Reading the Writing-Machine:

Inscription, Loss and the Ethnographic Imagination of A.C. Haddon

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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ABSTRACT

The fin-de-siècle incarnation of a specifically ethno-graphic anthropology is arguably marked out by one trait more than any others: its burning epistemological, aesthetic and ethical impulse to inscribe – to write, to draw, to photograph, to phonograph, to film – to deploy, in other words, an array of -graphic technologies to represent its 'ethnic' object. Such technologies overlap and interweave in complex ways, rise and fall in relative popularity and produce archival traces that call for multiple readings and rewritings. Focusing on a case study of the intermedial writings of zoologist-turned-anthropologist, Alfred Cort Haddon (1855-1940), this thesis is an attempt to thrust deep within the roots of such an impulse. It traces these roots to a pivotal historical and philosophical moment (the late nineteenth century) within which the nascent discipline of anthropology, armed with an array of such '-graphic' technologies, conjured forth a spectral object: at once vanishing and vanished, disappearing and disappeared. Death was both to-come and already there, and this spoke to a desire for an Indigenous plenitude that was both threatened and lost.

However, in the emerging play between these two plenitudes, both were replaced with a (technologically mediated) spectre. Subject to the brute force of an all-powerful 'external' world-system (capitalist, colonialist and Christian), but without the means of even documenting the history of its own destruction, much less challenge it, such populations were posed as being hopelessly cast adrift: forever dead and dying, and in need, therefore, of representational 'salvation'. How, then, do these two sets of processes (inscription and loss) interact with one another, and what is their role within the vast archival writing 'machines' of colonialism? Exploring the interstitial space between medium specificity (photography-cinematography-phonography) and intermediality, this thesis is an attempt to resonate such questions, to set them in motion, to make them sound.
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To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a kind of machine that is in turn productive, that my future disappearance in principle will not prevent from functioning and from yielding, and yielding itself to, reading and rewriting.


Now is the time to record. An infinitude has been irrevocably lost, a very great deal is now rapidly disappearing thanks to colonisation, trade, and missionary enterprise [...] The most interesting materials for study are becoming lost to us, not only by their disappearance, but by the apathy of those who should delight in recording them before they have become lost to sight and memory.

Alfred Cort Haddon, The Study of Man (1898a, p. xx)
INTRODUCTION

Mimetic Machines, Moribund Objects and the Colonial Archive

A sepulchral air lingers about the corpus of Victorian anthropology, for it was, as its authors readily and often attested, largely the record of dead or dying peoples.

David Hoyt, 'The Reanimation of the Primitive' (2001, p. 1)

David Hoyt's funereal insight succinctly sketches out the broad parameters of this thesis: the chiasmatic encounter between inscription, loss and anthropology at the turn-of-the-twentieth-century. More particularly, it traces the relationship between three overlapping fields of analysis: (1) the space between earlier \-graphic\ technologies, such as drawing and phonetic writing, and their fin-de-siècle equivalents, such as photography, cinematography and phonography, (2) the discursive production of a moribund Indigeneity\(^1\) and (3) the colonial archival or epistemological impulse. Such a relationship is not fortuitous, and despite the fact that each tends to remain within its own historical and theoretical discourses, this thesis will attend to their intersection: how and why does the emerging discipline of ethnographic anthropology deploy such \-graphic\ technologies to construct and capture a moribund Indigeneity? How does this intersect with the colonial archival or epistemological impulse, and what contingent legacies does this engender?

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\(^1\) The hyphen is used here to indicate that I am using \-'graphic\' both in a general sense (relevant to drawing and phonetic writing, etc.) and as a suffix (relevant to technologies such as photography and cinematography, etc., and also to the specifically ethnographic branch of anthropology that I will be focused on in this thesis). This is an attempt to provisionally draw together what is obviously an otherwise disparate collection of modes of inscription. It is not an attempt to elide the differences between them.

\(^2\) The general convention at present is to capitalize references to 'Indigenous groups' or 'Indigeneity' when they are meant in a specific sense.
Such questions frame the ensuing debate, but the recurrent use of the definite article might be regarded as a stylistic convenience only. Following recent theorists of 'the' colonial, such as Nicholas Thomas (1994) and Ann Laura Stoler (2010), this thesis starts from the basic premise that there was no one overarching colonial experience, no dichotomous schism between colonizers and colonized, no singular colonial logic or rhetoric, but rather a complex and contingently mediated network of colonial agents and ideas who/which cast light on the crucial space between the language of metropolitan decrees and the lived experience of colonial societies. As a consequence, the main focus of the thesis will be narrower than my opening gambit suggests, even if its frames of reference are not. This is less an empirical specialization, then, and more a theoretical reflection on the complex multiplicity of colonial experiences read through three intersecting frames: mimetic machines, moribund objects and the colonial archive.

The centrepiece of the discussion will be the embeddedness of fin-de-siècle British anthropology within such a nexus. For British anthropology, this was a period of transition between the anthropological grandeur of armchair evolutionism (as manifested by figures such as Edward Tylor and James Frazer) and the experiential minutiae of the ethnographic paradigm (as manifested by figures such as Bronislaw Malinowski and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown) (cf. Grimshaw, 2001, ch. 1, partic. p. 29). However, this was also a period in which British anthropology came of age as a modern, ethnographic discipline, and its founding predicament was to do so at precisely the same time that its ostensible objects – most often, colonial subjects – were regarded as being 'on the wane' (Levi-Strauss, 1961). That loss was its
predicament; however, its 'tragedy'\(^3\) was that the conditions of possibility for both (i.e. the rise of anthropology and the loss of its object) were one and the same. As Renato Rosaldo (1993, p. 70) remarks, this fact shields itself behind an 'imperialist nostalgia' that 'uses a pose of "innocent yearning" both to capture people's imaginations and to conceal its complicity with often brutal domination':

> Imperialist nostalgia revolves around a paradox: A person kills somebody, and then mourns the victim. In more attenuated form, someone deliberately alters a form of life, and then regrets that things have not remained as they were prior to the intervention (1993, pp. 69-70).

The response from within the emerging field was to occult such an anti-foundational impasse (i.e. that anthropology was an integral part of the very thing destroying its object of study) by posing itself as a redeemer of lost worlds – the so-called 'salvage motif' or 'salvage paradigm' (Gruber, 1959), and we will come back to this later. However, the first generation of ethnographic fieldworkers did not formulate this motif with exclusive recourse to older -graphic technologies, such as phonetic writing, lithography or drawing. Indeed, their version of 'redemption' was particularly instructive for what follows: these technologies were supplemented\(^4\) by nineteenth century -graphic technologies, such as photography, cinematography and phonography (cf. Doane, 2002, p. 4).

The rise and fall of such -graphic technologies within the discipline is complexly

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3 By 'tragedy' here I mean a tension held in suspension without resolution (cf. Scott, 2004). I will develop this theme in the part III of the introduction.

4 At this stage, I am using the term 'supplement' in a fairly conventional sense, but it will take on a more specifically Derridean meaning later. Indeed, it will be part of my argument here to suggest that each of the -graphic technologies will come to cut into each of the others, exposing an unresolved play between plenitude and lack. At certain points I will use the term in the general sense, and at other points I will use it in the Derridean sense. However, it should be clear from the context which is which.
overdetermined, but it is something of an historical irony that both can be glossed via the same three interlocking or overlapping elements: firstly, a positivist commitment to anthropology as a quest for data not meaning, collection not interpretation; secondly, an assumption that such data reside on a visible or audible surface that can be captured by such technologies (cf. Grimshaw, 2001, p. 24; Edwards, 1998, p. 106; Griffiths, 2002, p. 128); and, thirdly, a fervent belief in the imminent destruction of the discipline’s objects of study just at the very moment that the discipline comes of age. The first two are closely related, but both are greatly exacerbated and, indeed, justified by the third.

However, such a combination of elements was fairly short-lived within the discipline as it gradually moved from data to meaning, collection to interpretation, surface to depth and, ultimately, from modern technologies of inscription back to a narrowly defined phonetic writing (cf. Grimshaw, 2001, p. 25). Thus such technologies acquired a certain taint by association and their use became unfashionable in mainstream social and cultural anthropology as a positivist leftover, despite spirited calls to the contrary from within the mainstream of the discipline (e.g. Margaret Mead) and from professional specialisms on its fringes (e.g. ethnomusicology and visual anthropology) (cf. MacDougall, 1997, pp. 290-291). However, contrary to the prevalent view in anthropology that these technologies were handmaidens to an outmoded positivism, I will argue throughout this thesis that there are resources within their deployment which provide for a powerfully resonant counter claim that undermines the foundations of the discipline at the very moment that it establishes them, exposing their gaps, uncertainties, anxieties and, ultimately, their sheer anti-positivist rawness (cf.
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In America, the most important figure of this early transitional moment was undoubtedly that of the German-American anthropologist, Franz Boas (1858-1942), who patiently laid the foundations of what were to become codified as the disciplines or sub-disciplines of cultural anthropology, physical anthropology, anthropological linguistics and material culture studies. His students, followers and/or peers (e.g. Alfred Kroeber, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Robert Lowie and Edward Sapir) would later go on to dominate the American discipline(s) well into the twentieth century and beyond.

In Britain, the most important figure of this moment was arguably that of the zoologist-turned-ethnographer, Alfred Cort Haddon (1855-1940). Haddon's students, followers and/or peers (e.g. Charles Seligman and W.H.R. Rivers) would also go on to influence (at least elements of) the British discipline (most notably Rivers' genealogical method, for example). However, Haddon would ultimately remain known for one core achievement: his 1898 anthropological expedition to the Torres Strait Islands, a dispersed island group situated between what were regarded as two distinct cultural, geographical and racial zones (Australia and Papua New Guinea). Repeating my opening gambit, this expedition will be our key

5 Following the broader logic of this thesis, the empirical details of Haddon's life, writings and scientific activities will be laid out in the specific contexts which I deem most appropriate to the associated analysis in which they are embedded.

6 I am stressing the transitional nature of this moment in order to distinguish between earlier forms of anthropology not based on fieldwork and later forms of anthropology where fieldwork became fully institutionalized. Boas and Haddon are both transitional in this sense.
protagonist here for three interlocking reasons: its redoubtable faith in modern recording technologies, its epistemological urgency and its archival scale.

Its roots, however, lie ten years earlier (circa 1888) and in another discipline (zoology). Haddon – then a young professor at the Royal College of Science in Dublin – was looking for a zoological expedition to make his name. His friend and colleague, Thomas Henry Huxley ('Darwin's bulldog'), suggested the Torres Strait Islands, in part because of their geographical situatedness, and in part because he had travelled through the region on his 1846-1850 voyage of the Rattlesnake (Goodman, 2005). Haddon therefore undertook a zoological expedition to the Strait in 1888. However, he effectively returned home an amateur anthropologist, convinced that the three Cs of colonial modernity (capitalism, Christianity and colonialism) would lead to the obliteration of Indigenous culture (Haddon, 1901, pp. vii-viii; Herle, 1998b, pp. 81-82); zoology could wait, anthropology could not (Haddon, 1897, pp. 305-306).

Capitalism had arrived most concretely with the discovery – in the middle of the nineteenth century – that the Islands possessed rich and globally sough-after resources in pearl shell and bêche-de-mer (Beckett, 1987, pp. 87-109). Prior to the emergence of cheap, mass-produced plastics – which would ironically litter the Islands and the region in later years – the former proved an irresistible material for the production of buttons and other ornamentation in Europe. Its pearly lustre and rainbow iridescence made it especially attractive as a fashionable accessory.

7 In the process, he also simultaneously imported 'the' scientific method and the fieldwork model into the discipline. Indeed, Haddon is credited with being the first to use the term 'fieldwork' in an anthropological context.

8 The anthropologist, Jeremy Beckett (1987, pp. 24-60), glosses these three forces as 'Pearlers, Pastors and Protectors'.
The latter - a type of sea-cucumber - was a desirable delicacy for the Asian markets, where it was regarded as having aphrodisiac qualities. Therefore, pre-existing and extremely long established 'vertical' trade networks between Papua New Guinea, the Torres Strait Islands and Aboriginal Australia started to become supplemented with more recent 'horizontal' trade networks between Europe, the Torres Strait Islands and Asia. The latter channels were regarded as running infinitely faster and deeper than the former, bringing in a raft of new cultural influences and material goods, taking out raw materials and turning Islanders and other inhabitants of the Pacific/Oceanic region into an intra-competitive group of proletarian wage labourers.

Christianity arrived with the London Missionary Society in 1871 (the year of the so-called 'coming of the light', see ch. 1). This took the form of an iconoclastic destruction of representative samples of sacred material culture along with a more subtle hybrid merger of cultural practices (Beckett, 1987, pp. 87-109). Education, literacy and 'modesty' took Christian form, even when the content was often adapted from Indigenous sources. Together, the effect was rapid, widespread and - in Haddon's view - irreversible. This would most often lead Haddon to become caught between 'salvage' - recording before it is too late - and 'reconstruction' - recreating after the fact (the non-missionary equivalents of 'salvation' and 'redemption'). As we will consider later, the link between the two is usually memory: recreations from memory taking him closer to prelapsarian recordings. The point is to rout out and archive memory by rendering it visible, audible and tangible: the insensible brought both to the senses and to a supplementary, machinic sensorium. Therefore, unlike the missionaries, Haddon's 'salvation' and
'redemption' would be of memory rather than the soul.

Colonialism not only took the form of the general encroachments of British imperialism – which, since Captain Cook’s voyages through the region, had regarded the land as 'Crown land' – but also the more specific encroachments of Australian colonial policy, which annexed the Islands in 1877 as part of Queensland and began to exert ever increasing controls over the subject population (Beckett, 1987, pp. 87-109).9 Given this, one would do well to heed those (like Thomas, 1994; Edwards, 2001) who refuse to see colonialism or imperialism as homogeneous blocks, of which more later. Suffice to say at this point that two very specific registers of colonialism/imperialism will therefore be minimally registered within this thesis: the broader discourses of British imperialism which circulate around the project (and are at times critically registered within it) and the more narrow discourses of Australian colonialism; both could be said to enable the project, albeit in different ways.

On this basis – and despite having little or no formal training in anthropology – Haddon became determined to mount a large-scale anthropological expedition to the Islands. After much lobbying for funding and several preparatory expeditions in Ireland (of which more later), he managed such an expedition in the March of 1898, under the auspices of the University of Cambridge. He led a team of physicians (Charles Seligman [1873-1940] and William McDougall [1871-1938]); an experimental psychologist (W.H.R. Rivers [1864-1922]); a musical scholar inter

9 The wider relationship between Australia and the Islands is extremely complex and overdetermined and beyond the scope of this thesis (particularly in relation to the vexed issue of land rights). Suffice to say here, however, that despite elements of devolved governance, Torres Strait islanders are considered to represent Australia’s 'other' Indigenous community.
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alia (Charles Myers [1873-1946]); a linguist (Sidney Ray [1858-1939]) and a photographer (Anthony Wilkin [1878-1901]) (Haddon, 1901, pp. viii-ix; Herle, 1998a, p. 1). Given the size of the team, the scale of the expedition was such as to produce a vast body of archival materials – journals, notes, letters, reports, photographs, phonograph recordings and four minutes of extant film – now spread across a range of different cultural institutions.\(^\text{10}\)

This expedition thus constitutes an exemplary point of intersection between the three component parts of this thesis: the relationship between archaic and modern -graphic technologies, colonial loss and the archival or epistemological impulse. It was chosen for a number of reasons, reasons which often run contrary to its marginal position within the history of British anthropology. Firstly, this was not only one of the earliest large-scale anthropological expeditions of any kind, incorporating a range of specialisms in music, language and ethnology etc., but, more particularly, it was one of the first, and indeed last, to deploy an appropriately large-scale collection of -graphic technologies to accompany it: several photographic cameras, two phonographs, a cinematograph and a host of scientific measuring equipment. What makes Haddon’s project particularly interesting in this regard is that, amongst its other modes of inscription, it deploys three of the century’s central -graphic technologies – photography, cinematography and phonography – technologies which, some have argued (e.g. Kittler, 1999, p. 1; Doane, 2002, p. 4), began to undermine the dominance of earlier -graphic technologies, such as phonetic writing and drawing. This therefore places us in the crucial space between between old and new -graphic technologies, and

\(^{10}\) For example, Cambridge University, the British Library, the British Film Institute and the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies.
between mechanical and non-mechanical and indexical and non-indexical inscription.

Secondly, because the beginnings of a modern, ethnographic anthropology have usually been traced to Bronislaw Malinowski (anthropology's 'Conrad'), Haddon's writings have largely gone unexamined outside of their place as footnotes to a disciplinary history\textsuperscript{11}, and, more particularly, largely unexamined as writings (i.e. subject to literary analysis). Following on from the first point, what makes Haddon's project most interesting in this case is that it is an unfinished project composed of interweaving media and overdetermined fragments, rendering his writings amenable to multiple, overlapping and sometimes contradictory readings (cf. Clifford, 1986a, pp. 15-16). Haddon has to hold together multiple registers, and his failure to always assert an uncontested authorship is itself an interesting feature of his writing. Although Haddon undoubtedly occupies a privileged authoritative position\textsuperscript{12}, his signature is by no means the only one to be found in his work. His writings are co-signed, and not only by the other expedition members. Finally, by being one of the first anthropological projects to collapse the division between fieldworker and theorist, it was also one of the first projects to unwittingly begin to prise open the gap between experience and representation that would later come to shake the foundations of the discipline.

Collectively, therefore, the choice of focus is a strategic one. As a result, the analysis that follows is neither straightforwardly literary (anthropology as a 'kind of

\textsuperscript{11} Martin Nakata's work (e.g. 2007) is an interesting exception.

\textsuperscript{12} 'However monological, dialogical, or polyphonic their form, [ethnographies] are hierarchical arrangements of discourses' (Clifford, 1986a, p. 17).
writing\textsuperscript{13}, visual (anthropology qua image analysis) or acoustic (anthropology or ethnomusicology qua sound analysis), nor is it uncritically media specific (phonetic writing, photography, cinematography, etc.). Instead, it will focus on the complex entanglement of different modes of inscription and their relationship to a particular motif of Indigenous loss (the 'salvage' motif, of which more later). Haddon is by no means uniquely situated in this regard, but alongside Franz Boas in America (who has incidentally received far more attention), he is nonetheless exemplary of a particular moment of desire vis-à-vis what I will be calling an 'expanded' field of inscription and an 'expanded' field of loss.\textsuperscript{14}

Invariably, both fields are tightly wound together, and so although the following sections will attempt to unravel them in turn, it is more accurate to see this as an attempt to explore the same set of themes from different angles. Part I focuses on the emergence of 'writing' (i.e. alphabetical script subject to literary analysis) as a problematic category in anthropology and expands this to include the complex embeddedness of other modes of inscription. Part II explores the broader contexts within which the associated figure of anthropological loss becomes expanded and meaningful, and part III attempts to explain how both are gathered together under the rubric of the so-called 'salvage motif'.

\textsuperscript{13} That is to say, alphabetical script subject to literary analysis.
\textsuperscript{14} See fn. 18 for a clarification of the limited way in which I will be deploying the term 'expanded'. 
I. Contexts of Inscription: 'Anthropology and the Scene of Writing'\textsuperscript{15}

Twenty five years since the publication of the landmark amalgam of anthropological writing, literary criticism, critical theory and cultural studies, *Writing Culture* (Clifford and Marcus, 1986), one might be forgiven for thinking that it was uncontentious - even predictable, clichéd - to scrutinize anthropology as a kind of 'writing'\textsuperscript{16}, and thus subject to the same types of linguistic opacity, rhetorical flourishes, differential meanings and conceptual foundations as any other writings. If Clifford Geertz's recourse to hermeneutics (2000, ch. 1) treated the intersubjective experiences of anthropologists and informants as a series of overlapping 'texts' to be interpreted, then the 'writing culture' debate treated the resulting ethnographies as a series of complex cultural objects to be analysed. The relationship between these two understandings echoes John Mowitt's (1992, fn. 2, pp. 223-224) discussion of two of the conventional ways in which text has been understood (i.e. the phenomenological text and the tradition of 'textual criticism'). Geertz (via Ricoeur) adopts the former model, and the 'writing culture' debate the latter. Hermeneutics allowed Geertz to read culture 'as text' analogically (i.e. culture 'as' or 'like' published alphabetical script), a move which was held to challenge the stranglehold of anthropological positivism: from data to meaning (cf. Mowitt, 1992, p. 11). The 'writing culture' debate simply turned this idea on its head by reading the resultant ethnographic 'texts' (in the narrow or conventional literary sense) as culture, similarly challenging anthropological positivism. Anthropology's understanding of 'text' derives in no small part from this moment,\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15} Obviously echoing Derrida's reading of Freud (2001, ch. 7), this is also the subtitle of the introduction to Clifford Geertz's important early foray into debates about anthropology and writing, *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author* (1988a).

\textsuperscript{16} Again, this is meant in the narrow sense of alphabetical script subject to literary analysis.
largely bypassing the radically expanded meanings it comes to acquire within the
*Tel Quel* group for example (cf. Mowitt, 1992).

Nonetheless, bearing these caveats in mind, such an approach has borne
considerable fruit over the years. However, this is in spite of spirited attempts by
some authors (past and present) to adhere to the illusion of immediate, self and co-
present experience and transparent communication, and in spite of a predictable
wave of disgruntled nay-saying from within the inner sanctum of the discipline.
Indeed, anyone trained within the often stuffy, empiricist confines of the British
tradition of social anthropology in the last twenty five years or so will undoubtedly
have encountered at least some irascible, world-weary reactionaries intent on
dismissing such debates as so much ('continental') stuff and nonsense
('acontextual, lacking empirical rigour, self-indulgent and pretentious'). They may
well be right in some respects, but what is striking about such figures is that this
denunciation of the 'writing culture' debate is so often accompanied by an
unerrring and usually uncritical compulsion to write, albeit as a culminating
'outcome' of ethnographic fieldwork. Because this compulsion is often concealed
by an unquestioned sense of entitlement, or an evangelical zeal (not fortuitously
bound to a certain coterie of unreformed colonials in the discipline), such figures
usually heave a weary sigh at the prospect of the kinds of questions that rise to the
fore for any reader of *Writing Culture* or its aftermath: for whom do you write? To
whom? By what authority?

It is obviously the case that countless anthropologists have diligently agonized
over precisely these questions, but there remains a lingering desire by some to
brush them aside as so much reactionary, undergraduate polemicism. 'Yes yes, but let's get on with the real work of ethnographic, field-based research and writing'. Indeed, such a response might well tempt one to play the infantile gadfly by repeating the question 'but why?' to every unsatisfactory answer. However, beyond such school-yard theatrics, a series of important, lingering questions remains, questions which animate this thesis and which resolve themselves around a core problematic: the relationship between inscription and loss in anthropology. Why are some anthropologists so resistant to so-called 'literary' readings of their work whilst still so preoccupied with 'doing anthropology', an integral part of which is writing? Accepting that the answer to this is not naïve positivism, what residual desire or anxiety does this diagnose vis-à-vis realism, 'truth', phonocentrism and loss, and (how) is this related to the way in which their discipline has historically constructed its object as threatened or lost?

At first glance, the connection seems reasonably obvious and historically grounded: between the high noon of European imperialism in the late nineteenth century and the collapse of such empires in the mid twentieth century, anthropological research and writing was, to a greater or lesser degree, treated as a means of partially indemnifying against the cultural losses wrought by the forces of colonial modernity (colonialism, capitalism, Christianity, etc.). As noted before, this is characterized as anthropology's 'salvage motif' or 'salvage paradigm' – anthropology as a redeemer of lost worlds (Gruber, 1959). We will explore this motif or paradigm in more detail in part III, but suffice to say at this point that the discipline's founding, tragic predicament is the anxiety that it has come of age too late:
Ethnology is in the sadly ludicrous, not to say tragic, position that at the very moment when it begins to put its workshop in order, to forge its proper tools, to start ready for work on its appointed task, the material of its study melts away with hopeless rapidity. Just now, when the methods and aims of scientific field ethnology have taken shape, when men fully trained for the work have begun to travel into savage countries and study their inhabitants – these die away under our very eyes (Malinowski, 1992 [1922], p. xv).

Just at the precise moment that the discipline casts off its pre-scientific, speculative shackles and comes of age as a modern, ethnographic human science, its object of study is threatened or lost. As mentioned earlier, the tragedy is not merely that anthropology has come of age too late, but that the conditions of possibility for both the discipline itself and the destruction of its object of study are one and the same.

However, this simple formulation is rendered more complex by a series of necessary qualifications: (1) the compulsion to 'write' during this period incorporated a much wider range of modes of inscription (photography, phonography, cinematography, drawing, etc.) and was accompanied by a desire to simultaneously efface such inscriptions or to treat them as transparent vehicles to the cultural traditions they were representing (a core part of anthropology's phonocentrism seemingly lies here); and (2) the cultural losses wrought by colonial modernity were allegorically and metonymically bound to the cultural losses wrought by the supposed absence of writing and history. Anthropology's objects were thus constructed as being threatened or lost twice: not only by the forces of capitalism, colonialism, and Christianity which wiped clean the Indigenous slate, but by a presumed lack of history and writing (cf. Grimshaw,
2001, p. 29). Forever on the brink, such objects were conjured forth as phantoms which cast shadows but left no traces.

However, it is precisely because such a sense of loss is doubled that the relationship between inscription and loss arguably leaves a much deeper trace in the discipline which expands beyond this historical moment. As James Clifford (1986b) suggests, even contemporary anthropology enacts a broader, redemptive allegory: ethnography as a redeemer of *unwritten* worlds, thereby allegorizing the shift from speech to writing. In her study of the relationship between deconstruction and anthropology, Rosalind Morris (2007, p. 6) links this idea to the perception that 'populations without writing possess an authenticity and a proximity to nature (an immediacy) that mark their historical priority and their vulnerability to corruption'. On this basis, the relationship between ethno-graphy's '-graphic' technologies and its 'ethnic' objects is a 'supplementary' one, and we will return to this theme in more detail later. Suffice to say at this point that ethnography poses itself as a vast (and ostensibly 'exterior') written supplement to its own speech-bound and moribund objects. Ethnography's '-graphic technologies simultaneously add to a 'non-literate' plenitude – precariously positioned between a death that is at once imminent and immanent – whilst compensating for a devastating spectral deficit: such objects cast shadows but leave no traces, and it is these shadows that need to be 'fixed' by external representation, however ghastly, inadequate or violent such a process turns out to be.

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17 As Clifford makes clear (1986b, pp. 117-119), the idea that anthropology's objects are somehow 'outside' writing is utterly blown apart by Derrida's reversal and displacement of the speech/writing dichotomy.
What role then might this allegory - of saving speech in a transparent writing - play in contributing to a (residual) phonocentric or realist resistance to treating writing as literature, and (how) can we examine the relationship between the historical phenomenon of salvage anthropology and contemporary practice without falling prey to a simple minded anachronism? It is part of the aim of this thesis to explore both strands (i.e. to examine the earlier historical moment whilst also staking wider claims about the discipline as a whole). To this extent, A.C. Haddon is an exemplar (of a problematic) not an historical footnote (to a discipline).

Such an overlapping analysis provides an opportunity to take some of the critical insights of the so-called 'writing culture' debate and to focus their intensity on an 'expanded' field of inscription that I am calling the 'writing-machine'. By this I mean not only an abstract collection of different and complexly overlapping modes of inscription (phonetic writing, drawing, lithography, photography, phonography, cinematography, etc.), but their material means of inscription (pen, stylus, camera, phonograph, cinematograph), their surfaces of inscription (paper, glass, wax, celluloid), and the historically contingent archivization and dissemination of the results. Published writings are not the same as field notes and journals, and both are different from indexical technologies such as photography, phonography and

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18 It is important to stress here that this reading of inscription is 'expanded' only insofar as the 'writing culture' debate in anthropology is concerned (i.e. where 'writing' is understood as alphabetical script subject to literary analysis). That is my staring point. I hope to make clear from my clarifications that - in this instance at least - references to the 'writing-machine' or to an 'expanded field of inscription' are pointing to a field that is substantially narrower than that contained in, for example, Derrida's reading of writing or arche-writing (despite the allusions to 'Signature, Event, Context' [1982, p. 316]) or, say, Barthes' reading of text (cf. Mowitt, 1992, ch. 5). This is for reasons of economy and focus, and it is not intended to be registered here in an uncritical way. It is hoped that the specific contexts in which these ideas are developed will expose the complexity of this basic schematic outline, thereby collapsing its provisional simplicity or seeming instrumentality.
cinematography, but all are (and produce) culturally mediated and socially disseminated material objects. The task of this thesis, therefore, will be to consider how such an expanded focus impacts on how one might read the overlapping of different modes of inscription in any one instance. At times, such an analysis will focus on the 'horizontal' relationships between different media (e.g. photography, cinematography and alphabetical script), and at others it will focus on the 'vertical' relationships between the constituent elements of one medium (e.g. camera, photographic plate, paper print, etc.). In practice, however, they will often overlap.

For example, chapter one explores the ways in which photographs of racial and cultural 'types' (printed from glass plates) become embedded in – and reinforced by – ethnographic writings. Chapter two attempts to unravel the significance of a series of photographic stills which have been produced from Haddon's ethnographic films, modified with line drawings and paint, lodged in the archives and published as part of a popular and widely disseminated travelogue. Chapter three examines the attempt to convert 'noise' into meaningful sound and meaningful sound into alphabetical script and graphical notation. As such, part of my argument here is a methodological or sociological one: a call for a 'thick description' of writing machines and their inscriptions (cf. Geertz, 2000, ch. 1).

Anthropological writings in general, and fin-de-siècle writings in particular, are rarely composed solely of alphabetical script. They are, for example, routinely studded with other embedded modes of inscription: photographs, drawings, film stills, graphs, maps, etc. Whilst a growing body of extremely valuable work has been engaged in the analysis of these media as relatively discrete forms (visual
anthropology's engagement with photography and film, for example [e.g. Edwards, 1990; 1998; 2000; 2001; Griffiths, 2001; Poole, 2005]), considerably less work has been done on the interactions between these different media. Therefore, if my starting point here is with the conventional post Writing Culture gesture of reading anthropology as a kind of writing (i.e. a series of literary texts in the narrow sense), then it treats such writings as embedded, multimedia objects which are more than the sum of their parts and more than their respective disciplinary or methodological associations. My object thus shifts from a narrowly defined anthropological writing (qua alphabetical script) to a broadly defined multimedia object.

Photographs, film stills, drawings and maps 'mean' differently when embedded within a piece of writing. This is an obvious point perhaps, and it has received plenty of attention in literary criticism (e.g. Rabb, 1995), but I would argue that this embeddedness works differently in anthropology, and fin-de-siècle anthropology in particular. Unlike twentieth century anthropological writings, where photographs, drawings and maps often appear, but usually as mere illustrations to a centralized, authoritative text (successfully or not), fin-de-siècle anthropological writings often give far greater weight to these other modes of inscription. The reasons for this are complex and, in part at least, are the subject of this thesis, but the result is a series of works which masquerade as unified objects composed of different but mutually compatible fields, but which, on closer inspection, come nearer to the ruins of inscription. The medium specificity which these writings attempt to submerge, and which has quite understandably exercised the minds of visual anthropologists, film theorists and photographic
scholars, cracks through the pages creating fracture lines and fragments which undermine - or, perhaps, render more complex - any claim to positivist certainty. Tensions emerge across indexical inscriptions, and between them and their others, via a series of complex lines of intersection or entanglement.

We will have cause to expand on this in greater detail in the coming chapters, but suffice to say at this point that such lines of intersection or entanglement can be provisionally and tentatively dubbed supplementary and intermedial. The former obviously owes a heavy debt to Jacques Derrida's reading on Rousseau in *Of Grammatology* (1997, pp. 141-316), where it becomes part of a chain of non-synonymous terms which diagnose the speech-writing nexus. However, in this context it becomes a convenient shorthand for thinking through the unresolved play between plenitude and lack in Haddon's medial relationships. For example, when Haddon deploys 'type' photographs - as we will consider in chapter one - he poses photography as an ostensibly independent and self-complete medium for extrapolating racial 'truths' (photographic surfaces peeled off the 'real') only to find that such 'truths' are hidden below the visible surface of the photograph; a limit point has been reached. The photograph must therefore be folded back onto an ostensibly 'exterior' written commentary for mutual reinforcement: the photographs give the commentary extra scientific weight; the commentary penetrates beneath the photograph's visible surface. However, when a similar limit point is reached within the commentary, Haddon will fold it back again onto the photograph, and so on. In each case, Haddon poses his media as simultaneously self-complete and lacking, thereby creating an unfinished chain of supplementarity. Each medium adds to each other medium whilst simultaneously
exposing their limit points; the circle is never complete and each medium is radically changed and challenged by the process. This means that such a supplementary bond between Haddon's different media is also – by extension – an intermedial bond. Each medium penetrates each other medium, but in such a way that neither dissolves medium specificity nor conceals the divisions between indexical and non-indexical modes of inscription. Instead, we become caught in the interstitial space between medium specificity and intermediality and between indexicality and non-indexicality, and much of this thesis will inhabit precisely such a space.

As such, this is not only a call for an 'expanded' field of inscription in general (reading inscriptions in a material and social context, for example), but also a call for an 'ontological' reading of modes of inscription. This is in opposition – or addition – to the semiotic readings of specific forms of inscription (e.g. phonetic writings, paintings, photographs or films, etc.) which tend to dominate in colonial discourse studies or postcolonial critique. In short, I am interested in photography as well as photographs, cinema as well as films, and so on (cf. Mowitt, 2005). This is of significance methodologically – shaping the way in which the material is analysed – and theoretically – shaping the kinds of questions asked and arguments raised. Most notably, it will be part of my argument throughout this thesis to suggest that it is only by attending to such an expanded, 'ontological' reading that one can begin to prise open a space between the positivistic deployment of such technologies and the anti-positivistic import of their ontology, and one of the most fundamental means of doing so is to attend to the simple observation that haunts fin-de-siècle anthropology whilst being continually occulted within it: inscription
and loss both lessen and deepen one other.

**Inscription and Loss**

Indeed, inscription – even if abstracted to the creation of differential marks – has always been suffused with a sense of loss. As the predicament of Plato's *Phaedrus* suggests (cf. Derrida, 1981), the price of posterity is the externalization of memory in matter, which, for contemporary thinkers of technicity, such as Bernard Stiegler (e.g. 1998), re-enacts the more originary material externalization that constitutes the human as such. In Stiegler's terms (1998, *passim*), such an entry into matter¹⁹ – whether through the manufacture of tools or the inscription of differential marks – destabilizes the sovereignty of human consciousness as self-presence, subjecting the human to the effects of material contingency and chance, to unknown futures and uncertain outcomes. On such a view, the 'entry' into mnemonic technical inscriptions²⁰ – is there an outside? – simultaneously exacerbates loss and indemnifies against it. This is the first stratum of loss. The second stratum is that such inscriptions are not wholly adequate to that which they inscribe. The latter exceeds the former. Thus in abstract terms, inscription and loss both lessen and deepen each other. Loss – imminent or posterior – often implies inscription and vice versa.

If we start to historicize this inscription-loss nexus, we see that the relationship is

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¹⁹ I won't rehearse the debate between Derrida and Stiegler here (for which see Stiegler, 1998 *inter alia*), but suffice to say at this point that the reference to materiality produces a narrower focus than that implied by Derrida's *arche-writing* for example. This is in part because of different readings of André Leroi-Gourhan.

²⁰ Stiegler considers even stone tools to be mnemonic technical in some sense, but here I am thinking more narrowly of phonetic and non-phonetic writing systems, etc.
particularly pronounced within nineteenth century indexical technologies, such as photography, phonography and cinematography. Such inscriptions promise an existential bond with their referents, making them ideal partners to both the mournful desire of the *memento mori* tradition and the scientific positivism of disciplines like anthropology – and there is more than a hint of overlap between the two (cf. Mulvey, 2005, p. 54). However, as with mnemotechnical inscriptions in general, such inscriptions are never wholly adequate to that which they inscribe. As a result they become, in part at least, a record of that which they cannot inscribe, of that which exceeds them, hence their poignancy. They seem to touch the referent whilst highlighting what has been left uninscribed, what has been left behind. For mourner and scientist alike, each indexical inscription is a broken promise to bring back the dead. Inscriptions are a record of their failings as much as an indemnification against loss, and this duality means that the process of inscription is often caught between the twin forces of desire and fear.

This is especially the case when modern indexical technologies are pressed into the service of positive sciences like Victorian anthropology, and its fin-de-siècle ethnographic incarnation in particular. Here the play between desire and fear – shielded behind a positivist surface – is mapped onto an epistemological desire to record and a deeply ingrained anxiety that it is either too late to do so or – worse still – that it was 'always already' too late to do so. On this reading – as we will consider in the coming chapters – a crucial fissure opens up between the positivistic use of such technologies and the anti-positivistic power of a media apparatus marked by excess and lack and a methodology marked by desire and fear.
However, if inscription and loss form an indissociable bond, as I have been arguing here, then expanding the field of inscription – which we have considered in part I – is not enough. We also need to attend to the broader contexts within which the associated figure of loss is embedded and expanded – which we will consider in part II. Expanding both fields – inscription and loss – will ultimately press them back together – which we will consider in part III. This will afford an opportunity to bring together hitherto separate discourses, such as debates about modernity and technology (which often neglect questions of colonialism and loss) and debates about colonialism and loss (which often neglect questions of modernity and technology). In this sense, the choice of the Torres Strait expedition is once again a strategic one: less a footnote to the disciplinary history of anthropology and more an examination of a complex nodal point at the intersection of several historical discourses on technology and modernity and inscription and loss under conditions of imperialism and colonialism. It will therefore restate our original questions by asking what is at stake in the relationship between colonial loss and modern technologies of inscription, such as photography, cinematography and phonography? What binds these modes of inscription together in such a context and what separates them? Ultimately, what sort of cultural legacies does this engender? These are our broader questions. However, establishing the framework for an answer requires that one first weave more narrowly between theoretical/cultural-historical accounts of modernity and its unresolved antinomies and theoretical/cultural-historical accounts of imperialism and its discourse(s) of extinction; these are the dual contexts within which modern anthropology emerges and within which anthropological loss becomes meaningful.
II. Contexts of Loss: The Antinomies of Modernity

If there is any consensus within the vast and now canonical corpus of theoretical literature on European modernity – and this is far from certain – it is that it\textsuperscript{21} is a thing of contradictions and antinomies, a formulation of space and time or society and culture wherein exhilarating dynamism and boundless destruction form two sides of the same coin. New worlds spring forth whilst apparently 'archaic' ways of life and well-worn conceptual frameworks are swept aside with breathless rapidity. Such a process often opens out a range of dichotomous pairings and associations that still resonate in certain circles today (e.g. modernity/tradition, history/structure, etc.). Amongst the minimal markers of such a process are a number of seismic shifts in politics, economics and culture (e.g. the shift from a feudalistic political-economy to capitalism; from rural to urban; from comparatively homogeneous and static communities to vast population growth and movements; from old to radically new technologies of industry, transport and communication; and from 'tradition' to cultural forms which shatter the mould, etc. [cf. Hall, 1992a]), all of which match the forces of construction with those of destruction, or, indeed, which pitch the one against the other.

Such a tension is often read in the mode of tragedy, wherein fragmentary and contradictory parts do not resolve themselves into a dialectical whole (cf. Berman, \textsuperscript{21} It/they, depending on whether one views it as singular or plural, process or outcome (cf. Hall, 1992a, p. 9).
1983; Scott, 2004). On such a view, the tragedy of modernity is not so much its fated hurtling towards destruction – the flip side of the more familiar progress narrative – but rather its relationship to the unresolved contradictions between dynamism and destruction.

However, the available literature on these processes often remains remarkably silent on the particular and obvious significance that this unresolved dialectic of construction and destruction – this tragedy of modernity – might have to that most prevalent of modern enterprises, European imperialism and colonialism, or expansion and settlement, if we are to follow Edward Said's useful gloss (1993, p. 8). Modernity is apparently something that happens in the European or American metropolis and the fact that its restless energy globalizes these effects is left to others to address (cf. Hall, 1998):

The project of provincialising 'Europe' has to include certain other additional moves: 1) The recognition that Europe's acquisition of the adjective modern for itself is a piece of global history of which an integral part is the story of European imperialism [...] The idea is to write into the history of modernity the ambivalences, contradictions, the use of force, and the tragedies and the ironies that attend it. (Chakrabarty, 1998, p. 386, emphasis in original).

In what seems to be a step backwards from what we can call the high modern era, interest in the social and political subordination of blacks and other non-European peoples does not generally feature in contemporary debates around the philosophical, ideological, or cultural content and consequences of modernity. Instead, an innocent modernity emerges from the apparently happy social relations that graced post-Enlightenment life in Paris, Berlin, and London. These European locations are readily purged of any traces of the people without history whose degraded lives might raise awkward questions about the limits of bourgeois humanism (Gilroy, 1993, p. 44).

22 The motif of tragedy pops up again here. We will return to this in part III.
That European imperialism and colonialism, and everything that goes along with them (plantation slavery, scientific racism, etc.), were embedded in a capitalist European modernity should hardly be contentious, and not just as a pre-capitalist vestigial hangover which could somehow be disentangled after the fact, but, at the very least, an intrinsic and integral part of modernity, and, at most, its very condition of possibility (cf. Hall, 1998; Gilroy, 1993, pp. 54-55). On this view, the neglect of such topics in debates on modernity is not only entirely unconscionable, but obscures the fact that the aforementioned tragic play between dynamism and destruction was and is a resolutely global one.

Nevertheless, despite the relative paucity of discussions on the global reach of such a tension in theoretical accounts of modernity and modernism, such a discourse does exist as a contemporary adjunct to the forces of European imperialism and colonialism themselves. Indeed, what is remarkable is that even though more recent theorists often neglect the imperial contexts of modernity, nineteenth century writers and politicians often remained keenly attuned to the parallels between home and abroad, where both were regarded as sites which balanced growth and renewal with transience, change and loss, albeit in very different ways.

However, if the pendulum swings between dynamism and destruction, then it was regarded as tilting towards the latter under conditions of imperialism and colonialism, and those to bear the full brunt of such an imbalance would invariably be the world's 'colonial' (i.e. 'Indigenous' rather than 'settler') populations. The motto of such a view would be that (colonial) contact equals (Indigenous) death. In his useful account of the phenomenon, Patrick Brantlinger (2003, passim) dubs this
contact talk an 'extinction discourse'. In its most streamlined form, two countervailing forces are perilously pitched against each other: the top down, monolithic singularity of colonial modernity and the bottom up, fragile multiplicity of pre-colonial Indigeneity or 'tradition'. In some versions, this is posed as a biological or 'racial' phenomenon, whereby contact between modern Europe and the colonies leads to disease, death, miscegenation and destruction. In other versions, it is a posed as a socio-cultural phenomenon, whereby contact between modern Europe and the colonies leads to a too rapid shift up the 'ladder of civilization' leading to contamination, apathy and/or socio-cultural obliteration. In both cases, the pendulum swings between celebration, characterized as the colonial order of things, and mournful condemnation, characterized as 'proleptic elegy' (Brantlinger, 2003, passim) or 'imperialist nostalgia' (Rosaldo, 1993, ch. 3), but the net effect of both is more or less the same: resignation in the face of the inevitable. This is a pitched battle and there can only be one winner. However, this battle bears the tell-tale signs of a fractured temporality that will pervade the coming debate: the world's Indigenous populations are simultaneously moribund and dead, vanishing and vanished, departing and departed, or, to put it another way, their cultural and/or biological extinction is simultaneously imminent and immanent, which is one of the main reasons why such a discourse is both so prevalent and so long lasting. There is no beginning and no end and affected populations thus appear as so many phantoms and ghosts, wisps of smoke in the endless storm of colonial modernity (cf. Hoyt, 2001).23

23 Following Clifford (1986b, pp. 112-113), this type of analysis is in no way intended to detract from the fact that such a sense of loss was often entirely justified. It is merely to point out that it is also a rhetorical strategy, and, moreover, a rhetorical strategy wherein its celebrants and critics both appear to further its concrete outcomes through their sense of the inevitable. This is one of the ways in which Brantlinger (2003) undercuts the various colonial apologists who point to contemporary contrary voices as proof that imperialist ideologies were not all-encompassing. The resignation of celebrants and critics alike renders them both entangled,
The briefest perusal of coffee table exploitations of the trope of Indigeneity suggests that such a discourse is alive and well (from Leni Riefenstahl's *Vanishing Africa* [1982] to National Geographic's *Vanishing Peoples of the Earth* [1968]). Indeed, given its fragmented temporality, one of the core features of such a discourse is that each generation poses itself as being just on the cusp, thereby justifying its excessive and nostalgic preoccupation, as Marshall Berman has said of modernity more generally:

People who find themselves in the midst of this maelstrom are apt to feel that they are the first ones, and maybe the only ones, to be going through it; this feeling has engendered numerous nostalgic myths of pre-modern Paradise Lost. In fact, however, great and ever increasing numbers of people have been going through it for close to five hundred years (1983, pp. 15-16).

James Clifford uses Raymond William's analysis of the European pastoral tradition to make a similar point in relation to ethnographic writings:

> [E]ach time one finds a writer looking back to a happier place, to a lost, "organic" moment, one finds another writer of that earlier period lamenting a similar, previous disappearance. The ultimate referent is, of course, Eden (1986b, p. 113).

Indeed, one might well regard the discourse of colonial extinction, in both its negative and positive forms, as merely a variation on the European pastoral tradition. In Williams' analysis (Clifford, 1986b, pp. 113-114), the spatial division culpable and complicit, albeit in different ways, and this is of particular importance in that the discipline of anthropology – and A.C. Haddon in particular – are firmly rooted in the latter camp and like to use this as a lever to dissociate themselves from the worst excesses of colonialism/imperialism. The arguments that will be developed here will call for a more subtle series of links between anthropology and imperialism.
between rural and urban, to choose one particularly prevalent example, often takes on an ambivalently marked temporal or developmental hue: the urban might be rushing headlong into the future, but such dynamism is a catalyst for both civilized progress and ruinous immorality; the rural might harken the past, but such a call represents both a pastoral idyll and a harbinger of primitive survivals. Therefore, just as the home countries might match civilized progress with ruinous immorality and pristine pastoral idylls with primitive survivals, so too might the colonies; both remain sites of modern dynamism and destruction and both remain pervaded by a sense of loss. Such loss might be expressed ambivalently, but it is felt no less keenly for all that allowing parallels to be drawn between the two.

It is within the fin-de-siècle context of this discourse of loss that the modern (i.e. ethnographic24) discipline of anthropology emerges and – as a consequence – emerges as a science of loss. This is not simply because anthropology's objects were almost exclusively drawn from colonial populations regarded as becoming extinct, but most crucially because – as mentioned earlier – such populations were also regarded as being outside the fold of historical time and thus outside the fold of writing (cf. Grimshaw, 2001, p. 29). If the blow of rapid change was softened by historical inscription at home, then the sense of loss for Indigenous colonial populations was doubled: not only were they regarded as being moribund but also lacking in the means to record their own destruction. Their time was constructed as being regenerative, with past, present and future as part of a continuum. Cultural and social forms were regenerated through repetition with evolutionary

24 Whilst one could obviously regard the discipline of anthropology as having deep roots pushing it back at least into the Enlightenment, most historians regard the late nineteenth century/early twentieth century emergence of anthropology qua ethnography as the beginnings of the modern discipline.
change only gradually folded into the temporal mix and no graphic record left in its wake. Rapid historical change in the absence of historical inscription was perceived as pure unmediated loss, a loss doubled and thus keenly felt by the burgeoning discipline of anthropology. In this sense, colonialism was regarded as giving Indigenous populations all the worst aspects of historical change with none of the redemptive qualities of historical inscription. Thus, if anthropology could not stop the first, it could at least provide the means of the second: composing elegies for the lost. 'Salvation' lay, therefore, not in being saved per se, but in representational salvage, the enabling and archetypal motif or paradigm of the fin-de-siècle discipline, and this is where our lines of analysis—loss and inscription, colonialism and modernity—begin to cross.

III. From Salvage to Salvation: The Tragedy of Colonial Modernity

Each generation of anthropologists has its own version of the salvage motif (cf. Berman, 1983, p. 15), but through the points of contextual and/or thematic rupture, there is a remarkable consistency, at least in terms of tone and tenor. Indeed, one cannot help but be impressed and dismayed in equal measure by the sheer resilience of a discourse repeatedly cast into the anthropological long grass as an embarrassing anachronism. Arguably the most famous exemplification of this motif or paradigm is drawn from one of the self-styled 'fathers' of British anthropology, Bronislaw Malinowski (Urry, 1993, p. 14), and we have encountered it before:

Ethnology is in the sadly ludicrous, not to say tragic, position that at the
very moment when it begins to put its workshop in order, to forge its proper tools, to start ready for work on its appointed task, the material of its study melts away with hopeless rapidity. Just now, when the methods and aims of scientific field ethnology have taken shape, when men fully trained for the work have begun to travel into savage countries and study their inhabitants – these die away under our very eyes (Malinowski, 1992 [1922]: p. xv).

Such a motif has seared the anthropological imagination, and I invoke it here less as an historical marker – for it neither begins nor ends here – and more as an exemplary moment of a refrain which can be heard repeatedly on the frontiers of European imperialism. It opens one of the most famous monographs in anthropological history, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, and is held to mark both a beginning and an end: the beginning of a 'scientific field ethnology' based on the participant observation of a lone anthropologist, and thus the end of the split between the armchair theorist and the amateur collector. Indeed, this is a shift that James Clifford (1988, pp. 26-32) establishes as the emergence of a new form of anthropological authority. This shift is almost literalized by the epigraph's appearance in the preface, wedged somewhere between the new ethnography, written by the anthropological apprentice, and the foreword, written by one of its old masters, Sir James Frazer, author of *The Golden Bough* – an already antiquated encyclopedic catch-all of anthropological synthesis. In the mythographic, retrospective narrative, which we will have much cause to question over the course of this thesis, this is the moment when the guard changes hands, from stuffy armchair evolutionism to modernist synchronism, from distant height to level depth (cf. Hoyt, 2001).

Malinowski pinpoints a tragic tear – a caesura – in the fabric of a burgeoning

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25 Part of the significance of the Haddon expedition is that it sits between these two moments.
Ethnology, one that will extend back and forth in time: Ethnology, as a grand comparative science in the spirit of the Enlightenment *philosophes*, is a resolute product of modernity – one of the great human sciences to emerge out of the Enlightenment and to triumphantly render the 'Human' as simultaneously subject and object of knowledge (cf. Foucault, 1970, pp. 344-387). However, this victory is in danger of being rendered pyrrhic by the fact that the nascent field's object of study is rapidly becoming washed away as (or by) that very modernity's post-diluvian detritus.

That the figure of *tragedy* should be used by Malinowski to mark these contradictions (aporias, limits, antinomies, caesuras, etc.) is by no means incidental, not least because as a young student, Malinowski was a keen reader of Nietzsche in general, and *The Birth of Tragedy* in particular. Indeed, as Joan Vincent (1994, p. 686) is keen to point out, '[*Argonauts of the Western Pacific*] must now [given the publication in English translation of his early writings] most certainly be reread in the light of Malinowski's Nietzschean roots'. Tragedy has long held a source of fascination for scholars, but in recent years it has become something of a *cause célèbres* for a certain poststructuralism. One scholar in particular has sought to bind this type of analysis to a thinking of the overlapping strands of anti-colonialism and postcolonialism in the work of the Trinidadian Marxist historian C.L.R. James. In his expansive account of James' *The Black Jacobins*, the American anthropologist, David Scott, diagnoses James' attendance to the historical moment of tragedy in the following terms:

[T]hose moments of large historical conflict in which new forms of
thought and action are struggling relentlessly with the old: Aeschylus in fifth-century Athens, Shakespeare in early modern England, Melville in nineteenth century America. They all wrote in a time of historical upheaval or civilizational rupture. For James, these were moments not merely of transition, but moments when great historical forces were at irreconcilable odds with each other, in which tensions between competing historical directions were at a particularly high pitch, and in which new kinds of subjects (James would have said new kinds of "personalities") were being thrown upon the historical stage, individuals embodying within their single selves the mighty conundrums and divisions of their age (2004, p. 12).

Scott (2004, ch. 2) sees this, and James' reconstruction of *The Black Jacobins* as a tragic rather than romantic narrative, as an important means with which to shift from the (failed) teleological (romantic) yearnings of the anti-colonial movements towards a more complexly rendered postcolonial re-reading that neither affirms nor rejects that tradition in any straightforward sense.

In this light, *fin-de-siècle* ethnology could be said to mark one such site of tension, metonymically diagnosing a moment of tragic historical transition under modernity. The crucial point is that the consequent contradictory tensions of such a transition do not give way or buckle, but rather are held together in suspension without resolution. Hence the forces of modernity can be simultaneously productive and destructive. The same modernity which produces the field of scientific ethnology can simultaneously kill its object, for instance. However, this is not merely a matter of holding contradictions in suspension. Tragedy suggests a partial puncturing of the instrumental mastery of the rational subject through its inexorable susceptibility to the forces of contingency and chance, and in this there is an important parallel between the tragedy of the pre-Socratics and its modern or modernist re-animations:
In short, tragedy sets before us the image of a man or woman obliged to act in a world in which values are unstable and ambiguous. And consequently, for tragedy the relation between past, present and future is never a Romantic one in which history rides a triumphant and seamlessly progressive rhythm, but a broken series of paradoxes and reversals in which human action is ever open to unaccountable contingencies – and luck (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 13).

This is important for us not only in that the progressivist time-line of colonial modernity is held in check by a figuration of tragedy, but also in that we are thrust into a thinking of the postcolonial futures implied by the losses of colonial modernity, and the consequent forms of inscription attendant upon those losses. In short, it is significant in enabling us to think through our triad of inscription, loss and archival inheritance.

Drawing on the work of Hayden White, Scott suggests that one therefore needs to distinguish between 'romantic' and 'tragic' modes of emplotment:

[T]he Romantic mode of historical emplotment rides a rhythm of progressive overcoming and ultimate victory over the world's misfortunes, the tragic mode offers an agonie confrontation that holds no necessary promise of rescue or reconciliation (2004, p. 135).

The key point from our perspective is that the former adopts a redemptive approach towards its sufferings whereas the latter does not, and here we start to move from salvage to salvation. On this reading, the salvage motif could be said to (attempt to) enact a shift between the 'tragic' and the 'romantic', from susceptibility to chance, contingency and the aleatory demands of modernity, towards the (partial) redemption of inscription (thereby enabling a legacy, an
inheritance). In other words, ethnology – in its salvage mode – negotiates its own sense of tragedy by using the tools it has forged to enact a shift from the tragic to the romantic, to redeem tragic loss through ethnographic inscription. As mentioned before, James Clifford (1986b, p. 118) considers this aspect of salvage to be a kind of allegory, allegorizing the shift from speech to writing, damnation to salvation, thus expanding the sense of loss engendered by modernist flux to the loss engendered by a (supposedly) pre-literate, memorial society. Of course, this attempt to shift from the tragic to the romantic via inscription is ill conceived on the grounds that the latter is precisely one of the key means by which chance enters the fray.

Perhaps acknowledging this predicament, Malinowski’s *Argonauts* – which began in tragedy – ends in an interrogative sigh:

> Alas! the time is short for Ethnology, and will this truth of its real meaning and importance [as 'one of the most deeply philosophic, enlightening and elevating disciplines of scientific research'] dawn before it is too late (1992 [1922], p. 518)?

Ethnology has come of age too late (the very mark of tragedy). However, there is also a mirror implication or flip side to Malinowski’s declamation, i.e. that prior cultural encounters – before the perceived melting away of the world’s Indigenous populations – would have came too early, for science that is. Cultural encounters prior to the melting away of anthropology’s object may have been fruitful but would have remained inexplicable or insufficiently scientific to be of worth, which is part and parcel of the pre-anthropological writings which anthropology likes to ritually dissociate itself from (e.g. missionaries’ accounts, travel writing, etc. [cf.
Rosaldo, 1986; Pratt, 1986]). Indeed, it is this aspect of the refrain that will be developed later by one of anthropology's other 'founding fathers', Claude Levi-Strauss.

Levi-Strauss's formulation of the problem of loss lies buried within one of the great travelogues of twentieth century anthropology, *Tristes Tropiques* (1976), a book that will later catch the eye of a certain Jacques Derrida and acquire a position of especial - if often overlooked - importance in *Of Grammatology* (1997, pp. 101-140). It is also a book that will become (retrospectively discovered as) one of the *cause célèbres* of anthropology's 'experimental moment' (cf. Geertz, 1988b; Richards, 1994, ch. 6):

> After an enchanting trip up-river, I had certainly found my savages. Alas! They were only too savage [...] They were as close to me as a reflection in a mirror; I could touch them, but I could not understand them [...] I had only to succeed in guessing what they were like for them to be deprived of their strangeness: in which case, I might as well have stayed in my village. Or if, as was the case here, they retained their strangeness, I could not make use of it, since I was incapable of even grasping what it consisted of (Levi-Strauss, 1976, p. 436).

Using the same exclamatory sigh as Malinowski, Levi-Strauss is caught between an encounter with the Amazonians in a moribund state but with all the anthropological knowledge to hand – knowledgeably sifting through the ruins, or fragments, so to speak – and an ante-diluvian encounter with the Amazonians but in the absence of such knowledge. These are seemingly the horns of the dilemma with which anthropology is faced: a 'pristine' encounter with cultural alterity which remains inexplicable due to an absence of scientific understanding, or a 'ruined' encounter which, although animated by a mature anthropological
discourse, remains fragmentary and partial due to an absence of scientific data. Indeed, this circular pattern, a pattern from which Levi-Strauss can neither escape from nor choose, is precisely the pattern that will follow him in his encounters (albeit in a spatialized version of his temporal circle): the outer Amazonians who are explicable but ruined and the inner Amazonians (the 'Nambikwara') who are pristine but inexplicable (Levi-Strauss, 1976, pp. 323-416).

Thus, roughly outlined, stand Malinowski and Levi-Strauss's variations on the theme of representational salvage. However, despite sporadic forays into other forms of inscription (cf. Clifford, 1986a; Prosser, 2005, ch. 2) both Malinowski and Levi-Strauss tended to respond to such loss by squeezing ephemeral experience through the 'bottleneck of the [written] signifier' (Kittler, 1999, p. 4) in a bid to fix its shadows and to tame its unwieldy excess. Loss was redeemed through phonetic writing and excess was supposedly curbed. As a consequence, those interested in treating anthropology as a 'kind of writing' have tended to neglect or underestimate other forms of inscription, and for two key reasons: one, because – despite critical readings – they often tacitly accept the foundation myth that poses figures such as Malinowski and Levi-Strauss as the self-styled fathers of anthropology, and, two, because – despite their indebtedness to the broader field of British cultural studies – their main source of inspiration is from literary criticism leading them to focus on published alphabetical script rather than on an 'expanded' field of inscription. However, without wishing to labour the criticism, it is worth stressing that this was not the first generation of ethnographers, nor was it the first generation to experience such a sense of loss, nor was their response to it so narrowly focused on phonetic writing.
Indeed, even by the time Alfred Cort Haddon enters the fray (circa 1888-1898), the modern incarnation of the discipline was already sufficiently well-worn for synthesizing academic text books and histories, and it is here that he outlines his technologically mediated variation on the motif of Indigenous loss:

Now is the time to record. An infinitude has been irrevocably lost, a very great deal is now rapidly disappearing thanks to colonisation, trade, and missionary enterprise. The change that has come over the uttermost parts of the world during the last fifty years is almost incredible. The same can be said of Europe and of our own country. Emigration and migration, the railway, the newspaper, and the Board School – all have contributed to destroy the ancient landmarks of backward culture. The most interesting materials for study are becoming lost to us, not only by their disappearance, but by the apathy of those who should delight in recording them before they have become lost to sight and memory (1898a, p. xx).26

We need to attend to Haddon's variation of the refrain – a variation which, of course, precedes and, in some senses, paves the way for Malinowski's in terms of both its continuity with and rupture of prior and proceeding manifestations – as it will neatly summarize much of what this thesis will attempt to elicit. The refrain opens with an appeal to the intertwining of temporality and inscription, 'now is the time to record'. This appeal is more complex than it appears, firstly because – unlike Malinowski and Levi-Strauss – the concept of 'recording' covers a considerably expanded field, as we have examined, and secondly because its

26 There are interesting – if somewhat ironic – parallels between this passage and § I of The Communist Manifesto: '[The world] market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages [...] The bourgeoisie [...] draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization [...] It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into its midst [...]’ (cited in Mowitt, 2005, p. 6-7; citation modified).
invocation of the present is split by what follows: 'An infinitude has been irrevocably lost, a very great deal is now rapidly disappearing thanks to colonisation, trade, and missionary enterprise' (Haddon, 1898a, p. xx). In a blaze of rhetoric, the ensuing passage resonates on a number of levels: it invokes the temporal discrepancy between immanence with 'a' ('an infinitude has been irrevocably lost') and imminence with an 'i' ('a very great deal is now rapidly disappearing'); the three Cs of colonialist, capitalist and Christian modernity (or 'colonisation, trade, and missionary enterprise'); and ultimately an appeal to turn to technology as a response to such loss ('those who should delight in recording before they have become lost to sight and memory') (Haddon, 1898a, p. xx). The reference to sight and memory will take on a particular and enduring significance throughout Haddon's writings. This is because the division between an immanent and an imminent loss often becomes blurred forcing Haddon to reconstruct newly extinct cultural traditions by converting memory into vision and sound. It is also important to note that, as per our discussion of the antinomies of modernity at home and abroad, Haddon explicitly makes the link between both strands of loss (cf. Urry, 1993, p. 3):

The change that has come over the uttermost parts of the world during the last fifty years is almost incredible. The same can be said of Europe and of our own country (1898a, p. xx).

In this context, modernity is poison and cure. Whilst producing the means with which to redeem lost worlds, '[e]migration and migration, the railway, the newspaper, and the Board School – all have contributed to destroy the ancient landmarks of backward culture' (Haddon, 1898a, p. xx). In formulating such
destruction, Haddon finally goes on to explicitly register the theme of double loss that we encountered earlier:

> The most interesting materials for study are becoming lost to us, not only by their disappearance, but by the apathy of those who should delight in recording them [...] (1898a, p. xx).

The Indigenous populations of the world are lost once (empirically) to a colonial modernity and twice (representationally) to a perceived lack of history and literacy. This means that shadowed behind each of the variations on the theme of salvage lies an important implication: the most immediate sense of loss (empirical loss) is merely a modulation of a more basic sense of loss enshrined within the very foundations of the discipline itself: cultures which (apparently) do not write are (apparently) lost to posterity, whether or not they are threatened by colonialism (cf. Clifford, 1986b, p. 118). Therefore, we are dealing here with two initial registers of loss that manifest themselves differently and at different levels of intensity: empirical loss (of men and women and the cultural forms which they embody) and representational loss (where such men and women and the cultural forms which they embody evade or exceed inscription). We have already alluded to this doubleness earlier, but to this we might add a third category of conceptual loss (of 'Man') as early anthropological data was ultimately collected in the name of reconstructing the origins and histories of 'Man', the universalist fig leaf over a European particularity. Rather than see such concepts as their a priori conditions of possibility, anthropologists often thought they could somehow reconstruct them after the fact. In what Johannes Fabian (2002 [1983]) has famously dubbed an 'allochronic' discourse, space was converted into time allowing contemporary
Indigenous populations to shed light on ancient Europe. Thus, the ensuing loss of such 'data' was a serious blow to these transcendental ambitions (cf. Derrida, 2001, ch. 10; Urry, 1993, p. 3). There are thus three senses of loss at work here: empirical (men), representational ('men') and conceptual (Man). Each of these registers is archaic but takes on a specific hue in the context of the emergence of a scientific field ethnology.

These registers of loss have a number of important consequences for the discussion to follow: most notably, they exacerbate the imperialistic import of what I will be calling the epistemological (and/or archival) impulse of the discipline and the concomitant use of the new technologies of inscription therein. A sense of humanistic urgency often became – and, I would suggest, often still is – a veil draped over an opportunistic sense of unquestioned and arrogant entitlement. Nonetheless, beyond the ideological justification such loss creates, the tensions it engenders remain unresolved and, most crucially, remain so of necessity. This is anthropology's predicament, which – as we have seen – is in turn metonymically bound to the predicaments of modernity more broadly, predicaments also located at an empirical level – the huge pace of change, the destruction, etc. – at a representational level – ushered in by the new technologies of inscription – and at a conceptual level – the 'closure' of metaphysics. In this instance, ethnology becomes a nodal or crossing point, a point at which the antinomies of modernity meet. Thus the stakes of the following discussion are very high indeed, and rather more significant than the usual footnote to a disciplinary history would seem to suggest.
In what follows, such tensions will play out in an extension of our original questions: why do anthropologists feel so compelled to write in and out of the 'field', and how does this relate to their use of other modes of inscription, such as photography, drawing, phonography and film? Where and how do these media intersect? Where do they diverge? How is this taste for inscription related to the way in which their discipline has historically constructed its object (i.e. as threatened or lost)? What, ultimately, is the relationship between inscription and loss? Each of the following chapters is an attempt to focus the intensity of these questions on a series of singular sites or tightly focused moments: the margins-turned-pivot-points of Haddon's writing. Chapter one focuses on a small and marginal sample of Haddon's racial 'type' photographs, but considers the more central question of how their embeddedness on the page undoes Haddon's positivistic and racialist logic. Chapter two examines the relationship between movement and stillness on the margins of Haddon's ethnographic cinema, but explores the extent to which an emergent tension between movement and stillness and indexicality and non-indexicality pulls at the seam between rationality and fantasy, and chapter three focuses on the extent to which a peripheral attempt to render sound meaningful and representable exposes a much larger chasm between experience and representation; each folds the margins back into the centre with a view to exposing the irreducible gaps, fissures and logical fault-lines inherent within Haddon's overall project, and – by extension – within anthropology as a whole.

27 Echoing our other engagements with the figure of supplementarity, such a relationship (in this case between margins and centres) is also bound up with the 'logic of the supplement' as Nicholas Royle (2003, p. 57) has made clear.
PART I: PHOTOGRAPHY

The Coming of the Light: Contingency, Rationalization and A.C. Haddon's Photographic Surfaces

Photography [...] is concerned with the staging of a struggle against the loss of memory, an attempt to archive and preserve what is about to disappear for good.

Gerhard Richter, Copy, Archive, Signature (in Derrida, 2010, p. xxx)

Categorical Gestures

Roland Barthes (2000a, p. 4) opens his influential late study of photography, Camera Lucida, with a pressing desire to know what photography is 'in itself.' His first faltering steps lead him to attempt to classify his object via a series of categorical distinctions which, for him, are ultimately external to photography's 'essence': 'empirical (Professionals / Amateurs), or rhetorical (Landscapes / Objects / Portraits / Nudes), or else aesthetic (Realism / Pictorialism)' (Barthes, 2000a, p. 4). As with Barthes, the momentum of this chapter does not stem from such conventional categorical gestures, but they nonetheless provide a useful platform on which to stage the argument to come, not least because few disciplines set more store by classificatory schemas than anthropology, and the use of

28 The 'Coming of the Light' is how Torres Strait Islanders refer to and commemorate the bringing of Christianity to the Islands. Christian missionaries from the London Missionary Society landed on 'Darnley Island' (Erub Island, see fig. 4) on July 1, 1871, and every year the Islanders celebrate the 'Coming of the Light' festival on that day (Beckett, 1987, p. 87). It is here that the salvation of religion and the salvation (salvage, redemption) of science come together.

29 The fact that this desire is never fulfilled is an indication of the limitations of the phenomenological method. In part at least, that is one of the underlying – or implied – themes of Camera Lucida.
photography within anthropology is no exception.

However, if this is a chapter about the role of photography in Haddon's 1898 Torres Strait expedition, it is only so with a number of key qualifications or caveats: firstly, photography is not read here as a discrete medium, but rather, as I set out in the introduction, as one part of an intermedial constellation (or set of shifting constellations). In other words, I have artificially foregrounded what is not so in the writings. Secondly, photography is not read systematically. In other words, this is not a comprehensive study of photography in the expedition, but is, rather, read symptomatically or marginally vis-à-vis the discourses of inscription and loss that I set out in the introduction. Thirdly, photography is not read chronologically (tracing its rise and fall from Haddon's beginnings through to his later work). It is, rather, read thematically pushing back towards influences and forward towards legacies.

Unlike cinematography, which was beset by considerable technical difficulties, photography formed one of the intellectual and methodological mainstays of the expedition's visualist agenda, with over 300 monochrome photographs taken using two Newman and Guardia 35mm cameras as well as an experimental (albeit unsuccessful) Ives and Joly process for developing colour plates (cf. Edwards, 1998, pp. 106-7; Griffiths, 2002, p. 128). Most of these photographs were taken by Haddon's undergraduate assistant, Anthony Wilkin – a young and gifted amateur who published photographic accounts of his trips to Egypt, Libya and Algeria (On The Nile With a Camera, Libyan Notes and Among the Berbers of Algeria [Haddon, 1901, p. 28]). Nonetheless, almost all of these photographs were orchestrated or
directed by Haddon, a point which foregrounds the unclear line between professional and amateur in anthropology, science, art and photography in fin-de-siècle Britain. Indeed, this was a source of considerable anxiety in a discipline attempting to lever itself into the pantheon of existing sciences at this time (cf. Grimshaw, 2001, p. 29).

Haddon's photographic 'corpus' ('we must classify, verify by samples, if we want to constitute a corpus' [Barthes, 2000a, p. 4]) breaks down along lines strikingly similar to Barthes' rhetorical categories (landscapes/objects/portraits/nudes). Haddon would undoubtedly agree with Baudelaire's suggestion (cited in Benjamin, 1999 [1931], p. 527) that photography's 'proper duty' is to 'serve as the handmaiden of science and the arts'. However, there is something of an irony in the fact that although his first duty was to science, his photographic genres are drawn almost entirely from the arts. Indeed, this is one of the reasons, Barthes argues (2000a, p. 4), why such categories do not enable us to distil the 'essence' of photography: because they could be applied to pre-photographic media.

With certain notable exceptions, Haddon's photographic output could comfortably be gathered under Barthes' rhetorical categories, comprised as it is mainly of landscapes (panoramas and picturesque vistas), material objects (from the profane to the sacred: amulets, carvings, masks, etc.), cultural activities (dancing, cooking, hunting, etc.) and individual portraits (formal and informal) (see fig. 1 below).

One of the more interesting exceptions to this model is the use of photography to reconstruct now defunct cultural traditions (cf. Edwards, 2001, ch. 8). This is a theme that I will return to later in this chapter and explore in more detail in the chapter on Haddon's ethnographic films.
However, it is significant that such categories are deployed by a nascent discipline which did not yet make professional or institutional distinctions between material culture, social anthropology and physical anthropology. In short, beyond the shared rhetorical framework, these differences matter. Indeed, perhaps because of this lack of definition, one of the most persistent and perplexing of these genres (persistent and perplexing because at once so simple and empty and yet so complex and resonant) is that of the 'type' photograph, anthropology's bastard child of classical portraiture, phrenology and race science. Each of these forms (portraiture, phrenology, race science and 'type' photography) shares a visual economy which views the body, and more particularly the face, as a legible surface full of deeper meaning and waiting to be deciphered (cf. Davis, 2004, p. 25). 'Every human face', Schopenhauer suggests (cited in Davis, 2004, p. 25), 'is a hieroglyph which can be deciphered, indeed whose key we bear ready-made within us'. Such photographs represent one end of a spectrum of representations used to codify cultural, ethnic and/or racial typologies (cf. Edwards, 1990, p. 236).
Here subjects are usually extracted from discernible cultural contexts and positioned frontally and in profile against a blank background. Culture, ethnicity and race are often registered but conflated and comparisons between types are usually implied but qualitative and idiosyncratic (see fig. 2 opposite). The looseness of this photographic genre meant that it acquired a certain popular currency, moving from the pages of specialist anthropological publications into widely distributed publications and cheap and popular cartes-de-visite reproductions of national or ethnic 'types' (Edwards, 1990, p. 238).

At the other end of the spectrum is the full anthropometric photograph. Here subjects are usually positioned frontally and/or in profile against a standardized and measurable background with a view to quantitatively comparing and contrasting specifically 'racial' types (see fig. 3 opposite). This became an important site of power and fantasy in mid to late nineteenth century anthropology, a place where racial politics were played out and cultural longings and anxieties expressed, a place where
racial and cultural difference was made and unmade. In practice, there was often an overlap between the two modes, but in both cases the literal machinery of photographic portraiture, which held subjects immobile (cf. Barthes, 2000a, p. 13; Benjamin, 1999 [1931], p. 515), was here replaced by a discursive machinery of colonial power. The 'funereal immobility' (Barthes, 2000a, p. 6) of the sitter was converted into a static metonymy; each individual became a fly in the amber of their 'race'.

Up until recently, the dominant mode of reading such photographs has been a broadly discursive one that examines the knowledge/power nexus by drawing together the links between surveillance, colonialism, criminality and madness (cf. Edwards, 2001, p. 131). This approach owes much to the importation of Foucault into photography studies via analysts such as John Tagg (e.g. 1988) and others. Indeed, there is much to commend in such an approach, and the analysis that follows owes much to it, but there has in recent years been a trend towards addressing the specificity of the photographic image (as a meaningfully material surface, a sociological object and/or an historical artefact, etc.) (cf. Edwards, 2001). This focus on specificity has been conducted in part to challenge the top-down homogeneity of some of the discursive readings of photography, but also – and, perhaps, more importantly – with a view to prising open spaces where individual photographs might nuance or challenge the totalizing homogeneity of the grids of knowledge and power in which they were and are embedded (Edwards, 2001, p. 131; Thomas, 1994). In other words, both approaches could usefully be regarded as complementary rather than oppositional, and it is in this spirit that I will attempt to conduct the following analysis.
Conducting such an analysis therefore involves shifting between what might hitherto have been regarded as 'formal' and 'social' registers, the former addressing the photograph as both a material surface and a conveyor/purveyor of meanings; the latter addressing the photograph and its associated apparatus in terms of their role within colonial knowledge production. This offers a number of overlapping methodological approaches. Firstly, one might analyse such photographs as examples of 'colonial discourse(s)' which deploy, challenge or negotiate with colonially resonant concepts such as race, culture, loss, etc. This is arguably the more conventional approach and although often masquerading as a form of 'discourse analysis', is often more accurately viewed as a type of hermetically sealed formalism at one remove. Nonetheless, no meanings produced in this context can be regarded as historically fixed or divorced from differences in reception. To conduct such an analysis is perhaps a necessary but not sufficient condition. It is in some ways to look 'through' the image. However, photographs might also be analysed as material artefacts in their own right, providing part of the material substrata of colonial knowledge production. To do so is in some ways to look 'at' the image, which is to extend rather than contradict the first approach. Finally, one might analyse photographs, along with the photographic apparatus itself, in terms of the power/knowledge networks in which they – as material artefacts – were and are embedded. To do so is in some ways to look 'around' the image, with a view to producing the kinds of social-semiotic and/or discursive readings which not only contextualize photography but open it up to a broader range of questions. Different aspects of these approaches will be deployed depending on the context, but in practice all three are often intertwined and
difficult to dissociate or clearly differentiate. Indeed, in some ways, they each say
the same thing, but all three offer a shifting focus between the contexts of the
image's original production and the unpredictable material and cultural legacies
which issue from them.

Opening up the medium of photography (and the genre of 'type' photography in
particular) to such questions brings us much closer to the nub of the problem –
and this is the question which precedes all the others and brings us back to Roland
Barthes: is there a relationship (direct or otherwise) between the way in which an
individual might represent a 'type' and an individual photograph might evoke
photography? And if each (singular) photograph also evokes photography as such
(cf. Richter in Derrida, 2010, pp. xxiv-xxv), then what do Haddon's 'type' photographs
say about the contradictions and aporias of the medium of
photography itself and vice versa? More simply, why does Haddon's project place
such an emphasis on the medium of photography (and 'type' photography in
particular) and how might a mutual investigation expose the epistemological fault-
lines and cracks that inhere in both?

I. Indexicality, Contingency, Excess

Haddon's enthusiastic penchant for photography - borne out in a number of
popular and scientific articles advocating its use (e.g. Stocking, 1993, p. 13;
Haddon, 1912; cf. Griffiths, 2002, pp. 132-133) – stems from a range of important
factors, some of which dovetail with his use of cinematography (such as the
visualist agenda of the project), some of which deviate (as we shall consider in the
next chapter). However, the crux of his enthusiasm for photography brings us back to Barthes’ famous opening gambit in *Camera Lucida*, a deceptively simple premise which (along with the work of C.S. Peirce and others [cf. Mulvey, 2006, p. 54]) virtually launched a genre of photographic criticism:

A specific photograph, in effect, is never distinguished from its referent (from what it represents) [...] (2000a, p. 5).

Just as there can be no empty consciousness for Husserl – there is only 'consciousness of' something (cf. Moran, 2000, pp. 16-17) – there can be no empty photograph for Barthes (2000a, pp. 28, 6) – there is only photography of something, some point of reference which 'adheres' to the photographic surface like 'that class of laminated objects whose two leaves cannot be separated without destroying them both'. Such a process of adhesion obviously explains the appeal of photography to a positive science looking to the surface of social, cultural and biological life for a reliable stream of data seemingly unencumbered by subjective whims and human error (Edwards, 1990, p. 237). As Christopher Pinney argues:

This relationship of physical contiguity between image and referent certainly played a central role in the truth claims of the colonial archive: photography was seen to surpass and eradicate the subjectivity and unreliability of earlier technologies of representation (2003, p. 6).

It also explains the appeal of photography to a discipline attempting to find an institutional foothold within the sciences by establishing its unique professional authority over the collection and interpretation of such ethnographic data, over and against the amateur pursuits of missionaries, travellers and colonialists (cf. Grimshaw, 2001, p. 29). This is particularly marked when one compares the
typological photographs of a proto-modern anthropology to other forms of representation or, indeed, to the idiosyncratic snapshots of interested amateurs. More than all of this, however, such a process explains the appeal of photography to a science which fears an imminent loss of referent, due to the combined forces of Christianity, capitalism and colonialism. In this context, photographic portraiture becomes a death mask taken from the not-yet-dead, a process which conlates the immanence and imminence of death:

In this way, the photographic portrait prepares the self for its own death; it is a form of mnemonic mortification that commemorates a passing that already has occurred or that is yet to come (Richter in Derrida, 2010, pp. xxxiii).

However, this also means that every photograph contains within it a painful tension: a promise to indemnify against loss by bonding with a dying referent, and an acknowledgement that no such bond – no matter how close – can ever allow one (the photograph) to replace the other (the referent).

- Nonetheless, the perception that photography could promise objectivity, authority and an indemnification against loss contributed to its (albeit brief) popularity and success within an emergent modern anthropology. However, this is also why it – and visual methods more generally – rapidly fell out of favour within the discipline as it moved away from – what was perceived to be – a positivist preoccupation with surface towards interpretation, depth and other sources of (usually) written authority (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 128). This is the conventional narrative of the history of British social anthropology: modern anthropology begins in the rejection of Victorian positivism and evolutionism and in the casting aside of its associated
technology and all things visual (cf. Grimshaw, 2001). However, there is another way to read this narrative, one which argues that the rejection of indexical technologies is not merely a rejection of its positivist strictures but also of its untamed contingency, alterity and excess, and this move involves a closer examination of the adhesive bond between photograph and referent. As Christopher Pinney and Siegfried Kracauer suggest:

No matter how precautionary and punctilious the photographer is in arranging everything that is placed before the camera, the inability of the lens to discriminate will ensure a substrate or margin of excess, a subversive code present in every photographic image that makes it open and available to other readings and uses [...] [H]owever hard the photographer tries to exclude, the camera always includes. The photographer can never fully control the resulting photograph, and it is that lack of control and the resulting excess that permits recoding, "resurfacing," and "looking past" (Pinney, 2003, pp. 6-7, emphasis in original).

Even the most typical portraits must retain an accidental character - as if they were plucked en route and still quivered with crude existence (Kracauer, 1997, p. 19).

Just as photographs might provide too little to indemnify against loss, they also provide too much in the way of a contingent excess. Indeed, theorists of photography have long been aware of such a relationship between photography and contingency. For example, one might think of Benjamin's (1999 [1931], p. 510) 'irresistible urge to search [...] a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the subject'. For Barthes (2000a, p. 4), the photograph 'is the absolute Particular, the sovereign Contingency [...] in short, what Lacan calls Tuché, the Occasion, the Encounter, the Real, in its indefatigable expression' [...] 'In the Photograph, the event is never transcended
for the sake of something else'. However, there is a crucial tension between photography's susceptibility to contingency — and we must remind ourselves that this is not an external breach that can be mitigated, but rather an integral part of the ontology of the medium — and the forces of rationalization and control with which photography was often used. Indeed, for Mary Ann Doane (2002, p. 10), such an unresolved tension between contingency and rationalization could be thought to characterize the experience of modernity more generally. This tension becomes particularly marked when photography gets pressed into the service of an emergent positive science where it is precisely the point that the singular event (one photograph, one individual, one moment in time and space) should be transcended for the sake of something else (the general, the typical, the universal).

Raw data distilled into theory; that is science, or at least one version of it. Indeed, Barthes (2000a, p. 28) notes the significance of this aspect of photographic contingency: '[...] it immediately yields up those "details" which constitute the very raw material of ethnological knowledge'. However, the process of converting such data into theory is not as smooth or as clean as one might think, and a residue of contingency, alterity and excess ultimately inheres along with the traces of the referent. Therefore, what makes photography most effective as a collector of 'raw data' (i.e. its unflinching indexicality, its seeming ability to transcend itself as a sign and to masquerade as its own referent [Barthes, 2000a, p. 45]) is also what makes it most suspect as a basis for scientific generalizations (i.e. its fleeting contingency, the fact that, although it may be of the 'real', it is passing). In other words, the very

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31 This reference to Tuche is an important reminder that the bond between photography and contingency is part of a much broader pattern of thought which combines technics and chance. For example, it evokes Aristotle's evocation of Agathon in the Nichomachean Ethics where he reminds us that, 'Art [techne] has a love for chance [tuché] and chance for art' (cf. Kilroy and Swiboda, 2007).

32 This tension is also very much at the heart of the relationship between technics and chance more broadly.
thing that bestows scientific legitimacy also undermines it (cf. Pinney, 2003, p. 6).

**Event and Structure**

Therefore, if indexicality is at the very heart of Haddon's choice to use photography, as I would argue, such indexical inscriptions nonetheless possess a number of overlapping peculiarities for the scientist. Firstly, they record both too much (a contingent excess which comes into conflict with the forces of rationalization) and too little (they are a poor substitute for a 'dying culture'). Secondly, they may serve well as raw data (of an event), but they must be transcended (as structure) to be science. Indeed, Barthes' enunciation of this tension takes on a peculiar literality in this context, as we shall consider later:

> Since every photograph is contingent (and thereby outside of meaning), Photography cannot signify (aim at a generality) except by assuming a mask (2000a, p. 34).

To that extent, they evoke the larger predicament that confronts anthropology: the tension between event and structure. As Derrida remarks:

> Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that could be called an "event," if this loaded word did not entail a meaning which it is precisely the function of structural – or structuralist – thought to reduce or to suspect (Derrida, 2001, p. 351).

Within the history of anthropology, the concept of structure is implied rather than enunciated in the evolutionary paradigm of Victorian anthropology precisely because it is not an historical model\(^{33}\); its preoccupations are with origins and

\(^{33}\) In this case, history and (an implied) structure can be thought to oppose one another. However,
evolutionary scales rather than events. The concept of structure becomes explicitly registered only later in the functionalism of Malinowski (a variant reading of Maslow's hierarchy of needs), the structural-functionalism of Radcliffe-Brown (a variant reading of Durkheimian sociology) and the structuralism of Levi-Strauss (a variant reading of Saussure). It is because Haddon straddles such Victorian evolutionism and modern ethnographers like Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Levi-Strauss (who weld together data collector and theorist) that the tension between event and structure becomes so pronounced.

In relation to photography, this tension opens up at least three different temporal registers wherein the eventness of the event is diminished in favour of an abstract structuring principle. For example, some of Haddon's photographs are posed as being 'too late' (e.g. those which reconstruct 'extinct' cultural activities, cf. Edwards, 2001, ch. 8). Here the time of the event is converted into an amorphous and non-historical past time. Some of Haddon's photographs are posed as being 'just in time' (e.g. photos which 'embalm' moribund cultural activities in time [cf. Bazin in Mulvey, 2006, p. 56]). Here the time of the event is converted into a typical, ethnographic present. Other of Haddon's photographs are posed as being 'outside time' (e.g. the photographic typologies with which we will be principally concerned). Here the time of the event is extracted from one flow of time (e.g. the time of the referents) and is entered into another (e.g. the time of the photo or the 'timeless' structuration of science). All three of these temporal registers attempt to transcend the eventness of the event and to gather it under the structuring, rationalizing force of science.

see Mowitt (2005, pp. 176-177, fn. 4) for a reminder that history and structure or history and structuralism cannot always be assumed to be oppositional.
In what follows I will examine how Haddon negotiates these conceptual and temporal tensions through a detailed exploration of two sets of 'type' photographs published in his popular account of the expedition, *Head-Hunters: Black, White and Brown* (1901), for it is in these photographs that the tensions between contingency and rationalization, particularity and universality or event and structure, come to the fore most prominently. The importance of such a tension and such an analysis lies in the fact that it is not confined to photography, or any other indexical technologies. Indeed, this tension sits at the very heart of the ethnographic enterprise more generally. If modern anthropology is constructed as an ethnographic discipline, then this tension forms its foundation stone. In Elizabeth Edwards’ succinct phrase (2001, p. 157), anthropological representations are 'extracted from real time' but 'authenticated through real-time observation'. In Haddon’s case, the resulting – and, I would argue, symptomatically unsuccessful – attempts to negotiate this tension not only involve a complex set of intermedial relationships between photography, phonetic writing, drawing and film (wherein each is used to 'supplement' the other – and we will come back to this question of supplementarity later), but such attempts ultimately expose the sheer rawness, power and anti-positivist import of indexical technologies (cf. Doane, 2002, p. 10), which is arguably what contributed to their expulsion from the discipline in the first place.

34 These pairs are obviously not strictly synonymous.
However, these tensions have important historical antecedents which will help to place Haddon's work in general, and *Head-Hunters* in particular, into context. Prior to the emergence of a professionalized field of anthropology, the cultural encounters between Europe and its others (by travellers, missionaries, colonialists, etc.) were complex, contingent and schematic affairs, embedded in a range of different discursive constellations. The attempt to systematize such encounters in the name of an emergent science led to the imposition of a range of theoretical (*a priori*) categories which were used to establish a comparative framework and, in their later form, to ritually debase any knowledge produced by travellers, missionaries and colonialists. Prior to the emergence of later anthropological paradigms (such as functionalism, structural-functionalism and structuralism, for example), the relationships or patterns between individual customs were of little concern. The point was to gather together a body of comparative data with a view to comparing individual customs across different cultural milieus (religion here or there, etc.) and/or assessing the overall level of cultural development within particular cultural milieus. This created a core tension between the ethnographer who describes (phonetic writing/particularity is their modus operandi) and the anthropologist who theorizes (in the interests of distilling a generalized human essence) (cf. Clifford, 1988, p. 28). This tension opens out onto a wider vista of others (particularity/universality, data/theory, experience/phonetic writing), which are hierarchically ordered, the former feeding into the latter: particular data drawn from the experience of 'travellers or residents in uncivilized lands'35 feeding

35 This was the tag-line of the *Notes and Queries on Anthropology* series, which ran for much of the late nineteenth- and early to mid twentieth-century (Urry, 1993, ch. 1).
into the universalizing theory of anthropological writings, and so on.

Therefore, immediately prior to Haddon, the division of labour between anthropologist and collector, theory and raw data, clipped writings and unruly experience, was unidirectional and deductive. The most obvious case in point in the first wave of professionalization of the discipline as a science was the emergence of the anthropological questionnaire, where a grid of universal categories (e.g. religion, politics, economics, etc.) were superimposed over experience in a bid to establish a comparative framework through which a human essence could be distilled. In the first instance, then, anthropology is predicated on the paradox of collecting instances of cultural difference with a view to transcending them (cf. Clifford, 1986b, p. 99). 'Ethnography's narrative of specific differences presupposes, and always refers to, an abstract plane of similarity' (Clifford, 1986b, p. 101). To that extent, the discipline's philosophical preoccupations are inherited from the Enlightenment.

Haddon's earliest forays into ethnography (e.g. his 1888 trip to the Torres Strait Islands) are precisely predicated on the imposition of such a deductive grid, loosely narrativized. Indeed, Haddon (1912, pp. 267-271) would later contribute to an edition of the same Notes and Queries which had earlier animated his own work. On the basis of the above distinction, therefore, Haddon would be very much in the mould of the ethnographer rather than the anthropologist at this time. The complexity emerges as his conversion to anthropology starts to collapse the gap between anthropologist and ethnographer, theory and raw data, clipped writings and unruly experience, thereby highlighting something of their discrepant
registers. The space between them dissolves both the unidirectional nature of the relationships and their deductive qualities, producing streams of contingency, alterity and excess. The paradox is that whilst narratives of personal experience are required to establish professional authority, they simultaneously undermine scientific validity. As Mary Louise Pratt describes it:

\[\text{P}ersonal\ \text{narrative\ persists\ alongside\ objectifying\ description\ in\ ethnographic\ writing\ because\ it\ mediates\ a\ contradiction\ within\ the\ discipline\ between\ personal\ and\ scientific\ authority,\ a\ contradiction\ that\ has\ become\ especially\ acute\ since\ the\ advent\ of\ fieldwork\ as\ a\ methodological\ norm.\ James\ Clifford\ speaks\ of\ it\ as} \quad \text{"the\ discipline's\ impossible\ attempt\ to\ fuse\ objective\ and\ subjective\ practices"\ (1986,\ p. 32).}\]

The solution is to place oneself within the work in order to establish authority ('I was there'), whilst also rendering oneself a transcendental viewer from above. This is anthropology's broader dialectic, i.e. that between the particular (the ethnographic encounter in all its eventness and contingency, etc.) and the universal (the general concepts which animate that encounter and its subsequent representation: the human, religion, economics, politics, etc., but which cannot be accessed empirically).

One of the things that makes Haddon's work significant in this regard is that it marks a trend toward such a tension. His work heralds a certain rupture in anthropology between the ethnographic encounter and its representation, between 'unruly experience' and 'authoritative written account' (Clifford, 1988, p. 25). Once established as the ethnographic norm, this mode created representations which were authenticated by the above-mentioned paradoxical
double move: revealing the presence of the anthropologist in all his or her contingency ('I was there at that point in time') whilst transcendentalizing that position with a view to converting event into structure. Such a move is particularly complicated when one focuses on technologies of inscription like photography. In this context, the deictic function of the photograph, so important to Barthes, points a finger in two directions at once: towards and away from the image, indexing both subject and photographer. As with ethnographic writings, it certifies the authoritative presence of the anthropologist ('I was there and took this photograph') whilst also subsuming that presence under an abstract structure ('this photograph means more than this moment, this event'). However, this process of certification and control is rendered unwieldy by unwittingly levering an opening to that which challenges it, and it is this opening that I will try to widen in the following reading of Head-Hunters.

II. Head-Hunters – Mise-en-Scène

Based very closely on his personal journal of the expedition\(^{36}\), Haddon (1901) published a popular travelogue of the trip, *Head-Hunters: Black, White and Brown*, three years after his return from the Torres Strait. This book was intended as a brief and self-consciously popular taster for the six volumes of scientific reports which would be published under Haddon's editorship before his death in 1940 (Haddon et al, 1901; 1904; 1907; 1908; 1912; 1935), and it was published in response to an intense public curiosity about all things colonial. In this sense, Haddon was caught between two significant and contradictory forces (forces

\(^{36}\) This is now in the manuscripts section of Cambridge University Library (Haddon, 1898b). Indeed, some sections of *Head-Hunters* are taken almost verbatim from the journal.
which I will later come to align with the tension between contingency and rationalization, event and structure, etc.): a desire to publicize a nascent discipline by deploying some of the popular idioms of travel writing, and a desire to establish a foothold in the sciences by deploying some of the idioms of the natural sciences (cf. Herle, 1998b, p. 93). The former renders the book explicable to a readership used to travellers' tales and missionary accounts; the latter attempts to extricate itself from such representations and to establish a unique professional authority over ethnographic data (a point which has as much to do with institutional positioning and funding as with epistemology). Indeed, this tension between narrative and science, popularity and rigour, which fundamentally structures the whole of *Head-Hunters* and becomes the impasse with which future ethnographic writings will struggle, is also fundamentally present in the space between Haddon's popular and scientific writings. To that extent, *Head-Hunters* can be read as a convenient condensation of Haddon's project more generally.

As Haddon's work is transitional between Victorian and 'modern' modes of anthropological representation, it (and *Head-Hunters* in particular) arguably renders these tensions more evident than in later work, where, in Clifford Geertz's terms (1988b, p. 29), '[t]he devices, the construction scars, the brush strokes are all more or less invisible, at least to the unwary eye'. Revealing such brush strokes, *Head-Hunters* opens with what would become the classic opening gesture for future ethnographic writings: Geertz's 'I-Witnessing' model (1988a, ch. 4), where the journey and the writer are situated in a very specific moment in time, thereby setting the scene and authenticating the narrative to come:
We arrived at Torres Straits\textsuperscript{37} early in the morning of April 22nd, 1898, and dropped anchor off Friday Island, as the steamers of the Ducal Line are not allowed now to tie up at the hulk at Thursday Island. Shortly afterwards we were met by the Hon. John Douglas, the Resident Magistrate, and Dr. Salter, both of whom were old friends who had shown me much kindness during my previous expedition [...] 

The township of Thursday Island, or Port Kennedy, as it is officially termed, had increased considerably during the past decade. This was partly due to the natural growth of the frontier town of North Queensland, and partly to the fact that it has become a fortified port which commands the only safe passage for large vessels through these dangerous straits (Haddon, 1901, p. 1).

Such a manoeuvre immediately establishes authorial and professional authority, clearly situated and embedded within a specific colonial administrative framework. Indeed, this is the source of much of Haddon's access and resources.\textsuperscript{38} This move simultaneously poses the book as an explicitly narrative account; it is the non-fiction equivalent of 'once upon a time' (cf. Crapanzano, 1986, p. 53). In Mary Louise Pratt's terms, such openings:

\begin{quote}
[P]lay the crucial role of anchoring that description in the intense and authority-giving personal experience of fieldwork [...] Always they are responsible for setting up the initial positionings of the subjects of the ethnographic text: the ethnographer, the native and the reader (1986, p. 32).
\end{quote}

However, it also makes clear that Thursday Island, the administrative centre of the Islands, just north of the tip of Queensland (see fig. 4 below), is an extension of a frontier. It is, to use Christopher Bracken's\textsuperscript{39} phrase (1997, p. 12), 'an appendage sewn to the empire's flank', or, to re-use Haddon's phrase, an 'outlier[...]' of the

\textsuperscript{37} At the time that Haddon was writing (circa 1888-1898), the Torres Strait Islands were known as the Torres Straits.

\textsuperscript{38} In his personal journal for the 1888 expedition, Haddon (1888, p. 3) notes with approval that one of the chief colonial officials on the Island, Hugh Milman, puts the resources of Empire (such as a boat launch) at his disposal, whilst also allowing Haddon to accompany him on his 'rounds' of the Islands in order to question the 'natives'.

\textsuperscript{39} Many thanks to John Mowitt for directing me towards Christopher Bracken's work.
empire'. Sitting at the centre of a global trade in pearl shell and *bèche-de-mer* since the 1860s, the Islands were settled by missionaries from the London Missionary Society in 1871 (see fn. 1) and 'annexed' by the Crown in 1877. These are the three Cs of colonial modernity that we encountered in the introduction: capitalism, Christianity and colonialism, or 'pearlers, pastors and protectors' as the anthropologist Jeremy Beckett (1987, pp. 24-60) would have it. The Strait thus became an important frontier along a both a 'vertical' north-south axis (between Australia and Papua New Guinea) and along a 'horizontal' east-west axis (between Europe and Asia). Indeed, although anthropologists often choose islands because of their perceived boundedness, the sea (like a hyphen) joins as much at it separates; it is both bridge

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40 This is in reference to the text of a lecture on the 'Western Isles of Ireland' (of which, more below) in a manuscript in the Cambridge Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology (Box 98, W06/1/6).

41 Pearl shell was principally used for the decorative buttons in such demand in Europe, and *bèche-de-mer* — a type of sea cucumber — was treated as a sought-after delicacy in Asia. Therefore, the Strait was very much at the centre of 'horizontal' and 'vertical' flows of trade.

42 It is worth stressing parenthetically that the part-whole relations implied by Bracken's and Haddon's phrases and by the notion of 'annexation' may also be read in supplementary terms. 'Additions' to the empire — particularly islands (and we might remember that Australia was 'added' to Britain just as the Torres Strait Islands were 'added' to Australia; to that extent, the Islands are a supplement to a supplement) — may equally create forms of displacement, not least in this context because the Islands would later play a pivotal role in Indigenous land rights by undermining the concept of *terra nullius* in Australia (in part at least, the legal basis for the colonization of the continent, of which more later). This was a 'tale wagging the dog' moment. A landmark ruling (the so-called 'Mabo' case) had ramifications across the whole continent of Australia simply because the Islands had been annexed. Otherwise, its implications would have been minimal and locally defined.
and barrier (cf. Kuklick, 1996). Such a situatedness sets the Islands between two cultural flows, two socio-economic systems, two sets of histories, two modes of hybridity and change. Haddon is interested in one (e.g. the 'vertical' cultural flows between Papua New Guinea and Australia), but not in the other (e.g. the 'horizontal' cultural flows between Euro-Australian-Asian capitalism/colonialism and the Islands). In this light, Thursday Island – as the Island's administrative centre – becomes a place where lines are drawn and crossed at the same time: Europe at its limit point. As Christopher Bracken argues:

In the colonial text the limit marks the line, or set of lines, where Europe attempts to trace a clean boundary between itself and its exterior. Yet the limit invariably fails to establish itself because it is crossed by the very movement that draws it. The limit occupies a textual zone where the marking of limits is impossible (1997, p. 5).

Such flows and transgressions are coded by Haddon as corrupted authenticity: the place where, in Bracken's terms (1997, p. 5), Europe meets a pale reflection of itself. Rather than cast colonialism and industry to the margins, as with later ethnographies, they are incorporated so as to work the tropes of loss and decay into the book. To this extent, the book is closer to Levi-Strauss's melancholia than Malinowski's romanticism:

Although the town has increased in size its character has not altered to any considerable extent. It is still the same assemblage of corrugated iron and wooden buildings which garishly broil under a tropical sun, unrelieved by that vegetation which renders beautiful so many tropical towns. It is true a little planting has been done, but the character of the soil, or perhaps the absence of sufficient water, render those efforts melancholy rather than successful [...] The characteristic mountains of

43 Again, there is something of a supplementary logic in how the Islands are bound to one another and bound to the landmasses of Australia and Papua New Guinea.
44 See the introduction.
eviscerated tins, kerosene cases, and innumerable empty bottles which betoken a thirsty land, have been removed and cast into the sea (Haddon, 1901, pp. 1-2).

The implied juxtaposition here is not between two socio-economic systems, two sets of histories or two cultures, but between one of these sets and nature. The sea is filled with detritus, corrugated iron 'broils' under the tropical sun and the land is posed as being corrupted to the extent that the very soil is no longer capable of supporting life. This is an affront to his aesthetic sensibilities (cf. Geertz, 1988b, p. 40), a stance which conveniently masks the fact that he is an integral part of that very system and process. However, once the motif of rupture is established, this passage, and the ensuing descriptions of colonial types on Thursday Island, become a prelude to the 'journey into the interior'; a spatial readjustment is required (from 'Thursday Island to Murray Island'). This is another classic motif in anthropological writings. Otherness is posed as a series of concentric rings and one must press on inwards to gradually peel away the European influences (cf. Bracken, 1997, p. 9). Therefore, the colonial context is invoked less as an integral part of the analysis and more as a means of heightening the sense of urgency for collection, a point which Haddon had been stressing since his first visit in 1888:

I found, even then, that the opportunities of learning about the pagan past of the natives were limited, and that it would become increasingly more difficult, as the younger men knew comparatively little of the former customs and beliefs, and the old men were dying off (Haddon, 1901, p. vii).

Each new visit – even if punctuated by a ten year gap – positions the subjects of ethnography as simultaneously lost and 'on the brink'. This is a well established

45 This is not a literal interior in this case. His destination, 'Murray Island' or 'Mer', is on the eastern fringes of the Torres Strait (see fig. 4).
scene-setting narrative device, and in so doing it implicitly situates the microscopic world of ethnography within the macroscopic world of global, political-economic systems. As George Marcus (1986, p. 165, fn. 1) argues, there have historically been two main ways of doing so: the redemptive mode of ethnography and the salvage mode. In the former, the ethnographer 'demonstrates the survival of distinctive and authentic cultural systems despite undeniable changes' (Marcus, 1986, p. 165, fn. 1). In the latter, the ethnographer 'portrays himself as "before the deluge," so to speak. Signs of fundamental change are apparent, but the ethnographer is able to salvage a cultural state on the verge of transformation' (Marcus, 1986, p. 165, fn. 1). Haddon often switches erratically between the two modes, but it is in the metaphorical spatial shift between periphery and centre that he hopes to be able to stress the primacy of the latter over the former 46; to ward off an immanent death in favour of an imminent one, and one way to begin to do so is to re-frame the Islands historically, geographically and racially.

**Discursive Frames**

Indeed, if the first chapter of *Head-Hunters* implicitly places the Islands within a contemporary world system, then the second chapter begins by historicizing that system. However, history is presented here as the outside, as the Islands' other: the point where they break through the surface of European cartography and history. 'Our' time is not 'their' time (cf. Fabian; 2002). This is done merely to situate the Islands within a range of external disciplinary or discursive frames: geography,

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46 As mentioned before, this is not a literal or geographical centre, but rather a conceptual or cultural centre where he spent more of his time than anywhere else (Mer or Murray Island), and this is on the eastern fringes of the Island group (see fig. 4).
natural history, biology, anthropology, etc. These frames act as prostheses to a landscape which cannot otherwise 'speak' to him, and their ordering is significant. The Islands are briefly placed within a European historical frame and then emptied and re-situated within a timeless, primal, geographical and climatic emptiness. Rather than the corrupt nature of chapter one, nature is here the allegorical bedrock to biological life and culture. This is an allegory of origins, reconstructing an empty, natural or primal landscape that is then peopled by biological beings, or racial 'types', who, in turn, create culture (the 'natural foundations of society', Geertz, 1988b, p. 38). In other words, the Islands are posed as a backdrop for the playing out of European history, an empty landscape rendered meaningful via the discourse of geography, a natural landscape of flora and fauna and biologically rendered humans, and only then a peopled, cultural landscape. Such a manoeuvre, whilst at several removes from the brute force of colonial expansionism, arguably inhabits the same rhetorical and conceptual space, wherein Indigenous modes of emplacement are wiped clean.

Indeed, it is worth reminding ourselves that land (whether we it read as 'place', 'space', 'property' or a combination of all these things at different times) is not a simple given, despite its brute materiality. It has to be made or constructed as meaningful through a complex range of discourses and practices, such as mapping, exploration, law and settlement for example, and this can obviously lead different structures of meaning to come into conflict. In the case of Australia – and to a lesser extent, the Torres Strait Islands – a combination of ignorance and hubris led colonial cartographers, geographers and explorers to wipe clean the 'New World'
of Indigenous modes of emplacement, or making place⁴⁷ – of Indigenous cartography, geography and property, for example (and anyone even vaguely versed in Australian Aboriginal art will know how complexly these modes of emplacement are figured⁴⁸). In other words, they wiped clean the meaningful inhabitation of the land, the phenomenology of land if you will, leaving nothing but empty space, returning it to a certain brute materiality, a blank slate to be filled with colonial modes of cartography, geography and private property under the law.⁴⁹

In other words, one mode of emplacement became replaced by another – under the guise of filling an emptiness – and never was the truistic relationship between knowledge and power more apt. Indeed, knowledge is often at its most epistemologically, psychologically and politically powerful when it is constructed as a site of desire, a site of emptiness to be filled, when one knows (the parameters of) what one does not know. This is almost literalized in the case of Australia, or, as it was known in the seventeenth century, terra australis incognita, the 'unknown land of the south', or later, 'New Holland' as Dutch imperialism reached its height. This is the first step in rendering the unknown knowable. However, in this case, mapping this unknown land, beginning to fill the spaces, beginning to render the knowable known, bringing it under the conceptual grip of knowledge, merely brought it one step closer to being materially appropriated as property. Indeed,

⁴⁷ The name itself, 'New World', implies this very cleansing process, as does the fact that the New World came to be largely named after the Old Word (e.g. New South Wales, and so on). This is an attempt to blindly read these worlds as blank canvases upon which to recreate the 'Old' World.
⁴⁸ I use the category of 'art' advisedly. Much of what has been considered narrowly under the category of 'art' is just as much about mapping, geography and cosmology, for example.
⁴⁹ This notion of Australia as a vast and sometimes threatening emptiness – a desert or wilderness – is a trope often either uncritically repeated or critically negotiated in a wide range of Australian films and literature (cf. Walkabout, Mad Max, Rabbit-Proof Fence, Japanese Story, Ten Canoes, The White Earth, etc.).
this might be read as a form of ex-propropriation, as what was posed as the rightful imposition of property into a propertyless society is more accurately the obliteration of one mode of property ownership by another.

A considerable amount of conceptual labour has to be conducted for such a manoeuvre to be enacted and to appear both rational and just, and in Australia the concept of *terra nullius* (or 'empty land') played a key role in doing just this, in emptying out the land, nullifying it in a sense, readying it to be legally and morally converted into private property. Such a concept is rarely explicitly evoked in colonial writings, acting more as a background assumption, what goes without saying, which makes it all the more difficult to rout out and challenge. Indeed, the Torres Strait Islands were never explicitly colonized on this basis, but the annexation of the Islands in 1877, whilst Australia was still considered a British colony, means that the effects of such a system were imported into the Islands at one remove, and this suggests that Haddon’s move to read the Islands through comparable frames was both meaningful and explicable.

In this light, it is significant that Haddon’s first-person narrative voice is excised from the book at this point and the temporal register shifts from the present (a narrative of discontinuous events) to the past (at both historical and geographical registers). This is an important fold in the book between the authenticating first-person narrative of specific events in the first chapter and the transcendental viewpoint of the second. Indeed, one could easily have written the second chapter having never visited the Islands, but the reader is positioned to lend the chapter’s descriptions greater credence because they are anchored by the first.
Therefore, it is significant that it is here that we are first introduced to Haddon's biological 'natives' and their photographic types, foisted upon an empty landscape, outside of history and without culture. Indeed, we go from barographic readings and climatic conditions to race theory in one paragraph; the foundations are set:

Like the other natives of Torres Straits, the Murray Islanders belong to the Melanesian race, the dark-skinned people of the West Pacific who are characterised by their black frizzly or woolly hair. They are a decidedly narrow-headed people. The colour of the skin is dark chocolate, often burning to almost black in the exposed portions. The accompanying illustrations give a far better impression of the appearance and expression of the people than can be conveyed by any verbal description (Haddon, 1901, p. 18, emphasis added).

There are two key points to stress here. The first is that this description precisely represents the first plank of what Tzvetan Todorov (2006, p. 213, emphasis in original) refers to as 'racialist propositions [...] The existence of races':

The first thesis obviously consists in affirming that there are such things as races, that is, human groupings whose members possess physical characteristics; or rather (for the differences themselves are self-evident) it consists in affirming the relevance and significance of that notion (2006, p. 213).

This is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, because – as we shall consider in a moment – the ensuing passages follow Todorov's other racialist propositions almost exactly (albeit with two meaningful exceptions), and, secondly, because such differences are manifest as visual, surface phenomena, which therefore accord well with the positivist and visual agenda of the project. Indeed, it is within this latter point that we encounter one of the most important folds in the book
(which is our second point to stress): the 'self-evidence' and specificity of racial difference cannot be made manifest via the written commentary. The commentary here meets its visual limit point, acknowledges its lacunae and requires supplementation by a diptych of type photographs (see fig. 5 below), which Haddon refers to rather coyly as 'accompanying illustrations'. This question of supplementarity is important. As I set out in the introduction, it is the mode with which Haddon's media most often interact with one another. Just as in Derrida's reading of Rousseau, for example (1997, pp. 141-164), writing might simultaneously add to a supposed plenitude (e.g. speech) and make up for its deficiencies (e.g. external storage) in such a way that both are radically altered, so too Haddon's photographs in this context add to the supposed plenitude of his writings whilst also highlighting their visual and indexical deficiencies. The play between plenitude and lack remains unresolved. Racial difference might be 'self-evident', but such self-evidence must be more than demonstrated; it must be made manifest, traced like a footprint in the sand or the contours of a death mask. In this sense, the frontal and profile poses of these photographs are significant in that they are an attempt to add dimensionality, to push beyond the limited flatness of the photographic plate and to touch the contours of the human face. Such photographs are not merely peeled off the face, they are wrapped around it like a shroud.

50 These photographs and the reference to them were removed from the abridged version of the book (Haddon, 1932).
51 As an aside, it may be interesting to note the embossed Leeds Public Libraries stamp at the bottom of the following image (fig. 5), taken from a first edition of Head-Hunters still available from Leeds Public Libraries (it is also present at the top of figs. 10 and 13). Although not directly tied to the analysis which follows, this is a small material trace of what I am calling the 'writing-machine'. Amongst other things, it is a literal index of the complex bonds between, for example, ink, paper, glass plates, printing technologies, cameras, etc. and the networks of distribution and reception between, in this case, Cambridge and Leeds.
The first rhetorical manoeuvre of these photographs – in this context at least – is to replicate the process of emptying out which began the chapter, extracting biological bodies from their cultural milieus. As Eleanor Hight and Gary Sampson point out in their volume on *Colonialist Photography*:

> [T]he native body has been repeatedly partitioned from its own culture, history, and geography as it is inscribed with typifying marks of difference in photographs (2004, p. 10).

This is the classic motif of the type photograph, where race is centred not merely in the body, but on the (sur)face as the visible seat of difference. Such a motif can be traced back to looser and more transitional manifestations in earlier periods of Haddon's career. After his 1888 trip to the Torres Strait, and frustrated by his inability to acquire funding for a return visit, Haddon set about organizing an

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52 The 'Mamoose' is a community leader, 'chief' and/or intermediary between the local population and the colonial officials.
anthropological survey of Ireland, where he had been living and working on and off since the early 1880s (Griffiths, 2002, p. 129). Such a project would include ethnography, folklore and physical anthropology, an integral part of which was the use of photography. Indeed, in many ways, Haddon’s time in Ireland – rather than his earlier expedition to the Torres Strait in 1888 – represents a key shift in his work towards a more racialist approach to the subject. Although interested in the whole of Ireland, it is significant that Haddon would choose the western islands of Aran as his main anthropological focus in the early 1890s (e.g. Haddon, 1893; Haddon and Browne, 1893). This was for two main reasons. Firstly, because anthropology’s microscopic focus has always lent itself to seemingly discrete units of study, islands often became the location of choice, thereby creating a fantasy of boundedness and fixity (cf. Kuklick, 1996). Secondly, and most significantly, Haddon became convinced that the inhabitants of the Aran Islands represented a distinct racial branch, or set of branches. Indeed, this work was undertaken as part of a larger project with a view to ‘unravel[ing] the tangled skein of the so-called Irish “race”’ (Cunningham and Haddon, 1892, p. 36).

It was in Ireland that Haddon began to experiment with the kinds of racial profiling that would later come to fruition in his second expedition to the Torres Strait Islands, and it is here that he would deploy a looser, transitional version of the type photograph which included the profile and frontal poses, but which did not actively attempt to extract its subjects from their cultural and historical contexts (see fig. 6 below).
To that extent, they may be regarded as apprentice pieces for what was to come. However, a rigorous process of recontextualizing was nonetheless at work, and the same process of naturalizing that we have seen in *Head-Hunters* could be seen here, in this case by explicitly treating the study of the Aran Islanders as an extension of *natural* history:

[T]here must be a large number of persons in Ireland who do not take any special interest in any one group of animals or plants, and have no taste or opportunity for making collections, but who, nevertheless, would like to occupy their leisure with something that is both interesting and worth doing. To such I would commend the study of the Irish Man (Haddon, 1893, p. 303).

Such is the all too familiar conceptual conflation of biology, animality and raciality:
the 'Irish Man' as a species of interest for the gentleman amateur (indeed, this article was published in *The Irish Naturalist*). Using the precise logic that he had used in the Torres Strait in 1888 and would use again in 1898, such a species was at risk:

Owing to migration and emigration, the mingling of peoples has become more intimate, and the newspaper and the school-board have been potent in sweeping away local customs and in levelling up the less advanced folk. All we can now do is to record the little that remains of old-time custom and thought (Haddon, 1893, p. 303).

All is not lost, however, as beneath the surface of the 'civilisation of the British Islands' there remain 'relics of the previous millenniums of savagery and barbarism' (Haddon, 1893, p. 304). Ireland – and, by extension, the Torres Strait Islands – would allow Britain a glimpse at its own past. The circle is complete; space is converted into time and the 'time of the other' is not the time of the self (cf. Fabian, 2002).

By the time he came to publish his more complete ethnography of the Aran Islands (Haddon and Browne, 1893), Haddon's methods and racialist logic had hardened or found fuller form. The ethnography came complete with extensive and detailed tables of anthropometric recordings which attempted to establish the Islanders' relative positionings on the so-called 'index of nigrescence', a notorious scale that had been developed by the influential race theorist John Bedoe, whose *Races of Britain* (1885) attempted to measure hair, eye and skin colour with a view to establishing measurable racial scales and distributions.
Both sets of photographs – each in different ways – are suffused with such a logic and attempt to feed the cultural and biological complexities of the body and face through a totalizing, racializing and temporalizing grid, just as was previously the case with the anthropological questionnaire. In both cases, alterity (excess, contingency, etc.) is being reduced to the same (uniformity, universality, etc.). Therefore, if the first rhetorical move of such photographs is to empty out context and meaning, then the second move is to re-import new contexts and new meanings through the imposition of a conceptual grid (akin to the more literal grids of anthropometric photographs). In other words, Haddon floods an ostensible (biological) emptiness with (cultural) meaning (cf. Barthes, 2000a, p. 35). However, it might be more accurate to describe the process in reverse. Strictly speaking, Haddon does not import new meanings 'after the fact', allowing neutral, empirical data to be interpreted. Such impositions are the a priori condition of possibility for the meaningfulness of the images in the first place, and it is precisely for this reason that Haddon's photographs look so stilted, so 'mortiferous' in Barthes' phrase (2000a, p. 15). 'T[he image [...] is heavy, motionless, stubborn [...] Photography transformed subject into object, and even, one might say, into a museum object [...]’ (Barthes, 2000a, pp. 12-13). Those photographed sit between subject and
object like a spectre, and the photographer tries and fails to keep death at bay
(Barthes, 2000a, p. 14):

However "lifelike" we strive to make it (and this frenzy to be lifelike can only be our mythic denial of an apprehension of death), Photography is a kind of primitive theater, a kind of Tableau Vivant, a figuration of the motionless and made-up face beneath which we see the dead (Barthes, 2000a, pp. 31-32).

Indeed, it is perhaps ironic that Haddon (1912) was the first to admonish the lifeless immobility of anthropological photographs in his contribution to the Notes and Queries guide on the use of anthropological photography. Here he argues that the containment and fixity of posed photographs should be accompanied by a more relaxed, naturalistic approach to photography (Haddon, 1912, p. 270). However, neither keeps the 'apprehension of death' at bay, and it is invariably the latter which takes precedence in 'type' photography.

Such a process of containment and fixity also has a very concrete disciplinary corollary, as Martin Nakata makes clear:

Islanders were not only inscribed into the textual world beyond them; Islanders' bodies were also regulated and disciplined by an array of bureaucratic, regulatory and discursive mechanisms associated with government, church and commercial interests which was premised on and circumscribed by particular ways of thinking about 'natives' (2007, p. 129).

The truistic relationship between knowledge and power, whilst obviously never linear, causal or clear-cut, takes on a brutal concreteness in this – and perhaps every – case. However, this process is not so without residue and excess, and this
brings us back to the core tensions with which we have been concerned up to this point. The visible surface 'skin' of Haddon's type photographs has been peeled off entirely contingent events (multiple moments, multiple spaces, multiple bodies, multiple named individuals\textsuperscript{53}). That is what we see; that is what is being indexed here. Indeed, this aspect of photographic contingency is precisely what enables photographs to be so easily repositioned, re-framed and re-read, as Christopher Pinney argues:

The photographer can never fully control the resulting photograph, and it is that lack of control and the resulting excess that permits recoding, "resurfacing," and "looking past" (2003, pp. 6-7).

This point is made extremely forcefully by observing the simple fact that the photograph of Pasi, for example (fig. 5, on the right) – one of Haddon’s main informants and seemingly close friends – was literally and conceptually re-framed by Haddon for a personal photograph album of the journey (now in the Cambridge University Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology) entitled 'Sunny Memories' (see fig. 7 opposite).

The photograph is cast into an oval frame – meaningfully re-inscribing the image as singular, contingent and personal – and set amidst a photographic collage of representative images from the expedition. Interestingly, this photograph – rather

\textsuperscript{53} Two of the men (Ari and Pasi) are named in the captions and the other two men (Thomas Colman Flaherty and John Michael O'Donnell) are named in the footnotes. This fact is rather unusual for type photographs, but highlights all the more starkly the discrepancy between specific and general registers.
than the one from _Head-Hunters_ – was used in a recent exhibition at the Cambridge University Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology entitled 'Assembling Bodies' (Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2010a). The argument behind the inclusion was that the Torres Strait expedition marked a shift from anthropometric photography to portraiture (Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2010b). However, such an argument takes no account of the tension between this 'portrait' and the version in _Head-Hunters_, nor between both and the overtly racialist logic of the book. Indeed, what remains striking here is the extent to which this recontextualizing does nothing to soften the disconcerting intensity of Pasi's gaze. The fact that Haddon can switch between such contexts with apparent ease is precisely the problem, and it is this code-switching which also contributes to the conceptual tensions within his use of photography. This represents something of a fracture line in the photographs, a tiny chink of light streaming through a totalizing system, and we will have cause to lever open that space later in the chapter (cf. Edwards, 2001, p. 132).

However, such a multiplicity of meanings and contexts (the fact that the still photograph will not remain still) also opens it up to being used in ways which endorse totalizing systems. For example, the twentieth century Australian novelist, Ion L. Idriess, made liberal use of Haddon's photographs and illustrations in a series of novels set in or around the Torres Strait Islands (e.g. _Drums of Mer_, 1938; _Isles of Despair_, 1947 and _The Wild White Man of Badu_, 1950). In _Drums of Mer_ (a breathless colonial fantasy of exotica, violence and a white man's attempts to become culturally incorporated on the Island of Mer), fiction and non-fiction, specific and general are welded together in rather uneasy ways, with photography
Idriess buries the novel in the literary architecture of a non-fiction book: maps, illustrations, a professional foreword (from a 'Mission Priest' on the Strait) and an 'Author's Note' in which he attempts to lever the scientific legitimacy of Haddon's Reports — and the 'historical fact[s]' upon which the story is based — into his fictional world of exotic colonial stereotypes (Idriess, 1938, pp. ix-xiii). Indeed, there are even sections of the book where Idriess quotes Haddon verbatim in the middle of the narrative. Once established as an ideologically legitimating strategy, Idriess has no problem importing photographs from entirely different contexts (e.g. from Haddon's Reports) directly into the novel.

Indeed, the tensions which mark Haddon's use of these photographs (e.g. that between specific and general, named informant and type) come quite forcefully to the surface of the book here. For example, towards the end of the novel, in a chapter titled 'The Virgins of Waiat' (Idriess, 1938, pp. 329-345), we find another portrait of Pasi along with two other Islander men (see fig. 8 opposite). This time the photograph is coded less as a 'type' photograph and more as a cultural illustration of 'traditional' Indigenous head-dresses and adornments. However, what makes the use of this image so

Figure 8, 'Three Head Men of Mer' (Idriess, 1938, facing p. 334)
peculiar in this context is that text and image appear to exist in an almost entirely parallel relationship: they simply hang together, as if in mid-air, without any mutual reference. The only purpose of the image appears to be to root the novel's fantastical narrative in a non-fictional context. The other peculiarity of its use in this context is that our gaze is constantly drawn back and forth, to and fro, between representations (of named individuals – remarkably Idriess actually leaves a variation of the original caption in place, which names Pasi ['Passi'] and now has almost no specific meaning in the context of the narrative of the novel) and typifications (of ethnicity or race).

Such a shift of focus is particularly problematic in this context, because what in Haddon's hands might be a shift between named individual and anonymous, racist type, in Idriess' hands becomes a shift between named individual and racist, colonial stereotype. The difference between the two might be regarded as inconsequential, of course, but the conceptual apparatus being deployed is different in each case. For Idriess, the tension between specific and general – and the contingency which precipitates it – is an aesthetic opportunity for exploitative self-justification. For Haddon, it is a scientific threat to the photographs' ambitions to transcend themselves: the point for him is precisely not to represent, but to use such representations to typify.

Visible (Sur)face, Invisible Depth

Returning to Haddon's type photographs in Head-Hunters, we see that such a threat of contingency is mitigated by an attempt to erase everything that would
situate the photographs in a specific place or time. These photographs admittedly remain ambivalent in this regard in that the subjects are still wearing their own clothing, but the tight focus on the body and face and the blank background render these photographs culturally and historically indistinct. It is the (sur)face which acts as these photographs' centre of gravity, a point which enables Haddon (1901, p. 18) to say of his informants and friends, now transformed into anonymous, biological types: 'the features are somewhat coarse, but by no means bestial'. This is a implicit reference to an earlier book by Haddon (The Study of Man, 1898a, p. 79), where 'coarse' and 'fine' form an implied ladder of 'development', and this replicates the allegorical development of the second chapter of Head-Hunters: from nature, to animal to a 'lower' level of humanity.

In general terms then, the central aim remains clear: the visible surface (indexing specific moments in time and specific individuals) is being used to scientifically authenticate an invisible depth (typifying a general racial or ethnic trait). This is very much a sleight of hand, and – as we shall consider in a moment – Haddon will do the same thing in the ensuing passages. This is an ideological conjurer's trick that we must remain on our guard for. What it occults is the uneasy relationship between surface and depth, visible and invisible, specific and general, etc., and this means that the anthropological tensions that we have set up thus far are becoming extended further.

Such a relationship between surface and depth, visible and invisible, etc. is obviously not unique to Haddon, and, indeed, an attempt was made to render the invisible visible by Haddon's colleague and mentor, Francis Galton (1822-1911).
Galton is well-known as Darwin's cousin and one of the forerunners of the eugenics movement, but he also set up an anthropometric laboratory in London in order to measure and compare racial/ethnic 'types'. Haddon himself attempted to set up a similar anthropometric laboratory in Dublin, where, as I mentioned earlier, he had endeavoured to 'unravel the tangled skein of the so-called Irish "race"', albeit with limited success (Cunningham and Haddon, 1892, p. 36). Galton's response to the relationship between surface and depth, visible and invisible, specific and general, etc. was to produce a series of composite photographs, where several specific photographs of characteristic 'racial types' would be superimposed upon one another producing a blurred, ghostly composite designed to collapse the space between specific and general and to reach at the essentials of racial difference (see fig. 9 below).

![Figure 9, Francis Galton, 'The Jewish Type' circa 1885 (from Maguire, 2009, p. 11)](image)

Importantly for us, however, Haddon's response to such invisible depths of the photograph is not to produce a composite photograph but to retreat back into the
written commentary. In other words, what we are starting to see here is a loop of supplementarity. Phonetic writing supplemented by photographs, photographs by phonetic writing, and so on. In each case, the medium is posed as simultaneously complete and lacking, wherein another medium enters the fray, and so on; there is no end point and each medium is radically altered in the process. In this context, we discover another important fold in the book, replicating the sleight of hand practiced by the photographs (i.e. where an indexical visible surface authenticates and conjures an invisible depth), and it is here where we reach Todorov's second racialist proposition (2006, p. 214, emphasis in original), 'Continuity between physical type and character':

The racialist postulates, in the second place, that physical and moral characteristics are interdependent; in other words, the segmentation of the world along racial lines has as its corollary an equally definitive segmentation along cultural lines (2006, p. 214).

This is precisely the invisible depth that Haddon is unable to visualize on the surface, but which he nonetheless attempts to smuggle in under the umbrella of indexical visuality. To this extent, Haddon's type photographs can be mapped onto Bhabha's discussion of the colonial stereotype. For Bhabha (1994, p. 6), the colonial stereotype is caught in an ambivalent tension between self-evidence (where it is obvious and does not need to established) and anxious repetition (where such so-called 'self-evidence' is anything but, and requires constant reaffirmation):

For it is the force of ambivalence that gives the colonial stereotype its currency: ensures it repeatability in changing historical and discursive conjunctures; informs its strategies of individuation and
marginalization; produces that effect of probabilistic truth and predictability which, for the stereotype, must always be in excess of what can be empirically proved or logically construed (1994, p. 66, emphasis in original).

The reference to excess is crucial in this context, because it is precisely such excess which leads Haddon to shift registers between the photograph and the written commentary in a bid to conceal the rift between what can be shown (i.e. peeled off a visible surface) and what can be proved (i.e. the invisible and unprovable depths of 'racial' characteristics). Such a move is one of occultation, and it enables our allegorical ladder of development (European history, nature, biology, etc.) to finally reach culture qua psychology and morality:

Their mental and moral character will be incidentally illustrated in the following pages, and considering the isolation and favourable conditions of existence with the consequent lack of example and stimulus to exertion, we must admit that they have proved themselves to be very creditable specimens of savage humanity (Haddon, 1901, pp. 18-19).

Now that we have moved under the indexical surface, we have to remain satisfied with written 'illustrations' of 'mental and moral character', illustrations which are nonetheless concealed under the authenticating cover of the type photographs. Indeed, such a sleight of hand not only covers over the manoeuvre by which the visible can conjure the invisible, but by which the individual can conjure the type, and this is Todorov's third racialist proposition (2006, p. 215, emphasis in original), 'The action of the group on the individual [...] [T]he behaviour of the individual depends to a very large extent, on the racio-cultural (or 'ethnic') group to which he or she belongs'. This is the crux of Haddon's use of photography. Just as a photograph is pliable enough to conjure photography, so too is the individual
pliable enough to typify a 'race'.

However, the meaning of that racial difference has yet to be established. For Todorov (2006, p. 215), this meaning is clear: 'The racialist is not content to assert that races differ: he also believes that some are superior to others'. This is his fourth racialist proposition, 'Unique hierarchy of values' (Todorov, 2006, p. 215, emphasis in original). This is significantly the point at which Haddon's logic begins to waver, which opens up an unresolved rift in his work and in Victorian anthropology more generally, between the difference posited by race theory and the identity posited by the so-called 'psychic unity of mankind'. The former claims multiple human lineages wherein differences are rooted in biology. The latter, attributed to the nineteenth century German anthropologist, Adolf Bastian (1826-1905), claims one human lineage wherein differences stem from different environmental stimuli, and this is precisely the logic that Haddon follows in the ensuing passages. However, to do this he must remove the racial logic from the final link in the chain: racial existence, mental and moral character, group behaviour and stereotypically detrimental character traits (such as avarice, laziness or ingratitude):

The natives certainly do not like to be made to work [...] but after all, this is pretty much the same with everybody. Nature deals so bountifully with the people that circumstances have not forced them into the discipline of work [...].

As to ingratitude. They take all they can get and, it is true, rarely appear as grateful as the white man expects; but this is by no means confined to these people. How often do we find exactly the same trait amongst our own acquaintances! [...].

[I]t is not beyond the savage mind for the argument thus to present
itself. I did not ask the white man to come here. I don't particularly want him. I certainly don't want him to interfere with my customs. He comes here to please himself. If he gives me medicines and presents that is his look-out, that is his fashion. I will take all I can get. I will give as little as I can. If he goes away I don't care (Haddon, 1901, p. 19, emphasis added).

Either through disingenuousness or naivety, Haddon wavers at the final point: the occluded slide between racialism and racism, a distinction arguably of greater historical than conceptual significance. This is Todorov's final racialist proposition, 'Knowledge-based politics', 'where racialism rejoins racism: the theory is put into practice' (2006, p. 215). Indeed, in his discussion of laziness, avarice and ingratitude – obviously informed by discussions with colonialists on the Islands54 – Haddon appears acutely aware of the fact that precisely such a shift is being made on a daily basis. However, he appears blind to the relationship between his racialism and their racism. Instead, he falls back on a rather thin blend of humanism, relativism and reformism: these negative traits can be observed but attributed to environmental and cultural factors – up to and including mild anti-imperial sentiment – rather than racial typologies. The thrust of this is an appeal to the 'psychic unity' doctrine. 'We', Haddon repeatedly reminds us, would behave the same way under the same circumstances.

This blend of humanism, relativism and reformism explains much of Haddon's world-view of imperialism, whilst simultaneously exposing the acute tensions between humanism and racialism that would later take root in his work. Like other ideological justifications for imperialism, such as scientific racialism and the

54 Prior to his return trip to the Torres Strait Islands, Haddon (1993 [1891], p. 8) writes that '[i]t is hardly possible for those who have not visited the Colonies to realize how very deep, bitter & undisguised this contempt is'.
'civilizing mission', such a blend is intimately bound to post-Enlightenment histories of humanism and in practice often overlaps with them (cf. Young, 1990, partic. ch. 7). However, in principle, it conflicts with racialism by adhering to the 'psychic unity' doctrine (one human line, not many), and from the 'civilizing mission' in resisting calls to expedite the 'evolution' of subject populations through education, missionization and 'civilization', etc. Indeed, as we have considered with Haddon's evocation of loss, this blend often wears the superficial mask of an anti-imperial critique, challenging the destructive violence and cultural coercion of imperial policies and practices. In his most outspoken document on the subject, an unpublished plea to the newly formed Imperial Institute for an Imperial Bureau of Ethnology (circa 1891), Haddon (cited in Stocking, 1993, pp. 3-4, 8) imagines the map of the globe being spattered with the 'red-paint of British aggression' and castigates aspects of imperial policy and practice as often being little more than 'legalised murder':

The result of this policy is that we exterminate slowly or rapidly, unintentionally or by force, the inhabitants of the countries we annex. The story of our Colonial administration is sad & humilitating. If an impartial foreigner were to write the true history of our dependencies, he would be branded as inaccurate & prejudiced. The blame lies alike with the general public, the legislators & the executive. Ignorance engenders callousness, which is the fertile mother of injustice, cruelty, & legalised murder (Haddon cited in Stocking, 1993, p. 8).

However, crucially for Haddon and despite appearances, such flaming rhetoric is actually in the name of a reformed, humanitarian imperialism of benign and paternalistic ascendancy and not in the name of an anti-imperialist critique. In the same document, Haddon (cited in Stocking, 1993, pp. 13, 8) – clearly pushing for anthropological funding from the Imperial Institute – explicitly refers to such
reformism as reducing the 'cost of maintaining our ascendency' [...] 'The more we know about a people, the easier it will be to trade with them'. This humanist reformism is, therefore, all the more difficult to rout out because its justification and support of imperialism is not explicitly based on racism or forced 'civilization', but rests, rather, on humanistic 'sciences of the human', such as the newly professional discipline of anthropology. Indeed, whilst scientific rac(ial)ism and the 'civilizing mission' might be regarded as having withered away for the most part today, contemporary humanistic and/or humanitarian engagements with the history of imperialism, and its neo-imperialist counterparts, often continue to insist that imperialism remains at heart a corrupted idea rather than an inherently iniquitous one.

However, Haddon appears unaware, at this point at least, of the extent to which such a tension between liberal humanism and racialism pulls radically at the seam of his project and racial logic. He would, nonetheless, come to realize this in his later work – particularly with the the rise of Nazi raciology (e.g. Haddon and Huxley, 1936) – and the Torres Strait expedition can, to some extent at least, be regarded as the beginning of the end of race theory in both his work and in British social anthropology in general. In the tension between race theory and 'psychic unity', the latter would very much come to hold sway.

III. Colonial Mimicry

If I have been attempting thus far to create a space within totalizing systems in order to make room for their conceptual undoing, then the photographs that we
have been looking at can be usefully juxtaposed against a series of later 'type' photographs which appear towards the end of *Head-Hunters* (ch. XVI: 'Port Moresby and the Astrolabe Range'). These photographs (see fig. 10 below) afford a greater opportunity to expose fracture lines within totalizing systems, in no small part because they are posed as an explicit failure of such systems, albeit read through the frame of colonial farce. This is a common trope in colonial travel writing, and read through such a frame, failure is figured as a source of amusement in the face of the 'native's' truculence or lack of understanding. Such a figure is complicated in this case by the fact that the source of the amusement is an act of colonial mimicry, with all the complex ambivalence that inheres (Bhabha, 1994, ch. 4). Nevertheless, whilst there is little doubt about the basis of the inclusion of such material, such a decision also renders *Head-Hunters* a far more resonant source for our purposes than Haddon's scientific *Reports*, where such gaps, discontinuities and methodological failures were more likely to be expelled or concealed.55

55 One of the most astute readers of the *Reports* from the perspective of its gaps, discontinuities and failures is the Sydney based academic Martin Nakata, himself a Torres Strait Islander. In *Disciplining the Savages, Savaging the Disciplines* (2007), Nakata reads Haddon's *Reports* through a broadly Foucauldian frame, patiently working through the texts and exposing their circular arguments, *non-sequiturs* and blind alleys.
Given Haddon's interest in the 'vertical' cultural flows between Australia, the Torres Strait and Papua New Guinea, it is significant that these photographs were taken along the coast of what was then British New Guinea (now Papua New Guinea; see fig. 11 opposite).

Indeed, Haddon was not simply interested in cultural flows, but in establishing 'racial' flows and links from Melanesia to the Torres Strait. As before, photography played a vital role in this process, and this becomes more important than ever as
Haddon moves between the Torres Strait and Papua New Guinea attempting to plot racial similarities and differences.

The chapter in which these photographs appear (ch. XVI: 'Port Moresby and the Astrolabe Range') begins with the type of colonial contextualization which began the first chapter on Thursday Island (ch. I: 'From Thursday Island to Murray Island'). The ubiquitous Government House and Mission Station, two of the most obvious signs of colonial power, are juxtaposed against an aestheticized nature: '[t]he double bay is surrounded by thinly wooded hills, and when these are brightened in places by the rising sun the effect is very beautiful' (Haddon, 1901, p. 235). The tone is neither overtly mournful nor melancholic, but the presence of a powerful colonial infrastructure and influence (representing colonialism and Christianity) is clearly invoked, a point which will be of crucial significance to the photographs which follow. The third key institutional influence (after colonialism and Christianity) is capitalism and this is invoked through the trade networks of the 'Burns Philp's Trading Company', which will also feature in the story behind the photographs: 'This great trading company has ramifications all over Queensland and British New Guinea, and Port Moresby is naturally an important centre for their trade' (Haddon, 1901, p. 235). We therefore encounter three forces then (colonialism, Christianity and capitalism), each of which will have an important role to play, not least because they are the three forces which Haddon had for many years associated with the decay and destruction of Indigenous culture (cf. introduction; Haddon, 1898a, p. xx). Nonetheless, Haddon (1901, p. 236) has no difficulty in accepting the benefits of access and resources which he acquires through his relationship to such forces (in this case five horses borrowed...
from 'the Government and the Vaigana Company' in order to trek through the Astrolabe range of mountains to access his subjects).

It is significant for what follows that the focus of the chapter at this point is on narrative and events rather than on scientific generalization and structure, not least because behind that focus is a clear and explicitly registered tension between the two. This is Haddon at his most specific and writerly – perhaps even painterly – and we have a return here of the 'journey into the interior' motif: the trek through the mountains to heighten the sense of interiority and isolation of the destination (an aim that will only be met in part). Descriptions of nature, of which there are many, have the quality of poetic anecdote rather than science. This is an echo of the aestheticized nature of the beginning of the chapter:

An occasional wallaby hopping in the grass and small flocks of white cockatoos that screeched as they flew, gave a further Australian colour to the scene [...] After the coast hills had been passed we saw looming in front of us the precipitous Astrolabe Range, rising abruptly from hilly ground and forming a huge rampart stretching away to the south-east, occasional peaks rising higher than the general level of the fairly uniform edge (Haddon, 1901, p. 237).

After a brief attempt to locate this landscape within a scientific rather than aesthetic frame, Haddon (1901, p. 240) goes on to thematize the obvious discrepancy between narrative and science by informing us that 'a rapid horse-ride through a wooded country is not favourable for geological observations'. This theme is continued in a more dramatic, painterly and discrepant vein a page later:

A haze pervaded the lower landscape, owing to the vapour-laden south-east breeze and the widely drifting smoke of numerous bush fires made
by natives who were clearing the scrub for their gardens. This haze gave a softness to the view, and painted the shades with various shades of blue, but a little less "atmosphere" would, on the whole, have been better from a topographical point of view (Haddon, 1901, p. 241, emphasis added).

Each of the succeeding passages follows in like manner: poetic description followed by an attempt at geological or geographical generalization, but the overall effect is to heighten rather than smooth over the discrepancies. However, it is notably at this point, amidst these discrepancies, that Haddon attempts to lodge the Indigenous population within the chapter, and he does so whilst deploying one of the most virulent and long-standing of Victorian anthropological tropes: that of temporal distantiation, or what Johannes Fabian (2002, passim) refers to as 'allochronic discourse'. More simply, the time of the ethnographer and the time of his or her subjects do not match. What had hitherto been a shared space and time becomes split into the present of the ethnographer (and the reader) and the 'prehistoric' past which his subjects are now made to represent:

It is characteristic of these bush tribes to build their villages on the top of hills for the sake of safety from attack. Many of the villages formerly had tree-houses, but there are now very few of these left, as the country has been pacified [...] It might strike the reader that it would be very easy to chop down the tree and so destroy the refugees at one fell blow, but it must be remembered that these were designed by men still in their Stone Age, and it is by no means an easy or rapid matter to cut down a large tree with stone axes, especially when overhead foes are hurling down stones and spears (Haddon, 1901, p. 242).

Just as racialism uses surface differences to justify racist depths, so too allochronic discourse uses superficial differences (e.g. stone tools) to make larger claims about mental, moral and cultural development. If contemporary Islanders and prehistoric Britons both use stone tools, then surely they must think and act in the
same way. However, this point requires some nuance in this context, as it will impact upon the reading of the photographs to come. Although Haddon was clearly an evolutionist in the biological science – he started out as a zoologist after all – he was not strictly speaking an evolutionist in the cultural sense. In other words, his avowed aim was not to use the Torres Strait data to establish evolutionary or developmental scales whereby two groups separated in time (e.g. nineteenth century Papua New Guinea and Stone Age Britain) could be compared on a scale of savagery, barbarism and civilization.\textsuperscript{56} His evolutionism was often more literally Darwinian (e.g. tracing evolutionary patterns in art production across a region, as Darwin traced the beaks of finches in the Galapagos Islands). Nevertheless, such an 'allochronic' logic often works its way into his writings (cf. Edwards, 2000, pp. 113-114; Haddon, 1901, p. 220), and when it does, it heightens the effect and makes us all the more critically aware in that it is for him a trope divorced from any meaningful theoretical project, a point which makes it all the more disjointed and incoherent.

At first glance, such 'Stone Age' people appear to bring Haddon far closer to his goal to locate the 'interior' and peel back the layers of European influence: 'It was interesting getting a glimpse, for it was nothing more, of a real Papuan village, entirely unchristianised and scarcely at all affected by European civilisation' (1901, p. 243). Here we have a switch between George Marcus's redemptive mode of ethnography (1986, p. 165, fn. 1) – where continuity is found through change – and the salvage mode – where the ethnographer is positioned 'before the deluge'. Such an encounter, however brief, is immediately juxtaposed with a return to Port

\textsuperscript{56} This was precisely the museological choice made by the Pitt Rivers Museum in Oxford, for example.
Moresby with all its hybrid complexity, a point which Haddon makes photographically by contrasting his mountain hosts – Udia and Daube (fig. 12 below, top) – and a Port Moresby village with 'the London Missionary Society's Station in the background' (fig. 12 below, bottom).

Indeed, it is precisely these kinds of tensions and juxtapositions which set up the 'type' photographs that immediately follow. Back in Port Moresby, Haddon makes the acquaintance of Gewe, a 'chief' of Agi, one of the inland Papuan villages. Haddon's intermediary brings Gewe to Burn Philp's store – our core representative of capitalism and trade – where he is given 'some turkey-red twill for a loin cloth, a belt, a cotton shirt, a secondhand guards-bandsman's tunic, and an ancient top hat [in which] the old fellow strutted about mightily pleased with himself' (Haddon, 1901, p. 245; see fig. 13 below).
Haddon then attempts to measure Gewe and take some type photographs, but with revealingly limited success. Consequently, Haddon's description of the events surrounding the production of these photographs warrants citation at some length, as it requires considerable conceptual unpacking and will contribute in no small way towards opening out the relationships between rationalization and it others.

Ballantine brought the party round to the hotel, as I wanted to measure and photograph them. I began with Gewe, and it was ludicrous to see his expansive smile of self-content. First we took him as he was, then by dint of gentle persuasion we divested him of his regalia, and it was evident that parting from his hat was the sorest trial. It appeared to be quite hopeless to get a side view of his face, as he kept turning round to see what we were doing, till Ballantine suggested that I should show him some pictures; so I produced a coloured plate of Torres Straits dances which so fascinated him that he became comparatively still immediately. But even so we could not get a satisfactory side-face portrait of him. I then measured his height, span, and head, and it was with great relief and transparent joy that he resumed his hat. I did not take all the measurements I should have liked, as he became restive and
suddenly stalked off. I then measured a few other natives, who were duly photographed (Haddon, 1901, p. 245). The first point to stress here is the complex relationships of colonial power between Ballantine – Haddon’s colonial intermediary, power-broker and gatekeeper – Haddon and Gewe (cf. Edwards, 2000, p. 118). The opening sentence effectively marks an act of exchange between Ballantine (the ‘energetic Treasurer and Collector of Customs’) and Haddon (Haddon, 1901, p. x). Haddon’s epistemological desire – to measure and photograph – is mapped onto Ballantine’s colonial power to provide. Questions of permission or authority are simply not part of the equation. The biggest difficulty for Haddon is not how to acquire permission, but how to elicit sufficient understanding to achieve acquiescence. Such a lack of understanding, which in other parts of the book evokes a frustrated response, is here read through a thin veil of mocking humour. Gewe's self-satisfaction is read as 'ludicrous' because of a misplaced belief in the magical power that his 'regalia' might bestow. Gewe is described as a 'chief' or leader in his own community, and so the idea that he might transpose one set of power relations – and their associated insignia, particularly head-gear – onto another would not have been unusual. However, the choice of the word 'regalia' is not innocent and is intended to render ironic the type of official (ceremonial, royal, militaristic, class-based) status that 'a guards-bandsman's tunic, and an ancient top hat' might convey. Such are the fetishized insignia of colonial power – in this case cast-off commodities purchased at a colonial trading post – and they are here held up to its representatives like a broken and distorting mirror (cf. Bracken, 1997, pp.

57 This is almost identical to the accompanying passage from Haddon’s journal (1898b, p. 140) in Cambridge University Library.
58 Haddon heightens this sense of irony by later getting Gewe to remove his hat when viewing a photograph of Queen Victoria (Haddon, 1901, p. 246).
Two of Homi Bhabha's processes (1994, chs. 3-4) are at work here: the so-called 'self-evidence' and anxious repetition of a colonial stereotype (in this case, the colonial mimic) and the space between mimicry and mockery wherein Europe's vision of itself through its others is both humorous and threatening, the former often concealing the effects of the latter. The first process is significant in this context because it marks a fold in the book between type and stereotype. The former fails in its aims and for two main reasons. Firstly, Gewe's refusal to remove his 'regalia' denies Haddon's attempt to extract the 'native body' from its cultural and historical context (which in this case is one of colonial hybridity). Indeed, Head-Hunters is littered with similar attempts by Haddon to literally peel away the layers of colonial influence. His failure to do so punctures Haddon's a priori assumption that there is somehow a pre-cultural body lurking behind the surface phenomena of culture. As a consequence, the photographs become resolutely tied to the contingencies of the event, to the specific time and place in which they were produced and which they index, and Haddon's aims are thereby reduced from scientific generalization to anecdotal whimsy. In effect, Gewe holds the photographs in situ, and the process of typification fails.

However, refusing to remove his 'regalia' is not the only way in which he achieves this. Gewe also holds the photographs in situ by resisting their stillness. It is significant that, although he will submit to a frontal portrait – where the gaze of photographer and photographed meet – he will not submit to a profile view, where he will become an object to-be-looked-at but which does not see. In the absence of
a concrete photographic apparatus to enforce bodily discipline, he resists through motion, blurring the profile portraits taken of him. It then becomes doubly ironic that Haddon should not only show Gewe photographs to attempt to enforce the stillness of the photographed moment (by distracting his gaze), but photographs which are themselves attempts to still motion (i.e. photographs of dance).

Whatever Gewe's intentions, both manoeuvres – refusing to undress and refusing to sit still – effectively mean that the photographs cannot transcend themselves as racial types. However, it is precisely their failure as 'types' that opens a space for them to be read as a stereotype: the 'native' mimic man. Such a stereotype has a long and illustrious history which – in its various forms – marvels at the natives' capacity for mimicry and repetition, mocks their failed attempts to copy the colonialist and revels in their fascination with mimetic technologies (cf. Taussig, 1993; Bracken, 1997, pp. 17-22). Not content with the photographs' status as indexes of a singular event, Haddon wants such representations to typify, and if they can't typify racially, then they will be made to typify culturally.

This occurs in the process of narrative supplementation between written commentary and images. As with the first set of 'type' photographs, these photographs require narrative supplementation to become 'legible'. For the former photographs, the 'truth' or 'self-evidence' of race always exceeded its ability to be captured visually (cf. Bhabha, 1994, p. 66). That is even more so with these latter photographs, and so rather than using a visible surface to conjure an invisible depth of racial types, a visible surface is being used to conjure forth a colonial stereotype.
The significance of such a move is that it is by shifting between failed racial type and colonial stereotype that Haddon once again lifts the photographs above the immediacy of their production, and this then becomes yet another means of attempting to fix the sliding position of the colonial subject. However, the stereotype is no less subject to ambiguity and rupture than the type. As Bhabha argues (1994, p. 66), the stereotype is an implicit acknowledgement of the ambivalent - or 'two-powered' - nature of colonial discourse. It is 'a form of knowledge that vacillates between what is always "in place," already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated', and such ambivalence suggests the weaknesses as well as the strengths of colonial discourse, its cracks as well as its monumentality (Bhabha, 1994, p. 66).

In this case, Haddon’s 'anxious repetition' involves conjuring the most extreme form of juxtaposition that he can muster:

In the afternoon I went to where the natives were camped and witnessed one of those extremes of culture that are rarely met with, even in frontier colonies. My friend Gewe, clad in his medley of nineteenth-century garments, was solemnly chipping a hole in a stone club-head with a piece of flint! Close by was another mountaineer clad in his native fringed belt and sporran, holding a cheap mirror before his face, and shaving himself with a fragment of a glass bottle (Haddon, 1901, p. 245).59

There is an ocean of meaning in that exclamation mark. It evokes our previous discussion about 'allochronic' discourse. The stone tool and flint are obvious temporalizing gestures intended to place Gewe – Haddon’s 'friend' – on a different

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59 This is almost identical to the accompanying passage from Haddon’s journal (1898b, pp. 139-140) in Cambridge University Library.
temporal and developmental scale than himself. Such a gesture also attempts to anchor, fix and reinforce a particular cluster of photographic meanings wherein the complexities of colonial hybridity are read as tragedy and farce. The farce is that both Gewe and the other mountaineer are (almost literally) set up as pale reflections of European modernity – deploying its very detritus: a cheap mirror, broken glass, an old top hap – and the tragedy is that, in so doing, they gesture towards their own destruction.

However, another way of reading Haddon's scene of mimicry is to see it as a point of slippage between the strategies of colonial authorities and church leaders – teaching English, reading the bible, providing European clothing, etc. – and the strategies of the Indigenous population. Mimicry had played a key role in Islander relations since at least 1871, when the London Missionary Society (LMS) stationed themselves on the Islands. The strategy for dealing with Islanders was less one of extermination and more one of colonial co-option, in no small part by controlling religious and secular education (Beckett, 1987, pp. 88-89). As with Lord Macaulay's early nineteenth century attempt to educate a stratum of Indian officials who were 'almost the same' as the English 'but not quite', or 'almost the same, but not white' (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 86-89, emphasis in original), the LMS wanted to bring the Islanders within the remit of 'European civilization' whilst making clear their inferiority. As Jeremy Beckett remarks:

From the late nineteenth century, then, the Islanders were subjected to a steady barrage of indoctrination, the gist of which was that they were indebted to white people for the benefits of British rule, the Christian Gospel and the opportunity to earn the wherewithal for a 'civilized' way of life. At the same time, it was made clear to them that they were not
the equals of Europeans and could not expect to enjoy the same freedoms or material wellbeing [...] Living and thinking with the ideas the Europeans gave them, the Islanders were coming to see themselves as reflections in a colonial mirror (1987, p. 90, 92).

However, such an attempt to make the Islanders 'almost the same' as Europeans (through mimicry) 'but not quite' is inherently fraught with internal tensions. As Bhabha argues (1994, pp. 86-89), colonial discourse is, of necessity, split between drawing the colonial other within the structures of Western knowledge (as versions of their colonial keepers) and keeping them outside those structures (as inferior, bizarre, eccentric objects). This is so because, although colonialism often perpetuates its power by getting colonial subjects to identify with and 'mimic' the subject positions of the colonisers, to do so totally successfully would puncture the ideological legitimacy of imperialism and the hierarchies upon which it is built. In a sense, the colonial subjects would become too like that which they were copying, two equal versions of the same thing rather than the hierarchical model of difference upon which imperialism depends. On that basis, imperialism would not be necessary as even by its own standards it had succeeded in its ideological aims (producing civilized subjects on a European model) and this would undermine the authority of the whole imperial enterprise. As Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin explain, this opens up a space between mimicry and mockery:

The problem for colonial discourse is that it wants to produce compliant subjects who reproduce its assumptions, habits and values – that is, 'mimic' the coloniser. But instead it produces ambivalent subjects whose mimicry is never very far from mockery. Ambivalence describes the fluctuating relationship between mimicry and mockery, an ambivalence that is fundamentally unsettling to colonial dominance (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1998, p. 13).
Therefore, what at first glance might be read as a straightforward act of complicity (e.g. copying the colonizer's behaviours, values, clothing, mannerisms, languages, etc.) might on closer inspection reveal the weaknesses of colonial authority as mimicry gives way to mockery, repetition to difference and farce to threat.

Writing about the Aboriginal inhabitants of Victoria (BC), Canada, in the same period, Christopher Bracken explains the process and the logic behind it:

They adopt a code of dress that signifies their proximity to Western civilization, yet by repeating that code they render it different from itself and distance it irretrievably from all things Western (Bracken, 1997, p. 8).

Bracken (1997, p. 17) argues that the 'offence' that this causes stems from the fact that their 'imitations actively destroy Europeanness by rendering it different from itself'. This doubles the sense of loss: not merely the loss of an 'authentic', self-present Indigeneity, but also the loss of an authentic and self-present Europe, and that is what cuts into its colonial authority. As Bhabha suggests (1994, p. 126), "[t]he menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority'. Therefore, rather than affirming the power of mimicry for the establishment and maintenance of colonial discourse (like the LMS) or rejecting it outright (like Haddon), Bhabha wants to make the more subtle argument that colonial discourse is internally split, contradictory and only ever partially successful in its aims or goals. In this light, Haddon's attempt to fix Gewe by shifting between type and stereotype might be said to simultaneously open up another shifting space between mimicry and mockery.
The second (related) part of the stereotype shifts the focus to what Michael Taussig (1993, p. 198) refers to as 'the white man's fascination with their [colonial subjects'] fascination with these mimetically capacious machines [photography, cinematography, phonography, etc.]'.

In the evening Ballantine gave his visitors a lantern show in the boatshed, interspersed with phonograph songs and tunes by Ray. I think they did not understand the latter, but the pictures were thoroughly appreciated by them. I sat on a box next to Gewe in order to watch him, and I had a great treat. He had his hat on, but the military tunic was absent. Most of the lantern-slides were local, and the natives recognised them immediately. One slide was of especial interest, as it was the photograph of a village that Gewe and others had subsequently sacked and burnt. One wonders what was passing in the mind of the warrior, as in front of him was the representation of the "before," and in his mind's eye he must have seen the "after" (Haddon, 1901, p. 246).60

This performative dimension follows a familiar pattern across Head-Hunters, where magic lantern slideshows and phonograph performances are regularly deployed as an entertainment and an opportunity for study (cf. Edwards, 1998). Indeed the realization that such technologies might in some sense 'pacify' the Indigenous population was put to considerable use as a means of social observation and recording (as we saw with Haddon's attempts to photograph Gewe) (Edwards, 2000, p. 119). Of course, as with Taussig's observation, the fascination here is largely with their fascination with these technologies, and in both cases, the roots of such a fascination appear to lie in particular with their capacity for phonographic and photographic indexicality. Although Haddon often asked the Islanders and Papuans to draw for him – and often did so himself – he rarely displayed drawings, paintings, illustrations or any other form of inscription.

60 This is almost identical to the accompanying passage from Haddon's journal (1898b, p. 141) in Cambridge University Library.
It was phonography and photography which really fascinated, and that fascination seemed to emerge from the bond between representation and referent, or, in particular, from considering whether the Islanders or Papuans would be able to conceptually prise them apart. What engages Haddon is not merely the peculiar or discrepant spectacle of Gewe in a top hat overflowing with excitement ('Gewe expressed wonder and admiration by a broad grin, glistening eyes, and by making various sucking and clicking noises with his lips' [Haddon, 1901, p. 24]), but with how such excitement suggests a relationship between the lantern-slides and the landscape. What is of particular interest is not merely the fact that the Papuans can recognize the landscape, a point which in itself does not determine whether a distinction has been made between representation and referent, but the fact that such a distinction is being forced upon Gewe through the temporal discrepancy between them. Just as Haddon's photographic oeuvre is caught up in the tension between visible surfaces and invisible depths, Haddon's ethnographic imagination is piqued by considering the relationship between observable social phenomena (e.g. Gewe's excitement in the face of the photographs) and unobservable psychological states (e.g. how Gewe might conceptualize the relationship between representation and referent, past and present). The implication in this scenario is that the distant past is represented by the photographic representation ('before'), the immediate past by Gewe's memory ('after') and the present by the performative moment of the display ('now'). This temporal play between inscription, memory and display appears to be at the root of Haddon's fascination, and the implication is that Gewe will not be able to conceptualize the relationship between these registers.
Such a temporal play between inscription, memory and display is brought to the surface most forcefully elsewhere in Head-Hunters, in this case by explicitly thematizing the relationship between death and loss that is lodged within them:

To their intense and hilarious delight I showed them some of the photographs I had taken during my last visit, not only of themselves, but also of other islands in the Straits. We had an immense time. The yells of delight, the laughter, clicking, flicking of the teeth, beaming faces and other expressions of joy as they beheld photographs of themselves or of friends would suddenly change to tears and wailing when they saw the portrait of someone since deceased (Haddon, 1901, pp. 9-10).61

In this context of display – this 'now' – Haddon deliberately draws out the contingency at the heart of photographic indexicality, the fact that the photograph 'reproduces to infinity' what 'has only happened once' (Barthes, 2000a, p. 4). In this case, the point is precisely to root these photographs in a particular point in space and time, and a point which is now long past (the Torres Strait Islands, 1888). Such passing, and such poignancy of loss elicited by the adherent bond between representation and referent, is brought home most forcefully by confronting the now dead. This effect is heightened by the fact that many Torres Strait Islanders did and still do practice a prohibition on the representation of the dead. However, it is precisely the contingency of the this-has-been which contributes to the Islanders' enchantment with the photographed image in this context. These are not type photographs or stereotypes, but photographs of known and named individuals and relatives taken at very specific times which are now past. This provides a powerful means of re-framing the images and flooding them with alternative meanings.

61 This story is recounted in Haddon's journal of the expedition (1898b, pp. 63-64).
However, this is precisely the register that Haddon has been attempting to occlude or occult all along: the contingency at the heart of photographic indexicality, which not only roots such inscriptions in a particular place but, crucially, in a particular time. Indeed, both of the above examples draw out what has been lying dormant in the other 'type' photographs that I have been analysing throughout this chapter: the relationship between indexicality, contingency and temporality. In the temporal schema that I laid out earlier in the chapter (where Haddon's photographs are posed as being either 'too late', 'just in time' or 'out of time'), the photographs of a now despoiled village and a now deceased villager fall into the middle category. Haddon recorded them 'just in time', before they died or were destroyed. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it opens out the temporal relationship between representation and referent. If a referent has died or been destroyed and yet one can still see the representation, one can't help but see the difference between the two registers ('before' and 'after'), which is precisely why Haddon is so interested in the responses of the Islanders and Papuans ('now').

However, the second – and most important – point of significance about these images is that they undermine the process by which Haddon's 'just in time' photographs attempt to occlude their irreducible contingency. In order to erase the 'eventness' of the event which they index, such photographs normally take a specific event and render it typical. A photograph of a specific individual at a specific time making a clay pot becomes a photograph of how clay pots are made in general. Past becomes present and specific becomes general. This is the photographic version of what is more commonly known as the 'ethnographic present', the predominant post-Victorian model of ethnographic writing. However,
in the context of the photograph of the despoiled village or deceased villager, and, crucially, in the more general context of recording a 'dying culture', the process of typification becomes fatally compromised. One can't argue that this is how this village is in general, or this is how pots are made in general, if both have been destroyed. Such destruction – imminent or immanent, assumed or actual – is the very reason for the production of the images in the first place and yet it serves to once again root such representations in a particular place and time, and it is this resistant strain of photographic contingency which keeps resurfacing to problematize, exceed or 'other' any attempt at controlled rationalization.

This is no less the case when the photographs are posed as being 'too late', as with the reconstructions that we will consider in the coming chapter, or 'out of time', as we have seen with the decontextualized, photographic typologies that we have been principally concerned with throughout this chapter. In the case of the former, the time of the event is converted into an amorphous and non-historical past time, and in the case of the latter, it is extracted from the flow of time altogether. However, in each of the three temporal scenarios, Haddon's attempt at rationalization or totalization is fundamentally predicated on the indexicality of the photographic medium. Therefore, just as photography will always conjure the photograph and the type photograph the individual, so too the indexicality of the medium will always conjure types of contingency, alterity and excess which are irreducible rather than accidental parts of the process.
PART II: CINEMATOGRAPHY

'A Fantasy in Red and Green': Indexicality, Motion and A.C. Haddon's 'Cinema of Attractions'\textsuperscript{62}

I had the satisfaction of being able to take a cinematograph picture of the processional dance. The grotesque masks worn by ruddled men, girt with leafy kilts, had a strange effect as they emerged from the jungle, and very weird was the dance in the mottled shade of the tropical foliage, a fantasy in red and green, lit up by spots of sunshine.

A.C. Haddon, Head-Hunters: Black, White and Brown (1901, p. 47)

From Photography to Cinematography

The previous chapter examined Haddon's negotiations with and within the aporias of photography – and the medium's duplicitous capacity for indexicality – which simultaneously enables and disables any clear-cut positivist pretensions. Whilst seemingly the positivist tool \textit{par excellence}, photographic indexicality is also, to use Mary Ann Doane's apt phrase (2002, p. 230), 'the privileged bearer of contingency', and this cuts against the grain of any positivist rationalization. In the context of Haddon's oeuvre at least, photographic indexicality becomes the pre-eminent site of tension between the types of contingency and rationalization which would later come to shape the broader field of anthropological representation, and which Doane (2002, p. 4) sees as shaping the cultures of modernity more generally. This chapter will explore the related convergences and divergences which emerge in

\textsuperscript{62} Versions of this chapter were delivered at a research seminar in the School of Architecture and Art History at the University of Reading, and at a Film and Philosophy conference at the University of Bristol. The present chapter bears the traces of the feedback that I received from students, staff and colleagues.
the relationship between photography and cinematography, and between both and their others (e.g. phonography, phonetic writing and drawing, etc.). In terms of the convergences, we once again encounter the spectre of indexicality – albeit in this case inflected through C.S. Peirce's reading of the concept (cf. Metz, 2003). In terms of the divergences, the crucial question that we have yet to encounter is that of motion, movement or kineticism. What happens when the photochemical base of photography – the very basis of its indexicality – is set to motion and what new intermedial aporias arise? In turn, to what extent do the concepts of indexicality and motion allow us to gather Haddon's cinematographic oeuvre under the rubric of what Tom Gunning (1990; 1996) refers to as the 'cinema of attractions', and where does that analogy break down? These questions will be explored through an examination of Haddon's fin-de-siècle film fragments – the first of their kind in ethnography (Long and Laughren, 1993, p. 33) – and the analysis will shift in focus between questions of intermediality, referentiality and materiality.

As we discussed in the previous chapter, one of the most basic premises underlying the expedition in general (and its use of indexical technologies in particular) was a certain turn-of-the-century visualist agenda which proposed that cultural depth could be read off a visually captured surface, much as a phrenologist might extrapolate from the morphology of one's skull, or a race theorist from the pigmentation of one's skin. For this purpose, the cinematograph seemed an ideal piece of apparatus with which to peel away the skin of culture. However, despite Haddon's ambitions for the fledgling medium (i.e. that it would form part of a positivistic, visual continuum) and his enthusiastic recommendations to colleagues (e.g. Baldwin Spencer in Australia, to whom he recommended the 'cinematograph
as an indispensable piece of anthropological apparatus’), cinematography proved to be something of a technical disappointment (Griffiths, 2002, pp. 128, 147). Filming in the tropical heat of the Torres Strait climate, the camera – damaged from weeks of arduous travel – would regularly jam, and in a blinding flash of light, his subjects would vanish before his very eyes (see fig. 14 below)\(^6\): appearance and disappearance within three frames (Griffiths, 2002, p. 134; Long and Laughren, 1993, p. 34).

However, for Haddon, this was not only an unwarranted intrusion of the camera upon the field of vision, but all the more frustrating insofar as his task was construed as an urgent one: to *transparently* inscribe on paper, wax and film stock – what were perceived to be – the last vestiges of a moribund culture. Therefore, the spectral play of appearance and disappearance evinced by the camera itself took on a new and increasingly urgent meaning: simply put, his subjects were disappearing both on and off screen. However, they were not yet the disappeared, and so a ghostly inbetweenness was being reflected on both sides: a failing technical apparatus that represented the space between presence and absence, and an

\(^6\) Although a rather well-worn philosophical cliché, the idea that too much light blinds takes on a very concrete significance here. The overexposed frame becomes like a cinematic cataract.
imminent cultural loss which did the same. Thus, his medium and his subject matter each came to echo the other by registering (as) ephemeral fragments (cf. Doane, 2002, p. 3). As a result, his cinematic inscriptions became both witnesses of, and poor substitutes for, such loss: the fleeting ephemera of cinematic capture peeled off the reel/real. Instead of continuous wholes – itself a fiction of the medium – Haddon was left with discontinuous fragments, which heightened the relationship between indexicality and contingency and between medium and object, and which made the process of converting representations into typifications all the more difficult.

Such fragments were more often than not associated with Indigenous dances, a point which dovetails with Felicia McLaren’s provocative thesis about the threads binding cinema to dance (and such links have been well documented in early cinema, e.g. the famous Serpentine Dance):

[T]he camera does what dance – or to be more precise, a certain apprehension or reception of dance – had done previously: making liveness an image, taking the spectator into a different experience of time or space, bringing to the eye what was previously imperceptible (2003, p. 28).

For Haddon, such a penchant for dance was most obviously linked to the fact that the body’s fleeting combination of movement, duration and spatial arrangements is both difficult to visually grasp (and we will return to the metaphor of touch later) and difficult to represent in other ways (e.g. photography, drawing, phonetic writing, etc.). Consequently, dance on film holds an enduring appeal as a form of tangible and spectacular cinematic display. As Fatimah Tobing Rony argues:
Dance was almost always represented as spectacle: to be watched at a distance. The public as well as scientists were fascinated by the bodies of indigenous people, and dance film showed how those bodies moved, how masks were worn. Moreover, an iconography is formed: the native [...] is identified with the body (1996, p. 65).

However, Haddon’s penchant for dance is also linked to the fact that, in this context, dance is a cultural metonym, no mere empty ceremonial gesture or purely aesthetic formation, but capable of conjuring forth a socio-cultural whole, and, moreover, a socio-cultural whole ostensibly passing into oblivion. For Alison Griffiths:

Haddon's choice of subject matter may therefore have been guided by three factors: his judgement of their ethnographic significance; their prior representation as photographs; and how well they embodied the medium's capacity for representing motion (2002, p. 146).

Indeed, this not only suggests why Haddon may have chosen his particular subject matter, but why he may have chosen his particular medium or media, and it is this space between ethnographic significance, photographic indexicality and cinematic motion that will form the backdrop to this chapter. How do indexicality and motion come together in early cinema – and ethnographic cinema in particular – and what tensions and contradictions are consequently opened up both within the medium of cinematography itself and between it and its others?

**Stop Tricks: Indexicality and Motion**

One point of departure for such questions is Friedrich Kittler's (1999) tour de force
of media history and theory, *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*. In the 'Film' chapter, Kittler (1999, ch. 3) suggests that the emergence of modern cinema qua cinema can be traced back – conceptually rather than historically – to the relationship between continuity and discontinuity, appearance and disappearance. 'Cinema, in contrast to sound recording, began with reels, cuts, and splices' (Kittler, 1999, p. 115). This is most neatly and dramatically exemplified in the accidental discovery of the cinematic 'stop trick': 'the magical appearance and disappearance of figures against a fixed background' that Haddon had also unwittingly encountered. As Kittler recounts:

Legend has it [...] that George Méliès, the great film pioneer, ran out of celluloid while shooting a street scene. He left the tripod and camera in position and loaded a new reel, but in the meantime so-called life naturally went on. Viewing the fully spliced film, its director was consequently surprised by the magical appearance and disappearance of figures against a fixed background. Méliès, who as former director of the Théâtre Robert Houdin had already projected many a magical trick onto the technological screen, had accidentally also stumbled upon the stop trick (1999, p. 115).

For Kittler, the 'stop trick' is first and foremost a conjurer's trick, echoing the magician's dialectic between appearance and disappearance ('now you see it, now you don't' [Gunning, 1996]). In Méliès' case, it marks the appearance and disappearance of the – often female – body; in Haddon's case, it marks the appearance and disappearance of his anthropological object *per se*. For the one, it is a creative opportunity; for the other, it is a technical hindrance repeating a disciplinary loss; for both, it represents bodies in motion: *fort/da*. Such a play is no doubt imbued with archaic patterns of fascination or fear, patterns which, as Laura Mulvey (1985, p. 305) has remarked in a different context, are 'reinforced by pre-
existing patterns of fascination already at work within the individual subject and the social formations that have moulded him'. From the 'fort/da' of Freud's ruminations (Gunning, 1996, p. 82), to Méliès' magical tricks, to Haddon's spectres, these patterns take on many forms. However, once viewed within a specifically cinematic context, Kittler (1999, p. 115) argues that such a play between appearance and disappearance gives rise to cinema itself – as distinct from the mere technology of cinema – and this play is particularity heightened in this case by at least two of the crucial components of early cinema: its capacity for indexicality and its capacity for movement or kineticism (cf. Doane, 2002, p. 24; 2007, p. 129).

Indeed, it has perhaps become something of a commonplace to associate some of the fascination with cinematography – and early cinematography in particular – with the fact that it is an indexical form of inscription. In this context, this interpretation owes a considerable debt to Charles Sanders Peirce's work on signification (a body of work whose light has often been dimmed by the glare of a certain Saussurian linguistics). As is well known, Peirce developed an immensely complex topography of the sign, one of the key underlying triads of which was his division of signs into symbols, icons and indices: the first, in which signifiers are bound to their referents by social convention (as would pertain in language, for example); the second, in which they are bound by some point of similarity (a pictorial representation perhaps); and the third in which they are bound by an 'actual contiguity or connection to the world', in Christian Metz's phrase (2003, p. 139). 'The lightning is the index of the storm' or the footprint the index of the foot (Metz, 2003, p. 139). It is not so much that the viewer somehow 'confounds the
signifier and referent' as Metz (2003, p. 144) would have it (as was allegedly the case in the reaction to the Lumière brothers' iconic film of an approaching train), but that the signifier accrues a 'strange feeling of reality', a fascination with the fact that it has somehow *touched* its referent, and we will come back to this question of touch later when discussing the materiality of the cinematic surface.

I would suggest that this capacity for indexicality – this 'strange feeling of reality' – is one the key reasons why early cinema – and its first decade in particular – generated the kinds of visceral scopic thrill that the American film historian, Tom Gunning (1990; 1996), has come to associate with the phrase, the 'cinema of attractions'. Such a phrase invokes both the fairground attractions with which early cinema was associated and Eisenstein's 'montage of attractions'. Gunning (1990, p. 57) argues that, in its first decade, cinema was marked by certain key tendencies: an emphasis on display or exhibition over story or narrativity; a focus on short everyday 'actualities' (the banality of the social world made strange); a focus on cinematic tricks, rather than on elaborate fictions; and, crucially, a tendency towards direct spectatorial address of a kind that compromises, or at least renders more complex, one's voyeuristic anonymity. This, as Gunning suggests (1990, p. 57), is an 'exhibitionist cinema [...] a cinema that displays its visibility, willing to rupture a self-enclosed fictional world for a chance to solicit the attention of the spectator'.

However, this capacity for commanding visibility and soliciting its spectator was not only bound up with cinema's capacity for indexical display – the power to show, to make appear – but was often achieved through the very stop tricks
courted by Méliès: the power to conceal or to make disappear, either directly or by implication (Gunning, 1990, p. 57). In this sense, Méliès' 'magical transformations' become in Gunning's words (1996, p. 78), 'emblematic examples of the cinema of attractions, endlessly replaying the effect of surprise and appearance [or] the sudden appearance and then disappearance of the view itself', an effect made nonetheless all the more powerful by cinema's capacity for indexical inscription:

The basic structure of attractions, then, revolves around either the act of display and the anticipations that can be heightened by delaying or announcing it (or both) and its inevitable disappearance (which can be gradual or sudden and dramatic) (Gunning, 1996, pp. 79-80).

Collectively, these tendencies not only have the effect of rendering cinematic subjects and spectators spectacularly visible (or invisible), but of simultaneously rendering the cinematic apparatus itself visible (or invisible), a desirable component of that very spectacle; cinema putting itself on show in a sense.

The other key factor in the fascination wrought by the stop trick is, I would suggest, its capacity for kineticism or movement, a movement which makes plain and literal the play of Méliès' projected screen magic: bodies in motion appearing and disappearing in the blink of an eye. Such an attempt to unleash the dormant or latent temporality and dynamism of other forms of inscription (up to and including photography) has roots as ancient as the fascination with appearance and disappearance itself. However, its more recent proto-cinematic history swings from Eadweard Muybridge's locomotion photography (which Kittler [1999, p. 119] describes as one step from cinema) and Étienne-Jules Marey's chronophotographic gun (which explores the dynamism of modernity via the relationships between
pictorial representation and war), to Ernst Mach's photodynamism, all of which negotiate with the dialectical fort/da of the coming technology.

Indeed, such a dialectical play of appearance and disappearance is only the most overt manifestation of the underlying mechanism which makes cinema itself possible. For the blink of the eye which registers Méliès' magical tricks conceals a play of appearance and disappearance speeded up to the point of invisibility, or *Death at 24 X a Second*, as Laura Mulvey (2005) would have it. Such a trick of motion conjures life out of death:

Film gives back to the dead a semblance of life, a fragile semblance but one immediately strengthened by the wishful thinking of the viewer. Photography, on the contrary, by virtue of the objective suggestions of its signifier (stillness, again) maintains the memory of the dead as being dead (Metz, 2003, p. 141, emphasis in original).

This is another film trick, the most basic and important of all, indeed, that which underlies all the others\(^{64}\): the optical illusion of motion through projected stillness. This optical illusion has most often been explained by the so-called 'persistence of vision' (i.e. where one frame endures as an afterimage rendering the momentary disappearance between it and the next invisible) (Doane, 2002, p. 70). As Metz puts it (2003, pp. 139-140, emphasis in original) 'even if each image is still, switching from one to the next creates a *second movement*, made out of successive and different immobilities'.

The problem with this theory for Doane (2002, p. 71) is that it suggests a deficiency of vision, a deficiency of the human body, thereby demonstrating an

\(^{64}\) 'The film trick preceding all film tricks' as Kittler (1999, p. 122) would have it.
anxiety surrounding the empirical surety of vision. In some quarters, such an approach has therefore been superseded by more recent cognitive theories which, according to Doane (2002, p. 71), posit a critical visual threshold 'beyond which the human eye is incapable of perceiving difference', sometimes referred to as the 'stroboscopic effect' (e.g. the blurred spokes of a spinning wheel [cf. Kittler, 1999, pp. 119, 122]). Nonetheless, whether viewed as a deficiency or a critical threshold, the effect is much the same: that the visual experience of motion is an optical illusion, or that the eye perceives continuous motion or appearance where there is only discontinuous fragmentation. This is one of the main reasons why Kittler (1999, p. 119) associates film with the Lacanian 'imaginary' rather than the Lacanian 'real', the latter of which he allots to phonography.

These kinds of shifts between appearance and disappearance are not, of course, restricted to cinema. Indeed, as Derrida has said of an expanded writing:

> To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a kind of machine that is in turn productive, that my future disappearance in principle will not prevent from functioning and from yielding, and yielding itself to, reading and rewriting (1982, p. 316, emphasis added).

In principle at least, the instant of one's disappearance, absence or death becomes enshrined within the inscription at the very moment of its production, or as Derrida says during a filmed interview with Bernard Stiegler: 'we already know that death is here' (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p. 39). Indeed, this point is especially marked and charged in indexical forms of inscription, particularly when one perceives an imminent or recent loss of referent. In its more literal sense, one might think here of the *memento mori* tradition, or, indeed, Roland Barthes'
(2000a, p. 95) famous analysis of the simultaneously dead and dying prisoner in *Camera Lucida* ('he is dead and he is going to die'). (His) death is both imminent with an 'i' (i.e. coming) and immanent with an 'a' (i.e. already there).

As we saw in the previous chapter with Haddon's use of photography, such a seeming temporal paradox between imminence and immanence – and such a play between appearance and disappearance – is precisely analogous to what has become known as the so-called 'vanishing primitive' motif or trope, an extraordinarily persistent belief in the calamitous fate awaiting the world's Indigenous populations in the face of the onrushing force of a monolithic modernity. From National Geographic's *Vanishing Peoples of the Earth* (1968) to Leni Riefenstahl's *Vanishing Africa* (1982) such a fate is always both upon us and just around the corner (immanent and imminent), despite evidence of the emergence of a far more complex – if far from innocent – hybridity.

Each of these pairs of concepts – indexicality and motion, appearance and disappearance, and imminence and immanence – will come to play a key role in Haddon's cinematographic oeuvre, albeit in ways which not only challenge Haddon's positivist ambitions for the medium, but which open up the relationship between vision, memory and imagination within anthropological representation more generally.
Haddon's famous four minutes of extant film are now regarded as the first pieces of ethnographic cinema made explicitly for that purpose (cf. Long and Laughren, 1993, p. 33). There are five distinct sections (or six shots) depicting Indigenous dances and technical processes, but the first and most significant (a fifty second single-shot) records the climax of the initiation ritual of the male children of Mer, one of the Eastern Torres Strait Islands: the point at which the identity of the mythical culture-heroes, Malu-Bomai, are revealed, represented by masks worn by the dancers or zogole (sacred men of Mer). This initiation marks a point of transition, a temporal shift or change of social status from childhood to adulthood – indeed, a social death as much as a social birth – and the process is thus locked away on the liminal, spatial margins of the social until that transition is complete.65

Underlining the difficulty of describing movement in film, Alison Griffiths schematizes the shot as follows:

The brief single-take Malu-Bomai ceremony film features three dancers who shift their weight from one leg to another as they move in a tight circle in front of the camera. As the film begins, the three men stand behind one another (the third slightly off-frame right), slowly shifting their weight from foot to foot in a rocking motion with their arms at their sides and their hands extended at right angles from their bodies. The rhythmic movements intensify as the men lift their legs and shake their entire bodies, and the dancer in the foreground, followed by the other two, turns his body away from the camera in a counterclockwise direction and moves slowly round in a circle until he has resumed his starting position. This circular pattern is repeated twice in the 50-second shot (2002, p. 135).66

65 We will return to this theme later, but it should be clear that such space is deeply gendered, and the secrets which are revealed therein to the Islands' boys-becoming-men are strictly guarded from the Islands' women of all ages. To that extent, the invidious gendering of sacred and profane has currency here.

66 A clip of this film can be found on the following site: http://aso.gov.au/titles/historical/torres-
What is significant about this description is that, although an accurate account of the shot, it tells us very little. On its own, neither the film nor the description are sufficient. Acutely aware of this problem, Haddon provides a rather different gloss on the pro-filmic event, one which adds elements which are *not* contained in either the event or the film:

Suddenly the fearsome procession appeared [...] and the three *Zogole* slowly marched with peculiar movements. They alone wore leafy girdles [...] The head of the first *zogole* was covered with a ruddled turtle-shell mask [see fig. 15 below], representing a human face, which had a beard of human jaw-bones; above the face were leaves and feathers, and hanging from it behind was a painted carapace of a turtle, the latter supported by a long string by the second *zogole* (Haddon, 1901, p. 48).

![Figure 15, Bomai Mask used in the first shot of Haddon's film (from Herle and Rouse, 1998, p. 91)](strait-islanders/clip1/ [accessed 15/12/11]).

Thus we learn from Haddon – not from the film – that this first mask represents the face and totemic allegiances of the mythical culture-hero whose secret and sacred name is *Bomai*. Haddon continues:
The third zogole bore a turtle-shell mask [see fig. 16 below] representing a hammer-headed shark, on which was a human face; it was provided with human arms and hands, and decorated with leaves, feathers and turtle-shell figures of birds, frogs and centipedes (Haddon, 1901, p. 48).

This second mask, Haddon informs us, represents the face and totemic allegiances of the culture-hero Malu, who, although different from Bomai, masquerades as his profane alter-ego. As Haddon explains:

There were some sacred words which they disliked mentioning: for example, the culture hero in the "Myth of Origin" of these ceremonies is always spoken of as Malu, and this name is known to women and children – it is, in fact, what they call an au ne, i.e. a "big" or "general name"; but his real name is Bomai – this is the zogo ne (sacred name) or gumik ne (secret name), which only initiates may learn, and is one of those "unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter" (1901, p. 46).

Therefore, the first shot ostensibly records the revelation of a secret – the sacred emerging out of the profane\(^67\) – a sacred visage and a secret name, known only to the initiated and protected from reiteration by strict prohibition. In some senses,

\(^{67}\) Again, note the gendering of this division.
the name of 'Bomai' is a performative utterance, one which encodes and sets in motion a secret narrative as much as it denotes a real or mythical figure, one which has the power to breach sacred law, and one which – under circumstances of transgression – has the power to kill (Haddon, 1901, p. 49). Two provisional points suggest themselves at this stage: the first is the specific visual significance of the masks in the encoding/revelation of this secret (and we will come back to this in a moment) and the second is that this secret also has an aural dimension: not only a sacred visage shown but a secret name chanted amidst a theatrical performance staged. As Felicia McLaren (2003, p. 50) suggests, because '[e]arly cinema relied on live performance as one subject for early films [it] was an ideal medium for presenting moving bodies dispossessed of their voices'. However, it is the combination of vision and sound which has such a powerfully affective impact on the initiates. Indeed, this latter aural dimension reminds us that so-called 'silent cinema' was far from silent – often being accompanied by live performances or phonographic recordings – and that is so in this case also (cf. Kittler, 1999, p. 171; McLaren, 2003, p. 50). As we will consider in more detail in the next chapter, the expedition’s two Edison 'Home' phonographs were pressed into considerable service recording a wide range of songs, stories and chants, including those associated with the Malu-Bomai ceremony – recordings occasionally 'synchronized' with the film on the few occasions that it was actually exhibited (cf. Griffiths, 2002, pp. 134, 148).

Here we return to the kinds of supplementarity that we discussed in the previous chapter. In this case, a seemingly 'self-complete' film reaches its limit point and

68 This is a point that I will develop at greater length in the following chapter on phonography.
attempts to find resolution in another medium, here by way of 'synchronization'.
However, the question of synchronization is itself significant or misleading in this
context as the cinematographic and phonographic recordings were made at
different times and in different places. In this sense, this is the filmic equivalent of
the process we saw in the previous chapter, whereby specific representations
were made to typify general racial types or broader cultural practices. Because
rendered typical, the specificity of the representational context does not matter,
and so a frontal and profile view of two different individuals can come to represent
one racial 'type', or cinematographic and phonographic recordings from different
contexts can be pressed together as one indexical and intermedial whole. In both
cases, the specificity of the event is made to transcend itself as structure, and in
both cases, the unwieldiness of the former breaches the self-assurance of the latter.

However, the main point I want to stress at this stage is that, from the perspective
of those not versed in Island Custom ('Ailan Kastom'), this audio-visual secret –
however construed – still requires the addition of a provisional supplementary
narrative for its revelation or audition. As Mary Ann Doane has suggested,
'conditions of exhibition [of early cinema] were often grounded in an
acknowledgement that the image was not self-sufficient':

The spectator was often expected to have knowledge of another text
[...]. Or, in many cases, the lecturer (a person hired to accompany the
film with comments, explaining what was happening) would act as an
external source, pointing out aspects of the image whose readability

In Haddon's case, this cuts both ways: the image simultaneously lacks and exceeds
any narrative framework. Therefore, just as Haddon's photographs were forced beneath the surface of his written commentary in a bid to control their excessive and deficient meanings, so too Haddon's films remain simultaneously excessive and deficient: too much and too little. As Alison Griffiths makes clear, this is 'the enduring paradox in the history of visual anthropology':

[A] tension between the apparent sufficiency of the ethnographic image – its excess of visual detail on the one hand versus its discursive insufficiency on the other, the fact that while it may appear to tell us a great deal about a particular social or cultural practice, it nevertheless remains "annoyingly mute" (in ethnographic filmmaker and theorist David MacDougall's words) about what these cultural forms and symbols might actually mean in broader anthropological terms (2002, p. 129).

However, such a paradox is doubled in this case because, as Felicia McLaren argues (2003, p. 51), it extends beyond cinematic representation and into dance performance itself: 'By suspending its meanings in signs, dance produces the simultaneous option of seeing "too much" and "not enough"'. Therefore, without supplying the kinds of narrative frame that Haddon was to produce voluminously over the rest of his life in hundreds of pages of manuscripts and published material, it remains particularly difficult to render his cinematic images of dance 'legible', to penetrate beneath their surface.

[L]acking intertitles and entirely dependent on expert contextualization in order to be made legible to both scientific and lay audiences, Haddon was left with the question of what exactly could be done with his films in the absence of an intellectual framework for ethnographic film (Griffiths, 2002, p. 145, first emphasis added).

Indeed, I want to deliberately stress the reductive literary metaphor of legibility
here (cf. Mowitt, 1992, p. 142), as it is precisely the point for Haddon to attempt to curb visual excesses and deficiencies with what he takes to be the control offered by phonetic writing. Even to contemporary spectators/auditors, the images and sounds remain peculiarly resistant to reading (to legibility) without such frames, that is, beyond generalized, primitivist tropes of dance, 'native bodies' as spectacle, bodily expressivity as the colonial norm, and so forth.

Of course, the flip side to this argument is that this so-called 'lack of legibility' is anything but for spectators with a knowledge of Torres Strait Islander 'Kastom'. Indeed, the masks and headdresses themselves can be read as forms of inscription, encoding historical, memorial and mythical narratives very much legible to those immersed in that particular cultural milieu (cf. Herle, 2004, p. 201). That is precisely why they wield such affective power in and out of initiations. Indeed, Haddon once unwittingly showed the central Bomai mask in the film to a group of uninitiated Islander women, and was severely rebuked for doing so on the basis that the secrets which it did and does encode should not be revealed, a point which reminds us of the gendering of secrecy, space and the sacred/profane nexus on the Islands (Haddon, 1901, p. 47). In a more recent documentary about Torres Strait material culture in European museums (Cracks in the Mask, Calvert, 1997), an Islander cultural historian (Ephraim Bani) is shown the same mask – still intact and now in Cambridge – and he is clearly shaken by its continued affective power.

However, the point to stress is that these masks and headdresses do not necessarily have a fixed historical, memorial or mythical content. They are, in a sense, recording machines themselves, just as capable of encoding the complexities
of colonial cultural hybridity as of being destroyed by them. Indeed, more recent versions – intriguingly known as 'dance machines', both because they are most often incorporated within dances and because they are often composed of several mechanically interacting components (cf. McLaren, 2003) – have exploited these open-ended mimetic qualities by encoding recent historical events. For example, the same documentary in which Ephraim Bani is confronted with the Haddon mask shows Bani and another contemporary Islander wearing a model-plane headdress 'recording' the Islands' role in the Pacific portion of the Second World War (Calvert, 1997). Other artists have created similar headdresses, but with representations of more recent historical incursions, such as laptops and satellite dishes, etc. (Peacock, 2004, p. 48). In some senses then, what we are actually seeing in Haddon's film is a process by which one recording device faces another. Part of the accrued affective power of the Bomai mask today is precisely its role in the histories of colonial hybridity which led Haddon to the Islands in the first place. It 'records' – or becomes encrusted by – such histories rather than obscuring them.

Indeed, this idea of a reciprocal interplay between recording devices and between gazes – like two mirrors repeating each other ad infinitum – has been explored explicitly in the work of the contemporary Islander artist, Janice Peacock. Peacock (2004, p. 59) recently created a series of headdresses (Movie Camera head-dress, 2002) upon which she mounted abstract miniatures of Haddon's cinematographic camera. By implication, such headdresses look at the spectator as much as the spectator looks at them; the spectacular object also sees, and records; the gaze is reciprocated. As if to echo this point, Ephraim Bani suggests that his journey to Europe's museums with a camera will be like 'an eye from Torres Strait entering
into the museum itself to behold the things that have been taken away' (Calvert and Purser, 1998, p. 311). Recording becomes a form of substitute repatriation in this context, a practice which museums often rhetorically exploit as examples of community involvement. For example, the website of the Cambridge Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology used to display a photograph of contemporary Islander elders (including Bani) filming in the museum, without stressing Bani's criticism of museum practice in the film or, indeed, responding to his requests for the repatriation of such objects. Such a camera faces the spectator as much at its ostensible institutions and objects; a double vision is created, a point which Bani light-heartedly alludes to in the precursor to *Cracks in the Mask, Talking Broken* (1991):

You're looking at me like someone in a zoo, but why don't you watch yourselves in a mirror and look at yourselves? Maybe one day I'll come around, get my camera and start studying you people (Bani cited in Calvert and Purser, 1998, p. 307).

Indeed, just as Haddon's photographs point in two directions at once - towards and away from the camera - so too Haddon's films also point in two directions at once - recording and authenticating his presence, and by extension that of the colonial order, as much as that of the Islanders. Even more so than photography, Haddon's films thus produce the kind of paradoxical double manoeuvre that we witnessed in the previous chapter: a general, scientific narrative that is authenticated by a set of specific experiences. As Alison Griffiths (2002, p. 141) suggests, 'Haddon's cinematic study of the Malu-Bomai ceremony provides a compelling sense of "being there" among the Islanders, a feeling of co-presence at an event which is absent in photographs of the same scene', and it is this sense of
'being there' which authenticates the larger scientific generalizations. To that extent, Peacock's work does the same thing, albeit at a different register, recording both specific, experiential, personal and familial narratives as well as the broader and overlapping narratives of colonialism, memory, inheritance and legacy.

Nonetheless, to those outside of this cultural milieu, Haddon's films remain stubbornly resistant to legibility. However, this resistance is precisely the point. This is show rather than tell cinema, harnessing the great twin powers of cinematic indexicality and kineticism in a bid to 'mak[e] images seen', in Tom Gunning's borrowed phrase (1990, p. 56, emphasis in original). This underscores the links that a number of scholars have made between the film and Gunning's 'cinema of attractions' (e.g. Griffiths, 2002, p. 143). In the first instance, 'it is precisely this harnessing of visibility', Gunning suggests (1990, p. 56), 'this act of showing and exhibition, which [...] cinema before 1906 displays most intensely':

[T]heatrical display dominates over narrative absorption emphasizing the direct stimulation of shock or surprise at the expense of unfolding a story or creating a diegetic universe (1990, p. 59).

Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that I – like Haddon – had to append the opening provisional narratives. In this case, Haddon's 'theatrical display' is enhanced by exploiting the two key factors which we suggested were central to the patterns of visual fascination in the Méliès film: indexicality and motion or kineticism, both of which he had been grappling with separately in pre- or perhaps even proto-cinematic forms. On his earlier trip to the islands in 1888, Haddon had not only taken a multitude of photographs, but – as a keen, scientifically trained
illustrator — had attempted to capture the kineticism of that most dynamic and
temporal of forms of bodily expression, dance, in hand-drawn and painted
illustrations accompanying letters home to his family (see fig. 17 below).

These letters are interesting in the way in which they weave together commentary and image,
image and movement, and memory and vision. Indeed, as with the 'loop of supplementarity'
that we examined in the previous chapter, whereby a seemingly self-enclosed commentary
gives way to another medium of necessity and vice versa, these letters switch between words
and images in ways which reveal mutual fracture lines and weaknesses. The written
commentary cannot convey the dynamism of dance and so must be folded back intermedially onto the drawings — for example,
as Haddon draws his son's attention to what the movements of dance actually look
like and which he cannot convey in letters — but the drawings cannot capture the
dynamism of dance either, which in turn opens up a space that will only be occupied by the invention of the cinematograph much later.

However, one of the key differences between this instance of supplementarity and those which arose in the previous chapter is that what we are dealing with here are non-indexical inscriptions, or at least inscriptions which index differently. This heralds a theme that we will later see developed in a complex relationship with
indexicality and motion, and that is the attempt to render memory in a visual form. These drawings are not observations; they are Haddon's memories, materialized and set to an implied motion. Therefore, whilst it might be something of a push to consider the central triptych of images in this letter to be proto-cinematic in any direct or technical way, they – and a host of others like them in the Cambridge archives⁶⁹ – nonetheless announce a certain preoccupation with visuality and movement or spectacle and display that would later come to fruition in his photographic and cinematic imagination (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 130).

However, the relationship between indexicality and motion sometimes emerges as a tension in his cinematic work, particularly when that work comes to be drawn through the 'bottleneck of the [written] signifier', to adapt Kittler's apt phrase (1999, p. 4). In other words, when it comes time for publication, which in this case means a decomposition from cinematography back to photography and alphabetical script. Indeed, the ability to create the illusion of motion through the manipulated flux of still images (Metz's 'second movement, made out of successive and different immobilities' [2003, pp. 139-140, emphasis in original]), presupposes that one can reverse that trend, that one can still the stream and stop the motion for the purposes of – in this case – scientific analysis. In other words, to de- or re-compose cinematography back into its photographic constituents; to go from Lumière back to Muybridge, from Kittler's 'fusion or flow in the imaginary' back to 'chopping or cutting in the real' (1999, p. 122). In Haddon's case, this process of medial conversion was necessitated in part because few audiences had ready, direct access to his ethnographic films, but also – and more importantly –

⁶⁹ See the Haddon Papers (HP), envelope 1029 in the Manuscripts section of the Cambridge University Library.
because, as we have seen, such films required a kind of complex narrativization which exceeded the technology of cinema at that time.

It is, therefore, precisely such a task of cinematic decomposition and narrativization that Haddon attempts in some of his published writings, such as this example (fig. 18 opposite), drawn from the same book that we looked at in the previous chapter, *Head-Hunters: Black, White and Brown*. Indeed, these images are placed immediately adjacent to the earlier narrative account I gave of the *Malu-Bomai* ceremony, a point which highlights the bond of mutual supplementarity between them. The narrative is seemingly self-contained but requires the authenticating seal of the indexical inscription. In turn, the indexical inscription stands alone as an index of the event, but also requires a narrative description to transcend itself as event; each requires and thereby cuts into the supposed plenitude of the other.

However, Haddon's attempt to shift from cinematography to photography and
commentary harbours within it something of an irony in terms of indexicality and motion: not only do Haddon's indexical inscriptions have to be squeezed through a non-indexical and supplementary commentary, but his hard fought motion has to be stilled for the sake of publication and analysis. The 'semblance of life' that Metz (2003, p. 141) suggests inheres in cinema has to be replaced with the 'stillness' of photography which 'maintains the memory of the dead as being dead'. Nevertheless, what is crucial for Haddon is that the shift between cinematography and photography is not complete. Like the Lumière brothers' iconic film of an arriving train, where a seemingly still image suddenly gives way to movement (McLaren, 2003, p. 52), the sense of slippage between them is both meaningful and symptomatic (cf. Mowitt, 1992, p. 158). Indeed, these photographs bear the traces of at least three distinct photographic genres, two of which begin to transition into cinema: the conventional photographic portrait; the sequential photography of early pioneers like Eadweard Muybridge; and the 'chronophotography' and 'photodynamism' of figures like Étienne-Jules Marey and Arturo Bragaglia.

Taken in isolation at least, these three photographs could provisionally be read as examples of an ethnographically inflected form of photographic portraiture of the kind we saw in the previous chapter. Here the process of typification is not about rendering the individual body/face as a racial type, but rather about representing the individual body/face as a cultural type. In this sense, we return to Rony's suggestion (1996, p. 65) that dance is the archetypal spectacle wherein the 'native' becomes associated with his or her body and/or face. Indeed, in this context, the masked face is only a more literal version of the typifying 'masks' we saw in the previous chapter; in both cases, the individuality of the photographic subject is
superseded in favour of that which transcends it, and this is a point that we will return to in a moment (cf. McLaren, 2003, pp. 33-34).

However, such a reading of these photographs becomes radically altered when they are examined in conjunction with one another. It is, of course, deeply meaningful that Haddon should choose to present these photographs as another triptych in the style of his earlier illustrated letters, but in this case as a more overt form of cinematic mimesis: the page masquerading as a vertical strip of celluloid. To that extent, a process of slippage begins to occur between photography and cinematography, and one can't help but think here of the sequential photography of figures like Eadweard Muybridge. Muybridge famously anticipated the kineticism of cinema to such an extent that his photographs of human and animal locomotion can now actually be projected in a way which closely resembles cinematic motion (cf. Doane, 2002, p. 199; Kittler, 1999, p. 119). This works because his photographs are so rapidly sequential. For the effect to be perceived on the static surface of a printed page requires displaying large numbers of small images in horizontal succession (see fig. 19 opposite).

Haddon does not have this luxury within or on the pages of a popular travelogue, nor are his intentions to scientifically inscribe the motions of the human body in the same way, but the positioning of these photographs – although not directly
sequential – is clearly intended to convey the sense of motion which is suggested in
the commentary. In that sense, the images and the words combine in an effort to
conjure – rather than directly represent – motion, and then to bind that motion to
an overarching narrative not directly contained within it. Neither words nor
images can do so alone, and so spectacle and narrative come to supplement one
other.

However, this effort comes up against a serious impediment: his attempt to banish
the hard fought motion from between the frames only succeeds in highlighting
motion within the frames, albeit a motion ironically not readily perceptible when
the frames themselves are in motion. In a sense, there is an excessive leakage
between the dynamism of the dance and the speed of the film, and motion returns
as blurring, particularly in the centrally important images of the Bomai mask, that
most sacred and revelatory part of the film (see fig. 20 below). This makes visibly
evident the two contradictory forces at work in Haddon's use of cinematic stills: a
desire to represent – or conjure – the motion of the body and a desire to represent
the stillness of the mask.
Figure 20, Film stills from shot one (Haddon, 1898c) (these are taken from the same frames that Haddon uses in *Head-Hunters*, albeit in different form)

The centrality of the figure of the mask that we mentioned earlier becomes deeply significant in this context, and it is here that Barthes' discussion of specificity and generality in photography takes on a strange literality:

> Since every photograph is contingent (and thereby outside of meaning), Photography cannot signify (aim at a generality) except by assuming a mask (2000a, p. 34).

In our analysis of the type photograph in the previous chapter, we looked at how Haddon used representations of individual human faces to typify a racial generality. The latter became a kind of generalizing mask drawn over the faces of those individuals photographed. As Barthes (2000a, p. 34) reminds us, 'it is this word [mask] which [...] designate[s] what makes a face into the product of a society and of its history [...] the mask is the meaning'. In the context of Haddon's first ethnographic film, not only are specific events 'masked' by being rendered typical – the latter is their meaning in that context – but the faces of its individual protagonists are literally masked thereby sublimating their individuality and conjuring a cyclically repeated set of ritual – 'rite of passage' – narratives readily legible to its individual initiates. The faces of the film's protagonists are masked,
but these masks in turn evoke both the totemic allegiances of the culture-hero(es), *Malu-Bomai*, and an abstract depiction of their anthropomorphic faces. We move, therefore, from face to mask and back again, and the failure of both to signify with any cinematographic or photographic clarity is of paramount importance for Haddon, necessitating a retreat into other supplementary forms of – non-indexical – inscription.

This opens up something of an interesting disjuncture between indexicality and motion. In this case, the indexical power to capture that 'strange feeling of reality', to use Metz's phrase (2003, p. 144) – the power to display, to make appear – seems compromised by the perpetual motion of the 'still' images; cinematic time inheres in them still as they stand poised between action and inaction, appearance and disappearance (see fig. 21 below). There is, to appropriate John Mowitt’s phrase from another context (2005, p. 114), 'a volatile mix of stasis and motility in the image'.
Such an inbetweenness renders the images only partly legible, but rather than suggesting a schism between cinematic inscription and visual perception, one might read the relationship between them as one of empirical analogy (cf. McLaren, 2003, p. 59). Indeed, part of the optical illusion which allows us to perceive motion in cinema (the so-called 'stroboscopic effect') creates blurring in our visual perception of non-cinematic motion (such as the blurred spokes of a moving wheel). 'The truth of motion' as Mary Ann Doane (2002, p. 84) has
remarked, 'is imprecision of form and indecipherability'. Blurring in cinematic inscription and visual perception might be as one. However, such an analogy threatens the very representability of motion. 'An artist sketching a dancing woman', Doane tells us (2002, p. 84), 'imagines the [...] body coming and going, an unseizable ghost' but 'that truth is too stark for, and indeed in contradiction with, the goals of representation'.

To that extent, Haddon's blurred images of the Bomai mask come to implicitly evoke the explicit attempt by photographers such as Étienne-Jules Marey and Arturo Bragaglia to harness such blurring in order to represent time and motion within pre-cinematic photography (cf. Doane, 2002, ch. 3; McLaren, 2003, pp. 22-23). Unlike Muybridge, who attempted to conjure time and motion through a sequential succession of clear, still images, Marey (in his 'chronophotography') and Bragaglia (in his 'photodynamism') attempted to do so through blurred single images, where the traces of time and motion take visible form (Doane, 2002, p. 87; McLaren, 2003, p. 24). Such an attempt had been prefigured in earlier attempts to capture the dynamism of modernity in paintings of people, animals and machines in motion, but the indexicality of photographic variations on this theme lent the images a particularly striking spectral uncanniness (McLaren, 2003, p. 25). They capture what the eye actually sees, but the resultant images both 'capture and collapse time and motion in such a way that their familiarity is rendered unfamiliar. In some ways, this is akin to Benjamin's (2002 [1936], p. 117) discussion of an 'optical unconsciousness' in film, whereby techniques such as the close-up and slow-motion actually come to represent aspects of our visual cognition which we might register but not be consciously aware of (cf. McLaren,
2003, pp. 27-28). 'One goal', Felicia McLaren tells us (2003, p. 22), 'was to photograph, in movement, what the eye could not see', or at least not register.

For Haddon, such residual motion is less an abstract representation of movement, time and cognition and more a further limit point of the technology of cinema, albeit a limit point that manifests itself as an excess. The cinematographic camera records more than the eye can see, and when reduced to 'still' images, such excess literally obscures what the eye can see. However, his response to such a limit point is perhaps telling in that he turns to other forms of inscription in a bid to supplement and thus 'clarify' the cinematic 'stills' that will not sit still. In a – presumably utilitarian – attempt to eradicate motion from the picture, he deploys his visual skills to literally draw (in ink) and paint over the images of the Bomai mask, the point at which that most sacred of secrets is revealed (see fig. 22 below).
It is these modified versions of the film stills which end up in *Head-Hunters*. This opens up a strangely complex play between the different modes of inscription, as drawing and painting over cinematic stills *conceals* as much as it *reveals* in this context, as we can see from this later and more complete photo-cinematic touch up.
in this case using charcoal, pastel and paint (see fig. 23 below).

Such a process of transformation reveals the mask more clearly, but it does so at the expense of the image's indexicality and, indeed, that indexicality's bond to the sacred secret. This places Haddon into something of a crucial double bind: caught between the desire to maintain a certain indexical integrity – which threatens the images' visibility or legibility – and the necessity to superimpose a supplement – which threatens the images' indexical verisimilitude. The former poses the film as self-enclosed in and of itself – single shot focus, fixed camera, no narrative editing, no intertitles, no obvious impositions of any kind, a desire for pure transparency – whereas the latter exposes the film's deficiencies because of the necessity to superimpose a supplementary visual and/or narrative frame. Without the latter, the former is seemingly rendered inexplicable, but conjoining both seemingly impinges upon the indexical verisimilitude of the former. In other words, there is a need to supplement an indexically rendered visuality with something else, such as phonetic writing, drawing and painting, and a something else which, in this context, casts it roots deep into the past through memory.

Figure 23, 'Three phases of the Ceremonial Dance of the Bomai-Malu zogo le', Reports, Vol. VI (Haddon et al, 1908, Plate XXIX, no pagination)
In the end he plumps for the option of photographic modification, but this tension between clarity and verisimilitude, indexicality and its others, is particularly marked here for one key reason: what is displayed to us with such indexical charm is in fact a reconstruction of a pre-Christian initiation ritual no longer practiced, owing to powerful missionary influence since 1871. The masks are made from Haddon's cardboard packing cases, the protagonists are pillars of the Christian church and the initiates are replaced by the camera. Haddon had first become aware of these practices during his earlier visit to the islands in 1888. At that point, they were conveyed to him as memorial accounts of rituals already no longer practiced (memory and mourning going hand in hand, in a sense) and without concrete visual counterparts, save in the imagination. This was so because, in a wide-ranging process of iconoclasm, the missionaries had made certain the destruction of the visual traces of ritual (cf. Herle, 1998b, pp. 87-90).

Thus Haddon's task becomes more complex than the conventional trope of the 'vanishing primitive' would suggest. Rather than simply deploying indexical technologies to record the last vestiges of a moribund culture, Haddon's task becomes shifted towards the use of those technologies for the conversion of memory and imagination — Haddon's included — into vision (to conjure forth into vision) (cf. Kittler on Freud, memory and visuality, 1999, pp. 141-142; Herle, 1998b, p. 94). In fact, his task swings between both in a sense. Just as Barthes in Camera Lucida (2000a, p. 95) is pricked by the realization that the prisoner's death is both imminent with an 'i' (i.e. coming) and immanent with an 'a' (i.e. already
there), so too Haddon is caught between a rhetoric of being 'on the brink' –
bestowing legitimacy upon his recording practices – and 'too late' – necessitating
post-hoc reconstructions. 'It was', Haddon tells us (1901, p. 190), 'very saddening
to be continually pulled up in our researches by the oft-repeated cry of "Too late!"'.
In this context, Haddon's appeal to record Indigenous customs 'before they have
become lost to sight and memory' (1898a, p. xx, emphasis added) takes on a
particular significance. The two are wound intimately together for Haddon; the
former will come to rescue the latter by rendering it visible.

The flip side of this argument, which Haddon appears only dimly aware of at this
point, is the well-worn idea that the inscription of memory also partakes of its
destruction (cf. Kittler, 1999, p. 10). Of course, this is precisely why writing has so
often been rendered subordinate to speech, as Derrida (e.g. 1981; 1997; 2001; etc.)
has meticulously demonstrated. The tension lies in the fact that although
inscription emerges as the necessary condition for the preservation of memory,
such inscriptions are viewed as falling still-born onto the page. Live and personally
accountable memory gives way to a supposedly dead and impersonal writing.
However, this is so of necessity, a point which renders memory simultaneously
complete and lacking. To that extent, part of Haddon's fear of cultural loss is bound
up in the fact that, no matter how detailed, his inscriptions will never be adequate
to the memories which they conjure; on this understanding, all speech must give
way to loss, whether recorded or not. As James Clifford (1986b, pp. 117-118) has
argued, this is part of a broader anthropological allegory of redemption and
damnation by which the discipline – focused as it is or was on supposedly 'non-
literate' communities – brings speech into (phonetic) writing of necessity, but then
regrets the lack of adequacy between the two. Therefore, the pathos of Haddon's work stems from the tension between such knowledge – however implicitly registered – and a desire to proceed nonetheless, to press on regardless in order to bring an invisible memory to a visible surface.

Here we have a repetition of the surface-depth relations which we examined in the previous chapter. There we found Haddon using an indexical and visible surface (the 'type' photograph) to justify a non-indexical and invisible depth (the 'truth' of race). Here we see Haddon once again using an indexical and visible surface (filmic reconstructions) to justify a non-indexical and invisible depth (memory and imagination). This is a masquerade of positivism or scientism concealing a central, memorial fantasy, and such a tension works its way within and between Haddon's popular and scientific writings (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 141).

This adds a new layer of interpretation to the visual supplementation of the cinematic stills, in that memory and imagination bear a peculiar relationship to indexical inscription. Put simply, one cannot – in any direct sense at least – film from memory or imagination. One can, however, draw or paint from memory or imagination, a point which allows Haddon's imagination freer rein and gives these forms of inscription a heightened sense of importance, albeit at the expense of their empirical utility. Indeed, the difficulty for Haddon is that what, at one level, is a utilitarian clarification of an indexical image is, at another level, an imaginary imposition of subjective memory. The slippage between indexical and non-indexical inscription therefore opens up a troubling seam of subjectivity, the variability of which is made clear when one attends to other attempts to visually
capture the masks and the *Malu* ceremonies through drawing alone (see fig. 24 below).

![Figure 24, Drawings by Islanders and expedition members of the *Bomai* mask (left) and the *Malu* mask (right), *Reports*, Vol. VI (Haddon et al, 1908, pp. 290-291)](image)

These composite drawings, taken from Haddon's *Reports*, are more complex than they at first appear, both in terms of temporality and in terms of the relationship between memory and vision. The bottom two drawings on the right-hand page and the drawing on the right-hand side of the left page were drawn by Islanders *before* the masks were made, but after the rituals were no longer practiced. In other words, they were drawn from memory. The drawing on the left-hand side of the left page and the drawing at the top of the right-hand page were drawn by Haddon or another expedition member after the masks were made. In other words, they were drawn in the visual presence of the objects, or at least a photograph of them. Of course, these objects were in turn based on the memories captured in the first set of drawings. We therefore enter into a circle of memory, inscription and materiality: from memory to drawings, from drawings to masks and from masks
back to drawings again, and the consequent variability between them is considerable.

However, in order to fully untangle this assemblage of inscriptions and their complex relationship to indexicality, inscription, memory and vision requires paying closer attention to the way in which these images and Haddon's cinematic stills of the masks become stitched within the fabric of *Head-Hunters*. Indeed, Haddon devotes a whole chapter of *Head-Hunters* to the *Malu* ceremonies, indicating both his considerable and abiding interest in the topic and his deep desire to recreate the event for the camera (Haddon, 1901, ch. IV). In this chapter, Haddon makes clear the ring of extreme secrecy which surrounds such events – a ring which he and the readers are now, of course, breaching – and the symbolic qualities of the masks with regard to such secrecy. 'Sacred emblems', Haddon tells us (1901, p. 42), 'are frequently shown to the lads [i.e. the initiates]; these are often masked men who symbolise some legendary or mystical person or event'. There are two points worth stressing here, both of which echo Haddon's broader predicament: how to use the specific to conjure the general without each collapsing the integrity of the other. One point is that – as we have mentioned – the masks, like Haddon's 'types', enable the masked men to reach beyond themselves and their individuality. In a sense, wearing a mask renders the specific general, but not in a way that keeps such divisions clearly distinct; the masked men remain both specific and general at the same time. The other related point to stress is that the totemic animals which these masks often represent are themselves caught up in the tension between the specific and the general. Abstracted – and often quasi-anthropomorphically – images of specific totemic animals come to represent both such
totemic animals in general and the broader social groups with which they are affiliated, and, by extension, specific individuals come to represent both their own general groups and that group's totem:

This animal, or whatever it may be, is spoken of as the totem of the clan or individual, and it should be borne in mind that the totem is a species of animal, or plant, not an individual one. Thus all cassowaries, and not any one particular bird, are the totem of the whole cassowary clan, or of each member of that clan (Haddon, 1901, p. 43).

As a result of these tensions, there is a constant and disorientating process of focal shifting between specific and general registers, and it is this which Haddon must grapple with, both in his writings and in his ethnographic films. This difficulty or tension is especially compounded when, as in this case, the rituals in question are no longer extant. On that basis, Haddon's reconstructions must, therefore, bear the weight of specificity and generality; firstly, they must be conjured forth in all their visual specificity in order to render the invisible memory of the past in a visual form, and, secondly, their consequent representations must also be made to transcend themselves, to typify the general. As a consequence, it is precisely at this point in the chapter that Haddon shifts focus from a general discussion about totemism to a specific discussion of his attempts to reconstruct the Malu ceremonies. However, this is ultimately with a view to being able to shift back again – from the specific to the general – either directly or by implication.

Before filming proceeds, Haddon (1901, p. 46) is able to work up enough of a 'temporary recrudescence of interest in these and other ceremonies' to induce a number of Islanders to create cardboard models of the Malu masks for him. This is
significant in this context because Haddon’s impulse to commission these masks can be traced back to a failed attempt to do so on his prior 1888-1889 trip to the Islands (Haddon et al, 1908, p. 289). His imagination had been piqued when a number of Islanders told him of the already wavering or extinct Malu ceremonies and later made drawings of the masks from memory (see fig. 25 below), as ‘the originals had been destroyed’ (Haddon et al, 1908, p. 289). Therefore, in the absence of ‘original’ or reconstructed masks, Haddon must contend with an intertwining of memories – theirs and his – made material and visual through drawing.

Haddon seemingly has these types of drawings and memories in mind when he once again attempts to render memory in a visual form by commissioning the Bomai masks in 1898, and the discrepancy between the two elicits some disappointment. ‘Both models [see fig. 24, the top drawing on the right-hand page and the left-hand drawing on the left page] were slightly different from what I expected, but there is no doubt they are as accurate representations as it is now possible to obtain’ (Haddon, 1901, p. 46). What is at stake here is that the various non-indexical attempts to visually apprehend a memorial past are both subjective and troublingly variable; they merely hint at the contours of an uncertain past. Haddon therefore attempts to even out or flatten such variability by creating an intermedial synthesis, which is crucially both indexical and non-indexical, or which at least swings between the two. He begins
with a description of the cardboard model of the central *Bomai* mask:

The face-mask is of open work, painted red, and stuck on it are scattered white feathers. The raised nose is made of beeswax; the eyes are two red seeds; a ring of wax represents the lips. Cardboard models represent the beard of human lower jawbones. Above are feathers of the Torres Straits pigeon and croton leaves. Behind is a model of a turtle (Haddon, 1901, p. 47).

At this stage, we already have a complicated overlapping of memory, vision and commentary: the visually apprehended memories of the Islanders from Haddon's 1888 expedition (along with Haddon's own memories); the material conversion of that memorial vision through the creation of the masks, and Haddon's conversion of both into a written description. Despite his concerns about accuracy, Haddon is nonetheless pleased with the affective power that this overlapping assemblage of reconstructions elicits, and it is here that the circle is completed: from memory to vision and back again. Reacting to the injunction not to show the masks to uninitiated women, Haddon suggests that this is:

[A]n interesting proof of the sanctity in which the original was held. The ceremonies had not been held for a quarter of a century, the people are all Christian, and yet even now a woman may not see cardboard models of the tabooed masks! (1901, p. 47).

However, the affective power of the masks is most marked when viewed by Islanders with personal memories of their own initiations (cf. Herle, 1998b, p. 94):

We had many male visitors to see the masks, and it was quite pathetic to see the expressions of pleasure tempered with sadness manifested by the old men. They shook their heads and clicked, and even the tears started to their eyes. Ichabod! (Haddon, 1901, p. 47).
As if to conjure something of this affective power, the commentary is at this point wrapped around the same monochrome drawing of the cardboard mask that we saw in the *Reports* (see fig. 26 opposite; cf. fig. 24). However, this drawing has now become congealed with the memories and narratives which have preceded it. Indeed, what is particularly significant about this drawing is that it is an implicit attempt to weaken the link to an invisible past and to strengthen the link to a visible present; in other words, it is a sleight of hand, or eye. Rather than – or as well as – transporting the viewer back into an invisible, historical and mythical past, the mask and its images draw that past into a visible present through an implied performance (Griffiths, 2002, p. 141). The first set of drawings of the mask were created from memory alone, and a fairly distant one at that, for which there were few visual correlates. This second drawing is drawn either in the presence of the cardboard reconstruction or its photograph, and can thus implicitly claim greater historical and visual accuracy – however speciously – as well as a type of visual potency situated in the present. This is attested to by its affective power, and this appears crucially important in that, as Alison Griffiths argues (2002, p. 141), it allows Haddon to align his visual reconstructions with the viscerality, tactility and emotion of the *original* ceremony (i.e. the invisible ceremony which has not been filmed) (cf. Herle, 1998b, p. 92):

It is tempting to see, then, in Haddon’s cinematically inspired recreation
of the Malu ceremony for the Head-Hunters reader an alignment of visuality itself with the senses and the emotions rather than the rationalist rhetoric of the expedition's Reports. So where Haddon's Head-Hunters description of the Malu-Bomai ceremony attempts to evoke the phantasmatic excesses of the original ceremony, and capture something of the visceral and tactile quality of the dance, which could only be hinted at in the photographs, his dispassionate Reports entry more closely parallels the discursive tenor of his still photographs of the same event (Griffiths, 2002, p. 141).

Indeed, it is this affective dimension of Haddon's approach to visuality which is exploited in appropriations of the drawing of the mask from Head-Hunters. For example, the Australian novelist, Ion Idriess, whom we encountered in the previous chapter, uses the image in his 1947 novel, Isles of Despair. Set in the 1840s, Isles of Despair is an account of Barbara Thomson, a young Scottish shipwreck survivor on the Torres Strait who is alone spared by the Islanders because they take her to be the spirit of one of the chief's dead daughters.

Like many of his other novels, Idriess is keen to stress the factual basis of the narrative, both by drawing on actual events (there was a Barbara Thomson; she was a shipwreck survivor; she did live on the Islands for many years and returned to tell the tale), and by situating that narrative within the shell of a non-fiction account, and it is here that Haddon figures prominently. Indeed, the novel is littered with drawings from Haddon's writings, and in chapter XIV ('Lurking Dangers'), Idriess (1947, pp. 91-99 [96]; see fig. 27 above) literally shapes his writing around...
the drawing of the cardboard *Bomai* mask as well as one of the earlier drawings made by one of the Islanders (albeit inexplicably upside down). Here the affective power of the masks, which created a sense of awe amongst the initiated Islanders, is here converted into an exoticized and simultaneously intoxicating and suffocating threat of danger: the time and place of initiation from which women are barred access and transgression is punishable by death. Choosing a female protagonist takes on a particular significance in this context in that – given the gendering of secrecy, space and the sacred that I mentioned earlier – it allows Idriess to heighten the effect of his exotica by focusing on the nature of transgression. In this case, the transgression is doubled: not only a breach of sacred, secret and gendered space, but such a breach perpetrated by a white female outsider unwittingly elevated in status by being misrecognized as an ancestor. This suggests a complex articulation of gender, race and class, all of which plays through Barbara's first encounter with the very apotheosis of the sacred and the secret, i.e. the masks:

The ghost and spirit masks of the mari, markai, Lamar and dogai ghosts and spirits. Masks less hideous but grotesque in their barbaric design and colour were half men and half reptile, part men and part bird or fish [...] Masks of *cultural heroes*, of Yadzebub the Warrior and other warriors who made history, of visitors from the skies, *Bomai, Malu, Abob and Kos, Bia, Siwi, Gelam*, and many others (Idriess, 1947, p. 92, emphasis added).

However, her first premonition of danger comes when, passing through the 'grotesque poles and carvings and shrines', she is confronted with 'a fantasy from prehistoric ages': a sorcerer preparing for the 'Death Dance' (Idriess, 1947, p. 93):
Even light and shadow seemed weirdly affected by these grotesque poles and carvings and shrines [...] She stared. Shambling out from the ravine mouth was a something, a monstrosity neither tree nor giant bird nor man but a living thing reminiscent of all three – a fantasy from prehistoric ages. Trembling plumes, shivering leaf and vine under the towering mask of the markai, Spirit of Death. It came gliding up through the amphitheatre to pause by the spirit shrine [...] The illusion of gliding was perfect, helped by the grotesquely patterned leaf petticoat stretching almost to the feet, kept in tautened shape with ribs of cane [...] 

It was Barbara's first real awakening to the unknown dangers which surrounded her. Not the ordinary dangers of shark or animal, reptile or man, but the elusive, much more terrible dangers of the age-old beliefs and violent revenges of primitive man (Idriess, 1947, pp. 93-95).

Such purple prose might appear to be at a considerable remove from Haddon's – and, on the whole, it is – but it is significant that it is at the precise point at which we encounter Haddon's affective drawing of the Bomai mask in Head-Hunters that Haddon's prose begins to rhetorically echo Idriess's 'weird [...] grotesque [...] fantasy'. Having succeeded in getting the Islanders to animate the masks for a reconstruction of the Malu-Bomai ceremony, Haddon finally gives way to his fantastical desire and kaleidoscopic imagination, and it is this which he is most keen to capture on film:

Gadodo, Kilerup, and another man dressed up, and I had the satisfaction of being able to take a cinematograph picture of the processional dance. The grotesque masks worn by ruddled men, girt with leafy kilts, had a strange effect as they emerged from the jungle, and very weird was the dance in the mottled shade of the tropical foliage, a fantasy in red and green, lit up by spots of sunshine (1901, p. 47).

This is a crucial point for Haddon – rendered in uncharacteristically florid prose – and it is one which enables a specific event with specific, named individuals to reach well beyond itself: out into a typifying generality and out into Haddon's
visually charged imagination. The specificity of the event, and the surface representations peeled away from it, become a conduit through which he hopes to conjure the invisible depths of imagination, memory and desire. Indeed, this is a timely reminder that such reconstructions are ultimately not – or not only – about the affective power of the masks and their associated rituals to the Islanders, but about the affective power of such masks and rituals to Haddon himself. Haddon's attempt to reconstruct both masks and rituals is caught between a rationalized desire to fill an epistemological gap and a affective desire to recreate a phenomenological experience. As Alison Griffiths suggests:

One is [...] struck by the way the film negotiates several different and potentially contradictory modalities: the theatricality of performance, intimations of the subjectivities of the Islanders, and the putative certitude of scientific knowledge (2002, p. 141).

Such tensions persist in published accounts of the event as well, although the balance between these forces shifts uneasily depending on whether one is reading Haddon's popular or scientific writings (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 140). The difficulty for Haddon is that he must contend with anthropology's broader predicament, i.e. the paradoxical way in which personal experience authenticates generalized narratives. However, such a process is fluid rather binary, and so over-emphasizing the former runs the risk of undermining the validity of the latter. This is particularly problematic when the question of 'experience' shifts from providing an authenticating base, which is rendered invisible after the fact, to a more complete exploration of the affective qualities of ritual and recording. Indeed, this tension prefigures a debate about representation and experience which would only come to the fore much later in anthropology and ethnomusicology,
particularly in experientially rich domains like ritual and/or music (e.g. Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Barz and Cooley, 1997). Here the disparity between dry, abstract analysis and profound personal experience was particularly strongly felt. Of course, such a tension between these two levels is only dimly registered by Haddon, but it is presumably for this reason that Head-Hunters – the popular, narrative account of the expedition – gives much freer rein to the representation of experience than Haddon's Reports – the scholarly, scientific accounts of the expedition (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 140). Nonetheless, this should not blind us to the fact that such a tension is present in each. Indeed, to some extent, Head-Hunters might be regarded as a window onto the suppressed forces within the Reports themselves, and both must contend with the core tension between specific and general and between experience and representation.

It is seemingly for this reason, therefore, that when we at last encounter his cinematic stills in Head-Hunters, Haddon carefully shifts the focus away from the specificity of the singular event and the filming of the ritual – associated with a visible present – towards a more generalized account of the narrative details of such rituals – associated with an invisible past. More precisely, the former is being used to conjure forth and authenticate the latter:

In order to give the reader a substantially accurate idea of the Malu ceremonies, I do not propose to describe exactly what we saw, but I shall endeavour, as briefly as possible, to resuscitate the past (Haddon, 1901, pp. 47-48, emphasis added).

At the crucial moment the narrative folds in two, shifting from vision to memory, from present to past and from the 'red and green' of perception (Haddon's 'fantasy
in red and green') to the black and white of the page. However, this is not an historical past; it is an undated pre-Christian past, where the sacred men of Mer (no longer named individuals but allegories or representatives of the whole) perform the 'traditional' (i.e. habitual) Malu-Bomai ceremony (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 141). Indeed, the irony of Haddon's incursion into this imaginary pastness is that the further he pushes into it, the further he moves away from historical time; for Haddon's past time is closer to what we might call 'structural' time, an expanded ethnographic present set in the past. In other words, the supplementary narrative is both an account of an event, a fleeting moment captured in time – one day, one set of people, one location – and an invocation of that which exceeds that event. This highlights the kind of shift routinely enacted in ethnographic accounts and one which James Clifford (1986b) has famously dubbed 'ethnographic allegory', where one register (e.g. historical individual action) allegorically recalls another (e.g. generic habitual behaviour).

Therefore, the narrative detail required to make the film and the film stills legible is less a description of the film – and the fleeting moment it captures (what Alison Griffiths gave us earlier) – and more a reconstruction of a social memory – and the structural continuity it implies. More precisely, there is a two-way process at work between the two forms of inscription and the two registers. The film and the film stills remain part of a tangible, visible present, but they require the conjuration of an invisible past to make them legible. Conversely, the invisible past requires a visible present in order to become authenticated, visible and tangible. These two registers remain distinct, but Haddon attempts to allow each to interact and intertwine with the other. Nonetheless, this is not an entirely symmetrical
relationship. Haddon requires the vitality of a 'living', breathing present to impart life into a 'dying' past, to 'resuscitate' it, and, as we shall see/hear in a moment, such breath will take on an auditory quality.

However, the slide between these two registers of present and past becomes more complete as Haddon moves to a discussion of the second part of the initiation: a less sacred phase where the initiated are given public recognition of their status. This event is not depicted in Haddon's film and so he must fall back on a drawing of the scene in order to render the memorial past visible and – later – audible. However, this is a drawing which takes its visual cues from a set of photographs which he later published in the *Reports*, and which he only latterly peoples more completely with initiates and spectators (see fig. 28 below).

![Figure 28, Drawing of the second initiation ritual from *Head-Hunters* (on the left) (Haddon, 1901, Plate VI., A., facing p. 49) and a photographic reconstruction from the *Reports*, Vol. VI (on the right) (Haddon et al, 1908, Plate XXV, no pagination)](image)

It is as if his desire for reconstruction is so strong that any indexical inscription will serve as an authenticating base upon which he can reconstruct a tangible – albeit imaginary – ritual experience. The stillness of this visual reconstruction is then mapped onto the implied motion of the commentary:
Two or three pairs of *omai le* [dog men: initiates] rushed forward, with bent body and trailing arms; with their hands they jerked up sand behind them as they ran, ever and again stopping and playing about and jumping over each other after the manner of the dogs they personated.

These were followed by several pairs of *daumer-le* [pigeon men: initiates] who, in the intervals of running forward, jumped about in a crouching attitude, and beat their chests with the palms of their hands, thereby imitating the perching and the flapping of the wings of the Torres Straits pigeon (*daumer*) (Haddon, 1901, p. 49).

This is then followed by an overlapping play of gazes wherein the scene we see in the drawing and read about in the commentary is witnessed not only by the spectators but by the *zogole* (or sacred men of Mer) who participated in the first initiation (i.e. the one captured on film). However, in this case, they see without being seen, or at least without being recognized. In order to preserve the sacred secret which they represent and which they conferred in the first initiation ritual, the individual identities of the *zogole* – and what they represent – are 'masked' from view on pain of death (and once again we are reminded here of the gendering of secrecy, space and the sacred):

These operations were watched by the three *zogole*, who slowly and sedately marched along till they arrived opposite the spectators, and they then stood still. The reddened bodies of the *zogole* were entirely covered with white feathers, and their heads were similarly obscured; each carried five wands in his right hand. Although they were visible to the women, the personality of the *zogole* was supposed to be unknown to them, and should any woman divulge the name of one of the *zogole*, "she die that night" (Haddon, 1901, p. 49).

Here the tension between experience and representation becomes particularly knotted because unlike later forms of anthropology and ethnomusicology, where the problem is how to adequately represent – or at least convey – one's
experiences, Haddon’s representations are attempts to conjure experiences which he did not actually have. Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that the tension between experience and representation is actually doubled: Haddon must firstly work out how to represent his own personal experiences and secondly work out how to make such representations conjure a second set of habitual experiences rooted in a past which he did not actually inhabit. This is an important variation on the theme of using the specific to represent the general, because this is not about using personal experiences rooted in the present in order to authenticate the dry, generalized abstractions of a positive science, but about using such experiences to authenticate a second-order experiential seam of habitual pastness.

Indeed, such a tension comes particularly to the fore when he attempts to convey a crucial part of the ritual that has so far been missing, and that is sound. Just as Haddon attempted to use indexically registered visual representations of a reconstructed present – in this case, the film stills – to conjure an invisible past, so too he attempts to use indexically registered audio representations of a reconstructed present – in this case, phonograph recordings – in order to conjure an inaudible past. We have already discussed Haddon’s attempts to ‘synchronize’ his cinematic and audio recordings, but the obvious limit point that he must contend with within the confines of the pages of Head-Hunters is the stubborn muteness of the technology of the book. This is a point that ethnomusicologists would later struggle with, often by literally supplementing their writings with recorded material, but Haddon’s choice is to juxtapose narrative descriptions of the auditory dimensions of the second Malu ritual – rooted in an inaudible and imaginary pastness (singing, chanting, drumming) – with a photograph of actual
phonograph recordings in the present (see fig. 29 below).

Figure 29, 'Ulai singing Malu songs into a Phonograph: Gasu is beating the Malu drum', Head-Hunters (Haddon, 1901, Plate VI, B., facing p. 49)

The drum-men appearing from behind a point at the southern end of the beach, ran forward and beat their drums with the characteristic staccato rhythm, and as the chant slowly augmented in sound, all the other voices were hushed, and the audience sat motionless in hushed expectancy (Haddon, 1901, p. 49).

The photograph of the phonograph recordings comes to authenticate this narrative description, and in turn, the narrative description comes to flesh out the photograph. However, in some senses, the phonographic apparatus itself becomes the object of the photographic gaze here, because it, rather than an isolated photograph of a singing, chanting or drumming Islander, appears to conjure sound, or at least to authenticate the written description of sound. Indeed, Michael
Taussig (1993, p. 215) suggests that the phonograph in this image is positioned in a 'sacred pose'. The intermedial relationships obviously become very knotted at this point, but the point to stress is that Haddon is using every weapon in his technical arsenal in order to convey, rather than directly represent, experience.

All of which begins to cast Haddon's cinematographic project in a very different light: less the cinematic verisimilitude that one might expect from an indexical form of inscription and more a fantasy of imagining and remembrance. As we have looked at in various ways so far, such a process of imaginary reconstruction swings between visual supplementation (adding to or amending the images with ink, paint or other images) and a process of narrative supplementation. Both modes of supplementarity are closely intertwined. Indeed, as Gunning (1996, p. 73) is the first to point out, 'the desire to display may interact with the desire to tell a story, and part of the challenge of early film analysis', he suggests, 'lies in tracing the interaction of attractions and narrative organization'. Show and tell go hand in hand, a point that Haddon is all too conscious of.

However, Haddon's desire to recreate and/or convey the experience of the Malu-Bomai ceremonies is not restricted to the types of visual, narrative (and, by implication, audio) supplementation that we have considered so far, and it is here that we move beyond Head-Hunters. Indeed, some of the supplementary images produced in other writings bear a strangely disjunctive relationship to the details of the film, or perhaps a strangely consonant relationship with the absent details of the film (e.g. the initiates, those commissioned to beat the sacred wasikor drum, the avenues of stave-touting men, etc.). We have already examined this process at
work in the drawing of the second initiation ritual in *Head-Hunters*, but as if to hammer this point home in relation to the first and more sacred initiation ritual captured on the film, Haddon produces a watercolour drawing of the more complete picture for volume VI of the *Reports*, where those absent features are included (see fig. 30 below).

This becomes another imaginary visual supplement to the film which invokes a past remembrance. However, this does more than merely fill gaps in the empirical record; rather intriguingly, it also offers us a view of the *off-screen* space of the film (marked by the foreground), a space which, in the film, is occupied by the cinematographic camera and tripod and is here occupied by the initiates (see fig. 31 below).
This point is particularly significant in that we might read it as puncturing some of the voyeuristic anonymity that could be perceived in the film. Indeed, although not unambiguous, it is tempting to articulate Haddon’s spectacular display to a colonial and perhaps even voyeuristic scopic regime: constructing a spectator who, as Metz (cited in Gunning, 1996, p. 75) puts it, is positioned to ‘watch[...] in secret, without the scene he watches acknowledging his presence’. Looking again, however, the spectator is pressed into the disconcerting realization that in this case they are in fact also positioned as the chosen addressees; their gaze fuses with that of the absent initiates; they no longer see without being seen. In some ways this is less a dissolution of the voyeuristic regime per se, and more a shift from one type of voyeurism – where one sees without being seen – to another – where one watches the film ‘as though it were aware of one’s presence’ (Mowitt, 2005, p. 20, emphasis in original). However, without suggesting that this reciprocal gaze is symmetrical in terms of colonial power, it does pose a number of questions about the relationship between the film and one of Gunning’s most central characteristics of the ‘cinema of attractions’, i.e. direct spectatorial address. As Gunning suggests:
The attraction invokes an exhibitionist rather than voyeuristic regime. The attraction directly addresses the spectator, acknowledging the viewer's presence and seeking to quickly satisfy a curiosity. This encounter can even take on an aggressive aspect, as the attraction confronts audiences and even tries to shock them (the onrushing locomotive that seems to threaten the audience is early cinema's most enduring example) (1996, p. 75).

In this case, we are reminded of the fact that the performance of the zogole is designed both to instil a sense of grave secrecy and fear within the initiates and to lodge that experience within their memory. This is more than a neutral address and it perhaps allows us to double up the meaning of 'display', i.e. where it is both a spectacle to be voyeuristically consumed by the spectator and an aggressive social display directed towards that very spectator (now positioned as an absent initiate), thereby puncturing its voyeuristic anonymity: display as spectacle and display as performance.

In other words, there is something of a reversal at work here between different scopic regimes and spectatorial positions. At first glance, the spectator is positioned to look at the sacred men (zogole) through a voyeuristic, colonial visual regime, which produces hierarchies of power and – in a related way – hierarchies of the senses. However, such zogole look back at that spectator through a sacred mask, repositioning them as visible – albeit in this case absent – initiates. This exchange of gazes is significant in that it establishes a second type of spectatorial address – the visible and confronted initiate – existing in principled tension with the first – forms of anonymous colonial voyeurism that see and are not seen. This shift or tension goes some way towards reversing (and perhaps even displacing) the hierarchical relationship between the former – the spectatorial voyeur – and
the colonial objects of such a scopic regime. In this case, the ostensible 'objects' of
the film (i.e. its referents, the zigole) are in a position of power over the absent
initiates, and it is this latter demoted position which is now being mapped onto
that of the spectator. Once again, this does not 'scale up' to the concrete hierarchies
of colonial power, but it does puncture some of the microscopic asymmetries of the
film. The other side of this argument – I won't call it a master/slave dialectic – is
that this reversal might itself be said to be reversed by the simple fact that the
spectator (when positioned as an absent initiate) is also positioned to receive
secret and sacred knowledge. Therefore, what we have here is a circle of
exchange(s) wherein scopic regimes and spectatorial positions keep shifting.

We can expand on this shifting play of gazes, regimes and positions by turning
briefly to the fourth of Haddon's ethnographic films – recording the technical
processes involved in fire-making – for it is here that the direct address of the
cinematic subjects is most explicitly registered. This is significant for a number of
reasons. Firstly, because it is an opening to the types of complex Islander agency
and subjectivity which surface from time to time in Haddon's writings. In this case,
three of Haddon's closest informants are shown seated in a grassy plain using the
friction technique to make fire. Making fire and making film: the alpha and omega
of light-based technologies. The question of reciprocity becomes complex here
because, contrary to the 'cinema of attractions', the purpose of the film is not – or
not merely – to produce a cinematic spectacle, but rather to produce a cinematic
narrative. (Indeed, the hearth is a common spatial trope associated with
storytelling.) This fact is underscored by the direct spectatorial address between

70 A clip of this film can be found on the following site: http://aso.gov.au/titles/historical/torres-
strait-islanders/clip2/ [accessed 15/12/11].
cinematic subject and cinematic film-maker, for what is transpiring between them is actually a verbal dialogue, albeit one that is shrouded in silence. The cinematic subjects are literally addressing the cinematic film-maker both in an exchange of gazes and in an exchange of voices. Put more simply, whilst Haddon is filming them, they – presumably – are teaching him about making fire, a point which renders the obvious asymmetries of power between them more knotted and nuanced.

However, it is here that we also come to the second point of significance about this film: the discrepancy between the film itself (qua spectacle) and this dialogue (qua narrative), and this returns us to our well-worn problematic of specificity and generality, which in this context is also mapped onto the relationship between artisanal production and technical reflection. Or, to put it another way, the space between the cinematic spectacle and its narrative dialogue is the space in which artisanal production is supplemented by technical reflection. What this section of the film actually depicts is a specific action of fire-making conducted in a now ossified present. In order for this present to evoke a generalized or habitual past, Haddon must extract general, technical principles. It is only by so doing that he can attempt to stave off the threat of contingency – which, we should remind ourselves, is inherent to the medium itself (cf. Doane, 2002, p. 65) – and convert the specific into the general. On this basis, the relationship between cinematic spectacle and narrative dialogue replicates or echoes the relationship between experiential authority and scientific generalization. The former of each pair represents specificity and the latter generality. Mary Ann Doane makes a similar point in terms of the relationship between description (which she associates with
Description is a capitulation to the vast and uncontrollable, and ultimately meaningless, realm of the contingent. It is allied with the visual (a "picture") and with the contemporaneous ("one describes what one sees, and the spatial 'present' confers a temporal 'present' on men and objects"). Narration, on the other hand, has an intimate relation with the past (it "recounts") and is therefore able to testify to necessity and inevitability (2002, p. 12).

However, it is precisely this kind of tension which sits at the heart of all technical processes: the supplementary relationship between technical action (performed/described in the present) and logical reflection (preceding such action and/or narrated/produced after the fact). This is the point at which technics becomes a techno-logy. Despite the tendency to emphasize the latter over the former, on the grounds that logical reflection might somehow confound the contingencies of technical action, each leaves a trace in the other. On this basis, the horizontal foresight of technics gets cross-cut by the vertical blindness of chance (Kilroy and Swiboda, 2007). No matter how detailed and thorough one's logical account of fire-making, for example, each instance is unique and – of necessity – subject to the contingent vagaries of environment and materials. This is the tension that is contained in the space between the cinematic spectacle and the silent narrative, and the join between them is the look to the camera, a look which solicits the attention of the spectator and foregrounds the link to the 'cinema of attractions'.

However, where the link to the 'cinema of attractions' breaks down is in the space
between spectatorial positioning and audience reception: given its extremely limited exhibition to small scientific gatherings, none of Haddon's films had a substantial audience to look back, in the same way that other films of the period had, and neither did that limited audience see itself mirrored in the film (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 148). Nevertheless, the film has actually been exhibited on the islands more recently by the Australian documentary film-maker, Frances Calvert (personal communication). Indeed, Calvert includes a section of the Malu film in her important documentary about Islander material culture, *Cracks in the Mask* (1997), which was also shown on the Islands recently, in part as a substitute or precursor for the repatriation or loan of the objects depicted. 'By taking the images back it revitalises our culture and has created a greater awareness amongst younger people' (Anon, 1997, p. 3). A series of more recent documentaries have done likewise (e.g. the BBC's recent 'Hidden Treasures of ... Australian Art' [2011]), suggesting that Haddon's films have more of an audience now than they ever had at the time of filming. In this sense, the 'cinema of attractions' circle becomes complete, wherein the film not only acquires an audience, but an audience who recognize themselves in the film. Of course, such recognition is at one remove, historically and — to some extent — culturally; the familiar rendered at least partially unfamiliar, but it nonetheless provides a mechanism by which an audience can supplement the kinds of cinematic spectacle we have been looking at with its own narrative account.

However, both approaches — focusing on the spectacle of ethnographic cinema or the supplementary narratives of its audience — bring us to a problematic impasse: how do we avoid being pushed to either side the screen? The former focuses on the
spectacular visibility of the cinematic referents and the latter on the narrativized visibility or audibility of the cinematic audience. The problem is that each produces its own form of blindness by looking through rather than at the screen – and, by implication, the camera and its material supports. This move is significant here because it marks a shift from the type of broadly 'horizontal' analysis that we have been conducting thus far – focused on the intermedial relationships between cinema, photography, phonetic writing, etc. – to a type of 'vertical' analysis – focused on the constituent elements within one medium (e.g. camera, tripod, celluloid, screen, etc.). As I set out in the introduction, both can be gathered under the rubric of the 'writing-machine' and are often intertwined, but the latter in particular serves to foreground the presence of the medium's material supports. How, then, do we begin to look? How do we shift attention away from either side of the screen – referents and audience – and towards the cinematic surfaces themselves and what implications does this have?

III. Transparency-Opacity-Contingency: Haddon's Cinematic Surfaces

One place to begin is on the material surfaces of the celluloid itself (cf. Doane, 2007a, p. 18). This is an area of analysis that is often literally overlooked in the study of early ethnographic film – and in film studies more generally, albeit with notable exceptions (e.g. Doane, 2002; 2007a; 2007b; Mowitt, 2005). This is arguably the case in no small part because of the seductiveness of cinematic indexicality, where our gaze is sometimes directed through rather than at the screen. To this extent, cinematic indexicality – as an extension of its photochemical base – offers the lure of what Didi-Huberman (cited in Doane, 2007, p. 129) refers
to as the 'fantasy of referentiality', a modality of light-inflected 'touch' allowing one
the illusion of brushing up against a cinematic referent whilst viewing an iconic
likeness, if we are to use Peirce's terminology. As Alison Griffiths suggests:

[0]ne is struck by the tactile quality of the cinematic image, the way in
which the flat spatial composition and surface textures of the image
seem to drift out toward the spectator not just visually but through a

This is the illusion of distance mastered, to borrow Benjamin's insight (2002
[1936], p. 105). Such a fantasy could be said to be particularly pronounced in the
earliest proliferation of 'actualities', film shorts and ethnographic cinema, where –
as we have already considered – the sheer visceral thrill of display preceded the
emergence of narrativity and montage as the dominant cinematic paradigm(s).
However, such a lure also threatens to render the material base of the cinematic
inscription a deceptively transparent one, as one becomes seduced by the 'other
side' of the screen – the 'that-has-been' of cinema (cinematic index as trace) – or as
one follows the pointing finger of the indexical sign through the screen and
beyond: 'look, here is a spectacle' (cinematic index as deixis). Both forms of index
(deixis and trace) find their way into the cinematic 'fantasy of referentiality', the
former pointing to a 'something', to a 'this', the latter revealing its specificity.

Nevertheless, that 'something' in this context is at least doubled, for cinematic
inscription bears within itself more than just an indexical trace of its referent(s);
its bears an indexical trace of its own material conditions of possibility: the action
of light, dust, scratches and temporal decay upon its photochemical base, and the
material/ideological effects of the broader cinematic apparatus.\textsuperscript{71} Such an expanded reading of cinematic indexicality renders the material base of the cinematic inscription a resolutely opaque one, an inscribed surface composed of and by the action of light, dust, scratches and temporal decay, an action which both inscribes and continually re-inscribes, creating a surface of imperceptible movement and change even in its unprojected stillness (cf. Doane, 2007, p. 129). One is pressed against the cinematic surface itself, which, in its own right and in light of subsequent debates about indexicality and digitality, poses a range of new questions surrounding spectatorship, authorship, contingency, historicity and temporality, and which calls for a newly revivified set of analytical codes and conventions as one flits between a cinematic surface at once indexical and iconic, transparent and opaque.

It is at this point that we may benefit from a return to C.S. Peirce's work on indexicality. Indeed, although I have invoked Peirce's reading of the concept throughout this chapter, one of the things worth pointing out here is that Peirce reads photography – and we might extend this here to film – as sitting between iconicity and indexicality (cf. Metz, 2003, p. 139; Doane, 2002; McLaren, 2003, p. 26). The photograph or celluloid print both look like and, in a sense, touch their referents, but – unlike the footprint and the foot – the line of touch which persists between them is only so via the mediation of light (cf. Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, 71 It should be stressed that, for the most part, I will be using the term 'apparatus' in an intentionally narrow sense here to refer to the medium's material supports, or the relationship between camera, celluloid, screen and so forth. This is in part to hold the analysis at arm's length from from the full force of 'apparatus theory'. However, this is less a principled disagreement or - a key theoretical decision – indeed, aspects of what I am calling the 'writing-machine' could arguably be accommodated to a broader idea of the cinematic apparatus (qua l'appareil and dispositif) – and more an attempt to narrow the focus to the types of material/technical effects of interest here. In this sense, the analysis is possibly closer to l'appareil than dispositif, although I am less interested in what might be glossed as 'ideological effects' and more in how Haddon's attempt to erase the medium's material supports undoes his positivist logic.
pp. 113-115; McLaren, 2003, p. 26). One might think here of the opening of *Camera Lucida* where Roland Barthes (2000a, p. 1) describes his youthful self becoming fascinated with an image of Napoleon's brother on the grounds that he (i.e. the young Barthes) is gazing at the eyes that gazed upon Napoleon. This is a conjunction of gazes which Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler (2002, pp. 113-115) analyse in terms of the lines of light and touch. This inbetweenness or mediation is, I think, important to consider in that it encourages us to reflect upon the sometimes overlooked forms of what we might call 'hyper-indexicality', forms which often only appear when one attends to the materiality of the image surface itself, when one looks at it rather than (or perhaps as well as) through it, rather like a dirty pane of glass which momentarily catches our gaze in contrast to the view beyond; it is difficult to apprehend both at once. Just as a footprint is an indexical trace of the foot which made it, so too are the dust, scratches and flashes of light on the celluloid surface ('spots of sunshine', to reuse Haddon's phrase) (see fig. 32 below) indexical traces of the air particles through which the light travelled to produce these images, and the processes of time and age which subsequently act upon them, none of which are under the regulatory control of the cinematographer, and all of which subject the celluloid to the vagaries of chance, serendipity, and – perhaps – historicity; in other words, to a certain (technical) alterity beyond conscious control. This produces a form of, what we might call, 'overwriting' (sometimes passing beyond human perception at display speed): the machine literally writing itself on itself, a form of automatic or auto-graphic writing.

These features arguably bring both the cinematic apparatus into view – the appearance and disappearance of which is part of our broader dialectic here – and, indeed, the effects of history itself (literally time on the screen). However, there is another obvious layer of complexity that can be alluded to, and that is that what is represented here is, of course, a digitized print from the celluloid, which, contrary to certain views on the topic, does not so much as eradicate the issues surrounding indexicality and materiality as render them more complex and knotted.  

Computers, screens and projectors are all material objects and they leave their own indexical/material traces, most notably here in the visibly decomposed pixelation of the image (see fig. 33 below). Here the ‘overwriting’ is overwritten again; a technological palimpsest. Thus Haddon’s film contains both the marks of its original and secondary inscriptions (e.g. dust, light flashes, scratches, marks of age, etc.) as well as the marks of its tertiary inscription (digitized pixelation).

73 As we will also examine in the phonograph chapter, such a shift from celluloid to digital supports enacts a concomitant shift in interpretation, which is part and parcel of what I mean by the ‘writing-machine’.
These issues of material traces come particularly to the fore in the second and third sections of Haddon's film – which are split into three discontinuous shots – and where Haddon is forced to confront the materiality andopacity of the cinematic apparatus. In each of these shots, we see a series of highly choreographed, stylized and patterned crouching movements mimetically replicating activities associated with agriculture (such as planting yams), fishing (such as collecting pearl shells) and ecology (such as the movements of crabs, birds and iguanas, etc.). Thus Haddon's choice is as much strategic as it is aesthetic: dance as a metonym of the social. Dance in this context is made up of bodies in motion and their prosthetic extensions – feathered headdresses, etc. – which together create a gestural language that reflects on various economic, ecological and religious dimensions of the social; it is, in effect, one form of body movement 'representing' another.

So what Haddon is confronted with – or rather orchestrates – is a singular pro-filmic event of bodies in motion, an event with its own internal duration and spatial arrangements or logic, but an event nonetheless composed of ephemeral
moments. The challenge for Haddon is to make such ephemera exceed themselves and their moment of inscription, to make them typify (a culture) rather than represent (a moment), to obviate, in other words, the threat of contingency implied by the logic of the event. In this case, his singular event is implicitly caught between at least three contradictory – or perhaps overlapping – temporal formulations wherein the so-called 'real time' of the event is made to exceed itself: firstly, the event as part of, what we might call, a structural-present, or, more commonly, an 'ethnographic present' (the ahistorical motif: where individual historical action – 'this is how X person performed a dance on that day' – invokes generic habitual behaviour – 'this is how the X people perform such dances in general'); secondly, the event as part of a present-becoming-past (the vanishing native motif: where one presents oneself as before the deluge, just in time to record the last moments of the damned) and thirdly, the event as part of a past-becoming-present (the reconstruction motif: where depictions of partial or complete reconstructions are given the scientific seal of indexicality, in this case partial reconstructions of dances much reduced by missionary influence). So one either denies historical time – slicing through to the typical – invokes it as a form of imminent loss, or regards it as the backdrop to one's ruins. In other words, one is either outside time, just in time or too late. These temporal formulations produce fracture lines which run throughout the project as a whole, but all three provide a means of shifting from the event, a fleeting moment captured in time – one day, one set of people, one location – towards that which exceeds that event, and, as such, they provide a means of staving off the spectre and threat of contingency implied by the logic of the event itself.
However, the crux of such a threat is that it leaves its mark(s) on 'both sides' of the screen: both the pro-filmic event and the inscription process. Haddon has already responded to the former by trying to efface the presence of the event (or reduce it to structure); he now responds to the latter by trying to efface the presence of the apparatus (or reduce it to transparency). In this regard, Haddon finds himself caught in an unresolved tension between transparency — a desire to obliterate the presence of the apparatus, to 'touch' the spectral referent and evaporate its contingency — and opacity — a realization of the impossibility of any such obliteration. The film's surface stubbornly refuses to be occluded and Haddon is forced to weave between it and its 'beyond'.

The attempted erasure of the cinematic apparatus operates in a number of overlapping ways (relating to temporality, spatiality and light): firstly, disavowing any intentional ruptures, cuts or edits (i.e. attempting to make the time of the event — so-called 'real time' — consonant with that of its representation, and this is the 'real time' which I have suggested has been made to exceed itself); secondly, giving the camera a fixed position (no pans, close-ups or other movement, etc.\(^{74}\)) and thirdly, replicating the height, positioning and light intensity of vision. Clearly these factors are (at least in part) determined by the mechanics and limitations of the apparatus (circa 1898), but such an eventuality is not in itself incidental or ideologically neutral as Jean-Louis Baudry (e.g. 1992) has made clear in his cinematic apparatus essays. In this context, what is being primarily established or demonstrated is a positivistic fantasy of cinematic transparency.

\(^{74}\) See Mowitt (2005, p. 153) on the later attempt to incorporate the zoom shot in ethnographic film as a 'visual sign of nonintervention', on the grounds that one can appear closer without moving the camera.
However, the attempt to efface the apparatus meets with certain crucial limit points, most neatly summed up in this case by a series of ruptures or – what Mary Ann Doane (2002, pp. 159-160) refers to as – 'ellipses' created by a series of camera jams in this case – and here we return to Méliès' 'stop tricks'. This happens three times in the second set of clips, represented below (fig. 34) in three horizontal rows (1-3, 4-6 and 7-9).

The numbers in the central vertical column (2, 5 and 8) represent the point just before or after the jam and the numbers at the left and right of each represent moments a few frames either side. Numbers 2 and 5 are just after the camera has been restarted (i.e. it is the beginning of the new shot rather than the end of the...
old) and number 8 is just at the point of the jam (after which he gave up and went on to a new subject: fire-lighting).

Such ruptures (whether intentional or not) were disavowed by some as producing an unpalatable perceptual shock, and courted by others (e.g. Georges Méliès) as producing magical effects of appearance and disappearance. As Stephen Bottomore remarks in his study of the origins of cinematic editing:

[Shot transitions] without warning and without intermediate change [meant that the] eye suffered a shock [...] for a new eye, one image replacing another in a flash does in fact give the impression of a magical substitution, a lightning-like metamorphosis (1990, pp. 105, 112).

Both responses (perceptual shock and magical fascination) are closely analogous to, and bound up with, the affective relations between modernity, technology and subjectivity, but they are particularly pronounced in this case given that the 'edit' was produced by a contingency of the camera. To Haddon – no great theorist of modernity – this is a mere nuisance, a risible opacity of the equipment, the glass turned to sand, the water to snow, but such ruptures are highly overdetermined and lodge an opaque screen between the event and its representation (both literally and metaphorically). Such a space of opaque mediation is of particular concern to Haddon because it means that the representation carries both less and more than the event. It records too little (there are gaps and discontinuities in the record, and no record, however complete, will substitute for a cultural milieu) and too much: it creates points of deviation between the representation and the event-as-spectated in terms of temporality, spatiality and light, all of which cut into Haddon's attempt to efface the presence of the apparatus.
Firstly, we see the rupturing of so-called 'real time', which not only produces a jarring shock to the smooth spatial and temporal flow of the film, but much more pointedly becomes an exemplar of the concealed rupture that is cinema itself. In other words, the rupturing of so called 'real time' merely foregrounds what is normally hidden (i.e. that cinematic 'real-time' is an effect of projection: stillness made to masquerade as movement). Secondly, we see a magical disappearance of the performers as they are cast into an off-screen space – evoking Bottomore's 'lightning-like metamorphosis' (see fig. 34, number 2) – and the subsequent movement of the camera into that space (see fig. 34, number 5), which destabilizes the film's momentum, drawn from a contrast between the rapid movement of the dancers and the relative stillness of both the camera and the photographic tableaux in the background. Thirdly, we see a brilliant excess of light intensity (see fig. 34, number 2) at the point of rupture, rendering the image opaque (or at least translucent), and this highlights the extent to which the very light which makes the image transparent or legible is what, in it excess, makes it slide towards the opaque and the illegible: a cataract forming over a camera eye.

The significance of such a material focus is that it foregrounds the artifactuality of the image or image construction process and makes visible the technology of cinema itself (and/or its effects), all of which, so the argument goes, have been traditionally occulted or effaced in classical narrative film. Such artifactuality is bound up with – and unveils – the history of the inscription itself and the histories in which such an inscription is embedded. In Mary Ann Doane's apt phrase (2002, p. 143), it reveals a film 'stained with [its] own historicity'. Less obviously perhaps,
such a focus also challenges the residual hylomorphism (or form-matter relations) of cinema, which often reads the celluloid surface as inert matter to be formed – and thereby submerged – by an overarching cinematic authority or authorship. Challenging such an approach gives the camera and the materiality of the cinematic surface a role in the authorial process: the machine literally writing itself on itself. Just as the carpenter or sculptor can never fully master their materials, so too the film maker can never fully master theirs. This exposes the film surface to more than the effects of light, but also to the godly whims of chance, as we have seen. Some film makers have deliberately courted such effects by literally showing the camera on screen or actually marking or scratching the surface of the film, but what I have tried to explore here is the extent to which such experiments foreground what is already there – but perhaps occluded – in other forms of cinematic inscription, either through extremely visible marks of historical decay or through fossilized instants or ruptures within and between frames which are barely perceptible to the eye at projection speed. The challenge of such an approach is to sidestep the poles of residual hylomorphism on one side – which reads the cinematic surface as inert matter – and a form of materialist determinism on the other, which reads the celluloid surface – as well as cinema's broader material conditions of possibility – as entirely constitutive of cinematic inscription (without residue). The former gives cinematic materiality too little significance, the latter too much. Thus the challenge is to lay recourse to a non-reductive reading of cinema's material base, as part of the condition of possibility for, but not the limit point of, cinematic inscription.

I would argue that it is precisely the accumulation of these kinds of effects which
ultimately presses Haddon into a decisive – and perhaps damning – double bind: i.e. that his images offer both too little – acting as poor substitutes for vanishing referents and requiring supplementation to counter illegibility – and too much – becoming, on the contrary, too legible, too overdetermined and prone to manifold readings, too excessive and open to chance encounters and unencumbered historicity (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 143). Indeed, it is perhaps for this very reason that Haddon, in his later years and published works, began to turn away from indexical technologies, and their visually or acoustically rendered surfaces, towards a more strictly phonetic writing, a turn which post-Victorian anthropology at large began to effect. As mentioned before, this was part and parcel of a more general shift in anthropology from data to meaning, surface to depth and positivism to its others, etc. However, what at one level might be read as a turn away from the reductiveness of positivism can also be read as a turn away from the excessiveness of indexical technologies. On this reading – and we will develop this in the next chapter – anthropologists began to squeeze the human sensorium through the 'bottleneck' of phonetic writing (Kittler, 1999, p. 4) in a bid to either bypass indexical technologies altogether or to hold their excesses in check. Either way, such a move could not succeed without residue, and this is most forcefully in evidence in the disjunctive logics and kaleidoscopic colours of Haddon's ethnographic imagination. Haddon's oeuvre swings between the 'red and green' excesses of an experiential prose and the 'black and white' interests of a rigorous science, and that is a tension which remains unresolved, but ultimately – I would suggest – creatively generative for the anthropological generation to come.
PART III: PHONOGRAPHY

'The Exhalation of the Past': Moribund Objects, Mimetic Machines and A.C. Haddon's Phonographies

Memory is unique to each one of us, and it is familial, tribal, communal, the seepage into our minds of other memories, an intravenous inheritance, the past in our bloodstream, elixir, stimulant, poison, antidote [...] the exhalation of the past that shapes the present, like the glassblower's breath in the bubble of hot, melted sand.

Peter Quinn, 'In Search of the Banished Children' (1997, p. 143)

Media Convergence: The Digital Uncanny

Each of the preceding chapters has examined the set of tensions which arise in the shift from medium specificity (centred on the indexicality of photography and cinematography; cf. Doane, 2007, p. 129) to intermediality (the sets of relationships between or within these media and their others: published phonetic writing, drawing, handwriting, etc.). However, one of the core points of tension is that the one never gives way to the other in any complete or clean-cut way. There is no clear point at which photography slides into – and thereby becomes – its others, or cinematography ceases to maintain its medium specificity, etc. Despite appearances, each remains distinct and yet – perhaps paradoxically – at the same time is clearly marked by its situatedness, relatedness or juxtaposition with or within its others. Such a tension or problem is neither coincidental nor extraneous to the medium in question. It is an inherent or latent tension, but one which
becomes especially marked, highlighted or pronounced in situations of intermedial proximity.

Such a tension has also been registered within this thesis, which is nominally – and self-consciously – structured around medium specificity, but which gives way at each instant to a set of intermedial complications to such specificity. In this chapter, phonography will participate in the same set of tensions as photography and cinematography, but, as deployed by Haddon at least, it will do so in very particular ways with very particular consequences both for our discussion of intermediality and for our discussion of indexicality and motion. This chapter will therefore add to the continuing discussion of medium specificity and intermediality both by considering the role of phonography within this set of questions but by also considering a question that has remained peripheral or latent up to this point: the question of media convergence. Indeed, it is precisely because medium specificity does not give way to intermediality in a clear-cut way that Haddon is forced to look for solutions which will merge – what Friedrich Kittler in *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter* (1999, *passim*) likes to call – 'data streams'. Interestingly, however, Haddon’s work appears to reverse the direction of travel that Kittler schematizes in *Discourse Networks*. Summarizing in *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*, Kittler (1999, p. 3-4) suggests that, circa 1800, phonetic writing offered a clean and unitary funnel through which the human sensorium could be channelled, and thereby transformed into, the written signifier. The compatibility between each signifier – even, or perhaps especially, if that compatibility is one of binary opposition – meant that the game of signification could be played on a level playing field. Without necessarily surrendering to the idealist implications of this
sentiment, signifiers could be referred back to other signifiers and, at least in principle, all sensation could be rendered comparable in ways that were impossible with variant sensations like touch and sound, for example. As Kittler's translators, Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz put it:

The discourse network of 1800 depended upon writing as the sole, linear channel for processing and storing information. For sights, sounds, and other data outside the traditional purview of language to be recorded, they had to be squeezed through the symbolic bottleneck of letters, and to be processed in meaningful ways they had to rely on the eyes and ears of hermeneutically conditioned readers. Reading, in that sense, was an exercise in scriptographically or typographically induced verbal hallucination, whereby linguistic signs were commuted into sounds and images (in Kittler, 1999, pp. xxiv-xxv).

Circa 1900, enter into this walled garden the indexical triumvirate of the nineteenth century: photography, phonography and cinematography. For Kittler, this suggests that acoustical and visual 'data streams' became detached for the first time both from the human sensorium itself and from the relative comfort of the written signifier:

With the advent of phonography and film, however, sounds and pictures were given their own, far more appropriate channels, resulting in a differentiation of data streams and the virtual abolition of the Gutenberg Galaxy (Winthrop-Young and Wutz in Kittler, 1999, pp. xxiv-xxv; cf. pp. 4-6, 14).

Whatever the merits and demerits of such an argument, Haddon is, in a sense, faced with this predicament in reverse: he starts with a disembodied human sensorium and the kinds of mutually incompatible 'data streams' that are essential for a nascent positive science, particularly when such a science fears a loss of object. However, as we have considered already, such disembodiment and mutual
incompatibility pose serious threats, not only to the goals of a positive science, but to the goals of a positive science that wishes to communicate its intentions, methods and conclusions to an interested scientific audience and, even more, to a general and popular readership. In short, some form of media convergence – for which read media translation – is in order. As we have considered in the preceding chapters, Haddon’s response is to channel such variant 'data streams' through phonetic writing, albeit in ways which are simultaneously incomplete, fragmentary and excessive, and, as we shall consider in this chapter, such an approach to merging different media reaches a certain limit point or complication with the phonograph.

One might begin to establish this by first pointing to Kittler’s own addendum to his 'discourse networks', suggested in *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter* (1999) and developed in *Literature, Media, Information Systems* (1997): circa 2000, the spectre of media convergence returns via the question of digitization. The divergent, analogue 'data streams' of 1900 converge once again, but this time as binary code. This is ultimately a form of writing itself, of course, but one which must be 'machine-read'. Writing in 1985, Kittler (1999, p. 2) prophesied that digitization would precipitate a convergence of media, or – more hyperbolically – the obliteration of media altogether (cf. Doane, 2007, pp. 130, 143). In the context of Haddon’s media archive, this produces unanticipated intermedial relationships and juxtapositions which reveal the uncanny qualities latent within the media themselves and within their inter-relationships. Indeed, there is something of a paradox here in that digitization draws all media through one convergent, digital filter – like phonetic writing circa 1800 – whilst at the same time revealing each
medium in all its specificity. The closer the media are brought together, the more we are able to understand their differences.

**Auld Lang Syne: 'The Wonders of the Gramophone'**

We therefore encounter two types of media convergence, analogue and digital. Haddon's obvious adherence to the former means that, by drawing his multiple data streams through the filter of alphabetical writing, he must simultaneously use and occult such streams. The multiplication of data streams is therefore both a blessing and a curse for Haddon: the former because it enables greater empirical depth and scope, and the latter because it is contingent and unwieldy. As we have said, he attempts to sidestep this by re-converging such data streams back into letters. As a result, their combined affective force is not always felt. No matter how intermedial it might be, a piece of travel writing, for example, is not the same as a multimedia presentation. However, it is somewhat ironic that one of the ways in which these streams can be made to most fully enact their affective potential (in all their analogue medium specificity) is by attending to their digital convergence. In other words, one can shift from an intermedial publication to a multimedia presentation by way of digital reproduction. Despite the now shifted bond between inscription and referent, one can activate the uncanny and discrepant registers of Haddon's media by so doing, and two of the key elements for this effect are chance and simultaneity. To choose one prominent example, such an effect is produced when – as happened to me by accident – one inadvertently ends up listening to a

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75 There is obviously a large body of writing on the relationship between indexicality and digitality, but particularly notable or relevant examples include: Doane, 2002, 2007; Kittler, 1999 and Stiegler, 2002.
digitized phonograph recording of the expedition's linguist, Sidney Ray, on the eve of the expedition, whilst simultaneously reading a scanned copy of his obituary in an anthropological journal (see fig. 35 below).

This is an aural version of Barthes' (2000a, p. 95) analysis of the simultaneously dead and dying prisoner in Camera Lucida (Ray is dead and he is going to die) and it serves to highlight the paradoxical closeness and distance of indexical recording technologies, even if this is at one digital remove. The distinction here—and seemingly the source of such uncanniness—is not that between the seeming vivacity of Ray's voice in the phonograph recording and the presence of death in the obituary. It is the realization that the obituary is merely drawing out more explicitly the presence of death/absence which is (of necessity) enshrined within the phonograph recording itself (cf. Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p. 39). That is what affords Ray's voice such a haunting, ghostly quality; it is so close and yet so far away; the aural 'focal' point keeps shifting.

One could have such an uncanny encounter with a phonograph and a hard-copy of the journal, of course, but doing so digitally on one computer heightens the effects.

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77 Whilst reading the obituary, I accidentally moved the cursor over the sound file, which started playing Ray's voice without me initially realizing. The sudden realization that the same person was being referred to in both forms of inscription produced a particularly uncanny effect.
of chance and simultaneity. This chance simultaneity exposes the spatial and temporal discrepancies between the two representations and between both and then/there and now/here. More than twenty years had passed between the invention of the phonograph in 1877 and Ray's recording in 1898 – a period of time which seemingly did little to lessen the machine's affective qualities, particularly where recording was concerned – and more than forty years passed between the recording and Ray's death in 1939. Historical time becomes uncannily flattened in the act of listening. What was recorded was for the purposes of a hypothetical future which has already come.

This effect is heightened by the fact that the recording depicts Ray giving a demonstration of the 'wonders of the phonograph' (a telling slip of the tongue caught in wax), after which his friends and colleagues gather to say farewell by singing 'Auld Lang Syne'. Based on a Robert Burns poem about the passing of time, 'Auld Lang Syne' (literally 'old long since') is most commonly sung at New Year's Eve, but is also sung at any social event which marks both an end and a beginning, e.g. graduations, journeys, funerals, etc. This further levers open the relationship between the phonograph and death (cf. Brady, 1999, p. 15). The endings/new beginnings are multiplied: the expedition itself, the fear of cultural death of the Torres Strait Islanders (imminent and immanent) and the death of the expedition members themselves (imminent and immanent). All participants are dead and going to die, and this realization – or experience – in a moment of digital

78 One might think here of Gavin Bryars' attempt to musically grapple with _The Sinking of the Titanic_ (1969-). In some versions of this composition, the ambient strains of a seemingly calm sea are combined with the gentle ringing of a buoy's bell and the implied sounds of revellers at a party on-board the ship. The temporal implication is clearly of a before and an after, and the sounds have been processed to sound as if they are emanating from the bottom of the sea; close and yet distant.
media convergence is both effectively uncanny and uncannily affective. Edison's 'Home' phonograph (Haddon and Ray's machine of choice), used at home, opens itself up to the unheimlich.

Aside from its general focus on voice and speech, sound and music, and loss and the machine – all of which will be examined in this chapter – this interlude suggests two important specific points. The first is a reiteration of a point from the introduction: namely, the extent to which a shift in archival supports (e.g. from wax and paper to binary code and hard-drives) effects a shift in interpretation, experience, archivization and institutionalization. This is part and parcel of what is meant by the 'writing-machine' and once again it enacts a shift from an intermedial or 'horizontal' analysis (between phonography and phonetic writing in this case) to a medium specific or 'vertical' analysis (from wax to computer memory). Sometimes this shift is geographical, topographical or topological (for example, the recording in the above vignette is lodged digitally within the British Library Sound Archive and the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies rather than at Cambridge University). To this extent, digitization precipitates a type of institutional or archival spread which – although contained within – is not bounded by these traditional institutions. This is a shift of space/place as well as a concomitant shift of authority; it is a dispersal as well as a gathering (cf. Derrida, 1995, esp. 1-23). At other times, the shift from analogue to digital actually precipitates a repetition of an earlier discursive construct. For example, the question of digitization figures in a peculiarly recurrent version of the trope of loss that we have been tracing throughout this thesis: namely, that the analogue recordings created to indemnify against loss are themselves subject to
the threats of decay or loss. The response this time is to digitize, a process which is rhetorically encrusted with ideas of permanence and solidity. As Mary Ann Doane suggests (2007, p. 143), the 'cultural dream of the digital is a dream of immateriality, without degradation or loss'. In that sense, this is not only a return of the threat of loss (albeit reformed), but a return of the related threat of contingency. Digitization promises (and obviously fails) to finally render the process of mediation invisible, or at least translucent rather than opaque, and to escape the ravages of material decay. Therefore, what at one level might be a loss – a broken bond between referent and representation – might at another level be a gain: a promise of immaterial permanence (cf. Doane, 2007, p. 143). However, as we considered in our discussion of film in the previous chapter, such a promise is as likely to be compromised by digitization as enabled by it.

The second point that this interlude suggests is the extent to which phonography is such an inherently temporal medium, both in the general sense of past/present relations (phonographic recordings are always of the past [cf. Ames, 2003, p. 314]), and in the more specific sense of the role that temporality plays in the perception of recorded sound itself. Indeed, this latter quality takes on an a particularly important significance here and begins to shift phonography away from other media, like photography for example. The 'meaning' of any phonograph recording (that is to say, our ability to perceive it as such, rather than it semiotic qualities) is entirely dependent upon temporal duration in a manner analogous to one's immediate perception of music, to choose one prominent example.

Such a point suggests Husserl's influential discussion of the distinction between
primary, secondary and tertiary retention (cf. Moran, 2000, pp. 124-163). Following Husserl's favourite example of musical perception, primary retention is, according to Husserl, what makes that perception possible as such. As each musical instant slips away into the past, we must rely on an immediate act of memorial retention in order to join these instants into a meaningful whole that we experience as music. Whilst so doing, we simultaneously project our perception into the future (what Husserl calls 'protention'), in anticipation of future musical instants (cf. Moran, 2000, pp. 128, 138). Together, these instants are gathered together and meaningfully perceived as music. In other words, we literally could not hear music as music without memory. This is analogous to the process by which we perceive the projection of discontinuous still images in cinema as movement. In the musical example, such temporal discontinuities in sound are perceived as the smooth flow of musical perception. This effect is even more effective in auditory experience, because, unlike film, we cannot slow it down to reveal its discrete components (or at least not in the same way). Therefore, the illusion of a smooth flow of sound is even more convincing. This lack of discreteness poses something of a problem for Haddon, as we shall consider later.

In sum, what will constitute a musical unit of analysis?

Secondary retention refers to the process of memory at one remove from the event (e.g. remembering a piece of music that one had heard earlier in the day). Tertiary retention – an area that Husserl was famously uninterested in and which was subsequently taken up in phenomenal detail by Bernard Stiegler (e.g. 1998) – refers to the process of externalization by which such memory is stored up or written down, etc. Phonograph recordings clearly fall into this latter category, but
these three memorial modes form more of a loop than a line in the sense that one's perception of something like a phonograph recording depends upon primary retention, and one's later remembrance of such perception could be regarded as secondary retention; the circle is complete.

Interesting, although such an insight about phonography's inherently temporal nature might move phonography away from photography, it actually brings it closer to cinematography, for 'temporal duration' is really 'movement' by another name (cf. Mowitt, 1992, p. 196). Just as with our discussion of cinematic movement or kineticism in the previous chapter, part of the core fascination with the phonographic apparatus itself and its recordings is not only that they bestow a certain movement, dynamism or vitality, but that they do so of necessity. Cinema stopped is photography; phonography stopped is silence.

From Social-Semiotics to Mediation-Translation

Each of these themes – archival supports, loss, temporality and movement – will be developed later in the chapter, but let us first move to a brief methodological consideration of the kinds of analysis which I would like to conduct here. For Haddon at least, phonography is embedded in an intermedial context in at least three main ways: explicitly as a sociological phenomenon; peripherally as a photographic object and implicitly as an intermediary between speech and writing, music and graphical notation. The second strand here has already been explored briefly within the photography chapter, but also touches at times on the other two strands. I therefore propose to perform two overlapping tranches of analysis:
firstly, examining the phonograph (qua material object) and phonography (qua practice) from a broadly socio-semiotic perspective. Here we overlap with Elizabeth Edward’s analysis of anthropological photography (e.g. 2001): photography qua social mediator rather than, or as well as, photographs as evidential or semiotic surfaces. Indeed, phonography figures prominently and similarly in Haddon’s writings, and *Head-Hunters* in particular, sometimes in terms familiar to Michael Taussig’s (1993, pp. 200-207) reading of what might be called the ‘technology of enchantment’\(^7\), but more often – alongside photography – as a means of general social interaction. Either way, the significance lies in the fact that the phonograph is there at the scene of inscription, foregrounding the apparatus itself. Like the ‘cinema of attractions’, it is not only the ‘natives’ who are fascinated, as we considered in our ‘Auld Lang Syne’ interlude, and also like the ‘cinema of attractions’, one of the principle sources of fascination is with the process of recognizing oneself in the apparatus.

Secondly, I propose to examine the phonograph as a means of transformation from speech to phonetic writing and from music to graphical notation. To that extent, this second tranche sees the phonograph adopting one of the original purposes intended by Edison: the phonograph qua mechanical amanuensis or copyist, albeit with something of an ironic shift from office and home (Haddon used Edison’s ‘Home’ phonograph after all) to the field (cf. Brady, 1999, pp. 1, 22-23). Indeed, this function is doubled here such that the phonograph qua mechanical amanuensis is implicitly transcribing – and rendering tangible and immortal – the final words of...

\(^7\) This phrase is most commonly associated with Alfred Gell’s essay (1999, pp. 159-186), ‘The Technology of Enchantment and the Enchantment of Technology’. Here I mean it in the more general sense implied by Michael Taussig (1993, pp. 198), i.e. what he calls ‘the white man’s fascination with their [colonial subjects’] fascination with these mimetically capacious machines [photography, film, phonography, etc.]’. 
the dying (cf. Kittler, 1999, pp. 11-13). As Kittler suggests (1999, p. 13), 'the realm of the dead is as extensive as the storage and transmission capabilities of a given culture [...] In our mediascape, immortals have come to exist again'.

In this context, phonography performs these functions – transcribing and preserving – by becoming an intermediary between speech and phonetic writing, music and graphical notation (cf. Kittler, 1999, p. xii). Following Kittler's discussion of media convergence, such a process of mediation enables an otherwise bewildering variety of data streams to be returned to the comforting familiarity of a convergent 'Gutenberg Galaxy' (Kittler, 1999, p. 4). Whilst Kittler's translators suggest that phonography can 'faithfully manipulate the spoken word in ways that no longer require that speech be translated into writing' (Kittler, 1999, p. xii), Haddon's predicament is that such a process of translation is a necessity. So far as he is concerned then, the process of mediation between speech and phonetic writing and music and graphical notation marks a shift from the material unwieldiness of Edison's 'fugitive sound waves' (cited in Brady, 1999, p. 1) to a perception of – the control offered by phonetic writing. In this sense, phonography adopts the role of a true medium (cf. Brady, 1999, pp. 8-9).

However, the vital mediating role it plays in this regard is but one link in a long chain of musicological conversions or translations that need to be telescoped out. There is a second – and prior – order of transformation at work here: from the materiality of the voice to speech and from the complexities of audible sound – including the sound of the machine and the audible traces of its recording surfaces – to music. One must therefore make a distinction between speech and music (qua
meaningful signification) and voice and sound (qua material excess, 'fugitive sound waves', etc.). The transformation of the latter into the former involves a distinct process of occultation, not only of the machine and its recording surfaces, but of the sonic complexities and contingencies of sound and voice.

Thus, we have a chain of transformation expanding from sound to music to graphical notation. However, between sound/music and graphical notation, phonographic inscription adds a third mediating layer by transforming sound/music into material culture qua tangible recorded object (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 313). This is an extension of the idea that material objects (like the masks of the previous chapter) might encode historical narratives. In this context, sound and music are being encoded as material objects. Only then can such sound (qua music) be transformed into graphical notation, and only then can the latter be further transformed into information to build an evolutionary narrative (information qua positive data [cf. Ames, 2003]).

The process of transformation therefore telescopes out like this: from 'noise' to meaningful sound, from sound to music and material culture, and from material culture to phonetic writing, graphical notation and information. This is similar to the process of transformation we saw in the previous chapter where an invisible memory was converted into a visual, material form. In this case, we shift from an invisible and intangible sound to an inaudible but visible surface. However, this is not just a shift from the invisible to the visible. As with the previous chapter, the more specific link between memory and vision comes into play – adding a fourth mediating layer – as much of the music waiting to be transcribed stems from
memorially mediated, post-hoc reconstructions. To that extent – under certain circumstances – the process of transformation might actually telescope out like this: from *memory* to 'noise', meaningful sound, music, material culture, phonetic writing, graphical notation and information.

Whatever way we choose to order this complex and expanding set of transformations or translations, it is this second tranche of transformation or translation that will prove the most problematic for Haddon, not least because it is the place and source of the most bafflement, excess and contingency (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 304). That is not simply because of the complex chain of transformations involved and the possibility of going astray at each stage, but also because the phonograph itself records too much as well as too little. In other words, it is not a silent or transparent partner in the process of mediation. Part of its strength is that it records more than passes through readily perceptible semiotic filters (the materiality of the voice, the shuffling of the material surfaces of the machine, etc.) (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 314). This authenticates 'raw data' as data, but it also produces streams of excess which have to be whittled away in the process of analysis, successfully or otherwise. Haddon has therefore to follow a circuitous route whereby once recording technologies function to gather and authenticate their data, they can be cast aside as transparent and/or incidental to the analysis, successfully or otherwise.

1. **Phonographic Exhibition: 'Voices Echoed from The Mysterious Instrument'**

Thus adumbrated stand our two main tranches of analysis. Let us then begin with a
discussion of the phonograph qua sociological phenomenon. To open with by far the most resonant source for such an analysis (Haddon's [1901] popular travelogue, *Head-Hunters*), explicit references to the phonograph (qua material object) and phonography (qua practice) appear no less than twenty-seven times in the book. These are instances of what I might call 'phonographic events', and will act as the units of analysis for this more sociologically and semiotically oriented section. This book therefore offers the deepest and richest seam for a sociologically oriented reading of how phonography mediates colonial social relations between Haddon's team, the Torres Strait Islanders and inhabitants of Papua New Guinea.

As with the analyses that we have conducted thus far on photography and cinematography, *Head-Hunters* again becomes a most valuable source, not least because Haddon's methodologies and informal interactions – seemingly of peripheral interest to the more 'scientific' and less 'narratively' focused *Reports* – are left clearly on display and operative within the book. Indeed, the relative volume of references to the phonograph, whilst not overwhelming, is itself interesting in that it represents roughly a third of all Haddon's references to media in the book, despite the fact that of his three core modes of inscription, it is photography which leaves a disproportionately high trace within the published materials associated with the expedition (e.g. the six volumes of scientific *Reports*, the various articles and *Head-Hunters*). This is deeply symptomatic of (amongst other things) the beguiling *performative* appeal of the phonograph, an appeal which is matched only by the magic lantern slide as a form of entertainment, edification and, perhaps most crucially, a form of social interaction eliciting ethnographic material. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that both performative

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80 Bearing in mind that such a dichotomy between science and narrative is neither posed explicitly by Haddon nor endorsed uncritically here.
modes (each approaching the temporality and dynamism of cinema) tend to either sit side by side or overlap in Haddon's writings (and in *Head-Hunters* in particular). It is also worth stressing that, although little remains to record audience responses in any detailed way, Haddon later exhibited such multimedia displays to a 'home' audience back in England (Griffiths, 2002, pp. 134, 148). In other words, the performative appeal of the phonograph is a general one, even if the filtering of colonial power therein is far more context-specific.

As a result, such beguiling qualities need to be first set within the context of the various ways in which phonography often figures within colonial writings, sociologically and semiotically. For example, one of the first ways in which it appears is via the 'colonial farce' trope that we encountered in the first chapter on photography. This trope functions by rendering comedic or farcical the unwillingness of the informant to comply with and/or understand a request to be filmed, photographed, recorded or measured, etc. (cf. Gitelman, 1999, pp. 122-123). As the writer most often assumes their presence and right to record to be both taken for granted and unquestionably rational, such unwillingness is almost always coded as some combination of ignorance, irrationality, truculence, greed, laziness or stupidity rather than resistance, however muted or inchoate. Therefore, what might be excised from a 'scientific' account as an epistemological failure is converted in a popular account into the kind of anecdotal whimsy that raises a wry smile from the anthropologist, traveller or knowing reader.

Such a trope also has a distinct class dimension and maps very neatly onto the early reception of the phonograph in Europe and America (cf. Gitelman, 1999, pp.
121-122). As Erica Brady suggests (1999, ch. 2), one popular feature of such discourse is the presence of an urban, wealthy elite mocking the lack of understanding of the unsophisticated masses – either metropolitan or rural – who simply cannot comprehend the relationship between machine and sound or referent and acoustic signifier without recourse to violence (witness the famous early advertising campaigns for the phonograph [cf. Gitelman, 1999, pp. 122-125]).

As with so many other comparable examples, a rhetorical chain is created between colonial subjects, metropolitan or rural masses, children and animals (cf. Brady, 1999, p. 29), a point which phonograph advertisers made considerable rhetorical use of (e.g. the 'listen to the band' or 'his master's voice' series [Gitelman, 1999, pp. 124-125]).

One of the other related ways in which the phonograph appears in colonial writings is via the more familiar 'technology of enchantment' trope: 'the white man's fascination with their [colonial subjects'] fascination with these mimetically capacious machines', as Michael Taussig (1993, p. 198) would have it. Following Taussig (1993, pp. 200-203), one might think here of the famous scene in Robert Flaherty's 1922 film, Nanook of the North, where one of the bewildered Inuit protagonists attempts to consume a phonograph record being played. Or one might think of Werner Herzog's 1986 film, Fitzcarraldo, where the trope is extended such that 'native' fascination with the phonograph (whilst travelling up river – the colonial trope par excellence) might be exploited for the purposes of placation (cf. Taussig, 1993, p. 203). The assumption is that the 'natives' will not be able to understand the technology – and the colossal body of scientific knowledge behind it – and will therefore mysticize such technology by incorporating it within
their own worldview (e.g. attributing 'magical' properties and powers to a machine that can copy the voice and bring back the dead). This effect is all the more powerful if the recordings themselves are of a sacred or magical nature. At that point, message and medium merge in the realm of the mystical.

Finally, and this is most often the case within anthropological and ethnomusicological writings, the phonograph sometimes appears via the trope of an authenticating albeit anecdotal reportage ('today we recorded native song using the new machine ...' 'I was there ... I recorded this data'). Predictably for Haddon, it is this final and somewhat more prosaic figure which makes its presence felt most forcefully in his writings. Nonetheless, it is the play between these tropes which offers the most insight into the sociological and semiotic mechanics of the phonograph.

However, it would be useful to sound a note of caution at this point, albeit one which contains an important methodological and theoretical clarification. I would not like to overplay the presence and force of these tropes here, partly because, as I hope to demonstrate in a moment, they present themselves with more subtlety, nuance and specificity in Haddon's work, but more importantly because – to reiterate one of the underlying arguments of this thesis – one cannot simply pre-format an overarching set of colonial tropes and then foist them upon singular pieces of literature, without expecting unexpected deficiencies, excesses and contingencies. This is part of the broader framework within which this chapter, and, indeed, to a larger extent this thesis, is located: a call for specificity and nuance in readings of complexly singular colonial relations. The first tranche of
this argument is therefore fairly conventional: close attention to the ways in which phonographic events figure within such writings cautions against any generalized or stereotyped conclusions about how the phonograph mediated colonial social relations in toto.

This point will be expanded upon in more detail in the conclusion, but suffice to say at this stage that the first tranche of the argument follows similar calls by analysts of colonial and anthropological specificity, such as Elizabeth Edwards (2001), Nicholas Thomas (1994) and Ann Laura Stoler (2010). For each of these analysts, the devil is very much in the ethnographic detail. In some senses, such scholars could be said to be merely applying an anthropological and ethnographic penchant for microscopic ('bottom-up') specificity to the broader field of anthropology itself. Viewed from such a perspective, there is often a lack of fit between specific writings and generalized tropes. However, I want to go further than this by arguing that this lack of fit is precisely wherein the analysis lies, and this is where we move from the first to the second tranche of the argument. Such a call also resonates with the (perceived) tensions between an Anglo-American strand of 'poststructuralism' (itself an Anglo-American term of convenience) drawn from Foucault and a similar strand drawn from Derrida. Such tensions are played out with more nuance and subtlety in the actual engagement between Foucault and Derrida (e.g. Derrida, 2001, pp. 36-75), but it serves to make the point here that such a tension, however carefully construed or formulated, also plays out in a shift from what is sometimes claimed to be a 'top-down' reading of a generalized 'colonial discourse' (as a unitary entity) to a 'bottom-up' reading of a complex and fractured multiplicity of social relations, ideas and writings. Of
course, one could easily argue that any talk of a tension between 'top' and 'bottom' misunderstands Foucault's more fluid or permeable reading of power (1998, pp. 92-102). Indeed, such positions do not need to be posed in such stark binary terms in the first place.

However, whatever the merits of this claim, different points of emphasis, drawn from different theoretical and methodological sources, can nonetheless be prioritized. In this sense, I consider the analysis here to be calling for one such point of emphasis (i.e. making a claim for the analytical importance of the detail) rather than taking sides in a falsely binarized polemic. In my view, details often reveal complex conceptual knots (not necessarily - but often - aporias) which, when partially unravelled (there is no endpoint or hermeneutic finality), not only reveal complex connections between convergent or divergent ideas and practices, but, perhaps most importantly, often take one unawares in terms of their specificity and in terms of the forms which those details take, despite the conceptual framework one brings to it in the first place (e.g. our set of colonial tropes). Details beget details in this sense, some of which push one further into the immediate work, some of which open up other intertextual associations.

To that extent, and bearing in mind the obvious risk of reductionism, the analysis here is indebted to a broadly 'deconstructive' – at times explicitly Derridean – approach to a type of alterity (not reducible to 'cultural difference') that is simultaneously anticipated and surprising (cf. Derrida, 1997, pp. 157-164; Royle, 2003, p. 57). The irony of such a position is that those who make the call for 'bottom-up' subtlety and nuance in readings of 'colonial discourse' very often elide
the differences between Foucault and Derrida in the name of a generalized 'poststructuralism', which commits the same generalizing error they are critical of, or even a generalized 'postmodernism', which is even worse. Put simply, the point to make is that Derrida (cf. 1997, pp. 157-164) has more to say about subtlety, nuance and specificity than such critics might care to admit. I would, therefore, like to conduct the following analysis in the critical spirit of those who want to move away from an undifferentiated notion of 'colonial discourse', but without jettisoning the theoretical sensibilities drawn from certain strands of 'poststructuralism'.

**Phonographic Encounters**

Our first encounter with the phonograph in *Head-Hunters* (Haddon, 1901, p. 36) follows an account which significantly uses sound to register the cultural hybridity that Haddon most often renders as loss. The scene emerges on Mer ('Murray Island') within the context of a war of wills between the expedition members and an influential Samoan preacher and teacher, Finau, who fears that Haddon's work will risk a 'recrudescence of paganism' (Haddon, 1901, p. 35). In this context, and partly for Haddon's benefit, a neighbouring village decides to lay on a musical performance of songs from 'Thursday Island [the administrative centre of the Islands] or from the crews of fishing-boats' (Haddon, 1901, p. 35). Indeed, it is worth pointing out that such a source for the songs is significant: the colonial administrative centre and the sea are literally fluid sites of hybrid interaction between cultural influences. Consequently, and to Haddon's enduring disappointment, any desire for pristine cultural 'authenticity' is once again
thwarted by a complex hybrid mixture, and like so many similar scenes, Haddon's tone suggests a mixture of farce and pathos. The performers arrive in their 'Sunday best', the songs are Japanese, the girl's faces are daubed with white powder and a 'dab of red pigment on each cheek' – in imitation of Japanese settlers – and the dancing swings between a barely recognizable European polka and a pale imitation of a carnivalesque mass ornament:

[A] man blowing a whistle walked round and round and called out, "Twenty-five cents a ride," or something to that effect. Next a number of men ranged themselves in pairs, like the spokes of a wheel radiating from a hub of girls. The latter sang, and the men walked round and round the girls, gradually going faster and faster. This was in imitation of a merry-go-round which had paid a couple of visits to Thursday Island (Haddon, 1901, p. 36).81

Condensed in this small vignette is the whole, complex history of colonial relations on the Islands: the interstitial location between Europe and Asia; the impact of European missionization; the reach of industrial capitalism and its carnivalesque entertainments via Thursday Island, the administrative centre ('So popular was this merry-go-round that I was informed the owners made a profit of £1,600 for three months' work' [Haddon, 1901, pp. 36-37]); the ambivalence of colonial mimicry; the flexibility of Islander cultural forms to absorb and reflect the changing histories in which they are embedded (as we saw with the model-plane 'dance machines' in the previous chapter), etc. However, what is particularly significant in this example is that the familiar complexities of cultural hybridity are being channelled through bodily movement and sound. This is the shape and sound of industrial capitalism, colonialism and Christianity, or rather it is the shape and sound of their absorption and recapitulation. From the 'la la la – la la la' of a

81 This story is recounted in Haddon's journal of the expedition (1898b, p. 65).
transformed European polka ('copying a white man's dance', Haddon, 1901, p. 36),
to the whistle of the merry-go-round, the Islanders are translating the complexity
of their historical circumstances into the terms of familiar cultural forms like song
and dance. This is an exercise in meaning-making, assimilation and perhaps even
mockery in Bhabha's terms (Bhabha, 1994, ch. 4), rather than an exercise in bald
mimicry. It returns a warped and unflattering vision/echo of Europe back to itself
(cf. Bracken, 1997, p. 5). However, for those such as Haddon, this scene merely
highlights the extent to which music and language are particularly ephemeral and,
when combined with the supposed mimicry of the Indigenous population, are
extremely susceptible to being 'lost' through hybridity (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 310).

It is perhaps for this reason, therefore, that this is the scene which precedes the
introduction of the phonograph, with its brimming potential for musical and
linguistic redemption. However, there is something of an irony here in that its first
appearance is as part of 'an evening entertainment in the schoolhouse' (the
expedition team's centre of operations), being used primarily to play 'band-music
and songs' from England (Haddon, 1901, pp. 37, 338). Following a pattern that
would become familiar, the phonograph becomes situated somewhere between
entertainment, pacification, inducement and ethnographic solicitation. It is
consequently not a surprise to see it paired up with the magic lantern, both of
which have the dual function of inscription and performance. Indeed, as Eric Ames
(2003, p. 310) makes clear in his examination of the field of comparative
musicology (one of the forerunners to ethnomusicology), the dual function of
Edison's phonograph gave it something of a dual reputation as both poison and
cure in relation to Indigenous music: the spread of popular song by the
phonograph was often partly blamed for the destruction of 'traditional' music, even if the ephemeral nature of this music could be best captured by such a technology. Sociologically and semiotically then, the phonograph figures as both a metonymic echo of Western civilization, and as an inscribing cure to Western civilization's poisonous decay (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 310). As Erica Brady suggests:

The phonograph as a force in popular culture accelerated the process of corruption and decay of traditional ways of life – or so claimed many ethnographers. Ironically, many chose the phonograph – the very agent of corruption – as their tool of choice in preserving the disappearing remnants of those ways (1992, p. 2).

In this light, it is significant that both of the phonographs which Haddon brought with him (Edison 'Home' phonographs) had a dual record and playback function, as this dual function is a crucial part of its social situatedness. However, at this stage it is the latter which takes precedence. As Haddon (1901, p. 338) tells us, he had brought recordings of 'band-music and songs' from England, presumably with the express intention of using them to entertain and to solicit ethnographic information, but, in the first instance, they soften the force of his request for compliance. Such recordings bookend his opening speech, producing an effect that is subtle but noticeable: on its first appearance, the phonograph is imbued with power, an inducement to make representations rather than – or as well as – a means of making representations themselves.

Haddon's opening speech is a request or injunction to conduct research, or rather an explanation of what is to be done:
I opened the proceedings with an address in jargon English, and referred to my last visit and told them what we wanted to do this time (1901, p. 37).

In the context of colonial administration, Haddon's rights of access had obviously not been established through consultation with the Islanders, but through representatives of the colonial order. Referring his listeners to his past visit in this context has the dual effect of refreshing their memories and anchoring his authority to return. At this point, the line between demand, call and request starts to thin, but there is little doubt that Haddon merely assumes the right to present himself on the Islands and to record. The details of what is to be recorded and when might be subject to negotiation, but not whether such recordings proceed in the first place. In an attempt to supplement and/or soften his speech, such a demand or call is followed immediately by 'a couple of tunes on the phonograph', which, in this regard, begins to perform something that 'unmediated' speech cannot, something beyond conventional signification: a demonstration of a 'superior' technical prowess, an unspoken but sounded injunction to comply (cf. Gitelman, 1999, p. 122).

In this light, it is somewhat ironic that the phonograph is introduced as a replacement for what would otherwise have been live musical accompaniment. Charles Myers, the expedition's musician, 'was to have performed on his violin, but unfortunately the violin had suffered from damp, had become unglued and had fallen to pieces' (Haddon, 1901, p. 37). The phonograph's first function is therefore to replace a broken violin, and Ray, the expedition's linguist, is left in charge of the phonograph, rather than Myers, the expedition's musician. The process of
disarticulating music and musician has therefore been made a necessity by the material contingencies of the tropical climate (the same climate which had caused Haddon's cinematographic camera to regularly jam), but the symbolic power wielded by the machine is made all the more forceful as a result.

This effect is heightened by having the phonographic recordings followed by a magic lantern slide of an earlier expedition to the Islands in 1845 (under Captain Blackwood), complete with images of all-powerful ships and compliant Islanders. By implication, this is a claim to prowess coupled with a call for compliance, and it is at this point that Haddon attempts to conjure the dynamism and sound of his other media: the illustrated slide, Haddon tells us, depicts a 'noisy, gesticulating crowd of naked savages' (1901, p. 37, emphasis added). Embedded in this context, the phonograph becomes a metonym of colonial power. Its sheer presence and functioning, irrespective of content, signifies (cf. Pietz, 1987, pp. 268-269). It is inextricably, albeit ambiguously, bound to the same cultural, economic and political forces that Haddon is trying – or claiming – to hold at bay (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 310).

However, as if to supplement the stick of compliance with the carrot of reciprocity, Haddon follows the magic lantern slide with a recent photograph of a gift of fruit given to the team by the Islanders (literalizing the ethnographic gift economy that Haddon wishes to participate in: photographing the gift as a gift returned); a photograph of a recent wedding (seemingly at the request of the participants); and a photographic selection from his previous visit in 1888. After another phonographic interlude, Haddon (1901, p. 37) exhibits some slides 'of native
decorative art and native drawings of animals', alongside some comic slides and finishes with 'a couple of phonograph records'. By implication, this is an ethnographic *quid pro quo*, a reciprocal – if entirely asymmetrical – social contract of sorts.

On this reading, phonography is enmeshed in a complex intermedial power-play. However, what is interesting is the extent to which the Islanders appear neither particularly intimidated nor especially fascinated by the machine. Where one might expect to see an appearance of the 'technology of enchantment' trope, it is often the opposite that occurs. Indeed, the relative indifference to the phonograph is perplexing and interesting. Reiterating our earlier train of thought about the symptomatic lack of fit between general tropes and specific writings, what *Head-Hunters* often reveals is precisely the extent to which the Islanders understood and exploited both the power and pathos of the phonograph and its recordings. As Erica Brady makes clear, responses to the phonograph were often more nonchalant than it would otherwise appear:

> Native and other informants brought their own cultural equipment to the experience of being recorded, enabling them to face the mechanical wonder with more nonchalance than the patronizing anecdotes give them credit for – sometimes with more sangfroid and dignity than members of the culture intent on recording them (1999, p. 30-31).

This can be considered, for example, in the way in which Islanders and Papuans often appear to bend it to suit their own purposes, which, more often than not, is about the pleasure of hearing-oneself-speak or 'sing *after the fact*. Indeed, once Haddon shifts emphasis from using the phonograph to 'exhibit' (and the visual
metaphor is somewhat interesting in this regard) recordings brought from home (popular songs and band-music) to those recorded in the field, one theme repeats itself over and over: the exquisite delight in hearing-oneself-speak or sing, the visceral thrill of hearing one's voice echo back as if from beyond the grave. As Haddon tells us about his trip to British (Papua) New Guinea and after:

During our stay at Bulaa [British New Guinea], Ray gave several phonograph demonstrations and recorded some of the local songs. The natives were never tired of listening to the machine, and fully appreciated singing into it, and were very delighted at hearing their songs repeated by it. [...]

In the evening we had a performance on the phonograph, which gave great enjoyment to the natives of both sexes and all ages. As in New Guinea, the reproduction of their own songs pleased the people much more than hearing the band-music and songs on the cylinders we had brought with us from England (1901, pp. 234, 238).

Figure 36, Phonographic recording by Ray in British (Papua) New Guinea (from the collections of the Cambridge Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology [see P.2057.ACH1-P.2058.ACH1])

82 The use of an Edison 'Home' phonograph in this context (that great icon of bourgeois
This theme of aural pleasure seems to far outweigh any fascination, fear or ignorance associated with the phonographic apparatus itself. What, then, might be at stake in this pleasure? To some extent, one might suggest that the thrill lies precisely in the *delay* between speaking (or singing) and hearing. This is perhaps an ironic echo of Derrida's (1973, pp. 78-79) discussion of the phonocentric (auto-affective) feedback loop of 'hearing (understanding) oneself speak', but in this case without the comforting illusions of interiority or self-presence. Indeed, it is important to remember that one's voice sounds fascinatingly or disconcertingly different once disembodied and delayed (as anyone playing with their first recording device will attest: 'Is that really me?' [Royle, 2003, p. 54]). Without the resonating chamber that is one's head and body – and which only the bearer can hear – one hears oneself as if from afar, likes others do, as an other. One becomes an other to oneself, which is ironically how anthropologists and ethnomusicologists often construct their subjects/objects: self-alienated others. However, it is also important to stress that the phonograph does not merely divest the voice of a body; in a sense, it dis- and then re-embodies the voice. Within the machine itself, the resonating wood and metal take the place of one's body. This 

domesticity) is something of a delicious irony here. Domestic space is replaced by public space and 'home' is replaced by the colonies. This photograph also suggests the one above from the *Malu* recordings (fig. 37), which we examined in the cinematography chapter. In both cases, the phonograph itself also becomes the object of the photographic gaze. In this context, it is also interesting to note that Frances Calvert's 1997 documentary about Torres Strait cultural material, *Cracks in the Mask*, opens with a phonograph as a metonym of Haddon's project.
might pose something of a threat (to personal authority, self-presence, etc.), but it can equally be experienced as an exquisite, uncanny delight, part of the frisson of which is a foretaste of one's own death and resurrection in wood and metal; death and immortality are both to-come.83

Most of the subsequent phonographic encounters are also split between the dual functions of inscription and performance (with or without references to magic lantern slide shows), but between which one can usually detect the distinct patterning of colonial power. More often than not, the phonograph becomes an active player in the solicitation of ethnographic and biological information, material culture, photographic opportunities and, of course, field recordings. The phonograph sits at the very centre of Haddon's multimedia apparatus, both as a social lubricant and as a scientific instrument in its own right, and as with other instruments of colonial knowledge, it is suffused with colonial power. To that extent, the 'technology of enchantment' argument is implied rather than plainly stated, albeit contained within a seemingly benign anecdotal tone which anchors and authenticates the narrative ('I was there. This is how I made my recordings'). Haddon hopes that the apparatus will hold sufficient interest to enable other transactions to take place, and in a recapitulation of the tensions between scientific generalization and poetic narrative that we saw in the first chapter, the phonograph often follows the latter whilst adopting the tone of the former. Here are a selection of examples from across British New Guinea and the Torres Strait:

83 Alongside pleasure, the other important implication of auditory delay is that it forces the listener into a realization of the difference between acoustic signifier and referent, contrary to the stereotyped trope by which colonial subjects (and children, animals or the working classes) would not be able to understand the difference.
Into, and out from, the sombre shadows there passed lank women and jolly children, whose bronze skins were picturesquely lit up by the flickering yellow flames. *We traded a little with the natives, and Ray gave some tunes on the phonograph.* [...] Next morning we returned to Iasa [...] *I measured ten men and did some trading.*

[T]owards evening [we lit] a fire, sitting by which we had our dinner, a crowd of natives watching our every action with great interest. *We afterwards bought some specimens, whilst Ray gave a phonographic exhibition, and secured two good records* (Haddon, 1901, p. 100, emphasis added).

[...] On Monday morning we measured ten natives pretty thoroughly and took a number of photographs. Ray exhibited the phonograph, and obtained some new records, whilst Seligmann worked hard at native medicine (Haddon, 1901, p. 174).

[...] We went ashore about eight o'clock the following morning and stayed till about four in the afternoon. We measured half a dozen men, and made records of their hair, eyes, skin, ears, etc. Seligmann tested the tactile sensibility of one or two natives, and got some interesting results. Ray gave a tune on the phonograph, and got some young people to sing a hymn on a blank cylinder. Wilkin took some photographs (Haddon, 1901, p. 200).

The colonial knowledge-power relations that were latent within Haddon's opening speech start to take on a more concrete quality here. More often than not, the phonograph sits right at the centre of a coercive and racialist practice of knowledge production, albeit most often as the lure rather than the direct instrument. Crucially, what these examples suggest – and this point can be extended to the opening speech – is that, sociologically speaking, Haddon is using the phonograph to methodologically supplement the other media. In other words, there is a type of methodological and sociological intermediality at work here. For example, when photographic portraiture fails or becomes difficult to conduct because of a lack of stillness or concentration, phonography becomes a photographic enabler by stoking a sense of fascination, placation or focus. The resultant photography might be published as self-sufficient and separate, but
Head-Hunters is particularly interesting in pointing to the medial lack which phonography attempts to make good. This effect can also be considered in reverse, where phonography fails to achieve its goals and photography is used to fill the gaps. Indeed, this appears to be one of the main reasons why Haddon so often deploys a combination of phonograph recordings and magic lantern slides to get what he wants.

This can be examined in an addendum to the scene of colonial mimicry that we encountered in the photography chapter, where Gewe – the Papuan chief – refused to remove his European top hat and guard-bandsman’s uniform to submit to be photographed (Haddon, 1901, pp. 244-246). Here Haddon explicitly deploys a type of audio-visual colonial sovereignty to achieve his epistemological – and, by extension, political – demands (cf. Pietz, 1987). In an attempt to force capitulation, Haddon initially deploys his tried and tested method of phonographic exhibition. However, this effect fails and for rather telling reasons, i.e. because Gewe and his coterie do not appear to ‘understand’ the machine (Haddon, 1901, p. 246). Rather than such ignorance giving way to magical enchantment, placation or even self-interested manipulation of the machine, it gives way to indifference. Consequently, Haddon attempts to display photographs of Indigenous dances to get Gewe to submit to be photographed, and when this doesn’t work, he attempts to deploy both photography and phonography. Indeed, the only thing that convinces Gewe to doff his top hat in respect is when Haddon (1901, p. 246) exhibits a magic lantern slide of Queen Victoria whilst playing a recording of ‘Soldiers of the Queen’ on the phonograph. Such an articulation of music, militarism and monarchy rhetorically

84 In her book length study of the phonograph, Scripts, Grooves and Writing Machines (1999), Lisa Gitelman publishes a cartoon sent by an admirer to Edison in which a colonial 'type' destroys a...
picks up on Gewe's quasi-militaristic bandsman's uniform as well as Haddon's ironic references to Gewe's 'regalia'. The portrait of the Queen seems to mockingly echo Haddon's portrait of Gewe, not least because Gewe – although not quite a sovereign – is a self-styled leader of his people. He appears to understand how to align his own power (or perception of power) with that which appears to emanate from his 'European' clothing, with its rhetorically encrusted military and royal associations. In other words, this is not about 'magic' or 'mysticism' misplaced; it is about power. However, it is interestingly at this point that Haddon's tone shifts from one of mockery of Gewe's attempts to 'copy' European clothing and mannerisms to one of patronizing respect, a tone which spreads from clothing and mannerisms to implicitly racialized readings of his face; compliance appears to improve physiognomy.

He had a fine distinguished face. He held himself well, and behaved like a gentleman. When the portrait of Queen Victoria was on the screen, the phonograph played "Soldiers of the Queen," and I made Gewe take off his hat. He did so cheerfully, as if he understood the Queen should be respected, and directly after the picture was changed I let him put it on again (Haddon, 1901, p. 246).

Here we have a direct meeting between the colonial sovereignty of the monarch (at this time, the Torres Strait Islands were still legally 'Crown land') and the power of photography and phonography to encapsulate, amplify and enforce such sovereignty. Such a knowledge-power relationship is, of course, very much implied within all of the preceding phonographic encounters, where colonial power is never far from colonial knowledge production, but it takes on a strange literality in

phonograph because he cannot distinguish between mimetic representation and reality. To double the theme of mimicry for comic effect, the cartoonist has the colonial type pick up a top hat left on the beach (Gitelman, 1999, p. 122).
this context. The irony of this particular encounter is that Haddon has unwittingly – and contrary to his own intentions – partially succeeded in doing what European missionaries and colonial officials had been claiming to do all along: to make colonial subjects in the image of their imperial overseers.

'The Mysterious Instrument'

Amongst these generalized examples of phonographic encounters in *Head-Hunters* lies one encounter in particular that is worth considering in more detail, not only because it is one of the more complex examples of tangled cultural hybridity that Haddon recounts in detail, but because at its heart lies the phonograph itself as a central and emblematic figure, albeit in ways which loosen the categories with which colonial phonography is sometimes understood. The scene emerges in the Mekeo district of British (Papua) New Guinea at a Catholic mission station. Haddon hopes to use this as a base for a later ethnographic excursion into the interior, and in order to find favour with their hosts, Haddon and Ray decide to deploy the phonograph:

Ray, by request, had brought the phonograph ashore, and he gave a selection on it in the course of the evening, greatly to the delight of the Fathers and Brothers, none of whom had ever heard one before. Brother Philip, a kind-hearted, merry Dutchman, who is always smiling and laughing, and who is one of the musicians of the fraternity, was child-like in his enthusiastic appreciation of the machine. We persuaded some natives to sing into the phonograph, and, as usual, they were delighted at hearing their own voices echoed from the mysterious instrument (Haddon, 1901, p. 252).

The casual reference to a childlike state is extremely interesting in this context, not
least because it is not directed at the Indigenous population – as is the stereotype – but rather at a Dutch missionary who, rather pointedly, also happens to be a musician. The fact that he is a musician is interesting in that – unlike the Indigenous listeners – his fascination is both with the apparatus itself and with the pre-recorded music brought from Europe. As someone who plays music, his fascination is seemingly drawn from the fact that this is the first time that he has heard music disarticulated from its makers. As Erica Brady remarks:

For a first-time listener, the phonograph demanded a new and unfamiliar way of hearing in which the source of the sound was completely divorced from the usual accompanying sensory information derived from visual interpretation of movement (1999, p. 33).

By contrast, the response of the Papuan listeners is arguably subtly different. If the response of the Dutch missionary suggests the pattern of the 'technology of enchantment' (i.e. a fascination with the apparatus in itself), then the Indigenous response appears to suggest the affective power of the delayed voice that we discussed earlier. Haddon's reference to 'the mysterious instrument' is clearly intended to elide the gap between the response of the missionaries and that of the Indigenous listeners (implying the 'technology of enchantment'), but there is nothing to suggest that the latter group views the instrument itself – as opposed to the voices emanating from it – as particularly mysterious. That would be to mystify what might otherwise be read as a generalized curiosity, knowledge or ignorance.

Indeed, one need not attribute magical properties to a technology one does not fully understand. Part of Haddon's own fascination with the machine appears to be with its seemingly inexplicable ability to capture Edison's 'fugitive sound waves'
(cited in Brady, 1999, p. 1). For him, perhaps as much as it is for the Islanders, it is the 'mysterious instrument' (Haddon, 1901, p. 252). However, to know *that* it works – and without supernatural prompting – is not the same thing as to know *how* it works, any more than for contemporary users of cars or computers. On the basis of Haddon's writings at least, the suggestion is that the latter is the case with most of the Islanders who come into contact with the machine. Nonetheless, many of the Islanders and Papuans – and the community leaders or 'chiefs' in particular – appear to demonstrate a distinct understanding of the ways in which the machine mediates colonial power relations by amplifying, immortalizing and expanding the power of the human voice. Seemingly without specific prompting about content, some of the community leaders deliver speeches into the phonograph suggesting not only an understanding of the power of the machine, but an understanding of the ways in which it might be incorporated within – or made to serve – existing cultural practices like oratory. One can, therefore, make a distinction between a conventional reading of such scenes via the 'technology of enchantment' trope (e.g. the Islanders attributing bewildering and 'magical' powers to the machine) and a reading of these scenes which suggests keen Islander knowledge of colonial power relations.

For example, after an ethnographic trip into the interior of the district, Haddon and colleagues later return to the mission station with a phonograph recording made during the excursion:

In the evening Ray gave a phonograph entertainment. On his visit a few days earlier he recorded a speech by Matsu, the chief, in which he exhorted the people to make the Government road, and finished off
with a hunting song. This speech sounded very fine; it begins with the customary loud clearing of the throat, and the sentences come in bursts, the intervals of silence being evidently part of the orator's art (Haddon, 1901, p. 268).

This encounter is more complex than it might first appear. Unlike the earlier encounters, where pleasure is implicitly taken from a temporal delay but a spatial continuity (recordings of speeches or songs played back in the presence of the performers but after the fact), this encounter is shifted from the context of recording both temporally and spatially. This has a number of important consequences. For instance, the listeners are no longer assumed to be members of the the chief's own group, which means that any specific contextual meanings shift into the realm of generalization and typification. This is not a specific speech for a specific group of people; it is a general speech representing a type, a form posing as an entertainment. In short, the contexts of listening are different and this shifts the focus of the meanings.

We have already considered this type of shift many times in this thesis (e.g. in the relationship between generalized viewings of photographic types and specific viewings of individual friends and relatives, etc.). This is part and parcel of anthropology's broader predicament between the general and the particular, but it maps onto phonographic contexts in very similar ways. For example, in Frances Calvert's 1997 documentary, Cracks in the Mask, the Torres Strait elder and cultural historian, Ephraim Bani, is played one of Haddon's phonographic recordings of an unnamed informant recounting a mythical tale. Up to that point, all focus had been placed on the recording as a general representation of a particular tale, but Bani is amazed to discover that the storyteller is his wife's
ancestor. Such a shift of focus obviously has significant implications for how one understands a recording, and it is all too easy to forget such significance within an anthropological setting. As Alan Jabbour remarks about contemporary interest in early Native American recordings:

To the scholars they provided fascinating documents for the study of cultural history; but for the spiritual heirs of the traditions the cylinders documented, the recordings had the greater intimacy of being "somebody's grandfather" (cited in Brady, 1999, p. 5).

In this context, it is clear that the listeners in the missionary station are hearing a very different recording than that intended by Matsu, the chief. For the general audience, it is posed as an 'entertainment', a general demonstration of the apparatus with the added frisson of a colonial setting and subject. For Haddon, it is a demonstration of the machine's incredible ability to not only represent content, but to capture and generalize form. Haddon is not interested in representing Matsu's speech in all its specific detail; he is interested in typifying the general art of oratory, and his enthusiasm appears to come from the power of the phonograph to locate such an art in the space between voice (qua material trace) and speech (qua signification). As Kittler's translators remind us:

[Phonography] records all the voices and utterances produced by bodies, thus separating the signifying function of words [...] as well as their materiality [...] from unseeable and unwritable noises (Kittler, 1999, p. xxviii).

In this sense, it is telling that Haddon (1901, p. 268) should be most interested in the fact that the phonograph has managed to capture that which exceeds conventional signification, e.g. 'the customary [for which read typical] clearing of
the throat' and 'intervals of silence'. The aesthetic qualities of these vocal nuances are of more interest to Haddon than spoken content, even if he must draw such data back through the filter of the written signifier in order to bring them to significance.

By contrast, Matsu clearly intends a much more specific group of listeners with a much more specific content-focused context in mind. In the split between form and content, the former is the condition of possibility of the latter in this context, rather than a separable and hierarchically ordered entity. By posing the speech in this way, Matsu appears to demonstrate a core understanding of at least three key elements: a knowledge of the vagaries of colonial power relations (whatever the specific details, advocating participation in the building of a government road in late 1800s British New Guinea is hardly a politically neutral act); a knowledge of the phonograph as a technical means of amplifying such power; and a knowledge of how both can be channelled through – and assimilated within – existing cultural forms, such as oratory.

Such phonographic insights are not restricted to the Indigenous population. Indeed, perhaps the most remarkable section of the chapter is towards the end where, in a peculiar conflation of missionaries and Papuans, Haddon uses the occasion of a phonographic exhibition to make racial observations of the French missionaries:

Sunday, July 17th – We all went to early morning Mass, and Ray afterwards exhibited the phonograph to a very large audience of demonstrative, excitable natives and delighted missionaries. I was
particularly struck with the calm, strong, sweet face of the Sister Superior. She is a Parisienne, with a narrow face and a finely-shaped nose. The two Savoyarde Sisters contrasted with her in having round faces and snubby noses; their more homely countenances were brimful of simple-hearted kindliness. An instructive demonstration of two European races when I was on the look-out for a lesson in Papuan ethnology! The phonograph selection was decidedly mixed, but that did not matter in the least. The Sisters appeared most pleased with the European orchestral marches (1901, p. 273).

The first point worth stressing here is the context: just as Islanders and Papuans appear acutely aware that the power-voice nexus can be amplified by the phonograph, so too the missionaries – arguably more than almost any other group – remain acutely aware that the power invested in the voice exceeds mere speech or signification. One need only think of the performative power of missionary oratory, for example. Indeed, Matsu is not the only one to excel in the rhetorical power of oratory. Therefore, giving a phonograph demonstration straight after a morning Mass takes on an extra significance here: one set of mediated voices is being replaced by another.

The second point worth stressing is the set of contrasts: despite the seeming conflation of missionaries and 'natives', the latter are 'excitable' and 'demonstrative', whereas the former are 'delighted'; the 'round faces and snubby noses' of the Savoyarde Sisters are 'homely' and 'brimful of simple-hearted kindness' in contrast to the narrow-faced Parisienne with the 'finely shaped nose' whose face is 'calm, strong and sweet' (Haddon, 1901, p. 273). Such contrasts are relatively rhetorically nuanced, but the implication of racial differencing is clear, even – or perhaps especially – if that is within a European context. One need only think back to Haddon's writings on Ireland (see the photography chapter) to be
reminded of the fact that references to 'round faces', 'snubby noses' and 'simple-hearted kindness' take on a racially charged, atavistic quality here, in contrast to the aquiline features of 'modern' northern Europeans. Once again, the phonograph participates in this racializing process as an important social protagonist at the scene of inscription, albeit in a more conceptually knotted way than before.

Each of these sociological examples demonstrates the extent to which the phonograph (qua material object) and phonography (qua social practice) not only mediate colonial social relations in a general way, but become an active protagonist in the construction, distribution and perpetuation of a racialized and power-laden colonial knowledge. However, without laying recourse to a non-discursive reading of humanistic resistance, such knowledge-power relations are, at the very least, more porous than they would otherwise seem. Indeed, this is part and parcel of our more general debate about nuancing colonial discourse analysis. This is most emphatically not to deny a colonial power-knowledge nexus, but simply to point to examples were such a nexus is subtly inflected by the complexities of social relationships on the ground. As mentioned before, such a 'view from below' is in no way incompatible with a Foucauldian reading of power (Foucault, 1998, pp. 92-102), which is flexible and fluid enough to accommodate such nuances, but it is nonetheless at odds with the blanket way in which Foucault is often deployed in colonial discourse analysis. Focusing on the nuances reveals a more complex process of negotiation and assimilation by means of which one set of knowledge-power relationships are read through the veil of another, and both are changed in the process. This process is neither symmetrical nor, in the final analysis, macroscopically disruptive to the larger forces in play, but is nonetheless
of particular interest to any analysis of the interpenetration or dissolve of analytical strata (e.g. from 'top-down' to 'bottom-up', or from colonial discourse analysis to sociology, etc.).

II. Translations: Memory-Sound-Music-Writing-Culture

However, there is more than one way to dissolve such strata and reveal the pressure points within the power-knowledge nexus. If we have thus far broadly paid heed to the social matrices in which the phonograph and phonography are embedded, we must also then pay heed to complexities of the phonographic inscriptions themselves and the matrices of musicological translation in which they are discursively embedded (memory-sound-music-writing-culture, etc.). Translation is one of anthropology's most basic narratives (translating one set of cultural norms into another, etc. [cf. Asad, 1986]), but here it takes on a much more fundamental quality where inexplicable acoustic phenomena are made to mean and brought to inscription. The processes of translation are multiple, complex and overlapping. This requires a shift of focus from a broadly socio-semiotic reading to a more musicologically or even 'ontologically' oriented reading, for want of a better phrase. It also involves a shift from Head-Hunters to the Reports (Vol. 4, 'Arts and Crafts' [Haddon et al, 1912]), where language, and particularly music, take centre stage as (positive) objects of (scientific) analysis.

To that extent, this section is like Part I but in reverse: all of the affective qualities of recorded sound, music and voice must be stripped away for the purposes of musicological scrutiny, and when we do finally arrive at a 'scientific' discussion of
music, the phonograph becomes a silent and unacknowledged partner, an invisible and inaudible tool to be cursorily registered (qua sociological oddity or data source) but notably suppressed. In the shift from narrative to science and from Head-Hunters to the Reports, the phonograph's significance to Haddon's project will be heightened and its audibility reduced. Experience – and the phonograph along with it – are jettisoned as music and language (qua positive objects) take their place.

Such a focus suggests a simple opening question, albeit one which, when pressed, soon opens itself up to others: are music and language the starting point for our analysis or the expedition's analysis? Or, on the contrary, do such objects have to be discursively constructed as such from out of other sonic materials? If so, what are these materials? If they are sound and/or 'noise', then where do they come from? Are they the ambient noises and voices of Islander life or inaudible memories brought to sound by machine? If the latter, what happens then? How do we shift from machined sound to music and language? How then do we make such objects submit to inscription and analysis, and what kinds of analysis do we finally conduct? This set of questions not only suggests the complex matrices of translation in which music and language are embedded here, but also the pressure points which – at each stage of translation – threaten to conceptually unravel the expedition's underlying logics. Such matrices are, by their very nature, non-linear and overlapping, and therefore difficult to comprehend or represent. However, one way to do so is to set them out as an interlocking chain of translations or transformations. To that extent, the 'moving over' or across of trans-lation at least takes on a certain spatial coherence as a metaphor. Three possible sequences
suggest themselves: a logically extrapolated sequence (what is implied), a chronological sequence (what happened) or a linear sequence (what is written). The second sequence is of limited analytical value, and cannot accurately be reconstructed in any case, but the third sequence – which I intend to follow in the analysis to come – would seem to be analytically aided by the first – which I will therefore schematize here:

(1) From memory to recorded sound: the first strand involves a process by which the inaudible and immaterial are translated into the audible and tangible, a phonographic surface capturing and replaying the voice and other sounds; (2) from sound to speech and music: the second strand involves a process by which the voice and other sounds are brought to meaning and translated – or discursively constructed – as speech and music; (3) from music and speech to graphical notation and phonetic writing (lyrics and commentary): the third strand involves a process by which music and speech are translated into vision as graphical musical notation or phonetic writing; (4) from graphical notation and phonetic writing to analysis: the fourth strand involves a process by which speech and music are translated into positive, evolutionary data. The relationship between each of these strands is complex and overlapping and – when examined within a specific context – is constantly re-ordered, re-organized and re-doubled.

Making Music

Published fourteen years after Haddon's second Torres Strait expedition of 1898, the 'Arts and Crafts' volume of the Reports (Haddon et al, 1912) is one of the main
sources of information for the team's analysis of Torres Strait Islander music. Written by the team's chief musician, Charles Myers, the 'Music' chapter of volume four of the *Reports* conducts a strictly musicological – rather than ethnomusicological or sociological – reading of musical forms from the Torres Strait Islands. The focus of the chapter is therefore abstract and analytical and its ostensible themes are technical in nature, but if one attends to the interstitial spaces of such a reading, one of its underlying (or, perhaps, overriding) themes is that of translation. This is not least because, firstly, music itself must be *made* – fashioned, discursively produced, and not only by the Islanders – and, secondly, because it must be made to submit to inscription. The complexities of how these dual forces pan out within the commentary can easily be overlooked if one does not pay heed to the written and graphical cues littered throughout the chapter.

However, Myers does not start at this point. He starts with prefabricated, 'primitive' music and asks 'why should we study it?' Nevertheless, even the very first line of the chapter suggests far more than it is actually saying and introduces the theme of translation by subtle implication:

> The songs of the Miriam or Murray Islanders, which form the subject of this section, are of considerable interest from the standpoint of musical history and development. For they differ among one another not only in complexity of structure but also in date of composition and place of origin (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 238).

Contained within this simple formulation is a complex process of translation which not only implies a translation of sound into music – of which more below – but, more importantly, of music into evolutionary data. This is the first strand of
translation that we can highlight here (comparable to the fourth strand of our logical sequence above). We will return to this in more detail a little later, as it becomes entangled in some of our other stands, but it bears remembering at this point that, following our continuing theme of the relationship between the particular and the general in anthropology, phonographic recordings were often made less with a view to the specificity of musical performance, and more with a view to how that specificity might be obliterated in the furtherance of comparative, evolutionary aims (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 311). However, unlike Victorian anthropologists such as Edward Tylor, who took their cue from the Enlightenment philosophes, Myers' focus is not on origin and cultural development along a universal scale (of savagery, barbarism and civilization), but rather on origin and geographic spread within a particular region. As Myers tells us (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 238), such forms of music 'thus afford an opportunity of tracing the changes in musical expression which may occur in course of time within a primitive community'.

To that extent, Haddon and Myers' comparative musical method is drawn more from the zoological and biological sciences (compare Darwin's finches, for example) than from the burgeoning field of comparative musicology. Indeed, the two major fin-de-siècle phonograph archives crucial to the development of that field – Vienna and Berlin – were not brought into being until 1899 and 1900 respectively (cf. Ames, 2003). Haddon and Myers' work on music therefore sits somewhat anomalously between evolutionary studies in the spread and psychology of music and the foundation of the fields of comparative musicology and, later, ethnomusicology. This inbetweenness is significant because Haddon and
his colleagues were not only breaking new ground in ethnographic fieldwork in general, but presaging the kinds of ethnomusicological fieldwork that were yet to exist.

Nevertheless, the point to stress here is that there is a process of translation at work: musical experience is being translated into comparable data. Unlike *Head-Hunters*, where musical experience plays an important role, the *Reports* are in large part an attempt to extract data from experience, casting the latter aside after the fact. The former may be the latter's condition of possibility, but once it has served its purpose – both to enable data extraction and, crucially, to authenticate it – then it can and must be cast aside. There is therefore a noticeable shift at this point from narrative and sociology to the science of music. Such a shift is never complete, of course, and although the consequent tension is present in the expedition's popular and scientific writings, the balance between them is different.

The difficulty of adopting such a fluid, comparative approach focused on the origin, development, distribution and spread of music is that musical form and content are in a state of perpetual flux. As mentioned in the first chapter, Haddon's team remain interested in 'vertical' cultural flows, where the Islands are positioned between British New Guinea and Australia, but not in 'horizontal' cultural flows, where they are positioned between Europe and Asia. For example, the possible introduction of '[f]lutes, pan pipes and Jews' harps' from South Sea Islanders and Papuans is of legitimate interest, whereas religious music is prized most of all because it is not 'affected by *contamination* with European music' (Haddon et al, 1912, pp. 238-239, emphasis added).
The most significant music of all — and here we return to the themes of the cinematography chapter — is that associated with the Malu cult, the secret and sacred initiation ritual for Mer's adolescents. Such secrecy, Myers claims, saved the sacred music from 'contamination', but left it shrouded in silence:

[The songs of the Malu cult were so sacred that no native woman or child might hear them; indeed no white man had ever heard them before the arrival of the members of our Expedition. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the natives were induced to sing them (Haddon et al., 1912, p. 239).

This is the archetypal and enabling fantasy of fin-de-siècle anthropology: to rout out the pristine from under the layers of contaminating cultural detritus. Here we have a return of the 'before the deluge' motif that we examined in the photography chapter. However, that which supposedly saves such musical data from the flood is also that which conceals it. Therefore, the pre-eminent problem for Myers and Haddon — preceding that of the conversion of music to data — becomes how to bring the consequent silence to sound. As is so often the case, it is at this point that the 'before the deluge' (redemption) motif gives way imperceptibly to an 'after the flood' (salvage) motif, for such music was actually no longer performed and had to be reconstructed from memory. Therefore, this brings us to our second main strand of conversion: from memory to sound (comparable to the first strand of our logical sequence above). The silence that Haddon and Myers wish to breach is historical and memory is its only bridge. In a direct analogue to the reconstructions of the Malu ceremonies for the cinematographic camera — converting memory to vision — we here have a shift to sound — converting memory
to audition. Of course, it is the phonograph which will be used this time to give an 'after the flood' reconstruction the indexical, scientific seal of a 'before the flood' redemption. The temporal flow is reversed: a present-becoming-past becomes a past-becoming present:

In securing the records for the phonograph, great care, moreover, was taken to ensure that they were obtained from the older men who were alive in the times when the ceremonies were still being performed, of which these songs formed part (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 239).

Reconstructions from memory are accepted as positive data, albeit one step from observations and auditions. The other point worth stressing is the part-whole relations implied in this passage: specific instances of reconstructed songs metonymically evoke general song cycles, general song cycles metonymically evoke the ceremonies of which they are part, and both metonymically evoke a more general cultural world which is lost or being lost. As Eric Ames says of a similar predicament in comparative musicology:

Rather than concentrate on the individual voices of distinguished men or loved ones, comparative musicologists gathered the "collective" sounds of non-European music. In so doing, they employed the metonymic logic of ethnographic exhibition, where the individual body of the performer represented the larger, absent whole (or "people"). By virtue of metonymy, "voices of the dead" came to describe the songs of entire, allegedly vanishing, populations (2003, p. 311).

In Haddon and Myers' case (Haddon et al, 1912, pp. 239-242), such a shift is more subtle, in that specific singers are actually named in the Report, but the overall rationale for such recordings – as with the expedition and, indeed, anthropology as a whole – nonetheless pushes at the metonymic seam between the specific and
Section three of the chapter, 'Methods of Analysis', brings us to the real nub of the problem: how do we shift from – or distinguish between – sound and music, and what constitutes a musical unit of analysis? This represents our third and fourth strands of conversion: from sound to music and from music to phonetic writing and graphical notation (comparable to the second and third strands of our logical sequence above). Such a process might seem self-evident, but – repeating our call for analytical detail – it is only by attending to the details that one gets a sense of what is at stake in the process.

The crux of this section is that in order for music to be studied as a positive scientific object, it must first be converted into – or constructed as – one (cf. Kittler, 1999, pp. 25). This involves the processes of conversion or translation that we have been talking about thus far (i.e. from silence to music via memory, and from music to data via evolution), but much more fundamentally it involves attempting to break music down into isolatable and analysable units. As Eric Ames (2003, p. 305) makes clear in his study of the field of comparative musicology, ethnographic encounters with music were often perceived as a 'disorienting barrage of sensory stimuli that initially resisted transcription'. The problem therefore becomes one of both 'aural perception' and 'acoustic legibility' (Ames, 2003, p. 306). Here the phonograph played a key role and becomes an auditory version of Benjamin's 'optical unconscious' where it can 'hear' more and better than we can ourselves (for example, by slowing down, speeding up or extending sections of music [cf. Ames, 2003, pp. 298, 313, 315; Kittler, 1999, p. 24]). Rather than a poor substitute
for a mouth and an ear, in this context it becomes a hyper-realized extension of speaking and listening, and just like Benjamin's analysis, the image that springs to mind for comparative musicologists is that of the scientist/surgeon dissecting reality (cf. Ames, 2003, pp. 314-315). Comparative musicology not only made this point particularly forcefully in relation to the phonograph, but in relation to cultural alterity – coded as the 'primitive' – most especially (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 298).

However, the difficulty resides in working out what constitutes a musical/phonographic unit. Is it a song, a set of lyrics, a melody or rhythm, a chord or note? Even more so than cinema, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, can be broken down into meaningful and readily apprehensible photographic units, phonograph recordings cannot be broken down in such discrete ways. There is no unitary measure of sound equivalent to the film still. To that extent, phonography is the 'temporal medium par excellence' (Ames, 2003, p. 314). Here we see one of the interesting implications of Kittler's (1999, pp. 15-16) attempt to align film with the Lacanian 'imaginary' and phonography with the Lacanian 'real'. Because cinema for Kittler (as opposed to the mere technology of cinema) is predicated on splices and cuts, it can be broken down into discrete units. By contrast, the smooth flow of phonographic sound cannot be so dissected. Its meaning – that is, its condition of meaningfulness – resides in its forward or backward momentum (the relational differences between now, then and to-come) even if that momentum gives the impression of musical stasis (e.g. a single note, repeated). Indeed, as we have already mentioned, it is for this reason that Husserl chose musical melody to exemplify the role that retention and protention play in perception (cf. Moran,
However, it is worth stressing parenthetically that such a lack of discreteness becomes fundamentally altered in the shift from analogue to digital recordings – the source of the analysis here. Whether or not musicologically useful or relevant, digitization not only channels Kittler’s 'data streams' through a digital filter, but it allows such filtered streams to be broken down into basic digital units of ones and zeroes. This is the ultimate discrete unit and, as Bernard Stiegler (2002, pp. 150-152) says of photography, it fundamentally breaks the direct indexical link between referent and inscription. In this case, the bond between original sound source, recording and ear is broken. To that extent, we might add another layer to Myers' own set of musical translations: from analogue to digital and from indexical to non-indexical.

Myers has no such concerns about the indexical chain linking sound source, recording and ear. However, he does have his own reasons for not trusting the naked ear as a means of constructing a discrete musical object. Indeed, Myers' solution to such lack of discreteness – or lack of musical objecthood – is to not turn to the human ear in the first instance. As we mentioned with Eric Ames’ (2003, p. 306) analysis of comparative musicology, the first problem is one of 'aural perception'. How do we make sense of what we are listening to? How do we know that what we are hearing is the same as what the recording's protagonists or original audience were hearing? In short, to what extent is the act of hearing not only mediated by the machine, but by culture more generally? Unsurprisingly, Myers' response is not to attempt a type of cultural analysis of sound perception.
that will cut into the latter’s universality and objectivity. On the contrary, if he cannot hear phonographic sound as perceptible and analysable music with his own ears, he must lay recourse to machines that will serve as a supplementary sensorium for the purposes of further universalizing and objectifying sound. The human ear is not accurate enough. This solves Ames' first problem, 'acoustic perception', and lays the groundwork for the second, 'acoustic legibility'. Myers uses two devices to convert unfamiliar rhythms into 'standardised' (i.e. European) units and unfamiliar tones into recognizable quantities on a scale: a metronome and a mysterious device for measuring tone called an 'Appun's Tonmesser'. The latter consists of:

[A] box of metal tongues any one of which can be made to vibrate at will by means of air driven from bellows. The tongues are carefully tuned so as to give tones which are successively different by two vibrations. The box contains 65 tongues giving as many tones ranging from 128 to 256 vibrations per second. The pitch of tones emitted by such tongues is remarkably constant, despite the inevitable variations in temperature and wind pressure (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 242).

Myers is effectively using a breathing, mechanical mouth to hear (cf. Kittler, 1999, p. 26). The materiality of air pressure – and thus touch – is closely bound to the audition of sound; without tangible vibrations in air, there can be no sound ('in space no one can hear you scream'). In this case, inexplicable and variable sounds captured as vibrations (both those of the phonograph and those of the Tonmesser) are being made to conform to a standardized and superimposed numerical grid, irrespective of environmental shifts which might otherwise change the sound. Crucially, what this device makes possible is a provisional answer to the

85 This was the famous tag-line for the film Alien.
86 'The grooves of Edison's phonograph recorded nothing but vibrations' (Kittler, 1999, p. 24).
question 'what is a unit of musical analysis?' Thanks to the Tonmesser, Myers – who obviously has no access to digital sound – can now answer that it is a tone. With some amount of levity, this might even be regarded as a kind of digitization *avant la lettre*. Using this device, Myers can literally stop the flow of the music – the way one might take a still from a film – and isolate individual tones on a scale that is divisible into hundreds or 'cents':

Any one tone can be prolonged on the phonograph by holding up the lever which usually rests on the spiral steel thread and is driven along it. When this lever is held up, the glass style remains stationary instead of travelling along the spiral groove cut in the wax cylinder. The mean of several determinations, made both by upward and downward changes in the tones of the Tonmesser, is taken as the required pitch (Haddon et al., 1912, p. 242).

What is interesting here is that, given the inherently temporal and relational nature of music (musical sense is, at least to some extent, predicated on the relationships between notes over time), Myers' attempt to isolate musical units converts them into something other than music in any conventional sense. Of course, this is the ultimate pseudo-scientific fantasy of mathematical precision: the belief that one's approximate measurements of the world – if sufficiently detailed and quantitative – can be taken to be that world. Indeed, this is what Husserl took to be part of the 'crisis of the European sciences' (cf. Moran, 2000, pp. 164-191). Such a process converts sound into musical units of analysis and therefore readies them to be transcribed or translated into some form of musical inscription approximating 'European notation'. This is where we reach our fourth strand of conversion (comparable to the third strand of our logical sequence above): from music – or, at least, musical units – to phonetic writing and graphical notation, or,
by implication, from music or musical units to vision.

However, this is where such notation reaches an important limit point. Despite his attempt to render such music in graphical form, the conventional means of doing so is only ever a very rough approximation, as Myers readily acknowledges (Haddon et al., 1912, p. 242). The music resists notation and must therefore be situated somewhat anomalously between two seemingly incompatible fields: European graphical notation (based on ratios) and numerical charts (based on frequencies) (cf. Kittler, 1999, p. 24). The supposedly universal division of an octave into twelve semitones is, by means of the Tonmesser, divided into units of one hundred for each semitone. Twelve semitones therefore becomes twelve hundred cents. Such precision – or perception of precision at any rate – therefore exceeds not only what the inexperienced ear can hear, particularly if one is culturally trained to hear only twelve notes in an octave, but also what the page can communicate or convey in graphical form. The provisional compromise is to provide a literal conversion chart between semitones and cents (see fig. 38 below).

Such a conversion table is then further converted to the 'usual' or 'customary' (i.e. European) alphabetical nomenclature for each note (a, b#, etc.) and, by extension, to graphical notation. Therefore, via a convoluted process of intermedial translation, sound is converted into recorded music, recorded music is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>Quotient</th>
<th>Cents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temperied semitone</td>
<td>1:959</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just semitone (16:16)</td>
<td>1:96</td>
<td>110.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just minor tone (9:10)</td>
<td>1:111</td>
<td>120.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperied tone</td>
<td>1:122</td>
<td>130.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just major tone (6:5)</td>
<td>1:123</td>
<td>141.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperied major third</td>
<td>1:125</td>
<td>150.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just minor third (5:6)</td>
<td>1:139</td>
<td>160.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just major third (6:5)</td>
<td>1:190</td>
<td>170.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperied major third</td>
<td>1:200</td>
<td>181.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just fourth (3:4)</td>
<td>2:24</td>
<td>201.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperied fourth</td>
<td>1:225</td>
<td>211.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just tritone (5:4)</td>
<td>1:240</td>
<td>222.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperied tritone</td>
<td>1:241</td>
<td>232.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just sixth (6:5)</td>
<td>1:295</td>
<td>242.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just minor sixth (1:6)</td>
<td>1:296</td>
<td>253.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just major sixth (6:5)</td>
<td>1:297</td>
<td>264.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperied major sixth</td>
<td>1:298</td>
<td>274.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just minor seventh (9:10)</td>
<td>1:299</td>
<td>284.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just major seventh (15:16)</td>
<td>1:300</td>
<td>295.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperied major seventh</td>
<td>1:300</td>
<td>305.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Octave (1:2)</td>
<td>1:120</td>
<td>315.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 38, Conversion chart from Reports, Vol. IV (Haddon et al., 1912, p. 243)
converted into numbers, and numbers are converted into visually apprehended signifiers: letters and images. In other words, far from being a simple process of converting music into musical notation, sound must first be *made* into music and that music made *ready* for inscription (cf. Kittler, 1999, pp. 24-25). To that extent, the phonograph sits *between* sound, music and inscription.

However, perhaps unsurprisingly given the methodological and graphical complexity of the model Myers is trying to follow, the problem of the *representability* of music persists. This is not least because, as Kittler (1999, p. 25) points out, there is a 'gulf separating Old European alphabetism from mathematical-physical notation'. Kittler (1999, p. 24) reads this as a gulf between the 'symbolic' and the 'real', but it can also be read as a more general symptom diagnosing music's resistance to inscription. For example, such resistance to inscription is keenly demonstrated in the case of one of the particular songs that he attempts to analyse: *Malu* song IV A. In a return to the cinematography chapter, this is the song sung during the climax of Haddon's first ethnographic film: the precise point at which the initiates learn that the secret and sacred name of *Malu*, the culture hero, is *Bomai*. Given Haddon's abiding interest in the *Malu* cult, and given its ability to supplement the film and breach its silence\(^\text{87}\), this is a song which attains a particular significance for the expedition. As a consequence, an attempt had been made four years earlier to transcribe the song into European notation and to translate the lyrics (see fig. 39 below).

\(^{87}\) As mentioned in the previous chapter, the recording was at times 'synchronized' with the film on the rare occasions that it was shown.
Myers tells us that this earlier attempt 'does not always tally exactly' with the new attempt because the former 'was intended only to convey to the European a rough idea of the character of the songs' (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 243, emphasis added).

Therefore, in an attempt to rein the music in and make it submit to inscription, Myers (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 243) develops an incredibly complex alphanumeric/graphical form of hybrid notation which combines European notation, '+' and '-' signs to indicate deviations between earlier and later attempts at transcription, numerical indicators of precise values of the tones derived from the Tonmesser, 'V' signs to indicate silences, asterisks to indicate drum beats and two ties to indicate 'glissandi', or continuous change[s] of pitch in passing from one note to the other' (see figs. 40 and 41 below).
The point to stress about this attempt to force music through the strictures of inscription is the lack of backward compatibility or backwards translatability. Although we might shift from sound to music to inscription, we would be hard pressed to shift in the opposite direction. In other words, any attempt at musical reconstruction would be unlikely to succeed in any recognizable manner. However, this appears to be the thin end of a much larger wedge. No only does this open an obvious space between positive data and the experience from which it is supposedly derived, it seems to suggest a paradoxically inverse relationship: the greater the desire for accuracy and precision, the larger the gap between the original performance and the above alpha-numeric/graphical inscriptions. This marks a peculiar point of in-folding or collapse within Haddon and Myers' positivistic desire. Their need to construct music as a positive, quantifiable object.

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88 The performance/notation dichotomy is a long running one in musicology (cf. Mowitt, 1992, p. 180). In stressing this 'gap' here, I am not trying to uncritically oppose a supposedly unmediated 'live' experience to its 'dead' transcription. I am merely stressing the desire wrapped up in Myer's failed attempts to make performance and notation commensurate.
(qua evolutionary data) is so strong that they are prepared to ride roughshod over musical experience to do so. In other words, if musical experience does not fit the representational model, they decide to forcibly reconstruct the former rather than the latter, which is all the more suspect from analysts placed squarely within the positivist tradition. Of course, this is something of a conjurer's trick and we have encountered it more than once before in this thesis: using empirical data to authenticate supra-empirical models whilst concealing the join and occulting the logical non sequiturs.

In this sense, the positivistic desire for accuracy and precision of inscription serves only to prise open an increasingly large gap between experience and representation. Such a gap is most obviously because the process of transformation/translation is also a process of extraction from cultural context which converts specific musical performances into approximate and general types. This is familiar terrain here and it brings into sharp relief Eric Ames' suggestion (2003, p. 313) that phonography allowed analysts to 'speak of a body of music, and to shape it discursively into various forms', but, in this context, Myers pushes this to an extreme by literally taking four recordings of the same song and attempting to approximate a numerical, tonal average (see fig. 42 opposite).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A (iii)</th>
<th>1.360</th>
<th>1.357</th>
<th>?</th>
<th>1.389</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B (iii)</td>
<td>1.382</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>1.301</td>
<td>1.423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (iv)</td>
<td>1.529</td>
<td>1.375</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D (iv)</td>
<td>1.508</td>
<td>1.590</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1.421]</td>
<td>[1.466]</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1.400]</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1.416</td>
<td>1.388</td>
<td>1.372</td>
<td>1.406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 42, Conversion table from the Reports, Vol. IV (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 250)

However, there is a more fundamental reason for such a gap between experience
and representation: such musical performances simply exceed inscription. Indeed, this excessive gap between experience and representation is arguably one of the expedition's most significant legacies to the post-positivist disciplines of anthropology and ethnomusicology, both of which would later be forced to deal with the implications for their respective practices (e.g. Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Barz and Cooley, 1997). Moreover, these are the traditions which attempted to forcibly reconstruct the representational model rather than the experiences upon which it is based.

In Haddon and Myers' case, such excess is merely the flip side of the coin of loss. Indeed, an important tension begins to emerge at this point between a perception of musical loss and a perception of musical excess: the expedition's phonograph recordings are hopelessly inadequate in the face of a feared cultural annihilation, and yet at the same time such recordings disconcertingly exceed both 'aural perception' and 'acoustic legibility' (Ames, 2003, p. 306). This is exacerbated by the fact that such a play between loss and excess in enshrined within the mediating technologies themselves, and this further complicates the attempt to distinguish between 'noise' and sound, music and notation, nonsense and sense, imprecision and precision. Not only do the new technologies of inscription record more than (symbolically mediated) meaning (in the sense of the materiality of the voice, for example), they also record more than the positivist's 'real', more than an index of the referent. For example, one not only receives an inscription of the materiality of sound and voice, but also an inscription of the materiality of the machine, an added, second layer inscribed over the first. In this sense, indexical modes of inscription record more than that which emanates directly from the spectated or audited
event (e.g. the hiss or rhythmic shuffling of a wax cylinder, the marks on the celluloid, etc.). Phonography and cinematography – and, by extension, photography – therefore share a common bond:

Both recorded indiscriminately what was within the range of microphones or camera lenses, and both thereby shifted the boundaries that distinguished noise from meaningful sounds, random visual data from meaningful picture sequences, unconscious and unintentional inscriptions from their conscious and intentional counterparts (Winthrop-Young and Wutz in Kittler, 1999, p. xxvi).

However, if we are to follow Kittler's (1999, pp. 15-16) association between phonography and the Lacanian 'real', such a link between the machine and 'indiscriminate noise' becomes even more pronounced in phonography than it does in film. This is both the best and worst of outcomes for Haddon and Myers. On Kittler's reading, phonography produces that most raw of raw data, but, as a direct consequence, it also demands careful subsequent processing to ensure that it does eventually pass through the grids of the symbolic lest its excessiveness overwhelms. In Haddon and Myers' case, music undermines and overflows the ability to both be heard as such and to be notated, and seemingly the only sanctuary is the written signifier. Here, for example, is Myers' attempt to interpret his ill-fitting musicological grid of the four versions of song Malu VI A:

The average for the above intervals of (iii) and (iv) amounts to 1.399 or 581 cents, a slightly flattened tritone (32 : 45) [...] If we omit the intervals (bracketed in the above columns) due to these causes the average amounts to 1.361. Precisely the same average is reached if we limit ourselves to the fourth sung (without glissando) in (iii). The ratio 1.361 amounts to 534 cents (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 250).

Despite the incongruity of attempting to superimpose such an incoherent,
positivistic and *Eurocentric* reading of Miriam sacred songs, Myers appears oblivious to the irony of castigating European incursions into such music (Song XVI) on the grounds that it demonstrates a 'more complex form':

To many this song, like the last, will appear to bear *suspicious traces of European influence*. Despite its *more complex form*, however, it retains many of the leading characteristics observable in the majority of purely Miriam songs. The descent to a minor seventh from E to F is the most striking feature of the tune. It is followed by a twice repeated descent through two (?) minor thirds (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 254, emphasis added).

In one fell swoop, European influence is simultaneously disavowed as an incursion and heightened by association with formal complexity. This ironically doubled association (importing European models whilst critiquing the importation of European models [cf. Derrida, 2001, p. 356]) is further developed by deploying a Eurocentric historical (and, by implication, developmental) schema which divides between songs which are 'ancient', those which are 'medieval' and those which are 'modern' (Haddon et al, 1912, pp. 255, 241-242). This schema requires some unpacking here, both because of the slippage between developmental and historical scales and because there are several rhetorical, theoretical and disciplinary registers working with or against one another at the same time.

Myers first alludes to Islander music as being 'ancient', 'medieval' or 'modern' towards the beginning of the chapter (Haddon et al, 1912, pp. 241-242). Here he attempts to place such music into a developmental sequence which can be mapped directly onto a loose historical sequence, the assumption being that music – like history – progresses towards greater complexity. However, repeating our earlier
point about the expedition's evolutionism, it bears remembering at this point that the avowed aim of the expedition was not – or not mainly – to place the Islanders on a universal and progressive scale of 'savagery', 'barbarism' and 'civilization'. Expedition members often use such terminology, of course, and they also occasionally slip into such universal models (e.g. Haddon's 'Stone Age' Islanders from the photography chapter). However, the main thrust of their evolutionary model is a more directly Darwinian one drawn from zoology and biology. This is significant because Darwin's model of biological evolution is arguably more complex than anthropology's model of cultural evolution. Whilst the latter might posit a singular, universal and non-historical scale of development ('savagery-barbarism-civilization') – where, for example, Stone Age Britons could be developmentally aligned with nineteenth century Indigenous groups – the former posits a telos that is locally rather than globally defined. In other words, rather than suggesting a grand chain of biological and cultural Being with white, male European humans at the apex, Darwin's model is driven by blind, chance-driven mutations selected for relative to environmental changes. Local environments determine telos such that a shift in the former impacts directly on the latter; implicitly at least, there is no absolute hierarchy.

Myers and Haddon do not follow these implications to their fullest extent, but they are influenced by Darwin to the extent that they are more likely to trace evolutionary or development associations in one locale (in this case, musical forms within and between the Islands) than claim 'primitive' Islanders are comparable to Stone Age Britons. On this basis, Myers attempts to construct a tripartite schema of development by which the relative complexity of Island songs can be charted and
then mapped directly onto a loosely construed historical sequence. Thus, *Malu* songs, as the most 'primitive', represent an archaic and mysterious past. *Keber* songs – or those of middling complexity – represent a more recent period and 'secular' songs – as the most complex – the most recent:

We may reasonably look on the Malu songs as representing ancient Miriam music. The question arises, of course, as to how far the keber and the secular songs may be respectively regarded as specimens of "medieval" and "modern" Miriam music (Haddon, et al, 1912, p. 241).

Admittedly, such a schema is self-consciously provisional and speculative, but deploying the terms 'ancient', 'medieval' and 'modern' (even in their lower case generality) to characterize the three stages and three musical forms is riddled with complexities and paradoxes. Firstly, it suggests a shift from the Darwinian model of evolution – where developmental scales are locally defined or relative to environment – to a model which slips confusingly between developmental and historical scales, and, what's more, scales drawn from Europe and speciously universalized. However, although such a move is common currency in colonial discourse, the way in which it is done here has particular significance. For instance, rather than use developmental terms such as 'savagery' and 'barbarism', or evoke varying degrees of 'primitiveness', and then map them onto historical terms like 'Stone Age', 'Prehistoric', etc., which is the most common pattern (cf. Fabian, 2002), the terms 'ancient', 'medieval' and 'modern' have different European historical correlates which extend beyond a generalized sense of 'old', 'middle' and 'new'. Such terms sit somewhere between historical and developmental frames and evoke both general and particular registers: the general relates to the way in which such terms are used in European history in general, but the particular register –
most pertinent for our purposes here – relates to a specifically musicological discourse of historical development. This appears to be the main reason for such an invocation.

Even within contemporary musicological writings, it is not difficult (albeit with some elements of caricature) to ascertain a meta-narrative of musical progress which begins in early medieval church music (e.g. plainsong) – the 'dark' ages being also the silent ages – progresses in complexity towards polyphony, harmony and increasing secularization; reaches its apogee in the classical and romantic high-points of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Central Europe; and then fractures into a myriad of more or less successful modernisms, many of which are read as reactionary or regressive (cf. Sadie and Latham, 1985). This is obviously an overly simplified narrative, but its roots run deep and its presence makes itself felt in Myers' use of the terms 'ancient', 'medieval' and 'modern'. In this context, he is extracting them from their historical context and giving them developmental overtones, such that, for example, harmonic complexity and a high volume of intervals can be given developmental priority over the doubled repetition of single notes, consonance can be given priority over dissonance, complex rhythms over simple rhythms, fixed tempo over fluid tempo, etc. Of course, given that Myers is writing this in 1912, such a set of developmental associations is not without significance within the various musical strands of European modernism at the time. However, Myers' use of the term 'modern' is anomalous in this regard. By 'modern' he explicitly means music that is not influenced (or 'contaminated') by Europe. Rather, he means contemporary Island music which has been composed by Islanders in recent years, is secular in character and displays higher levels of
'complexity' (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 242). To that extent, and entirely beyond his intention, Myers has given the Islanders a type of ironic, non-European 'modernity'.

Nonetheless, in a metonym of the project as a whole – and, perhaps, anthropology as a whole – Myers more generally seeks out the non-European in the ill-fitting (musical) idiom of the European. Indeed, his whole musicological framework is drawn from European sources which rarely fit the source material (e.g. his attempt to reconstruct Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian scales or to specify relative major or minor dominance within songs even where 'no definite tonic is generally recognizable' [Haddon et al, 1912, pp. 257-259]). Through such a framework, Myers (Haddon et al, 1912, pp. 260-261) is able to suggest an implied developmental ranking vis-à-vis European music (e.g. fixed tempo and harmony as models of sophistication and 'lax tempo' and unison singing as markers of the primitive). Myers even speculates that the most 'primitive' (i.e. most 'ancient') songs, those associated with the Malu cult, are drawn more from 'natural' than cultural sources, wherein content dominates over form:

It is not difficult to see how this feature has been derived from a prolonged cry or wail, the natural formless expression of sorrow. For this reason, doubtless, the mournful nature of the Malu songs is so prominent (Haddon et al, 1912, pp. 261, emphasis added).

Such an implied developmental and historical schema of musical complexity places the 'primitive' (or 'ancient') Torres Strait Islander music alongside the music of Aboriginal Australia but below that of the Veddas of Sri Lanka. By contrast, the 'secular' (for which read 'modern') Torres Strait Islander music demonstrates 'a
wider range of notes, greater tunefulness, and a more obvious attempt at contrast and alternation of figures' (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 261). Through a process of mathematically analysing the positive data, Myers (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 256) is even able to 'deduce' that such 'modern' music displays a developmentally significant increase in intervals per song. However, even the 'modern' songs are subdivided into two and hierarchically ordered on the basis of how they sound to European ears:

Both are characterised by a greater liveliness, by a greater range of tones, by increasing complexity of structure and increasing feeling for tonality. In the one, however, there is considerably greater conciseness of form and (to our ears) greater tunefulness and tonality than in the other, in which, on the contrary, diffuseness, an unwillingness to rest on the natural tonic, and the avoidance of large intervals, are the distinguishing features (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 266, emphasis in original).

It is here that we reach the real nub of Myers' chapter – and, indeed, this chapter – the point of translation par excellence: from quality to quantity and back again. This is yet another intellectual sleight of hand comparable to what we saw in the photography chapter – where Haddon attempted to use a set of visible surfaces (photography, skin) to authenticate an invisible depth of racial 'truth' – and the cinematography chapter – where Haddon attempted to use another set of visible surfaces (film, photography, drawings) to authenticate an invisible and intangible sets of memories. In the case of phonography, the process has been taken a step further by passing through a quantitative and positivistic mediator: not only are Haddon and Myers attempting to authenticate ethnocentric cultural hierarchies using supposedly empirical data captured by the phonograph, but they are attempting to do so with the extra force offered by quantification. This would
appear to render such hierarchies **self-evident** (and it is, of course, relevant that sound is being converted to the visual at the same time) and therefore beyond the realm of argument. This is also comparable to Haddon's attempts elsewhere (e.g. his reading of 'race' on the Aran Islands which we looked at in the photography chapter) to pass 'racial truth' through a doubly authenticating filter: not only is such 'truth' based on concrete experience, but it is based on concrete experience which can be quantitatively, and therefore hierarchically, ordered.

The phonograph, therefore, begins to re-emerge at the highpoint of its significance and the low point of its audibility: it mediates and bolsters such 'truth' claims and allows them to consolidated by – and translated into – a process of quantification. To that extent, the phonographic apparatus and its inscriptions each participate in a much larger programme of knowledge and power which cuts across both tranches of this chapter. The sociological world of *Head-Hunters* offers a veiled glimpse of the cultural hybridity of power-laden colonial relations, and the methodologies and procedures by which colonial knowledge was produced in such a context. The positivistic musicology of the *Reports* demonstrates how such colonial knowledge can be subject to acute logical pressure points which weaken its power to cohere. Spanning quality and quantity, excess and loss, sociology and musicology, the phonographic apparatus and its unwieldy inscriptions are lodged in the interstitial spaces between each.
CONCLUSION

Reading the Writing-Machine: Historiographical Foreclosure and Theoretical Legacies

"Turning and turning in the widening gyre / The falcon cannot hear the falconer; Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world [...]"

W.B. Yeats, 'The Second Coming' (Finneran, 1997, p. 189)

'The Centre Cannot Hold'

In his short 2003 study, Jacques Derrida, Nicholas Royle (p. 57) considers the extent to which the margin-centre relationship is bound up with what he calls the 'logic of the supplement', which he provisionally – and in a self-consciously instrumental way – glosses as an unresolved play between plenitude and lack (pp. 48-49). Whilst appearing self-sufficient and complete, and capable of unproblematic addition from the 'outside', the centre simultaneously finds itself subject to unremitting internal pressure and dislocation from its margins. To that extent, Yeats' well-turned phrase provides something of a mantra for this thesis, not least because, in broad terms, each of the preceding three chapters might be read as an attempt to fold the margins of Haddon's project inwards with a view to pressuring its logical/conceptual centre(s). This has taken many forms – from Haddon's photographic typologies and cinematic fragments through to Myers' musicological positivism – each of which, I have argued, dislodge their respective
centres. To that extent, I have made no claim to offering a systematic or comprehensive study of Haddon's work, the expedition team's work, or the work of the expedition as a whole; in real terms, I have barely scratched the surfaces of what is a forbiddingly large body of already scratched surfaces (photographic plates, celluloid, phonograph recordings, etc.). However, what – one might ask – are the broader implications of such a move? What are the stakes? Can Haddon's project – or, more particularly a material, social and ontological reading of its use of inscription technologies – also be folded outwards towards a broader set of questions, debates and disciplines? In other words, beyond nuancing Haddon's role within the disciplinary histories of anthropology, what are the stakes of the project for its various and broader constituencies (e.g. the disciplines of British and American social and cultural anthropology, cultural studies, postcolonial studies and the theoretical humanities more generally)?

To some extent at least, such stakes also participate in the supplementary logic between a series of ever-expanding margins and centres. For example, just as I have focused on the margins of Haddon's project with a view to pressuring its centre(s), so too the marginal position of Haddon's project as a whole within the discipline of anthropology comes to exert pressure on (a) the reception of his work within the discipline and (b) on the centre of that discipline itself (and its use of technologies of inscription therein). In that sense, my focus on Haddon's project can be very much read as an extension of the disciplinary critiques of the early to mid 1980s (e.g. Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Clifford, 1988; Fabian, 2002 [1983]; Geertz, 1988a; Marcus and Fischer, 1999 [1986]). It builds upon such critiques by implicitly asking a set of crucial questions of far greater import than the relative
fate of Haddon's work within the discipline: for example, what role have
technologies of inscription (indexical and non-indexical) played in anthropology's
construction of its object? What does Haddon's project have to say about the
relationship between experience and representation in the discipline more
generally? Why did mainstream anthropology turn away from indexical
technologies and – for the most part – retreat back into a narrow, phonetic
writing? What would the implications be of calling for a return to an intertwining
of such technologies today? Most importantly, how might we ask these questions
whilst moving from a potentially paralysing critique to an enabling affirmation? By
extension, anthropology's relatively marginal position within the theoretical
humanities (and cultural studies and postcolonial studies in particular) can be
folded back into the centre via a rethinking of a kind of theoretically informed
case-based work which presses at the seam between theory and object, active and
passive and which calls for a rapprochement between the broadly – and obviously
problematically – defined arenas of media theory and postcolonial studies. Another
way to say the same thing is to consider the question of legacies, legacies which are
not histories – legacies which haunt – and this focus on legacies is important
because legacies cannot be historicized away. What legacies or traces, then, has
Haddon's project left for or in anthropology, cultural studies and postcolonial
studies and how might those legacies redefine the centre(s) of those fields?

I. Historiographical Foreclosure

If we begin with the disciplinary reception of Haddon's work, it is fair to say that
this thesis has, of necessity, read Haddon against the grain of such a reception, and
this is for a number of important reasons: the first is that his work is most often
treated as a footnote to a disciplinary history with little of any import to say about
the contemporary discipline or beyond; the second is that it is not generally read
in light of well-established disciplinary critiques; the third is that, with certain
notable exceptions, it is not generally read in light of his engagement with and
between media; and the fourth is that it is often read through the veil of a certain
imperial apologism. What at one level appears as an entirely laudable attempt to
lever open a space for his work and to reveal a set of complex nuances within the
disciplinary histories of anthropology, is at another level a foreclosure of that
debate. Indeed, I would contend that there is a kind of double foreclosure at work
within the historiographical reception of Haddon: the first stops the margins of
Haddon's work from folding in on themselves (particularly in relation to race,
imperialism and media) and the second stops Haddon's work as a whole - as
marginal to the discipline of anthropology - from folding in on the centre of the
discipline (and the two are obviously related). The preceding three chapters have
focused in detail on - or intervened in - the former, but what of the latter?

This double foreclosure works by creating a type of historical firewall around
Haddon's work which converts an unwieldy legacy - that might otherwise catch
the discipline unawares - into a fixed historicity - which stays within and knows

89 Of course, the footnote also participates in the logic of the supplement, which is why I have
attempted to fold such margins back onto their respective centres.
90 This is so despite the disciplinary self-definition which opens Cambridge and the Torres Strait:
Centenary Essays on the 1898 Anthropological Expedition (Herle and Rouse, 1998), one of the few
sustained studies of Haddon's work and that of the expedition team more generally.
91 For example, Elizabeth Edwards (1998; 2001) and Alison Griffiths (2001) are extremely astute' 
analysts of Haddon's photography and film respectively. However, such a move tends to relegate
these media to the sub-genres of ethnographic photography and film, and that does not get at
the complexity and radicality of the relationships between them, which is important because it is
here where both critique and affirmation are at their most forceful.
92 Between the armchair evolutionism of Edward Tylor and James Frazer and the ethnographic
paradigm of Bronislaw Malinowski and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown.
its place. This is a commonly repeated logic and it often adopts the appearance of its opposite. To take two notable and not incidental examples, recent public and academic debates around the histories of slavery and of colonialism have often given the initial impression of raising the profile of such issues – tracing legacies, considering questions of contemporary responsibility, etc. – whilst in real terms burying and/or protecting such arguments within the historiography. To paraphrase: 'that was then and this is now, and as we have raised the issue, we do not need to speak of it again or – more importantly – we do not need to trace the, often surprising and unexpected, relationships between then and now'. To do anything else is branded as irresponsible anachronism. Indeed, Catherine Hall's recent 'Legacies of British Slave-Ownership' project (2011-) is intended to counter such tendencies within the discipline of history on precisely those grounds (but even it only takes such legacies so far). However, the most crucial aspect of this logic – and, in some ways, the most insipid – is that it is not the same thing as concealment. Therefore any criticism levelled at the lack of debate can point to the fact that there has indeed been such a debate. However, what it occults or occludes in the process is the logic by which such debates fence off past and present in such a way as to forestall the argument or cut the relationship.

In a less dramatic vein, such a logic is playing out in the reception of Haddon's project, where certain aspects of his work – including its relationship to race, imperialism and media – are historicized in order to be historicized away and, therefore, its ability to leave unexpected and troubling – but possibly affirmative – legacies to the disciplinary critiques of anthropology is foreclosed. To paraphrase: 'we can't judge the past by contemporary standards'; 'he wasn't as bad as his
contemporaries', etc. This is a prime example of framing an historical debate with a view – deliberately or otherwise – to insulating the present: history as exorcism. By rendering his work anomalous or atypical, rather than peripherally critical, it is kept in its place, and a body of resources with which to critique and/or affirm the discipline of anthropology is denied.

For example, Haddon's project has many troubling things to say about the relationship between imperialism and anthropology, troubling not least because his liberal humanist endorsement of imperialist reform refuses to stay put in the anthropological or imperial past. As I argued in chapter one, Haddon's liberal humanism is pro-imperial whilst at the same time sidestepping the traps of the 'civilizing mission' and 'scientific racialism', and this has concrete effects on the types of humanitarianism from which contemporary forms of imperialism often take succour. To that extent, whilst this thesis is centrally positioned within calls for subtlety, nuance, complexity and detail in readings of colonial discourse, this should in no way be read as a weakening of critical energy against imperialism. Indeed, Haddon's project is all the more problematically embedded for participating in a type of imperial logic which exceeds its historical situatedness, and that is undoubtedly one of his project's most disconcerting legacies: a liberal humanist, but pro-imperial, disavowal of the 'civilizing mission' and – eventually – 'scientific racialism'. The crucial slippage between past and present – or historical and structural – registers means that traces are left within anthropology's epistemologies, theories and methods, and they cannot be excised or exorcized through historical scrutiny, any more than colonialism might be relegated to a fixed past by treating it historically. Indeed, that is one of the core problems with
the historical debates surrounding anthropology's relationship to imperialism more generally: the often abstract links between past and present, historical events and disciplinary methodologies, are not made as forcefully as they could or should be. This is likely to lead to a cry of anachronism – and, indeed, what I am calling for here might be considered a type of 'critical anachronism' – but this project has been explicitly posed as something other or more than a micro-history of the discipline of anthropology. Just as Haddon's project is allegorical, so too is mine.

That is precisely why the kinds of nuance that I have been calling for are necessary, i.e. to make the case that it is needed all the more to heighten critical readings of figures like Haddon and their disciplinary legacies. It is easy to take an overtly racist slave-owner to task. It is all the more difficult to do so with figures like Haddon – and liberal humanist strands within the human sciences more generally – who/which tend to slip out from under any attempt to fit them within neat or fixed categories. However, that is precisely why such work needs to be done: both because – alongside overtly racist slave-owners – figures like Haddon are extremely common in colonial discourse, and – most disconcertingly – because much of Haddon's logic is recognizably post-Victorian, even contemporary at times. This fact enables his readers to – not to put too fine a point on it – let him off the imperial hook. That debate (i.e. that he is a pro-imperialist with pro-imperialist views) has been acknowledged but foreclosed and separated off from the present (as we examined in chapter one with the museological attempt to redefine Haddon's overtly racialist 'type' photographs as examples of an emergent 'anthropological portraiture'). However, I would argue that nuance is required not
to lessen the critique of Haddon's work, but to sharpen it and to rout out any resurgence of his logics in a contemporary context.

What I am calling for, therefore, is a shift from a linear and causal history or historiography to a thinking of legacy and inheritance qua critical anachronism: a type of 'backwards time' where past, present and future are related in ways which are neither linear or causal nor foreseen (cf. Bennington, 2000, *passim*). The reception of Haddon's work\(^93\) does explicitly deal with the question of legacy in two fairly conventional but not insignificant ways: i.e. the narrow histories and methodologies of the British discipline of social anthropology\(^94\) and – more broadly – the history, culture and politics of the Torres Strait Islands.\(^95\) Both are valid and interesting lines of development. However, both also implicitly work with and within the juridical concept of legacy as a foreseeable gift to the future (and the ethical and legal dimensions of such a logic are not uninteresting or unimportant):

*legacy* •n. (pl. *-ies*) 1 an amount of money or property left to someone in a will. 2 something handed down by a predecessor (Pearsal, 1999, p. 810).

Such readings are not insignificant, but my reading cross-cuts them with another: the variation of the concept predominant in computer science, i.e. legacy as an ostensibly superseded and unwanted left-over that – for logistical or financial reasons – remains and insinuates itself within the new (Pearsal, 1999, p. 810).

\(^93\) This is most obviously represented by the 1998 commemorative volume, *Cambridge and the Torres Strait: Centenary Essays on the 1898 Anthropological Expedition* (Herle and Rouse, 1998).

\(^94\) Most importantly, the legacy that W.H.R. Rivers' genealogical method left for the later field of kinship studies, and the lesser legacies that the expedition as a whole left for the later fields of psychological, physical and linguistic anthropology.

\(^95\) Most importantly, the cultural, aesthetic, material and legal impact of Haddon's writings, recordings and collections on contemporary identity politics and land rights.
Such a legacy comes from behind in a sense. It is dorsal, in David Will’s terms (2008). It comes as an unannounced disruption, and that is important in this context because once we move from history to legacy and inheritance, we are able to stress a type of structural – or perhaps even deconstructive – doubleness within Haddon’s work, a doubleness centred on the three orienting frames of this thesis as I have laid them out: (1) anthropology’s relationship to inscription in general, and the shifts in mechanical inscription towards the end of the nineteenth century more particularly (cf. Doane, 2002; Kittler, 1999); (2) anthropology’s discursive construction of – and relationship to – its subjects/objects as vanishing or lost and (3) the epistemological or archival impulse which joins both together. As I have read them in the preceding three chapters, these frames authenticate the production of positive data and attempt to justify Haddon’s project’s uncomfortable positioning within imperial institutions and practices.

However, read as a site of doubleness or expansion, each frame points in two directions at once; each can be opened out: (1) inscription becomes not only about the specifics of the emergence of mechanical inscription towards the end of the nineteenth century, but also about the complex forms of what Bolter and Grusin (1999, p. 273) call ‘remediation’96 (that is ‘the formal logic by which new media refashion prior media forms’) at the end of the twentieth century and beyond (and that includes the question of digitization). Such a move positions Haddon’s work as not only relevant to the so-called ‘writing culture’ debate in anthropology, but suggests a move beyond such a debate: moving backwards in order to move forwards, i.e. by folding media into anthropology’s disciplinary critiques. (2) Loss

96 My thanks to John Mowitt for directing me towards this concept.
becomes not only about the historical specificity by which colonial modernity
discursively produced Indigeneity as a site of perpetual moribundity, from which a
stream of positive data could be peeled, but also an examination of the extent to
which the figure of loss – or the relationship between inscription and loss – haunts
the discipline of anthropology much more generally. This happens in the
conceptual and historical shift from posing the discipline as a redeemer of
vanishing worlds (the salvage motif) to a redeemer of unwritten worlds (the
speech/writing allegory). Both figures of loss appear together in the fin-de-siècle
discipline, but the latter figure transcends the historical specificity of the former
and leaves its traces within the contemporary discipline in various complex ways
which continue to endorse types of anthropological authority in some – but by no
means all – contexts. (3) Finally, as I mentioned in the example above, the resultant
or concomitant colonial epistemologies of desire and power are not restricted to
that particular historical moment. They also leave traces in the methodologies,
theories and orientations of the discipline more generally. Therefore, by stressing
the logic of legacy over history – and by opening out our three frames – we are able
to shift from Haddon and his historiographical reception to (an expansion of) the
disciplinary critiques of anthropology.

II. Disciplinary Critiques

Indeed, Haddon bequeaths a series of important questions to the discipline which
cross over our three frames and can be gathered under the rubric of what I have
been calling the 'writing machine' (or a material, social and ontological reading of
technologies of inscription): for example, what role have technologies of
inscription (indexical and non-indexical) played in anthropology's construction of its object? What does Haddon's project have to say about the relationship between experience and representation in the discipline more generally? Why did mainstream anthropology turn away from indexical technologies and – for the most part – retreat back into a narrow, phonetic writing? What would the implications be of calling for a return to an intertwining of such technologies today?

Of course, it is not incidental that such doubleness or expansiveness has been a core theme throughout this thesis and throughout the discipline of anthropology more generally. As I suggested earlier, according to James Clifford's (1986b) study of ethnographic allegory, one of anthropology's great predicaments or tensions is that every empirical encounter and representation allegorically evokes and requires a larger (transcendental) narrative. For example, a specific description of childbirth simultaneously evokes – and is logically predicated upon – a 'universal' story of women's experience. For Clifford, that is the condition of meaningfulness of the representation. It is meaningful to us both because it is different – 'look at how "they" understand and experience childbirth differently' – and because it is the same – 'and yet we share the human universal of childbirth'. Such an empirical/transcendental logic is inextricably bound to the history of anthropology and suggests a crucial anti-foundational impasse for the discipline: the conditions of possibility of an ostensibly empirical discipline are not empirical. This is neither a flaw nor a failing, but rather a result of the inevitable conceptual unwieldiness of all empirical disciplines, and it can either be courted or occulted but not removed through greater care or heightened empiricism. It is, therefore, perhaps more of a
flaw in the geological sense, a crack in a seam of rock which can be pressured and
opened, or concealed and masqueraded, but not filled. This is anthropology's
predicament and it has been woven throughout Haddon's work in many and
various ways (most often via a tension between the particular and the general).
However, it also weaves it way through this thesis itself. My project is woven and
implicated within Haddon's. Indeed, just as anthropology's micro-narratives evoke
larger ones, so too this thesis – focused as it has been on the margins of the
margins (the marginal minutiae of a marginal figure) – evokes larger narratives as
well. There is no outside from which we can resolve the tensions and square the
circle, so to speak.

However, it is my hope that stressing such doubleness – or expansiveness – will do
more than merely entrench the disciplinary critiques of anthropology – which
would be in danger of slipping into a type of paralysing, self-defeating or
iconoclastic stasis – but more pointedly that it will push towards a type of
affirmation of contemporary anthropological media. And the concept which joins
both together – critique and affirmation – is the concept of contingency, or more
particularly the intimate bond between between indexicality and contingency,
which has been one of the core arguments that this thesis has sought to sustain.
This concept sits right at the centre of our disciplinary questions above: how does
anthropology use technology to construct its object? Why did the discipline turn
away from such technologies, and how might a return to them push us beyond the
'writing culture' debate? Simply put, indexical technologies provided the emergent,
positive human sciences with a vast body of 'raw data', and what's more a body of
'raw data' peeled off a seemingly dying set of referents (the bond between
inscription and loss is here at its most intimate; this is where they cross and touch). To that extent, they were the positivist tools *par excellence* and promised to banish the subjective variability of the human agent, even more so than prior techniques born of the same desire (e.g. the anthropological questionnaire which was an attempt to standardize and perfect the collection process). However, such a logic was cross-cut by a crucial tension: such 'raw data' were also harbingers of a type of radical contingency at odds with any attempts at controlled rationalization. In other words, (nodding to Levi-Strauss) they were too raw to be cooked\(^97\), and to that extent indexical technologies simultaneously enabled *and* disabled positivist ambitions. That is the rub. They exceeded their rational containment.

This is a logic which has resurfaced again and again within the preceding chapters\(^98\), but the reason why it is so important here is not simply that it demonstrates the extent to which the margins of Haddon's work dislodge and displace the centres, (which is the first layer of unfolding), but that it contributes to an overturning of a vital argument within the broader disciplinary histories of anthropology (which is the second), i.e. that anthropology turned away from indexical technologies because of their proximity to a simplistic and problematic positivism and their predilection for the conversion of cultural surfaces into sources of data. Such a 'turning away' from indexical technologies (and photography and cinematography in particular) was all the more ironic from a discipline which remained resolutely ocularcentric. Vision – primarily the supposedly unmediated vision of the lone ethnographer – remained at the centre.

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97 My thanks to John Mowitt for directing me to this link or connection.
98 As I suggested in chapters one and three, this is also part of a broader discussion about the relationship between technology and modernity, and between technics and chance.
of the knowledge production process (cf. Fabian, 2002, ch. 4); it simply retreated into the supposed depth and complexity of phonetic writing after the fact. However, if we make the argument that indexical technologies are not only handmaidens to an outmoded positivism, but also harbingers of a radical contingency, then the symptomatic disavowal or displacement of such technologies in the mainstream, ethnographic anthropology of 'founding fathers' like Malinowski and Levi-Strauss might also be read as an attempted disavowal of contingency. In that light, the retreat into a narrowly phonetic writing in post-Victorian anthropology at large can be read less as an exploration of positivism's others – depth, complexity and meaning, etc. – and more an exercise in attempted control, rationalization and foreclosure.

That line of argumentation emerges obliquely from the analysis of Haddon's work, but, on my reading, it bequeaths a legacy to the disciplinary critiques of anthropology, and one which, crucially, extends those critiques beyond themselves. Displacing the supposed control and transparency of anthropology's phonetic writings has long been the mainstay of the disciplinary critiques of anthropology, but the connection between both and the disavowal of indexical technologies (qua harbingers of contingency), is a relatively new and untapped line of analysis. It is an attempt to steer a course between a focus on anthropology as a kind of literature – which rarely examines how its writings are encrusted with other media – and a focus on anthropological media – which rarely examines how such media are embedded within anthropological writings. However, the crucial

99 The former is most obviously represented by James Clifford and George Marcus's hugely influential edited volume, *Writing Culture* (1986) and its associated works (e.g. Clifford, 1988; Marcus and Fischer, 1999 [1986]). The latter is most obviously represented by splinter groups within visual anthropology, ethnomusicology and folklore studies interested in ethnographic uses of photography, cinematography and phonography (e.g. Edwards 2001; Grimshaw, 2001;
point to make here is that I am not merely calling for a more entrenched critique of the discipline of anthropology via Haddon's margins (i.e. re-thinking why anthropology might have turned away from indexical technologies), but equally for an affirmative return to the types of complex (re)medial relations of the fin-de-siècle period. This might even be considered a call for a type of anthropological 'media studies', for want of a better phrase, attuned not only to media, but, crucially, to the types of 'remedial' rivalries between media which call into question the dominance of phonetic writing in the discipline, and its attendant structures of authority and control. Indeed, given the intrinsic bond between indexical technologies and contingency, there is no necessary reason why such technologies should be beholden to a type of superficial or regressive positivism or scientific racialism. What's more, if the arguments of this thesis carry any weight, it may be that the intrinsic bond between indexicality and contingency pushes the discipline further from the disconcerting residue of positivism and scientific racialism than it is at present. In a very concrete sense, then, contingency becomes a site of both double critique (of Haddon's project and anthropology as a whole) and a site of affirmation (of the relationship between indexicality and contingency as an un[fore]seen future).

However, as broached in the previous chapter, this critique-affirmation relationship is itself important and is caught up in the space or tension between two variant strands of 'poststructuralism' that we might crudely, quickly and for the sake of concision gloss as 'discourse analysis' and 'deconstruction' (not necessarily reducible to the work of Foucault and Derrida). Contained in this space

Brady, 1999). One might also think about the growing interest in the relationship between anthropology and media more generally (e.g. Ginsburg, 1995; 2008).
or tension is a problem of scale and method, and its implications reach far beyond Haddon and the disciplinary critiques of anthropology. To put it bluntly, discursively analysing a set of specific colonial writings – like Haddon's – with a view to critically 'discovering' their endorsement of larger racist stereotypes, racialist generalisations or misogynistic gender norms is not new(s), it is predetermination; foresight rather than insight. If you know your conclusions in advance, there is little point in conducting the analysis. However, where such analysis can offer more, and spill beyond or surprise itself, is by attending to unexpected sites of displacement, moments where the analysis does not fit and totalizing systems start to come apart ('the centre cannot hold'). That is where critique and affirmation start to cross. Otherwise – and this is an issue of central concern to Gayatri Spivak in *The Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999) and Homi Bhabha in *The Location of Culture* (1994) – we risk paying for the coherence of our analysis at the cost of demonstrating the unbreakable strength of colonial discourse. This thesis risks the reverse: demonstrating the microscopic fault-lines in colonial discourse at the cost of a straightforwardly 'coherent' (that is to say, 'predetermined') analysis, and this pitches us, finally, into the unremitting complexities of the theory/object relation in cultural studies, postcolonial studies and the theoretical humanities more generally. If, as Stuart Hall suggests, '[t]he only theory worth having is that which you have to fight off, not that which you speak with profound fluency', then how do we make a case for the case study whilst 'wrestling with the angels' of theory (Hall, 1992, p. 280)?
Much of the analysis in the preceding chapters originally stemmed from a very simple methodological and theoretical tension which, whilst initially suggesting itself as a structural flaw, slowly began to be revealed as something more symptomatic and, crucially, more generative: why – when one is accustomed to conceptual seepage at binary seams – is it so difficult to avoid opposing 'theory' and 'object' when one actually does cultural studies? Why is there so often an ill fitting, and, at times, uncomfortable shifting of analytical registers? Obviously, in attempting to answer such a question, one risks going into an ontological tailspin as one attempts to pin down definitions, to deconstruct implied binarisms between theory and object, and so forth. The crucial point, however, is how is one to ask and answer such questions without disowning what would conventionally be seen as theoretical complexity or empirical nuance? In other words, if this thesis has converged with certain critiques of so-called 'top-down' theory on the grounds that it is insufficiently attentive to empirical nuance, then the central point is this: what does it mean to ask this question theoretically? The short answer, which we will return to in a moment, is to insist on the supplementary bond between them.

However, this began to formulate itself into a more specific question: why does there appear to be such a gap between – what has perhaps unfairly been generalized as – 'postcolonial theory' and specific objects of analysis, and what does this mean? Is this simply the result of an insufficiently attentive reading of both or something more? Indeed, much of the initial frustration of this thesis stemmed from a seeming lack of fit between the two. Why does one perpetually
read about certain figures or tropes within colonial discourse only to find that they are either not there in specific writings, for example, or are there in ways which suggest new questions? There is often a disconcerting chasm between so-called 'theoretical' works and specific colonial writings, as if the change of focus from the general to the particular renders invisible up close what is clear from afar.

Such considerations did not emerge ex nihilo and have gathered a body of writing around themselves. For example, postcolonial polemicists such as Benita Parry (e.g. 1987), for instance, have subjected the so-called 'Holy Trinity' of postcolonial studies (Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha and Edward Said) to considerable criticism in recent years in light of the perceived obscurity, difficulty and generality of their work, but more broadly in light of what could be argued to be a trend in contemporary postcolonial studies away from abstract generality, where one talks about colonialism in the singular as if there was only one form and as if it remained one and the same for all time, towards forms of material specificity, which take seriously the important differences of class, race, sex, gender, history, geography and language that splinter colonialism into a multiplicity of colonial and postcolonial encounters (cf. Thomas, 1994, p. ix). On such a reading – and it is fair to say that it caricatures key postcolonial theorists – postcolonial studies stands accused of constructing colonialism as, in some senses, an homogeneous power block or a kind power/knowledge nexus (in Foucauldian terms), superimposed from the outside on unwitting populations. For these critics, there is no colonialism – or, indeed, postcolonialism – in general. As Nicholas

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100 This phrase is from Robert Young’s Colonial Desire (1995, p. 163).
101 In this sense, Bhabha’s work, for example, is about historical formations without itself being particularly historical in its orientation.
Thomas argues:

[T]here is an impasse in much current writing that arises from too
dogged an attachment to 'colonialism' as a unitary totality, and to
related totalities such as 'colonial discourse', 'the Other', Orientalism

Whilst the political impetus behind postcolonial studies may be sound, its critical
edge is rendered blunt by its lack of nuance, or so the argument goes. It is only
when one examines a specific case study that the deeply complex empirical
heterogeneity of the colonial project – or colonial projects – becomes clear. '[O]nly
localized theories and historically specific accounts can provide much insight into
the varied articulations of colonizing and counter-colonial representations and
practices' (Thomas, 1994, p. ix).

Whilst acknowledging that few postcolonial theorists would recognize their work
within a summary of this sort, such critiques are well taken, at least to the extent
that general and particular registers may not always align well. However, one
might equally respond that the work of Spivak, Bhabha and Said clearly does
reward patient reading, offering complex theoretical accounts of many of the
issues which have concerned more empirically oriented scholars in the first place
(particularly a way of recasting the problems of postcolonial resistance and
postcolonial inheritance in a more complex and nuanced fashion that relies neither
on dichotomous models of thinking nor posits an essentialist revolutionary
agency). The problem with such critiques, therefore, is that the theory does fit
sometimes and, at other points, it partially fits. How, then, are we to respond? Such
a lack of fit, or partial fit, suggests certain options: ignore it; manipulate the object
to make it fit; jettison the theory, etc. However, what slowly started to emerge was
the idea that this lack of fit – or partial fit – might itself be wherein the analysis lies.
This is where the figure of supplementarity becomes particularly important,
because this 'lack of fit' is not a weakness, much less a spurious split between
'theory' and 'politics'; it is nothing more (or less) than an effect of the logic of the
supplement. As Nicholas Royle (2003, p. 58) argues '[the] distinction between
primary [i.e. object] and secondary [i.e. theory] is turned upside down,
fundamentally disturbed by a thinking of the supplement'. Theory and object will
never 'fit' together without residue, excess and lack.

This has a range of implications that are as much of practical and methodological
significance as they are of theoretical significance. For example, on one reading, the
supplementary lack of fit is asking – if not necessarily answering – the question of
how one is to relate cultural theory and different cultural materials in a way that
sets up both as active and potentially antagonistic partners in the same process.
Indeed, whilst teachers of a theoretically informed cultural studies are often loath
to teach methodology in a didactic way – because it risks submerging the
specificity and alterity of the resultant work – attending to the supplementary
bond between theory and object offers some methodological insights into how
they may be brought together. This is not applied theory and cases are not sites of
passivity. It is a two-way process which attempts to avoid the 'mastery and
application' model that is so difficult to avoid in teaching cultural studies. Indeed,
despite every precaution and caveat, one of the most resilient initial responses to a
theoretically informed cultural studies is a hylomorphic one: to attempt to make
theory submit to one's will and then use it as a tool to open up inert cultural matter
and/or get it to reveal its hitherto hidden secrets. Such a response is perhaps understandable, but it is a timely reminder of a truistic insight: cultural theory is inside rather than outside the culture it analyses. Like any other comparable example, one can’t simply dispense with one predetermined methodological model and replace it with another. However, a crucial precept of this thesis is this: if one cannot and should not predetermine the outcome, one can at least set up the process as a fluid one and demonstrate by examples.

However, this is not just a practical and methodological question but also a more theoretical one. In other words, this is not just a traditional debate about theory and practice or theory and the empirical, but a more complex debate about the relationship between singularity and universality. Focusing on cases opens up sites of singularity which may offer challenges to the universality or grandiosity of some strands of post-Enlightenment theory. This is perhaps ironic given that attempts to theorize the limits of the Enlightenment – or its universality and rigidity – have often been conducted in the name of a certain anti-essentialist singularity – opening up the question of difference, for example – but they have nonetheless often ended up repeating the arid grandiosity of overarching theory which, for some, submerges that very singularity (cf. Arditi and Valentine, 1999, pp. 106-142).

As Nicholas Thomas argues:

The paramount irony of contemporary colonial studies must be that critics and scholars, who one presumes wish to expose the false universality and hegemony of imperial expansion and modernization, seem unwilling themselves to renounce the aspiration of theorizing globally on the basis of particular strands in European philosophy. (1994, p. x).
Accepting that there is a clear polemical agenda in such a sentiment, and acknowledging that this predicament is certainly not absolute, this risk is arguably heightened when theory becomes its own object. By contrast, this thesis has been written in the belief that there is much to be gained from the kind of case-based work that offers different challenges to and for theory. Indeed, it is one way to mark the distinction between cultural studies and philosophy, or a philosophically oriented cultural studies and philosophy.

Such case-based work therefore attempts to steer between two opposed courses often taken in cultural studies: the one, where theory becomes its own object, and the other, where a revived empiricism attempts to dislodge theory. This is a caricature of general trends, of course, and is not to be taken too strictly, but it nonetheless animates much of the work produced in cultural studies and offers a set of difficult choices for the cultural analyst. The other difficult course that such work attempts to set is that between an extremely focused proper-name-theory version of case-based analysis (e.g. Freud in the colonies) and a generalized theoretical bricolage where a multitude of theoretical influences are invoked in a superficial, piecemeal or reductive manner. The problem with the former is that it is often theory-as-its-own-object by another name. The specificity of the case study is often in danger of slipping into the background as lengthy passages of theoretical exegesis take its place. The problem with the latter is that paying heed to the case study in a detailed way often makes it difficult to shift registers in ways which take each seriously. Obviously, both of these options are predicated on a set of specious binary oppositions which need to be pressured, but the challenge, therefore, becomes one of partially or strategically conceding to one without
uncritically aligning it with its others. For example, if it is difficult to avoid separating what are conventionally thought of as theoretical and empirical registers, then, at the very least, we do not have to accept that, for instance, the former is active and the latter passive or that the relationship between them proceeds in one direction only. Indeed, one of the reasons why this latter point is significant is that it is by pushing at the seam of the latter oppositions (active/passive) that we may hope to also push at the seam of the former (theory/object).

On this basis, an ostensibly disabling lack of fit between theory and object can be rendered methodologically and theoretically enabling and creatively generative. This emerges as one of the core cases for the case study in cultural studies. The other seeming lack of fit that emerges as significant in making that case is that between different theoretical models, disciplines, fields and themes, etc. Sometimes case studies demand a rapprochement where hitherto there had been division. To that extent, this thesis has also been an attempt to locate the blind spots or acoustic dead zones between such disciplines, fields and themes (e.g. histories and theories of colonialism, modernity and technology, etc.). It is probably most accurate to therefore view this case study as a node in a discursive network. Such an image is particularly significant when the specificity of the analysis is under way and it becomes impossible to separate out different analytical registers. However, such an image makes it difficult to position or conceptually render the varying scales of analysis in which the present study has been embedded. To that extent, one might simplify and attempt to view the initial contexts as a series of concentric rings: starting at the outer edges with attempts to
analyse the histories and theories of modernity, narrowing to focus on the relationship between modernity and technology and modernity and colonialism, narrowing to focus on anthropology within that context, and narrowing again to focus on the Torres Strait expedition within that context, etc. On that basis, the project becomes less an empirical specialism for its own sake and more an attempt to intersect such circles and their associated disciplines, themes, theories and methods.

Such an intersection makes sense from the perspective of a case study, but at a broader level a number of peculiar and perplexing blind spots start to emerge. For example, whilst there are always notable exceptions (e.g. Mowitt, 2005; Rony, 1996; Stoler, 2010, etc.), it is not difficult to read canonical and entirely creditable works which explore the media-modernity nexus, such as Friedrich Kittler's *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter* (1999) or Mary Ann Doane's *The Emergence of Cinematic Time* (2002), and find scant references to colonial discourse (cf. Mowitt, 2005, p. xxviii). Conversely, it is not difficult to read similar writings in postcolonial studies, such as Homi Bhabha's *The Location of Culture* (1994) or Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1995), and find scant references to technologies of communication or inscription. Indeed, although many strands of postcolonial criticism have paid close (almost fetishistic) attention to the relationship between the conceptual content of cultural representations, colonial governance and academic mores, much less has been written on the relationship between colonial governance and the material/technical conditions of possibility of these cultural representations. This might be a result of simple theoretical specializations, different traditions or, perhaps, a selective dissemination of 'poststructuralism' where, for example, one
group might be more inclined to stress Derrida's reading of Rousseau in *Of Grammatology* (e.g. Paul de Man, 1971) and another his prescient account of science and technology in the same book (e.g. Bernard Stiegler, 1998). There are no doubt a wide range of contingent reasons for this – and one wouldn't want to endorse a crude 'two cultures' model here – but it does appear somewhat peculiar, not least because of the major significance that communication and inscription technologies played in sustaining and disseminating colonial discourse. This is exacerbated by the fact that when analysts do turn to examining such a connection (and there have been several interesting examples in recent years, e.g. Samson and Hight, 2004), there is often a tendency to construct another series of semiotic surfaces to be analysed (e.g. 'reading' colonial photographs rather than analysing colonial photography). There is nothing inherently wrong with such an approach, and this thesis owes much to it, but in my view it needs to be supplemented with the kinds of broader material, social and ontological questions that are raised in detail only in those writings which address the media-modernity nexus.

This thesis has therefore been an attempt – perhaps not so much at a rapprochement *per se* – but at a drawing together of influences, themes, theories and methods from these seemingly disparate traditions. An attempt to do so at a broader level would likely yield different results, but an attempt to do so through the tight focus of a case study carves out theoretical and methodological questions and relationships which either did not hitherto exist or which remained at the margins of a number of disparate discourses. I have therefore attempted to work with or against the 'grain' of the collective material (cf. Stoler, 2010), rather than superimpose pre-configured 'theoretical models' onto 'empirical objects'. In this
sense, the project has been more artisanal than architectonic, much as a carpenter's abstract forms take material suggestions from the wood, reversing and displacing the master/servant relationship between carpenter and wood, theory and object. Instead of opposing the relative merits and demerits of so-called 'empirical' or 'theoretical' approaches, I have attempted to argue for a supplementary parity between them; each has simultaneously added to and displaced the other. Stressing the logic of the supplement is important because it acknowledges the extent to which 'theory' and 'object' will never 'complete' one another without excess and lack, nor can the relationship between them be aligned with their binary partners. Indeed, without acknowledging such a logic, the very language used to discuss this tension will keep falling into specious binarisms: top-down/bottom-up, macroscopic/microscopic, large-scale/small-scale, etc. In short, rather than a clean set of oppositions or a clean blurring between them, there is a constantly shifting set of foci, which undoubtedly poses considerable methodological and theoretical challenges. However, although methodologically problematic and conceptually disabling at times, such challenges are equally symptomatic of core and unavoidable tensions, and – in the final analysis – are hopefully generative of more sophisticated creative encounters to come.


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