COLONIALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION OF CAPE SOCIETY UNDER THE

DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY

(Two Volumes)

by

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Volume One
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Abstract

This thesis analyses the constitution of Cape society under the Dutch East India Company. The conceptual approach combines aspects of marxism and pluralism. It draws on the necessarily partial perspectives of specialist histories and other disciplinary contributions to knowledge of that period. It offers a new interpretation of the major forces involved in shaping Cape society prior to systematic Colonial encounters with Nguni and Sotho. The first two chapters specify the problems and outline the analytical framework. The third chapter examines the Dutch antecedents and origins of the V.O.C. It is argued that there is little foundation to the common view that 'Dutch Calvinism' influenced Cape 'race relations'. Chapter 4 analyses the pre-colonial structure of Cape Khoisan societies and the relations between them and the Sotho and Nguni. Chapter 5 illustrates how, through a combination of forced trade and military and political offensives, the political economies of Khoisan societies were destroyed by V.O.C. and settler colonialism. Chapter 6 analyses the process of differential incorporation of Khoisan and slaves in the labour arrangements of the Cape, and underlines their centrality in shaping social structure. In chapter 7 that structure is analysed, and the forces shaping and sustaining the structurally plural society are contrasted with those making for change. While economic factors made for limited alteration of structure, demographic and slow acculturative processes (especially systematic hypergamy), contributed to the changing system of relationships. Chapter 8 explores the origins in the western Cape of the trekking movement of the 18th century, and contrasts the structure of that ranching society with the west. Chapter 9 concludes by summarising the argument and underlining the secondary and contingent nature of 'colour' as a factor in the constitution of Cape society, by contrast with the causal primacy of culture and class.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMS FOR ANALYSIS

The formation of Cape society in the second half of the 17th century and during the 18th century is the earliest instance of European colonialism in Africa in the modern era. It is remarkable that so little attention has been paid to the constitution of Cape society, for it exemplifies in many forms and particulars the central features of settler colonialism which have been analyzed for other parts of Africa, or for later periods in South African history.

In the analysis of the Cape, as a case study of colonialism and the constitution of a new society, all the main features of that general process may be identified. There was a clash of competing and contrasting economic systems and their associated ideologies, cultures and normative universes; there was disruption and destruction of indigenous societies and their cultures; there was the more or less forceful incorporation of indigenous peoples as labourers into the new political economy and social structure formed by the colonial encounter in the pursuance of metropolitan objectives and emergent local settler interests; there was the consequent emergence of specific local ideologies and attitudes which reflected the economic and other relations between the dominant and the dominated, and which also influenced those relationships. In addition, in the case of the Cape, there was the importation of slave labour from a third geographical and cultural arena, with important implications for the patterns of social structure and group relations. Moreover, the history of colonialism at the Cape is illustrative of two other phenomena which have been identified by social scientists.
in recent years. First, it can be regarded as a clear early example of that relationship between Europe and the 'third world' which has been described as a metropolis-satellite or centre-periphery relationship, through which the interests of the metropolis, or centre, have been systematically pursued to the disadvantage and increasing dependency of the 'satellite' or periphery. In the case of the Cape, the international mercantile operations of the Dutch East India Company, served to provide for the accumulation of capital and wealth in the Netherlands. The peoples of the Cape — colonists, indigenous groups and imported slaves alike — were subordinated to the interests and orders of the Company, and the political economy and social structure of the new society there was in no small way influenced in its shape by those interests and dictates. Secondly, and related to that, the history of the Cape in the 17th and 18th centuries may be seen as one of the earliest instances of the 'development of underdevelopment' in so far as the Khoisan were concerned. Indeed the process went further than that. Not only was there a process of the 'underdevelopment' of their economies, there was also set in motion a series of economic, political, social and military forces which resulted in their effective destruction and disappearance.

To the student of colonialism and so-called 'race relations' in colonies of settlement, the Cape thus offers a fascinating example of many features which later became common elsewhere. Seen in those terms — rather than, say, as simply an early and preliminary part of South African history in the modern era (though of course such characterizations are not mutually exclusive) — the dynamics and structural sequences of Cape history in the 17th and 18th centuries take on a meaning and coherence which is generally lost in the standard histories.
In this first Chapter, some of the dissatisfactions with the existing accounts are recorded by posing a series of questions which form the cores around which the subsequent Chapters are organized, and which thus form the general framework of enquiry.

Few histories of South Africa fail to mention how, on 6 April 1652, three ships - the Reijger, Hoop and Drommedaris - of the Dutch East India Company\(^1\) dropped anchor in Table Bay after a voyage from the Texel lasting more than four months.\(^2\) The leader of the fleet - who was to be the first Commander at the Cape - was armed with clear instructions\(^3\)

Whereas it has been thought fit, by Resolution of the Assembly of Seventeen, representing the said etc Company, that - in order to provide that the passing and re-passing East India ships, to and from Batavia respectively, may, without accident, touch at the said Cape or Bay, and also upon arriving there, may find the means of procuring herbs, fresh water, and other needful refreshments - and by this means restore the health of their sick - it is necessary that a general rendezvous be formed near the shore of the said Cape.

Manifestly, there was at first "..... no intention of founding a settlement or colony; it was simply a secure port of call that the needs of trade seemed to demand".\(^4\) This "..... cabbage patch on the way to India .....", as de Kiewiet has described the port, was not intended to be anything other than a

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1. The abbreviated form for the United Netherlands Chartered East India Company. In Dutch it is the Generale Vereenigde Ge-Octroyeerde Cost-Indische Compagnie, or, for short, the V.O.C., and colloquially, 'Jan Compagnie'. See Leo Fouche: "The Origins and Early History of the Dutch East India Company".


3. "Instructions for the Commanders proceeding for the service of the said Company, with their ships Dommedaris, Reijger, and the Yacht the Hoop, to the Cabo de Bona Esperance, In order, upon arriving there, to execute as follows: ...." Cited in D.Moodie: The Record, pp.7-8.

victualling point for ships pursuing the grander purposes of the
Company.\(^5\) Within three days of anchoring in the Bay, van Riebeeck,
the Commander, issued in turn his own firm instructions to the men
responsible for executing the immediate objectives. He re-iterated
what these were and added some special comments with respect to
their behaviour towards the indigenous people.\(^6\)

And as such new undertakings should be conducted with great
cautions, particularly as regards the wild people of that
country, (they being very impudent), and especially great
care be taken that we be in every respect on our guard and
in a posture of defence, also, that no cause of offence may
be given by us or our men to that people, but that on the
contrary, that all kindness and friendship be shown to them,
in order that by our amicable conduct they may become
inclined to an intercourse with us, so that by this means
we may have the greater supply of all kinds of cattle, and
suffer less molestation from them in plantations etc. which
we are to cultivate and to rear for the supply of the
Company's passing and re-passing ships, the chief object,
in the first instance, of our Honourable masters - and what
further may in time be sought for the service of the
Company ......

And accordingly, whoever ill uses, beats, or pushes, any of
the natives, be he in the right or in the wrong, shall in
their presence be punished with 50 lashes, that they may see
that such is against our will, and that we are disposed to
correspond with them in all kindness and friendship, in
accordance with the orders and objects of our employers.

There were, in all, approximately 100 men from these three
ships who went ashore to start building fortifications and to get
ready for the cultivation of fruit and vegetables.\(^7\) They were,

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5. C.W. de Kiewiet: A History of South Africa. Social and
Economic, p.4.

pp.10-11. (My emphasis A.L.)

7. M.F. Katzen claims that there were 90 in the party. C.L. Leipoldt,
referring to a dispatch dated 28 May 1652 from the Cape to
Batavia, claims that the total population at the settlement then
was 126 persons in all, while E.G. Malherbe, quoting Theal, states
that there were 'about 100'. See (a) M.H. Katzen: "White Settlers
and the Origin of a New Society", p.187, (b) C.L. Leipoldt: Jan
van Riebeeck, p.118, and (c) E.G. Malherbe: Education in South
Africa, p.41.
moreover, explicitly forbidden from engaging in any "... traffic or barter with the natives or savages .... whether in cattle, refreshments, or any other article whatsoever....".\(^8\)

These men were all European employees of the Company. None were farmers or entrepreneurs operating on their own account. There were no slaves, no political exiles from the East Indies, and no other ethnic collectivities within the employ or domain of the Company. Though it is true that in his Dagboek (and there is some dispute as to how much of it was personally written by van Riebeeck) the Commander was, within 19 days of his arrival at the Bay, reflecting how useful it would be for speeding up cultivation\(^9\)

... if only there were enough men for the purpose, for which we require some married Chinese and other free Mardijkers (liberated slaves, A.L.) or even Hollanders, who could be allowed on certain conditions to occupy some plots of land.

Now, despite the fact that our "... knowledge of the history of the hunters and the herders is still fragmentary"\(^10\) we do know that at that time the indigenous people of the Cape (commonly

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10. Monica Wilson: "The Hunters and the Herders", p.74. A careful recent study by R.H.Elphick has added generally to our knowledge of the origins and migration of the Khoi. He postulates the development of a San core, originating in northern Botswana, getting cattle and sheep and becoming herders over many generations, and moving south. R.H.Elphick: The Cape Khoi and the First Phase of South African Race Relations, Chapters I, II and III, especially.
referred to in the literature as the 'Hottentots' and the 'Bushmen', though the terms Khoi and San will be used in this study) were widely distributed throughout South Africa, though more concentrated in south-westerly areas. Though estimates differ, Wilson considers it likely that there were some 200,000 Khoi south of the Orange river in 1652. And though there are some good anthropological reasons for questioning the distinction made between Khoi and San, and hence an argument for referring to them collectively as the Khoisan, Schapera estimates that there were, in what is today the Cape Province, a minimum of 10,000 San.

To the north and north-east were large groups of Nguni and Sotho - essentially distinguished from each other by linguistic criteria. We need not deal further with them here for they will not figure significantly in the account which follows, though it is important to note in passing that, as Harinck has shown, contact and interaction between some Nguni and Sotho groups and Khoi hordes had been going on for a long time. The relationship however between the San hunting

11. Ibid., pp.40-41.
12. Ibid., p.68. Elphick contests this and suggests that there are unlikely to have been more than 100,000 Khoi in the Western Cape in 1650. Elphick: Op.cit., p.54.
15. See Monica Wilson: "The Nguni People", and "The Sotho, Venda and Tsonga".
bands on the one hand, and the pastoral Khoi and Bantu-speaking people of South Africa on the other hand, was less cordial, and the number of 'hunters and gatherers' had, according to Schapera, probably declined considerably over the years prior to the arrival of the Dutch, as a consequence of conflict and warfare between them. 17

Thus in the very middle years of the 17th century - the period when the "Golden Age of the Dutch Republic" 18 was at its peak - a small, insecure and limited victualling station was put down at the tip of the African continent to service the vast monopolistic operations of the Company in the East Indies, and thereby to enhance and ensure profits at home - its major and single-minded purpose. Though the Khoi had been in desultory contact with Europeans from the late 15th century, after the Portuguese had rounded the Cape, the establishment of this 'settlement' was to represent the beginning of the first systematic 'contact' and interaction between the agents of the thrusting mercantilism of Northwest Protestant Europe and the transhumant 'hordes' of the indigenous Khoi and the San hunting bands. Whatever may be the limitations of the notion of 'culture contact' as it has been used in historical and anthropological studies 19 the situation at the Cape at that point in time may be simply described for our immediate purposes as two very different 'cultures' facing each other across a frontier - as much sociological and psychological as physical and economic - constituted by a combination of curiosity, wariness, mutual uncomprehension and, probably, suspicious dislike.

19. See for example, B. Malinowski: The Dynamics of Culture Change, and Max Gluckman's critique of this in his "Malinowski's 'Functional' Analysis of Social Change". Also, see John Rex: "The Plural Society in Sociological Theory" for an examination of Malinowski's approach and for a suggested research strategy on these questions.
On the one hand there were some 100-125 Europeans, with rudimentary equipment, inadequate skills and limited motivation for the achievement of their given objectives. For the first few years, they lived, huddled at the foot of Table Mountain, somewhat more miserable than enthusiastic - for they had not joined the Company to end up in such a place for such purposes. The sheer physical survival of the settlement was far from assured. Its existence was precarious, its initial successes meagre and its prospects doubtful. Strictly controlled in their activities by the orders from the Seventeen, as implemented by van Riebeeck and his Council, and confined to a small area around the ramshackle fort they built on the edge of the Bay, these men must have reflected sourly upon their bad luck in being sent to the Cape, by contrast with what they might have been able to achieve had they been posted to Batavia, where the prospects for a rather more lucrative and speedy personal aggrandizement were known to be considerably better. On the other hand, roaming over the land with their herds of cattle, sheep and goats, the acephalous Khoi 'hordes' and the small bands of San hunters, went largely undisturbed in the pursuit of their daily life, though there is evidence to suggest that some groups, at least, were probably rather concerned about possible developments, depending on how long these strangers planned to stay. For they had some experience of how previous visitors had behaved.

If the above rather brief description of the position in the middle of the 17th century is somewhat cursory, it will nonetheless serve as a contrast to the situation just over a century later. For by then the picture looked very different indeed. A short profile will help to demonstrate the contrast.

There were, in 1768, some 7,818 'Europeans' (perhaps better categorized as 'burgers' for the Caucasoid purity of all these is highly questionable) distributed across the categories of free farmers, entrepreneurs, Company officials and employees. The same source\textsuperscript{21} tells us that there were in that year some 8,207 slaves, most of whom had been brought to the Cape from the East Indies and East Africa. Most were from Madagascar and Mozambique. In the 17th century there had already been a proliferation of 'settlements'. Hottentots Holland (Somerset West) in 1678; Stellenbosch in 1679; the Great Berg Valley in 1687; Drakenstein (settled largely by the French Huguenot immigrants) in 1687; Wagenmakers Vallei (later Wellington) in 1698, and Waveren (later Tulbagh) in 1700.\textsuperscript{22} During this period, and continuing through the first half of the 18th century, these 'settlements' were given a more formal constitutional status and a variety of legal, religious and political institutions were set up. By 1750 there were courts of law in Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Swellendam (founded in 1746), and there were churches at Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Drakenstein, Tulbagh and Zwartland (Malmesbury).\textsuperscript{23}

And, whereas in January 1653 van Riebeeck had only 230 horned cattle and 580 sheep\textsuperscript{24} there were (according to the not too reliable \textit{opgaaf} figures) in 1763 a total of 33,523 cattle and 199,339 sheep in the Cape Colony.\textsuperscript{25} (Since the \textit{opgaaf} was the basis for tax assessment, farmers tended to give low estimates of the size of their flocks).

\textsuperscript{21} Victor de Kock: \textit{Those in Bondage. An Account of the Life of the Slave at the Cape in the days of the V.O.C.}, p.237. Based on Beyers' \textit{Kaapse Patriotte}, Theal's Records and Barrow's \textit{Travels}. See Bibliography for details of these works.

\textsuperscript{22} M.H.de Kock: \textit{Selected Subjects in the Economic History of South Africa}, p.18.

\textsuperscript{23} G.M.Theal: \textit{History and Ethnography of Africa},III, p.88.

\textsuperscript{24} G.M.Theal: \textit{Ibid.}, II, p.31.

\textsuperscript{25} S.D.Neumark: \textit{Economic Influences on the South African Frontier 1652-1836}, p.75.
By the middle of the 18th century the status and condition of what had once been independent Khoi groups, moving freely with their flocks, had changed radically. As Marais describes it: "... by the second half of the eighteenth century most of the colonial Hottentots were in the position of servants". And Hodgson, dealing with the period around the 1770s, observed: "... To all intents and purposes the Hottentots had now been absorbed into the economic life of the community ....". The San had not fared much better — indeed their fate had, on one view, been somewhat worse. Though the resistance of both Khoi and San had been a lot fiercer than is usually allowed, as Marks has usefully shown, the combination of encroachment onto San hunting grounds by colonists and systematic attempts by Commando parties to eliminate them physically, had drastically reduced their numbers and forced many to flee to the mountain fastnesses in the north and north-east. One century after the establishment of the camp at Table Bay, the independent economic basis for Khoisan existence had been effectively undermined and destroyed, and, of those who remained and survived, their incorporation into the structure of the colonial society had moved beyond the point of no return.

Thus, what had once been a 'frontier situation' around the port - later to be called Capetown - had become totally transformed. The control of large areas of the western Cape Colony by the Company and settlers was assured and firm; this had in part been achieved by the eastward expansion of the colony. A large slave population had

29. On this concept see the useful short paper by Martin Legassick: "The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography".
been imported, and natural increase added to this. Agricultural farming in the Western Cape and the growing importance of cattle and sheep ranching in the East characterized economic activity. Relative to the early days, a colonial community\textsuperscript{30}, derived largely from Dutch, German and French immigrants, (as well as widespread illicit unions and marriages with slave women) and their offspring, and calling themselves 'Africanders'\textsuperscript{31} were spread out through the colony, whose borders – it should be noted – were far from clearly defined. These are well known historical 'facts'. So too is the fact of the Western Khoisan demise and, as a result of miscegenation between individuals of most groups, the beginning of the emergence of those who later came to be called the Cape Coloured people.

There are also reliable figures relating to the number of ships calling at the Cape. There are, too, useful and illuminating details concerning the rearing, sale and export of cattle and sheep, and derived pastoral produce. Comprehensive studies of educational policies and practices, slave life and conditions, missionary endeavours and social and political activity, help to give us a picture of what life – mainly for the so-called European community – was like at different times and places during this period. Whatever its other defining features may have been, and however one conceptualizes it, few dispute the view that the socio-economic and political structure of Cape society in the middle of the 18th century was one in which the colour of a man's skin seems to have become a crucial fact.

\textsuperscript{30} What Balandier, dealing with more recent times in Africa, has referred to as the 'colonial society'. G.Balandier: "The Colonial Situation", pp.36-57.

\textsuperscript{31} René de Villiers and others before him claim that the term 'Africander' was first used by Hendrik Bibault in Stellenbosch in 1707. See de Villiers' piece on "Afrikaner Nationalism", p.365.
People of colour, so-called, to the extent that they were part of
the society, were, in the main, located in inferior and subordinate
positions in terms of status, wealth, power or prestige - or any
other such index. Why?

What were the central dynamics and processes of historical
change which had shaped the new society that had come into existence?
It is with that central question that this study is concerned.

Most of the general and specialist histories of this period give
a reasonable picture of the major sequences of events, the significant
happenings, and what are seen to be the relevant consequences of
these. But it is unquestionably the case that despite differences
in emphasis and moral tone, the dominant tradition in South African
historiography dealing with this period has involved a pre-occupation
with the dating of events and a rather flat charting of the geo-
political and economic growth and expansion of the colony. The
approach of that kind of historical writing has, as Hobsbawm has
lamented with reference to aspects of historiography, "... lent
itself most readily to chronological narrative".32 Its methodology
moreover has assumed that "... hypotheses arise automatically from
the study of 'facts', that explanations consist of a collection of
chains of cause and effect, the concepts of determinism, evolutionism
etc."33 Even the few historical studies which reflect an awareness
of sociological parameters do not, in any systematic manner, attempt
to interpret these. For example, C.W.de Kiewiet, writing more than
30 years ago, observed that34:

The true history of South African colonization describes
the growth, not of a settlement of Europeans, but of a totally
new and unique society of different races and colours and
cultural attainments, fashioned by conflicts of racial
heredity and the opposition of unequal social groups.

32. E.J. Hobsbawm: "Karl Marx's Contribution to Historiography", p.266.
Such a view, despite some of the questionable biological metaphors in the language, remains remarkably modern in its approach. In so far as it was intended to have relevance for the period under consideration, as well as the 19th century, and in so far as it identifies a central theme in South African history, it forcefully points one in the direction of a systematic, historically-anchored analysis of the emerging social, political and economic structures of the 'new and unique' society. Moreover, it implicitly raises questions about the kinds of asymmetrical and conflicting goals and purposes which helped to create it, and the emergence and elaboration of the ideology which served to legitimate it.

More recently, the Editors of the *Oxford History of South Africa* have underscored this view by stressing the argument that the central theme of South African history is interaction between peoples of diverse origins, languages, technologies, and social systems, meeting on South African soil.

Yet, despite such declarations neither de Keiwiët nor those Chapters in the *Oxford History* concerned with the Cape in this period, deal with questions and problems which, *prima facie*, are raised by such general frames of reference, and thematic commitments. Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to assert that there is no systematic historical sociology of the period, which attempts to move beyond chronological reconstruction. It is necessary to specify more analytically the processes which gave rise to the new formal and informal institutions, the manner in which particular patterns of economic behaviour were instituted, the structure of relationships within and between groups, the specification of the latter, and - to

borrow a phrase from M.G. Smith\textsuperscript{36} - the modes of "inter-ethnic association" and incorporation, which constituted the 'new society'. The implosion of a European 'fragment'\textsuperscript{37} into a totally alien and distinctive ethnic and cultural zone offers a challenging opportunity to redefine the components of this history, and to reconsider the relationships emerging within it.

It seems thus that there are substantial gaps in our understanding of that process of historical change. This study attempts to close some of those gaps by adopting the following strategies. 

\textbf{First}, to pose a series of closely related and logically connected questions designed to establish a set of problems for interpretation and explanation which the histories have not satisfactorily answered. Indeed, some of the questions which I propose to explore have not greatly engaged the interest of most historians.

\textbf{Secondly}, I shall set out the broad theoretical orientation, the relevant conceptual constructs and the appropriate subordinate analytic categories in terms of which such an analysis may be carried forward.

\textbf{Thirdly}, it will then be possible to answer the questions posed by relating the analytic framework thus established to the evidence, in order to give meaning to the 'facts' which it identifies, and hence to trace out those connections and relationships which have been overlooked, or which the narrative approach has not been concerned to uncover.

\textsuperscript{36} M.G. Smith: "Pluralism in Pre-colonial African Societies", p.106.

\textsuperscript{37} The concept of 'fragment' is discussed in L.Hartz (ed): The Founding of New Societies. See particularly L.M.Thompson's contribution to this volume entitled "The South African Dilemma". Also, B.M.Schutz: The Theory of Fragment and the Political Development of White Settler Society in Rhodesia.
Before setting out the core questions with which the subsequent chapters will be concerned, it would be useful to summarize the argument thus far. In this way it may be seen how the proposed strategies converge. I have argued that the absence of a systematic historical sociology for the first century of V.O.C. rule at the Cape has meant that we do not have a coherent explanatory account of its historical development. The fault lies not simply in the kinds of questions which historians of various political persuasions have conventionally asked, but also in the historiographical tradition in terms of which they have been generated, and answered. As subsequent chapters will indicate, the answers to the questions with which the histories have been concerned, contain a wide range of asserted correlations, postulated connections between certain phenomena and statements about cause and effect. Prima facie, they give rise to a scepticism because they rest on a set of (usually implicit) assumptions about social behaviour and organization in the formation of the new society which are not self-evident, and leave one with a sense of things only partially or inadequately explained. This situation provokes a different set of questions which are derived from an alternative orientation to historical explanation. The manner in which they may successfully or plausibly be answered depends crucially on the conceptual framework and analytic categories in terms of which the historical material is confronted and the evidence presented. There is thus a dialectical relationship between, first, the kinds of questions to which dissatisfaction with the historical accounts have given rise, and, secondly, the theoretical perspectives in terms of which they might most usefully be answered. Here lies the convergence, and the methodological starting point. The claim being made is that the
conceptual categories elaborated here identify significant inter-
connections, and thereby justify turning to the broader perspectives
and a variety of disciplinary approaches from which they are derived.
The approach makes possible a plausible account of the growth of Cape
society, and provides a perspective in terms of which more detailed
studies can be undertaken. In the next chapter I will examine the main
theoretical categories more closely. The remainder of this chapter
will be devoted to a specification of the questions to be asked, and
the reasons for asking them.

One general point needs to be made here. Periodization
inevitably entails a degree of arbitrariness. The central questions
in this study are inextricably tied into a determinate period during
which various political economies and 'cultures' met and mingled on
South African soil. But each of these had a history. How far back
does one need to trace the elements in each? The problem, I think,
will resolve itself by specifying what it is that the questions are
designed to answer, by the way in which they are framed and by the
limitations - with respect to the Khoisan for example - which our
ignorance imposes upon us. I suggest, finally, that there is a
logical connection between the questions to the extent that, located
as they are within an historical epoch, they give rise to each other
in a sequence whereby the one feeds out the next. This is not to
assert that they are the only worthwhile questions, but rather repeats
an earlier part of the argument. That is, the questions being posed
are not simply a random collection of supplementaries aimed at
plugging gaps. Collectively, they represent an alternative frame-
work for the analysis of historical change at the Cape. What follows
here is an advance notice of the issues to be examined.
1. Whether the settlers at the Cape constituted a representative 'fragment' of 17th century Dutch society, or whether, as L.M. Thompson claims, they were "... an inferior, partial selection from it", the fact remains that those people from the Netherlands and north-west Europe who joined the V.O.C. or who emigrated to the Cape, originated in a society whose socio-economic, cultural and ideological dimensions need constantly to be borne in mind. For, if we are dealing with a subject which centres crucially on the interaction of economic and social systems, cultures and ideologies, and which gave rise, in a 'colonial situation', to a whole set of new institutions, practices and customs, then it seems reasonable to argue that we cannot analyse that process without tracing backwards in time the interests, perceptions and predispositions which the colonists brought with them and which were anchored in their social and geographical origins. Without doing this one cannot make sense of the way in which they behaved towards the indigenous people. One cannot, in short, situate them.

What were the relevant components of Dutch culture - and particularly their concentration in the V.O.C. - that were 'exported' to the Cape? What we have to ask is what kind of weltanschauung dominated Dutch society in the 17th century? What kind of goals, purposes, intentions, hopes and aspirations did it generate which, when interacting with, and impacting upon Khoi and San culture and the imported slaves, contributed to the shaping of a 'new society'? Can we locate, in this, a kind of sociological 'multiplier' by which we can identify and then explain the relationship between (for example) on the one hand, the mercantilist and materialist ethos of Dutch society, and, on the other hand, the patterns of socio-economic

organization and stratification, division of labour, and political arrangements at the Cape? Will it assist in identifying an unfolding ideology which both influenced and then justified the particular development of Cape society and the way in which the settlers reacted to their new environment and acted to shape it to their purpose? In short, what were the salient features of value and ideology in the social consciousness of Dutch society in the 17th and early 18th centuries? How, through the medium of the settlers and Officials did these influence the shape of Cape social structure during the first century of Company 'rule'? There are some important implications for the relationship between ideology and social structure involved.

There is a further and related problem concerning attitudes and perceptions. And that is the taxing question of how people of colour in the wider world were perceived in the Netherlands. If there was a 'colour consciousness', what form did it take? To what extent was it fused or confused with attitudes to alien cultures? The question is rather crucial, though answers to it have differed considerably. Moreover the limitations of the evidence constrain its use as a basis for inference. If it is the case, which may be impossible to establish with confidence, that the settlers came to the Cape with already hostile and hard attitudes to people of colour, then the subsequent developments there have a not very surprising logic to them. If, on the other hand, such attitudes were not firmly established in the social consciousness of the Netherlands, why and how did they develop and harden at the Cape? What are the connections, if any, between the goals, aspirations and ideology of the colonists and the way they came to regard and treat people of
colour? Is there a relationship to be uncovered in the way in which material interests and economic imperatives conditioned attitudes to labour, how these were then related to the development of colour attitudes, justified later in more or less spurious Scriptural terms and hence, perhaps, rendered comfortable in psychological terms? What is the connection between material interests, social attitudes and the formation and development of social structures in the 'colonial situation'?

These kinds of questions have relevance not only for the 17th and 18th centuries at the Cape, but the contemporary situation in South Africa. They are worth exploring in their own right as part of the debate about the relationship between ideas, attitudes and beliefs and social structure. One way of entering the debate is by examining the issues in a specific historical context. No simple statement of what is a very complex problem can be satisfactory. However, it will be interesting to explore the view that ".... human attitudes and beliefs fail to persist unless the situations and sanctions that reproduce them continue to persist, or, more crassly, unless people get something out of them", and its corollary that ".... values change in response to circumstances". It may be rather more complicated than this suggests.

A significant part of the answer to such questions will surely be found - if it is to be found at all - in an analysis of the processes of social differentiation and subordination of various categories of people in the shifting context of emerging socio-economic and political purposes, of sustained and systematic

relationships between groups, and the changing balance of power. But before one can unravel these processes it is important to be as clear as possible about attitudes prior to such continuous contact. At least it seems to be a logical starting point. The argument is well stated by Jordan in his study of white attitudes to blacks in the U.S.A. from the earliest days. He says: 40

It only gradually dawned that I was .... cutting into the seamless webb of time at just the wrong moment, that it was necessary to probe the characteristics of Englishmen before rather than when they first confronted Africans.

Likewise, we must ask about the representative attitudes and dispositions of Dutchmen in their native land before they first confronted on a regular basis the Khoisan people and before they were in systematic relations with an imported slave population.

To answer such questions one needs to define rather more closely such terms as 'culture', 'ideology' and 'society'. I propose to do that in the following chapter as part of the general outline of the conceptual approach and theoretical perspective in terms of which this study will be cast.

2. I shall argue that the pattern and structure of group relations which emerged in the colonial or contact situation was fashioned in part by the interaction of asymmetrical structures and the relative strengths of both 'immigrant' and 'host' political economies and cultures. It follows that it is important to define more clearly the collective predispositions, attitudes, commitments to a type of social organization etc., of the 'invading' culture. It is equally important to have an accurate picture of Khoisan societies, prior to that impact. In a discussion of the distribution

of what he calls 'racial and cultural types' in the New World today, Marvin Harris argues that

the variable which initially deserves emphasis is the nature of the aboriginal societies with which the European societies came into contact. One of the most important features of the American environment from the point of view of the colonists, whether conquistadores or pilgrims, was not the climate or the topography. It was instead the level of socio-cultural integration characteristic of the Amerindian societies with which the Europeans were obliged to interact.

Though in this study, the prime concern is not the distribution of 'racial or cultural types', but rather the process of development of a new society, Harris's point is important. The interaction involved conflict, but too often in the literature on the Cape this is conceived of in terms of one dimension - a fractious and bitter squabble over resources such as land and cattle. This forecloses on the possibility of disentangling the intricacies of 'culture conflict' which the notions both of 'culture' and 'conflict' can be seen, on another view, to entail. It has been pointed out that

conflicts between cultures, depending on the nature of the contacts, might well include conflicting ideologies, religions, interests, rights and all other types.

This raises a question of methodological and interdisciplinary substance. By training the focus of analysis on aspects of conflict we are concerning ourselves with a process which is multi-dimensional, and has a variety of levels, in this kind of context. I shall argue that there was a great deal more to it than simply a conflict over resources: I shall suggest that we must also describe a complex clash of meanings, purposes, behaviours, beliefs and visions which were embedded in the histories, and which made for the particularly rasping

41. Marvin Harris: Patterns of Race in the Americas, pp.2-3.

42. Raymond W.Mack and Richard C.Snyder: "The analysis of social conflicts - towards an overview and synthesis", p.221.
and acrimonious form of conflict. People thought, talked and acted past each others' comprehension. To establish that, and to trace out its manifestations, demands a certain kind of evidence which questions about the nature of Khoisan culture and society are designed to elicit. But there are problems here. In the above section dealing with Dutch society I have presumed that by asking certain questions, one will be able to educe from what historians tell us about that culture some relevant information about ideas, purposes, goals and meanings, which the analytic categories organize into a more or less coherent and manageable set of facts concerned with a range of associated predispositions etc. In order to abstract a comparable profile (if such can be done) of Khoisan beliefs, interests, ideas and predispositions, etc., we turn not to the historians, but to the anthropologists and the ethnographers. We ask similar kinds of questions, but rely on a different type of evidence, collected in a different way and organized by the two disciplines in their own categories. Can we abstract from the anthropological and ethnographic material the relevant features, characteristics and beliefs of Khoisan societies and cultures and cast them in the kind of conceptual mould which will permit a more intricate analysis of the forms and levels of conflicts between the two 'cultures'? The attempt must be made, despite the methodological and evidential constraints, if claims to analyse interaction between the 'immigrant' and 'host' groups are to be taken seriously. It will thus be necessary to scan the evidence from the different disciplines and to reorganize it in terms of the appropriate categories which will provide the basis for analyzing the variety of levels and forms of interaction and conflict.

43. These problems of 'interdisciplinarity' are treated at the start of the next chapter.
This second set of questions started by referring to asymmetrical structures and societies of relative strengths. The point needs to reclaimed here. We shall never know whether, had the Bantu-speakers been established in the Western Cape, things would have turned out differently. But from the late 18th century and through the 19th century there were frequent and ferocious battles between them and the colonists, which raged from the Eastern Cape at first, and then - as the trekboere moved north - in Natal, the Transvaal and what is today the Orange Free State. By contrast, the conflict with the Khoisan in the 17th and 18th centuries was limited. Yet no major Nguni or Sotho 'tribe' was ever annihilated culturally, and therefore as an ethnic entity in the way the Khoi, and most San, were. Why? Was there, within Khoisan society - if we can use the term 'society' in this context as Nadel has defined it - a fatal structural weakness which, when faced with a threat such as that which the colonist came to pose, prevented Khoi and San from banding together in sustained self-defence, as Nuer sections might have done? Was it simply a question of their relative technological weakness in the face of European weaponry and their vulnerability to certain diseases? Some argue that this is always the fate of nomadic, segmented, acephalous hunters and herders in situations of this kind; others argue that it was unique.

3. Armed, as it were, with their pre-contact histories, ideologies, cultures and some preconceptions of each other, two of the parties to the colonial situation met on a regular basis for the first time. It is to the examination of one crucial and cumulative

44. S.F.Nadel: The Foundations of Social Anthropology.
aspect of that interaction that the strategy of enquiry now logically points. There were no settlers initially and the first colonists as such were Free Burghers, local ex-employees of the Company, who were given a limited degree of freedom to farm in a restricted area on their own account in 1657. 'Settlers' as such came later. But at the same time as the Free Burghers were set up the first slaves were systematically introduced at the Cape. All this marks a new system of relationships, with important implications for attitudes, perceptions and behaviour of all parties, and in particular the Khoisan and the Dutch. Though it took time before the Council of Seventeen was reluctantly to recognize it, the de facto establishment and extension of the settlement was occurring with a logic and dynamic of its own, given that situation and those conditions.

The theme that must be here examined is the process whereby the destruction of Khoi hordes and undermining of the independent basis of their political economies was brought about. From the start of this process precedents affecting relations between groups were created which were to throw their shadows forward. What was the nature of the initial contacts? Were there any indications, at this stage, of the pattern that was to emerge? What did the Company want and what policy and practice did it - and the colonists - adopt to achieve those ends? What was the nature of the relationships and institutions which this phase and theme brought into existence, and is it possible to detect from early on the logic of conflicting interests, sharpened by mutual non-comprehension and contrasting goals, which was to bring about the demise of the Khoi hordes in particular?
Most accounts do not fail to mention some, or all, of the following factors as being responsible in differing degrees for the destruction of the Khoi and, subsequently the Cape San, as identifiable and independent societies: coercion and compulsion through warfare, the undermining of the relatively fragile Khoi economic infrastructures, 'acculturation' (both as cause and consequence), political subjugation, and the random but disastrous effects of disease. But before this took place there had been a period of nervy economic interaction largely through the cattle trade. That condition did not prevail for long. Remorselessly, it will be argued, the material imperatives and interests of the V.O.C. and the settlers bit further and further into Khoisan autonomies and the structure of relations between the various Khoisan groups, which was based on their flocks and access to land, or their hunting grounds and the game. This was a crucial condition of Khoi demise and a precondition of their political subordination and incorporation as dependents within the Cape society. As this happened, a very slow cultural transformation was taking place, and the whole process was punctuated by warfare and the battering effects of various diseases. The socio-economic and political dimensions of this process were not distinct or sequential: they overlapped in time and affected each other in cumulative ways. To examine how Khoi societies were undermined and destroyed, it is necessary to stand back from the immediacy of specific events - the 'Hottentot war' of 1658-60, (a "scuffling affair", Walker dismissively calls it46), the second was during the 1670s, the 18th century outbreaks of smallpox, the pressure on land and, crucially through all this, the depletion and loss of Khoi herds through pressure trading by the V.O.C. and colonists, both when they were permitted to trade and when not. The

power and demand of the Company and settler material interests fed on themselves and drove deep into the heart of Khoi societies, shattering their vulnerable political economies. As one of Conrad's characters observes in *Nostromo*: 47

"Only let the material interests once get a footing, and they are bound to impose the conditions on which alone they can continue to exist.

There is nothing damagingly determinist in this view, provided 'material interests' are defined in the context of the perceptions, ideology and social purposes of one group of human beings in relation to others, in terms of their antecedent histories and the characteristic norms of economic behaviour in the societies from which they have come, and which they bring to bear in the new context.

There are two major questions for the analysis here, which the way the whole process is conceptualized will help to answer. First, a conceptual scheme is needed in terms of which one can describe, at different points in time, the structure of relations as it developed between Khoisan and colonists (and, later, slaves). For, initially, it is clearly not possible to talk either about a 'colonial situation' which involved regular relations between the groups, or a 'society' constituted, in part, by these groups. The social, political, economic, and cultural boundaries between them were too marked to talk, in any sense, of a 'common' society. But this was to change. A conceptual scheme which enables one to chart and describe these changes in structure is necessary. I will argue that a sequence of synchronic snapshots of various 'moments' will help this, and I shall draw on contributions to the theory and analysis

47. Joseph Conrad: *Nostromo*, p. 81
of 'plural societies' to do so. In the next chapter I propose to deal with this question more fully, and later to operationalize some associated concepts in the substantive account.

Secondly, if pluralism will help us to conceptualize and describe different stages in the slowly articulating socio-economic and political arrangements, it does not, I think, have the explanatory power to aid our understanding of the dynamics which generated the changes and forged the new structure of relationships. Here we need a theory (or theories) of change and development that can be used diachronically to point up, differentiate between and evaluate the various factors and forces. While pluralism provides a useful set of conceptual constructs to describe and highlight the characteristic features of a range of distinctive and special societal types, underlining the obstacles to and consequences of certain kinds of change in them, it does not — because it does not set out to do so — offer much in the way of an explanation or theory of change. There are more useful insights to be derived, for example, from marxism which will help here, and to this it will be necessary to turn also in the next chapter.

In this section of the study, then, matters of substance concerning the fate of the Khoisan will be tackled. The focus will be on two interlocking strands in the historical process. First, the ways in which Khoisan culture was broken down and secondly, how, through this process, their 'incorporation' into the new society came about. From marxism it will be possible to identify a variety of driving forces — epitomized (and caricatured if seen as the 'only' cause) by the thrust of material interests — and from pluralism it will be possible to delineate and describe the constitution of the
emerging 'society' at different historical moments, its institutional arrangements and structural characteristics, as they hardened over the century.

5. The process of Khoisan 'incorporation' into the structure of Cape society was intimately tied up with labour demands and arrangements, and most Khoisan came to occupy menial positions in the occupational hierarchy of the society. The structure and shape of stratification that emerged in the first century of Company rule was in large measure defined by the way in which the 'labour' question was resolved. Moreover, on one perspective, the so-called 'race relations' pattern was both cause and effect of this, though it was a great deal more complex than this formulation suggests. Nonetheless, a discussion of the fate of the Khoi leads one procedurally, therefore, into an examination of a particularly knotty aspect of this period: the sociology of labour/slavery at the Cape. It is a remarkably under-researched area, and deserves a careful study in its own right. But so many of the emerging characteristics of the society can be traced to and from the labour arrangements, that it must be of prime concern, for the essence of 'incorporation' as a concept, and its dynamics, can be most clearly located and operationalized in a sociology of slavery and labour.

Various disciplinary studies might ask different questions of the evidence. Was the slave system 'efficient'? Whether it was or was not, why were slaves introduced? Who wanted them, and how was Khoisan labour distributed and regulated? Was there a distinctive 'culture of slavery'? Did it have implications for all groups, and consequences of any particular kind on the generations after emancipation? Historians and sociologists of slave systems
might want to ask whether the form which slavery took at the Cape is comparable to that 'peculiar institution' in the Americas and, if there are differences, how might one account for them? Social psychologists might find it useful to enquire whether the system of slavery at the Cape and the incorporation and 'freezing' of people of colour into subordinate positions in the socio-economic structure was affected by and/or gave rise to explicit and articulate colour antagonisms and prejudices. But in this study a focus on the sociology of slavery/labour at the Cape must be concerned with most, if not all, of these questions, for the answers have direct relevance to the overall analysis. They are crucial to an understanding of the interaction between various interests, goals, purposes, ideologies etc., in fashioning the political economy, social structure and legitimating ideas of Cape society. At almost any point of analytic entry, the search for connections and relationships between attitudes, beliefs, objectives and institutional arrangements, leads one - given the ideological orientation in terms of which both Company and settlers may be seen to have operated - to ask questions about the role of slavery and labour in the development of the society. In order to argue for, and assert, the centrality of the 'labour factor' in supporting the overall explanatory perspective, subsidiary analytic categories will be used to shape the answers to questions such as the above. It may be questioned whether it is legitimate to collapse slavery and the employment of 'free' people of colour into one general category. I shall argue that there are strong reasons for doing this. Though there were differences - both in form and substance - between the two, their elision for the purposes of this analysis will be
justified in terms of the similarity of the objectives for which both groups were harnessed and pressed into service, and in terms of the implications which 'unfree' and 'free' labour by people of colour had for social structure and attitudinal developments.

Frazier has commented on this general question in the following terms, and his observation is germane to the argument. He writes:

48 The recruitment of 'free' native or coloured labour in many parts of the world where Europeans have settled or gained political control has often concealed a system of forced labour. The element of force become apparent when one examines the methods of recruitment, the terms on which the workers have been engaged and the control which Europeans have exercised over native or coloured workers during the period of their employment.

And in his detailed study of Maynier and the Graaff-Reinet 'Republic', Marais observed:

49 The fact is that many Hottentots were far from being the free men of the official theory. If they were not actually slaves, they may be described as bondmen.

An analysis of slavery and labour at the Cape does not constitute an end in itself. It's significance lies in the contribution which it will make to the overall explanation of the birth and growth of the institution and norms of the new society. Indeed, outside of that context, such an analysis would be robbed of much of its meaning. Bloch, in his work on Fuedal Society, puts this kind of argument succinctly:

50 A society, like a mind, is woven of perpetual interaction. For other researches, differently oriented, the analysis of the economy or the mental climate are culminating points; for the historian of the social structure they are a starting point.

48. E. Franklin Frazier: Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World, p. 120.

49. J. S. Marais: Maynier and the First Boer Republic, p. 73.

A consideration of the question of slavery and labour will be, then, one of the building blocks for a larger expository purpose. And on this question – the manner in which slavery and labour relations both expressed and helped to fashion over time the structure and ideology of the society – the historians have delivered an incomplete report.

6. At this point it will be appropriate to pause, for a number of strands in the argument which will have been independently pursued will need to be consolidated. A summary evaluation of the socio-economic and political structure of the Western Cape will help to establish starting points and prepare the way for the analysis of subsequent substantive developments which grew out from this. To some extent the procedural steps to this stage in the argument will have kept pace with 'key' historical events. But analyses of some of the factors and forces – such as the above consideration of slavery and labour – will have necessarily run on beyond the limits which a strictly chronological frame of reference imposes. In passing, this will demonstrate the limitations of that approach, and the problems of this one. Similarly, other trends developing simultaneously within the interstices of the society will have been by-passed, or only referred to tangentially in the process of chasing forward in time (and tracking sideways in uncovering structural connections) certain aspects which the conceptual lenses will have brought into focus. For example, the beginning of the gradual Eastward movement of the veeboere in the early 18th century is a complex matter of substance to which specific attention will have to be given. But the analytic programme of this study and the framework on which it is
based necessarily establish a hierarchy of related problems, which don't mesh neatly with the chronology of events and which, for rather practical reasons and for analytic convenience, can only be dealt with in terms of a logical order shaped by the theoretical orientation. And it is, after all, the case that "...you can only say one thing at a time - elegantly".\textsuperscript{51} The problem of what Nettl calls 'simultaneity' inevitably dogs the heels of the sociological approach to a case study in historical change. At this point in the study that problem surfaces decisively. But by this stage a number of questions will have been answered and it will be useful to effect a synthesis at an appropriate level of generality. I will have explored the relationship between the historical antecedents to the 'contact' situation, the collective and representative predispositions, preconceptions and perceptions of the groups, levels and kinds of conflict, forms and modes of subordination and incorporation, and the institutions of 'free' and 'unfree' labour. It will be possible to describe the hardening social structure and the set of norms about behaviour in the new context, in the 18th century, and as the frontier of people, and their ideas, began to move east, initiating new phases of interaction.

I have suggested earlier that one of the dominant forces which contoured the shape of the new society and which may largely be held responsible for the way in which groups were distributed unevenly and unequally in its formation was the manner in which the material interests of the Company and the settlers - not to be regarded as anything like a unified group - adapted themselves to local conditions. In the process these interests will be seen to be

\textsuperscript{51} J.P. Nettl: \textit{Political Mobilization}, p.23.
expressed in local enterprises which in turn generated certain
imperatives - like labour requirements, land and the need for
cattle - which developed a particular logic of their own, and had
implications for the behaviour of all groups.

Generally, I shall argue that material and ideal interests
can be shown to be causally and dialectically connected to a range
of practices affecting and locking together labour and social
relations. If this can be shown to have established precedents
for behaviour and attitude which were carried outwards in the
expansion of the colony, and if this can be seen to have issued in
an elaboration of more or less integrated ideas about social
organization then, at this point in the study, it will be useful to
examine closely the ideological condition during the course of the
18th century.

Ideology plays a central role in the conceptual framework
to be deployed. I shall deal with it more fully in the next chapter.
For the present it needs to be said that the notion will be used
both as a descriptive term and as an explanatory concept. Briefly,
it will denote the purposes, values, ideas, aspirations, dispositions
and beliefs of a group, in the context of their history and their
social location in a given but changing economic situation. The way
such a group acts in the situation contributes to changing it,
though they do not alone dictate the terms of change. But they
perceive the changed situation differently over time. Ideology, in
this sense, is like a two-way prism: it refracts purposes and
generalized beliefs onto reality, thereby affecting it, and mediates
the group's social interpretation and definition of that reality. To
intersect this interplay between men and their environment at any
point is necessarily an arbitrary operation. But for our purposes it will be helpful to construct a profile of the kinds of ideas which were becoming current at the Cape at this time and relate them to the shifting bases of stratification and the social structure which was being forged and legitimated in terms of the ideology, and the way in which inter-group relations were being defined. Will it be possible to compare the state of the ideology with what it had been half a century before? What will this tell one about change?

An answer to that question will be essential before one can commence to look seriously at the factors which gave momentum to the eastward expansion of the colony, the kinds of ideas the trekkers may reasonably be expected to have taken with them, and hence their purposes, grievances and commitments. If a relationship can be established between aspects of Dutch culture and the kinds of arrangements which emerged in the interaction with Khoisan and slaves at the Cape, so too it seems logical to proceed on the assumption that the experiences of people in and around the western districts had implications for their beliefs and behaviour when, as trekkers, some of them moved into the interior. Likewise, the experience of the Khoisan in their early dealings with the Dutch were to have implications for their responses to this new development.

7. In the previous section different aspects of, probably, a more or less consistent set of ideas - the ideology - which had gained currency amongst settlers at the Cape by the turn of the century will have been examined. It will be useful to 'divide' this ideology into a set of more or less interlocking facets: 'economic ideology', 'colour' attitudes, political ideas, religious beliefs,
and so on. Whether they were, in fact, more or less coherent, whether they were mutually supportive and whether they had begun to constitute an explicit and identifiable weltanschauung, almost in the form of a creed, will be a question to be examined later, and set against the empirical evidence about institutional practice in education, the churches, farming and politics, and so on. But in this section the specific focus of analysis will be on the explanation of the trek out of the Western Cape, and on the political economy of this initially mobile society in the 18th century. The connection with the examination of ideology will be made apparent.

What factors pushed, and what factors pulled (or lured) them out of the settled western districts? Why did they leave and what did they seek? And who were they?

Interpretations of this movement and the kind of society which it brought into existence differ widely. There are three points that need to be made here about this question. First, one is dealing with at least two dimensions of historical change. On the one hand, one seeks an explanation of why the movement commenced and what sustained it. On the other hand, though clearly related, one is setting out to identify and analyse the kind of society which developed. In what respects, if any, did it differ from that which had begun to consolidate in the western areas? Secondly, the overall purpose - to expose connections and identify relationships between events and developments - points logically to this expansion of the colony as the next matter for enquiry. And thirdly, it seems therefore to be the case that the explanation for, and analysis of the trekking movement must be rooted in, and related to, an understanding of the structure and ideology of that society from which it came.
Part of the answer to the set of questions which such a consideration precipitates will have been suggested in the previous section. But it will be necessary to give closer attention to those, and additional factors, which will have only been referred to in passing. Again, the problem of 'simultaneity' raises its head. In concentrating on the outward expansion of the colony it will be necessary to look back and organize into an integrated focus a series of political, economic, ideological and sociological variables, which - in terms of the general theoretical orientation - will be combined and concentrated to explain this movement.

The effects of monopolistic and authoritarian policy of the Company on settler interests and attitudes, the consequences of population increases and land pressure, the increased demand for meat at the Cape, the hopes of and belief in the promise of lucrative ranching possibilities in the east, political corruption, frustration and agitation, and the 'labour factor' will be examined. By using appropriate analytic categories it should be possible to confront somewhat more analytically the relatively undifferentiated collection of 'facts' in the histories and other sources, and thus relate various dimensions of the social, economic and political processes in the society to the causes, structure and consequences of the trekking movement. In the light of this approach an explanation for that movement and an account of its emerging structure of relationships and its ideology to the latter years of the 18th century will be offered.

It is not within the scope of this study to trace further interaction in the East. The last quarter of the 18th century marks the beginning of a decisive new stage in South African history. For
though there is written evidence that Europeans and Nguni had been in contact from the 16th century,\textsuperscript{52} the period of systematic conflict and cooperation between them across a "cultural frontier"\textsuperscript{53} begins towards the end of our period. Moreover, the further development and consolidation of the Cape colony in late 18th century is also beyond the scope of this study. The cut-off point is of course arbitrary in a number of respects. Certain features of the Eastern Cape were crucially affected by the growing interaction with Nguni, even in the period under investigation. Hunting, exploring and trading parties had been travelling east and north from the second half of the 17th century, and contact with Nguni was not infrequent. But I am concerned with the evolving structure of colonial relationships prior to systematic contact with the Nguni: conceptually, therefore, I will be regarding the first 125 years as constituting a field of enquiry in its own right, though the limitations in doing so are obvious. Khoi and San were in contact with Nguni, and had been - in a variety of ways - for a long time. Europeans were in contact with Nguni too. Colonist parties, with Khoi servants and interpreters, moved between the western districts and the Eastern 'frontier', which, following Wilson, may be regarded as the Gamtoos River and beyond. But the period and problems under consideration were not substantially influenced by those developments. Where they are relevant, they will be introduced at the appropriate points.

At this point in the analysis, it will be necessary to take stock of the situation in the whole colony, constituted by the 'settled' western districts and the more fluid and mobile East, in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Monica Wilson: "The Early History of the Transkei and Ciskei".
\item \textsuperscript{53} Monica Wilson: "Cooperation and Conflict: The Eastern Cape Frontier", p.233.
\end{itemize}
the last years of the 18th century. Three remaining questions have to be tackled, which will complete the study. They are best identified separately in advance, here, but will be treated together by way of conclusions.

8(a) If it is possible to talk about the 'new society' which had been formed as a consequence of various levels of interaction, what, if any, were the differences between its western and eastern wings? What links—political, cultural, social and economic—were there which more or less bound the 'society' together? Is it plausible to talk of a single 'society'? Or, if not, how may the differences in kind or degree be characterized? I will argue, first, that it is plausible to view the colony as a single society though there were important fissiparous tendencies. These will need to be explained. I will suggest, secondly, that the differences between west and east lie more in degree than in kind, and that these may be conceptualised in terms of degrees and forms of pluralism, related to the characteristic features of economic life. The definition and elaboration of these forms of pluralism will be rehearsed in the following chapter, and then worked into the substantive account at later points in the argument. I shall look once again at the economic and ideological condition of the whole colony, and describe how the structural differences in degree may be conceptualized in terms of pluralist categories. What customs and institutions had grown up in the west which were or were not present in the east, and if not, why not? In what ways did structure and stratification differ? Schools and churches were less prominent formal institutions in the East: slavery was predominant in the West, though the use of so-called 'free'
(i.e. non-slave) labour, including San was common in the East. Thus, the structural and ideological character of the Colony in the latter years of the 18th century will form the core of this section. Attention will be devoted particularly to the differences, and the explanations for these, between the West and the East, a distinction which, in itself, is somewhat formal, since the former merged with the latter, and economic and social ties were close — though politically, the east was already beginning to rumble and express irritation at efforts to dictate policy and practice from Capetown. New ideal and material interests evolved on the 'frontier', with implications, yet again, for the new phase of contact there. But that is not my concern here.

8(b) In the context of the developing analysis, the preceding section will have abstracted from and imposed on the history a series of accounts of relationships and interconnections between events and developments. Each step in the argument will, of necessity, have had to take into account an increasingly inclusive range of factors as the complexity of the society grew. But each will have given a limited view of the whole, from a particular angle, asking subsidiary questions. To provide a more holistic overview of the processes which were at work through the century, two lines of enquiry will now have to be tracked through the major points of the partial analyses in order to pull them together and to establish a more comprehensive relationship between the 'parts' of the account which the analytic programme will have isolated for special treatment. The first is the crucial question of how, in the process of incorporation, "culture conflict" gave way to "colour conflict", as Patterson
Previous sections will have offered partial contributions to the explanation for this by examining specific and subordinate dimensions of the problem. Now it will be necessary to adjust the lens and to relate these contributions, in a tighter perspective. Thus the focus here will be on the shifting bases and forms of stratification and structure over the whole period, as the colony expanded in geographical and demographic terms and as its increasing complexity was expressed in hierarchies of power, wealth, status, occupation and group definition. Whether a 'caste' type social structure was emerging, or whether a 'plural' structure can be identified will have important implications for the analysis of stratification between and within groups. Conceptually, the notion of a shift from culture to colour conflict, as the defining feature, seems both too limited and too diffuse. I will argue, instead, that an analysis of the changes is more usefully conceived of in terms of a series of more inclusive and societally extensive structures, starting with the meeting of at least two 'cultures' and social systems, and ending up with a single 'structurally plural' society brought about by the differential incorporation of groups, the definition of which came increasingly to be based on class not colour, as cultural distinctiveness slowly began to fade at the middle levels. The explanation for this, I will argue further, can be located, in short, in an understanding of the varying relationship between the purposes of the colonists in the light of their ideology, the local economic situation and its constraints and possibilities, the response of the Khoisan and the presence of an increasing slave population.

54. Sheila Patterson: Colour and Culture in South Africa, pp.5-6. This may not be the most useful way of conceiving the process, and it will be suggested later why a different conceptual orientation makes better sense.
This leads to the second conceptual net which will have to be drawn through the insights derived from the previous historical and structural analyses, in order to pick up relevant detail, evidence and indications about social relations and the social definition of group consciousness.

8(c) In looking back at the development of the colony during that first century the emergence of a consciousness of colour and a sense of white superiority amongst the settlers is often remarked upon. The actual definition of 'whiteness' then – as indeed now – was somewhat imprecise, mixing social as well as pigmentocratic categories. Now, whether the early colonists and officials brought with them, in their ideological baggage, a predisposition which facilitated this development or whether it was entirely an indigenous growth at the Cape, or a mixture of both, will have already been partly dealt with. But it is central to this argument that – whatever the balance and mix of the two possibilities and however powerful the phenomenon may or may not have been – the growth and/or elaboration of colour consciousness and attitudes of superiority must be seen to have been rooted firmly in the socio-economic and political processes of the developing society. And only in that context, not forgetting the histories and pre-conceptions, can its course be traced and its causes explained.

But the manner and extent to which 'whites' came increasingly to define the whole situation and most social relationships in terms of colour needs to be clarified. This will find its anchorage and expression in the evidence and argument about the institutionalization of 'colourism': the explanation for the process, however, is only partly accounted for by that.
Initially, no legal distinctions were made on grounds of colour. Across a range of practices and procedures – marriage, education, profession of Christianity, baptism of children and even manumission of slaves – the colour of a person's skin alone was not grounds for differentiation or exclusion or segregation. Yet, it seems to have become subsequently the basis for distinctions, exclusions and unequal treatment. It is said that 'mixed' schools declined or disappeared; that the profession of Christianity did not last long as a basis for a slave claiming his or her freedom; that marriage between 'white' and 'coloured' (whether of Khoi or manumitted slave origin) were frowned upon and became less frequent – though sexual relations across the colour line remained common. The processes we will have been looking at gave rise to a social order in which it seems as if colour became a major index of group differentiation. Was that the case, and if not, what was?

Some writers have tried to isolate single, or major, causal factors. Mason, amongst others, for example, identifies the "Calvinistic religion" as being crucial. But, if this was the case then why, according to one historian of Christian missions in South Africa, was there, for example, in relation to marriage in the early days, no distinction ".... on the score of colour" made by the Calvinistic church? Another single factor – or major factor – explanation, followed by Katzen, suggests that attitudes of white superiority amongst, for example, the stock farmers ".... stemmed from the slave-owning traditions of the western Cape".

Monocausal explanations for phenomena of this kind are rarely satisfactory. They tend to be reductionist in approach and thus divert attention away from the complex interplay over time in any society between structure and ideology - a distinction which in itself is questionable when simply formulated in those terms. Each of the preceding sections will have contributed parts of a larger answer which needs to be located and distributed, in terms of the evidence, across a fair period in time. The parts need to be pulled together in terms of the wider perspective by asking relevant questions of the relationships that have been traced. Did particular kinds of ideal and material interests which have been identified, nestling in a broader ideology, generate a need for labour which, once obtained, had structural consequences and hence implications for ideology? Did these in turn - given both the constraints and the possibilities of the time and the place - generate further purposes and aspirations as the local situation became more familiar and its prospects more 'rationally' evaluated? How far did perceived and experienced differences of various kinds between colonist and Khoisan, and colonist and slave, have implications for the former's behaviour and attitude? Under what circumstances and at what point did the often-asserted correlation between 'black men's work' and tough physical labour emerge? We know that, according to some observers, farmers and trekkers and others worked exceptionally hard on their own behalf. Did local predikante, identifying with their largely burger congregations help, perhaps, to adjust Scriptural teaching to accommodate local practices? To what extent? Did fear and suspicion of an alien 'outgroup', and physical conflict, contribute to the genesis of hostility which some of the above factors later sustained and transformed and carried forward? Could a restricted
market situation, fierce competition and labour shortages perhaps have influenced local settler communities not to permit or encourage upward mobility of labourers, or easy manumission of slaves, who were mainly people of colour?

Some contemporary theories and comparative accounts of the causes and course of group conflict, hostility, stereotyping and prejudice will be examined in the light of the historical evidence and assessed within the context of the theoretical orientation being used. Various interpretations of this particular development at the Cape can then, in passing, be evaluated. In the process a more rounded answer should emerge. Certainly, no simple explanation in terms of a base-superstructure argument will suffice. For, I shall argue, aspects of the 'superstructure' - the ideology - were as instrumental as the 'base'. Indeed, the distinction between base and superstructure is a clumsy one. It will need to be collapsed and re-organized in the course of the various questions isolated for treatment. For 'superstructure' - or ideology - is not simply or only a consequence: it can also be a cause, and in the kind of situation with which we are dealing here, it is ignored as a causal factor at substantial explanatory cost.

9. The study will conclude with a summary re-statement of the argument. I shall compare the approach used, and what the analytic and conceptual frameworks have been able to identify and relate, with the dominant historiographical school and what its practitioners have been able to explain. Further I shall suggest that, however well documented, the general and specialist histories have not been able to uncover significant interconnections and relationships because they
have, in the main, been immersed in that kind of empiricist
historical tradition which assumes that the discovered 'facts' speak
for themselves. And, following from that, the kinds of questions
which are designed to extract and trace out interlocking relations-
ships can only be answered by an explicit analytic programme and set
of organizing concepts. These are located in a body of theoretical
orientations to the analysis of levels and dimensions of historical
change. As opposed to and contrasted with that approach in which
hypotheses arise from the study of 'facts', I shall submit that a
more useful and revealing account can be offered by starting with
a broad theoretical perspective and testing and evaluating it
against the historical evidence of a particular instance of colonial
conquest and its consequences.

"History is not a succession of events, it is the links
between them". 58 We shall have to see if it proves possible to
identify and magnify some of those links.

In this chapter the central interpretative propositions and the conceptual structure which organizes the evidence are set out. Although these represent a bald and somewhat unsupported summary of the more complex argument which follows, the reader deserves to be alerted to the kind of approach which is being used here, and to be informed in advance of the meanings that will be given to terms which carry much of the explanatory weight.

A study of this kind makes explanatory claims not in terms of contributing to general theory, nor in terms of some new 'interdisciplinary' synthesis. The scope is more modest, and the objective more realistic. What is being offered is an argument, an explanatory account of the constitution of Cape society which will expand our understanding of that period in South African history. It is rare that understanding in social science proceeds by knocking down everything that has gone before and building afresh. Equally rare is the discovery or presentation of new 'facts', though it is refreshing when it happens and hence when myths evaporate. More frequently, we proceed by re-organizing 'old' evidence in terms of different initial hypotheses, theoretical hunches or conceptual schemes. Hence what is crucial is the conceptual structure which mediates between the general propositions and the evidence. The subordinate concepts and categories which do the work of organizing the evidence thus have a dual role: on the one hand they operationalize the argument, that is they serve to identify and arrange the evidence in a particular way; on the other hand, the very organization of the evidence in such a manner serves to justify and
support the overall argument. There is necessarily something circular about this formulation, and rightly so, for the better and tighter the working relationship between the relevant concepts and the evidence they mobilize, the more plausible will be the explanation and the more convincing the argument.1

The fashionable plea for more 'interdisciplinary' work has its weakest case - if it is a case at all - in the call for an integrated social science. It is not at all clear what that would be. Nor is it clear how one would proceed, in some holistic fashion, to be 'interdisciplinary'. The hope or claim that some interdisciplinary synthesis will one day be achieved is misplaced. For the synthesis - if that is what it is - takes place in practice not in, or between, the disciplines, but in the context of the actual argument or explanatory account which is aimed at answering a series of questions about a particular historical problem or set of problems, in a comparative framework. And, crucially, it is such a set of questions which the problem provokes (or, the subsidiary ways in which the problem is formulated) that initiates the searching movement into the various disciplines, which are of course not each dominated by single orthodoxies. Each of the disciplines has its own partial standpoint, perspectives and preoccupations. Each explores different relationships at different levels. The questions require that one tries to make connections between those discrete perspectives and relationships. It is these connections which in practice shape the argument by linking the perspectives (or aspects of them) in a wider and more rounded

1. These problems are lucidly explored in the compact analysis by Gerald Studdert-Kennedy in his Evidence and Explanation in social science, especially chapters 8 and 9.
interpretation. But such linkages are not expressed in terms of either a new synthetic language of modish interdisciplinarity, or in terms of a patchy eclecticism. They are forged in, and expressed through, the arrangement of the historical material and evidence in new and different ways, thereby exposing interconnections which had not before been identified in causal, functional or dialectical relationships.  

José Nun argues that the social sciences do not differ from each other in their empirical referents - all deal with human behaviour - but in the way they structure their respective objects of analysis.

The task thus is to structure the structures, as it were, and relate them to each other in revealing or illuminating ways which have been provoked by the questions that are put to the history. This brings one back full circle to the initial point of entry to the discussion - namely, the importance of the conceptual scheme that organizes the major interpretative thrust. There is no point in exploring further those areas of 'higher methodology' which Barry, with appropriate wryness, describes as ".... that bourne from which no traveller returns". A discussion in the abstract about these matters, or the nature of 'theory' is not productively pursued here. The matter is best left to rest with the above statement of my position.

2. A classic instance of this is Barrington Moore's study on the variety of paths to the modern world, as he calls it. See his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.


The questions raised earlier and which are dealt with in detail in the following chapters are framed so as to identify relevant evidence and to look for plausible causal relationships which will support the central interpretative proposition. That is, the development of Cape society in this period can most usefully be described and analysed in terms of the process of differential incorporation of various groups over time, a notion which, happily, also sums up the main conceptual structure of this study. I will argue that the various kinds and levels of conflict, of ideological formation and development, of labour demand, economic behaviour, social relationships and political action may all be analysed in terms of their contribution to this process of differential incorporation—a process, which, at the same time, decisively shaped the peculiar structural features of the society. It is now necessary to look in some detail at the main and subsidiary orientations which are the starting points, and the subordinate but related concepts, terms and definitions.

A sociological theorist has recently described the history, structure and forms of social differentiation in modern South Africa as being the product of the way in which

groups of varying histories and ethnic origins .... enter the modern society with varying rights and degrees of rightlessness according to the kind of conquest or unfreedom which was imposed on them in an earlier period. 5

While his concern is with modern South Africa it is clear that this view applies with equal force to the 17th and 18th centuries. It is

a particularly useful observation because it combines the dimension of time with that of structure, and the variables of ethnicity with those of conquest and 'unfreedom'. However, to make such a view of the process of differential incorporation operational for explanatory purposes we need a more detailed account of what is involved. It is first necessary to set this discussion in the context of the debate concerning pluralism. While this debate has, almost entirely, been concerned with the analysis of colonial and culturally complex societies in recent times, it has serious analytical implications for the development of Cape Society, and is therefore of relevance for this study.

While the 'pluralists' insist that there ".... does not now exist any agreed or systematic body of concepts and analytic propositions which could pass muster as a theory of pluralism or of the plural society" their case rests firmly on the view that established social and political theory cannot adequately account for the emergence, structure and functioning of a certain identifiable type of society. This type is variously called 'plural', 'composite', or 'segmental'. Most social and political theory, they argue, ".. remains bound by its basic presuppositions and applicable only to those societies that fulfill its exclusive criteria". Plural societies, on their view, are characterized by substantial diversity in institutional systems,

6. M.G. Smith: "Some Developments in the Analytical Framework of Pluralism", in Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith (eds.): Pluralism in Africa, p.415. Both Smith and Kuper contribute important articles to this volume, and a useful history of the development of the pluralist tradition can be found in these pages.

7. Ibid., p.419.
by an absence of value consensus and by cultural heterogeneity of a kind that has crucial implications for the socio-political and economic life of the society. It is important, in passing, to note at this point that the pluralist perspective presupposes a conceptual distinction between 'society' and 'culture'. The former is more inclusive than the latter. They are not defined in terms of each other and are not regarded as being coterminous, though they might be. Even those, like Rex and van den Berghe, who would not call themselves 'pluralists' agree that societies like South Africa are remarkably difficult to classify. Moreover - and this is central to the debate - they are not persuaded that "... concepts derived from stratification theory ...... adequately cover crucial cases of race relations ....". The categories of stratification theory which are applied to those, at least, culturally homogeneous advanced industrial societies are not of much help in looking at plural societies. Factors such as ethnicity, institutional diversity, religion and cultural diversity are held to be of more salience and thus deflect the application of the analytic categories of stratification theory with its assumptions about a substantial degree of institutional uniformity in the bases of societies.

Those who are sceptical of, or downright hostile towards this kind of view take a variety of positions. Lockwood usefully surveys the debate. Though it is difficult to give a brief and


and representative account of the various objections to pluralism, there are perhaps two central ones which should be stated here, shortly, for they are relevant to the wider purpose. It should also be said, in passing, that it is a pity that much of the debate has been mixed up with the debate about 'race relations' and the analysis thereof: it is, in fact, both deeper and wider than that. Those who are hostile to pluralism argue that there is no need for special categories in the analysis of the structure and functioning of societies characterized by racial, ethnic, cultural or other such cleavages to which pluralists attach significance. Race and culture relations can (and ought to) be analyzed in terms of general sociological categories and those of stratification theory. There is no need for special treatment. Furthermore, they claim, the pluralist preoccupation with discontinuity and diversity in the institutional bases in society, diverts attention away from an examination of the central economic, political and legal institutions in the society, and how those who dominate these came to do so. One of the critics of Smith accuses him of leged main: "Smith has succeeded in eliminating the initial problem of pluralism: under what conditions does cultural diversity in a society promote social cleavage?". 11

Now it seems to me that the 'debate' could be constructively resolved by recognizing two things, and drawing the appropriate lessons from them. For the purposes of the ensuing discussion it is necessary to get these points clear here. The first is that the developing pluralist tradition offers a series of descriptive categories for, as well as a number of highly suggestive insights about

the formative processes of those societies which, on everyone's admission, are clearly not in any sense culturally, ethnically, racially, institutionally or in religious terms homogeneous. And there is general agreement that these cleavages cannot be overlooked: the differences concern the significance to be attached to them and the manner of so doing. The elaboration of the distinction between a corporate group and category, and its identification in institutional discontinuities between rather more closed than open social segments assists considerably when trying to disentangle dimensions of class, colour, culture etc., in colonial and other plural situations. Moreover the notion of differential incorporation - to which I shall turn in detail in a moment - conceptualizes helpfully the kinds of structural relationships and historical processes which institute them, and which we can so often recognize in these societies. The second point to be made in respect of this 'debate' is that the 'critics' of pluralism are right in arguing that there are very limited criteria and explanatory principles within pluralism for explaining why such discontinuities take on the significance they do, or how certain groups within such societies come to dominate their structures. Institutional discontinuities do not in themselves explain why certain social structures and systems develop. In short, where pluralism offers the categories for describing a particularly complex structure of relationships, it is not able to offer a systematic or comprehensible explanation of the causes of such structures other than the suggestive notion of the process of differential incorporation.

12. I have expanded on this in "The Constitution and Continuity of South African Inequality: Some Conceptual Questions".

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But, it may be argued, pluralists have not set out to offer a theory of change or migration or colonization. Rather they have been concerned to develop a conceptual scheme which will contribute to the analysis of certain types of society - including, but not being limited to, the colonial society - which have been constituted in various ways as a consequence of different processes and which pose severe problems for conventional theories.

Likewise, while the 'critics' - and the group is a mixed one - of pluralism claim that social and political theory (be it marxist or functionalist) does have the conceptual tools with which to explain the causes of the peculiar structure of plural societies, it does seem to be the case that the actual constitution of these societies at various points in time can best be described in pluralist terms.

The establishment of an analytical programme based on a selection of concepts and insights from both approaches will be useful, not for the sake of setting up some abstract 'theoretical' synthesis, but precisely because each approach contributes most helpfully where the other is weakest. It remains only at this point to endorse the view that "the elaborating of plural empirical theory, explicitly married to the classic discussions of group formation, action, consciousness, conflict and change ....." promises progress.\footnote{Ira Katznelson: "Comparative Studies of Race and Ethnicity: plural analysis and beyond", p.151.}

Certainly, such elaboration in the context of interpreting particular historical case-studies - such as the Cape - is worth exploring.

That, at least, is the broadest 'theoretical' orientation of this study. The subordinate organizing concepts, categories and terms will, however, have to bear much of the explanatory burden. The
way in which these will be mobilized in the substantive account which follows needs now to be discussed.

The notion of 'differential incorporation' is central to this study. It describes an historical process as well as conceptualizing the way in which groups came to be incorporated unequally in terms of access to, and participation in the economic, political, and social arrangements of an increasingly common society. The notion of 'incorporation' directs attention to the processes whereby two or more collectivities - usually with important antecedent differences in history, culture, ethnicity and so forth - are drawn together. There is, however, nothing mysterious about the process: in examining the case of the Cape in the 17th and 18th centuries it is possible to specify the factors which were instrumental in doing this. Furthermore, the emphasis on the differential nature of the process focuses attention on those forces which acted to lure or compel (or both) certain groups into more or less subordinate positions within the slowly articulating structure of the society. Thus, in examining the processes of differential incorporation over time, it is necessary to focus on the antecedent histories, cultures and ideologies of the specific groups in conflict, as well as on the resources at their disposal, the material and ideal goals they pursued (such as access to land, labour, possessions, a way of living) and the manner and consequences of establishing and maintaining domination and hegemony. In sum, then, differential incorporation as a conceptual tool identifies a particular kind of group interaction involved in the formative stages of, here, a colonial society, being

14. M.G. Smith: "Pluralism in Pre-colonial Africa". There is a full discussion of this and related terms.
forged out of the relationships between groups defined in terms of
culture, and ethnicity, at least. It
is, however, important to stress again that it is not only or simply
because of these distinctions that a social order based on
differential incorporation is instituted. On the contrary, it is
necessary to explain the development of this peculiar structure of
relationships in terms of additional factors, such as competing
ideologies, purposes, and the distribution of power. The relation-
ships between these factors and the structures they helped to form
are crucial. Some of the more flexible Marxist interpretations of
these - by scholars such as A. Gramsci, G. D. Genovese, E. P. Thompson
and E. J. Hobsbawm - are useful in this respect.

Thus, differential incorporation describes a particular
and recognizable social structure which is brought about by all these
factors. It suggests, in addition, that instead of a stratification
system constituted by gradations and strata through which, in
principle, people may move upwards or downwards, the particular form
which stratification takes in such societies is characterized by an
explicitly inegalitarian arrangement of composite groups and
categories defined in terms of cultural, class or ethnic differences,
or a combination of them. Once again it is to factors other than
these differences along that one must look for the explanation of why
they may be given a special social significance, and why they may
become the bases for 'locking' groups into a structure of inequality.
Such an arrangement will be termed 'structurally plural', and its
meaning explained shortly. Such a system, furthermore, then becomes
legitimated, for the dominant, in a developing ideology. It originates
in their antecedent experiences, their definition of the situation,
and the goals and purposes they pursue. And it is expressed in the
new structures of group relationships which they have been instrumental in shaping, and which, in their view, promote their ideal and material interests. 15

The analytic advantages of using this approach, and its entailed subordinate strategies are considerable. A number of methodological requirements are satisfied. First, the dimension of time is built into this way of conceptualizing aspects of the process of societal formation and change. Secondly, the structural dimension is, broadly speaking, given a conceptual definition in terms of a patchwork of groups locked together in a peculiarly tight arrangement of inequality. And thirdly, the need to look elsewhere for a fuller explanation of how and why this structurally plural set of relationships becomes instituted is underlined.

Smith has defined structural pluralism as the most complex form of plural society, and it presupposes the prior existence of both social and cultural pluralism. He distinguishes between the three modes in the following way. 16 Cultural pluralism consists solely in institutional differences to which no corporate social differences attach. Social pluralism is the condition in which institutional differentiations coincide with the corporate division of a given society into a series of sharply demarcated and virtually closed social segments. Structural pluralism consists further in the differential incorporation of specified collectivities within a given society and corresponds with this in its form, scope and particulars.

The meaning of cultural pluralism is, I think, quite clear. It denotes a situation in which cultural differences have no significance


nor are they invested with any - for social, political or economic purposes. They are, in short, marginal to the central socio-economic and political arrangements in the society. Social pluralism may be conceived of as standing midway along a continuum of plural types. The corporate sections defined by their cultural distinctiveness - in respect of which their institutional systems are crucial - are not arranged in any hierarchy but are rather 'federated' and incorporated within the society on more or less equivalent terms, while nonetheless being effectively 'closed' sections. Structural pluralism necessarily presupposes social and cultural pluralism, or it can institute it. In other words it can either be built up out of a prior system of cultural and social pluralism, or - and this is important - it can be the result of a consequent social definition of a situation - by custom, necessity or by legislation, or a combination of the three - which invests previously irrelevant features (be they colour, religion, culture etc.) with a significance which then becomes the basis for discriminatory treatment and unequal access to the social, political and economic resources in the society.

Moreover, the way in which the notion of structural pluralism will be used in this study entails an explicit sense of group hierarchy. The explanation for and description of this hierarchy will focus on those processes which, in Rex's terms as were mentioned earlier, brought the groups with "varying histories and ethnic origins" into the society with different kinds of rights and "degrees of rightlessness" consequent upon the manner of their incorporation, or - as he

17. For a detailed discussion of this see Leo Kuper and M.G.Smith: Op.cit., and also M.G.Smith: "Social and Cultural Pluralism".
18. See Leo Kuper: "Ethnic and Racial Pluralism".
describes it - the "conquest or unfreedom" imposed upon them. This recognition that a structurally plural order exists is, then, the starting point for working backwards through time to seek an explanation for how it came about. A most helpful way of conceptualizing this process is by use of the notion of differential incorporation. But it is not enough. The conceptual scheme has to include other concepts and explanatory aids to answer this question, and it is to these that I now turn.

How, it may be asked, do plural societies come about? At the most general level of explanation the answer must surely be that they are brought into existence by the meeting of at least two cultures, which may be the result of a variety of factors such as conquest or migration. But this is too general. In any specific case a very complicated historical analysis would be necessary to establish empirically the causes and contours of such movements. But even that would not be sufficient. It would clearly not take us very far to try to explain the formation and structure of the new society at the Cape in terms of the causes of Dutch overseas expansion, though that would be, by definition, part of the explanation, but not the most important part. Of equal importance is an analysis of the culture and ideology of the Dutch component of Cape society, in the form of the 'fragment' which was established at the Cape.19 Equally, as was pointed out in the previous Chapter, an analysis of Khoisan society in similar terms is necessary. But before proceeding to those questions it is important here to get clear the stipulative meaning which will be given to the central concepts of 'society', 'culture' and 'ideology', for they will be

used frequently. There is a rather wide ranging debate amongst social scientists as to the definition of these concepts. Consensus about their usage seems unlikely, for very good reasons, and hence a stipulative definition as to how these terms are to be used in this study, and for what purposes, is necessary. A discussion of these terms will also involve some wider conceptual and theoretical issues, which are most usefully dealt with here.

The first point to be made in this respect is that an analytic separation of 'culture' and 'society' is required. For, clearly, if one asserts that there are and have been plural societies defined, in part, by internal cultural differences, then it is obvious that 'society' cannot be defined in terms of 'culture'. They are not, manifestly, necessarily the same thing, nor are they expressions of the same thing. Yet the elision of the two concepts has a long history. In his *Primitive Culture*, Tylor offered the now classic definition of culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society".20 Kluckhohn is rather more explicit in his running of 'culture' and 'society' together. He says: "A 'society' refers to a group of people who have learned to work together; a 'culture' refers to the distinctive ways of life of such a group of people".21 Likewise, Malinowski develops a notion of culture as a highly integrated set of institutions, and it seems that he viewed these as coterminous with 'society'.22

may be the case that this kind of approach reveals from another perspective the way in which much social theory has operated with categories which have been evolved to deal with homogenous societies, and it underlines the objection raised earlier that such theory is too often bound by its basic assumptions and is hence of relevance only to those societies which fulfill its criteria.23 It is worthwhile, then, to endorse the view of Lienhardt that ".... it is necessary to distinguish between culture, as the sum total of material and moral resources of any population, and social systems".24 He proceeds to argue thus:25

Peoples culturally heterogeneous are commonly drawn together in a single political system, and not only in modern states. On the other hand, cultural homogeneity is by no means always accompanied by political unity.

The question is of course more complex than this. There is bound to be some variable relationship between given cultures and societies. The two, while not being the same, are clearly related. But not in the way which Nadel suggests. Or, rather, in the case of plural societies, the 'two-dimensional' view of the relationship between culture and society which he suggests, does not hold. He says:26

Society, as I see it, means the totality of social facts projected on to the dimension of relationships and groupings; culture, the same totality in the dimension of action.

It is necessary, I think, to conclude that none of these theorists -

23. See Note 6, above.
25. Ibid., loc. cit. And of course it may be argued that there are sub-cultures - for instance based on class - within such homogenous societies. But that would be using the notion of culture in a very wide sense indeed.
with the obvious exception of Lienhardt - could have been allowing for those societies - termed here as 'plural' - in which at least two (and in some cases more) 'cultures' co-exist. Moreover in examining a situation like the Cape, we are examining the emergence of a new society. Part of the explanation for its peculiarity will lie in the fact of two or more cultures being drawn together, which makes the definition of 'society' in terms of 'culture' - and vice-versa - problematic. For, an additional aspect of the explanation lies in the elucidation and specification of the structure of relationships between the 'cultures', the relevant corporate groups and so on in a common society. And while it may be possible to indicate how a 'common' culture begins to emerge, it is first necessary to insist that the common society predates the common culture. This time-lag creates special problems for the equal and uniform incorporation in one society of individuals from different antecedent cultures while such individuals undergo socialization and acculturation. For these reasons the concepts of 'culture' and 'society' will be used as analytically distinct in this study. Conceptually, the notion of 'society' is more inclusive than that of 'culture'. Historically, it is prior to, and empirically it is more complex than, that of 'culture'. Yet, in this disembodied conceptual form it tells us the least. That may indeed be the fate of the most general and inclusive kinds of concepts.

Precisely because I propose to explore some relationships between more or less 'cultural wholes', it is necessary to make this distinction between society and culture. A rather more fine distinction - between culture and ideology - will also have to be made and I shall turn to that shortly. Thus, as an initial
I will use the term 'society' to apply only to a population over and in which effective and recognised political authority is exercised. The temptation to tie the notion down to a territorial base - as Smith does\(^2\) must be resisted, if only because nomadic groups do qualify in all respects - except their nomadism - as 'societies'. If a crucial feature of a 'society' is its regulation of internal political affairs then a Khoi horde or San band must be viewed as societies, however small they may be, and despite any wider 'federation' of similar small units. If they are not societies it is not at all clear what they are.

This approach, then, follows the alternative view of 'society' to which Nadel holds, a view which seems to run counter to his cultural definition of society. He regards 'society' as ".... the relatively widest effective group, regarding a certain kind of effectiveness as crucial". For him, the political unit will usually combine both the widest group with the most effectiveness. "We are in fact saying that, when we look for the widest population most effectively held together in a group, we find that it is the population held together by the employment of force (apart from other things); and the employment of force which is so effective we call 'political'".\(^2\) Used in this sense it can accommodate a number of other less inclusive dimensions, though there are some problems that need to be dealt with. First, in the case of the Cape it is not always entirely clear in the 17th and 18th century that effective


government was exercised over the regularly increased area defined officially as the political unit presided over by the Company. Though de facto changes in the border of the Colony were formally proclaimed by Plakkaat of the Council of Policy, it did not follow that effective political control was exercised over the area thus defined. Indeed the border areas were, particularly as the 18th century moved on, characterized by a measure of unruly and largely unchecked interaction between the settlers and the Khoi and, further afield, the Nguni. Hunting parties, traders, and others established both co-operative and conflict-ridden relationships in that region. One author refers to this as the "trading-raiding" syndrome. 29

Although by the 1780s the boundary of the Colony was still to the West of the Fish River there were probably some 30 families, if not more, living on the Eastern side of the river, grazing their cattle there. These men — including well-known figures such as the Prinsloo and Bezuidenhout brothers, Lucas Meyer, Christoffel and Jan Botha, not to mention the 'infamous' Coenraad Buys — are usually described in the literature as 'ruffians' and 'turbulent'. 30 They are viewed as the scum of the frontier tide. One can, of course, see them in a very different light: as rather ruthless entrepreneurs playing for high stakes: playing, as it were, both sides of the frontier. They struck deals and alliances with Xhosa chiefs when it suited them, just as they reneged on such deals when it became profitable to do so. Their submission to Company authority was, similarly, erratic, and hardly continuous. Secondly, during the period various Khoi groups moved into and out of the formal orbit of the Company's domain. The


geographical dimension of the unit defined by Company edict as subject to its government did not always correspond with the political dimension entailing the effective exercise of authority over various groups. Neither the frontier 'ruffians' nor the Khoi groups were always or consistently a part of the 'society' in the sense in which the term has been defined above, though they may have been moving through the geographical area. Such groups were perhaps in the society but not of it. This remained true for the 'ruffians' throughout the 19th century, and further afield than the Cape. 31

Thirdly - and this is central to the argument - it was the progressive de-constitution of Khoi hordes as independent cultures and societies, by a complex of forces, and their absorption into the new society that both constituted the process of differential incorporation and established the structural features of the society. It was their vulnerability to politico-military force and their subsequent economic and material dependence on the society that made them part of it. Viewed from the perspective of 'frontier studies' it can legitimately be said that in South Africa "... the frontier from the start involved inclusion as well as exclusion: in whatever capacity, non-whites became integral parts of the total society". 32

But what needs to be borne in mind here, however, is that though they were later to contribute to the formation of the so-called Cape Coloured people, at the point where their socio-economic fate compelled their political submission, Khoisan cultural distinctiveness did not fade overnight. Change is rarely that 'total' or sudden.

32. Ibid.
Moreover it is improbable that Khoi experienced any profound sense of 'belonging' to the newly evolving society. In this respect to describe them as being part of it does not fulfil Nadel's requirement that there be a subjective awareness "... as it is expressed, above all, in names and verbal statements on being one people, tribe, nation and so forth; so that the widest group must be a group proclaimed".\textsuperscript{33} But I'm not sure that this matters, as my initial stipulative definition will have indicated. However, a brief comment on Nadel's formulation usefully carries the discussion forward. There seem to be severe limitations in his conception of 'society'. The 'objective' and 'subjective' requirements he enunciates — namely that of effective political control and that of belonging — entails one of two analytic consequences, or both. Either it means that by definition a plural society is not a society, or it means that — as with many other social theorists — the scope of his definition is too restricted to include systems which, unlike the homogeneous ideal type on which the notion seems to be based, are the products of complex historical tides which have thrown groups, cultures and highly asymmetrical sets of institutions together and initiated new societies. The Cape during this period, and later, is just one of these societies: to explain and describe adequately the processes that were involved in its development, a wider and more inclusive conception of society is needed.

Thus, despite the inevitable problems, in reality, of much blurring at its empirical edges, the conception of 'society' which will be used here hinges on three components. Two have been mentioned

earlier. First, that of a distinct population unit, and secondly, a system of government having effective political authority over that population. What qualifies for effective political authority may be rather more difficult to identify in practice. The successful and effective use of power — in the Weberian sense — seems to be influential in Nadel's definition.34 But there are problems here too, particularly in the colonial context where, as pointed out above, the societal boundaries (both in geographical and demographic terms) are uncertain. For it is not altogether clear whether the resort to coercive power, say through the force of arms, is evidence of either the unambiguous assertion of authority in an already constituted society, or the process of colonial conquest itself. The conceptual problem here is rather well demonstrated by the following extract from the Journal of the Cape Commander, dated September 26th, 1705.35

Some Hottentots arrived from 'Zuurveld' reporting that their Captain 'Claas' has departed this life. The Governor appointed his brother Hoeza to succeed him and presented Hoeza with the cane with the brass knob on which his name was engraved ....

Apart from being a splendid early instance of attempted Indirect Rule and the 'appointment' by a European colonial authority of the 'Chief', it is not immediately apparent whether such a symbolic act in fact represented the exercise of political authority, nor whether the Zuurveld horde could be said to have been subject to such authority. After all, they did not have to request permission to move away, cross the colonial boundary or engage in barter: and they were not subject to the various edicts nor to punishment for infringement of


of them. For at this time, these Khoi were not - as far as can be assessed from the context - entirely subservient economically to the Company or any settlers, though they were moving in that direction. Thus their membership of the 'society' is questionable. It is precisely for this reason that it is useful to add the third component in the conception of 'society' to be used here. And it is this: the economic involvement and interaction on a systematic and continuous basis with other groups. This may arise from necessity or volition or compulsion; but what characterizes it, crucially, is the dependent and consequently interdependent nature of the activity. Unless and until Khoi became economically dependent on, and therefore of necessity involved in the economic life of the colony, the fact of their formal and apparent political incorporation did not mean that they were part of the society. Furthermore, their 'cultural' identity remained for some time as an independent variable, though it was to crumble as the economic basis of their society disappeared from under them. On this view, the conception of 'society' is sufficiently inclusive to be used for more complex analytical purposes. It permits one to disentangle the different axes along which differential incorporation took place - the geographical, social, political, cultural and economic. In the Cape context it is important to have the analytical tools to do this. Moreover it facilitates the simultaneous treatment of the temporal and structural dimensions involved in the formation of a 'new' society. Further, it offers the scope, in a study of this kind, to treat 'culture' as a separate, but related, factor. Finally, while separating culture from society and hence allowing for a multi-cultural society it does not preclude mono-cultural social systems. Rather it liberates 'society' from its
identification with a single culture, and a single consciousness of belonging thereto. Hence it breaks with the dominant tradition in social theory of regarding 'society' as being in some sense necessarily anchored in a uniform institutional base and a value consensus. What it encourages, on the other hand, is a wider conception of 'society' and a recognition of the variety of forms it may take, including the plural society and its forms. In the case of the Cape the interesting questions that can now be asked of such a society concern not only the degree and consequences of institutional incompatibility between the cultural components but also the kinds of structures of relationships which held the sections together, the prior histories, ideologies and purposes of the various groups and the manner in which new groups and categories came into existence. Central to this conception of society is not institutional uniformity and value consensus, but a high degree of pluralism and chronic conflict. It is important however to add that this view does not imply that conflict is in some sense necessarily less, or more unlikely, in other societies. Also, as with all stipulative definitions, it is neither water-tight nor all-embracing. For the purposes of this study, however, it may be seen to work rather usefully.

Bearing in mind the subsequent history of South Africa during the 19th and 20th centuries, and with some comparative glances at other 'plural' societies such as Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Israel, Indonesia and Trinidad, it is tempting to speculate about their past constitution, present condition and foreseeable future. I think I would want to argue that such societies as these are deeply flawed historically, and the causes are various: imperialism, migration, colonial expansion, conquest, trade and slavery. While they cohere
as societies, the structural sources of conflict are sunk deep within
them. It is associated in part with the institutional incompatibilities
that come from their plurality of cultures. So long as the collect-
ivities who enact and enforce these cultures continue to do so (and
socialize their young to do so) - often for very good reasons - and
so long as, in consequence of this, a cultural, religious or ethnic
consciousness predominates over and against a more universal sense of
citizenship, the prospects for any of the standard ideal outcomes do
not look good. What is more, this applies with equal force to
liberal-democratic, social-democratic and socialist scenarios. It
is simply not the case that only so-called 'western liberal-democratic'
societies - or models of them - have, or assume, or are said to have
a high degree of 'consensus'. On close examination liberal-democracy,
social-democracy and socialism all necessarily presuppose a degree of
institutional uniformity in the structural base of a society and a
consensual ideology appropriate to it. Put more crudely - and hence
as a caricature - the programmes of parties and organizations, or the
writings of theorists which favour any one of these preferred
outcomes all assume one or another 'identikit' or 'uni-cult' subject,
citizen or comrade. Consciousness of membership and participation
first as a citizen - instead of as Jew or Arab, Zulu or Afrikaner,
Malay or Chinese - is rather important. But this is another
argument on a grander and perhaps more speculative level; it cannot
be pursued here. However, concerns of this order follow decisively
from some of the conceptual issues which have been raised and are
worth mentioning precisely because of their historical significance
and continuing relevance. The problems of analysing and explaining
the constitution and functioning of both historic and modern 'plural'
societies are substantial, and claims for the omincompetence and universal applicability of general theories of societal formation and change meet their sternest test when confronted by such societies.  

It has not yet been made clear what stipulative definition is to be given to the concept of 'culture' - a central notion for this study and the more general considerations just mentioned. It is to this that I now turn.

It is only the foolhardy non-specialist who enters the debate about the definition and proper use of the term 'culture' with any confidence. Kroeber and Kluckhohn reviewed literally hundreds of definitions of the term. One's sense of the fierceness of the debate amongst anthropologists, and between them and sociologists, is given an anxious edge upon discovering that not "... until 1958 did the Dean of American anthropologists, A.L.Kroeber, and the Dean of American sociologists, Talcott Parsons, agree to sign a non-aggression pact(!) in which both culture and society are recognized." But even the most limited survey of the literature by an amateur tends to suggest that, however acrimonious and fierce, the academic


debate does not seem necessary. And although Kroeber and Kluckhohn formulated a 'compromise' definition of culture, it is itself so inclusive that, even from beyond the discipline and the debate, an outsider is bound to see that it is without much advantage. The attempt by any group of scholars to impose a conceptual orthodoxy or negotiate a definitional consensus is bound to be of little value because the implied initial premise upon which such efforts are based is flawed. Thus the debate about 'culture', the legitimate field of 'culture studies' and the compromise definition achieves little, it would seem. This is because the rival definitions and usages flow from differing inquisitive purposes for which the concept is used. And it is simply not possible to legislate about the kinds of questions which scholars can or can not legitimately ask, nor the concepts they must use to facilitate their enquiry, as was argued at the start of this chapter. The most that can be asked is that their usage be not too outrageous, that the terms be clearly defined, consistently applied and open to challenge. The differences, however, will presumably continue. Not only is the concept used by different scholars in various disciplines to identify and organize social phenomena for different purposes, it is also used at a variety of analytical levels. Precisely for these reasons it is necessary to stipulate what it is that one's use of the concept is designed to identify, how such usage fits into the broader analytical purpose and at what level of abstraction it operates.

39. They say: "Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems, may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action". A.L.Kroeber and C.Kluckhohn: Op.cit., p.357.
Taking these points in reverse order, there is manifestly a considerable difference between Tylor's now classic definition and a recent expression of the school of thought which conceives of culture as essentially cognitive and conceptual. Thus, Harris argues that "... culture consists of an immense series of systems of concepts, many of them in constant change and interpenetration". 40 (This, in fact, is closer to the conception of ideology which will be used in this study, and it will be examined shortly). Recalling Tylor's definition, with its emphasis on some more empirically identifiable phenomena, such as art, morals, beliefs, law, custom and habits, it would seem that there is a noticeable difference in the level of abstraction. But that does not exhaust the difference. For while both include ideas and social behaviour together in their conception of culture, Tylor's definition appears more concerned with the description of what this is, whereas Harris' approach (drawing on Geertz and Lévi-Strauss) directs attention not only to what men do, but the processes whereby they structure what they do and the purposes for which they do it. In short, for Tylor, culture describes how men live their lives in groups, whereas for Harris it is more than a descriptive concept; it has explanatory potential too, for its role in social life (and thus the way in which the scholar should understand it) "... is to present us with a diversity of partial or coherent systems with which to organize our experience". 41 Clearly, then, it is not only a matter of a difference in the level of abstraction. There is also, and rather crucially, a differing centre of gravity given to the proper field for the analysis of the content

40. Nigel Harris: Beliefs in Society, p.28.
41. Ibid., p.33.
and function of culture. So the problem becomes more complex. Not only do various authors use and define a concept such as culture for differing analytical or polemical purposes, but the very definitions they use are employed to permit them to identify, or ignore, purposes and roles which, on one view, culture performs for social groups. The analyst's purposes are combined with and compounded by the purposes and functions which his conception of culture is held to imply.

It does not seem to be avoidable. Moreover, for this and other reasons it seems that the continuing debate about the concept of culture is unnecessary if its objective is to define an orthodoxy, and to 'settle' once and for all what culture really is, or what the proper field of enquiry for 'culture studies' ought to be. Though there are limits to such a view, it does seem that each writer will use the term in a way that fits his analytic purposes. And provided it is made clear what it identifies, there do not seem to be serious problems in proceeding, at any rate, on that assumption.

It has already been said that for the purposes of analytic convenience I wish to separate the two related concepts of culture and ideology. Generally - though not always explicitly - they have been run together in inclusive and omnibus conceptions of culture. Thus Harris' view, though highly abstract, may be seen almost to collapse the two, with the result that 'culture' and 'ideology' become effectively interchangeable. Less abstractly, Malinowski defined culture as

\[ \text{the integral whole consisting of implements and consumers' goods, of constitutional charters for the various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs.} \]

\[ \text{42. B. Malinowski: Op. cit., p. 36.} \]
W. I. Thomas in developing his classic 'theorem' of the 'definition of the situation' described a 'cultural situation' as one in which a body of values has been accumulated and preserved (mainly through the instrumentality of language) in the form of institutions, mores and codes, together with a reinforcing set of attitudes or tendencies to act in conformity with prescribed behaviour patterns or norms.

Now it is of course the case that culture and ideology are closely related and that their separation is only of analytic convenience. Clearly 'culture' is, for most theorists, the more inclusive concept, and an analysis of ideology "... can most usefully be undertaken in the context of a consideration of culture as a whole rather than in an isolated fashion". Making anything other than an analytic distinction between the two is like the crude and rather useless division of 'base' and 'superstructure' or 'material' factors and 'ideology'. The most concise objection to just such a separation has been made by Gramsci, who says:

... material forces would be historically inconceivable without form and .... ideologies would have to be considered individual dabbling without material forces.

So too with culture and ideology. Thus, bearing in mind these important objections and qualifications, it is necessary to make clear here how the concept of culture is to be used in this study. Implicitly, such a clarification ought also to indicate the meaning and use to be assigned to ideology. When Lévi-Strauss refers to culture as "... the patterns OF and FOR behaviour prevalent among

a group of human beings ...." 46 he is providing a useful basis for the stipulative distinction I wish to make between culture as a mode of behaviour (the 'active' side, perhaps) and 'ideology' as the organization of experience for behaviour (the 'passive' or 'pre-disposing' dimension). And clearly, in practice, there is a continuing relationship and interaction between the two. They represent, for analytical purposes only, different emphases along a more inclusive continuum of culture. If we extract the 'ideological' aspects from Tylor's early formulation — thus leaving his emphasis on customs, law, art, habits and, crucially, institutions — one approaches more explicitly the 'active' sense of culture which I take Kluckhohn to mean when he refers, at one point, to culture as the "distinctive ways of life" of a group of people. 47 A more technically complex formulation of this is that of M.G. Smith upon whose ideas in his seminal article on the question I have drawn heavily. He writes: 48

I hold that the core of a culture is its institutional system. Each institution involves set forms of activity, grouping, rules, ideas and values. The total system of institutions thus embraces three interdependent systems of action, of idea and value, and of social relations.

Now if, for the moment, the dimension of 'idea and value' is separated out and treated as a distinct but related aspect of 'culture' in its inclusive sense, the above conception of culture can be given, in any situation, a quite concrete anchorage in the institutions of,

46. As expressed by C. Kluckhohn in his Culture and Behaviour, p. 64.
47. Ibid., p. 21.
inter alia, marriage, family, education or socialization, 'religious'
practices, recreation, eating habits and taboos, language, material
culture and standardized modes of economic activity. Generally it
seems fair to argue that such institutions cohere in a systemic
fashion in any given culture. Further, while each institution has
its associated set of 'ideas and values', these together constitute
a broader system of ideas, beliefs, mores, predispositions etc.,
which can legitimately be referred to as the 'ideology'. To repeat,
the relationship between the institutional system and the ideology is
close; form is given substance in the content, and the content given
meaning in the form. Thus in talking about 'culture' it is to these
practices and institutions of a people that I mean to refer.

There is, furthermore, nothing particularly new in such an
approach. Various 18th century and 18th century commentators on the
Cape seem to have been pointing to just such differences between the
European settlers and the indigenous peoples. Thus, for instance,
Mentzel - a fairly astute observer of the Cape scene in the 1730s -
had the following to say: 49

The language of the Hottentots is even more primitive
and contains no abstract terms whereby one could give
expression to religious ideas. It is particularly
difficult for the same reason to grasp what their
peculiar customs and beliefs are ....

Despite these apparent problems of 'comprehension', Mentzel quotes
the words of two settlers who had visited the 'Cabonas': 50

49. O.F. Mentzel: A Geographical and topographical description of
the Cape of Good Hope, Vol.II, p.134. Hereafter designated as
O.F. Mentzel: Description ....

50. Ibid., Vol.III, p.304, citing a report to the Council of Policy
by Roos and Marais, the leaders of an expedition in 1761/2 to
the 'Cabonas'.

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Their religion consists chiefly in praising and worshipping the new moon when it rises .... Although this is the limit of their religious practices, we have noticed that they have a kind of idea about a Supreme Being, whom they call Chuyn, that is big or powerful. If they want to give an impression of something that is beyond their comprehension, they say: 'It is the work of Chuyn'.

Elsewhere⁵¹ Mentzel offered quite an elaborate and, given the time and place, reasonably accurate account of 'Hottentot' culture. He covered aspects of birth, marriage and other ceremonies, weapons, their food and methods of cooking, fire-lighting techniques, copper-smelting, exogamous marriage customs, treatment of adultery, death and burial, their dances, musical instruments, language and hunting crafts.

The Swede, Charles P. Thunberg, who visited the Cape in 1772 gave, also, quite a detailed account of the way of life of the 'Hottentots'.⁵² He referred to their appearance, dress, economy, language, marriage and population control techniques (though he did not call it that) and their religion. He observed that men often had two wives and that women had a "real husband" and a "locum tenens" or "substitute".⁵³ He noted with curiosity that they rode oxen, and that they had "no religion".⁵⁴

Kolbe (whose account Mentzel considered inaccurate in several respects)⁵⁵ was unsteady in the picture he drew of the 'Hottentots'. "In their customs and institutions they cannot be said to resemble any People besides the Jews and the old Troglodytes".⁵⁶

⁵¹. Ibid., Vol.III, p.266, passim.
⁵⁵. "I shall also find space for the life, usages and customs of the Hottentots, and take the opportunity of correcting Kolbe's errors ....". Ibid., Vol.I, p.136.
Such handicaps apart, however, he noted that they have no such thing as money among them. Their traffic, as well with one another as with strangers, is always of barter. There are but few of them that have any notion of the usefulness or the value of coin and those are such as live about the Cape Town...

Though he considered them to "... without doubt, both in Body and in Mind, the laziest people under the sun ..." and "... in the matter of diet the filthiest people in the world...." he nonetheless perceived certain virtues in their "... most beautiful simplicity of manners ...." and he was impressed by the fact that:

The Hottentots know nothing of the Deceits and faithless acts of Europe. Their word is sacred; and there is hardly anything upon Earth they look upon as a fouler crime than Breach of engagement.

As a witness, Kolbe cannot fully be relied upon. There is no evidence to support his claim that:

I know many of them who understood Dutch, French and Portuguese, to a Degree of perfection ....

Nor can we really believe him that "numbers of them" told him that:

..... the vices they saw prevail among the Christians; their Avarice, their envy and Hatred of one another, their restless discontented tempers, their lasciviousness and injustices were the things that principally kept the Hottentots from hearkening to Christianity.

57. Ibid., p.260.
58. Ibid., pp.46-47.
59. Ibid., p.339.
60. Ibid., p.59.
61. Ibid., p.37. The question of the languages spoken at the Cape is dealt with later. See also M. Valkhoff: Studies in Portuguese and Creole, passim.
Earlier in the 18th century there are examples in various descriptions of the Cape of a less generous and more fiercely intolerant view of the way of life - and indeed the lives - of the Khoi. Thus Daniel Beeckman had little to say of them, other than: 63

You may guess that these filthy Animals (for they hardly deserve the name of Rational Creatures) if at London, would be much greater Customers to our Butchers, Kitchen-Wenches, and Chimney-Sweepers, for their Dress etc., than to the Mercers, Perfumers etc. ....

Or Commissary Cnoll, who travelled a short distance inland from the Port in 1710, concluded his remarks on the Khoi by stating that, "In brief, these savage people are, in all their habit, save in their human form, like beasts". 64 A few years earlier, John Maxwell in a letter to the Rev. Dr. Harris, had the following to report: 65

By all that I have seen and heard of them and other nations they are the most lazy and ignorant part of mankind, by virtue of which two most excellent qualifications there are no manner of arts practised among them, no plowing or sowing, no going to sea in so much as a boat, no use of iron or money, no notion of God, Providence or future state, no tradition of creation or flood, no prayers or sacrifices, no magical rites, nor any fine notion of any invisible being capable of doing them either good or harm....

To the Chaplain of a passing English fleet, the Hottentots 66 are the most Bestial and Sordid .... They are sunk even below Idolatry, and destitute both of Priest and Temple .... and .... have lost all kind of Religious Devotion.

Some of these latter extracts, along with other observations and opinions as documented in Company records in the 17th century which will be examined later, are interesting for a number of reasons. They are illustrative of one aspect of certain kinds of group interaction which Allsop, in his study of the American Hobo, identified with some precision: ".... establish your victim as debased and barely human, thereby justifying inhuman draconian treatment". The matter need not be pursued here; it will be taken up again in a later chapter. It will be necessary there to examine how attitudes such as these developed in this culturally plural context and in the light of the settlers' purposes as they formed and changed over time. These attitudes held by Officials and settlers (or particular groups of them) towards the Khoi and San (or groups of them) became part of the ideology of the settlers as that term will be used here. But that is running ahead of the present argument.

The point here is neither to explore that related area nor to evaluate the accuracy and reliability or otherwise of these and other accounts. The purpose of this short excursion into these descriptions was to illustrate a different but associated problem concerning the concept of 'culture' and its usage in this study. Given the purposes of this enquiry as stated in the previous chapter there are good reasons for using this notion to refer quite simply to related sets of practices and institutions, rather than employing one or other of the more abstract formulations which focus on culture as essentially conceptual and cognitive. Equally, there are persuasive practical reasons for treating Lévi-Strauss' 'structural' approach to culture with a cautious (if bewildered) respect.

First, because a prime purpose is to trace the relationships between various cultures in the formation of the 'new society', it is helpful - given the problems of identifying evidence which the more abstract notions of culture entail - to employ a more empirically operational conception of culture. The notion of culture as an "immense series of systems of concepts", as Harris defines it, may have considerable theoretical potential. In practice, it is difficult to operationalize, as yet, in any given case study of 'culture contact' and 'culture conflict' precisely because of its problematic status in relation to the relevant evidence. Perhaps it is because we do not, as yet, have the kinds of analytic categories which can mediate between that level of theory and the data it seeks to organize.

Secondly, the evidence which is available in ethnographic and historical accounts is of such a kind that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to translate that into a 'higher order' system of concepts as culture. Thus, both ways - whether starting from the available evidence, or from the notion of culture as a system of concepts - it is difficult to relate theory to evidence.

Thirdly, the broader analytical purpose of this enquiry does not require that culture be treated at such a level of abstraction. It is not concerned with establishing, or contributing to the formulation of "... general principles ...." or "theories .... which should be applicable to all societies and valid for all possible observers", which is what his translator claims is the major concern of Lévi-Strauss. The purpose is far less ambitious and considerably more limited than that. Now it may be that Lévi-Strauss is basically

concerned with "... universals, that is, basic social and mental processes of which cultural institutions are the concrete external projections or manifestations". 69 But Lévi-Strauss himself recognizes quite explicitly that the way in which the concept of culture may be used will differ according to the kind of questions being asked, the level of generality and the object of the particular exercise. He is worth quoting at some length on this point because, although the "... goal of structural analysis" is to reduce cultural discontinuities to "invariants" - the "universal" for the anthropologist is like the 'isolate' for the demographer - he recognizes that there will be differing aims of enquiry, and hence differing heuristic uses of the term. 70 The methodological implications are apparent. 71

If our aim is to ascertain significant discontinuities between, let us say, North America and Europe, then we are dealing with two different cultures; but should we become concerned with significant discontinuities between New York and Chicago, we would be allowed to speak of these two groups as different cultural 'units'. Since these discontinuities can be reduced to invariants, which is the goal of structural analysis, we see that culture may, at the same time, correspond to an objective reality and be a function of the kind of research undertaken. Accordingly, the same set of individuals may be considered to be parts of many different cultural contexts: universal, continental, national, regional, local, etc., as well as familial, occupational, religious, political, etc... This is true as a limit; however, anthropologists usually reserve the term 'culture' to designate a group of discontinuities which is significant on several of these levels at the same time. That it can never be valid for all levels does not prevent the concept of 'culture' from being as fundamental for the anthropologist as that of 'isolate' for the demographer. Both belong to the same epistemological family.

69. Ibid., loc.cit.
71. Ibid., loc.cit. My emphasis.
Much of the difficult theoretical discussion of Lévi-Strauss is beyond the scope (and competence) of this study and not directly relevant for its purposes. What is of methodological importance, however, and of relevance to the question of culture is Lévi-Strauss' clear distinction between levels and aims of analysis. Again he is quite explicit:

Great care should be taken to distinguish between the observational and the experimental levels. To observe facts and elaborate methodological devices which permit the construction of models out of these facts is not at all the same thing as to experiment on the models .... This distinction is all the more necessary, since many discussions on social structure revolve around the apparent contradiction between the concreteness and individuality of ethnological data and the abstract and formal character generally exhibited by structural studies. This contradiction disappears as one comes to realise that these features belong to two entirely different levels, or rather to two stages of the same process.

Despite the Gallic theorizing tradition, he is remarkably empiricist in his insistence that, on the "observational level",

.... the main - one could almost say the only - rule is that all facts should carefully be observed and described without allowing any theoretical preconception to decide whether some are more important than others.

All facts? No preconceptions or even rudimentary criteria for selection? Won't these necessarily be involved, given that questions are being asked? There are objections to that view. However, the 'two levels' - of observation and model-building - are distinct, but related. "What interests the anthropologist and what belongs to the realm of culture, is the different modulations, if I may use the word, undergone in various societies and at various times, by basic material, which is by definition always and everywhere identical."

72. Ibid., p.272. My emphasis.

73. Ibid.

It will be one of the central arguments in the substantive account which follows that it is precisely these 'different modulations' - the institutions and practices that form the core of social behaviour as culture - whose content has to be carefully described and whose interaction and differential incorporation in a single society has to be analysed and explained.

The fourth and final reason why it is useful to conceptualize culture in these terms can be argued with reference again to the extracts from the various descriptions of the Khoi and San mentioned earlier. Whether their accounts of the Khoisan were accurate or not, the Officials, expedition leaders, local settlers in various parts of the colony and visitors to the Cape have left a fairly large body of writing about what they thought and observed. Often their attitudes and opinions are unambiguous though ill-informed. At other times - particularly when Officials are reporting back to Amsterdam or Batavia - it is not entirely clear what they really think, for there are indications at different times that they are at pains, for various reasons, to give a favourable impression of the relationship between the colonists and Khoi. What however is clear - and illustrated in some of the excerpts cited above - is that, in general, the kinds of categories and terms in which these descriptions are phrased are essentially those which relate to observations of difference in respect of institutions and practices. The various diarists and commentators, in short, perceive and describe what they regard as differences in what we will here call culture. It is rare for colour, or colour alone, to be the most salient feature of their descriptions of the Khoisan. When colour is mentioned it is

75. I have been referring to the Khoisan and Dutch as if they were each homogeneous groups; they were not. However, for the sake of clarifying these broader conceptual issues that shorthand has been adopted.
usually a subordinate part of a wider picture in which the central parameters are cultural distinctions. I will argue that "cultural consciousness" preceded "colour consciousness", or rather that initially it dominated the official and settler perception of the indigenous people. Now it is of course the case that as the first century of Company 'rule' unfolded, the degree of cultural difference - the 'institutional discontinuities' of both Lévi-Strauss and M.G. Smith - waned, particularly in the western districts. If colour came to be a crucial factor in their perception and 'consciousness', and if it subsequently emerged as a major basis for exclusion and differential incorporation, then how it happened will need to be explained. What, however, is important to stress here is that, whether or not culture may be usefully conceived of as a complex system of concepts for purposes of theoretical argument, (Lévi-Strauss' 'experimental level'?), the settlers for their part observed and defined the distinctions in rather more immediate and concrete terms. While the evidence for it is limited it may also be possible to infer that the Khoi, for their part, considered - initially at least- European customs and institutions to be strange, and certainly threatening to their way of life. Moreover, it is necessary in a study of this kind - perhaps especially in a study of this kind - to take careful account of the terms and rough categories of meaning which the parties to the situation themselves made. That may not be a sufficient condition of methodological completeness, but it seems to be a necessary one. This does not mean that we have to adopt the terms of the parties in toto, or regard their way of describing what they saw as an adequate account of the complex structures of relationships growing up between and among them.
Clearly, it is inadequate. However, where their descriptions focus on the customs, habits and practices which our categories of analysis identify as the institutional cores of culture, there is a further good reason for making the best of this congruence and thus for using the term 'culture' in the way which should by now be clear. Whether "cultural institutions are the concrete external projections and manifestations" of "universals" (Lévi-Strauss' "... unconscious structure underlying each institution and each custom ....")76 or not, is therefore beside the point as far as the scope of this study goes. The concern is to trace and explain the causes, contours and consequences of the interaction of at least two 'cultures', as defined above, and to account for the emergence of the 'new society'.

In sum, then, I have stipulated what the concept of culture will be used to identify, how that usage fits the broader explanatory purpose and at what level of abstraction it will operate. Though its meaning has been effectively rehearsed above, it is now necessary to stipulate explicitly what sense will be given to the related concept of 'ideology'.

The closeness of the concepts of culture and ideology is nicely illustrated by the title of Geertz's influential article: "Ideology as a Cultural System".77 This closeness - in terms of the bearing which these concepts have in relation to the evidence - has a number of dimensions, and separating them helps to demonstrate these and their relatedness.

77. Clifford Geertz: "Ideology as a Cultural System".
First, and most simply, an ideology may be said to be constituted by a 'framework' of related ideas, values, beliefs, predispositions, prejudices, expectations and norms which cluster together in a coherent and mutually supportive way. There is nothing new about this usage of the term. What needs to be borne in mind, however, is that such frameworks, as with all ideologies, are neither 'free-floating', nor moored in some firm and rigid sense to the culture of which they are a part. They stand in a shifting and adapting relationship to the cluster of practices and institutions which constitute the culture, and the process of adaptation - as conceived here - does not only and always originate in some obvious change in culture. Not only is adaptation at least a two-way process, it can be and is also initiated in either 'sector'. So that just as a cluster of institutions makes up the core of a culture by cohering in a more or less systemic way, so too a cluster of related ideas and beliefs constitute the ideology which meshes with that culture.

Secondly, incorporated in the ideology are the rough categories, concepts and constructs in terms of which the representatives of one cultural tradition perceive another, describe it and provide the basis for forming judgments about it. It does not matter - for the sake of this argument - whether the various descriptions of the Khoi (before, during or after regular interaction took place) were or were not 'accurate'. Nor would it matter whether the Khoi description of the Dutch was 'accurate' or not. The relativity of the very idea of 'accuracy' in this context is underlined. What does matter is that these rough categories - rooted in the culture of the perceivers and expressed in their language - were what they used to identify practices such as 'worship', or 'marriage' or various kinds
of economic activity. Such opinions, attitudes and judgments formed by the Dutch about these practices were, thus, influenced, initially, by at least two broad sets of factors. The one was their prior knowledge, experience and expectation of the Khoi in particular, or 'Native people' in general; the other was the extent to which institutional practices, which they observed and identified, deviated in content and form from their own equivalents, or what they believed to be their equivalents. To this extent the wide-ranging and inclusive notion of ideology which Manners and Kaplan spell out is worth starting with, since it applies with equal force to both European settlers and Khoisan, as it would apply to any identifiably distinct cultural group. They say that ideology\(^79\)

\[
\text{includes values, norms, knowledge, themes, philosophies and religious beliefs, sentiments, ethical principles, world views, ethos and the like.}
\]

But ideology, like culture, is neither as static nor goal-less as this seems to imply. A central feature is also purpose. Thus, thirdly, in the light of the above, it is necessary to build into the stipulation of the concept of ideology a purposive and adaptive dimension. The purposive aspect will help to explain, in a very central way, the causes and issues of conflict; the adaptive dimension will assist in explaining the contours of that interaction and give some clues to the process of modification and change in ideology and behaviour. Concretely, however limited the prior knowledge of each other, and however vague and unformed the mutual perceptions may have been, the processes whereby each group observed, reacted to and defined the others were crucially related to the

\(^79\) David Kaplan and Robert A. Manners: *Culture Theory*, p.112.
purposes they were pursuing or the interests they were defending. In his discussion of this question, Harris tends to view ideologies as being linked to class. I think that this is far too limiting a conception, but it illustrates yet again the tendency for issues of this kind to be treated in much of the literature as if societies were always more or less culturally homogeneous. Though there may indeed have been differences in emphasis and immediate purpose between sections of the settler community and the Officials at the Cape in the late 17th century and beyond, and though there may indeed have been differences in strategy and tactics for survival amongst different Khoi hordes, it is nonetheless quite clear that what these larger collectivities shared in common was much greater. Or, initially, at least, and for some time thereafter. Thus the row which developed about the behaviour of Adriaan van der Stel and his clique and the resistance to them by Adam Tas and others is of great importance. It will be examined later. The point here, however, is that if, as Harris concisely argues, ideology can also be viewed as "... the language of the purposes of a social group ..." it severely constrains its usage if the conception of 'social groups' is limited to classes. My contention is that, at a broader level, and particularly in a colonial situation, ideology can be seen to be associated also with cultures, in the way that has been spelled out above. There is an interesting point, however, which arises from this and it can be most usefully treated here, for it relates to some of the earlier discussion in this and the previous chapter. Initially


81. Leo Fouché (ed.): The Diary of Adam Tas, 1705-1706.
the various groups - the Dutch and the Khoi societies - did not constitute a single 'society'. They peered warily at each other across an ideological divide. Intermittent and fragmentary contact between the societies and cultures in part defined the relationship. In time this gave way to more regular and sustained interaction, and this in turn led to the incorporation of Khoi and San in the 'new society'. The process of incorporation and the structure of relationships which organized this indeed came to constitute the framework of the society. Gradually, Khoi culture faded. But it did not happen swiftly. Moreover the economic and socio-political subordination of the Khoi and the emergence of the Cape Coloured people were not sequential: they overlapped in time and differed in degree over space. Even Kolbe, as was seen earlier, noticed the differences between 'Hottentots' at "... the Cape Town ...." and inland. Now even if one wanted to claim that, for the Western Cape district in the mid-18th century, there was - leaving aside the slave population - already a considerable degree of cultural continuity between so-called Free Blacks (and Browns), 'free' Khoi labour and the settler community, it would do grave injustice not only to the evidence, but also to the complexity of the situation, to consider that those who had been dominated and subordinated in the process of incorporation represented characteristically a 'class' with an 'ideology' of its own. 'Class', culture, ethnicity and ideology overlapped and intertwined in an intensely complex way. A conquered 'culture' or a differentially incorporated segment does not, in virtue of that, come to be simply or only a subordinate 'class'. Nor is the conceptualization of the situation as essentially or really one of class and class conflict necessarily the most useful. There is much more to it than that. Not only do important trace elements of their
prior institutions and practices remain, but also aspects of their ideology (perhaps in the form of religious beliefs, superstitions, food-taboos, etc., or the very non-acceptance of the philosophies and world views of the dominant) remain. Thus at all stages - pre-contact, initial contact, systematic interaction, during the speed-up interaction which results in differential incorporation and for a considerable time after that - it is both useful and important to regard the variable of ideology as separate, and to treat it with care while relating it constantly to its cultural referent which is, in turn, undergoing change and adaptation as the 'new society' begins to form.

It will be necessary, as a prelude to that discussion, to describe major features of Dutch ideology prior to the arrival at the Cape of the first Officials and employees. Similarly, in considering the Khoisan prior to the establishment of the Dutch station at Table Bay, it is appropriate to try to reconstruct the essential features of their ideology as part of their culture. For both these purposes it will be assumed that it is possible to characterize representative central features of the ideology of these cultures. This assumption rests on the view that, despite 'sub-cultures' and an indeterminate degree of regional or sub-group variation, it is possible to talk about the ideology of Dutch, Khoi and San societies, because in both cases there were dominant cultures and associated ideologies in the societies and not a plurality of cultures and world-views competing for 'hegemony'. Gramsci's notion of 'hegemony' usefully sums up the relatedness of culture and ideology in the sense which the previous sentence implies. As Williams has formulated it, 'hegemony' for Gramsci is: 82

an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations.

Now although Gramsci developed this concept in the context of a very different kind of discussion about politics and radical change in class-based advanced industrial societies, and although Williams' formulation exaggerates certain features, it is a useful definitional peg on which to hang a discussion of this kind. The evidence will be looked at later. For the moment what needs to be said however is that in the middle of the 17th century the Dutch Republic was at the height of its Golden Age. Though it would be wrong to suggest that it was in all respects united, homogeneous and without internal tensions, it is nonetheless clearly the case that it was not characterized by major cultural or political cleavages. Indeed, as Huizinga observes, in contrasting the Dutch Republic with Britain: 83

We may safely say that Dutch culture in 1625-75 was at a more developed stage than its counter-part in England. Conflicts of the kind that split national life wide open and threatened cultural stability across the Channel, found a fairly harmonious solution here.

It is not necessary to accept the notion of 'stages' in this to see the force of the point. And despite the limitations of our knowledge, there is much to suggest that, likewise, Khoi and San societies were characterized by an interesting degree of cultural continuity. Thus, in respect of these cultures it will be possible to talk about the ideologies they brought to the 'contact' situation, and in terms of which they all initially observed, defined and reacted to each other in the context of the purposes they pursued or the interests they defended.

As the 'new society' began to form, all ideologies underwent changes, just as institutions and practices were affected by changes in perception and the adaptation and/or expansion of ideologies. Once again we are back with the unavoidable sense of the closeness of culture and ideology. Following the analogy of ideology as a two-way prism (as outlined in the previous chapter), it will be possible to analyse how the ideology of the Dutch, when confronted by alien cultures and their institutions, or by new problems that needed solving, or puzzling phenomena that needed to be 'synchronized' with long-held beliefs and expectations, was adapted at the Cape to cope with all this. Observations made of alien institutions and practices were expressed in terms of the categories of the ideology, which were then adjusted (or expanded) to take account of these observations. My argument will be that the implications of this for behaviour were considerable, especially when set against a rough schedule of individual purposes and collective objectives. Similarly, the implications of such new behavioural patterns - in respect of labour, or treatment of Khoi, or styles of life etc. - for ideology are crucial.

Thus, bearing in mind that ideologies - as I mean to use the term here - are not only frameworks of belief, ideas and norms etc., but also that they embody purposes, are in a close reciprocal relationship with the institutions of a culture, and serve to "... render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful..." and "... to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them ...."84 it is possible to endorse Geertz's view that.

85. Ibid., loc.cit.
Whatever else ideologies may be .... they are, most distinctively, maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience.

It is in this sense - as expanded in the previous few pages - that the concept of ideology will be used.

In the preceding pages the central interpretative propositions and organizing concepts which will mobilize the evidence have been outlined. Differential incorporation, the degrees and forms of pluralism, the concepts of society, culture and ideology have been stipulatively defined and the way they will be deployed in explaining the formation of the new society has been broadly indicated. Such an outline can do no more than sketch the main conceptual structure of this study. The more detailed analysis of that process will be left to the substantive account. While 'differential incorporation' sums up the central process that defined the manner and mode by which the various cultures were drawn together into a peculiar structure of relationships, it does not - on its own - explain enough. Neither does the description of various forms of institutional discontinuity as between the cultures which 'interacted' explain the manner of interaction nor its results. The ideology - particularly of the dominant - will, however, provide important insights about the causes and contours of conflict, the nature of, and reasons for the steady demand for labour, the shape of economic activity associated with this and the social relations which developed.

It will be argued that each of these factors, while of intrinsic interest in its own right, may best be analysed in terms of the contribution it made to the process of differential incorporation which instituted a structurally plural order.

At the centre of the 'new society' there was a growing core
of institutional practices which defined the culture of the dominant. Most of these were adapted and drawn from the antecedent experiences and cultures of the Europeans. But as the new society developed it was not only 'Europeans' who participated in this culture. Nor were the interests of the dominant identical. There were 'free Blacks', and the emerging Cape Coloured people shared customs, religion and language with the 'Europeans'. Moreover, differences in ideal and material interests between, inter alia, knechte, western Cape agriculturalists, the townspeople of Cape Town, the veeboere, trekboere and the Officials of the Company need to be recognised. For although they participated in and shared the same culture and ideology in the broad senses defined earlier, and though - for some limited purposes - they defined themselves as a solidarity group, we need categories of analysis which will enable us to identify the smaller groups that developed within this dominant common culture. Likewise, as the Khoi societies began to crumble as independent entities, some Khoi entered the new society as so-called 'free labour', while others fled. A baffling mixture of collectivities which overlapped in terms of culture, class and colour ensued. In addition there were Khoi who retained distinctive elements of their culture - though this was fading - while being incorporated as subordinates within the common economic and political system of the colony. Between these extremes there were a series of intermediate categories.

In order to untangle the overlapping dimensions of culture, colour and class it is necessary to have analytical tools that will enable one to do this. I have found it useful for these purposes to distinguish between corporate groups and categories. 86

86. A. Leftwich: "Classes and Corporate Groups", passim.
Used correctly, as H.S. Morris points out, the word category is a term used in logic for a label attached to a class of objects which have some quality in common. Strictly speaking a category cannot 'turn' into a group or quasi-group, but it is convenient to use the word for the zero-end, so to speak, of the scale of social aggregates of which the fully corporate group is the other end.

Now, because in the case of the Cape there were other groups, smaller than 'cultures', it is necessary to have some means of distinguishing them. The distinction between category and corporate group helps. Thus a category identifies a collectivity which is characterized by the following features. The members of it have one or more 'objective' characteristic in common. By 'objective' characteristic I would include colour, culture, language, religion, a particular relationship to the means of production or access to political power. For this reason it is primarily an analytic construct which is of use largely for purposes of classification. Thus, a category is not of major importance in analysing social or political interaction. For a category does not have a common and shared consciousness of itself as a group. It does not act as a group. Indeed, such a collectivity as it is experienced (or, rather, not experienced) by its members, is internally divided by other more salient factors which constitute the basis for group consciousness and action amongst certain 'members' of the category, and conceivably against other 'members'. Thus, for example, Marx's notion of 'class in itself' would be one kind of category. So, more concretely, would the 'free burgers' of the Cape. In terms of access to the sources of political power they were alike. But they were internally divided with respect to their relationship to the means of production. Thus when some farmers acted against the

sharp practices of van der Stel and his cronies, the townspeople played little part in the crisis. As Fouché comments: 88

The townspeople - the publicans and lodging-house keepers, who found a parasitic livelihood in the embryo city that lay about the Castle - had neither art nor part in this movement ..... With the farming community they had nothing in common .... The well-being of the community, and the just rights of the colonists were nothing to them.

As a whole the free burgers formed a category: but smaller collectivities amongst them - like the wine and grain farmers - constituted a corporate group for a particular set of purposes, and this example suggests a definition of such a group. There are two critical variables which define a corporate group: they must share institutions and experience a sense of corporate solidarity and consciousness. 89 It may be a temporary phenomenon; it may last. Thus Marx's 'class for itself' is one example of such a group, but the concept is an inclusive one, subsuming under it, and manifesting itself in a variety of concrete forms, which are not exhausted by 'class for itself'. Thus, as the 18th century wore on, there was emerging in the western Cape a population of so-called Brown 'Afrikanders'. They shared institutions and practices with the so-called White 'Afrikanders'. In terms of these they may all be regarded as having constituted a category. Yet there is evidence to suggest that as time passed - and for reasons which will be expanded later - the latter began to regard themselves as somehow distinct


89. Consider the closeness of this definition derived from the sociological tradition to that by a psychologist, Henri Tajfel, who defines "a group as a category of people fulfilling two criteria: the first, that an individual identifies himself as belonging to that category; and the second, that this identification is to him of some emotional significance". H.Tajfel: "Cooperation between Human Groups", p.78.
from the former. To the extent that they did, their consciousness of themselves identifies them as a corporate group. Colour was replacing culture as one of the determinants of subordinate incorporation; why this may have been so will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. And the explanation for this apparent shift to a definition of the situation more in terms of colour will be related to the ideology of the dominant group, the purposes they pursued, their ideal interests, their sustained demand for labour and the manner in which they adapted their broad objectives to the constraints of the local political economy.

Thus differential incorporation does not simply describe the way in which different and asymmetrical cultures interacted and resulted in an inegalitarian plural structure. There were other smaller collectivities developing within the interstices of the new society which were accumulating particular sets of interests. How these interacted with each other in terms of their competing or conflicting purposes is central to an understanding of the development of the new society. Certainly, it is from that perspective - and in relation to the questions posed in the previous chapters - that the enquiry will be conducted. The pluralist terms which have been explored above, and the central concepts which will be used in analysing the processes which shaped the new society will constitute the analytic framework. But that framework is incomplete without bringing one crucial operational principle decisively into the forefront here. An account of the development of Cape society which assumes that the interaction and conflict between the groups can be explained - even in part - by any general notions such as conflicts of "... racial heredity", as de Kiewiet in an unguarded moment does,90

or as de Kock does when referring to "... inherent and natural..." characteristics (of indolence) of the Khoi, 91 will not carry explanation forward. Though it is necessary to look at cultures, societies, ideologies, corporate groups and categories, it is also well to remember that these are - as with all concepts - abstractions from a complex web of human action. As such we can only understand individual or collective human agency within specific historical contexts. The notions of 'human nature', or 'man' or 'natural characteristics', or 'racial heredity', in abstract, describe and explain nothing, for nowhere can we locate any of these outside of historical contexts. As Thompson observes: 92

What Marx proposed (and I am thinking of the theses on Feuerbach) was that all human conflicts are observable only within specific social contexts. And the bare forked creature, naked biological man, is not a context which we can ever observe, because the very notion of man ... is coincident with culture; man only is insofar as he is able to organize some parts of his experience and transmit it in specifically human ways. Thus to propose the investigation of 'man' apart from his culture (or his lived history) is to propose an unreal abstraction, the investigation of non-man. And at least in recent history human conflicts have found expression within systematized social and cultural contexts, so that the conflict itself finds expression within the terms of that context: as, for example, we cannot understand certain kinds of aggression independently of the contextual concepts of the ownership of property or of nationhood.

There may indeed be more to it than that, but - at least - this study of the Cape will proceed with that observation firmly in mind.

South African historiography dealing with the 17th and 18th centuries at the Cape is very sparse when it comes to explaining or exploring the relationships between the metropolitan Dutch society and culture, and the local emergence of a new society at the Cape. In this chapter, the argument is about the Dutch background and its implications for those relationships. First, it will be argued, the specific organization of the economic and material interests of the V.O.C. were deeply rooted in Dutch economic and political history, and that many of its characteristics had direct and far reaching implications for developments later at the Cape. Secondly, it is argued that the central features of the associated European metropolitan culture, behaviour, ideology and normative universe, as well as other institutional devices, borrowed from elsewhere (like slavery), must be clearly analyzed and stated before one can account for the pattern of subsequent Cape interaction, precisely because the structure of that interaction at different levels cannot be explained without first describing and analyzing its contributory component parts. An equivalent of the Khoisan will have to follow.

Three main themes run through this chapter, as they do throughout the study. They derive from the principal assumptions which underpin the organization of the evidence and the argument in relation to the history of the Netherlands, prior to but also during the colonial contact at the Cape. The first is that the broad material interests and the associated organization of technological
capacities of groups in any given situation both generate certain imperatives for them, and also set limits, broadly speaking, to what such groups can do to achieve them. Secondly, there is a complex relationship between any such mode of production, on the one hand, and the associated political institutions, culture and ideology which, on the other hand, express, influence and sustain it. The analysis of that relationship historically is difficult enough where there is, comparatively speaking, a common culture and a prevailing ideology. The problems for analysis are, however, compounded when there are at least two cultures present in a 'plural society', meeting in a distant colonial situation. Thirdly, this interaction in the colonial context can only be plausibly and instructively analyzed diachronically, that is through the medium of historical time. The analytical and organizational problem is to do justice to the evidence and the chronological sequences while at the same time analyzing and expanding upon the structural characteristics.

The concern with these themes about a complex interaction taking place at the related levels of material interests, cultural incompatibilities and ideology, needs to be defended by demonstrating not only that there were differences (in this case between the Khoisan and the Dutch and also between both them and the imported slaves) but that they were significant, had formative histories and hence enduring legacies. It is these latter aspects which were crucial

1. The simplistic and deterministic notion of 'base' determining 'superstructure' which emerges from Marx's "Preface to The Critique of Political Economy" is not one which social scientists or theoretically interested historians can easily accept. However, in his emphasis on praxis, men making their own histories, within certain constraints, there is a sounder way of rescuing what "... is meaningful in his thought", rather than quibbling over what he 'really' meant. See E.D.Genovese: "Marxian interpretations of the Slave South", p.96.
in the formation of the plural society. For what 'arrived' at the Cape during the second half of the 17th century was not simply a group of men and women. It was a group which embodied some significant and representative aspects of the popular culture and values of the Dutch Republic in the mid-17th century. They had joined the V.O.C. with certain objectives in mind and yet their lives were subjected to its rigorous control. The congeries of collective and mutually re-enforcing behaviours, beliefs, predispositions, interests, perceptions and institutions can best be described by deriving a modal type or representative figure of the V.O.C. employee in the second half of the 17th century.

He was a male Protestant, possibly a Calvinist, who had joined the V.O.C. (or been press-ganged into it by the zielverkoopers) in order to get to the Indies. He would have been a youngish man, either drawn from the considerable pool of unemployed (de grauw) of the United Netherlands, or who had migrated there from other parts of Protestant Europe, notably Germany. His ambition would have been to reach the Indies where it was believed that the possibilities for making a rapid and substantial fortune were considerable. He would not have been thinking seriously of settling there, and certainly not at the Cape. He would have intended to return home and there is, at least, a 50/50 chance that he would have been literate. His Protestantism would in practice have been surprisingly nominal, and, if Calvinist, would have entailed no explicit implications for his behaviour towards people of colour, though as a part of his ideology

2. It will be apparent that the view taken here is different from that which regards them as unrepresentative and only an "inferior, partial selection" from Dutch society. L.M.Thompson: "The South African Dilemma", p.103. The regents or senior burghers of Holland were certainly no more representative, nor were the Professors or Divines or artists.
it would have combined a belief in the superiority of his culture, world-view and general patterns of life vis a vis that of the Khoi, for example, with a deep-seated national hostility towards Iberian Catholicism (and its allies) which he would have defined as a major enemy in the struggle for mercantile supremacy in the wider world. He would have believed, moreover, that the use of, and trade in foreign and alien slaves was no less legitimate than the buying and selling of silk or cloves, or the conduct of warfare to promote such ends. Underpinning this belief would have been an unambiguous assumption that trade and the pursuit of profit were the central and universal principles of civilised economic life to which his country and the Company were dedicated. Were he an educated man - and some of the higher officials were - he would possibly have been aware of the defence of war and the legitimacy of slavery as offered by Grotius. 3 But, even if he had not heard those views, the ideology of the Republic and the terms of public debate would have made such operational premises both widespread and largely unchallenged. It is most improbable that he would have thought that Blacks were inferior beings or the descendants of the Children of Ham, for he would not have previously been exposed systematically to any such ideas in the Netherlands. Nor were such views at all common in either of the two areas and cultures with which he might have had contact: the Iberian peninsula or England. The Church of which he was a member, though probably a nominal one, had not taught that Blacks were either of those two things. But he would have been suspicious of, and aggressive towards, alien and particularly "heathen" cultures and peoples, for in the 16th and 17th centuries the notion


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of 'heathendom' was still soaked in complex and hostile meanings and implications. But where the chance occurred locally at the Cape, given the shortage of Dutch women, he cohabitted with and married local Khoi women and, with more regularity and enthusiasm, slavesses from the East. [The word 'slavess' is a direct translation from the Dutch/Afrikaans word slavin. It's very useful]. He would have preferred that such women adopt Dutch ways, and this tended to happen. Their baptism and formal admission to the Church would have been welcomed. Later, in the 18th century, those immigrants who took slavesses as concubines and mistresses would often have had them manumitted, baptised and admitted to the Church, prior to marrying them, though sometimes this happened after marriage. He would also have grudgingly accepted the rigid discipline and monopolistic policy of the V.O.C. At the Cape he might have begun by entertaining thoughts of desertion, or contravention of the regulations which prohibited independent cattle barter with Khoi bands and other forms of 'free' trade, and not infrequently he would have broken them.

4. See the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol V. p. 171. for a discussion of the meaning of the word 'heathen' and its historical associations. For the meanings and associations in Dutch for the word 'heiden' (beastly, atrocious, and abominable) see H. Jansonius: Groot Nederlands-Engels Woordenboek, Deel I, p. 611.

5. Amongst the 4000 brief biographies of Germans at the Cape which have been collated by Hoge are the following: Johan Paul Gottfried Fabitus, originally of Magdeburg in Germany was a soldier in the employ of the V.O.C. from 1765-1782. In 1783 he married Rosina of the Cape, his slavess (female slave) whom he then manumitted in 1785. Or the similar case of Matthias Greef (also of Magdeburg). He was a burger in 1680. On the 12th November that year he married Susanna Claasen of the Cape, who was confirmed 6 years later at Stellenbosch on the 27th October, 1690. Hoge: Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, p. 93 and p. 120.
It is not possible to construct this representative type on the basis of the secondary historical literature on the Cape. For that literature gives one, in general, a rather flat and relatively lifeless picture of the early 'settlers', and the image which is systematically cultivated is of a group of men whose world view was clamped within the grim and bleak pessimism of 'primitive Calvinism'. Moreover, explanations for what transpired at the Cape in the 135 years after 1652, often attribute considerable influence to Calvinism, as if it were a spirit that uniformly gripped the minds, and influenced the behaviours of Professorial Divines at Dort in 1618/19, as well as the drunken and debauched soldiers, sailors and whores who peopled the kroegen (pubs) of Dutch dockland. This 'idealist' tradition in much South African historiography would have one believe that the Calvinism of the Dort elite can somehow be held to be causally responsible for the development of 'race relations' and 'race attitudes' because of its sombre predictions about predestination and 'damnation', which were attached to people of colour. 6 I contest this view on two grounds in the course of this and later chapters: first, by raising theoretical objections to the 'idealist' interpretation; and secondly, on empirical grounds by examining here some of the evidence about Calvinism and other possible metropolitan sources for such 'race attitudes', or behaviours.

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6. By 'idealist' in this context I mean that view which holds that ideas and beliefs - disconnected from, and disembodied of, material interests and customary behaviours - have causal primacy in the shaping of individual behaviour and social structure. This position is influenced by the superb essay on a related theme by Genovese: "Materialism and Idealism in the History of Negro Slavery in the Americas", and his "Class and Race" in The World the Slave-holders Made.
The representative type is also a starting point. It adumbrates the behavioural, ideological and institutional features which are of crucial importance in understanding the subsequent relationship and interaction between the Dutch, Khoisan and slaves. Generally speaking the historians have started out with a very different kind of chronological and linear conception which has substantially different implications for their analysis of subsequent developments. Thus it is necessary here to show that these features of Dutch society, which were exported by the V.O.C., had roots deep within the history of the United Netherlands, in its political economy, social structure, culture and ideology at the height of the Golden Age. And the history of the Dutch Republic provides ample evidence to support that description of what constituted 'the fragment' that arrived at the Cape. Later, in contrasting this with the essential features of Khoisan culture, and antecedent historical and structural bases of at least two parts of the plural society can be established, and the analytical usefulness of that conceptualization and approach can be underlined. Before proceeding to look at that history, one final introductory general statement must be made.

The people who arrived at the Cape from Europe were not free to do as they wished within the environmental and material constraints of their situation. They were limited and controlled by the dictates of V.O.C. policy, as formulated in the interests of the shareholders in the Netherlands by the Heeren (or Batavia), and as interpreted by local officials at the Cape. There was, in short, a chain of downward political and economic pressures and dictates which linked the interests of the Heeren to the fate of the Khoisan. There is an illuminating analogy to be drawn from the theories of the modern
'underdevelopment' school of economists, like A.G. Frank and Samir Amin. They argue that contemporary 'third world' countries have limited prospects for escaping from their dependency. They suggest that the long and complex historical chain of dependence, between the corporate industrial giants and industrialized powers at one end (today), and the peasant or tribal cultivators at the other end, represents a process of accumulation on a world scale and the generation and transfer of wealth which has significantly structured and tilted the balance of wealth, resources and power against the peasants or tribesmen. Moreover, according to them, this historical process decisively accounts for the 'underdeveloped' condition of third world economies. This notion, taken with the previous argument about radical cultural differences, is instructive (when suitably modified) for explaining the complex relations between the Netherlands and the Cape Khoisan societies. If one conceives of a similar, but less sophisticated, chain which connected the 17th century 'corporate giant' - the V.O.C. - to the Khoisan herders and hunters, some of the pressures and processes which acted to shape Cape society become more intelligible: a long and apparently jumbled set of sequences emerge with a more coherent underlying causal thrust. Pressure from the shareholders and the State on the V.O.C. (and vice-versa), the insistence of the latter on the adherence throughout the empire to a strict monopolistic policy, the constraints imposed by local Cape officials on any entrepreneurial ambitions of the vryburgers and employees alike, and the latter thus necessarily

7. A.G. Frank: *Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America*, and Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution; Samir Amin: "Accumulation and Development. A Theoretical Model" and his Accumulation on a World scale. Their arguments are complex; and I probably simplify them.
encroaching on, and squeezing the Khoi (while simultaneously demanding more slaves) - all this suggests an economic, mercantile and organizational chain which connected the fate of the Khoisan to the pressures from Amsterdam. And it helps to explain the constraints on the early settlers which converged with, and underpinned their already negative and, in some respects, hostile attitudes to the Khoi. It also suggests a pervasive material dimension of the bases for inclusion and exclusion in the 'colonial society' and the arrangements for and maintenance of the division of labour which acted also to define the political economy of Cape society.

Thus, alongside and interwoven with the cultural and ideological difference and the clash of material interests, there was a series of political and economic constraints on the local officials and settlers against which, in time, they (the settlers) were to rebel. But, while the constraints held fast, they had little alternative (or desire) but to extract surplus and unequal exchange from the slaves whom they owned, and from the Khoi, whose steady decline into dependence compelled them to work for the settlers.

In short, the downward chain of increasingly tight economic and organizational pressures worked its way through, and was expressed locally at the Cape in the relationships between initially distinct corporate cultural groups. Alternatively stated - that is, expressing this historical and analytic nexus the other way round - the cultural diversity and institutional discontinuity between the groups acted crucially to establish the contours along which the downward imperial economic pressures flowed. Hence they also partly defined the form which conflict and interaction took, and thus the shape of the society which emerged. The essence of this study is an
analysis and interpretation of that historical process and ultimately its structural outcome in economic, political and social terms at the Cape.

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How does the evidence justify the picture of the representative type presented earlier? What evidence supports the wider arguments involved, and what conceptual orientations identify and locate that evidence? It is analytically convenient to divide the argument here into a number of more specific but related questions. Nettl's problem of simultaneity precludes any lucid description and explanation of the 'seamless' historical web. The following factors are therefore treated separately and their interconnections emerge cumulatively, and are highlighted at the end.

1. What is the relevance of Dutch economic history as background in the formation of the V.O.C.?

2. How did this affect the associated socio-political structure, and the cultural and ideological features of Dutch society and their concentration in the organization and ethic of the V.O.C.?

3. What role did Calvinism play in the ideology of the Republic, and, more specifically, what were its implications for attitudes and behaviours to 'heathens' and/or people of colour?

4. What evidence is there about 'colourism' in the Dutch Republic?

5. How did the Dutch come to adopt slavery when the institution was long dead in the Netherlands? What were the differences between the old and almost timeless features of slavery and the 'new' slave
systems brought about in the new colonial situations where the masters were in the minority (generally) and not the slaves, and where — unlike the Mediterranean tradition — a series of negative stereotypes and disadvantaged roles accumulated on top of each other in the person and status of the slave?

The economic history of the Netherlands from the Middle Ages through to the late 16th century provided the people of the Low Countries with a set of skills and material interests, and the organizational capacities which gave them a decisive advantage when, first, the centre of European economic life swung away from the Mediterranean towards the northwest and when, secondly, the political, religious and economic rift with Spain initiated the 80 Years' War of Independence — 1568/1648 — and necessitated that they go it alone. 8 The technological basis of later Dutch maritime and mercantile strength was founded upon the fishing industry which was and decisive in the economies of Holland/Zealand particularly, which it

dominated from the middle of the 14th century.\textsuperscript{9} The number and kind of craft which were used in this industry, and the number of people who were involved in its various aspects - catching, salting and distributing, etc. - were crucial for later developments. "It is no exaggeration to say that the Great Fishery provided the experience and the means which later enabled the Dutch to become a maritime power of the first magnitude. By trial and error they learned the art of seamanship and navigation, experimenting with hulls and rigging to build the best vessels for each particular purpose".\textsuperscript{10} By 1562 there were at least 700 fishing smacks and 20,000 men involved in the herring industry, while the merchant fleet was, at the same time, about 800-1,000 in strength with some 30,000 sailors.\textsuperscript{11} By 1609 there were some 60,000 men involved in one way or another with fishing and another 10,000 sailing round the world.\textsuperscript{12} And by the middle of the 17th century, de la Court estimated that some 450,000 people were directly and indirectly involved in the fishing industry, compared with 200,000 on agriculture and about 650,000 in other industries, which is remarkable for a population of between 1½-2 million.\textsuperscript{13}

The basis of the Dutch navy and merchant fleet established in this way enabled them to become, in the course of the 16th century, the major European middlemen and transporters. Not only their skills

\textsuperscript{11} Goslinga: \textit{Op.cit.}, p.47. This was double the English figures for that time.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}, p.117.
but also their needs meant that initially the Dutch imported food and other goods, the Low Countries produced very little. Thus they had to import grain, wood, wine, dyes, coal and industrial materials, like metal, wool, hemp, ship-timber and salt for the shipping and herring industry. From trading and transporting on their own behalf, the ship-merchants were able to expand their activities and become the major maritime carriers of goods. They ferried goods between the Baltic and Iberian ports, and lived - because they had to - as traders. This maritime and trading basis to the expanding Dutch economy converged with the long history of independent trading towns which dotted the Low Countries from deep within the medieval


15. Keller: Op. cit., p. 376; Blok: Op. cit., II, p. 343, makes the point that early in the 16th century Netherlands ships and sailors were quite used to Spanish and Portuguese ports, a point which has relevance later again for the question of the possible sources of ideas or images of Black people. Hollanders and Zealanders and Frieslanders had signed on Spanish and Portuguese ships bound for Africa, Brazil and the East, long before the Revolt. Goslinga: Op. cit., pp. 23-24. The volume of Dutch shipping in the Baltic steadily increased from 1497 to the mid 17th century. In 1497 the record of shipping through the Oresund showed that of the 400 ships that passed into the Baltic, 260 were Dutch in origin. In mid-1650, of the 1035 ships that went through, 966 came from the Netherlands. Masselman: Op. cit., p. 18 and D.W. Davies: A Primer, p. 9.
period, and was aided by the lattice-work of rivers and canals which entered the sea in the Netherlands and gave them access to internal markets in Europe. Major rivers – the Scheldt, the Maas and the Rhine – drained through the Low Countries and the rural economy was deeply implicated in the practice and ethic of trade. "North of the Ij, where the dense network of waterways placed almost every village in direct communication with the sea, ocean sailing and fishing assumed a central role in the rural economy." Most households in the country areas divided their time between ".... dairying, peat-digging, seafaring, spinning, dike and ditch labour and a wide variety of household activities".

When the 80 Years War began with the abortive uprising in 1568 against the centralizing and intolerant policies of Philip it was soon clear that the economic survival of the Netherlands was at stake, especially when the first of their ships were 'arrested' in 1585 in Portuguese harbours. It became essential that, instead of relying on the carriage of goods that were brought to Europe by the Iberians, they themselves would have to spread out to the source of these riches, particularly after the fall of Antwerp to the Spanish in 1585. Moreover, among the 100 ships arrested that year in Portugal,


18. Ibid., p.72. In the 13th century, and into the 15th century, Bruges had been the main port till the Zwin silted up. Trading fleets from Venice came up to the town. And other centres like Ghent, Liege, Ypres and Brussels, as well as towns in Flanders and Brabant were crucial in the system of commerce. Blok: Op.cit., I., p.249 and II, p.328. Also, Pirenne: Op.cit., p.206.

19. See next page.
were 30 salt carriers, since most salt came from Setubal for the herring industry. The Dutch were thus compelled to go elsewhere for this vital resource. They turned initially to the Cape Verdes, where a Zealand fleet had first called in 1528, from where good quality salt was available, and then across the Atlantic to the Caribbean and along the Venezuelan coast, especially at Punta de Arya. The closure of the Iberian ports moreover meant that the bullion and luxury goods which had made their way to the markets and trading centres of the Netherlands no longer flowed in. Yet despite the importance of the colonial ventures, neither the slave trade which soon became the centre of the W.I.C., nor any other

19. From this time on the centre of commercial activity and capital accumulation shifted north to Amsterdam. By the 16th century Antwerp had taken over from Bruges as the main centre, and the Portuguese crown maintained an agency there. It was the main central point for the distribution of spices from the East. Boxer: The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p.61. Parry: The Age of Reconnaissance, p.47, and E.E.Rich: "Colonial Settlement and its Labour Problems", p.331. Venetian galleys had travelled up the Scheldt from the 13th century to Antwerp. Often some seagoing craft could not get up-stream and their goods were transferred to fleets of smaller craft. Bindoff: The Scheldt Question, p.16.


21. It has been argued that one of the main items which came from Seville in Spain in the 16th century was bullion. R.Trevor Davis: The Golden Century in Spain, 1501-1621, p.153. The same city was remarkable for its cosmopolitanism and slave and free population. Dutch seamen there could not have missed seeing any of this. R.Pike: "Sevillian society in the sixteenth century: Slaves and Freedmen", passim. The role of bullion in the Dutch economy was crucial. de la Court wrote that: "The inhabitants of Holland can trade in no countries but by carrying goods thither, which having sold and turned into money, they convert it into other goods they find there, or failing that, return this money into Holland by exchange; but if such foreign lands have little or no occasion for our goods, but afford rich commodities (to us) then is it not self-evident that we cannot trade with them to any purpose, unless we carry thither gold and silver in coin or in bullion? And since in consequence everyone knows that Norway, the East Germany, Smyrna, India, China, etc., do afford us infinitely more merchandise than they take of us, we cannot trade with them except by gold or silver". Cited in C.H. Wilson: "Trade, society and the State", pp.510-511.
imperial activity ever surpassed the Baltic grain trade. More
capital was employed on that commodity in the mid-17th century in
the Amsterdam bourse than any other. 22

The expansion of economic activity in the colonial and
slave trade which occurred in the first half of the 17th century was
aided crucially by the inflow of capital and entrepreneurial skills
to Amsterdam in particular, following the fall of Antwerp in 1585
when the centre of commercial and speculative activity shifted from
there to the United Netherlands. Financiers like Fugger and Welser
of Germany, and Gualterotti and Buonvisi of Italy had branches or
agents in Antwerp, as did bankers and speculators from Florence,
Genoa and Spain. 23 Small and medium-sized joint stock companies had
been formed in Antwerp where foreign capital and local seamanship
skills combined and set a precedent of operational use in Amsterdam
later. This in turn generated insurance broking and by 1564 there
were some 600 people in the insurance business there. 24

After the fall of Antwerp, the Protestants were given a
few years to get out, and they left (as did others) taking capital
and skills with them to the north. Some 20,000 refugees from the
south went north: many were merchants, some were Marranos, and there

pp.133-4. Violet Barbour puts a figure on it: she estimates
that ¾ of the capital active on the Bourse was in the Baltic
East India or West India trade was never equal to the Mediterranean
or Baltic 'mother trade', but it was nonetheless very important.

Op. cit., II, p.330. Its reputation was such that 5,000 merchants
cit., p.375.

is also likely to be characterized by a taste for gambling in all
its forms .... In the feverish atmosphere of Antwerp in the
sixteenth century a whole world of promoters of more of less
chimerical projects appeared - purveyors of advice, men with many
irons in the fire, and also inventors and engineers". Ibid., p.32.
It was, like Amsterdam later, not without its crooks either.
were also exiles from Poland, Germany, Spain, Portugal, France and England. But these external factors did not create the commercial, financial and maritime strength that had been growing in Holland and Zealand. The City of Amsterdam had careful marchant-oligarch rulers who were sensitive to the economic needs of the United Provinces. The institutions which could attract and regulate the search for profit were quickly set up. A Chamber of Insurance was established in 1598. The V.O.C. was fashioned in 1602 out of the anarchy of shipping companies which included the most prominent - De Compagnie van Verre (Distant Lands Company). A Bourse was opened in 1608 by the Town Council, and its early dealings were in the Town Hall. In the following year an exchange bank was opened and in 1614 a lending bank was set up.

These institutions and the finance that kept them going and fuelled the economic expansion that rapidly ensued flourished in a climate which had for long been hospitable to speculation and commercial activity. A tradition of one-off investment ventures - known as bodemerij (derived from the English, bottomry) - developed


27. Barbour: Op.cit., p.17. The exchange bank was the "most famous instrument of Amsterdam capitalism". From 708 depositors in 1609-11 more than half came from the southern provinces, while a third of the wealthiest Amsterdammers were also of Southern origin. Ibid., p.45 and p.24. See also van Dantzig: Op.cit., p.15.
into the more extensive joint enterprises (rederij) which took place on the basis of limited liability. Even people of very small means could participate in shipping ventures and they became known as "ventures on parts". Some 'parts' were as small as 1/192. A group of reders (ship-owners, literally) would "... combine for a purpose limited as to scope or as to time ...." and they might participate in "... building, buying, chartering or freighting a ship .... (or) .... take shares in .... a mill, a train-cookery, a lighter, an anchor-smithy, a rope walk, a lime-kiln or a starch-factory". 28 When the first ships returned from the East at the end of the 16th century and the V.O.C. was formed, Netherlanders must have thought that the hitherto deam of limitless riches was coming true. Small investors were encouraged to participate in the Company, and it was also seen as a national and united front against the Iberians. There was a rush of such investors. "Small tradesmen, artisans, and men of all walks of life contacted someone who knew a director, no matter how tenuous the connection might be. An Amsterdam merchant is recorded as having acted for his wife's seamstress and laundry woman." 29

28. Barbour: Op.cit., p.141. All this helped to establish the tradition and habit of saving (and gambling) to invest in some enterprise or another. Ibid., pp.28-9. When the Cape burgers later repeatedly asked for permission engage in free trade along the east coast it was thus quite in line with a strong tradition and practice in Dutch economic history and behaviour.

By the middle of the 17th century, the "... primacy of the city (Amsterdam) was threefold: as a shipping centre, as a commodity market and as a market for capital ...". 30 The city dealt in timber, fisheries, wine, grain, sugar, tobacco, English tin, coals, Swedish copper, Spanish wool, Bordeaux wine and even Portuguese salt. Foreign governments and princes came to Amsterdam to raise loans, and Dutch capital was invested and deployed abroad. The merchants and financiers of the City traded in knowledge, provided brokerage, credit, insurance and exchange facilities. 31

The accumulation of capital and the availability of skills meant that the United Netherlands were not entirely without industrial output. Ship-building boomed on the banks of the Ij and the Zaan. 32 With windmills for power, peat for fuel, inland waterways for transport, cheap labour on tap, the industrial production of the Republic climbed through the 17th century. It involved textiles, woollens, linens, brick-works, lumber-sawing, oil-pressing, paper-making and of course the printing industry: the majority of English books were printed in the Netherlands in the 17th century; Oxford University Press got its oriental type-faces from Holland, and thousands of volumes and pamphlets in German, Latin, French, Spanish, Hebrew, Syrian, Bohemian, Danish and Dutch flew off the presses. 33

30. Barbour: Op. cit., p. 18. "For their shipping, trafficke and Commerce by sea I conceive No place in the world comes Near itt, there being att once come into the Texel att my being there 26 shippes, viz From E India 8, From W India 9, and 9 from Guinny etts.,". Peter Mundy: The Travels of Peter Mundy, IV, p. 71. He described: "...corne, pitch, tarre, flax, hempe, etts. From Dantzicke, Cuningsberg, etts., in the Baltic Sea; Masts, timber, Fish, etts., From Norway: From Denmarck, Cattle; And from any part off the world besides, either in Europe, Asia, Affricke or America, where any trade is,... with which supplying other Countries they More and More enrich their owns". Ibid., p. 72.


The centre of the industrial activity was not Amsterdam but Haarlem, and Leiden, and the effects and impact of this atmosphere and ethos spread out into most areas of the country. The trading and maritime activities had, from the 16th century and before, influenced the ideology and culture of the entire society. The smallness of the country, the relative density of the population and the proximity of the towns to the rural areas accentuated this. I return to this question shortly.

What socio-political structure was associated with, and made possible this extraordinary explosion of commercial and economic activity? The explanation lies partly in the history of the social structure of the Netherlands after the decay of weak old feudal relations and partly in the contingent factors forced upon the merchant-oligarchs by the war with Spain. The relevance of this for the kind of people and the dominant values and assumptions of the men who joined and manned the V.O.C. will be apparent. After the 13th century, slavery hardly existed in the Low countries, and unfree labour was all but gone by the 16th century. A careful sketch of the main features of Dutch rural society in the early 16th century has been given by de Vries. They included a substantially free and land-holding peasantry, involved in buying and selling land or — if not the land — owning the houses which stood on it.

34. One authority notes that "...... peasants whose land lay near a town were more aware of the advantages of capitalism. Having realised that the provisioning of the townspeople depended largely upon themselves, they exploited the situation and, as a result, there was a great degree of prosperity among them than in more rural provinces". Zumtorn: Op.cit., p.246. The notion of an all-pervasive and 'hegemonic' ideology in the Netherlands in the 17th century is sustained by all this evidence.

The bulk of the northern districts of Friesland, West Friesland and Groningen were enfranchised and seigneuries were non-existent. "In a society with a weak privileged class, without feudal tenure, without open fields and nucleated villages, any description of peasant society must stress individualism rather than a communal spirit. The customary portrait of rural society in Europe, showing it to be legally divided but socially cohesive, is misleading in many instances but is certainly wrong in the northern Netherlands".\(^{36}\)

The northern Netherlands (which became the Republic) had few noble landholdings; there was no important traditional aristocracy, with lateral links to the Church, as elsewhere in Europe. Only in Utrecht was there any significant alliance between the 'hoofdelingen' (noblemen) and monasteries.\(^{37}\) Moreover, the clergy"... as an estate, had ceased to exist with the victory of the new faith; in fact, Calvinism could not have spread so quickly had the clerical estate been more firmly rooted in the first place".\(^{38}\) Thus neither the Reformation nor the Revolt had any serious opposition from abbeys or prelates. The Church in the Netherlands enjoyed nothing like the ownership of land that was elsewhere the case. (It owned between 1/5 and 1/3 of all landed property in Western Europe).\(^{39}\)


\(^{37}\) Ibid., p.26 and pp.38-43. "Feudalism was dead. Noble and priest had given way to the urban middle class. A burgher aristocracy ruled the cities and the cities ruled the commonwealth". Fisher: Op. cit., p.596. De Vries says that in Holland there were only 12 families belonging to the 'accredited' noble class. de Vries: Ibid., p.35.


\(^{39}\) Albert Hyma: Christianity, Capitalism and Communism, p.12. Sir William Temple, in his Observations Upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands wrote: "For whereas in most, if not all other parts of Christendom, the clergy composed one of the Three Estates of the Country, And thereby shar'd with the Nobles and Commons in the Influence upon the Government; That order never made any part of the Estates in Holland, nor had any Vote in their assembly, which consisted only of the Nobles and the Cities ....". p.103.
With this kind of rural background and social structure, at the middle point of the 16th century, it is not surprising that the distinctly bourgeois and fundamentally urban society which grew up in the Netherlands in the period of the revolt was one in which individualistic and acquisitive values, rooted in trade and exchange, profit and interest rates, dominated. The main events of the Revolt are well known; they need only be used here to account for the political structure which emerged and which was reflected in the organization of the V.O.C. The Revolt had its roots deep in the 16th century and had a complex mixture of causes and conditions which linked economic grievances to some emergent religious differences and political ambitions. Opposition to the centralising policies of Philip, resistance to the relentless extraction of revenues from the Netherlands for Imperial purposes, the presence of Spanish troops, the ugly persecutions of the Inquisition (which had been introduced by Charles V in 1522), the infringement of jealously guarded urban autonomies and the general disruption and interruption of peaceful trade which this all entailed, turned to active revolt in the 1560s. It is important to remember that at this time and for long to come the vast majority of the people of all the Netherlands were still Catholics and that Calvinists were a minority, though a sharp and active one. The general support for the revolt, even by Catholics, perhaps reflected an increasingly protestant and 'nationalist' definition of the situation vis-à-vis Spain. The dramatic events of 1568-1572, culminated with the capture of Brill by the Sea-Beggars; then all the provinces of the Low Countries agreed to resist together according to the Pacification of Ghent in 1576. The alliance did not hold, and Spanish power was able to detach the Southern provinces from the seven northern provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Gelderland,
Overijssel, Groningen and Friesland. These latter provinces came
together in the Union of Utrecht in 1579. It was a cautious, loose,
defensive military alliance of supposedly independent and autonomous
States. Each town council sent members to its provincial States to
represent them, and the Union of Utrecht brought them together in
the States General. Though initially more of a "... meeting of
allies rather than a parliamentary assembly..." its power grew in
time.40 Rather, because the contribution of Holland and Zealand to
Republican revenues was so great, their influence was powerful at
the centre. The position of Holland in the political economy of the
Netherlands is worth underlining here if only because Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, Delft, Dordrecht, Leyden and the Hague - all major towns -
were in Holland.41 By 1581, through the Act of Abjuration, the
United Netherlands embarked upon a policy that could not be easily
reversed, and the war generated its own momentum of hostilities and
hates. A twelve-year truce from 1609 allowed the Dutch to make fast
certain gains, though it also revealed deep political differences
amongst the elite about war and politics and theology and the attitude
to Spain, which culminated in the execution of the liberal leader
Oldenbarneveldt and the stiff conservative pronouncements of the
Synod of Dort. The truce ended in 1621 and the war with the Iberians

aspect of the Netherlands see Blok: Op.cit., III, ch.XII; Pirenne:
contemporary account, see O.F.Mentzel: A Description ...,I,
pp.43-50.

41. The Republic's revenue was raised by quota from each province.
Amsterdam contributed 58.5% of the total. J.G.van Dillen: Op.
of the State of Holland that the V.O.C. was formed from the cut-
throat competition between at least 10 different Companies
operating in the East before 1602. The activity and ferocity of
the competition was fierce, and before the V.O.C. was formed the
Eastern trade was known as "de wilde vaart".
commenced again, fought first in the East Indies and then the West Indies, down the African coast and across the Atlantic. All means were used: ruthless commercial rivalry, buccaneering, piracy and the more conventional methods. Finally, in 1648 the war was brought to a formal end by Spain's recognition of Dutch independence at the Treaty of Münster in 1648. Four years later van Riebeeck arrived at the Cape. 42

The institutional structure of the United Netherlands remained much the same as laid down in the Union of Utrecht, though real political power in the towns, States and the States-General stemmed from two related sources. On the one hand there was the well-established power, mutually respected autonomy and considerable authority of the town councils. Municipal life had been active in the Middle Ages and had been related to a thriving commercial involvement, and continued to be so in the 17th century. 43 On the other hand, power was, in general, concentrated in the hands of the relatively few members of the urban patriciate - the regents or oligarchs - who had been and still were dominant in the commercial life. Masselman has given a useful account of the history and

42. Classically, as in the case with most nationalisms, the conflict with Spain united temporarily different classes, groups and even religions against a common enemy. Many Catholic 'politiques' were active in Zealand and Holland in the 1560s. Also "... the act by which the rebellious provinces abjured King Philip II in 1581 alleged no religious reasons or justification". J.W.Smit: "The Present position regarding the Revolt of the Netherlands", p.13. Huizinga points out that Alva's taxation plans were particularly resented in the North because they infringed local communal and fiscal traditions of independence and provincial autonomy and authority. See also Masselman: Op.cit., passim. Sir William Temple, who was British Ambassador to the Hague from 1668-70, gave a generally similar - and balanced - explanation of the revolt. Temple: Op.cit., pp.17-18. E.P.Thompson has pointed out how religious sentiment and political hostilities can become fused amongst all classes in nationalist fervour. See The Making of the English Working Class, especially chapter 11.

structure of town politics in Amsterdam, with the Vroedschap (board of regents) of 36 Burghers running the city, with the right to co-opt. And Murray reports Burgomaster Hooft of Amsterdam as saying in 1615 that the "...government consisted entirely of either merchants or persons who at one time engaged in trade. The Vroedschap came from trade and ruled a city dedicated to it". 44 Power in Dutch cities, derived from success in, and command over, commerce, placed authority "... in the hands of a few people drawn from a small group closely knit by intermarriage" and they "... constituted a strict oligarchy...". 45 These town councils were thus the locus of political and economic power. The franchise was limited - some councils were self-appointing - but it varied from town to town and province to province. 46

This cautious confederacy that defined the political structure of the United Netherlands and which brought together a series of centres of power was a rough model upon which the 1602 constitution of the V.O.C. was based. 47 Run too by an oligarchy - and dominated by the province of Holland - it was strict in terms of discipline and committed without reservation to the pursuit of profit


46. In Friesland, for example, the system of government was based on the voting rights of the farmers who owned land. de Vries: Op.cit., p.26. See also J.C.Renier: The Dutch Nation, p.17, where he describes how early representative forms of government gave way to oligarchies.

through trade by the ruthless application of the principle of monopoly, despite Grotius' defence of the freedom of the seas.\textsuperscript{48} In ideological terms the V. O. C. mixed ferocity of principle with the pragmatic adoption of tactics designed to achieve its main ends. Within its domain no independent entrepreneurial activity was permitted apart from the grudging right which was permitted to employees to return from the East with some booty in their sea-chests. Like the United Netherlands, the V. O. C. was a careful hierarchy of power, wealth and status. In the end these rigid principles and procedures of mercantilism constricted the emergence of a domestic industrial economy, but the accumulation of wealth, which was available for loan, was a decisive factor influencing the industrial development of England.\textsuperscript{49} In short, the V. O. C. was a concentrated distillate of some of the harsher and more relentless material values of Dutch society: it sought profit, it applied a monopoly and it gave no quarter in its pursuit of these ends. The men who joined the Company, indeed who were the Company, reflected all this. They were in general, ruthless, greedy, usually uncouth and rough, yet, strangely, the evidence suggests that a relatively high proportion of them were literate.

What were the features of social structure, culture and ideology in the Netherlands in the 17th century that permits that generalization? It is important to underline this: for the men who went to the Cape came from that society or via that Company, even if

\textsuperscript{48} See Boxer: \textit{Op.cit.}, and especially chapter 4, "Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum".

one third of them were from other parts of Protestant Europe. The political and social structure, as outlined above, was a mixture of horizontal federalism and a highly stratified hierarchy both within each Province and the Republic as a whole. Yet Dutchmen - and others - aspired to be merchants: "Any man could try to enter this class. Any man might, by careful planning, audacity, and luck, become one of the greatest merchants to whom the highest magisterial offices of the town were available."\(^50\) The first and most pervasive factor that needs to be underlined is that Dutch society generated and expressed a highly urban - and necessarily literate - culture. By the 15th century, Holland was predominantly urban and so, to a lesser extent, were Zealand and Utrecht.\(^51\) By 1662 some 60% of the people of Holland were townspeople.\(^52\) There was great poverty amongst many of the urban dwellers, and Leyden textile workers lived in hovels. Child labour was exploited in the early 17th century and a limit of 14 hours per day was placed on the working hours of children in that town in 1646. Against these depressing features of the urban life there must be set the remarkable reputation of the Dutch (and Amsterdam in particular) for their provision of alms-houses, poorhouses and workhouses, as well as orphanages and reception centres for vagabonds and tramps.\(^53\)

50. Masselman: Op.cit., p.60. Few can have succeeded though, for the oligarchies closed in on themselves - yet many no doubt aspired.


52. North and Thomas: Op.cit., p.105; Haley: Op.cit., p.49. The population of Amsterdam is indicative. It grew from about 30,000 in 1567 to 100,000 in 1600, to 115,000 in 1630, to 170,000 in 1652 and reached 200,000 in 1670. Antwerp's population had fallen from the high of 100,000 in 1550 to 50,000 in 1600. Figures from Zumthor, Barbour, Haley, Geyl, Bloom and D.W.Davies.

The 'swarming proletariat' of the towns and particularly the sea-towns had developed no political response to their condition: there was remarkably little protest against the conditions that they lived in.\(^\text{54}\) On the contrary, despite the squalor of their lives, the trading and material ideology appears to have been pervasive and hegemonic. "It is a fact, nevertheless, that numerous witnesses hailing from the Catholic countries of Europe were shocked to find that greed of gain seemed the prime motive power, not only for the leading class, but of the entire community".\(^\text{55}\) The ordinary man was said to be "... terribly grasping, and the prospects of immediate profit would set an entire working-class district in an uproar of excitement. Inn-keepers, coach-men, porters, hawkers, all had a single instinct when confronted with an unknown customer - to fleece him as thoroughly as possible, without regard for established tariffs".\(^\text{56}\) The norm of making a profit influenced all classes in the society deeply in all forms and particulars.

One ought not to be surprised that social behaviour in such a highly urban society - and one through which there flowed thousands of soldiers and sailors - was like this. In the paintings of the


56. Zumthor: \textit{Op.cit.}, p.237. Later, similar views were commonly expressed about Cape Town burgers. See, for instance, Robert Percival: \textit{An Account of the Cape of Good Hope}. He was also in the Netherlands before going to the Cape and thus his comparative comments on this point are relevant.
Dutch masters there are acres of 'tavern' scenes, and pictures depicting 'The Procuress', or the baudy, puking, lecherous, drunken and splendidly debauched figures represented by Adriaen Brouwer (or Jan Steen's 'The Joyous Return'), which are in stark contrast to the stolid, staid and dark figures depicted for example in Rembrandt's ' Syndics' or his 'Nightwatch'. Sir William Temple found Dutch mariners to be "plain .... rougher people .... surly and ill-mannered", and though people were frugal and 'passions cooler', "Avarice may be expected". There was much drinking.

57. On Brouwer, see G. Knuttel: Adriaen Brouwer. The Collections of Rubens and Rembrandt are many. I found the following very useful. Rubens: Des Meisters Gemalde; Lawrence Gowring: Vermeer; Seymour Slive: Frans Hals; Arthur M. Hind: A Catalogue of Rembrandt's Etchings, and Otto Benesch: The Drawings of Rembrandt. I am grateful to Richard Verdi who spared time to point out some interesting aspects of the Dutch masters, and who steered me in the direction of some valuable sources for them.

58. Temple: Op. cit., pp.82-90. Renier suggests that there was a two-tiered proletariat - the rabble ('het grauw') which inspired everyone with fear and horror, and "... the orderly proletariat, the hard-working manual labourer, the farmhand, the man in the dockyard, the sailor, the domestic servant, all the people whose employment was fairly regular and who shared in the prosperity of the country". Renier: Op. cit., pp.101-2. A roughly similar distinction is still made in the North of England, for instance, where the aspirant members of the working class are referred to as "clean working class". The distinction is not so much based on the type of work done, but the endorsement of middle-class values and behaviours.
observer of the Low countries in the late 17th century, described in detail the licensed brothel in Amsterdam he came across—called 'The Long Seller'. "This exchange is open from six a clock in the evening until nine at night; every Whore must pay three stivers at the Door for her entrance or admission. I have heard some (people) plead for toleration (though Ministers preached against it—A. L.) of these wicked Meetings, upon pretext, that when the East-India Fleets come home, the seamen are so mad for women that if they had not such Houses to bait in, they would force the Very Citizens' Wives and Daughters ....". Whatever may have been the degree of commitment to Calvinism and the Reformed Church, the notion of a puritan, pious and restrained life in which men accumulated their wealth in response to some inner calling and devotion to work, and lived dry and devout lives makes no sense as a generalization about urban Dutch culture and ideology in the 17th century.

As one might expect in a highly urban society hinging on an economy devoted to that kind of trade and exchange, the level of literacy was high. In the middle of the 16th century, the Italian observer Guicciardini noted that ".... the common people have mostly a beginning knowledge of grammar and just about all of them, yes, even the farmers and the country folk, know at least reading and writing". A century later, the literacy of grooms married in Amsterdam with the occupation of seafarer, born abroad, was 41%; of those born in Amsterdam the percentage was 55% and of those born in the smaller towns around the percentage was 59%. In all, the percentage of

59. William Carr: An Accurate Description of the United Netherlands, pp.70-71. He claimed that at that time the V.O.C. alone employed about 30,000 men "in constant pay". Ibid., p.34.
literate grooms in Amsterdam in 1630 was 57%, in 1660 it was 64% and in 1680 it was 70%.\(^6\) In a society devoted to trade the skills of literacy were crucial and the Dutch thus socialized their young accordingly. Educational institutions - from infant schools to universities or the so-called 'illustrious schools' - were widespread. There were five universities by the mid-17th century: Leiden (1575), Franeker (1585), Groningen (1614), Utrecht (1636) and Hardewijk (1648).

The book and publishing trade flourished, and not simply on the export market. The high literacy rate helps to explain the volume of chap-books and travel books that were published in Dutch. After the Bible, the many travel accounts which were published in those days were most popular.\(^6\) Printed newsletters - corants - were a feature of the Republic, dating from 1618, and were a major means of distributing news.\(^6\) People were well informed.

Visitors, like Sir John Evelyn and Peter Mundy, commented on the number of paintings and painters, and the common custom of buying pictures at fairs. Houses and shops were well decorated with them, though the artists did not fare at all well, for there was no court or Church which could or would patronize them, and the market was glutted.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) Zumthor citing Guliciardini; and de Vries: Op.cit., p.212. Later at the Cape, there is evidence to show that Dutchmen who arrived in the 17th century and Germans who filtered into the burger population after 1717, were not all illiterate. Many could sign their names, and did. See Hoge: Hydreae and Personalia of the Germans, passim. The percentage amongst the Germans was probably higher, but an accurate count should be done to establish the point.


It was from this society (or through it in the case of foreigners) and steeped in that extraordinary culture and ideology of gain, that the men who joined the V.O.C. came. Some 3-400 men annually went East with the fleets. Amsterdam was the major centre for the recruitment of employees, whether Dutchmen or foreigners. There were sometimes problems in getting enough men to go East, but this was offset by the wild enthusiasm with which some men viewed the prospects of getting East and the competition to enlist was stiff. Mentzel described a scene on recruitment day at the East India House. "I myself have seen men scramble up to the window of the second storey, above the door, and wait there, hanging on to the iron grating, until the door was open; then immediately let go, fall on the heads of the men standing round the door and in this way get carried into the (recruiting) house". Though Catholics were not allowed to join, there were Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians, Frenchmen, Irishmen, Scandinavians and Germans in the employ of the Company and it kept recruiting agents in Bremen and Hamburg.

64. Geyl: Op.cit.,II,p.182. During the 17th century, that is. According to Boxer, some 578 ships left the Netherlands for the East between 1611 and 1651. Boxer: Op.cit., p.314. Nieuwenhuis gives a slightly higher annual average of about 30 per annum. Rob Nieuwenhuis: Oost-Indische Spiegel, p.32. Given a ship's complement of about 200 men, something like 115,000 men visited the Indies in that 40 year period alone. Even allowing for the high mortality rate on board and for men doing second or third voyages, the number is impressive. Consider the quite explicit reasons for joining the V.O.C. as given by Volkert Evertz who had worked as a bookbinder in Amsterdam, and "... had several times heard from those who had journeyed to the East Indies and were once again come back home, what an excellent land this was .... and how also they had brought back a good fistful of money. I also became wishful to see these lands; and knowing no other means thereto than to abandon my trade (which brought me in little), I resolved to take service with the Proprietors of the East India Company. To this end I had myself signed on at Amsterdam as a Cadet. R.Raven-Hart: Cape Good Hope, I, p.45.


67. See next page
From "all corners of Protestant Germany (came men) eager for adventure and gain", and Flemings, Walloons, Scandinavians and Germans "swarmed" to Amsterdam in search of fortunes. It was from amongst ".. the poorer classes" both urban and rural that men joined the V.O.C. hoping to get East, to make their fortunes and return home. 68 For them, as with the officials, and the Heeren and the investors "... the polestar was profit, its lodestone greed". 69

Internal corruption bit deeply into the efficiency of the V.O.C., so that when finally the Company collapsed the initials were said to mean 'vergaan onder corruptie' (perished through corruption). 70

Not all recruits however appear to have been anxious to get East: and there was an active press-ganging business conducted by the zielverkopers, the crimps. 71 Men were sought in pubs,

67. Masselman: Op.cit., pp.243-4; Boxer: Op.cit., pp.82-9, and The Dutch Seaborne Empire, pp.55-6; Geyl: Op.cit.,II, p.182. Not all the men in the V.O.C. service at the Cape were Calvinists. There were various creeds of Protestants and probably a few Catholics. Certainly there were Lutherans and sympathisers: see B.Kruger: The Pear Tree Blossoms, passim. The first Jew in South Africa was David Heylbron, a German, who was baptized at the Cape though he arrived as a soldier in 1671. He was the cattle-herd at Hout Bay. He signed his name in Hebrew. Hoge: Personalia, p.159.


69. J.S.Furnivall: Netherlands India, p.34.

70. Ibid., pp.48-9.

71. J.De Huliu: "De Matrozen en soldaten op de schepen Der Oost-Indische Compagnie", passim. He gives a vivid and detailed account of the practice.
promised the earth and then compelled to sign over a portion of their future wages in return for being found a place on a ship. Some men found themselves going East when they'd hoped to travel to the West Indies, and youngsters were pressed into service. For this reason alone, it is no wonder that desertion rates were high. De Hullu estimates that the non-national element constituted about a third of the ships' companies. Once sailors and soldiers completed their 3 to 5-year contract and returned from the East they were reputed often to have immediately squandered their earnings - or what was left after the crimps had taken their commission, in a six-week orgy of pub crawling: hence the name, 'Lord of Six Weeks'. What stories they told can only be imagined, and then with difficulty, but presumably their tales fired the imaginations of those who were already interested in, or predisposed to go East. And so the flow of men turned the wheel of the V.O.C.

While outwardly proper and respectable in appearance and behaviour, the ruling classes nonetheless promoted their international interests - through the W.I.C., the V.O.C. and a variety of other ventures - with systematic dedication and ruthlessness. These values and goals were endorsed by both the 'respectable' working class and 'het grauw', who saw in the work of the two great Companies - whose wealth they aspired to share - the combination of two related objectives. The one was the defeat of the Portuguese and Spanish, and the other was the victory of Calvinism over the corrupt affluence of the Church of Rome, under which they had come to see themselves as suffering. The role of the Dutch Reformed Church and Calvinism in providing the ideological articulation for certain secular and national objectives will be examined shortly. What needs to be stressed here is that the representative figure sketched earlier - of a generally
uncouth, rough, grasping, materialistic and chauvinistic representative employee of the V.O.C. — was identified later at the Cape by many, including Grevenbroek. Not only Dutchmen, but ".... all the criminals and rascals who flee into Holland by land, or down the Scheldt, the Maas, the Waal, the Rhine, the Canal of Drusus, the Ems .... most of these intend to serve under the flag of our Company. Their virtue is to triumph over the restraints all other men obey; no place is left in their breasts for any honest hope".72 Many observers at the Cape in the 17th and 18th century identified these characteristics in the inhabitants of the town, both Official and burger, so that it cannot be said that the general norms and behaviours of V.O.C. Officials and employees (and free burgers who were drawn from them in the main) at the Cape were radically different from the prevailing patterns outlined here for the urban life of the seaports of the Netherlands.

If robust materialism and roughness, ambition and greed emerged from and sustained the socio-economic life and the political ambience of the Republic by the time the settlement was established at the Cape, what role did Calvinism play in all this and especially in the ideology of the people? What, if any, were its implications for attitudes and behaviours towards 'heathens' and/or people of colour? The point must be dealt with here because it is a common assumption of much South African historiography that Calvinism can in some way be held causally responsible for many aspects of the attitudes and

72. J.G. Grevenbroek: "A Short Account of the Cape of Good Hope", p.237. During the first decade at the Cape some of the convictions reveal something of the character of the men. Offences included insulting and/striking the Commander and/or visiting Captains; brawling with knives when drunk; desertion or attempted desertion; theft; assisting the 'Hottentots' to steal vegetables; blaspheming in public against the Commander's wife and other women. See "Abstract of Convictions", Moodie: The Record, I, pp.251-4.
behaviours of Dutchmen at the Cape. Some examples will illustrate the point, and underline the earlier argument about the hegemony of 'idealism' in the historiography, from which one is left sometimes with the impression of a bleak, gloomy and orderly Dutch society, rigid and repressed by the nightmare of Calvinism and devout in most forms and particulars. Freda Troup, following Walker, comments: "The basic factor in the evolution of the Afrikaner Volk was their deep rooting in seventeenth century Calvinism. The original settlers emigrated from a Netherlands which had been nourished on this stern doctrine for a hundred years".  

In his account of later 19th century developments, Professor Walker insists that "... starting with an endowment of late 17th century Calvinism and brought up for generations among slaves or Bushmen and Hottentot serfs and latterly Bantu barbarians, the Trekkers held as firmly as any politician in the Carolinas that there was a divinely appointed gulf between themselves and such as these".  

F. A. van Jaarsveld alludes to the heritage of the "... Calvinist religious doctrine" as one of the factors in the conception and formation of the Afrikaner nation.  

Sheila Patterson suggests that the doctrine which the Boers took with them through the slow trek of the 18th century and beyond was that "... of sixteenth century Calvinism .... Chief among these doctrines were that of the 'elect' and that of 'predestination".  

And C. F. J. Muller opines that inspiration "... of a Calvinistic trust in God" influenced Afrikaners to spread Christian civilization in Africa.  

73. Freda Troup: South Africa, p. 50.  
76. Sheila Patterson: The Last Trek, p. 177.  
Spilhaus says that "... the Calvinist best of them trusted in Jehovah with all the faith of the Israelites, and many believed that the footsteps of the Israelites had preceded them". L.M. Thompson argues that "... primitive Calvinism", expressed in the Heidelberg catachism and the decrees of Dort "... with its emphasis on predestination ..." were "peculiarly suited to the taste of the white community ..." which was accustomed from birth to treating non-white peoples as slaves or serfs or enemies ...". And, as pointed out in chapter 1, Nason suggests that the 'Calvinistic religion' was of crucial causal primacy in the development of Cape 'race relations'. Katzen takes a similar view. Even radical and marxist scholars are drawn into the tempting explanatory box. Jordaan talks of the trekkers as "... armed with the doctrine of predestination...", and Legassick, stressing the Calvinist "... two-class conception of man..." with its roots in its Dutch bourgeois history, suggests that it had "... greater inherent tendencies towards rigid racial definitions...". It seems clearly to be the case that this kind of view, and the tone with which it is relayed, is one of the many South African historical myths. Certainly if one starts one's enquiries in the metropolitan Dutch context, there is simply no serious basis for these sweeping explanatory positions. Moreover, as will emerge in later chapters,

there is precious little evidence, from the trekkers in the 18th century themselves, that they saw themselves as 'Israelites', or that they trusted in Jehovah and were guided in their social and economic policies of inclusion and exclusion by the high principles of predestination identifying the 'Elect' and damned. Nor is it strictly-speaking true that they treated and regarded all 'non-whites' as serfs or slaves: they cohabitated with them, slept with them, married them, hunted with them, fought side by side on commando parties with them, gambled with them and got drunk with them, and in general crossed the supposed divided between the Damned and the Elect a lot more often than can, generally speaking, have been to their ultimate Eternal credit. Moreover the view that Calvinism was causally responsible for a variety of Cape developments is never supported by an analysis of the mechanism of that process. If it is argued that dichotomous Calvinist ideas were widely held in the Dutch Republic - which is contested below on other grounds - and then exported to the Cape, how did they structure and influence behaviour and 'race relations' there? What evidence endorses such a view and what socio-psychological mechanism transformed such ideas into practice? The onus is on those who make the claim to illustrate the process. There is however little evidence, and seldom are examples given for the 17th and 18th centuries, and one is left largely with generalized statements of a speculative kind that the 'negative' aspects of Calvinism, its stress on predestination, the idea of the elect and its exclusivity "... were all perfectly adapted to the interracial situation on the frontier."\(^\text{83}\) But even that kind of view becomes untenable if one argues - as has been recently done with

\(^\text{83. MacCrone: Op.cit., p.129 and Note 3 on that page.}\)
great force - that there was no 'racial' frontier in that sense of ingroups and outgroups, as MacCrone's formulation requires. On the contrary, the 'frontier' early on "involved inclusion as well as exclusion: in whatever capacity, non-whites became parts of the total society". 84

But here it is necessary to look at the extent and role of Calvinism in the United Provinces before the settlement took place.

Who articulated the Calvinist position? What was it in relation to aliens and heathens? Did it influence behaviour in the Netherlands, and whose? Was it exclusively a religious and theological phenomenon, or did it become deeply implicated in a nationalist definition of the situation of the Netherlands vis-a-vis Spain? In any event how widespread was it, and how many Calvinists were there? Huizinga writes thus: 85

The stranger interested in our history generally has the idea that the Republic was a wholly Calvinistic state. We ourselves know better than that. The Dutch Reformed Church, our particular brand of Calvinism, prevailed in the form laid down by the Synod of Dort. This does not mean that the country, people and culture were completely moulded in the Calvinist stamp .... Before 1600 many a serious man, particularly among the educated classes had yet to make a final choice between Catholicism and the new Faith .... Everywhere large minorities continued to adhere to Rome, even in Zealand, the Protestant stronghold. It is proof positive of the lack of proselytizing fervour among the Reformers that round the foci of the Revolt - round Alkmaar and Leyden - most of the villages remained predominantly Catholic. .... The victory of 1618 (Dort, A.L.) barely deserves the name. For however orthodox the Protestant majority had grown since the crisis, it would be untrue to say that Dutch life and culture, seen as a whole, was dominated by the spirit of the Synod of Dort. How quickly were the Remonstrants rehabilitated!


A careful reading of the literature, and the observations of contemporaries, reveals a number of closely related features of religion and Calvinism in the Netherlands in the 17th century. First, it is not clear that even by 1670 a majority of the people of the Netherlands were Calvinist. Secondly, there is abundant evidence - implicit in some of what has gone before, above, and in the art, literature and observations of visitors - that the grim injunctions of Dort and the anti-capitalist preaching of the ministers were in no way representative of the beliefs or behaviours of the mass of the people. Thirdly, Geyl's claim that the Synod of Dort had declared the Church to be the community of the elect and that Blacks were doomed to slavery, as the sons of Ham, has little foundation in the specific formulations of the Dort Synod, or later Synods. Fourthly, the most important role of Calvinism in the Republic as it emerged in the course of the Revolt was to help in the formulation and articulation of a more secular, national ideology and crusade against the Iberians and Rome in the global struggle for a trading supremacy. It also helped to define more sharply the perspective and identity of Dutchmen abroad in that it acted to establish a more or less clear consciousness amongst them of the ideological, cultural and behavioural differences between them, on the one hand, and the 'heathen' peoples they encountered on the other hand. Cultural consciousness of that rounded, multidimensional form, preceded colour consciousness. The evidence which supports these propositions is abundant.

In Holland in 1587 about 90% of the population were Roman Catholic, and Geyl says that in the Province only about 50% of the population by mid-17th century "... belonged to the Church which at
Dort had purged herself so very completely". 86 A French official declared in 1672 that only a third of the total population were Calvinists, that another third were still Catholic and the remainder belonged to various Protestant groups. 87 "A Calvinist surveying society during the Years of the Truce could be little satisfied even with the literature ..... The Calvinist in the North saw a vigorous and colourful society, a surging of desires and opinions, an irresistible effervescing of forces which cared neither for election nor for predestination...". 88

Moreover it was a relatively tolerant society, despite the official pronouncements from Dort. Mundy wrote enthusiastically that ".... every one goes to what Church he pleases, there being only 8 or 9 public churches besides the English, French, Lutheran, Anabaptists, etts., and Jewish Sinagogues ...." in Amsterdam. 89 Grotius was an Arminian, Rembrandt a liberal and Vondel became a Catholic when he was 54 in 1641. 90 And the last major witch trial took place in Utrecht in 1595, when that province was the centre of strict Calvinism. 91 Nonetheless, there were periods when Catholics did bear the brunt of harrassment and persecution, particularly at times of internal political strife and when their position and faith was seen as indicating sympathy with the enemy, Spain. 92

The high-point of official Dutch Calvinist orthodoxy was in 1618-1619, and for some years after, consequent upon the Synod of Dort. Its main findings on abstruse theological points are of no more relevance to us here than they were to the man in the street. But Dutch Calvinism must be seen as an integral part of the history and development of the society and its ideology in the process of self-definition and conflict with Spain. Protestantism had first entered the Low Countries by way of the South via France in the form of Lutheranism in the second decade of the 16th century. It achieved a following in Antwerp and other towns and ports. There are two contrasting ways in which this support for the movement may be explained. Pirenne says that "... it triumphed where the worker was reduced to a precarious existence, and where his sufferings drove him to catch at every novelty. Discontent, the spirit of revolt, and the hope of bettering his lot, worked without exception in favour of Calvinism". A different view of this type of urban response has been offered by E.P.Thompson in his account of the role of non-conformism in the English working class. Methodism, like Calvinism in the Dutch Republic, offered many things. It offered a community and structure of ties for people whom Industrial revolution had uprooted, and gave them a place in an otherwise ugly world. In some areas and at some times it merged with fierce hostility to Napoleon, the Beast, and in the emphasis it placed on the after life, it was "... the chiliasm of

the defeated and the hopeless". This latter point is strengthened by the observation that chiliasm has often accompanied 'revolutionary outbursts", and in its 'popular rhetoric', Dissent had two main enemies - Sin and the Pope. Though time and place are different, the central features of Calvinism and Methodism in the two countries seem to have enough in common to treat Thompson's explanation as relevant (and richer) for both. Moreover the impermanence - and hence the subsequent gradual growth of Calvinism in the Netherlands, by means of a surging forward and then a falling back - makes sense of the apparently strong Calvinist moments, followed by a quiet settling back of people into their lives, dominated by trade and imperial activities.94 The blending of Calvinism with the anti-Iberian crusade also acted, moreover, to contain its radical potential.

While the regents and merchants of the late 16th century were not committed to the new faith, they had resented the Spanish interference with, and limitations on, their autonomy in the towns.95 Not being fanatical Calvinists (the Brussels 'rising' of 1576 had been headed by the 'leading classes', who were largely Catholic) there can be little substance to the argument that religious differences


were the cause and central feature of the rift with Spain. There was, in the early 17th century, much tension between regents and merchants (many of whom were still Catholic), and the Calvinist leaders who were puritanical, and hostile to the accumulation of wealth, the charging of high interest rates and acquisitive mercantile norms in general. Yet in the early stages of the Revolt one must perhaps conceive of this group hesitating between choosing for the Beggars (whose Calvinist fanaticism they feared and repudiated) and hence against Spain; or for Spain (and hence 'reactionary' Catholicism, the Inquisition, political centralization and the gnawing away at Netherlands wealth), and against the Beggars. "Oh, you Spaniards, you Spaniards, you will make us all Beggars", cried a Dutch Catholic priest.

The generally depressed urban conditions of the 1560s are the background to the appeal of the Calvinist preachers and hence the initial urban phases and bases of the Revolt, symbolized perhaps in the Breaking of the Images in 1566. "Poverty, unemployment, inflation, taxes, corruption, all seemed to have something to do with the clergy and the church". This is a phenomenon not uncommon in the psychology and sociology of violent mass movements, where one particular outstanding symbol is attacked. The Sea-Beggars who


98. I.Schoffer: Op.cit., p.70. His analysis is sensitive. "The numbers of riots increased, mobs freed heretics out of prisons and even snatched them from the hands of the hangman, images in churches and chapels were besmirched and mutilated". Ibid.,p.71.

99. The literature on these questions is usefully surveyed by Henry Bienen: Violence and Social Change, passim.
took Brill in 1572 and whose followers rampaged in the years thereafter were no more representative than the middle and upper strata of Dutch society in the North which did not go along with the Beggars' bitter intolerance. Indeed there were towns in the North, like Amsterdam and Haarlem, which became refuges for Catholics fleeing from the Beggars, and it is Geyl's view that 'minority dictatorships' were at first forced upon Holland and Zealand towns in the 1570s. With the outcome of the Revolt in doubt for at least 20 years, one must assume that shrewd merchants, their livelihood dependant upon trade and commerce, weighed their outward, overt and expedient support for the initially extreme Calvinist authorities against a concern for peace which was the primary condition for the pursuit of their interests.

But by the end of the 16th century the 'national' dimension of the revolt rubbed the edge off its Calvinist definition. Dutch ships had begun to challenge the Portuguese in West Africa and the East, and they were active in the Mediterranean. As the economic, political and religious dimensions of the conflict between the Netherlands and the Iberians overlapped, the different foci of the revolt complemented each other and diluted the specifically Calvinist aspect of it. Within the Church - though not everywhere in the society - the Calvinists had the advantages of being organized and disciplined, and all the short-term benefits of 'vanguardism' in


101a. J.W. Smit suggests persuasively that the Revolt should be seen not as a bloc, but that there "... were a number of revolts, representing the interests and the ideals of various social, economic and ideological groups: revolts which sometimes run parallel, sometimes conflict with one another, and at other times coalesce into a single movement." J.W. Smit: "The Present Position Regarding the Revolt of the Netherlands", p.28.
politics accrued to them. But they did not dominate or define the contours of social life or determine the conditions of economic activity. As we shall see, not only did they lose touch with the cultural and ideological centres of gravity of Dutch life, but there also were not very many Calvinist ministers. There had only been two in Amsterdam in 1578; there were six in 1600 and 14 in 1622.¹⁰² "In 1593 a commission, appointed by the States of Utrecht made a tour of the province, questioning the newly installed ministers as well as former priests. Their report gives a vivid picture of the motley and sometimes extraordinary conditions prevailing. In the large majority of villages the old priests were still functioning. Many .... declared their willingness to comply; but some were still obviously hankering after the accustomed usage; others had come over part of the way, but had failed, whether through ignorance or through obstinacy, on some particular point".¹⁰³ The colonial question became mixed up in the debate too: there were those who favoured the Truce because it would be good for trade and commerce and there were those who saw such a view as constituting a treasonable compromise with Spain and Catholicism. During the Truce, the religious and political disputes - between predestination and war, on the one hand, and less dogmatism and peace on the other hand - were thrashed out amongst the politicians and the clerical elites. And though the orthodoxy - the Contra-Remonstrants - triumphed at


Dort in 1618/19, it was a Pyrrhic victory: it did not affect the commercial policy or the cultural and ideological tone of the society. Apart from the Divines, the general calibre and intellectual level of the predikanten was low; moreover, it is reckoned that there were fewer than 2,000 in all over the period 1600-1800, while only 1,000 served abroad, and many returned home again after a few years. 104

"Calvinism had to combat a native and strongly humanistic movement, critical of Roman sacramentalism, hostile to dogmatic confessionalism, distrustful of any binding authority in the church save that of the bible, evangelical and tolerant". 105 Not only did it have to combat that tradition in religious matters, but it also was up against the full momentum of the bustle and drive of a commercially-oriented society, deeply implicated in trade and transactions of money, with a keen eye for the profit margin which had characterized and defined Dutch bourgeois society and urban life, and had done for centuries. The explosive maritime thrust of the Netherlands in the 16th and 17th centuries added to that. So the Calvinist divines and predikanten became more and more cut off from the tone and drive of social, political and economic life. In the 1570s the Synod of South Holland had cautioned against permitting a banker to partake of the Holy Supper; theological faculties at


Utrecht advised an Enkhuizen Church not to allow a widow to become a member because she owned shares in a 'Lombard's bank'. Yet by the 1650s the North Holland Synod gave permission for a 'loan' bank clerk to attend communion. So things were changing. At Dort, the Revd. Udemans - the Zealand delegate - denounced usury to be the "..... filthy and dishonest profit that a person obtained by lending his own money or goods against the law of love and equity". And while the predikanten thundered against dancing, long hair for men, tobacco, coffee, taking walks or doing business on Sundays and a host of activities which were central to the operation of capitalism - charging high interest rates, the accumulation of capital through and for speculative ventures, etc. - the people went on very much in their accustomed ways. English puritans were ".... sometimes scandalized by the lax observance of the Sabbath that they found in Dutch cities ..... (where) .... many shops were open, markets held and ships unloaded and loaded ....". Mundy noted that there were few holidays kept, ".... Christmas, Easter, Whitsontide and Sondaies excepted; the latter butt badly kept ...".

Can this be the bleak Calvinism with its grim implications for social relations that emerges when looked at from the dominant perspective in the historiography on South Africa? It seems that one is bound to fail if one tries to read back into Dutch culture and ideology the doctrines of Dort. The evidence of a bustling, active,

mercantile society, and its associated culture and ideology is more persuasive. Artistic, literary, commercial and everyday life - though of course it had its religious dimensions - were imbued by forces "... which worked to a large extent independently of, and indeed hostile to, that religious regime which, nevertheless, in 1618-19 obtained in Holland". And Schoffer's conclusion about the relationship of orthodox Calvinism to the culture of the society seems worth citing in full:

The Calvinised Church seemed to be settling on too small a foundation to become a really representative Church of the whole community of the Republic. The original roots of humanism, from which Calvinism too had drawn its sap, had dried up. Contacts with the educated governing classes withered away. When the forces of nationalism, of the 'scientific revolution' and finally the Enlightenment began to work in the Republic, the Church (generally speaking) lived outside of the mainstream of culture. A dreary stream of internal squabbles about Bible texts, about the Sabbath, about Supralapsarianism spoilt the tone of the Church. And so the official Protestant Church, while finally winning the majority of the population, did not succeed in becoming the cultural centre of the Dutch Golden Age. In the hard struggle of revolt and expansion the Church seemed to have spilt its best forces.

Against this background of a culture in which profit and successful trade were pervasive norms, in which literacy was widespread, in which - despite monogamous marriage, the nuclear family and formal worship - the seaports were filled with rough and raucous men, in which the pursuit of all kinds of temporal pleasures was widespread (if formally frowned upon), in which a remarkable artistic school flourished, and in which men sought advancement and prosperity by hook


or by crook — at home and abroad — no conception of a clanking, iron-clad Calvinism structuring behaviour and attitudes can be sustained. This being so, the influence of the 'stern doctrine', or "seventeenth century Calvinism", and the rest, must be called seriously into question. In later chapters, much more immediate, direct and certainly more mundane factors are pointed to as being more plausible in explaining some of the developments at the Cape: there is no need to point back to 16th and 17th century theology and religion in the Netherlands to find some fatal causal flaw in the chain which ended up with the emergence of narrow, exclusive social and economic policies at the Cape.110

But if the cultural and social life of the Netherlands at the time when the V.O.C. rose to power and settled at the Cape was not one which nourished in theory, or institutionalized in practice, the 'stern' doctrines of Calvinism, what was decided at Dort? And what had been decided particularly in respect of 'heathens' and their relationship to the Church? It is not necessary to outline here the whole complex of issues and politicking that culminated in Dort. It is sufficient to note the context. The two primary antagonists in the long debate that had preceded the Synod were Arminius, the 'liberal', and Gomarus, the 'dogmatist'. Questions relating to the Church/state relationships and the question of the 'Elect' and 'damned' stemmed from and gave sharpness to the disputes amongst their followers which spilled over into wider commercial, diplomatic and political questions, which ended not only with the victory of the orthodox but also the

110. A recent study on the rise of Afrikanerdom locates the Calvinist definition of the political and 'racial' situation (stemming largely from Paul Kruger it seems) in the second half of the 19th century. See Dunbar T. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom, chapters I and II especially.
execution of Oldenbarneveldt. Arminius argued for toleration, that other churches should be allowed, and that the merciless line on predestination should be moderated. Gomarus had insisted on the total autonomy of the Church and intoned an aweful interpretation of predestination. "Gomarus was the only person who had the courage to assert the extreme doctrine that God had chosen certain individuals for eternal life, and decreed eternal death for others even before the Fall of Man".111 The followers of Arminius (who had died in 1609) were trounced and the Synod found in favour of the position and line of the Contra-Remonstrants. The 105 deputies, ministers, elders, professors and theologians from abroad - who conducted their discussion in Latin - declared that even ".... if the reprobate should have truly performed all the works of the saints, nothing can help towards their salvation; that by the same doctrine it is taught by God, by the single and mere pleasure of his Will, without any respect or regard to sin, has predestined and created for eternal condemnation the majority of mankind....".112

Now Geyl has declared that "The Synod of Dort had made the Church, the Community of the elect. The blacks, the sons of Ham, doomed to slavery, born in heathendom, lacked all marks of election and it was not allowed - this had been explicitly laid down by the Synod - to baptize them without special guarantees".113 Apart from the fact that Geyl is wrong about Dort, the kind of view he expresses with such force and conviction has found its way into many interpretations of South African history in the 17th and 18th centuries - particularly in respect of the origins and growth of 'colourism' and

112. Ibid., pp.375-6.
113. P.Geyl: The Netherlands,II, p.188.
the principles of exclusion and inclusion. It is part of that 'idealist' interpretation of historical process and the shaping of structures which has been mentioned above. 114

But the question of 'Ham' and people of colour did not crop up at Dort at all in the way that he implies. 115 Moreover, when taken with other evidence about general attitudes to alien peoples and heathen cultures in the wider world in the Netherlands and elsewhere, the question seems not to have been one concerning either the origins of people of colour, or any implied prescriptions for their status, but rather more practical questions about the relationship of 'heathens' to the Church and the obligations of Churchmen towards them. It was their alleged heathendom which was at issue, not their colour. The manner in which the question was raised at Dort confirms this: it was about evangelism, and, crucially, the issue of baptism.

Two preliminary points need be made: first, the pronouncements of Dort were to be binding on predikanten at home and abroad, and they were referred to later for authoritative interpretation. Secondly, the process whereby, in various colonial situations, the practice drifted away from the central metropolitan line - a process which is termed 'colonial drift' in a later chapter - is what has to be explained in and for each colonial context.

At the 17th session of the Great Synod, on the 30th November, 1618, the delegates of North Holland ".... proposed another

114. See also F.A. van Jaarsveld: The Afrikaner Interpretation of South African History, p.9 and passim; P.L. van den Berghe is quite explicit: "Africans, so the argument runs, are descendants from Ham, who was cursed by Noah, and are destined by God to be servants of servants, hewers of wood and drawers of water". South Africa. A Study in Conflict, p.15. It is not clear from the context whose argument it was, nor when or where it was used, by whom and in relation to whom. I return to this question again in chapters VII and VIII, in the Cape context.

115. See next page.
question about the children of the **Indians** (the general term to refer to indigenous peoples of the Indies and elsewhere), praying a **speedy** Answer because the ships bound to the East-Indies were just ready to sail with the first fair wind. The Question was: "Whether Children who were born of Heathen parents, taken into Christian families for Servants might be admitted to Baptism, in case those who brought them thither should promise to see them educated in the Christian Religion?". The discussion rambled on over a few sessions - but was secondary (and probably distracting) to the main issues which the Synod was thrashing out. There were some precedents which the Synod could refer to. Between 1580 and 1620, for instance, the general line of various regional synods had been this: provided they were not ".... the children of Jews, Turks, etc....", 'heathens', 'gypsies', or the children of 'goddelose' (without god, but in this context meaning more without any God) parents, should be baptised, providing the parents (if Christian) or the guardians promised to bring them up in a Christian manner. There was no sustained linking or reference to either Ham or 'zwarte' (Blacks). Moreover, it is the view of an authority on this question that though the 'myth of

115. In much of what follows I am relying on the views of scholars who have devoted careful attention to these and related questions though not coming at the problems from the angle adopted in this study. I am particularly grateful to Alistair Duke of Southampton University who provided me with useful advice and suggested some other people who might help. He referred me also to J. Heitsma and S.D. van Veen (eds.): *Acta der Provinciale en partikuliere synoden*. Other sympathetic advice and assistance was given by Dr W. Balke of Bodegraven, Dr Johannes Postma of Mankato State College and Dr J.M. van der Linde of the Rijksuniversiteit Te Utrecht. Also, the invaluable Brandt: *The History of the Reformation* and C. Spoelstra: *Bouwstoffen .... Op. cit.*, passim.


117. This is a distillation from the Synods of South Holland, Hardewijk and Zealand.
Ham' (as he calls it) was known, it was neither articulated in any systematic fashion nor rationalised. Moreover, it is his view that there were too many good theologians and professorial Divines at Dort for them to cling to such a myth. And they didn't need it anyway. In the 17th century, the 'myth' was not at all strong or persuasive, though it emerged in the 18th century more forcefully in the colonies, and apparently in Surinam especially. Since the question is linked to 'colourism', it will be discussed again shortly.\textsuperscript{118}

As the discussion at Dort proceeded, additional issues were fed into the debate. What of children who were slaves? Or the children of slaves? There was a majority view - never voted on, it turns out - that such children ought \textit{not} to be baptized however they had been taken, in war or otherwise. But in the end, a formal, compromise solution was agreed and the position established at Dort became definitive. It was later quoted at length to Ds. Overney at the Cape by the Amsterdam classis, when he had sought guidance on a related point. The resolution was as follows:\textsuperscript{119}

\begin{quote}
In this session there was read out aloud the answers of both foreign and home (Inlandse) Theologians to the written questions posed about the baptism of the children of Heathens; and having heard all the advice it was unanimously decreed: that those who have reached an age and are able to comprehend instruction, should not be admitted to Holy Baptism unless they have before been instructed somewhat in the fundamentals of the Christian religion, profess their belief and are able to give some
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
118. Personal communication from Dr van der Linde via Dr Balke.

119. C. Spoelstra: \textit{Op. cit.}, Part 2, pp. 9-10, Document 169. My emphases, A.L. In none of the historical literature on South Africa have I seen this text quoted in English, or fully or accurately summarised. I am indebted to Vernie February (and he to his collection of dictionaries) who helped me to wrestle with the 17th century Dutch and render this in fair English.
\end{footnotes}
account thereof, desire baptism themselves, with reliable witnesses present, who promise to instruct them further in the Christian religion. Those who are now baptized ought to enjoy the self same right of freedom as other Christians and ought not to be handed over to the power of the Heathens, either through sale or alienation from the Christian masters or the Hon. Gentlemen (Heeren van de Compagnie). Of the children of the Heathens also, who, on account of their youth or their inability to understand the language couldn't be instructed by the Christians, it is also judged by a majority of votes that they ought not to be baptized until they reach those years at which they are capable of being instructed in the first principles of the Christian religion and can comprehend these, and until this really happened. Also that reliable witnesses should diligently promise that they would instruct these more fully and deeply in the Christian belief, and will not permit them, in so far as this is possible to them, to be once more estranged from the family or community of Christians.

Three points emerge decisively from all this. First, the deceptive formulation in much secondary literature is not supported by the specific content, meanings or intent of the Dort decision. Nowhere there are 'the children of Ham' mentioned in specific or even implied terms anyway. Secondly, with this official position in the metropolitan Church clearly stated, it provides the base and starting point for the later examination of the way in which practice came to veer away from the initial principle, and in so doing shifts the locus for, and explanation of local deviations in the material and ideal conditions prevailing at the Cape or in other colonial situations. And thirdly, there are only the most speculative of grounds for arguing that the Calvinist orthodoxy at Dort was causally responsible for subsequent attitudes and/or behaviours at the Cape, though much later there may be grounds for arguing that aspects of the Calvinist vision were re-interpreted as a post-hoc legitimating ideology. But there is little evidence — even later at the Cape — that either the 'Ham ideology' or any other aspects of the Dort orthodoxy were actually used to shape or enjoin policies of exclusion,
as opposed to inclusion, though later justifications may have emerged.

Finally, before turning to look at the possible sources for, and actual perceptions of, alien cultures and colours in the Dutch Republic before systematic contact was established at the Cape, it is worth making a few comparative points which qualify and broaden the discussion thus far. As a perspective, justificatory or explanatory set of ideas, the 'children of Ham' argument was a very weak one in the Dutch experience in the 16th and 17th centuries and did not emerge decisively in any way whatsoever within the 17th century Calvinist orthodoxy. As will shortly be shown it did not figure either in any serious way in the experience of either the English or Iberians, and had virtually no implied prescriptions for behaviour or social relations where it did emerge. The travel literature, as will be argued next, rarely explained the differences which were observed in Biblical or scriptural or theological terms, though there were a few exceptions. Jan Heinz Jahn refers to a Dutch theologian whose work, Patriarchengeschichte, was published between 1667-71.

The theologian, Johan Heinrich Heidegger wrote: "At the moment Noah pronounced his curse Canaan's hair became little coils and his face became completely black". As a result, Heidegger concluded, the Negro was the son of Canaan and was "... doomed forever to remain in servitude". Later, in the middle of the 18th century a

120. Jan Heinz Jahn: Wir Namnten Sie Wilde, p.8. This had been the view of George Best, the Englishman, in 1578. "God would a sonne should bee borne whose name was Chus, who not only it selfe, but all his posteritie after him should be blacke and lothesome, that it might remaine a spectacle of disobedience to all the world. And of this blacke and cursed Chus came all the blacke Moores which are in Africa .... being perhaps a cursed, dry, sandy and unfruitful ground, fit for such a generation to inhabite in". G.Best: Discourse in R.Hakluyt: The Principal Navigations, Vol.III, pp.262-4.
Brazilian slave-owner defended slavery on the following grounds:

"For we are whites descended from Adam, and the Negroes are descended from Cain who was black, and who died cursed by God himself, as the Scripture relates". This view was received in amazement by a lawyer from Lisbon who heard it, and who disputed the point.  

The theological or religious or scriptural basis for behaviours and beliefs, as well as the justification for maintaining slavery were both unnecessary in the 17th and 18th centuries and also very rarely used. And even later, even amongst the pro-slavers, at the height of the English abolitionist debate, the view that Blacks were "...a distinct, inferior species were shared by virtually none". Later, one American certainly didn't take the 'Ham argument' seriously either, saying: "I doubt it in the first place, because Ham's mother and father were both white folks. And I doubt it in the second place because I don't believe God would a sprung such a joke as that on the community".  

Whatever the wider European theories and views on the matter, and whatever the subsequent terms of the slavery and anti-slavery debate, one thing seems clear: there was not, within the formulations or preoccupations of Dutch Calvinism in the 16th and 17th century, the ideological injunctions, explanatory of normative categories, or justificatory propositions for either regarding or treating people of colour, qua their colour, as inferior or as legitimate candidates for...  

121. The details are in Boxer: Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, pp.104 ff. There is need of a similar kind of work on the Dutch empire.  


slavery. If and when those developments occurred they emerged in the context of the particular structure of economic, political and social relations in the specific colonial situations, and within the international context of slavery and the slave-trade into which the Dutch expanded, as they did in respect of cloves and spices. That last question is dealt with more fully shortly.

It has been argued thus far that the immediate and rich urban and commercial political economy of the Netherlands gave rise to and sustained a bustling and secular cultural life and an ideology in which the pursuit of trade and profit were paramount. Also, it has been argued above that not only is there much doubt about the degree to which the Netherlands of the 17th century were saturated in the grim doctrines of Calvinism, but that even its official doctrines - stemming from Dort - had few explicit or implicit injunctions for policy in respect of the treatment of people of colour, though it was concerned with 'heathens', and the question of their admission to the Church. The fact that, in practice, most 'heathens' were people of colour is not particularly relevant. In the 16th and 17th centuries the fatal identification of colour with slavery and with heathendom had not yet taken root, and even later, at the peak of slavery, it was the exception to find (in English thought and literature, at least) it justified in terms of some inherent immutable inferiority or difference of people of colour. It is in the light of these antecedent characteristics of Dutch culture and ideology that

124 Barker: Op. cit., passim; and also the superb accounts by D.B. Davis: The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture, passim; and Winthrop Jordan: White over Black, passim. My argument opposes Jordan on this point.
the interaction at the Cape later will be analyzed. The explanation for developments there must be offered in terms that metropolitan background and the constraints and opportunities at the Cape, against which and in terms of which the goals, norms and emergent interests of the settlers and the officials were pursued, and in terms of the contrasts and discontinuities between these and the political economies of the Khoisan and their cultures and normative universes, which are examined in the next chapter.

Before proceeding to look at that, two final questions remain. First, what might have been the kinds of images and perceptions which a representative Dutchman had of alien cultures and colours in the wider world during the first half of the 17th century? Ideas and images filtered through from the Iberians and the English. Moreover, Dutchmen themselves were going south down the African coast, at first on the ships of other nations and then on their own. Diaries and journals were kept, stories were told by sailors and handed on in the sea-ports. Some recycling of ideas and perceptions will have been taking place from the Indies, to the metropolis and back again. Despite these problems it is possible to suggest some major features of Dutch perceptions of the wider world, though their particular images and impressions need to be located in a broader European context. Are there any grounds for asserting furthermore that the "... essential matrix of ideas from which institutionalized racism grew, already existed in Europe - and perhaps more prevalently in Protestant Anglo-saxon Europe...."? 125

125. Legassick: Op.cit., p.4. It is one thing to discuss European attitudes to 'Blacks' in Europe, and another thing altogether to consider European perceptions of Africans in Africa on the other hand. The distinction is elaborated below.
What related attitudes accompanied the broad perceptions? The second and final question from the original slate (p.110) is how did the Dutch come to adopt slavery in their empire when the institution was long dead and banned in the Netherlands? Are there any major problems to be overcome in explaining this dualism in theory and practice?

First, what is the evidence about 'colourism' or the predisposing matrix of ideas in the Netherlands? In answering that question one must first locate the position of the Netherlands in a wider European comparative and historical context. Unlike the position for England, there is very little work done specifically on that question for the Netherlands.126 Yet for subsequent explanatory purposes it is necessary to be as clear as possible about prior Dutch attitudes towards, and perceptions of, Blacks before they encountered and interacted with them systematically in the colonial context.

The central conceptual strands in the argument are, however, also relevant in respect of the English and the Iberian experiences. Also it is vital to remember that it was from those two regions that the Dutch are most likely to have picked up and learnt things about the extra-European world, because of either recent close or historically longstanding connections between them,

especially in the case of the Iberian peninsular. There are two
major strands in the argument which identify the evidence and under-
pin its organization. The first - which crops again in the analysis
of the Cape situation later - is that colour or 'race' (in the
colourist sense) has no behavioural correlates whatsoever. Therefore
before any enduring kind of historical and societal association
between 'colour' and certain roles, occupations, and statuses
emerged, there simply were no historical grounds or structural bases
or psychological orientations for the emergence of 'colourism'. For
example, the variety of nationalities and colours from which Greek and
Roman slaves had come, as with later Tuscan slaves, and the fact that
Christians were amongst those made slaves in North Africa, all had
prevented the identification of colour with servitude, and had also
suppressed the emergence of a negative stereotype built up from a
cluster of associated roles and statuses or characteristics which
converged on the Black or the Negro. 127 So that in Europe, prior to

127. D.B.Davis: The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture;
H.J.Nieboer: Slavery as an industrial system; George MacMunn:
Slavery Through the Ages; Rice: Op.cit.; Mary L.Gordon: "The
Nationality of Slaves under the Early Roman Empire"; F.Snowden:
Blacks in Antiquity, and his "The Negro in Ancient Greece" and
"The Negro in Classical Italy"; Iris Origo: "The Domestic
Enemy: The Early Slaves in Tuscany ...."; I.G.Detweiler: "The
Rise of Modern Race Antagonisms"; Donald Wood: "Some Greek
Stereotypes of other People"; Hannah Arendt: "Race thinking
before Racism"; Philip Mason: ".... but O! My Soul is White";
C.R.Dunstan: "A Note on Early Ingredients of Racial Prejudice
in Western Europe". All over the Islamic Middle East and North
Africa the range of colours and somatic types is obvious to even
a contemporary observer. There is little evidence of any kind
of sustained 'racial' hostility within those cultures and
societies. They have had long connections with Africa south of
the Sahara, via the slave trade. See Denys Hay: Europe in the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, pp.374-5; N.R.Bennet;
"Christian and Negro Slavery in Eighteenth Century North Africa"
who claims that Negro slaves serving in the armies of 'Berbery'
are recorded as far back as the 9th century, p.70; and Nehemiah
Levtzion: "The Early States of the Western Sudan to 1500", p.151
and passim.
the imperial expansion which commenced at the end of the Middle Ages
there were no traditions or prejudices in respect of people of colour,
qua that colour. Furthermore, the incredible tales and fantasy
stories - about Prester John, for instance, or Monomotapa - which
gripped the imagination of both literate and illiterate peoples and
which were widespread and popular from the Middle Ages, will have led
Europeans to believe that not only were there Black Christian Kings
and Empires, but also that there were civilizations of enormous
wealth and power presided over and lived in by Black (often rendered
as 'Ethiopian') people. In addition to Prester John, there were
Mandeville's Travels and the reports of Carpini, Polo and others. 128
And it is of importance to note too that a great volume of the
eyearly travel literature in many languages was printed in the Low
Countries. 129

of the world in the Middle Ages"; Claude Jenkins: "Christian
Pilgrimages, AD 500-800"; Eileen Power: "The Opening of the
Trade Routes to Cathay"; B. Penrose: Travel and Discovery in
the Renaissance; A.P. Newton: "Travellers' Tales of Wonder
and Imagination"; Malcolm Letts: Sir John Mandeville. The
Man and His Book; F.M. Rogers: The Search for Eastern Christians;
A.P. Newton: "European Travellers in Africa in the Middle Ages";
Edgar Prestage: "The Search for the Seaf route to India, 1415-
1460"; Sir Denison Ross: "Prester John and the Empire of
Ethiopia".

129. See the "List of Early Printed Books, 1467-1546" in Rogers:
Op.cit., pp.185-193. Antwerp was a major printing and
(Elseviers), passim. The problem of why some people were black
and others not was rarely explained in terms of the biblical
notion of Ham and his children. Some geographical explanations
were used, certainly by the Greeks, who considered themselves
in contrast not only with the 'Ethiopians' but also the fair
skinned Scythians. Menander wrote:
"The man whose natural bent is good,
He, mother, he, though Aethiop, is nobly born,
'A Scyth', you say? Pest! Anacharsis was a Scyth! ".
The second and related point is this. An examination of the Iberian, English and Dutch travel literature of the days of reconnaissance and discovery reveals a regularity which is worth stressing immediately and forcefully. It is an elementary but crucial point which has, I think, generally been missed, but which emerges from the material. In general, the characteristic perception of 'Negroes' (and I am thinking primarily of Africa, obviously, but it holds good too in respect of dark peoples in 'the Indies' for instance) fragments from the 15th century into two broad categories. In Europe, Negroes were Blacks, while in Africa they were Africans. That is, the characteristic factors and manner in terms of which Negroes in Europe were perceived in Europe - turned on, and was largely concerned with the obviousness of their colour and other physical features. In Europe, in short, the manner in which Negroes were described and probably perceived, emphasised their distinctive somatic features. By contrast - and the contrast is marked - the travel literature shows a remarkable uniformity in describing in largely cultural, contextual and behavioural terms the peoples and societies the diarists met. So in Africa Negroes were perceived in broader cultural terms and en masse. I believe the implications of this point are important: they recur and ramify in later chapters. They need to be incorporated into the descriptions and analyses of both prior attitudes and predispositions of Europeans before they interacted in the colonies or factories with Blacks and slaves, and also brought into any explanation for the emergence of 'colourism' in the colonies, though the latter point needs to be supplemented clearly by an analysis of the political economy of each colonial situation, which involved also an account of the role of slavery in it.
What is striking is that the descriptions and recorded perceptions by Europeans of Africans in Africa in large numbers, often more or less naked, manifestly godless and without churches or temples, speaking in strange tongues, behaving in decidedly un-European ways, having many wives, inhabiting jungles and swamps or arid deserts or tropical regions, along with terrifying animals and so on, are essentially cultural and contextual. The colour of the people is only one factor - and a minor one. What frightened, worried, puzzled, fascinated or repelled the Europeans was a complex of strange behaviours and observed institutions. The evidence is there in the English journals and diaries, and the Iberian ones, and is replicated in the Dutch ones.

In the accounts of the early Iberian explorations down the coast of Africa - and even earlier - the impression emerges. For instance, Lully, describing the country of 'the Nile' talked about 'negroes' who were idolaters, leading merry 'but just' lives, holding goods communally, where there were kings and princes who worshipped the sun, stars, birds and beasts. "They are of great stature and are negroes". Pereira, who was involved in setting up the Elmina Castle, commented about the people round Axim that they were 'Negroes'

130. Leo Africanus: Observations of Africa, in Purchas His Pilgrims, V; Zurams Chronicle of Guinea in Hakluyt; Duarte Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de situ orbis in J.W.Blake (ed.); Europeans in West Africa 1450-1650; de Barros: Asia (Hakluyt); C.R.Boxer: Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 1415-1825. Indeed as early as the 13th century the image is there in Raymond Lully's Blanquera, cited in A.P.Newton: "European Travellers .......", taken from M.Ch. de la Ronciere: La Découverte de l'Afrique au Moyen Age (Cairo, 1924-5). And Antonie Galvanos: Book of the Discoveries of the World (in Purchas, X); and Freda Wolfson: Pageant of Ghana.

and lived "... on millet, fish, yams, together with a little meat; they are naked from the waist up, and uncircumcized and heathen, but, God willing, they will soon become Christians...".  

Leo Africanus told of 15 great Negro Kingdoms and named them, and also discussed Prester John.  

The contrast with the hostile, later typically 'racist' attitudes, to which Boxer refers, is interesting.  

But the main burden of Boxer's evidence about the unpleasant record of Portuguese 'race relations' must be seen in the light of two important qualifications. First, the attitudes emerged in (and are quoted from) colonial situations - not simply contact and/or factory contexts, and decidedly not from the metropolitan centre itself. And secondly, the overwhelming weight of evidence from those situations relates not to the 15th or even 16th centuries but to the mid-17th and, decisively, 18th centuries. The point is important: there are a few instances of those kinds of attitudes and prejudices expressed - even in the modern period - in metropolitan Portugal, though 'racism' and discriminatory practices were widespread in the Portuguese colonies in Africa.


135. See E.Mondlane: The Struggle for Mozambique; D.M.Abshire and M.A.Samuels (eds.) Portuguese Africa; Henry A Nevinson: A Modern Slavery, and Boxer: The Portuguese Seaborne Empire. The accumulation of comparative evidence about unpleasant 'race relations' in the colonies of both Catholic and Protestant powers, and the colonies linked to both 'feudal' and 'bourgeois' political economies in the metropoles suggests strongly that the explanation for these developments have to be located in the colonial situation and attention given to specific local demographic, economic and political relationships in the light of - rather than in terms of - the European antecedents in culture and ideology.
In general, the journals of the English navigations reflect the same reaction to, and impression of, a total societal and cultural contrast in terms of culture, economy, environment and habitat.\footnote{136} What stands out in the reports of men like Best, Towrson, Barnes, James Welsh, Hawkins and John Lok is that in addition to the unflattering things said about Blacks, or 'Aethiopes', 'Nigritaeis', 'Moores', 'Moorens' or Negroes', they all underlined the "... radically contrasting qualities of colour, religion, and style of life, as well as animality and a peculiarly potent sexuality".\footnote{137}

Likewise, the classic and full statement by Pieter de Marees about the Gold Coast reflects the same impression. He was a Dutchman who lived there and wrote in detail about the area in 1602. As with many of the English and Iberian accounts his report was a mixture of perceived fact, fictitious explanation and snap judgements. The people were described in the usual terms as "greedy", "savage", "idolatrous", "lecherous" and so on, though there was also some useful


\footnote{137. Jordan: Op.cit., p.43. "None of these blacks seemed to behave like Englishmen", Ibid., p.25. What Jordan and others do not note is that this cumulative perception of African life styles and differences were clearly not revealed or observable in Europe when individual Blacks came there. Barker has clearly shown that though there were - few - speculations about the relationship of some people to the animals, the main and overwhelming impression created in the English accounts does not question their humanity, but is hostile to their culture. Barker: Op.cit., and especially his conclusions. Theories relative to the 'great chain of being' were far and few between. See Arthur O.Lovejoy: The Great Chain of Being. The Khoi - as we shall see - figure in some few accounts relative to this.}
information for later travellers. 138 A century later, a similar account by William Bosman, who had been chief factor on the Guinea Coast was published. 139 Between these dates the main pre-1650 Dutch accounts of the Khoi were written, and they repeated much of what Iberians and English had said of them, as will shortly emerge.

A final and closely related point about the travel literature needs to be made before looking at other kinds of evidence about the Netherlands specifically. It is extremely rare to come across explanations for the colour of Africans which are couched in terms of the 'children of Ham' argument. Jordan, Davis and Walvin tend to overstate this. 140 The actual number of reports in which

138. It was translated into English and incorporated in Purchas VI, pp.247-366. Also summarised in Wolfson: Op. cit., pp.4-6. It's full title is "A Description and Historical Declaration of the Golden Kingdom of Guinea, otherwise called the Golden Coast of Myna". Other people and places - like Benin, for instance - were reported on by de Harees with great awe and wonderment, describing Kings with many wives, soldiers and slaves. Purchas, IV, pp.263-41. The popular travel stories in volkstaal were in heavy demand and were distinct from the sophisticated Latin or Dutch literature. They were more like chap-books. They appealed in the 17th and 18th centuries to a mass readership looking for shock-details such as de Graaf's description of the impalement of a slave, or adventures fighting "inboorlingen of Portugezen". W.Y.Bontekoe's Memorable Description of the East Indian Voyage 1616-1625, was first published in 1645. "It became the most widely read chapbook (volksboek) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." Before 1800 it was published 70 times. See Rob Nieuwenhuis: Oost-Indische Spiegel, pp.21-28.

139. William Bosman: A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea, (1705). The sub-title, carrying the pragmatic merchant's concern indicates the slave, gold and ivory coasts and a map points them out.

140. See Jordan: Op.cit., p.56. He says "Englishmen did possess a concept of slavery formed by the clustering of several rough but not illogical equations. The slave was treated like a beast. Slavery was inseparable from the devil in men; it was God's punishment upon Ham's prurient disobedience. Enslavement was captivity, the loser's lot in a contest of power. Slaves were infidels or heathens. On every count, Negroes qualified." I think this drastically overstates the case and mixes contexts. There is no evidence that this was a representative view, nor that the accumulation of such equations was widespread.
the argument figures and in which the 'children of Ham' were identified in the persons of the Negroes were very few if one considers the hundreds of journals and diaries and reports that emerged from the period. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, the argument simply did not surface in the Iberian debates. The dispute between Las Casas and Sepulveda, for instance, over the question of slavery, turned more on the interpretation of Aristotle than it did on complicated biblical exegesis, and the authorities who have worked in the field adduce no evidence about the 'Ham' argument. 141

Although the common cultural perception of Blacks in Africa may be found in the travel literature, there are some interesting differences in respect of the perception of Blacks in the metropolitan countries. Walvin has argued that from the 17th century there was an increasing number of Blacks (and latterly, slaves) in England. They were a source of 'curiosity and appendage value' in England. It became fashionable to employ them as servants, minstrels and menials. 142 He suggests 'racialism' was there from an early date, though Barker has contested that by making some fine and important distinctions in the argument. What is critically important to recognize is that Blacks must have been of greater curiosity value amongst an insular people like the English, as compared with the Europeans and especially the Iberian and Mediterranean countries whose contact with Africa, via north Africa, was far longer and more


142. Walvin: Black and White, p.11.
sustained. But in England - and indeed in north-west Europe in general - one can see how it would have been only (or largely) their colour and related somatic features that would have been remarked upon. For, in the towns and seaports, the presence of Blacks there could not have been accompanied, obviously, by a wider visible context and complex of cultural, religious, familial, climatic, behavioural or economic characteristics which so centrally defined the lives of African peoples in Africa, and the European perception of it. Colour, having no automatic behavioural correlates, did not bring any associated cultural or environmental facets with it. In short, Africans in England were plain 'Blacks', but Africans in Africa were, in the words of Sir George Barnes "... Moores, Moorens, or Negroes, a people of beastly living, without a God, lawe, religions or common wealth, and so scorched and vexed with the heat of the sunne, that in many places they curse it when it riseth ...". 143

As for the Iberian peninsula, there is remarkably little evidence about 'racial' attitudes and social hostilities in Portugal or Spain on grounds of colour. Yet there were large numbers of Blacks (and slaves of other nationalities and colours, which may be the key to the explanation as suggested earlier) there. In the 16th century Spain imported up to 10,000 slaves per annum from the Portuguese

143. "The Second Voyage to Guinea set out by Sir George Barnes .... in the yere 1554. The Captain whereof was M.John Lok", in Hakluyt, IV, p.57. Not all accounts were so negative as was mentioned earlier in connection with de Marees. But all emphasised the cultural, ecological and demographic contrasts, not solely or significantly the colour. Later, as Barker has skillfully shown "... all the most extreme theories about racial, as opposed to cultural, inferiority, came from a small group scarcely representative of even their own slave-owning class and certainly at odds with the main currents of British opinion". Barker: Op.cit., p.46.
possessions. And, as the Moors were expelled from the Iberian peninsula a population vacuum had resulted in certain areas. "In the sixteenth century Negro slaves were brought from Africa to help correct the disproportion ....." in Portugal. That slavery was still flourishing well into the late 18th century in Portugal is evident from the attempts by the Portuguese dictator, Pombal, to abolish it at home. Yet there is little evidence to indicate that this was accompanied by colourism or exclusivity in the metropolis or any popular beliefs about the inferiority of Blacks, as has been shown was similarly the case in England by Barker. And it was pointed out earlier that those kinds of attitudes - calling on Biblical or other kinds of exegesis for support - were regarded with some amazement by metropolitan Portuguese who encountered them abroad, as in the Brazilian defence of slavery.

In general (though this is another argument that needs detailed comparative attention elsewhere) the historical and contemporary evidence suggests that 'racist' or colourist attitudes and policies as we understand them today did not originate in the

144. R.Trevor Davies: The Golden Century of Spain, 1501-1621, pp.188-9; the question of Blacks in Spain, both slave and free, is carefully treated by Ruth Pike: "Seville Society in the Sixteenth Century: slave and freedman", passim.

145. William C. Atkinson: "Institutions and the Law" in H.V. Livermore (eds.): Portugal and Brazil, p.89.

metropolitan countries, nor were there the matrices of ideas which were especially suited to their emergence elsewhere. On the contrary the ubiquity of differing forms and degrees and emphases of those ideas and policies emerged and took shape in the constitution of the political economies and social structures of the colonial situations. Then, later, through a complex process of re-cycling, migrations and further colonialisms and communication speed-ups etc., they came to be reflected in the literature, idioms, ideology and even sometimes the vocabularies of the metropolitan countries, but not always, as Portugal and Spain and the Netherlands may indicate. That is, until new plural colonial societies were actually formed by the interaction and subordination of one or more culture to another, Portuguese (and other Europeans) and different African groups peered at each other across initially limited trading frontiers constituted also by massive cultural and contextual contrasts. So far as we can tell neither side initially perceived or regarded the other simply as 'masters' or 'slaves', or as 'Hamites' or white men. Such simple categories of status or perception are rare in the evidence. They may have emerged later in the structures and relationships which constituted the new societies formed by colonialism. If that was the case, then colourism might be regarded as something of a shorthand — and colour a signal for it — which emerged at the end, so to speak, of a long, complex, socio-historical and psychological process. 147

However, in the case of Portugal and Spain, their long-standing historical connections with Africa via the Mediterranean may also have accounted for the relatively low curiosity value of Blacks in the towns and seaports of the Iberian peninsula, though many of the country districts were isolated.

147. This is a point which emerges again later.
Though the argument must be qualified by some caution, it seems to be the case that, as with the Iberians and English, cultural consciousness of alien peoples preceded and precluded colour consciousness in the Netherlands. The position of the Dutch Republic must be seen in the wider context sketched above. Long-standing connections with the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Mediterranean meant that Dutch traders and seafarers would have seen people of colour in those areas, and hence will have picked up images, stories and reports of the contacts between those countries and Africa. Merchants and their agents from the Low Countries were active in major Italian cities in the early 16th century. Ships from Italy had tied up at Bruges and Antwerp from the 14th century, and some were galleys which were manned and rowed by 'Moorish' and Negro slaves. Dutch merchants had been involved in the Mediterranean slave trade with 'Berbery'. As the Portuguese West African penetration and trade developed in the second half of the 16th century, merchants from the Low Countries were involved too, and prosperous Flanders merchants instructed their Andalusian agents "... to make enquiries about prospects, to assemble suitable cargoes and to hire Castillian pilots who were to take their caravels to Guinea in return for Flemish gold". And, as was shown earlier,

148. David W. Davies: A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade, p.36. At Livorno a 'Via degli Scali Olandesi' (street of Dutch wharves) still exists.


150. Davies: Op. cit., pp.44-5. Hay claims that there were something like 7-10,000 slaves in Genoa in 1380 and that the majority were 'Moors' from North Africa, or Negroes via 'Berbery'. Hay: Op. cit., pp.374-5.

the rise of Antwerp coincided with the shift in the centre of trade from the Mediterranean to the northwest, and when the Iberian ports were closed to the Republic, individual Dutchmen went there and got jobs on the Portuguese ships, before the indigenous mercantile expansion of the Netherlands to the East. Foremost amongst these individuals was Jan van Linschoten. First he learnt Spanish and then moved to Lisbon where he joined a fleet which went East in 1583, returning in 1598. When it came out, his *Itinerario* was enormously popular and was reprinted many times. After it appeared, there were hundreds of later accounts, for each ship of the V.O.C. had its own journal and often there was more than one amateur diarist. But the *Itinerario* set the tone. He distinguished between Madagascar and 'Mosambique' and their peoples; he compared different 'nations', their manners, customs and speech; he told of Prester John's land - "...the country of Abexynes"; he informed his readers of the fascinating customs of the 'Peguans' - who offered their visitors 'many maides'; he described the Portuguese in the Indies, their slave trade and the beauty of the slavesses, and he was fascinated by Eastern "... customs and superstitions in Religion" as well as Armenians, Arabians, Persians and 'Moors'. He also made barbed comments about the materialistic "... thirsty and insatiable desires" of the Jesuits.

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153. R. Raven-Hart: *Before van Riebeeck*. For instance, the various accounts of Houtman's later expedition is explained by this practice of more than one Journal being kept.


155. Ibid., I, passim. Africa was not perceived or described as one monolithic bloc without differences. This is clear from Linschoten and Houtman.
Such was the general tone of his Voyages and the Itinerario. The journey by Houtman (who had first been sent to Portugal as "een soort spion"—a kind of spy—to the Indies netted a number of reports and accounts, one of which contained an interesting early observation of the Khoi, as we shall see.

In this description, as with the description of other peoples and places, the impression given is one in which total context and cultural distinctiveness is the dominant one, not colour per se and that was the theme of accounts—along with adventure stories and drama—which defined the subsequent reports in the 17th century.


157. Raven-Hart: Op. cit., and (a) J. C. Mollema (ed.): De Eerste Schipvaart der Nederlanders Naar Oost-Indie onder Cornelius Houtman, 1595-7, which is based on Lodewijks, and (b) J. C. Mollema (ed.): De Eerste Schipvaart der Hollanders naar Oost-Indie, 1595-7. The title page of Houtman's journal read: "Journal of the Journey of Holland ships undertaken in the East Indies. Their course and orientation, and the strange adventures that befell them. All very industriously written down from time to time, as well as historical reports about the people, lands and towns which were visited. Where money is, where there is profit to be made and what business can be done there. How a very profitable and satisfying living can be had, and also certain experiences and places and marked names of use to seafarers. Also the vocabulary and the chief Javanish words, all illustrated with maps and figures. The book is printed through the desire and wishes of certain merchants, and one may find it for sale at Barent Langenes, Bookseller, Middelburgh, 1598."

This reveals concisely the preoccupations of Dutchmen in the international trade and the dominant values and interest.

Thus, as the Dutch expanded into the wider world they brought home images and stories which underlined those that would have been circulating by word of mouth in their ports and in books and printed accounts amongst the literate, which had been derived from their Iberian (and English) connections. Thereafter there was a Dutch empire which provided the sources and resources for their images and perceptions and writings and the slow re-cycling process began. But from the late 16th century there had also been a close political contact with the English, supplementing the longstanding trading connections, and Dutch sailors and soldiers would also have picked up stories about Africa and the wider world from them. 159

Further external sources of stories and images will have been the foreign students in the Netherlands, particularly at Leyden. Between 1625-1651, for example, of the 11,076 students studying there, 52% were from abroad, including Spain, the Turkish Empire, North Africa and Persia. 160

By contrast, however, with England (and the Iberian peninsula) there are grounds for arguing that there were comparatively few Blacks in the Netherlands. Walvin, Little and others have shown that in the 17th and 18th centuries there were significant numbers of Blacks (as slaves and freemen) in English cities, and also that there was a demand for Black servants. Runaway slaves were reported in the newspapers. 161 There is support - in the papers,

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161. Walvin: Black and White, pp.7-11.
and also in the portraits of families and aristocratic ladies and gentlemen with their black servants – that this is so. Hence there are grounds for believing that blackness may have had an early identification with servitude. Negative connotations became associated, in words, with blackness, and Walvin suggests that in this negative way Blackness "... expressed distinct English cultural values". Words and phrases like black looks, blacklist, blackball, blackguard, blackleg, blackmail and blackmark are, he argues, illustrative of this.

In the Netherlands, however, in the 17th century, there do not seem to have been any comparable developments. First, at the end of the 16th century, there was a Rotterdam ruling that a Negro slave landed there would be automatically freed, thus reducing the incentive for Dutchmen to bring home Black slaves for service. A similar ban was issued in the Indies in 1636, and other, related, prohibitions repeated in 1650 and 1713: these long pre-dated the English policy on this question.

162. Ibid., pp. 24-26.

163. The actual dates when the words became current does not altogether support Walvin's point about timing, but the general hunch is an interesting one. Blacklist (1692); blackball (1770); blackguard (1532); blackleg (1771 for its meaning as a race-course swindler, and 1865 for its strikebreaking associations); blackmail (1552) and blackmark (1845). Blackamore is found from 1547; Black art from 1590 and black book from 1479. Shorter Oxford Dictionary, passim.

164. Goslinga: Op. cit., p. 55; van der Chijs: Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, 1602-1811, Vol II, pp. 409-410; Boxer: Op. cit., p. 243. The contrast with, say, Seville, could not be more sharp. Not only were slaves kept there and brought to the town, but Black freedmen emigrated to the New World and returned after some years. Blacks from south of the Sahara were common in Seville from at least the 13th century. By the 16th century, the city had become the second most important slave centre in western Europe. Lisbon was the first. The Blacks were welcomed into the Church and within 2 or 3 generations were firmly part of Christianity and Spanish culture. "As a result they were eventually incorporated into the economic, social and religious life of the city". Pike: Op. cit., p. 359 and passim.
Blacks in the Netherlands in virtue of the long Iberian and trade connections, it may well be that during the 80 Years War this tailed off, though it would be wrong to conceive of a hermetically sealed border between the Republic and the Netherlands at that time. Zumthor claims that "... in the larger Dutch towns it was not so unusual to come across such freed slaves among the domestic households of wealthy families". But where would they have come from, and in what numbers, given the bans and the strict controls which both the V.O.C. and W.I.C. endeavoured to impose?

Secondly, there is the evidence from the art of the period. Though it cannot bear too much explanatory weight, one thing is clear: the Dutch artists of the period, by contrast with the English, painted few Blacks. If one excludes the representations of Blacks in classical and Biblical paintings — part of a long pictorial tradition — there are only a handful of more or less well-known African negroid figures, as opposed to the relatively more plentiful Moorish figures, easily identified by darker features, dress and curled turbans. The most famous, perhaps, are the 'Four Negro Heads' by Rubens. The same heads were used also by van Dyck and may suggest something of a scarcity of models. Like the Greek artists of the ancient world, it appears that Rubens and van Dyck were fascinated by the artistic possibilities of the colour and

165. Zumthor: Op.cit., p.301. But he confirms that slaves landed in the Netherlands were automatically freed. He is the only author I have come across who makes the point about the presence of freed slaves in Dutch towns, but he cites no evidence.

166. I am grateful to Richard Verdi who discussed the implications of some of this with me and who checked some wilder inferences by his careful knowledge of the painters and their contexts. The point about the few Blacks in Dutch paintings has been confirmed by Seymour Slive — personal communication.

contrasting features of the 'Ethiopians'. There may be other interpretations for the scarcity of such figures in the Dutch paintings. One could be that so many of the Dutch school — in order to eat — had to paint for particular kinds of clients who wanted particular kinds of pictures of themselves and their life-styles in which the painters specialized, and also that there are unlikely to have been many Negroes in that class, if they were in the Netherlands at all. That leads on to two additional possible explanations: either that Negroes were poor (which would confirm the servant-role hypothesis) or that there weren't many in the country anyway. Another etching by Rembrandt — 'Negress Lying Down' has been said not to be a Negress anyway. There is the very rare example — unlike English art in the 17th century — of the portrait of 'Elena Cattaneo with Negro Attendant', also by Rembrandt. And there is the famous (and puzzling) Frans Hals picture of 'Family Group in a Landscape', with a young Negro boy who might be an attendant, or might be a member of the family in the form of an adopted son, since he was dressed identically to the male child in the painting, and is in no way distinct except by his colour. In Hals there is also the darkish, southern 'Preeckelhaering' (mountebank, clownish) figure which is referred to ambiguously — and perhaps intentionally so — by Slive as the 'so-called Mulatto'. In any event, the same joking, mocking and drunken figures appear in Dirck Hals and Jan Steen too,

168. F.M. Snowden: Blacks in Antiquity, pp. 181-2. He refers to Terra Cotta figures, bronze and marble statues and so on.
170. C.J. Holmes: Notes on the Art of Rembrandt, p. 177.
171. Seymour Slive: Frans Hals, II, plate 279. Professor Slive says that it is not at all clear what the status of the Black boy was. (Personal communication).
but tell nothing about Africans and/or attitudes towards people of
colour as such. And there are the 'Two Negroes' by Rembrandt.\footnote{172}

There is Jan Mytens' 'Queen Henrietta of England with a Negro
servant'.\footnote{173} There are two pictures by Albert Eeckhout - 'Negro
from the Congo with Elephant's Tusk' and 'Brazilian Mulatto', both
either painted during, or based on, his visit to Brazil.\footnote{174}

Though the evidence is not conclusive or representative -
even if one looks at the background paintings on the walls of rooms
depicted in other paintings - the pictures provide some confirmation
that, relative to England and the southern European cities and sea-
ports, there were probably very few Blacks and Africans in the
Republic. But, despite the ban on their importation - "... free or
unfree ...." - given the automatic manumission entailed if they
arrived there, and given the very few African figures represented in
the art, the question must necessarily remain an open one. But where
they are represented, it appears as if they were enjoyed by the
artists for their colour and somatic contrasts, as they had been for
the Greeks. There is no impression of savage or heathen qualities,
nor any uniformly negative attributes or subordinate stereotype or
associated role. Their pictures suggest something of a loneliness,
a degree of alienation and an outsider-like quality. But that is as
much in the eye of the painter as the subject.

What this all suggests is that there were few Blacks from
Africa in the Netherlands; that while they were perceived as Blacks

\footnote{172}{Kitson: \textit{Rembrandt}, plate 46.}
\footnote{173}{W.Bernt: \textit{The Netherlands Painters of the 17th Century,II}, p.822.}
\footnote{174}{Bernt: \textit{Op.cit.}, I, p.354 and p.353. He was in Brazil for some
years after 1637.}
they were not identified with the savage or heathen or culturally
distinct and fascinating images contained in the travel literature;
that where they were present they were likely to have been poor, and
- of central importance - their blackness (as perceived by the
painters) was not associated with evil, godlessness, extraordinary
or bestial cultures, verdant jungles, rivers flowing with pearls the
size of pears or with any of the other attributes that became
identified in the travel literature, more or less, with the peoples
of Africa or the Indies in Africa or the Indies. In short, Negroes
were Africans or 'Moors' in Africa, and Blacks in Europe for the
Netherlands too.

Finally, there is the question of language and phrases.
Though 'zwart' (i.e. black) was sometimes used as synonymous with
slaves in the Indies, and sometimes implied negative attributes,
systematic identification of 'black' with negative or hostile
behaviours or qualities does not appear to have found its way so
widely into the idioms or phrases of Dutch (or, interestingly,
Afrikaans), apart from in the literal sense where, for example,
'blacklist' was translated as zwarte lijst. But 'blackball' is
'deballoteren', a blackguard is 'deugniet', blackleg is an
'onderkruiper' or 'oplichter', and blackmail is afpersing - none of
which imply or entail anything about colour. A 'Blackamore' (first
used in English in about 1547 - joining of Black and Moor, presumably)
translated directly as Moriaan or Neger (Moor or Negro). And in
the 18th century (in 1742) there was published in Amsterdam and Leyden
the thesis by Jacobus Johannes Capiteyn on "De Slaverny, als niet
strydig tegen de Christelyke Vryheid" ("On slavery, which is not
counter to the Christian Freedom"). Capiteyn was a 'Moor uyt Afrika'
who defended slavery in Biblical terms arguing that it was not incompatible with 'spiritual freedom'. He was referred to descriptively and it seems without prejudice or any directly hostile meanings as 'Swarte Jacobus Capiteyn'.

Thus, the employee of the V.O.C. during the first half of the 17th century, is unlikely to have had a 'colourist' outlook, for he would not have been exposed systematically at home, or via contacts either with the Iberians or English, to any such ideology, for there was no structure or historical basis for it. If colourism later emerged, it emerged in the colonies of the Republic - as it did in those of Iberia and Britain - and has to be explained in those contexts. But there is no evidence which compellingly suggests that it had developed in anything like the strength that would have been necessary for it to be re-cycled back to the Netherlands and then

175. A. Van Dantzig: Het Nederlandse aandeel in de Slavenhandel, pp.114-116. This whole question of the associated meanings and echoes of words is extraordinarily difficult to be precise about. What, for instance, does one make of the common practice in South Africa to give the nickname 'Blackie' to people (usually men) whose surname is Swart, without any negative connotation being meant or taken?

176. N. van de Graaf had some very unflattering things to say about both the Dutch women and children of 'mixed' parentage in the East Indies, and he described them as 'ongebleekte dongris' (unbleached, rough cotton of an inferior kind). Reisen van Nicolaus de Graaf, 1639-1687, pp.13-14. He was blunt in his denunciation of uncouth behaviour in the Indies, but his comments about the people there - especially the women - were not what we would call 'racist'. Rather they reflect his contempt for the idle lives and associated immorality which he observed amongst settlers living off the backs of a slave population and considered such behaviour fundamentally un-Christian. See also P.D. Milone: "Indische culture and its relationship to urban life", passim.
out again via the men who drove the engine of the V.O.C. in the 17th century. But the Dutchman - or German or Protestant employee of the Company - will have had some idea of what lay in store for him, and if he had no clue at all his more experienced shipmates are sure to have told him. The images and perceptions that would have been percolating amongst the 'Heeren van ses weken' in the seaports and urban centres of the Netherlands will have emphasised cultural and behavioural and contextual distinctions and wonders - some attractive and some repelling, some frightening and some fascinating. The question of colour per se would have been secondary.

This is nowhere better illustrated than in the monumentally negative, yet ultimately non-colourist image which the Khoi had in European eyes from the first contact with them, and which was repeated - often plagiarised - in the Dutch accounts of them, right up to and beyond the settlement at the Cape. From the first Portuguese accounts, at the end of the 15th century, right down to van Riebeeck, the stereotype is depressingly consistent and - for the time and context - not entirely without foundation. Thus Pereira (who, so far as is known, did not visit the Cape) described them in the following terms, no doubt picking up reports from the da Gama expedition: 177


This general picture is repeated over and over again by other Portuguese, English and Dutch visitors at the Cape. From the wealth of reports and opinions on the Khoi one may extract the following list of features in terms of which they were characteristically perceived and described for some 150 years prior to the settlement at the Cape in 1652. They were - shortish/brown/yellowy/tawny/black, stinking, they clucked and talked like the sound of a turkey (hence one explanation for the name 'Hottentot'), the male child's right testicle was removed at birth (a common explanation was that it enabled them to run faster), they had woolly tufts of hair on their heads, they smeared themselves with grease, wore a pouch round their necks for pipes and tobacco, and arm-bracelets in ivory or copper, they carried sticks or clubs, they were swift runners, they were nomadic and had no industry or commerce or agriculture, nor did they know anything of gold or silver, they had no faith and were godless though they were thought to worship the moon, the women had long and pendulant breasts, they all wore guts or intestines round their necks or legs, they ate raw entrails, women had to cut off the top joint of their little finger at marriage or widowhood, they had neither government nor kings, but only chiefs whose power was based on their wealth in cattle, they were polygamous and in general bestial, sordid, horrible, savage, sickening and barely human. But they were humans: about that there was no doubt, though their origins perplexed visitors, and now and again - though generally an exception - they were likened to animals. This raises a point which is worth spelling out a little more fully.

178. The material is usefully brought together in R. Raven-Hart: Before van Riebeeck, passim. See also Barker: Op. cit., chapter III. This is a weak chapter in his usually good argument, but at least the English evidence is helpfully collected in one place. He claims that the 'clucking turkey' image originated with Dapper. It is in fact much earlier and can be found in Lodewijks' account of the Houtman voyage. See Mollema (ed.) De Eerste Schipvaart der Hollanders ..... Op. cit., p.140.
While the image of the Khoi prior to 1652 was systematically negative and hostile in terms of their culture, behaviour, language and general appearance, it was never seriously or consistently questioned that they were human, though the descriptions of them and the revulsion they generated came close to that and were not flattering. Mollema summarises the unambiguous view of the early Dutch diarists:

If the Dutch sailor felt himself to be a kindly master, highly superior to these foul-smelling, sods of brown apes with their flat faces and protruding backsides around them which he could have knocked down with one fist-blow and with a kick of his boot, laughing about the care they took to conceal their 'little women' (derogatory, A.I.), to hide them between the bushes, then his further journey to Madagascar must have quickly given him a different impression. Those were well-proportioned brave men with thick bunches of hair, broad in the shoulders, narrow in the hips with whom you couldn't play.

Later diarists - as indicated above in the list of features identified in their reports - continued to regard the Khoi as bestial and godless, utterly alien in culture and norms. Yet they, and subsequently the settlers and colonists at the Cape, never questioned that the Khoi were humans. What emerges clearly in this respect is that where explicit considerations of their inhumanity were raised, the people who did so had either never visited the Cape or had been there only fleetingly, though some Dutchmen - like Ten Rhyne and Grevenbroek - speculated about the origins and history of the Khoi.

179. Mollema: Op. cit., loc. cit.. The description of their speech was "Their speech resembles the stuttering clucking of angry male turkeys. They speak with an impediment, like those people who live round the Kempten and the Alps whom one calls Juliae (S.W. Beieren, i.e. Bavaria and the Julian Alps) and who, through the hardness of the snow-water have developed goitre". Ibid., loc. cit.. This appears to be the origin of the 'turkey' image which became common in later accounts. While this was the dominant image of the Khoi, there were some less harsh descriptions, such as that in the Remonstrance of Jansz and Proot. See Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp.1-4.
While the Dutch at the Cape perceived them as lawless, having extraordinary customs, being deficient in entrepreneurial or industrial skills and as being culturally alien, this did not entail a belief in their non-humanity. Instead it did not prevent the Dutch at the Cape from seeing and playing off the tactical and commercial possibilities of the situation. Nor did it stop them from taking Khoi women as mistresses or concubines, marrying them, living in close quarters with Khoi families, fighting alongside them on commando attacks against the Khoisan resisters and even — with little enthusiasm, however — trying to educate and convert them in a non-racial though culturally plural society. So that it was not from amongst the officials or settlers at the Cape that the question of the place of the Khoi in some universal hierarchy of species was raised.

It was people like Rev John Ovington (who made a fleeting visit to the Cape in 1689 on his way East) who speculated that the Khoi were the 'very reverse of Human kind' and that "... if there's any medium between a Rational animal and a Beast, the Hotentot lay fairest claim to that species". Sir William Petty raised a similar such racist question in the mid-17th century, and the authors of The Lay Monastery — who'd never been near the Cape — suggested links between the Apes and Monkeys and the 'savage Hotentot', as well as the ".... stupid native of Nova Zembla ....". At the end of the 18th century the great chain of being theory emerged more forcefully and was expressed in the writings of people like Soames

Jenyns in his *Disquisitions on Several Subjects* in which the Khoi were said to have been at the lower end of the chain.\footnote{182a}{In 1774, in his *History of Jamaica*, Edward Long claimed that he did not think that "... an orang-outang husband would be a dishonour to an Hotentot female ....".} What needs to be stressed is that such views were foreign to the Cape and there is nothing to indicate that such speculations were ever entertained by colonists or officials, who - after all - married Khoi women, took them as mistresses, cooperated with them in defence and attack and sought their labour, as we shall see.

While Ten Rhyne (1686) wondered whether the Khoi had originated from Ham (though given its context, none of the negative connotations were implied), and while Grevenbroek (1695) suggested that it was from the Israelites that they'd learnt their ".... sacerdotal and sacrificial rites", neither of them - or later writers on the Khoisan at the Cape - ever seriously thought of the Khoi in those terms, though the sense of cultural distance and the perception of somatic difference may have remained strong, as indeed it was.\footnote{184}{In fact, apart from Ten Rhyne's early speculation about the origin of the Khoi, the question of their status as 'the children of Ham' did not surface in those terms in the 17th century at all. Moreover, its usage in the 18th century appears to be very sparse indeed; the evidence is negligible. There is one reference in the}
Church records to Ham in 1703. But this is—in that collection of documents, at least—unique. Moreover it is the language of religion, and does not reflect a pervasive definition of social reality in those terms amongst the colonists. It has been suggested that this Old Testament view of the Khoi, 'bastards' and other non-whites was widespread. Yet all the main evidence that is used to illustrate that argument is not drawn from the 17th century or the 18th century at the Cape. Rather, those propositions rely heavily on statements from the 19th century and later. No doubt the language of religion contained such notions and images, but their social usage for prescriptive and/or justificatory purposes is an entirely different matter. Recent studies confirm the view that the political and social exploitation of these notions lies in the 19th century and later. Certainly there is no evidence whatsoever that East Indian and other slaves were regarded as inferior beings, and the range of skilled tasks they performed in the agricultural and domestic economy of the Cape will not have provided any basis for

185. The Drakenstein Church Council wrote to Amsterdam, saying: "After a fair and laudable confession of faith before the congregation, we have accepted as a convert and member of the invisible (verborgen) body of Jesus Christ someone born of Muhammdaan (sic) parents. It were desirable that it please our Almighty God and Shepherd of the flock to bring the old occupants of this land (the Hottentots) into the fold of Jesus Christ, so that also Cham may also no longer be a servant of servants; this is desirable but seemingly cannot happen without the all-powerful hand of our merciful God, at which time the fullness of the heathens will come to pass". C. Spoelstra: Bouwstoffen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederduitsch-Gereformeerde Kerken in Zuid-Afrika, Part I, pp. 33-4, Document 12, dated 4th April, 1703. The Amsterdam Classis approved the action and said that it hoped that "... God may once and for all cast off the curse of Cham's offspring; that he will cause the fullness of the Heathens to come to pass, and that he will bless the entire Israel ...". Ibid., Part 2, pp. 14-16, dated 21st December, 1703.

186. F.A. van Jaarsveld: The Afrikaner Interpretation of South African History, pp. 6-7. His claim is weakly supported. The main evidence he adduces—apart from the above 1703 reference—is decisively outside the 18th century. This is the burden of Moodie's argument too. See Dunbar T. Moodie: Op. cit., p. 29. Also Irving Hexham: "Dutch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism", passim.
such a view. While one can see how a rough and ready impression of class and cultural hierarchy - from the Dutch at the top through to the Khoi at the bottom - would have been a plausible kind of way for the structuring of perception by the dominant, the rapidity of the mixing and miscegenation of people at the Cape - East Indians, Africans, Khoi, Dutchmen (and combinations of them) - must have eroded any reliable basis for reading off culture and behaviour and lineage from appearance, certainly in the town.

It is, moreover, highly unlikely that Cape settlers coming from the Netherlands and Protestant Europe in general in the 17th and 18th centuries would have thought of the Khoi in Biblical terms or in the manner of Jenyns, Petty and others. Their perception of them as culturally alien and distant would not have entailed any direct implications for behaviour towards them, nor would it have called on any Ham-like notions for explanatory, prescriptive or justificatory purposes, and certainly there is no persuasive evidence of anything like that. One must constantly remember that there was no tightly segregated frontier - physical or sociological - between the colonists and the Khoi: as the colonial society expanded the Khoi became part of it, from very early on, albeit in subordinate capacities.

And the closer and the more frequent the contact between them all in that colonial context, the less likely are Europeans to have considered Khoi to be non-human, in virtue of their daily experience of, and with them. And the more the interaction, the closer the (subordinate) sexual, social, economic and other links between them within the structures and emergent institutions of the new society. Yet those Khoisan who were outside the colonial society and who were resisting its advance and its predatory incorporations
were mercilessly hunted and fought and regarded as barely human adversaries who deserved to be eliminated. Though the Khoi never enjoyed an attractive or positive image, at least one farmer at the Cape rated their women higher than the Dutch women when he told Sparrman, in the 1770s, about his preferences in women. "First, the Madagascar women who are the blackest and handsomest; next to these the Malabars, then the Bugunese or Malays, after these the Hottentots, and last and worst of all, the white Dutch women". 187

Thus the image of the Khoisan in the eye of the representative Dutchman in the first half of the 17th century, prior to systematic contact at the Cape, was consistently negative, but in cultural and behavioural terms. The stereotype of them - in advance of the interaction - had nothing whatsoever to do with/prior hostile predispositions towards people of colour rooted in any notional dichotomous categories of Calvinism. Nor did it reflect a blanket racist or colourist outlook in the Netherlands of the kind that was later to emerge in 19th century Britain in the heyday of Empire, in which immutable behavioural and cultural correlates were associated with physical features. Though later, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, Khoisan were incorporated in subordinate roles and statuses in the Cape colonial political economy, the explanation for that must be rooted squarely in the local material conditions and the externally imposed constraints of the V.O.C., not in terms of 'idealist' interpretations of causal relations in the formation of social structure. And so long as the cultural discontinuities

187. A. Sparrman: A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, I, p.75.
persisted in fact, so long were there readily available criteria for the bases of subordination and exclusion, though it is in the nature of such cultural criteria to permit people to move across boundaries by socialization and/or changing their behaviour, as is in some respects the case with class. What distinguishes exclusion or differentiation on grounds of culture and class from grounds of colour is that they allow (in theory, if not always in practice) for mobility. Colour, by definition, vetoes any such movement of individuals or groups, and thus consigns an outgroup to permanent exile from the entitlements of the polity or social system by locking them in a subordination from which there is no escape. The emergence of that development in South Africa has to be explained historically, in terms of the political economy of South Africa, for there are no grounds for it in the antecedent history or ideology of the Netherlands. In any event it is a phenomenon which may emerge, as such, at the far end of a long historical sequence during which cultural differences may first have been partly, or even (as in the case of the 'Coloureds') totally eliminated, while the need (in economic and class terms) to retain more or less rigid bases of exclusion from or access to, the scarce societal resources have remained.

Finally, is there a problem to be resolved by the fact that the Dutch adopted slavery abroad, and at the Cape in particular, although the institution was dead and banned in the Netherlands? This relates to a further associated point. It is commonplace to find slavery blamed for the emergence of attitudes of white superiority in South Africa, and even at the Cape before the 19th
century industrial revolution. However, the simple explanation which links colourism and 'racialism' automatically to slavery is not satisfactory. After all, slavery has existed since time began, in one form or another, so far as can be said, and where there is evidence it does not indicate that slavery qua slavery produced anything remotely like institutionalized colourism. The distinction between slavery and freedom is most usefully conceived of as a continuum which was defined by the presence or absence of all or some of the classic freedoms of the citizen in ancient Greece: the right to a legal personality, the right to work at what one wished, personal mobility and personal inviolability. From Biblical times through antiquity to the Middle Ages, slaves had almost always been drawn from a variety of nationalities and cultures, usually also from outsiders, relative to the dominant group. Thus there was no structural basis for 'racialism' to emerge. Moreover in Florence and the Middle East in the Middle Ages the variety of 'colours' ranged from the Ethiopian to the Scythian, and included Circassians, Turks, Spaniards, Syrians, Armenians, Caucasians, Tartars, Bulgarians and Georgians. Being foreigners, the slaves were also outsiders in the society, having been brought into the settled dominant culture of the majority. If and when they adopted the culture and/or religion of their masters, manumission and absorption was not only possible but common, provided economic circumstances prevailing at the time permitted or encouraged it, as in 16th century Seville too. What

distinguished the 'new' colonial slavery from the old legacy that had remained in the Mediterranean basis right into the period of expansion was that, by and large, not only were slaves in the colonies in the majority - with the important exception of the U.S.South - but also - like their masters - they were expatriates, but unlike their masters, they were Black or Coloured. 190

Furthermore, slavery had long died out in northwest Europe, and in particular the Netherlands, before the colonial expansion began. Hence Europeans could not be and were not enslaved by Europeans though the condition of indentured servant or knecht was pretty close to slavery, though for a limited period. But Dutchmen could not be slaves, and what is more, they knew it. Thus the slaves that they brought to the Cape came not only from different cultures - that is not new: the slave has always been an outsider - but also from different colours. Yet their colour alone did not prevent manumission and absorption as wives (mostly) or 'free blacks' into Cape or East Indian Dutch society. Manumissions not only took place in the East and at the Cape, but were quite common. The children of freed slaves or of freed slavesses married to colonists, filtered into and were part of the free burgher colonial elite, with formally equal access to economic resources, political influence and social status. In the 18th century - and later - it is quite likely that a significant proportion of that elite were 'Brown Afrikaners'. The emergence of the co-called 'Cape Coloured People' is evidence of that, and the difficulty which 'white' Afrikanerdom has had in the 20th century in defining their relations with 'Brown Afrikanerdom'

(the Coloureds) confirms that colour is an almost impossible basis of differentiation and discrimination to sustain where there are wide and major areas of institutional continuity between so-called colour groups.

Thus slavery, in itself, explains very little about the formation and shape of the Cape political economy, its social structure and associated attitudes, in the same way that antecedent attitudes or institutions alone explain little. The Dutch officials at the Cape brought the institution there for a specific purpose: they needed labour, and slavery was the cheapest form, short of enslaving Dutchmen which was - by that stage - impossible. And when they had expanded into the mercantile system "... they were already faced with established slave-trading routes and the example of highly profitable Iberian use of slave labour". 191 But the Dutch also brought with them a history of, and procedure for, the manumission of those slaves who deserved it or qualified for it, as the discussion of Dort will have shown. Freedom meant, formally at least, equality with other free burgers. Now it has already been argued that Dutchmen are unlikely to have had any profound feelings of racial or colour superiority, though they did have a distinct sense of cultural and ideological distance between themselves and other groups, and considered their culture superior. Thus if attitudes of hostility hardened towards the culturally distinct Khoisan and, initially, the culturally alien slaves from Madagascar and the Indies, there is no cause for puzzlement: institutional discontinuities and slave desertions and Khoisan attacks are sufficient grounds for explaining that, given the context and situation, for the plural society is

defined structurally by such discontinuities, and the differential incorporation of distinctive segments within it. But if cultural or religious distinctions faded, and manumission or inclusion in the common society was then stalled or denied, it is not to slavery as such that one must look for the explanation, but to the wider political economy that underpinned the whole system of unfree labour and set limits, therefore, to the amount of upward mobility possible in the society.

This brings the argument full circle back to one of the initial conceptual starting points, namely that the group of colonists and officials who arrived at the Cape were also constrained by the tight monopolistic policy of the V.O.C. This policy which acted to cramp the potential of the Cape colonial economy, pressed down through successive groups and layers of power, and imposed limits on the expansion of the political economy of the Cape, and thus affected the social structure and associated attitudes, goals and interests. Initially, therefore, cultural and somatic differences were not only readily observable indicators, but also handy and useable to the Dutch in the arrangement of the division of labour which the V.O.C. imperatives dictated. In short, the division of labour coincided initially with the division and discontinuity of cultures. When, later, these divisions began to fade and there began to emerge a common culture, then - if the political economy could not or did not expand sufficiently to take the strain, given that there was already much competition between the burgers in a limited market - new solutions to an old problem had to be found. One solution, as we shall see, was to trek; but was another solution to limit the manumission of those who earlier would have qualified? If that did happen, then it is in the context of that history and that matrix of
socio-economic and political factors that the explanation for a class-based system - with a deeply implicated 'racial' or colour dimension - has to be located. The shift in criteria that took place was - schematically - from culture to class. But the point to emphasize here is that the institution of slavery was brought to the Cape by the 'fragment', and the ideology of the fragment in no way vetoed it. But that ideology did not enjoin permanent servitude or inferiority on Biblical or any other grounds, nor did it endorse it. If anything, it urged the expansion of freedom and the community of Christians. Thus when later problems of the kind outlined above may have arisen, their solution evolved in terms of local Cape political and ideological resources. There was no prior prescription for such policies in the Netherlands, though there were aspects of the ideology which could be drawn on, and twisted, to legitimate them. These are questions to which the discussion will return in later chapters when examining key aspects of interaction at the Cape.

Thus from the unique and complex economic history of the Low Countries which stood at a crucial temporal and spatial crossroads in Western Europe, there developed a powerful, mercantile and trading economy. It expressed and gave rise to a largely urban and remarkably literate culture with a robust associated ideology that both articulated and sustained the secular institutions, norms and values of the society. They were materialist and acquisitive, oriented to trade and the making of profit, and geared to production or exchange for purposes of the generation of wealth and the accumulation of capital. In this context there emerged the V.O.C. which chrystallized and concentrated such values, behaviours and
expectations. The role of Dutch Calvinism, it has been argued above, has been misrepresented in most of the historiography on South Africa, because it has started at the South African end. An examination of the Dutch Republic in the half-century or more before 1650, does not reveal a society or a people uniformly gripped by the gloomy doctrines of Dort. Nor does it reveal any specific injunctions or philosophies enunciated at Dort which can be held to be primarily causally responsible for developments at the Cape. Moreover there is scant evidence for the view that there had already formed in the Netherlands that matrix of ideas which influenced or provided the justification for colourism or racism, and it will later be suggested that those developments - which need careful definition and specification - were not typically prevalent at the Cape in the 17th and 18th centuries anyway. What has been argued here, and what will be developed later again is the view that while there was a profound sense of cultural distinction and distance, this did not predispose Dutchmen to be 'racist' in the sense we understand it today. Nor did it entail any prescriptions for behaviour or justification for enslavement on the grounds of colour, though Grotius had defended slavery in general in the classical terms of Roman law as codified by Justinian.192 The kind of relations that emerge in the structure of new societies constituted by diverse cultural groups and colours in given economic contexts are far too complex to be labelled 'race relations', and such a label conceals more than it reveals.

In addition to this background of ideas, norms and institutions in the culture and ideology of Dutch society, there were

the dictates of the V.O.C. tracking through its international and colonial trading empire, which were based on and reflected the interests of the metropolis. These imperatives came to bear on, and constrain the behaviour and emergent local interests of settlers at the Cape, and thus acted also to shape the structure of the society there. The 'fragment' which thus arrived at the Cape, therefore, bore with it the culture, ideology and institutions of the European antecedents which have been outlined. The burden of the argument has been to sketch these as essential background to the analysis of the nature, levels and kinds of interaction that subsequently ensued between the Dutch and the V.O.C. at the Cape, on the one hand, and the material and human environment on the other hand, subject always to the downward pressure of the V.O.C. and its interests. What the argument also does is to locate the problem at the Cape and in the structure of interaction there, which is where the analysis of colonialism and the constitution of new societies belongs. Before that can be done, the structure, culture and normative universe of the Khoisan - prior to systematic contact - needs to be examined. For the argument has also underlined the need to see the emergence of Cape society in terms of the clash of radically discontinuous economic systems, cultures and ideologies and the emergence from that clash of a single political economy and social structure in the form of the plural colonial society.
Chapter 4

KHOISAN SOCIETY AT THE CAPE

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of Khoisan society at the Cape prior to the establishment of the V.O.C. settlement, and to outline the structure of relationships between San, Khoi and Bantu-speakers. Though some Khoi had been in contact with European seamen round the coast of South Africa from the end of the 15th century, the establishment of the station at Table Bay in 1652 marks a decisive and fateful turning point in the history of the Khoisan. 1

1. Schapera says "... although Bushmen and Hottentots are usually classed as belonging to one ethnic group, termed 'Khoisan' by Schultze, it is both more convenient and more accurate to regard them as two separate divisions of that group". I. Schapera: The Khoisan Peoples of South Africa, p.21. (Hereafter referred to as Schapera (a)). My overall concern with the relationships between economy and culture, and the differences between cultures, underlines the case for treating them separately, while acknowledging the similarities between them. Most authorities treat the Khoi and San as different, or only regard them as a single group for certain purposes. See Shula Marks: "Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", p.53. Also, Monica Wilson: "The Hunters and the Herders", p.43. Ray Inskeep: "The Archaeological Background", p.29. All draw on the classic piece by E.O.J. Westphal: "The Linguistic prehistory of Southern Africa: Kwadi, Bush, Hottentot and Bantu Linguistic Relationships". He says "The term 'Khoisan' is of no linguistic usefulness whatever", p.243. The relationship between Khoi and San is dealt with later. Philip V. Tobias: "Physical Anthropology and the Somatic Origins of the Hottentots", passim. He says a "... variety of racial threads (have) become woven into the skeinwork of Hottentot culture in Southern Africa", Ibid., p.14.
Prior to that time, so far as we can gather from the really quite slim evidence,² the small bands of hunter/gatherer San, the larger hordes of Khoi herders, and the slash-and-burn and pastoral Bantu-speaking Nguni and Sotho (the latter also being skilled craftsmen in various metals) lived in relatively peaceful relations with each other. These relations varied from individual

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2. There is little direct evidence about the Khoi, for no group survived intact. There are important early travel accounts which provide the basis for most of the work on the Khoi. There is more firm material on the San, and modern studies of the !Kung, the G/wi and other hunters of Botswana and Namibia tend to confirm to the authorities many aspects of political economy and social life which tally with what is known about San hunters in the Cape from the 17th and 18th centuries. The main sources for ethnographic data on the Khoisan are: Schapera (a): Op.cit.; Wilson: Op.cit.; Schapera: "The Native Inhabitants" (hereafter Schapera(b)); C.G.Seligman: The Races of Africa; L.F.Maingard: "The Lost Tribes of the Cape"; Schapera (ed.): The Early Cape Hottentots, being the collected writings of the 17th century observers, O.Dapper (1668), W.Ten Rhyne (1686) and J.Grevenbroek (1695); G.Stow: The Native Races of South Africa; M.Hodgson: "The Hottentots in South Africa to 1628" and John Cope's King of the Hottentots. There is also the remarkable work by Philip Tobias. Also, Mrs Marshall's work on the !Kung and other studies by modern writers like E.Marshall Thomas: The Harmless People, and L.van den Post's The Lost World of the Kalahari. Most are extensively used by Wilson, Harinck and Marks. Where appropriate I refer to the evidence as collated by the latter in secondary material. Also, L.F.Maingard: "The First Contacts of the Dutch with the Bushmen until the time of Simon van der Stel (1686)", and his "History and Distribution of the Bow and Arrow in South Africa"; L.Fourie: "The Bushmen of South West Africa" and H.Vedder: "The Nama". More recently the historical work by Richard Elphick has made our knowledge much richer. R.E.Elphick: The Cape Khoi .... Op.cit., passim.
client-patron connections between and within the three major groups, through temporary symbiotic arrangements to entirely independent self-sufficiency. What is central to the overall argument of this study is that what the Dutch impacted upon was a loose network of relationships between these groups which were distributed over a wide geographical area. The disruption this impact caused — and the destruction of societies and cultures which ensured — was as much a consequence of institutional and normative incompatibilities as it was the result of warfare, the spread of disease and an 'excessive' trade which imposed upon the Khoi to a level which was, in the end, beyond the capacity of their economy to sustain. Moreover, the taut political economy and social structure of the Cape settlement, which both expressed and exaggerated the aggressive and acquisitive norms and behaviour of the robustly individualistic Protestant culture, proved to be quite incompatible with the incorporation of the 'refugees' from the shattered Khoisan societies on anything that, overall, approximated to an egalitarian basis. The detailed analysis of that is dealt with later.

But before one can proceed to analyze that interaction, and to chart how and why the Khoisan broke up, it is first necessary to know rather more about the structure of Khoisan societies than the standard histories provide. What has to be done here is to express the internal structures of these societies, and the relations between them, their environment and the other groups in terms of a theoretical model that will give clearer meaning to the slim evidence

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3. The Khoisan did not crumble without a fight. Shula Marks has corrected the standard impression. See Marks: *Op.cit.*, *passim.*
we have for them. Such a conceptual scheme will serve to point up also the kinds of structural incompatibilities and discontinuities between Khoisan and European societies which resulted in severe conflict when they met and interacted on a sustained basis for the first time after 1652.\(^4\)

What, first, are the bare empirical bones about numbers, distribution and economic organization of the Khoisan and Bantu-speaking 'tribes' that will help at this stage to situate them? The Khoisan peoples of South Africa is a wider term used to refer to Khoi and San.\(^5\) The San, whose culture stems from the Late Stone Age, were the small 'yellow-skinned' hunters and gatherers who belonged to what Maquet describes as 'the civilization of the Bow'.\(^6\)

\(^4\) By using other contributions, theoretical and otherwise, to the analysis of similar sized hunter-gatherer band societies, it is possible to establish working models of these societal types, and the San in particular. It ought also to be said that by 'European' I do not mean simply 'white'. Colour has no behavioural correlates and is therefore little analytical use in considering interaction except insofar as one can show that the individual is affected by the perception of the 'colour' of others. Thus by 'European' in this study I mean in the first instance that group at the Cape whose mode of production and culture reflected and was expressed in terms of typically individualistic Western Protestantism, committed to accumulation, the pursuit of trade and profit. By the mid-18th century this group was certainly not 'white' and probably never had been 'purely' so anyway.

\(^5\) See Note 1, above.

\(^6\) J. Maquet: The Civilizations of Black Africa. The Khoisan in general are referred to in the literature as being 'yellow-skinned', though it is often suggested that Khoi were slightly taller and darker than the San, possibly due to long contact and interaction with the Bantu-speakers. Schapera (a): Op. cit., p.43; Wilson: Op. cit., p.47. Elphick has suggested that the characteristically tall size of Khoi can be attributed to a regular milk diet over many generations amongst cattle-keepers. A similar point is made by G.P. Murdock in his Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture, pp.52-3. Elphick: Op. cit., p.20. The 'yellow-skinned' description is common. Wilson: Op. cit., p.40; Schapera (a): Op. cit., p.20; Seligman: Op. cit., p.16. Yet the variety of terms used by contemporaries in the 16th and 17th centuries gives one cause to doubt the significance of 'yellow' and suggests that colour is a highly relative (to time and context) characteristic, which is given to others by a group or an individual. For a wide-ranging comparative study of hunters, see: R.B. Lee and I. de Vore: Man the Hunter, especially chs. 1, 4, 5 and 13.
They were distributed in small hunting bands through the more arid and mountainous regions of the Southern Africa away from the Eastern coastal strip, but where the game nonetheless were plentiful. It has been claimed that there were some 10,000 San in the Cape before the Boer commandos and expansion of the colony on to their hunting and gathering grounds resulted in their sharp decline in numbers. But this figure is speculative, and has been called into serious question, though no firm alternative has been given. There is as yet no hard evidence to suggest whether the number in the Cape area was higher or lower. However, in 1957 there were still some 51,000 'Bushmen' in Southern Africa, most of whom were concentrated in Botswana and Namibia. Given both the continuity and distinctions in culture between 'pure' San - Elphick appropriately calls them 'aborigines' - and 'pure' Khoi, it may be difficult to establish finally what the numbers might have been. They were very often seen with, or attached to, Khoi by the earliest writers, but do not appear to have been on or near the east coast, according to Maingard.7

The pressure on the San was compounded from the narrowing scope for their free movement, the reduction in game and access to veldkos and the southward movement of Nguni - all of which acted to trap them in an impossible situation which precipitated their fierce resistance against, and assaults on, all cattle-keepers, for their

very survival was at stake. The Khoi, on the other hand, were nomadic pastoralists, organized in larger 'tribes', or hordes, and were to be found in the Western Cape and along the coastal plain as far as the Mzimvubu in the northeast, and the mouth of the Orange river in the northwest. The groups of Khoi we know from van Riebeeck's time were distributed from the Orange round to the Mzimvubu in roughly the following contiguous order: the Nama; the Great and Little Charigiquas; the Cochoqua (or Saldanhars); the Peninsular groups known as the Goringhaikonas (The 'Watermen' or Herry's 'Strandlopers'), the Goringhiquas ('The Capemen') and the Gorachourquas ('The Tobacco Thieves'); the Chainouquas; the Hessequas; the Gouriquas; the Attaquas; the Houteniquas; the Damaquas; the Damaquenas; the Hoemgeiquas; and the Conaquas between the Keiskamma and the Kei who were really Xhosa-Khoi. Inland, slightly to the southwest of present-day Graaff-Reinet were the Inquas. The Khoi were to be found mainly in this coastal area, and it is reckoned that there were about 200,000 Khoi south of the Orange when the Dutch arrived.

8 Though there was a degree of institutional and normative continuity between the Khoi and the San, we must at this stage concentrate on the differences between them. In large measure these turned on, and flowed from the crucial distinction in their mode of economic life: the San were hunters and gatherers, while the Khoi - who also hunted - were herders of sheep and cattle.

The Bantu-speaking people of South Africa, the Nguni and the Sotho, will not figure significantly in this study. Systematic and intensive contact with them occurs only from the 1770s. But they were at both 'ends', so to speak, of the web of relationships that existed in South Africa before the arrival of the Dutch. Nguni and Sotho refers primarily to a linguistic divide, though there were other differences too: the Sotho were skilled workers in metal, and tended to live in larger settlements, for example. But the Nguni/Sotho must be distinguished for our purposes from the Khoi and San in respect of the level of technology, system of production and the associated social and political structures. For the Nguni and Sotho were all cultivators as well as keeping beasts and hunting. Political organization and social structure was accordingly both larger in terms of the constituent units of various tribes and more steeply ranked in terms of hierarchy, which was accompanied by a greater degree of specialization. The Nguni were, broadly speaking, distributed between the Drakensberg and the sea, and from the area of the Fish river in the south to roughly present-day Swaziland. Their precise numbers are not known, but they were certain to have been far in excess of the Khoi: Shaka's army alone has been estimated to have been between 50,000 and 100,000 in strength and at the height of his imperial might he is said to have added about half a million people

8. (continued from p.203) ...." are there?" He was told, "This is difficult to establish since they lie now here with their cattle, now there". See F. Valentyn: Description of the Cape of Good Hope with the Matters concerning it, II, p.243.

to his realm.  

The Sotho lay, broadly speaking, on the westward and landward side of the Drakensberg to the north of the Nguni, and stretched from the area of the Orange River in the south to the Limpopo in the north. Again, none of the authorities offer any estimates of the numbers of Sotho at the time of the Dutch arrival, but travellers at the end of the 18th century were amazed to find large individual settlements of up to 15,000 people.

In the previous chapter I suggested that an examination of the complex history of the rise of the Dutch Republic and its empire both illustrated and confirmed a number of assumptions which formed the starting point for an analysis of the economy-society, social structure-ideology and culture-ideology relationships. Of course, the economic 'base' does not 'determine' the 'superstructure' - as the mechanistic interpretation and 'language' used to describe these complex relationships implies. It is nonetheless the case (which can be demonstrated in respect of the historical period under consideration in the Netherlands) that the material interests and associated technological capacities of societies both generate imperatives which


must be fulfilled for the survival of the group, but also set broad limits to what can be done to achieve those ends. Secondly, there is a complex relationship between any such mode of production and the associated political institutions, culture and ideology which express, influence and sustain it. Few anthropologists in their monographs of particular societies leave out of account an explicit consideration of the relationship between economy, social structure and the wider political, symbolic, religious and ritual life of the people. Historians have tended to be more coy: the relationships are hinted at, the complex welter of 'facts' judiciously arranged, and generalizations about interconnections avoided. Perhaps this is because the societies they characteristically study are more complex: but it also says something about the nature of the disciplines. What is relevant to our purposes here is that anthropologists of different 'schools' and with a range of distinctive interests and emphases - social, economic and political - are more self-consciously aware of the need to confront the problems about the relationships between 'the economy', the central features of social structure and the distribution of political power. Thus one anthropologist in analyzing the historical relevance of changing kinship structures to broader social change in Southern Africa has suggested that, in explaining the rise of kingdoms, for example, ".... the monopoly of trade is one clue to centralization". 12 Similarly, a political anthropologist, Barnes, in a study of the 'snowball state' of the Fort Jameson Ngoni, in looking for interconnections within the

society, argues from the assumption that while rights in land generally provide a key to the "... structure of society", this did not apply in the case of the Ngoni because the state was so much on the move. Thus, he suggests that "... the principle index of power was the number of a man's dependents". And there are of course numerous other examples of this self-conscious 'inter-disciplinarity' within anthropology, and the frankness with which these relationships are sought.

The point here is, in fact, quite straightforward and can be briefly stated. Within anthropology, and its more recent involvement with historical questions, scholars search more openly for interconnections between different dimensions of social life. Whether underpinned by synchronic structural-functional assumptions or not, they rightly assume (and often demonstrate with great skill) that there are relationships to be uncovered, identified and traced. Moreover, they generate hypotheses and 'theories' of a fascinating kind by use of the comparative method.

13. J.A. Barnes: Politics in a Changing Society, pp.29-32. Another example of this explicit concern to seek connections may be found in Godfrey and Monica Wilson: The Analysis of Social Change. One of the questions they set out to ask was how "... change from a number of small, locally decentralized organizations, within which political authority was linked closely with religious and economic status, to an enormous centralized organization within which authority is less immediately linked with religion and economic status, is related to economic changes .....". G. and M. Wilson: Op.cit., p.7. Their little study has recently been described as "the most ambitious attempt to explain the overall process of change since the Communist Manifesto". See Richard Brown: "Anthropology and Colonial Rule: the Case of Godfrey Wilson and the Rhodes Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia", p.195.

14. One can do no better than refer to that work of M.G. Smith in this respect. In particular see his comparative tour de force on "Pluralism in Pre-colonial African Societies", Op.cit.. He concludes by making an unduly modest claim for the comparative method.
But there are substantial analytical problems when one draws on conventionally historical studies and tries to integrate these with the anthropological interpretations and synchronic accounts of 'primitive' societies when analyzing the contours and consequences of contact, conflict and interaction in the colonial situation. Not only are the various societies which are involved in the process radically different in terms of their cultures, structures and normative universes, but the theories, concepts and categories in terms of which each has conventionally been described and analyzed by the disciplines, are also of a different order. It is necessary to carry those kinds of problems along in the course of the following chapters. But against that background it is worth setting out here the general orientation to the analysis of indigenous Cape societies, which, aided by insights about structure from the accounts of the anthropologists, offers an attempt at providing conceptual balance with respect to the approach used in the previous chapter about the Dutch.

The Belgian anthropologist, Maquet, states the predicament of these societies succinctly, thus: 15

The most urgent aspect of adaptation consists in extracting from the natural habitat which is necessary to maintain the lives of individuals. (sic) This is why the production of material goods is the basis of a culture .... The other aspects of culture - economic organization, political institutions, world view, art, etc. - can only develop within the limits set by production. This dependence of the totality of the culture on the relationship between its environment and its technology is especially noticeable in societies which live only just above the subsistence level ..... This dependence of certain aspects of a culture on its means of production is not determinism. It is simply the case that a subsistence economy precludes certain political forms such as, for example, the state: how could a body of officials, devoting their full-time activities to administration, exist in a society in which each individual consumes as much as he produces? When the production of material goods provides a surplus, the possibilities of political forms increase.

As a general statement with quite direct implications for the analysis of the economy-society and economy-polity relationships it provides the basis for the comparative framework of assumptions that is needed here. It also provides a useful point of analytic entry to the structure and culture of the Khoi and the San. It will be apparent that the perspective which Maquet defines is congruent with the set of operational assumptions and orientations which were spelt out at the start of the last chapter and which gave shape to the Dutch and European material there.

A consideration of hunting-band societies in Africa and elsewhere provides the basis for a rough model of such societal types which the San hunters and gatherers illustrate in all significant and relevant respects. The central structural and normative characteristics of these societies suggest the following features of the type. In terms of size and scale they are very small indeed: few would be larger than 200 persons, and most would be closer to about 50.17


described as a 'subsistence economy' based on the collective hunting of game (generally by males, but often with female help, and also children), and the gathering of veldkos by all. It has long been an assumption of ethnographers and economic historians that this existence is precarious and fragile. That is only one view. Sahlins has observed that traditionally the hunter-gatherer "... is condemned to play the role of bad example, the so-called 'subsistence economy'..." Since scarcity is a relation between means and ends, and since - relative to their ends - the hunter-gatherers lived in plenty, he describes them as the 'Original Affluent Society'. In his survey of the economic life of the hunter-gatherers, Lee suggests, moreover, that life is not nasty, brutish and short, that a substantial volume (60-80%) of their food comes from gathering, and that their ecological balance is not nearly so precarious as previously thought and we need to see ".... hunting and gathering as a persistent and well-adapted way of life". 17a Such economies generate no 'surplus' because individuals consume what they 'produce' - that is what they collect and hunt. Moreover they do not spend a great deal of time in such pursuits. Amongst the !Kung, for instance, Lee found that they rarely kept more than two days' food in hand, that the women spent not much more than 2-3 days per week in collecting veldkos and that the staple - mangetti nuts - were abundant. "Why should we plant", they

17a. M.Sahlins: "Notes on the original Affluent Society", p.88; Richard B.Lee: "What Hunters do for a Living, or, How to Make out on Scarce Resources", p.43. This may exaggerate the 'affluent society' argument somewhat, but it is a useful corrective. See also K.Jordaan: "The Bushmen of Southern Africa: anthropology and historical materialism", passim.
said, "when there are so many mangongo nuts in the world?".\textsuperscript{17b}

Moreover, hoarding was frowned on, and individuals preferred to spend their time visiting, sleeping, embroidering or maintaining the camp. There is no cultivation and hunter-gatherers keep no beasts apart from some hunting dogs. The technology associated with this mode of subsistence is Late Stone Age, rudimentary, but quite adequate for the purposes of the groups. The bow, the poisoned arrow, the short spear, the hunting net and/or pit and a few bone or stone utensils are typical. In analyzing the social and political relations within such groups — and between them — one can trace connections running forward and back from this central fact: without game or access to the communal hunting grounds and veldkos, they must collapse, retreat or adapt. The implications of this mode of subsistence ramify throughout the system of social and political organization.

All this clearly relates to the congeries of norms which sanction and express the behaviour appropriate for the collective pursuit and distribution of food, and the control of feuds which, in the absence of formal political organization, could rip through and destroy the band. "The civilization of the bow is a complete way of life, organized round a certain way of obtaining subsistence", writes Maque.\textsuperscript{18} The hunt itself required cooperation. Men and women

\textsuperscript{17b} Lee: Op.cit., p.33. He says of the Dobe Bushmen that they "... eat as much vegetable food as they need, and as much meat as they can". Ibid., p.41. The same is true of the Hadza. See James Woodburn: "An introduction to Hadza Ecology", passim.

\textsuperscript{18} Maquet: Op.cit., p.66.
and children were needed to flush the quarry out of the bush towards the pit or the net, and a number of men would have to run down a beast. Often a fusilade of arrows, or a concerted assault with spears on a downed animal, would be needed to finish the kill. Everyone would keep their eyes (and also ears in the case of bees making for a hive) open for veldkos, to be collected en route from one hunting ground to the next, or from camp to camp. For this is another central feature of the band - constant mobility and hence economy of baggage on the move. They would have few 'possessions', and life on the move for women demanded that they did not have more than one very small child to be looked after at any time.

Moreover the implications for economic life of the close relationship between the band and the environment meant that division of labour


19a. Wilson: Op.cit., p.53. Amongst the Mbuti, Turnbull relates that ".... a woman can only feed one child at a time so she must not become pregnant again until her child is weaned. This may be from one to three years". Wayward Servants, p.122. Describing the !Kung, Marshall says: "On the long treks the mother carries all her worldly goods, including the ten or a dozen egg-shells filled with water, such roots and berries as she may have, and her infant in the pouch of her kaross". L. Marshall: "!Kung Bushmen Bands", p.329. By contrast, Khoi of course could and did use oxen to carry their belongings and themselves. The implications of this difference for group size, mobility and social organization are crucial and obvious.
was elementary, tending "... to follow the natural lines of sex and age ....". 20 And the internal relations of distribution within the band were governed in general by the principles of "generalized reciprocity" which Sahlins so carefully identifies. 21 Cooperation was enjoined between members of the band in hunting, and the principles of sharing what was hunted or collected was accordingly widespread. The size of the band, the mode of subsistence, the closeness of the relationship with the environment, and the principles of 'generalized reciprocity' meant a high degree of equality between members, and no stratification worth talking about. 21a


21. M. Sahlins: Op. cit., pp.188-9. He distinguishes the sharing "vice-versa movements" of goods within this kind of economy by stating that characteristically "... goods collectively procured are distributed through the collectivity". This is typical of the economy like that of the San "... in which food holds a commanding position, and in which day-to-day output does not depend on a massive technological complex nor a complex division of labour". Ibid., pp.186-7. The polar opposite of 'generalized reciprocity' is, for Sahlins, 'negative reciprocity' which identifies the "... attempt to get something for nothing with impunity, and the several forms of appropriation, transactions opened and conducted toward net utilitarian advantage". Ibid., p.195. The latter principles of economic behaviour reflect concisely Dutch economic ideology in this period.

21a. Discussing the associated 'reciprocal exchanges' Nash observes that "... the more homogeneous the society is in wealth the more likely is reciprocal exchange". Nash: Op. cit., p.31. And Sahlins suggests that 'generalized reciprocity' is "... the bias, finally, of societies ordered by kinship", where "... force is decentralized, legitimately held in severalty, the social compact has yet to be drawn, the state non-existent. So peacemaking .... is a continuous process going on within itself". Sahlins: Op. cit., pp.186-7. These points accurately highlight and illustrate the situation amongst the San.
The implications of this for political and social organization are equally direct and immediate. Not being cultivators or pastoralists they did not impose on, or alter, their environment. Rather, they responded and reacted to it. Given the limitations of size, the associated equality within the band and the imperatives and choices of their economic life, it follows that political organization was necessarily informal, non-hierarchical and oriented in processual and normative terms to maintaining the peace. There were no chiefs or headmen, but generally affairs were organized by an informal band council of adult men who would collectively take decisions particularly about the hunt or moving camp. There were no structural or substantive sources of direct coercion which could be applied: social control was crucial.

Thus the economy-polity relationship in this societal type is characteristically direct: no 'surplus' was generated in the economy and, partly in consequence of this fact, the political structure, or rather the political dimension, was low-level and 'flat', articulating no hierarchies of power other than the authority of the individual family head or the informal council of elders within each band. The further implications of this political economy and social structure of the band (which was itself typically constituted by small patrilineal families), for external relations with other bands and other societies will be examined later. For the present, all that needs to be stressed is that the capacity of the band to expand and incorporate new members beyond a very limited point was nil. The system of production and the appropriately simple technology provided the ultimate constraints on growth and band size. Moreover the institutional arrangements and political forms precluded it. Accordingly, hunting bands were extremely fragile and vulnerable units,
in relation to pressures on them, and their central structural features could be easily undermined by environmental contingencies with immediate and disastrous consequences for the group.

The political economy and social structure of the hunters generated and reflected an appropriate set of associated norms in which a high value was placed on collective solidarity and harmony, with hostility to individualistic or anti-social activity and deviation from expected procedure and behaviour. It is less easy to generalize more widely about the 'ideology' or 'world-view' of the hunters. Insofar as 'religion' goes it varied in its particulars and form as between different societies and their immediate ecological environment. But what does seem clear is that the horizons of the illiterate hunters were, by comparative standards, limited and low. The very simplicity of their material culture and social organization implies a not very complex system of ideas and beliefs. But more than that it is impossible to say: no-one has yet got inside the world-view of the hunters, but the evidence about religious practice and ritual behaviour suggests a strong bias directed towards, and turning on the immediate and rather a-historical concerns of the hunt, survival, and particular aspects or animals associated with it. Certainly, if the rock art of the San is anything to go by, this is clear. The hunters appear not to have had a strong sense of history or concern with either their ancestors or the future after death.

22. Turnbull's account of the behaviour of Cephu, the deviant, and his treatment by the band, is revealing. See The Forest People, p.91 ff., and passim.

23. The Mbuti do not speculate about 'the future' after death, though they have some nice degrees and gradations of being dead. The Wayward Servants, p.347. Mrs Marshall claims that the !Kung are very 'present orientated'. See Wilson: "The Hunters and Herdgers", p.53. In literal terms the Namibian !Kung Mrs Marshall studied in the 1950s had a very limited horizon. "They knew almost nothing about the world outside this region. Our informants did not know of the existence of the Atlantic Ocean only slightly 400 miles in a bee-line to the west, or the existence of any oceans". Mrs Marshall: Op.cit., pp.326-7. Yet some 'Bushmen' were reported to have had a rich fantasy life. D.Bleek: "Bushman Folklore", passim.
What this account of the typical hunting band suggests, then, is a society in which the economy, culture and socio-political relationships were closely bound up one with another in a tight and mobile nexus of relationships between members of the group, between the group and the environment and between contiguous groups. The direct implications of their limited technology and the hunting and gathering mode of subsistence, which did not permit the storing up of surplus or its redistribution or exchange, are crucial in this respect and underline the fragility and vulnerability of the group, relative to structurally more complex and economically more aggressive and acquisitive groups.

In all relevant respects the evidence for the San confirms the general picture: it will be useful here to fill out some particulars in relation to them. The contrast between the structural and normative features of these societies, and their particulars and form in the case of the San, is radical when compared with those of the Europeans who settled at the Cape in the mid-17th century. At that time the game was ample and anxieties about space were not a problem for the San. They lived in hunting bands of about 50 members, which were loosely aggregated into larger 'tribes' defined by a common language.24 (But on the wider question of language there is doubt: Westphal claims that in Southern Africa "... there are (even now,A.L.) four unrelated Bush language-types".25) The large herds of game provided adequate supplies of food, and individual bands also

collected berries, roots, termites, caterpillars, locusts, frogs, lizards, scorpions and beetles: some, near the coast, caught fish. Wild honey was gathered and there is evidence to suggest that some hives were the property of individual families in the band. Meat from a successful hunt would be distributed and shared amongst the band, according to the principles of 'generalized reciprocity', though a man kept the skin of an animal he had slain, and the clothes - cloaks, loin-cloths and aprons - for his family would be made from this. The territory of the band was jealously regarded, and trespass without permission by another band could lead to bloodshed. 'Trade' as such was peripheral to the economic life of the band, though Schapera suggests that amongst neighbouring friendly bands people moved "...freely from one to another to trade and seek a wife or visit relatives ...", but it is not at all clear what was traded or under what conditions. And Wilson says that the furs, ostrich-egg shells, beads and feathers from the hunt were used to trade in iron and tobacco. This 'trade' between San groups must have been marginal in the extreme, and it may be better to conceive of it as an extension, as between bands, of the generalized reciprocity and sharing that characterized intra-band relationships. On the other hand it is possible and likely that contact with Khoi or Bantu-spearers - which I shall return to later - included relations in which 'balanced reciprocity' (what we'd call 'trade') was one of the aspects, and symbiosis (at group level) and clientship (at the


the individual level) were others. For it is hard to see what San bands could have systematically exchanged with each other, though it is much more plausible to see them engaging in very low-level and limited and peripheral 'exchanges' with cattle-keepers, iron-workers and agriculturalists as they moved into and away from contact with them, possibly in return for various 'services'.

The case for conceiving of economic relations between bands as being extensions of 'generalized reciprocity' within them is supported by the practice of exogamous, and occasionally (for elders) polygamous marriage, establishing new links between San bands. As size grew, a split based partly on the 'new' marriages would have to occur and a new band be formed. Moreover, as if to cement the importance of the game and the hunt it is remarkable how thoroughly the imagery and imitation of the animals suffused the dance, art, ritual and 'religion' of the hunters. In their dancing—a feature of band life for which the members had almost endless energy amongst the Ituri foresters too—animals or the hunt would be mimed or re-enacted. And they painted kudu and buck and wildebeest on the rocks and in caves, and on ostrich egg shells, from which they also made ornaments, as they did with leather for bangles. Myths—in which the Eland figures prominently—were told as stories. When asked where 'Kaang' (or Kaggen), the creator of all things was, a hunter informed

28. "Balanced reciprocity refers to direct exchange. In precise balance the reciprocation is the customary equivalence of the thing received and is without delay". Sahlins: Op.cit., p.194. In his discussion of the G/wi Kalahari bands, Silberbauer says: "The G/wi have a system of loose alliances between sets of bands. This entails the exchange of visits between members of allied bands (and also en bloc visits) and, in times of drought, the sharing of all assets of their territories". Silberbauer: Op.cit., p.15.

J.M. Orpen that they didn't know, but the elands did. They seem to have identified Kaang also with the Mantis. It is not paradoxical that a people whose whole society, culture and existence was bound up with the animals would both hold them in respect and awe, miming and praising them, and at the same time 'pray' for good hunting.

I propose to examine the relationship between San, Khoi and the Bantu-speaking people separately towards the end of this chapter. What must be said here, however, is that as the game supply — and access to what game was left — was reduced, and their area of mobility constrained, the San hunters hit back at all cattle-keepers — colonists, Khoi, 'Bastaards' and Nguni alike. In the process, old relations with Khoi were shattered and the typical basis of later conflict between San and colonist established. In the end, of course, they were forced to retreat away from the line of colonial advance. Or, qua San, they ceased to exist. They were either wiped out, or they were absorbed and incorporated into wider groupings, but not as San. The question of the extent to which 'cultural commuting' did, or could have, taken place as between the categories Khoi and San must wait until a more explicit characterization of the typically Khoi 'way of life' has been given. And it is to this that I now turn.

The central fact about the Khoi material culture and way of life which distinguish it decisively from that of the San hunters

30. Wilson: Op.cit., p.54, and Turnbull: Wayward Servants, pp.120-1. van der Post: Op.cit., p.244. He describes how when he showed some reproductions of San paintings to the Kalahari group he visited, "... the two old people, man and woman, began crying as if their hearts would break and hid their heads in their arms. But the younger men instantly crowded round and exploded with sounds of astonishment, as if suddenly they saw something confirmed that, until then, had only been rumour". The Lost World of the Kalahari, p.221. These people no longer paint.
is that the Khoi were cattle-keepers. In short, what game was to the San, cattle (and sheep) were to the transhumant Khoi. Moreover, the herding of cattle, and the natural increase in stock which is associated, meant that it was possible to 'produce' a surplus over and above what was needed to maintain the community, and was accompanied by a greater division of labour. "The existence of both the surplus and the social division of labour makes possible exchange".31 I shall examine the limited evidence we have about Khoi 'trade' under the separate consideration of relations between groups at the Cape later in this chapter. What needs to be pressed home here as the central comparative point in the examination of the societal types at the Cape prior to the Dutch settlement is that at almost any point of analytic entry to the Khoi political economy, social structure, ceremonial practice and belief systems, cattle are crucial. Though the Khoi also hunted and collected veldkos, it was their possession of often very substantial herds of cattle and sheep, off which they lived and which they infrequently slaughtered, that affected or was the basis of, horde size, political organization, typical causes of conflict and warfare, disputes and fission, social structure, ritual and ceremony, the capacity to attach San or poor Khoi as clients, the scope for barter and trade on the basis of 'balanced reciprocity' and their greater 'cultural compatibility' with the Nguni in the east, which enabled Khoi to 'incorporate' Xhosa, and vice-versa, because of the wide measure of institutional continuity.32 While it is tempting to


32. The point about cultural compatibility is made in a careful analysis by Harinck: Op.cit., p.146. Shula Marks rightly questioned the use of the term 'horde'. It is no more adequate than 'tribe', and she suggests 'chieftdom'. I think that is too restrictive, and retain 'horde', despite its inadequacies.
see the Khoi as standing 'half-way' between the San and the Bantu-speakers, the principles of classification from the different disciplines - in terms of culture, economy, language and physical type - do not converge on this conclusion.\textsuperscript{33} We simply do not know enough about the deep history of the Khoisan to be able to be more confident about this. And even if the Khoi are in certain respects unique - possibly in consequence of a long period of contact with, and borrowing from, pastoralists by southerly San - it is nonetheless possible to identify the broader structural and normative features of these 'men of men', men of cattle, and thus to regard them as belonging to the category of transhumant societies, displaying some general characteristics of that kind of economy.

By contrast with the hunting-band, cattle-keepers moved in much larger units. In the case of the Khoi numbers varied between ".... several hundred to a couple of thousand".\textsuperscript{34} Political organization is necessarily more complex whether 'informal' and characterized


\textsuperscript{34} Schapera (a): Op.cit.,p.225. Wilson says the Khoi horde was "twenty to fifty times the size of the hunting band". Wilson: Op.cit.,p.58. In his Journal, van Riebeeck recorded on 8th November 1659 that "Oedasoa was lying in Saldanha Bay with more than 1600 of his Saldanhars". See Moodie: The Record.,19p.195. The main Nuer 'tribes' are far larger: see E.E.Evans-Pritchard: The Nuer,pp.117-9. Herskovits says that "... there seem to be almost no cases on record where, under aboriginal conditions, any shortage of suitable land for proper grazing existed in territories of non-literate pastoral folk". M.J.Herskovits: Economic Anthropology, p.343.
by articulated hierarchies of power within and between sections, themselves ranked in terms of seniority (the case with the Khoi). In the latter case - a ranked hierarchy of authority within sections and between them - the wealth in cattle and the generosity of the headman or chief in times of hardship illustrate the close connections between economy and socio-political structure. But if the wealth in cattle of such societies established the conditions for political rank, the nomadism associated with the keeping and grazing of large herds restricted the degree to which power could accumulate, since it made for a more loose alliance of segments and permitted the peeling off of a section and the establishment of a new core. Thus, in the specific case of the Khoi, the independent hordes were constituted by an alliance of patrilineal clans, in turn made up of a series of patrilineal extended families. The principle of seniority was reflected and expressed throughout the horde from relations between siblings, in the family, through the headship of the clan to the 'chieftanship' which was hereditary through the senior lineage of the senior patriclan. Sitting with the heads of the other clans, the chief disposed of his authority in the arbitration of disputes between clans and the enforcement of some decisions. Thus the two central dimensions of the transhumant economy - cattle and mobility - set up a tension between two opposing principles. On the one hand, the accumulation of cattle, and its measurement as an indicator of wealth, status and authority, generated a hierarchy of power throughout the society, which was more steep than amongst the hunter-gatherers. On the other hand the nomadic principle and the relative autonomy of the patriclans checked the centralization of power, making fission both possible and desirable when horde size became unwieldy. And by contrast with the Nguni, this entailed the establishment of new
hordes (or tribes). Even amongst the Ngoni, whose very history was bound up with constant mobility - 'the snowball state' which Barnes describes - segmentation "... was a process of growth", while fission "... did not bring into being any new segments, but merely dissolved the highest segment of all as a cohering political unit". Amongst the Khoi the constraints of size involved the break-up, not growth, of a horde and the formation of new ones based on departing patricians. At the Cape, the Goringhaiqua, Goringhaikona and Gorachouqua had originally been one horde - the Chochoqua under Gogosoa, the senior chief - but then split three ways, after dividing into two branches under Gonnema and Oedasoa.

As to conflict among cattle-keepers, the typical bases of conflict related to grazing territory, waterholes and cattle marauding, no doubt exaggerated in lean times. Trespassing was a major casus belli. Maquet suggests that, particularly amongst those groups which subsist almost entirely on pastoral products, warfare is common because cattle are easily lost and easily acquired by poaching. Thus there was a need for defence, since a dispute between groups could easily flare up and escalate. However, with an eye to the later discussion of the kind of relations that developed between the V.O.C. and the Khoi in respect of barter and conflict over cattle and land-usage, it is necessary to qualify this point. Although feuding

between Khoi hordes was common, the warfare was not aimed at the
annihilation of the enemy or the expropriation of their land or
cattle, or the extraction of tribute or labour, nor did it result
in that. The structural constraints on size, anyway, would have
precluded this. Rather, it was aimed at redressing grievances -
either caused by trespass, or the seizure of cattle or setting fire
to pasture grass - and, "When peace was desired the two sides came
together at their boundary, and after they had agreed upon terms an
ox was slaughtered with spears, and the corpse left a prey to wild
animals." 38 Once again, in the typical causes, contours and conse-
quences of conflict between hordes one finds cattle at the root.
The importance attached to cattle - both in material and ceremonial
terms - is common amongst cattle-keepers. Their uses, moreover,
amongst the Khoi extended to their being deployed as battering or
protective formations in warfare, and some Khoi could ride oxen,
while cattle are reported to have been obedient to the whistles of
their owners. All this implies "... a long and close association
between men and cattle ....". 39

In short, like the Xhosa to the east of them, the Khoi
"... had a high value orientation towards pastoralism which was
expressed in an elaborate cattle-cult associated with the veneration
of ancestors, and at times of great stress, a supreme being". 40

warfare.

in various rites. See A.W.Hoernlé: "Certain rites of transition
and the conception of !Nau among the Hottentots", passim.

The practical implications of this for social life and social structure were direct and far-reaching. Amongst the Khoi, marriage was polygamous and exogamous between clans. The marriage ceremony involved the slaughter of beasts and the pouring of gall from a slaughtered animal over the bride's feet. Cattle passed from the husband to his mother-in-law, for it was the women who looked after the cattle and controlled the domestic milk supply, unlike the Nguni. Likewise, births, deaths, initiation ceremonies for girls and boys were the typical kinds of important occasions when cattle were slaughtered. Moreover the centrality of herding and grazing in the material life, culture and belief system of the herders is underlined further by the fact that the 'hero gods' - like 'Tsuni-//Goab' - were associated with good and rain, and were often perceived as being in conflict with the opposite, a mischievous and harmful 'supernatural personage', like '//Gaunab'.

41 The concept of 'ideology' may seem an odd one to use in respect of the San or the Khoi. But the cattle cultures, like all others, were associated with a 'world-view', or a

41. Schapera: The Early Cape Hottentots, pp.xii-xiii; Wilson: Op.cit., p.62 and Seligman: Op.cit., p.36. According to Hahn, the Naman believed that Tsuni//Goab 'made' the people, gave them the country, and brought rain, causing the grass to grow. Schapera: Op.cit., p.378. He also describes the Naman rain-making ceremony when cattle were ceremoniously slaughtered and prayers sung to the Father of Fathers. Ibid., pp.378-380. Khoi danced at the new moon and full moon, though the authorities are not persuaded that this constituted explicit moon-worship. The mantis appears to have been identified with good grace and favour, as with the San. See J.C.Grevenbroek: "An elegant and accurate account of the African Race ..... commonly called Hottentots", in Schapera (ed.): The Early Cape Hottentots, p.187. Schapera also suggests that some Khoi worked in metal; presumably the Naman? And T.Hahn: Tsuni-//Goam. The Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi, passim.
consciousness, that was intimately bound up with the imperatives of their material life - the cattle, the pastures, the grazing and the rain. The connections between the economy of such a societal type, the socio-political structure and the ceremonial and religious life of the people were close.

Finally, the principles governing internal relations of distribution and exchange and the ownership of property appear to have combined typical features of 'generalized reciprocity' and 'balanced reciprocity'. On the one hand the land of the horde was communally held, while the normative structure enjoined hospitality and widespread sharing within the groups. On the other hand, because they had more possessions, individual property rights were more highly developed than amongst the San. "Huts, livestock, weapons, utensils and other objects of common use" were privately owned. Moreover, amongst some groups, ivory, copper, rings, bracelets, iron beads, axes, adzes, spears, karosses, iron and beads were obtained (by 'trade', to which I shall turn shortly) from Nama Khoi and conceivably from Bantu-speaking Tswana. The sharing within extended families, and more widely within the patricians, will have concerned food, not the items and luxuries gained by barter. However the latter - exchanged according to the principles of 'balanced reciprocity' - were made possible by the 'surplus' cattle or sheep which individual families of herders were able to generate. It is in this respect of that aspect of their economic life that subsequent

contact with Europeans was to render the Khoi highly vulnerable as
the pressure to trade mounted, as I shall argue later. There is,
lastly, a suggestive point made by Schapera in respect of the role
of the chief amongst some Khoi groups. He says that the "... chief
may is generally the wealthiest man in the tribe ...", that he/claim a
part of every animal taken in hunting, and that, according to Hahn's
account of the Nama Khoi of Namibia, a chief was expected "... to
have an open house and an open hand", implying a special economic
function of a redistributive kind. The point is speculative and
the evidence unclear. However, if this were the case it would
suggest that, at least among those hordes which were well endowed
with cattle and sheep, and where the hierarchical structure was more
systematically synchronized with an unequal distribution of wealth,
the 'redistributive' principle operated. From a theoretical and
comparative point of view this is neither odd nor unusual. Sahlins
suggests that "... rights of call on the produce of the underlying
population, as well as obligations of generosity, are everywhere
associated with chieftainship". Moreover such 'redistribution'
serves to sustain the community and acts as a ritual or symbol of
the subordination of the community to central authority, and thus
"... redistribution sustains the corporate structure itself".

43. Hahn: Op.cit., pp.16-17. A mean 'chief' was said to be
"... greatly left-handed or stingy".

a similar point. Reciprocity, he says, with a central agency -
"a political/economic centre" - for collecting goods and
distributing them defines the redistributive type of exchange
system. This falls short of the system of 'mobilization'
whereby an "elite collects goods and services .... for the
It is, at least, not implausible that some Khoi groups approximated this level and degree of structural differentiation, division of labour and wealth. As we shall see, the closeness of some Khoi particularly in the east, to some of the Xhosa chiefdoms, and the similarity (and indeed elision) in structure, language and culture, renders this quite possible. The same may be said for the Nama Khoi north and south of the Orange river, who were in contact with the Sotho Tlhaping. 45

At any rate, the evidence reveals a substantial variation between wealthy and impoverished Khoi - for example, compare the 'Saldanhar' Khoi with Herry's Strandlopers scrounging round Table Bay - and that, in itself, suggests that there was a continuum, within the category of the herders, of differing degrees of structural differentiation developing out of the respective material circumstances of the hordes in question at various times, and which was also related to the kinds of systematic interaction with other groups which they experienced.

Against that background it is convenient to examine here some aspects of the relationships between the Khoi and San before proceeding to look briefly at the structure of Nguni/Sotho society and the wider and loose network of relationships which existed between them and the Khoi, particularly with regard to 'trade' and clientage.

The precise nature of the histories and the relations of Khoi and San has long worried the experts. Recently, Elphick has persuasively suggested that the Khoi derive from a San core in northern Botswana. He suggests that several bands broke away and to the south from there, and acquired stock from Bantu-speakers. He suggests that this may have occurred at least in the mid-14th century, if not before. Moreover, he adduces strong evidence to support this argument that these people moved slowly south to the middle Orange river area, and that the Cape Khoi went straight on towards the south, while the Nama moved west along the Orange. He terms this process an 'upward ecological cycle', and supplements the argument by suggesting that it was balanced by the possibility of a 'downward ecological cycle', which - as a result of a variety of factors - could force Khoi back into typical hunter-gatherer patterns of life. Marks had put this kind of case more forcefully by saying that there was ".... little to distinguish a landless and cattle-less Khoi from a Bushman, or a Bushman who acquired cattle from a Khoi". 47

Now it is apparent from the ethnographic specifics outlined earlier that there were many aspects of their cultures which suggest substantial institutional continuities and hence render this argument most convincing, especially in respect of Khoi origins. It is clearly the case that both San and Khoi could and did hunt and gather, and that herders who fell on hard times could (and did) revert to

46. See Note 1 above. And Elphick: Op.cit., chapters I-IV. Elphick's work has resolved some important questions about Khoi origins, but there are some reservations which I outline below.

this, using 'San' techniques. The general principles governing internal relations within the group, sharing and communal hospitality - 'generalized reciprocity', that is, in exchange terms - prevailed amongst the Khoi in many respects, particularly with regard to food. Moreover the principles, procedures and ceremonies relating to marriage, (exogamy and doing service for the bride's parents) were similar. 48 Also, the imperatives of transhumance and nomadic hunting/gathering required spaced pregnancies and, if necessary, the disposal by the midwife of a baby born too soon - "...'thrown away', in the Naron phrase". 49 Both Khoi and San danced, particularly when the moon was full, or at the new moon. It appears that their 'religious' practices - if we are not able to say much about beliefs - were not dissimilar. The mantis crops up in both San and Khoi religious symbolism and was identified with the 'good spirits'. But there one must pause in the argument before assuming that there could be a rapid upward cycle from 'pure' San to Khoi, though it remains legitimate to conceive of the possibility of a rapid downward cycle. And there are other reasons for proceeding with caution before regarding the San-Khoi continuum as one which could be traversed within a generation.

The linguistic evidence is, first, important. It indicates that though all the hunters 'clicked', as did the Khoi, it is not probable that they all understood each other. Neither is it clear

48. Wilson: Op.cit., pp.52-3, and p.60. The husband was usually required to perform some kind of service for his parents-in-law before returning to his family group with his wife. Sometimes they would help to form the nucleus of a new group.

49. Ibid., loc.cit.
that all Khoi were always understood by San and vice-versa. If this is the case, how could all San and cattle-less Khoi communicate with each other?

Secondly, some hunters painted, and the herders did not. That is evident from the content of the rock-art. This suggests a much more important distinction between the cultures of the hunters and the herders, and one that can perhaps not be so easily blurred by suggesting that there were two different 'ways of life' between which individuals or even groups could shuttle, depending on material circumstances. There are some finer yet crucial distinctions that need to be made which imply a difference in kind, as opposed to degree, between the hunters and the herders. It is quite likely that herding Khoi who fell on hard times lived like the hunting San. We know that the herders could and did hunt and gather veldkos. So it is likely that they fell back on those techniques until, by one means or another (which included attaching themselves as clients to cattle-keepers, as we shall examine shortly) they were able to begin to build up a herd again. Thus ignoring the uncertain evidence about physical appearance and the more persuasive linguistic evidence, it seems plausible to argue only that it was probably impossible to tell the difference between San and cattle-less Khoi, and the Dutch certainly did not do so initially. Thus it is likely that cattle-less Khoi 'became' - or appeared to - San in terms of behaviour and life-style, and attached themselves as clients to more prosperous Khoi. But that is an entirely different matter from suggesting that the converse therefore also holds; that is, that "... groups of San could

acquire cattle and become herders ". 51 As I have argued above, the differences between the societal types, anchored on the distinct economic systems, implies a series of different technologies, skills, belief systems, ceremonies and cultures, though Khoi originated from a San core. Moreover, the really quite elaborate 'cattle-cult' of the Khoi and the complex techniques of enlarging herds and controlling them - like riding oxen, and teaching cattle to respond to calls and whistles, and so on - meant that it was no simple matter to 'become' a Khoi. But in the light of this, the most testing evidence seems to be the generally unsatisfactory attempts made to turn hunters into herders. In the late 18th and early 19th century, stock farmers on the north-eastern periphery of the colony were so exasperated by the remorseless raids by San on their flocks and herds that they gave the hunters sheep and goats in an attempt to convert them into pastoralists. While raiding decreased for a while, and though some San took to stock breeding, "... few bands of hunters - other than those attached to a mission station or a group of herders - seem to have been transformed into herders". 52 The relationship between the farmers and the hunters in that area in this respect were complex. Colonel Collins who toured the 'North-Eastern boundary' of the colony in 1809 reported that many of the 'Bosjemans' had been saved from perishing by "... the supplies of sheep and game which they received from the farmers". One family had supplied ".... the Bosjemen in the course of three months with 142 head of large game". 53 Given the tension on that border and the


regular raids on stock by San in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, as they were forced back into the mountains and their access to game diminished as did the ample herds too, it is not unduly cynical to see the actions of the farmers as having a somewhat more pragmatic purpose. If they could provide the San with food - game which the farmers could shoot on a large scale, or sheep and goats, or even the odd head of cattle - then it was no doubt their calculation that this would stop the raids on their more valuable herds. Certainly this seems to have been what Lichtenstein discovered near Tulbagh in 1804. There he found that the Landdrost had come to an arrangement with a group of San whereby "...in consideration of the yearly tribute of cattle to be paid them, they would maintain a quiet and peacable conduct .... on the other hand they were solemnly promised that no colonist should take into his own hands the right of punishing injuries received by him; and that they should not be pursued for past offences".  

The points confirm the general argument that it is unlikely that commuting between the categories of Khoi and San (or, more loosely, herding and hunting) in both directions was either in principle possible or widespread. For as Professor Wilson writes, "... the transformation of hunter to herder involves a radical shift in values, in particular the willingness to forgo immediate food in order to preserve breeding stock for future supply. Hunters were likely to eat all the stock they acquired".  

55. Wilson: Op. cit., p. 72. Also, a person who is !Nau "...is also a danger to other people, and more especially to the animals and other living things on which the community depends..." Hoernlé: Op. cit., p. 67. The elaborate rituals associated with, for instance, childbirth, marriage, puberty and bereavement, all involved seclusion, and particularly separation from the herds. People couldn't simply 'become' Khoi given that degree of cultural and ideological difference and detail.
Given the two quite distinct societal models which San and Khoi exemplify at the extremes, and given especially the comparative evidence about the societal type of hunter-gatherer, the following argument may resolve some of the problems. The origin of the Khoi in a Central Botswana San core makes great sense and explains many of the continuities. But three categories of people emerge from the evidence and the analysis— one at either end of a structural and historical continuum and the third rather more uncertainly in the middle. At the one extreme there are the aboriginal San. At the other extreme the established and prosperous Khoi hordes, like the Inqua, and they stood at the recent end, so to speak, of a number of historically complex transitions, involving the acquiring of new skills, different values and preferences and associated rituals and ceremonies. Between the extremes, on this schematic continuum, it seems useful to regard cattle-less Khoi as being difficult to distinguish from San. They utilized precisely the same techniques for survival and would therefore have necessarily been smaller in group size for precisely the same reasons that hunting bands in Southern Africa and elsewhere had to be. Such groups— either San or cattle-less Khoi— may have attached themselves to cattle-rich Khoi or, later, to veeboere. Once they had a sufficient cattle or sheep to start a self-supporting herd, the Khoi elements were able to do so. (Herry's ability later, at the Cape, to do this, is evidence of that).

The San clients however would not have done so. Some might have been in temporary clientship, others in the process of slow absorption into the Khoi group. But the change in norms, consumption patterns, ritual associated with cattle and politico-social organization simply could not have been acquired in so short a time to permit San to 'become' Khoi within (or over) a generation.
However, the downward spiral could indeed have been very fast for Khoi, and brought about by disease, drought or warfare. But they would have retained the residual skills and latent capacities and potential to reverse their fate by acquiring cattle, as suggested above.

This helps to explain why the Dutch at first made no distinction between Khoi and San and why there is some uncertainty about differentiation of cattle-less Khoi from San in the middle of the continuum. A final point is that there appear to be no rock-drawings which illustrate pastoral pursuits — only hunting. This and the other evidence suggests two conclusions: first, that the 'upward ecological cycle' was very slow indeed — many generations, if not longer; while the downward cycle could be very rapid. But, secondly, groups could not shuttle between the 'pure' types.\textsuperscript{55a}

The theoretical argument about the significant discontinuities between cultures and the empirical evidence tend to converge on a conclusion. Khoi without cattle fell back on a San (or hunting) way of life. And there is little doubt, despite the problems generated by the linguistic evidence, that such Khoi formed loose alliances of interest with San and engaged in predatory offensive attacks against both other cattle-rich Khoi, and colonist veeboere. As early as the late 17th century Dapper had noted that "They (the San,A.L.) are extremely great plunderers and marauders. They steal...

\textsuperscript{55a} There is probably less disagreement than meets the eye. A most stimulating and — to me — clarifying correspondence with Professor Elphick, and a useful comment on it by Dr Shula Marks, suggests that most of the differences in interpretation are attributable to the difficulties (and hence non-specification) of establishing the time taken for these processes. Elphick's account of the origins of the Khoi must remain definitive. But the transition from the old 'Bushman-versus-Hottentot' conception to the more fluid notion of an easy or rapid elision between San and Khoi must be handled with great caution, given the structural characteristics of the two societal types in their ideal-typical and empirical aspects. I am grateful to Professor Elphick for his response to correspondence and to Dr Marks for making some most constructive points about the difficulties in all this.
from other (sic) Hottentots all the cattle they can get....". 56

Before looking finally at the wider network of relationships between the indigenous societies, under the headings of clientage and trade, a brief sketch of the typical features of the political economy and social structure of the Nguni/Sotho is needed here. 57

In respect of economic systems, associated population size, socio-political structure and culture, the Bantu-speaking chiefdoms of South Africa were respectively more diversified, larger in terms of constituent units, structurally more differentiated and hierarchical, while their wider institutional and belief systems were accordingly more complex. They all grew crops, herded cattle and sheep and goats. Some fished, and they all hunted. The wider and more diverse economic structure of these societies meant that there was a more complicated division of labour, both in respect of residential units (that is 'horizontally' within and between kinsmen and clansmen) and 'vertically' in respect of the political hierarchy. They also were settled and, unlike the Khoisan, not nomadic. While the Nguni lived in scattered homesteads, the Sotho resided in more compact and quite substantial settlements. The resultant surplus which could be generated by this mixed economy entailed two things which are of importance for our purposes here. First, it meant that — unlike the San — they could incorporate or attach strangers to their lineages or clans on a considerable scale without the economic infrastructure

56. O. Dapper: "Kaffraria or Land of Kaffirs, Also Named Hottentots", p. 33. At this time of course no distinction was made by the Dutch between San and Khoi; they called the former 'Souqua' Hottentots.

57. The two most succinct and compact accounts of the Nguni and the Sotho are those by Monica Wilson in the Oxford History of South Africa, Vol 1. Also, Schapera (ed.): The Bantu-speaking Peoples of South Africa, passim.
being placed under intolerable strain. Secondly, they could exchange some of their surplus for other necessary or desired goods. But this did not take place on a wide scale. The Sotho, for instance, were skilled craftsmen in metal, ivory, wood and leather, and they exchanged these goods for cattle. The degree of specialization and division of labour this implies was a further consequence of their more diverse and substantial economies, not only between men and women, different age groups and various status strata, but also between men and men, chiefs and commoners. Developing out of these economies, then, and expressed in them, we have a more complex nexus of socio-political and cultural relationships.

The typical unit was the territorially-based chiefdom, which was constituted by a number of patriclans (which sometimes overlapped between chiefdoms as a result of splits in the latter) which were composed of a number of lineages all claiming descent from a common ancestor, and exogamy was in general practised between the clans, though the Sotho permitted and favoured cousin marriage. The predominance of one clan, that of the chief, determined status, and the others were ranked in relation to it. A common basis for splitting of a chiefdom, and the establishment of a new one, was the 'fault line', as it were, that ran - as a result of polygamy - between the sons of the 'great wife' (the bearer of the heir) and the right-hand wife (the first wife). The opening up of this 'fault' within the chiefdom meant that it split and a new one was established. Similarly within each clan, a split would occur when a component lineage would peel off and marriage took place between two lineages formerly of one clan, but now the nuclei of two.

The elaborate cattle-cult of the Nguni and the Sotho has already been referred to; the details are not relevant here. A
high value was placed on cattle, both in terms of 'wealth' and in terms of values associated with them. Strict regulations governed contact between women and cattle, and their "... rituals reflected the preoccupation of the Nguni with cattle". They passed as 'lobola' at marriage and were the usual sacrifice at puberty, marriage, sickness, death, purification of women after childbirth, and so on. The authority of the chief was considerable in respect of arbitration, keeping the peace and maintaining the rule of law, and extracting fines and tribute. Yet illustrating the associated and checking principles of the 'centralizing movement' in exchange terms, and its correlate, redistriction, the chief had obligations of generosity, "... subsidizing religious ceremony, social pageantry, or war...". "The Chief, everywhere acts as a tribal banker, collecting food, storing it, and protecting it, and then using it for the benefit of the whole community", says Malinowski. "A stingy chief lost followers; a generous man attracted them". The chief too was custodian of the past; the Bantu-speakers venerated their

58. Wilson: "The Nguni", p.127. Maquet suggests rather more generally the characteristics associated with cattle in such societies "..... enable them to play a role which recalls, though not very closely, that of capital in western economic systems". The Civilizations of Black Africa, p.120.


60. Ibid., citing Malinowski.

ancestors and evinced great respect for customs and tradition, and sacrificed to the shades. Witchcraft was identified as one source of evil and misfortune, and there were some people who were specialists in the interpretation of the "will of the shades and the identity of evildoers".

From the preceding account of the San, Khoi and Nguni/Sotho it is possible to identify and contrast one aspect of their respective political economies and social structure. The capacity of the hunters to absorb strangers into their bands was almost nil. Their economy could not cope with this, the organization of band structure precluded it and there was little they could offer in the way of patronage. Indeed such was the precariousness of their ecological balance that infanticide was a necessary means of controlling population. The Khoi, (or some of them), on the other hand, given larger herds of cattle, the capacity to generate surplus by careful tending of the beasts, and the consequent variations in wealth, could - in some cases - take in strangers at the margins. The patrilineal and patriclan organization of the hordes provided a structural point of entry, or attachment, for such people and they had the cattle and sheep to be herded which provided the basis for patronage. The Nguni/Sotho, by contrast with both the hunters and herders, could and did attach strangers on a greater scale because of their political economy and social structure. Indeed both the Ngoni - on the 'snowballing' movement to the north - and the Sotho were constituted by waves and layers of populations in the course of their respective histories. But the loose network of relations between San, Khoi and Nguni/Sotho at the Cape prior to the arrival of

62. Ibid., p.128 and passim.

the Dutch is best analyzed in terms of the more general questions of clientship and 'trade', and it is to the former that I turn first.

There is little systematic comparative and theoretical work on patron-client relations for Africa. Thus there is no ready analytical framework upon which to draw, and in terms of which the structure of pre-colonial inter-group relations at the Cape may be explored. The absence of such an established body of theory may account, too, for the diverse and discrete ways in which the term 'clientship' or 'clientage' has been used. However, as a tentative way of ordering the variety of different arrangements subsumed under the head of client-patron relationships, the following characteristics, developing out of a core common to all, ought to help our purposes. The central features of the client-patron relationship are, first, that the institution is generally found between individuals (or reasonably small groups); secondly, that it is not institutionalized through a 'formal charter'; thirdly, that it is thus without 'legal consequences' but entails reciprocal obligations of service, exchange and/or protection, and fourthly, that it has both political and economic dimensions. The variations from this core of associated features - particularly in respect of

64. The limited work on this for sub-Saharan Africa means that explicit and well established analytical frameworks which might be tested hardly exist. See Maquet: Power and Society in Africa , pp.195-216. Lucy Mair offers some empirical comparisons in Primitive Government.

of the groups we are concerned with here— and include the **duration** for which a particular client-patron relationships exists, the **kind** of duties and services provided by the parties, the **purpose** for which the relationship is entered, and the political implications— more so for the patron than the client— entailed. Moreover, it makes sense to locate the phenomenon at the middle of a continuum, the variations in which stretch on the one hand from **temporary** symbiosis (between two socio-political and cultural groups which are ".... internally autonomous and institutionally distinct....") to relationships which led to complete absorption and incorporation on **differential and equal terms**.

It is quite clear that many of these forms held in South Africa within and between most of the groups examined earlier. The variations indicated above can also be found to apply. Temporary symbiotic relationships obtained between Tswana cattle-owners living in substantial settlements and San hunters (called Sarwa). The latter brought game, pelts and ivory in return for iron weapons, tobacco, grown food and beads. It is not altogether clear whether the hunters were given cattle, though it is suggested that over a **very long period".... some Sarwa also were being transformed into cattle-owners". But the social and political correlates of this symbiotic relationships were direct and strict: the 'clients' were not incorporated at all, had no access to the judicial process, and marriage between Tswana and Sarwa was frowned on.67 Similarly, Nguni and San were involved in intermittent symbiotic relationships, and it is

reported that the Mpondomise and Mpondo (Xhosa groups) ".... depended on San as rainmakers....", and it seems that such client groups were attached in the first instance to the chief and his kin.68 This kind of symbiotic relationship - not always peaceful, for San raids on Nguni or Sotho cattle resulted in warfare - is in some ways similar to that which obtained between the Mbuti pygmies and Negro villagers, described by Turnbull.69 An aspect of this type of relationship was that bands, or members of bands, were in no way incorporated within the institutions of the Nguni or Sotho, and remained segregated from them. Associated negative attitudes reflect this. Kuper says that the Kgalagari considered that "... the Bushmen live like wild animals, without leaders, without permanent villages, and without law."70 And Turnbull reports that such negative attitudes -despite formal symbiosis - between Mbuti and the villagers were mutual. The Mbuti pygmies called the Bantu-speakers 'animals' and 'savages', and the Bantu-speakers regarded the pygmies similarly.71 Thus, this kind of symbiotic relationship between the hunters and the cultivators was neither close nor intense. Rather, it was intermittent, reflected the socio-political and cultural autonomy of the groups, but provided for temporary economic arrangements of a mutually satisfactory kind, though the political and economic predominance of

70. Adam Kuper: Kalahari Village Politics, pp.44-5.
71. The Forest People, p.47.
the 'patrons' was clear. Smith says that this kind of clientage is "... institutionalized political symbiosis between individuals and/or reasonably small groups .... By itself clientage is unlikely to dissolve sectional boundaries whenever differences of culture, religion or race are prominent". The evidence from the Cape seems to confirm this. But the explanation needs to be taken further than simply the cultural, religious or 'racial' factors: the economic autonomy of the groups and also the temporary nature of the arrangements would need to be considered too, as well as the limited purposes for which such relationships were entered into by both groups.

The second representative kind of clientship - the more typical form which the relationship takes - was between individuals. The economically more secure and established (that is, the settled Xhosa and Sotho in relation to the Khoi, and the herding Khoi in relation to the hunting San) tended to be patrons, not clients. These relationships were presumably temporary, unlike the hereditary ubuhake ('to pay a visit of homage') relationship in Rwanda which Maquet describes, though that could also be ended by either party at any time. The temporary client relationship must have ebbed and flowed with seasons, individual circumstances and the contingencies arising from natural and environmental conditions. It was common where the groups lived or came into close and proximate geographical relations, and no doubt it was precisely those same conditions of

72. M.G. Smith: "Institutional and Political Conditions...", p.56.
of contiguity which gave rise to the issues of conflict that have been described. There is evidence to indicate that the client-patron relation occurred amongst the cattle keepers, between them and also between hunters and herders. Thus the individual hunter and his family may have come to an arrangement with a herder - Khoi or Nguni/Sotho - and perhaps done some hunting and gathering for his patron in return for protection, food and other items. There is little firm evidence for the 17th century about the particulars of this hunter/herder relation, and many questions are not easy to answer. Did the hunters actually herd for the Khoi or Nguni/Sotho? I argued above that the transformation of a hunter into a herder was not simple. Given, moreover, the complicated evidence about language, how did they communicate? Perhaps those groups of hunters and herders that lived close to each other could understand enough of each other's language? No doubt the more permanent relationships that also developed (see below) meant that clients learnt the languages of their patrons. In any event there is enough evidence and a painting from the 19th century - to be able to support the San/Khoi client/patron relationship, though the form and content of it is less easy to be sure about.  

74. Wilson: "The Hunters and Herders", pp.62-64, and "The Sotho ...", pp.192-3. There is an interesting comparative point. Hunters have been known to become clients of farmers. But "... while clients of the farmers are drawn into the farming economy .... (they) often do not themselves adopt such an economy. Objects from the material culture of the farmers will come into the possession of the clients but the appropriate technology will often remain the prerogative of the former group". D.W.Philipson: "Early Iron-using peoples of South Africa", pp.41-2.
Within the same category it was customary for 'poor' Khoi to attach themselves to richer Khoi as herders. Schapera says: "A wealthy cattle-owner will place some of this stock under the care of an impoverished tribesman, allowing him to use the milk for his own nourishment and to claim half the increase". This is the classic form of the individual and temporary relation of clientship, for once the client had built up the basis of a new herd he could detach himself from the relationship and rejoin his clan, though he could also remain a herdsman for the rest of his life. The same was true for Khoi/Xhosa relationships, particularly in the Eastern Cape districts.

Finally, at the end of the continuum there were those client/patron relations that resulted in full incorporation within the society of the patrons. When clientship becomes more permanent, says Wilson, the clients ".... learn the languages of their patrons and lose their own; their crafts mostly disappear and they become absorbed into the patron's culture". There are some theoretical questions to be asked shortly about the conditions under which this happened. But historically there is evidence to suggest that this probably occurred between some San clients and Khoi patrons - which is not the same thing as San 'becoming' Khoi. And within the same relationship category Khoi clients were absorbed by Xhosa groups in


the Eastern Cape, though it appears from some of the linguistic
evidence that this did not always entail complete and equal incor-
poration, and that Khoi "... participation was limited to that
extent in Xhosa society". The mixing and incorporation in the area
of the Fish river was not only a result of client-patron relations
but also the result of Khoi and Gonaqua living interspersed among
Xhosa. Marriages took place between them or by the former attaching
themselves to Xhosa lineages and vice-versa, for both Xhosa and Khoi
societies "... had facilities which provided means of incorporation".79
Thus, at this end of the client-patron spectrum, the causes and
process of full or partial incorporation of individuals or small
groups by another one merge with other wider processes of interaction.

pp.103-6.

to this process of incorporation via lineages may not be
identified in the Boer practice of incorporating servile
dependents and their children as 'members' of the family, albeit
unequal and 'second-class' members? The descriptions that occur
of homestead structure and life in, say, Olive Schreiner's
Story of an African Farm suggests this strongly. More recently
the superb novel by André Brink: Looking on Darkness (Kennis
van die Aand) has some startlingly powerful observations on
some aspects of the process. Not surprisingly – for many reasons –
it is the first major novel in Afrikaans to have been banned in
South Africa. And although we know very little about this
process, the waves of population that were absorbed in the form-
atation of the Sotho, as they came south, were many. "Cattle-
keepers and cultivators absorbed both hunters and other
cattle-keepers and cultivators". Wilson: "The Sotho .....",
p.133. It seems to have been happening from well before 1600.
Ibid., pp.134-5. In relation to Khoi and Xhosa in the East,
Harinck suggests that Xhosa took Khoi women, and also that
"Assimilation of Xhosa by Khoi occurred when leaderless Xhosa
refugees entered Khoi chiefdoms". From these unions the Gonaqua
emerged, and they in turn, he argues, "... were incorporated by
the expanding Xhosa chiefdoms during the early 1700s".
Thus the continuum stretching from intermittent symbiotic relations between autonomous entities, through the more typical individual and temporary client/patron relationships, to the partial or full incorporation of individuals and small groups into other cultures and politico-economic systems is illustrated by the Cape material. There are of course areas which are patchy, and aspects of these relationships about which one simply cannot be sure. But these networks of quite distinctive societies were loosely linked together at their edges by a variety of systems of clientship and wider interaction, which were also supplemented by long-distance trade. I deal with that shortly. Before doing so it is important to pull out some tentative theoretical conclusions which have comparative implications for the analysis of V.O.C.-colonist/Khoisan relations in later chapters.

There were no overwhelming economic or material reasons for the more powerful groups - Xhosa in relation to Khoi, and Khoi in relation to San, to put it simply - to attack and swallow up the smaller or weaker groups, though some status derived from having followers and clients. Indeed so long as the game was plentiful and the landscape not a fiercely contested scarce resource, Khoi and San lived side by side, as did Khoi and Xhosa, and more generally Nguni/Sotho and San. These contacts were expressed sometimes through client-patron relations and their form and content differed between groups at different times and places, and some absorption and incorporation - differentially and uniformly - took place too. That this was possible turns on a number of factors which are worth suggesting.

First, intermittent symbiosis or temporary clientship must have depended for their transientness on the real possibility for
the hunters or the herders to return to their hunting grounds or herding areas. And of course one of the critical factors that was to distinguish Khoi-Dutch dependency relations from these prior relationships was that, in general and as time went by, temporary clientship or symbiosis became impossible, and a return to their land had been foreclosed on because the colonists had taken it, or had moved onto it. Also, during their clientship, the clients must have had to retain their ".... internally autonomous and institutionally distinct ...." cultures. These two related aspects of the broader socio-economic circumstances surrounding the arrangement were the preconditions of their survival as a culture under those conditions of clientship discussed above. Secondly, the full absorption of clients or 'others' into the culture and society of the patrons - though the two may be found together, or apart - presupposes, broadly speaking, two structural conditions. First, the economy of the patrons (or the 'hosts') must be able to tolerate whatever the increase in numbers may be, and irrespective of the point of entry. That is, it might either be attachment to a chief or to a lesser lineage. Secondly, and directly related to the latter consideration, the structure and institutional arrangements of the patrons' society must be such as to permit this admission and consequent 'acculturation' through integration. And we have seen how both Xhosa and Khoi - but not San - had this capacity. This, it seems, underlines the force of Smith's point that "... the most thorough social incorporation that unilineal descent permits involves adoption of outsiders into the host lineages as members with full rights. This is more easily done for individuals than for groups". Where, however, the incorporative process did not involve equality or 'full rights', we

have the germ of one form of 'plural society' through differential incorporation. But there are problems. If cultural absorption was complete, what means were used to distinguish the former clients? And why? This is part of a much wider problem and the answer in each case would need careful analysis. We need to ask more than "... which groups acculturate and why ...." at any particular time and place. 81 We need to ask 'which groups absorb' and why? And how? The history, political economy, institutional arrangements - say, labour requirements, extended families and clans, or nuclear families - normative universe and goals of the dominant groups and their relationships, in respect of all these aspects, with the clients or the conquered has to be analyzed. For instance, among the Ndebele, the 'layers' of conquered and incorporated groups were separated largely in terms of prestige into a three-tier system with the descendants of the original Nguni warriors from Natal being the dominant stratum, known as zansi. Next came the enhla who were descended from the Sotho and Tswana groups taken in during the Ndebele period in the Transvaal. Last of all were the recently conquered Shona, called lozwi or holi. Marriages between these strata were not approved of, though in time the distinctions faded. 82 By contrast, however, another Nguni offshoot - the Ngoni - developed an entirely homogenous society from "... a motley heterogeneous collection of individuals ..." whereby "... recent captives, both men and women, were indoctrinated in Ngoni ways and made to feel that they, too, were Ngoni". 83 The means were, in brief, through the age-set


82. J.D.Omer-Cooper: The Zulu Aftermath, pp.149-150; M.G.Smith: Op.cit., pp.119-120. He says "... these differences of corporate status persisted despite enculturation within the age-set organizations". My emphasis, A.L.

systems and marriage. An important difference—which relates the discussion of the accommodative structures to the economic system and material organization of the society—is that "... cattle were a short-term asset and the control of cattle did not give rise to any cleavage of interest which was not already present in the residential system" of the Ngoni. 84 This suggests that more than only the 'structure' of accommodation needs to be examined, or rather that its particulars, with respect to form and capacity, in themselves need to be explained in terms of the wider economic systems and its associated normative features and values. 85 In discussing Dutch/Khoisan slave relations we shall have to return to this. But, if the culture, language, dress and religion come to be shared by two previously discrete groups—that is, IF institutional continuity ensues—and IF the political economy of the conquerors or patrons does not require or enjoin particular categories or 'classes' of menials or specialists to be drawn from the conquered or the clients, nor demands a historically-based division of labour, how important do somatic differences, or differences in prestige based on history, or names even, become? And IF the definition of particular aspects of physical difference, or the identification and valuing of certain prized historical associations are in themselves socially conditioned, wherein lies the explanation for that? These are bigger questions

84. Ibid., pp. 31-2.

85. Smith says: "So far as our data extend, the only variable that correlates uniformly with these distributions of cultural and ethnic differences is the structure of accommodation; and clearly, as the examples show, it is this accommodative structure that sets the limits, forms and rate of enculturation and interaction across corporate boundaries". Smith: Op. cit., p. 141. But what institutes and fashions the particular forms of 'accommodative structure'?
than can be answered here. However, they set up a broader conceptual and comparative context within which relations between Khoi, the San, the Nguni/Sotho, later European settlers, and African and Asian slaves at the Cape will need to be assessed. Before closing this chapter it is finally necessary to examine 'trade' relations at the Cape prior to the impact of the V.O.C. settlement.

In considering the wider question of relations between groups at the Cape prior to the intrusion of the V.O.C. and colonists, one has to take note of recent research which identifies a "... long distance trade network, extending from the Xhosa chiefdoms westwards through successive Khoi chiefdoms to the vicinity of the Cape Peninsula, and northwards to the Orange river and thence to the western Sotho or Tswana chiefdoms ....". In later chapters we shall look specifically at the impact of the V.O.C./colonists upon the Khoi at the Cape, particularly in respect of the manner in which their economies were undermined, and the economics of that process. But before one can proceed to analyze those and other processes (military, political, etc.), it is first necessary to examine the character of pre-colonial intra-Cape 'trade'. That is, one must first outline, in more abstract terms, the central features of the patterns of exchange between them and the Nguni/Sotho particularly. The position of the San in this network is less important for our purposes here. Moreover, the evidence about their role in rudimentary exchanges is minimal. And from what has been said above about their political-economies it is highly unlikely that they were in any way systematically involved.

Emerging from what has already been said about the character of the Khoi and Nguni/Sotho political economies, and the principles and procedures governing their internal systems of production, exchange and distribution, it is evident that, in these kinds of societies, "... the economic exchange relation is not always easy to distinguish from other transactions involving goods....". In these and other respects the economic systems of the Khoi and Nguni/Sotho differed radically from those of the mercantilist nations of Europe. While all societies have dimensions in which strictly 'economic' relations cannot be distinguished from the strictly 'social' or 'political' relations, the differences in degree between these types become, for our purposes, differences in kind, or certainly are at the polar opposites of a very long continuum. And it is in respect of the nature and role of 'trade' that this is particularly true, though a discussion of trade inevitably draws one back into a discussion of the very core of the contrasting economic systems themselves.

The characteristics of 'trade' in, and between, societies like those of the Khoi and the Nguni may be identified in the following terms. First, given the limited productive capacity and the respective levels of specialization and diversification within the socio-economic structures, there was little 'surplus' generated. Amongst the Nguni/Sotho cultivators there was, of course, more than amongst the transhumant Khoi, though within the category of the latter there were some groups which were better off than others, and this had implications for their capacity to attach clients and followers. But in respect of both types, 'trade' was peripheral to

their economies. Secondly, where they did 'trade', what they exchanged was not primarily food or any goods which were essential to the productive capacities of their economies, but 'luxuries' and other items like ivory, iron pieces, ornaments and so on, and even then such exchanges were clearly at the margins. Thirdly, the surplus that was generated internally was used variously by chiefs or family heads for purposes which had a greater priority than 'trade'. It was used to enable client-patron relations to be established or followers to be attracted and kept. Or it was used by chiefs to provide for the communities in times of hardship. And only over and beyond that, and at the margins, was it used in exchange for other goods. Thirdly, there was no 'money' involved, not even of the cowrie shell variety used in West Africa, nor the small copper crosses which were apparently used in the Katanga area as currency from the eighth century. Finally, there were no markets. A 'market' "... implies a site, a marketplace, and it implies a kind of exchange". Neither that kind of regular exchange, nor the sites for such markets appear to have existed. In short, what may be said

88. Ibid., p.238.
90. See Wilson's chapters in the Oxford History Vol.I, which deal with the Herders, the Nguni and the Sotho. She says: "It is clear that regular markets, such as were common further north in Africa did not exist among the Nguni, and the trade in metal must have been small because even iron remained so scarce until the 19th century". "The Nguni People", p.114. Schapera says that "... organized trading visits from one Hottentot tribe to another do not appear to have occurred to any extent, if at all". Schaper(a): Op.cit., p.349. For the Sotho, there is evidence that they were "... the chief metal-workers of the Transvaal, and supplied the coast", but the extent and scope of their 'trade' is uncertain. Wilson: "The Sotho ....", pp.145-7, pp.150-1, and pp.180-1.
to have existed generally was what has been termed 'autoconsumption', that is, where "Each unit of production consumed all that it produced".  

And of course that needs to be qualified by underlining the important variations between Khoi and Nguni/Sotho systems of political economy referred to earlier, particularly in respect of the degrees and kinds of diversification in the mode of production, the associated levels of technological capacity and the accumulation and redistribution of 'reserves' by chiefs and 'big men'. This had implications for other aspects of the relations between groups and individuals within groups, such as the symbiotic relationships and various forms of clientship mentioned above. And that in turn underlines the closeness of the various 'circuits' of exchange, and the interpenetration of the 'political' and the 'economic' dimensions of social structure within wider normative contexts. The crucial point to emphasize here - before looking at the evidence - is that, whatever the actual scope and form of 'trade' within Khoi groups and between them and the Nguni/Sotho, none of these peoples produced or herded for exchange in the market or trade sense that we associate with the characteristics of 17th century Dutch economic behaviour and ideology in the European or imperial theatres. Whereas the latter were rooted in production for exchange and profit, and where, in general, men related to each other through the cash nexus - the most impersonal and 'most economic' form - and according to the principles of 'negative reciprocity', the Khoi and the Nguni/Sotho combined in their systems of production and exchange the opposite principles of 'generalized', 'balanced' and 'redistributive' reciprocity, or - to put it more sharply - production for collective use.


Two points are worth noting here. The first is that the Nguni/Sotho, with their more substantial and diversified economic structures and their more complex divisions of political and economic labour, had the capacity and potential, on the one hand, to resist later encroachments of a military, political and economic kind by colonists in the late 18th and 19th centuries. On the other hand, their political economies were such that individuals and groups were able to respond - and did - to the market opportunities opened up during the 19th century: in short, the political economies of the Nguni/Sotho permitted their transformation into peasantries or 'proto-peasantries'.

How and why that happened is a separate question and beyond our scope there. The second point relates more centrally to our concerns. It is that the political economies of the transhumant Khoi were more vulnerable, structurally speaking, to the economic and political demands for trade in cattle and sheep which were made on them by the V.O.C. and colonists, and - related to this - the scope for individuals to respond and direct this demand was considerable and had devastating implications for the coherence and integrity of the hordes. The process whereby this may be analyzed in abstract terms will be outlined after the evidence about the content and form of intra-Cape trade has been examined.

The evidence about the long-distance trade network, stretching from the north-east, down through the vicinity of the Cape Peninsula and then north-west towards the Orange river, suggests a number of thin connecting strands. It seems that Saldanha Cochoqua

got iron, copper and beads viaNama Khoi, and conceivably from Tswana or Sotho groups. It is not altogether clear what they gave in exchange but Harinck suggests that it might have been cattle, but certainly was dagga (the local hemp or cannabis) which came from the Xhosa in the east. If it was cattle – and the Inqua to the east of the Cochoqua were known to be rich in beasts – then it confirms the earlier point that some hordes at least were able to generate an available limited surplus, providing the basis for rudimentary exchanges at the margins. It must have been very marginal, it needs to be restated, because the Khoi lived off their cattle and it would have been collective suicide to barter away anything more than a fairly limited number at any time. In addition to this flow – or perhaps it was a trickle – of metal which moved from the northwest to the southeast, via the middle men who had cattle, there was a westward flow of dagga, which came from the Xhosa. In the East, moreover, it appears that the Gonagua (Khoi-Xhosa) were in close relations with the Xhosa where they gave beads and copper in return for dagga. And around the Western Cape, and in the peninsula region in particular, the local Khoi there exchanged beads and metals which they got from the North (and later from the Dutch) for dagga and cattle which they obtained from groups like the Inqua. The evidence is not entirely clear, but it may be the case that the Inqua, strategically located in the centre of this network, gained in cattle as 'middlemen' (literally and figuratively) both from a westward movement of dagga which they mediated, and an eastward movement in 'luxury' items like iron, copper, beads and so on. And from the

94. G.Harinck: Op.cit., p.164. Professor Wilson points out that the Sotho also used hemp and that it was important in barter with Khoi and San who wanted it. So there may have been a number of flimsy 'trade circuits' in this commodity, not only confined to the Xhosa in the East. See Wilson: "The Sotho....", p.142. See Elphick on the "narcotics" trade, too. Elphick: Op.cit., pp. 109-120.

end of the 16th century, coastal Khoi, at least, will have been in receipt of some European trade goods like brass and iron, and it was such groups, in and around the Cape, who were first to feel the impact of the V.O.C. and colonist demand for cattle after 1652.

There are many questions still unanswered about this trade network. Was it really 'long distance' trade with 'buyers' and 'sellers' at both ends? Did Xhosa and Sotho actually connect knowingly via a whole series of contiguous groups passing goods back and forth? Or was it more likely to have been a series of very local, very limited chains or circuits of 'balanced exchange' between contiguous groups?

Apart from the Inqua and the Gonaqua, the Khoi seem to have received barter goods and dagga - from both the northeast and the northwest and later, the Dutch - not much cattle. In return, the Sotho and the Xhosa may have got cattle in exchange for metal goods and dagga in the case of the Sotho, and dagga only in the case of the Xhosa. 96

In anticipation of the analysis of the course of events which will be looked at in later chapters, it is as well to indicate here how economies such as those of the Khoi became extremely vulnerable when they began to interact systematically with the V.O.C. and the

96. In his stimulating article dealing with Khoi/Xhosa relations, Harinck makes some large claims. He says that the Table Bay area functioned as "the centre of diffusion of Dutch copper, brass, beads, and other products that ranked high in Khoi and Xhosa values .... At the other end of the network the Xhosa provided the diffusion centre of dagga. Between these two centres the Inqua (Hamcunqua) chiefdom was located. This chiefdom was vital in the western flow of dagga and the eastern flow of metal and beads. The Inqua obtained copper plates from the Khoi Orange River chiefdom and possibly from the Tswana. They exchanged these articles with the Gonaqua and Xhosa for Xhosa-grown dagga. The latter filtered via the Inqua through successively contiguous chiefdoms between them and the Cape Peninsula". Harinck: Op.cit., p.164. I am not sure whether the evidence he cites supports that degree of long-distance trade between these 'centres'.

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colonists whose world-view, goals and purposes and contrasting patterns of economic behaviour posed a direct threat to their very existence, because the demands of the V.O.C. and colonists went directly to the heart of their economies - the cattle.

The hordes lived off their cattle and exchanges at the margin were minimal, and they bartered for luxuries. The goods which constituted the luxury items were in relatively short supply, yet were attractive and tempting to the Khoi, as alcohol became later. For such groups it is not possible to exchange cattle beyond a certain point for non-productive items without committing collective economic suicide. The evidence suggests that in their exchange relations with the Xhosa and Sotho, they did not, and there was not much - in volume or kind - to be obtained anyway. The sudden implosion into those limited and balanced 'circuits' of exchange of abundant supplies of beads, brass, copper, tobacco and arrack from the V.O.C. had shattering effects. The way in which goods of this kind were pumped into the diffuse and precarious Khoi economies and the web of loose exchange relations between them and others, and the way in which this undermined their autonomy and created relations of dependence is perhaps analogous to the process of 'monetization' which has been identified and analyzed elsewhere in Africa, at later periods. The process can be briefly outlined.

Marx observed that 97

We have an original unity between a specific form of community or tribal unit and the property in nature connected with it, or the relation to the objective condition of production as naturally existing, as the objective being of the individual by means of the community. Now this unity .... has its living reality in a specific mode of production itself, and this mode appears equally as the relationship of the individuals to one another....

97. Karl Marx: Pre-capitalist Economic Formations, p.94. My emphasis, A.L. In this extract one can also see how Marx is suggesting that 'economic' and 'social' relations are not easily separable.
Marx continued by pointing out that the disruption of such communities and the consequent creation of 'detached individuals' "... necessarily arises from the intercourse with foreigners, from slaves, the desire to exchange the surplus product, etc., (and) dissolves the mode of production upon which the community rests, and with it the objectively individual man ... Exchange has the same effect...". While these observations are general and abstract it is clear what the causal process in any given instance would be. It has a number of distinct but related elements and stages. First, it presupposes a desire for certain objects (and their availability) which 'rank high' in the values of the group. We have seen this to be the case with the Khoi in relation to such items. Secondly, it implies that these things - in this case, pieces of iron, copper, brass, etc. - do not themselves contribute to production of the means of subsistence. That is, they don't create food, nor enable it to be obtained from others, further up the line, without costs which are difficult to bear and at the same time retain the group integrity. Thirdly, the process generates a momentum whereby the material base of the society (the cattle and sheep) becomes thinned out to the point where the group cannot continue to exist. For the goods which they obtain from "... the intercourse with foreigners..." do not exchange sufficiently or equally any longer (if they ever did), for more cattle and sheep (in this case) from other groups who still possess such herds. This is so because the 'price' is going up, or supply is ceasing as other such groups, perhaps, begin to retreat away from the vortex which could pull them in and destroy them, or because they are attracted themselves directly to it. Thus, fourthly,

98. Ibid., loc.cit. My emphases, A.L.
the community becomes atomized and individuals or families are thrown into one form of dependent relationship or another. Over the century at the Cape, these kinds of dependent relationships varied and the whole process was punctuated by resistance and counter-attack. Moreover, it happened over a long period and was uneven and patchy. Some Khoi retreated, so linked up with San groups and fought back, and other presumably were absorbed into Xhosa and Sotho chiefdoms, while thousands died in warfare and as a result of disease. But many were forced into service for the farmers - and veeboere in particular - whose expanding farm areas were foreclosing on the possibility of Khoi returning - if they had the chance - to independent transhumance. Thus the point at which the V.O.C./colonists met the Khoi, and through which they began to interact systematically with them - the meat trade - is the starting point for the subsequent analysis of the causes, contours and consequences of the collapse of the Khoi, and the subordinate incorporation of some in the new society. These questions are examined later.

The attraction of certain goods for the Khoi, and the pressure - starting in Amsterdam - which came to bear down on them to exchange their cattle for these items, together combined to undermine their economic base through the increasing 'monetization' by trade objects of their economies. This in turn acted to destroy their systems of subsistence - pastoral nomadism - and forced them into the emerging and expanding colonial political economy and the associated social structure. The use of the notion 'monetization' is only approximate; it is the analogy however that is worth stressing. Neale has observed that 'monetization' provides 'opportunities' and 'temptations'. For it is tempting to "... engage in commercial activities in respect of those things which have become
monetized and are saleable outputs and to acquire those things which have become monetized and are useful inputs into a process of production for sale." Clearly the process at the Cape, as we shall see later, was not exactly like that. We may better talk of a 'qualified monetization' in which the inflow of trade-goods in exchange for cattle had the effect, over a long period, of destroying the modes and means of production and subsistence - herding and cattle - without creating an alternative, and thus necessarily compelling Khoi in the end to fight, to flee, to attach themselves to other Khoi or Nguni/Sotho in some variation of the dependent client relationships or to seek 'protection' and 'work' with the V.O.C., the mission stations (of which in this period there was only one, soon closed down) or as labourers for veeboere.

The process was, of course, accompanied by other factors which all nonetheless converged to hasten the same result. There was disease (smallpox) that ripped through the hordes, and the wars of the 17th century with the V.O.C. all left the Khoi weaker and more vulnerable. The overall process of their subordination and incorporation was patchy and uneven. Yet the very patchiness and the uneven character of the responses by different hordes at different places and at different times was itself a condition and cause of their

99. Walter C. Neale: "Monetization, Commercialization, Market Orientation and Market Dependence". I have found discussion with Alec Erwin of the University of Natal, Durban, extremely productive in respect of these general questions about the process of dissolution of 'pre-capitalist modes'. See his unpublished paper: "Economic Growth and Change in South Africa", Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, May 1975 for a useful survey of the arguments and for some suggestive points on this and related matters.
collective decline. But in addition to the resistance they put up, which Marks has carefully re-told, there were some other methods which they could and did use at least to slow down the inevitable, though it is not likely that they saw it that way.

They could also increase the asking price in the early days, and before the V.O.C. got its own herds going. The 'Strandloper', Herry, emerges from the history not as the first 'collaborator'. The term 'collaborator' is in any event heavily freighted with unnecessary and distracting overtones, and it also does not encapsulate sufficiently precisely the role which Herry, and others later, played. For Herry was, classically, a broker. Boissevain distinguishes between patrons and brokers by pointing to two distinct types of resource which patrons and brokers typically dispose of. The patron has 'first order' resources, that is land, jobs, cattle, jobs, etc., while the broker has 'strategic contacts' with the people who have these resources, and these contacts are 'second order' resources. 'Those who dispose second order resources are brokers'. And we shall later see how the V.O.C. was regularly exercised to try to short-circuit the brokers and go direct to the source of the 'first order resources', and how the latter sought the V.O.C. But an earlier instance of the manner in which an individual Khoi could act as broker and also alter the 'terms of trade' by bringing new knowledge to the trading situation in a quite unexpected way was the case of Xhore (or Cory). Xhore was captured at the Cape and taken to

101. Ibid., p.62.
103. See John Cope: King of the Hottentots. He describes this extraordinary incident.
England by Captain Towrson in May 1613. In London he lived at the home of Sir Thomas Smythe, a prosperous merchant and trader who was anxious to know about the possibilities of the Cape. One of the things that Xhore learnt, it seems, was that brass (and other metals) were not in scarce supply at all in England, for he saw a great deal of it. He appears to have asked for, and obtained, a suit of brass armour. He was returned to the Cape in June 1614 - "Xhore go home, Saldania go!", he cried mournfully in London, we are told, till returned to Table Bay - and was put ashore, clutching his 'copper armour and javelin'. He promised to return with his horde and cattle. In due course he did so, but the price had rocketed. John Jourdain was at the Cape in 1617, and blamed (as did others) the difficulty and expense of the current barter for meat for the ships ".... on that dogge Corye .... the cause of all this rogerye....". Prior to Xhore's visit to England, claimed Jourdain, "... we had a cowe for half a yard of an old yron hoope, which nowe they esteeme not .....". 105

This underlines a number of points. First, that the role of the individual in these kinds of volatile contact situations can be quite crucial. Secondly, that his or her intervention in 'the market' can be important in shaping the structure of economic relationships, and that he or she can either slow down or speed up the interaction and its socio-political consequences. Thirdly, the Xhore incident - bizarre as it was, with brass armour and all -

104. Ibid., p.97.
illustrates how quickly the Khoi learnt the principles of 'negative reciprocity' and also how disadvantaged they had necessarily to be in the long run, once they became involved in 'trade' of this kind, whatever they did by way of raising the 'price'. Fourthly, once the trade goods got to the horde, the arrival of the stuff must have had consequences which acted to disrupt the community and, in the end, helped to dissolve the mode of production, as Marx indicated was the process which ensued when this kind of exchange took place. Finally, whatever a broker is able to do by way of playing both ends, he or she depends for his or her success on delivering the goods to both parties. In the case of the Cape therefore a successful broker must have contributed unwittingly to the demise of the hordes. For, by ensuring that both parties got what they wanted – meat for the V.O.C. and metals and tobacco for the Khoi – he or she was speeding up the process whereby the material bases of Khoi societies were being eroded. We shall return to all these questions in later chapters.

This chapter can be concluded by emphasising the main strands in the preceding argument. It has been shown how in respect of all the main dimensions of social life – economic behaviour, social structure, political organization, culture, world-view, normative universe and associated meanings – the Khoisan (and Nguni/Sotho) and Protestant European societies were radically at odds. The social organization and political economy of both the hunting San and the transhumant Khoi, moreover, sanctioned and permitted the breaking away of sections and the formation of new bands and hordes. The cores in turn replicated the self-sufficient features of the societies from which they came. They did not impinge on each other though there was marginal contact and exchange at the peripheries between Khoisan groups and between them and Nguni/Sotho through the medium of various
forms of client/patron relations and a loose system of 'trade'.
Arguably this process of replication and relatively peaceful contact
at the margins was the manner in which these societies provided for
expansion. It also points up the structures of expanding patri-
lineages within a particular political economy which could accommodate
new members without necessarily segregating them or relegate them
to specialized and/or subordinate roles. That form of 'expansion'
was not known to, and was also incompatible with, the political
economy and associated social structure of the colonists and the new
society which resulted from the settlement. Their expansion involved
no self-sufficient breaking away and replication of autonomous units
- though much later the trekking Boer polities of the interior may in
some rough way be analagous. Rather, it was an inclusive, land-
hungry geo-political spread, entailing no reciprocal toleration of,
or symbiosis with other groups. It involved a necessary disruption
of the societies - and the loose web of relations between them - they
encountered in their way. And it entailed the incorporation as
menials of the 'refugees' from that destruction in a labour-hungry
economy. The entry point of the V.O.C. and colonists to the pre-
colonial societies at the Cape was through 'trade'. It is to that
process and the associated developments that it is now necessary to
turn.

questions which Smith asks is, ".... how far, and under what
conditions, differential incorporation presupposes or generates
the institutional and social differences that constitute
His critics deny that he is interested in these central
questions, and therefore ignore his concern with them. They
have simply not read him carefully.
Why did the Khoi hordes in and around the Western Cape, and then steadily further inland, collapse? What circumstances surrounded this development over the first century of V.O.C. rule, and with what conditions was it associated? Moreover, what were the cumulative consequences of each stage of that process, and what were the implications overall for the political economy and social structure of the Cape? It is to this set of related questions that it is now necessary to turn. Together with later chapters which deal with labour, slavery and social structure, the answers to these questions provide the central structural clues to the manner in which the constitution of Cape society was gradually articulated in that period, and into the second half of the 18th century.

In identifying the fate of the Khoi as one of the central themes which define the manner in which Cape society was constituted, and its shape, one is underlining a complex process which involves both destruction and construction. The former, with which this chapter is concerned, describes the factors and forces which acted to break up the hordes, disrupt and distort the relations within and between them and inland groups, and the consequences of this. The latter, that is the 'constructive' aspect of the process, describes the manner in which a new society - and, at its heart, a system of production and the associated arrangement of labour relations - was forged: that is, the formation of an entirely new structure of political, social and economic relations. The two processes - the destructive and the
constitutive — were two sides of the same historical coin. For the collapse and decline of the Khoi hordes — and the flight of some away into the interior over the Orange River — was also the overall cause and condition of their incorporation in the new society over time. For as the colony expanded, in response to the pressure put on it by the demands of the V.O.C., and in consequence of the emerging local interests and goals, the forces unleashed by that development cracked open and shattered the autonomy of the hordes. It thus created the conditions which forced individual Khoi and their families, detached from their collapsing hordes or clans, to be sucked into the colonial polity and be differentially incorporated in generally subordinate roles and systematically inferior status positions in its economic and social structure. In the first instance this process had nothing whatsoever to do with 'colour', or, for that matter, with the Christian/heathen divide which is usually identified as the main basis for differentiation. It was far wider than that. It turned on the manner in which members of one cultural group were first incorporated as labourers, herders and menials and then, later, lodged and locked there, even as cultural transformation was taking place. For the labour question at the Cape was historically linked to the fate of the Khoi. I shall argue later that the system of labour relations initially fashioned and was strengthened by the structure of 'cultural relations', and that, incidentally, the structure of so-called 'race (i.e. colour) relations' was a product of this, and not the other way round. For the system of social stratification which emerged was shaped by the structure of labour, qualified and buttressed in certain crucial respects by the cultural discontinuities at any given time — but changing over time — between groups,
particularly the Khoi and first-generation imported slaves from
the East and Madagascar. But these are questions for later
chapters. Here, the focus is on the process of the decline of the
Khoi. Before looking at that in detail it is important to point out
the dramatic nature of that process by illustrating the contrast
between their situation in the 1650s and a century or more later.

It is rarely recognized how substantial were the Khoi
herds in the 1650s. And it is a useful starting point for this
analysis to show how drastic was the shift in the balance of power -
that is, command over the key resources of land and cattle - from
that time to the later 18th century. While it is impossible to
estimate accurately the number of cattle and sheep in the possession
of the Khoi groups at the time the Dutch settled, one can get a very
rough idea from the population estimate of 100-200,000 Khoi south
of the Orange in 1650. Moreover, there is substantial evidence in
the Dutch documents that, even around the vicinity of the Peninsula,
and only slightly further afield, the size of the Khoi herds was
enormous. From van Riebeeck's time onwards, the Journal and other
reports are filled with details. In November, 1652 there was a
report of ".... about 40 or 50 Saldaniers with at least a thousand
cattle as well as sheep....".¹ A few days later some 1500 or 1600
animals were seen.² By early December that year "... we saw on the
slopes beside Table Mountain, the pasturage and the country all
around covered with sheep and cattle like grass on the veld".³


2. Ibid., I, p.101. It is not at all clear from the internal
evidence of the Journal whether this was a 'horde' or an advance
party of a clan. It is more likely to have been the latter.
When the full horde was at the Cape, the number of cattle was
far in excess of this. See below.

3. Ibid., I, p.107.
On the 13th December, the diarist reflected that it would be quite possible ("if we are ordered to do this") to seize "10,000 head of cattle", which would provide ample supplies, and also stock for breeding. For "If one cannot get the cattle from them by friendly trading, why should one suffer their thieving without making any reprisal? This would only be necessary once: with 150 men, ten or twelve thousand cattle could be secured without danger of losing a single person. On the other hand many savages could be captured without a blow as they always come to us unarmed; they could then be sent to India as slaves". By early 1653 it was reported that ".... easily 20,000 sheep and cattle had been brought to the area near the Fort since the previous November. The same picture was reported through the mid 1650s. By that time it had begun to become more or less clear that the main groups which visited the Table Bay pasture area in the late Spring and early Summer, were the Cochoqua (the "Saldanhars") whose cattle was "... as numerous as the grass of the fields...." and by November 1655 the Journal recorded 'innumerable' cattle, 5,000 to 6,000 people and 400 to 500 huts.

4. Ibid., I, p.112. Throughout the early period there is this strange mixture of tones in the Journal and Letters. Caution, expediency, aggression, passivity, and fear are common notes struck. As they got to know more about successive groups of Khoi, the characteristic tones of early caution and respect gave way to aggression, hostility and impatience that they would not trade, or trade in sufficient volume. When that phase in the attitudinal cycle was reached, ruminations about annihilating a particular group became pronounced. See also, Marks: Op.cit., p.63 and fn.34. But the V.O.C. had ruled out enslavement of the Khoi. The tone in the Journal also contrasts strikingly with that of the Directors and their (expedient) philosophy of non-intervention in Khoi affairs.

5. Ibid., I, p.129.

6. Ibid., I, pp.368-370.
Because the supply of cattle through barter from these local groups was never adequate for the purposes of the Company, two strategies were pursued from the very earliest. The one was to send expeditions inland to make contact with supposedly cattle-rich groups, and the other was to breed cattle and sheep locally. We shall have to look at the implication and consequences of those strategies later, but from the expeditions undertaken - and their usually quite full reports - it is possible to get an impression of the size of the herds of some of the inland groups. When Eva (the Khoi woman who lived with the Commander's family) told the Dutch of the cattle-rich Namaqua, she advertised them in terms that met with the Commander's approval, and aroused his interest. She said they lived about 20 days' away, that they had stone houses, wore white skins, had churches and believed in God like the Dutch. Moreover, they had slaves who worked in crafts for them, and traded in tusks and ivory. An expedition to contact them was quickly mounted and it was hoped that other groups would also be found. But it was only in 1662 that some Namaqua were located, and the diarist of the expedition, van Meerhof, described them as having "... a mighty large number of cattle" and reported having seen 4,000 cattle and 3,000 sheep in one kraal. By the time of his departure from the Cape in 1662, van Riebeeck was able to leave a rough picture of the Khoi groups around the Cape. In his reference to the Chainouquas, the Chariguriquas, (who had mainly sheep), the Hessequas (with

7. Ibid., III, pp.8-9, dated 1st January 1659. The description sounds very much like some of the Sotho groups around the Orange River: it suggests knowledge, at least, by the local Khoi of the Sotho.

"... great herds of cattle ..."), the 'Chamaquas, Omaquas, Atiquas, Houteniquas' and Chauquas (who all had "... countless herds of cattle ....."), van Riebeeck confirmed the impression of a really very substantial number of cattle and sheep at the Cape at that time. And they were in the possession of the Khoi, not the Dutch.

TABLE I
CATTLE AND SHEEP IN POSSESSION OF COLONISTS, 1652-1793

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.12.1652</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 1.1653</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 6.1653</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.10.1653</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.10.1653</td>
<td>1 Milch cow, 1 ox, 4 calves.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td>±370</td>
<td>±650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. 8.1658</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.12.1658</td>
<td>V.O.C.: 20</td>
<td>V.O.C.: 1396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burgers: 238</td>
<td>Burgers: 348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.10.1658</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. 6.1659</td>
<td>Very few. Not clear how many.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1660</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>± 90 at Fort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1660</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1662</td>
<td>V.O.C.: 278</td>
<td>V.O.C.: 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burgers: 300</td>
<td>Burgers: 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668</td>
<td>V.O.C.: 400</td>
<td>V.O.C.: 1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Moodie: Op.cit., I, pp.246-251. In 1668, Dapper claimed that the Cochoquas ('Saldanhars') had "... well over a hundred thousand (cattle) in number, and about two hundred thousand sheep". Dapper: Kaffraria or Land of the Kafirs, p.23. But later he says the Cochoqua had only 1000 cattle and 2000 sheep. Ibid., p.73. (Dapper does not appear to have ever left the Netherlands. See Schapera's Introduction to The Early Cape Hottentots, p.2.) But Dapper's source was probably the anonymous author of the Klare ende Korte Besgryvinge van het land aan Cabo de Bona. Esperanca, (Amsterdam, 1652).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burgers:</td>
<td>V.O.C.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>4697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1672</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>6172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1677</td>
<td>(V.O.C.: 662)</td>
<td>(V.O.C.: 1649)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1678</td>
<td>511 in Hottentot-Holland area.</td>
<td>910 in Hottentot-Holland area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1681</td>
<td>3,300 (In all)</td>
<td>14,000 (In all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1682</td>
<td>2,000 (It seems in total)</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1685</td>
<td>V.O.C.:</td>
<td>V.O.C.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1687</td>
<td>V.O.C.:</td>
<td>V.O.C.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burgers: 1164</td>
<td>V.O.C.: 9218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1692</td>
<td>V.O.C. (?) 4645</td>
<td>V.O.C. (?) 4852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1696</td>
<td>6441</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>Burgers: 8357</td>
<td>V.O.C.: 53971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V.O.C. oxen: 1429</td>
<td>V.O.C.: 5956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1701</td>
<td>9,704 (Burgers) and the majority of the herds were now in the Stellenbosch District.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>12,671 (Burgers). Majority of stock in Stellenbosch and Swellendam Districts.</td>
<td>79314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1708</td>
<td>14320</td>
<td>89533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711</td>
<td>20743</td>
<td>116256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1713</td>
<td>16557 (of which 11000 were in the Stellenbosch and Drakenstein Districts)</td>
<td>120208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718</td>
<td>16202</td>
<td>64381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1723</td>
<td>21888 (of which 14000 in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein Districts)</td>
<td>88837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1733</td>
<td>26824</td>
<td>135014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743</td>
<td>34916</td>
<td>169440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>31375</td>
<td>152092</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

272
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1753</td>
<td>36243, broken down, thus: 191511</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stellenbosch: 5594</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drakenstein: 10207</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swellendam: 11694</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>33523</td>
<td>199339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1769</td>
<td>38012</td>
<td>250000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775</td>
<td>39019, broken down, thus: 285094, thus: 376433, thus: 310904, thus:</td>
<td>285094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cape: 6103</td>
<td>Cape: 401060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stellenbosch: 5487</td>
<td>Stellenbosch: 42335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drakenstein: 15367</td>
<td>Drakenstein: 127380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swellendam: 12062</td>
<td>Swellendam: 74319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>61961, broken down, thus: 376433, thus:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cape: 7135</td>
<td>Cape: 28560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stellenbosch: 7366</td>
<td>Stellenbosch: 49594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drakenstein: 24417</td>
<td>Drakenstein: 194670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swellendam: 23043</td>
<td>Swellendam: 103609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1783</td>
<td>62762, broken down, thus: 310904, thus:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cape: 7398</td>
<td>Cape: 21390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stellenbosch: 7827</td>
<td>Stellenbosch: 29405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drakenstein: 26067</td>
<td>Drakenstein: 183319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swellendam: 21470</td>
<td>Swellendam: 76790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There seems to have been a massive decline in Stellenbosch and Swellendam sheep between 1778 and 1783. Khoisan raiding? Or unreliable opgraff figures? Or is this consistent with demand arising from French presence at Cape?

1788 (total) 80921 (total) 445557
1793 (total) 82110 (total) 475205

These figures are taken from the same sources as for Table II, and also Neumark: Economic Influences on the South African Frontier 1652-1836, Table 3.

1. It is interesting to note that in 1793 when the total colonial figure for sheep was 475205, the Graaff-Reinet figure was 281195 - more than half. And in the same year, when the total cattle figure for the colony was 82110, the Graaff-Reinet and Swellendam areas together contributed 53365, again well over half.

2. The 'demand' side of the cattle and sheep figures gives some indication of the economic forces at work. In the late 1660s something like 300 cattle and 2000 sheep were required per annum, but by 1683 about 100 sheep were being provided per ship. (Elphick: Op. cit., p.210). During van Riebeeck's period
between 1652-1662 some 5-6000 men called at the Cape each year and stayed for an average of 10-14 days. (M.H.de Kock: Op.cit., p.10). The following figures set out the average number of ships for the stipulated periods calling at the Cape. It is important to note that after 1751 the figures include ships calling at both Cape ports, Table Bay and Simon's Bay, and include both Dutch and foreign ships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Average Ships per annum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1652-1661</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1662-1671</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1672-1700</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700-1714</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1715-1724</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1726-1750</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751-1771</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1772-1780</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781-1784</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1785-1789</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, in 1666 on his departure, Wagenaar confirmed this general impression again, pointing out that the Chainouquas were by that time the main source of supply, and they lived "... to the Eastward...". 10

By contrast, the Dutch stocks of cattle were meagre. They fluctuated wildly in numbers in the early years, as some of the figures in Table I indicate, particularly in the period between 1652 and 1660. There was, for instance, a modest supply of about 130 cattle and 350 sheep in January 1653, which plummeted to a desperate low of 1 cow, 1 ox, 4 calves and 60 sheep in October 1653. Van Riebeeck commented on this state of affairs: "May God make amends". 11 There was some improvement in supplies and stocks over the next few years so that in December 1658 there were about 658 head of cattle and 1434 sheep in the possession of the Company and the free burgers. But then, as hostilities leading up to the first war in 1659 mounted through the early part of that year, the stocks were depleted by raids and thefts. In May 1659 the Journal reported a very poor state of affairs, and in June only 100 of the 500 sheep on Robben Island remained alive. 12 But by the end of December, 1660, with hostilities ended and as a result of "..... generous trading..." with the new-found allies and friends, the Chainouquas, the Journal ended the year on a jaunty note. 13 But the size of the Company and colonist herds hardly justified such


12. Ibid., III, p.72.

optimism, and the balance of command over cattle at the Cape remained decisively with the Khoi, even if the position of weaker groups closest to the settlement had become shaky, and showed signs of growing dependance on the settlement. It was, however, not until after 1677 - the year in which the second Cape war came to an end - that the Company herds of cattle and sheep began to mount steadily and systematically, as the figures in Table I show. And even then, as we shall see, expeditions for purposes of barter were often (annually sometimes) undertaken deeper and deeper into the eastern interior, well into the 18th century.

If the balance of command over cattle resources was decisively in favour of the Khoi, the same is true for land. In the 1650s the area over which the Company had undisputed control was almost nil. The position of the fort and its immediate surroundings was hardly secure. The Khoi who came west and south to the Table Bay pasture areas in early summer continued to do so, and grazed their herds in and around the foot of Table Mountain. Company employees and officials were edgy, and often aggressive in their ideas about what to do to the Khoi. But specific instructions not to retaliate against 'offences' were

14. I deal with the question of labour and dependence more fully in the next chapter. However it is worth pointing out here that as early as 1655 some Khoi - probably a clan of Goringhaika ('Capemen') who were described as 'Herry's allies' - sought 'protection' at the Fort. "These allies of Herry accordingly requested to be allowed to live, with their huts and the residue of their stock, under our protection in the valleys between the dunes at the rump of the Lion Mountain, and said that for a bellyful of rice, some tobacco and arrack some of them would willingly fetch firewood for the cooks every day". From the context it appears that they had lost some cattle to other Cochoqua and possibly San raiders. Though they were asked to barter cattle by the Dutch, "They rejoined that they had to subsist on the milk, but that there were other tribes in the interior, and when these came hither we could get sufficient". Journal, I, p.313.

15. see next page
repeatedly issued, lest the cattle trade (such as it was) suffer, and stern warnings of punishment accompanied the instructions.  

Almost ten years to the day after the settlement had been established it was still necessary to have a 'mounted guard'.

In 1662 the Company gardens consisted of 21 morgen (about 45 acres). The whole area under some kind of cultivation in the peninsula, in 1658, was about 350 morgen.

15. See the Despatch from van Riebeeck to Batavia, dated 7th July, 1659, in which he implored for an increase of strength for the garrison, needed "... in such perilous times ... to save what we have got ....". Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp.180-1, and Marks: Op. cit., p.64.

16. A typical Resolution of the Council, dated 21st October, 1653, illustrates the expedient character of the policy. Despite the loss of 44 Company cattle to Herry, the leader of the Strandlopers (Goringhaikona), any revenge attack ".... might totally and for ever deprive us of the trade – at present the chief object of our masters at this place .... as we are not so much interested in taking vengeance upon a parcel of thievish Strandlopers as thereby to suffer in our needful traffic with the Saldanhars, which is of great importance to the Hon. Company ....". Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp.36-7. As the land and power balance tilted in the favour of the V.O.C. and colonists, this cautious and expedient approach vanished entirely from the records. And some offenders were punished. In October 1672 a soldier who had been mutinous, seditious, broken prison and deserted and had stolen a sheep from a Khoi was ".... sentenced to be severely flogged and dismissed .... his sword to be broken, to be pilloried the whole day under the gallows .... to labour in chains for 10 years and to forfeit his pay". Moodie: Op. cit., I, p.381. In September 1673, a free woman (and her servants) who had stolen and slaughtered 2 Khoi cows, was sentenced to be bound to a post at the execution place, severely flogged, branded and confined to Robben Island. Ibid., I,p.382. Even a century later punishments – though few and far between – were meted out. In 1765 Johan Otto Diedrichs was sentenced to 25 years' hard labour on Robben Island for cruel treatment of Khoi. See Hoge: Personalia of the Germans, p.73. One should not, however, conclude from this that all offences were detected or, when they were, that they were punished. But some were, and the wording of the regulations were quite clear. The case of Etienne Barbier, in 1739, is another instance. See E.A.Walker: A History, pp.93-4; A.J.Boeseken: "The Company and its subjects", p.54, and Gie: "The Cape Colony under Company Rule 1708-1795", p.148.


Thus, in respect of the two resources - cattle and land - which were central to the economic life, social survival and purposes of both the Dutch and the Khoi, the balance of control and command was decisively in the favour of the Khoi. A hundred years later the relationship had changed totally. As Table I shows, there were some 38000 cattle and almost a quarter of a million sheep in the possession of the colonists in 1769, and those may be low figures. And already by 1700 the colony had spread out to engulf the whole of the peninsula, and stretched as far as the Drakenstein and Hottentots-Holland mountain ranges, (running from north to south), in the East, and northwards along the western side of those mountains to some 45 miles north of Cape Town on the Atlantic coast. Some colonists had spilled over the Drakenstein ranges into the land of Waveren (now Tulbagh), and others had set up in the district of Riebeeck's Kasteel. Over the following 50 years the expansion was consolidated. Though the borders were not clearly defined, by 1750 the colony stretched as far as Mossel Bay on the South-east coast and the Elephant river on the North-west coast. There was, of course, still bitter resistance, but it was largely by San, or Khoisan alliances or cattle-less Khoi "...on the periphery". The years after 1700 were filled with reports of incidents of 'attacks' on colonists and cattle in the outlying areas. The attackers were variously defined as 'Ubiqua', 'Hottentots', 'Grikwas and Namaquas', 'bushmen or highwaymen', 'Sonqua Hottentots'.


20. Ibid., Vol.III, pp.87-8. By 1795 the colony's official border stretched to the Fish River in the east. To the west and north of this it bulged up almost to the Orange River and then ran down, across and gradually up again to the Buffalo River on the Atlantic coast, about 80 miles to the south of the Orange River mouth at present-day Alexander Bay (Oranjemund). The 'bulge' was to be the main area of the Graaff-Reinet district after 1786: it was the region in which some of the most bitter fighting between commandos and Khoisan resisters took place after 1760.

and 'Bosjemans-Hottentoten'.

Despite the fierce resistance in the far north and northeast which went on until early in the 19th century, it is quite clear that the Khoi in the western and settled eastern areas were no longer taken as a threat. They had been impoverished of their stocks and their land. In his account in 1668, Dapper had written that "... the principal wealth of the Hottentots lies in their cattle, and in the beadwork which they barter from our people ...". And we have seen from other evidence that the Khoi herds were enormous. By the early 18th century, however, even the official reports to Amsterdam confirmed that Cape Khoi had been reduced to poverty and thence either dependence or banditry. Describing the situation in 1702, an official wrote to the Seventeen that "The Hottentots in the neighbourhood (of the Cape, A.L.) have already been deprived of all their cattle, which, though not taken from them in violence, have been bartered from them for tobacco and beads, after they have been made drunk with Brandy. Having been in this manner impoverished, they are tempted to steal, and to take to evil ways and ... to join the robbers, so that well-disposed inhabitants become the sufferers". And by the early 1770s, when Thunberg was travelling widely through the Cape, the position was clear. He met "... with but small remains of the once more numerous Hottentot nations, which, as late as the beginnings of this century, still inhabited these vast plains .... Now there are only a few scattered

22. See for instance Leibbrandt: Journal, 1699-1732, in particular the entries dated 3.3.1701 (p.35); 7.4.1701 (p.37); 26.5.1701 (p.38); 16.6.1701 (p.38); 26.8.1701 (p.39); and 31.1.1719 (p.276). See also Marks: Op.cit., pp.70-1; and Theal: Op.cit., III, p.45,ff; p.81,ff; p.118,ff; and p.188,ff.


24. Leibbrandt: Letters Despatched, 1696-1708, p.191. It would be simplistic to believe that no violence was involved. It would also be unwise to dismiss the suggestion that Khoi had responded enthusiastically to metal pieces, tobacco and liquor. My emphasis, A.L. But this indicates that the alcoholism was a condition and consequence of Khoi collapse, rather than a cause of it.
villages (kraals) .... to be found, in which they either live by themselves or are taken into service at the Company's posts and grazing farms, or else by colonists themselves. For the most part, these societies, especially in the vicinity of the Cape, are far from being numerous; but farther in the country they are both more populous and more wealthy". 25 A century before, he observed, it had been easier to ".... learn the mode of life of these people. Now, the way to their abodes is very long, their societies very small, their manners and way of life much altered, and the whole nation under much restraint". 26

Whatever resistance was being put up by San or Khoi-San alliances, or cattle-less Khoi, on the north-eastern edges of the colony, the balance of control over land and cattle had already changed dramatically in the west before 1700, and was steadily altering through the eastern cattle-ranching areas as the 18th century wore on. How had this come about? What processes may be identified as being responsible for this massive shift in power, that is in the command and control of the crucial resources of cattle and land over the century? In short, how does one explain the collapse and decline of the Khoi hordes in the face of a relatively small number of colonists (as Table II shows), and in the light of only two major (but very localized) wars - that of 1659 and

25. Charles P. Thunberg: Travels in Europe, Africa and Asia, I, pp.304-5. Mentzel reported in the 1730s that a Khoi 'Captain' whom he had met had ".... confessed openly that they have to put up with having to move their cattle as soon as a white colonist covets their pasture". Manifestly; things had changed substantially since the 1650s: one can also envisage the consequences of this movement as groups trespassed over the land of others. I return to this later. O.F. Mentzel: Description, III, p.330.

27. Table II sets out the figures for the development of the colonial and slave population over the century. Apart from one reference in Neumark's study to a figure of about 13000 to 15000 'Hottentots' in about 1830, I have never come across any data on the changing number of Khoi in the Cape during this period. Gie reckons there were about 15000 'Hottentots' in the Cape in 1795, and 14000 of them were in the outlying districts of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet. Gie: Op.cit., pp.164-5.

The 1805 Census reported a 'Hottentot' population in the Cape of about 20000. See Wilson: "The Hunters and the Herders", p.68. The only criterion at that stage − or at any stage − upon which such arithmetic could have been based was cultural. [One only needs to ask the question: "When was a 'Hottentot' not a 'Hottentot', and the point is made.] Given the shifting, changing and vague border-lines between cultural groups by the early 19th century, it is not clear that such a figure is accurate or indeed what it means. But whatever other meaning it may have had, e.g. not 'Coloured' or 'Bastard', it at least indicates that there had been a substantial decline of 'pure' Khoi, by which I mean clicking transhumants of the kind described in the previous chapter!

The important thing to note here too is that there were only about 1300 'Dutch' at the Cape in 1700 and about 811 adult slaves and 80 slave children. By 1750 there were about 5000 colonists and V.O.C. employees, and 4019 slaves (and 742 children). The main population jump, however, is after the mid-18th century, and it reached some 20000 by 1800. Thus Marks' argument that the population increase may have explained the relative speed of the collapse in the 18th century only applies to the second half of the century. At least, it only bites hard as an argument for that period. The Khoi collapse had, however, by then been largely accomplished. I suggest below the main reasons for this, which do not have a great deal to do with the relative population sizes of the colonists, but turn more centrally on structural questions.
TABLE II

COLONIAL BURGER POPULATION AND SLAVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>men</th>
<th>women</th>
<th>children</th>
<th>slaves</th>
<th>slavesses</th>
<th>Knechte</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99 V.O.C. men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>women &amp; children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>130 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1655</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>133 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1658</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>89 slaves in all</td>
<td>69 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1661</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1662</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>men &amp; women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100 slaves in all</td>
<td>120 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1672</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>men &amp; women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63 slaves in all</td>
<td>30 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1679</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>117</td>
<td></td>
<td>491 slaves in all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1685/9</td>
<td>Arrival of 80 Huguenot families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1687</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>burgers and wives in all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1687</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>44 &amp; 36 children</td>
<td>39 Knechte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>burgers and wives in all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>1255</td>
<td>burgers and families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>702</td>
<td>109 &amp; 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>1769</td>
<td>burgers and families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1707</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>145 &amp; 117</td>
<td>128 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>burgers and families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>260 &amp; 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>burgers and families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1771 slaves in all</td>
<td>114 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1713</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>burgers and families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1775 burger slaves &amp; 440 V.O.C. slaves</td>
<td>114 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1723</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>burgers and families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2224</td>
<td>408 &amp; 290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>and wives</td>
<td>1483</td>
<td>2867</td>
<td>560 &amp; 446</td>
<td>122 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1733</td>
<td>3191</td>
<td>burgers and families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4703 slaves in all</td>
<td>117 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1708 282
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>men</th>
<th>women</th>
<th>children</th>
<th>slaves</th>
<th>slavesesses (slaves &amp; slave-children)</th>
<th>Knechte</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1743</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2197</td>
<td>4619</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>4589</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3322</td>
<td>821 &amp; 779</td>
<td>81 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3591</td>
<td>880 &amp; 848</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753</td>
<td>5419</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4137</td>
<td>1031 &amp; 877</td>
<td>114 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Second small-pox epidemic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758</td>
<td>5676</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4105</td>
<td>1021 &amp; 806</td>
<td>101 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>1278</td>
<td>3610</td>
<td>5072</td>
<td>1214 &amp; 929</td>
<td>127 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1772</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8387</td>
<td>1184</td>
<td>in all, including 'Coloured'.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>9721</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7380</td>
<td>2171 &amp; 1556</td>
<td>81 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1788</td>
<td>12661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9931</td>
<td>3075 &amp; 1804</td>
<td>43 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1797</td>
<td>18079</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26281</td>
<td>slaves in all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is important to start from what has gone before. On the one hand there is the analysis of Dutch society and culture in the 17th century and the character of the 'fragment' which peopled the settlement at the Cape. On the other hand there is the structure and character of Khoi and San societies prior to the colonial intrusion. We have, in short, to place at the centre of
the analysis of their subsequent interaction the fact that two modes of production, organized for radically contrasting ends and purposes, and associated with distinctive cultures and normative universes, became locked in conflict. And the cultures, like the two systems of political economy, were incompatible. I shall argue that what we have to see as central to that interaction, and therefore as crucial in understanding its consequences in the decline of the Khoi, is the manner in which one mode of production, and its associated goals, purposes and behaviours, penetrated the other, and thus accomplished its collapse partly from within and partly from without. But before proceeding to look at that in detail, a brief preliminary statement is necessary here.

Because the causes, circumstances, conditions and consequences of the collapse and decline of the Khoi are so closely interleaved, they are best stated briefly in general terms first, and then elaborated under analytically distinct, but historically integrated heads. Their defeat and demise under colonialism was not accomplished simply by the systematic application of force and fraud. That is both too easy and too comfortable an explanation. It was the result of a combination of 'pressure' trading (to which, in some critical and damaging respects, the Khoi responded), punctuated by warfare and coercion, the expropriation and 'purchase' of their land, the deep penetration and disruption of intra-horde exchange and other relations by the 'commoditization' and corrosion of their economies by trade-goods, liquor and other items. It was also the consequence of the absorption and incorporation of refugee and detached Khoi in the limited but expanding and hungry labour 'market' in the Cape economy, the associated but slow acculturation amongst some such Khoi, the expropriating and bullying tactics of
eastward moving veeboere (who were in part responding to the opportunity to meet the demand for cattle at the Cape), the ravaging effects of diseases (like the smallpox epidemics of 1713 and 1755), and the consequential imposition of political control by the V.O.C. - through an elementary system of indirect rule - as the autonomy of the hordes, and their internal political mechanisms, were disrupted and decayed. The possibility of wholesale flight and orderly withdrawal further towards the east or the north by refugees was largely foreclosed on by the presence there of Nguni, and the Sotho.

Some of this is usually present in the general histories. But it is portrayed as a haphazard, desultory, unconnected and fragmentary set of happenings, constituted by contingent bits and pieces of conflict and scuffling fights, random attacks of disease and Khoi weakness in the face of temptations like tobacco and liquor and other items. All this is of course there, as part of the sad history. But there is a logic to that process that can be uncovered and analyzed, and ought to be examined in its own right, rather than being regarded as the secondary and consequential outcome of a generalized movement of Dutch expansion. For that 'expansion' itself at the Cape is just another (unsatisfactory, I think) way of conceptualizing the trajectory of Khoi collapse. Moreover, the 'expansion' itself had a logic behind it, and a history. The history was the general rise and spread of the Dutch empire, and the logic was ordered by the specific requirements, arising out of that history, which were imposed on the Cape settlement

28. It is extraordinary to note that there is no single major study of the fate and decline of the Khoi. Their story is a sad one, to be sure, and deserves careful attention, as a case study in one form of colonialism. Dr Elphick's study of the early period and the two 17th century wars is a major contribution to the early history of the Khoi. Elphick: Op.cit., passim.
by the V.O.C. in its initial and enduring purpose for it. Thus the content of the expansion of the colony has to be grasped clearly in terms of that initial rationale, the purposes of the V.O.C. and the emergent local interests of the officials and the burgers, and the implications of these for the indigenous societies. By concentrating on the fate of the Khoi in the light of these considerations and against the background of the V.O.C. and colonist pressure upon them, one is able to generate a causal model of the destructive colonial process of 'interaction', and its results.

By way of a final preliminary statement to the main concerns of this chapter, it is worth pointing out that although it is not a major example or instance of the phenomenon, comparatively speaking, the history of the Cape and its peoples in the first century of V.O.C. rule illustrates in many of its forms and particulars the process of 'underdevelopment', which has been characterized by A.G. Frank and others as the 'development of underdevelopment'. The factors and relationships that have been held to characterize that process in Latin America and elsewhere may be identified at the Cape, and are in some respects more dramatically exposed. The so-called metropolis-satellite relationship cannot be more explicitly illustrated than in the tight links between the V.O.C. in the Netherlands and the subordinate and subordinated role of the Cape settlement. And although the Cape did not contribute directly in kind in any significant way to the fuelling of Dutch capitalism in its middle and late mercantilist era, nonetheless the requirements imposed on the settlement were

specifically geared to the wider accumulative purposes of the Dutch Republic, and to servicing V.O.C. operations. To that extent it illustrates Frank's thesis that the expansion of European mercantilism and capitalism "... penetrated even the apparently most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world".\textsuperscript{28b} The local emergence of a settler and colonial interest of course complicated and widened that process, as we shall see, and it is in respect of the configuration of social relations thus established within the colony that pluralist categories are so useful for explanatory and descriptive purposes. Conventionally, the collapse of the Khoi has been regarded as a subordinate or illustrative part of other thematic concerns, like the 'colour problem' or 'the emergence of the Cape Coloured people', or problems of 'administration'. And of course it can be seen as those too. But there is no single account of the fate of the Khoi as a case study in colonial penetration and 'interaction'. By identifying more carefully the complex relationships over that first century at the Cape, the process can be shown to be rich in detail and clear in design. For it is simply not the case that the Khoi (or San) were merely swatted out of the way by the Dutch. Rather, a careful examination of the century in the light of the conceptual considerations and theoretical orientations outlined earlier reveal a web of economic, diplomatic, political and social relations which both accomplished and accompanied the decline of the Khoi (and San), and acted to draw them into the structure of the colonial society thus constituted.

This process, thus, involved complex chains of cause and effect. They were cumulative over the period, linking the demands

\textsuperscript{28b} \textit{Ibid.}, p.6. My emphases, A.L.
and imperatives of the Heeren 17 to the collapse of those societies, via the policies and emergent local interests of the Cape officials and the settlers. The model which organizes the evidence to illustrate that process may be stated in general terms in the following manner here first, and then examined under the respective conceptual headings.

From what has been argued about the structure of Khoi societies it is clear that their cattle-based economies were the key to their collapse, and because of cattle, ... land. [For the San, it was game and veldkos land]. The Directors in Amsterdam wanted supplies for their ships passing the Cape. The local officials and servants could and did grow some produce but initially depended on the Khoi for cattle. The local Khoi however were not able to provide enough cattle on either a regular or predictable basis. This gave rise to the pattern of persistent, coercive and pressured barter which ultimately became a kind of long distance trade. Both the V.O.C. and the colonists used similar items: liquor, tobacco, metal pieces and other 'luxury' items, which tempted and - despite increases in the asking 'price' - created a 'demand' of sufficient momentum to carry the Company trading offensive deep and destructively into the heart of the politically loose structure of intra-horde and inter-horde relations, disrupting and then breaking up those structures and their relatively fragile ecological balances, from within. Once that process had begun, once - that is - the penetrating bridge-head through the cattle trade was established, success fed upon success, and conflict over cattle and land ensued. The impact on the Khoi of trading under this kind of constraint, and the deeper penetration in the interior of inter-horde relations was such as to leave successive and receding perimeters of Khoi groups...
without the material means of social survival. Even in the 1730s, when Mentzel was at the Cape, he noted expeditions by eastern farmers who went 200 miles inland for cattle, or so they said.\textsuperscript{29}

At each stage some of the refugees from that process were left embedded in the expanding colonial society.\textsuperscript{29a} The Khoi nearest the Cape felt the impact first. They - as with later groups further inland - responded ambiguously. On the one hand they did trade cattle and sheep for brass and copper and metal, and there are instances (which we shall see) of quite substantial exchanges of cattle. It is far from clear that they only traded under coercion. But, on the other hand, they also resisted fiercely the continued presence of the settlers and their systematic encroachment onto traditional Khoi pastures. The land was used for cultivation by colonists, but also as pasture for the increasing V.O.C. and settler herds. Having lost cattle and then land, the Khoi attacked these herds, thus causing further friction and establishing the basis for the wars of 1659 and 1673-7. V.O.C. and colonist frustration and irritation was exacerbated by the reluctance of the hordes deeper inland (like the Namaqua or the Inqua) to come down to the Cape on a regular basis, or to enter any formal and binding agreements to deliver a given amount of cattle at stipulated times,


\textsuperscript{29a} de Kiewiet identifies this process in respect of later Boer-Nguni relations, but dismisses the century of Dutch-Khoi relations in a few pages. He sees each clash between them leaving Nguni embedded in "white society". \textit{A History of South Africa}, p. 25. The colonial society - not in Balandier's sense, but meaning the overall political economy and social order - is unsatisfactorily conceived of as simply a 'white society'. By that time, as a careful examination of the Dutch/Khoi/slave relationships shows, it was a complex, plural, multi-'racial' social organization, not in any way approximating a 'white society'.
despite some of the absurd 'treaties' concluded. So the V.O.C. and colonists went inland, on a regular basis, and initially amicable trade relations in turn gave way to fighting as more Khoi groups were impoverished of their cattle, saw their grazing areas being occupied, and then resisted further barter. Commandos were despatched and further land expropriated. The cumulative, widening process of subjection through impoverishment went on. As hordes collapsed, some fled inland where they 'trespassed' on the territory of other groups and attacked their flocks. Internal wars broke out, and some Khoi who were in touch with the Dutch sought alliances with them against other inland groups. By 1700 the trend was already established. If the Khoisan resisters further inland were a major threat to the cattle farmers in the northeastern areas, separated from the west by the mountain ranges (but still connected to the western markets), in the latter areas the historical fate of the Khoi was settled. They had succumbed through a combination of pressure trading, bribery, temptation, coercion, the loss of their herds and customary access to land. Some, no doubt, became available as clients to other Khoi (and Nguni and Sotho) further afield, but there were quite severe economic and structural limits to the numbers of clients that could be supported. Others became available as labourers for menial tasks in ad hoc ways with the Dutch, while others fled north over the Orange River. The effects of diseases and fevers in the 17th century and then the smallpox epidemics of the 18th century added to the catalogue of other contingent factors that speeded the Khoi decline.

Thus, with their herds savagely depleted, their transhumance severely constrained, the capacity to regenerate their mode
of life reduced to almost nil, their resistance tapering off (with the important exception of the conflict in the Graaff-Reinet area) many Khoi became increasingly dependent upon farmers for odd jobs and food. Those who survived all this, and who had not retreated inland, were incorporated in the colonial society and came slowly to adopt the institutions and languages of the emerging Afrikaner people, and contributed to that emergence.

In short, the initial V.O.C. requirements for cattle and agricultural produce led to the local need for land, and that meant conflict, which in turn resulted in the accumulation of more land and cattle by the V.O.C. and the graziers, which then precipitated the attacks by Khoi on their herds, and hence more conflict, more land, more cattle, more decay, more destruction. As the process worked itself out, the Cape Khoi - qua Khoi - disappeared from the face of the earth. But the transformation of the survivors of these people, and their descendants, over the centuries, was slow, yet decisive. On the one hand, they were a major factor in the formation of the so-called 'Cape Coloured' people. On the other hand they also contributed significantly to the constitution and extent of the equally so-called Afrikaner people. The line dividing these two 'communities' became increasingly vague, shifting and indistinct, because the communities were not distinct. The degree of cultural continuity between and within them was substantial. In any event, whatever dividing line may later have been imposed on the arbitrary basis of colour - though with a less arbitrary explanation - it had not emerged in this period with any clarity or force, as will later be argued. To concentrate on the 'colour' question is analytically unsound, and hence misleading. It is also historically confusing if one is to understand
the structure of relations, and its causes and antecedents, that emerged in the formation of the new society. For this structure of Cape colonial society before 1800 was in general 'non-racial', yet slave-owning. There is nothing particularly paradoxical or even unique about this: it was also the case in Brazil and the East Indies.\textsuperscript{30} Though the argument about that must wait for a later chapter it is worth bearing the point in mind when considering the application of the general model to the historical material in greater detail.

I propose to do that under the following broad headings. First, it is essential to look at that wide mobile nexus of relationships that are best subsumed under the heading of the "trading and raiding" syndrome.\textsuperscript{31} For this provides the clue to the initially gradual, then rapid tilting of the cattle and land balance in favour of the V.O.C. and colonists. It also raises some difficult problems about why some Khoi did barter to the damaging extent they appear to have done. Secondly, and associated with this, was the pattern and sequence of the collapse of Khoi hordes as independent and distinctive groups. The implications of this for relations with other anterior groups can be identified in terms of the rippling and corrosive effects of the process of 'commoditization' by barter goods, deep trading and its consequences.

\textsuperscript{30} See Frank Tannenbaum: Slave and Citizen. Despite the serious criticisms of that study, it remains a masterly and lucid comparative account of a very difficult problem. See E.D.Genovese: The World the Slaveholders Made, and E.D.Genovese and L.Foner (eds.): Slavery in the New World, which includes the critique of Tannenbaum by Marvin Harris in his "The Myth of the Friendly Master". On the East Indies, there is no better source book than de Graaf's Cost Indisse Spiegel, for a contemporary description.

\textsuperscript{31} This suggestive phrase is used by Legassick in "The Frontier Tradition.....", p.17, and is picked up by Marks in "Khoisan resistance .....", p.67. On its own it is too limited conceptually to encompass the complex and cumulative historical process. While it suggests a dynamic process on one dimension, it lacks historical depth and structural 'width'. But seen as part of a wider structure of unfolding relations of conflict and cooperation, (continued on next page).
Thirdly, the political techniques, (from very early on), of indirect rule and the establishment of tactical alliances which the Dutch used to establish contacts, supply lines and to confirm their supremacy, if not their control, over the Cape Khoi, needs to be described and analysed. Fourthly, there is the question of cultural change amongst some colonial Khoi and the agencies of that change. In later chapters some of the consequences of that will be taken up more fully in the context of the consideration of the labour/slavery question in the political economy and social structure of the settlement, with its connections to metropolitan Europe and the East.

First, and centrally, how did the trading and raiding cycle work, and with what effects? It can be argued that some Khoi, at least, exchanged rather more cattle and sheep for metals, beads, tobacco and arrack than was, strictly speaking, in the interests of their social self-survival, but why? There are at least two perspectives on this exchange relationship and it needs to be examined from at least two sides - that of the Dutch and that of the Khoi. As is almost inevitable in situations of this kind, the evidence for and from the former is more substantial. But within it there is some material which illustrates the Khoi perspective.

There can be little doubt that, from the first, the Dutch officials at the Cape intended to establish what they

31. (continued from previous page) ..... expansion and resistance over time, it captures an essential part of the destruction and construction, as well as the cultural incompatibilities and assimilations.
believed could be systematic trading and diplomatic relations with the inland Khoi. 32 Every possible precaution was taken to ensure

32. They had some grounds for believing this to be possible. From the time of da Gama's voyage in 1497 cattle had been bartered in small numbers from Khoi around the Cape. The first record of such an exchange is given by the diarist of da Gama's journey, describing the events at the Aguada de Sao Braza (Watering Place of Saint Blasins, according to Mollema: De Eerste Schipvaart der Hollanders naar Oost-Indie 1595-7, p.135). This was Mossel Bay. Could the people there have been Hessequas? See Raven-Hart (ed.): Before van Riebeeck, p.6. Thereafter, various Portuguese, French, English and Dutch callers bartered cattle at different points round the Cape. The Khoi developed a mixed reputation, but they were mostly perceived as aggressive and dangerous. But Janssen and Proot, marooned with the Haerlem crew at the Cape in 1649, commended them (and the Cape) to the Heeren, saying that "... after we had lain there for five months, (the natives).... came daily to the Fort which we had thrown up for our defence, to trade, with perfect amity, and brought cattle and sheep in quantities ....". Raven-Hart: Op.cit., p.170, and Moodie: Op.cit., I, pp.3-4. Houtman, in 1595, at Mossel Bay, had a successful bartering experience. Mollema: Op.cit., and Raven-Hart: Op.cit., pp.17-18. So the potential for the cattle trade was considered good by van Riebeeck. While he was sceptical about the character and disposition of the Khoi, he nonetheless entertained visions of establishing sustained barter with them for "... horned cattle and sheep", which - along with other animals - could have provided the basis of an export trade in hides, to Japan, he thought. "Further Considerations and reflections upon some points of the Remonstrance presented by Mr Leendert Janz ....."; in Moodie: Op.cit.,pp.5-7. For van Riebeeck's period, see Journal, and also Goodwin: Op.cit.; Moodie: Op.cit.; H.M. Robertson: "The Economic Development of the Cape under van Riebeeck", and Wilson: "The Hunters and the Herders". In his Instructions to Pieter Everaerde, leader of an expedition to the Namaqua in November, 1661, van Riebeeck stressed the need to establish trade links and hoped they would "..... enter into closer acquaintance and alliance with us". The Dutch believed that the Namaqua were "... in communication...." with the gold-rich people of Monomotapa, and hence urged Everaerde to find out as much as he could about those people and their trading preferences. Journal,III, pp.429-33. Groups further afield, like the "Chamaquas, Omaquas, Atiquas, Houteniquas, Chauquas, Hancumquas, 'Choboquas, and Cobonas'....", were believed to have settled villages, a great deal of cattle, dacha 'plantations' and much 'gold or 'Chory' and 'white gems'. The Namaquas were said to be "... a more active race than the Hottentots". See Memorandum from van Riebeeck to Wagenaar, in Moodie: Op.cit., I,pp.246-251, dated 5th May,1662. The difference in tone in the descriptions of these distant people as contrasted with that of the local known 'Saldanhars' is striking. Interestingly, when the odd generalizations, exaggerations and peculiar turn of phrase are allowed for, there is some kernel of fact in some of this.
that nothing thwarted the realization of the objective.\(^{33}\) The Company was determined to keep barter in its hands, and the reasons are well known. On the one hand they were following the monopolistic and mercantilist policy of the time which meant that they brooked no competitive independent bartering by colonists or employees which might raise the barter 'price'. On the other hand, in the particular circumstances of the Cape, they feared that 'incidents' might occur which could escalate into costly warfare. Thus edict after edict was issued forbidding any such barter, though there were a few short spells when it was permitted, though contrary to the preferences of local officials.\(^{34}\) It is clear, however, that

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33. One of the first proclamations issued by van Riebeeck on 9th April, 1652, dealt with how men should behave and was specifically geared to ensure "... the greater supply of all kinds of cattle ...." and the promotion of the Company's interests. Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 10. In February 1658, van Riebeeck wrote to the Seventeen that "... taking the number of ships at 30 annually, this would require 240 cattle and 240 sheep ...." Another 200 sheep and cattle would be required for the settlement, making 440 of each needed annually. The Record, I, p. 119. By 1695, Grevenbroek estimated 40 ships of all nationalities per year were calling at the Cape. Grevenbroek: "An Elegant and Accurate Account of the African Race ....", p. 281.

34. The edicts forbidding illegal barter were issued 16 times between 1658 and 1680. See S.D.Newmark: Economic Influences on the South African Frontier, 1652-1836. The initial proclamation of 9th April, 1652 had forbidden it. One of the earliest repeat edicts was issued on 8th January, 1654. See M.K.Jeffreys: Kaapse Plakkaatboek, I, p. 13. Others, re-affirming it were frequent and, one suspects, frantic. Certainly, they were regular. Thus 12th October, 1654; 26th September, 1657; 20th July/8th September, 1693; 27th October, 1702; 4/9th April, 1727, and 8th December, 1739. They are, respectively, in Jeffreys: Op. cit., at I, p. 17; I, p. 107; I, p. 282; I, p. 326; II, p. 129 and II, p. 168. The edict of 1739 actually specified that there could be no barter with "Hottentots or Caffers", which indicates that from early in the 18th century barter contacts had been made with Xhosa groups. Following pressure from the burgers and the visit of Commissioner van Goens in 1657, the cattle trade with the Khoi was temporarily thrown open, though they were forbidden to pay more than the V.O.C. did, while barter of ivory, rhino horns and feathers was prohibited. Resolution of 6th November, 1657, in Moodie: Op.cit., p. 114. However, the ban was re-imposed, after confirmation of the policy was received from Amsterdam on 4th May, 1658. It was permitted again in late 1699 and banned again in 1702. Then it (continued on next page)....
that illicit barter went on, and the frequency of the bans illustrates that. What it also illustrates is that there were Khoi who were prepared to exchange cattle for trinkets or tobacco or liquor, and that they 'responded' positively to the barter with really quite disastrous consequences. There is thus an explanatory problem here to which one must shortly return. For it seems to be the case that this fatal flaw - bartering away more cattle and sheep than their economies could stand - has not been sufficiently considered by those whose historical sympathy is, understandably, with the Khoi.

But in so far as the V.O.C. were concerned, the received view about the reluctance of the Company to let the settlement expand, while at the same time insisting upon the provision of meat, is somewhat misleading. It is true that "The Company set its face against the expansion of the Colony's limits", but it is simplistic to suggest that the colonists sought freedom "... by turning their backs upon the sea". Equally, it is true that van Riebeeck, and

34. (continued from previous page) ..... was open again from 1707 to 1727. See Katzen: Op. cit., pp.208-9, and Marks: Op. cit., p.69. From the time the free burgers had been given their freedom, the sale of meat to any ships was forbidden to them. To prevent smuggling small packages of meat on board ship the slaughter of beasts was forbidden, unless specific permission had been obtained. See Moodie: Op. cit., I, p.104, (June 1657), and also p.107, pp.124/5 and pp.357/8. A similar edict preventing colonists from killing cattle without permission of the Governor was promulgated in December 1698. See Leibbrandt: Letters Despatched, 1696-1708, p.102. The clash of interest between the burgers and the officials which this illustrates was there from the earliest times as the edicts indicate. One of the first complaints of the free burgers, in their first petition of November 1658 was about this. They said that though "... we were expressly promised to be allowed to trade with the inhabitants called Hottentots, now that we are free .... that trade is forbidden .....". Moodie: Op. cit., I,p.151. The Dutch mercantile turn of mind and behavioural patterns were strong, and their purposes and aspirations clear.

35. In July 1660, one of the upstanding citizens, Herman Remanjene, was discovered to have been trading illegally with the Khoi, and he was punished. See Moodie: Op.cit.,p.254. In October of that year, Jan Zacharias was fined for bartering 4 sheep from the Chainouqua at the Duynhoop. Ibid., loc.cit.

others after him, were preoccupied with the cattle trade. But whatever the Company might have said, however constrained the Cape commanders may have felt, and however random and apparently unconnected the various aspects of the expansion of the colony may be described as having been, the fact remains that the logic of the Company's demands, and the implementation of their policies, required deeper and deeper penetration into the interior, without it necessarily entailing geographic expansion, and the officials of the Company at the Cape knew this. Local factors - namely, the colonists and their developing interests - accomplished the latter. But penetration into the interior - for cattle, gold, ivory, feathers and 'Monopotapa' for instance - was necessarily entailed, given the imperatives of V.O.C. policy and the emergent interests of the colonists. From the start, exploration and penetration - which went hand in hand - were part and parcel of the political economy of the settlement and the logic of its purposes. The arrowhead of that penetration was trade, and the pressure behind it was the V.O.C. demand for meat for the ships and garrison.

The repeated cycle of relations that was expressed through the 'trade' between the Dutch and successive Khoi hordes, or sections


38. For evidence about the belief that gold, Angola and Monomotapa were within fairly easy striking distance, see Journal, I, p.380, the entry for 22nd December, 1655. See also the "Instructions for Mr van Riebeeck . . . ." from van Goens on 16th April, 1657. Moodie: Op.cit., I, pp.97-9. van Goens had written: "I see little difficulty in penetrating from this quarter to the River of Spirito Santo, and the City of Monomotapa, to see if anything is to be done for the Company there". Ibid., loc.cit. For a full list and brief account of the various expeditions undertaken between 1655 and 1795, see M.W.Spilhaus: The Making of South Africa, Appendix, pp.399-405, and A.J.Büseken: "The Lure of Africa", passim. Wagenaar, in turn, in his Memorandum to his successors, declared that the first and foremost task of the Company was to "...endeavour to live, and trade, in peace with these tribes, at the same time and for the same purpose, to penetrate - by parties of volunteers - further and further into the interior". Moodie: Op.cit., I, pp.246-51 (My emphases, A.L.) The 'official mind' at the Cape declared itself explicitly, and from the start.
of them, had a pattern. First, trade or barter was the only way the Dutch could initially obtain cattle, and it was self-evidently the appropriate method which Dutchmen, coming from the Netherlands of the 17th century, would think of adopting. For trade was a way of life, as was shown earlier, and the pragmatic and expedient (and ruthless) search for profit was virtually stamped into the Charter of the V.O.C., and certainly characterized the expectations, norms and behaviour of its employees. So, from the start, the pressure originating with the Directors in Amsterdam, and coming down the colonial hierarchy — was on the Khoi to barter their cattle. And nothing illustrates more clearly than this how different was the Dutch conception of the purpose and form of exchange relations from that of the Khoi. Thus, secondly, the initial caution and expediency which the officials at the Cape showed in their early dealings with the 'Saldanhars' (the Cochoqua) gave way to puzzlement as to why the Khoi seemed so reluctant to trade in the kind of quantity which the Dutch expected, given the size of the herds they saw near the Fort. Puzzlement quickly gave way to irritation, as instanced in April 1655, when the Journal recorded that a group of Khbi, with plenty of cattle, had not been disposed to barter any, which was a common complaint of the Diarists. In this particular instance, the writer contemplated the time when all their cattle could be taken from them, a fate which "... they richly deserved and continue to merit by their daily conduct". Earlier the Diarist had written that "These natives do not want to part with their cattle or sheep, although they have at least 1500 or 1600 altogether. It is therefore our opinion that it would not be out of place to deprive these rogues of the cattle and to remove their persons with wives and children". 39

This shows that the Dutch simply did not understand the structure of Khoi societies, for it was almost beyond their comprehension that such people did not play the economic game according to the rules of trade. And it was accordingly with some scepticism that the Journal recorded the reason given by some Khoi for not bartering when they said that they "...could not do without their cattle as they had to live on the milk, and so forth, as others had also alleged". 40

Whether they believed it or not, relations were not improved. And the Dutch inability to grasp the nature of the relationship between the Khoi economies and their behavioural hesitance and avoidance of immediate, sustained and large-scale exchanges only exacerbated tension and the potential for conflict in that situation, which was the next phase in the cycle of relations. For as the settlement expanded onto land for the free burgers in 1657, and as both V. O. C. and free burger herds began to grow, the local Khoi struck back. The war of 1659 was not so much about cattle as it was about pasture land. 41 The Goringhaiqua (a Cochoqua offshoot), known as the 'Capemen' were primarily involved. When peace was finally made in April 1660, the Dutch - in response to the charge that they had unjustly taken Khoi pasture land - retorted and justified what they had done in terms of which Grotius would have approved. They said that the "land had ..... justly fallen to us in

40. Ibid., I, p. 314. A Dutch visitor to the Cape in 1655, Gijsbert Heeck, wrote "... cattle (as aforesaid) the inhabitants would not barter - which, because of the quantity we had seen inland, seemed to us pretty strange". Raven-Hart: Cape Good Hope, I, p. 39.

41. See Marks: Op. cit., p. 64, ff. Also Journal, III, pp. 45-197 dealing with the war period from 19th May 1659, to 6th April 1660. The hold of the V.O.C. on the Cape was never less secure than in that period. After that, however, its position was never seriously threatened again. All the key Khoi 'chiefs' and brokers - Oedasoa, Gogosa, Herry and Doman (who had been to Batavia with van Goens) were involved one way or another. The formal resolution of 19th May, 1659 declaring war on them aimed to "... capture as many cattle and men as we can". Journal, III, p. 48. Also, Spilhaus: The First South Africans, pp. 197-212. The war is described in detail by Elphick: Op. cit., pp. 165-172.
a defensive war, won by the sword, as it were, and we intended to keep it".  

It requires little effort to see how much scope there was, in this kind of situation, for misunderstanding, not to put too fine a point on it. The persistent and progressive penetration of the interior was associated with scuffles, counter-raids by Khoi and San, and retaliatory strikes by the Dutch. The behaviour of the colonists and employees of the Company in provoking Khoi counter-attacks was something which even the officials acknowledged. When the 1660 Peace was concluded the Goringhaiqua are reported in the Journal to have said ".... that the colonists and others who lived in the country had done them much mischief, by sneaking off with either a sheep or a calf on occasion, by snatching off their beads or armlets .... or by beating and striking them, without the Commander's knowledge - and there is some truth in this."  

The immediate cause of the more prolonged war of 1673-7 against the Cochoqua under Gonnema appears to have been the activities of some freemen who, with officials permission, had been on an expedition to shoot hippos "and other large game", and were themselves killed in a fight with the Cochoqua.  

But there had been a history of tension in respect of that area and that group, and the conflict that followed was

42. Journal, III, p. 196. A concise statement of grievances over this issue had been voiced much earlier, in February 1655, when Peninsula Khoi said that the Dutch "... were living upon their land and they perceived that we were rapidly building more and more as if we intended never to leave, and for that reason they would not trade with us for any more cattle, as we took the best pasture for our cattle." Journal, I, p. 292. In 1678 the 'Hottentots-Holland' region was opened up to colonists for their cattle. This can not have been reassuring to Khoi in that region. See A. J. H. van der Walt: Die Ausdehnung der Kolonie am Kap der Gutten Hoffnung, pp. 12-13.


However, the full-scale, all-out formal warfare of this kind was neither characteristic nor representative of the conditions which were associated with the penetration of the Khoi political economies. It was, in fact, the exception. It is clear, of course, that individual colonists, or parties of them, bullied and cheated Khoi where and when they could, perhaps more often when the barter trade was legalized during the periods mentioned earlier.

45. See, for instance, the discussion in MacCrone: Op. cit., pp. 60-62. An initial attack by the V.O.C. raiding party, despatched on the 12th July, netted 800 horned cattle and 900 sheep. Moodie: Op. cit., p. 330. With that level of retaliation it is not surprising the war dragged on for 4 years. A second offensive, in May 1674, by a V.O.C. force of 100 soldiers and burgers (with the aid of "250 Hottentots") cleaned out "... the greater part of the enemy's cattle, being fully 800 horned cattle and about 4000 sheep". Ibid., p. 338. Equally, it is not surprising that Gonnema and Oedasoa finally 'agreed' to a humiliating peace which included a commitment "... to deliver yearly, upon the arrival of the return fleet, 30 horned cattle". Ibid., p. 352. The loss of 1600 cattle was probably tantamount to the effective shattering of that alliance of clans under Gonnema. Shortly afterwards, Gonnema sought V.O.C. 'protection'. Another account of the war with Gonnema is in Böeseken: "The Lure of Africa", pp. 43-44. Elphick describes the sequences of this second war in detail. Elphick: Op. cit., chapter vii.

46. In 1702, the Cape government banned the cattle barter again, "... in consequence of the great and intolerable excesses of most of the freemen, who committed violence, robbery, murder - robbing the poor natives of their main subsistence which only consists of cattle, by such detestable proceedings....". Letter of 1st April, 1703 to Amsterdam. Leibbrandt: Letters Despatched, 1696-1708, p. 192. Even allowing for van der Stel's anxiety to retain the monopoly for himself and his clique - and not taking the crocodile tears too seriously - independent evidence before and after his governorship confirm that this sort of thing was common, though as we have seen, not frequently punished. For a discussion of an instance of bullying of Khoi by colonists and officials see L. Fouché: The Diary of Adam Tas, pp. 368-373.
But this, as with the wars, was the consequence not the cause of the process of pressure trading, penetration and impoverishment that defined the shift in control and command of cattle and land resources and accomplished the Khoi collapse in the face of this kind of colonialism. From the Dutch perspective, then, the trading aspect of the cycle turned rapidly into a raiding and counter-raiding pattern in roughly the following sequence. First came expeditions to locate the Khoi groups. This was followed by the establishment of some kind of edgy though amicable bartering relationship, and then, perhaps, some expression of resistance to further bartering by the Khoi. At that moment in the cycle almost any incident—offensive or disrupting to either side—could give rise to the outbreak of conflict, ranging from very localized raiding and counter-retaliation through to the full-scale 'war' as outlined above.

Then, as one Khoi group after another, over the century and beyond, was more or less cleaned out of their cattle, the Dutch were sucked deeper into the interior to establish new connections and make new alliances, and find new supplies. For it soon became clear to the officials that local hordes round the Cape stood in the way of close and (they thought) promising trade relations with other more distant but fantastic groups like the Namaqua and also the "Chamaquas, Omaquas, Atiquas, Houtuniquas and Cauquas", as they were described in the Journal.47

47. Journal, III, pp.302-3. The first statement of local ethnography and commercial relations suddenly appeared in the Journal on the 19th October, 1657. Journal, II, pp.171-2. There are hints here of more complex trading and political relationships among the groups. Herry is reported here as saying that local Khoi obtained their copper from the Namaqua, but he did not know where they got it. Ibid., II, p.185. It was only, however, in June 1658 that the officials learned about the Hancumquas (Inquas or 'Daccha Makers') who grew dagga, according to Eva. Journal, II, p.286.
Please note that pages 303-5 have been bound in the wrong order, but the pagination is correct.
often at times of scarcity, or after an outbreak of disease affecting the cattle — still went inland to supplement the herds or to provide the Company with sources of supply which were independent of the colonist herds.\textsuperscript{55} Most of the relationships established with new groups of Khoi turned bitter in the end as the hordes were impoverished of their cattle, and as the veeboere moved eastwards on to their domains. The same was true of the area directly north of the Cape. In 1724 an expedition to re-establish and improve barter connections with the Namaqua was undertaken by Rhenius. Some 200 miles north of Cape Town, near Meerkhof's Kasteel, he encountered a group who told him that for "... two successive years we had cleaned them out of all their cattle..." and they added, apparently meaning it to be threatening, that "... they were no more inclined to trade with the Company and if all their cattle were gone from them they would come and fetch cattle from the Dutch".\textsuperscript{56}

Thus even when the cattle stocks held by the colonists were substantial, as Table I indicates, the V.O.C. continued to send out expeditions to barter. In some instances this was no doubt caused

\textsuperscript{55} Leibbrandt: Journal, 1699-1732. See 18th October, 1710 (p.243); 13th September, 1711 (p.252); 14th September, 1716 (pp.269-70); 28th September, 1722 (pp.291-2); 19th September, 1725 (p.301) and 15th September, 1726 (p.303). Almost all these expeditions were undertaken in the late Spring or early summer in anticipation of the return fleet. On the fleet, see A.J. Böseken: Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse en die 18de Eeuwe Samelewing aan die Kaap, "Die Retoervloot".

\textsuperscript{56} The Journals of Brink and Rhenius, edited by E.E. Mossop, pp.138-9. They also said that "... as soon as they saw our coming (they) had taken the best of their cattle in the mountains and were disinclined to barter with us". Ibid., p.141. Defensive aggression and strategic withdrawal were combined. In the Journal and reports and letters, the new inland groups about whom the Dutch had heard but who had not been contacted, were regarded differently and discussed with respect. Once they were contacted the cycle applied to their relations with the Dutch. See Note 32 above. After 1720, the Namaqua were the main source of cattle in the trade. See Legassick: The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries, pp.107 and 126. In 1726, Khoi in the Rivierzondereind area complained about 'European' depredations, and again this happened in 1739 in the Piketberg area, the latter incident leading to the Barbier episode. Theal: History of Africa, III, p.24 and pp.43-4. Also Neumark: Op.cit., pp.95-6.
In practice, the process can be shown working itself out. In the early 1650s the exploration and penetration was rather local - they sought the 'Saldanhas' and traded with them. By the end of that decade there was urgency to make contact with the Namaquas. The 1660s brought promising barter with the small but cattle-rich Chainouquas, and then in the 1670s the group that had become a major source of cattle was the Hessequas. By the time the peace with Gonnema had been concluded, the V.O.C. was looking further East, having exhausted the supplies from the Goringhhaikas (Capemen) and the Gorachouquas (the Tobacco Thieves). By 1669 the Saldanha supplies were drying up, and interest in the Namaquas (in the north) was again being expressed, for it was believed that they were "so rich in cattle". In 1679 it was stated that "... the neighbouring Hottentots are now so impoverished of cattle..." that even had a trading party been sent to them, little would have been obtained, and the future for the trade lay in the east with the Hessequas. By 1681, van Goens could assert that "... the Company

48. See the Memo from Wagenaar to van Quaelbergen, of the 24th September,1666 in Moodie: Op.cit., pp.290–296. And van der Stel wrote to Amsterdam that there was "... a scarcity of cattle among all the neighbouring Hottentots, including Gonnema". 23rd December,1679. Ibid., p.373.

49. Ibid.,pp.303 and 305. It is likely that the V.O.C. incurred the anger of the Cochoqua under Gonnema by using the Saldanha area as a staging point to penetrate further north to the Namaqua. See the Resolution to this effect dated 10th January,1670. In Moodie: Op.cit.,I,p.305.

50. Ibid.,I,p.372. Thus Grevenbroek described the Hessequas as "the chief tribe". Once a year, he wrote, "... a merchandise of tobacco, arrack and copper necklaces, is sent to them to be profitably exchanged for cattle. The natives are agape for these articles owing to the long interval of waiting". "An Account of the Cape of Good Hope", p.109. In the previous year, the Khoi in the area as far east as the Hottentots–Holland mountains were said to be "... impoverished in respect of cattle...." and hence it was resolved to send an expedition inland to the Hessequas for a six-week bartering mission. Resolution of 26th October,1678. Moodie: Op.cit.,I,p.367,fn.1.
no longer depends so much upon the barter with the Hottentots, as was formerly the case ....". Nonetheless almost annual barter expeditions to the east were being undertaken, but by 1685 skirmishes with the Hessequas punctuated the country "... which, in former times ..... was quite safe and could be traversed without fear...". As the Hessequas lost their cattle and hostilities broke out, the Council at the Cape was already resolving to send an expedition to the Inqua, so that ".... both parties might enter into an exchange of their several articles of merchandize ...." adding that the Inqua country was very populous, and that ".... no Europeans or white people had ever been there....". In due course Ensign Schrijver set out on his expedition and, having made contact with the Inqua, learnt of yet further groups deeper inland, such as the Gonaqua ".... from whom these Inquahase Hottentots barter Dakka, which is used by them as the Indians use opium ...." and other, including the ".... Briqua, who are eaters of men....".

The process was relentless and rapid. At the same time, the balance of cattle stock being built up by the Company and the colonists was on the increase. Despite this, regular expeditions -

51. Moodie: Op.cit., I, p.380. "By 1700 the settlements between Cape Town and Tulbagh were more than capable of supplying the Company with all the vegetables, grain, fruit, wine, brandy, beef and mutton required for its garrison and ships. The main aim of the Company had thus been realized, and consequently it had no particular inclination to promote and extend colonization any further". M.H.de Kock: Op.cit., p.31.

52. Moodie: Op.cit., p.395. This illustrates the rapid degeneration of relations as the trading gave over to mutual raided.

53. Ibid., I, p.429.

by the colonist refusal to sell their cattle at the prices being offered. Thus regular Company expeditions continued through the first half of the 18th century, as Mentzel, who was at the Cape until the early 1740s, described.\footnote{At intervals of 3 or 4 years the government usually sends out a commando of about 40 to 50 European soldiers and sailors, besides a few bastard Hottentots under the command of a reliable officer .... to obtain cattle from the Hottentots in exchange for tobacco, dagga and such trifles}. By the 1770s, however, barter with the Khoi was tapering off, but was not over. "This bartering traffic", wrote Thunberg a little prematurely, but making the general point, "has now quite ceased as well in this north western as in the south eastern parts of Africa, especially since the land is well peopled, and the farmers, who abound in cattle, are now capable of delivering as many soever may be wanted".\footnote{Thunberg: Op. cit., Vol II, pp.156-7. He indicated further, however, that the next candidates for 'such traffic' would be the ".... Caffres and Namaquas, who are possessed of a great quantity of cattle, and whose lands have not hitherto suffered ...". Ibid., loc. cit. In any event, Thunberg's claim that the barter had ceased was probably a bit premature. For in 1774 Plettenberg authorised a "....journey to barter cattle", issuing "4 half-arms arrack, 240 lbs of tobacco, 100,000 copper beads and 4 gross of pipes" for the expedition to use. Moodie: Op. cit., III, p.40. The Landdrost and Heemraden (local officials) of the Swellendam district were not too hopeful of any successful trade as "...little remains to the Hottentots ....". Ibid., p.33. This was deep in the eastern Cape, north of the Gamtoos River mouth. Similar indications of impoverishment were reported from the northern Cape. See letter from Plettenberg to the Stellenbosch Landdrost, dated 14th June, 1774. Ibid., p.33.}
From the Dutch side of the trading-raiding relationship the process was thus one of purposeful, progressive inland penetration, accompanied by insistent and apparently insatiable trading pressures, considerable bullying, Khoi counter-attacks and raids on colonists and their cattle, Dutch retaliation in turn followed by Khoi withdrawal, defeat, exhaustion or submission to imposed 'peace agreements'. This in turn drew the V.O.C. further inland yet again in search of cattle supplies. The cycle bored its way on until the edges of the Nguni peoples in the east, and the Sotho in the north were reached. By the time that this happened - though contact with the Nguni had been made much earlier by expeditions which had set out for the East\textsuperscript{58a} - in a systematic way, the disintegration of the main Cape Khoi hordes had either taken place or was well advanced. The eastern-moving veebeere in the 18th century took every advantage of the situation. But as they moved into the north-eastern regions they forced fleeing and refugee Khoi up against the mountainous areas, where alliances with San precipitated ferocious resistance and counter attacks. And even though formal 'war' was rare, the use of the officially sanctioned Commando operations became widespread.\textsuperscript{59} In the second half of the

\textsuperscript{58a}. In 1702, on an expedition to the Eastern Cape, burgers with Khoi servants and helpers plundered 2000 cattle and 2500 sheep from the Inqua. Elphick: Op. cit., p. 289. This episode is referred to again later where it illustrates a different point.

\textsuperscript{59}. In December/January, 1715/1716 official permission was granted to Jacob Mostert to get up a commando to regain 36 oxen stolen by 'Bushmen'. Leibbrandt: Requesten, II, p. 733. This is an early example of many such instances. See also Marks: Op. cit., pp. 70-1. Earlier than this Johan Schreyer who was at the Cape between 1668 and about 1674 observed this process and described it succinctly, thus: "They (the 'natives') have indeed many times tried to resist the newcomers, namely the Dutch, but since they have no such equipment as the Europeans they have usually been defeated, and must surrender to the enemy and suffer the loss of some hundred oxen and sheep." From his Neue-Ost-Indiansche Beschreibung, 1679, in Raven-Hart: Cape Good Hope, I, p. 131.
18th century there were periods in the north-east of the
Stellenbosch and Swellendam districts - the area which later became
Graaff-Reinet in 1786 - when an almost permanent state of war
existed. But this was not so to the west and south.

In turning to examine the character of the Khoi side of
the relationship, one thing is clear. If the Dutch side of the
relationships exhibited a single-minded and purposive deep trading
offensive, backed by military and other means, the Khoi hordes
responded with more ambiguity and divisive variation. But at the
centre, the analysis of their decline can, in large measure, be
approached in terms of the manner in which they responded, and
succumbed, to inducements and to the trading pressure in its various
forms.

The first thing that needs however to be emphasized, and
then put aside and borne in mind, is that the Khoi and later the
San did resist, and at different times did so fiercely. The
conventional view that the colonial advance was only marginally
hindered until the Nguni and Sotho were reached has been corrected
in recent years. 60 But, despite the war of 1659 (when the V.O.C.
presence at the Cape was almost ended), the war of 1673-7, the
coercive and bullying tactics, and the systematic use of commandos

60. Marks: Op.cit.. She argues that the "... complex range of
responses of the Khoikhoi ...." included collaboration and
resistance. This is a useful corrective, but my argument is of
a related but different kind. It starts with the Khoi social
structure and political economy and I argue that its loose and
relatively precarious nature hindered wider and more effective
alliances of resistance, made penetration and division of the
hordes and the interior easier, and hence accelerated their
disintegration, despite the resistance which some groups put up.
The simplicity of Khoisan social organization may have made
adaptability and change possible, Marks argues. I argue that
the simplicity placed severe constraints on adaptation and
change, and accounts primarily for their collapse, in the face
of various inducements, pressures and offensives.
by the Dutch, it is too easy and too comfortable to explain Khoi decline in those terms alone, or even largely in terms of those factors. Nor is it sufficient to indicate the technological gap that gave such considerable fire-power advantage to the Dutch in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries. And it is simply not the case that the Khoi were reluctant and defiantly unwilling partners in the barter trade, as we shall see. On the question of resistance, there can be little doubt that the most systematic and sustained phase of this was in the second half of the 18th century; there is nothing in the earlier period that compares to it, though there had been conflict and fighting. 60a The last-ditch character, it seems, of the fighting between the Khoisan resisters and the veeboere communities (including the often well-armed Khoi and 'Bastaard' members of the commandos) ran right across the northern and especially the north-eastern edges of the colony, and even beyond the formal 'boundaries'. In the Roggeveld, Bokkeveld, Hantam, Nieuweveld, Camdebo, Sneeuwberg and Bruintjes Hoogte areas, the fighting increased steadily and systematically through the second half of the 18th century, reaching its peak in the 1770s and after. Theal's accounts of the escalation and violence of the period after 1730 makes grim reading. 60b In a series of co-ordinated

60a. San groups were involved in systematic attacks on the cattle of farmers in the North between 1701-1703. The areas hardest hit were round Riebeeck's Kasteel and the Piketberg. Khoi cattle were also seized, and commandos moved against the attackers "...on behalf of the Hottentots". Theal: Op.cit.,II,pp.414-6; and Leibbrandt: Letters Received,1695-1708, from Stellenbosch to Cape, dated 13th March,1701.

60b. "The Hottentots broke down undramatically and simply". De Kieweit: Op.cit.,p.20. That kind of view has been challenged by Marks: Op.cit.,p.71,ff. Her useful survey of the history of this period shows this clearly and decisively. Also, for some of the more bloody details, see Theal: Op.cit.,III,p.45,ff,p.81, and p.188,ff. Many farmers were forced to abandon their farms or cattle outposts. Here Theal refers to raids by Khoisan resisters - and no doubt also groups which were near to starvation - between

(continued on next page).....
commando retaliatory strikes, for instance, in 1774 alone, some were
500 'Bushmen' (as they/called in the official reports) were shot
and killed and 239 taken prisoner.\textsuperscript{60c} It has been estimated that
in the decade between 1785 and 1795 some 2500 'Bushmen' were
killed and 669 taken prisoner.\textsuperscript{60d} Nothing in the 17th century
or the first half of the 18th century matched that.

It is of course not possible to be certain about the
precise composition of the groups which resisted the penetration
and expansion across that range of space and time. They are usually
referred to in the literature as 'Bosjeman-Hottentotte'. They may
have been San; they may have been cattle-less Khoi, or combinations
of both - in warfare their methods were the same. They raided
cattle-stations and farms, slaughtered (or maimed) stock, drove off
cattle and sheep and attacked \textit{veeboere} families and their dependants.
The resistance was fierce. There may be a \textit{prima facie} case, as a
rough rule of thumb based on the previous analysis of the differences
between the Khoi cattle-culture and the San hunter-gatherer culture,

\textsuperscript{60b.} (continued from previous page).... 1754-1763 in the Roggeveld
and in the Bokkeveld. In the 1760s, there were attacks in the
Zak River area, and in May 1770 near present day Beaufort West.
Also, see Marais: \textit{The Cape Coloured People}, pp.16-30.
Many years later, George Thompson was told in the Roggeveld
area by a farmer who had been involved in many commando
operations against the Khoisan that ".... a great number had
been shot and their children carried into the Colony. On one
of the expeditions, not less than two hundred Bushmen had been
massacred". George Thompson: \textit{Travels and Adventures in

\textsuperscript{60c.} "Report of Field-Commandant Nicolaas van der Merwe ...." in
Moodie: \textit{Op.cit.},III,pp.35-7, and \textit{passim}. Also, Walker: \textit{A

\textsuperscript{60d.} G.E.Cory: \textit{The Rise of South Africa},I, pp.19-20. Also,
p.39.
for assuming that, where the resisting group kept the cattle they had driven off and tried to build up herds from them, they were remnants or refugees from Khoi hordes which had collapsed and retreated and re-grouped. Conversely, as was often the case, where the cattle were subsequently found by commandos (or so they said) to have been quickly slaughtered, and eaten, it is possible that the core of the groups were San. But it seems to have been the case, as Marks suggests, that Khoisan alliances - between groups with both Khoi and San antecedents - were common, though ad hoc. Some escaped slaves and Khoi servants joined these groups too.

The rugged mountains into which they retreated made for quite appalling methods of brutality to flush them out of caves and kloofs. Prisoners were taken too - mainly women and children - and they were distributed as servants to the members of the commando. This illustrates another manner in which scarce labour was secured on the periphery, where of course there was only a handful of slaves. 60e

Even as the fighting raged in those areas in the second half of the 18th century, barter arrangements and expeditions continued to be organized with groups nearer the coast. In the same year as the combined commando operations of 1774, the Swellendam Landdrost requested ".... for the trade for the Hottentots, 200,000 Amsterdam copper beads, 504 lbs of tobacco and 338 cans of arrack". 60f

This resistance must be seen as a constant background to what follows here. Over the extremities of the colony, at different


60f. Ibid.,III,p.39. Letter from Landdrost of Swellendam to Governor Plettenberg, 20th November,1774.
places and at different times from the mid-17th century to the late 18th century, a combination of features was present in the trading-raiding relationship. Barter and withdrawal, attack and defence, accommodation and submission, as well as submission and incorporation — these all defined the process on ever widening arcs of the colony. But — and this is the central strand of the argument which follows — they expressed, in different forms and ways, the conditions and consequences associated with the fundamental thrust of colonialism through the trading and commodity penetration by the V.O.C. of the Khoi economies, and the geographical expansion of the colonists which followed, and sometimes (later) even led this process.

The apparent speed with which successive Khoi groups disintegrated, though not usually without a phase of struggle, can only be satisfactorily explained in terms of the precarious nature of their transhumant economies relative to the new pressures on them, and the looseness of their political organization. In asking why and how the Dutch were able — despite the wars of 1659 and 1672-7 — to gain decisive control and supremacy so quickly, thus establishing bridgehead after bridgehead into the interior, the answer must turn on structural factors first and foremost.

Two questions of a general kind will serve as a basis for examining the Khoi side of the trading-raiding relationship. First, what features of the political economy, social structure and ecology of the Khoi (as analyzed in the previous chapter) made those societies particularly vulnerable to this sustained offensive of the V.O.C.? Secondly, and related to this, why do some Khoi groups appear to have traded off really quite substantial numbers of cattle and sheep in return for non-productive barter goods?
The character of the variable and ambiguous Khoi response may be illustrated in the following ways. On the one hand there is enough evidence to indicate that various groups at different times and in different places responded quite positively - and with a shrewd sense of value in their own terms - to the opportunity to exchange cattle and sheep for metal pieces, beads, arrack and tobacco. On the other hand, resistance to V.O.C. and colonist pressure was, in general, by a succession of small groups and rarely involved any serious alliances or large-scale bonding for defensive or offensive purposes. Moreover, the internal disputes within and between hordes and sections of them which was in part (and only in part) a consequence of the corrosive effects which the barter goods had on intra- and inter-horde relations, must also be seen as part of the overall structural context of the 'response'. The explanation for the above may be located in the loose 'federal' socio-political structures of the hordes themselves, which rendered them vulnerable to penetration, division and disintegration. Why was this so?

The 'fissiparous tendency', outlined in the previous chapter gave considerable autonomy to the patricians and their heads. Taken with the transhumant way of life and mode of production, primarily for use, not exchange, it meant that horde unity was

61. Stow suggests that "... there does not appear to have been a single tribe or clan capable of bringing two or three thousand men into the field". Native Races of South Africa, p.246. Though that may seem to represent a sizeable military force, their arms were relatively feeble compared with the Dutch guns. The fact also that they had to move with and protect their cattle must have seriously limited the form of their resistance. The figure Stow gives may be an exaggeration anyway.

structurally difficult to establish and even harder to maintain.
Given the presence at the Cape of an abundance of barter goods - and
the penetration of the interior by traders - individual clans and
clan-heads were able to establish independent relations with
Dutchmen, officials or colonists. No doubt some clans 'favoured'
barter more than others, and perhaps those that did were in a
position to support a higher level of exchange than those who did not.
Nevertheless, by bartering off their 'surplus', any group must have
weakened itself and brought it closer to the edge of decline in
status and wealth as a corporate group, hence establishing the prime
condition for fission. It is important to stress here that within
societies of this segmentary kind, the role of the individual clans,
or clan and/or family heads was decisive. For the structure gave
scope for such individuals, or groups of individuals involved in
decision making about such matters, to take decisions about the
exchange of beasts (in this instance), the consequences of which
could have been disastrous. The 'individual's role' in historical
change is, in the final analysis, given room or constrained by its
structural context. For beyond a certain point in barter relations
the vulnerability of a section or a horde increased dramatically.
And once the herd size was reduced by decisions of that kind, other
factors - drought, disease, inter-clan or inter-horde conflict and
raiding - would have tipped the group in question to the edges of
survival, as a group. They would, broadly speaking, have had three
options open to them. They could have fallen back on hunting and
gathering; or, they could have broken up and sought temporary client
status with a better-endowed group; or, they would have perished.

The sudden implosion, into the loose and fractious network
of political and economic relationships within and between hordes, of
a quite substantial supply of barter goods like copper, brass, beads, liquor, etc., must have been very tempting indeed to Khoi. For, within their frame of values, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, these items ranked high in terms of their preferences, for decorative purposes and limited exchanges. The pumping of such goods into that system of relations also severely sharpened rivalries, and initially created considerable opportunities for the brokerage skills of the likes of Herry and Doman, which in turn underlined the divisions. Liquor and tobacco soon, too, became popular as items of consumption, and not in any sense as exchange goods.

The point to emphasize here is not simply or solely that they idly bartered away their cattle for 'baubles', but the character of the exchanges involved, and the consequences. The analysis of such exchanges across sharply discontinuous cultural lines and between two radically contrasting systems of production with differing norms and purposes and distinct hierarchies of value, is technically in economics a complex matter. But what seems clearly to have been the case in this instance is that, by any comparative

62a. As an example of the sheer volume of the commodities being pumped into the interior, consider what was taken by one expedition "for purchasing livestock" in February, 1658. They had 660 lbs brass, 75 lbs tobacco, and 3 gross pipes. Journal, II, p. 238. In 1655 Wintervogel had only taken 6 lbs of brass and 6 lbs of tobacco. Ibid., I, p. 301. The 1659 expedition to the Namaqua took, inter alia, cloth, earings, bracelets, chains, beads, brass bells, hundreds of needles, copper plate, brass, copper, wine, tobacco. "They are to find out if any of these commodities are in demand". Ibid., III, p. 14. My emphasis, A.L. A similar volume of barter goods - on 5 oxen - including spades, choppers and pick-axes accompanied the 1661 expedition to the Namaqua. Ibid., III, p. 328. And although the 'price' of cattle was being hiked up by the Khoi and the enterprising brokers, it is not difficult to image what impact this kind of volume of goods was having. See below, note 64.
reckoning, that exchange of cattle and sheep for bits of copper and brass etc., was a highly unequal and destructive one. The almost suicidal character of such exchanges on any scale, for the Khoi, and the unequal nature of the exchange is demonstrated by pointing out two things. First, the reverse process (Khoi successfully obtaining back cattle and sheep from the Dutch in return for such barter items) is unthinkable: it could not have happened. To that extent, the Dutch were effectively getting something for almost nothing.\textsuperscript{63} The Khoi, on the other hand, were bartering away the very core of their socio-economic systems and hence the basis for clan or horde autonomy. We know, secondly, that metal pieces had exchanged for dagga in the inland trade, but there is no serious evidence to indicate that cattle or sheep on any large scale were being obtained by this means by Khoi from other groups, or from the Xhosa or Sotho. The Sotho had supplied metal bits and the Xhosa had supplied dagga. In fact, there is very little evidence of a substantial or compensating trade in cattle amongst the groups in the pre-colonial period, though other items did exchange at the margins, as we have seen.

Thus, without the Khoi being able to replenish their stocks of cattle and sheep by exchanging the things (or some of them) which they got from the Dutch with other groups further inland, who were not or could not get in touch directly with the Dutch, their economic systems were edged to the point of dissolution. And we

\textsuperscript{63.} In his account of trading expeditions to the Hessequas, Ten Rhyne advised that "..... care must be taken not to let them see the supply of merchandise; otherwise our men would be in instant peril of death". Ten Rhyne: "An Account ....." \textit{Op.cit.}, p.137.
also know that barter of that kind and for those things (cattle and sheep) was no central part of Khoi economic life. They did not breed cattle for a 'market'. Prior to the advent of the V.O.C. at the Cape, barter was in any event peripheral to their economic life, and its existence should in no way be taken as central to their mode of production. More centrally, the structure of Khoi social organization, communal familial ownership of the herds and the principles governing distribution and the regulation of political life, effectively precluded the systematic exchange of collectively held goods (crucial for the survival of a group) for individually consumed or enjoyed 'luxury' items. Once that process commenced in anything more than a marginal form, its effects were shattering on the whole structure of Khoi society, and dissolved the normative bonds which sustained it.

The trading-raiding offensives by the V.O.C. and the colonists thus penetrated and corroded deep into the structures and relationships within and between Khoi hordes. What it did was to create enough 'demand' for barter goods to upset a potentially precarious and loosely-slung socio-economic, political and ecological balance. In the process it sharpened rivalries, tempted, dazzled, and divided clans, thus initiating - or perhaps hastening? - intra- and inter-horde warfare. From the Khoi side of the relationship, therefore, their inability to collaborate in widespread or systematic defence or attack, the opening up of new and bitter rivalries and divisions within and between them, the corrosive effects of 'commoditization' (rather than 'monetization') on social cohesion and economic life, all stem from their inability to fuse into more effective alliances in the face of the penetration of their
The preceding analysis depends on evidence of three related kinds. First, it needs to be shown that successive Khoi groups did barter quite large numbers of their herds, and not only under duress. Moreover, many groups only resisted when a certain low level in their stocks was reached, and/or when the Dutch or other Khoi herds increased or trespassed on their pasturage. This may be seen as revealing that the 'moment' when resistance commenced was relatively late (and perhaps too late?) in the trading cycle and thus came to define the start of the raiding, counter-raiding and resistance phases of the relationship. Secondly, it is important to show that from quite early on the Dutch barter goods were penetrating along the thin lines of inland exchanges and that, in consequence of this, some interior groups were lured or enticed

64. In the previous chapter it was suggested that the process of corrosion and decay was analogous to the effects of 'monetization' in the 'underdevelopment' of African economies in more recent times. In the case of the Khoi the process was achieved by barter commodities, not money. Elsewhere in Africa the forcing of people into the labour market was achieved by various measures, including the imposition of taxes. It is therefore interesting to find Mentzel referring to the barter at the Cape as ".... more like a tax levied on the nearest Hottentot kraals under the pretext of trade". Mentzel: Op.cit., III,p.123. My emphasis,A.L. Though the analogy is loose and the term clumsy, 'commoditization' conveys in some respects the essence of the process of corrosion of Khoi economies by the penetration of unproductive Dutch commodity goods. In some respects the consequences were more disastrous: elsewhere money could at least be exchanged back for food, and was. It does not seem to have been the case that barter goods were exchanged further inland for much other than dagga, and not enough cattle to maintain economic viability. The Dutch are unlikely to have given anything back for copper or beads. But they took on impoverished Khoi as labourers, so the effect seems remarkably similar. All of this helped to reduce the Khoi to dependency and hastened their incorporation in the colonial economy.
into the barter relationship, which in turn drew the Dutch deeper inland to make contact with groups such as these about whom they heard, and vice-versa. Finally, on the Khoi side of the relationship, it must be shown that one of the critical major consequences of all this was sharpened friction between and within hordes, and that, as their impoverishment and hence their decline proceeded, inter-Khoi raiding increased and that refugees from the disintegration which ensued were pulled into the colonial economy by the undertow created.

What then is the evidence that can be assembled under the first head: about the volume of Khoi barter with the Dutch at various times and places? It has been suggested by Schapera that the Khoi were guilty of "reckless trading". Others have challenged the view that "..... the Khoi 'willingly' bartered away their cattle for 'mere baubles'....", but assert that in the end they "..... literally acculturated themselves out of existence". It will be clear from what has been said above that the argument here is that the former process was a condition of the latter, and that historically they were deeply implicated with each other, though sequentially the loss of their means of independent existence preceded or was associated with their incorporation in colonial society.

The commitment to penetrate inland by the V.O.C. to establish contacts and trade was not only initiative being taken in respect of those relationships in the early days. Indeed, during

the first decade most of the barter was done in and around the Table Bay by Khoi who brought cattle to exchange for barter goods. 67

In that first decade, and more, groups were arriving - often unexpectedly - at the fort, and they came with sizeable herds, though they rarely bartered large numbers. For example, in November, 1657 a Chainoqua 'chief' ".... arrived at the fort with 100 men and 71 head of cattle ....." and after a few hours ".... all their cattle were bought from them ....." 68 In general, however, the numbers of cattle exchanged at any one time in the 1650s were not as substantial as they later became. 69

67. If we are to believe the documents, it is quite evident that this aspect of the relationship was there also. Curiosity about the Dutch too, no doubt, brought Khoi to the Fort. A Chainoqua group ".... none of whom had ever been at the Fort ....." appeared on the 16th December, 1657. According to the Journal, at any rate, they ".... had come to see what sort of people the Hollanders were ..... they promised also to bring us much cattle". Journal, II, p. 193. Presumably, all this communication was being done via Herry, who was described as ".... a broker for other natives of the interior .....". Ibid., loc.cit.

Herry's skills as a broker are well known. His popularity with the V.O.C. ebbed and flowed directly in proportion to his success in bringing new contacts and generous supplies. In June, 1655, for example, the Journal recorded official gratitude and satisfaction to him ".... who knows how to conduct the trade to our contentment, and how to earn his brokerage". Ibid., I, p. 325. Clearly at an early stage they recognized and approved of a successful middle-man. But when he got in their way, they turned on him. See Elphick: Op.cit., pp. 148-165.


69. Prior to the 1660s the numbers were always small. For example, 3 cows and 4 sheep in October 1652; 29 cattle and 32 sheep in January 1653; 3 cows in November 1654; 26 cattle in June 1655; 67 cows and 12 sheep in July 1655; 16 cattle and 20 sheep in November 1655 and 66 cattle in December 1657; in 1658 the trade remained limited and patchy as tension built up towards the war of 1659, though contact with the Chainoqua was promising. In 1660 as peace negotiations began, trade picked up again. It is likely that not only did those who were in conflict with the V.O.C. not barter, but others further inland would not trespass over the land of Cape Khoi, and did not want to risk their herds by moving towards the fort. In January 1660, 20 sheep were obtained from the 'Saldanhar' Cochoqua and similar numbers through the year.
In the early 1660s however van Riebeeck was exuberant in reporting a "flourishing trade" with the Chainouqua, including a single exchange for some 83 cattle and 71 sheep. Thus by 1662, he was able to inform his successor that the Company had a good and constant trade with the Cochoqua sections under both Gonnema and Oedasoa, and that the Chainouqua and Hessqua would shortly be coming to the Cape. Earlier he had explained the lack of success in contacting other inland groups by informing the Directors that groups like the Chainouqua had ".... a great distance to travel, and having to travel slowly with their cattle, cannot reach us so soon, as we had supposed or as we had understood them to have promised ....". But as the 1660s wore on the barter with the Chainouqua was sustained, and on Wagenaar's departure in 1666 he described them as "our good friends". The relationship led later to friction with the Cochoqua under Oedasoa, as we shall see.


71. Another instance of Khoi bringing cattle to the fort - and there are many other instances which replicate the point - was recorded on 6th November 1660, when "... some of Gonnema's people brought 19 sheep and 6 cattle to the fort". Journal, II, p.280. Within 13 years the relationship between Gonnema and the V.O.C. had deteriorated into a prolonged war. Wouter Schouten, in 1665, observed that "... the Hottentots" continually "... bring all sorts of beasts from their neighbours in the Sardaigne Bay and from the southerly regions of Monomotapa, for sale with the people in the Table Bay ....". Raven-Hart: Op.cit., I, p.14.

72. van Riebeeck to Amsterdam, in Moodie: Op.cit., I, p.244. This may of course have been optimistic or misinformed. He may also have been trying to cheer himself up. But the other evidence confirms that some inland groups did want to come south to contact the Dutch.

73. Wagenaar to Amsterdam, on the 16th May, 1666. Moodie: Op.cit., I, p.281. To van Quaelbergen, Wagenaar wrote: "For the last six years we have begun to be acquainted with the tribes who live to the eastward, named the Chainouquas, and we have always lived in perfect friendship with them, as we still do". Ibid., I, p.293. Their main 'demand' was for tobacco, it seems.
Even allowing for misunderstanding, communication blockages, distortion and generous embellishment for the benefit of the Hoeren at home, the sheer arithmetic of barter deals - confirmed or observed by travellers at the Cape or sometimes by visiting Commissioners - indicates that from the 1670s onwards the numbers of cattle being exchanged were increasing, as were V.O.C. and colonist stocks. Since the officials were quick to point out 'offences' against them or the colonists by the Khoi (or San), the absence of mention of attacks by Khoi may be taken as evidence of relatively peaceful barter. It is evidence that Khoi groups were bartering in substantial numbers, and that trading relationships with the cattle-rich Hessequa (and later Inqua) had not yet degenerated into raiding and conflict. For example, with the Hessequa alone, in the 1670s, the numbers of cattle and sheep obtained were high. Individual deals with them through the decade yielded numbers of cattle such as 178 (in 1672), 256 (in 1673), 239 (in 1676), 164 (in 1677), 142 (in 1678), 100 (in 1679) and 250 (in 1681). Over the same period the numbers of sheep obtained increased from 375 in one of the 1672 visits to 1000 in 1681. While Marks is right to correct the impression that the Khoisan gave little or no resistance, and to point to their unwillingness to trade beyond a certain point, nevertheless internal evidence in her article confirms that the volume of bartered cattle was considerable. "Thousands of sheep and hundreds of head of cattle were bartered for iron, copper, beads, arrack and tobacco". But even this seriously underestimates the number exchanged. A count of some numbers recorded from the barter with the

Hessequas alone suggests at least 1332 head of cattle between 1672 and 1683. In 1677 The Directors praised the Cape Governor for having obtained, "... near Mossel Bay, upwards of 900 cattle and sheep before the arrival of the return fleet". 76 Ten Rhyne described the Hessequa as being "... agape for these articles" (the barter goods) which were "... profitably exchanged for cattle". 77 Again, in 1683 Amsterdam noted with approval that 669 head of cattle and 2374 sheep had been obtained in three visits during one year from "..... the east of Africa". 78

Expeditions during the first quarter of the 18th century (see note 55, above) netted good numbers too. For example, the figure of 288 head of cattle obtained on one 1716 mission was not unusually high. 78 In 1707, the trader, Hartog, returned from one of his frequent trips with 220 oxen and 242 sheep. 79

Taken thus as one dimension of the trading-raiding syndrome, it would be unwise to argue that there was systematic and principled unwillingness of Khoi to barter, just as it would be unwise to ignore the coercion and bullying tactics by the V.O.C. and colonist commandos, official and unofficial. There was pressure, there was resistance, there was raiding, but there also is evidence of substantial and suicidally high levels of barter by Khoi groups - levels which no clan or family or horde can for long have been able to sustain, and hence they were bound to have been weakened, at least,

77. Ten Rhyne: Op.cit.,p.109. The Hessequas, he said, though 150 miles away "agree in their habits with those who are regularly settled at the Cape of Good Hope".
78. Leibbrandt: Journal,1699-1732,pp.269-70. There must have been some double counting, but not enough to alter the significance of the numbers.
79. Ibid., p.140.
as a result of this. Being thus weakened, they were vulnerable to attack, drought, disease or raiding by other Khoi, or colonists. Certainly their capacity to attach clients would have been seriously reduced and the overall prestige and power of a family, clan or horde undermined. The explanation for how such a loss of cattle came about - that is, the structural looseness of the hordes and the patricians - is supported by this kind of evidence. Thus when small groups of Cochoqua, for example, so often mentioned in the Journal as having come to the Fort or as having been met and contacted a short distance inland, are described, it is likely that these groups were in fact small, relatively autonomous clans, or sections of hordes, making independent deals. Later evidence from the Mossel Bay area and further afield confirms that impression. Thus it was by this

80. In April, 1655, Jan Wintervogel and a party travelled 50 miles inland. Here "they had also found some Saldanhars - as they called themselves - in several parties, some 15 or 16, others of 20 or 30, tolerably but not abundantly supplied with cattle, and a certain band about 15 or 16 miles from here, approximately 70 to 80 men strong, with countless numbers of cattle and sheep...". Journal, II, p. 305. My emphases, A.L. In June, 1657 some free burgers came across "two encampments about 5 or 600 in number". They bartered a few head, but were told that "... the right Saldanhars lay about 12 days' journey further, and that towards the dry season they were likely to come with cattle enough....". Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 103. The Hessequas were distributed in the 1670s in quite a substantial area from Mossel Bay to 'Botte River'. Ibid., I, pp. 321-372. In 1669 Ensign Schryver described finding three Hessequa kraals at Lange Kloof and "... some of them came and bartered to us (a few) cattle .....". Ibid., I, p. 439. Dapper, whose work was apparently based on the anonymous Klare end Korte Besgryvings van het land aan Cabo de Bona Esperanca (Amsterdam, 1652) said of the Cochoquas that they lived in "... fifteen or sixteen different villages about a quarter of an hour's distance from each other.... Each village consists of thirty, thirty-six, forty or fifty huts, more or less, all placed in a circle a little distance apart". Dapper: Op. cit., p. 23. And as early as 1666 even Wagenaar noted that the 'Hottentots' "... within a space of 40 or 50 mylen to the east and north of this African Cape .... are in the habit of wandering from one place to another with their cattle (and) .... are divided into 9 hordes (geslachten) or (continued on next page)...

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means that the volume of barter goods was filtered, unevenly, into different levels and segments of the hordes and this in turn must have established disruptive rivalries and jealousies. No horde chief, or clan head - given the loose political structure of the Khoi societies - could have prevented or vetoed such deals, and the consequences of loss of cattle and sheep above a certain critical level must have radically altered internal structures and relationships. It is a pity that we have no single example of the process in all its details, but there can be little doubt, given our knowledge of the structure and shape of those societies, that this is what happened when barter goods arrived. And the overall loss of cattle meant that, in time, the ability of impoverished Khoi to become clients and thereby re-establish a herd, was systematically foreclosed upon. There thus remained three possibilities: to flee, in

80. (continued from previous page).... assemblages of Families, or rather villages, or members of the same kraal". Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 291. On the expedition to the Inqua in 1689, Schryver expresses precisely the practice of making widespread deals with lesser clan or family heads when he reported that on one day "Captain Hykon (the 'king') held a council in his kraal, therefore he was not with us once during the day (which we passed in bartering notwithstanding)". Ibid., I, p. 437. My emphases, A.L. The interesting thing about Schryver's mission is that in addition to these instances of peaceful barter, he gives an account of a fight with some 'Hougliqua Hottentots' (the description of whom is not at all clear) in which having ".... knocked down 30 of them" with a "general volley", "... we took possession of their cattle". Ibid., p. 438. Willing barter, divisive barter with sub-clans and detached segments, and coercive theft by the Dutch were all part of this particular expedition's experience. It illustrates the overall process in general, combining all the features at once. Moreover the often quite clear observations of the different groups and kraals which are described above in some of the extracts in this note suggest that, given an awareness of the segmentary nature of the hordes, individual initiatives to trade with each were very likely to have been taken. The Dutch appear to have understood less about the internal relations of Khoi society.
desperation and hunger, inland; to form ad hoc defensive and offensive alliances with other cattle-less groups or San; or to seek food by working for the Dutch doing odd jobs at first and becoming herders later.

In the light of an analysis of the structural vulnerability of the Khoi to the temptations and consequences of such barter, along with the other pressures on them, the decline, decay and collapse of the hordes appears thus as less random and more explicable. An attempt to answer why the barter items ranked so high in their preferences, and why they seem to have risked so much in order to get them will be looked at shortly. Now, the second kind of evidence that supports the analysis above needs to be examined briefly.

The question that needs to be put is this. What evidence is there to show that the Dutch barter goods were being moved along the slim but effective exchange routes into the interior, and thus enticing Khoi groups there to establish some kind of contact with the Cape, or drawing the Dutch out into specific directions towards specific groups?

There can be little doubt that the Dutch stumbled into a rudimentary and tenuous network of political and economic connections, and that such a network effectively conveyed information deep inland about the availability of barter goods, and also conveyed information back to the Dutch about the groups that were anxious to make connections with them. From the earliest days, if the Dutch documents are to be believed, Khoi groups were interested in the new arrivals at the Cape. Likewise, the Dutch were able to utilize the networks to feed information and 'samples' through to the interior, however blindly and gropingly they must initially have perceived the demographic lay-out to be. For instance, on the 20th April 1653,
twelve head of cattle were bartered
from other natives who live further inland but are clad
similarly to those who had been here before. They said
they had come because they had seen the Saldanhars
returning with so much copper and had also understood
from them that there were people living here (meaning
us Netherlanders) who had more copper. (81)

They hinted too that as soon as others heard, they would come south too.

In advertising their presence, the V.O.C. seems to have
found Herry's broker role to be useful and he cleverly used for
personal gain the manoeuvrability which access to Dutch goods gave
him. He may well have been able to persuade relatively close groups
to come down to barter, or not. It is likely, moreover, that when
he or Doman or Eva promised, or set off to establish, links with
inland groups, they made contact with individual clan or family heads,
rather than more senior chiefs. 82 In the case of Eva we know that
her sister was one of the wives of Oedasoa. He was a 'captain' of
one of the main Cochoqua hordes and the Dutch were clearly excited
about the possibilities of trade which this particularly advantageous
connection might provide. 83


82. Herry's skills and cunning as a broker - which he was actually
called in the Journal - are well known, but in support of the
point here, consider the following entry dated 27/28th
November, 1654, which reads: "... we have bartered 2 head of
cattle from new natives, but always with the oft-mentioned
allies of Herry in attendance, who appear to act the part of
brokers ...." Journal, I, pp. 273-4. What was meant by 'new
natives'? A new horde or alliance of clans or a clan?

on Herry, Doman and Eva, and their role and connections.
It was via links of this kind that information and barter goods flowed inland to the hordes, and information about them and their interests flowed back to the Fort. The Dutch became involved in a network of connections which drew Khoi groups south to them and which lured the Dutch deeper and deeper into the area, as we have seen. It is in this wider sense that the Cape can be seen as a "centre of diffusion" as Harinck describes it. 84 Herry was active in all this. In 1655 he offered to take copper inland some 30 miles and to initiate barter with un-named groups there. The Company agreed, and he disappeared for some months, to return with a rather meagre supply. 85 By the late 1650s the Dutch were beginning to get a sense of the political and economic geography of the hordes and were persuaded that if copper were given to the Goringhaika they would in turn be able to exchange it for more cattle further inland, though this never seems to have happened in practice. 86 At the same time the Dutch soon learnt about the Hancumquas (Inquas) from Eva. She alleged that the Goringhaika were harbouring some runaway slaves and would pass them further along the network "... to the Hancumquas living far inland from here, and cultivating the soil in which they grow daccha ...". 87 And in October 1657 the first ethnography of

84. Harinck: Op.cit.,p.164. Wider, because more than commodities were being distributed. Information, rumours, appeals, deals, invitations and requests were filtering back and forth.

85. Journal, I, pp.336-340. He left on 7th September and only returned in early December, having only brought 13 cattle. The Dutch were suspicious about what he'd been up to, during his absence. 'Klaas' made a similar offer in July 1672, saying he'd go inland to barter if the V.O.C. gave him brass, tobacco and beads. The Company agreed and gave him small quantities of trade goods. Moodie: Op.cit., I, p.321.


87. Ibid., II, pp.286-288.
the different groups appeared in the Journal. Within a few years further evidence of a connection between the Cape and the Inqua was provided when Eva claimed that they would be sending cattle to the Fort via the Chainouqua. In the same year, 1660, a visit by some freemen to the 'king' of the Chainouqua revealed that he had close links with the inland Inqua who "... make a living by keeping cattle and planting the valuable herb dacha ....". Two of the Chainouqua returned to the Fort with the freemen where they were entertained and given presents. Officials hoped that, somehow, the 9 bunches of red beads, six bars of brass, a small mirror, six pipes and 1½ lbs of tobacco would be carried deep inland and would so favourably impress their 'king' that ".... when the countryside was drier and their lords came closer we would comply with their proposal of regular traffic between our people and theirs with merchandise and cattle". The first direct contact with the Namaqua has already been referred to and thus the Dutch and the Namaqua will have become roughly familiar with each other's preferences and offerings, if they were not already well informed by this quite lively intelligence system that served them both.

88. Ibid., pp.170-2. The first statement of local ethnography and commercial relations appeared suddenly in the Journal on 29th October, 1657. See Journal, II, pp.171-2. There are hints in this of a more complex trading and political relationship amongst the groups. (It was only later, however, in June 1658, that the officials learnt about the 'Hancumquas' (Inqua or 'Daccha makers') who grew dagga, according to Eva. Ibid., p.286). They also learned that the Cape Khoi got beads ("which that nation made and sold"), copper and cattle from the Namaqua. Ibid., II, p.185.

89. Journal, III, p.205. Then in December 1660, the V.O.C. learned directly from (a presumably drunken) Soeswa, the Chainouqua chief, about the cattle-rich Hancumquas and the internal dagga and cattle trade. Ibid., III, pp.302-3.


It is not surprising that by 1672 there was some evidence of the internal market actually being saturated with copper and brass if one considers the volume of these commodities which had been pumped into it over the previous twenty years. Expeditions were suspended (but not for long) on the grounds that ".... the Hottentots are oversupplied with copper and tobacco, and will only part with inferior cattle at enormous prices." But if the Dutch side of the initiative faltered temporarily, by the late 1680s the Inqua sent an emissary direct to the Fort seeking, in 1687, to "... open communication with the Commander", and within a year of that visit Schryver's expedition to them had been despatched, with much success.

92. Theal: Abstracts, dated 4th March 1670. The same anxiety was expressed in a resolution of 5th March. Moodie: Op.cit.,I, pp.305-6. In February that year, the Commander - replying to questions from Commissioner van der Bronck - had said: "The Hottentots are a cunning people, and seeing that our constant parties leave them no rest, nor time to supply, by breeding the deficiency caused in their stock by barter, would sell no more, except at treble the profit .... the barterers must admit that on every journey they left behind one half of the stock purchased; whereas by discontinuing the journeys the Hottentots would be compelled to the fort, for they cannot exist without barter nor can they sell their cattle for tobacco and brass to any but us". Ibid.,I,p.306,fn. And of course the 'prices' were hiked up by Khoi as Dapper described early on when he wrote that they "... had grown wiser through intercourse with us". Dapper: Op.cit.,p.73. At that time (the 1660s) their "..... favourite and most desired articles" were tobacco, brandy, beadwork and copper. Ibid.,loc.cit.

This evidence confirms a number of points made in the preceding analysis. First, the loose network of contiguous contacts linking the Table Bay with inland groups like the Inqua and theNamaqua was sufficient to draw and entice Khoi groups towards the Dutch and the Cape. Secondly, from 1657 onwards a rough political and economic geography of the area was beginning to crystalize in Dutch thinking. They were not hesitant to push barter goods out into the interior in the hope that they would serve to convey information about their presence to the inland groups and lure them to the Cape. In short, the overall process of the Khoi decline and collapse must be seen in the light of these effects which the barter goods had on their internal structures and relationships. What made that process not only possible, but also speedy, was the part played by these networks in moving barter items and information about them into the interior, and the drawing of the Dutch out to seek specific arrangements with specific groups. By the time the Inqua were contacted and relations established with them - by 1690 - the corrosive effect of these goods along the networks on the internal structures and external relations of most major Khoi hordes had already reached a critical and decisive point.

Thirdly, then, what evidence is there to show that one of the most damaging and disrupting effects of the cattle barter was a dangerous increase in conflict and bickering within and between hordes? It is necessary to start with a reminder that transhumant segmentary societies are structurally prone to tensions and conflict. The scope for differences and disputes over cattle, grazing grounds and waterholes is substantial, and it was suggested in the previous

94. See a discussion of the dynamics of this in, for example, Lienhardt: Social Anthropology, p. 38, ff. and, G. Balandier: Political Anthropology, ch. 3 and passim.
chapter that it is likely that this was a feature of Khoi relations even prior to the arrival of the Dutch. The presence of the Dutch per se did not seriously accelerate tensions, but the sudden availability of barter goods, and their penetration inland, did. For as the successive Khoi groups responded to the lure of the barter goods, and as the V.O.C. traders went inland, bringing herds back with them, and as others in turn heard about this and invited contact, the effects of all this criss-crossing of land and pasturage must have been to stir up a flurry of raiding and counter-raiding. Add to that process a steady impoverishment of some groups, and an attempt by them to prevent richer groups encroaching on their domains, and the consequent poaching, trespassing, warfare and disintegration of hordes must have been savage. Moreover in what appears in the documents to be a hectic and jealous jockeying for advantaged status with the Dutch, Khoi rivalries were sharpened, and the Dutch were not slow to take advantage of them. The erratic history of relations between the Dutch and Gonnema, for instance, (a "firm alliance" in 1662 had disintegrated by 1673 into a relationship involving "... sundry acts of violence and outrage..."95), confirms that the officials were quite unconcerned about these effects of their pragmatic trading offensives, except in so far as they hindered access to the current favourite suppliers, or access by the latter to the Fort.

One of the rare examples of a contemporary clearly identifying the overall process and the cumulative causation underlying the collapse of Khoi groups, was the Landdrost, Starrenburg.

In 1705 he made a journey to the 'Namacqua Hottentots' to trade. In his Journal he recorded that he found very little cattle and noted that some 'vagabonds' — Dutch burgers, like 'Dronken Gerrit' (Drunken Gerrit) — had been using bullying tactics in getting cattle from the Khoi, and this in turn set in motion the processes that have been described here. He wrote: 95a

By this I realised with regret how the whole country had been spoilt by the recent freedom of bartering, and the atrocities committed by these vagabonds, since when the cattle of one kraal is carried off by the Dutch, they in turn go to rob others, and these again rob their neighbours, running off with the spoil into the mountains and feasting there until it is finished and then again seeking for more; and so from men who sustained themselves quietly by cattle-breeding, living in peace and contentment, divided under their chiefs and kraals, they have nearly all become Bushmen ('bosjemans'), hunters and brigands, dispersed everywhere between and in the mountains.

One could not find a better description of the rapidity of the downward cycle, initiated by the Dutch pressure and bullying but not systematically sustained by it. The forces set in motion put Khoi group against Khoi group in various ways, including this.

Not a single major named group escaped becoming involved in hostilities with others between the 1650s and 1700. Oedasoa's section of the Cochoqua were reported by Eva to have planned attacks on an impoverished Goringhaika clan in 1659.96 In 1664, Oedasoa made an effort to enlist V.O.C. support for an all-out attack on "... his enemies, the Hessequas and their allies ....", offering the Company a share of the spoils to the tune of 1200 head

of cattle.  

In the north, as Gonnema and Oedasoa found themselves under pressures, through loss of cattle and some bullying by the Company, they probably started to raid Namaqua herds, and they became involved in fighting with the Namaqua (who were to the north of them), and a ".... yearly war between the Namaqua and the Hottentots on this side, in which the latter are plundered of cattle...." appears to have resulted.  

Not slow to take advantage of the plight of the Saldanhar Cochoqua, the Company determined to use that area as a base for expeditions into the land of the Namaqua.  

And this no doubt was among the factors which later gave rise to the war with Gonnema in 1673. In April and December, 1672 the Company noted with concern that those ".... who are richest in cattle" had not been coming to the Fort, while those nearest the fort had "... been so ruined by internal wars against their neighbours ....." that they had little to offer in barter. It was apparent to the Company that the cattle-rich distant groups in the east would not visit the Cape "... from fear of being massacred and robbed by their enemies, (our neighbouring Cape Hottentots) through whose territory they would have to pass ...." and who were destitute of cattle.  

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97. Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp. 274-5. The Council considered the proposal seriously, contemplating taking all Oedasoa's cattle which he proposed to leave in V.O.C. care while he dealt with the Hessequa. By this time, of course, the Chainouqua - "our good friends", the allies of the Hessequas referred to by Oedasoa - were a major source of cattle to the Dutch. On balance the Council decided it was not worth the risk of getting ".... easily led into some new disputes and entanglements". Ibid., loc.cit. See also, pp. 289-292.  


conflict is evident here: distant groups with cattle, proximate groups impoverished, raiding and warfare between them, hesitation by the inland groups to traverse the territory of the impoverished, and the consequent Dutch decision to go inland. This internal cyclone of conflict and mutual marauding and counter-attacks continued to the end of the 17th century and well beyond into the 18th century. In March, 1699 a letter to Amsterdam from the Cape bemoaned the "... continuing .... mutual wars and thefts ...." which resulted in the diminution of Company supplies. 101 And deep into the 18th century, cattle-less Khoi and hard-pressed San (and alliances between them) raided not only the veeboere moving east, but also those hordes and clans amongst the Khoi who were still left with cattle, and who were retreating before the advancing trekkers towards the Xhosa. 102

This evidence confirms the three aspects of the analysis of the ambiguous Khoi side of the relationship and their collapse in the 17th and 18th centuries. First, it shows that successive Khoi groups did barter what turned out to be disastrously large numbers of their herds. Secondly, it illustrates the point that information about the availability of valued commodities (and the objects themselves) were filtering inland along the chain of contacts between contiguous groups, and that inland hordes were systematically enticed into bartering relationships, while the Dutch penetrated in the specific direction of groups they heard about via these connections. Thirdly, it confirms that as these processes went on,


102. Schryver reported that the Inqua feared the 'Sonquase Hottentots' (San) attacks on their herds. Through the period there were constant reports of San attacks on Khoi herds, thus establishing the basis for some Khoi/Dutch alliances against the hunters. Journals of Bergh and Schrijver, p.235.
internal disputes within and between hordes erupted in cycles of internecine conflicts which speeded the process of disintegration. Overall, it illustrates the processes which result in this form of colonialism when a market and profit-oriented set of economic imperatives and purposes penetrate another relatively fragile system of self-sufficiency. For it left more and more Khoi in the classic condition of dependency, thereby establishing the basic condition for their incorporation in the colonial economy as servile labourers, or compelling them to flee.

Before turning finally in this chapter to examine the techniques of political subordination that accompanied this process, there is one relevant remaining and puzzling question to confront in this section of the analysis. Why did the Khoi want those barter goods? The question raises wider issues of a psychological, sociological and indeed philosophical kind that cannot really be answered satisfactorily. It seems that we do not have the theoretical tools, or wisdom, to handle problems of this kind which raise such fundamental questions about so-called 'human nature' and behaviour. But they are worth raising. Is it enough to say that the Khoi wanted copper and brass pieces, coloured cloth, beads, needles and artificial hatbands because they 'ranked high' in their value system? Why did they rank high? Were they - or some of them - functional in that they could either be used (say in hunting) or exchanged in turn for other items which they were not themselves able to produce, like dagga? The question can be posed at a more general level in comparative terms in respect of other societies at other times. Why do (some) people want decorative objects, or new fashions or any other such items that do not have a self-evidently functional role
in any system of production and exchange? Many of the barter items that were pumped into the Cape were worn or consumed and not exchanged, like necklaces, tobacco and arrack. To get these things some Khoi were prepared, it seems, to barter away some of their most valued resources, their cattle, which were so utterly central to all aspects of their systems of social and political organization. They thus irrevocably weakened their capacity to sustain more frontal attacks. How strong was the novelty factor? How important did items like this become within groups in respect of very fine but significant gradations of status or esteem? Was the gulf between the simplicity of Khoi society and the abundance of these barter goods of the Dutch so great that the Khoi were partly dazzled and unable to resist? These questions cannot be answered. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that most Khoi groups lived in such a potentially precarious ecological balance that once their herds were reduced beyond a certain critical point - by a combination of barter, raiding, warfare and disease - it was impossible to re-establish a viable basis for their social and cultural survival. As the colonists moved on to their lands and as remaining Khoi hordes were squeezed back against the Nguni and the Sotho, and attacked by the defensive and retreating San, their final collapse could not be staved off. Their simplicity did not permit them to adapt and change. It was, on the contrary, a condition of their disappearance as corporate groups with distinctive modes of production and socio-cultural systems. For the closeness of the relationship between their economy and their socio-political and cultural systems meant that the latter were

102a. It has been suggested that Khoi were partial to ornaments for the women. Elphick: Op.cit.,p.226. But why?
unable to 'tolerate' any significant variation in the former. Cattle cultures depend on cattle. Hence, once their cattle reserves were depleted, the structure of social organization and associated institutions were doomed to spin in a downwards spiral of partly self-inflicted and partly imposed fragmentation and disintegration as the V.O.C. economic and military penetration of their societies proceeded, and the geographical spread of the colonists took place. It was the latter which foreclosed steadily upon temporary client-ship between Khoi and veeboere: for the land to which Khoi would have returned to re-build their herds was no longer open to access by them.

Conversely, the decline, disintegration, incorporation and retreat of the Khoisan was a necessary condition for the 'expansion' of the colony. As the balance of command over the prime resources of cattle and land tilted sharply towards the V.O.C. and the colonists, the economic development of the settlement proceeded. Although the level of economic activity and exploitation of the Cape was very low by contrast with other colonial situations in Africa and Latin America more recently, it nonetheless is illustrative of the theory of the development of underdevelopment. This asserts essentially that "Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin ...." and that they are ".... not just relative and quantitative .... (but) .... relational and qualitative, in that each is structurally different from, yet caused by its relation with, the others". 103

There remain two questions from the original slate at the start of this chapter. First, what techniques of political control

and attempts to legitimate their position did the V.O.C. use to try, also, to hasten and order the process analyzed above?

Secondly, to what factors can one point in describing and accounting for, in a preliminary way here, the cultural changes that were taking place amongst those Khoi embedded in the colonial economy or on its fringes?

No colonial power or regime has ruled, or tried to rule, without attempting to adopt some procedures of control and legitimation which will both ease its costs and lighten the burdens, while trying to ensure its fundamental goals and purposes. The V.O.C. is no exception in respect of the Cape. Given its objectives to stimulate and sustain a constant supply of slaughter cattle, at least cost, the Company sought - as we have seen - alliances and accommodations, attempting agreements and treaties. As conflict ensued and economic weakness forced the Khoi groups to seek 'protection', the V.O.C. turned to the use of Indirect rule. In the 1650s there are instances at the Cape of the first examples of this later well-known strategy in the history of colonial Africa. Indeed from the perspective of political analysis of the changing structure and relations of power, the period of V.O.C. rule can be conceptualized as one which shifted slowly but systematically from Indirect to Direct rule. The process accompanied the direct and differential incorporation of Khoi and some San in the economic development of the colony and also was marked by the shift from exclusion to their inclusion within the associated social structure of the plural society in both the west and the east, as will be argued later.

The encroaching process in political (and social) terms may be outlined, in abstract, by way of four stages. They were
brought about by the side effects of the disintegrating economies of the Khoi and the collapse and decay of the central institutions of their societies. First, as the combined effects of war and barter left successive groups impoverished, they either sought political alliances and 'protection' from the Dutch, or protection was thrust upon them. Secondly, as the remnants of hordes or a series of associated clans came together, they would re-form under a clan head and obtain recognition from the V.O.C., or the Company itself would appoint such a person and expect— at least initially—that he maintain 'order' and ensure compliance with 'agreements'.

Thirdly, as more and more Khoi fell away from the core institutions of their political economies and social systems, they congregated, very much like refugees, in 'kraals' under government-appointed 'captains', and the drift away into initially temporary and then permanent 'employment' had commenced. The final phase of the process was their complete incorporation on the farms and (less so) round Cape Town, in the colonial political economy and social order.

These stages are only analytically distinct. They overlapped in time and differed in speed from area to area, each influencing the sequence and experiences from place to place. The process was well under way in the Western Cape by the last decades of the 17th century, as the subsequent discussion on labour will show. By 1727 (14 years after the first smallpox epidemic) the western areas only had a few kraals. By the second half of the 18th century "... the majority of the dispossessed Hottentots drifted into the service of the farmers, making

104. One author wrote: "in die omtrek van ongeveer 250 tot 300 myl rondom die Kaap (was daar) nie meer Hottentott kraal aan te tref nie, hoewel daar hier en daar nog 'n geïsoleerde familie of twee saamgewoon het". P.J. van der Merwe: Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie, p.143. He goes on to state, without identifying the process which accomplished it, that: "In die loop van die agtiende eeu het die Hottentote langsamerhand hul ekonomiese selfstandigheid verloor, en gepaard hiermee het hul politieke organisasie verdwyn". Ibid., loc.cit.
general a movement already partially developed and forming a definite class of hired labourers". And when Governor van Plettenberg toured the colony in 1778 he noticed ".... that there were no kraals left, but everywhere Hottentot families lived with farmers on their farms".

This process may be identified in a variety of instances that studded the whole period. Initially, the organizational problems in attracting sufficient cattle and maintaining 'order' edged the V.O.C. in the direction of striking formal deals with individual Khoi clan or horde chiefs, or the brokers, whereby they would deliver a regular amount of cattle and sheep in return for Company 'protection'. At the core of this system was the embryonic system of Indirect rule. In essence, what was involved was a deal whereby the chief (or head or broker) recognized V.O.C. authority and accepted its 'protection' which gave a kind of 'favoured nation' status, in return for which he guaranteed a stipulated and regular amount of cattle and sheep, and/or the maintenance of local order and good behaviour within the clan or the horde.

The difficulty of course with any agreement of this kind across vast cultural and political divides is that the definition of what constitutes 'order', or misdemeanours and crimes, varies directly with the structure, culture and normative universe of the societies involved. There is, thus, inherent in any such system of indirect rule within an emergent plural society (and nothing illustrates

105. M.L. Hodgson: "The Hottentots in South Africa to 1828", p.601. My emphases, A.L. The term 'class' is used by the author here to denote, I take it, a category. Its more complex sociological use in this situation - and its overlapping edges with 'culture' as a category - will have to be examined later. Barrow says the same dependant condition obtained amongst Namaqua by the end of the century. Travels, pp.357-8. In his report, de Mist in 1802, confirmed this impression for all Khoi groups including the Namaqua. Memorandum on the Cape, pp.253-6.

the plurality more clearly than this), and its shifting lines of
cleavage, a fundamental disparity between the expectations of the
dominant group and the capacity of the 'intercalary' leader, chief
or head to deliver the goods, however willing he or she may be to do
so.

No carefully ranked system of hierarchy and compliance is
possible on a basis of consensus in a situation where two political
economies and cultures, and hence two normative universes, do not
mesh. Thus, in practice it was rare for these early agreements of
Indirect rule to work. For example, as early as 1656 Herry was given
protection and recognition, "... provided that for every large
ship that arrived, he supplied 10 head of cattle, and every yacht
or small ship 5 head, in payment for which he was to receive more
copper and tobacco than the other Hottentots...."107 This, the
most rudimentary system of 'Indirect supply' - a feature of brokerage
- and an illustration of the 'favoured nation' tactic, never worked,
nor could it. Herry neither had the cattle nor the means to ensure
their delivery on such a regular basis for such a 'market', despite
his occasional success as a broker. For he was dependent on other
groups as suppliers, and a constant stream of slaughter cattle was
something which neither he nor they could guarantee.

As the problems of local 'administration' (that is,

107. Journal, II, p.39. The special treatment he got - more copper -
illustrates the 'favoured broker' principle, and also V.O.C.
desperation. It is also a classic tactic aimed at and
producing division and rule. In 1678 Governor Bax claimed in
a letter to the Heeren "That we have also made a treaty with
all other Hottentot Captains herabouts, namely, they shall be
bound to bring up, annually, upon the arrival of the return
fleet, a certain number of horned cattle and sheep and thus
shall render them more and more tributary without their
perceiving it, provided we always give them a present in

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domination and control) increased - after the free burgers were established and the first slaves arrived in 1657 - additional problems faced the officials. Flurries of raids and counter-raids, the harbouring of runaway slaves by Khoi groups and, still, the problems of the meat supply, compelled them to try to expand the terms of such agreements and impose heavier burdens of the chiefs and 'captains'. In 1658 an 'agreement' was reached with Gogosoa, the head of a Goringhaika alliance of peninsula clans, which provided that each party punish its own transgressors. It also specified the border of their respective 'territories', required the Khoi to return any runaway slaves and deliver them to the Fort in return for payment for each in "... brass and tobacco as for an ox ....", and to provide 10 cattle and 10 sheep for every large ship in the Bay. 108 This, as with other similar deals later, did not work either, nor could it: Gogosoa's control over the clans in his alliance - as with any chief - was not absolute by the very nature of horde structure. He simply could not have guaranteed compliance in respect of any or all of the other conditions on any systematic or long-term basis.

While the interests of the V.O.C. dictated that it would be to their advantage to establish such arrangements if they could, the politics of impoverishment for some Khoi groups compelled them to seek protection and recognition too. The interests of the V.O.C. and the desperation of such Khoi converged on a rudimentary, ramshackle and unworkable system of indirect rule which marked the critical passage from the first to the second stage of the process outlined above. Any such group which accepted that shift in the


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relation - however tactical and short-term they thought or hoped it might be - had started out along the path of elision from Indirect to Direct rule.

Initially, staffs of office, mounted with a copper head on which was stamped the Company mark, were issued to Khoi chiefs. These staffs identified the chiefs in the chain of Indirect rule command, but also symbolized the dependency relationship that was consequential upon the economic weakening of the clan alliance or horde in question. The practice had commenced within the first 25 years of the V.O.C. presence, and some staffs had been issued as early as the 1660s. The practice lasted throughout the 18th century, but the function and meaning of the staffs changed radically. They no longer represented symbols of authority, nor were they symbols of an agreement. They came rather to symbolize acceptance and submission and the promise of good behaviour, and appear to have been issued widely and frequently after particular bouts of conflict and retaliation. They were given to 'Bushmen' 'captains' (sic) too.

For instance, when the peace with Gonnema was concluded in 1677, it was a harsh one. It exacted a heavy price - or tried to - from the vanquished, and it provided that in addition to having to control his people ".... as we do ours .....", he had to "....promise as a tribute, and acknowledgement for this peace, to deliver yearly, upon the arrival of the return fleet, 30 horned cattle .....".

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109. Theal: History of South Africa, 1489-1691, I, p. 228. In the Swan, Sonnenschein, Lowry and Co., edition of 1888: there are a number of Theals, and pagination and quotation is difficult without this specification being clear). He says about 6 or 8 had been issued to Khoi 'captains' near the Fort.

110. Moodie: Op.cit., III, p. 69, fn. 1. Also, Ibid., III, p. 37, p. 39 and p. 53. At least it was thought they were 'Bushmen'.

111. Ibid., I, p. 352, dated 24th June, 1677. It's unlikely that he was able to deliver regularly or that he ever did. On the 14th November, 1678 the Journal recorded that he had only delivered 9 of the annual tribute of 30 horned cattle he'd promised.
With the capacity of the alliance to resist having been broken, Gonnema shortly thereafter appealed for protection as one "..... among the number of the Company's allies...." and requested a staff of office, too, as proof of this. 112

But by the 1730s the politics of the overall process of elision from Indirect to Direct rule had reached the point where the Cape government was appointing new 'captains' and was generously issuing the staffs which Mentzel says were called 'Palanbangars'. 113 Viewed from the perspective of narrow political analysis, this practice of appointing headmen complements the analysis of the economic disintegration of the hordes. The process had begun to change quite decisively. It reflected the internal political decay of Khoi groups which was directly associated with the economic collapse.

Moreover, if the 'naming process' (that is, who 'names' whom, and by what name) is at least an index of a changing political and social relation, then even the early 18th century names given to some Khoi 'captains' is further evidence of this change. They were called, inter alia, Scipio, Hannibal, Jason, Hartloop (literally, 'fast runner'), and Hasdrubal. 114 It became uncommon for horde names to be used, and rarely the names of the 'captains'. The groups were referred to loosely as 'Bushmen' or 'Hottentots' (though this tended to become associated with the loyal, or employed) or 'Bosjemans Hottentots'. All this supports the view that, in political

112. Ibid., I, p.367. This is earlier than Marks suggests such requests for recognition were.


terms, they had lost structure and coherence as larger on-going corporate political entities. Nonetheless, people live - and must live - in groups. Thus the refugees and remnants, initially perhaps squatting on the edges of cattle farming areas, retreated and re-grouped in ad hoc defensive and offensive alliances. In their attacks on the farms and the herds they were not only resisting: they were also fighting for food, and survival.

In May 1774 a commando set out, bristling with powder and shot - and nine staffs of office. These were to be issued, but to whom? It seems clear from the context that they were to be given to the leader (if they could identify one) of the defeated resisting group, and acceptance of it was presumably taken to mean, in that particular language of interaction, acknowledgement of defeat and submission. But what options were then open to such groups? Presumably the same as those that had always been open, with one exception. The possibility of retreating still further was limited by the closeness of the Nguni in the east and the Sotho in the north. Thus, either they were sucked into the colonial economy or they fled - far away - to the north and west. But if and when they came into the domain of the V.O.C. they were increasingly subject not only to its economy, but also its law.

This overall political process is expressed too in the encroaching scope of V.O.C. law and jurisdiction. Initially, and implied in the early 'agreements' with Khoi chiefs, only employees of the V.O.C. and free burgers fell under the jurisdiction of the law which applied at the Cape. The border line between who was and

116. The legislatures whose enactments could have had force at the Cape were those of the States General, the States of Holland, the Government of Batavia (through the Statues of the Indies, or of (continued on next page)...
was not a 'subject', was largely a social, cultural and political one, not a colour one. It quickly became blurred, but not by colour considerations. As the V.O.C. control encroached over and onto Khoi groups so too did political power. The politics of the situation enabled the Company to apply its laws directly to Khoi, not only because they put themselves under Dutch law by a changed way of life, but because the V.O.C. had the power to impose the law, though not frequently in the 17th century. As the sphere of control broadened out, so too did the jurisdical sweep of the Court claim authority to judge and to punish.

It is not at all clear if and when any specific decision of a general enabling kind was taken which could have permitted or

116. (continued from previous page) ...Batavia), and the Council of Policy at the Cape. See E.F. Watermeyer: "The Roman-Dutch Law in South Africa", being chapter XXXI of the CHBE; also Walker: Op.cit., pp.101-2, and J.L.W. Stock: "The New Statutes of India at the Cape".

117. It has been claimed (by Katzen) that in the 17th century only Christian and Dutch-speaking Khoi who had been assimilated were subject to Cape Laws. Katzen: Op.cit., pp.215-6. This is not strictly true; it was wider than that, and the criteria for who was subject to the 'law' seems to have been a function of political power and tactical considerations, rather than simply cultural definition. In 1672 and 1678 Khoi - who were manifestly not 'assimilated' - were tried and convicted of theft. Their names included most un-Dutch ones like Kharri, Dhaurry, Chamtagou, Quisa, Gamaka, Ore and Derva. They were hanged. See Moodie: Op.cit., p.317, p.380 and p.383.

In the case of the distraught Khoi woman Sara, who committed suicide on 12th December, 1671, the Court of Justice had to decide whether the Roman Law applied to her and thus whether her body should be "... hanged on a gibbet as carrion for the fowls ....". On the grounds that she had lived under the protection of the V.O.C. and had entirely relinquished the "... heathenish or savage Hottentot mode of life ....." it was decided (that is, on cultural and religious grounds), presumably after a long discussion, that the Roman Law applied. See Leibbrandt: Journal, 1671-4 and 1676, p.35 and Moodie: Op.cit. I, p.315-6, fn.1.

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enjoined such a shift in policy, at least from the standpoint of colonial jurisprudence. 118

What is clear however is that by 1769, and probably before that, the Courts were regularly passing sentences on Khoi (described as 'the Hottentot X'). The variety of their names reveals furthermore the transitional and thus transformative process that was, socially and culturally, under way. Direct rule and direct application of Dutch and Cape law reflect direct political control and power by the Cape government through district administrations and courts, loose as they were. No doubt the arbitrary and Direct rule of the masters applied more widely and with as much, if not more, force.

118. Katzen claims that "... in the 18th century .... the Cape government claimed jurisdiction over all Khoikhoi within its boundaries". Katzen: Op.cit., loc.cit. It is also said that ".... legally they existed in an ambiguous region between law and the arbitrary will of their masters". de Kieweit: Op.cit., p.20. Marais puts it this way: "There was no law regulating the relations between master and servant. And by the second half of the eighteenth century most of the colonial Hottentots were in the position of servants". Marais: Op.cit., pp.111-2. Jurisdiction over some Khoi living in the colony, but not really as part of it in a structural sense, commenced through the instructions of Commissioner Nolthenius in 1748 that Khoi could complain through the courts about their treatment by farmers. Böseken: Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse, Op.cit., pp.76-9.
The names of the 'Hottentots' included the following: Frederick, Kalkoen (a derogatory name, and certainly meant as such even today, meaning roughly, 'stupid Turkey'), Willem Stroo, Louis, Klyn Booy (Small Boy), Cupido, Toontje, Jantje ('Little Jan'), David Paardewagte, Wittebooy ('Whiteboy'), Cobus Anthony (which, like Cupido, was a classic combination of two common slave names at the Cape), Abraham de Vrees and Hans. \textsuperscript{119} Were they still 'Khoi', and what does it mean to say they were? If they were, by what definition and criteria were they judged to be so, and by whom? I return to this question in the course of looking at the constitutive side of the story and in the analysis of social structure in later chapters, where its consideration is more appropriate. But it is worth mentioning here, as indicative of the probably fluid and shifting character of social structure and stratification by that time, particularly as it arose out of the consequences of the Khoi collapse.

But what the court records also reveal is an accumulation of power, for the scope of law is a fairly reliable index of a changing social and political relation. In respect of major areas of the Cape, particularly the west, it suggests moreover that naked power - formally exercised by official commandos or unofficially deployed by raiding colonists - was being converted into authority, following the distinction Weber made. Taken in conjunction with other

\textsuperscript{119.} I have drawn these from the "Abstract of Convictions before the Court of Justice in the Castle of the Cape of Good Hope, 1769-1782", in Moodie: Op. cit., III, pp. 106-109. The assortment of Dutch names, derisory and derogatory names, slave names and first names only, illustrates a number of sociological conditions of a society undergoing change, and also the complex inputs in the colonial situation.
contrasts this chapter has demonstrated between the mid-17th and late 18th centuries, it indicates the extent to which a new society was being constituted. But within it there was no unified culture, with homologous institutions replicated across the sprawl of the colony. There were still substantial institutional discontinuities (and 'class' and status differences) between various groups and categories, within the same political economy and constituting its social structure. That brings to the forefront again the question of the plural society. And it becomes appropriate, finally, to make here some brief points about the cultural changes that accompanied the incorporation of the Khoi in the colonial economy, in consequence of, and associated with, the disintegration of their societies.

The identification and definition of the plural society requires the minimum conditions of two cultures, at least, present within one society. If large areas of the Cape — with the important exceptions of, for example, the Camdebo region and northern Graaff-Reinet (as it was to be) and Stellenbosch — were coming gradually to be more and more fully under the control and authority of the Cape government in the 18th century, it is possible to talk of a society being established in the process. Insofar as those groups over whom that authority was exercised can be shown to have been differentiated from each other in terms of culture, as well as other dimensions, it is possible to talk of a plural society. But it cannot be suggested that it was static in form or stable in terms of social relations: the very nature of that pluralism was undergoing change as the groups and categories that constituted the society were changing too. The long-term logic of those changes through acculturation in the 19th century and beyond, in the western Cape, were in the direction of a 'non-racial' but class-based society. In the
history of South Africa, wherever a region other than the Cape was included in wider political and social provisions of legislation - colonial or national - the effect has always been to stamp 'colour' differentiation on the Cape when the historical and structural logic in that area has always run strongly against that process.

The detailed examination of those changes are dealt with later. Here, some preliminary questions arising out of the collapsing Khoi societies must be posed, and the preliminary answers carried forward to the later substantive discussion. What indicators of cultural change can be pointed to, and how was this process related to the disintegration analyzed above?

Part of the reason for the abrasive and conflictual side of the Dutch/Khoi relationship stemmed from their radically contrasting cultures and normative universes. In certain important respects they 'talked past' each other. Moreover, the V.O.C. and Dutch, despite pragmatic concern for the establishment of treaties and deals, regarded the Khoi way of life as being in general bestial and Godless. Their observation and experience of them confirmed the already severely hostile and negative stereotype they had been given in the travel literature and, no doubt, by word of mouth accounts, in the 16th and 17th centuries. A further note crept in to the tone of official and travel literature at the Cape in the 17th and 18th centuries. It was that Khoi life styles were somehow (and the San certainly) inferior and worthless, though this had nothing to do with their colour, but everything to do with their culture and behaviour. Thus, as and when the Dutch came to dominate over the Khoi, and their societies were undermined, the cultural distance which still remained - despite changes - provided a logical and self-evident
basis for the differential incorporation of Khoi in the colonial society, though some upwards (and inwards) mobility across those discontinuities was possible but, initially, not frequent.

The initial divide between the contrasting and competing political economies and the cultural zones associated with them (that is, between the societies) is dramatically symbolized in the case of Eva, the Khoi woman who lived with the family of van Riebeeck and later married the Company surgeon, van Meerhof, in 1664. On one occasion, she was setting off as an emissary to obtain cattle. On leaving the fort she ".... at once dressed herself in hides again and sent her clothes home. She intended to put them on again when she returned to the Commander's wife, promising, however, that she would in the meantime not forget the Lord God, Whom she had learnt to know in the Commander's house; she would always think of Him and endeavour to learn, etc.". \(^{120}\)

In political, economic, social and geographical terms the sharpness of that kind of divide decreased steadily as the relative power, wealth, status and physical expansion of the V.O.C. and colonists occurred. Increasingly, Khoi groups and individuals were included within the embryonic society and its emergent economic, political and social structures. From the start - as in all situations where women from the invading group are scarce - sexual relations, extra-marital unions, concubinage and multi-cultural and multi-'racial' families, incorporating Khoi servants (and slaves) within the micro-pluralist, but hierarchical and patriarchal extended family structures, were frequent and common. \(^{121}\) As this

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120. *Journal, II*, p. 343. That, at least was what she was reported to have said.

121. see next page.
social process developed and as more Khoi fell away from the core institutions of their societies and came into the colonial society, cultural changes took place. However, in any particular instance it is probable that complete continuity with the emergent Afrikaner culture - particularly its languages and religions - took at least two fully-integrated generations, given the initial cultural distance and also the strong likelihood of its maintenance, to some degree, by both groups.

The immediate influences and compulsions of the domestic economy and the familial structure was thus one agency (and probably the most important) through which meso-cultural change took place in consequence of the economic and political disintegration of successive Khoi societies as outlined above. But there were others at this level too. Occasional baptisms and conversions were recorded, and while educational provisions for them were negligible, some elementary instruction was probably received by some Khoi children whose parents were in service with the farmers. A short-lived missionary effort

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121. from previous page).... See for instance the accounts in J.S. Marais: The Cape Coloured People, pp.9-13; and Anon: "The Origin and incidence of miscegenation at the Cape during the Dutch East India Company's regime, 1652-1795", passim; and P.L. van den Berghe: "Miscegenation in South Africa", particularly pp.68-70. Later, this question will be discussed more fully in relation to the wider matrix of social relationships with and between slaves, Khoi, 'Bastards', and 'Europeans'. It is interesting to note in this context however that on his expedition to the Namaqua in 1685, Simon van der Stel "... issued an order as we began more and more to approach to the Hottentots kraals, that none of our people should have any intercourse with the female Hottentots on pain of being flogged and dismissed from the Company service as schelms (knaves, rascals, rogues)". "Extracts from a Diary .... of Simon van der Stel", in Moodie: Op.cit., I, p.400.

by the Moravian, Schmidt, in Baviaans Kloof between 1737-43 (which
was unpopular with local farmers, as was its successor in the 1790s)
had only fractional success. 123

Cultural change, however, lags behind political and economic
decay, though they are closely bound up in a changing nexus of internal
and functional relations. It is this lag that accounts for the
discontinuities that remained within the new society and makes
possible, and necessary, the description of its constitution in terms
of the categories of pluralism. Some groups — like the Griqua, Gona
and Korana — survived through adaptation, and retreated, joining
others (or colliding with them) and forming new entities, some of which
survived and some of which did not. 124 Khoi servants and 'Bastaards',
often well-armed, were active on commando duties against San and
Khoisan raiders. 125

pp.54-59, and B. Kruger: The Pear Tree Blossoms.

J. S. Marais: The Cape Coloured People, pp.32-4. Also see Peter
Carstens: The Social Structure of a Cape Coloured Reserve for
some interesting insights into the origins of the Baster
Community, p.19. He describes their ancestors as "... the
Voortrekkers of Little Namaqualand ....". He has also told how
when he first voiced this view publically in South Africa at an
anthropologists' conference, there were outraged objections from
some quarters. He also suggests that an elementary tiered
'class' structure had emerged in that northern Cape area with
the Dutch at the top, the Basters next and the Khoi at the
bottom. Ibid., p.239. This kind of conceptualization is
interesting but needs refining. To use 'class structure' to
conceptualize a hierarchy of, in fact, cultural categories
(though they may have been more than that in their relations to
one another) conceals the complex overlapping of class and
culture.

Company Rule, 1708-1795", p.150. See also the various Commando
Overall, the picture was unclear, with different degrees and kinds of cultural change taking place and varying from area to area. But that is the point: it was the contrasts which defined the institutional discontinuities at the extremes, and the fluidity which defined the overlapping forms and emerging common culture at middle levels of the plural society. And those are the features of the society which make concrete analysis of its constitution (and change within it) so elusive and difficult.

During the second half of the 18th century the process of disintegration amongst the inland hordes was observed and commented on by many travellers. Thunberg, Sparrman, Le Vaillant, Stavorinus and Barrow confirmed the picture of decaying institutions. It varied from south-west to north and east: the latter showing less outward signs of the settling hierarchical social structures of the west, in part defining the different character of their pluralism. But despite the fierceness of the resistance to the north and north-east, the slow process of incorporating the refugee and remnant kraals and 'captaincies' in the social order of the ranching areas was taking place.

By the 1770s Sparrman's account describes the features that preceded and accompanied the cultural changes: fragmentation of the hordes was far advanced, meaningless 'captaincies' were still being appointed, a general policy of divide and rule prevailed, there was decay in morale, with some groups spying against others for the V.O.C.

In sum, the cultural and behavioural changes that occurred were consequent upon the economic and political fission of Khoi structures, leaving individuals and families ensnared as labourers and dependants in the settled agricultural economy of the west and the spreading pastoralism of the east.127

The central clue to the articulation of the social structure of the new society that was being constituted behind the outer edges of this movement lies in the organization and shape of the system of labour and slavery in the political economy of the colony. For what this chapter has demonstrated is one face of the two-sided logic of colonialism - its destructiveness and its relentlessness. Now it is necessary to turn to examine the other side of the story: the analysis of the kind of society that was built in the course of that process. I shall argue, moreover, that the implications of the system of labour and slavery were central to the system of stratification, and that taken together with the changing but enduring cultural divisions, they established locally the structural context for the emergence of a range of attitudes which included, but were not exhausted by, so-called 'colourism'. For 'race relations' at the Cape started out by being 'international' and 'cultural relations', became labour and class relations and - as cultural changes took place - emerged uneasily in a vague, shifting and confused interlocking and overlapping of them all, with 'colour' as only one factor in a complex mix.

127. It has been said that the Khoi "... is geassimileer in die ekonomiese stelsel van die blanke". P.J. van der Merwe: Op.cit., p.143. My emphases. A.L. It will be necessary to correct the notion of a 'white' (blanke) economic system. The whole point of the approach being used in this study is to move away from that kind of conceptualization of structure and differentiation. Rather, an inclusive society with en economy including (and using) all groups - differentially - but mutually dependent on each other must be postulated, for without that it is not possible to understand or even describe the colonial situation and its development. The destructive and constructive aspects of colonialism at the Cape are intertwined, as argued at the start of this chapter.