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The University of Leeds
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Abstract

This study explores the meaning and operation of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from the Saint Malo Declaration in December 1998 up to the European Council of December 2013. Applying a comprehensive strategic culture framework, the study affirms that CSDP began as an intergovernmental initiative but its institutional structure and implementation reflects a non-traditional type of intergovernmentalism, lacking the usual interests-based interstate bargaining. The study affirms that there is an emergent European strategic culture that co-exists with member state strategic cultures. It further identifies a credibility gap between the Union’s stated security and defence ambitions and its current level of capability and actorness. The explanation for these shortcomings lies in a form of bureaucratic politics suffused throughout CSDP processes. The bureaucratic politics explanation of CSDP stands in sharp contrast to suggestions that the policy area exhibits Europeanisation, finding this concept too vague to be analytically useful in understanding what CSDP represents. The original contribution of the study is that the often suggested need for CSDP to be driven by Grand Strategy in the academic literature is inappropriate and unfeasible because member states consistently fail to define their common interests, and the form of bureaucratic politics of CSDP conflicts with the development and implementation of Grand Strategy. While Grand Strategy cannot work, bureaucratic politics may in the long-term incrementally deliver an EU strategic culture, strategic actorness and enhanced capability. The study therefore concludes that despite shortfalls, the bureaucratic politics approach is the most effective way to analyse CSDP in a scholarly sense and also as a means to achieve the declared ambitions of CSDP.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BAE</td>
<td>British Aerospace</td>
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<td>BG</td>
<td>EU Battlegroup</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>Bureaucratic politics</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Civilian Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capability Development Plan</td>
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<td>CEECs</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CGS</td>
<td>Council General Secretariat</td>
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<td>CHG</td>
<td>Civilian Headline Goal 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management Committee</td>
</tr>
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<td>CIV-MIL</td>
<td>Civilian-Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Crisis Management Operation</td>
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<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management Planning Directorate</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGAP</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik/German Council on Foreign Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate General for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>DG ECFIN</td>
<td>Directorate General for Economy and Finance</td>
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<td>DG ENLARG</td>
<td>Directorate General for Enlargement</td>
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<td>DG RELEX</td>
<td>Directorate General for External Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia Herzegovina (1995)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EADS</td>
<td>European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECFR</td>
<td>European Council for Foreign Relations</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Identity</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-3</td>
<td>France, Germany, United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>European Union Delegation</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>EU Police Mission</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>Grand Strategy</td>
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<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of 20 leading industrialised nations</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFA</td>
<td>Helsinki Final Act</td>
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<td>HHG</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR/HR-VP</td>
<td>High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies (Paris)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Stabilisation Force Afghanistan (NATO)</td>
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<td>LI</td>
<td>Liberal Intergovernmentalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy (USA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operations Headquarters</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>SEM</td>
<td>Single European Market</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe</td>
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<td>SPD</td>
<td>German Social Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/German Institute for External and Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>TTIP</td>
<td>Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</td>
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<td>UAVs</td>
<td>Unmanned Airborne Vehicles</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US/USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WBIF</td>
<td>Western Balkans Investment Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>WMDs</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Chapter One

Introduction: Grand strategy and bureaucratic politics

1.1 Introduction

The St Malo Declaration in 1998 called on the EU to create the ‘capacity for autonomous defence’ (SMD, 1998); the European Security Strategy (ESS) called for ‘(an EU) strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and where necessary robust intervention’ (Solana, 2003:13); the Lisbon Treaty refers to ‘the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.2); the phrase ‘Defence matters’ opens Conclusions from the December 2013 European Council on EU security (European Council, 2013). Despite this rhetoric, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) remains mostly about security, not defence. CSDP is a set of mainly civilian security-related instruments concerned with ‘peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.1). EU defence capability remains marginal as NATO and member states represent defence interests.

This thesis uses a strategic culture frame of analysis to assess the meaning of CSDP, and addresses claims in the literature that CSDP requires a Grand Strategy approach to achieve substance (Biscop, 2009, 2010; Howorth, 2010; Biscop and Coelmont, 2012). Substance means adequate military capability, coherence and actoriness to address perceived threats (Shepherd, 2003). The ESS identifies terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime as key threats (Solana, 2003). This was up-dated in 2008 to include cyber security and energy security (European Council, 2008), with a new emphasis on human security (see pp.53-4) (Kaldor, 2012; Whitman, 2013:193).

The original contribution of this study is that Grand Strategy, ‘the calculated relationship between means and large ends’ (Gaddis, 2009), is inappropriate and unfeasible because member states consistently fail to define their common interests, and bureaucratic politics best explains the development and implementation of CSDP. While Grand Strategy cannot work, bureaucratic politics may in the long-term deliver an EU strategic culture, strategic actoriness and enhanced capability. The thesis develops a critique of Grand Strategy as dependent upon all or most member states engaging in state-level adaptation and therefore Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003). It also requires the development of institutions at the European level that would eventually bring defence and security integration. There is
therefore an association between Grand Strategy and Europeanisation, as both imply integration. GS arguments appeal for a more federal, state-like EU. This thesis argues that thus far the CSDP process has evolved very differently, through bureaucratic politics, which actually conflicts with the Grand Strategy ambition.

Bureaucratic politics explains CSDP better than various alternatives (see Chapter 2). It is more appropriate than assigning Europeanisation to this policy area, as many scholars including Haseler (2003, 2004), Gross (2007), Mérand (2008), and Watanabe (2010) have done. The thesis also considers and rejects other theoretical standpoints as insufficient or inappropriate, including neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, varieties of social constructivism, and Brusselsisation, though the latter is useful as it relates closely to bureaucratic politics (see Chapter 2).

This chapter explains core concepts underpinning the study: strategic culture, Grand Strategy, strategic actorness, bureaucratic politics, and Europeanisation. It then offers a brief explanation of the historical context of CSDP before introducing the hypotheses for the study and the main research questions. A methodology section follows before the chapter ends with an outline of the thesis structure.

The thesis covers European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) from St Malo through to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, when ESDP was renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and up to the December 2013 European Council on defence and security. The study mostly uses the term CSDP, embracing both pre-Lisbon ESDP and post-Lisbon CSDP, except where specific reference to ESDP is appropriate.

The work is located in the domain of foreign and security policy. Most foreign policy literature assumes that states can better achieve their interests through cooperation, and even by sharing sovereignty (Moravcsik, 1998). This notion has underpinned institutional development throughout the post-1945 period, and reflects how states approach security threats (Hoffmann, 1981; Goldmann, 2001; Solana, 2003; Cooper, 2004). Hoffmann implies a multilateral approach to security that embraces an ethical perspective:

(the statesman) ought to be guided by the imperative of moving the international arena from the state of a jungle to that of a society (Hoffmann, 1981:35).
Various writers note increasing EU interest in foreign policy (Allen, 1998; Smith, 2004; Haseler, 2004; Howorth, 2007; Bickerton, 2013), a trend coinciding with the changing international environment and a post-Cold War reassessment of sovereignty.

1.2 Core concepts used in the study

Strategic culture, a ‘contested concept’ (Gray, 1999a:61; Meyer, 2013:52), provides a common prism for academic analysis of CSDP (Hyde-Price, 2004; Longhurst, 2004; Howorth, 2014; Biava et al, 2011). The European Security Strategy (ESS) (Solana, 2003:11) highlights strategic culture as essential to ESDP. The thesis considers whether the EU has attained or is developing a strategic culture, defined as:

A distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use of force, held by a collective and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process (Longhurst, 2004:17).

This definition allows for a ‘comprehensive approach’ (CA), more than the traditional focus on military force. The comprehensive EU security concept is understood as:

A stress on preventive action using a full range of EU policy tools directed towards a single target/problem (with a spectrum of tools including) military, policing, law, human rights, and economic development resources (Smith, 2012:265-6).

The comprehensive approach (Major and Mölling, 2013; Smith, 2012, 2013) is manifest in official documentation (Petersberg Declaration, 1992; Amsterdam Treaty, 1997:Art.J.7; European Communities, 1999:55; Solana, 2003; EEAS, n.d.a). The Petersberg Tasks for example provide for peacekeeping as well as peacemaking (armed intervention), while the European External Action Service (EEAS) includes economic and political development within its brief.

An important strand of CSDP literature argues that the policy demands Grand Strategy (GS), defined by Biscop, echoing Gaddis (p.1), as a calculated relationship between:

an actor’s fundamental objective and the basic categories of instruments it chooses to apply to achieve that (Biscop, 2013a:38).
In the US context, as in Europe, GS entails a comprehensive approach:

Grand strategy (...) refers to the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state's deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state's national interest. Grand strategy is the art of reconciling ends and means (Feaver, 2009).

Proponents of GS argue that the Union is failing to develop a proper strategic culture underpinned by military (and civilian) capability, and served by adequate political will (Biscop, 2009, 2010; Howorth, 2010; Biscop and Coelmont, 2012). Consequently the EU lacks 'actorness' in this area, understood as:

(the) capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system (Sjöstedt, 1977:16).

Actorness is, like GS, understood in terms of ends and means. A strategic actor:

(is) capable of long-term planning and implementing activities in order to achieve the goals it has set (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009:11).

Biscop suggests that GS is encapsulated in the European Security Strategy (Solana, 2003), and that GS, like the ESS, is a preventive, holistic and multilateral approach to security. It must reconcile interests with the values of the Union's social model, and be constructed with clear goals around neighbourhood policy, enlargement, regional objectives, global and institutional objectives, and conflict resolution and crisis management. GS furthermore must be implemented, so Biscop calls on the High Representative-Vice-President of the Commission (HR-VP), supported by the European External Action Service, to be formally entrusted with this task (Biscop, 2009:4-5; 2013a:44-5). GS is regarded as essential for the Union to maintain its social model and influence in a multipolar world dominated by continent-sized powers (Biscop and Coelmont, 2012).

An original claim is that strategy may emerge through bureaucratic politics, defined as:

bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government (Allison, 1969:970).
In contrast Grand Strategy is predicated on member states articulating common interests and collectively committing to addressing civilian and military capability shortfalls, and entrusting EU institutions, under the authority of the High Representative-Vice President, to pursue the vision set out in the European Security Strategy (Solana, 2003). This is the Grand Strategy ambition. This is problematic if CSDP operates through bureaucratic politics within a hierarchy of actors, and throughout multiple components of a complex institutional arena. Bureaucracy, using a Weberian conception, is an essential feature of advanced societies:

The modern capitalist state is completely dependent upon bureaucratic organisation for its existence (Giddens, 1971:159).

Giddens summarises the Weberian bureaucratic organisation as comprised of specialist officials appointed on the basis of technical competence evidenced by diplomas, qualifications, and experience; they perform clearly defined functions within authoritarian and clearly demarcated hierarchies. Weber considers bureaucratic organisation as:

the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control (and) superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline and in its reliability (Weber, 1970:267).

Weber’s positive perspective contrasts with contemporary criticism of bureaucracy as complex, restrictive, unresponsive, and frequently dismissed as ‘red tape’ (du Gay, 2000:1):

According to conventional wisdom, bureaucracy stands for unnecessary and burdensome regulation (Kanninen and Piiparinen, 2014:48).

Weber (1964) suggests that specialist technical expertise and rationality explains the superiority of bureaucratic organisations over alternative forms of societal organisation, but while his formulation was based on hierarchical structures, in the twenty-first century post-Weberian bureaucracies are founded on the ‘network logic of globalisation’ (Kanninen and Piiparinen, 2014:49).

The power of international organisations and bureaucracies generally, is that they present themselves as impersonal, technocratic, and neutral – as not exercising power but instead as serving others (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999:708).
As Kanninen and Piiparinen (2014) point out, Urry (2008) alludes to post-Weberian bureaucracies’ powers, benefiting from transnational networks involving interactions between multiple actors that enable flexible and more efficient responses to emerging conflicts. This thesis examines how CSDP institutional structures (Chapter 5) and policy implementation (Chapter 6) signify bureaucratic politics of this kind, echoing Allison and Zelikow's analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis:

(Government organisations) are called into being by political processes; their goals, like their masters, are often diffuse; (they) are especially burdened by unique constraints; they cannot keep their profits; they have limited control over organisation of production; they have limited control over their goals; they have external (as well as internal) goals governing their administrative procedures; and their outputs take a form that often defy easy evaluation of success or failure (Allison and Zelikow, 1999:149).

Organisations' limited resources constrain their ability to fulfil goals set by their masters and inertia sets in as the transaction costs of change increase. An inevitable characteristic of complex bureaucracies, of which armed forces are an example, is the obligation to compromise on what principals define as organisational goals. This seems apt for CSDP and may explain sub-optimal achievements and even strategic incoherence. Organisations do not lack central purpose or goals, but they become prey to ‘bureaucratic drift’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999:152). They adopt norms and routines:

where satisficing is the rule stopping with the first alternative that is good enough (…) the menu of choice is severely limited and success is more likely to be defined simply as compliance with relevant rules (Allison and Zelikow, 1999:152).

This matches the observation that CSDP reflects lowest-common-denominator agreement (Smith, 2008:10, Rynning, 2011:30). Wilson (1989:205) says executives wish to obtain allies at a reasonable price while operators (those implementing policy) seek to cope with a situation by getting adequate commitment, guidance and resources from above. This is a good summation of the lowest-common-denominator impediment to strategic coherence or Grand Strategy. Allison (1971:176-8) refers to chiefs oriented around power and Indians around feasibility, while Wilson (1989:13) stresses that bureaucrats are constrained by their political masters. They may at best ‘muddle through’ towards limited objectives (Lindblom, 1959). The political masters of CSDP are the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and
member states, but the definition of bureaucratic politics on p.4 does not suppose that decision making and implementation is limited to a single power node in a bureaucratic structure. Instead, policy making and implementation is much more diffuse. Freedman identifies an association between bureaucracy and strategy, arguing that the rise to prominence of strategy as a conceptual instrument in problem-solving is a recent phenomenon that coincides with:

the bureaucratisation of organisations, professionalisation of functions, and growth of the social sciences (Freedman, 2013:xiii).

This complements the Weberian claim that bureaucracy is a dominant characteristic of contemporary capitalist society. Grand Strategy proposes the pursuit of strategic goals with adequate resourcing and actorliness to enable accomplishment of those goals. This thesis explores the tension between GS and BP, given the fundamentally bureaucratic nature of EU policy-making and implementation processes. While bureaucracy therefore is what modern society and modern states depend upon, this thesis argues that bureaucratic politics is the process through which CSDP governance and implementation operates, utilising the standard definition of politics as ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Laswell, 1936).

A further core concept is Europeanisation, used by some writers in reference to the EU developing into a ‘superstate’ with a significant defence and security dimension, albeit one attuned to a post-national, post-Cold War world (Moravcsik, 2002a, 2009; Leonard, 2005; McCormick, 2007). Others refer to Europeanisation specifically in relation to foreign, security and defence policy (Tonra, 2001; Haseler, 2003, 2004; Wong, 2005; Mérand, 2008; Gross, 2007a, 2009; Watanabe, 2010; Klein, 2010). The term ought to be restricted to adaptation by states converging towards EU perspectives (Radaelli, 2003), rather than some general interstate cooperation (Featherstone, 2003). Moumoutzis (2011) questions the analytical usefulness of applying Europeanisation to foreign policy. On these grounds this thesis rejects the view that CSDP provides evidence of Europeanisation, except through a weak, ‘minimal’ understanding of Europeanisation as ‘a response to the policies of the European Union’ (Featherstone, 2003:3). Featherstone comments that this is hardly analytically useful except in a general sense. The thesis adopts Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation:

processes of a) construction b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (...) discourse, political structures and public policies (Radaelli, 2003:30).

The focus on ‘domestic adaptation’ (Radaelli, 2000, 2003; Manners and Whitman, 2000; Wong, 2005; Major, 2005) is critical. However the extent to which this is top-down, or Brussels-driven, as opposed to a state-level response to horizontal and internal pressures bringing policy change, is disputed, so caution is advisable in applying Europeanisation to foreign and security policy. This thesis questions the attribution of Europeanisation to the CSDP process, as if there were a Grand Strategy pursued by member states, adapting domestic processes to European-level pressures through a top-down process meeting bottom-up assimilation. An original claim in this thesis is rejection of this notion on two counts: first, following Moumoutzis (2011), it is almost impossible to reliably demonstrate that domestic policy changes because of European pressures; secondly, the actual processes of CSDP reflect bureaucratisation far more than they do rational choice decision-making of Europeanisation in Radaelli’s conceptualisation, or indeed processes required to implement Grand Strategy, which also depends on rational choice.

Having introduced strategic culture, Grand Strategy, strategic actorness, bureaucratic politics and Europeanisation, the next section provides a brief historical background to CSDP, including reference to key official statements and declarations.

1.3 Historical context: the emergence of CSDP

The Pleven Plan (Pleven, 1950) for a European Defence Community (EDC) failed in 1954 because the French Assembly rejected the commonisation of defence. The European Economic Community (EEC) had no coherent defence-related institutions. Instead the Western European Union (WEU), created in 1955, acted as ‘a security and defence liaison mechanism between France and NATO and between the UK and the EU’ (Howorth, 2005:180) but it lacked operational impact. The dominance of NATO and the success of détente ensured paralysis in West European security and defence initiatives. The EEC eschewed a significant foreign policy role, although ministerial consultation under European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s led to coordination on some issues. EPC developed from being a ‘talking shop to a more active, collective foreign policy-making mechanism’ (Smith, 2004:117) involving officials for whom consensus was a policy objective contributing to ‘institutionalisation’ (Smith, 2004:11).
The most striking characteristic of EPC and its successor, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), is ‘positive integration’ (Smith, 2004:5). It gave voice to the European Community in international affairs, ‘asserting European interests and values beyond its borders’ (Smith, ibid), eventually leading to institutions with a defence and security role.

Foreign policy coordination derived not from intergovernmental negotiation but from normative cooperation, a feature of bureaucratic politics and the changing nature of the state (Bickerton, 2013), but EPC proved insufficient in the post-Cold War environment.

The WEU re-emerged during the 1990s through a mainly French initiative, the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). This aimed to strengthen the European voice inside NATO and merge the WEU into the EU. Commission President Jacques Delors expected the Union to develop defence competence (Delors, 1991:106-9), but ESDI failed on account of Atlanticist-Europeanist tensions within EU-NATO membership (Howorth, 1997). The Maastricht Treaty (TEU, 1992) brought closer WEU-EU engagement, partly facilitated by the variable geometry and flexible nature of WEU governance and policy-making (Archer and Butler, 1996; Nuttall, 1994; Guehenno, 1994; Heathcote-Amery, 1994).

While the Single European Act referred to cooperation on the ‘technical and industrial conditions necessary for security’ (Single European Act, Art.30 6b), the Maastricht negotiations drew the WEU closer to EU policy-making. Until Maastricht the integration process had barely touched the ‘high politics’ of foreign and security policy due to sensitivities around sovereignty, a sub-text to CSDP processes. But the notion of sovereignty is challenged by changing international norms, processes and treaties (Walker, 1994; Goldmann, 2001). Even so, post-Maastricht, intergovernmentalism remained uppermost precisely to respect sovereignty. The Amsterdam Treaty promises that the Union shall:

(define) the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy; (decide) on common strategies; (adopt) joint actions (and) common positions (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997:Art.J.2).

The Petersberg Tasks of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, are expressly within the purview of the common foreign and security policy. But NATO remains the core of defence, so while Amsterdam brought EU-WEU convergence, the latter was not yet fully incorporated into the
treaties, so the ‘essentially civilian character of the Union is preserved (in the Amsterdam Treaty)’ (Duff, 1997:xxxv).

Amsterdam introduced four new instruments in pursuit of common strategies: ‘constructive abstention’ that does not block a foreign policy decision; the post of High Representative for the CFSP; a policy planning and early warning unit; and the incorporation of Petersberg Tasks into the treaties. It advanced the prospect of common defence and WEU integration into the European Union (European Communities, 1999:55; Amsterdam Treaty, 1997:Art.17).

NATO also moved towards ‘Non-Article 5 Crisis support operations’, a grey area between peacekeeping and limited war. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was an example (NATO, 1999a). This lacked UN Security Council backing but demonstrated a shift towards crisis management and peace enforcement (NATO, 1999b; Grant, 1999).

According to Hyde-Price, the Union had to develop a stronger military dimension in a multifaceted strategy towards conflict resolution, a strategic approach that reflects common ground between the realist Hyde-Price and others’ criticism of CSDP lacking strategic direction (Howorth, 2009, 2010a; Biscop, 2009, 2013a; Biscop et al, 2009; Simòn, 2011; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Biscop and Norheim-Martinsen, 2012). Hyde-Price affirms that:

> greater attention needs to be focused on strategic concepts like compelling, armed suasion, and coercion (Hyde-Price, 2004:338).

This would entail the emergence of a new European strategic culture. If the EU were to manage this transition to meet changing needs:

> (the lead would) inevitably come from Britain and France, the only two European states with any tradition of or capability for ‘limited power projection’ (Hyde-Price, 2004:334).

At St Malo, Britain and France provided the first hint of pooling resources, a potential landmark in the integration process, a Rubicon moment when the UK accepted a European Council role in defence and security, and France the need for cooperation that would cement, and not undermine, the transatlantic partnership (Howorth, 2000a:34).
Fig.1.1 summarises the pressures driving policy development.

**Fig.1.1 Exogenous/endogenous factors driving European security and defence cooperation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Exogenous factors</strong></th>
<th><strong>Endogenous factors</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European concerns over US nuclear policy and strategic defence initiative (SDI)</td>
<td>Political pressures for greater EU role in neighbourhood security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of Cold War 1989-91</td>
<td>Need for EU role in international security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict in Africa (ex-colonies) Somalia, Rwanda, DR Congo</td>
<td>Security in former colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War 1990-91</td>
<td>Sense of responsibility for former colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan Wars 1991-95</td>
<td>Need for EU contribution to European defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo conflict 1998-9</td>
<td>Budgetary pressures, e.g. cost of maintaining conscription and large land armies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of nuclear proliferation and chemical weapons</td>
<td>Single Market pressures, e.g. on procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons trading, need for arms control</td>
<td>Need for equipment R&amp;D cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased profile of UNSC, OSCE</td>
<td>Formerly non-aligned states shifting towards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainties over NATO role</td>
<td>Western Alliance (Sweden, Austria, Finland)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While Hyde-Price stresses military capability, non-realists emphasise the comprehensive approach, CIV-MIL cooperation and capability enhancements embracing the range of Petersberg Tasks, especially peace-building (Major and Mölling, 2013; Smith, 2012, 2013). Both perspectives call for enhanced military capability. Hyde-Price refers to Machiavelli’s *The Prince* arguing that the Union needs to be ‘half beast and half man’ as civilian power alone is insufficient, lacking ‘coercive instruments’ (Hyde-Price, 2013:18). This perspective is shared by UK Prime Minister Blair, co-architect with President Chirac of the St Malo Declaration, calling for ‘a genuine European defence policy which concentrates on combat capability’ (Blair, 2010:678).

Chirac meanwhile expressed support for European defence autonomy which, while complementing the Atlantic Alliance, should go beyond prioritising issues that directly affect Europe’s security (Chirac, 2001:7). Howorth comments that the logic of a common foreign and security policy requires higher defence spending and not the anticipated post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’. But Maastricht demanded austerity to meet the convergence criteria for
Economic and Monetary Union, and so lower government spending (Howorth, 1997:14-15). Austerity would be even more electorally unacceptable if pursued alongside increased defence spending. Howorth suggests that CFSP and ESDI would fail without increased expenditure. On the need for the rationalisation of armed forces, Howorth writes:

even the British government seems finally to have decided that participation in the European Armaments Agency is not only unavoidable but actually desirable (Howorth, 1997:17).

This is despite ‘the British defence establishment’s almost visceral anti-European instincts’ (ibid) blocking serious European security integration. ESDI without British participation would be meaningless, but during the 1990s Britain resisted a stronger EU security role, preferring the WEU linked to NATO to ensure a strong sovereign basis in defence policy (Chuter, 1997; George, 1998; Hurd, 1991; Hansard, 1996).

CFSP failed its first big test over Yugoslavia (Dover, 2005) although Smith (2004) points out that CFSP only entered into force in November 1993 and was never intended to deliver the scale of engagement the crisis demanded. CFSP concerned long-term economic and diplomatic tools, not military intervention. It did deliver sanctions, an arms embargo, aid, and assistance with the eventual electoral process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, any positive assessment is questioned by David Owen, the international community’s European negotiator tasked with finding a political solution to the Bosnian War after 1992. Owen describes EU ‘institutional inertia’ (Owen, 1996:298) and the acute dangers in seeking consensus to protect the chimera of a common foreign and security policy (Owen, 1996:377-8). He argues that CFSP should be based purely on intergovernmental consensus.

As pressures for a European security policy developed during the 1990s, the Union finally had to confront a longstanding criticism that it was ‘an economic giant but a political pygmy’ (Piening, 1997:31; Kirchner, 2006:951; Mérand, 2008:16). France and Britain represented the extremes vis-à-vis the transatlantic relationship, one suspicious of US hegemony and since 1966 a non-participant in the North Atlantic Council, the other closely identified with US-NATO primacy. Clearly if Paris and London could share the same analysis and vision, others could be brought to the party.

The changed security environment and the failure of ESDI demanded further effort towards a greater European role in security and defence, either within NATO or in parallel with the
Alliance. George (1998:268) comments on a closer alignment of French and British security perspectives during the late 1990s, including British support for the Franco-German initiative of an armaments procurement agency, which Britain joined in 1996. George says London’s joining in followed support for the idea from the Head of British Aerospace, Dick Evans.

Howorth (1997) argues that a defence identity has always been integral to the European integration project, although always contending with the counter-assumption that European security depends on NATO. The tentative steps towards ESDI within NATO mutated into something much more significant: ‘a policy’ (Howorth, 2005:183). Key change factors were the changed environment following the end of the Cold War, including the US seeing Europe as a lesser strategic priority; pressure from the US for the Europe to accept more of the security burden, and Prime Minister Blair’s understanding of this; a new understanding of the need for an ‘international community’ response to security crises; and the outbreak of military conflict in Europe itself (Howorth, 2014:21-4). Howorth argues that these pressures meshed with shifting sentiment within the EU that it needed a greater security presence.

St Malo began bilaterally but its protagonists envisaged the initiative being taken up by the wider Union, as happened in the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki Councils. St Malo called for an integrated European approach to security, including ‘the capacity for autonomous action backed up by a credible military force’ (SMD, 1998).

The Nice Treaty formally incorporated ESDP into the EU (Nice Treaty, 2000:Art.17). For five years after Kosovo there was ‘an explosion of constructive developments in security and defense’ (Blecher, 2004:348), including new institutions, EU-NATO interaction, EU-led operations in Congo, Macedonia and Bosnia, some pooling of intelligence, initiatives facilitating military and civilian peace operations and regular EU defence ministers meetings, counter-terrorism measures, police and border cooperation, and overall the development of:

- a more effective “toolbox” for dealing with a wide spectrum of security challenges and
- much-increased US respect and support for European defence (Blecher, 2004:349).

While CFSP moved up the agenda, ESDP represented a major step, embracing the Headline Goal of a European Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 troops deployable within 60 days and under EU rather than NATO command. This appeared to signal intention towards enhanced credibility as a strategic actor, and arguably to further progress European integration.
**Fig.1.2 Core statements and declarations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Key goals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St Malo Declaration (1998)</td>
<td>The capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal (European Council, 1999b)</td>
<td>Member states must be able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Security Strategy (Solana, 2003)</td>
<td>Need to build a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (Council of the European Union, 2004).</td>
<td>A range of modalities for the setting up and deployment of multifunctional CCM resources in an integrated format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on Implementation of the ESS (European Council, 2008)</td>
<td>(Need to be) more capable, more coherent and more active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU Preamble/Lisbon Treaty (2007:C115/16)</td>
<td>To implement a CFSP including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence (…) thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR-VP Baroness Ashton in EEAS Review (EEAS, 2013a)</td>
<td>The EEAS can be a catalyst to bring together the foreign policies of member states and strengthen the position of the EU in the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Council (2013)</td>
<td>An effective CSDP helps to enhance the security of European citizens and contributes to peace and stability in our neighbourhood and in the broader world</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally it is useful to note in this historical overview how official documentation (see Fig.1.2) since the Petersberg Declaration has promoted the notion of EU strategic actorness, for example in the European Security Strategy which promises not only an EU strategic culture but also the ‘capacity for robust intervention’ (Solana, 2003:11), and the Lisbon Treaty reference to the common security and defence policy which:

shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. (This) shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised within NATO (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.2).

The evident caveats however ensure member state primacy, with a double sovereignty lock through Council unanimity and approval by member state Parliaments.
The thesis explores whether the ambitions referred to in Fig.1.2 constitute mere rhetoric or whether they indicate emerging ‘substance’ (Shepherd, 2003) in the form of capability. There is frequent reference to these commitments throughout the study, including opinion from experts and CSDP practitioners on the extent to which they match CSDP in practice.

1.4 Hypotheses

The thesis tests two hypotheses designed to help explain the management and operations of CSDP and to assess possible implications for European integration. In particular they explore the relationship between Grand Strategy and the processes through which CSDP is implemented.

1.4.1 H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor

This hypothesis requires analysis of strategic culture, clearly expressed in the ESS as essential to strategic actorness (Solana, 2003). Attaching such a contested concept to an organisation of member states as diverse and fissile in foreign policy terms as the European Union is not straightforward. This is ironic because in handling crises, the Union surely needs clarity of purpose and ‘actorness’ (defined on p.4) (Sjöstedt, 1977). Moreover the comprehensive approach (CA) implies capability and willingness to act using both civilian and military instruments.

Several writers refer to the huge range of theatres in which the Union has performed diverse functions and is therefore evidently an international actor in foreign and security policy, a point underscored by over 30 CSDP missions since 2003 (Adebahr, 2007; Vanhoonacker et al, 2010; Biava et al, 2011; Smith, 2013). EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) have a significant role in post-conflict zones such as the Great Lakes, the Caucasus and the Western Balkans. But mere presence or being an actor does not necessarily equate to strategic actorness. Whether the EU can justly be described as a *strategic* actor is less certain.

Adebahr (2007) says EUSRs are a growing security and defence policy instrument but cautions that while they may suggest policy initiatives to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), they are not decision makers. They coordinate national policies with the Commission and provide EU presence, i.e. non-absence, in post-conflict environments. They:
exert influence (...). Actorness builds on concrete policy initiatives or interaction with third parties (Adebahr, 2007:18).

A strategic actor matches long-term planning and implementation to the achievement of defined goals (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009). Asseburg and Kempin report criticism that CSDP has been rather symbolic, with missions too small to represent anything substantial or strategic and the institutional machinery too complex, while member states lack consensus. Such criticisms amount to a lack of Grand Strategy. The treaties specify that the:

common foreign and security policy (...) shall be defined and implemented by the Council (...) acting unanimously except where the Treaties provide otherwise (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.24.1).

This is tautological: CFSP shall be implemented unanimously except where there is no unanimity and on rare occasions where other provisions enable implementation without unanimity, such as through constructive abstention (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.31). As regards the size of EU operations, Witney (2008) points out that in 2008 just 6,000 military personnel were deployed in ESDP military missions, representing 0.3 percent of total member state military personnel. Soder (2010:3) reports that at the end of 2009 around 54,000 troops from EU member states were employed in multilateral operations, 78 percent through NATO and just 7 percent through CSDP. But Asseburg and Kempin caution against an emphasis on numbers since small missions, and presence, can have considerable strategic impact. In a detailed assessment of twelve missions they conclude that the EU has some way to go before it can be accurately described as a strategic actor, despite the success of missions in at least one key ESS aim:

(to) avert security threats, stabilise the immediate neighbourhood (and) strengthen effective multilateralism (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009:252).

Actorness does not mean willingness to throw troops into battle: conflict prevention surely constitutes actorness. In Europe there is extreme doubt over the efficacy of purely military solutions to complex problems (Menon et al., 2004). Many who opposed the 2003 Iraq intervention considered it extremely unlikely that regime change would secure a stable liberal democratic, pro-Western, competent, legitimate government. But there is often no agreement on how crises should be handled. Iraq divided EU member states; Kosovan independence divided the European Council in December 2007 (Majone, 2009:16); Libya in
2011 produced no consensus (Gottwald, 2012); and Israel-Palestine issues usually elicit EU incoherence (Harris, 2012). There has however been consensus on Iranian nuclear ambitions, leading to a comprehensive agreement with Tehran (Hansard, 2013; Telegraph, 2013a; Hadfield and Fiott, 2014).

Association between the word ‘strategic’, military capability and preparedness to engage in military action relates to strategic culture. Kagan and neo-con hawks in America believe that strategic culture is *de facto* based on military capability and preparedness to act (Kagan and Kristol, 2000; Krauthammer, 2001a, 2001b; Kagan, 2004). The Obama presidency brought a more consensus-oriented multilateral approach (Gowan, 2010; Jerusalem Post, 2011). Several writers criticise Kagan’s failure to understand the European approach to security (Cooper, 2004; Sedivy and Zaborowski, 2004; Gaffney, 2004; Hyde-Price, 2004; Menon *et al*., 2004). They argue that a multilateral preventive approach that embraces political and economic development is more conducive to security, as evidenced by EU enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which aims to deliver regional development and stability. Similar political benefits have been achieved through economic partnerships such as the 1975 Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 which cover EU relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific states. These initiatives reflect European ‘civilian power’ (Duchêne, 1972; Maull, 1990).

Testing H1 must take account of the comprehensive approach (CA) to security. This is a basis for a European strategic culture that contrasts with realist assumptions. Menon *et al* argue that ‘the EU is not Kantian because it is weak (militarily); it is weak because it is Kantian’ (Menon *et al*., 2004:10). The emergent strategic culture in Europe, if that is what it is, is different from the realist perspective that demands a Hobbesian response to a violent and unstable world. The EU represents a different kind of actoriness, dismissed by Kagan (2004) as essentially irrelevant in a dangerous and volatile international environment. The ESS is preventive, holistic and multilateral (Biscop, 2013:38-9), but it recognises that civilian power is *not enough*, so the Union has developed a ‘toolbox’ approach that embraces military instruments within multilateral frameworks.

The EU-way (Everts *et al*, 2004) supposes that a classical, military capability-oriented strategic culture is not enough either. If the EU is to have credibility as a strategic actor as indicated in H1, it must *necessarily* pursue the comprehensive approach using civilian as well as military means, and often a combination of both. Cooper (2004) argues that to
remain a partner of the USA, Europe must show greater willingness to share the international security burden, but through a comprehensive approach.

That the Union should enhance its strategic actorness, its military capability and its preparedness to act is clearly implied in the ESS (Solana, 2003) and underlined by Witney (2008), Biscop and Coelmont (2010a; 2011a), Zandee (2011), and Menon who writes:

If Europeans are to make the contribution to international security to which their rhetoric aspires, far more progress must be made in enhancing military capabilities (Menon, 2009:244).

While Kagan argues that Europe has abdicated responsibility for its own security, there is no sense among these writers that Europe should do this. Bonino (1999) and Heisbourg (2000) called on EU governments to adopt convergence criteria to enhance common security and defence capability, a process that would lead to converging strategic cultures. Matlary (2006) supposed this would lead to a developing European strategic culture with significant implications for CSDP. It would challenge Kagan’s claim that Europe contributes little to security and defence, restated by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 2011 when he lambasted Europe’s NATO contribution, highlighting that among 26 European allies only Britain, France, Greece and Albania meet the two percent target of GDP spending on defence (Gates, 2011; Mardell, 2011; Defense Department, 2012).

With its strong emphasis on multilateralism, the ESS is the document that comes closest to defining an EU strategic culture. Its relatively uncontroversial aims and objectives ensured acceptance by all ESDP signatory states despite the recent divisions over Iraq. Its weakness is that while it identifies threats and asserts common values, it does not specify how its goals can be achieved (Heisbourg, 2004; Biscop, 2009, 2011a; Biscop et al, 2009). It refers to instruments but not how these can be developed to ensure effectiveness. The ESS therefore is of limited benefit in capacity-building, or defining the means to achieve aims. It does not define the extent of actorness. It merely asserts intention, a component of Hypothesis 1, so assessment of H1 must include consideration of whether the rhetoric in the ESS, the Lisbon Treaty and elsewhere is matched by tangible outcomes, namely actorness.

Heisbourg (2004) highlights several positives in the ESS but criticises the lack of reference to the transatlantic relationship, or to potential EU-US conflicts of interest in relations with Asia, particularly China. It says little about internal security beyond the need to combat
terrorism, and little about how to ensure willingness to counter threats. Heisbourg criticises the document for not delivering what its title implies, namely a security strategy. In essence the ESS is not adequately strategic (Biscop, 2011a), which undermines two elements of H1, EU credibility and strategic actorness.

Heisbourg is also critical of the emphasis on Middle East stability when enhancing the status quo is hardly conducive to regional reform or democratisation, a prescient observation given the onset of the Arab Spring within a few years (Perthes, 2011). Heisbourg calls on the EU to conduct a proper security audit of foreign aid, a concerted effort to understand how best to achieve reform in the Middle East, an EU defence White Paper, a strategy for EU internal security, and an EU-US permanent secretariat. None of these have occurred, nor were they indicated in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS (European Council, 2008).

Matlary (2006) suggests that even if an emergent European strategic culture exists, its effectiveness depends on political will, absence of which damages CSDP. Strategic actorness requires vision, leadership, political will, and a coherent plan to achieve defined objectives, both military and civilian. It also implies willingness to correct capability deficiencies. This is why analysis of European strategic culture is fundamental to testing H1. It is necessary to ascertain whether the EU has a European strategic culture that reflects the CA and delivers strategic actorness.

Similarly Biscop and Coelmont (2010a) caution that military capability does not guarantee strategic actorness; this requires the will to deploy force, adequate diplomatic follow-up using a holistic approach, and strategic coherence (Major and Mölling, 2013:45). This means accepting the full implications of the Petersberg Declaration (1992), as implied at St Malo (SMD, 1998), and also the ambitions articulated in the ESS (Solana, 2003), and implied by references to ‘common defence’ in Articles 24 and 42 of the Treaties (Lisbon Treaty, 2007).

The question remains whether member states are prepared to enhance civilian and military capability, and are they prepared to act in the face of security threats and crises (Lindlay-French, 2002). Strategic weakness implies a lack of vision, poor leadership, lack of political will, no coherent plan, and no defined means to address capability deficiencies. Whatever CSDP was intended to produce, if H1 is not supported by evidence, then EU credibility is damaged by the lack of fit between rhetoric and achievement, limiting the ability of the Union to act strategically in the interests of international security.
The notion that CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor depends upon the coherence of EU ambition in this area. Coherence requires a common strategic culture, but there is no clear consensus in the literature on whether the EU possesses one. Kagan (2004) says no, while Hyde-Price (2004) writes that diverse strategic cultures among member states make the notion of a European strategic culture fanciful. Biava et al (2011) say the Union has developed a strategic culture, amply demonstrated by actorness in more than 30 missions.

Hypothesis 1 claims that CSDP *intends* certain outcomes that enhance the credibility of the Union. Enhancing credibility requires coherence and consensus on what the policy is about. This relates to the ambition, stated in the ESS, to be milieu-shaping, to have influence in international affairs. H1 presumes this can only be achieved through the Union becoming a strategic actor. The hypothesis therefore sets out to assess EU performance in achieving this. Is strategic actorness possible in a primarily intergovernmental policy field? The extent of intergovernmental primacy and the need for unanimity, for example, is key to H1. The study will address the institutional and policy-making processes underpinning CSDP. This may also reveal something about the CSDP contribution to integration. Are there signs that post-Lisbon CSDP is moving in this direction?

H1 relates strongly to Grand Strategy (GS). Proponents of GS insist that the EU must develop the capability to be a strategic actor, and this requires an integrated approach to security and defence. H1 however permits flexibility in interpreting EU compliance in this respect, in that it refers to intention. This recognises CSDP as a process, not subject to a clear time limitation. Like the Single Market, CSDP is enabled over time and ‘might lead to common defence’ (Lisbon Treaty, 1997:Art.24).

A strategic culture must be goal-oriented, and in its broadest sense this aspiration is stated in the ESS which seeks to enable the Union to enhance its own security and contribute to a ‘better world’ (Solana, 2003). If H1 is upheld and CSDP enhances the EU as a strategic actor, this points not only to an EU strategic culture but also to CSDP and the Union successfully dealing with capability shortfalls, addressing immediate threats, and contributing to European and international security.

Hypothesis 1 *CSDP intends to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor* also implies a contribution to European integration. The Union may act *like a state* despite being an organisation composed of member states, a fundamentally different entity. A state or an
organisation that has a strategic culture acts strategically and is an actor in security and defence; or at the very least the implementation of a strategic culture means that the entity becomes an actor in these fields. These claims are explored and tested throughout the thesis. If the study concludes that the relevant literature and primary research demonstrates that the EU has no strategic culture, then it follows that it cannot be a strategic actor. This would leave the Union far from any Grand Strategy as advocated by Biscop and others (Venusberg Group, 2007; Biscop, 2009, 2013a; Biscop et al, 2009; Howorth, 2009, 2010a; Drent and Zandee, 2010; Simón, 2011; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010a, 2012).

For Gray, Grand Strategy incorporates a military strategy (Gray, 2007:3). GS proponents argue that in a global and multipolar environment the Union should discover the means to exercise strategic influence to counter threats identified in the ESS and in the Report on its Implementation (European Council, 2008). Strategic influence means power, the power to affect the international environment in ways consistent with the values the Union purports to uphold. To achieve this, the Union and member states must develop and apply:

A grand strategy that translates the values on which the EU’s own social model is based into a proactive and constructive foreign policy, aimed at concrete objectives: on that basis, with the right political leadership, the EU can be a global power (Biscop, 2009:5).

Grand Strategy therefore is founded in the EU’s social model and incorporates the values of democracy, representation, and soft power. It also, as Gray suggests, embraces a military strategy, beyond the soft power foundation of the Union, but there is a lack of consensus on this, as illustrated by dissent over intervention in Libya (Giegerich and Nichol, 2012; Bucher et al, 2013). Michel suggests that the Libya conflict highlights a tendency among some NATO allies to either withhold military participation or attach caveats, doubtless with Germany in mind (Michel, 2013:258).

Taylor predicts the failure of the European Union on account of it not achieving the transition from ‘a multilateral organisation dealing externally with other multilateral arrangements’ (Taylor, 2008:167). It fails, he says, to add international power to capacity. The challenge is to reconcile ambition with the problem identified by Cooper (2004): the Union is not a state and turning it into one is not feasible, especially given problems of legitimacy and democratic deficit. The solution to ‘strategic deficit’ (Dreft and Zandee, 2010:17) is not to exacerbate the more widely commented democratic deficit (see Section 5.7. p.154). It is difficult to persuade
an organisation of 28 member states with over 506 million citizens (Eurostat, 2014) that a Union founded as an antidote to military power should abandon its traditional civilian power preferences and behave like a traditional state, i.e.: developing strategic power including military capability under common control. An essential GS feature is that it is founded on comprehensiveness, which includes military capability. This may be problematic for some member states with strategic traditions inimical to military interventionism. A further challenge is to establish a strategic culture independent of and autonomous from the US and NATO. For more Atlanticist member states a GS that questions traditional tenets of state strategic culture is likely to encounter supreme difficulties. Indeed, despite the stated ambitions in the St Malo Declaration, the Helsinki Headline Goal, the ESS and in Articles 24 and 42 of the Lisbon Treaty (1997), it is striking that Lisbon asserts the continuing primacy of intergovernmentalism in Article 42 (see p.14). Article 42 thus undermines Grand Strategy aspiration.

The key research questions relating to H1 are:

- What are the drivers of CSDP?
- Is there a European strategic culture?
- Is the EU a strategic actor?
- Does CSDP contribute to the European integration process?

Following theoretical considerations in the next chapter, Chapters 3 and 4 are primarily concerned with Hypothesis 1 and the research questions above, before the latter part of the thesis develops analysis of Hypothesis 2 and bureaucratic politics.

### 1.4.2 H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics

The analysis moves to a further explanatory level with Hypothesis 2, testing for evidence of bureaucratic politics shaping the CSDP experience. H2 is tested using evidence from expert interviews, CSDP literature and official documentation and the treaties, in order to assess the impact of bureaucratic politics on CSDP aspirations, decision-making and implementation.

H2 emerges from the proposition that CSDP may advance slowly and incrementally on an issue-by-issue basis, typical of bureaucracies (Wilson, 1989). The analysis assesses the
extent to which CSDP achieves significant outcomes within limits imposed by member states. H2 allows a contrastive analysis with the potential or otherwise in Grand Strategy, including assessment of the proposition that the EU and member states should pursue GS.

Analysis of H2 requires understanding what CSDP has achieved and whether bureaucratic politics explains the level of achievement. Perhaps BP inhibits strategic actoriness, and even paralyses CSDP management and operations, in which case BP becomes the antithesis of Grand Strategy. This requires analysis of the institutional structures involved in CSDP processes, including the post-Lisbon changes, notably the new European External Action Service (EEAS) under the High Representative for the Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (see Chapter 5).


Bickerton explains how the HFA emerged not from high level intergovernmental negotiation between principals, i.e. heads of state and government. It was the work of technocrats and experts working as proxies for their member states within European Political Cooperation (EPC). It was informed by a spirit of common purpose to achieve consensus. This is unlike the intergovernmental negotiating of the Single Market or Common Agricultural Policy, negotiations built on bargaining from interest-based positions (Moravcsik, 1998). The HFA process reflected the bureaucratic politics referred to in H2 and through which arguably CSDP now operates. This way of working may enable CSDP better than Grand Strategy.
Bickerton applies a bureaucratic explanation to trends in European foreign policy, contributing to what became CFSP at Maastricht. Subsequently a few writers have developed this association regarding CDSP (Dijkstra, 2009, 2011, 2012a; Vanhoonacker et al, 2010; Bossong and Benner, 2010; Chappell and Petrov, 2014), while many more have applied the concept of Europeanisation (Tonra, 2001; Haseler, 2003, 2004; Wong, 2005; Mérand, 2008; Gross, 2007a, 2009; Watanabe, 2010; Klein, 2010). Both hypotheses demand consideration of the power relationships involved. Can bureaucratic politics assist an explanation of CSDP and shed light on key policy drivers? The key research questions arising from H2 are:

- What are the main features of the institutional structures of CSDP?
- What do missions tell us about the nature and purpose of CSDP?
- What do we learn about issues of bureaucratic politics, governance and legitimacy in CSDP processes?
- What power do CSDP institutions have to drive policy?
- What are the prospects for Grand Strategy in the light of the putative dominance of bureaucratic politics?

These questions are mostly addressed from Chapter 5 onwards.

The implications of bureaucratic politics for Grand Strategy and strategic actorness are critically important. If the thesis finds that H1 is not supported, or supported to only a limited extent, part of the explanation could lie in the outcome from testing H2.

1.3 Thesis hypotheses – key dimensions and relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H1</th>
<th>CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>↑</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU strategic culture → strategic actorness</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>→ potential for Grand Strategy (GS)</td>
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<td>↑↓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INSTITUTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>CSDP is best explained by bureaucratic politics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>↓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucratic politics → impact on institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>→ relevance to GS and/or actorness</td>
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</table>
The hypotheses are potentially contrastive in that support for one may undermine the other. The study may also suggest that the bureaucratic approach can deliver the strategic actorliness intended by the official documentation summarised in Fig.1.2 (p.14).

1.5 Methodology

This study uses qualitative research, described as ‘a source of well-grounded, rich description and explanation of human processes’ (Miles et al, 2013:4). Qualitative data can enable rich and fruitful explanation, and assist the revision of contemporary conceptual frameworks, using an interpretivist methodology where knowledge is understood as ‘a social and historical product and ‘facts’ come to us laden with theory’ (ibid, 7). As already explained, these conceptual frameworks include strategic culture, Grand Strategy and bureaucratic politics, as well as other potential explanations of CSDP, namely intergovernmentalism, Europeanisation, Brusselsisation and social constructivism.

The study analysed CSDP literature comprising books and journal articles. Views from the literature were tested against data from qualitative primary research, consisting of 28 semi-structured interviews with actors and policy makers, and experts on EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP in particular. The evidence and opinion from elite interviews was tested against the literature and compared with evidence from EU official documentation and statements, including the treaties. Literature search began with looking at key journals, especially Journal of Common Market Studies, European Security, Survival, European Foreign Affairs Review, subject experts (e.g. Howorth, Biscop, Menon), and other work referred to in articles. EU sources were found through europa.eu, especially Commission, Council and EEAS websites. Google searches facilitated access to media coverage of relevant topics, especially from the BBC, Guardian, Financial Times, Telegraph, and Le Monde.

Use of reputable academic sources and official documentation is a standard secondary research methodology (Cottrell, 2011). EU sources include Council Decisions and Conclusions, press releases and other relevant documents including EEAS and European Defence Agency (EDA) websites. Government sources and White Papers are also used, especially from France, Germany and the UK as well as other official publications. Checking interview opinion against a range of other sources is vital in evaluating arguments and tests the reliability of field observations (Cottrell, 2011:143). The researcher is required to weigh
arguments, and can do so even with a relatively small number of sources, by looking for gaps in evidence, inconsistencies or flaws (Cottrell, 2011:144).

The primary research is designed to test for the existence of the key phenomena of strategic actorness and strategic culture integral to CSDP process. These are core to H1: *CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor.* The interviews also aimed to assist understanding of the drivers of CSDP, the institutional processes involved both in policy making and mission implementation. Analysis of primary data contributed to assessment of H2: *CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics* which has implications for strategic actorness and for demands in the security literature that the EU should develop a Grand Strategy to meet its goals in this policy area. The interviews therefore discussed the drivers of the CSDP process, strategic culture, institutional process, the EU role in security and defence, and missions, in order to better understand the purpose, management, and operational effectiveness of CSDP.

The interviews used intentionally generic questions providing opportunities for discursive answers, but also specific comments, perhaps pertinent to individual respondents, rather than prompted directly by the researcher. The interviews were in most cases lively conversations peppered with real insight. Quotations from the interviews are presented where they contribute to analysis of the hypotheses and enhance understanding of CSDP processes.

The sample of 28 respondents achieved a balance between 15 actors/participants in CSDP institutions and 13 expert commentators, at least two of whom either are or have been high-ranking officials inside CSDP-related institutions. Another foreign policy expert is a senior official with experience of working in several EU institutions, including currently the European Parliament. All were selected on account of their experience and understanding of CSDP and as such provide witness perspectives on its strengths and weaknesses, including the strategic ambition and level of achievement.

All the experts interviewed have acted as consultants on the CSDP process. Care was taken to ensure a wide range of respondents, comprising policy makers, expert witnesses, and individuals involved in policy implementation. Several experts work in think tanks and policy centres, an informal network described by Manners (2006:191-2) as comprising ‘transnational advocacy’ for CSDP. Another served as a senior Brussels-based journalist. At the beginning of the research, potential respondents were approached following
recommendations from academic colleagues, or on the basis of desk research. Sometimes email enquiries led to recommendations concerning who could be a suitable respondent. Eventually interviewees suggested others to approach, thus ‘snowball sampling’ (Devine, 2002:205; Thompson, 2002:183; Handcock and Gile, 2011; Edwards and Holland, 2013:6) was used in selecting candidates, sometimes leading to an interview, sometimes not.

A concern in qualitative research is selection bias, which is difficult to eliminate entirely so it is important to be aware of its presence and implications (Hague and Harrop, 2013). The spread of respondents across different functions, comprising actors within EU institutions, CSDP mission officials, think tank experts, academic specialists, plus others, reduces the risk of bias, or wrong conclusions due to institutional actors’ presenting their work in a favourable light, or being overly critical of their masters, where most staff are state appointees. Seldon (1988:10), however, says civil servants are often high quality respondents because they tend to be dispassionate and objective. Cross-checking with official sources, and with academic and media assessments, helps check the validity of respondents’ statements.

Initial contact was by email bringing a response rate of approximately 50 percent. Non-respondents were usually approached a second time to see if they would answer a reminder. Of the 38 who did respond, ten declined to be interviewed, citing lack of availability, changed employment, or some other reason. By the end of the research period 2010-2013, 28 interviews had been conducted from around 80 approaches. Inevitably barriers to access apply for the most senior ranking decision-makers, Heads of State, EU High Representative, ministerial aids, and EU ambassadors. Richards (1996) refers to access as a drawback with elite interviewing. The research depends upon quality data from close observers of these roles, including senior officials in the EDA, CMPD, EUMC, and advisors to the HR-VP. This level of access was achieved, and supported by investigating speeches and writings by senior policy makers and officials, including the HR-VP.

The selection of EUFOR Althea as a case study must be justified over other candidate missions. Yin (2013) refers to the risk of bias, but points out that the case study may be generalisable to theoretical propositions, not to populations or universes. This therefore suits matching Althea to the wider implementation of CSDP, but it is essential that the researcher retains objective rigour and tests ‘evidence’ from interviews against other material observations and understanding, including direct observation of the setting, academic literature, media assessments, and official sources, and other interviews with individuals.
familiar with, but not directly involved with, Althea. It is necessary to assess whether criticisms are particular to Althea, whether they contradict other official, academic, or media assessments. In fact interview opinion in Sarajevo chimed with experts familiar with this and other missions, and with another respondent close to another Balkan mission, EULEX Kosovo. Furthermore six of the seven Sarajevo respondents had detailed first-hand knowledge of the wider EU role in the Balkans, three having worked in other missions in FYROM and Kosovo. Another was an expert on the Commission. All interviewees had a broad understanding of CSDP so could comment specifically on their own work, but also on general CSDP issues. Similarly think tank and academic experts have considerable experience and knowledge of security and defence policy. All these factors reduce the risk of wrong conclusions drawn from interview data, or from a case study.

EU treaties are an important reference point, including how Treaty statements on CSDP match the experience of individuals engaged in policy implementation. Likewise EEAS press releases may present a positive spin on achievements, so a critical perspective from interviewees may offer a contrast, while academic comment informs overall judgement. The researcher’s task is to reach a balanced assessment on the basis of evidence. For example media reaction to the appointment of Catherine Ashton as High Representative was negative, and some respondents to this research were unimpressed by her low profile. Over her term of office she quietly racked up several successes and media and academic assessment by 2013 was broadly positive (see p.132). It is the role of the researcher to weigh up evidence and reach a reasoned conclusion. This is fundamental to the research process where qualitative research is the primary data collection method.

As well as comparison between respondents, opinions within interviews were checked by seeking confirmation or modification of views expressed, and by post-interview verification of each transcript by individual respondents (Richards, 1996) (see below). Similar questions were asked of different individuals to compare responses, with corroboration adding to the strength of evidence for a particular perspective, or highlighting differences. Respondents were not named in cross-checking or in reference to research findings to avoid compromising anonymity. Phrases such as I’ve heard that… or I understand that… might be used. The main cross-checking comes from comparative analysis of primary data and CSDP literature, and official sources (see bibliography). All interviews are reported anonymously.

The initial email to targeted individuals outlined the purpose of the research, its nature and the researcher’s affiliations (Sheffield Hallam University in 2010 and from January 2011 the
University of York) and research/PhD registration (University of Leeds). The email included an attachment outlining the research project, the kind of questions involved, and information on process, consent, and confidentiality. This is usual practice in qualitative research (Richards, 1996; Edwards and Holland, 2013:67). The process was approved by the University of Leeds ethics committee which insisted on anonymity and data security.

For those who responded positively a time and place to meet was agreed. To enhance efficiency sometimes three or four interviews were fixed with different individuals around the same period in the same city. One respondent supplied answers to questions via email and in informal discussions. One individual offered to coordinate several interviews with officials working in the EUFOR Althea mission. This cohort thus comprised a specific subgroup, and Althea a case study in mission performance. Seven Sarajevo interviews were conducted, one by telephone the week after the face-to-face interviews.

EUFOR Althea is selected as a case study for the following reasons: it was the first large scale ESDP military mission, launched in December 2004; it remains on-going; it is widely considered successful; beginning with 7,000 troops, it was the largest ESDP deployment; it appears to encapsulate much of what CSDP aspires to deliver, including stabilisation, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, and support for democratic institutions; it meets usual mission exigencies that it is multilateral, authorised by a UN mandate, and supported by NATO and the wider international community; it embraced a preparedness to act if necessary across the full range of Petersberg Tasks (Petersberg Declaration, 1992). Althea began as a military mission, and technically it remains one, currently consisting of around 600 personnel (1400 at the time of the interviews), the overwhelming majority of whom are military, not civilian. However, the mission itself has developed an almost completely civilian character, even if it could presumably use military force if required.

Visits to Sarajevo in 2011 and 2015 provided opportunity for direct observation of the context in which EUFOR Althea operates, including informal conversations and encounters with physical reminders of the experience, history and current situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and contrasted with personal memories from six pre-war visits to ex-Yugoslavia territories. First-hand observation of the Althea situation added important value to the case study. Direct observation is a significant source of evidence in case study research (Yin, 2013:92).
Case study is a common research approach in political science (Hull, 1999; Yin, 2013). It involves a qualitative approach and typically links various themes in political studies. The usefulness of the approach is that while the subject, in this example EUFOR Althea, is specific, it can be representative for comparison purposes with other similar examples (Hague and Harrop, 2013). Althea is one example of CSDP implementation, so may indicate conclusions regarding the wider policy. Althea works as a case study on account of the combination of approaches applied to learning about the mission, namely consideration of academic literature, documents and primary sources, interviews with participants, and visiting the region where the mission is located. The multiple methods approach is applied across the entire study to examine CSDP in practice, enabling cross-checking of information. Althea also has a specific characteristic which adds to its appeal as a CSDP case study: being the first large-scale EU military intervention it has the value of being a prototype, from which lessons can be learned for other deployments. EUFOR Althea also offers the benefit of examining real life events, and CSDP implementation through the mission. Yin (2013:8) stresses the value of direct observation and of interviews with persons involved in the events under analysis. The case study therefore reveals specific data on:

- organisational and managerial processes,
- neighbourhood change (and)
- international relations (Yin, 2013:2).

Case study is not the dominant primary research methodology in this thesis. It is a subset within the totality of elite interviews with experts and practitioners across the spectrum of CSDP activities. Althea however is useful in revealing evidence about CSDP implementation and has implications for the policy overall.

One Sarajevo interviewee and one respondent in Southern Germany were interviewed by telephone. These interviews were audio recorded, with permission, to assist transcription. For face-to-face interviews this was not necessary, as note taking was adequate and convenient. All face-to-face interviews were conducted at a location chosen by the interviewee. In the initial email, the procedure for the interviews was explained, and once the meetings began the procedure was again explained as follows. The researcher would first establish an anonymous mode of reference in reporting the interview, for example ‘CMPD official’, ‘Senior EDA official’ or ‘senior official in EUFOR Althea’. Experts tend to be referenced according to their affiliation, as in ‘Berlin-based DGAP expert’. The second step was for the researcher to give an overview of the research and to outline broad areas of questioning and specific questions relating to the issues under investigation. Then the
researcher would return to the first question and ask that one, listen to usually quite long and
discursive answers, occasionally asking follow-up questions or making other comments
relevant to the developing argument. As the respondent talked, the researcher wrote in a
rapid personalised style in a note book. The interviews took between 35 and 75 minutes,
most around 60 minutes.

Almost all interviews were dynamic and animated, containing rich insight reflecting the
expertise and experience of the respondents, most of whom were keen to talk about EU
defence and security. I had imagined being regarded as a nuisance but this was never the
case. The interviews were an exciting and enriching experience, helped by thorough
preparation and my own knowledge, essential in elite interviewing (Richards, 1996).
Anonymity is a necessary convention in academic research but it was amusing that some
interviewees would be happy to get a public airing, saying ‘everyone knows what I think
anyway’, while others, especially in EU institutions, were anxious to remain anonymous.

The technique employed, note taking and transcribing followed by email confirmation and
editing, was extremely efficient and probably more successful than recording, especially in
protecting anonymity and ensuring a relaxed environment. The absence of audio recording
except in two telephone interviews perhaps assisted free expression, and so can be
advantageous (Richards, 1996; Edwards and Holland, 2013). The interviews were guided,
keeping within a broad framework, but supplementary questions and comments meant
respondents could digress, adding more information as they wished (Bryman, 2012). This
led to rich, unprompted and detailed content. Qualitative analysis with in-depth interviews is
a common practice in political science, using:

an interview guide, open-ended questions and informal probing to facilitate a
discussion of issues in a semi-structured or unstructured manner (Devine, 2002:198).

Probing questions and requests for elaboration require skill and judgement from the
refer to the researcher’s active engagement generating ‘guided conversations’. Devine says
qualitative research usually involves only a small number of respondents, as in this research,
and transcripts constitute the research data, which is analysed and interpreted. In addition:

Interviewers also engage in observing the interviewee and the setting in which they
are found (which can) facilitate interpretation of the material (Devine, 2002:198).
This was especially important in Brussels and Sarajevo where respondents lived and worked in a specific CSDP culture, in Brussels one of policy-making and institutionalisation, in Sarajevo policy implementation. Repeated visits to Brussels meant a developing understanding of the ‘Brussels culture’ implied in the literature (Allen, 1998; Checkel, 2005; Mérand, 2008). The case study approach and visits to Brussels provided a benefit from qualitative research in that it is grounded in the situation under analysis (Miles et al, 2013:11). Another relevant observation about qualitative methods is that they are:

most appropriately used where the goal of the research is to explore people’s subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences. Intensive interviewing allows people to talk freely and to offer their interpretation of events (Devine, 2002:199).

The approach therefore is well suited to analysing the phenomena explored in this thesis, namely strategic culture and strategic actorness, the implications of CSDP for European integration, and bureaucratic politics. The effectiveness of CSDP was especially relevant in the Sarajevo interviews, where experts engaged in policy implementation could give first-hand assessment of whether their presence in Sarajevo was conducive to post-conflict development or not. The same applies to the expert reporting on EULEX Kosovo, an interview which enabled comparison with EUFOR Althea with which the respondent was also familiar. Data collected from interviews is interpretive as is the analysis. The value of the interviews is the rich diversity of perspectives from a wide range of respondents, covering various roles in different theatres of CSDP policy-making and implementation. This brings a rich set of data and allows for detailed analysis that collectively and individually sheds significant light on testing the hypotheses and the research questions. In terms of explaining CSDP the interviews present diverse opinions. It is the researcher’s task to draw conclusions based on the evidence from interviews, literature, and the official record, including media commentary. All of this constitutes the methodology employed in the study.

Immediately after the interviews the handwritten notes were typed into a laptop computer. An approximate transcript was saved as a Word file and emailed as an attachment, usually within 24 hours, to the respondent who was asked to check accuracy, to edit or alter it as appropriate using Track Changes before returning it as ‘approved’, which constituted a final stage in the consent process. It also allowed important content checking, corrections or addition of a nuance. Almost all did this, and those who did not were informed that silence
was interpreted as consent to the transcript as a true record. In a few instances follow-up clarification by email was used and appended to transcripts.

Approved transcripts were stored on the researcher’s laptop with suitable security, and back-up copies emailed to the researcher’s university with password protection within institutional e-security conditions. The researcher used the transcripts to compile thematic syntheses around various themes such as ‘strategic culture’, ‘institutions’ or ‘mission experience’. Analysis and cross-checking between transcripts was undertaken using tools within Word packages, notably searching for keywords to link topics. This might have been done using commercial software tools such as Nvivo but while perhaps less efficient the compilation of thematic files around key concepts echoed the tagging and categorising characteristics of such software. Search tools within Word proved adequate, enabling common threads, consistent arguments and indeed counter-positions to be readily identified. Analysis of transcripts over a long time period led to close familiarity with and understanding of respondents’ arguments, facilitating interpretation and analysis.

1.6 Conclusion

This thesis is an analysis of the evolution and practice of EU common security and defence policy (CSDP). It explains the significance of CSDP in terms of the goals expressed in key documents and treaties, and the means to pursue these, including Grand Strategy. It is a study of how CSDP has evolved, examining institutional practice and policy implementation.

This chapter has introduced core concepts used in the study: strategic culture, Grand Strategy, strategic actorness, bureaucratic politics and Europeanisation. It has summarised CSDP’s historical context within EU foreign and security policy, referring to European Political Cooperation (EPC), a precursor of CFSP. The chapter also discussed the Hypotheses, H1 focusing on strategic actorness, H2 on bureaucratic politics, and the main research questions. Finally the methodology underpinning the thesis was described.

The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 considers alternative frameworks that might be assigned to CSDP, notably neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, and social constructivism and explains why these are inadequate or unsuitable. It then draws a link between Brusselsisation and bureaucratic politics, before discussing different interpretations of strategic culture, the main conceptual framework for the study.
Chapters 3 considers the extent of strategic culture convergence among the largest member states, France, Germany and Britain (EU-3), whose commitment is seen as essential to the success of CSDP. At issue is whether different member state strategic cultures render a European strategic culture implausible.

Chapter 4 looks at the role of other member states and argues that ‘a comprehensive’ European strategic culture is emerging, and that this coexists with member state strategic cultures. Chapter 5 explores the institutional framework and associated dynamics around CSDP, with particular relevance to H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics. Here the bureaucratic politics argument is strengthened while intergovernmentalism, key tenets of which are reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty, actually renders Grand Strategy an unlikely means through which CSDP can achieve substance. Chapter 6 looks at evidence from 33 missions between 2003 and 2013. Missions reveal much about the goals and achievements of CSDP (Fig.1.2), and assist further testing of H1 and EU credibility as a strategic actor, as well as prospects for Grand Strategy. Mission evidence also assists testing H2’s claim that bureaucratic politics best explains CSDP.

Finally Chapter 7 outlines the major conclusions from the study, and assesses the Grand Strategy/bureaucratic politics relationship. It also considers the prospects for CSDP, and suggests avenues for future research. Ultimately the thesis argues that while a European strategic culture has been emerging since St Malo, there is little consensus around shared interests so CSDP lacks strategic coherence. This makes an overt Grand Strategy approach, actively and coherently pursued by member states, unfeasible. In contrast, pooling and sharing and incremental issue-by-issue coordination can deliver capability improvements. Bureaucratic incrementalism, a hallmark of CSDP, may eventually contribute strategic actorness and even integration.

The overall argument of the thesis therefore is that bureaucratic politics contrasts with the strong leadership and vision implied by Grand Strategy. In time the EU may emerge as a significant international actor in security and defence, capable of strategic actorness in case-by-case situations.

The timeframe of the study is from the St Malo Declaration (December 1998) to Lisbon Treaty ratification (2009) and post-Lisbon, up to the December 2013 Council meeting.
Chapter Two

Theoretical considerations and strategic culture

2.1 Introduction

This study is grounded in International Relations (IR) and European integration theory: IR because foreign, security and defence policy are traditionally located in the state-centric domain of IR, and because IR helps analysis of the strategic dimension to CSDP, embracing power, international actorness and strategic culture. IR relates to foreign policy which invites consideration of the role of bureaucracies and individuals (Allison, 1971), already underlined above in relation to CSDP in the light of studies regarding European Political Cooperation, the Helsinki Final Act, and CFSP (see pp.8 and 23).

Bickerton (2011) refers to IR’s Westphalian inheritance leading to a view of the EU as state-like, but CSDP needs a more nuanced approach. Member states are decisive in the evolution and implementation of CSDP but the processes are more diverse than straightforward horizontal intergovernmental bargaining (Hooghe and Marks, 2012:840). This demands a different treatment of the concept of state, defined as the essential unit of International Relations (Carr, 1939:147-9). In IR theory, the international system is usually described through attributing corporate statehood or agency to states (Wendt, 1999:196). While this study uses this IR shorthand throughout, it challenges the state-as-actor simplicity by revealing the role of interest groups, elites, bureaucracies, individuals within the state, and actors playing various roles depending on the issue, time and circumstance.

Following Wendt (1999:196) this study considers the state as a ‘metaphor’ or ‘useful fiction’ for what is ‘really something else’. For empirical purposes states are:

real actors to which we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and intentionality (Wendt, 1999:197).

This shorthand is especially evident in Chapters 3 and 4 which consider how different state strategic cultures may combine in a European strategic culture.

Integration theory is important because the research considers the fundamentally intergovernmental nature of CSDP within foreign policy, and whether integration occurs as with the Single Market process. The intergovernmentalism of CSDP is confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty (2007), especially Article 42.2 (see p.14), but while power rests with member
states, analysis of decision-making and institutional process in this area suggests it is not merely an intergovernmental field: other processes are involved (see Fig.2.1).

Fig.2.1 Theoretical context of CSDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Relations Theory (IR)</th>
<th>Integration Theory</th>
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<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Federalism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Neofunctionalism (spillover)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intergovernmentalism*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Liberal Intergovernmentalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Social) Constructivism*</td>
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<td>Sociological Institutionalism/Institutionalism*</td>
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<td>Elite socialisation</td>
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<td>Policy-making processes</td>
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*Especially significant for CFSP/CSDP

Fig.2.1 represents different theoretical strands, including variants of social constructivism. Examination of CSDP institutional structures (Chapter 5) includes consideration of elite socialisation and sociological institutionalism (Checkel, 1999; 2005), helping to assess whether CSDP advances supranationalism at the expense of intergovernmentalism, thus diminishing the centrality of the state (Taylor, 1983; Wendt, 1999). In fact interviews affirm that member states exercise key power over CSDP processes, but without any surety that intergovernmentalism alone is the policy driver. This consideration was important in determining the hypotheses (see Section 1.5).

This chapter critically examines potential theoretical explanations for CSDP. The study selects bureaucratic analysis as its focal point, justifying this on account of the weaknesses in alternative explanations, notably the insufficiency of intergovernmentalism. While CSDP began as an intergovernmental initiative, how it works in practice requires a more nuanced explanation. The thesis also suggests that intergovernmentalism undermines the prospects for Grand Strategy. This chapter also develops discussion of strategic culture, and considers how the EU can develop its own distinctive variety, given the usual association between strategy, states and military alliances (Freedman, 2013).
Section 2.2 assesses grand theories of integration in relation to CSDP, namely functionalism and neofunctionalism (Mitrany, 1948; Haas, 1958) and intergovernmentalism and the variant Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) (Taylor, 1983; Hyde-Price, 2004; Moravcsik, 1998). Section 2.3 looks at social constructivism (Checkel, 1999, 2005; Christiansen et al, 1999) which is arguably more applicable since constructivism is not a ‘grand theory’ but offers insight into how CSDP as a foreign policy field works in practice. Section 2.4 considers Brusselsisation (Allen, 1968) and network analysis (Mérand et al, 2011), both of which suggest proximity to bureaucratic politics. The concept of state transformation (Anderson, 2009; Bickerton, 2009, 2013) is relevant given its association with the bureaucratisation of the modern state. Discussion of strategic culture, a prerequisite for EU strategic actoriness, follows in Section 2.5 before Section 2.6 discusses CSDP power dynamics. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.

2.2 ‘Grand theory’ explanations for CSDP

The earliest grand theorising over European integration focused on federalism, but neofunctionalism (Mitrany, 1948) emerged as a pragmatic alternative designed to reach similar ends. Monnet and Schuman pursued incremental integration through ‘spillover’, whereby the transfer of function leads to sovereignty transfer and new institutional loci of authority (Haas, 1958, 1964). Neofunctionalist spillover means that coordination in one area may extend to adjacent areas, but this is less marked in security and defence than in community affairs. Neofunctionalism has an institution-building logic (Evans and Newnham, 1998:359). The resultant supranational institutions and legislation led to integrationary forces that underpin the Single Market and give it legal status. Integration is defined as:

the process whereby an international organisation acquires responsibility for taking an increasing number of decisions in areas which were previously reserved to the state (Taylor, 1983:26).

But CSDP lacks the supranational, integrationary institutions and legislative framework that neofunctionalism generated. The SEM is underpinned by the hard law of the *acquis communautaire* while the normative basis of CSDP represents soft law. There is arguably spillover in civilian crisis management (CCM) through coordination between various instruments, enhanced CIV-MIL cooperation and new institutional structures serving crisis intervention. But command and control, funding and personnel issues remain mission-
specific and state-determined. Neofunctionalism clearly involves bureaucratic and technical processes bringing harmonisation and eventually integration. The Single Market process was marked by supranationalism from the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, and eventually from the Commission as overseer of community law. The construction of the acquis communautaire governing coal and steel and other sectors of the economy after 1958 was integrationary. No such process has occurred in foreign policy or CSDP. Hence despite some bureaucratic and technical similarities, neofunctionalism cannot be applied to CSDP.

EU foreign and security policy is an intergovernmental domain:

Foreign policy, security and defence are matters over which the individual national governments retain independent control. They have not pooled their national sovereignty in these areas, so Parliament and the European Commission play only a limited role here. However the EU countries have much to gain by working together on these issues, and the Council is the main forum in which this ‘intergovernmental cooperation’ takes place (European Communities, 2005:16).

This sets out the power hierarchy concerning EU foreign and security policy, with the Commission and Parliament having little influence. Maastricht established CFSP as intergovernmental (TEU, 1992). CSDP, a subset of CFSP, is ‘largely intergovernmental’ (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:283). State primacy over security and defence is a core tenet of realist IR theory, but realism hardly matches CSDP, given its basis in inter-state cooperation. Neorealism at least recognises an institutional dimension to intergovernmental cooperation (Waltz, 1979), so better reflects CFSP and CSDP. Over time CSDP may bring increased responsibility and decision-making to EU institutions but it remains subject to approval by, or at least the acquiescence of, member states. There is no supranational authority and no power transfer. In contrast to the association between integration and supranationalism (Taylor, 1983), CSDP poses the question of whether integration may occur in the absence of supranationalism.

The centrality of states to CSDP means intergovernmentalism remains a vital though insufficient explanation. It assumes that integration proceeds from inter-state negotiation (Hoffmann, 1966). This is initially promising, given that CSDP stems from CFSP, and St Malo was a bilateral British-French initiative. But the zero-sum game assumptions of intergovernmentalism do not match CSDP processes (Keohane, 1989; Moravcsik, 1998).
Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) explains the Single Market using policy-making analysis. It considers the actions of interest groups of which the state is an expression (Moravcsik, 1998). Where state representatives see benefits in common policy, they cooperate to advance national interests, notably to maintain market share in a global trade environment. This requires pooling sovereignty to enhance living standards and promote social harmony. The Single European Act (1986) and the Single Market process illustrate a consensus in favour of integration to achieve desired outcomes (Moravcsik, 1998; Milward, 2000).

The focal process of LI was interstate bargaining, but no such process has occurred with CSDP. Perhaps LI rationalism might deliver more actoriness, and indeed Grand Strategy demands interest-based rational assessment of the means/ends relationship (Biscop, 2009, 2013a; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010a; Howorth, 2009, 2010a). But with CSDP there is less of the benchmarking and convergence that marked Single Market construction, despite calls for just such a process (Heisbourg, 2000; Venusberg Group, 2007; Witney, 2008; Howorth, 2010; Major and Mölling, 2010a; Biscop, 2013b), and pressure from the European Defence Agency (EDA, 2006, 2012). Also, while multinational corporations were vital to SEM construction, there has been little pressure for rationalisation from the defence industry. In fact the opposite has occurred (Fishpool, 2008). The failed BAE-EADS merger in 2012 underlines the lack of common cause in the defence industrial sector (Telegraph, 2012c). Military elites may support rationalisation but they are not policy drivers in liberal democracies; they serve their political masters, at most offering advice.

Unlike SEM intergovernmentalism, there has been no pooling of sovereignty or legal consequences analogous with the *acquis*. Member states struggle to articulate common security interests, lack consensus on threat, and have different strategic cultures (see Chapters 3-4). While CSDP involves cooperation, the intergovernmental bargaining and supranational institutions that shaped the SEM do not apply to CSDP.

Fig.2.2 contrasts the different processes underpinning the Single Market and CFSP/CSDP. CFSP/CSDP is intergovernmental, but *not simply intergovernmental*. Other dynamics are present. The SEM process led to economic and political integration marked by shared sovereignty, supranational institutions and legal frameworks, including Community Law enforced by the Commission and the European Court of Justice. No such process underpins CFSP/CSDP, so outcomes resemble cooperation, not integration. While opt-outs and differentiated integration have occurred (EMU, Schengen), in general Community law applies to all 28 member states, whereas CSDP allows varying commitment, including non-participation, on an issue-by-issue basis. Allen (2012) argues that this undermines common
security and defence. Member states, especially the larger ones, continue to construct bilateral relationships with other powers, limiting CFSP coherence and effectiveness. Perhaps to counter this, the Lisbon Treaty (2007:Art.42.6) introduced Permanent Structured Cooperation whereby groups of able and willing states may contribute to an initiative, but non-participants weaken the ‘common’ in CSDP.

Fig. 2.2 Dominant theoretical explanations for Single Market and for CFSP/CSDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Single Market</th>
<th>Liberal Intergovernmentalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State bargaining → Agreement →</td>
<td>Pooling/sharing sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common supranational institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic and political Integration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legal foundations</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>CFSP/CSDP</th>
<th>Intergovernmentalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State representatives in discussion → Agreement → Cooperation/Partnership</td>
<td>Issue-by-issue common initiatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intergovernmentalism endures across foreign and security policy reflecting a ‘Europe of independent nation states’ (Major, 1994; Blair, 1997) or a ‘Federation of Nation States’ (Jospin, 2002:27). The EU embraces devices such as veto or opt-out that resist integration. Intergovernmental processes based on cost-benefit analysis focus on enhancing domestic interests, rather than prima facie support for integration with some loss of sovereignty. Classical intergovernmentalism suggests a win-lose view of sovereignty. Cooperation that defends sovereignty represents a win-win outcome.

A former member of a German think tank, the Venusberg Group, says of CSDP:

There’s no ambition because the member states don’t agree on what this ambition should be (Interview 14).

This matches Biscop’s view (2013a) that member states fail to articulate common interests, which damages policy coherence. A Brussels-based foreign policy expert argues that CSDP processes are state-dominated and determined by local interests such as jobs in the defence industry (Interview 2). Another expert echoes Dinan (2011), referring to the potential for supranational impact from the HR-VP and the EEAS, but much will depend on
personalities, implementation, and political will (*Interview* 4). A military expert suggests Lisbon could bring real progress after a hiatus following the Dutch and French referenda on the Constitutional Treaty (*Interview* 5; BBC News, 2005). A Berlin-based DGAP expert notes the loss of impetus after the referenda, arguing that Britain, France and Germany all lost interest, focusing on their own interests and preferences (*Interview* 25), a view challenged in an SWP paper arguing that other factors would shape ESDP, including future crises, US policy, and political will among leading EU member states (Petersohn and Lang, 2005).

St Malo was a bilateral initiative and CSDP has always been primarily intergovernmental and state-mediated, but the endeavour was taken up by the EU as a whole because that is what was needed to secure momentum (*Interviews* 11, 22). This perspective is backed by Howorth (2007), Mérand (2008), and Menon (2009). Coordination at the Brussels-level is desirable, especially through the PSC, while the field remains mainly intergovernmental (Giegerich, 2015). The Commission and Parliament played no role at St Malo, in Cologne or in Helsinki (European Council, 1999a, 1999b). But post-Lisbon, the Commission is more involved and the HR-VP has a linking role between the Council and the Commission (see Chapter 5). The developing institutional and policy-influencing complexity suggests something beyond intergovernmentalism (Smith, 2004; Howorth, 2014; Mérand, 2008; Giegerich, 2015).

Fig.2.3 summarises interview data regarding intergovernmentalism and CSDP. Respondents accept the intergovernmental nature of CSDP, but also detect a developing European-level influence post-Lisbon, so it would be unwise to dismiss CSDP as simply intergovernmental: it is an evolving process. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) introduced the EEAS and HR-VP, and several experts suggest these will have growing impact (Chapter 5, Sections 5.2 and 5.3). Institutional changes signal a significant ‘step beyond intergovernmentalism’ (*Interview* 4). This may lead to creeping integration of European foreign and security policies. The evidence suggests some support for the intention element in H1 **CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor.**

Almost all interviews began with affirmations of the centrality of intergovernmentalism but Fig.2.3 shows several respondents detecting institutional changes with potentially integrationary impact. They perceive some increase in Commission and Parliament influence, but the real impact may come from the HR-VP and the EEAS. The field is not purely intergovernmental: something more complex and significant regarding integration may be happening (Mérand *et al*, 2008; Dinan, 2011; Bickerton, 2011). Fig.2.3 underlines the evolving nature of CSDP as a process, and the potential for Lisbon to have a significant
impact, a widely supported view (Bono, 2004a; Matlary, 2006; Strickman, 2008; Drent and Zandee 2010). This argument is developed in Chapter 5.

Fig. 2.3 Respondents’ reaction to description of CSDP as ‘primarily intergovernmental’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ views</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESDP is intergovernmental</td>
<td>1,7,10,14,22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP mainly intergovernmental</td>
<td>4,5,6,8,9,11,23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States uppermost in all respects</td>
<td>2,3,15,16,17,18,19,20,21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘states call the shots’</td>
<td>1,2,4,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States look after their own interests</td>
<td>3, 9,13,15,18,24,25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon indicates potential supranationalism: EEAS/HR-VP</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmentalism increasingly affected by Methode Monnet because of cost considerations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On paper CSDP is intergovernmental; post-Lisbon, institutions are increasingly important</td>
<td>4,5,6,8,9,10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission, HR-VP, EP, and EEAS have growing role</td>
<td>5,8,9,26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS can develop an important role</td>
<td>5,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP subject to normative pressures</td>
<td>6,11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris is determining influence on CSDP</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA is intergovernmental</td>
<td>1,6,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmentalism will be affected by budget pressures</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Numbers indicate interviews; see Appendix, p.302)

This thesis argues that CSDP requires a new comprehensive theoretical explanation unbound by a purely state-centric, intergovernmental interpretation. While the field has an intergovernmental core, a better understanding is required since CSDP processes consist of much more than simply intergovernmentalism.

2.3 Social constructivism as explanatory of CSDP

Rosamond (2003:112) cautions against a ‘grand theory’ approach to explaining European integration, arguing that the processes by which integration occurs may be more informative than the form of integration. Social constructivism is concerned with process. It encompasses ideas and values and exogenous developments such as international agreements and practice, and institutional innovation, if not laws. It chimes with normative power Europe (Manners, 2002; Kaldor, 2012) as opposed to a ‘military power’ (Bull, 1982). Historically, as Howorth in various writings and Smith (2004) have argued, the soft power (Nye, 2004) of European foreign and security policy has always been central. This is
unsurprising as soft power carries few sovereignty implications and suits member states with 'weak' strategic cultures and/or pacifist preferences, as well as Atlanticist states and those most concerned about sovereignty. This double restraint risks perpetuating a lack of military strategic actorness, which a comprehensive strategic culture would need to accommodate.

Social constructivism embraces normative trends involving international treaties, conventions and human rights, such as the UN-sanctioned Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001) introduced R2P, signalling an emerging international norm towards the right and even duty of states to intervene to relieve extreme suffering. Libya in 2011 was an example of R2P (Gottwald, 2012; Hehir, 2013). Constructivism is reflected in the International Criminal Court efforts to detain and put on trial suspected war criminals, part of the EUPOL BiH and EUFOR Althea remits in Bosnia (Council Joint Action, 2002; Council Joint Action, 2004b).

The ESS (Solana, 2003) arguably suggests a constructivist dimension to CSDP, as it privileges multilateralism through the UN and other bodies. Ortega describes the ESS as a statement of ‘faith in multilateral solutions to global challenges’ (Ortega, 2007:43). For social constructivists, normative values counter the anarchical tendencies in the state system. The result is not world government, but international governance. Constructivism highlights consensus around agreements such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Convention, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Directive. These may be enforced by international agencies with new standards emanating from specialist authorities, such as the World Trade Organisation, or the International Atomic Energy Agency tasked with overseeing compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Constructivists argue that institutions and ideas play a key role in policy-making, competing with member states and challenging, but not replacing, traditional intergovernmentalism (Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1999; Checkel, 1999, 2005; Shaw, 1999; Christiansen et al, 1999; Diez, 1999; Koslowski, 1999). The social and institutional aspects of constructivism are important: the qualifier ‘social’ suggests the sociological roots in some institutional approaches (Jenson and Mérand, 2010). Social constructivism attempts to embrace the epistemology of sociology more than the normative pure constructivist approach, focusing on informal elite socialisation, enmeshed European social relations and even identity construction contributing to integration (Fligstein, 2008). Checkel refers to the:

constitutive dynamics of social learning, socialisation, routinisation and normative diffusion (and the) identity forming roles (of institutions) (Checkel, 1999:545).
Social constructivism is not a grand theory of integration. Rather, it emphasises ‘policy formation through norms and processes’ (Christiansen et al, 1999:528). Interviews for this study explore the extent of member state primacy in decision-making, or whether institutional socialisation plays any role, as well as power distribution between states and institutions. The weakness in social constructivism is that it overstates normative influence and underplays power, while intergovernmentalism and indeed realism and neorealism, are more cognisant of power realities. Interstate bargaining strives to defend national or local interests such as sovereignty or employment. State primacy may counter social constructivist logic, institutions having only state-mediated, secondary influence. These competing pressures can be observed throughout the CSDP process, where EU-isation would mean cooperation or common policy but this occurs only in case-by-case examples (Kirchner, 2006:959). In a phrase frequently encountered in this research, lowest-common-denominator agreement applies. This suggests bureaucratic politics (see pp.4-7 above).

The Solana-inspired institutions (see Chapter 5) reflect elements of social constructivism yet they have limited power, being subject to member state control. Mérand, et al (2011:124) refer to the state reconstituting itself at the Brussels level in a ‘heterarchical’ and multi-level policy-making environment, meaning that various entities and actors shape CSDP, not just member states' horizontal bargaining. This suggests bureaucratisation, but also, in a constructivist view, the transformative nature of European integration impacting on the identity of policy makers and those who implement policy. Mérand (2008) describes ESDP as a ‘social field’ where policy-making processes contribute to strategic culture formation. Interviews for this research suggest only marginal impact in this respect (see Section 5.4).

A focus on policy-making avoids fixation on institutional development. However Christiansen et al, caution against replacing neofunctionalism with social constructivism, precisely because the latter is not a ‘grand theory’, and there is overlap between social constructivism and aspects of neofunctionalism (Christiansen et al, 1999:530). Checkel refers to social constructivism as a ‘middle-range theoretical approach’ (Checkel, 1999:557) eschewing neofunctionalist claims that the European project could be ‘identity shaping’. While social constructivism is not an integration theory, its normative dimension matches the EU experience. Manners (2002, 2006) applies normative theory to ESDP since the initiative is underpinned by values and soft power, both evident in the ESS (Solana, 2003). Analysis of strategic culture must consider values and how they assist consensus-building. Meanwhile Grand Strategy challenges the EU to create ‘a proactive and constructive foreign policy aimed at concrete objectives’ (Biscop, 2009:37). Grand Strategy does not question the values-based approach, but it requires a proactive and strategic response (Biscop, 2011a).
An advantage of social constructivism is that it is not a one-size-fits-all approach (Checkel, 1999). It embraces various policy-making processes, including socialisation, rational choice, and comitology (committee rules and procedures). It recognises leadership and charisma, and 'policy windows (of opportunity)' (Checkel, 1999:552). Regarding leadership, the impetus for CSDP came from Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac (Blair, 2010:536), and Javier Solana was influential in its institutional development (Nuttall, 2005:100; Edwards, 2006:8).

Even if socialisation and policy-making processes contribute normative and integrationary pressures, this depends on the institutions involved, their power capability, and the issues in question. CSDP institutions, including the EEAS and CMPD, are small and lack power. The normative power of social constructivism is not decisive in CSDP; it is not negligible, but it cannot determine policy. Constructivism pays insufficient attention to power dynamics: Lisbon reaffirms state control over CFSP (see p.14) (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42:2).

Policy-making procedures may filter into member state political cultures (Borzel, 2002) and be reflected in downloading and socialisation dimensions associated with Europeanisation (Wong, 2005). Sociological institutionalism (Weiner, 2006; Fligstein, 2008) suggests new structures may emerge that are compatible with existing ones. CSDP institutions can be a fruitful field of analysis, especially concerning European strategic culture (Edwards, 2006:8).

Howorth (2007) refers to realism and constructivism as the dominant competing theories affecting CSDP, later amending this to include institutionalism. He notes that institutional innovation around CSDP has the complexity of a ‘wiring diagram’ (Howorth, 2014:34). Realism affirms state primacy and pure intergovernmentalism, while constructivism focuses on a post-modern, post-sovereign perspective (Cooper, 2004). Howorth criticises the negativity of realism, a state-centric world view where military strength preserves the sovereign state, eternally threatened in an anarchic environment (Mearsheimer, 1990, 2001; Krauthammer, 2001a, 2001b; Rynning, 2003; Lindlay-French, 2002, 2004). Realists dismiss CSDP as irrelevant given the diversity of interests and strategic cultures. A realist expects little cooperation; individual states are responsible for security within traditional alliances. But even NATO membership and mutual dependency barely equates to realism. The transatlanticism of several EU states, especially Britain, reflects neorealism, but is different from the constructivist dynamics which play some part in CSDP. As discussion of strategic culture will demonstrate, a pragmatic approach to international relations means the exogenous pressures that inform constructivism cannot be ignored.
2.4 Brusselsisation and bureaucratic politics

Arguably Brusselsisation is a concept closely related to social constructivism as it relates to policy-making processes, institutionalism and socialisation (Allen, 1998; Müller-Brandeck-Boquet, 2002; Mérand, 2008; Mérand et al, 2011). It also has a normative dimension within the Brussels-EU milieu (Manners, 2002; Checkel, 2005).

Allen defines Brusselsisation as the ‘steady enhancement of Brussels-based decision-making bodies’ (Allen, 1998:42). European-level interest in foreign affairs began with EPC in the 1970s and developed in the Single European Act which signalled ‘ambition to move towards a common foreign policy’ (Allen, 1998:49). The SEA ‘ended the pretence that foreign policy activity could be kept away from Brussels’ (Allen, ibid).

This change was consolidated as the Cold War ended and EU involvement in foreign and security affairs increased, to better address the changed threat environment (Solana, 2003; Cooper, 2004). Allen refers to the ‘enhancement’ of Brussels-based bodies and the role of officials in positions one step removed from their principals and member state origins. This reflects bureaucratic politics, but crucially there is no power shift (Allen, 1998; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002; Mérand et al, 2011).

Despite the proliferation of entities involved in developing and implementing security and defence policy, the key to understanding CSDP is where and how power is utilised. This demands a change in the ‘state v Europe’ mindset that often dominates foreign policy discourse, a consequence perhaps of the uncritical labelling of CSDP as ‘intergovernmental’. In reality, things are more fluid and complex.

Several writers explore the Brussels-member state relationship (Meyer, 2006; Mérand, 2008; Howorth, 2010b; Mérand et al, 2011; Bickerton, 2011). They highlight the centrality of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), established in 2001 (Council Decision, 2001). Instead of a power shift to Brussels, Howorth coined the phrase ‘supranational intergovernmentalism’ when the High Representative took over the Presidency of the PSC (Howorth, 2000b:36, 84), later explaining this as:

the phenomenon whereby a profusion of agencies of intergovernmentalism take root in Brussels and, through dialogue and socialisation processes, reaction to ‘events’, and a host of other dynamics, gradually create a tendency for policy to be influenced,
formulated, and even driven, from within that city. (…) an idea close to Brusselsisation (Howorth, 2005:182).

This suggests that Brusselsisation combines institutional socialisation with policy-making dynamics involving social and normative processes that could even drive policy initiatives, therefore something more than intergovernmentalism. On this basis this thesis applies institutional socialisation as a conceptual tool of analysis to better understand CSDP processes (see Section 5.4, p.139). It invites consideration of socialisation dynamics, linking institutional socialisation, Brusselsisation and bureaucratic politics. Mérand presents a startling interpretation of Brusselsisation:

The increasing number of meetings held in EU Council buildings has led to what insiders call a ‘Brusselisation’ of defence policy, with the result that, today, one can argue that defence staffs have taken ownership of the EU (Mérand, 2008:33).

He moderates this a few pages later, describing ESDP as a ‘transgovernmental field’ (Mérand, 2008:42), and refers to the ‘institutionalisation of military cooperation’ (Mérand, 2008:45) which began with NATO after 1949 and developed more strongly after the Cold War, and is further progressed by ESDP. Mérand clarifies his understanding of Brusselisation, citing Checkel (2005), and explaining the phenomenon as:

an increase of the level of interaction among national experts around EU issues and often taking place in the European capital (Mérand, 2008:82).

He argues that Brusselisation means that EU foreign policy remains intergovernmental: it does not equate to Communitarisation as there is no foreign policy transfer to supranational institutions. While institutional development and the number of national experts working in Brussels on foreign and security policy has increased exponentially, there has been no shift in sovereignty because power remains with member states (Mérand, ibid). There is no supranational dimension, and no power shift to drive integration among all member states. This limits the potential for Grand Strategy.

Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet uses the term ‘Brussenising’ to denote EU-level decision-making and policy implementation around CFSP. She also implies bureaucratisation:

The formulation and implementation of policy will be increasingly Europeanised and Brusselised by functionaries and services housed permanently in Brussels (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002:261).
But she adds that authority remains with member states, a view upheld in research interviews. Also, the Commission right of initiative in this field is limited (Mérand, 2008:82). Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet cites the Amsterdam Treaty innovation of the High Representative and the prominence of key committees in Brussels, especially the PSC and related bodies approved at Nice (Treaty of Nice, 2000) as examples of Brusselising, interpreting this as:


Amsterdam and Nice brought ‘Europeanised rationality to CFSP’ (ibid) but without transfer of sovereignty. There is no power shift, but this is not simply intergovernmentalism. Brusselisation does not take power from member states. Allen (2005) says decision-making may in part occur at the European level, and influence may be exercised from Brussels, while Howorth (2005) suggests policy could be driven from Brussels, a much more substantial claim. Meyer even applies the term Europeanisation to the PSC, describing it as:

one of the most important ideational transmission belts of a gradual Europeanisation of national foreign, security and defence policies (Meyer, 2006:137).

But this overstates PSC influence by implying a disjuncture between it and member states. There is no such split, partly because of changes in political process that represent a ‘transformation of the modern state’ (Anderson, 2009:109). Crucially the Brussels-based CSDP entities are dominated by member states. The PSC is not an independent policy initiator. Meyer’s claim might be more tenable if the word Brusselisation replaced Europeanisation, consistent with Mérand’s and Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet’s view that Brusselisation maintains member state control, and sovereignty.

Having linked Brusselisation and bureaucratic politics, this thesis applies a bureaucratic politics analysis in H2 CSDP is best explained by bureaucratic politics. Policy analysis studies indicate a bureaucratisation of security policy that overrides intergovernmental bargaining (Mérand et al, 2011; Bickerton, 2011). H2 challenges intergovernmentalist assumptions, and may reflect wider EU processes. Siedentop (2000) describes the EU as centralised and bureaucratic like France, unlike federal and democratic Germany. This perhaps is an overstatement and Bickerton (2011:182) avoids intra-EU distinctions by casting the ‘modern state’ as suffused with pragmatism over principle, technocracy over representation, a process that ‘depoliticises all member states’ representative politics’ (Schmidt, 2006:9). More recently Bickerton articulates the transformation of the state from nation state to member state (Bickerton, 2013:4).
The claim that EU security and defence policy has been bureaucratised is consistent with perspectives that imply bureaucratisation: heterarchy and multilevel governance (Mérand et al., 2011), ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:284; Wallace and Reh, 2015:109), and Brusselsisation (Allen, 1998; Müller-Brandeck-Boquet, 2002). Moravcsik’s LI cannot be applied to CSDP even if the negative integration of the Single Market Plan, i.e. the stripping away of barriers to market efficiency, might be a model for rationalising military capabilities through pooling and sharing, industrial cooperation, and changes to procurement law through Directive 2009/81/EC which attempts to bring defence equipment within Single Market rules (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013). This could assist capability and cooperation through rational choice, but how much rational choice applies to foreign, security and defence policy is open to debate. Howorth suggests that intergovernmental coordination in security and defence represents a:

...sea-change in the way the EU and its member states will henceforth relate to the outside world (Howorth, 2007:31).

He comments that coordination fits with intergovernmentalism since it implies the rational choice element of the latter. He wonders if coordination could lead to integration, and speculates on the grey area between the two, coinining the neologism ‘co-ordigation’ (Howorth, 2007:32). Howorth’s routine use of ‘coordination’ instead of ‘cooperation’ invites consideration of integration as a possible outcome from the CSDP process, but ultimately a choice between CSDP’s ‘collapse and a bold move forward’ probably depends more on external events rather than conscious decision (Howorth, ibid:69).

2.5 Strategic culture

Analysing strategic culture provides insight into how security policy has developed, and the significance of CSDP. Many writers have explored European strategic culture as a frame of reference within EU foreign policy analysis (Gray, 1999a; Cornish and Edwards, 2001, 2005; Rynning, 2003; Hyde-Price, 2004; Margaras, 2004; Matlary, 2006; Giegerich, 2006; Edwards, 2006; Meyer, 2005, 2006, 2013; Howorth, 2014, 2009; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Biava et al, 2011). This study follows this tradition given that the ESS, the document at the heart of CSDP, urges the Union to develop its own strategic culture (see p.1 above). Furthermore Mérand writes that:
the ultimate guarantee of a successful ESDP is the consolidation of a European strategic culture (MéRAND, 2008:23).

The research question ‘Is there a European strategic culture?’ addresses EU capability to have impact, to have ‘actorness’, in security and defence (H1). The analysis will reveal whether, in MÉRAND’s terms, CSDP is ‘successful’, or has ‘substance’ (Shepherd, 2003). Strategic culture is ‘the milieu within which strategic ideas and defence policy decisions are debated’ (GRAY, 1981:22). It is a ‘context for understanding, rather than explanatory causality for behaviour’ (GRAY, 1999a:49). It is a framework within which the EU develops as a security and defence actor. A frequently cited definition of strategic culture is:

The institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general acceptance of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities (albeit limited) (CORNISH AND EDWARDS, 2001:587).

Has the EU developed a strategic culture marked by capability and actorness? CSDP implementation, its level of achievement and aptitude for Grand Strategy, can provide answers to this question. BIAVA et al., (2011) argue that the Union has a strategic culture, and one that demonstrates actorness through CSDP structures, mechanisms and instruments, and is evidenced by interventions and missions. This thesis tests these claims.

The construction of a European strategic culture has been a parallel process to CSDP development. The ESS emphasises strategic culture as fundamental to EU actorness in international security and defence (SOLANA, 2003:11). The CSDP-strategic culture relationship is pivotal to understanding the policy. EU credibility as a strategic actor depends on the coherence of EU ambition. This thesis explores the extent of CSDP coherence and consensus. It analyses the feasibility of Grand Strategy, regarded by many as essential to strategic actorness, comparing this with the significance of bureaucratic politics.

A state or organisation with a strategic culture acts strategically: it is an actor in security and defence. If the literature and primary research reported here indicate an absence of strategic culture, then it follows that the EU cannot be a strategic actor. Grand Strategy requires a commitment to a common strategic culture, a prerequisite for actorness. Traditional IR-based theories, especially those grounded in realism or neo-realism, lack the tools to explain how security policy develops (MARGARAS, 2004). MARGARAS argues that a strategic culture-based analysis avoids the pitfalls of approaches constrained by rational choice and game theory assumptions which proved unreliable during the Cold War. Human beings do not
always behave rationally, and in game theory uncertainties and misjudgements contribute to a dangerous and unpredictable environment. The Cold War was marked by high risk and proxy conflicts (Ferguson, 2006), and at least twice by extreme risk, during the Cuban Crisis in 1962 and Able Archer in 1983 (Walker, 1994).

A European strategic culture must assist CSDP in contributing to ‘a better world’ (Solana, 2003). The Lisbon Treaty seeks to implement a CFSP (which embraces CSDP) that:

(reinforces) the European identity (...) in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:TEU Preamble).

CSDP objectives are stated in official documents (Fig.1.2, p.14). In a primarily intergovernmental domain, member states are responsible for these ambitions, so they must implement a process and a vision of how things should be: that is what strategy implies. Strategy is ‘an instrumental science for solving practical problems’ (Brodie, cited in Baylis and Wirtz, 2010:6). It ‘attempts to think about actions in advance, in the light of our goals and our capacities’ (Freedman, 2013:x). Culture has to do with ways of thinking and acting, ‘how we do things’. It should help define how the EU is represented, perceived, and understood by its publics and the rest of the world. This is a comprehensive strategic culture that stretches understanding beyond Cornish and Edwards’s definition. Kirchner refers to milieu goals comprising ‘conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction’ (Kirchner, 2006:949).

A common European strategic culture might be counter-intuitive in a mainly intergovernmental policy area where member states' foreign and defence policies have historically shown considerable variance (Howorth, 2004; Edwards, 2006). The CSDP process invites consideration of whether the EU is capable of a common strategic culture and whether this is feasible without supranational instruments.

In the literature the term ‘security culture’ is also used, defined as:

enduring and widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform the ways in which the state’s/society’s interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced (Krause, cited in Sedivy and Zaborovsky, 2004:192-3).

This reflects the importance of history while highlighting a psychological dimension to security/strategic culture, stressing beliefs, attitudes, interests and values, abstract notions
located in thought. These concepts contribute to the collective view of the *demos*. Howorth considers the term ‘security culture’ as ‘more neutral politically’ (2007:178), reflecting the ‘collective mindset (...) taking shape in the EU’ (*ibid*). While agreeing with this view, this thesis uses the term ‘strategic culture’ because it is more frequent in the literature, as did Howorth himself in *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (2007). Security culture defined by Krause is wider in scope than usual interpretations of strategic culture but Longhurst's definition (on p.3) explicitly links beliefs, attitudes and practices to force. This allows the possibility of a *pacifist* strategic culture, for some a contradiction in terms. But ‘beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force’ must allow non-use, for some EU member states a long-held principle, only recently modified in Germany (Global Security, 2012; Brose, 2013).

Cornish and Edwards (2001) provide a commentary on the *potential or actual* emergence of EU strategic culture extending beyond civilian power, which is essential to the Union's aspiration to be a global actor, a view echoed by the ESS. Without this there can be no ‘revolution in the EU and in military affairs’ (Gnesotto, 2000:1), a revolution which demands military capability, echoing Hill (1993). A strategic culture *must have* a military dimension. A ‘revolution’ implies an EU military role with direct impact on the EU-state relationship, perhaps extending supranationalism, and deepening European integration. This is critical to how this thesis applies the term ‘strategic culture’: it adopts a *comprehensive* understanding comprising humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making (Petersberg Declaration, 1992). This is fundamental to the ESS and CSDP (Pagani, 1998; Edwards, 2006; Zwolski, 2012a, 2012b).

Military capability being a component of strategic culture is consistent with Colin Gray’s analysis, warning that Europe ‘has turned its back on war’ (Gray, 2007:276). He argues that while Europeans live in a realm of affluence, beyond Europe's borders lie regions of poverty and desperation. Europeans should prepare for disorder and construct the means to deal with potential threats. This explains the urgency among strategy enthusiasts for the EU to embrace capability and strategic actorness. A full enquiry into the nature of strategy cannot be undertaken here but Gray suggests a holistic approach, a system view that takes account of ‘multiple interdependencies and the numerous factors at play’ (Freedman, 2013:238). Gray identified seventeen elements that comprise strategy: people, society, culture, politics, ethics, economics and logistics, organisation, administration, information and intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, technology, operations, command, geography, friction/chance/uncertainty, adversary, and time (Gray, 1999b:23-43). Elsewhere he advises
that strategy and its operationalisation through strategic culture should take full account of people and politics, preparation for war, and war proper (Gray and Johnson, 2010:376). This strategic approach depends on understanding history, experience, and the present. Institution building alone does not guarantee peace (Gray, 2007:277). In this context strategy analysts emphasise both civilian and military capability, and the need to weigh aims with capability. Strategy requires flexibility and adaptability to unpredictable circumstances (Freedman, 2013). It is continually subject to externally imposed limitations, including resources. CSDP shows that resourcing is central to coherence in any emerging strategy.

Many writers insist that CSDP requires increased military capability (Everts et al, 2004; Venusberg Group, 2007; Witney, 2008; Howorth, 2010; Zandee, 2011; Menon, 2011a). Indeed, while a gap exists between capability and the St Malo, Helsinki and ESS aspirations, the EU remains a paper tiger. It lacks strategic power and is too reliant on normative and civilian power which proved inadequate during the 1990s Balkan crises. As the ESS implies, a purely soft power CSDP is a logical impossibility.

Realists emphasise that a strategic actor requires capability and political will to deploy force (Rynning, 2003; Kagan, 2004; Hyde-Price, 2004, 2013; Baylis and Wirtz, 2010). In the EU this is largely missing, but a strategic culture based on wider human security interests (Kaldor, 2007, 2012; Drent and Zandee, 2010; Zwolski, 2012a) is not rooted in a force capability mindset. After the Cold War Robert Cooper, an architect of the ESS, argued for a new post-national approach to security appropriate for ‘a postmodern world’ (Cooper, 2004:26). He observes a blurring between domestic and foreign affairs as transnational agreements such as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Convention banning landmines and the International Criminal Court point to a changed environment, challenging traditional views of statehood and sovereignty. Watanabe notes that:

crucial elements of (Germany’s) strategic culture, such as an attachment to multilateralism, European political integration, and the constraint of the use of force through national and international norms (have enabled Germany) to situate itself at the forefront of efforts to advance (European) political union (Watanabe, 2010:17).

She argues that Germany’s key engagement with the stabilisation and association process (SAP) in South East Europe indicates a strategic, soft power approach towards regional transformation, encapsulating an emergent EU strategic culture. This is an example of why
the Cold War conception of strategy based on military capability should be revised to incorporate a fresh interpretation of strategic culture (Gray, 1999a; Biava et al, 2011; Zwolski, 2012a). It challenges the view that member states’ diverse strategic cultures prevent the EU substantiating its own strategic culture (Hyde-Price, 2004). Gray considers that ‘a security community may have several strategic cultures’ (Gray, 1999a:54). Matlary (2006) considers the EU unlikely to develop a traditional strategic culture, but:

a post-national strategic culture based on human security provides a window of opportunity for (the EU as) a unique post-national strategic actor (Matlary, 2006:107).

Kaldor (2007:182) cites a UN Development Programme defining seven elements of human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (UNDP, 1994). Rynning (2003) argues that the EU may develop a strategic culture based on common interests and shared views of the world. Like Matlary, he suggests that the EU cannot build a strong (traditional) strategic culture but may develop one based on a ‘community of values’ (Rynning, 2003:484). It may contribute to:

‘good governance’ in the European neighbourhood and build ‘an international order based on effective multilateralism’ (ibid, 486).

Rynning argues that the EU is presented as a liberal force for the good of democracy promoting its ‘identity’ in world politics, an echo of normative power Europe (Manners, 2002; Forsberg, 2011). Perhaps CSDP is part of an EU bid to transform its enemies, an ambition pursued somewhat differently by an idealist President Bush or Prime Minister Blair in Iraq (Bush, 2002; White House, 2002; Mazaar, 2003; Blair, 2010). Maybe CSDP seeks to:

(resolve) other peoples’ conflicts by military means if necessary, but without violating international law (Rynning, 2003:486).

The comprehensive approach (see p.3) reflects the changed circumstances post-Cold War and post-9/11, consistent with Gray (1999a, 1999b), Rynning (2003) and Biava et al (2011). The traditional focus on state military capability does not fit the EU in the 21st century, and not only because the EU is not a state. Instead a multilateral, multi-instrument approach from economic and political pressures to military threat constitutes a ‘European way of war’ (Everts et al, 2004) predicated on prevention, and consistent with key EU documents (Petersberg Declaration, 1992; Amsterdam Treaty, 1997; SMD, 1998; Solana, 2003; Lisbon
This matches Europe’s transition towards a (comprehensive) strategic culture (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Biava et al, 2011) and the widening reach of EU security interests, an emerging consensus on threat management, and developing institutional means to achieve security objectives. Biava et al echo Gray’s description of the European strategic culture environment, indicating a complex high context culture, in contrast to the US (Gray, 1999a).

The CA of the ESS represents a ‘complete package of military and civilian tools to tackle crises’ (Drent and Zandee, 2010:10). This contrasts with the US National Security Strategy (White House, 2002) published after the 9/11 attacks, which:

frames its security environment more traditionally by identifying terrorism as ‘the enemy’ while the ESS emphasises the complex causes that lie at the roots of terrorism and locates the causes also within the Union itself by including a phrase that ‘This phenomenon is also part of our own society’ (Drent and Zandee, 2010:10).

Rynning (2003) also underlines the US approach as unilateralist and pre-emptive, while the ESS demonstrates commitment to multilateralism, suggesting heterarchy, or ‘multiple centres of power’ (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010:1353). This heterarchical, multi-actor, multi-level governance (Mérand et al, 2011), embracing ‘supranational intergovernmentalism’ (Howorth, 2000b:36, 84), is reflected in CSDP institutional development (see Chapter 5). Biava et al, (2011) describe how the EU has sought to coordinate civil and military resources in an integral CIV-MIL strategy, but Drent and Zandee (2010) caution that despite the need for such coordination in crisis management, this has not yet been achieved.

The NSS was a direct response to 9/11 (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003), and according to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee member, the democrat Joe Biden, it showed that neo-cons had taken over the Bush administration (Biden, 2003). In contrast the ESS was a comprehensive statement of security needs, so the impulse for the two documents is different. The ESS reflected various external factors and embraced common perspectives, perhaps an expression of strategic culture convergence after the divisions exposed by the Iraq crisis. Menon (2004) argues that converging sentiment on the nature of threat enabled agreement on the ESS despite the split over Iraq. ESDP faced major challenges as opposing factions seemed likely to derail the St Malo and Helsinki ambitions, rendering defence and security cooperation impossible.

CSDP has evolved as a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. Instead of traditional state strategic culture coherence, EU strategic culture permits ‘flexible coalitions outside the
EU framework’ (Rynning, 2003:491) as in Libya in 2011. The Battlegroup (BG) concept (EEAS, 2013b) might also contribute to developing European strategic culture. This Anglo-French initiative in 2007 was modelled on the EU Artemis RD Congo operation of 2003 (Lindstrom, 2007:9). A number of member states participate in BGs comprising around 1500 troops plus support services, intended for rapid deployment (within ten days) to crisis situations. The BG undertakes training before being rostered, remaining on stand-by for six months. The concept does not replace the HHG, but constitutes ‘one specific additional capacity to (the) overall capability objective’ (Biscop and Coelmont, 2013b:81). Weaknesses in the BG idea are considered in Chapter 6, pp.178-79.

Norheim-Martinsen (2011) argues that the developing comprehensive approach is the essence of an emergent EU strategic culture and while it may be difficult to build a strategic culture based on values, this is what the EU is doing, albeit unevenly and it being continually contested. The CA accepts a values-informed process, and Snyder offers a definition of strategic culture which despite its Cold War timing implies a values perspective:

A set of semi-permanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behavioural patterns socialised into a distinctive mode of thought (that) guides and circumscribes thoughts on strategic questions, influences the ways in which strategic issues are formulated, and sets the vocabulary and perceptual parameters of strategic debate (Snyder, 1977:8).

Here ‘beliefs, attitudes and behavioural patterns’ can surely be interpreted as commonly held values. Snyder observes that this strategic culture is manifest in elite groups, meaning political leaderships, including military leaderships given that a strategic culture permeates different elites, before percolating down to other sections of society through shared and transmitted perspectives, although there may be a disjuncture between elites and the governed. Elites may concentrate on military force despite lack of popular support or outright opposition. Elite-generated shifts in strategic culture might mirror wider processes around European integration, sometimes described as elite-driven, especially in neo-functionalist explanations (Haas, 1958, 1964; McDonald and Dearden, 1999; Strøeby Jensen, 2003).

Johnston links symbolism to preferences regarding military force in a definition of strategic culture which reflects traditional understanding:

an integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, metaphors, or analogies) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs (Johnston, 1995:46).
Meyer stresses the importance of ‘unpacking’ strategic culture, assessing its ‘important ideas, attitudes, beliefs, values and norms’ (Meyer, 2005:524). Meanwhile Johnston (1995) and Lantis (2005) underline the potential for elites to reshape strategic culture despite a prevailing view that strategic cultures are resistant to change, unresponsive and ‘fairly static’ (Lantis, 2005:3). This suggests strategic culture evolves, or could emerge in the EU.

A further question is whether an EU strategic culture requires strong leadership. Elites can shape or change strategic culture (Heng, 2012) but it is questionable whether the CSDP process has benefited from adequate leadership. Javier Solana as High Representative, especially during the early part of his tenure, provided this. He enjoyed a strong profile, but interviews for this study suggest his influence waned after 2005, primarily because member states were reluctant to provide adequate resources, a widely supported view (Venusberg Group, 2007; Witney, 2008; Menon, 2009). Solana managed to construct an institutional framework from which the EU launched missions, confirming the operational existence of ESDP. But these institutions could not by themselves constitute a European strategic culture. Nevertheless Solana’s legacy was an institutional framework which continued to develop and from which a European strategic culture could emerge.

This discussion of strategic culture, and how the concept is applied in the EU, has demonstrated two opposing interpretations: the traditional approach reflected in Cornish and Edwards’s (2001) definition and by realist assessments, and the more comprehensive, post-modern understanding in Biava et al (2011). This distinction reappears in interview evidence in Chapter 5, revealing two opposing assessments regarding the progress of CSDP. This chapter now concludes with comment on whether the EU can become a strategic power.

2.6 The EU, power and sovereignty

In a Westphalian world security is state-mediated, and national security demands drive policy. Can a shift from purely national strategic cultures towards a European strategic culture be a natural corollary of Single Market integration? Some commentators (Moravcsik, 2002a, 2009; Haseler, 2004; Leonard, 2005; McCormick, 2007) imply that Europe’s trading and economic strength and soft power mean it can assume superpower status, or even that it already has. More measured assessment suggests that the EU strives for an international role but struggles to determine what that role should be (Menon, 2008; Manners, 2010). EU foreign and security policy analysts highlight the gap between threats and capability (Lindlay-French, 2002; Venusberg Group, 2007; Witney, 2008; Howorth, 2010; Menon, 2011a).
The ‘Europe as superpower’ argument contains several flaws. First, Europe’s economic strength is far from assured, especially in the light of post-2008 financial turbulence and the Eurozone crisis. A new 21st Century Triad comprising the US, the EU and China looks fanciful even if the USA-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) becomes a reality (European Commission, 2013a). Secondly the US may be less committed to providing Europe with a security umbrella, frustrated by the collective failure to commit resources to defence capability. American attention may switch with the ‘Asian pivot’ (Peterson, 2013:58; O'Donnell, 2011a:430; Biscop, 2012:1298; Defense Department, 2012; Financial Times, 2012a; Liao, 2013) (see p.182). A fresh European security crisis could again expose the Union’s weakness, as in the 1990s. Thirdly, the attractiveness of the EU model may diminish as it struggles with challenges emanating from contemporary economic globalisation. The Union has not resolved Greco-Turkish-Cypriot tensions inside NATO. Turkey’s EU accession appears paralysed (Malmström, 2009; Today’s Zaman, 2012; Bakar and Rees, 2013; Grabbe, 2014). In sum, Europe is not destined for superpower status, a destiny that may not even be desirable in a post-sovereign environment:

If the nation state is a problem then the super-state is certainly not a solution (Cooper, 2004:37).

The notion of a post-sovereign environment suggests that cooperation and partnership are no longer optional but necessary and inevitable (Howorth, 2001; Major and Mölling, 2010b; Hammond, 2012; Biscop, 2012; 2013b; Menon, 2013; Overhage, 2013). Cooperation underpins bilateral agreements such as the Lancaster Gate treaties between Britain and France (BBC News, 2010; New York Times, 2010) and the entire CSDP process. The strategic implications of CSDP require analysis in the light of changes affecting sovereignty:

The cardinal principle of sovereignty in international affairs, the right to declare war, (has) been constrained by nuclear caution and alliance responsibilities (...) in domestic matters, the right to regulate the currency, to decree taxation and to manage the economy in order to establish social priorities, is now constrained by the enforcement mechanism of the new global economy, the markets (Walker, 1994:355).

Howorth argues that the whole notion of:

national defence (is) at best a misnomer, at worst a logical contradiction (...) national and continental dimensions of security have been utterly subsumed within the Atlantic Alliance (Howorth, 1997:12).
The changed security and threat environment obliges European states to consider pooling and sharing, with attendant sovereignty implications. The ESS implies that security can only be achieved through alliances and multilateral initiatives backed by the UNSC (Solana, 2003). Menon insists that having influence requires combined effort:

If Europeans, including the French and British, aspire to exert real influence over international security affairs, they must do so collectively or not at all (Menon, 2013:36).

They must also formulate security and defence policy within resource constraints and possibly reduced US commitment to Europe's security (Financial Times, 2012a). European reticence in developing a coherent security strategy could even hasten US disengagement.

Biscop (2008:16) differentiates between the EU as a global player and a global power. He stresses that the Union is less of an actor than it could be, particularly in foreign and security policy. Elsewhere, consistent with Grand Strategy aspiration, Biscop affirms that:

The EU must be a power, i.e. a strategic actor that consciously and purposely defines long-term objectives, actively pursues these, and acquires the necessary means to that end. (...) (T)he EU must be seen to act upon its strategy. The EU therefore cannot be a status quo power that seeks to maintain current conditions: its agenda entails a commitment to proactively shape the environment (Biscop, 2009:19-20).

This thesis examines whether this plea for EU power and Grand Strategy is realistic. Without the power to shape the international environment, is CSDP ‘a policy without substance’ (Shepherd, 2003)? This may be implied in Tony Blair’s assertion twelve years after St Malo that the EU must develop a ‘defence policy (based on) combat capability’ (Blair, 2011:678), which suggests the ESS promised more than it delivered. However, just as the Union is a sui generis example of economic integration (Bickerton, 2013:190), Lisbon introduced a novel comprehensive approach to crisis management to ‘(strengthen) international security’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.1). Lisbon is vague on the means to achieve its objectives (Merket, 2012; Duke, 2012), with just one paragraph on the new EEAS (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.27.3).

Lisbon ratifies CSDP as ‘a crisis management tool’ (Mattelaer, 2010:3), a unique form of post-national strategic culture, based primarily on civilian and soft power, backed by limited military attributes for small-scale crisis management operations with multilateral approval.
through UN resolutions, and larger state-led military interventions where required. Given the absence of defence, Lisbon suggests less than was promised by St Malo, the HHG, or the ESS, but the comprehensive approach to security addresses threats beyond the scope of NATO (Smith, 2013). The twenty completed missions and seventeen ongoing (October 2014) are operations for which NATO would not be suitable (see Table 6.1) (ISIS Europe, 2014). CSDP has evolved as a comprehensive instrument without the power implications of a major defence component, a feature which frustrates Grand Strategy ambition and undermines EU strategic actorness. CSDP suggests a change from a purely national prism on security policy, a ‘paradigm shift’ in European affairs (Matlary, 2006:116). Analysis of EU credibility as a strategic actor, especially in the context of integration, goes to the heart of understanding this shift, if such a shift has really occurred. Is Grand Strategy a realistic path towards strategic actorness, or is this undermined by bureaucratic processes?


The EU aspiration to enhance international security through crisis management reflects this new norm. Policy formulation moved from Westphalian and Cold War assumptions regarding territorial defence, traditional alliances and inviolable sovereign borders towards international cooperation involving operations authorised by multilateral institutions, often in partnership with these bodies. CSDP pursues the comprehensive approach (CA) under the EEAS, which coordinates crisis management and development, another major shift in EU external affairs (Vanhoonacker et al, 2010; Duke, 2012; Merket, 2012; Zwolski, 2012a; Smith, 2013).

The UN is no longer fixated on territorial integrity: it has a broader human security interest reflected in the human development index (Brzoska, 2003). The EU was a forerunner in this values-based transformation, its normative values predating changes in the UN and NATO. The Union views security through a human development lens, underlining the shift from Westphalian sovereignty to a multilevel system of governance that privileges multilateralism and transnational legal frameworks. Disputes do arise. The Iraq crisis highlighted divisions over the legality of the US-led intervention (Blair, 2011:438). Any prevailing EU security policy is shaped by many variables including different member state strategic cultures (see
Chapters 3-4). Common policy can be elusive as Iraq, and Libya demonstrated. HR-VP Ashton reacted quickly to the Libyan crisis, calling for EU humanitarian intervention within a multilateral framework. The Council authorised a CSDP operation, but this did not happen because member states could not agree (Ashton, 2011a; Council Decision, 2011c).

Coherence may also be compromised by institutional complexity. Rees refers to the increasing role of EU institutions but without power shifting from member states to supranational entities. Instead, ‘actors from discreet sectors of national governments cooperate’ (Rees, 2011:24), and remain decisive in decision-making (ibid, 25). Their pre-eminence and the potentially wide range of views ensures that European security and defence policy is based on uncontroversial ‘civilian power’ (Duchêne, 1972:39), or as we shall see later, ‘lowest-common-denominator’ agreement. Arguably civilian power dominates EU strategic culture and European security and defence policy is feasible only if based on civilian means and objectives. This however would entail abandoning the St Malo ambition for an autonomous security and defence role, and capability for ‘robust intervention’ (Solana, 2003:11), meaning peace enforcement, not just peacekeeping.

In fact the ESS is clear that civilian power is insufficient, a widely held view (Blair, 2011:678; Biscop, 2009, 2010; Howorth, 2009, 2010a; Financial Times, 2012a). Civilian power is non-military and non-coercive, derived from economic strength, trading influence and ‘attachment to legal processes’ (Rees, 2011:25). It embraces Nye’s concept of values, a key component of ‘soft power’ (Nye, 1990; 2002). Majone (2009) explains that later writers expanded on Duchêne’s civilian power. The EU became:

> a novel kind of power in international relations, not only because of its emphasis on non-military instruments of foreign policy, but also because of its promotion of multilateral solutions, (...) regional cooperation, and (the) primacy (of) conflict prevention, negotiation and peacekeeping (Majone, 2009:14).

This is consistent with the declared scope of CSDP (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.1). Manners developed Duchêne’s concept in NPE theory (Manners, 2002, 2006; Forsberg, 2011). The Union promotes democracy, human rights and the rights of minorities (Cameron and Balfour, 2006). Civilian and normative power imply milieu-shaping ambition, and contribute to strategic culture, but the violent break-up of Yugoslavia demonstrated the limits of soft power (Glenny, 1996:99; Dover, 2005; Howorth, 2007:13). Thus comprehensive capability is a prerequisite for credibility as a strategic actor. Lisbon recognises this, promoting ‘multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.28D), but the EDA lacks power, being only able to make recommendations (see Chapter 5).
2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the theoretical context of CSDP, arguing that ‘grand theories’ of integration do not adequately explain CSDP processes. Neofunctionalism has brought supranational institutions and common law, none of which applies to CFSP/CSDP. The policy area is primarily intergovernmental but intergovernmentalism is an insufficient explanation for CSDP. Social constructivism is promising because of its normative dimension and focus on policy-making. Institutionalism also requires closer analysis, especially given the extent of institutional innovation in this field; Brussellsisation is interesting because it relates closely to bureaucratic politics, which emerges as key to explaining CSDP, and central to the originality claim in this thesis (see Chapter 5).

The chapter also examined strategic culture to better understand the concept before the next two chapters consider whether a European strategic culture exists. Finally the chapter explored power relations regarding CSDP, arguing that the changed international environment makes cooperation essential in order to address contemporary threats.

An effective and comprehensive strategic culture is a *sine qua non* of EU credibility as a strategic actor. CSDP may be a means to achieve this, eventually perhaps involving supranational competence, and even integration. The comprehensive approach embraces normative power which Forsberg describes as an ‘ideal type’:

\[
\text{The EU has normative interests, behaves (usually) in a normative way, uses normative means of power and achieves normative ends when it does so (Forsberg, 2011:1199).}
\]

This correlates with the notion of the Union as both vehicle and driver of post-national politics (Cooper, 2004). But exogenous pressures (Fig.1.1, p.11) require member states to confront security challenges (Menon, 2012:586), and to develop capability, including hard power (Baylis and Wirtz, 2010:3-4). Cooper, a key architect of the ESS, describes the EU as:

\[
\text{the most developed example of a postmodern system. It represents security through transparency and transparency through interdependence. It is more a transnational than a supranational system (Cooper, 2004:36-7).}
\]

Now the thesis explores whether the Union actually *has* a strategic culture by combining assessment of relevant literature with primary research data. The next chapter focuses on the strategic cultures of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and considers strategic culture convergence between them.
Chapter Three

Strategic cultures in EU-3: France, Germany, United Kingdom

3.1 Introduction

This chapter and the next explore the key research question: Is there a European strategic culture? Establishing a European strategic culture is central to the European Security Strategy (Solana, 2003). H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor requires assessment of strategic actorness, while Grand Strategy, no less than the ESS, requires a common European strategic culture (see p.3).

This chapter examines the strategic cultures of the three largest and most powerful EU member states, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (EU-3), in order to assess their compatibility, possible convergence between them, and contribution to EU strategic culture. Throughout the chapter some older literature is used as a base-point (Marcussen et al, 1999; Hyde-Price, 2004; Howorth, 2004; Kagan, 2004; Menon et al, 2004) in order to show possible changes over time. Being within the intergovernmental policy field of CFSP, the most powerful and influential member states are critical to CSDP development (Hill, 2011; Helwig, 2013:237) and so their strategic culture traditions merit particular attention (Charillon and Wong, 2011; Pohl, 2014). EU-3 convergence would suggest a developing European strategic culture, and examining EU-3 power dynamics can help explain CSDP.

Hyde Price (2004) believes diverse strategic cultures make a common European strategic culture unfeasible. If this view is correct more than ten years later it would carry profound implications for strategic actorness and GS, and undermine H1. Chapters 1 and 2 explained the comprehensive nature of any EU strategic culture, promoting international security through a multi-instrument approach. Strategic actorness implies implementing policies towards specified goals, while GS demands a European strategic culture, coherent ambition, and political will. CSDP requires consensus on aims, objectives, means, and policy implementation. Howorth reports the importance of EU-3 shifting from:

long-held shibboleths (British ‘Atlanticism’, French ‘exceptionalism’, German ‘pacifism’ and ‘civilianism’ (towards a) common acceptance of integrated European interventionism, based not solely on the classical stakes of national interest, but also
on far more idealistic motivations such as humanitarianism and ethics (Howorth, 2004:212).

EU-3 embrace the range of perspectives among member states concerning security policy (Pohl, 2014:4). This diversity is captured by Mercussen et al:

British political elites have continuously considered Europe as the friendly ‘out group’, whereas German elites have seen (their) country’s own catastrophic past as ‘the other’, and the French political elites have traditionally added the US to their list of ‘others’ (Marcussen et al, 1999:616).

‘Otherness’ generally among EU-3 seems to limit a CSDP contribution to defence and strategic actorness. Two assumptions underpin this chapter. Firstly, to uphold H1, a European strategic culture must be present, or developing, and a credible strategic actor must have a strategic culture, since any substantial security policy, crisis intervention, or institution-building requires consensus among member states. Secondly, strategic actorness is fundamental to Grand Strategy. Biscop (2009) argues that the Union requires both GS and political will to deploy military force if required.

Realists claim the lack of military capability precludes the EU from having a strategic culture (Hyde-Price, 2004; Kagan, 2004). Kagan’s caricature of the Union as a homogeneous Kantian paradise averse to military responsibility and luxuriating beneath the US-NATO security umbrella provoked a robust response. Menon, et al (2004) insist the EU approach to security is based on multilateralism, international law, and building democracy using peaceful means through technical and economic support, persuasion and incentives. The Union seeks to anticipate problems and prevent them from developing into full-blown conflict. Much that the EU does regarding security goes unnoticed because nothing happens. Furthermore EU member states exhibit a range of approaches regarding force:

(Paris and Britain) think mainly if not solely in terms of military power (…) they are only too happy to deploy their armed forces abroad (…) Blair and Chirac (…) think and breathe ‘hard power’ (while) at the other end of the spectrum neutral European states such as Finland and Sweden have insisted on the development of a European capacity for peacekeeping and crisis management to reflect their own long-standing emphasis on these aspects of their foreign policy. Germany, meanwhile, sits somewhere in the middle (Menon et al, 2004:8).
France and Britain have comprehensive strategic cultures and the St Malo logic aimed to upload French and British interest in military capability to the European level, an uploading analogous to projection in Wong’s conception of Europeanisation (Wong, 2005:137). Success would require others to increase defence spending and contribute proportionally to CSDP and capacity-building, embracing the ESS ambition. British and French support for a comprehensive approach suggests continuing commitment to defence expenditure and international security (HM Government, 2010; Ministry of Defence, 2012; France Diplomatie, 2013; Elman and Terlikowski, 2013). The UK, however, retains an emphasis on sovereignty:

Defence remains a sovereign issue within the UK; the UK retains an effective veto on any new EU CSDP activity and complete control over the allocation of UK personnel to EU activity (Ministry of Defence, 2012).

While there are similarities in the French and British relationship to force, there are also differences, while Germany is an outlier among the ‘big three’. Moreover:

Iraq (…) made it painfully obvious that Europe is a heterogeneous assemblage of autonomous nation states with their own often contradictory policy preferences and traditions (Menon et al, 2004:8).

Is an EU strategic culture therefore even possible? Menon et al make a strong case, defending the European emphasis on prevention over pre-emption and multilateralism over unilateralism. They accept a range of co-existing perspectives among member states while affirming that the Union can present a unitary whole. Kagan’s Hobbesian realism is not only a poor characterisation of Europe but it misreads 21st century needs. Chapter 2 explained how the CA is much more than military capability and preparedness to use force, embracing civilian and military instruments backed by multilateral authorisation (Menon, 2008:192-3).

On this basis, and in a remarkably short time, ESDP has developed into the post-Lisbon CSDP supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the HR-VP.

Chapter 2 (p.55) noted that Gray (1999a) affirms that a security community may display different strategic cultures. Respondents for this research were unanimous that CSDP would fail without support from all the ‘big three’, which underlines the importance of considering EU-3 strategic cultures. But other factors are important including other member states’ contributions (see Chapter 4), economies of scale in times of austerity, and institutional dynamics (Chapter 5). Indeed the primary original claim in this thesis is that bureaucratic politics explains CSDP and this presents a more feasible approach towards achieving its
goals than a Grand Strategy approach, which requires member states to agree common interests and accept adaptation towards common defence. This involves a level of integration and resourcing that member states show no sign of accepting. Grand Strategy therefore seems to be an appropriate means to develop EU strategic actorness.

H1 refers to EU credibility as a strategic actor in international security. A lack of convergence between EU-3 strategic cultures would undermine this, and render CSDP almost entirely ineffective. Strategic culture analysis may reveal a more complex reality, with implications for Grand Strategy, that a European strategic culture is evident, and that despite weaknesses, CSDP is developing substance.

Following this overview of the strategic culture context, we now examine EU-3 strategic cultures, first France, then Germany, then the UK. In summary this chapter shows their evolving strategic cultures but also highly durable traits in each. Consideration of EU-3 provides only weak evidence of a common EU strategic culture and no definitive answer on whether the EU has a strategic culture.

3.2 France and strategic culture

After the end of the Cold War Yost (1993) described the Gulf War (1990-91) as a driver towards modernising French armed forces and enhancing military capability, if necessary through cooperation with European partners. The war unequivocally revealed US superiority, a cultural shock to the French political and military establishment that spurred cooperation while exposing the hubris in a presidential boast that France was the world’s third military power (Mitterrand, 1989).

Nuclear capability may have weakened France economically and strategically. In Bosnia, NATO was the main actor, with France outside the alliance Command. Minimal French engagement in the Gulf and Bosnia contrasted with the image France wished to present, so Paris sought to bolster its credentials through enhanced multilateral cooperation, a strategic culture change coinciding with the CSDP process. France accepted the need to compromise on military sovereignty in order to enhance capability, an enduring lesson for CSDP. French leadership in Artemis, rapprochement with NATO under Presidents Chirac and Sarkozy, bilateral accords with the UK, cooperation with Germany and Poland through the Weimar
initiative (Dickow et al., 2011), and interventions in Libya and Mali, suggest an evolving French strategic culture.

Howorth (2001:784) anticipated the changed consensus emerging from think tanks, committees, and media commentators, collectively driving a ‘co-ordinative discourse’, which pushes France towards European cooperation. The debate in France contrasts with a more closed defence and security culture in Britain. Pohl (2014) questions the realist assumption that Paris intended ESDP to balance US influence in Europe (Paul, 2004, 2005; Posen, 2004, 2006; Art, 2006; Jones, 2007; McNamara, 2011). More important motives were to enhance French status in Europe, and to improve collective European security capability (Everts et al., 2004), and perhaps to push European integration (Haseler, 2003).

French strategic culture is intimately linked to the policy preferences of successive Presidents. The Presidency is intensely identified with the French state. Normally states and agency need to be kept separate, but in France the two are indivisible. President Sarkozy contributed to the stabilisation of Georgia during the 2008 crisis, working closely with Javier Solana and the Finnish Presidency of the Council (Interview 1). He also sought a personal ratings benefit from the Libya crisis in 2011 (Interview 14). The President determines defence and security policy, and rivalry between Chirac and Blair underpinned their disagreement over Iraq in 2002-03 (Charillon and Wong, 2011:25).

Somewhat surprisingly, and despite apparent political differences, more French people (77 percent) than any in any other European state consider Europe and the USA to have common interests, while 75 percent of the French consider Europe and the US to share common values, compared with just 57 percent of Britons (Transatlantic Trends, 2012). This suggests popular sentiment towards the US may have shifted from entrenched Gaullism (Meyer, 2013:55).

French reintegration with NATO is part of the transformation towards European cooperation, reflecting a French realisation that ‘hanging together is preferable to hanging separately’ (Howorth, 2001). President Sarkozy sought better relations with Washington (Sarkozy, 2007) while France appeared more interested in European security architecture than at any time since the failed EDC initiative in 1954 (p.8). The Iraq dispute in 2002-3 now looks like a blip in improving Paris-Washington relations. Gaffney links the crisis to ‘constructed’ and ‘imagined’ nationhood ‘and its relation to culture, memory, and self-identity’ (Gaffney, 2004:248). He considers the French presumption of near equality with the US as a conceit related to the culture surrounding the Presidency and Chirac’s appeal to his own constituency. It coincided with his patronising chiding of Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic for signing an Anglo-Spanish letter to the *Wall Street Journal* supporting the US on Iraq (Gaffney, 2004:251-2). The letter may have been intended to undermine a European security role, but its true origins may not be known for thirty years (*Interview 25*).

Howorth highlights the deep-rooted difference between British and French security cultures in the ‘market/civil society’ distinction (Howorth, 2000:35). They also exhibit longstanding rivalry for leadership in Europe compounded by British resentment over France being central to the creation of the EEC (George, 1998). Rivalry resurfaced over Iraq with each appearing to head an Atlanticist and a European faction. France had tended to be the outrider seeking European autonomy from Washington, always an impossibility given Europe’s low defence spending and lack of defence integration. The transatlantic partnership remains a Cold War legacy and a convenience for most EU member states.

Ironically both the UK and France have failed to fully engage with Europe. France has often pushed intergovernmentalism over German-style federalism. Military and foreign affairs reflect historical rivalry: France and Britain possess Europe’s strongest militaries; both are nuclear powers and Permanent (P5) UNSC members. Their transatlantic relations have often diverged with France critical of the US and reluctant to accept security dependence. French support for European defence and security reflects latent ‘Gaullism’ (Hartley, 1972; Hoffmann, 1984/1985; Charillon and Wong, 2011). De Gaulle developed an independent nuclear deterrent and withdrew France from NATO military command in 1966. Howorth (2000) refers to French exasperation with the British assumption that NATO is a neutral organisation while Chirac sought a more independent ESDP. Bryant (2000) argues that ESDP remained conditional on French rapprochement with NATO.

Chirac sought to strengthen Europe’s role in global security by developing collective instruments, and research cooperation (Chirac, 2005, 2006). But echoes of Gaullism continued: Chirac resumed nuclear testing and opposed the invasion of Iraq; within ESDP the RD Congo *Artemis* mission was considered successful but also an example of France pursuing French interests (*Interviews 1,9*). An EUMS official alludes to French unilateralism:

> France has interests in Algeria, in Mauritania, in Mali, but until France feels that she cannot handle these interests alone she will continue to address them unilaterally (*Interview 8*).

A London-based ECFR expert argues that while France approved of the ESS and wanted it strengthened in 2008, this did not happen partly because ‘France wanted to upload (French) ideas into the ESS’ (*Interview 10*), so again French pursuit of French interests (Menon,
2009:239), but this opinion is contested. Pohl (2014:130) considers French support for EU intervention in Tchad in 2008 was based on humanitarian concerns (Le Figaro, 2007) and came after President Sarkozy had sought disengagement from Africa.

Charillon and Wong (2011) report a growing realisation that France can no longer assume primacy in foreign policy so alliances are necessary, albeit defined by French interests. Paris has tended towards a more European position to compensate for declining influence in a Union of 28 states. There has also been a marked improvement in French-US relations since 9/11, notwithstanding Iraq. Reintegration into NATO facilitated intelligence sharing. Sarkozy saw rejoining NATO command as strengthening the European voice in NATO and improving relations with Washington, while he underlined France’s central role in Europe’s contribution to global security (Sarkozy, 2009). More recently, The Economist has suggested France has become Washington’s principal European military ally (Economist, 2014), citing improved bilateral relations plus French preparedness to confront Islamic fundamentalism in the Sahel. Relations are rarely fixed: the UK Parliament voted against joining with the US in action against Syria in 2013 (New York Times, 2013) prompting Secretary of State John Kerry to contrast the UK position with support from France (Guardian, 2013a).

France resisted Single Market competition in the defence sector to protect French manufacturers, but Paris is not alone in this (Interview 10). Changes are happening: Anglo-French defence agreements (BBC News, 2010) and the Hollande Presidency’s commitment to industrial partnership and pooling and sharing indicate an inclination towards more industrial cooperation (France Diplomatie, 2013). Elman and Terlikowski (2013) affirm French determination to lead in security matters despite austerity, but enhanced cooperation suggests strategic culture convergence.

Traditional Anglo-French rivalry has not prevented bilateral cooperation. The Lancaster Gate agreements on nuclear and defence cooperation (Ministry of Defence, 2010) are potentially a profound shift, either towards European cooperation, or more plausibly they represent traditional bilateral realpolitik, only slightly related to CSDP. Other states might join in or risk marginalisation (Biscop, 2012). Paris and London probably view cooperation through different prisms, one seeing European cooperation, the other bilateral intergovernmentalism (Interview 12). Valasek (2012) reports subsequent misgivings, partly stemming from different expectations. Hollande would prefer to embrace other member states, but the Conservative-led UK coalition is more circumspect.

Despite nuclear capability, France like the UK is only a medium-sized power facing challenges in the global economy. A possible driver of nuclear compromise with Britain may
be cost concerns and relevance, as there is no obvious threat that could be deterred by nuclear sabre-rattling. Closer cooperation, burden sharing and intelligence coordination are logical responses to power deficits, spending constraints, and diffuse threats.

Paris may suspect the UK lacks commitment to CSDP, or might leave the EU altogether, a sentiment increased by the anti-EU climate in Britain (Financial Times, 2012b; BBC News, 2014). The UK’s abandonment of take-off and landing equipment that would accommodate French planes on British aircraft carriers looks like a snub: Valasek suggests the 2010 treaties are ‘in trouble’, and little from London fits Hollande’s vision of strengthening CSDP. These differences may be ideological, so enhanced Anglo-French cooperation under British Conservative and French Socialist leaderships looks unlikely.

French military intervention in Mali and the Central African Republic in 2013 reflects the view that security threats from Islamic militants must be addressed through French military action, albeit with support from the UN and African forces (World Review, 2013, 2014a; Simòn, 2013; Le Monde, 2014a). These crises did not attract a ‘boots on the ground’ response from other EU member states, or a CSDP military operation, in spite of obvious implications for EU security. Furthermore, despite the positive tone in the 2013 Livre Blanc (Présidence de la République, 2013), perhaps France has diminishing expectations of CSDP and is more interested in bilateral ties with the US (Economist, 2014).

The suspicion remains that French military intervention in Africa is governed more by economic self-interest than by commitment to fighting international terrorism (Menon, 2009:236; World Review, 2013). While President Hollande may have wished to reduce French interventionism in Africa, in fact for multiple reasons France remains deeply engaged in African security (Simòn, 2013; Economist, 2014; Le Monde, 2014b, 2015). Melly and Darracq (2013) comment that Sarkozy and Hollande have sought a more multilateral approach to Françafrique. Sending 4,000 troops to Mali in January 2013 had substantial support from the Malian government, the AU, EU and UK, and most importantly, the UN (UNSC, 2012). President Hollande has signalled respect for African states’ autonomy and support for human rights, a new dimension to French-African relations (Hollande, 2012). The 2013 Livre Blanc underlines French-African partnership in Sub-Saharan security and calls for greater EU engagement, implying criticism of European partners’ weak commitment to security in the Sahel, where CSDP is limited to the EUTM mission in Mali (Présidence de la République, 2013; Simòn, 2013). A Presidency-commissioned report criticises EU member states’ feeble contribution to European defence and the slow military development of CSDP
(Védrine, 2012), while there are strong ministerial indications of bilateral partnership between France and Germany to address security concerns in Africa (Le Drian, 2014).

The Lancaster Gate treaties, combined Anglo-French action over Libya, and limited cooperation in Mali suggests shared British and French security interests, underpinned by an economic and strategic case for partnership. This lends some support to H1 CSDP intends to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor, but bilateralism is more evident than multilateral commitment. However, perspectives can change quickly, and Heng (2012) cautions that Anglo-French relations have been cooler since Hollande entered the Elysée, but partnership is evident across a range of foreign policy issues (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013).

Security and defence Livres Blancs offer significant guidance on evolving French strategic culture. The 1972 version was primarily concerned with a Soviet enemy, 1994 with nuclear deterrent, while the 2008 edition:

recognises that France’s national security is inextricably interdependent on external factors (and) globalisation now shapes international relations (Fiott, 2008:5).

It contained only one reference to ESDP, appearing more interested in Europeanising NATO than boosting ESDP. It identified similar threats to the ESS, namely international terrorism, ballistic missile attacks, cyber attacks and environmental and health crises. It referred to European ambition, including an intervention capability of 60,000 soldiers, an ability to sustain two or three peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions as well as several civilian operations, a European planning and operations capability, and a better integrated European defence industry (Présidence de la République, 2008). These were all ESDP ambitions, so the paper suggests convergence with ESDP. A Brussels-based military expert describes it as ‘a civil-military document, concerned with security, not only with defence’ (Interview 5). It is striking however that the 2013 Livre Blanc shows stronger commitment to CSDP and frustration at the low levels of defence spending by European allies (Présidence de la République, 2013), even as France too reduces its expenditure (Simòn, 2013).

Both the 2008 and 2013 versions testify to better Franco-American relations. The former supports European collaboration in space research through a cyber-defence agency, the CERES satellite system, and the Multinational Space-based Imaging System to replace older generation instruments in France, Germany and Italy. French space ambitions, according to Fiott, have a clear European dimension but may be compromised by
competitive rivalry, especially between France and Germany, and between the EU and the US (Fiott, 2008:9-10).

Sarkozy sought to make France more relevant to the US and to raise its international profile as a security actor, with full reintegration into NATO and deployment of 700 French troops in Afghanistan under NATO’s ISAF. Paris also endorsed US plans to station missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Hollande has consolidated this rapprochement (Economist, 2014) while the 2013 Livre Blanc unequivocally supports CSDP and calls for European defence, both complementary to NATO interests (Biscop, 2012), a perspective shared by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen (Le Monde, 2013a). It emphasises the need for European cooperation in satellite surveillance technology, and intelligence equipment, including UAVs. It also confirms falling defence spending and personnel cuts, partly due to changing from large land armies to intelligent preventive use of armed forces (Simòn, 2013). However Simòn warns of the dangerous assumption that austerity and reduced spending, currently $62.3m and 2.2 percent of GDP (SIPRI, 2014), can be compensated by increased cooperation.

Development between the 2008 and 2013 Livres Blancs is instructive. Fiott comments that peacemaking and crisis management require adequately trained civilian personnel and that civil-military operations depend on the interoperability of troops and civilian staff. Effective CCM requires unity ‘between all European Council and Commission instruments, capabilities and resources’ (Fiott, 2008:10). The 2008 version makes scant reference to these requirements but the 2013 edition is unequivocal, calling for a new commitment to CSDP, indicating evolution in French strategic culture towards European interest, and disappointment with others’ contributions.

In a significant remark concerning strategic culture, an SWP expert commented that France and Britain sought to upload their preferences to the European level, bilaterally developing a rapid response concept to deal with crises, and urging others to join the process. Rapid response depends on capability ‘so transformation of armed forces was placed firmly on the agenda’ (Interview 22), echoing the developing defence dimension inside CFSP (Howorth, 2005). Franco-British bilateralism from St Malo onwards is a pragmatic effort to boost multilateral force projection capability. It requires multistate participation, burden-sharing, collective instruments, cost benefits, enhanced effectiveness and influence, so it closely matches European Defence Agency aspirations (EDA, 2013, 2014a, 2014b).

This attempted ‘uploading’ however is not to create supranational institutions. It reflects ‘intergovernmental coordination’ or ‘co-ordination’ (see p.49 above) (Howorth, 2007:32), or
defence policy transference through horizontal channels leading to convergence (Mérand, 2008; Mérand et al, 2011). Such processes are central to developing a European strategic culture and suggest how the EU could become more strategic. This approach is confirmed by the French Defence Minister in the context of Weimar cooperation with Germany and Poland (Le Drian, 2015).

In conclusion, changes in French strategic culture are not straightforwardly a case of becoming Europeanised. Support for CSDP reflects France’s mission and responsibility to contribute to international security (de Villepin, 2002), underlined in recent Livres Blancs (Simòn, 2013). French and British strategic cultures are comfortable with power projection (Menon et al, 2004; Simòn, 2013). French NATO re-orientation consolidates closer relations with the US, while bilateralism involving the UK and Poland strengthens European cooperation. French interests remain uppermost, underpinned by pragmatism over reduced status despite nuclear ‘autonomy’. French strategic culture has clearly evolved since St Malo, with more partnerships, burden-sharing, and multilateralism, all reflecting the CSDP process. France is a major CSDP mission contributor (see Chapter 6), heavily oriented towards the band from the Horn of Africa to the Sahel, an area Paris regards as Europe’s near-abroad (Simòn, 2013). Key declarations (Chirac, 2005; Sarkozy, 2009; Hollande, 2012; Présidence de la République, 2013; Melly and Darracq, 2013) reflect multilateralism and a European orientation but this should not be overstated. The evolving French strategic culture suggests only weak support for H1 and EU credibility as a strategic actor, as post-Iraq, France edges towards closer cooperation with the USA (Economist, 2014).

3.3 Germany and strategic culture

Germany has traditionally been the strongest advocate of non-military solutions to security threats, a consequence of its demilitarisation following the Second World War (Chappell, 2012:51). Rearmament occurred within constitutional, NATO and European structures, with strict limitations on the use of force. After the Cold War and criticism of German non-engagement in the Gulf War, adjustments to the Basic Law allowed out-of-area deployment within multilateral forces providing humanitarian relief. Germany considered ESDP:

a decisive step towards Europe’s deeper integration and enhanced capacity for action in security matters. The goal is a European Security and Defence Union as part of a fully developed Political Union (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2003:11).
This unequivocal integrationary ambition demonstrates significant development in Germany’s ‘Europeanised’ strategic culture (Chappell, 2012:97), and commitment to foreign policy cooperation with neighbouring countries, in particular the Weimar Triangle with France and Poland (Federal Foreign Office, 2014; Dickow et al, 2011). Far-reaching changes include Bundeswehr professionalisation in 2011 and reductions in armed forces personnel from 240,000 to 185,000 (Guardian, 2012a). But capability and spending limitations mean Germany lags behind France and Britain (Wagner, 2006). Multilateralism is fundamental to German strategic culture (Buras and Longhurst, 2004). An SWP expert comments:

There’s still a strong commitment (to European security and defence policy), the rhetoric hasn’t changed. Germany is fundamentally European and the principles are the same: never alone, always multilateral, civilian-led and all together in preventative action. This is the German strategic culture and on this basis Germany will cooperate. There’s still a gap between rhetoric and capability (Interview 22).

However, weak expenditure undermines the ‘strong commitment’ also underlined by a former German defence minister (de Maizière, 2013). Wagner (2006) says Germany has gone from ESDP leadership to laggard, as domestic antipathy inhibits security engagement. A CMPD military officer somewhat improbably asserts that ‘(Germany) has no strategic culture’ (Interview 9), revealing more about the interviewee’s traditional interpretation of strategic culture than whether Germany has one. A former Venusberg think tank member says ‘Germany lacks ambition in this area’ (Interview 14), because security or defence is an electoral liability despite growing acceptance of international responsibility. A former SPD member of the Grand Coalition of 2002-06 remarks on the lack of popular debate:

The SPD want a debate on security and defence (...) but while Europeanising security and defence policy is okay for the SPD it’s not okay for German society which still doesn’t really want any security and defence policy of any kind. It’s not a topic of much interest in German society (Interview 24).

This is reflected in low defence spending and indicates how far Germany has to travel before it can act as a ‘normal’ state and contribute fully to international security.

The core problem is the lack of substantial public support for a stronger German engagement in global security affairs (...) Germans are (not) categorically against a stronger international role (but) the majority perceives domestic issues to be more pressing. What is more, when their country does become active in global security
affairs, public opinion is much more supportive if the engagement is non-military such as disaster relief (Brummer, 2008).

While this is especially marked in Germany due to the enduring shadow of Nazism, antipathy towards hard power is a common across Europe. Defence spending among European NATO members is 1.6 percent of GDP, compared with 4.5 percent in the US and Canada (SIPRI, 2014).

Germany has never been a force behind CSDP but its support after St Malo raised expectations and reflected an evolving German strategic culture (Wagner, 2006). Engagement is vital, and Berlin’s commitment to the comprehensive approach is unequivocal (Federal Foreign Office, 2009); but unlike in the economic sphere, Germany cannot provide leadership (Interview 22). ‘Normalisation’ of German foreign policy continues, but is constrained by history:

German strategic culture is profoundly rooted in 20th Century experience. Germany was most clearly and directly dependent on the US for military protection post-1949, and from that position the Federal Republic developed a strategic culture that verged on the pacifist (Sedivy and Zaborovsky, 2004).

Unlike France, Germany had no qualms about American military protection, welcoming US military presence as a guarantee against Soviet expansionism. Even since 1991 Germany has seemed reluctant to sever the umbilical cord. Nevertheless Schröder sided with France over Iraq, an indication perhaps of Germany’s ‘growing up’, freed from dependency on its American protector.

Germany’s multilateral, restraint-based and consensus-oriented strategic culture could hardly support US pre-emptive action in Iraq, especially with Joschka Fischer of the Green Party as Foreign Minister. But while the Schröder-led coalition opposed the US over Iraq it did so even as the dominant security culture in Germany was changing (Buras and Longhurst, 2004), echoing the French situation. Schröder’s bold defence of German interests and his attempt to talk to the US on equal terms sits oddly with ‘the state of German foreign and security policy resources (especially the defence budget)’ (ibid, 244). While doing little for German credibility in this area it failed to reassure a sceptical public. Nor did it precipitate Berlin abandoning its Atlanticist preferences, as Haseler (2003) anticipated.

The new ‘Berlin Republic’ has been more internationally-minded, edging towards normalising external relations. German armed forces served with NATO in Bosnia, Kosovo and
Afghanistan, and have deployed in EUFOR DC Congo and EU NAVFOR Atalanta, reflecting changes in German strategic culture (Interview 24).

Germany has gone from a special case to a normal military. It used to be an outlier. Now it is still one of the more reluctant countries in Europe to deploy force, but it's no longer off the charts (Valasek, 2012).

A CIVCOM official gives a striking example of changing strategic culture:

In 2006 Germany sent troops to the Lebanese border with Israel despite all the history in that decision, so these are huge steps beyond the dominant strategic culture (...) over decades. So Germany has moved much closer to a French or UK position on force projection (Interview 6).

This represents a sea change from the Cold War when ‘Germany avoided a strategic culture’ (Interview 24). Germany now contributes to multilateral engagements, although public debate remains minimal. Pacifism endures with military interventions looking like exceptions that prove the rule (Bittner, 2013).

Keller (2012) reports both German elite and public fear of ‘overstretch’ in terms of what the west can achieve in the security context, a concern born out of experience from engagement in Afghanistan where Germany has been a major contributor, but where ambitions have been considerably downgraded.

The normalisation trend in foreign policy ought to suggest convergence between Germany and France and support for H1 since German commitment is a prerequisite for CSDP (enhancing) the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor. But none of this automatically translates into deploying armed forces, or strategic actorness (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010a), though it would be a step in this direction. In 2006 France wanted Germany to send soldiers to DR Congo, but it was absolutely not what Berlin wanted (Interview 25), fearing ‘entrapment’ through an obligation to deploy into conflict zones. In November 2008 Germany and Britain declined to send a Battlegroup to DR Congo (Interview 1) and France criticised German reluctance to join a French-sponsored EU military mission to Darfur (Lichfield and Paterson, 2008). These disputes illustrate ESDP’s declining momentum after 2007 (Interview 25). Biscop (2012:1305) comments that by 2009, CSDP had ‘run out of speed’. German reticence contrasted with rhetorical commitment to CSDP (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2011). Foreign Minister Westerwelle emphasised a preference for NATO evolving into a political community based on values, and therefore convergence between NATO and EU strategic cultures (Westerwelle, 2010).
An EDA official highlights differences within the political class that belie the notion of common policy. Referring to Europeanist-Transatlanticist tensions, he reports a Europeanised German Foreign Ministry favourable to French preferences and a traditional pro-NATO Ministry of Defence - ‘(NATO) will continue to be the cornerstone of Germany’s future security and defence policy’ (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006:4) - with few civilian staff, reluctant to engage even with the EDA, and partial to local protectionism, suggesting that the political view says one thing, but in practice there is a lack of progress due to prevailing industrial interests (Interview 7). This difference in ministry perspectives is reported by Jacobs (2012). The proposed BAE-EADS merger broke down in 2012 partly due to German Defence Ministry obstructionism (Financial Times, 2012c; Guardian, 2012a; World Review, 2012), surely harming the prospect of a strategic CSDP, and undermining H1. Local preferences may apply in other member states with significant defence industries (Nones, 2000; Fishpool, 2008).

The suggested different perspectives between German foreign and defence ministries are not clear-cut. There has been substantial adaptation by the MoD, including Bundeswehr reform, a close EU-NATO partnership (de Maizière, 2013), and a threat identification closely matching the ESS and the Report on its Implementation (European Council, 2008; Federal Ministry of Defence, 2011). Chappell (2012:83) emphasises continuing constraints on military action and where deployment occurs, in Kosovo and Afghanistan for example, it is primarily through NATO.

A Brussels military expert identifies evolution in German strategic culture:

Germany has moved from its old position. No state can entirely absent itself from this process, and Germany above all knows this. It has to take responsibility, the Balkan crisis showed this. Now Germany is present in CSDP (and NATO) operations, but Germany and German governments have to move slowly, but they are moving (Interview 5).

This underlines the impossibility of German leadership but clear accommodation with a European strategic culture. German security is deeply embedded within multilateral organisations, the EU, NATO and the UN, with a profound commitment to purposes of humanitarian relief (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2011). German strategic culture, like that of France, is undergoing rapid development including accepting a role in international strategic policy-making (Koelbl, 2005; Shepherd, 2014).
The 2006 and 2011 Defence White Papers (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006, 2011) identify similar threats to the ESS (*Interview* 14). In October 2006 the German cabinet approved *Bundeswehr* participation ‘in crisis management missions to right humanitarian wrongs’ (Howorth, 2007:206), but troop deployment remained controversial. All German governments encounter deep electoral opposition to military intervention. One respondent reflected that Sarkozy could expect some popularity uplift for sending aircraft into action over Libya, but this simply cannot happen in Germany:

> You can easily find majority support to send 200 soldiers on a transport mission to Africa (...) but when it comes to sending 200 soldiers on a combat mission in the Mediterranean then it’s clearly worlds apart (*Interview* 14).

The German population is highly resistant to armed intervention, especially in Africa (Brummer, 2013), but German troops remained part of the European contribution to the UN-sanctioned ISAF Afghanistan operation, and Chancellor Merkel agreed to send 250 troops to Mali to support the French Serval Operation (*Le Monde*, 2014c, 2014d; von der Leyen, 2014). The political class is ahead of the public in the normalisation process, although people are more tolerant of military engagement, and not just for peacekeeping. A Transatlantic Trends (2012) survey showed a majority of Germans polled supported intervention in Libya, but respondents were not asked if they approved of their government’s decision not to participate. Borger (2012) reports Chancellor Merkel and her foreign minister’s calculation that deployment would go down badly just before regional elections. The survey also showed that 75 percent of Germans think the US and Europe share common values, a similar figure to French opinion, and indicative perhaps of growing acceptance of burden-sharing in a globalising world. However a *Die Zeit* commentary argues that the humanitarian, multilateral and UN-authorised case for German engagement in Libya was unassailable, yet no deployment happened (Bittner, 2013). Reluctance to engage forces persists despite promises of a more proactive military contribution to international security (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006). Arguably the Libya example suggests a gap between stated policy and actual willingness to deploy forces to volatile situations. Humanitarian intervention is acceptable but military participation aimed at regime change as in Libya remains a step too far (*Interview* 14). Keller (2012) reports increasing antipathy to force deployment, but Shepherd (2014) detects an understanding in political circles that Germany should play a bigger role in CSDP which will benefit German and European interests.

German engagement with CSDP remains discreet, and claims of an evolving strategic culture should not be exaggerated, especially as change has slowed since Lisbon. A UK-
based expert says public reluctance to accept out-of-area responsibilities means Germany has not become a ‘normal’ state, and refers to the resignation of President Köhler in 2010 ‘because he was honest about what the German army was doing in Afghanistan’. He describes him as a:

victim of a political culture, not a strategic culture. Germany finds it extremely difficult to make the change from a political culture to a strategic culture (Interview 3).

Köhler’s resignation followed a misunderstanding in an interview where he was referring not directly to German troops in Afghanistan, but to keeping shipping lanes open off Somalia through the EU NAVFOR anti-piracy mission. The MP Denis MacShane said Köhler was:

voicing a self-evident truth that German military power was now a manifestation of German national interests (MacShane, in Guardian, 2010a).

So despite shifts in German strategic culture and out-of-area deployment, popular sentiment still lags, especially where the media can stir reaction. Reluctance to accept military engagement reflects how Germany, and not only Germany, has sheltered under NATO, avoiding debate about security and defence. It has, according to some, avoided a strategic culture, but this depends upon the definition: respondents for this research interpret the term differently, some arguing that Germany had no strategic culture before ESDP, others that German strategic culture evaporated after the Cold War. Neither view seems tenable: Cold War Germany had a soft power strategic culture that was US- and NATO-dependent. Since St Malo German strategic culture has remained rooted in civilian and normative power but is increasingly comprehensive, prepared to deploy armed forces in internationally sanctioned multilateral CCM. This could contribute to greater EU strategic actorness, strengthening H1.

Strategic culture can range from pacifist to aggressively militarist. Clearly no EU or NATO state presents at either extreme. Germany has always had a strategic culture, and practices regarding force include non-use as well as use. Germany’s evolving strategic culture has been accompanied by constitutional change and attitudinal shifts especially among political elites. There has been some commitment to partnership in CSDP missions, in Battlegroup preparation, and in accepting an EU security role, but Federal Ministry communiqués affirm the centrality of NATO to security and defence (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006, 2011, 2013c). The 2011 statement is a comprehensive commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, to a European role in international security, and to CSDP and European integration. But German non-participation in Libya shortly afterwards suggests a lack of actorness. Like the wider EU, official rhetoric exceeds engagement:
One of the primary goals of German security policy is the strengthening of the European area of stability through the consolidation and development of European integration and the European Union’s active neighbourhood policy with the states of Eastern Europe, the southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean region (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2013a).

The Arab Spring and the Libyan crisis however brought no CSDP response. A DGAP expert said Foreign Minister Fischer was an important figure in the Grand Coalition in moving ESDP forward, wanting Germany to accept international responsibility, and to develop a strategic culture, not just for Germany, but for Europe, a view backed by Bittner (2013). But after 2007 progress slowed. Germany has, according to this respondent, a business culture, not a strategic culture. This could determine the future of CSDP, as Germany is ‘the tipping country’ for the initiative, and the euro crisis is turning the continent away from strategy (Interview 25). Germany’s status, underlined by the financial crisis, is as a ‘geo-economic power’ (Kundnani, 2011; Szabo, 2015) within which there is a ‘strategic vacuum’ and loss of interest in foreign affairs, a risk increased by Berlin’s leadership role in confronting economic crisis (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011:536).

This is a frightening prospect as business and the ‘executivisation’ of politics diminishes the role of foreign policy actors: ‘geo-economics (is) replacing geopolitics’ (Szabo, 2015:137). Worse, this expert thinks clever people go into business, trade, and the global economy, not politics and foreign affairs. The entire CSDP effort is threatened by its diminished status, and not only because of the euro crisis. This weakens the Europeanisation of German strategic culture and the evolution of a European strategic culture. Continuing reluctance to deploy force in crisis situations such as Libya, or even Syria, and the reduced 2012 Defence budget of €31.87bn (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2013b) hints at an ongoing lack of actorness on the part of Germany and across the EU.

A loss of momentum in consolidating a comprehensive as opposed to an overwhelmingly soft power strategic culture undermines strategic actorness. A lack of coherence in German strategic culture is underlined by inadequate capability enhancement (Wagner, 2006). Rhetoric exceeds capability as investment remains weak, despite Bundeswehr reform (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2012).

If Germany abandons its quest for a strategic and proactive CSDP, the initiative is likely to suffer benign neglect and fail. The rhetoric implies a comprehensive European security culture but this is not backed by deeds or spending. This seems a dramatic, but plausible assessment to which the thesis returns in the conclusion. The German approach to foreign
policy is embedded in a European rhetoric according to Daehnhardt (2011), but increasingly this is motivated by efforts to align EU initiatives with German interests. Daehnhardt argues that Berlin pushes German interests, consistent with the Lisbon Treaty reinforcing member state power and unanimity for key decisions. She suggests that Europeanisation ‘can easily go into reverse’ (ibid, 54).

German strategic culture remains in a state of flux. Germany seems not to have assimilated a ‘full range of instruments’ strategic culture. Like others, Berlin engages in case-by-case assessment, and exercises extreme caution over military deployment. This remains the most civilian of strategic cultures. German military deployments since 1994 suggest a changed strategic culture, but as one Berlin-based expert commented, continuity is also evident as Longhurst (2004:73) and Bittner (2013) also insist, while Shepherd (2014) detects subtle shifts towards greater engagement under the post-2013 coalition, despite Chancellor Merkel’s reticence concerning military solutions to security challenges. She has consistently emphasised that military stabilising measures should go hand in hand with political and civilian processes (Merkel, 2008a, 2008b, 2009). Germany faces the same challenge as all others: how to organise security and defence policy to best meet contemporary threats. While soft power remains central to German security strategy, military deployment within a multinational force with UN authorisation is at least possible.

Since St Malo, CSDP reflects an uploading of German strategic culture to the EU level, ‘civilianising’ the aspiration for autonomous defence (Howorth and Menon, 2009). With more assertive German influence, CSDP emphasises soft power within the CA, rather than the defence capability and autonomy envisaged at the outset (Daehnhardt, 2011). Military actorness is strictly limited and Libya showed continuing European capability deficiencies (Biscop, 2012).

Germany’s civilianising effect on CSDP is striking, but this has failed to deliver adequate civilian let alone military resources. The signs are of balancing between Paris and London together, and Berlin, but a balancing that threatens the future of CSDP. Berlin’s approach is not one of leadership, but it certainly has influence.

As regards H1 **CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor**, German strategic culture offers little support. If the Germany as ‘geo-economic power’ thesis gains traction then CSDP may lose all momentum. German ‘normalisation’ of security and defence policy has not really happened, despite a CA that could eventually contribute strategic actorness. Germany has always supported European integration but the euro crisis and Germany’s emergence as a reluctant hegemon and a geo-economic power (Kundnani,
2011) could have serious implications. In security and defence Berlin cannot offer leadership:

The mood is that there should be leadership from Paris and London, they have a global presence and are used to an international role, but here in Germany the mood is that we have the major economic role, so that’s enough. I prefer the French way, which is based on an understanding of a French cultural, military and economic role, while in Germany it's just the economic role that we have. But we should be closer to France in other spheres too, not just economy (Interview 24).

German reluctance to spend more on defence may have tempered Anglo-French ambitions and hampered capability development. After significant shifts in German strategic culture under Schröder, Chancellor Merkel's administration paid scant attention to security and defence as the euro crisis remained centre-stage, before and after federal elections in September 2013.

German strategic culture suggests a paradox. Germany may have Europeanised its strategic culture, but its basic tenets remain unchanged: restraint, deterrence, stability and anti-militarism. The civilianisation of the St Malo ambition may have been welcomed by others, ironically even by Britain (see below). This is not leadership, but a determination not simply to acquiesce in others’ preferences.

Germany can accept the CA and has moved towards the 'toolbox' that includes armed force but rather than develop a Europeanised common strategic culture Berlin asserts its right not to follow a French lead on Libya, or raise its defence expenditure above 1.4 percent of GDP, $49.3m (SIPRI, 2014).

There is some convergence towards France in accepting out-of-area deployment, participation in multinational military operations like ATALANTA, and in the professionalisation of the Bundeswehr. But NATO remains the cornerstone of German defence, underlining the split between the S and D in CSDP. But this is apparent among all member states. Despite references to common defence in all core declarations (Fig.1.2, p.14), this remains ‘over the horizon’ if present at all, as CSDP is a CCM instrument. Despite rhetorical support for CSDP, low defence spending and reluctance to deploy troops suggests low commitment to CSDP actorness. German strategic culture is evolving but its key tenets remain constant, so support for H1 from the German example is minimal.
3.4 United Kingdom and strategic culture

British historical reserve towards Europe meant governments eschewed foreign policy integration, preferring a confederal, intergovernmental arrangement, protective of sovereignty. At Maastricht John Major celebrated the removal of the word ‘federal’ from the TEU (Bruges Group, 1997) but Koslowski (1999) points out that not even the USA Constitution contains this word, so Major’s ‘victory’ was somewhat Pyrrhic. The British preference for an association of sovereign states is well established (Thatcher, 1988; Major, 1994; Blair, 1997; Brown, 1997, 2005; Cameron, 2013) and reminiscent of De Gaulle’s *Europe des patries* (Grant, 2011). While France ‘Europeanised’ under Mitterrand, no equivalent process occurred in Britain. The latent ‘problem’ with Europe affects UK strategic culture, as Britain resists European encroachment and is largely hostile to pooling resources.

Britain has always been committed to NATO, is a nuclear power and full partner to the US in the ‘special relationship’ (Woolner, 2011; Ministry of Defence, 2006) which includes close UK-US defence industrial cooperation. ‘The UK still prefers the NATO lead’ (*Interview 22*) despite a decade of ESDP, as confirmed in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) (HM Government, 2010).

Prime Minister Blair, co-initiator of the ESDP process, maintained commitment to Britain’s global security role (Blair, 2011). St Malo, far from being a dramatic shift towards European defence, was viewed from London as a means to boost NATO (Shepherd, 2003). Compared with France and Germany, UK strategic culture seems less susceptible to change. It consists of two core tenets. First, ‘global responsibilities and global ambitions’ (HM Government, 2010:3) and second, the ‘pre-eminence defence and security relationship with the US’ (*ibid*, 58), principles underlined by Blair (2011:411), his successor, Gordon Brown (2007), and Defence Minister Hammond in the Conservative-led coalition government (Hammond, 2012). The UK remains Atlanticist but bilateral cooperation with France, designed to save money, has had marginal impact on EU security initiatives and strategic culture. This bilateralism may undermine collective European efforts and others’ willingness to engage in a process that may appear to others as dominated by Anglo-French interests.

Keetch (2004) stresses the US-orientation of UK defence interests, while Wallace (2005) considers the UK-US relationship imbalanced, based on a flawed premise: a UK not properly integrated inside European structures is of less interest to pragmatic and utilitarian US administrations than every UK government since Churchill has imagined. Hofmann
comments that ‘(Blair’s) determination to give wholehearted support to the United States over Iraq (...) scuppered his own St Malo initiative’ (Hofmann, 2003:19).

The SDSR commits the UK to the NATO target of two percent of GDP defence expenditure and retaining the world’s fourth largest defence budget (HM Government, 2010). It refers to bilateral relationships and alliances wherever appropriate, the Lancaster Gate treaties being significant examples. Pannier (2013) sees the defence cooperation treaty as indicative of closer cooperation through epistemic communities, noting that while France is interested in European defence, the UK focuses on transatlanticism, so perspectives from Paris and London differ, a view which supports interview opinion (Interviews 1,3,4,11,12), and evidenced by MoD papers on the UK’s nuclear deterrent that do not even mention France (Ministry of Defence, 2006, 2013). Harries (2012) comments that nuclear cooperation between Britain and France is based on economic pragmatism, and London would not pursue this at the expense of its intimate nuclear relationship with the USA.

St Malo (SMD, 1998) and CSDP generally, the SDSR (HM Government, 2010) and Lancaster Gate treaties (Ministry of Defence, 2010) all suggest EU-level cooperation, but they also represent traditional British pragmatism rather than ideological conversion. This is consistent with UK foreign policy since 1945. London’s default position is American primacy:

while the UK is prepared to Europeanise those elements of its national strategic culture which are compatible with NATO, it is not prepared seriously to adapt when this is not the case (Howorth, 2007:189).

British strategic culture has accommodated a pragmatic interest in CSDP, engagement in CCM, and a closer partnership with France. This has brought deeper engagement with European initiatives, but it represents continuity rather than revolution in strategic culture. A senior EDA official summarises the UK position as ‘still the outrider’ (Interview 7). There remains more than a hint of semi-detachment, especially post-Lisbon, as the UK appears less inclined to upload its preferences, instead going cool on the whole enterprise (Hoffmann, 2003; O’Donnell, 2011a; Biscop, 2012). The vision appears to favour CSDP without defence, so avoiding any sovereignty implications.

The SDSR emphasises partnership with international institutions, including the UNSC, NATO, OSCE, IAEA, EU, and G20, and bilateral relations with the regional associations ASEAN, the AU and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The UK, like France, is a medium-sized power, but given the historical ties, British governments are unlikely to act in foreign and security terms without considering American preferences. By comparison, relations with
France are merely pragmatic, oriented towards low ambition missions and some defence partnering in equipment, and it would appear, after the 2010 treaties, in nuclear weapons. This does not indicate a Europeanised strategic culture. France features as one half of a functional relationship between fellow members of the Western alliance, albeit the most important among European allies, and the one perceived as a status rival, given similar defence spending, nuclear capability, limited force projection, and self-image as a global power. London however wants Washington to know that CSDP can benefit NATO, now including full French participation, so the 2010 Treaties are consistent with UK transatlanticism. An MoD official reports:

The view between London and Paris is a grown-up one, informed by pragmatism; in every instance pragmatism will underpin policy (Interview 12).

Pragmatism underpins UK support for ESDP after 2003. A government report praised the EU’s stabilisation achievements in Bosnia (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2007), while a Select Committee commentary included ministerial statements on the benefits of ESDP to security (Parliament UK, 2008), particularly concerning the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 approved by the PSC in 2004 (Council of the European Union, 2004). UK pragmatism can bring progress even concerning defence:

The military are pragmatic and see cooperation as a way to secure relevance. The political shift is slower, maybe it takes three or four years, but the movement in the current (Coalition) government is striking (Interview 12).

The SDSR shows significant alignment with European thinking, especially in relation to threat. This represents an important if under-remarked shift in UK strategic culture towards a more European position, essential to strategic actoriness. But UK strategic culture remains global in both ambition and practice, reflecting acceptance of force projection capability, like France (Interview 6). The SDSR says more than one might expect about the EU, defining:

member of the EU as a key part of our international engagement and a means of promoting prosperity and security in the European neighbourhood. The common security interests of the member states are served when they use their collective weight in the world to promote their shared interests and values including on major foreign policy security concerns. The EU's ability to integrate civilian and military responses coherently will become increasingly important. (HM Government, 2010:61).
The EU is just one of many international organisations through which Britain plays a security-related role, principal among which is NATO. But the quote above, from a government led by a Eurosceptic Conservative Party, is remarkably integrationist, perhaps reflecting input from the paper’s co-signatory, Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minister and former MEP, Nick Clegg. Furthermore the SDSR supports EU enlargement to promote stability, and mentions the EEAS role in conflict prevention, and EU civilian and military missions, including the NAVFOR Atalanta anti-piracy mission (Ibid). UK governments regularly express support for enlargement (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012). The SDSR also supports the EU use of Northwood as an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) and cooperation with other member states to enhance CIV-MIL capabilities, energy security, efforts to disrupt terrorist funding, and measures to combat international crime.

This might imply a more Europeanist approach, an evolving European strategic culture, and even the strategic actorness in H1, but caveats apply. First, Aktipis and Oliver (2011) report that substantive institutional developments such as EU Battlegroups, EDA and EU Operational headquarters were mostly Franco-German initiatives initially resisted by London. Lindlay-French (2010) suggests the Lancaster Gate treaties are stronger on rhetoric than on commitment to capability improvements, and Valasek (2012) reports cooling British enthusiasm for the accords and French frustration at British prevarication over aircraft carrier technology. Nevertheless there are signs of closer cooperation with Paris over procurement, nuclear technology, Libya, Mali, and commitment to partnership in global security matters (Guardian, 2011; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013).

The second caveat concerns the claim that UK strategic culture underwent a change towards pre-emptive intervention during Tony Blair’s premiership (Heng, 2012). While Blair supported humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and Sierra Leone in 2000, he also supported pre-emptive military operations against potential attack from Iraq (Blair, 2011:412-13). Pre-emption was part of the American NSS (White House, 2002). This represented a sea change from the non-interventionism of Blair’s predecessor John Major, especially in relation to the Bosnian War of 1992-5 (Simms, 2002). Blair repositioned UK strategic culture as proactive and interventionist, consistent with US preferences post-9/11, and more inclined towards military intervention than the CCM that would prevail as CSDP developed. Indeed CSDP is criticised for being reactive rather than proactive (Witney, 2008; Asseburg and Kemptin, 2009; Menon, 2009; Howorth, 2009, 2010; Biscop, 2009, 2013a; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010a, 2011a; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Simón, 2011; Kupchan, 2012). So Blair’s repositioning of UK strategic culture at St Malo, regarded as a Rubicon crossing (Howorth, 2000:34, 2007:30), was overtaken by a ‘reverse crossing’ that consolidated UK
Atlanticism within a few years. This U-turn followed a remarkably Europeanist Anglo-French Summit at Le Touquet in February 2003 where President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair signalled their intention to pool defence capabilities and set up a European armaments agency, the idea that precipitated the EDA (BBC News, 2003).

Howorth argues that Blair’s St Malo commitment was not Europeanist zeal but stemmed from American pressure ‘as a result of historical forces unleashed by the end of the Cold War’ (Howorth, 2007:30). It did not seem so at the time, but given Blair’s engagement with the American cause throughout his premiership, Howorth’s assessment looks correct. This highlights the consistency of UK post-Cold War strategic culture. St Malo is less than the Damascene conversion sometimes portrayed but it enabled a more open, multilateral transatlantic dialogue on security (Howorth, 2007). British governments have wanted a CSDP shaped by transatlanticist preferences and have backed the process in so far as it benefits NATO. Once it became apparent that others were unwilling to boost defence spending, British interest waned (O’Donnell, 2011a; Biscop, 2012).

The 2010 SDSR is unconvincing regarding enhanced capability. An ECFR expert in London says it casts doubt on whether the UK even has a strategic culture ‘other than a concern to play some kind of important global role and that we like our armed forces’ (Interview 10). Even the second part of this statement is questionable as the Review sanctions significant cuts in troop numbers and resources, creating anxiety in all three armed forces (Telegraph, 2012a, 2012b). The Minister of Defence used a NATO platform to argue for multilateral pooling and sharing, but without referring to CSDP (Hammond, 2012; Biscop, 2012).

While the UK has relatively high defence expenditure, it fell from $63.6bn in 2011 to $56.2m in 2013, 2.3 percent of GDP (SIPRI, 2014). High spending permitted major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the brief but successful UK-only operation in Sierra Leone in 2000. Reduced expenditure and force reductions in 2012-13 challenge the notion that Britain can maintain its ‘global responsibilities and global ambitions’ (HM Government, 2010; Ministry of Defence, 2012; Interview 10).

The SDSR strongly criticised the previous government’s perceived neglect of the armed forces, and signalled a modernisation of capability, savings through rationalisation, and investment in equipment. The Coalition government delayed a decision on renewing the Trident Nuclear Weapons system, although the Minister of Defence appeared to pre-empt Liberal Democrat reservations by signalling the intention to replace Trident over a thirty-year period (Guardian, 2012c). Two UK respondents consider Trident irrelevant to contemporary security needs (Interviews 2,26) while a third expressed support for its renewal (Interview
10). The issue remains controversial (BBC News, 2013; Parliament UK, 2014) but has never been incorporated into debate about CSDP, as if nuclear defence has no relationship to a crisis management instrument with primarily civilian orientation, an assumption widely rejected by interviewees for this study who hold a comprehensive and long-term perspective.

UK strategic culture should be interpreted through the lens of the overall UK conception of Europe and European integration. Marcussen et al (1999:618) describe the British as ‘liberal nationalist’, privileging national sovereignty over federalist or integrationary objectives. This has established a strong sense of identity in the British polity, reflected in the description of Britain as an ‘awkward partner’ in Europe (George, 1998; Gifford, 2010). This has been reinforced recently, leading to suspicion that Britain may even quit the Union altogether (Observer, 2012; Financial Times, 2012b, 2013a; Sundberg and Zetterluld, 2013; Terlikowski, 2013; Kempin and Mawdsley, 2013; Simòn, 2013). The ‘awkward partner’ reputation is consolidated by such speculation, by the official position of the leading party in government (Conservative Party, 2010), by Prime Minister Cameron’s demands for ‘repatriation of powers’ from Brussels, and his non-compliance with the EU fiscal pact in 2011-12 (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2013:30-31). In addition, the anti-EU UK Independence Party won the European Parliament elections in 2014 (BBC News, 2014; Independent, 2014a; 2014b). The anti-integration mood surely undermines any prospective European orientation for UK strategic culture.

The longer a narrative remains unchallenged, the more entrenched become the related myths (Marcussen et al, 1999:630). The assumption that Britain is a global power, a major international player and the key partner to the USA, has endured across the political elite. Partnership with Europe gets little mention in a mostly hostile press, where 11 of 19 daily and Sunday newspapers are on the Eurosceptic right, with 21 million from a total 26 million circulation (Peak and Fisher, 1997:45).

Several newspapers laud Britain’s military strength and belittle European pretensions to a security role using emotive language like ‘a European army’ or ‘European Superstate’ to stir hostility towards an EU role in defence. The British public seems more accepting than their continental counterparts, especially Germany, of military interventions, even without multilateral authorisation. Combat deaths are also tolerated, perhaps helped by a media rhetoric that regards fatalities as ‘heroes’ while political elites refer to the ‘sacrifice of those who defend our freedoms’, sustaining public identification with ‘myths’ (Weber, 2001:6) that shape the prevailing strategic culture. Europe and CSDP is not part of this mindset.
Elite disinterest in an EU role when crises emerge is also apparent. During the 1999 crisis over Iraq’s supposed WMDs, the supposedly pro-European Prime Minister Blair by-passed the EU completely despite his chairmanship of the EU Council:

(Blair) moved immediately towards the (traditional role of) British governments (…) a loyal ally and lieutenant of the United States. For Britain it seemed Washington was the only significant player in town and its policy on Iraq was made in conjunction with the USA rather than with the EU (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999:160).

Blair remained consistent through to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, reflecting the fundamental Atlanticism of UK strategic culture, and traditional UK caution over public opinion and the question of sovereignty (Hughes and Smith, 1998). Meanwhile the ESDP process shifted towards ‘greater emphasis on cooperation and partnership’ (Interview 5), but cooperation has not always meant British support for an EU lead.

In November 2008 the UN Secretary General asked for an EU Battlegroup in DR Congo but Britain and Germany declined, ‘preferring state back-up to the existing UN presence, so the EU couldn’t take any lead’ (Interview 1). A UK-based foreign policy expert affirms that despite changes in British thinking, NATO’s strategic culture dominates (Interview 11). The Conservative Party 2010 election manifesto devoted just two of 120 pages to Europe, and mostly reflects a rearguard action to limit Europe and ‘repatriate’ powers:

We believe Britain’s interests are best served by a European Union that is an association of its member states (and) we will never allow Britain to slide into a federal Europe (Conservative Party, 2010:113).

CSDP is not mentioned. Marcussen et al, (1999) point out that little has changed since Churchill positioned Britain at the centre of a new post-war world order, as leader of the Commonwealth and a bridge between Europe and America, a ‘myth’ described in Hugo Young’s classic study of Britain’s relationship with Europe, This Blessed Plot (Young, 1998).

Following the 2010 General Election the coalition agreement between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties included a commitment to a ‘balance of competences’ review to analyse the UK-EU relationship. Beginning in 2010 the first reports emerged in 2013, including foreign affairs and security and defence policy. The report is unequivocal: member states are preeminent in an intergovernmental field where unanimity is required, member states have a veto and no state is obliged to supply forces to a CSDP mission. Indeed the review suggests rather than repatriation of powers, the UK should help the EEAS achieve
common interests, so enhancing EU effectiveness in foreign and security policy (HM Government, 2013).

This however contrasts with Aktipis and Oliver’s assessment of Europeanisation and UK foreign policy. They report British concerns over institutional threats to intergovernmental decision-making. British reticence, they argue, undermines prospective capability improvements. London’s reluctance to move away from intergovernmental decision-making remains absolute and tensions persist between the need for cooperation and domestic opposition to a stronger EU role (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011), especially with rising anti-EU sentiment after the 2010 general election.

Ironically the anti-EU trend coincides with recognition among previously sceptical policy elites in Whitehall that the EU can and should add value as a security actor, and that British participation is essential (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011:83-4). This is a significant change in British strategic culture, but is out of step with public sentiment or understanding.

If the uploading of German civilian perspectives constrained the defence autonomy signalled at St Malo, this may have suited the UK given its ‘awkward partner’ approach (George, 1998; O’Donnell and Whitman, 2007:255). The British view of CSDP seems to match the EU as a ‘small power’, mostly civilian and minimalist (Toje, 2011). It is probably highly significant that an FCO report warns against ‘competence creep’ from the EEAS, calling for UK ‘vigilance’ against this (Parliament UK, 2013).

The SDSR implies that austerity may oblige all member states to rationalise defence spending. This could bring a new logic to CSDP (Interview 23), even advancing pooling and sharing (Biscop, 2013b). In the short term, austerity diverts attention from foreign and security policy, and governments may prioritise local interests and employment, and reduce defence spending (Interviews 2,7,9,10,11,25). Spending cuts combined with efforts to retain sovereignty ultimately degrade defence capability (Major and Mölling, 2013). This damages any prospects for EU strategic actorness, undermining H1. Biscop characterises the British approach to CSDP as leading it in order to limit it, handicapped by a perpetual tendency to view the initiative as a ‘zero-sum game’ (Biscop, 2012:1297).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the strategic cultures of the three largest EU member states because CSDP, part of CFSP, is primarily intergovernmental, so power is critical in policy-
making and implementation. France, Germany and Britain are regarded as essential to CSDP and European defence. Convergence between their strategic cultures would assist the development of a European strategic culture, a prerequisite for the strategic actorness of H1, and according to the ESS, essential to CSDP. Several interviewees commented on the *sine qua non* status of France and the UK to CSDP, but also Germany, a perspective shared by Charillon and Wong (2011), Atkipis and Oliver (2011) and Biscop (2012).

The chapter has assessed changes in EU-3 strategic culture since the late 1990s, using literature from across this period, as well as primary data from elite interviews. Key findings are that France and Britain display strategic cultures based on force projection, military capability, and preparedness to use force, and both have relatively high defence spending. French strategic culture has shown considerable movement, accommodating reintegration with NATO, improved transatlantic relations, features which together with some bilateral cooperation with Britain suggest some convergence between Paris and London regarding strategic cultures. French commitment to CSDP depends on strict compatibility with French interests, and France maintains the St Malo ambition of enhanced crisis intervention capability that complements NATO.

German strategic culture is markedly different, but also displays considerable evolution through armed forces professionalisation, out-of-area deployment within UN-backed coalitions, including combat operations, and preparedness to undertake humanitarian crisis relief. This suggests limited strategic culture convergence towards France and the UK, but low defence spending and a reluctance to deploy force remain consistent traits in German strategic culture.

UK strategic culture is broadly conservative, NATO-oriented, and Atlanticist. London accepts an EU crisis management role but European defence barely features in the British narrative. So while there are some signs of strategic culture convergence among EU-3, there is a lack of coherence due to inconsistency, especially from the UK and Germany, which undermines H1. Berlin engages in CSDP rhetoric but fails to deliver spending on civilian, let alone military capability. Commitment is lacking across the board (Menon, 2011a; Major and Mölling, 2013) which does not augur well for CSDP (O'Donnell, 2011a; Biscop, 2012).

CSDP faces several threats, including low defence spending, inadequate commitment or derisory participation from any of EU-3. Other threats are that the UK allows CSDP to perish through neglect, or British withdrawal from the EDA or even leaving the EU altogether. In sum, there is a danger of ‘Neo-Westphalian resistance’ (Duke, 2012:49). Another risk stems
from trends in the global economy such as the on-going euro crisis and potentially new orientations for Germany and German business relating to Germany becoming a ‘geo-economic power’ (Kundnani, 2011).

In contrast to these negative pressures facing CSDP there may be opportunities deriving from strategic culture convergence between other member states, or new imperatives relating to the ‘US pivot’ (see p.182) and/or new security crises that drive member states towards more cooperation. Strategic culture convergence may provide a foundation for CSDP to enhance the credibility of the Union as a strategic actor (H1), perhaps even with a supranational dimension (see Chapter 5). This chapter detects no outright incompatibility between EU-3, and all have displayed considerable flux during the CSDP process. UK interest however seems to be declining, so any development in strategic actorness would seem to be in spite of the UK approach, not as a consequence.

This chapter is inconclusive about European strategic culture and strategic actorness, suggesting minimal support for H1. Incoherence, inconsistency, and lack of commitment are more in evidence. There is common ground among EU-3 concerning the comprehensive approach and CCM, but little sign of commitment to resourcing the CHG, CSDP, or defence.

The focus on France, Germany and the UK underlines the continuing importance of intergovernmentalism; it also shows how these member states do not clearly articulate their own or common interests where security is concerned. There is no sign of defence integration. Cooperation, where it occurs, is limited to pragmatic bilateral initiatives and issue-by-issue policy-making. Grand Strategy looks a distant prospect at best. Le Monde suggests the EU is ‘paralysed’ regarding common defence because of sovereignty concerns, industrial competition, different political interests, and increasing reluctance to deploy force, despite collective defence spending that approaches €180bn (Le Monde, 2013b). This suggests intergovernmentalism impeding CSDP, as states are reluctant to commit resources, and there is only very limited common policy. The failure to articulate common interests undermines Grand Strategy. Evidence from this chapter demonstrates at most an incremental approach to cooperation around civilian crisis management, but not much more.

Inconclusive then regarding European strategic culture, this chapter suggests that other member states’ contributions need to be considered. The next chapter therefore provides further analysis beyond EU-3 to assess whether a common European strategic culture exists. Other states and other dynamics, especially the CSDP institutional framework (Chapter 5), must be considered.
Chapter Four

Is there an emerging European strategic culture?

4.1 Introduction

H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor cannot be upheld without evidence of a European strategic culture. To be a strategic actor without a strategic culture is clearly an oxymoron. An EU strategic culture would have clear implications for enhanced cooperation and might even contribute to integration.

The previous chapter noted some modest convergence between the strategic cultures of EU-3, France, Britain and Germany, but also continuing difference. This chapter explores whether in spite of differences among member states, a common European strategic culture may be achievable, present, or emergent. This is essential to testing H1.

Using Longhurst’s strategic culture definition and the CA which embraces civilian and military instruments, this chapter builds on the analysis of EU-3 strategic cultures by assessing whether there is an emerging European strategic culture, and includes reference to other member states. There are two main interpretations of what strategic culture may represent: a hard power or comprehensive kind, as shown in Fig.4.1. Chapter 2 emphasised that the EU kind, post-Cold War, is comprehensive.

Fig.4.1 Opposing interpretations of strategic culture

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Hard power/hard concept of strategic culture</th>
<th>Comprehensive security → comprehensive understanding of strategic culture</th>
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<tr>
<td>Military capability/power projection</td>
<td>Diplomacy/incentives/persuasion continuum through to coercion/</td>
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<td>Acceptance of unilateralism</td>
<td>Limited use of force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Realist world view</td>
<td>Essential multilateralism/basis in international law</td>
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<td>Interests-based</td>
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The previous chapter detected tendencies among EU-3 to try to upload national preferences into CSDP, a process which for some equates to Europeanisation (Wong, 2005). France and somewhat inconsistently the UK sought increased military capability, while Germany pressed for the ‘civilianisation’ of the St Malo ambitions with an emphasis on CCM and conflict prevention.

This chapter begins with an overview of strategic culture challenges following St Malo, and then considers whether a European strategic culture is emerging, using analysis of primary data in two camps, ‘sceptical’ and ‘positive view’ respondents. These contrasting views approximately correspond to the different interpretations of strategic culture in Fig.4.1. The chapter ends with discussion of the conclusions from Chapters 3 and 4.

4.2 Strategic culture challenges following St Malo

Bono writes that the St Malo process after 1999 was marked by ‘contradictory dynamics shaping the ESDP’ (Bono, 2004a:444). The Headline Goal (European Council, 1999b) was intended to provide power projection capability, and was later augmented by targets in the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) following criticism of the US and UK handling of the Kosovo crisis (Council of the European Union, 2004; Parliament UK, 2008). St Malo became mired in ‘competing national and institutional agendas’ (Bono, 2004a). Interstate rivalries increased after George W. Bush won the US presidential election in November 2000, exacerbated by the 9/11 attacks and the US-led invasion of Iraq. These events ‘intensified the subordination of the ESDP to NATO and US ambitions’ (Bono, 2004a:444-5). The US and NATO wanted ESDP to focus on reconstruction, humanitarian and development aid, policing and civil administration, as well as peacekeeping tasks by selected EU member states. Broadly speaking this is what emerged as CSDP became essentially a CCM framework for conflict prevention.

Bono says the US envisaged NATO and the EU becoming *suppliers of services to the US*, providing political legitimacy to US-led operations and subordinate to US control, a view echoed by Daalder and Lindsay (2005:43,113), and also by President Bush indicating a more conciliatory and multilateral approach to US allies at the start of his second term (Bush, 2005). ESDP as a service agency to the US would be anathema to France but might be attractive to the UK and possibly Germany. The ESS-implied autonomous capability to handle security crises in its own neighbourhood is very different, although the US would welcome increased European capability within NATO. In Britain ESDP was initially envisaged ‘as a capability driver’ (Menon, 2009:232), a view underlined by the British
commitment to a comprehensive CSDP complementary to NATO, and desire for a close working relationship between both (Ministry of Defence, 2012).

Different French and British perspectives ensured that after the Cologne Council and the HHG, unity gave way to dissent over the scale of ambition. Fresh differences surfaced during the Iraq crisis which provoked a major conceptual dispute over international law. The UK and USA saw no need for a fresh UN resolution before military action, whereas France and Germany did. The Franco-German position reflected a fundamental ESDP principle: the need for unequivocal international backing for armed intervention.

The HHG was augmented by civilian and peacekeeping aspirations around which there was consensus, but agreement on combat operations was always more difficult. Germany and Sweden accepted traditional peacekeeping, while the UK and the Netherlands wanted caution over the extent to which the EU could lead high-end peacemaking, preferring state-led intervention. France and the UK have fewer qualms about military action, while Germany, Italy, Spain and other more pacifist or non-aligned countries share a cautious approach, preferring diplomatic solutions (Bono, 2004a:448). Major and Mölling (2011) regard persistent differences in strategic culture as a reason no Battlegroup deployment.

Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Austria have become more conscious of peacekeeping responsibilities, and are significant if low-spending contributors to CSDP. They accept the need to strengthen their military capabilities while remaining sceptical about any EU defence role. Their commitment to CSDP is conditional on limited military ambition: the D-word remains taboo. In Ireland the constitutionally required referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001 was lost mainly on account of traditional defence neutrality; only after painstaking reassurances did Nice survive a second plebiscite in October 2002 (Laffan and O'Mahony, 2008). Eventual approval of Nice suggests modest public support in Ireland for ESDP. Irish mission contributions of up to 850 personnel have been achieved through alignment with other formerly neutral states, especially Sweden. Sweden has shown leadership in the face of public opposition, which as in Ireland, was countered by focusing on humanitarian responsibilities (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009). Together with Finland, Sweden and Ireland have influenced CSDP particularly through participation in the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) in 2008. This also includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway (Swedish Armed Forces, 2014). The website referenced here reports EU-wide commitment to the Battlegroup concept and underlines the fact that missions depend on decisions by all EU member states. This is so, but in practice deployment can be vetoed by BG members themselves, or one member
may withhold participation. There is no EU primacy in foreign and security policy, so the intergovernmental foundation of CFSP is protected (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.24.1).

Dickow et al, (2011) affirm the dependency on intergovernmental cooperation in Battlegroups and mention sensitivities surrounding an initiative that brings together states with different strategic cultures. Nevertheless, as the Nordic Battlegroup demonstrates, even non-EU Norway contributes to CSDP, is a partner in the EDA, and has been active in Nordic Defence Cooperation with EU allies (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2013a). Norway has signed an agreement on cooperation in air transportation, a significant example of pooling and sharing (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2013b). Thus, developing cooperation even among formerly non-aligned states and others with strong Atlanticist traditions appears to suggest an emergent common strategic culture. Notably, while Germany did not participate in the Libya intervention, it did not oppose it.

Sweden is a full participant in CSDP, well ahead of at least 17 other member states. Witney suggests that in any vanguard of leading contributors, Sweden’s credentials are ‘unassailable’ (Witney, 2008:15n). Indeed Sweden has undergone:

A fundamental change in national defence strategy from the armed neutrality of the last century to a new focus on multinational expeditionary operations – and new recommendations from the National Defence Commission propose a doubling of Sweden’s ‘level of ambition’ for international operations (Witney, 2008:22).

This represents a shift towards a European strategic culture, evidenced by support for an increased EEAS role in achieving CFSP goals (Government Offices of Sweden, 2014). Transnational consensus is evident in Ireland, Austria and Finland, though neither Ireland nor Austria spend even one percent of GDP on defence (Witney, 2008). Despite convergence, Menon (2009:237) stresses that institutional factors and different perspectives within the PSC undermine unity around a common strategic culture.

Ulriksen (2004) argues that the EU should play to its strengths, namely common values and interests, even though it struggles to define these. Ulriksen argues that the Union must ensure the continuing relevance of NATO but can only do so and maintain partnership with the US from a position of strength. A priority for European armed forces remains full adjustment from huge land armies designed for territorial defence to professional security-oriented expertise to meet contemporary threats. This requires adjusting spending from personnel to training, technology and hardware, including transporters, helicopters and communications technology (Witney, 2008; Bergedorf Round Table, 2009). Giegerich and
Nicoll (2012) similarly call for cooperation on efficient use of financial resources while highlighting a seven percent real terms fall among 23 European NATO members’ defence spending between 2006 and 2010. Defence spending in most EU states has declined since the Cold War (Rajendran, 2014; Debating Europe, 2014).

Reform and modernisation should be properly targeted and coordinated. EU member state armed forces have considerable experience and expertise in stabilisation activities, complementing the US which is less competent in this area (Menon et al, 2004). The US can win military victories but its forces are less successful in achieving political goals. Ulriksen cites Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq as examples, underlining the view that the EU should build on proven strengths rather than ‘heedlessly strive towards an idealised American way of war’ (Ulriksen, 2004:467).

There is no evidence that the EU has attempted such an outcome from CSDP. It has developed an alternative approach to security, arguably influenced by Germany and smaller states similarly lacking force-oriented strategic cultures. It uses a constructive non-traditional conflict prevention approach, wherever possible avoiding the use of force (Biava, et al 2011).

Quille refers to values, expressed in the ESS as commitment to ‘a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’ (Solana, 2003:9). Reference to the UN Charter underlines the CFSP commitment previously affirmed in the Treaty of Amsterdam (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997:Art.J.1). But Kosovo demonstrated the need for military capability within what Quille described as ‘a more robust concept of civilian power’ (Quille, 2004:429). Civilian power without military capability could not achieve the desired political objectives, so France and Britain sought ‘capability development’ at the Anglo-French summit at Le Touquet in February 2003 (Quille, 2004:431; BBC News, 2003).

During the early ESDP years France and the UK wished for a capability-oriented ESDP with a significant military dimension, while other states emphasised a civilian orientation. But no states provided adequate resourcing, according to interview evidence (see below). Meanwhile, as Witney (2008) and others point out, EU member states possess over 2 million soldiers but ‘70 percent of them cannot be used outside their respective territories’ (Bergerdorf Round Table, 2009:48). Despite its avowed comprehensiveness, EU strategic culture remains deeply constrained by national impediments to strategic actorness. This underpins the sceptical opinion reported below.
4.3 To what extent is there an emerging European strategic culture?

4.3.1 Sceptical opinion

This section reports evidence from interviews on whether the EU has a strategic culture, beginning with sceptical opinion. How can a heterogeneous community of 28 states with different histories and experiences and different interests build a common strategic culture? Menon et al (2004) recognise the range of perspectives among member states but present a case for this diversity, as the Union turns a challenge into an opportunity. In endeavouring to accommodate diverse perspectives, needs, expectations and experiences, a comprehensive view of security is a convenient outcome. The challenge to accommodate diversity is reflected in the entire European integration process, becoming increasingly complex with every enlargement. What is remarkable is not how little CSDP has achieved, but how much.

A common European strategic culture would suggest broad if not unanimous consensus on the EU role in defence and international security. But defining consensus beyond the blandness of the ESS is difficult. Advocates of Grand Strategy criticise the ESS for being merely declaratory: it avoids explaining how the EU can achieve its goals; it is no proof of actorness; it neither demonstrates a strategic approach nor a coherent strategic culture (Biscop, 2009, 2013a; Biscop et al, 2009; Howorth, 2009, 2010a; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010a; Drent and Zandee, 2010; Simòn, 2011). GS supports the comprehensive approach and welcomes the intensification of CIV-MIL cooperation, but its proponents demand a more coherent and proactive capability-building process accompanied by the political will to implement CSDP. They argue that CSDP must confront contemporary challenges and enable the Union to contribute to international security as promised in the ESS and other key documents (see Fig.1.2, p.14). The ‘sceptical’ respondents reflect this demand for a systematic and proactive approach (Heisbourg, 2004; Biscop, 2011a), without which many even doubt that the EU has a strategic culture:

There is no strategic culture. The states have relied on the US for 50 years (…) Europeans have no habit of thinking strategically on questions of security. There is no European defence. The ESS was big picture but completely vague on specifics (Interview 2).

But this ‘no strategic culture’ view reflects an understanding founded on defence and military capability. It is more common among respondents with a military background (see Fig.4.2). The same respondent argues that the EU faces no territorial threat and pointed to Simon
Jenkins’ argument that armed forces should be entirely dispensed with (Guardian, 2010b). This suggests that the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’ idea is still present, even in the UK with its strong strategic culture, and in spite of evidence from the 1990s that weakness and strategic incoherence carries mortal risks.

Others are equally sceptical. An EUMS official says even in Brussels an emerging European strategic culture is ‘not marked’, whereas NATO has one. But NATO is over 50 years old, compared with a decade or so of CSDP. He argues that the broadness of strategic culture, comprising ‘homeland security, civilian culture and a grand strategic culture’ makes it hard to pin down and ultimately empty, reflecting Hyde-Price (2004). Consistent with Grand Strategy literature he criticises the ESS as vague:

(There is) no grand strategy, no highest possible level of a long-term vision of through what guidelines the security objectives are to be achieved (or maintained) (Interview 8).

The lack of strategic vision makes acquiring capability difficult. ‘There’s no defence in ESDP, it’s about security only’ (ibid), which reflects crisis prevention rather than crisis resolution, and echoes the Treaty description of CSDP as intended for ‘peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.1). This chimes with Heisbourg’s view of the ESS as lacking a clear concept by which to measure capability or guide actions; it may express a way of thinking about security but it is an inadequate basis from which to develop strategy (Heisbourg, 2004). Biscop argues that emphasis on a preventive, holistic and multilateral approach explains how to do things but not what to do (Biscop, 2011a). This vagueness is criticised by several respondents as an inadequate basis for European strategic culture (Interviews 2,6,8,14), and by various authors (Whitman and Juncos, 2009; Duke, 2012; Merket, 2012; Allen, 2012; Koutrakos, 2012). Lisbon’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) allows groups of states to combine their security capabilities (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.46) and may provide a useful starting point (Biscop, 2009, 2011a; Howorth, 2009, 2010a).

A European Parliament official argues that ‘there should be a political process’ as without this the ESS cannot be ‘operationalised’, and the ESS alone cannot guarantee actorness: it requires commitment to give it practical significance (Interview 24), a view backed by Grand Strategy proponents (Biscop, 2011b). Sceptics argue that values alone cannot deliver strategy or a strategic culture, but it is problematic that states have different security interests, a potential barrier to common strategic culture. An EUMS official comments that the Commission pursues values and the Council interests, but without agreement on what
those interests are (*Interview 8*). This reflects part of the Grand Strategy argument, as values and ‘normative principles’ do underpin the EU approach to security (Biscop, 2009:5; Howorth, 2009:18), and are prominent in the Lisbon Treaty (2007:Art.2, Art.21.1). Identification of common interests however, is essential (Howorth, 2009; Biscop, 2009, 2013a:41-2).

European integration has always highlighted values. For example the Copenhagen criteria for accession candidates refer to:

- stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (European Commission, 2012a; Amsterdam Treaty, 1997:Title V).

A CMPD military official argues that a European strategic culture would enable member states to better take advantage of membership but they tend not to do this, instead looking to narrow local interests. In a view shared by others he says the main barrier to an EU strategic culture is states’ preoccupation with their own interests, so CSDP has:

- a lowest-common-denominator (approach, achieving) the most we can, given the constraints (*Interview 9*).

This echoes a comment on ESDP that ‘the lower the level of commitment, the higher the likelihood of achieving consensus’ (Toje, 2008:132). The same official argues that long-term the Union may achieve more, but now CSDP remains limited. He bemoans the lack of progress during his three years in Brussels but says much has been achieved since St Malo.

The values-interests nexus is commonly referred to: interests reflect realist IR perspectives (Mearsheimer, 1990, 1994/95, 2001; Hyde-Price, 2004; Kagan, 2004; Lindlay-French, 2004, while values underpin social constructivism (Checkel, 1999, 2005; Christiansen *et al.*, 1999) and normative theory (Manners, 2002). CSDP is founded on values but several respondents argue that interests must be defined. The military would like proper definition of interests (*Interview 8*). Grand Strategy requires member states to combine commitment to common values with clearly identified common interests (Biscop, 2009; 2013a:41-2), which underlines the need for public debate about the purpose of CSDP.

This thesis argues that CSDP is evolving through bureaucratic processes in policy formulation and implementation. Evidence for this is discussed in the next two chapters on CSDP institutional dynamics and missions. Grand Strategy is not happening and nor is it
visible on the horizon. The evident frustration among the sceptics reported in this section is broadly consistent with that of proponents of Grand Strategy.

A CMPD official suggests that Germany, Spain and Italy have no strategic culture, presumably on account of their reluctance to deploy military force, while Britain and France do have one, so there can be no common European strategic culture; instead states look to their interests, and this is evident in missions. This respondent nevertheless adds that ESDP achieved a lot through 27 relatively successful missions, small scale but not insignificant:

Now ten years on we are at the point where we need a great leap forward, we need something considerable (Interview 9).

This view is reflected in calls to replace the ESS with a European Global Strategy (Biscop, 2011a) and for a ‘grand bargain’ on security (Howorth, 2010a). Both imply that this could happen with sufficient political will. The claim that several states have ‘no strategic culture’ is not tenable, since it disregards the comprehensive understanding of the term (Gray, 1999a; Longhurst, 2004; Rynning, 2003; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010; 2011; Biava et al, 2011) and Grand Strategy advocates are no less supportive of the CA.

A Paris-based expert says that no common strategic culture exists between France, Britain and Germany but there is common ground where they cooperate, such as on Kosovo and Iran (Interview 1). This echoes a record of cooperation through EPC and CFSP which generated a ‘coordination reflex’ (Smith, 2004:94), a basis for a common strategic culture, but on an ‘issue-by-issue’ basis described by, among others, officials working with EUFOR Althea (Interviews 15-21). The Paris-based respondent suggests that the EEAS will contribute to an EU strategic culture but ‘there is no natural instinctive EU strategic culture yet’. The adverb implies that one is emerging. He further hints that economic pressures may drive cooperation. This view intriguingly indicates that states maintain different strategic cultures but these may coincide with an emergent European one, a perspective implied by Hill (2004) and one that chimes with states responding to security challenges on an issue-by-issue basis, often determined by domestic interests (Pohl, 2013, 2014).

A former member of the Venusberg Group accepts ‘overlap’ between states on some issues. But Venusberg experts found wide disparities on threat perception with migration being almost the only common concern (Interview 14). This is striking given that the ESS was backed by all member states and is essentially a statement of the threat environment. Respondents who criticise the ESS for lacking strategic content echo Heisbourg (2004) and Witney (2008). Vagueness made the ESS easy to support, and Lisbon makes no mandatory
requirements: PESCO (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.46), and the EDA is subject to Council bidding (ibid, Art.45).

The Venusberg respondent argues that the relationship between geography and threat is underestimated, and demonstrates 'a lack of common strategic vision' (Interview 14). He cites the Libyan intervention in 2011 where nine EU member states took part, arguing that nine out of 27 is hardly a united response. Conversely this could be seen as significant cooperation, although CEE states and Germany did not participate. The contention appears to be that without common threat perception, a common strategic culture or common response is impossible.

The diversity of threat perception should be contrasted with the coordination reflex mentioned above. Membership of the EU and the western alliance drives common security perspectives, particularly among smaller and medium-sized states (Hill, 2004). This is evident even among previously neutral or non-aligned states like Ireland and Sweden.

Many interview respondents refer to the lack of public debate on security and defence (Interviews 3,10,24,25). Public discussion could spur consensus over threats and their implications. Cyber security, terrorism, and energy security are potentially severely disruptive threats according to the ESS Implementation Report (European Council, 2008). Instability in former colonies is probably a concern more for ex-colonial powers like Britain and France who tend to advocate stronger engagement in Africa than do others, not least because they have the capability to intervene.

The Venusberg respondent comments that Germany remains ‘comfortable with letting the French and the British call the shots’ (Interview 14). Germany, happy with an Anglo-French lead, did not oppose St Malo, while the ‘civilian dimension (is) embedded in the German response’ (ibid) for reasons of domestic politics, a view backed by Longhurst (2004), Brummer (2008), Chappell (2012), Pohl (2014).

A UK-based expert described the process leading to the ESS in 2003, recalling an extraordinary lack of debate Europe-wide at government level and virtually universal reluctance to discuss threats. The fundamental reliance on the US and NATO remained. The ESS came from the EUHR Javier Solana asking Robert Cooper, with input from Nick Witney, Brian Crowe in the EU Military Staff, and another British official, to draft the document. Solana liked the draft but it was watered down by the Council. The CGS called for a debate on the ESS implications and there were various think-tank conferences; the London School
of Economics set up a call for contributions, but there was actually no debate anywhere. This lack of engagement demonstrates not a European strategic culture, but instead:

all we have is avoidance (…) an ingrained strategic non-culture, and not much has changed (Interview 3).

This verdict is backed by another expert who commented on the diversity of views and the absence of debate (Interview 10). He said ‘history hangs heavy’, arguing that several states avoid security questions, and criticised the ESS Implementation Report (European Council, 2008) as a ‘missed opportunity’. Instead of a common position, we are ‘dependent on the Foreign Ministries to decide what the ESS amounts to and there’s been no public debate, no proper discussion at any level’ (Interview 10). Without debate the prospects for a common strategic culture are poor even after decades of EPC and CFSP cooperation.

The lack of public debate is clear but what is striking from interviews is the lack of debate among member state governments. In testing this perspective against the literature the picture is inconsistent. Matlary (2009:97) reports how France and Britain lead on CSDP, their governments used to a ‘foreign policy prerogative’ whereby troop deployment is essentially a presidential or prime ministerial decision, often without significant public or parliamentary approval. The UK parliament usually defers to the political lead from the prime minister’s office. Kosovo, the Gulf War, Sierra Leone and Iraq in 2003 are such examples, while Syria in 2013 bucked the trend. Other states participate in CSDP to enhance their profiles within the EU (Allen, 2012) or to gain a voice in foreign affairs that they could not have if acting alone (Smith, 2009). Matlary cites Sweden as an example, but nowhere has defence and security policy been subject to extensive public debate. Allen (2012) reports intense diplomatic activity among member states in the evolution of a European foreign policy that resembles ‘governance without government’ (Allen, 2012:645; Smith 2009). Matlary suggests that governments may choose to ‘outsource’ the unpleasantness of troop deployment to the EU or other international organisations (Matlary, 2009:141-2; Coker, 2007). Meanwhile Pohl emphasises German commitment to CSDP as a complex balancing of often conflicting domestic pressures, including the need to stay close to the US, to promote a multilateralist foreign policy, to contribute to European integration, and to assist stabilisation in Europe’s near abroad while avoiding being drawn into protracted military engagements (Pohl, 2014:165). A German Bundestag member reports the lack of public debate concerning security and defence despite considerable discussion among German political elites (Interview 24).
In contrast to respondents claiming a lack of debate at the political level, it seems more plausible to argue that there is debate among elites, especially in the European Council and the Council for Foreign Affairs, but this does not percolate down, rarely developing into a public discussion. The French and British publics largely defer to the foreign policy prerogative, while in other member states specific issues may attract public attention, such as relations with Russia in Poland, or referenda on European treaties in Ireland (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008; Telegraph, 2009a).

In relation to H1 **CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor**, sceptical interview evidence highlights the gap between cooperation and integration but the literature suggests caution in reading much into this. References to ‘governance without government’ by Smith (2009) and Allen (2012) suggest purpose, intention and long-term engagement towards EU impact in foreign and security policy: in sum, strategic actorness, but sceptical respondents consider this may have reached its limits. A strategic CSDP must extend beyond cooperation and civilian orientation. It requires crisis management coordination, including forces integration based on the Battlegroup idea, integrated and compatible technologies, communications and control systems, and member state willingness to accept leadership from others in military operations. While there has been progress, several respondents criticise the slow development of integrated crisis response capability, echoing the Venusberg Group (2007), Witney (2008), Howorth (2009), and Biscop and Coelmont (2010a; 2011a). Weaknesses in the Battlegroup concept need resolution, notably funding arrangements (see pp.178-9).

A DGAP expert refers to the promising start towards a common strategic culture but says the momentum dissipated after 2005, a view supported by Biscop and Coelmont (2010a), and Biscop (2012). Now instead we have a ‘technical strategic community’ in Brussels and a ‘technocratic culture’ in the Commission (Interview 25). This respondent criticises the lack of leadership post-Solana, and refers to Commission-Council rivalry preventing a strategic dimension to CSDP. The loss of momentum affects not only security, defence and foreign affairs, but the entire European project.

Fig.4.2 below summarises the sceptical remarks regarding EU strategic culture. Proponents of Grand Strategy similarly bemoan the lack of a strategic approach, especially the failure to identify interests (Howorth, 2009, 2010a; Biscop, 2009, 2013a; Biscop et al, 2009; Simón, 2011; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Biscop and Norheim-Martinsen, 2012). While Howorth and Biscop accept the comprehensive nature of EU ambition, realists criticise the lack of attention to military capability (Kagan, 2004; Lindlay-French, 2004; Hyde-Price, 2004),
echoing some of the criticisms from sceptical respondents. Hyde-Price, in a development from an earlier focus on diverse strategic cultures among member states (Hyde-Price, 2004) writes that institutional development is moving the EU ‘ineluctably (…) beyond the one-dimensional reflexes of a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power’ (Hyde-Price, 2013:26). Perhaps he over-emphasises the role of EU-3 and underestimates other member states’ contribution (see next section), as well as the potential in the EEAS (Lisbon Treaty, 2007). Hyde-Price focuses on power, which rests with member states who control resources and determine both civilian and military capability. In a still predominantly intergovernmental field, states also determine political will and commitment to actorness (Major and Schöndorf, 2011; Biscop, 2013a:49).

Several respondents refer to CSDP as a ‘lowest-common-denominator’ field, consistent with key literature (Toje, 2008; Smith, 2008:10, Rynning, 2011:30; Chappell and Petrov, 2014:3), and with bureaucratic politics (Weber, 1970; Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Wilson, 1989). The bureaucratic politics argument also reflects domestic sources of foreign policy as key determiners for CSDP (Pohl, 2013, 2014), setting the limits of EU actorness but ensuring some limited mission deployment, so CSDP is a functioning area of the CFSP. Wilson refers to policy implementation being dependent on what is feasible given the resources released by political masters, themselves constrained by needing to find allies ‘at a reasonable price’ (Wilson, 1989:205). This description of bureaucratic politics matches CSDP.

Evidence from sceptical respondents undermines support for H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor. This section suggests: a virtual absence of a European strategic culture; diverse interests and a lack of commitment; a lack of debate which adversely affects CSDP coherence and substance. Defence coordination is barely mentioned, as defence policy remains purely intergovernmental, state-mediated and NATO-oriented. Finally, strategic culture cannot be constructed on values alone.

Fig.4.2 below presents the ‘sceptical evidence’ thus summarised. An important observation concerning the sceptics is that their interpretation of strategic culture maintains a strong emphasis on military capability. While they accept the EU aspiration to develop a strategic culture based on the comprehensive approach, their analysis is greatly influenced by military weakness stemming from poor resourcing and a too cautious approach to pooling and sharing. This leads to a negative perception regarding whether the EU has a strategic culture.
These perspectives represent a power-based IR assessment. Hyde-Price calls on the EU and member states to focus less on values and a ‘crusading approach’ and more on interests and hard-headed assessment (Hyde-Price, 2013:24-5). This matches sceptical respondents’ views, and the Grand Strategy demand for a focus on interests (Biscop, 2013a). The sceptical perspective suggests a lack of GS, a lack of actorness, and therefore little support for H1. Analysis now turns to respondents offering a more positive assessment.

### 4.3.2 Positive opinion

This section reports respondents more accepting of the proposition that European strategic culture is apparent, indicating some support for H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor. Several refer to the emergent nature of European

### Précis of remarks on strategic culture

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Précis of remarks on strategic culture</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 50 yrs reliance on US-NATO. No habit of strategic thinking. No European defence. No defence in CSDP.</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>Traditional military capability view of s.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. NATO yes, not EU, or CSDP. ESS vague, lacks strategy. EU uses values, strategy needs interests. France pursues interests in Africa. Commission values applies, Council interests, so l.c.d. applies</td>
<td>No/minimal</td>
<td>Military perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK, France have s.c., Germany, Spain, Italy do not. No E.s.c. States look to interests so l.c.d. applies. Weak CSDP but in 10yrs, much achieved</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Military perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of debate hinders s.c. Politicians avoid security and defence debate. CSDP means French push for EU role in Africa, UK for ‘coalitions of the willing’ in Iraq, Afghanistan</td>
<td>No, little evidence</td>
<td>Pessimistic assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common s.c. only issue-by-issue. EEAS will help, especially through smaller states, key role. L.c.d. agreement, effective but low key. BG concept flawed, not operational</td>
<td>No, not really</td>
<td>Modest but important progress. Long-term view Essential to develop CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of momentum post-2005. No leadership, states lost interest, institutional turf wars, states fixed positions. EEAS some limited success. Not strategic</td>
<td>No; ‘technical, strategic community’</td>
<td>s.c. was emerging under Solana but momentum lost by 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States have to enable E.s.c. Lack of political process. Socialisation effective in Brussels. Need for strategic approach from states.</td>
<td>No. Brussels institutional culture only</td>
<td>Focus on states’ role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of views more than a E.s.c. Lack of debate on ESS</td>
<td>Many different views</td>
<td>Implies s.c. impossible without debate and military capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.s.c. presupposes capability, this is lacking. ESS describes threats, states see these differently, e.g. Libya. Geography matters. Germany supports civilian efforts, otherwise reluctant, accepts ESS because it’s vague</td>
<td>Not really. Some overlap but no common s.c.</td>
<td>Interesting focus on threats; implies l.c.d approach in civilian capacities</td>
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**KEY**: s.c. = strategic culture; E.s.c. = European strategic culture; l.c.d. = lowest-common-denominator agreement on policy or action; BG = Battlegroup. (Numbers in brackets refer to interviews; see Appendix, p.302)
strategic culture, and highlight the centrality of the ESS, which when launched was seen as a declaration of intent. Biscop describes it as:

> omni-present in EU discourse, in statements by European and other policy makers, and in the academic debate (Biscop, 2011b:127).

The ESS has impact beyond Europe, perceived as a rallying call to member states that EU should take responsibility as a global actor in promoting EU values and seeking a ‘better world’ as its formal title suggests (Solana, 2003). Biscop considers the ESS central to constructing an EU strategic culture but argues that what counts is actual performance (Biscop, 2011a; 2011b). This relates to the H1 reference to intention, but intention does not equal substance. Several respondents, like Howorth (2007), see the ESS as a rallying point for a European strategic culture: ‘The ESS is a significant driver of ESDP’ (Interview 22); ‘(it) was a bold document in 2003’ (Interview 10); ‘(it) was a response to the US National Security Strategy (of 2002)’ (Interview 3). But it lacks detail, it fails to specify reporting or reviewing mechanisms, means or objectives, or a benchmarking system to address capability shortfalls (Biscop, 2011b). Furthermore CSDP is reactive rather than proactive, a recurring criticism among ‘sceptics’ and ‘positives’, and shared by many scholars (Witney, 2008; Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Biscop, 2009; Menon, 2009). However, Lisbon ratification in December 2009 and the launch of the EEAS in 2010 suggests progress, as does the Ghent Agreement on pooling and sharing between Sweden and Germany, later adopted by EU Defence Ministers (EU Security and Defence News, 2010; European Council, 2012; Ashton, 2010; Biscop and Coelmont, 2011a). Ghent provides for member states to determine which capabilities should remain national, which might be pooled, and those to which they will no longer contribute (Biscop, 2011c). Combined with PESCO (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.46) this presents an opportunity for more coherence and effectiveness (Biscop and Coelmont, 2011a, 2011b). However to develop into a strategic initiative, Ghent must be supported by a ‘Permanent Capability Conference’ (Biscop and Coelmont, 2011b, 2011c, 2013b:88) to move PESCO from paper to actual practice.

Several respondents adopt a long-term view suggesting that, once established, CSDP will represent a new norm, gaining acceptance that during its formative stages it could never achieve because it remained contested. This ‘long view’ explains how CSDP could contribute to Europeanisation, and even integration, through pooling and sharing, and eventually capability enhancement and more actorness. While this is speculative, it is reflected in foreign policy literature (Hill, 2003; 2004; Smith, 2004; Howorth, 2014). Several
interviewees imply the same, and three vehemently so (Interviews 10,11,22). One points out that the SEM took six decades to reach its current imperfect state, so no-one should suppose that ESDP in a mere decade can be complete. Maastricht already signalled:

(EU) Identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence (TEU, 1992:Title I, Art.B).

This underlines the long-term commitment to CFSP. Indeed in security terms:

Police coordination and common security policy has become much more significant (with) more practical sharing of information (Interview 11).

This respondent stresses a historical perspective. In only a few years there has been considerable growth in multilateralism in civilian affairs while military cooperation will take longer (Interview, ibid). EU foreign policy is developing deeper cooperation, even with different perspectives depending on the issues (Hill, 2003). This has a gradual, incremental impact on the Union as a security actor:

The EU is (…) proving its own worth as a distinct and capable international security actor (Atikipis and Oliver, 2011:84).

As with the wider European integration process, changes are gradual and elite-driven, under reported and even less understood by electorates, but nonetheless real. According to Pohl (2013, 2014) they emanate primarily from domestic foreign policy drivers, a view supported by several respondents (Interviews 1-7,10,12,15-23), and in academic literature (Smith, 2004; Hill, 2004; Bickerton, 2013). Hill detects ‘decades of quiet cooperation’ (2004:160) and ‘gradual convergence’ in the ‘long game’ of European foreign policy cooperation (ibid, 161). Interview respondents refer to member states as policy drivers but stress the increasing role post-Lisbon of CSDP institutions (Interviews 4,5,6,8,9,12,23,26), a perspective also supported in the literature (Watanabe, 2010; Mérand et al, 2011; Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Léonard and Kaunert, 2012; Dijkstra, 2012b; Martin, 2013).
The Lancaster Gate treaties in November 2010 (see pp.58 and 69 above) provoked little comment, mostly escaping public notice, but they perhaps indicate strategic convergence between Paris and London, and the emergence of ‘epistemic communities’ (Adler and Haas, 1992) within Anglo-French military elites (Pannier, 2013:551-2). Pannier relates the pragmatism involved to the USA’s ‘Asia pivot’ (see p.182). France and Poland offer potential for closer cooperation, but industrial partnering seems more likely than close politico-military ties, despite common Weimar group membership (Elman and Terlikowski, 2013). O'Donnell (2011b) argues that there could be significant CSDP benefits if Paris and London responded positively to overtures from Warsaw. Future agreements may indirectly contribute to EU capability but fundamentally CSDP, and CFSP, is a long-term work-in-progress, bolstered by institutional change, especially through the EEAS and the potential impact of the HR-VP (HR-VP) (Allen, 2012:652). Allen, like many respondents reported here, notes the vagueness in the Lisbon Treaty on how the EEAS and HR-VP will operate. Also, PESCO is limited to those states willing to participate, without clear guidance on how to advance capability, other than through non-binding recommendations from the EDA (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.28). Such ambiguity highlights the need for political will (Menon, 2011a; Biscop, 2013a; Helwig, 2013).

Several respondents point to an emergent European strategic culture ‘(especially) if you stress the word emerging’ (Interview 22), highlighting coexistence with national varieties (Interviews 4,11,22); EU strategic culture coexisting with national strategic cultures is noted by Norheim-Martinsen (2011). European strategic culture is progressive and has appeared within a short time frame which suggests potential security actorness, and therefore support for H1. The positive assessments imply a patient, long-term assessment. One described the D-word (defence) as taboo in EU circles since the 1954 European Defence Community debacle, so ‘progress since St Malo has been remarkable’ (Interview 22). The emergence claim is strongly linked to change in Germany: while the underlying principles of multilateralism and civilian-led initiatives have not changed, and capability is still an issue, there is appreciation that ‘new military tasks are ahead’ (Interview 22). Indeed Germany has deployed more troops than France in Afghanistan. There has been major adjustment from ‘no out-of-area deployment’ to Germany being embedded within a multilateral, civilian-oriented CSDP that may involve deploying armed forces (Brose, 2013; Federal Ministry of Defence, 2011, 2013a; see Section 3.3).

Germany’s role suggests some uploading of preferences to the European level, bringing other states on board, while accommodating, to a limited extent, Anglo-French aspirations that Germany should accept a military role inside CSDP. Shifting strategic cultures suggest
limited convergence between member states, but processes are more horizontal than vertical and cannot be reduced to one-dimensional or adaptation-based explanations. Resourcing has remained an issue (Wagner, 2006; Witney, 2008; Mérand, 2008; Menon, 2008; Rees, 2011; Major and Mölling, 2013). Majone (2009:201) derides the failure to provide the indicated 4,500 troops for a mission in Tchad in 2008.

Despite resourcing weaknesses, Major argues that European strategic culture is evolving with endogenous and exogenous pressures involving ‘cross-loading (and) horizontal patterns, cognitive reorientation and socialisation’ (Major, 2005:186). This complements processes that extend beyond the EU as the arena for change, having a:

cross-country, cross-institutions and cross-policy dimension that may lead to domestic change and transfer of ideas, norms and ways of doing things that are exchanged from and with European neighbours, domestic entities or policy areas (Major, ibid).

This reflects a constructivist and normative perspective of an emergent European strategic culture, consistent with positive views. A DGAP expert affirms:

There is a European strategic culture. It is hard to define when it's around a group of states, but it exists around a self image as a legitimate actor in the neighbourhood, concerned with things like arms control, and the growing understanding of shared security in the EU and between member states. This is not fully developed but the EEAS will create greater coherence and unity in threat assessment (Interview 23).

This respondent argues that the alliance character of the EU develops on the basis of civilian, political, economic and military instruments, a trans-institutional ‘tool box’ approach to security involving partnership with and between member states. This highlights the novelty of the emergent European strategic culture and its co-existence with member state strategic cultures. Another respondent says unequivocally that an emergent strategic culture exists, comprising common attitudes, habits and values among European militaries, and that this co-exists with a NATO strategic culture created over six decades, and which remains dominant, especially in Britain (Interview 11). These perspectives chime with social constructivist and normative arguments that institutions develop over time, sustained by ideas and values, and profiting from sunk costs and pressures to build international frameworks (Checkel, 1999; 2005; Christiansen et al, 2005; Manners, 2002). Indeed the constructivist thread is apparent among the positive respondents. However the next chapter undermines constructivist explanations of CSDP, finding stronger evidence for a
bureaucratic politics explanation aided and abetted by domestic policy drivers, while not altogether eliminating institutional innovation as a factor.

Values are central to strategic culture (Snyder, 1977; Longhurst, 2004) and post-sovereign transnationalism (Cooper, 2004). Values are prominent too in constructivism (see pp.42-5) and commonly mentioned by authors not notably in any constructivist camp (Rynning, 2003; Smith, 2004; Meyer, 2005; Biscop, 2009, 2011b). Values are fundamental to the ESS (Solana, 2003) and to the EU's developing strategic culture (Menon, 2008:192-3; Biava et al, 2011), and also central to Grand Strategy (Biscop, 2009:5). So a range of perspectives refer to values in the CSDP context: this is strongly reflected in data from 'positive' respondents.

The notion of an emergent strategic culture coexisting with state strategic cultures is also consistent with Pohl (2014), who considers CSDP to have developed from national elites finding common cause in seeking to contribute to low cost non-controversial initiatives tacitly accepted among domestic audiences, both policy makers and electorates. The result is a form of EU-level 'muddling through' what is broadly accepted domestically, echoing a focus on 'marginal or incremental values' (Lindblom, 1959:83). This signals the bureaucratic politics explanation for CSDP developed later in the thesis in relation to H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics. Pohl's assessment highlights how CSDP becomes a functioning policy in issue-by-issue instances where domestic and European interests coincide. PESCO (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.46) depends on horizontal agreement, without a top-down driver of CSDP. The HR-VP and the EDA can steer but not drive, and the EEAS can only achieve what is sanctioned and resourced by its political masters, the PSC and member states (Helwig, 2013). None of this precludes the emergence of a European strategic culture based on collectively-held liberal, democratic and normative values. The point should be emphasised that values alone cannot constitute a strategic culture, nor do they determine policy: they merely contribute to the strategic culture that underpins CSDP.

An EU foreign policy expert says that European militaries are affected by socialisation, cooperation, joint manoeuvres and common procedures. This assists the evolution of a European strategic culture that coexists with national strategic cultures (Interview 11), a view shared by Pohl (2014) and Biava, et al (2011). Elite socialisation is considered in the next chapter. A consequence of the emergent strategic culture is that:

We're very likely to see an emerging variable geometry, coalitions-of-the-willing to deal with specific contexts as they arise (Interview 11).
This observation chimes with the PESCO initiative, and suggests co-existence or overlapping between different strategic cultures, not only between member states and the EU, but between the EU and NATO. Majone (2009) refers to the expectation among some scholars (Maillet and Velo, 1994) that variable geometry eventually leads to full integration but there is little evidence of this in foreign and security policy where diversity remains the norm despite common values underpinning the ESS and the emergent European strategic culture. What materialises varies depending on the issue, but incremental emergence and coexistence are prime characteristics. A Brussels-based expert affirms that the emergent European strategic culture is:

not strong, but it’s a feeling, complementary to national strategic cultures. It is based on a sense of there being an ‘EU way’. (For the moment this emergent strategic culture is) insufficient to lead the EU or to lead an EU action, or even an EU policy, but there is a consensus on the ‘EU way’ (Interview 4).

This view is supported by Menon et al, (2004), Everts, et al (2004), Menon (2008), Biava et al, (2011). References to values also occur in the ESS and the treaties (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997; Lisbon Treaty, 2007). EUFOR Althea officials make the same point (Interviews 15-21; see Chapter 5). The sense of an emergent ‘EU way’ is perhaps more evident at the mission level especially in post-conflict settings (see Chapter 6) than in Brussels, and certainly more than in member state Ministries of Defence or Foreign Affairs which are more oriented towards domestic audiences, and state sovereignty. But the ‘EU way’ is evident, constituting an embryonic and normative EU strategic culture. While some respondents view economic austerity as an opportunity for policy convergence, a Brussels-based expert (Interview 4) fears spending cuts make alignment of strategic cultures less likely. He recommends that cost savings should be coordinated at the EU level to improve capability and coherence. Biscop (2011b) and Biscop and Coelmont (2011b) agree but warn that pooling and sharing is no panacea for capacity building, which requires increased resources.

An EDA official (Interview 7) is well placed to assess the need for EU-level coordination. He comments that economic pressures could force cooperation through economies of scale, but member states should accept EDA recommendations, a view shared by an ECFR expert (Interview 10). The EDA official contrasts the level of European strategic culture in 2010 with the start of the decade but cautions that it depends how the term is defined. While there are common perspectives and shared ideas, and a socialisation effect over the decade, national positions remain at variance, and convergence does not mean everyone thinks the same.
However, echoing Witney (2008), he points to considerable movement. In Sweden for example, as noted earlier, there has been a shift from:

extreme reluctance (…) to an important level of participation, albeit with a strong civilian orientation (Interview 7).

He explains that various member states have adopted a more European position. In Ireland there is strong engagement despite almost no budget and almost no armed forces. Ireland contributed to EUFOR Tchad and is proactive in the EDA. The Netherlands has moved from almost complete transatlanticism to full CSDP engagement. Poland has made a similar journey, partly motivated by procurement from the US being expensive and Warsaw receiving less from the US than expected. Chappell reports how the 2011 EU Presidency marked Poland’s:

‘return to Europe’ (and the) huge strides from a sceptic to an enthusiastic proponent and leader of CSDP’s development (Chappell, 2012:197).

Poland used its Council Presidency to push for the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) to be a permanent CIV-MIL standing OHQ, and has been highly active in Battlegroups, using the concept to modernise the Polish military, and developing its role as ‘an emerging military leader’ (Chappell, 2012:158). Pomorska (2011:173) describes Poland as an ‘enthusiastic participant’ in the European security system. Considering CSDP as a whole and German-Polish convergence in security and defence thinking, Chappell reports German advocacy of new security tasks, commenting that both countries’ policy makers:

support the EU as a security and defence actor in the civil-military realm and promote EU-NATO compatibility (Chappell, 2012:192).

A Europeanised perspective has been evident in Germany from the outset. An SWP expert claims that ‘ESDP wouldn’t have happened without German input’ (Interview 22). This respondent underlines the importance of the Iraq crisis as an ESDP driver because it generated a consensus that Europe requires hard power to act in a crisis. This suggests an important shift towards a common position, embracing hitherto Atlanticist-inclined CEECs. Momentum was stalled but not derailed by referenda defeats on the Constitution (Interview, ibid). Subsequent developments have assisted convergence, notably the Ghent Framework (see p.107 above) and the Weimar Triangle Initiative between France, Germany and Poland (Dickow, 2011) which implements a permanent planning and conduct capability. This is more than a narrow three-state agreement, having both British and American support, so there are various signs of a more Europeanised approach to security (Interview, ibid). Ghent presents
an opportunity in times of austerity for more intelligent use of resources to boost capability, but it requires a strategic commitment, according to Biscop and Coelmont (2011b). While these initiatives may in the long-term signal a Europeanised approach, CSDP depends on Britain and France bringing weight to Europe’s ability to exercise global security influence, as only they possess adequately power-based strategic cultures (see previous Chapter) (Lindlay-French, 2010). Others call for a Grand Strategy based on concrete initiatives, top-down guidance and political will (Biscop, 2009, 2013a; Biscop et al, 2009; Howorth, 2009, 2010a; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010a; Drent and Zandee, 2010; Simòn, 2011). A former military officer in Brussels summarised the historically disparate positions among member states, all heavily weighed by history, and says that some states:

have managed since 1954 to have no strategic culture at all, relying solely on NATO (but) all this is changing. We see convergence in this area (Interview 5).

He comments that the 2008 Livre Blanc is a civil-military document concerned with security, not only defence, while in the UK there is now a much higher level of interest in partnership and cooperation, and Germany has moved from its former position: the Balkans showed that Germany had to take responsibility. Indeed a Balkans expert reports Germany as the most engaged member state in Kosovo (Interview 27). But clearly other member states, Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands, and even Austria, Finland and Ireland, contribute to an emergent EU strategic culture and should not be forgotten (Interview 3). Giegerich and Nicoll (2012) assess troop deployments, citing Denmark, France, Sweden and the UK as above the European average along with Austria, Italy and Slovenia, clear evidence of emerging European strategic culture in these member states. Laggards, however, include Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Greece, Malta, Romania, Spain and Portugal. Germany though is fully engaged with the CSDP process, according to the Brussels military expert cited above:

Germany is present in CSDP and NATO operations, but Germany and German governments have to move slowly, but they are moving (Interview 5).

He argues that there is more commonality than the public ever hear about. Germany’s commitment to Kosovo, affirmed by Interview 27 (above) and by Hamilton (2014), is relatively low-cost and low-risk, and yet it translates well domestically as taking responsibility and contributing to international security. This reflects Pohl’s (2013, 2014) assessment that CSDP operates primarily according to domestic drivers.
A military expert in Brussels cites Poland as instructive, shifting towards a European position, 'a big player in CSDP', again benefiting from domestic support. Pomorska (2011) stresses Polish CSDP interest as consistent with Warsaw's Atlanticist preferences, and interest in the ENP towards Belarus and Ukraine. Poland and other CEECs 'have shifted towards convergence and a common position (on strategic culture)' (Interview 5). This expert, like several others, notes the contribution from smaller member states:

Ireland is a good example. The Irish position is that if there’s a UNSC mandate, then okay we’re part of it. And for ESDP operations with a mandate, both military and civilian operations, this is okay. ESDP is creating its rules of operation, its terms of engagement, and they are in practice clear and fully in line with Irish views. So Ireland for example played a lead role in the second Congo mission (Interview, ibid).

Denmark, paradoxically, also demonstrates convergence, despite opting out from CSDP and the EDA for political reasons. In reality Denmark engages with both, and ‘certainly would not dream of exercising a veto. Rather, they have always been supportive’ (Interview, ibid), a view upheld by Copenhagen’s support for ‘the development of the EU as an actor in the field of security’ (Larsen, 2011:93). Austria, like Ireland historically neutral, is ‘utterly supportive and engaged’ (Interview 5), a view confirmed by Giegerich and Nicoll (2012). These countries can only operate from within a CSDP framework and from that they gain legitimacy and, arguably, influence. This highlights CSDP’s importance to smaller member states, an aspect of the process sometimes overlooked. It has not been built purely on EU-3 convergence: others are important (Interview 3), as Smith (2004:20) affirms, referring to EU foreign policy developing not only because of EU-3, but also because the smaller states play an important role. Indeed they collectively assist a fundamental gelling effect around CSDP cooperation, contributing to trans-European integration. Witney (2008) however, like Giegerich and Nicoll (2012), highlights wide disparities in member state contributions to CSDP implementation and resourcing.

A political and military adviser to EUFOR Althea comments on European strategic culture residing within a soft power culture that reflects European identity:

We (Europeans) prefer a more diplomatic and cooperative approach and that I think is a European culture, a soft power culture that is working (Interview 21).

This reflects the European ‘way of war’ (Everts et al, 2004) and Europe’s emerging strategic culture (Menon et al, 2004; Biava et al, 2011). However, while soft power can work in the Balkans where EU membership is the prize for economic and political reform, beyond
Europe it lacks salience in defusing situations of armed conflict. Realists consider soft power virtually irrelevant to the strategic culture debate, but CSDP rests on soft power backed by the threat of military force. It does therefore require capability, and ‘where necessary, robust intervention’ (Solana, 2003:11).

A EUFOR Althea official, doubtful that a European strategic culture exists, contrasts differences at government level with what happens at mission level. Through Althea transnational cooperation works well, this hardly indicates a common European strategic culture (Interview 18). This suggests CSDP works on an issue-by-issue basis (Interviews 1,14). The next chapter on the institutional dynamics of CSDP discusses this and other characteristics of bureaucratic politics that support H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.

The polarised perspectives on strategic culture present a challenge for this research. Approximately half the respondents referring directly to strategic culture consider that the EU does not have one, while a slightly smaller number comment on an emergent European strategic culture. Combined with analysis of relevant literature referred to above which refers to convergence between member state strategic cultures, and retaining an understanding of the concept based on the comprehensive approach and Longhurst’s definition (on p.3), leads to the conclusion that a European strategic culture is emerging, and that it co-exists with member state strategic cultures. In H1 terms this means that an emergent EU strategic culture does deliver modest strategic actorness and in time could lead to a stronger strategic approach. By contrast the sceptical views (Section 4.3.1) echo proponents of Grand Strategy, urging more proactive engagement and a pronounced strategic effort towards capability enhancement. This requires clear political will to boost strategic actorness.

An emergent strategic culture is also reflected in EU documentation, particularly the Lisbon Treaty (2007). Lisbon contains institutional initiatives that could enable a more proactive CSDP, namely the HR-VP as head of the EEAS, the EEAS itself which has a comprehensive foreign policy remit, and the EDA role, enhanced through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (see Chapter 5 for detailed analysis). It is also significant that the ‘positive’ respondents reported in this section adopt a long-term view and stress progress in a short time, especially compared with six decades of SEM integration. This positive assessment matches commentaries by Chappell (2012), Biava et al (2011) Norheim-Martinesen (2011) and Meyer (2005, 2006, 2013).
The positive view recognises achievements stemming from pooling and sharing, including cooperation in helicopter training, the European Satellite Communications Procurement Cell, Letters of Intent signed by 15 countries on field hospitals, and air-to-air refuelling agreed by 10 countries (EDA, 2012, 2013, 2014). Biscop highlights the almost complete integration of the Belgian and Dutch navies (Biscop (2013b). Drent and Zandee (2010:72-3) report Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands establishing a European Air Transport Command (EATC) near Eindhoven. Military air transport by these five nations no longer occurs separately (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2008).

These agreements demonstrate that something genuinely integrationary and strategic maybe within reach, supporting the intention element in H1 CSDP intends to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor. Large-scale projects initiated years ago like the A400M military transporter and NH90 helicopter are multinational. France and Britain cooperate in several areas, including aircraft carriers. Pooling and sharing is happening and is a model for future development (Biscop, 2013b). In November 2012 the foreign and defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain - the UK notably absent - ended with the words ‘we need more Europe also (in) defence’ (France Diplomatie, 2012:3).

Biscop (2013b) insists that for cooperation to develop into strategic initiatives with an integrationary dynamic, a more comprehensive capability-enhancing approach is required. This is outlined in the Long-term Vision from the EDA (2006) and the Capability Development Plan adopted by the Council in 2008 (EU Council Secretariat, 2010; EDA, 2014a). By 2012 the Council noted ‘significant progress’ on pooling and sharing in several EDA-facilitated initiatives, including Air-to-Air Refuelling, Medical Support, Training and Maritime Surveillance, and called for further efforts in Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, dual use satellite technology, smart munitions and naval logistics (European Council, 2012:2).

The EDA reports progress in ‘cooperative capability projects’ (EDA, 2013, 2014) including Air-to-Air Refuelling, countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), helicopter training, air transport, military satellites and maritime surveillance, while the HR and the European Council advocate joint efforts to develop unmanned airborne vehicles (UAVs), Air-to-Air Refuelling, satellite communications and cyber security (Ashton, 2013c:2; European Council, 2013:para.11). The Council meeting in December 2013 was preceded by preparatory papers from the HR (Ashton, 2013c), the Commission (European Commission, 2013d) and from the European Parliament (2013b). These documents suggest enhanced cooperation, a strengthening European strategic culture and ambition towards improved capability, and
even actorness. They contribute to the continuing EU rhetoric concerning capability and actorness (SMD, 1998; European Council, 1999a, 1999b, 2008; Solana, 2003; Lisbon Treaty, 2007). Interview opinion regarding an emergent European strategic culture is summarised below.

Fig. 4.3 Existence of European strategic culture: Emergent/Affirmative views

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Précis of remarks on strategic culture</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Researcher comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some wanted a European s.c., others didn’t. Range of views (18)</td>
<td>Varied</td>
<td>At mission level there is a working s.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big change in Germany, more engagement. A transformation. Exogenous pressures drive change (6)</td>
<td>Not yet, but coming. Emergent <strong>E</strong></td>
<td>Long-term view. No confidence in ESS as blueprint for s.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, emerging. <strong>Coexists</strong> with state s.c. German view strong in ESDP: multilateral, civilian-led, all together in preventive action (22)</td>
<td>Yes, emergent. <strong>Co-exists</strong> with state s.c. <strong>E CX</strong></td>
<td>Long view of history. Compared with NATO, much achieved in 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent, based on ‘EU way’, which exists. Not strong, but present. Complements member states’ s.c. (4)</td>
<td>Yes, emergent. <strong>Co-exists</strong> with state s.c. <strong>E CX</strong></td>
<td>Long view. Need to develop strategic element, coordinate response to austerity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS tried to provide European s. c. EU tries to combine development, foreign policy, and CSDP. Slow s.c. evolution, <strong>co-exists</strong> with state s.c.’s (11)</td>
<td>Yes, emergent <strong>co-exists with state s.c.</strong> <strong>E CX</strong></td>
<td>Long-term view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong EDA engagement from small states esp. NL, Sweden. UK ‘outlier’. Germany inconsistent, defends its industrial interests in EDA (7)</td>
<td>More than before, emergent <strong>E</strong></td>
<td>Convergence needed in long-term. So far only evident in small and medium states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergence is real. State s.c.’s changing. Big changes in CEECs. More Europeanist (5)</td>
<td>Convergence <strong>EC</strong></td>
<td>States move at different speeds on European s.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No political process. Lack of debate. States not driving European s.c. No <strong>strategic</strong> approach, not a priority. States control decision-making (24)</td>
<td>Yes, but weak. <strong>YW</strong></td>
<td>Only at mission level, and l.c.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s civilian, and <strong>soft</strong> power. Works in Balkans (21)</td>
<td>Yes <strong>Y</strong></td>
<td>Mission perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European s.c. in civil, military, political and economic processes. Various instruments, cooperation growing, becoming established (23)</td>
<td>Yes, and developing <strong>Y</strong></td>
<td>Long-term view, much progress in 10 yrs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:** s.c. = strategic culture; l.c.d. = lowest-common-denominator; **E** = Emergent; **CX** = co-existing with state s.c.’s; **EC** = convergence between states; **YW** = Yes, but weak; **Y** = Yes (Numbers indicate interviews; see Appendix, p.302)

### 4.4 Conclusion

EU strategic culture is a prerequisite for EU strategic actorness and fundamental to the aims of CSDP, namely peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.1).

Evidence concerning strategic culture relates to H1 **CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor.** The previous section (4.3) presented a divide
between ‘cup half-full’ or ‘cup half-empty’ perspectives. Positive opinion highlights core values on which an EU emergent strategic culture is developing, including multilateralism, international law and commitment to democracy and human rights. Positive respondents focus on the Union’s pursuit of security objectives through the comprehensive approach, a ‘toolbox’ comprising economic measures, trade, aid, support for political development, and democratisation. This represents a comprehensive strategic culture and a developing process towards enhanced CIV-MIL capability and strategic actorness.

In contrast rejection of the notion of an EU strategic culture rests upon the lack of an adequately strategic approach, the tendency for the Union to be reactive rather than proactive, and the failure to fully implement a top-down capability assessment and development plan as consistently advocated by the EDA (2014a). These respondents also stress the failure to identify common interests and to match capability to the threat environment. Ultimately they identify an absence of Grand Strategy. Several emphasise the lack of coherence in developing an EU military capability, or even towards strengthening the European contribution within NATO. In other words, military weakness undermines EU strategic culture.

Having considered relevant academic literature and other sources, including official publications, the study concludes that there is an emergent EU strategic culture, especially as CSDP should be understood as an evolving process. A key observation is that the emerging strategic culture coexists with, rather than replaces, pre-existing but also changing state strategic cultures, and a NATO strategic culture. Strategic cultures are in flux, subject to different interpretations, and still adjusting to post-Cold War realities (Biava et al, 2011).

There has clearly been some strategic culture convergence between member states, involving not just EU-3 (see Chapter 3) but also others, several with strongly pacifist or Atlanticist traditions. Several states have shown important development in their strategic cultures, especially the more pacifist Sweden and Ireland, and Atlanticist Poland and Denmark. Britain and France have moved towards cooperation between their militaries and foreign policy elites. German strategic culture has undergone substantial shift towards civilian and military commitment, although it remains a laggard, especially in spending terms. But change is evident:

Especially after the Kosovo crisis of 1999, Britain, France and Germany have moved towards increasingly compatible strategic concepts (King, 2005:47).
The extent to which this compatibility has progressed since 2005 is a disappointment to many of a sceptical persuasion on the issue of EU strategic culture. It also disappoints the United States which has consistently demanded higher European defence spending. But despite the slow pace of change where defence is concerned, CSDP has consolidated through institutional development (see next chapter) and through missions (see Chapter 6). Positive respondents agree with sceptics about the lack of capability and willingness to intervene in crises, but they focus on what has been achieved. Convergence does not mean an integrated or common perspective, as implied by Europeanisation (see next Chapter, Section 5.5), meaning state-level adaptation to comply with demands from supranational institutions (Radaelli, 2000, 2003). Interview evidence suggests exogenous pressures and some elite socialisation pushing states towards common positions. Cooperation nurtures ways of thinking, and shared values and policy preferences. Such normative processes can assist policy convergence, contributing to the emergent European strategic culture detected in this Chapter.

The question of values is important because the EU’s comprehensive strategic culture has values at its core. The comprehensive approach (CA) is fundamental to CSDP, and values are present in the ESS (Solana, 2003) and Lisbon Treaty (2007). Several writers stress values as integral to an emergent EU strategic culture (Biscop, 2009; Chappell, 2012; Biava et al, 2011; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). Fig.4.4 summarises the notion of an emergent European strategic culture.

**Fig.4.4 Summary of emergent European strategic culture (eEsc)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key observation on emergent European strategic culture (eEsc)</th>
<th>Researcher comment or caveat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No consensus on a common European strategic culture (s.c.)</td>
<td>But evident convergence between states, incl. Fr, UK, Ger, in short time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But European s.c. is emerging/emergent</td>
<td>But in crab-like fashion, resisted and contested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eEsc is different from previous state s.c.’s</td>
<td>Consequence of changed threat environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse, diffuse and changing nature of threat</td>
<td>Coming to terms with post-Cold War changed environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eEsc uses mainly civilian and soft power and range of instruments</td>
<td>“Toolbox” (diplomacy, trade, economic assistance, support for democracy, human rights, policing and judicial matters). Partnership with or accession to EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Toolbox’ includes coercion from threat of force, esp. in peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>Consistent with Petersberg Tasks and ToA (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eEsc is multilateralist</td>
<td>CSDP missions require UN or other multilateral authorisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eEsc co-exists with state strategic cultures</td>
<td>Degree of fit dependent on issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since CFSP and CSDP are intergovernmental, state s.c. may trump eEsc (issue-by-issue)</td>
<td>Veto applies, no QMV. States decide participation in missions, issue-by-issue. States’ s.c. also changing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signs of uploading of s.c. preferences between state and European level</td>
<td>Small states, states without military-oriented s.c. may see preferences uploaded if part of coalition of interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal pressures between states</td>
<td>Pressures also from international organisations and other agents, exogenous pressures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategic culture convergence occurs on account of horizontal transgovernmental channels, not from the vertical top-down adaptation model derived from Community Law (Major, 2005; Mérand et al, 2011). Various intergovernmental initiatives, including St Malo, the Anglo-French treaties in 2010, the Weimar Initiative and the Ghent Framework, all contribute to cooperation (Dickow et al, 2011) and the emergent European strategic culture. Norheim-Martinsen says that despite member states’ different interests, since the ESS was published:

> a specific strategic culture has in fact evolved, in which consensus on a comprehensive approach to security as a unique European Union asset, rather than on a broad set of shared security interests among its Member States, has become the focal point for the fledgling (CSDP) (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011:524).

This chimes with the positive evidence above. The comprehensive approach (p.4) rather than common interests becomes the *sine qua non* for a European strategic culture. This shifts the terms of understanding from the interest-based nature of a traditional reading of strategic culture, making it easier to accept that a common European strategic culture exists.

There is growing consensus on soft power and normative principles. There is also rhetorical acceptance of the need for enhanced capability. Battlegroups have improved transnational cooperation (Lindstrom, 2007, 2011; Dickow et al, 2011), and the EDA has assisted progress on rationalisation and capability (EDA, 2012, 2014b; Biscop, 2013a). Pooling and sharing between groups of member states has brought ‘islands of cooperation’ (Mawdsley, 2012), and rationalisation according to Major and Molling (2011) and Biscop (2013b).

An emergent European strategic culture however does not necessarily indicate strong support for H1 *CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor*. A strategic CSDP, as implied in H1, means actorness and capability across the full range of instruments. An emergent EU strategic culture does however confirm at least the potential for EU strategic actorness. In fact respondents are almost unanimously critical of CSDP’s lack of strategic focus so offer little support for H1. But several take a long view, seeing significant progress in a short time, and potential scope strategic actorness in future.

Various assessments of CSDP stress its achievements, and report that CSDP enhances the notion of a comprehensive European strategic culture (Howorth, 2014; Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2008; Grevi, Helly and Keohane, 2009; Menon, 2009; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010a; Biava et al, 2011). Others conclude that the Union remains some way short of strategic actorness (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009:158; Simòn, 2011; Kupchan, 2012). This
underlines how CSDP is a work-in-progress, and suggests weak support for the intention element in H1, but almost no support for strategic actorness being already established.

Simòn (2011) and Kupchan (2012) argue that CSDP lacks the necessary strategic approach to meet security threats, insisting that this is essential to EU survival in the 21st century. This underlines the important implications of H1 *CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor*. Grand Strategy proponents insist that EU credibility as a strategic actor is essential for survival, but as power is more diffuse than it was in a Union of 6, 9 or 12 member states, it becomes harder for the Union to behave *as if it were a single state*. The thesis intends no judgement on what CSDP requires, while Grand Strategy is arguably a manifesto for reform. The thesis instead highlights what CSDP is about and how it works, and on this basis questions the feasibility of Grand Strategy. Similarly Maull (2011) suggests that merely to ‘get strategic’ is unlikely to deal adequately with Europe’s wider problems and bargaining between national elites may have reached its limits. This helps to explain why intergovernmentalism, typically based on interstate bargaining, is an insufficient description of how CSDP works, or is likely to develop. Other processes are involved, but as Chapter 2 argued, neofunctionalism does not complete the picture, because there has been no shift towards building supranational institutions or a body of European law as was achieved by neofunctionalism in the early years of European integration.

The thesis develops the argument that the evolution and practice of CSDP suggests that Grand Strategy is unlikely to gain traction over a *modus operandi* of ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1959:83), a reflection of bureaucratic politics. Chapters 5 and 6 have a stronger orientation towards testing H2 *CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics*.

While this chapter lends only weak support to H1, the discussion is not yet closed. In the meantime analysis of H2 requires examination of CSDP institutional arrangements (Chapter 5) and mission implementation (Chapters 6). These chapters enable further examination of the relationship between rhetoric and achievement (see Fig.1.2, p.14) and analysis of Europeanisation as a feature of CSDP. They also assist assessment of the feasibility of a Grand Strategy approach towards achieving the Union’s goals regarding security and defence. The next chapter also develops a deeper look at other potential explanations for CSDP, specifically Brusselsisation, social constructivism, and Europeanisation.
Chapter Five

Institutional dynamics and policy-making

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the institutional context of CSDP against competing theoretical explanations, namely Brusselsisation (Allen, 1998), institutional socialisation (Checkel, 1999, 2005), and Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003; Wong, 2005), and progresses exploration of H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics. While intergovernmentalism remains fundamental to the foreign, security and defence policy-making process (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013), it offers an incomplete explanation of CSDP, failing to capture the institutional dynamics of the policy-making process and CSDP implementation (see pp.38-42). Other explanations are explored in this chapter together with further assessment of Grand Strategy as a means to develop CSDP capability. GS is frustrated by the Union’s failure to articulate common interests and by weak CIV-MIL capability development. The chapter explains why these deficiencies persist.

An analysis of CSDP institutions must be fundamental to the thesis:

It is only via an appreciation of the nature and workings of international institutions that one can understand CSDP (Menon, 2011:84).

The chapter assesses whether bureaucratic politics (see pp.4-7) explains CSDP, and whether the overt pursuit of Grand Strategy (see p.4) can drive its development. This further tests H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor, but is more concerned with H2 and bureaucratic politics.

Section 5.2 outlines the institutional structures of CSDP. Section 5.3 critically examines changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The remainder of the chapter analyses potential explanatory theories in relation to the institutional design of CSDP in the light of primary research and an extensive CSDP literature. Section 5.4 explores institutional socialisation which lacks the power to drive CSDP, and Brusselsisation which has been reinforced by Lisbon consolidating a CSDP bureaucracy, namely the European External Action Service. Section 5.5 challenges claims regarding Europeanisation on the grounds that the concept is difficult to justify except in its weakest form of mere cooperation between European states.
Sections 5.6 and 5.7 consider bureaucratic politics as a potential explanation for CSDP. Section 5.8 summarises the chapter’s main findings which contribute to the originality of the thesis. These are that Lisbon sets up an institutional framework through which CSDP may be developed and that the manner in which CSDP has evolved and is implemented reflects bureaucratic politics. This has important implications for Grand Strategy: GS is not a feasible means through which CSDP can develop, while bureaucratic politics may be more successful in the long term. GS depends on power relationships within the Union, but while power is decisive in traditional intergovernmental bargaining, this is not how CSDP works, which makes an overt GS approach untenable.

5.2 CSDP institutional architecture

During the 1980s EPC attempted to help member states arrive at foreign policy coherence from which the Commission could present the ‘community view’ on foreign policy issues. This worked reasonably well but produced only tepid declarations, easily countermanded by individual member states in a purely intergovernmental environment.

The Maastricht negotiations sought to progress the consensus-based EPC but the Pillar architecture of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, 1992) affirmed Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as intergovernmental (Bomberg, et al., 2008:5-6), so throughout the 1990s common policy was more aspiration than reality. Member states adopted different perspectives on major challenges, notably German reunification and the Balkan crisis. CFSP arrived in response to divisions arising from Germany’s early recognition of Slovene and Croatian independence, which while responding to the inevitable, would have looked more assured with full European Community backing. The crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina likewise drew an incoherent EC response (Glenny, 1993), although former European envoy to ex-Yugoslavia, David Owen, is sharply critical of the Union’s attempt to drive a common response, insisting that intergovernmentalism should permit member states to frame policies in accordance with national interest (Owen, 1996:377).

CFSP affirmed Commission responsibilities for trade and external policies while the Council and the rotating Presidency took the lead in foreign affairs (Allen, 1998). This meant dual responsibility for EU external affairs leading to rivalry and confusion. The Commission sought influence through its development role and the former DG1A External Relations, to which Commission President Delors appointed foreign and defence policy advisors. Turf
wars between the Council and the Community-oriented Commission have been a feature of EU foreign and security policy ever since (Dinan, 2011). The Treaty of Amsterdam (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997) did little for institutional clarity but it did introduce the role of High Representative for the CFSP and an early warning and planning unit under HR authority, steps which ‘continued, perhaps accelerated, the process of Brusselisation’ (Allen, 1998:57) (see pp.46-9).

St Malo triggered considerable institutional innovation under Javier Solana’s leadership as HR (Smith, 2004; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Cross, 2008; Mattelaer, 2010). The Cologne Council in June 1999 agreed to strengthen CFSP and common defence, and the capacity to take on the full range of Petersberg Tasks including ‘autonomous action’ (European Council, 1999a). In December the Council agreed the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) (European Council, 1999b). ESDP formally began in 2003 under the so-called Solana institutions headed by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the decision-making vanguard of EU security and defence policy (Meyer, 2006; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Mérand, 2008; Howorth, 2010b; Mérand et al, 2011; Bickerton, 2011). These structures lay within the ambit of the Council, an intergovernmental regime with rights of veto and opt-out, a situation that remains unchanged post-Lisbon.

ESDP spawned a General Secretariat of 200-plus member state-nominated officials, a kind of civil service answerable to the PSC and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). Member state ambassadors in the PSC constituted a powerful consensus-seeking and compromise-oriented body with control over ESDP missions (Meyer, 2006; Howorth, 2010b, 2014). The Secretariat embraced specialist units involved in management and implementation, notably the EU Military Committee (EUMC) composed of member state Military Chiefs, the highest military body in the Council and ‘the key decision-shaping body in crisis management’ (Howorth, 2007:74). It:

(provides) the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all matters military within the EU. It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework (Council Decision, 2001b).

It also gives military direction to the EU Military Staff (EUMS) which supplies strategic options in crisis management. It forwards these with evaluations, advice, and risk assessment to the PSC. The EUMC also provides financial estimates for crisis management military costs.
Solana oversaw the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004 (Council Joint Action, 2004a; Council Decision, 2011a), another Anglo-French initiative tasked with securing rationalisation and efficiency gains in equipment, procurement, and cooperation between member state militaries, promoting combined technologies and research, and improving the effectiveness of military expenditure (Schmitt, 2004; Howorth, 2007:109; 2014:87). It is not a Council body and while small and lacking executive authority, it has highlighted wasteful consequences of derogation from the Treaty of Rome regarding procurement, which often leads to research and production duplication, and interoperability problems between forces, undermining both CSDP and NATO (Witney, 2008:50n). The EDA launched a Capability Development Plan (CDP) in 2008, an evolving needs analysis-based process, designed to assist member states with resource rationalisation and capability enhancement (EDA, 2014a).

Lisbon ratification in 2009 inaugurated CSDP, the position of High Representative for the Union’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy combined with the Commission Vice-Presidency (HR-VP), the European External Action Service (EEAS), and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (Lisbon Treaty, 2007). These innovations are discussed in Section 5.3, but the key point is that member states retain power, and responsibility for CSDP rests with the PSC (Howorth, 2010b; Mérand et al, 2011; Bickerton, 2011). This overview of the CSDP institutional structures demonstrates the importance of avoiding the intergovernmentalist ‘state v Europe’ assumption that often dominates IR and foreign policy discourse. CSDP is more complex, making intergovernmentalism an inadequate explanation of the processes involved.

Interview evidence confirms that there has been no power shift away from member states. Many respondents define the states as ‘drivers’ of CSDP (Interviews 1,2,4,14) but this is an oversimplification as it underestimates how institutional development and bureaucratic politics, as H2 proposes, impacts on CSDP processes. It also underestimates the extent to which states may block initiatives, for example by merely paying ‘lip service’ to the EDA (Howorth, 2014:87).

Since February 2010 CSDP has been implemented through the EEAS, a service organisation headed by the HR-VP. A notable post-Lisbon innovation within the EEAS is the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) tasked with improving coordination between civilian and military aspects of crisis management (Gebhard, 2009; Drent and Zandee, 2010:39; Stevens, 2012; CMPD, 2014). The CMPD is central to mission planning
and policy implementation, responsible for drafting a crisis management concept (CMC) which covers the political and military aspects of a crisis intervention. The military input comes from the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS) (EEAS, n.d.b) while civilian expertise comes from the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) (Council Decision, 2000) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities unit (CPCC), the latter operational since 2007-08 and reflecting the military structures already existing between the EUMC and EUMS (ESDP, 2008:24-5; Gebhard, 2009). The CPCC is under PSC control and strategic direction, and HR-VP authority. It ensures effective planning and implementation of civilian CMOs (EEAS, n.d.b). Following advice from the EUMC and/or CIVCOM, the crisis management concept is negotiated in the PSC. Once agreed, it is forwarded to the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and the Council for approval (Björkdahl and Strömvik, 2008). Fig.5.1 represents key CSDP structures.

**Fig.5.1 CSDP Structures (based on ISIS, 2013)**

The PSC ‘exercises political control and strategic direction’ in respect of CFSP and CSDP (EEAS, n.d.b). It maintains oversight once a mission is launched, receiving reports from mission commanders. It also receives reports from 141 EU Delegations (Ashton, 2013a), which are part of the EEAS. They coordinate the Commission role in human rights, democracy and stabilisation initiatives, aid, trade and other economic matters, providing overall management of EU engagement with third countries. The comprehensive approach
is, according to ex-CMPD Head Walter Stevens, central to EEAS strategic coherence (Stevens, 2012). However progress has, according to Major and Mölling, brought ambiguous results due to strategic incoherence. They call for a:

peacebuilding strategy to improve the coordination and implementation of the EU’s instruments across the spectrum of its peacebuilding activities (Major and Mölling, 2013:45-6).

The CIV-MIL cooperation and comprehensive vision within the CMPD is intended to improve coherence in crisis intervention, which Witney (2008:2) considered missing. While Drent and Zandee (2010:36), Gourlay (2011) and Dinan (2011) suggest the CMPD could be another interim step in an evolving process, Stevens (2012) insists that the EEAS and CMPD have greatly enhanced strategic coherence, citing the EU NAVFOR Atalanta mission as evidence of the comprehensive approach (EU NAVFOR, 2015a, 2015b; Council Joint Action, 2008a).

The CMPD, regarded by an insider as the central instrument in CSDP (Interview 9), also engages with the Commission on the economic and political implications of CM, including the Commission role in post-crisis stabilisation, economic matters, democracy and rule of law, human rights and institutional development. The CMPD encapsulates the ‘toolbox’ approach (EEAS, n.d.b), comprehensive CIV-MIL and Commission-EEAS coordination. It can resolve the divide between ‘community’ and Council interests identified by Schroeder (2007). The emergent EU strategic culture (see previous chapter) is also evident, but planning processes may be undermined by rivalry between the CMPD and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability unit (CPCC), according to an SWP expert (Interview 22), a concern which reflects doubts about EEAS coherence in general (Mauri and Gya, 2009; Barber, 2010; Gourlay, 2011).

The EDA played a pivotal role in encouraging the Commission to introduce secondary legislation, approved by the Council, to enable Single Market law to prevail in defence industry procurement, potentially a step towards rationalisation and efficiency savings for European militaries. The EDA is described as the ‘strategic cornerstone of CSDP’ (Chang, 2011:73) but more realistically it is an intergovernmental body under member states’ control. It answers to the PSC, not vice versa (Interview 6). It has made a ‘valiant effort’ (Biscop and Coelmont, 2011b:151) to promote pooling and sharing, but is undermined by caveats in the Lisbon Treaty, specifically Article 346 which contradicts the spirit of the secondary legislation just referred to, offering a ‘security exemption’ whereby member states can make any
procurement choice they wish. The EDA seeks to define and promote ‘a European capabilities and armaments policy (and) assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42; EDA, 2014a). It pursues efficiency gains by encouraging pooling and sharing of military assets, a process theoretically enabled by another Lisbon innovation, Permanent Structured Cooperation (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.46). PESCO encourages groups of member states to pursue collective action, including pooling and sharing, or mission engagement, while others remain uninvolved. According to Strickmann (2008), Drent and Zandee (2010), Biscop and Coelmont (2011b, 2011c) and Biscop (2013b) these developments can, under EDA guidance, bring significant capability enhancements, but while there is progress in pooling and sharing (see p.117), the issue is challenging because it touches upon sovereignty (Stevens, 2012).

This section has demonstrated striking institutional development in little more than a decade. While there is better civilian-military partnership, resources have not followed the institutional lead, a long-term issue among European NATO members. Financial crisis and austerity exacerbates the problem (Stevens, 2012), as does member states’ failure to identify, prioritise and articulate strategic interests (Biscop, 2013a). Inadequate resources continue to undermine actorness and prospects for Grand Strategy.

The institutional framework developed around CSDP suggests weak support for H1 CSDP intends to enhance the credibility of the European Union as a strategic actor, especially if one emphasises intention. The framework for strategic actorness exists but effectiveness (and actorness) is undermined by inadequate resources, lack of political will and failure to identify common interests. Further analysis of H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics may explain why these weaknesses persist and whether CSDP may achieve substance despite these deficiencies. The next section provides more detailed criticism of Lisbon Treaty innovations.

5.3 Critiquing the Lisbon Treaty: EEAS, HR-VP and PESCO

Institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty potentially enhance the comprehensive effectiveness of EU foreign and security policy (Zwolski, 2012a, 2012b; Blockmans and Wessel, 2009) including prospects for institutional policy entrepreneurship (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Dijkstra, 2012b; Biscop, 2011a; Crowe, 2008; Mauri and Gya, 2009; Grässle, 2011; Martin, 2013; Sus, 2014). This section looks at the impact of three Lisbon innovations:
the European External Action Service (EEAS), the High Representative-Vice President (HR-VP), and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

The EEAS (Council Decision, 2010b; Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.27.3) absorbs the previously named Council General Secretariat (CGS), most of the Commission’s DG External Relations and part of DG Development (Dinan, 2011:115). It is a service organisation supporting the HR-VP, underpinning CSDP crisis management tasks, and the Commission’s external relations and development interests. The EEAS ought to bring advantages through linking the Council’s foreign policy interests with the Commission’s external engagement, as well as the HR also being Commission Vice-President. The Commission exercises a broad governance role, embracing trade, aid, external relations, development, diplomacy and budgetary matters. It also has responsibility for the EU Delegations and bilateral relations with third parties, including the Copenhagen criteria and relations with pre-accession states (European Commission, 2012). However, such potential advantages may also provide fertile ground for rivalries within, and with, the EEAS, and with the Parliament.

The increased profile of the Parliament is notable. It is assigned to:

- fully play its role in the external action of the Union, including its functions of political control as provided for in Art.14.1 TEU, as well as in legislative and budgetary matters (Council Decision, 2010b:para.6).

The Parliament secured an equal distribution in EEAS personnel between Council appointees, Commission staff and national diplomatic services (Dinan, 2011:114) and also won influence over the budget, and Commission financial interests (Archick, 2014). These achievements are considered by an EUMS official (Interview 8), and by Klein and Wessels (2013:463), as potentially integrationary. As well as enhancing Parliament’s influence, the Decision specifies that EEAS staff should not act as agents of their sponsoring member state. They:

- should carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interest of the Union in mind (Council Decision, 2010b:Art.3.4 para.9).

This pushes the EEAS towards a form of supranationalism without authority, given that it lacks autonomous decision-making. The Commission appointing a third of EEAS staff reflects the wider brief of the new service compared with the former CGS. It embraces
economic, trade and political development issues, all funded from the Community budget. These interests are pursued by the 141 EU Delegations representing the Union in states where there is usually a development or post-conflict interest. An MEP writes that EUDs demonstrate that:

the pretence that European foreign policy continues to be made in an entirely intergovernmental fashion with each of the (...) EU member states acting independently around the world has been discreetly abandoned (Harris, 2012:6).

The reach of the EEAS is considerable, supporting not only the HR-VP in the conduct of the Union’s CFSP and CSDP, but also it:

assists the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations (Council Decision, 2010b:Art.2.2).

The EEAS brings the Commission and CSDP closer together (Klein and Wessels, 2013), adding to the bureaucracy of the policy field, as in Weberian terms it is clearly a bureaucracy. This should not automatically weaken CSDP, although actorness may be difficult if actorness means capacity to act like a (traditional) state. In fact, as Dinan (2011) and Klein and Wessels (2013) report, the EEAS engages in foreign policy areas previously under the Commission:

The Commission keeps its role in trade and in negotiating deals and has brought this into the EEAS. There’s a lack of coherence on trade issues and on human rights or values, but trade is uppermost (...). The Commission role certainly has a bureaucratic nature, that’s true, so there is some bureaucratic dimension to the EEAS and its Commission aspects (Interview 26).

Applying ‘a Weberian bureaucratic autonomy concept’, Helwig (2013:105) comments that bureaucracies can develop significant autonomy, a form of agency slippage (Beem, 2009). EEAS effectiveness depends on its institutional design and leadership from the HR-VP. It operates ‘under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (Council Decision, 2010b:Art.3). Klein and Wessels (2013:462) stress that despite potential HR-VP policy initiation (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.18.2), this did not happen under Catherine Ashton. Fiott (2015:88) suspects this may not be unconnected to her being
British and influenced by the UK government. London wanted to limit EEAS impact, specifically by cooperating with the new organisation only where such cooperation would enhance British interests (House of Lords, 2013).

Howorth (2013:15) reports ‘widespread astonishment’ at the choice of the ‘inexperienced’ Ashton for the HR-VP role. One commentator described her appointment as ‘ridiculous’ (Telegraph, 2009b). The Economist (2012) commented on her ‘mediocrity’, and Dinan (2011) on her faltering start while noting she had too many responsibilities as HR, Commission Vice-President, Head of the EEAS and of CSDP, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and Head of the EDA. Duke (2012) suggests her ‘triple hat’ as Chair of the FAC, Commission V-P and HR was meant to promote inter-institutional coherence, a bridging role between the Council and the Commission (EEAS, n.d.b, n.d.c; Zwolski, 2012a).

Several respondents criticised Ashton’s lack of leadership. She was appointed as ‘a bureaucrat’ (Interview 1), ‘a mediator’ (Interview 23), with a ‘Commission mentality’ (Interview 9). She ‘is not a strategist’ (Interview 25), nor ‘an initiator’ (Interview 4), and has ‘too many roles’ (Interview 26). She is therefore ‘unlikely to contest Member State leaders on the world stage’ (Helwig, 2013:241). Howorth suggests her appointment was a sop to the UK which required one of the ‘top jobs’ (Howorth, 2011; 2014). Another view is that she was a low profile candidate appointed to oversee the new structures and assist the efficiency of a new organisation (Interview 26). But she was played a difficult hand (Barber, 2010; Allen and Smith, 2011, Dinan, 2011, Grässle, 2011; Howorth, 2014), and managed her multiple roles effectively, for which ultimately she gained credit (Martin, 2013; Telegraph, 2013a). Indeed widespread criticism was undermined by her achievements in conflict resolution between Serbia and Kosovo (Radio Free Europe, 2013; EEAS, 2013c) and Iran and the international community (Hansard, 2013; Financial Times, 2013b). She won praise for her unspectacular but diplomatic approach to foreign policy (Allen and Smith, 2011; Hadfield and Fiott, 2013, 2014; Martin, 2013; Guardian, 2013b; Whitman and Juncos, 2014), but Howorth (2014:62) says her leadership was weak and lacked vision, and she failed to end institutional turf wars.

The suspicion remains that Ashton was appointed to match the bureaucratic politics of the new organisation. Hadfield and Fiott comment on her low profile compared with the Presidents of the Commission and Council, both more likely to represent the EU in prominent meetings. Ashton was never likely to deliver ‘policy entrepreneurship’ or ‘strategy’ (Hadfield and Fiott, 2013:171). Unsurprisingly several respondents regarded Ashton as less proactive than Solana, although he was losing influence towards the end of his tenure.
Several expect Lisbon to advance CSDP, anticipating increased EEAS and HR-VP impact depending on the personality in the role (Interview 4,8,7,10,22,23). In contrast, a CMPD military expert (Interview 9) fears for the organisation’s future despite it being ‘an excellent idea’ that could improve CIV-MIL coordination, because of potential conflict with the HR-VP. This suggests another dimension to the turf wars surrounding the EEAS (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010:1355; Dinan, 2011:113; Allen and Smith, 2011; Murdoch, 2012; Howorth, 2013:16; Edwards, 2013:74; Klein and Wessels, 2013:462; Major and Mölling, 2013; Furness, 2013; Sus, 2014; Archick, 2014), also noted by a DGAP expert (Interview 25). Despite these concerns, Ashton’s tenure did not appear marked by CMPD-HR competition, while the CMPD has become a key CSDP institution.

An IISS expert also referred to the breadth of the HR-VP role and lack of clarity in the Lisbon Treaty. Member states purposefully left arrangements ‘somewhat vague’ (Howorth, 2013:15). The Treaty suggests bureaucratic politics, a characteristic of which, according to Wilson (1989), is multiple channels, complex power relationships, and ill-defined roles:

Ashton made a slow start but she’s been handed a difficult task, almost, you could say an impossible one. The roles are not defined, not determined. The power relationships, in fact Lisbon doesn’t set out how the HR position is supposed to relate to the President of Foreign Affairs Council, nor to the rotating Presidency, nor to the Commission, nor to (the President of the Commission). It's very unclear (Interview 1).

The HR-VP has a difficult, contradictory brief (Hadfield and Fiott, 2013:172; Helwig, 2013). There is much scope for conflict of interest between the HR and the Council President, being head of the EEAS and of CSDP, and also Commission V-P (Grässle, 2011; Dinan, 2011; Howorth, 2013). CSDP and the EEAS are compromised by the financial crisis coinciding with embedding new structures (Grässle, 2011; Klein and Wessels, 2013). Excessive expectations were placed on Ashton by those wanting an ‘action-oriented’ EEAS for whom the title European External Action Service again suggests rhetoric exceeding reality. But respondents are unanimous that member states control the level of ambition and achievement. Klein and Wessels (2013:463-9) argue that the Lisbon innovations are undermined not only by austerity and the HR-VP not being a policy driver, but by states’ reluctance to utilise Lisbon’s potential or to direct CSDP towards military crisis management. Instead they adopt a minimalist mostly civilian approach, reactive rather than proactive.
While the EEAS suffers from its vague brief and complex structure (Mauri and Gya, 2009; Barber, 2010), these concerns are only slightly ameliorated by the Decision establishing the new organisation (Council Decision, 2010b). The EEAS does reflect the CA to security, not least because it involves Commission interests, Parliamentary oversight and significant trans-institutional communication (see Fig.5.1, p.127). External Affairs formerly lay with the Commission but now the Commission has a role inside the EEAS (Interviews 9,12). Taking DG RELEX into the EEAS diminishes Commission authority and adds complexity to its external affairs role (Helwig, 2013:240). Sus (2014:69) reports difficulties in coherence and information exchange between the Commission and former Commission staff in the EUDs, now serving a different master. While traditional Commission interests now sit alongside CSDP, several analysts say the Commission loses out in relation to EEAS responsibilities (Dinan, 2011; Grässle, 2011; Furness, 2013), a judgement reflected in the Decision describing the EEAS as ‘functionally autonomous’ (Council Decision, 2010b:1), therefore independent of the Commission. A CIVCOM official says the Commission and Parliament have only a ‘minimal’ role in the EEAS (Interview 6), which is consistent with their being kept informed but lacking power. Dinan describes the EEAS as not exactly a new institution but ‘autonomous (and) separate from the Council Secretariat and from the Commission’ (Dinan, 2011:114). There is little sign of the EEAS having the authority to be a policy entrepreneur or to benefit much from agency slippage, but it might develop influence through soft power.

Martin (2013) reflects on EEAS potential to forge important working relationships with the Parliament, and albeit with more difficulty, with the Commission, where the relationship is somewhat tetchy, partly because the Commission provides the EEAS with an extremely limited budget, €489m in 2012, equivalent to Portugal’s development expenditure or Slovenia’s defence budget, but typically criticised in Britain as ‘excessive’ (FRIDE, 2012; Telegraph, 2013d). The Commission finally published a document defining the Commission-EEAS working relationship (European Commission, 2012b) but Sus (2014:70) concludes that its effectiveness requires all sides to act according to its guidelines. The large number of organisations in the Quality Support Group initiated by the Commission paper indicates the scale of complexity, with representatives from the EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG ENLARG, DG TRADE, DG ECFIN and the EEAS for Foreign Policy Instruments (Sus, ibid). This example of Commission-EEAS coordination indicates both Brusselsisation and bureaucratisation of EU external policy including CSDP, strengthening support for H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.
Dinan (2011:104) describes the EEAS as ‘one of the most striking innovations in the Lisbon Treaty’, ‘*sui generis* (and) something new entirely’ (*ibid*, 114), as does Sus (2014:56). Archick (2014) and Dinan (2011) report the difficult genesis of the EEAS, fraught with rivalry between the Council and Parliament, the Commission and Parliament (*Interview 25*), between the HR-VP and Parliament (Howorth, 2013), and between the Commission and Council according to a CMPD official (*Interview 9*) and Korski (2008). Murdoch (2012) describes a bureaucratic negotiation involving appointed officials, but one so divisive that even a minimally successful outcome was surprising and owed much to the skill of the Swedish Presidency (Government Offices of Sweden, 2009).

The EEAS comprises not only the former CGS but also the diplomatic service, and political and aid instruments ‘formerly associated with CFSP or European Commission external action and assistance’ (Gourlay, 2011:18). Gourlay also refers to rival interests stemming from the cleavage between CSDP-CFSP and aid programming, and a potentially blurred role between DG DEVCO which controls most of the external action budget and EEAS responsibility for the early stages of strategic programming through Country Strategy Papers (Gourlay, 2011:19). Gourlay suggests that streamlining EU external action risks fresh uncertainty over planning CSDP interventions. Indeed CSDP is compromised by a difficult relationship between external demand and resources supplied by member states:

> The scope of the EU’s CSDP ambition is (...) likely to remain a product of the interplay of EU member state interests and capabilities, albeit in a fiscal environment (...) less conducive to relatively expensive overseas interventions (Gourlay, *ibid*).

Others comment on EEAS ‘contradictory mandates’ (Hadfield and Fiott, 2013:170), while Lisbon is vague regarding HR-VP shared responsibilities with the Council and Commission Presidents. Nor is the future structure of the EEAS defined (*Interview 4*; Barber, 2010:59). Eventually however the EEAS, combined with the potential of the HR-VP role, may become a key innovation in EU external action (Avery, 2007; Crowe, 2008; Sus, 2014). Its success will depend on its capacity to marry ‘different institutional cultures’, given its diverse composition (Zwolski, 2012:79). According to Howorth it represents further ‘Brusselsisation’, an inevitability resisted by member states but eventually recognised by them as desirable in order to achieve ‘greater policy coordination and coherence’ (Howorth, (2013:16). Howorth (2012) and Léonard and Kaunert (2012) detect increasing supranational governance in the security arena post-Lisbon despite its intergovernmental foundations. Taking a long-term view, this potential is recognised by several respondents (*Interviews* 4,12,22,26), which
supports the intention element in H1 CSDP intends to enhance the credibility of the European Union as a strategic actor. Member states want influence concerning international security and recognise their limitations without EU-level coordination provided by a developing institutional matrix. This strengthens the bureaucratic politics claim of H2.

Under EDA guidance, pooling and sharing, austerity, exogenous factors and institutional pressures may combine to bring further cooperation, even integration, once member states recognise common interests and external events bring pressure for rationalisation. Just as strategic culture seems embryonic and emergent (Chapter 4), so does a more integrated security and defence policy. This develops the argument that CSDP is a manifestation of both deepening Brusselsisation and bureaucratic politics, enabling cooperation more readily than could Grand Strategy, which is heavily resisted. Ashton, a former Commission bureaucrat with little foreign policy experience, was unlikely to be a strategist. Had member states wanted a visionary leader to drive Grand Strategy, they would have chosen an experienced international politician. The post-Lisbon institutional changes consolidate bureaucratisation and strengthen H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.

Several respondents voice frustration over minimalist cooperation, although some detect much more (Interview 11,12,22,23). Many (Interviews 4,5,7,8,9,10,12,22) appeal for greater pooling and sharing and capability development, which Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is intended to develop (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.46; Biscop and Coelmont, 2011b, 2011c). PESCO should enable ‘top-down guidance and coordination’ (Biscop, 2012:1303), improving cooperation on an issue-by-issue basis. Groups of states able and willing to contribute to an initiative or combine resources can do so while others remain outside (Witney, 2008; Drent and Zandee, 2010; Biscop and Coelmont, 2011b). PESCO needs ‘real but realistic criteria, a permanent capability generation conference and promotion of pooling and sharing’ (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010b:2; 2011b:159-62). Lisbon offers no means to guarantee actorness or enhanced capability, or the cooperation that PESCO demands, so like the ESS, it contains more rhetoric than practical guidance on achieving declared ends. Questions remain over how and to what extent states will pool resources, and with what reaction from those outside the participating core (Whitman and Juncos, 2009:43-4). PESCO ought to facilitate EDA-identified rationalisation (Interviews 5,6); it should deliver on the CDP (EDA, 2014a), but it remains handicapped by unspecified strategic objectives, no clear means of implementation, and concerns over costs exacerbated by the financial crisis (Major and Mölling, 2010). This is less a question of expenditure than the risk that the crisis diverts attention from the need for capability enhancement. PESCO lacks state backing for
operational effectiveness and capacity building (Interviews 4,24; Biscop, 2012). In four years it has brought no obvious results (Interviews 4,22; Klein and Wessels, 2013:465; Major and Mölling, 2013), a view shared by Ashton herself who described member states’ appetite for PESCO as ‘limited’ (Ashton, 2013c:16).

In summary, without state backing PESCO will at most enable low ambition, low-cost ventures, bringing limited capability improvements but no appreciable impact on the will to deploy resources, even if capability were enhanced. So PESCO reflects a combination of intergovernmental reluctance to achieve anything substantial and a bureaucratic minimalism towards progress, strengthening H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics while adding little to suggest strategic actorness (H1). What CSDP fails to achieve can be blamed on member states failing to progress the initiative; what it does achieve depends on minimalist bureaucratic gains. CSDP resembles a two-way process of intergovernmental reluctance, and progress through bureaucratic incrementalism.

Lisbon indicates potential should member states coalesce around common interests. It adds to the notion of an emergent EU strategic culture (see previous chapter) but more significantly it signifies bureaucratisation of EU security policy. Bureaucratic politics is evident across the entire EEAS External Affairs remit, including CSDP. Lisbon’s potential is recognised in the positive responses reported above (pp.106-18), while respondents looking for a more strategic integrationary Grand Strategy perhaps underestimate what has been achieved. There are limited signs of EU credibility as a strategic actor, and some signs of supranational governance. Lisbon may eventually bring these outcomes closer (Drent and Zandee, 2010; Dinan, 2011; Gorlay, 2011; Major and Schöndorf, 2011; Biscop, 2011a; Howorth, 2012, 2013).

Lisbon provides more Brusselsisation, according to Howorth (2013). While several respondents insist that member states drive CSDP (see Fig.2.3, p.42), they have the accelerator beneath one foot but are more likely to apply the brake with the other. Parliament’s influence has increased (Interview 8), both generally across EU affairs (Allen and Smith, 2011; Dinan, 2014) and in foreign and security policy according to Mix (2013), Archick (2013) and Martin (2013), who reports a developing Parliament-EEAS partnership. A Brussels expert detects signs of integration:

Lisbon is a step beyond intergovernmentalism, towards more supranationalism, essentially because of potential in the position of High Representative (Interview 4).
Various commentators endorse this interpretation, including Kaunert and Léonard (2012), Léonard and Kaunert (2012), and Dijkstra (2012b), especially if the EEAS were to become a fully-fledged EU institution (Biscop, 2011a; Crowe, 2008; Mauri and Gya, 2009; Grässle, 2011; Martin, 2013; Sus, 2014). Much may depend on personalities in key positions (EEAS, 2014b) although Moumoutzis (2014) argues that Lisbon’s foreign policy unanimity requirement means that whoever is HR-VP, the role matters little.

The suspicion that Ashton was a political choice designed to limit the potential in the role and stifle the EEAS may also surround her successor Federica Mogherini (Viceré, 2014; Telegraph, 2014). But aided by a more assertive Parliament, the EEAS could strengthen the EU role in external affairs, including CSDP (Dinan, 2014). The EEAS is criticised for its bureaucratic structures (Martin, 2013; Dijkstra (2013). Dijkstra recommends a less bureaucratic, flatter organisation with shorter lines between Desk Officers and the HR-VP. The EP Foreign Affairs Committee also criticises the service for being top-heavy, its hierarchy and chains of command lacking clarity (European Parliament, 2013). The EEAS and HR-VP both lack the capacity to be policy entrepreneurs, but this may not always be true. The EEAS could ‘become an influential policy actor in its own right’, expectations as yet unfulfilled (Wallace and Reh, 2015:82).

Consistent with the above commentary, several respondents highlight Lisbon’s potential (Interviews 5,8,9,12,28). The EEAS is also bureaucratic, having a broad scope and composition, being staffed by one third Commission appointees, one third CGS, and one third member states (Interview 12; Zwolski, 2012a; Council Decision, 2010b:Art.6.9). This enhances Brusselsisation, also because the Commission-Secretariat majority potentially delivers a consensus-oriented approach and a bureaucratic network mindset (see 5.6 below). This strengthens H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.

Institutional rivalry reflects the shift from traditional intergovernmentalism towards multiple actor governance involving both supranational and transgovernmental pressures, and reflecting a bureaucratisation of the policy field (H2). According to an EUMS official, the Parliament-EEAS relationship and manoeuvring by Parliament to strengthen Commission engagement through the EUDs enhances Parliament’s foreign and security policy influence, giving it leverage over Commission financial interests (Interview 8). Parliament also gains from being the only directly elected institution (Grässle, 2011).
While Lisbon ensures Commission proximity to CSDP through its external affairs role and the EUDs’ trade, aid and economic brief, CSDP is an EEAS responsibility under the executive authority of the HR and PSC. Essentially, the Commission and Parliament have consultative and informational roles. Their power, while not insignificant, is financial. Critical to CSDP effectiveness is how the Commission’s external interests link to or compete with crisis management (Dinan, 2011). This remains relatively unknown, and reflects a concern that the EEAS is:


The strengthened Parliament influence over the EEAS could eventually assist EU strategic actorness. The Parliament gained from the inter-institutional wrangles over the EEAS, having oversight of the ‘budget, personnel, aid policy, ratification issues and hearings for top jobs’ (Howorth, 2013:16; Grässle, 2011). It also obtained ‘de facto co-decision power on the Council Decision on the EEAS’ (Klein and Wessels, 2013:463) while MEPs have worked to build effective relations with the new service (Martin, 2013).

Still lacking a clearly defined role, the EEAS is criticised for not delivering EU actorness in international security, but actorness depends on the member states. Unsurprisingly and despite its complexity, vague purpose and lack of institutional clarity, the EEAS’s own report on its first 18 months is mostly positive about its achievements (EEAS, 2013a). O’Sullivan (2012) and Martin (2013) also commend its work in terms of coherence and partnership, notwithstanding budgetary and staffing constraints, and the limited extent to which the member states have resourced CSDP or supported CSDP interventions. This lack of political will underlines the continuing importance of intergovernmentalism, not in facilitating CSDP but in restraining its scope and scale. By consolidating member states’ capacity to block common policy, Lisbon makes Grand Strategy less feasible. CSDP therefore depends on other means, utilising its institutional structures and instruments to achieve positive outcomes, principally through bureaucratic incrementalism conducted on a lowest-common-denominator basis.

The intention element in H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor can be linked with Commission and Parliament ambitions regarding CSDP. In sum, this overview of the impact of Lisbon suggests EEAS/HR-VP influence and potential rather than power. Taking the long view, supranational governance may be in the
ascendancy, progressing integration, but there is little hard evidence to support H1 and strategic actoriness. Nevertheless there is potential in this direction.

5.4 Testing the theory: is socialisation or Brusselsisation significant in the evolution of CSDP?

Section 2.3 introduced social constructivism, a theoretical field that embraces institutional, policy-making, and socialisation norms and practices that may contribute to identity formation and an integrationary dynamic. The CSDP institutional framework suggests potential in this respect assuming the institutions themselves and associated normative practices can be policy drivers. This section explores whether institutional socialisation drives integration.

Related considerations are the potential impact of Brusselsisation and whether there is any institutional drive towards actoriness (defined on p.4). Affirmative answers would support H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor, and advance the notion of an emerging EU strategic culture. It would also suggest integration, especially if accompanied by member states recognising common interests and values (Major and Schöndorf, 2011; Biscop, 2013a), and shared commitment to the goals reflected in key documents (see Fig.1.2, p.14).

Taylor (1983) argues that integration follows institutional innovation. Hynek (2011:81) remarks that the EEAS ‘is uniquely positioned to play the role of a principal agency in the field of crisis management’, echoing Klein (2010) who writes about autonomous agency among EU instruments in the Balkans. But Britain’s veto of a French proposal for a permanent Operations Headquarters (OHQ) in Brussels clearly opposes integration. London argued that this would duplicate NATO structures (Reuters, 2012). The Lisbon Treaty, given its potential discussed above, could bring an integrationary direction to CSDP but Drent and Zandee (2010:70) stress that national sovereignty over defence remains untouched and that CSDP is primarily a CCM instrument.

Social constructivists claim that institutional innovation can produce identity formation and integration (Checkel, 1999, 2005; Christiansen et al, 1999). Checkel defines socialisation as ‘a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community’ (Checkel, 2005:804). This relates to identity formation. While identity is socially constructed (Risse,
identities are rarely fixed, and individuals carry multiple coexisting identities. Checkel adopts a middle-range theory view that does not anticipate a wholesale identity shift of a game theory win-lose kind. He argues that institutional socialisation might bring ‘sustained compliance based on the internalisation of (...) new rules’ (Checkel, 2005:804). Kuhn, meanwhile, refers to:

individuals holding multiple – often competing – collective identities, a collective identity needs to be perceived as salient in order to ‘trump’ other identities and to have behavioural consequences (Kuhn, 2012:996).

She further emphasises that individuals with ‘an affective relationship’ (ibid) to a community need to identify as members of that community but also with it through shared values and aspirations. We may infer from this that individuals within CSDP institutions could be subject to Brusselising pressures, leading to identity as ‘Europeans’ with ‘European interests’. A Brussels-based expert refers to a ‘CSDP reflex’ in the institutions (Interview 4), and an ECFR expert in London to ‘a common European interest’ in the EDA and CGS (Interview 10) which may imply institutional socialisation, recalling the ‘coordination reflex’ referred to on p.101 (Smith, 2004:94).

In contrast, a military officer in the EUMS doubts any esprit de corps among his peers, or more generally among CSDP institutions (Interview 8). Support for this view comes from Juncos (2014) who finds a marked absence of esprit de corps in the EEAS. For institutional socialisation to be transformative in policy terms, European identity would have to usurp other identities or would require a power shift towards collective Europeanised influence overriding member states’ preferences. There is no evidence of this and respondents roundly reject this proposition.

Institutional socialisation in Brussels does not imply ‘going native’, abandoning previous identities and loyalties. Any socialisation dynamics and identity formation cannot be construed as driving CSDP and/or strategic culture, though it might suggest some strategic culture-identity co-existence between state and European varieties, consistent with Chapter 4 conclusions regarding co-existing strategic cultures.

Mérand. et al (2011:140) report state power as ‘reconstituted at the European level’, so it makes little difference if among the PSC an esprit de corps contributes to European identity: member states are decisive. This is not to suggest that socialisation dynamics are irrelevant,
but any development of EU military capability will require an attitudinal sea change in member states towards strengthening EU institutions. Some of the strategic culture ‘positives’ (see Chapter 4) and also Herz (2009), stress the long-term nature of the CSDP project (Interviews 11,14,22), but enhanced capability requires fundamental uplift in member state commitment.

Institutional socialisation depends on a consensus-oriented, pragmatic approach to forging agreement that constructivists suggest can contribute to integration. This also implies a bureaucratic culture (see pp.4-7) in CSDP governance supporting H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics. Bossong (2013) writes that there has been a focus on socialisation dynamics and informal learning within Brussels-based institutions under various concepts such as Europeanisation (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 2010), Brusselsisation (Breuer, 2010), epistemic communities (Cross, 2011), communities of practice (Bicchi, 2011) and governmentality (Merlingen, 2011), so it is worthwhile assessing any evidence to support this perspective.

A UK-based foreign policy expert suggests that EU military personnel are affected by socialisation pressures, habituated by decades of alliance membership and now by joint actions and CSDP collaboration, including participation in Battlegroups (Interview 11). This is consistent with the notion of emergent epistemic communities (Cross, 2011; Bossong, 2013; Pannier, 2013). But while there may be shared perspectives, it is doubtful that this transfers into institutional processes that negate national channels because this would touch ‘the neuralgic issue of sovereignty’ (Interview, ibid), a view supported by Martin (2013) and from within the CMPD by Stevens (2013). The EEAS may develop a more effective ‘lessons-learned’ process (Bossong, 2013), but lessons are only learned if applied in the planning stage prior to mission deployment (EEAS, 2014a).

The notion of epistemic communities implies socialisation but does not necessarily impact on strategic culture or policy-making, or deliver integrationary consequences. Another expert expresses similar reticence:

The PSC is the core instrument for foreign and security policy. It works on a daily basis, the foreign policy ambassadors have impact but it’s small. It needs a loud voice or a high-ranking politician to bring a reaction. There is machinery for creating joint positions in the EU and this is significant. There are briefings from Desk Officers and the colleagues in the Secretariat and between the various actors, and the
process is strengthened by the large array of topics covered by CSDP. The structures force interaction, and the effect is to embed cooperation, and institutional socialisation shapes policy-making, but integration implies a handover of sovereignty and this is not happening (Interview 23).

This view acknowledges some socialisation dynamics, as does a former member of the Venusberg think tank (Interview 14), but the impact is marginal. There may be cooperation but it is not decisive in building strategic culture, in policy-making, or delivering integration, a view reflected in studies of the PSC (Howorth, 2010b; Mérand et al, 2011; Klein and Wessels, 2013:463). Meyer (2006) meanwhile adopts a constructivist position that the PSC drives Europeanisation, and Wiesniewski (2013:97) reports the Parliament influencing Brusselsisation and even Europeanisation through its engagement with the EEAS. In contrast a Berlin-based DGAP expert dismisses socialisation/Brusselsisation:

There’s no power behind this. There’s a lack of energy in what is happening. The smart people are leaving, Brussels is somehow bloodless with respect to power and power is what counts (Interview 25).

So, even if there is a Brussels-located esprit de corps, as Wiesniewski (2013) suggests, it has no influence. An ECFR expert detects collegiality within the institutions but stresses that member states impose absolute constraints, and the CGS (now EEAS) and EDA both demonstrate collegiality and institutional socialisation; staff share a European interest, but power, money and decisions remain with member states; the PSC is collegial and good at negotiating a policy document, but power is what matters, especially if something actually has to be done, in which case, ‘national interest is to the fore’ (Interview 10). This respondent stresses that at the working level state representatives cling to national interest, perhaps more than might happen at ministerial level, where there could be consensus, as the 2013 Council demonstrated (European Council, 2013). An ECFR expert emphasises how the national perspective may see Atlanticism or Europeanism as a zero-sum game:

The UK can end up seeming more royalist than the King and more Catholic than the Pope (Interview 10).

An MoD official refers to UK scepticism over an EU institutional role, preferring state control over policy (Interview 12), which feeds impatience with ‘British exceptionalism’ (BBC News, 2013d) and the ‘awkward partner’ reputation (George, 1998). UK demands to hold down or
reduce the Community budget win few friends in Brussels, especially as London insists on maintaining the rebate secured by Margaret Thatcher at Fontainebleau in 1984 (Young, 1998; BBC News, 2013e). The British mood reflects resistance to ‘Europeanising’, or ‘going native’ as Thatcher used to call it, among UK officials in Brussels. Integration is ‘UK-resisted’ (Interview 12).

Deferece to ministers occurs not just in the British case. Only ministers have the authority to alter previous positions. Loyalty to state views is uppermost, even in the PSC, or especially in the PSC, if anything substantial is discussed. State autonomy is unequivocal. Biscop and Coelmont (2013a), while in no way countermanding member state primacy in an intergovernmental field, report the Council Conclusions in December 2013 as revitalising debate and putting defence back on the agenda, a considerable development and, for these authors, advocates of Grand Strategy, a cause for optimism.

Collegiality and common perspectives exist, nurtured by socialisation perhaps, but insignificant once personnel or finance is required for a mission. Even so the EEAS is an arena within which socialisation dynamics and a knowledge-based community learning from experience, may prosper (Bossong, 2013), but with minimal impact on policy, even if a certain institutional dynamic exists inside the PSC (Interviews 4,5,6,10). Respondents referring to socialisation downplay its significance. An EDA official, commenting on efforts to develop common policy, reports that the institutions cannot supply integrationary pressure, although the EDA might try, and sometimes be a catalyst. Even the PSC and the EUMC cannot do this as officials follow member state leads; ‘the institutions show little evidence of being driving forces’ (Interview 7). This view has substantial support (Witney, 2008; Menon, 2009; Simón, 2011; Biscop and Coelmont, 2011b; Biscop, 2013a). Impetus must come from member states, in particular the Council (Biscop and Coelmont, 2013a), the key European-level forum through which foreign, security and defence policy is developed. Foreign policy literature stresses the increasingly transgovernmental rather than intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy-making (Meyer, 2006; Howorth, 2014; Bickerton, 2013; Giegerich, 2015), while Mérand et al, describe policy-making as:

heterarchical (shaped by a variety of administrative and political actors), multi-level (supranational, national and perhaps even local) and inclusive (involving state and private actors (Mérand et al, 2011:124).
This is bureaucratic governance that extends well beyond even transgovernmentalism. A CMPD military expert, sceptical about the impact of CSDP, accepted that socialisation contributes an institutional ethos, a way of thinking, even an *esprit de corps*, but even if this could ‘drive things forward’, which seems unlikely, it cannot be equated with integrationary pressure because states defend their interests and control policy (*Interview 9*). Various authors agree (Meyer, 2006; Mérand *et al*, 2011; Bickerton, 2013; Howorth, 2014; Giegerich, 2015), recognising collegiality but underlining that member states are the power brokers. A CMPD official describes how consensus is reached:

> In the Secretariat there may be 100 people (...) with 100 different ideas but in the end we speak and act as a Secretariat, even if the Secretariat is composed of people from national perspectives, who defend national positions. So what happens is, to get a Secretariat consensus, we work to the lowest-common-denominator, what is acceptable to all. We arrive at small and uncontroversial decisions, we achieve what is possible, what all can support (*Interview 9*).

This account emphasises diverse opinion among member states but also within the institutions, so collegiality is low-level and uncontroversial. It matches the assessment of the PSC as consensus-oriented (Bickerton, 2011:180; Howorth, 2010b) and the need among the ‘Council triangle’ for COREPER and PSC to find common cause (see p.125), in contrast to assumptions about intergovernmental bargaining. The institutions are, as institutions tend to be, consensus-oriented but to achieve consensus they seek agreement on uncontroversial, low cost issues (*Interview 12*). This is consistent with H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics, since bureaucracies operate through consensus, low-risk, lowest-common-denominator, and issue-by-issue politics (see pp.4-7).

The research interviews do not suggest that socialisation dynamics drive integration so constructivist arguments are undermined. However, the Lisbon innovations (see previous section) may bring gradual, incremental and long-term cooperation, potentially with integrationary consequences.

Grand Strategy enthusiasts might wish for big policy initiatives such as major uplift in defence spending or high profile pooling and sharing to address capability deficiencies, but CSDP has not developed in this way. The 2013 Council agreed to reconvene in June 2015 to assess progress in defence coordination, potentially an unequivocal steer towards cooperation and capability enhancement (Biscop and Coelmont, 2013a; European Council,
2013). This is the closest member states have come to a European defence commitment since the HHG, and may signal capability development. It could even be a step towards strategic actorness (H1). But the steer, if that is what it is, comes from the intergovernmental Council, not from Brusselsisation or socialisation, roundly dismissed by an SPD Bundestag member:

Brussels offers some coordination, but in terms of strategic oversight or vision, there’s nothing. The EDA maybe contributes something, but it’s not much. There’s a minimal level of socialisation and Brusselsisation, not much (Interview 24).

In contrast to the deterministic views from sceptical respondents for this research, Dijkstra (2012a) provides a more nuanced perspective concerning CGS officials, distinguishing between civilian and military operations. EU officials are more influential in the agenda-setting phase and in civilian missions than in the implementation of military missions where inevitably Brussels technocrats and specialists are one step removed from policy implementation. Civilian missions are run from Brussels while military operations are directed from member states and through NATO. EUFOR Tchad/RCA was planned and coordinated from Paris and EUFOR Althea from Sarajevo under PSC authority in Brussels. Dijkstra does not refer to socialisation, but mentions institutional memory as influencing officials’ input to CSDP, especially in the preparatory phase of a mission. The CGS (now EEAS) is a bureaucratic service organisation to the missions, possessing both impartiality and process expertise which enhances its influence, but it has no power. It is a network within a wider network of state actors and institutions, contributing to heterarchical processes. Furthermore, as CMPD and CGS officials insist (Interviews 9,13) the EEAS reflects a growing body of specialist expertise, a continuing development of epistemic communities (Adler and Haas, 1992; Cross, 2011; Bossong, 2013; Pannier, 2013) at the heart of European security policy. These communities of officials and technocrats contribute to the bureaucratisation of security policy consistent with H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics. While there is evidence of Brusselsisation, and aspects of bureaucratic politics are apparent, socialisation dynamics have little impact. Officials are seconded to Brussels for only a short time (Dijkstra, 2012a). They tend not to act as national agents, but nor do they promote institutional interests (Juncos and Pomorska, 2010, 2011).

To summarise, while some socialisation may imply a ‘CSDP reflex’ and ‘normative consensus’, the impact is marginal beyond some esprit de corps and cooperation. This section provides little support for H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU
as a strategic actor. Socialisation dynamics do not promote actoriness. CSDP is driven by member states and exogenous factors, drivers which propelled its establishment in the first place (Menon, 2012; Giegerich, 2015). Apart from the European Council, the EU institutions cannot instigate any great leap forward. In contrast H2 gains some support, since processes typical of bureaucratic politics are evident in the CSDP institutions, specifically lowest-common-denominator agreement in areas of low risk, consensus seeking, and developing epistemic communities.

5.5 Europeanising security and defence policy: claims regarding Europeanisation

Chapter 1 explained the rationale for examining Europeanisation, namely that a sizable literature insists that CSDP demonstrates Europeanisation (see p.7). An important claim in this thesis is to reject the association between CSDP and Europeanisation, significant because it has impact on the feasibility of Grand Strategy. The term ‘Europeanisation’ lacks precision and it is difficult to empirically demonstrate security and defence policy change being due to Europeanisation (Moumoutzis, 2011). Similarly Major argues that over-extension or loose application of the term should be avoided as it is not easily applied in the intergovernmental CFSP arena (Major, 2005).

A strengthening EU strategic culture could indicate Europeanisation if one applies a ‘minimal’ definition (Featherstone, 2003:3) (see p.7). Flockhart (2010:788) characterises Europeanisation as ‘different forms of diffusion processes of European ideas and practices across time and space’, a definition that recalls the understanding of globalisation as ‘about (…) the transformation of time and space’ (Giddens, 1998:30) and hardly empirically demonstrable. In defence of Flockhart, she refers to the elusiveness of a precise definition and argues for a distinction between Europeanisation and EU-isation, the latter understandably the usual focus for EU scholars.

This thesis adopts Radaelli’s definition (see p.7), also used by Watanabe (2010:40), which focuses on domestic adaptation in response to EU pressures. This reflects EU-isation, which consists of ‘political encounters’ leading to internalisation of rules and norms, and states’ technical adaptation to EU practice (Wallace, 2000; Flockhart, 2010). While the adaptation model implies more than cooperation, it is important to understand how Mérand interprets Europeanisation. The title of his (2008) book, European Defence Policy, like The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy (Gross, 2009), may be misleading. Neither book
suggests the state has been usurped by EU-level defence or foreign policy. Mérand says the state is no longer the sole arbiter in defence policy. No government undertakes armed forces reform, or audits its defence capability, or deploys armed forces without referring to European allies, and they often engage in enhanced defence cooperation through CSDP, NATO, and bilateral initiatives.

Moumoutzis (2011) argues that clear evidence of Europeanisation as adaptation in security and defence policy requires systematic comparison with how state policy alters due to EU-originated pressures. Identifying cause and effect and attributing policy change to EU pressures is unconvincing as changes might have occurred anyway, or stem from domestic preferences rather than EU pressures. What might be normative and consistent with EU interests might simply coincide with domestic interests (Pohl, 2013, 2014).

Moumoutzis says ‘Europeanisation should not be exclusively identified with socialisation’ (Moumoutzis, 2011:608), but the Europeanisation scholars referred to above do not look ‘exclusively’ at socialisation. More pertinently he argues that ‘(Radaelli’s) adaptational pressure model is not applicable’ (ibid) because:

National foreign policy makers choose to incorporate EU foreign policy norms, practices and procedures into their policies either because they have become convinced that it is appropriate or because they have calculated that it is utility-maximising to do so (ibid).

This is qualitatively different from state adaptation. Moumoutzis considers the adaptation model a ‘promising’ definition because the construction element focuses on ‘central penetration of national systems of governance’ (Moumoutzis, 2011:611) but there is no evidence of this happening on account of EU pressures. In security and defence policy this cannot be evidenced in a primarily intergovernmental arena.

This study does not undertake the formal analysis of Europeanisation advocated by Moumoutzis, i.e. systematic appraisal of the extent to which norms, practices and procedures are incorporated into the domestic level by disaggregating EU and state policy and conducting a comparative analysis of cause and effect. But it does address the concept on the basis that Europeanisation claims are widespread in the literature (see p.7) and Radaelli’s adaptation model suggests assimilation between member state strategic cultures and a European strategic culture. Europeanisation would support the notion of an emergent
EU strategic culture and deliver a seedbed for strategic actorness, boosting H1 *CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor.*

Several interviewees were asked whether Europeanisation impacts CSDP, the logic being that if state adaptation shapes policy and policy implementation, it would affect member state security and defence policies, strengthen European strategic culture, and enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor. Strong support for the ‘Europeanisation-as-adaptation’ thesis would furthermore suggest integration (see Fig. 5.2 below), but given that this is hard to demonstrate empirically, the notion of Europeanisation should be treated with scepticism, especially as the socialisation element of Europeanisation (Wong, 2005) was not supported by respondents (see previous section). Fig. 5.2 suggests a binary view of Europeanisation as present or not, but there may be intermediary positions based on a ‘minimal’ definition (see p.7). This is also hard to demonstrate in a robust fashion.

The relevance of Europeanisation to Grand Strategy is that GS requires state adaptation to accommodate EDA or other EU-originated and intergovernmentally agreed common policy. The GS claim is for top-down, coordinated CIV-MIL capacity-building based on implementing the EDA’s CDP (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010b, 2011b, 2011c; EDA, 2014a) (see p.126). But this is not happening and nor is it likely to given member state resistance.

**Fig. 5.2 Europeanisation impact on CSDP and strategic culture, actorness and integration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is Europeanisation evident?</th>
<th>YES—— Effect on policy construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shapes CSDP implementation ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthens EU strategic culture ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supports EU as strategic actor → contributes to integration (H1 supported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO—— No effect on policy construction</td>
<td>No shaping of CSDP implementation ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No impact on EU strategic culture ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zero impact on integration (H1 not supported)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tonra describes the ‘Europeanisation’ of foreign policy as:

a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a system of collective European policy-making (Tonra, 2000:229).

This implies adaptation and normative behaviour among communities of policy makers, and a significant practice-informing role for epistemic communities. It also allows for integrationary tendencies as part of CSDP processes, represented here:

**Fig.5.3 Europeanisation and the potential for strategic actorness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU institutions</th>
<th>socialisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brusselsisation</td>
<td>state adaptation → common policy → integrationary tendencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some caveats apply. Any process leading to strategic actorness depends on commitment from member states since it requires resources, and political will. Also, as explained in the previous section, the socialisation component of Brusselsisation has no power. This undermines constructivist explanations for CSDP and EU foreign policy more broadly. Nevertheless, domestic adaptation would strengthen European strategic culture and support an integrationary dynamic in CSDP processes. The problem remains that it is hard to demonstrate this empirically (Moumoutzis, 2011).

Further undermining the Europeanisation argument, most respondents affirm member state centrality to CSDP. States ‘call the shots’, or ‘rule the roost’ (Interviews 1,2,14,4; see Fig.2.3, p.42). This is consistent with foreign policy literature and the foundation of CFSP as an intergovernmental domain (European Council, 1991; Moravcsik, 1998; Howorth, 2007, 2014; Pohl, 2013, 2014). The Maastricht Treaty stated:

The unanimity requirement (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.2; Mattelaer, 2013:22) (see p.14) determines that common policy cannot be enforced against the will of any member state. This makes the idea of Europeanisation look especially weak despite its widespread presence in the literature (see p.7).

A spectacular example of rhetoric exceeding reality is the TEU reference to the UNSC which declares that ‘permanent members (…) will (…) ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union’ (TEU, 1992:Art.J.5.4), but in 1998 and again in 2003 Britain and France took opposing positions concerning military action against Iraq. In contrast, the language in Title V of the TEU strongly implies a common foreign and security policy, and the stated objectives in Art.J.1.2 are similar to ESS aspirations a decade later.

CSDP has not integrated state armed forces into European structures. States retain sovereignty over their armed forces and can opt out of missions. Battlegroups have not been deployed, although Dickow et al. (2012) suggest the Weimar Battlegroup could re-launch the initiative. There is no sign of the ‘European army’ raised as a federalist spectre by sections of the UK media (Telegraph, 2013b, Express, 2012), although this is considered an idea ahead of its time by a former German Defence Minister sympathetic to defence integration (Jung, 2014), and a sensible aspiration by new Commission President Juncker in 2015 (Guardian, 2015), but an IISS expert says no member state is arguing for this (Interview 1).

One expert, while describing CSDP as primarily intergovernmental, asserts a significant caveat that suggests support for H1:

At the hub of (CSDP) is the PSC and all participants contribute to an integrationist mindset. A CSDP reflex emerges after a while, suffused throughout the institutions (Interview 4).

This is a remarkable comment about the PSC, considered by several respondents as the ‘voice’ of member states, comprised of Ambassadors ‘on message’ from their capitals. It challenges traditional intergovernmentalism, suggesting an institutional dynamic that echoes Mérand’s claim that defence policy has undergone Europeanisation. Mérand refers to ‘a European defence field’ (2008:143), a consequence of five decades of cooperation through NATO and foreign policy cooperation through the EC/EU. It also reflects Smith’s suggestion that ‘European integration is largely an ongoing discourse about institutions’ (Smith, 2004:9).
This perspective is shared by respondents who detect Europeanisation in the CSDP process (Interviews 5,11,22) and others reluctant to use the term but who accept some emergent Europeanising trend, especially post-Lisbon (Interviews 4,12,13,14). A military expert (Interview 5) agreed that Europeanisation, Brusselsisation and common policy are all emerging, albeit slowly, with the PSC at the centre. He detects a strongly bureaucratic structure assisting CSDP development, suggesting support for H2.

An SWP expert acknowledges a Europeanisation dynamic, interpreting the term in ways consistent with Wong (2005), seeing uploading and downloading in the CSDP process, and arguing that the British-French lead in rapid response capability was taken up by others, particularly Germany. This brought armed forces modernisation into sharp relief (Interview 22), a view matched by Helsbourg (2000), Donnelly (2002), Witney (2008), Fishpool (2008), and Biscop (2011b). Lindlay-French (2002) sees diverse interests and strategic confusion indicating Europe’s failure, particularly in defence. European militaries may modernise through a technocratic, process-oriented, incremental approach based on limited cooperation. A pan-European Grand Strategy would fully implement the CDP (EDA, 2014a). Current signs are that European forces modernisation is somewhere between the two.

Watanabe (2010) claims that Berlin sought to strengthen South East Europe (SEE) regional integration through CSDP underpinning the Stability Pact in SEE. This reflects changes in German foreign policy, an evolving German strategic culture, and commitment to multilateral strengthening of European integration, consistent with Pohl (2014) who argues that domestic pressures contribute to multilateral endeavours and Europeanising foreign policy initiatives. This can progress common foreign policy and CSDP, potentially constituting strategic actorness. A former Venusberg Group expert accepts this is happening but cautions that states determine whether CSDP achieves its objectives (Interview 14). The Stability Pact can be interpreted as policy uploading, consistent with the notion of domestic foreign policy drivers (Pohl, 2013, 2014).

The same respondent however suggests that convergence or integration depends on extent and interpretation. If Europeanisation means joint actions, some preparedness to respond to a UN call, or support a UN mission or mandate, then this happens, but this is cooperation, not Europeanisation. The term is sometimes applied for some kind of EU influence, or cooperation reflex. There is a substantial gap between security cooperation (weak Europeanisation; Featherstone, 2003:3) and state adaptation and defence integration (strong Europeanisation; Radaelli, 2003). Convergence is evident but states remain in
control. Accommodation with EU membership and signing up to CSDP is clear, just as states previously adapted to NATO, but this is far from integration (Interview 14).

Chapter 2 highlighted how the Liberal Intergovernmentalism of the Single Market process does not apply to foreign and security policy (see pp.38-42). Eventually CSDP might deliver a different route towards communitarisation of security and defence policy, perhaps through bureaucratic politics. A minority of interviewees for this research consider integration a potential long-term outcome (Interviews 4,11,22).

An MoD official, recognising both Europeanising and Brusselising tendencies in CSDP, refers to the impact on national defence policies through ‘institutional and legal instruments’ (Interview 12). This refers to the HR-VP, the EEAS, and the ‘legal personality’ of the Union (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.47). So far these innovations have not produced substantial outcomes. Nor has the EDA-recommended rationalisation through the CDP been comprehensively adopted (EDA, 2014a). The legal instruments referred to are not analogous to Single Market provisions. They relate to Council approval of a common position or Joint Action, or a UN mandate before an EU intervention. The ‘legal personality’ of the Union cannot override member state preferences (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Dec.24), preferences which may include doing nothing, or doing very little. In other ways CSDP does affect defence, through normative tendencies towards sharing information, consultation and cooperation where appropriate (Mérand, 2008). Article 24 implies limitations on unilateralism:

The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area. The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.24.3).

But member states pursuing separate and even contradictory policies cannot be deemed inconsistent with the above in any legally determinable way if the Council has not previously achieved a common position, so the provision is mere rhetoric. Lisbon consistently suggests common policy, except where there is none. The Council, and still less the HR, cannot ‘ensure compliance’ with any foreign and security policy provision in the Treaty.
Ultimately, discussion of Europeanisation confirms no power shift from member states over defence policy. Cooperation is enabling strategic actorness (H1) to a limited degree. So far there is no supranational or integrationary impact that adaptation in Radaelli’s terms, and Grand Strategy, implies. Nevertheless an MoD official suggests that CSDP makes Europeans think about security across a broad spectrum:

from a hard-edged military (perspective) through peacekeeping, executive and civilian policing and training and monitoring missions to economic and development assistance activities (*Interview* 12).

This is the comprehensive approach that underpins emergent European strategic culture (see Chapter 4), and Germany’s approach to SEE reported above (Watanabe, 2010). The HR-VP straddles Commission and CSDP responsibilities; the EEAS remit embraces security and development interests and ESS ambitions. Security and development issues are linked (Zwolski, 2012b:989). The post-Lisbon arrangements therefore reinforce the comprehensive approach (Drent and Zandee, 2010:5-13; Zwolski, 2012a, Stevens, 2012).

The MoD official observes cooperation and shared outlook that implies Europeanisation, but this is ‘French-led and UK-resisted’ which he regards as unfortunate. The UK opposes supranational influence over military or civilian capabilities, so while the EU has a coordinating role, when and what to deploy remains firmly under member state control (*Interview* 12). Again, this highlights that no power shift has occurred.

Unanimous assessment among respondents that states are the main drivers (see Fig.2.3, p.42) suggests a basic contradiction: to be maximally effective, CSDP needs to pool and increase resources. The MoD official says the 2010 Anglo-French accords indicate UK suspicion of institutions, and resistance to debate among the 28, so the outcome becomes lowest-common-denominator, a characteristic of bureaucratic politics. Europeanisation as adaptation (Radaelli, 2003) is undermined by states’ reluctance to pool sovereignty, which reduces the scope for strategic actorness, and Grand Strategy.

An EEAS military expert was circumspect about the term ‘Europeanisation’, but implied the notion of lowest-common-denominator without using the phrase:

> There is Europeanisation, but it’s limited. The policy that we get is devalued. It would be better if we could proceed on the basis of a two thirds consensus (*Interview* 13).
Indeed Qualified Majority Voting would revolutionise CSDP and significantly progress integration, but there is no likelihood of QMV in this area. An EUMS official refers to the need for Europeanisation, citing its practical application in EU NAVFOR Atalanta (Council Joint Action, 2008a; EU NAVFOR, 2015a), where a critical mass of member states pursue a common position based on shared interests in combating piracy (Interview 8). While Atalanta reflects cooperation rather than Europeanisation, he stresses that deeper cooperation is needed to combat threats, given the blurring between internal and external security, a view reflected in the Council (Solana, 2003; European Council, 2008), in the EDA (2013, 2014) and in CSDP literature (Donnelly, 2003; Howorth, 2007; Biscop, 2013a; Cross, 2014).

The UK government also refers to a comprehensive approach to security with benefits for CSDP and NATO (Ministry of Defence, 2012). Cyber security, climate change, counter-terrorism and migration present new challenges that call for deeper cooperation, even integration, which Biscop (2013a) estimates will happen, once common interests are fully understood. Despite little hard evidence of Europeanisation, Mérand detects:

>a progressive institutionalisation of military cooperation (involving both the EU and NATO) (Mérand, 2008:45).

This implies strategic convergence between the EU and NATO. CSDP focuses on conflict prevention and CCM through cooperation rather than Europeanisation. Two experts wanting greater commitment to CSDP call for strategic thinking, but they see little or no Europeanisation (Interviews 3, 25). An ECFR expert explains where authority lies:

>There’s no Europeanisation. CSDP is very much an intergovernmental activity. Member states own the capabilities, have the money, and take the decisions (Interview 10).

An IISS expert in Paris detects a loss of momentum post-Solana, reasoning that:

>Lisbon has progressed CFSP a bit but in general the real worry is that there’s more renationalisation than Europeanisation (Interview 1).

This view is understandable given various caveats (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.2; Art.327; Art.346; Declaration 13; Blockmans and Wessel, 2009) (see p.14). He argues that in spite of institutional changes, member states are reasserting control, resisting EDA demands for
pooling and sharing. While this suggests state-centredness rather than Europeanisation, it seems overly pessimistic, as others see opportunities arising from Lisbon, and pooling and sharing is happening (see p.117). Various authors stress the PSC commitment to consensus, and to CSDP (Howorth, 2010b; Bickerton, 2011; Cross, 2014).

A senior EDA official also detects little Europeanisation but suggests the EDA might progress integration as it can be a catalyst for ideas (Interview 7), a view unsurprisingly supported by the EDA itself (EDA, 2006). A Bundestag member says the same but sees little evidence of Europeanisation (as adaptation) (Interview 24), an assessment shared by Biscop (2013a) and Biscop and Coelmont (2011c).

A CIVCOM official detects no significant Europeanisation in CSDP but says the financial crisis post-2009 makes security and defence cooperation imperative because of diminishing resources ‘so capability development will depend entirely on partnership’ (Interview 6), a view backed by the European Council (Reuters, 2013), the EDA (2012) and Parliament (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2013). A security expert in Brussels accepts some degree of Europeanisation but mostly through small CSDP missions, not in defence operations such as Iraq or Afghanistan (Interview 2). This implies Europe as a ‘small power’ (Toje, 2011) and CSDP remaining a conflict prevention instrument (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.1). It reflects the view that CSDP depends on lowest-common-denominator agreement, thus supporting H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.

In sum, assumptions regarding Europeanisation in much foreign policy literature (see p.7) should be challenged since instead of member state adaptation to EU pressures there is only soft cooperation between states, many anxious to preserve an appearance of autonomy in foreign, defence, and security policy. Respondents’ views divide fairly equally between rejection and acceptance of Europeanisation, broadly defined. Given the limitations of the concept, this constitutes minimal support for H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor. There is little to suggest any integrationary force, so Grand Strategy seems particularly remote.

5.6 Institutional framework: bureaucratic politics?

This chapter has reported no evidence of a socialisation dynamic driving CSDP and little evidence of Europeanisation beyond cooperation. The institutional framework however
suggests further Brusselisation and a developing bureaucracy which shapes the nature of CSDP and its achievements. This section argues that transformation from a purely intergovernmental foreign policy approach began under European Political Cooperation and has continued under CSDP. Smith (2004) and Bickerton (2011, 2013) indicate the origins of this change (see pp.8-9 and 23). This thesis develops this argument with specific application to CSDP, adding to understanding of this change and rebutting claims concerning Europeanisation, while also contesting the view that Grand Strategy is a realistic prospect for CSDP development.

Smith argues that EPC, the precursor to CFSP, was subject to a complex transgovernmental communications network, only loosely overseen by the Council, which was rarely a driver of EU foreign policy (Smith, 2004:100). EPC developed as a forum in which bureaucrats and agents of the member states rather than their principals began to think about coordinated policy (ibid, 144); and the Commission became more engaged with CFSP post-Maastricht. These processes signalled the bureaucratisation of EU foreign policy now reflected in CSDP and underpin H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.

Rather than consolidating intergovernmentalism, CFSP after Maastricht became a system of governance comprising a network of actors and institutions, with increasing Parliament and Commission engagement. This is central to the bureaucratic politics of CSDP and contrasts strongly with the bargaining interest-based processes of intergovernmentalism. Several respondents mention institutional influence, especially post-Lisbon (Interviews 4,5,8,9,12), a trend consistent with Smith’s analysis, but member states control CSDP resources and are the power brokers over deployment (Interviews 4,6,7,9,10,12,14,15,21). The reluctance of member states to consolidate cooperation through integration stems from atavistic concerns over sovereignty and local protectionism, particularly over employment (Interviews 2,3,7,9,25). This inhibits capability improvements that EDA recommendations and PESCO could deliver (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010b, 2011b; EDA, 2014a).

Sections 5.2 and 5.3 above suggest that the CSDP institutional framework provides potential for strategic actorness but actorness depends on member states’ supplying strategic coherence, sanctioning interventions, and providing adequate resources. Without this commitment the initiative remains minimalist, which suggests H2’s bureaucratic politics. Having already noted criticism of the EEAS as ‘too bureaucratic’ (Martin, 2013; Dijkstra, 2013; European Parliament, 2013) this section looks further into CSDP bureaucratisation.
Negative connotations of bureaucracy are common in liberal democracies (Gandy, 1989; Van de Walle, 2004) but a Kosovan expert argues that in post-conflict societies, bureaucracy that enables the development of a modern state is more valuable than imperfect democracy, and infinitely better than nationalism-inspired chaos (Interview 27). From a Weberian perspective he insists that competent officials are preferable to politicians tainted by past associations, so we should not assume bureaucratic politics is disadvantageous or exists at the expense of democracy, as implied by a DGAP expert critical of the minimalist issue-by-issue nature of CSDP (Interview 25).

Chapter 1 (pp.4-7) introduced the concept of bureaucratic politics, suggesting that government processes are burdened by constraints and agents have limited control over goals, while results are difficult to evaluate (Wilson, 1989; Allison and Zelikow, 1999). This is manifestly true of conflict prevention and CSDP (Menon et al, 2004). Organisations are constrained by limited resources, which can sap morale among personnel tasked with fulfilling principals’ expectations, or even their own. Sub-optimal outcomes are inevitable given the constraints. Better results would require more resources which are not forthcoming. This applies to CSDP, especially given the criticism that it suffers from strategic incoherence (Interviews 1,3,4,5,8,9,10,11,14,25), a view backed by Blockmans and Wessel (2009) and Lindlay-French (2010) who, like Kagan (2004), condemn Europe’s entire approach to defence and security. EUFOR Althea officials report similar concerns (Interviews 15-21) as does a Kosovo expert referring to EULEX KOSOVO (Interview 27).

The view that CSDP is overly concerned with process and compliance rather than results (Interviews 8,9,12,14,27) echoes Richter’s (2009:31) comments on EULEX KOSOVO and Ioannides (2009:41) on CSDP in general. Ioannides regards missions as too technical and insufficiently integrated with wider peacebuilding goals. Lowest-common-denominator agreement is a feature of CSDP because member states do not commit adequate resources and try to avoid material or political costs (Toje, 2008:132; Smith, 2008:10; Rynning, 2011:30; Chappell and Petrov, 2014:3). Some member states appear to disregard initiatives such as PESCO or EDA proposals that could eliminate duplication, offer cost savings, and enhance capability (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010b, 2011b, 2011c; Gross-Verheyde, 2012).

As mentioned above, Bickerton describes EPC as an administrative process similar now to CSDP, especially the way of working in its foremost policy-determining body, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is:
in a no-man's-land between intergovernmental and supranational policy-making (…) with an orientation towards consensus and compromise (Bickerton, 2011:178).

He describes the PSC and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) as ‘consensus-seeking bodies that view foreign policy as a problem-solving exercise’ (Bickerton, 2013:29). CIVCOM provides opinion on reports from CSDP missions, and assesses the capacities of member states to provide adequate staffing for a mission. Composed of nationally appointed officials, it functions as a discussion and decision-making forum between member states. Howorth’s study of the PSC found that:

the quest for consensus (was the) basic stock-in-trade of the PSC members (and that) the dominant mode of interaction is consensus-seeking rather than bargaining around fixed national positions (Howorth, 2010b:16).

Bickerton argues that the PSC, CIVCOM, and CSDP generally, are largely orchestrated by proxy through a bureaucratic process that has colonised the EU, and led to what he argues is a conceptual change from nation states to member states (Bickerton, 2013:12). This is a significant shift from traditional neo-functionalist or intergovernmentalist frameworks, and reflects the evolution of the EU post-Maastricht. It represents a ‘transformation of the modern state’ (Anderson, 2009:109), whereby democracy has given way to bureaucracy in policy-making, and consensus seeking is dominated by compromise. This matches comments from a DGAP expert critical CSDP’s lack of strategic direction (Interview 25). But compromise and consensus is essential to agreement among 28 member states. The continued availability of veto, the ‘security exemption’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.346) and the unanimity requirement constitute huge problems for Grand Strategy, and ensure that bureaucratic politics is a more viable means for CSDP’s evolution. HR-VP Ashton herself appears to recognise this:

We should not delude ourselves. Lisbon left (the) CFSP as intergovernmental and subject to unanimity decision-making: (in the) absence of political will or an agreement amongst the member states there are limits to what the (EEAS) can deliver (Ashton, 2013c).

It is in this context that bureaucratic process may be enabling, as opposed to CSDP being blocked by individual member state calculations regarding sovereignty. Of course they may still block, but the technocratic manner through which CSDP operates, utilising EEAS
structures, allows consensus at the highest level, in the PSC. This is consistent with claims that the bureaucratic nature of the EEAS may assist CSDP evolution (Interviews 5,7,26,27).

Bureaucratic politics emerges as the antithesis of Grand Strategy. GS depends upon states recognising shared interests and engaging in a top-down directive process of pooling and sharing and capacity building. There is little evidence of this happening. Raising GS to the top of the EU agenda would risk severe splits between states with different strategic cultures and different valuations regarding sovereignty. There is no evidence that 28 member states are prepared to drive security and defence policy through QMV. Lisbon reaffirms the unanimity principle in foreign and security matters, so GS is not viable. Instead bureaucratic politics is happening: Mattelaer reports how EU security operations function through a planning mechanism designed to cope with ‘multiple competing agendas’, necessitating:

a multifunctional system that can serve as a policy vehicle for exporting national policy preferences (Mattelaer, 2013:158).

This is bureaucratic politics, quite inimical to a unanimously agreed Grand Strategy, or even one supported by a majority of member states. National politicians, even once on the European stage, cannot drive major policy changes with domestic support (Oppermann and Hose, 2007). This impedes the vision and proactive policy-making demanded by Grand Strategy. Instead a bureaucratic piecemeal approach prevails and politics gives way to process. Characteristics of CSDP practice, namely lowest-common-denominator and issue-by-issue policy-making, become entrenched. Strategic planning and Grand Strategy are rendered improbable (Toje, 2008). Support for H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics undermines the GS approach to achieving actorness. CSDP demonstrates how member states find other means on an issue-by-issue basis to promote domestic interests (Pohl, 2013, 2014).

A former military officer and CSDP expert (Interview 5) argues that while Solana only had the EUMS behind him, post-Lisbon the HR-VP has the much larger and more comprehensive EEAS. He regards the institutional changes as subtle but important, and says there was no loss of impetus. This is contestable, given the small scale of interventions since EULEX KOSOVO and EU NAVFOR Atalanta were launched in 2008. More plausibly he suggests that a proper bureaucratic structure now underpins CSDP, adding weight to H2. The institutions may lack decision-making power but they provide an effective bureaucracy to support CSDP interventions, albeit comprising CCM rather than combat operations.
Indeed, CSDP is ‘a crisis management tool’ (Mattelaer, 2010:3; Lisbon Treaty, Art.42.1). Lisbon therefore suggests something less than the fully comprehensive, strategic embrace of defence and combat capability indicated by St Malo and implied by the HHG, the ESS, and treaty references to ‘common defence’, implications consistently adopted by Grand Strategy advocates pressing for ‘more defence’. Lisbon therefore reflects confusion, on the one hand referring to ‘common defence’ (Article 42.2), but also the relatively modest role of CSDP missions (Art.42.1). The ambitious rhetoric in core documents (Fig.1.2, p.14) implies Grand Strategy, but contrasts with the modest way in which CSDP actually works through bureaucratic politics. GS has an overt integrationary and defence ambition. Catherine Ashton, regularly criticised for lacking a strategic approach, appealed to the Council to adopt precisely that ahead of its December 2013 meeting (Ashton, 2013c). Instead of Grand Strategy, CSDP represents bureaucratic politics, easily embedded within Brusselsisation:

a vast number of committees and subunits that constitute today a large institutional nexus, made up of hundreds of permanent representatives and seconded personnel (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010:1356).

This highlights how the policy area has advanced beyond intergovernmentalism towards bureaucratisation consistent with H2. The HR-VP, approaching the end of her term, presented a comprehensive wish list regarding Council priorities (Ashton, 2013c). The document made clear that the initiative had to come from the Council, the power brokers, as CSDP is heavily constrained, the EEAS having no right of initiative in policy terms, being dependent on member states for resources and its own institutional needs. Ironically this appeal resembles a call for Grand Strategy, but the instruments assembled to deliver CSDP, the HR-VP and the EEAS, under PSC authority, are more suited to bureaucratic incrementalism than Grand Strategy.

While the EEAS supports CSDP, the Commission may influence crisis management through its financial oversight, a possible hint towards integration and a supranational dimension. More probably, the funding complexities involved (see pp.178-9) are a brake on any potential supranationalism, as again member states predominate. It is more likely that the EEAS and HR-VP achieve some ‘strategic and institutional consolidation’ (Hadfield and Fiott, 2013:180), becoming a ‘European level’ professional and diplomatic service, or even ‘a catalyst for a ‘Europeanisation’ of security and foreign policy’ (O’Sullivan, 2012:7). Alternatively member states may:
use all available opportunities to assert national priorities within the Service (which would attenuate) the integrative foreign policy-making mechanics that the EEAS is designed to foster (Hadfield and Fiott, 2013:180).

Meanwhile the HR as Head of the EEAS and Vice-President of the Commission could assist Commission-Council coordination (see p.132), although the Council maintains oversight of CSDP through the PSC and COREPER. The heterarchy of security and defence policy-making is underlined by the relationships between various actors and institutions (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010:1353), but therein exists possible rivalry. Hadfield and Fiott comment on the HR-VP’s diplomatic achievements, while also noting that she rarely features in declaratory moments. For example Council President Van Rompuy announced the December 2013 Council Meeting to review European defence, and he addressed a NATO Summit in May 2012 (Hadfield and Fiott, 2013:176).

Lisbon attempts better Commission-Council coordination, but whether it achieves this or merely provides further bureaucratisation consistent with H2 is considered in the rest of this section. Respondents mostly reserve judgement until changes are fully embedded (Interviews 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 22) while echoing Gebhard (2009), Drent and Zandee (2010) and Zwolski (2012a) that Lisbon points the way ahead by dismantling the Commission-Council pillar structure. Zwolski (2012b) welcomes the EEAS having both development and security responsibilities, and therefore potentially delivering on the ESS comprehensive promise. However, the post-Lisbon arrangements may fall short of the CIV-MIL coordination that CSDP needs, particularly because the EEAS and the geographic delegations (EUDs) maintain an institutional cleavage between CFSP/Commission responsibilities for development and governance issues, and CSDP for crisis management (Gourlay, 2011:18-19). Section 5.3 above discussed the contradictory mandates of the HR-VP and the EEAS, broadly considered a work-in-progress (Barber, 2010:59).

PESCO may become just another bureaucratic device without strategic impact unless backed by regular capability conferences (Biscop and Coelmont, 2011c, 2013b). It risks free-riding from non-contributors, especially in times of austerity, so like the Battlegroup initiative it may reflect bureaucratisation (H2) rather than deliver strategic actorness (H1). In contrast, CSDP having a permanent operational headquarters (the OpCen) within the CivMil Cell of the EUMS, may facilitate autonomous action. This proposal was dismissed in 2003 for fear of duplicating NATO’s SHAPE (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010:1353).
Bureaucracies necessarily require compromise but this should not blind their masters to the need for efficiency. Drent and Zandee (2010), Norheim-Martinsen (2011) and Mattelaer (2010) call for better civil-military coordination in CSDP which the former Head of CMPD assures is happening (Stevens, 2012). But member state commitment and resourcing is critical. CSDP remains handicapped by small staff numbers. The EEAS employs 3,417 (in September 2013), just 1,457 in Brussels and 1,960 in the EUDs (Martin, 2013:7). As the EEAS Review (EEAS, 2013a) makes clear, the organisation needs clarification and streamlining of responsibilities, particularly regarding CSDP and mission planning.

Meanwhile the EDA repeatedly calls for equipment rationalisation but its recommendations are easily ignored. UK governments have shown ambivalence towards the Agency (Witney, 2008:23; O’Donnell, 2011a:426) which lacks power, being entirely dependent on states and the PSC (Interviews 1,2,6,7,12,24,25). This view is backed by Chappell and Petrov (2010), and Chang (2011) who underlines Lisbon’s confirmation of the ‘security exemption’ in armaments procurement (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.346). A proposal by Biscop (2004:518) for an EDA-managed ‘limited procurement budget’ for EU armaments spending looks like an early bid for Grand Strategy that would receive short shrift from member states.

A Brussels-based expert described the EDA as faced with ‘bureaucratic inertia’ (Interview 2), a criticism aimed at member states rather than at the EDA itself. The proposition that CSDP has been taken over by bureaucratic politics is not accepted by all respondents. A European Parliament official says:

CSDP is a structure: it responds to security situations, it has the potential to take diplomatic or military action, so it is more than just a bureaucracy (Interview 26).

But CSDP cannot ‘take action’. It can only be implemented by member states through the PSC and the Council, and yet the member states lack unity and ambition (Interview 14). The Parliament official says CSDP is developing and the EEAS is emerging as a significant service organisation with the EU Delegations being the ‘main innovation’, bringing local influence and engagement to EU foreign policy in 141 countries where they constitute the Union’s main diplomatic presence. This assessment is questionable, as the EUDs come under the EEAS radar but historically have been a Commission interest. The EEAS has diverse functions and engages multiple actors across different institutions. Bátorá describes how the EEAS:
draws upon and recombines physical, legal and ideational resources from various organisational fields (Bátora, 2013:602).

None of this implies ineffectiveness; the EEAS is ‘potentially a major and highly significant development’ (Howorth, 2013:16), an assessment echoed in HR-VP Ashton’s report (EEAS, 2013a), and shared to varying degrees by respondents (Interviews 4,5,6,8,12,22,26), almost all with the caveat that success depends on member states. Some report that the driver for CSDP will come from outside the EU, from the US for example (Interviews 1,2,4) or from economic imperatives (Interview 8).

This section has considered the institutional elements of CSDP in relation to bureaucratic politics. The conclusion concerning H2 is that the policy area demonstrates a bureaucratic type, and the HR-VP and the EEAS could in time provide a more proactive EU security role. CSDP is not merely a bureaucratic arena. Whether the HR-VP and the EEAS develop their potential for policy entrepreneurship will depend on further reforms identified in Ashton’s Review (EEAS, 2013a). CSDP effectiveness requires better resourcing and more ambition from member states. Moreover it reflects the conceptual challenge of bureaucratic politics: the capacity to conduct policy and achieve actoriness through a bureaucratic organisation.

This emergence of a bureaucratic type relates to legitimacy in this policy field. The challenge to uphold legitimacy while achieving actoriness within a bureaucratic politics context is addressed in the next section.

5.7 Legitimacy and CSDP

This section considers further institutional evidence relating to H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics. It proposes that bureaucratic organisations, comprising officials rather than elected representatives, lack democratic foundation.

The complex ambiguity of the EEAS adds to its bureaucratic and technical nature, strengthening H2, especially in the context of the wider EU, which reflects bureaucratic politics at the expense of democracy (Bickerton, 2011, 2013), contributing to democratic deficit (Maiore, 1998; Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002b; Crombez, 2003; Hix, 2005, 2008). Wisniewski (2013) specifically refers to foreign and security policy in this respect. Dinan refers to the ‘yawning gap between the governed and the governing in the EU’ (Dinan,
Bickerton (2011) argues that democratic deficit affects the modern state generally, not just the EU. The opposition between bureaucracy and democracy centres on questions of legitimacy. How democratic is CSDP? Evidence of a lack of legitimacy may suggest support for H2.

The conceptual framework for legitimacy in this thesis follows Comelli (2010) and the typology set by Wagner (2005) whereby legitimacy has three dimensions:

1) legitimacy as ensured by effective governance (“government for the people” or “output legitimacy”); 2) legitimacy as ensured by participatory procedures (“government by the people” or “input legitimacy”, the latter of which, in turn, may take place at national and/or European level); and 3) compliance with international law (Comelli, 2010:83).

Bickerton (2011) argues that the modern state and the EU display bureaucratic politics at the expense of democracy, citing Beetham:

the power of the bureaucracy is inversely proportionate to the strength of democracy (Beetham, 1987:89).

Hence a lack of legitimacy and confirmation of democratic deficit in CSDP would support H2

**CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.**

Output legitimacy requires that the results of CSDP should be adequately successful in returning public benefits proportionate to cost. This is difficult to assess but the EU normally reports missions as successful within their limited remits (Solana, 2007a; Emerson and Gross, 2007; Witney, 2008; Menon, 2009; Grevi et al, 2009; Kirchner, 2013) and in terms of the minimal costs involved, they are (*Interview 18*). But detailed assessment reveals variable achievement and critical shortcomings in speed of deployment, strategic coherence and personnel provision (Witney, 2008; Asseburg and Kempin, 2009:5-7; Berg, 2009; Mattelaer, 2013). It is not especially testing if missions are relatively small and straightforward, avoiding challenging situations. The largest CSDP military mission, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was effectively a badge change from NATO to the EU with the brief to uphold the Dayton Accords. Althea officials interviewed for this research argue that the mission secures modest achievements but lacks strategic ambition (*Interviews 15-21*).
In RD Congo in 2006, Tchad in 2008, RD Congo again in the same year, or the unfolding Darfur Crisis after 2003, the EU might have launched a mission but member states withheld participation so there is clearly no output. Assessment of CSDP should consider not only what is accomplished but also non-achievement following inaction. In perhaps the major tests of EU foreign policy coordination since Iraq, the Arab Spring and Libyan crises brought no coherent response (Gottwald, 2012). Libya highlighted divisions between member states and the US-backed Anglo-French intervention underlined EU military weakness. While the Iranian nuclear threat has brought consistent and partially successful diplomacy led by EU-3, there has been less obvious unity over Libya, Egypt and Syria. France and the UK supported arming Syrian rebels but many member states feared a regional escalation of conflict (Guardian, 2013c, 2013d). EU sanctions on Syria have been applied with some success (Whitman and Juncos, 2013:160). France intervened unilaterally in Mali in February 2013, not waiting for a combined EU effort. These challenges are beyond the scope of a crisis management framework merely a decade old. If a criterion for success and legitimacy is output, then the scorecard is not especially impressive, as highlighted by Asseburg and Kempin (2009). Considering the long-term intention implied in H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor, analysts refer to the EEAS and HR-VP contributing significantly to EU diplomatic presence in its neighbourhood, including Israel-Palestine (Whitman and Juncos, 2013:160-61; Hadfield and Fiott, 2013:173-180).

Input legitimacy requires adequate oversight by state authorities and parliaments, with genuine policy-making accountability. This is relevant to CSDP as a subset of Common Foreign and Security Policy, since CFSP is designated as intergovernmental, lacking supranational institutions. The Lisbon Treaty, in establishing the EEAS, makes a fundamental change to the EU role in foreign and security policy but neither democracy nor legitimacy is mentioned (Wiesniewski, 2013). Member state governments, through the PSC, control policy-making, and CSDP actions require their authorisation. But CSDP is not purely intergovernmental, which according to Comelli (2010) raises questions of legitimacy. Even if it were purely intergovernmental under Council control, the lack of European Council and Ministerial transparency contributes to democratic deficit (Hix (2008:67-86). Parliament offers oversight rather than control, except that it can withhold support for the EEAS budget (Wiesniewski, 2013; Furness, 2013).

A two-fold weakness in CSDP undermines EU credibility as an international security actor: the rhetoric surrounding the EU contribution (Fig.1.2, p.14) is not matched by outcomes, capability or actorness. Secondly, the assumption that the EU is a normative power
bathed in the warm glow of legitimacy is not justified. Normative power does not equal legitimacy, or effectiveness (Manners, 2010).

Post-Lisbon, in a bid to enhance CSDP legitimacy, the HR-VP must refer CFSP to the Parliament whose opinion is taken into account (Comelli, 2010; Quille, 2010; Furness, 2013). Quille argues that national and European Parliamentary oversight and more inclusive and wide-ranging debate about CSDP strategic objectives enhances legitimacy. This is surely the triumph of hope over expectation. There is a notable lack of public debate (Smith, 2005). A UK expert criticised the absence of debate anywhere even prior to releasing the ESS (Interview 3). Another commented that the Report on ESS implementation (European Council, 2008) involved no debate (Interview 10) while a DGAP expert affirmed that in Germany there is studied avoidance of debate on CSDP (Interview 25) echoing a Bundestag SPD member (Interview 24).

There remains little debate, and still less strategic planning about how the EU can:

- develop a capacity to effectively and sustainably avert threats to European security,
- stabilise its neighbourhood and contribute potently to multilateral crisis management (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009:6).

Parliament oversight and opinion on CSDP is hardly power (Furness, 2013). The only significant Parliament role is some budgetary control of non-military missions, but states may choose to supply additional funding for personnel (Comelli, 2010), so the EP cannot set limits even for civilian missions. Nevertheless this chapter has described increased EP influence on CSDP compared with the Commission, especially as the Parliament was influential in establishing the EEAS (Dinan, 2011; Furness, 2013). Wiesniewski (2013) argues that the Council acceded to EP pressure for oversight of the EEAS to avoid worsening democratic deficit, an argument consistent with a sociological institutionalist and normative view, and indicative of Council sensitivities over legitimacy.

Apart from the opportunity for some binary level parliamentary scrutiny, such as access to Council deliberations and the right to ask questions (Council Decision, 2010b; Wiesniewski, 2013), there are other opportunities for legitimising the policy process through state representation in the PSC and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). Input legitimacy therefore exists through member state control of key bodies, including COREPER, thus reflecting the intergovernmental principle of member state authority in this field, although this is not
equivalent to direct accountability. Public debate is minimal, so democratic oversight remains limited, unless one assumes that state control equates to legitimacy.

The input legitimacy of CSDP institutional structures is therefore limited to EP oversight and the extent to which member states control the policy-making process. Legitimacy in an intergovernmental field requires member state control but in regard to CSDP, governments tend to avoid hard decisions about capability and strategic purpose. Critically therefore, intergovernmentalism may secure a form of legitimacy but at the expense of operational effectiveness.

As Comelli (2010) points out a CFSP-CSDP objective is to promote democracy (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.21), so it hardly enhances EU credibility if CSDP adds to democratic deficit. Accountability and scrutiny by the EP and national parliaments should be stronger, but national parliament power over security and defence policy varies among member states. In the UK, Italy and Germany, executives and their appointees shape policy, although rhetoric may exceed achievement here too. Tony Blair was not short of strategic ambition in Warsaw:

> We need a vastly improved European defence capability so that (we can) undertake actions in our own right (where NATO chooses not to act) (Blair, 2003).

The EU uses international law to legitimise CSDP actions. Mission deployment must conform to international treaties, be backed by a UN resolution, and have support from relevant authorities. CSDP missions meet these criteria so legitimacy is enhanced.

Member state failure to provide CSDP with strategic coherence or adequate CIV-MIL capability hinders output legitimacy. Despite a significant institutional community, coherence is still lacking. CSDP and the EEAS do not represent a political community able to deliver strategic difference, which undermines H1 and strategic actoriness. This is summed up by a DGAP expert:

> We have an EEAS, we have institutions and we have missions, but this amounts to a technical kind of strategic community, not a political one (Interview 25).

According to Mattelaer (2010), institutional development has made CSDP more accountable than NATO or the UN, which suggests considerable legitimacy. PSC authority and member state representation in the EUMC ensures strong state oversight. Indeed CSDP legitimacy
compares favourably not only with other international institutions but with other areas of EU policy. The apparent effectiveness of the institutional machinery is somewhat illusory, and this compromises output legitimacy.

Furness (2013) applies principal-agent theory to analyse whether the EEAS can deliver coherence to EU external policy. It is heavily constrained by its role as a service provider to many principals, primarily but not only the HR-VP, the Council and the Commission. Within the complex bureaucratic relationships involved, including with member states, the Commission and Council Presidencies, the EEAS could potentially secure some autonomy in limited areas. Furness suggests that:

> once created, bureaucracies can develop independently of the legislative and executive authorities that gave them their original mandate (Furness, 2013:105).

Developing an argument from Beem (2009), Furness suggests that bureaucracies in the international sphere can shape the strategies and preferences of domestic actors, although this is more likely in the EU case with smaller and medium-sized states than with the UK, France and Germany who are more assertive regarding policy preferences.

The deficiencies and modest outcomes from CSDP stem from low member state commitment rather than from bureaucratisation *per se*. Bureaucratisation is strongly evident, but the modest scale of achievement post-Lisbon reflects strategic incoherence and lack of political will (Helwig, 2013; Biscop, 2013b). CSDP is operational but not strategic. Its marginalisation, increased since the financial crisis post-2009, demonstrates that security and defence no longer enjoy the status they once had in international affairs. CSDP is below the radar, lacking public scrutiny and accountability, the more so because it is about CCM, not defence. There is little substantial evidence of public support for CSDP. Brummer (2007) argues that while the Commission suggests high public approval for European security and defence policy, detailed analysis shows support is at best ambiguous and not uniform. Peters (2014) reports public sympathy for common EU foreign policy, especially in times of crisis, and even support for an EU role in territorial defence. In contrast, he finds scant evidence of support for the EU defending universal values, a major component of CSDP, much more than defence.

This appraisal of the relationship between CSDP and legitimacy finds weak evidence of output legitimacy and modest input legitimacy. Policy scrutiny in this sphere is elite-led and
technocratic, rather than public or by member state Parliaments. CSDP legitimacy is however enhanced by multilateralism. Finally, there is little hard evidence of public support for an EU role in security and defence, especially in terms of the universal values espoused by the ESS, or CSDP in practice. On these grounds legitimacy considerations strengthen H2 *CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics* on the grounds that bureaucratic process is uppermost while democratic process and accountability is weak.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the institutional framework of CSDP. It has considered interview data and CSDP and foreign policy literature on Brusselisation, socialisation dynamics, and Europeanisation (as adaptation), since these phenomena are potentially explanatory of CSDP and, if significant, could support H1 *CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor*. The chapter concludes that intergovernmentalism is not an adequate explanation of how this policy field works. Assessing the institutional processes around CSDP allows testing of H2 *CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics*.

As with divided views on strategic culture (Chapters 3 and 4), respondents are split between those accepting Brusselising and socialisation dynamics and those who see little evidence of this. The chapter acknowledges ‘institutionalisation of cooperation’ (Smith, 2004:17) and even a ‘coordination reflex’ (Smith, 2004:94), but the impact on policy-making is slight as there is no power shift away from member states. Institutional dynamics, which reflect Brusselisation, have little impact on member states where power remains, either to release resources, or to determine policy. Brussels-based CSDP institutions, including the EEAS and its components, have some shaping effect but do not determine policy. Socialisation factors do not advance policy in this area. There is almost nothing to imply a sociological institutional or identity-driven push towards supranationalism or integration, as constructivists might anticipate.

There may be some potential for policy entrepreneurship in Brussels once the EEAS and HR-VP become established, but member states impose strong financial and political constraints, comprehensively maintained in the treaties. Personality factors are also important and member states appear determined to limit the risk of strong HR-VP leadership by appointing low profile individuals unlikely to compete with the Council and Council Presidency, or with the Commission President.
There is little sign of integrationary impact from CSDP, although eventually this may occur through bureaucratic processes as the EEAS consolidates, and principal-agency dynamics develop. These factors will affect CSDP evolution, as the EEAS is a work in progress with, according to Dinan (2011), some potential to become a full EU institution.

Europeanising processes are constrained by member states, the final determiners of CSDP substance. Enhanced cooperation reflects a comprehensive and emergent European strategic culture (see Chapter 4). This study makes no claims concerning adaptation by member states (Radaelli, 2003). Adaptation is difficult to assess and the thesis does not attempt to meet demands from Moumoutzis (2011) regarding assessment of whether European-level pressures drive state-level adaptation. The chapter therefore rejects Europeanisation on the basis that state adaptation is not proven and socialisation in particular (Wong, 2005) seems an especially weak basis for Europeanisation claims. Ascribing Europeanisation to varying levels of cooperation among member states, with some evidence of shared values and common perspectives seems somewhat arbitrary. An important contribution of the thesis therefore is to question the validity of ascribing Europeanisation to CSDP-related processes, beyond a minimal interpretation of the term based on limited cooperation.

The Lisbon Treaty could bring an integrationary dimension through the EEAS or strong HR-VP leadership. The EDA and PESCO are potential drivers of capability development, but these outcomes are not yet apparent. The chapter finds the Commission role is marginal, while Parliament has gained influence, building links to the EEAS, some financial leverage over the Commission, and a co-decision foothold over Council decisions (Klein and Wessels, 2013:463). Its star has risen, but not much beyond an informational role with some financial oversight. It does however benefit from being directly elected.

Analysis of CSDP institutional structures brings only weak support for H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor. However potential exists for a more strategic CSDP, so emphasis on intention strengthens the hypothesis. Strategic actorness requires better resourcing and commitment from member states, still decisive in delivering actorness.

Regarding H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics, several factors support this: the institutional arrangements and the heterarchical nature of policy-making and implementation (see pp.44 and 55); CSDP dependency on lowest-common-denominator
agreement and issue-by-issue policy-making; its development and implementation through technical processes involving technocratic officials, and what Allison and Zelikow (1999:152) termed ‘satisficing’. All of this suggests bureaucratic politics, so there is strong support for H2. Eventually bureaucratic politics might deliver integrationary impact, especially as a coordination reflex is apparent at an institutional level. The potential for coordination to eventually amount to integration has been noted by Howorth; as commented on p.49, he employs the term ‘co-ordigation’ (Howorth, 2007:32; 2014:215).

However integration is not evident, nor is security and defence prominent in public debate. Member state interests often diverge and sovereignty concerns and intergovernmental preferences remain strong, especially in larger member state. This was evident in UK reactions to Commission President Juncker’s remarks regarding defence integration (Guardian, 2015). Intergovernmentalism, however, is an insufficient explanation for CSDP given that elements of Brusselsisation, transgovernmentalism, heterarchical policy-making and multilevel governance combine in a heavily bureaucratised network of technocratic experts, agents and actors that utilises processes quite different from the bargaining of traditional intergovernmentalism.

There is weak evidence that Lisbon moves CSDP into potentially supranational and integrationary territory, but this is a long-term prospect predicated on the HR-VP and EEAS delivering policy entrepreneurship. This is not happening now. They do not shape strategic direction, although Ashton (2013c) attempted at the last to push the Council in this direction. Strong leadership from the HR-VP would require a changed Council-HR relationship, while Lisbon consolidates state control over security and defence policy (see pp.14 and 159).

Adopting EDA recommendations concerning pooling and sharing, implementing the Capability Development Plan (EDA, 2014a), and activating PESCO could enable a more strategic CSDP. An official in the CMPD comments:

Now, ten years on, we are at the point where we need a great leap forward, we need something considerable (Interview 9).

But this is not on the horizon, which frustrates advocates of Grand Strategy. Lisbon introduced enhanced cooperation (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.20) and PESCO, but with the assurance that the rights of non-participating member states shall not be prejudiced (Art.327). Ultimately therefore, while evidence from institutions offers weak support for H1
**CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor**, Lisbon affirms member state primacy. So H1 can only be supported on account of the implied intention, and the long-term potential for strategic actorness.

CSDP thus remains low-level and low-ambition, but there is some evidence of a consensus-seeking mindset in the Brussels institutions, even in the PSC (Meyer, 2006; Howorth, 2010b). States remain the key arbiters in policy-making; there is only very modest evidence of any supranational or integrationary dynamic, amounting only to long-term potential in currently embryonic structures. Some experts, perhaps optimistically, refer to integration as the direction of travel. States control the scope, speed, extent and areas where cooperation occurs, and where integration may occur in future. Any integrationary dynamic is embryonic and vulnerable to counter-pressures from resistant member states, anxious to preserve sovereignty. The Lisbon Treaty is vague about the implications of institutional change, which undermines H1 (strategic actorness) but enhances H2 (bureaucratic politics). Unless and until PESCO or the CDP brings substantial pooling and sharing and enhanced capability, there will be powerful constraints on the EU achieving *substantial* strategic actorness.

The final part of the chapter argued that the bureaucratic nature of CSDP undermines its legitimacy, given its low output legitimacy, meaning a low level of achievement compared with the EU’s stated ambitions regarding international security. This adds to EU democratic deficit, but member states themselves are also bureaucratised, chiming with the Weberian description of modern capitalist societies and the post-Weberian idea of the ‘network logic of globalisation’ (see p.5). There is a profound lack of public debate, which coincides with a failure by member states to identify common interests (Biscop, 2013a). Input legitimacy is reasonable, given considerable state control over policy-making and implementation, although binary parliamentary oversight is minimal. The bureaucratic politics element runs counter to any democratic gain from input legitimacy, all of which lends strong support to H2.

The main findings of this chapter are that there is developing evidence of ‘institutionalisation of cooperation’ (Smith, 2004:17) and a consensus-seeking mindset in EEAS and PSC. Characteristics of bureaucratic politics are strongly evident: technocratic process, low ambition, consensus-building, lowest-common-denominator agreement, issue-by-issue policy-making, sufficing, governance over government, process over politics, difficult to measure outcomes, and low public engagement. The dominance of bureaucratic processes
in CSDP implementation and the reluctance of member states to articulate common interests, or even to substantially pool defence assets, undermines the feasibility of Grand Strategy. GS is predicated on the need for a high level of security and defence integration. There has been no power shift from member states, and Lisbon’s reaffirmation of the unanimity principle constitutes a barrier to Grand Strategy. GS is rendered implausible given member state preferences, diverse interests and lack of commitment.

In the absence of opportunities for Grand Strategy to deliver strategic coherence or actorness, CSDP is dependent on bureaucratic politics to make progress. This type of governance may be ‘below-the-radar’ in terms of public recognition, and it lacks a clear call to arms, or the top-down leadership and vision, that Grand Strategy implies. The bureaucratic politics of CSDP utilises a complex of institutions (see Fig.5.1, p.127) within and beyond the EEAS to construct and implement policy through processes that are not simply intergovernmental, but multilevel, heterarchical, and highly networked among institutions, multiple agencies and instruments. While Brusselsisation is apparent there are few grounds for supposing that sociological institutionalism or socialisation dynamics drive CSDP.

The field remains intergovernmental in that member states control resources and deployment decisions, but its development proceeds on the basis of bureaucratic politics within a constrained institutionalism, whereby there are powerful member state-imposed limits on what may be achieved.

A further conclusion from this chapter is that there is only ‘minimal’ Europeanisation and little evidence of ‘Europeanisation as adaptation’ in the defence and security field. However Lisbon may provide some potential for CSDP development in the long term, even with strategic outcomes, but this requires member states support or at least acquiescence. Integration and supranationalism in this field is barely evident. Promising initiatives that could deliver enhanced capability such as the EDA’s Capability Development Plan or PESCO are frustrated by member states’ lack of ambition and lack of consensus. Finally, CSDP continues to priorities civilian crisis management and is much less concerned with defence.

The next chapter continues this analysis using evidence from CSDP missions. Consideration of missions can enable further assessment of the extent of EU actorness.
Chapter Six

Mission experience: Is CSDP a policy of substance?

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores evidence from CSDP missions to assess H1 *CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor.* It also tests H2 *CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.* Support for H1 would suggest a strengthening of EU strategic culture, which as argued in Section 2.5, p.49, is essential for strategic actorness. Missions are an obvious means through which the Union can demonstrate strategic culture (defined on p.3) and actorness (p.4).

Asseburg and Kempin (2009:5) argue that 23 missions between 2003 and 2009 indicate a lot of EU security activity but even so, there was little substantial strategic actorness. Others describe the EU as reactive rather than proactive and call for a more strategic approach (Witney, 2008; Menon, 2009; Biscop, 2009, 2011b, 2013a; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010a, 2011a; Howorth, 2009, 2010; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Simón, 2011; Kupchan, 2012). Missions clearly show that CSDP is operational but it impacts in other ways too: capability enhancement, security cooperation and planning, including risk assessment and horizon scanning, are all means through which CSDP contributes to EU security and defence.

Section 6.2 discusses the scope and ambition of CSDP and refers to weaknesses in the Battlegroup concept. Section 6.3 considers mission context, capability, autonomy, and civilian security. Section 6.4 examines mission experience and lessons learned drawing on evidence from commentaries on various missions and on primary research, including a case study of the EUFOR Althea operation in BiH. Althea is chosen for reasons explained on page 29, mainly that it is the largest and longest running EU military operation and is usually considered a successful mission. However evidence regarding missions is drawn from across the CSDP experience, not simply from Althea. Nevertheless the case study is instructive as Althea officials criticise the operation in terms which reflect the bureaucratic politics of CSDP as a whole.

The chapter offers evidence of how CSDP implementation reflects the minimalist, lowest-common-denominator characteristics of the initiative, being dependent on limited resources and low-level commitment from member states. Despite this, CSDP has achieved some
notable successes, especially when understood in the context of the comprehensive approach that utilises a full range of instruments, including political and economic initiatives, to enhance security.

The chapter highlights the gulf between CSDP in practice and Grand Strategy aspirations. Early writing on ESDP wondered whether the initiative would be a policy of ‘substance’ (Shepherd, 2003). Shepherd and others argued that to be so, it would require military capability (Howorth, 2001; Giegerich and Wallace, 2004; Hyde-Price, 2004; King, 2005; Salmon, 2005). This literature implied sympathy with the notion of Grand Strategy as a means to achieving the autonomous capability referred to in the St Malo Declaration, in the HHG, and in the ESS. The chapter concludes that while CSDP is a functioning policy, it has consolidated around civilian crisis management and security issues. Mission evidence shows that it is significantly less defence-orientated than St Malo or even the ESS implied. This suggests that CSDP is a long way from adopting the Grand Strategy that many have advocated. Instead it has developed through bureaucratic, gradualist, and issue-by-issue cooperation, and its achievements are difficult to quantify, but it makes significant contributions to security, even while it falls well short of Grand Strategy aspirations. The chapter also suggests that the bureaucratic politics of CSDP implementation has been more effective in Europe’s near abroad, specifically the Western Balkans, than further afield, although the counter-piracy Atalanta operation has also achieved significant success.

6.2 Scope and ambition of CSDP and mission deployment challenges

The thesis has mentioned how the EU’s stated ambitions (p.14) regarding security invite criticism over its capability deficiencies. This builds on Hill’s ‘capability-expectations’ gap (Hill, 1993; Toje, 2008) and suggests a credibility gap between aims and outcomes. For example the ESS aspires to:

promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations (Solana, 2003:8).

Events following the Arab Spring in 2010 and in Palestine and Ukraine more recently suggest the EU has only marginal impact on (some of) its neighbourhood. EU-Russia relations have seriously deteriorated. It is a moot point whether the Union has achieved ‘a
secure Europe in a better world’ (Solana, 2003). If the EU cannot be an effective milieu shaper, perhaps it is destined to remain a ‘small power’ (Toje, 2011). After St Malo and the HHG, military ambitions were downgraded (Crowe, 2003; Menon, 2004). While Giegerich and Wallace (2004) contended that ESDP would come of age through mission experience, calls for enhanced capability, coherence, and political will reflect a continuing lack of actorness. The modest scale of missions reflects low ambition even more than low capability. Biscop (2011b) writes that CSDP lacks leadership and preparedness to act, and so needs a Grand Strategy to achieve its ambitions.

It remains a fluid process. Post-Iraq in 2003 ESDP developed as a crisis management instrument with a comprehensive civilian-military character and an emphasis on civilian missions and preventive action. Norheim-Martinsen says this focus was already in the ESS which:

lacks the (...) unambiguous will to use military force to protect core values (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011:532).

Lisbon sets out that the Union may confront certain tasks using civilian and military means including:

Joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.43.1).

Despite the broad scope of CSDP and its ‘common defence' aspirations (*ibid*, Art.42.2), the policy is mostly civilian-oriented. Among 37 missions up to October 2014 (Isis Europe, 2014) seven have been military, mostly in rather benign, low-risk environments, and the remainder civilian or military assistance and training missions. Emerson and Gross (2009:12), and Menon (2009), point out that while missions are invariably described as successful (Solana, 2007a), they are low ambition and mostly civilian. Others condemn the lack of strategic content, missions being ‘small, lacking in ambition and strategically irrelevant’ (Gowan and Korski, 2009:11). Ultimately CSDP has evolved as a set of CCM instruments for conflict prevention, as shown by the post-Lisbon missions (Major and Mölling, 2013; EEAS, 2014d). Only one has been military, the small scale EUFOR RCA, lasting one year (EEAS, 2015).
An important CSDP military instrument is the EU Battlegroup idea (see p.55-6). This merits attention because non-deployment also reveals significant truths about CSDP. By 2007 the HHG had been scaled down to nine deployment-ready Battlegroups. A military expert in Brussels and an EUMS official say the initiative can assist capability enhancement (Interviews 5,8) as Biscop (2013b) also insists. An E CFR expert (Interview 10) says BGs are based on quality rather than quantity, but an IISS expert (Interview 1) says the idea is ‘inherently flawed’ as states may withdraw or withhold facilities. This degrades effectiveness or may mean abandoning a mission (Haine, 2008:3). To counter this Lindstrom (2011) calls for larger permanent BGs on permanent standby, while Elman and Terlikowski (2013:2) describe the Weimar BG comprising France, Poland, and Germany and considered one of the most successful, as offering ‘little chance of (…) permanent defence cooperation’.

In November 2008 the German and UK Battlegroup declined a UN request to intervene in DR Congo. Deployment depends on who is on the roster. The Union has no authority to demand deployment and state parliaments will be reluctant to send personnel simply because they are rostered during a crisis (Interview 4). Menon delivers a damning criticism of bureaucratic preoccupation with structural and technical processes rather than meeting strategic demands (Menon, 2009:244).

Others criticised the process whereby deployment is subject to member state approval and BGs are disbanded after operational rotation (Venusberg Group, 2007:37). Lindstrom (2007:61) suggests that the scheduling might lead states to manipulate the preparation stage to avoid deployment, though this might be politically difficult during a crisis and lead to loss of face (Interview 10). Even so, domestic pressures to avoid deployment may speak more loudly than humanitarian need.

Financing is a fundamental weakness. According to Biscop and Coelmont (2013b), having no crisis management budget is a deterrent to BG deployment and undermines the entire CSDP, a view echoed among respondents (Interviews 7,9,10,23), although a CIVCOM official considered the problem overstated (Interview 6). Core costs of military operations are met by the Athena mechanism with state contributions proportional to national income, while contributing member states meet direct operational expenditure on a ‘costs-lie-where-they-fall’ basis, a mechanism widely criticised as complex and inadequate (Venusberg Group, 2007; Witney, 2008; Biscop, 2008; Fiott and Jacquemet, 2008; Biscop and Coelmont, 2013b). Athena meets only 10 percent of total mission costs (Menon, 2009:239). A German
think-tank is unequivocal: ‘Common funding for all ESDP missions is a first order pre-requisite for an effective ESDP’ (Venusberg Group, 2007:55).

A CMPD military official condemns the funding arrangements as ‘absurd’, and ‘designed to ensure Battlegroups will never be deployed’ (Interview 9). A CIVCOM official points out that there is no central financial support for civilian missions (Interview 6), while a Berlin DGAP expert comments that funding for civilian personnel is even worse in Germany because the Länder pay salaries, not the Federal budget (Interview 23).

While CSDP central funding would be strategically coherent, the supranational dimension and budget implications guarantee member state resistance, especially from net contributors. During austerity and with rising anti-EU sentiment, a boost to CSDP spending seems unimaginable. This further undermines Grand Strategy prospects. Also, centralised funding would expose budget arrangements to more scrutiny and exacerbate public hostility to defence spending.

While funding issues alone do not explain BG non-deployment they add to member state reluctance to commit personnel to CMOs, ensuring that interventions are small-scale and under-resourced. Of course deployment decisions are case dependent. Even after the PSC agrees an intervention, and UN backing is received, deployment depends on the force generation process. Mattelaer reports that EUFOR Tchad/RCA involved five conferences between November 2007 and January 2008, after which the mission had assurances for only half of required resources (Mattelaer, 2013:51-3). In contrast, NAVFOR Atalanta (EU NAVFOR, 2015a, 2015b) was launched in November 2008 as the risks seemed less daunting, direct interests more transparent and positive outcomes more likely.

Assessment of the BG concept reveals a bureaucratic process that is a deterrent to CSDP military operations. The concept is plagued by roster complexities, membership, and funding issues (Haine, 2008). However, BGs have brought benefits. An SWP expert (Interview 22) cites capability development, interoperability, technical cooperation and force transformation, also reported by Lindstrom (2007), Dickow et al, (2011), Chappell (2012), and Biscop and Coelmont (2013b). On balance BGs indicate a bureaucratic exercise quite distinct from strategic actorness. This undermines H1, but the complex BG arrangements suggest support for H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.

The next section surveys the context within which missions take place.
6.3 Mission context: Military capability, autonomy, and civilian security

The HHG became mired in conflict between different visions for ESDP broadly equating to an Atlanticist versus Europeanist split over compatibility or competition with NATO, a split which coincided with disagreements over Iraq and the infamous Chocolate Summit in April 2003, so-named on account of chocolate being a staple of the participant states, namely Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Germany (Mérand, 2008:128). What eventually emerged was a consensus not around European power projection, but CMOs and conflict prevention, orchestrated by member state representatives in Brussels through key committees, the PSC, CMPD and CIVCOM. The consensus-oriented, problem-solving approach of these bodies (see pp.144-6, 158-9) was evident in the earliest stages of ESDP (Crowe, 2003; Menon, 2004). CSDP uses norm-driven consensus rather than power-political ambitions (Bickerton, 2013:178). This means compromise is intrinsic to CSDP and it is based on values, so almost inevitably civilian-oriented. EU foreign policy leans towards ‘power avoidance’ (Laïdi, 2008), again highlighting the gap between rhetoric and reality. This power avoidance is rooted in European experience in two world wars, and helps explain EU soft power aspirations throughout its formative decades, encapsulated in normative power Europe theory (Manners, 2002, 2006). This finds expression in the mostly civilian orientation of CSDP.

Most ESDP missions were civilian or relatively small-scale (Interviews 4,11). A single post-Lisbon military operation, EUFOR RCA, and still no Battlegroup deployment, suggests continuing reluctance to use BGs. The Darfur humanitarian crisis in 2004-08 was an opportunity for EU force deployment but no mission was agreed, although the Union linked EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Council Joint Action, 2007a) to Darfur. According to a Brussels-based expert (Interview 4), Sweden wanted the Nordic Battlegroup despatched to Tchad rather than the usual force generation process, but the UK withheld Northwood as the command centre, preventing deployment. Pohl (2013:139-40) also says this was a factor in the non-deployment but Seibert (2010:n153) reports Swedish officials ultimately not wanting deployment. Mattelaer (2013) says member states suspected France was pursuing national interests and felt the situation did not fit the stated purpose of BGs. There was no agreement because the operation would have involved substantial common costs under the Athena mechanism, which several member states did not want. Pohl (2013:140) also says the UK feared being dragged into the Tchad/RCA crisis as it was a leading member of the follow-up BG. Ultimately the Tchad mission went ahead on the basis of the usual force generation process, which was slow and difficult (Majone, 2009; Mattelaer, 2013:53). The complexity of force generation and the difficult cost arrangements suggest support for H2 and the
bureaucratisation of CSDP. The Tchad episode illustrates weaknesses in the BG concept and limited actorness (H1), while the Darfur Crisis prompted a Parliament demand for UN action under R2P (European Parliament, 2007).

While deployment to Central Africa is always likely to be resisted by many member states, several respondents (Interviews 1,3,4,10) suggest that in the unlikely event of a flare-up in Kosovo this would require EU intervention because the US would consider it Europe’s responsibility. Others believe a major security challenge in Europe’s neighbourhood would bring a NATO rather than EU response (Interviews 2,3,4,11,13). The Libya crisis in 2011 suggests this is correct: NATO members acted under NATO with Arab League and AU backing (NATO, 2012). CFSP was marginal: the EEAS set up a political and diplomatic presence but no CSDP operation (EEAS, n.d.d; Gottwald, 2012). This is unsurprising as it reflects CSDP is a CCM framework, not a NATO substitute.

In CCM, CSDP is better equipped than NATO which lacks civilian expertise, its focus being territorial defence under Article 5 (NATO, 1949). Respondents refer to the ‘civilianisation’ of CSDP, underlining differentiation between NATO military tasks and European Union CCM (Interviews 1,11). Two senior officials (Interviews 15,16) refer to the civilianisation of EUFOR Althea. CSDP civilianisation was aided by the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 approved by the PSC in 2004 (Council of the European Union, 2004), a capability enabler for CCM within the comprehensive approach involving a capability assessment and lessons-learned approach. Across all member states, resourcing the CHG has proved problematic. CSDP was always intended to be twin-tracked, i.e. CIV-MIL-oriented, although civilianisation may have emerged as a pragmatic solution to the ‘threat’ that a defence orientation might compromise NATO supremacy, a significant UK concern throughout.

Eventually, enhanced military capability could suggest a stronger defence component to CSDP (Interview 5) but mission experience underlines civilianisation especially as BGs, designed for rapid response, have not been deployed. The moot question is whether NATO will insist on the EU handling military threats in future, obliging deployment through CSDP. This depends on how much the US expects Europeans to attend to their own neighbourhood security. A ‘US pivot’ towards Asia Pacific implies profound consequences for the US-NATO-EU triangle (Peterson, 2013:58; O’Donnell, 2011a:430; Biscop, 2012:1298; Defense Department, 2012; Financial Times, 2012a; Liao, 2013), but this view is not shared by the former German Defence Minister who sees the EU/NATO partnership as effectively permanent, and suggests that the US concern with Asia is nothing new (de Maizière, 2013).
Several respondents consider it inevitable that EU member states must accept security responsibility (Interviews 4, 7, 9, 22), a view shared by Grand Strategy proponents (Witney, 2008; Menon, 2009; Biscop, 2009, 2013a; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010a, 2011a; Howorth, 2009, 2010; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Simòn, 2011). A senior EDA official commented that Berlin Plus which allows EU use of NATO assets (Berlin Plus, 2003) is no basis for Europe’s future security so member states will need to embrace common and enhanced defence capability (Interview 7), a position consistent with Grand Strategy advocates.

Having briefly surveyed the security context of CSDP mission deployment, we turn now to the missions themselves, and evidence concerning the implementation of CSDP.

6.4 CSDP missions

6.4.1 Mission experience and lessons learned

Table 6.1 CSDP Missions A) Military B) Civilian 2003-2014
(Source: Adapted from ISIS Europe, 2014; EEAS, 2014d)

Details of all ongoing and completed missions available at:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A) CSDP Military Missions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCORDIA FYROM</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARTEMIS DR Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea BiH</td>
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<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR TCHAD/RCA</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU NAVFOR Atalanta</td>
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<td>EUFOR RCA</td>
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## B) CSDP Civilian Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type of mission/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUMM W.Balkans</td>
<td>01/03-12/07</td>
<td>M Serbia/Mont, Kos, BiH, FYRM, Albania. Max. 600 in 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM BiH</td>
<td>01/03-06/12</td>
<td>P €32.9m total 540 staff, 27MS, 7TS, 27MS, 6TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Proxima/EUPAT FYRM</td>
<td>12/03-12/05</td>
<td>P €30.95m total 186 police; 138 police under EUPAT after 12/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUJUST-THEMIS Georgia</td>
<td>07/04-07/05</td>
<td>RoL €2,050m total 10 EU experts; 10 MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa/EUPOL RDC</td>
<td>04/05-06/07</td>
<td>P €4.3m 23 international staff; 6 MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC DR Congo</td>
<td>06/05-06/15</td>
<td>SSR €4.6m 26 staff; 7 MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUJUST LEX Iraq</td>
<td>07/05-12/13</td>
<td>RoL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS EU Sudan</td>
<td>07/05-12/07</td>
<td>A 30 police; 15 military experts; 2 military observers; 15 MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM Aceh</td>
<td>08/05-12/06</td>
<td>M €15m 125 EU staff, 93 ASEAN, 12 MS, 7 TS, 5 ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR BST Georgia</td>
<td>08/06-08/09</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>10/06-06/15</td>
<td>B Palestine €940,000 4 EU staff; 3MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova</td>
<td>11/05-11/15</td>
<td>B 100 international staff, 120 local staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS Palestine</td>
<td>01/06-06/15</td>
<td>P €8.97m 71 staff, 41 local. 21MS, 3TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPAT FYRM</td>
<td>01/06-06/06</td>
<td>P Police Advisory Team €1.5m 30 police officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPT Kosovo</td>
<td>05/06-06/08</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL RD Congo</td>
<td>07/07-09/14</td>
<td>P SSR 31 staff, 7 MS. Close cooperation with UN Mission in DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td>07/07-12/16</td>
<td>P €58m 206 staff, plus 178 local 23 MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU SSR Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>05/08-09/10</td>
<td>SSR €7.6m total; 8 international staff, 16 local. 4 MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>07/08-06/16</td>
<td>RoL €90m 800 int. staff, 800 local. Most MS plus 5 TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM Georgia</td>
<td>10/08-12/14</td>
<td>M €26.6m (15 months to 12/14); 274 int. staff, 128 local. 23 MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU NAVCO</td>
<td>09/09-12/14</td>
<td>Replaced by EU NAVFOR Atalanta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>04/10-12/16</td>
<td>MT €11.6m 125 staff 10 MS, 1 TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger</td>
<td>07/12-07/16</td>
<td>SA €9.16m 56 int. staff, 31 local. 11 MS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP NESTOR Horn of Africa</td>
<td>07/12-12/16</td>
<td>SA Naval, anti-piracy. €11.9m 86 staff + 18 local 15 MS, 2 TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAVSEC South Sudan</td>
<td>06/12-01/14</td>
<td>SA Aviation Security. 34 international, 15 local staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>01/13-01/17</td>
<td>MT €11.4m 80 international staff 13 MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>05/13-06/15</td>
<td>B €26m 17 international staff; operating from Tunisia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:** A=assistance B=border M=monitoring MT=military training P=police RoL=rule of law SA=support/assistance SSR=security sector reform MS=member states TS=Third states (Budgets annual unless stated otherwise)

Table 6.1 shows that most CSDP missions have been civilian. A military representative in the EEAS (*Interview 13*) explains the non-deployment of BGs by saying that CSDP ‘prefers post-crisis management’. Post-crisis stabilisation and conflict prevention suggests a minimally strategic CSDP, unlike the defence orientation of the US NSS for example which reflects hard security and military capability (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). The seven military operations (Table 6.1A) have been primarily post-conflict and UN-mandated as stabilisation and peacekeeping missions. Missions have entailed broad
ambitions including support for democratic governance, policing, law and order, the defence of human rights and post-conflict stabilisation, needs for which NATO, primarily a defence organisation (NATO, 1949), is not designed. Civilian CSDP missions match the comprehensive approach (see p.3) reflected in the ESS, whereby conflict prevention is central to CSDP, but Gya (2009) argues that the CCM role of CSDP is under-developed and under-resourced, a view strongly backed by EUFOR Althea officials (*Interviews 15-21*).

A Brussels-based foreign policy expert considers there are few lessons from CSDP missions as ‘most are civilian (…) they are all marginal (…) and too small to have any real impact’ (*Interview 2*). Missions do not demonstrate ‘autonomous defence’ (SMD, 1998), but instead a range of low-level cooperation that reflects some of the ESS milieu-shaping ambition, especially in the Western Balkans. The focus on humanitarian intervention and conflict prevention is consistent with the Lisbon commitment to ‘peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.1). Despite treaty references to ‘tasks of combat forces’ and ‘peace-making’ (Art.43.1), missions have mostly, but not entirely, avoided these. Military operations in Africa, especially EU NAVFOR Atalanta (Council Joint Action, 2008b; EU NAVFOR, 2015a) have been the exceptions.

The first EU military operation was *Concordia* in Macedonia (FYROM), launched under Berlin Plus, in 2003 (Council Joint Action, 2003a; CONCORDIA, n.d). It involved an EU force taking over a peacekeeping role from NATO. The Alliance provided assistance in that *Concordia* could call upon additional forces in extremis (Mace, 2004). While technically an ESDP operation, the headquarters was SHAPE while the force headquarters was the NATO base at Skopje. An EU Command Element was located in Naples at the NATO Allied Forces South base, the NATO Joint Force Command for Balkan operations (Howorth, 2007:232).

While EU member states demonstrated capability shortfalls (Howorth, 2007:99) Berlin Plus seemed to offer a ready-made solution. It ensured that ESDP should be compatible and not competitive with NATO, and had immediate impact through *Concordia*. In June 2003 the EU responded to a UN call to despatch 1800 troops to DR Congo in Operation *Artemis* (ARTEMIS/DRC, n.d.), and EUFOR Althea (EUFOR Althea, 2015) was launched in Bosnia in December 2004. These operations used NATO command structures and NATO assets under Berlin Plus, provoking the observation that ‘without NATO, ESDP would be unworkable’ (King, 2005:51).
Cooperation with NATO smoothed UK and US anxieties over ESDP. Secretary of State Albright referred to the unacceptable three Ds of ‘decoupling, duplication and discrimination’ (Albright, 1998). NATO Secretary General George Robertson responded with the more positive ‘three Is’ of ‘indivisibility of the alliance, improved European capabilities, inclusiveness of partners’ (Howorth, 2000a:45; Robertson, 1999). Not only Berlin Plus but also France’s return to the NATO Atlantic Council assuaged concerns, with France also more accepting of NATO’s presence in EU-ESDP affairs (Charillon and Wong, 2011:21). Despite initial fears, ESDP never threatened NATO integrity or undermined the Atlantic partnership. On the contrary it may have benefited the alliance, at least until the US loses patience with European reluctance to accept burden-sharing and higher defence spending.

So ESDP began with dependency on NATO resources through Berlin Plus (2003) which initially worked reasonably well, especially in the Balkans, according to an MoD official (Interview 12) but less well according to Howorth (2014:76) who judged the arrangements ‘rather awkward’. Indeed various respondents criticise the inter-institutional arrangements as cumbersome and lacking coherence (Interviews 7,9,12), a view backed by Perruche (2008:24) and Strickmann (2008:51). Institutional difficulties relating to the Turkey-Cyprus problem eventually stymied Berlin Plus (Interview 12), an assessment shared by Simón (2011:8) and from within NATO by Brauss (2008:40). This led to over-dependency on lead nations supplying resources, typically France in DR Congo Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 (EUFOR RD Congo, n.d.), and EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2008 (EUFOR Tchad/RCA, n.d.). Lead-nation dependency should in theory be countered by the accumulated capability of Battlegroups, but these too have significant weaknesses (see pp.178-181).

Several respondents are not convinced of the utility of a close EU-NATO relationship, implying that the Union and member states should pursue independent capability that complements NATO, rather than institutionalise dependency through a Berlin Plus-type mechanism (Interviews 7,9,11). The EU prefers compatibility and partnership rather than dependency, but the Turkey-Cyprus dispute effectively paralyses Berlin Plus for future operations, according to a UK MoD paper (Johnston, 2010). Both parties declare that they seek a complementary and strategic relationship (NATO, 2014; EEAS, 2014f).

The suggestion that the EU should pursue military capability does not entail re-adopting the St Malo-implied autonomy (SMD, 1998). That has been all but buried as CSDP developed as a comprehensive crisis management instrument focused on post-conflict stabilisation and conflict prevention. Enhancing capability is compatible with and advantageous to CSDP-
NATO coexistence (EEAS, 2013a) and the transatlantic partnership (Major and Mölling, 2010b). The challenge is to develop the comprehensive approach through strategic capacity building, as demanded by proponents of Grand Strategy (Biscop, 2013b). This requires capability across the full range of instruments, military and civilian, with effective planning, implementation and control mechanisms.

A former Director of DGE IX (Civilian Crisis Management) (Serrano, 2006) highlighted the lack of strategic coherence, arguing that member states tended to assess advantages from a mission in terms of benefits on the ground, or utility to national interests. Lack of clarity regarding EU security aspirations is underlined by Gourlay (2011) and Hatzigeorgopoulos (2013), who comments on the failure to match up to the logic of the ESS. Strategic incoherence is a recurrent theme in this research, undermining the EU’s capacity to substantially enhance international security, though such impact is hard to measure.

Lessons from missions primarily concern inadequate resources, communication deficiencies, and limited political will (Interviews 7,8,9,10,22,26). Resourcing is problematic even where, as in EULEX KOSOVO, substantial costs are involved: €265m in the operational phase February 2008-June 2010 (Grevi, 2009:353); or they are relatively large in staffing terms (Interview 27; EULEX Kosovo, 2014). Various accounts refer to inadequate CSDP resources (Juncos, 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2008; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2008; Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Solana, 2009, Emerson and Gross, 2009; Menon, 2009; Grevi et al, 2009; Gross, 2012). There can also be chronic shortfalls in the force generation process, criticised for being cumbersome and bureaucratic even after a mission is agreed (see p.180 above).

Several respondents refer to missions offering lessons regarding institutional processes. While perspectives vary, the main concern is resourcing. A CMPD official comments:

Institutionally we’re not ineffective. If we could achieve positive outcomes, we would... if we had the means (Interview 9).

This implies a positive view of the post-Lisbon framework, but as noted in the previous chapter there is some structural incoherence and competitive jockeying between components in the institutional jigsaw (Dinan, 2013). Frustration over resources is widespread, among EEAS officials (Interviews 8,9), the EDA (Interview 7) and elsewhere (Interviews 13,26). An SWP expert refers to fragmented planning and command structures and advocates permanent planning and conduct capabilities, whilst also noting inadequate
support for civilian missions, dependent on states volunteering staff and meeting all costs (Interview 22), a criticism also from a DGAP expert (Interview 23). A senior Althea official in the OHR refers to a shortage of civilian volunteers, resulting in understaffed missions (Interview 16). These limitations are widely recognised (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2008; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2008; Witney, 2008; Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Emerson and Gross, 2009; Menon, 2009, 2012; Grevi et al, 2009; Major and Mölling, 2010a; Gross, 2012).

Civilian recruitment is particularly difficult (Juncos, 2007; Gowan and Korski, 2009; de Coning, 2010; Bloching, 2011; Gourlay, 2013). Respondents cite chronic shortages of trained and available expertise, particularly for CCM (Interviews 7,16,22,27). A senior EDA official complains that ‘Europe has 2 million police officers but getting 100 for a mission is extremely difficult’ (Interview 7) and refers to the inadequate preparation of personnel engaged in CM training. Carabinieri and Guardia Civil contribute well, but they are not trained to train civilians for CMOs. An expert on EULEX Kosovo reports acute problems in recruiting judges and prosecutors for a law and order mission (Interview 27), also noted by Grevi (2009). Perhaps a greater problem for EULEX is that the mission and EU policy towards the territory is compromised by contradictory ambitions, namely to protect minority Serb interests in the north and assist the majority Kosovar population in building an autonomous state (Merlingen, 2013:152-3). Bloching (2011) reports chronic staff shortages and expertise deficiencies in Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives, citing EUPOL Afghanistan (Council Joint Action, 2007b) where a mere 317 EU personnel are trying to improve policing: even the projected target of 400 was not realised.

Staffing deficiencies cannot be remedied without member state commitment. As EUFOR Althea data (see below) will demonstrate, calls for better civilian expertise and resourcing are common. The Union utilises primarily civilian power to enhance democracy, promote stability, and assist economic development. This includes a significant role for the Commission and EUDs, which should develop further but evidence from interviews and the literature suggests that CSDP remains limited in scope, poorly resourced, and subject to major state-imposed constraints (Bloching, 2011). Bloching highlights weak civilian capability, especially the lack of permanent support structures, and calls for a permanent pool of equipment, transport vehicles, and communication tools (Bloching, 2011:16). This seems a modest request but Gourlay (2013:103) argues that civilian CSDP should cut its cloth according to its limitations and focus on achievable ambitions in the EU near abroad where local buy-in to EU objectives can be relied upon. Indeed reining in ambition may be especially appropriate in the military sphere. This is a strategic actorness of sorts, minimally
consistent with H1, but more modest than core statements, and Grand Strategy, imply (Fig.1.2, p.14).

A military expert in the EEAS refers to the lack of CIV-MIL resources, reporting that once an operation is set up it is immediately scaled back because resources are not forthcoming (Interview 13), also noted by Mattelaer (2013). Gross (2013) reflects on EU SSR efforts in Asia and argues that while the approach has been comprehensive it cannot be considered strategic, being reactive rather than proactive, minimalist and heavily constrained.

Resource inadequacies contrast with claims of success attributed to civilian operations. CSDP has achieved successes but this is in spite of severe deficiencies. Missions contribute to security, but there are critical 'shortcomings in the quantity and quality of available resources' (Grevi and Keohane, 2009:69), as HR Solana admitted, referring to a 'mixed' record on capacity-building (Solana, 2007a:4). One expert says missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Aceh, and Congo achieved good work but considers them all 'marginal' (Interview 2): they do not constitute strategic actorness, or large-scale achievement. The impression is that missions reflect the embryonic nature of the EU contribution to international security. For several respondents the impact is marginal, a disappointing verdict considering the Union's own positive assessments (Solana, 2007a; European Council, 2008; Ashton, 2013b, 2013c; EEAS, 2013a). The EU does not yet constitute a power able to strategically confront violence, terror and injustice (Biscop and Whitman, 2013:2).

Biscop (2013b) argues that pooling and sharing can deliver enhanced military capability, but Major and Schöndorf (2011) underline the need for concerted efforts across diplomatic, military, civilian, humanitarian and development aid instruments, not merely a focus on military capability. This is the comprehensive approach extolled by the former CMPD head, Walter Stevens (Stevens, 2012). It reflects the emergent European strategic culture (Chapter 4) and highlights the preventive element of CSDP. Prevention depends on civilian efforts and soft power to enhance stability and secure sustainable political and economic development. CSDP must be understood in the context of the comprehensive approach which uses other instruments, such as the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF, 2014) which works with EU enlargement policy. EU post-conflict stabilisation and development efforts have brought clear benefits across the region (BBC News, 2013b; EEAS, 2013c; Radio Free Europe, 2013; Peen Rodt and Wolff, 2012; Kirchner, 2013). Biermann (2014) and Gross and Rotta (2011) suggest a varied assessment with Bosnia and Kosovo still presenting major challenges, but significant progress in other ex-Yugoslav territories.
Communication concerns offer further lessons for CSDP, as missions demonstrate the need for more streamlined channels of authority and communication (Interviews 7,13,15,22), as noted by the EEAS itself (EEAS, 2013a, 2014a). Major and Schöndorf (2011) emphasise the urgency of improved command, control and communication. An EEAS military expert reports that military processes work through a chain of command, involving collecting and storing information in a database that supports CSDP. Lessons may be tactical and operational but military-strategic lessons are often politically sensitive which complicates taking action to improve processes (Interview 13). Bloching (2011) reports member states’ circumspect view of lessons learned and recommendations from, among others, the European Security and Defence College and the Swedish EU Presidency (Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2011) for fear that they highlight weak member state commitment.

Better CIV-MIL coordination is needed, and better sharing of information and expertise, not only within CMPD but with external agencies involved in CMOs (Interviews 7,13,15,16,17), a point underlined by Emerson and Gross (2007:12) and Bloching (2011:14), and recognised by the EEAS itself (EEAS, 2013a). A senior EDA official highlights coordination and chain-of-command difficulties (Interview 7), as do Asseburg and Kempin (2009:154) who report a lessons-learned process as ‘woefully absent’ especially in the civil sphere. Bossong (2013) similarly criticises the informal and haphazard way in which experience informs a learning process, while also estimating that the EEAS will bring more effective tracking of experience to improve mission effectiveness. It is surprising that the recommendations in the EEAS Review (EEAS, 2013a) do not include introducing a proper lessons-learned approach.

An EEAS military representative expresses concern that lessons are regarded as problems, as signs of weaknesses, when an objective and constructive approach is needed; the NATO-EU common membership ought to suggest open communication but instead there is a lack of transparency, partly because information is classified (Interview 13), as Bloching (2011:14) confirms.

The same EEAS official says monitoring missions to improve efficiency works because standard operating procedures can be easily altered, but the focus should be on outcomes and behaviour rather than process. He reports effective inter-agency dialogue, especially EU-UN cooperation in EU NAVFOR Atalanta (EU NAVFOR, 2015a), but right across CSDP there should be better information sharing with NATO, OSCE, and the UN: too much is classified, which makes little sense. An MoD official commends the Atalanta operation:
(The) counter piracy mission off Somalia is very successful, not least because it has brought in third parties, India, China, the US...and that’s in spite of, or actually because, it’s an EU mission (Interview 12).

The same respondent reports effective coordination with different agencies working with the Balkan missions, a view barely shared among EUFOR Althea officials (see below). A CMPD military official has a less positive view of Atalanta, criticising the lack of follow-through as there are no agreed procedures for dealing with detainees:

(Atalanta) is more successful (than NATO’s efforts against piracy) but it’s also dysfunctional. We apprehend pirates, they throw their guns in the sea, we give them food and water, (...) there’s no process to charge them or try them, nobody wants them, so we let them go (Interview 9).

This seems too negative; Helly (2009) reports the EU handing 68 pirates to the Kenyan authorities in August 2009. He commends Atalanta, the first EU naval operation, as a prime illustration of the multilateral multi-agency approach achieving measurable success (EU NAVFOR, 2015a, 2015b). Nevertheless Atalanta, like other missions, fails to fully engage with the political and legal ramifications of its role. Weber (2009) suggests that for all its success, Atalanta does not address the causes of piracy. This is more a criticism of CSDP’s lack of coherent strategy than a criticism of Atalanta, but it undermines H1 *CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor.*

Whatever the institutional failures, political will is a critical issue, as argued by an SWP expert who says coordination suffers from competition and poor coordination, even between the post-Lisbon CMPD and the Conduct Planning Civilian Capability within the EEAS:

(But) it’s no use blaming the EU or its institutions; this is an intergovernmental policy area so it’s up to member states to do what’s required (Interview 22).

Others refer to member states’ political will (*Interviews* 2,4,7,9,10,15-21,22), as does former High Representative Solana (2007), Emerson and Gross (2007:16) and Biscop (2013b). One expert complains that member states’ diverse interests make it impossible to be sure what CSDP is trying to achieve (Interview 3), as reflected in the difficulties in putting a mission together with adequate and proportional participation across several member states (Schroeder, 2007:32; Mattelaer, 2013:53).
In theory the CMPD produces mission reports that incorporate lessons learned. Once Council-approved, these should bind member states to addressing shortfalls in financing and personnel provision (Bloching, 2011:15). However a CMPD military official says requests depend entirely on states agreeing to supply resources, and usually the response is negative (Interview 9). This suggests not process or institutional failure, but a failure of political will, a widely supported view (Venusberg Group, 2007; Witney, 2008; Menon, 2009; Biscop, 2011b; European Voice, 2009). Political will is essential to strategic actorness, and its absence undermines H1. This criticism is not forthcoming from the HR-VP or in the EEAS Review (EEAS, 2013a), an indication of the constraints under which they operate.

The same official (Interview 9) says a lack of political will stymies specific missions, for example EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (Council Joint Action, 2008c; Helly, 2009a:375), while EUMM Georgia (EUMM Georgia, 2015; Council Joint Action, 2008d) was merely defending commercial interests, and Eastern Congo problems could be resolved if member states wanted to facilitate solutions; instead other interests mean they ‘benefit from failure’. He argues that EU interventions in Bosnia have been popular with member states because they are low risk, no-one gets killed, and having troops in Bosnia is preferable to Afghanistan where they will probably be shot at. This verdict on missions was particularly damning. The fundamental complaint is that member states lack commitment. In contrast, while Helly (2009a) reports difficulties with the Guinea-Bissau mission, and staffing resources were inadequate, the mission was not an outright failure, and it continues to monitor a potentially volatile situation (EUMM Georgia, 2015). Fischer (2009) says the mission stabilised Georgina relatively quickly, despite differences in member state interests and perspectives.

A DGAP expert argues that the limited ambition and small scale of missions has had dire consequences: NATO and the USA have ‘given up on CSDP’ because it fails to bring financial and political commitment to forces modernisation and rationalisation (Interview 23), a view supported by O’Donnell (2011c). The Obama administration appears to have a circumspect view of CSDP, supportive while it reinforces EU-NATO ties (Davis Cross, 2013). Serfaty and Biscop (2010) detect Euro-Atlantic strategic concept convergence and Coelmont (2014) argues that the Obama administration still hopes for greater European commitment to a strategic transatlantic partnership around CSDP, while cautioning that this risks being focused on France rather than the entire EU. A continuing concern is low defence spending (Interview 16), echoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ remarks (see p.18). A UK-based expert also mentions US ‘disillusion’ with CSDP (Interview 3) while another respondent considers the entire project to have lost momentum (Interview 25). Such perspectives reflect
frustration with a lack of ambition, and CSDP’s modest contribution to international security. These views contest the notion of EU credibility as a strategic actor (H1). Instead the initiative is considered process-driven and minimalist, and missions often produce outcomes that are hard to measure, especially if the lessons learned process is under-developed. These are traits of bureaucratic politics (H2).

This section now ends with some general observations regarding evidence from missions. A positive assessment is that missions reflect the embryonic nature of a CSDP process little more than a decade old which is now backed by a reasonably effective institutional framework. Missions are mostly small scale and under-resourced, but most have delivered positive outcomes. Ultimately political problems are hardest to resolve, as an EEAS military official suggests:

Politicians (are) more circumspect, more cautious. We could collectively be more forthcoming about the high end implications (with) stronger political leadership, for example on strategic ambitions, on defining the end state, not just the end date, as was the case for EUFOR Tchad (Interview 13).

A former military officer affirms that CSDP is about cooperation with NATO, as EUPOL Afghanistan demonstrates, being complementary to the Alliance and having UNSC approval (Interview 5; Peral, 2009). According to this respondent CSDP supports UN missions and provides a civilian dimension to crisis management. This implies a strategic approach, and the US and UN support CSDP missions. Washington’s position is pragmatic because the US wants and expects enhanced European military capability to benefit NATO.

The weakness is that falling defence expenditure and inadequate ‘burden sharing’ adds to American frustrations. Paradoxically, Berlin Plus meant questions over European contributions to defence were temporarily neutralised. US impatience resurfaced in Robert Gates’ resignation speech and Hillary Clinton also warned about European defence spending (Evening Standard, 2010). Perhaps material and ideological proximity to NATO enabled CSDP to survive since as the British insisted, there could be no decoupling, a perspective now universally accepted, not least by France (Coelmont, 2014).

Artemis DR Congo in 2003 (ARTEMIS/DRC, n.d.; Council Joint Action, 2003b) is identified by an ECFR expert as a successful mission on which the Battlegroup concept was based (Interview 10), a view shared by Helly (2009b:185), and by a former military officer (Interview
5) who argued that Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo (EUFOR RD Congo, n.d.; Council Joint Action, 2006, 2007c), successfully ‘internationalised’ CSDP operations. But the narrow base of Artemis, French-led and mostly using French troops, was criticised by a CMPD official (Interview 9), because, while the French could go into Eastern Congo and deliver results, EU actions lack credibility if dominated by one member state, especially a former colonial power.

Even if (a mission is) under an EU flag the impression is that this is France acting for French interests (Interview, ibid)

Helly (2009b:184) makes the same observation. Major (2009) and Mattelaer (2013) criticise cumbersome force generation procedures and member states’ reluctance to provide the necessary personnel, while Tull (2009) highlights the lack of strategic embedding of EUFOR RD Congo with other EU-sponsored SSR initiatives. These concerns undermine EU credibility as a strategic actor (H1).

EUFOR RD Congo lasted just four months, mandated to support the UN MONUC mission to facilitate a safe and secure environment within which elections could take place, to protect civilians, and support any UN troops facing difficulties, and to secure Kinshasa airport (Major, 2009; Tull, 2009; EUFOR RD Congo, n.d.). It was broadly successful and considered a model for the future (Agence France-Presse, 2006) but it was not without political and operational difficulties. A former Venusberg Group member commented that Solana wanted an EU Battlegroup, as did France and Belgium. Germany was reluctant, given that its position on the roster meant a large deployment of German troops. The UN requested this but Germany demurred and it did not happen (Interview 14). The episode highlights a fundamental weakness of the Battlegroup idea. Ultimately Berlin felt Paris was trying to ‘export national interests’ to the EU (Gross, 2009:120), although a more charitable interpretation is that France sought to Europeanise the effort and support the UN through ‘effective multilateralism’ (Tull, 2009:56). Another view is that the EU ‘is plainly operating in rivalry with the UN in this field’ (Tull, ibid). EUFOR RD Congo field commander Major General Damay was French, and the Operation Commander in Potsdam was a German, Lieutenant General Viereck (EUFOR RD Congo, n.d.). Twenty-one countries contributed 1,800 troops, including Switzerland and Turkey, but 1,090 were French (Major, 2009). Martinelli reports a reasonably good level of coordination between UN and EU forces, and with the EUSR in Kinshasa, and good coordination between the EUHR, the EUSR and the UN in New York. In general she says UN-EU cooperation worked well, although there were some intelligence difficulties at a political and field level (Martinelli, 2008:123). The mission
was judged a success by HR Javier Solana (Solana, 2007b), but chains of command were complex, involving several actors, so decision-making on the ground was ‘cumbersome’ (Martinelli, 2008:123), and there were interoperability problems among European forces, indicating a need for more joint training.

German refusal to lead another operation in DR Congo in 2008 was again partly due to suspicion that the mission was about promoting French interests (Interviews 1,9; Menon, 2009:236). The non-CSDP French Mali operation in 2013 with some British technical support is also vulnerable to this criticism but it does have German support (von der Leyen, 2014).

A former member of the Venusberg Group judged the Battlegroup concept to suffer from a fundamental weakness exposed by the DR Congo examples in 2006 and 2008. If the lead nation refuses to deploy, then intervention is stymied. For Germany there are major constitutional and Parliamentary barriers to deployment. In Afghanistan and the Balkans the obstacles were overcome but Central Africa is another proposition. He says:

(A Congo deployment) goes far beyond the perimeter of German strategic thinking (Interview 14).

This illustrates striking differences in French and German strategic cultures, and different interests (see Chapter 3). It also shows how states exercise full control over deployment, so this characteristic of intergovernmentalism is clearly intact. This undermines EU strategic actoriness (H1). Respondents comment on the right of withdrawal as a fundamental weakness of Battlegroups (Interviews 1,3,4,9), though an ECFR expert (Interview 10) refers to loss of face in withdrawing, but there seems little evidence that this prevents states from withholding deployment. The Tchad example in 2008 suggests many reasons for non-deployment (Berg, 2009; Seibert, 2010; Mattelaer, 2013) including diverse interests, domestic pressures, competing military demands, lack of commitment, arguments over purpose and strategy, and leadership issues, also highlighted by Hatzigeorgopoulos (2012).

An MoD official cites EUFOR Tchad/RCA (EUFOR Tchad/RCA, n.d.; Council Joint Action, 2007a) as ‘hardly a resounding achievement given what it cost’ (Interview 12). Others point to shortcomings, notably that it was French-dominated and lacked broad commitment, and while primarily a humanitarian intervention it avoided more challenging tasks (Interviews 3,13,23). Helly assesses a challenging mission fairly positively, but its French domination raises questions about others’ commitment to multinational CSDP operations in Africa (Helly,
2009c:350). Berg (2009) is more critical, echoing respondents’ scepticism. He reports the ‘feeble’ nature of the intervention, dominated by member state interests and a desire to appear to respond to the Darfur Crisis on which it had negligible impact, the Tchad crisis being mostly internal (ICG, 2008). That CSDP responses stem from domestic interests matches Pohl’s (2014) assessment. Pohl reports sharp divisions among member states over whether Tchad was suitable for a BG deployment (see pp.180-81).

The issues raised in this section essentially boil down to political commitment, the principal limiting factor, and arguably as important as strategic culture in determining actorness. In fact, regarding H1, there is limited evidence of strategic actorness. Centralised funding, planning, command and control, and centralised resources would offer something substantial, especially if supported by enhanced CIV-MIL cooperation, which Lisbon attempts to advance through the CMPD. But new structures take time to embed and require adequate resources. This section demonstrates some of the characteristics of bureaucratic politics: a limited, issue-by-issue, minimalist approach, relatively low cost endeavours with outcomes that are difficult to measure, lowest-common-denominator agreement on what, where and how to deploy, and somewhat under-developed processes for lessons learned, especially in terms of information sharing with other agencies. Overall there seems only limited strategic actorness (H1) but rather more to suggest the presence of bureaucratic politics in CSDP implementation (H2).

The critical role of member states in supplying resources or agreeing deployment shows where decision-making power lies. A CMPD military official highlights member state commitment as the central issue:

Are member states ready to put under European control a certain quantity of forces and resources, on permanent standby, both military and civilian? (Interview 9).

He argues that a minimum number of member states need to agree on a mission and then to contribute adequately to ensure credibility, success in the field, and diplomatic success. This could progress the EU towards credibility as a strategic actor; it might even further European integration. The fragmented nature of mission coordination, tortuous force generation and deployment procedures, anomalies in the Battlegroup concept, and over-reliance on a lead nation, usually France, significantly undermines CSDP.
There is consensus that 34 missions raised the international profile of CSDP, and the EEAS may signal growing EU intent. The Union is taking on responsibilities and showing some capacity to shape the international environment towards its values, particularly in the Western Balkans, but this should not be overstated. Success depends on the Union having something concrete to offer such as membership, trade, development opportunities, or political engagement. A DGAP expert suggests that without greater coherence, changes in the global economy may mean EU influence declines (Interview 25).

Respondents frequently imply that the limited scale of missions makes it difficult to draw major conclusions other than that CSDP lacks strategic direction and the capability to achieve milieu-shaping aspirations. However, in the Western Balkans, despite deficiencies, EU missions and other soft power initiatives such as the WBIF (mentioned above), and other international agencies (Kirchner, 2013) have had important influence, epitomised by Croatia’s EU accession (BBC News, 2013c). EU impact beyond its immediate neighbourhood is difficult. Arguably Atalanta is the most successful and the most strategic of the more distant CSDP operations. It can be a model for the comprehensive multi-agency approach. In summary, missions show only weak support for H1, and more for H2 and bureaucratic politics, especially in how deployment is agreed, personnel recruited, and missions implemented.

An ECFR expert says a major lesson learned, perhaps mostly from NATO engagement in Afghanistan, is that only a comprehensive approach can bring results:

> The whole idea of transformation, of imposing capitalism and liberal democracy, has been shown up as a fantasy (Interview 10)

Mazaar (2003) and the former head of CMPD (Stevens, 2012) deliver the same message. Western efforts at transformation in Iraq and Afghanistan became mired in the sheer enormity of the challenges, so less ambitious CSDP interventions may offer a better return. CSDP is an appropriate reflection of Europe as a ‘small power’ (Toje, 2011). The lesson is not just for the EU. The UN may have over-reached itself with the notion of responsibility to protect (R2P). The global environment has altered, and while capitalism may have triumphed, liberal democracy has not:

> authoritarian capitalism is much more congenial to most countries (and) the R2P ideal died in Sri Lanka (Interview 10).
The relevance is that the EU cannot realistically hope to drive its values and aspirations into every corner of Africa. Normative Power Europe (Manners, 2002) struggles to have the influence it may once have implied. As the world economy alters and new powers emerge, European and American influence declines. This suggests that CSDP is likely to be more effective in areas where it can realistically exert political pressure, and where EU membership is in prospect. Member states will continue to calculate where their interests lie (Interview 25), an argument echoed by Gourlay’s (2013) call for modest but attainable ambitions. This assessment is more in tune with a bureaucratic incremental approach than a top-down, integrationary Grand Strategy.

The pragmatic conclusion is that CSDP needs greater coherence and better resourcing but is likely to remain marginal, providing assistance in CCM, reconstruction and development, but the transformation of Europe’s strategic power on the basis of Grand Strategy is fanciful. Mission evidence suggests H1 depends on a long-run timeframe with emphasis on intention.

A further caveat is that the EU can and should retain its loftier milieu-shaping ambitions, including R2P, in its near-abroad. This has arguably been tested in Georgia in 2008 (EUMM Georgia, n.d.) but the Union could not realistically send a Battlegroup to oppose Russian intervention. Instead it invoked a combination of French-led diplomacy and post-conflict stabilisation assisted by the EUMM Georgia in 2008-09 (Fischer, 2009). More recently the war in Ukraine in 2014-15 presents a far bigger challenge than CSDP is equipped to deal with, or was ever intended for (Sakwa, 2014; Yelisieiev, 2015).

Mission evidence demonstrates minimal progress towards military substance but there have been improvements in cooperation and coordination. The lack of BG deployment means this progress remains untested. CSDP has not delivered the capability benefits to the western alliance that the US and UK hoped for a decade ago. Like much else, this relates to political will and resourcing. An EUMS official summarises the constrained nature of CSDP:

There is agreement on limited missions. The lowest-common-denominator is dominant, so missions are small, short-lived and easily defined, with limited objectives. The scope is always very limited (Interview 8).

The phrase ‘lowest-common-denominator’ is often encountered in CSDP literature (Howorth, 2007:3; Smith, 2008:10, Rynning, 2011:30; Chappell and Petrov, 2014:3) and in this research. It is apposite but a Brussels-based expert affirms ‘there will be more military
operations in the future’ (Interview 4), suggesting that ‘unknown unknowns’ (BBC News, 2007) may shape the evolution of CSDP.

A UK foreign policy expert adopts a sanguine view of the lack of ‘military substance’, preferring to underline how CSDP missions reinforce the EU as a civilian, soft power organisation. In a short time CSDP has achieved impressive multilateral and institutional development, and is not solely about soft power, although:

there may yet be further instances of the US doing the cooking and Europe doing the washing up (Interview 11).

In keeping with EU soft power, most missions have been civilian and even the military ones have been about civilian protection. EUFOR Althea became a civilian mission staffed by military personnel, as reported in the next section.

6.4.2 Case Study: EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

This section begins with an outline of the EUFOR Althea context, and reports on interview data from Sarajevo-based respondents and others where relevant. The rationale for choosing Althea as a case study is on p.29. Comments reported from Sarajevo respondents refer to the mission itself, but also the wider Bosnian and Western Balkans context, and occasionally to CSDP as a whole, especially because the EUFOR officials interviewed were high level CSDP experts who had worked in other post-conflict settings.

EUFOR Althea (EUFOR Althea, 2015) inherited the NATO SFOR remit after the Bosnian War (1992-95) and the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement (DPA) of December 1995 (OHR, 1995; Council Joint Action, 2004). Althea took over NATO’s peacekeeping role with authorisation from the UNSC Resolution 1575, updated by UNSC Resolution 2123 (UNSC, 2013). Its mandate was and remains to ‘contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH’ (Klein, 2010:149) and ‘to ensure compliance with the Dayton Peace Accords’ (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2006:57). Facing high levels of organised crime, a weak economy and a territory ‘awash with weapons and ammunition’ (Bertin, 2008:62), a significant EUFOR responsibility has been to provide reassurance to the local population (Klein, 2010:149-50). Upholding the DPA is key to the mandate but presents a major challenge as Dayton consolidated ethnic cleansing, partitioning the state between the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina administered by Bosniaks and Croats, and Republika Srpska under Bosnian Serbs, all under a weak federal government and the UN High Representative (UNHR). Serbs and Croats have no loyalty to this arrangement, so the state remains hobbled by ethnic division (European Commission, 2009:7-9, 2014a; Dziewulska, 2011; Biermann, 2014).

Howorth (2005:194) described Althea as ‘a test of the EU’s military muscle’ involving 7,000 troops, scaled down from a peak of 60,000 under NATO command in December 1995. The mission remains subject to six-monthly review, its mandate continually renewed. Technically a military operation, in practice it has had more of a policing role, assisting the Bosnian authorities in countering organised crime, helping to bring indicted war criminals to justice, and ‘weapons harvesting’, thereby reducing the risk of renewed conflict. It also supports the UNHR who until September 2011 was also EU Special Representative (EUSR) for BiH, the latter post now decoupled from the UNHR (Council Decision, 2011b).

Althea is a clear example of EU engagement on behalf of the international community, being UN-sanctioned and tasked with upholding the DPA. The threat in 2004 was that Bosnia could revert to chaos or become a seedbed for regional violence. The mission is a post-conflict peacekeeping operation, now comprising a mere 600 personnel from 17 EU member states and five partner nations (EEAS, 2014c). Chappell and Petrov (2014) describe Althea as a reflection of EU strategic interest in the Western Balkans to establish peace and security, but Althea officials interviewed for this research criticised the EU’s lack of an adequately strategic approach. This seems harsh given the context of enlargement policy, the Stability Pact for SEE, and €13.1bn of regional investment between 2008 and 2014 from the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF, 2014:11).

Klein reports that the former mission commander General Leakey, backed by HR Solana, saw the fight against organised crime and the effort to provide a safe and secure environment as complementary (Klein, 2010:150). Mission personnel contributed to disrupting crime through vehicle checks and similar interventions which provoked criticism from the parallel EU Police Mission (EUPM BiH, n.d.) in Bosnia. EUPM considered EUFOR involvement an unwelcome interference in policing responsibilities (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2006). Gross (2007b) also reports concerns over coherence between different actors. The EUSR in Sarajevo and the PSC adjusted the overlapping competences of the missions, giving EUPM the lead in fighting crime, in capacity building, and institutional development in support of the local police. Dziewulska (2011) considers it a weakness of the EU instruments in BiH that they inherited roles from previous UN interests: EUPM replaced
the International Police Task Force (IPTF), Althea followed SFOR, while the EUSR is an extension of the UNHR, so all three lacked full EU identity and purpose.

A vital context to EUFOR Althea is that Bosnia is a post-conflict society where internal security risks endure, albeit on a much reduced scale. While the quantity of weapons in the country has greatly reduced, Bertin describes a:

weak economy (with) widespread organised crime and corruption and the fragility of the rule of law (...) deeply divided along ethnic lines and across the two entities (...) the Bosniak/Croat Federation and Republika Srpska (Bertin, 2008:61-2).

Bertin refers to Althea’s ‘long-term’ task ‘to leave behind a peaceful and stable Bosnia en route towards EU membership’ (ibid, 76). Other reviews confirm alarming levels of dysfunction and instability (Gross, 2007b) or at best political stagnation (McMahon and Western, 2009; Whitman and Juncos, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). This downbeat assessment is echoed by the October 2014 election results which reflected the ethnic divisions institutionalised by the DPA (New York Times, 2014; Biermann, 2014), and negative assessments of its economy, still in a parlous state (European Commission, 2014a; Heritage Foundation, 2015).

**EUFOR mandate:** The primary mandate is to uphold the DPA (OHR, 1995) but EUFOR officials (Interviews 15-21) refer to the wider EU role to provide reassurance and security to the local population and assist local authorities in state-building, including institutional development, policing and legal structures, and to facilitate economic and political processes to secure a viable future with a view to Bosnian candidacy for EU accession. This relates to H1 and strategic actorness as EU accession is a strategic aim. It also reflects the understanding of Europeanisation in Emerson and Gross (2007). However respondents consider accession many years away, barely mentioning it and none forecasting a date. Nor do recent assessments imply candidate status is imminent (Whitman and Juncos, 2013:157; Grabbe, 2014; European Commission, 2014a). Accession is not part of the UN mandate, so while technically EUFOR is mandated by the UN, an EU mission clearly embraces political and strategic objectives. In the Western Balkans this means a pre-accession strategy including a Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) prior to candidate status (Kirchner, 2013).
**Success of the mission:** There is clear consensus that EUFOR Althea was and remains a successful peacekeeping mission. It has contributed to a safe and secure environment and has upheld the DPA (*Interviews* 15-21), echoed in the mission itself (EUFOR Althea, 2013), academic assessments (Gross, 2007b; Keohane, 2009:218; Merlingen, 2013:150; Whitman and Juncos, 2009-2014; Kirchner, 2013) and official conclusions (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2007; Hansard, 2008; Council of the European Union, 2010). There have been no deaths from armed violence since EUFOR replaced SFOR in December 2004. However caution should be exercised in declaring the EU presence in BiH comprehensively successful. Indeed Overhaus (2009:28) refers to a ‘frozen conflict’ that requires strategic effort from the EU and member states, and the ability to intervene militarily if necessary; the Commission reports that Bosnia’s journey towards EU accession candidacy is ‘at a standstill’ (European Commission, 2014a:1).

Althea successfully partnered NATO during the initial transition stage. It has combined well with other IGOs, although less successfully with other EU instruments, notably EUPM (Juncos, 2007; Gross, 2007b, 2012; Overhaus, 2009). Althea’s most striking success has been ‘civilianisation’ (*Interviews* 15,16), reflecting a stable and improving security situation. In the absence of sustained threat, the mission’s main function is reassurance (Bertin, 2008:67; Overhaus, 2009:21). Significantly, most Bosnians support the continuation of the mission (Bertin, 2008:67), and despite reduced manpower, Althea still makes a vital contribution to Bosnian security (Gross, 2015).

Althea’s achievements include weapons harvesting, intelligence gathering, patrolling, tracking and catching indicted war criminals, combating organised crime and supporting local law enforcement agencies. The mission ‘added to the impact and political standing of the Union in Bosnia’ (Bertin, 2008:75). Emerson and Gross (2007) caution that success should not be overstated as Althea began as a continuation operation, and various instruments and organisations contribute to stability. Furthermore, success should not obscure shortcomings that have implications for CSDP, and EU aspirations for the region.

**Challenges facing the EU and EUFOR Althea:** EUFOR officials report a deterioration or at best stagnation in the political situation in recent years (*Interviews* 15,16,17,20), a view confirmed by Whitman and Juncos (2010:190-91; 2011:196-9; 2012:159; 2013:157-8). This is not a military or security deterioration: there is minimal danger of returning to the violence of the early 1990s. A senior OHR official comments:
We cannot continue to offer the excuse, or allow the excuse that internal divisions, the ethnic divide, the history, the numbers killed or injured, (are) an excuse for not moving forward. We cannot forever use the past as an excuse for doing nothing. Basically the ethnic smokescreen is 20 years old, but the media and education here perpetuates the same myths, the same divisions. This is an abject failure (Interview 16).

This failure is met by EU, or specifically member states', reluctance to address this with anything strategic, practical and measurable. Bosnian officials and politicians are guilty of enormous levels of corruption, ‘the worst in the Balkans, worst in Europe’ (Interview 20). Indeed, corruption is widespread throughout south-east Europe (Emerson, 2008:4). The Union does not confront this and remains remote from what is happening, while member states only want to hear a positive story. Money that arrives often ends up with corrupt local politicians and bureaucracies:

Money comes in here, but it’s not getting to where it should be, it’s effectively laundered. It comes in, goes out, and comes back to the same people. The EU is helping what it should be preventing. The EU, Brussels, thinks money will ease the problems, but it doesn’t. The problem is we give the political leaders money, but we don’t give them responsibility. We give them assets that disappear (Interview 16).

State dysfunction, division and corruption is a fundamental problem facing the EU and its instruments (Interviews 15,16,19,20). These perceptions match expert analyses (Bertin, 2008; McMahon and Western, 2009; Centre for the Study of Democracy, 2012; European Commission, 2014a). Media reports suggest that public frustration over corruption, state failure, and economic crisis, prompted serious civil disorder in February 2014 (Reuters, 2014a; EU Observer, 2014). Notably, the protests occurred across all entities and ethnicities.

However, elections in October 2014 showed that the different entities remain fixed along ethnic lines, reflecting the DPA, but hardly assisting the development of a coherent state with popular support (Guardian, 2014b; New York Times, 2014). This outcome echoes gloomy assessments from three years earlier (Interviews 15-21) and contrasts with up-beat official statements from the Althea mission itself (EUFOR Althea, 2013). But that Althea is a success is surely not in dispute: as a CSDP mission it upholds its mandate. It is the wider Bosnian context which is unsatisfactory and here the comprehensive approach is less successful than the narrow remit of the Althea operation.
State-building remains paralysed by the impasse between the Bosnian entities disengaged from the process, especially Republika Srpska (RS) whose leader Milorad Dodik argues openly for secession (Turkish Weekly, 2014; Guardian, 2014b; Biermann, 2014). The EU is compromised by entity representatives’ calculations concerning potential costs if they stray from appeasing their nationalist constituencies towards accepting what the EU offers. Essentially the Union wants to uphold Dayton, while ethnic groups are opposed (Biermann, 2014:495). Criticism of the Union must be understood in this context.

Respondents accuse the Union of acquiescing in the divisions reflected in the DPA (Interviews 15,17,19). This is surely unfair since Althea’s mandate is to uphold Dayton, not to unpick it. The task was a poisoned chalice, compromised by the appalling violence of the Bosnian War and the poverty of choices available to the UN in securing peace in 1995. Althea must uphold the DPA, so if the Agreement is deficient it is not for the EU alone to forge improvements. Althea officials recommend DPA revision, especially since population data from the 1991 census has changed considerably (Interviews 16,17,19). The 2013 census will not necessarily bring improvement: a population of 4.4 million, 43 percent Moslem, 31 percent Serb, 17 percent Croat and 8 percent none-of-the-above (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014).

A further observation is that Althea deploys the wrong personnel. It is a military mission involving trained soldiers, but has almost exclusively civilianised, embracing gender equality, human rights and political development, for which military staff lack expertise (Interviews 15,16). Howorth and Menon (2009) suggest that CSDP shifted from a military orientation towards a civilian approach to security; just seven of 34 missions are military operations (Table 6.1 above). According to Althea officials, while the civilianisation of Althea can be considered a success, it has implications for mission coherence and for the training and skills of the personnel, especially where soldiers carry out civilian tasks (Dijkstra, 2011). The European Council has taken steps to address competence among mission personnel on issues such as gender and human rights (CIVCOM, 2013).

Chappell and Petrov (2014) describe peace and stability as a strategic objective, and while limited, it does not conflict with member states’ interests. Britain and Germany withdrew their personnel from Althea but wish the operation to continue, and remain engaged with Bosnia in other ways (Gross, 2015). This does not indicate an absence of strategy. Chappell and Petrov (2014:13), and Pohl (2014), suggest that scaling down but not closing Althea may feed an ulterior motive, namely to retain an EU-NATO partnership through Berlin Plus. Pohl
argues that EU efforts in BiH are designed to compensate for past failures and give the EU a ‘security identity’ (Pohl, 2014:67-71). Such manoeuvring would be condemned by Althea officials because it suggests Althea continues for the EU’s benefit, not for BiH. These minimalist aims reflect a bureaucratic approach to promoting normative values.

Bringing more Balkan states into the EU is a strategic ambition, but evidence suggests strategic weakness, undermining H1. In contrast, an incrementalist, issue-by-issue approach supports the notion of bureaucratic politics (H2). The successes and challenges summarised below suggest an EU approach to Althea and BiH that lacks strategy. EU engagement appears remote, although respondents suggest that the new EEAS-EUD structures may bring improvements.

Fig.6.1 EUFOR role, achievements and challenges in BiH: Interview data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Respondents’ Comments</th>
<th>Synthesis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR role</td>
<td>Economic and political support 15,18,21</td>
<td>Rooted in UN mandate. Uncontroversial.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security and reassurance 15,18,19</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Need to focus on state building in BiH 16,21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Promotion of democracy, EU values, human rights 15,21</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR achievements</td>
<td>Peacekeeping role is successful, ‘safe and secure environment’ 15,17,18,19,20</td>
<td>Widespread positive assessment. Emphasis on providing safe and secure environment.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Weapons harvesting 15,19</td>
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<td></td>
<td>‘Eyes and ears’ for the international community 15,16,18,20,21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Support law enforcement agencies 15,19,21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Facilitate dialogue between local agencies and communities 15,19</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assist in partnership with NATO (Berlin Plus) and other international organisations 15,19</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of soft power, EU values, human rights 15,17,21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Contribution to Community Assistance, Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Civilisation’ of EUFOR role 15,16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges facing EUFOR</td>
<td>BIH situation deteriorated in recent years 15,16,17,20</td>
<td>Major political problems in BiH; severe state dysfunction (reflected in 2014 disturbances and election results).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>DPA needs review 16,17,19</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Political impasse 15,17,18,19,20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Corruption in local officials and politicians 15,16,19,20</td>
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<td>BIH a ‘dysfunctional’ state 15,16,19,20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Proper (civilian) skills needed for personnel 15,16</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Six-monthly tour-of-duty too short 16</td>
<td></td>
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(Numbers indicate interviews; see Appendix, p.302)
Shortcomings of EU engagement in BiH: EUFOR officials complain that the EU provides carrots but no sticks (*Interviews* 16,17,20). Local politicians and bureaucrats receive money but have no responsibility. A political advisor to the EUSR says the carrot has to be big enough to unlock the political impasse (*Interview* 21), a view shared by Biermann (2014). What is offered needs to be substantial but there must be sanctions if there is no progress on political dialogue. The Union is less successful in achieving this. A widespread concern is that Brussels is remote, and only wants good news; member states consider Bosnia a far-away problem that should melt away; austerity means that Bosnia slides further down the list of priorities (*Interviews* 15,16,17,19,21).

Respondents regard the EU approach as minimalist, matching the ‘small power’ description of the Union (Toje, 2011). Toje cites Cooper *et al.*, (1993:19-20) in positing that small powers embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide diplomacy, a view echoed in Sarajevo. Althea officials imply that the EU pursues ‘lowest-common-denominator’ agreement (Smith, 2008:10; Rynning, 2011:30), constrained by the unanimity requirement.

Sarajevo interviewees complain that the EU fails to provide leadership and strategic coherence. It sets no measurable targets, being more concerned with process and compromise (*Interviews* 17,20). Lowest-common-denominator consensus-seeking reflects bureaucratic politics (H2). The notion of ‘satisficing’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999:152) applies, and Althea is conducted through officials dependent on compromise and process. This reflects the bureaucratic way. The mission lacks clear strategic goals, proceeding through incremental step-by-step initiatives intended to improve governance and reassure the population. This can bring positive results, especially in the context of wider regional endeavours. In the view of one senior official ‘soft power is working’ (*Interview* 21).

Althea officials condemn EU acquiescence in shocking levels of corruption and waste, endemic throughout Bosnia (Emerson, 2008). While fewer citizens are engaged in corrupt practices, corruption continues to rise and the judicial process fails to combat the problem (Centre for the Study of Democracy, 2012). Althea officials criticise the EU, the OSCE and the UN for lacking a proactive and strategic response, merely hoping that time will bring improvements. Respondents relate corruption to a deteriorating political situation (*Interviews* 15-20). Another called for a more proactive and strategic approach from member states, underlining Althea’s dependency on Europe’s capitals, who remain detached from what is happening (*Interview* 21). All Althea interviewees call for proactive engagement and accuse member states of tolerating a deteriorating situation. While no-one gets killed Europe’s
politicians take no real notice. The political impasse, corruption and state-level dysfunction highlighted by McMahon and Western (2009), Kirchner (2013) and repeatedly by Whitman and Juncos (2009-2014), remains entrenched.

The outsourcing of Bosnian engagement to EU instruments lends support to H2 and bureaucratic politics. The detached approach generally epitomises minimalist, process-oriented traits of bureaucracies. If the mission is merely to support EU-NATO relations, this is well short of a strategic approach to resolving the political impasse in Bosnia. Fig.6.2 summarises the weaknesses of the EU approach to BiH.

Fig.6.2 Shortcomings of EU performance in BiH: Interview data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ Comments</th>
<th>Synthesis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member states remote from what happens</td>
<td>Implication of ‘lowest-common-denominator’ approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU remote from what happens</td>
<td>EU and member states remote, too soft, consensus-seeking, avoiding difficult issues, and decisions; too process-oriented, lacking strategic vision</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU too soft, carrots but no sticks</td>
<td>Failure to address fundamental problems</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU ‘lowest-common-denominator’ approach</td>
<td>N.B. Too early to assess impact of EEAS and EUDs, but mood not optimistic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Need for member states consensus, result often to do nothing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lisbon develops EEAS and EUDs at expense of EUSR-EUPM-EUFOR</td>
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<td>EU must communicate better with local population</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU too process- and compromise-oriented rather than focused on results, measurable targets, and outcomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of clarity, must commit long-term; need for strategy and leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inadequate skills set among mission personnel; need for more civilian skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe paying for old colonial structures (Austria, Hungary, Turkey heavily engaged in BiH, also economically)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Profoundly negative assessment of EUPM</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPM works at state and entity level, not local/municipal level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Money laundering and mafia, ineffective policing</td>
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<td>Low EU impact: brings money, but no assessment of outcomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Ethnic smokescreen’ persists, an ‘abject failure’ to achieve progress in 20 years; institutional failure at EU level</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU gives political leaders in BiH money, but no responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo highlights EU inconsistency</td>
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<td>There should be an EU Ambassador to BiH, not just the EUSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Need for clarity and information sharing between EU instruments and other international actors</td>
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(Numbers indicate interviews; see Appendix, p.302)
There is an awkward precedent that most EU states have recognised Kosovo’s 2008 Declaration of Independence (Interviews 15, 27). This fuels separatist ambitions in Republika Srpska (Turkish Weekly, 2014; Guardian, 2014b) and threatens EU-Serbia relations (Batt, 2010; Kirchner, 2013). Croats and Serbs have no commitment to BiH: Croats look to Zagreb, Serbs to Belgrade. Evidently Banja Luka sees Republika Srpska as on a ‘sliding scale to secession’ (Interview 15). The Krajina Serbs, exiled inside Bosnia and living in camps, are understandably restless. Also unresolved is Brcko, the enclave linking the two parts of Republika Srpska, where a mix of ethnicities with no loyalty to BiH remains under UNHR control. McMahon and Western (2009) see Brcko as a rare example of shared governance, unlike Mostar and Sarajevo, once ethnically mixed but now marked by sectarian division.

**Institutional relationships:** Understanding the institutional dynamics in the Bosnian context may help to assess whether Althea reflects CSDP generally, and assist evaluation of H2. *CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.* Menon (2011b) describes the debate between realists who underestimate the power of institutions in shaping security policy, and institutionalists who overplay institutional impact while underestimating the role of power and agency. He argues that power in the EU is diffuse, and that through institutional engagement, smaller states can exert more influence than they otherwise would. Evidence from Sarajevo supports this, but respondents frequently refer to unanimity constraints and the difficulty in achieving consensus for anything substantial or involving major cost, a view echoed by a US Congressional Report on EU foreign and security policy (Mix, 2013).

In May 2011 when the Sarajevo interviews were conducted the Lisbon changes were incomplete. Respondents preferred to ‘wait and see’, hoping that the EEAS and the EUD would deliver more coherence and proactive engagement, but aware that member states’ commitment and high quality support and oversight from Brussels is crucial. This reflects a major concern for CSDP generally. Following Menon (2009, 2011b), a key issue is power and whether the EEAS and EUDs have the authority and resources to effect change. During a return visit to Bosnia in 2015 conversations with members of the public suggested that while the UNHR Valentin Inzko was a good man with good intentions, he was powerless to unlock the political impasse that grips Bosnia (United Nations, 2015).

Klein’s (2010) study of EU Balkan engagement reports agent autonomy but also their fundamental weakness in driving change. The developing role of technocrats and officials working through EU instruments suggests support for the bureaucratic politics of H2. The concern is that the EEAS will enhance the Commission and a ‘Brussels culture’, a process-
oriented ‘technocratic consensus’ (Interview 17). Much will depend on the EEAS ability to assert politics over Commission-inspired technocracy. Kirchner (2013) affirms that deep-rooted political and economic intransigencies in Bosnia (and Kosovo) are a greater challenge than peacebuilding. As the previous chapter indicated, institutional battles over the EEAS gave the Commission less leverage than the Sarajevo officials anticipated. The EUDs, being within the EEAS, may diminish Commission influence (Sus, 2014). Helwig (2013) comments on the complexity of the new structures, while Duke (2012) suggests that Lisbon and the EEAS Council Decision provide little guidance on working relationships. Bureaucratic outcomes are more likely than strategic clarity.

A credible observation from a EULEX Kosovo expert (Interview 27) is that in post-conflict societies a bureaucratic process exercised by competent officials can be effective, especially in delivering sector-by-sector improvements aligned with the SAP. This matches how the EU accession process focuses on sector-by-sector improvements and chapter-by-chapter assessment by technocratic experts (European Commission, 2012a).

Althea respondents call for a target-oriented, results-based approach where those receiving assistance and money are required to take responsibility for tangible outcomes. This demands a political process, but Althea officials are sceptical about achieving this, the impression being that institutional turf wars (see Chapter 5) are being played out in Sarajevo. Debate within the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), established under the DPA with representation from 55 countries, concerned the future relationship between EU instruments in BiH, namely the EUSR, the Office of the (UN) High Representative (OHR) (OHR, 2015), the EUD (EUD BiH, 2015), EUFOR Althea, and EUPM (which ended in 2012). The PIC tried to exert pressure on entity authorities to oblige cooperation in state-building, and to facilitate judicial process (OHR, 2012a). But ‘secessionist conflicts are strongly resistant to external preference change’ (Biermann, 2014:490).

When UNHR Ashdown tried to force Republika Srpska to choose between EU accession and retaining their state-like autonomy within BiH, they chose the latter (ibid, 502). Before Lisbon, the OHR and EUSR coordinated EUFOR and EUPM, being responsible for both. Under the EEAS, this role is shared with the EUD and there could be rivalry between the different approaches of the OHR-EUSR and the EUD which is more dialogue-oriented, seeking compromises between local politicians (Interview 17). Dialogue is needed, but without strong political pressures and insistence on accountability, fruitful outcomes are unlikely. What could bring positive responses from elected BiH representatives? Even if
eventual EU membership is on offer, this may have little impact on irredentist positions, especially as accession seems so remote (Whitman and Juncos, 2009-2014). Decoupling the EUSR from the UNHR might help, especially as the former is tasked with assisting the accession process (Council Decision, 2011b).

EUFOR officials criticise the lack of a proactive, results-oriented approach, and argue that the mission remains compromised by weak foundations and inadequate resources, without the capacity to drive political change in a complex of divided ethnicities and inter-entity mistrust. The fear is that the ‘Brussels culture’ engenders a sense of Althea being a holding operation, unable to promote political development. Member states should commit to moving things forward, arguably by strengthening existing instruments. This gloomy assessment is echoed by the PIC reporting BiH as ‘falling further behind the rest of the region, particularly in terms of European integration’ (OHR, 2013). Nevertheless there is a wait-and-see approach to discover how the EUD develops and some optimism over Renzo Daviddi’s appointment as its Deputy Head (Interview 20).

An official in the OHR describes EU policy towards BiH during the Lisbon implementation phase as focused on process, rather than on solving problems, arguing that ‘reaching compromises (becomes a goal in itself)’ (Interview 17), further suggesting the bureaucratic tendencies of H2, a Brussels culture based on satisficing. The EU ‘(dealing) with problems in a technocratic manner’ implies a lack of imagination and political will (Whitman and Juncos, 2013:155). A focus on process over results undermines strategic actorness (H1), while strengthening bureaucratic politics (H2). Actorness requires increased resources and unequivocal member state support. Instead, Commission influence within the EEAS may import ‘methods (…) characterised by excessive bureaucratisation and a lack of political flair’ (Dinan, 2011:115), again suggesting support for H2. Even Parliament’s role is mainly technocratic, involving scrutiny over appointments and budget, fraught with operational difficulties, and subject to criticism over wasted resources, so it lacks public support (Archick, 2014:12).

According to Annex 10 of the DPA the OHR is tasked with promoting institutional overlap (OHR, 1995, 2012b), while the EUSR is also Head of the EUD in BiH (Council Decision, 2011b). Hofmann (2011) refers to the need for intensive cooperation between different IGOs, such as the EU, NATO, OSCE and UN. Althea displayed institutional overlap through Berlin Plus with NATO and the EUSR being double-hatted as UNHR. Althea officials comment favourably on such cooperation but also suggest a need for better coordination and
information sharing between IGOs (Interviews 12,13,17). In contrast a former EDA official describes Berlin Plus as overly complex and unviable because of confused command channels once NATO is involved (Interview 7). The main benefit from Berlin Plus is access to material assets such as helicopters, but field command cannot work efficiently, so autonomous CSDP missions are the way forward. CSDP’s basis in security and CCM highlights its different raison d’être to NATO. CSDP deals with conflict prevention and values, while NATO deals with defence. This is highlighted by the French Defence Ministry (Ministère de la Défence, 2012).

Commission influence in Bosnia, through the EUD, the OHR (OHR, 2015), and the comprehensive role of the EEAS, as well as the network of IGOs active in BiH of which the EU is one, extends the heterarchical nature of policy-making (see previous chapter) to different agencies, including external actors. However:

State actors keep the upper hand (and) PSC Ambassadors occupy a strategic position at the core of the network (Mérand et al, 2011:140).

Sarajevo officials stress that the PSC is decisive in overseeing Althea and CSDP (Interviews 15,18,21). It is the power broker controlling resources (see Chapter 5). This chimes with all interviews for this thesis and various academic studies (Howorth, 2007, 2010b; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Mérand et al, 2011). Althea officials acknowledge the multi-directional channels referred to as heterarchical governance (see p.44) by Mérand, et al. There is also agreement that the working relationship between the EU instruments in BiH (EUSR-EUFOR-EUD and formerly EUPM) can be described as ‘horizontal’, with high levels of actor autonomy (Klein, 2010).

The direct interlocutor at the EU level for the EUSR and EUFOR Althea is the Balkan Desk Officer in the CMPD, but decisions on CMPD recommendations are taken by the PSC and member states. The Balkan Desk Officer is Policy Advisor to the CMPD. Althea has direct communication to the Balkan Desk in the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability unit (CPCC), and with the Political Military Group under the PSC, and finally with the EUMC and EUMS which inform the PSC. The PSC considers policy options presented by the CMPD and rules on what policy, if any, is adopted. A political advisor to the EUSR considered that even QMV would make little difference because a proposed operation would need support from at least one, or even two, of EU-3, as no mission could be effective without France, Britain or Germany (Interview 21). This is echoed by the US Congressional Report referred
It highlights the difficulty in obtaining unanimity among member states, so achieving anything ‘substantial’ is difficult (Mix, 2013).

EUFOR respondents assess their interlocutors in the CMPD and EUMC positively, and recognise the shoestring nature of the overall Balkan involvement. The resources available have greatly diminished from 7,000 personnel to around 1,250 at the time of the interviews, and 600 now (EEAS, 2014c). But crucially the remit has not altered (Interview 15). This reflects the diminished security risk and Althea’s symbolic importance, showing that Berlin Plus is still operational (see p.203 above). EUFOR officials may inflate the importance of EUFOR within the panoply of IGOs in BiH. Even among EU agents, Althea is but one among several engaged in state-building in Bosnia. As EUFOR has diminished (and EUPM closed), the role of the combined EEAS instruments EUSR, OHR and EUD has increased.

The mission responds to member states’ authority, and both they and Brussels officials regard Bosnia as low priority, according to the Sarajevo respondents. A request from CMPD would usually be met with ‘not yet’ or ‘no’. These remarks are instructive:

By 2005 we in EUFOR were getting more contact with EUMC under the PSC, and Chiefs of Defence Staffs from the EUMS, and they still come regularly and they apply what we can call a finger-on-the-pulse approach. (...) they report it back in Brussels along with the reports that we send. It’s an assessment of EUFOR by EUFOR in the report, and if we ask for something then the EUMC take the message and they’ll reply yes or no, and if it’s something we want then it’s usually no. The decisions are taken at PSC level, EU Ambassadors. They’re on message with their capitals. So the modus operandi of the PSC is to get requests from the military people and report back that the governments say not yet or they don’t agree and that’s all there is to it (Interview 18).

This suggests the bureaucratic politics of H2 where information is channelled through a number of interlocutor officials to a point relatively high in the hierarchy, remote from ground-level personnel, to member state ambassadors in the PSC. The PSC is the ultimate arbiter of what happens through the EU instruments in Bosnia, Althea included, as affirmed by various commentaries (Howorth, 2010b, 2013; Mérand et al, 2011; Bickerton, 2011).

The EU instruments in BiH remain in transition while post-Lisbon changes consolidate. Respondents in Sarajevo and elsewhere refer to the need to give the EEAS time, while HR-VP Ashton’s May 2011 visit to Banja Luka was significant because she came with ‘a big
enough carrot, i.e. progress on Bosnian EU accession (Interview 21; Ashton, 2011b). Subsequent events suggest that Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik remains more interested in secession (Turkish Weekly, 2014; Guardian, 2014b; Kirchner, 2013).

The EUSR moving into the EUD building, where he is also Head of the Delegation, is a significant consolidation, albeit one that may diminish the role of EUFOR Althea (Gross, 2012). The EUD may strengthen Commission engagement and could increase EU multilateral engagement in BiH, but this is speculation. In practice it may mean nothing of the sort. There is plenty for the EU Delegation to address; it may raise the Union’s profile in Bosnia, but raising Bosnia’s profile in the EU could be more valuable.

The Sarajevo interviews also reveal little support for Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003; Wong, 2005) or for European strategic culture. Evidence of either would strengthen H1 and EU credibility as a strategic actor. If there were signs of progress towards accession, such as a stabilisation and association agreement, this might be anticipated. Respondents detect little strategic clarity and no integrationary dimension to Althea, a conclusion also drawn by Pohl (2014:71). However the new EUSR role indicates that a stabilisation and accession process and an accession strategy exists, so contrary to EUFOR officials downbeat assessment, this might channel political development. But it would be premature to make specific claims.

Several authoritative reviews offer little encouragement regarding Bosnian accession, citing not only the lack of progress on political reform, but also that BiH is not a properly functioning market economy, and civil society remains ethnically fragmented (Grabbe, 2014; Whitman and Juncos, 2013, 2014; World Review, 2014b). The Commission not only reports negatively on economic reform, but also on rule of law, judicial and administrative reform, corruption, and the protection of minorities (European Commission, 2013b:20; 2014a). EU accession is considered somewhat fanciful in Sarajevo (Interview 20). No Sarajevo respondent mentions dates, not even for candidate status.

Althea officials argue that the EU should get closer to the situation in BiH, take more interest and commit to political development. Althea lacks a European identity according to one official, perceived as a continuation of international community involvement rather than as an EU initiative (Interview 15). This may reflect public scepticism towards the EU given the failure of EU12 to respond during the crisis in the 1990s. When Althea took over from SFOR it was seen as a change of insignia, and hardly noticed (Interview 18); Keohane (2009:214) and Pohl (2014:58) refer to the ‘badge change’. The EU profile has never been great: it is
one of many external agencies in Bosnia, including the UN, OSCE, NATO, Council of Europe, and others. Even a proactive EUD is unlikely to change these perceptions.

Respondents criticise the lack of strategic consensus (Interviews 16,17) and others suggest a minimalist European strategic culture in the sense that EUFOR responds to and communicates with Brussels-based institutions, a limited form of Brusselsisation (see pp.46-8) (Interviews 15,21). EU instruments seem hamstrung by the pursuit of process rather than defined outcomes, and stymied by a lack of consensus (Interview 18). This suggests an absence of a strategic approach and little agreement on the fundamentals of state-building (Interview 17). There is instead bureaucratic inertia (support for H2), a perception echoed in the Kosovo experience (Interview 27).

Limited signs of an emergent European strategic culture appear in the soft power values-driven approach of Ashton’s apparently successful diplomacy in visiting Banja Luka in May 2011 (Ashton, 2011b), also reflected in the much commented civilianisation of EUFOR Althea (Interview 21). There is clear soft power normative ambition in EU engagement with BiH, and CSDP generally. Sarajevo respondents suggest that the EUD should focus on political outcomes, including partnerships at municipal level, to resolve the impasse that hinders democratic process between the different entities. One respondent suggested the EU appoint an Ambassador to Bosnia, an omission that should be rectified ‘just as a mark of respect’ (Interview 20). This, together with a proactive EUD, could enhance EU engagement. Gross (2015) suggests some unlocking of the political log-jam may be happening, as Germany and the UK push for progress on implementing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in Bosnia. This answers Althea officials’ call for more strategic member state engagement.

This section has considered the implementation of CSDP through the prism of EUFOR Althea. Consistent with previous chapters, Althea reveals a controlling and coordinating role for Brussels, but governed by member states, not by supranational institutions. There is no strong Commission role within the EEAS but together with the EUD in Sarajevo it may contribute to a long-term state-building strategy for BiH, including progress towards EU accession. Against this positive scenario, the political stasis has continued, even worsened, since May 2011 (Mix, 2013; Pohl, 2014; Biermann, 2014; Guardian, 2014b; New York Times, 2014; Turkish Weekly, 2014). The EUD may enhance a Brussels culture, a technocratic consensus that nurtures compromise and gradualism rather than a strategic, proactive approach: this is the view from Sarajevo and elsewhere. A second conclusion from
the data is that EU instruments both pre- and post-Lisbon depend entirely on member states through the PSC. What may be in flux is how these inter-relate now that the EUSR doubles as Head of the EUD. Fig.6.3 summarises comments from EUFOR Althea officials on the institutional structures relating to the mission.

Fig.6.3 Institutional structures: Interview data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional structures: Respondents’ comments</th>
<th>Synthesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR communicates with EUMC and Chiefs of Defence Staffs from EUMS. EUFOR reports to EUMC which reports to PSC</td>
<td>EUFOR Commander autonomous within UN mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison between EUSR and EUFOR with Balkan Desk Officer in CMPD, who is Policy Advisor to Operation Commander; also with Balkan Desk in CPCC; PMG under PSC, EUMC and EUMS</td>
<td>EUFOR liaises with EUMC, and CMPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Secretariat too small, staffing issues</td>
<td>PSC (member states) rules on EUFOR continuing and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC and member states decide everything</td>
<td>Brussels staff liaising with EUFOR is small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Commander autonomous within mandate</td>
<td>Some agreement on heterarchical institutional relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Autonomy without power’</td>
<td>Good relations with Brussels from CMPD down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good EUFOR-NATO relationship</td>
<td>Impact of EEAS and EUD remains to be seen. Risk of it being too technical, insufficiently proactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From PSC down EUFOR works well. EU instruments in BiH work well</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal relationship between the EUSR-EUPM-EUFOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLG, heterarchical institutional processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR coordinates activities of EUPM and EUFOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUD taking over political role in BiH, but needs to be proactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk of lack of coherence, different approach between OHR and new EU structures in EUD and EEAS, a ‘Brussels culture’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive engagement from EEAS, EUMC, EUMS, HR-VP’s office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP sends delegations to BiH but role is remote, unclear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission has diminished while mandate and role remains unchanged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘CMPD is driving force of EUFOR (but) it doesn’t matter (what) CMPD cooks up, if member states can’t agree it won’t be adopted’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor communication Althea to Brussels, Brussels isn’t listening. EU level institutional failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for coordinated approach focused on state-building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even if CSDP had QMV, it requires support of UK, France or Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUD under EEAS may weaken EUSR (and EUFOR); time will tell impact of EEAS/EUD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Number indicates interviews; see Appendix, p.302)

The EUFOR Althea interviews suggest the following conclusions regarding H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor. There is little support for this given the minimally strategic approach of Althea’s role in BiH. There may be some
marginal increase in Commission influence through the EUD and other wider Western Balkans initiatives but little impact where Althea is concerned. The mission has little impact on BiH EU accession prospects. Althea is regarded as minimalist and status quo-oriented. It cannot drive political change, although it contributes to EU and international community engagement. All agencies, including the EU, should focus on a strategic approach to state-building.

The mission has provided post-conflict stabilisation, peacekeeping and reassurance to a recovering population, consistent with CSDP and mission aims. These outcomes assist a long term pre-accession strategy, but this has been poorly articulated. In sum, there is weak support for H1, but respondents' remarks seem overly negative given the wider regional multi-instrument EU effort towards stabilisation and association.

Regarding H2 *CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics*, Althea demonstrates several characteristics to support the hypothesis. The mission applies a lowest-common-denominator approach and is compromise and consensus-oriented. There is a clear hierarchical staffing of EU engagement in Bosnia, including Althea itself. The mission employs technically competent officials engaged in satisficing basic expectations, especially that there should be no inter-ethnic violence. The focus is on process over results, and targets are unclear, outcomes non-specific. Positive achievements however suggest an emergent strategy through the bureaucratic politics of mission implementation. We shall return to this important conclusion in the final chapter of the thesis.

While opinion from EUFOR officials suggests that the EU approach to Althea is bureaucratic, and non-strategic, this overlooks the fact that the overall EU presence in the Western Balkans does indicate a strategic effort towards stabilisation and accession, albeit also through a minimalist, incremental, bureaucratic process, not a Grand Strategy. Althea in isolation can appear less strategic than the overall CSDP and EEAS effort.

Althea offers more evidence that member states are the power brokers in allocating resources and personnel to missions but intergovernmentalism does not adequately describe the CSDP process. Institutionalism underestimates member state roles, especially regarding power. The Sarajevo data supports the claim that states maintain their hold on policy through the PSC. The CSDP institutions and EU instruments in BiH operate under a form of constrained institutionalism: their scope for action and their potential is restricted by member states.
Althea respondents report that the mission seeks compromises and conflict avoidance, without addressing fundamental problems. Member states commit insufficient energy and resources, lacking a fully strategic approach based on defined, measurable outcomes. The mission has civilised but its personnel are military, lacking appropriate civilian skills and training. Many postings are short-term, with personnel removed just as they begin to understand the challenges, a CCM weakness noted by Chivvis (2010) and Bossong (2013).

The lack of proper strategy means the Union struggles to address state- and municipal-level dysfunction, and the failure of the different entities to cooperate (Biermann, 2014). There is little inter-communal cooperation; federal policing is low quality; legal and educational norms are divergent, often antagonistic; employment is highly segregated; corruption is endemic, exacerbated by poor tracking of European funding; recipients are not subject to effective scrutiny, nor obliged to take responsibility for specified outcomes. These conclusions match Commission assessments (European Commission, 2013b; 2014). Unemployment stands at over 40 percent (Trading Economics, 2015).

An ‘apartheid state’ is consolidated by neglect (Interview 20), which seems an excessively critical assessment, as there has been extensive EU engagement in BiH and the entire region. But the enduring tensions do risk state disintegration or violence, which partly explains Althea’s mandate being regularly renewed. In the short-term violence is unlikely given the lack of appetite for renewed fighting and reduced capability on all sides, and the Federal government has concentrated military resources under UNHR control. Overall the prospects for Bosnia remain poor, given the lack of commitment from Serb and Croat populations, and Bosniaks’ lack of confidence (Biermann, 2014). Zagreb and Belgrade are crucial, but with Croatia now an EU member and Serbia on a pre-accession path (Whitman and Juncos, 2014), interference looks unlikely. In contrast, internal dissent risks instability.

Althea officials blame member states’ lack of commitment for the continuing difficulties. But it is not within the gift of the EU alone to overcome local intransigence. Certainly the gap between ‘the aspirations of ESDP on the one hand and the perceived insufficiencies of the actual operations on the other’ (Gross, 2007b:132) remains profound. Simply throwing resources at a region scarred by sectarian violence is unlikely to overcome acute political and economic dysfunction. The EEAS in Brussels and the OHR-EUD in Sarajevo may engineer improvements, especially if Commission and Council interests are better coordinated. But as reported in Chapter 5, inter-institutional rivalry and under-resourcing limit strategic effectiveness. A more proactive EU engagement could assist political and
psychological renewal in BiH, but Althea data provides little support for strategic actorness (H1); there is substantial backing for bureaucratic politics (H2).

EUFOR Althea is part of a broader EU and international community engagement in Bosnia. The EU uses the Stabilisation and Association Process and Stabilisation and Association Agreements in the Western Balkans to deliver significant results (Shepherd, 2009; Kirchner, 2013; Biermann, 2014; Sedelmeier, 2015). This is a strategic approach. Under pressure from Germany and the UK, the BiH parliament voted in February 2015 for reforms that could lead to implementing an SAA, renewing the prospect of a Bosnian accession process (Gross, 2015). Gross suggests that grassroots, bottom-up pressure may oblige intransigent entity authorities to accede to EU pressure, or coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is not always military: it may be political and economic (Matlary, 2009:195). German and British involvement answers the call for greater member state engagement.

6.5 Evidence from missions: Conclusions

CSDP Missions present some key trends:

(The) globalisation of the operational area; expansion of the operational spectrum; increasing civilian-military border interaction; growing intertwining of the first and second EU pillars; and evolving capability processes (Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2008:14).

These observations remain apposite. By December 2014 the EU had deployed 34 military and civilian missions in Africa, Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus, and the Middle East (ISIS Europe, 2014). Civilian-military cooperation has been a feature of several missions, including border missions, and the ongoing naval operation EU NAVFOR Somalia (Atalanta). EUFOR Althea began as a military operation and effectively ‘civilianised’. There has been a developing assimilation between former Commission responsibilities and Council foreign and security interests now within the EEAS. CSDP remains embryonic but the scope of missions continues to develop, even if individually they are modest in scale and ambition. Battlegroups have not been deployed, and states are constrained by austerity. Both civilian and military capability, and CIV-MIL cooperation, is evolving, while defence budgets continue to contract (RAND, 2012). In a short time CSDP has accomplished a substantial amount, even if EU rhetoric (Fig.1.2) appears to exceed capability, implementation, and outcomes.
A Balkans flare-up would probably bring a CSDP military intervention, potentially a first Battlegroup deployment followed by a larger NATO-type intervention led by the UK and France with limited US participation, as in Libya in 2011 (Interview 4). Libya highlighted European capability shortfalls and CSDP has brought only limited capacity-building to European armed forces (Mölling, 2011). Washington has long urged increased European defence spending, but cuts have continued, especially during post-2008 austerity. This highlights the continuing absence of defence in CSDP, so anything ‘serious’ would rapidly become a NATO responsibility. Two respondents (Interviews 11,13) mention the cliché ‘the US-NATO does the cooking, Europeans wash the dishes’.

CSDP remains more attuned to post-conflict reconstruction and civilian tasks:

There’s state resistance to (CSDP armed force) deployment, and in a major crisis they would call on a NATO Reaction Force (Interview 11).

An IISS expert alludes to member states’ capability deficiencies and weakness in CSDP generally while arguing that the Union has contributed significantly to stabilisation in the Western Balkans, but it is precisely there that CSDP could be severely tested and could ultimately fall apart (Interview 1). But no such test has arrived, and the risk of serious chaos in the Balkans has diminished partly thanks to EU efforts (Kirchner, 2013).

This chapter’s survey of CSDP missions shows that CSDP has consolidated as a CCM, post-conflict reconstruction, and conflict prevention instrument. It is mostly civilian but combines with military forces (e.g. Althea, Atalanta). The Balkans remains a test for CSDP, and Bosnia and Kosovo present major political challenges. Overall the EU role in the region since 2003 is positive. CSDP promises comprehensive and successful outcomes, meaning political development and enhanced security. Missions tend to be small-scale and minimalist, but they make a modest contribution in various theatres. EU soft power diplomacy, and a normative approach towards state transformation, can still be effective where it offers something concrete. Missions, combined with several other agencies, contribute to a long-haul process. CSDP uses the comprehensive approach, a ‘toolbox’ of instruments within a wide political and economic development strategy. The arrival of the EEAS in 2010 and its consolidation since can enhance the effectiveness of missions, especially as proper lessons-learned processes become embedded.
CSDP is a limited endeavour with limited strategic effectiveness but missions are not insignificant, bringing important local improvements. They demonstrate limited EU actorness in international security. They do not indicate developing EU defence capability, but there are benefits from inter-state cooperation. Battlegroup deployment depends on unanimity among participating member states and among all CSDP signatories, and this has not yet happened, which calls into question the field utility of the concept.

Resource deficiencies are especially apparent, both civilian and military, and these deficiencies are entirely down to member states avoiding higher contributions, which they can easily do in a primarily intergovernmental field. Common funding of CSDP military operations is limited to the Athena mechanism which attends to common costs. Force and resource generation procedures are slow and bureaucratic, lacking member states’ commitment. Missions and mission deployment, implementation, monitoring, and lessons-learned processes all reflect traits of bureaucratic politics, including lowest-common-denominator agreement, consensus orientation, issue-by-issue decision-making, satisficing, low-cost and low-risk engagements, technocratic procedures, hierarchical structures and complex institutional channels.

Biscop (2011b) suggests capability is not the fundamental barrier to CSDP effectiveness. He cites poor leadership and the commitment to intergovernmentalism in an area where this cannot bring strategic power to contemporary security challenges. The capabilities-expectations gap (Hill, 1993) remains, as does the lack of political will identified as undermining Althea back in 2005 (Dover, 2005). Althea officials report this continuing weakness, damaging CSDP coherence and effectiveness.

34 missions do not represent the ‘autonomy’ or ‘capacity’ promised at St Malo and Helsinki, but this does not mean CSDP has failed. Instead the scope and scale has become clear. CSDP is a crisis intervention instrument as envisaged at Laeken (European Council, 2001). It continues to evolve towards a comprehensive framework for peacekeeping, crisis intervention, post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention, backed by growing military capability, but under member state control.

CSDP is a vital ingredient in EU engagement with the Western Balkans. Both Althea and EULEX KOSOVO are on-going. Huge challenges remain for future EU enlargement. Grabbe (2014) underlines the importance of a comprehensive approach well beyond technical compliance with the acquis, citing fundamental and permanent changes in political culture.
and warning against accession for states with uncertain status, a reference to Kosovo, but also to Bosnia given its internal divisions. This is relevant because CSDP is a fundamental part of broad EU efforts towards regional transformation. This is a strategic EU ambition.

Hypothesis 1  
CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor gains little direct support from the mission record, and almost none from EUFOR Althea. However, there are signs of significant long-term evolution as CSDP may bring deeper cooperation and enhanced CIV-MIL capability. It may even develop strategic actorness, but evidence reported here suggests limited achievements so far. The process is underway, and must be understood within the context of wider, and strategic, EU ambition.

Hypothesis 2  
CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics is supported by mission evidence. BP is a process (see p.7). CSDP operates through processes that reflect bureaucratic politics: missions depend on lowest-common-denominator agreement, are deployed on an issue-by-issue basis, and are consensus-oriented, technocratic, minimalist and low-risk. They reflect ‘satisficing’, attracting little public attention, but suiting domestic preferences. Intergovernmentalism remains the power behind CSDP, determining the scope and ambition of the initiative. But how CSDP actually works, how it is implemented, is better explained by understanding its bureaucratic nature.

The substantial and original finding of this thesis, that bureaucratic politics explains CSDP to the detriment of the prospects for Grand Strategy, gains substantially from evidence presented in this chapter. The next and final chapter develops this argument and summarises the main conclusions of the thesis. It also points towards future research.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This study has explored the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the St Malo Declaration in December 1998, focusing on its institutional development and operations. The purpose of this final chapter is to summarise the thesis conclusions, affirm its original contribution, and suggest further research.

While CSDP is located within CFSP, an intergovernmental domain within EU policy-making, the thesis argues that intergovernmentalism is an inadequate explanation of how CSDP operates. Member states control resourcing and mission deployment, but both institutionally and in terms of implementation, CSDP is dominated by bureaucratic politics. This calls into question the CSDP literature advocating that the EU should adopt a Grand Strategy (GS) approach towards achieving the goals articulated in the ESS and other core documents (see Fig.1.2, p.14, and p.21). A stronger EU contribution to international security requires enhanced civilian and military capability. Grand Strategy proponents call for greater strategic actorness and coherence, but this study finds little appetite for an overt and comprehensive strategic plan involving coordination under the top-down guidance of, for example, the EDA. There is little evidence of member states being willing to substantially pool strategic capability. Instead there remains an attachment to nation state sovereignty despite this being something of a chimera (see p.58). Grand Strategy requires commitment to member state adaptation, reflecting Europeanisation in Radaelli’s terms (Radaelli, 2003), but this is not apparent. GS presupposes defence integration, but there is no appetite for this, nor even much public debate. That GS cannot be operationalised is furthermore underlined by member states’ failure to define common interests or to agree on how security risks should be addressed. Grand Strategy, as defined on p.4 above, is denied by Europe’s CFSP being grounded in an intergovernmentalism that requires unanimity. This is extremely difficult for an organisation of 28 members. As argued in Chapter 2, the intergovernmentalism that built the Single Market used QMV, which does not apply to CFSP. It also depended on states recognising and articulating common interests. This has happened to only a limited degree in the security and defence field where different interests are often apparent. Chapter 2 also argued that the kind of bargaining that Moravcsik (1998) placed at the heart of Liberal Intergovernmentalism does not apply to CSDP. For these reasons, state power tends to act
as a barrier to the EU becoming a ‘global power’ of the kind that Grand Strategists have advocated (Biscop, 2009:5).

The focus of this study is the relationship between Grand Strategy and bureaucratic politics, in how CSDP operates and evolves. The major original claim of the thesis is that CSDP has evolved and is practised through bureaucratic politics and that this, together with the unanimity demands of traditional intergovernmentalism, renders Grand Strategy unfeasible. CSDP has achieved and continues to achieve important outcomes. Within CFSP it contributes to wider EU goals regarding international security and development, which means there is a strategic dimension to CSDP, and that this is a component of wider EU policy. CSDP in practice involves long-term aims and consists of small steps towards achieving them. The policy reflects incremental, gradual development, coordinated by and through a complex network of technocrats and officials. Policy-making and implementation involves multilevel and heterarchical processes (Mérand et al, 2011), combined with multiple external actors in member states, missions and IGOs. This reflects key characteristics of BP that contrast with traditional intergovernmental bargaining based on interests. GS, meanwhile, requires an intergovernmental bargain that is interest-based and dependent on rational choice. CSDP does not work like this.

CSDP reflects a developing EU strategic culture based on core values and the comprehensive approach (see Chapter 4). It does so through a long-term and minimalist developmental process. This represents a strategy of sorts, but not a Grand Strategy. CSDP lies within a multidimensional framework of EU diplomacy in pursuit of economic and political ambitions. A key component involves regional stabilisation initiatives that collectively progress EU interests. This study emphasises that these initiatives are developed through bureaucratic politics, not through a Grand Strategy dependent on front-loading interests, intergovernmental agreement, and member state adaptation to top-down EU pressures.

Chapter 2 reviewed alternative explanations for CSDP, in particular ‘grand theory’ approaches of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism (pp.37-42), explaining why these are inappropriate or insufficient. The chapter also considered normative and constructivist explanations. Further evidence regarding the insufficiency of these approaches was considered in Chapter 5. Section 2.5 explained how the term ‘strategic culture’ is used in the study (defined on p.3). Strategic culture provides the overall conceptual framework for the thesis. Evidently without a strategic culture there can be no strategic actorness, and the ESS stresses that building a European strategic culture is essential.
European strategic culture is based on a comprehensive understanding of the term, and its emergence reflects the comprehensive approach (CA) (see p.3), which underpins CSDP. Chapter 3 reported bilateral cooperation, and some strategic culture convergence between France, Germany and the UK (EU-3). It also found traits in EU-3 strategic cultures that limit this convergence. Each retains its individual strategic culture and cooperates where cooperation is deemed appropriate. All three reflect aspects of a common European strategic culture and all subscribe to the CA; they are essential contributors to CSDP.

Chapter 4 extended the exploration of strategic culture to other member states and the EU as a whole. Medium and small member states make a considerable contribution to CSDP, and have, like Germany, helped to shape the initiative towards mostly civilian crisis management (CCM) and conflict prevention. As a result, and echoing Zwolski (2012b), one can observe coexistence between member state strategic cultures and an emergent European strategic culture.

With the emergent and comprehensive European strategic culture established as the context for the study, Chapter 5 examined the structures (see Section 5.2, p.124) through which CSDP is developed and implemented. Chapter 6 explored evidence from missions. These chapters lead to the conclusion, core to the thesis and its originality, that CSDP is best explained by bureaucratic politics and that Grand Strategy is an unfeasible route towards realising the goals of the CSDP process.

Section 7.2 considers the thesis hypotheses and summarises key findings concerning these and the related research questions. Section 7.3 provides a concluding overview of the BP-GS argument; Section 7.4 summarises the original contribution of this research, and the final section, 7.5, suggests directions for future research.

7.2 Hypotheses: strategic actorness and bureaucratic politics

7.2.1 H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor

The study finds weak support for H1. An emphasis on the intention element makes the hypothesis more tenable. The emergent EU strategic culture and the post-Lisbon institutional framework suggests support for H1 on account of the potential for increased strategic actorness, enhanced cooperation, and even an integrationary element, something akin to
‘co-ordigration’ (Howorth, 2014:215). Institutional change alone cannot amount to anything strategic, but in the short time since St Malo the Union has clearly become a security actor. CSDP has added to EU presence through missions and it has brought limited actorness to its international role. Missions have tended to be small, low-cost and low-risk, but they have enhanced EU credibility in the regions where they have occurred. Current circumstances are challenging as political and economic uncertainties assail the European project. Exogenous events including financial crisis, changing US priorities, instability following the Arab Spring, and conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Hadfield and Fiott, 2014; Reuters, 2014b), make demands for Grand Strategy understandable, but the adoption of a coherent top-down and directive GS is unlikely, given that member states tend to focus on national self-interest and short-term, non-strategic benefits, or damage limitation from current crises. Lisbon locks in the principle of unanimity (see p.14; Ashton, 2013d), an important inhibitor of Grand Strategy.

CSDP must be understood as a process, little more than a decade old, founded on a comprehensive approach involving an EU presence and limited actorness in post-conflict theatres. It is implemented through a still embryonic EEAS-EUD network. The EEAS Review highlights how its future impact will depend upon enhancing the bureaucratic process, an indication of how the CA relies on minimalist, incremental steps and process improvements (EEAS, 2013a, Ashton, 2013d; Hadfield and Fiott, 2014).

Several factors undermine H1, and indeed GS aspirations. During 2003-2009 the credibility of the Union as a strategic actor increased only slightly despite its profile in regions where missions took place. Missions have demonstrated enhanced cooperation and CA implementation, especially EU NAVFOR Atalanta (EU NAVFOR, 2015), considered one of the most successful operations. But CSDP’s strategic impact remains slight. Minimal actorness relates to low member state commitment and how CSDP has been implemented.

Testing H1 finds no clearly defined strategic basis to CSDP. It suffers from a lack of direction and weak leadership, the latter less a criticism of Catherine Ashton than a comment on the constraints under which the HR-VP is obliged to operate (Ashton, 2013d). The means towards achieving the goals of the ESS are not properly articulated. Core documents (p.14) include aspirations that suggest strategic intention, up to and including defence autonomy and ‘common defence’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.42.2). But a credibility gap exists between rhetoric and achievement, and within Lisbon itself, which refers to the objective of common defence while repeatedly asserting the need for unanimity, protecting individual state
preferences and traditions, including the ‘security exemption’ which contravenes Single Market principles.

At a micro-level, promised deployments do not match expectations. By December 2007 EUPOL Afghanistan had only a fraction of the promised 195 police trainers; in 2008 deployment to Tchad was delayed six months because of a shortage of helicopters and transport aircraft (Menon, 2012:592-3). The term ‘credibility gap’ echoes the seminal ‘capability-expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993), concerning EU foreign policy and the instruments at its disposal. Throughout the ESDP years this gap remained (Toje, 2008). A former head of the EDA labelled the attempt to build European defence capability ‘a failure’ (Witney, 2008). There have not been substantial capability improvements since Lisbon ratification in 2009. Biscop and Coelmont (2013b:90) warn of Europe becoming ‘militarily irrelevant’ without concerted effort towards integrating its fragmented military resources. And yet the framework through which this could be achieved exists: the Capability Development Plan (EDA, 2014a).

The notion of a credibility gap is supported by interview data for this study, including Althea officials, critical of EU commitment to a mission that shrinks while the demands remain relatively unchanged, and the political situation in BiH deteriorates. Now Althea looks somewhat symbolic, having shrunk to 600 personnel, while political paralysis continues. However, two caveats apply. First, Althea demonstrates failings, but not failure. The challenges in Bosnia are addressed by various IGOs, Althea being a small part of the international community’s political and economic Balkans engagement, and one element in an EU strategic effort towards stabilisation and development, and eventual accession, for countries throughout the region. Secondly, the Sarajevo interviews, a subset of the primary data collection, took place in 2011 just as major changes were affecting the EU presence in Bosnia: the EEAS was in its infancy, the EUSR moved into the EU Headquarters, and in 2012 EUPM ended. Early signs were that EUSR-EUD linkage was a positive step related to a pre-accession strategy. But later literature reported in this thesis, and a return visit in 2015, suggest paralysis in Bosnia’s progress towards EU membership.

A common criticism, supported by interview data for this study, is that CSDP has lacked direction, especially since 2005. Even Javier Solana’s proactive leadership lost impetus around this time. The loss of the Constitutional Treaty appeared to deliver a blow to CSDP which after 2007 became inward-looking and focused on institution-building. Gray (2007) underlined that institution-building alone could not amount to strategy, but the Union has developed a network of institutions to deliver its foreign and security policy, including CSDP.
Lisbon, meanwhile, retained ambitious rhetoric, but various caveats protect the CFSP unanimity principle (Blockmans and Wessel, 2009). The result is that the relevant EU institutions and the missions themselves are responsible for progressing CSDP, but they can only do so through a minimalist, incremental, bureaucratised way of working.

Enhanced strategic actorness and Grand Strategy would be more plausible if there were either a strong lead from the member states or if there were a strong supranational dimension to CSDP. The member states are not providing any lead, and QMV in this field is not on the horizon. There is some long-term potential for supranationalism through the embryonic EEAS, and from the HR-VP, depending on the personality of the incumbent. Lisbon affirms the ‘legal personality’ of the Union (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.47), but a caveat (ibid, Declaration 24) confirms member state primacy. Discussion of H2 (below) refers to how the CSDP network and policy implementation process could develop a non-institutional supranationalism. This would enhance common policy, and actorness. Long-term, CSDP could, on account of its comprehensive nature and networked relationship with other areas of EU policy, achieve greater strategic actorness.

Dinan (2011) suggests that the increased role of the Commission and European Parliament is potentially significant, but the Commission’s managerial oversight and funding through the Athena mechanism is hardly strategic. Nevertheless, within the EEAS, the EUDs assisted by the Commission, pursue development policy in post-conflict situations through trade, aid, economic and political development, rule of law, and human rights, all under the auspices of CFSP. Hadfield and Fiott (2014:173) refer to the EEAS ‘Triple-D policy’ of defence, diplomacy and development. Lisbon enhances the link between former Commission interests (DG RELEX, DG ENLARG) and security issues, which is strategically significant since it consolidates CSDP into a matrix of EU external action. This trans-institutional network links strategic actorness (H1) with bureaucratic politics (H2) and has long-term strategic potential to deliver improved coordination between various agencies and policy initiatives, across the widest interpretation of the comprehensive approach. There is also the prospect that coordination begins to resemble integration, but there is no clear demarcation between these processes (Howorth, 2014:214).

The European Parliament is a peripheral actor in CSDP, with an informational role only, but it provides input on wider CFSP and Commission interests, including diplomacy and development. It may achieve more influence on CSDP through its budgetary approval role, its Joint Decision role with the Council, and the EP committees dealing with foreign affairs,
and security and defence (European Parliament, 2015). The Parliament also benefits from democratic authority as an elected body. Lisbon requires that it is informed of CSDP and PESCO initiatives, but this is not power. Parliament’s interest in democracy and human rights is reflected in CSDP’s normative dimension, so while it influences policy, it is doubtful that it could push CSDP towards greater strategic actorness.

Other factors undermine H1. CSDP has civilianised and the policy has lacked strategic coherence. Member states have different interests and aspirations regarding CSDP, a prime reason for GS lack of viability. A striking comment from a UK Parliament report shows London’s determination to limit EEAS influence: ‘The EEAS should not have a role in providing consular assistance’ (Parliament UK, 2013). Hadfield and Fiott (2014:173) refer to the UK insistence that member states should:

remain the bulwark against proliferating EU defence engagements (and we must)
remain vigilant against any threat of competence creep on the part of the EEAS (Parliament UK, 2013).

Given the unanimity lock provided by Lisbon, and the determination of a key member state that was an initiator of CSDP, to limit EU intrusion into an intergovernmental arena, it seems inconceivable that Grand Strategy could drive the initiative forward. There is a shortage of political will in many member states, not just the UK. Weak resourcing undermines actorness; CIV-MIL capability gains have been limited; funding and force generation processes, both civilian and military, remain cumbersome and bureaucratic. Spending on defence is declining even while resources remain well short of what CSDP would need to embrace actorness in accordance with core goals (see p.14), or indeed with Grand Strategy. Thus GS is undermined by Treaty provisions, by process, by spending deficiencies, and by political will.

Throughout its short history CSDP has, understandably given the range of perspectives among 28 member states, focused more on political than military objectives, more civilian than military, more development and diplomacy than defence. This has underpinned the civilianisation of CSDP, rooted in soft power and normative values. Missions have been mostly small, low-risk, low-cost, and of limited ambition. CSDP has evolved as a primarily CCM instrument focused on post-conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction, political development, and conflict prevention. However Article 43 (see p.177) also includes ‘tasks of
combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007:Art.43.1), so the potential remains for a greater defence dimension.

CSDP is a process towards increasing actoriness, but a gradual one that reflects the implications of H2 and bureaucratic politics, more than it does Grand Strategy. This is unlikely to change in the short- or even medium-term. While there is long-term potential in CSDP, and the post-Lisbon institutional structures may enable more strategic coherence in future, much depends on the personalities, political will, and resources released by member states, who remain the policy drivers and gatekeepers. It also remains to be seen how successfully the EEAS can achieve the improvements indicated in the 2013 Review.

Institutional weaknesses continue to undermine CSDP, including the division of interests between Commission external policy, and the Council/EEAS. A geographic design of the Commission's involvement with the EEAS remains in place.

H1 CSDP is intended to enhance the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor gains only modest support, primarily because of the intention element and the potential within the institutional network that develops and implements CSDP. Strategic actoriness may increase over the long-term, but clear vision and leadership would enhance this. For CSDP to become a substantial strategic instrument requires stronger political support, leadership and resources. It may even require qualified majority voting (QMV).

The main drivers of CSDP are the member states, the key principals and power source in policy-making and resource delivery. The member states govern CSDP through proxies that 'reconstitute the state' (Mérand et al, 2011) at the Brussels level, mainly through the PSC and EEAS member state appointees.

An emergent European strategic culture is evident. This co-exists with member state strategic cultures, and that of NATO. These often reflect differing traditions, preferences and interests, but a common European strategic culture is developing, based on the comprehensive approach and underpinned by EU values.

The Union clearly has a presence in international security but strategic actoriness remains underdeveloped due to a lack of political will, limited resources, limited CIV-MIL capability, and a failure to clearly articulate common interests. These factors significantly compromise the prospects of Grand Strategy driving CSDP in future.
There is only minimal evidence of CSDP contributing to integration, other than through a commitment to the comprehensive strategic culture mindset which is applied selectively, depending upon the issue. Limited resources and the failure to articulate and pursue common interests means integration is extremely marginal. Nevertheless there is integrationary potential within the post-Lisbon structures even without formal supranational institutions. CSDP and the comprehensive approach, even where most evident and most effective (i.e. in the Western Balkans), represents cooperation, not integration. Evidence of Europeanisation-as-adaptation would constitute integration but this is difficult to demonstrate empirically and in any case, seems not to be evident. Grand Strategy would drive CSDP in an integrationary direction, but there is no power to make this happen. GS requires a top-down steer from EU member states in the Council, but despite the rhetoric from the December 2013 Council (European Council, 2013) indicating this might be forthcoming, there is unlikely to be a change of gear. Instead the incremental bureaucratic development of CSDP continues, not a CSDP rebirth through Grand Strategy. There is no sign of the EDA being given a leadership role to force through its Capability Development Plan, or to drive more strategic pooling and sharing through PESCO. Instead we see limited cooperation leading to incremental increases in capability. Assessment of H2 reinforces this conclusion.

7.2.2 H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics

Testing H2 involved analysis of the institutional structures and evolution of CSDP (Chapter 5) and the nature of policy development and implementation through missions (Chapter 6). The question of legitimacy was also considered because CSDP is intended, according to the ESS, to contribute to democracy and good governance (Solana, 2003). It hardly assists EU credibility if CSDP adds to the Union’s widely commented democratic deficit (see p.164).

Examination of CSDP institutional structures (Section 5.2) and post-Lisbon changes (Section 5.3) suggests a policy-making arena where bureaucratic politics prevails. It is reminiscent of the bureaucratic arena described by Allison as one in which what happens is not necessarily the solution to a given problem, but is the result of compromise, coalition, and even confusion among officials who see different sides of an issue (Allison, 1969:708). CSDP is a heavily bureaucratised policy field, typical of the modern state, reflecting governance rather than government (Bickerton, 2011:182) or ‘discipline’ against ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991:103), later conceptualised as a transformation from ‘nation state’ to ‘member state’ (Bickerton, 2013:12). The centrality of these bureaucratic traits to CSDP’s evolution and practice adds to the conclusion that Grand Strategy is hardly viable.
The institutions themselves constitute a complex administrative network, a large number of committees and information channels reaching across almost the entire architecture of EU governance, and populated by technocrats and officials, one-step-removed from their political masters, the elected ministers in member states, or serving directly appointed officials whose manner of working is suffused with bureaucratic practice. The PSC, the core decision-making unit within the institutional complex, is an agent of the Council and the member states. It has limited and delegated autonomy. Its primary role is to run CSDP missions, to which end it further delegates to mission commanders and staff. Beem (2009) and Klein (2010) report potential agent autonomy within CSDP, but strategic direction must emanate from the PSC. It and COREPER are ‘consensus generating machines’ (Bickerton, 2011:180); (see p.145); this limits their strategic potential, given that CSDP depends upon lowest-common-denominator agreement. The institutional framework is the arena through which consensus is achieved, and given the challenge of finding agreement among 27 or 28 member states (Denmark is not a CSDP-signatory), the bureaucratic modus operandi trumps strategy, rendering Grand Strategy an unfeasible means to fulfil EU security ambitions.

The Lisbon Treaty introduced the High Representative of the Union’s Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HR-VP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS is a bureaucracy and service organisation at the disposal of the HR-VP, providing management and coordination to CSDP missions and related instruments, including the EU Delegations. These initiatives offer limited scope for actorness, and in the long term even strategic actorness. The EEAS and CSDP instruments depend on member states for resources, and are under the authority of the PSC. This constitutes a form of constrained institutionalism with potential policy entrepreneurship opportunities for the EEAS and the HR-VP, and agent autonomy among CSDP instruments and the EUDs, which are closely linked to the Commission. There are signs that the EEAS may benefit from support from other EU institutions, notably the Parliament. It is important to note that CSDP is a work-in-progress and that the first missions (of 34 to date) were launched only in 2003.

Examination of CSDP democratic legitimacy in Section 5.7 (p.164) suggests limited democratic accountability. This strengthens the H2 claim regarding bureaucratic politics, and echoes the notion of inverse proportionality between democracy and bureaucracy (Beetham, 1987). Applying a legitimacy framework from Wagner (2005) and Comelli (2010), the analysis determined that CSDP lacks output legitimacy since its successes are small, hard to quantify, and confined by the modest scale of ambition and limited resources. Input
legitimacy is more evident, given the high level of principal control, i.e. through member states’ power over deployment, resources, and mission duration. Binary parliamentary scrutiny is extremely limited. Finally, legal legitimacy is good, since missions need UN authorisation and international community support from relevant IGOs. CSDP operates through the Lisbon Treaty which has ‘legal personality’, and the unanimity requirement also strengthens the policy’s legal credentials. Taken together though, and considering its technocratic manner of operation, and that CSDP is hardly a matter of widespread public debate or knowledge, the policy lacks accountability: its democratic credentials are not particularly good. Nevertheless they are no worse than those of NATO or the UN (Mattelaer, 2010), or other EU policy fields (see p.168).

Analysis of CSDP missions (Chapter 6) further consolidates an affirmative assessment of H2. Most are small, low-risk and low-cost. Even EUFOR Althea was described by a senior official as costing ‘a tiny amount of money’ (Interview 18), especially if compared with the economic cost of violent conflict (Bozoli et al, 2010). Interview evidence broadly supports this, and the notion that mission deployment depends on lowest-common-denominator agreement (Toje, 2008; Smith, 2008:10; Rynning, 2011:30; Chappell and Petrov, 2014:3). A ‘satisficing’ approach to policy (and mission) implementation means a lack of strategic or long-term thinking, characteristic of bureaucratic politics and evident in the issue-by-issue, minimalist practice, and limited or unquantifiable outcomes from missions. Process appears more important than tangible outcomes. Consensus becomes the aim, which may, according to the most critical respondents interviewed for this research, take precedence over principles. The UK however demonstrates defence of a principle, state sovereignty, at all costs, in seeking to prevent the EEAS or HR-VP from providing strategic leadership of security and defence policy (see p.227 above). This is an illustration of how a Grand Strategy to strengthen common security and defence policy would be rejected out-of-hand by the UK.

A summary assessment of H2 is as follows: The EU’s CSDP is a manifestation of bureaucratic politics, where sub-optimal outcomes are achieved, and missions are governed by a hierarchical technocracy that answers to member states through the Council and its proxies. CSDP illustrates limited legitimacy through a low level of public consent, minimal Parliamentary scrutiny and member state control through Brussels-located proxies (especially the PSC). CSDP is run by a complex network of committees staffed by technocratic experts and officials appointed by member states and other EU organisations as their proxies. Outcomes are low-level and under-reported, making scrutiny difficult. Policy
is based on satisficing rather than on strategic gains. Compromise and consensus are goals of policy-making process, rather than defending principles. A DGAP expert in Berlin (*Interview 25*) describes CSDP as a ‘technocratic community’ rather than a political one. Missions are mostly small, relatively low-risk, low-cost and low in ambition. Interventions are based on lowest-common-denominator agreement, and once in place they often lack clearly defined targets, or measurable outcomes, so success is hard to measure. The short tenure that officials hold, whether as officials posted to missions or as member state appointees to the CSDP arena in Brussels, also lends credence to the notion of ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1959:83), and relying on horizontal networks to meet minimal organisational goals.

Counter-arguments to H2 are considered in the early part of the thesis, and repeated here only briefly. Alternative explanations include ‘grand theories’ of neofunctionalism (pp.37-8) and intergovernmentalism (pp.38-42). CSDP has not led to the creation of supranational institutions through the kind of spillover processes featured in neofunctionalism that led to legal and institutional supranationalism, and integration. Intergovernmentalism is a better candidate to explain CSDP since the policy lies within the Maastricht intergovernmental pillar of CSFP. However, the Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998) that underpinned Single Market development involved interstate bargaining from defined interest-based positions and rational choice decision-making, none of which are characteristic of CSDP. Intergovernmentalism remains significant however because the member states control resourcing and determine the extent of the defence component within the policy. State power can prevent transition towards common policy, and be a barrier to common strategic ambition. This is especially apparent where defence is concerned. For some states, including the UK, sovereignty in defence policy seems at least rhetorically, to be an act of faith. State power then inhibits the potential for Grand Strategy to become a driver of CSDP.

Another possible alternative explanation for CSDP is social constructivism and related approaches (see Section 2.3, p.42), particularly institutionalism and institutional socialisation. Section 5.4 (p.139) examines this in relation to CSDP’s institutional framework, and finds that the normative dimension in this field is conceptually important in determining the nature of the CA, but socialisation dynamics do not drive policy-making, and have no impact on CSDP actorness. Ultimately social constructivism is too dependent on normative theory (Manners, 2002), failing to take adequate account of power relationships.
Brusselsisation (Allen, 1998) is also examined in this context, and its proximity to bureaucratic politics is identified. CSDP shows strong support for the proposition from Mérand et al (2011) that this is a transgovernmental field within which state power is reconstituted at the European level. Institutional development around CSDP reflects Brusselsisation, also because it does not involve a power shift away from the member states. Brusselsisation reflects some of the network logic of bureaucratic politics.

Finally the study explored Europeanisation (Section 5.5, p.146), prompted by the substantial EU foreign policy literature which proposes that EU foreign policy, CSDP, and even defence policy demonstrates Europeanisation (see p.7). Adopting Radaelli’s (2003) adaptation model, this study rejects this as impossible to demonstrate empirically and barely evident. This echoes Moumoutzis (2011), who questions the methodology behind Europeanisation claims. This thesis finds that beyond transgovernmental cooperation on an issue-by-issue basis, there is no evidence of CSDP indicating much more than a ‘soft’, empirically hard-to-verify form of Europeanisation. An original contribution of this study is to link this finding to the impracticality of Grand Strategy, since GS would clearly require Europeanisation as adaptation. This is not evident and there is little declared appetite for this in the security field and none regarding defence.

In conclusion, H2 is strongly supported, evidenced by critical analysis of primary data from interviews, relevant academic literature, and the official record and media commentary. The study therefore finds that the evolution and implementation of CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics.

Other summary conclusions relating to H2 and the related research questions require mention.

The institutional framework of CSDP is examined in Section 5.2 (p.124), followed by a critique of the Lisbon changes (Section 5.3, p.129). There is some potential for policy entrepreneurship from the HR-VP and the EEAS. While Dinan (2011) mused on the potential for the EEAS to become a fully fledged institution, one may speculate that it could become a ‘purposeful opportunist’, echoing studies of the Commission (Pollack, 1994; Cram, 1997). CSDP implementation also permits a degree of autonomy at the mission level (Klein, 2010; see Chapter 6).
CSDP structures (see Fig.5.1, p.127) consist of a complex web of committees comprising technocratic experts under the authority of the Council and member states. Officials in DEVCO and the EUDs may defer more to the Commission than to the Council, as loyalties extend through sectoral lines (Hartlapp et al, 2013). The European Parliament also has growing influence on CSDP practice, emboldened by its status as a directly elected institution and by its increased oversight role, budgetary authority over the Commission, and its co-decision status with the Council.

Mission analysis (Chapter 6) demonstrates the difficulty of garnering adequate support across 28 member states, except for relatively modest and primarily civilian endeavours. Missions are agreed and monitored by the PSC which confirms resourcing needs. Missions have occurred across a range of theatres and for various purposes (see Table 6.1, p.182-3). Member state commitment varies, often correlated with individual state interests rather than the common European interest or interests of the territory involved. Limited resourcing reduces mission effectiveness, and force generation processes are complex, cumbersome and often stymied by member state reluctance, and occasionally obstructionism. Of 34 CSDP missions between 2003 and Spring 2014, just six were military operations. Overall mission evidence suggests a civilianisation of CSDP, an instrument for Civilian Crisis Management and conflict prevention. Missions often suffer from a lack of strategic clarity, a frequent criticism of CSDP generally. Most produce outcomes that are sub-optimal, especially given limited resources and low levels of commitment from member states. Compromise and sufficing appear symptomatic of mission implementation.

Complex institutional structures and the technocratic nature of policy development and implementation, consensus-oriented policy-making, compromise over principle, and a tendency towards ‘satisficing’ over clear strategic ambition, limits strategic actorness. The bureaucratic politics of the CSDP arena matches the gradual construction of a common strategic culture, and its coexistence with pre-existing and resilient member state strategic cultures, and indeed with NATO strategic culture. Common defence policy and articulation of common interests is particularly hard to achieve and remains, in an intergovernmental sphere, the preserve of member states and their principals.

These characteristics determine that bureaucratic politics explains the evolution and implementation of CSDP, a stronger basis for understanding the policy field than other theoretical positions referred to in the study, notably Europeanisation, which applies only as
a form of cooperation, relying on shared values, and having some relationship to third states engaged in an EU accession process.

Despite considerable institutional innovation, the power to develop and resource CSDP resides firmly with member states. Bureaucratic politics does not alter this power relationship between the states and Council as principals, and their agents: the HR-VP, the EEAS, and missions. Limited agent autonomy is not a power shift, especially regarding mission deployment or resourcing. The power factor means the policy field remains primarily intergovernmental. While not contesting the primacy of intergovernmentalism, this study challenges its sufficiency in explaining CSDP. Bureaucratic politics is the most effective way to analyse CSDP in a scholarly sense, to better understand the nature and working of CSDP. The agents and instruments responsible for implementing the policy lack the power to drive major strategic choices, but they are fundamental to how CSDP has evolved and is practised, and probably how it will evolve in future.

7.3 Bureaucratic politics and Grand Strategy: why one works, and the other does not

Bureaucratic politics is a more plausible means through which to develop CSDP than an overt intergovernmentally agreed Grand Strategy. GS might apply following a major external shock, such as a definitive switch in US policy away from defending European interests, and this coinciding with a major security crisis in the European Union itself or in its immediate neighbourhood. Inaction on the part of the EU would carry major risks, so GS in such circumstances might be forced upon reluctant member states. GS in these circumstances would indeed be timely, operating as a call to arms to member states as suggested on p.174. But until now, as this thesis has argued, GS is too easily resisted by member states who steadfastly remain anchored to elements of their strategic cultures that are antipathetic to deeper security integration and common defence is even more remote. In these circumstances, aided by the institutional structures created since St Malo, and especially since Lisbon, the less transparent and less visible process that permeates those structures enables an incremental, uneven, somewhat piecemeal evolution of common policy and common strategic culture. The process reflects bureaucratic politics and in the long term it continues to edge the EU towards greater security actorness and a more coordinated security culture.
This thesis deals with evidence from St Malo to the European Council in December 2013, not with future scenarios. However, on the basis of current evidence one may speculate that bureaucratic politics could permit further incremental development of CSDP, including CIV-MIL capability enhancement, whereas an overt drive for GS would risk breaking the initiative because member states would find GS imposition unacceptable. Instead, the gradual, minimalist, issue-by-issue process of bureaucratic politics may in the long-term build upon current foundations. It might even bring increased strategic actorness and some integrationary characteristics such as a stronger HR-VP role, or EEAS policy entrepreneurship, although currently this is not evident.

A weakness in the Grand Strategy proposition, and one that relates closely to the Europeanisation-as-adaptation model, is that both depend on rational choice. Both require member states to calculate what is in their best interests, to articulate those interests as common among 28 member states, and to follow a rational convergence strategy based on EDA recommendations. This would replicate some characteristics of the Single Market process, specifically the willingness to pool and share sovereignty, and to accept the emergence of supranational structures in guiding an integration process that ‘will lead to common defence’ as promised by the Lisbon Treaty (2007:Art.42.2). Of course, as mentioned several times, this promise is followed by immediate caveats, but beyond a major shock as suggested above, there is no sign of unanimity in the Council determining that the 28 member states shall move to ‘common defence’.

The thesis highlights the continuing credibility gap between CSDP outcomes regarding actorness and capability, and the promises made in core documents (p.14). The rhetoric implies greater EU impact throughout the international security environment than CSDP has delivered. The ‘capability expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993) remains, and CSDP reflects the notion of ‘small power Europe’ (Toje, 2011). It is from this context that bureaucratic politics can progress CSDP, whereas Grand Strategy will be stymied by Treaty insistence on unanimity.

Treaty caveats that preserve member state primacy undermine any prospect of Grand Strategy, necessitating other means through which to develop CSDP. Foreign and security policy remains primarily intergovernmental, and the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over CSDP. The HR-VP and the EEAS could in time contribute to developing EU strategic actorness, and the EU Delegations already play a significant role in 141 countries (Ashton, 2013a), raising the Union’s international profile. There are opportunities for ‘agent autonomy’
A significant aspect of CSDP implementation involves interaction with other parties (Adebarh, 2007:18), thus highlighting how actorness emerges from the multilateral, networked character of CSDP. The policy engages a wide range of actors in security interventions, being part of a wider EU strategic approach to international affairs. This reflects not only the comprehensive approach of CSDP, but the entire European project and all aspects of its international engagement. This is a strategy of sorts, but not the Grand Strategy recommended for CSDP which aims to enhance CIV-MIL capability and EU actorness up to and including achieving common defence ambitions. It is instead a broad policy approach of which CSDP is a part. The collective drive of the European endeavour may in the long term progress the ambitions of the ESS to strengthen international security.

The institutional framework of CSDP (Chapter 5) supports the intention element in H1 especially as the study finds significant potential for CSDP development through this framework. CSDP is a process and in the long-term it can enhance EU security actorness. The most significant elements within this potential are the CMPD, tasked with ensuring mission coherence and overall strategy, and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which if taken up by member states and informed by the EDA, could assist capability development. The EDA/PESCO combination, supported by the on-going CPD process, offers an opportunity for further cooperation between limited number of states engaging in rationalising their defence resources and equipment, even on the basis of the BG concept. This potential maps well into the way bureaucratic politics operates, as a piecemeal, irregular, incremental means towards accomplishing sub-optimal but moderately effective outcomes. The CSDP institutional environment operates through bureaucratic politics, rather than benefitting from overt steering from above. A potential change in this is the role of the Council, which added to the strategic rhetoric (see p.14) in December 2013 in the Council Conclusions. It remains to be seen how the Council will report on progress in the reconvened June 2015 Council meeting. My expectation is that the rhetoric from 2013 will have promised more than has been achieved.

The thesis referred to Dinan’s (2011) speculation that the EEAS could develop its ‘autonomous’ status (Council Decision, 2010b:1) to become a fully-fledged institution, implying potential policy entrepreneurship (see pp.129 and 170). Clearly there would be powerful opposition to this from some quarters (see p.227 above). It seems more feasible that the EEAS will consolidate as the arena through which CSDP develops in a bureaucratic and incrementalist fashion, under the constrained leadership of the HR-VP. The EEAS may develop some limited supranationalism through policy implementation. It may achieve some
integrationary impact but *without* becoming a supranational institution. Haas (1958) considers the potential for supranationalism without supranational institutions within an administrative system dependent on the pragmatic pursuit of compromise and consensus.

Evidence of enhanced cooperation in some areas of CSDP may contribute to integration, enabled by the post-Lisbon structures. While foreign and security policy was once a purely intergovernmental area, the bureaucratic politics and institutionalism of CSDP builds upon the foundations established by EPC and CFSP, utilising multilevel and heterarchical governance in policy-making and implementation processes. This suggests limited supranationalism without supranational institutions. Ultimately CSDP depends on member state support to develop substantial EU presence in international security. The comprehensive approach allows a broader and more sophisticated EU contribution to security than in previous decades.

The EEAS and HR-VP may achieve a consensus-oriented working relationship with the Commission and Parliament, also assisting something of the supranationalism that Haas identifies. This suggests more development potential for CSDP than Grand Strategy would present, given that member states are not inclined to make the great leap forward that GS demands.

### 7.4 The original contribution of the thesis

This thesis makes the following contribution. Beyond intergovernmentalism, CSDP implementation should be understood in terms of bureaucratic politics, which is a more realistic means through which to develop CSDP than Grand Strategy. The process through which CSDP has evolved and continues to operate, across the comprehensive approach and including mission implementation, reflects characteristics of bureaucratic politics. Analysis of CSDP as a bureaucratic field offers scope for advancing scholarly understanding of how this policy area operates.

There is a strong association in the literature between EU security and defence policy and Europeanisation. This is ill-founded, except in the weakest form of the concept, i.e. transgovernmental cooperation. This claim is based on the lack of evidence that state adaptation (Radaelli, 2003) to EU pressures drives cooperation in this policy field.
This originality is centred on confirmation of H2 CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics. A traditional foreign policy-based explanation of European security and defence policy and CFSP as intergovernmental is an inadequate description of CSDP implementation. Intergovernmentalism is important in terms of power, as member states are the final arbiters in policy-making and resource allocation. Hence the minimalist nature of CSDP, its civilian crisis orientation determined by member states and Treaty limitations. This is supported by the Council and member state Parliaments so the foundation of CSDP remains intergovernmental. The field demonstrates constrained institutionalism (p.174).

CSDP is implemented by proxy through officials and experts who comprise an extensive Brussels-based network together with the CSDP instruments, including missions and EU Delegations. Collectively this constitutes a bureaucracy and the outcomes from CSDP are dependent on bureaucratic politics as a way of working, typically involving sub-optimal outcomes, technocratic procedures, consensus and compromise, and networked channels across multiple agencies in a hierarchical system. The implementation of CSDP has achieved important outcomes where missions have been deployed. There are instances of capability improvement, notably through capacity enablers, enhanced cooperation, pooling and sharing, and integration with other policy fields through stabilisation and accession agreements, and development interests of the Commission and the EUDs. CSDP maps into a wider EU strategy of political and economic development in regions within the EU sphere of interest. This has brought notable successes, especially in the Balkans where there has been significant, although uneven, progress. Importantly CSDP is implemented in conjunction with other institutions and agencies. While CSDP does contribute to post-conflict normalisation, considerable challenges remain if it is to have a lasting and strategic impact on international security.

The study provides a critical assessment of Grand Strategy (GS). Grand Strategy, as promoted in security and defence literature, is a policy prescription akin to a manifesto for change (see pp.122 and 174). Its proponents demand that the EU should use its institutional structures, many created since St Malo, to facilitate EU actorness in this area. GS is presented as means to enhancing EU military and civilian resources, the combined result of which could deliver a policy of ‘substance’ (Shepherd, 2003) that embraces ‘actorness’ (Sjöstedt, 1977). Actorness depends on capability and political will (Bisco, 2013a). The critique of Grand Strategy is based on two assumptions: firstly that bureaucratic politics (BP) is effectively the antithesis of the conscious, elite-led, top-down political dynamic required by Grand Strategy. Secondly, GS requires an intergovernmental consensus to
advance integration among member states, resulting in common policy in the foreign and security policy domain. There is little evidence of appetite for such a step-change.

In summarising this argument, it helps to restate why CSDP is best explained through bureaucratic politics and why Grand Strategy cannot work, at least at the present juncture in the European integration process. Bureaucratic politics, sometimes termed as a way of ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1959:83), reflects the manner in which many advanced industrial and post-industrial societies work. Such societies are heavily bureaucratised (Weber, 1970; Giddens, 1971). Using an approach adopted by Allison and Zelikow (1999), the study identifies characteristics of CSDP construction and implementation as typical of the process of bureaucratic politics. CSDP involves an array of bureaucratic institutions and committees, populated by experts and technocrats, not democratically elected officials. In a Principal-Agent analysis, while the former hold power in terms of deployment and resourcing, agents enjoy limited autonomy which can affect implementation, given that principals are often remote (Beem, 2009; Klein, 2010).

Member states hold the purse strings; they are reluctant to resource CSDP to match the ambitious rhetoric of key policy statements (see Fig.1.2, p.14), including from the European Council (European Council, 2013). So the policy remains restricted to an issue-by-issue, lowest-common-denominator approach: it risks permanent minimalism. This is utterly different from a Grand Strategy approach which requires vision, leadership and political will, as well as clear articulation of common interests and the means to achieve them (Gaddis, 2009). The goals of GS are to align capability, strategic actorness, and political will.

Grand Strategy therefore needs clear recognition of common interests and unanimous approval of the means to defend these (Biscop, 2013a). There is little evidence of this. As argued in Chapter 2, intergovernmentalism of the kind that developed an imperfect single market is not driving security and defence policy. Member states exercise power but there is no political will towards Grand Strategy, and no appetite for integrating security and defence capability. Concerns over sovereignty and diverse member state interests ensure a Grand Strategy paralysis. While financial austerity ought to stimulate rationalisation and pooling and sharing (Overhage, 2013), this occurs only marginally, and rational choice is evident only in isolated areas of cooperation rather than as a feature of a comprehensive and strategic approach. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), intended to enable just such developments, has hardly been activated. GS therefore is undermined by classical intergovernmentalism which defends the individual state prerogative. While GS calls for
greater integration, the response is rhetorical at best. The EU talks the talk of European capability and common policy (Fig.1.2, p.14), and the Council Conclusions in December 2013 are in this tradition. But the reality is that austerity and nervousness over the future of the European project is pervasive, with retrenchment towards national sovereignty and foreign policy bilateralism evident in the UK, in France (Economist, 2014) and perhaps elsewhere, notably Hungary and the Czech Republic in 2014 (CSDP expert, personal communication, 2014; Guardian, 2014c). UK commitment to CSDP is especially difficult to discern. Across the Eurozone, austerity and economic crisis dominate the agenda. At the EU level the TTIP agreement with the USA and economic growth seem greater priorities than security and defence cooperation (European Commission, 2013c, 2014b).

Grand Strategy therefore is a distant prospect, likely to remain so until the Union is faced by an external shock such as a strategic shift by the US towards Asia-Pacific interests coinciding with a military and humanitarian crisis in the EU neighbourhood (Klein and Wessels, 2013:469). For the period analysed in this thesis, bureaucratic politics explains how CSDP works in practice. BP and GS are different routes towards capability and actorness. They are not however, diametrically opposed, since in the long term strategy may emerge from the perhaps unpromising territory of bureaucratic politics (see next section). GS looks like a big bang approach that could destroy CSDP because member states will not accept the basic premise of common interests and security and defence integration. They privilege domestic preferences concerning sovereignty, and defer to constraints of the electoral and democratic process. In the UK Euroscepticism is in the ascendancy, and in Germany there is little appetite for out-of-area military deployment except through limited NATO-led actions as in ISAF in Afghanistan. In Germany, and most other member states, defence spending remains well below the NATO-prescribed 2 percent of GDP. Other states accept limited engagement in CCM but have equally little appetite for EU defence capability, and still less in progressing CSDP towards supranational governance. The HR-VP acts in the service of the Council, and the EEAS supports the HR-VP and the Council. Neither can exercise power, nor can they overtly drive CSDP.

In these conditions the only way for CSDP to progress is through its current process, namely bureaucratic politics in an incremental, issue-by-issue, lowest-common-denominator fashion. Given the extent of achievement since St Malo, and the widespread cooperation that has contributed to an emerging EU strategic culture, further accomplishments, missions, and more coordinated efforts may follow, spurred perhaps by new crises.
7.5 Indications for further research and final remarks

The overall finding that CSDP is marked by and progressed through bureaucratic politics suggests further research on the bureaucratic nature of CSDP, specifically in relation to policy-making and mission implementation, and coherence between the EEAS and missions. A return to Sarajevo is indicated, to further explore EUFOR Althea, and to assess opinion among Althea officials concerning the mission’s relationship to Brussels now that the EEAS has consolidated. Questions of principal-agency relationship may reveal more about the how bureaucratic channels and bureaucratic politics contribute to policy implementation. It would be logical to combine this with research on EULEX Kosovo to similarly explore communication with Brussels, and lessons learned regarding both missions. This should examine the missions’ contribution towards stabilisation and association, ahead of an accession strategy. To what extent are the positive gains from missions the result of improved coherence or the chaotic drift of bureaucratic politics, the muddling through that characterises this way of working? Disputes over Kosovo’s status complicate the territory’s progress towards accession candidacy. An important research interest relating to Althea and EULEX is whether they represent a strategic approach to regional stability and bilateral relations with the European Union, or as this study suggests, are a manifestation of bureaucratic politics achieving minimalist outcomes that over the long term may amount to something substantial.

A related question is whether strategy can emerge from bureaucratic processes. This is an important contention in this thesis that invites further research. The notion that strategy can emerge from bureaucratic process is heavily marked in management studies. According to Henry Mintzberg, the contemporary organisation works as a system characterized by formal authority, regulated flows, informal communication, work constellations, and ad hoc decision processes (Mintzberg, 1979; Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985). There are parallels with the hierarchical and technocratic processes of bureaucratic politics in this description. Organisations function in complex and varying ways due to differing flows, including flows of authority, work material, information, and decision processes (Mintzberg, 1978, 1979; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) suggest that strategy emerges from multiple processes, including disjointed incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959), lessons learned, entrepreneurial factors relating to vision and leadership, and power dynamics comprising both micro-power within organisations and macro-power. This correlates well with CSDP post-Lisbon, where intergovernmental power interacts with policy-making networks in a multilevel and heterarchical system engaged in the application of EU foreign
and security policy (Mérand et al, 2011). Freedman (2013:555) confirms the importance of lessons learned in a complex and changing environment, where a linear top-down imposed strategy is unlikely to work, as opposed to ‘emergent strategy’ that takes account of complexity and changing circumstances. This is fertile ground for more research to better understand the processes through which CSDP can benefit from emergent strategy, which connects with the notion of emergent strategic culture in this thesis.

Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) refer to emergent strategy that uses social processes and cultural factors, a constructivist dimension which recalls Brusselsisation (Allen, 1998; Mérand, 2008). This study found that sociological institutionalism lacks power in CSDP, but it may be one of several elements contributing to emergent strategy, including exogenous pressures identified as policy drivers (see Fig.1.1, p.11), and institutional factors that reflect the hybrid nature of power, with clusters of behavioural modes within institutions. This is evident within CSDP and the EEAS, notably the PSC, CMPD, EUMC, and EDA (see Chapter 5), and among EU instruments in BiH (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4.2, p.198). In a development of Mintzberg’s notion of emergent strategy, Chia and Holt consider rational, deliberate and designed strategy as naïve, given the existence of too many contingencies and alternative limits, and too many system influences; instead they point to ‘the surprising efficacy of indirect action’ (Chia and Holt, 2009:203). This chimes with the ascendancy of bureaucratic politics where much is indirect, and where as Allison (1969:708) pointed out, even ‘confusion between (...) officials’ may contribute to policy outcomes.

Du Gay describes a type of bureaucracy that matches the dominant characteristics of CSDP:

A system of representative government requires officials to act as the custodians of the constitutional values it embodies (so) it cannot frame the role of bureaucrats solely in terms of efficient management, performance, responsiveness and securing results (du Gay, 2000:12).

In other words, bureaucracies are not predictable: they display characteristics other than efficient management with measurable results. The EU is a system of representative government, a democratic type, and a bureaucracy. It purports to uphold values that are core to its evolving strategic culture, but its manner of pursuing its ambitions reflect bureaucratic politics, where values may be shared, but efficiency cannot be guaranteed, or even measured. This study suggests a need for further research on opinion inside the EEAS and the CMPD on the feasibility of Grand Strategy, especially in the light of the bureaucratic
processes that dominate the EEAS. This would shed light on how bureaucracy and bureaucratic politics may enable EU strategic ambitions.

CSDP institutional progress since St Malo has been considerable. Lisbon delivered an institutional framework, no doubt still evolving, which could be effective if states would provide the necessary commitment and resources. While grand strategists argue that CSDP must achieve greater strategic coherence, actorness and capability, CSDP applies a range of instruments on an issue-by-issue basis to crisis management and conflict prevention. It makes a limited but positive contribution to international security, primarily through CCM and humanitarian intervention. CSDP reflects a pragmatic, technocratic and bureaucratic approach to policy formulation and implementation. The potential for enhanced strategic actorness exists. There may even be a developing contribution to European integration. Despite shortfalls, the bureaucratic politics approach may in the long term enable a stronger and even a more coherent EU contribution to international security.

The Union and member states should define and declare common vital interests. It is a curious aspect of CSDP that the institutional framework has been created, 34 missions have been undertaken, the policy exists, but its over-arching and fundamental purposes remain poorly articulated. This ambiguity is evident in all areas of EU policy, as it struggles to come to terms with the complexities of contemporary economic globalisation and changes in the international political economy. The Union may be a small power, but contemporary security challenges suggest a need for enhanced capability and greater actorness in future.
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Appendix: Interviews 2010-13

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2 Expert on EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels 17/06/2010
3 European foreign and security policy expert, Leeds 25/06/2010
4 Security and defence policy expert, Brussels 01/07/2010
5 Former military officer and ESDP expert, Brussels 08/09/2010
6 Expert on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, Brussels, 09/09/2010
7 Senior Official in EDA, Brussels 10/09/2010
8 Official in EU Military Staff in Council Secretariat, Brussels, 22/09/2010
9 Military official in CMPD, Brussels, 24/09/2010
10 Security and defence expert in ECFR, London 30/09/2010
11 EU Foreign policy expert, York, 18/11/2010
12 Senior Official in MoD, London 10/03/2011
13 Military representative inside EEAS, Brussels 23/03/2011
14 Former Member of Venusberg Group, Munich 25/03/2011 (telephone)

15-21 EUFOR ALTHEA Sarajevo cohort
15 Consultant to EUFOR Althea, 16/05/2011
16 Senior Official in OHR, 17/05/2011
17 Chief of Political Dept in OHR, 17/05/2011
18 Senior Official in EUFOR HQ, 18/05/2011
19 Senior Official (2) in EUFOR HQ, 18/05/2011
20 Consultant to project for EU Delegation/European Commission, 19/05/2011
21 Senior Policy Adviser to EUSR/EUFOR, 25/05/2011 (telephone)

23 Defence and security expert, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin. 27/09/2011
24 SPD Member of Bundestag in the Grand Coalition 2002-06, 09/07/2012
25 Defence and security expert, DGAP, Berlin 11/07/2012
26 Senior Official in the European Parliament, 10/05/2013
27 Expert on Kosovo and EULEX KOSOVO, Leeds, 18/07/2013
28 Senior Brussels-based journalist, EU expert (various dates)