vulnerable patient in need of emotional aid to meet the rigours of study, incapable of coping (Panton, 2004, cited in Bartram and Bailey, 2010). This representation of the problem may have come about (Q3) through a mutually corroborating discourse emerging from academic staff experiences and perceptions, filtered into policy through the networks of experts (many of the authors on secondary policy documents have academic affiliations). However, this deficit model is perhaps almost as widely
critiqued in the research on international students (Goode, 2007; Ippolito, 2007; Kingston and Forland, 2008; Coate, 2009; Montgomery, 2010) as it is replicated (Q6).

The deficit model of international students reveals what Bullen and Kenway (2003) term ‘culturalism’: the privileging of culture as a primary explanatory tool, a culturally essentialist presumption of homogeneity within cultural groups (Marginson, et al., 2010; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). In this corpus, particularly in the secondary policy documents, cultural difference is used to explain knowledges, perceptions and behaviours, and ultimately to underpin deficit representations of students. Montgomery and McDowell (2009) suggest that students are seen to undertake higher education in the UK to remedy a cultural deficit. Suggesting that international students, because they are not British, are necessarily in deficit (Bullen and Kenway, 2003; Devos, 2003) is a neo-imperialist, or neo-racist, dimension to this discourse. This involves silencing critical student voices when they highlight power imbalances in the classroom and postcolonial relationships (Welikala and Watkins, 2008), which do not appear at all in the policy texts (Q4). There is also silence on institutional or cultural marginalisation of international students (Marginson, et al., 2010).

Effectively, the deficit model makes individual students responsible for the quality of their experience (Q5) (Sidhu, 2006), implying that dissatisfaction is the result of their cultural, linguistic or academic shortcomings. This is apparent in associations made between lower satisfaction scores and regional origin. These links are attributed to “unrealistic expectations” (Archer, et al., 2010b; UKCISA, 2011b; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013) and associated with “differences in educational culture between students’ own country and the UK” (UKCOSA, 2004, p.27). Similarly, there has been a link made between national cultures and learning deficits, often made with reference to Confucian cultures (Sidhu and Dall’Alba, 2012). In the academic literature, this has often been linked with particular learning styles or behaviours, such as memorisation (Kingston and Forland, 2008, p.207).

Where satisfaction is low, answers are sought in the assimilation (Van Leeuwen, 1996) of students as subjects to regional origin. This is a form of categorisation, where an identity for this group (e.g. “East Asian students”) is constructed and expectations and behaviours are created for them (Fairclough, 2003; Bacchi, 2009).
However, Welikala and Watkins (2008) established that family, individual and social group factors also contributed to differences between students’ approaches to learning, which were not easily explained by culture (Q4). The problematisation of the category ‘different’ on the basis of their culture discursively marginalises international students in policy, and may impact institutional and even classroom practices when its assumptions are reproduced in research (Q5). The deficit model also subjectifies students by, as Grace Karram (2013) found in the Canadian context, constructing students as passive recipients of institutional help, although the intent is usually to help students who are seen to be in difficulty or distress (Ippolito, 2007). An alternative is, as Marginson et al. (2010) suggest, for institutions to strengthen informal security for students rather than seeking to fill social and emotional needs. This has the potential to create a deficit identity for international students (Hacking, 1999), where they are institutionally identified as a “problem category” (Bacchi, 2009). This can create a self-fulfilling prophecy where students ‘live down’ and internalise the discursive representations held by staff (Bullen and Kenway, 2003; Goode, 2007), and in this case, by policy makers.

Implicit in this representation is the presumption that engagement in international education must be to the benefit of the UK to accept the presence of international students. Yet under international agreements such as the GATS (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010), the UK cannot prevent GSM entirely, so the problem can be thought about differently (Q4): as laudatory rhetoric in a post hoc justification.

**Students as consumers**

Students are also constructed as social subjects through their representation as consumers (Marginson, *et al.*, 2010). The equation of satisfaction with experience as a proxy for quality (Q3) is premised on a marketised model of higher education, facilitated by a lack of consensus on an alternative vision of quality in higher education (Ashwin, *et al.*, 2015). In the marketisation model, the student experience is connected to the idea of a rationalistic, free consumer (Sabri, 2011), who needs to be satisfied to generate “brand loyalty” and reputational advantage for the institution and the sector.
Satisfaction and its measurement has been linked to the marketisation of international higher education, which has allowed international students to be represented as customers, and consumers (BC, 1999; BC, 2000a; Böhm, et al., 2004; BC, 2003; UKCOSA, 2004; Ipsos Mori, 2006; Home Affairs Committee, 2009; Archer, et al., 2010b; BC, 2010; UKCISA, 2010a; UKCISA, 2011a; BIS, 2013b; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013; UKCISA, 2013c). As Williams (2012) observes, the terms are used in the policy discourse interchangeably, although dictionary definitions and theorists propose a distinction on the premise that consumers use and discard a product, whereas customers purchase a product or service. Therefore, the customer arguably has more power than the consumer, as they create a longer lasting relationship with the provider. In the textual data, however, there is little evidence of such a distinction, and students are described as both customers and consumers.

The main actor in this discourse is typically the institution or the UK as a nation-state (Fairclough, 1989), such that students are rarely depicted as agents (Mulderrig, 2003). Students-as-consumers are acted upon: researched and analysed (BC, 2000a; Böhm, et al., 2004), managed (ibid.; Archer, et al., 2010b), communicated with (BC, 2003; BC, 2010), offered products (BC, 2003), competed for (BC, 2003), offered a service/convenience experience (BC, 2003; UKCISA, 2010a; UKCISA, 2011a), marketed to (BC, 2003), profiled (BC, 2003), and protected (BIS, 2013b; UKCISA, 2013c). This concept of the student as consumer divorces them from their social or class background (Leathwood and O’Connell, 2003), silencing (Q4) how different life histories may influence students’ experiences of higher education, international as well as home (e.g. Crozier, et al., 2008; Xiang and Shen, 2008). A degree of equality is thus assumed between all students (Tannock, 2013). These silences may encourage a passive learner identity and alter learning (Naidoo, et al., 2011).

Some argue that the position of consumer is an empowering one for students, offering them a set of rights and bargaining power (Williams, 2012), such that student satisfaction surveys are seen to offer a voice which institutions must listen to in order to succeed. It is also assumed to create better quality of services, although this is not always the case (Q4) (Marginson, et al., 2010). The emphasis on satisfaction rests on a conflation between a moral imperative (that it is right to listen to students and respond to their views) with an epistemic conviction (that students are privileged knowers) (Moore and Muller, 1999). Moore and Muller argue that
‘voice discourse’ causes researchers to suggest that the voices of the discursively oppressed are the only authentic forms of knowledge. Extending this argument to the ‘student voice’ implies that student experience discourses position students as ‘oppressed’ within the higher education system, and that satisfaction surveys are empowering (Buckley, 2014). This produces a narrow representation of student voice primarily in terms of satisfaction and experience, constraining possible statements (Sabri, 2013).

By valuing student voice to the extent that they can recommend or voice negative views of a country and a university, a subject position is discursively created (Foucault, 1972), which is primarily defined by consumer-like relations, actions, and rights (Q5). This encourages students to exert consumer rights, such as complaints, rather than citizen or universal rights, like protests or lobbying (Marginson, et al., 2010; Robertson, 2011). When students exert consumer rights, they exercise agency within the confines established by marketisation discourses. However, Marginson et al. (2010) suggest that students in Australia are largely unaware of their rights as consumers and so are unlikely to exert them. ‘Consumer’ is also often a passive role, where the institution takes the main action, as described above where students can be ‘marketed to’ and ‘protected’ (Askehave, 2007; Naidoo, et al., 2011). Similarly, it encourages students to see an education, or rather the sign thereof, a degree, as something to ‘have’ rather than something to ‘be’ (Molesworth, et al., 2009), such that they focus on the acquisition, on meeting the threshold requirements, rather than on the possibilities for becoming. Yet the role of a consumer can also be a more active, engaged model where the consumer is a co-creator and active agent in learning (Naidoo, et al., 2011), so there are alternative models (Q4). Even so, the role of consumer is a limited one, where rights are conferred on the basis of economic power only. A more powerful alternative model is articulated by Marginson et al. (2010) who argue for a rights-based approach to students as self-determining agents, entitled to the full range of freedoms on the basis of universal rights.
Conclusion

Students are discursively represented as consumers or customers, in a fundamentally passive relationship with institutions. As such, they have the power to evaluate the quality of their learning experience, which is substituted for education quality in policy discourses. Therefore, their satisfaction determines how UK HE is perceived internationally, creating a reputation for quality. Students are also seen as resources for internationalisation, again a passive role in that their diversity does the work of generating intercultural learning for UK students. In this sense, international students create, evaluate and promote quality international higher education. Where this does not occur, international students are held to be in cultural deficit: their difference is at once valued for what it signifies (a cosmopolitan globalism), and de-legitimized when it results in different attitudes or negativity. In valuing their difference as diversity, a dividing practice is established between international and home students, as evident in problematic classroom interactions and mutual stereotypes. By seeking to explain the reasons behind student satisfaction, and validating its use as an indicator of quality, the narrative has the discursive effect of disempowering critical international student voices in a neo-colonial assignation of ‘Otherness’, necessarily in deficit.
Chapter 7 - Income: an economic rationale and international students as economic contributors

“The estimated £3.8 billion a year that international students bring into the UK” (BC, 2003, p.2)

The most dominant rationale in this corpus is the financial incentive to recruit international students. At its heart is the premise that the UK needs more money and that direct international recruitment is an appropriate, effective means of obtaining it. The 2011 Budget (HM Treasury and DBIS, 2011, p.40) argues that “Higher education is central to economic growth and the UK has one of the most successful higher education systems in the world”. The direct income gained through tuition fees and related payments (Conlon, et al., 2011), as well as the economic growth that results from the labour market value of skilled graduates, are claimed as essential functions of international higher education. From the outset of the PMI, the economic gains were cited as a major factor in attracting international students: “British exports of education and training are worth some eight billion pounds a year. Money that feeds into our institutions and helps our goal to open up opportunities for more people to study” (Blair, 1999). This emphasis has intensified throughout the period under discussion, and David Willetts’ foreword to the Coalition International Education Strategy echoes the same logic: “Overseas students who come to Britain to study make a huge contribution to our economy” (BIS, 2013a, p.3). He cites tuition fees, other payments and the boost to local economies as well as the national economy as a consequence of international students’ presence in the UK.

The emphasis on income gained through education exports in general, and international students’ presence in the UK in particular, relies on a number of problematisations at work in the discourse of marketisation in higher education in policy on international students. The first section highlights the key concepts which emerged from the qualitative analysis. Essentially, the income to be gained from international students’ tuition fees, other expenditures, and labour market contributions are argued to give the UK a competitive advantage in the international higher education marketplace, thus maintaining its position. The second section presents the WPR analysis, which argues that the underlying problem is one of
competition, where the UK is vulnerable to losing market share. The core assumptions in this representation of the problem are that international higher education is a marketplace, universities are businesses, education is a commodity, and growth is a unilateral benefit. This engenders a subject representation of international students as ways to earn money, vectors of income, rather than individuals.

An economic rationale: International students generate income and competitive advantage

International higher education, and particularly the direct recruitment of overseas students to UK HEIs, is constructed in the corpus as a global business (DfES, 2003; BC, 2003; Archer, et al., 2010b), with economic benefits to the UK (BIS, 2009). It is represented as a source of external income (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013) and therefore “a major contributor to national wealth and economic development” (BC, 2012, p.3). It is also described as a sector (Böhm, et al., 2004), and an industry (BC, 2000a; DfES, 2004; BIS, 2013b): “(e)ducation is a tradable sector with imports and exports like any other tradable sector, such as manufacturing” (Conlon, et al., 2011, p.12). International education is frequently described as a ‘market’ (BC, 1999; BC, 2000a; BC, 2003; Böhm, et al., 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; DfES, 2003; DfES, 2004; Bone, 2008; Kemp, et al., 2008; Archer, et al., 2010b; BC, 2010; Conlon, et al., 2011; DTZ, 2011; BC, 2012; BIS, 2013a, b, c; Lawton, et al., 2013; Mellors-Bourne, 2013). The presence of international students in the UK is presented in terms of supply and demand (Conlon, et al., 2011; BIS, 2013a and d).

The rhetorical use of numbers of international students is prevalent throughout the corpus, and is closely linked with the market model (Blair, 1999; BC, 1999, 2000, 2003; DfES, 2003, 2004; Labour Party, 2005; Blair, 2006; DfES, 2006; Bone, 2008; Kemp, et al., 2008; UKBA, 2008; DIUS, 2009; BC, 2010; May, 2010; Archer, et al., 2011; Conlon, et al., 2011; Cameron, 2011; DTZ, 2011; QAA, 2012; BIS, 2013a, b, c; Cameron, 2013; Gowers and Hawkins, 2013; Secretary of State for the Home Office, 2013; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013; UKCISA, 2013a and b). For example: the PMI set a target “to achieve a higher education market share of 25% by 2005 (50,000 additional students)” (Blair, 1999); “In 2002/03, 174,575 international students studied in UK higher education institutions,” (DfES, 2004, p.17); “international students accounting for 14.1%” of the student population (Bone, 2008,
“an extra 93,000 (international students) in HE” were recruited (DIUS, 2009); and “In 2011/12, there were 435,000 international students studying at 163 publicly-funded higher education institutions” (BIS, 2013a, p.14). This is a small sample of the ways in which numbers of international students are discussed.

**Income**

The size of the market is said to have “grown sharply in recent years” (BIS, 2013a), often quantified in terms of income potential (BIS, 2013b): for example, “(I)n 2008/09, the size of the global market for higher education was £3.34 million” (Conlon, *et al.*, 2011, p.77). A growth rate of 7% is predicted between 2012 and 2017 in the global education market (BIS, 2013b). This sustained growth is unusually high in comparison to other sectors (Böhm, *et al.*, 2004), and is, therefore, an important target for government intervention. These data are typically presented to set out the potential profits the UK could amass (DfES, 2003; BIS, 2013b). The UK’s ‘performance’ in terms of ‘market share’ is then evaluated (BC, 2003).

The economic benefits derived from increased income constitute the main rationale for increasing the UK’s ‘market share’ (Blair, 1999, 2004, 2005, 2006; BC, 2000a; Roche, 2000; Home Office, 2002, 2006; BC, 2003; DfES, 2003; Böhm, *et al.*, 2004; BC, 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Labour Party, 2005; Bone, 2008; HEA, 2008; Kemp, *et al.*, 2008; UKBA, 2008; Home Affairs Committee, 2009, 2011; QAA, 2009; Conlon, *et al.*, 2011; DTZ, 2011; BIS, 2013a, b, c and d; HEFCE, 2013; UKCISA, 2013b). Financial benefits are argued to accrue institutions from tuition fee income (e.g. BC, 2003) and to the wider UK economy through spending on other “goods and services” (e.g. Conlon, *et al.*, 2011). This funds research and teaching in HEIs (BC, 2003) and is thus sometimes presented as ultimately benefiting UK students through intercultural learning (see Chapter 6).

HEIs are observed to be increasingly dependent on this income (Blair, 2006; Home Affairs Committee, 2009). Such dependence could be construed as a source of concern, but Blair (2006) and other central policy actors (e.g. BC, 2003; BIS, 2013a) instead represent this as a contribution from the sector to the country. Yet the inherent risk of a commercial approach is acknowledged: “Although international students represent an important source of income for universities, the international
activities of our higher education institutions cannot be primarily motivated by commercial self-interest, or they will wither” (BIS, 2009, p.89). This perspective is an unusual one in the corpus, although concerns are expressed regarding the perceived dependence on particular ‘markets’; having too many students from one country on one course (BC, 2003; Kemp, et al., 2008; Archer, et al., 2010b). Hence, the PMI2 emphasised the importance of diversifying recruitment, aiming to double the number of main source countries of students to the UK each year (DIUS, 2009). This goal was not achieved, and at the end of the PMI2, the sector remains reliant on a few source countries, particularly China (DTZ, 2011).

Income generated through overseas students is quantified: “overseas students alone are worth £5 billion a year” (The Labour Party, 2005, p.25); and “international students bring in around £8 billion a year to the UK” (Home Affairs Committee, 2009, p.10). Because this income is derived from foreign currency sources, it is treated as an export (Conlon, et al., 2011). Income from international students located in the UK, from after 2006, becomes subsumed in the broader category of education exports, with TNE, English language teaching, independent schools, goods and publishing, and so on (BC, 2010). Over the period examined in this corpus, the focus gradually turns away from the physical presence of international students and embraces virtual engagement in international education at a distance. Figure 25 below shows that the conceptualisation of the international education sector is much broader than direct recruitment to UK HEIs.

Figure 25: Defining the education sector in the IES (BIS 2013a, p.13)

This belies the claim and suggests that TNE is preferable for political reasons, namely the increasingly divisive debate on migration (see Chapter 8).

8 The same is also true at the time of writing (UUK, 2014).
The importance of the income students bring is enforced by the requirement to demonstrate that they have “sufficient funds” available to obtain their visa (UKBA, 2008; Gower, 2010; UKBA, 2011; Home Office, 2012; Home Office, 2013). Students needed to have enough money to pay their fees and support them for the first year - set at £9,600 (UKBA, 2008). After the reforms of 2010-2011 (see Chapter 8 for more detail), the requirements for proof of this funding became more stringent, necessitating cash funds in the students’ own bank account for more than 30 days, or proof of relationship to the account holder, restricting acceptable banks, and so on (Home Office, 2011; Home Office, 2013). The rigidity of these requirements has been the subject of much criticism (UKCISA, 2010b; Home Affairs Committee, 2011), but highlights the importance of students’ financial assets for policy makers.

**Filling gaps in the labour market**

In addition to direct revenue, international graduates are framed as generating income through their participation in the labour market, filling “skills gaps” (Roche, 2000; BC, 2003; DfES, 2003; Blair, 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Blair, 2006; Home Office, 2006; Kemp, et al., 2008; Brown, G. 2009; Brown, 2010; May, 2010a; Cameron, 2011; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). This rationale occurs throughout the corpus, but especially under Labour Governments, where migration policy is placed in the service of the UK’s knowledge economy and industry (Home Affairs Committee, 2011). In this logic, certain professions are framed as having “labour shortages”, unable to recruit adequate numbers of workers domestically, such as the IT and health care sectors (Roche, 2000). Recruiting highly skilled migrants (HSM), and, in particular, international students with UK HE qualifications is seen to solve this dilemma (MAC, 2010). Although immigration to fill a skills gap is considered a last resort when those skills are not available domestically (Blair, 2004; Brown, G. 2009 and 2010; MAC, 2010; May, 2010b; Home Office, 2011; Cameron, 2011). As described in Chapter 1 (see p.27 for more detail), the Points-Based System for migration management includes international students under Tier 4, and could easily seek graduate employment in the UK after studying (Blair, 2006; Home Office, 2006; Kemp, et al., 2008; BC, 2010). This was a key factor in maintaining the attractiveness of the UK under the PMI and PMI2.
While continuing to acknowledge the contributions of migrants and the necessity of filling skills gaps, later discourses emphasise greater selectivity in recruiting migrants and students, and in permitting only certain students to work as graduates (May, 2010b; Cameron, 2011). With the aim of maximising the economic and cultural benefits to the UK, particular migrants are sought: “those whose ideas and innovation can help drive our growth and productivity” (UKBA, 2011a, p.17). Specifically, this means that “entrepreneurs will be welcome; scientists will be welcome; wealth creators will be welcome” (May, 2010b, emphasis mine). The most desirable migrants are therefore business people and those in high (economic) value occupations where the returns to the UK economy will be quick and easily measurable. The UK’s economic interests with regards to domestic unemployment rates, as well as overall growth, remain central.

The international higher education marketplace

The economic model at work in this rationale frames international higher education as a marketplace. This marketplace is described as rapidly evolving (BC, 1999; BC, 2000a; BC, 2010), experiencing “volatility” (BC, 2000a, p.9), “dynamic” (BC, 2003, p.6), and experiencing “major changes” (BC, 2003, p.6). The documents describe a “series of social, cultural and demographic changes throughout the major target markets” (BC, 2000a, p.9). In particular, these changes are identified as “growing customer expectations, intensifying competitor activity, technological advancements, enhanced mobility, ageing populations, growth in knowledge-based economies and changing government attitudes” (BC, 2003, p.7). The BIS (2013d, p.19) adds, “changing patterns of demand”. The overall market is considered to be expanding in terms of the number of students who would consider international education (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). These changes in part led to a shift in focus away from direct student recruitment towards strategic collaboration (BC, 2010), and TNE (BIS, 2013a and b). This reflects an emphasis on the diversification of educational income sources (DTZ, 2011). “Traditional student recruitment” is argued to no longer determine who succeeds in the global education market (BC, 2010, p.3). Indeed, the IES sets out the Coalition Government’s aim as being to “effectively promote excellence beyond attracting international students via the Education UK recruitment service to cover all education exports: transnational education, education products and services and work with other countries to develop their own education
infrastructure” (BIS, 2013a, p.58, emphasis mine). This demonstrates the shift in emphasis: while direct recruitment will “continue to be important to UK education exports” (IES, 2013a, p.14), the majority of the strategy is devoted to TNE. Chapter 8 offers a possible explanation for this change, in terms of the net migration debate.

Within the market, competition is an important theme (BC, 1999; BC, 2000a; Roche, 2000; Böhm, et al., 2004; Home Office, 2002; BC, 2003; DfES, 2003; BC, 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Blair, 2006; DfES, 2006; Bone, 2008; Kemp, et al., 2008; BIS, 2009; DIUS, 2009; Archer, et al., 2010b; BC, 2010; Green, 2010; Archer, et al., 2011; Home Affairs Committee, 2011; DTZ, 2011; UKCISA, 2011b; BC, 2012; QAA, 2012; BIS, 2013a, b, c, and d; HEFCE, 2013; Lawton, et al., 2013). The market is argued to be increasingly competitive (BC, 1999; BC, 2000a), due to more countries becoming involved, and established destination countries becoming more strategic and more aggressive (Böhm, et al., 2004; BC, 2003; Kemp, et al., 2008; BC, 2010; Archer, et al., 2011; Conlon, et al., 2011; DTZ, 2011; QAA, 2012; BIS, 2013a and b). Countries cited include “China, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Australia, France, Japan, Italy, Canada and South Africa” (BC, 2010, p.5) as having increased their ‘market share’ i.e. attracted more international students. So while this discourse presents demand for international higher education as growing, so is supply and competition.

In representing international higher education as a marketplace, education is at times represented as a product (BC, 1999, 2000, 2003; Böhm, et al., 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Kemp, et al., 2008; BIS, 2013a and d). For example, the Brand Report (BC, 1999, para. 57) describes educational institutions as ‘product providers’, and the IES (BIS, 2013a, p.61) emphasises the importance of students being sure that “they are getting a quality product and a recognised qualification”. In the PMI, the ‘product’ typically refers to particular programmes or courses (BC, 1999, 2000, 2003). In the IES, it appears to incorporate the experience as well as the course, consistent with the latter phase of the PMI2.

In order to measure marketplace success, students are represented as numbers and targets. High numbers are represented as indicators of the UK’s competitive success. The PMI and PMI2 targets for recruitment are frequently mentioned (Blair, 1999;
BC, 1999; BC, 2000a; BC, 2003; DfES, 2003; Blair, 2006; DfES, 2006; BC, 2010; Archer, et al., 2010a; Archer, et al., 2011; and evaluated (BC, 2003; Blair, 2006; DIUS, 2009; BC, 2010; Archer, et al., 2010a; DTZ, 2011). These targets are widely represented as successfully met: “we have not only reached this target but beaten it by an extra 43,000 students” (Blair, 2006); “the targets were exceeded ahead of schedule, with an extra 93,000 (students) in HE” (DfES, 2006; DIUS, 2009 - repeated verbatim); and “(the PMI) was very successful, exceeding its 75,000 student recruitment target by 43,000 students” (BC, 2010, p.6). A more measured evaluation in the DTZ final report (2011, p.4) states that “the PMI2 has met some of its targets”, identifying the increased diversity of recruitment as a particular area which was not met. Similar targets are also set in the IES, although in cautious terms: "(w)e consider it is realistic for the number of international students in higher education in the UK to grow by 15-20% over the next 5 years” (BIS, 2013a, p.35, emphasis mine). The target is more explicitly set in the press release than in the strategy itself: “(i)t (the IES) aims to secure an extra £3 billion worth of contracts for the UK’s education providers overseas, and attract almost 90,000 extra overseas university students by 2018” (BIS, 2013c). This discrepancy suggests that government does not wish to position itself as responsible for actively promoting direct recruitment of international higher education students. This contrasts with the discourse prevalent during the PMI, where there is a suggestion of possession over students: “we want to have 25 percent of the global market share of Higher Education students” (Blair, 1999).

Maintaining the UK's position

It is therefore argued that for the UK to maintain its international higher education market position, as indicated by student numbers, against the competition highlighted in the previous section, it must become more professional in its education marketing (BC, 1999), define the unique qualities of a British education (BC, 2003; BIS, 2009), and measure the perceptions of international students (DTZ, 2011). The PMI targets were to increase the ‘market share’ of higher education students held by the UK (BC, 1999; Blair, 1999). The UK is argued to have a strong position within the world market, (BC, 1999, 2000; BC, 2003), “second only to the USA” (DfES, 2004, p.20; BC, 2010, p.3) and to be a “world leader in the recruitment of international students” (Blair, 2006). Similarly, the IES (BIS, 2013a, p.26) argues
that “(t)he UK has a number of truly international educational brands, many of them with a long tradition behind them”. This is quantified as “a market share of 13% in 2011” (BIS, 2013b, p.6). The British Council (2000a) and Blair (1999) attribute this position to a “reputation for quality”, as highlighted in Chapter 6. However, increasing competition is presented as threatening this position (BC, 2000a; Bone, 2008; Kemp, et al., 2008), requiring a “different approach” (BC, 2010, p.16) to recruitment (through partnerships and TNE). As the IES has it, “the UK needs to move quickly to secure a world leading position” (BIS, 2013a, p.49). Without such changes, the BIS (2011, p.78) projects that market share would “decrease... to 8.8% in 2020”.

The national brand (see Chapter 1 for more detail), and education marketing more generally, are considered to be key ways to improve the UK’s position (Blair, 1999; BC, 1999; BC, 2000a; BC, 2003; Böhm, et al., 2004; DfES, 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Bone, 2008; Kemp, et al., 2008; DIUS, 2009; BC, 2010; Archer, et al., 2010a; Cameron, 2011; DTZ, 2011; Home Affairs Committee, 2011; QAA, 2012; BIS, 2013a, b, c and d). They are intended “to create the demand from international students that will satisfy member institution needs” (BC, 2000a, p.16). This statement is explicit: the demand is not merely being met by education providers; rather, it is being generated through marketing in the service of institutions. Education is, in this positioning, merely another attractiveness factor for the UK, like its tourist attractions, and as such may be expected to behave like other industrial sectors.
Generating income: WPR analysis

Unlike in other rationales, the corpus explicitly documents challenges in this area (Q1), which change over time. The PMI particularly highlighted the lack of professionalism in higher education marketing (BC, 1999). However, by 2006, the challenges had become more focused on consolidating the national brand through a renewed focus on student experience and employability, and diversification (DfES, 2006). In 2009, the bogus college scandal became prominent (Home Affairs Committee, 2009), and at this point, the challenges cited were primarily to strengthen the immigration regulations in the interests of sustaining reputation for competitive advantage (May, 2010a, b). The IES published in 2013 refocuses attention on the marketisation of the sector, especially “a lack of coordination”, different forms of competition and a structure not amenable to growth (BIS, 2013a and b). There is palpable continuity underlying these shifts: the UK is always argued to be in a relatively strong position, but nevertheless vulnerable for different reasons, and the answers are typically found in marketised responses.

While revealing, these challenges cannot be read as unproblematic in the WPR approach (Bacchi, 2009). At their heart, all of these challenges are addressed towards the aim of increasing the UK’s income, which presumes a more fundamental problem (Q1): a need for more money, both for higher education and the country as a whole. This corpus explores a period when central funding for HEIs was being significantly reduced, particularly in England (Sastry, 2006), having fallen by 10% from 2000-2011 (Universities UK, 2013), yet this is silenced in the policy discourses. It may, therefore, be inferred that this ‘export income’ is a replacement for central government funding, which may explain the lack of concern regarding the sector’s dependence on global revenue streams. In addition, it is suggested that international students may stay on as graduates to fill particular skills gaps in the labour market. This also contributes to the national economy. Nationally, while positive economic conditions ruled from 1999-2007, Buller and James (2012) argue that the New Labour government had to create a sense of economic competence, which they did by explicitly implementing conservative monetary policies by increasing the UK’s income and reducing state expenditure. Since 2007, the economic crisis has dominated political discourses, making revenue gain still more
central as a rationale (HM Treasury and BIS, 2011). The results of the WPR analysis are summarised below in Figure 26.

![Figure 26](image)

**Figure 26: ‘What is the problem represented to be’ analysis of economic rationale**

A number of core assumptions underpin this problematisation. Firstly, that international higher education is a marketplace. Secondly, that UK HEIs are businesses and that the role of the sector is to generate income nationally. Thirdly, that education is a product. Fourthly, that growth is unequivocally positive. These assumptions have been challenged by the literature with regards to UK HE, on numerous grounds. The following discussion will apply these criticisms to international education and consider alternative ways in which international education may be understood. There are two broad categories of critique: firstly, on the grounds of the accuracy of the assumptions about marketisation made, and secondly, on the potential negative impacts of marketisation. In this problem representation, students are constructed as numbers and income sources.

**International higher education: a marketplace**

The most fundamental assumption is that international higher education is a marketplace (Q2). This is widely held throughout the corpus, without explanation, justification or alternatives. Brown and Carasso (2013) suggest that the characteristics of a market model in higher education would include: fully autonomous institutions; low barriers to market entry and wide student choice; wide variance on price; freely available information which enables students to make rational choices; regulation in the form of consumer protection; and quality
determined by what employers and students value. They, along with Marginson (1997), conclude that higher education is more accurately described as a ‘quasi-market’, moving the direction of full marketisation. ‘Quasi-markets’ are seen to achieve government goals (Dill, 1997; Naidoo and Williams, 2014). On a national level, UK HE may be seen as quasi-market due to a number of factors: the difficulty of establishing an entirely new university; the low probability of the government allowing an HEI to fail (Dill, 1997); and the continuing subsidisation of student fees by the government (Brown and Carasso, 2013), amongst others.

International higher education, however, is more widely accepted as a marketplace (e.g. Harman, 2004; Naidoo, V. 2007; Tham, 2010; Shu, 2012). It is seen to be closer to a ‘true market’, as the competitors are countries rather than institutions (e.g. Tham, 2010; Shu, 2012). Therefore, new entrants are countries which have traditionally not competed for international higher education, like Malaysia (Tham, 2010) and Taiwan (Ma, 2010). In this sense, the barriers to market entry are lower, and there is no international regulation or overarching quality assurance. The GATS agreement assured a degree of free movement in trade and services, and consequently in student mobility (Robertson, et al., 2002). This, it is argued, constitutes wide and free student choice internationally. It is also argued that global competition generates increased choice and lower prices (Naidoo, R., 2007). Global league tables (Marginson and van der Wende, 2007) and the importance of reputation to the capacity of countries to attract international students (Xiang and Shen, 2008; Hazelkorn, 2011) suggests that students conceive of education as a product, wishing to have the best.

However, international higher education could be argued to fall short of a ‘true market’ ideal type, so it is possible to think about this problem differently (Q4). Firstly, higher education institutions often compete internationally as a sector rather than as individual institutions. Research on the promotion efforts of national agencies like the British Council, IDP Australia (Sidhu, 2002) and EduFrance (Dodds, 2009) concurs. Institutions operate within a national brand (Lomer, et al., forthcoming), and there is a strong driver towards collaborative research relationships (e.g. BIS, 2013a). So there is a tension between competition between individual institutions, and an expectation that HEIs will behave in similar, marketised ways, as defined by the national brand. This is consistent with the move
towards ‘governing at a distance’ (Rose and Miller, 2008), as highlighted in Chapter 2. With the discursive deployment of the marketplace, which is seen as a depoliticised field (Sidhu, 2006) (Q3), the capacity of the sector to resist government intervention is reduced.

Secondly, participation in international higher education is likely to be influenced by social and cultural capital, so the choice is not free or rational. Yet the Coalition Plan for Growth (HM Treasury and BIS, 2011, p.71) argues that:

> Markets rely on active and informed consumers who...force businesses to produce efficiently and innovate. Growth is undermined when consumers face excessive barriers to switching suppliers, (or) where there are market failures in the flow of consumer information.

The economic plan in which international higher education is implicated therefore relies on a model of consumer behaviour which does not hold true for international students. For example, Waters (2006) documents how social capital influences decisions to study internationally among Hong Kong students. Similarly, Mazzarol and Soutar (2002) identified family experiences of particular countries as having a major impact on the choice of international higher education destination. Social capital also influences how students access and understand information, which may be challenging to interpret in its complexity, leading some to rely on the heuristic of global rankings or paid agents (Xiang and Shen, 2008). These examples only touch on the complexity of this issue, which for international higher education, draws on intersections of wealth, social and cultural capital, transnational networks, race and class, language and post-colonial networks of movement and power (e.g. Sidhu, 2006). They are sufficient to call into question the accuracy of presuppositions of equal access underlying a market model for international higher education (Tannock, 2013). The requirement to have a certain, large, amount of funding available even to obtain a visa substantiates this critique; it automatically excludes significant numbers of potentially able students. The impact of capitals on students’ access to and experiences of international higher education, however, are left unproblematic in the corpus (Q4). This suggests that students who have little by way of social or financial capital are marginalised by the policy discourse (Spanger, 2011), and are not the target market.
Yet Blair (1999) claims that the PMI would seek to ensure that our universities and colleges are open to able students from around the world. In a world of lifelong learning, British Education is a first class ticket for life. I want to see the benefits of that education, that ticket, given to as many as possible across the world. (emphasis mine)

British Education is not, as asserted here, open to as many ‘able’ students as possible from around the world, for they are prevented by barriers of financial and social capital. This claim is undermined from within by its silence (Foucault, 1972) on these inequalities (Tannock, 2013).

Thirdly, the international higher education marketplace is regulated in the UK, although it is not regulated globally. The QAA regulates all institutions, and, therefore, their international provision, which Brown and Carasso (2013) argue to be tightly controlled by ministerial intervention via HEFCE. International higher education in the UK is also further regulated by the UKBA (Jenkins, 2014). At the time of writing, permission for HEIs to recruit legally international students depended on having “Highly Trusted Sponsor” status, entailing compliance with a wide range of oversight by the Government (UKBA, 2011a, c; UKBA, 2013b). This suggests that international higher education in the UK is only partly marketised. These regulatory barriers are discussed, for example, in the BIS (2013a, b), not silenced, but they are interpreted as challenges for the sector to work around, creating a contradiction to the market discourse.

A number of critics also point to the perils of fully marketising international education (Q5, Q6). On a national level, it is argued that marketisation can reduce higher education’s capacity to act as a public good (Tilak, 2008), limit its potential to provide space for transformative education (Molesworth, et al., 2009), and entrench social disadvantage (Naidoo, R. 2007). International higher education can similarly cement global inequalities between countries (Tilak, 2008; Xiang and Shen 2008; Tannock, 2013). Yang et al., (2002, cited in Marginson, et al., 2010) suggest that marketisation may actually decrease the quality of student experience. Marketising international higher education may, therefore, have unintended consequences not considered in the policy discourse.
HEIs as businesses and the paradox of government control

The next major assumption is that higher education institutions are businesses (Q2). One of the key challenges documented in the corpus refers to the difficulty of encouraging HEIs to adopt business-like behaviours. Market research conducted to help develop the ‘Education UK brand’ concluded that UK HEIs had “low levels of marketing expertise” (BC, 2000a, p.5), “unclear selling propositions” (ibid.), and “a failure to recognise in real detail how markets are changing” (ibid., p.7). This theme emerges again in the Coalition IES (BIS, 2013a and b) which identifies a key challenge of “co-ordination failure”, limiting the sector’s capacity to respond and take advantage of “high-value opportunities”. The implication in both of these examples is that HEIs are not responding like businesses and that this constitutes a problem (Q1). Ironically from a strict liberalisation perspective, the solution embedded in these policies appears to be central government ‘coordination’. This took the form of increased activity through the British Council Education Counselling Services, the creation of a national brand (BC, 2000a) and later providing “brokerage and support” (BIS, 2013a) to help HEIs coordinate. The “Britain is GREAT™” campaign conceptually positions international higher education to borrow from the UK’s national image as traditional, with a strong heritage and a reputation for creative industries like fashion and music, aligning it with other exporting industries (Pamment, 2015). In so doing, the inherent differences between HE, and, for example, the aviation industry, are elided and its character reduced to visual symbolism. These effects potentially tighten government control over a putatively autonomous sector, operating according to market norms (Q5) (Shattock, 2006; Trow, 2006).

For universities are not businesses. The public/private distinction has become increasingly blurred over the last 20-30 years (Tight, 2006). HEIs are now expected to behave in more business-like ways, implementing instrumental approaches to managing academics, heavy reliance on NSS and similar data sets relevant to ‘consumer satisfaction’ (Naidoo, R. 2007; Sabri, 2011). But universities also still rely heavily on public funding – 45% of Russell Group universities’ income came from public funds (The Russell Group, 2010). While this proportion is likely to fall (Brown and Carasso, 2013), the state is still considered to have some responsibility
for HE. On a national level, HE is supposed to provide a public function, as suggested by their charitable status (HEFCE, 2014), by facilitating the creation of knowledge and providing a competitive advantage within the knowledge economy (Olssen and Peters, 2005). This is a key silence and a way to think differently about higher education (Q4). The public good, or “externalities of higher education” (Tilak, 2008), is harder to demonstrate on a global scale as benefits are thought to confer on the country where the graduate works – typically their home country (Healey, 2008). However, earlier understandings of international higher education positioned it as a tool for development (Walker, 2014) as in the Colombo Plan (Harman, 2004), and as Chapter 5 suggested, as global diplomacy. It is, therefore, possible to conceive of universities delivering international higher education as something other than businesses generating income (Q4).

**Growth is good**

One of the central assumptions of international higher education as a marketplace (Q2) is that growth in the UK’s market share of international higher education is necessarily good, as it increases the UK’s income and makes the nation more competitive. This assumption, deriving from tenets of neo-liberal economics (Q3), is so widely held as common-sense (Fairclough, 1989) in the international higher education literature that it is rarely explored or justified in great detail. In the policy corpus, success is equated with growth. Both the PMI and the Coalition IES, aim to increase international student numbers, representing this growth as desirable. The PMI2 target was to “sustain the managed growth of UK international education delivered both in the UK and overseas” (DIUS, 2009), and the IES, amongst other industrial strategies, aims “to secure sustainable future growth in the economy” (BIS, 2013c). The conflation of success with growth is replicated (Q6) in the compilation of rankings data (Marginson and van der Wende, 2007), echoed in university rationales (Bolsmann and Miller, 2008), and in much of the literature on international higher education in other countries (e.g. Harman, 2004).

However, it is possible to think about this problem differently (Q4): the logic of competition and measuring by market share means that if the UK increases its proportion of international students, another country loses (Slaughter and Cantwell, 2011). Marketplace competition is a zero-sum game unless ‘new markets’ are opened up. This can be understood to further contribute to global stratification,
deepening inequality between countries (Marginson, 2006; Naidoo, R. 2007). Some students are made appealing targets for competition, but other groups become less attractive (Rivza and Teichler, 2007). The drain of talented students from developing to developed countries, exacerbated by global rankings that consolidate the reputations of already powerful countries (Marginson and van der Wende, 2007), leaves developing countries with struggling nascent tertiary sectors (Naidoo, R., 2007). This consequence of the UK’s market success is largely silent in the corpus (Q4) and potentially undermines policy claims to seek to build “a new relationship with the emerging powers ... based on values and mutual respect” (BIS, 2013a, p.53). If the UK’s success is dependent on other countries losing their “brightest and best” students, and those with the most financial capital, this would seem to be in contradiction with the imperative to build relationships with precisely those countries.

While the adoption of policies for growth is taken for granted as a rational strategy, it is possible to think differently about growth in international higher education. Healey (2008) suggests that the reality of tightening public funding and massification of HEIs meant that growth in international higher education was a reactive, chaotic response to government policy, instead of a rational, deliberate strategy (Q3). This is consistent with other accounts of UK HE policy formation as haphazard (Belcher, 1987; Bird, 1994; Kogan and Hanney, 2000; Humfrey, 2011). Since the results of my research demonstrate that international higher education growth is, in fact, part of government policy as well as a sector response, extending Healey’s (2008) argument suggests a multi-vocal, contradictory, national policy, where expanding international higher education offers an exit route from straightened budgets. This interpretation is consistent with Blair’s promise of abiding by the stringent fiscal policies set by the Tories (Buller and James, 2012): with limited spending capacity, seeking another resource stream becomes paramount for the state to sustain HE as a valuable asset.

Growth in international higher education can be thought about differently (Q4), and can also be seen as undesirable for its impacts within the UK. Healey (2008) suggests that significant expansion is more likely to take place in lower-ranking universities in vocational subjects, consistent with Marginson’s (2006) analysis. This could lead to what Sir Drummond Bone (2008) called the ‘ghettoisation’ of
international students, in particular, subjects and courses, leading to a domino effect with regards to experience, satisfaction and eventually, reputation. It also exposes universities to increased risk of market failure (Slaughter and Cantwell, 2011). Therefore, it is possible to see growth not as a rational, inevitable response, but also as a problematic, irrational response which disenfranchises other countries which could be considered partners and collaborators in international higher education.

**Desirable migrants, HSM and the knowledge economy**

Economic growth is, however, represented as hindered by skills gaps in the labour market in the UK, which international graduates as workers solve (Q1). Generally, where skills shortages occur in highly skilled, knowledge-intensive domains, international students are desirable temporary solutions (Tremblay, 2005). New Labour migration policies targeted economic performance (Düvell and Jordan, 2003), and saw skills gaps as important barriers to growth, to be resolved by relaxing immigration requirements for highly skilled and graduate pathways (Wright, 2012). Under the PMI, informed by a knowledge economy model, students constituted a source of skilled labour in areas where the UK was lacking (Geddie, 2014). In this framework, skills are an element of individual human capital (Raghuram, 2008), which can benefit nations that attract people with these skills. This is seen as essential to compete as a nation in the “race for talent” (Suter and Jandl, 2008; Tannock, 2009) and produces a synergy between labour policies and immigration (Düvell and Jordan, 2003). This assumes that international graduates are an effective source for gaps in labour skill markets (Q2), although it is possible to think about this solution differently (Q4). For example, Migration Watch (2015) challenges this problematisation, stating that after the closure of the post-study work visa, comparatively few visa applications were made by graduates with job offers in the UK.

What is not discussed (Q4) in this model of competition is the ethics of recruitment, in terms of how this impacts countries which send students (Geddie, 2014). It is assumed (Q2) that the UK is a desirable destination for migrants, and that British industry will be able to recruit the “brightest and the best” (Cerna, 2011). This assumption rests on a neo-liberal economic model, where people are conceived of as rational economic actors, who will seek out migration opportunities on a primarily financial basis (Raghuram, 2008). It also rests on the concept of a meritocracy,
implying global equality of opportunity (Tannock, 2009). However, the evidence of the effectiveness of HSM policies (Suter and Jandl, 2008; Cerna, 2011) regarding rates of stay and job positions (Hawthorne, 2010) and contributions to the economy is limited. The early changes to permission to work while studying may have made the UK a more attractive destination for many students (Düvell and Jordan, 2003; DTZ, 2011), although the wider impact on the national economy is difficult to evaluate.

The convergence of the UK’s adoption of this policy with other countries experiencing temporary skills gaps and demographic labour shortages (Raghuram, 2008; Hawthorne, 2010; Cerna, 2014) suggests that this representation of the problem and solution has come about through policy transfer (Q3). Canada and Australia have tailored their migration policies to the needs of employers and businesses using Points-Based Systems for systematic recruitment, in particular, labour shortages (Ziguras and Law, 2006; Robertson, 2011; She and Wotherspoon, 2013). In such a system, private actors can have an impact on public policy (Wright, 2012; Cerna, 2014), but whether such lobbying is ethical or appropriate is left unproblematic in the discourse (Q4), which assumes that policy should meet the needs of industry (Q2).

**Education as a product**

Having accepted international higher education as an industry, education is assumed to be a commodified product (Q2). In the British Council Brand Report (BC, 1999), for example, particular courses are framed as products: “Product: Degree courses, Technical courses, Vocational course” (para. 60). Later, the British Council suggests that HEIs need to systematically consider their “product development strategy” (BC, 2000a, p.13). Similarly the Coalition IES talks in terms of students “getting a quality product and a recognised qualification” (BIS, 2013a, p.61). This discursive construct positions students as consumers, as illustrated in the previous chapter, a tendency which has been observed in other research on advertising to international students (Sidhu, 2002; Askehave, 2007; Leyland, 2011).
But the consequences (Q5) of constructing education as a product, and students as consumers, are seen to be in conflict with deep approaches to learning (Molesworth, *et al.*, 2009), as the meanings attached to international higher education are reduced to the economic benefits they create for students (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). Molesworth *et al.* (2009) argue that seeing education as something to ‘have’, consequent to a capitalist, liberal model, encourages students to ‘acquire’ education in the form of a qualification, leading them to reject intellectual transformation. Where a pedagogical relationship is read as equivalent to the relationship between consumer and provider, relationships become instrumental, and learning may be compromised (Naidoo, *et al.*, 2011). Within the literature on international higher education students in the UK, marketisation is often taken as a given, reproducing the problematisation (Q6) (e.g. Pereda, *et al.*, 2007; Barnes, 2007; Bartram and Bailey, 2010; Hart and Coates, 2010). Indeed, the British Council (2003, p.8, emphasis mine) quote an IDP Australia report as saying:

> The fundamental shift in the funding of higher education towards the consumer has had a profound impact on the expectations and needs of students. Fundamentally, this shift has resulted in a *breakdown* in the traditional teacher-learner relationship which has been replaced by a customer-service relationship.

Despite the clear negative terminology, the report presents this pragmatically and uncritically, as a challenge to be met and a given, rather than a major pedagogic flaw. That marketised practices have become the common-sense activities of the international sector speaks to the naturalisation of the marketisation discourse (Fairclough, 1989, p.89). However, there are critical voices in the literature, albeit fewer than those who critique marketisation in domestic HE. For example, De Vita and Case (2003) take the internationalisation of the commodified curriculum to task as superficial and self-contradictory. Rajani Naidoo (2007) argues that this may have a particularly negative effect on developing countries, focusing on more vocational skills productive in the short term but without the extended depth of knowledge to gain sustainable advantage.
There are also alternative conceptualizations of education (Q4). For instance, Madge et al. (2009) advocate an ethic of care and responsibility in international education. Sidhu and Dall’Alba (2011) suggest that an emancipatory cosmopolitanism is still possible in modern corporate global HE. However, as Ashwin et al. (2015) found with regards to quality, the alternative discourses are partial and incoherent, each voicing different critiques, and, therefore, failing to present a coherent alternative, which may be why the marketisation discourse has become so pervasive.

**International students as subjects: economic contributors and numbers**

International students are represented (Q5) as valuable because they make major economic contributions to the UK through their fee payments, and other expenses while in the UK. Indirect economic benefits are also thought to emerge from alumni connections leading to increased consumption of British brands and products, the establishment of trade networks leading to commercial advantage for the UK, economic development from skilled migration (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013) and job creation (Home Affairs Committee, 2011). As the IES has it: “countries (try) to attract more students from overseas to come to them to study, because that is what produces the largest and most visible financial benefits to the country concerned” (BIS, 2013a, p.31). Here, the financial returns on the presence of international students are made the preeminent rationale for their recruitment. The importance of economic contributions and financial benefits are emphasised throughout the corpus, but in PMI texts, they are often listed last, after benefits to global diplomacy (see Chapter 5), cultural and social benefits, and educational contributions (see Chapter 6). This suggests that under the Coalition Government, the economic rationale for international students has superseded, though not eliminated, rationales of diplomacy and education.

The numeric representation of international students in a binary category aggregated as statistics suggests attempted control through the collection of knowledge (Rose and Miller, 2008). As suggested in Chapter 3, the act of quantifying a group of people transforms them from agents into objects, reifying them. Particularly with regards to the migration policy, separating out international students as a calculable category renders them subject to the actions of the powerful, namely their control
through visa systems. A PBS attempts to quantify the skills held by migrants through qualifications, language levels, and desirable experience (Raghuram, 2008; Cerna, 2011; Hawthorne, 2010), and in the case of students, their financial worth (Marginson, et al., 2010). Again, the use of quantification appears as a technology of governance, regulating migrants’ access to opportunities and mobility (Rose and Miller, 2008) (Q5). One crucial silence (Q4), however, regards questions of class, capital and equality - in other words, how some graduates come to have desirable skills while others do not (Raghuram, 2008). Students’ financial vulnerability during their studies is also not a significant component of primary policy discourses (Marginson, et al., 2010), although it is mentioned in some secondary policy documents (UKCOSA, 2004; Ipsos Mori, 2006; Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). Neither is the colonial legacy, which makes it easier for some to access UKHE than others, much discussed (Marginson, et al., 2010). Reading their presence as a sign of the UK’s market success attributes action and agency to the nation and industry, rather than to students. The establishment of a statistical category of the ‘international’ student creates an ‘othering’ discourse, establishing a binary between home students and the international ‘Other’ (Devos, 2003; Collins, 2006; Trahar, 2010; M’Balia-Thomas, 2013). This is a hollowed-out imagined subject, recognisable only by their difference to the supposed norm, such that “the international student” (note the definite article), is homogenized as foreign (Devos, 2003). It also allows attendance monitoring and the deployment of recruitment statistics as fact-totems of success in the marketplace (Sabri, 2011).

Students are active grammatically when making a financial contribution. They “contribute” (UKBA, 2010), “bring” income and benefits (BC, 2003; Home Affairs Committee, 2009), “invest” (Home Office, 2006), “make a contribution” (BC, 2003; BIS, 2013c), “boost the economy” (BIS, 2013c), “spend” (Blair, 2004; Conlon, et al., 2011) “provide a benefit” (DfES, 2003), and “can deliver tremendous... economic benefits” (BC, 2003, p.14). However, this depicts only limited agency, because there is no choice implied. If a student is international, and not a scholarship recipient, they must make an economic contribution in this discourse. Indeed, if they do not, then this is seen as problematic. Research students (Kemp, et al., 2008; Suter and Jandl, 2008) are seen to contribute directly to knowledge creation and innovation. Students are often literally valued in terms of their economic contribution: “overseas students alone are worth £5 billion a year” (Labour Party,
“nearly 50% of students globally worth £2.5 billion” (BIS, 2013a, p.15), and “an additional 50,000 students by 2004/05, worth £500 million per annum” (BC, 2003, p.14). Indeed, this is criticised by Sir Drummond Bone (2008, p.3), who argues that the “problem with the UK (in terms of a falling market share) is a perception that our universities are solely interested in international students as a source of revenue”. This was part of the logic behind the PMI2 revisions to emphasise building longer-term “sustainable relationships” (DfES, 2006), as a result of perceptions that the UK was financially focused (BC, 2003). But these long-term sustainable relationships, like Sir Drummond Bone’s criticism, are intended still to generate revenue for the UK.

As “designer migrants” (Kell and Vogl, 2008) international students contribute to both the labour market and culture (Q5) (Raghuram, 2008; Cerna, 2011). Having been educated in the country, they possess immediately transferable educational capital in the form of local qualifications, appropriate language levels (Hawthorne, 2010) and desirable skills. In consuming education locally, they contribute economic capital and when they work, they contribute labour (Robertson, 2011). In the policy discourse, there is little mention (Q4) of experiences after entry, or on citizenship which, in contrast to the USA, Canada, and Australia, is not an intended outcome from HSM in the UK (Raghuram, 2008). Rather, HSM is seen as a temporary gap measure (Wright, 2012), which confers no rights on the workers. The discourse is also silent (Q4) on job satisfaction (Raghuram, 2008) and vulnerability (Nyland, et al., 2009; Marginson, et al., 2010). This suggests that the dominant policy discourse privileges the interests of the national economy and industry, over the interests of individuals, constructing individuals in terms of their relation to the labour market.

Crucially, the ultimate beneficiary is the UK (Fairclough, 2003), rather than the student. Other research on international students has identified similar rationales (Leyland, 2011; Robertson, 2011). Although the economic benefits to students are also present, they are much more prevalent in the secondary policy documents (Böhm, et al., 2004; UKCOSA, 2004; Ipsos Mori, 2006; Kemp, et al., 2008; Archer and Cheng, 2012) than in the primary policy texts (Blair, 1999; BC, 2003; Blair, 2006; BC, 2010; DTZ, 2011). This is, however, a notable silence (Q4) in the Coalition era texts, where it is rarely mentioned (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013 is the
exception). When the benefits to students are mentioned, it is the perception which is highlighted, and little attempt is made to establish or document material changes in students’ circumstances which might be attributed to a UK education (again with the exception of Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013). The relationship established is one in which the student benefits the nation, and where the student’s worth is measured in their financial contribution. The ideal subject (Fairclough, 1989; Rhee, 2009) created through this discourse is a relatively well-off student whose family transfers money to the UK. They spend money freely while in the UK (Conlon, et al., 2011), live in private accommodation, have private health insurance (Home Office, 2013a), and establish preferences for UK products and brands, as well as long-term commercial networks (Mellors-Bourne, et al., 2013).

Students may internalize this representation, learning to value themselves primarily in economic terms (Sidhu, 2006). As Rizvi and Lingard (2010, p.207) suggest, “it converts students into economic units, with the implication that only those aspects of other cultures that are commercially productive are worthy of attention”. In a context of neo-liberal ideologies, this representation contributes to dehumanizing subjects, depriving students of an expectation of a democratic voice and treatment as an individual and reducing their agency to economic choices. Yet despite research which highlights such rationales in the UK (Askehave, 2007; Bolsmann and Miller, 2008; Leyland, 2011) and research from Australia which offers similar critiques (Devos, 2003; Robertson, 2011), the UK literature on international students offers no such discursive critique of political representations. By this silence, researchers acquiesce in the economic subjectification of students (Q6).
Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has explored the prevalence of a market-based problematisation in the corpus, where the problem is represented to be gaining competitive advantage and income for the UK. The core assumptions are that international higher education is a marketplace, that education is a product that competition is essential, that higher education is a source of income generation for the UK internationally, and that growth is necessarily a measure of success. In this discourse, international students are represented as a means to income generation, or economic resources, to the benefit of the UK.

However, criticisms suggest that international higher education neither should be nor is a perfect market. They have also highlighted how global inequalities may worsen as a result of such competition and growth. Criticisms have also been made of the effects of conceiving of education as a product in terms of reducing its transformative potential. These alternative voices, while disparate and diverse, demonstrate that it is possible to imagine international higher education differently, as emancipatory, equitable, caring and pedagogically sound.
Chapter 8 - Immigration: a rationale against international student recruitment

“We need to ensure that only the brightest and best can come” (May, 2010a).

Wider migration policy discourses have negatively impacted international students present in the UK, creating a counter-rationale to their recruitment. It is argued that as migrants they contribute to public concern, social pressures, and abuse of the system. Immigration policies have fluctuated from welcoming increased immigration for economic growth under Blair, to more recent attempts to reduce net migration under the Coalition government (see Chapter 1).

Stepping outside the policy discourse for a moment, it is important to distinguish between technical and political usage of the terms ‘migration’ and ‘immigration’. Technically, migration refers to both inflows (immigration) and outflows (emigration) of people of any nationality across borders. Thus, net migration is the sum total when numbers of emigrants are subtracted from immigrants. Politically, however, migration has come to mean ‘immigration’, and ‘migrant’ has come to mean ‘immigrant’. To remain, as Foucault (1972) insists “within the discourse”, I use the terms as they are used in the discourse in the presentation of the results but distinguish between the two in my discussion.

This chapter begins with the qualitative analysis, which shows a changing view of immigration and of students as migrants. It draws on those key migration policy documents with particular relevance to international students (for a complete list by category, see Appendix 2). Because documents were included on the criteria that they related to or impacted on international students, a full review of migration policy during this period is not attempted. Rather, migration has emerged as a theme from the policy on international students. The second part of the chapter explores the problematisation, arguing that migration discourses implicate students, at first to their benefit (see Chapter 7 in relation to skills gaps) and later to their detriment. It explores the assumptions and subject effects which derive from the categorisation of students as migrants.
**A counter-rationale: International students should not be recruited because net migration should decrease**

In policy discourses, migration is supposed to “work(s) for Britain”, and be “in our country’s interests” (Blair, 2004), such that the UK’s interests rank above those of migrants, or sending countries. Similarly, when Prime Minister, Gordon Brown (2009) made “(t)he case for managed and controlled migration where it is in the national interest - economically, socially and culturally” (emphasis mine). Later documents stress this still further: “The Government believes migrants should come to the UK for the right reason - to contribute to our society rather than simply taking from it” (Home Office, 2013a, emphasis mine). The use of the word ‘taking’ suggests a model of society where resources are limited. In contrast, migration is sometimes argued to be essential for growth and avoiding the collapse of public services (Blair, 2004). This representation also continues into Coalition discourse: “And the right immigration is not just good for Britain – it’s essential” (Cameron, 2013). The distinction here is in the use of the modifier, ‘the right’ immigration, which speaks to the increasing ‘selectiveness’ of later migration discourses. It is where immigration is not seen to work in the UK’s interests that problems arise.

**Changing perceptions of migration**

Economic benefits are seen to be a key rationale for migration, and during the PMI and PMI2 periods, this rationale predominated (Roche, 2000; Home Office, 2002; Blair, 2004; Blair, 2005; Home Office, 2006; Brown, G. 2009; UKCISA, 2009). Immigrants are represented as playing significant roles in the provision of public services (Blair, 2004) and figures are cited to show their ‘disproportionate’ contribution to the economy - 10% of GDP while only being 8% of the population in employment. While migration is constructed as needing ‘control’ and ‘management’, the contributions of migrants are presented as a rationale for further increasing and welcoming immigration (e.g. Roche, 2000; Home Office, 2002; Blair, 2004). Early speeches (Roche, 2000; Blair, 2004) select examples from historical moments of great potency in the national consciousness, such as Polish pilots in World War Two, and Indian soldiers on the Western Front. This implies an attempt to naturalise immigration to the UK, by incorporating it into national narratives of identity.
Positioning migration as “an inevitable reality of the modern world” (Home Office, 2002, p.4) is one way of making it seem ideologically neutral (Fairclough, 1989), causing significant migration levels to be seen as natural and the benefits as commonsense. This obscures the role of neoliberal values in encouraging and responding to migration in particular ways.

Policy discourses under the Coalition Government also acknowledge important contributions from immigration (Home Office, 2010; Green, 2010; May 2010a and b; Cameron, 2011; Home Office, 2011; UKBA, 2011a; Cameron, 2013; Home Office, 2013a). However, in these later speeches, it appears to be a preliminary rhetorical move conceding ground before establishing a need for tighter control, leading to the establishment of a target to reduce the number of non-EU immigrants (HM Government, 2010, p.21) to around the “tens of thousands” (Green, 2010b; Cameron, 2011a; Home Office, 2013a) (see Chapter 1 for more detail). These are seen to be the “levels our country can manage” (Cameron, 2011a). Although negative perceptions of the UK’s welcome to international students are seen as a barrier to increasing growth in the sector (BIS, 2013a), “the sheer number of students coming in, and the large proportion of total inward migration this represents” (May, 2010a) are said to be unsustainable (Green, 2010a; Home Office, 2012).

Public concern & social pressures

The policy documents claim a “public concern” (Home Office, 2011), “something we heard on the doorstep” (Cameron, 2011a), regarding “the perceived abuse of public services, pressure on jobs and employment, and numbers of immigrants” (Home Office, 2011, p.27). While present under New Labour as well (Blair, 2004, 2005; Home Office, 2006; Brown, 2010), it becomes more prevalent after 2010. According to the Home Office Impact Assessment regarding reform to the student visas (2011, p.27), “the reasons given for public concern include the perceived abuse of public services, pressure on jobs and employment, and numbers of immigrants”.

The rapid influx is claimed to cause “great economic and social pressure”, in particular “on key public services such as schools, the health service, transport, housing and welfare” (May, 2010b). Although earlier documents have occasionally highlighted “tensions” (Home Office, 2002), impact on employment (Home Office, 2006) and a lack of social integration (Blair, 2004), the Coalition Government places
more emphasis on the negative impacts of immigration (e.g. Cameron, 2011a). The proposed solution is to reduce migration, which will alleviate “congestion and pressure on public services such as schools and healthcare at a time when public spending is reduced” (Home Office, 2011, p.10). They also proposed to raise money by, for example, introducing a health levy for all immigrants (Home Office, 2013a). Students are implicated in this proposed solution because they are categorised as migrants (May, 2010b).

In addition, the public is said to lack “confidence in our immigration system” (Home Office, 2011), so reforms and “tough action” are in part intended to “restore public confidence in the immigration system” (May, 2010a). New Labour policies also identify public concern as significant, particularly regarding the asylum system (Roche, 2000; Blair, 2004; Home Office, 2005) and bogus colleges (Home Affairs Committee, 2009). The Coalition Government was “determined to be different” in tackling abuse of the system, which is said to undermine public confidence (Green, 2010a and b; May, 2010a; Cameron, 2011a; 2011b; Green, 2011; Home Office, 2013a).

**Abuse of the system: bogus students**

Public concern is also said to centre around perceptions of abuse of the visa system. Under New Labour, it primarily refers to asylum (Roche, 2000; Blair, 2004) but becomes linked to students: “We are also overhauling the visa system to make it simpler for talented individuals who want to come to study in Britain, while keeping out anyone who intends to abuse the system” (Blair, 2006). Limiting abuse was part of the rationale for establishing particular procedures as part of the Tier 4 student visa route (UKBA, 2008; Brown, 2010; Johnson, 2010), to facilitate ‘genuine students’ to enter the country (BIS, 2009). Later, issues were primarily identified with the abuse of this route (May, 2010a; Home Office, 2011). Therefore, reforms to the student visa route attempted to prevent “abuse by filtering out those who contribute least and pose the highest immigration risk” (Home Office, 2011, p.9). While ‘abuse’ primarily relates to illicit economic activities, other risks are also present, such as terrorism (Home Affairs Committee, 2009; Gower, 2010) and

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9 As of 2015, this proposal has been implemented, albeit at a reduced surcharge for students.
‘proliferation’, the transmission of information related to creating weapons of mass destruction. This concern led to the introduction of the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) (UKBA, 2008; QAA, 2012).

Bogus colleges were a particular focus of the debate on abuse. These colleges were found to be facilitating illegal economic activity among their students, offering subpar education and resources (Home Affairs Committee, 2009; Green, 2011). This discourse began under a Labour Government, (Home Office, 2006), intensified during Gordon Brown’s premiership (Gower, 2010), and became still more prevalent under the Coalition Government. In consequence, students came to be labelled as ‘bogus’, in contrast to “legitimate students” (Home Office, 2006; UKBA, 2008; Home Affairs Committee, 2009; Gower, 2010; May, 2010a; Home Office, 2010; UKBA, 2010; Cameron, 2011a; Home Office, 2011, b; Home Affairs Committee, 2011; Cameron, 2013; Home Office, 2013d). So-called “bogus students” are those who “have no intention of studying and who disappear to work illegally” (UKBA, 2008, p.8), typically from low-level courses. They are said to be “disguised economic migrants” (Home Affairs Committee, 2009, p.65) or to be seeking long-term residence (Home Office, 2011). They are said not to have “a genuine desire to study” (May, 2010a) and to be “gaming the system” (Cameron, 2011a), sometimes through fraud (Home Affairs Committee, 2009). Yet only 2% of HE students are shown to be non-compliant (Home Office, 2010). This suggests an attempt to discursively reposition ‘legitimate students’ as distinct from ‘illegitimate’ or ‘bogus’ students and to distinguish such efforts from the overall drive to reduce migration.

Selecting students

The policy discourse attempts to resist “misperceptions” of these efforts as a cap on student visas, as they do not intend to reduce the number of “genuine students” (Home Affairs Committee, 2011). Rather, it is argued that the intent is to reduce abuse: “we want to see tough action being taken against those who have no right to be here or who abuse our services” (Home Office, 2013a, p.1). There is frequent reiteration of the statement “there is no cap on the number of legitimate students coming to Britain” (BIS, 2013a, p.4) in various forms (Cameron, 2011a; Cameron, 2013; Home Affairs Committee, 2011; Home Office, 2011; BIS Committee, 2013; BIS, 2013c; Home Office, 2013d). Indeed, legitimate students are welcomed: “(w)e’re rolling out the red carpet to those whose hard work and investment will
create new British jobs” (Cameron, 2013). The positive terminology - “red carpet” and “be welcome” - is used in conjunction with quite restrictive criteria.

The repeated iteration of the phrase “the brightest and the best” indicates increased selectivity (Roche, 2000; DfES, 2003; Home Office, 2006; Conservative Party, 2010; Green, 2010; May, 2010a and b; Cameron, 2011; Home Affairs Committee, 2011; Home Office, 2011; Green, 2012; Home Office, 2012; NAO, 2012; Cameron, 2013; BIS, 2013a and d; Gower and Hawkins, 2013; Home Office, 2013a). The stated objective of the Impact Assessment of changes to UKBA regulations is to “improve selectivity of students and Post-Study Work Route migrants to the UK, to ensure they are the brightest and the best and those making the highest economic contribution” (Home Office, 2011, p.1), by “weeding out those who do not deserve to be here” (May, 2010a). The exclusionary discourse, restricting migrants and students to those who are ‘desirable’, advocates “a system where we only let in those students who can bring an economic benefit to Britain’s institutions and can support Britain’s economic growth” (May, 2010b). In this discourse, students need to earn their right to study in the UK by their elite status and contributions to the country. Phrases such as “only let in” and “weeding out” reveal the exclusive nature of this discourse, which is stronger in Coalition policies than under New Labour.

Negative economic costs of this increased selectivity are accepted: “Whilst we recognise that the estimated economic costs of these proposals appear significant, it is clear that Option 2 will help tackle abuse in the student system and help to reduce net migration” (Home Office, 2011, p.32). These costs primarily affect FE and English language teaching sectors (ibid.), as HE is positioned as a site for legitimate students (Cameron, 2013). Conlon et al. (2011) estimate that these proposals reduce estimates of annual growth in education exports from a 4% to 3.7%. The MAC (2010) also anticipates economic costs in wider net migration reductions. This appears to be in tension with claims to be acting in the best interest of UK universities (Home Office, 2011), and with the broader economic goals of the International Education Strategy, to foster growth in education exports (BIS, 2013a).
This counter-rationale may, therefore, be summarised as follows. Restricting the right to study in the UK to selected ‘legitimate’ students who make the right kind of contribution is seen to be a way of reducing abuse of the system. Although it may lead to reduced economic growth, this is an acceptable cost. Reducing abuse of the visa system by limiting access is intended to restore public confidence in the migration system, and to reduce perceived social pressures which lead to public concern. This is part of an overall drive to reduce net migration, where high levels are seen to be ‘unmanageable’ and ‘unsustainable’, and not in Britain’s interests. The problematisation analysis of this counter-rationale is presented below.

*Students as migrants: WPR analysis*

The central problem (Q1) is represented to be excessive immigration causing public concern, to be solved by reducing abuse and overall immigration numbers.

![Figure 27: ‘What is the problem represented to be’ analysis of immigration counter-rationale](image)

In this counter rationale, the assumptions (Q2) appear to derive from the representations, as Figure 27 shows, whereas in previous rationales the reverse has been the case. Firstly, international students are represented as migrants. Secondly, ‘public concern’ about immigration is presumed to include students. They are discursively conflated with asylum seekers and illegal immigrants and are assumed to add pressure to services and community tension. A nested problem (Q1) is represented to be the risk posed by students to the UK, where the solution is
increased discipline through compliance with visa regulation rules imposed on students and HEIs.

**Defining migrants: students**

The power of discourses to define and socially categorise groups of people (Foucault, 1982; Moscovici, 2000; Fairclough, 2003) is highlighted in the debates over whether students should be officially classified as migrants (Q1) (MAC, 2010; Home Affairs Committee, 2011; BIS Committee, 2013; Home Office, 2013d). The Government’s position is that in reporting data to international organizations, it conforms to the UN definition of a long-term migrant - someone who remains in a country for 12 months or more (Home Office, 2013d).

Firstly, the rules by which this statement has been made (Foucault, 1972) rely on a shared understanding that this ‘someone’ is not a citizen of that country - a legal alien (Marginson, et al., 2010). Secondly, this demonstrates how global governance can operate through requirements on data reporting (see Chapter 2), and how the collection of statistics as a source of knowledge can have material effects (Rose and Miller, 2008). Thirdly, it demonstrates different interpretations of compliance with this requirement. The Government argues that it can only report net migration in terms which conform to the UN definition. Universities UK in their evidence to the BIS Committee (2011), and indeed the BIS Committee and Home Affairs Committee (2011) in their conclusions, argue that while this data can be reported to comply with international requirements, other definitions can be used to inform domestic policy. These alternatives seek to disrupt the representation of students (Q6). Universities UK (cited in BIS Committee, 2013) refer to Australia, Canada and the USA, which distinguish for the purposes of domestic policy guidance between permanent and temporary migrants, while still reporting internationally in compliance with global definitions (Cavanagh and Glennie, 2012). Changing this technical label would potentially filter through into the public discourses, offering greater nuance. The Government’s response (Home Office, 2013d, p.6) argues that the quality of existing data sets in the International Passenger Survey (IPS) adequately disaggregate categories of migrants for policy purposes, and reiterates
their intention to “comply with the international definition”. The Immigration
Minister stated that:

to say somebody who comes here for three years as a student is not here, so
doesn’t count, is just absurd... The idea that somebody can be here for three,
four, five years or longer but in some way do not have an impact. They are
living somewhere, so they are having an impact on housing. They will be
taking public transport. If they are here for three years, it is quite likely they
use the health service. All the immigration pressures on the public services,
which we all know about, are as affected by an individual student as they
are by an individual on a work permit (BIS Committee, 2013, p.5).

A ‘migrant’ here is defined on the basis of their social impact. The implication is that
social pressures on public services are a key part of being a migrant, as will be
further explored below. The definition of students as migrants is consistent with
discourse from the PMI era (Home Office, 2002, 2006; Blair, 2004; UKBA, 2008).
However, during this period, they and other skilled migrants were defined as
‘contributing’ rather than ‘impacting’, and are seen as desirable. Thus, while the
formal definition may be the same, associated meanings have changed.

For instance, the discursive construction of the “immigrant”, understood as a foreign
citizen entering the UK, is belied by the one aspect of the data collection. The IPS
collects data on everyone who crosses international borders to enter the country with
the intent to remain for over a year, which includes British citizens returning from a
stay abroad (Blinder, 2012). In 2010, this category constituted 16% of immigrants to
the UK (ibid.). This suggests that the technical collection of data relies on
understandings of ‘migrant’ which are not commonly shared by the public, yet the
statistics themselves have the discursive power to impact how the public perceives
the problem (Q5).

Conceptually, it is problematic to categorise students as migrants, as it reduces their
experiences and individuality to a single dimension: their border-crossing. As with
the categorisation of students as international, the distinction fundamentally “others”
them (Q5), creating a binary (Bacchi, 2009) in student populations between the norm
- home students - and the Other - international migrants. The effect on students is
clear: they are made to feel insecure, frustrated, and disempowered by immigration
processes (Marginson, et al., 2010). They report feeling insulted, humiliated, and
being treated “not treated like a student but rather as a potential criminal” (UKCISA,
2011a, p.27).
King and Raghuram (2013) propose an alternative (Q4), that all students could be defined by mobility on a continuum from “local travel” to “global travel”, emphasising the continued global movement that many international students are likely to experience, and the domestic or regional mobility experienced by home students. Even Enoch Powell (cited in Acton, 2011, p.3), in his famous Rivers of Blood speech, differentiated between permanent settlement and students: “This has nothing to do with the entry of Commonwealth citizens, any more than of aliens, into this country for the purposes of study or improving their qualifications...They are not, and never have been, immigrants”. If he, the lodestone of radical opposition to immigration, identifies students as distinct from immigrants, this categorisation is not inevitable or ‘natural’.

Reducing immigration: a numbers game

The way statistics have been gathered informs the representation of the problem of too many international students (Q3). The collection of information is a key technology for governance, a way to control the population (Foucault, 1977; Rose and Miller, 2008). Yet here, available data is limited, and sources contradictory (MAC, 2010). The most widely used source, the IPS, samples travellers at a range of ports, and may significantly under-represent international students departing (Mulley and Sachrajda, 2011). The UKBA records visas issued, but since not all students who apply for visas come to study (UKBA, 2010), this likely overestimates potential entrance. Therefore, the Home Office cannot determine exact numbers of international students in the country (Achato, et al., 2010; MAC, 2010) and likely overestimates, given that departures are underestimated. In the policy discourse, it is the UKBA data most commonly referred to (e.g. Green, 2010; May, 2010a; UKBA, 2010; Cameron, 2011a; Home Office, 2011; Gowers and Hawkins, 2013a, b), meaning that inflated numbers are discursively dominant. These discrepancies are not mentioned in the primary policy documents (Q4) but are often highlighted in the secondary policy documents.

Immigration is represented to be a problem when there is ‘too much’ and when it is illegal (Q1). However, the Coalition Government solution is to reduce net migration, which counts legal entry (MAC, 2010; Mulley and Sachrajda, 2011). Reductions in
illegal immigration are by definition not calculated or measured, and would not contribute to achieving this goal (Mulley and Sachrajda, 2011). The numbers of illegal immigrants cannot be known with any accuracy (Blair, 2005). To attain immigration levels in the “tens of thousands”, reductions have to occur in countable entry points, reducing legal net migration (Acton, 2011). As the biggest category of immigrants, with high rates of compliance (ibid.; Home Office, 2010), students are a “soft target” (Cavanagh and Glennie, 2012), easier to access than asylum seekers or illegal economic migrants. The discursive effect (Q5) of reducing net migration is, therefore, to shift the burden onto reducing legal student migration, suggesting that the underlying political problem is the public perception of immigration numbers.

Undesirable migrants and public concern

The PMI and Coalition policies both concur in their representation of students as migrants. But under Coalition policies, they become represented as undesirable and causing public concern (Q2). This is a key subject effect (Q5), with a number of implications.

Both terms ‘migrant’ and ‘immigrant’, used often interchangeably in public discourses, carry negative connotations caused by a discursive association between ‘migrants’ and ‘asylum seekers’ (Blinder, 2012; Philo, et al., 2013). Throughout Blair’s premiership, there was a perception of an uncontrolled influx of asylum seekers (Spencer, 2007), often reported in the vocabulary of natural disaster - floods, waves and flows, for example (Philo, et al., 2013). This hostility towards asylum seekers then spilled over to apply to all those categorized as migrants (Spencer, 2007), including students.

This leads to the assumption that student immigration causes major public concern (Q2). Research for the Oxford University Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (Blinder, 2012) confirms a high level of public concern, potentially influenced by intensive media coverage (Q6) (Philo, et al., 2013). This suggests that the discursive power of the media is potentially significant in the creation of this problem (Bacchi, 2009). However, when thinking of students, members of the public were more likely to be positive than if considering permanent immigration (Blinder, 2012). There are also significant critiques and attempts to disrupt this association between immigration and students (Q6) (e.g. Milligan, et al., 2011; Cavanagh and Glennie,
Therefore, the assumption in policy discourses that public concern about immigration encompasses students may be called into question. In categorising students as migrants, the aspiration to permanent residency is assumed (Q2). However, international students may alternatively be represented (Q4) as planning a temporary stay (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002). Students frequently state that they hope to gain short-term work experience prior to returning home (Milligan, et al., 2011). According to Home Office data, the 3 % who reach permanent settlement after 5 years typically do so via work or family routes – legally, in other words (Achato, et al., 2010). None of these particular situations cause public concern (Blinder, 2012), yet these findings are not widely reproduced in the discourse (Q4). Instead, the numbers of those who stay for longer than 5 years - “more than a fifth” - are the focus (e.g. Green, 2011; Cameron, 2011a), although these students are all doing so legally, through graduate work or continued study (Achato, et al., 2010). Suter and Jandl (2008) estimate that typical global stay rates are between 10 and 30%, but may be higher for higher education levels and in particular subjects. The IPPR estimates 15% stay over 7 years in the UK (Cavanagh and Glennie, 2012). Therefore, comparatively the UK is on a par with, or lower, in terms of permanent student migration than other countries. Although the policy discourse reports this as excessive (e.g. May, 2010b), it can also be understood as a small minority of the total population (Q4). The categorisation of students as migrants, therefore, has negative connotations of permanence, but can be thought about differently. As Universities UK (2011, p.39) states, “International students are not permanent migrants to the UK.”

The public concern also rests on the perception of a burden on social services, which is represented to be a problem (Q1). Citizenship and permanent residency confer the right to access healthcare, education, social services and welfare benefits, while temporary or illegal migration does not (with the exception of health care) (Blinder, 2012; Philo, et al., 2013). Such access is seen as generous and students are assumed to burden public services to the same extent as permanent settlers (e.g. Cameron, 2011a; Home Office, 2011) (Q2). There is little accurate data on this question, but it is likely that in the short-term international students use health services, social services, and school-level education proportionately less than their domestic
counterparts (MAC, 2010; George, et al., 2011). Students are estimated to generate around 40% lower costs than their UK equivalents (George, et al., 2011), which could be seen as outweighed by their fee contributions. The assumption (Q2) that students ‘take’ in using public services during their stay, and more fundamentally, that they do not have the right to do so is, therefore, open to question. An alternative argument (Q4) might be made that as they contribute so substantially to the economy and universities by internationalising the classroom, they have a right to use public services (e.g. UKCISA, 2013b).

Students abusing the system - surveillance, compliance and discipline

Public concern also encompasses illegal immigration, which for international students means “abuse of the system”, as presented above (Q1) (Spencer, 2007; Blinder, 2012). The consensus on reducing ‘abuse’ of the system is clear, dominant and rarely challenged (Q6). Although there is widespread criticism in the sector of UKBA regulations and implementation (e.g. Jenkins, 2014), there are few challenges to the need to reduce ‘abuse’ (e.g. Universities UK, 2011), the right of the state to take such action, so the sector as a whole is compliant (UKBA, 2010).

Students pose a risk, which is represented to be a problem (Q1): “we need to know that (students) are behaving properly when they are here” (Green, 2011). This construct appears to have developed through policy borrowing from the USA (Q3) where after the 9/11 attacks (Borjas, 2002), perceptions of risk amongst international students increased significantly (Ewers and Lewis, 2008). Security activities intensified as a result (Q5) (ibid.; Urias and Yeakey, 2009). Terrorism per se is not typically associated with international students in this corpus, but the introduction of the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) in the UK (Merrick, 2012) suggests a perception of related risks, namely the proliferation of ‘dangerous’ knowledge (Urias and Yeakey, 2009). The ATAS was established to monitor “postgraduate study in certain sensitive subjects, knowledge of which could be used in programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery” (FCO, 2013), evoking similar concerns in the USA about leakage of sensitive information (Borjas, 2002). This programme was introduced in 2007, only a few months after the July 2007 terrorist attacks in London, although no explicit link between the two is made.
Such perception of risk and fear (Urias and Yeakey, 2009) has underpinned increased monitoring and surveillance of international students and their academic activities in the UK (Q5) (Ewers and Lewis, 2008; Merrick, 2012; Jenkins, 2014). Universities are implicated in this disciplinary process through the requirement of ‘compliance’ with immigration regulations (Jenkins, 2014), and threatened with the revocation of the right to recruit internationally. The range of surveillance technologies on students is significant. When applying, students are required to provide evidence of their English levels, finance and academic qualifications (UKBA, 2013b). The risk is therefore represented to be that students with restricted finances and with lower levels of English may undertake illegal work (Q1). Because the binary categorisation between ‘legitimate’ and ‘bogus’ students relies on whether students work or not, student work is categorised as suspect (Robertson, 2011). That English levels are a risk factor and test results as a form of insurance is also widely unquestioned (Marginson, et al., 2010). Students from many countries\(^{10}\) are required to complete police registration upon arrival (UKCISA, 2013a). Biometric residence permits require students to provide biological data which is then used to legitimate their activities (opening a bank account, for example) (Warren and Mavroudi, 2011). In 2013, the Government proposed requiring landlords and employers to verify the immigration status of tenants and employees (Home Office, 2013b; Home Office, 2013c)\(^{11}\). In combination with the attendance monitoring in place at many universities through technologies such as swipe cards and attendance logs, the cumulative effect is one of intense monitoring and surveillance (Q5).

Although Warren and Mavroudi (2011) found that many migrants did not object to this experience, others found it alienating, creating a point of difference between them and British citizens - a dividing practice (Q5) (Foucault, 1988; Bacchi, 2009). In an educational context, this creates a “two-tier student identity” (Jenkins, 2014, p.1), where a student’s legitimacy rests on their physical presence and other behaviours rather than on their academic activities. The campus becomes securitised

\(^{10}\) On the basis of which countries are included on this list (e.g. Yemen, Colombia, China, North Korea), risk factors appear here to focus on geographical nexuses of organised crime (National Crime Agency, 2014) and the potential for security risks (MI5, 2015)

\(^{11}\) This has since been enacted as a pilot study in the Birmingham area, and will take effect nationally from 2016.
and academic staff are placed in the position of border guards through the act of maintaining attendance registers and reporting on their students’ behaviour to the Home Office (Jenkins, 2014). If students are seen as autonomous academic actors, rather than migrants, their physical presence at particular ‘checkpoints’ throughout the academic year could be considered of secondary importance. The imposition of migration regulations threatens traditional student autonomy, which demonstrates that at other times in history, international students have been conceived of differently (Q4), not primarily through their status as border-crossers (King and Raghuram, 2013). A key silence (Q4) here concerns students’ rights - whether they have the agency to choose to attend certain parts of their course, to select which aspects they engage with or the right to privacy, to withhold some of their personal biometric data.

The emphasis in the construction of ‘risk’ as a discursive object is on risks to the UK and the visa system, not to the student themselves and the risks they experience. With regards to work, the problem could be represented to be the exploitation of students rather than the visa system. Marginson et al. (2010) give an account of the systematic discrimination and exploitation of the student workforce in Australia, and argue that policies do not adequately protect students’ rights as workers. Instead, as in the UK, policy “equates ‘work rights’ only with the ‘right to work’” (ibid., p.127). While in this corpus there is no definitive evidence of such exploitation in the UK, this rights-based critique represents an alternative understanding of students as workers.

**Conclusion**

Thus, representing students as migrants has become a discursive barrier to their recruitment in policy, particularly after the 2010 election of the Coalition Government. In contrast to the economic rationale for migration presented in the previous chapter, it found that the migration was negatively framed, in relation to public concern, perceived “abuse of the system” and pressure on public services. Where immigration leads to “low skilled employment”, “bogus colleges”, or “risk” it is argued that it should be reduced. The Coalition Government’s drive to reduce net immigration impacted students as the biggest category of legal immigrants. Student migration is represented as a problem where they are also assumed to generate public concern, exploit public services, abuse the system and seek
permanent settlement. They are also seen as a risk, and surveillance is the solution. This discussion has highlighted these assumptions and has demonstrated that there are alternative conceptual and discursive possibilities.

Disjunctures appear in the intersection of the discourses of migration with those of education, and those of economics. Although students are rarely explicitly linked with the threat of terrorism or the exploitation of the visa system to their own economic ends, they are monitored and surveyed as if they were. Although they are described as “the best and the brightest”, they are suspected of wishing to work on illegally on the black market for below minimum wage. Although they are sought out by the country and institutions for their economic and educational potential, they are thought to be exploiting health and social services. The discursive assimilation of students with migrants has, therefore, come into conflict with the discourses of economic and pedagogical rationales.
Conclusion

Policy discourses on international students from 1999 to 2013 have been dominated by rationales for or against international student recruitment. In essence, international students are discursively framed as desirable to the extent that they benefit the UK, solving key policy problems, which they are seen to do educationally, economically and politically. However, the debate on immigration problematises students as migrants, creating a barrier to their presence by framing them as less desirable for the UK. The three rationales in favour of recruitment have proved to be quite stable over changes in government, although shifts in emphasis have revealed discursive differences. Firstly, while international students are considered to enhance the UK’s influence, this was conceived of in terms of public diplomacy under the PMI, and in terms of soft power under the Coalition IES. Secondly, while reputation was an important rationale through the period, the PMI sought to materially alter student experiences to generate satisfaction, whereas the Coalition IES relies exclusively on branding to do so. Thirdly, the economic rationale intensifies and comes to predominate under the Coalition IES, such that all engagement in international education is fundamentally justified in economic terms, whereas, under the PMI, other rationales were also important. Finally, immigration came to be seen as a counter-rationale under the Coalition Government, whereas under New Labour it was also seen as a positive incentive to engage in international student recruitment. These rationales have shaped the discursive representations of students.

Contributions

This thesis has contributed to the emerging field of research on international student policy and by extension to international HE, by mapping its iterations in the UK, establishing what has happened, what has been said, what has changed and what has stayed consistent. It has also linked education policy to migration policy. This study builds on the work of Humfrey (2011), Geddie (2014) and Walker (2014) by taking a critical approach to representations of international students in policy, a new approach for the UK. These findings extend similar approaches taken by research from Australia into new geographic territory. It has also made methodological
contributions. It demonstrates that Bacchi’s framework of questions can usefully be applied to UK HE policy, and this work is one of the first to adopt this approach. The results also show that systematic approaches to inductive text analysis can be facilitated through software, as this is one of the few studies to employ CAQDAS in policy text analysis in UK higher education.

**How have students been represented?**

As migrants, international students have been understood both as beneficial to the UK when they fill labour market skills gaps, and as problematic abusers of the visa system, generating public concern and burdening public services. Under the latter problematisation, they are seen as a risk and become increasingly subject to surveillance. International students have been implicated in the wider controversy over net immigration and the Conservative drive to reduce it. They have been brushed with the same undesirable colours as asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants in a discourse that constructs a binary category between citizens and immigrants. At the heart of these discourses is an understanding of human capacity as subject to points-based evaluation, subordinating individuality to the driver of the knowledge economy.

The global diplomacy narrative represents students as influential, elite, understanding of ‘British values’ and sympathetic to them. They are seen to use their time in the UK to build relationships and have positive, life-changing experiences, making lasting ties with political consequences. These relationships are represented as generating soft power for the UK, increasing its influence through a network of alumni ambassadors overseas. This rationale has Cold War traces and does not account for changing funding patterns of international HE. The dominant representation of international students excludes students who do not come from or are unlikely to attain positions of significant influence, are not academically exceptional, and are not necessarily supporters of British foreign policy.

Within the knowledge economy model, international higher education has been taken to be a marketplace, where competition drives intrinsically beneficial growth and higher education is no more than an industry, generating income for the country. Therefore, international students are economic resources, measured in volume,
whose presence is attributed to the successful branding and marketing of the UK higher education sector overseas. Their presence is valued to the extent that they benefit the UK, and the responsibilities of the UK to international students are not significant.

International students are represented as customers and consumers of international higher education, valued for their capacity to generate reputational capital, and to the extent that their satisfaction with their education indicates a high quality of product. Consequently, the quality of education is conflated with the quality of ‘learning experience’, international students’ satisfaction is measured and the resulting data refracted to create reputation to attract more students. ‘Meeting expectations’, or more often ‘managing’ them, becomes a key imperative, as students are understood as demanding customers.

International students are represented to do more, however, than simply evaluate quality: they also generate and impede it. They are seen as educational assets, for their impact on home students, creating an “internationalised classroom” by virtue of their diversity. Read through a culturalist lens which ascribes behaviour and deficit to national origins, international students are read as passive vectors of globalised knowledge whose mere presence is adequate to enhance quality. Yet they also impede educational quality and the implementation of this agenda of intercultural learning, because they are seen to be in deficit - linguistic, academic and cultural.

What has changed?

Policy discourses on international students represent them in complex, interwoven, plural ways. They have changed from 1999-2013, but not in strict association with changes in political parties in control. Overall, there has been more continuity than change. Both Coalition and Labour administrations have valued and rationalised the recruitment of international students to the extent that they benefit the UK, framing them as solutions to policy problems. This is perhaps a reasonable endeavour for national policy, but privileges the interests of already powerful entities (the UK higher education sector, its institutions and the British state) over less powerful, potentially marginalised individuals far from home. Both Coalition and Labour administrations have sought the income from international students, the reputational gain earned by virtue of their presence, the potential benefits to higher education for
home students, and the hope of increased political influence. In the discourse of the Coalition Government, the idea that international graduates might fill domestic labour market skills gaps has largely been dropped, and the negative perception of excessive immigration has instead become dominant. Both Coalition and Labour governments, however, adopted a discourse of exclusiveness and selectivity in attempting to attract the “best and the brightest” students. They took different actions to achieve this, the Coalition Government opting to rule out certain students who did not meet threshold standards, and the Labour Governments seeking to attract and reward desired students. There is more attention paid under Labour Governments, particularly in secondary policy documents, to the actual education and classroom experience than is apparent under the Coalition Government.

At the heart of these representations, however, is a key binary categorisation, on which this thesis also rests: international students are ‘othered’, defined by their difference, by the adjective ‘international’ which says they deviate from the presumed norm of ‘home’ students. Even narratives which seek to value this difference entrench and replicate it by the discursive reinforcement of accepted social categorisations. In other words, every time we accept that something meaningful can be said about ‘international students’ as a group, we perpetuate the conceptual marginalisation of a social group.

Even critiques which seek to empower the very group they discuss, by identifying them as a group reproduce the division - including this thesis. Yet policy critiques need to be part of the discourses which they critique, because understanding discourses as socially constructed requires participating in them. That means using the discursive formations, even while dismantling them. There is no way out of the discourse, no way to stand outside it. Because UK policy talks about and defines international students as a meaningful category, this thesis has also done so. But, crucially, I have not taken ‘international students’ themselves as my subjects. Instead I have taken their discursive representation as my subject and sought to critique it through a problematisation framework.
Where next?

This thesis has addressed a number of questions which still merit further scrutiny opening up avenues for more research in the future. From a global policy mobility perspective, it could form the basis for establishing relationships between changes in international student policy across a range of countries and build on work on exploring how policies travel (Geddie, 2014). For example, it is apparent that the PBS migration system was largely borrowed from Australia; similarly, the British Council branding initiative appears to have been imitated by Canada (ibid.). Policy seems to travel bilaterally and unsystematically.

Narrowing down into the UK, this study could move out from discourses in texts and into discourses in life, the extent to which the representations from policy impact the way that international students represent themselves, and see themselves represented. It could also examine the way that higher education professionals represent international students, how they are refracted in institutional discourses.

Moving away from public policy discourses, accessing policy actors, ex or current, could explore (albeit partially and retrospectively) informal discursive representations. An alternative window on public discourses would be to examine the media representations of international students, as Philo et al. (2013) did with refugees. A genre-focused study could, using this corpus, examine the chains of reproduction wherein a single document can be reinterpreted and recycled in different forms: from research report to policy, to speech, to press release, for example. A critical discourse analysis could sample equivalent genres from this diverse corpus such as speeches and conduct a linguistic analysis on the representations to further substantiate the inferences made here.
So what now?

The findings of this research offer the HE sector in the UK, and elsewhere, an enhanced critical awareness of these discursive representations in policy, and the extent to which they may influence institutional, disciplinary and individual decision-making, styles of talking and ways of being. Discourses have the power to define and limit the ways that we live our lives and think about ourselves, so they can profoundly influence academic, institutional, and students’ identities and lived experiences. The danger in having such a substantial gap in the literature on this subject is that sector actors may be unaware of the ways in which they unconsciously reproduce and act out discursive representations with which they may be philosophically deeply at odds. I do not advocate an alternative set of representations because students are individuals, and as such as varied, unpredictable, and changeable, neither universally ‘weak and vulnerable’ or ‘strong and resilient’. Any attempt to construct alternative representations would generate its own disciplinary effects, disempowering students as agents in new, creative and subtle ways.

For policy, this study offers a reason to think differently about international students in UK HE. Firstly, the competitive zero-sum model of the market is profoundly damaging to global equality, development and in the long run, stability. Increasing market-share deprives another country of its piece of a finite pie. It also means perpetuating extant inequalities - by seeking out people who are already potential higher education students of one country or another and offering them additional advantages, it creates a class of hyper-educated people while others lack access to basic primary education. By then further expecting that those people will go home after they finish studying, the current policy is creating its own demise. Effectively, current international HE recruitment sends home a group of well-educated, privileged people with all the tools to set up domestic higher education in the UK’s model. Just as the UK once sold guns, before selling the industrial technology to manufacture them, the country and the HE sector are now selling the intellectual technology to make higher education. We are creating our own competitors - if we are doing our jobs well. A lasting international HE sector, therefore, needs different rationales to lead to different representations of students.
It is essential for academic researchers as beneficiaries of the international higher education system to acknowledge the discursive power of policy over international students. Because national policy often sets the terms of public discourse, its representations of international students may be having significant unexplored consequences, perpetuated by the academy. Silence on post-colonial implications of othering students by their country of citizenship or residence and their culture represents compliance. Reproduction of consumer and deficit models of students are already part of students’ self-subjectivizations. Cooperation in a diplomatic narrative implies a primacy to British foreign policy objectives. It is the ethical responsibility for those of us who participate in international higher education to critically examine how the policy represents students, and if necessary, to resist and disrupt it. This is a necessary precursor to the emancipatory, caring, critical, empowering pedagogy to which most institutions and academics are dedicated.
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Appendix 1: Policy Actors

Departamental Bodies

**BIS - Department for Business, Innovation and Skills** - previously DIUS - Department of Innovation Universities and Skills. The Department has responsibility for economic growth, education, skills, businesses and consumers. It incorporated **The Department for Trade and Industry** from 2007.

**The Cabinet Office** supports the Prime Minister and the running of government. It is a ministerial department which takes the lead in certain policy areas.

Variously, **the Department for Education and Employment, Department for Education and Skills** and **the Department for Education** was the department responsible for the education system in England and had responsibility for higher education until 2007.

**The Department for Work and Pensions** is a ministerial department responsible for pensions, welfare and child maintenance policy.

**The Department for Culture, Media and Sport** is a ministerial department with responsibility for promoting cultural and artistic heritage, innovation, and creative industries.

**The Foreign and Commonwealth Office** is a ministerial department that promotes the UK’s interests overseas, dealing with security, promoting exports and providing consular services.

**Home Office** - a ministerial department in charge of immigration, crime, policing and counter-terrorism.

The **Ministry of Defence** is a ministerial department responsible for the armed forces, intelligence and security services.

**The Scottish Executive**, now **the Scottish Government** is the devolved government for Scotland with responsibility for health, education, justice, rural affairs, housing and the environment.
UK Border Agency (now UK Visas and Immigration) is part of the Home Office and manages visa, asylum and citizenship applications.

UK Trade and Industry is a non-ministerial department responsible for promoting inward investment and exports.

The Welsh Office is a UK government department which coordinates devolved responsibilities, representing the UK government in Wales and Welsh interests in Westminster.

*Non-Departmental Public Bodies:*

The Government defines an NDPB as a “body which has a role in the processes of national government, but is not a government department or part of one, and which accordingly operates to a greater or lesser extent at arm’s length from ministers” (Cabinet Office and Efficiency and Reform Group, 2014)

The British Council works overseas to develop cultural relations, by providing services in English language, arts, education and society, in the interests of fostering ties between the UK and the rest of the world. It included the British Council Education Counselling Service, which coordinated its higher education recruitment and marketing activities, and Educ@tion UK, a brand and recruitment website. It is an NDPB sponsored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Migration Advisory Committee is an advisory NDPB sponsored by the home office which advises the government on migration issues, specifically the impacts of immigration, limits under the points-based system and skills shortages in the labour market.

The Higher Education Funding Council for England is sponsored by the BIS and distributes funding to universities and colleges.

The Higher Education Academy - responsible for enhancing teaching and learning in UK higher education, aimed at improving the student experience. Receives majority of funding from HEFCE to whom it is responsible.

The International Unit is a research and policy body funded by HEIs.
Quality Assurance Agency - under contract with the funding councils, independent of government and HEIs, entrusted with monitoring and advising on standards and quality in UK higher education as a statutory function.

The Higher Education Statistics Agency - collects and monitors statistics for subscribing higher education institutions on behalf of HEFCE, although it is formally independent.

Research Council UK is a partnership between the UK’s seven research funding councils, distributes funding and supports research.

UK Council for International Student Affairs - a national advisory body in the interests of international students. Independent body, funded in part by grants from the BIS and Scottish Government, and by membership subscriptions from HEIs. Previously known as UKCOSA, UK Council for Overseas Student Affairs.

Independent bodies involved in implementation and research for policy

The Association of Graduate Careers Advisory Services is a professional body for careers and employability in higher education.

DTZ is a commercial real-estate organisation, which also includes a research team covering market trends.

i-graduate is a commercial organisation which tracks student and stakeholder opinions for institutions and countries.

Ipsos Mori is a leading market research company in the UK.
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## Appendix 3: Coding Structure

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Appendix 4: Extracts from Research Diary

Conceptual issues

15/06 - competition

Created: 15/06/2014 11:22

Competition include between countries and within the UK i.e. with private providers. Should I distinguish?

Remember - competition = in general. Competitor countries = when specific countries are mentioned.

“This new competition poses a threat to the UK sector.” - threat vs challenge. A useful query?

I think that UK’s market share should be under the competition parent node. Clear overlaps.

What is the difference between ‘demand’ and ‘growth’? All growth is a statement of increases in demand. All demand is not necessarily growth i.e. as a description of current demand. Therefore demand should be parent node to growth.

Next step: finish sorting out growth vs demand - done.

All forecast is basically about growth. Now have made a distinction between statements of current and past growth (‘growth’) and future (‘forecast’, although this does include some negative growth as politicians have it)

I’m eliminating everything that I had parallel coded with other sectors e.g. TNE and growth and categorising it all under other sectors. I can deal with this later but for the moment it will be easier to analyse if it’s simply not there.

PMI2 - ‘sustain the managed growth’ as opposed to ‘increase and grow’

Next step: need to sort out child nodes under growth. I’m splitting these into ‘decline’ i.e. ‘negative growth’ and ‘barriers, limits, constraints’. Entails some recoding and sorting but these are the two issues. Done.

NB would be valuable perhaps to go through forecasts and separate growth from decline.

Merged ‘Changing HE enrollment into ‘opportunity global demographic change’ - basically covered the same items.

Next step: education export earnings.
New code - overseas domestic education systems

In *Making it happen*, notice that talking about the ‘quality of experience’ rather than ‘quality of education’ on p4. I’ve coded this as both quality and experience but an interesting ambiguity I need to pick up on in analysis.

- UPDATE - 10/05 - found this phrase exactly quoted in the Hyland and Trahar HEA report, quoted from Clark OECD report. Now, I’m not sure that I want to include the OECD report in the analysis but have been reading Stephen Ball again and I think I should give some consideration to the international influences on policy. Don’t want to be accused of methodological nationalism. Where did I hear that - assignment 2/3?

- UPDATE - 10/05 - similar thing with ‘learning experience’ - not precisely talking about learning as objectively measured.

In fact, we’ve got not just education as a commodity but quality as a commodity. and

- UPDATE - 25/05 - quality = selling point & quality = experience = satisfaction; therefore satisfaction = quality = selling point - BOH p.14

- another e.g. “Under-resourcing of support services is likely to impact negatively on future recruitment, while those institutions who provide good support services will see the benefit from more satisfied students.” (ibid p.41)

New code - UK education advantages - rather odd something similar to this hasn’t popped up before. Ran text query but it doesn’t turn up much. Will have to check manually in IES.

New code - help and support for international students. again surprising it hasn’t come up before. Learning more about using the text query - synonym function pretty useless - turned up ‘living’ and ‘bearing’ and what it thinks those are synonyms for I don’t know. I think this was the trouble with code above too - specific phrase may not turn up but the text query searches for all the words individually rather than all the words in proximity unless you do it as the precise phrase. Still not using auto-coding. Don’t think it would work with this. But it is SO useful to know about viewing the broader context. Does rather invalidate some of those criticisms about CAQDAS and CDA, given that all the results are provided within the document so I think when doing the actual analysis I’m going to be moving between screen and paper to retain the context. wish it included page numbers. Re help and support it’s noticeable that in the IES the support is to business and sector, rarely to students (2-3 times)

I don’t have a specific code for international students voices when they are included e.g. quotes. These are included under the generic ‘international students’ code.

UPDATE - new code for international student voices; need to be able to distinguish
the student voice from the authorial policy voice, but also to note where student voice is being used to support

Issue with the PMI 2010 report. There’s lots of puff about particular projects e.g. things they’ve done to improve employability. but it’s not actually about the international students, it’s about the activities undertaken on their behalf. so if i code it under ‘IS - employability’ that’s not really accurate. But then isn’t that something I can pick up in the analysis? Yes, I think so. Because this is Bacchi’s point, isn’t it - a ‘solution’ is being proposed related to employability but a lot of assumptions are being made in order to reach the stage where this is an appropriate solution.

“the international student experience”

“the international student experience” - singular, objectified / reified. international student = adjective. Ripe for CDA! ran as search query turned up plenty of results. so giving lip service to diversity and individuality but actually using language that implies otherwise.

- UPDATE - turning up a lot in the UKCISA PMI achievements document foreword. noticing again how much richer the forewords are thematically than most of the text. yet constantly referring to lower satisfaction rates from East Asia. Starting to notice more when they are dis-aggregating by country. I can code this under ‘home country’ but didn’t code for this in Archer.

Starting to wonder whether all of these documents are relevant. A lot of detail about which students feel what doesn’t really enter in to policy decisions at all. But isn’t that the point? What aspects of students’ experience get included / excluded in policy? I feel that this is important. Not sure why. If I think about it in this way, I don’t have to code everything in these research reports - just highlight the aspects. Then compare which ones pop up most often and figure out why and which ones emerge in central policy.

Elite students - brightest and the best. There’s something going on here. An overlap, an elision, that leads to a restricted version of who international students should be and incidentally completely contradictory of the image of student as consumer. The market vision of HE is at least egalitarian in its approach.
Methodological issues

Reconsidering my corpus

Created: 25/05/2014 10:42

I’m reflecting on the scope of the texts that I have collected and considering whether they all need to be included. The main group includes material originating from central government or agencies funded by central government or that have been heavily influential, e.g. Vision 2020 report. My ‘3rd party’ folders include material from sector organisations like UUK and the Russell Group, because I wanted to include their perspective. But I’m not actually sure if this is realistic. I might be better off excluding these for the moment and focusing more tightly on the most relevant, central documents. After all, I can still use the information from 3rd party reports like IPPR to demonstrate that there are resistances and alternative discourses without including them in the analysis. Right? This is definitely something to discuss with Vassiliki.

Because does it even make sense, if I’m doing a discourse analysis of policy, to include critiques of the policy in the data collection? Unless that’s my research question, but in my case it isn’t. I think I’ve got a bit confused - in acknowledging that policy is plural and contains fractured discourses, I’ve actually gone and sought out the fractures, even when they don’t originate from policy sources. I don’t need to examine the entire field - I’ve established there is a research gap i.e. on central, national policy - I don’t need to go further and simultaneously analyse all the resistances. These can come in in my discussion.

So if I tighten my criteria for inclusion, that means only from government department or government funded agencies. That includes UKCISA (partially funded), HEA. It excludes HEPI....

13/07

Created: 13/07/2014 12:21

2011 Home Affairs Committee on student visas: point 22. - this is really a point about over-reliance but it is not phrased in terms of a problem - rather it talks about ‘jewel in the crown’. Completely different positioning. Not sure how to incorporate this in the WPR framework.

section 23 adn 24 make a comparatively unusual rhetorical case combining skills shortage, knowledge economy and international competitiveness ot argue for continued international recruitment.

New code: Student visas / deter potential students. ‘misperception’ code doesn’t cover it. created it from 2011 UKCISA so need to review visa-students parent code because I think I’ve got some statements in there that need to be recoded as ‘deter’
Also the ‘reduce migration’ code now includes consequences of that reduction rather than just a statement of intention. may need to create a child code identifying consequences.

Worth pointing out that the UKBA consultation did not target students at all. consequently impact assessment (totally worth doing an independent WPR on - classically follows the format) doesn’t include student voice at all. nor does the commons select committee. i wonder if they called any nus reps or international reps? yes they did call an NUS rep but no international students. kind of a major omission!

2013 Healthcare consultation: “The Government believes migrants should come to the UK for the right reason - to contribute to our society rather than simply taking from it.” But why should they? The right to freedom of movement is a human right enshrined in international convenants, and no where does it say that migrants have to benefit the host country. Also, what about the UK’s responsibilities as a member of an international community? Have just checked UNDHR and no - no right to move to other countries, just within 1 and to leave own. Not the right to go anywhere else.
Appendix 5: Extracts of Coding reports

Attract and Recruit International Students

Reference 1 - 3.57% Coverage
Today, we are launching a long-term strategy to reinforce the United Kingdom as a first choice for the quality of study and the quality of our welcome to international students.

Reference 2 - 2.04% Coverage
We are introducing a package of measures to help encourage students from overseas to study in the UK. We will offer to international students a new welcome and more open doors.

Reference 3 - 1.72% Coverage
We have the measures in place, but we are also setting tough targets for recruitment. We want to have 25 per cent of the global market share of Higher Education students and we want to increase the number of international students studying in Further Education institutions by 100 per cent. Our aim is to reach these targets by 2005. Tough targets, but deliverable.

Reference 1 - 0.30% Coverage
This document provides a status update on the development of the British Education brand. It follows publication of the preliminary report In May 1999 — "Branding British Education" and the launch of a government sponsored initiative to attract more international students to the UK.

Reference 1 - 0.27% Coverage
The report does not cover the many positive things happening in institutions, the British Council or with the very welcome Prime Minister’s initiative to attract more international students to UK education. The report deliberately focuses on our weaknesses so that we might recognise them and address them. How we react will determine how successful UK education will be in the international education marketplace in the early part of the 21st century.

Reference 2 - 0.06% Coverage
• Relatively unambitious recruitment targets; • Little detailed understanding of the potential of current and future markets; • Inadequate attention being paid to long term planning;

Reference 3 - 0.17% Coverage
• A failure to recognise the long term recruitment benefits of strategic relationship building and the scope for staff exchanges;

Reference 4 - 0.14% Coverage
A framework for the development of a world-class international student recruitment strategy for institutions

Alumni - Ambassadors

Reference 1 - 0.12% Coverage
Alumni ambassadors
The cultivation and management of champions who act for the institution
In the long-term, such students act as long-term advocates in the wider world both for the UK and the institutions they attended.

**Reference 2 - 0.12% Coverage**

- The PMI targets and focus of work has mainly been in the area of recruitment. However, it is current students and recent graduates who are the potential ambassadors for the UK. They can facilitate improved international relations and trade links and are central to achieving the long-term objectives of the PMI.

5.7 There are also a number of other important cultural, social, political and international outcomes which should accompany a successful managed migration system: migrants who will act as future ambassadors and advocates for the UK and the use of English as a business and teaching language and effective public diplomacy and raising the UK’s reputation abroad.

As the PMI2 initiative draws to a close, the challenge is to sustain that engagement and the responsiveness of institutions and of staff, to ensure each year that the UK’s international students are, in increasing numbers, its advocates and ambassadors.

70 Ambassadors and Representatives joined the pilot and tagged themselves as “UK educated” during 10 week pilot Reaching a combined network of 20,300+ friends and family (Approximate number based upon analysis of 75% of the Ambassadors” & Representatives” networks) Based on feedback from 22 Ambassadors and Representatives who have provided feedback to date, 50% were asked for advice, from an average of 6 prospects during the 10 week period The Ambassadors and Representatives traded 266 links to Education UK pages

5. There has been a lack of clarity about whether the Government’s principal aim is to place a cap on the number of student visas issued each year as it did previously with Tiers 1 and 2 of the migration system or to deter those seeking to abuse the student visa system in order to work and settle in the UK. The Government has stated it does not intend to place a cap on student visas, arguing that its proposals are aimed at tightening the system rather than...
cutting down on the number of genuine students. On 24 January 2011, the Minister for Immigration said in the House of Commons:

Reference 2 - 0.07% Coverage
On 8 February, during an adjournment debate on the issue the Minister said: “We want to encourage all those genuine students coming here to study at our world-class academic institutions.”

“I can tell the hon. Gentleman that we are not currently looking at limits on tier 4 immigration visas” students.

Reference 3 - 0.05% Coverage
6. We are in agreement with the Government that any cap on student visas would be unnecessary and undesirable. Any cap could seriously damage the UK’s higher education industry and international reputation.

Although there is no limit placed on the volume of students allowed to qualify under the new proposals there are uncertainties around the volume estimates; without a limit it is possible that student visas issued will not significantly reduce. The Home Office will continue to monitor the number of students and dependants coming through the route.

That’s why with us, if you’re good at your subject, can speak English and have been offered a place on a course at a trusted institution - you will be able to get a visa to study here.

Despite the view of the Home Office, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills appears to be sympathetic to removing overseas students from the Government’s migration figures. Speaking on 29 May at the Gulf Education Conference in London, Rt Hon. David Willetts MP, the Minister for Higher Education, said that higher education, which was already a “great British export industry”, could be “far bigger”. He went on to say that he wanted to see an expansion in the numbers of overseas students because “growth is the government’s agenda, and we want to see it grow”. He also told the House in the previous week that there was “no limit” on the number of genuine students who can come to the UK to study. However, he appeared to acknowledge that the visa regime had an impact on overseas student stating that:

Of course we are in close contact with the Home Office on the implementation of these rules, but the key point is that there is no cap on the number of overseas students who can come to Britain.

We want the brightest and best students in the world to choose our universities so we’ve said no cap on student numbers at our world class universities.
there is no cap on the number of legitimate students coming to Britain, nor do we plan to impose one.

We have no cap on the number of students we want to welcome to the country and no intention of introducing one.

The Coalition’s Mid-Term Review stated there is no cap on the number of students who can come to study in the UK, and there is no intention to introduce one.

While being clear that all legitimate students are welcome, without a limit on numbers,

there is “no limit on the number of legitimate students”