‘The Weights & Measures of the Human Mind’:
The Transcendental Analysis of Cognition and Coleridge’s Theory
of the Mental Faculties

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to lay the ground for further work on interpreting Coleridge’s *Logic* and its relation to the rest of his philosophy, particularly the system of speculative metaphysics and theology presented in Coleridge’s *Opus Maximum* fragments. I do this by exploring the connections between Coleridge’s conceptions of the *a priori*, the cognitive faculties (or capacities), and the nature of logical theory. Part 1 seeks to place Coleridge’s views on logic in their broader historical and intellectual context, showing why Coleridge considered the investigation of the faculties, and the analysis of our cognitive operations and contents, to be fundamental to logical theory, and arguing that this position is a product of Coleridge’s critical engagement with the early modern logic of ideas and faculties. Part 2 gives a preliminary account of Coleridge’s interpretation of two key Kantian terms, ‘*a priori*’ and ‘transcendental’, exploring the analogies Coleridge uses to elucidate the nature of the *a priori* and the purpose of transcendental claims. Part 3 expands on this account, considering how Coleridge’s conceptions of the *a priori* and the transcendental inform his claims, especially in *Logic*, on the human mental faculties and their contribution to sensory experience and cognition; it focuses on Coleridge’s views on ‘the obvious threelfold division’ of our cognitive capacities into sense, understanding, and reason, his descriptions of the formal (*a priori*) and material (*a posteriori*) elements of cognition, and his functional theory of the constitution of our faculties. Part 4 discusses the relations between Coleridge’s theory of the cognitive capacities and his conception of the *a priori*, focusing on Coleridge’s claims concerning the origins of *a priori* forms and contents in our cognitive capacities, and the transcendental method of inquiry which he contends is able to prove such claims.
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Abbreviations

Bibliography
I began this project with the intention of producing an exposition of the theory of cognition which Coleridge presents in his Logic. Yet it soon become apparent to me that, before such an exposition could be produced, many currently unresolved (and largely unaddressed) issues in Coleridge studies would have to be confronted. To list a few of the most notable examples: The view that Kant is one of the greatest influences on the development of Coleridge’s thought has long been a cornerstone of Coleridgean scholarly orthodoxy, and yet little has been written concerning how Coleridge actually interprets those Kantian principles which he claims to adopt, and in particular about why Coleridge thought that Kant offered the most satisfactory theory of the principles of sensory cognition (although much has been written about how Coleridge’s supposedly takes over Kant’s ideas seemingly without any interpretive input). Coleridge emphasises the importance of properly understanding the meaning of the term ‘a priori’ in such well-known published works as Biographia and the 1818 edition of The Friend, and notes in a number of manuscripts and marginalia that Kant provides the best explanation of the nature of the a priori, and yet there is, as far as I have been able to discover, currently no scholarship which considers Coleridge’s claims about the a priori in any detail (in spite of the fact that the attempt to prove the possibility of certain kinds of a priori knowledge is one of the main goals of Coleridge’s broader philosophical project). A large and distinct body of Coleridge criticism has grown up around his two gnomic statements about the imagination in Biographia Literaria, and Coleridge’s distinction between Reason and Understanding is often cited as one of the founding principles of his philosophy, but one finds only a few attempts to explain why Coleridge lays such emphasis on the cognitive faculties or powers, or to provide a detailed account of how Coleridge conceives of such capacities. As I will be arguing throughout, although Coleridge’s Logic remains his most neglected major manuscript, it is a text that can shed light on all of these issues. In this work—by way of presenting a sort of prolegomena to the Logic—I try to show that if we are to make sense of Coleridge’s views on Kant’s transcendental philosophy, the a priori,

1 For this emphasis on Kantian influence, see e.g. Ashton (1980), 40-4, (1998), 196; Orsini (1969); Wellek (1931); Wheeler (1981), 15-16; Willey (1972), 86-89.

2 For Coleridge’s emphasis on the a priori, see BL.II.293n; Friend.I.179n. For his claim that Kant gives the best definition of the a priori, see CM.III.218-9, IV.112, 355 (cf. SWF.I.689ff).

3 Some notable exceptions are Cheyne (2014); 3.2-9; Engell (1981); ch. 20; Pradhan (1999) ch. 1-5; see also, Hedley (2008), ch. 2; Warnock (1976), pt III; Webster (2010), Appendices A-B.
and the nature of the mental faculties, we must begin with *Logic*. Indeed, to do so is simply to follow Coleridge’s own advice: for he saw his various philosophical works as forming part of a single integrated project (working towards a defence of his Trinitarian Christianity), and took *Logic* to be the ‘propaedeutic’ first stage of this project.4

My principal aim will be to lay the ground for further work on interpreting the *Logic* and its relation to the rest of Coleridge’s philosophy, particularly the system of speculative metaphysics and theology which he presents in part in the *Opus Maximum* fragments, but also those more programmatic statements of Coleridge’s philosophical views that are found scattered throughout such earlier published works as *The Statesman’s Manual* and *The Friend*. I do this by exploring the connections between Coleridge’s conceptions of the *a priori*, the faculties, and the nature of logical theory. Part 1 seeks to place Coleridge’s views on logical theory in their broader historical and intellectual context, showing why Coleridge held the investigation of the faculties, and the analysis of our cognitive operations and contents, to be fundamental to logical theory, and arguing that this position is a product of Coleridge’s critical engagement with certain strands of the early modern logic of ideas and faculties. Part 2 gives a preliminary account of Coleridge’s interpretation of two key Kantian philosophical terms, ‘*a priori*’ and ‘transcendental’, exploring the analogies Coleridge uses in an attempt to elucidate the nature of the *a priori* and the purpose of transcendental claims. In Part 3 I expand on this account, considering how Coleridge’s conception of the Kantian *a priori* and transcendental informs his claims, especially in *Logic*, about the human cognitive faculties and their contribution to sensory experience and cognition; there I focus, in particular, on Coleridge’s views concerning what he calls ‘the obvious threefold division’ of the cognitive powers into sense, understanding, and reason, his descriptions of the formal and material elements of cognition, and his functional theory of the constitution of our cognitive powers. Finally, in Part 4, I offer a more detailed discussion of the relation between Coleridge’s theory of the cognitive powers and his conception of the *a priori*, giving careful attention to Coleridge’s claims about the origins of certain kinds of *a priori* forms and contents in our cognitive powers, and the transcendental method of inquiry that Coleridge contends is able to prove such claims.

4 See *Logic*, xl-xlII; CL, IV: 589 (Sept 1815); VI: 967 (Oct 1833).
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Finally, to my wonderful wife Emily: thank you for your boundless love and kindness, and for doing more than anyone (and perhaps far more than you realise) to help keep me sane and get me through the seemingly interminable final stages of this project.
Author’s Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work, and that due credit is given where reference has been made to the work of others. It has not been previously published nor submitted for any other degree at the University of York or any other institution.
1. Coleridge on Logic, Psychology, & the Cognitive Faculties

Kant is widely (and quite rightly) considered to be the major influence on Coleridge’s conception of logic. Kant’s texts, particularly the first Critique and Prolegomena, are also undoubtedly a principal source for Coleridge’s own writings on logic. This has led to the conclusion that in Logic Coleridge uncritically adopts Kant’s views, and so reproduces (and sometimes even exacerbates) Kant’s errors in the field of logic. Thus, Coleridge has been subject to two charges traditionally (though not uncontroversially) laid against Kant. Firstly, as in this observation by Robin Jackson, that what Coleridge offers under the guise of logical inquiry is in fact not part of logic at all:

Kant has been criticised for paying lip service to the importance of logic while really presenting a “curious mixture of metaphysics and epistemology”. Coleridge, who in the matter of logic relied upon Kant’s authority, followed suit.

Secondly, as in Tim Milnes’ view, that Coleridge’s account of logic is not just ‘unlogical’, but also vitiated by the fallacy of the psychologism:

Kant’s arguments [in his transcendental logic] have long been criticized for their tendency to blur the distinction between conceptual necessity and mere psychological incorrigibility. If anything, however, Coleridge is even more inclined than Kant to fall into what Frege would later deplore as the conflation of formal and psychological arguments, equating ‘logical necessity’ with the limits on thought dictated by ‘the constitution of the mind itself’.

Jackson and Milnes are certainly correct to suggest (i) that Coleridge followed Kant’s theory of logic closely in many respects, and (ii) that Coleridge’s conception of logical inquiry, like Kant’s, includes much material which would nowadays be considered as belonging instead to epistemology, metaphysics, or psychology. However, as I will be contending in the sections that follow (1.1-5), there are some serious problems with their respective assessments. In particular, Jackson and Milnes, along with many other Coleridge scholars, make little attempt to situate Coleridge’s interpretation of Kant, or the claims of both thinkers about logic and cognition, within the appropriate historical

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5 On the sources for Coleridge’s logic, see Logic, lvi-iii.
6 Logic, lxi. Jackson (ed.) is citing Kneale and Kneale (1971), 355, which reflects a fairly widespread view of Kant’s place in the history of logic.
7 Milnes, (2008), 46. Milne’s is quoting from Coleridge’s remarks at BL.I.200-1.
and intellectual context. They largely ignore the question of why Coleridge’s account of the purpose of logical inquiry, and his reading of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, place such great emphasis on the need to develop an analysis of the contents and operations of the mind, and particularly a theory of the natural or innate cognitive capacities of human subjects.\(^8\) Thus, Coleridge’s core aims are dismissed from the outset not because he fails to realise his own philosophical goals in the *Logic*, but because such goals are judged to be illegitimate from the standpoint of the modern historian or theorist of logic (as Milnes and Jackson understand this standpoint).

I will be arguing here that, much like Kant’s position, Coleridge’s conception of logic should be assessed not in terms of contemporary formal or symbolic logic and its domain of inquiry, but rather in the context of a notion of logical inquiry which he did in fact share. Rather than measuring Coleridge’s *Logic* by standards that were not historically available to him, we should consider this text and its account of the nature of logic in light of those notions of ‘formal and psychological arguments’ and ‘logical necessity’ which were familiar to Coleridge and which shaped the kinds of logical inquiries pursued by his contemporaries.\(^9\) In short, to make sense of Coleridge’s views on logic, we need to pay attention to the historical and philosophical markers he offers himself, situating his statements on logic in their appropriate intellectual context. This will require assessing Coleridge’s position in light of the early modern logical theories to which he claims to be responding rather than in light of modern criticisms of these theories. To determine if Coleridge is at all guilty of ‘equating ‘logical necessity’ with the limits on thought dictated by ‘the constitution of the mind itself’’ (i.e. the fallacy of psychologism), we first need to establish what such terms meant to Coleridge, and how he employs them in the context of *Logic*.\(^10\) We should not simply assume that Coleridge’s definitions of terms like ‘logical necessity’ and ‘the constitution of the mind itself’ will map directly onto contemporary understandings of these concepts. To make sense of Coleridge’s approach to defining such terms, we need to pay careful attention to his account of logic and its relation to an investigation of what he calls ‘the forms and functions of the understanding’.\(^11\) As I will show, when *Logic* is viewed in the context provided by the early modern philosophical tradition—especially in relation to the logic of ideas and cognitive faculties—it becomes

\(^8\) For example, Milnes’ lengthy essay (2004) on Coleridge’s logical theory gives no attention to the role of faculty analysis in Coleridge’s logic, or in the popular long eighteenth-century logical textbooks that Coleridge cites in his own *Logic* (for further discussion of this issue, see 1.1-4).

\(^9\) For some recent examples of this sort of context-based approach to Kant, see Hatfield (1990), (1997) and Waxman (2005), (2014). On Kant’s logic specifically, see Mosser (2008).

\(^10\) Milnes (2008), 46.

\(^11\) *Logic*, 146-7 (cf. 37, 45-6).
possible to see that this text is not a ‘curious mixture of metaphysics and epistemology’, but rather an attempt to engage critically with the logical conventions of its time. To get a sense of Coleridge’s motivations for criticising the early modern logical tradition which had come to dominate the philosophy of his own age (at least in Britain and France), we will need to look more carefully at the case for Kant’s influence on the account of logical inquiry presented throughout Coleridge’s Logic (see 1.2), as well as placing this account in the context of Coleridge’s claims about logic, psychology, and the faculties (see 1.1).\(^\text{12}\)

1.1 Coleridge on Logic, Psychology, & the Understanding

i. Coleridge’s Criticisms of Eighteenth-Century Logic: An Overview

Coleridge begins his Logic with some complaints against eighteenth-century logicians that help to situate his views in relation to both Kantian and early modern approaches to logic. He identifies two problems that he suggests are ‘perhaps nowhere more strikingly exemplified than in the most popular modern books, French and English, professing to teach logic and having its name in their title’. First, he criticises the textbooks, such as ‘Dr. Watts’ Logic’, which present the ‘essentials of common logic’ (i.e. the rules and forms of the syllogism) in a confused and unsystematic way, ‘blended with metaphysics, theology, psychology, grammar’ and other miscellaneous subjects.\(^\text{13}\) Second, Coleridge censures the works that, in his view, attempt the illicit substitution of a materialist and associationist psychology for the study of logic proper (although he does not yet specify precisely what such study should involve):

In the far-famed Logic of Condillac, on the other hand, the student may find the whole theory of materialism (borrowed without acknowledgement from David Hartley) only not one syllable concerning logic itself.\(^\text{14}\)

Both species of misnamed logic, Coleridge avers, are guilty of ‘hazard[ing] confusion by co-ordinating heterogeneous subjects’. In short, Watts, Condillac, and their followers have introduced into the domain of logical inquiry, and indeed into the teaching of

\(^{12}\) See CL.IV.760 (Jul 1817), V.138 (Feb 1821); cf. SWF.I.128 (c. 1803), II.947 (c. 1821).

\(^{13}\) Logic, 6. Coleridge is of course referring to the popular Logick (1725) of Isaac Watts. Coleridge may also include the laws of (non-)contradiction and identity as part of ‘the essentials of common logic’, but he sometimes suggests that these laws have a subordinate status to syllogistic rules (see esp. 87-92).

\(^{14}\) Logic, 6. The mention of Hartley here makes clear that Coleridge is referring to materialist theories of mind (cf. his reference to Hartley’s ‘vibrations’ in a similar context at 37). Coleridge does not appear to have ever offered evidence to substantiate his claim that La Logique (1781) is plagiarised from Hartley’s Observations on Man (1749).
logical theory, methods and principles that have no claim to logical status. According to Coleridge, this is because such ‘pseudo-logical’ works ignore the methodological rules (furnished by logic itself) that facilitate an ‘insight into the distinct import of terms as well as into the necessity of new or newly defined [logical or natural-philosophical] terms for the expression of different objects’. Coleridge later explains that these shortcomings of contemporary logicians are largely the consequence of their failure to recognise what makes logical rules distinct from those kinds of rules that are employed in other fields of inquiry. As we shall see, this is not just a question of form and function, but also a matter of the source or origin of any particular rule.

Given Coleridge’s mention of Hartley, coupled with his critical remarks on the Lockean-influenced work of Watts and Condillac for its confusion and/or substitution of logical rules with psychological ones, it may seem that Coleridge’s aim here is to deny that the study of mental or cognitive operations has any place in logic. However, if these comments are placed in the context of his statements elsewhere concerning the nature and purpose of logical inquiry, it soon becomes evident that Coleridge’s intention is not to criticise such logicians for their attention to the human mind and its functions. Rather, his point is that logic involves a particular kind of method or approach to the analysis of our cognition and its basic elements to which these philosophers do not adhere, and which is absent from the most popular contemporary textbooks. Indeed, just before he launches into the abovementioned lamentation on the state of logical theory in Britain and France, Coleridge gives a clear indication of his view that the methods and principles of logic must be grounded in or derived from the human mind, and supplemented by our knowledge of cognitive processes.

Having credited Aristotle with the invention of logic, Coleridge claims that Aristotle’s development of logical and methodological rules was guided by his sense ‘that a method, which should be suited to all understandings, must be drawn from the laws and constitution of the understanding itself’. It is the neglect of this Aristotelian insight, Coleridge goes on to imply, which vitiates many of the major logical works of his own day. What Coleridge means by ‘a method suited to all understandings’ is a logic grounded in universal and necessary (a priori) principles. What

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15 Logic, 6-7. See CL.V.133 (8 Jan 1821) for Coleridge’s dismissal of Condillac’s work as ‘pseudo-logic’ and cf. SWAT.I.128n (c. 1803, in the MS Outlines of the History of Logic) for the claim ‘It will be more accurate perhaps to say that the study of Logic altogether is exploded in France, for Condillac’s book is rather psychological than logical’. I discuss this problem in 1.4.

16 See Logic, 37, 44-5n, 196-7.

17 Throughout, I follow Pippin in holding that to refer to something (say, a form of mental activity) as ‘grounding’ something else (say, a kind of representation or cognitive state) is just to say that the former is what is required to account for the latter (usually as the ‘ground of its possibility’); see (1982), 9

18 Logic, 5.
he means by claiming that such principles ‘must be drawn from the laws and constitution of the understanding itself’ is that the nature and purpose of logic and its principles cannot be fully understood without due attention to the relation of such principles to the human cognitive powers in which they have their source. The ‘psychological’ approach of Hartley and Condillac goes astray not because it attempts to analyse cognitive powers, but rather because of the conclusions it draws from such analysis, and in the definitions it provides of ‘the laws and constitution of the understanding’.

**ii. Coleridge’s Definitions of ‘Logic’ & ‘the Understanding’**

To make sense of Coleridge’s views on logic and psychology, we will need to consider more closely precisely what he means when employing two of the key phrases taken from the introductory passages of *Logic* outlined above: ‘logic itself’ and ‘the laws and constitution of the understanding’. Coleridge offers various definitions of logic and its subject matter, and distinguishes between a range of different subfields of logic. For now, I focus on his more general (and conventional) definitions of the term and on how such definitions relate to Coleridge’s conception of the understanding and its ‘laws and constitution’. Before presenting his own theory of logic in detail, Coleridge provides the following two definitions of logic in passing: (i) it can be defined ‘as the art and science of discoursing conclusively’, and (ii) it is a science ‘of which no other definition need be given than that it contains the rules and forms of the understanding, on whatever objects [these rules] are employed, in exclusive reference to the correspondence of these objects to its [the understanding’s] own forms’.

By ‘discoursing conclusively’ Coleridge means reasoning in accordance with the rules and figures of the syllogism; by the ‘objects’ of the understanding he means ‘thoughts or conceptions’ (including the contents or referents of such cognitive states); and by ‘the rules or forms of the understanding’ he means the rules that are taken to govern all discursive thinking and concept-application (i.e. ‘the laws of thought’). For Coleridge, then, the reasoning process and the rules

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19 This is made clear at *Logic*, 34-7, 42-3, 146-7.
20 See esp. *Logic*, 51-2 where Coleridge outlines his distinctions between formal or ‘canonic’ logic (the logic of the syllogism), ‘dialectical’ or ‘criterional’ logic (the transcendental logic of the *a priori* conditions of experience, which furnishes criteria for ‘the distinguishing of truth’ in judgements concerning sensory objects), and ‘organic’ or ‘heuristic’ logic (the logic of ideas in the Platonic sense, i.e. the rules of *noesis* which serve as ‘an organ for the discovery of [speculative metaphysical] truth’).
21 *Logic*, 22, 34. Cf. 205n, 233n for suggestions that Coleridge uses ‘object’ (of the understanding) here in a similar sense to that in which Locke employs the term ‘idea’.
22 See e.g. *Logic*, 37ff, 51-2, 68ff. Cf. n. 15 above; it is likely that Coleridge, like Kant, regards the laws of (non-)contradiction and identity as rules or conditions of ‘discoursing conclusively’ (forming coherent propositions), but at times Coleridge talks as if these laws were trivial and had only a psychological status.
taken to guide or govern it are closely connected to the mental acts of reasoning and rule-application. In fact, he refers to this class of cognitive activity—which also includes conceiving, judging, abstracting, and inferring—as ‘the Logical Acts’. The nature of this connection is especially clear in Coleridge’s explanation of what it means for logic, the various branches of which he takes to consist in the exercise and analysis of the cognitive activities (or operations) just listed, to be conceived as ‘a formal science’:

When I say that what is true of all must be true of each, or [Whatever is affirmed of a generic conception applies to all subordinates (or particulars) comprehended in that conception], or simply affirm that [Every notion, of whatever it may be, is either general or particular], I am not speaking of anything, but of the acts of my own mind and the law or form according to which it acts or ought to act. Now the sciences which treat of these forms are hence contradistinguished as formal sciences, and in this acceptation of the word, logic, geometry, and arithmetic are all alike formal sciences.

On this view, logical rules are not simply principles that govern or constrain the kinds of statements or propositions we can formulate, or the kinds of knowledge-claims we can assert or justify; they are also ‘the acts of [the] mind and the law[s] or form[s] according to which it acts or ought to act’. Thus, to enumerate and analyse the rules of logic, we need to survey and specify the various kinds of cognitive operations in which such rules are grounded. This is why Coleridge says the rules and method of logic ‘must be drawn from the laws and constitution of the understanding itself’, i.e. from those operations in which the exercise of understanding, or our capacity for discursive thought (especially conceiving and judging), is taken to consist. As we shall see later, many of Coleridge’s disagreements with the logical theories of thinkers like Condillac and Hartley turn on his interpretation of what it means to describe those rules or forms of the mind ‘according to which it acts or ought to act’ (especially when it comes to determining what kinds of cognitive laws can be taken to have a normative force or function, prescribing standards or criteria for ‘true knowledge’). In particular, as I will show in 1.4, Coleridge takes the view that, when we discuss the ‘laws or forms’ according to which the human mind acts or ought to act, we can describe these ‘laws or forms’ of thought only in what Coleridge

(in his sense of something non-normative), even though he also grants that anything that does not meet these criteria cannot qualify as a coherent thought or proposition. See 87-92; cf. 174-80.

See esp. Logic, 60-103 (‘On the Logical Acts’); cf. 53-9, 239-71 (esp. 262-6ff).

Logic, 43. The phrases in square brackets are translations of Coleridge’s Latin.

See Logics, 5-6, 34-7, 146-9, 211-4, 245-7.

For Coleridge’s views on such logical rules and criteria, see 34-7, 51-2, 111-2.
calls ‘logical’ terms (i.e. as the normative criteria that govern discursive cognition). For, on Coleridge’s account, even if there are certain psychological or neurophysiological laws which govern or determine some features of our sensible experience, such physical laws can have no bearing on questions, normative or otherwise, concerning the epistemic properties of our ‘conceptions or thoughts’ (i.e. although physical laws may play a role in certain aspects of knowledge acquisition – e.g. by controlling the receptive functions of human sense organs – such laws do not determine what constitutes valid knowledge for human subjects). Consequently, there are both normative and descriptive elements to Coleridge’s logical theory, though he contends that logic, viewed as a theory of cognitive operations and the norms of thought, must exclude from its description of the mind all materialistic or naturalistic terms (which belong to empirical psychology).

Given that Coleridge defines logic as the science which ‘contains the rules and forms of the understanding’, his conception of the understanding and its operations is, unsurprisingly, closely related to his conception of logic. In fact, it could even be said that for Coleridge logic (in the general sense of the term) is a theory of understanding or discursive cognition, including cognitive activities and operations ranging from the construction of syllogisms (a process involving what Coleridge calls ‘the mental acts’ of ‘seclusion’, ‘inclusion’, and ‘conclusion’) to making judgements about sense-impressions and their ‘correspondence’ to ‘objects without us’ (a process Coleridge calls ‘think[ing] of [sensory] phenomena as objects’ or ‘substantiation’). As was noted above, it is the understanding which Coleridge takes to be responsible for the bulk of those cognitive operations with which logical inquiry is concerned. It is variously defined as the ‘faculty of judging’, the ‘faculty of conceptions’, the ‘faculty of thinking’, the ‘reflective faculty’, and the ‘discursive faculty’. In such contexts, Coleridge uses the term ‘faculty’ in much the same way as Descartes, Locke, or Kant: it designates the capacity for a specific kind of cognitive activity, or the capacity for an interrelated set of cognitive activities, such as discursive thinking (taken to include the activities of judging, conceiving, reflecting,
etc.). Because Coleridge takes logic to consist partly in the study of rules and concepts (considered as both forms and contents of discursive cognition) and partly in reflection on the cognitive operations taken to ground or make possible (i.e. produce or originate) such concepts and rules, he views the understanding as the faculty that makes logic itself possible (i.e. as the cognitive capacity in the analysis of which logical inquiry consists). His view is encapsulated in the claim that ‘the end or final aim’ of education, which for Coleridge must culminate in the study of logic, is ‘the formation of right notions, or the mind’s knowledge of its own constitution and constituent faculties as far as it is obtained by reflection’. So, for Coleridge, the nature of a given logical theory is largely determined by the account of the understanding and its operations which informs and underpins this theory. A complete system of logic must thus include an account of the ‘constitution and constituent faculties’ of the mind ‘obtained by reflection’. Coleridge calls the branch of logic that studies rules and concepts (considered as the forms of thought) ‘common’ or ‘formal’ logic, and takes this branch to be purely normative. He terms the branch of logic that analyses the cognitive operations taken to make possible logical rules and concepts, and indeed all the forms and contents of discursive cognition, ‘transcendental’ or ‘critical’ or judicial’ logic, and takes this branch to serve both descriptive and normative purposes (i.e. it specifies those modes or forms of cognitive activity – Kant’s categories – in which the normative criteria of discursive thought are grounded).

iii. Coleridge on Logic & the Problem of Faculty Terminology

The connection between Coleridge’s definitions and employment of the terms ‘logic’ and ‘the understanding’ has some further implications that must be noted before considering the historical and intellectual context of his theory of logic and cognition in more detail. Coleridge’s definitions emphasise the relationship between logical theories and analyses of the understanding and its operations partly because he wants to establish (i) that logic is a discipline which is concerned only with a particular kind of cognitive content and its principles (i.e. discursive or conceptual knowledge and the rules or forms that ground, or make possible, such knowledge), and (ii) that the understanding is the cognitive capacity

31 I discuss Coleridge’s conception of the faculties further in 1.5. On the early modern view of faculties as capacities for certain kinds of cognitive activity, see Hatfield (1990), ch. 1, Waxman (2005), ch. 1.
32 Logic, 13-14. On how the understanding makes logic possible, see e.g. 34-7, 212-3, 265-6n.
33 See e.g. Logic, 9-12ff, 37, 51-2, 111-2, 139-47.
34 For this distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘transcendental’ logic, see e.g. Logic, 139-43, 146-9, 211-4, 248ff. On Coleridge’s account, the normative element of transcendental logic determines the epistemic criteria that apply to or govern our judgements concerning perceptual objects (or rather, concerning the contents of our sensory cognitive states); its descriptive element determines the cognitive operations or ‘forms and functions’ that make discursive cognition possible.
whose operations produce this cognitive content (i.e., to use Coleridge’s terms, concepts, as the form(s) and content(s) of discursive cognitions, are the ‘acts and products’ of the understanding). He also aims to explain why, given this relationship, we must be sure to keep the contents and operations of the understanding distinct from those attributed to other faculties (like sense or reason), and likewise keep the subject matter and principles of logic separate from those of other disciplines (like mathematics or theology). So when Coleridge contends ‘the knowledge of every understanding that is the same with the human [understanding] is a knowledge by means of conceptions, not intuitive but discursive’, he does so to underline that such cognitive content and the mental operations taken to produce it must be sharply distinguished from the kinds of intuitive cognitive contents given through the faculties of sense (sensible intuitions) and reason (intellectual or spiritual intuitions). In particular, Coleridge wishes to emphasise that we should not use the terms ‘reason’ or ‘understanding’ as general terms serving to designate the whole range of the mind’s cognitive capacities, both intuitive and discursive.36

This is why Coleridge disputes the kind of definition of ‘reason’ that is offered in, for instance, Isaac Watts’ influential textbook *Logick* (1725): ‘The Word *Reason* is not in this place confined to the mere Faculty of reasoning or inferring one thing from another, but includes all the intellectual Powers of Man’.37 For, on Coleridge’s view, we have a distinct set of discursive cognitive capacities (as made use of in logic) and intuitive cognitive capacities (as employed in such fields as theology and ontology). The discursive capacities yield discursive (conceptual) knowledge and are collectively designated by the term ‘understanding’. The intuitive capacities yield nondiscursive (noetic) knowledge of ontological, theological, and moral principles, and are collectively designated by the term ‘reason’.38 Moreover, Coleridge distinguishes both these sets of cognitive capacities from the intuitive sensory capacities, which include what he calls our ‘capability of acquiring representations’ (i.e. objects given in sensible intuition), and certain ‘synthetic functions’ of the ‘intuitive power’ of imagination. These capacities are collectively designated by the term ‘sense’ (as ‘the source and faculty of [sensible] intuitions and perceptions’).39 Thus, Coleridge also rejects broad definitions of ‘understanding’ as a cognitive capacity which includes both sensory and intellectual functions or operations, such as that presented by

35 For Coleridge on acts and products of the understanding, see esp. *Logic*, 68-81; cf. 211-4, 262-6.
36 See *Logic*, 235-8, 246-7ff.
37 Watts (1755), 1.
38 See Coleridge’s account of reason, sense, and understanding as ‘the [cognitive] powers from which the sciences derive their name and character’ at *Logic*, 34-7, which is summarised in his table of ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’, or nonempirical and empirical, sciences at 44-5n (see also 4.1-2 below).
39 See *Logic*, 34-6, 68-70, 72-3ff, 153-4ff, 201-2.
Condillac in La Logique (1781): ‘the reunion of all these faculties is called understanding[, ... it] comprehends perception, attention, comparison, judgement, reflection, imagination, and reasoning; we cannot form a more exact idea of it’.\(^40\) According to Coleridge, ever since the establishment of the earliest Athenian schools of Platonism and Aristotelianism, ‘the understanding [has traditionally been designated] as the discursive faculty, or that which employed itself on the conceptions of the mind and the general terms representing them, in distinction from the intuition, or intuitive power of the mind [i.e. the sense, including perceptual imagination], as employed on the forms of perception in time and space’.\(^41\) Consequently, any definition of understanding as a faculty or cognitive capacity which is responsible for (or taken to include) sense-perception or sensory aspects of imagination oversteps its bounds, blending sensory and intellectual (especially conceptual) operations that Coleridge contends ought to be conceived as distinct sets of cognitive functions.\(^42\)

On Coleridge’s terms, insofar as we speak of reasoning or the use of reason at all in logic, we should be taken to mean only the ‘discourse of reason’, the exercise of the discursive capacities of understanding ‘in the light of reason’, or the application of the principles of reason to the discursive cognitive contents given or produced through the operations of understanding.\(^43\) The complexities of Coleridge’s conception of the relationship between the cognitive capacity of reason and the rules or forms of discursive cognition (i.e. of the understanding) need not concern us here. For now it is sufficient to note that Coleridge makes a clear distinction between intuitive and discursive intellectual powers, and therefore uses ‘reason’ to refer only to the former kind, and ‘understanding’ to refer only to the latter kind.\(^44\) This distinction helps to indicate what Coleridge shares with conventional eighteenth-century conceptions of logic, and also what separates his methods and terminology from such accounts. Consider, for instance, how Coleridge’s reason/understanding distinction appears in light of the following entry on logic in Rees’

\(^{40}\) Condillac (1809 [1781]), 47. Presumably, Coleridge would also reject Locke’s claim that ‘The power of perception is that which we call the understanding’ (Essay, II.xxi.5), insofar as this claim is taken to entail that the term ‘understanding’ designates, in part, the sensory capacities of the mind; for evidence that Coleridge interprets Locke in this way, see *TT*.1.312; *BL*.1.141-2 (cf. I.110).

\(^{41}\) *Logic*, 32-4. His next sentence makes the distinction clear: ‘Here λόγος is distinguished from θεωγία, as the understanding from the sense’. Coleridge often claims that Alexandrian philosophers like Plotinus use the term θεωγία to refer to the functions of both sense (as the ‘capability of acquiring representations’ [i.e. sensible intuitions]) and the perceptual or ‘intuitive imagination’ (as ‘our power of combining a multiplicity of presentations’ or of ‘appréhension or primary combination’—what Kant calls ‘transcendental synthesis of the imagination’). See *Logic*, 34, 68-70ff, 245; cf. *CPR*, B151, 156ff. See also 1.5, 3.3 below.

\(^{42}\) It must be noted, however, that in such contexts distinction does not mean division for Coleridge (i.e. the mind is unified, although its capacities can be distinguished for purposes of analysis and enumeration, esp. in working out theories of logic and cognition (see e.g. *Logic*, 68-70, 251-4).

\(^{43}\) See e.g. *Logic*, 236ff (esp. Coleridge’s reference to those ‘principles of reason inseparably connected with the understanding as a foundation is with its edifice’ at 237; cf. 87-92, 211-2).

\(^{44}\) Coleridge’s classic statement of this distinction is *Friend*.I.154-5 (cf. *Logic*, 33-6, 43-4, 68-70).
Cyclopaedia, published in 1819 (the year before Coleridge began composing Logic), but still very much reflective of the eighteenth-century view of the nature of logical inquiry that remained standard in Coleridge’s own time:

LOGIC, the art of thinking justly; or of making a right use of our rational faculties, in defining, dividing, and reasoning: or, as it is defined by an excellent writer on the subject, ‘logic is the art of using reason well in our enquiries after truth, and the communication of it to others’; quoting from the opening paragraph of Watts’ Logick.

[... In order to think aright, it is necessary that we apprehend, judge, discourse, and dispose, or methodize, rightly: hence perception or apprehension, judgement, discourse or reasoning, and disposition, whence results method, [are] the four fundamental articles of this art; and it is from our reflections on these operations of the mind that logic is, or ought to be, wholly drawn [another view popularised by (Lockean) logicians like Watts].]

Returning to Coleridge’s definitions of logic as (i) ‘the art and science of discoursing conclusively’, and (ii) the science that ‘contains the rules or forms [i.e. the operations] of the understanding’, it is evident that his views are closer to the Wattsian conception of logic presented here than Coleridge’s opening criticisms of Watts in Logic might be taken to suggest. The main difference is terminological: Coleridge would not accept this broad definition of what it means to be engaged in ‘the use of reason’; however, he would not dispute, on technical grounds, that logic does involve some use of reason, or the exercise of our ‘rational faculties’ and capacity for reasoning. Moreover, as was made clear above, Coleridge accepts the general view that ‘it is from our reflections on [the] operations of the mind that logic is, or ought to be, wholly drawn’, even if he has disagreements with eighteenth-century logicians like Watts or Condillac about what sorts of cognitive forms and contents such reflective procedures are employed to analyse and describe (i.e. what kind of theory about the ‘laws and constitution of the understanding’ and its relation to logical rules may be derived from such reflection). Similarly, while Coleridge agrees that a logical theory should involve some account of the mental operation of ‘perception or apprehension’, he argues that the terminology of such a theory must distinguish between the respective contributions of our discursive intellectual capacities and intuitive sensory

45 Rees (1819), Vol. 20, 277, with quotes from Watts (1725), I. On Watts as a populariser of the ‘Lockean’ logic of ideas and faculties, see Buickerood (1985).
46 See e.g. Logic, 5-7, 37ff, 196-7.
capacities to perceptual processes (rather than stating that the understanding includes or ‘comprehends’ both sensory and intellectual operations, like Condillac).47

To get a better sense of why Coleridge is so insistently critical of the proponents of an eighteenth-century view of logic which he seems to hold himself, we need to look more closely at what Coleridge has to say about Aristotle’s contribution to logical theory, considering how these statements reflect the influence of Kant on the one hand, and the assumptions that Coleridge shares with his eighteenth-century logical adversaries on the other. I will begin by looking at the case for Kant’s influence on Coleridge’s conception of logic (1.2). I then discuss how this influence needs to be considered in the context of the early modern logic of ideas and cognitive faculties that shaped Coleridge’s reading of Kant (1.3). Part 1 concludes with (i) a discussion of how Coleridge’s distinction between ‘logic’ and ‘psychology’ reflects his rejection of what he sees as an untenable materialistic version of facultative logic, rather than being evidence for his denial that the analysis of cognitive operations and contents should form part of logic (1.4), and (ii) a more detailed account of Coleridge’s conception of the cognitive faculties or powers, and the different ways in which he thinks such mental capacities can be described (1.5).

1.3 Coleridge, Aristotle, & the Question of Kant’s Influence

i. Coleridge’s Kantian Reading of Aristotle

Coleridge’s opening statements on Aristotle, and his contrast of the approach to logic first developed by Aristotle with that of ‘the most popular modern books, French and English, professing to teach logic and having its name as their title’,48 is a useful reference point for contextualising Coleridge’s own approach in Logic. While Coleridge does not explicitly mention Kant here, his emphasis on the methodological purposes of logical rules (for keeping diverse fields of knowledge distinct), and on the need for such rules to be a priori (universal and necessary, or ‘suited to all understandings’49), is a clear indication of Kant’s influence. For Coleridge not only frames Aristotle’s contributions to the early development of logic in this Kantian fashion; he also repeats Kant’s well-known claim that Aristotle was the first to enumerate and systematise the core principles of general or formal logic (Coleridge’s ‘common logic’), and in doing so left little need for the further

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47 See Condillac (1809 [1781]), 47.
48 Logic, 5-6.
49 Logic, 5. Although Coleridge does not say so directly here, it becomes clear elsewhere (e.g. 34-7, 43-5, 146-7) that any rules or principles ‘drawn from the laws and constitution of the understanding’ must, on his conception of logic (as a theory of the human understanding), be a priori.
development of this field. Given that there had been many advances in formal logic since Aristotle’s time with which Kant was surely familiar, this statement has often been criticised. However, precisely what Kant meant in asserting that since Aristotle, ‘[formal logic] has also been unable to take a single step forward, and therefore seems to all appearance to be finished and complete’ remains a matter of some dispute. Coleridge’s statement that ‘the essentials of common logic […] have remained without change from their first promulgation by Aristotle and […] are indeed as little susceptible of change as the rules of common arithmetic’ appears to place him in line with some contemporary commentators on this issue. It suggests not that Coleridge reads Kant’s claim as denying the possibility of any further progress in formal logic, but rather that Coleridge takes Kant to mean that because the core principles of logic discovered by Aristotle (Kant’s ‘formal rules of all thinking’) have a special a priori status, these principles cannot be subject to further development or change. The source or ground of this special status is ‘the laws and constitution of the understanding’, just as the rules of common arithmetic have their ground in our forms of intuition (the faculty of sense): a source which confers upon these rules the same a priori status. In short, it is because Aristotle recognised that the fundamental principles of logic must be grounded in this way, and thus drew them from their original source in the human understanding, that the set of logical rules which he was the first to systematise cannot be improved upon.

That Coleridge is most likely following Kant here is further confirmed by two other notable parallels with the first Critique preface in which Kant presents the above assessment of Aristotle’s place in the history of logic. Like Kant, Coleridge states that logic is a ‘science’. In Coleridge’s terms, ‘any kind or quantum of knowledge that has been reduced to rules’ qualifies as a science. What is required to reduce the field of knowledge that is constituted by general or common logic to rules (and thereby render it ‘scientific’) is to identify those ‘rules or forms of the understanding’ in which these

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50 See CPR, Bviii. Kant’s term ‘general logic’ is widely taken to refer only to an Aristotelian system of formal syllogistic logic and its fundamental rules (although some scholars, like Mosser, claim that Kant includes more than just the rules of the syllogism in a general logic). Coleridge uses the term ‘common logic’ in much the same way, with an emphasis on ‘the form of the syllogism’ (see Logic, 51-2). Unless otherwise stated, I use the terms ‘general’, ‘common’, and ‘formal logic’ as roughly equivalent.

51 CPR, Bviii. For a reassessment of Kant’s claims about Aristotle, see Mosser (2008), 88-92.

52 Logic, 6.


54 Here I follow Mosser’s reading of Kant, see (2008), esp. ch. 2-3.

55 That Coleridge follows Kant in arguing that the ground or source of the basic rules of arithmetic and their apriority must be our form of intuition or sensibility (specifically, time, as the form of inner sense) is clear at Logic, 36, 41, 165-8, 213-4 (cf. CPR, B46-8).


57 Logic, 5 (‘the word “science” being here taken in its highest sense’).
fundamental ‘laws of thought’ are grounded. Along with claiming that logic must be a science, Coleridge emphasises ‘the high expediency of drawing as sharp and distinct a line as possible around each several science’, and the consequent need to keep logic and its principles separate from those of other disciplines. This is why he praises Aristotle’s recognition of the need for the kinds of methodological principles (furnished by logic) that enable such a systematic differentiation and classification of different sciences or fields of knowledge. It is also the reason for Coleridge’s criticism of those contemporary logic textbooks that present the principles of formal logic ‘blended [together] with metaphysics, theology, psychology, grammar, [etc.]’, or which seek to substitute some kind of materialist psychological theory for a formal analysis of cognition (usually by reducing the formal laws of thought provided by a general logic to neurophysiological mechanisms or psychologically grounded habits of thought). The implications of this Kantian influence for Coleridge’s conception of logical inquiry will be discussed further later (see 3.2, 4.1-2). For now I want to focus on another aspect of the connection here with Aristotle (as viewed from Coleridge’s Kantian perspective): Aristotle’s historical role as a significant figure in the development of a ‘facultative logic’ which concerns itself with the relation between logical rules or forms and the human cognitive faculties and their operations, and reached its high point in the early modern period. This point is important as it has bearing not only on how Coleridge was influenced by Kant’s logical doctrines, but also on how Coleridge interpreted such Kantian doctrines before he decided to incorporate them into his own Logic (i.e. on how whatever influence Kant had on Coleridge was mediated by the historical and intellectual context within which Coleridge encountered Kant’s ideas concerning the nature of logic). To see why this matters, it will be useful first to say a bit more about Coleridge’s relation to Kant and the general lack of emphasis on the relationship between the cognitive faculties and logical rules or forms in many current interpretations of their respective logical systems.

58 See Logic, 34, 37, 41, 146. Cf. Kant’s claims at CPR, Bviii-ix, B76-8.
59 Logic, 5. Cf. Kant’s observation at CPR, Bviii that ‘It is not an improvement but a deformation of the sciences when their boundaries are allowed to run over into one another’.
60 Logic, 6, 37, 133. Cf. CPR, Bviii for Kant’s criticism of those ‘moderns who have thought to enlarge [general logic] by interpolating psychological […], metaphysical [… and] anthropological chapters’ (this ‘proceeds only from their ignorance of the peculiar nature of this science’).
61 This term was coined by Buickerood (1985) and subsequently employed by many other historians of early modern logic. See e.g. Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), Schuurman (2004), Sgarbi (2013).
ii. Logical Rules & the Cognitive Faculties in Kant & Coleridge

Many contemporary interpretations of Kant’s general and transcendental logic, and of the relations between these two branches of Kant’s logical theory, downplay or seek to remove altogether the role of Kant’s account of the human cognitive powers in his description of the nature and purpose of both the general and transcendental forms of logical inquiry. Such readings tend to focus instead on how Kant’s notion of form and his theory of concepts as rules may be redefined in terms of the conceptual framework(s) provided by more recent developments in formal logic and epistemology, or on how Kant’s claims concerning the rules of sensibility and understanding can be interpreted as statements about the epistemic conditions or criteria that must govern our cognition or cognitive experience rather than as references to specific functions of our cognitive faculties or capacities.

While some recent approaches give closer attention to Kant’s claims about the nature of human mental processes, emphasising the significance of the psychological elements of Kant’s first *Critique* and attempting to present its main insights in terms provided by contemporary cognitive science, these readings seldom have much to say about the role of Kant’s theory of cognition in relation his account of general logic and his arguments in the Metaphysical Deduction. What this means, in short, is that logical or epistemological interpretations of Kant generally separate his claims about logical rules and epistemic conditions from his claims about our cognitive faculties, whereas psychological or ‘cognitivist’ interpretations typically do the converse, separating Kant’s claims about the formal principles of human cognition from his claims about the formal principles of (general) logic. This often results in questions about why Kant emphasises the relationship between logic (in both its general and transcendental forms) and the investigation of our cognitive faculties being glossed over as historical curiosities, or recast as problems that fall outside of the sphere of logical inquiry.

Given that Coleridge, too, not only emphasises the need to keep logic and its principles sharply separated from other fields of knowledge, but also contends that the source or ground of all logical principles must be the human faculty of understanding, this state of scholarly affairs has important implications for any attempt to make sense of Coleridge’s reading of Kantian logical (and cognitive) theory.

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62 Here the interpretations of Allison (2004 [1983]) and Strawson (1966) are particularly influential.
63 See e.g. Friedman (1992), Tiles (2004).
64 See e.g. Allison (2004), Pippin (1982).
66 For an overview of this traditional response, see Waxman (2005), ch. 1, esp. 6-11.
However, in the relatively small area of Coleridge studies concerned with his *Logic* there has been little attention to the relations between Coleridge’s conception of logic and his account of the ‘forms and functions’ of the cognitive faculties, or to how Coleridge interprets Kant’s claims concerning the nature of logical forms (considered as norms of thought) and cognitive forms (considered as mental operations, or modes of human sensory and intellectual activity). 67 As was pointed out earlier, Jackson and Milnes repeat the prevailing scholarly assumptions concerning Kant’s theory of logic as either strangely intermixed with metaphysical and epistemological principles (thus removing it from the sphere of logical inquiry), or as a long since exploded version of psychologistic logic (so disqualifying it from consideration as a logical theory). 68 The alternatives to their two approaches tend either to read Coleridge’s account of logic in relation to eighteenth-century linguistic theory with little reference to his theory of the cognitive faculties, or to focus on Coleridge’s accounts of cognitive and perceptual processes without considering how these accounts relate to his theory of logic. 69 In all these cases, as with the readings of Kant just outlined, little attention is given to Coleridge claim that the ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms of the understanding’ forms an essential part of logical inquiry, or to Coleridge’s possible reasons for interpreting Kant’s logic along such lines. 70 Here I will follow the lead of those Kant scholars who seek to frame their interpretations of his views on logic and cognition not in terms of contemporary logical, epistemological, or cognitive theory, but rather in the terms provided by those early modern philosophical traditions to which Kant was responding, and by which he was strongly influenced, in developing his own theories of logic and cognition. 71 For while the core terms of Coleridge’s account of logic and theory of cognition are largely drawn or adapted from Kant, it should be recognised that Coleridge’s sense of the meaning and significance of Kant’s terminology is in many ways determined by his prior engagement with the influential tradition of the early modern ‘logic of cognitive faculties’. 72

67 For some representative remarks on the ‘inherent forms and functions’ or ‘several functional powers’ of sense and understanding, see e.g. *Logik*, 12-14, 145-9, 213-4, 242-8.
68 See *Logik*, liii; Milnes (2008).
70 See 146-7. That Coleridge interprets Kant’s logic in this way is made clear at 148-9, 213, and 268.
71 In particular, I follow the examples of Hatfield (1990) and Waxman (2005).
72 I take this phrase from Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), 103; cf. Schuurman (2004).
1.4 Faculties, Ideas, & Origins: Coleridge & Long Eighteenth-Century Logic

i. The Development of Facultative Logic: An Outline

Before considering Coleridge’s views concerning the connections between Kantian and early modern logical theory in more detail, we need to look more closely at the historical background of the structure and content of the eighteenth-century logic textbooks which he criticises in the opening passages of *Logic*. As was suggested earlier, the way in which Coleridge contrasts Aristotle’s contribution to the early development of logic with the theory and practice of logic typical of the popular English and French textbooks of his day is significant not just because of what Coleridge thinks separates the logical work of thinkers like Watts and Condillac from that of Aristotle (i.e. their different views of the origin and status of ‘the laws of the understanding’). For, although Coleridge sees these authors as taking fundamentally different positions concerning the nature, source, status, and classification of logical principles, he also views their works as forming part of the same broad tradition of ‘facultative logic’. This is an approach that standardly considers the objects of logical inquiry in relation to the cognitive faculties and which attempts to characterise (and sometimes to justify) the principles of logical doctrine with reference to the operations of these faculties. As Coleridge was aware, while this way of theorising about logic and its relationship to the cognitive faculties began to reach new levels of sophistication late in the seventeenth century, it is a philosophical practice that goes back much further. In this section (1.3) I give a brief overview of the historical development of facultative logic, and discuss how Coleridge seeks to situate his own logical work in relation to this tradition. In 1.4 I will discuss how the development of facultative logic resulted in substantive changes in the structure and content of long eighteenth-century logical texts, as well as showing that while Coleridge criticises certain materialistic strands of this new faculty-oriented logic, his own logical texts follow a similar pattern, focusing on the nature and origin of cognitive operations and contents rather than the traditional topics of Aristotelian formal logic.

Capozzi and Roncaglia, amongst others, have noted that while ‘many logicians developed an interest in the analysis of the cognitive faculties’, during the seventeenth century, the incorporation of discussions of the human cognitive activities into logic has a much earlier historical precedent (well-known to early modern logicians):

73 See 1.1 above.
74 See *Logik*, 5-6 (cf. 37).
76 For Coleridge’s views on the ancient roots of the facultative approach, see *CL*.II.679ff, *W.F.*I.124-40.
dealing with the nature and object of logic and with the justification of the traditional partitions of logical treaties through a reference to mental operations had been a well-established practice since Aristotle’s *Organon*: The operations of simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning had [thus already] been mentioned as mental counterparts to the logical doctrines of concepts, judgments, and inferences.77

As they go on to point out, this Aristotelian approach is reproduced in such influential early seventeenth-century textbooks as Robert Sanderson’s *Logicae artis compendium* but was superseded in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries by a different kind of ‘logic of cognitive faculties’. Traditional facultative logics sought to use ‘The study of the cognitive faculties […]’ to provide an expository framework for logical doctrines’, by identifying certain sorts of cognitive operations as the ‘mental counterparts’ to particular terms or components of logical theory (e.g. concepts and judgements). What separates Locke, Descartes, and the Port-Royal logicians from their Aristotelian forerunners is that they pay closer attention to questions concerning the role of our cognitive faculties in the production and manipulation of the kinds of cognitive content with which logical inquiry is concerned. In these newer developments of facultative logic, the expository framework of mental counterparts is thus further extended: ‘the cognitive operations involved in the formation and use of ideas become a central concern of logicians’.78 This new focus on how ideas or ‘the immediate objects of the mind’79 come to be formed resulted in further concentration on questions concerning the origin of ideas and other such mental objects or contents, as well as in renewed attention to perception and cognition (as problems for logic).80 As noted in 1.1, Coleridge takes such questions of origin, especially as applied to the forms or rules of the understanding, are central to logical inquiry.81 In what follows, I consider some further textual and contextual evidence for my claim that Coleridge’s *Logic* should be placed within the new facultative tradition which developed in the wake of the Cartesian and Lockean logic of ideas and faculties.

78 Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), 103-6. On Sanderson as a proto-facultative logician, see Schuurman (2004), 11-16; cf. Sgarbi (2013), 152-7 on Sanderson’s logic and British Aristotelianism.
79 This is Coleridge’s definition of Locke’s sense of the term ‘idea’ (see *Logic*, 210n).
80 On the focus on perception and cognition in early modern logic, see Michael (1997), Hatfield (1997).
81 See *Logic*, 34-7, 68-70, 151-4, 183-4n, 254, 265-6n.
ii. Facultative Logic in Coleridge’s early 1800s Letters & Manuscripts

As it happens, sometime before Coleridge formulated his first plans for a work on logic and committed them to paper in mid-1803, he had already carried out a fairly detailed study of (perhaps) the two most influential figures in the tradition of the early modern logic of ideas and cognitive faculties: Locke and Descartes.\(^{82}\) Coleridge’s series of ‘philosophical letters’ on Locke on Descartes is well-known, but it has seldom, if at all, been considered in relation to Coleridge’s conception of logical inquiry, or indeed to Coleridge’s projects for a logical work in 1803 and the 1820s.\(^{83}\) This may be because Coleridge himself does not explicitly raise questions concerning logic and its domain of inquiry at any point in these letters (although he does claim that Locke’s misconceptions concerning the nature of innate ideas could have been avoided had he ‘ever looked into the logical or metaphysical works of Aristotle’).\(^{84}\) However, the main topic of Coleridge’s letters, Locke’s criticism of Cartesian innate ideas and the relation of ideas of sensation and reflection to the human cognitive faculties, makes clear the connection with early modern logic here. Moreover, while Coleridge admits in the first of these letters that he had not previously read Locke’s *Essay* very closely, his familiarity with the writings of Locke-influenced thinkers, like Hartley, Berkeley, and Condillac, before 1801 means that Coleridge would have been aware that the problem of the nature and ‘original Sources of our Ideas’ was of fundamental concern in the early modern logic of ideas and cognitive faculties.\(^{85}\) What I want to propose is that Coleridge’s letters on Locke and Descartes must be recognised as the starting point for his interest in the history and theory of logic (especially questions on the relationship between logical principles and the contents and operations of the mind, framed as a matter of ground or origin). As I will be arguing, this is why we should take seriously the possibility that Coleridge’s reading of Kant’s theories of logic and cognition (as presented in his *Logic*) was influenced in significant ways by his prior engagement with the early modern logic of ideas and cognitive faculties.

For our present purposes, we will not need a detailed account of the arguments of Coleridge’s 1801 letters on Locke and the problem of innate ideas; rather, I discuss some common themes connecting these letters to the 1820s *Logic* manuscript, in order to

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\(^{82}\) Here I follow the characterisation of this tradition in Schuurman (2004), esp. ch. 2.

\(^{83}\) For the history of this sequence of letters, prepared for Coleridge’s patron Josiah Wedgwood and his brother Tom early in 1801, see *CL.II*.677-8 headnote. On Coleridge and Locke, see Brinkley (1949).

\(^{84}\) *CL.II*.693.

\(^{85}\) This is Coleridge’s own statement of the problem at *CL.II*.685. See *CL.II*.679 for Coleridge’s admission that ‘Mr Locke’s Essay was a Book which I had really never read, but only looked thro’ before beginning his comparative study of Locke’s and Descartes’ theories of ideas. Coleridge was also studying §II, ‘Of the Origin of Ideas’, of Hume’s *Enquiry* at this time (see *CL.II*.672, 681).
show the continuity of Coleridge’s views on logic across this period (especially his sense of the centrality of the theory of ideas and faculties to logical inquiry). There are two key points of connection here, which are themselves closely related: (1) the claim that Locke misinterpreted Descartes’ definition of innate ideas, having failed to realise that they are in fact identical to his own definition of ideas of reflection (and also that Descartes had already anticipated and refuted the kind of objection framed by Locke); and (2) the claim that there is a tradition going back to ancient philosophy that sees the ‘innate principles’ or ‘primary notions’ which Locke supposedly mischaracterises as ‘innate ideas’ not as some special kind of knowledge or truth residing originally in the mind, but rather as the innate or natural cognitive capacities of the human mind. For, according to Coleridge, ‘By [the term] Ideas Plato, notwithstanding his fantastic expressions respecting them, meant what Mr Locke calls the original Faculties & Tendencies of the mind’, and this conception of innate or natural cognitive faculties can be found not only in Plato and Aristotle, but also in the writings of Sennert, Descartes, and Hume.86 On his account, this is a principle of logical theory that was well established by Aristotle’s time. Both (1) and (2) show clearly Coleridge’s early interest in the problem of the origins of our ideas (or representations) and their relation to our cognitive faculties. The list of sources Coleridge draws on for these claims also provides evidence for his familiarity with the ancient and early modern philosophical traditions which seek to explain the connections between the cognitive or epistemological content studied in logic and the cognitive faculties or operations taken to correspond to or produce such content.87

What is most important about (1) and (2) for our purposes is that they provide fairly stable reference points for charting the development of Coleridge’s conception of logic. (1) is stated in much the same form in Coleridge’s 1801 philosophical letters and in his Logic manuscript twenty years later. The case of (2) is more complicated as Coleridge was, after 1801, to revise his interpretation of the Platonic ideas substantially; however, his conception of the ‘original Faculties & Tendencies of the mind, the internal Organs, as it were, and Laws of human Thinking’ that he refers to in the 1801 letters is much the

86 See CL.II.679-91. Coleridge cites from a wide range of texts to support claims (1) and (2), including Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, Diogenes Laertius’ Life of Plato, Sennert’s Epitome Naturalis Scientiae, Descartes’ Meditations and Discourse on Method, Locke’s Essay, and Hume’s Enquiry (see CL. editor’s notes for details; cf. Logic 184n, 236-7n). On the view that ideas originate either in sensation or in reflection on the operations of the mind, Coleridge states, ‘Des Cartes and Locke agreed with each other in [this] Tenet common to all the Philosophers before them’ (686).

87 i.e. the ‘proto-facultative’ Aristotelian tradition (represented here by Aristotle and Sennert), and the early modern logic of ideas and cognitive faculties tradition (represented by Locke and Descartes).
same in *Logic* (and presented in terms that Coleridge had coined in the earlier text). This is significant because it is thus clear that Coleridge’s interpretation of these claims about the nature and origin of the contents and operations of the human mind (which he first studied closely in the works of Aristotle, Locke, Descartes, and other influential ancient and early modern authors on logic and cognition) changed little over this twenty year period. Conversely, though many textual details of the *Logic* manuscript do suggest that Kant had become one of the dominant influences on Coleridge’s view of logical inquiry by the early 1820s, one finds no similarly unequivocal documentary evidence for Kant’s impact on Coleridge’s conception of logic in the early 1800s. Indeed, the limited textual record we have of Coleridge’s responses to Kant’s first *Critique* (a core source for *Logic*) during these years suggests not only that Coleridge initially struggled to make sense of Kant’s theory of experience, but also that he doubted the validity of Kant’s doctrine of the categories, arguably the foundation of Kant’s account of logic and cognition. By the 1820s, Coleridge had clearly come to accept Kant’s tables of judgement- and concept-forms and many of the major implications of Kant’s arguments in his Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions; but there is no evidence that Coleridge held this view when he began to work on logic c. 1801, and so no grounds to assume that it was Kant rather than any of the numerous other philosophers that Coleridge was reading over this period who shaped his early theory of logic and its relation to the cognitive faculties.

Of course, such historical data alone will not prove that the early modern logic of ideas and cognitive faculties was ultimately any more influential on Coleridge than Kant’s logical doctrines. However, what it does suggest is that Coleridge came to terms with the basic principles of early modern (and ancient) logical theories rather more quickly than he did with those of Kant’s philosophy. More importantly, putting aside the question of influence, this also gives us further reason to believe that Coleridge would have been inclined to read what he found in Kant’s writings on logic and cognition in terms of the framework of ideas and faculties provided by the early modern texts with which he was engaging at this time, as well as to place Kant’s ideas within the traditions of facultative logic stretching back to Aristotle. Coleridge had not yet, so far as may be inferred from

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88 For (1) see *CL*.II.684-5 and *Logic*, 184n; for (2) see *CL*.II.682 and *Logic*, 133.
89 The same is true of Coleridge’s c. 1803 *Outlines of the History of Logic* MS (WFT.I.123-40) and his c. 1820s ‘Sketch of the History of Logic’ (*Logic*, 24–41).
90 But see e.g. Ashton (1980), 40-4, (1998), 196; Wheeler (1981), 15-16; Willey (1972), 86-89, for the assertion of such Kantian influence from c. 1800-1 onwards, in spite of the lack of textual evidence.
91 See CM.III.248-9 (conjecturally dated to c. 1801-8; the earlier date seems more likely, as Coleridge had evidently better come to terms with Kant’s philosophy by 1809; see CN.III.3605 (Aug-Sep 1809).
92 Coleridge’s acceptance of the categories is clear at *Logic*, 254-71, esp. 263-6.
the available evidence, made up his mind about the categories or the nature of Kant’s idealism when he began to plan his work on logic. But what we do know of this period is that in 1801, just as in the 1820s, Coleridge contended that ‘Des Cartes and Locke held precisely the same opinions concerning the original Sources of our Ideas’, and that the sensory and reflective reception of ideas (representations) depends upon the operations of ‘the original Faculties and Tendencies of the mind’ or the ‘original moulds of the mind’ (later ‘primary moulds or forms’). Coleridge was later to comment that he took Kant to be ‘the first scientific analyst’ of these cognitive faculties. But, as the foregoing analysis should make clear, Coleridge certainly did not think of Kant as the first philosopher to have recognised or taken up these particular problems; nor did he initially regard Kant to have provided the most persuasive theoretical account of the nature and origins of the contents and operations of the human mind (considered as a matter for logical inquiry). Rather, Coleridge came to endorse Kant’s logical theory only after adopting a facultative framework in terms of which he was able to make sense of Kant’s claims.

Another useful reference point here is the June 1803 letter where Coleridge first outlines his plan for a work on the history and theory of logic. It is perhaps the earliest occasion on which we find Coleridge conflating the systems of Hartley and Condillac, as well as referring explicitly to the works of these philosophers as theories of logic (he also states his intention here to develop ‘a philosophical examination of [Condillac’s] Logic’). More importantly, Coleridge’s sketch of the plans for this logical work indicates that, by 1803, he had decided to adopt the kind of facultative approach to logic outlined in the preceding part of this section. For here, after giving a chapter-by-chapter overview of the historical aspects of his projected work, Coleridge states that his analytical history of the development of logic from the pre-Socratics to Condillac will be ‘follow[ed by] my own Organum verè Organum—which consists of a Σύστημα [system] of all possible modes of true, probable & false reasoning, arranged philosophically, i.e. on a strict analysis of those operations & passions of the mind, in which they originate, & by which they act’. This shows that well before Coleridge had championed Kant as offering ‘a true analysis of the understanding’, he considered the principal aim of logical inquiry to be an analysis of the operations of the human mind that could determine the ground or origin of our capacity to reason, by tracing the modes of such reasoning back to their sources in our cognitive

93 See CL.II.684-5 and Logî, 184n; CL.II.682 and Logî, 133.
94 See Logî, 268
95 CL.II.947 (Jun 1803).
faculties.\footnote{This is, at least on some readings, a central feature of Kant’s account of logic and cognition (see esp. \textit{CPR}, B90); as we have seen, however, Coleridge could just have easily adopted such an approach from Locke or Condillac, who often discuss this problem of origins in more detail (see nn. 94-6 above). This c. 1820s assessment of Kant as an analyst of the understanding is from \textit{Logic}, 210 (cf. 268).} I will now consider how Coleridge’s endorsement of this facultative approach is evident in some of his remarks on Kant and Aristotle in the 1820s \textit{Logic} manuscript.

### iii. Facultative Logic in Coleridge’s 1820s \textit{Logic} Manuscript

There are a number of places in the \textit{Logic} where Coleridge claims that Kant is the first modern logician to have fully resolved the problem of the origin and formation of the different kinds of cognitive content with which logic is concerned, and the further question of the relation of such content to the operations of our cognitive faculties.\footnote{\textit{Logic}, 148-9, 210, 268.} It is for this reason that Coleridge adopts without much alteration Kant’s representation-terminology and its classification of the different grounds or origins (in our cognitive faculties) of the diverse kinds of cognitive content(s) presented to us by the mind.\footnote{See \textit{Logic}, 111-2; Coleridge uses these terms throughout \textit{Logic} (see e.g. 34-7, 151-2ff, 213-4) \textit{Logic}, 147. Cf. 213; \textit{Logic}, 63, 268 (cf. 33-4, 147-9).} Why Coleridge chose to adopt this solution is a matter for later sections.\footnote{See esp. \textit{Logic}, 34-7, 151-2ff, 213-4.} What needs to be noted here is (1) that Coleridge interprets Kant’s logical theory as a version of facultative logic that is concerned with the ‘analysis of our intellectual faculties’\footnote{\textit{Logic}, 147. Cf. 213; \textit{Logic}, 63, 268 (cf. 33-4, 147-9).} (this is why he not only proclaims Kant ‘the greatest logician since the time of Aristotle’, but also the ‘first scientific analyst of the logical faculty’ or human understanding\footnote{See e.g. \textit{SWF}.II.947 (c. 1821), \textit{CL}.V.138 (Feb 1821), \textit{CN}.IV.5123 (Feb 1824).}); and (2) that Coleridge was primed to read Kant’s account of logic and cognition in this way because of his prior engagement with the early modern tradition of facultative logic (which remained the dominant approach to logic in Britain at the period Coleridge was composing \textit{Logic}, as he himself often observes\footnote{See esp. \textit{Logic}, 148-9 (cf. 51-2, 239-42).}). This is important because Coleridge did not read Kant only as a faculty theorist, but also as a philosopher who made major contributions to accounting for the epistemic criteria or formal conditions that govern all (human) sensory cognition. In fact, contrary to the interpretation dominant in Kant studies since the early twentieth century, Coleridge takes Kant’s analysis of the cognitive faculties to be the foundation of his most important insights into the nature and function of such epistemic criteria, and emphasises the connections between these two aspects of the Critical Philosophy.\footnote{See esp. \textit{Logic}, 148-9 (cf. 51-2, 239-42).} As I discuss further in \textbf{1.4}, Coleridge’s interpretation of this connection between epistemic criteria and the cognitive faculties is what informs his distinction between ‘logical’ and...
‘psychological’ analysis of ‘the laws and constitution of the understanding’, and underlies his criticism of the theories of cognition offered by Hartley and Condillac as fallacious attempts to substitute psychological laws for logical rules.\textsuperscript{104} For the moment I will focus some other passages, which show that Coleridge shares the view that a complete system of logic should involve an investigation of the origins of our cognitive content (especially ideas or representations) and an analysis of our cognitive faculties.

Once again, Aristotle is an important reference point here. This is because, while Coleridge refers to Kant as ‘the first scientific analyst of the logical faculty’, he mentions Aristotle as one of the first philosophers to define the understanding itself as our ‘logical faculty’ (designated by the term ‘\(λόγος\)’), and to distinguish the understanding from other cognitive capacities such as reason and sense:\textsuperscript{105}

That Aristotle, however, did not differ from his great master and rival [Plato] as to the existence of the distinction which I am now about to notice is evident from his own words: “there must be something transcending the \(λόγος\)”, that is, the logical faculty, viz. that which is the principle of this faculty [i.e. ‘the \(νοῦς\) or pure reason’], to which numerous other passages of the same import might be added from his logical and metaphysical works.\textsuperscript{106}

Having introduced the distinction between understanding or \(λόγος\) as our ‘logical faculty’ and \(νοῦς\) as that which ‘transcends’ or is the ‘principle of this faculty’, Coleridge goes on to provide an overview of the faculty terminology employed by ancient philosophers after Aristotle to distinguish between different cognitive capacities:

At this time the substantive \(λόγος\), we have said, acquired a new sense, and was employed to express the intelligent faculty itself and this in a threefold relation: first it signified the logical faculty, the reasoning power, in short the understanding including the judgment, in distinction from the \(νοῦς\) or reason. Secondly it [\(λόγος\)] signified the understanding, as the discursive faculty, or that which employed itself on the conceptions of the mind and the general terms representing them, in distinction from the intuition, or intuitive power of the mind, as employed on the forms of perception in time and space, that is number and figure: […] Here the \(λόγος\) is distinguished from \(θεωρία\), as the understanding from the sense, and […] thirldly the \(λόγος\) was used in a somewhat larger sense, as the mind or intellective power abstractedly

\textsuperscript{104} See Logic, 5-6, 37ff, 139-43.
\textsuperscript{105} Logic, 33; cf. 65-70. I discuss Coleridge’s reading of Aristotle’s employment of the term ‘\(λόγος\)’ further below, when turning to account of the historical development of faculty terminology (see 3.3).
\textsuperscript{106} Logic, 33. As at 5-6, where Coleridge also mentions Aristotle’s ‘logical and metaphysical works’, no passages are actually cited. The editor suggests Coleridge is here paraphrasing De Anima 3.5.
from the νοῦς or pure reason [...]; from the reason, I say, as at once the light of the mind and its highest object [i.e. as the ‘power of ideas’ or capacity for noesis].

After outlining this ‘threefold relation’ between λόγος, θεωρία, and νοῦς, and providing English equivalents for these ancient Greek terms (in the faculty terminology familiar to his readers), Coleridge offers a further explanation of what it means to refer to λόγος or understanding as our ‘logical faculty’:

Th[is] sense is [...] an application of it [i.e. the term λόγος] to a particular and correspondent science—that of logic; of which no other definition need be given than that it contains the rules or forms of the understanding, on whatever objects they are employed, in exclusive reference to the correspondence of these objects to its own forms.

I return to these passages in 3.3 to offer a more detailed account of Coleridge’s views on the import of Greek faculty terminology; for now it is sufficient to note that Coleridge’s statements here show that he considers the tradition of facultative logic, conceived as a discipline concerned with the classification and analysis of our cognitive faculties and their operations, to have its roots in ancient philosophy. More importantly, it suggests that Coleridge conceives of logic specifically as the discipline concerned with developing a theory of the understanding (defined as our ‘logical faculty’), considered as one of our fundamental cognitive faculties, and the origin or source of those cognitive contents and operations with which logical inquiry is concerned (i.e. concepts and judgements). That Coleridge seeks to emphasise such a connection between logic and the understanding is perhaps nowhere more evident than in his employment of the adjective ‘logical’ to refer specifically to the acts and operations of the understanding and to the cognitive content produced, or presented to the mind, by its cognitive functions. With this in mind, we can now consider some representative examples of long eighteenth-century facultative logic and Coleridge’s response to these theories. I look first at the differences between the influential logical textbooks of Sanderson and Watts, and then turn to a discussion of how the work of Condillac and Hartley fits into the facultative tradition popularised by

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107 Logic, 34. See 68-70 on reason as a ‘power of ideas’ (cf. 43-4, 237-8).
108 Logic, 34 (cf. 5-6, 37, 212-3).
109 Coleridge makes this clear at Logic, 66-70, 147-9, 154, 255 (cf. 44-5 and nn).
110 See esp. Logic, 64-5 where Coleridge defines ‘logical’ as ‘subjective in reference to the understanding, aloof from the question of its [i.e. the act or object of cognition’s] reality independent of the understanding’ (cf. 66-70, 77-81). Coleridge entitles the chapter on his theory of the understanding ‘On the Logical Acts’ (see 60-103, where Coleridge employs the term ‘logical’ in this sense throughout).
Watts, giving particular attention to Coleridge’s criticisms of the claims about the human mind and its cognitive mechanisms which he attributes to Hartley and Condillac. As we shall see, Coleridge argues that these philosophers have substituted psychology for logic not because they focus on analysing the faculties, but rather because they attempt (in his view) to derive the human capacity of discursive cognition (i.e. the understanding and its operations and contents) from the faculty of sense.

1.4 Long Eighteenth Century Logic & Coleridge’s Critique of Hartley & Condillac

i. Locke’s Influence on the Structure & Content of Logical Theory

To see why Coleridge’s criticisms of Hartley and Condillac are central to his account of logic as a discipline concerned with the analysis of our cognitive faculties, we must return to Coleridge’s dismissive account of eighteenth-century British and French logical theory (as represented by some of the popular contemporary textbooks). As was noted in 1.2-3, while Coleridge criticises the logical texts of Watts and Condillac on different grounds, he would have recognised both works as strongly influenced by the approach to logic established by Locke (but anticipated in some respects by Descartes and the Port-Royal logicians). Of particular significance here is Locke’s role in initiating a shift in the focus of logical inquiry away from a concern with the forms of the syllogism and the modes of argumentation bound up with these logical forms, and reorienting it towards a concern with analysing the operations and products of our cognitive faculties and investigating the origins of certain kinds of cognitive content (e.g. ideas). The content of Coleridge’s *Logic* is reflective of this shift: It contains only a single short chapter concerned with the syllogism, while the majority of the manuscript is devoted to an analysis of the cognitive faculties and discussion of a range of cognitive operations involved in the production of different kinds of cognitive content (even Coleridge’s theory of the syllogism and his discussions of epistemic criteria are framed in terms of their relation to specific cognitive acts or capacities).

Indeed, as I have been arguing, although the form Coleridge’s *Logic* eventually took was strongly influenced by Kant’s transcendental theories of logic and

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111 See *Logic*, 5-6. A closely contemporary letter (Feb 1821) also attests to Coleridge’s sense of Locke’s influence on eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century approaches to logic (see *CL*.V.139). In a series of far earlier letters Coleridge claims that Locke’s analysis of cognition is heavily dependent on the prior work of Descartes (see *CL*.II.679-85, Feb 1801).
113 Of the 271 pages in the Bollingen edition of Coleridge’s *Logic*, his theory of the syllogism is covered on just 53-9, while 24-47, 60-103, 139-74, 181-256 all concern aspects of logic (broadly construed) and its relation to (an analysis of) the cognitive faculties (esp. understanding, but also sensibility).
cognition, Coleridge’s reading of Kantian logic was clearly developed in response to a set of philosophical terms and problems provided by the early modern logical tradition.

As a number of historians of early modern logic have pointed out, although the logic of ideas (or logic of cognitive faculties) developed during this period in Locke’s Essay and other influential texts made little contribution to formal logic (neither to the discipline as it was understood in the late seventeenth century nor to its contemporary forms), it did bring about important developments in theories of sensation, perception, and cognition.114 As noted in 1.3, many of these developments relate to a new concern with the problem of the origin and formation of different kinds of cognitive content or mental objects (such as ideas or representations, concepts, and judgements), and with analysing the cognitive faculties or operations thought to be responsible for producing (and manipulating) such content.115 The impact of this new approach (through Locke’s influence in Britain, and through the influence of Locke, Descartes, and the Port-Royal logicians in France) is reflected in significant methodological changes in the presentation and organisation of material in many subsequently influential logic textbooks.116 If we compare the structure and content of the popular eighteenth-century logical works that Coleridge mentions to that typical of the Aristotelian logical handbooks that were the standard texts in the early seventeenth century, the nature of this methodological shift and the extent of Locke’s influence becomes clear (especially the influence of Book II of the Essay, but also that of the Introduction and Book I).

On the one hand, to take an influential example from the British Aristotelian tradition: although Sanderson’s Logicae artis compendium (1615) works within the ‘mental counterparts’ framework of early (or proto-) facultative logic, specifying those mental operations taken to correspond to particular components of Aristotelian logical doctrine, this textbook’s general structure and content are determined by other considerations. Thus, it begins not with an analysis of the human cognitive powers or an investigation of the origins of different kinds of cognitive content, but with formal definitions of the basic terms of Sanderson’s logic, then moving on to a consideration of the structure of propositions, and a discussion of the principles of argumentation and scientific method.

114 See e.g. Michael (1997), 18: ‘In the two hundred years in which the logic of ideas was dominant, it was in fact the theory of perception that was the principal focus of attention; [and] it is this which was principally developed’. Cf. Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), 103.
115 As Michael puts it ‘the chief focus in the logic of ideas was not on form but on content, principally on epistemological content’ (1997, 3).
(framed in terms of traditional logical topics and syllogistic forms). On the other hand, as I discuss below, Watts and Condillac follow Locke in beginning their textbooks with a consideration of the nature of certain kinds of cognitive content (ideas), particularly with reference to questions of its origin and its relation to our cognitive faculties (especially sense and understanding), leaving discussion of the syllogism and definition of its formal terms until much later, or simply dismissing the utility of such terms at the outset.  

We saw above that Locke’s *Essay* helped initiate a significant shift of focus in logical inquiry, moving away from an emphasis on the syllogism and other such formal logical matters in favour of closer attention to the analysis of cognitive content and the cognitive operations involved in the formation or production and use of such content. It is obviously an oversimplification to suggest that logic before Locke was concerned only with the theory of the syllogism, just as it is an oversimplification to suggest that Locke’s new logic of ideas and cognitive faculties has no concern with formal problems (broadly construed). The point is just that Locke’s influence led to new approaches to theorising about the relation between logical principles and the cognitive faculties taken to produce the cognitive content with which logical inquiry is concerned, and to greater emphasis on questions concerning the origins and status of such content. Thus, Locke’s *Essay* begins with an overview of the value and purpose of inquiring into the faculty of understanding, emphasising the utility of acquiring a knowledge of the limits and extent of our cognitive capacities. Book I states his case against innate ideas, while Book II considers, amongst other problems, possible alternatives for the source or origin of our ideas (sensation and reflection, rather than from within the mind itself, prior to all sense-experience). Since it is this focus on origins that is particularly evident in the texts of Watts, Condillac, and others influenced by Locke’s approach, I focus on the impact of Book II in particular on the structure and content of such logical works (although Book IV is also an important influence on their approach to questions of knowledge and opinion).

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117 As Sgarbi notes, the three parts or divisions of logic are arranged according to Sanderson’s ‘tripartition of mental operations leading to scientific knowledge’ (2013, 153); cf. Capozzi and Roncaglia for the view that Sanderson’s approach involves a ‘mental counterparts’ framework (2009, 103). See 152-7 for Sgarbi’s useful overview of the structure and content Sanderson’s logic (1617).

118 Locke does not introduce any discussion of the syllogism until Book IV, §4, only to dismiss its claim to intellectual utility (see 1824, 1.195ff, an edition contemporaneous with Coleridge’s *Logic*).

119 Interestingly, in a letter in which he claims that he values Kant ‘not [...] as a Metaphysician but as a Logician’, Coleridge suggests that CPR ought to be entitled ‘An Inquisition respecting the constitution and limits of the Human Understanding’ (in CL.V.421, Apr 1825). This is because Coleridge disagrees with Kant about the limits of human reason and the possibility of acquiring knowledge of the noumenal realm through speculative metaphysical inquiry (see e.g. *Logic*, 139-40n; cf. 44-5 and nn, 168-9).

120 This, at any rate, is how Coleridge reads Locke (see esp. *Logic*, 184n, 209-10, 233n).
ii. Watts, Condillac, & Hartley in the Context of Facultative Logic

My aim here is to give a better sense of the aspects of eighteenth-century logical theory which Coleridge has in mind when criticising Watts, Condillac, and Hartley. I will also show why Coleridge treats the work of Hartley and Condillac as equivalent: what matters in this case is not the unsubstantiated charge that Condillac’s logic is ‘plagiarised’ from Hartley, but rather the fact that Coleridge considers their respective accounts of logic and cognition to be similarly problematic forms of materialistic faculty-theory. This is important because while it is not clear that Coleridge had read Condillac’s *La Logique* (1781) closely, we know that he was very familiar with Hartley’s *Observations* (a text which was one of the principal early influences on Coleridge’s views on cognition).121 In this way, Coleridge’s close association of the logic of Hartley and Condillac makes it possible to identify the likely targets of his criticism of these two thinkers, even though Coleridge himself does not supply any textual support for his claim that ‘in the far-famed *Logic* of Condillac, […] one may find the whole theory of materialism […] only not one syllable concerning logic itself’.122 It will also help to show what Coleridge means when he asserts ‘that the study of Logic altogether is exploded in France, for Condillac’s book is rather psychological than logical’,123 even though his own *Logic* focuses far more on the analysis of cognitive activity than on the rules of formal (i.e. syllogistic) logic.

If we turn now to the texts of Watts, Condillac, and Hartley, we can see clearly the influence of Book II of Locke’s *Essay* on their structure and content, particularly in the opening chapters of these works, where the focus is on questions concerning the nature and use of our cognitive faculties, and the origins of the sensory and intellectual content upon which these faculties are exercised.124 In Watts ‘The First Part of Logick’ is subtitled ‘Of Perceptions and Ideas’, and he begins his textbook with the statement that ‘The first part of Logick contains Observations and Precepts about the first Operation of the Mind, *Perception or Conception*’.125 In Watts’ definitions, ‘Perception is the Consciousness of an Object when present [and] *Conception* is the forming of an Idea of the Object whether present or absent’.126 Thus, his logical theory presents as its foundation an account of the

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121 Although Coleridge often mentioned plans to write a detailed criticism of Condillac’s ‘pseudo-logic’ (see *CL*.II.947-8, Jun 1803, III.238-9, Oct 1809), there is little surviving textual evidence that suggests he ever carried it out. Comments in *CL*.II.675, 706 (Feb-Mar 1801) suggest that Coleridge was reading Condillac at various points c. 1800-1.
123 *SWF*.I.128n.
124 The first five sections Book II, ch. I of Locke’s *Essay* deal specifically with the problem of the origin of our ideas and their sources in sensation and reflection (upon the operations of the mind).
125 Watts (1755), 7.
126 Watts (1755), 8n.
operations and contents of the mind, rather than the kinds of formal definitions of terms found in Sanderson. Having given an overview of the contents of his work, which opens with these sections on the general nature of ideas and ‘The Objects of our Conception, or the Archetypes or Patterns of these Ideas’, Watts then draws attention to the novelty of such an approach in a textbook on logic: ‘FIRST, the Nature of Conception or Perception shall just be mentioned, tho’ this may seem to belong to another Science rather than Logick’. This suggests that, while Watts’ textbook was produced at a time when Locke’s influence had begun to be widespread, he still saw a need to acknowledge that this Lockean facultative approach was not the only, nor indeed the most well-established, method of doing logic. Indeed, Watts’ initial definition of logic as ‘the Art of using Reason well in our Enquiries after Truth, and the Communication of it to others’, could be read as placing his work within the scholastic and humanistic traditions preceding the early modern logic of ideas, even with the following explanatory footnote: “The Word Reason is not in this place confined to the mere Faculty of reasoning or inferring one thing from another, but includes all the intellectual Powers of Man’. This is because Watts still shares with these earlier logics the view that ‘the Design of Logick is to teach us the right Use of our Reason, or Intellectual Powers, and the Improvement of them in ourselves and others’. Where Watts differs is in working from the assumption that a knowledge of sensory and perceptual processes (particularly in the production of ideas and concepts) is required to facilitate the correct use and further improvement of our cognitive faculties. For ‘In order to attain this [kind of logical knowledge], we must enquire what are the principal Operations of the Mind, which are put forth in the Exercise of our Reason’.

In Condillac’s logic we find a rather more direct claim to novelty and originality, with no hint of a concession to prior logical traditions. Condillac contends not only that ‘this logic resembles none of those which have been composed hitherto’, but also implies that no previous logician has managed to uncover the true laws of thought, claiming that all his ‘predecessors’ have ‘searched for the laws of thinking where they are not’. What Condillac means becomes clearer when he states ‘We shall not […] begin this logic by

127 Watts (1755), 7-8.
128 Watts (1755), 1. Coleridge offers a similar general definition of reason at Logic, 34-5 (but cf. 69-70 for a more specific definition on which Coleridge places great philosophical emphasis).
129 Watts (1755), 1. On Watts as a Lockean logician, see Capozzi and Roncaglia, (2009), 105-6.
130 Watts (1755), 4. Cf. his subsequent statement that ‘the Art of Logick is composed of those Observations and Rules, which Men have made about these four Operations of the Mind, Perception, Judgement, Reasoning, and Disposition [i.e. the cognitive operation of systematically arranging our ideas (6)], in order to assist and improve them’.
131 Condillac (1809 [1780], 1-2, tr. by Joseph Neef). Capozzi and Roncaglia observe that Condillac ‘developed a concept of logic that owes much to Locke, although he proudly maintains that it is similar to no one else’s’ (2009, 106).
definitions, axioms, or principles; we shall begin by observing the lessons which nature
gives us’.\footnote{Condillac (1809 [1780]), 3. Cf. 132: ‘it is therefore from nature we must learn the true logic’.} What nature teaches us is how to regulate our mental faculties, which allows
us to analyse the sensory contents of experience in a systematic way. With the assistance
of this ‘analytical method’, we can ‘explain the origin and generation either of ideas or of
the faculties of the mind’ (in sensation).\footnote{Condillac (1809 [1780]), 3-4. Cf. 16ff: ‘To analyse is […] nothing else but to observe in a successive order the qualities of an object, so as to give them in the mind the simultaneous order in which they exist […] Thought is analysed in the same way as exterior objects; we decompose it the same way’. See 42-7ff for the application of this method to ‘the analysis of the mental faculties’.} Such a method of analysis must be applied not only to the contents of experience and thought, but also to the cognitive faculties whose
operations are employed in sensing and thinking. In this way, we can acquire knowledge
of those rules that govern ‘the art of reasoning’ (i.e. the analytical method of Condillac’s
logic): ‘in the art of reasoning, as in the art of calculating [algebra], every thing amounts
to composition and decomposition; and we must not imagine that they are two different
arts’.\footnote{Condillac (1809 [1780]), 120. Here Condillac introduces the idea that logic, like algebra, should be a systematic language (cf. 3: ‘the art of reasoning will [by Condillac’s method of analysis] be reduced to a well constructed language’).} In short, the rules of logic will not be discovered by considering the ‘definitions, axioms, or principles’ involved in the formal theory of the syllogism, but by the analysis and systematic reorganisation of our sensory cognitive content. This approach enables us
to uncover the rules which regulate our cognitive faculties, and thereby to define the true
‘laws of thinking’, and determine ‘what is the origin and generation of the faculties of the
human understanding’.\footnote{Condillac (1809 [1780]), 124; cf. 47, where these operations are linked to the understanding.}

As in the case of Watts, to ask such questions about our faculty of understanding
is, for Condillac, ‘to ask what is the origin and generation of the faculties by which man,
capable of sensation, conceives things, by forming ideas thereof’. Condillac, like Watts,
lists under this head those basic operations of the mind taken to be involved in sensing
and conceiving: ‘we see immediately that perception, attention, comparison, judgement, reflection, imagination, and reasoning, are together with the sensations, the known data of the problem to be solved’.\footnote{Condillac (1809 [1780]), 124; cf. 47, where these operations are linked to the understanding.} Where he departs from logicians like Watts is in asserting that all these
mental operations (comprehended under the term ‘understanding’) must derive from a
single original faculty: the faculty of feeling or sensation. For, having ‘explained how the
faculties of the mind successively arise from sensation, […] we see that they are nothing
but the faculty of sensation which is transformed in order to become each of them.\textsuperscript{137} In other words, our cognitive equipment is not divided into a traditional scheme of distinct faculties or capacities of sense, understanding, imagination, memory, etc. which are taken to be somehow innate in the human mind. Rather, the traditional faculties are all derived from (and so grounded in) that of sensation, and must be drawn or developed out of this original faculty of sensation through a gradual process of learning, whereby we acquire new cognitive skills or abilities (Condillac claims the rules of this process are presented in systematic form by his logic).\textsuperscript{138} This point is particularly important, as it provides a clue to the reasons for Coleridge’s claim that Condillac’s logic was ‘basely purloined’ from the in many respects quite different system presented by Hartley.\textsuperscript{139}

Hartley’s\textit{ Observations on Man} constitutes a new extension of the Lockean logic of ideas and cognitive faculties. For Hartley does not begin with an account of the general nature of ideas and the operations of the mind exercised upon such cognitive content by the understanding, but instead with a theory of the neurophysiological mechanisms and psychological laws on which, Hartley claims, all such cognitive contents and operations must be grounded. I discuss why Coleridge rejects Hartley’s aim to account for the rules that govern cognition in terms of such a purely naturalistic framework as a candidate for a system of logic below; for the moment, I will focus on why Coleridge contends that Condillac, who proposes nothing resembling either Hartley’s mechanism of vibrations or his law of association, is dependent upon Hartley’s doctrines for the core principles of his logic.\textsuperscript{140} Given that Hartley does actually not anticipate Condillac’s attempt to trace all our cognitive faculties or abilities back to a single original faculty, we need to consider some alternative possibilities to make sense of Coleridge’s claims here.

### iii. Coleridge’s Conflation & Criticism of Hartley & Condillac

Now, given that Coleridge usually introduces Condillac’s name in polemical contexts, as a typical representative of French materialism, it seems likely that his identification of the logic of Hartley and Condillac turns on Hartley’s materialist theory of mind, particularly

\textsuperscript{137} See Condillac (1809 [1780]), 50 (cf. 44-7); cf. Locke (1824), I.108-10 (II.i, §§1-5).

\textsuperscript{138} See Condillac (1809 [1780]), 42-50 (cf. 5-6, 9). Interestingly, although Coleridge ordinarily mentions Condillac only to attack him, CL.II.706 (Mar 1801) suggests he was momentarily under Condillac’s influence: ‘I shall be able to evolve all the five senses, that is, to deduce them from one sense, & to state their growth, & the causes of their difference’.

\textsuperscript{139} CL.II.675 (Feb 1801) accuses James Mackintosh of having plagiarised Condillac in a series of lectures given in 1800 (see CL.I.569, Feb 1800), suggesting that Coleridge was familiar with Condillac’s thought, and perhaps\textit{ La Logique}, by this point.

\textsuperscript{140} CL.II.947 (Jun 1803). In fact, Condillac attacks the ‘supposition’ of vibrations as ‘altogether imaginary’ (1809 [1780], 51).
his attempts to reduce all cognitive operations to the law of association, and in turn show that all acts of association are grounded in the physical mechanism of vibrations. Since Condillac does not actually endorse anything like Hartley’s ‘material hypothesis’, it seems that Coleridge bases his claim about the similarity of their logical systems on their shared view that all cognitive content (both simple and complex ideas) ‘arise[s] from Sensation; and that Reflection is not a distinct Source’ (Hartley notes this is one of the only points on which he ‘differ[s], in respect of logic, from Mr. Locke’s excellent Essay on Human Understanding’). For Coleridge, this view amounts to an attempt to ‘make […] the Mind from the Senses’, an approach that he associates with the claim that there can be no non-sensory or a priori cognitive content, and which he seems to think must ultimately reduce to some form of mechanistic materialism. Indeed, Coleridge’s principal charge against Condillac is that in his La Logique ‘the student may find the whole theory of materialism (borrowed without acknowledgement from David Hartley) only not one syllable concerning logic itself’. The source of this puzzling claim could be the final chapter of Part I of Condillac’s logic, where he offers an overview of ‘the causes of sensibility and memory’ and discusses some of the speculations about their possible mechanical basis.

This covers similar material to the far longer chapters II and III of Hartley’s Observations, which provide detailed accounts of ‘the Application of the Doctrines of Vibrations and Association to each of the Sensations and Motions’ (i.e. the neurophysiological basis of sensorimotor functions) and a further ‘Application of [this] Theory to the Phaenomena of Ideas, or of Understanding, Affection, Memory, and Imagination’ (i.e. the neural basis of all sensory ideas and cognitive functions). However, while Condillac remains open to the possibility that our ideas and cognitive faculties and functions have their basis in a neurophysiological mechanism of some kind, he dismisses speculative hypotheses about mechanisms that cannot be observed (e.g. Hartley’s vibrations) as fruitless.

141 Hartley puts forward his doctrines of vibration and association in (1791) ch. I, §I, moving on to discussion of the generation and association of ideas in §II (this is an edition Condillac owned and annotated, which includes an additional volume with notes on Hartley by Hermann Pistorius).
142 Hartley (1791), I.360-1. Pistorius’ biography of Hartley notes that ‘He received his first principles in logic and metaphysics from the works of that good and great philosopher Locke’ (III.xii). The principle that all ideas originate in sensation (rather than in sensation and reflection, as Locke states in Book II of the Essay) is not explicitly stated in Condillac’s logic, but could be inferred from (1809 [1780]), 44-5, 48, 50. Cf. Locke (1824), I.108-10 (I.ii, §§1-5). See Coleridge’s remarks at BL.I.142; Logic, 237n.
143 TT.I.312; BL.I.141-2 (cf. I.110). See also Logic, 183-5, 236-7n. Coleridge also attributes this view to Locke, so it may be that Hartley’s different answer to the origins question is immaterial here.
144 Logic, 6.
145 Condillac (1809 [1780]), 51-66.
146 Hartley (1791), 114-267, 268-403.
147 Condillac, (1809 [1780]), 65-6. He does not specify if he thinks such observation may be possible in the future, given sufficient improvement in our natural-scientific instruments.
doubtless undermines Coleridge’s case, his general point may be allowed to stand: where Hartley and Condillac are similar is in introducing consideration of the ‘mechanical basis’ of the cognitive contents and operations that traditionally form part of facultative logic, and in arguing that all such contents and operations ultimately derive from sensation (or, rather, in our faculty of sense or intuitive sensory cognitive capacities).148

Coleridge’s claim may also depend on some more general similarities between the systems of Hartley and Condillac: Both thinkers emphasise the connection between logic and language; both give extensive attention to the role of the five (or more) senses in our acquisition or apprehension of ideas (this is what grounds their respective theories of the understanding and its operations); and both contend that the fundamental rules of logic must be grounded in some basic psychological law or mechanism (which can be inferred from observing the way in which children learn).149 Like Condillac, Hartley also uses the traditional definition of logic as ‘the art of thinking or reasoning’,150 and both philosophers believe that it is possible to reduce all complex ideas to simpler units of sensory content, through a process of analysis or decomposition.151 However, in the main, it seems that if Coleridge has any grounds for asserting that the logical theories of Hartley and Condillac are in effect identical, it is the fact that both hold that the fundamental units or primitive terms in a system of logic, taken as the analysis of our cognitive contents and operations, must be ideas of sensation (with all concepts or ideas of reflection being taken to derive from such primitive sensory contents).152 In any case, what matters here is that, rightly or wrongly, Coleridge viewed Hartley and Condillac as philosophers who sought to ground their logical theory in a mechanistic account of the faculty of sensation and the nature of sensory ideas (with such ideas being taken as the primitive cognitive content upon which all the operations of understanding must be exercised, given that reflection itself is not ‘a distinct Source’ of ideas).153

iv. Coleridge’s Distinction between Psychological & Logical Theories of Cognition
Having considered Coleridge’s criticisms of Hartley and Condillac, I will turn now to his reasons for claiming that Condillac and Hartley’s theories of the principles of cognition (or laws of thought) are ‘rather psychological than logical’. As we shall see, Coleridge’s

149 See Hartley (1791), ch.1-II, Condillac (1809 [1780]), Part I.
150 Hartley (1791), I.270; Cf. Condillac (1809 [1780]), 1-3.
151 See Hartley (1791), I.360-1; Condillac (1809 [1780]), 3-4, 16ff, 42-7.
152 See Hartley (1791), I.360-1; Condillac (1809 [1780]), 25-6, 47-8
153 See BL.I.141-2; Hartley (1791), I.360-1.
claim is based on two principles: (i) that those rules or forms of thought with which logic is concerned cannot be determined by any sort of physical necessity, and so cannot be reduced to the sorts of physiological mechanisms and psychological laws postulated by mechanistic psychological theories (which means that a logical theory that invokes such mechanisms and laws is ‘rather psychological than logical’); and (ii) that logical theory is concerned with only the \textit{a priori} necessary aspects features of cognition (which Coleridge claims cannot be grounded in any kind of physical necessity), whereas it is the task of empirical psychology to analyse the \textit{a posteriori} or contingent aspects of cognition.

That Coleridge holds (i) is evident in the following assertion that logic involves no reference to the physiology of the mind or the physical mechanisms of cognition:

\begin{quote}
for aught that we are here concerned with, thought may be the mere result of organisation; the brain may be an organ for the secretion of mind, according to the recent assertion of a medical philosopher; or the aggregate of ideas, conceptions and images may be founded in vibrations, either of strings, or of a tremulous fluid, permeating on strings. With all this the logician has as little to do as common sense has; [it is] sufficient for him that thoughts are thoughts and the laws by which they act are the laws of thought [i.e. ‘the rules or forms of the understanding’], for to these laws, and to these only as far as they contain the science of reasoning conclusively, is his science confined.\textsuperscript{154}
\end{quote}

Coleridge’s point is not that such ‘laws of thought’ cannot be shown (or postulated) to have some sort of neurophysiological basis, or some connection to neural mechanisms and physical processes or structures located in the brain. Rather, he is contending that, whatever relation the objects of logical inquiry bear to the putative material or physical structure of the mind, this relationship is (a) \textit{not} a problem with which logic is concerned, and (b) \textit{cannot} form part of the kind of theory that could provide an adequate account of those laws or forms of thought (the rules of understanding) that it is a principal task of logic to investigate and define. Coleridge is not denying the possibility of describing the mental states or processes in which logical rules may be instantiated in naturalistic or quasi-scientific terms (with reference to, say, the structural organisation of the brain, or some neural mechanism, such as Hartley’s vibrations). He is, however, purposely trying to circumvent the claims of those theories of mind which present such naturalistic (and in his view reductive) descriptions of cognition as part of logical inquiry, conceived as an investigation of the operations of our cognitive powers and the contents of our cognitive powers.

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Logic}, 37. 34-5 makes clear Coleridge’s view of the laws of thought as rules of understanding.
states. For Coleridge is claiming here that there is a fundamental distinction between the kinds of laws that govern cognitive activity (e.g. as normative constraints on thought or epistemic criteria governing judgements) and the kinds that may govern the material or physical phenomena taken to be located in the brain and postulated as the physiological basis of our cognitive activity. Given this distinction, Coleridge holds, the naturalistic approach can tell us nothing about thought per se even if the terms and categories of this approach refer to cognitive states and processes, they refer only to aspects of these states and processes belonging to a sphere of inquiry which is clearly distinct from the realm of logic, namely (empirical) psychology.

That Coleridge holds (ii) is made evident in his distinction between the ‘empirical conditions under which the exercise of the understanding takes place’ and ‘principles a priori, i.e. [...] the principles derived from the construction of the [mind] itself, not from its uses’. He introduces this distinction in a discussion of the general kind(s) of a priori cognitive content said to ‘inhere in the forms and functions [of sense and understanding] and the rules generalised from these [forms and functions]’ and the more specific kind of a priori cognitive content said to be ‘derived from a knowledge of the constitution of the understanding itself and of the universal forms of the sense’ in the context of an account of the methods and principles of common logic (Kant’s general logic). Coleridge starts off by considering what makes pure—as opposed to applied—common logic a ‘formal science’, i.e. a discipline in which ‘I am not speaking of any thing [e.g. a sensible object], but of the acts of my own mind and the law or form according to which it acts or ought to act [i.e. the laws of thought]’, and which therefore ‘must abstract from all the contents or material of [cognition]’:

Now the common logic is either pure or applied; in the first [...] we abstract from all empirical conditions under which the exercise of the understanding takes place; we abstract from the influence of the sense, from the interference of the imagination, from the laws of memory, from the weight of customs, of inclination, of passion, and, inclusively, from the sources of human prejudices—in short, we abstract from all causes from which any given and particular cognitions arise, or out of which any counterfeits of knowledge proceed—because all these

155 He makes this clear at Logic, 133 (cf. 265-6n).
156 Logic, 139-40.
157 Logic, 146, 149.
158 For Coleridge’s definition of ‘formal science’ see Logic, 41, 43; cf. 34-7; this makes clear his view of logic as the formal science concerned with ‘the laws of thought’ or ‘the rules or forms of the understanding’; see 110-2 for Coleridge on ‘the contents or material of [our] knowledge’ (cf. 12n).
Coleridge’s aim here is to emphasise that insofar as this subfield of logic is considered as a pure or formal science, it must be nonempirical, and therefore can have no reference to sensory cognitive content (‘the influence of the sense’, which is always empirically given), or to any of those ‘empirical conditions under which the exercise of the understanding takes place’. As he puts it elsewhere, such a method ‘require[s] that I should consider the mind in and for itself, separately from the objects of the senses and sensations’, because the pure or formal sciences are concerned with ‘a higher evidence than that which the senses can afford, or which can belong to objects of the bodily sense considered as matters of fact’ (a category to which the ‘contingent occasions of [the understanding’s] application’ belong).\(^{160}\) In short, logic as Coleridge conceives of it cannot consist in any kind of empirical knowledge, and logical theories should not derive their principles from any analysis of ‘the empirical conditions under which the exercise of the understanding takes place’. If we accept ‘that logic […] presents the universal and necessary rules of the understanding’, then we must reject attempts to derive these rules from the ‘contingent occasions of its application’. For any rule, or system of rules, which claims to be ‘suited to all understandings’, i.e. universal and necessary, ‘must be drawn from the laws and constitution of the understanding itself’.\(^{161}\) As we shall see below, Coleridge claims that Kantian transcendental logic is the first logical theory to succeed in explaining how such rules derive from the ‘constitution of the subject’. He thinks Kant is the first philosopher to develop a pure (i.e. nonempirical) analysis of the understanding that serves not only to classify the various contents of the understanding, but also to explain how certain ‘pure operations of the understanding’, or what Coleridge calls ‘its inherent forms or its several functional powers’, make possible our apprehension of this content (i.e. ‘a knowledge by means of conceptions’).\(^{162}\) But first we need to consider some implications of Coleridge’s negative characterisation of \textit{a priori} cognitive content, as quoted above.\(^{163}\)

\(^{159}\) \textit{Logic}, 139. Coleridge takes this distinction between pure and applied logic from Kant (see e.g. \textit{CPR}, B75-9; cf. Coleridge’s claims at \textit{Logic}, 51-2, 139ff, 196-7).

\(^{160}\) \textit{Logic}, 42, 36; see also, 37-41, 43.

\(^{161}\) See \textit{Logic}, 112, 6.

\(^{162}\) For this definition of the conceptual content of the understanding (taken as our ‘discursive faculty’ or ‘faculty of conceptions’), see \textit{Logic}, 244ff (cf. 65-70).

\(^{163}\) For Coleridge’s characterization of \textit{a priori} or pure cognitive content as formal knowledge (or as the formal element of our knowledge), see e.g. \textit{Logic}, 34-7, 42-4, 111-2.
Coleridge’s decision to begin his account of pure common logic and its sphere of inquiry in negative terms is quite deliberate: he opens this section of *Logic* with the claim that ‘in order to see distinctly what a thing is we must ascertain what it is not.’

164 This is an approach which he continues to follow later, when considering how transcendental knowledge is to be distinguished from formal knowledge (*a priori* cognitions in general) on the one hand, and noetic knowledge (a special class of *a priori* cognitions that is taken to derive from ‘the unindividual and transcendent [...] reason’ or νους, and to include the truths of reason apprehended through intellectual intuition) on the other. He starts by listing those ‘empirical conditions under which the exercise of the understanding takes place’ not just to indicate the contents and operations of the mind from which the pure or formal sciences ‘abstract [their] attention’, but also because he wants to suggest that any adequate account of ‘the laws of thought, [...] as far as the[se laws] contain the rules of reasoning conclusively’, cannot take contingent, empirically determined conditions of this kind as its starting point. For instance, Coleridge refers to ‘the laws of memory’ here as a way of implicitly contrasting his own logical theory with the systems of Hartley and Condillac, which seek to reduce all the ‘rules or forms of the understanding’ to the law of association (Coleridge says that the memory ‘receives all its materials ready made from the law of association’, so it seems reasonable to infer that Coleridge takes the law of association to be a law that governs the functions of memory). Coleridge’s reference to ‘the weight of customs, of inclination, of passion, and, inclusively, [...] the sources of human prejudices’ could similarly be read as an implicit contrasting of his approach with that of Hume and others who contend that concepts like causality and necessity can be derived from psychological mechanisms or habits of thought. In Coleridge’s view, such accounts may be able to tell us about certain empirical conditions under which we exercise the understanding, but they cannot give us any insight into the non-contingent or necessary features of cognition – its *a priori* principles – that Coleridge defines as ‘the

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164 *Logic*, 139.
165 See *Logic*, 43-4, 60-70, 168-9, 211-4.
166 For these definitions of logic as a formal science, see *Logic*, 37, 41ff (cf. 34-5).
167 See BL.III.305; cf. *Logic*, 125-6ff for Coleridge’s account of ‘the too habitual passiveness of the mind to the automatic trains of the memory and the fancy, the sequency of which is mechanically determined by accidental proximity of time and place in the original impressions [i.e. by association]’, framed in a similar way to his claim at BL.II.305 that fancy is ‘a mode of Memory’ that is subject to, or operates in accordance with the law of association. See also BL.I, ch. 5-6; *The Friend*, 1.456ff; *Logic*, 13-4ff.
168 See esp. *Logic*, 183: ‘What [Hume] called on the metaphysician to do was to assign the origin of this notion [i.e. ‘the notion of causality’], to give proof that it was not a mere prejudice, and to ground this *feeling* of a necessity [i.e. of a necessary causal connection between two events] on the rational conviction that accompanies insight’ (cf. 187-8ff).
acts of [the] mind and the law[s] or form[s] according to which it acts or ought to act.\textsuperscript{169}

Thus, insofar as accounts of this sort are presented as logical theories (i.e. theories of the understanding and its operations), their claims that it is possible to derive logical rules or laws of cognition from the analysis of such empirical conditions cannot be accepted. For Coleridge, no empirical account of cognition (which he terms ‘psychology’) can provide the means for distinguishing between ‘counterfeits of knowledge’ and ‘true knowledge’, the epistemic criteria for determining the truth or validity of any given claim.\textsuperscript{170}

Coleridge claims principles derived from repeated experiences, or psychological laws and mechanisms inferred from the regularity of such experiences, cannot properly account for the features of our cognition and its objects. Thus, he takes such accounts to be necessarily incomplete.\textsuperscript{171} He introduces a negative characterisation of common logic at this point in \textit{Logic} partly to show what kinds of principles are required for a complete account of cognition. Coleridge’s main concern here, however, is arguing that knowledge of such principles, i.e. ‘formal knowledge’, must be grounded in a transcendental theory of those cognitive faculties from which the \textit{a priori} or pure cognitive content that yields formal knowledge is derived.\textsuperscript{172} This concern becomes further apparent in his next set of statements on what separates pure common logic and its principles from an empirical (or psychological) analysis of cognition that is concerned with the ‘contingent occasions of [the understanding’s] application’:

\begin{quote}
[I]n order to the knowledge of these [i.e. the ‘empirical conditions under which the exercise of the understanding takes place’ and ‘the objects of the senses’], experience is required. But the pure common logic appeals wholly to principles \textit{a priori}, i.e. to principles derived from the construction of the machine itself, not from its uses; from the construction of the understanding altogether abstracted from the material on which it acts, or the causes by which it is called into action. [Common logic] is therefore, and so we have called it, a canon of the understanding [...] but only in respect of the formal, let the subject matter be what it may, drawn from outward experiences or from inward consciousness and reflection.\textsuperscript{173}
\end{quote}

Coleridge’s conception of what it means for \textit{a priori} principles to be ‘derived from the construction of the machine [in this case, the mind] itself, not from its uses’ is covered in more detail in \textbf{3.4}, where I consider the connections between Coleridge’s account of the

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Logic}, 43 (cf. 37).

\textsuperscript{170} See \textit{Logic}, 37ff for Coleridge’s account of ‘true knowledge’; cf. 51-2, 110-2.

\textsuperscript{171} See e.g. \textit{Logic}, 38-41, 139-44.

\textsuperscript{172} On this claim, see esp. \textit{Logic}, 211-4 (cf. 141-3, 215-24, 242-8).

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Logic}, 139-40.
construction’ or constitution of the cognitive faculties and his interpretation of Kant’s theory of transcendental knowledge. There I shall also examine Coleridge’s reasons for beginning the section of Logic which serves to introduce his account of transcendental knowledge with the opposition outlined above between the pure a priori contents and principles of logic and the empirical contents and principles which Coleridge elsewhere refers to as ‘the subject [matter] of Physics or Psychology’. But before turning to these problems, we need to consider Coleridge’s theory of the human cognitive faculties more closely. This topic is the focus of the next section (1.5), which will help to make clearer Coleridge’s views concerning the opposition between the ‘psychological’ logic of Hartley and Condillac and Kant’s transcendental or ‘critical’ logic, viewed as different approaches to accounting for the nature of discursive cognition.

1.5. Powers & Plantules: Coleridge on the Nature of the Faculties

i. Education & Inquiry into the Faculties: An Overview

As was noted in 1.4, Coleridge rejects the kinds of mechanistic and materialistic theories of cognition he takes to be offered by philosophers like Hartley and Condillac because he thinks that such theories cannot provide an adequate account of the rules that govern (sensory) cognition. According to Coleridge, in order to determine such rules we need to adopt Kant’s transcendental logic, which Coleridge often characterises in the following metaphorical terms, as a philosophical method for analysing the mind and its capacities (as well as the contribution the mind makes to cognition):

[Kant’s method is] that logical προεξετασθα docimastia [‘examination preparatory to learning’], that Critique of the human intellect, which previous to the weighing and measuring of this or that begins by assaying the weights, measures, and scales themselves [or]

a pre-inquisition into the mind [considered] as part Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge: an examination of the Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the Objects to be weighed or measured by them.175

In Parts 2-4 I consider Coleridge’s claims about the way in which Kant’s transcendental philosophy, conceived as ‘the pre-ponderative inquisition of the Weights & Measures of

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174 CN.IV.4764 (c. 1820-1); cf. Logic, 6, 37, 44-5n.
175 See CM.III.918, V.81. For further discussion see 3.1-4.5. Coleridge may have adapted this metaphor from Herbert’s De Veritate. See e.g. (1937 [1624]), 75-6: ‘In the first place, then, I shall proceed to examine truth itself, and in the second place, assertions which claim to be true, just as scales are tested before goods are weighed out; for unless the scales are accurate, what we measure by them will also fail to be exact’.
the Human Mind’, enables us to demonstrate how sensory experience and cognition is possible, and in particular to prove ‘that experience would be impossible but for the a priori origins of certain features of our cognition’. To lay the ground for these parts of the thesis, however, we first need to look at how Coleridge describes those faculties or capacities of the mind that transcendental inquiry seeks to ‘enumerate and define’.

As we shall see, Coleridge’s brief account of his philosophy of education in the introduction to Logic is a useful reference point here. For Coleridge defines ‘education’ as consisting in the two closely connected processes of drawing out and then training the ‘forms and faculties’ of the mind, and then describes the way in which these ‘intellectual powers’ or cognitive capacities are gradually ‘educed’ or drawn forth from within the mind by the effects of external sensory stimuli, before being ‘trained up’ or ‘specially disciplined’ through a series of self-conscious or reflective mental exercises. My aim in this section is to show how the analogy (with the growth of plants) that Coleridge uses to illustrate the nature of this process also offers useful insights into his conception of the nature of the faculties, viewed as capacities or potentialities for certain kinds of cognitive abilities which can be actualised in certain forms of cognitive activity.

ii. The ‘educible and eductive nature’ of the faculties: Coleridge’s Plantule Analogy

Coleridge introduces his account of the process of ‘education’ with one of his favourite procedures: providing a brief etymological history of the term(s) under consideration as a means of bringing out deeper, underlying meanings and illustrating the different ways in which the term in question may be applied and employed. In this case – although he does not explicitly draw attention to the point himself – Coleridge’s etymological analysis of the word ‘educate’ helps to shed light on his conception of the ‘intellectual powers’ or ‘several faculties of the mind’ and the ways in which our cognitive capacities and abilities are called into action. His overview of the gradual changes in the meaning of the Latin terms educare and educere, from which the English ‘education’ is derived, gives a sense of how Coleridge conceives of those natural or inherent capabilities of the mind which his programme of education is intended to develop and discipline. It also suggests what characteristics Coleridge thinks are required for some kind or form of mental activity to

177 Coleridge uses these terms at Logic, 213.
178 See Logic, 8-14.
179 For Coleridge’s use of this procedure in Logic, see 9-10, 24-37, 91-2, 114-5 (cf. 79, 81).
180 Logic, 12-13.
qualify for this status (as an activity that is natural to or part of the nature of the mind).

Leaving aside the finer historical and linguistic details of Coleridge’s account, I will focus here on what his etymologising can reveal about his conception of the cognitive faculties or powers, and on how this conception informs Coleridge’s approach to analysing the contents and operations of the mind. Before proceeding, it must be noted that Coleridge makes a distinction between ‘reason as a presence to the human mind, not a particular faculty or component of the mind’ and ‘the understanding’ and ‘the sense’ as its [the mind’s] two component faculties. I return to this distinction briefly at the end of this section (1.5), discussing how it relates to Coleridge’s account of sense and understanding as the ‘components’ or ‘constituents’ of the human mind. Coleridge’s claims about what separates reason from sense and understanding will also be considered in further detail in 3.2-3 and 4.3-5. For now, all that need be noted is (i) that Coleridge thinks of reason as a special kind of cognitive capacity which should not be described in faculty terms, and so (ii) does not include reason in his account of the process whereby the ‘several faculties of the mind’ are ‘educed’ and ‘educated’ under the conditions of sensory stimulation. As we will see later, this is because Coleridge considers reason, in contradistinction to sense and understanding, to be an ‘organ of the Super-sensuous’, a capacity which ‘bear[s] the same relation to spiritual [i.e. noumenal] objects [...] as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena’, and which is thus concerned only with what is non- or super-sensible.

Let us return to Coleridge’s claims about education and the faculties. According to Coleridge, ‘The Latin word from which our “educate” is taken is itself a derivative. Educare ab educere: “educate” from “educe”, that is, “draw forth”, “bring out”. Here he describes how such terms originally applied to horticultural contexts and specifically the ways in which the inherent qualities or tendencies of plants drawn forth by Nature can be further managed and nurtured by human hands:

In its primary sense it is applied to plants, and expresses the process by which man imitates carries on, and adapts to a determined human purpose the work of education (evolution, development) performed by Nature. What Nature has educated, man educates or trains up.

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181 The question of what it means for a faculty or form to be inherent or innate, especially as a ‘constituent’ of the mind, is one of the dominant themes in Coleridge’s Logic. I consider this problem in further detail in 3.4 on Coleridge’s theory of the cognitive constitution of the human subject (cf. 4.3).

182 Logic, 69-70; cf. 43-4. See also Friend.I.155-8.

183 Friend.I.155-6. This aspect of reason is discussed further in 4.5 below.

184 Logic, 9.

185 Logic, 9 (cf. 18n).
Subsequently, Coleridge claims, the extended meaning of ‘educare’ comes to include all the means by which the eductive powers and tendencies of Nature are protected, invigorated, or even called into act by adjustment of circumstances, i.e. surrounding influences. As an example of this usage, Coleridge cites a poem by Catullus in which a spring shower is said to ‘educate’ the flower by stimulating ‘the educible and eductive nature in the seed or plantule, [...] bringing it at once to excitement and nurture’. Finally, ‘in its most comprehensive acceptation’, this term comes to apply to the ways in which parents bring up and nurture their children, conceived as a process analogous to the developmental influence of environmental factors (such as weather and soil) on the growth of the ‘plantule’ or seedling. Although Coleridge goes on to describe how this process applies in the case of ‘the forms and faculties’ of the human mind, his further claims about how the cognitive faculties should be educated or trained, need not concern us here. However, before moving on to discussion of how Coleridge’s theory of faculties relates to his conceptions of the a priori and the transcendental (see Parts 2 and 3), it will be useful to consider what Coleridge’s account of ‘the eductive powers and tendencies of Nature’ or ‘the educible and eductive nature in the seed or plantule’ suggests about his conception of the nature of the cognitive faculties themselves. In particular, I consider how Coleridge’s plantule analogy informs his view that one can speak of both a potential and an actualised form or state of a cognitive faculty.

The starting point for my comparison is Coleridge’s idea that one can speak of seedlings as possessing latent or dormant ‘powers and tendencies’ that, under suitable conditions, may be excited or drawn forth and then further developed by some kind of external stimulus. As we shall see, this notion of a natural tendency that is ‘called into act’ by stimulation from without is a defining feature of Coleridge’s conception of the human cognitive faculties or intellectual powers. Here Kant’s employment of the term Vermögen is an important reference point. For, as I will be arguing throughout, while Coleridge tends to translate this key Kantian term as ‘faculty’, his usage is much closer to the now widely preferred rendering of Vermögen as ‘capacity’ or ‘power’. That is to say,

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186 Logic, 9-10.
187 Logic, 10.
188 See Logic, 10-12ff.
189 Logic, 9-10.
190 See e.g. Pluhar: ‘I render Vermögen (and likewise Kraft in this sense) as ‘power’ (sometimes also as ‘ability’) rather than as ‘faculty,’ in order to dissociate Kant’s theory (of cognition, desire, etc.) from the traditional faculty psychology. [...] My point here is to keep the Kantian powers, which are simply abilities, from becoming reified, i.e., turned into psychological entities such as compartments, sources, or agencies “in” the mind’ (translator’s note, CPR, Axi, n19). See also Pippin (1982), 218-9. For a similar statement from Coleridge, see Logic, 255-6 on cognitive powers as ‘functionaries’ of the mind.
Coleridge uses the term ‘faculty’ to refer to a capacity for some kind of cognitive activity (e.g. perceiving, conceiving, judging, etc.), rather than to some kind of putative material (i.e. neurophysiological) or immaterial mental structure taken to be responsible for such activities. Indeed, as I explain further in section 3.4, Coleridge’s views on the ‘cognitive constitution’ of the human mind are closely bound up with his claim that what it means to describe the constitution of the mind, or of a particular cognitive faculty such as the understanding, just is to describe or ‘enumerate and define’ the set of cognitive activities or abilities ordinarily attributed to the faculty in question (this is a process Coleridge refers to as identifying ‘its [i.e. a given faculty’s] inherent forms or its several functional powers’).191 In short, what Coleridge variously refers to as ‘the forms and faculties’, ‘forms and functions’, or ‘constituent forms’ of the human mind, he takes to be constituted, in his special sense of the term, by those cognitive activities in which the exercise of our cognitive faculties or capacities consists. Thus, Coleridge often uses the terms ‘form’, ‘faculty’, ‘power’, and ‘function’ almost interchangeably, presenting them as a set of closely related concepts that can be defined in terms of one another.192 In some contexts, Coleridge does attempt to distinguish between ‘faculties’ and ‘powers’, and also to define a ‘faculty’ as the collection of those cognitive powers or abilities which may be said to ‘constitute’ it.193 For the most part, however, he tends to speak in broad terms of forms, functions, faculties, or powers whenever he wants to designate a capacity for some kind of cognitive activity.194 For our present purposes, it need only be noted that Coleridge employs such terms to refer to cognitive capacities and abilities. Having given a preliminary outline of Coleridge’s conception of cognitive faculties or powers, we can return to the question of the links between Kant’s notion of a Vermögen and the ‘powers and tendencies’ of Coleridge’s plantules.

As hinted above, the connection I have in mind here depends on the parallel or analogy between the seedling, or rather ‘the educive and educible nature in the seed or plantule’, as a potentiality for growth and development (into a specific type of flower, say), and the Kantian Vermögen or Coleridgean faculty, as a potentiality for cognitive activity (realised in specific cognitive ability such as reflection or judgement, say). In both

192 See e.g. Logic, 68-9n on ‘function’ and ‘power’, 146-7ff on ‘faculties’ and ‘constituent forms’, 213-4 on ‘inherent forms’ and ‘functional powers’.
193 Thus, the faculty of sense is our capacity for intuiting or apprehending the sensory manifold (making it an ‘intuitive power’), while the faculty of understanding is our capacity for the various acts Coleridge takes discursive thought to consist in, such as reflection, abstraction, conception, and judgement (which makes it our ‘reasoning power’ or ‘discursive faculty’). See Logic, 34-7, 68-70; cf. 146-9, 213-4.
194 See e.g. Logic, 9-12ff, 34, 245-7.
cases, such a potentiality or capacity is actualised (or ‘called to act’, as Coleridge puts it) when it is affected by the appropriate kind of external stimulus or condition, or by an alteration of its ‘surrounding influences’: a ‘process of educing from without’ is required to excite the inherent ‘powers and tendencies’ of a seedling, and likewise the ‘forms and faculties’ of the human mind.\(^{195}\) What it means for a cognitive faculty to be educed or drawn forth in Coleridge’s sense may be brought out by considering Kant’s distinction between *Vermögen* and *Kraft* (i.e. *faculty* and *power*, a distinction that Coleridge sometimes employs in *Logic*\(^{196}\)). As Beatrice Longuenesse summarises this point:

The *Vermögen* (*facultas*) is the possibility of acting, or tendency to act, that is proper to a substance. Following Baumgarten, Kant writes that a *conatus* is associated with every *Vermögen*. This *conatus* is a tendency or effort to actualize itself. For this tendency to be translated into action, it must be determined to do so by external conditions. Then the *Vermögen* becomes a *Kraft*, in Latin *vīs*, force.\(^{197}\)

Longuenesse draws attention here to Kant’s warning that the human mind should not be considered as a substance. However, she suggests that if the terms ‘capacity’ and ‘power’ are used with due awareness of the different meanings they possess in Kant’s lectures on the metaphysics of substance, then they can offer some insight into the concepts of *Vermögen* and *Kraft* that Kant employs in his ‘transcendental analysis’ of cognition in the first *Critique*. Bearing this caution in mind, Longuenesse claims, we can think of the kind of capacity or *Vermögen* that forms part of Kant’s descriptions of the forms of cognition in an analogous way: as ‘a *possibility or potentiality*’ for a particular kind of cognitive activity that is ‘actualiz[ed... under sensory stimulation]’. Thus, Kant’s *Vermögen zur urteilen* or capacity to judge (i.e. the human understanding) becomes actualised as the *Urteilskraft* or power of judgement under the ‘external conditions’ of sensory stimuli, those factors that enable or ‘determine’ a potentiality or capacity for cognitive activity to ‘actualize itself’ or be ‘translated into action’ (put another way, we can consider the ‘capacity to judge’—one of Kant’s definitions of the understanding—as ‘a *possibility or potentiality* of forming judgements’).\(^{198}\) As should now be evident, Coleridge’s idea of the ‘the educive and educible nature in the seed or plantule’ or ‘powers and tendencies’ latent in the seedling involves a similar notion of a *conatus* or ‘tendency or effort to actualize itself’ (a tendency

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\(^{195}\) *Logic*, 8-10.

\(^{196}\) See e.g. *Logic*, 239-40.

\(^{197}\) Longuenesse (1998), 7.

\(^{198}\) Longuenesse (1998), 7-8.
that becomes actualised, say, in the growth of the seedling into a fully developed flower). Below I discuss in further detail how Coleridge applies this conception of powers and tendencies as potentialities for some kind of activity in his claims about the actualisation and exercise of the cognitive capacities or ‘intellectual faculties of man’, considering how it informs Coleridge’s description of how ‘we first draw or bring out the faculties of the nascent mind’ through the process of ‘eduction’ (a process which is initiated by sensory stimulation, taken as a condition under which cognitive capacities are actualised).199

iii. From Faculties to Powers: The Potential & Actualised Modes of Sense & Understanding

That Coleridge holds the view of the cognitive faculties just outlined, as potentialities or capacities for some kind of cognitive activity (actualised as a particular cognitive power when a particular faculty is excited or exercised), is evident from the following definition of ‘the faculty of sense’ or ‘sensuous nature’:

The capability of acquiring representations [i.e. sensible intuitions which are taken to refer or relate to some ‘correspondent object’], which our elder logical and metaphysical writers entitled “receptivity”, is what we call sensibility or sensuous nature, or the property of having the sense or sentient faculty called into action.200

Here our ‘sensuous nature’ or ‘capability of acquiring representations’ functions in a way analogous to the ‘educible and eductive nature of the seed or plantule’.201 The faculty of sense is ‘called into action’ by being excited or ‘educed’ from without by some external object affecting the senses: this faculty’s ‘sensuous nature’ responds to these impressions or affections in much the same way that the ‘educative nature’ of the seedling responds to the effects of the spring rain which stimulates the growth of the plantule.202 In certain contexts Coleridge also uses a faculty/power dichotomy similar to Kant’s Vermögen/Kraft distinction between a cognitive capacity considered as a potentiality for activity on the one hand, and as actualised in some kind of cognitive ability called into action by sensory stimulation on the other. We find Coleridge talking of the faculty of sense as an ‘intuitive power of the mind’ that is ‘employed on the forms of perception in time and space’: i.e.

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199 See Logic, 9-10, 12-14. Coleridge himself draws attention to the analogies between the growth of the seedling and the development of the cognitive faculties, considered as a kind of potentiality or capacity for action (see esp. 10-11; cf. 166n).
200 Logic, 153-4. For this Kantian definition of ‘representation’, see LA, 113, CN.III.3602; cf. Logic, 37-8, 239-40, 254 on the way in which such a representation ‘refers’ or ‘corresponds’ to an object.
201 Logic, 9.
202 Thus, Coleridge also refers to the faculty of sense as ‘the capability of sensation’ (Logic, 164).
the faculty of sense or ‘capability of acquiring representations’ becomes actualised as the intuitive power when it is stimulated, or ‘called into action’, by ‘various impressions or influxes from without’. Put another way, if we consider it prior to any such sensory apprehension (as a potentiality for such activity), the faculty of sense is just a ‘capability of sensation’. It is when we exercise the senses, which are excited through being affected by diverse external impressions or influxes, that the ‘sentient faculty’ is actualised as the ‘intuitive power’ which makes possible our apprehension of spatial and temporal data in the perceptual manifold.

Coleridge talks of the understanding in a similar way, as ‘the faculty that enables [us] to think of [sensible] objects’ and ‘the organ of our thoughts and conceptions’, by which he means our capacity for discursive thought. Coleridge takes such discursive cognitive activity to consist primarily in making judgements about the objects given through sensible intuition, so he also defines the understanding as our capacity for or ‘faculty of judging’.

As with the description of the faculty of sense above, this definition involves a conception of the understanding as a potentiality or capacity for a particular kind of activity that is actualised in some cognitive ability, or set of cognitive abilities, under the conditions of external sensory stimulation. This is why Coleridge also refers to the understanding as ‘the substantiative power […] by which we give and attribute substance and reality to phenomena and raise them from mere affections and appearances into objects communicable and capable of being anticipated and reasoned of [i.e. objects or cognitions of objects that have intersubjective or ‘objective validity’]. When the faculty of understanding is stimulated or called into action from without by sensory impressions or ‘affections’, our capacity for judgement (and for discursive thought more generally) is actualised in ‘the substantiative power’ through which we exercise our ability for ‘judging concerning the substantiality of phenomena’, or making judgements about the ‘substance and reality’ or claims to intersubjective validity of what is given in sensible intuition.

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203 See Logic, 34, 153-4, 12n.
204 Coleridge follows Kant in conceiving of this process of sensible apprehension or synthesis as carried out by the imagination, which is also taken to be responsible for the integration of spatial and temporal data in the synthetic cognitive process Kant calls ‘combination of the manifold’. Thus, Coleridge refers to both sense and imagination as our ‘intuitive power’ or ‘vis intuitiva’ (see Logic, 201), and appears to treat imagination as a function of the faculty of sense (see e.g. Logic, 225 on ‘productive imagination’ as ‘the form and constructive power of the inner sense’; cf. 71-2, 75). Cf. Kant at CPR, B151-2ff.
205 Logic, 154 (cf. 66-8 and esp. 132 on our ‘reflective and discursive powers’). Coleridge makes it clear that such thinking and conceiving must be discursive at 249; cf. 26, 132, 258.
206 See Logic, 239-40; cf. 79.
207 Logic, 239; see 227 for Coleridge’s notion of ‘judgments possessing objective validity’; 142-9 makes clear that his view entails a standard of objectivity defined in terms of intersubjective validity.
208 See Logic, 239-40, 253-5; cf. 262-4, 265-6.
with ‘the sentient faculty’ above, if we think of the understanding prior to such judging, as a potentiality for such cognitive activity, it is just a capacity for discursive thought. It is when we exercise the understanding, making judgements about the sensory ‘affections and appearances’ which have excited its discursive activities, that this ‘faculty of judging’ is actualised as the ‘substantiative power’ that makes possible discursive cognition, or a ‘knowledge by means of conceptions’.209 Thus, just as Coleridge refers to the capacity for intuitive sensory activity as the ‘sensuous nature’ of the faculty of sense, he refers to the capacity for discursive cognitive activity as the ‘essence’ of the understanding.210

It is useful here to recall the conceptual background of Kant’s *Vermögen/Kraft* distinction in the eighteenth-century metaphysics of substance, and the definition of the concept of a *Vermögen* as ‘the possibility of acting, or tendency to act, that is proper to a substance’.211 This will help us to see how the analogy between the tendencies or powers proper to a substance and the activities or abilities characteristic of the human mind (i.e. its cognitive capacities) applies to Coleridge’s definitions of the faculties of sense and understanding. As we have just seen, Coleridge defines our capacity to acquire sensory representations or ‘sensuous nature’ as ‘the property of having the sense or sentient faculty called into action’.212 So, following the mind-substance analogy, we can think of the mind as being possessed of a latent property or tendency to act which is actualised or ‘translated into action’ when the mind is determined by external conditions, i.e. affected by ‘impressions or influxes from without’. In other words, the ‘property of having the sense or sentient faculty called into action’ which is actualised through the exercise of the ‘intuitive power of the mind’ that allows such impressions to be intuited or apprehended as spatiotemporally arrayed sense data (i.e. the manifold of sense).213 Coleridge takes this sensory capacity or ‘sensuous nature’ to be proper to the human mind—considered as analogous to a substance of some kind—in much the same way that ‘the educible and eductive nature in the seed’ is a property or tendency proper to seedlings. Thus, just as it is part of the seedling’s nature to respond to rainwater and the various other external conditions which actualise and determine its capacities for growth, it is part of the nature of the human mind to respond to the impressions or influxes from external objects that affect the faculty of sense, thereby calling it into action.214 In Coleridge’s terms, this is the

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209 *Logic*, 249.
212 *Logic*, 153-4.
214 See *Logic*, 8-11, 34-7ff, 152-4ff.
process in which ‘an affection of the subjective sense [by external stimuli] call[s] forth that mode of action which results from its [i.e. the sentient faculty’s] own constitution and characteristic property [i.e. its receptivity or sensuous nature].’

We can apply the same analogy to Coleridge’s account of the understanding. As just noted, Coleridge states that we he calls ‘the substantive power’ is ‘the essence’ of the understanding. In other words, our capacity to make judgements about the contents of our sensible intuitions is an essential property of the faculty of understanding, and of the human mind more generally. This cognitive capacity is exercised in making judgements in which we ‘attribute substance and reality to phenomena’, i.e. determine the ‘objectivity or correspondency to a real object’ of those ‘affections and appearances’ given through sensible intuition. Coleridge takes this process of ‘substantiation’ to be the ground or starting point of all discursive cognition (in short, it is by means of such judgements that we acquire discursive knowledge of sensible objects). Thus, if we adapt the terms of Coleridge’s definition of the faculty of sense, it could be said that this capacity to acquire discursive cognitions, the intellectual or discursive nature of the mind, is the property of having the understanding or ‘discursive faculty’ called into action. The capacity to judge (i.e. to know things discursively) is thus, like the capacity to receive sensible intuitions, a property or tendency (of the mind) to act that is called into action under the conditions of external sensory stimulation. This discursive capacity is actualised through the exercise of ‘the substantiative power of the mind’, which enables such subjective sensory stimuli to be ‘raise[d] from mere affections […] into objects communicable and capable of being anticipated and reasoned of’. Put another way, as Coleridge says elsewhere, the faculty of understanding, considered as our capacity to judge, is actualised through the cognitive process whereby ‘[sense] impressions or […] the materials supplied to the understanding by the sense […] become objects [of cognition] in and by the mind’s judgements and modes of judging’. Thus, what it means for the substantiative power of the mind to be the ‘essence’ of the understanding is just that the understanding has a ‘discursive nature’: it is a capacity for discursive cognition that is proper or natural to the mind, a tendency to respond to and process sensory stimuli in particular way (i.e. discursively, through judgement and conception) that is part of the nature of the (human) mind. In concluding

215 Logic, 162; cf. 153-4.
216 Logic, 239-40. According to Coleridge the process of substantiation, like any other kind of discursive cognition, must involve concepts (thus the understanding is also our ‘faculty of concepts’). However, it is enough for present purposes to discuss only the role of our capacity to judge in this process.
217 Logic, 239-40.
218 Logic, 265-6.
this part of the thesis, I shall discuss how Coleridge’s talk of the sensuous and discursive natures or ‘essences’ of the mind relates to his claim that sense and understanding are the ‘two component faculties’ or ‘constituents’ of the human mind, as well as considering, in brief, why Coleridge thinks reason must be distinguished from these two ‘components’, as a cognitive capacity which is ‘a presence to the human mind, not a particular faculty or component part of the mind’. 219

iv. Cognitive Constitution & Capacities as Components

In sections 3.4 and 4.3-5, I consider Coleridge’s views on what it means for a cognitive faculty or capacity to be part of the nature or constitution of the mind in closer detail. In particular, I show that while Coleridge is more confident than Kant about the possibility (or permissibility) of treating the human mind as a substance, he still follows the Kantian principle that, in the field of transcendental analysis, questions concerning the underlying nature or substance of the mind must be suspended. As we will see in 3.4, this is because Coleridge agrees with Kant that transcendental talk about the forms of human cognition and the ‘constitution of the human subject’ has no reference to the neurophysiological mechanisms or immaterial substance in which such cognitive forms might be grounded. Rather, transcendental talk about cognitive constitution refers only to those a priori rules that govern or condition all sensible and discursive cognition; taken collectively, these rules or forms are said to be the conditions constitutive of (the possibility) of all such cognition. 220 This is the special sense in which Coleridge speaks of ‘the understanding and the sense as the two constituents of the mind’, taken as ‘its [i.e. the human mind’s] two component faculties’. 221 That is to say, sense and understanding are considered as components or constituents of the mind in the sense that these terms, taken to refer to a specific set of sensory and intellectual capacities, designate the collection of cognitive capacities and abilities in which human cognition consists. For Coleridge, as for Kant, it is only in this limited sense that we can talk of the forms of the faculties of sense and understanding disclosed by a transcendental analysis of cognition as constitutive of all sensible experience. Without this set of intuitive and discursive cognitive capacities being inherent in the mind, such experience (especially discursive cognition of sensible objects) would not be possible. However, as Coleridge puts it, we can only speak of such forms

219 See e.g. Logic, 43-4ff, 69-70, 143-7ff for this use of ‘components’ and ‘constituents’.

220 For Coleridge on a priori or transcendental conditions of cognition and experience, see Logic, 146-9, 165-8, 187-8. See 37, 252-4, 265-6n on how claims about the forms of cognition in such an ‘analysis of our intellectual faculties’ have no reference to either material or immaterial mental structures (cf. 213).

221 Logic, 35, 70.
and faculties (i.e. cognitive capacities) as ‘innate, in the alone rightful and alone intended sense of inherent in the constitution of the understanding [and sense], or as constituting what we mean by understanding [and sensibility]’: the transcendental point of view sees faculties only in terms of their characteristic activities.222

For the remainder of this section I focus only on how Coleridge’s conceptions of cognitive constitution and mental ‘components’ relate to the faculty/power distinction, taken as a way of differentiating between a potentiality or capacity for some general kind of cognitive activity (a faculty) and the actualisation of this general capacity through the exercise of a particular cognitive ability (a power or function). To begin, it will be useful to note some potential limitations and ambiguities in the faculty/power distinction. In her discussion of Kant’s use of the terms *Vermögen* and *Kraft*, Longuenesse observes that when Kant employs this terminology in his descriptions of the cognitive faculties and their operations, the distinction between *Vermögen*, as a potentiality for a certain kind of cognitive activity, and *Kraft*, as the actualisation of this activity in some kind of cognitive ability, ‘is not always entirely clear’. As she observes, Kant’s ‘vocabulary is […] far from fixed, and it would be a mistake to expect [Kant’s faculty terminology] to sustain overly sharp distinctions’.223 In Coleridge’s case, the situation is comparable. One finds similar semantic slippages throughout his *Logic*: Coleridge refers to a broad range of cognitive activities, such as abstracting, reflecting, judging, imagining, perceiving, and conceiving, sometimes in faculty-terms and sometimes in power-terms. But as I shall explain below, this is not down to conceptual confusion on Coleridge’s part, but rather derives from his use of the faculty/power distinction in two different ways. In some cases, this distinction is used to differentiate between the capacity for a specific kind of cognitive ability (such as abstraction), and the exercise of this ability (the act of abstracting). In other cases, it is employed to designate the capacity for some general kind of cognitive activity (e.g. when we consider the understanding as our faculty for all discursive cognitive activity), and the actualisation of this capacity through the exercise of a particular kind of cognitive ability (e.g. in the exercise of our discursive powers of reflection, conception, judgement, etc). In both cases, the distinction between a *faculty* as a potentiality or capacity for some kind of cognitive activity and a *power* as the actualisation of this capacity through the exercise of a specific cognitive ability is maintained.

222 *Logic*, 266n. That Coleridge treats this conception of constitution as applicable to the faculty of sense is evident in his reference to ‘the constitution of the sense itself and the inherent properties of its constituent forms’ at 165 (cf. 153-5, 162). Cf. 252-4 on the ‘component powers’ of the understanding.
We can see how the faculty/power and potentiality/actualisation distinctions that were outlined above operate in *Logic* by briefly considering how these two closely related distinctions apply to Coleridge’s definitions of the ‘constitution’ of the faculties of sense and understanding. For in *Logic*, Coleridge’s employment of the faculty-power distinction to differentiate between the potential and actualised aspects of our cognitive capacities is perhaps most clear and consistent in his general definitions of the faculties of sense and understanding, taken as general cognitive capacities which are constituted by a collection of different cognitive abilities. Viewed from such a perspective, sense and understanding are considered as capacities for all intuitive and discursive mental activities in general that are actualised through the exercise of a range of particular intuitive and discursive mental operations, with the intuitive kind being taken as proper or belonging to sense, and the discursive kind being taken as proper or belonging to understanding. Thus, as we saw above, Coleridge speaks of the faculty of sense in general as a capacity for intuitive and sensory activity which is exercised through the intuitive powers of sensible intuition (or apprehension) and imagination. Likewise, when Coleridge speaks of the faculty of understanding in its most general sense, he is referring to the understanding as a capacity for discursive cognitive activity which is exercised through a variety of discursive powers including reflection, judgement, abstraction, and conception (which together constitute the ‘substantiative power of the mind’). In sum, sense and understanding are said to be ‘components’ or ‘constituents’ of the human mind in the sense that, taken together, they are the two general cognitive capacities, actualised through a range of particular cognitive abilities, that constitute the fundamental set of mental activities (i.e. the basic sensory and intellectual functions) in which the human mind (in general, for all finite subjects) and its possible range of sensory experience and discursive cognition consists. To reiterate: such talk of the constitution or components of the mind by Coleridge should be taken to refer only to the mind’s characteristic activities, and not to its putative features as a material or immaterial substance, or some combination of both. This, on Coleridge’s account, is ‘the alone rightful and alone intended sense’ of the term ‘constitution’, ‘whatever [the human mind] may be in other respects, whether a self-subsistent soul, or a function of the same, or a mere modification of matter, or a common result of two co-agents’. In the case of reason, however, this rule does not apply.

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224 See e.g. *Logic*, 34-6, 153-4, 213-4, 221-4.
225 See e.g. *Logic*, 33-7, 68-72, 205-6, 239-42, 255-6ff.
226 *Logic*, 266n (cf. 38-41, 45, 139-43). For further discussion, see 3.4 below.
As noted at the beginning of this section, Coleridge makes a distinction between ‘reason as a presence to the human mind, not a particular faculty or component of the mind’ and sense and understanding ‘as its [the mind’s] two component faculties’. Since Coleridge’s views on the nature and functions of reason are discussed in detail in 3.3 and 4.3-5, here I will consider only what it means for Coleridge to claim that although reason is a cognitive capacity that can be exercised by human subjects, it should not be confused with the ‘two component faculties’ of the human mind. According to Coleridge, we need to be ‘aware of the unindividual and transcendent character of the reason’. Put another way, we need to recognise reason as a cognitive capacity or power which is not grounded in ‘the constitution of the subject’ but derives from some source that transcends all finite human minds. Coleridge often talks of the forms of sense and understanding as ‘what all human subjects possess in common by necessity of their constitution’, and ‘the universal subjective, or that which is common to the race without distinction of individuals’. But while this subjective constitution is something that ‘subsists in all beings possessing the faculties of sense and intelligence, […] without relation to individuality’, in the sense that it transcends individual human minds, it is not, on Coleridge’s account, ‘unindividual and transcendent in the same way as reason’. Reason is—at least potentially—present to the human mind, but it is also something which ‘subsists’ independently of the human mind, whether in reference particular subjects, or ‘the universal subjective’. Given that reason is independent of the cognitive constitution of the human subject in this way, it cannot be said to be a ‘constituent’ or ‘component faculty’ of the human mind.

This claim obviously raises the question of what reason is grounded in, or derives from, if not the human mind and its cognitive constitution. Coleridge’s answer to such a question is evident from his claims about the different ways in which mind and its forms can be contemplated. Coleridge contends that in order to understand the nature of sense and understanding, we must consider ‘the human mind collectively taken’, or ‘that which is common to the race without distinction of individuals’ (i.e. the universal subjective). But to understand the nature of reason, we need to ‘take the mind itself; not this man’s mind, nor yours, individually, nor even the human mind generally, but mind absolutely’. In Coleridge’s terms, to talk of ‘mind absolutely’ is not simply to talk of all possible minds, or the constitution of all such subjects, in the most general sense: it is to talk of ‘that Being

227 Logic, 69-70; cf. 43-4. See also Friend I.155-8.
228 Logic, 69.
229 Logic, 145, 203n.
230 Logic, 43n; cf. 203n.
231 See e.g. Logic, 139-45ff, 172-3.
and Will which we express by the word “God”, and to ‘elevate our conception [of God] to the absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind, the underived and eternal “I am”’, considered as ‘the principle of being and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality: the ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of that existence, absolutely one and identical’. Viewed in this way, God, as the Absolute, must be the ground of all finite subjects (including finite human minds) and all finite subjects. Given that, on Coleridge’s account, God is the only possible candidate for the Absolute, insofar as reason consists in or is designated as what we call ‘mind absolutely’ (as opposed to ‘the human mind generally’), reason must have its ground or source in God, ‘the absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind’. As Coleridge puts it in one of his mid-1820s manuscripts: ‘Reason is from God, and God is reason, mens ipsissima [i.e. mind its very self]’. This is why Coleridge speaks of ‘the unindividual and transcendent character of the reason as a presence to the human mind’, stating that if we contemplate mind in its different aspects, ‘In subordination to [νοῦς or reason], and as more properly constituting the human mind in its specific sense as the human mind, we find the λόγος (the understanding) and the ὑπογίς, the sense’. I give a further account of Coleridge’s threefold division of the cognitive capacities, and the implications of his Greek terms in 3.1-3 and 4.1-3. To lay the ground for this account, we first need to look more closely at Coleridge’s interpretation of Kant’s claims about the ‘transcendental’ and the a priori, and their relation to the cognitive faculties. This will be the main concern of Part 2.

232 Logic, 44, 85.
234 Logic, 44. Cf. 70n, where Coleridge claims that we should consider ‘the understanding (λόγος) as one of the two faculties of the mind, the sense or intuitive faculty (ὑπογίς) [as] being the other, [and] the reason (νοῦς) as the universal power presiding over both’. For further discussion, see 4.1, 4.4 below.
2. Kantian & Coleridgean Conceptions of the Transcendental & the A Priori

2.1 Kant & Coleridge on A Priori Cognitions, Transcendental Knowledge, & the Content of Transcendental Representations

i. Kant’s Definitions of ‘A Priori’ & ‘Transcendental’ in Coleridge’s Logic

In this part of the thesis my focus will be on explaining how Coleridge conceives of the transcendental method used in Kant’s analysis of cognition, and its relation to the a priori. A simple way to begin is by considering how Kant employs the terms ‘transcendental’ and ‘a priori’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, and then seeing how far Coleridge follows such usage in his Logic (noting that its key sections often consist in translation or paraphrase of those passages where Kant works out his definitions of the critical philosophy’s core terms). In the introduction to the Critique Kant states ‘I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori’. As Patricia Kitcher notes, what this kind of ‘transcendental knowledge’ is concerned with is ‘how we know objects’: ‘Its specific province comprises those features of cognition that can be traced to a priori origins’ and its claims are ‘established by transcendental proofs, which show that experience would be impossible but for the a priori origins of certain features of our cognition’. For Kant, such features of cognition are a priori if we can demonstrate them to be ‘independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses’, and thereby ‘distinguish[ed] from empirical ones, which have their sources a posteriori, namely in experience’; such demonstration is the object of Kantian ‘transcendental proofs’. To achieve these ends, Kitcher argues, Kant tends to employ the term ‘a priori’ in three distinct but often mutually supporting senses: it can refer not only to (1) the origin of certain features of our cognition taken to have a special status, but also to (2) the logical form which a priori propositions concerning such features must take, and (3) the kind of knowledge in which the a priori, taken to have an origin that is independent of all sense-experience ((1)) and to involve claims or judgements that are universal and necessary ((2)), consists. If an inquiry is transcendental, then such ‘a priori cognitions’ are its field. As will be discussed further below, it should be noted that there is some dispute amongst Kantian scholars as to whether Kant should be interpreted as taking the a priori to be independent of sense-

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1 CPR, B25.
4 See Kitcher (1990), 15-16. Kitcher gives priority to the logical form sense of a priori. I number them differently above simply for convenience of exposition.
experience in the sense that (a) *a priori* cognitions or principles cannot originate in or be derived from ordinary sensory experience, or (b) *a priori* cognitions or principles can be known without reference or appeal to such experience, irrespective of claims concerning their origin. First, however, we need to consider why the problem of *a priori* origins is significant to Coleridge (and especially his claims about cognition in *Logic*).

In the *Logic* sense (1) and (3) of Kant’s *a priori* play a significant role throughout: Apart from Coleridge’s various appropriations of Kant’s own statements on the *a priori* origins of the ‘formal’ features of sensible cognition, his fondness for the Leibnizian rejoinder to the Aristotelian dictum concerning the sensory origin of all cognition, is an indication of his concern with the kinds of cognitive content which Kant claims are ‘independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses’, and his belief that the ‘birth-place’ of these cognitions is what accords them this special *a priori* status. Thus, many of the principal parts of *Logic* are concerned with presenting Coleridge’s interpretation of Kant’s claims concerning the grounds and origins of *a priori* cognitions and principles. Although Coleridge also recognises sense (2) he evidently conceives of the universality and necessity of the *a priori* in a somewhat different and more limited way than Kant (as we will see in 4.3, this limitation is a consequence of Coleridge’s views concerning the origin of the invariant and *a priori* aspects of sense-experience). So for now I focus on sense (1) and the problem of *a priori* origins, for the question of what it means to claim that a given cognitive form or content has an *a priori* origin is central to Coleridge’s interpretation of the aims and methods of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, as well as to his account of the nature of *a priori* necessity and other aspects of modality (which Coleridge seeks to explain in the terms furnished by the philosophical procedure he calls ‘transcendental analysis’).

Before considering further what Kant and Coleridge mean in claiming that certain features of our cognition have an *a priori* origin, however, we must examine more closely how Coleridge employs the terms ‘*a priori*’ and ‘transcendental’ in *Logic*. For it

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8 In Coleridge’s translation ‘there is nothing in the understanding which was not previously in the sense – except the understanding itself’ (*Logic*, 226-7).
9 *CPR*, B2.
10 *Logic*, 154.
12 This is because Coleridge believes that non-sensible intuitions and cognitions are possible for beings with our cognitive capacities, and thus that the *a priori* features which Kant contends are universal and necessary for all our possible experience (which must be sensible) would not apply to them. See *BL* I, 288-9n, *Logic*, 154-5 (see also 146 on this ‘conditional necessity’).
needs to be kept in mind that although transcendental philosophy is concerned with a special kind of *a priori* knowledge (what Kant calls its carefully delimited ‘field’ of ‘*a priori* cognitions’), not all *a priori* knowledge-claims are necessarily included within the scope of Kantian transcendental discourse.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, while there are various types of ‘*a priori* representations’, the kinds of *a priori* knowledge-claims that transcendental philosophy seeks to make concern only those that Kant classes as ‘transcendental representations’.\(^\text{15}\) Given that ‘representation’ (Kant’s *Vorstellung*) is a notoriously slippery term, I will follow Kitcher throughout in taking it to refer to either our cognitive states or the content(s) of our cognitive states (and occasionally both together, depending on context). Thus, an *a priori* representation is a cognitive state with *a priori* content (i.e. what Kant calls a ‘pure’ representation in which we abstract from all the sensory or *a posteriori* content given in empirical representations); a transcendental representation is a cognitive state with a special kind of *a priori* content. Kant’s transcendental discourse is concerned solely with claims about this special class of *a priori* representation.\(^\text{16}\) As Kant puts it: ‘not every *a priori* cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognise that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely *a priori*, or are possible (i.e. the possibility of cognition or its use *a priori*).’\(^\text{17}\) If the content of some *a priori* representation does not concern ‘the possibility of cognition or its use *a priori*’, then claims concerning this content cannot belong to transcendental discourse, regardless of whether such claims involve *a priori* knowledge of some kind (such as the axioms of geometry, as conceived by Kant).

To give a brief example of how Kant illustrates his distinction between the different kinds of *a priori* content that can be presented in our cognitive states: A mathematician who constructs or contemplates a geometric figure in her imagination (rather than, say, on a sheet of paper), considering its features as given in the pure spatial manifold of sensibility without reference to any *a posteriori* content(s), can be said to be contemplating an *a priori* representation. According to Kant, however, ‘neither space nor any geometrical determination of it *a priori* is a transcendental representation’. Thus, representations containing *a priori* content concerning mathematical procedures or the axioms of mathematics taken to be exemplified by such procedures, for instance, must

\(^\text{14}\) See *CPR*, B81-2.
\(^\text{15}\) See *CPR*, B82 (cf. B34-5).
\(^\text{16}\) How Coleridge employs this Kantian representation terminology, particularly its distinctions between different kinds of *a priori* and *a posteriori* content, in *Logic* will be discussed further below (see 3.1-3). For Kitcher on this rendering of *Vorstellung*, see (1990), 66, nn. 12-14.
\(^\text{17}\) *CPR*, B81-2.
not be classed as a part of transcendental knowledge, although (for both Kant and Coleridge) they are undoubtedly a kind of *a priori* cognition. Rather, ‘only the cognition that these representations are not of empirical origin at all and the possibility that [such representations] can nevertheless be related *a priori* to objects of experience can be called transcendental’. In other words, in Kant and Coleridge’s view space, or the pure spatial manifold in which imaginary geometric figures may be constructed in thought, is an *a priori* representation. But only our knowledge concerning the nonempirical origins of this manifold and the ways in which it constrains the construction of such figures, or our cognition that space (conceived as an *a priori* representation) is related to objects *a priori*, can be classed as transcendental representations. In short, only claims concerning how spatiality or any other feature of our sensory experience is possible *a priori*, or should be taken to have an *a priori* origin independent of all such experience, can belong to Kantian transcendental discourse. Only the cognition that, and how, such features or contents of our cognitive states are possible *a priori* can furnish transcendental knowledge.

**ii. Coleridge on Transcendental Knowledge & the Analysis of the Faculties**

I will provide a more detailed account of Coleridge’s claims concerning transcendental representations and transcendental knowledge in sections 4.1-4. But it will be useful to introduce some of Coleridge’s statements on the transcendental here, to compare them with the Kantian definitions just outlined. Coleridge, like some contemporary Kantian scholars (particularly Kitcher and Waxman), favours a definition of the transcendental as concerned not only with the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience, but also with demonstrating the *a priori* origin of these conditions (identified with certain invariant features or contents of our sensory cognitive states, such as spatiality). His sense that a knowledge of such conditions of possibility cannot be empirically derived is evident from Coleridge’s following claims: ‘All knowledge is excited or occasioned by experience, but all knowledge is not derived from experience, such, for instance, is the knowledge of the conditions that render experience itself possible’. As Coleridge goes on to point out, such nonempirical truths or conditions are distinct from whatever is *a posteriori* in our cognition and experience, and designated as ‘transcendental’:

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18 *CPR*, B81-2.
19 See Kitcher, (1990), ch. 1-2; Waxman, (2013), ch. 1.
Now to distinguish the truths that are necessarily presupposed in all experience as its condition and co-cause, from the facts or knowledge not only occasioned by, but actually derived from experience, whether it be the experience of the world without or the experience acquired by reflection on ourselves, [...] the term “transcendental” has been chosen.\(^{21}\)

What Coleridge means by ‘experience acquired by reflection on ourselves’ here is the kind of cognition acquired through our reflection on the contents and operations of the mind. Those cognitions derived \textit{a posteriori} from ordinary sense-experience belong to empirical psychology, which considers only the contingent features of cognition given \textit{a posteriori}, and are therefore distinguished from those invariant features of cognition given \textit{a priori} (and which are the field of what Coleridge terms ‘the science of transcendental analysis’).\(^{22}\) The link between the transcendental and reflection on the contents and operations of the mind is made further evident in Coleridge’s subsequent statement of definition: ‘Transcendental knowledge is that by which we endeavour to climb above our experience into its sources by an analysis of our intellectual faculties’.\(^{23}\) As I shall show later (4.1-4), Coleridge takes the ‘truths that are necessarily presupposed in all experience as its condition and co-cause’ to be a special kind of \textit{a priori} form and content, and holds that this ‘analysis of our intellectual faculties’ (the procedure Kant calls ‘transcendental reflection’) is required to explain how these features of cognition are possible \textit{a priori} and ‘independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses’.\(^{24}\) But for the purposes of this section, what matters is that Coleridge follows Kant in distinguishing transcendental knowledge \textit{of} these \textit{a priori} forms and contents (which itself consists in a special kind of \textit{a priori} cognition) from such pure forms and contents themselves, as given our in \textit{a priori} representations or cognitions.

Here Coleridge’s distinction between the \textit{use} of the faculties employed in pure sciences (i.e. nonempirical disciplines) like mathematics and logic, and the \textit{analysis} of these cognitive faculties and the operations whereby they present (or produce) those \textit{a priori} forms and contents in which mathematical and logical knowledge consist is key to making sense of his view of the transcendental. According to Coleridge, the kind of knowledge with which pure or formal disciplines are concerned derives from our cognitive faculties. This is why he holds that ‘[just as] we cannot become mathematicians

\(^{21}\) \textit{Logic}, 146-7. Cf. Coleridge’s statement at 76: ‘the unity of apperception is presupposed in, and in order to, all consciousness. It is its condition (\textit{conditio sine qua non}) or that which constitutes the possibility of consciousness \textit{a priori}’.

\(^{22}\) Coleridge makes this distinction clear at \textit{Logic}, 139-43ff, 196-7 (cf. 213-4, 248).

\(^{23}\) \textit{Logic}, 147.

but by reasoning according to the laws and necessities of the primary imagination, so neither can we be logicians or discourse logically, but according to the inherent forms and necessary data of the understanding. However, as he notes elsewhere, this must not be taken to mean that an analysis or knowledge of the operations of these faculties is required to prove the validity of mathematical or logical principles:

The mathematician rests perfectly secure that his axioms and propositions are necessary and universal truths, without troubling himself with any analysis of the faculties by which he constructs his figures and demonstrates their relations.

Similarly, Coleridge observes that the claim that the principles of formal logic have an a priori origin in the human understanding ‘does not express, nor is it meant to imply, that their evidence is derived from the knowledge of this [faculty and its operations]’, for “The principles and canons of common [or formal] logic are evident independently of the insight given by transcendental analysis [i.e. the analysis of our cognitive faculties].” As with the Kantian definitions of the transcendental discussed above, the aim of Coleridge’s statements here is to suggest that while transcendental knowledge must involve a priori principles and knowledge-claims of some kind, it should also be kept distinct from other more general kinds of a priori representations and cognitions (e.g. the content of pure intuitions in mathematics or of pure concepts in formal logic). The a priori knowledge derived from the mind’s pure operations and representations is not the same as, and does not derive its proofs or validity from, transcendental knowledge of how such a priori cognitive forms and contents are possible a priori.

To reiterate Kant’s formulation of the distinction Coleridge is drawing on here: ‘not every a priori cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations […] are applied entirely a priori, or are possible (i.e. the possibility of cognition or its use a priori).’ In Coleridge’s view, only ‘an analysis of our intellectual faculties’ can yield such transcendental representations, the class of a priori cognition ‘that

25 *Logic*, 266n. Coleridge also says here that it is an ‘essential postulate […] in the sciences of geometry and arithmetic, to contemplate the subject-matter from the point of the pure sense or intuitive faculty’.
26 *Logic*, 140.
27 *Logic*, 212n. Coleridge uses the term ‘common logic’ for what Kant calls ‘general logic’, a discipline that is concerned only with the a priori rules of the understanding or ‘formal laws of all thought’, rather than the transcendental principles which make such rules and their application possible.
28 On this distinction, see *Logic*, 211-4 (esp. 212n).
29 *CPR*, B81-2.
is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible \textit{a priori}.

Clearly, much more needs to be said about how Coleridge interprets statements of this sort, and what he thinks it means for certain representations to be applied \textit{a priori} (or to talk of modes of cognition as possible \textit{a priori}). For now it will be enough to note that this Kantian distinction between different kinds of \textit{a priori} representation or cognitive content(s) is always in the background of Coleridge’s claims concerning the aims and methodology of transcendental philosophy, and his statements on the nature and origins of those \textit{a priori} features of cognition that this philosophy takes as its field of inquiry. To see why Coleridge adopts such distinctions, we must first consider his views on the nature and origins of the different kinds of content he thinks it is possible for us to have present to the mind, as contained in our cognitive states. In particular, I discuss (in 3.2) how Coleridge’s views here are informed by the distinctions he draws between (1) the \textit{a priori} and \textit{a posteriori} sources of cognitive content, and (2) the diverse kinds of \textit{a priori} content in our cognitive states (i.e., the different kinds of what Kant would call ‘\textit{a priori} representations’, when this term is taken to refer to a certain special kind of ‘pure’ cognitive state from which all empirical content has been abstracted). But before taking up (1) and (2), we will need more details on Coleridge’s account of the \textit{a priori} to provide a broader conceptual context for the discussion of these problems. This will help lay the ground for my analysis of how Coleridge’s definition and characterisation of the \textit{a priori} relates to Kant’s distinction between \textit{a priori} cognitions in general and the particular kind of \textit{a priori} cognitions which yield transcendental knowledge in 4.1-4. In the remainder of this section (2.1) I give a brief overview of Coleridge’s definitions of the \textit{a priori}. In the sections that follow (2.2-3.4), I explore the underlying connections between Coleridge’s claims about the \textit{a priori} origins of certain kinds of cognitive content(s) and his theory of the cognitive faculties (especially their pure acts and products).

iii. Coleridge on the Criteria for Apriority & the Problem of \textit{A Priori} Origins

At various points in Logic Coleridge defines the \textit{a priori} as ‘an act or product of the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions from external objects’ or as those conditions and features of our cognition that have their origin \textit{ab intra} (‘from within’, or

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30 See Coleridge, \textit{Logic}, 147 (cf. 76); Kant, CPR, B25.
31 See \textit{Logic}, 140-9, 203-5, 212-4 (cf. CPR, B74-82).
32 Coleridge talks of representations and their content as ‘present to the mind’ at \textit{Logic}, 73, 233n.
'a mente ipsa [from the mind itself]', as Coleridge puts it elsewhere).33 Put another way, if something – whether some act or product of the mind or some sort of cognitive content deriving from such acts and products – is characterised as a priori in this way, then ‘all means and materials a posteriori are excluded from [it]: it must be conceived as being independent of whatever can be given empirically, or apprehended through ordinary sense-experience.34 This is why Coleridge claims that for some kind of cognitive content or knowledge to qualify as a priori, it must ‘have[e] a higher evidence than that which the senses can afford, or which can belong to objects of the bodily sense considered as matters of fact’.35 Similarly, he identifies the a priori with ‘the necessary, the permanent, the universal, or the truths having these attributes’, and also remarks that ‘truths a priori, from which the facts of experience are contradistinguished, are characterised by a sense of necessity’ (which Coleridge contrasts with the ‘sense of contingency’ that accompanies empirically given facts).36 In sum: Coleridge claims that whatever is a priori must (i) be derived from within the mind, (ii) be given or known independently of sense-experience and (iii) be characterised by universality, necessity, and ‘permanence’ (Coleridge’s term for what is immutable or invariant in our cognition).37

Now, while universality and necessity are fairly familiar features of the a priori, it will be useful to say a little more about Coleridge’s notion of ‘permanence’ before going on to discuss his account of a priori origins further. As just noted, Coleridge employs the term ‘permanence’ and its variants to refer to what is immutable or invariant in cognition (and in sense-experience). He also uses such terms to refer to those immutable things or principles which he takes to subsist independently of the human mind (e.g. God, and the Ideas, taken as intelligible or noumenal laws of nature), and to determine objects as they exist independently of human perception or cognition of them. Thus, Coleridge says that we can speak of ‘permanence and universality [as] subjective or objective, i.e. relative or absolute’.38 As I explain in 4.3, this distinction between relative and absolute permanence must be understood in terms of Coleridge’s distinction between the subjectively real and the objectively real a priori. For now, it will be sufficient just to outline these two notions.

33 Logic, 76; cf. 141-2, 145-6. See also CM.V.355. For further discussion of this Coleridgean reading of the (Kantian a priori), see 2.2-3 below.
34 Logic, 212.
35 Logic, 36; cf. 34, 139-41.
36 Logic, 141; cf. 40 for Coleridge’s related account of the ‘perception of a truth, permanent, necessary, and raised above all accident and change [apprehended] in a geometrical contemplation’ (a priori truth, or pure cognitive content). Coleridge uses the term ‘fact’ in a broad sense to designate the diverse kinds of objects or cognitive contents given a posteriori through the senses (see e.g. 34ff, 44-5n).
37 Coleridge also regards self-evidence as a characteristic of the a priori (see Logic, 140ff, 211-2).
38 Logic, 173 (cf. 43n, 141n, 202n).
of permanence and their relation to (i) what is invariant in human cognition and (ii) what is immutable independently of human subjects. In the first instance, ‘permanence’ refers to ‘that which is universally and permanently subjective, that is, what all human subjects possess in common by necessity of their constitution’.

In other words, those aspects of cognition which, given the way in which the human mind is constituted, are invariant or not subject to change, such as the spatiotemporal ordering of the sensory manifold that is grounded in the human forms of sensible intuition (space and time), or the discursivity of all cognitions acquired through the operations of the understanding. In this case, what is ‘permanently subjective’ just is that which, given certain invariant principles of human cognition, must always be the same for all human subjects under all possible conditions.

In the second instance, ‘permanence’ refers to ‘truth in its eternal and immutable source’ (i.e. God), and ‘immaterial and permanent things’ (i.e. the Divine Ideas).

This ‘absolute’ kind of permanence is ‘the subsistence of the universe, material and intellectual’, or those eternal and immutable principles or aspects of the world as it exists independently of all human subjects, but which (as I show in 4.3-5) Coleridge claims, contra Kant, are possible objects of human cognition, acquired through intellectual intuition or noesis.

As we shall see, Coleridge’s views concerning the differences between relative and absolute necessity, universality, and permanence are closely related to his claims about the kinds of invariant principles which have their source in the human mind (e.g. the rules of mathematics and logic) and those which have their source in something beyond the human mind (e.g. the Ideas, taken as noumenal principles which govern all phenomenal objects).

I shall return to Coleridge’s account of the a priori and its implications later (see 2.2-3.4); in concluding this section (2.1), I focus just on Coleridge’s claim that the a priori status of the pure forms and contents of sensory cognition is something determined by the origin of such forms and contents. Taken on its own, Coleridge’s assertion that the term a priori is used to designate some ‘act or product of the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions from external objects’, might be interpreted to mean that it is not the origin of such acts and products in ‘the mind itself’ that accords them this a priori status, but rather how we consider these acts and products (i.e. operations and contents) of the mind. In this case, something is a priori not because it originates from within the mind, but because it is something which can be ‘considered as distinct from

39 Logic, 202n. For further discussion, see 3.2-4.

40 Friend I.105-6; cf. Logic, 83-5. For further discussion, see 3.3, 4.3.

41 For Coleridge claim that we need not follow Kant in rejecting the possibility of intellectual intuition, see e.g. BL I.288-9n; cf. Logic, 242-3ff. This is discussed further in 4.3-5 (see also 3.1-3).
the impressions from external objects’ (i.e. given or known independently of, or without reference or appeal to, the a posteriori content of experience). However, as Coleridge makes clear elsewhere (in responding to perceived misinterpretations of Kant), it is the origin of certain contents and operations of the mind that is paramount in their claims to a priori status: ‘Kant has explained the sense, in which he uses the phrase “a priori” as determining a fontem sive natale solum, minime vero tempus, et occasiones, idearum—the ubi oriuntur, not the quando [a ‘source or birthplace’, but not in the least the time and occasions of ideas—the ‘where they arise’ not the ‘when’].’ This interpretation, along with Coleridge’s claim that transcendental knowledge derives from ‘an analysis of our intellectual faculties’, is encouraged by passages like the following, in which Kant characterises transcendental philosophy as an inquiry into the origins of those principles of cognition (like categories or pure concepts) which cannot be derived from experience. Here Kant defines his transcendental ‘analytic of concepts’ as:

the hitherto rarely attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of concepts a priori by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their birthplace, and by analyzing the pure use of this faculty.

On Coleridge’s view, what Kant means by ‘analysing the pure use of this faculty’ is that philosophical procedure whereby we seek to analyse the operations and contents of the understanding (i.e. its acts and products), ‘considered as distinct from the impressions from external objects’. As Kant’s statement above suggests, if the aim of such an analysis is to investigate the possibility a priori of certain contents of the understanding (its pure concepts), then it must be carried out by ‘looking for them in the understanding alone, [taken] as their birthplace’. If we can show that certain aspects of cognition have their origin in the understanding, then we can thereby confirm their claim to a priori status. This is why Coleridge claims that Kant uses the term a priori to designate the ‘source or birthplace’ of certain kinds of cognitive content (i.e. ideas or representations which do not derive a posteriori from sense-experience). Considered in this context, Coleridge’s characterisation of transcendental knowledge as ‘that by which we endeavour to climb above our experience into its sources’ strongly suggests that he takes the principal aim of

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42 See e.g. Logic, 76, 139-43ff, 210-4.
43 CM.III.117-8.
44 Logic, 147 (cf. 140, 209-10n, 213-4, 248).
45 CPR, B90. Coleridge’s sense that Kant is the first philosopher to successfully attempt this ‘dissection of the faculty of understanding itself’ is reflected in his claim that Kant is ‘the first scientific analyst of the logical faculty [i.e. the understanding]’ (Logic, 63, 268; cf. 33-4, 147-9).
transcendental philosophy to be providing proof ‘that experience would be impossible but for the a priori origins of certain features of our cognition’.

To see why Coleridge holds the view on our cognition and its sources outlined above, we must first consider in further detail Coleridge claims about how the Kantian a priori and its relation to our cognitive faculties or capacities ought to be interpreted. This will help to lay the ground for my subsequent account of Coleridge’s distinction between the different kinds of a priori evidence or cognitive content (see 4.1-4), in the context of Coleridge’s interpretation of transcendental inquiry as a method of philosophical inquiry which enables us to show ‘that experience would be impossible but for the a priori origins of certain features of our cognition’, or as Coleridge phrased it, ‘to climb above our experience into its sources by means of an analysis of our intellectual faculties’ (see 3.1-2, 4.4-5). In the sections that follow (2.2-3.4), I discuss further Coleridge’s claim that what it means for some form or content (i.e. some act or product) of cognition to be a priori is that it derives from the human mind and its cognitive capacities.

### 2.2 The Spectacles of the Mind: Coleridge on Interpreting the Kantian A Priori

The precise meaning of the Kantian a priori, particularly its connection to ‘conditions of the possibility of experience’ and its role in our acquisition of transcendental knowledge of such conditions of our cognition, remains in dispute. One of the main points of controversy here is whether Kant’s a priori should be interpreted as logical only, or if it also has some sort of psychological dimension, with this raising the further question of whether such psychological elements are a deliberate part of Kant’s conception of apriority, or an unintended (and unwelcome) consequence of his definition of the a priori in the Critique. For the purposes of this section, I give a brief overview of the relevant issues. According to the widely endorsed logical reading, Kant uses the term ‘a priori’, particularly in his descriptions of our faculties or cognitive powers and the fundamental elements of sensory cognition, to refer only to a special kind of evidence (what he calls

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46 See Kitcher, (1990), 15. As was noted earlier, Coleridge’s interpretation of Kant shares a number of features with Kitcher’s view.

47 See Kitcher, (1990), 15.

48 *Logic*, 147.

49 Following Kitcher, I will throughout treat ‘experience’ and ‘cognition’ (or ‘cognitive experience’) as closely equivalent terms for Kant and Coleridge. In other words, when Kant talks of ‘experience’, what he usually has in mind is the experience of knowing ‘our mode of cognition of objects’. While such a reading of Kant’s aims and terminology in the *Critique* might be disputed, it is nevertheless evident that our basic experience of knowing (primary modes of cognising) objects is Coleridge’s principal concern throughout *Logic*, even when he discusses the forms of cognition without any reference to its objects.

50 For a recent interpretation of the Kantian a priori which emphasises such psychological elements, see Waxman, (2013), esp. 23-32.
our ‘a priori representations’) and the logical form of our philosophical discourse and knowledge-claims about such evidence (only senses (2) and (3) of the a priori, as outlined in 2.1). On the psychological or cognitive reading, which has come in for much criticism even in its more moderate forms, Kant’s ‘a priori’ is a term that also refers to the special origin of such evidence (certain invariant features of our cognitive experience) in the mind and its characteristic forms or modes of cognitive activity (sense (1) above). Here faculty (Vermögen) is taken as a term that, while it encompasses such notions of special evidence, refers specifically to these forms of cognitive activity—and sometimes also to the putative mental structures taken to be responsible for such activity and its a priori form.51 Given that Coleridge explicitly presents transcendental philosophy as ‘an analysis of our intellectual faculties’ tasked with ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms’ of such faculties, Logic seems to follow the psychological approach in its description of the ‘inherent forms or several functional powers’ of sensibility and understanding.52 As I show in the remainder of this chapter, however, Coleridge’s notion of the a priori, particularly in its relation to transcendental knowledge, must be filled out further before an informed assessment of the psychological elements in his interpretation of Kant can be offered.

Coleridge’s clearest endorsement of Kant’s attempt to develop a philosophical method which seeks to account for ‘the possibility of cognition or its use a priori’53 in Logic is found in his account of the mental unity that supposedly must underlie all our cognitive activity in the chapter ‘On the Logical Acts’. Here, drawing on the principal arguments of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Coleridge contends that some kind of basic mental unity must be presupposed as a condition of consciousness itself, in order for us to account for the possibility of any particular act of cognition, such as the construction of a geometrical figure or a judgement about the relations between perceptual objects. Following Kant, Coleridge wants to show that some such condition of mental unity is required to explain how it could be possible for a subject to make connections between or ‘synthesise’ the contents of a series of different cognitive states, or indeed even to recognise that such a sequence of representations ‘belongs’ to a single, unified subject and its unfolding sensory experience.54 Coleridge’s view of mental unity is not central to his claims on the a priori, so my focus here will be on his Kantian notion of

51 For an overview of the differences between the logical and psychological readings of Kant, see Beiser, (2002), 163-76 (cf. Waxman, (2013), ch. 1).
52 Logic, 146-7, 213-4.
53 CPR, B81-2.
54 On Kant’s theory of mental unity, see Kitcher, (1990), ch. 3.
conditions of possibility, and on what Coleridge thinks it means for such conditions to be designated as *a priori*, or as something that can be known *a priori*. As we shall see, although Coleridge is not always explicit about the connection himself, what he has to say here concerning the *a priori* conditions of consciousness and synthetic cognitive activity is a key reference point for making sense of his later account of transcendental knowledge and the procedures whereby we come to acquire such knowledge.

Having given an overview of how the Kantian theory of functions of unity and synthesis as fundamental to all cognitive activity can be used to explain what supposedly occurs in the mind of someone contemplating geometrical figures in their imagination, Coleridge offers the following summary of this account of mental unity as a condition of the possibility of consciousness (and thus of all cognitive experience):

This primary mental act, which we have called the synthetic unity or the unity of apperception, is presupposed in, and in order to, all consciousness. It is its condition (*condition sine qua non*) or that which constitutes the possibility of consciousness *a priori*, or, if we borrow our metaphor from space instead of time, *ab intra* [from within]. Both metaphors mean one and the same, viz. an act or product of the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions of external objects.\(^5\)

A number of things should be noted here. Coleridge defines a ‘condition’ as something that ‘constitutes the possibility’ of something else, and asserts (as does Kant) that such conditions of possibility are to be established *a priori*. Thus, to specify the condition(s) of something, such as consciousness or our mode of cognition of objects, is to account for the possibility of this thing, and such specification involves a procedure (of acquiring or establishing knowledge) that is independent of any particular experience (i.e. it is derived *a priori* rather than *a posteriori*). That Coleridge has an independence criterion for apriority something like Kant’s view that the *a priori* must be ‘independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses’\(^6\) is made particularly evident in his remark that the metaphorical terms ‘*a priori*’ and ‘*ab intra*’ must be understood as meaning or referring to some ‘act or product of the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions of external objects’. Put another way, these metaphors should be taken to refer to cognitive acts or cognitive contents considered in abstraction from all sensation (what Kant calls

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\(^5\) *Logic*, 76 (see 71-6 for Coleridge on the role of mental unity in geometrical construction).

pure as opposed to empirical representations).\textsuperscript{57} Thus, if we establish some condition or principle of our knowledge or experience \textit{a priori}, we also establish that it involves the kind of cognitive content that cannot derive from sensory impressions and must derive instead from some nonempirical origin or source (as the term \textit{ab intra} suggests, such a source must ‘lie in the mind \textit{a priori}’\textsuperscript{58}).

I discuss below why Coleridge emphasises the metaphorical character of terms such as ‘\textit{a priori}’ and ‘\textit{ab intra}’, and how this view informs Coleridge’s statements on the correct interpretation of Kant’s definitions of the \textit{a priori} and the transcendental (a significant point given that Coleridge has been criticised for interpreting the Kantian \textit{a priori} as though it involved references to things that are literally temporally or causally prior to experience, or to forms of cognition that could be shown to have an actual, specifiable spatial location in some neurophysiological structure).\textsuperscript{59} But more needs to be said about how Coleridge characterises the \textit{a priori} in \textit{Logic} and other related texts before the purpose of such spatial and temporal metaphors in his analysis of cognition and its basic elements can be fully understood. For after giving the statement on mental unity as the condition that ‘constitutes the possibility of consciousness \textit{a priori}’ just quoted, Coleridge offers a gloss on the meaning of \textit{a priori} which warrants careful attention. Indeed, his remark reads strikingly like an anticipation of Russell’s description of ‘Kant’s categories [as] the coloured spectacles of the mind’,\textsuperscript{60} and could thus be interpreted as an indication that Coleridge wishes to emphasise the psychological rather than the logical aspects of his Kantian conception of apriority:

\begin{quote}
We may illustrate the sense of this so frequent and so frequently misused term “\textit{a priori}” by likening it to the stains in the old cathedral glass which predetermines the character of the rays which it transmits and reflects.\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

If we take this stained glass analogy as serving to illustrate Kant’s distinction between the forms of cognition that ‘lie \textit{a priori} in the mind’ and determine or order the ‘materials’ of sense given \textit{a posteriori} in experience,\textsuperscript{62} then Coleridge’s point is as follows: The acts of the mind itself (its \textit{a priori} rules or forms) can be said to ‘predetermine the character’ of those sensory impressions ‘which it transmits and reflects’ in a way analogous to the

\textsuperscript{57} See CPR, B33-5; B74-82.
\textsuperscript{58} Kant’s phrase at CPR, B125 (for similar statements from Coleridge, see Logic, 44-5; 71, 184n).
\textsuperscript{60} This is taken from ‘The Philosophical Importance of Mathematical Logic’ in (1992), 39.
\textsuperscript{61} Logic, 76.
\textsuperscript{62} See Logic, 111-2, 265; cf. Kant’s statements at CPR, B33-5, B74-5.
process whereby rays of light refracted through stained glass windows in a cathedral take on a certain colour. In view of Coleridge’s talk of *a priori* and *ab intra* as temporal and spatial metaphors just prior to this illustration, however, questions remain as to precisely how far Coleridge thinks such analogies can be pushed. In particular, there is the problem of whether such talk of what is *a priori* in the mind and its activity should be taken to refer to physical neural processes that somehow predetermine the character of all sensory experience (which would make any claim to apriority problematic), or to some other aspect or feature of our mode(s) of cognition.63

On Russell’s view, such predetermination by the *a priori* is taken as referring specifically to certain properties of the human mind and its modes of cognition, rather than, say, to a constraint on certain kinds of knowledge-claims or the necessary logical or conceptual form of certain kinds of evidence or discourse. Thus, it may be said that the Kantian formal idealism (partly) adopted by Coleridge employs such comparisons of apriority to the refraction of light by stained glass because this view assumes that the universality of *a priori* truths comes from their property of expressing properties of the mind: things [i.e. the objects of sensible experience] appear to be thus because the nature of the appearance depends on the subject in the same way that, if we have blue spectacles, everything appears to be blue.64

Viewed in this way, Coleridge’s stained glass analogy can be interpreted as serving to make two similar claims about the nature of the *a priori*. (1) That, on Kant’s view, the *a priori* is a property of the mind, or an expression of its properties, and is therefore dependent on the nature of the subject (i.e. dependent on what Kant and Coleridge call the cognitive constitution of the subject). (2) That the Kantian *a priori* is a property of the mind that conditions (or is the necessary condition of) all possible experience for such subjects, in the same way that whatever is seen through blue spectacles must appear blue, or all light which passes through stained glass necessarily takes on a certain colour (with the *a priori* properties of the mind playing the role of the refracting medium and the *a posteriori* elements of sensory impressions playing the role of what is refracted). In this sense, what is *a priori* in the mind, and conceived as constituting the possibility of experience (particularly cognitive activity) *a priori*, is a condition of the possibility of experience in the same way that stained glass of a certain colour, when it functions as a

63 This problem is explored further in 3.4.
64 Russell (1992), 39.
refracting medium, might be said to be a condition of the possibility of light of this colour being produced through such a process of refraction.

To put it in Coleridge’s terms: if we think of experience (in this Kantian sense) as occasioned by ‘something acting on us from without’, then our apprehension of, for instance, spatiotemporal order or causal connections in our experience (of the sensory manifold) must be conditioned and produced by certain *a priori* ‘forms and functions’ which act on us ‘*ab intra*’ or from within, governing the synthetic cognitive activities that process whatever ‘acts on us from without’ (i.e. sensory affections or impressions from external objects).\(^65\) To understand how such processing works we can think of it as something analogous to what occurs when light acting upon or interacting with coloured glass is refracted by this medium to produce a certain colour or pattern of light. What is *a priori* in the mind functions like a pair of Russellian coloured spectacles: whatever is perceived, or ‘transmitted and reflected’, by means of such ‘spectacles of the mind’ is necessarily always conditioned and constituted by the colours or patterns whose form is ‘predetermined’ *a priori* by the nature of the spectacles (i.e. by what Coleridge calls ‘the subjective nature of the mind’ or ‘the constitution of our own faculties’).\(^66\) So, for some aspect of our cognitive experience to qualify as an *a priori* property or ‘form’ of the mind, it must be shown to condition or determine the ‘materials supplied […] by the sense’ in a way analogous to how ‘the stains in the old cathedral glass […] predetermine the character of the rays which it transmits and reflects’.\(^67\) As we shall see, for Coleridge, the principal purpose of transcendental philosophy is to show how the pure forms of sense and understanding condition all sense-experience, as well as being the transcendental principles of the possibility of all such experience: the *a priori* ‘rules or forms’ of human cognition that are required to explain how (sensory) cognition and its objects are possible for beings with our cognitive constitution (see 3.1-3, 4.3).\(^68\) The next few sections (2.3, cf. 3.4), however, focus on Coleridge’s views concerning what it means to claim that certain forms and features of sense-experience and cognition have an *a priori* origin, particularly with reference to Coleridge’s conception of the *a priori* as something which derives from the mind and its natural or innate capacities.


\(^{66}\) For Coleridge’s references to cognitive constitution, see *Logic* 140-4, 146-7, 203n. On reading Kant’s *a priori* forms of cognition in terms of information processing theory, see Falkenstein, (1995), 5-11ff; cf. Kircher, (1990), 21-30.

\(^{67}\) *Logic*, 265, 76.

\(^{68}\) For Coleridge on such rules, forms, or laws of cognition, see e.g. *Logic*, 34-7, 65-70, 211-4, 235-8.
2.3 Coleridge on the *A Priori*, the Transcendental, & Necessary Conditions

i. The Problem of Pre-existence: Coleridge on *A Priori* Forms as Necessary Conditions

To lay the ground for the above discussions, more needs to be said about Coleridge’s view of *a priori* forms or principles as necessary conditions which ‘pre-exist’ or make possible our experience (as well as certain kinds of nonempirical knowledge). So, before we consider Coleridge’s conception of *a priori* origins in further detail, it will be useful to look closely at another of his favourite analogies for explaining the nature of the *a priori* (and *a priori* knowledge in particular). This analogy is important because it invokes a notion of ‘pre-existence’ that initially seems to run counter to Coleridge’s assertion elsewhere that ‘the a priori has no relation to Time’, so that we must ‘borrow our metaphor from space instead of time’ when attempting to explain the nature of the *a priori* and its relation to experience (and cognition)⁶⁹:

By knowledge, *a priori*, we do not mean, that we can know anything previously to experience, which would be a contradiction in terms; but that having once known it by occasion of experience (i.e. something acting upon us from without) we then know that it [i.e. the *a priori* knowledge or principle] must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible. By experience only I know, that I have eyes; but then my reason convinces me, that I must have had eyes in order to the experience.⁷⁰

If we compare this characterisation of the *a priori* to the ‘cathedral glass’ analogy discussed above, we can see that Coleridge is here employing the phrase ‘must have pre-existed’ in very narrow sense, and in a way which is intended to exclude all reference to temporal relations. In this context, ‘must have pre-existed’ means only ‘must be the necessary condition of’. Just as we would say that eyes or some kind of visual system are a necessary condition of the possibility of vision or visual experience, or that some kind of coloured glass is a necessary condition of the possibility of the process whereby light of the same colour is produced by refraction, we can also say that the *a priori* forms of cognition (pure intuitions and pure concepts) are necessary conditions of the possibility of experience (and that certain kinds of *a priori* principles, which are taken to be grounded in these forms of cognition, are necessary conditions of the possibility of certain kinds of knowledge, e.g. logical, mathematical, or natural-scientific).⁷¹ Thus Coleridge should be taken here to be making a claim about how *a priori* knowledge—or,

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⁶⁹ CM.IV.355 (cf. III.218-9), *Logic*, 76.
rather, those \textit{a priori} principles and pure representations from which such \textit{a priori} knowledge derives, and in which it consists—is related to experience, and particularly about how we can prove that something which can only be known ‘by occasion of experience’ can also be said to have a nonempirical status (i.e. how do we show that certain elements of experience or knowledge are not derived from experience, if we grant that ‘All knowledge is excited or occasioned by experience’?). In this case, the answer is that whatever is a necessary condition of experience cannot be taken to derive from such experience. Coleridge is not saying that \textit{a priori} knowledge somehow causes our experience, but rather that the \textit{a priori} principles which furnish such knowledge ‘must [...] be supposed to exist previous to experience’, as necessary conditions of the possibility of such experience.\textsuperscript{72} Our knowledge of such conditions is itself \textit{a priori}, which is perhaps why Coleridge’s statements seem to suggest that this \textit{a priori} knowledge is what ‘must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible’. On Coleridge’s own account, however, to claim that something could somehow be known ‘previously to experience’ is ‘a contradiction in terms’. So, as is made clearer in many of his other statements on the \textit{a priori}, he presumably means just that (i) knowledge of the nature of \textit{a priori} principles is itself a kind of \textit{a priori} knowledge, and (ii) by coming to know such principles ‘by occasion of experience’, we come to see that the principles themselves are what ‘must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible’ (i.e. they are \textit{a priori} conditions of the possibility of experience, but can nevertheless only come to be known through an analysis of experience).\textsuperscript{73}

That ‘pre-existence’ taken in this sense refers only to how we explain the possibility of some given thing (vision, coloured light, experience, etc) by identifying that which must precede it as the necessary condition of its possibility (eyes, stained glass, the forms of sense and understanding, etc) is evident from Coleridge’s subsequent explanatory sentence: ‘By experience only I know, that I have eyes; \textit{but then my reason convinces me}, that I must have had eyes in order to the experience’ (my emphasis). In this analogy, the aim is not to illustrate some ontological or physiological claim about what causes vision or experience, but rather to show how we reason when formulating an argument of the form ‘for some given thing, \textit{Y} [e.g. vision, experience] to be possible, some necessary condition, \textit{X} [e.g. eyes, \textit{a priori} forms of cognition] is required’.\textsuperscript{74} What is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} These quotes about knowledge and experience come from Coleridge’s account of \textit{a priori} forms and conditions at \textit{Logic}, 146-7ff.
\item \textsuperscript{73} See \textit{Logic}, 146-9.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Here I follow Stern’s outline of such claims in (1999), 6-11.
\end{itemize}
at issue here is not so much the particular content of a given knowledge-claim (‘eyes
must pre-exist the act of sight, in order for visual experience(s) to be possible’), but
rather the structure of this claim, taken to exemplify a general form common to all such
claims (‘X must precede Y as its necessary condition, in order for Y to be possible’).
Precedence or pre-existence is thus a question only of the order of explanation, of how
‘my reason convinces me’, not of any temporal, ontological, or physical relations that
may hold between the things about which we are reasoning.75 Thus, while it may seem
somewhat contrary to his phrasing, Coleridge should be taken here to be making a claim,
at the second level, about how we identify what constitutes the a priori status of certain
sorts of principles (i.e. they must be a necessary condition of the possibility of something
else, e.g. experience, or some kind of knowledge), rather than a claim about the nature or
characteristics of a priori knowledge per se (e.g. the self-evidence or the necessity and
universality of certain mathematical and logical propositions). Although our cognition of
the a priori status of certain special kinds of epistemic principles (e.g. the categories) and
cognitive contents (pure representations and cognitions), constitutes a kind of a priori
knowledge, this knowledge itself is obviously not what constitutes the necessary
conditions of the possibility of our experience. Rather, it is the case that we know the
objects of such knowledge (the a priori forms or principles of our cognition) to have such
an a priori status because we know that they are necessary conditions of the possibility of
experience. This adds a fourth criterion for apriority to those that were outlined in 2.1:
Whatever is a priori must (1) be derived from within the mind, (2) be given or known
independently of sense-experience, (3) be characterised by universality, necessity, and
‘permanence’ (Coleridge’s term for what is immutable or invariant in cognition), as well
as (4) being a necessary condition of the possibility of experience, or for certain kinds of
knowledge (logical, mathematical, metaphysical, and natural-scientific).76 It is only to
refer to (4) that Coleridge ordinarily employs the term ‘pre-exist’ in contexts where he is
discussing the nature of the a priori and the transcendental.77

As we shall see, although this conception of pre-existence sometimes seems to
blur the boundary between Coleridge’s general conception of a priori knowledge and his
conception of the specific kind of a priori cognitions designated as ‘transcendental
knowledge’, it also helps to make clear Coleridge’s grounds for holding that
transcendental knowledge must be a priori. Moreover, it will help to show that part of the

75 See BL.I.293; Logic, 146-7.
76 Coleridge also sees self-evidence as a mark of the a priori (see e.g. Logic, 140ff, 211-2).
confusion here stems from the fact that transcendental knowledge, as well as being a specific kind of *a priori* cognition, also consists in claims about the nature of the *a priori* and about those more general kinds of *a priori* knowledge which are distinct from the transcendental (i.e. transcendental knowledge involves *a priori* knowledge-claims that purport to be claims about *a priori* knowledge itself). Here apriority criterion (4) is a useful reference point. First, it should be noted that Coleridge, of course, does not take the view that anything which is a necessary condition of the possibility of something else must be attributed an *a priori* status. Eyes or a visual system may be a necessary condition of vision, but this does not accord them an *a priori* status. The relationship between eyes and the activity of vision is just something analogous to the relationship between *a priori* forms and experience, which helps us to understand the nature of the *a priori* (and particularly its role in sensory cognition). So, while Coleridge often uses physical or mechanical analogies to explain the nature of the *a priori*, he should never be taken to be suggesting that what is an *a priori* necessary condition of experience or of knowledge is also a kind of physical necessity, though it is in some ways analogous to the visual organs that are a physically necessary condition of vision. After all, for Coleridge, where we can establish some kind of physical or natural necessity (at least, in the realm of purely material or physiological causes and conditions), we can always do so empirically. The same, clearly, does not hold true of the *a priori* forms or conditions of sensory experience and cognition. I will return to this problem later in 4.3-4 where I discuss Coleridge’s views on the distinction between subjectively real *a priori* forms (Kantian pure forms of intuition and categories) that are necessary conditions of human cognition (and so have an epistemic necessity limited to the cognitions of finite human subjects) and objectively real *a priori* forms (Platonic Ideas) which are the ground or cause all objects which subsist independently of human cognition (and thus have a metaphysical or ontological necessity that extends beyond the bounds of human sensory cognition and its objects, and which Coleridge takes to be the immaterial causal powers that ground all material causes and conditions or natural necessity). In concluding this section, I want to focus on another aspect of apriority criterion (4): the distinction between the necessary conditions of the possibility of (sensory) experience and the necessary conditions of the possibility of

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80 See e.g. *Logic*, 37-41, 44-5n.
81 See e.g. *Logic*, 83-5, LS, 32-3.
certain kinds of knowledge (or of the cognitive content from which such knowledge is
taken to derive).

Here we can divide (4) into (4a) that which is a priori because it is a necessary
condition of the possibility of experience, and (4b) that which is a priori because it is a
necessary condition of the possibility of a certain kind of knowledge or of the cognitive
contents from which such knowledge is taken to derive. On Coleridge’s view, the pure
forms of sensible intuition (space and time) and the pure forms of conception and
judgement (the categories) meet both (4a) and (4b): these a priori forms are necessary
conditions of the possibility of sense-experience (4a), and thus must also be necessary
conditions of the possibility of all other kinds of knowledge (4b), insofar as we accept
the claim that ‘All knowledge is excited or occasioned by experience’, so that no
cognitions of any kind could be possible without some kind of experience. At a more
particular level, pure sensible intuitions are necessary conditions of the possibility of
mathematical knowledge, while the pure forms of conception and judgement are
necessary conditions of logical knowledge.  

Conversely, there are certain a priori principles, particularly in mathematics and logic, which are necessary conditions for the
possibility of certain kinds of knowledge, but which are not necessary conditions for the
possibility of experience. For instance, the axioms of Euclidean geometry might be said
to be necessary conditions of the possibility of a knowledge of Euclidean geometry, and
the principles of non-contradiction and identity to be necessary conditions of the
possibility of coherent statements or propositions (in an intensional logical theory,
restricted to claims about the forms and conditions of epistemic judgements).  

Given

that, in Coleridge’s view, such principles are necessary conditions for certain kinds of
mathematical or logical knowledge, but are not also necessary conditions for the
possibility of the cognitive contents (pure intuitions or pure conceptions) from which
such knowledge is taken to derive, we can divide (4b) further into (4b¹), ‘X is a necessary
condition of the possibility of knowledge-type Y’, and (4b²), ‘X is a necessary condition
of the possibility of knowledge-type Y, and a necessary condition of the possibility of the
cognitive content from which knowledge-type Y is taken to derive’. While the axioms of
Euclidean geometry and the principles of non-contradiction and identity meet only (4b¹),
the pure forms of sensible intuition and the pure forms of conception and judgement
meet both (4b¹) and (4b²), because they are not only conditions that make possible

82 That Coleridge holds this view is made clear at Logic, 211-4 (cf. 34-7, 44-5 and nn). For more detailed
discussion of the textual evidence for these points, see 4.1-4.
83 For this view of Kantian logic, see e.g. Mosser, (2008), ch. 1-2.
certain kinds of *a priori* knowledge, but are also what make possible the pure cognitive content from which these different kinds of knowledge are taken to derive.\textsuperscript{84}

\textit{ii. Coleridge on the Relationship between the A Priori & the Transcendental}

In my view, when Coleridge discusses the nature of the *a priori*, and of necessary conditions (particularly in his *Logic*), he is concerned primarily with the kinds of *a priori* forms or principles that meet apriority criteria (4a) and (4b\textsuperscript{2}). I provide a more detailed account of the textual evidence for this aspect of Coleridge’s interpretation of the Kantian *a priori* in sections 3.1-4.4; for the remainder of this section, I focus only on how Coleridge’s claims about such necessary conditions and their apriority inform his account of the relationship between the *a priori* and the transcendental. As we will see, Coleridge employs the same eye analogy to explain the nature of the *a priori* and the nature of the transcendental not because he has confused the two, but because this analogy is intended to apply only to those *a priori* forms or principles which meet criteria (4a) and (4b\textsuperscript{2}), and which can thus be designated as transcendental principles (i.e. ‘the conditions that render experience itself possible’;\textsuperscript{85} and which are also required to account for the possibility of certain kinds of nonempirical or pure cognitive contents, and the *a priori* knowledge taken to derive from this content). In such contexts, I will be arguing, Coleridge uses the term ‘transcendental’, or the phrase ‘transcendental to’, in the same way he uses the term ‘pre-exist’, or the phrase ‘must have pre-existed’. To indicate, and to illustrate, the kind of relation which holds between *a priori* necessary conditions and the things (particularly sensory experience and certain kinds of *a priori* cognitive content) which these conditions ‘pre-exist’ or make possible. Because Coleridge takes the *a priori* to be ‘transcendental to’ experience in this sense (i.e. it is a necessary condition of the possibility of experience), he is able to employ the same analogy to explain what he means by the terms ‘*a priori*’ and ‘transcendental’.

We can get a better sense of Coleridge’s position on this matter by comparing his usage of the eye analogy in contexts where he is discussing how we must conceive of the *a priori* with his usage of the same analogy in contexts where he is defining the terms ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendental knowledge’. In the revised 1818 edition of *The Friend* Coleridge glosses the term ‘*a priori*’ as follows, explaining that if we can know something *a priori*, then it must be taken to derive (or follow)

\textsuperscript{84} Coleridge makes this distinction at *Logic*, 211-4, 225.

\textsuperscript{85} *Logic*, 146-7.
from those necessities of the mind or forms of thinking, which, though first revealed to us by experience, must yet have pre-existed in order to make experience itself possible, even as the eye must exist previous to any particular act of seeing, though by sight only can we know that we have eyes.  

As we saw in section 2.1, Coleridge uses the same analogy a few years later (c. 1819-22) in the _Logic_ manuscript, in his account of the _a priori_ conditions of the possibility of experience and the nature of the transcendental:

All knowledge is excited or occasioned by experience, but all knowledge is not derived from experience, such, for instance, is the knowledge of the conditions that render experience itself possible, and which must therefore be supposed to exist previous to experience, in the same manner as the eyes must pre-exist to the act of seeing, though without that act of seeing we never should have learnt that we possessed eyes. Now to distinguish the truths that are necessarily presupposed in all experience as its condition and co-cause, from the facts or knowledge not only occasioned by, but actually derived from, experience [...], the term “transcendental” has been chosen.

To make sense of the parallels between the two passages just quoted, we need to look more closely at the series of claims that Coleridge puts forward in the second passage. First, Coleridge begins by pointing out that, although ‘All knowledge is excited or occasioned by experience’, a distinction must be made between ‘the facts or knowledge [...] actually derived from, experience’, and the ‘knowledge which is not derived from experience’ (i.e. between _a posteriori_ and _a priori_ knowledge). Second, as an example of such nonempirically derived knowledge, Coleridge cites ‘the knowledge of the conditions that render experience itself possible’. Third, Coleridge states that these conditions (as distinct from our _a priori_ knowledge of them) ‘must therefore be supposed to exist previous to experience, in the same manner as the eyes must pre-exist to the act of seeing’ (i.e. such conditions ‘pre-exist’ experience in the sense that they are necessary conditions of the possibility of experience, just as eyes are necessary conditions of the possibility of vision). Fourth, in the concluding clause of his eye analogy sentence, (i.e. ‘though without that act of seeing we never should have learnt that we possessed eyes’), Coleridge reiterates his first point: the fact that we could never acquire _a priori_ or nonempirical knowledge without experience is no proof that such knowledge (or all of

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86 _Friend_.I.179n.
87 _Logic_, 146-7.
our knowledge) must be empirically derived, or that all our cognitive contents must therefore have an *a posteriori* origin. Finally, Coleridge notes that we can use the term ‘transcendental’ to ‘distinguish the truths that are necessarily presupposed in all experience as its condition and co-cause, from the facts or knowledge not only occasioned by, but actually derived from, experience’. As I will show below, however, Coleridge also uses ‘transcendental’ in a broader sense, as a term to refer to whatever is taken to be a necessary condition of the possibility of something else. This broader usage is the principal reason for the close parallels between Coleridge’s different accounts of what is meant by the terms ‘*a priori*’ and ‘transcendental’. By looking more carefully at the kind of claim Coleridge is using his eye analogy to illustrate, we can get a better sense of how he views the relationship between the *a priori* and the transcendental.

The key reference point for my claims here is a manuscript fragment, roughly contemporaneous with Coleridge’s account of the *a priori* in the 1818 *Friend*, in which Coleridge attempts to develop definitions of many of the terms which were to become central to his c. 1820s manuscript draft of *Logic*. In this text, which may be an incomplete version of the ‘glossary of terms’ that Coleridge refers to at various points in *Logic*, but which he apparently never incorporated into the existing manuscript transcription of the work, 88 we find Coleridge searching for a term to designate some thing which is taken to be a necessary condition of something else:

> TRANSCENDENT signifies not any thing transcending experience, ([and is] therefore perhaps not a well-chosen term) but that which must be supposed in the mind precedent to experience, for the one sole purpose of rendering experience possible—(thus the eye is transcendent to Sight—tho’ without Light & Objects it [i.e. the eye] were useless, & could never have been discovered)]. 89

As we have already seen, by the time he came to compose *Logic* Coleridge had settled on the term ‘transcendental’ for the kind of condition of possibility he describes here, using the same analogy to illustrate the nature of such conditions. Furthermore, in the later text, Coleridge clears up the confusion he is worried about here (of mistaking the transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience for something ‘transcending experience’) by emphasising that whatever is ‘transcendental to’ experience should be ‘distinguish[ed] from pretended cognitions and assertions that transcend our intellectual

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88 For these textual details, see *Logic*, xxxix-li; *SWF*.I.689-90. 
89 *SWF*.I.692.
faculties or, what is equivalent, or which the human mind can be shown to possess no appropriate faculty and which assertions are therefore called “transcendent”’. But this earlier account of conditions of possibility is nevertheless important, partly for those elements that do not appear in Coleridge’s later definition of the term ‘transcendental’ (especially his use of the phrase ‘preceident in the mind’, which I discuss further below), and partly for the light it can shed on Coleridge’s reasons for using the eye analogy in those discussions of the *a priori* where he does not mention transcendental conditions or transcendental knowledge. Of particular importance here is the way in which Coleridge uses the phrase ‘the eye is transcendent[al] to Sight’, to indicate that the eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of vision. For, in the above passage he employs the term ‘transcendent[al]’ in much the same way that he uses ‘pre-exist’ elsewhere to refer to the nature a of condition of possibility and its relation to that which it ‘renders possible’ (e.g. ‘the eyes must pre-exist to the act of seeing’).

Given this, we may distinguish between a narrow usage of the term ‘transcendental’ that refers only to ‘the conditions that render experience itself possible’ (as in the passage from *Logic* quoted above), and a broader usage which refers more generally to the relation between a necessary condition and that which it renders possible (as in ‘the eye is transcendent[al] to Sight’). If we place such different uses of the term ‘transcendental’ in the context of Coleridge’s apriority criteria (4a) and (4b), we can see that the narrow use of ‘transcendental’ corresponds with (4a), as it refers only to *a priori* necessary conditions of the possibility of experience, while the broader use corresponds to (4b), as it refers in a more general way to the kinds of *a priori* necessary conditions that, while they do not make experience itself possible, are required to account for the possibility of other things, especially certain kinds of cognitive content or knowledge.

Having outlined Coleridge’s two different senses of ‘transcendental’, we are in a better position now to examine the kinds of claims he is making about the *a priori* in the 1818 *Friend*, and to consider how such claims relate to his definitions of transcendental knowledge in *Logic*. As I noted above, Coleridge states in *The Friend* that if we can know something *a priori*, then it must be taken to derive (or follow)

from those necessities of the mind or forms of thinking, which, though first revealed to us by experience, must yet have pre-existed in order to make experience itself possible, even as the

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90 *Logic*, 147; cf. 169.
eye must exist previous to any particular act of seeing, though by sight only can we know that we have eyes.92

Although it is not immediately clear, given Coleridge’s emphasis on how the a priori ‘necessities of the mind or forms of thinking’ make experience possible, Coleridge is, in my view, making two separate claims here about the a priori (and a priori conditions of possibility, in particular). The more obvious claim, as we have seen, is that these a priori forms are the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience in the same way that we can speak of eyes as the necessary conditions of the possibility of vision. This meets Coleridge’s apriority criterion (4a) as outlined above. However, there is, at least implicitly, another claim being made here: Since Coleridge begins by stating that whatever constitutes a priori knowledge, or can be known a priori, must derive ‘from those necessities of the mind or forms of thinking [that] make experience itself possible’, he is also evidently claiming that the a priori principles of the possibility of experience are necessary conditions of the possibility of a priori knowledge. This meets Coleridge’s apriority criterion (4b\textsuperscript{3}). Indeed, as I will show in 3.2-4.5, one of the principal aims of Coleridge’s version of transcendental philosophy is to show how the a priori forms or principles of cognition are required to account for the possibility of the kinds of pure cognitive content(s) from which the knowledge specified in (4b\textsuperscript{3}) derives, and so can be shown to meet apriority criterion (4b\textsuperscript{2}). In sum: on Coleridge’s account, it is not just that such principles are necessary conditions of the possibility of experience that secures their a priori status, but also the fact that these principles are the forms or conditions required to account for the possibility of all nonempirical knowledge; they are ‘transcendental to’ or ‘pre-exist’ (i.e. make possible) both our experience, and the various a priori cognitions that are ‘excited or occasioned by experience’.93

What separates the a priori and the transcendental, then, is a matter of context: If we are concerned with how a priori forms or principles are related to the experience or to the kinds of (pure and empirical) cognitions that they make possible, we describe these forms or principles as ‘transcendental to’ those things which they make possible (just as we would say ‘the eye is transcendent[al] to Sight’). If we are concerned with a priori knowledge per se, rather than with the conditions required to account for the possibility of such knowledge, then a further distinction must be drawn between our a priori knowledge of things like mathematical and logical rules or principles and our a priori

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92 Friend.I.179n.
93 See BL.I.293; Logic, 146-7.
knowledge of things like ‘the conditions that render experience itself possible’, or how ‘mathematical reasoning or all truths respecting measure, number, and motion […] are] possible’.\(^4\) So, although whatever is a priori may be described in transcendental terms (i.e. as a necessary condition of the possibility of something else—whether sense-experience, knowledge, or a kind of cognitive content—as in Coleridge’s eye analogy), only the latter kind of a priori knowledge belongs to the specific class of a priori cognition that, following Kant, is designated as ‘transcendental knowledge’. Coleridge can use the same analogy in his 1818 account of the a priori and his 1820s account of transcendental knowledge as a species of nonempirically derived or a priori knowledge because, in both instances, he is making transcendental claims (i.e. claims of the form “for some given thing, Y [e.g. vision, experience] to be possible, some necessary condition, X [e.g. eyes, a priori forms of cognition] is required") about a priori principles and their relation to (i) experience and (ii) nonempirical knowledge. I will provide a more detailed account of the kinds of arguments Coleridge makes about the forms or conditions required to account for the possibility of sense-experience, and of the different kinds of a priori representations and cognitions, later in 3.1-4.4. In concluding this section I want to return, briefly, to the question of whether, and to what extent, Coleridge’s interpretation of the Kantian a priori emphasises its (disputed) psychological elements.

iii. The Psychological A Priori & Coleridge’s Twofold Conception of A Priori Representations

As we saw in 2.1-2, Coleridge often describes the a priori in terms of its relation to the mind: he speaks of a priori principles as the ‘necessities of the mind or forms of thinking’; says that by the terms ‘a priori’ and ‘ab intra’ (‘from within’) we mean ‘an act or product of the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions from external objects’; and also claims that ‘K[ant] has repeatedly explained that a priori […] = a mente ipsa [from the mind itself]’.\(^6\) Coleridge also states that the a priori forms or principles of sense and understanding are ‘inherent in the constitution of’ these cognitive faculties, and that these forms ‘must be supposed in the mind precedent to experience, for the one sole purpose of rendering experience possible’ (my emphasis).\(^7\) It is clear, then, that for Coleridge whatever is a priori must be taken to derive from or originate in ‘the mind itself’. Indeed, as I discussed earlier in this section, Coleridge’s ‘cathedral glass’ analogy works in much the same way as Russell’s later ‘blue spectacles’ analogy, aiming to show

\(^4\) Coleridge makes these distinctions clear at Logic, 146-7ff, 211-4.
\(^5\) This formulation is based partly on Stern, (1999), 6-11, esp. 8ff.
\(^6\) See Friend, 179n, Logic, 76, CM.IV.355 (cf. III.218-9).
\(^7\) See e.g. Logic, 146-7, 265-6n, SWF.I.692.
that ‘the universality of *a priori* truths comes from their property of expressing properties of the mind’.

We also established in 2.1 that Coleridge’s account of the *a priori* and the transcendental shares some features with the position held by the contemporary Kant scholars Kitcher and Waxman, who argue that when Kant claims that particular elements of our experience and cognition must have an *a priori* origin, what he means is that these elements must derive in some way from our cognitive capacities (rather than having an *a posteriori* origin in sense-experience). In sum, if holding that the *a priori* has the ‘property of expressing properties of the mind’, or derives from the mind and its capacities, is to hold a psychological conception of the *a priori*, then Coleridge’s account of the *a priori* clearly is psychological. At the very least, his theory of the *a priori* must be said to contain prominent psychological elements, and it should be recognised that Coleridge interprets Kant’s claims about the *a priori* as being primarily claims about the human mind and its cognitive capacities (considered as the modes or forms of human cognition).

Wayne Waxman’s overview of what he calls Kant’s ‘psychological a priori’ is a useful reference point for elucidating Coleridge’s claims about how the *a priori* principles of the possibility of experience can be conceived as ‘pre-existent’ or ‘transcendental to’ experience, because they are those conditions which necessarily precede all experience in the sense that they are what ‘renders experience itself possible’. In discussing Kant’s conception of the ‘necessary validity’ of all *a priori* representations, Waxman describes the Kantian *a priori* as that which ‘precedes and makes possible’, or is the necessary condition of, some other thing in terms quite similar to Coleridge’s account of the Kantian *a priori* as that which ‘pre-exists’ experience:

The necessary validity Kant attributed to the *a priori* representations of transcendental philosophy [...] needs to be understood psychologically. Their necessary validity has always to be limited to their relation to other representations, to the exclusion of things in themselves, and then only to those representations that originate in the same mental faculty: a pure intuition of sensibility is necessary because it precedes and makes possible all other sensible intuitions (mathematical and empirical intuitions); a pure concept of the understanding is necessary [...] because it precedes and makes possible all other concepts of objects (mathematical and empirical); and a principle of transcendental judgment is necessary because it precedes and makes possible experience itself.

100 See Waxman, (2013), 23-32.
Waxman goes on to make clear that such necessary validity consists in being a necessary condition of something else, and to emphasise Kant’s view of such *a priori* conditions as being conceived of in terms of their origin in our cognitive capacities or faculties (i.e. as mental rather than purely logical forms, as principles or aspects of our cognition that have a nonempirical origin, rather than just as conditions that are known or established without appeal to experience):

Being a necessary condition not just for some but for absolutely all representations of the same kind, empirical included, was, in Kant’s view, sufficient to prove a representation to be a priori. And since “kind,” for him, is entirely a function of the representations’ faculty of origin—sensibility, understanding, or judgment—it follows that the necessity of a priori representations can reflect nothing other than the nature and workings of the psyche originally responsible for producing them.102

As we saw earlier, Coleridge takes the view that what makes certain principles of our experience and cognition *a priori* is that they are necessary conditions for experience, or for certain kinds of knowledge. I discuss the details of this position further in 3.2-4.5; for now it is enough to note that when Coleridge refers to ‘those necessities of the mind or forms of thinking [which] must yet have pre-existed [our experience] in order to make experience itself possible’, he also means the kind of *a priori* representations which are described in Waxman’s account of Kantian necessary validity, as just quoted. Although I have up to this point been arguing that Coleridge conceives of these ‘necessities of the mind’ as *a priori* principles, we can see from the following passage that, for Coleridge, an *a priori* principle just is a Kantian *a priori* representation:

If ‘IDEAS (*sensu* Platonic) or supersensual realities’) be termed principles of reason, there would seem to be no impropriety if the forms belonging to understanding [the categories], on which the exercise of its functions is grounded, were called analogously the principles of the understanding, and in like manner if the universal forms of the intuitive faculty [space and time] were entitled the principles of sense, and, should this be thought a more natural or more readily intelligible expression than that of “pure conceptions” and “pure intuitions”, there can be no objection to the change capable of outweighing its convenience […].103

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103 Logic, 238.
The \textit{a priori} representations which Kant calls \textit{‘pure conceptions’} and \textit{‘pure intuitions’} are the very same \textit{a priori} principles or forms that Coleridge has in mind when discussing the \textquote{conditions that render experience itself possible, and which must therefore be supposed to exist previous to experience}.\footnote{Logic, 146-7.} As Coleridge goes on to point out here, when we talk of \textquote{the principles of understanding} or \textquote{the principles of sense}, we must bear in mind that such principles should not be considered as something distinct from the \textit{a priori} representations termed \textit{‘pure conceptions’} and \textit{‘pure intuitions’}, because they can be characterised as \textit{both} a kind of cognitive operation and a kind of cognitive content (i.e. as \textit{both} what Coleridge calls \textit{‘pure acts’} and \textit{‘pure products’} of the mind):

\begin{quote}
[T]here can be no objection to th[is] change [in representation terminology] capable of outweighing its convenience—provided only that it does not lead as unaware into the error of supposing a conception [or intuition] to be a something different in nature from conceiving [or intuiting], or [the activities of] conceiving [and intuiting] a something different from the mind that so conceives [and intuits].\footnote{Logic, 238. Although Coleridge is referring specifically to pure conceptions in this passage, it is clear (esp. from 151-4) that he takes the same to apply to pure intuitions.}
\end{quote}

Put another way, while we may make a terminological distinction between the cognitive activity of conceiving and the cognitive content produced, apprehended, constructed, etc through such activity, this distinction should not be taken to refer to some kind of literal separation of cognitive act and product that is actually present or apprehensible to us in our cognitive states. Rather, this is just a theoretical position that we take up in order to explain the relations between the different elements of our cognition, and thus our usage will vary with context: We refer to the principles of understanding and sense as either cognitive operations (i.e. the acts of conceiving and intuiting) or as cognitive contents (i.e. the products of these acts, conceptions and intuitions), depending on the particular aspect of our cognition or experience that we are, at that moment, attempting to explain. The act/product distinction, however, is purely theoretical. Coleridge makes this clear in some remarks on the use of the term \textquote{intuition}, in which he makes the same point as the passage above make about the uses of the term \textquote{conception}:

\begin{quote}
W[e] therefore adopt [the term] \textquote{‘intuition’}, from the Latin \textit{intuitus} or \textit{intuitio}, from \textit{intueor}, to look on or at a subject, to have it present to the sight, and then by a wider usage, present to the senses generally, whether the outward or the inward senses, signifying a simple beholding,
\end{quote}
both the act of beholding, and the simple product thence resulting, indistinguishably [my emphasis]. Indistinguishably, I say, for we cannot separate the one [the act] from the other [the product] without reference to some hypothesis or theory. Our consciousness contains no such distinction, [and consequently] we are aware of no such twinship or duality [of the act and the product of intuition].

As we will see (3.1-2, 4.1-4), Coleridge thinks that the best ‘theory or hypothesis’ that we can adopt to explain such distinctions is Kant’s transcendental philosophy. It is because Coleridge interprets Kant’s claims about a priori representations within this act-product framework, that he takes Kant’s transcendental claims about our sensory cognition and its conditions and sources to be claims not just about how certain kinds of a priori representations are required to explain how various other kinds of pure and empirical representations are possible—to give one of Waxman’s examples, ‘a pure intuition of sensibility is necessary because it precedes and makes possible all other sensible intuitions (mathematical and empirical intuitions)’. Rather, these claims must also be taken as claims about how certain kinds of pure or a priori cognitive operations, taken to derive from (or originate in) our sensory and intellectual cognitive capacities, are required to make possible certain kinds of cognitive content, as well as the sensory experience of which such cognitive contents constitute the basic elements. My aim in the next few sections (3.1-4.2) will be to explain Coleridge’s views concerning what it means to claim that the a priori forms or principles of cognition are ‘innate’, or ‘in the mind precedent to experience’, and in particular his view that what it means for something (e.g. a form, operation, or content of cognition) to have an a priori origin is just that it is ‘innate’ or ‘in the mind precedent to experience’ in this way.

106 Logic, 151.
3. The Elements of Experience: Coleridge’s Transcendental Theory of Cognition & the Transcendental Analysis of the Cognitive Powers

3.1 Transcendental Analysis & the Threefold Division of the Cognitive Powers

We saw above (1.5) that Coleridge describes Kant’s transcendental method as ‘a pre-inquisition into the mind [considered] as part Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge: an examination of the Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the Objects to be weighed or measured by them’. Before discussing in further detail the diverse kinds of a priori cognitive content with which this ‘critical inquisition into the intellectual faculties’ is concerned, we must consider why Coleridge characterises such a transcendental ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms’ of the faculties as ‘a pre-inquisition into the mind [my emphasis]’ which serves primarily to establish ‘a compleat Propædia of Philosophy’. On Coleridge’s view, transcendental inquiry serves the following propaedeutic functions: (1) it defines the limits of sensible experience and sensory cognition, which allows for a further distinction between non-sensory and sensory cognitions and their content (i.e. a distinction between the respective objects or contents of intellectual and sensible intuitions); (2) it defines the epistemic criteria (or ‘laws of thought’) and conditions to which all sensory cognition must be subject (i.e. the a priori rules of sense and understanding), and also establishes the principles of all non-sensory cognition (i.e. the Ideas of reason); (3) it investigates and explains the nature of the cognitive faculties or powers whereby we acquire such cognitions (both sensory and non-sensory); finally, in virtue of (1)-(3) it explains (4) how sensory and non-sensory cognitive contents or objects and the diverse kinds of knowledge deriving from them are possible. This is why Coleridge describes transcendental knowledge as introductory to, or preparatory for, other kinds of knowledge: it consists in the kinds of arguments and principles that are required to explain how certain kinds of knowledge (e.g. mathematical, logical, noetic, or empirical cognitions) are possible. Such transcendental arguments and principles in turn allow us to define the respective limits and rules governing the different kinds of knowledge, and thus to determine the appropriate objects of the diverse inquiries (e.g. mathematics, logic, noetic, or physics and psychology) which give rise to these different kinds of knowledge. In what follows, I consider some of the textual evidence for points (1)-(4), with a particular focus on Coleridge’s characterisation.

1 CM.V.81.
2 Logic, 146-7, 205; CM.V.81-2 (cf. CM.III.918-21).
3 On this division of knowledge, see esp. Logic, 44-5n. See also Coleridge’s claims about the ‘sciences of experience’ (139-40ff) and empirical ‘natural inquiries’ or ‘physical researches’ (5-6, 38-9).
of transcendental inquiry as ‘a pre-inquisition into the mind’ or ‘critical inquisition into the intellectual faculties’, and Coleridge’s threefold division of such inquiry into ‘transcendental [...] Æsthetic, Logic, and Noetic’. I give an account of Coleridge’s views concerning the general character of the cognitive forms, operations, and contents taken to originate in the human cognitive faculties in this part of the thesis (3.1-4). In the part that follows (4.1-5), I shall focus on Coleridge’s claims about the forms, operations, and contents taken to derive from specific cognitive capacities, and the sorts of philosophical methods that enable us to prove such derivation.

I will take as my starting point here some passages from a notebook entry that dates to around 10 years before Coleridge’s composition of Logic. This entry will help to bring out further the connections between Coleridge’s view of transcendental inquiry as performing a special propadeutic function (by providing a theoretical framework for explaining, and distinguishing between, certain kinds of knowledge) and his claim that such transcendental inquiry must consist in a ‘critical inquisition into the intellectual faculties’ (a nonempirical investigation or pure analysis and noesis of the contents and operations of sense, understanding, and reason). Coleridge opens the entry under consideration here by outlining a conception of cognition and its objects that he claims is shared by a range of prominent early modern philosophers:

What is the common principle of the Philosophical Systems of Descartes, (Lock?) Berkley, Hume, and Kant? That

Our Senses in no way acquaint us with Things as they are in and of themselves: that the properties, which we attribute to Things without us, yea, that this very Outness [i.e. the apparent mind-externality of objects of perception and cognition], are not strictly properties of the things themselves, but either constituents or modifications of our own minds.

Coleridge then presents a brief account of the ways in which Cartesian and Berkeleian idealism attempt to account for the nature of the relationship between mind and world, and how these two theories attempt to explain the origins and properties of the objects of perception and cognition. These details, however, need not concern us here. What I want to focus on is Coleridge’s subsequent claim that ‘The first step [...] by which we can pass from psychology to metaphysics, is the examination of this common principle’ (i.e. the principle that ‘Our Senses in no way acquaint us with Things as they are in and

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4 See CM.V.81, Logi, 205.
5 For this claim, see e.g. CM.III.918-21, V.81-2; Logi, 146-9, 205-6 (cf. 169, 211-4).
6 CN.III.3605 (c. Aug-Sep 1809).
of themselves’). What Coleridge means by ‘pass[ing] from psychology to metaphysics’ in this context is the theoretical shift from an account of the objects and processes of cognition, and the contents and operations of the mind, which is restricted to empirical and naturalistic terms (i.e. an account that appeals to *a posteriori* principles) to an account of the same that is framed in nonempirical terms (i.e. an account that appeals to *a priori* principles). Coleridge presents the move from a psychological to a metaphysical account of cognition and its objects in terms of the different theoretical perspectives one can take on the cognitive faculties, and particularly the role of the faculties in the constitution of experience and cognition (see 1.4-5).

He begins his ‘examination’ of the principle that ‘Our Senses in no way acquaint us with Things as they are in and of themselves’ by stating some of the questions about the objects and processes of cognition which such a principle raises:

Have we or have we not, a faculty of Perception? Do we perceive, or do we only deduce the existence of Things? Which is the proper expression—The perception of a Table? or the Perception, Table?8

In other words, (i) what kinds of cognitive faculties or capacities do we possess, if it is possible to speak of such faculties at all? (ii) Do our faculties give us ‘direct’ access to the objects of perception and cognition (i.e. do such faculties ‘acquaint us with Things as they are in and of themselves’), or do these faculties only present to our minds cognitive states and contents from which we infer the existence of mind-external objects? (iii) Given the problems raised by question (ii), should we speak of our perceptions as being perceptions of objects, i.e. as cognitive states that inform us directly of the existence of things like tables (‘The perception of a Table’)? Or should we speak of these perceptions as being ‘either [the] constituents or modifications of our own minds’, i.e. as cognitive states that consist (at least in part) of the sensory impressions from which we can infer or deduce the existence of things like tables (‘The perception, Table’)? In short, as Coleridge puts it elsewhere in the same entry, is ‘all our Knowledge confined to Appearances’, or do our perceptions and cognitions acquaint us with, or provide us with knowledge of, ‘an external Reality, or self-Subsistence’? Is it the case ‘that these [sensory]...
Impressions which we call Things, are truly only Ideas, or Representations, which change with the changes of the representative Faculties in the subject.\(^9\)

Later in Logic, Coleridge reformulates this problem as the question of whether objects of sensory experience and cognition can be proven to be ‘properly and wholly objective’—i.e. [demonstrated to] have a subsistence independent of the mind which contemplates them.\(^10\) In both Logic and this earlier notebook entry, Coleridge claims that we cannot resolve this problem without a prior investigation of the cognitive faculties or powers, what he calls ‘a pre-inquisition into the mind’. In Logic Coleridge puts this point in subject-object relation terms: ‘the knowledge of the constitution of the subject is a necessary precondition of any distinct knowledge respecting the object’.\(^11\) The notebook entry presents this point in terms of the relationship between our cognitive faculties and our experience, making clearer the sense in which Coleridge thinks a ‘pre-inquisition into the mind’ is a ‘precondition of any distinct knowledge respecting the object’:

Prior however to this dispute concerning the nature of our experience [i.e. the question ‘Do we perceive, or do we only deduce the existence of Things?’], we surely ought to examine the nature of the faculties by which we acquire experience, and reason concerning it [i.e. our experience and its objects or contents]. All metaphysical philosophy indeed is at last but an examination of our powers of knowledge—and the different systems are best distinguished by their different accounts of these powers—in their obvious threefold division, [1.] our sensitive faculty, or the Sense—2. our Understanding—3. and our reason.\(^12\)

At this point in the entry, Coleridge sets out his intention to describe how the different systems of ‘metaphysical philosophy’ attempt to explain the ‘nature of the faculties by which we acquire experience’ through the ‘examination of our powers of knowledge’. However, Coleridge does not get much further than offering a critique of the Lockean theory of sensation, along with some definition of his own representation-terminology (which is clearly adapted from Kant) before the entry breaks off.\(^13\) But while the entry remains incomplete, Coleridge’s ‘threefold division’ of the cognitive capacities, and his characterisation of ‘All metaphysical philosophy’ as ‘at last but an examination of our powers of knowledge’, points forward to his later accounts of transcendental inquiry as a

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9 CN.III.3605.
10 Logic, 142.
11 Logic, 145.
12 CN.III.3605.
13 See CN.III.3605, f19-117 (see LS, 100-114, esp. 113-4 for a later, and more complete, statement of Coleridge’s representation-terminology and some of his criticisms of Locke).
‘critical inquisition into the intellectual faculties’ that can be divided into ‘transcendental [...] Æsthetic, Logic, and Noetic’; this also anticipates his claims in Logic concerning the traditional tripartite division of the faculties into sense, understanding, and reason, and their corresponding pure cognitive contents (i.e. the evidence of sense, the evidence of understanding, and the evidence of reason).14 With this in mind, I want to turn now to a closer consideration of how Coleridge’s statements above on the ‘obvious threefold division’ of the faculties, and the ways in which ‘the different systems [of philosophy] are best distinguished by their different accounts of these powers’, can be shown to inform Coleridge’s account of transcendental knowledge and its propadeutic function in Logic. In particular, I focus on Coleridge’s claims about the origins of pure or a priori cognitive content in our faculties, and on placing such claims in the context of his characterisation of transcendental inquiry as ‘a pre-inquisition into the mind [considered] as part Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge’.15

As we shall see (in 3.3), Coleridge contends that the ‘threefold division’ of our cognitive capacities into reason, understanding, and sense is a traditional feature of the ‘examination of our powers of knowledge’ that goes back to ancient Greek philosophy. It is tied to the view—which Coleridge also presents as traditional—that certain kinds of nonempirical or a priori knowledge derive from the operations and contents of certain kinds of cognitive capacities. Coleridge introduces this view as ‘the universally admitted and understood diversity of metaphysic [which he prefers to call, ‘the science of noetics, more frequently, but less appropriately, entitled metaphysics’], logic and mathematics, and the convenience and exact correspondence of these to the three sources of the reason (σοφία), the understanding (λόγος), and the sense (μάθησις)’.16 Coleridge claims that this tripartite division of our nonempirical knowledge and its sources is ‘presented in a synoptic form’ by the following table of pure sciences (i.e. a priori fields of inquiry), where he also puts forward the more general distinction between ‘metaphysical’ (a priori) and ‘physical’ (a posteriori, especially sensory) evidence or cognitive content:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Śtāsāṣṭiyāṣāṣṭiyā [metaphysics]</th>
<th>A—Noetics = the evidence of reason17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Śākṣāṣṭiyā [Logic] = the evidence of the understanding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śtāsāṣṭiyā [Mathematics] = the evidence of sense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 See CM.III.918-21, V.81-2; Logic, 34-7, 44-5, 205-6, 211-4, 236-8.
15 CM.V.81. This point is also discussed further in 4.1-5 below.
16 Logic, 70. Coleridge uses μάθησις in the same way as śākṣāṣṭiyā, to refer to the faculty of sense, or ‘the intuitive power of the mind’ (see e.g. 34-6, 73-5ff, 245). See also 3.3 below.
I explain further below what Coleridge means by ‘the evidence’ of reason, understanding, and sense, and why he claims that we can trace this nonempirical cognitive content and the knowledge deriving from it back to its sources in our cognitive capacities (see 4.1, 4.3). As I will be arguing, Coleridge’s table of pure sciences must be considered in the context of (i) his distinction between the employment and the analysis or examination of our cognitive capacities (our ‘powers of knowledge’), and (ii) Coleridge’s contention that a transcendental or ‘critical inquisition into the intellectual faculties’ is required to explain fully how certain cognitive capacities contribute to our experience and cognition, and how these capacities make certain kinds of evidence (or cognitive content) possible. In Coleridge’s view, most philosophers take it for granted that the exercise or employment of the capacities traditionally designated as sense, understanding, and reason is what produces the various elements and contents that make up our cognition, and that this threefold division grounds the further distinctions between the nonempirical knowledge designated as mathematics, logic, and noetics. However, as we shall see, Coleridge also claims that the explanation of how the different kinds of a priori knowledge are possible, and of why they must be taken to derive from the operations and contents of certain cognitive capacities, has been successfully carried out, when attempted at all, by only a minority of philosophers. This is because, before the development of the transcendental method for ‘a pre-inquisition into the mind [considered] as part Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge’ by Kant, no such explanation (proceeding through an analysis of our cognitive capacities or ‘powers of knowledge’) would have been possible, at least on Coleridge’s account of the history of philosophy. In section 3.3 I will discuss Coleridge’s claims about the conception of the cognitive capacities held by (most) philosophers from the ancient to the early modern period, and on how Coleridge’s distinction between the employment and analysis of, or inquisition into, our cognitive capacities applies to this conception (and the faculty terminology in which it is expressed by those who hold it). In sections 3.4-4.5 I shall return to the question of how Coleridge’s interpretation of Kant’s transcendental inquiry into the elements of (sensible) cognition is informed by the

17 Logic, 44 and 44-5n. See also 33-6 for the scheme of faculties or powers summarised in this table.
18 On this (according to Coleridge) traditional assumption esp. Logic, 34-7, 43-5, 69-70.
threefold division of the cognitive capacities and the employment/analysis distinction outlined above. Before taking up these problems, however, it will be useful to consider Coleridge’s table of the pure and empirical sciences in the context of his claims about the aims of transcendental inquiry, and in particular, in relation to Coleridge’s employment of the Kantian matter/form distinction.

3.2 Transcendental Analysis & the Sources of Experience: Coleridge on the Formal & Material Elements of Cognition

i. Coleridge on Transcendental Analysis: An Overview

As was noted in sections 2.1-3, Coleridge’s endorsement of Kant’s conception of the transcendental is clear from the following claim in *Logic*, which appears in a passage that serves to introduce ‘the terms which the most profound of modern logicians and the proper* inventor and founder of transcendental analysis has adopted’:

Transcendental knowledge is that by which we endeavour to climb above our experience into its sources by an analysis of our intellectual faculties, still, however, standing as it were on the shoulders of our experience in order to reach at truths which are above experience.

Accordingly, ‘the science of transcendental analysis, [is] so called from the character of its aim and object, which is to rise from the knowledge or matter of consciousness to the faculty by which it is known or presented’. As Coleridge makes clear early in *Logic*, what he means by ‘truths which are above experience’ is just the kind of knowledge or cognitive content which Kant claims must be taken to have an *a priori* origin because it could never be derived *a posteriori* from any sensory experience. Like Kant Coleridge believes that the methods of transcendental philosophy make it possible for us to distinguish between pure and empirical content in our representations (cognitive states) in this way, and that what this distinction turns on is the difference between the kind of ‘content of cognition’ which is ‘originally given *a priori* in ourselves’ and the kind that is given to us through our senses. Following this, Coleridge draws a further distinction between ‘mixed’ or empirical sciences (for which he uses the general term ‘physics’) that have their sources in sensory experience (impressions from ‘the objects of bodily sense’) and ‘pure’ or

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19 148-9. In the footnote to this statement (indicated by the asterisk), Coleridge complains of those who claim that ‘Kant stole the transcendental analysis’ on account of the superficial similarities between his philosophy and ‘a few scattered hints in some ancient or modern books’.

20 *Logic*, 147.

21 *Logic*, 248.

22 See *CPR*, B81; *Logic*, 44-5, 70.
nonempirical sciences that have their sources in our intellectual faculties themselves (the ‘inherent forms and functions’ of our cognitive powers). Thus, empirical inquiries are concerned with evidence that is given \(a\ posteriori\) through the senses, while pure inquiries are concerned with evidence that is given \(a\ priori\) through some ‘act or product of the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions from external objects’. In Coleridge’s view, then, the pure sciences concerned with such \(a\ priori\) representations are ‘comprised in the term “metaphysics”, as being above, or \(transcendental\) to, the physics’, because they are conceived ‘as having a higher evidence than that which the senses can afford’. Given that such higher evidence cannot be acquired empirically, the means to attaining transcendental knowledge must be a specialised pure ‘analysis of our intellectual faculties’, whereby we arrive at the \(a\ priori\) sources of our experience (or so Coleridge claims). But as noted in 2.1-3, not all \(a\ priori\) evidence or cognitive content plays this role in transcendental philosophy. To see how Kant’s distinction between different kinds of \(a\ priori\) representations or cognitive content fits into Coleridge’s table of pure sciences, we must first take a closer look at Coleridge’s account of the diverse sources of different kinds of \(a\ priori\) and \(a\ posteriori\) evidence (or contents), which he frames in terms of the metaphysics/physics distinction just outlined.

ii. Kant’s Matter/Form Distinction in Coleridge’s Logic

A useful reference point here is Kant’s matter/form distinction, presented as follows in the opening passages of the Transcendental Aesthetic (I consider Kant’s claims here only with reference to Coleridge’s views on \(a\ priori\) origins):

I call that in the appearance [i.e. the object of empirical intuition] which corresponds to sensation its **matter**, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the **form** of appearance. Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation,

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23 See Logic, 34-7, 44-5, 70, 146-7, 213-4.
24 This is Coleridge’s definition of \(a\ priori\) at Logic, 76. For further discussion, see 2.1-3 above.
25 Logic, 36 (my emphasis). Cf. 44 where ‘physics’ is designated as an ‘Empiric’ science concerned with ‘the evidence of the senses’ (which are ‘sense + sensation + impressions’). Coleridge’s use of the term ‘transcendental’ here can seem to imply that all \(a\ priori\) or metaphysical evidence yields transcendental knowledge. However, it is more likely that he is suggesting that these pure inquiries deal with the kinds of \(a\ priori\) principles that are required to explain the possibility of the empirical knowledge dealt with by the ‘natural inquiries’ that Coleridge collectively terms ‘physics’. It is in this sense that metaphysics is ‘above, or \(transcendental\) to, the physics’ (see also 37-41).
26 This, at any rate, is Coleridge and Kant’s view. See esp. Logic, 145-9 (cf. CPR, B74-82).
the matter of all appearance is only given to us *a posteriori*, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind *a priori*, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.\(^{27}\)

One way of looking at Coleridge’s separation of *a priori* and *a posteriori* evidence by origin is as a variation on Kant’s matter/form distinction. On the one hand, we have the metaphysical evidence ‘contained’ in our faculties. This concerns the formal elements of cognition: the ‘inherent forms and functional powers’ that govern a cognitive capacity or the ‘pure products’ produced through the operation of this faculty which are given or ‘encountered in the mind *a priori*.\(^{28}\) On the other, we have the physical or phenomenal evidence of the senses. This concerns the material elements of cognition: the empirically given ‘affections’ upon which sense and understanding exercise their functions. So, the ‘evidence of sense’ refers to the form of pure intuition, ‘evidence of the senses’ to the matter of empirical or mixed intuition, the respective *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements of sensible intuition.\(^{29}\) The ‘evidence of understanding’ refers to the form of pure concepts, those *a priori* rules that make it possible for us to ‘give and attribute substance and reality to phenomena and raise them from mere affections and appearances into objects communicable and capable of being anticipated and reasoned of’.\(^{30}\) Coleridge describes the relationship between the formal and material elements of cognition as follows: when the evidence (or matter) of the senses given *a posteriori* is ‘brought under the [*a priori*] rules of the understanding […] and the [*a priori*] forms of sense [it] becomes experience’.\(^{31}\) Coleridge’s conception of the formal and material elements of cognition is made further evident in his gloss on the distinction between the faculty of sense and the sensations: ‘the sense or sentient faculty […] of course includes the sensations. When therefore we mean to abstract from the sensations we want a distinct term to express this intent, and we then call this faculty THE SENSE’.\(^{32}\) Thus, the evidence of sense is *a priori* because it is identifiable with the form and content which is contained or ‘encountered’ in this faculty and its pure representations when we ‘abstract from the sensations’, from the empirical content given *a posteriori* through the operations of this faculty (i.e. ‘the evidence of the senses’). As he explains later, Coleridge holds that the *a priori* forms or rules of sense and understanding must be taken as ‘the conditions that render experience itself possible’.\(^{33}\)

\(^{27}\) *CPR*, B34-5 (cf. Coleridge’s statements at *Logic*, 111-2, 132-3, 139-43).

\(^{28}\) Kant’s expression at B34-5; cf. Coleridge at *Logic*, 146-7, 213-4.

\(^{29}\) *Logic*, 44 (cf. 12n, 111, 153-4ff).

\(^{30}\) *Logic*, 239.

\(^{31}\) *Logic*, 44n.

\(^{32}\) *Logic*, 44, 154 (cf. Kant’s statements at *CPR*, B34-5ff).

\(^{33}\) See *Logic*, 146-7.
What transcendental analysis seeks to demonstrate is that whatever may be given \( a \) \( posteriori \), insofar as it is a possible object of sensory experience for beings with our cognitive constitution, is dependent on what is present in the mind \( a \) \( priori \) (the inherent forms or modes of our cognition) for its possibility and objectivity (for us). Further, whatever may be given \( a \) \( priori \) must in turn depend on (or be ‘grounded in’) our subjective constitution itself.\(^{34}\) This is why Coleridge says that ‘the aim and object’ of ‘the science of transcendental analysis’ is ‘to rise from the knowledge or matter of consciousness to the \textit{faculty} by which it is known or presented’.\(^ {35}\) To rise from the content of some cognitive state to the faculty or cognitive power ‘by which it is known or presented’ involves showing (1) that such cognitive content, or certain of its fundamental features, must originate in the operations of this faculty, and thus (2) that the possibility of the former (being given) is in some way dependent on the nature and function of the latter.\(^ {36}\) To see how this goal relates to Coleridge’s views on \( a \) \( priori \) evidence and the various kinds of \( a \) \( priori \) cognitive content, we need to look a little more closely at his Kantian representation terminology, particularly insofar as it relates to what I have called the formal and material elements of our cognition and experience. As discussed further below, insofar as \( a \) \( priori \) evidence concerns the origin of certain kinds of representations and the ground(s) or condition(s) of the possibility of such pure cognitive states and their content, it may be taken to constitute or furnish what Kant calls ‘transcendental representations’. But before looking at Coleridge’s account of transcendental knowledge-claims about the sources and possibility of such \( a \) \( priori \) cognitive content in more detail, we must first consider why he distinguishes between various kinds of cognitive content according to their diverse origins. This will show the ways in which Coleridge’s emphasis on origins informs his distinctions between different kinds of \( a \) \( priori \) evidence, as well as his notions of what is formal and material in our cognition.

In these earlier passages of \textit{Logic}, Coleridge does not specify that transcendental representations constitute just \textit{one} of the various possible kinds of \( a \) \( priori \) evidence or cognitive content. Rather, his principal purpose here is to emphasise that there are two

\(^{34}\) I discuss this claim further in \textit{3.4, 4.3-4} below (cf. \textit{2.1} above). Throughout I follow Pippin in holding that to refer to something (say, a form of mental activity) as ‘grounding’ something else (say, a kind of representation or cognitive state) is just to say that the former is what is required to account for the latter (usually as the ‘ground of its possibility’); see (1982), 9.

\(^{35}\) \textit{Logic}, 248. That Coleridge uses \textit{faculty} as a term intended to refer specifically to some cognitive power, or capacity for a certain type of mental activity (such as intuiting, conceiving, or judging), is made clear at \textit{Logic}, 9-12ff, 151-4ff, 239-40ff; cf. Kant’s remarks at \textit{CPR}, B34-5.

\(^{36}\) See \textit{Logic}, 68-70, 145-7, 152-4, 211-4, 238-45. This is why Coleridge claims ‘the knowledge of the constitution of the mental faculties forms the science of transcendental analysis’ (213), conceived as an ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms of [our mental faculties]’ (147).
basic classes of evidence or cognitive content that derive from two fundamentally different sources. That which has its origins \textit{a priori} in the mind and gives our cognition its form, and that which has its origin \textit{a posteriori} in something affecting or acting upon the mind from without and furnishes us with what Coleridge calls ‘the contents or \textit{materials of [our] knowledge’} (i.e. the empirical sensory element or matter of cognition).\textsuperscript{37}

What serves to distinguish the formal from the material in our cognition, then, is their respective origin. This is why Coleridge claims that we should speak of the origins or sources of different kinds of representations or cognitive contents and what is \textit{a priori} in them in terms of spatial metaphors or metaphors of ‘birth-place’.\textsuperscript{38} What it means for the evidence (or content) given in different representations to have an \textit{a posteriori} origin is just that it derives from those bodily sensations, impressions, and images that make up our sensory experience. What it means for such evidence to have an \textit{a priori} origin is just that it derives from the acts and products of our intellectual faculties or cognitive powers, considered in abstraction from that which affects the mind from without by being given through the senses (as ‘impressions from external objects’).\textsuperscript{39}

When we abstract from all empirically given material of cognition in this way, considering the acts or products of our faculties of sense and understanding without any reference to the \textit{a posteriori} content of representations (especially sensible intuitions) given through the operations of these two cognitive capacities, we can acquire a transcendental conception of ‘pure sense’ and ‘pure understanding’.\textsuperscript{40} That is, Kant’s methods enable us to ‘obtain a notion’ of the ‘pure forms’ of our cognition and the \textit{a priori} cognitive content (or pure products) arising from these forms.\textsuperscript{41} Transcendental analysis seeks hereby to prove not only that whatever can be given \textit{a posteriori} as the material of cognition (in our sense-experience) must be conditioned or determined by \textit{a priori} forms of cognition, but also that these \textit{a priori} forms and the \textit{a priori} evidence or cognitive content to which they give rise must originate in the ‘inherent forms and functions’ of our intellectual faculties. This is why, when considering our faculties from the transcendental perspective (as pure

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Logic}, 111. Coleridge adds that this ‘material constitutes in fact what we mean by its [our knowledge, or rather some cognitive state or kind of cognitive content] relation or reference to the object’.

\textsuperscript{38} In other words, the formal or \textit{a priori} elements of our cognition must be traced back to the operation of certain cognitive powers (their origin in a particular faculty); they are not a kind of cognitive content that can be traced back \textit{in time} to some originating sensory impression or idea (in the sense of an empirical representation), or that could ever be shown to be built up out of or derived from some collection of impressions or ideas (which could, in principle at least, be shown to have originated in, or been associated and connected with one another by, the subject at some particular moment, or sequence of times, in their experience). See e.g. \textit{Logic}, 76, 139-47. See also \textbf{3.4, 4.1-2} below.

\textsuperscript{39} See \textit{Logic}, 76; cf. 215-24 (esp. 219-20).

\textsuperscript{40} See \textit{Logic}, 152-4, 227-8, 267.

\textsuperscript{41} See \textit{Logic}, 154; cf. 141-7, 211-4, 265-8.
cognitive powers without reference to their empirical aspects), we can talk of them as the ‘condition and co-cause’ or ‘sources [of] our experience’.  

iii. Kant’s Aesthetic & Logic: The Forms of Sense & Understanding in Coleridge’s Logic

I will return to Coleridge’s account of the relationship between the formal and material elements of cognition in 3.3. For the moment, however, I focus on why Coleridge claims that transcendental analysis is concerned with determining what he calls the ‘sources’ of experience. According to Kant, ‘Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind’, the ‘two stems’ of ‘sensibility and understanding’. What Kant’s transcendental analysis of ‘these two faculties or capacities’ aims to show is that these faculties ‘contain a priori representations which constitute the condition under which objects are given to us’ (sensibility) and through which such objects are cognised or thought (understanding). It seeks to specify the rules that determine how objects must be given to us by means of intuition (‘the reception of representation’) and ‘thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind)’ by means of concepts. This search operates on the assumption that ‘Intuitions and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition’, which can ‘arise’ only through the ‘unification’ of the functions of our two fundamental cognitive ‘faculties or capacities’. The elements of cognition furnished by sensibility and understanding are both ‘either pure or empirical’; i.e. these elements can be considered either as a priori representations (or cognitive states) abstracted from and taken to be independent of all sensation, or as a posteriori representations that ‘contain’ sensation, the empirically given ‘matter of sensible cognition’ which ‘presupposes the actual presence of the object’. What Kant means by such a contrast between the ‘formal’ (a priori) and ‘material’ (a posteriori) elements of cognition is further brought out by his claims that ‘pure intuition contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure concept only the form of thinking of an object in general’. While all our actual experience consists in both formal and material elements mixed together indiscriminately in the contents of our cognitive states (and cannot occur at all without some empirically given ‘matter of sensible cognition’), transcendental philosophy provides us with a method for ‘isolating’ these pure a priori formal conditions. In fact, what it shows us is that some such set of conditions is necessary as the a priori principles of the possibility of any experience (and of the knowledge derived from such experience). But we must, Kant

42 Logik, 146-7.
43 I follow Kitcher in occasionally rendering Kant’s Vorstellung as ‘cognitive state’ instead of the more traditional but rather less precise ‘representation’; see (1990), 66.
asserts, be careful not to ‘mix up’ the ‘roles’ of sensibility and understanding in pursuit of such principles. Rather we must ‘separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them’, and consequently must divide such transcendental or formal analyses of cognition into ‘the science of the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic [and] the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., logic’ (noting that such a system of aesthetic or logic may be regarded as transcendental only insofar as it is concerned with ‘our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori’).

In *Logic* Coleridge follows Kant’s division of his first *Critique* into an Aesthetic and Analytic (transcendental logic). He contends that ‘we must subdivide [the transcendental analysis of cognition] into two kinds, each forming a distinct science’. The first branch is concerned with ‘the universal forms of the pure sense and the knowledge [that] has been entitled “transcendental aesthetic”,’ a term intended ‘to distinguish the faculty of sense itself abstractly from the sensations and from the modifications of the senses or organs of sense’. The second deals with ‘the forms and functions of the understanding and the rules generalised from these’, and so ‘in analogy with the former is termed transcendental logic’. The aesthetic describes the *a priori* formal features of sensible intuition, those rules that determine the conditions under which objects are given to us (i.e. perceived as part of the spatiotemporally ordered manifold of sense). The analytic or logic describes the *a priori* formal features of sensible cognition, the rules that determine the conditions under which objects are thought. These ‘forms and functions’ together constitute what Coleridge calls the ‘principles of sense’ (i.e. space and time, as the pure forms of sensible intuition) and the ‘principles of understanding’ (i.e. Kant’s table of categories, as the pure forms of conception and judgement). On Coleridge’s view, these pure or *a priori* forms and contents should be taken to consist in

[T]he constitutive *forms*, or constitutional acts and functions, of the *sense* and of the *understanding*, with the several products [or contents] of these [acts, forms, and functions], as far

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44 All quotations from *CPR*, B25, B29-30, B74-6 (cf. Coleridge at *Logic*, 146-55).
45 *Logic*, 146.
46 ibid., 147-8.
47 As Coleridge recognises at *Logic*, 263, Kant allows for the possibility of sensible intuitions which are not brought under the categories and so form little more than a ‘chaos’ of disorderly sense impressions, but does not think there could be any sensible cognition without an object being given through sensibility (i.e., the categories necessarily remain ‘empty’ without a manifold of sensory objects to which they could be applied: there can be no cognition without some relation to an object). See *CPR*, B151-2.
as they are producible \textit{a priori}: viz. the pure intuitions of the one [i.e. the sense] and the self-derived notions and conceptions of the other [i.e. understanding].\textsuperscript{49}

As we have seen, Coleridge contends that transcendental knowledge must derive from ‘an analysis of the intellectual faculties’. This is why he claims that ‘the knowledge of the constitution of the mental faculties forms the science of transcendental analysis’: it is an ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms’ of the cognitive powers or faculties, which is divided into ‘the transcendental aesthetic, or analysis of the pure sense’ and ‘the transcendental logic or analysis of the pure understanding’.\textsuperscript{50} It is such analyses of the faculties that allow us to determine their ‘constitutive forms, or constitutional acts and functions’, and it is our claims about how such forms, acts, and functions together constitute ‘the conditions that render experience itself possible’ that yield transcendental knowledge.\textsuperscript{51} The finer details of Coleridge’s account of ‘the constitution and constituent forms’ of the cognitive faculties, and the conditions of the possibility of experience, will not concern us here (this is discussed more fully in 3.4 and 4.3-5). For the remainder of this section I focus on (1) how Coleridge’s act-product terminology relates to his notions of \textit{a priori} form and content, and on (2) how Coleridge’s interpretation of transcendental analysis is related to his conception of the special kind of pure cognitive content that he terms ‘\textit{a priori} evidence’.\textsuperscript{52} But first, a little more needs to be said about the ways in which Coleridge differs from Kant on questions regarding the sources of human cognition, and especially the role of reason in contributing to cognition, in the context of the account of transcendental analysis outlined above.

\textbf{iv. Transcendental Dialectic vs. Transcendental Noetic: Coleridge’s Departure from Kant}

As we have just seen, Kant claims that ‘Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind’, the ‘two stems’ of ‘sensibility and understanding’, with the corollary that ‘Intuitions and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition’.\textsuperscript{53} In Coleridge’s view, however, we must reject the first statement and modify the second: this is because (i) Coleridge holds that, in addition to sense and understanding, reason should be recognised as one of the ‘fundamental sources’ from which our cognition arises, and (ii) while Coleridge would agree that ‘Intuitions and concepts therefore constitute all the

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Logic}, 213.
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Logic}, 213; cf. 146-9.
\textsuperscript{51} See \textit{Logic}, 146-7.
\textsuperscript{52} Coleridge introduces this term at \textit{LS}, 104; cf. \textit{Logic}, 44-5, 211-4. See also, 3.3 and 4.1-2 below.
\textsuperscript{53} See \textit{CPR}, B25, B29-30, B74-6.
elements of our cognition’, he holds that along with sensible intuitions and concepts, our
cognition also involves intellectual or spiritual intuitions (although only in certain special
cases, rather than as regular features of our sense-experience and discursive cognition).54
Thus, although Coleridge does not disagree with Kant that reason is a cognitive capacity
that we employ when making inferences, or attempting to systematise our knowledge, he
does think that Kant is wrong to deny the possibility of intellectual intuition, and to limit
human reason to knowledge of sensible objects. Indeed, Coleridge goes so far as to claim
that the constraints Kant imposes on reason’s epistemic grasp in the first Critique, as well
as the philosophical errors that Kant attributes to human reason’s tendency to overreach
and deceive itself in Transcendental Dialectic, should be reassigned to the understanding.
Coleridge phrases this revision of the scope of the first Critique as follows:

in Kant’s Critique of the Pure Reason there is more than one fundamental error; but the main
fault lies in the Title page, which to the manifold advantage of the Work might be exchanged
for—An Inquisition respecting the constitution and limits of the Human Understanding.55

What Coleridge means here is that, insofar as the arguments of Kant’s Critique are limited
to claims about the conditions and limits of human sensory and discursive cognition (i.e.
to the analysis of the rules or forms of sense and understanding), it is correct. Where ‘the
Title page’ goes wrong, however, is in implying that such an analysis of cognition has any
application to reason. This is because, in Coleridge’s view, although the limits of sensory
experience and discursive cognition are a consequence of ‘the constitution or constituent
forms’ of sense and understanding, as Kant contends, such limits have no bearing on the
possibility of our cognition of non-sensible or intelligible objects (e.g. the Ideas). Rather,
all that is proved by the limits of cognition determined by Kant’s transcendental aesthetic
and logic is that sense and understanding are not appropriately constituted for cognising
or apprehending such noumenal objects and principles.56 This is why Coleridge, contrary
to Kant, thinks that a ‘transcendental noetic’, or account of how the non-sensible objects
of cognition intellectual intuited through the employment of reason are possible (proving
in turn that speculative metaphysics or noetics is possible), is an achievable goal.

We can get a clearer sense of Coleridge’s position here by briefly considering the
alternative solution to Kant’s Antinomies that he proposes in a footnote in Logic. Rather

54 See e.g. Logic, 33-6, 43-5, 146-9, 236-8. This is discussed further in 3.3 and 4.1-5.
55 CL.V.421. Cf. Logic, 139-40n, 205-6.
56 See e.g. Logic, 154-5, 172-3. This point is discussed further in 4.4-5.
than accepting that speculative knowledge of the super-sensible realm, or of the answers to certain philosophical questions, is not a possible object of human cognition, Coleridge contends that such things could only be said to be unknowable in the sense that they ‘do not fall under [the] cognisance’ of the human understanding (conceived as a capacity for discursive or conceptual knowledge, especially of sensible objects):

When from two premises, both of which are affirmed with equal right by the understanding, the understanding itself by legitimate deductions can arrive at two contradictory conclusions, the only possible solution of the difficulty is found in assuming that the understanding has been applying its own forms, or those which it has borrowed from the sense, to objects which do not fall under its cognisance; as when, for instance, the understanding applies the forms of space and time, of quantity, quality, and relation, to the idea of the Supreme Being, or of things themselves as contradistinguished from the phenomena.57

In short, Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic does not show that ‘contradictory conclusions’ of this kind compel us to accept certain limitations to human knowledge, or to recognise that certain philosophical questions cannot be decisively answered (or have no validity or significance, given such limitations on our knowledge). Rather, it shows only that human understanding is not appropriately constituted to acquire anything other than a ‘negative’ knowledge of non-sensible or noumenal objects, such as ‘the idea of the Supreme Being, or of things themselves as contradistinguished from phenomena’:

In these cases, I say that the understanding is indirectly and by negation the organ of the reason, and the exercise of logic for this purpose by the understanding to prove the inadequacy of the understanding [for the apprehension of non- or super-sensible objects, e.g. ‘the eternal verities of Plato and Descartes’] constitutes the Platonic dialectic which the divine philosopher calls the wings by which philosophy first raises herself from the ground.58

For Coleridge, this has the further consequence that the Ideas of reason are constitutive rather than merely regulative, so that what he calls ‘noetics’ or ‘the logic of ideas and first principles’ remains a realisable philosophical aim, even if we accept Kantian claims about the limits of sensory cognition. Curiously, then, while Coleridge departs from Kant when it comes to the Platonic conception of reason, which he shares with Descartes, Spinoza,

57 Logic, 139-40n. Cf. Friend.1.155-7ff; Ls, 59-61.
58 Logic, 140n. The interpolated reference to ‘eternal verities’ is from Friend.1.177n. For further discussion of Coleridge’s view on reason and the ideas, see 4.3-5. On the ‘negative insight’ into the possibility of non-sensible objects of cognition provided by transcendental analysis, see Logic, 154-5, 172-3.
and the Cambridge Platonists, as a special kind of cognitive capacity which enables us to acquire intuitive and certain knowledge of non- or super-sensible things, he nevertheless maintains that the account of human cognition offered by such early modern rationalists must be critically reassessed in light of Kantian transcendental analysis.\(^{59}\) As we shall see, this is partly because Coleridge thinks that Kant’s transcendental method can be applied to reason, provided that we bear in mind that reason is not subject to the limits to which Kant confines it in the first *Critique*. I will return to these issues in 3.4 and 4.1-5, where I discuss their relation to Coleridge’s conception of Ideas as the forms of reason.\(^{60}\) In what remains of this section, I focus only on Coleridge’s account of *a priori* forms and content insofar as it applies to his characterisation of the forms of sense and understanding.

**v. A Priori Form & Content: Coleridge’s Act-Product Terminology**

We are now better placed to see how terms like ‘form’ and ‘content’ apply in contexts where Coleridge is discussing the nature of the *a priori*. If Coleridge is speaking of some act or operation of the mind itself considered as distinct from sensory impressions from external objects, what he means is an *a priori* form. If he is speaking of some product of the mind itself (taken to be produced by such activity or grounded in such form), what Coleridge means is an *a priori* content. Thus, if we take space and time to be the acts, or the modes of activity, of (pure) sense, we can speak of them as *a priori* forms of sensible intuition. If we take the categories to be the acts, or the modes of activity, of (pure) understanding, we can speak of them as *a priori* forms of the understanding (and thus of all discursive cognition). The pure intuitions produced by, or grounded in, our forms of sense are, on this account, a kind of pure or *a priori* cognitive content. Likewise, the pure concepts produced by, or grounded in, the forms of understanding are a kind of pure or *a priori* cognitive content. If space and time are acts or forms of the mind, then pure intuitions are products of this mental activity or form. Likewise, if the categories are acts or forms of the mind, then pure concepts are products of this mental activity or form.\(^{61}\)

Interpreted in this way Coleridge’s act-product terminology also helps to dissipate some of the ambiguities in Kant’s employment of terms such as ‘representation’, ‘intuition’, and ‘concept’, which in some cases seem to refer both to the mental acts of representing, intuiting, and conceiving *and* to the cognitive contents (representations, intuitions, and

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\(^{59}\) On this conception of reason, see e.g. Bedford (1979), 71-2ff.

\(^{60}\) See e.g. *LS*, 61n: ‘Reason, in the highest sense of the term […] is the Source of Ideas and conversely, an Idea is a self-affirming truth […], which the Reason presents to itself, as a from of itself (cf. *Logic*, 211-2, 237-8 on Ideas as the ‘principles of reason’).

\(^{61}\) Coleridge makes this clear at e.g. *Logic*, 233-8, 256ff, 263-5ff.
concepts) produced by, or given through, such mental operations or modes of cognitive activity. So, while Coleridge uses this Kantian representation-terminology in much the same way, when he talks of the ‘forms’, ‘functions’, or ‘acts’ of a given cognitive faculty, he should be taken to be referring only to the cognitive operations in which the exercise of the faculty is held to consist. Likewise, when he talks of the ‘products’, ‘contents’, or ‘materials’ of a given cognitive faculty, Coleridge should be taken to be referring only to the cognitive contents that the operations of the faculty (conceived as a capacity, or as a mode of cognitive activity) are held to produce or present to the mind.

I will discuss how Coleridge conceives of the complex relations between form and content, in the context of his interpretation of the Kantian a priori, in sections 3.4-4.5. For now it is enough to note (i) that Coleridge thinks of a priori form as a kind of form that is grounded in, or originates from, an act or operation of ‘the mind itself considered as distinct from the [sensory] impressions from external objects’, and (ii) that Coleridge thinks of a priori content as the kind of content that is the product of such acts or operations (also considered in abstraction from all sensory impressions or empirically given cognitive content). It should be noted, too, that while Coleridge takes a priori forms or acts to produce (or ground) a priori contents or products, he also thinks of such pure forms as the kinds of things that can themselves be contemplated as contents, or objects, of our cognitive states. This is why Coleridge employs terms like ‘form’ and ‘formal’ not only to characterise the a priori features of certain modes of cognitive activity, but also to describe the a priori features of certain kinds of cognitive content (with these forms or modes of cognitive activity taken as things that can also be considered as such content). Put in slightly different terms, this means that, on Coleridge’s view, we can speak of pure intuitions and pure concepts as both (a) forms or acts and (b) contents or products of the mind, considering them in such different (but interconnected) guises depending on the context (see 2.3). With this in mind, we can return to Coleridge’s account of the nature of the special kind of cognitive content that he calls ‘a priori evidence’.

Given that there has already been frequent allusion to Coleridge’s concept of a priori evidence in the above section, it will be useful, briefly, to say a little more about what in Coleridge’s view makes the content of our pure representations, and whatever

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62 On this ambiguity in Kant’s representation-terminology, see Kitcher, (1990), 36ff (she uses the terms ‘process form’ and ‘product form’ to make the act/product distinction).
63 See e.g. Logic, 73-6, 151-4ff, 211-4, 265-6n.
64 See e.g. Logic, 132-3, 215-24.
65 See e.g. Logic, 73-6, 132-3, 237-8.
66 Coleridge’s most detailed account of how certain a priori forms (particularly mathematical rules) can be contemplated as a kind of pure cognitive content is at Logic, 73-5 (cf. 215-24).
knowledge we may derive from such content, \textit{a priori}. For apart from the origin of all such content in sources that are supposedly ‘independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses’, or whatever may be given empirically,\textsuperscript{67} there are some other important features of \textit{a priori} evidence emphasised by Coleridge in \textit{Logic}. I will outline these here, and then offer more a detailed account in sections \textbf{4.1-5}, which will focus on how Coleridge’s account of \textit{a priori} evidence relates to the special class of \textit{a priori} knowledge Kant claims we can derive from transcendental representations.\textsuperscript{68} As noted in section \textbf{2.1} Coleridge follows Kant’s reworking of traditional notions of the \textit{a priori}. He takes the term ‘\textit{a priori}’ to refer to the logical form of propositions that can be proven independently of or without reference to experience (especially knowledge-claims or judgements taken to be universal and necessary), as well as to the nature and origins of certain invariant features of sensible cognition and experience that are taken to have a special status. Coleridge brings together these aspects of the \textit{a priori}, taken as that which is universal, necessary, and invariant in all cognition and experience, by describing it as consisting in ‘permanent relations’. In Coleridge’s terms, the \textit{a priori} cognitive content with which logic deals are ‘the permanent relations in conceptions’ (pure concepts), while geometry and algebra are respectively concerned with ‘the permanent relations of space and time’ (pure intuitions). Here ‘permanent relation’ stands for some \textit{a priori} representation or cognition. What makes the \textit{a priori} ‘permanent’ in Coleridge’s sense is that this cognitive content has the logical form of propositions or knowledge-claims that purport to be universal and necessary: unlike a contingent fact or empirical claim, once properly established the \textit{a priori} is not subject to any possible revisions.\textsuperscript{69} It is precisely such claims to ‘permanence’ that distinguish the formal or \textit{a priori} elements of our cognition from the material elements derived \textit{a posteriori}.

Along with the above emphasis on the \textit{a priori} cognitive content given in pure representations as concerning ‘the necessary, the permanent, the universal, or the truths having these attributes’,\textsuperscript{70} Coleridge emphasises a further aspect of the \textit{a priori}: its relation to our notions of possibility and probability, particularly as conditions governing certain kinds of knowledge-claims or truths. Thus, in \textit{The Statesman’s Manual}, Coleridge develops a concept of \textit{a priori} knowledge as whatever may be known as ‘a fact probable in itself’, in the sense of a truth which ‘the mind determines [from] its logical possibility’ alone. What

\textsuperscript{67} As discussed in \textbf{2.1}, this is Kant’s view (see esp. CPR, B25), and is clearly endorsed by Coleridge in \textit{Logic} (see esp. 145-7 and 212: ‘all means and materials \textit{a posteriori} are excluded from the problem’).

\textsuperscript{68} On this distinction, see Kant’s claims at CPR, B25, 81-2. See also \textbf{2.1-3} above.

\textsuperscript{69} See 43, 146-7, 211-2, 219-20.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Logic}, 40.
he means by ‘logical possibility’ here is the conditions that determine what can be admitted by Reason as possible, as involving no contradiction to the universal forms (or laws) of Thought, [or] no incompatibility in the terms of the proposition. Coleridge then goes on to remark that all ‘determination on this head belongs exclusively to the science of Metaphysics’, and that insofar as anything may be thus determined independently of what is given a posteriori, its logical possibility or ‘probability in itself’ is what ‘constitutes its presumptive proof, or the evidence a priori’. As was noted earlier, ‘metaphysics’ is Coleridge’s blanket term for the pure (nonempirical) sciences which are concerned with ‘a higher evidence than that which the senses can afford, or which can belong to objects of the bodily sense considered as matters of fact’ (i.e. a priori evidence) and the knowledge we can derive from it. One of my principal aims throughout will be to show that Coleridge conceives of such ‘universal forms (or laws) of Thought’ and the cognitive content deriving from them as a priori, and takes transcendental analysis to provide us with the philosophical method for tracing such a priori forms and content back to their origin in ‘the constitution and constituent forms of [the mental faculties]’.

In sections 4.1-5, I consider how Coleridge distinguishes between transcendental representations and other kinds of a priori evidence in attempting to account for the origin of our pure representations, as well as between the a priori form(s) and content that has its source in our cognitive powers and that which originates from somewhere other than within the human mind. But to provide a broader conceptual context for this discussion, we first need to consider some of Coleridge’s claims about the cognitive powers, their content(s), and their relation to sensory experience and cognition in further detail.

3.3 Coleridge on Ancient Greek Faculty Terminology: The Threefold Division of the Cognitive Powers, their Contents, & their relation to Experience

i. Coleridge’s Kantian Reading of Ancient Greek Faculty Terminology

To get a better sense of what Coleridge’s formal/material elements distinction (see 3.2) involves, we will need to turn to the more detailed statements on cognitive operations and contents which Coleridge claims are ‘presented in a synoptic form’ in the table of pure sciences that was introduced above (in 3.1). This will also help to make clearer the

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71 See LS, 104. Here we can see that Coleridge follows Kant definition of the a priori as that which can be ‘cognised from its mere possibility alone’ (see SWF:1.690, where Coleridge quotes this definition from Kant, MFNS, 16, and discusses the relation of the a priori to the faculties).
72 Logic, 36.
73 See Logic, 146-7, 212-4.
74 Logic, 70.
historical and intellectual context in which Coleridge’s table, and its relation to his interpretation of transcendental philosophy, should be considered. In the introductory sections of Logic where the table of pure sciences is first introduced, Coleridge claims that the threefold division of our cognitive faculties or powers into ‘the reason (νους), the understanding (λόγος), and the sense (θεωρία)’ and their respective a priori contents can be ‘dated from the formation of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, under the immediate successors of Alexander and principally in Egypt’. In particular, Coleridge has in mind here the Academicians Speusippus and Polemo, and the Peripatetic Theophrastus, as the ancient philosophers who established ‘the full formation of this terminology’ (all are either quoted or referred to at various points in Logic, in the context of terminological discussions of the faculties and their contents and operations). As Coleridge goes on to point out, while the Platonists and Aristotelians of this period ‘differed indeed materially’ on many points, they shared a conception of the nature of the intellectual capacity designated as ‘λόγος’, and its relation to the sensory capacity designated as ‘θεωρία’ and the ‘transcendent’ intellectual power termed ‘νους’. His historical account of the development of faculty terminology is significant for our purposes because it helps to show Coleridge’s sense of the continuities between his own Kantian representation terminology, the early modern faculty terminology with which he assumes his readers to be familiar, and the much earlier definitions of the faculties and their contents that Coleridge presents as being a standard feature of ancient Greek philosophical terminology. As we will see later (in 4.1-2), placing Coleridge’s table in this context will also help to show what Coleridge considers to be the major advances of Kantian transcendental philosophy, and which aspects of transcendental inquiry he thinks were partly anticipated by Kant’s ancient and early modern predecessors. In the next few passages, I focus only on the definitions of the faculties and characterisations of their contents which Coleridge summarises in his table of pure sciences.

According to Coleridge, the faculty terminology that came to be widely adopted following ‘the formation of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools’ was intended not only

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75 *Logic*, 32. The clause ‘principally in Egypt’ suggests that Coleridge could be thinking of Alexandrian philosophers like Ammonias Saccas, Plotinus, and Porphyry. However, his reference to ‘the immediate successors of Alexander’ makes this chronologically improbable. Moreover, while Coleridge mentions these philosophers (particularly Plotinus) elsewhere, at this point of the *Logic* MS, the only member of a Platonic or Aristotelian school he mentions is Speusippus, which makes chronological (if not geographical) sense. This suggests that either ‘immediate’ or ‘Egypt’ is a transcription error.

76 *Logic*, 32. For mentions of Speusippus (c. 408 – 339/8 BC), see 33 (on λόγος and νους), 146 (on sensation); for Polemo (d. 270/269 BC), see 146, 148 (on θεωρία or θεωρήσις and λόγος); for Theophrastus (c. 371 – c. 287 BC), see 204 (on νους).

77 See *Logic*, 33-4.
to facilitate a clearer distinction between different kinds of cognitive faculties or powers and their contents, but also to indicate the different ways of considering these faculties and the relations between them. To illustrate this point, Coleridge presents an overview of the sense in which the term ‘λόγος’ was employed at the time, in order to signify three different ways of thinking about the mind and its capacities. In each case Coleridge provides English equivalents to indicate how these different uses of ‘λόγος’ would be expressed in more contemporary faculty terminology:

At this time the substantive λόγος, we have said, acquired a new sense, and was employed to express the intellectual faculty itself and this in a threefold relation: first it signified the logical faculty, the reasoning power, in short the understanding including the judgment, in distinction from the νοῦς or reason.78

As Coleridge will go on to explain, this ‘threefold relation’ serves to designate a range of different mental abilities and the various disciplines associated with these cognitive functions. In this passage λόγος or the understanding is described as ‘the logical faculty’ or ‘reasoning power’ which consists in the capacity to judge because judgement is the basic cognitive function from which logical knowledge derives (this has the corollary that logical theory must be a theory of the rules governing epistemic judgements, and must consist in rules derived from ‘the laws and constitution of the understanding itself’).79 In this context, λόγος is distinguished from ‘the νοῦς or reason’ to show that while it is our ‘reasoning power’, by which Coleridge means a capacity for discursive cognitive activities like making epistemic judgements or analysing propositions, it is a faculty that performs a class of cognitive functions very different from those of reason itself (i.e. the acts of λόγος produce a different kind of cognitive content to the acts of νοῦς, so that insofar as the activity designated as ‘reasoning’ involves the employment of λόγος or understanding, it should be considered as something distinct from the activities that involve the employment of νοῦς or reason, such as noesis or intellectual intuition).80 The reason for such a distinction, grounded in the view that different cognitive faculties produce or contain different kinds of cognitive content, becomes further apparent when

78 *Logic*, 33-4.
79 See e.g. *Logic*, 5-6, 37, 51-2, 213-4. According to Pippin (1982) ‘Kant’s [...] view of logic is entirely intensional. For him, clearly, logic was a logic of judgments, not propositions, a logic of the relations between concepts or between judgments, not an extensional logic, capable for example of formally defining truth functional relations between propositions’ (94). Coleridge follows Kant in taking judgment as the focus of his logical theory, so I take the same point to apply to Coleridge’s position.
80 On this distinction, see e.g. *Logic*, 33-4, 68-70, 237-8.
Coleridge turns to the second aspect of the ‘threefold relation’ in terms of which the λόγος and its functions can be considered:

Secondly it [i.e. λόγος] signified the understanding, as the discursive faculty, or that which employed itself on the conceptions of the mind and the general terms representing them, in distinction from the intuition, or intuitive power of the mind, as employed on the forms of perception in time and space, that is number and figure: but in both instances, with abstraction from all that is furnished from without, of all that does not belong to the mind of its own right. Here the λόγος is distinguished from θεωρία, as the understanding from the sense, and of course distinguished as from its equal and collateral.81

In this passage λόγος is distinguished both in terms of the kind of cognitive functions it performs (i.e. the way it is employed or exercised) and the kind of cognitive content that it is ‘employed on’ (i.e. the representations or cognitive states that are apprehended through the exercise of this faculty). Thus, what separates λόγος from θεωρία is its discursive functions, as an intellectual faculty the exercise of which produces ‘a knowledge by means of conceptions’, and its conceptual contents, ‘as the source of discursive knowledge’.82 What separates the θεωρία from λόγος is its intuitive functions, as a sensory faculty the exercise of which produces temporal and spatial intuitions (and the arithmetical and geometrical knowledge deriving from these intuitions), and its intuitively given sensory contents, as ‘the birth-place of intuitions’ or ‘source and faculty of intuitions and perceptions’ and ‘the source of intuitive knowledge’.83 From a terminological standpoint, what λόγος and θεωρία share is that they serve to designate our discursive intellectual faculty and our intuitive sensory faculty considered in ‘abstraction from all that is furnished from without [i.e. sense ‘impressions from external objects’], of all that does not belong to the mind of its own right’.84 In other words, these terms were employed by ancient philosophers to indicate the pure operations and contents of these faculties that are taken to have an a priori origin. This is what it means for these

81 Logic, 34.
82 These are Coleridge’s definitions of ‘discursive’ at Logic, 247-8.
83 See Logic, 68, 154, 247 for these definitions. In this context, Coleridge uses ‘intuitive knowledge’ to designate the kind of cognitions that derive from intuitively given cognitive content, but which can also involve discursive processes and conceptual content. For instance, Coleridge holds that our geometrical knowledge is intuitive in the sense that it is (i) self-evident and (ii) grounded in spatial intuitions, but is discursively acquired insofar as it requires the application of mathematical concepts (see 221-4).
84 See Logic, 12n, 76-7, 132-3, 263-6 for this notion of what is ‘furnished from without’.
operations and contents to ‘belong to the mind of its own right’. Coleridge adds that ‘the λόγος is distinguished from θεωρία, as the understanding from the sense’ to show that these early Greek definitions of the faculties and their operations and contents can be understood in the same terms as early modern faculty terminology. Indeed, his own use of evidently Kantian faculty terminology in describing the conceptions of θεωρία, and its spatial and temporal intuitions or ‘forms of perception’, held by ancient Platonic and Aristotelian philosophers further underlines Coleridge’s sense of this continuity in faculty terminology and its theoretical purposes across the centuries.

What Coleridge means here by characterising λόγος and θεωρία, or sense and understanding as ‘equal and collateral’, and as faculties the operations and contents of which can be considered ‘with abstraction from all that is furnished from without’, is explained in more detail in his subsequent account of the third aspect of the ‘threefold relation’ of λόγος. In these passages Coleridge returns again to the reasons for making a sharp distinction between λόγος and νοῦς:

Thirdly the λόγος was used in a somewhat larger sense, as the mind or intellective power abstractedly from the νοῦς or pure reason, as the supposed identity of the intellectio [intellect] and the intelligibile [intelligible]; from the reason, I say, as at once the light of the mind and its highest object, and no less in abstraction from the sensations and impressions, as far as the conditions, causes, and materials of these were found in the body or though its medium.

Here Coleridge is again emphasising the view that while λόγος and νοῦς both perform intellectual (rather than sensory) functions, they must be considered as distinct ‘intellective power[s]’. Coleridge expands on this point in the next sentence, remarking that while νοῦς, λόγος, and θεωρία and their pure operations and contents can be considered ‘in abstraction from the sensations and impressions’, there is still a distinction to be drawn between the nonempirical knowledge deriving from λόγος, and θεωρία and that which derives from νοῦς, taken as ‘the light of the mind and its highest object’:

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85 See also Logic, 39-41, 42-4, 76-7. At 40-1 Coleridge claims that Pythagoras was the first philosopher who ‘inquired what the subjective [i.e. the mind] could effect by its own powers, by reflection on its own acts and the products of those acts, for and within its own sphere’, and thereby discovered ‘a truth, permanent, necessary, raised above all accident and change, [which] had flashed upon him in a geometrical contemplation’ (i.e. Pythagoras discovered the a priori/a posteriori distinction).
86 For Coleridge’s earliest claims about how this conception of the ‘Original Faculties & Tendencies of the Mind’ goes back to ancient Greek philosophy, see CL.II.679ff (Mar 1802). Cf. Logic, 233n.
87 Logic, 34.
The knowledge derived from the latter sources [i.e. ‘the sensations and impressions’], was considered as fluctuating below the formal sciences [i.e. logic and mathematics]; in our present use of words, it was merely empirical […], but which, when reduced under the forms or inherent rules of the understanding, was capable of being elevated into experience and of becoming the substitute, and often the indispensable substitute, of the permanent truths of pure reason, that is, in all those numberless cases […] where we must accept the probable in all its degrees, in lieu of the certain.88

Coleridge’s claim here is that the ancient philosophers under consideration drew a distinction between two different kinds of non-contingent truth and two different kinds of objective (i.e. intersubjectively valid) knowledge, depending on whether these derived from λόγος and θεωρία or from νους. He is not only contrasting contingent or ‘merely empirical’ knowledge with formal (i.e. logical and mathematical) knowledge, but also making a further distinction between such formal knowledge (taken to derive from the forms or ‘inherent rules’ of sense and understanding) and ‘the permanent truths of the pure reason’. He is also alluding to the role of the ‘inherent rules of the understanding’ in rendering empirical knowledge objective or intersubjectively valid.

What it means, in this context, for empirically given sensory cognitive content (i.e. ‘the sensations and impressions, as far as the conditions, causes, and materials of these were found in the body or though its medium’) to be ‘capable of being elevated into experience […] when reduced under the forms or inherent rules of the understanding’ is that subjecting such contents to these non-contingent rules is what enables it to become an objective cognition. Coleridge summarises this claim in the footnote to his table of pure and empirical sciences which states that the ‘evidence of the senses’ only ‘becomes experience’ when it is ‘brought under the rules of the understanding […] and the forms of sense (= intuitus puri)’.89 Since the forms of sense and understanding are ‘what all human subjects possess in common by necessity of their constitution’, this is a process that yields ‘Images [i.e. appearances] which all men having

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88 Logic, 34. It should be noted that for Coleridge ‘the forms of perception in space and time’ constitute the a priori content of the faculty of sense (the ‘evidence of sense’), while ‘the sensations and impressions’ constitute the a posteriori content or data of the bodily senses (the ‘evidence of the senses’). Coleridge claims that the employment of such terminology ‘to distinguish the faculty of sense itself abstractedly from the sensations and from the modifications of the senses or organs of sense’ may be traced to ‘Polemo, the successor of Speusippos, who succeeded Plato, the great founder of the Academic School’ (see 146; cf. 34, 45, 154 for distinction between ‘evidence of sense’ and ‘evidence of the senses’).

89 Logic, 44n. This all looks rather Kantian, of course. However, Coleridge’s position in these passages appears to be that many ancient philosophers held a similar view of the nature of experience, and especially objective cognition (but cf. 148-9n, where Coleridge makes clear his view that, regardless of the ‘few scattered hints in some ancient or modern books’, it is Kant who ‘first saw and communicated the truths [of the transcendental analysis of cognition] in their full extent’).
their right faculties under the same given circumstances are capable of receiving': those 'appearances that belong to mankind generally and constitute the common world of the senses and which under the name \textit{phantomena} we distinguish from appearances that result from accidents and peculiarities of the individual subject'.\footnote{Logic, 130, 141, 203n.} It is this 'common world of the senses' which constitutes 'experience' in Coleridge's sense of the term. We can know that such sensible cognition is intersubjectively valid because we know that the \textit{a posteriori} content from which it derives is conditioned by non-contingent rules or principles that are 'universally and permanently subjective, that is, what all human subjects possess in common by necessity of their constitution' (so that, 'under the same given circumstances', 'all men having their right faculties' would have the same experience, or objectively valid empirical cognition).\footnote{Logic, 203n; cf. 43n reference to 'truths which subsist in all beings possessing the faculties of sense and intelligence, independent of all will and without relation to individuality' (see also \textit{4.3} below).} Now, Coleridge does not mention Kant in any of the various passages quoted above, presenting this conception of experience as objective empirical cognition as being standard among ancient Greek philosophers (at least in the Platonic and Aristotelian schools from the third century BCE onwards), so I take him to hold the view that this account of what constitutes objective or intersubjectively valid sensory cognition was common long before Kant's first \textit{Critique}, but that Kant was the first philosopher to develop a theory of subjectivity which could explain (a) how such cognition is possible, and (b) why we are justified in taking the objects or appearances in which empirical cognition consists to be intersubjectively valid.\footnote{See esp. \textit{Logic}, 146-9, 205-6n; cf. \textit{CM}III.918-21, V.81-2.} As I will explain below, Coleridge considers the knowledge deriving from such empirical cognition (of sensible objects) to be probable rather than certain because the non-contingent rules or principles which ground its claims to objectivity apply only to the cognition of human subjects, and so do not govern objects of cognition themselves, insofar as such objects are taken to 'have a subsistence independent of the mind that contemplates them'.\footnote{Logic, 142 (this is Coleridge's definition of what makes an object 'properly and wholly objective').}

\section*{ii. Coleridge on Probable vs. Certain Knowledge & the 'permanent truths of pure reason'}

Although Coleridge is not very clear here about what it means for objective empirical cognition to be 'capable of [...] becoming the substitute, of the permanent truths of pure reason', it seems that he is referring to using one kind of objective or intersubjectively valid knowledge ('the probable') in place of another ('the certain'), in a context where (our) probable knowledge of sensible objects is taken to be conditioned by one kind of

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90 \textit{Logic}, 130, 141, 203n.  
91 \textit{Logic}, 203n; cf. 43n reference to 'truths which subsist in all beings possessing the faculties of sense and intelligence, independent of all will and without relation to individuality' (see also \textit{4.3} below).  
92 See esp. \textit{Logic}, 146-9, 205-6n; cf. \textit{CM}III.918-21, V.81-2.  
93 \textit{Logic}, 142 (this is Coleridge's definition of what makes an object 'properly and wholly objective').
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non-contingent truth or principle, and our certain knowledge of such objects to be determined by another ‘higher’ sort of non-contingent truth or principle. According to Coleridge, as we saw in 2.1, ‘the necessary, the permanent, the universal [i.e. the a priori aspects of cognition], or the truths having these attributes’ derive from the pure or a priori operations and contents of reason, understanding, and sense; in turn, it is from the a priori forms of these three basic cognitive capacities that we ‘derive the rules and principles by which our observations and reflections are to be corrected’. For our observations of sensible objects and our reflections on the operations and contents of our minds to yield intersubjectively valid knowledge (which can be either probable or certain), they must be ‘corrected’ by or ‘reduced under’ the a priori ‘forms or inherent rules’ of our cognitive capacities. Because Coleridge holds that the a priori forms of sense and understanding are ‘principles of knowing’ which ‘all human subjects possess in common by necessity of their constitution’, he claims that knowledge of sensible objects that is grounded in these principles can only be probable, given that these forms cannot be said to subsist in or determine any objects that ‘have a subsistence independent of the mind that contemplates them’ (i.e. the principles of knowing condition our knowledge of things-as-they-appear, but do not apply to things-as-they-are, independently of our perceptions and cognitions of them). Such knowledge is probable in the sense that we hold it to be true of things-as-they-appear, given the ways in which the a priori forms of sense and understanding that are common to all human subjects condition the realm of appearances (the common world of the senses), and therefore regard it as a reliable guide to what such objects may be like independently of their perception or cognition by human subjects. Because human subjects possessing the same cognitive capacities will, under the same circumstances, have the same experiences of sensible objects, we can say that these common experiences yield reliable knowledge of what such objects are probably like, independently of human subjects and their cognitive states (Coleridge talks of such empirical cognition as yielding ‘a probability which, sufficing for all practical purposes, may be called an empirical certainty’). In Coleridge’s view, however, we cannot be said to have certain knowledge of the objects of empirical cognition unless we have a means of ascertaining what such objects are actually like, independently of our experiences of them. This is where the ‘permanent truths of the pure reason’ (i.e. Ideas, in the Platonic sense) come in. 

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94 Logic, 40.
95 See Logic, 141.
96 Logic, 34-6, 42-4, 146-9, 236-8.
Coleridge holds that ‘the unindividual and transcendent character of the reason [taken] as a presence to the human mind, not a particular faculty or component part of the mind’ means that we must distinguish reason from sense and understanding, taken as ‘the two component faculties’ or ‘constituents’ of the human mind. A corollary of this view is that the a priori forms of sense and understanding are subjectively real, or ‘universal, necessary, and permanent’ (non-contingent) only for finite human subjects, whereas the a priori forms of reason are objectively real, or universal, necessary, and permanent (non-contingent) not only for human subjects, but also for all those objects taken to subsist independently of such finite minds and the objects or contents of their cognitive states. Put another way, subjectively real a priori forms can determine only what appears to human subjects, while objectively real a priori forms determine what actually exists independently of such subjects and their common (i.e. intersubjectively valid) experience(s). To use Coleridge’s terms, the a priori forms of sense and understanding are ‘principles of knowing’ that govern ‘apparent reality’ (human experience of the phenomenal world of the senses), while the a priori forms of reason (‘the permanent truths of the pure reason’ or ‘Divine Ideas’) are ‘principles of knowing and being’ that govern ‘substantial reality’ (the noumenal world of Ideas that is grounded in the absolute mind of God, and thus exists independently of finite human minds, but can be known by such minds through intellectual intuition or noesis). While the former class of non-contingent truths or principles yields knowledge (of sensible objects) that is reliable (‘the probable in all its degrees’), and which may be employed as ‘the substitute […] of the permanent truths of the pure reason’, only the latter class of non-contingent truths or principles yields knowledge (of both sensible and non-sensible or intelligible objects) that can be regarded as ‘properly and wholly objective’, and therefore as certain (because it is true independently of human cognition and its limitations). In sum: whatever qualifies as objective or intersubjectively valid knowledge from the finite human standpoint is not, on Coleridge’s account, a truly objective kind of knowledge. This is why Coleridge avers that ‘from the formation of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools’ philosophers have sought to distinguish λόγος and θεωτικα, taken as ‘the two component faculties’ of the

97 *Logic*, 69-70.
98 For Coleridge on ‘principles of knowing’ and ‘principles of being’ see *Logic*, 79-87; for his theory of apparent (phenomenal or sensible) and substantial (noumenal or intelligible) reality, see 127-31.
99 See *Logic*, 34, 142, 146-7. Obviously, Coleridge does not deny that a priori mathematical and logical principles yield certain knowledge; his point is just that the certainty or self-evidence of such principles ‘has no subsistence but in the faculty of a finite mind’ and so cannot be said to hold for objects that are taken to have their subsistence independently of such minds (thus, if natural objects have some kind of mind-independent existence, such a priori principles cannot yield certain knowledge about them). This view is made clear by Coleridge at *Logic*, 43n, 203n; *LS*, 32-3; *OM*, 276. See section 4.3 below.
human mind, ‘from the νοῦς or pure reason [taken] as […] at once the light of the mind and its highest object’.

For it is only by recognising and investigating the ‘unindividual and transcendent character’ of the Ideas or principles of reason that we can explain fully the nature of the relationship between mind and world, and the possibility of (noetic) knowledge that is ‘properly and wholly objective’ (here, clearly, Coleridge differs sharply from Kant concerning the scope and limits of human knowledge and its possible objects, particularly with reference to the apprehension of non-sensible objects).

Coleridge’s sense of the fundamental difference between intersubjectively valid knowledge acquired from the standpoint of finite human minds and the truly objective knowledge acquired from the standpoint of the absolute mind of God (which is partially accessible to finite human subjects through the Ideas) can be seen from the following footnote. This comment is appended to his claim that ‘the appearances [which] form the content and materials of experience […] are] as necessarily accompanied by a sense of a *contingency, as the truths [and principles] a priori, from which the facts of experience are contradistinguished, are characterised by a sense of necessity’ (i.e. by our awareness of their non-contingent status):

*I scarcely need inform the reader that this [conception of contingency] is to be interpreted relatively to the human understanding. By the Supreme Mind doubtless every object is contemplated with the same insight to its necessity as the properties of [a] circle or the functions of an algebraic term are by the human mathematician.

In light of the above discussion of Coleridge’s claims about ‘the probable in all its degrees’ and ‘the certain’, with reference to our knowledge of sensible objects, this note has two important implications: (i) a certain knowledge of the sensible objects that are known only as appearances in empirical cognition is possible (and would consist in an insight into the necessity of their properties), and (ii) such certain knowledge of sensible objects is analogous to our knowledge of the self-evident and certain truth of algebraic and geometrical propositions. While the ‘universally subjective’ a priori forms or principles of sense and understanding which condition all sense-experience ground our intersubjectively valid knowledge of sensible objects (as appearances), this knowledge allows us only to ‘arrive at a probability which, sufficing for all practical purposes, may

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100 Logic, 32, 34.
101 Logic, 69-70, 139-40n, 236-8 (cf. 205-6, for Coleridge on the limits of Kant’s approach).
102 Logic, 141.
103 See Logic, 34-6, 43-4, 211-4, 236-8.
be called an empirical certainty’ (i.e. empirical cognition yielding knowledge that is reliable or highly probable, but which cannot be shown to be necessarily or certainly true). However, the ‘properly and wholly objective’ a priori forms or principles of reason, the Ideas which can be accessed by finite human minds through intellectual or spiritual intuition, enable us, by partaking of the Divine Intellect or Supreme Mind (i.e. God), to contemplate such sensible objects in their intelligible or noumenal aspect, ‘with the same insight to [their] necessity as the properties of [a] circle or the functions of an algebraic term are [contemplated] by the human mathematician’.

I return to Coleridge’s distinction between subjectively real and objectively real a priori forms later, in 4.3-5. In those sections I shall focus on explaining how Coleridge’s claims about the fundamental differences between the human mind’s ‘component faculties’ of sense and understanding and the ‘unindividual and transcendent’ reason (i.e. God’s absolute mind, in which finite human subjects partake through the employment reason) relate to his threefold division of cognitive capacities and the diverse kinds of pure or nonempirical knowledge which have their ‘sources’ in these capacities. As we shall see, this is a core feature of Coleridge’s interpretation and expansion of Kantian transcendental philosophy and its analysis of the elements of human cognition. In the remainder of this part of the thesis, I focus on placing the conception of the cognitive capacities and their respective contributions to cognition outlined above (and presented as traditional by Coleridge) in the broader conceptual context of Coleridge’s claims about ‘the constitution of the subject’.

In particular, I will discuss (i) Coleridge’s distinction between the employment and the analysis of our cognitive faculties, and (ii) his overview of transcendental knowledge, and the aims and objects of transcendental inquiry into the sources and elements of our cognition (especially with reference to how such an inquiry seeks to describe the ‘constituent forms’ of sense and understanding).

3.4 The Transcendental, the A Priori, & the Constitution of the Faculties

i. Coleridge on A Priori Cognitions & Cognitive Constitution: An Overview

We have seen (3.1-3) how Coleridge distinguishes between the different kinds of a priori evidence or cognitive content according to the different faculties from which these kinds of cognitive content are taken to derive (e.g. pure intuitions from sense, pure concepts

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104 *Logic*, 141n. For Coleridge on Ideas, see also, 43-4, 233n, 237-8. His most detailed account of Ideas and the kind of knowledge deriving from them is *OM*, 214-90 (‘On the Divine Ideas’).

105 Coleridge uses this term at *Logic*, 145 (cf. 202n).
from understanding, intellectual intuitions and Ideas from reason). We have also seen that Coleridge makes a distinction between the kind of a priori cognitive content that is taken to derive from sense and understanding, considered as those faculties or cognitive powers that ‘constitut[e] the mind in its specific sense as the human mind’, and the kind of a priori cognitive content that is taken to derive from reason, considered as ‘the universal power presiding over both [sense and understanding]’ or ‘mind absolutely’ (i.e. God considered as ‘the absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind […] wherein we find the principle of being, and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality’). We are thus now in a position to consider how Coleridge distinguishes between a priori cognitive content (what Kant calls ‘pure representations’) in general and the particular class of a priori cognitions designated as ‘transcendental knowledge’, as well as to give some account of the kinds of features Coleridge thinks a cognitive state with a priori content (a pure representation) needs to possess in order to qualify as a transcendental representation. This will also help to lay the ground for my subsequent discussion of how Coleridge’s conception of what he calls ‘the constitution of the subject’ informs his account of transcendental knowledge and its objects. As I will explain later (see 4.2), Coleridge takes the most significant advance in the field of theorising about the a priori and the nature of pure cognitive content to have been Kant’s shift from ‘a mere classification of ideas’, in accordance with their origins in sense-experience or reflection (as offered by e.g. Descartes and Locke), to ‘a true analysis of the understanding’, or ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms of the understanding’, that seeks to show not only that there is a kind of cognitive content that does not derive from sensory experience (i.e. a priori evidence), but also to explain how such cognitive content, or rather, the presentation of such cognitive content to the mind, is possible. In this section I begin by briefly restating Coleridge’s distinction between the formal (a priori) and material (a posteriori) elements of cognition. I then discuss some of the analogies that Coleridge uses to explain the differences between formal, empirical, and transcendental knowledge of such elements, particularly in relation to his account of the ‘constituent forms’ of cognition (i.e. the forms of sense and understanding).

We saw in section 1.4 that Coleridge contends that pure common logic should be concerned with only ‘the formal [elements of cognition], let the subject matter be what it may, drawn from outward experiences [i.e. from objects of the senses] or from inward

106 See e.g. Logic, 34-7, 66-70, 211-4. For further discussion, see 4.1-2 below.
107 See Logic, 44, 70n.
109 See Logic, 210, 145, 147; cf. 146-9, 205-6n.
consciousness and reflection’. As he states it, ‘the pure common logic appeals wholly to ‘principles a priori, i.e. [...] principles derived from the construction of the machine [i.e. the human mind] itself, not from its uses [i.e. from the application or employment of such principles in empirical cognition]’.

This claim needs to be put in the context of Coleridge’s table of pure and empirical sciences and his ‘[over]view of the powers [i.e. cognitive faculties] from which the[se] sciences derive their name or character’. Coleridge’s distinction between a priori contents and principles of the understanding and ‘contingent occasions of its application’, or the ‘empirical conditions under which the exercise of the understanding takes place’, is first introduced in this table, as is the mechanical analogy which Coleridge employs when explaining what he means by the constitution or construction of the cognitive faculties. As noted in 3.2, at this point in Logic, Coleridge frames the distinction between pure and empirical cognitive content in terms of an opposition between metaphysical evidence that has its origin in our cognitive faculties (i.e. the a priori contents and principles of reason, sense, and understanding) and physical evidence that has its origin in ‘objects of the bodily sense, considered as matters of fact’. This corresponds broadly with Coleridge’s distinction between formal (a priori) and material (a posteriori) elements of cognition, which is also often expressed in terms of the following opposition between mind and nature:

As, then, the sum of the objective was entitled nature, as comprising all the phenomena by which existence other than our own is made known to us, so was the sum of the subjective comprehended in the name of mind or intelligence [Coleridge’s emphasis].

[I]t has been required of me that I should consider the mind in and for itself, separately from the objects of the senses and sensations. All that belongs to the former we have for our present purposes agreed to comprise under the name of the “subjective” or intelligence, and all the latter under the term “objective” or nature.

Coleridge defines the term ‘phenomena’ as referring to those ‘appearances that belong to mankind generally and constitute the common world of the senses[,] and which [...] we distinguish from appearances that result from accidents and peculiarities of the individual
subject’. He brings these descriptions of the natural and phenomenal realms together in the following definition of ‘Nature, in its passive and material meaning’ as ‘= natura natura, [a term which] signifies the sum of all the phaenomena by which the existence of any thing is made known to us’. From this division between the realms of the mental (the subjective) and the physical or material (the objective), Coleridge draws a distinction between formal and empirical knowledge, and between formal sciences and sciences of experience (i.e. empirical natural science or ‘natural enquiries’). My aim here is to show how Coleridge’s distinction between formal and empirical knowledge is related to his account of the constitution (or construction) of the cognitive faculties.

ii. Coleridge’s Conception of ‘Constituent Forms’: the Mechanist Analogy
Incidentally, Coleridge’s table of pure and empirical sciences in Logic is followed by a passage in which Coleridge introduces the analogy of mechanical construction that he will later employ in attempting to elucidate the differences between formal, empirical, and transcendental knowledge. Here Coleridge states that when the logician considers ‘the evidence of the understanding’ (pure concepts), she is concerned with the kind of cognitive content that derives from ‘the laws of the understanding, or the rules that result from the constitution of the understanding itself considered abstractly from its objects, even as the mechanist would examine an engine previously to its use, or an astronomer a quadrant or telescope’. To make clearer the nature of the analogy he has in mind here (between the human mind and mechanical instruments), Coleridge provides the following gloss on what he means by the constitution of the understanding:

It is the same whether we say the constitution of the understanding or the constituent forms of the understanding, the understanding being considered as the band or copula of these [forms]. Thus a steam engine, of course, comprises all the component parts; but these parts, considered in themselves as individual things, do not involve or constitute the idea of the steam engine: it is the steam engine = the parts + the copula of the parts.

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114 Logic, 130.
115 SWF.I.688, in a ‘Glossary of Terms’ which may have formed part of the materials Coleridge used in composing and compiling his Logic MS. Here Coleridge also defines ‘Natura naturata’ as ‘= the sum or aggregate by which its [i.e. passive or material nature’s] existence is made known to us’; cf. Logic, 45n for a similar reference to ‘nature as the aggregate of objects (natura naturata).
116 See Logic, 41 for Coleridge equation of ‘natural enquiries’ with ‘physics’, his general term for empirical inquiries into phenomenal nature (which includes the mind, insofar as certain of its features can be described or explained in naturalistic terms, as Coleridge allows for at e.g. Logic, 37).
117 Logic, 45.
118 Logic, 45.
For now, all that need be noted here is that Coleridge conceives of the constitution of the understanding (and sense) in purely functional terms. The aim of his steam engine analogy is not to suggest that cognitive faculties or capacities are composed of a set of moving parts like a machine. Rather, Coleridge is claiming that just as we can think of any machine or mechanical instrument purely in terms of the collective functioning of the individual parts which constitute it, we can think of a cognitive faculty or capacity purely in terms of the collective functioning of the individual cognitive operations and activities in which the exercise of this faculty or capacity is taken to consist. What it means to say that a steam engine is ‘the copula of [its] parts’ or that the understanding is ‘the band or copula’ of its constituent forms is that our conception of the collective functioning of its interconnected parts or forms as a unified whole is what constitutes, or determines, our conception of any given machine or cognitive faculty. So, in this view, to think of a steam engine is to think of the engine’s ‘component parts’ working together, not as ‘individual things’, but as the unified entity that is a steam engine (i.e. this is what ‘constitute[s] our idea of the steam engine’). Likewise, to think of the understanding and its constitution is to think of the understanding’s constituent forms or ‘several functional powers’ working together, not as individual mental acts or rules of cognition, but as the unified set of discursive cognitive operations that is our capacity for discursive cognition (i.e. this is what ‘constitut[es] what we mean by [the concept, or term] understanding’, conceived as our ‘discursive faculty’).

In both cases, to talk of the constitution of something (whether a machine or a mind) is not just to speak of its various components as an aggregate of individual parts which, taken together, constitute this thing, but to speak of how these parts function together as a unified whole. Coleridge makes a further distinction here, between a mechanical whole, which is the ‘common result of its constituent parts’, and a ‘productive unity’ or a whole ‘that is of necessity antecedent to its parts’. Machines like the steam engine and mechanical instrument like the sextant (and their parts) are a ‘mechanical’ whole of the former kind, the mind and its various capacities are an ‘organic’ whole or unity of the latter kind. However, what matters for our present purposes is just that Coleridge conceives of constitution purely in terms of how the components or forms taken to constitute such wholes function together, without reference to questions concerning how such components or forms physically fit together.

119 See esp. Logic, 155, 265n.
120 Logic, 265-6n. See also 212 for Coleridge’s reference to ‘the constitutive forms, or constitutional acts and functions, of the SENSE and of the understanding’.
121 See 231-2 and n.
122 For Coleridge on this functional unity of the mind, see Logic, 232n, 255-6ff.
(e.g. in the case of the various mechanical components of a steam engine, or the various physiological structures of a human brain).

Put another way, constitution is a matter of how we conceive of the functional relations between any given set of interconnected components, having no reference to the make-up of any of these individual components themselves. In the case of a steam engine, its components may be made up of a range of different kinds of materials, but the physical characteristics of these parts should have no bearing on our conception of the engine’s constitution, in Coleridge’s purely functional sense of this term: all that is considered is how these parts operate, and particularly how the various parts function together as the whole which we recognise as a steam engine. In the case of a cognitive faculty like the understanding, its constituent forms may be caused by—or identifiable as—certain neurophysiological structures (or some kind of immaterial substance), but the material (or immaterial) characteristics of any given form must have no bearing on our conception of the understanding’s constitution, insofar as the constituent forms of the understanding are considered in purely functional terms, as the cognitive activities and operations that together constitute what we recognise as our capacity for discursive cognition. As Coleridge puts this point in a note on cognitive constitution, the nature of such discursive forms and operations must be conceived of:

in the alone and rightful sense of inherent in the constitution of the understanding, or as constituting what we mean by the understanding, whatever it may be in other respects, whether a self-subsistent soul, or a function of the same, or a mere modification of matter, or a common result of two co-agents as the tune from a musical instrument.123

So just as what we mean by ‘steam engine’ (i.e. what constitutes our idea of the steam engine) is a specific kind of machine with a particular set of mechanical functions which are conceived to operate together in a certain way, regardless of whether this machine and its parts are composed of metal or heat-resistant chocolate, what ‘we mean by the understanding’ is a specific kind of cognitive capacity with a particular set of discursive functions which are conceived to operate together in a certain way, without reference to what the understanding ‘may be in other respects’, whether its constituent forms are the result of some neurophysiological structure, or the functions of some kind of immaterial substance.124 In 4.3-5 below, I consider Coleridge’s claim that ‘the knowledge of the

123 *Logic*, 266n.
124 See also *Logic*, 6, 37, 132-3.
constitution of the mental faculties forms the science of transcendental analysis’ in the context of his functional conception of cognitive constitution. For the remainder of this section I focus on the relationship between this Coleridgean conception of constitution and Coleridge’s account of the difference between formal and transcendental knowledge (i.e. between the knowledge of a priori cognitive form and content and the knowledge of the cognitive capacities that make such form and content possible), and particularly his claims on the kinds of a priori cognitive content (pure representations) from which these two different classes of a priori cognitions are taken to derive.

iii. Formal, Transcendental, & Empirical Aspects of Mind: Coleridge’s Sextant Analogy

Having given an outline of Coleridge’s conception of constitution, we can now consider how it informs his attempts to differentiate between diverse kinds or classes of cognitive content based on differences in the features and origins of such contents, particularly with reference to the various kinds of cognitive operations and conditions that Coleridge takes to give rise to or produce different kinds of cognitive content. We will also now be able to see why Coleridge connects certain kinds of cognitive content with certain kinds of epistemic procedures, with these connections in turn providing a basis for Coleridge’s distinctions between certain kinds of knowledge. I will take such connections as the starting point for elucidating the purposes of Coleridge’s functional analogies between the component parts of mechanical instruments and the constituent forms of human cognitive activity. In particular, I consider why Coleridge thinks such analogies are useful in spite of his strong criticism of mechanistic materialist accounts of cognition.\footnote{See e.g. \textit{Logic}, 37, 132-3, 265-6n.} As was noted earlier, Coleridge suggests there is an analogy between a logician’s analysis of the laws of the understanding, or the rules that result from the constitution of the understanding itself considered abstractly from its objects’ and the procedures whereby the mechanist would examine an engine previously to its use, or an astronomer a quadrant or telescope’.\footnote{\textit{Logic}, 45.} He returns to this analogy in those passages of \textit{Logic} where he first introduces his distinction between empirical, formal, and transcendental knowledge, employing the mental-mechanical comparison to illustrate the nature of the contrast he draws here between ‘principles derived from the construction of the machine itself [i.e. the understanding]’ and principles derived from ‘its uses’ or the ‘contingent occasions of its application’ (i.e. between its pure and its empirical aspects):
By way of illustration we will take a sextant or other optical instrument. Now we may consider this [i.e. the sextant] in three different ways, viz. with regard to the objects and particular images which it presents, or, abstracting from these, with regard to the way in which it presents these images, however different in themselves, and which is in common to them all, or lastly with regard to the construction and constituent parts of the sextant itself.127

As Coleridge goes on to explain, these ‘three different ways’ of considering the data and mechanisms of ‘a sextant or other optical instrument’ may be thought of as analogous to three different ways of considering our cognitive content(s) and the operations and conditions taken to produce this content. To consider the mind ‘with regard to the objects and particular images which it presents’ is to consider the empirically given or \textit{a posteriori} elements of our cognition and its contents. To consider the mind ‘with regard to the way in which it presents these images [i.e. the contents of empirical cognitive states] however different in themselves, and which is in common to them all’ is to consider those universal, necessary, and invariant elements of our cognitive states that are taken to be given \textit{a priori} within the mind itself (\textit{ab intra} or \textit{a mente ipsa}). Finally, to consider the mind ‘with regard to the construction and constituent parts [of the human mind] itself’ is to consider how the cognitive faculties or capacities taken to ‘constitute the mind in its specific sense as the \textit{human} mind’ (i.e. sense and understanding) function in such a way as to make possible all \textit{a posteriori} and \textit{a priori} cognitive content (conditioning \textit{a posteriori} content and grounding or originating \textit{a priori} content). These three different ways of considering the mind and its contents and operations yield Coleridge’s ‘three divisions of knowledge’: the empirical, the formal, and the transcendental.128

However, before giving a detailed explanation of how his analogy between the human mind and a sextant yields these three divisions of knowledge, Coleridge offers a brief explanation of the differences between the empirical, formal, and transcendental perspectives on (or accounts of) the contents and operations of the mind, with reference to his conception of constitution. Here Coleridge wants to emphasise that we can arrive at a knowledge of certain aspects of the mind’s activity without having given an account of the operations, or constituent forms and functions, of its various cognitive capacities (i.e. what Coleridge calls ‘an analysis of the faculties’):

127 \textit{Logic}, 140.
But before we apply this instance [i.e. the mind-sextant analogy] it must be premised that in the mind the way in which the instrument acts of necessity, to a certain extent is demonstrable without the knowledge of the construction or constitution of the instrument, its exercise being inseparably accompanied with a sense of its necessity inherent in itself, and this necessity it is that forms the essence of a knowledge a priori. We do not say it has always done so and so, and therefore we have no doubt that it will continue so to do; neither the analogy of the past nor the anticipation of the future enters at all into the contemplation.129

Again, it should be kept in mind here that Coleridge is not suggesting that there is any direct analogy between the mechanical parts of a sextant and the constituent forms, or functional powers, of sense and understanding. Rather, the analogy is between how we understand the functioning of these (on Coleridge’s view) two very different kinds of ‘instrument’. Coleridge’s aim here is to suggest that just as we can know that, assuming the instrument is in working order, a sextant will always function in the same way given the functional relations between its constituent parts, even if we have no knowledge of these parts themselves, we can know that, assuming our mind is in working order, our cognitive faculties of sense and understanding, will always function in the same way given the functional relations between their constituent forms. The reason we can know this, on Coleridge’s view, is because our exercise of such instruments (whether a sextant or a cognitive faculty) is ‘inseparably accompanied with a sense of its necessity inherent in itself’: by employing the instrument we become aware that it works in a particular way, even if we cannot give any account of the constituent parts or operations which cause the instrument to function in this way. In doing so, we also come to recognise that its particular way of working is something that is determined solely by the nature of the instrument, in virtue of some functional ‘necessity inherent in itself’.130 It is in this way that Coleridge conceives of the a priori aspects of cognition. To consider the a priori aspects of cognition that are taken to derive from the mind (‘a mente ipsa’), and to be independent of the contingent conditions of any particular experience, is to follow a similar procedure to that in which ‘the mechanist would examine an engine previously to its use, or an astronomer a quadrant or telescope’: considering those aspects of a given instrument’s functioning that derive from this instrument’s construction or constitution, and are thus

129 Logic, 140.
130 Logic, 140; cf. 45, 213-4, 266n.
independent of the contingencies of any particular observation that might be made with the instrument (i.e. the data furnished \(a\ posteriori\) by this instrument).^{131}

Coleridge’s point in the passage just quoted is that the way in which the mind ‘acts of necessity’ can partly be determined with reference to the contents presented through the exercise of certain cognitive faculties, even if we have not yet determined how the operations or ‘several functional powers’ of these faculties produce such content. This is because we can tell that the exercise of any given cognitive faculty and its operations is ‘inseparably accompanied with a sense of its necessity \(inherent\) in itself’, by which Coleridge means that when we exercise the faculties of sense or understanding, there are always certain invariant features that accompany the operations of these faculties, and which must characterise whatever content is given or produced through such operations. This view informs Coleridge’s earlier claim that ‘principles \(a\ priori\) are ‘principles derived from the construction of [the mind] itself’.^{132} As we saw above, Coleridge contends that ‘the alone rightful and alone intended sense of inherent in the constitution of the understanding’ refers only to the cognitive functions and operations that together ‘constitute what we mean by the understanding’, having no relation to what such faculties ‘may be in other respects’ (this also applies to what we mean by the term ‘sense’).^{133} Since Coleridge takes this ‘necessity inherent in [the mind] itself’ to derive from the construction or constitution of our cognitive faculties, and to be that in which \(a\ priori\) principles (of cognition) must consist, he contends that ‘this necessity it is that forms the essence of a knowledge \(a\ priori\)’. Because whatever is invariant, or universal and necessary, in our cognitive states is something that derives from (the operations of) the cognitive faculties taken to be productive of such states, insofar as the \(a\ priori\) is taken to consist in whatever is universal and necessary in our cognition, the same sort of necessity, ‘which inheres in the forms and functions of the understanding [and the sense] and the rules generalised from these’, must be identified as that which ‘forms the essence of a knowledge \(a\ priori\)’, or grounds all \(a\ priori\) principles.^{134} What Coleridge’s sextant analogy aims to suggest here, then, is that ‘the essence of a knowledge \(a\ priori\) should be conceived as something like the invariant features of the optical data presented by a sextant, as that which follows necessarily from the construction of this instrument (considered in Coleridge’s purely functional terms), and must therefore be distinguished

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^{131} See Logic, 45-6, 73-6, 140-1ff.
^{132} Logic, 139.
^{133} Logic, 266n; cf. 153-4.
^{134} See Logic, 139-41, 146-7.
from the contingent features of such data which are caused by other factors (such as the conditions under which some individual observation occurs).

Coleridge’s subsequent claim that ‘We do not say it [i.e. the mind] has always done so and so, and therefore we have no doubt that it will continue to do so’, coupled with his remark that ‘neither the analogy of the past nor the anticipation of the future enters at all into the contemplation [of the a priori elements of cognition]’, is intended to reiterate the point outlined above. Coleridge is implicitly contrasting those invariant features of cognition and experience which he claims must derive from the constituent forms or inherent functions of our cognitive faculties with the kinds of contingent features that may reappear in different experiences, and which can form the basis for empirical generalisations about the operations of the mind. This is why, in the preceding passages, he asserts that we must ‘abstract from all empirical conditions under which the exercise under which the exercise of the understanding takes place’ when engaged in the consideration of the a priori aspects of cognition. For these a posteriori features of our cognitive states ‘respect the understanding, circumstantially, under certain contingent occasions of its application, or of [the sensible] objects, to which and by which the application [of this faculty] was determined’, and therefore reveal nothing concerning the invariant and non-contingent aspects of the understanding and its operations. We might be able to make certain generalisations about the understanding and its activity, based on our repeated observations ‘drawn from outward experiences or from inward consciousness and reflection’, but insofar as these observations refer to contingent and empirically given conditions or objects of cognition, they cannot yield any knowledge of ‘the way in which the [understanding] acts of necessity’. To acquire any knowledge of why the exercise of the understanding is ‘inseparably accompanied by a sense of its necessity inherent in itself’, we must consider the cognitive content given through the exercise of this cognitive faculty ‘with regard to the construction and constituent parts [or forms] of the [understanding] itself’. While Coleridge does consider knowledge of the a priori aspects of cognition to be the kind of knowledge which can be derived from generalisations based on the analysis of certain features of our cognitive contents and operations, he makes a sharp distinction between the epistemic procedures involved in making generalisations about the necessary features of cognition and those employed in making generalisations about the contingent features of cognition. The former kind concern only the ‘necessity inherent in’, or following from, the constitution of a given

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135 See *Logic*, 139.
cognitive faculty, while the latter kind may concern any empirical condition or object affecting this faculty, or any ‘contingent occasion of its application’. To employ the terms of Coleridge’s sextant analogy: generalisations about contingent features of any given instrument’s data concern ‘the objects and particular images which it presents’, while generalisations about necessary features of this instrument’s data concern only ‘the way in which it [acts of necessity in] present[ing] these images, however different in themselves, and which [way of presenting] is in common to them all’. As noted above, Coleridge also allows for a knowledge of this necessity which is independent of any such consideration of the understanding (or sense) and its operations. For, on this Coleridgean account, we need not know why particular aspects of our cognition are universal and necessary to recognise that they do in fact exhibit such features. Indeed, if all exercise of the understanding is ‘inseparably accompanied with a sense of its necessity inherent in itself’, then it cannot be the case that our apprehension of ‘this necessity […] that forms the essence of a knowledge a priori’ is in some way dependent upon a prior knowledge of the constitution of the understanding (since only certain ways of exercising the understanding, i.e. only the act of transcendental reflection, can yield such knowledge). To make sense of Coleridge’s view that ‘the way in which [the mind] acts of necessity, to a certain extent is determinable without the knowledge of [the mind’s] construction or constitution’, we need to look at the examples he gives of the kinds of a priori knowledge and principles that may be derived (from pure cognitive content) independently of any claims referring to the constitution or constituent forms of the cognitive faculties (which produce this content):

Proofs of this we have in every position [or proposition] of geometry and arithmetic as well as in pure logic. The mathematician rests perfectly secure that his axioms and propositions are necessary and universal truths, without troubling himself with any analysis of the faculties by which he constructs his figures and demonstrates their relations.

This remark should be put in the context of Coleridge’s claim that ‘[just a]s we cannot become mathematicians but by reasoning according to the laws and necessities of the primary imagination, so neither can we be logicians or discourse logically, but according

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136 See Logic, 139-40. For Coleridge’s comments about the various kinds of generalisations based on an analysis of our cognitive operations, see e.g. 12-14, 65-70, 73-6ff, 141-5ff.
137 See Logic, 140. This corresponds to Coleridge’s distinction between the necessity of the constitution of our faculties and the contingency of the possible uses or exercise of these faculties.
138 Logic, 139-40. Transcendental reflection is discussed further in 4.1-2 below.
139 Logic, 140.
to the inherent forms and necessary data of the understanding or reflective faculty’ (he also says that just as the *a priori* forms and contents of logic must be ‘contemplated from the point of reflection’, those of mathematics must be ‘contemplated’ from the point of the pure sense or intuitive faculty’). When Coleridge states that the exercise of a cognitive faculty is ‘inseparably accompanied with a sense of its necessity inherent in itself’ it is these ‘laws and necessities’ or ‘inherent forms and necessary data’ of our intuitive and discursive cognitive faculties to which he refers. This is why Coleridge contends that such necessity (in the functioning of the human mind) is what ‘forms the essence of a knowledge *a priori*’: he takes the ‘laws and necessities’ of our cognitive faculties to be the ground or origin of the *a priori* principles of formal sciences like logic and mathematics.

The point of statements such as ‘the way in which [the mind] acts of necessity [is] to a certain extent determinable without the knowledge of [the mind’s] construction or constitution’ is to emphasise that there is a distinction between our knowledge of the *a priori* forms and contents which derive from the way in which the mind ‘acts of necessity’ (the pure principles and subject-matter of logic and mathematics) and our *a priori* knowledge of the pure cognitive acts and products (the ‘inherent forms and necessary data’ of our cognitive faculties) that are taken to be the ground or origin of such *a priori* forms and contents (i.e. to be what make such forms and contents possible). Coleridge’s aim here is to demonstrate that, even if we accept the claim that all *a priori* principles and pure cognitive contents must derive from or be grounded in our cognitive faculties and the forms and functions of such faculties, we must maintain a clear distinction between the *a priori* cognitions that consist in the knowledge yielded by analysis of our cognitive faculties, and those *a priori* cognitions consisting in a knowledge that is independent of such analysis of the faculties. Coleridge’s claims about how transcendental philosophy enables us to acquire the former kind of *a priori* cognitions concerning cognitive faculties and their contents will be the principal subject of the next part of the thesis.

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140 *Logic*, 266n.
141 See *Logic*, 141-3, 146-9.
4. ‘The Weights & Measures of the Human Mind’: Coleridge on the Threefold Division of Transcendental Inquiry & The Nature of the *A Priori*

4.1 Transcendental Reflection & the Sources of *A Priori* Evidence: Coleridge’s Table of Pure Sciences & The Threefold Division of the Faculties

Like Kant, Coleridge thinks it possible to isolate and analyse certain basic elements of our cognition or experience (and the evidence given in diverse kinds of representations or cognitive states) through the procedure Kant calls ‘transcendental reflection’. Kant contends that if we seek to explain ‘the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition’ from the transcendental perspective,

The first question prior to all further treatment of our representation is this: In which cognitive faculty do they [our representations or cognitive states] belong together? Is it the understanding or is it the senses before which they are connected or compared?¹

What such a procedure entails is suggested by Kant’s definition of ‘reflection’—taken as the cognitive process on which all acts of judgement and comparison depend—as ‘a distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong’. As Kant’s subsequent gloss on his definition makes evident, this procedure intends to establish that different kinds of pure representations (i.e. *a priori* cognitive contents) can be shown to ‘belong to’ or derive from different cognitive powers:

The action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition, I call *transcendental reflection*.²

In other words, what it means for some representation, some kind of cognitive state or its contents, to belong to or be situated in a particular cognitive power is that the latter is responsible for the former (in Kantian terms, this cognitive power or faculty is what makes the representation in question ‘possible *a priori*’).³ As was discussed earlier in 2.1-3, what makes such reflection on the content of our cognitive states *transcendental* is that it is

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¹ *CPR*, B316 (see also CPR, B33-5, 74-82); cf. Coleridge’s similar statements at *Logic*, 151-4, 266n, and esp. 234: ‘it is only by means of this reflection, by which we represent the mind as a whole consisting of all its thoughts as its parts, that we can form any conception of the mind at all’.
² Kant’s definition at *CPR*, B317; cf. Coleridge’s statements at *Logic*, 153-4, 169, 246-7, 265-6n.
³ See *Logic*, 146-9. Cf. Kant’s claims at *CPR*, B25, 34-5, 81-2ff. For further discussion of these points, see also 2.1-2, 3.2-3 above.
concerned with ‘our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori’. This is why Coleridge claims in Logic that when we seek ‘fully to understand the nature of [our representations] transcendentally’, ‘neither the thing nor the knowledge [i.e. the object of a representation or cognition] is the subject of investigation, but the faculty by which the thing is known’. I explain below how Coleridge follows Kant in emphasising that such a method must involve an important distinction between a priori knowledge derived from, or ‘present to the mind’ as, pure or nonempirical cognitive content (such as the principles of mathematics or formal logic) and a priori knowledge-claims concerning the nonempirical origin of such content (the propositions of transcendental philosophy). For as we will see, Coleridge’s distinction between different kinds of a priori evidence is partly an application of Kant’s claim that ‘not every a priori cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely a priori, or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use a priori)’. This will also require a further account of the kinds of content in our representations or cognitive states that Coleridge thinks can be taken to constitute a priori evidence, particularly the kind that furnishes the basis of transcendental knowledge. With this in mind, we can turn now to Coleridge’s table of the pure (a priori) and mixed (empirical) sciences, which outlines the different kinds of a priori and a posteriori evidence or cognitive content in accordance with their different sources.

Coleridge’s table, which serves to introduce the distinction between metaphysical and physical evidence outlined above (see 3.2), is arranged as follows:

μεταφυσικά [metaphysics]
A—Noetics = the evidence of reason
B—Logic = the evidence of the understanding
C—Mathematics = the evidence of sense

φυσικά [physics]
D—Empiric = evidence of the senses

Scholium. The senses = sense + sensation + impressions.

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5 Logic, 153; cf. 169: ‘transcendental exposition […] rests in the ascertainment of the faculty the existence of which we know only by means of reflection, i.e. by an exercise of one of the functions of the faculty’.
6 CPR, B81-2.
7 Logic, 44 and 44-5n. See also 33-6 for the scheme of faculties or powers summarised in this table.
Coleridge’s footnotes to the table state his views on the method and content of noetics (speculative metaphysics) and ‘Empiric’ or ‘the sciences of experience’ (empirical natural sciences). Given that we are concerned here only with Coleridge’s claim that certain kinds of cognitive content must have their source or origin in certain cognitive faculties, for the moment I focus just on the evidence-faculty correspondences laid out in the above table, and particularly on how these correspondences inform Coleridge’s distinction between the different kinds of a priori evidence or content. I will return to the problem of how Coleridge characterises the pure cognitions deriving from diverse kinds of a priori evidence later (4.3), after discussing what this table of pure sciences can tell us about Coleridge’s conception of transcendental representations and the special kind of a priori content that he, following Kant, takes them to contain.

In my view, Coleridge’s scheme of pure sciences in Logic is premised on what I described above as a (transcendental) comparison of and distinction between our various representations and the cognitive powers or faculties ‘in which they are situated’ (i.e. in which they originate a priori, and to which the a priori content of these representations can be traced back). Thus, while Coleridge recognises one general source of a posteriori evidence (sensory experience, taken as the combined activities of the bodily senses and our cognitive powers), he contends that we must distinguish between three different sources of a priori evidence. Namely, the faculties of reason, understanding, and sense, each of which corresponds to a particular pure science and its field of a priori inquiry. Consequently, we have Noetics (or ‘truths of reason applied’, by which Coleridge means the speculative principles or laws of ontology, theology, and ethics), which concerns itself with ‘the evidence of reason’; Logic—including both the formal and transcendental branches—which concerns itself with ‘the evidence of understanding’; and Mathematics, which is concerned with ‘the evidence of sense’. This is why Coleridge speaks so confidently of ‘the universally admitted and understood diversity of metaphysic [or ‘the science of noetics, more frequently, but less appropriately, entitled metaphysics’], logic and mathematics, and the convenience and exact correspondence of these to the three sources of the reason (νοησις), the understanding (λόγος), and the sense (μάθησις)’. In short, what it means for a faculty to be the source of a pure science is that it is the cognitive power...

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8 For these Coleridgean definitions, see also Logic, 38-41, 43-4, 134-7, 139-43.
9 See Kant’s claims at CPR, B74-82 (which Coleridge follows at e.g. Logic, 145-7, 152-4, 211-4).
10 Logic, 44. Cf. 90. ‘The mathematic […] , which has for its subject the forms of the pure sense and the products of the active imagination, is not only the first pure science but supplies to all other sciences the most perfect model and exemplar’.
11 Logic, 70. Coleridge uses μάθησις in the same way as θεωγία, to refer to the faculty of sense, or ‘the intuitive power of the mind’ (see e.g. 34-6, 73-5ff, 245). See also 3.3 above.
taken to be responsible for (i.e. the ground or origin of) the kind of pure representations or *a priori* cognitive content(s) with which a particular nonempirical mode of inquiry is concerned. This is why Coleridge claims to be presenting ‘a view of the [cognitive] powers from which the [pure] sciences derive their name and character’, when he gives his account of the faculties of reason, understanding, and sense and the different kinds of cognitive content (or evidence) which is presented to the mind through the acts or operations of each faculty.\(^{12}\)

On this reading, Coleridge takes *a priori* evidence to concern the operations of a particular faculty (its acts) and the cognitive content given *a priori* through these operations (its pure products). Thus, evidence of reason concerns intellectual or spiritual intuitions and their content, evidence of understanding concerns pure conceptions and their content, and evidence of sense pure intuitions and their content. Accordingly, he contends that we may ‘define reason as the power of ideas, the understanding [as] the faculty of conceptions, and the sense [as] the source and faculty of intuitions and perceptions’.\(^{13}\) It should be noted, however, that Coleridge’s table of pure sciences serves only to designate certain of our cognitive powers as the ‘source and faculty’ of certain kinds of evidence or cognitive content. While Coleridge’s scheme does emphasise the ‘exact correspondence’ of particular faculties to particular fields of *a priori* cognition, it must not be taken to suggest that Coleridge thinks we exercise only this single particular faculty when engaged in the ‘formal science’ or nonempirical inquiry designated as corresponding to it. Rather, Coleridge claims that our three basic cognitive powers, the faculties of reason, sense, and understanding must work in unison, with the former taken as ‘the universal power presiding over both [the latter two]’.\(^ {14}\) He does, however, sometimes emphasise that we should isolate or attend only to the activities or products of a single cognitive power, as is required for the different branches of transcendental analysis, or in considering the field of *a priori* evidence dealt with by a particular pure science.\(^ {15}\) In such cases, a claim about the correspondence between a given cognitive faculty and its evidence should be taken to concern only the origin of a certain kind of cognitive content in the operations or acts of this faculty or power. Thus, such a claim has no bearing on how, for instance, formal logic or mathematics is carried out or how

\(^{12}\) *Logic*, 35.

\(^{13}\) *Logic*, 68. Coleridge uses ‘idea’ here in a Neoplatonic sense, as an intelligible or noumenal principle taken to be apprehensible through nonsensible (spiritual or intellectual) intuition (see *Logic*, 236-8).

\(^{14}\) *Logic*, 70n. Coleridge holds that the combined activities of sense, understanding, and reason must be involved in every act of cognition, even if it is the case that certain kinds of cognitive contents and operations derive only from certain cognitive faculties (see e.g. *Logic*, 68-70, 256-61).

\(^{15}\) See esp. *Logic*, 211-4 (cf. 66-70, 236-8).
these disciplines derive and prove their principles. Coleridge means just that (1) formal or pure sciences deal with a kind of nonempirical evidence or cognitive content that must have its origin a priori in a corresponding cognitive power, and (2) it is possible for us to distinguish between different kinds of a priori evidence according to the different origins of the diverse pure representations (cognitive states and their contents) whereby such a priori cognitive content is presented to the mind. As Coleridge makes clear later in Logic, (1) and (2) depend on the further claim that (3) by thus accounting for the origins of certain kinds of cognitive content, we are thereby able to explain the ground of their possibility (as a feature of our cognitive experience).16

With this framework based on Coleridge’s table of pure sciences now in place, we can proceed to a consideration of how Coleridge’s claims on ‘the convenience and exact correspondence of [noetics, logic, and mathematics] to the three sources of the reason (νοης), the understanding (λόγος), and the sense (μέθοδος or θεωρία)’ relates to Kant’s account of transcendental representations and their contents.17 My aims here will be as follows: (1) to show that Coleridge’s table of pure sciences is predicated on the two principal claims of transcendental philosophy, as he understands it: i.e. (i) that experience and the various cognitive activities in which it consists would not be possible ‘but for the a priori origins of certain features of our cognition’,18 and (ii) that we can show a priori ‘that and how’ these features originate in, and are made possible by, certain cognitive faculties or powers; (2) to show what, on Coleridge’s view, separates transcendental representations and transcendental knowledge from other kinds of pure a priori representations and cognitions, such as pure sensible or pure intellectual intuitions and pure concepts, and the different kinds of cognitions taken to derive from the content given in or by means of these a priori representations; and (3) to show that the problems raised in points (1) and (2) must be considered in the context of Coleridge’s distinction between the use or employment and the analysis of our cognitive faculties, conceived of as a distinction between (a) the a priori evidence given, apprehended, or constructed, etc. by means of a particular faculty (its pure forms and contents, or ‘constitutional acts and functions’ and ‘pure products’19) and (b) an investigation into how the presentation of such a priori evidence to the mind is possible a priori (which must proceed, Coleridge asserts, by means of a transcendental analysis of the pure contents and operations of the cognitive

16 See e.g. Logic, 211ff (esp. 212n), 247-8, 265-6n.
17 Logic, 70.
18 Kitcher (1990), 16; cf. Coleridge’s claims at Logic, 76, 146-7 (see also 2.1 above).
19 Coleridge’s terms for a priori forms and contents at Logic, 212-3 (see 2.1, 3.2 above).
faculties or capacities in question). I will also show how this distinction relates to the
distinction, hinted at in point (2) above, between the cognitive contents taken to
originate in our faculties and the different kinds of knowledge that can be derived from
such contents. This will help to clarify what it means to hold, as Coleridge does, that
while transcendental, mathematical, and logical knowledge all derive from the same
general class of *a priori* evidence (pure representations and their contents), each kind of
knowledge consists in a different sort of *a priori* cognition (i.e. each discipline involves
distinct kinds of *a priori* knowledge claims). The principal focus here will be on how
transcendental representations give rise to knowledge of the *a priori* origins and *a priori*
possibility of certain features of our cognition.

4.2 The Classification of Content & The Analysis of the Faculties: Two
Perspectives on Coleridge’s Table of Pure Sciences

i. Coleridge’s Table of Pure Sciences & the Employment/Analysis Distinction

It will be useful to begin the discussion of (1)-(3), as outlined above, by recapitulating the
main points of Kant’s account of transcendental representations and the procedure of
transcendental reflection whereby, he claims, we can acquire this particular kind of *a
priori* cognitive content; we can then consider how Kant’s views inform Coleridge’s
claims about transcendental knowledge and the analysis of the cognitive faculties, and in
particular how Coleridge’s conception of transcendental representations and their *a priori*
content relates to his table of the pure sciences. As we have seen, Kant uses the example
of space, taken as the pure form of outer intuition, to illustrate his distinction between
transcendental knowledge and other kinds of *a priori* cognition, and to show what kind of
content must be contained in a representation in order for it to qualify as a
transcendental representation (see 2.1). When Kant says that ‘neither space nor any
geometrical determination of it *a priori* is a transcendental representation’, he means that
neither the contents of a pure outer intuition, nor the geometrical procedures exercised
upon such *a priori* content (e.g. the construction of a triangle in the pure spatial
manifold), taken on their own could be considered as *a priori* representations or
cognitions with a transcendental status. This is because the contents of transcendental
representations must concern only the *a priori* origins of some feature of cognition (such
as spatiality) or the *a priori* possibility of cognition. As Kant puts it, ‘only the cognition
that these representations [i.e. our pure sensible intuitions and pure conceptions] are not

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20 Coleridge sets out this distinction at *Logic*, 139-43ff (esp. 140) and 211-4 (esp. 212n).
21 Coleridge makes this point clear at 211-4 (cf. 225ff, 265-6n).
of empirical origin at all and the possibility that they can nevertheless be related *a priori* to objects of experience can be called transcendental.\(^{22}\) According to Kant, the means to acquiring such transcendental representations is ‘transcendental reflection’, a philosophical procedure which he defines as ‘The action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition’.\(^{23}\) This enables us to determine (i) that the contents of pure sensibility and pure understanding have an *a priori* origin, and (ii) that the cognitive activities of pure intuiting (i.e. apprehending the pure spatial and pure temporal manifolds) and pure understanding (i.e. the acts of *a priori* discursive cognition, such as making synthetic *a priori* judgements and employing pure concepts) constitute what Kant terms an ‘*a priori* employment’ of our cognitive faculties, which in turn allows us to demonstrate (iii) what grounds the *a priori* contents and principles of pure sciences like mathematics or logic (i.e. how they are possible *a priori*).\(^{24}\) What I will try to show below is how Coleridge’s table of pure sciences relies upon the principles Kant claims can be established through transcendental reflection.

We saw above (4.1) that Coleridge’s table of pure sciences is intended to provide ‘a view of the [cognitive] powers from which the sciences [of noetics, logic, and mathematics] derive their name or character’, by which he means that each of the pure sciences is concerned with a specific kind of *a priori* evidence, which is in turn taken to originate in or derive from a specific kind of cognitive power. This is why he refers to the cognitive powers to which these three pure sciences are taken to ‘correspond’ as their ‘three sources’. That is, Coleridge claims that noetics concerns ‘the evidence of reason’ (pure intellectual or spiritual intuitions that have their source in reason); that logic concerns ‘the evidence of the understanding’ (pure concepts that have their source in the understanding); and that mathematics concerns ‘the evidence of sense’ (pure intuitions that have their source in the sense), because he holds that each of these pure sciences or nonempirical inquiries and the kind of *a priori* evidence (i.e. class of pure representations) with which it is concerned is made possible through the exercise of a specific cognitive

\(^{22}\) CPR, B81-2.

\(^{23}\) CPR, B317; cf. Coleridge’s statements at Logic, 153-4, 169, 246-7, 265-6n.

\(^{24}\) By the *a priori* uses of cognition or the *a priori* employment of our cognitive faculties, I take Kant to mean some mode of cognition or cognitive procedure which involves, or produces, cognitive content or knowledge that (i) does not derive from sense-experience, or (ii) can be given or known (i.e. established) without appeal to such experience. For Coleridge’s use of a similar concept see Logic, 140ff, 193n, 211-4, 215-24. On Kant’s notion of *a priori* employment, see Hatfield (1990), 84-7.
faculty or power. However, as noted earlier (in 2.1), Coleridge also makes a distinction between the employment of a faculty that is involved in any given pure science and the analysis of this faculty (i.e. the investigation of its pure contents and operations); this distinction is encapsulated in his remark that ‘The mathematician rests perfectly secure that his axioms and propositions are necessary and universal [i.e. a priori] truths, without troubling himself with any analysis of the faculties by which he constructs his figure and demonstrates their relations’. By such claims, Coleridge means that the a priori evidence (pure representations) and a priori rules (pure principles) with which mathematics and logic (and also noetics) are concerned give rise to a kind of knowledge that is proven or established independently of any claims about the role of our cognitive faculties in the acquisition or apprehension of such evidence and rules (considered as possible contents of a pure representation). As Coleridge puts this point, ‘the principles [of logic and mathematics] are evident independently of the insight given by transcendental analysis’: the norms of thought that are established by mathematics and logic do not depend on any prior knowledge of, or claims about, our cognitive faculties for their proof, validity, or normative status. What I want to argue here is that when Coleridge’s table of the pure sciences is placed in the context of this employment/analysis distinction, it can be interpreted as presenting the results of a transcendental analysis of the faculties, rather than as simply cataloguing the diverse kinds of a priori evidence in accordance with their respective origins.

The first thing to note here is that Coleridge’s employment/analysis distinction suggests two different possible ways of interpreting his table of pure sciences. On the one hand, the table can be read as a systematisation of the following set of philosophical assumptions (which Coleridge takes to be traditional): (i) there are two basic kinds of cognitive content: that which derives from the acts and products of ‘the mind itself’ (pure or a priori content), and that which derives from ‘the impressions from external objects’, ‘the objects of the senses and sensations’ (empirical or a posteriori content); (ii) we can distinguish between three different kinds of pure representations according to their respective origins in the cognitive faculties or powers of sense, understanding, and reason; and (iii) these three different kinds of pure cognitive content (i.e. a priori evidence) each give rise to, or constitute the field of inquiry for, a corresponding pure science which considers the evidence presented to the mind through the exercise of its

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25 See Logic, 34-7, 44-5.
26 Logic, 140 (cf. 212n).
27 Logic, 212 (cf. 247-8, 265-6n).
related power (i.e. the cognitive capacity ‘from which [a] science derive[s its] name or character’): thus, ‘Mathematics = the evidence of sense’, ‘Logic = the evidence of the understanding’, and ‘Noetics = the evidence of reason’. On this reading, Coleridge’s table serves primarily to summarise what we know simply through the employment of our different cognitive capacities (i.e. that the exercise of a specific faculty, e.g. sense, yields a specific kind of a priori evidence, e.g. pure intuitions). In sum, to paraphrase Coleridge, this version of the table sets out those assumptions about the a priori origin and status of certain kinds of cognitive content in which we rest perfectly secure without troubling ourselves with an analysis of the faculties by which such pure content is given, apprehended, constructed, etc. It offers a classification of the different kinds of a priori evidence (in accordance with their respective origins), but makes no claim to have proven or demonstrated the grounds of such a classification, by means of an analysis of the pure contents and operations of the cognitive faculties. Rather, the table is the expression of a set of traditional assumptions: ‘the universally admitted and understood diversity of [noetic], logic and mathematics, and the convenience and exact correspondence of these [pure sciences] to the three sources of the reason (νους), the understanding (λόγος), and the sense (μαθησις [or θεωρετικα])’, a view that Coleridge says can be traced back to the first Platonic and Aristotelian schools.

On the other hand, Coleridge’s table can be read as a summary of the results of a transcendental theory of pure cognitive content and its origins which claims to prove the following: (a) that certain kinds of cognitive capacities are required for the presentation of certain kinds of cognitive content to the mind to be possible; and (b) that the consideration of the pure operations and contents (a priori acts and products) of these cognitive capacities from a transcendental perspective allows us to show how the pure science taken to correspond to each capacity is possible (or, to show how the different kinds of knowledge yielded by these nonempirical inquiries – mathematics, logic, and noetics – are possible). On this reading, the table serves primarily to summarise what can be known by means of a transcendental analysis or investigation of the forms and functions of our cognitive capacities. For example, that the faculty of sense, especially outer sense, is required for pure spatial intuitions to be possible, or that a pure analysis of

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28 Coleridge’s formulations of (i)-(iii) are taken from Logic, 34-7, 39-41, 42-4, 73-6. See 32-4, 40-1, for Coleridge’s claim that (i)-(iii) are traditionally held views (at 40-1 Coleridge claims that the distinction between pure and empirical cognitive content originated with Pythagoras; at 32-4 he claims that the tripartite division of cognitive capacities and their contents was formalised by the time of Plotinus).

29 Logic, 70. Coleridge’s phrasing here suggests that he regards this tripartite distinction as self-evident, or at least as resting on the dual authority of philosophical tradition and universal assent.
sense is able to show how the pure spatial intuitions from which geometrical knowledge derives are possible, and thus how geometrical knowledge itself is possible (and likewise with logical knowledge, which derives from pure concepts and their content, or noetic knowledge, which derives from pure intellectual intuitions or Ideas and their content). \(^{30}\)

In this case, Coleridge’s table of pure sciences is intended to show that ‘the convenience and exact correspondence of [noetic, logic, and mathematics] to the three sources of the reason (νοέω), the understanding (λόγως), and the sense ([θεωρεί])’ can be proven by a transcendental theory of cognition which shows not only that the different kinds of pure representations with which each of these nonempirical disciplines is concerned have an a priori origin in a corresponding cognitive capacity, but also that it is the pure contents and operations of these capacities which make such disciplines, and the different kinds of a priori knowledge to which they give rise, possible. \(^{31}\)

**ii. From Classification to Analysis: Coleridge’s History of Faculty-Theory**

I have suggested above that Coleridge’s table of pure sciences should be considered in the context of his distinction between the employment of our faculties (which gives rise to, or makes apprehensible, constructible, etc., certain kinds of a priori evidence) and the analysis of our faculties (which shows how the presentation of such pure cognitive content and the a priori knowledge deriving from it is possible). \(^{32}\) With this distinction in mind, we can separate the two different interpretations of Coleridge’s table just outlined into an attempt to classify the different kinds of a priori evidence or pure representations and their sources on the one hand, and an attempt to explain how such a classification and the divisions of cognitive content it proposes must be theoretically grounded on the other. This is a useful approach to take, given that Coleridge tends to divide the history of philosophy (and especially theories of cognition) before and after Kant along fairly similar lines. According to Coleridge, while many of Kant’s ancient and early modern predecessors developed classifications of the different kinds of pure cognitive content, and linked these classifications to corresponding schemes of cognitive faculties, prior to the emergence of Kantian transcendental philosophy, no thinker had presented a complete theoretical account of the contribution made by the different cognitive faculties in the production and apprehension of a priori evidence. To use Coleridge’s terms, before Kant we had only the ‘mere classification’ of the different kinds of pure

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\(^{30}\) See *Logic*, 43-4, 211-4, 236-8.

\(^{31}\) See e.g. *Logic*, 211-4 (logic and mathematics), 225 (mathematics), 256-7 (logic).

\(^{32}\) See *Logic*, 140, 212n, 265-6n.
representation, not the ‘true analysis’ of the cognitive faculties from a transcendental perspective, explaining how such \textit{a priori} cognitive content is possible.\textsuperscript{33} While some philosophers recognised the need for an analysis of cognition that could show how the faculties produce and condition certain aspects or elements of sensible knowledge and experience, it was (the Critical period) Kant ‘who first saw and communicated the[se] truths in their full extent, and with systematic comprehension’.\textsuperscript{34}

To give some examples of such anticipations of Kant’s transcendental method: Coleridge credits Pythagoras with having discovered the distinction between \textit{a priori} and \textit{a posteriori} knowledge (“The perception of a truth, permanent, necessary, raised above all accident and all change […] flashed upon him in a geometrical contemplation”), and with having established that \textit{a priori} cognitive content must derive from the mind’s ‘own acts and the products of those acts’.\textsuperscript{35} He also contends that the tripartite division of the cognitive faculties or powers into ‘the reason (\textit{νοεί}), the understanding (\textit{λόγος}), and the sense (\textit{θεωρία})’ and their respective \textit{a priori} contents had been fully established by the time of ‘the formation of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, under the immediate successors of Alexander’.\textsuperscript{36} Coleridge suggests in his marginalia that certain aspects of the works of Plotinus and Proclus can be interpreted as anticipating Kant’s much later intuitionist account of mathematical cognition.\textsuperscript{37} The ‘categories of Aristotle, with the fragments attributed on very suspicious authority to Archytas and the Pythagorean school’ are noted as ‘approaches to […] the transcendental logic’.\textsuperscript{38} In the early modern period, Coleridge lists Bacon and Edward Herbert as having produced works that may be considered ‘as anticipations or an implication of’ transcendental philosophy, which ‘commenc[ed] in a sort of tentative \textit{broadcast} way’ the analysis of cognition and the faculties ‘brought to a systematic Completion by Immanuel KANT in his Critik der rein[en] Vernunft’.\textsuperscript{39} Coleridge is not explicit about the details of these ‘anticipations’ and

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Logic}, 210; see also, 146-9, 205-6n, 211-4, 247-8, 268.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Logic}, 148-9n; cf. 205-6n. However, see also \textit{CL.IV.851ff}; \textit{CM.IV.156}; \textit{Logic}, 243-4 for Coleridge’s claim that Kant’s precritical \textit{Inaugural Dissertation} (1770) ‘contain[s] the Germs’ of his transcendental philosophy (Coleridge is referring in particular to Kant’s theory of sensibility in this text).
\textsuperscript{35} See \textit{Logic}, 40-1. Here Coleridge clearly contrasts ‘the phenomena transmitted by the outward sense’ (\textit{a posteriori} cognitive contents) with ‘the necessary, the permanent, the universal, or the truths having these attributes’ (\textit{a priori} cognitive contents). See also, 132-3, 139-43.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Logic}, 33-4ff. For further discussion of this claim, see 3.3 above.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Logic}, 32-3. For Coleridge’s suggestion that Plotinus’s theory of ‘creative contemplation’ anticipates certain aspects of Kant’s account of mathematical cognition, see 73-6, 245; for Coleridge’s suggestions concerning how Proclus anticipates Kant’s theory of sensible intuition, see \textit{CM.IV.156}.-8.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Logic}, 205-6n; cf. 5, where Coleridge claims that Aristotle was the first philosopher to recognise that for the rules of logic to have an \textit{a priori} status (i.e. as the universal and necessary laws of thought), they must be ‘drawn from the laws and constitution of the understanding itself’.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Logic}, 205-6n, \textit{CM.III.919}, V.81-2.
implications’. In Herbert’s case, he may have in mind the way in which the theory of knowledge presented in De Veritate (1624) is developed in the context of an account of the mental faculties and their objects.\footnote{For Coleridge’s knowledge of Herbert, see CL.II.682-3ff. For Herbert account of the faculties, see e.g. (1937 [1624]), 90-107, 232-88. For an endorsement of Coleridge’s assessment of Herbert as an anticipator of Kant, see Bedford (1979), 259-60.} In Bacon’s case, Coleridge seems to regard the Baconian claim that there are ‘innate idols […] inherent in the nature of the intellect itself, which is found to be much more prone to error than the senses’ in Novum Organum (1620)\footnote{Bacon, (2000 [1620]), 18ff. For Coleridge’s comments on similar passages, see Friend.I.491 and esp. Logic, 39-40, where Coleridge states ‘the very understanding itself, even independent of the causes that always in each individual possessor render it more or less turbid or uneven, does in the language of our immortal Verulam “ipsa sua natura radios ex figura et sectione propria immutat”’ (i.e. ‘[as an uneven mirror] by its very nature distorts the rays according to its own figure and section’). He is quoting a variation of Bacon’s Distributio operis (1740), I.15.} as anticipating certain aspects of the Kantian theory of ‘Transcendental Illusion’ (human reason’s inherent tendency to self-deceit). In particular, Coleridge seems to hold that Bacon developed in outline the theory of the epistemic criteria that are grounded in the nature of the human intellect—especially the understanding and its operations—that was later worked out in full by Kant, within the transcendental framework of the first Critique (Coleridge may interpret Herbert’s claims about the inherent limits of discursive cognition and the faculties responsible for it in a similar way).\footnote{For Kant on Transcendental Illusion, see CPR, B354-66; cf. Coleridge at Logic, 139-40n.} Aside from Bacon and Herbert, Coleridge also designates Locke as one of the early modern philosophers who came closest to discovering Kant’s transcendental analysis of cognition and the faculties. He suggests that before Kant, Locke was the only philosopher to have noticed the significance of a distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements, in ‘the third chapter of the fourth book’ of the Essay:

In this chapter [probably IV.iii.22] our great essayist expressly distinguishes two sources of the mind’s judgments, and two sorts of knowledge as resulting therefrom—the first being the agreement or disagreement of the idea with itself, that is, analytic judgments, and the other the combination of two ideas into one subject, that is, synthetic judgments. And he adds that with regard to the latter the power of the mind, acting on its own resources, is very limited—but without particularising what the limits [of synthetic judgments] are, or what the knowledges contained within them \footnote{Logic, 209. As with Bacon and Herbert, Coleridge does not provide any direct quotes.}.

Coleridge goes on to suggest that, had Locke ‘proceeded to this enquiry, he must have been led to the transcendental logic, that is, a true analysis of the understanding and not
a mere classification of the ideas [i.e. ‘in Mr. Locke’s sense of the term as including all the immediate objects of the mind’]. Leaving aside the problems posed by the analytic/synthetic distinction, I want to focus here on Coleridge’s sense that Kant provided new insights into the ‘sources of the mind’s judgments, and [the] sorts of knowledge […] resulting therefrom’, and especially Coleridge’s claims that Kant ‘brought to a systematic Completion’ the work of his philosophical predecessors in the field of analysing ‘the power[s] of the mind, acting on its own resources’.

Coleridge considers the ancient and early modern philosophers listed above to be engaged, in different ways, in an ‘inquir[y into] what the [mind] could effect by its own powers, by reflection on its own acts and the products of those acts, for and within its own sphere’. It is this shared aim that marks them out as anticipators of Kant’s transcendental approach. What sets Kant’s Critical philosophy apart from the work of his predecessors, in Coleridge’s view, is that it develops the first systematic explanation of how a priori cognitive content and the knowledge deriving from it is possible, and the first theoretically well-grounded proof that certain features and principles of our cognition must originate ‘ab intra’ or ‘a mente ipsa’ (i.e. ‘from within the mind itself’). This is why Coleridge emphasises that Kant should be recognised as ‘the proper inventor and founder of transcendental analysis’, the ‘aim and object [of which] [science] is to rise from the knowledge or matter of consciousness to the faculty by which it is known or presented’ (which proceeds ‘by strict investigation of the human faculties’ or ‘the preponderative inquisition of the Weights & Measures of the Human Mind’). It must be noted here, however, that Coleridge also tends to highlight what he takes to be similarities between Kantian transcendental philosophy and some strands of ancient Platonic philosophy as much as he emphasises Kant’s supposed advances over such thinkers as Proclus and Plotinus in certain areas (primarily in the theory of sensory cognition and faculty-analysis). Thus, to get a better sense of what Coleridge considers most novel – and most important – in Kant’s transcendental analysis, we need to look

44 Logic, 210 (Coleridge adds this definition of ‘idea’, employed in a similar sense to the Kantian term ‘representation’, at 210n; see also 233n).
45 Coleridge holds that all acts of discursive cognition must consist in an epistemic judgement (see e.g. Logic, 239-40ff, 265-7; he interprets Kant as having the same view), so his claims about the ‘sources of the mind’s judgments’ should be considered in this context.
46 Logic, 41. Coleridge uses the term ‘the subjective’ instead of ‘the mind’ here, but that the takes these terms to be equivalent is evident from his definition of ‘the sum of all the subjective [as] comprehended in the name of mind or intelligence’ (Coleridge’s emphasis), or ‘the mind in and for itself, [considered] separately from the objects of the senses and sensations’ (Logic, 37, 42).
47 For this definition of the a priori, see Logic, 76 (cf. 39-41); CM.IV.355. See also 2.1-3 above.
48 See Logic, 148-9, 248 (cf. 268); CN.III.3934 (c. Jun-Jul 1810), V.5080 (c. Dec 1823).
49 On Kant, Proclus, and Plotinus, see esp. CM.IV.156-8 (cf. Logic, 73-5ff, 245).
more closely at how Coleridge contrasts Kant’s methods with those of the early modern philosophers whom he criticises as offering ‘a mere classification of the ideas’. As I will show, Locke and the Cambridge Platonists are Coleridge’s key reference points here.

If we return for a moment to Coleridge’s table of the pure sciences, we can see that, on Coleridge’s account, philosophers before Kant would take the table to present a classification of the different faculties and their contents (although some, e.g. Locke, would of course reject the tenability of such a scheme of a priori evidence and its origins in the cognitive capacities or powers of the mind); whereas Kant and those who follow his transcendental approach would take the table to present the results of an analysis of the faculties and their ‘inherent forms and functions’ which shows how these pure representations, and the knowledge deriving from them, is possible (and also that such cognitive content must have an a priori origin and status). Coleridge often uses Locke’s Essay to illustrate this difference. For instance, in a footnote to some remarks on how ‘the critical inquisition into the intellectual faculties’ was not fully developed ‘previously to the appearance of the Critique on the Pure Reason’, Coleridge presents the following contrast between the methods of Locke and Kant:

Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding is an enquiry respecting the (by him so called) ideas, that is, notions, conceptions, as the immediate objects of the faculty, and not an inquiry into the constitution of the faculty itself […] but as a distinct branch of speculation [such a transcendental inquiry or ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms’ of the faculties] did not exist before the publication of the Critique on the Pure Reason.

What Coleridge means here is that Locke’s Essay gives an account of the contents and operations of the understanding (i.e. those pure and empirical representations involved in discursive cognition), but does not explain what makes the contents and operations of this faculty possible, or consider the question of what is required to account for the possibility of such cognitive content. Coleridge says elsewhere that ‘as Locke teaches that the Understanding is but a Term signifying the Mind in a particular state of action, he means that the mind furnishes itself; and so he himself expresses the Thought, by]

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50 See Logic, 209-10 (cf. 205-6n).
51 This, at least, is how Coleridge interprets Locke’s position in the Essay (see e.g. Logic, 183-4). However, on Coleridge’s view, insofar as Lockean ‘ideas of reflection’ can be said to exist at all, they must be some kind of a priori form or content, deriving from or accessible through reflection on the acts and products of the mind (see e.g. Logic, 12-14, 37-41, 139-49, 232-5).
52 See e.g. Logic, 146-9, 211-4, 239-48.
53 Logic, 205n. The interpolated quote in square brackets is taken from Coleridge’s definitions of transcendental analysis and its aims at Logic, 146-9 (esp. 147-8).
defining Ideas of Reflection [as] ‘those, which the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself.’ So, given that Coleridge also claims that the operations of the mind can themselves be considered as a kind of cognitive content, his point here is not that Locke fails to offer any account of the operations of the understanding; rather, it is that Locke does not offer any adequate explanation of the kinds of representations that ‘the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself’. This is because, on Coleridge’s view, Locke’s Essay considers ideas of reflection only as the contents or ‘objects of the faculty’, without proceeding to an ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms of the understanding’, which serves to explain not only that the ideas of reflection must have an a priori origin, but also how such representations and the knowledge deriving from them is possible a priori. Put in different terms, Locke takes it for granted that ‘the mind furnishes itself’ and that we can distinguish between cognitive content deriving from (i) the operations of the mind and from (ii) the objects which affect the mind from without (via the senses), and therefore offers only a ‘mere classification’ of these different kinds of ideas or representations. What Locke fails to provide is the kind of theoretical framework which shows, by means of an analysis of our intellectual faculties, how ‘the constitutive forms, or constitutional acts and functions’ of these faculties condition and make possible their objects or contents. While Lockean reflection allows us to classify different kinds of cognitive content, Kant’s transcendental reflection enables ‘the formation of right notions, or the mind’s [acquisition of] knowledge of its own constitution and constituent faculties as far as it [i.e. such a knowledge of ‘the constitution of the subject’] is obtained by reflection.’

I give a more detailed discussion of Coleridge’s views on ‘the constitution and constituent forms’ of the cognitive faculties in 4.3 (cf. 3.4). For now, all that needs to be noted is that Coleridge conceives of such constitution in purely functional terms. As is suggested by his talk of ‘the constitutive forms, or constitutional acts and functions, of the sense and of the understanding’, for Coleridge, to speak of the constitution or the constituent forms of a faculty is just to speak of the cognitive activities or functions in which the exercise of this faculty is taken to consist. The forms and functions of sense and understanding are ‘constituent’ or ‘constitutional’ only in the sense that, taken together, these forms are the cognitive operations which constitute the intuitive sensory

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54 CL.II.680; Coleridge is quoting from Essay, II.i.4.
55 For Coleridge’s further comments on this problem, see Logic, 184n, 233n. See also CL.II.679ff.
56 See Logic, 146-9; cf. 205-6n, 211-4.
57 See Logic, 146-7. For further discussion of this issue, see 3.1-4 above, 4.5 below.
58 See Logic, 12-14, 145-6; cf. 43n, 203n.
and discursive intellectual capacities that we designate as ‘sense’ and ‘understanding’ (this is also the case with those intuitive intellectual capacities designated as ‘reason’, or ‘the power of ideas’). The underlying connection between Coleridge’s conception of cognitive constitution and his distinction between a classification of representations and a transcendental investigation and analysis of the cognitive faculties by which any such representations must be presented to the mind can be seen in the following note, where Coleridge explains what he thinks is lacking from the analyses of knowledge offered by the Cambridge Platonists, particularly John Smith and Henry More:

What they all wanted was, a pre-inquisition into the mind itself, as part Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge: an examination of the Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the Objects to be weighed or measured by them—short, a transcendental Analysis of Æsthetic, Logic, and Noetic. Lord Herbert was at the entrance of, nay, already some paces within, the Shaft and Adit of the Mine, but he turned abruptly back [Coleridge does not state why]—and the Honor of establishing a compleat Propædia of Philosophy was reserved for Immanuel Kant a century or more afterwards.

I will consider the significance of the crossed out words below, since these offer some useful insights into Coleridge’s conception of transcendental knowledge and its limits. But first, I want to consider how Coleridge’s claims here relate to his table of the pure (and empirical) sciences. The reference to ‘a pre-inquisition into the mind […]’, as part Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge’ makes clear Coleridge’s view that we need a transcendental inquiry into cognition to understand not only how the mind acquires, or apprehends, certain kinds of cognitive content (as an organ of knowledge), but also what contribution the mind itself makes to the production of such content (as a constituent of knowledge). Thus, ‘the Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the Objects to be weighed or measured by them’ here represent the ‘constitutive forms, or constitutional acts and functions’ of sense, understanding and reason, while the ‘Objects’ from which we abstract in a transcendental investigation into such forms and functions of cognition represent the different kinds of content given in our various cognitive states (i.e. our pure and empirical ideas or representations). Bearing in mind Coleridge’s claims

59 See e.g. Logic, 43-5, 146-7, 151-4ff, 163-5, 248-54.
60 CM.V.81-2. This annotation was written on the flyleaves of Coleridge’s copy of John Smith’s Select Discourses (1660). He makes a similar assessment of Cambridge Platonism (and other areas of seventeenth-century Latitudinarian thought) at CM.III.918-21, a footnote on the flyleaves of his copy of Henry More’s Theological Works (1708). Both sets of marginalia were written c. 1823-4. Although Coleridge is very familiar with Spinoza’s theory of knowledge, he does specify if he thinks Spinoza is guilty of the same errors.
that the ‘aim and object’ of transcendental philosophy ‘is to rise from the knowledge or matter [i.e. content] of consciousness to the faculty by which it is known or presented’, we can also see how his division of this transcendental ‘examination of the Scales, Weights, and Measures [of cognition] themselves’ into aesthetic, logic, and noetic is related to his table’s division of our pure representations into the a priori evidence or contents of sense, understanding, and reason.

As I explained earlier (see 4.1), in this context, to ‘rise from’ the content of some cognitive state to the faculty or cognitive power ‘by which it [i.e. a cognitive state and its contents] is known or presented’ involves showing (1) that such cognitive content, or certain of its fundamental features, must originate in the operations of this faculty, and thus (2) that the possibility of the former (as something given or presented to the mind) is in some way dependent on the nature and functions of the latter (as the faculty or power which makes such presentation possible). Thus, a transcendental aesthetic rises from the content of pure sensible intuitions to show that these representations are dependent upon, or grounded in, the faculty of sense and its operations or inherent forms and functions. A transcendental logic rises from the content of pure conceptions to show that these representations are dependent upon, or grounded in, the faculty of understanding and its operations or inherent forms and functions. Likewise, transcendental noetic rises from the content of pure intellectual (or spiritual) intuitions to show that these representations are dependent upon, or grounded in, the faculty of reason. As noted in 4.1 (cf. 2.1), this transcendental account of the cognitive faculties and their content has the further implication that, if we accept the claim that the pure content or a priori evidence presented by each faculty gives rise to a corresponding pure science or nonempirical inquiry, then a transcendental inquiry into the ‘constitutive forms, or constitutional acts and functions’ of a given faculty is able to explain not only the possibility of the cognitive content with which its corresponding pure science is concerned, but also the possibility of the knowledge deriving from this content (which in turn allows us to account for the possibility of each pure science itself). Consequently, transcendental aesthetic enables us to account for the possibility of the evidence of sense, and thus for the possibility of the mathematical knowledge deriving from these pure sensible intuitions. Transcendental logic enables us to account for the possibility of

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61 See Logic, 68-70, 145-7, 152-4, 211-4, 238-45. This is why Coleridge claims that ‘the knowledge of the constitution of the mental faculties forms the science of transcendental analysis’ (213), conceived as an ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms of [our mental faculties]’ (147).

the evidence of the understanding, and thus for the possibility of the logical knowledge deriving from these pure conceptions. Transcendental noetic enables us to account for the possibility of the evidence of reason, and thus for the possibility of the noetic knowledge deriving from these pure intellectual intuitions. It is these results of the transcendental theory of cognition that Coleridge’s table of pure sciences serves to summarise, and to which he refers in the marginal note quoted above.\[63\]

In sum, Coleridge’s table shows how, by a transcendental inquiry into our cognitive faculties or powers, we can account for the possibility of certain kinds of pure (and empirical) cognitive content, and thereby also for the possibility of the different kinds of knowledge taken to derive from such content. It is only the \textit{a priori} evidence concerning such claims about the conditions of the possibility of certain kinds of cognitive content and the experience and knowledge constituted by or deriving from such content that constitutes transcendental representation (i.e. \textit{a priori} contents and cognitions with a transcendental status). Our awareness, e.g., that ‘Logic = the evidence of understanding’, i.e. that logical knowledge is made possible by the pure conceptions that have their origin in the understanding and its operations (as the pure representations that are made possible by the \textit{a priori} acts and products of the understanding) would be a transcendental representation that yields transcendental knowledge: that special kind of \textit{a priori} knowledge that consists in ‘ris[ing] from the knowledge or matter of consciousness to the faculty by which it is known or presented’.\[64\] Given this view, the division of four classes of evidence and knowledge presented in Coleridge’s table of sciences, can be read as a series of four transcendental claims about the possibility of such evidence and knowledge, and particularly about the cognitive capacities which are the conditions required to account for the possibility of such cognitive content, divided into the three nonempirical or pure kinds of knowledge (noetic, logic, and mathematics), and the single kind of empirical knowledge (which gives rise to physics or ‘the sciences of experience’). We require a transcendental aesthetic, logic, and noetic in order to account for the respective contributions which our three cognitive capacities of sense, understanding, and reason make to these different kinds of content and the knowledge deriving from it, as well as to account for the role each of these capacities plays in the constitution of our sensory experience and cognition.\[65\]

\[63\] CM.IV.81-2. See also 4.3 below.

\[64\] Logic, 248.

\[65\] See CM.IV.81-2 (cf. III.918-21). See also Logic, 139-49 (cf. 34-41, 44-5n).
Having considered how Coleridge’s table of pure sciences is informed by, and thus reflects, his interpretation of transcendental philosophy, we are now in a position to discuss in more detail Coleridge’s views on the application of such a transcendental theory of cognition and its principles. In the next few sections (see 4.3-5), I will take a closer look at (1) why Coleridge claims that transcendental inquiry serves a primarily preparatory function (as what he calls the ‘compleat Propædia of Philosophy’); (2) the ways in which Coleridge distinguishes transcendental knowledge from the other three main categories of *a priori* knowledge (mathematics, logic, and noetics), with a focus in particular on how Coleridge characterises the different kinds of *a priori* representations and cognitions that derive from sense, understanding, and reason, and from transcendental theoretical inquiry into the forms and functions of these faculties; and (3) how Coleridge characterises the aims, objects, and limits of transcendental inquiry and particularly his conception of the kind of pure content given or contained in what Kant calls a ‘transcendental representation’. To lay the ground for some of this discussion, I conclude this section by briefly considering the significance of Coleridge’s crossing out of the words ‘itself’ and ‘analysis’ from the overview of the three distinct branches of transcendental inquiry in the marginal note quoted above.

### iii. Coleridge on Transcendental Inquiry & the Unanalysability of Reason

Coleridge’s reason for crossing out ‘itself’ here is quite straightforward. It indicates his recognition that although the transcendental theory of cognition is the kind of pure inquiry which abstracts from all empirically given sensory content, such a theory must still give an account of the role of this material element of cognition (‘the impressions from external objects’66) in the constitution of experience and knowledge. To provide a complete explanation of the nature of sensible experience and cognition, we need to consider not only the ‘the Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the Objects to be weighed or measured by them’ (i.e. the *a priori* forms and functions of our cognitive faculties), but also the *a posteriori* sensory content or matter which is taken to come to us, or be given, ‘from without’ whenever external things affect or act upon the senses, and which is thus also ‘part Constituent of [our] Knowledge’ (at least insofar as such knowledge refers to the sensible objects of empirical cognition).67 So, in short, even if a Kantian transcendental theory of cognition holds that the mind must condition, and contribute to, the content of all our cognitive states, we still need some account of the

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67 *CM*.IV.81.
contents and conditions which are not contributed by the mind itself, in order to explain what is required for such cognitive states to be possible at all.

Coleridge’s reasons for crossing out the word ‘analysis’ from his marginal note on transcendental inquiry and its threefold division are somewhat more complicated, and will need to be put in the context of Coleridge’s account of the pure cognitive content that he calls ‘the evidence of reason’ (see 4.3-5). For now I give only an outline of the relevant problems. The main issues here are (i) that Coleridge rejects Kant’s claim that all our knowledge must be discursive (‘by means of conceptions’ in Coleridge’s definition), (ii) that Coleridge holds a different conception of reason and its limits, and thus reassigns the source of Kantian ‘transcendental illusion’ from reason to the human understanding (see 3.2), and (iii) that Coleridge therefore allows for a kind of transcendental knowledge that is nondiscursive and nonconceptual (and which is therefore not acquired by means of transcendental reflection). As we have seen, Coleridge holds that by reflecting on the pure contents and operations of our cognitive faculties (their \textit{a priori} acts and products), we can acquire a transcendental conception of the ‘inherent forms or […] several functional powers’ of these faculties. He terms this procedure a ‘transcendental analysis’ of the faculties, ‘where neither the thing nor the knowledge is the subject of investigation [i.e. neither the object nor the content of cognition], but the faculty by which the thing is known’ (Coleridge adds that ‘this perhaps is the most intelligible explanation of the term “transcendental”’). However, Coleridge also holds that the reason, or ‘the power of ideas’, is a special kind of cognitive capacity with contents and operations which cannot be subject to such analysis. To see why Coleridge claims that reason cannot be subject to transcendental analysis, and yet still holds that there can be a ‘transcendental noetic’ (which seeks to explain the \textit{a priori} origins and \textit{a priori} possibility of the pure cognitive content deriving from reason), we will need to look briefly at Coleridge’s claims about ‘transcendental exposition’ and its limits. This will help to show that although Coleridge takes our transcendental knowledge to derive from ‘the formation of right \textit{notions}, or the mind’s knowledge of its own constitution and constituent faculties as far as it is obtained by \textit{reflection}’, he also holds that there are principles of transcendental knowledge which cannot be obtained by reflection.

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68 This is discussed further in 4.3-5 below.
69 \textit{Logic}, 154, 213-4. While Coleridge holds that transcendental analysis is not concerned with \textit{a priori} representations and cognitions \textit{per se}, he nevertheless takes reflection upon such pure cognitive content to be part of transcendental inquiry (since it is by means of such transcendental reflection that we identify the ‘constitutional forms, or constitutional acts and functions’ of the faculties).
70 \textit{Logic}, 13; cf. e.g. 18, 242, 265-6n on such reflection.
According to Coleridge, the kind of knowledge derived from a ‘transcendental exposition’ of any given cognitive faculty ‘rests in the ascertainment of the faculty the existence of which we know only by means of reflection, i.e. by an exercise of one of the functions of the faculty’. Since Coleridge claims here that to know the existence of a faculty by means of reflection is to exercise one of the functions of this faculty, it initially seems that this definition of transcendental exposition could apply only to the understanding and its functions (given that, on Coleridge’s view, the understanding is ‘the reflective faculty’). However, this statement comes in Coleridge’s chapter on the faculty of sense and the pure forms of intuition, so it is arguably more likely that what he means here is that acquiring a knowledge of the existence of a particular faculty by means of reflection is a process that requires reflecting on the cognitive activities that are involved in the exercise of this faculty and its functions (i.e. the process Kant calls ‘transcendental reflection’). In this context, to ‘ascertain’ a faculty means to identify the acts and products (or operations and contents) which belong to, or are ‘situated in’, this faculty. Thus, to ascertain, or explain in transcendental terms, the faculty of sense just is to identify the pure forms of intuition by reflecting on the cognitive activity involved in the exercise of this faculty and the cognitive content produced by it (i.e. our pure sensible intuitions). Likewise, to ascertain the faculty of understanding is to identify the pure forms of conception and judgement by reflecting on the cognitive activity involved in the exercise of this faculty and the cognitive content produced by it (i.e. our pure conceptions). In the case of reason however, we cannot identify its forms and functions by means of transcendental reflection, because the acts and products of reason cannot be given or known through such a discursive and reflective process, and therefore cannot be analysed in the same way as the acts and products of the sense and understanding. Rather, these pure intellectual intuitions and their contents can only be known intuitively through an act of Platonic-style noesis. This means transcendental noetic must involve some kind of intuitively acquired knowledge of how the inherent forms and functions of reason make such intuitions possible. The transcendental principle of explanation is still the same: an inquiry into the operations and content of the cognitive capacity in question allows us to acquire knowledge of how certain kinds of pure cognitive content and the a

71 Logic, 169.
72 CPR, B316; see also B33-5, 74-82; cf. Coleridge’s similar statements at Logic, 151-4, 234, 266n; for further discussion of transcendental reflection see 4.1 above.
73 On this procedure of ‘ascertainment’ see esp. Logic, 213-4, where Coleridge claims that the ‘inherent forms and functions or […] several functional powers’ of sense and understanding ‘are capable of being enumerated and defined’ (by means of a transcendental or pure analysis of these faculties).
74 See e.g. Logic, 34-6, 43-4, 236-8.
priori cognitions deriving from it are possible; but the means of acquiring this knowledge is different. To make sense of Coleridge’s position here, and to clarify what distinguishes transcendental noetic from transcendental logic and transcendental aesthetic, we must turn now to Coleridge’s more detailed characterisation of the cognitive faculties and their a priori contents and operations, considering in particular how this characterisation relates to his two-level theory of the a priori.

4.3 Coleridge’s Two-Level Theory of the A Priori: The Grounds for the Distinction Between Transcendental Analysis & Transcendental Noetic

i. Coleridge on Conditionally vs. Absolutely Necessary A Priori Forms

As noted earlier, in 2.1, in Logic Coleridge defines the a priori as ‘an act or product of the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions from external objects’ or as those conditions and features of our cognition that have their origin ab intra (‘from within’, or ‘a mente ipsa [from the mind itself]’, as Coleridge puts it elsewhere).\(^{75}\) Put another way, if something – whether an act or product of the mind, or some kind of cognitive content deriving from such acts and products – is characterised as a priori in this way, then ‘all means and materials a posteriori are excluded from [it]’: it must be conceived as being independent of whatever can be given empirically, or apprehended through ordinary sense-experience.\(^{76}\) This is why Coleridge claims that for some kind of cognitive content or knowledge to qualify as a priori, it must ‘have a higher evidence than that which the senses can afford, or which can belong to objects of the bodily sense considered as matters of fact’.\(^{77}\) Similarly, he identifies the a priori with ‘the necessary, the permanent, the universal, or the truths having these attributes’, and also remarks that ‘truths a priori, from which the facts of experience are contradistinguished, are characterised by a sense of necessity’ (which Coleridge here contrasts with the ‘sense of contingency’ that ‘accompany[es]’ the empirically given).\(^{78}\) In sum: Coleridge claims that whatever is a priori must (1) derive from within the mind, (2) be given or known independently of sense-experience, (3) be characterised by universality, necessity, and ‘permanence’ (Coleridge’s term for what is immutable or invariant in our cognition), and that it (4) may also be a necessary condition of the possibility of experience, or a necessary condition of certain

\(^{75}\) *Logic*, 76; cf. 141-2, 145-6. See also CM.IV.355. For further discussion of this Coleridgean reading of the Kantian a priori, see 2.1-3 above.

\(^{76}\) *Logic*, 212.

\(^{77}\) *Logic*, 36. Cf. 34, 111-2, 139-43.

\(^{78}\) *Logic*, 141. See also 40 for Coleridge’s references to the ‘perception of a truth, permanent, necessary, and raised above all accident and change [apprehended] in a geometrical contemplation’.
kinds of knowledge (logical, mathematical, metaphysical, and natural-scientific).\textsuperscript{79} In this section I will focus on how Coleridge distinguishes between two different kinds of \textit{a priori} necessity: the ‘conditional necessity’ that is grounded in the cognitive constitution of finite human subjects and the ‘absolute necessity’ that is grounded in the infinite or ‘Eternal Mind’ of God.\textsuperscript{80} I will be contending that Coleridge holds a two-level theory of the \textit{a priori}, and that his distinction between absolute and conditional necessity follows from his distinction between what I will call a ‘noetic’ or Platonic conception of the \textit{a priori} (as objectively real) and a ‘transcendental’ or Kantian conception of the \textit{a priori} (as subjectively real).\textsuperscript{81} First, however, it will be useful to recapitulate the main features of Coleridge’s threefold division of the diverse kinds of \textit{a priori} evidence (nonempirical or pure cognitive content) and their respective sources.

As was shown in 3.1-4.2, Coleridge recognises one general source of \textit{a posteriori} evidence (sensory experience, taken as the combined activities of the bodily senses and our cognitive capacities), but contends that we must distinguish between three different sources of \textit{a priori} evidence: The cognitive capacities of reason, understanding, and sense, each of which corresponds to a specific ‘pure science’ and its field of \textit{a priori} inquiry. This division follows from ‘the universally admitted and understood diversity of metaphysic [or noetics], logic and mathematics, and the \textit{convenience and exact correspondence} of these [pure sciences] to the three \textit{sources} of the reason (νους), the understanding (λόγος), and the sense (μάθησις [or θεωρία]).’\textsuperscript{82} As we saw in 4.1, in Coleridge’s terms, what it means for a given cognitive capacity to be the source of a pure science is that it is the capacity taken to be responsible for (i.e. the ground or origin of) the kinds of pure representations or \textit{a priori} cognitive contents with which a particular nonempirical mode of inquiry is concerned. This is why Coleridge claims that he is presenting ‘a view of the [cognitive] powers from which the [pure] sciences derive their name and character’ when he gives his account of the capacities of reason, understanding, and sense and the different kinds of cognitive content (or evidence) which is presented to the mind through the acts or operations of each capacity.\textsuperscript{83} He takes \textit{a priori} evidence to concern the operations of a particular capacity (its acts) and the cognitive content(s) given \textit{a priori} through these acts (its ‘pure products’). Thus, the evidence of reason concerns intellectual intuitions and their content (i.e. the Ideas, which give rise to noetic knowledge), ‘the evidence of understanding’

\textsuperscript{79} See e.g. \textit{Logic}, 39-41, 76, 140-7. See also 2.1-3 above.
\textsuperscript{80} See esp. \textit{Logic}, 146; cf. 43n, 43-4, 236-8.
\textsuperscript{81} Coleridge sets out this distinction at \textit{Logic}, 145-6 (cf. 43-4, 140n, 202n).
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Logic}, 70.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Logic}, 35.
concerns pure conceptions and their contents (which give rise to logical knowledge), and ‘the evidence of sense’ concerns pure intuitions and their contents (which give rise to mathematical knowledge). Accordingly, Coleridge contends that we can ‘define reason as the power of ideas, the understanding [as] the faculty of conceptions, and the sense [as] the source and faculty of intuitions and perceptions’.

As I will be arguing in this section (and in those that follow), what distinguishes these three cognitive capacities and the different kinds of knowledge that derive from their respective operations and contents is that, on Coleridge’s account, those \textit{a priori} truths and principles of mathematics and logic that derive from the forms of sense and understanding have a conditional necessity, whereas the \textit{a priori} truths of noetics that derive from reason have an absolute necessity. It is in this distinction that Coleridge’s two-level theory of the \textit{a priori} consists, for his theory is grounded in a distinction between subjectively real and objectively real \textit{a priori} forms, or between those forms or principles that are finite-mind-dependent and those which are finite-mind-independent.

With this in mind, it should be noted that for Coleridge, phrases like ‘objectively real’ or ‘properly and wholly objective’ simply mean or refer to what is real and true independent of the conditions of human cognition: i.e. those objects and principles that are taken to subsist in a finite-mind-independent way. To use the terms introduced in 2.1, whatever is subjectively real or finite-mind-dependent has what Coleridge terms a ‘relative’ necessity, universality, and permanence (i.e. it is ‘real in relation to the human mind as the subject’), while whatever is objectively real or finite-mind-independent has what he calls ‘absolute’ necessity, universality, and permanence (i.e. it is ‘properly and wholly objective’, and has a ‘reality beyond […] appearances, or beyond the human mind collectively taken’).

Simply put, Coleridge’s two-level theory of the \textit{a priori} distinguishes between the conditional \textit{a priori}, which he takes to be grounded in the ‘constituents’ or ‘component faculties’ common to all finite human minds (sense and understanding), and the absolute \textit{a priori}, which he takes to be grounded in the infinite mind of God (which is itself the source and ground of reason, including the capacity of the human mind to exercise its rational powers). This is why Coleridge distinguishes sharply between the ‘unindividual and transcendent character of the reason as a presence to the human mind, [that is] not a particular faculty or component of the mind’ and ‘the understanding and the sense’.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Logic}, 68. Coleridge uses ‘idea’ here in a Neoplatonic sense, as an intelligible or noumenal principle taken to be apprehensible through non-sensible (spiritual or intellectual) intuition (see \textit{Logic}, 236-8).

\textsuperscript{85} See \textit{Logic}, 142-6 (cf. 127-31), and esp. 172-3. See also 3.4 above.
are the two constituents of the mind’. What he means is that sense and understanding must be considered ‘in subordination to [reason], and as more properly constituting the mind in its specific sense as the human mind’. (as Coleridge notes elsewhere, all it means to say that sense and understanding are constituents or components of the human mind is that these are the terms we use to refer to those sensory and intellectual capacities that the human mind is ordinarily taken to possess, without any reference to claims about the material neurophysiological structures or immaterial spiritual substances in which such capacities might be grounded). This is also why, in a lengthy footnote on the nature of self-consciousness, Coleridge asserts that:

We cannot too early familiarise the mind to the distinction between the conditional finite “I”, which knows itself [only through] distinct consciousness by occasion of experience, [and] which is so far not improperly named by the followers of Kant the empirical “I” (das empirische Ich), and the absolute “I am”, and likewise the inheritance of the former in the latter “in whom we live and move and have our being”.

In Coleridge’s view, the conditional or finite ‘I’ is the ground or source of the ‘principles of knowing’ which necessarily condition all human sense-experience and sensory cognition. These principles, however, govern only the objects of knowledge which are apprehended from the finite human standpoint, and can tell us nothing about what Coleridge calls ‘the wholly and properly objective—i.e. [things which] have a subsistence independently of the mind which contemplates them.’ So, in Coleridge’s terminology, the forms or principles of sense and understanding, which have a ‘conditional necessity’ deriving from the constitution of the human subject, should not be confused with the ‘principles of being’ which govern those objects which subsist independently of the human mind and the forms and conditions of its cognition. It is only in God, or ‘the absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind, the underived and eternal “I Am” […] that we find the principle of being and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality, the ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of that existence, absolutely one and identical’. Thus, it is God, conceived as the ‘underived and eternal “I Am”’, who is the ground or source of those ‘principles of being’ which Coleridge designates as the ‘Divine Ideas’ that have an

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86 Logic, 69-70.
87 Logic, 44; cf. 70n.
88 Logic, 85n. Coleridge is of course quoting (with variations) Acts 17.28.
89 See Logic, 142 for this definition of objectivity (cf. 141n, 145-6ff).
90 Logic, 84-5 (cf. BL.I.264-86)
‘absolute necessity’ (deriving from the eternal, unbounded creative activity of God, ‘the absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind’). Given that only those principles that derive from, or are grounded in, the absolute mind of God can function as both epistemic and ontological principles, only the Divine Ideas can be considered as objectively real (i.e. as finite-mind-independent) a priori forms or principles that have a scope and validity extending beyond the limits of human sensory cognition and its objects.

Coleridge holds that the conditionally necessary principles or forms of knowing are required to account for the possibility of human sensory experience, as well as for the possibility of logical, mathematical, and natural-scientific knowledge. He takes all such principles to be a priori in the Kantian sense, as forms which condition all knowledge and experience from the finite human standpoint, and holds that we can discover these forms through a transcendental ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms of the understanding [and sense]’, which is carried out through reflection on the contents and operations of the human mind (and is therefore a discursive or conceptual kind of knowledge). Conversely, the absolutely necessary principles or forms of being and of knowing are required to account for the existence of all objects (mental and physical), as well as for the existence of the human subjects in which the conditionally necessary principles of knowing subsist. Coleridge takes these principles of being and knowing to be a priori in the Platonic sense, as forms which determine the nature of all objects which subsist independently of finite human subjects, and holds that we can discover these principles only through a Platonic-style noesis or intellectual intuition (our knowledge of these principles is therefore intuitive or nondiscursive, i.e. noetic or acquired by means of Ideas rather than concepts). In what follows, I discuss how Coleridge’s distinction between the ‘conditionally necessary’ principles of knowing and the ‘absolutely necessary’ principles of being is closely related to his further distinctions between ‘real’ and ‘formal’ knowledge, and subjective and objective necessity (or between the ‘universally subjective’ a priori and the ‘real objective’ a priori).

ii. Coleridge on the Subsistence of Subjective & Objective A Priori Forms

An important reference point here is Coleridge’s account in Statesman’s Manual of the ‘threelfold Necessity’ which governs the different kinds of knowing and being:

91 Logic, 83-5ff, 146-7, 236-8; see also esp. ‘On the Divine Ideas’ in OM, 214-90
92 See Logic, 146-7, 211-4, 242-8ff.
93 See Logic, 169, 211-4, 236-8; OM, 214-90 (esp. 206-8ff, 221-4ff, 275-6ff).
There is a logical, and there is a mathematical, necessity; but the latter is always hypothetical, and both subsist formally only, not in any real object. Only by the intuition and immediate spiritual consciousness of the idea of God, as the One and Absolute, at once the Ground and the Cause, who alone containeth in himself the ground of his own nature, and therein of all natures, do we arrive at the third, which alone is a real objective, necessity. Here the immediate consciousness decides: the idea is its own evidence, and is insusceptible of all other. It is necessarily groundless and indemonstrable; because it is itself the ground of all possible demonstration. The Reason hath faith in itself, in its own revelations.94

We can get a better sense of how Coleridge’s claims in this passage are related to his distinction between the two different kinds of a priori necessity, by considering them in the context of what he says in Logic about ‘the distinction which I have been called upon to observe and make between real and formal knowledges, and [between] the real and formal sciences in consequence’.95 In particular, what Coleridge means in claiming that the necessary truths of logic and mathematics ‘both subsist formally only, not in any real object’ becomes clearer in his account of the mental acts that are studied by the formal sciences (and which are taken to be separate from mind-independent things):

Whether I speak of a man’s soul or his body, I speak of a something which I suppose to subsist of itself and not contained in the act of my contemplation. But when I say that what is true of all must be true of each, […] or simply affirm that [whatever is affirmed of a generic conception applies to all subordinates or particulars in that conception], I am not speaking of any thing, but of the acts of my own mind and the law or form according to which it acts or ought to act. Now the sciences which teach these forms are hence contradistinguished as formal sciences, and in this acceptation of the word, logic, geometry, and arithmetic are all alike formal sciences.96

These claims reflect Coleridge’s conception of ‘the essential Subjectivity of all abstract (or formal) Sciences, ex. gr. Logic, Geometry, &c’.97 Coleridge holds the laws of logic and mathematics to be universal and necessary (i.e. a priori), but he also claims that these laws are objective only in ‘the secondary and metaphorical sense of “objective”, [as] that which is universally and permanently subjective, that is, what all human subjects possess in common by necessity of their constitution’ (i.e. the universal forms of sense and

94 LS, 32.
95 Logic, 42-3.
96 Logic, 43.
97 CM.II.887.
understanding, in which mathematical and logical knowledge are grounded, the former in our pure forms of sensible intuition, space and time, the latter in our pure forms of conceiving and judging, the categories.⑨ The sense in which the principles or truths that are ‘universally and permanently subjective’ are also objective is further elucidated by Coleridge in a different note: ‘in this connection and use of the words, “objective” is opposed to “subjective” as “universal” to “individual”, and not as “real” to “formal”—in his terminology in Logic, such formal principles or truths are ‘universally subjective’ rather than ‘accidentally subjective’:

James sees that as yellow which to men in general appears as red, and this we say is [accidentally] subjective: that is, results from the individual subject. But no mind can confound the properties of a circle with those of a square. These are truths which subsist in all beings possessing the faculties of sense and intelligence, independent of all will and without relation to individuality. They are in all minds as though they were but in one mind, and being in one mind are the same as in all. Hence they are called universal truths, while those which being equally universal are at the same time transcendent to sense, and irrelelative to space and time, are entitled eternal truths.⑩

We can see now that when Coleridge claims that ‘logical and mathematical necessity’ ‘both subsist formally only, not in any real object’, what he means is that such necessity ‘subsists in all beings possessing the faculties of sense and intelligence’ (i.e. in the a priori forms of sense and understanding). While the truths of logic and mathematics are necessary for all beings with our cognitive constitution, they are only subjectively real, because they are grounded in principles or forms ‘that have no subsistence but in the faculty of a finite mind’.⑪ Conversely, the other class of universal truths that Coleridge mentions in the passage just quoted (the Ideas), are ‘absolutely necessary’: they determine ‘all objects and subjects above space and time’ (i.e. everything in the intelligible or noumenal world, which for Coleridge means that these truths and principles must also determine everything, whether mental or physical, in the sensible or phenomenal world), and have a ‘real objective, necessity’ because they derive from the ‘unindividuated and transcendent’ Reason, considered as ‘the living source of living and substantial verities,

⑨ See Logic, 202n (cf. 43n, 211-4, 236-8).
⑩ Logic, 43n. For more on this distinction between the universal and the accidental subjective, see 127-8, 172-3 (here Coleridge notes the effects jaundice on an individual subject’s perception as an example of what is ‘accidentally subjective’, while giving the capacity to perceive the spatiotemporally ordered manifold of sensible objects as an example of what is ‘universally subjective’).
⑪ See OM, 276.
[which] presents the Idea to the individual mind and subjective intellect, which receives and employs [such Ideas] to its own appropriate ends, namely to understand thereby both itself and all its objects'. Ideas, as we saw above, do not have their subsistence in the faculty of a finite mind', but in ‘the absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind, the underived and eternal I Am [in which] we find the principle of being and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality, the ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of that existence’. They are the noetic or objectively real a priori forms, what Coleridge calls ‘the subsistence of the universe, material and intellectual’: Those eternal forms which are ‘characterised neither as object nor as subject exclusively, but as the identity of both [subject and object], as at once formal and real’. What makes Ideas ‘at once formal and real’ is that they are both epistemic principles, as the ground of our knowledge of all mind-independent objects (anything that ‘I suppose to subsist of itself and not [to be wholly] contained in the act of my contemplation’), and ontological principles, as the ground of the existence of all such objects. In contradistinction to the formal principles of logic and mathematics, Ideas subsist in real objects, and so must be taken to be constitutive, at least in part, of those objects (of cognition) that are ‘properly and wholly objective—i.e. [which can be taken to] have a subsistence independent of the mind which contemplates them’. While Coleridge certainly does not deny the mental reality of logical and mathematical principles, he is clear that they are only subjectively real (like space and time, taken as pure forms of intuition).

Having considered the main features of Coleridge’s distinction between objectively real and subjectively real a priori forms (and between formal or ‘subjective necessity’ and ‘real objective necessity’), I want to turn now to Coleridge’s views on the differences between the various kinds of transcendental claims we can make concerning how to demonstrate the possibility of the nonempirical knowledge taken to derive from these two distinct types of a priori forms. This will also help to make clear Coleridge’s reasons for making a distinction between mathematical and logical knowledge on the one hand, and noetic knowledge on the other, even though he evidently regards both of these classes of nonempirical knowledge as a priori. In particular, I will show why

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101 OM, 274 (cf. LS, 32-3).
102 See Logic, 85; OM, 276.
103 See Logic, 43-4, OM, 274-6. Cf. esp. Logic, 87 definition of ‘the noetic’ as ‘that knowledge in which truth and reality are one and the same, that which in the ideas that are present to the mind recognises the laws that govern in nature, if we may not say the laws that are nature’ (see also, Friend I.493n).
104 Logic, 142.
105 See e.g. Logic, 172-3 for Coleridge on the subjective reality of space and time (as the grounds of all geometrical and arithmetical truths and principles, they are universally subjective in the same way).
Coleridge separates the methods and principles employed in transcendental logic and transcendental aesthetic from those employed in transcendental noetic. I will take as my starting point here Coleridge’s definitions of noetics, and his account of what is involved in this nonempirical discipline that is concerned with the \textit{a priori} contents and operations of reason (‘the evidence of reason’). As we will see, Coleridge’s statements here must be considered in the context of (i) his two-level theory of the \textit{a priori} and (ii) his distinction between ‘transcendent’ and ‘transcendental’ philosophical methods.

4.4 From the ‘Point of Reflection’ to the ‘Reality of Reason’: Noetic, the Universal Subjective, & the Principle of Subject-Object Identity

\textbf{i. Coleridge’s Apriority Criteria & the Evidence of Reason}

Given the first three apriority criteria outlined in 2.1 and 4.3, it is evident that the pure or nonempirical cognitive content which Coleridge terms ‘the evidence of reason’ and ‘the truths of reason’ must be regarded as having an \textit{a priori} status. This is particularly evident in Coleridge’s descriptions of the field of pure enquiry he designates as ‘noetics’, and his account of the relationship between the cognitive capacity or power of reason and the contents of noetics (the truths and principles of reason, i.e. Platonic Ideas, as employed in the speculative metaphysical fields of ontology, theology, and ethics):

the consideration of [the evidence of reason], as the primary truths—\textit{aeternae veritates} [eternal truths]—independent of all time and place and in which the reason itself consists, gives rise to the science once called the first philosophy, then ontology, by others—but more laxly \textit{et improprae} [and improperly]—metaphysics, but for which the term “noetic”, or the science corresponding to the \textit{noetic}, would be the most unpresuming and most appropriate exponent.

[Noetics involves] those permanent and universal truths which in the peculiar sense are entitled truths of reason, and mind contemplated as the source of these is designated the reason, or, using the Greek term for the after-convenience of its derivation, the \textit{noetic}.\textsuperscript{106}

These statements leave little doubt that Coleridge takes truths of reason to derive from the mind, to be given and known independently of ordinary sense-experience (i.e. the spatiotemporally ordered manifold of sensible intuition), and possess the characteristics of universality and permanence (as ‘truths having these attributes’). That he also regards such truths as necessary is evident in Coleridge’s identification of these ‘primary truths’

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Logic}, 35-6, 43-4.
of reason with what he terms ‘primary reality’ (i.e. ‘objective reality’, or the world as it exists independently of human minds). Coleridge claims that ‘the reality of reason’ is a ground and source of this primary reality (as well as of all our knowledge of such reality), and that truths of reason must thus be characterised by their ‘absolute necessity’ (because such truths are independent of those conditions which determine and constrain human sensory cognition of the world). Thus, Ideas or truths of reason meet Coleridge’s first three apriority criteria. But as we saw earlier, Ideas are not only principles of knowing, but also principles of being, which are required to explain how those objects which have a subsistence independent of the finite minds which contemplate or perceive them can come to exist independently of such minds. This means the Ideas also meet Coleridge’s fourth apriority criterion: since we cannot explain how the objects that occasion sensory cognition come to exist without recourse to Ideas, these principles must be recognised as finite-mind-independent conditions of the possibility of experience (insofar as we accept the view, held by Coleridge, that there could be no experience of sensible objects at all, were there not some mind-independent realm of things to occasion such experience by affecting the mind through its sensory cognitive capacities). Without these ‘absolutely necessary’ principles of being, grounded in the absolute mind of God, there would be no physical things for finite minds to experience, and indeed, no finite minds or subjects to acquire any experience or knowledge of such objects.

Given all of this, the truths of reason, and ‘the evidence of reason’ from which our knowledge of these truths derives, may be considered as fulfilling Coleridge’s main criteria for apriority. Given that the evidence of reason does not contain, or refer to, any kind of cognitive content given or known a posteriori, it is also evident that the intellectual or spiritual intuitions through which such evidence of reason is given or presented to the mind qualify as Kantian pure representations (even though such intuitions are not a class of pure representations that Kant himself would recognise). Yet, when Coleridge first introduces his claim that the truths and principles of reason are characterised by their ‘absolute necessity’, he does so not to indicate that such truths and principles must be regarded as one of the possible kinds of a priori cognitive content; rather, he wants to emphasise that the absolute necessity exhibited by the evidence of reason needs to be distinguished from ‘the conditional necessity which inheres in the forms and functions

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107 See *Logic*, 134, 145-6. See also 83-4ff for Coleridge’s claim that God, the absolute mind who grounds the reality of reason, must be the ground of existence and of our knowledge of existence, so that God is in effect both the ground and source of all reality and all cognition (cf. *LS*, 32-3).

108 See *Logic*, 83-5ff. For a more detailed account, see *OM*, 214-90 (esp. 220-2ff, 275-6ff).

109 For Coleridge on Kant’s denial of the possibility of intellectual intuition, see e.g. *BL*.1.288n.
of the understanding and the rules generalised from these, and which [has] the property of being affirmed *a priori*. Coleridge appears to be suggesting here that the truths of reason must be contrasted with the kind of pure cognitive form and content which has ‘the property of being affirmed *a priori*. At the very least, he seems to be claiming that the cognitive form and content which derives from reason must be *a priori* in a different way to that which derives from the understanding. As we saw earlier (in 4.3), Coleridge makes this distinction partly because he holds that those *a priori* forms which derive from understanding (and sense) are subjectively real, or ‘have no subsistence but in the faculty of a finite mind’, whereas those *a priori* forms which derive from ‘the unindividual and transcendent’ reason are objectively real, because they ‘subsist independently of the [finite, human] mind’. Below, I consider in further detail how Coleridge’s usage of the term ‘*a priori*’ in *Logic* relates to his distinction between what he calls ‘the subjective’ and ‘the objective’ in the same text. This will help lay the ground for a closer consideration of Coleridge’s transcendent/transcendental distinction and its relation to his claims about why an inquiry into the contents and operations of our cognitive capacities is required to demonstrate how certain kinds of cognitive content(s) are possible.

**ii. Coleridge on the Subjective, the Objective, & the Limits of Reflection**

In those sections of *Logic* which deal with the *a priori*, Coleridge contends that ‘the knowledge of our intellectual nature is the substance and life of all our knowledge and the ground of intelligibility of all other objects of knowledge*. In other words, as he puts it elsewhere, in order to acquire a knowledge of the nature of the various possible objects of our experience and cognition, ‘we surely ought to examine the nature of the faculties by which we acquire experience’ or carry out ‘an examination of our powers of knowledge*. According to Coleridge, such an inquiry into our ‘intellectual nature’ or ‘powers of knowledge’ (i.e. cognitive capacities)

supposes a knowledge first of that which, though common in kind to all men, we yet, each of us, are entitled to call “mine”, or “myself”, as contradistinguished from that which is “not mine”, “not of myself”—that, viz. which we have so often spoken of as a knowledge of the subjective in contradistinction from the objective. And secondly a knowledge of that which is not myself, or of me as contradistinguished from that which the mind possesses in itself or

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110 *Logic*, 146.
111 See OM, 276; see also *Logic*, 145-6.
112 *Logic*, 144.
113 *CN.III.3605*. 
communicates from its own stores, i.e. a knowledge of the objective as contradistinguished from the subjective. And lastly a knowledge of that which is distinguished from both, as transcending both and [being] of both the root and identity [i.e. a principle of subject-object identity, or ‘a principle of being, and of knowledge, or idea, and of reality’].

Bearing in mind that Coleridge elsewhere defines ‘subjective’ as ‘the mind [considered] in and for itself, separately from the objects of the senses and sensations’ (i.e. ‘the sum of all the subjective comprehended in the name of mind or intelligence’) and ‘objective’ as ‘nature [i.e. the sum of] all the phenomena by which other existence than our own is made known to us’, we can see that he is making distinctions here between (i) our knowledge of the mind and its contribution to cognition, (ii) our knowledge, or at least our sensory awareness, of what the mind does not contribute to cognition (and which is assumed to come to us ‘from without’), and (iii) our knowledge of the principle that makes possible a unification of these mind-dependent and mind-independent or mind-external contributions to our cognition and its objects, because it is ‘the root and identity’ of both the subjective and objective elements of cognition. As we shall see, Coleridge claims that our knowledge of the subjective elements of cognition must be acquired through reflection (especially reflection on our cognitive operations), that our knowledge of the objective elements of cognition must be acquired through empirical sensible intuition, and that our knowledge of the principle that unifies these elements, both at the epistemic and ontological levels, must be acquired through intellectual intuition (and is therefore not accessible through reflection on our cognitive operations and contents, because such knowledge cannot be given or known discursively).

Before expanding on the implications of these distinctions, Coleridge emphasises the connection between our knowledge of the subjective elements of cognition and the procedure of reflecting on the operations and contents of cognition:

Now it is evident that the knowledge mentioned in the [first] place, which we may call the universal subjective, or that which is common to the race without distinction of individuals, must be acquired before we can form any judgement of the [second], the properly objective. At least from the point on which we have hitherto stood and are still standing, viz. the point of

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114 Logic, 145 (quotation in square brackets taken from 85).
115 For these definitions and distinctions, see also Logic, 37-8, 42-3. By ‘me as contradistinguished from that which the mind possesses in itself or communicates from its own stores’, I take Coleridge to mean our sensory awareness of ‘the phenomena by which other existence than our own is made known to us’ (i.e. of those elements of cognition which must be given a posteriori, and which do not derive from, or originate in, the a priori operations and contents of the mind).
reflection. This must be necessary in as much as our knowledge of [the] objective [as acquired from the point of reflection] is merely negative. We affirm it to be objective—in other words, that the objects of such knowledge subsist independently of the mind—only because it is not accompanied by the mark of the subjective, viz. its validity a priori, and because it is not included and therefore not to be evolved out of that which we know to be the subject itself.116

Our knowledge of ‘the universal subjective’, and of what is ‘evolved out of that which we know to the subject [i.e. the mind] itself’ is acquired from the ‘point of reflection’. What Coleridge means by this is only made clear later in the Logic manuscript, where he claims that when we analyse the (universally) subjective elements of cognition we should confine our inquisition to the data presented to us by reflection, and as they appear to us in the act of reflecting; or to the immediate inferences from these made necessary by the laws of reflection’.117 He will later identify Kant’s categories as ‘the laws of reflection’, claiming that ‘As long as we reflect, the categoric species [or ‘elementary conceptions’] must necessarily appear as the accompaniments of reflection, as the means by which, or the modes in which, we reflect, and not as the contingent objects of our reflection, not as the materials on which we reflect’.118 Here, however, Coleridge is concerned only with describing the standpoint of reflection itself:

What those laws [of reflection] are is a subject for future inquiry, but be they what they may, it is easy to imagine some superior being capable of contemplating at once an individual mind and its objects, of judging how far and in what manner the objects are modified for the human mind by its own mechanism, and lastly of looking at the objects independent of such modification. Now he who disclaims all pretensions to any prerogative of this kind [i.e. of looking at the objects of cognition independent of their modification by the human mind], or who, though believing that a substitute or something analogous to it [i.e. this mind-independent perspective] subsists even for the human intelligence, nevertheless abstracts (that is, voluntarily withdraws his attention) from it and agrees to reason as though no such power existed, is said to stand on the point of reflection [Coleridge’s emphasis].119

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116 Logic, 145. At this point of the manuscript, Coleridge or his transcriber appears to have confused the order of exposition from the preceding paragraph, referring to our ‘knowledge of the subjective’ as ‘the second’ and our ‘knowledge of the objective’ as ‘the first’; given that the broader textual context makes it clear that this is the opposite of what Coleridge means, I have exchanged his references to ‘first’ and ‘second’ here, to bring this passage in line with the previously established order of exposition.

117 Logic, 245.
118 Logic, 266n.
119 Logic, 245.
Returning to Coleridge’s earlier commentary on the distinction between the subjective and the objective elements of cognition, we can see now that insofar as our knowledge of ‘how far and in what manner the objects [of cognition] are modified for the human mind by its own mechanism’ consists in the knowledge of ‘the universal subjective, or that which is common to the race without distinction of individuals’ and is taken to be ‘evolved out of that which we know to be the subject itself’, such knowledge is acquired by ‘stand[ing] on the point of reflection’ (as Coleridge himself claims in both passages about ‘the point of reflection’). Moreover, we can also see why Coleridge states that whatever knowledge of the objective elements of cognition is acquired from the standpoint of reflection must be ‘merely negative’: for analysing cognition and its constitutive elements from a reflective perspective does not secure for us the ‘prerogative’ of contemplating or ‘looking at the objects [of sensory cognition] independent of [their] modification’ by ‘the human mind by its own mechanism’ or ‘that which the mind possesses in itself or communicates from its own stores’. Rather, reflection is a procedure that allows us to do no more than ‘affirm […] that the objects of such knowledge subsist independently of the mind’, because we know such objects must be given a posteriori (in empirical sensible intuition) and so are ‘not accompanied by the mark of the subjective, viz. [their] validity a priori, and because [these objects are] not included [in] and therefore not be evolved out of that which [through reflection] we know to be the subject itself’.

iii. The Reality of Reason vs. The Reality of Nature: Noumenal & Phenomenal Objects

Having outlined the limits of the standpoint of reflection, Coleridge goes on to point out that knowledge of the subjective elements of cognition is nevertheless a prerequisite for complete knowledge of the objective elements of cognition, claiming that our knowledge of both sets of elements presupposes some sort of principle of subject-object identity:

[I]t is evident that the knowledge […] which we may call the universal subjective […] must be acquired before we can form any judgement of […] the properly objective. […] But on the other hand, though less obvious, it is no less true that as […] the knowledge of the constitution of the subject is a necessary precondition of any distinct knowledge respecting the object, yet this must presuppose the existence of that [first] and highest insight—an insight into the existence of a somewhat that is the common ground of the subject and object, were it only that

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120 Logic, 145; cf. 245.
121 Logic, 145, 245 (cf. 37-41, 139-43).
it [this ‘common ground’] is in the order of its formation anterior to reflection, in which power the antithesis of subject and object has its birth and origin.122

As we saw earlier (in 4.3), Coleridge claims that this ‘common ground of the subject and object’ must be God, conceived of ‘as the One and Absolute, at once the Ground and the Cause [of all reality], who alone containeth in himself the ground of his own nature, and therein of all natures’, or ‘the absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind, the underived and eternal “I Am” [wherein] we find the principle of being and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality, the ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of that existence, absolutely one and identical’.123 Just as it is through the ‘power’ of reflection that we discover ‘the antithesis of subject and object’ or the distinction between the subjective (formal) and the objective (material) elements of our sensory cognition, it is ‘Only by the intuition and immediate spiritual consciousness of the idea of God’ (i.e. through intellectual intuition or noesis) that we can discover ‘the root and identity of both [subject and object]’, or the principle of subject-object identity.124 In what follows, I discuss Coleridge’s distinction between the different kinds of knowledge of subject-object relations which we acquire (i) through reflection (i.e. discursively) and (ii) through intellectual intuition, looking at how this distinction informs Coleridge’s account of the difference between the principles of Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic on the one side, and Transcendental Noetic on the other. As we will see, to understand Coleridge’s account of this difference, we must look carefully at his claims about the contrast between the methods and objects of ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’ philosophy.

After outlining his views on the subjective and objective elements of cognition and the methods whereby we acquire knowledge of these elements, Coleridge returns to some of his earlier claims about the nature of the ‘primary reality’ which is taken to be, in part, constituted by these two sets of elements:

There is as we have already learnt, a somewhat which, whether we refer it to an agency without ourselves or acknowledge it as an immediate presence to and as it were within the mind, we in both cases express by the affirmative “is”. And hence we distinguish from the reflective faculty [i.e. understanding] two species of reality—the reality in nature and the reality of reason.125

122 Logic, 146.
123 LS, 32, Logic, 84-5 (cf. BL.I.264-86)
124 See Logic, 145-6; LS, 32-3 (cf. Logic, 84-5, 132-3).
125 Logic, 146.
Coleridge is here referring back to a previous passage concerning the relation between ‘primary reality’, the world as it is taken to exist independently of finite human minds, and our ‘reflective and discursive powers’, the faculty of understanding:

[T]his reality [...] contain[s] a truth which being antecedent to the act of reflection, and of course therefore to all other acts and functions of the understanding, assert[s] a being transcendent to the individual subject in all cases and therefore all subjects thinking under the same laws. Of this primary reality we discovered two sources—one above the reflective and discursive powers, the other below them. The one was the reason, and the other the impressions from the senses.126

The ‘being transcendent to the individual subject’ is of course God, considered as ‘the ground of existence, and the ground of [our] knowledge of that existence, absolutely one and identical’.127 What Coleridge means by describing reason as a source of reality and by such phrases as ‘the reality of reason’ is perhaps most neatly summed up in his definition of reason and its objects in the 1818 *Friend*:

I should have no objection to define Reason with Jacobi, and his with his friend Hemsterhuis, as an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena. But then it must be added, that it is an organ identical with its appropriate objects. Thus, God, the Soul, eternal Truth, &c are the objects of Reason; but they are themselves reason. We name God the Supreme Reason; and Milton says “Whence the Soul Reason receives, and Reason is her Being”.128

That is to say, reason is the ‘organ’ or cognitive capacity whereby we acquire knowledge of ‘spiritual truths, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Necessary’, the sorts of knowledge which constitute the realm of noetics. Moreover, the capacity we designate as ‘reason’ is ‘identical with its appropriate objects’, the Ideas of God, the Soul, eternal Truth, and so on.129 On the one hand, Coleridge is simply characterising reason in the same way that he characterises our other cognitive capacities, sense and understanding. For Coleridge also contends that what we mean when we refer to the ‘constituent forms’ or ‘inherent forms and several functional powers’ of these faculties is just the set of cognitive abilities which

126 Logic, 132.
127 Logic, 85.
128 Friend.l.155-6 (Coleridge is quoting from Paradise Lost, V.486-7).
129 Friend.l.155-6; cf. Logic, 44n. That Coleridge uses the term ‘organ’ to designate a cognitive capacity of some kind is clear at Logic, 154 where he claims that ‘the understanding is the organ of our thoughts and conceptions’ (cf. SWF.l.332-6 on ‘The Soul and its organs of Sense’).
are taken to constitute those cognitive capacities which we designate as ‘sense’ and ‘understanding’. Given that the forms of sense and understanding can be considered as both ‘pure acts’ and ‘pure products’ (i.e. a priori operations and contents), we can say that the pure or nonempirical objects of these two faculties (i.e. our pure intuitions and pure conceptions) just ‘are themselves’ sense and understanding—at least insofar as we hold, as Coleridge does, that the pure objects of these faculties just are the modes of cognitive activity in which the exercise or employment of these faculties consists (see 1.5, 2.3, 3.2).

To explain: space and time, as the pure forms of sensible intuition, can be considered as both objects of the pure sense, and as the cognitive operations or activities in which this capacity consists; likewise, the four classes of categories, as the pure forms of conception and judgement, can be considered as both objects of the pure understanding, and as the cognitive operations or activities in which this capacity consists. On the other hand, Coleridge is making a further claim about the nature of reason which does not apply to sense or understanding: it is a cognitive capacity that is somehow ‘identical with’ those principles, the Ideas, which are taken to subsist independently of all finite human minds (and are thus contradistinguished from the ‘inherent forms’ of sense and understanding, which ‘have their subsistence in the faculty of a finite mind’, as ‘what all human subjects possess in common by necessity of their constitution’).

What separates reason from sense and understanding, then, is (i) that reason is a cognitive capacity which is grounded in the absolute mind of God, rather than in the common cognitive constitution of finite human subjects, and (ii) that reason is a capacity that is ‘identical with’ all of its ‘appropriate objects’ (the Divine Ideas). This is in contrast to sense and understanding, which may be said to be ‘identical with’ their ‘constituent forms’, insofar as such forms can also be the pure objects (or contents) of these faculties, but which cannot be said to be ‘identical with’ the sensory impressions that they receive from ‘something acting upon us [i.e. finite human minds] from without’. For while the forms of sense and understanding make possible our apprehension of sensible objects, these forms cannot be said to be ‘identical with’ sensible objects in the same way that reason is ‘identical with’ those non-sensible or intelligible (i.e. noumenal) objects which it enables finite human minds to apprehend—or, rather, to partake of or participate in—through the act of intellectual (or spiritual) intuition.

130 For this conception of sense and understanding, see esp. Logic, 146-7, 265-6n.
131 See e.g. Legis, 202n, OM, 276.
132 See e.g. BL.I.293n, Legis, 76-7, 143-6ff.
133 On this process, see e.g. Legis, 43-4, 69-70; OM, 88-92ff, 171-6, 274-6.
With the above claims in mind, we can see now that what Coleridge means by ‘the reality in nature’ and ‘the reality of reason’ is just the material, phenomenal objects of the senses on the one hand (as apprehended through sensible intuition or aisthesis), and the immaterial, noumenal objects of reason on the other (as apprehended through intellectual intuition or noesis). These two classes of objects are both distinguished from the ‘reflective faculty’, the understanding and the objects given through its discursive acts and products, or ‘the data presented to us by reflection, […] as they appear to us in the act of reflecting’.

Having presented this tripartite division of our cognitive capacities and their respective spheres or objects, Coleridge then goes on to describe the objects of the senses as being characterised by their ‘apparent contingency’, objects of understanding as characterised by their ‘conditional necessity’, and objects of reason as characterised by their ‘absolute necessity’ (here contrasted with the conditional kind):

[W]e distinguish from the reflective faculty two species of reality—the reality in nature and the reality of reason. The one characterised by its apparent contingency, as proceeding from a power separate from our own will and spontaneity, and the other by its absolute necessity, not the conditional necessity which inheres in the forms and functions of the understanding and the rules generalised from these, and which necessity with its consequence, the property of being affirmed a priori, we have aptly compared with the movement of a machine that results solely [and] inevitably from the construction of the machine, supposing it to act at all, though this is itself not universally necessary, but must be limited to the mind from the faculties of which such and such cognitions result.

Coleridge’s distinction between ‘absolute’ and ‘conditional’ necessity was covered above (see 4.3), so I will focus now on how this distinction is related to Coleridge’s division of the transcendental or ‘critical inquisition into the constitution of the intellectual faculties’ into aesthetic, logic, and noetic. In particular, I consider the ways in which this division is informed by Coleridge’s contrast between the respective aims and objects of what he calls ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’ philosophy. My principal goal will be to develop an outline of Coleridge’s views on the different kinds of transcendental claim(s) involved in transcendental aesthetic, logic, and noetic.

134 See Logic, 37-41, 43-4, 146-7.
135 Logic, 245.
136 Logic, 146. For further discussion of Coleridge’s notion of ‘construction’ (by which he means cognitive constitution), see 3.4 above.
4.5 Transcendental Inquiry & Transcendent Metaphysics: The Possibility of Noetic Knowledge & the Limits of Human Cognition

i. Transcendent or Transcendental Knowledge? Coleridge's Case for Noetic

The first thing to note here is that, after Coleridge introduces the distinction just outlined between the ‘absolute necessity’ which characterises the forms and objects of reason and ‘the conditional necessity which inheres in the forms and functions of the understanding and the rules generalised from these’, he informs the reader that:

Our present business is [confined] to the latter [i.e. ‘conditional necessity’] and this again we must subdivide into two kinds, each forming a distinct science—these are, first, the universal forms of the pure sense and the knowledge [that] has been entitled ‘transcendental aesthetic’, [...] that investigation into the constitution and constituent forms of the understanding, which in analogy with the former is termed transcendental logic.\(^{137}\)

Now, Coleridge notes at various points in the *Logic* manuscript that there is a distinction between ‘the unindividuated transcendent [...] reason as a presence to the human mind, not a particular faculty or component part of the mind’ and the sense and understanding, considered as ‘its two component faculties or species’ (i.e. ‘as more properly constituting the mind in its specific sense as the human mind’).\(^{138}\) Given such a distinction, Coleridge contends, we must discuss the respective objects, operations, and contents of sense and understanding on the one hand, and of reason on the other hand, separately and within different theoretical frameworks. Since transcendental philosophy is concerned primarily with the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of our experience and of the objects of our cognition, we must begin with a consideration of sensible or phenomenal objects and the conditions under which such objects are given and cognised (i.e. the constituent forms of sense and understanding, as disclosed by transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic). Then, having once established the conditions and limits of sensory experience and cognition, we can turn our attention to non-sensory cognition, considering intelligible or noumenal objects and the conditions under which such objects are apprehended (i.e. the constituent forms of reason, as disclosed by transcendental noetic).\(^{139}\) However, although Coleridge provides broad outlines of this transcendental project throughout his *Logic*, he appears never to have completed the projected third part of the manuscript concerned with noetic, or to have incorporated the detailed discussion of noetic knowledge and its

\(^{137}\) *Logic*, 146-8.


\(^{139}\) For references to this division of transcendental labour, see e.g. *Logic*, 51-2, 76, 154, 169, 212.
objects that he offers in *Opus Maximum* into any later drafts of *Logic*.\(^{140}\) Indeed, there are moments in *Logic* where Coleridge seems to suggest that the theory of noetic does not in fact form part of such a transcendental inquiry into our cognition. But, as I will explain below, when we consider such passages in the broader context of Coleridge’s conception of transcendental inquiry (as established in 2.1-3 and 3.2-4.2), it is possible to frame his account of noetic and its objects in transcendental terms.

As noted earlier, the key reference point for making sense of Coleridge’s position here (as presented in *Logic*) is his use of the terms ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’. As we saw in 2.1, when Coleridge first defines the term ‘transcendental knowledge’ in *Logic*, he claims that it must consist in ‘the knowledge of the conditions that render experience itself possible’, which are characterised as follows:

Now to distinguish the truths that are necessarily presupposed in all experience as its condition and co-cause, from the facts or knowledge not only occasioned by, but actually derived from, experience, whether it be the experience of the world without or the experience acquired by reflection on ourselves, and yet at the same time to distinguish the former knowledge from pretended cognitions and assertions that transcend our intellectual faculties or, what is equivalent, for which the human mind can be shown to possess no appropriate faculty and which assertions are called “transcendent”, the term “transcendental” has been chosen.\(^{141}\)

Having defined these two opposing terms, Coleridge goes on to elaborate further what separates ‘transcendental’ from ‘transcendent’ knowledge, especially with reference to the relationship between our ‘intellectual faculties’ or cognitive capacities and these different kinds of philosophical knowledge:

Transcendental knowledge is that by which we endeavour to climb above our experience into its sources by an analysis of our intellectual faculties, still, however, as it were, standing on the shoulders of our experience to reach at truths which are above experience, while transcendent philosophy would consist in the attempt to master a knowledge that is beyond our faculties, an attempt to grasp at objects beyond the reach of hand or eye or all the artificial ends and as it were, prolongations of eye and hand, of objects therefore the existence of which, if they did exist, the human mind has no means of ascertaining, and therefore has not even the power of imagining or conceiving.\(^{142}\)

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140 For this system of noetic or ‘logic of ideas’, see esp. *OM*, 214-90.
141 *Logic*, 146-7.
142 *Logic*, 147.
At first glance, it can appear as though Coleridge is ruling out the possibility of noetic knowledge here (as, indeed, one might expect from a philosopher who has just endorsed Kantian transcendental philosophy and its account of the limits of sensible experience and the possible objects of human sensory cognition).\(^{143}\) For, given that Coleridge talks of ‘the unindividual and transcendent character of the reason’, and refers to the Ideas as things which ‘transcend the sense’ (or as ‘eternal truths’ which are ‘transcendent to sense, and irrelative to space and time’), such noetic or noumenal objects could be said to meet the description of the ‘pretended cognitions and assertions that transcend our intellectual faculties’ or ‘a knowledge that is beyond our faculties’.\(^{144}\) Furthermore, if such statements are considered in conjunction with Coleridge’s claim that sense and understanding must be considered as ‘constituting the mind in its specific sense as the human mind’ as its ‘two component faculties’, while reason must be considered as a ‘power of ideas’ which is ‘transcendent’ to the human mind, then it seems plausible to contend that, insofar as the Ideas are possible objects of reason, they would be the kind of ‘pretended cognitions […] for which the human mind can be shown to possess no appropriate faculty’—little more than the illusory objects of a ‘transcendent philosophy’\(^{145}\). However, as has been shown above (4.1-3), Coleridge clearly does hold that finite human minds can acquire knowledge of Ideas through intellectual intuition, and that such subjects can employ Ideas through a noetic process whereby they partake of, or participate in, the absolute mind of God. Given this, Ideas cannot be ‘pretended cognitions’: for, even if reason is an ‘unindividual and transcendent’ power, ‘not a particular faculty or component part of the mind’, it is nevertheless ‘a presence to the human mind’.\(^{146}\) This means that, on Coleridge’s account, the human mind does in fact possess some ‘means of ascertaining’ the existence of such noumenal entities and the noetic cognitions that derive from them: insofar as reason is acknowledged to be a cognitive capacity that can be exercised by finite human subjects, it cannot be said that Ideas are the kind of cognition(s) ‘for which the human mind can be shown to possess no appropriate faculty’.\(^{147}\) Admittedly, Coleridge does say that, strictly speaking, reason is not a faculty, and thus arguably cannot be something that the human mind ‘possesses’. But the point still stands: Whether human subjects are said to possess it, partake of it, or to have it present to their minds, reason clearly is a cognitive capacity.

\(^{143}\) Although Coleridge cites ancient precursors of the transcendental approach at *Logic*, 148-9, he makes it clear here that he is following Kant, ‘the proper inventor and founder of transcendental analysis’.

\(^{144}\) See *Logic*, 43-4, 69-70, 154-5.

\(^{145}\) See *Logic*, 69-70, 146-7.

\(^{146}\) *Logic*, 69; cf. 43-4. See also *OM*, 88-92ff, 171-6, 274-6.

\(^{147}\) *Logic*, 147 (cf. 43-4, 68-70, 169). See also 4.3 above.
that the human mind can—at least potentially—exercise or employ, and the Ideas clearly are possible objects of cognition for such a mind.148

Given the above, what separates the kinds of knowledge dealt with in noetic from the kinds of knowledge dealt with in transcendental aesthetic and logic is not the fact that the former kinds of knowledge are held to be impossible. Rather, it is the fact that, given the difference between reason, as an ‘unindividuated and transcendent’ power, and sense and understanding, as ‘component faculties’ (of the human mind), a different method is required to demonstrate how Ideas (taken as non-sensible, intelligible objects), and the mental activity of intellectual intuition, are possible (i.e. a method distinct from that which we employ to show how sensible objects, and the mental activities of sensible intuition and discursive thought, are possible). But before looking more closely at what Coleridge says about the possibility of such noetic knowledge in Logic, it will be useful to return briefly to his note on the threefold division of transcendental inquiry, considered as an investigation into the elements of our cognition which consists in

a pre-inquisition into the mind [considered] as part Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge: an examination of the Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the Objects to be weighed or measured by them—in short, a transcendental Analysis, Aesthetic, Logic, and Noetic.149

For our present purposes, this note is important for both chronological and conceptual reasons. It is dated to 1824, meaning that Coleridge’s claims here were made after his composition of the Logic manuscript (c. 1819-22).150 This shows that Coleridge continued to maintain the division of transcendental philosophy into aesthetic, logic, and noetic, in the years after his work on Logic had stalled. As we saw in section 4.2, the word ‘analysis’ is crossed out in this note because Coleridge uses the term ‘transcendental analysis’ to refer specifically to an ‘investigation into the constitution and constituent forms of the understanding [and sense]’, or the ‘conditionally necessary’ a priori forms of the human mind. These forms must be considered separately from the ‘absolutely necessary’ a priori forms of the divine mind, in which human subjects participate through the exercise of reason: the Ideas, which are not objects of transcendental analysis (taken to consist in a special kind of discursive or conceptual knowledge of the conditions of the possibility of

149 CM.V.81.
150 For the chronological details of the marginal note, see CM.V.80; for those relating to the composition dates for MS Logic, see Logic, xxxix-li (“When was the Logic Written”).
experience), but rather the objects of transcendental noetic (taken to consist in a special kind of nondiscursive, intellectually intuited metaphysical knowledge of what Coleridge calls ‘the subsistence of the universe, material and intellectual’). In short, reason and its constituent forms are ‘part Organ, part Constituent’ of our cognition in much the same way as the inherent forms of sense and understanding, and reason is equally amenable to transcendental investigation. Below I consider Coleridge’s views concerning what makes these two forms of transcendental inquiry (analysis and noetic) different.

ii. Coleridge on the Relationship between Transcendental Analysis & Transcendental Noetic

Coleridge’s sense of the need for a distinction between transcendental analysis (aesthetic and logic) and transcendental noetic is made further apparent in the following series of passages in Logic, which pose the questions of whether, and how, the kind of speculative metaphysical knowledge he terms ‘noetics’ could be possible:

Now it yet remains to be seen whether such a science as that of metaphysics (in the sense of a first philosophy) is possible, or whether it be not transcendent of the human faculties instead of transcendental, i.e. referable to the constitution of these faculties; in which latter case it would be the same as transcendental logic and the name would be superfluous. But this possibility cannot be ascertained except by the means of transcendental logic, and the determination, whether affirmative or negative, presupposes the knowledge so obtained.\(^{152}\)

In this instance, Coleridge seems to be suggesting that if such speculative metaphysics or ‘first philosophy’ is possible, then it may be either ‘transcendent of the human faculties’ or ‘referable to the constitution of these faculties’ (i.e. ‘transcendental’). Given his later usage of the term ‘transcendental noetic’, and his uses of the term ‘transcendent’ elsewhere in Logic, this passage may also be read as suggesting that if speculative metaphysics is shown to be ‘transcendent of the human faculties’, then it must consist in some kind of impossible ‘pretended cognitions’, or that if its possibility is provable at all, then it must be ‘referable to the constitution’ of reason, taken as a capacity for noetic knowledge.\(^{153}\) Yet, Coleridge is clear that if such metaphysical knowledge is to be proven possible by being shown to be ‘referable to the constitution of [the] faculties’, then it would in fact be ‘the same as transcendental logic’ and thus referable to the constitution of sense and understanding.

\(^{151}\) See Logic, 146-7, 211-4; OM, 274-6; see also, Logic, 213: ‘the transcendental analysis consists of two parts, viz. the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental logic’.

\(^{152}\) Logic, 169.

\(^{153}\) See Logic, 146-7, 169; cf. 43-4, 68-70.
(which would presumably remove any need for a transcendental noetic). To get a better sense of what Coleridge means here, we must consider more closely his contention that, regardless of whether speculative metaphysical knowledge of some kind is at all possible, ‘this possibility cannot be ascertained except by the means of transcendental logic’.

As was noted above, Coleridge’s threefold division of transcendental inquiry is premised on the assumption that before we can give any account of our experience and cognition of non-sensible (or super-sensible) noumenal objects, we must first develop an account of our experience and cognition of sensible, phenomenal objects (and its limits). On Coleridge’s account, this ‘propaedeutic’ task must be jointly carried out by means of a transcendental aesthetic and a transcendental logic. He summarises this position in the following passage, where, having briefly defined ‘the terms which the most profound of modern logicians and the proper inventor and founder of transcendental analysis [Kant] has adopted’, Coleridge attempts to recast these terms in a ‘less uncommon’ form:

we prefer [to the term ‘transcendental logic’] the more intelligible and less uncommon title of the critical or judicial logic, i.e. a criterion of the general and particular judgements passed by the understanding as the faculty of reflection, derived from a knowledge of the constitution of the understanding itself and of the universal forms of the sense to which the legitimate exercise of its functions is confined. 154

By ‘criterion’, Coleridge means ‘a test for the distinguishing of truth’, so a transcendental logic is concerned with how we determine the truth or ‘objective validity’ of all those ‘general and particular judgements passed by the understanding’. 155 Since Coleridge takes sense-experience to consist primarily in the discursive cognition of sensible objects, and takes discursive cognition itself to consist in our judgements about the sensory contents or matter of our ordinary cognitive states, for anything to qualify as experience in this sense, it must meet this ‘criterion’, as established by transcendental logic. In other words, for any kind of ‘contents or material of sensory consciousness to be cognised or thought as an object of cognition (or to ‘become experience’, as Coleridge phrasing it), it must ‘be brought under the rules of the understanding […], and the forms of sense (= intuitus puri [pure intuitions]).’ 156 As Coleridge notes here, this criterion is ‘derived from a knowledge of the constitution of the understanding itself and of the universal forms of the sense’:

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154 Logic, 149.
155 See Logic, 51-2, 111-2, for Coleridge’s notion of a ‘criterion’; cf. Kant’s claims at CPR, B83ff.
156 Logic, 44n; cf. 263-5ff, esp. 263n: ‘to think of a thing at all is to superinduce some a priori conception on the phenomenon that occasioned and excited the act of thinking’.
the former class of forms is a concern of ‘the transcendental logic or analysis of the pure understanding’, which specifies the conditions under which sensible objects can be thought (the categories); the latter class of forms are the concern of ‘the transcendental aesthetic or analysis of the pure sense’, which specifies the conditions under which such objects can be given or apprehended through sensible intuition (space and time), thereby determining the bounds of sense-experience, the sphere ‘to which the legitimate exercise of [the understanding, as our capacity for sensory and discursive cognition] is confined’. Given this overlap, Coleridge proposes, ‘The analysis of both the pure sense and that of the pure understanding would stand under the common head [of transcendental analysis] and be distinguished only as the several chapters of transcendental logic’. Since both of these ‘chapters’ of the transcendental analysis of our cognitive capacities are concerned with the conditions under which sense-experience, defined as the discursive cognition of phenomenal objects, is possible, the aesthetic can be readily absorbed into the logic, and as Coleridge proposes, ‘may more conveniently sink into a subdivision and be contained under the name of its more comprehensive co-factor’.

Now, bearing in mind that Coleridge includes the transcendental aesthetic and its account of space and time as our pure forms of sensible intuition (or ‘the principles of sense’) within the theory of transcendental logic, as one of its subdivisions, one can see why Coleridge claims that the possibility of the non- or super-sensible objects of noetic knowledge (as the possible contents of intellectual intuition) is something which ‘cannot be ascertained except by the means of transcendental logic’. For when Coleridge raises the question of ‘what time and space themselves are’, and whether ‘they attach wholly to the form of [sensible] intuition, to the subjective nature of the mind [or the] constitution of our own faculties’, he also notes that this question is:

indispensable as the condition of all other insight, whether of positive insight into the nature of the things which are the proper objects of sensuous intuitions, or, negatively, of those [objects] which transcend the sense [i.e. the objects of intellectual intuitions].

157 The quotations concerning Coleridge’s overview of transcendental aesthetic and logic in this passage are all taken from Logic, 213-4. Cf. 153-4: ‘by the pure sense [...] the objects are given us, [...] The understanding, on the other hand, is the faculty that enables [us] to think of these objects’ (Coleridge is, of course, here following Kant’s claims at CPR, B34-5).
158 Logic, 214; as we saw in 2.1-3, Coleridge makes clear at 146-7 that what he subsequently refers to as the ‘criterion’ of our epistemic judgements concerning sensible objects (i.e. the categories) form part of those ‘conditions which render experience itself possible’ (cf. 239-40).
159 Logic, 169, 237-8.
160 Logic, 154-5. For Coleridge on the distinction between sensible and non-sensible or intellectual intuitions, see BL.I.289n, Logic, 242-4.
As we have already seen, Coleridge characterises Ideas as those ‘eternal truths’ which are ‘transcendent to sense, and irrelative to space and time’.\(^{161}\) Thus, insofar as we take Ideas to be possible objects of intellectual intuition (which is non-sensuous), it is evident that, as Coleridge says here, we can acquire ‘negative’ insight into their nature, by determining ‘the nature of the things which are the proper objects of sensuous intuitions’. Since the aesthetic shows that ‘we are incapable of presenting any object to the understanding by means of the sense except under the forms of space and time’, and that these ‘universal forms of sense [necessarily determine the sphere] to which the legitimate exercise of [the understanding’s] functions is confined’, it also demonstrates that insofar as the Ideas are things ‘transcendent to sense, and irrelative to space and time’, they cannot be the kinds of objects which are given by means of sense, and thought or cognised (discursively) by means of understanding.\(^{162}\) In sum, transcendental logic (taken as including the aesthetic) is ‘indispensable as the condition of all other insight’ concerning the possible objects of our cognition, particularly the possibility of non-sensible objects of cognition, because it shows (i) what kinds of objects cannot be given non-sensibly (i.e. by means of intellectual intuition), and (ii) specifies the limits and conditions under which the cognitive faculties or capacities that are not appropriately constituted for the apprehension of non-sensible content must operate. Thus, transcendental logic provides further ‘negative’ insight into the conditions under which the apprehension of Ideas, or other kinds of non-sensuous objects, may be possible.\(^{163}\) This, in my view, is why Coleridge holds that the possibility of noetic or speculative metaphysical knowledge, and of the non-sensible objects of such knowledge, ‘cannot be ascertained except by the means of transcendental logic’.

**Coda: A Final Word on Coleridge’s Transcendent/Transcendental Distinction**

There are, however, two further (potential) difficulties remaining here. Firstly, it might be contended that a demonstration of which kinds of objects cannot be taken to constitute noetic knowledge is not, even if it must form part of, a demonstration that such objects are actually possible. Secondly, given the interpretation of transcendental logic outlined above, it appears that, insofar as such a theory proves that non-sensible objects (e.g. Ideas) cannot be presented to the human mind by means of sense or understanding, it can also be taken to prove that such objects are necessarily ‘transcendent of the human

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\(^{161}\) *Logic*, 43n; cf. 36, 237-8.

\(^{162}\) *Logic*, 154-5.

\(^{163}\) See *Logic*, 154-5 (cf. 41 on ‘negative idealism’ and ‘negative materialism’).
faculties instead of *transcendental*, i.e. referable to the constitution of these faculties’ (and, therefore, that things like Ideas are not in fact possible objects of human cognition). This, again, would seem to suggest that Coleridge is inadvertently arguing that the kind of knowledge which he says is ‘the *highest* problem of Philosophy’ (i.e. the Ideas) consists only in ‘pretended cognitions and assertions that transcend our intellectual faculties’, or objects ‘for which the human mind can be shown to possess no appropriate faculty’. To make sense of these difficulties, we must consider the definition of ‘noetic’ that follows Coleridge’s claims about transcendent metaphysics:

There is indeed, as we have already noticed, a higher sense of the term “logos”, in which it signifies the reason as including the understanding. On this assumption there would arise relations of the understanding to the reason and of the reason to the understanding, and the knowledge of these relations would constitute a higher, or rather the highest branch of logic, viz. the logic of ideas and first principles [… W]e have proposed to designate this branch by the name of noetic and have taken it as the subject of our last section, to the introduction of which the question (“Is a first philosophy possible”) is deferred.

As I noted above, Coleridge seems never to have completed this ‘last section’ of his *Logic* manuscript. However, as we shall see below, he does nevertheless provide a few more hints about what noetic knowledge (and any proof of the possibility of such knowledge) would involve. But first, let us consider how the passage just quoted may be read in relation to the two residual difficulties concerning Coleridge’s employment of the terms ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’, as outlined above.

In the first case, one possible solution is to suggest that when Coleridge claims that ‘this possibility cannot be ascertained except by the means of transcendental logic’, he is referring not to (a) the possibility of noetic or speculative metaphysical knowledge, but rather to (b) the possibility that such knowledge is ‘not *transcendent* of the human faculties [but] transcendental, i.e. referable to the constitution of these faculties’. On this reading, what transcendental logic would enable us to ascertain is whether the sort of metaphysics or ‘first philosophy’ that is possible must be limited to our knowledge of the conditions of the possibility of sensory experience and cognition. If such knowledge were limited to this realm, then ‘it would be the same as the transcendental logic and the

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164 *Logic*, 169.
165 See *Logic*, 147, 169; *LS*, 114.
166 *Logic*, 169 (Coleridge is referring back to an earlier discussion of the term ‘logos’ at 33-6).
167 *Logic*, 169.
name ['of metaphysics (in the sense of a first philosophy)'] would be superfluous: i.e. transcendental logic, taken as the metaphysics of our knowledge of the sensible world, would be the only possible kind of metaphysics.\textsuperscript{168} However, as I have already shown, Coleridge holds that the principal function of transcendental logic is \textit{not} to determine the limits of all possible human cognition, but rather to determine the limits of sensible experience and cognition, and thereby to give us ‘negative’ insight into the nature of those objects which \textit{cannot} be given by means of sensible intuition or cognised by means of the understanding (e.g. Ideas, which can be apprehended by means of reason only, through the process of intellectual intuition or \textit{noesis}). In other words, transcendental logic serves to lay the ground for a more comprehensive account of the possible objects of human cognition (particularly the non-sensible noumenal kind), rather than to rule out the possibility of proving that non-sensible objects of cognition are possible objects of cognition for human subjects. From Coleridge’s perspective, then, transcendental logic allows us to ascertain that while noetic knowledge of non-sensible objects is not ‘referable to the constitution’ of sense and understanding, this does not necessarily mean that such cognition must be entirely ‘transcendent of’ the human cognitive capacities (only that it is not apprehensible by sense or understanding).\textsuperscript{169}

This brings us to the second problem: the question of whether proving that noetic knowledge is not ‘referable to the constitution of the human faculties’ (in contexts where this term is limited to sense and understanding, considered as the ‘two component faculties’ that ‘constitut[e] the mind in its specific sense as the \textit{human} mind’), also entails a proof that noetic knowledge is not possible at all for human subjects (i.e. can be taken to consist in ‘a knowledge that is beyond our faculties’).\textsuperscript{170} In my view, given that Coleridge claims noetic or ‘the logic of ideas and first principles’ would consist in our knowledge of the ‘relations of the understanding to the reason and of the reason to the understanding’, with reason being considered as ‘including the understanding’, we should be open to the possibility that, on Coleridge’s account of human cognition, to say that a certain kind of knowledge is ‘not referable to the constitution’ of a particular faculty or capacity is not also to claim that this capacity plays no role in the acquisition of the kind of knowledge in question. To use a different example: when Coleridge contends that the categories are ‘not[\textit{t}] derived from the sciential or transcendental aesthesis, but [\textit{rather}] abstracted and generalised from general experience’ in a process that ‘involv[\textit{es}] the exercise, active and

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Logic}, 169.
\textsuperscript{169} See \textit{Logic}, 51-2, 76, 149, 154-5, 211-4, 237-8.
\textsuperscript{170} For the quoted definitions, see \textit{Logic}, 44, 69-70, 147.
passive of the senses’, what he means is that, although the categories themselves do not
derive from the pure forms of sensible intuition, our knowledge of these pure forms of
conception and judgement nevertheless involves a consideration of the relations between
sense and understanding. Put another way, while our knowledge of the categories is not
‘referable to the constitution’ of our faculty of sense, we would not be able to explain
fully the role the categories play in our cognition without an accompanying account of
the relation between the forms of understanding and the forms of sense, as conditions of
the possibility of sensory experience and discursive cognition.171

By extension, just because our noetic knowledge of Ideas is ‘not referable to the
constitution’ of sense and understanding, this does not mean that a noetic involves no
consideration of sense or understanding. Indeed, as we have seen, while Coleridge clearly
holds that objects of noetic knowledge must be ‘transcendent to sense, and irrelative to
space and time’, he also suggests that our knowledge of noetic and its objects (Ideas or
‘first principles’) should consist in an account of the relations that hold between reason
and understanding.172 Thus, just as transcendental logic (or analysis) considers how sense
and understanding contribute to our cognition of sensible objects, and how these two
faculties relate to one another, transcendental noetic would consider how understanding
and reason contribute to our cognition of non-sensible objects, and would involve some
account of how these two capacities relate to one another. In short, insofar as the human
understanding plays some role, however small, in the acquisition of noetic knowledge,
such knowledge cannot be said to be ‘transcendent of the human faculties’, or beyond the
bounds of possible human cognition.173 This brings us to the end of the current project:
just as Coleridge’s Logic offers a ‘negative’ account of the possibility of noetic knowledge
that points forward to his speculative theology and cosmology in Opus Maximum, I shall
draw this thesis to a close with the promise of further work on Coleridge’s more detailed
positive doctrines on reason and the Ideas, noting that such work would not be possible
without the theoretical framework that I have attempted to develop here.

171 Coleridge makes this clear at Logic, 147-9, 151-2, 260.
172 See Logic, 169 (cf. 154-5, 236-8).
173 Coleridge says little about this relationship in Logic, but see e.g. CM.II.293, III. 12-13, for a discussion of
how discursive cognitive practices are required to lay the ground for the reception or apprehension of an
intellectual or spiritual intuition (e.g. the Idea of God) through noesis.
Abbreviations

Below is the list of abbreviations used in referring to works by Coleridge:

**BL**  

**CL**  

**CM**  

**CN**  

**Friend**  

**LS**  

**OM**  

**SWF**  

**TT**  

Abbreviations used in referring to works by other authors:

**CPR**  

**MFNS**  
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