Pictorial Representation and the Significance of Style

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Abstract

This thesis aims to show that the concept of style ought to be given greater significance in understanding depiction. I argue that if we want to understand pictorial representations we must remember that how they depict is crucial to understanding not only why they depict what they do, but also why we have the particular kind of experience that they engender.

I develop and defend an account of artistic style that has its basis in the claim that individual style is the way in which an artist does something, where this way of doing something is highly personal. With this in place I explore and critically evaluate previous attempts at understanding pictorial representation, in particular the popular Resemblance View, further clarifying the phenomenon of seeing-in along the way. I then modify and develop an account of depiction which has its basis in the work of Flint Schier and Dominic Lopes, who argue for an ‘Aspect-Recognition’ theory of depiction. The Aspect-Recognition theory, I contend, can give us the beginnings of a story about depiction, but while it is pointing in the right direction, I show it is still inadequate. I then use the concept of style that I have developed and build upon the Aspect-Recognition theory to provide a better account; one that not only has explanatory force but also does justice to pictorial diversity and the phenomenology of pictorial experience.

Finally, I put this view to work in resolving familiar problems in the philosophy of depiction, namely pictorial misrepresentation and pictorial indeterminacy. These remain the most persistent difficulties for other theories of depiction. Thus my view not only better describes the nature of pictorial experience more generally but is also much better equipped to make sense of curious phenomena in pictorial representation.
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Author’s Declaration

I declare that the work herein presented is my own, and that due credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. Material from Chapter Three of this thesis has been published as an article entitled ‘Reducing the Space of Seeing-in’ in the British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 54. No. 4 (2014), pp. 409-424.
Introduction

‘The history of art…may be described as the forging of master keys for opening the mysterious locks of our senses to which only nature herself originally held they key…Of course, once the door springs open, once the key is shaped, it is easy to repeat the performance.’

One of the many things we have learnt from the work of Ernst Gombrich is that art history has a pattern of experimentation, of trial and error, and is laden with conventions and expectations that are either met or not met. The mystery of our ability to represent the world in pictures, and why we should represent it so differently throughout history, is lessened by the observation, immediately following on from the quote with which I began, that ‘we respond differently when we are ‘keyed up’ by expectation, by need, and by cultural habituation.’ If this is so, then why has the philosophy of depiction said so little about this pattern? If depiction throughout the ages has a narrative of forging paths through changing styles, made possible by learning from the art of the past, then what allows the image-maker to forge her own path, and to depict the world in her own way, ought to be given a greater significance when we attempt to understand pictures and the kinds of visual experiences they engender.

Yet the philosophy of depiction, while it ranges over countless issues concerning the way we represent the world in pictures, makes very little reference to artistic style; perhaps because the concept is too vague to put to work. However, if it can be made clearer, and neater, through philosophical analysis, I think it is of great significance for many of the concerns in the philosophy of depiction. Despite the central importance of artistic style with regard to understanding and appreciating artworks, determining what exactly the term ‘style’ means is no easy task. However, this is the task I set myself in the first chapter, and is one that, upon finishing it, will ground all that I go on to say about pictorial representation.

In Chapter One I discuss the concept of style as critical art historians have conceived of it, and introduce and critically evaluate previous accounts of artistic style. The first equates style with something akin to formal features or the manner in which something is expressed. On this view, style turns out to be a matter of ‘how’ something is said as opposed to ‘what’ is said, positing the distinction between form and content as a crucial ground on which to define artistic style. I then suggest that this view is inadequate because it ignores the fact, pointed out by Nelson Goodman, that often style is a matter of what is said as well as a matter of how.

2 Ibid
However, despite my rejection of this formulation of style, I suggest that there is still room for the ‘how?’ consideration if we conceive of style as located in the activity of an artist. Taking a cue from Kendall Walton’s paper ‘The Products and Processes of Art’, and the account of style given by Jenefer Robinson and Peter Lamarque, I propose that the ‘how?’ question ought to be pushed back into the act or process of creating artworks, which, I contend, can give us a satisfactory account of style. I argue that an artist’s style is a matter of the way in which she does something, where this way of doing something is highly personal. This, I claim, allows for both form and content to be taken up into an artist’s stylistic repertoire. In the final section, I consider a series of objections to my view and reply to each one in turn.

In Chapter Two I consider ways in which we might come to know about an artist’s style, which concerns our perceptual experiences of style properties, thus building on the account of style I argued for in the first chapter. I make use of recent literature on high-level properties to argue that style properties are a species of high-level properties that can be visually experienced. I argue that we can visually experience not only low-level properties such as shape, colour, or size, but also ‘high-level properties’ such as aesthetic properties. However, while I argue for the conclusion that the perception of aesthetic properties is possible, I also argue that there is a further species of high-level property that figures in our experiences of artworks, namely style properties.

What little discussion of stylistic properties has occurred has tended to equate style properties with aesthetic properties. However, this tendency to run together style properties with aesthetic properties is, I claim, a mistake, and in this chapter I demonstrate various ways in which they are distinct. Having established this distinction between aesthetic properties and style properties, I then give a thorough analysis of the claim that style properties are high-level properties, and argue that we can visually experience them. I consider possible objections to the claim that style properties are high-level properties, showing that each one can be met. I then propose that the conclusions I have argued for in this chapter are significant to the philosophy of depiction. In particular they make sense of expertise in art, and the way in which a knowledge of artistic style informs our experiences of pictures.

Having developed my own account of individual style, and our perception of stylistic properties, in Chapter Three I begin an analysis of one of the central features of a perceptual account of depiction, namely seeing-in. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide the right account of seeing-in in order to ground what I will go on to say about style and depiction. While the concept of seeing-in originates in the work of E.H Gombrich and Richard Wollheim, recent accounts of seeing-in have taken a pluralistic turn. Dominic Lopes

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argues that seeing-in is a multiple phenomenon and identifies five different kinds of seeing-in. Dan Cavedon-Taylor identifies a sixth kind, and claims that the space of seeing-in marked out by Lopes can be further expanded. In this chapter, Chapter Three, I argue that the phenomenon of seeing-in does not divide in as many ways as Lopes and Cavedon-Taylor propose. I show that either Naturalism or Twofoldness can accommodate the additional ‘ways of seeing-in’ identified by Lopes, and that, if they cannot be so accommodated, then they are not genuine instances of seeing-in. I therefore conclude in the first part of this chapter that the space of seeing-in ought to be significantly reduced.

The refinement of this concept then leads, in the second part of this chapter, to a discussion of one of the most popular views of depiction, namely the Experienced Resemblance Theory. This theory makes use of the notion of seeing-in but seeks to improve upon its explanatory role in depiction. I consider the most plausible version of this theory, which belongs to Robert Hopkins. His thorough account of the relation between depiction and resemblance in terms of what he calls ‘Outline Shape’ is fully explored, and the benefits enumerated. However, I propose that there are significant problems with this view, some of which stem from its inability to cope with the space of seeing-in argued for in the first part of this chapter. In particular I argue that the view cannot explain pictorial indeterminacy, inflection, and pictorial misrepresentation. As such I reject this view and conclude that we must look elsewhere for an account of depiction that does justice to the nature of seeing-in and the diversity of depiction.

In Chapter Four I outline and defend a non-matching perceptual theory of depiction, namely the Aspect-Recognition theory. This theory has its basis in the work of Flint Schier, and has been developed by Dominic Lopes. Lopes’s view centres on the idea that pictures present aspects of their subjects, which viewers can recognize since the presentation of those aspects engages their recognitional capacities. Thus this chapter also explores the phenomenon of recognition, and how it operates, in order to bolster the claim that depiction has something to do with recognition. With this in place, on of the central claims of the Aspect-Recognition Theory, that depiction need not necessarily be viewpointed, is elucidated and it is shown why this view has advantages over the Resemblance View, which was rejected in the previous chapter.

However, I argue that this account needs improvement, since recognitional abilities have limits. As such it is possible that they can give out at any moment. Because of this I claim that the Aspect-Recognition Theory has a large explanatory gap, namely that it cannot explain when and why recognition should fail. To fill this gap, I integrate my account of artistic style into the Aspect-Recognition Theory in order to build a better version of it that can explain why pictorial recognition is sustained even where depicted subjects are radically transformed. I connect my account of individual style with the aspectual structure of
depiction, showing that there is room for considering the way in which an artist does something in the Aspect-Recognition Theory, and that by doing this we can get a highly persuasive theory of depiction. I then show how adapting the theory in this way has certain advantages in explaining a puzzle about depiction, namely the puzzle of mimesis, which was introduced in Chapter Three. I then consider objections to my account and reply to them, and in the final section I critically evaluate Lopes’s theory of picturing as an ‘information system’, which further distances my account from his.

Having adapted the Aspect-Recognition Theory to include my account of style, I put this theory to work in the final chapter. I consider the two curious phenomena in depiction, namely misrepresentation and pictorial indeterminacy, taking each in turn. In this chapter, Chapter Five, I begin by describing what pictorial misrepresentation is not, arguing against a definition of misrepresentation that can be plausibly drawn out of Hopkins’s defence of his Experienced Resemblance Theory. I argue against this definition by, firstly, arguing that it presupposes a resemblance view, and, secondly, that it unnecessarily limits the representational capacities of pictures. I go on, via a discussion of pictorial realism, to claim that incorrectly ascribing properties to the depicted subject is only a necessary condition for misrepresentation. Something else is needed for sufficiency.

I suggest that misrepresentation is intimately related to artistic style, and formulate this into a definition, such that it can provide the required condition with which to correctly determine cases of misrepresentation. Thus I demonstrate how the modified Aspect-Recognition Theory, which gives style its proper significance, can explain pictorial misrepresentation. I then introduce possible objections and show that each one can be met. Finally, I discuss pictorial indeterminacy, which, like misrepresentation, proved troublesome for the Experienced Resemblance Theory. I demonstrate that the view argued for in this thesis makes better sense of pictorial indeterminacy by avoiding, unlike the Resemblance Theory, a separation between seeing-in and pictorial content. I claim that our perception of artistic style preserves the connection between seeing-in and pictorial content, and attribute any indeterminacy to the configuration of the pictorial surface rather than to the pictorial content. I conclude with a final discussion of the benefits of adopting the view of depiction I have argued for, which shows that the concept of style is key to the philosophy of depiction and ought to be given a great significance.
Chapter One

The Concept of Style

‘Every artist, and every true connoisseur, possesses a genuine feeling of what the term implies, however difficult it might be to express this in words.’ (Gottfried Semper)\(^4\)

The above comment from Semper concerning the concept of style is one I believe neatly sums up the difficulty of defining style. While Hans Georg Gadamer claimed that, ‘The notion of style is one of the [undiscussed] self-evident concepts upon which our historical consciousness is based’\(^5\), to me it still has the familiar difficulty one feels when trying to resolve any philosophical problem; that when it seems that one’s finger is hovering in just about the right place, the finger slips and the spot at which one was trying to pin it down has seemingly vanished. Gadamer was right to point out its lack of discussion, but the meaning of the term, and thus the concept of ‘style’, is certainly not self-evident. While it is spoken of and argued about in many disciplines, its meaning has not been adequately understood, and defining it as a concept has proved to be just as difficult.

Certainly attempts to define style have been made, and it takes little time to find passing comments or insightful remarks on the concept that capture something intuitive about it. But while it may never be a wholly neat concept, it has not, in my view, been tidied up nearly enough to make it a useful concept in the philosophy of depiction, and this is, in part, the task I set myself in this thesis. I set myself this task because I think the concept of style, once we can get at the root of its meaning, can be brought to bear on many of the concerns in the philosophy of depiction. It is, I claim, of great significance in helping us to better understand the way we depict the world.

Indeed, the importance of style with regard to understanding artworks has rarely been denied. According to Jenefer Robinson, figuring out the aesthetic significance of a painting depends upon figuring out its style and, in particular, its place in the history of style.\(^6\) Robinson’s claim echoes the thinking of influential art historian Erwin Panofsky who, in his work *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, proposed that even determining the representational content - that is the literal subject matter - of a painting depends heavily on knowing what style it is in. For him, that the infant portrayed in Roger van der Weyden’s *Three Magi* is seen as an apparition and not as a small child hanging in mid-air is a result of our background knowledge of the painting and our ability to correctly locate it in its historical, stylistic,


context’, while for Wollheim, ‘Style is a precondition of aesthetic interest.’ Furthermore, as is the case for van der Weyden’s painting, stylistic considerations often prevent vast misunderstandings of artworks. As Mark Rollins points out in a recent paper, a critic once described Woman in Sunlight by Renoir as a woman whose body was depicted as bruised, as if it were rotting flesh, rather than as a woman whose body was dappled in sunlight and shadows. Thus there are also very clear practical reasons why style should be considered important.

However, despite the central importance of artistic style with regard to understanding and appreciating artworks, determining the precise meaning of ‘style’ is, as I have already warned, no easy task. Indeed, even deciding where to begin when attempting to refine a concept that is used so widely and in a motley of distinct ways is, of course, a task in itself. However, since I have mentioned that one need not look far to find comments, remarks, and helpful insights into the notion of style, I think a good place to start is with these observations, so that we might see if there are any common threads that could help to weave the concept together. I think there are common threads, and threads that anticipate, however slightly, the account of style that I will go on to defend. What follows are a series of quotations that attempt to capture some sense of what we mean by the term ‘style’. I will go on to comment on them, and try to refine a little of what I think is the shared germ of an idea and understanding of style, but I think it works well for the reader to read them in succession, without interjection, so that the ideas and insights are given the individual attention they deserve.

‘We represent the self in all we make, so that whether we are painting a picture or building a house or making a chair, we leave some trace of uniqueness on what we make. That trace of uniqueness is our style…’
(Herbert Read: poet, art critic (and anarchist))

‘The tangled threads of each historical style cannot be combed straight, counted, and measured. A theory or a scholarship that attempted to do so would quickly destroy that vital essence for which works of art are treasured: their unique and inimitable reflection of a human personality.’
(Paul Zucker: art critic, art historian, and architect)

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8 ‘Pictorial Style: Two Views’. In The Concept of Style, Berel Lang (ed), (1979), pp. 183-202, p. 188.
10 Read, Herbert, The Origins of Form in Art, (Thames and Hudson 1965), p. 178
‘Style has nothing to do with regions, nations, or schools…it is…a compliment to manier’ and means something close to character or personal character.13
(Willibald Sauerländer (Art historian) speaking of the views of Giovan Pietro Ballori (Art historical biographer)

‘Under the name style a self-sufficient language is evolved which has its roots only in the depths of the author’s personal and secret mythology.’14
(Roland Barthes: literary theorist, philosopher, and linguist)

‘The style is the man himself’15
(Georges-Louis Leclerc, count de Buffon: French naturalist)

What is common to all of the above remarks on the concept of style is a reference to an individual and their character or personality. Though it helps us in attribution, style seems not to be simply an amassing and cataloguing of recurrent features, it consists in something deeper than this; it is related to the person responsible for, and the creator of, those features. But the term ‘style’ did not always have a meaning similar to that captured by the above remarks. Considering the etymology and evolution of the term is helpful to demonstrate that it was a process, a gradual development and seeping into language, that we began to think and talk of style in this way.

The meaning of the term ‘style’ has its origins in the Latin Stilus, meaning simply an instrument for writing; hence it had its beginnings in an association with the literary.16 But over time the term evolved into one of the most fundamental concepts in art history, related no longer to writing in its basic sense, but to individuality. It is documented by Sauerländer as being used in this sense, at least in Italy, by 1530, and the individual and personal connotations of the term ‘style’ had been established by the second half of the eighteenth century.17 What is remarkable about the evolution of the term, despite its connection to ‘a way of doing something’ with an instrument, is that the use of the term in relation to individuality and personality crept into our language seemingly so naturally that one would think we had always spoken in these terms, and furthermore we each appear to understand what is meant by it when we talk of the style of this or that artist, or this or that school. Looking back to its original meaning serves as a reminder that the term evolved and

12 English translation: “Manner”, “Style”
17 Sauerländer, ‘From Stilus to Style: Reflections on the Fate of a Notion’, p. 257-258.
transformed along with art and art history, and gained currency as a term embroiled with notions of individuality and personality without being subject to much scrutiny, or to being something of a ‘self-evident’ concept, as Gadamer proposed.

Philosophical thinking on the concept of style has, over the last few decades, begun to shed further light on what this term might mean, and indeed many accounts diverge from this seemingly natural way of talking about individuality. This divergence demands that we reopen the case, if there is one, for conceiving of style in this way. I happen to think there is a strong case for defining the concept in this way, that is, by tying it closely to individuality and the personal, and that the threads of this way of talking throughout history are indeed pointing in the right direction. Of course, as there are other accounts on offer, what is needed is a critical analysis of those other accounts, and a persuasive argument for conceiving of the concept of style in terms of individuality and the personal.

I think the first and most important step in the analysis of the concept of style is to refine the question that is the focus of this chapter. As I see it there are at least two distinct, though intimately related, questions that immediately spring to mind when considering the concept of style. The first question, which will be the title of the next section of this chapter, asks ‘what is style?’ This question demands an investigation into the nature of style itself, along with determining what style should be contrasted with, if there are any such candidates. The second question has an epistemological nature and can be formulated roughly as ‘how can we (the viewer) know, or know about, an artist’s style?’ This question only scratches the surface of our understanding of style and prompts further questions regarding whether we can perceive an artist’s style, that is whether we can literally ‘see’ a style.

In this chapter I will mainly be concerned with answering the first question, leaving the second question until the next chapter where it will be framed as part of a larger investigation into the nature of our experience of art more generally. To answer this first question I will spend some time discussing certain traditional views, which equate style with formal features or the manner in which something is expressed. Typically on these views, style turns out to be a matter of ‘how’ something is said as opposed to ‘what’ is said, which presupposes a distinction between form and content upon which a definition of artistic style can be constructed. I reject this account of style but suggest that there is still room for the ‘how?’ question if we conceive of style as inherently connected to the way in which an artist does something. The ‘how?’ question, on my account, has significance when it relates to the process of creating artworks, which, I contend, can give us a satisfactory answer to our first question, namely ‘what is style?’ Thus in this first chapter, in which I give my own account of style, I attempt to come somewhat closer than others to placing my finger in just the right spot.
1.1 What is Style?

The first part of the answer to the question ‘what is style?’ involves distinguishing between two types of style, namely ‘general’ and ‘individual’. As it turns out, what style is in each case is different. Here I restrict talk of style to pictorial styles since Richard Wollheim, one of the principle proponents of such a strict distinction, takes pictures as his primary subject. Clearly a distinction between general and individual style can be made when we talk about, and when the art historian identifies, pictorial works of art. But the nature of this distinction has become a matter of controversy due to scepticism about the stability of general style terms. This was prompted by Wollheim’s claim that only individual styles have what he calls ‘psychological reality’, whereas general styles serve only a taxonomic purpose.\(^{18}\) To have ‘psychological reality’ means that an individual style forms part of the artist’s mental store and has a significant influence over the way in which an artist works. General styles, however, serve only to organize and categorize works. As such, they lack explanatory value.

Let us look a little closer at the notion of ‘psychological reality’ that Wollheim proposes for individual style. ‘The force of the claim that style has psychological reality’, Wollheim writes, ‘is that the style-processes that a correct style-description for a given artist presupposes are indeed part of that artist’s mental store.’\(^{19}\) The term ‘psychological reality’ is thus the name given to the contribution of cognitive processes to the act of painting, which directly influences the way an artist works. The contention that individual styles have psychological reality develops into what Wollheim terms a generative conception of style, one that is dependent on the underlying processes or operations within the artist.

General styles, on the other hand, according to Wollheim, do not have this psychological reality; they are merely taxonomic and devoid of any explanatory value, remaining classification tools or a shorthand for art historians. Wollheim subdivides general style into three forms: (a) universal style such as classicism, geometrical style, and naturalism. (b) historical or period style such as neoclassicism, art nouveau, and social realism. And (c) school style such as ‘the style of S’, where the painting is not by S.

Wollheim builds two theses into his concept of general style.\(^{20}\) The first thesis is termed the description thesis, which proposes that general style terms are merely taxonomic and do not possess explanatory value. The second is the relativization thesis, which proposes that general style terms are relative to the changing points of view of art historians and as such are unstable. On this second thesis Wollheim writes, ‘style-


\(^{19}\) Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, p. 194

\(^{20}\) Ibid, pp. 183-184
descriptions can be written and re-written unconstrained by anything except prevailing
art historical interests.' 21 Hence, on this view, general styles are ‘…external to an artist,
and they are not explicable in terms of some individual artist’s psychology or expressive
aims.’ 22 As such the distinction between individual and general styles is construed as a
distinction between what is internal and external to the artist.

While there is certainly something intuitive about positing the distinction
between individual and general style as a distinction between the internal and the
external, the conception of general style argued for by Wollheim is not uncontroversial.
Jason Gaiger argues that the description thesis, which maintains that attributing a style to a
painter has no explanatory force in respect of her work, is questionable. He points out
that this fails to acknowledge the crucial role played by general style terms in
understanding and interpreting pictures. 23 He finds support for this in Nelson
Goodman’s claim that the question as to whether concepts of style are merely ‘curatorial
devices for sorting works according to origin’ is misleading since it assumes that
‘attribution is alien to aesthetics’, 24 that is as if attribution had no role to play in our
understanding of artworks as artworks. Indeed, this chapter began with suggestions by
Robinson 25 and Panofsky about the significance of style for understanding artworks.
Without style attributions using general style concepts we would be unable to understand
either art now or art of the past, or indeed the ways in which works relate to other works.
Gaiger claims that art historical and art critical practice is essentially comparative, and seeks
to understand the place artworks occupy in history alongside the developments, shifts,
and changes in style, and why those changes occur, which is to understand the place of
individual artworks within ‘a dynamic structure’. 26

Indeed, in his highly influential work The Critical Historians of Art, Michael Podro
discusses a change in attitude of those critical historians writing at the end of the
nineteenth century regarding past art. It became clear that, for critical historians such as
J.F Herbart, Karl Schnaase, and Gottfried Semper, current art maintained an intimate
relation to past art, adopting and transforming it so that past art was both developed and

21 Ibid, p. 196
22 Lamarque, Peter. Work and Object: explorations in the metaphysics of art. (Oxford University Press 2010),
p. 143
25 Jenefer Robinson has also examined the way in which artists make use of general style categories—
in particular and appropriate ways—to bring out an individual expressiveness, which adds further
point to the claim that general style concepts are not explanatorily devoid. She claims that general
styles should be thought of as ‘a set of stylistic devices and conventions’, which can be inexpressive
but can also be used in a way that conveys an artist’s own views, which amounts to the highly
personal expression found in individual style. Robinson, Jenefer, ‘General and Individual Style in
26 Gaiger, ‘The Analysis of Pictorial Style’, p. 23
taken up by current artworks. According to Podro, ‘The past work presents the ‘material’
to be transformed by its adaptation in the new work, and new material is absorbed and
structured by being connected with art of the past.’ Thus past art and past styles form
an integral part of our understanding of pictures and their relation to their predecessors.
Past and present are bound up with one another and evolve together. Abandoning these
considerations and looking at general styles merely as categories that works can be
subsumed under neglects the importance of present art’s relationship to past art, and
misrepresents the task of the art historian. Gaiger rightly concludes that, ‘the task of
comparison, and the establishment of a meaningful context of interpretation, should not
be seen as an empty project of classification.’ To conceive of general styles in this way
would fail to recognize their significance in understanding art itself.

Gaiger also argues that the relativization thesis misrepresents art-historical practices
and ‘excludes the possibility of a hermeneutically sensitive search for an increasingly
correct employment of general style terms.’ According to Gaiger, the practice of art
history demands that any changes in the use of a term, or what it encompasses, should
respond to and better develop previous categorizations. Art historians do not merely see
their task as taxonomic, rather they perceive their task as what Gaiger describes as a
‘collaborative and ongoing search’ into the correct identification and usage of style
categories. In doing this they believe that such categories can tell us something about the
artwork itself and do not merely reflect current art-historical tastes. General style terms
thus prove to be an essential tool for attribution and origin, which help us to better
understand pictures themselves and not just the current preoccupations of the discipline.
As such the conception of general style is perhaps not as Wollheim proposes.

However, while Gaiger’s criticisms of Wollheim for his uncharitable relegation
of general style terms to merely taxonomic purposes are persuasive, the intuition that
there is something fundamentally different about general style as opposed to individual
style, which rests on a distinction between internal and external relations to the artist,
emerges unscathed from Gaiger's criticisms. While we can certainly accommodate the
claim that general styles have a crucial role to play in interpreting and understanding
pictures, we need not abandon the thought that individual style is something more deeply
connected to the artists themselves. Thus general styles certainly contribute to
interpretation, and allow us to make sense of pictures that, without the appropriate art-
historical knowledge of style, would be deeply misunderstood. However, they remain
external to the artist in the sense that they are not necessarily inherently personal.

27 Podro, Michael. The Critical Historians of Art, (Yale University Press 1982), p. 68
28 Ibid, pp. 23-24
29 Ibid, p. 22
While general styles inform and influence each and every artist, it is only when they are used to convey something highly personal that they form part of an individual style. To quote Jenefer Robinson, though here she is discussing literature, ‘[the artist] may adopt the “right” conventions but he does not use them to convey his own concerns, views and attitudes.’ 30 That is to say that general styles can form part of an artist’s resources in the process of creating their works. They can be used, moulded, and pointed to, but it is only when they are used in a way that is highly personal and individual to the artist that they form part of an individual style. Taken alone, general styles are not internal to the artist; they are not highly personal. Thus again the notion that individual style is internal to the artist, while general styles are external to the artist, reasserts itself. Of course this claim needs more detail, argument and refinement. As such we need to probe deeper into the notion of individual style to see if it really is contrasted with general style in this way. What then, is individual style?

1.1.1 Individual Style: ‘what’ vs ‘how’

Let us begin by considering the definition of style as proposed by E.H. Gombrich in his entry on ‘Style’ in the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. ‘Style’, Gombrich writes, ‘is any distinctive, and therefore recognizable, way in which an act is performed or an artefact made.’ 31 Style, then, is a matter of ‘how’ something is done. Meyer Schapiro, who has offered some of the most in-depth analyses of the concept of style, proposed that, ‘the description of a style refers to three aspects of art: formal elements or motives, form relationships, and qualities…’ 32 Hence, on this view, style is rooted in the formal elements of the work, the way in which a subject matter is approached and transformed through formal qualities. Not only this, if it is the case that style is the way in which something is done, a matter not of what is said but how it is said, there must exist the possibility of choice between a set of alternatives. If there were only one way of doing things there could be no such thing as style. This sentiment is echoed by Winston Churchill’s reply to a barber who asked him in what style he would like to have his hair cut: ‘A man of my limited resources cannot presume to have a hair style − get on and cut it.’ (News Chronicle, London 19th December 1958). 33 Indeed, as Stephen Ullmann points out, the notion of synonymy plays a crucial role in the

33 Gombrich cites this comment in his entry on style.
problem of style. That two artists could say the same thing but say it in two different ways gives us a clear and intuitive grasp on the concept of style. Hence choice, or the possibility of a choice, between a set of alternative ways or methods seems to be at the root of our understanding of style.

With this intuitive model in place, we seem to have an obvious and clear way of describing the individual style of an artist. But perhaps it is not as clear-cut as this view supposes. The opening lines of Nelson Goodman’s ‘The Status of Style’ read as follows:

‘Obviously, subject is what is said, style is how. A little less obviously, that formula is full of faults.’

What are the faults that Goodman is referring to? Firstly, Goodman proposes that architecture and non-objective painting, and indeed most music, have no subject, and as such their style cannot be a matter of how something is said for there is no ‘something’ to be said. According to Goodman, these kinds of artworks ‘do’ other things and mean in other ways. Secondly, and perhaps more damning to the view of style as form or manner, even where the only function of an artwork is saying, as might be the case in some literary works, Goodman points out that we shall have to recognize that some features of style will be features of what is said rather than the way of saying it.

As an example, Goodman proposes that if one historian writes in terms of battles and another in terms of social changes, when they are writing about the same period, we shall have to say that their style is not only a matter of their prose or any other manner of saying, but of what is said. Furthermore, Goodman writes that, ‘part of a poet’s style…may consist of what he says—of whether he focuses on the fragile and transcendent or the powerful and enduring, upon sensory qualities or abstract ideas and so on.’ We must therefore accept that, at least sometimes, some features of what is said count as aspects of style.

Goodman also attacks the central importance of synonymy, calling it a ‘suspect notion’. He contends that very different things may be said in much the same way, and as such, synonymy of subject and variation of form, or ways of saying, is not always

35 However, while this seems like an intuitive way of thinking about the concept of style, I do not think this is quite right. To anticipate a point I make later on concerning unconscious style, it seems to me that some aspects of an individual style are not chosen despite being inherently personal. Thus while it is necessary that there be alternative ways of doing things, the notion of choice, on my view, is less important.
36 Goodman, ‘The Status of Style’, p. 799
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, p. 801
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid, p. 800
required to identify a style. Goodman also raises this point in his ‘On Likeness of Meaning’, proposing that no two terms have exactly the same meaning, and he cites Graham Hough’s comment that, ‘…the more we reflect on it, the more doubtful it becomes how far we can talk about different ways of saying; is not each different way of saying in fact the saying of a different thing?’ Hence, the notion of synonymy, and so the possibility of choice between alternative ways of saying much the same thing, looks less and less likely to be a candidate on which to formulate a definition of style that has its root in the distinction between form and content. As such the distinction between stylistic and non-stylistic features has to be drawn on other grounds.

While I agree with Goodman that we have to accept that sometimes some features of what is said count as aspects of style, I worry that if we push his example in the other direction then we are still forced into a separation of what is said from how it is said. On Goodman’s view, it looks as if when both historians are writing about the same thing in the same period then either: (a) they are in the same style, or, (b) their styles differ. The problem with the former is that it seems too narrow; we would not want to be forced into saying that works that deal with the same subject matter are in the same style. But the problem with the latter is that we appear once again to be forced into a ‘how’ vs ‘what’ distinction as our basis for style, positing the distinction between form and content as indicative of style. We cannot, in this example, account for their being in different styles due to a difference in subject matter therefore, by implication, if we want to say they are in different styles it must be something to do with a difference in form.

It is true that Goodman’s claim is only that sometimes what is said provides the criterion of difference between styles, but presumably when what is said cannot provide this difference then the implication is that form will do the work, which posits a distinction between form and content. Moreover, it is not obvious to me, even where two works have the same subject matter, that what is said is the same. This seems most clear in the case of literature, where many writers speak about love but say very different things about it. And in painting, two painters may depict a love scene, as such they are ‘talking’ about the same thing, but they might be saying very different things about it, and this difference need not be due to any difference in the formal features of the works. If this is true then we need not look only to form to provide the difference in style between two works with the same subject matter.

41 There Goodman is concerned with determining the circumstances in which two terms or predicates can be said to have the same meaning, and rejecting previous accounts, in particular the view that two terms have the same meaning if they have the same extension. He concludes that, ‘Theoretically, then, we shall do better to never say that two predicates have the same meaning but rather that they have a greater or lesser degree, or one or another kind, of likeness of meaning.’ Goodman, ‘On Likeness Of Meaning’, Analysis, Vol. 10. No. 1, (October 1949), pp. 1-7, p. 7
A converse thought also follows from Goodman’s example, which is that we would not want to be forced to say that works that deal with different subject matter cannot be in the same style, since this is obviously untrue. Two works could deal with wildly different subject matter and still be in the same style, and yet we would also not want, I think, to say that what accounts for them being in the same style is solely a matter of formal features; that is to say that the subject matter has varied but the form remains the same. I think we ought not to restrict style in these cases to purely formal features. As in Goodman’s example of poets focusing on the tender or the fragile, two works that have different subject matters can be in the same style not simply because of a similarity in formal features, rather it is due to a similarity in focus on the aspects of their chosen subject matter. As such, one might think that, where they focus on the same aspects they are in the same style. This anticipates, in part, the view of depiction that I will develop in Chapter Four.

The point to be stressed here is that, even if two works deal with different subject matters, they can still do so in the same style, and this need not be solely a matter of having similar formal features, since their similarity in style may also be a matter of the way in which they deal with their subject matter. The subject matter of an artist’s work might vary radically and yet the works have a strikingly similar stylistic character. Their sameness of style is not restricted to sameness in form. Rather, their sameness in style consists in a sameness of their choice of focus, what they exclude from their work as well as what they include, and the way in which they do this. This, then, does not posit a strict separation of form and content as the basis on which to distinguish or match up styles.

Goodman’s view, while teaching us important lessons about the role of subject matter in determining style, still forces us into a form/content distinction. However, there are independently good reasons (that is independent from our concerns about the concept of style) to think that we ought not to posit such a strict separation, which I will say more about below. Further, our being forced into this distinction seems to rest on a narrow conception of an artwork’s content, drawing simply on the subject matter. Hence, if we could get an account of a work’s content as being something different from subject matter alone, then this would do justice to the thought that sameness of subject matter does not amount to sameness in what is said or sameness in style. Similarly, with our ‘same style/different subject matter’ case, we can preserve the thought that it is not simply formal features that account for their being in the same style, since a more robust view of content might give us a way of claiming they are in the same style despite a difference in subject matter.

I think if we can do this we will be in a better position to resist an account of style that rests on the distinction between what is said vs how it is said, that is, a distinction between form and content. I think we can, but to do so will involve a digression into a long running concern in aesthetics regarding the inadequacy of a separation of form and content.
such that what is said or expressed in a work could be fully realized in a neat linguistic formulation or paraphrase. Indeed it is this concern that will lead us now to better understand what exactly the ‘content’ of a work of art is, since there are different ways of conceiving of it that go beyond Goodman’s formulation, which seems too thin to account for differences in what is said even where artists are talking about the ‘same thing’.

1.1.2 Form/Content Unity and Style.

As we have seen, some views about style seem to presuppose a distinction between form and content. However, many have argued against this separation. As such, if it turns out that the distinction between form and content is not warranted in cases where we are interested in artworks as artworks, then there will be no distinction between form and content on which to base our concept of style. Is the distinction warranted? Philosophers concerned with form and content unity usually take as their impetus A.C. Bradley’s renowned inaugural lecture ‘Poetry for Poetry’s sake’. Bradley’s aim was to challenge two views about poetic value; on the one hand a naïve formalism which proposes that the essence, and so the value, of poetry lies in its formal properties, and on the other a naïve reductionism about content, which proposes that the essence of poetry lies in what it says or communicates about significant human concerns e.g. the fall of man. The rejection of these two naïve views leads him to his thesis of the unity of form and content.

‘They [the naïve positions] imply that there are in a poem two parts, factors, or components, a substance and a form; and that you can conceive of them distinctly and separately, so that when you are speaking of the one you are not speaking of the other. Otherwise how can you ask the question, in which of them does the value lie? But really in a poem, apart from defects, there are no such factors or components; and therefore it is strictly nonsense to ask in which of them the value lies.’

The reason, according to Bradley, that asking whether substance or form is more valuable is nonsensical is because in a poem they are one and the same thing. They are identical. To see this more clearly we must turn to Bradley’s distinction between ‘subject’, ‘substance’, and ‘form’. This should also help us refine the notion of content as it has been discussed thus far.

‘Subject’, for Bradley, is roughly what a poem is about, its subject matter. And this is not internal to the poem since other poems or artworks could also have the same subject matter. Subject might include monarchs or well-known stories or places, matter that could

44 Ibid, p. 4
easily be shared by other poems. Thus the opposite of subject is not form but the whole poem itself because, ‘the subject is one thing; the poem, matter and form alike, another thing.’[45] ‘Substance’, for Bradley, or ‘content’, is the way in which that subject matter is realized in the poem itself. It is within the poem. The ‘form’, then, is something akin to the mode of realization of the subject within the poem; but although we appear to have identified three separate elements, for Bradley form and content are numerically identical. In effect to speak of one is to speak of the other. This identity of form and content is ‘the essence of poetry so far as it is poetry.’[46] The poem itself is the form-content unity. Thus if we are to value the poem as a poem, we must value it as a form-content unity. This also applies to pictorial art, since two paintings could depict a landscape, that is they have the same subject, and yet differ radically in how they depict it, which is not simply reducible to a difference in formal features. The works themselves differ in how their chosen subject matter is realised; in what they focus on or choose to leave out, in what they say about their subject matter by depicting it in a certain way, all of which is particular to each work and cannot be shared by both despite sharing the same subject matter.

One might talk about the literal subject matter, what can be shared by two works, or talk of form abstracted from the work such as rhyme, metre, rhythm, and so on, but this is to talk about them purely as formal properties, or subject matters, that could appear in other works. To attempt to abstract form as defined by Bradley will not be illuminating since it will not capture the particular form-content unity. What Bradley’s definition of form and content demands is work-specificity, their realization in a particular work. However we need not follow Bradley in his strict numerical identity of form and content. Peter Lamarque claims that we can capture this core idea in terms of a unity or mutual dependence.[47] The key claim, however, is still that neither form nor content can be identified independently of the other.

But is it really the case that a work’s content cannot be paraphrased? Can we not have a less strict conception of content that doesn’t tie into the mode of realization, one that allows a more-or-less close paraphrase to satisfy sameness of content? Lamarque recognizes that this possibility rests on a reflection on the sameness of content and what would be required for this to occur.[48] Lamarque’s contention is that content-identity is interest relative such that whether a paraphrase of a poem’s content is the same content expressed by the poem depends on the interest brought to the poem itself.[49] Thus the sameness of content depends on the interest brought to the question of whether the content is the same. If our interest is in broad themes such as time or the power of love then we

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[45] Ibid, p. 6
[46] Ibid, p. 15
[48] Ibid
[49] Ibid, p. 410
might indeed find many works that have the same content. However, if we are interested in reading poetry, if we are interested in the poem as a poem, then we must acknowledge that there is essentially only one way in which a work’s content is expressed. If this is our interest then content-identity is lost under any different form. Form-content identity is something assumed and demanded by the practice of reading poetry.

This is further supported by what is known as the principle of functionality, namely that what is found in the poem is there for a purpose. The form of expression is crucial under this principle. Hence if we extract lines aside from their context, or paraphrase them, we do not do justice to their dramatic context in which they have significance and function to express meaning. Only the original expression found in the work can do them justice. We also cannot be indifferent to substitution, that is, replacing one line with another that seems to more-or-less capture what was expressed by the original. This is because the meaning of a poem is context sensitive and reading poetry as poetry demands a sensitivity that is not expected in ordinary language. To substitute lines or abstract parts would be to change the meaning of the poem.

Similarly for pictures, we cannot be indifferent to changes in the visual properties of the work, for not only will this affect the visual experience the picture elicits but also the appreciative response we have to it. For example, while it is possible to change visual elements of a painting by Constable and continue to see it as depicting the same subject, those changes fundamentally affect the particular experience we have of the work, and what make it a ‘Constable painting’, indeed this painting, and not a painting by someone else. The particular configuration of the two-dimensional surface, and the way in which that supports a visual experience of the depicted subject, is the work itself, and as such we cannot be indifferent to substitution in much the same way we cannot be indifferent to substitution in works of literature. The principle of functionality is as pertinent in the visual arts as it is in the literary arts. As Roger Scruton points out, ‘Art provides a medium transparent to human intention, a medium for which the question, Why? Can be asked of every observable feature, even if it may sometimes prove impossible to answer.’

Consequently, if we are interested in artworks as artworks we ought to take form-content unity as of great significance for both our understanding of art and our experience of it. Form and content are inextricably bound up, and their unity is the artwork itself. As Roland Barthes famously put it,

‘If, until now we have looked at the text as a species of fruit with a kernel (an apricot for example), the flesh being the form and the pit being the content, it would be better to see it as an onion, a

50 Ibid, p. 412
51 Ibid, p. 414
How does this relate to the concept of style and the thought that it ought not to be drawn on the basis of an opposition, or separation, of form and content? I think there are two conclusions to be drawn from this discussion. First, that if we accept form-content unity then, for those views that presuppose this distinction, there is no significant sense of form as distinct from content to base a definition of style on. We cannot simply say that form is what constitutes a style since that would be to posit a separation of form and content, and further, would ignore the distinctive role that content plays in style.

Secondly, I think the three-part distinction that Bradley makes can resolve the problem that I posed for Goodman concerning works that deal with the same subject matter. If we take it that works can have the same subject matter, in Bradley’s sense, we can still claim that they are saying different things and are in different styles since their fine-grained content, understood in Bradley’s sense, is different. It is different because while it may deal with the same subject matter, its content at a fine-grained level is determined by how this subject matter is realized in the work itself. Thus we need not look to form where subject matter appears to give out in providing a criterion of stylistic difference since works dealing with the same subject matter can still be radically different in what they say.

Indeed a stylistic difference between two works might be possible even where the subject matter is broadly the same and the form is broadly the same (a sonnet, a formal portrait); the difference resides not in content or form alone but in the unique form-content unity. In releasing ourselves from the constraints of talking in terms of form differentiating styles of works that have the same subject matter we are not committing ourselves to, nor are we forced back into, a form/content distinction. Furthermore, we are still preserving the thought that what is said is as important to the concept of style as how it is said, since both can form part of an artist’s individual style. However, the challenge now is to fill the gap previously filled by form and formal features in our account of style.

1.1.3 Individual Style: A ‘Features-Based’ Account

If form vs content (or ‘how’ vs ‘what’) cannot give us a satisfactory account of style then what will? One way to get an answer involves turning our attention to how we attribute styles to artists. This would give us a combination of all of those features that determine

style. If we could get a list of this kind then style would be simply an amalgamation of those features that are typical of a particular artist. Our interest, then, is not in form-content unity but in correctly identifying stylistic features. This approach seems akin to what Goodman proposes as an alternative to identifying style purely with form. For Goodman, style ‘consists of those features of the symbolic functioning of a work that are characteristic of author, period, place or school.’\(^{54}\) Goodman’s account of style is thus features-based and takes a taxonomic turn. On this view we need not exclude subject matter such as setting or themes since they could be characteristic features that serve to identify when, where, and by whom an artwork was produced.

A consequence of this view is that stylistic features are identified as objective properties of objects such that they can be identified without presupposing further knowledge of the objects themselves. Stylistic features are inherent or intrinsic properties. However, not all the features that aid us in attribution are stylistic. Goodman excludes things such as the literal signature of the artist, the label on a picture, and the chemical properties of paint, since these do not contribute to the ‘symbolic functioning’ of the work. They are not, ‘aspects of what the poem or picture or piano sonata says or exemplifies or expresses.’\(^{55}\) Goodman says little about what is meant by ‘symbolic functioning’, and Dale Jacquette, writing on Goodman’s views on style, worries that this in itself may prove the definition to be a failure.\(^{56}\)

Putting issues of clarity to one side (we may all agree that artworks symbolize in one way or another), there are more difficult problems for Goodman’s account. Consider the case proposed by Jenefer Robinson of two perceptually indistinguishable canvases, which consist of a field of red crossed vertically by three thin black or white bands. Robinson writes that,

‘One of these is a painting by Barnett Newman and has Barnett Newman’s style. The other was produced by me and is an unfinished design for my new open plan living room, the thin bands marking the positions in the room where I wish to place, respectively, a Japanese screen, a long sofa, and an étagère…we cannot tell the works apart just by looking at them, yet Barnett Newman’s painting has Barnett Newman’s distinctive style, whereas mine has no style at all. Why is this?’\(^{57}\)

The answer Robinson gives is that only the Barnett Newman canvas has aesthetic significance, the features of the painting such as the three black or white bands were created with a specific aesthetic intention. In Robinson’s room plan the placement of the lines has

\(^{54}\) Goodman, ‘The Status of Style’, p. 808
\(^{55}\) Ibid, p. 807
\(^{57}\) Robinson, ‘Style and Significance in Art History’, p. 8
practical but no aesthetic significance. Robinson adds that while her room plan can be
looked at as if it were a Barnett Newman, the fact remains that it was not created with any
aesthetic intention and does not have any aesthetic status. Thus we cannot know whether
something has a style until we know it has aesthetic significance. Put another way the
thought is that we cannot know a feature is stylistic until we know what it is a feature of.
Thus if we cannot know a feature is stylistic merely on the basis of looking, then a taxonomy
of features that serve to identify a work cannot be of much help in figuring out the style it is
in. Put simply, we need to know more. On Goodman’s view, the Barnett Newman-like room
plan has features that would serve to identify Newman as the artist, and so has his style. A
features-based view of style thus gives us odd results in determining which objects have an
individual style.

Robinson’s argument can be seen to form part of a widespread concern in
aesthetics with the idea of aesthetic properties, which originated in the work of Frank
Sibley.58 The claim is that an artwork’s perceptual properties include aesthetic as well as non-
aesthetic ones. Aesthetic properties include things like a sense of mystery and tension, which
are just as much features or characteristics of works as art as non-aesthetic ones such as dark
colouring and diagonal composition. They are in the work to be seen, heard, or otherwise
perceived there, but they are dependent on non-aesthetic properties; they are emergent or
Gestalt properties. It is because of the dark colouring and diagonal composition of a painting
that it has a sense of mystery or tension.

However, contra Sibley, Kendall Walton argues that aesthetic properties cannot be
discovered merely by examining the works themselves. We need to know some other facts
about the origins of works of art, and in particular the category to which they belong.59
Walton proposes that the aesthetic properties a work seems to have depend in part on which
of its features are standard, variable, and contra-standard for us, and this will depend on the
category we perceive the work to be in. Such categories include media, genre, form, and the
category we are most interested in here, namely style.

I do not want to claim that stylistic properties are necessarily aesthetic properties;
some may be and some may not be. In fact the identification of stylistic properties with
aesthetic properties is something I will argue against in the next chapter. But it may be worth
pausing here to consider what kind of properties style properties are if they are not aesthetic
properties. One might think that rather than being aesthetic properties style properties are a
kind of artistic property, and the vast literature dedicated to distinguishing between the two
is testament to the importance of the distinction when it comes to understanding the

135-159
59 Walton, Kendall L. ‘The Categories of Art’. In Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic
Tradition, P. Lamarque & S.H. Olsen (eds), (Blackwell 2004), pp. 142-157
evaluation of artworks. What is the distinction? Peter Kivy claims that aesthetic properties are essentially structural and sensual properties, and thus artistic properties, ‘concern any relevant properties other than the aesthetic’. Jerrold Levinson describes an artistic property as a property that, while appreciatively relevant, ‘embodies relations to the surrounding cultural context as a whole’, and thus not directly perceivable in a work, while Tomas Kulka describes an artistic property as a ‘complex relation which is in need of further explication’. Examples of artistic properties include originality, influentiality, and skilfulness, which, according to Kivy, Levinson, and Kulka, are not perceivable in the work itself.

Might style properties thus count as artistic properties? If, as according to Kivy, an artistic property is an appreciatively relevant property, then I see no reason in principle why some style properties cannot be artistic properties. However, I do not think style properties are necessarily artistic properties; again some might be and some might not be. My way of walking, for instance, might be a stylistic property, but it doesn’t seem to be an artistic property. Further, I am hesitant to categorise style properties as artistic properties if the other part of the characterisation of artistic properties is true, which claims that they are relations that are not directly perceivable in artworks. Indeed, in the next chapter, I argue that style properties can be perceptually represented. Whether the characterisation of artistic properties as imperceptible is correct will depend, in part, on the willingness to admit such properties into the contents of perception. I think there are good reasons, to be outlined in the next chapter, to think that style properties can be perceptually represented. Whether this extends to all artistic properties is another question. The arguments that I offer in the next chapter may be grist to the mill of someone who wished to claim that imperceptibility is not a defining feature of an artistic property. However, should it turn out that one can directly perceive artistic properties, then I would have no concerns about subsuming some style properties under that category. For now, then, I claim that while style properties are aesthetically relevant, they are not necessarily aesthetic properties, and the question of whether some style properties are artistic properties I leave open until it is decided whether artistic properties can be perceptually experienced.

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60 It explains, for example, why we might value a work even if we do not find it aesthetically pleasing.
64 As Jerrold Levinson puts it, ‘for a painting…being original…is rather like being expensive: you can only “see” such in the painting in an extended inferential sense.” Footnote 9, p. 183.
65 Indeed, the way in which I go on to characterise artistic style, that is as a way of doing something, does not obviously look like an artistic property, since it may be attributed to many other actions or objects that are not artworks.
To return to Walton’s discussion of categories, while the discussion here revolves around the notion of aesthetic properties, I think there are important lessons to learn from it regarding identification of style properties. Lessons that show that Goodman’s view cannot be right. Let us firstly elucidate Walton’s notion of standard, variable, and contra-standard properties. A standard property is one in virtue of which works in a category belong to that category, such that lacking that feature would disqualify works from that category. A variable property is a property where the possession or lack of it in a work is irrelevant to whether or not a work qualifies for the category. A contra-standard property is a feature whose presence tends to disqualify works as members of the category. Thus a painting might have the standard feature of flatness, a variable property such as what is depicted, but it could not be three-dimensional since that feature will disqualify the work from being a painting. The thought then is that the category in which we perceive the work to be in will affect the aesthetic properties it seems to have.66

Walton supports this with his now famous example of a society in which painting does not exist but which produces a kind of work of art called guernicas, which are like Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ but done in various bas-relief dimensions such that the surfaces protrude from the wall. In this society, Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ would be counted as a guernica rather than as a painting. Its flatness is variable under the category of guernicas and the figures on its surface are standard relative to the category guernicas. Thus the flatness, which is standard for us, is variable for members of the other society.67

What follows from this is that the difference between those features which are standard and variable for us, and those which are standard and variable for the other society, would make a significant difference to our aesthetic reaction to ‘Guernica’ and theirs. To us it seems violent, dynamic, and disturbing, but for them it would be cold and lifeless. While we take no note of ‘Guernica’s’ flatness, since it is a standard feature for painting, they will find it striking and noteworthy, perhaps it might even be thought to be the most expressive feature of the work. Thus aesthetic properties like violent or disturbing depend on which category we perceive the work as belonging to.

While this discussion has been limited to aesthetic properties, I think the general lesson—that we need to know more about a work before we can understand and appreciate it in the appropriate way—applies similarly to stylistic properties. To use Walton’s example, while for us Guernica is a painting that has Picasso’s distinctive style, for the society in which multiple guernicas are made, Guernica would not have Picasso’s style, it would simply be another guernica, and a flat one at that.

66 Ibid, p. 143
67 Ibid, p. 148
Of course we might say that all of these guernicas share Picasso’s mode of depiction but this looks like a case of having imitated a style rather than of having Picasso’s distinctive style. This anticipates an argument concerning imitation of style that will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. I think it would be a mistake to say that all of these guernicas have Picasso’s individual style, even where they might imitate surface features perfectly. And Walton’s example seems to demonstrate this, since, in order to know what features count as stylistic, we need to know about an artist’s individual style. Individual style explains the stylistic features present in a work. Thus a perfect copying of features would not amount to having that *individual* style, even where it might imitate and share certain features.

The lesson to be drawn from Walton’s discussion of categories is that we need to know more about a work before we can say what style it is in and subsequently identify stylistic features. If we remind ourselves of the opening remarks from Panofsky concerning misunderstandings and determining subject matter, we can agree that even our seeing a subject in a picture can depend on knowing about its style, and, while stylistic features serve to help us in attribution and in steering us towards the correct experience of the work, the individual style itself is not reducible to those features. Hence a taxonomic view of style that roots an artist’s style in those features that serve to identify origin cannot work, since we would already need to know which features are relevant to style and which are irrelevant, which can only be achieved by knowing more about the artwork itself, such as what style it is in. In short, in order to know what style a work is in we would need to identify stylistic features, but to identify those features we would first need to figure out the style. Thus style is prior to the taxonomy, not identical to it.

Furthermore, this account of style seems to me to have conflated the two questions I proposed at the beginning, namely ‘what is style?’ and ‘how can we identify or know an artist’s style?’ Goodman’s view seems to answer only the second question, since it tells a story about, and makes sense of, how we attribute styles to artists; but it is style that put those features there in the first place. His view seems to make style something of an afterthought, something that can be used merely as a tool of classification. A list of features may help us determine a general style, which we identified as external to the artist, and to attribute styles to artists but it does not get to the core of individual style itself. Thus we must look elsewhere to define the concept.

1.2 Individual Style: Style as a Way of Doing Something

Thus far we have rejected conceptions of style that draw on the distinction between form and content along with features-based accounts of individual style. Hence, an adequate
account of style needs to consist not only in the ‘how’ but also in the ‘what’, as unified in the work of an artist, and must avoid a taxonomic definition that reduces individual style to the stylistic features. But does the ‘how?’ question really have no application in a discussion of style, given that its place therein seems so intuitively appropriate? Consider again the definition of style proposed by Gombrich: ‘Style is any distinctive, and therefore recognizable, way in which an act is performed or an artefact made.’ 68 Read one way we are led to the form-content distinction, but read another way we are led to a view that locates artistic style in the action of an artist, in the act of creating an artwork.

One acts-based view of style is that of Kendall Walton’s, and it is one with which the view I shall defend shares important similarities. However, my view also contains important differences, which I hope will become clear in the following discussion. In his paper ‘Style and the Products and Processes of Art’, Walton contends that while we think our interest is bound up only in the works of art themselves, when it comes to matters of artistic style we ought to be concerned with the manner in which the work was made. 69 One motivation for thinking that this is the right way of conceiving of style concerns the way in which we treat, and talk about, natural objects, that is objects that are not the products of human action. Walton writes that, ‘Poems and paintings are sometimes witty, or morbid, or sophisticated, but it is hard to imagine what a witty tulip, or a morbid mountain, or a sophisticated lake would be like.’ 70 Furthermore, when these kinds of qualities are present in a work of art they are often aspects of the style of the works. In natural objects, however, we do not think the same. 71

Another motivation for turning our attention to processes rather than products is the evident inadequacies of what Walton terms ‘the cobbler model’ of the art institution. On this model the art institution has a three part structure: the producer, the product and the consumer or, on the cobbler model’s terms, the cobbler, who makes the shoes, which are worn by the customer. On this view the entire point of the process consists in how well the shoes fit the customer. As such the customer need not concern himself with the cobbler’s process of making them. All that matters is the shoes themselves. We can see this structure mirrored in the artworld. We have an artist who is the producer, the work of art produced, and the appreciator. What reservations should we have about this model according to Walton?

68 My emphasis.
69 Walton, Kendall L. ‘Style and the Products and Processes of Art’, pp. 72-103
70 Ibid, p. 74
71 Of course we might think that somehow natural objects evoke feelings or appear to have these properties to us. Such cases are discussed by Wollheim under the general heading of ‘expressive perception’ (See: Painting as an Art, pp. 80-89), but even where this is the case we would not call them stylistic features.
The overarching dissatisfaction with this model stems from the thought that it focuses too much attention on the work of art, the object, and not enough on the act or process of making it.\textsuperscript{72} Counterexamples to this model immediately spring to mind such as performance art and dance, where the focus is almost exclusively on what the artist does. In certain performance pieces, or what might be called avant-garde, there is no product at all.\textsuperscript{73} The art consists in what the artist does. Similar points could be made regarding readymades such as Duchamp’s \textit{Fountain}. Here the object of interest seems to be not what he made, but what he did. We might also consider photography to be a case in which the actions that produce the product are of significance, not merely because of the techniques involved in photography, but also because of the considerable planning and lengths to which some photographers go to get the perfect shot. For example, some of the most fascinating photographs by Cindy Sherman are those in which she has photographed herself at a seemingly impossible angle, and the incredible ways in which she has transformed herself as the subject. Thus when I look at a Cindy Sherman photograph my thoughts are often focused on what had to be done, and in what way, in order to produce the image in front of me. Thus we cannot expect that a viewer who is interested in appreciating the style of work can simply immerse herself in the work alone without any consideration of the artist’s actions, since, as we have learnt from Goodman, what is said or done is as important as how it is said or done.

Thus there are significant reasons to refer to the actions of an artist and the process of creation when considering artistic style. And given our talk of the style a work is \textit{done} in, or styles of painting or writing, along with our hesitation to make style attributions to natural or non-made objects, it seems right for Walton to deduce that, ‘It is beginning to look as though human action has something to do with all style attributions.’\textsuperscript{74} Another advantage of an acts-based account of style is that it avoids excluding subject matter or content from style considerations since part of an individual’s style may consist in what she chooses to do, or say, or depict. However, there remains still an important question regarding action. For if style is a way of doing something, what exactly is it that artist’s do? What is the action being performed? As Peter Lamarque points out, ‘if a style is a way of doing something then what the style is, is logically dependent on what is being done.’\textsuperscript{75} To return to Walton’s account of style, he has a particular kind of action in mind, which rests on the kind of action he thinks could be visible to a spectator.

Walton proposes that, ‘we may begin with the suggestion that we “see” in a work the action of producing it, and that the work’s style is a matter of what sort of action is

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\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, p. 75
\textsuperscript{73} I hesitate on this point since it could plausibly be argued that the performance itself is the product.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, p. 73
\textsuperscript{75} Lamarque, \textit{Work and Object}, p. 141
Walton intends to pursue concerns how a work appears to have been made, that is what kind of action it looks like the artist performed in making it. It is this appearance of an action, rather than the actual action performed which requires reference to the artist and their intentions, that is crucial to a work’s style. Walton’s view turns on the idea that the aesthetic qualities a work possesses, that is, qualities of style such as exuberance, playfulness, morbidity, and so on, are possessed by virtue of appearing to have been made by certain kinds of actions. Thus the character of a work’s style is intimately related to how it appears to have been made. ‘Tentatively’, Walton writes, ‘to be in a flamboyant, sentimental, or timid style, is to appear to have been created in a flamboyant or sentimental or timid manner.’

Walton’s qualification that style is related to how a work appears to have been made, rather than what actions were actually performed, can be seen to answer a familiar concern regarding artists’ intentions, namely the intentional fallacy. Monroe Beardsley has criticized references to artists’ intentions as a means of validating interpretations, proposing that what we should really be talking about are the works themselves and not the artists. Thus, on Walton’s view, we can translate talk about an artist’s intentions into talk about what intentions it looks like the artist had, judging by the work itself. Any tension is thus resolved by the distinction between actual and apparent artists.

However, Walton rightly acknowledges that sometimes knowledge about what an artist actually did will affect our experience of the work, and indeed how it appears to us. This thought acknowledges the fact that the way things look or sound is often conditioned by what we know or believe. This background knowledge need not always be specific though. Often common knowledge regarding culture and historical context is simply available to us, such that we can successfully determine with accuracy what exactly the artist did or tried to do. Thus background knowledge often serves to establish what an artist did, as well as changing our perception of what it looks like she did when we attend to the work. The point of this qualification for Walton is to demonstrate that how the features of artworks appear to have been made, and so the qualities they possess, depends not just on the features themselves but on the context and the kind of background knowledge available. Hence, although style is not necessarily tied into the actions an artist actually performed, or the

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76 Walton, ‘The Products and Processes of Art’, p. 80
77 Note again the identification of stylistic properties with aesthetic properties. An assumption that is strange given what Walton goes on to say about certain stylistic features e.g. ‘paint having been dropped rather than brushed on’, which do not obviously look like aesthetic properties.
78 Ibid, p. 87
80 Walton, ‘The Products and Processes of Art’, p. 89
intentions they actually had, Walton is prompting us to take note of the fact that there are cases in which background knowledge informs what we see.

Walton goes on to draw the following conclusion from this discussion. He claims that flamboyance and timidity, namely those properties linked to apparent artists, are expressive. And what constitutes being in a certain style is not having an expressive nature, or the expression itself, but having certain features such as thin wiggly lines, painterliness, balance and so on, which are expressive. Style, then, is not expression but the means of expression, which is identified by having expressive features. The expressive features are what “do” the expressing in the work. His account thus locates styles of works firmly in the works themselves since the means of expression, tied into the apparent actions of the artist, can be read off the work itself. In short, style is a matter of what appears to have been done, which results in expressive properties that, on Walton’s view, are stylistic features.

I will not continue pursuing Walton’s discussion and his attempt to pin down those properties or features in detail; thus far we have enough to establish our main concern, namely the kind of action that is being performed. On Walton’s account the action he identifies is the apparent action of an artist using her materials and creating the artwork, which is visible in the work itself. Thus the action apparent to a viewer would be something like the action of dropping paint onto a canvas as opposed to applying it with a brush. To the viewer it appears, judging by the work itself, that the painting was painted by the action of dropping rather than brushing. Hence Walton’s account of action, and so style, is essentially bound up with the use of material and medium.

Given that this is the action Walton is referring to when he defines style as a matter of how an artist did something, it is not surprising that what we can “see” in a painting is an action that concerns only the use of materials. Furthermore, it turns out to be the way in which the materials appear to have been used that indicates the style of an artist since the way the materials are used is responsible for those features that Walton identifies as expressive, namely features such as ‘thin wiggly lines’, painterliness, and balance. Those features are expressive but, again, for Walton it is not the expression itself that constitutes the style, but rather the means of expression, which is bound up with the kinds of actions performed by artists in making their works. For Walton, the kinds of actions performed by artists that are visible in a work concern the use of materials. Thus we can say of a painting, for example, that ‘it is in a flamboyant style because the paint seems to have been splattered onto the canvas rather than brushed on’. Hence statements about style are statements that refer to the apparent actions of the artist, to what she appears to have done with her materials.

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81 Ibid, p. 94
However, while shifting the notion of style into action looks like a positive way forward, I don’t think we have come as far as we would like in our attempt to define style. The problem for Walton’s account is that by concerning himself only with actions to do with use of materials, and so with expressive features indicative of those actions, Walton’s view comes dangerously close to the form/content distinction that was shown to be inadequate as an account of artistic style. Indeed by selecting features such as ‘painterliness’ and ‘balance’ as expressive features indicative of style, we can see that a conception of style that talks in terms of formal features has crept in, for an explicit concern with the handling of materials leaves no room for considerations of content.

Walton himself almost explicitly states the absence of content considerations with regard to style when he writes that, ‘styles are to be identified not with what is expressed but with what in the work does the expressing.’\(^{82}\) Hence we seem to have a view of style that involves something akin to the claim that style is not what is said but the way it is said. Furthermore, as we have seen, the ‘way’ or ‘ways’, he identifies as doing the expressing are exclusively formal in their being bound up with the way in which artists use their materials to produce a sense of ‘balance’ or ‘flamboyance’. While there is certainly room for consideration of the way in which artists use materials in a concept of style, in fact this may be highly significant in some cases, it leaves little room for content considerations, which, as we have seen, are often a crucial part of an artist’s style. The preoccupation with action concerning the handling of materials fails to give the content of works their significance in individual style. Thus we are left with the unhappy picture of style we began with.

How can we avoid these consequences whilst preserving the thought that style is essentially bound up with action or what the artist does? As we saw, my agreement with Walton stemmed from his shifting of the ‘how?’ question back into action, which gave a reading of Gombrich’s definition a different application. But we also saw that this can easily lead us to the form versus content view of style. It can, I think, also lead us to another view of style that gives the ‘how?’ question application without positing a sharp distinction between form and content. I will spend the remainder of this chapter discussing this view, and some modifications of it that, I think, will give us the right account of individual style.

1.2.1 Individual Style: Style, Personality, and the Personal

As we saw, one kind of answer to the question of what an artist does is that she does things with materials, for example, applying paint to a canvas. Her style, then, becomes a matter of how, or the way in which, she applies paint to the canvas. This seems to be

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\(^{82}\) Ibid.
roughly the answer Walton proposes in his account. But according to some theorists there is also something else an artist does when creating her work, something more than, though intimately related to, what she does with her medium. One thing that an artist does, over and above applying paint to a canvas in a certain manner, is express something, be it an idea, a feeling, or a personality. Her style, then, will be a matter of how she does this; it is the pattern of intricate artistic intentions manifested, and identified, in the work.

This way of thinking about the concept of style is not new, it is anticipated in art history, and it is alluded to when many thinkers reflect on the notion of style (not least in the series of quotations with which I began this chapter). Moreover, there are very recent accounts of individual style, such as Jenefer Robinson’s and Peter Lamarque’s, who propose that style is indeed a way of doing something where that way of doing something expresses an artist’s personality. They tie individual stylistic features into the manifesting of an artist’s underlying psychological states or processes, and as such they are only identifiable in relation to them. A distinctive style, for Robinson and Lamarque, is ‘an expression of the individual personality of the author (or implied author) of that work.’ This view is also affirmed by Nigel Warburton, who uses it to mount a persuasive argument against what he calls Roger Scruton’s ‘implicit position’, namely that photographs cannot be art. He writes that, ‘Individual style is the style of an individual: it is therefore a distinctive pattern of human intentions (or apparent intentions) communicated through works of art and revealing an apparent underlying personality.’ Individual style, then, is precisely a matter of the way that personality manifests itself in the work.

This conception of style is heavily intentionalist, and echoes Wollheim’s contention concerning the ‘psychological reality’ of individual styles. In his ‘Pictorial Style: Two Views’, Richard Wollheim writes that, ‘insofar as we are interested in paintings we are interested in the paintings of painters’ and this is because ‘it is…only in the hands of painters that painting is expression.’ Consequently if we are interested in artworks we should, in the knowledge that they are made, be interested in artists and their actions, and look to these in our thinking about individual artistic style. This view of style has the advantage of not limiting stylistic features to formal features, and as such it makes sense of the thought that individual style consists just as much in what is done as how it is done, since what is done, and what has been chosen to be done, is indeed conceptually linked to a way of doing

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84 Lamarque, *Work and Object*, pp. 139-152
87 Wollheim, ‘Pictorial Style: Two Views’, p. 186
something. This way of doing something, which manifests an artist's personality, is the artist's style.

While I am sympathetic to talk of *a way of doing something*, and indeed take this phrase as getting close to the notion of individual style, I hesitate in appealing to the concept of expression as partially constitutive of the concept of style. Thus while the view I will go on to develop shares important similarities with the views espoused by Lamarque, Robinson, and Warburton, it differs in distancing the concept of style from the concept of expression. While I share the view that an individual style is connected to the person who made the work that has the style, the concept of expression comes with a heavy conceptual burden. The problem that presents itself to this conception of style is roughly this: if style is a matter of how an artist expresses herself, of the way in which she reveals her underlying psychological states, then should the artist not actually be in the state the work purports to express then the work cannot be an expression of that inner state. Furthermore, if it cannot be expressive in this way without the correlative underlying inner state then it cannot be said to have the correlative expressive, and so stylistic, quality. For if expressive features are stylistic features, and expressive features are non-contingently related to an artist's underlying inner states, then, should the artist not have that inner state, there will be no genuine expressive feature and as such there will be no stylistic feature.

This is at odds with the fact that there could be cases in which a work seems expressive of, say, sadness, where the artist himself does not genuinely feel sad. Indeed John Hospers cites records left by artists who created artworks where the expressive qualities of the work in no way matched their inner state of mind. For example, he cites Poe as giving an account of the 'cold-blooded calculation' while writing his infamous poem 'The Raven'. Should this be the case, the Expression Theorist would be forced to say that the work is not expressive of, say, sadness at all; that we were mistaken. The work cannot be in a sad style unless the artist was actually sad himself, for without his sadness there can be no expression of sadness and as such there can be no such expressive qualities in the work. This has the odd consequence that the expressive qualities of an artwork become falsifiable based on information about the artist, which is inconsistent with the way we actually treat and talk about them.

Indeed Alan Tormey has provided a persuasive argument to the point that works of art can be 'expressive' while not containing expression, and so not committing us in any way to claims about the underlying psychological states of the artist. He proposes that the reason standard conceptions of art as expression get into the difficulties noted above has its basis in

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a misunderstanding of the logic of ‘expression’ and ‘expressive’. He proposes that once this misunderstanding is removed it is plausible that the presence of expressive properties does not entail the occurrence of a prior act of expression. Once expressive properties are shown to be independent of previous acts of expression we are permitted to use the concept of ‘expressive’ in a way that does not commit us to any facts about artists and their actions. Thus statements about the work are not about the person who created it. Tormey captures this nicely when he writes that,

‘…Statements about the expressive qualities of an art work remain, irresolutely, statements about the work, and any revision or rejection of such statements can be supported only by referring to the work itself. ‘That’s a sad piece of music’ is countered not by objections such as, ‘No, he wasn’t’…but by remarking ‘You haven’t listened carefully’ or ‘You must listen again.’”

Perhaps one might object here that by merely talking of emotion we have ignored other crucial things an artist might wish to express. Indeed, Robinson and Lamarque talk of artists expressing their personality, values, interests, and aims in their artworks. However, given the commitment to the claim that ‘individual stylistic features are a manifestation of underlying psychological states’, I believe the problem still presents itself even if one talks of expressing personalities or values. The problem might be posed as follows: if stylistic features are expressive of a personality or a system of values then, should an artist not have the personality or value system that the work appears to express, it cannot be expressive of that personality or value set and cannot have those expressive features. If it cannot have those expressive features it cannot have those stylistic features and as such it cannot be in the style we perceive it as being in. Moreover, as Lamarque has pointed out, ‘what the style is, is logically dependent on what is being done.’ However, if style is a matter of the way in which an artist expresses her personality through her work, then if there is no expression, as would be the case if there were no corresponding inner state or personality “behind” the artwork, then there is nothing being “done”, and if there is nothing being done there can be no way of doing it and as such there can be no style.

Judith Genova poses this as a significant problem for any account of style that locates it in the person making the object, accounts that she groups together under the heading ‘The Signature View’. She characterises the view as committed to the claim that works have the style they have because they are made by a maker that has that style. She

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91 Ibid, p. 105
92 Lamarque, Work and Object, p. 143
93 Ibid, p. 141
poses two problems for this view, which run along the lines of the problem as I phrased it above. First, that works may express things like states or feelings that are not possessed by the maker, and second, that when we talk of the style of a work we are talking about the work and not the person, that the stylistic features belong to the work. As such, works literally possess those properties so any statement about them must be a statement about the work and not the person who made it.

We can now see how this problem parallels the problem Walton identifies for his account and prompts his move from actual to apparent artists. If we remember, the problem for Walton was that sometimes how a work appears to have been made often does not tally with how it was actually made. As such, if style were a matter of how the artist actually went about using his materials, then we would be forced to conclude that statements about the style of a work of art are actually statements about the artist himself. And as Walton himself points out, this leaves open the possibility of an intentional fallacy lurking in the account. But by moving from actual to apparent artists, and making style a matter of how a work appears to have been made, Walton locates style firmly in the works.

Might this move to an apparent or implied author rescue Robinson’s account of style as a way of doing something that is expressive of personality? Indeed Robinson does make this move in places. In ‘Style and Personality in the Literary Work’ she writes that, ‘what is more typically expressed by the style of a work is not the personality of the actual author, but of…the “implied author”, that is, the author as she seems to be from the evidence of the work.’ 95 This might seem to rid us of the commitments to underlying psychological states in conceiving of style.

However, in this move to an implied author it is concerning how much of the very core of a theory that locates style as in part constituted by the expression of a personality is lost. The move to an implied author seems innocuous, but when considering what proponents of such a view claim about the benefits of the view, namely that it makes sense of why style is a highly individual and personal way of doing something, it threatens the very plausibility of the view which, I think, stems precisely from its connection with the actual artist. It is the artist that has made the work, it is the artist who puts their style into their work, and, to repeat Goodman, we cannot act as if attribution were alien to aesthetics. Thus, in an attempt to rescue the account from the charge of an intentional fallacy about artistic style, the very substance of the account is lost.

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95 Robinson, ‘Style and Personality in the Literary Work’, p. 234. She also makes this move in the quotation on p. 36 of this thesis, taken from ‘General and Individual Style in Literature’, p. 148
Hence, the view of style as a way of doing something that is expressive of a personality faces a dilemma if it is committed to the concept of expression being heavily involved in the concept of style. On the one hand the separation of the personality apparent in the work from that of the actual person who made the work loses something crucial about the account of style as connected with personality; and, on the other, if we preserve the connection with expression we end up in serious difficulties concerning a mismatch between what is expressed in the work and the actual expression of the artist. Thus the view is an unhappy one. However, the view gets some good results, I believe, in conceiving of style as a way of doing something. Where it goes wrong is in tying this way of doing something into expression, which as I have said comes with a heavy conceptual burden. Thus the view I will now develop takes as its starting point the notion of a way of doing something.

As I see it, there is no reason why a way of doing something need necessarily be tied into expression or expressing. One way of doing something might express something; another way of doing something might not. My way of sighing loudly while sitting at my desk may express frustration or sadness, or it may not express anything, it might be that I haven’t taken enough deep breaths for some time, so, after having breathed in heavily that breath needs to be forced out again. Nothing particularly expressive is going on here. However, the way in which I sigh, expressive or not, is my way of sighing, it is particular to me, and in a sense, highly personal. So, while the action of sighing may say nothing about my underlying psychological states, it can still be very personal to me. One might even say that my way of sighing has my individual style. Of course the move to a discussion of artworks and style changes the scope of the lesson to be learnt from my little example, but I think the general model holds. When I paint I do something; the way in which I do this, whether it be throwing paint or dabbing it, whether I choose humanity as my subject matter or trees on a skyline, whether I emphasize the leaves on the trees as contrasted with the branches, or give very little detail here or there, or ignore some aspects and hone in on others, is highly personal to me and is my individual style, that is my way of doing something.

‘Ways of doing things’ need not be restricted to formal features, and nor do they have to connect up with the concept of expression. One might think of the way that Vermeer depicts light on the surfaces of objects, or the way in which Cindy Sherman transforms herself before the camera, or the way Rachel Whiteread uses negative space in her work, or the way in which Robert Bresson’s ‘models’ move and talk in his films. Artists do different things in different ways, and this is inherently personal - this is why we call it an individual style.

Hence, to have an individual style is not necessarily to express anything, though of course it might. It is not connected so much to expressing a personality, but to the personal. While this way of conceiving of style preserves the connection of the work to the artist who
made it, which proved to be an attractive feature of the account that linked style with personality, it does not force us to say anything about underlying psychological states that the artist might actually have. A further advantage of connecting style with the personal, rather than to expression, is that it does better in explaining certain stylistic features that do not appear to be related to one’s ‘inner life’ at all. It is plausible that some methods that artists employ, or some of the things they do, need not be consciously done. In *Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence*, Merleau-Ponty recounts a slow motion recording of Matisse painting, which suggests that not all gestures or activities of painters are intentionally chosen. The passage is worth quoting at length and reads as follows:

‘A camera once recorded the work of Matisse in slow motion. The impression was prodigious, so much so that Matisse himself was moved, they say. That same brush which, seen with the naked eye, leaped from one act to another, was seen to mediate in a solemn and expanding time—in the imminence of a world’s creation—to try ten possible movements, dance in front of the canvas, brush it lightly several times, and crash down finally like a lightning stroke upon the one line necessary. Of course, there is something artificial in this analysis. And Matisse would be wrong if, putting his faith in the film, he believed that he really chose between all possible lines that day and, like the God of Leibniz, solved an immense problem of maximum and minimum.’ ⁹⁶

And here is Matisse recounting the same recording:

‘There was a passage showing me drawing in slow motion. Before my pencil ever touched the paper, my hand made a strange journey of its own. I never realized before that I did this. I suddenly felt as if I were shown naked—that everyone could see this—it made me deeply ashamed. You must understand this was not hesitation. I was unconsciously establishing the relationship between the subject I was about to draw and the size of my paper. Je n’avais pas encore commence a chanter (I had not yet begun to sing).’ ⁹⁷

While it appeared that Matisse’s hand was consciously making choices between sets of available actions, no such choice was present to his mind. His actions were unconsciously habitual. Thus some of the stylistic features that find themselves as effects of an artist’s action may not be choices that are consciously present to the artist himself. Some aspects of style may be explicable in terms of external factors or as habits such as the way an artist holds their brush or sets up their palette. These features cannot be explained in terms of any underlying psychological state, nor can they be the outcome of

⁹⁶ Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’. In *Signs*, (Northwestern University Press 1964), p. 45. I would like to thank Dominic Shaw for drawing my attention to this passage.

some inner dialogue an artist has with herself. However, they can still form part of the way in which an artist does something, which is deeply personal to the artist. The way in which one moves one’s hands and skims across a canvas can be highly personal and individual to your way of doing something. Thus an account that conceives of style as a personal way of doing something can make sense of unconscious or habitual stylistic choices and features.

Consequently, this view of individual style does better than previous accounts by distancing itself from the claims about expression and the manifesting of underlying psychological states. It also does better by restricting talk of style to talk of the personal rather than personality. However, since it is a modification of the view that takes style to be a way of doing something that expresses a personality, perhaps the best way of developing it further is to see how it copes with familiar objections waged against that view. If my view can do better still then I believe it is the correct account of individual style.

1.3 Potential Objections

As we saw, one kind of objection centred on the notion that works may express things that the maker is not expressing. I believe we have sidestepped this problem by releasing individual style from the constraints of expression and statements about the actual underlying psychological states of artists. However, Judith Genova poses a second difficulty for any view that locates style in the person making the object, namely that when we talk of the style of a work we are talking about the work and not the person, that the stylistic features belong to the work. As such works literally possess those properties so any statement about them must be a statement about the work and not the person who made it. Perhaps part of the worry here is that such views seem to make the work an afterthought, and that really we are only ever talking about the person who made it every time we say something about the work itself. This second objection applies to my account of style, since it does not remove the person altogether despite removing a commitment to expression. On my account the connection with the artist who made the work is preserved, since style is conceived as being inherently personal.

However, this objection overlooks the possibility that, while style features may originate from the person who makes the work, they can still be literally possessed by a work. A signature view such as my view need not be committed to the claim that all statements about style are only statements about persons and actions, and not about the work, since if a work does not actually possess certain properties indicative of a certain
style then it cannot be in that style. Genova’s objection seems to assume that the person is in some sense invisible in the work. However, style is a highly personal way of doing something, and that, I claim, can be visible in the work. The full argument for that claim will be the focus of the next chapter, where it forms part of a discussion of the perceptible properties of artworks. For now, though, it is not obvious that committing oneself to a signature view, where stylistic features are deeply personal and so connected to the person who makes the object, means that stylistic features cannot be literally possessed by, and visible in, the work. The mere fact that style is deeply personal does not mean that works do not possess those highly personal stylistic features. The work has this or that individual style because it has been made in a way that is highly personal to the artist; in their way of doing something. We cannot sever this connection but nor do we need to claim that works do not possess those properties, and so claim that any statement about the work is never anything but a statement about the person who made it.

However, Genova has further objections. She claims that, ‘if style does originate in character, then art historians have been sorely misled in their talk of Baroque or Classical styles.’ The objection seems to be that a view that locates style in personality leaves little room for general style considerations, and other factors constitutive of style. However, this ignores the already discussed distinction between general and individual styles. While the concept of individual style has been developed along the lines of the personal or character, nowhere have I claimed that general style must also follow this way of thinking. In fact I argued that we ought to preserve the distinction between general and individual styles on the basis of an internal/external relation. I claimed, like Robinson, that the only way in which general styles can be inherently personal is when they are used in a way that is highly individual to the artist. General styles, while they can be used by artists in personal ways, are not by definition personal.

Further, Genova’s objection seems to beg the question against the signature view, of which my view is a species, in claiming that, ‘Individuals express their milieu, their form of life, and their artistic training as much as their psychological selves’, since this assumes that all those features listed are stylistic ones that fall outside what the signature view identifies. However, in order to claim this, and use it as an argument against the signature view, it needs to be argued that those features are indeed stylistic. There are many responses one could make here. Firstly, it is open to me to claim that if these features are apparently not deeply personal or indicative of a personal way of doing something then they are not style features. The denial of these features being stylistic is consistent with my view’s claims. What would then be needed is an argument to show that my view has overlooked something here.

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98 Genova, ‘The Significance of Style’, p. 318
If that response is not satisfactory, and one is inclined to think the features listed above are indeed stylistic, then it is also open for my view to embrace these features and claim that they too are inherently personal. An artist’s ‘form of life’, while I am not entirely clear what Genova means by this, looks like something that could indeed be inherently personal. At best, it is not something that need be obviously excluded from an artist’s characteristic or personal way of doing something. An artist’s milieu, while it is related to an artist’s social environment, is still something that could be very personal in the way in which it is dealt with in the work, and indeed how an artist relates to that social environment can be inherently personal. Further, artistic training is simply training, practice of technique among other things, rather than a prescribed way of creating works. Thus while training may be evident in a work, if the work is distinctive in any way it is because the artist has put that training into practice in an individual way.

Finally, another response might be to say that those features listed above, in particular artistic training, might be better conceived along the lines of general styles since they are external to an artist and can be taught, but again this does not bar each one from being taken up by an artist and transformed, realised, and composed in highly personal ways. As such, my view can still hold that artistic training is inherently personal, since the way in which it is used can be particular to an artist. In short, Genova’s objection requires more argument to show that my signature view has overlooked something very significant. But even where more argument could be mounted against it I think there are plenty of resources within the view of style as inherently personal with which to build a convincing reply.

Genova’s final objection seems more troublesome. She writes that, ‘artists may change their styles often in a lifetime without our having to assume severe personality changes; nor is it impossible for a single work to exhibit a highly distinctive style.’ 99 This objection seems more difficult for my view to deal with since there are clearly cases of artists changing styles (Picasso would be a good example here) throughout their working life. However, why do we need to assume there have been severe personality changes on my view? On the one hand, it’s entirely possible that artists’ personalities change throughout their lives. But also, it’s not clear why all of those changes and ways of doing things cannot be highly personal and therefore part of the artist’s individual style. If style is a way of doing something, where that way of doing something is highly personal, then of course artists may do different things at different periods of their life. However, all of these different ways of doing something can still be highly personal. As such, multiple styles do not threaten the conception of individual style as highly personal, since all of those styles will be highly personal to the artist.

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99 Ibid.
Thus when Picasso moved through his Blue Period to his Rose Period, we do not have to assume that he had a severe personality change. What we can say, however, is that the way in which he made his work has changed. Further, that each work created is in Picasso’s style because the way in which he has made his work is still highly personal in its being a way of doing something. Moreover, we can group works together or set them apart on the basis of these considerations. We can say styles have changed, or developed, or emerged on the basis of these considerations. In short, Picasso may have done very different things but the way in which he did them was deeply personal and individual to him.

But what of the single work that has a highly distinctive style? Well, firstly if it is by one known artist and is seemingly in a different style then we can still say that it has that artist’s individual style since, as we have already established, doing different things does not mean they cannot be done in highly personal ways. However, what are we to make of an anonymous single work? This makes the example slightly trickier. Nevertheless, it seems to me that in such an event we could still talk of this work as having an individual style that is highly personal even if it stands alone. There does not seem to be anything that would prevent us from saying that it has a certain style on the basis of the way in which the work has been made, and what it focuses on or leaves out, or the way in which it deals with this or that subject matter, even if we did not know who had made it. We could say of this work, then, that it has a distinctive style on the basis of the way in which the artist did something, which is highly personal. We need only focus on the work and what has been done, and the way in which it was done, to say that it has an individual style. As such, Genova’s objection seems unproblematic in the event of there being a single work with a highly individual style. Furthermore, one might think that if another anonymous single work cropped up, and it shared this highly personal way of doing something, then we at least have a prima facie case for attributing the works to the same author.

The final potential worry I wish to address concerns the widely discussed problem of forgery and imitation in the arts. The definition of style proposed by Robinson and Lamarque, one that has its roots in the psychological underpinnings of an artist, potentially gives us a good result regarding forgeries by capturing the intuition that while on the surface forgeries and originals are indiscernible there remains something fundamentally different about them. According to Lamarque, in one sense forgeries can exactly imitate the individual style of an artist and yet in another, deeper, sense they fail

100 Without wanting to delve too deeply into psychology, it is entirely plausible that the Blue Period reflects Picasso’s depression during this time.

101 One might think of anonymous poetry here. Even where multiple poems are written by anonymous authors we might be able to distinguish two of the poems as being by the same author because they share the same highly personal traits. As such even anonymous poetry can have a highly distinctive style. I would like to thank Peter Lamarque for this example.
altogether. The reason they fail, why they are ‘worlds apart’, is precisely because individual style is grounded in personal expression. This suggests a clear-cut reason why forgeries and imitations cannot stand in the place of their originals, why they cannot be in the same style. ‘The reason’, according to Lamarque, ‘is that in both cases the style has been cut away from its expressive grounding, that underlying sentiment that makes it the style it is.’ and this result seems like a good one, and one that my own account should be able to produce.

I think it can, and the reason it can rests on my view’s claims about style being related to a way of doing something. As Lamarque has pointed out, a way of doing something is logically dependent on what is being done. Hence, I contend that in creating an artwork and in imitating or forging an artwork very different things are being done. In the latter case the imitator or forger is only imitating the surface features, what is being done is very different, and if what is done is different, then the way of doing it is different. As such, a forgery or imitation cannot have the individual style of the original artist. Only the original artist’s way of doing something is highly personal. The forger or imitator can perfectly mimic a style but they cannot have the same individual style of the artist. The style is, to use Lamarque’s phrase, not originated. What is deeply personal about an individual style cannot be reproduced. Consequently I believe my account can give a good result regarding our intuitions about the fundamental difference between forgeries and originals without tying the concept of style so closely to the concept of expression, which, as we saw, posed difficulties for Robinson and Lamarque’s views.

To conclude, I have argued that both definitions of style based on a distinction between form and content and definitions that are features-based fail to answer the question ‘what is style?’ as it pertains to individual style. I have suggested that style ought to be considered as a way of doing something that is not solely concerned with the handling of materials, or concerned with the way in which artists express themselves, which involves a necessary connection to an artist’s underlying psychological states. I have argued that individual style is a way of doing something, where that way of doing something is deeply personal and individual to the artist. I argued that my view of style can cope with the potential worries identified and can do much better than previous views in accommodating certain stylistic features that do not obviously result as an effect of a conscious choice. By considering these worries I have shown that my view is a welcome revision of a style as a way of doing something definition. Style, then, is still a question of ‘how?’ The task now is to answer the other question I posed at the beginning of this chapter, namely ‘how can we (the viewer) know, or know about, an artist’s style?’ Answering this question will give us a better

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102 Lamarque, Work and Object, p. 145
103 Ibid, p. 152, (My emphasis)
104 Ibid, p. 149
understanding of our perceptual experiences of artworks more generally, and how the conclusions I have reached in this chapter will prove significant for central problems in the philosophy of depiction.
Chapter Two
Style Properties as Perceptible Properties

Can we visually experience not only properties such as shape, colour, or size, but also so-called ‘high-level properties’? I think we can, and such properties include the properties we are interested in here, namely style properties. The concerns in this chapter are twofold. First, I argue for the claim that aesthetic properties are perceptually represented, that the properties represented in perceptual experience outstrip low-level properties such as colour, shape, solidity, etc., and, second, to argue that style properties are also high-level properties that can be represented in perceptual experience, albeit they might not necessarily be aesthetic.

I will introduce the notion of high-level properties, and the arguments in favour of including them in the possibility space of what can be represented in perception, namely phenomenal contrast arguments, and cases of aspect switching. I then consider the most plausible objections to these arguments, which pose alternative explanations for the contrasts and switches. I respond to these objections and demonstrate that positing high-level properties as being responsible for the phenomenal contrast is in fact the best explanation of the contrast. As such we ought to concede to a more generous account of the admissible contents of perception, and conclude that high-level properties can be represented in perception.

However, while I wish to motivate the claim that aesthetic properties can be represented in perception, I distance myself somewhat from others in their treatment of aesthetic properties and style properties. This is because what little discussion of stylistic properties has occurred has tended to equate style properties with aesthetic properties. While it is clear that properties such as ‘delicate’ or ‘vivid’ are aesthetic, it is not obvious that all stylistic properties are aesthetic. This tendency to run together style properties and aesthetic properties is understandable since style properties seem to resemble aesthetic properties, i.e. high-level properties, more than low-level properties, and style properties have an aesthetic significance. However, in doing so, the very nature of style properties, and our perception of them, has been neglected and as such has not been given the significant treatment it deserves. In Chapter One I considered whether style properties might count as artistic properties, and claimed that insofar as they are aesthetically relevant they may indeed be instances of artistic rather than aesthetic properties. However, I also claimed that we ought to hesitate on this categorization given the characterization of artistic properties as properties which are not directly perceivable in works. This is because I think that style properties can be perceptually represented. This chapter therefore gives a thorough analysis of this claim, building on the conclusions drawn concerning artistic style in the previous chapter.
The significance of the conclusions drawn in this chapter centre on the notion that the perception of style properties as a species of high-level property explains why expertise in art often leads to a more appropriate experience of what a picture depicts, thus showing a connection between those properties we see the picture as having, namely stylistic properties, and that which a picture is seen as depicting. In short, if style properties are perceptible, and the art expert is more perceptually attuned to them, then it should come as no surprise that the expert has less trouble ‘perceptually figuring out’ pictures that are indeterminate, inaccurate, or, in terms of the most plausible alternative to the theory of depiction I will go on to develop, do not resemble the objects they purport to depict. As such, the representation of high-level properties in perception provides some of the material with which to explain our perceptual experiences of depictions.

2.1 What Kinds of Properties Can We Visually Experience?

How limited are the limits of the phenomenal content that can be represented in my visual experience? Put another way, when I look at a tomato the phenomenal content of my visual experience involves the representation of redness and roundness, but does it also represent the property of ‘being a tomato’, a so-called ‘high-level’ property? Those who answer negatively to the latter have been branded conservatives about which properties can be represented in perceptual experience. Those who hold a conservative view align with a long tradition of claiming that the properties that we can visually experience are strictly low-level. Hence we can only experience properties such as colour, shape, size, motion, and spatial properties. The phenomenal character of, for example, visual experience is limited to these properties. As Tim Bayne puts it, ‘The phenomenal world of the conservative is an austere one.’ What is at stake here then is deciding on the richness of the contents of one’s perceptual experiences.

However, those holding a more liberal view of the admissible contents of perception have challenged this tradition of austerity regarding phenomenal content. Those who are more liberal are high-level content theorists, and claim that we can not only visually experience low-level properties but also so-called ‘high-level’ properties. Examples of high-level properties include properties such as the property of ‘being graceful’, or of belonging to

107 Bayne, Tim. ‘Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content’.
a certain biological kind e.g. ‘being a pine tree’, or natural kinds e.g. water, or of being in a certain mental state. In contrast, conservatives hold that we can represent these kinds of high-level properties but only at the level of belief; as such our awareness of them is post-perceptual rather than represented in perceptual experience. One way of construing the conservative position is in terms of an inferential story; we see a movement and, on the basis of a background belief formed in virtue of previous experiences of this particular movement, judge that the movement is graceful. For the liberal however, the high-level property ‘gracefulness’ is represented in our visual experience; there is no need for a post-perceptual judgement or a background belief to justify any judgment about the gracefulness of this particular movement. The perception is enough on its own. Why should there be such wide disagreement, and what is really at stake if you are a liberal or a conservative about perceptual content?

One important consequence of branding oneself a liberal or a conservative concerns the relation between perception and belief. If one is a liberal about perceptual content then one will be more tolerant of perceptual experiences that can, by themselves, justify propositions. Take our previous example of judging that a movement is graceful. For a conservative about perceptual content, it is a background belief, based on previous experiences of a particular movement, which eventually justifies the belief in the proposition ‘this movement is graceful’. However, as we saw, for the liberal no post-perceptual judgments are required, the perception itself is justification enough for one believing that ‘this movement is graceful’. Thus whether one is a liberal or a conservative about phenomenal content has implications for one’s commitments concerning perception and its role in justification. At this stage we must not presuppose that one view is correct, however, as we shall see, the liberal view makes much better sense of certain perceptual experiences that might appear to be justifying all on their own, i.e., the perceptual experience is enough to justify a belief in a proposition. Such experiences include aesthetic experiences, or experiences that involve, in some way yet to be determined, aesthetic properties. Thus, without begging the question against the conservative, I suggest at this stage that one might prefer to be a liberal in order to explain aesthetic experience, but let us first turn to the arguments for the perceptual representation of high-level properties in experience.

The arguments for high-level perceptual content are often grounded in the phenomenology of visual experience. John Searle uses the notion of aspect-switching to argue that the visual phenomenology is different depending on which aspect one is experiencing, and this change cannot be accounted for by low-level visual experience. Perhaps the most persuasive argument for high-level property perception though is Susanna

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Siegel’s ‘phenomenal contrast’ argument, which aims to establish that we visually experience biological kind properties (K-properties). In virtue of acquiring new recognitional capacities—for example, learning how to recognize pine trees—Siegel argues that the high-level property ‘being a pine tree’ can be perceptually represented, which changes the overall phenomenology of one’s experience when in the presence of pine trees. This is contrasted phenomenologically with the experience before acquiring the recognitional capacity. This change in overall phenomenology, Siegel argues, is best explained by a change in the phenomenology of the visual experience, which is in turn best explained by a change in the properties represented in one’s visual experience. One’s experience of a pine tree after one has learnt to recognise pine trees differs from previous experience of pine trees because one’s visual experience now involves representing a high-level property i.e., the property of being a pine tree (a biological kind property). I will quote Siegel’s argument in full below because its exact form is important. It’s important because those who resist it tend to deny at least one of its premises. Her argument runs as follows:

‘Let E1 be the sensory experience had by a subject S who is seeing pine trees before learning to recognise them, and let E2 be the sensory experience had by S when S sees the pine trees after learning to recognise them. E1 and E2 are sensory parts of S’s overall experiences at each of these times. I’m going to call the premise that is unproblematic if the cases are convincing premise (0):

(0) The overall experience of which E1 is a part differs in its phenomenology from the overall experience of which E2 is a part.

Claim (0) is supposed to be an intuition. It is the minimal intuition one has to have, for the argument to get off the ground.

(1) If the overall experience of which E1 is a part differs in its phenomenology from the overall experience of which E2 is a part, then there is a phenomenological difference between E1 and E2.

(2) If there is a phenomenological difference between the sensory experiences E1 and E2, then E1 and E2 differ in content.

(3) If there is a difference in content between E1 and E2, it is a difference with respect to K-properties represented in E1 and E2.”

Thus, according to Siegel, the reason why the two experiences differ is due to a change in the properties represented in the visual experience. This change cannot be attributed to a change in low-level properties, since those remain the same both before and after one acquires the

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110 Siegel. ‘Which Properties are Represented in Perception?’, pp. 481-503
111 Ibid, pp. 491-492
recognitional capacity for pine trees. As such, the phenomenal contrast must be due to the representation of high-level properties in E2, in this example K-properties.

There are many ways in which one might attempt to block the moves from (1)-(3), and it is possible that someone might deny (0). A conservative might say that there is some ‘before’ and ‘after’ difference, but this is a difference in the beliefs formed, as such it is not an experiential difference. Hence, there would be no difference in qualitative character. However, as the minimal intuition I cannot see why one would want to deny this. While it is only an intuition that there is an experiential difference, and there are troubles with arguing from intuition, it is a particularly strong one. One case in which I think this minimal intuition is stronger is Siegel’s case of learning a new language. Siegel writes that:

‘When you are first learning to read the script of a language that is new to you, you have to attend to each word, and perhaps to each letter, separately. In contrast, once you can easily read it, it takes a special effort to attend to the shapes of the script separately from its semantic properties.’ 112

The minimal intuition here is that the experiences are qualitatively different. Having had experiences of learning new languages, I suspect that most will agree that there is some qualitative difference after one is competent at a new language. While I do not claim that this intuition undermines the conservative view altogether, I think the onus is on the conservative to make a strong case here for there being no qualitative difference at all between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ experiences.

Let us grant the minimal intuition (0), how might an objector respond? The most common strategy is to deny the phenomenal contrast argument any explanatory force, either by rejecting one of its premises or by attempting to show that there are alternative explanations for the contrast. As such, what is needed for the conclusion that high-level properties are represented in E2 is that it be the best explanation for the phenomenal contrast between E1 and E2; and this, as we shall see, is no easy task.

2.2 Objections to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument
2.2.1 Non-Sensory Phenomenology

One way of blocking the move from (1)-(3) would be to deny premise (1), which would be to deny that the phenomenological changes are sensory. As Siegel herself notes, there are many different kinds of phenomenology, of which sensory phenomenology is only one. One could then claim that the changes between E1 and E2 rely on non-sensory

112Ibid, pp. 490-491
phenomenology, and if that is so there is no reason to accept premises (2) and (3), which in turns means that one need not posit high-level properties. One way in which one could explain the difference without appealing to sensory phenomenology is to appeal to cognitive phenomenology. On this model, once one has gained the recognitional capacity for pine trees, an appropriately formed belief could do the work in changing the phenomenology between E1 and E2. One proponent of this kind of strategy in relation to object recognition is Michael Tye,\textsuperscript{113} to whom Tim Bayne attributes a doxastic model of object recognition.\textsuperscript{114} This view claims that a background belief can account for the phenomenal difference. How might one respond to this claim, and secure the notion that the contrast is sensory?

If one is not convinced by Siegel’s pine tree case, one might be convinced by Tim Bayne’s detailed contrast argument, based on a case of agnosia. Associative visual agnosia is an impairment which involves a loss of, or inability to apply, a recognitional capacity to a stimulus that is accurately perceived. Thus while there is no failure in the visual system, subjects are unable to identify the object or its function. For example, a subject may have no difficulty in perceiving the form of a key but they cannot recognize it as such, and when asked what the object is, or is for, they may be entirely unsure or give incorrect answers. Subjects can, however, normally perceive the colour, shape, and location of the object, and they can categorize it correctly, as is evidenced by the fact that subjects can adequately spot a match with visually identical objects.

According to Bayne, this impairment involves a difference in the phenomenal character of visual experience, citing H.L. Teuber’s claim that associative agnosia involves ‘a normal percept stripped of its meaning.’\textsuperscript{115} Hence, \textit{what it is like} to see a key for the visual agnosic differs from \textit{what it is like} for you or me to see a key. What accounts for this difference? As is evidenced by the visual agnosic’s ability to match visually identical objects, their perception does not differ from ours in virtue of a difference in the perception of low-level properties. Rather, what the visual agnosic lacks is the ability to recognize and perceptually categorise objects. Thus it is a difference in high-level content. The visual agnosic does not see the high-level property of ‘being a key’ despite their visual system remaining functionally intact. What explains the difference between the visual agnosic’s experience and yours or mine, is a loss of some perceptual content that is normally present in perceptual experience, and, since it cannot be a loss of low-level content, it must be a loss of high-level content, and, crucially, the sort of high-level content that is \textit{normally} represented in perceptual experience.

\textsuperscript{113} Tye, \textit{Ten Problems of Consciousness}, p. 215
\textsuperscript{114} Bayne, ‘Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content’, p. 395
Why might this phenomenal contrast case be more plausible? One reason to think it is more persuasive than Siegel’s pine tree argument is that it is harder to deny premise (1) and claim that the phenomenal contrast is due to a change in non-sensory phenomenology. As we saw for the pine tree case one could claim that an appropriately formed belief could account for the difference in phenomenology between E1 and E2, but Bayne’s case seems less susceptible to this explanation.

The reason it is less susceptible is because, according to Bayne’s analysis of the empirical data from Rubens and Benson, inserting the appropriate belief cannot reinstate object recognition for the patient with visual agnosia. Bayne suggests that if a patient who could not recognize a pipe as a pipe were told that the object in front of them were a pipe then they would judge the object before them to be a pipe i.e., form the belief that the object they were looking at is a pipe. However, further analysis of the empirical data shows that if the patient is now told that in fact the object before them might not be a pipe, they still retain their belief that it is a pipe and yet their experience of it as a pipe is not retained. Thus, according to Bayne, ‘Perceptual recognition is not simply a matter of believing that such and such a type of object is present whilst enjoying low-level experience.’ If one accepts Bayne’s conclusions then one is led to the conclusion that it is high-level property perception, and not an appropriately formed belief, that causes the phenomenal contrast.

Bayne’s contrast case thus makes other phenomenal contrast arguments more plausible, since it demonstrates that there is a phenomenal ‘layer’ missing in the visual agnoscic’s case that would usually be present in a normal perceiver. Thus the best explanation of phenomenal contrast between experiences E1 and E2 is that high-level properties are represented in E2, that is, the experience one has after gaining a recognitional capacity. Though of course this is too quick. While Bayne’s case resists explaining phenomenal contrasts in terms of non-sensory phenomenology, this is only to reinstate premise (1) of Siegel’s argument, not the argument itself. For one can still resist the move from (2)-(3), and offer alternative explanations.

2.2.2 Differences in Attention and Aesthetic Properties

One alternative explanation for the phenomenal contrast concerns differences in attention, which can make phenomenal differences between E1 and E2. This would tackle both premise (2), which posits a difference in content between E1 and E2, and also threatens premise (3) since one need not claim that the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2 is due to a difference in the properties represented in each experience. Richard Price denies that the

116 Bayne, ‘Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content’, p. 396
phenomenal differences between E1 and E2 are due to differences in content, and argues for what he calls the ‘non-content’ view.\textsuperscript{117} On this view there are alternative explanations for the phenomenal contrasts that do not involve any differences in the properties represented. One such alternative is to claim that differences in patterns of attention can do the work in explaining why E1 and E2 differ phenomenally.

To argue for the non-content view, Price discusses cases of aspect-switching, such as the infamous duck/rabbit figure. According to Price, aspect-switching is accompanied by a shift in patterns of attention towards a figure such as the duck/rabbit. For example, when looking at the duck/rabbit figure under the ‘duck aspect’, one’s attention is distributed differently from when one is looking at the figure under the ‘rabbit aspect’, and this difference in patterns of attention makes for a phenomenal difference between the two experiences. Price also discusses the Kanizsa triangle figure (fig. 1 below), claiming that:

“When one sees it as composed of a white triangle superimposed on black circles, it seems that one attends to the straight lines between the three black circles that would be the edges of the white triangle. When one sees it as composed of three black circles with wedges cut out of them, then one attends to these circles alone without attending to the straight lines that would be the edges of the white triangle.”\textsuperscript{118}

Applied to Siegel’s pine tree example, one might say that a perceiver’s patterns of attention in E2 are distributed differently over the scene in front of them than they were in E1, which is the experience they had before they acquired the recognitional capacity for pine trees. After they can recognise pine trees they attend to the scene differently, perhaps honing in on the shape of the foliage, which justifies their judgement that the tree before them is indeed a pine. This difference in attention is enough to make a phenomenal difference between E1 and E2. As such we need not posit high-level properties to explain the phenomenal contrast.

\textsuperscript{117} R. Price ‘Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character’, pp. 508-518. What is not clear in Price’s paper is whether he is simply rejecting the representation of high-level properties or representationalist theories altogether (such as Siegel’s).

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid, p. 514
Aspect-switching is thus inherently related to patterns of attention.

However, it’s unclear that Price’s view can play the explanatory role he wants it to regarding aspect switches. Price himself acknowledges that it is possible to aspect switch without any difference in patterns of attention, and further that one can focus one’s attention and yet still undergo an aspect switch, which means that differences in attention cannot explain the switch. For example, when looking at the Kanizsa triangle, I can attend to the cut out circles with great effort and yet, as will be discussed in detail in the next chapter concerning seeing-in, the recognitional aspect constantly reasserts itself; try as I might the triangles enter my visual experience. The switch seems mandatory, suggesting that shifts in attention may not account for the phenomenal difference.

While this response primarily concerns Price’s account of aspect-switching, it has significance for phenomenal contrast arguments since it puts pressure on the idea that patterns of attention can do the work in causing a phenomenal difference between experiences. This is so because, as the main method of argument against high-level property perception, Price’s account of aspect-switching cannot establish the conclusion he wants. Thus, to return to Siegel’s example, a shift in one’s pattern of attention after one has gained a recognitional capacity is not obviously the best explanation for the phenomenal contrast. It could be something else, i.e. representing a high-level property in E2.

However that is only to say that it is not obviously the best explanation, it does not rule it out altogether. Ruling it out requires a different strategy, which I will pursue using a different kind of example given by Price himself. The example that Price uses is the Dalmatian Figure (fig. 2 below). He writes of it that, ‘Changing one’s patterns of attention towards a figure can cause a phenomenal difference to occur…Initially, one’s attention is
evenly distributed over the shapes in the picture. After one sees the Dalmatian in the middle of the picture, one attends to the specific outline of the Dalmatian.  

(Fig. 2) Dalmatian

The part of this explanation that is unclear to me is the causal story Price is telling regarding the phenomenal difference. While it is true that once one sees the Dalmatian one can focus one’s attention on its configuration, it’s not clear that it is at this point that a phenomenal change has occurred. Presumably what allows one to focus one’s attention in the first instance is seeing the Dalmatian in the picture, and having this recognition, having this aspect dawn upon oneself, is presumably where the experience changes phenomenally. As we saw with the Kanizsa triangle, the shift is more mandatory than shifts in patterns of attention can account for, and similarly in the Dalmatian image the Dalmatian appears instantly. For Price, it is ‘after one sees the Dalmatian’ that ‘one attends to the specific outline of the Dalmatian’. If it is not a difference in attention that causes the change though, it looks difficult to say that the phenomenal difference is accounted for by attention itself, since presumably the experience’s phenomenal character changes as soon as one sees the Dalmatian, not when one changes one’s patterns of attention towards it, since this comes after the switch according to Price. The mandatory nature of aspect-switching seems to undermine the explanation of the phenomenal change in terms of patterns of attention. To be clear, what I am not denying is that patterns of attention can make a phenomenal difference, what I am questioning is whether the phenomenal change hasn’t already occurred.

\[119\text{Ibid, (my emphasis)}\]
according to the description of the case given by Price. If it has occurred already then, at least in this case, patterns of attention again look explanatorily weak.

However, while Price is not clear on whether he takes voluntary or involuntary attention to be primarily responsible for the shift, he could appeal to the notion of involuntary attention to explain aspect-switching. In that case, one’s attention is involuntarily drawn to a certain aspect of the image e.g. to the aspect under which one sees the rabbit rather than the duck. Thus the distinction between voluntary and involuntary attention can provide a reply for Price. Further, the explanatory force of patterns of attention for Siegel’s pine tree case looks plausible.

According to Price, after one learns to recognize a pine tree one will attend to the features of pine trees that distinguish them from other trees. ‘Acquiring a recognitional disposition for pine trees will cause one’s patterns of attention to shift when one looks at a grove containing pine trees and other sorts of trees.’ In this example the causal story is clearer; it is acquiring the recognitional capacity that causes one’s patterns of attention to shift, which then accounts for the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2. As such, during E2, one’s attention is focused on the low-level properties of the scene before you differently, which accounts for the phenomenal contrast. The question, ‘what are you attending to differently?’ has a clear answer. So Price’s account seems plausible, for pine trees at least.

However, it looks less plausible for aesthetic properties, which I will now use to put pressure on Price’s account. While the property of being a pine tree might not be represented in perception, an aesthetic property could be. For aesthetic properties it is not clear that shifts in patterns of attention, voluntary or involuntary, caused by acquiring a recognitional capacity, rule out the representation of high-level properties as, at least in part, responsible for the phenomenal contrast. For liberals about the content of perception, aesthetic properties look very promising as an example of a high-level property. One reason for this is that the inferentialist story that posits a background belief as providing justification for one’s belief that, say, a movement is graceful, looks less plausible for aesthetic properties.

This is so because it seems difficult to determine what background beliefs would do the work here. Something we have learnt from the work of Frank Sibley is that one cannot reason from one’s past experiences of certain combinations of low-level properties being graceful to the conclusion that this current combination of low-level properties is also graceful. As Sibley puts it, ‘…there are no sure-fire rules by which, referring to the neutral and non-aesthetic qualities of things, one can infer that something is balanced, tragic, joyous,

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120 Ibid, p. 516
and so on. One has to look and see.” Aesthetic properties, then, are grist to the liberal’s mill.

To return to the question ‘what are you attending to differently?’ for the pine tree case, it is plausible that one is attending to low-level properties differently. However, in the aesthetic case, say of a graceful movement or a serene landscape, one may indeed attend to low-level properties differently but this does not seem to be enough to say that a movement is graceful, since there are no set rules about combinations of low-level properties that would amount to a judgement that this movement before me right now is graceful. In the pine tree example the question ‘what are you attending to differently?’ after one has acquired the recognitional capacity seems readily answered with ‘low-level properties’, ones associated with pine trees such as shape (of the foliage), texture (of the bark), colour (of the foliage and bark), and so on. That question is not so easily answered in the aesthetic case given the lack of rules about low-level properties warranting aesthetic judgements. The rules for recognizing pine trees are much simpler than the rules for recognizing gracefulness. Indeed, as Jerrold Levinson notes, our talk of aesthetic properties better fits with the view that we do experience them as having a look or appearance, rather than our ascription of aesthetic properties referring to multiple non-aesthetic qualities that an object possesses. He writes that, ‘When we ascribe an aesthetic property it seems that what we are ascribing, at base, is an emergent way of appearing, and not a range of ensembles of disparate traits.’ As such, in the aesthetic case, one’s attention may indeed be distributed differently over a scene in E1 and in E2, but what one is attending to, low-level or high-level properties, is not yet decided.

One way to decide this is to refer back to the method of argument. Remember that in each stage of Siegel’s argument, and Bayne’s agnosia case, there is no change in low-level properties. This meant that any change must be attributed to a different source (for Siegel and Bayne the source was the representation of high-level properties, for Price the source was a change in attention). Preserving this method, we can say that in the aesthetic case there is no change between E1 and E2 in the low-level properties represented in experience. However, as we have seen, attending to low-level properties in the aesthetic case cannot give us reasons to say that a movement is graceful, since there are no rules about which combinations amount to gracefulness. As such, it does not matter whether one’s attention is voluntary or involuntary since no amount of attending will result in the judgement that a movement is graceful. Thus the reply that the attention is involuntary will not do the work in the aesthetic case. Unlike the pine tree case there are no low-level properties associated with the ‘category’ of being graceful, such that we can attend to them differently after gaining a

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recognitional capacity. Attending to low-level properties in the aesthetic case will not work in
the same way as it did for the pine tree case. Thus, while our attention may have shifted
between E1 and E2, so too must the properties represented in our visual experience. If it is
not low-level properties we are attending to in E2 in the aesthetic case, it must be high-level
properties.

As such, shifts in patterns of attention do not rule out high-level property
representation in the aesthetic case, and further, high-level property representation is
seemingly required to make sense of Price’s attentional difference account, since a difference
in attention requires that there is something being attended to. It cannot be low-level
properties being attended to in the aesthetic case, so for Price’s claims about attention to go
through we need to posit high-level properties. As such, Price’s claims about attention
cannot rule out the representation of high-level properties in the aesthetic case, and in fact
work to support the claim that such content is represented in E2.

What I do not deny is that there may be some role of attention in aesthetic
experience. Indeed one often has to ‘look and see’, and focus on parts and pieces that give
rise to an aesthetic experience, but this is to attempt to direct one’s attention towards
aesthetic properties that are already there, over and above low-level ones, and to reveal them.
This is, as Hopkins points out, ‘The heart of critical discussion…’ it is ‘…the activity of
pointing out features of the object to one’s audience. It is to direct the attention of one’s
companion so that her experience reveals some of the object’s features to her.’ That those
features are experientially revealed suggests they are already present, over and above low-level
features; it is simply that they are not yet represented in one’s perceptual experience. Once
they are represented the phenomenal content of the experiences shifts to include high-level
properties.

To summarise, my arguments against Price have been twofold. First, I argued that
cases of aspect-switching do not have the explanatory force required to motivate Price’s
claim that shifts in patterns of attention cause phenomenal differences. In showing this to be
the case I suggested that this weakens the argument against high-level property perception,
given that it is one of the main ways in which Price tries to motivate his claim that patterns
of attention have explanatory force in phenomenal contrast arguments.

Second, I used the case of aesthetic properties to demonstrate that, even if Price’s
claims about attention are plausible for biological kind properties, they do not put pressure
on the aesthetic case. I demonstrated that the object or focus of one’s attention in the
aesthetic case is unlike the pine tree case in that it cannot be only low-level properties one is
attending to. I then claimed that an attentional difference might have occurred but that this

123 Hopkins, Robert. ‘Critical Reasoning and Critical Perception’ In Knowing Art: Essays in Aesthetics and
Epistemology, M. Kieran and D. Lopes (eds), (Philosophical Studies Series (107), Springer,
requires that high-level properties be represented in E2. As such, high-level properties being represented in perception, and so included in the phenomenal content of such experiences, cannot be ruled out by Price’s account of attention in accounting for the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2 in the aesthetic case, and further, that the representation of high-level properties in E2 is the best explanation of there being a difference at all between E1 and E2.

2.2.3 Aesthetic Properties and Emotions

However, there is still a further strategy for resisting Siegel’s argument, one that applies to aesthetic properties such as being graceful, balanced, delicate, and so on. As such, the liberal view is troubled even when it is aesthetic properties at issue. We can run a Siegel-type phenomenal contrast argument for the aesthetic case. Let E1 be an experience before one has gained the recognitional capacity for graceful movements, and E2 be the experience one has after one has gained this recognitional capacity. For the liberal employing the phenomenal contrast argument, the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2 is due to a difference in properties represented. In E2 the property ‘graceful’ is represented in one’s visual experience, which changes the overall phenomenology of the experience of which E2 is a part. How might a conservative resist this conclusion?

According to Jesse Prinz, our emotional states are enough to warrant the attribution of aesthetic properties to, for example, a visually experienced scene before us. As Prinz puts it, ‘…we consider our emotional reactions to be good evidence for aesthetic properties, and that suggests that our aesthetic terms refer to the power to cause such properties.’ Thus the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2 is due to a difference in emotion. The phenomenology of E2 differs from E1 since one recognizes the movement as graceful, which has an associated emotional response. This emotional response has its own phenomenal character. As such emotional reactions can, by themselves, cause phenomenal differences. Thus we have another alternative explanation for the contrast that does not posit high-level properties. And while these options remain we cannot say with any certainty that the representation of high-level properties is the best explanation for the contrast. What is needed for the latter conclusion is to close off the alternatives, a task to which I shall now turn my attention.

While I do not doubt that there is some affective story relevant to our aesthetic judgments or appraisals, I do not think that the perceptual representation of high-level

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properties can be dispensed with in the analysis of this case. Again it is the causal story that troubles me. As we saw, Prinz thinks that our aesthetic terms refer to the power to cause aesthetic properties. But do our emotional reactions cause such properties to exist? Or are we merely reacting to the properties that are already seen in the scene before us? And if, as has been the case for all contrast arguments, there is no change in the low-level properties experienced, why should someone react emotionally in E2? Presumably the acquisition of a recognitional capacity is supposed to explain this, and causes an emotional response in us, but what are the rules concerning combinations of low-level properties such that one reacts emotionally in E2, after acquiring the recognitional capacity, and not in E1?

The acquisition of a recognitional capacity for ‘gracefulness’ does not seem to fill the gap in the aesthetic case given that we are still, according to the conservative, only enjoying low-level property experience in E2. It seems that for an emotional reaction to occur one must be having a different kind of visual experience in E2, even if in the end it is this emotional reaction that causes a phenomenal difference between E1 and E2. Thus again we find that a difference between E1 and E2 is predicated on there being a difference in the properties represented in those experiences. Without there being some difference in properties there is no reason to suppose that someone would react emotionally to the scene in E2 and not in E1. Compare the aesthetic case with Siegel’s pine example again. In the pine example one attends in E2 to low-level properties such as shape and colour, which one’s recognitional capacity has taught one to identify, but in the aesthetic case there are no strict rules for identifying gracefulness while enjoying only low-level property experience. I cannot point to gracefulness in the same way I can point to a pine. As such it seems that we need to posit high-level properties in order to make sense of there being an emotional reaction to the visually experienced scene.

Thus I believe the objections waged against the phenomenal contrast arguments can be met for the aesthetic case, and further, that high-level property perception is required to explain perceptual differences between E1 and E2, which in turn plays a role in there being a phenomenal difference. As such I think there are good reasons to think that aesthetic properties are represented in experience, and are within the ‘reach’ of phenomenal content, to use Bayne’s terms. And further, that having experiences of them fundamentally changes the way in which we perceive artworks.
2.4 Style Properties as High-Level Properties

2.4.1 Style properties as distinct from aesthetic properties

If what has been said so far is convincing, then aesthetic properties are the kind of properties that can be visually experienced. The question I now want to ask however is whether these are the only high-level properties of artworks that can be visually experienced. Are there other kinds of properties of artworks that are high-level but not necessarily aesthetic? If there were it would mean that we have a different kind of property that does not depend for its 'high-level-ness' on being essentially aesthetic. Do such properties exist?

Here is one suggestion - when looking at a painting one not only sees the property of being delicate or vivid, but also the property of being in the style of Picasso, or of being in an Abstract style. Thus one very important kind of property of artworks that can be visually experienced is stylistic. This is not to deny stylistic properties their aesthetic significance. As such I am trying to tread carefully so as not to imply that style properties are unrelated to aesthetic considerations, some of which are touched upon by Sibley and developed by others in discussions of critical practice and perception of art more generally. My claim is that style properties, while they have aesthetic significance, are not necessarily of the same sort as those commonly identified as aesthetic properties, even though they play a part in our perceptual experiences, and judgements of, artworks. Thus style properties, on my view, can be experienced in much the same way as aesthetic properties, and have just as much significance, but sometimes they are of a different sort than those traditionally thought of as aesthetic; and getting clearer on this will allow for a better analysis of the different kinds of properties one can represent in one’s perceptual experiences of artworks.

I am not convinced that style properties can be equated with aesthetic properties. It at least does not seem prima facie obviously true that style properties are necessarily aesthetic properties, even though they certainly have an aesthetic significance. To see why this is so I will first discuss the kinds of features of artworks we call stylistic, which I think will show that they are not necessarily aesthetic. I will then offer some reasons to resist the claim that style properties are necessarily aesthetic. In doing so I hope to show that there is a distinct kind of high-level property of artworks that can be visually experienced that has not received the attention it deserves.

I argued in Chapter One that style is fundamentally a way of doing something, where that way of doing something is highly personal. One motivation for adopting my account of style was that it allowed for subject matter to form part of an artist’s style. I claimed, along with Goodman, that whether a poet focuses on the fragile rather than the robust is a highly personal way of doing something to the artist, and can form part of her style. Thus subject matter is integral to artistic style. How does this help challenge the view that stylistic
properties are simply aesthetic properties? I do not claim to possess a clear definition of what makes a property aesthetic, but aspects of subject matter do not seem to fit neatly into the catalogue of the types of property that are often identified as aesthetic. Here are some of the concepts Sibley calls aesthetic: ‘unified, balanced, integrated, lifeless, serene, sombre, dynamic, powerful, vivid, delicate, moving, trite, sentimental, and tragic.’ I cannot offer any argument to the point that there is something all of these features have in common, which would allow for the makings of a definition, but it seems to me that the subject matter or content of an artwork is very different from the types of features identified by Sibley. If subject matter can be a feature of style then some stylistic features are very different from those features that are often identified as aesthetic.

Consider, for example, the work of photographer Diane Arbus (fig. 3). Arbus is known for photographing people who have been described as ‘deviant’ or ‘marginal’. While Arbus’s style can be described as tender and moving, that is, as having what we tend to think of as aesthetic properties, it is also importantly constituted by her choice of subject matter, and the way in which she deals with it. Thus a feature of Arbus’s style, and part of what identifies her as the artist, something which is highly personal to her, is her choice of subject matter. Furthermore, one could imagine another artist who focuses on the same subject matter as Arbus and yet whose photographs have entirely different aesthetic properties. As such aesthetic properties are distinct from subject matter while subject matter, and the way in which it is dealt with, that is the particular content of the work, can be a feature of style.

(Fig. 3) Arbus, *A young man in curls at home on West 20th Street NYC*, (1966)

Thus some style properties are not characteristically aesthetic. Hence, if style properties are high-level properties that can be visually experienced then at least some style properties constitute some other kind of high-level property that is perceptible in artworks,

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126 I would like to thank Keith Allen for this point and for pushing me to be clearer here.
and seeing this high-level property, like seeing any high-level property, can depend on a genuine piece of learning. Those who know Arbus’s work and know her style will perceive her work differently from the novice who simply sees that there is a certain subject matter without understanding its significance or seeing it as a style property of the work. The novice looking at the Arbus will not perceive the work as having the property of being in the style of Diane Arbus. The expert, however, will see that the work has this property and thus what it is like to perceive the work for her will be very different from what it is like to perceive the work for our novice, and yet this does not obviously depend on the representation of properties that are characteristically aesthetic.

A further reason to think that some style properties might be high-level but non-aesthetic is that sometimes what would typically be called a low-level or non-aesthetic property can be a style property. For example, an artist may use colour in a highly personal way, such that the use of colour becomes a way in which an artist does something. That is to say that the colour of the work becomes essentially a property of style. For example, Matisse’s disregard for the natural colour of objects was a feature of his style and indeed the general style category ‘Fauvism’. This highly personal use of colour, *this way of doing* something, seems characteristically non-aesthetic in nature. It is the focus on the highly personal way of doing something that marks this out as a feature of style, for of course ‘uses’ can be aesthetic e.g. using a sombre or harmonious colour combination. However, if using colour in this way is highly personal to an artist, and is part of her way of doing something, then it is not simply an aesthetic property, it is a property of individual style. Though this involves a low-level property, the way in which that property is used and presented is distinctly high-level and, in virtue of being used in a highly personal way, non-aesthetic insofar as it is now a feature of style. As such, when we gain the recognitional capacity to see those colours as essentially stylistic features, our visual experience changes.

The recognition of style, which can include the way in which a low-level property such as colour has been used, changes one’s visual experience to include the representation of high-level style properties. The person who is attuned to the style of an artist or a general style category sees those colours but also sees the style features, the way of using the colours, such that their visual experience goes beyond merely seeing that the work has those colours and shapes. Rather they see those colours and shapes differently, that is, as properties of style. Again the phenomenology of their experience differs from that of the novice, and this change is explained by a change in the visual properties experienced given that there is no change in low-level property perception. While the novice simply sees colours and shapes, the expert sees style. This, while it may not be a visual experience of aesthetic properties, seems to be a visual experience of high-level properties. Thus style properties, while they are

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127 I would like to thank Keith Allen for this example.
high-level properties, are not necessarily aesthetic given that some style properties can be properties such as shape and colour, i.e., non-aesthetic in nature.

2.4.2 Style Properties and Phenomenal Contrasts

Are style properties really genuine instances of high-level properties that can be perceptually represented if they are distinct from aesthetic properties? In order to motivate the thought that style properties can be perceptually represented we need to return to Kendall Walton’s ‘The Categories of Art’, which was discussed in Chapter One.\(^{128}\) As we saw, the paper was written with an eye to disposing of a certain kind of formalism, i.e. one that says that works are to be appreciated and valued merely on the basis of their perceptible properties alone. We also saw that, contra Sibley, Kendall Walton argues that aesthetic properties cannot be discovered merely by examining the works themselves. We need to know some other facts about the origins of works of art, and in particular what category they belong to. For example, one could perceive a work under the category PAINTING or ABSTRACT, or IN THE STYLE OF PICASSO’S ABSTRACT FIGURES. The thought then is that the category in which we perceive the work will affect which aesthetic properties it seems to have.\(^{129}\) Thus the perceptual experience of a work can be profoundly affected by the category under which the work is perceived. We also saw Walton support this with his Guernica example, which, for the purposes of this chapter and what has been discussed thus far, can be seen as a type of phenomenal contrast argument. One’s perception of Guernica in the PAINTING category is phenomenally different from one’s experience of it in the GUERNICA category. I think that something we can derive from Walton’s claims is that if one correctly perceives a work in a certain style category, which can be more or less precise, at least some of the work’s properties change. This is simply an extension of the claim that perceptual experiences of works vary with categories. Our experiences vary because perceiving a work under a category changes the properties we perceive in the work.

As we saw, perceiving ‘Guernica’ under the category PAINTING rather than under the fictional category GUERNICA significantly changes the aesthetic properties the work seems to have. Our experience of perceiving Guernica under the category GUERNICA will be phenomenologically different from our experience of the work under the category PAINTING, and what accounts for this difference is a difference in the properties visually experienced. When one perceives the work under the category PAINTING, one will have a visual experience of the high-level aesthetic property ‘vivid’ or ‘dynamic’ i.e., properties the

\(^{128}\) Walton, Kendall. ‘The Categories of Art’, pp. 142-157
\(^{129}\) Ibid, p. 143
experience of the work under the fictional category GUERNICA lacks. Accordingly perceiving a work under a certain style category will change the properties one visually experiences the work as having. But are style properties experienced, and are they high-level?

I think we can use the method of phenomenal contrast to show that they are. Perceiving 'Guernica' under no style category intuitively seems rather different to perceiving it under the category CUBISM. What accounts for this difference? The style category one perceives a work under changes one’s visual experience of the work to include style properties. In the same way in which perceiving the work in the correct category will allow one to perceive the aesthetic properties of a work, correctly perceiving a style category will allow one to perceive the individual stylistic properties of a work. And indeed one might think that a style category itself is a property that can be represented in perceptual experience. Walton claims that categories are perceptually experienced, which does not rule out that they are high-level properties represented in experience.

Acquiring knowledge of style on this account is like acquiring a new recognitional capacity, and this is indeed a genuine piece of learning. As Roger Scruton points out in a discussion of critical practice concerning music, ‘Knowledge of a piece of music may provide reasons (and not just causes) for my hearing it in a certain way.’\textsuperscript{130} Once one has the recognitional capacity to recognize certain styles, one’s current visual experience is phenomenologically different from the experience one had before one had that recognitional capacity. And this change in phenomenology is due to a change in the visual properties one now experiences. So the person without the recognitional capacity CUBISM really does see the painting differently from someone who has that recognitional capacity. This is because the latter person visually experiences the high-level stylistic properties, such as being in the style of CUBISM, and perhaps individual stylistic properties of the category, while the former does not.

Perhaps one way of supporting this argument is to refer to cases in which we get style categories wrong. In Chapter One I cited the example of a critic who described \emph{Woman in Sunlight} by Renoir as a woman whose body was depicted as bruised, as if it were rotting flesh, rather than as a woman whose body was dappled in sunlight and shadows.\textsuperscript{131} Thus the critic perceived the woman represented in the painting as having bruised and rotten flesh. Clearly this was not the effect Renoir was hoping for, as is evidenced by the title of the piece; but suppose we are familiar with Renoir’s methods of painting, and the style of Impressionism and its concern with the transience of light. Arguably there is a difference now between our experience of Renoir’s painting and the experience of someone who has not learnt to recognise these features. Just as the novice who begins to study Picasso comes


\textsuperscript{131} Rollins, ‘Neurology and the New Riddle of Pictorial Style’. p. 392
to see the aesthetic property ‘vivid’, the novice who comes to study Renoir will, withstanding any total lack of aesthetic concern, come to see the stylistic properties of Impressionism as perceptible in the work of Renoir. Acquiring stylistic sensitivity is like acquiring a new recognitional capacity that, in some cases, radically changes our perceptual experience of artworks. What changes is how we see the work. Equipped with our recognitional capacity, we perceptually represent the high-level properties of style. Perhaps we might even say that we literally see the Impressionism or, to go more fine-grained, that we see the ‘Renoir-ness’ of the painting.

We can also return to Jenefer Robinson’s Barnett Newman example discussed in Chapter One, which again can be framed as a contrast argument. One could plausibly imagine some novice stumbling into a Newman exhibition and thinking it was an exhibition for interior design ideas. What makes the difference between our novice’s experience of the canvas and the experience of a person who has the recognitional capacity for Barnett Newman’s style, call it, ‘BARNETT NEWMAN’? It seems plausible to say that these two people literally see the canvas differently and thus what it is like to see the canvas is also very different for them. Our novice does not see the canvas as having any style properties, nor any aesthetic properties, and nor, for that matter, any aesthetic significance whatsoever. Our expert, on the other hand, will see the aesthetic properties and will see the style properties. To use a similar phrase: the expert literally sees the ‘Barnett Newman-ness’ of the canvas, whereas the novice has no such visual experience. Thus using the notion of indiscernible canvases we can see that at base level, at the level of perceiving low-level properties, perhaps nothing changes between our novice’s visual experience and our expert’s visual experience. Thus what accounts for the difference in our novice and our expert’s experiences must be the lack of (for our novice) and the presence of (for our expert) high-level properties in visual experience. And at least some of those properties appear to be stylistic.

2.5 Resisting Alternatives Again

One might worry at this stage that one can simply rehearse the objections against high-level properties being perceptually represented that we saw previously, i.e., accounting for the phenomenal difference in terms of attention or emotional differences. However, I think there are good reasons to resist these alternatives. First, while differences in patterns of

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132 The example described a case of indiscernible canvases, one of which is a Barnett Newman painting and the other is a room plan.
133 We can compare our novice to Bayne’s visual agnosic. We might think that there is a phenomenal ‘layer’ missing for the novice, one that the expert has acquired through experience.
attention might work for stylistic properties such as subject matter, it will not account for those properties of style that are typically seen as low-level, albeit stylistic. This is because one’s attention does not cause the low-level properties to look different. In much the same way that one’s attention does not change the way a pine tree’s shape or colour looks, attention does not change the way properties such as colour or shape appear in the case of artworks. In the pine case one has learnt to attend to the low-level properties differently without any change in representational content; the trees do not look different, their shape and colour do not look different, rather one has learnt to focus on these properties in a different way.

However, in the style case the low-level properties do look different, the colours and shapes are properties of style, of a way of doing something, and are visually experienced in this way. While there is no change in the low-level properties, they come to look different in virtue of our seeing them as properties of style, as a way of doing something. These ways of doing something, which are highly personal, are visible in the work, and can be visually experienced. Hence, it is the properties represented in my visual experience that have changed rather than my attention being directed in some new way. Thus the phenomenal contrast cannot be explained by attentional differences.

What about emotional differences? As we saw it was unclear that emotional differences work to demonstrate that aesthetic properties are not represented. I think style properties put further pressure on this idea since in the style case it is not clear what we are emotionally responding to. While it is true that style properties have aesthetic significance, it’s not clear that they are always aesthetically evaluated or responded to in the same way as aesthetic properties. We saw that for Prinz emotional reactions are the litmus test for the presence of aesthetic properties, but this seems less plausible for the stylistic properties. While I may be moved by a vivid portrayal of loss, it sounds less plausible to be moved by the style of an artist, and some aspects of an artist’s style such as subject matter may have no emotional significance at all. Thus the emotional difference account of the phenomenal contrast looks implausible for stylistic properties.

But here is a possible objection to my account of stylistic properties as, at least sometimes, distinct from aesthetic properties, and my claim that we can perceive them.\textsuperscript{134} Take the aesthetic case again, if there is a phenomenal difference between E1 and E2, how can we know it is stylistic properties responsible for this contrast and not aesthetic properties? The concern is that it looks difficult to isolate style properties in a phenomenal contrast argument involving an aesthetic case. As such I can’t use the method of phenomenal contrast to argue for high-level style-property representation. At best I could say that there is a phenomenal difference but that this could be due to aesthetic or style

\textsuperscript{134}I would like to thank Heather Logue for this objection, and for helpful discussion.
properties, not style properties alone. And if I cannot isolate style properties as responsible it looks difficult for me to claim, using the method of phenomenal contrast, that they are a distinct kind of high-level property that can be perceptually represented. Thus the objection proceeds by denying the distinctness of aesthetic properties and style properties and, on that basis, puts pressure on my claim that style properties are perceptible. What I need to show is that style properties can make phenomenal differences all on their own, which would bolster my claim that they are distinct high-level properties that can be perceived.

One response I can make is to grant that the phenomenal contrast may not be solely due to the representation of style properties in perception. It may be due to aesthetic properties or a combination of both aesthetic and style properties. A better response would be to attempt to construct a phenomenal contrast argument that isolates stylistic properties as responsible for the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2. I think it is possible to construct one, and for convenience I will use the already discussed ‘Barnett Newman and the novice’ case. Let us re-imagine our novice stumbling into an art gallery containing a Barnett Newman painting. Add to this that our novice is now aware that they are in an art gallery and not an interior design exhibition. So, our novice now knows that the canvas before them is in fact an artwork. Knowing this, the novice understands that the painting has aesthetic significance, and they notice its aesthetic properties such as its balance, and the subtle changes of colour characteristic of Newman’s often-delicate compositions. Still, our novice does not know that this is a Barnett Newman painting, nor do they recognize his style.

Now let us run the phenomenal contrast case. E1 is the experience we have just been describing, that is before the novice acquires the recognitional capacity of Newman’s style but is capable of seeing that the canvas has aesthetic properties (our novice is not such a novice after all). Let E2 be the experience the novice has after they have learnt about Barnett Newman’s style; they have seen more of his works in different collections, they have some idea of Newman’s way of doing something. In short, they are able to recognise his style. Equipped with this recognitional capacity, it is intuitive to say that E2 differs phenomenally from E1, and this is not due to any representation of low-level properties, or aesthetic properties, since this case was constructed on the premise that these remain constant in both E1 and E2. Hence, the phenomenal difference must be accounted for by the perceptual representation of style properties.135

To conclude, I have argued that alternative explanations for the phenomenal contrast are unsatisfactory, and I have constructed a pair of experiences that isolate style properties as responsible for the phenomenal contrast. If my responses to the objections go

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135 This might also involve a better awareness of aesthetic properties or the way in which aesthetic properties are perceived since seeing a work in a particular style category may change the aesthetic properties the work seems to have. However, this is made available by perceptually experiencing the style properties first, and it is this visual experience of style properties that changes the overall phenomenology of the experience.
through then the perceptual representation of style properties is possible, and is not threatened by style properties being unable to make phenomenal differences all on their own. Further, if what I have said thus far is convincing, I believe there are some benefits to the conclusion that stylistic properties are represented in perception. The first is that it makes good sense of expertise. It gives support to the claim that art experts and those engaged in critical practice really do perceive works differently from those less experienced. Not only this, but experts also perceive works better than those with minimal knowledge or lack of recognitional capacities. Allowing for the representation of aesthetic and stylistic properties in perception lends support to this intuitive claim about expertise. Second, that experts perceive works differently makes sense of critical practice, that our perceptions of artworks can provide reasons for our aesthetic judgements and appraisals. If the novice and the critic experience the same properties, then there may be no substantive reason to claim that the critic’s judgement is more warranted. However, if the critic’s recognitional capacities are tuned into identifying, and so representing perceptually, high-level properties that the novice cannot, then it adds force to the claim that the critic is a better judge. Further, to anticipate a line of argument I will pursue throughout the next few chapters, if style properties are perceptible then it should come as no surprise that what we see a picture as depicting is affected by perception of style properties. Certain depictions challenge the eye, but this challenge becomes surmountable when one perceives them better, when one perceives them in their style. As such, the perception of stylistic properties can make sense of some people’s ability to see better than others what a picture depicts.

Thus, now that we have an understanding of the way in which style properties are perceived in pictures, we ought now to turn to the nature of pictorial experience itself to see how perceiving style can illuminate a theory of depiction. To do so will require a necessary excursion through the terrain of an alternative account of depiction, which I will argue against. However, first we must get clear on a phenomenon that is central to depiction, one that all perceptual theories of depiction make use of. I believe this phenomenon has yet to be adequately refined and understood. Thus the beginnings of the following chapter will explore the phenomenon in some detail until we arrive at an understanding that I think best captures its true nature and its place in a theory of depiction.
Chapter Three
Seeing-in and Resemblance

‘...Pictorial representation is a perceptual, more narrowly visual, phenomenon. Imperil the visual status of representation, and the visual status of the pictorial arts is in jeopardy.’

I begin this chapter with a warning from Richard Wollheim, who until recently has been thought to have developed the most persuasive account of the phenomenology of our pictorial experiences. The above comment is important to the framework within which I will develop an account of depiction. That framework is, as is advised by Wollheim, perceptual. That the nature of our pictorial experiences, and what secures success in depiction, has at its core an experience of seeing the depicted subject may seem trivial. But Nelson Goodman has, among other things, taught us much about representation in his Languages of Art, and his work reminds us that it is far from obvious that pictorial representation has a distinctly perceptual nature. One thing we learn from Goodman is that a theory of pictorial representation can be developed along symbolic, rather than perceptual, lines. Goodman’s Semiotic theory of depiction, which models the laws of pictorial representation on the laws of language, allows that a spectator standing in front of a representational picture need only apply these laws to determine what the picture depicts. As Wollheim puts it, about Goodman’s theory, ‘the grasp of representational meaning is fundamentally an interpretive, not a perceptual, activity.’

Safe to say that Wollheim disagrees, and the numerous objections to Goodman’s theory of depiction are testament to the importance of the perceptual nature of pictorial experience. Enumerating and assessing those objections would require an additional chapter, such is their force. I will take it that those objections press the Semiotic theory in ways that firmly establish the need to preserve the perceptual nature of pictorial representation; that looking, for example, at a picture’s title is not sufficient for depiction. Even though this looking might be an alternate species of pictorial identification, it is not what depiction fundamentally consists in. I heed Wollheim’s warning in this chapter, and develop an account of a visual phenomenon central to all perceptual theories of depiction. With Semiotic theories aside, I outline and argue against the most plausible alternative perceptual theory of depiction to my own. Pictorial representation is certainly a perceptual phenomenon, my task in this chapter is to give the phenomenon its most thorough analysis.

136 The first part of this chapter has been published as an article in the British Journal of Aesthetics. See: Bradley, Helen. ‘Reducing the Space of Seeing-in’, The British Journal of Aesthetics, vo. 54. No. 4, (Oxford University Press 2014), pp. 409- 424
138 Ibid, p. 397
3.1. Seeing-in

Central to the issue concerning what it is for a picture to be representational lies a special kind of perceptual capacity, namely seeing-in. It is seemingly uncontroversial to say that we see things in pictures. I can see a lion in a painting of an animal that can, all things being equal, be correctly described as a lion. What has become a matter of controversy, however, is the specific phenomenology attributed to seeing-in. One of the first attempts at elucidating this phenomenology comes from Ernst Gombrich in his *Art and Illusion.*

According to Gombrich, our visual experience of pictures is one that is illusory in nature. Thus, seeing a woman in a picture is, in various respects, like seeing that woman face to face. How is this possible? Gombrich claims that paintings are able to depict due to failings in our visual discrimination, which allow illusory effects to occur. Thus a painting of a landscape produces an illusion of seeing a landscape face-to-face, but, if this kind of illusion is to be produced, our experience of seeing O in a picture cannot involve an experience of seeing the design properties responsible for our seeing O, for that would ruin the illusion.

Gombrich uses the ‘duck-rabbit’ illusion to demonstrate this point. When looking at the illusion one can see it either as a rabbit or as a duck, but, crucially, one cannot see it as both a duck and a rabbit simultaneously. One may switch back and forth, and we might remember that therein lies a rabbit whilst we see the duck, but we cannot see both animals in the picture at the same time. Similarly in pictorial depictions we can see either subject or design but never both at the same time. Again one may switch back and forth, seeing design and then seeing subject, but one cannot have a visual experience of both at the same time.

However, Gombrich’s account is surely insufficient in accounting for all kinds of pictorial depictions. Do we undergo an illusory experience of face-to-face seeing when looking at abstract art? It does not seem as if we do. Moreover, even within straightforwardly figurative art, Gombrich’s account proves unsatisfactory given that subjects or items within the picture might be represented in unusual colours or at odd angles, precluding an illusory experience from ensuing. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that Gombrich’s own example of the duck-rabbit illusion fails to establish that design properties are not experienced. Dominic Lopes claims that the switches between seeing duck and then rabbit are better described as switches of contents rather than switches in design seeing. That is to say that switching between seeing rabbit and seeing duck does not preclude seeing how that animal has come to be depicted, which involves seeing design properties. The example does not show that one cannot, at one and the same time, see the rabbit and also see how the rabbit is depicted.

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139 Gombrich, E.H. *Art and Illusion.*
140 Ibid, pp. 4-5
141 Dominic Lopes, *Sight and Sensibility,* (Oxford University Press 2005), p. 31
Further, if our visual experiences of pictures match in such a way as to be indistinguishable from seeing those objects face to face, then it fails to give significance to pictures themselves, and the special kind of attention we give them. This concern is termed the puzzle of mimesis, which stems from, on the one hand, the thesis that to evaluate a picture as a picture is to evaluate it as eliciting experiences of the picture itself and as of the scene it depicts (Pictorial Evaluation Thesis) and, on the other, the thesis that pictures elicit experiences as of the scenes they depict and, as such, resemble in important respects face-to-face experiences of them (Mimesis Thesis). The puzzle is generated when these two theses are taken together, along with the fact that we do evaluate pictures differently from the way in which we would evaluate our experience of seeing the depicted scene face to face. Why should this be so, given the two claims? If our experiences of pictures match our experiences of objects seen face to face, as proposed by Gombrich, why should we value pictures and treat them differently, something which we standardly do? Lopes puts this concern nicely. Speaking of Van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes, he asks, ‘How, for example, can anyone be moved by a picture-induced experience of some old shoes unless they are also moved by an experience of the shoes seen face to face?’ Clearly we are moved by pictures in ways that we are not moved by ordinary visual experiences; as such Gombrich’s account cannot resolve the puzzle.

Having been found to be unsatisfactory, the task of defining seeing-in, and describing its phenomenology, was taken up by Richard Wollheim. For Wollheim, the phenomenology of our seeing-in experiences is characterised by what he terms twofoldness. Made up of one experience with two aspects, a recognitional and a configurational aspect, twofoldness demands of the viewer of a representational picture that he simultaneously sees the subject, what is depicted, and also the marked surface or design properties. Thus in order for a picture P to represent a subject S, a spectator must see S in P, which demands simultaneous attention to both marked surface and what is depicted. This, he claims, explains much of our appreciation of pictures. Thus we can see Wollheim’s theory as addressing the puzzle of mimesis outlined above.

I will say much more about Wollheim’s account of seeing-in below but it is important to point out that the supposed failure of Wollheim’s concept of twofoldness to adequately describe the nature of our seeing-in experiences has recently prompted a move towards an account of seeing-in that divides into kinds. This hinges on the idea that because pictures themselves are diverse, indeed pictorial art is something of a motley, an account of

142 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, p. 4
143 Ibid, p. 12
144 Ibid, pp. 20 - 21
145 Ibid, p. 20
seeing-in ought itself to be diverse in order to capture what is distinctive about pictorial depiction and representation. It is thus claimed that the phenomenology of an experience so central to depiction is much more complex than Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness can account for.

Dominic Lopes proposes to treat seeing-in as a multiple phenomenon. He thus suggests five ways of seeing-in that he feels do justice to the variety of pictorial representations. More recently Dan Cavedon-Taylor has argued that the space of seeing-in marked out by Lopes is incomplete, and proposes a sixth kind of seeing-in that fits neatly into the taxonomy. However, despite the contention that seeing-in admits of kinds, I will argue that the phenomenon of seeing-in, though certainly more complex than Wollheim suggests, does not divide in as many ways as Lopes and Cavedon-Taylor propose. In particular, I will show that the purported cases of pseudo design seeing do not demonstrate that actual design properties are not experienced, and as such these cases can be captured by the other ‘ways of seeing-in’ that Lopes identifies, notably Naturalism and Twofoldness. I also argue against the claim that Actualism is a distinct kind of seeing-in, and as such I conclude that the space of seeing-in ought to be significantly reduced. Thus this first part of the chapter seeks to refine the notion of seeing-in to ensure we have the correct understanding of the phenomenon before delving into a theory of depiction. Establishing the correct account of seeing-in is important since it will show the inadequacy of any theory of depiction that is not sensitive to its variations. This is, in part, the problem I pose for the Resemblance View of depiction, which is addressed in the second part of this chapter.

3.1.1 Twofoldness and Inflection

Let us begin by getting a little clearer on what both Wollheim and Lopes mean by twofoldness as a description of the phenomenology of seeing-in. Seeing-in occurs in many situations that are not representational such as seeing faces in clouds or dancers in marked walls, but seeing-in as applied to the pictorial arts is defined by Wollheim as a distinct kind of perception that is triggered in the presence of an artwork with a differentiated surface. When a surface is suitably marked, an experience, with a distinctive kind of phenomenology, will be elicited. Twofoldness, as we have seen, is the name given to this phenomenology, and it characterizes the experience one undergoes when before a representational picture. When looking at a suitably marked surface, according to Wollheim, we are visually aware at once of

147 Dominic Lopes, *Sight and Sensibility*.
the marked surface and of something in front of or behind something else. I call this feature of the phenomenology ‘twofoldness.’

What exactly is meant by simultaneous awareness? It has been pointed out in a recent paper by Bence Nanay that there is an ambiguity in the notion of awareness that results in an ambiguity in the notion of twofoldness, which leaves it open to interpretation. Nanay suggests two interpretations, both of which we have reason to think can be attributed to Wollheim:

(i) We consciously attend to both the depicted object and to some properties of the surface.

(ii) We perceptually represent both the depicted object and some properties of the picture surface (while we may or may not attend to them).

The reason that both of these readings can be attributed to Wollheim is because each is supported by one of Wollheim’s two arguments in favour of the twofoldness of seeing-in. The first argument from the perceptual constancy of pictures seems to support reading (ii). According to Wollheim, upon viewing a picture one could move around from what one might call the ‘optimal viewing point’ (perhaps directly in front of, and central to, the picture), yet when one makes these moves it does not necessarily bring about perceptual distortion. Wollheim claims the reason for this constancy lies in the spectator’s awareness, not only of what is represented, but also the surface qualities of the picture.

However, while an awareness of surface qualities may account for constancy, it does not entail that we are aware of the design properties of the picture. Indeed this is a point that Dominic Lopes makes against Wollheim’s view, which leads Lopes to divide seeing-in into different kinds that depend, in part, on the presence of design properties, and conscious attention to them, in our seeing-in experience. However, this point only undermines twofoldness in sense (i), it says nothing about sense (ii), which, as Nanay points out, Wollheim can be held to endorse given the argument from perceptual constancy, which seems to appeal to the concept of twofoldness in sense (ii).

But Wollheim can also be read as endorsing twofoldness in sense (i), and as such the objection works against it. He can be read as endorsing twofoldness in sense (i) because of his second argument in favour of the twofold character of seeing-in, which appeals to the fact that a great deal of our appreciation of pictures is bound up with seeing how the surface is marked. We see not only the subject represented but also how that subject has been represented in virtue of the brush strokes and expanses of colour on the picture surface.

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150 Nanay, Bence. ‘Inflected and Uninflected Experience of Pictures’, In Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction, Abell & Bantinaki (eds), (Oxford University Press 2010), pp. 181 - 207
152 Ibid.
Thus, if we are to fully appreciate and evaluate representational pictures our attention must be twofold and, crucially, twofold in sense (i). This shows how Wollheim’s view can solve the puzzle of mimesis since pictures will not, on the basis of our attention to design features in our seeing-in experience, elicit experiences that are indistinguishable from seeing the object face to face.

With these two readings in place it is important for the purposes of this chapter to point out that Lopes attributes twofoldness in sense (i) to Wollheim. Lopes writes that:

‘Wollheim holds that we always see a picture’s design at the same time as we see in it the scene it depicts: the one interpenetrates the other in a single experience. Design seeing transforms the content of seeing-in so that it no longer matches the content of seeing the scene face to face. Design is ‘recruited’ into the depicted scene so that the scene no longer looks the way it would when seen face to face.’ 153

While it is clear that there is a weaker construal of twofoldness available to Wollheim, and I do not wish to advocate one over the other as the correct reading, the reading of twofoldness in sense (i) that Lopes uses will be the focus of this chapter. This strong sense of twofoldness has come to be termed inflected seeing-in, and much of the recent literature on this topic has been concerned with understanding exactly what this kind of seeing-in is.154 I will spend the remainder of this section elucidating this notion since it is crucial to understand it in a way that fits with what Lopes says about the phenomenon before we can say anything useful about the proposed division of seeing-in. This is because that very division is motivated by the supposed failure of inflected seeing-in (or just twofoldness for Lopes) to account for all pictorial experience.

Inflected seeing-in is marked off from other kinds of seeing-in in virtue of the kinds of features or properties, and our awareness of them, that figure in the seeing-in experience. Dominic Lopes proposes a distinction between two kinds of features of pictures.155 On the one hand there are design properties, which are those visible properties of a picture in virtue of which the surface depicts an object or scene. On the other hand there are surface features, which can perhaps be characterised as all the other visible properties of a picture that are not properties in virtue of which a picture depicts an object or scene.156

According to Robert Hopkins, paradigm cases of inflection are those in which an awareness of design properties transforms other aspects of pictorial experience.157 Thus inflection challenges, as Hopkins puts it, ‘the key expectation that in principle the

153 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, p. 40
154 See, for example, Robert Hopkins, ‘Inflected Pictorial Experience: Its Treatment and Significance’. In Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction, Abell & Bantinaki (eds), (Oxford University Press 2010), pp. 151 - 180, and Bence Nanay, ‘Inflected and Uninflected Experience of Pictures’, pp. 181 - 207
155 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, pp. 35 - 36
156 Examples might include the grain of the canvas or the sheen of the paint.
experienced design and the thing seen in it can be characterized without reference to each other. This fits with some of Lopes’s claims about pictures supporting a twofold seeing-in experience. For example, he claims that we see the design as ‘undergirding’ the depicted scene, and he cites Michael Podro’s claim that design is ‘recruited’ into the depicted scene. If inflection is possible, design and depicted object cannot be pulled apart and characterized independently of one another.

What exactly does it mean though to see a design undergirding the depicted scene? Does it just mean a mere awareness or a causal influence of design on the whole picture? Hopkins does not think so. Given that a key motivation of proponents of inflection is to use it to explain our appreciation of pictures, these theorists must have something stronger than mere awareness in mind. Hopkins considers a series of statements that purport to capture what proponents of inflection mean and arrives at the following definition:

**Inflection**: Sometimes, what is seen in a surface includes properties a full characterization of which needs to make reference to that surface’s design (conceived as such).

These properties, namely inflected properties, do not reduce to design properties but they are properties visible in a surface that need characterising by reference to the properties of the surface that sustain seeing-in. Thus when inflection occurs, an awareness of design does not just cause one to see something in it, rather the scene seen in ends up possessing features that cannot but be characterized by reference to the design. Design interpenetrates the scene. Hopkins claims an example of inflected pictorial experience is Rembrandt’s sketch for the posthumous etching of Jan Cornelisz Sylvius (Fig. 4). Talking of the sketch, Hopkins notes that our experience of looking at the picture has a double content, of seeing both the pastor and the ink marks on the surface of the picture and in seeing that the sketch portrays movement of the hand, Hopkins writes that:

‘The upward thrust of the hand is clearly visible. But to see it one must see the ink strokes which depict the hand as themselves driving upwards. Indeed the hand seems to be both body part and rising splash of ink…Thus what is seen in the picture is a hand composed of rising ink. Since what is seen-in needs characterizing in part by reference to properties of the picture’s design, prima facie what is seen in the sketch is an inflected property.’

158 Ibid.
159 Lopes, *Sight and Sensibility*, p. 128.
161 Hopkins, ‘Inflected Pictorial Experience’, p. 156
162 Ibid, p. 158
Importantly for proponents of inflection, this means that what is seen in a pictorial surface cannot be something that can be seen face to face, since only pictures can sustain seeing-in experiences of objects or scenes that possess features that involve reference to design. As Hopkins notes,\textsuperscript{164} this allows Lopes to use the notion of inflection to solve the puzzle of mimesis. According to Lopes, inflection is the answer to the puzzle\textsuperscript{165} since, although pictures do resemble their objects in certain respects, inflection changes the phenomenology of the visual experience such that it differs in a very significant respect from face-to-face seeing. The difference is that objects and scenes in pictures possess inflected properties, while objects and scenes seen face to face could not be seen to have those properties. This explains why we value the two kinds of experience differently and thus the puzzle is solved.

We now have an understanding of inflected seeing-in, which for Lopes is simply twofoldness. Hence, when I use the term twofoldness in what follows, I will mean twofoldness in Lopes’s sense, as inflected seeing-in. We can now turn to Lopes’s arguments for seeing-in as a diverse phenomenon.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, pp. 165 - 166
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid, p. 192
3.1.2. Ways of Seeing-in

By conceiving of twofoldness in the foregoing sense, as inflected seeing-in, arguing for twofoldness as the definitive phenomenology of seeing-in becomes very difficult. One problem in particular immediately presents itself, and it is this problem that motivates the pluralist turn with regard to seeing-in. If all representational seeing involves twofoldness then it is clear that there are certain kinds of pictures that cannot be representational. Such pictures include, though perhaps are not limited to, trompe l’oeil pictures, which repel rather than attract attention to their surfaces as marked. Trompe l’oeils, then, are non-representational pictures.

This, unsurprisingly, has struck many people as an uncomfortable consequence of twofoldness. Indeed Wollheim himself seems to acknowledge that the result is rather counterintuitive, writing that: ‘No-one (I find) will take it on trust from me that, say, trompe l’oeil paintings are not representations…’ 166 As such, recent work on seeing-in has proposed to treat our visual experience of trompe l’oeil pictures as a markedly different kind of seeing-in experience from twofoldness. With one division in place, the possibility space of seeing-in, including its phenomenological description, is thrown wide open.

In his Sight and Sensibility, Lopes proposes a division of seeing-in across two axes.167 On one axis seeing-in divides between illusory seeing-in, notably trompe l’oeil, and non-illusory seeing-in, namely pictures that demand twofold attention. To be clear, the relevant sense of illusory for Lopes describes pictures that engender an experience that is phenomenologically indistinguishable from seeing the depicted object face to face. Along the other axis, seeing-in divides between being distinct from design seeing, again trompe l’oeil fits here, and being doubled with design seeing, again pictures demanding twofold attention slot in here. Filled out thus far the varieties of seeing-in can be shown in Table 1 below:

Table 1. Ways of seeing-in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seeing-in</th>
<th>Illusionistic</th>
<th>Non-illusionistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divided from design seeing</td>
<td>Trompe-l’oeil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubled with design seeing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Twofoldness</td>
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166 Wollheim, ‘On Pictorial Representation’, p. 217
167 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, pp. 39 - 43
Lopes fills the table with three more ways of seeing-in. Firstly, he proposes that some pictures, though they are not illusory, still divide from design seeing.\textsuperscript{168} That is, one cannot see anything in them whilst one is seeing their design as a design. However, in such cases one sees the surface of the picture as a surface even when one is seeing what is depicted. This means that the seeing-in experiences engendered by these pictures are phenomenally distinguishable from face-to-face seeing. As Cavedon-Taylor puts it, ‘when seeing-in accompanies seeing a picture’s surface, but not its design properties, one finds a trompe l’oeil-like inability to appreciate how seeing-in is supported by the picture, but one also finds a twofold-like double-awareness’.\textsuperscript{169} Lopes notes that this fits with Kenneth Clark’s personal story, cited by Gombrich, of viewing Velázquez’s \textit{Las Meninas}. Clark tried to stalk the illusion by first standing incredibly close to the painting and then slowly stepping back so that he might try and pin down the moment at which the marks and configurations transformed into visions, but as much as he tried he could not see both configuration and vision at the same time.\textsuperscript{170} Thus the spectator here is not undergoing an illusory experience of face-to-face seeing but nor is he having a twofold experience. Lopes terms this way of seeing-in ‘Naturalism’.

Cases of Naturalism seem best explained as instances not just of surface seeing as distinct from design seeing but of surface seeing where our attention to design is not conscious. We always see the surface of the picture when we see something in it; however we do not see its design as a design. This seems to be captured by Lopes’s claim that:

‘When we look at a picture, we normally see in it the scene it depicts, but we may also see its design as a design. Of course, there is a sense in which we always see a picture’s design when we see things in it, for we always see a scene in a picture by seeing the picture face to face. It is only in virtue of seeing the configuration of marks on its surface, and being sensitive to visible changes in them, that we see anything at all in the picture. However, seeing a pictorial design face to face does not entail seeing the design as a design—it does not entail…design seeing.’\textsuperscript{171}

Thus we see the pictorial design face to face, and we are not undergoing an illusion due to surface seeing, but we do not see the design as a design.

Perhaps seeing-in experiences that are Naturalistic could be identified with the weaker sense of \textit{twofoldness} discussed earlier, that is as perceptually representing both the depicted object and some properties of the surface (while we may or may not attend to them). Indeed the weaker construal might be some kind of common denominator between

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid, p. 38
\textsuperscript{170} Gombrich, \textit{Art and Illusion}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{171} Lopes, \textit{Sight and Sensibility}, p. 28.
all the ways of seeing-in identified by Lopes. However, one might worry that the weaker construal does not distinguish enough between trompe l'oeil and Naturalism since, as Nanay points out, the weaker sense does not exclude the possibility that we represent the surface properties of trompe l'oeil without being aware of them. However, while trompe l'oeil paintings can engender an experience that is phenomenologically indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing, Naturalistic pictures cannot produce this illusory experience because they always double with surface seeing. Thus while the weaker construal may be some kind of common denominator, and Naturalism seems to share some features with it, I will continue to use the term Naturalism in order to be clear that it describes a way of seeing-in distinct from both twofoldness (in Lopes’s sense) and trompe l'oeil.

It is also important to point out that the difference between Naturalism and twofoldness seems to be a difference in the role of design properties in explaining why one has the seeing-in experience one does. In cases of twofoldness, the explanation shows up in the phenomenology of one’s seeing-in experience; one sees the design as a design, and one sees those design properties as undergirding one’s seeing-in experience. Whereas in cases of Naturalism the explanatory features do not show up in the phenomenology of one’s seeing-in experience; we do not see the design as a design. However, the design properties still explain why one has the seeing-in experience. Thus there is a difference between Naturalism and twofoldness at the level of explanation, that is, as a difference in what actually explains our seeing-in experience and what we see as explaining, or as responsible for, our seeing-in experience. I will say more about this in section 3.1.3.

Secondly, Lopes identifies cases where the content of seeing-in transforms design seeing itself. Twofoldness describes the way in which design seeing informs seeing the subject, but can seeing the subject inform design seeing? Lopes uses the example of the famous image of the Dalmatian sniffing the ground (fig. 2 in Chapter Two) to show how this can occur. When looking at the image for the first time it appears to you as an arrangement of unrelated black blotches in no particular configuration. One does not see anything in it, but suddenly an image of a Dalmatian sniffing the ground comes forth from the mass of black blotches. Now one sees the Dalmatian in the picture.

However, the contour cannot be described as a design property since, according to Lopes, ‘the design features…must be visible independently of seeing anything in the picture’. But seeing the subjective contour of the dog, seeing the design, relies on seeing

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172 I would like to thank an anonymous referee at the British Journal of Aesthetics for suggesting this.
174 Perhaps this might speak in favour of talking in terms of twofoldness (in Lopes’s terms), Naturalism, and trompe l’œil, rather than of different concepts of twofoldness. However, it is important to acknowledge that, on the weaker reading, there may be some commonalities between Naturalism and trompe l’œil.
175 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, pp. 40 - 42
176 Ibid.
the dog in the picture. If we do not see the dog in the picture we cannot see the contour. It therefore cannot be a design feature. Consequently, since the contour seems to appear as if it is a design feature when really there is no design seeing occurring, this is a case in which seeing-in is accompanied by an experience of non-actual design properties or pseudo-design seeing. Lopes terms this way of seeing-in ‘Pseudo-twofoldness’.

The final way of seeing-in that Lopes identifies is inserted into the table with a question mark next to it, which perhaps demonstrates that it is not clear that it is indeed a genuine case of seeing-in. Still, Lopes makes an intuitive case for its place therein. This kind of seeing-in is illusory yet doubles with seeing design properties, and concerns the idea that a picture can depict what it is. Lopes gives the example of Jasper Johns’s paintings of targets, in which the painting itself is a target. Thus seeing the target in the painting is illusory in Lopes’s sense since our visual experience of it is phenomenally indistinguishable from seeing a target face to face, but it also doubles with seeing the picture’s design since one sees the surface of the painting, which includes all the properties in virtue of which we see the target, and those properties are also properties of the target itself. To use Lopes’s example, if the surface of the painting is crumbly or garish then so is the surface of the target: ‘We could not see properties of one without seeing the other’. Hence the design properties are actual properties of what is seen in the surface. Lopes terms this way of seeing-in ‘Actualist’. The table filled out with these last three appears as follows:

Table 2. *Ways of seeing-in*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seeing-in</th>
<th>Illusionistic</th>
<th>Non-illusionistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divided from design seeing</td>
<td><em>Trampe-l’oeil</em></td>
<td>Naturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pseudo-twofoldness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubled with design seeing</td>
<td>Actualism?</td>
<td><em>Twofoldness</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

177 Ibid, pp. 42 - 43
178 Ibid.
3.1.3. Reducing the Space of Seeing-in

What are we to make of Lopes’s case for *pseudo-twofoldness* as a way of seeing-in that doubles with seeing pseudo design properties? Lopes suggests that seeing the contour that emerges from the Dalmatian picture is not a design property itself, and I find myself in agreement here since there is no real contour on the pictorial surface. Furthermore, according to Lopes, design properties must be visible independently of seeing anything in the picture. But in the Dalmatian case, seeing the contour relies on seeing the dog. However, something Lopes says throws suspicion on the claim that we do not experience actual design properties when looking at the Dalmatian image. Lopes notes that the Dalmatian image is a paradigm example of what he calls ‘a more widespread phenomenon’, namely seeing subjective contours. This, he remarks, can be deliberately exploited by artists and picture-makers, and can form part of an artist’s resources. In this sense pictures can be designed so that a subjective contour emerges.

However, if a picture is so designed, then part of seeing the subjective contour, and therefore seeing the dog in the picture, must rely on seeing the design properties of the picture. When trying to explain why the image depicts the dog it does not seem that we are in any doubt as to what makes this so. It is the arrangement of black spots. Images like the Dalmatian image are not like the Rorschach inkblots, designed to mould subjectively into pictures that vary for each person who looks at them. What can be seen in the Dalmatian image is fixed by the way the black mass is arranged, even if the configuration is not seen straight away. Thus although one cannot see the contour initially it does not mean that the black mass is not informing our eventually seeing it. Consequently the fact that the contour is not a design property, despite its appearing as one, does not show that we are not undergoing a twofold experience of seeing-in.

However, one might argue that even though there may be genuine design properties available in the Dalmatian case, there does seem to be a difference between *pseudo-twofoldness* and *twofoldness* proper that rests on what I described as a difference at the level of explanation. One might argue that in cases such as the Dalmatian image we seem to have a level of explanation that does not figure in the phenomenology of the seeing-in experience; we do not see the actual design properties (the black spots) as undergirding our seeing-in experience. What we see as responsible for our seeing-in experience is a subjective contour, but that subjective contour is not an actual design property. Thus our seeing-in experience of the Dalmatian image cannot be a case of *twofoldness* proper since it is not a seeing-in experience that involves seeing genuine design properties.

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179 Ibid, p. 41
180 Ibid, p. 42
Hence there is a phenomenological difference between *pseudo-twofoldness* and *twofoldness* proper, even if there is no real difference in what actually explains our seeing-in experience i.e., actual design properties such as black spots in the Dalmatian image and, say, brush marks in a painting. In order to demonstrate that *pseudo-twofoldness* is in fact an instance of *twofoldness* proper, albeit a more complex instance, it needs to be shown that there is no substantial difference at the level of phenomenology. The question then is whether there really is such a large phenomenological difference between pseudo-twofold and twofold seeing-in. In other words, can the seeing-in experience in the Dalmatian case be inflected?

Granted that the configuration of black spots is responsible for our seeing-in experience and indeed sustains it but, as we have seen, a genuine instance of *twofoldness* requires much more than this. *Twofoldness* demands conscious attention to design and depicted subject, where design is recruited into the scene and inflects the illustrative content; we see the design as a design. What do we see in the Dalmatian image? I think that once we have the seeing-in experience it can be described as inflected. For it is not just that we see a dog in the picture, rather we see a dog as composed of black spots. We see its leg as defined by a mass of blackness, and the shadow it casts in the same way. We see that it is pointed towards the ground and sniffing in virtue of the upward thrust of the left part of the black configuration, which creates the terrain. The subjective contour is only a part of a larger experience of inflected seeing-in. Thus although the subjective contour may not be a design property it does not show that our seeing-in experience is not inflected by other, genuine, design properties. If what inflection requires is seeing something in a surface that has properties that need to be characterized by reference to the surface’s design, then the Dalmatian image seems like a genuine case, even if seeing the design depends on seeing the dog.

Does it matter that seeing the design of the Dalmatian image depends on seeing the dog? I think we ought to question Lopes’s insistence that design features must be visible independently of seeing the thing depicted by his own lights. On Lopes’s conception of *twofoldness*, which is inflected seeing-in, inflected properties are precisely those that straddle the divide between properties belonging to the picture surface and those that belong to the object or scene seen in. Thus while the seeing-in experience is not always quick to come about, and indeed we cannot experience the black spots as design properties without also seeing the dog, this does not show that when the seeing-in experience occurs we are not undergoing a twofold experience of both design properties and object depicted. *Twofoldness* requires seeing a design (conceived as such) and subject depicted, which in this case can only occur once we see the dog. In fact we ought to expect this if inflection is possible since it

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181 I would like to thank Paul Noordhof and Ema Sullivan-Bissett for insisting that I be clearer about this.
challenges what Hopkins described as the ‘key expectation’ that, in principle, experienced design and the thing seen in it can be characterized without reference to each other. The idea of inflection suggests that this is not always possible, and in the case of the Dalmatian image the two are inextricably bound up.

Therefore, since the fact that a subjective contour is not a design property does not entail that one is not undergoing a twofold, inflected, seeing-in experience, pseudo-twoworldness collapses into twoworldness proper. As such it belongs in the bottom right side of the table since it is not illusory (in Lopes’s sense) and it doubles with seeing design properties. Though it may be a more complex instance of twoworldness given the presence of a non-actual design property in the seeing-in experience, this does not show that it is significantly different to a twofold experience in Lopes’s sense.

What can we say about Actualism? As we saw, Lopes offered an example of paintings that might engender Actualist seeing-in. The example was Jasper Johns’s target paintings, which engender a visual experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from seeing a target face to face. Thus the painting is illusory in Lopes’s sense, but it also doubles with seeing the picture’s design since one sees the surface of the painting, which includes all the properties in virtue of which we see the target, and those properties are also properties of the target itself. Thus the design properties are actual properties of what is seen in the surface.

However, it is not clear that a visual experience of Johns’s painting is a seeing-in experience, and Cavedon-Taylor points out a potential worry in a footnote to his paper ‘The Space of Seeing-in’.182 The concern is that, when we look at Johns’s painting, what we actually see is just a target and not, in addition, a depiction of a target. Indeed Lopes remarks that, ‘pure actualism may entail the objectionable supposition that a picture may depict what it is’ 183 but perhaps this only speaks against pure Actualism. According to Cavedon-Taylor, an example John Hyman discusses might be a less contentious case of Actualism.184 The example is one of Hogarth’s self-portraits in which one sees Hogarth painting a comic muse. Actual blobs of paint depict the blobs of paint on the artist’s palette. Although there may be no distinction between the depicted blobs of paint and the actual blobs of paint this does not prevent the painting as a whole from being an image so long as the area containing the blobs of paint is not, according to Hyman, ‘considered as a self-sufficient whole’.185 Thus the painting can depict the blobs of paint but only in a larger context.186

Perhaps, then, Actualism is a genuine way of seeing-in if it is engendered only by a part of a picture. Indeed Lopes proposes that, ‘seeing in a picture need not be purely trompe

182 Cavedon-Taylor, ‘The Space of Seeing-in’, p. 274 (Footnote 15)
183 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, p. 45
185 Ibid
186 Hyman writes that, ‘if we excised it from the painting it would cease to depict anything at all.’ Ibid
l'œil, naturalistic, pseudo-twowfold, twofold, or actualist" and Cavedon-Taylor agrees. This motivates the idea that variety among seeing-in makes for a variety of seeing-in within pictures. Perhaps Actualism is a phenomenon that occurs only in regions of pictures, which would allow images that engender this kind of seeing-in to be depictions. Thus while pure Actualism may be objectionable, Actualist seeing-in in the context of a picture that admits of various forms of seeing-in is perhaps not so contentious.

This does indeed sound more palatable, and appears to make sense of an interesting phenomenon where a picture depicts using the very same materials depicted. However, I think there is still a problem with Actualism concerning where it is supposed to belong in the table of ‘ways of seeing-in’, and the features it is supposed to enjoy. Actualism is described as a seeing-in experience that doubles with design seeing and is an experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing, which warrants it being subsumed under illusionistic. It seems odd though to describe Actualism as illusionistic since one is not having an experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing; one is, so to speak, face-to-face seeing.

Let us take the Hogarth portrait as our example again since it appeared to be a less contentious case of Actualism. According to Lopes’s characterisation of Actualism, when we look at Hogarth’s painting, or at least at the region that depicts the blobs of paint, we have an experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from seeing blobs of paint face to face. But given that Actualism is also characterised as a seeing-in experience that doubles with seeing design properties that are actual properties of the subject depicted, namely actual blobs of paint, it seems that we cannot describe our experience as illusory. What we see are actually blobs of paint. These are the design properties that figure in our visual experience and belong to the object depicted. Thus we acknowledge them both as design properties and as properties belonging to the depicted object. But describing them as illusory does not seem quite right since we are not having an experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing; we are face-to-face seeing. Thus Actualism cannot be classed as an instance of seeing-in that is illusionistic.

However, with the illusory aspect removed, perhaps Actualism might count as an instance of twofoldness, that is, as a seeing-in experience that is non-illusionistic and doubles with seeing design properties. Lopes’s twofoldness is inflected seeing-in where what is seen in a surface includes properties that must involve reference to that surface’s design (conceived as such). Perhaps, then, Actualism fits the bill. However, this move is potentially blocked if we remember that inflected seeing-in involves inflected properties, which cannot be represented in face-to-face experience. This provided the basis for Lopes’s solution to the puzzle of

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187 Lopes, *Sight and Sensibility*, p. 45
188 Cavedon-Taylor, ‘The Space of Seeing-in’, p. 274 (Footnote 15)
mimesis, but in cases of Actualism we are not undergoing an experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing. Instead we are actually face-to-face seeing. Hence the design properties, which are actual properties of the subject depicted, might not count as inflected.  

One might think that this can be resolved by further appeal to the likelihood that a single picture will admit of varieties of seeing-in. As such, seeing an object in a picture, which has Actualist elements in a region of the pictorial surface, will not collapse into face-to-face seeing. This might leave room for the claim that the kinds of design properties attributed to Actualism—ones that we see as actual properties of the object one sees in the surface—are inflected properties and thus Actualism can be subsumed under twofoldness. Whether a proponent of inflection might wish to acknowledge these kinds of properties as inflected properties is a question I leave unanswered. Discussion of the notion of inflection and the extent to which pictures are inflected is ongoing and thus any answer I could give here may seem premature. What I hope to have shown in this section is that Actualism might, at worst, fail to count as a genuine kind of seeing-in if one struggles to see a place for it at all in the taxonomy. At best, it is an instance of twofoldness and should thus be confined to the bottom right of the table drawn up by Lopes. Thus while Actualism might be a striking feature of some pictures, it should not hold its own place within the space of seeing-in.

3.1.4 Pseudo-Actualism

Do these five ways exhaust the possibility space of seeing-in? Cavedon-Taylor suggests that Lopes’s taxonomy leaves out a sixth kind of seeing-in. Prompted by the thought that one would expect the possibility space of seeing-in to be symmetrically structured, Cavedon-Taylor identifies a gap in the table drawn up by Lopes, specifically the gap between trompe l’oeil and Actualism. He proposes that this putative variety of seeing-in would mirror its counterpart on the right hand side of the table, namely pseudo-twofoldness. Thus we should expect that this variety has Actualist elements, just as pseudo-twofoldness has

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189 One point worth noting, which I would like to thank Peter Lamarque for, is that one might think that the blobs of paint on the canvas are indeed different from the blobs of paint we see in the picture. That the blobs of paint in the depiction are part of the work of art, and as such cannot be identical to the blobs of paint on the canvas, seen as merely blobs of paint. If this is true then we have a case of seeing-in, of seeing blobs of paint in the picture. However, even if one thinks this there are still troubles about where to place Actualism in Lopes’s table, since this is not obviously a case of illusory seeing-in, which means it is better described as an inflected pictorial experience. Describing it as inflected, however, might prove troublesome for the view of Actualism as illusionistic. As such the notion of Actualism still proves problematic for the space of seeing-in as carved out by Lopes.

190 I would like to thank an anonymous referee at the British Journal of Aesthetics for pressing me to expand the discussion of Actualism.

191 Cavedon-Taylor, ‘The Space of Seeing-in’
twofoldness elements, and that it is illusionistic, and thus divides from design seeing. Furthermore, just as pseudo-twofoldness involves an experience of subjective contours, of seeing design properties that are not in fact there, so too will this proposed variety of seeing-in. From this Cavedon-Taylor concludes that it is plausible that the sixth variety of seeing-in will fit the following description:

1) Seeing-in is accompanied by a non-veridical experience of design properties (i.e. seeing-in is accompanied by experiencing the picture to have design properties it lacks).

2) The design properties that accompany seeing-in belong to what is seen in the picture.

As such he terms this sixth variety 'Pseudo-actualism'.

Cavedon-Taylor thinks there are pictures that elicit this kind of seeing-in experience, and he appeals to the familiar figure, which was discussed in Chapter Two (fig. 1), of the Kanizsa triangle to demonstrate this. Presented with three dots spaced equidistant from each other with small angles cut from them, along with three small angles in an opposite configuration, our perception supplies lines and organizes the configuration into triangles. Not only this, but our perception organizes them in such a way as to create depth, tone, and brightness where really there are no such features. The ‘top’ triangle formed by the dots seems closer and brighter than the one formed by the three angles, and it also appears to have a contour. As such we are seeing design properties that are not in fact there and, furthermore, we see them as belonging to the triangle that we see in the picture. Consequently we have a purported case of pseudo-actualism since what we see are not design properties proper, so divide from design seeing, yet the non-veridical seeing of these design properties presents them in our visual experience as being identical with what is seen in the picture’s surface.

Cavedon-Taylor’s example is appealing and further demonstrates the complexity of our seeing-in experiences. However, it is not clear that cases of pseudo-actualism do not involve seeing genuine design properties, even if we do not attend to them. The concern I have is that the non-veridical experience of design properties does not establish that design properties are not figuring in our seeing-in experience at all. Although the subjective contours may not be design properties this does not exclude the configuration of the parts of the triangle that are design properties, namely the cut out circles and angles, from figuring in our seeing-in experience. The reason our eyes are prompted to supply lines to the configuration so as to produce the image of two overlapping triangles is because the relevant parts of the picture have been designed in a way that produces this result. It is our experience.

192 Ibid, p. 276
193 Ibid.
of these design properties that is responsible for our seeing the triangles. Without an experience of seeing these design properties the seeing-in experience of the two triangles would not be engendered.

However, although genuine design properties do figure in our seeing-in experience it is not clear that our seeing-in experience is inflected. Furthermore, it is not clear that we see even the non-actual design properties as inflected properties. The design properties, although they explain why the seeing-in experience is engendered, do not show up in the phenomenology of our seeing experience. We do not see the design as a design. Thus the level of description is limited to what actually explains our seeing-in experience rather than what we see as explaining it. As such the seeing-in experience does not exhibit a twofold character in Lopes’s sense.

What does seem to be the case, however, is that one is visually representing the features of the surface, the design properties, even where one cannot attend to them at the same time one is seeing the triangles in the picture. In fact it is quite difficult to look at the Kanizsa triangles and see only the configuration. The recognitional aspect of seeing-in constantly re-asserts itself almost as soon as we have tried to silence it. Furthermore, it seems almost impossible to see the subjective contour as a design property whilst also seeing the triangles. So even a non-actual design property, which is supposed to provide a phenomenological difference between pseudo-actualism and Actualism, cannot be seen at the same time one sees the triangles. Thus if one cannot see anything in the picture whilst simultaneously seeing design properties, actual or non-actual, then the seeing-in experience seems best characterized by Naturalism.

As we saw, Naturalism describes those seeing-in experiences that are divided from design seeing, since one cannot see anything in the picture whilst one is also seeing design properties (conceived as such). However, it doubles with seeing a picture’s surface and is thus phenomenally distinguishable from face-to-face seeing. This is what makes Naturalistic pictures non-illusionistic, that they fail under any circumstances to trompe l’oeil. The Kanizsa triangles image seems to fit this description since one cannot, at one and the same time, see both design properties as inflecting the illustrative content and see the triangles. The design properties are perceptually represented, and indeed form part of the explanation as to why we see the triangles, but they are not, and cannot be, consciously attended to whilst we see the triangles in the picture.

The Kanizsa image, however, does seem to exhibit something that other cases of Naturalism do not. In the Kanizsa image, seeing a non-actual design property such as a subjective contour is explained in virtue of actual design properties, which cannot be seen at the same time one sees the subjective contour. Thus one ‘quirk’ of the Kanizsa triangles image is that it seems to elicit two stages of Naturalistic seeing-in. At one stage one sees a
subjective contour in the image but one cannot simultaneously see the design properties responsible for seeing it (one is not design seeing in Lopes’s stronger sense). At the other, perhaps more sophisticated, stage, one sees a triangle in the image but one cannot simultaneously see the design properties responsible for seeing it (again one is not design seeing). However, although the Kanizsa image allows for a seeing-in experience of a subjective contour, what one describes as the subject of the image are the triangles themselves and not the subjective contour. As such we ought to be interested in describing the phenomenology of a seeing-in experience of the triangles, which, as we have seen, cannot double with actual or non-actual design seeing.

Furthermore, what actually explains why we see the triangles in the picture are the actual design properties of the image, since this is what seeing the subjective contour, and so the triangles, depends upon. Hence, a seeing-in experience of the triangles does not differ from other cases of Naturalism, which rely on genuine design properties being visually represented but not consciously attended to. So, despite an interesting characteristic of the Kanizsa image in allowing for two stages of Naturalistic seeing-in, there is no difference, at the level of explanation and at the level of phenomenology, between pseudo-actualism and Naturalism if it is a seeing-in experience of the triangles and not the contour that is at issue. A seeing-in experience of the Kanizsa triangles is thus best characterized as an instance of Naturalism, as an experience that includes seeing genuine design properties but without design seeing in Lopes’s stronger sense.

However, there is a potential hindrance to this move. And this is the fact that purported instances of pseudo-actualism are illusionistic. While I have argued that genuine design properties are experienced, though not consciously attended to, when looking at the Kanizsa triangle image, the triangles we see in the Kanizsa image are supposedly experienced as phenomenally indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing of triangles. Thus they are illusory in Lopes’s sense. But Naturalistic pictures cannot trompe l’oeil under any circumstances. Thus there is a danger of being forced to subsume seeing-in experiences engendered by images like the Kanizsa triangles under trompe l’oeil.

However, there is a possible solution, which rests on the key difference between trompe l’oeil and Naturalism. What prevents seeing-in experiences characterized by Naturalism from engendering a trompe l’oeil seeing-in experience? The answer, according to Lopes, is surface seeing. In cases of trompe l’oeil, the reason they are so successful in producing visual experiences that are phenomenally indistinguishable from face-to-face seeing is because we struggle to see their surfaces. However, to the extent that seeing the triangles in the Kanizsa Triangle image is accompanied by an awareness of the picture’s surface, the seeing-in experience is not trompe l’oeil. Indeed Cavedon-Taylor affirms this thought in his discussion.

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194 Lopes, Sight and Sensibility, p. 40
of the Kanizsa triangles when he says that, ‘we always remain perceptually aware of the picture’s surface when we see the triangle in the Kanizsa Triangle’.\textsuperscript{195} Thus, by Cavedon-Taylor’s own lights, \textit{pseudo-actualism} must be an instance of Naturalism since it doubles with surface seeing, which means it must be non-illusionistic. The space of seeing-in can now be represented as follows:

Table 3. \textit{Ways of Seeing-in}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seeing-in</th>
<th>Illusionistic</th>
<th>Non-illusionistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divided from design seeing</td>
<td>\textit{Trompe-l’oeil}</td>
<td>Naturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubled with design seeing</td>
<td></td>
<td>\textit{Twofoldness}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To conclude the first part of this chapter, the proposed division of seeing-in need not go as far as Lopes and Cavedon-Taylor suggest. In virtue of the differences between design seeing and surface seeing, and the levels of explanation of the role of design properties, I have shown that Naturalism captures \textit{pseudo-actualism}, \textit{twofoldness} captures \textit{pseudo-twofoldness}, and that the place of Actualism in the taxonomy should be reconsidered. Thus the space of seeing-in, while certainly complex, ought to be significantly reduced. These three ways of seeing-in do justice to the variety of pictures, and any account of depiction ought to be able to accommodate them.

3.2 The Experienced Resemblance Theory of Depiction

Now that we have a better understanding of the nature of seeing-in we can turn to its use in the philosophy of depiction, where it forms a central tenet in most theories. However, some theorists find seeing-in lacking in its ability to explain how pictures depict, and demand more explanatory work to be done. In particular they seek to expand on the recognitional aspect of seeing-in, that is, what is involved when we recognize the subject or object in the picture. Many theorists defer to the long-standing idea that depiction necessarily involves resemblance. That is to say that if we see something, call it S, in a pictorial surface, this is due to our seeing a resemblance between the pictorial surface and S itself. These theorists thus accept that seeing-in grounds depiction but add that it is resemblance that

\textsuperscript{195} Cavedon-Taylor, ‘The Space of Seeing-in’, p. 278
grounds seeing-in. The Resemblance Theory of Depiction, I believe, stands as the most plausible alternative to the theory of depiction that I will argue for. As such it deserves thorough attention and convincing argument against it. This part of the chapter will be concerned with this task.

The Resemblance Theory fell out of favour for a long time, provoked, in part, by a crippling critique of it by Nelson Goodman in his *Languages of Art*. There Goodman brands the resemblance view ‘The most naïve view of representation’ and crudely formulating it as ‘A represents B if and only if A appreciably resembles B’. Goodman claims that, ‘more error could hardly be compressed into so short a formula.’ Ignoring the obvious point that perhaps Goodman’s own formulation of the view sets it up to fail, he provides some challenging objections to the claim that depiction and representation necessarily involves resemblance.

Goodman points out that resemblance, unlike representation, is a symmetrical relation. That is to say that if B resembles A then A resembles B. In depiction though, a picture may resemble a subject S, and so represent it, yet S does not represent the picture. Goodman writes that, ‘while a painting may represent the Duke of Wellington, the Duke does not represent the painting.’ Furthermore, an object resembles itself to the maximum degree but it rarely represents itself. Thus resemblance, unlike representation, is also reflexive. Another significant problem is that depiction need not be of some particular, and indeed it need not be of some particular which actually exists, but resemblance is a relation that only holds between one particular and another. Consequently the resemblance view cannot seem to cope with the depiction of some, but no particular, thing with various properties.

These problems are significant if we take resemblance to be an objective relation between one item and another. Recent proponents of the Resemblance Theory have thus made a more subtle use of the concept of resemblance, and shifted the relation of resemblance between picture and object into the realm of experience. The idea, then, is not that there is an objective resemblance between picture and object but rather that we *experience* pictures as resembling the objects they depict. This turn away from resemblance simpliciter thus focuses on the experience one has before a picture, which will contain, amongst other things, an experience of resemblance between depicted subject and object in the real world. This, they claim, is the experience that explains how a picture depicts what it does. Upon viewing a picture P depicting some subject S, I experience a resemblance between the surface of P and S, which accounts for my seeing S in P.

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196 Goodman, *Languages of Art*, pp. 3-4
197 Ibid.
The denial of a strict resemblance between picture and object remedies the problems Goodman waged against the resemblance view. If the resemblance relation between picture and object is one that is experienced, there will be no symmetrical relation since that requires an actual resemblance relation held between two objects. The same holds for the problem that resemblance is reflexive. If it is an experience at issue, then there is no strict, fixed, relation to be reflexive. Experienced resemblance also resolves the difficulty that resemblance seems able to cope only with depiction of particulars. It allows that I can experience something as resembling some, but no particular, thing as when, for example, I see a picture of a bird that falls under the genus ‘blackbird’. I can still experience a resemblance between the picture and some more general idea, in this example blackbirds.

However, one of Goodman’s objections to the resemblance view remains significant even after the move to experienced resemblance. This is the objection that paintings, according to Goodman, resemble other paintings more than they resemble their subjects: ‘A Constable painting of Marlborough Castle is more like any other picture than it is like the Castle.’ But the picture represents the Castle and not another picture. If paintings look more like paint covered surfaces than the objects they purport to depict then the resemblance relation, experienced or otherwise, holds more strongly between other pictures and not the objects they depict, but still we say they represent these objects and not other paintings. A converse thought also follows, that where two objects are held up for comparison, one is more likely to find more difference than similarity. Thus resemblance cannot be a sufficient condition for representation.

This point proves to be an acute difficulty for any resemblance view of depiction. This is because it homes in on an area of indeterminacy within resemblance accounts, namely to specify in what respect pictures are experienced as resembling their subjects. The difficulty is that resemblance is always relative. That is to say that when asked whether something resembles something else, it is perfectly reasonable, and often required of us, to ask ‘in what respect?’ Without a decisive respect in which pictures are experienced as resembling the objects they depict, Goodman’s objection goes through.

3.2.1 Resemblance and Outline Shape

What respect, then, is most apt to capture the way in which pictures are experienced as resembling the objects they depict? Experienced Resemblance theorists generally agree that it is some form of shape that will provide the best answer, although they differ on how this is to be understood. One account of how shape provides the key respect in which

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198 Ibid.
pictures look like what they depict is that of Robert Hopkins. He proposes that the resemblance relation be cashed out in terms of ‘Outline Shape’ 199

Using the example of tracing a pyramid seen on the horizon (fig. 5), Hopkins proposes that from the point at which the pyramid is traced, the tracing will subtend, in every plane (as we move up from the base to the apex), the same angles as the pyramid. Thus the tracing will match the angles subtended by the pyramid and as such will resemble the pyramid in outline shape. Outline shape, at a point (e.g. the point from which we make the tracing) is thus defined by Hopkins as, ‘the solid angle it subtends at that point.’200 And it is outline shape that Hopkins proposes provides the respect in which pictures look like what they depict.

![Pyramid Tracing](image)

(Fig. 5) Pyramid Tracing

The point that Hopkins now needs to secure is that we actually do perceive an object’s outline shape in the real world. For if they cannot be perceived it is impossible that pictures can be experienced as resembling them. Hopkins admits that the definition of outline shape he has given makes it seem like a very mysterious property indeed, but he appeals to familiar phenomena that he believes shows that we do perceive this property.

He gives the example of the way in which edges of a road seem to converge on the horizon. Our experience of this does not suggest that I have been misled, that is, nothing about this makes me believe the road does indeed become narrower and forms a point at which I will end up. But Hopkins thinks that this “false talk” of edges converging tells us something about the way the world is represented in our experience. In particular, it tells us

200 Ibid, p. 55
something about a feature of our experience. Hopkins proposes that when we talk of edges converging on a horizon, we are expressing our experience of the outline shape of the road, that is, the solid angle it subtends at a point. Hopkins writes, ‘False talk of edges seeming to converge is our way of capturing true claims about the decreasing angles subtended, i.e. of capturing at least part of the outline shape of the road.’ Outline shape is thus a feature of the way the world is represented in our experience.

However, talk of subtending angles and the geometrical relations of outline shapes causes another concern; that if this feature is indeed there to be perceived by all, its complexity makes it difficult for anyone who lacks the relevant knowledge of geometry to understand. With this complicated characterization, which limits who can understand it, let alone recognize it, it makes it difficult to understand the above phenomenon as a perception of outline shape. To resolve this difficulty Hopkins appeals to the notion of non-conceptual content, that is, the idea that a subject can have an experience with a certain content despite lacking the appropriate concepts to characterize that content. The thought is that an experience involving outline shape is available to everyone, even if they do not possess the concepts by which to understand the content of that experience. The perception of outline shape thus forms part of the non-conceptual content of a subject’s visual experience.

Hence, according to Hopkins, there is a single respect in which pictures look like what they depict. In order for a picture P to depict a subject S, a subject must experience P as resembling S in outline shape; but does outline shape provide an adequate account of how we see things in pictures? As Hopkins points out, much of this will depend on whether such things as outline shapes are perceivable in the real world. That is not to insist that they must always be perceived, or that they cannot be misperceived, but rather that they are there to be perceived in the first place.

To begin with, I want to attend to the point just considered, that is the question of whether such an esoteric property as outline shape is available even to those who do not have the conceptual resources to understand it. Hopkins points out that to object to outline shape being non-conceptual would in fact aid his argument for outline shape being accessible to all, since this would justify the ascription of the concept outline shape to those who have those experiences. This would show that, after all, outline shapes are not as peculiar as Hopkins has worried they might be.

However, there is a tension to be noted here that stems from Hopkins’s own characterisation of Outline Shape. This is that the notion of Outline Shape, as characterised by Hopkins, looks like it needs to be conceptual if it is to be used in a comparative process such as that of experienced resemblance between picture and object. One needs to be able not only to see outline shapes, but also to use them in, and allow them to figure in, our

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Ibid, p. 59
perception of resemblances between picture and object. It seems that if outline shapes were non-conceptual contents we could not adequately bring them to bear on our perceptual experiences of pictures. While it is true that it need not be a wholly articulated concept, the notion of Outline Shape, as described by Hopkins, looks too complex to be inherently non-conceptual. The characterisation of outline shapes given by Hopkins, and the role Hopkins claims they play in our pictorial experiences, makes them sound conceptual through and through.

To be clear, I am not claiming that Outline Shapes must be conceptual, rather that the characterisation that Hopkins gives of Outline Shapes makes them look like they need to be, and as such, Hopkins has not given enough argument to the point that they are non-conceptual. The onus is thus on Hopkins to provide further detail on the claim that outline shapes are non-conceptual contents of experience, despite their complex nature. Without further argument, it is difficult to see how an appeal to non-conceptual content can free outline shapes from the concern that they cannot be recognized and perceived by everyone. Thus Hopkins’s appeal to non-conceptual content to explain our perception of Outline Shapes, and their role in pictorial experience, is left wanting. If that is the case then there is a significant tension between the fact that the perceptual content ‘Outline Shape’ looks like it needs to be conceptual to play its required role in Hopkins’s theory, and the fact that, according to Hopkins’s own claims, it does not look as if it can be since it is not something that can readily be understood.

3.2.2 Pictorial Indeterminacy, Inflection, and Misrepresentation

It is also worth considering further whether we do in fact see such things as outline shapes in such a determinate way. This is not to suppose, as Hopkins argues against, that outline shapes need have clearly defined contours and edges. He claims that even a patch of mist can have an outline shape because it will vary through space and subtend angles at levels of density. What I question is not whether outline shapes are clear or faint, but whether they are continuous or complete. Consider Impressionist painting. Much of the impetus towards that style of painting, that is, proceeding with the open brushing of colours rather than lines and contours, stems from the thought that the outline as used in painting does not really exist in the world. What the Impressionists tried to capture in their paintings was the indeterminate transience of light and colour as it exists in nature. If that is what is really there to be seen in the world, then it may seem that one must try especially hard to see an outline shape and, moreover, to see it as uninterrupted and closed.
There is also evidence of visual supplementation and ‘filling-in’ in ordinary visual experience. The most prominent example is that of the subjective lines that emerge from the already discussed Kanizsa triangle. The effect is not restricted to triangles or other straight-line figures. Kanizsa and others have demonstrated it with circles, pear shapes and curvilinear free forms. That subjective contours are present to perception leaves open the possibility that what we experience as continuous and determinate actually relies in a large part on the spectator’s share in the experience, rather than outline shapes existing in the world, waiting to be perceived. However, if one is not convinced that this holds true of the real world, or at least that the phenomenon is too rare to mitigate against the idea of closed outline shapes, perhaps it is enough that this kind of indeterminacy can happen in pictures. Indeed subjective contour is an effect that has been exploited by picture makers throughout history. The Lascaux cave paintings provide a nice example of this. Many of the figures have a gapped outline in order to create depth and perspective. The yellow mare, known as the Chinese horse, exhibits gapping typical of the paintings along with variations in colour and tone, which break up the outline. Yet despite the discontinuous outline of the horse, our eyes glide over the figure and see it as if it were complete, that is, our seeing-in experience is that of a horse rather than a horse with a gapped outline. Without a determinate outline shape it seems difficult to apply Hopkins’s geometrical notions and consider the similarity in subtending angles at a point since, without a closed outline, the angles of an item depicted in a pictorial surface will not be the same as those of its actual outline shape.

However, Hopkins is likely to subsume cases like the Chinese horse under the heading of ‘indeterminate pictorial content’, which poses an acute difficulty for the resemblance view, and one which Hopkins proposes can be adequately solved. The problem, as Hopkins sees it, is that pictures with indeterminate pictorial content, such as a stick figure, depict something with content that is much more determinate. But since the shape of a stick figure and the shape of a person differ radically, how can we experience the picture as resembling a person? Hopkins’s solution is to advocate a separation between what is seen in a surface and what is depicted. In that case we can say that what we see in the picture of a stick figure is an oddly shaped, wiry man, without claiming that that is what the picture depicts. Hopkins further demonstrates that what is seen in and what is depicted can come apart through his discussion of Jacopo Tintoretto’s *Seated Man seen from Above* (Fig. 6). Hopkins refers to the indeterminate portrayal of the right arm of the figure and claims that we see in the marks an arm with several different boundaries yet that is not what we take the picture as representing. Thus what is seen-in and what is depicted can separate.
But all this is at the cost of denying the central tenet of experiential accounts of depiction, of which the resemblance view is one, that what is seen in a picture determines what it depicts. However, Hopkins does not see the separation suggestion as being as strict as this. He is not advocating that a picture can depict S even though everyone else sees T in it, merely that the pictorial content can be more indeterminate than what is seen in. As Hopkins puts it, ‘separation does not leave pictorial content entirely free of the content of seeing-in. The thought is that the former may be indeterminate in ways the latter is not.’

However, I am not convinced that what is seen-in and what is depicted can come apart in the way that Hopkins suggests. Furthermore I believe Hopkins has confused seeing-in with only one aspect of this experience, which thus leads him to make this mistaken claim. Consider again the Tintoretto drawing. Hopkins describes the content of seeing-in as seeing an arm with several different boundaries, but this does not seem to be the correct way to characterize what is seen in. The content of seeing-in rather, is seeing an arm in the picture, not an arm with several different boundaries. That Hopkins picks out the indeterminate marks of the arm suggests to me that he is in fact conflating seeing-in, which in this example looks like a paradigm case of twofoldness, with its configurational aspect, that is the design properties or marks on the surface that sustain the seeing-in experience. The indeterminate lines, shading and tone suggest an arm, which we see in the picture, but it seems odd to only identify these features with what is seen-in. Rather they are part of the configurational aspect,

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202 Ibid, p. 128
which indeed we do see, but only in conjunction with the recognitional aspect, which adds up to a single twofold experience of seeing-in, the content of which is an arm.

Consider a slightly different example, one that depicts movement, such as Leonardo da Vinci’s chalk drawing Rearing Horse (Fig. 7). This drawing contains indeterminate pictorial content. The head of the horse is hard to discern, and it certainly cannot be determined where exactly in the picture that head is; it is also relatively indeterminate how many legs the horse has given that one can make out at least six rough outlines of a leg. If we take Hopkins’s line, all of this must be included in the determinate content of seeing-in; that is, we see in the picture the outline of six legs, and a head with no determinate boundary or position, along with some curved and dashed lines around the central figure yet what is depicted is a horse. But that again seems an extremely odd way to describe what we see in the picture.

There is no doubt that we do indeed see these elements but a more natural way to describe the picture is as seeing design properties, the configurational aspect, which, together with the recognitional aspect, add up to a twofold seeing-in experience of a horse rearing in all its dynamic fullness.203 The content of our seeing-in experience is thus a horse rearing, not a horse with indeterminate boundaries and disjointed lines. Thus what is seen-in and what is depicted remain as one; as such Hopkins cannot appeal to a separation, based on a false claim about the content of seeing-in, in order to explain pictorial indeterminacy and the difficulties it poses for a resemblance view. Pictorial indeterminacy needs to be explained in some other way, which does not jeopardise the connection seeing-in and pictorial content. I suggest an alternative way to understand the phenomenon in Chapter Five.

(Fig. 7) da Vinci, Rearing Horse, (c. 1503)

203 It is worth noting here that indeterminate pictures look like cases that engender either twofold or Naturalistic seeing-in experiences, since indeterminate pictures are not likely to elicit a trompe l’oeil seeing-in experience.
A further problem is that these examples of pictorial indeterminacy seem to suggest an inability to cope with twofold seeing-in, given that these cases involve seeing design properties such as indeterminate lines, which depict the subject. Twofold seeing-in was one of the three kinds of seeing-in that I argued for as a genuine possibility, yet these examples show that paradigm cases of twofold seeing-in cause problems for the notion of outline shape and resemblance. As such there are clear cases of depiction, and the experience elicited by them, that the resemblance view cannot accommodate. I will say more about this problem in the next section, where I frame it as part of a larger discussion of inflection and the problems it poses for the Resemblance Theory.

Da Vinci's horse drawing raises another question for the resemblance view and the adequacy of Outline Shape in explaining depiction. This is a question about its capability of explaining depictions of events or states, such as a horse in the act of rearing. Consider Rubens's painting The Descent from the Cross, in which Christ is depicted as being lowered into the arms of nine figures including The Virgin, St John, Magdalene, and workers. It is not clear how Outline Shape could aid in understanding why we see this event in the painting. Firstly, it is unclear what it would mean for the lowering of Christ into the arms of nine figures to have an outline shape. Perhaps it would simply be the tracing of the most peripheral parts of the figures. As such we can make sense of the individual Outline Shapes of each of the depicted subjects. But this seems far too limited to do justice to the painting itself, which incorporates not only colour but also indications of movement that add up to the figure of Christ appearing to be lowered. Events, unlike objects, are not depicted as static despite the fact that the moment is frozen still in the painting. If we simply focused on outline shape we would lose the dynamic nature of depictions of events, which is precisely what we are supposed to see.

Perhaps one might say that there is a resemblance consideration taking place when we view paintings like Rubens's, and that is the observation that the lowering of Christ resembles the act of lowering and not, say, throwing or lifting. The nine figures in the painting resemble figures in the act of supporting and not, say, dropping or pushing. It is still unclear though how Outline Shape would help explain the fact that an act of lowering is depicted, and not an act of throwing, since much of the visual evidence for this is bound up in the subtleties of the painting such as the textures, brush work, and soft colourings of the

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204 Richard Wollheim raises a slightly different, though related, objection that hinges on the thought that where events are depicted, or other represented qualities such as, to use Wollheim's own example, 'the aftermath of a prolonged storm', it is difficult for the Resemblance Theory to locate where exactly we see the resemblance or experience the picture as resembling this quality or property. For the Resemblance Theory, the representing element needs to be demarcated in the picture, but where in the picture is 'the aftermath of a prolonged storm' represented? This, Wollheim claims, commits the Resemblance Theory to a requirement of what he terms 'localization'. See: Wollheim, 'What Makes Representational Painting Truly Visual?', In The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 77, (2003), pp. 131-147, pp. 136-7
clothing that indicate the kind of movement occurring. The serene and loving facial expressions of the nine figures also tell us something about the kind of action being performed. To anticipate my own claims here, much of the content of our seeing-in experiences of the painting seem to rely on stylistic features, which, I have argued, not only help us to understand depiction but also prevent vast misunderstandings, such as seeing the picture as depicting the throwing of Christ rather than the lowering of Christ. All of this would be set aside if we took Outline Shape as our criterion of depiction, which seems entirely questionable given their important role in specifying the kind of act being performed.

A further problem for the Experienced Resemblance view centres on the phenomenon of inflection, which, as we have seen in the first section of this chapter, is a genuine possibility within the space of seeing-in, and is an experience that only a picture can elicit. As such, any theory of depiction ought to be able to accommodate it, but how many of, and to what extent, are our pictorial experiences inflected?

We have already seen that Hopkins thinks there is at least one example of inflection, namely Rembrandt’s sketch of Jan Cornelisz Sylvius, and notes that if one is persuaded by this case one ought to be willing to accept that there are other cases, and indeed I think there are. The Catalan painter Antoni Tapies is just one of many artists who demonstrate a preoccupation with the surfaces of their pictures. By burning, scoring, layering, ripping, and etching into his works, Tapies’ work has an obvious materiality to it, moving beyond mere lines and colours in depicting his chosen subjects (often things which are described as lowly and dirty). A seeing-in experience of his work ‘Matter in the Form of a Foot’ presents us with, not simply a foot, but a foot composed of concrete, marble dust, and floor sweepings—common materials used by Tapies. If our experience is not so fine-grained as to see this then it is at least a seeing-in experience of a foot that needs characterizing in part by reference to the picture’s design properties, namely to the inflected properties. Our experience of the materials is not a separate experience, they form part of the thing seen-in. Seeing a ‘Tapies foot’ is not possible in face-to-face experience. Seeing a ‘Tapies foot’ is an inflected pictorial experience, and only a picture can allow us to see a ‘Tapies foot’.

Another example, which I think is interesting in virtue of the materials used in the depiction, is ‘Mes Trophées’ by Annette Messager (Fig. 8). Messager has painted intricate landscapes onto the surface of a black and white photograph of a hand, creating a depiction on the surface of a photograph. She uses the creases of the photographed hand as part of her design, highlighting outlines, and giving depth and tone, while the ink drips down the surface of the photograph, as if it were still wet. If we draw our attention only to the drawings on the photograph’s surface, rather than the photograph of the hand, the seeing-in experience of the landscape on the palm of the hand appears to be inflected by the dropping
ink, and the creases of the palm. The veins and terrain of the landscape are formed of creases in skin and running ink, the houses are nestled in the fold of the thumb, and the wrinkles darkened by ink create a gloomy sky. A seeing-in experience of this peculiar landscape is inflected, it includes properties that must be characterised in part by reference to the design, and a landscape composed of skin and ink is not the kind of landscape one could see face-to-face.

(Fig. 8) Messager, Mes Trophées, (Series of works, 1986-1988)

So, I think there are further examples of inflected pictorial experience, and, crucially, there are enough to make trouble for Hopkins and his Experienced Resemblance Theory of Depiction. How does inflection make trouble for this view? Given that inflection is possible, the first problem is that it looks difficult for the view to accommodate it. Granted that not all pictorial experiences are inflected, as such the Experienced Resemblance Theory fares better in trompe l’œil and naturalistic cases of seeing-in. Inflection is possible however, and any account of depiction should be able to cope with it, and indeed explain how it fits with their proposed theory of depiction. The trouble with inflection for the Experienced Resemblance Theory is that its very nature seems quite at odds with the main thrust of the view, namely that depiction consists in perceptual matching, in particular a match in Outline Shape between object and depicted object. But inflected properties, by definition, are not the kind of properties that objects in the actual world could be seen to have, since only pictures can sustain seeing-in experiences that involve reference to design. Thus there can be no perceptual match between depicted object and object in the actual world in cases of inflection, since the depicted object will have very different kinds of properties than those found in face-to-face experiences.

However, granted that some depictions have properties that could not figure in the real world, and as such cannot be seen as resembling the objects they depict, the Experienced Resemblance Theory maintains that it is a match in Outline Shape that provides
the respect in which pictures resemble the objects they depict. Thus if inflection is to cause real trouble for the Experienced Resemblance Theory, then it must cause trouble with the notion of outline shape. Does it? Well, if we remember that the discussion of pictorial indeterminacy hinged on the idea that there are cases in which Outline Shape is not closed or uninterrupted, and further, that the examples discussed there looked like paradigm cases of twofoldness, I think we can make trouble for the Experienced Resemblance Theory using the notion of inflection.

If we return to Hopkins’s own example of a picture eliciting an inflected pictorial experience, namely the Rembrandt sketch, where the hand, and its upward thrust, was seen as composed of rising ink, we have an example where outline shape does not figure in our seeing-in experience. It does not figure in our seeing-in experience because it cannot do so. This is because the Outline Shape of the depicted hand, by being inflected, will not match the outline shape of an actual hand seen in the real world. The problem is similar to the problem of pictorial indeterminacy, where what we saw in the picture was obscured and indeterminate, a non-matching outline shape, and yet we still had a seeing-in experience of the subject depicted despite this. Inflection can, though of course not always, preclude a determinate outline shape from figuring in our experience of pictures, and without this it is difficult to see how pictures can be seen as resembling their subjects in Outline Shape. As such, inflected pictorial experience can include experiences that preclude Outline Shape from playing its fundamental role in Hopkins’s theory. Thus there are pictures, and seeing-in experiences, that the Resemblance Theory cannot accommodate.

The main problem that inflection poses for Hopkins can be constructed as a dilemma in the following way: on the one hand, if Outline Shape is too restrictive it cannot explain inflection (or pictorial indeterminacy), and on the other, if it is not restrictive enough in allowing for inflection and pictorial indeterminacy (as would be the case if Hopkins’s claims about separation of pictorial content and what is seen-in go through) it cannot do any work as the basis for the Experienced Resemblance Theory as a theory of depiction. Thus the Experienced Resemblance theory is either unable to accommodate a wide range of depictions or risks losing a grip on the very thing that does the work for the view in explaining depiction and our seeing-in experiences. The view thus produces very unsatisfactory results regarding indeterminacy and inflection, and there exists another troubling problem for the view, which I will now turn my attention to.

This problem for the Experienced Resemblance theory concerns misrepresentation. The problem of misrepresentation and Hopkins’s proposed solution forms a crucial part of his overall account of depiction. This is because the solution he proposes involves the abandoning of a deep-seated assumption, one that has played a central, if not vital, role in all other resemblance accounts of depiction. In order to locate what this assumption is it is
important first to clarify the nature of the problem misrepresentation poses for the resemblance view.

Hopkins uses a caricature of Tony Blair to illustrate how misrepresentation poses a difficulty for his account. In order to misrepresent Blair, the picture surface must enable us to see him with properties he does not in fact have e.g. a huge mouth, ears, wild eyes etc. However, those properties will not correspond with Blair’s outline shape. Consequently, if we are to see Blair with these properties we must, at one and the same time, see Blair in the picture, that is, see the surface as resembling Blair in Outline Shape, and see something with a huge mouth, wild eyes etc., and see the surface as resembling that in Outline Shape too.

Put simply the problem is this: when something is misrepresented as having properties it does not in fact enjoy, the Outline Shape of the misrepresented item will not match the Outline Shape of the item in actuality. Thus we cannot reconcile two very different Outline Shapes. If this is the case it is not possible for the resemblance view to allow such properties to be seen as features of what the surface is seen as resembling. In short, the view cannot explain why we can see in surfaces a particular with a property, or properties, it does not possess. As such, it does not look as if the view can accommodate misrepresentation.

Before we consider Hopkins’s proposed solution to this problem I think it is important to get a little clearer on what misrepresentation consists in for Hopkins. There is one phrase that stands out in his discussion, which provides a neat way of summarising his view: ‘[a] picture is not bound to ascribe only properties which the item actually enjoys. When the picture does not do so, we have pictorial misrepresentation—as in a picture which depicts the Eiffel Tower as blue, or as standing on the banks of the Ganges.’ Thus we end up with a definition of misrepresentation that can be formulated as roughly this: misrepresentation occurs when a picture ascribes properties to its subject that it does not really enjoy. I reserve the question of whether this is an adequate definition for the final chapter, where I suggest it is indeed inadequate and formulate my own definition which relates to my account of style developed in Chapter One. For now, let us consider Hopkins’s proposed solution to the problem of misrepresentation for the Resemblance Theory.

How is the problem to be resolved? Hopkins points out that in the case of misrepresentation, the crux of the problem is to make good the claim that a picture is seen as resembling in Outline Shape what it depicts for two resemblances, that is one resemblance to the misrepresented particular (Blair), and one to the way in which he is misrepresented (having a huge mouth, wild eyes etc.). Thus resemblance enters into our experience of depiction twice. Consequently the path to solving the problem must lead us to resemblance

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205 Hopkins, Picture, Image, and Experience, p. 94
206 Ibid, p. 30
entering the content of our experience of depiction only once; one outline shape, one resemblance.

Here is where Hopkins suggests abandoning a significant assumption within theories of resemblance. The assumption is that if resemblance is to play a role in depicting an item, it is resemblance to the item as it really is. That is to say that if P resembles S, it resembles S as it really is, but, Hopkins claims, this assumption is not necessary. According to Hopkins, what matters with regard to resemblance in depiction is resemblance to the item as it is depicted as being, and that allows that it may be depicted with properties it does not really enjoy. In the Blair example what is required is not that the marks be seen as resembling Blair as he really is but that they be seen as resembling Blair with certain properties. This solution thus makes the real Outline Shape of the item extraneous to our seeing it in a pictorial surface. Hence we have only one Outline Shape, the one the item is depicted as having, and so the concept of resemblance enters the content of our experience of depiction once.

However, there is a significant worry, and one that Hopkins himself raises, that stems from abandoning the assumption that the resemblance at work in depiction is resemblance to the item as it really is, and this is that without resemblance to the item as it really is we lose any kind of restriction on what has been depicted. If the resemblance involved in depiction is not resemblance to the item as it really is, then the view cannot offer an explanation why, when such properties could easily be enjoyed by both, we should see Blair with those properties and not, say, Clinton. What limits the possible experiences of resemblance?

To solve this difficulty, Hopkins appeals to the contents of one’s visual experience more generally. Ordinary visual experiences contain complex contents. For example, seeing a dog is not just having an experience the content of which includes a dog shape, fur texture, or size, from which you form a belief that there is a dog before you. Rather one’s experience must be characterized in part as an experience as of such a thing, namely a dog. If one’s experience only included the former features, colour, shape, etc., you would have had a different phenomenological experience. That is to say what it was like to have that experience would have been different. From this, Hopkins claims that there is some plausibility in the thought that experiences of resemblance will share the features that figure in standard visual experiences, that is to say they too will have complex contents.

This observation leads Hopkins to conclude that the reason an experience of resemblance of Blair with certain properties differs from one of Clinton with those same properties is because it will differ phenomenologically. That is to say that one’s experience of resemblance will involve the complex content Blair rather than Clinton. The concepts of particular things thus enter into experiences of resemblance and provide the phenomenological criterion of difference between an experience of Blair with certain
properties and Clinton with those same properties. This, Hopkins proposes, solves the
difficulty and explains what it is to see Blair with certain properties in a picture rather than
Clinton with those same properties.

However, there is a large problem with this solution in that it does not tell us why
the concept of Blair should enter our experience of resemblance between the pictorial
surface and Blair himself rather than Clinton. If, as Hopkins proposes, Blair with those
features and Clinton with those features, ‘would share every property of their appearance…’
why should it be the case that the concept Blair enters our experience, and thus why should
we see Blair and not Clinton in the pictorial surface?

Hopkins claims that this is not a question that needs to be answered by the view,
designating it the task of art historians and psychologists. If there is no reason why though,
on the basis of the visual evidence, the concept of Blair should enter our experience rather
than Clinton, it looks as if the view does need to answer this question since it has not
explained how it is that that concept plays its vital role in determining what it is to see Blair
in the pictorial surface. It seems that, on a resemblance view, if Blair resembles Clinton in
that they share every property of their appearance, there is no reason, based purely on the
visual information available (and we must remember it is a visual experience we are
maintaining accounts for depiction) that the concept of Blair should enter our experience of
resemblance and, furthermore, there is no reason why that experience should lead us to see
Blair in the picture rather than Clinton. As such it seems that the view has a large lacuna in
its account of misrepresentation and, consequently, its explanation of what it is to see Blair
in a picture.

I will return to the topic of pictorial misrepresentation in Chapter Five, which will
mount further pressure on the plausibility of the Experienced Resemblance view. It will be
considered in detail once I have offered my own account of depiction. So to conclude this
chapter, I have pointed to various ways in which the notion of experienced resemblance and
Outline Shape prove problematic in explaining pictorial depiction. There are several
phenomena it cannot accommodate, notably inflection, pictorial indeterminacy, and pictorial
misrepresentation. Thus we must construct an account of depiction that, once assembled,
can provide the materials with which to explain these phenomena. In the next chapter I
defend and develop an account that can do this.

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207 Ibid, p. 108
Chapter Four
The Aspect-Recognition Theory of Depiction and the Significance of Style

‘At the core of depiction is the recognition of its subject and this remains so even when the subject is radically transformed and recognition becomes correspondingly extended; it remains so not because we seek the subject matter despite the complications of painting but because recognition and complication are each furthered by each other.’ 208 (Michael Podro)

The problems for the Experienced Resemblance theory resulted from a criterion of depiction that was too restrictive. Thus when it came to problem cases, the notion of Outline Shape needed loosening to an extent that it lost its explanatory value. The move was thus from a strict criterion to a loosened one; one that eventually gave out. With this in mind, I think a better way to begin to understand the nature of depiction is to start with the sparseness of some depictions; those with seemingly impossible configurations, and those with blurry and indeterminate content. If we can get an account of depiction that makes sense of these difficult cases then the easy ones, the paradigm cases of highly determinate depictions, will follow suit. Thus the method here, to put it crudely, is to move from looseness to strictness in accounting for the diversity of depiction.

Indeed, the account I will now begin to defend and develop is almost predicated on the idea that pictures are indeterminate in many respects. They are often hazy, ambiguous, stubborn in what they reveal and what they don’t, and they are, at times, certainly puzzling for a viewer. As Wölfflin put it:

‘The eye enjoys overcoming difficulty. One must set it solvable tasks, it is true, but...the visual arts can dispense with the partial obscuring of form or confusing the eye, as little as music can dispense with dissonance and an interrupted cadence.’ 209

If pictures often confuse the eye then the best place to start in explaining depiction is with the source of that confusion.

4.1 Aspects and Commitments

Since the demand for a perceptual match between depicted object and object in the real world was the source of our troubles with the Experienced Resemblance View, a theory of depiction that abandons this demand is likely to be an improvement. So what we need is a non-matching perceptual theory of depiction. What does this alternative look like? One non-

208 Podro, Depiction, p. 5
209 Cited in: Podro, The Critical Historians of Art, p. 18
matching perceptual theory, proposed by Dominic Lopes, is called the ‘Aspect-Recognition Theory of Depiction’. Lopes’s view has its basis in the idea that pictures present aspects of their subjects, which viewers can recognize since the presentation of those aspects engages their recognitional capacities. \(^{210}\) Recognitional abilities are dynamic, such that one can recognize an object in front of you as a previously seen object with a certain set of properties as being that same object with a different set of properties. Building on the dynamic nature of recognition, Lopes proposes that different ways of depicting objects capture different, recognisable, aspects; we can recognize that a picture is a depiction of S, even if S is depicted as having a different combination of properties than observed in previous encounters with S.

According to Lopes, the mistake made by previous accounts of depiction, including the Experienced Resemblance view, was to assume that a picture’s content is determinate in all respects. Matching theories of depiction, according to Lopes, ‘indulge in what may be called the figurative fallacy’. \(^{211}\) The root of this fallacy is to assume that pictures are determinate regarding all of the properties of the depicted subject in the same way an ordinary visual experience of that subject is determinate. But this is a mistake, since if pictures were determinate in this way then they would all be determinate \textit{in the same way}. This is clearly false, since pictures present subjects in remarkably different ways, with varying degrees of determinacy. In place of determinacy, Lopes, drawing on the work of Gombrich in \textit{Art and Illusion}, claims that pictures are essentially selective in the aspects they present of their subject. Any picture must depict its subject as having some properties but not others, having this property but not that property, and, for all other properties that the picture is not specific about its subject having, the picture remains non-committal. According to Lopes, pictures may be committal and non-committal in various ways:

‘A representation (of any kind) is ‘committal’ with respect to property F provided that it represents its subject as either F or not-F. If it does not go into the matter of F-ness, it is ‘inexplicily non-committal’ with respect to F. Finally, a representation is ‘explicitly non-committal’ with regard to F when it represents its subject as having some property (or properties) that preclude it from being committal with regard to F.’ \(^{212}\)

For example, when a woman is depicted as having red hair, this picture is committal about the redness of the depicted subject’s hair. It ‘says’ to the viewer that this subject does indeed have red hair. But pictures can also be ‘inexplicily non-committal’, as, say, when a charcoal drawing neither depicts nor does not depict a woman as having red hair. The matter of the colour of the subject’s hair simply isn’t gone into since the limitations of the medium

\(^{210}\) Lopes, \textit{Understanding Pictures}


\(^{212}\) Lopes, \textit{Understanding Pictures}, p. 118
prohibit these kinds of commitments from being made. Further, pictures can also be ‘explicitly non-committal’ such as when a picture depicts the right side of a woman’s face at the expense of depicting the left side. Thus the picture is explicitly non-committal, it refuses to make a commitment about the appearance of the woman’s left side since it represents her from the right side, which precludes the picture representing the left side.\textsuperscript{213}

What is an aspect according to Lopes? For one thing, pictorial aspects are not reducible to visual aspects. Thus the Aspect-Recognition theory is not a version of what is commonly called ‘Pictorialism’, the view that pictures are in some way equivalents to visual experiences.\textsuperscript{214} Importantly, for Lopes, the selective nature of pictorial content undermines an Albertian model of depiction, which holds that pictures ought to present their subjects as having properties that they could be seen to have in actuality, and from some determinate point of view. Lopes thinks that the aspects presented by pictures expand on those presented in ordinary visual experience. Pictures can represent objects as having combinations of properties that they could not normally be seen to have. The consequence of this is that pictures need not necessarily be viewpointed, as in a Cubist painting that depicts a complex of parts seen from no particular point of view. As such, pictorial content, rather than being specific and determinate, is \textit{aspectually structured} (more on this shortly); it is the combination of visual commitments made by a picture.

Thus a pictorial aspect, rather than being modelled on visual aspects, is, according to Lopes, ‘… [a] pattern of visual salience, a pattern as much of what a picture leaves out as what it includes.’\textsuperscript{215} An aspect is thus individuated by the kind of commitments it makes about its subject. The totality of a picture’s commitments’, Lopes writes, ‘comprise the ‘aspect’ it presents of its subject…’\textsuperscript{216} Thus we can think of an aspect as being the many different commitments and non-commitments a picture makes about the visual properties of its subject. For example, I may depict a landscape as having a certain terrain, and in depicting it I may make commitments about this terrain such as its having twists and turns in certain places, and as having a certain colour of foliage, and as having patterns of interweaving footpaths. The ‘aspect’ this picture presents would be the totality of all of these commitments to the visual properties of the landscape. The structure of the picture, then, is determined by these commitments (explicit or inexplicit).

Thus, to say pictures are \textit{aspectually structured} is to say that pictures present aspects of the depicted subject by being committal and noncommittal in various ways about the visual properties of that subject. As such, a picture is a construction of these various commitments,

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\textsuperscript{213} Ibid, pp.118 -119. See also: Lopes, ‘Pictures, Styles, and Purposes’, pp. 330-341
\textsuperscript{215} Lopes, \textit{Understanding Pictures}, p. 119
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
some of which are more sparse and indeterminate than others. These commitments, when
assembled together, comprise the aspect of the depicted subject.

Although aspects are not always spatial (a picture can be committal, inexplicitly non-
committal, or explicitly non-committal about colour or texture), Lopes claims that a picture
is a representation that presents spatially unified aspects of its subject. That is to say that a
picture represents parts of objects as spatially related to each other, such as a Cubist painting
of a body, where parts of the body are spatially related to each other despite being presented
in a configuration that is wholly different from our actual perceptual experiences of bodies.

Thus pictures, and so pictorial content, are spatially unified configurations; they
present aspects (the totality of the picture’s commitments) of their subject that are related to
one another spatially, even if that relation undermines the actual relation those parts of the
subject have in actuality. Furthermore, Lopes writes that:

‘Some pictorial aspects are essentially pictorial; a picture may make a
combination of commitments and explicit non-commitments that
cannot be made by any visual experience…Pictures [can] often
represent objects as having combinations of properties that no
ordinary (non-pictorial) experience could represent them as
having.’\(^{217}\)

An example Lopes uses to demonstrate this is pictures in split-style, where, for example, an
animal may be depicted as seen from several viewpoints e.g. from above, from the side, or
head on. These viewpoints are spatially integrated and related to one another to form a
complete depiction that is aspectually structured given the picture’s various commitments or
non-commitments to features enjoyed by the depicted subject.

One important feature of a theory that determines what pictures represent in virtue
of selected aspects presented by the picture, rather than perceptual matching between
depicted subject and the subject in actuality, is that it does justice to the thought that both a
finely detailed drawing of an eagle, and a split-style native painting of an eagle, are both
depictions of eagles. There are two benefits to this. Firstly, it allows for pictorial diversity
since some pictures make numerous commitments while others make very few, and some
make commitments that would not match any ordinary visual experience of the depicted
subject in actuality.

Secondly, given the aspctual structure of pictures, there is a clear method for
distinguishing systems of depiction. Styles of picturing, according to Lopes, are characterised
by the kinds of properties with regard to which pictures are committal, inexplicitly non-
committal, or explicitly non-committal. Hence, for Lopes, two pictures are in different styles
if they are committal and non-committal concerning different properties altogether. Works
in the same style are both committal and non-committal about all the very same kinds of

\(^{217}\) Ibid, p. 121
properties.\textsuperscript{218} As such, Lopes’s account makes sense of pictorial diversity, and has the resources with which to individuate systems and styles of picturing. But given the aspectual structure of pictures, which sometimes combine properties that no visual experience could represent a subject as having, how is it that we see in pictures the subjects they purport to depict?

4.2 The Dynamism of Recognition

Having established the essentially selective nature of pictorial content, Lopes proposes that what explains our ability to see subjects in pictures is a certain kind of perceptual mechanism, namely recognition. According to Lopes, identifying what a picture represents exploits ‘perceptual recognition skills’, that we can recognise objects previously encountered, even if those objects have undergone radical changes.

‘A creature is said to possess a recognitional ability when, on the basis of perceptual encounters with the objects, it assembles dossiers of information enabling it to identify those objects as ones previously encountered.’\textsuperscript{219}

It is this skill or ability that underlies our being able to determine what pictures represent. As such, this explains the diversity of depiction, given that we can see subjects in pictures despite ambiguity or indeterminacy.

Lopes’s account of pictorial recognition has its basis in a framework of pictorial identification, which is modelled on Gareth Evans’s account of information-based identification. This forms part of Lopes’s account of pictures as bearers of information, which makes use of the notion of the information system, as developed by Evans. According to Lopes, pictures are information-transmitting devices; they are what Lopes terms ‘Evansian’ information states. Information states are those belonging to the ‘informational system’, which Evans thinks characterises the foundation of our mental lives.\textsuperscript{220} The informational system comprises perception, memory and communication, and information states are those that are ‘of’ the object that is the causal input to the information system. The object is the source of the information state. Picturing, Lopes claims, is an informational system, and pictures are caused by their sources. ‘What a picture represents’, Lopes writes, ‘is its source, the object or the scene that played the required role in its production.’\textsuperscript{221} Given

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{218} Lopes, ‘Pictures, Styles, and Purposes’, pp. 338-339
\item \textsuperscript{219} Lopes, \textit{Understanding Pictures}, p. 136
\item \textsuperscript{220} Evans, Gareth. \textit{The Varieties of Reference}, John McDowell (ed), (Oxford University Press 1982), pp. 121-135
\item \textsuperscript{221} Lopes, \textit{Understanding Pictures}, p. 184. It is not clear whether this account can accommodate depictions of fictional persons or objects.
\end{itemize}
Lopes’s commitment to an Evansian account of pictures as information systems, pictorial recognition, for Lopes, has its basis in the thought that a picture conveys or ‘transmits’ aspectual information from its subject to the viewer. On the basis of this information, viewers recognise its source, i.e., they recognise the subject in the picture. However, we need not be committed to this view of pictures; the role of recognition can be established without making any claims about pictures transmitting information from their sources to their viewers. As such, while it is important to note that Lopes develops his account of pictorial recognition against this backdrop, I leave the task of assessing the plausibility of his view of picturing as an information system to the final section of this chapter where the contrast between Lopes’s views and mine will be fully illustrated.

We do need however to better understand the nature of recognition and the role it plays in the Aspect-Recognition Theory of depiction. There are two features of ordinary perceptual recognition that are important to understanding pictorial recognition. The first is that recognition, for Lopes, is dynamic, that is, one can recognise objects across what Lopes calls ‘dimensions of variation’. For example, my recognition of a face might be dynamic across viewpoints (one dimension of variation), and ageing processes (another dimension of variation). The more dimensions of variation one can recognise an object in, the more dynamic one’s recognition ability is. As such, having a dynamic recognitional ability depends on one’s ability to make connections between currently perceived objects that have undergone radical changes with previously perceived objects and, for Lopes, ‘to say that recognition is dynamic is to say that features, objects, and kinds of objects can be recognised under different aspects.’

However, the dynamism of recognition has limits. Firstly, an object can change in ways that strain a dynamic recognition ability, such as an object that has undergone very radical changes. Secondly, recognitional abilities are relative to kinds of aspects e.g. an ability to recognise an aged face does not extend to being able to also recognise it in a distorted mirror. Recognition, Lopes writes, ‘is not boundlessly elastic’. There is thus a limit imposed by an inability to recognise objects across different dimensions of variation. Given this, there will be a point at which recognition gives out, and so a seeing-in experience of a subject in a picture will not be engendered. More will be said about this limit and its explanatory value in the theory below.

The second feature of recognition, which is intimately related to the dynamism of recognition, is what Lopes, drawing on the work of Flint Schier, terms ‘generativity’. According to Schier, ‘natural generativity’, with regard to pictures, describes the process by which, having had success in recognising an object in one picture, one is naturally led to an

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222 Ibid, p. 138
223 Ibid, p. 140
ability to interpret, and so recognise objects in, many other pictures.\textsuperscript{224} As such, generativity describes the ability to recognise different objects under a new kind of aspect, that is to say that recognitional competency at recognising one object under a new aspect suffices to recognise other objects under that same new aspect. For example, recognising a three dimensional shape from above or from the side, under different aspects, will allow one to recognise other shapes as seen from above or from the side. To use a pictorial example - recognising a pipe in a Cubist style, under a certain aspect, will allow one to recognise other objects such as violins or fruit in a Cubist style. Thus the dynamism of recognition, and competency at recognising objects across dimensions of variation, allows for generativity, for being able to recognise different objects altered in similar ways. One advantage of the Aspect- Recognition theory is thus that it can make sense of highly abstract pictures, since recognition is generative once we are competent within a system of depiction, such as a Cubist style.

This is how perceptual recognition in ordinary perception functions. How does this translate onto the pictorial case? According to Lopes, and others, pictorial recognition is an extension of ordinary perceptual recognition. It is dynamic across variations, that is, one can recognise objects in pictures under different aspects, and it is generative, that is, one can recognise objects under new aspects. On this latter claim about generativity, Lopes writes that:

\begin{quote}
‘Once a viewer has gained the ability to recognise some objects with which she is acquainted when they are presented in split-style aspects, she is then, in principle, able to recognise any object with which she is acquainted under split-style kinds of aspects.’ \textsuperscript{225}
\end{quote}

The thought that pictorial recognition exploits similar perceptual mechanisms to those found in ordinary perceptual experience is affirmed by Karen Neander, writing on the role of likenesses in depiction and recognition, claiming that:

\begin{quote}
‘When we recognise a picture of our friend the process is very much the same, except that there are additional factors to be taken into account. We take into consideration the fact that we are looking at a picture; we compensate for the medium and the style.’ \textsuperscript{226}
\end{quote}

This claim about recognition, and its importance to our perceptual experiences of artworks, is also found in Gombrich. Writing on our ability to recognise objects across what have been identified as dimensions of variation, Gombrich claims that:

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Ibid, p. 148
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‘Without this faculty of man and beast alike to recognise identities across the variations of difference, to make allowances for changed conditions, and to preserve the framework of a stable world, art could not exist.’

Further, describing our ability to compensate for differences, he writes that:

‘Every time we meet with an unfamiliar type of transposition, there is a brief moment of shock and a period of adjustment—but it is an adjustment for which the mechanism exists in us.’

This faculty is thus necessary for our seeing-in experiences of objects in pictures, as such pictorial recognition, and its dynamism, is a fundamental part of understanding the nature of depiction and our ability to see objects in pictures. Perceptual recognition is the fundamental mechanism that allows seeing-in experiences to occur, and therefore undergirds all pictorial experiences.

However, Lopes is quick to point out that, while pictorial recognition may be modelled along the same lines as perceptual recognition, it has important differences. Lopes claims that ‘pictorial recognition, unlike ordinary recognition, operates at two levels’. The first is ‘content-recognition’ which consists in recognising a design as making up an aspect of its subject. When one looks at a picture, unlike ordinary perceptual experience, one is presented with a two-dimensional surface covered with marks. Explaining the relation between seeing those marks and seeing the subject was the task of Chapter Three, where we saw that there are three distinct modes of seeing-in that explain this relation. Hence, the first level of recognition may be described as recognising the configurational aspect of seeing-in, and identifying it as salient to the subject depicted. Pictures’ designs on the Aspect-Recognition Theory’s view present recognisable aspects of their subjects, and the first level of recognition is recognising that design as a pictorial aspect.

The second level is subject-recognition, where one recognises the picture’s contents, the design that makes up the aspect of the subject i.e., the totality of the picture’s commitments, as being of their subject. Thus one not only recognises the design as a configuration of features that comprise an aspect of a man, one, at the second level, sees that aspect as being of a particular subject, say, Clinton. This could, of course, fail. As Lopes points out, one who had never seen a particular man, say Clinton, may succeed in content-recognition yet fail in subject recognition. ‘This’ Lopes writes, ‘makes sense of the fact that there are two ways to fail to grasp a picture. You can fail to grasp the picture’s content—it looks just like a jumble of shapes and colours—even though you know it represents a familiar object. Or you can tell what kind of object is represented, yet fail to grasp that the

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227 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, p. 47.
228 Ibid.
229 Lopes, Understanding Pictures, p. 144
object is that familiar object.’ Given this two-level structure to pictorial recognition, while it may exploit perceptual recognition skills, it outstrips the limits of recognition in ordinary perception in virtue of the aspectual structure of pictures.

4.3 Benefits and Problems

One benefit of the view that pictures are aspectually structured and selective is that it makes better sense of the phenomenon of inflection (i.e., twofoldness), which was discussed in Chapter Three. There it was refined and subsequently proved problematic for the Experienced Resemblance view. I suggested that, given inflection is possible, it is a kind of litmus test that will tell against a theory of depiction should it be unable to cope with it. The account I have been outlining is much better placed to accommodate inflection; as such it ought to count in favour of adopting it.

Let us remind ourselves of the phenomenon of inflection. As we saw, inflected seeing-in is marked off from other kinds of seeing-in in virtue of the kinds of properties, and our awareness of them, which figure in the seeing-in experience. Here is our definition of inflection again:

**Inflection**: Sometimes, what is seen in a surface includes properties a full characterization of which needs to make reference to that surface’s design (conceived as such).

Thus inflected pictorial experiences are those in which an awareness of design transforms the seeing-in experience to include an awareness of design properties. Consider Maurice De Vlaminck’s *Paysage de Bougival* (fig. 9). This painting arguably engenders an inflected seeing-in experience. We do not simply see in the picture clouds and trees, rather we see in the picture clouds composed of brushstrokes and dabs of paint. This picture presents certain aspects of the scene, some of which are inflected by design properties. One’s attention is drawn to the design properties, as what we see in the picture needs characterising by reference to the design properties.

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230 Ibid, p. 146
The Aspect-Recognition Theory of depiction’s talk of some pictures engendering a seeing-in experience of an object with impossible combinations of properties, or properties that no ordinary visual experience could represent an object as having, I think captures, in part, the notion of inflection. If we remember that inflected properties are not the kinds of properties that could be seen in ordinary visual experience since only pictures can engender a seeing-in experience of properties that involve reference to design, then the Aspect-Recognition Theory’s claim that there are some aspects that are essentially pictorial seems to capture the idea and description of inflection and inflected properties. Inflected properties are essentially pictorial and as such, I propose, can be considered as pictorial aspects within Lopes’s account. Thus there are some pictures that present aspects of objects in the world in combination with aspects that are essentially pictorial such that they could not be seen in face-to-face experience. As such, the Aspect Recognition Theory can accommodate inflection.

Further, inflection itself seems to occur most often in highly stylised depictions such as Vlaminck’s. It is when one is presented with a seeing-in experience that is distinctly non-matching that inflection is said to have occurred. Thus the Aspect-Recognition Theory, which can accommodate styles of picturing given its commitment to the claim that pictures are aspectually structured (structured by various commitments and non-commitments), allows for depictions that are highly stylised, such as those engendering an inflected seeing-in experience. Inflection, which draws a viewer’s attention to the design properties of the picture, forms part of an artist’s resources, and if it is used in a distinct way, as may be the case for Vlaminck, then it can be a feature of style. Inflection, then, can be a feature of an artist’s individual style, that is, part of their highly personal way of doing something. The
Aspect-Recognition Theory makes sense of this resource, of inflection being part of a picture’s aspect, and as such it makes sense of artistic styles.

Not all pictures are inflected of course. In Chapter Three we identified two other ways of seeing-in, namely Naturalistic and trompe l’oeil. While the Experienced Resemblance View looked capable of accommodating Naturalism and trompe l’oeil, it failed to accommodate inflection. The Aspect-Recognition Theory has the advantage of not only accommodating inflection but also makes good sense of the other two distinct modes of seeing-in. Pictures that engender a Naturalistic seeing-in experience of their subjects are not illusory yet they divide from design-seeing, that is, one cannot see the subject in the picture and see the design as a design at the same time. The Aspect-Recognition Theory, by claiming that pictures are aspectually structured, accommodates this kind of seeing-in, since it does not limit in any way which aspects of a subject can be presented. A picture can, on the Aspect-Recognition Theory, closely model the aspects of a subject that one would ordinarily perceive them as having.

Thus while it makes no commitment to an Albertian model of depiction, the theory allows for pictures that are structured in this way, as might be the case in Naturalism. Indeed, trompe l’oeil, which approaches illusion in its ability to engender an experience qualitatively similar to face-to-face seeing, is an experience that is engendered by an aspectually structured picture. It is simply that that structure closely models the experience of seeing the depicted subject face to face. Thus the Aspect-Recognition Theory can accommodate our three ways of seeing-in. Pictures are aspectually structured, and this structure can engender any of the three kinds of seeing-in experiences depending on its selection of aspects to present to a viewer.

A further advantage of the Aspect-Recognition Theory is that it seems to resolve, in part, the puzzle of mimesis, which was discussed in Chapter Three. If pictures do not match exactly their subjects in the real world, despite triggering perceptual recognition, then this explains our unique interest in pictures. The puzzle of mimesis is a puzzle about why we value pictures differently from the objects they depict in the real world. We find no interest in looking at a bedroom, yet Van Gogh’s depiction of his bedroom holds our interest in a unique way. We saw that inflection helped to resolve the puzzle of mimesis given that inflection changes the experience we have of objects in pictures from that of ordinary visual experience of the objects. Add to this the claim that pictures are essentially selective and aspectually structured, and as such need not accurately match an ordinary perceptual experience of the subject, then pictures become more interesting by their unique presentation of aspects. That Van Gogh’s bedroom is depicted from this angle and not that angle, in this colour and not that colour, peaks our interest in it as a picture.
We can enumerate the benefits of the Aspect-Recognition Theory as follows: it can make sense of highly abstract and indeterminate pictures, it can make sense of styles of picturing and individuate them, it can accommodate inflection, and it seems to resolve, in part, the puzzle of mimesis. This theory, then, is pointing in the right direction. However, there is reason to pause here. First, while I have claimed that the theory looks better equipped to deal with the puzzle of mimesis, I have been careful to note it only solves it in part. The reason I claim it is only in part a solution to the problem is that something else is needed to make sense of our pictorial interest. For, while an Aspect-Recognition Theory makes good sense of our interest in perceptually non-matching pictures, it does not fully explain those that remain good ‘likenesses’ of their depicted subjects. That is to say that while it can explain our interest in ambiguous and complex pictures, it does not say why we ought to be interested in pictures that more closely match the object in actuality.

Inflection, we saw, explains some of this interest, but not all pictures are inflected. Seeing-in that is Naturalistic or trompe l’oeil, as we have already noted, does not involve an awareness of design properties in the same way as inflected seeing-in. As such, what accounts for our interest in these pictures, given that our seeing-in experiences can closely match those visual experiences of their subjects in the real world? Granted that pictures are aspectually structured, but if that structure closely matches the object in actuality, why should the picture be of any interest? Hence, while the theory can accommodate the variety of seeing-in experiences, it struggles to make sense of our interest in pictures that engender Naturalistic or trompe l’oeil seeing-in experiences. Something else is needed to bolster the claim that Aspect-Recognition adequately deals with the puzzle of mimesis. This ‘something else’ will be added in the next section of this chapter.

A further problem encountered by the theory concerns the dynamism of recognition. As we have seen, recognition is not boundlessly elastic, it can fail when vast changes overstretch the capacity, or where a dimension of variation fails to be crossed. We already know that certain pictures challenge the eye, are represented in complex configurations, and can be vague and ambiguous. The Aspect-Recognition Theory’s advantage was that it could seemingly explain why we see things in these kinds of pictures using the perceptual mechanism of recognition. However, recognition can fail, and it remains to be seen when and why recognition should fail. There seems to be a lacuna in the explanation of why we see things in picture in the Aspect-Recognition Theory if, as is sometimes the case, pictures are so complex that recognition gives out. What aids recognition where it would otherwise fail?

Lopes anticipates this and identifies two additional pictorial modes of identification. The first is information-based, that is, if one has independent information, perhaps from testimony, then one can identify the subject in the picture. For example, verbal descriptions
of the fictional character Peter Pan may help us identify pictures of him. The second is conventional, where certain conventions identify depicted subjects. For example, the Virgin Mary is often depicted as wearing blue clothing, a convention that allows us to pick her out and so identify her in pictures. Iconographic pictures often function in this way. Thus Lopes has recourse to other modes of pictorial identification to allow for pictorial recognition.

However, to return to a warning from Wollheim, Lopes's modes of identification are information-based and conventional, not perceptual. As we saw at the beginning of Chapter Three, any theory of depiction ought to preserve the distinctly perceptual nature of our experiences in front of pictures. The two ways identified by Lopes are distinctly non-perceptual. If we could add to our account of pictorial recognition a purely perceptual phenomenon we would do better in developing a perceptual account of depiction. What we want to know is why, on the basis of our visual experiences of pictures, recognition does not fail in certain cases, and to answer this without bringing in non-perceptual criteria with which to solve problem cases. If we could do this then we can preserve the distinctively perceptual nature of the theory of depiction I have been outlining.

To do this requires revising the Aspect-Recognition Theory of depiction, and revising it to include certain phenomena for which I have been arguing throughout this thesis. In what remains of this chapter I will modify the Aspect-Recognition Theory, building into it my account of style and our perceptual experience of style properties, which, I claim, better explains how the phenomenon of pictorial recognition functions. By adapting the Aspect-Recognition Theory in the way I propose, we can not only better understand pictorial recognition, but also better equip the theory to adequately deal with the puzzle of mimesis, which I have claimed is not yet resolved.

4.4 Aspect-Recognition and Style

What aids recognition such that, when it looks as if it is about to stumble, it actually triumphs and one undergoes a seeing-in experience? The answer, I propose, is intimately related to artistic style. The reason we recognise a Cubist portrait as a portrait of a person, despite the minimal information and its obscure configuration of aspects, is because we are familiar with this style of picturing. In chapters One and Two I developed an account of style, and of our perceptual experiences of stylistic properties that I believe can now be brought to bear on the Aspect-Recognition Theory of Depiction. What I will now do is build this account of style into the Aspect-Recognition Theory, and in doing so construct the materials with which to further explain the ability to recognise pictures that have minimal or obscure information, or depict a subject with inflected properties.
As we have seen, seeing things in pictures depends on our recognitional capacities, which are dynamic in various ways. However recognition has its limits. So what explains our ability to see things in pictures when their configurations are obscure or indeterminate? I suggest that it is our knowledge of an artist’s style, of their highly personal way of doing something, that aids recognition where it would otherwise fail. Style, then, is the key to the dynamism of our recognitional abilities. The more we know about an artist’s style, the more dynamic our recognition will be. This is an extension of Lopes’s claim that:

‘Once a viewer has gained the ability to recognise some objects with which she is acquainted when they are presented in split-style aspects, she is then, in principle, able to recognise any object with which she is acquainted under split-style kinds of aspects.’

Thus a knowledge of style extends our recognitional abilities across dimensions, making them generative and more dynamic. The task now is to make good this claim and demonstrate its plausibility and utility in explaining recognition.

How are styles related to aspects? The claim about knowledge of style and recognition will only work within the framework of the Aspect-Recognition Theory if styles are suitably connected with the aspectual structure of pictures. Thus, what is needed to secure the claim that style promotes pictorial recognition is for style to be a significant part of the theory. I think it can be made significant in the following way. My suggestion is that selecting and making explicit certain aspects of the world, which is how a picture depicts its subject, is part of an individual artist’s style. Pictures, as we have seen, are selective; they are committal and non-committal in various ways, but while we may describe a picture as containing the selected aspects, it seems only natural, to my mind at least, to ask - who is doing the selecting? The answer to this can give a clue as to how individual style ties into the Aspect Recognition Theory.

It is the artist who is doing the selecting. Thus my suggestion is that the selection of aspects to make explicit, or to be committal or non-committal in various ways, forms part of an artist’s individual style. The ‘choice’ of aspect, on my view, is thus inherently personal. I use the term ‘choice’ hesitantly here, since we have seen that my account of style allows that an artist’s style need not be consciously chosen. However, the way in which the artist does something is highly personal to her, and this way of doing something involves selecting aspects of her subject to depictively commit to, while remaining non-committal about others. We need not make any claims about the actual underlying psychological states of the artist to claim that aspect selection is personal even if it is not consciously done. The idea that the aspectual structure of pictures is inherently bound up with the activity of the person who made the work accords with some of Lopes’s claims about his Aspect-Recognition theory.

232 Ibid, p. 148
He writes that, ‘pictures are frequently made precisely in order to make explicit certain aspects of the world.’\(^{233}\) Pictures are thus made to demonstrate a preference, and are suited to different aims and purposes; to different ways of doing things. But perhaps one might think it is a leap to connect styles with aspects. However, I think Lopes would not find this too great a step given his claim that pictorial styles are individuated by the kinds of aspects they represent. Further, Lopes does not seem closed to the idea that pictorial styles are connected to aspects. Indeed he writes that, ‘We capture what is distinctive of a style through a description of the types of properties with regard to which they are inexplicitly or explicitly non-committal.’\(^{234}\) And further, that ‘our familiarity with the similarities typical of style is a familiarity with the intentions of the artists working in that style.’\(^{235}\) Thus Lopes, who conceives of depictive styles as aspectually distinguished, ought to be receptive to the idea that depictive styles connect up to artists’ intentions in the way I have proposed.

As such we can plausibly connect styles and aspects such that they can do the work in aiding recognition. The first thing to note about this suggestion is that it preserves the perceptual nature of pictorial recognition. I argued in Chapter Two that we could perceptually represent style properties when looking at a representational picture. This, in part, explained expertise in art, that the expert actually sees pictures differently from the novice. Our expert perceives the stylistic properties of the work. Given this, it is seemingly natural to extend this claim to a claim about the dynamism of recognition. The expert, in being suitably informed and so visually experiencing style properties, has more dynamic recognitional abilities. They have acquired, through experience, the recognitional capacities for certain styles such that when a picture represents its subject in complex ways, this is seen as a feature of style and allows the expert to recognise, and so see, the subject in the picture. As such, the expert need not have recourse to other, non-perceptual, modes of recognition. A perceptual experience of style properties, which makes a recognitional ability more dynamic, secures pictorial recognition.

The second thing to note about connecting styles with aspects in the way I have proposed is that it gives further strength to the Aspect-Recognition Theory’s ability to accommodate inflection, and, importantly the puzzle of mimesis. First, inflection, I claimed, can form part of an artist’s resources, it can be part of their way of doing something. Hence, when inflection occurs, if I am familiar with the style, of the way in which inflection is being used, I may be better positioned to undergo a seeing-in experience. Recognition in cases of inflection is, in part, dependent on familiarity with styles, which explains why it does not give out when faced with inflected pictorial experience. Secondly, and crucially, connecting aspects with style in this way better resolves the puzzle of mimesis and the Aspect-Recognition

\(^{234}\) Ibid, p. 338
\(^{235}\) Lopes, Understanding Pictures, p. 19
Theory’s ability to explain our interest in pictures that more closely match the subjects they depict in actuality. If aspects are the result of ways of doing things, of selecting this aspect and not that aspect, on the part of the artist, then it explains why we are interested in pictures that engender Naturalistic and trompe l’oeil seeing-in experiences. Objects in the world do not have a style, pictures do, and this is the product of an action on the part of the artist; it is the product of her highly personal way of doing something. As such, even where depicted subjects closely match, in terms of aspects, the object in the world, we see this as aesthetically significant to the picture. It is significant because it is stylistically significant.

This explains our interest in pictures that engender Naturalistic or trompe l’oeil seeing-in experiences, and as such better accommodates them within The Aspect-Recognition Theory. If we take the case of trompe l’oeil, and our understanding of style, we can see how our interest in pictures that engender this kind of seeing-in experience is different from our interest in ordinary perceptual experiences of the objects depicted. If trompe l’oeil pictures present selected aspects, and this is a feature of style, then our interest in them is bound to be different from our interest in ordinary visual experiences of their subjects. For there is still a selection among aspects, which has a significance not found in our ordinary perceptual experiences of objects.

Some of the things masters of trompe l’oeil tell us about their work also square with this reasoning. For example, William Harnett, one of the famous trompe l’oeil artists from the Second School of Philadelphia remarked that “In painting from still life I do not closely imitate nature. Many points I leave out and many I add.” He also gives an example of painting a flute and adorning it with glints of gold not seen in the rather modest object in front of him but on a gold coin he had studied. Hence, although a trompe l’oeil seeing-in experience of a trompe l’oeil painting may closely match our visual experience of seeing that object face-to-face, the choice of aspects presented is still intimately related to the artist and their way of doing something. Trompe l’oeil pictures are aspectually structured in ways that reflect artistic choices and selections, which explains why our interest in them is fundamentally different from our interest in ordinary visual experiences of their depicted objects.

That depicted objects match in various ways the object in the world is an important feature of the way in which an artist has done something. Further, as I have argued, those features are high-level properties, which can be perceived in the work by those who have the suitable recognitional capacities. Thus, even where a picture closely matches its depicted subject in actuality, on my view the match is only part of the perceptual story. For despite a match in some respects, there are properties perceptually represented in our visual

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experiences of pictures that are not represented in our visual experiences of the objects themselves. These properties are style properties. As such the content, and by consequence the phenomenology, of our experiences of pictures and our experiences of the objects they depict in the real world, are significantly different with respect to the properties represented. This explains why pictures, despite close matching, hold our interest differently from a visual experience of the depicted object in the real world. Consequently, by building my account of style, and our perception of style features, into the Aspect-Recognition Theory, it gives added force to the theory’s ability to resolve the puzzle of mimesis.

Finally, by connecting styles with aspects, the claim about the generativity of recognition is made more robust. That one can be familiar with an artist’s way of doing something, and that one can perceive features of this in the work, gives a backstory to the claim that seeing an object under a new aspect will allow one to recognise other objects under that same aspect. According to the modified Aspect-Recognition Theory I have outlined, an aspect, while it is in Lopes’s terms ‘a pattern of visual salience’, is salient because it is a feature of style. This is the reason the aspect is significant, and allows one to recognise subjects in different pictures in that same style. As we saw in the discussion of high-level properties in Chapter Two, acquiring a recognitional capacity is a genuine piece of learning, one that transforms future experiences of objects that one can now recognise. As such, acquiring a recognitional capacity for a certain style will transform one’s experiences of other pictures when one sees them in that style. One can learn about an artist’s style, about their way of doing something, which, within the framework of the Aspect-Recognition Theory, is aspectually presented through choice and selection. These properties are firmly rooted in the works themselves, and are there to be perceived. Learning to see those properties thus gives force to the claim that once this is achieved one will be able to recognise other objects in that same style. That aspects are connected with styles explains generativity in recognition.

The claim that styles be considered within the framework of the Aspect-Recognition Theory is somewhat opposite to Neander’s claim about pictorial recognition that we ‘compensate’ for style. Rather, my suggestion is that style, and knowledge of style, forms an integral part of the process by which one can undergo a seeing-in experience of a subject. Recognition, I claim, cannot dispense with style, or to somehow see through it. Instead it is a fundamental part of pictorial recognition, one that allows it to prevail where it would otherwise give out. That I am familiar with the way in which an artist does something allows me to interpret pictures accordingly, and to be competent at recognising the subject. Knowledge of style, and thus having a recognitional capacity, informs my seeing-in experiences.

We are, of course, not all experts; as such, the dynamism of recognition is only extended in those cases where we are suitably informed. Others will have to rely on non-
perceptual modes of pictorial identification. My claim here is that there can be further explanation of the dynamism of recognition, which is available by connecting styles and aspects in the way I have proposed. One might wonder though how easy it is to extend one’s recognitional abilities. I think that knowledge of, and so perception of, style is not an overwhelmingly difficult achievement, though it may take some effort. As Gombrich writes, speaking of the limits of likeness in his *Art and Illusion*:

‘…We can attune ourselves to different styles no less than we can adjust our mental set to different media and different notations. Of course some effort is needed. But this effort to me seems eminently worthwhile…’

Indeed Gombrich cites this worthwhile task as one of his principal reasons for selecting pictorial representation as the subject of his lectures. Thus, while we can adjust ourselves perceptually to see stylistic features that aid pictorial recognition, improving the dynamism of our recognitional abilities is, of course, a genuine piece of learning that, if achieved, will make us more competent in depiction.

4.5 Potential Objections

So far we have seen how my account of style can be built into the framework of the Aspect-Recognition Theory. I have argued that by doing so the theory is improved in its ability to explain the diversity of depiction, in explaining both complex and determinate depictions, and that adapting it to give style significance can better place it to resolve the puzzle of mimesis. However, there are objections to my view that immediately present themselves, which I will now address. By answering these objections I will add further force to the significance and plausibility of the view of depiction I have modified and developed, and in doing so ready the view for its final task, namely resolving familiar problems in the philosophy of depiction.

The first objection one might wage against the Aspect-Recognition Theory, and the way in which I have adapted it, is that it is not sufficiently different from the other perceptual theory of depiction I have rejected, namely the Experienced Resemblance View. One might, given the claims about recognition, wonder why the two theories are posed as opposites, and argue that they are indeed highly similar, that recognising objects in pictures is simply noticing resemblances. In short, the worry is that the Aspect Recognition Theory is simply a ‘re-hash’ of the Experienced Resemblance View, and, as we saw, that view was

237 Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*, p. 54
unconvincing, which might make my view guilty by association. Is it sufficiently different from the Experienced Resemblance View? I think so, and I offer two main reasons why we ought to reject the above objection.

The first is that the premise and commitments from which each theory starts are remarkably different. Resemblance views begin with a claim about the perceptual matching of our experiences of pictures to experiences of object in the real world. The Aspect-Recognition Theory begins with a claim about the non-matching nature of our perceptual experiences of pictures to the perceptual experiences of their objects in the real world. As such, Resemblance views restrict pictorial recognition to pictures that match, in Outline Shape, their subjects in the real world. Hence, they model pictorial aspects on visual aspects, to those that can be presented in ordinary perceptual experience. While the Aspect-Recognition Theory allows for vast changes in the way a subject is depicted, over which recognition can prevail, Hopkins’s resemblance view requires a very close match in Outline Shape between the pictorial surface and the depicted subject in actuality. As Lopes puts it, ‘resemblance theorists wrongly restrict the range of recognizable aspects that pictures may present to those that could be presented in ordinary perception.’

As we have seen this does not do justice to the variety and diversity of pictures, especially given that some pictorial aspects are essentially pictorial e.g. inflection. The Aspect-Recognition Theory, by contrast, does not model pictorial aspects on visual aspects, claiming instead that what can be seen in pictures often outstrips what can be seen in ordinary visual experience. Thus, the premises from which each theory begins are radically different, which results in a highly distinctive account of depiction.

Granted that each theory begins from different theoretical commitments, one might still contend that recognition is essentially involved in noticing resemblances. This brings me to my second main reason for resisting the claim that the two theories are too similar. This reason is that recognition, fundamentally, expands on resemblance. Recognizing an object in a picture is not dependent on seeing that it resembles the object in reality. If it were, it would fail on multiple occasions. Recognition, as has been claimed, is dynamic, and can range across dimensions of variation, to an extent that it can become generative. Hopkins’s Resemblance view, which posits a close match between the Outline Shape of the depicted subject and the subject in actuality, is more restrictive than pictorial recognition, since resemblance in Outline Shape demands the kind of perceptual matching that pictorial recognition does not require. As we have seen, objects change in vast ways and yet recognition is still triggered. A vast change for a Resemblance View would hinder the perception of resemblances in Outline Shape, on which the theory crucially rests. The vast changes over which recognition prevails would undermine the perception of resemblances.

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238 Lopes, Understanding Pictures, p. 147
especially where resemblance in Outline Shape between picture and depicted object in the real world is demanded. As Lopes writes,

‘... it is crucial to recognition that recognizable aspects of an object need not be similar in a uniform sense—objects can change in remarkable ways and yet remain recognizable.’ 239

Hence, while seeing resemblances requires uniformity—uniformity in Outline Shape—recognition operates differently in being dynamic.

However, a recent paper by Robert Briscoe threatens the inseparability of resemblances and recognition, and we may find ourselves plunged into a ‘chicken and egg’ scenario here, or at least into a situation that does not allow for the two to be pulled apart. According to Briscoe, who closely examines the psychological literature on recognition and resemblance, influential Prototype and Exemplar theories take visual object recognition to be, at core, a similarity-based process. Briscoe writes that:

‘According to prototype theories, for example, ascertaining whether a perceived object O belongs to a certain category C involves generating an internal representation of O’s visible properties; retrieving from long-term memory a representation of the visible properties statistically associated with C’s membership; computing the degree of similarity between these two representations; and, last, applying a decision rule that specifies the degree of similarity required for membership in C. Exemplar theories primarily differ from prototype theories in treating stored object representations involved in recognition as representations of previously encountered category members. That said, the categorization process is no less similarity-based. Identifying an animal as a cat, e.g., involves computing the degree of similarity between the animal’s perceived properties and those of previously encountered cats.’ 240

Given that object-recognition in ordinary perception functions in this way, Briscoe thinks there are good empirical reasons to think that pictorial recognition also has this same underlying psychological process; that we ‘compute’ some degree of similarity between a depicted object and previously encountered objects in the real world. As such, computing similarities i.e., resemblances, underpins perceptual recognition, and so pictorial recognition. If this is correct then we cannot disentangle recognition and resemblance, which means that

239 Lopes, Pictures, Styles, and Purposes, p. 337
240 Briscoe, Robert. ‘Depiction, Pictures, and Vision Science.’ Manuscript. (2013) Available at: http://philpapers.org/rec/BRIVRI, p. 23. It’s worth noting that Briscoe’s description of the process of seeing resemblances in this way seems to bolster the objection I waged against the resemblance view in Chapter Three, namely that the experience of seeing resemblances between the picture and the depicted subject in actuality looks conceptual through and through, and yet for Hopkins they are supposedly non-conceptual, which allows him to appeal to them in explaining depiction. If this analysis of the empirical literature is correct then Hopkins cannot appeal to non-conceptual content to secure the claim that a resemblance in Outline Shape between picture and depicted subject secures depiction.
my view and Lopes’s are, at bottom, ‘re-vamped’ Resemblance Theories. If Briscoe is right then it would turn out that all the objections I waged against the Experienced Resemblance Theory in Chapter Three apply equally to my own view.

However, while I find Briscoe’s analysis of the empirical data on object-recognition illuminating, it is not clear that object-recognition maps onto pictorial recognition in the way he suggests. The first thing to note is that while Lopes uses basic perceptual recognition, and our perceptual mechanism of recognition, to inform recognition in the pictorial case, he is clear that pictorial recognition is not identical to ordinary visual recognition. As we saw, Lopes claims that pictorial recognition has a two-level structure which involves content-recognition and subject-recognition. This ensures that pictorial recognition, while exploiting the same perceptual mechanisms found in ordinary object recognition, is distinct from ordinary perceptual recognition. Thus, while it makes use of the perceptual mechanism of recognition, the Aspect-Recognition Theory is not committed to the claim that pictorial recognition is identical to ordinary perceptual recognition. Given this, we need not be committed to any claims about the psychological process in pictorial identification being identical to that of ordinary perceptual recognition. If pictorial recognition is not exploiting exactly the same psychological processes as perceptual recognition, which involves the computing of similarities, then we needn’t suppose that pictorial recognition also involves the computing of resemblances. As such, we needn’t worry that pictorial recognition needs an experience of resemblance in order to function; thus the first objection turns out not to be as troublesome as it first appears.

The second objection one might wage against my view is that it over-generates cases of pictorial recognition, that is, on my view, if one is suitably informed one will always recognise an object in a picture, and undergo a seeing-in experience. This, prima facie, seems false. One could have all the knowledge and perceptual recognitional abilities required and yet still fail to see the subject in the picture. Is this true of my view, that we will always see what a picture depicts? My answer is, unsurprisingly, no, and this is because recognition still has its natural limits. The claim is that knowledge and perception of style aid recognition, not that it secures it in every case. We may be fully informed about caricatures and yet fail to recognize their subject. There are no guarantees for seeing-in, but there are tools and aids.

But perhaps this answer is not enough, in fact it may reveal a further weakness in its admission that perception of style does not secure recognition, and so seeing-in. If it doesn’t secure it then doesn’t it show my account of style and recognition to be false, given that there could be a suitably informed observer who, despite having all the requisite materials to recognize S in P, does not have the appropriate seeing-in experience of S in P? I have two suggestions that provide a negative answer to this complaint against my view. The first is that I could simply dig my heels in regarding this objection and claim that any case where the
spectator is apparently suitably informed yet does not have the seeing-in experience is, despite appearances, not really a case in which the spectator is suitably informed. Thus the conditions for knowledge of style and perception on my account have not been met, which explains why no seeing-in experience is engendered.

While this is a possible explanation, and one I might be entitled to pursue, it seems unsatisfactory. So here is an alternative explanation: we attribute any kind of failure here not to the observer but to the artist. They have failed to depict the subject since no suitably informed perceiver can perceive the picture as a depiction of the subject it purports to depict. This is an extension of Wollheim’s claims about appropriate experiences engendered by pictures:

> ‘Such an experience will elude even the suitable spectator, and that is because the artist failed to make a work that tallies with the intentions that he undoubtedly had. In such cases the work, we must conclude, represents nothing...’

Thus there is now a shift to the artist in being responsible for the failure of a seeing-in experience, or the appropriate experience, since what I have said here does not show that no seeing-in experience occurs, rather that the appropriate one has not occurred. The spectator may have a seeing-in experience, say, of a man, but not of, say, a specific man e.g. Blair.

Hence, failures in recognition have two sources: (1) failure on the part of the spectator, and (2) failure on the part of the artist. No account of depiction can predict the outcome of such failures, that is, what perceptions or seeing-in experiences might occur; it can only make suggestions about how to deal with them should they occur. My own account makes the suggestion that when they do occur then they are due to the occurrence of either (1) or (2). Recognition is not ‘boundlessly elastic’, and (1) and (2) place limits on this.

The final problem, the solution to which I will leave until the final chapter where it will be framed as part of a larger discussion of the difficulty, is that arguably the Aspect-Recognition Theory entails that all depictions are, in theory, misrepresentations. If depictions are precisely non-matching then it turns out they are not faithful representations of their subjects. Mismatching is precisely that, and an account of misrepresentation that is predicated on misattribution of properties to subjects will result in over-generating misrepresentations for the Aspect-Recognition Theory. My answer to this problem is fully argued for in the next chapter, since I think an adequate reply to this objection must first delve into the issue and ultimately decide what misrepresentation consists in. As it turns out, it does not, on my view, simply consist in wrongly attributing properties to depicted subjects. This gives a clue as to how the Aspect-Recognition Theory can meet the objection. Further though, I demonstrate how building in my account of style and so adapting the theory better...

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241 Wollheim, ‘On Pictorial Representation’, p. 404 (See also, Painting as an Art, pp. 48-50)
explains the nature of misrepresentation, demonstrating how it poses problems for the Experienced Resemblance View, whilst allowing my adapted version of The Aspect-Recognition Theory to escape unscathed.

4.6 Picturing as an Information System: Conceptual vs Non-Conceptual Depiction

We have now seen how my account of style can be built into the Aspect-Recognition Theory, and the advantages it can bring. Before I move on to the final chapter, and answer in full the last objection I posed for my account, it is important to differentiate my account of picturing from Lopes’s in one further respect. This is because, while I find Lopes’s account of the aspectual nature of depiction convincing, I find his wider account of picturing as an information system problematic. One need not be committed to such a view of picturing, even if one is committed to claims about the aspectual nature of depiction. And it is important for my view to hesitate on this wider claim about picturing as information systems, since the way in which I have developed the Aspect-Recognition theory undermines many of the claims that the theory of pictures as information systems allows. Indeed my account moves in the opposite direction to one of the most controversial conclusions Lopes reaches. I will spend the remainder of this chapter assessing the claims made by Lopes, in particular his claim that handmade pictures can exhibit belief-independence, and, as such, depiction can be non-conceptual. I want to distance myself from such claims since I think they are false, and my adapted Aspect-Recognition theory that gives style its proper significance is not committed to them.

The theory that pictures are information-transmitting devices has a number of theoretical consequences. For one thing, it allows Lopes to argue for the belief-independence, and so transparency, of handmade pictures. This claim has its roots in the debate concerning the transparency of photographs, an argument most systematically presented by Kendall Walton. Walton claims that photographs are transparent. That is to say that when we look at photographs we literally see the objects photographed. This is not to say that we see the objects directly as we see objects in the real world. Rather we see through photographs, we see the objects by seeing a photograph of them. However, seeing an object through a photograph is still a way of really seeing it, even if that seeing is indirect in being mediated by a photograph.

Walton offers two arguments in favour of the transparency of photographs and the claim that we see through them to the objects. The first is a kind of slippery slope argument

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that appeals to the way in which we talk about seeing through spectacles and mirrors. The suggestion is that we can extend this to our talk of seeing someone through a photograph. If we see through spectacles and telescopes why not also say that we see through photographs? Seeing through spectacles may be indirect but it is, for Walton, still a case of seeing. The second argument rests on the idea of seeing as a causal process whereby one has visual experiences that are counterfactually dependent on the visible properties of objects. This means that one’s visual experiences would change only if the visible properties of the object changed, but, crucially for Walton, these counterfactual relations must be independent of other beliefs (and other intentional states). If a person’s eyes were disconnected, and instead a scientist supplied them with the visual experiences corresponding to what they would have seen were there eyes connected, then this does not count as an instance of seeing for Walton. This is because the visual experiences are dependent on the scientist’s beliefs and not directly counterfactually dependent on the features of the scene before them.

Now, so the argument goes, if belief-independence is constitutive of genuine seeing, then photographs can satisfy this requirement. The dependence of the photograph on the scene is not mediated by any beliefs anyone may have about how that scene appears. Once the camera is set up and the shutter released, the image that appears on the film is in no way dependent on the beliefs of the photographer. Thus, when we look at a photograph we literally see the object through it. Belief-independence secures this for photographs. Conversely, for handmade pictures the counterfactual relations between picture and scene are mediated by the picture maker’s beliefs. Thus we do not see through handmade pictures to the world.

However, Lopes’s account of pictures as information systems challenges this, and he claims that we ought to slide further down the slippery slope and maintain that we do indeed see through handmade pictures. According to Lopes, ‘there is as much reason to believe we see through paintings and drawings as through photographs.’ Lopes thus argues that handmade pictures meet the belief-independence requirement for transparency. One way in which he argues for this is to use the Evansian notion of an information state in ordinary experience and, given his commitment to a picture being an information state, then claim that picturing shares important features with ordinary information states. One of the key features of information states is their belief-independence. For example, a perception caused by perceiving an object is an information state that is carried to the information system, and is independent of the content of one’s beliefs. That one knows and believes that the squares in Adelson’s chessboard are two different colours does nothing to stop our perceiving them as the same colour. Hence the perceptual state exhibits belief-independence.

Lopes, *Understanding Pictures*, p. 181
According to Lopes, pictures function similarly in being informational states caused by the objects, which are their source. ‘What a picture represents’, Lopes writes, ‘is its source, the object or the scene that played the required role in its production. And a handmade picture’s subject is no more determined by the artist’s intentions or beliefs than is a photograph’s.’ 244 A picture is an informational state, which has as its cause the object it represents, and this state is not mediated by any beliefs about the object itself. Thus there is no disanalogy between photographs and handmade pictures for Lopes; they both exhibit belief-independence, and so transparency.

A further argument for the belief-independence of handmade pictures rests on Lopes’s conception of the process of drawing. According to Lopes, drawing is simply a recognition-based skill, and recognition is a perceptual, experiential process. Lopes claims that ‘we can recognize objects without the benefit of beliefs about their properties’,245 and the process of drawing, according to Lopes, is simply applied recognition. In drawing, one is simply required to make marks that are recognizably of the appearance of the object that is guiding your drawing movements. Beliefs are dispensable in this process. As Lopes puts it, ‘A belief that one is drawing Piccadilly Circus is not required in order to make an object that can be recognized as of Piccadilly Circus.’246

Furthermore, making a picture, Lopes claims, is making something with non-conceptual content. He claims that, insofar as drawing is a recognition-based skill, that it requires the picture maker to be guided only by the appearance of an object; it does not require that the properties of what is drawn be conceptualised. An artist’s drawings may simply reflect her experience of the world. And since beliefs are composed of concepts, it follows that the process of drawing has non-conceptual content that one can experience, and so one can draw something without having any beliefs about that thing. Lopes writes that, ‘in drawing the eye and the hand work together, perhaps bypassing the mind, or rather that portion of the mind that deals in concepts and beliefs.’247 Pictorial contents are belief-independent because they are non-conceptual, and there are no beliefs without concepts. Consequently both photographs and handmade pictures maintain belief-independent patterns of counterfactual dependence on their subjects. Handmade pictures thus satisfy the belief-independence requirement for transparency.

These two arguments taken together provide a powerful argument to the point that handmade pictures are transparent. Thus if there is a difference between handmade pictures and photographs it cannot consist in the uniqueness of belief-independence to photographs. However, Lopes is careful to add that he is not suggesting that drawing never engages our

244 Ibid, p. 184
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid, p. 186
conceptual repertoire, or that artists never form any beliefs about the objects they are
drawing. The claim is that concepts, and so beliefs, are dispensable in this process, and as
such it is not a necessary condition on the act of drawing that our conceptual repertoire be
engaged. Still, the claim Lopes makes is a very strong one. He claims that he sees, ‘no reason
why an artist must bring to bear any concepts about the content of a picture he is making. It is
possible to draw something, guided by the look of the thing...without having a concept of
it.’ 248 So the claim is that having a belief about an object is not a necessary condition for
drawing it, and that any kind of concept about the object whatsoever is also dispensible.

Berys Gaut objects to this conception of drawing, appealing to the conceptual
nature of action itself (and drawing is certainly an action of some kind). ‘Drawings’, Gaut
writes, ‘by definition, are the product of an action, the act of drawing something…One
wants to draw a cat, for example, and believes that by making such-and-such marks, one will
do so.’ 249 Action is distinct from mere behaviour because the action is intentional under
some description, and is thus brought under a concept by the agent. ‘Actions’, Gaut
continues, ‘have intentional explanations: every action is to be explained by the agent’s
beliefs and desires. Beliefs and desires are constituted by concepts. So if a drawing is made,
the process of its making must be governed by concepts.’ 250

These intentional explanations are what make the difference between actions and
mere behaviour. My turning on the light can be explained in terms of the beliefs and desires
I have, it can be explained intentionally. However, my action of turning on the light may also
startle the cat but I did not intend to startle her since I was not aware of her presence. As
such, startling the cat is not an intentional action since it cannot be explained by any of my
beliefs or desires. Thus drawings are the products of the action, or series of actions, of
drawing, and their content is explained by an ineliminable appeal to artist’s beliefs and
desires. These beliefs and desires explain why the drawing has the content it does.

Gaut does not claim that every feature of an action is intentional; just as startling the
cat was a feature of my action of turning on the light that was unintentional. Likewise, not
every feature of a drawing-action need be intended and as such not every feature of a scene
an artist is drawing need be conceptualised. The claim is only that some content must be
brought under concepts by an artist, that their drawing-action is explained in part by their
beliefs and desires. This is enough however to undermine Lopes’ argument since belief-
indepenence for Lopes rests on the claim that no concepts at all are present in the act of
picture making. However, it is a necessary feature of the action of drawing that some
concepts be brought to bear since that action is to be explained in part by reference to the

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248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid. 
beliefs and desires of the artist. The mediation cannot be experience alone, as Lopes claims, since this would not be the action of drawing.

Perhaps one might defend Lopes by granting that drawing is an action but asking the following question - is drawing necessarily the product of an intentional action? It doesn’t look like drawings, by definition, are the products of intentional actions. One could absent-mindedly produce a drawing, or perhaps by intending to do something else one’s actions produce a drawing. But even if drawings need not be the product of an intentional action, it isn’t going to help Lopes much. Presumably Lopes is applying his arguments to those drawings that are the products of intentional actions since it proves very little to say that a drawing produced unintentionally can involve no beliefs or concepts. If we’re talking about drawing as an unintentional action then plausibly no beliefs or concepts need be involved as explaining that action. As such we have an example of drawing that does not necessarily involve reference to beliefs or concepts. But if we’re talking about drawing as an intentional action it seems implausible. It is drawings of these kinds, as the products of intentional actions, that are of interest here. Indeed the nature of drawing as discussed by Lopes suggests that indeed he is talking about drawings as the product of intentional actions:

‘The artist looks at an object, marks a surface, checks to see whether the result is recognizable as of the object, and then revises the drawing until a recognizable aspect emerges.’ 251

This is to talk of the intentional action of drawing, and indeed the checking in this example illustrates one’s desires to accurately represent the subject, and that the artist has the belief that in marking the surface an accurate drawing will be produced. Gaut’s point still holds since it seems highly implausible that one intends to produce a drawing, guided by our experience of the subject, and intentionally makes marks on a canvas such that a drawing will be produced, without bringing to bear any beliefs or other intentional states whatsoever.

Related to this notion of checking, Gaut has a further argument against Lopes. According to Lopes, experience could be the only thing guiding one’s drawing actions and not beliefs. So beliefs drop out as playing a necessary role. In response to this claim, Gaut asks us to consider the following:

‘How, on this account, is the artist supposed to adjust the drawing in order to capture the appearance of its subject. Since only experience may be involved, she just see, presumably, that, say, a cat drawing is not as black as the cat and alters the drawing appropriately. But this claim occludes the role of beliefs and desires in the drawing process. To see that P, a picture, is blacker than O, its object, is to make a type of judgment: Seeing that involves a judgment, in a way that simply seeing an object does not.’ 252

251 Lopes, Understanding Pictures, p. 186
252 Gaut, A Philosophy of Cinematic Art, pp. 86-87
In order to adjust one’s drawing one must see that $\phi$ is the case, which is to make a type of judgement, and hence to hold a perceptual belief that $\phi$ is the case. Thus belief must be involved in the drawing process where that process involves adjusting one’s drawing appropriately.

Something Gaut does not discuss but I think is important and related to seeing that concerns how seeing that the object one is purporting to depict relates to other objects in the scene and, believing that things are so, one attempts to capture those spatial relations in one’s drawing. However, while in photographs this point of view and the spatial relations between objects depicted depends in no way on an artist’s beliefs, in a handmade picture that point of view and the spatial relations between the object depicted and the other objects in the scene rests entirely on how the artist believes those spatial relations to be, even if, in the end, she decides to thwart them in her depiction. One sees that an object is at such-and-such a distance from another object, forms the belief that such-and-such is the case, and if one wants to induce a perceptual matching seeing-in experience, checks to see whether one’s drawing accurately represents this, and adjusts it accordingly. It might even be the case that one needs to see that certain spatial relations hold in actuality in order to be able to aspectually structure one’s picture differently from the actual scene.

One can also construct an epistemic argument against the transparency of handmade pictures. There is an epistemic difference between photographs and handmade pictures such that, while photographs are in some way constrained to represent the facts, handmade pictures are not as reliable in this way. Robert Hopkins cashes out this difference by maintaining that photographs allow for what he terms ‘factive pictorial experience’\textsuperscript{253}, that is to say that what is seen in a picture is indeed how things really were when the picture was made, and so, as a matter of necessity, its accuracy is guaranteed. Thus while photographs, of necessity according to Hopkins, accurately represent that such-and-such was the case at a time, handmade pictures are not constrained in this way and are liable to misrepresent, even if that misrepresentation is minimal. Handmade pictures never support factive pictorial experience since, when they are accurate, they are so only in virtue of how someone took things to be. For traditional photography, on the other hand, seeing that something is the case in no way determines what appears on a photographic film. For handmade pictures, seeing that, which involves a judgment about how things appear, forms the very basis of our ability to draw.

Thus, while the Aspect-Recognition theory of depiction has multiple benefits, committing it to claims about information transmission, and, in virtue of this, transparency, is problematic, and it is problematic independently of the fact that this claim about

transparency fundamentally does not fit with my own view. On my view pictures are aspectually structured, but this structure is selected by the artist, and forms part of her way of doing something. Her way of doing something is highly personal, and our knowledge of this, and our perceptual experience of stylistic features, aids pictorial recognition and seeing-in. A consequence of this is that handmade pictures are fundamentally the products of intention, of choices and selections, which is predicated on the idea that they have a style. Whatever is involved in this process, of seeing the world and depicting it in one’s own way, I think it is conceptual through and through.

Of course a personal style can be unconscious, it can be habitual and instinctual, as we saw might have been the case for Matisse. While one’s actions may not be preconceived or ‘held in one’s mind’ this does not rule out the aspects of style that are, and further, the simple fact that one is trying to depict a recognizable subject, even if the resulting depiction is obscure, seems necessarily to involve some beliefs about the object when one is trying to capture it on a two-dimensional surface. Thus, while I do not beg the question against Lopes, his claims are implausible independently of any claims I make about depiction; my view is at odds with his in an important respect - that individual style precludes the belief-independence of the act of picture making.

Hence, to conclude this chapter, we have arrived at a theory that is distinct from Lopes’s but bears important similarities with regard to aspect-recognition. I have adapted the theory, and the claim that pictorial recognition exploits certain perceptual skills, to include my own account of style, claiming that it makes better sense of our ways of seeing-in established in Chapter Three, and the puzzle of mimesis. This view has further advantages however, to which the next chapter is dedicated. We have seen that it resolves some puzzles about depiction, but I have left the most troublesome until last, namely pictorial misrepresentation and pictorial indeterminacy. These problems have put considerable pressure on other accounts, and indeed formed part of my main criticisms of the Experienced Resemblance View. As such, the view I have developed ought to be able to better explain them. I think it can, and in the next chapter I demonstrate how it does so.

254 p. 42 of this thesis
Chapter Five
Misrepresentation, Pictorial Indeterminacy, and the Significance of Style

Having argued for a theory of depiction that incorporates my account of style, I will now turn my attention to two phenomena that all accounts of depiction ought to be able to explain, and indeed where the view I have developed fares better. The first is pictorial misrepresentation, and the second is pictorial indeterminacy. We saw that these phenomena caused trouble for the Experienced Resemblance Theory. But in order to be sure that they do not trouble my view we must consider them in detail and adequately define them. In this chapter I begin by describing what pictorial misrepresentation is not, arguing against a definition of misrepresentation that can be plausibly drawn out of Hopkins’s defence of his Experienced Resemblance view. This definition has as its basis the view that representation involves inaccurately ascribing properties to a depicted subject. However, I show that a proponent of the view is forced to claim that misrepresentation is absolutely rife among the arts, and to maintain a very limited conception of the representational capacities of pictures. As such, I claim that we ought to resist this definition as it stands, and that incorrectly ascribing properties to the depicted subject is only a necessary condition for misrepresentation. Something else is needed for sufficiency.

To argue against the adequacy of the initial definition of misrepresentation, I introduce an account of pictorial realism, in particular Dominic Lopes’s account, which satisfactorily explains the diversity of judgements of realism. This view of realism mounts further pressure on the plausibility of Hopkins’s account of misrepresentation by severing the connection between realism and accuracy. With this in place, and having rejected the view of misrepresentation as inaccurately ascribing properties to a depicted subject, I suggest that misrepresentation is intimately related to artistic style, such that it can provide the required sufficiency condition with which to correctly determine cases of misrepresentation. Thus my account of depiction, which gives style its proper significance, can explain pictorial misrepresentation. The final part of this chapter addresses the problem of pictorial indeterminacy, as it was discussed in Chapter Three. There we saw that it made trouble for the Experienced Resemblance view with its reliance on Outline Shape as a criterion of depiction. The sparseness of some depictions confirmed the inadequacy of Outline Shape, and in this chapter I again show how connecting an Aspect-Recognition Theory with my account of style can better explain the phenomenon.
5.1 What Misrepresentation Is Not

What is misrepresentation? Misrepresentation in the pictorial arts is a curious case. It is curious because for a picture to misrepresent one must simultaneously see it as representing the subject depicted and see the depicted subject as enjoying properties it does not in fact enjoy. Misrepresentation is in some sense a failure but it is not a failure to represent at all. Hence typically, and perhaps intuitively, misrepresentation describes those cases in which something is represented but not represented, or depicted, accurately. There are many kinds of misrepresentation. I can misrepresent a person’s character by describing them as unfriendly when in fact they are perfectly pleasant, I can misrepresent the facts of this or that situation, and I can misrepresent the distance between landmarks on a map by using a faulty key. In cases of misrepresentation, then, something has gone awry, or wrong, or has misfired. But what is pictorial misrepresentation? What has gone ‘wrong’ in a picture that misrepresents its subject?

Here is where the situation becomes tricky. The term ‘misrepresentation’ has a negative sting, and we often use it in a normative sense to describe cases where something has gone wrong. However, I do not wish to make any normative claim about misrepresentation. To be clear, what I am interested in here is whether something depictively misrepresents i.e., involving visual properties of the depicted subject; it is possible that something can depictively represent a subject while misrepresenting it some other way. Consider the following example. I decide to depict someone who, despite their kind-hearted nature, has upset me in some way. I create a depiction of them, and anyone looking at that picture will recognise my kind-hearted enemy in the picture; that is to say that anyone who looks at my picture will undergo a seeing-in experience of that person. As such I have successfully depicted my kind-hearted enemy. However, what I have thus far withheld from the story about my depiction is that I depict my kind-hearted enemy as committing some terrible act, one that anyone who knows my kind-hearted enemy would know she would not do because she is kind-hearted.

Now, what I have ‘done’ in my picture, among other things, is to say something false about this person. One might thus plausibly say that I have misrepresented my kind-hearted enemy; and in saying this one means it in a negative sense, that I ought not to have done this. Here is the normative sense of the term ‘misrepresentation’. While I am of course interested in cases where pictures misrepresent their subjects in this sense, my primary interest in this chapter is to describe the nature of depictive misrepresentation, which, insofar as everyone sees my kind-hearted enemy in the picture, my picture is not guilty of. Furthermore, as will be established in more detail in this chapter, even if inaccurate

255 I would like to thank Dominic Lopes for suggesting an example of this kind to me.
properties are ascribed to the depicted subject, in this case my kind-hearted enemy, insofar as everyone sees my kind-hearted enemy in the picture, my picture depictively succeeds. As such, inaccuracy is consistent with depictive success, a claim that this chapter aims to make good.

Thus, on the one hand, we have what can be termed ‘normative misrepresentation’, connected with the negative complaint about my picture showing my kind-hearted enemy committing some atrocity, and on the other, depictive misrepresentation. My primary concern is with the latter kind since it is this kind that causes problems for theories of depiction, and the notion that inaccuracy is consistent with depictive success will distance myself from other accounts of depictive misrepresentation. This distinction will be important throughout this chapter, since objections to my positive account of pictorial representation are likely to hone in on this area of ambiguity in the meaning of the term ‘misrepresentation’.

Now that I have outlined the kind of misrepresentation I am interested in, namely depictive misrepresentation, how should we define it? Perhaps the best way of characterising pictorial misrepresentation, which we intuitively take to be in some sense a distortion of the facts, albeit visually rather than descriptively, is as inaccurately ascribing properties to a depicted subject. Again, saying that a picture has inaccurately ascribed properties to the depicted subject is not meant to make any normative claim, rather it simply describes the visual properties enjoyed by the depicted subject as compared with the visual properties the subject has in actuality. Let us take as our starting point then the following definition:

(D1) misrepresentation occurs when a picture ascribes properties to its subject that it does not really enjoy.

Something akin to this definition can be found in Robert Hopkins’ discussion of misrepresentation in his *Picture, Image, and Experience*. He writes that:

’[a] picture is not bound to ascribe only properties which the item actually enjoys. When the picture does not do so, we have pictorial misrepresentation—as in a picture which depicts the Eiffel Tower as blue, or as standing on the banks of the Ganges.’ 256

Indeed it is a definition that crops up later on in Hopkins’s defence of his Experienced Resemblance view of depiction since, as we have seen, it looks difficult for the view to explain how we can see in surfaces a particular with a property it does not possess. Here we find our initial definition of misrepresentation surfacing again because, according to Hopkins, ‘such seeing-in is the basis of pictorial misrepresentation.’ 257 Given the view’s commitment to depiction consisting in an experienced resemblance in Outline Shape

256 Hopkins. *Picture, Image, and Experience*, p. 30
257 Ibid, p. 96
between depicted subject and object in the real world, it does not look as if the Resemblance View can allow for misrepresentation at all.

As we saw in Chapter Three, Hopkins proposed a solution to the problem of misrepresentation by suggesting that we abandon the core assumption of Resemblance Theories of depiction, namely that if resemblance is to play a role in depicting an item, it is resemblance to the item as it really is. However, I argued in Chapter Three that Hopkins’s proposed solution does not work, since abandoning this core assumption leaves the view open to the objection that without it the view cannot explain why we should see one particular subject and not another. If both of the subjects are depicted as possessing the same properties, then Hopkins’s suggestion that a concept of one particular will enter at the exclusion of the other does not do the explanatory work. The arguments in this chapter can be seen as, in part, bolstering that concern, and putting further pressure on the idea that the Experienced Resemblance Theory can cope with pictorial misrepresentation.

Aside from the difficulties with Hopkins’s proposed solution to the problem of misrepresentation, we might still ask whether the above definition, (D1), provides us with a sufficient condition for misrepresentation. To answer this question I will again take a cue from Hopkins and begin with the case that he identified as problematic for his resemblance view. The case in question was caricature, in particular a caricature of Tony Blair, who is depicted with wild eyes, huge ears, and an eccentric hairstyle. These are all properties that the real Blair does not possess. As such, according to Hopkins, the caricature misrepresents Blair. But, Hopkins claims, this is not to suggest that caricatures do not tell us something genuine about the person depicted. In fact a caricature may often tell us more about the person by exaggerating certain features. ‘But’, Hopkins writes, ‘It does so precisely through distorting his physical features…’ Thus by misrepresenting Blair something profound can be expressed by the caricature.

It is important to note that Hopkins is focusing entirely on depictive misrepresentation here. He claims that through misrepresentation, through the inaccurate ascription of properties to the depicted subject, something profound can be said about the subject. What is expressed or said about the subject seems different from what is depicted. As we have seen, we can be successful in depiction and yet misrepresent our subject, or conversely for Hopkins’s example, we can depictively misrepresent yet say something true about our depicted subject. While depictive misrepresentation and misrepresentation in some other sense i.e., the normative sense, might be intimately related, one can commit one kind of misrepresentation but not the other. As such we ought to put claims about true or profound things being said about the subject to one side and hone in on the claim that the

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258 Ibid, p. 104  
259 Ibid.
inaccurate ascription of properties to the depicted subject constitutes depictive misrepresentation.

While my purpose in this chapter is not to directly challenge the Experienced Resemblance view (that was the concern in Chapter Three), I do think it is important to point out that the characterisation Hopkins gives of misrepresentation presupposes a Resemblance View of depiction. This is because it turns out that any picture that does not resemble its subject—a picture that does not accurately ascribe properties—is a misrepresentation. Thus if we accept this account of misrepresentation it looks as if we are in some way committed to a resemblance view of depiction. But perhaps this will not be troublesome for many. As such we cannot challenge this definition of misrepresentation on pain of committing ourselves to a Resemblance View of depiction. Arguments against that view, while intimately related to the concerns in this chapter, have been considered elsewhere.

However, what is significant for my purposes here is that thus far no argument has been given for this definition of misrepresentation that does not presuppose a Resemblance View. As such it remains to be seen why we should conclude on the basis of wrongfully ascribed properties that pictorial misrepresentation has occurred. The appeal to caricature seems to suggest an intuition about caricatures— that they are misrepresentations and, in virtue of this, they say something true about their subjects. But why can’t the intuition go in the other direction? Why not suppose that caricatures are successful depictions, since everyone sees the subject in the picture despite inaccurately ascribed properties, and they tell us something true about their subjects?

Resemblance theorists cannot answer this without presupposing their own view. So perhaps the real difficulty for a Resemblance View is not that the caricature misrepresents Blair but rather that it quite adequately represents him whilst at the same time looking different from Blair in actuality. The onus is then on the Resemblance View to explain how a representation that does not resemble Blair is indeed a representation of Blair. If the only argument against the point that our intuitions about caricatures can go in the opposite direction presupposes that a Resemblance View is correct, then perhaps we ought to throw suspicion on (D1).

Indeed I believe that there are many reasons we should resist it. Firstly, if (D1) is correct then it turns out that depictive misrepresentation is absolutely rife among the arts, since many pictures do not accurately ascribe properties to their subjects. I would contend, however, that the distortion of physical properties is an important way in which artists faithfully represent their subject. In fact it might even be the case that such distortion can get us closer to our actual experience of subjects. We have already encountered examples of this, such as split-style depictions, but some of the things artists tell us about their work
also support this. For example, Picasso said of his painting of his lover Dora Maar that his use of the double profile stemmed from his keeping his eyes always open. Because of this, when he kissed her, this was how she appeared to him. As such, despite depicting her with properties she does not actually possess, for Picasso, the painting captures something true of his experience of her. Her face is, for him, truly represented. With distortion functioning as a significant artistic device that strives to get closer to our experience of the subjects depicted, it seems odd to call Picasso’s painting a misrepresentation. Yet if depictive misrepresentation consists in wrongly ascribing properties to a subject then this is what his painting must be. Without wishing to presuppose my own view about depictive misrepresentation, it is worth noting that distortion can be a stylistic feature, that is a way of doing something. As such, if Hopkins’s view of depictive misrepresentation turns out to be correct, we would also have to claim that stylistic features significantly contribute to a picture’s being a misrepresentation. Again this sounds odd given that in creating a work artists are, I think it is safe to assume, trying to depict rather than misrepresent their subject in their own way i.e., in their own style.

Though perhaps Picasso’s style is a strong case of distortion. As such some further examples might better illustrate the point that the subject matter can look to us nothing like the actual object yet we see in it the very thing it purports to depict. Somehow the distortion evokes in us a seeing-in experience that is closer to our experience of seeing the subject face-to-face. Consider Van Gogh’s painting *Wheat Field with Crows* (fig. 10). The painting depicts the sky using sharp, harsh lines of colour, something that ordinary visual experience does not, and could not, involve an awareness of. The sky is distorted by these features, which, given that they are the kinds of properties that cannot be seen in face-to-face experience, look apt to be described as inflected properties. We see in the picture a sky as composed of black and blue shards jarring against, and colliding with, one another. Yet skies do not enjoy the property of sharp, distinguishable lines of colours, what we describe as brush marks. But something about that very distortion, about the way the distinguishable shards of blues and blacks impact with each other, evokes in us a seeing-in experience of a tempestuous sky similar to that of an actual sky threatening thunder. And if this case of inflection proves troublesome for our initial definition, then I suspect other inflected pictures will put a similar strain on it, which I will discuss in due course. As such, despite inaccuracy, Van Gogh’s painting proves itself to be a faithful representation of its subject; of the experience one would have in front of the real scene.

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The thought that distortion, or embellishment, in art can get us closer to an actual experience of a depicted subject is expressed by Ruskin in his discussion of ‘Turnerian Topography’, which is described as an imaginative art that goes beyond simple topography. Ruskin begins by discussing a simple topography of the Pass of Faïdo, in the canton of Ticino in Switzerland, which is neither interesting nor impressive, and would not serve to evoke in the viewer the sensations of actually seeing this beautiful and awe-inspiring ravine. From this Ruskin goes on to claim that:

‘[And] the aim of the great inventive landscape painter must be to give the far higher and deeper truth of mental vision, rather than that of the physical facts, and to reach a representation which, though it may be totally useless to engineers or geographers, and, when tried by rule and measure, totally unlike the place, shall yet be capable of producing on the far-away beholder’s mind precisely the impression which the reality would have produced, and putting his heart into the same state in which it would have been, had he verily descended into the valley from the gorges of Airolo.’

While we may want to claim that an artist inaccurately depicted the subject, thereby enhancing what was really there before them, to say that they have misrepresented their subject seems to miss the point that Ruskin is articulating so eloquently. In fact, to complain that this picture misrepresents its subject seems precisely that-a complaint. This brings us back to the point about the normative sense of misrepresentation. Criticising Turner for misrepresenting the landscape implies he has done something wrong, that he has made a mistake. This sounds odd, and the point that Ruskin seems to be getting at is precisely that ‘mistakes’ and inaccuracies can be intentional; they can enhance the composition and help to achieve individual creative goals. They can be indicative of an artist’s style, which makes their work their own and issues in a personal vision of their subject. While one might claim that Turner has misrepresented the scene in some normative sense, depictively speaking, which is

the sense we are interested in here, if one has a seeing-in experience of the subject in the picture despite the inaccuracies then the depiction is successful.

Some of these considerations also show up in our appreciative responses to artworks. One could imagine two identical canvases, one painted by an artist, the other by a child. Both incorrectly ascribe a property to their depicted subject. However, though we might want to apply a standard of correctness to the child’s depiction it would be highly inappropriate to suggest to an artist that she has made a mistake. The distortion of physical features in most pictures does not suggest something has gone wrong, nor do we respond to them as if it had. As such our appreciative responses do not involve standards of correctness, and we do not recognize most paintings to be misrepresentations despite the fact that (D1), taken literally, entails that most are. Part of this seems premised on the idea that artists have depictive and artistic intentions, they are aiming not only to depict something but also to depict it in their own way. Again we might take into consideration that an artist has an individual style, which precludes one from inappropriately applying standards of correctness (though of course one might still choose to do so).

Further, (D1), which is premised on a Resemblance View, is also troubled by the phenomenon of inflection, which was discussed in detail in Chapters Three and Four. How does inflection make trouble for this view? In short, the demand for a perceptual match causes further problems in considering which pictures are misrepresentations. As we have seen, inflection, by definition, means that pictures engendering an inflected seeing-in experience have features that could not be seen in face-to-face experiences. As such, pictures that engender inflected seeing-in experiences amount to misrepresentation if (D1) is true. Thus inflection is tantamount to misrepresentation. This outcome is predicted by (D1), where misrepresentation consists in an inaccurate match between depicted object and object in the real world given the misattribution of properties. The phenomenon of inflection thus puts further pressure on the plausibility of (D1). Given that inflected seeing-in is a species of representational seeing, since it is agreed by most (including Hopkins) to occur at least sometimes, a better move would be to claim that (D1) is false, as it stands. Inflected seeing-in, then, does not amount to misrepresentation, contra (D1).

Part of the problem with this definition of misrepresentation is that it assumes a very narrow conception of pictorial realism. Our initial definition, (D1), like the Resemblance View, assumes some kind of matching between depiction and depicted object, which rests on the idea that the properties depicted must match those enjoyed by the object in actuality. The more it matches, the more realistic the picture. As we have seen, Hopkins’s Resemblance View is a matching perceptual theory of depiction, since he claims that the Outline Shape of a depicted subject and the Outline Shape of the actual subject will match
given that they subtend the same angles. However, that assumption is false. Pictorial realism need not consist in this kind of matching between depiction and depicted object. If this is true, and inaccurately ascribing properties to a depicted object does not threaten its realism, then again this ought to put pressure on the idea that misrepresentation solely consists in misattributing properties to a depicted object. In the next section I introduce an account of pictorial realism, which adequately explains pictorial diversity and mounts pressure on the idea that matching the depicted properties of the subject with the properties the subject actually enjoys amounts to realism. In denying this is sufficient for realism, the materials with which to construct an argument in favour of disposing of the view of misrepresentation that consists in the misattribution of properties become available.

5.1.1 Pictorial Realism and Accuracy

At first sight, pictorial realism seems to be understood as in some way involving accuracy or informativeness; the more accurately a picture depicts its subject, the more informative it is about that subject, and thus the more realistic it is. This seems initially appealing, and perhaps pictorial realism only ends where illusion begins, as might be the case in viewing highly successful trompe l’oeil paintings. Dominic Lopes calls this view of pictorial realism the ‘traditional or ‘simple’ account of pictorial realism, and his description of the view immediately echoes the sentiment expressed by our initial definition of misrepresentation. According to Lopes, on this ‘simple’ view, ‘To say representational realism depends on accuracy is to say that a picture is realistic to the extent that its subject has the properties it is depicted as having’. Hence an unrealistic picture, one that is inaccurate in the properties it ascribes to its subject, is, on the view of misrepresentation characterised by (D1), a misrepresentation. Thus, on that view, the connection between pictorial realism and pictorial misrepresentation is firmly established, since pictures that are unrealistic turn out to be misrepresentations according to (D1) alone. My strategy here is to reject the connection between unrealistic pictures and misrepresentation by rejecting the ‘simple’ account of pictorial realism. If there is no connection between accuracy and realism, and so no connection between realism and misrepresentation, then (D1) is false since it commits us to claiming that unrealistic pictures are misrepresentations.

262 Hopkins, *Picture, Image, and Experience*, p. 53
264 Ibid, p. 278
Indeed, the connection between accuracy and realism is not only tenuous but also fundamentally flawed. As the art historian Linda Nochlin notes:

‘The commonplace notion that Realism is a “styleless” or transparent style, a mere simulacrum or a mirror image of visual reality, is another barrier to its understanding as an historical and stylistic phenomenon.’

There is a history of thinking in this way. Nelson Goodman’s work reminds us that this transparency does not exist, and that everything is seen through a conventional lens. Similarly, Ruskin and Gombrich affirm the myth of the innocent eye, while Constable compares seeing nature to learning to read hieroglyphs. Realism then, is not simply the styleless default.

Dominic Lopes goes some way towards disposing of the view that accuracy is sufficient for realism. To use his example, the ‘happy face’ drawing that consists of two dots for eyes and a curved line for a mouth is accurate to the extent that all faces have two eyes and a mouth. However, as he rightly notes, there is more to faces than the characteristically ‘happy face’ depicts. Thus while we may intuitively feel that accuracy is important, it is certainly not sufficient for realism. Furthermore, the ‘simple’ view of realism, which often combines accuracy and informativeness, fares no better. Lopes proposes three counterexamples that ought to make us reject the idea of pictorial realism consisting in accuracy and informativeness. Firstly, Lopes claims that accuracy is not only insufficient for realism but also is not even necessary. Some realistic pictures may misrepresent their subjects by, Lopes writes, ‘attributing to them properties they do not have’. What Lopes says here will likely be ringing alarm bells regarding the distinctive similarity with (D1) above; more on this in a moment. Secondly, Lopes raises the counterexample of fictional pictures which are neither accurate nor inaccurate; and fictional pictures can certainly be realistic. Thirdly, in another counterexample, a cartoon or simple sketch may be more realistic than a Cubist painting, which Lopes thinks can disclose plenty of information.

To return to the similarity between the sentiment expressed by (D1) and the thought expressed by Lopes in his first counterexample. I think this is unfortunate, and a point at which my thinking departs from Lopes. According to Lopes a picture can misrepresent by inaccurately ascribing properties to the depicted subject, and that picture can still be realistic. But if realism is not tracking accuracy, why must we conclude that in this case we have pictorial misrepresentation? If accuracy is not required for realism, why make the further claim that the inaccuracy of ascribed properties amounts to misrepresentation? It seems that

266 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, p. 12.
267 Lopes, ‘Pictorial Realism’, p. 278
268 Ibid
269 Ibid
if Lopes relinquishes accuracy as a condition for realism there is no additional motivation to call this picture a misrepresentation. If inaccuracy is tolerated by realism then there does not seem to be any reason why we ought to conclude on the basis of inaccuracy that misrepresentation has occurred. Hence, while I agree with Lopes’s claim that accuracy certainly isn’t necessary or sufficient for realism, I do not accept the further claim that misrepresentation has occurred since I have argued thus far that an acceptance of (D1) entails implausible consequences. Something else is needed to establish that this picture is a misrepresentation if inaccuracy is permitted in pictorial realism.

But still we may feel the intuitive pull of Lopes’s example. The picture is realistic but it has made a mistake of some kind; it has failed in some way. Surely this failure constitutes misrepresentation? Hence one may feel that the desire to call this picture a misrepresentation is telling in itself, and a significant drawback to denying the further claim is that it cannot make sense of this intuition. No matter, I think our claim to misrepresentation happening in some pictures can be secured in other ways, ways that do not depend solely on inaccurately ascribing properties. I go on to defend a different way of conceiving of misrepresentation in the next section. Thus, for now at least, the claim can be maintained that Lopes’s motivation to call this picture a misrepresentation is unwarranted.

Differences aside, I think that Lopes’s counterexamples do show that a combination of accuracy and informativeness does not suffice for pictorial realism. Since a realistic picture might be inaccurate, a fictional picture neither accurate nor inaccurate, and a picture with relatively minimal detail may be more realistic than a picture that offers up an abundance of information, the simple view of pictorial realism ought to be rejected. I think it is this view that underlies the definition of misrepresentation characterised by (D1), and is thus too narrow, resulting in a view of misrepresentation that belies our experiences of pictures and what we see them as representing. So much, then, for the simple view. How, then, should we characterize pictorial realism if not in terms of the accuracy with which pictures depict their subjects? An answer to this question will require a return to the themes of Chapter Four, since the Aspect-Recognition theory discussed there motivates the view of pictorial realism that I believe to be correct. It is this view that connects with issues of artistic style, the concept of which will form part of the positive account of misrepresentation in this chapter.

As we saw in Chapter Four, Dominic Lopes proposes a non-matching perceptual theory of depiction, which has its basis in the idea that pictures present aspects of their subjects, which viewers can recognize since the presentation of those aspects engages their recognitional capacities.\textsuperscript{270} Hence different ways of depicting objects capture different, recognisable, aspects. We also saw that pictures are not determinate in all respects, pictures

\textsuperscript{270} Lopes, Understanding Pictures.
may be committal and non-committal in various ways. From this theoretical background, and taking a cue from Nelson Goodman’s views on convention, Lopes proposes that realism is relative to the system (or modes or styles) of representation. Hence, pictures that are inaccurate, fictional, or minimally informative may be realistic interpreted within some system of representation. Again Lopes makes use of his claims concerning aspects of pictures, proposing that we individuate systems on the basis of the aspects presented. Hence different systems of picturing present different aspects. Given this variance, pictures in different systems of representation also vary in informativeness. Perhaps, then, the more properties regarding which pictures are committal the more realistic they are, since this system will be more informative.

However, Lopes rightly points out that some pictures are realistic despite being minimally informative. Some pictures make few commitments about certain properties e.g. a line drawing. Hence Lopes proposes that pictorial realism does not depend on the degree of informativeness that a picture offers; rather pictorial realism is to be understood in terms of appropriate informativeness within a context of use. To use Lopes’s example, the split-style pictures of the Haida (fig. 11) are more realistic to them because they inform the Haida about the structure of the body of the animal. Realism is judged on the extent to which pictures realise their intended aim of conveying the appropriate information for the purposes they serve in certain contexts. Thus Lopes claims that, ‘a picture is realistic to the extent that it belongs to an appropriately informational system.’

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271 Lopes, ‘Pictorial Realism’, p. 279
272 It is worth noting that it is not just visual information about a subject that pictures can be informative about. Pictures can be informative about the artist, or culture, or about the medium used.
273 Ibid, p. 283
274 Ibid
The advantage of conceiving of realism according to how successful a picture is in informing its viewers appropriately is that it can explain why there is diversity in judgements of realism across different cultures, times, and contexts. Furthermore, it explains why cartoons or line drawings can be realistic. They are embedded in an appropriately informative system of representation, Lopes contends, because of the narrative context in which they usually occur. Despite the scant amount of properties, or the amount of inaccurate properties the subject is depicted as having, they convey information that plays a role in the narratives in which they occur. Lopes also suggests that this is why caricatures can be realistic. The satirical narrative within which they occur, that is of mocking and shaming their subjects, makes them appropriately informative. Thus realism does not consist in the accuracy of ascribed properties to the depicted object. Realism, like depiction, is dynamic and shifting, and the history of style itself documents these gradual changes in what we see pictures as representing realistically.

This, among other things, is what we learn from Ernst Gombrich. That art progresses by trial and error, beginning with some initial schema that is adjusted and corrected. Pictures, for Gombrich, are ‘an end product on a long road of schema and correction’ and ‘the form of representation cannot be divorced from its purpose and the requirements of the society in which the given visual language gains currency.’ Hence the rules of realism, of realistic schemata, are conventional, and realistic representation depends on the kinds of requirements that we as viewers have. The point that accuracy does not often

275 Ibid, pp. 283-284
276 Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*, p. 78
figure in our pictorial experiences of realism is captured nicely, and also amusingly, by Gombrich in the remark that follows his discussion of learning to draw a human head:

‘We have come to accept certain forms in pictures as representing heads, and we are not troubled before our attention is roused—though if somebody entered the room with an egg-shaped head, or even with a mouth misplaced like Preissler’s, we would be sure to notice something wrong.’ 277

What I hope to have shown thus far is that if realism is relative to a system, and systems are characterized by the aspects represented, which need not match those of the actual object as experienced in ordinary perception, then we need not conclude that misrepresentation has occurred solely on the basis of inaccurately ascribed properties. In short, if inaccuracy in property ascription is tolerated by pictorial realism then it ought to be tolerated by pictorial representation. The assumption that realism consists in accurately ascribing properties underlies (D1), since the inaccuracy of ascribed properties is supposed to determine misrepresentation, and the definition itself is borne out of a matching theory of depiction. However, this assumption is false. As such inaccurately ascribing properties cannot be distinctive of misrepresentation, since it is compatible with realism. Despite Lopes’s thought that a picture can be realistic and still misrepresent, we saw no argument for this claim, and given the consequences of adopting (D1) we ought to reconstruct our definition of misrepresentation, as we did our definition of pictorial realism, without building in any conditions of accuracy. If we do not it will result in a very limited view of the representational capacities of pictorial art, and would entail some odd results in determining whether a picture is a misrepresentation.

I hope to have demonstrated also that due to the insufficiency of wrongly ascribed properties for misrepresentation, and the relativity of realism, it must be the case that there is nothing prima facie about the way pictures look that determines whether a picture has misrepresented its subject. Perhaps my example of identical canvases (one by an artist and one by a child) can be seen as pushing the often-made point in aesthetics that we need to know more about the history and conditions of the production of an artwork before we can determine how we ought to respond to it. If we want to find a further condition that is sufficient for misrepresentation then perhaps we ought to go beyond mere appearances. The next section, in which I outline my own view, is a move in that direction.

277 Ibid, p. 148
5.2 Misrepresentation and Artistic Style

What I want to suggest is that determining whether a picture is a misrepresentation is intimately related to artistic style. In short, if a picture incorrectly ascribes properties to its subject, yet they fall within the remit of the artist’s style, then the picture is not a misrepresentation. This, I contend, will limit the scope of misrepresentation such that we do not have to conclude on the basis of wrongly ascribed properties that, say, Picasso has misrepresented his subject. That he has not done so is a consequence of his style. This additional claim, that style is significant to misrepresentation, thus also distances my view from Lopes’ and his notion that a picture may misrepresent its subject by inaccurately ascribing properties. Of course the challenge now is to pin down exactly what my account of pictorial misrepresentation amounts to, which makes use of the conception of style I have been defending by putting it to work in accounting for pictorial misrepresentation in a way that makes better sense of the phenomenon.

Perhaps the best way to demonstrate what I have in mind is to return to the caricature case. Why might our intuition tell us that this is not a misrepresentation? I believe it is because we are familiar with the general style of caricature and the kinds of aims and intentions artists working in this style might have, and these are seen in the work. In caricature it is often some kind of satirization of the subject depicted, and our knowledge of this informs our experience of the picture. It is because I recognize the style of caricature, and see the picture as having that style, that I see the picture as a representation of Blair and I appreciate its humour. Knowing about caricature, that typically it involves satirising its subject by exaggerating certain features, guides us in how to respond. As Lamarque points out, ‘styles have a function, they contribute to meaning and effect, they have a point.’ 278 The ‘point’, then, in our example is to mock Blair. Thus style considerations get us the right result for caricatures.

This also returns us to the distinction in Chapter One between individual and general styles, where I claimed that individual style is internal to the artist, while general styles are external to the artist.279 As such we can also recognise the individual styles of caricaturists, since they will have highly personal ways of mocking and satirizing their subjects. For example, Gerald Scarfe has a highly distinctive style, which is often very dark in its portrayal of his subjects; their appearance is almost grotesquely exaggerated and, in several depictions, they are spattered with blood. As Scarfe puts it, ‘An artist’s job is to present a new view of the world, seeing things anew for other people. With people in power, I use the

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278 Ibid. p. 144
279 p. 18 of this thesis
worst techniques I can find.’ Of course one might disagree with Scarfe’s depictions, one might even say he has grossly misrepresented his subject, but this is misrepresentation of a kind similar to my picture of my kind-hearted enemy. Scarfe’s pictures are depictively successful but he may still be guilty of misrepresentation in some other normative sense. Everyone can see Tony Blair in Scarfe’s picture, but we might think he ought not to be depicted as he is. Thus, again, even in cases of an individual, highly personal, style of caricature, giving style its proper significance gets a better result.

However, while style considerations get us a good result for determining when misrepresentation has not occurred, we also need a way of determining when it has. While (D1) is vastly inadequate, we ought, after having considered the significance of style, be able to use the concept of style to give a better definition of pictorial misrepresentation. I think we can do just that. In fact a better definition might be formulated as follows:

(D2) Depictive misrepresentation occurs when a picture incorrectly ascribes properties to a depicted subject and this cannot be explained by appeal to general or individual style.

It should be clear that this will significantly limit the scope of misrepresentation, and will help us avoid the conclusion that far too many works are misrepresentations. It also preserves the thought that the representational capacities of pictures go beyond correctly ascribing properties to their subjects. Furthermore, it explains the fact that we do not consider most art to be misrepresentation and why such considerations do not enter into our appreciative responses. It allows for pictures that engender an inflected seeing-in experience, and gives further support to the view of realism as informativeness within a context of use. Having knowledge of style can allow for pictures that inaccurately ascribe properties to the depicted subject to be realistic, and so not misrepresentations. As such my claim that artistic style connects up with pictorial representation gives further detail to the notion of a context of use.

Also, this extra condition that must be met for a picture to misrepresent also allows my view to escape the objection I posed at the end of Chapter Four that, like the Experienced Resemblance view, the Aspect-Recognition Theory allows for too much misrepresentation. Having argued for an adapted Aspect-Recognition Theory, which has the concept of style that I have argued for built into it, my view avoids the objection by requiring that further conditions be met for misrepresentation to occur. The Aspect-Recognition Theory as developed by Lopes does not make this connection between depiction and style, as I have developed it, and is thus still vulnerable to the problem of misrepresentation in

280 Gerald Scarfe quoted in Samadder, ‘Boris Jonson and Nigel Farage are walking caricatures: there’s not a lot you can add’, The Guardian, 3rd May 2014.
much the same way as the Experienced Resemblance view. (D2) better describes misrepresentation, and avoids many of the troubles (D1) encountered. As such adopting this view of misrepresentation, which is predicated on my account of depiction as ‘aspect-recognition plus style’, allows one to avoid uncomfortable consequences in determining which pictures are misrepresentations.

This does raise the question, however, of which pictures turn out to be pictorial misrepresentations. Perhaps we will be hard pressed to find genuine instances of pictorial misrepresentation, and I will consider this potential objection shortly. However, I have provided a description of what conditions need to be met for pictorial misrepresentation to occur, and I think we can see where those conditions might be met by considering non-stylistic features. What is a non-stylistic feature? A feature that falls outside the characteristic way of doing something—in the case of individual style this will be highly personal to the artist—will not be a feature of style. Perhaps an example might be found in the distinction proposed by Wollheim,281 and by Goodman282, between style and signature. For Goodman, although style is a matter of characteristic features that serve to identify a work’s origin, certain features contribute to its ‘symbolic functioning’ while others do not.283 The latter might include chemical properties of the paint and the actual signature of the painter. Though these features might serve the purpose of identification they are not stylistic features.

However, in addition to properties such as the signature of the artist we might also say that a feature that seems out of place in a general style, or is uncharacteristic of the individual style of an artist, is also not a style feature. This might consist in wrongly ascribing a property to a particular. For example, we might again consider two identical canvases, where one is by a well-established artist, the other by a novice. While we would be reluctant to say that the artist has misrepresented her subject in her picture (perhaps a well-known person or place), I think we would be right to reserve the term misrepresentation for the novice; in the latter case we might be inclined to criticise the inaccuracies in the depiction as an example of incompetent draughtsmanship. The novice’s picture inaccurately ascribes properties to the depicted subject, and this cannot reasonably be explained by appeal to either general or individual style. As such I think it would be correct to say that the novice has pictorially misrepresented her subject. While we allow inaccuracies in the artist’s case, assuming they form part of her highly personal way of doing something, which guides our experience of the picture, we ought to be less tolerant of inaccuracy regarding the novice’s depiction. Of course, that novice might improve, and a style may emerge, but we would still need to know more about the work, and more about the style, to avoid seeing it as a pictorial

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281 Wollheim. Painting as an Art, p. 36
283 Ibid, p. 808
misrepresentation. Thus I think there are examples of pictorial misrepresentation that my view can make sense of. How much misrepresentation there will be is another question, and one that motivates one of the main possible objections to my view, which I will now consider.

5.2.1 Potential Objections

There are several objections that might be made to my characterisation of misrepresentation. The first turns on the idea that my view allows for too little misrepresentation to occur. One worry is that it might even turn out that there will be no misrepresentation under an assumption that mature artists, i.e. those with established styles, cannot make pictorial or depictive errors. That is, there looks to be significant pressure to explain all apparent misrepresentation as a matter of style. This means that an artist with an established style could ascribe any property she likes to a subject and it will be a representation if it is in her style.

I have two possible replies to this objection. The first is to simply bite the bullet and accept that mature artists cannot make mistakes. If what I have said about style and misrepresentation is correct then perhaps it is not such a bad outcome to insist that an artist with an established style is almost outside the remit of depictive misrepresentation, even if they can be guilty of the other normative kind. Thus the very little room my account leaves for depictive misrepresentation among mature artists may be seen as a positive result if we find ourselves hesitant to say that those artists make mistakes when they inaccurately ascribe properties. This route is further tempting if one takes the principle of functionality, discussed in Chapter One, to be significant. That principle stated that what is in a work is there for a purpose, and in the case of depiction we might say that everything in a picture is there for a depictive purpose. If this principle is taken seriously then we ought to be less worried about the possibility that mature artists can’t make depictive ‘mistakes’.

The second reply turns on what I said in the beginning about misrepresentation being a failure of some kind but not a failure to represent at all. Misrepresentation must allow that one sees in the pictorial surface the subject depicted, and see it with properties it does not enjoy. On my account such seeing-in does not determine misrepresentation unless the wrongly ascribed properties seen cannot be explained by appeal to style. However, if an artist ascribed any property she liked to an object such that the pictorial surface no longer engendered a seeing-in experience of the subject at all, then the artist has not misrepresented: she has failed to depict the subject altogether. I cannot ascribe just any property I wish to the

284 I would like to thank Keith Allen for this objection.
Eiffel Tower whilst purporting to depict it. To do so would be to fail to depict the Eiffel Tower.

Of course we might still allow that in some way the picture still represents the Eiffel Tower, but this would not be representation in any significantly visual sense. Thus while my account may increase the amount of wrongly ascribed properties one is willing to tolerate before a subject is no longer depicted, it does not entail that there are no limits whatsoever. Thus no appeal to style will allow that a picture that purports to depict the Eiffel Tower, yet has every feature of Big Ben, is a depiction of the Eiffel Tower. And further, though my view is more tolerant of depictive misrepresentations, this does not mean it is more tolerant of the normative sense of misrepresentation. So while a picture, despite inaccuracies, is a successful depiction it might still misrepresent in some other deeper sense. As such one should not be troubled by having more often to withhold the term misrepresentation if one adopts my view. The normative sense, the critical complaint about a picture, is still available to ascribe to many depictions despite their depictive success.

A further objection is that one might simply reject my account of stylistic features as having any explanatory value in seeing pictures as misrepresentations. One might think that Hopkins could claim that the picture depictively misrepresents to make an expressive point, as might be the case in caricature, yet it still depictively misrepresents since we see the depicted subject as enjoying properties it does not actually have. However, this objection only seems to work if my account has no story about how we visually experience style properties, and how style connects up with recognition, and so depiction. Chapters Two and Four were devoted to giving substance to my claims in Chapter One about the concept of style itself, demonstrating how it integrates into an experiential theory of depiction. Thus it is not the case that the concept of style is somehow ‘outside’ of our experience of pictures. Not only can we see stylistic features, i.e. perceptually represent them in our experiences, but having that experience also aids pictorial recognition such that we see in pictures the objects they purport to depict.

I have argued that style is inexorably bound up with depiction in an experiential way. As such a picture that inaccurately ascribes properties, on my view, does not depictively misrepresent if one sees those properties as properties of style, of ways of doing things. Depiction itself is inherently tied into artistic style as experienced by the viewer, and thus there is no room for Hopkins to claim that my view is talking about some other kind of misrepresentation that has something to do with expression rather than depiction. I have shown that artistic style is of great significance to our experience of pictures, and my view of misrepresentation is thus tied into the way in which we experience pictures as depicting their subjects.
Therefore I think I can cope with the objections outlined. As such my account better captures the nature of pictorial misrepresentation, which ought to tempt one to adopt it. However, there remained a further persistent problem for the Experienced Resemblance View, namely pictorial indeterminacy. If the view I have been arguing for can be shown to cope with this phenomenon better then we have further reasons to adopt it. I think it can, but in order to show why we must return to the problem itself and the difficulties it caused for the Experienced Resemblance View.

5.3 Pictorial Indeterminacy

Some pictures depict subjects in great detail, with clear outlines and from a determinate point of view. But not all pictures do, and it is in these cases that the problem of pictorial indeterminacy arises. How is it possible to see a subject in a picture if the surface of that picture is vague, abstract, and indeterminate? We saw in Chapter Three that an artist’s sketch provided an example of pictorial indeterminacy, where the pencil marks on the pictorial surface were scattered and faint, and yet we saw in the picture the body of a man. Take another example though, again one introduced by Hopkins, namely a stick figure. A stick figure depicts a person, but it does so through very little detail. According to Hopkins, ‘The picture is…simply silent about the person’s shape, in any but the roughest terms.’ 285 This silence proved problematic for Hopkins since his view demanded a match in Outline Shape between depicted object and object in the real world. It is difficult, then, to perceive a match in Outline Shape between persons and stick figures in any determinate way. And stick figures are but one example of this kind of indeterminacy, and demonstrate, ‘in an extreme way an important feature of depiction’ 286 according to Hopkins.

The solution for Hopkins was a separation between seeing-in and pictorial content, that while seeing-in could be highly determinate, the pictorial content could be indeterminate. This meant that pictorial content is not identified with what is seen-in. The claim that seeing-in determines pictorial content is one of the key assumptions of any experiential theory, and one that Hopkins was willing to sacrifice in order to resolve the problem of misrepresentation and pictorial indeterminacy for his view. However, as I argued in Chapter Three, it’s not a claim that I think can be dispensed with, and I argued there that Hopkins’s belief that he could do without it stemmed from his confusing the recognitional aspect of seeing-in with the configurational. As such separation will not do the work of solving the problem of pictorial indeterminacy, and further, given any experiential account of

286 Ibid, p. 123
depiction’s commitment to the centrality of seeing-in, it’s not one that we should give up willingly.

Does the view I have argued for fare any better? Well, for one thing, it does not demand the separation advocated by Hopkins in order to resolve the problem. What one sees in a picture is what the picture depicts; the phenomenon of seeing-in, on my view, thus remains central to determining pictorial content. Rather than looking outside the experience to determine what a picture depicts, I hold that what is seen-in is dependent on other experiential factors, in particular a perceptual awareness of style features. This is what allows pictorial recognition to function smoothly. As such resolving the problem of indeterminacy via separation is not the strategy I will adopt here. Instead we can look to the already assembled resources within my view of depiction that connects aspect-recognition with artistic style.

According to Lopes’s view, and mine, pictures are aspectually structured, and make various commitments about a depicted subject. My account adds that artistic style is tied into aspect selection, and thus the resulting array of commitments a picture presents comprises part of an artist’s style, which aids pictorial recognition and engenders a seeing-in experience. Thus if we can explain pictorial indeterminacy as falling into the structure I have just outlined then we need not look to the separation of seeing-in and pictorial content to bridge the gap. Let us again take an artist’s sketches as our example. There are certain conventions that sketches usually adhere to. They are often in black and white, the subject depicted is vague, or roughly outlined, with various lines and dashes comprising the depicted subject. These are conventions we are familiar with, and we have certain expectations of sketches that we do not have of, say, watercolour paintings. We look for things in the marks if they cannot at first be seen, and if it is a study in preparation for a painting we may look for early signs of the finished artwork. We are often more tolerant of indeterminacy in sketches since we do not expect it; the rules of sketching, and looking at sketches, seem different from the rules of painting, and looking at paintings.

The commitments that sketches make, then, might be far less than other kinds of depictions, and we might struggle to see depicted subjects in the indeterminate haze they present. However, we are familiar with these conventions, and we are aware that sketches can often puzzle the eye if they are quick renderings of a subject. It is part and parcel of our experiences of sketches that they have certain characteristic, often stylistic, features, and knowing this we look at them differently than we do other pictures. Sketches can also exhibit very individual styles, evidenced by the way in which art historians identify sketches as being by this or that particular artist. Again, the lesson from Walton’s ‘Categories of Art’ that the category we perceive the work to be in affects how we respond to it seems appropriate. There are standard, variable, and contra-standard properties for sketches that warrant our
judging them to be in that category and not another. The aspects that sketches present, the standard properties of the category 'sketches', are steeped in style or convention and, without wanting to give some complete list of the criteria a depiction must meet to be defined as a sketch, we know when the surface we are looking at is a sketch.

Given these conventions, these ways of doing things that all sketches share, when looking at a sketch we allow for indeterminacy and sparseness, and let it inform our experience of the picture. We know that sketches do not depict arms in highly determinate ways, and we do not expect of sketches the kind of commitments about arms that we might expect from a finely detailed ink drawing. That we are familiar with the style of sketches aligns our expectations, and the aspects presented, though sparse, are understood to comprise a particular subject, and, even though we might struggle for some time, the pictorial surface engenders a seeing-in experience of the subject. Though the surface features are sparse, our familiarity with the style ensures pictorial recognition and the resultant seeing-in experience.

On this account there is no misalignment between the determinacy of seeing-in and the determinacy of pictorial content. Rather, knowledge of style secures the determinacy of what is seen-in despite the pictorial surface, the two-dimensional configuration of design properties, being indeterminate. As such, while the configurational aspect of seeing-in can be indeterminate, knowledge of style and our perceptual experiences of style ensure that the recognitional aspect of seeing-in functions smoothly such that the seeing-in experience engendered is highly determinate and, as a consequence, means that the pictorial content is also determinate. Seeing-in fixes pictorial content, something that Hopkins wants to deny at the expense of losing this central claim of all experiential accounts. However, we need not deny this if we adopt my account and tie seeing-in and style together. By doing this we can attribute any indeterminacy to the configuration on the surface of the picture, to the design properties, rather than to the content of the picture or the seeing-in experience. Knowledge and experience of style secures the determinacy of both seeing-in and what the picture depicts. Hence we can explain why we see-in pictures something that is highly determinate despite an indeterminate configuration by an appeal to our knowledge of the stylistic conventions governing pictures, in this example sketches.

Thus pictorial indeterminacy, and accounting for it, is not so troublesome if one adopts the view that depiction is inherently bound up with artistic style. Our experiences of pictures are informed by style, and I have argued that properties of style are the kinds of properties that can be experienced. One can see that by refining the concept of style, and giving an account of how we experience it, it can come to play a significant role in the philosophy of depiction. I have adapted an Aspect-Recognition theory in order to give style its proper significance, and this last chapter has shown that within this theory the materials
with which to explain persistent problems for other views can be found. Giving style its proper significance is crucial to understanding pictures and pictorial experience, and I have in this thesis provided an account of a way in which it can be done.


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