THE POLITICS OF THE ARMY 1647-1660

(Two Volumes)

Volume Two

by

DEREK P. MASSARELLA

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We have indications that the dissolution of the first Protectorate Parliament caused a lot of hard thinking about how the government of the country was to be given the substance and appearance of legality. It seems as if, temporarily at least, the whole constitutional question had been thrown back into the melting pot. It was out of this melting pot that the system of the Major Generals evolved. The Major Generals were an expedient devised to help sort out the pressing problem of national security in the aftermath of the deep psychological blow caused by the Royalist risings and the short-lived discontent in the army. They were never intended to be a long-term solution to the problem of settlement. That issue still continued to haunt all those involved or interested in the nation's politics.

However, before moving on to discuss these developments in more detail it is necessary to pause to examine the Western Design. This ambitious innovation in foreign policy had been under discussion since early 1654. Lambert was opposed to it on the grounds that it was too grandiose and that there were more immediate concerns nearer home. He felt that the cost would far outweigh any benefit. His view did not prevail and in December the expedition under the command of Penn and Robert Venables, who had commanded a regiment in Ireland, set sail. The expedition came close to disaster largely as a result
of inadequate planning, poor supplies and the inferior quality of the men. Penn and Venables on their return were committed to the Tower but released on resigning their commissions. (1)

Penn went on the expedition as Admiral and Venables as General. Venables had five foot regiments under him together with a company of reformados, a troop of horse and a small detachment of artillerymen. The Colonels of the five regiments were Venables himself, James Heane, a member of the army who had commanded the expedition which helped the fleet under Blake reduce Jersey in October 1651, Richard Fortescue who had left the army in 1647 during the dispute with Parliament and who now returned to the army probably because he needed money as his personal affairs were in a very unsound position, Anthony Buller who had fought during the first Civil War in the west of England and had been governor of Scilly when his men revolted in favour of the King after which he was out of the army, and Andrew Carter who had served in Lambert's foot regiment. Heane, Fortescue and Carter died in the West Indies and Buller returned home in June 1655 to give an account of the expedition. He did not go back but took no part in army politics in England. (2)

According to Venables, none of the other officers were taken on

"but such as had the commendation of some of his Highnes Council, Chief Ministers of State, or Officers of the Army"


(2) C. H. Firth (ed.), The Narrative of General Venables, Camden Society, new series, 60, pp. XVIII-XXI; Firth and Davies, p. 707.
which of course did not necessarily mean that they were the most suited
to meet the challenge demanded by the grand design. (1) The men were
recruited from the existing regiments but, according to Venables, the
officers in these regiments "generally gave us the most abject of their
Companies" in order "to spare their old Blades". The balance was made
up by impressment and the total size of the force was probably about
2,500, although it had been planned to be 3,000 strong. (2)

In 1656 William Brayne was sent to Jamaica to reinforce
the design. His regiment was raised by recruiting from the regiments
in Scotland. Forty-two men were drawn out of each regiment to form
the new regiment which totalled 504 men. The officers were supplied
by promoting from the ranks with the exception of the most senior in
which officers no longer in employment were given commissions. These
included John Bramston who had been cashiered for his part in Overton's
plot but who was re-admitted to the army after giving a personal
declaration of loyalty to the Protector. He died on his way to the
West Indies. (3)

The regiments in Jamaica had no effect on army politics
in Britain. The nature of the recruiting of officers and men for the
original expedition and for its reinforcement once again supports the
view that has been argued above that there was no attempt to get rid
of radical regiments by dispersing them to far off places. (4)

(1) Firth (ed.), Narrative of General Venables, p. 91.
(2) Ibid., pp. XXII-XXIII, 5-6, 9, 107.
(3) Dodl. Rawlinson Ms. A24, f.206; Firth and Davies, pp.
704-706; Firth (ed.), Narrative of General Venables,
pp. 171-173.
(4) C.f., Hill, God's Englishman, p. 183.
Evidence for the deliberations over the summer months about how to cope with constitutional matters and whether it would be necessary to change yet again the form of government stems largely from Royalist newsletters and the dispatches of the Venetian ambassador. It would seem that there were two lines of action being suggested to Cromwell; one from the army and the other from civilians. According to the Venetian ambassador, the army, after a series of meetings, pressed Cromwell to re-assume the legislative power and rule by issuing ordinances in much the same way as he had done before the Parliament had met. This was hardly a surprising reaction on their part as the failure of yet another Parliament made them even more disillusioned with Parliaments tout court. However, all but the most naive officers must have realised that such a situation could not last indefinitely. The ambassador says that some of Cromwell's supporters were trying to sell the idea to the army that Cromwell should become Emperor and that successive Emperors should be chosen by the army as in Roman times. Perhaps this is not so far-fetched as at first appears when we consider Napoleon's career at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. The ambassador alleges that by early September the officers had decided against offering Cromwell what amounted to absolute power because they were afraid that he might use that power against them to reduce pay and even to purge the regiments.\(^{(1)}\)

In a petition that appeared on 30 July some City civilians also urged Cromwell to reassume the legislative power, thus altering The Instrument, and in time to call a new Parliament. Possibly because the petition was interpreted as being part and parcel of other attempts to get Cromwell to become King it was suppressed. (1)

A more likely analysis of these developments, spanning June and July, is that Cromwell was taking advice from all quarters about how to give the government and the administration of justice legal authority and that after a number of consultations with lawyers and army officers it was concluded that in the existing circumstances it was best for legislative power to reside in the Protector and Council of State. It would be fantastic to believe that the army would really be content with or actively wish absolute power to be in the hands of one person. That would have gone too much against the grain of all that they had stood for. In the event the government was carried out by the Protector and his Council until circumstances forced the calling of a second Parliament. (2) It is dangerous to read too much into these deliberations and to suggest that there was a split in the Council of State between the civilian members favouring kingship and the army officers favouring Cromwell as Emperor. (3)


(2) C.S.P.V. 1655-1656, p. 71; Nicholas Papers, II, p. 313.

(3) Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, III, p. 304; c.f. ibid., pp. 304-308. My interpretation differs from Gardiner's.
The newsbooks give no indication of these political discussions. They confined themselves to reporting the efforts being made to cut back on the costs of maintaining the armed forces. Meetings of officers were held in July and August to work out a new establishment and for cutting back on numbers. This appears to have been the work of the Council of State and some of the chief officers of the army.\(^1\) The officers who worked on the proposals were Whalley, Reynolds, Goffe and Broghill, already becoming an influential political personality. Broghill's regiment had been disbanded in 1653 but he continued to command an unregimented troop and to hold the rank of Lt. General of the Ordnance in Ireland, although he tends to be more of a civilian than a military man in terms of his political activity.\(^2\) Others named as being on the committee of officers, presumably a standing committee to deal with all aspects of army administration were Twisleton, Packer, Francis White, Barksted and Worsley.\(^3\) The names include a fair number of future Major Generals. Lt. Colonels John Mills of Ingoldsby's regiment, Waldine Lagoe of Pride's and Major John Miller of Barksted's also sat on a committee charged with administering the

\(^{(1)}\) Faithful Scout, 6-13 July 1655, 20-27 July 1655; Mercurius Politicus, 19-26 July 1655; Perfect Diurnal, 23-30 July 1655; Perfect Proceedings, 2-9 August 1655, 9-16 August 1655, 16-23 August 1655; Perfect Account, 8-15 August 1655. For the new establishment which was passed by the Council of State on 26 July with effect from 23 July and the proposed cut back in men q.v. C.S.P.D. 1655, pp. 234, 251-252, 256, 260, 261, 263, 278-279; Mercurius Politicus, 16-23 August 1655, Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, III, p. 317.

\(^{(2)}\) C.S.P.D. 1655, pp. 229-230; Firth and Davies, p. 588.

\(^{(3)}\) C.S.P.D. 1655, pp. 74, 89, 125, 148, 171, 181.
arms and ammunition in those garrisons which were to be reduced. (1)

What is beyond dispute about developments over the summer is that there was a considerable amount of soul searching after the January dissolution and that various suggestions were put forward from a variety of sources. However, in the end it was decided not to alter the foundations of the government as laid down in The Instrument. The country, especially in the aftermath of Penruddock's rising, and the army, in the aftermath of the 'plots', were in no condition for yet more political turmoil caused by a fundamental alteration or suspension of The Instrument. It was felt that the question of internal security was far more pressing and the Major Generals were designed to deal with this.

The presence of military governors in charge of large areas was by means new. As Professor Aylmer has pointed out Haselrig, Lambert and Lilburne held such important positions in the late forties and early fifties. Disborowe's appointment as overlord in the south west in the spring of 1655 was therefore not without precedent. (2) Officers also acted as militia commissioners in some of the localities in the interests of national security. (3) Thus the system of Major Generals was no innovation comparable in scale or conception to the Barebone's assembly or to The Instrument, which it was in no way intended to supplant. The system evolved gradually over the summer and autumn of

(1) C.S.P.D. 1655, p. 303.
(2) Aylmer, State's Servants, p. 48.
(3) Q.v., for example, C.S.P.D. 1655, pp. 78-79.
1655. It was not ready and waiting, fully developed to fill an important political gap. The origins of the system have been well-covered by Rannie and most recently by Professor Roots. (1) What emerges is that the initiative for the Major Generals came from the Council of State and that the philosophy underlying it was basically military, the securing of the peace in the wake of the Royalist rising. The official inauguration of the system on 31 October emphasised the importance of the Major Generals and the militia they were to supervise as a security force. Even the so-called moral instructions can be seen in the light of the government's desire to create an effective way of coping with internal security. (2)

It would be wrong to look for an individual as responsible for the system. It emanated from the Council of State and bears all the marks of being a corporate measure. The assumption that the Major Generals would work hand-in-hand with the local authorities, not usurp their powers, could be seen as furthering the policy of the respectable revolution to which Cromwell remained committed, although in practice it turned out to be a very clumsy way of trying to achieve this. The Major Generals were less successful in reconciling than in alienating the localities, even if this was not entirely their fault. (3)

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(3) For a good assessment of the relations between the local and central governments during the Protectorate, including an evaluation of the Major Generals q.v. D. Underdown, 'Settlement in the Counties' in Aylmer (ed.), Interregnum, pp. 165-182.
The emphasis on improving the moral tone of the nation could also appeal to the army, especially to those who felt that the advancement of reform must proceed in conjunction with the advancement of godliness. Lambert certainly played an important role in the drafting of the original instructions of 22 August to the Major Generals and a paper devised by him giving further orders and instructions to them was read in Council on 4 September and referred to a committee made up of himself, Pickering, Fienes, Lisle, Mulgrave and Strickland, all civilians, with the exception of Lambert of course. (1) However, it would be stretching the evidence too far to speculate, as does Gardiner, that Lambert "may fairly be regarded as probably the originator, certainly the organiser" of the system. (2) All we can safely say is that he played an important part in helping to work out a satisfactory administrative framework in which the Major Generals could operate. He remained involved in this work into 1656 and in June of that year he presented a report to the Council of State with additional instructions which were read and agreed to. (3)

Two overlapping criteria seem to have been behind the appointments of the individual Major Generals to their respective areas. The first was that most of them had been born in their areas, and the second, their connection with their areas by virtue of military

(1) C.S.P.D. 1655, pp. 296, 370.
(3) C.S.P.D. 1655-1656, p. 382.
service. The former applies in the case of Goffe, Fleetwood, Skippon, Whalley, Boteler, Berry, Worsley, Lambert and his deputies Robert Lilburne and Charles Howard, of Fleetwood's deputy, Hezekiah Haynes, and Berry's deputies, Rowland Dawkins and John Nicholas. Kelsey was a native of London but had been governor of Dover in succession to Algernon Sydney since at least August 1651, thus making him very familiar with the counties under him. (1) Disborowe had also served in the west country at various times between 1649 and 1651, before his return there in 1655. Barksted was also a native of London and as Lieutenant of the Tower he was well qualified for his role as Major General for that part of Essex which was not under Skippon's jurisdiction.

By and large the Major Generals and their deputies were men of administrative experience both in military and civilian matters. The record of men such as Lambert, Fleetwood, Disborowe and Lilburne needs no mention in this respect. Skippon appears to have been appointed in his capacity as a much respected veteran, the grand old man of the army. Kelsey, Goffe, Barksted and Worsley had all been active in army administration during the fifties, and Berry, as we have seen, allegedly helped Lambert draw up The Instrument. (2) Whether or not this was the case he devoted himself wholeheartedly to his new job. Of the full Major Generals a question mark hangs over the person

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(2) Reliquiae Baxterianae, p. 72.
of William Boteler. He did not have a regiment of his own. He had had a troop which he had raised in 1648 by order of Parliament and had attended the Army Council in November and December of that year. In March 1651 he commanded a troop serving under Harrison, although it was probably not in Harrison's regiment itself but in the forces under his command at this time. But after this he was more involved with civilian activities in his native Northamptonshire and in trying to sort out some troubles in Bristol which involved the former secretary for intelligence, George Bishop. Boteler condemned the toleration shown to the Quakers. This was not inconsistent with his own belief in a wide ranging liberty of conscience. Many 'liberals' in this respect considered the Quakers as dangerous subversives. In selecting him as one of the Major Generals Cromwell must have had quite a high opinion of Boteler and of his suitability for the job. It is ironical that Boteler who came close to impeachment in 1659 and who was technically not a member of the army until his appointment as Major General, should have ended up as personifying all that was unacceptable about the Major Generals and by inference of the army in the eyes of the nation.

Of the deputy Major Generals, Haynes and Packer, who took over from Bridges as deputy to Fleetwood early in 1656, were familiar with administrative work. Bridges, who succeeded to the Colonels


of Okey's regiment on the latter's dismissal, became a full Major General in July 1656 on Worsley's death. Howard, Dawkins and Nicholas were chosen for their strong local connections, although Howard as the former Captain of the Life Guard was clearly well-known to Cromwell. Thus, the Major Generals were appointed on the basis of their past record. They were all men of proven ability, and, with the exception of Boteler, men of standing in the army, although not necessarily in their localities, and they set to work with the energy and zeal that had been expected from them. (1) It is not intended to discuss the administrative efficiency of the Major Generals and their impact on the localities, this much needed task is being undertaken by Professor Roots. (2)

During the winter of 1655-1656, when the Major Generals or their deputies were busy in their areas and the country was being governed by the Protector and Council of State, the nation was more settled. It was during these months that Lambert and Fleetwood emerged more clearly as the leading officers in the army. They could rely on the diligence of their deputies to carry out the Instructions. Disborowe, who had been busy over the summer as a member of the Council of State, did not go down to the west country until the beginning of December. Before that he delegated responsibilities to his subordinate officers, as he had done since his

(1) There are lives of all the Major Generals, except Boteler, in the D.N.B.

(2) In the meantime q.v. Rannie, art. cit.; Roots, art. cit.; Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, III, chapter XL; J. Berry and S. G. Lee, A Cromwellian Major General, Oxford, 1938, and the various local studies which have appeared in recent years.
previous appointment in March. His talents were widely respected and in February 1656 there were rumours that he would be sent to the fleet to re-assume his position as General-at-sea which he had held in 1653. (2) Those of the Major Generals or Deputy Major Generals who were near London appear to have continued to take part in army administration. (3)

National security continued to be an overriding concern, if not an obsession, on the part of the government. Any sort of opposition, real or imagined, was stamped out no matter from what source it came, whether Quaker, Presbyterian, Fifth Monarchist or Royalist. It was a time when suspicion ruled in the government's calculations, a reflection of the government's feeling of insecurity and of the political question mark still hanging over the nation's future. This atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust even pervaded the government itself and is manifested in the relationship between Henry Cromwell and Fleetwood, which will be commented on at greater length below. There was also alarm for the safety of the Protector's life and this prompted the formation of a crack corps, the reformed Life Guard, which was intended to be a sort of Praetorian guard. There had been rumours since early September that Cromwell was unhappy with his Life Guard and Royalist sources speculated wildly that he was going to use the money raised for the Protestants of Piedmont to employ a body of Swiss mercenaries to act as his guard. (4)

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(1) C.S.P.D. 1655, pp. 234, 244, 250, 253; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff. 54-55.
(3) C.S.P.D. 1655-1656, p. 325.
(4) ibid., pp. 316, 375, 384.
Before the reform, the Life Guard was quite small, 45 in number. It was decided that this should be increased because of the assassination threats. However, the Life Guard had not been free from discontent. Thomas Buttevant, a former member of the guard, was reported by Deputy Major General Haynes for spreading subversive Fifth Monarchist literature in the Eastern Association. William Howard, a kinsman of the former Captain of the life guard, Charles Howard, was purged at the setting up of the new life guard and later in the year carried the Leveller demands to Charles Stuart. These cases may well have been isolated but discontent continued to linger on even in the reformed guard. John Toope revealed Sindercombe's plot to the authorities in 1657. It was also reported that other guardsmen supported the plot although the evidence for this is not really convincing. The new blood for the reformed life guard was to come from 12 of the "most faithfull, valiant and proper souldiers in each regiment of horse" and the chance to purge the older members of discontented elements, loosely referred to as 'anabaptists', was also taken. This shows that political calculations could and did on occasion determine appointments and dismissals. The new life guard was to be placed under the command of Captain Richard Beke.

(1) Firth and Davies, p. 54. For Buttevant q.v. also Capp, Fifth Monarchy Men, pp. 92, 112, 114, 116, 207, 243, although it is not as clear as Dr. Capp suggests that Buttevant was purged. He might have left voluntarily, q.v. Thurloe, IV, p. 629; Carte, II, p. 81.

(2) Thurloe, III, pp. 774, 790.

(3) Clarke Papers, III, pp. 62, 64; Carte, II, p. 81. For Beke q.v. biographical appendix.
Cromwell was said to have full confidence in the new body. (1) It was left to Lambert to work out the establishment for the new life guard. His recommendations were approved on 8 March. (2) This caused Royalists to speculate that Lambert had become supreme in the army, its "darling", and that he had chosen all the new life guard which had become his creature. (3) Clearly, this was far from the truth.

Despite Fleetwood's glowing report to Henry Cromwell early in the new year that the work of the Major Generals "in reforming the severall associations and corporacious goes on very prosperously" (4) concern about the need for a long term settlement remained. At the end of February there appears to have been a meeting of army officers at Whitehall which the Venetian ambassador took to be a conference of the Major Generals. Some of them, especially those at or near to London may well have attended, but Goffe, Disborowe, Derry and Worsley were certainly busy in their respective areas at this time. (5) The reports we have of the meeting say that the question of keeping the legislative power in Cromwell and the Council of State was discussed and that there was talk of calling a Parliament at some unspecified future date. (6) A more likely reason for the meeting was to review

(1) Carte, II, pp. 81-82.
(2) C.S.P.D. 1655-1656, pp. 192, 203.
(3) ibid., p. 236.
(4) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff.74-75.
how effective the government was proving under the existing circumstances and that what emerged was a consensus that, for the moment anyway, things were going well enough and that the Major Generals were doing their work satisfactorily. There might have been a mention of a Parliament, but it is unlikely to have been any more than that. It was at this time that Royalist newsletters began to suggest that Lambert was the leading figure in the army even a rival to Cromwell and that the new life guard was his creature. As we have seen this was far from the truth but the Royalists were drawing attention to his energy and hard work in government which must have enhanced his prestige and status, a role which no doubt appealed to him.

Cromwell's confidence in the Major Generals was expressed at about this time in the speech in the City. In it he said that the Lord was on the side of the Major Generals making them

"more effectual then was expected, and by receiving a good acceptation with those who of late stood at some distance with us."

Cromwell was being over-optimistic and badly misjudging the mood of the localities and their resentment of the Major Generals. By May, however, the government's ambitious but expensive foreign policy was running it into severe financial difficulties which demanded prompt attention and,

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(2) For his activity q.v. C.S.P.D. 1655 and ibid., 1655-1656, passim.
(3) Clarke Papers, III, p. 65.
possibly, a change of policy at home. It was decided to hold a meeting of all the Major Generals under the pretext of reviewing their work. In fact, Cromwell and the Council of State were going to sound out the Major Generals about what should be done to deal with the financial crisis. They were to be asked how things were in their areas and presumably if more money could be extracted from them. All of them arrived by the appointed time, 17 May, except for Robert Lilburne who felt obliged to give priority to a meeting with some local commissioners in York. He apologised to Cromwell for this and promised to hasten southwards once it was over. He wrote on 16 May and the first meeting took place on 21 May, suggesting that it was felt to be most important for all the Major Generals to attend and that consequently it was put back to enable Lilburne to attend. On the 27th Thurloe wrote to Henry Cromwell saying that the Major Generals had given an account of the situation in their areas

"whereby it appeares that their beinge in this trust hath much conduced to the safety of the countryes and to the satisfaction of honest men."

As with the Protector's assessment this was over-optimistic. Thurloe said they were going on to consider broader issues, that is what was to be done to get the government out of its financial mess. Once again our knowledge of the discussion is hampered by lack of evidence.

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(2) Thurloe, V, pp. 9, 19, 33, 45.

(3) ibid., p. 63.
However, the discussions lasted until well into June and were quite intense. (1) The outcome was a decision to call a new Parliament as the only satisfactory way out of the crisis. This decision does not appear to have been as closely kept a secret as both Thurloe and Fleetwood suggested in their respective letters to Henry Cromwell at the beginning of July. (2) The Venetian ambassador knew about it as early as the beginning of June. Thurloe wrote to Montague on 10 June, in cypher, telling him of the decision to call a Parliament to get money. He was careful to give the impression that it was the government's unanimous decision to which the Major Generals agreed. He did not hint at any disagreements. Monck was informed of it sometime in June and wrote to Thurloe on 1 July supporting it. He considered it a tactical masterstroke because if the Parliament did not

"mind more the publique good than their owne ends the fault will be theirs"

and there could be no blame on Cromwell and his Council for attempting to govern alone after that, but he hoped it would not come to that. (3)


(2) Thurloe, V, p. 176; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff. 84-85.

(3) C.S.P.V. 1655-1656, Carte, II, p. 109; Thurloe, V, p. 175. The fact that Montague and Monck were informed of the calling of a Parliament well before Henry Cromwell and that Henry was told after the official announcement on 26 June, lends support to Henry's contention that he was being kept in the dark about many things and reinforces the view that Ireland once subdued had a pretty low priority in the government's thinking.
It was quite a different view of Parliaments from that which he held in 1659 when the sovereignty of Parliament figured so largely in his thinking and when he felt nothing including army unity, was too great to stand in its way. Monck was, if nothing else, a man who could sail effortlessly with the prevailing wind.

The demand for a new Parliament probably originated from the Major Generals themselves and a significant number of the Council of State. Cromwell, supported by an indeterminate number of the Council, was opposed to the idea and favoured extending the decimation tax. However, his Major Generals must have emphasised that this would be impossible and therefore urged the calling of a Parliament, no doubt exuding confidence that they could guarantee the election of one favourable to the government. In February 1657 during the kingship crisis, when relations between army and Parliament were turning sour yet again, Cromwell reminded his officers of his opposition to calling a Parliament and to their failure to control its membership:

"After you had excercised this power awhile, impatient were you till a Parliament was called. I gave my vote against it, but you (were) confident by your own strength and interest to get men chosen to your heart's desire." (2)

Cromwell was being unfair to the Major Generals, they had not wanted a Parliament but advocated one as the best way to overcome the financial crisis which had been caused not by them but by the government's policy.

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(2) Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, pp. 417, 418.
The Major Generals were back at their posts by the end of June and in the case of Kelsey, at least, they were thinking hard about how to secure the return of members amenable to the government. (1)

The decision to call a Parliament was bound to raise the political temperature and to give encouragement to the various opponents of the Protectorate. In July there occurred the well-known attempt to co-ordinate left-wing opposition with the forthcoming Parliament in mind. Such an attempt had not been made in late 1654 and early 1655 at the time of the Three Colonels' Petition and the Fifth Monarchist discontent with the Protectorate. In 1656 the attempt involved former army officers, Rumpers and Fifth Monarchists. The basis for negotiation was Vane's A Healing Question which had appeared in May and which advocated the supremacy of successive Parliaments elected by faithful adherents of what was called "the good cause". These Parliaments would govern, if need be, in conjunction with a single person and Council of State, but the Parliament would be supreme and control both the civil and military branches of government. (2) This demand for parliamentary control over the army was one of the major causes of the fatal breach between the restored Rump and the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in the army in October 1659. As far as we know the meetings were not attended by any serving officers but they did involve such diverse former officers as Okey, Rich, Harrison and Richard Goodgroom who might have been the

(1) Thurloe, V, p. 165.

author of *A Copy of a Letter from an Officer of the Army in Ireland*. This polemic appeared at about the same time as Vane's tract, and attacked the Protectorate for being too much of a neo-monarchy and, like Vane, called for an unlimited Parliament to govern the nation as the repository of supreme power, both civil and military. (1)

The meetings had little chance of success. The differences between a Harrison and an Okey, and in the essence of their opposition to Cromwell, were too great. However, the meetings are important because they mark the crystallisation of a particular sort of Republicanism that was to become vital by 1659, the sort of Republicanism that looked back to the Rump as the guardian of the 'good old cause'. In this respect the contacts between Okey, Bradshaw and Goodgroom and the proposal that the legal authority under which it was suggested the anti-Protectorate group should work, some 40 members of the Long Parliament, takes on a new dimension. The government reacted by rounding up what had become by now the usual suspects, including Okey, Rich, Harrison, Lawson and Ludlow as well as Bradshaw and Alured. All were questioned and Rich, Harrison and Alured were detained. (2)

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(1) Thurloe, V, p. 197; *ibid.*, VI, pp. 184–186; E381(3), *A Copy of a Letter* ..., repr. Exeter, 1974. The editors of this reprint speculate that Streater was the author. Q.v. also Pocock, 'James Harrington and the Good Old Cause' (pp. 35–36) and Barnard (*Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 317n.) for discussions about the authorship of this tract. The claim that Ludlow was the author is very unlikely. If Streater was the author then he was possibly guilty of backsliding himself. In November 1656 he petitioned the Council of State complaining that he had been in six different actions including infringement of the Ordinance to enable soldiers who had served the Commonwealth to exercise any trade (*C.S.P.D.* 1656–1657, pp. 159–160).

At the end of August George Fenwick had his commission as Colonel of foot and governor of Leith and Edinburgh Castle taken away. Fenwick, who was also returned as an M.P. to the new Parliament but refused admission, was probably considered disaffected and too much under the influence of his father-in-law, Sir Arthur Haselrig. His regiment was given to Lt. Colonel Timothy Wilkes. (1)

It should be added that another Copy of a Letter this one from the hand of "a true Commonwealthsman" and "written to an officer of the Army" also circulated in the first part of 1656. It advocated a hereditary single person and urged Cromwell to place the succession in his family. The author attacked the principle of parliamentary sovereignty calling it "a yoak which our fathers never knew of nor are we able to bear". He even went so far as to say that if there were a referendum "not one in twenty but would desire their old government again". (2)

In the army there appears to have been some uneasiness with Cromwell's dual role as head of government and head of the army. According to the Venetian ambassador there was a desire for someone not so deeply involved in affairs of state to be at the head of the army thus raising its morale in case it had to take to the field in an emergency. He added that there were rumours about making Fleetwood

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(1) Clarke Papers, III, p. 71.

(2) E381(2), A Copy of a Letter written to an Officer of the Army by a true Commonwealthsman and no Courtier. Extracts of this tract are reprinted by Firth, 'Cromwell and Crown', E.H.R., XVII, 1902, pp. 431-433. There are two versions of the tract; the first one (E370 5) appeared on 19 March according to Thomason.
the General instead, but that there was a preference in the army itself for Lambert. If the report is accurate, it seems a rather surprising request as both Fleetwood and Lambert were as heavily involved in government as Cromwell. Perhaps too much should not be read into the story as the Venetian ambassador at this time, Giavarina, could be both surprisingly well-informed, as over the calling of the Parliament, and equally surprisingly mis-informed, as with his report of Barksted's death in October. It seems evident that the Major Generals had promised more than they could deliver. They were not, after all, petty dictators in their areas, but they did try hard to influence the outcome of the elections. The extent of their failure can perhaps be grasped from a letter by Kelsey to Cromwell on 26 August after elections had been held in Kent. Kelsey wrote that most of the

"Cavaliers fell in with the Presbyterians against you and the Government, and the spirit is generally bitter against...men, decimators, courtiers, etc., and most of those chosen to sit in the ensuing Parliament are of the same spirit."

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In fact what happened in Kent was that the traditional M.P.s were being returned in the county to the second Protectorate Parliament. Kelsey favoured imposing a test on all M.P.s before allowing them to sit to ensure that they would not meddle with The Instrument:

"without your consent, nor yet with what has been done by you and Council, in order to the peace and safety of the nation."

Kelsey had, of course, helped promote The Instrument in 1653. A test was subsequently imposed on the members of the Parliament. Kelsey further declared that he, and those under him, would stand by Cromwell "with life and fortune" to maintain:

"the interest of God's people, which is to be preferred before 1,000 Parliaments." (1)

It was strong language but it betrayed the realisation that there had been a failure to deliver the right sort of Parliament. Given this realisation drastic measures, including force if necessary, were recommended; the arts of politics, of compromise and reconciliation, of giving and taking, of the possible, were not even mentioned. In this respect the attitudes reflected in Kelsey's letter symbolise those of the army during the next three years or so. The army was to fluctuate from one extreme to the other; from making a great show of wanting to achieve a settlement by legal and constitutional means to trying to hasten on that settlement by sweeping any obstacles aside with the exercise of naked military force. By ignoring the arts of politics it is no wonder that it lost credibility in the period after the death of Cromwell, its supreme politician.

Before the start of the Parliament the government decided to make sure of the unity of the army especially in view of the recent Rumper-Fifth Monarchist activity and the inevitable politicisation of the country at election time. There was a partial return to the Army Council of the late 1640's, although in a very much more watered down form. A field officer from each regiment was sent for to attend a Council of War ostensibly to advise on military matters especially a planned recruitment of the regiments. The officers sent up by the regiments were not elected but appointed by the regimental commanders and no soldiers were represented. The occasion was used by Cromwell to give the officers a lecture justifying the government's policy. Once again national security was emphasised, particularly the 'threats' from the Royalists and Fifth Monarchists. Major Ralph Knight one of the representatives who had been sent from Scotland, and to whom we owe the account of the meeting, hoped it would "much strengthen and cement the army".

It was at this meeting too that new resolutions were passed to tighten up discipline in the army. Evidence of these measures comes from a letter from Lambert to Monck inclosing the various resolutions of the Council of War. It shows that there was a determination to ensure that officers returned to their commands.

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1. Clarke Papers, III, p. 71. For the additions to the regiments and garrisons q.v. C.S.P.D. 1656-1657, pp. 94, 114, 128-129. The regiments were recruited to 1200 at this time but were soon cut back to 1,000 in November (ibid., p. 161).

2. Clarke Papers, III, p. 72.
and stayed there. In Scotland this was a problem that had dogged Monck's predecessors. Officers were to return to their charges regardless of any previous passes that had been issued, no matter by whom, and in future only those who had a pass from Cromwell, or the general officers of the army in England and Scotland, were to be absent without leave. This was not to apply to those officers chosen as M.P.s. The officers were also to enforce a strict discipline over the soldiery and to deal severely with swearing, drunkenness and all other vices. Lambert recommended the holding of monthly Councils of War. The officers were also required to have

"a careful inspection into their respective charges that noe suspicious person or persons come among them to disaffect them."

Lambert felt that this was "not the least materiall" and left it to the vigilency and discretion of the officers to enforce.\(^{(1)}\) No doubt the resolutions were sent to all the regiments with the representatives when they returned to them. In order to keep the army content more money seems to have been made available to cover its arrears, especially those of the regiments around London. The Venetian ambassador speculates whether this was done to prevent riots and to stop the army from going to the Parliament to get its arrears, but this seems an unlikely interpretation.\(^{(2)}\) But whatever the reason Cromwell and the government clearly recognised the need for the presence of a reasonably contented and peaceable army when the Parliament met.

\(^{(1)}\) Clarke Ms. 43, f.76 + v.; c.f. C.S.P.V. 1655-1656, pp. 112-113 where the newly arrived Venetian ambassador, Sagredo, shows himself highly impressed with the discipline, appearance and equipment of the army.

\(^{(2)}\) C.S.P.V. 1655-1656, p. 264.
The regiments which were ordered to be recruited at this
time were the Protector's two regiments, Lambert's, Barksted's, Mills's,
Hewson's, Pride's, Salmon's and Briscoe's. It is probable that Cromwell's
regiments together with Lambert's, Mills's, Barksted's and Hewson's were
in London. Mills's regiment had formerly been Ingoldsby's. Mills took
over in September 1655. Ingoldsby took over Charles Howard's horse
regiment (formerly Rich's). Howard returned to the life guard and Beke
was given the Majority in Mills regiment. (1) Hewson's original
regiment had been one of those selected by lot for the Irish service in
1649. Four companies of it along with other Irish companies had
returned to England in 1655 at the time of the Royalist rising. Hew-
son's companies did not return to Ireland but were incorporated into
a new regiment formed for him in October 1655. Of the other strengthened
regiments Pride's appears to have still been in Scotland, Salmon's
was ordered from Scotland to the strategically important town of Hull
in August 1656, Briscoe's which had formally been Constable's, before
his death in June 1655, had served in Scotland and might have returned
to England, possibly even to London. (2) Mills and Briscoe along with
the newly promoted Waldine Lagoe, who took over from the deceased
Major General Charles Worsley as Lt. Colonel of Cromwell's foot regi-
ment, were responsible for examining the admission tickets of the new
M.P.s, a scene which must have recalled Pride's Purge to many M.P.s.
All men were officers of long standing. In the late 1640's they had
been: junior officers.

(1) Firth and Davies, pp. 151-152.
(2) C.S.P.D. 1655, p. 106; ibid., 1656-1657, pp. 94, 123-129;
Firth and Davies, pp. 332, 410, 532, 402; Firth, 'Scotland
and the Protectorate', p. 305. Pride's, Hewson's, Mill's
and Goffe's were still in London in June 1658 (C.S.P.D.
1658-59, p. 73).
The second Protectorate Parliament, in which all the Major Generals sat and in which the army was well represented, was to bring the English Revolution to yet another important turning point. Cromwell who had been severely disappointed with his first Parliament, and possibly with Parliaments in general, had been, as we have seen, very hesitant to have another one, but in the end had given in to the view that a Parliament should be called. During the first months of the Parliamentary session Cromwell gradually lost this suspicion and began to be impressed with the Parliament's attempts to put forward proposals for settlement and what appeared as its genuine desire to get on well with the Protector. (1) This does not mean that the Parliament met in September armed with blueprints for settlement. As so often in the course of the English Revolution, the proposals evolved in response to a serious crisis. At this juncture the catalyst was Naylor's case and the proposal for settlement which emerged out of it was The Humble Petition and Advice, including originally the offer of kingship. Here at last the tantalising prospect of a settlement that was the work of civilians was held before Cromwell's eyes. To accept it in full Cromwell would have been forced to alienate large and important sections of his army; even in accepting it without the kingship clause he was placing quite a strain on the loyalty of the majority of the army which had faithfully followed him up till then through all the twists and turns of

(1) C.f. Professor Underdown's argument that by 1657 many of the older families were beginning to accept the Protectorate and to return to active politics, and thus to make a more positive contribution to the problem of settlement (D. Underdown, 'Settlement in the Counties 1653-1658', in Aylmer (ed.) Interregnum, p. 177.)
the 1650's. When we talk about the army in the crisis of 1656-1657, we mean effectively the army around London especially those officers stationed there, or as M.P.s. This emphasises once more just how important the forces in or near the capital were. In the crisis over kingship Cromwell had to give in to their opposition to kingship. He did not try to appeal over their heads to the forces in Ireland or Scotland. It is doubtful if such a course were viable anyway. During the crisis the Protector tended to listen more to the advice of civilians and appeared to be prepared to follow a more civilian path. The knowledge of this, together with a feeling that he was somehow cutting his previous close bonds with the army and perhaps a perception that in the long term it could only mean a weakening of the army's direct role in politics, helps explain the way in which many of the officers dug in their heels and forced Cromwell to reject kingship. This sense of alienation had already manifested itself, as we have seen, as early as June with the reports that the army were wanting a new General.

Initially great things were expected from the Parliament. Henry Whalley, the Judge Advocate of the army in Scotland, wrote to his comrades north of the border on 11 October:

"The whole House are unanimous in carrying on the best things for the good of the nations, both spirituall and temporall, so as truly I feare not through mercy but that God will owne us." (1)

(1) Clarke Papers, III, p. 76.
However, even before Naylor's case arose, and threw a spanner in the constitutional works, a proposal was made on 23 October to discuss the question of succession, whether it should be elective or hereditary. The proposal did not get very far. But once the question had been brought up, public discussion of it proceeded apace and started rumours, especially among the foreign ambassadors, that Cromwell was being asked to become King, although at this stage this was not the case. It soon became clear that the whole question was divisive, not just between the civilians and the military, but within the army itself.

Sir Charles Firth has shown that the question of a hereditary Protectorate even kingship was nothing new and, as we have seen, The Instrument in its original form might well have included kingship. It is possible, if the report of the French ambassador can be relied on, that in the first Protectorate Parliament, when the succession was discussed, Lambert supported the idea of a hereditary Protectorate. This would be consistent with his 1653 view. However, the suggestion of styling the single person King was quickly dropped in 1653 after a sounding out process in the army. Thus, it is not surprising that the re-emergence of this issue in late 1656 should arouse passions in the army once more. This can be seen in the letter from

(2) ibid., pp. 437-438, 442.
(3) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1902, pp. 429-438; Burton, I, p. LI.
(4) Q.v. above.
Colonel John Bridges to Henry Cromwell on 25 November. Bridges, whose title was a courtesy one, was an Irish M.P. in 1656 and although he is said to have had a foot company in Ireland he was essentially a civilian and not a military man. In his letter he says that Berry was opposed to the notion of a hereditary succession and that Disborowe supported him in this. Disborowe argued that it would be unwise suddenly to change the constitution from an elective to a hereditary one at this stage. Bridges, on the contrary, put forward some very sound reasons for the change. (1)

However, the intervention of Naylor's case helped put an end for the time being to the attempts to change the succession, and no doubt gave those who favoured a change a breathing space to work on something more comprehensive, the proposals that eventually became The Humble Petition and Advice. The article by Messrs. Wilson and Merli has gone over quite effectively the constitutional problem raised by the case. (2) They show that the administration was unaware of the full implications of Naylor's case. But it was not just the administration that was unaware of this; many members were similarly ignorant and only realised the powder-keg with which they were playing after Cromwell's letter arrived. One might also take issue with their view that The Instrument "ordained" positions of "reciprocal responsibility" for "the triumvirate of Army, Protector and Parliament" and even their conclusion that Naylor's case "demolished the ephemeral spirit of unity and co-operation" between "the three partners in


in government" on the grounds that The Instrument did not formalise, let alone institutionalise, any such partnership. One of the basic problems of the 1650's is that the power of the army was not really institutionalised. The Protector, in the person of Cromwell as head of government and head of the army, went some way towards trying to solve the problem but it raised the question of Oliver's successor. Would the army always be satisfied that future Protectors were suitably qualified to hold the two positions? Professor Aylmer has argued that the pre-June 1657 Council of State with its solid block of senior officers had given institutional form to the power of the army. (1)

But this was an informal expression of that power. One would also add that the administrative activities of many of the officers relating to matters which were not purely military which we have noted at times especially after 1653, for example in the post office and at the Admiralty, were further manifestations of this as well as the officers who sat in the Protectorate Parliaments. But this sharing in the burdens of government, while it no doubt kept many officers from brooding too much over politics, was never formalised despite the fact that the Other House went some way towards trying to do this and that was the root of the problem.

The debates over Naylor's case revealed that there was no unified view amongst the officers in the House over the issues raised by it. On the question of liberty of conscience and that of

(1) Aylmer, State's Servants, p. 49.
the rights of the individual there was a big difference between Sydenham who said

"I shall choose rather to live in another nation, than where a man shall be condemned for an offence done by a subsequent law" (1)

a view supported by Packer (2), and the views of Skippon (3), Whalley (4) and Boteler who went so far as to say that

"If I were sure to loose my life in the next parliament, for the principles I hold now, I should not stick to give my vote that this man deserves death." (5)

Boteler's words are very ironical given events at the Restoration. Clearly he would not have minded if, to paraphrase Cromwell, Naylor's case became his own. On the 26 December the Protector's letter in which he demanded to know on what grounds the House proceeded was read. Adam Baynes had warned the House that it was vulnerable to this danger as early as 8 December (6). The letter threw the officers and the House in general off balance. Scout Master George Downing argued unequivocally that the House had complete competence to deal with the case. He claimed that the existing House of Commons now united the powers of the previous Lords and Commons, but he soon changed his view (7). Goffe, before the arrival of the letter, had in his accustomed Godly

(2) ibid., p. 99.
(3) ibid., p. 101.
(4) ibid., p. 101.
(5) ibid., p. 113.
(6) ibid., p. 59.
(7) ibid., pp. 248, 254.
fashion, perhaps gone too far in his demand for a strict punishment for Naylor than he would have done in retrospect. He said

"I shall not entertain an irreverent thought of The Instrument of Government. I shall spend my blood for it. Yet if it hold out anything to protect such persons I would have it burnt in the fire." (1)

Sydenham, Hewson and Fleetwood showed themselves to be rather taken aback and worried by the letter. They favoured setting up a committee to look into the matter to try and come up with an answer to Cromwell. (2) Boteler displaying insecurity wished that Cromwell had intervened earlier, while Packer favoured a debate, which would involve, he felt, less loss of face to the House and in which the House's constitutional position could be examined. He was supported in this by Sydenham and Worsley. (3) Whalley showed himself both politically naive as well as tactless when he said that the House of Lords and Star Chamber had passed greater sentences and that, therefore, the present House could do so as well. (4) It was an extraordinary remark to come from a man who had fought against royal tyranny to make, but quite in keeping with his character. Reynolds suggested a way out by urging the House to vote that Naylor's case and punishment should not be made a precedent. His suggestion was backed by Sydenham. (5) Both failed to see that a mere vote of the House could not stop it from becoming a precedent.

(1) ibid., p. 108.
(2) ibid., pp. 247, 248, 253.
(3) ibid., p. 257.
(4) ibid., p. 260.
(5) ibid., pp. 270, 274.
Disborowe, who appears to have been absent when the letter came, favoured rectifying the mistake if it turned out that one had been made. He was worried that it might become a precedent. Like the other speakers he did not want to get on the wrong side of Cromwell. This was evident in the speech by Luke Robinson, a correspondent of Robert Lilburne, in which he asked

"What is above the jurisdiction of a Parliament?"

He felt that it was not the multitude and hoped that the jurisdiction of Parliament would not be questioned. However, he was aware that there could be a possible conflict between Protector and Council and Parliament and advocated a commission to look at precedents and present them to Cromwell. Nevertheless, his assumption was that Parliament should argue from a position of strength, very much the view of a Rumper. Finally, came Lambert's speech, an impressive one, in which he still adhered firmly to the line of 1653 embodied in The Instrument. But in his speech he also shows signs of being slightly on the defensive. He said it was no good supporting a commission until Parliament had worked out exactly what its position was. He hoped that it could be safely assumed that

"A right understanding between his Highness and the Parliament is certainly the salus populi."

But he added, in a somewhat threatening tone, "I hope it will also be thought suprema lex". Fearing that Naylor's case was being exploited

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(1) ibid., p. 271.
(2) ibid., p. 271.
by some to question the constitution established by The Instrument
he proceeded to justify the Council of State and its recent policies.

"Some of us wish that we might serve you in any
other place with greater hazard of our lives",

possibly a reference to the army members of the Council and further
active service on behalf of the cause. He argued that the recogni-
tion had been necessary and that free Parliaments would have resulted
in a situation whereby

"those may creep into this House, who may come
to sit as our judges for all we have done in
this Parliament, or at any other time or place."

This was an argument that the Three Colonels had overlooked. Lambert
then swung the debate back to the question of the power of Parliaments,
and the dangers of a parliamentary dictatorship arising therefrom, the
alleged motive for the expulsion of the Rump in 1653. Lambert skill-
fully denied that he was arguing about Naylor in particular

"lest it may seem to plead too far for liberty
of conscience",

but warned of the dangers of free Parliaments in the future. They
might result in the present servants of the state being hauled before
the bar of the House. Lambert felt that for an unspecified time in
the future a necessarily unrepresentative group, a revolutionary minority
in modern parlance, would have to guide the cause forward. He added

"We ought to take care to leave things certain and
not expose the people's liberties to an arbitrary
power."

(1) ibid., pp. 231-282.
In the rejection of Lambert's views by the Parliament because they wanted to see Protector and Parliament as the dynamo for progress, not Protector and Council with the army in the background, one of the main causes for the disequilibrium of the next few months and also one of the principal reasons for Lambert's fall can be seen.

The House showed no inclination to raise the sleeping dog once more when early in the new year the Speaker reminded it that it still had to reply to Cromwell. As Burton put it

"I heare it will never be mentioned again, if it be, I dread the consequence. Absit." (1)

Naylor's case was soon surpassed in importance by other developments and it is possible that those who had realised that the constitution was in need of amendment were hard at work devising an alternative.

It is generally agreed that it was the Major Generals themselves who were in favour of going to Parliament to get the decimation approved. (2) However, in this they were not just supported by the "military party" on the Council. Thurloe also supported the move. (3) The debates reveal differences of opinion amongst the officer M.P.'s. Hewson, Kelsey, Packer and Lambert were in favour of a tax against Royalists defined broadly and in the case of Lambert for a hard line against all malignants, while Whalley felt it ought to be stressed that it was only against those who had been active for Charles Stuart. Whalley's caution was shared by Colonel Philip Jones. Disborowe, who

(1) ibid., p. 296; Wilson and Merli, art. cit., p. 56.
(2) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 19; Firth, Last Years, pp. 107-103.
(3) Burton, I, p. 237.
had introduced the bill, was for defining cavaliers more closely
"It is their reformation not their ruin, is desired". (1) The
debate was re-opened in the new year when the question of a possible
contravention of the Act of Indemnity, touched upon at its first
airing, received further attention. Broghill in a very eloquent
speech spoke out against the bill and in what seems to have been a
deliberately condescending tone, suggested that the Major Generals who
had acted under it in the interim of Parliaments should be indemnified.
He argued that they had acted "in emergency, and mere necessity for
self preservation". (2) Not surprisingly this raised the hackles of
some of the Major Generals. Robert Lilburne muttered that

"he scorned to accept that indemnity, he would
venture his indemnity." (3)

Broghill was gleefully emphasising that the assumption behind the
Major Generals seeking a parliamentary confirmation of the decimation
tax was that they were inferior to a Parliament, and, that by implica-
tion, the whole army was as well. He also realised that the Major
Generals had advanced their Achilles heel for the Parliament to strike
at. But that is not how the officers viewed matters. Perhaps they
thought they were being magnanimous in putting the bill before Parlia-
ment. Broghill was certainly growing in influence at the Protector's
court and in his circle of advisers. Henry Cromwell was glad that
his father was taking Broghill's advice and felt that it was time to

(1) ibid., pp. 235, 237, 240-42; c.f. Firth, Last Years,
pp. 103-110.

(2) Burton, I, pp. 310-313.

(3) ibid., p. 313.
do something to counteract what he saw as the designs of the Major Generals especially as he felt the Protector had "so complyant and well-affected a parliament to back him therein". \(^{(1)}\) Henry Cromwell was in favour of power being more heavily weighted in favour of civilians.

The debate provoked quite an abrupt and frank outburst from Disborowe defending the actions of the Major Generals. As in Lambert's speech over Naylor's case there are signs of defensiveness. Disborowe said that the decimation tax was too low and should be higher, thus throwing his old-year plea for reconciliation out of the window.

"It is blows not fair words that settled and must settle the peace of England. Haply, you may find them speaking good words. Let us consider what they would do by us, if they had the power ... It is our swords must indemnify us." \(^{(2)}\)

The Major Generals made the decimation tax into a vote of confidence in themselves, and effectively into one on the army too. Lambert said

"The quarrel is now between light and darkness, not who shall rule, but whether we shall live or be preserved, or no." \(^{(3)}\)

In the end the House did not see it that way; they could envisage settlement without the need for a military presence bearing down as heavily as the Major Generals had. The rejection of the bill and Cromwell's indifference, if not thankfulness for its defeat, increased

\(^{(1)}\) B.M. Lansdowne Ms. 823, f.336; c.f. Thurloe, VI, p. 93. He was not so outspoken to his father \(\text{ibid.}, \text{p. } 222\).  
\(^{(2)}\) Burton, I, pp. 315-317.  
\(^{(3)}\) \text{ibid.}, p. 319.
the sense of alienation among the officers, and presented a frightening prospect to the more perceptive of them, that in terms of politics, for the first time since 1647 the army could become superfluous. (1)

In the meantime the question of the succession had come up once more. After a debate on 19 January in which it was decided that the House should express their thanks to Cromwell for the recent seizure of Spanish ships, John Ash urged that Cromwell should be requested to take upon himself the government according to the ancient constitution. Disborowe was somewhat startled by this and said firmly that it would be "but a slendour prop (for the Protector) without taking care to secure his enemies. Downing came out in favour of kingship. Perhaps Ash was letting the kingship cat out of the bag prematurely. (2) The question of kingship was the subject of discussion behind the scenes during the next month until Pack presented his proposals for a new constitution on 23 February.

The chronology of the kingship crisis has been very well covered by Sir Charles Firth in the second part of his article in the English Historical Review, (3) and it is not proposed here to cover the same ground. What emerges from the sources Firth prints is that there was a clear civilian/military split over this issue, one which emerged from the very presentation of Pack's proposals. However, there was also a split within the military itself. It is this split and the impact of the crisis on the army that will be focused upon here. The

(1) For the rejection of the bill q.v. Firth, Last Years, I, pp. 124-125; Clarke Papers, III, pp. 87 + n., 91; q.v. also Burton, I, p. 331 for the sort of anti-army, not just anti-Major General, gossiping that went on among some M.P.s.


(3) C. H. Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., XVIII, 1903, pp. 52-80; q.v. also Firth, Last Years, I, Chapters V and VI.
officers who appear to have been uncompromisingly against kingship were Lambert, Sydenham, Baynes, Hewson, Sankey, Salmon, Mills, Mason, Lilburne and Pride. Those who were for it were the ageing Skippon, Philip Jones, Richard Ingoldsby, Howard, Reynolds and Broghill. Fleetwood and Disborowe were opposed to it but didn't want to see it blown up into a crisis of major proportions if this could be avoided. Whalley, Goffe and Boteler wavered and Cooper moved from opposition to support for the move. The attitude of the rest of the officers, and of the army in general, is less easy to determine. But one thing is clear, the crisis really only affected that part of the army in and around London. The forces in Scotland and Ireland waited upon events although the authorities in London were worried lest some of the opponents of kingship should try and spread their propaganda to the other armies. Henry Cromwell wrote to Droghill after the army petition of 8 May that some "incendiaries" had come to Ireland but he hoped they would not get far. (1) Monck was warned by Cromwell of the possibility that copies of the army petition might be sent northwards and he was instructed to search the posts to prevent any copies of the petition from being distributed. Monck promised Cromwell that there would be no trouble in Scotland and immediately wrote to his fellow officers warning them to be on the look out for the petition which he said had a post-script

(1) B. N. Lansdowne, 823, ff. 337-338; Thurloe, VI, p. 291.
"of a very bad and dangerous consequence, and it is certainly set on by some people ill disposed to peace and settlement."

He added that the original petitioners "have dissociated themselves from the post-script", which in fact they had. (1)

By all accounts Lambert was vehemently opposed to the kingship proposal from the moment of its introduction. According to the Venetian ambassador, he denounced the proposal as contrary to the oaths and protestations every one had made and to the reasons why they had fought the war, and that he saw no real reason to make any change. He would be content if Parliament would nominate a successor. (2)

Lambert was opposing the offer of kingship and not necessarily the rest of Pack's proposals. The Major Generals approached Cromwell; of all the officers they obviously had the easiest access to the Protector. They went to see him on the very evening of the day that Pack had presented his proposals. It was a tense and awkward situation with no words passing between either side for a quarter of an hour, showing both the awe and deference they still had for Cromwell. At this stage they were not coming to threaten or challenge Cromwell. They felt somewhat confused and appeared to be coming to Cromwell to ask him to do something, to pull something out of the hat to save the situation. Cromwell must have sensed this and after they had complained to him about the parliament he turned on them and not mincing

(1) Firth, 'Scotland and the Protectorate', p. 354; Thurloe, VI, p. 310.

(2) C.S.P.V. 1657-1659, p. 22; Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1903, p. 55; Firth, Last Years, I, pp. 132-133.
his words asked

"What would you have me do? Are they not of your own garbling? Did you not admit whom you pleased and keep out whom you pleased? And now do you complain to me?"

It was unfair, but showed once more that Cromwell was dissociating himself from the Major Generals. (1)

The Major Generals were soon made aware that disquiet over Parliament's proposals extended to other officers as well and immediately Lambert, as the chief figure opposing kingship took swift action to control and co-ordinate these sentiments, to prevent them from becoming unmanageable. (2) There are good grounds for arguing that Lambert, while appreciating the tactical value of having a good number of fellow officers opposed to kingship, was determined not to let their opposition get out of hand. Moreover, it appears that this extended opposition emerged spontaneously and was not stirred up by Lambert, but that he tried to control it. (3) Thurloe tries to convey the impression that Lambert was fomenting the trouble and even to make the crisis appear as a personal difference or even rivalry between Lambert and Cromwell. (4) The outcome of these rumblings in the army was the famous meeting between Cromwell and the officers on 27 February when the Protector rounded on them and gave a very personalised and distorted account of the way in which he felt he had been

(1) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1903, p. 59.
C.f. Trevor-Roper, 'Oliver Cromwell and his Parliaments', in Religion, the Reformation and Social Change, p. 382, for a different interpretation of Cromwell's relationship with his Major Generals at this time.

(2) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1903, p. 59.

(3) Clarke Papers, III, p. 93.

(4) Thurloe, VI, pp. 74, 93 especially the latter.
pushed around by the army. (1) It must have been delivered with the same sort of confidence he had exuded a few days before, a confidence inspired by the belief that at long last perhaps the odds for the much sought after harmony with Parliament were extremely favourable and that in future instead of the Protector having to base his power on the army he could base it much more on Parliament, and that thus the policy of healing and settling could flourish on surer ground. There is no doubt that he was encouraged in all this by his civilian advisors, particularly Broghill, whose standing increased throughout the crisis. (2) Cromwell's own evaluation of what Pack's proposals meant to him is made in one of his speeches during the crisis, on 8 April, in which he says

"No man can put a greater value than I hope I do, and shall do, upon the desires and advices of the parliament." (3)

However, Cromwell and his advisers were making a basic tactical error if they felt they could dispense with the army's advice, or ignore it as Henry Cromwell was urging Broghill to get Cromwell to do. (4) There is a great deal in Sir Charles Firth's remark that

"the officers were the representatives of the Cromwellian party, the army was the constituency Cromwell represented." (5)

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(1) Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, pp. 417-418. C.f. Thurloe's remarks on the speech (Thurloe, VI, p. 93). He glosses over the differences between Cromwell and the officers as does Reynolds (B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff.316-317); c.f. the Venetian ambassador's report where Cromwell is alleged to have said that the meeting "deserved to be called a threat rather than a friendly conference" (C.S.P.V. 1657-1659, p. 27).

(2) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff.326-327.

(3) Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, p. 453.

(4) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 832, ff.329-30, 331-32, 336, 337-338; Thurloe, VI, p. 93.

(5) Firth, Last Years, I, p. 133.
Meanwhile, efforts were made by the pro-kingship members of the army to organise themselves. This lobby contained a number of the Irish officers many of whom sat for Irish constituencies in the Parliament, and most of whom, with the exception of Hewson and Sankey were in favour of kingship. (1) The meetings took place at Downing's house. Downing was apparently responsible for leaking the account of the meeting of 27 February. Charles Howard and Colonel Ingoldsby, although it is not clear if this was Richard, the regicide, or his younger brother Henry, are specifically mentioned as attending. (2)

It is possible that those who attended these meetings were also responsible for the deputation that went to Cromwell on 5 March. But this deputation, of some nine or ten officers chosen from a much larger number, is not necessarily identical with the pro-kingship group. It is equally conceivable, and in some ways more plausible, that they were the delegation Cromwell had recommended the officers to send him for further satisfaction when he made his speech on 27 February and that they represented the middle ground of the officers who were genuinely shocked by Cromwell's speech and were keen to try and patch up the differences and to restore the harmony between Cromwell and the officers. (3)

(1) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1903, p. 55. Cooper who is also mentioned as anti-kingship changed sides.

(2) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff. 312-313.

The crisis was abated somewhat by the resolution to postpone the debate on the question of kingship until the extent of the powers to be granted the King had been worked out in detail. (1) Jephson, on whose account we rely for this, claimed that this was done with Cromwell's consent in an attempt to gain time to win over Fleetwood and possibly Disborowe whom he hoped would then use their influence on the rest of the army. Perhaps Cromwell and his advisers were hoping to play on Fleetwood's well-known indecisiveness, but their belief that they could win over Disborowe seems to have been unwarranted as he had opposed the idea of kingship from the days when it was first mentioned in January. (2) They might also have been hoping to drive a wedge between Lambert on the one hand and Fleetwood and Disborowe on the other.

During March the other clauses of Pack's proposals were debated, including those for the setting up of the 'Other House' and religious toleration. (3) It was resolved unanimously to accept in principle the provision for a bi-cameral parliament. The army could agree to the idea of a second chamber, provided it was not either in

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(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff. 312-313.
(2) ibid., loc. cit. Jephson's letter is partly written in cypher some of which the editor of a very useful, but unpublished, edition of Lansdowne Ms. 821-823 has been unable to decipher with complete assurance (C. Jones, 'The Correspondence of Henry Cromwell 1655-1659, and other Papers, from the B. N. Lansdowne Ms. 821-823', Lancaster M. Litt, 1969, p. 337). Q.v. also, Burton, I, p. 363.
(3) Q.v. Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1903, pp. 62-64.
name or power the same as the old House of Lords. The 'Other House' could be seen as resolving the shortcomings of The Instrument that had become apparent during Naylor's case and as a way of further preventing the danger of perpetual parliaments which had been one of the army's consistent dislikes in the 1650's. Besides, the 'Other House' could offer many of the officers a chance to be actively and formally involved in politics. Later in the year Fleetwood and Disborowe argued that the power of nomination to the 'Other House' should be in Cromwell alone. Disborowe said that

"if we have the same confidence in His Highness that formerly we had, that he will do things for the good of the nation, we need not fear to leave it to him."

Sydenham was worried lest the traditional peers would try to claim that they had a right to sit in the 'Other House' and had some qualms about giving the power of nomination to Cromwell solely. However, the point to be emphasised in all this is that the military were not opposed to the idea of a second chamber per se. The attitude of Lambert in early March to the decision of the House to proceed with the other clauses of Pack's proposals is unclear. Sometime after Cromwell's speech on 27 February the Venetian ambassador says that he withdrew from the Parliament. Other commentators say that he was silent in the House over the next few days. Either way he remained active on the Council of State during these days, indeed, up to the time of his dismissal. Unlike Harrison before his eclipse he did not withdraw.

(1) Burton, II, pp. 297-301; c.f. Firth, Last Years, I, pp. 141-149.
(2) C.S.P.V. 1657-1659, p. 27; Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1903, pp. 58, 63; C.S.P.D. 1656-1657, p. XXII.
from positions of power. On the question of religious toleration the House passed a clause which was altogether more restrictive than that of The Instrument, news of which Downing passed on approvingly to William Clarke in Scotland. (1)

With the re-emergence of the kingship question for debate on 24 March, controversy began to rage once more. The opponents of kingship must have taken heart from some of the reports reaching them. On 8 March one of Captain Adam Baynes's correspondents in the north wrote that he met

"with none of ye Army or their frends that are free but averse to it in these parts and is rather looked upon as a Touchstone upon some differences of great persons then any free offer to yt. change."

He hoped God would direct "our Grandees to peace and unity" least the common enemy benefited. He added that he found

"ye Presbyter smile at this difference in hopes my Lord will sue his interest, ye Cavaleer does laugh to see us setting up ye things we have pulled down but I am still in your opinion my Lord Prot(ector), our best master upon earth, will find his best frends they that have, must and will defend him and ye peace of this poore nation when he commands, X (and?) they be ye Army."

On 10 March the same correspondent wrote

"I am sure I meet not with an honest true lover of my Lord Protector in the west riding but rather wish my Lord Prot would refuse ye title."

(1) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1903, p. 62.
He repeated that the common enemy continued to rejoice at the planned change

"And ye army frends are punctually (emphatically, G.E.D.) against it." (1)

Baynes himself was, of course, one of the original opponents of kingship and had favoured calling Pack to the bar of the House for introducing his proposals. (2) What is interesting about this grass roots opinion reaching London is the fundamental trust in Cromwell and the belief that his strength was in the army.

On 26 March the House voted in favour of asking Cromwell to become King and this caused a fatalistic response among some of the Major Generals, six of whom were reported to have gone to Cromwell

"and tolde him that although whilst it was in debate they opposed it, yet nowe observing a series of Providence in it, they were sattisfyed, and withall that itt was his duty to accept it." (3)

The six probably included Whalley, Boteler and Goffe all of whose attitudes towards kingship were beginning to soften. (4) The attempts during April to get Cromwell to accept the title and his prevarications are well-known and have already been well-covered. (5) During this period Fleetwood and Disborowe were won over to accepting the other provisions in Pack's proposals. (6)

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(1) B.M. Add. Ms. 21424, ff.224, 225; c.f. ibid., f.216.
(2) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1903, p. 55.
(3) ibid., pp. 64-65, 66.
(4) ibid., p. 67; B. M. Lansdowne/822, f.34; q.v. also Thurloe, VI, p. 157 for Colonel Thomas Cooper's reasons for his conversion to kingship.
(5) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1903, pp. 67-74; Firth, Last Years, I, pp. 150-191; Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, pp. 433-509.
(6) Thurloe, VI, p. 219; Firth 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1903, p. 69.
a head early in May with the presentation of the army petition on the 31st. By this time "the spattering dirte which is throwne about here", as Richard Cromwell had described the intrigue surrounding the whole crisis, (1) was becoming by turns malicious, petty and nasty and it was obvious that a decision would have to be taken one way or the other to end the speculation and restore some sort of stability in the government and in the army. Reynolds, a supporter of kingship, who was about to be appointed commander of the expeditionary force to Flanders, was reluctant to go. He accused Fleetwood to his face of trying to get rid of him, which Fleetwood denied. Francis Russell did not support such a view. He felt that Cromwell was behind the appointment and that he was pressing Reynolds too hard to go on this important expedition. Reynolds' reluctance must be ascribed to personal reasons and not to political ones. The command of a British expeditionary force was quite prestigious. Reynolds' reservations, besides a basic unwillingness, may well also stem from the fact that he was originally to go as second-in-command, but that he stuck to his guns and made it clear that he would not accept the inferior position but would only be content with the full command. He got his way, and on 25 April he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the force. On 22 April Henry Cromwell had written to his father recommending that Reynolds who had "bin allways faithfull and industrious in your highnes service"

(1) B. N. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff.324-325.
be given a command equal to his merit. He also referred to the rumour that Reynolds was being sent to France for political reasons. Sir Francis Russel wrote to Henry Cromwell to tell him that Pride had charged Russel with being pro-kingship because he hoped Henry would become King eventually. These baseless accusations and insults continued even after the refusal of kingship. On 12 May the inflamed passions between civilians and army officers came to a head in a verbal clash between Pride and John Goodwin, M.P. Pride said that Goodwin should be called to the bar for claiming that the evil counsellors advising Cromwell not to listen to his Parliament—presumably he meant the anti-kingship army officers—were like those who brought about the quarrel with the last King. Goodwin tartly replied that Pride ought to be brought to the bar for killing the bears, for which he was applauded.

Pride was also one of the main instigators of the army petition of 8 May to Parliament. Another was Dr. John Owen, one of Cromwell's chaplains, who was to become even more influential among the senior army officers in 1659 when Lambert, Disborowe, Fleetwood, Berry, Whalley, Goffe and Sydenham were members of his Church at Whitehall. Owen also had links with old Rumpers like Ludlow and Vane and

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(1) ibid., 822, ff.45-46, 47-48, 57-58, 63-64; Thurloe, VI, p. 223, 230-231. Reynolds' force was partly recruited from existing regiments, C.S.P.D. 1656-1657, p. 374. For a discussion of the composition of the force and the circumstances surrounding Reynolds's death in December 1657 q.v. below.

(2) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 822, ff.57-58.

(3) ibid., ff. 71-72; Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 26n.
it is quite conceivable that his Church became in 1659 what the Nag's Head had been in 1647, an informal meeting place for politicians of differing views to talk things over and work out tactics.\(^1\) However, this is to look ahead. In 1657 Owen was vehemently opposed to kingship and at the beginning of March, shortly after the decision to postpone debate on the title, he was reported to have left London in great haste and anger.\(^2\)

According to Ludlow it was Pride who advocated the approach to Owen who is said to have drawn up the petition. Pride, Ludlow suggests, stampeded Disborowe into it, and, with the help of Lt. Colonel Mason, some 26 or 27 officers were cajoled into signing.\(^3\) However, a newsletter in the Clarke Mss. says that both Lambert and Disborowe denied any foreknowledge of the petition. This ties in with Fleetwood's account that he was ignorant of it until Cromwell told him about it. This would suggest that the petition was indeed a spontaneous act and that it did not originate from the trio of most senior officers, but from the next level down. The involvement in the presentation to Parliament of a man of Goffe's stature in the army, who had previously been said to be coming round to favouring kingship, was a warning that it could not be taken lightly. This would also explain why Fleetwood found the petition "honest" but "unreasonable". It could, after all, be read as a challenge to the army leadership, although it was certainly not intended to be so.\(^4\)

The House saw the petition as further proof

\(^1\) P. Toon, God's Statesman, the Life and Work of John Owen, Exeter, 1971, pp. 106, 110; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823, f.251.

\(^2\) ibid., p 821; f.324-325-326.

\(^3\) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 25; Thurloe, VI, p. 231; Firth, Last Years, I, pp. 190-191.

\(^4\) Clarke Ms. 29, f.60v; Clarke Papers, III, p. 105; Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E.H.R., 1905, p. 75; Thurloe, VI, p. 281 says Mason was the chief promoter of the petition.
of the threat the army could be to its own status, and it must have made many M.P.s even more determined to press on with getting the proposals accepted. The petition has not survived. Ludlow gives what is probably a pretty full and accurate precis. The petition alleged that the supporters of kingship were hoping that Cromwell's acceptance of the title would destroy him and weaken the hands of those who had been faithful to the cause. (1) This can be read simply either as paranoia, or as the natural reflexive response of members of a body which saw itself as the vanguard of the cause. The conspiracy theory is a common reaction among any strongly committed ideological group.

The army petition and the threatened resignations of Lambert, Disborowe and Fleetwood forced Cromwell to make up his mind and to reject kingship. Attractive as it may have appeared to have been able to go forward in harness with a solid civilian backing, Cromwell realised that the army was still the most important variable in politics.

It is necessary to try and account for the reasons why the offer of the crown became such a major crisis. A number of general points can be made. Firstly, the crisis represents primarily a civilian/military conflict but with both groups being internally divided as well. Secondly, the military opponents of kingship cannot be equated with either Rampers or Republicans, although such groups tried to exploit it.

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(1) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 27.
The army petition of 8 May "slipt into the presse", as one of William Clarke's correspondents put it. Perhaps this was deliberate. It was published with a post-script inviting two men from each regiment to own and subscribe to it. The post-script was apparently in favour of a commonwealth. Some of the officers were questioned about it and denied any knowledge of it claiming that it was a part of a design to discredit them. The other officers also dissociated themselves from it. (1) Thirdly, the proposals, or Humble Petition and Advice, was the first attempt at settlement to emerge from civilians. Fourthly, the crisis helped make the possibility of a split within the army a distinct possibility. It marked the most serious threat to unity among the officer corps since the Presbyterian officers had left the army in the spring and summer of 1647. Harrison, as has been shown, had no real following in the army in 1653 and the sort of discontent associated with the 'plots' of 1654-1655 was much more individualised and easily contained by silencing the officers involved. During these crises the officers had stood by Cromwell. But in 1657 the crisis was taking place at the centre not in Scotland, on the periphery, where its impact was much diminished. There was a danger of a rift between Cromwell and a sizeable number of his officers. Opposition to kingship ran quite deep amongst them. For this reason Professor Trevor-Roper's view that the opposition to kingship would have "evaporated"

if Cromwell had cashiered a few of the senior officers "silently" is very questionable. (1) Cromwell was in no position to carry out a night of the long knives.

As for the soldiery we have few glimpses as to how they reacted to the crisis. It seems as if they were apathetic for the most part. On 21 April Thurloe wrote to Henry Cromwell saying that

"Many of the soldiery are not only content, but are very well-affected with this change. Some indeed grumble, but that's the most for ought I can perceive."

In June the Venetian ambassador said that "the simple soldiers" were happy with the refusal of the title. He added his subjective view that the officers did not like so much power concentrated in the hands of Cromwell and were trying to convey this to the soldiery, but that they would not listen as they only objected to the title. (2)

The question of kingship aroused so much passion in the army and hostility to the Parliament because in a way it was a challenge to the army's supremacy in politics. In the background was the general instability of the Protectorate and the doubts about its ability to become a lasting form of government. The experience of the first Protectorate Parliament which had tried to alter the constitution, the resort to the Major Generals, the issues raised by Naylor's case all showed the need for an overhaul of The Instrument if the Cromwellian policy of healing and settling was to be accepted by and take a firm hold on the nation. Sindercombe's plot and the plans for

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(1) Trevor-Roper, 'Oliver Cromwell and his Parliaments', in Religion, Reformation and Social Change, p. 384.

(2) Thurloe, VI, p. 219; C.S.P.V. 1657-1659, p. 71.
a Fifth Monarchist rising (Venner's plot)\(^{(1)}\) gave a further and more immediate impetus to the desire to settle the government on a more solid foundation. The political nation was at long last looking to Cromwell to provide this foundation and he in return was beginning to realise that he could look to them also. The problem was the army. The army's opposition to kingship, as with its support for a dissolution of the Rump in April 1653, was prompted by both rational and irrational factors. There was the feeling of wounded pride, a dislike of being outflanked by civilians interfering with The Instrument which was felt to be the army's child. This was exacerbated because it came at a time when the army itself was at a loss to come up with any alternative itself. It was reaching a stage of uncreative bankruptcy. The fact that the army petition of 8 May had to be drafted by a civilian symbolises this in a dramatic way. But there was also the perception that the civilian promoters of the Humble Petition were getting at the army, trying to reduce its power and influence in politics. The point was made quite clearly by Thurloe when he summarised the views of the kingship lobby:

"The title is not the question, but it's the office, which is known to the laws and this people. They knowe their duty to a kinge and his to them. Whateuer else there is will be wholly new, and be nothinge else but a probationer, and upon the next occasion wil be changed againe. Besides they say the nowe protector came in by the sword out of parliament, and will never be the ground of any settlement, nor will there be a free parliament soe-longe as that"

\(^{(1)}\) Firth, Last Years, I, pp. 36–38, 212–217.
continues; and as it savours of the sword now, soe it wil at last bringe all thinges to be military. These and other considerations make men who are for settlement steady in their resolution as to this government now in hand; not that they lust after a kinge, or are peevish upon any account of opposition; but they would lay foundations of libertye and freedome, which they judge this the next way to."

It was a point also made by T.B., a member of Parliament and supporter of kingship. He felt that the anti-kingship group opposed it because "Sword dominion is too sweet to be parted with, and the truth is (whatsoever kind of squeeziness we may pretend to) that the single issue, the maine dread is that the civill power shall swallow up the military." (3)

At one stage Cromwell appeared to be being won over to this idea of curbing the military. On 11 April at the meeting with the parliamentary commissioners Oliver was said to have remarked "that he would rather take any title from the Parliament than keepe a title given him by anybody else." (4)

The fear that civilians were trying to undermine the cause lies behind the army petition of 8 May. The kingship crisis as a whole reinforced the view in the army that it was the guardian of the good old cause. The attempt to give the government a much more obviously civilian appearance and quality had run into dangerous waters and the success

(1) Thurloe, VI, p. 219.

(2) Thomas Burton?

(3) Carte Ms. 227, f.84, quoted in Clarke Papers, III, p. 105n.

(4) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 822, ff.37-33; c.f. the retrospective account of this meeting, possibly by Fiennes, Monarchy Reasserted, repr. in Somers Tracts, VI, p. 346 ff.; Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, pp. 456-461.
Cromwell had had in carrying along the vast majority of the army with him in pursuing the policy of the respectable revolution, a policy which by and large had been followed since 1649, was beginning to come unstuck. Ironically, this was to push the army further to the left, into the hands of Rumpers and Republicans. It is in early 1657 that a collapse of unity among the officers on a dangerous scale comes close to reality and that the seeds of the chaos of 1659–1660 are sown. It is in 1657 that the army's creative political energies run out with the disastrous consequences this was to have both for itself and for the English Revolution.
The political controversy did not stop with Cromwell's refusal of kingship. It took over another two weeks for the House to vote to change the title from King to Protector and for the Humble Petition and Advice to be formally offered to Cromwell with this change. (1) The tension between the pro and anti-kingship members persisted during the debates on the powers of the Lord Protector. The pro-kingship group seemed to feel that they had suffered only a temporary setback. Downing favoured leaving the first article of the Humble Petition as it stood, that is that all acts should be valid under either title, King or Lord Protector. Sydenham queried this, but Downing replied

"I would have it stand as it does. It may be that his conscience (Cromwell's) may receive conviction." (2)

Thurloe wrote to Henry Cromwell that any mention of the word King in reference to the constitution went down badly with the anti-kingship group. (3)

Outside the House and in the army there was concern to stop attitudes favourable to kingship from spreading. Robert Lilburne wrote to his fellow Yorkshire M.P., Luke Robinson about the change of

(1) Firth, Last Years, I, pp. 193–200.
(2) Burton, II, pp. 140–141.
(3) Thurloe, VI, pp. 310–311.
the title from King to Protector. He asked Robinson to speak to Captain Thomas Strangeways about Major William Goodrick. Lilburne feared that Goodrick was "much a new royalist" and might well try to disseminate his views among the soldiery. He suspected that there was some ulterior motive behind Goodrick's departure for the north and recommended that the officers and soldiers of Lambert's horse regiment, then stationed in the north, should be informed about all this. Lilburne's letter was "intercepted."(1) This could either be because the government, or at least Thurloe, was still suspicious of some of the anti-kingship officers or it might be that all letters to Robinson were being intercepted.

The Parliament continued to sit until it was prorogued on 26 June. During the last weeks of the Parliament the opponents of kingship played as full a part in its proceedings as any of the other members. But the vindictiveness between the pro and anti-kingship groups continued to smoulder. It became more open in the debates over settling lands on both Broghill and Fleetwood in recognition of past services. The moves to award these grants came at a time when some members were beginning to feel guilty about the amount of time being spent on private rather than public business. On 1 June there was a debate over the question of settling lands to the value of £1,000 per annum on Broghill. Samuel Highland, Colonel Mathews (a courtesy title)

(1) ibid., pp. 292-293.
and Kelsey opposed the move on the ground that the Parliament should settle its own debts before handing out gratuities. Lambert, Fleetwood, Sydenham and Disborowe withdrew before the question was put, probably as a deliberate snub to Broghill. (1) On 8 June Major Anthony Morgan and Major William Aston moved that some reward be given to Fleetwood, and Whitelocke and Strickland moved that it might be £1,500 per annum in lands. Morgan wrote to Henry Cromwell saying that he had been encouraged to present his motion by Lambert and others. Fleetwood was said to be delighted with the move. Perhaps Lambert and the other supporters of the proposition were trying to get even for the money given to Broghill, but as other members, including Disborowe, commented such largesse to fellow M.P.s could do the House's reputation no good in the eyes of the nation. As Disborowe put it

"You are in debt to many poor people that want bread, whose cries ascend high; many poor soldiers unsatisfied, and great occasion for monies as ever you had."

His colleagues Whalley and Goffe supported the motion and Lambert, somewhat facetiously, commented:

"I would not have it said the nation is in that weak condition that this will undo them. The honourable person deserves a great deal more."

What Lambert was playing at, by pressing behind the scenes for the proposal, remains a mystery. It could have been, as he said, that he thought Fleetwood deserved such a reward, or that he was getting tit–for–

(1) Burton, II, pp. 175–179.
tat with Broghill or even that he was trying to wreck the proceedings and prestige of the House. One would tend to suspect that there was a more subtle reason than merely benevolence. Either way the motion was reckless, as Robert Beake pointed out:

"We cannot cloister up this vote within these walls. It will appear without doors. You have followed the very worst path and track that the Long Parliament trod in."

No wonder the junior officers and the soldiery became so profoundly disillusioned by 1659. Fleetwood was more tactful and gallantly refused the award. (1)

The last few days of the session were devoted to amending the Humble Petition into what became known as the Additional Petition and Advice. There was a fierce debate on the question of oaths for the Protector, the Council of State and the Parliament. It was over the question of oaths that Lambert was to resign at the beginning of July. The debates show that there were considerable differences among the officers on this issue.

On 23 June the new oath for Cromwell was debated. The justification for a new oath was felt to be based on the fact that the Humble Petition was setting up a new form of government and that the Protector should be bound to it. Both Boteler and Whitelocke argued that at the moment there was an "Interregnum" (sic) and that Cromwell should swear the new oath as soon as possible. (2) Lambert

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(1) Burton, II, pp. 197-200, 224; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 822, ff. 84-85; C.S.P.V. 1657-1659, pp. 74-75.

(2) Burton, II, pp. 279, 280.
did not feel the question of oaths to be so important and queried its timing, but at the same time making it clear that he was not opposed to oaths, per se.\(^{(1)}\) On the question of preparing an oath to present to Cromwell Sydenham, Sankey and Lambert were among those opposed to it and Disborowe and Philip Jones among those for it. The debate on the oath continued during the next day when it was broadened out to include the oath to be imposed on the Council of State, or Privy Council. There is no evidence of any filibustering on the part of M.P.s during the debate. Lambert took a full part in it and moved at least one amendment to the oath for the Council which was not accepted.\(^{(2)}\) Sydenham maintained his opposition to all oaths.\(^{(3)}\) There was further division over the proposed oath to be tendered to Parliament. Whalley, Disborowe, Goffe and Philip Jones were in favour of binding Parliament by an oath on the simple grounds that they felt that if Cromwell and the Council were to be under an oath then so too should the Parliament. Sydenham and Lambert opposed it. Sydenham argued that it would make it easy for opportunists to come in and for men of conscience to be kept out, thus showing how far the wheel had turned since the days of the Engagement and how much oaths had been debased over the past few years. He did not like the idea of binding future Parliaments,

\(^{(1)}\) ibid., pp. 276, 277.
\(^{(2)}\) ibid., p. 287; Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, p. 462.
\(^{(3)}\) Burton, II, p. 289.
"You have said you would have Parliament free, and will you now lay a force upon you? I had rather soldiers stood at the door, than my conscience to keep me out. It is worse than a file of musketeers."

Lambert opposed the oath because he felt it would lead to conflict between the legislature and the executive. This was Lambert, the architect of The Instrument speaking. Baynes and Sankey supported an amendment to the oath calling for members to swear to maintain the privileges of Parliament, which Goffe felt was unnecessary. (1)

For the remainder of the 24 June the right of nomination to the Other House was discussed. This has already been mentioned above. There was also some debate on plans for Cromwell's second installation as Protector. Disborowe favoured a modest ceremony and Lambert one involving the sword: "A sword is an emblem of justice". (2) All these debates show that the coalition of anti-kingship officers had split up and that they now found themselves on opposite sides during divisions. Lambert and Sydenham remained cool towards the new constitution, but Disborowe displayed a keenness to get it off the ground and working.

On 26 June Oliver Cromwell was installed for the second time as Lord Protector in a ceremony more pompous than the first one. The persons attending him were more noticeably civilian on this occasion. The Earl of Warwick carried the sword and Lisle, Montagu and Whitelocke were conspicuous. Lambert and most of the officers were said to have

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(2) Ibid., pp. 302-303.
boycotted the proceedings which must have appeared as a deliberate snub to Cromwell, but Fleetwood and Claypole, the Master of the Horse (a ceremonial title) and a vigorous opponent of the decimation tax, were in attendance. However, within a couple of weeks the officers had been won over to a firmer support for the new government. At the beginning of July, Francis Russel wrote to Henry Cromwell that Fleetwood and Disborowe "beginne to grow in request at Whitehall". He also said that Disborowe had made a speech in Parliament in reply to Lambert. This was probably during the debates over oaths when differences of view between Lambert and Disborowe had been apparent.

It was during these debates that Lambert and Sydenham appeared to be isolating themselves. Of all the senior officers Sydenham, a Dorset man, was Lambert's ally. Baynes, a fellow northerner, was more like a client. As we have seen, at one stage Lambert felt obliged to reassure the House that he was not opposed in principle to oaths, an indication that he was having to justify his position. During the debates he had taken every opportunity to show his basic prejudice against the Humble Petition, but he had not opposed it root and branch. By early July he had also isolated himself in the army and maneuvered himself into such a position whereby

(1) Whitelocke, Memorials, IV, pp. 304-305; Clarke Ms. 29, f. 90v.; Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, pp. 561-562; Firth, Last Years, I, p. 200.

(2) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 822, ff. 132-133.
Cromwell was able to purge him easily and with no overt response in his favour from the army. Why was this so? The reason must lie in the fact that during the crisis although there was a lot of revulsion in the army against the title of King which finally forced Cromwell to reject it, there was a very solid middle ground feeling among the officers; that is those who were opposed to the title but who were still prepared to follow Cromwell once that divisive issue had been cast aside. This middle ground feeling had surfaced in the aftermath of Cromwell's speech of 27 February after which, it was suggested above, a delegation representing a large number of officers went along to Cromwell, on 5 March, to try and patch up the differences. This middle ground was probably made up of officers who either genuinely believed that the fate of the cause was bound up inseparably with the fate of Oliver Cromwell, or, at a more mundane level, that their own self-interest was tied up with Cromwell's fate. Lambert miscalculated and underestimated the strength of this feeling; Fleetwood and Disborowe probably subscribed to it, hence their desire to see the new constitution work. Lambert also miscalculated the extent to which he could disagree with the new constitution and get away with it. He was not as important in terms of public relations as Fairfax had been in 1649 when he did not subscribe to the Engagement and yet remained Lord General. Thus, Lambert's fall which there is every reason to believe he did not want to come about, given his continued activity on the Council of State almost up to the moment of his
resignation and his participation in the Parliament, came about very easily. It seems likely that Lambert might in fact have wanted to go back on his decision not to take the oath as member of the Council of State. Thurloe wrote to Henry Cromwell on 28 July saying that an unnamed person

"desired to serve in the counsell, and offered to take his oath; that is passed upon. He is now retired in appearance." (1)

There are good grounds for believing he meant Lambert.

Given the tensions between Protector and army over the previous months Cromwell was lucky only to have to pay such a seemingly small price for the restoration of army unity. (2) But Lambert's dismissal swelled the ranks of former officers with the most substantial figure of all. No pro-Lambert group arose in the army. Sydenham took the oath and was admitted to the Council of State. (3) Thurloe, ever worried about such things, was relieved that Lambert's resignation passed without incident. He wrote to Henry Cromwell

"The army, for ought I can perceive, is generally in a very good posture, and quiet at least, if not fully satisfied, which I hope it is. I am sure there is noe such thing as a formed knot, nor any such endeavours as are spoke of, to remove H.H. back to his former station. Some little men may discourse at randome things that they themselves will not act, if it were come to that I believe H.H. need noe help to govern his armye, nor are thinges in so dangerous a posture as some men may fancy them. (I speake my own apprehensions.) I beleive both the parliament and armye have a very good opinion of and affection for his highesse." (4)


(2) For an account of the events surrounding Lambert's fall q.v. Firth, Last Years, II, pp. 3-5; C.S.P.V. 1657-1659, pp. 87-88.

(3) Clarke Papers, III, p. 114.

(4) Thurloe, VI, p. 412.
Thurloe was perhaps being over optimistic, but he was aware of, and
drawing attention to the fact that uneasiness with the government's
sense of direction and its more civilian appearance, the subconscious
fears behind the kingship crisis, lingered on in the army and could
break out into discontent in the future. For the moment, however,
his assessment that the army was in a quiet posture was pretty
accurate.

At the end of July the officers in London held a meeting
at which they

"appeared most unanimous ... that the present
settlement was the best that had yet been
brought forth and that it was their duty, in
their places and their stations, to strengthen
his Highness's hands."

Even those suspected of disaffection were said to "shew ... satisfaction".
The officers of two regiments wrote to the Protector pledging loyalty.
Thurloe felt that an address might be made by the whole army. (1) Lam-
bert's foot regiment was given to Fleetwood who was also said to be
designated for the Lt. Generalship of the army, and his horse was given
to Diaborowe who was said to be about to become General of the horse.
Eventually Lambert's horse passed to Falconberg, and Whalley became
Lt. General of horse, and Goffe Major General of foot. (2) Fleetwood's
comment on Lambert's fall was brief and unemotional: "such passages
of providence are to be teachings to us". Henry Cromwell was glad

(1) ibid., p. 425. The officers of the two regiments making
the address to Cromwell judging from the context of
Thurloe's letter were probably Lambert's, but they might
well have been Cromwell's. Firth takes them to have been
Lambert's, (Last Years, II, p. 6).

(2) Clarke Papers, III, pp. 114, 132, 141; C.S.P.D. 1657-58,
p. 373.
about Thurloe's news that Cromwell needed no help to govern his army and Monck casually mentioned that he was pleased the officers at their meetings had declared

"soe much affection to the present government, his highnesse and familie." (1)

During the summer and autumn of 1657 the acute financial plight of the nation persisted and prompted plans to cut back on the numbers in the armed forces and on the assessments to support them. (2)

There were plenty of discussions in the Council of State about how best to achieve this. Fleetwood favoured a smaller force, well-paid and well-disciplined. As far as the army in Ireland was concerned, when Henry Cromwell heard of the proposals to reduce the army there he wrote to Thurloe, saying that he would have favoured cutting back on the numbers of officers, not of the soldiers; no doubt thereby hoping to rid himself of what he considered disaffected elements. However, the plans for reducing the armed forces were agreed to by all the officers, but they ran into difficulties on two counts; firstly public safety, or national security, and secondly, the lack of funds to pay off those to be reduced. The planned disbanding does not appear to have got any further than an order to reduce one soldier from each regiment on guard duty throughout the country and for the pay saved thereby to be used for fire and candle. (3)

(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 822, ff. 146-147; Thurloe, VI, pp. 404, 438.
(2) Aylmer, State's Servants, p. 50.
In the middle of November the horse regiments were reported to be 18 weeks in arrears and the foot 14 weeks. For political reasons free quarter was not allowed; 1647 remained firmly implanted in the collective consciousness of the government. This meant that the officers had to seek credit for their men and there were fears that the officers' credit was almost spent. Fleetwood informed Henry Cromwell that the problem of arrears was not so bad in Ireland as in Scotland where it was intended that the reduced forces would be paid off with money originally designed for the standing army. To solve the problem he said that an account of the army's and navy's arrears was being prepared for the next parliamentary session. (1) In the event this got nowhere. Fleetwood tended to play down the problem of arrears in Ireland. In July 1657 the Irish officers had sent over a petition for satisfaction of their pay arrears and complained also that the lands assigned them fell far short of the debts owing them. (2) By early January Fleetwood wrote that the fleet and the army were

"in a goode condicion. This army never hade such an occation to be tempted as they have now, yet are, and I trust will be, in a very staunch and quiet condicion."

He looked forward to the next session of Parliament directing things towards a settlement and felt confident that there was much in the

(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 822, ff. 274-275, 296-297; Clarke Ms 30, f. 13.

(2) Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A. 52, f.7.
existing government that preserved the liberties of the people in religious and temporal matters. (1)

In the meantime the government had also been busy selecting persons to sit in the Other House. Selection was completed on 10 December and the writs of summons were drawn up. (2) In all 67 men received summonses to the Other House. Of these, 19 were members of the army, spanning a wide spectrum of the senior officers at that time, ranging from Falconberg, Richard and Henry Cromwell, through Disborowe and Fleetwood to Pride, and John Jones now back in the army as governor of Anglesey. No one below the rank of Colonel was called and those officers who were summoned were well-known to Cromwell either as Councillors of State, Major Generals or men who had been active on army administration, Mathew Thomlinson, an Irish Councillor recently knighted by Henry Cromwell who now held a high opinion of him despite his former distrust, can also be identified as an army man although technically he was not a member of the army as this time. Three other men were connected or were soon to be connected with the army: Broghill, Edward Montagu, at present Admiral of the Fleet but before the end of the year to be Colonel of the regiment late Stephen Winthorp's, and Lockhart who succeeded Reynolds as Commander in Flanders after the latter's death. (3) It was certainly not the Protector's intention to swamp the Other House with army officers. In the end 42 men accepted the summonses and 37 actually appeared at the first

(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823, ff. 9-10.
(2) Firth, Last Years, II, pp. 10-11; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 822, ff. 292-293.
(3) The circumstances surrounding Reynolds' death will be discussed below.
sitting of the Other House. Assuming that most of the officers summoned were fairly regular attenders this still did not give them a majority in the new house, even had they been a united bloc, which they certainly were not. (1)

The second session of Parliament in which some of those excluded from the first session and from the first Protectorate Parliament, including Haselrig and Scott, were allowed to sit, began on 20 January 1658 and all the field officers around London were ordered to attend Cromwell at Westminster Hall either for a briefing or more likely to hear him make his speech to the Parliament. (2)

Any hopes of harmony prevailing in the new session were soon dashed and in just over two weeks the Parliament was dissolved in a spontaneous act of fury by the Protector. The reasons for this are well enough known: the dispute over the Other House, the wrecking tactics of the Rumpers, Haselrig and Scott, the attempt to stir up disaffection in the army, and the pro-Rump petition.

The debate over what to style the Other House began on 22 January but actually got under way a week later on 29 January and the House remained preoccupied with this issue until it was dissolved on 4 February. When the question was first raised Kelsey and Boteler, realising that the issue could become a serious stumbling block, urged the House not to get bogged down with such a contentious problem.

(1) Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, pp. 684–685. (My tally of army officers differs slightly from Abbott’s); Thurloe, VI, p. 634; A Second Narrative of the Late Parliament (so-called).

(2) Clarke Ms. 30, f. 8v.; Firth, Last Years, II, pp. 16–18; Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, pp. 704–709.
Adam Baynes favoured a debate, wondering why the members of the Other House styled themselves Lords when Cromwell did not allow them that title. (1) At the height of the debate the following week the speeches are noteworthy because they show that the current political discussion within the House, and by implication outside as well, was by this time being influenced by Harrington's ideas, set out in his *Oceana* which had appeared in the autumn of 1656. We have seen that until now the sort of Republicanism that had manifested itself in the army in opposition to the Protectorate had tended to emphasise the importance of free sovereign Parliaments and that this led to a hearkening back to the Rump. This nostalgia for the Rump grew stronger and was at the basis of the abortive attempts to unify the major opposition groups in 1656 over Vane's *Healing Question*. But Harrington's neo-classical Republicanism, with its emphasis on an elected rotating senate, was qualitatively different from the Rumper Republicanism and capable of broader appeal, once the Protectorate had finally broken down, among the army which still retained strong reservations about unlimited Parliaments, which the Rump, rightly or wrongly, was remembered as aspiring towards.

These two very different sorts of Republicanism were to become important in the context of 1659 but their emergence in the language of parliamentary politics can be traced back to early 1658. (2) As Sir Charles Firth and

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(1) *Burton*, II, p. 342.

(2) This distinction is not new. It has been made by Professor Pocock, ('James Harrington and the Good Old Cause', pp. 30–48, esp. p. 42) and by Sir Charles Firth before him (*Last Years*, I, pp. 67–68). Pocock draws the distinction between "true Commonwealthsmen" like Ludlow and Neville, and "unreconstructed Rumpers" like Haselrig and Scott, the main issue dividing them being that of a rotating senate ('James Harrington and the Good Old Cause', p. 42). Firth adds a third brand of Republicanism that of "the Fifth Monarchy men and the extreme sectaries" harking back to Barebones "as the model to be imitated" (*Last Years*, I, p. 67). But this millenarian strain was of no real importance in army politics between 1658 and 1660.
Professor Pocock have pointed out Scott's speech to Parliament on 29 January 1658 showed great familiarity with Harrington's historical analysis. However, it was not just Scott who displayed such familiarity. Boteler gave an impressive and well argued speech in favour of calling the Other House a House of Lords in which he argued that "religion, piety and faithfulness to this Commonwealth" were "the best balance" and that the members of the Other House had these qualities. "It is not estates will be the balance". Robert Beake also argued in favour of styling the Other House a House of Lords. His point was that the sword was there.

"Is not that also a good balance? He that has a regiment of foot to command in the army, he is as good a balance as any I know ..." (3)

No doubt these remarks were welcomed by many of the officers, especially those in the Other House, although they would not have put it quite so bluntly. The debates over the Other House were a dress rehearsal for those which were to take up so much time in the next Parliament.

It did not take very long for Cromwell to become disillusioned with the proceedings in Parliament and to feel that no positive steps towards settlement could come from them. He intervened on 25 January with a long speech calling for unity in the face of the common enemy and his patience finally ran out early in February. Finally, on the 4th

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(1) Burton, II, pp. 382-392, esp. p. 389; Pocock, 'James Harrington and the Good Old Cause', pp. 43-44; Firth, Last Years, I, p. 23. Pocock is wrong to say that Adam Baynes did not sit in the second Protectorate Parliament. He did and, as we have seen, was vocal and already opposed to styling the Other House a House of Lords.


(3) ibid., pp. 414-417, esp. p. 416.
he dissolved it. This decision was entirely his own and took everyone by surprise. (1) The incident that provoked it was the pro-Rump petition circulating in London, and as Cromwell suspected, in the army as well. If it was being circulated in the army, and there is every reason to suppose that it was, then it was done without the connivance or knowledge of the most senior officers. Whalley and Disborowe told Cromwell that they had not heard of such a petition. (2)

The petition itself was printed (3) and was the outcome of a renewed attempt to weld together a coalition of the various elements opposing the Protectorate, especially the Rumpers and Fifth Monarchists. The petition also made a direct bid for army support by demanding that no officer be removed from the army except by a Council of War. This old chestnut was meant to appeal to the officers. The rank and file did not enter into the calculations of the petitioners. If they had, then pay arrears would have found a more obvious response among the soldiery. As with the dissolution of the Rump and later with the establishment of the Protectorate, Cromwell realised the need to ensure that the army was behind him. The evidence recently printed by Professor Underdown from the Bennet Papers, now in the Folger Library, Washington, shows that dissatisfaction in the army centering around Packer had already manifested itself before Cromwell's speech to the officers in London on 6 February. (4) This confirms Thurloe's report.


(2) Firth, 'Letters', p. 108.

(3) B.M. 669 f.20(71), A True Copy of a Petition signed by very many peaceable and well-affected People inhabiting in and about the City of London ...

that Packer and his fellow Captains voiced their discontent first to Fleetwood and Disborowe and then to other senior officers including Kelsey, Haynes, Berry, Creed, Goffe and Whalley. According to Thurloe they persisted throughout in speaking in generalities referring loosely to "the good old cause". They seem to have felt that their criticisms were not so great as to move them to leave the army. They declared that they were willing to follow Cromwell "upon the grounds of the good old cause", and this remained their attitude right up to their dismissal. (1) It is possible that Cromwell suspected Packer was in some way associated with the pro-Rump petition, but we have no evidence for this. Packer, who had been branded a notorious anabaptist as early as 1644, had been authorised to preach in July 1653 at the same time as William Kiffin, so clearly the petition's call for an all-embracing religious toleration would appeal to him. Kiffin was also mentioned as disliking the Protector "in the way he is in" at the time of Packer's dismissal, but he was opposed to any alliance between Baptists and Fifth Monarchists. (2)

At the meeting on 6 February Cromwell told his officers, more defiantly than almost a year before,

"that such as were not satisfied he would have them give him theyr Commissions and be as honest (at least as the German soldiers) that if they could not goe further with him, to tell him soe." (3)

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(1) Thurloe, VI, p. 806; c.f. ibid., p. 786; Underdown, 'Cromwell and the Officers', p. 106.

(2) Sub D.N.B., Packer; C.S.P.D. 1653-54, p. 13; Underdown, 'Cromwell and the Officers', p. 105; Capp, Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 122.

(3) Underdown, 'Cromwell and the Officers', pp. 105-106; Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, p. 737.
It was fighting language, but it was also the language of anger and Cromwell's behaviour at this time has rightly been seen by Professor Underdown as a further indication of his declining mental state. (1) But the use of terror as a political tactic by men with charisma, especially in the face of those who have little or nothing to offer as an alternative, can be an effective weapon to counteract opposition, as we have seen in our own twentieth century. As has been said before, the officers' creative energies had already begun to run dry. After the kingship crisis they had nailed their colours firmly to the Cromwellian mast and now more than ever their fate appeared to be bound up with that of Cromwell because they could not conceive of any alternative way towards settlement at this particular time. However, in just over a year the situation was to change very dramatically. But obversely Cromwell, even in his fit of temper, realised that his fate was tied up with that of the army. After his discourse with Packer and the other Captains, Cromwell discussed the options open to him with some other officers, no doubt including Disborowe and Fleetwood, and it was decided to dismiss Packer along with Captains Gladman, Malin, Barrington and Spinage and Captain Lt. Hunter. These officers accepted this with some reluctance and pledged to live peaceably in their retirement. Of the other officers present at this interchange only Biscoe spoke out, saying that Cromwell "had dismissed 6 as honest

officers as any were in his Army". Perhaps he was suggesting that the whole affair was little more than a storm in a teacup. In the cases of Packer and Gladman, two old veterans, Biscoe's comments were undoubtedly true. Monck wrote to Thurloe, saying that he had long thought of Packer

"as a discontented and dangerous person, and he hath gotten many discontented persons both of officers and troopers into His Highnes's regiment, that I lookt upon itt as the worst regiment in the army for disaffection to the present government."

He did not substantiate the charge. At the time of Overton's 'plot', however, Tobias Bridge, the future Major-General, had written to Thurloe saying that Packer "is not so firm as is pretended", which suggests that Monck's view was not necessarily without foundation. Monck also commented favourably on Mitchell's, Talbot's and Cobbett's declaration to Cromwell. It was the sort of gesture that would appeal to a disciplinarian like Monck. Professor Underdown is probably correct to suggest that Thurloe and William Clarke's correspondents tried to play down the affair. This was Thurloe's usual, and understandable, response in such situations. A campaign in the press and among the regiments to drum up support for the Protector

(1) Thurloe, VI, pp. 786 (Fleetwood to Henry Cromwell, 8 February, three days before their dismissal where he says that he thinks Packer and Gladman would be dismissed), 827; Underdown, 'Cromwell and the Officers', p. 106.

(2) Thurloe, VI, p. 807; C. Clar. S.P., III, p. 4.

(3) Underdown, 'Cromwell and the Officers', p. 103; C.S.P.D., 1657-58, p. 288; Thurloe, VI, p. 806; Clarke Papers, III, p. 141.
was started up pretty quickly. It was almost like a vote of confidence in Oliver Cromwell. A newsletter written to William Clarke said

"It's expected that all the chief officers should declare themselves and in pursuance thereof Col. Cobbett, Col. Mitchell, and Col. Talbot have declared to continue their faithfull service to his Highness, being satisfied with what have been done."  (1)

Even before the dismissal of the Captains, Mercurius Politicus had condemned the Fifth Monarchists for trying to spread seditious literature in the army. On 19 February it reported that the people who scattered the seditious papers would not have felt encouraged to do so had they known "how little the Soldiers minde them". It attacked those amongst them who were ex-officers, saying that the soldiers have had past experience of how, when they were officers they had been proud and tyrannical and, libellously, that they had been apt to cheat the soldiery of their pay. (2) All of these charges could of course quite easily have been levelled at some of the officers still serving, but this escaped Mercurius Politicus's attention.

No doubt partly encouraged by the decision to speed up pay for the army, declarations of loyalty from the forces in Scotland poured into London over the next month. The addresses were published in the newsbooks and are all very similar in style and content. Cromwell is looked upon as God's chosen instrument for the good of the nation. (3) The regiments, or parts of regiments, which sent in

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(1) ibid., p. 141; q.v. also Thurloe's report to Henry Cromwell (Thurloe, VI, p. 806) written three days later which implies that the action of the three colonels was spontaneous.

(2) Mercurius Politicus, 4-11 February 1658, 18-25 February 1658.

(3) Clarke Papers, III, p. 141. For references to the printed versions of the declarations from the forces in Scotland q.v. Catterall, 'The Failure of the Humble Petition and Advice', American Historical Review, IX, p. 56n. The declarations are also to be found in Clarke Ms. 30, ff. 25v, 32, 33v, 36, 37v, 43, 46, 48v, 52, 54, 56, 60v, 66, 70v, 71v, 75, 80, where the signatories are also named. They were all officers.
addresses were Wilkes's, Talbot's, Charles Fairfax's, Monck's foot and horse, Beade's, Cobbett's, Thomas Cooper's, the Dundee garrison, Ashfield's, Robert Lilburne's, Fitch's, Inverloughy garrison, St. Johnston garrison (alias Perth), Hacker's, Morgan's, Orkney garrison and Disborowe's. On 17 February Henry Cromwell wrote to Thurloe, saying that those officers who were in Dublin when news of the purge of officers reached Ireland offered "freely and unanimously" to make an address of loyalty to Cromwell. Henry did not want to damage this spontaneity and enthusiasm for his father but wanted to get Thurloe's advice before sending in a petition. A petition was eventually drawn up after discussion amongst a relatively small group of officers and circulated in the army in Ireland. There were only about 12 dissenters from it, including Major William Lowe of Cooper's regiment who opposed it on the grounds that it had pro-kingship tendencies. But Sankey and Philip Carteret, the Advocate General for Ireland, said that if kingship "were really most suitable to the constitution of these nations, that then they would desire it". The address was sent over with Colonel Abbott, Lt. Colonel John Nelson and William Petty, and was later published in the press with the comment that it was "cheerfully" subscribed to by all the officers and soldiers. (1)

In England it was decided to present an address subscribed by all the officers in or around London. This was done after a general meeting of the officers at which Fleetwood made a plea for unity in the

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(1) Thurloe, VI, pp. 21, 71-72, 84, 114-115, 142; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823, ff. 377-380; Mercurius Politicus, 17-24 June 1658; Firth, Last Years, II, pp. 49-50.
army. In all 224 officers signed it and it was decided to present the address to Cromwell in the presence of all the officers above and including the rank of Captain. In these meetings the seeds of the return of the Council of Officers can be seen. Mention was made of the Humble Petition and Advice in the address, but there was no unlimited enthusiasm for it. However, the officers expressed their intention to remain united and loyal to Cromwell "as our general and chief Magistrate". (1)

The garrison of Hull sent in its own address of loyalty to Cromwell, as did Biscoe's, Richard Cromwell's and Daniels' regiments. The one from Richard Cromwell's amounted to a justification of government by a single person. The regiment said they were convinced that the safety of the nation next to God depended on the security of Cromwell, who was also called "our lawful Prince". From Flanders, Morgan and his fellow commissioned officers also sent an address. It was rather verbose, claiming that "peace and Plenty" ruled at home. The officers were in danger of being deceived by their own rhetoric. (2) The address from Richard Cromwell's regiment shows some signs of desperation, a reluctance to face up to the fact that Oliver Cromwell would not be around for ever. This reluctance also marks the addresses from the regiments in Scotland. If one were looking for a present-day analogy one would choose Spain in the months before Franco's death where the ruling class, including the army, were gripped by paralysis.

(1) Clarke Papers, III, pp. 143-145; Mercurius Politicus, 25 March-1 April 1658; Firth, Last Years, II, pp. 48-49.
(2) Boldl. Rawlinson Ms. A57, f.312; Publick Intelligencer, 29 March-4 April 1658, 3-10 May 1658, 10-17 May 1658; Mercurius Politicus, 8-15 July 1658.
The next few months up to Cromwell's death were characterised by an atmosphere of acute insecurity, an atmosphere common in succession crises. The Protectorate government was felt to be under attack from Royalists, Commonwealthsmen and Fifth Monarchists. This insecurity was reflected in the reports reaching Henry Cromwell in Ireland. He wrote to Thurloe, asking if it were true that Fleetwood and Disborowe were seeing Lambert, not just out of old friendship but to discuss other things, including politics. He said he hoped his father would have an eye to such matters and would

"supply the vacancies now in the army with such whose principles must and will lead them to what is good, rather than such, who out of levity, and not understanding themselves, are apt to talk liberally of living and dying with his highnes etc." (1)

Eventually Cromwell filled the vacancy caused by Packer's dismissal with Boteler, the former Major General, of whom Henry disapproved. Henry might well have had a valid point about the ease with which the army could chant slogans, and this ability was to increase during the next couple of years, but the army were steadfast behind Cromwell at this time, out of a mixture of self-interest and genuine conviction and because they could not envisage anyone else who would guarantee the revolution in which they had played the role of midwife and out of which they had done quite well. But, as we have seen, they did not wax as hot about the Humble Petition and Advice. Henry was also perhaps over-worried by the reports that Fleetwood and Disborowe were

(1) Thurloe, VI, p. 857.
seeing Lambert. It is quite understandable that such close ex-colleagues should keep in touch with one another. After all Lambert had resigned his commissions and was not implicated in any kind of opposition to the Protectorate, unlike such former officers as Harrison, Rich or Okey. The report, significantly originated from Droghill who was keen to retire to Ireland at this time, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health. Perhaps he sensed that Cromwell's days were numbered and that a diplomatic withdrawal to Ireland to bide his time was the best policy. It could well be that Droghill deliberately played up the report in the hope of discrediting Fleetwood and Disborowe. Rumours also circulated in some Royalists circles that Monck was discontented. However, Hyde was not convinced by these stories. As far as Monck is concerned it would be wrong to identify him conclusively with the more obviously civilian Cromwellian group, as does Professor Woolrych. This implies more consistency in his views than had appeared until then or was to be evident later. Monck was, as has been stressed, a pragmatic man with quite a strong streak of opportunism.

Meanwhile, the financial crisis continued. Various expedients to raise money, if necessary without recourse to Parliament, were under consideration, including a new decimation tax on Royalists. It seems that Disborowe was one of the main advocates of this scheme. However, Fleetwood felt that there would be a new

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(1) Thurloe, VII, pp. 38, 102.
(2) Thurloe, VI, pp. 857, 858.
(3) C. Clar. S.P., IV, pp. 17, 22, 25.
Parliament. The vacillation continued throughout March but by the beginning of April Cromwell appears to have been coming round to favour a new Parliament and by late June a committee of nine was meeting daily to consider what matters should be laid before the Parliament. Clearly, the uncertainties surrounding government policy continued. The feeling of uncertainty is reflected in the report that Ludlow, Rich and Vane were to be offered places on the Council of State. However, the one reference we have for this episode (a reply by Henry Cromwell to a letter from Thurloe) is very obscure and it could be that they were only called before the Council of State rather than asked to be members of it, which would have marked a considerable, if not to say impossible, about-turn both on their part and the part of the government. Nevertheless, the three supported the idea of a new Parliament, as well they might. (1)

The evidence for all this is very thin and much of it depends upon letters written by Henry Cromwell in Ireland in which he paraphrases some of the reports reaching him. With this reservation in mind it seems to me that Firth perhaps goes too far in suggesting that Disborowe headed a party in the Council of State which favoured using the power of the sword to raise money and that he was backed by Fleetwood in this. (2) A new decimation was probably one of a number of proposals under discussion. It is very unlikely that Disborowe pushed it with the intensity and conviction that Harrison and Lambert

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(2) Firth, Last Years, II, p. 271 (footnote 2 on this page should refer to Thurloe, VII, p. 820, not p. 821. The references he gives in n.1 do not really support his case).
had promoted their respective schemes in 1653. He was not in the same political class as Lambert, not even in that of the Harrison of 1647-1649. If on the other hand he did intend the proposal to be taken seriously as a long term solution to the problem of settlement, as Firth implies, then given the fate of the previous decimation tax and the unpopularity of the Major Generals he was not just being short-sighted politically but ultimately reckless and desperate.

The committee had a majority of officers on it: Fleetwood, Disborowe, Whalley, Philip Jones, Goffe and Cooper. The other members were Fiennes and Pickering and an unidentified ninth member. Henry Cromwell wrote sarcastically to Thurloe at the end of June (the two men were by then quite close confidants),

"The wise men were but 7. It seems you have made them 9; and having heard their names, I think myself better able to guess what they'll do, than a much wiser man; for no very wise man can ever imagine it." (3)

It might well be that this committee was the one that reported to Cromwell on 8 July about the question of the succession, declaring

(1) Technically Jones was still a member of the army but he was more important in a civilian capacity as Comptroller of the Protectoral Household (Aylmer, State's Servants, pp. 55, 110, 152, 164, 290, 300, 361).

(2) Thurloe, VII, p. 192.

(3) ibid., p. 218.
"that it was desireable to have it continued elective; that is that the chief magistrate should always name his successor, and that of the hereditary avoyded." (1)

Perhaps it was felt better to make this point because of fears that Cromwell might fall back on kingship, although the evidence that the resurrection of kingship was very much in the air at this time is by no means as hard and fast as Firth suggested; it rests on very inconclusive evidence which the sources he cites do not support. Moreover, he tends to play down the extent of feeling against kingship in the army. (2)

Over the next two months the Protectorate was in a state of hiatus. Cromwell's deteriorating health was obvious to all. There was a realisation that Cromwell might soon be dead and this caused concern. Henry Cromwell hit the nail firmly on the head at the end of June when he wrote to Thurloe:

"Have you any settlement? Does not your peace depend upon his highness's life, and upon his peculiar skill, and faculty and personal interest in the army as now modelled and commanded? I say, beneath the immediate hand of God (if I know anything of the affaires in England) there is no other reason why wee are not in blood at this day." (3)

Allowing for some obvious exaggeration, especially in the last part of the statement, it is quite a shrewd assessment of Oliver Cromwell's Protectorate. Once Cromwell was removed from the scene this was to become apparent.

(1) ibid., p. 269; Firth, Last Year, II, pp. 277-278.
(2) ibid., pp. 278-279 + n. 1 and 2.
(3) ibid., p. 218.
The circumstances surrounding the death of Cromwell are well-known. (1) The army officers involved in the appointment of a successor were Fleetwood, Disborowe, Whalley and Goffe. Firth questions the latter (2) but there is no reason to doubt his presence. He had been one of the committee of nine and had been quite important throughout the 1650's among those officers who were in London most of the time. However, at the end of August, when Cromwell was in his death struggle, there are indications that the army officers were at last waking up to the likelihood of his death and were trying to prepare themselves for it and to work out their response. Signs of the future division between Protectorate and anti-Protectorate officers, the latter centering around Fleetwood's residence at Wallingford House, also emerged. Fauconberg wrote to Henry Cromwell about these meetings. He alleged, in a gossip-like way, that Berry and another officer "only praid very notionally" at the meeting and that Ingoldsby and B(arksted?) were the only officers not summoned to the meeting "by which you may guess at something". Fauconberg also hinted at trying to win over Lockhart and his officers, thus fearing some sort of division in the army with Cromwell's death. (3) Thomas Clarges, also writing to Henry Cromwell, said that the meetings took place at Wallingford House and that, as well as praying for Cromwell, there was also some discussion of public affairs, but he did not elaborate beyond this. (4)

(1) q.v. Firth, Last Years, II, pp. 299-306; Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, pp. 866-872.

(2) Firth, Last Years, II, p. 305n.

(3) Thurloe, VII, p. 365.

(4) ibid., p. 369.
With the death of Cromwell and the hand-over of power to Richard the officers adopted a policy of wait and see; the political situation had become fluid once again.
III. SEPTEMBER 1658-MAY 1659

Full accounts of the narrative of events and intellectual background to 1658-1660 already exist in the works of Godfrey Davies and Professor Woolrych and it is not intended to retread ground where it is adequately covered by them. (1) However, the questions which have to be answered in this section are how the army moved from acquiescence in the Protectorate, even in its more civilianised and conservative form, into opposition to it and into support for a restoration of the Rump; whether that support was unconditional and whether we can see any signs of divisions within the army in April/May 1659 especially along the lines of Rumper/Harringtonian ones. We have also to consider the renewed politicisation of the army, that is when and to what extent the junior officers began to push the senior officers into intractable opposition to Richard Cromwell's Protectorate.

A good number of the senior officers signed the proclamation of Richard, but none were below the rank of Colonel. (2) On 18 September the army officers in London including some who were absent

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(2) Mercurius Politicus, 2-9 September 1658; Davies, Restoration, p. 5.
from Scotland and Ireland, presented an address of loyalty to Richard on behalf of the whole army. This last point is important. There can be no doubt that the army was starting to look upon itself as the guardian of the "cause" in the face of those who were at best lukewarm towards some of the ideals that had been fought for, or, at worst, favoured swinging the pendulum further back in a more conservative or reactionary direction. The officers in or around London, and therefore at the centre of the nation's political activity, were aware of this, more by instinct than by intellectual calculation. For them it was most important to ensure that army unity remained intact so far as this was possible. But they must also have realised that neither Monck nor Henry Cromwell would be enthusiastic and uncritical followers of whatever their comrades in London laid down as army policy.

The army address was presented to Richard on 18 September after being passed unanimously by a general meeting of the officers at Whitehall the day before, a meeting which amounted virtually to an old-style Council of Officers. Fauconberg wrote to Henry Cromwell saying that the officers largely responsible for the address were Sydenham, Berry and Hewson, and claimed, inaccurately, that only a very minimal number of officers from Ireland and Scotland were present. (1)

Unlike previous addresses of loyalty to Oliver, which never attempted to force a particular course of action on him, this address to his son can be seen as a veiled ultimatum. The address

said that Oliver

"will be had in perpetual remembrance amongst good men as having been the great Assertor of the Liberties of God's people, an Instrument to restore these Nations, to Peace, a lover of their Civil Rights, and so indefatigable in his endeavours after Reformation."

Oliver was said to have won much respect abroad. As for the Army "he reckoned the choicest Saints, his chiefest Worthies". Throughout the address ran the refrain of Oliver as champion of civil and religious rights. There was also concern for the future and advice for Richard on how best to follow in these enormous footsteps. He was requested to leave the army under the command of officers "of honest godly principles" and that they be allowed

"to adventure all that is dear unto them by all lawful ways and means to maintain an equal just liberty to all persons that profess godliness, that are not of turbulent spirits as to the peace of these Nations, nor disturbers of others, though differing in some things from themselves according to the true intent of the Humble Petition and Advice."

Here the army was claiming a right to have a say in civil affairs even going so far as interpreting "the true intent" of the Humble Petition. They also had their own views, even if these were somewhat vague, as to what they meant by "the good old cause", a phrase used in the address (its first usage in an official army communiqué). They implied that if the Protectorate of Richard Cromwell did not safeguard what had been achieved in advancing the cause and to further it then they would seek for an alternative government that would fulfil this aim. The army's claims were put even more directly when
the address suggested that the Privy Council should be composed of men "of known Godlines and sober principles" and "that they with your Highess and your Army" should carry on the work of reform. In other words the officers envisaged a kind of tri-partite government of Protector, Privy Council and Army as the ideal solution to the problem of settlement. It was the closest they had ever come to suggesting that the power of the army should be formalised in some sort of constitutional way. The successive attempts at settlement in the 1650's had always tried to avoid this, and Oliver encouraged and supported these attempts. With the second Protectorate, more openly civilian in character, he aligned himself firmly to such a course even at the risk of alienating the army.

These pretensions of the officers had certainly not been the true intent of the Humble Petition. The address went on to assert that they were not acting out of motives of self-interest but that they would be loyal to Richard. However, they hedged this in, and - none too subtly - made it clear that they expected him to support the sort of aspirations they had outlined, and that if he did he would have their unequivocal support for the existing constitution, that is government by a single person and two Houses of Parliament. According to Mabbott some 220 officers were present at the meeting on 17 September and all signed it. However, the manuscript copy of the address in the Rawlinson Mss. gives some 276 signatories. (1)

(1) O.P.H., XXI, pp. 233-236; Mercurius Politicus, 16-23 September 1658; Clarke Papers, III, p. 164; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823, ff. 104-105; Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A61, f.3; c.f. Davies, Restoration, pp. 8-10, Woolrych, Milton, p. 12. Both Davies and Woolrych wrongly state that the officers met on the 20th and that the address was presented on the 21st.
On 21 September Fleetwood wrote to Henry Cromwell justifying the inclusion of the Irish army in the address, but at the same time betraying a suspicion that Henry might resent this. Fleetwood's argument was army unity:

"Here was great union and surely that should be preserved with utmost care and diligence, and rather let all things of a doubtfull acceptance remaine as they are, then hazard the breach of union upon any indifferent, much lesse doubtfull, account." (1)

In the event, Henry had an address of loyalty drawn up and sent for subscription throughout the army in Ireland. The newsbooks gave the impression that Henry had been approached by some of his officers in Dublin to present an address to Richard. (2) Monck was not quite so independent as Henry, despite the fact that the two men appear to have maintained a correspondence. (3) Fleetwood had forwarded the Army's address of 18 September to Monck requesting that the officers in Scotland sign it. But Monck had already set in motion his own address. On 21 September he ordered all of the senior commanders who could to come to Dalkeith the following day to subscribe an address of loyalty. One hundred turned up and signed it. By the 23rd the other address had arrived from England. According to the Publick Intelligencer "the General thought it adviseable to decline the former" and subscriptions were made to the address newly arrived from England.

(1) Thurloe, VII, pp. 405-406.

(2) Ibid., p. 400; Publick Intelligencer, 13-20 September 1658. The address of the Irish officers (D.M. Add. Ms. 4159, f.71) was printed in the newsbooks (Mercurius Politicus, 23-30 September 1658). It is very bombastic but apolitical.

(3) Thurloe, VII, p. 384.
"to testify how great a harmony there is amongst the Officers of the three nations in their obedience and faithfulness to his Highness." (1)

But all was not as harmonious as the newsbook tried to make out. Monck sent the address he had originally intended to Thurloe "for your own satisfaction", presumably to show that he was prepared to maintain his independence. Thomas Clarges, Monck's brother-in-law who had been sent by Richard shortly after his accession to find out how Monck stood in relation to his government, (2) writing to Henry even says that Monck forwarded both addresses to Richard and also ordered petitions from individual regiments to be drawn up. (3) The latter assertion is very likely (petitions were also sent in by individual regiments in England), but the former is doubtful.

Thus, the pledges of loyalty to Richard contained in the address of 18 September hardly concealed the anxiety and fears of the officers in London about the future of the revolution and for how Richard's government would work out in practice. The separate addresses from the forces in Ireland and Scotland helped to demonstrate that the unity of purpose between the three major sections of the army in England, or rather London, Scotland and Ireland could no longer be taken for granted.

(1) ibid., p. 404; Publick Intelligencer, 27 September–4 October 1658.


(3) Thurloe, VII, pp. 411, 424. The two addresses from the forces in Scotland are in Clarke Ms. 30, ff. 164, 165 ff.
The officers in London had flexed their muscles in the address and over the next few weeks seemed determined to test the new Protector in what amounted to an attempt to win back some of the influence they felt they had lost since the establishment of the second Protectorate. In terms of army politics what was happening was a re-emergence of the early 1647 situation when the army became a political force for the first time. Then it was largely, but not exclusively, the soldiery who made the running. They forced the officers hand, coaxing them along paths not all of which were unwelcome to them but along which they themselves were hesitant to proceed. But in 1647 the officers had been successful in ensuring that they retained control over the direction that the army followed. In late 1658 the senior officers were being pressurised once again, but this time by their more junior commissioned colleagues. As in 1647 there was a reciprocal relationship: the senior officers were being forced by pressures from below into certain channels but at the same time these channels were not necessarily anathema to them. They were genuinely suspicious of the new Protector and his entourage and they wanted to restore what they believed by now to be the army's inherent right to a voice in politics. At the same time they were aware of the political dangers in this. The general political context of late 1658-April 1660 is similar to that existing between March 1647-January 1649. It is one of great fluidity with constantly shifting alignments. But in terms of army politics there is one great difference. In the earlier period there had been much consistency in
army's stance and, perhaps more important, there had been firm and decisive leadership. In the later period these were lacking. The army was not itself creating alternative constitutions as it had done with the Heads of the Proposals. There was not the same level of political consciousness as had been manifested in the Putney debates. Even when the army leadership had had to ally itself with other groups in late 1648 and early 1649, such as with the parliamentary Independents or the Levellers, they never relinquished the upper hand.

In the late 1650's the army showed itself once more to be aware of and responsive to some of the most progressive political thought of the day, but that thought was not being crystallised or matured within its own ranks as it had in the past by men of the calibre of Ireton or even Lambert. The army had no clear idea of where it was going in the late 1650's. It dabbled and it became torn within itself. First it tried to see how far it could go with Richard Cromwell, and eventually got rid of him, then it re-called the Rump, failing to realise the extent of the ambitions and genuinely felt convictions about parliamentary supremacy of men like Haselrig and Scott, and then it flirted with Harringtonian notions. By then it was too late and the lack of direction and leadership over the previous months made itself felt in a dramatic fashion. The tensions within the army, already in evidence in September 1658, were aggravated beyond control and the army tore itself, and the good old cause, to pieces. This could have happened at various times between 1647 and 1649. It did not because of the reasons already advanced, leadership and a remarkable degree of unity.
Professor Woolrych and the late Godfrey Davies have drawn attention to the strains in the Council of State between the civilian elements and the military ones over all aspects of policy in late 1658.\(^1\) However, despite Royalist optimism about these strains, a trial of strength was not attempted at this stage over the composition of the Council of State. Indeed from the Order Book of the Council of State it is clear that the officers on that body played a full part in its administrative work.\(^2\) Such a show-down so early on in the new Protector's career would have been politically disastrous; it would have been too obvious an intervention of the sword. Besides, it is not certain if the military members of the Council had the ability to carry out such a coup. They had their match, and more, in the civilian members. The testing ground between the Protector and army was to be the army itself. It is in this respect that the petition emanating from the junior officers in early October is to be viewed.\(^3\)

The petition, which called for Fleetwood to be made Commander-in-Chief with the power to commission officers and which was concerned only with army affairs, have emanated without the connivance of the senior officers, but there are good grounds for believing that the petition was welcome to them. They shared the petitioners' implied resentment at having someone as head of the army who was not an officer of long standing and who lacked the experience of having fought for the cause;

\(^1\) Woolrych, Milton, p. 14; Davies, Restoration, pp. 31-33, 38-39, 45-46.


\(^3\) For the full narrative of events for what follows q.v. and c.f. Davies, Restoration, pp. 34-40 and Woolrych, Milton, pp. 12-14.
it offended their *esprit de corps*. We have also seen how there had been some grumblings under Oliver for the separation of the roles of Commander-in-Chief and headship of government because the officers felt the army's morale was suffering as a result of their union. There was nothing inherently dangerous about separating the two roles. It would have been feasible and workable, provided the army and the civilian government were in close harmony. But in the context of late 1658 this was not the case. Besides, as Richard reminded the officers in a speech, drafted by Thurloe, which he made to them on 18 October, to concede their demand for a separation of the two roles would be contrary to the *Humble Petition* and *Advice*, and thus unconstitutional. He was aware of how essentially military grievances could spill over into political ones as the army's material grievances had done in 1647. The citing of the dismissal of Lambert as a dangerous and unfair precedent and the feeling among some of the officers in favour of restoring cashiered officers such as Okey no doubt sharpened this awareness.\(^1\)

The ease with which Fleetwood and the other senior officers, including Whalley and Goffe, who both stood by Richard the following year, were able to re-assert their own authority suggests that the junior officers had not yet become a group with clear-cut political aspirations. This only happened gradually, but in a sense inevitably, given their regular weekly prayer meetings, always in the past a prelude

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to some sort of action, the activity of Lambert, who there is every reason to suppose was at work behind the scenes, no doubt sensing a favourable wind that might sweep him back into the army and politics again, (1) and later on the influence of the Republicans.

Fleetwood and his more senior colleagues welcomed the noises being made from below so long as they could control them. Clarges suggests that Disborowe and Berry were especially favourable to the petition. (2) In the middle of October Fleetwood reminded a meeting of the officers located in and around London, and presumably including the junior officers, of the need for unity and discipline. (3)

For a while the political temperature was lowered. The clear warning in Richard Cromwell's speech that the officers ran the risk of provoking a constitutional crisis may have caused them to think again about their proceedings. The argument that there were close contacts between some of the officers and some Republicans at this time is unproven. It originates from Fauconberg and was spread abroad by the French ambassador who met Fauconberg regularly on official business and must have got the story from him. Even if some meetings took place their importance should not be played up and Fauconberg was probably hoping to spread the story to discredit the army officers. However, Henry Marten, Okey, Haselrig and Hacker, a serving officer and the officer who took the lead in accepting his commission from the Speaker the following

(1) The references to Lambert's activity are not conclusive, but as Davies suggested it is very likely, and would be quite in character, although it is very doubtful that he was working hand in hand with Disborowe at this stage as Fauconberg suggests (Davies, Restoration, p. 38, n. 35; Thurloe, VII, p. 328; q.v. also ibid., pp. 459–460).

(2) Thurloe, VII, p. 437.

(3) Clarke Papers, III, p. 166.
summer, were among those who were said to be members of a Republican club founded by Wildman in 1657. Other members might have included serving officers, but Hacker is the only recorded one. (1)

By mid-November feelings began to run high once again and Richard felt compelled to address the officers on 19 November to try and remove the jealousies and misunderstandings between them. According to a newsletter sent to William Clarke the reason for the renewed disquiet was that unlike previous weekly prayer meetings at St. James's, which were confined to discussions of scripture, some rumours that there were to be changes in the army "as if good men were put out, and worse put in" had been discussed. At the meeting Goffe suggested they were mistaken about this. (2) As in the past rumour played an important part in stirring up emotions. Clarges, writing to Henry Cromwell on 16 November, said that he had heard that it was the officers themselves who wanted five or six of their comrades purged. He also suspected that Henry's elevation to the Lord Lieutenancy did not go down well with them. A Royalist newsletter said that the army were petitioning for the disbanding of the regiments whose Colonels were related to Richard such as Fauconberg's, Ingoldsby's, Howard's and two others. No mention was made of Disborowe's or Fleetwood's, also relatives of the Protector. The story is unlikely. (3)

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The meeting between Richard and the officers on the 19th was designed to prevent any further political discussions. Two points emerge from the incident. Firstly, army concerns still preoccupied the officers above all else at this stage. Secondly, Goffe's presence at St. James and his remarks tend to suggest that the officers meeting at St. James were not exclusively junior officers. In other words the view that St. James's was for junior officers only is open to doubt. It is unlikely that the junior officers would attend in any great numbers, if at all, at Wallingford House. The officers having access there would be known to Fleetwood or his senior colleagues personally or else be involved in some aspect of army administration. On the other hand, there is every reason to suppose that, at this time anyway, the senior officers attended meetings at St. James's. How regular these attendances were is, of course, unknown; there are no records comparable to William Clarke's for late 1648 and early 1649.

After Richard had spoken

"The officers seemed to be much affected with what my Lord said, except some few of the inferior sort who muttered a little after they were gone, but they were persons unconsiderable."

The anonymous writer was confident that unity would prevail in the army now. (1)

A calm did indeed return after the Protector's speech.

Most people were looking towards the new Parliament. Tensions continued

to exist between the civilian and military members of the Council, even in a melodramatic fashion if we are to believe the French ambassador and a Royalist newsletter which said that Fleetwood charged Montagu, Fauconberg and Ingoldsby (the latter two were not members of the Council of State) with conspiring to abduct himself and Disborowe, a dubious tale.\(^1\) The final decision to call a new Parliament was made on 3 December after much debate in Council.\(^2\) In the army, at any rate, they had been discussing the future Parliament since at least early October.\(^3\) By the end of the year Thurloe reported to Henry Cromwell that "all is husht, in expectation of what the parlement will doe".\(^4\) By then it was not just the army that was preparing for the new Parliament but also the anti-government Republicans.\(^5\) On 6 January in a gesture of appeasement Richard invited the army officers of the rank of Captain and above to Whitehall to what was described as "a royall treatment".\(^6\) On 11 January Fleetwood and Disborowe were made joint wardens of the Cinque Ports and constables of Dover, positions previously held by Lambert.\(^7\)

The new Parliament, far from being constructive and positive from the government's point of view, sparked off new tensions.

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\(^1\) Guizot, Richard Cromwell, I, p. 271; C. Clar. S.P., IV, p. 118. Both Davies (Restoration, p. 46) and Woolrych (Hilton, p. 14) accept the story.

\(^2\) Davies, Restoration, p. 45.

\(^3\) Thurloe, VII, p. 425.

\(^4\) ibid., p. 531.

\(^5\) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 50 + n.

\(^6\) Clarke Papers, III, p. 173.

\(^7\) ibid., loc. cit.
and crises and ultimately helped bring about the fall of the Protectorate. There is no need to revise the accepted view that in this Parliament the Republicans, especially of the Rumper variety like Haselrig and Scott, were intent on filibustering and tried to undermine the government at every turn, even if this group was much divided within itself. The Professor Woolrych has also drawn attention to the fact that "conservative majority" in the House, the people whom Oliver Cromwell had been trying to win over with the policy of the respectable revolution and who showed signs of responding to these overtures as continued by his son, played an important part in alienating the army by anti-military, anti-religious toleration attitudes and their nostalgia for the old constitution. (1)

The Republicans were supported in the House by former officers like Okey, Alured and Packer. (2) Indeed in one vote on 18 April Alured changed his mind at the direction of Haselrig. (3) However, Lambert's attitude is much more ambivalent than Professor Woolrych suggests. (4) On 11 February he said

"I would have no reflections upon any person, as that they were for or against the Protector. We are all for this honourable person that is now in power."

and on 8 April he was quite warm towards the Other House,

"I would have you go hand in hand together."

(1) Davies, Restoration, Chapters IV and V; Woolrych, 'Last Quests', p. 191; Woolrych, Milton, pp. 17-18.

(2) ibid., p. 16.

(3) Burton, IV, p. 459.

(4) Woolrych, Milton, p. 16.
He was also very sensitive about the past, and his own role in recent history. On 30 March he declared

"I would have as little looking back as may be. If all actions be questioned that have been done in these late transactions, who of your friends that have served you 14 years can excuse his."

an important point regardless of the special pleading. Lambert's motives remain inscrutable. Before long he was to become one of the chief advocates within army circles for the return of the Rump but, as we shall see, this tactic had strong political motives on his part, and anyway he was not in favour of an unconditional return of the Rump. An unconditional return would have been too much to expect from the architect of the first Protectorate which was designed to counteract what were considered to have been the excesses of unlimited, unbounded and perpetual Parliaments. All Lambert's contributions in Richard's Parliament are of a very high standard.

As in previous Protectorate Parliaments the army members did not behave as a unified group, much less as a party. There were even splits amongst them over issues where one might have expected the equivalent of a modern three line whip, such as the charges against Petty and Boteler. The charge against Petty was brought by Colonel Jerome Sankey who had been associated with Wallingford House from at least mid-1658, although this might have had more to do with matters

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concerning the Irish army than any political ones. (1) Sankey went on to support the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in October 1659. (2) Of the army officers, and ex-officers, Kelsey, Baynes, Lambert and Morgan showed themselves very sympathetic to Petty. (3) In the bitter and acrimonious debate over Boteler, Baynes, Ludlow and Alured were against Boteler; Kelsey, Morgan and Whetham gave him support and Bennet, and Thurloe, spoke on his behalf. (4)

In the middle of February, at about the time of Moyer's pro-Rump petition, there was a further outburst of activity in the army. Moyer's petition was the same as the one which had caused Oliver to dismiss his last Parliament so abruptly. It was suggested above that at that time the petition probably circulated in the army, and in February 1659 no doubt this happened once again. As usual the senior officers did not wish to be outflanked by civilians and sought to counteract too much outside interference in the army by preparing a petition of their own. Richard got wind of it and went in person to Wallingford House to caution and admonish the officers. According to a Royalist report he is alleged to have said that he would part with the generalship and his life together, but it seems very unlikely that Fleetwood and Disborowe were thinking in terms of a direct challenge to the Protector at this stage. No doubt the petition that

(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823, ff. 45-46.
(2) Q.v. also biographical appendix.
(3) Burton, IV, pp. 244-247.
(4) Ibid., pp. 403-412.
was being concocted by the officers, and the senior officers were as involved in it as the junior ones, concerned itself with the question of the headship of the army. After the Protector's visit to Wallingford House the officers decided not to press on with a petition but debated broader issues "and seemed resolved to acquiesce in the Parliament's determinations". However, a committee was appointed to draw up a stand-by list of heads to be presented to the Parliament if need be. The members of the committee were Colonels Fleetwood, Disborowe, Whalley, Berry, Lilburne and Ashfield, Lt. Colonel Moss, Major Ellison, Captain Deane and others. This committee included members of what Ludlow and subsequent historians have seen as the three groups in the army at this time: the Wallingford House officers, the officers junior ranks who in association with the supported the Commonwealthsmen, and the Protectorians. But the fact that these officers were sitting on this committee and had doubtless been participating in the discussions that preceded its formation would suggest that these groups were not so rigid at this time. The fact that Whalley and Goffe, who both stood by Richard Cromwell, were members of Owen's congregation at about this time as well as Lambert, Disborowe, Fleetwood, Berry and Sydenham

(1) For these divisions q.v. Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 61; Davies, Restoration, p. 74; Woolrych, Milton, pp. 10-12.

(2) Clarke Papers, III, pp. 182-183; Thurloe, VII, p. 612; B. N. Lansdowne Ms. 823, ff. 223-224, 251; Clar. S.P., III, p. 426; Toon, God's Statesman, pp. 108, 110; c.f. Davies, Restoration, pp. 53-59; Davies, 'Army and Downfall', pp. 146-147 and Woolrych, Milton, p. 21 for different interpretations. Barwick's report to Hyde (Thurloe, VII, pp. 615-616) which is usually cited in relation to this incident seems to me reliable in its general assertion that there were some rumblings in the army, but very unreliable in its interpretation of these rumblings. Barwick includes Fairfax as a Republican and Fleetwood as a "Protectorist" veering towards the Republicans.
tends to support this view, although we have no record of their attendances. It is possible that Lambert was by this time present "under covert" at the Wallingford House meetings but there is no evidence to suggest that he was fomenting the army petition. (1) If he were present it was only on suffranc from Fleetwood and Disborowe. Lambert, however, urged the Parliament to take Moyer's petition into consideration. (2) His short speech on this is very characteristic of the others he made in this Parliament; he was trying to project himself as a statesman.

Meanwhile, Monck wrote to Thurloe saying that the army in Scotland was quiet and that he felt confident it would remain so. He had also ordered a ban on petitioning and interference in affairs of state. (3) Monck had already expressed his sympathies with the aspirations of the civilian Cromwellians in a paper to Richard which Clarges brought back with him after his trip to Scotland in early September. (4) His frankness in that paper had been prompted by the hope, albeit short-lived, that Richard would be able to further his father's policy of healing and settling. When it became apparent that this was not the case, he dropped Richard very quickly.

(2) Burton, III, pp. 292-293.
(3) Thurloe, VII, p. 616.
(4) ibid., pp. 387-388; Davies, Restoration, pp. 20-21.
Suspicion and mistrust between the triangle of Protector, Parliament and army was always present under the surface and it grew in intensity over the next few weeks. Two well known incidents helped sour relations between the army and the Protector. The first was the altercation between Cornet Sumpner and Major Thomas Babington of Ingoldsby's horse. Sumpner alleged that Babington was advancing ungodly men in the regiment, even cavaliers. At a hearing before the Colonel and Protector, Richard dismissed the allegations as spurious making his famous remark to Ingoldsby

"Go thy way Dick Ingoldsby, thou canst neither preach nor pray, but I will believe thee before I believe twenty of them."

Sumpner, according to the two Republican accounts we have of the incident was cashiered, but there is no other evidence to support this. Babington was purged after the fall of the Protectorate, no doubt out of a desire to get even, and was arrested for refusing to appear in answer to the summons of a court martial. (1) Sumpner became a Lieutenant. The second was the quarrel between Edward Whalley and Lt. Colonel William Gough of Monck's foot, not to be confused with William Goffe the Major General, and Richard Ashfield over the Other House. It almost came to blows. The quarrel smouldered on throughout March. (2) This incident was more serious because it is the first reliable evidence we have of a serious rift developing among the

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(1) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 62-63 + n; Davies, Restoration, p. 64; Woolrych, Milton, pp. 59-60; Firth and Davies, pp. 153-155.

(2) Clarke Ms. 31, f. 46; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823, ff. 245-246, 278-279; Davies, Restoration, pp. 64-65; Woolrych, Milton, p. 59.
senior officers. No doubt Ashfield was very popular with the Baptist Churches, but what made Richard Cromwell's handling of the affair so obnoxious in the eyes of many of the officers was the prospect that one of their colleagues would be tried before a court martial in an undignified way. The Ashfield affair was also made one of the bargaining counters between Ludlow and the officers in late March when overtures were made by the army to the Republicans in Parliament.\(^{(1)}\)

The army's distrust of the Parliament was caused by a threefold fear. Firstly, that, as with previous Parliaments, if left to themselves they would set about undermining the revolution; secondly the fear that the legality of the Rump's legislation was being questioned; and thirdly the fear of the motives of some of the members who seemed anxious to court the Royalists. The generous attitude of some M.P.'s towards the Royalists was made very explicit in the debate on the petition of 70 Royalists sold as slaves to Barbados.\(^{(2)}\) This took place on 25 March at the same time as the senior officers approached Ludlow. Ludlow was of course a former officer well-known to them and especially to Fleetwood and less obviously anti-military than the other Republican ex-officer Haselrig. The officers at this stage seemed intent on finding some way of countering the civilian conservative majority in the Parliament. All of this mistrust was encouraged by a barrage of propaganda directed at the army, accusing it of backsliding.

\(^{(1)}\) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 64.

and advocating a return to the vague concept of the "good old cause".
The barrage got underway shortly after the Parliament began to sit. (1)

What took place at the meeting between Ludlow and the
senior officers at Wallingford House and the outcome of it are already
well known. (2) The officers also decided in their meetings at Walling-
ford House, and possibly the most senior of them in their other meet-
ings as members of Owen's congregation, to reconvene the General
Council of Officers. There was nothing really new in this. It was
merely regularising a state of affairs that had existed over the past
few months. It could also help promote army unity, but as Professor
Woolrych has remarked

"Fleetwood was no Cromwell. He and his fellow
commanders grossly overestimated their influence
over their subordinates, and the republican
politicians were not to be used for any purpose
but their own." (3)

The senior army command was itself divided. Fauconberg who attended
the first meeting of the General Council on 2 April commented that
the under officers, or "rabble" as he put it, who were entitled to
be present by right which Fauconberg, not an officer of the late 1640's
vintage seemed unable to appreciate, had enthusiastically backed
Robert Lilburne and Ashfield whom they might have viewed as a sort of

(1) For an analysis of this literature q.v. Woolrych, 'The
Good Old Cause ...', Camb. Hist. Journal, XIII, 1957,
pp. 137-145.

(2) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 63-65; Davies, Restoration,
pp. 75-76; Woolrych, Milton, pp. 61-62.

(3) ibid., p. 62. Q.v. also his analysis of the motives for
the overtures to the Republicans in 'The Good Old Cause',
pp. 146-147. For Owen's growing importance with the
Wallingford House officers, especially towards the end
of April, q.v., Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston,
III Vols., Scottish Historical Society, Edinburgh, 1911-1940,
martyr figure. (1) A committee was appointed to draw up a petition to Parliament and to tone down some of the demands made by Lilburne, Ashfield and their supporters; its members were Colonels Lilburne, Ashfield, Mill, Lt. Colonels Mason, Pearson, Haines, Arnop and Mayer and Captain Deane. (2) Professor Woolrych has said that not a single Wallingford House man was appointed to the committee, incidently revising an earlier view that the committee was elected. (3) But as has been argued above the view that the categories originally set out by Ludlow were both rigid and accurate is open to doubt. The category of "Commonwealthsman" is particularly unsuitable as well as being inadequately defined both by Ludlow and subsequent historians, especially if it is meant to imply a long term commitment to the Rump. The committee for drawing up the petition is quite diverse in terms of peoples' behaviour over the next few months. Lilburne, Ashfield and Pearson turned against the Rump in October, Mill adhered to Richard, and Haines, if he is the same person as the Lt. Colonel of Lillington's regiment in Flanders, was accused of being "a great Protectorian" to the committee responsible for nominating officers over the summer. This could easily have been a malicious and unfounded accusation for he was kept on. (4) At the time of the petition the

(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823, ff. 291-292.
(2) Clarke Papers, III, p. 187.
(4) Firth and Davies, pp. 679, 691.
officers were in a state of flux. They were building up to a conflict with Parliament and ultimately with the Protector, and differences of opinion about how far to proceed in their opposition certainly existed amongst them, but to attempt to categorise them is hazardous and self defeating. Nevertheless, the pressures from the junior officers for a more radical course should not be underestimated at this time.

Fauconberg also reported to Henry Cromwell that the officers were determined to have approval of the King's death as "a touchstone or text" for members of the army and Council. Whether he meant the Council of Officers or the Council of State is not clear. However, judging from Barwick's account it seems likely that some form of engagement, or "attestation" as he called it, supporting the execution of Charles I was envisaged, one that would be required of government officials, M.P.s as well as army personnel. Fauconberg also said that a friend of his had purportedly seen a bill to this purpose in Disborowe's possession. It was intended that the officers should meet on the 20th to sign the engagement or "attestation" supporting the King's execution and to press Parliament to pass a vindication of the trial and execution. However, all this was overtaken by the crisis leading up to the dissolution of the Parliament.

The petition itself, presented to Richard on 6 April and by him to the Parliament two days later, marks the return of the army

(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823, ff. 291-292; Thurloe, VII, p. 662.

(2) ibid., loc. cit.; Clarke Papers, III, pp. 189-90; Guizot, Richard Cromwell, I, p. 363; Woolrych, 'The Good Old Cause', p. 149.
openly into the political arena. It was stating in no uncertain terms its claim to have a say in politics. Reference was made to the Solemn Declaration of June 1647 and to the alleged backslidings from the cause and to the dangers to the cause from the common enemy. Mention was also made of the genuine grievances of pay and indemnity. It was indeed "a challenge to the civil authorities" and as Whitelocke remarked "the beginning of Richard's fall". (1) Pride's late regiment, now under Richard Moss, sent in an address to Fleetwood and the General Council supporting the petition. It was signed by the junior officers and soldiery. (2)

There is little that can be added to the existing very full accounts of the events leading to the dissolution of Richard's Parliament. (3) Both army and Protector realised a conflict was likely, and Richard showed some signs of panic. On 20 April he knighted Hacker, the commander of the guards, presumably in an attempt to gain his support and consequently that of his men. (4) It did him no good.

(1) The petition is printed in O.P.H., XXI, pp. 340–345; q.v. also Davies, Restoration, pp. 76–78; Whitelocke, Memorials, IV, p. 342.

(2) E974(5), To his Excellency the Lord Fleetwood and the General Council of the Armies of England, Scotland and Ireland (sic,) the Humble Address of the Inferior Officers and Soldiers of the late Lord Pride's Regiment (8 April). The address is printed in Burton, IV, pp. 388–389.


(4) Clarke Papers, III, p. 191.
Hacker became firmly committed to the Rump over the next few months and remained loyal to it in October. He was also the first officer to set an example and receive his commission from the Speaker. Indeed, apart from a few senior officers including Fauconberg, Ingoldsby, Howard (all of whom recommended that Richard carry out a coup against Wallingford House by dismissing Fleetwood, Disborowe and other senior officers), Goffe and Whalley, the Protector's support in the army was negligible. He could summon only two troops of horse and three companies of foot to his side during the night of the dissolution. Even those officers who supported him could not get their regiments to act against Fleetwood and Disborowe. (1)

It must be emphasised that there was no consensus in the army as to where to proceed once the Parliament had been dissolved. There were strong inducements to recall the Rump. The contacts that had already been made with the Republicans, the feeling among the junior officers and their sympathisers in the senior ranks, and the intense pro-Rump propaganda campaign, much of it directed at the army made a recall all the more likely. The sort of pressure coming from below can be seen from the petition of Goffe's regiment, presented

(1) Baker, Chronicle, p. 641; Clarke Papers, III, pp. 193, 212-213; Guizot, Richard Cromwell, I, pp. 370-371; Davies, Restoration, pp. 80-84; Woolrych, Milton, pp. 64-66. Both Davies and Woolrych include Goffe among those officers recommending Richard to carry out a coup against Wallingford House. They give no evidence for this. Phillips, who mentions the story, does not include Goffe (Davies, Restoration, p. 80; Woolrych, Milton, p. 64; Baker, Chronicle, p. 641). According to the Venetian ambassador Thurloe informed Fleetwood and Disborowe that there might be a coup against them (C.S.P.V. 1659-61, p. 18).
to the General Council of Officers, which called for a purge of
the army and the return of the Rump. The re-admission of Okey and
Saunders whose Rumper Republicanism was of long-standing was a further
lurch in this direction. They were admitted late in April along with
Lambert, Packer and Gladman. Overton's and Rich's re-admission to
the army was still under consideration at the end of the month.

Overton's case is interesting. As we have seen, he had
been imprisoned in 1655, eventually ending up in Jersey, for his part
in the 'plot' that bears his name. On 5 October 1658 his sister
petitioned the Council of State for his release and the petition was
referred to a committee of the Council whose members included Fleet-
wood, Disborowe and Sydenham. Nothing was done in relation to the
petition so that she eventually presented a second petition on 20
January 1659. The Council of State voted against removing him. His
sister took the matter before Parliament on 3 February and the House
ordered his release the following month after a debate. During this
debate the legality of some of the proceedings of Oliver Cromwell's
Protectorate were questioned and the very nature of the army's role
in government and in politics in general came close to being put under
close scrutiny and criticism which could have provoked a constitutional

(1) E979(6), The Humble Remonstrance of the Non-Commission
Officers and Private Soldiers of Major General Goffe's
regiment (so-called) of foot, 27 April.

(2) Clarke Papers, III, p. 195

(3) ibid., p. 196.
crisis in the manner of Naylor's case. Overton returned to London amidst scenes of rejoicing and triumph, presumably because he was personally looked upon by opponents of the Protectorate as a martyr figure who had suffered for his opposition to government by a single person, and his case as useful and much-needed propaganda. As we shall see, he was restored to the army on 23 May along with Rich and Alured. Why his erstwhile colleagues appear deliberately to have hesitated to bring him back into the army is open to speculation. A possible explanation is that his strong individualism and unpredictability were not the sort of qualities that they were keen to have in the army at this particular juncture. Another explanation is that they suspected him of being too much a supporter of the Rump which coupled with his proven capacity for polemical self-expression could be a potential source of tension. On 10 June the Rump voted that Overton be given a command in the army "as becomes his merit" (interestingly, this was the same day that the Rump voted the verdict of Alured's court martial unjust and ordered it to be removed from the army rolls and that he be given a regiment of horse). It was rumoured that Overton would be made Major General of foot in Ireland. In fact he returned to his previous appointment as governor of Hull and received back his foot regiment. Perhaps some of the Rumpers hoped that he would be a useful ally to them in the army's senior command. As it turned out this was not to be the case, nor were the possible suspicions of his senior colleagues that he might be too uncritically enthusiastic for the Rump at all well-founded. As we shall see it was Overton's individualism
that determined his political stance over the next months. (1)

The question of Lambert's return to the army remains intriguing. As we have seen, he was quite active in the Parliament and there is good reason for supposing that he remained closely in touch with what was happening in the army. One suspects that he realised that it was in the army that his real power base lay and not in the Parliament, he was not after all by experience or temperament a parliamentarian. In the interval between the dissolution of Richard's Parliament and the recall of the Rump there was much discussion about the future form the government of the nation was to have. (2)

Mabbott's newsletter of 26 April to Henry Cromwell reported that the Council of Officers was discussing this question and whether the government should be according to the Humble Petition, that is including a Protector, by the Long Parliament, or whether a new constitution should be devised. He reported that nothing had been agreed upon as yet. (3) A sizeable number of the senior officers appear to have favoured ending the Protectorate. According to Baker, when anything was mentioned at the meetings at Wallingford House about keeping Richard in power, "it was obstructed or diverted by Propositions of Government". But some sort of compromise emerged whereby the Protector


(2) B.M. Add. Ms. 22919, f. 96 (Thurloe to Downing, 29 April 1659).

(3) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823, ff. 304-305.
was kept on, for the moment at least, with limitations to his power and whereby Fleetwood became Commander-in-Chief with power to issue and revoke commissions. That this could only be a stop-gap measure must have been obvious to Fleetwood and Disborough, whom one suspects was a bit more astute and radical than Fleetwood. Wariston probably hit on the reason for the reluctance to contemplate the ending of the Protectorate when he warned Fleetwood that the army could only make itself unpopular by first of all getting Richard Cromwell to dissolve the Parliament and then by ousting Richard. Wariston's account also confirms that during the last days of April there was talk in the innermost circle of the officers and their advisors, who included Owen, of recalling the Rump. He personally opposed this and made this clear to Fleetwood and Sydenham. He suggests that they and their advisors were determined that existing civil and religious liberties should be preserved but that beyond submitting themselves "to what government God shall incline them to" they had no idea about how to resolve the constitutional crisis. But even if they did not want it, the ending of the Protectorate would be forced upon them.

Central to any developments/the junior officers whose meetings at St. James's were by this time much more clearly distinguishable from those at Wallingford House. Former Lt. Colonel Joyce was said to be involved in these meetings and Vane and Haselrig were

(1) Baker, Chronicle, p. 642.
(2) Wariston, Diary, III, p. 106.
(3) For a different interpretation q.v. Davies, Restoration, p. 87.
said to have some influence over them. The inferior officers still had their contacts among the senior officers, particularly Lilburne and Ashfield, and it is possible that Lambert engineered his return to the army by associating himself with the junior officers and their enthusiasm for a return of the Rump, which was being stirred up by Owen, whose connections with the senior officers, including Lambert, we have already seen. According to one account Lambert, in association with others, worked from behind the scenes and left it to his fellow north countryman Lilburne, at whose quarters there were meetings, to lobby for a restoration of the Rump. When the junior officers declared for the Rump, Fleetwood and Disborowe brought back the officers purged by Oliver and ousted those who had sided openly with Richard in the recent crisis. These included Ingoldsby, Fauconberg, Howard, and the unfortunate Major Babington. The fact that Haselrig was brought back into the army and given Havard's regiment shows the way things were going. Suspicions about Lambert's ambitions and doubts about restoring him to the army, doubts which were encouraged by Wariston, might have lingered on in the minds of Fleetwood and Disborowe, but official reports fostered the impression that the return of the purged officers was done amidst joy and acclamation.

Whatever, if any, suspicions there may have been were soon laid aside. During the last few days of April Lambert, Disborowe, Sydenham, Cooper, John Jones (technically a member of the army but

(1) C. Clar. S.P., IV, p. 191; B.M. Add. Ms. 22919, f. 96 (Thurloe to Downing, 29 April 1659), Thurloe, VII, p. 666.
(2) Clarke Papers, III, p. 195; Wariston, Diary, III, p. 106.
an able man and known to Fleetwood from his days in Ireland), Derry, Hacker, Lilburne, Ashfield, Salmon, Sankey, Okey, Saunders, Clark, Kelsey and Barksted, all senior officers, met at Wallingford House. (1) On 28 April they passed a number of resolutions relating to the army. (2) It was decided to purge it of those officers who were alleged to have tried to divide it and replace them with men

"of godly honest principles, and always faithfull to the good interest in which wee have bin soe longe engaged."

The officers who had been laid aside "without just cause" were to be restored, a decision which would no doubt gladden Cornet Sumpner. The Council of Officers was to continue but be somewhat reduced in number. (3) It was to consist of a field officer from each regiment in and around London, with some other officers appointed as the Commander-in-Chief saw fit. It was to advise on

"such matters as shall be judged necessary upon this great emergencie."

This could well have been a conscious desire to counteract the growing influence of the junior officers. But a desire to ensure that sufficient numbers of officers returned to their charges for military reasons in anticipation of any possible trouble in the country must have influenced the decision as well. By the beginning of May Fleetwood had sent instructions to the strategically important garrison of

(1) Clarke Papers, IV, p. 196.
(2) Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 1-3.
Hull for it to be kept "in a posture of defence and safety for ye good old cause".\(^{(1)}\) No doubt similar instructions were sent to other regiments and garrisons. They might well have included a call for a declaration of support for the actions of the army in London. At Hull the officers

"generally desired to be at the penning the answer (to Fleetwood's instructions) but by his (the Governor's, Henry Smith) rebukes they desisted, soe yt he gave what answer pleased him in their names." \(^{(2)}\)

The officers at Wallingford House also resolved to set up a committee to draw up letters to the forces elsewhere in England, and in Scotland and Ireland, justifying recent developments and urging them to join with the forces in London

"in maintenance of the Good Old Cause and interest in which wee have joynlie engaged." \(^{(3)}\)

For the first time the physical divisions of the army were seen as crucial. Fleetwood had already realised this with his letter to Monck on 23 April, shortly after the dissolution of the Parliament, in which he sought to justify the action for fear of misinterpretations, and urged unity between the armies.\(^{(4)}\) On 29 April the officers

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\(^{(1)}\) B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f.44.

\(^{(2)}\) ibid. Smith was kept on but was eventually replaced by Overton. As compensation he was given a foot regiment (Fitch's) which was serving in Scotland. However, he did not go northwards and Monck appointed Miles Mann as Colonel instead (Firth and Davies, pp. 515-516, 556-557).

\(^{(3)}\) Clarke Papers, IV, p. 2.

\(^{(4)}\) ibid., III, p. 184. For the letter eventually sent to Monck on 3 May by the committee of officers, justifying their defiance of Parliament's order to dissolve the General Council and the dissolution of the Parliament, but making no mention of the fall of the Protectorate, q.v. ibid., IV, pp. 4-6 and also pp. 7-8.
discussed what was to be done about a future government. According
to a newsletter they "incline to the recalling of the Longe Parliament"
but there was some disagreement over a new Council, or possibly Senate,
especially as to whether it was to have any control over the restored
Parliament or not. One can reasonably suppose that Lambert was in
favour of some sort of control over the Parliament, a fact of some
significance for the future. Eventually it was decided to leave this
to the Parliament to decide.\(^{(1)}\)

During the next few days a certain number of officers,
of whom Lambert appears to have been the leader, was deputed to meet
with the Republican leaders to work out more definite plans for the
return of the Rump. The officers (in addition to Lambert), whose
names we have were Kelsey, Berry, Sydenham and John Jones. Haselrig
was also back in the army but his behaviour was more that of a civilian
than an army officer. Ludlow too was soon to be back in the army. The
Republicans were of the Rumper variety. The army put forward four
demands: an act of indemnity was to be passed, provision was to be
made for Richard Cromwell, reform of the law and of the clergy was to
be undertaken, and the government of the nation was to be by a representa-
tive of the people and a select senate. The first three were assented
to without much difficulty, but the final one proved to be problematic.\(^{(2)}\)
It was to cause division in the restored Parliament itself, and not
all of the officers can have been enthusiastic about it either. When

\(^{(1)}\) Clarke Papers, III, p. 196; Bakers Chronicle, pp. 642-643.

\(^{(2)}\) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 74-76; Wariston, Diary, III,
pp. 107-108.
the outcome of the meeting was reported back to the other officers Fleetwood, Disborowe and Lambert showed a dislike of the Republicans cautiousness. (1) It must have seemed to them as if the Republicans were playing hard to get. But within a few days the declaration of the officers for the return of the Rump had been delivered to the Speaker by Lambert and some 14 other officers, and the Parliament met on 7 May. (2) It is well-known that the army later claimed that the Rump had not been recalled unconditionally but had agreed to the army's propositions. Ludlow argues that the Republicans stressed that they were acting only in their private capacity and could not bind the House. However, a remark made by Wariston in July, when tensions between army and Parliament were developing, tends to support the view that the Republican leaders and the officers agreed to certain "privat conditions" during these discussions which it was expected both sides would adhere to. (3)

Pressure from below must have helped the senior officers make up their minds, (4) but there were other more practical and pressing considerations influencing them. The need for money and for a legal government to raise it was paramount as the problem of pay arrears, mentioned in the army's petition in early April, had

(1) Baker, Chronicle, p. 643.
(2) ibid., loc. cit. The list of officers presenting the declaration is printed by Berry and Lee, A Cromwellian Major General, p. 223n. It includes Haselrig.
(3) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 76–77n; Wariston, Diary, II, p. 123; Woolrych (Milton, p. 70n 22) accepts Ludlow's account.
(4) Baker, Chronicle, p. 643; Clarke Papers, IV, p. 3.
not been dealt with. To remedy this, the recall of the Rump seemed to offer the best and most readily available solution. (1) Its return was never meant by the officers to provide a permanent solution to the underlying problem of settlement. In their eyes that still remained to be worked out as the negotiations with the Republicans in late April and early May demonstrated. Some members of the Rump chose to see things differently. The Rump's restoration and the circumstances in which it was done created new problems. Resentment against the army and its dissolution of the Rump in April 1653 could not be forgotten as easily as the newsbooks tried to make out. Tensions were bound to remain. The disagreements among the officers on the question of a Council or Senate having a negative voice over the Parliament, although they were not serious in April, were fundamental to the whole question of whether Parliaments should be completely sovereign and free or not, and thus also sovereign over the military as well. These were issues that were to divide the army amongst itself and to cause the fatal second dissolution of the Rump in October. The fact that in April some officers clearly felt that the Parliament should not be bound anticipates the eventual split within the army in October. The newly restored Colonels Okey and Saunders had long since declared for free Parliaments in their petition in 1654. Finally, the appeals for unity to the commanders of the regiments

(1) C.f. Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 73.
out of London, and especially that to Monck, although nothing new in themselves (declarations of justification had been sent out after all the major changes in the 1650's), took on a more ominous character, and in the months ahead in terms of army politics, and by implication of national politics, the physical divisions within the army became one of the most decisive factors.
The arrival of Henry Cromwell in Ireland and Fleetwood's departure for England in September 1655 which made Henry de facto governor of Ireland (he was not appointed Lord Deputy until November 1657 and even then he was not given an entirely free rein. His instructions as Lord Deputy prohibited him from cancelling appointments made by Fleetwood)\(^{(1)}\) marks a shift to the right in Irish affairs.

In the discussion of Ireland until Fleetwood's departure it was emphasised that discontent in the army was by no means endemic but was confined to a small number of mainly Baptist officers and that, however much Fleetwood may have sympathised with the Baptists there is nothing to suggest that they posed a political threat to the Protectorate government. Fleetwood had sympathised with the Baptists; Henry Cromwell distrusted them. That had been clear from his first visit to Ireland in March 1654, and from the start of his second, and more permanent, stay he made this even more obvious. He openly mixed with Independent divines which led to the ridiculous charge that he was "priest ridden",\(^{(2)}\) and eventually so alienated the Baptist officers in the army that several of them resigned their commissions. In more obviously political matters Henry Cromwell sympathised with Broghill and favoured a hard line against the anti-kingship officers.\(^{(3)}\) In Ireland Henry's policy paid far closer attention to the interests of the older established colonists.\(^{(4)}\)

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\(^{(1)}\) Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 21n 21.


\(^{(3)}\) This has been discussed more fully in the section of the main narrative dealing with the kingship crisis.

Henry's anomalous position as de facto governor was quite unsatisfactory and soon caused some instability. On 14 November Reynolds wrote to Thurloe suggesting that Henry should be made Lord Deputy to end uncertainty and to place the government of Ireland on a much firmer footing. He said that Fleetwood's "sweetness kept bonds upon some who have since manifested discontents". Reynolds was aware that he ran the risk of casting aspersions on Fleetwood's character and, although he said he would rather "cut off my hand, than signe a paper reflecting upon his lordship's person and government", yet he had decided to risk this, and had joined in a petition to the protector for Henry to be made Deputy on the grounds that Fleetwood's absence from Ireland might be a long one. He hoped that somehow Henry would be appointed Deputy before the petition reached London. The petition originated from within the army, and Reynolds, somewhat coyly, was sensitive to the charge that could be levied at the army, that it was involving itself in matters that did not concern it:

"Things of this nature may in time to come beget a custome in our armyes to interpose in government which hath ruined many states." (1)

The petition was also signed by Theophilus Jones, an older established colonist who, although a member of the army, had seen no service in Britain, and Hardress Waller, who had been prominent in army politics between 1647 and 1649 but who had served in Ireland in the 1650's. (2)

(1) Thurloe, IV, p. 197.
(2) ibid., p. 327; Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A5, f. 249.
It seems likely that another petition was drawn up by some civilians in Dublin, possibly with the connivance of some of the long standing colonists, and that this was distributed in other parts of the country. This second petition was possibly more outspoken against Fleetwood. However, the petitions backfired seriously; they could be, and were in some circles especially Baptist ones, seen as an attack on Fleetwood and thus on toleration. Hewson, Henry Pretty and Richard Lawrence, three officers who had come to Ireland with Oliver, denounced the petition as the work of men who had deluded "many honest persons" and exploited Henry Cromwell's good nature in their desire to "weaken the Godly interest" and promote their "private interest". They called for Fleetwood to be kept on as Deputy. Henry disapproved of such an attack, and he appears to have taken steps to have it stopped.

The reaction to the petitioning in England is very interesting. Fleetwood chose to interpret the motives of the petitioners as aiming to cause division in the army. As for Cromwell, Sankey, who was in England at this time, said that he was very upset by the petitions because he felt they would give grounds for people to say that he was trying to advance his own family. The Protectorate had not after

(1) Thurloe, III, p. 29; ibid., IV, pp. 227, 348, 422; Clarke Papers, III, pp. 60-61; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff. 46-67.

(2) Thurloe, IV, p. 276.

(3) ibid., pp. 348, 422; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff. 52-53.

(4) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff. 44-45, 70-71, 80-81.

(5) ibid., ff. 40-41.
all taken the strong roots in the country it was hoped it would and,
as the discontent surrounding the various 'plots' of late 1654 and
early 1655 had shown, Cromwell could not be one hundred per cent
certain of the army either. Thus, anything which could lead to the
accusation that he was aiming at a personal despotism was most unwel-
come to Cromwell. Sankey's other suggestion, that Cromwell recalled
Fleetwood to England because he had heard from Staines, Major Hezekiah
Haynes and Captain Giffith Lloyd (the last two being members of Fleet-
wood's regiment in England) that his estate was suffering in his
absence is to be treated with scepticism. Sankey was quite an influen-
tial officer but he was not one of the most influential and thus privy
to what was happening in the innermost circles of government, although
no doubt he thought that he was. (1)

To emphasise his displeasure with the petitions the Protector
took the somewhat unusual step of writing to Hewson, with the intention
that the letter should become public. The letter has not survived but
judging from Hewson's reply it urged him to keep in touch and to try to
serve Henry and to promote unity amongst the godly. Hewson, for his
part, said that the differences in Ireland were quite small and assured
Cromwell that the Baptists, among whom he did not include himself, were
friends of the Protector. He said that he would obey Henry but drew
attention to his inexperience and, somewhat disrespectfully and unfairly,

(1) ibid., loc. cit. Q.v. also his letter to Henry Cromwell
of 4 December (ibid., ff. 52-53) in which he suggests that
Henry should have dissociated himself more forcefully from
the petitioning.
added that he hoped the Lord would keep Henry "from being puffed upp" with power. (1) Cromwell wrote a further letter to Hewson in January which was delivered by Sankey, who returned to Ireland in the new year. Hewson's reply went over much the same ground as his previous letter. (2) As far as Cromwell was concerned his policy in Ireland was an extension of his policy towards the army in England, that is of not alienating his officers from himself unnecessarily and thereby weakening his strong power base in the army. For him this was an overriding priority and contrasted with Henry's Irish policy which was to be aimed at trying to win over the older settled colonists. Oliver Cromwell looked at Ireland in terms of English politics. The army was the most important component of his power and authority, the army had pacified Ireland and was there to keep it in a state of tranquillity. Cromwell was determined that the tranquillity of the army, and hence of Ireland, should not be upset. It is another instance of the fact that the Protectorate government did not have a fully fledged colonial policy towards Ireland.

The differences in the Irish army over the question of the headship of government were patched up. Sankey and Colonel Thomas Cooper, who arrived in Ireland with Sankey to take up command of the forces in Ulster, and both of whom were Baptists played important parts in this with Cooper especially gaining Henry Cromwell's respect as a mediator. (3) A letter was sent to the Protector extolling Fleetwood's

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(1) Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A5, f. 249 ff.
(2) Thurloe, IV, p. 422.
(3) Thurloe, IV, pp. 408, 422–423, 433. For Sankey and Cooper q.v. biographical appendix.
virtues and thanking Cromwell for sending over Henry to carry on the good work. A compromise was put forward suggesting that Fleetwood be made Lord Lieutenant and Henry Lord Deputy. The letter was signed by most of the senior officers in Dublin including Theophilus Jones, Reynolds and Hewson. (1) According to Reynolds who was sent across to England with the letter, and also to lobby the Council of State for action on Irish affairs, some thought the exaggerated praise for Fleetwood came near to blasphemy. (2) On 5 February 1656 Thurloe informed Henry that the letter was welcomed in London and had been passed on to Fleetwood and Lambert to consider. He promised that he would inform Henry of any decisions regarding it. (3) In the event nothing came of it.

These divisions within the army in Ireland with their strong religious undertones did of course have political implications but these were really only important with regard to Irish affairs. They never grew into anything serious, not even comparable to the Three Colonels' Petition or Overton's 'plot' which reflected deeply felt discontent with government by a single person, although, as we have seen, such discontent was limited to relatively few officers. Hewson in one of his letters to Cromwell said that

"if ever there should come a time of triall your Highnes would find them (the Baptists) thereon for the present government when others it may be would faint in the work." (4)

(1) ibid., pp. 421-422.
(2) B. N. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff. 85-86.
(3) Thurloe, IV, p. 505.
(4) Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A5, f.251.
Perhaps he was going further than Allen or Vernon would have gone (they had, as we have seen, expressed some unease about the establishment of the Protectorate), but he was correct in saying that the Baptists were not opponents of the Protectorate. They might be opponents of Henry Cromwell and his style of government in Ireland, but that was something quite different. If Henry had been a more experienced politician, then perhaps he would not have antagonised some of the Baptist officers to the extent that in November 1656 Allen, Barrow, Axtell and Vernon all gave up their commissions. This move was condemned by some of their friends and according to Henry the officers themselves did not boast much about it, implying that they felt they had made a miscalculation. But Henry was wrong to believe that they resigned because of their "general disaffection to the government", unless he meant to his own in Ireland. (1) Henry Cromwell's problems with the Baptists are to be seen more within the narrower context of personality differences than in the wider one of general opposition to the Protectorate. It is quite wrong to argue that Henry faced difficulties with these officers because Fleetwood had promoted officers who were "Republicans at heart" and "who had unwillingly accepted the Protectorate in 1653". (2)

Henry Cromwell's attitude towards the Baptists did not stand him in good stead later on, during the political crisis surrounding the downfall of the Protectorate. It poisoned his relations with

(1) Thurloe, V, pp. 670-672, 729. The four officers were re-commissioned in the summer of 1659.
(2) Davies, Restoration, p. 239.
Fleetwood and the rumours that he was actively discountenancing the godly worried some of the officers in London.\(^{(1)}\) It is not surprising, therefore, that during the last days of the Protectorate all this, coupled with his known support of kingship, made Henry deeply distrusted in army circles.

During the kingship crisis in England there was very little trouble in Ireland. Henry wrote to what he styled "the well affected officers" to beware of trouble and planned to replace the guards of Dublin Castle who he felt were too much under the influence of Hewson, Lawrence and John Jones, who had by this time returned to Ireland.\(^{(2)}\)

Later in 1657, Henry had another confrontation with Hewson who, along with Lawrence, had promoted a letter among the officers addressed to Fleetwood welcoming Oliver's refusal of the crown. There was nothing subversive about the letter, although strictly speaking they ought to have cleared it with Henry first of all. Henry took exception to the address for which he held Hewson responsible and sent various papers about it to England which Thurloe thought indicated "an unquiet and divideing spiritt" in Hewson. He backed up Henry's response to the letter on the grounds that he could not have sat idly by "without too much prostituting your owne authoritie". Fleetwood, on the other hand supported Hewson.\(^{(3)}\)

In September of the same year Henry cashiered Lt. Colonel Alexander Brayfield of Hewson's regiment for trying to revive Hewson's

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\(^{(1)}\) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff. 78-79, 83-84, 142-143, 230-231; ibid., 823, ff. 343-346.

\(^{(2)}\) Thurloe, VI, p. 94; Brown, Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 165.

\(^{(3)}\) Thurloe, VI, p. 352; Brown, Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 166.
letter against kingship. Brayfield had been an elected officer of the regiment in 1647 and was one of the officers ordered to secure the King and bring him to London in December 1648. Despite requests from Cromwell, Thurloe and Broghill to think again about his move, Henry refused to reinstate Brayfield, who was, however, recommissioned in 1659. (1) Once again the Protector's desire to maintain stability in the Irish army was uppermost. But such incidents should not be exaggerated. The opposition to kingship among the Irish officers did not reach the same intensity as in England and there appears to have been no reaction to Lambert's fall. In 1658 Sankey and Philip Carteret, the Advocate General of the army in Ireland, were even prepared to support kingship if such a measure were required to bring about settlement, although this view would not have been supported by most of their colleagues in England. An address was sent to England in support of the Humble Petition and Advice. (2)

Richard Cromwell's accession to the Protectorate in September 1658 was generally supported by the army in Ireland. Both Sankey and Lawrence signed his proclamation in Dublin. After the proclamation many of the field officers met with Henry in Dublin Castle and requested him to make known their loyalty and support for Richard. A more formal address was to be drawn up later to be signed by themselves and by those under their command. According to one

(1) Thurloe, VI, p. 505; Clarke Papers, I, p. 437; ibid., II, pp. 142, 144, 146; Brown, Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 167. For Brayfield q.v. also biographical appendix.

(2) Brown, Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 168. Davies (Restoration, p. 239) is mistaken to suggest the Baptists, whom he equates with Republicans, disliked the Humble Petition and Advice more than the Instrument of Government.
newsbook an Ensign in Waterford garrison was dismissed by the governor, William Leigh, for being unwilling to attend the proclamation, although his non-attendance was not necessarily for political reasons. (1)

Henry Cromwell did not try to resist the fall of the Protectorate in May 1659 and he soon resigned his offices. He had expressed a desire to return to England on several occasions before and was now most probably glad to be relieved of his duties in Ireland which he cannot in any way have found a pleasant or rewarding experience. Colonel Robert Phayre, one of the officers to whom the warrant for the execution of Charles I had been addressed and during the 1650's governor of Cork and a sympathiser with the Quakers, carried an address of loyalty to the Rump from the Irish forces. The petition was said to include a request that all land grants in Ireland be confirmed. (2) The Rump re-established commissioners to govern Ireland. Two of the five appointed were associated with the army, John Jones and Mathew Tholmison. (3) Ludlow was re-appointed Commander-in-Chief early in July and he set off for Ireland after receiving his commissions from the Speaker on 18 July. He arrived in Ireland in late July. (4) The summer purges were also applied to the Irish regiments and the most notable changes were the return of the Baptist officers who had resigned in 1656. Allen replaced Daniel Redman who was to be influential in winning over the Irish brigade to Monck in 1659.

(1) Thurloe, VII, pp. 383-384, 400; Publick Intelligencer, 13-20 September 1658, 29 November-6 December 1658.

(2) Faithful Scoutt, 17-24 June 1659; Weekly Intelligencer, 21-28 June 1659.

(3) C.J., VII, p. 674.

(4) B. M. Stowe Ms. 142, ff. 64, 65 (warrants from Parliament appointing Ludlow Commander-in-Chief in Ireland (9 July), and Lt. General of horse and Commander-in-Chief (12 July)); C.J., VII, p. 722.
When Ludlow arrived in Ireland to take up his appointment he set in motion a full inquiry into the reliability of all the armed forces, the results of which he intended to submit to the nominating committee. The inquiry was not just confined to the question of political reliability to the Rump but included an examination into the extent of soldiers marrying Papists. After the return of the Rump in December one of the charges against Ludlow was that he had exploited this opportunity to purge the regiments of "friends and faithful servants" of the Parliament. (1) This is a most unfair charge. Ludlow's attitude to public affairs after the October coup was certainly ambiguous and can be interpreted as either pragmatic, in so far as he was acting to secure the good old cause in what he considered to be the best way under the circumstances, or as sheer opportunism, depending on one's point of view. However, it is absurd to suggest, given his well-known support for the Rump, that he actually ousted officers loyal to the Parliaments during his stay in Ireland. His action in calling a Council of Officers to counteract the Derby petition which Sankey had sent to Ireland also tends to disprove this accusation. (2) However, Ludlow's assertion that on the dissolution of the Rump in October 1659 the officers joined in a petition to be sent to Haselrig supporting the Rump is wrong and stems largely from Ludlow's retrospective desire to whitewash his behaviour between October and December. (3)

(1) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 117 and n., 121, 468.
(2) ibid., pp. 118-119.
(3) ibid., p. 120.
The news of the coup against Parliament threw the Irish officers into some confusion. Ludlow had already left for England when news of the coup came to Dublin. He had appointed John Jones as acting Commander-in-Chief. Jones was by no means confident nor relaxed in his new job. He had been appointed as a compromise in place of Sankey and Hardress Waller. (1) Jones's first concern was for security and after calling his officers together he ordered them to repair to their commands to prevent any trouble. (2) Unlike Monck, however, the army in Ireland decided to support the officers in England. But their support was qualified. On 26 October an address to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction was drawn up. It expressed "Astonishment and Sorrow" at the dissolution of the Rump which it said was treading "upon the Drinke of Ruine and Disolotion to themselves and these Nations, in ye unfixing of yt Nationall authority wch themselves ... had but few moneths restored to ye manadgmt and discharge of their Trust."

However, they conceded that "necessity and service of duty" must have caused their comrades in England to take this step and, arguing that national security (i.e. of Ireland) must have priority, they resolved to support the endeavours of the officers in London to settle affairs of state. They said that it was of the utmost concern to preserve unity between the three armies "that soe we may be in the hand of ye Lord as a threefold cord not easily broken". (3) Their misgivings were not so easily removed. The Declaration of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleet-

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(1) ibid., pp. 121-123; Mayer, 'Inedited Letters', pp. 262-263.
(2) ibid., p. 263.
(3) ibid., pp. 264-266.
wood faction as to why they had dissolved the Rump and outlining their intentions was felt by some of the Irish officers to be "but wrapped in Gen'l's". John Jones recommended that a further declaration of intent should be forthcoming to satisfy the unease felt by some of his officers. (1) Ludlow suggests that Colonel Thomas Cooper and his Major, Edward Warren, in particular, were unhappy about the coup. (2)

The reasons for the qualified support of the Irish officers for the coup are not far to seek. The main reason was one of wait and see. As a result of their geographical situation they were obviously not fully informed about developments in England. Moreover, the level of political consciousness in the Irish army was not, as we have seen, very high and it was most unlikely that they would, at first at any rate, seize the initiative themselves. In a choice between army and Parliament they instinctively sided with their colleagues. (3) Thus, there was genuine surprise at Monck's declaring against the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, news of which reached Dublin in late October or early November in the form of letters and papers addressed to Ludlow. The officers in Dublin, including Hardress Waller, who was later to take part in the seizure of Dublin Castle on behalf of the Rump, replied to Monck saying that his attitude was likely to bring about new bloodshed. Major John Barret, of Axtell's regiment, was sent with the letter to Monck and was subsequently in trouble in Scotland for allegedly trying to sow disaffection. (4) Monck could

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(1) ibid., p. 275.
(2) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 147. For Cooper, however, q.v. biographical appendix.
(3) For the problems of security in Ireland and the confusion in Irish affairs brought about by the coup q.v. Jones's comments (Mayer, 'Inedited letters', pp. 277, 279).
(4) ibid., pp. 271-274; Baker, Chronicle, pp. 668, 669.
well afford to remain unperturbed. He received word from his nephew, Henry Monck, who had been a Cornet in Henry Cromwell's horse regiment until he was purged in the summer of 1659, that Sir Charles Coote, Theophilus Jones and some others in the army were prepared to support him in his desire to see the Rump restored and that they hoped to win over Hardress Waller. Henry Monck had kept up a pretty regular correspondence with Monck about Irish affairs from at least earlier in the year. Monck remained in touch with the officers in Dublin but like many of his other letters at this time this was very much a propaganda exercise.

As we have seen Jones realised that not all of his officers were happy with the official position of support for the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction taken in the name of the Irish army. However, when news of the treaty between Monck and the army faction in London reached Ireland he decided to press on with measures to enable the election of representatives of the regiments in Ireland to participate in the General Council of the Army. He was fully aware that given the short notice of the forthcoming General Council the regiments would be unlikely to be able to send over representatives in time, and so urged that, wherever possible, officers at present in England should be chosen to represent the Irish regiments. The regiments were still to meet and to proceed with the election of

(1) ibid., pp. 668-669; Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 11, 23, 95; Firth and Davies, p. 592.

(2) Clarke Ms 32, f. 130v-132 repr. in B.M. 669, f.22(38), A Letter from General Monck to the Commissioners of Parliament in Ireland. Firth (Clarke Papers, IV, p. 96n) wrongly gives the B.M. call number as 669, f.22(39).
representatives, and by 10 December representatives had been chosen.\(^{(1)}\)

It is extremely likely that Ludlow was requested to represent the Irish officers in the absence of elected representatives.\(^{(2)}\) But as with the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in London such activities were destined to be of no consequence. It is interesting to note that Jones wrote a respectful letter to Broghill who still commanded an unregimented troop informing him that no provision had been made in the instructions received from London for such troops to elect representatives. Broghill had apparently written to Jones asking him to re-appoint the suspended officers, presumably those suspended by Ludlow.\(^{(3)}\)

On 6 December Jones wrote to Ludlow saying that there had been an attempt to disaffect the armed forces in Ireland and to win them over to supporting Monck. The disaffection seems to have been mixed with a certain amount of general discontent among some of the soldiery unattributable to political motives. Jones added that sadly the trouble was welcomed by some who had been or were considered supporters of the authorities.\(^{(4)}\) Finally, on 13 December Dublin Castle, and three of the Irish commissioners, Jones, Corbet, and Thomlinson, were seized on behalf of the Rump by a group of officers acting under Hardress Waller. Broghill and Sir Charles Coote likewise secured other important areas of the country. Jones accused Waller of trying to stir up war between England and Ireland and curiously enough claimed

\(^{(1)}\) Mayer, 'Inedited Letters', pp. 280, 283-287; B. M. Stowe Ms. 142, f.68.

\(^{(2)}\) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 163.

\(^{(3)}\) Mayer, 'Inedited Letters', p. 286.

Jones also claimed that Waller and his associates had deliberately kept secret from him a letter from Monck calling for the return of the Rump. He said that if it had been presented to him he would have joined with Monck in this demand. Perhaps he felt that the bigger the lie the more chance it had of being believed, for nothing in his previous correspondence or behaviour supports this contention and it must have been well-known to him without the missing letter that Monck had declared for the Rump.

When the Rump returned to power Monck wrote to the Speaker on 16 January supporting the coup against Jones and his fellow commissioners. He suggested Coope, Broghill, Hardress Waller, Theophilus Jones and Arthur Hill as a possible council to govern Ireland. In fact Coope, Hardress Waller, Henry Markham, who played an important part in securing the return of the Rump in London and who had served as one of the commissioners for the management of the Irish revenue, Robert Goodwin and John Weaver were appointed commissioners. Monck also enclosed the votes of a Council of Officers at Dublin attacking Ludlow's behaviour and requesting that he be prohibited from returning to Ireland. But the Rump had already ordered Ludlow, Jones, Corbett and Thomlinson to attend the House and answer for their conduct of affairs. It also approved of the seizure of Dublin Castle.

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(1) ibid., pp. 292-294.
(2) ibid., pp. 296-297; c.f. Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 191.
(3) Clarke Ms. 52, ff. 56, 64v; C.J., VII, pp. 803, 815.
In the meantime Ludlow, who had set out for Ireland after news of the seizure of Dublin Castle had reached London, endeavoured unsuccessfully to land at Dublin. Ludlow claimed to be acting as Commander-in-Chief of the Irish forces. Ludlow realising the futility of trying to stay in Ireland obeyed the summons of Parliament and returned to England to face the impeachment which was not in fact proceeded with. In his Memoirs he alleges that Coote was the prevailing figure in the Council of Officers and that he was working to promote a restoration of the Stuarts. By February Coote was indeed in touch with the Royalists, and in March the officers in Dublin, who had been purged of what Broghill (himself in touch with the King) called the "Phantastick Factions Officers, Troopers and Privat foot soldiers" had declared for the readmission of the secluded M.P.s and a free Parliament. The officers referred to by Broghill probably included Colonel Robert Saunders, governor of Kinsale, who had been Lt. Colonel of Ewer's (late Robert Hammond's) regiment in 1648 and who had gone over with the regiment to Ireland in 1649, Robert Phayre, governor of Cork and Salomon Richards, governor of Wexford and Lt. Colonel of Ludlow's foot regiment from 1659. The number of Cromwellian officers, that is those who came across with Cromwell's Irish expedition in 1649 or afterwards and who might have been expected to take a firmer stand on behalf of the good old cause, was thus considerably weakened. It is likely that those Cromwellian officers who supported, or acquiesced in, the moves towards a Restoration did so in the hope of securing their lands in Ireland. Hardress Waller and a few other officers who
were committed to the good old cause realised too late what the real motives of Coote and his associates were and unsuccessfully attempted a coup against them in February. From then on it was obvious that the army in Ireland would be firmly behind the demands for a free Parliament which, as we shall argue in the main discussion of events between January and May 1660, implied a restoration of the Stuarts. On 14 May 1660 Charles II was proclaimed in Dublin. (1)

CHAPTER SIX
The period from May 1659 to May 1660 can be divided into three main sections. The first, covering May to mid-October 1659 is dominated by the army's uneasy relationship with the restored Rump and culminates in the second dissolution of the Rump. It also involves the development of serious rifts within the army itself. These rifts were not just between the forces in and around London and those elsewhere, but among the officers in London as well. The period also includes the recommissioning of the regiments with the purging and restoration of various officers. The second period from mid-October to the end of December, from the second dissolution to the return of the Rump yet again, is the only time in the 13 years we have examined when the politics of the army can be said to be synonymous with the politics of the nation. It is during this time that the role of the army in the nation's politics effectively comes to an end. This is not to say that during the third period from late December 1659 to May 1660, from the re-restoration of the Rump to the return of the Stuarts, a period which includes Monck's march into England, the army was not as important a variable in politics as it had been in the past; after all it was the army which made the Restoration, just as it was the army which made the Revolution. What is different about the army's role in these final months of the English Revolution is that under Monck's leadership the army gradually renounced its claims to be the guardian of the revolutionary cause as it had come to interpret it, and was now for the first time in 13 years prepared to hand over
power unconditionally to civilians, who were to be given a blank cheque to decide what sort of government they wanted, even if it was obvious that this meant the return of the "common enemy", "the King of Scots", "the pretended King", Charles Stuart.

This did not come about easily, nor was it predetermined, least of all by Monck when he marched south on 1 January 1660, but arguably it was what the majority of the country wanted. Under Monck the army acquiesced in this, despite the last ditch efforts made by Lambert assisted by officers such as Okey, his opponent in the second period we shall be examining, but a man for so long committed to the concept of parliamentary sovereignty and an opponent of government by a single person. The acquiescence of the army is not surprising. By December 1659 with the exception of Monck's forces and the forces in Ireland under the command of men who adhered to Monck after the coup against Dublin Castle, it was broken and disspirited; the credibility of its officers in the eyes of the nation and in the eyes of fellow adherents of the good old cause destroyed, and its pretensions to be the guardian of that cause, let alone the vanguard to further it, shattered.

The shortcomings of Fleetwood and Disborowe as politicians are obvious. Lambert's intellectual gifts were considerable. He had stamina and showed considerable aptitude for the political in-fighting within the army. But his temperament ruined any chances of his ever becoming a second Cromwell with the ability to bestride both army and civilian politics with such mastery and apparent ease.
Lambert did well when he enjoyed Oliver Cromwell's support, but once that was gone he came undone.

But there was no one capable of replacing Lambert, Disborowe or Fleetwood. Cromwell's army had not been an academy for future statesmen. In this respect it differed from Napoleon's. This had never been Oliver's intention. The political role of the army in the 1650's was never consciously intended, it was the result of circumstances and events and of personalities. Hence, the army's enormous power was never formally institutionalised within a constitution. Its political strength had been dependent on a two-fold quality. Firstly its collective nature, that is on the pressure it could exert because of its numbers and nature as a military force. This aspect of its strength worked most effectively when a fair measure of unity of purpose existed as in late 1648 and early 1649 and during the Rump period. The second side of its political strength depended on the individual skills of its more able members, that is the quality of leadership and its success in persuading significant sections of the army and civilians to follow a particular course. Cromwell, Ireton and to a lesser extent Lambert stand in a class apart in this respect. That was both a source of strength and of weakness for the army.

By the end of 1659 these two facets of the army's strength had evaporated. The Ashfields, Lilburnes, Kelseyis and Darksteds on the one side who supported the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, and the Okeys, Moswy, Alureds and Hackers on the other who supported the Rump were not suited to fill the vacuum. Despite their competence in
various aspects of administration both military and non-military, they were essentially men of the second rank. Moreover, an army is made up largely of soldiers and not just of officers and, as we shall see, the evidence suggests that by the end of 1659 the soldiery had become totally disillusioned, more interested in pay than in politics, alienated from their officers whose activities they came to view as internal squabbles rather than a struggle for power to determine the nation's future. Indeed one of the interesting aspects of the situation in 1659 compared with that of the late 1640's is that the officers overlook, even ignore, the soldiery, assuming that they will follow the lead of their superiors. There are no appeals to the soldiery from the officers. By and large the crisis is confined to the officer corps, a reflection of how much things had changed since the late 1640's. No doubt this was caused by a lingering fear amongst the officers that involving the soldiery in politics, as in the previous decade, could all too easily get out of hand; but a revolutionary movement which does not have a reasonable amount of grass roots support cannot expect to get very far, unless it has the discipline and tight-knit organisation of the Bolsheviks, a philosophy which was quite alien to seventeenth century England, and to the nature of the army between 1647 and 1660.

Two days before the return of the Rump on 7 May it was reported that the army was very unanimous
"having as one man resolved upon a Common-wealth constitution, and have appointed 8 persons vizte Lord Fleetwood, Lord Lambert, Generall Disborowe, Colonel Sydenham, Sir Henry Vane, Sir Arthur Hesilrigge, Lt. Gen. Ludlow and Major Salway to agree upon a modell which is to bee debated by the field officers of the army";

in other words the leading figures involved in securing the Rump's restoration. All were to become members of the Committee of Safety, a body which was not in fact charged with drawing up a new constitution. (1) It seems likely that the committee formed on 5 May was very soon forgotten about. It was extremely overoptimistic to imagine that a committee of such diverse individuals with fundamentally different viewpoints would be able to work out a constitution acceptable to all sides. But the fact that the committee was set up at all emphasises the point that in the eyes of the army the restoration of the Rump was a temporary measure and that the army was holding fast to its claim to be consulted about any constitutional change.

This was made even clearer in the army petition to Parliament on 13 May. The petition which had been under discussion over the previous days was presented by a delegation of 18 officers on behalf of the others with Lambert as spokesman and whose numbers included Disborowe, Barksted, Berry, Ashfield, Lilburne and Okey. (2) The petition amounted to a catalogue of the programme which the army expected

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(1) Clarke Papers, IV, p. 8; C.J., VII, pp. 646, 647; c.f. R H Lansdowne Ms. 821, f. 154 repr. in American Historical Review, VIII, 1902-1903, pp. 87-88.

from the Rump and as a reiteration for public consumption of the
army's conception of the good old cause. The petitioners welcomed
the Rump's own declaration of intent of 7 May in which it had declared
that it would carry forward the work of settlement based on a form of
government without a single person, kingship or the House of Lords, a
government that would secure civil and religious liberties and further
reform. The petitioners appeared to be slightly inhibited about making
proposals to the Parliament

"Yet this nevertheless we have judged it our
Duty to represent what was chiefly and
unanimously upon our hearts, when we engaged
in that which made way for your return, which
we humbly (as becomes us) lay before you."

This passage suggests that the army did not agree on conditions prior
to the recall of the Rump with Haselrig and his fellow negotiators.
The army, as has been mentioned, later claimed that the recall of the
Rump was conditional. The petition was designed to set out for the
record, as it were, what the army felt the conditions ought to have
been.

There followed 15 requests. They dealt with a wide variety
of issues including civil and religious liberties, law reform, an act
of oblivion for everything done since the original dissolution of the
Rump, a purge of Royalists and others not committed enough to the cause.
There was also a call for successive Parliaments and for the separation
of legislative and executive powers. In this latter request one can
detect the hand of Lambert. The legislative was to consist of a House
of Commons elected by the people (the franchise to be determined by the
present Parliament) and a select senate

"Co-ordinate in power, of able and faithful persons, eminent for Godliness, and such as continue adhering to this Cause."

The senior officers did not necessarily have themselves alone in mind as senators, although they must have assumed fairly reasonably that they would be included among its members. Just how senators were to be created was not mentioned. It is unlikely that the officers had any detailed proposals themselves anyway. Besides, as we have seen, the discussions among the officers at the end of April showed that they were not themselves united on this question. Those who supported the idea of a senate hoped that it would counteract any future danger of a dictatorship by a unicameral Parliament and that it would also give the army some form of official representation. Those who opposed it or who had qualms about it were glad that it was being left to Parliament to decide the issue. (1) These controversial requests were referred to a grand committee of the House. (2) In the press the _Weekly Intelligencer_ called for "perpetual Interunion" between Parliament and army. It said that since the army had restored the Rump it was the business of the Rump to settle the army's pay. The Rump did in fact vote

"That speedy and effectual care be taken for Payment of the Arrears of the Army"

but, as we shall see, arrears were sadly neglected. (3)

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(2) Davies, _Restoration_, p. 93.

Although the terminology of the request for a senate is Harringtonian, it must not be assumed that the officers envisaged a select senate along the lines that Harrington had presented in his writings. The officers were quite vague about their proposals for a senate, perhaps deliberately so, as they were not all agreed about it in the first place, but perhaps also because they had not thought about it too profoundly. The concept of a senate advanced in the petition seems to have more in common with the Other House of the *Humble Petition and Advice* than with that of *Oceana*.

Of the new Council of State established by act of Parliament on 19 May only six of the 31 members were serving officers at the time (Haselrig, Fleetwood, Lambert, Disborowe, Berry and Sydenham). Ludlow and Morley became members of the army over the summer, indeed Parliament instructed the committee responsible for nominating commission officers to "take care" that Morley be made a Colonel. John Jones was well known and trusted in army circles and appears to have acted as temporary governor of Beaumarais.\(^1\) It also seems likely that matters of national security were left to the army officers on the Council of State. On 8 July the question of arresting and disarming dangerous persons was referred to the army officers who were on the Council for suggestions.\(^2\) There is no evidence to support Ludlow's

\(^1\) C.J., VII, pp. 659, 707; C.S.P.D. 1658-59, pp. 349; ibid., 1659-60, p. 29.

\(^2\) Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A134 (Proceedings of the Council of State 7 June-20 October 1659) sub 8 July.
attack on the military members of the Council of State as obstructive and poor attenders. Their scruples about taking an oath are probably to be understood more in the light of their scruples about oaths in general. (1)

Richard Cromwell had been overtaken by events. He was surprised and disappointed that support for his cause did not come from Scotland, Dunkirk or the fleet. His overtures to Monck came to nothing and on 25 May he signed his declaration of abdication. By that time he had ceased to be of any importance anyway; he was not even a pawn to be manipulated by either the Rump or the army. (2) The extent to which he had lost credibility among his supporters can be judged from a remark by one of Adam Baynes's correspondents on 9 May that

"my ld Fauconberg is highly offended and sayeth he scames to serve a person of soe low a courage as the Protector because he hath sent to him to deliver his Commission if it be demanded by ld Fleetwood."

Fauconberg had gone to Yorkshire to the family home at the end of April or the beginning of May. (3) He had been one of those favouring a coup against Fleetwood and Disborowe. Richard had no alternative to resignation. Monck, despite overtures from Henry Cromwell by means of Monck's

(1) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 84-85; Davies, Restoration, p. 102.

(2) American Historical Review, VIII, 1902-1903, pp. 87-89; Mercurius Politicus, 19-26 May 1659; Davies, Restoration, p. 100. By January 1660 Richard Cromwell had become a bitter man, complaining "Who should a man trust, if he may not trust to a brother and an Uncle;" R. Latham and W. Matthews (eds.), The Diary of Samuel Pepys, London, 1970, I, p. 21.

(3) B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, ff. 44, 46.
nephew Henry, declared for the restored Rump. In a private letter probably to Thurloe Monck said that nothing but the return of the Long Parliament, meaning the Rump, would be able to preserve the peace of the nation. Indeed this was the view to which he remained consistent throughout 1659. (1) Henry appears to have contemplated a combined intervention of the armies in Ireland and Scotland on behalf of his brother, but Monck rejected this. (2) Henry could not have gone it alone. The army in Ireland had its own divisions besides which the difficulties of a successful sea-borne 'invasion' were great in themselves, not to mention the general distaste and reaction in England against any military force intervening in English affairs from Ireland, no matter in what cause. Moreover, Henry did not have the resources for such an "invasion" and he realised this very quickly.

After learning of events in England Henry called together a Council of Officers and declared

"That for his part he was resolved to submit to the Providences of God, desiring them to do the like."

Some of the opponents of a restored Rump tried to stir up the army, but at a General Council of Officers "the false glosse that was before put upon transactions in England" soon vanished. It was resolved "and freely

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(1) Davies, Restoration, pp. 99-100; D.M. Add. Ms. 22919, f.100. For a different view of Monck's opinions at this time, and throughout 1659, q.v. M. Ashley, General Monck, London, 1977, p. 152. I disagree with Dr. Ashley's analysis, especially that Monck favoured a restoration of the Stuarts from August 1659. He relies entirely on the retrospective accounts of Price and Gumble (ibid., pp. 160-165). My reasons will be apparent from my own account. However, Dr. Ashley is correct to emphasise the speculation to which Monck's behaviour gave rise later in the year.

(2) Baker, Chronicle, p. 648; Clarke Papers, IV, p. 11 + n; Thurloe, VII, p. 674.
assented to, and afterwards more unanimously concluded and agreed upon" to engage themselves to promote the good old cause. Sir William Bury, Colonel Lawrence and Dr. Jones were sent over with some papers for Fleetwood and the Council of Officers in London. Henry Cromwell's acceptance of the restoration of the Rump was well received in London. The Moderate Informer commented:

"A two-fold Cable is of great strength, but a three fold cord is not easily broken." (1)

On 7 June the House voted that Henry Cromwell be acquainted with the resolution of the House that in future the government of Ireland was to be in the hands of commissioners appointed by Parliament and that he was to return to England to report on the state of affairs in Ireland. Henry resigned his post as Lord Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief on 15 June. (2)

The Rump wasted no time in appointing commissioners to nominate officers. On 11 May the Committee of Safety on which the officers had a fuller representation (and presumably more influence), than on the later Council of State recommended five commissioners to nominate officers. They were Fleetwood, Lambert, Haselrig, Disborowe and Berry. Doubtless this was thought to be too generous to the army and so Ludlow and Vane were added. (3) Even before this committee got down to the hard work of reviewing the commissioned officers changes

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(1) ibid., loc. cit.; Weekly Post, 10-17 May 1659, 31 May-7 June 1659; Faithful Scout, 20-27 May 1659; E933(20), The Moderate Informer.

(2) C.J., VII, p. 674; Thurloe, VII, pp. 683-684.

were made. Attention has already been drawn to some of them; for example the appointments of Lambert, Okey and Haselrig. At the end of May Colonel Richard Norton, governor of Portsmouth, was replaced by Colonel Nathaniel Whetham, who was to be one of the first to declare for the Rump in December, and Colonel Smith, governor of Hull, was replaced by a former governor of the garrison, Edward Salmon. Robert Overton eventually took over this command and Smith was given a regiment in Scotland. (1) On 23 May Overton, Rich and Alured whose re-admission had been under discussion since the end of April were restored. The delay in Overton's re-admission has already been discussed. As for Alured, we have seen how the manuscript version of the charges against him in 1654 included references highly critical of Lambert. It could be that these remarks, as well as the suspicions that he had withheld arrears from his Major in 1654, were not forgotten in 1659. The delay in Rich's case might well have been to do with his association with Harrison in the mid-fifties. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that the three men had their own scruples about the intentions of their colleagues. It was felt necessary to counteract rumours to this effect with a glowing account in the newsbooks of an interview with Fleetwood at Wallingford House immediately prior to their re-admission. (2) Lt. Colonel Waldine Lagoe was dismissed. He had supported Richard Cromwell during the April crisis. He was considered for a commission in the summer and eventually made Lt. Colonel of Charles

(1) Clarke Ms. 31, f. 97.

(2) ibid., f. 126; Mercurius Politicus, 19–26 May 1659.
Fairfax's regiment. He was also considered for the Adjutant Generalship of the army in Ireland, although there were protests against this proposal. (1) Hopefuls wrote letters expecting to be restored to the army after having left it for one reason or another. A Lt. John Roper wrote to Adam Baynes from Dalkeith on 9 May welcoming Lambert's return to the army. He said that he had heard of other officers being restored and mustered in the army and hoped that he too would be restored. He asked Baynes, who had spoken on his behalf to Fleetwood at his dismissal for charges unspecified in the letter, to intervene for him with Lambert. His request does not appear to have been successful. (2)

Parliament amended the bill appointing the commissioners to nominate officers so that the commissions were not to be issued by Fleetwood but by Parliament, and to be signed by the Speaker. In the new commissions obedience to Parliament, the Council of State, the superior officers and adherence to the articles of war appeared in that order. (3) The Rump must have been aware that this would not have been agreeable to all of the officers and indeed Vane, Ludlow and Salway opposed Haselrig, Algernon Sydney, another former officer, and Neville in this. No single issue could be guaranteed to cause indignation amongst those officers for whom the recall of Rump had been viewed as an expedient, as much as this. A meeting of the senior officers was

(1) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, pp. 3, 13; Firth and Davies, pp. 496-487, 503, 504.
(3) C.J., VII, pp. 673, 675; Davies, Restoration, pp. 105-106.
convened hastily at Disborowe's house which Haselrig and Ludlow attended. Lambert claimed that the Parliament was going back on assurances given before its recall. In reply he was told that

"no private persons either could, or had promised more than to use their endeavours in the House to procure certain things to be done."

Haselrig, behaving more as a civilian than as an army officer, argued that given the previous dissolution of the Rump (a rather unpleasant aside) it was not surprising that Parliament should seek to preserve its authority. It was emphasised that the recent vote in the House not to continue the present Parliament beyond 6 May 1660 was evidence enough that they did not seek to perpetuate themselves. This issue of principle had all the makings of another crisis and revealed once more the deep tensions between some of the senior officers and Republicans of both the Rumper and Harringtonian variety in the House. The heat was taken out of the situation by emphasising the need to maintain good relations between army and Parliament in view of the danger from the common enemy, and despite Disborowe's provocative remark, that he thought his existing commission as good as any the Parliament could give, the officers gave way. Following Hacker's example, who took the lead from Haselrig, they received their commissions from the Speaker. Phillips suggests that once again pressure from the junior officers was decisive in determining the senior officers' reaction. This seems unlikely as one suspects that the junior officers had no strong feelings on this question. The House sweetened the pill somewhat by voting
on 6 June that the officers would not have to pay for their commissions but would receive them gratis. (1)

As we have seen the committee for nominating officers, or the committee of Safety as it was also known, had already been at work. On 28 May the officers of Fleetwood's foot, Lambert's horse and foot, Ludlow's (formerly Goffe's), Lilburne's, Berry's and Hacker's regiments were considered. (2) In Fleetwood's foot regiment all the officers recommended on 28 May were passed without question by the Rump and received their commissions from the Speaker. Waldine Lagoe who had been purged beforehand was replaced by Jeffrey Ellatson (or Ellison) as Lt. Colonel. (3) In Lambert's foot Lt. Colonel Richard Elton was replaced by Jeremiah Campfield, who is to be distinguished from the Major Campfield of Ralph Cobbett's regiment. (4) Elton was reduced to the rank of Captain but in July he was made Major of William Mitchell's regiment. He adhered to the officers of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in the autumn unlike Campfield who stood by the Parliament. (5)

In Lambert's horse the Major, William Goodrick, who had supported Richard Cromwell was replaced as Major by Richard Creed who was to

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(1) This paragraph is based on Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 89-90; Clarke Papers, IV, p. 17; Baker, Chronicle, p. 648; C.J., VII, p. 673. C.f. Davies, Restoration, p. 106; Woolrych, Hilton, p. 99. The Royalist observers give a different analysis of the state of mind of Fleetwood and Disborowe, suggesting they were overwhelmed and felt at a loss by the move (C. Clar. S.P., IV, p. 224; Nicholas Papers, IV, p. 154).

(2) C.J., VII, pp. 668-669.

(3) ibid., pp. 668, 679-680, 743.

(4) Firth and Davies (index sub Campfield) confuse the two.

(5) C.J., VII, pp. 668, 680, 681, 742; Firth and Davies, pp. 528-529.
play an important part in drawing up the Derby petition. He was also one of the officers cashiered by Parliament in October. Adam Daynes and Robert Salmon became Captains and Thomas Spilman Captain Lt. instead of Thompson. The nominating committee's recommendations of John Hatfield as Captain and John Hodgson as Lt. were referred back to the committee for further consideration. Hatfield was eventually passed while Hodgson was transferred to Thomas Saunders' regiment. Both Lambert and Fleetwood were nominating commissioners themselves and must have been influential over appointments to their regiments. (1)

In Ludlow's regiment, which eventually went to Herbert Morley, who was to be instrumental in the Rump's return in December, John Wigan who had resigned his commission in 1654 because he could not accept the Protectorate, was nominated Major. He was later selected as Lt. Colonel to Overton's regiment but was unhappy about this because all the officers were strangers to him. He complained to the nominating committee that there was a conscious campaign of discrimination against Fifth Monarchists on the part of the committee

"but his judgment is that Jesus Christ is King of Saints as well as nations; His laws are laws of righteousness and His people ought to be employed in all places of public trust."

He suggested that this discrimination applied to appointments to the militia as well. It is curious that Wigan should have objected to serving in Overton's regiment as Overton sympathised with the Fifth

(1) C.J., VII, pp. 668, 680; Firth and Davies, pp. 259-260.
Monarchists. The Lt. Colonel of Ludlow's regiment, Clement Keane, was purged but as with Lagoe was later given a commission in a regiment (Pearson's, late Daniel's). William Farley became the Lt. Colonel and like the regiment's future Colonel, Morley, stood by the Parliament in the autumn for which reason he was purged by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. The other officers received their commissions on 9 June. There was some shifting around of the original nominations on 28 May within companies but the personnel remained the same.\(^{(1)}\)

Robert Lilburne's regiment had been serving in Scotland, but at the beginning of May it was ordered back to the north of England. It was to play an important part in the debacle at the end of the year. Only a handful of officers received their commissions from the Speaker on 13 June. Captain Thomas Strangeways was involved in the Derby petition in September but along with the Major, George Smithson, he joined with Thomas Fairfax in the north against the Colonel after the collapse of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in London. Captain Thomas Lilburne, a kinsman of the Colonel, was replaced by William Peverell. Thomas Lilburne had been an enthusiastic supporter of the Protectorate and had written to Thurloe in October of the previous year warning him to beware of Lt. Colonel Mason who had been one of the leading anti-kingship officers in May 1657.\(^{(2)}\)

Berry's regiment received its commissions from the Speaker on 10 June and the officers were the same as those laid before Parliament.


on 28 May. Again Berry as one of the nominating commissioners must have been able to influence appointments. Certain unspecified charges against Captain John Robinson to the nominating committee were not upheld after an inquiry held by a committee of army officers who reported back to the nominating committee. Berry adhered to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in the autumn but his regiment was not so committed to this faction as he was. (1)

Hacker's regiment was one of the first regiments to receive its commissions from the Speaker and Hacker, at Haselrig's instigation as we have seen, was the first officer so to receive a commission. Major Grove and Captain Empson were replaced by William Hobart and Thomas Willoughby respectively. Grove might well have been transferred to Robert Lilburne's regiment. Empson had fallen foul of Hacker as early as 1650, when the latter had tried to have him replaced, complaining to Cromwell that he was a better preacher than a fighter. Cromwell's reply to Hacker is famous. Hacker was trusted by Parliament, especially by Haselrig, and although his regiment was not in London in October it was ordered to proceed thither at the time of the crisis. During the following weeks Hacker worked actively for a return of the Rump. Empson had been an elected officer for Fairfax's horse in 1647. Whitley identifies him as the Thomas Empson who along with Packer, Spencer and Kiffin and others was given the right to preach in any unoccupied pulpit in 1653. Empson was given some land at Theobald's Park by Packer and Gladman in 1652. Whitley's suggestion that he was involved in preparing the Agreement of the People in 1647 is more questionable. (2)


(2) C.J., VII, pp. 669, 675-676; Abbott, Writings and Speeches, II, p. 378; Clarke Papers, I, p. 438; C.S.P.D. 1653-54, p. 13; Whitby, Baptist Bibliography, pp. 31, 50; Gentles, Ph.D., p. 278. For Hacker q.v. also biographical appendix
On 13 June the commissions for Biscoe's, Hewson's, Sydenham's and Salmon's regiments were passed by Parliament. The recommendations of the nominating committee were, for the most part, accepted, but those of Captain Daniel Nicholls and Captain Eaton were queried. Nicholls was later passed but the charge against Eaton brought by Biscoe himself was referred by the nominating committee to a committee of officers for examination. Eaton might well be the same person as Philip Eaton, one of the agitators in 1647. Hewson's regiment was passed uncritically. There were some queries about appointments to Sydenham's regiment. Captain Richard Wagstaffe's was referred back to the committee for a higher appointment. Wagstaffe had reported the defeat of the Levellers' revolt in Oxford in September 1649 to Parliament. He did in fact receive a commission from the Speaker as a Captain in Sydenham's regiment but he was later transferred to Okey's regiment. Like Okey he adhered to the Rump in October. Richard Barker was appointed to his place in Sydenham's regiment. The Lt. Colonel, Francis Allen, who had been an elected officer for the regiment in 1647 and the Major, John Grimes, son of Lt. Colonel Mark Grimes, presented a testimonial on the behalf of Richard Johnson. Johnson is most probably the agitator of the same name and regiment in 1647. The appointment of William Illin as Lieutenant was ordered to be recommitted to the nominating commissioners but he was eventually approved. Richard Johnson was also given a commission as Ensign in place of David Francis. Francis was made a Lieutenant in a

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(2) C.J., VII, p. 682, Firth and Davies, p. 412.
company in Ireland as compensation. Captain Consolation Fox had also been an elected officer in 1647, while Captain John Shrimpton, who was brought back into the regiment, had been cashiered in September 1649 for suspected implication in the Leveller mutiny in Oxford. Salmon's regiment was passed with the existing Major being replaced by William Walters. (1)

On the same day as these regiments were passed, Parliament ordered that Captain Messervy be given some employment in the army. If he was employed we have no record of his commission. He had been one of the committee to peruse and refine the army's Remonstrance of November 1648 for presentation to Parliament. Under the Protectorate he appears to have been in Jersey and was considered "a person of dangerous principles" by the government; why is unknown. (2)

On 30 June Okey's regiment was passed as a regiment of horse rather than of dragoons. Major John Daberon replaced Tobias Bridge as Major, the latter going as Major to Lockhart's regiment in Dunkirk. Richard Goodgroom (possibly the author of the anti-Protectorate tract A Copy of a Letter from an Officer in Ireland discussed above) was appointed Cornet. Goodgroom had Fifth Monarchist tendencies. In fact he became chaplain of the regiment. Okey himself had of course been involved in the discussions over Vane's Healing Question with Fifth

(1) C.J., VII, pp. 683, 685, 688; C.S.P.D. 1658-59, p. 394; ibid., 1659-60, p. 36; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 437, 438; Firth and Davies, pp. 374, 379, 299, 303. Firth and Davies are confused about Sydenham's regiment and overlook a number of interesting appointments. Mark Grimes was made a Colonel and given command of Cardiff (C.S.P.D. 1659-60, pp. 36, 221), he had been under consideration for Wagstaffe's place in Sydenham's regiment (ibid., 1658-59, p. 394; C.J., VII, p. 770). For more on Mark Grimes q.v. biographical appendix.

(2) C.J., VII, p. 683; Clarke Papers, II, p. 54; C.S.P.D. 1655-56, pp. 113-114.
Monarchists and Rumper Republicans in 1656. (1) Packer was promoted to the rank of Colonel of Oliver Cromwell's old regiment replacing Boteler, a controversial figure in civilian eyes. Gladman, Barrington and Hunter who had been cashiered along with Packer in 1658 were also restored and Gladman was made Major. John Spencer, who had Fifth Monarchist leanings and who had been authorised to preach in any unoccupied pulpit in 1658 along with Packer and others including Thomas Empson of Hacker's regiment, was passed as Captain. He appears to have remained loyal to the Rump in the autumn. According to a propaganda newsbook from Monck's forces he excommunicated all the officers who were members of his Church and who had supported the dissolution of the Rump in October. He was passed as Captain of the regiment by the re-restored Rump in January 1660. (2) Richard Morris was considered for this post but was passed over because he had been made one of the Adjutant Generals. Morris (or Merrest) had been one of the officers presenting the army Remonstrance to Parliament in November 1648. He was probably a member of the regiment when it was Fairfax's and then Cromwell's, and became an Adjutant General sometime around 1651. He continued in that capacity under the Protectorate. The reasons for some of the changes in the regiment can be gleaned from the State Papers Domestic. They covered a wide variety of grounds such as scandalous behaviour and the keeping of a mistress. Captain William Disher was charged with discouraging the raising of regiments.

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(2) Wor. Co. B.B. A4, The Faithful Intelligencer. From the Parliament's Army in Scotland; Firth and Davies, p. 76.
in Scotland in 1650-51, perhaps an insinuation that he was too favourable to Presbyterians, and also of deceiving the soldiery of their pay. Captain Ezard was said to be "a lover of good men" and ordered to have a troop of horse. But Richard Rumball (or Ramball) himself said to be "a violent prosecutor of all good people" and discontented at the change of government, was reported to have been given a paper to sign by Ezard in favour of Cromwell becoming King. Rumball had been one of the signatories of a petition in 1649 demanding the restoration of an Army Council along the lines of 1647 with agitators. (1) In the end Ezard did not receive a commission and Rumball was made a Lieutenant, a case of political reliability triumphing over godliness. The unfortunate Boteler, the displaced Colonel, suffered a serious loss of face. A proposal to make him Quarter Master General, not a very important office, was rejected. In November 1659 he was reported to be working for Whitelocke either as his secretary or else spying on him. He was referred to uncharitably as "decimating Boteler", unfairly personifying the heavy hand of the military. His colleagues do not appear to have been particularly troubled by his fall. (2)

Also on 30 June Parliament requested that John Nelthorpe be considered for a troop. Nelthorpe, like Morris, had served as an


Adjutant General and the House in fact issued him with an Adjutant General's commission on 5 August. However, Alured had him in mind for the Majority of his regiment in October and he appears to have been accepted by the nominating committee for this place, although the dissolution of Parliament by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction prevented him from receiving his commission from the Speaker. The House also asked that Arthur Evelyn, who had been in Harrison's regiment in 1647 and who had signed the letter of the agitators and elected officers to Wales, be considered for a place. He was made Captain of the guard in succession to Alured, an important job, and remained loyal to the Parliament in the autumn.(1)

In Richard Moss's, late Pride's, regiment two of the appointments are worth mentioning. The Lt. Colonel, Nicholas Andrews, and Captain Ralph Prentice had been agitators for the regiment in 1647. (2) Both had risen from the ranks. Andrews was a Lieutenant by 1648 and Prentice an Ensign by November 1647. In Disborowe's regiment, Quarter Master Edmund Beare is the same man who signed the Case of the Army Truly Stated in October 1647. (3) Other former agitators appear in other regiments. Edward Starre, one of the original agitators in Harrison's regiment in 1647, was passed as a Cornet in

(2) C.J., VII, pp. 700, 701; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 161, 437; Firth and Davies, p. 371.
(3) C.J., VII, p. 704; Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes, pp. 222, 234.
the summer of 1659 in the same regiment which was then intended for Whalley but went to Alured.\(^{(1)}\) In Philip Twisleton's regiment John Wilson, an agitator in 1647, was made Quarter Master of the regiment.\(^{(2)}\) It must of course be emphasised that these radicals of 1647 were not necessarily radicals in 1659; the political landscape had altered so dramatically in the last 12 years.

On 12 July Parliament ordered that John Streater, who had served in the army in Ireland in the early 1650's, be restored to some post in the army there. Streater, as we have seen, opposed the dissolution of the Rump almost immediately after the event. He was cashiered and later tried for publishing tracts hostile to the government. His writings greatly influenced the Three Colonels' Petition. In 1659 he was given command of the train of artillery, supported the Rump in the autumn, and helped put down Lambert's attempted rising in April 1660.\(^{(3)}\)

The nominating commissioners seem to have been uncertain of the army in Ireland, possibly fearing that Henry Cromwell had tampered with it. On 16 June Colonels Cooper, Richard Lawrence, John Clark and Jerome Sankey were ordered to be given regiments without any debate but Colonels Sadler, Barrow and Axtell were to be asked to appear before the commission in person.\(^{(4)}\) Discussion of the Irish

\(^{(1)}\) C.J., VII, p. 749; Firth and Davies, p. 178.
\(^{(2)}\) C.J., VII, p. 724; Clarke Papers, I, p. 439.
\(^{(3)}\) C.J., VII, p. 714; C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 52.
\(^{(4)}\) C.S.P.D. 1658-59, p. 375.
officers continued into July. On 2 July Sankey presented a list of the commissioned officers in Ireland to the committee and made a short speech. According to Ludlow, the list had been drawn up by Sankey, Lawrence, Edward Roberts, Auditor General of the Irish army, and Major Peter Wallis at the instigation of Fleetwood. They were to press for Ludlow to be Commander-in-Chief. Ludlow suspected an ulterior motive behind this last proposal, but in view of Ludlow's previous experience of Ireland his re-appointment to serve in Ireland, a militarily important country, seemed a very logical choice. (1) The list was in fact given to Ludlow and the nominating committee decided to deal with it two days later. But some objections were raised by Colonel Robert Barrow against Colonel Mills, who had sided with Richard Cromwell in April, Lt. Colonel William Keane of Cooper's regiment and Waldine Lagoe whom we have already come across. All three were being considered for appointment or re-appointment in the army in Ireland. Barrow's objections "were not for dissenting in judgment from himself as was said" - he was in fact a Baptist - "but from the good old cause now maintained by Parliament". But Lawrence, who had himself been distrusted by Henry Cromwell, spoke on their behalf emphasising their 17 years service. (2) Further consideration of the list was delayed until 8 July. Again Lawrence spoke on behalf of some of the more controversial suggestions. He argued that Sir Charles Coote had declared his loyalty to the Parliament. This was

(1) ibid., 1659-60, pp. 2-3; Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 94.
contradicted by Judge Advocate Henry Whalley who intimated that Coote's behaviour had been against the Parliament. Axtell argued that shortly after the dissolution of the Rump in April 1653 when Fleetwood and Henry Cromwell came across to Ireland, Coote told his soldiers

"A pox take them! we have bitten our tongues for some time, but now we may speak out."

Axtell's story is a bit confused. Fleetwood arrived in Ireland in September 1652 and Henry Cromwell made his first, brief, visit to Ireland in March 1654. In the event Coote was kept on; he was too important an individual in Irish politics to be left aside. In December he was one of the instigators of the seizure of Dublin Castle; by that time he was more of a Royalist. Of the other appointments Keane was made Lt. Colonel of Brayfield's regiment and Waldine Lagoe was suggested as Adjutant General. Peter Wallis was given Henry Cromwell's horse regiment. William Allen and John Vernon were also restored, Allen as a Colonel of horse and Vernon as Quarter Master General. Allen, Vernon, Barrow and Axtell had all resigned their commissions in 1656. Hewson, who like Lawrence had been distrusted by Henry Cromwell, was made Commander-in-Chief of the foot regiments. Alexander Brayfield, an elected officer of Hewson's regiment in 1647, who had been cashiered by Henry Cromwell in September 1657 on the grounds that he had been intriguing against his government was reinstated. As we have seen, Oliver and Broghill had considered Henry's action unwise at the time. Brayfield was to be given a regiment. He took over Cooper's who was in turn given Fleetwood's regiment of horse in Ireland. (1)

(1) ibid., loc. cit.; Firth and Davies, pp. 626-627, 670.
There also seems to have been a move to get Droghill reinstated. Sankey and Wallis spoke in his favour. Their argument was that he had used his influence to preserve order during the April crisis

"and that he was a means of sending the propositions (of the Army to England) saying it were better to do it by proposition than capitulation."(1)

It was a surprising recommendation as Droghill had not only been one of the key supporters of kingship but had been quite active against the army during that crisis. Whoever was responsible for the suggestion must have looked upon it as an act of appeasement to a man who was potentially still an important political figure, but it is unlikely that it would have been popular with, let alone be approved by any considerable number of the English officers. On 16 July the commissions for the Irish officers were ordered to be delivered to the officers by the commissioners for Ireland. John Jones was instructed to take them over to Ireland.(2)

The regiments in Flanders also came in for close scrutiny. Originally six regiments were sent to Flanders in May 1657 under the command of Sir John Reynolds, knighted by Cromwell. The other five Colonels were Thomas Morgan, who had been Monck's second-in-command in Scotland, Roger Alsop, who had been a Captain in Pride's regiment in 1647, Samuel Clark who had probably served in the Low Countries, Sir Bryce Cockrane, a Scot who had fought against the Commonwealth

(2) C.J., VII, p. 721.
and been taken prisoner at Musselburgh in July 1650 (he was, however, known to Monck who used his influence to get Cockrane his command in Flanders), and Henry Lillingston who had possibly served in Scotland in the early 1650's as well as in the Low Countries. Of the 6,000 men who were sent across only about 1,475 were members of existing regiments, the rest were volunteers. Of the officers the vast majority were men of little previous military experience. Subsequently, reinforcements were sent over eventually including the regiments of Robert Gibbon and Edward Salmon part of which formed a composite regiment under Lt. Colonel John Pepper (neither Gibbon nor Salmon served in Flanders and with the exception of two companies they were ordered back to England in December 1658). As with the Western Design the recruiting and dispatch of the force for the West Indies were not determined by political considerations, although as we have seen in the case of the circumstances surrounding Reynolds' original appointment in April 1657 there were rumours that politics were involved. (1) Reynolds himself had remained in touch with Henry Cromwell from Flanders and expressed a constant desire to be able to return to Ireland. The expeditionary force fighting, in the field was serving with an ally and was thus not an independent command allowing its

(1) The above is based on C. H. Firth, 'Royalists and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders 1657-1662', T.R.H.S., New Series, XVII, 1903, pp. 67-119, esp. pp. 76-89 (There is a mis-print on p. 88, the date of recall of Gibbons' and Salmon's regiments should be December 1658, not 1659); Boldl. Rawlinson Ms. A49, f. 292 (Accounts of Major General Kelsey and Captain Hatsell for transporting the 6,000 soldiers to France); ibid., A50, f. 155 ('Accounts of moneys disbursed for the pay of the respective companies shipped from Dover into France ...'); Mercurius Politicus, 30 April-7 May 1657.
senior officer a free hand. It also had to rely on poor provisions and quarters provided by the French which caused hardship and death. In November 1657 Reynolds' father-in-law, Sir Francis Russell, procured permission from the Protector for Reynolds to return briefly to England. There were subsequently rumours that Reynolds had been indiscreet, even traitorous, at a meeting he had had with James, Duke of York and that he was returning to vindicate himself from such aspersions. While it is highly possible that such a meeting did take place and that Reynolds might have appeared over-friendly to an embodiment of the 'common enemy', the story is unlikely. Reynolds had long wanted to return to England and the rumours about what was alleged to have taken place began to flow after his father-in-law had been, at Reynolds's own request, to see Cromwell for a warrant for his return. The suggestion that Lt. Colonel Francis White, who had been sent to Mardyke as governor in October, and who was killed with Reynolds in the same shipwreck, was the person who accused Reynolds of consorting with the enemy can be discarded likewise especially as it rests solely on the retrospective evidence of the Duke of York. Nevertheless, it is ironical that two of the more radical officers of 1647 should be killed simultaneously, although they had shed their radicalism well before their deaths. (1)

(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 822, ff. 214-215, 226-227, 268-269; Clarke Papers, III, pp. 122, 127; A. Lytton Sells, The Memoirs of James II, London, 1962, pp. 244-246; Thurloe, VI, pp. 670 (Sir Francis Russel to Reynolds, 24 November 1657), 680, 681, (Fleetwood makes no reference to the rumours and gives no hint that Reynolds was in any way under suspicion), 687-688 (Sir Robert Honeywood to Sir Walter Vane, Hague, 23 December 1657. Firth makes much of this letter, but Honeywood being in the Hague could well have been hearing the Royalist rumours about Reynolds which he reported back to London), 731 (Lockhart's refutation of the stories); c.f. Firth, Last Years, I, pp. 296-298 for a different interpretation.
However, to return to the summer of 1659, commissioners were sent over to report on the officers serving there. These commissioners were in fact army officers, Ashfield, Pearson and Packer. They received plenty of information about various officers. The charges against them were very wide ranging, both political and non-political, including drunkenness, swearing, whoring, false musters and discrimination against "anabaptists". The presence of the commissioners provided malicious gossipers and scandal mongers with a field day. The unfavourable reports addressed to them were directed at all ranks. Colonel Alsop was called

"an active man as a soldier, but an enemy to religion and godliness ... holding it a thing altogether unnecessary for a soldier to mind."

The charges were, for the most part, very generalised and they caused much resentment. Colonels Lilington and Alsop wrote to London on 18 August expressing their disgust at the way

"some unworthy persons have traduced some officers of this garrison to the Committee."

They wanted to send a man to the Council of State vindicating the garrison from the "slander of favour seekers". Some of the companies even petitioned on behalf of officers who were displaced.

The commissioners drew up lists of the various officers with a cross against the names of those to be displaced or a tick or

(1) Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A65, f. 17.
(2) ibid., f. 497.
(3) ibid., f. 51.
the letters "g(ood) o(FFicer)" against the names of those to be kept on. Occasionally there were other comments. William Witham was considered a good officer and "a civil man but formerly a royalist", but he was kept on. Colonel Samuel Clark was said to be "a very civil man but never served the parliament till now" and his Major, Samuel Batteby, was described as an "ancient man and alwayes served ye parliament". (1)

Once the commissioners had returned to England, Pearson, along with two of the nominating commissioners, Fleetwood and Berry, studied the lists and changes were finally agreed upon. (2) The fact that the commissioners sent to the continent in the first place were army officers and that the final lists were drawn up by army officers shows that the officers had more influence in the nomination process than their mere numerical strength on the nominating committee suggests.

As far as the regiments in Scotland were concerned Monck's plea that they should not be altered went unheeded. Even his request that, if there had to be alterations, then his own two regiments and that of Talbot with which he was personally acquainted should be left alone was ignored. Parliament disliked this interference and a stiff reply, prepared by Haselrig, was sent to Monck. It reminded him that

(1) ibid., ff. 73, 185.

(2) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, pp. 120-122, 150-152; Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A65, passim. Some of the reports to the parliamentary commissioners are reprinted by Sir Charles Firth in 'Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders 1657-1662', T.R.H.S., 1903, pp. 111-115.
Parliament was better suited to judge of these things than he. Monck replied a few days later making his famous remark that "Obedience is my greate principle". This did not stop him from trying to influence the appointments. On 30 August he wrote to Haselrig about changes in his horse regiment. According to Phillips, Pearson and Mason advised the nominating committee about changes in the Scottish regiments. Mason had served in Scotland as a member of Pride's regiment but appears to have spent much of his time in London. He was offered the governorship of Inverness or Jersey in the summer of 1659 and opted for Jersey. He was charged by some of his fellow officers on the island of actively promoting the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in Jersey. He had been in the capital in December 1654 at the time of the Three Colonels' Petition and in 1657 was an important figure in the army in opposing kingship. Pearson, soon to take over Daniels' regiment was, as we have seen, one of the commissioners sent over to Dunkirk so Phillips's assertion is quite plausible except that Mason, having spent such a long time away from Scotland, could not have been all that well-informed about the officers of the Scottish regiments.

(1) Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 16-17, 18n, 22-23; Davies, Restoration, p. 110.

(2) Bodl. Tanner Ms. 51, f. 113 repr. but not noted in Firth and Davies (p. 136).


Monck protested against the proposed changes in his horse regiment and some modifications were made by the nominating commissioners. Captain Christopher Keymer, whom Monck had cashiered in 1654 at the time of the Three Colonels' Petition for suspected disaffection to the government, was restored and received his commission from the Speaker.\(^{(1)}\)

There were also a few changes in Monck's foot regiment. Abraham Holmes, the Major, became Lt. Colonel of Sawrey's regiment. He had been an elected officer for Robert Lilburne's regiment in 1647 and during Overton's 'plot' he had fallen under suspicion because the letter of the 'conspirators' at Aberdeen calling for a meeting to discuss their attitude towards the Protectorate had been addressed to Holmes. In the autumn he supported the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and after the Restoration he remained committed to the good old cause. He was implicated in the Rye House plot. His transfer to Sawrey's regiment meant that the Majority in Monck's foot remained vacant. The four Baptist Captains who had signed the address of loyalty to the Protectorate at the time of Overton's 'plot' from the gathered Churches of St. Johnston's, Leith and Edinburgh were kept on. They were George Parker, Benjamin Groome, George Walton and William Downes.\(^{(2)}\)

Colonel William Daniel was replaced by Pearson. The exact motive for his removal is unclear but it seems to have been the result of an anonymous paper against him; however he seemed quite happy to

\(^{(1)}\) Firth and Davies, pp. 133, 136-137.

\(^{(2)}\) C.J., VII, p. 742; Clarke Papers, I, p. 436; Thurloe, III, pp. 29-30; Firth and Davies, pp. 539-540.
leave the regiment so long as it was made clear that he was not being discharged for "baseness or unworthiness". (1) In Talbot's regiment it was proposed to make Wroth Rogers Lt. Colonel. He had originally been in Constable's regiment and had served as Governor of Hereford, a post to which he did in fact return. There is no reason to suppose that he was a protege of Lambert. (2) Ralph Cobbett's regiment, formed in 1651, was changed entirely except for the Colonel and the Lt. Colonel, Arthur Young. The Colonel had played a full part in army politics in the late 1640's as a member of Barksted's regiment, in which Arthur Young had also served, and had been an elected officer. Robert Cobbett, probably the same man who had been a Leveller in 1647 and a contractor for army clothing in the 1650's, replaced Campfield as Major. (3) Robert Overton's restoration to his old regiment meant the displacement of William Mitchell who received a new regiment. Colonel Henry Smith, who had been governor of Hull, was given command of Fitch's regiment in Scotland as Fitch had become Lieutenant of the Tower of London. (4)

The officers serving in Scotland were to receive their commissions from commissioners for the government of Scotland to be appointed by the Rump to replace the Council of Scotland. Such commissioners were never appointed, a legal nicety in Monck's favour when he

(1) C.J., VII, pp. 762-763; Firth and Davies, p. 494.
(2) Firth and Davies, pp. 466-467; Davies, Restoration, p. 111; C.J., VII, p. 721.
(3) C.J., VII, pp. 743, 781; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 408n, 437; Firth and Davies, p. 473.
(4) Firth and Davies, pp. 556-557.
came to remodel his forces in the autumn. (1) However, some commissions were sent to Monck for distribution by the Council of State according to an order of Parliament. The commissions were for members of Twisleton's and Saunders's regiments. (2) Saunders's regiment is worth further comment. Saunders had been restored to the army and to his old regiment of horse in April. The regiment was still serving in Scotland but in July some troops were ordered back to England. Nathaniel Barton was appointed Major but was troubled because his troop was to be sent to Scotland. He wrote to Saunders on 27 July who was then at his home in Little Ireton (sic), Derbyshire asking him to intercede with Fleetwood so that he and his troop would not be sent to Scotland. Three days later he wrote again to Saunders and told him that he had spoken with Fleetwood who promised to write to Monck to pass absent officers in the musters and about his (Barton's) staying in England. Monck was himself very concerned about the number of absentee officers in the troop late Robert Hope's in Saunders's regiment, still serving in Scotland, and wrote to Barton ordering him to write to Captain Thomas Izod, who had succeeded to the command of the troop, and other officers of the troop to set out for Scotland to assume their commands. Barton asked Saunders to urge any officers who

(2) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 67.
were technically serving in Scotland but who might be with him in Derbyshire to set out speedily for Scotland. In fact Izod remained in England and actively worked for the return of the Rump in December, along with Saunders and Barton. (1) Clearly Monck was not adverse to all the changes being made in the regiments in Scotland. One of his main concerns was that absentee officers should return to Scotland, or as the case may be, take up their commands there. The fact that Barton preferred to stay in England also shows that even with the Rump insisting on issuing commissions to the officers, Fleetwood still retained the right to determine where they would serve. Most of those commissioned over the summer, if they were not already serving in Scotland, did not have time to take up their places before the autumn crisis. On 9 September the nominating committee authorised Monck to pay the arrears of officers in Mitchell's, now Overton's, regiment who were to be reduced, as the officers who were to replace them had not yet come to their charges. (2)

The nominating committee were assisted in their task by a committee of army officers who investigated the various charges brought against their comrades. (3) This gives us further evidence that the army officers had a fair degree of influence over the changes in

Firth and Davies, pp. 287-289; National Register of Archives, 18686, Derbyshire Record Office, 'Correspondence and other papers relating to the career of Thomas Saunders of Little Ireton', Numbers 80, 81, 82, 83, 86. These papers are very informative about Saunders career in the 1640's and in 1659 but contain no material on the rest of the 1650's. They are calendered virtually verbatim at the National Register of Archives. For Saunders q.v. also biographical appendix.

(2) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 184.

(3) ibid., 1658-59, pp. 379, 394, 395.
the regiments over the summer. On 30 June the question of who was to
deputise for Lockhart in Flanders was referred to Fleetwood and
Lambert. (1) There was no single criterion by which men were assessed
as to their suitability either to remain as officers or to be restored.
Political grounds, either disaffection towards, or support for the
Protectorate, were not the only reasons for removing or restoring
people. Drunkenness, loose living and what can generally be called
ungodliness were others. (2) Doubtless prejudice also played a part.
However, there were cases of people being removed or re-appointed solely
on political grounds. (3) Sometimes this was decided by the 'evidence'
of an informer which was assessed by the nominating committee. (4)
Those officers whose suitability was queried but who had connexions
with senior officers or who were favoured by them could rely on their
superiors to speak on their behalf. (5) Captain William Gough or Goffe
of Alured's regiment, not to be confused with the Major General or the
Lt. Colonel of Monck's foot regiment, was charged by a fellow officer
with describing the Instrument of Government as a "second Magna Charta".
It was also said he forced men to subscribe to an address of loyalty
to Oliver Cromwell. Colonel Ashfield spoke on Gough's behalf. In the
end Gough who had been in line for the Majority was recommended to be

(1) Bodl. Rawlinson Ms A134 (Proceedings of the Council of State,
7 June-20 October 1659).
(3) ibid., 1658-59, pp. 394, 392; ibid., 1659-60, pp. 28, 238-239.
(4) ibid., 1659-60, pp. 25, 28.
(5) ibid., 1659-60, pp. 29, 30-31.
Captain. (1) There also appears to have been a prejudice against Quakers in the nominations. (2) The more senior officers could present their own amendments or adjustments to the lists which were usually approved by the committee. (3)

Some of the more radical figures from the past, such as John Wigan were, as we have seen, approached directly. Rich recommended that John Breman, who had played an important part in the discontent surrounding the Three Colonels' Petition and Overton's 'plot', for which he had been cashiered, be reinstated. He wanted Breman to be made Major in preference to John Merriman who had been an elected officer in 1647 but who was now in retirement. Rich was overruled, although Breman became Major in September when Merriman resigned.

Breman was instrumental in the defection to the Parliament of the forces beseiging Portsmouth in December. (4) Some men wrote to the nominating committee asking to be reinstated. Colonel Eyres asked for any office, even that of corporal. (5)

We have seen how efforts were made to restore Lagoe despite his former support for Richard Cromwell. More surprising was the

(1) ibid., 1659-60, pp. 238-239. Firth and Davies (index sub, Gough, William) confuse Monck's Lt. Colonel and this William Gough.


(3) ibid., 1659-60, pp. 36, 226.


(5) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 35. It is not clear if this was William, the former Leveller, or Thomas, the governor of Hurst Castle in 1648. The latter was appointed governor of Hurst in September (ibid., p. 226) the former took over Lambert's foot regiment in January 1660 (Firth and Davies, pp. 528-529).
nominating committee's recommendation that Edward Whalley be given Montagu's late regiment. The move appears to have had the backing of Fleetwood. The Parliament vetoed the suggestion in a division in which Vane and Neville were tellers for the 'noes' and Sydenham and Strickland tellers for the 'yeas'. The regiment went to Alured.\(^1\)

Clearly, for some, the purge was not intended to be an occasion to eradicate, root and branch all those who had stood by Richard Cromwell. One of the most surprising omissions from those reinstated was Harrison. The most likely reason for this was that he was looked upon as the man most responsible (after Cromwell himself) for the dissolution of the Rump in April 1653. On 30 September the House voted that Harrison was to be disbarred from ever being an M.P.\(^2\)

Before completing this analysis of the summer purges we have evidence to suggest that the displacement of officers caused some resentment. On 6 June Cornet Thomas Pease of Adam Baynes troop in Lambert's regiment wrote to his brother-in-law, Adam Baynes, that the reduced officers in Lambert's and Lilburne's regiments

"are very high and promise to themselves great things, and new changes."

But such remarks on the part of the reduced officers were probably said in the heat of the moment.\(^3\) Finally, there is no evidence to support the view that the army representatives on the nominating committee

\(^{1}\) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 78; C.J., VII, p. 749; Guizot, Richard Cromwell, I, p. 450. Whalley and his son-in-law Colonel William Goffet who had likewise been purged after the fall of the Protectorate, fled the country at the Restoration and lived in exile in America. There are lives of both in the D.N.B.

\(^{2}\) C.J., VII, p. 790.

\(^{3}\) B.M. Add. Ms. 21425, f. 59.
steamrollered through appointments and least of all that they consciously picked men who would stand by the army against the Parliament. (1) Few, if any, were working with such a confrontation in mind over the summer.

The unpopularity of receiving commissions from the Speaker among certain officers was only the first factor to embitter relations between the army and Parliament. The vexed problem of indemnity, one of the main grievances in 1647, and in this highly legalistic age of key importance to participants in public affairs, also dogged their relations. Parliament dealt with the indemnity bill over a period from late May to early July. There was even an amendment, in the end defeated, to exclude Barksted from indemnity from suits or actions brought against him on behalf of Overton during his imprisonment in the Tower when the former was Lieutenant there. (2) When the bill was finally passed on 12 July Lambert, probably speaking on behalf of a sizeable number of officers, denounced it before Ludlow and Haselrig. There had been meetings of the officers before this. No doubt they were keeping an eye on developments in Parliament. Haselrig commented sardonically

"You are ... only at the mercy of the Parliament who are your good friends"

and Lambert retorted

"I know not ... why they should not be at our mercy as well as we at theirs",

hardly the sort of language from either side conducive to compromise and settling the nation's future on a more secure foundation. Wariston

(1) Davies, Restoration, p. 111.

(2) C.J., VII, p. 713.
commenting on the tension between army and Parliament said

"I find every one of them thinks the uther has broken their privat conditions to them maid befor the sitting of the House." (1)

The plans for a militia force were another source of contention. A militia force raised by the Rump could be used as a counterweight to the standing army. (2) However, a good many serving officers were appointed militia commissioners in the counties. The officers appear also to have had a say in the appointment of these commissioners and Fleetwood had some influence over the appointment of the militia force officers. Nevertheless, the officers were probably suspicious that the Rump had ulterior motives in setting up the militia. (3) In terms of the Rump's relations with the country at large, Professor Woolrych's argument that the Parliament's intention that it should approve each local militia officer by name and that the commissions should be handed out by the Speaker "was a foolish over-assertion of central authority" (4) reminds us that the Rump was not as universally popular with the nation as such a move assumed. It was running the risk of alienating both the army and a large part of the nation and of thereby isolating itself.

The officers beginning to group themselves around Lambert and Disborowe no doubt felt confident because they viewed the Rump as

(1) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 100-101; C. Clar. S.P., IV, p. 263; Wariston, Diary, III, pp. 123, 125; Davies, Restoration, pp. 112-114.
(2) C.S.P.V. 1659-61, p. 44; Guizot, Richard Cromwell, I, pp. 432-434.
(3) Firth and Rait, II, pp. 1293-1298, 1308-1342; National Register of Archives, 18686, Saunders Papers, Number 85; Nicholas Papers, IV, pp. 164-165, 167-168.
(4) Woolrych, Milton, p. 100.
only a temporary expedient. They were looking ahead to what would replace it and were discussing alternative forms of government. The evidence for these discussions is quite thin, and stems from Royalist reports and those of the French and Venetian ambassadors.

Meetings of the officers went on throughout this time. Some reports suggest there was a Council of Officers and this may have been the case. If so, we have no record of its deliberations and it is unlikely that it was on the scale of earlier Councils. What seems more likely is that officers sharing various viewpoints were meeting informally amongst themselves and that some civilians also attended such meetings. The idea of a senate was mooted, an issue which was likely to cause division amongst the officers. But, as has been pointed out, this was less Harringtonian than one which had much in common with the Other House of the Humble Petition. However, some of the literature being directed at the army officers, and no doubt influencing their thoughts, was Harringtonian in essence and was part of a conscious campaign. (1) The officers who favoured this wanted the senate to include themselves and to be co-ordinate with the House of Commons, a view which had already been expressed in late April and in the army petition of 13 May. This seems to have been opposed by sections of the junior officers, and no doubt by those of the senior officers who had opposed it in April as well. Their reasoning appears to have been that it would give their superiors too much power

at the expense of the Commons, a view shared by many of the Rump. There were efforts to bridge the gap by urging the officers favouring a senate to drop their demand for a perpetual senate and to have it elected annually along with the Commons. (1) But if the officers were divided on the question of the Senate so too was the Rump. Wariston reported that Haselrig did not favour Vane's or Neville's (a Harringtonian Republican) views on government. (2) There is also evidence to suggest that the junior officers, under the burden of lack of pay, were becoming less interested in politics anyway and like the soldiery, were more concerned with mundane things. The soldiery themselves do not seem to have been at all moved by the political developments. Indeed, the grievance of pay arrears, so fundamental to politicising the army in 1647, was beginning to come to the front again. It was to become very important in early 1660 only then, and even at this time, it had no political overtones. Some of Lambert's forces were reported to have mutinied for lack of pay on their way out of London to suppress Booth's rising. (3)

(1) Guizot, Richard Cromwell, I, pp. 391, 392, 400; Wariston, Diary, III, pp. 123, 125; C. Clar. S.P., IV, p. 263. This confirms the officers meetings and gives some of the participants, but the suggestion that there was a serious discussion about making Lambert Protector is absurd. Royalists were to give much credence to the reports that the officers favoured a new Protector (ibid., pp. 279, 286; Clarendon State Papers, III, p. 345). The Venetian ambassador, reporting the officers' meetings thought Parliament might be dissolved but added that the officers were uncertain about what to replace it with (C.S.P.V. 1659-61, pp. 44, 47, 50). The French ambassador also heard rumours that the army intended to dissolve the Rump (Guizot, Richard Cromwell, I, p. 434). However, these stories must be tempered by the fact that Major Robert Harlow, a Royalist, was up before the Council of State for spreading rumours that the army intended a coup against Parliament (National Register of Archives, 18686, Saunders papers, Number 80; C.S.P.D. 1659-60, pp. 32, 36, 79, 86).

(2) Wariston, Diary, III, p. 125.

The divergence between army and Parliament was smoothed over temporarily by Booth's rising which occurred in August, although the government had had knowledge of such a rising in July. Lambert and Disborowe were given command of the forces to crush the rising, Lambert in the north and north-west and Disborowe in the south-west and south Wales, areas in which they had both worked before. Lambert was overjoyed to be taking to the field once more. On his way out of London he was reported to be "obviously higher" against Cavaliers and Presbyterians and to have said

"that he will perishe or not allowe life to any gentleman engaged or above 200L per annum (sic) to any of that party or persuasion surviveinge." (2)

The defeat of the rising was important both militarily and psychologically from the army's point of view. As with the campaigns culminating at Worcester in 1651 it gave a much-needed boost to morale and seemed to show that God was on the side of the army and encouraged some of the officers to become more resolute in putting pressure on Parliament. Could military success, apparently backed by God, be transformed into political success as well? Lambert emerged from the campaign with enhanced prestige, but his vanity was pricked by Parliament's rejection of Fleetwood's proposal to restore his title of Major General. (3) It must have recalled the Rump's earlier refusal

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(1) Davies, Restoration, p. 139. For a full account of the rising q.v. ibid., pp. 123-143.

(2) Nicholas Papers, IV, pp. 177-178.

(3) Davies, Restoration, p. 146. When Overton was restored to the army he was given the title of Major General but not the pay (C.S.P.D. 1658-59, p. 375). Cf. Thurlow's tart comment in May. He mentions that Lambert has his regiment back, but not his Major General's place "which I suppose he must be" (B.M. Add. Ms. 22919, f. 100).
to make him Lord Deputy of Ireland.

The immediate outcome of this renewed self-confidence amongst some of the officers was the Derby petition. The petition emanated from the forces under Lambert. Some 50 officers were involved in the discussions from which it emerged. Sankey, the commander of the Irish Brigade (1,000 foot under Axtell and 500 horse under himself, sent out of Ireland to help suppress Booth's rising, a body which was to play an important part in army politics over the next few months), together with Colonel Mitchell, Major Richard Creed of Lambert's horse and others, were specifically charged with the drafting of the petition. In its final form the petition called on Parliament to prosecute the demands of the army's petition of 13 May. It went on to make specific demands for alterations in the army's senior command, ostensibly on the grounds of trying to prevent attempts to sow division in the army. Fleetwood was to remain Commander-in-Chief and his commission which was soon to expire was to be renewed. Lambert was to be his number two with Disborowe number three, as chief of the horse. Monck was to be next in command in charge of the foot. Reading between the lines of the draft of the petition there appears to have been some unease at giving Monck such a senior position, but, as must have been obvious, he was too important an individual to be brushed aside. The final two demands, calling for a remodelling of the corporations which had been favourable to the Royalists and the punishment of all recent rebels and their sympathisers, reflected the view that not enough was being done to stamp out the dangers from the Royalists. (1)

(1) Clarke Ms. 31, f. 217v; H. M. G. Leyborne-Popham, pp. 122-123; Baker, Chronicle, pp. 654-655; Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 57-58 for the letter to Monck by the officers supporting the petition enclosing a copy, thus showing their awareness of his importance.
The petition was addressed to Parliament but was forwarded to Fleetwood to be laid before the General Council of Officers. Fleetwood passed it on to Haselrig who took it to the House, where a debate ensued and it was even proposed to commit Lambert to the Tower as the man chiefly responsible for it. The petition was by no means subversive, even if in the last two clauses the petitioners did not confine themselves to strictly military matters, although arguably even these dealt with national security, a matter of prime concern to the army. Fleetwood would have been better advised to have laid the petition before a General Council of Officers for discussion. His action in handing it to Haselrig displays ineptitude, especially if he believed that Haselrig would present it to the House uncritically. The crisis was abated somewhat by the Rump's decision not to commit Lambert. However, the motion that

"to have any more General Officers than are already settled by the Parliament is needless, chargeable and dangerous to the Commonwealth"

ensured that the confrontation had only temporarily subsided.

One problem which cannot be settled conclusively about the Derby petition is Lambert's role. Both the late Godfrey Davies and Professor Woolrych support the view that Lambert had no knowledge of it, although Davies suggests that the officers in Derby were acting in concert with some officers in London. He cites Baker's Chronicle in support of this. There is no hard and fast evidence to support the

(1) Woolrych, Milton, pp. 112-113; Davies, Restoration, p. 148.
(2) Woolrych, Milton, p. 113.
(3) ibid., loc. cit.; Davies, Restoration, p. 147.
view that Lambert either was involved in the petition or had fore-knowledge of it. The discussions preceding it certainly took place when Lambert was in Derby, although he appears to have left for London before the petition was completed. It would be surprising if Lambert did not, at the least, get wind of the discussions. He must certainly have sympathised with the petitioners' objectives. His departure for London before the completion of the petition might well have been with the intention of preparing a General Council of Officers for it. If this were the case, he can hardly be blamed for failing to anticipate Fleetwood's action in passing on the petition to Haselrig. He must have known that his offer to resign would not have been taken seriously. He had managed to manoeuvre himself into a position of strength in the army, almost a position of indispensibility, since his return in April. The Derby petition affair helped strengthen his position amongst the officers in London. The reaction that the petition provoked in the parliament was said to have caused resentment among some of the officers.

On 22 September the House had ordered Pearson, Ashfield and Ralph Cobbett to bring the original of the petition before it. This does not appear to have been insisted upon, perhaps because it could have been construed as too much of a humiliation of the officers.

(1) H.M.C. Leyborne-Popham, p. 123.
(2) Baker, Chronicle, p. 654.
(3) Woolrych, Milton, p. 113.
concerned. On 23 September Fleetwood was ordered to communicate the House's vote that the petition was "dangerous to the Commonwealth" to the officers. (1) The following day at a meeting in Wallingford House he carried out this instruction. The officers agreed to drop the Derby petition and instructed a committee to draw up a "more moderate" address professing adherence to the authority of the House. This was to be presented to a General Council on 27 September. (2) According to Phillips the committee of officers responsible for drawing up the new petition departed from their original brief and brought in a petition which attacked the Rump for its proceedings against Lambert's forces. They were thus trying to outflank a group of officers who by and large sympathised with the Rump and who were to stand by it over the next few weeks. This group consisting of Colonels Okey, Hacker, Saunders, Lt. Colonel Nicholas Andrews, Majors John Daberón, Nathaniel Barton, William Hobart, Arthur Evelyn and Captains Clement Needham and John Breman amongst others, protested against this new petition and tried to hold it up. Some of them wrote to Monck asking him to use his influence with Fleetwood and Lambert to stop this petition. (3) It is worth adding at this point that Haselrig appears to have attended these meetings of the Council of Officers in his capacity as Colonel. According to one report he was threatened with being cashiered as a mutineer. Wariston says that he, Haselrig, asserted that absolute power

(1) C. J., VII, pp. 784, 785. The Publick Intelligencer (19-25 September 1659) says that the three officers summoned before Parliament were Ashfield, Cobbett and Lt. Colonel John Duckenfield. The latter, along with Major Richard Creed, was instructed by the officers at Derby to go up to London to acquaint the officers there with the petition (Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 57, 58n.).


(3) Baker, Chronicle, p. 656; Clarke Ms. 32, f. 3v.; Dodl. Clarendon Ms. 65, f. 102; Thurloe, VII, pp. 754-755 for Clement Needham's interesting and articulate attack on the supporters of the new petition.
was in Parliament to which the officers replied that they were employed to counteract arbitrary power no matter in whom, thus implying that they were the judges of what constituted 'arbitrary power'. Fleetwood in his usual indecisive way urged both sides to sleep on the whole business. (1) Whether or not Okey and his colleagues wrote to Monck, the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland had already discouraged meetings among his forces in support of the Derby petition which had already been sent to Scotland. (2) The attempts by Okey and the others to frustrate the new petition were successful in delaying its presentation until 5 October by which time some 230 signatures had been appended to it. (3) The newsbooks tried to give the impression that there was unity within the army and that there was harmony between them and the Rump, which was, of course, far from the truth. (4) In fact the officers were split more than at any time since early 1647 when the issue of disbanding had posed such a threat to unity. Wariston was more accurate than the newsbooks when he described developments as a struggle for supremacy between army and Parliament. (5) But as we have seen the army itself was divided.

The Rump began to brace itself for a confrontation with the army. The question of pay arrears was discussed and there was

(1) C. Clar. S.P., IV, p. 394; Wariston, Diary, III, p. 139.

(2) Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 58-59 + n.

(3) Baker, Chronicle, p. 656. C.f. the Publick Intelligencer (26 September-3 October 1659) which says that on 27 September some 23 officers met to discuss the new petition which it says was to be presented to the Council of Officers on 3 October.

(4) Weekly Post, 27 September-4 October 1659; Weekly Intelligencer, 27 September-4 October 1659.

(5) Wariston, Diary, III, p. 140.
talk of recruiting the House which was only likely to aggravate the situation even more. (1) In the north Ashfield's regiment had framed its own petition but on hearing of "some demurs among the officers at London concerning it" they decided to postpone sending it. (2) The army petition was finally presented on 5 October. It could hardly claim to represent the views of all the officers of the army. Those in the capital were already split and Monck was showing signs of diverging from those who supported the petition. They in turn realised the weakness of their position and tried to get subscriptions from the forces in Scotland and Ireland. (3)

The petition was presented by Disborowe; Lambert would have been a bit too provocative, given the prevailing view of the Rump that he was responsible for the Derby petition. Disborowe was accompanied by Berry, Packer, Axtell and Barrow. (4) The petition, or Representation and Petition as it was known, opened by vindicating the Derby petitioners. It went on to deny that there was any intention of setting up a single person and re-affirmed loyalty to the good old cause, urging Parliament to continue to promote it. The petitioners went on to make several demands relating to the army, including a re-affirmation of the view, so often expressed in 1647, that members of the army had not lost their right as freemen to petition Parliament.

Woolrych, Milton, p. 114; Davies, Restoration, p. 149.

The extent to which the army's arrears had been neglected can be judged from the fact that on 2 September the Council of State ordered that clothes be given to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers in lieu of arrears.

B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f. 141.


Clarke Ms. 32, f. 5v.
merely because they were soldiers. They conceded the right of Parliament to approve the nomination of officers but requested that only those who had been approved by the nominating committee should be allowed into the army, thus indirectly admitting that they had had a fair amount of influence over nominations any way. (1)

Over the next few days the House got down to the business of discussing the petition, but broke off the debate because word was passed on to Haselrig by Okey on 11 October that letters were being sent to the regiments urging them to subscribe to the petition. There was nothing necessarily sinister in this, but it did show that the officers in London who had promoted the petition were aware that they were acting out-of-step with their brethren, and that they were trying to remedy this. Haselrig over-reacted. Fearing a coup, the House passed a bill declaring that all legislation enacted since April 1653 was null and void unless confirmed by the Rump and that as from 11 October it would be treason to raise money in any form without the consent of Parliament. This was calculated provocation. The following day the signatories of the letter to Okey and to the other regiments asking for subscriptions to the petition, Lambert, Disborowe, Derry, Kelsey, Ashfield, Cobbet, Creed, Packer and Barrow were cashiered. Fleetwood was displaced as Commander-in-Chief and replaced by seven commissioners, himself, Ludlow, Nonck, Haselrig, Walton, Morley and Overton. Wariston and his Scottish associates thought it "a strange

(1) Baker, Chronicle, pp. 657-659; E100(5), The Representation and Petition of the Officers of the Army.
and judicial madness" to cashier the officers without first being sure about being able to rely on the rest of the army.\(^1\) The officers now had the perfect excuse to intervene. On 12 October Haselrig, Walton and Morley acting under their power as commissioners ordered Morley's own regiment and Moss's to guard the area around the Parliament. The following day despite the attempts by Morley and Haselrig to woo them with money most of these men defected to Lambert who headed the forces carrying out the coup against the Rump. For the second time in just over six years the army dissolved the Rump.\(^2\)

\(^{(1)}\) Wariston, Diary, III, p. 144.

The coup against the Rump caused confusion and those in the army who had brought it about at first showed hesitation over their next move. There was talk of trying to work out a compromise with the Rump. Meetings took place between some of the leaders of the coup and some of the leaders of the Rump. The Council of State, which continued to sit until 25 October, might have been viewed as a possible way of keeping up contacts between army and civilians in an effort to achieve a compromise, but its numbers were very depleted after 15 October. It must have been painfully obvious to all, except the most naive, that there was little chance of the Rump and the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction burying the hatchet. (1)

After all fundamental differences about the constitution and about priorities had existed since April and the Parliament had never shown any great enthusiasm for the army's proposals as laid out in the petitions of 13 May and 5 October. If these differences had not been settled over the summer why should they be now after so much acrimony and in such a highly inflamed situation? Haselrig, who made the running in the Rump, and Lambert, who made the running in the army, were digging themselves into entrenched positions; indeed they had already dug themselves in before the events of 12 and 13 October.

Attempts would be made to try and build a bridge between some of the Rumpers and the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and, if we are to accept Ludlow's highly personal account, he was to be one of the principal actors involved in trying to mediate between unyielding Rumpers and equally unyielding army officers. (1) Some of the Rumpers were of course to sit on the Committee of Safety. It was to be mooted at various times in the course of the next few weeks that the Rump should be restored, and just before its return in December Disborowe was reported to favour making 60 of the best and most able of its members into the select senate so dear to some of the officers. (2)

It would have been in effect a fag-end of a fag-end of the Long Parliament. Such a proposal, and other equally impractical ones which were bandied about over the next few weeks, merely serve to emphasise the near anarchical manner in which the nation's politics were conducted during this time.

In the end the Rump was restored or rather returned, but not as it had been in May as part of a presumed deal between army and Rump to safeguard the good old cause and carry it along to greater achievements, but rather by force of circumstances; there really was no alternative. The Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in London had collapsed from within as had its attempts to work with civilians, and there was no desire or enthusiasm amongst those officers who had either supported it or acquiesced in it to take on Haselrig and the

(1) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 143-146.
(2) ibid., pp. 182-183.
forces at Portsmouth, or Monck, or the fleet. In the north Lambert's force was also disintegrating. The leaders of the faction were forced to drop their plans for a new Parliament and the Rump returned by default. As was pointed out in the introduction to this chapter the re-restoration of the Rump in December 1659 effectively marks the end of the army's political role.

If there was no likelihood of the leaders of the coup patching things up with the Rump, the former, as had always been the case in the past, sought the assistance of civilians, including members of the dissolved Parliament who were willing to work with them, to share their newly assumed power. Five officers, Fleetwood, Lambert, Disborowe, Sydenham, and Berry (who, as we have seen, was reported to have had a hand in drawing up the Instrument of Government in December 1653) and five members of the Council of State, Whitelocke, Vane, Salway, Sir James Harrington and Johnston of Wariston, were set up by the Council of Officers as a temporary committee to work out how the government of the nation should be carried on. It seems most likely that their brief was intended to cover the pressing short-term need for some satisfactory and viable form of government rather than to answer the long-term question of settlement. The five officers were the principle movers behind the dissolution of the Rump, but the civilians were a very disparate group. The officers were clutching at any available straws. This was not the way to go about achieving a lasting settlement, one that would be acceptable to a significant number of the political nation.

(1) Woolrych, Milton, p. 119.
During these days the Council of Officers continued to meet. Colonel Ralph Cobbett was instructed to go to Scotland as a personal envoy to explain and justify the recent coup and Colonel Robert Barrow went on a similar mission to Ireland. (1) Both officers had been amongst those who had had their commissions revoked before the dissolution of the Rump. The officers who had adhered to the Rump on the 13th were suspended from their commands. It was at first decided to leave it up to a court martial to determine whether they should be kept on or cashiered, but it is unlikely that any court martial took place. With the possible exception of Robert Overton's treatment, vindictiveness towards their own numbers had never characterised the officers at any time during the 1650's. The number said to have been suspended initially was 15 and these included Haselrigg Morley, Okey, Alured and Saunders. (2) Over the next few weeks other officers and men deserted the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. (3)

Among the other resolutions reached by the Council of Officers at this time was a decision that the articles of war should be reviewed; this was referred to a committee. Fleetwood was voted Commander-in-Chief of the land forces, Lambert Major General of the forces of England and Scotland and Disborowe Commissary General of horse in England and Scotland, a palid reincarnation of the Fairfax, Cromwell

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(1) Clarke Ms. 32, f. 21v. For the attitude of the army in Ireland to events in England and Scotland q.v. above.

(2) E1010(16), The Declaration of the Officers of the Army, Opened, Examined and Condemned and the Parliament Vindicated; Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 148; Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 62-63. Clarke Ms 32, f. 129v lists 20 displaced officers including Cornet John Gregory who had been implicated in Overton's 'plot' and subsequently cashiered. He was reinstated in the summer of 1659.

(3) Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 93, 94.
Ireton leadership structure of 1647-1649. No mention was made of Monck. The nominating committee was to continue with the exception of Haselrig, and its quorum was to be three. Commissions were to be granted in Fleetwood's name and no officers were to be tried except by a court martial. Existing commissions were to be renewed without a new approbation. Lambert appears to have been very influential at these meetings. There is some indication that Fleetwood was reluctant to accept the generalship until his colleagues made their intentions clearer. But if so, he was easily prevailed upon to accept it. It was also intended to circularise the regiments with the results of these deliberations. A form of engagement to be loyal to the leaders of the coup was also devised and tendered to both the officers and soldiery for subscriptions. Ludlow says that this was the means by which the 15 officers were removed from their commands. He also says that Moss who had tried to oppose the coup, and Rich were allowed to stay on without subscribing. But the list of officers in the Clarke Mss contradicts this assertion as it includes Moss.

Nine of the officers removed from the army drew up an address to Fleetwood at the beginning of November. They were Morley, Evelyn, Farley (Morley's Lt. Colonel), Okey, Streater, Alured, Barton (Saunders' Major), Saunders and Markham. The document shows signs of being the work of Streater. It is extremely articulate. In it the

(1) Loyal Scout, 16-21 October 1659; Thurloe, VII, p. 771; Clarke Ms 32, f. 21v.
nine officers said that their comrades "have no parliamentary sanction" for their present course of action. They were accused of striking "at the Liberties of the English nation, and there is none now upon the stage of action, that can pretend to the same advantages, that the former Protector had",
a point showing, and perhaps calculated to show, sympathy and understanding as to why some of their fellow officers had served Cromwell, unlike Okey, Alured, Saunders and Streater who had not and who had supported the concept of parliamentary sovereignty from quite early on. It was also an indication of their respect for Oliver Cromwell and an appreciation of his qualities as a statesman. The nine urged their comrades to recall the Rump and to drop their claims to be working in the interests of the nation,

"The good people of this nation have been formerly deceived by good words and fair promises. Setting days apart for seeking of God in fastings when the way is not good, will not hereafter blind English eyes; doing things unwarrantably, and then intitling God to them, as they will never the more be owned by God, so they will be never the more acceptable to discerning men."

In so arguing the nine were in fact stripping away the godly clothes (the fasts, the prayer meetings, the seeking of the Lord) which had shrouded army actions in the past. Indirectly, and probably not consciously, they were attacking and depreciating the mythology by which the army had sought to justify its actions to itself and to the world. The appeal to "discerning men" and the implicit confidence that these men had the ability to see through the bombastic language

(1) Cf. Monck and his officers' disparaging remarks about Cromwell (Clarke Ms. 32, ff. 32, 49v, 115).
of godly propaganda, so much favoured by the army, and to judge politics in a more obviously secular way represents a high level of sophistication in political discussion, one which had previously been displayed by the Levellers.\(^1\) The address continued with a eulogy of the Rump, an esteem for what the nine saw as its achievements. They rightly pointed out that successive attempts at settlement in the last few years had included Parliaments, despite some attempts "to wean this English nation from love unto their parliaments". Again this suggests a more elaborate kind of argument, and a more modern one, that of learning from the past. The nine felt that there was no way of circumventing the people's love for Parliaments, and their support for the maxim that sovereignty resides in the people in their representative Parliaments. They point out that

"the spirit of the free born Englishmen (notwithstanding Parliament interruptions, yet) is still working towards a Parliament."

In fact their comrades fully realised this as their attempts to get a new Parliament were to prove. The difference between them was largely that between trust and distrust of unicameral Parliaments. It was more about means than about ends, but the army, the vanguard of the good old cause, the revolutionary cause, was hopelessly split over these means. The supporters of the coup and their fellow travellers had no intention, as the nine suggested, of setting up a "sword government". The inclusion of civilians on the interim governing body, the

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\(^1\) The nine do in fact talk about "the free born Englishmen".
committee of ten set up after the dissolution of the Rump, showed this. The nine officers alleged that the dissolution of the Rump was carried out merely as a result of the cashiering of nine officers. This was indeed the immediate cause, but, as we have seen, the background to it was far more complex than that. They also suggested that current discussions in the Council of Officers were not really free and certainly not representative of their own views. They concluded by urging their fellow officers to restore the Rump so that it "may take some effectual course for as comprehensive an election of a succeeding parliament, as the safety of the cause will bear." (1)

In other words the Rump was not to be allowed to sit in perpetuity and its successor was not to be a free Parliament. These two suggestions would certainly have met with the approval of their comrades.

During the rest of October discussions were held to determine what should be done to achieve a more lasting settlement. Various ideas were bandied about including that of a select senate which was to remain a favourite over the next few weeks. A more satisfactory solution to the short term problem of government was achieved. This was the Committee of safety, which received its authority to govern from the Council of Officers on 26 October. Summons to sit on the Committee were sent out by the officers. It was the first time the army or a part of it had acted in such a way since Cromwell sent out the writs

(1) E1005(8), The Humble Representation ... to General Mleetwood, repr. in Thurloe, VII, pp. 771-774.
for Barebones in his capacity as Captain General and Commander-in-Chief. Of the 23 members of the Committee of Safety ten were army officers, Fleetwood, Lambert, Disborowe, Sydenham, Berry, Ludlow, Hewson, John Clarke (Clerk), Lilburne and Bennet. The Council of Officers had a considerable say in the selection of the Committee. The French ambassador even reported that the junior officers tried to get Harrison elected. But the list was finalised on the 25th hastily because of the deteriorating relations between Monck and the supporters of the coup. By and large the Committee of Safety exercised the same powers as the Council of State had done, but it also had power to deal with delinquents and to indemnify those who had acted for the state since 1641. These powers were also defined on the 25th. During the discussions about the Committee it was suggested that if it did not come up with a new constitution within six weeks then the Council of Officers should undertake to do so but that during these six weeks it should nevertheless consult the officers about a new constitution. This serves to emphasise just how much control the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction wanted the army to exercise in public affairs and the claims they were making on behalf of it to be the guardian of the good old cause. Whether they could have come up with an alternative

(1) Clarke Ms. 32, f. 57; Whitelocke, Memorials, IV, p. 367. The late Godfrey Davies (Restoration, pp. 157-158) does not mention the substantial influence of the Council of Officers in shaping the Committee of Safety.

(2) Guizot, Richard Cromwell, II, p. 275 (the French ambassador's report is important for dating); Weekly Intelligencer, 18-25 October 1659; Wariston, Diary, III, p. 147; Woolrych, Milton, pp. 131-132.

constitution let alone one that would prove workable and acceptable to a sufficient number of the political nation so as to make it practicable, is doubtful, despite the strong feeling in the Council of Officers for a select senate. The idea of a senate seems to have obsessed the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and they appear to have hoped it would be a *deus ex machina* that would magically solve the problem of settlement. In the event a sub-committee of the Committee of Safety was appointed early in November to consider a suitable form of government for the three nations "in the way of a free state and Commonwealth". Presumably this sub-committee superseded the committee of ten set up after the dissolution of the Rump, if indeed that committee was concerned with proposing long-term answers to settlement. Of the 13 members who were originally appointed to sit on the sub-committee Fleetwood, Ludlow, Lambert, Disborowe, Berry and Newson were officers.\(^1\) The model of government which eventually formed the basis of discussion at the General Council of the Army in December was the outcome of this sub-committee's deliberations.

The Committee of Safety was expected to liaise with the Council of Officers, no doubt so that the Council of Officers could keep a close watch on its activities and thus show to the world that it was not backsliding once again. The co-existence of the Committee of Safety and the Council of Officers created a situation whereby there

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\(^1\) Ludlow, *Memoirs*, II, p. 149; Whitelocke, *Memorials*, IV, pp. 368–369. The sub-committee was originally made up of five members appointed on 1 November. The others were added on 3 November (*Weekly Post*, 1–8 November 1659; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 1–8 November 1659).
were two potentially competing sources of power and authority. The declaration of the General Council of Officers on 27 October went so far as to declare that the acts of (the Rump) Parliament passed immediately before its dissolution, that is those relating to legislation enacted since April 1653 and to the raising of money, were void.\(^{(1)}\) This was an exercise of military power as never before. The alienating effects of this on those members and former members of the army who did not support the coup and on large and significant sections of the political nation are obvious. One suspects that at times the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction were not really aware of the implications of some of their pronouncements and decisions.

This declaration of the Council of Officers also set out the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction's side of the story of the conflict with the Rump and of the dissolution. It claimed that the issuing of commissions by Parliament was an attempt to break the army into factions not only by

"bringing divers persons into Command of prejudicial mindes, but by removing faithfull officers into remote parts of this Commonwealth"

without cause and without consultation with the Commander-in-Chief.

No wonder the nine "discerning" officers were cynical about such misrepresentation in their address to Fleetwood. The Declaration also expressed the hope that the new government would assume liberty to all the free born in civil and religious matters and promised reform

of the law, the encouragement of godly ministers and the removal of tithes. It concluded by saying that the establishment of the Committee of Safety was a guarantee that the officers did not intend to set up a military dictatorship. (1)

As we have seen, even while these developments were taking place Monck's attitude was already beginning to influence decisions being made in London. The eventual conflict, albeit a bloodless one, between the forces under Monck and those of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction under Lambert's leadership was to be important, but not crucial, in deciding the fate of the insecure 'government' in London, but decisive in determining the fate of the good old cause. However, before going on to look at this conflict we shall consider the stance of Ludlow and Overton, two of the most important officers not in London during the October crisis.

Ludlow, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief in Ireland over the summer, was in Ireland during the crisis and decided to return to England. He was informed of the Rump's dissolution when he landed at Beaumarais and despite some doubts pressed on to London, where he played a full role in the events of the next few weeks. In his Memoirs he is careful to present himself in the most favourable light as a moderate and as working all along for the return of the Rump. (2) But his role is a little more ambiguous than that. According to John Jones, who was appointed acting Commander-in-Chief in Ireland in

(1) E1001(12), A Declaration of the General Council of Officers ...
Ludlow's absence, the latter wrote to him on his way to London saying that he would work with those now in power if they resolved "to establish honest righteous things" and that if they did not he would retire. (1)

If Ludlow's behaviour is ambivalent, that of Robert Overton is even more so. His somewhat maverick approach to developments defies classification as either a Rumper or a Harringtonian republican, although he did have some Fifth Monarchist leanings. In this respect he blends in with a renewed millenarian mood in late 1659 reflected in the attempt to have Harrison and Carew elected as members of the Committee of Safety. Vane, who shared in this mood, felt that this body ushered in the Kingdom of God. (2) However, although TP suggested above that millenarian views were a brand of Republicanism, with the exception of individuals like Vane and Overton, those subscribing to them, particularly the Fifth Monarchists, were never well-enough organised or united to play a leading and influential part in the more mundane task of political activity. (3) In September 1659 Overton had joined with a predominantly Fifth Monarchist group of individuals in signing An Essay towards Settlement which supported the original expulsion of the Rump in 1653 and urged the setting up a new rule of the saints and the purging of all former Protectorians from office. Yet the following month the leaders of the Rump still trusted him enough to make him one of the seven commissioners to rule the army

(2) Wariston, Diary, III, p. 149.
(3) For the renewed millenarian mood q.v. Capp, Fifth Monarchy Men, pp. 124-128.
just before the coup. Perhaps this is an indication of just how wide the Rump leadership was prepared to cast the net of supposed Republicanism. On 11 October Overton and the garrison of Hull refused to sign the Humble Representation and Petition and called instead for unity and submission to the authority of the Rump. By 27 October Overton was said to have declared for the Rump, although this can be interpreted as meaning that he had rejected Monck's overtures to him rather than adherence to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. He set out his views in his Humble and Healing Advice in which he viewed the dissolution of the Rump as an act of providence and reiterated his Fifth Monarchist sympathies and his determination to remain neutral should fighting break out between Monck and the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. (1)

There was no mistaking the way Monck would respond to the dissolution of the Rump in view of his attitude to the Derby petition and his refusal to let his forces subscribe to the Humble Representation and Petition. (2) However, we have evidence that an oath of loyalty to the Commonwealth as established without a single person, kingship or a House of Lords circulated and was subscribed by at any rate some of the forces under his command at this time. Subscriptions to this oath were taken in Charles Fairfax's regiment during September and in October after the dissolution. Fairfax, hardly a radical but more

(1) Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 60-61, 94; Clarke Ms. 32, ff. 46, 57; Loyal Scout, 21-28 October 1659; Weekly Intelligencer, 1-8 November 1659; Guizot, Richard Cromwell, II, pp. 274, 280, 284-285; B.M. 669 f.21(73), An Essay Towards Settlement; B.M. 100 f.75, The Humble Healing Advice; D.N.B.; Woolrych, Milton, p. 111; Capp, Fifth Monarchy Men, pp. 128, 129.

(2) Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 60-61n.
of an apolitical man, was trusted by Monck which gives one good
grounds for assuming that the oath had Monck's approval. (1) Monck
heard of the dissolution on 17 October and declared his intention to
stand by the dissolved Parliament on 20 October in three letters to
Fleetwood, Lambert and the Speaker. (2) Colonel Ralph Cobbet the envoy
of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction was not the bearer of the
news of the dissolution. The news reached him in an express letter
from Clarges. Monck's order book records that instructions were sent
to Berwick on 20 October that, in case Cobbet should turn up there,
he was to be arrested. On 22 October a formal order for securing
Cobbet was issued. Cobbet was said to be working for the officers
adhering to the faction and aiming to divide those loyal to Parliament. (3)
This would seem to suggest that right from the start Monck had little
or no intention of trying to reach an understanding and compromise with
his comrades in England.

Monck's three letters were the opening shot in a heavy
barrage of attacks and counter-attacks over the next few weeks in which
both sides sought to secure the greatest advantage to themselves both
politically and militarily. It was a phoney war, or as Gumble put it
"For all the War was nothing but Paper-bullets,
mutual Messages and letters." (4)

(1) B.M. Add. Ms. 15, 858, f. 236.
(2) Baker, Chronicle, p. 663; T. Gumble, Life of General Monck,
London, 1671, p. 132v (This edition is unfortunately badly paginated); Davies, Restoration, pp. 162-164.
(3) Clarke Ms. 49 (Monck's Order Book), unfoliated; Baker,
Chronicle, pp. 663, 665.
(4) Gumble, Monck, p. 131.
It was largely fought at the level of inferior journalistic propaganda more than on any profoundly philosophical one.

Two things stand out about Monck's behaviour at this time. The first is the speed with which he acted in starting to ensure that his forces would support the Rump, and the second that all along he acted in close consultation with certain of his fellow officers. His 'inner circle' was not as small as one contemporary tract suggested. Twelve officers are recorded as having attended a Council of Officers at Linlithgow on 21 October at which a letter to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction was drawn up. Those attending included three Majors and three Captains, so it was by no means exclusively confined to very senior officers. (1) Other letters continued to be drawn up after further meetings of the Council of Officers. (2) But by and large it would be fair to say that Monck preferred by instinct to work with smaller groups of men. Nevertheless, even before he set out for Linlithgow he had called a Council of Officers at Edinburgh. Ironically it met in Grey Friars Church where the National League and Covenant had been subscribed. At this meeting he declared that "he was resolved to make the Military Power subservient to the Civil" and to obey the Parliament. Those who could not agree with him were to have the chance to resign their commissions and passes would be issued for their journey home. Some of those present were hesitant to commit themselves whole-

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(2) Clarke Ms 32, f. 63.
heartedly to Monck as they had fears that his course of action could lead to possible warfare with their comrades. They suggested treating with the latter. (1)

Monck had already started to purge some of the regiments of men whom he felt were not faithful to the Parliament's interest. On 19 October he wrote to Colonel Timothy Wilkes authorising and ordering him to purge his regiment and to appoint new officers and to inform Monck of these new appointments. Monck claimed his authority to do this as one of the seven commissioners appointed by the Rump before its dissolution to govern the army. He also sent a letter to those officers distant from Edinburgh informing them of his action and inviting them to join with him. He also requested lists of those dissenting so that appropriate action could be taken against them. (2)

It is conceivable that a test or oath was administered to the officers and soldiers in the form of the one tendered to Charles Fairfax's regiment referred to above. Monck and the officers adhering to him were able to re-model the forces in Scotland by a mixture of purges and voluntary resignations. Contemporaries said that between 140 and 144 officers were displaced. But this figure includes N.C.Os. The men who left Scotland were allowed to take their horses, arms and other necessaries and their servants if they had any. (3)

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(1) Baker, Chronicle, p. 664; Gumble, Monck, p. 134v.

(2) Baker, Chronicle, p. 664; Clarke Ms. 49, (Monck's Order Book).

the effect of swelling Lambert's forces. Judged from the military standpoint it was a surprising gesture from one who prided himself so much on being a professional soldier.

Meanwhile in the north of England steps were taken by Lilburne to secure both the forces and the region generally for the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in anticipation of trouble. All the officers in Disborowe's regiment stationed in Durham and North Yorkshire were expected to sign a declaration of loyalty to the new government before being sent to Newcastle. On 28 October Lilburne and the various officers under his command sent a pledge of support to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. By 5 November when Lilburne was in Newcastle it was reported that there were great divisions among the soldiery with some declaring for the Rump. This should not be exaggerated. There certainly was some trouble but one of the sources describing it was a letter to William Clarke which no doubt played up the divisions as much as possible. On 7 November both Newcastle and Tinmouth were reported to have declared for the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction.\(^{(1)}\) It is not clear exactly when Robert Lilburne went to the north. He was in London at the time of Richard Cromwell's fall but by July he was in the north. He remained absent from London throughout the crisis.\(^{(2)}\)

The garrison of Carlisle decided to hold out against any attempt by Monck to secure it. On 31 October they sent an address to

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\(^{(1)}\) Clarke Ms. 32, ff. 60, 74v, 96; c.f. ibid., f. 58 and B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f. 175; Publick Intelligencer, 7-14 November 1659.

\(^{(2)}\) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, pp. 59, 69, 85, 86, 87.
Monck declaring that they were determined to resist any force sent against them until they were fully satisfied about both Monck's and the English army's proceedings. They justified this on the grounds that they were afraid of more bloodshed and because of their remotness. (1)

The purges Monck carried out in his regiments were soon reported to London, but not without some distortion. On 27 October Robert Baynes wrote to Adam Baynes that Monck had imprisoned "a great many honest officers and some private soldiers and preferr'd men of meane ranke and parts to great places. His way looks not well. I wish he have not a worse designe then ye restoring the parliament." (2)

At first sight this evidence dating from quite soon after the coup against the Rump suggesting that Monck's motives were suspect lends weight to Dr. Ashley's view that Monck was a secret Royalist from August 1659 (however it is not cited by him); a more plausible interpretation is that people were genuinely puzzled by Monck's vehement stand in favour of the Rump. After all, why should a former Royalist who subsequently served under the Commonwealth and the Protectorate suddenly become so committed to Republicanism and particularly to the Rump? Baynes's comment is based on suspicion and fear. As we shall see, right up to March 1660 Monck had not made up his mind about a restoration of the Stuarts and until then he was still distrusted by Royalists close to the exiled Prince's court. Monck was also reported to be recruiting Scots into his army. (3) He might well have recruited

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(1) Clarke Ms. 32, f. 64. Cf. Phillips (Baker, Chronicle, p. 665) who claims that the garrison favoured the English army. Firth and Davies (p. 523) follow Phillips.

(2) B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f.168.

(3) ibid., f. 170.
some Scots to fill up the vacancies caused by purging or by those who had left voluntarily. In December Mercurius Britannicus, the propaganda newsbook of Monck's forces, claimed that there was no harm in recruiting a few Scots who had fought with them for the cause and alleged that there was no threat of a rising in Scotland as Monck was popular with the Scots. (1) This was not how it was seen in London. The Weekly Intelligencer reported that Monck had left the Highland garrisons to the Scots

"which will mean that once Monck's design is frustrated in England we'll have to reconquer Scotland."

In fact Monck's relations with the Scots were a good deal more complex than that. (2) The Weekly Intelligencer also reported that Monck addressed the soldiery at Edinburgh promising them their arrears "at which they made a loud shout, and gave him 3 volleys of shot." It contradicts this statement a few paragraphs later when it alleged that Monck's forces were full of discontent. However, as far as money was concerned Monck was better off than the forces in England, especially those under Lambert which had to rely on free quarter thus contributing to their unpopularity. Clarges, who was sent by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction to request a treaty between themselves and the Scottish commander, made Monck well aware of his advantageous financial position. (3)

The first approaches for some sort of negotiations between Monck and the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction came from the latter (4)

(4) Davies, Restoration, pp. 171-172.
although, as we have seen, some of Monck's own officers had suggested that there should be some discussions between the two forces. Monck's sincerity about these negotiations, which eventually resulted in the drawing up of a treaty, was rightly questioned by contemporaries. The negotiations certainly enabled him to consolidate his position with regard to his own forces and the Scots and to allow for the weaknesses within the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and its associates to paralyse and impair it fatally. As a precaution against any hostile move by Monck either before or during the negotiations, Lambert went northwards to take command of the forces there. Judging by Fleetwood's remarks before the final collapse in December, that he could do nothing without Lambert's consent concerning a change of policy there must have been some form of unanimity and trust between the leaders of the faction. (1) It was hinted at in a newsletter that Lambert intended to raise all the north country militia on his way. (2) His personal connections and previous spells of duty there might have encouraged the hope that he could do this. It might, in addition to Lambert's own lust for glory, help explain why he went and not Disborowe whose regiment was stationed there. Clearly a very senior officer was required and Fleetwood was excluded because of his political importance in London.

Even before formal negotiations between the two forces got under way, informal contacts were made with Monck. A delegation of

(1) Whitelocke, Memorials, IV, p. 382.
people representing the congregated churches in and around London went northwards at the beginning of November to apply pressure on Monck to negotiate. The delegation included two former army officers purged at the fall of the Protectorate, Whalley and Goffe. If, as seems likely, the delegation, one of whose prime movers was John Owen, had the support of the factional leaders in London, this was a shrewd move. As we have seen, Lambert, Disborowe, Fleetwood, Berry, Sydenham, Goffe and Whalley were all members of Owen's Church earlier in the year.\(^1\)

The army in Scotland decided upon three commissioners to represent them in the negotiations with the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in London. This was settled at a Council of Officers at Edinburgh on 3 November, the same day as Lambert left London for the north. There were 23 officers present at this meeting. Gumble says that such 'democratic' practices were anathema to Monck who

"though he was good at Driving ... he was now forced to lead gently." \(^2\)

The fact that Monck submitted to such procedural forms is in itself an indication of how his freedom to act was circumscribed. According to Gumble's account Monck acted as a chairman at these meetings at which the officers were free to agree or disagree with the various proposals.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Weekly Post, 1-8 November 1659; Baker, Chronicle, pp. 668, 670. There is no other evidence to support Gumble's view (Monck, p. 142v.) that Whalley, Goffe and Samuel Hammond, the Newcastle divine who had been Haselrig's personal chaplain, were fifth columnists trying to undermine Monck's forces. The story is very unlikely. C.f. Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 82-83n.

\(^2\) Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 96-97; Gumble, Monck, p. 140v.

\(^3\) ibid., loc. cit.
This is a useful corrective to the widely held assumption that Monck was a virtual autocrat over the army in Scotland and that he went about things during these weeks in a calculated systematic fashion. It would be more accurate to say that he was working in concert with a number of his officers. Monck was not infallible; even in military matters he could make foolish errors as the order and counter-order to seize Newcastle suggest. Phillips suggests he ordered his Major, Ralph Knight, to seize Newcastle to "amuse" the faction in England. A more plausible explanation is that Monck realised the importance of the town and tried to gain control of it before reinforcements could be sent to strengthen it, but that he underestimated the speed with which reinforcements were sent up and was forced to abandon the attempt to seize the town. (1)

The three commissioners chosen to go to London were Colonel Timothy Wilkes, Lt. Colonel John Clobery of Reade's regiment and Major Ralph Knight of Monck's horse. (2) Clobery was a Devonshire man and kinsman of Monck and had been one of Monck's inner circle from after the coup. Earlier in the year Royalists had hopes of winning him over to the Stuart cause and by December were confident he was on their side. In 1660 he was one of Monck's closest advisors and by February was working for a Restoration. He was knighted in June. (3) These commissioners were later charged by Monck with having exceeded their authority and it was rumoured that Wilkes betrayed "their

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(2) Clarke Papers, IV, p. 97.
secret instructions”. Just how secret their instructions were is debateable. Wilkes had been one of Monck's trusted advisors and colleagues since the beginning of the crisis, but when the commissioners returned from London he had Wilkes arrested and gave his regiment to the Major, Thomas Hughes.\(^1\) Clobery was given Philip Twisleton's regiment, and Knight Thomas Saunders\(^2\) (Saunders who had been restored to the army over the summer did not join his regiment which was serving in Scotland).\(^2\)

It is worthwhile to have a closer look at the commissioners' instructions, in particular those referring to constitutional matters. The fourth article says that the members of the Rump should be allowed to return "with security against future interruptions till the 6th of May next", the date by which they had voted to dissolve themselves. No new form of government was to be set over the country "butt by Parliament, unlesse they should refuse to sitt, or sitting should refuse or neglect to establish the same betwixt this and the 6th of May next."

Thus, there was to be no unconditional return of the Rump. It was going to have to stick to its own promises. The eleventh article of the instructions, perhaps unintentionally, gave the commissioners much more leeway in these matters. The army's petition of 12 May (it was

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\(^1\) Ibid., pp. 197n, 299–300. This same source alleges that Wilkes was a Fifth Monarchist. But there is no other evidence for this and it is doubtful. C.f. Capp (Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 268) and also Gumble (Monck, p. 144) who says that the commissioners were almost made prisoner in London and were told that all Monck's horse had revolted to Lambert and that this hastened them into an agreement; an unlikely tale.

\(^2\) Firth and Davies, pp. 171, 238.
presented to Parliament on 13 May) was to be "owned" by the officers of the armies of the three nations

"with such ratification of the 4th, 12th and 13th Articles, and parte of the 9th as shall be agreed by the Commissioners of the Army now appointed to treat." 

These articles respectively referred to legislation enacted since the Ramp's dissolution in April 1653, Fleetwood's position as Commander-in-Chief, the legislative power being in a House of Commons and a select senate co-ordinate in power with the House of Commons, and qualifications for public servants. (1) At the very least, then, the instructions were ambiguous about the commissioners' authority to deal with constitutional matters.

But even if there are grounds for arguing that technically the commissioners did not exceed their instructions, that is how Monck and some of his fellow officers chose to interpret it. (2) As we have suggested Monck's commitment to these negotiations was in the first place pretty dubious, and the belief that the commissioners had exceeded their brief played right into his hands as did the subsequent demand for fresh talks. Doubts about the efficacy of a treaty were also shared by some of his officers. (3) As for the commissioners, they were probably motivated by a genuine desire to ensure a peaceful outcome to the conflict between the army in Scotland and the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. They must have felt that the treaty represented the best solution under the circumstances. (4)

(2) ibid., pp. 670-671; Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 116-117.
(3) Gumble, Monck, pp. 144v, 151, 153; Baker, Chronicle, p. 672.
The main feature of the treaty, agreed upon on 15 November, was its insistence that no new constitution was to be initiated without the consent of a General Council of the Army and the Navy. In one sense this was the most radical political move made by the army in the past 12 years. In 1649 it had, with the help of civilians, also drawn up a constitution. But it had tendered this constitution to the Rump expecting the Parliament to enact it. The army had been won over to the Instrument of Government once it had been offered to Cromwell, although it had been devised by an army officer. But now in 1659 it was claiming to be the ultimate arbitrator of such matters, in effect it was claiming to know what the people wanted, what was good for them. As we have seen the seeds of this claim were already present in 1647. It was implicit in the Remonstrance of 14 November of that year. But now it was being asserted consciously and unashamedly if not by all of the army, then at least by an important section of it. It is sometimes argued that in 1647 the army was more representative of the nation than the Parliament, that it reflected more accurately the feeling and aspirations of the nation than the Presbyterian controlled Parliament. (1)

It was after all composed of men of every social class. The Parliament was not. There can be no doubt that this is the way it viewed itself. So long as it maintained both a high degree of unity and of consensus about what it wanted to achieve then it could convincingly adopt this stance, namely that it was no different from the people, indeed that it was just the people in arms. That was the source of its strength in the period 1647 to 1649. But despite the fact that it could have acted in a dictatorial manner in those years by claiming to be the sole body

(1) Aylmer (ed.), Interregnum, p. 15.
capable of advancing the revolution, and there were influential persons in the army who would have preferred such a course of action, it never did so. The denial of such claims, or rather the unwillingness to push such claims to their logical conclusion, as many similar modern revolutionary movements have justified them, was the whole basis of the limited revolution of 1648-1649; working within established institutions to make the revolution respectable. It was also, I have argued, one of the reasons why the chances of a more radical revolution were stillborn. In 1659 the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction were insisting upon a General Council of the Army to decide the nation's future government, but they could not claim to be representative of much. They did not represent all of their fellow officers, they did not represent the soldiery who were excluded from the Council, and they most certainly did not represent any significant element of the political nation. In short they really only represented themselves. With such a slender power base and such a tenuous hold over power they could not even do that for long. If it was a fag-end of the Long Parliament which legitimised the revolution of 1648-1649, it was the fag-end of the army which was attempting to further that revolution in late 1659.

The General Council of the Army was to consist of two commission officers from each regiment, chosen by the commission officers or a majority of them convened for that purpose, the governors of garrisons which were not garrisoned by regiments and who could safely be spared (they were not to be elected by the garrison officers, perhaps an indication of the lower status of garrisons in the army hierarchy), and ten officers from the fleet. This General Council
was to meet on 6 December, which did not leave much time for preparations. The parallels with 1647 are obvious, but this General Council was intended to be a very watered down version of the previous one. The emphasis was on the commission officers, nothing was said of the N.C.O.s, let alone of the soldiery.

The treaty also provided for a Parliament to be called with qualifications to be determined by a committee of ten members of the Committee of Safety plus three commissioners for Ireland (two from the army and one civilian), three commissioners of the army in Scotland and three for the army in England. The last three were to be nominated by Fleetwood. (1) The committee at least gave the appearance of representing the three nations and the three armies. In practice it was redundant for, as we shall see, the General Council took upon itself the task of debating the qualifications for the new Parliament.

Wariston says that news of the conclusion of the treaty disgusted some of the civilians, especially Vane and Salway, because it had been made without the consent of the Committee of Safety. Vane and Salway disliked the idea of Monck becoming "the balance", or arbiter, in any settlement. Wariston correctly observed that the officers had become "the supreme delegating power without representatives from the people". (2)

Throughout November the sub-committee of the Committee of Safety had been working on the new constitution. By the 28th it


was reported that most of the new constitution had been finalised and was being given to a committee of army officers to examine and comment upon before it was returned to the sub-committee. From there it was to go before the General Council. We have little indication of the deliberations of this sub-committee but some people were trying to press for a scheme along Harringtonian lines. This was of course the time when the Rota club met and when Harrington's ideas were at their most fashionable.

The following discussion of the events surrounding the General Council should be read in conjunction with Professor Woolrych's account with which I differ on some points especially on the reliability of Ludlow. I also use some additional source material not used by Woolrych. The General Council of Officers convened on 6 December against a background of growing discontent in London in which the apprentices played a large part, a sign of great crisis in London as it had been in 1647 when the Presbyterians attempted their coup against Parliament. On 5 December there was a riot in the City which was vigorously and violently suppressed by a force under Hewson. The cause of the riot was the attempt by the Sergeant-at-Arms, on orders from the Committee of Safety, to read a proclamation against the circulation of petitions for a free Parliament. Such heavy-handed behaviour by the armed forces to quell the trouble in a situation which must have been along the lines of some of the

(1) Loyal Scout, 25 November–2 December 1659.


(3) Woolrych, Milton, pp. 142–150. This account is far more detailed and satisfactory than the late Godfrey Davies's.
student riots of the late 1960's could only help alienate the population at large from the army even more. (1) The government of the City too was showing signs of division between those who ranged from indifference to tacit support for the Committee of Safety and those who favoured challenging its authority over the question of the City's liberties, especially its claims to be able to dispose of its own militia. There was also a growing opinion in the City in favour of a free Parliament. (2) It was becoming more and more apparent that the Committee of Safety and its military backers in the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction were beginning to lose the City.

By 6 December too Haselrigg, Walton and Morley, three of the commissioners appointed by the Rump on 11 October to govern the army, had arrived in Portsmouth where the governor, Nathaniel Whethan, had declared for the Rump. Together with six others these three had already sent a letter in the name of the former Council of State to Monck authorising him to issue commissions and encouraging him to act towards a restoration of the Rump. (3) Other ex-officers such as Okey and Hacker were working, or would soon be working, actively on behalf of the Rump. Thus, by the time the General Council of the Army met, any real chance of implementing the new constitution it was summoned to discuss was already gone.

(1) For account of the incident q.v. Firth and Davies, pp. 414-415; Davies, Restoration, pp. 181-182; Woolrych, Milton, pp. 144-146. Hewson, a regicide, escaped at the Restoration. In September 1660 the apprentices prepared A Charge of High Treason against him (E1045(9)). Hewson was satirised because of his former profession as a cobbler (q.v. for example BM, 669 f.22(64), a verse satire on him).

(2) For a fuller discussion of developments in the City q.v. Woolrych, Milton, pp. 144-146.

Given the short space of time between the decision to summon such a Council and its first meeting, very few regiments had the time to select and send up representatives. John Vernon wrote to John Jones, the acting Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, that only 37 officers were present on 12 December. (1) Ludlow suggests that the "Wallingford House party", his label for what I have preferred to call the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, deliberately tried to keep the numbers small, especially by ordering various officers to return to their commands on grounds of national security. (2) This is very unlikely. It was in the interests of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction to have as many officers as possible to support the proposed constitution. The General Council had to meet quickly because it was essential to try and get the new constitution finalised and accepted speedily, so that it could be shown to the nation that there was a viable alternative to the Rump capable of guaranteeing the good old cause. It was unfortunate that the need for speed ultimately undermined the principle underlying the General Council, that of a supposedly representative body of all the officers in the three nations and in the fleet. We have seen how in early October, when events were moving incredibly fast, the officers decided to push on with the Humble Representation and Petition and to get more subscriptions to it after it had been presented to the Rump. Efforts were made to get representatives to attend the General Council and the difficulties caused by the deteriorating outlook for the "govern-

(1) C. Clar. S.P., IV, p. 481.
(2) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 163-165.
ment" in London were understood. On 10 December Allen Barnard wrote to Colonel William Mitchell saying that he had informed Lt. Colonel John Wade that he had been chosen one of the representatives of the regiment for the General Council and that he would acquaint Wade with Mitchell's further orders. Mitchell had commanded Robert Overton's regiment in Scotland until the summer when Overton was restored to it. Mitchell was given command of a new regiment formed out of loose companies. His Lt. Colonel was John Wade who was probably the same person as the man in charge of ship building and iron works industries in the Forest of Dean area. Who Barnard was is unclear. On 28 November Robert Baynes wrote from Newcastle to Adam Baynes mentioning that the preparations for further negotiations with Monck had taken up so much time. He urged Adam to request Fleetwood to proceed with the General Council despite the fact that no representatives had come from Scotland for it

"To the end noe tyme may be lost, delay being now the greatest danger." (2)

On 6 December John Jones wrote from Dublin, where the instructions for sending representatives to the General Council had arrived late because of contrary winds and had thus made it impossible for the Irish regiments to elect representatives, advising Fleetwood that

"Whatsoever ye Lord directs you to doe att yo' Generall Councell doe it quickly, Delayes and longe Debates are exceedingly dangeouse, if ye Springe overtake you before you come to a Settlim' I cannot see how you will avoyd ruine according to the reasonings of man."

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(1) B.M. Add. Ms. 18, 979, f. 266; Firth and Davies, pp. 556-557; Aylmer, State's Servants, p. 41.

(2) B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f. 184.
Jones nevertheless pressed on with arrangements for the election of representatives from the Irish regiments. (1) But unfortunately from the point of view of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction the time scale within which they were operating was not as long as Jones imagined in his letter; hence the haste in convening the General Council. However, according to the Venetian ambassador, once the General Council got under way its numbers increased daily as representatives arrived from the various units in the country. He also noted that none came from Scotland. (2) Thus, if the charge of trying to wreck the General Council can be levelled at anyone in the army then that person was Monck.

The General Council soon got down to the business of deciding on a new constitution. The sub-committee of the Committee of Safety had already come up with part of a draft for a new constitution, the contents of which are unknown, which it had presented to the Council of Officers on 2 December. (3) This draft was at first shelved by the General Council and a wide-ranging debate about calling a Parliament and a senate ensued. By 9 December the consensus of the meeting favoured a Parliament of two houses, and the sub-committee's draft was taken up again. The following day there was an intense debate as to whether the General Council should elect the second house, or senate, or whether it should be left to the "people". The latter course was decided upon. Wariston remarked that many of the officers

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(1) Mayer, 'Inedited Letters', pp. 289, 290. For Jones's arrangements for the election of representatives from the regiments in Ireland q.v. above (Chapter Five, Section IV).

(2) C.S.P.V. 1659-61, p. 102.

(3) C.S.P.V. 1659-61, p. 100.
were inclined

"to please the people, because officers had gotten good estats and would not hazard them in feighting with the people."

His implication was that the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction realised how isolated and unrepresentative it and the General Council were becoming and that anything that savoured of an attempt at military dictatorship might well meet with resistance. Ludlow warned the General Council of its unrepresentative nature in terms of the armies in the three nations. He also attempted to swing the General Council over to support for a recall of the Rump during the debates but, according to his own account, Disborowe was vehemently opposed to any further dealings with that body. Disborowe felt that the Rump

"had deceived them (the army) twice, and that they were now resolved to put it out of their power to do it again."

He also complained that the Rump had failed to fulfil certain undertakings alleged to have been given by its most influential members before its recall in May and that it had sought to purge the officer corps over the summer. As we have seen, this last accusation in particular was absurd; irrational factors were beginning to influence the decisions of the leaders of the faction, a complete contrast with the decisiveness and clarity of thinking involved in pushing through the revolution of 1648-1649. While the debates were in progress there appear to have been behind-the-scenes meetings between Fleetwood and other officers and Ludlow, Vane and Salway. These meetings, about the new constitution, further emphasised how isolated the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction was becoming; it was fast losing credibility even among those civilians who at first had been at the least willing to
acquiesce in the coup against the Rump. However, the outcome of the debates was the vote, on 10 December, that a new Parliament should meet in or before the following February. (1)

Ludlow accepted the outcome of the debates. According to one report "his dissatisfactions abated" after it had been reached, (2) but a more likely interpretation is that he was being realistic and was aware of the fact that there was little he could do against such strong anti-Rump feeling amongst the officers. But he was afraid that under the proposed new constitution the army would seek to gain as much power as possible by trying to ensure that the new Parliament was its own creature. To avoid this he suggested that

"The essentials of our cause might be clearly stated and declared inviolable"

and that any dispute arising between Parliament and army should be settled by a body of 21 Conservatives. (3) Clearly he was afraid that the senate would be too much under army influence to carry out this function, although this is the role the officers conceived the senate would have. Thus, the competition between the Committee of Safety and the Council of Officers for authority, which had existed since November, was in danger of being perpetuated under the new constitution in the form of disputes between the Conservators and the senate. This could become a source of conflict in the future in addition to any tensions between legislature and executive. The philosophy behind

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(1) Wariston, Diary, III, pp. 155-156; Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 165-169; Guizot, Richard Cromwell, II, p. 306; c.f. Woolrych, Milton, pp. 147-148. Godfrey Davies (Restoration, p. 186) is wholly inadequate on these events. Q.v. also Mayer, 'Inedited Letters', pp. 231-232 for evidence that Ludlow was disillusioned with the activities of the Lambert/Dishover/Fleetwood faction in the latter part of November. He wrote to Jones in Ireland suggesting that the acting Commander-in-Chief had deserted the Parliament. Ludlow's letter does not survive but its contents can be surmised from Jones's reply to it.

(2) C.S.P., IV, p. 481.

(3) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 171-172.
the Conservators perhaps anticipates the role of the Supreme Court
in the American constitution, and looked at within the broader historical
perspective perhaps the concept of the judiciary as the ultimate referee
on constitutional disputes was what men were gradually groping towards.
But such a role for the judiciary would not have been possible in the
English Revolution. They were not trusted by the army and other
supporters of the good old cause. This was one aspect of the demands
for law reform. In an age when the common law played such a central
and crucial part in the nation's political, social and economic life,
and when so much of the ideology justifying the attacks on the King
and his evil counsellors between 1640 and 1642 had been garbed in
the language of the common law, the failure to bridge the huge gulf
between the lawyers and the guardians of the revolutionary cause, the
army, explains in part the collapse of the English Revolution. In a
sense, the failure of earlier attempts at law reform came home to roost
in late 1659.

The "essentials of the cause" were drawn up under seven
heads and passed by the General Council on 13 December. They declared
against kingship, government by a single person, a House of Lords, and
impositions upon tender consciences, and in favour of the separation
of the legislative and executive powers and both Houses of Parliament
being elected by the people duly qualified. The army was to be maintained
in the interests of national security and not to be disbanded without
the approval of the Conservators. (1)

(1) Mercurius Politicus, 8-15 December 1659, repr. in Ludlow,
The army's commitment to a new Parliament raised the question of how it was to be elected. New schemes were put forward and discussed. These discussions about the franchise were conducted by both the General Council and the Committee of Safety, or its sub-committee, although the General Council had originally assigned this task to the former. (1) One proposal envisaged both the House of Commons and the senate being elected, another suggested the election of electoral colleges by the hundreds which would then go on to elect members for the county. There were proposals to allow towns to elect only their own citizens and not outsiders, which could well have affected non-resident gentry sitting for the boroughs. There was renewed talk of constituency reform, of disenfranchising certain smaller constituencies and enfranchising "towns of more importance. The complete exclusion of Royalists was also mooted. (2) How all this was supposed to ensure the return of a Parliament that would advance the good old cause, as the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction defined it, and one that would command the loyalty of, or at least the acquiescence of, a sizeable number of the political nation so as to ensure its ability to govern, remains a mystery. The army's previous attempts at managing elections had not been successful, nor had the franchises of the Instrument and Humble Petition succeeded in excluding the oppositions of the day. (3)

(1) Whitelocke, Memorials, IV, p. 379; B.M. 669 f. 22(51), The Monthly Intelligencer, December 1659–January 1660; Wariston, Diary, III, p. 158.

(2) B.M. Add. Ms. 18979, f. 266; Guizot, Richard Cromwell, II, pp. 312–313.

From the start, aspects of the new franchise proposals proved quite unacceptable to Whitelocke although he does not appear to have been opposed to the principle of a new Parliament. He opposed some of the franchise proposals on the grounds that they were "expressly contrary to the law". If Whitelocke's account of his behaviour is to be accepted then this was a strange and naive argument on his part, for what was the "law"? He had quite readily served under other governments, including the Committee of Safety, to which the same objection could have been made. However, it can also be read as an excuse to leave a sinking ship. Whitelocke refused to seal the writs. Some of the more radical officers said they would do it themselves. One even said

"that it could not be well, when in such a time as this a lawyer should be instructed with so great a charge as the keeping of the great seal, and that it were more proper for some who had endured the dangers of the wars and冒险ed their lives for the service of the Commonwealth, to have the keeping of the seal, than for a lawyer to have it, who had not undergone dangers as others had."

Here the gulf between soldier and lawyer was articulated quite dramatically. Fleetwood found the unnamed Colonel's language too excessive and reprimanded him. (1) But the Colonel had a point. The only alternative to this last effort on the part of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction to achieve a new constitution was a military dictatorship.

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(1) Whitelocke, Memorials, IV, pp. 379-380. But c.f. Wariston, Diary, III, p. 159. Wariston says that Whitelocke was one of a group, including Disborowe and Sydenham attending Fleetwood on 20 December and urging him to issue the writs.
Wariston says that some officers even favoured marching forces to York to join with Lambert. (1) But the leaders of the faction did not want this.

Yet another pigeon was coming home to roost. The policy adopted to bring about the revolution of 1648-1649, to get further reform under the Rump, to guarantee civil and religious liberties under the Protectorate and latterly to further the 'good old cause', sought to achieve those ends as far as possible by constitutional means. It had considerably weakened the chances of a more thorough-going revolution in 1648-1649 and by 1657 it had brought the army to a state of uncreativity and ultimately by 1659 to a position whereby the use of force to solve political problems was becoming almost an end in itself; it was not, as with Pride's Purge, the trial and execution of Charles I, the dissolution of the Rump and the dissolution of Barebones, an expedient to introduce a new, alternative and vibrant path towards settlement. Now in 1659 the reluctance to contemplate a fully-fledged military dictatorship revealed the army to be no more than a paper tiger.

Of course there were other factors contributing to this state of affairs. When we use the term 'army' in this context we really mean that part of the army in and around London, and by December more especially the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. Even this part of the army was itself considerably weakened by the purge of

(1) Wariston, Diary, III, p. 159.
October which had split the more obvious supporters of the 'good old cause' within the army into those officers adhering to the faction and those who remained loyal to the Rump. But both these groups were the heirs of the army's political role of the last 12 years, much more so than those units and officers serving in Ireland or under Monck in Scotland which were distant from political developments in London, and more so than those officers who had stood by the Protectorate in its last days and who were now discredited. No doubt also the leaders of the faction may have been uneasily aware of their insubstantial hold over power as well as of their own shortcomings as statesmen, and in the case of Fleetwood of his feebleness as a leader. Wariston remarked that

"Everyone of the officers told to us their confusion and unfitnesse to manage such a business as government." (1)

They were not made of the same stuff as their twentieth-century counterparts who have shown no hesitation about trying to run governments by themselves after coups against the civilian authorities.

Nevertheless, the long term reason for the collapse of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and ultimately for the collapse of the army's political role as it had been enacted in the late 1640's and 1650's lies in the fact that the army decided to try to reach settlement by proceeding along the constitutional path. In this respect, to use modern terminology, the army as a revolutionary movement was more akin to the Mensheviks than to the Bolsheviks. Thus, in December 1659

(1) ibid., loc. cit.
when some of the most important officers were being called upon by force of circumstances to seize full power they were incapable of doing so. They were victims of the army's past. They no longer had the conviction of being an aggressive and creative revolutionary movement; their revolutionary ardour was spent. This helped make the return of the Rump so easy. It also enabled army politics to decline into subservience to the civilian authorities. Even while the General Council of the Army was discussing the franchise, the fleet under Lawson declared for the Rump. It is unlikely that the fleet had even sent any of its allotted ten representatives to the General Council. Lawson's declaration was another nail in the coffin of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction.

For the sake of clarity it is necessary to interrupt the narrative for a brief account of the whereabouts of the fleet during these events. Until September the fleet had been under Montagu's command as Admiral (he had been appointed a General-at-Sea in January 1656). Montagu had lost his regiment with the restoration of the Rump but had retained his naval commission. In March the fleet had been sent to the Sound to back up English diplomacy in the Northern War. In June the Council of State appointed three additional commissioners to the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, namely Algernon Sydeny (who had served in the army as governor of Dover but who had been removed in 1651), Sir Robert Honeywood - with Sydneys a member of the Council of State - and Thomas Boone. The dispatch of the three commissioners was probably an indication that the Rump did not really trust Montagu, who maintained his independence. A difference arose with the Dutch, with whom the English had agreed in July to work together to secure a mutually
advantageous outcome to the war, over the question of the number of ships to be left in northern waters to coerce the Kings of Denmark and Sweden. Montagu won the day and persuaded his fellow commissioners, with the exception of Sydney, that the whole fleet should return to English waters which it did, setting sail on 24 August, anchoring in the Downs early in September. The suspicions the Rump held of Montagu were well-founded. Sir Edward Hyde had written to Edward Montagu, the Admiral's cousin, in June urging him to use his influence to get his cousin to work for a Restoration. On 27 July the Admiral himself wrote to Hyde from Copenhagen offering his services on behalf of Charles Stuart if a suitable occasion arose. It seems likely, therefore, that Montagu's decision to take the fleet back to England was influenced by a desire to intervene in Booth's rising on behalf of the Stuart cause. However, he still remained on good terms with Richard Cromwell. The Council of State disapproved of Montagu's action in bringing back the fleet and ordered that 15 ships should return to the Sound. Given his uneasy relationship with that body and with the army leadership and the well-founded suspicions about his loyalty it was no surprise that he was pushed aside and retired to Hinchingbrooke. For the next few months the fleet was under Lawson's command as Vice-Admiral. Lawson, about whose loyalty to the good old cause there was no doubt, had been appointed Vice-Admiral in May 1659. Montagu was re-appointed to the navy in February 1660, as General-at-Sea (along with Monck), and he worked for a Restoration. (1)

Before continuing the narrative to discuss the events surrounding the return of the Rump, something should be said about the 21 Conservators. Ludlow gives an account of their election and names some of those elected but his list does not tally with two other lists we have, and which have not been used by modern historians. One is in the Clarke Ms. in Worcester College and the other is in a newsbook. (1) Both lists give 20 names, Lawson’s is missing from the Clarke Ms. list and Packer’s from the newsbook one, so the names of the 21 are:

Fleetwood, Lambert, Vane, Salway, Ludlow, Thomas Harrison, John Carew, Robert Overton, Lawson, Berry, Packer, Hewson, Disborowe, Alderman Ireton, Steele, Whitelocke, Wariston, Sydenham, Sir James Harrington, Thomas Lord Fairfax and Robert Titchbourne, an incredible mix. (2)

According to Ludlow, Rich whom he suggests was also working for the return of the Rump, was nominated but rejected by the leaders of the faction "because they suspected him not to favour their arbitrary designs". This has to be modified by Wariston’s more contemporaneous account which shows that whatever their scruples or motives both Rich and Ludlow played a full part in the selection of the Conservators. Wariston alleges that Ludlow and Rich opposed his (Wariston’s) nomination on account of suspected hostility to liberty of conscience and latent Royalism. (3) The Conservators as finally agreed upon included a hotchpotch of diverse groups and individuals, established army officers and

(1) Clarke Ms. 32, f. 175v; Particular Advice from the Office of Intelligence, 9-16 December 1659.

(2) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 173 says that the Lambert/Disborowe/ Fleetwood faction secured Strickland’s and Pickering’s nomination, but in view of the contemporary lists this must be doubted.

adherents of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, Fifth Monarchists like Harrison and Carew, members of the Committee of Safety, City figures, and men like Overton, Lawson and Fairfax to give it the appearance of being broad based. Even if all these men, or even a majority of them, could have been persuaded to sit together as guardians of the good old cause, the definition of which they disagreed about anyway, they did not represent anything like a popular front of adherents to that cause. Arguably, it was only some such sort of popular front that could by this time have saved it and its supporters from disaster. A Rump-army alliance would have been a step in that direction but, as we have seen, that proved impossible. With the supporters of the good old cause so hopelessly divided amongst themselves it is not surprising that the cause itself soon collapsed.

Lawson's declaration for the Rump threw the General Council completely off-balance. They were reported to be "at a stand" by it. (1) (Some naval officers had previously expressed cautious support for the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction.) (2) Vane, Salway and Salmon were sent to Lawson to win him over to the proposals for a new Parliament. But Lawson was acting with the advice of Scot, Streater and Okey (who was well-known to him since the days of the discussions about the Three Colonels' Petition). (3) Interestingly enough there had also been contacts

(1) B.M. 669 f.22 (51), The Monthly Intelligencer, December 1659–January 1660.

(2) Publick Intelligencer, 12–19 December 1659.

between Honck and the fleet. Monck justified his position and refuted charges that he was working for Charles Stuart. (1)

The pledge of a new Parliament helped appease the City government for a while, but the fear of more trouble from the apprentices lingered on and anti-army feeling began to grow in intensity. Disborowe's regiment was ordered from the north to London to help keep the peace there, an indication of how seriously fears of trouble in the capital were treated. (2) The annual elections to the Common Council on 22 December also saw an influx of Presbyterians more favourable to the idea of a freely elected Parliament, and in time to a Restoration. Haselrig and his fellow Rumpers at Portsmouth urged the City government to declare for the Rump. On 7 December Haselrig, Morley and Walton wrote to the Lord Mayor saying that the restoration of the Parliament was the only way to avoid national ruin and that they would write to the Speaker to have the Parliament meet at Portsmouth if necessary. This gives some indication of the deliberations at Portsmouth. They wrote again on 20 December, in case the previous letter had not reached London, recommending the City government to join with Lawson and the fleet for the Rump. They suggested that the new Parliament agreed to by the General Council of the Army and due to meet on 24 January would not be able to command any authority. They said that only the Rump could lay the foundations for future Parliaments and that the original dissolution of the Rump in April 1653 "caused all our miserie". (3)

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(1) Clarke Ms. 32, f. 133 ff, Monck to Vice Admiral Goodson and the fleet. Lawson's name is crossed out.

(2) Publick Intelligencer, 19–26 December 1659. On its way south it eventually declared for the Rump on hearing of the virtual collapse of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in London (ibid.).

(3) B. M. Sloane Ms. 970, ff. 6, 8.
But, on the face of it, the City government always remained more
cconcerned with the City's safety and interests. They were determined
to keep their options open. Various commissioners were appointed to
consult with Fleetwood, Haselrig and his associates at Portsmouth,
and Lawson; a letter was also to be sent to Monck. John Knight and
Robert Blackstone were requested to attend the commissioners to both
Haselrig and Lawson, an indication of who the City government felt
was gaining the upper hand. (1)

Meanwhile in the north the phoney war between Lambert
and Monck had been continuing. Lambert had seen through Monck's
procrastination over further negotiations on the treaty and had
written to Fleetwood at the beginning of December

"signifying his trouble at the losing of time in
the Northern expedition by adhering to a grant
of too long time for a Treaty with General Monck,
conceiving thereby itt onely makes way for the
design of the publick enemy." (2)

This was apparent to his fellow officers in the north as well. Robert
Baynes wrote to Adam Baynes on 8 December that

"we have little reason to conclude yt Genll Monck
and his new created officers have any intentions
for peace however they pretend thereunto." (3)

A stream of propaganda issued from Monck's army, denouncing the Lambert/
Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and trying to undermine its morale. (4)

(1) Guildhall Journal, Jor. 41X, ff. 214v, 215.
(2) B.M. 669 f. 22 (5), The Monthly Intelligencer, December 1659-
January 1660.
(3) B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f. 185; C.f. Publick Intelligencer,
12-19 December 1659.
(4) The literature is located in Wor. Co. B.B. a.4. (volume of
pamphlets). Q.V. also G. Davies, The Early History of
main component of this propaganda was a newsbook, the first issue of which was called The Faithful Intelligencer and subsequent issues Mercurius Britannicus. Like its earlier namesake in the 1640's, no doubt its title was meant to imply that it was speaking on behalf of majority feeling in the three nations. The newsbook tended to be a gloss on Mercurius Politicus. Its contents provide further evidence of how well-informed Monck and his colleagues were on developments in England. (1)

Events in London immediately preceding the return of the Rump have all the elements of Götterdämmerung in them. On 20 December the Council of the Army seems to have decided to send commissioners to Lawson to inform him of their plans for the new Parliament, a last minute attempt to win him over. (2) Writs were also sent out for the new Parliament. According to Wariston, Fleetwood refused to authorise the issuing of the writs on the morning of the 20th despite being requested to do so by a delegation consisting of Owen, Whitelocke (who had changed his tune), Titchburn, Sydenham, Disborowe and Wariston himself. The Army Council thereupon voted to ask the Committee of Safety to issue the writs. Fleetwood was breaking down under the strain. The order to issue the writs was revoked the next day. (3) But it was too late. On 21 December Lawson declared once more for the Rump. He sent his reasons to Fleetwood. He felt that the "Wallingford

(2) B.M. 669 f. 22 (51), The Monthly Intelligencer, December 1659-January 1660; Mercurius Politicus, 15-22 December 1659.
House" proposals (his phrase) for a Parliament were not likely to safeguard the cause and the nation would only be subject to more changes without any legal foundations and that this would open the way for the Stuarts. He said that the Rump alone could authorise the raising of the money necessary for the army's and navy's arrears and that thus he could not send up any of his officers from the Downs to London to treat. (1) It was strange that the Rump, the fag end of the Long Parliament purged by the army, should come to be looked upon by Lawson, by Monck, by the Rumpers themselves, and even by some of the Committee of Safety, as the only legal body in the nation.

In the meantime the forces sent to besiege Portsmouth under Major Breman of Rich's regiment had deserted to the garrison and had submitted to the authority of Haselrig, Walton and Morley. They were joined by two troops of Berry's regiment under Major Unton Crooke and Captain Robert Hutton, both of which had declared for the Rump on 15 December. (2) The Council of the Army, or what was left of it, appears to have rejected a suggestion to send a force to oppose that under Haselrig and his colleagues in Portsmouth, as well they might for they could not rely on their own men by this stage. (3) Two troops of Packer's regiment declared for the Rump on 22 December and the following day the officers of the General Council themselves decided to submit to the Rump. They drew up several resolutions con-

(1) N.L.S. Adv. Ms. 35.5.11, f. 14.
(2) Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 210, 216; Parliamentary Intelligencer, 19-26 December 1659.
cerning their indemnity which they presumptuously intended to style as "the unanimous Agreement (sic) of the Officers of the Three Nations". It was given out to be signed by both officers and soldiers in the regiments in London, "but most of them refused to be any longer seduced from their obedience". (1)

In the highest ranks of the army confusion reigned during these days. It is plausible that Whitelocke urged Fleetwood to get in first and declare for Charles Stuart, but even Fleetwood for all his faults could not have agreed to this. Anyway he was soon reminded by Vane, Disborowe and Berry that such a move was not on. Neither the adherents of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction nor many, if any, of those officers who had gone over to the Rump would have supported such a move at this stage. Whitelocke's other suggestion that Fleetwood should seek an alliance with the City for a new Parliament, (presumably the one for which he had refused to sign the writs), was also a non-starter. We have seen how the City government was swinging to the right. Even if an alliance had been possible, it would only have increased the likelihood of new bloodshed. (2) Fleetwood appears to have given up the ghost by this stage, realising that all was lost. On the 20th (the same day as he refused to authorise the signing of the writs for the new Parliament) he apparently sent word to Lambert asking him to come to London. He seems to have tried to secure a deal with the former 'enemy'. On 23 December he sent to some M.P.s, asking for a

(1) B.M. 669 f. 22 (51), The Monthly Intelligencer, December 1659-January 1660; Parliamentary Intelligencer, 19-26 December 1659.

meeting at the Speaker's House. They refused, upon which he wrote again

"to acquaint them that the doors of the House were open to them, to return to the exercise of their Trust, and the sooner they did it the better, because of the disordered posture the Nations were at present in." (1)

His colleagues, Disborowe, Berry and Ashfield were reported to be "in a mourning condition". (2) On 29 December Disborowe wrote a letter of submission to the Parliament and offered his assistance. He said he would pray that God would give them strength

"that such a Foundation of settlement may be laid by you as the children yet unborn may have cause to bless God for".

He pledged loyalty to the Commonwealth. (3) There was really nothing more he could say.

On 24 December, according to the newsbooks, the soldiers marched down Chancery Lane to Fleet Street and showed their obedience to their General, the Speaker, who stood at his door with Sir James Harrington and Colonel Thompson among others, both former members of the Committee of Safety. Okey, who had stood by the Rump and who had been involved along with Streater and others in the plot to seize the

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(2) Clarke Papers, IV, p. 220 which adds that Fleetwood wrote to the Speaker saying that the Lord "had blasted them and spitt in their faces", a bitter realisation that perhaps after all the Lord was not on their side. C.f. Wariston, Diary, III, p. 160.

(3) Publick Intelligencer, 26 December–2 January 1660; El011(5), A Letter sent from Col. John Disborowe.
Tower on 12 December,

"delivered the sense of all that followed him,
in a short but pithy speech, comparing their
return to that of the prodigal Child."

A march past then took place led by Okey's regiment, followed by Alured's and Markham's. Lt. Colonel Francis Allen led Sydenham's regiment which was followed by Hewson's, whose Colonel had played such a notorious part in suppressing the apprentices riot earlier in the month. The rest of the forces in London were on guard duty. The Speaker then went to the Tower which Lt. Colonel John Miller gave up to him. Miller had replaced Fitch, the Lt. of the Tower, after the latter's implication in the plot to seize it. The Speaker gave £25 to the soldiery. The Parliamentary Intelligencer commented

"methinks the soldiers may see in this what General
thy are likeliest to thrive best by."

a shrewed and apposite observation. One of the first acts of the restored Rump on 26 December was to vote one month's pay to the private soldiery. (1) On 29 December Monck wrote from Coldstream to the Speaker in reply to a letter of his of 22 December pledging "absolute Obedience" to the Parliament. He was still unaware that the Rump had returned. However, by 1 January he had received word that the Rump had been restored. (2)

(1) B.M. 669 f. 22(51), The Monthly Intelligencer, December 1659-January 1660; Parliamentary Intelligencer, 19-26 December 1659; Publick Intelligencer, 19-26 December; C.J., VII, p. 797. (Two days after voting a month's pay to the private soldiery the Rump likewise voted a month's pay to officers below the rank of Captain and to non-commissioned officers, perhaps a recognition of their efforts on behalf of the Rump earlier in the year and that these ranks together with the soldiery were now more important than the senior officers, ibid., p. 798; Clarke Ms. 32, f. 208v); Firth and Davies, pp. 343-344.

(2) O.P.H., XXII, pp. 39-41; Clarke Papers, IV, p. 237.
One final thing must be said about the way the Rump returned, and that is that the regiments of the senior officers adhering to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction either seized the initiative for themselves and declared for the Rump, or were so disillusioned and demoralised that they would not respond to the commands of their superiors. (1) As we shall see, in the next section, the same was true in the north. There it was reported that at the height of the phoney war

"some of both armies, though far asunder run to each other, and that the scoutes of both sydes lately mett and instead of fighting, shott their pistolls on the ground and friendly discoursed and parted. Indeed the soldyres generally say they will not fight, but will make a ring for their officers to fight in."

This story is supported by some other evidence in the Parliamentary Intelligencer which talks about the disintegration of Lambert's forces. It said that the soldiers say they would not fight against Monck "but leave their officers to dispute their own quarrel". (2) Wariston with a hint of naive incredulity says the

"under officers and sojourns would not stand be (by) their superiors no/us (the Committee of Safety). Thes thinges astonished us."

The officers of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction had spent too much time away from their regiments and had become so involved with politics in London, that they were out of touch with the feelings and opinions of their juniors and of the ranks. It could no longer just


(2) Clarke Papers, IV, p. 300; Parliamentary Intelligencer, 19-26 December 1659; Wariston, Diary, III, p. 160.
be assumed or taken for granted that the men would follow their superiors. The senior officers had thus, inadvertently, cut themselves off from their power bases and by so doing ultimately destroyed themselves politically. That was something Oliver Cromwell had never allowed to happen to himself.
In addition to securing pay for the soldiery one of the first acts of the Rump on 26 December was to appoint interim commissioners to govern the army until at least three of those appointed on 11 October arrived in London. These were Alexander Popham, Robert Thompson (a member of the late Committee of Safety), Thomas Scott, Okey, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Alured and Henry Markham. The quorum was to be three. On 28 December Weaver was added to their number. (1)

On 27 December the Rump ordered that no forces were to be raised except by the authority of Parliament and that all forces that had been raised during its interruption were to be disbanded. This was not to apply to Monck's forces. The Rump was re-asserting its claims to supremacy over the military, but at the same time realising the importance of Monck who was still Commander-in-Chief according to the commission given him in the name of the Council of State in November. This was only to be confirmed by the Rump on 23 January, an indication of its ambiguous attitude towards him. (2) Haselrig, Morley and Walton reached London on the 29th and resumed their jobs as army commissioners. Parliament asserted the right of the commissioners to be able to call courts martial and to appoint officers to the various regiments. (3)

The House soon got down to the business of an indemnity for the army. On 28 December a committee was set up to draft an

(1) C.J., VII, pp. 797, 798.
(2) ibid., pp. 797, 823; C.S.P.D. 1659-60, pp. 299, 301; Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 137-139.
(3) C.J., VII, pp. 800, 801.
An indemnity bill which was eventually passed on 2 January. A division was taken on whether to include Lambert. Haselrig and Neville voted in favour of including him, Weaver and Hutchinson against. The French ambassador said that Vane spoke in Lambert's favour in the House and that Fleetwood and Disborowe were only included in the indemnity with difficulty. (1) But the Rump was not in the mood for seeking revenge against individuals, a point in its favour. Later in January a Royalist was to characterise Haselrig's feelings on the subject thus, that his anger against them was much abated

"because as he frequently declared they were the true enemies to Charles Stuart, and true friends to a Commonwealth, how false soever they had been (blinded with their own ambition) to him and their fellow members." (2)

A new Council of State was elected on 31 December and 2 January. It included Haselrig and Monck as well as Morley who had been made a Colonel over the summer but purged by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in October. Walton who had been a garrison commander in the early 1650's and who was shortly to be given Disborowe's regiment, and Fagge, Morley's brother-in-law who had worked for the return of the Rump as commander of the Sussex militia and who was to receive a regiment in February. Ashley Cooper, also a member of the new Council, was soon to command Fleetwood's horse and Fairfax had of course been

(1) ibid., pp. 798, 802; Guizot, Richard Cromwell, II, pp. 323, 328; Davies, Restoration, pp. 260-261; Woolrych, Milton, p. 157.

Lord General. However, with the exception of Monck and possibly Morley none of these men had a predominantly military outlook. They were civilians who held military office incidentally.\(^{(1)}\)

In these early days of the re-restored Rump there was much anxiety about Lambert's intentions. In London it was feared that he might indeed march south. The City continued to take steps for its own safety including the raising of six regiments for its own defence.\(^{(2)}\)

In fact, as we have seen, his forces were already in a state of disintegration but this was not yet clear in London. On 27 December realising the precariousness of the situation, Lambert called a meeting of his officers to discuss their next move. According to one report no decision was reached as to whether they should march against Monck or else go southwards, presumably to try and intervene on behalf of the Committee of Safety and the army faction. Colonel Samuel Clarke who commanded a foot regiment in Flanders which had been recalled for service in England in August 1659 is reported to have been doubtful if Parliament would grant them an act of oblivion. Another report says that the meeting in fact decided to march on London and to call on their brethren and the congregated Churches to support their demands to the Parliament for liberty of conscience and indemnity. This would seem to suggest that they were more concerned with salvaging what they could rather than trying to make a stand on behalf of the Committee of Safety. Lambert must have realised that his day was over. Colonel Salmon had been sent northwards from London by the officers to inform

\(^{(1)}\) C.J., VII, pp. 800, 801; Firth and Davies, p. 503.

their colleagues in the north of the decision to allow the Rump to sit again. By 3 January it was reported that all the forces lately under Lambert had declared for the Rump and were returning to their quarters as on 20 October. Two days later Lambert was said to be at Northallerton with only 50 horse, the rest of his forces having dispersed and submitted to the Rump. He made his way privately to London. (1) Lilburne who had marched to seize York on 23 December to prevent it from being seized for the Rump gave up the city to Fairfax at the beginning of January. Lilburne, who was reported to have been "the only man that hath heightened Lambert" against the Rump and to have said

"that he hoped never a true Englishmen would name the Parliament again, and that he would have the house pulled down where they sat, for fear it should be infectious",

tried unsuccessfully to get Fairfax's force to subscribe to an engagement against a King and a single person before surrendering the city. (2)

Clearly he feared that intentions of some were not just limited to the return of the Rump.

Forces in other parts of the country also declared for the Rump. On 2 January Mark Grimes, governor of Cardiff, pledged support for the Parliament. Major Unton Crooke's troop of Berry's regiment which had been in the west and had already declared for the Rump in mid-December, drew up a declaration which was printed in Mercurius Politicus. In it they spoke out for civil and religious liberty, for

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(1) Clarke Ms. 32, ff. 200v, 210, 218v; B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f. 190; Publick Intelligencer, 26 December 1659–2 January 1660.

a free commonwealth without single person, King or Lords, and against
the interruption of the Parliament. They said they had no ill-feeling
against their fellow soldiers and called for differences to be resolved
by discussions. (1) Some of the ideals of the good old cause lived on,
at least with them. Hacker, Saunders, Major Nathaniel Barton and Major
Beke had seized Coventry for the Rump and Captain Clement Needham
amongst others had done the same in Leicester. The officers in Colonel
John Biscoe's company (under the command of Captain Lt. Thomas Andrews)
and Captain Daniel Nichols company sent in a declaration for the Parlia-
ment from Chester. Other companies of the regiment had been sent to
besiege Portsmouth but had defected to Haselrig and his associates.
Biscoe himself was replaced by George Fleetwood at the beginning of
February; why is not clear. Both Andrews and Nichols were kept on by
the Rump during the new year purge but in late February they were both
accused of having carried out orders of the Committee of Safety. (2)
From Lancashire there was a declaration from the foot regiment of the
Irish Brigade. One of the signatories, Thomas Shepherd, could well be
the same person as the agitator of that name who was one of the three
who appeared before the Commons in April 1647 and who was then a member
of Ireton's horse. (3)

Meanwhile the government soon got down to the task of
re-modelling the army. On 9 January the House voted that Lambert, now
in London, Disborowe, Ashfield, Berry, Kelsey, Cobbet, Barrow, Packer
and Creed should be ordered to leave the capital. On 13 January the

(1) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 293; Mercurius Politicus, 29 December
1659-5 January 1660.

(2) ibid.; H.M.C. Levborne-Popham, p. 157; C.J., VII, p. 829;
Firth and Davies, pp. 402-403.

(3) Mercurius Politicus, 29 December-5 January 1660; Clarke
Papers, I, pp. 430, 438.
Council of State also ordered Majors John Clarke of Gibbon's regiment, John Daberon of Okey's, John Gladman of Packer's, John Grimes of Sydenham's and Hezekiah Haynes of Fleetwood's, Colonels John Clarke, Hewson, Salmon and Swallow, Lt. Colonels Francis Allen of Sydenham's and John Miller of Fitch's, who had commanded the regiment after the attempt to seize the Tower at the end of December, and Captain Griffith Lloyd of Fleetwood's regiment, to leave the capital. Not all of them complied with these orders which had to be repeated later on. On 7 January, after a vote, Morley was appointed Lieutenant of the strategically important Tower of London.

On the same day the House voted against giving Ingoldsby Morley's old regiment. According to some of the secluded members, on 27 December Ingoldsby had promised to speak on their behalf in Parliament "and we believe he did". There were also suspicions that he was a crypto-Royalist. Haselrig is alleged to have charged him with participating in Booth's rising. The Royalists did indeed believe he was on their side. Ingoldsby had also been opposed to the oath of abjuration to be imposed on the Council of State, although he was by no means alone in his opposition; Monck refused it and on his arrival

(1) C.J., VII, pp. 805, 812; C.S.P.D. 1659-60, pp. 305, 308, 309, 328, 342. With the approach of the Restoration Disborowe tried to escape from England but was arrested by the Sheriff of Essex. He had not been a regicide so there was no threat to his life or property but he was regarded with obvious suspicion by the Restoration government and eventually fled to Holland. He returned in 1666 and died in 1680 (for full details of his life post-1660 q.v. D.N.B.). As for Fleetwood he was well away from London by the end of January and by the beginning of March he was at Feltwell, Norfolk, a somewhat broken man (Latham and Matthews (eds.), Diary of Samuel Pepys, I, p. 34 + n5; D.N.B.). Neither Disborowe nor Fleetwood attempted to join with Lambert in April and both played no part in politics after the collapse of the faction in December.

(2) C.J., VII, p. 805.
did not participate in the Council's proceedings. Ingoldsby's previous association with the Protectorate cannot have helped him either.\(^{(1)}\)

However, on 7 January the House read lists of various regiments which must have been prepared during the previous few days. The lists were of Okey's, Alured's, Unton Crooke's (late Berry's), Haselrig's (late Packer's), Rich's, Jeremiah Campfield's (late Lambert's but soon to become William Eyres's) and Streater's (late Hewson's) regiments.

The House did not get round to debating the lists until the 11th. On that day it passed Crooke's, making a number of changes. George Sedascue who as Adjutant-General had been purged in October by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, was made Major. One Nathaniel Whetham was given a troop. It is possible, as Firth and Davies suggest, that this is the same man as the governor of Portsmouth, but if so it seems a pretty small reward for his prominent part in restoring the Rump. His biographers are not at all helpful on this point. On 10 February Whetham, the governor of Portsmouth, was given a regiment which seems to have been made up of companies in the Portsmouth garrison and surrounding areas. It is conceivable that Monck with whom he had served as a councillor in Scotland under the Protectorate, and who was also his friend, was influential in getting him this post.\(^{(2)}\)

On 12 January the House voted that Valentine Walton should have Morley's regiment but changed its mind and gave him Disborowe's instead. The Captains of the regiment, which had been in the north

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\(^{(1)}\) ibid., loc. cit.; Clarendon State Papers, III, pp. 489, 650-51; E1011(4), A Brief Narrative; Baker, Chronicle, p. 678.

at the time of the coup against Parliament and which had served under Lambert before its defection, were drastically purged. Major Robert Huntington who had resigned his commission in Cromwell's horse regiment in 1648, was made Major in place of John Blackmore. The only Captain who kept his place was Edward Scotten, one of the regiment's elected officers in 1647, despite the fact that he had adhered to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. (1) Okey, who had remained loyal to the Rump during the autumn crisis, was restored to his regiment and John Daberont, who had not, was replaced by Richard Wagstaffe as Major. Robert Rose and William Eyres were brought into the regiment and William Lynley was dropped. (2) Alured also returned to his command. The officers of his regiment had not been finalised before the October coup because of the resignation of Theopholus Hart as Major and because of various charges of favouring government by a single person brought against William Goffe. In January 1660 Christopher Alured and James Strangeways who had been under consideration for commissions in the regiment in October were given Captaincies. (3) In Haselrig's regiment (late Packer's) Gladman, Barrington and Hunter, who had been purged by Cromwell in 1658 but reinstated the following year, were once again removed and replaced by new men including Haselrig's son Robert. There were considerable changes in the more junior ranks and among the N.C.O.s. (4) Campfield had been created Colonel of Lambert's

(1) C.J., VII, pp. 808-809; Clarke Papers, I, p. 433; ibid., IV, p. 146; Firth and Davies, pp. 208-209.

(2) C.J., VII, pp. 697-698, 809. Firth and Davies (p. 300) wrongly suggest that Richard Ward was new to the regiment in January 1660. He had previously been Captain Lt. (C.J., VII, p. 697).

(3) C.J., VII, pp. 749, 809; C.S.P.D. 1659-60, pp. 202-203, 239. Firth and Davies (p. 195) are thus somewhat inaccurate in describing Alured and Strangeways as new.

(4) C.J., VII, pp. 693, 810.
foot regiment when the latter was cashiered on 12 October but on 12 January the House decided to give the regiment to William Eyres who had been a Leveller in 1649. Campfield became Lt. Colonel again. Christopher Skipper became the Major. Richard Elton who had signed the Derby petition and who had once been Lt. Colonel of the regiment was reduced to the rank of Ensign. Thomas Spilman, the Captain Lt. who had adhered to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, was also purged and replaced by a new man, James Cleaver. (1) Streater's regiment (late Hewson's) was also extensively purged. The Lt. Colonel, John Duckenfield who adhered to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, was replaced by George Weldon. The Major retained his place but five of the eight Captains were removed. (2) In Ashley Cooper's regiment (late Fleetwood's) Hezekiah Haynes, the Major, and Captain Griffith Lloyd together with three other Captains were purged. Thomas Izod who had been removed the previous summer was made Major and four new Captains were brought into the regiment. One of them was Peter Betsworth who had been governor of Calshot Castle in 1649. Some time in the course of his command articles were presented against him for scandalous misdemeanours including swearing, drunkenness, giving malignants places of trust and allowing one Samuel Dexter to preach weekly in the castle although he had been charged with drunkenness. Betsworth allegedly made the soldiers contribute to Dexter's up-keep.

(1) C.J., VII, pp. 680-681, 810, 815-816; Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 53, 146.

out of their pay. Baxter himself was charged with singing bawdy ranting songs, denouncing Cromwell and drinking to Charles Stuart and with instructing men how they could drink for 24 hours and not get drunk! (1) Rich who had not been dismissed by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in October was retained but there were some changes in his regiment. Breman remained as Major. John Toombes, who had been cashiered for his part in Overton's 'plot' but restored in 1659, was made Captain, and John Gregory, who had likewise been cashiered in 1655 when a Quater Master and restored in 1659 as a Cornet, became Captain Lt. The reference given by Firth and Davies to suggest that Rich's appointment was opposed does not support their argument. On 29 December the House had voted to thank Rich and Breman for their efforts on behalf of the Commonwealth. (2) On 27 January the House considered Hacker's regiment whose Colonel had remained loyal to the Rump and who had worked actively for its return. The Captains were changed. Captain Clement Needham was brought back and the former agitator Nicholas Lockyer removed. The Major, William Hobart, was also restored. (3) On the same day Pitch's foot regiment (late Fleetwood's) was dealt with. Samuel Gooday, who had been in Fairfax's foot in 1647 but had left the army because he was willing to accept Parliament's terms for the Irish service, became Lt. Colonel, and Christopher Copperthwaite, who appears to

(1) C.J., VII, p. 817; Clarke Papers, IV, p. 147; Bodl. Rawlinson Ms., A26, ff. 430, 431; S.P. 28/61, f. 690; Firth and Davies, pp. 98-99.

(2) C.J., VII, pp. 799, 817; C.S.P.D. 1658-59, p. 387; Firth and Davies, p. 156.

(3) C.J., VII, pp. 669, 824; Firth and Davies, p. 237.
have come from outside the regiment, became Major. Of the seven Captains only three were kept on. (1) In Moss's regiment, passed on 1 February, three Captains were purged including Ralph Prentice, one of the regiment's agitators in 1647. Another agitator from 1647, Nicholas Andrews, remained as Lt. Colonel. (2) In Herbert Morley's regiment four Captains were purged and one James Priest (Priece) was promoted to the Majority. (3) Sir John Lenthall's regiment (late Sydenham's) was extensively purged. John Mill, who had been Colonel until the summer of 1659 and who had supported Richard Cromwell, was restored to the regiment as Lt. Colonel. The Major, John Grimes, was replaced by Robert Linson, and only one of the seven Captains was retained. Their places were taken by new men as the Lieutenants and Ensigns remained largely the same. (4) Sydenham himself a supporter of the Protectorate, but closely allied with Lambert in opposing kingship and then an important figure in the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, had been expelled from the House on 17 January for his part in the coup. (5) In George Fleetwood's regiment (late Biscoe's) the Major, Mathew Cadwell, was replaced by Henry Gold, a newcomer, and five of the seven Captains were purged; as in other regiments they tended to be replaced by new men rather than by internal promotion. (6)

(1) C.J., VII, pp. 668, 824; Firth and Davies, p. 325.
(2) C.J., VII, pp. 701-702, 829.
(3) ibid., pp. 677, 781, 829.
(4) ibid., pp. 683, 829.
(5) ibid., p. 813.
(6) ibid., pp. 682, 829.
Even after Monck's arrival in London the commissioners for the army continued the purge. On 8 February Smithson's regiment (late Lilburne's) was dealt with. Smithson had been instrumental in ensuring that most of the regiment defected to Monck and the latter recommended as early as 12 January that he be given command of the regiment. In the new list Thomas Strangeways was made Major and Thomas Lilburne, a keen supporter of the Protectorate who had been purged the previous summer, was restored. Captain William Peverel whose troop had adhered to Robert Lilburne at the end of the year was kept on. The suggestions of Thomas Lilburne about some of the appointments to the regiment appear to have been taken up by Haselrig and his fellow commissioners. Monck made further changes to the regiment later in the month. (1) Alterations were also made to Lilington's regiment in Flanders. George Fiennes was restored to the Majority he had lost the previous summer, and George Fitz Williams, the former governor of Mardyke, was restored but only as an Ensign, not as a Captain. (2)

On 10 February the Rump passed the final three regimental lists, those of George Twisleton's (late Miller's), Saunders' (late Swallow's) and Whetham's which, as has been said, was made up of companies from Portsmouth and surrounding area. George Twisleton was possibly the brother of Philip who had commanded a regiment serving in Scotland at the time of the coup. He was not in Scotland at that


(2) C.J., VII, pp. 836–837. Firth and Davies (p. 691) wrongly say that Fiennes was only restored in March by Monck.
time and appears to have remained neutral. Monck appointed Clobery in his place, an appointment confirmed by the Rump on its return. (1) In George Twisleton’s regiment Miller was kept on despite his adherence to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. Three of the other Captains were retained although Monck made changes later in the month. (2) Saunders was made Colonel of Swallow’s late regiment because Monck had been forced to fill up the vacancies in his old regiment during his march south. Saunders had been restored to his old regiment after Richard Cromwell’s fall, but he had not joined it as it was serving in Scotland. In Saunders’s new regiment the Major was Nathaniel Barton purged in November from Saunders’ old regiment in which he likewise held the Majority. Captain Daniel Dale kept his place as did Lt. Richard Ireland but the other officers appear to have been replaced. (3)

The purge carried out by the Rump was substantial but not as extensive as Ludlow claimed. (4) One of the important features to emerge is that by and large the new Captains were new men who do not appear to have had any previous connexion with the various regiments to which they were appointed, or in many cases even with the army. It is possible that they were brought in from militia regiments and that the army commissioners may have felt that they would be more reliable.

(1) For George Twisleton q.v. Firth and Davies, pp. 345-346 and the note by W. D. Pink in Notes and Queries, 8th Series, January 1894, p. 28.

(2) C.J., VII, p. 838; Firth and Davies, p. 346.

(3) C.J., VII, pp. 713, 839. Firth and Davies (p. 229) are incorrect to say that only one of the old officers kept his place. For Saunders and Barton q.v. biographical appendix.

(4) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 204.
and loyal to the Rump. There was very little internal promotion within the regiments. Together with the gulf between officers and men that had already developed these changes further undermined the cohesion of the regiments and reduced even more their corporate identity and thus their potential to be the sort of political units or soviets they had been in 1647–1649.

On his march south Monck also made some changes in the various regiments under his command. Hugh Bethel, a Yorkshireman, who had been governor of Scarborough until the spring of 1649, was given Lambert's horse and Smithson was, as we have seen, given Robert Lilburne's regiment. In Lambert's horse regiment Monck brought back Major William Goodrick who had been dropped the previous summer. He was the man who Robert Lilburne had considered "much a new Royalist" in 1657. Monck also purged Joseph Pease, Adam Baynes's brother-in-law and one of his correspondents, Thomas Spilman, Robert Salmon, Thomas Lowell, Thomas Paul and one Bright. (1) Unlike his purges in Scotland Monck did not allow those ousted to keep their arms and he ordered the seizure of the arms and horses of those dismissed from Lambert's regiment. (2)

Some of those who had served under Lambert did not know how they would fare with the restored Rump and Monck's march into England. On 4 January Robert Baynes wrote to his brother Adam from York saying that he and his comrades did not know how they would stand in Parliament's reckoning but that the officers and soldiers would stick close by the

(1) B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f. 193.

(2) ibid., f. 194.
Parliament if it should so wish to employ them. He asked Adam to use his influence to this end if he could. Robert Baynes was being totally unrealistic. The division between the Rump and the adherents of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, whether active or merely passive, was too great just to be brushed aside or papered over as easily as he thought. In addition to the naivety one can also detect a certain degree of self-interest behind the request. Robert Baynes had devoted his career to the army and clearly must have felt worried about his job and his financial interests. He also failed to realise that his brother had been one of the first persons purged by the Rump.

Monck seems to have had it in for Ashfield's regiment. The regiment had served in Scotland until May 1659 when it was ordered to the north of England. The Colonel had been absent from the regiment for a long time and during the late 1650's he was, as we have seen, quite active in politics in London. During the troubles under Richard Cromwell Monck had written to the Protector saying that if Ashfield and Lt. Colonel Gough were sent back to Scotland they "could signify as little as any two officers in Scotland". In 1660 Monck dismissed all the officers except the Major, Henry Dorney. This did not come as a surprise to the members of the regiment, one of whose members was Robert Baynes. On 14 January he wrote to his brother that it was expected any day that all the officers would be dismissed and the

(1) ibid., f. 191.
(2) c.f., ibid., f. 203.
(3) Thurloe, VII, p. 638.
soldiers dispersed to other regiments. He said that Monck was very much incensed against the regiment. Robert thought this understandable as the regiment "was more not lesse guilty than many others" in the late disturbances. Four of the regiment's companies at Newcastle had already been purged and divided up and Baynes felt that the other six companies could expect the same treatment when Monck moved further south. (1)

On 14 January Monck authorised Colonel Thomas Morgan, who had been serving in Flanders until late 1658 but who still had a regiment of dragoons in Scotland, to take command of those regiments not going to London with him. These were Bethel's, Smythson's, the Irish brigade, Charles Fairfax's, Samuel Clarke's, the six companies of Ashfield's, and one of Salmon's. He was instructed to remodel them and discharge such men as need be. Morgan was eventually ordered back to Scotland to take command there. He did not arrive there until late February, despite the fact that his commission to command in Scotland was dated 25 January. The uncertain military situation in the north of England probably accounts for his delay. Nevertheless, the fact that Monck left Scotland without a replacement Commander-in-Chief during these critical weeks suggests either a great deal of trust in the Scots or else that he was taking a chance on their quiescence. (2)

Robert Baynes gives us some very useful information about what was happening in the north during Monck's march. On 14 January he reported that

(1) B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f. 195.

(2) Clarke Ms. 49 (Monck's Order Book), sub. 14 January; Firth and Davies, pp. 311-312; Dow, D. Phil., pp. 634-635.

Morgan had made his way to Scotland after the October coup. His dragoons soon became a regiment of horse (Firth and Davies, p. 312).
"all the officers in these parts ye were dismissed at the last change and some ye were laid aside in (1648) and others are earnestly soliciting for commands and are not without great hopes to accomplish their desire. For my owne part I shall be very willing to relieve myself if it be the parlement pleasure to have it see and shall be glad if the nacon be preserved in peace who ever be the instruments but to me its a paradox yt persons who the other day were layd aside for being see hott for a kingly government should now be thought the fittest persons to support the interests of the parliment and commonweall." (1)

It should have been quite obvious to him what the activity of those seeking places meant. There is a general feeling of fatalism running throughout the letter, a feeling which must have been shared by many in the aftermath of the events of the last few weeks. The re-emergence of a confident right-wing consisting of people who at best were advocates of government by a single person and at worst of a Restoration was appreciated, but there was a feeling of helplessness in the face of it. At the end of January Baynes wrote that the cavaliers and supporters of a free Parliament were working hard to procure arms and horses

"and are not without hopes of finding some friends lately crept into the Armie."

He added that Major Goodrick had been to see Fauconberg before setting off for London to receive his commission. He concluded

"I wish the parliament doe not take too many that will but act coldly to their interest if occasion be." (2)

The question of the justification for Monck's march into England is problematic. Professor Woolrych rightly points out that he

(1) B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f. 195.
(2) ibid., f. 201.
crossed the Tweed without any specific orders from the restored Rump. (1) It was only on 6 January that it was decided that he be specifically asked to come up to London and a letter was sent to him to this end the following day. (2) What is beyond doubt is that Monck was determined to make himself a key figure in subsequent attempts at settlement. His actions since the October coup had been directed towards seeing a return of the Rump, but as we have seen he made it clear that this would not be an unconditional return; the Parliament would have to adhere to its decision to dissolve itself by May 1660. He set out from Coldstream uncertain as to how he would be received, (3) but determined that the 'tyranny' of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction should not be replaced by the 'tyranny' of the Rump. It is extremely unlikely that he came to England with any preconceived plans or even vague commitment to restore the Stuarts. His temperament and his leisurely pace southwards, during which time he took every opportunity to acquaint himself with opinion in the country, show that this was not the case. During the next few months Monck displayed an ability to follow the prevailing wind; first with the Rump, then with the City and secluded members, and finally for a Restoration. There was nothing subtle or scheming in this, it just happened that way. A man with more cunning and ambition could have ensured a different outcome.

Much of the prestige for ending the imagined threat of military rule and for restoring the Rump accrued to Monck. This was

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(3) Gumble, Monck, p. 187.
apparent on his march south. He became a focus for attention and for hopes. It was not just Royalists who expected things from him. The Rumpers too realised his importance as de facto head of the army. On 16 January the House voted that a letter be drawn up saying that it was glad Monck was moving to London. Scott and Robinson were instructed to go to Monck, ostensibly to congratulate him but no doubt to get a clearer picture of his intentions and hopefully to try and influence him as well. The likelihood of tension between Monck and some of the Rumpers was apparent to the French ambassador. (1) Two other persons also went to meet Monck, Whetham, the governor of Portsmouth and Clarges who brought with him a list of the quarters of the forces in London which he had managed to obtain from Quater Master General John Butler. (2) Using this information it was decided to draw up a letter to the Speaker requesting the removal of all the regiments in London to new quarters. Only Morley's and Fagg's were to be excepted. We rely on Phillips for this account; which regiment he has in mind when he refers to Fagg's is unclear. It seems that a regiment made up of loose companies from other regiments came up with Haselrig and Morley from Portsmouth, probably under the command of William Farley. Farley had been Lt. Colonel of Morley's regiment (a regiment of which he became Colonel over the summer of 1659. It had previously been Ludlow's - until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief in Ireland - Goffe's and Oliver Cromwell's). He had been a member of the regiment since before


(2) Baker, Chronicle, p. 679.
1647. Both he and Morley had been purged by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in October. Morley, and presumably Farley, had been instrumental in ensuring the defection of Portsmouth to the Rump. On 3 January the House ordered that a month's pay be given to Farley's regiment, one of those that had come up from Portsmouth. Fagg, a Sussex gentlemen not previously a member of the army but Morley's brother-in-law, had attempted to raise forces on behalf of the Rump in Sussex in December but had been arrested. On 25 February he was appointed Colonel of the regiment under Farley's command which had come up from Portsmouth. Farley had in the meantime been reinstated as Morley's Lt. Colonel (1 February). It could be that Phillips is muddled about the date of Fagg's appointment and that he means that Monck requested that Morley's and the regiment nominally under Farley should remain in London. (1) For this reason the two regiments must have been considered relatively uncontaminated by the Lambert/Disborowe/ Fleetwood faction. The regiments which were to leave London (Okey's, Haselrig's, Cooper's and Rich's of the horse; Eyres', Markham's, Streater's, the regiment late Fleetwood's, presumably the one now Fitch's, Moss's and Fitch's, now Twisleton's, of the foot) had their new quarters pretty widely scattered, so that communications between the regiments and even within regiments would be extremely difficult, unlike 1647. The letter to the Speaker contained two lists, the one of the regiments

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(1) ibid., loc. cit.; C.J., VII, pp. 803, 807, 829; Clarke Papers, IV, p. 188; Firth and Davies pp. 507-509. Firth and Davies are themselves a bit muddled about Farley. The account cited does not square with their account of Farley's career on pp. 334-335.
to leave London, the other a list of those regiments accompanying Monck and the quarters that were to be given them. Monck's forces comprised his own horse and foot regiments, Cloberry's, Read's, Lydcott's and Hubblethorne's. Lydcott was eventually chosen to deliver the letter possibly because he was a kinsman of the Speaker. On 30 January the House approved Monck's request after rejecting Haselrig's suggestion on behalf of the Council of State that only four regiments leave London and only four of Monck's seven enter the capital.\(^{(1)}\) The request was very significant. With Monck and his force present in London and regiments whose commanders had been consistently loyal to the Rump, such as Okey and Streater, removed from it, Monck would be in a position to hold all the military cards in his hand should any confrontation arise with the Rump.

However, the withdrawal of the regiments from London did not take place without trouble. This was caused by lack of pay and was confined to the foot regiments. It started on 1 February among either Twisleton's or Eyres' (late Lambert's) regiments at a rendezvous in St. James's. An officer struck a soldier for offensive behaviour and the soldier retaliated, at which point a general mutiny or riot broke out with the soldiers saying

"they would have mony first and that they would see their officers hanged first else they would march without mony, neither would they goe to their gards. Some cried Lett us hang up our officers, some said, Letts teare their cloathes from of their backs and stript them naked."

The intervention of the Colonel was unavailing. The next day the mutiny spread to the troops quartered around Somerset House. Here the trouble was started by an old man and his two sons who were loath to leave London. Sir John Lenthal and Colonel Eyres played important parts in putting down the mutiny. But the officers generally were afraid; petrified by the venom of the men. Drink seems to have been important in stirring up the men and Lenthal ordered that no more drink be delivered to the soldiery and asked that two members of each company should come and confer with him. This seemed to divide the mutineers and reduced their numbers to about 100. However, Presbyterian elements from the City tried to exploit the trouble and to turn the mutiny into an act of revolt against the Rump and one in favour of a free Parliament, even of a Restoration. Some of the soldiers were invited to the 'Cardinals Hat' where certain "citizens of quality" promised them money if they would move into the City. The next morning the apprentices attempted to mount a demonstration which was suppressed by Farley's regiment (who was now commanding it is unclear. Fagg did not take over until later in the month). The newsbooks boasted that a massacre had been avoided. The Rump's quick decision on 2 February to vote a month's pay to Twisleton's and Lenthal's regiments took the heat out of the situation and the regiments involved in the disturbances marched from London. The trouble so alarmed the Rump that at its height they sent Scott to Monck to ask him to march into London without delay, but
he saw no reason to bring forward his march. The ringleaders of the mutiny were arrested and examined. A sergeant and eight soldiers were singled out for punishment. Four were sentenced to death but sentence was only carried out on two after lots had been cast. The other offenders were all whipped. Monck was re-asserting his authority in no uncertain terms. The affair had shown just how far discipline had been eroded during the past few months. These justifiable material grievances prompted no raising of the level of political consciousness among the men as in 1647. Judged against those earlier political activities and the previous military glories of the army it was a sad decline from a once great military body.

There was also trouble in Cockrane's regiment at Gravesend. This regiment had been one of the three regiments recalled from Flanders the previous August to help suppress Booth's rising. In November part of the regiment had been quartered at Gloucester along with some of Berry's which placed quite a strain on the city. The inhabitants were expected to provide both board and lodging. The corporation took up the matter with the Committee of Safety. It seems as if Cockrane and his fellow officers had condoned this and in January the Council of


(2) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 357; Rugge, p. 42.
State hinted at fraudulent behaviour on their part. Cockrane and possibly some others were cashiered, although it is not clear if this was for financial impropriety or for adhering to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. Part of the regiment was ordered to return to Dunkirk and while quartered at Gravesend they mutinied over pay. They also demanded the reinstatement of their old officers. Two of the soldiers (that magic number again) were sent to Monck to request the return of their old officers but he told them bluntly that

"their business was but to carry a Musquet or Pike under what officers soever, that they must submit to them the Parliament set over them, that in so doing he should cherish them but if they should fail in their obedience he should take strict course to reduce them to it."

Monck ordered Lt. Colonel Campfield of Eyres' regiment, one of those which had complied with the order to leave London and which was quartered in Kent, to suppress the mutiny. According to one report Campfield said to his men

"that they had now an occasion providentially bestowed on them, whereby they might justifie that their late disorder (i.e. in adhering to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction) proceeded only out of distemper, and not disaffection to the Parli(ment)."

Some people were obviously ready to sacrifice honour to prove themselves loyal to the authorities even if this meant turning upon their erstwhile colleagues and friends. This was an attitude that was to increase up to and after the Restoration. With the mutiny quelled the men were transported to Dunkirk and those of the old officers who had not already
been dismissed were so then. The mutineers themselves were disbanded. (1)
These mutinies, especially the ones in London, as with the use of armed
force to put down the apprentice riots in early December, could not
help but alienate the civilian population even more from what it
conceived of as an already over-pressive military presence in the
nation.

Monck finally entered London on 3 February and was greeted
by the Speaker. He refused to take the abjuration oath and thus to sit
on the Council of State which aroused the suspicions of Haselrig and
his associates despite Monck's constant reiterance of loyalty to the
Parliament. Monck was in an anomalous position. The House had by
this time confirmed him as Commander-in-Chief but showed a reluctance
to treat him as such. Haselrig was even said to have been unable to
stand anyone calling him "General" in the House. This attitude did
not go unnoticed. The French ambassador said that Monck tended to be
treated like one of the seven commissioners appointed to govern the
army on 12 October and that it was even said that his commission as
Commander-in-Chief had ceased with his arrival in London. Bordeaux
shrewdly observed that if his authority regarding the army was only
as one of the commissioners

"His power is very different, as the troops recognise
him as their only leader, and all parties look upon
him as the man upon whom depends the establishment
or the ruin of the Government."

(1) H.M.C. Mss. of the Duke of Beaufort etc., pp. 517-518;
C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 321; Publick Intelligence, 30
January-6 February 1660; Parliamentary Intelligence,
30 January-6 February 1660, 6-13 February 1660; Guizot,
Richard Cromwell, II, p. 343; Hugue, p. 37; Firth and
which alleges that the mutineers at Gravesend declared for
a free Parliament.
Even the foreign ambassadors were said to be courting him. What must have caused so much resentment to Haselrig was the point that had been made so obvious during the mutinies in London, namely that the Rump for all its pretensions was still very much dependent on the army and its de facto leader, George Monck.

Monck's importance was buttressed by his attendance in the House on 6 February. He was received with great solemnity, in a manner befitting a foreign ambassador as the Venetian envoy described it. Soldiers were also present in the palace of Westminster. His speech in reply to that of the Speaker made a number of political assumptions. He flattered himself that he had been in some measure instrumental in restoring the Rump. He told the House that on his journey south despite all the addresses made to him urging him to declare for a free Parliament he had upheld the authority of the Rump. He went on to make a few points which some of the Rumpers found offensive. He suggested that the fewer oaths and engagements that were imposed the easier it would be to reach a settlement, a clear reference to the abjuration oath. Drawing upon what he had observed about the mood of the political nation he said

"I know all the sober Gentry will close with you, if they may be tenderly and gently used."

He urged that neither the "cavalier" nor "phanatick" parties should have any share in government, military or civilian. Monck was advocate—

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(2) C.S.P.V. 1659-61, pp. 115-116.
ing a swing to the right, but in a sense he was reiterating Cromwell's policy of healing and settling, although he was of course no Cromwell. He also requested that care should be taken to settle the government of both Scotland and Ireland and especially to satisfy the adventurers in Irish land. (1) Scott and others were alleged to have remarked that Monck "seemed to affect Popularity" with the speech, and there is something in this. Whatever one may feel about Monck's political talents, or lack of them, he did at least have the ability to gauge the temperature of the country and to fall in line behind it. However, their other allegation that the speech gave "the Cavaliers a possibility of being received into the exercise of Trust" is not borne out by the speech. (2) But speculation about his motives continued. On 11 February John Baynes wrote from Leith that he hoped the malignants' expectations of Monck "will if not already vanish as a cloud". He said he had heard Monck declare often and convincingly against a single person and Restoration.

"However, he hath been aspersed lately and indeed itt was exceeding ill done of some that I can name that gave out that report that he was upon a cavaleir designe and that itt was the 2nd part of Sir Geo. Booth." (3)

It did not take long for a crisis between the Rump and Monck to blow up. The cause was to be the City of London. The sequence of events has been well covered by both the late Godfrey Davies

(2) ibid., p. 684.
(3) B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 425, f. 203.
and Professor Woolrych. (1) The crisis marks a decisive stage in the developments of January-May 1660 in that it turned Monck and a significant number of his officers against the Rump. They resented being used merely as the tools of the Rump. Their action in tearing down the defences of the City could be interpreted by civilians as yet a further manifestation of arbitrary military might, especially at a time when Monck was trying to project himself and the army as being upholders of liberty. According to Gumble some of the officers felt that Lambert had been right

"and would discourse; That they feared the Parliament would enforce them to follow his Methods." (2)

The outcome of the Parliament's request for the army to occupy the City and then to pull down the gates and portcullises was the army's letter to the House of 11 February.

After the initial move into the City Monck was made aware of the distaste of his fellow officers for their orders. Two of them were said to have informed him that the Council of State was growing jealous of him. Gumble implies that the two were Morley and Fagge. (3)

On 10 February the Council of State had recommended to Parliament that Alured be appointed Major General of London, which could be interpreted as an anti-Monck move. (4) Hubblethome, who had taken over Talbot's regiment serving in Scotland in November, was said to have especially

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(2) Gumble, Monck, p. 240.
(4) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 354.
resented the order to march into the City. The nominating commissioners had wanted to reduce him from Major to Captain the previous summer, so there must have been no love lost between the new established Colonel and some of those in power. (1) Two officers who somewhat surprisingly are mentioned as being in favour of a stand against the Rump are Saunders and Barton. Both men had remained loyal to the Rump over the autumn and Saunders had of course been one of the Three Colonels. Phillips goes so far as to suggest that both men inclined towards a readmission of the secluded members at this stage. (2)

Monck decided to call a meeting of a dozen or so of his senior officers, mostly men who had served under him in Scotland, to decide on a course of action. On 11 February a letter to Parliament was drawn up which as Professor Woolrych has said "was nothing less than an ultimatum". (3) The army was once again acting in an unambiguous political fashion. Only now, for the first time, its aims were in line with those of a majority in the nation, a very important distinction from the previous year. The letter reminded the Rump that the army, meaning really the army in Scotland, had been responsible for its sitting once again. However, the authors were afraid

"that the late wonderful and unparalleled Deliverance, is not so publickly and solemnly acknowledged as it might be."

Exception was taken to the fact that Lambert and Vane amongst others were still tolerated in London, indeed that Lambert seemed to be

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(1) Baker, Chronicle, p. 684; Firth and Davies, p. 467.

(2) For further important details about Saunders and Barton, in 1659 and 1660 q.v. biographical appendix.

"winked at", and that the purge of officers who had adhered to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction was not as thorough as it should have been. Any extension of the abjuration oath was rejected. Priase God Barebones' petition (presented to Parliament on 9 February) which had advocated such an extension was condemned. There was a plea for curbs on religious toleration. The authors did not want to "incur the censure of unjust Rigidity", but they did not want to permit "corrupt designs" to be carried on under the guise of liberty of conscience. This was in effect casting aside one of the main components of the good old cause. There followed the main demand, namely a call for recruiter elections. The qualifications were to be left to Parliament but those who actually fought against the Parliament and those who had declared their disaffection to it ought to be excluded. Was this to apply to "phanaticks" as well as "cavaliers"? The writs for these elections were to be issued within six days, a guarantee that Monck had already given to appease the City. The Rump was reminded about its pledge to dissolve itself and to set up a succession of Parliaments of the people's own election. Whether or not this was to mean freely elected Parliaments was not made clear. To make sure that the Rump did not miss the point, the letter concluded that the present guards assigned to the Parliament would continue but that the rest of the forces would be drawn into the City

"that we may have the better Opportunity to compose spirits, and beget a good Understanding in that great City, formerly renowned for their resolute adhering to Parliamentary Authority; and we hope that the same Spirit will be found still to breathe amongst the best, most considerable, and interested Persons there."
The letter was signed by Monck and 14 others including Saunders, Barton, and Daniel Redman, who had played a leading part in ensuring the defection of the Irish brigade from Lambert, the only officers in the group who were not members of the Scottish regiments. In the events leading up to the Restoration Monck's decision to ally himself with the City against the Rump is crucial. It could have been no secret to him that opinion in the City was favourable to the return of the secluded members, a free Parliament, and ultimately a restoration of the Stuarts. Monck was slipping into line with mainstream feeling in the country. (1) Lydcott and Clobery were instructed to present the letter to the House. (2) Clobery had been one of the three commissioners sent to treat with the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in November. By February 1660 he was working for a Restoration. Sir John Barwick approached him for information about feeling in the army. As to Monck himself, Barwick felt, significantly, that he "will venture no further than he knows they (the army) will follow". (3)

Parliament's reaction to the letter is well-known. On the afternoon of 11 February it voted to appoint five commissioners to govern the army, Haselrigg, Walton, Morley, Monck and Alured. The latter was apparently a compromise candidate instead of Overton and Ashley Cooper. A move to ensure that Monck was always one of the quorum of three was defeated. Haselrigg, Marten and Neville were the main figures

(3) Firth and Davies, pp. 171-172; C. Clar. S.P., IV, p. 550.
behind this snub to Monck. These votes only served to push Monck further into the embrace of the City. That night saw the roasting of the Rump. This incident greatly alarmed members of the Rump. Monck was asked to provide a guard for the safety of the Parliament and to attend the Council of State on the 13th. In fact, he declined to attend. He said that his officers and some eminent citizens had dissuaded him from leaving the City for fear of its safety. It was a very transparent excuse. On 14 February the Council of State instructed Alured to guard the Parliament and passed an indemnification of Alured and Okey.

On 12 February the Council of State directed a letter to the various garrisons in England about the events of the past few days. It emphasised that Monck was "unchangeably fixed and resolved to adhere to the Parliament" despite the rumours circulating that he favoured a free Parliament. The letter was prompted by knowledge that there was a steady correspondence between the City and the provinces. The garrison commanders were urged to deny these rumours and to prevent disturbances.

Addresses on behalf of the secluded members continued to reach Monck during this time. There were also riots in support of a free Parliament, or even of a Restoration, in some provincial areas. One of these riots was in Bristol where a somewhat similar incident

(2) C.S.P.D. 1659-60, pp. 359, 362; Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 261-262.
(3) E.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 363.
to that in London at the beginning of the month appears to have taken place. Soldiers who were ordered to march from the city to make way for new forces rioted because they had not been paid. Cries for a free Parliament were interspersed with demands for pay. The apprentices appear to have joined in with demands for a free Parliament as well. As a result Okey, one of the most consistent supporters of the Rump, was dispatched to Bristol to suppress the trouble.(1)

In Yorkshire the most considerable persons in the county, and some from outside, including Sir Horatio Townsend of Norfolk and Thomas Wharton of Lincoln, met and drew up an address calling for the readmission of the secluded members, and if not, then for a free Parliament. The two senior officers present in York, Morgan, who was about to leave to take up his duties in Scotland, and Charles Fairfax, heard about the petition and went along to see the contrivers of it to get it stopped. They felt it was of "dangerous consequence" and threatened the peace of the nations. Their advice and caution went unheeded. This was not surprising because, although there were units present in and around York, their quarters were widely scattered. This might have been in keeping with Monck's policy of dividing up the regiments to try and prevent communications. If so it showed the dangers of such a policy in a time of possible emergency. In Yorkshire there were also few officers around to command the men. Those who had been commissioned by the Rump had not yet shown up, particularly Bethel, Goodrick and

Strangeways. Fresh commissions for the officers had not yet arrived either. All this made Morgan comment that things could not

"be in a good posture till such time commissions come down for them and the respective officers enter to the discharge of their duty."

There was also the problem of money, or rather the lack of it, to pay for the army. This last point was given even more immediacy because the signatories of the Yorkshire declaration had threatened a taxpayers' strike if their demands were not met. Morgan's assessment was supported by Robert Baynes who feared that with Morgan's departure for Scotland, Smithson's continued absence and Charles Fairfax as the most senior officer "all will not be well for want of some stirring person to command". Baynes felt it was time somebody did something to prevent ruin. On 20 February he wrote that if only those officers who had been discharged by Monck were allowed to return to their charges,

"it would abundantly please most of the private sdes (soldiers) in these parts and under yt conduct would stick very close to the P(arliament) wch under new officers will be wavering under uncertaintie to what new interest they shall be drawne."

News of the letter of 11 February had also reached York and as a result the chief officers, military and civilian, ordered bonfires to be lit and bells to be rung. Baynes said this troubled some of the private soldiery. Some townspeople also drank the King's health openly. Others drank to Monck saying that he was the cause of their joy. Baynes added "Sadd dayes seeme to threaten". (1)

Baynes was probably being over-optimistic about the reactions of the soldiery. Apathy seems more likely to have ruled amongst them. But the situation in York as described in his letters shows why the Council of State was so concerned about the effects of rumours in the provinces and why it was calling on the garrisons to fulfil the modern role of the media. Correspondingly, the lack of any active role by the 'pulpit' in this respect is noteworthy. The letters of Baynes and Morgan also reveal how confusion and paralysis had taken a hold on the army in this area. No doubt the same was true elsewhere as well. With its command structure so weakened, especially by the purges of the summer and of the new year, the regiments divided one from the other, even troops and companies separated, the soldiers unpaid and mistrustful of their officers, it is hardly surprising that the army was in no position to formulate a political position and carry out a policy commanding widespread support among its members, let alone among the political nation. We are back once again in a situation whereby the part of the army in and around London was able to make the running, and the other forces followed its lead. But that part of the army had undergone a considerable change from the previous year under the impact of the purges of January and February, the expelling of certain regiments from the metropolis and the arrival of Monck's Scottish regiments. Monck was in a key position in all this because he was surrounded by officers most of whom were prepared to fall in behind a common policy, even if it led to a restoration of the monarchy.
We have suggested that Monck's alliance with the City was a major step in opening up the way for the return of the secluded members. During the next few days after the presentation of the letter to Parliament events moved further in that direction. Haselrig and Rich were alleged to be co-operating with Vane and Lambert to undermine Monck's position in the army, a charge which Haselrig denied. His letter to Monck setting out his denial seems quite tame. It is not written by a 'fiery spirit' but rather by a man who shows signs of being afraid for his own future. It is interesting that Alured was the intermediary between Monck and Haselrig. It is another indication of the close ties between the Colonel and Haselrig. In his original letter to Haselrig Monck reaffirmed his own commitment to a Commonwealth without King, single person or House of Lords. (1)

The Rump went some way towards satisfying the demands laid out in the letter of 11 February, especially by making provision for fresh elections. (2) But by this time Monck was actively engaged in negotiations with the secluded members. He made no secret of this and invited some of the Rumpers including Haselrig to attend. Monck might well have been trying to effect a reconciliation and to get the Rumpers to agree freely to readmit the purged members; but this did not really have any chance of success. Monck probably did not make up his mind about readmitting the members until quite late on, after it became obvious that Haselrig and his supporters would not agree to

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(2) Q.v. Davies, Restoration, pp. 235-236.
a voluntary readmission and after he had sounded out opinion among his officers. The latter decided not to oppose such a readmission, provided that the secluded members would declare themselves in favour of a Commonwealth and pass an act to confirm the sale of lands. Self-interest was fast becoming an important influence on their calculations. Clarges, Clobery and Gumble were appointed to treat with some of the secluded members. In these talks the secluded members were unwilling to tie the hands of a future Parliament. The three commissioners reported back to the officers, and Clarges recommended that the secluded members' reluctance not to be drawn on the question of confirming land sales should not be made into a reason for breaking off the talks. It would appear to the outside world that the army was only motivated by sectional interest, he argued. A paper with four heads was drafted which the members were to be requested to sign before their admission. These were that they would settle the command of the army, provide for its maintenance, appoint a new Council of State, and dissolve themselves. These requests did not prove hard for the secluded members to swallow and on 21 February under the aegis of the army they returned to Parliament in what amounted to a virtual coup against the Rump. Why did Monck support and work for their return? This is a question that could lead to endless speculation. The most plausible reason, and one that is consistent with the analysis of Monck's behaviour in this section, is that he and his closest advisors came round to thinking that the Rump was no longer representative of opinion in the nation and that it might prove reluctant to dissolve itself, whereas with the readmission of the secluded members and a more legal dissolution
of the Parliament the next assembly would have a better claim to legitimacy than almost any other government in the 1650's. News of the declaration of the army in Ireland, now under the control of people with whom he was quite friendly, for the readmission of the secluded members must also have helped him make up his mind. Monck was never a man to put himself out on a limb. (1)

The question of how this step, which was yet another lurch towards a Restoration, would be accepted by the rest of the army now arose. This was soon put to the test. Monck summoned a meeting of all the officers in and around London to consider a letter to be sent to the various forces in the three nations asking for their concurrence in what had been done. The drafting of the letter was referred to a committee which quickly produced one that was signed and sent from headquarters on 21 February. The letter claimed that the readmission of the secluded members followed by a legal dissolution of the Long Parliament and the election of a new Parliament "under such qualifications as may secure our Cause", was the only way to satisfy "good people" and guarantee the peace of the nation. They pledged that there would be no return to the old bondage and that the goal of a free state which they desired was inconsistent with the perpetual

(1) The fullest accounts of the readmission of the secluded members are in Davies, Restoration, pp. 287-289; Woolrych, Milton, pp. 173-175; Ashley, Monck, pp. 201-202. I have used Baker (Chronicle, pp. 687-688) more than these three scholars. K. H. D. Haley (The First Earl of Shaftesbury, Oxford, 1968, pp. 130-132) accepts too readily Ashley Cooper's account although he is not alone in this (q.v. Davies, Restoration, pp. 288-289). Dr. Ashley also rightly emphasises the impact of the declaration of the Yorkshire gentry, headed by Fairfax, in favour of re-admitting the secluded members in helping Monck make up his mind (Monck, p. 202; H.M.C. Leyborne-Popham, pp. 149-150, 154-155).
sitting of the Long Parliament. (They conveniently forgot to mention that the Rump did not intend to sit perpetually anyway, but any suggestion that it did was useful propaganda.) The signatories said that they were confident that the Parliament would interpose with the next one to get confirmation of all land transactions in the three nations passed in a bill. Anyone who rose in favour of Charles Stuart or any other pretended authority was to be arrested. All the regiments and garrisons were also asked to send up a representative with a written testimonial that they would acquiesce in the action of the army in London. In this way the forces distant from London could have the illusion that they were still participating in decision-making. The letter was signed by Monck and 11 Colonels, five Lt. Colonels, eight Majors, two Captains and the Quater Master General. The signatories included Saunders, Eyres, Moss, Evelyn, Streater, Wagstaffe and Barton, all of whom had supported the Rump in the previous year. (1) The Republican officers who had stood by the Rump during the October crisis were now divided. Those who were likely to oppose the readmission were soon to be removed.

Over the next few days the forces throughout the three nations drew up addresses supporting the readmission. These were printed in the newsbooks. The general tone of these addresses can be judged from that of Un ton Crooke's regiment. His troop had, as we have seen, declared for a Commonwealth and against a single person

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and House of Lords in late December. In the new address the regiment declared that

"our good Old Cause cannot decay nor impair, whilst 'tis in the hands of those who first understood it, and in whose quarrel and invitation we first drew our Swords, and shall be willing to sheath them when they command it, since its no pleasure to us to continue our commands or employment longer than they judj the necessities of our poor country require it." (1)

It seems like an act of blind faith in the secluded members, coupled with a quality of naivety. It was amazing to suggest that the good old cause and the intentions of the secluded members were compatible, yet that is what the address implies. It amounts almost to resignation from the political struggle, an attitude which is echoed in other regimental addresses.

But not all the officers were as passive or naive as this. There was trouble in Rich's regiment. News reached London of a rendezvous of the regiment at Bury St. Edmunds, scene of some of the army's activities in 1647. According to the newsbooks some officers "held forth dangerous principles to engage them against his Excellency and the present parliament."

Some of the men joined with them, but others left the regiment determined to remain loyal to Monck. When the news of the rendezvous reached London, Monck with characteristic swiftness, sent Ingoldsby, a former Colonel of the regiment, with six troops of horse and the Life Guard under Philip Howard to reduce them. It was quite a large force. Rich

(1) Parliamentary Intelligencer, 27 February-5 March 1660.
in a letter to Ingoldsby suggested that this was over-reaction and that

"though I may be reckoned one of them to whom this late change seems somewhat strange, yet what I have expressed by way of dissatisfaction never did amount to occasion any such motion."

He called a second rendezvous at which he gave his own views on current affairs urging his men to remain faithful to the Parliament but opposed to Charles Stuart. After this rendezvous they returned to their quarters ready to submit to what orders should come from Monck. Rich, a member of the House, appeared before it on 7 March. He denied the charges against him. The House referred the matter back to the Council of State, newly elected. The substance of the charge against Rich was laid out in a letter from Ingoldsby, but we have a record of other charges against him. These alleged that he had re-established agitators in the regiment to represent grievances, that he had filled up the regiment with men of "dangerous principles", that he had supported the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction judging it

"both lawful and expedient to break all civil authority to make way for the Fifth Monarchy",

that he had also abetted Cavaliers and forged signatures. It was an amazing catalogue of contradictory accusations. As a result of the incident the officers were purged. Ingoldsby replaced Rich and Thomas Babington replaced Breman who was also implicated in the trouble. Rich was kept in custody for several weeks. Whether or not he was trying to forment a rising in the Eastern Association against
the return of the secluded members, which seems unlikely, his actions provided the government with a good opportunity to silence a potential dissident. (1)

Okey also gave some indications of being unhappy with the readmission of the secluded members. The Recorder of the City of Bristol wrote to Monck claiming that Okey was trying to make the city into a garrison "in opposition to you and the now Parliaments' commands" and that he was endeavouring to make Lambert the head of all the forces in the west. These reports were denied by Major Thomas Izod now of Ashley Cooper's regiment (Izod had been transferred from the regiment, then Fleetwood's, in the summer of 1659 to Thomas Saunders' most of which was then serving in Scotland. He, like his Colonel and Major, did not join the regiment there and Monck filled their places. Saunders and Barton became Colonel and Major of Swallow's regiment and Izod returned to his old regiment, now Ashley Cooper's, with promotion as Major.) Izod wrote to Monck that he was amazed that there were aspersions cast against Okey:

"It is true that when I first acquainted him with your letter he was somewhat disturbed fearing that Charles Stuart would follow, but when he had considered, he said that if those things which you had declared for were made good he was satisfied."

A letter which Okey received from Lawson also helped to settle him. Izod said, if Okey had tried to do anything, he would have tried to

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prevent him because

"I fear this fanatic generation - which I suppose you expect trouble from - as I do the Cavaliers."

He also commented on Rich and Dreman saying that he considered them "two as dangerous persons as any in the army". The shift to the right amongst some of Monck's officers (or was it opportunism?) was becoming increasingly obvious. The Recorder of Bristol wrote to Monck shortly afterwards, revising his opinion of Okey and supporting Izod's assessment. (1)

Okey, who had had similar misgivings about political developments after the original expulsion of the Rump, had good enough reason to fear the consequences of the return of the secluded members. Shortly after he had left London for Bristol an action against him and Alured for secluding Sir Gilbert Gerrard in December was brought in Upper Bench. Prynne, the likely author of A Brief Narrative, an account of the attempts by the secluded members to sit when the Rump was re-restored and which specifically mentioned the two Colonels as being the officers preventing the return of the members, seems to have had a hand in the action as well. Okey also featured on a list of persons involved with the London militia, apparently drawn up for or by the Council of State for presentation to Parliament. It was a list of people allegedly disaffected to Monck, office holders under the Committee of Safety, so-called sectarists, and even people in favour

(1) H.M.C. Leyborne-Popham, pp. 160-161, 164-165; Firth and Davies, p. 301.
of toleration. \(^{1}\) A hardening of attitudes towards 'sectaries' was also witnessed at Shrewsbury where the soldiers of the castle, with the encouragement of those in the town and its citizens, turned out all Quakers and "anabaptists" from the castle. \(^{2}\) In early March Captain Walcott of the Irish brigade quartered at Chester, made an attempt to stir it up and to arrest Redman and other officers and to declare against Monck. This was soon put down. Walcott was allowed to return to Ireland. \(^{3}\)

It is at this time too that Hull and its controversial governor Robert Overton come back into the limelight. As we have seen, during the October crisis and after it Overton had been rather ambiguous in his attitude towards national affairs. On his way south Monck had written to him asking him to give an unequivocal declaration for the Rump. Overton replied that for his part he was glad that Monck adhered to the Rump and was not in favour of re-admitting the secluded members, a free Parliament or a single person, despite rumours to the contrary. He justified his various postures during the last few months on the grounds of trying to preserve his command. Monck let the matter rest there for the moment. However, with the return of the secluded members Overton declared against the actions of his colleagues in London, fearing that it would be the prelude to a restoration of the Stuarts. Monck sent Alured and Major Jeremiah.

\(^{1}\) H.M.C. VII Report, p. 483; E1011 (4), A Brief Narrative; H.M. 816.M.I. (105), A Copy of the Presentment and Indictment Found and Exhibited by the Grand Jury of Middlesex ...
H.M.C. Levborne-Popham, p. 166.

\(^{2}\) Parliamentary Intelligencer, 27 February-5 March 1660.

\(^{3}\) ibid., 5-12 March 1660; Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 238-239.
Smith, an old friend of Overton's, to Hull to try to win him over. At the same time he ordered Charles Fairfax to prepare to seize Hull by force, and an ultimatum was sent to Overton to deliver up the town. Alured and Smith reported that Overton was not at all informed of events in London, but that he had given them assurances of his loyalty to Monck. The suggestion that Overton was quite out of touch with developments in London is borne out by the declaration that he and his fellow officers sent to Charles Fairfax's, Bethel's and Smithson's regiments, calling on them to assist in the defence of the cause and against the rising star of monarchy. Overton and his officers were under the impression that several regiments had declared against the return of the secluded members and had expressed their determination to adhere to the cause. As we have seen, there had really only been trouble in Rich's regiment. However, there is no doubt that Overton's view, that there was a general drift towards a Restoration, was correct. Overton was deprived of his commission on 6 March. Charles Fairfax took possession of Hull on the 12th and Overton arrived in London on the 18th. According to Ludlow, Overton gave in so easily because he realised that he had no chance of holding out. Another upholder of the good old cause had been neutralised.\(^{(1)}\)

In the meantime what it is now appropriate to call the Long Parliament, or as one Royalist called it the "gigot" Parliament,\(^{(2)}\) had the task of fulfilling the four demands which the officers had made. On 21 February the act appointing the five commis-

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sioners to govern the army was repealed and Monck confirmed as Commander-in-Chief. (1) A new Council of State was elected, a much more obviously right wing and civilian one. Monck, Morley, Ashley Cooper were the only serving army officers on it although Rossiter, who had already declared for a free Parliament and who had left the army in 1647 because he supported the Parliament's proposals for disbanding, was soon to have command of Okey's regiment and Montagu was soon to be given Alured's. (2) The Parliament also voted in favour of a new Parliament to be summoned on 25 April.

On 27 February the House, presumably with the approval of Monck, issued a proclamation that all officers absent from their charges should repair to them at once. (3) According to Phillips this was done because there were too many officers present in the City and because of the danger of regiments attempting to rendezvous as Rich's had done. The fewer the number of officers there were in London the less likely were the policies of Monck and his advisors to run into opposition. (4) The presence of large numbers of officers in London had in the past been an important factor in the army's political role. The proclamation could only undermine this.

It was at about this time that rumours started to circulate either that Richard Cromwell was going to be restored as Protector or else that Monck himself would be offered the chance to become the Single

(1) C.J., VII, pp. 847, 849.
(2) C.J., VII, p. 849; Clarke Ms. 32, f. 252; Davies, Restoration, pp. 294-295.
(3) C.J., VII, p. 848.
(4) B.M. 660 f. 23 (65); Baker, Chronicle, p. 691.
There is no clear chronology for this but on 24 February Royalists reported that Haselrig, Scott and Robinson and others with some officers of the "old army", presumably those displaced in January, were working on proposals to re-establish the Protectorate as being the only expedient they can find to save themselves from utter ruin.

Another Royalist report said that St. John, Pierrepoint, Thurloe, Montagu and Philip Jones were in favour of restoring Richard and that this was why Ingoldsby and Charles Howard were restored to the army. (The latter took over Walton's regiment towards the end of February.) This report is pretty dubious. Ingoldsby and Howard replaced Rich and Walton for other reasons. But it is possible that at any rate some of these old Cromwellians momentarily toyed with the idea of a return of Richard, but if at all it was very likely only momentarily. At the beginning of March the Venetian ambassador heard stories about Monck becoming Protector, and as late as 12 April Whetham wrote to Monck saying that if there had to be a single person he hoped that Parliament would make it him. (1)

These rumours coincided with a period of renewed disquiet in the army which took place in the first half of March. The chronology of this discontent is difficult to work out exactly, but it seems evident that it occurred in two waves, the first prompted by the Parliament's resolve to establish new militia commissioners and the second by its repeal of the Engagement. (2) Monck emerged greatly

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(2) My analysis and chronology differs from that of Godfrey Davies (Restoration, pp. 298-299) and Professor Woolrych (Milton, pp. 192-193) both of whom misread Phillips (Baker, Chronicle, p. 693).
strengthened from the crisis. It was to be the last time that there was to be any major attempt by serving officers in London to try and force him to change his policy. It was also the last political struggle in the army in the old style among serving officers. In the struggle the leading officer opposed to Monck was Okey, newly returned from the west country. He was working in collaboration with civilians and with Haselrig who was still technically a member of the army.

On 7 March a group of officers met, provoked by growing fears that the Parliament was not committed enough against a Restoration. A remonstrance was drawn up against monarchy and a House of Lords. One Royalist account suggests that the remonstrance was also against all single persons. Haselrig and Scott were said to be behind it. That night the officers went to Monck who argued with them and threatened them saying that

"he was resolved to acquiesce in ye determinacion of ye Parlement, soe he expected that all under him should do ye like, and if they were not pleased with thier commands upon those termes, he would finde others that would bee."

On the 8th the officers went to Monck again and asked if he would sign their remonstrance or not. Realising that his bullying tactics were not working he organised a meeting between ten of the officers and ten M.P.s, to discuss matters. This also took place on the 8th. The officers demanded confirmation of all things done since the start of the troubles, that is an indemnity, which was to include the High Court of Justice and execution of Charles I. The officers also expressed concern about their property rights and about the militia. According
to one report on the question of the militia they were told that Parliament had already determined this and therefore it could not be discussed but that if they had anything to say they must petition the House; on the indemnity they were told that "a care would be had to it since all were equally concerned in it",

and on the question of a single person they and the whole nation must submit to Parliament's decision. As this report originates from a Royalist source the forwardness of the M.P.s on this last question is perhaps exaggerated. One thing is clear, however, the M.P.s were arguing with self confidence from a position of strength, the officers were insecure and very anxious. Nothing seems to have come from these meetings probably because the M.P.s argued that with a dissolution and new Parliament imminent it would be improper to commit their successor. On 9 March Monck appears to have attended the House (which is possible because the bill voting him and his heirs lands was engrossed on that day) and to have been urged to keep his officers in better order. (1)

A few days of calm seems to have followed. This might have been helped by Monck's order for officers to repair to their commands. The order was apparently issued by order of Parliament. (2) As with earlier orders that of 27 February seems to have been difficult to enforce. This deceptive calm came to an end with the House's vote on 13 March to repeal the Engagement. According to Phillips, it was


(2) Davies, Restoration, p. 300.
at this stage that Haselrig and Scott, working in collaboration with some of the officers, went to Monck to try and persuade him to become the Single Person. They argued that the actions of the Parliament showed that it was aiming at a Restoration. As a republic was likely to be unacceptable to most of the nation "who are always bad judges of what is best for themselves" a Single Person was necessary, and that no one was better suited than Monck for this role. Monck replied that he too had some worries about the repeal of the Engagement but that he had been personally assured by "many of the most discreet Members" that there was no ulterior motive behind it and that it was in keeping with their policy of not binding their successor. As for becoming the Single Person, he refused saying:

"The experience of Cromwell's fate gave him Reasons to avoid the Rock on which that Family split";

to which they replied that Cromwell had usurped his position whereas Monck would have it by the unanimous consent of all the people "and under what Name and Title be pleased to accept it". He rejected this. (1)

Just how they thought they were going to get the consent of the people for such a move begged an enormous question. The offer sounds like the desperate and grotesque action of men on the verge of defeat. According to Phillips, Monck refused to betray the identity of these men to the Council of State which had been informed of these proceedings by Clarges. (2) However, there was still one last card to play, the army.

(1) Baker, Chronicle, p. 693.

(2) ibid., pp. 693-694.
Further meetings between some of the Rumpers and their sympathisers in the army were held and a declaration was devised for Monck and the officers to sign in which they declared their support for a Commonwealth and against a single person. Parliament was to be asked to join in this declaration. The men behind this programme show some signs of confusion by renouncing government by a single person given their offer to Monck, unless of course, they only meant monarchy. The declaration was taken to Monck who on the advice of Clarges and William Clarke managed to have discussion of it postponed until the following day, the 11th, when there was to be a General Council of Officers. The French ambassador said that during the previous 24 hours there was

"much uncertainty in the course of events, because the officers of the army in London continue loudly to threaten."

He expected some decisive action and said that hitherto they had never deferred to their other commanders. The delay gave Monck time to prepare arguments against the declaration. When the Council of Officers met (it was more likely a meeting of those officers in and around London called by Monck and not a Council of Officers in the manner of 1659 let alone the late 1640's) Okey, who had returned from the west country, was one of the main spokesmen in favour of the declaration. He argued that if Parliament refused to join in it then such action should be taken "as God should put into their hearts to Save the Nation from destruction". This was the sort of language that had characterised army politics when the army was at the peak of its power and influence
but that time was now over and Okey's language sounds out of place. Monck would not lead a coup against the Parliament, and Okey and his supporters in and out of the army were in a minority. There was now a complete reversal of the 1647 situation. Those officers who supported the Parliament were now the majority, while in 1647 they had been a minority. Clarges warned Okey that the Parliament would sooner dissolve itself than submit to pressure from the army, in which case they would have to have recourse to Richard Cromwell, for he knew that Monck would not assume the headship of the government. The opposition within the officers evaporated almost as quickly as it had appeared; no one was prepared, or able, to try to force Monck's hand. The incident marks an important watershed in terms of army politics over these months. Monck had finally to decide whether to side with the army or with the Parliament. He chose the latter and remained committed to a dissolution and to a new Parliament. By this time he must have realised that this course of action implied a restoration of the Stuarts. It did not take a great deal of skill to realise the mood of the army. Okey and those who shared his defiant attitude were unrepresentative of majority feeling among the officers now changed considerably from the previous year because of the purges of January and February, the removal of certain regiments from the capital, and the presence of Monck's Scottish regiments. They were in no position to oust Monck. As far as the army in London was concerned, Monck could not count on their following his lead. He told the officers that

"Nothing was more injurious to Discipline than their meeting in Military Councils to interpose in Civil things"
and from then on prohibited any further assemblies. (1) The meetings of officers which had been behind much of the army's politics from 1647 onwards were thus terminated, with ease.

Monck's letter to Parliament urging them not to proceed with the militia bill which was causing alarm to many of his officers was probably intended to show that he was not being reckless in his trust of civilians. When the House received the letter on 16th a committee was appointed to go and see Monck to clarify aspects of the bill. They reported back that Monck "rested well satisfied" upon reading it. It did not really matter anyway for on the 16th the Long Parliament dissolved itself. (2) Monck had nailed his colours to the mast. Civilians would dictate the settlement of the nation, even if this meant a return of the Stuarts.

During the next month moves in that direction became more obvious. As Professor Woolrych has said, the real question was not whether Charles Stuart would return but whether the restoration of the monarchy would be conditional or not. (3) But there still remained the problem of ensuring that the army acquiesced in all this. This was made easier because the concerns of most of the officers by this time were not ideological but based more on fears for the future of their material interests especially the ex-Crown lands. These kind of fears could be allayed more easily than ideological ones. There appears to have been a further purge of the army. On 12 March Colonel

(2) Nicholas Papers, IV, p. 201; C.J., VII, p. 880.
Robert Bennet had been ordered to disband his force in St. Michael's Mount. Royalists reported that Monck was remodelling the army and that he had appointed five officers to examine the reliability of their comrades. The five included Clobery, Knight and Hubblethorne. One of the five (unnamed, but an informant of Darwick's) said they were all favourable to a Restoration. This might well have been wishful thinking. The new officers were said to be

"post nati to the spoyles both of the Church and Crown, for there the shoe pincheth most",
a shrewd observation.

Monck was also taking up contacts with Royalists and, according to one source, shortly after the dissolution of the Long Parliament actually declared privately for Charles. But contradictory reports still reached Charles. One said that Monck had in fact been offered legislative power. By whom was not made clear.

Charles Howard was already in touch with the King. On 23 March he wrote to Charles that Monck was far from being his enemy "but will go his own pace". He felt that the army was not quite ready for a Restoration but that they soon would be. There were rumours that some of the Rumpers and their sympathisers still in the army were trying to stir up trouble. Some "seditious persons" were said to be telling the soldiery that they would not get their arrears if there was a Restoration. The Council of State issued a proclamation denying such rumours.

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(1) Clarke Ms. 49 (Monck's Order Book), sub 12 March.
(3) Davies, Restoration, p. 312; Clarendon State Papers, III, p. 706.
(5) ibid., p. 708; C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 414.
In case such attempts escalated, the Council of State issued a proclamation ordering all officers civil and military to arrest anyone suspected of trying to disaffect the soldiery. The proclamation was to be read at the head of every regiment. (1)

It seems likely that Monck took the opportunity to purge at least some officers. One Royalist report says that Haselrig, Hacker, Okey and Moss were purged. Hacker, who had been ordered to appear before the Council of State on 6 March, was re-commissioned by Monck on 24 March. He and his regiment signed the army declaration of 9 April which, as we shall see, amounted to the army's resolution to accept unquestioningly civilian decisions. He was replaced by Francis Lord Hawly only after the Restoration. Okey was most probably purged in late March and his regiment given to Rossiter. Moss might well have also lost his commission at this time. His regiment had been one of those ordered to leave London at the end of January. It was disbanded on 21 April. As for Haselrig, Phillips says that he "quietly submitted" his commissions shortly after Lambert escaped from the Tower. This is confirmed by a letter Monck wrote to the Speaker of the Commons after the Restoration saying that Haselrig had given up his commands without trouble after Lambert's escape from the Tower. The letter was obviously designed to be as favourable as possible to Haselrig. It was written at the request of his friends. (2)

(1) B.M. 669 f. 24 (40); Baker, Chronicle, pp. 696-697; Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 266-267; Guizot, Richard Cromwell, II, p. 401.

It was decided that a symbolic gesture of acquiescence in civilian government by the army was required. This took the form of a declaration from the regiments not to meddle in affairs of state to obey all commands from Monck, the Council of State and whatever the new Parliament would determine. Clarges, Charles Howard, Ashley Cooper, Arthur Ansley and Knight, presumably with the approval and encouragement of Monck, were the instigators of the declaration. The declaration was tested out by Knight on his regiment, on Monck's horse, on the Life Guard, and by Howard on his. Pleased with their success they decided to extend the subscriptions to the declaration to all the regiments in and around London. A meeting of the officers of these regiments was called at St. James's, which it was emphasised was to be held with Monck's permission. The numbers of signatures was soon increased with the regiments that had come from Scotland with Monck taking the lead. The declaration was presented to Monck on 9 April. (1) Threats of dismissal seem to have played a part in securing signatures, although, as in the past, the newsbooks tried to paint a picture of cheerful and willing subscription to the declaration. (2)

It is an extremely important document; more than anything else it can be said to mark the army's renunciation of its political role, a development made easier as a result of factors we have already mentioned (the purges of January and February, the removal of certain regiments from the capital and the presence of Monck's Scottish regiments).

(1) Baker, Chronicle, pp. 696-697; Parliamentary Intelligencer, 9-16 April 1660.

(2) National Register of Archives, 18686, Saunders Papers, Number 104; Parliamentary Intelligencer, 16-23 April 1660.
The army said it would not hold meetings to meddle in affairs of state, thus making itself a divided interest from the rest of the people. In 1647 a similar charge had made the army adopt the philosophy that it was not a mercenary army but an army of citizens in arms. This gave rise to the belief, always at the back of the army's actions over the next years, that it knew best how to interpret what the people wanted, and what was best for them. This was of course tempered first of all by the nature of the limited revolution of 1649 and the subsequent policy of the respectable revolution. In 1660 this notion of the army not being a separate interest in itself, a corporation within the state, a charge which Monck's propaganda from Scotland had levelled at the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, was being turned on its head. Instead of being used to justify the army's predominance in politics it was now being employed to justify its subservience and sub-ordination to the civilian power. That is really what Monck had been working for in these months and that is what he had finally achieved. The declaration said that only Parliament "can secure us in our Religious and Civil Rights". That was not the language of defiance and revolution that had been characteristic of 1647-1649 and which Okey had echoed in March. In the context of 1660 it was the language of demoralisation, defeat, resignation and self deception.

Subscriptions to the declaration from the various regiments continued to come in during the next few weeks. Presentation of the declaration almost coincided with Lambert's escape from the Tower on 10 April. His attempts to raise a force to fight for the good old cause
were indeed the last fling of that cause. Nevertheless it did cause alarm among the authorities. News of the escape travelled fast. UnTon Crooke said it "flew" to his troops. (1) A number of suspected dissidents were arrested. These included Captain William Rainborowe, brother of Thomas who had been sympathetic to both Levellers and Ranters in the past and who had been dismissed from the army in 1649 after the Leveller revolt although he was given a militia regiment in Northamptonshire in 1659, Griffith Lloyd, one of the officers ordered to leave London in January 1660, and Packer. (2) Whalley and Goffe were both secured at Holmby House, the residence of Adam Baynes but were released upon giving an engagement to appear before the Council of State. Wildman was likewise arrested and released. (3) Prominent among those who rallied to Lambert were Okey, Richard Creed, one of the officers cashiered by the Rump on 12 October, Captain Timothy Clare, a serving officer in Ingoldsby's regiment, Captain John Gregory, who had been cashiered for his part in Overton's 'plot', and Captain Anthony Spinage who had been cashiered along with Packer in 1658. Others who were ordered to give themselves up on 21 April were Harrison, Salmon, Robert Lilburne, Ashfield, Miller, Wagstaffe, Gladman and the former treasurers at war, Blackwell and Deane. Breman was also arrested. (4) There were also some attempts to disaffect Smithson's regiment in Yorkshire in order

(1) H.M.C. Leyborne-Popham, p. 174.
(2) Parliamentary Intelligencer, 9-16 April.
(3) An Exact Accompt, 13-20 April 1660.
(4) B.M. 669 f. 22 (71); H.M.C. Leyborne-Popham, p. 178.
to get them to lay seige to York, but order was soon restored. (1)

In Nottinghamshire there was also trouble involving Captains Gabriel Wayne and Nicholas Lockyer. Both had been cashiered for supporting the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. Lockyer had been an agitator in 1647. A certain Captain Jonathan Everrard was one of the chief instigators of the rising. Both Lockyer and Everrard had been arrested at the end of March but released shortly thereafter. (2) As a result of the attempted rising Monck ordered that the declaration of 9 April should be tendered to the soldiery as well, which Phillips suggests led to many of them leaving the army. (3)

The attempted rising was finally suppressed on Easter Sunday, 22 April near Daventry. Lambert and those who rallied to him had no programme. The rising was one of desperation, a last ditch effort on behalf of the good old cause. The most detailed account we have of its suppression, and it must be emphasised that this is an official one, suggests that Lambert and his associates even favoured setting up Richard Cromwell again which prompted a reply from a

"stout officer, telling them their only end in that was to set up one again, who they themselves had already learnt to pull down ..."

The same account describes Lambert as a broken man, but this is not really supported by Phillips who does, however, support the view that the rising was a desperate bid. (4) The two men who played the most

(1) Parliamentary Intelligencer, 16–23 April 1660; H.M.C. Leyborne-Popham, pp. 175, 176–177.

(2) Mercurius Publicus, 19–26 April 1660; Parliamentary Intelligencer, 26 March–2 April 1660; National Register of Archives, 18636, Saunders Papers, Number 105; Firth and Davies, pp. 237–238.


important part in defeating Lambert were Ingoldsby and Streater. The former no doubt relished the chance to settle old scores, while the latter was continuing to ingratiate himself with the government, probably fully conscious of the way things were going. Along with John Mocock he had printed Parliament's order of 27 February ordering all officers to return to their charges. (1) Another officer who played a part in helping to suppress Lambert's rising was Thomas Saunders. After its defeat he wrote to his wife that

"this black cloud is suddenly blown over almost without a drop of blood."

He was also pleased to record that his regiment was "unengaged" to Lambert. Unlike his erstwhile comrade, Okey, Saunders like Streater was shedding his earlier Republican commitment. (2) Monck used the rising as an excuse to purge Fitch and Alured although the latter was said to have dissociated himself from the rising and from the troops of his regiment which took part in it. The regiments went to Sheffield, who had left the army in 1647, and to Montagu. (3) On 28 April Redman visited Chester to make "diligent search" if any of the Irish brigade had been involved in Lambert's rising. But he found them all faithful to Monck. (4) The Red Castle in Herefordshire held out for Lambert until early May. Under whose command it was is not clear. (5)

(1) B.M. 660 f. 23(65).
(2) National Register of Archives, 18686, Saunders Papers, Number:106, 107.
(3) Parliamentary Intelligencer, 23-30 April 1660; Firth and Davies, p. 159.
(4) Mercurius Publicus, 26 April-3 May 1660.
(5) ibid.
The very last effort to save what could be saved from the wreckage of the good old cause had been made and failed. It had had little chance of success anyway. On 25 April the Convention Parliament, with House of Commons and House of Lords, assembled, and it was clearly only a matter of time until Charles Stuart would be re-called. On 27 April a letter was presented to Monck by Sir John Grenville from Charles constituting him Commander-in-Chief. Monck advised Grenville to deliver it to the House first of all. The House read the letter and on 1 May requested Monck to communicate it together with the Declaration of Breda to his officers. Accordingly Monck summoned the officers in and around London to St. James's. Lydcott made an important speech in favour of the letter and Declaration. He said that the army now had the opportunity to fulfil the reasons why it was first raised namely the safety of the King's person, the Protestant religion, the privileges of Parliament and the liberty of the subject. There was no indication in the speech that Lydcott understood that these things meant different things to different people. It was almost as if the last 13 years were being brushed aside. Knight called for a written declaration to be drawn up and subscribed. It was referred to a committee of officers to draft one and an Address was presented to Monck on 2 May. The Address repeated the substance of Lydcott's speech and stressed the four main points of the Declaration of Breda: a free and general pardon (from which some of their erstwhile colleagues would soon be excepted), liberty for tender consciences, satisfaction of arrears, and Charles's willingness to confirm the purchases of land and grants of land to
people in possession thereof. All four were to be subject to the approval of Parliament. They felt that the fulfilment of these points would bring about peace and that the army thereby would have complied with the obligations for which they had first been raised. The Declaration of Breda appeared most likely to secure their material interests, which is no doubt what the vast majority if not all of the serving officers were most interested in by now. Revolutionary ideology and ardour had ceased to matter for them. Monck informed the House of the Address and obtained leave to forward it together with a letter to the King entrusted to Clarges. (1)

On 3 May Monck sent letters to the regimental commanders enclosing the King's letter, the Declaration of Breda and the Address of the officers ordering them to obtain subscriptions from all the officers and to return them to him in London. Subscriptions were soon forthcoming. (2) The Address and its acceptance by the regiments merely put the final seal on the army's abdication from politics. The politics of the army were finally at an end. All that remained was for the regiments in and around London to play their part in the reception of the King on his arrival in the capital, which they did on 29 May. A further address of loyalty was presented to him by Knight whose regiment along with the Life Guard, Clobery's, Fauconberg's (late Haselrig's) and Howard's (at one time Oliver Cromwell's) accompanied the new King

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(2) Parliamentary Intelligencer, 30 April-7 May 1660, 7-14 May 1660.
into the capital. (1) The army's part in the events immediately prior to the Restoration was thus ceremonial. The army had made it possible, civilians had made it a reality.

On 3 August Charles II appointed Monck Captain General of the armed forces for life. (2) Despite the fact that some Royalists were given what amounted to honorary commands in the regiments over the summer, Monck's main concern was a peaceful disbanding of the army regardless of the fact that the Declaration of Breda and subsequent 'memos' from Charles had suggested that the army would be kept on. (3) The Convention Parliament sought Monck's advice about disbanding and at the end of August he presented a plan to the House. The Parliament instructed the Committee of the Army to bring in a bill to this end. On 13 September the bill was passed. It included a loophole clause which allowed the King to raise soldiers in future so long as he paid for them. Thus, Parliament, in effect, lost the argument it had had with Charles's father over control of the armed forces - whether that control should be in the King or in Parliament. The Restoration settlement placed it in the King. In July 1661 the Cavalier Parliament

(1) Mercurius Publicus, 17-24 May 1660, 24-31 May 1660.

(2) For what follows I rely heavily upon Sir Charles Firth's introduction to the Regimental History of Cromwell's Army (Firth and Davies, pp. XXXIII-XXXVI) and L. G. Schwoerer's useful account ("No Standing Armies!", Baltimore, 1974, pp. 72-79) and on the references cited by them. J. Childs, The Army of Charles II, London, 1976, p. 7 ff. also mentions the disbanding.

(3) For the summer appointments q.v. Thomason tracts vol. E186 (newsbooks), passim.
stated finally that control of the militia was under the King's command alone.  

During the next three months demobilisation proceeded despite complications, mainly of a financial nature, and by the end of the year the army in England had been disbanded with the exception of Monck's regiments which were formally disbanded but immediately re-established in February 1661 as the Lord General's regiment of foot guards (the famous Coldstreamers) and the Lord General's troop of guards.  

The disbanding went smoothly, essentially because of the material inducements offered to the members of the army: satisfaction of pay arrears (with an additional week's pay), provision for those injured or disabled, and a waiver of apprenticeship requirements for those who had previously been in a trade. All had been grievances in 1647 and, perhaps significantly, had more appeal for the men than for the officers.  

Of the forces not stationed in England which were quite numerous those in Scotland were disbanded over a period until 1662. Some of the Scottish regiments served in Tangier.  

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(1) The reasons why there was so little parliamentary opposition to this are given by Mrs. Schwoerer (op. cit., pp. 72-75).  

(2) Firth and Davies, p. XXXIII; Davies, Coldstream Guards, pp. 111-112; Schwoerer, op. cit., p. 77.  

(3) Schwoerer, op. cit., pp. 77-78. I disagree with Mrs. Schwoerer's unqualified view that the "inherent" anti-militarism of the men was as important a stimulus to disbanding as disillusionment. The analysis above has shown the extent of disillusionment and bitterness against the officers existing amongst the rank and file from 1659. It is difficult to imagine how members of an armed force can be described as inherently anti-militarist unless they are conscripts.  

(4) Firth and Davies, pp. XXXIII-XXXIV; Dow, D. Phil., pp. 667-670.
was still a necessity to maintain a fighting force for security reasons but most of the older regiments were effectively disbanded in 1661 in a general reduction of the fighting forces there. Only some of the non-commissioned officers and some of the rank and file provide any continuity with the older regiments. (1) The units in Dunkirk remained in service, under new commanders, until the town was sold to the French in November 1662. The small force remaining in the West Indies was disbanded in 1662. (2) Neither the expeditionary force in Flanders nor the remnants of the Western Design had played any real part in army politics.

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(1) Firth and Davies, p. XXXV.
(2) ibid., pp. XXV-XXVI.
CONCLUSION

It has been argued that the army was a revolutionary movement that brought about the revolution of 1648-1649 and sought to further that revolution, ultimately failing and thereby enabling the Stuarts to return to the British throne, almost by default. Why did this come about and what sort of revolutionary movement was the army?

The army was both a redoubtable fighting machine and a formidable political one, yet it represented a minority of the nation and the majority of its members were not even members of the normal political nation. The first part of this statement requires little further clarification because it is a truism that revolutions are the work of minorities, and revolutionary movements are frequently minorities as well. Even the second part of the statement is not so controversial in that most of the senior officers were members of the political nation. For, as we have seen, one of the most important conclusions to emerge from this study of army politics is that the officers, despite Leveller attempts earlier on to stir up mutiny, remained firmly in control of the army and shaped its politics and destiny in the 1650's. Thus, when one talks about the army one effectively means the officers, and for most of the time the senior officers. The junior officers in London emerge as an important pressure group in the aftermath of the kingship crisis and remained so until the restoration of the Rump in May 1659, but they were only a pressure group and one that was confined to those of their kind in or around London. There is no evidence to suggest that they challenged the leadership of the senior officers or
that they attempted to make their influence felt in those units distant from London, as had the agitators in 1647. However, this is not to underrate their importance in the context we have just mentioned.

As for the rank and file, radicalism originating from this quarter had no chance of success after Ware and was defeated finally in September 1649 with the suppression of the Oxford mutiny. True, the rank and file came to the fore as an important variable in the power struggle of late 1659 but by that time there was no external political movement, such as the Levellers in the late 1640's, to create political grievances out of material ones. In 1659 the rank and file were of importance largely for negative reasons - armies, or factions in armies, need men to fight their battles, whether military or political. It is as a weapon to gain and maintain power that they are important in 1659, not as a group themselves contending for power.

With regard to the senior officers themselves, many were members of the traditional ruling class. Most did not belong to the upper echelons of their class but were men who came from families of some standing in their immediate locality, although not necessarily in their counties. They are best described in Professor Everitt's eloquent words:

"They shone instead as lesser stars in the larger constellations of county gentry ..." (1)

The senior officers tended to be educated men (usually at one of the universities and at one of the Inns) or had entered a trade. Some were younger sons. This was the sort of background of men like Henry Ireton,

(1) Everitt, Community of Kent, p. 34. C.f. Aylmer, State's Servants, p. 328.
John Lambert, William Sydenham, Robert Lilburne, Thomas Saunders, Mathew Alured, Edward Whalley, William Goffe (son of a rector), John Jones and John Disborowe, although not all were younger sons (e.g. Ireton, Lambert, Lilburne and Sydenham). These names span a wide spectrum of political opinion and allegiance among the officers in the 1650's. They were not the sort of men who emerged as leading figures in their localities and as M.P.'s very soon after 1640, men like Sir William Brereton in Cheshire or John Pyne in Somerset, or even Oliver Cromwell himself (it soon becomes obvious to any student of the English Revolution that Cromwell's career is full of contradictions which defy neat classification. In the case of this study it is the conflict between the military and civilian aspects of his career). There is a sense in which it was only the war and their subsequent army careers which made these men politically important. One can envisage a talented man like Ireton or Lambert playing a leading role in local or even national politics in virtually any circumstances but it is difficult to see how a Robert Lilburne, a Thomas Saunders, a Mathew Alured, a John Jones or even a John Disborowe would have reached such positions of power without the war and their military careers (and in the case of Disborowe without his family ties with Cromwell). (1) Even some of those who did not come from this background, e.g. John Okey, in origin probably a substantial citizen of London, soon showed that they shared in its style and aspirations. The argument that it was the war that made these people applies to such officers as well.

(1) It should of course be remembered that Fleetwood, Richard Ingoldsby and John Reynolds came from county gentry backgrounds but they were also younger sons. Fleetwood and Ingoldsby were also related to Cromwell.
Thus, it would be valid to suggest that the most important army officers were affected by what Professor Underdown has characterised as a conflict between

"two contradictory elements, one moderate and reformist, the other radical and revolutionary"

which influenced many of the traditional ruling class and their attitudes and reactions to events during the Revolution.\(^1\) Intellectually they also shared with many of their contemporaries what Professor Pocock has described as

"the dilemma of Cromwellian Puritanism ... a dilemma between several modes of action." \(^2\)

Their background and their investment in the crown lands gave many senior, and junior, officers a tendency to share in some of the accepted assumptions about the established social and economic system. This inhibited their revolutionary ardour. By way of illustration let us focus on law reform which remained one of the consistent demands of the army in the period. Would not too radical a reform of the laws have endangered their own position and in many cases their newly acquired wealth? They needed a comprehensive legal framework legitimised by a constitution acceptable to the majority of the nation as much as any other landholders to secure their standing, and were, as a result, uneasy about casting their fate, and fortune, to the winds of profound revolutionary social change. The officers were incapable of executing the policy of fundamental reform of the courts and property laws which

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\(^1\) Underdown, *Pride's Purge*, pp. 8, 353.

according to one distinguished contemporary, Sir Mathew Hale, would have made a Restoration more difficult to achieve. (1) Nor were they capable of giving the necessary leadership to the second component of what Mr. Conrad Russell has called the "alliance" or

"union between the discontents of the Parliamentary gentry and those of their social inferiors",

an alliance based on Puritanism and resentment of arbitrary taxation which helped cause the Civil War in the first place. (2) If the army officers had been men able to provide the leadership of these "social inferiors" then what Russell calls the second of the two revolutions within the English Revolution, the revolution of 1647-1649, "the revolution of the army", would have been more thoroughgoing. (3)

Therefore, we should not be too surprised when we come to characterise the nature of the army's political role to use a modern parallel as more akin to a Menschevik one than to a Bolshevik one, despite the fact that, as we have seen, particularly in late 1648 and early 1649, there was some quite strong feeling in army circles in favour of a more complete revolution. Given the social economic and educational background of many of the officers and the social and

(1) M. Hale, Some Considerations Touching the Alteration of Laws, ref. in Veall, Popular Movement for Law Reform, pp. 228-229.


(3) Ibid., p. 3. With all due respect, my analysis of the period 1647-1649 suggests that his statement that the revolution of 1647-1649 "was supplied by the Levellers and the Fifth Monarchists with truly revolutionary ideologies" is misleading (Ibid., p. 2). Mr. Russell's notion of the two revolutions echoes, but is not the same as, Dr. Hill's concept of two revolutions in the mid-seventeenth century (C. Hill, World Turned Upside Down, p. 12). For the reasons given above the army was incapable of ensuring the success of Dr. Hill's second revolution, (the establishment of communal property, more democracy in politics and law etc.).
economic aspirations of others and the intellectual turmoil of the Puritan mind it was likely that the army's political role would be Menshevik. (1)

Nevertheless, the army did want to see political legal and most certainly religious reforms introduced. But it hampered the likelihood of achieving this by deciding to follow through the logic behind the policy of the limited revolution, or respectable revolution of 1648-1649 and by the army's subsequent willingness to follow Cromwell. These twin policies characterised the period from 1649-1657 until the kingship crisis, which posed the greatest threat to army unity since the Levellers in 1647, threatened to blast away any chance of a settlement being achieved. The Three Colonels' Petition and other contemporaneous 'plots' were, as we have seen, confined more to individual officers and were in no way movements. Indeed the officers involved, especially the Three Colonels, had not thought through the full implications of their demands, especially about a free Parliament. What makes the kingship crisis so much of a turning point is that it not only threatened to ruin Cromwell if he had lost his power base, the army, but that it also posed the threat of ruin to the army. Assuming it (or rather a significant number of officers) had ditched Cromwell if he had accepted kingship it was in no position to offer any alternative solution to the question of settlement, and by this time it had tied up its raison d'être with the search for settlement. It had reached, as we have emphasised above, a state of uncreativity, of bankruptcy, and in

the wake of the Major Generals, of unpopularity with the nation. Thus, the near anarchy of 1659 could have set in two years earlier. But both sides, Cromwell and the army, perhaps realising the danger, drew back from the abyss, possibly in so doing throwing away the one great chance of achieving settlement, as Professor Underdown has hinted at. (1)

The crisis highlights a fatal contradiction in the nature of the army's political role. It was unlikely that a settlement acceptable to a substantial majority of the traditional political nation could be achieved while the army remained present in politics, and obversely it was unlikely that a satisfactory measure of reform acceptable to the more radical supporters of the Revolution could come about without the presence and influence of the army. The history of Portugal since the revolution of 1974 provides a modern parallel to this state of affairs. The army gradually threw away its claim to be representative of the people, the people in arms (a claim it could make with some considerable justification from 1647-1649) and to be the repository of the good old cause. (2) Gradually force came to be used as an end in itself. The army lost the ability to differentiate between the creative use of force, or 'right and might well met' (the military interventions and revolution of 1647-1649, the dissolution of the Rump and of Barebones, possibly even the Major Generals - in all of which the power of the sword had been used to help set up an alternative, and what was hoped viable, route to settlement) and its


(2) C.f. Dr. Hirst's view that the main defence of Parliament against the King was that it represented the people and the King no longer did (Representative of the People?, p. 193). The army took up this argument but ultimately proved that it did not represent the people. By 1659 it had become hopelessly split, and the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction with its tenuous hold on power and its claim to be acting in the interests of the good old cause was not representative of anything but itself.
uncreative use, more apparent after 1657 and which reached its peak in 1659 when the army discarded one prop after another (Protectorate, Rump, Committee of Safety and Army Council) in its search for support for a vision of settlement it had only the vaguest ideas about.

This may seem hard on the army which was also the victim of other circumstances placing limits on what it could hope to achieve practically: the dispersal of the regiments into the distant parts of the three nations and abroad, thereby ending the possibility of the sort of united, purposeful action of 1647-1649 made easy by good communications between the regiments. This helped break up army unity. The departure of Ireton for Ireland, an exile that seems to have been self-imposed, and his death in 1651 deprived the army of a great political mind and of a man who could have helped shape events in a different way had he lived. The decline of the 'popular movement' which had been so important in politicising the army in the first place and in influencing some of its most creative offerings towards settlement between 1647 and 1649 must also be taken into account, as must the failure of a united opposition to the Protectorate to develop. A strong popular movement or such a united opposition might have weaned the army from the policy of the limited or respectable revolution onto some other one. What sort that would have been is impossible to say but it is unlikely that it would have made settlement any easier. Indeed it is difficult to imagine how an alliance of say Fifth Monarchists and Rump Republican could have survived for long despite the fact that, as we have seen, such an attempt was made in 1656. The way the 'alliance' between 'Communists' and 'Social Democrats' fell apart quite soon
after the revolution in Portugal is a modern example of how expediency can lead to easy marriages and unhappy divorces. To be fair to the army, however, it must be remembered that it genuinely sought reform and that the only time its energies, rightly or wrongly channelled as the case may be, lapsed from pursuing this task was from 1649-1651 when it took to the field once more to secure and defend the revolution.

In conclusion, the army collapsed as a revolutionary movement and as a political force for all these reasons: the social, economic and intellectual ones shaping its responses to politics and its policies, as well as for the more immediate ones just mentioned. In an age which lacked political parties the army came close to being one. But it lacked a true identity: whether it was reformist/gradualist or radical/revolutionary (or to put it another way whether it was Menshevik or Bolshevik) although by and large it tended towards the former. This crisis of identity ran deep. The implications of this were important not just for army politics but for the English Revolution as a whole. Was the army, and in particular its officers who shaped its policy virtually alone from late 1647, to pursue a moderate or limited revolution or a radical one? Were the officers, largely from the landowning classes or else men newly recruited to them, to proceed cautiously along the road to reform, or risk all by pursuing a fully fledged revolutionary policy which could have brought about a social revolution the consequences of which they feared? Their inability to make up their minds about this lies at the root of the army's politics in the years we have examined. It was a tragic flaw which led to the chaos of 1659 and ultimately to the downfall of the good old cause.
The army made the revolution of 1648–1649; it also made the Restoration of May 1660. But it was not really the army of 1647–1659 which brought about the latter development. It was the force under Monck, a man keen on discipline who came to be surrounded by officers of like mind. Neither Monck nor his fellow officers shared in this identity crisis. They had resolved it, perhaps it had never even troubled them. For them the army ought to be subservient to the civilian authorities. It was this attitude which helped make the Restoration a reality and which continued to exist after it. It amounted to turning the political role of the army from 1647 to 1659 on its head, and it is an attitude of the modern British army which has so far persisted into our own time.
The following appendix does not contain exhaustive biographical entries on all the officers who served in the army between 1647 and 1660, nor even on those who appear at various stages in the course of the narrative. It is selective both as to those included and in terms of the details it gives about them. Its main purpose is to supplement the main narrative by providing in one place information, firstly, about the careers of those officers who are less well-known from the works of scholars of this period but who are, nevertheless, important in army politics (e.g. John Reynolds, Robert Overton); secondly, about individuals about whom some ambiguity or confusion exists (e.g. William Eyres); and thirdly, to provide new or additional information about officers or to modify the existing authorities (e.g. Thomas Saunders). The entries are in alphabetical order and are intended to be used in conjunction with the main narrative.

ABBOTT DANIEL (fl. 1649-1663)

In 1647 an elected officer for Okey's regiment. His troop was one of those selected by lot in 1649 for Ireland where he served during the 1650's as a Colonel. He retained his command in the summer of 1659 but was arrested by Sir Charles Coote in January 1660 for having opposed Parliament. In 1663 he was suspected of being involved in Blood's plot and a reward was offered for his arrest.

(Clarke Papers, I, pp. 170-173, 416, 439; Firth and Davies, pp. 621-623.)
ALLEN, WILLIAM (fl. 1647-1667)

A Warwickshire man originally but origin obscure. Was a felt-maker in Southwark. Early Civil War service for Parliament, by April 1646 a trooper in Cromwell's regiment. One of the original agitators and was called before the Commons in April 1647. He came to have more in common with the Grandees and when the Levellers denounced the original agitators and urged the setting up of new ones, John Lilburne attacked Allen as Cromwell's "officious and extraordinary creature" (E409(22), The Jugglers Discovered; Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes, p. 42). Firth (Clarke Papers, I, pp. 432-433) correctly identified Allen as the future Adjutant-General of horse in Ireland. The date at which he received his commission is unknown but it must have been sometime in 1648 (Professor Hardacre says it was sometime in the autumn of 1647 but cites no evidence (Hardacre, 'William Allen', p. 296. The Firth and Davies reference he cites does not support his point). Sydenham Poyntz refers to Adjutant-General Allen in October 1648. He says that after his arrest in York Allen treated him with civility, although it is not clear if he means once he (Poyntz) was brought to headquarters or if while still in York. (E469(23), The Vindication of Colonell Generall Points). His commission was anyway only for that of Captain, as Firth points out, Adjutant-General did not imply high regimental rank (S.P. 28/58, ff. 5, 7; Clarke Papers, I, p. 432). Allen is responsible for the account of the Windsor Prayer meeting in the spring of 1648 at which it was decided to call Charles I to account "for that blood he had shed" (E979(3), A Faithful Memorial of that Remarkable Meeting ... at Windsor Castle, repr. in Somers Tracts 3rd Collec., IV Vols., 1751, III, pp. 307-313). From 1649 to 1654 Allen was serving in Ireland.
The contrivers of the Three Colonels' Petition felt that Alured could speak openly of his disaffection with the Protectorate to Allen on his trip to Ireland (Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A41, f. 561), but it is unknown if Alured contacted him. Allen was surprised at Cromwell's elevation to the Protectorate but did not oppose it (q.v. above, Chapter Four, Section II); for his subsequent relations with Henry Cromwell and the relations of the Baptists, of whom Allen was one, with Henry q.v. above Chapter Four, Section III and Chapter Five, Section IV. In 1659 during the summer purges he was given command of the displaced Redman's regiment but did not go to Ireland to take up his position. He was removed from the army the following January. Quite what his attitude to the October coup was is unknown. In December along with Hugh Courtney he went as a commissioner to the fleet but on whose authority and with what purpose is not stated (Clarke Papers, IV, p. 165). He was arrested on various occasions after the Restoration. The last recorded mention of him is in 1667. (Hardacre 'William Allen', pp. 292-308; H. Wheeler Robinson, 'A Baptist Soldier - William Allen', Baptist Quarterly, III, 1926-1927, pp. 237-240; Whitley, Baptist Bibliography, index sub Allen, William; Clarke Papers, I, index.)

ALURED, MATHEW

brother in the first Civil War but by 1645 was a Colonel. His regiment petitioned Fairfax to be incorporated into the New Model, but without success (S.P. 28/34, f. 399; Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 214-215). A Colonel Matthew Alured signed the pro-Presbyterian military petition presented by Sir Thomas Essex to both Houses of Parliament on 22 March 1647. It is not clear whether this is the same man as the Yorkshire Alured (C.J., V, p. 120; L.J., IX, pp. 95-96). Alured played no part in army politics during the years 1647-1649. During the second Civil War Alured's regiment remained active and still cherished ambitions of being made part of the standing army, but again unsuccessfully (C.S.P.D. 1648-49, p. 99). In August 1650 he was given command of a regiment of foot originally raised by Colonel George Gill (Gell) after the latter was accused of defrauding the state. Alured commanded it in Scotland (C.S.P.D. 1650, p. 263; C.J., VI, pp. 450, 493; ibid., VII, pp. 22, 97; Innocency Cleared or the Case and Vindication of Col. George Gill (10 September 1651), in which Gill accused Alured of conspiring to ruin him in order to further his (Alured's) ambition; Wor. Co. 6.5.11 (117), Col. George Gill's Case. Gill, to whom Cromwell was well-disposed, was acquitted in February 1652 (Several Proceedings, 26 February-4 March 1652)). In addition to his role as a sequestration commissioner for the City of York and Hull he was made receiver for Yorkshire in 1649. He was accused of misusing his position as a committee man by farming a sequestered estate (C.C.C., pp. 171, 2155-2156; Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, 3-10 July 1649; Sheffield City Libraries, Bright Papers, 102b, 'Papers concerning the fee farm due to the crown for the manor of Eccleshill'). Pettiness and minor
corruption appear to have been two of his character traits. He was suspected of withholding arrears from his Major by John Baynes (Acker- man, Letters from Roundhead Officers, pp. 79, 82, 84, 92, 100-104, 109, 114; B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 422, f. 485). Alured was cashiered for his part in the Three Colonels' Petition but was detained in custody for ten months. During this time he renounced his claims to lands in Scotland formerly belonging to the Duke of Hamilton (B.M. Add. Ms. 25, 347, ff. 15-20, 20v). In August 1655 he wrote to Thurloe asking him to try to arrange an interview with Cromwell, but he was not released until the end of the year when he gave a pledge to the Protector not to do anything prejudicial to the present government and to live peacefully (Thurloe, III, p. 707; ibid., IV, p. 359). By August 1656 he had become politically suspect again and was arrested with Rich. On 14 August Alured was ordered to be committed to the Isle of Man, well out of harm's way, but this was suspended for a day or two. It is during this time that he gave his version of the genesis of the Three Colonels' Petition in 1654 (Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, IV, pp. 262-263; C.S.P.D. 1656-57, pp. 71, 581; Clarke Papers, III, p. 70; Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A41, ff. 560-561). His detention lasted six months and when released he seems to have returned to his estates where early in 1658 he was reported to be living peacefully (B.M. Add. Ms. 4159, f. 105, repr. in C. H. Firth, 'Two Letters addressed to Cromwell', E.H.R., XXII, 1907, p. 313.) With the restoration of the Rump in May 1659 Alured re-emerged onto the national scene. He petitioned the Parliament for the removal of the sentence imposed on him in December 1654. His request was considered by a committee which reported on 10 June in his favour (C.J., VII, pp. 678-679). He was soon restored to
the army and adhered to the Rump in October. With the return of the Rump in December he became of some importance until Monck took the opportunity of Lambert's rising in April to purge him from the army.

**BARTON, NATHANIEL**

of Caldwell, Derbyshire

Had been a chaplain to Sir Thomas Burdett of Foremark and during the dispute between Sir John Gell and Thomas Saunders had been appointed a temporary commander of Saunders' men (for the dispute q.v. under Saunders, Thomas). By April 1646 Barton was a Captain in Richard Graves's regiment, and felt happy with this. When Graves left the regiment in June 1647 because he adhered to the Parliament, Barton was promoted to the Majority and Scrope became Colonel. Barton was quite active in army politics between 1647 and 1649. John Lilburne accused him (and Okey) of being against the Leveller Agreement of the People in December 1648. But his recorded remarks during the Whitehall debates do not substantiate Lilburne's charge. When Scrope's regiment was disbanded in 1649, after the Leveller mutiny in May, Barton appears to have left the army. On 2 March 1650 he was granted a commission by the Council of State as Commander-in-Chief of the Derbyshire militia. His own militia troop served under Harrison in 1651. After this he disappears from national prominence until 1659 when over the summer as a result of a petition from Saunders and his officers he was appointed Major of that regiment, but was unhappy at the prospect of going to Scotland. He adhered to Parliament in October and was active with
Saunders in working for a return of the Rump. Despite suspicions about his activity over the summer during Booth's rising (q.v. under Saunders, Thomas) Barton became Major of Swallow's (now Saunders') regiment. By February 1660 Phillips says that he inclined towards re-admitting the secluded members. After this Barton falls into obscurity. (National Register of Archives, 18686, 'Saunders Papers', Numbers, 20, 65, 67, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 89; S.P. 28/76, f. 649; Clarke Papers, I, p. 60; ibid., II, pp. 105, 106, 132, 156, 190, 265, 270; ibid., IV, index, sub Barton, Nathaniel; C.S.P.D. 1650, pp. 403, 504; ibid., 1651, p. 236; J. Lilburne, Legall Fundamentall Liberties, p. 35, repr. in Haller and Davies, Leveller Tracts, p. 423; Firth and Davies contains errors about Barton's career esp. pp. 103, 233-234).

BEKE, RICHARD (1630-1707)
son of Henry Beke of Haddenham, Bucks., and Frances dau. of John Billiard of the county of Nottingham.

Richard Beke is to be distinguished from his namesake Major Robert Beke the M.P. for Coventry in the second Protectorate Parliament who had been attached to the Coventry garrison in the late 1640's (S.P. 28/60, f. 250). In 1651 Richard was a Lieutenant in the Life Guard. In 1653 he accompanied Whitelocke, a fellow countryman, on his Swedish embassy. Whitelocke described him as "a civil discreet and stout young gentleman, ingenious and of good parts and conversation" with whom he got on well. In February 1656 he married Levina Whetstone a niece of Cromwell. He was also Robert Lilburne's brother-in-law and John Jones' step son-in-law (q.v. pedigree). In the same month he became Captain of the reformed Life Guard. In 1659 he was made a Captain in Philip Twisleton's horse
regiment, then serving in Scotland, but he did not himself go there. His part in the autumn crisis is unknown but the reference to a "Major Beake" in Coventry being for the Rump could as well refer to Robert Beke as to Richard (Mercurius Politicus, 29 December 1659–5 January 1660, repr. in Firth and Davies, p. 236). After the Restoration he received a Special Pardon under the Joint Seal on 2 January 1661. It is possible that he served in the Restoration army. He was an M.P. in 1689 (for Aylesbury) and from 1690–1700 (for Wendover). He re-married in 1684 and died in 1707. (C.T. Beke, Some Particulars relative to Colonel Richard Beke, London, 1852, which at times confuses the two Bekes and which is slightly inaccurate about his career as an M.P. after the Restoration; Peck, Desiderata Curiosa, II, p. 499; Carte, II, p. 81; Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV, p. 96; D.M. Add. Ms. 37, 346, f. 31; Firth and Davies, index; Members of Parliament, I, pp. 557, 564, 572, 579.)
BERRY, JAMES (c. 1610-1691)

Origins unclear but served as a clerk in an ironworks, exactly where is unknown but in the Midlands (The D.N.B. and Berry and Lee, A Cromwellian Major-General, p. 4 contradict each other). Berry was a friend of Richard Baxter, and fought for Parliament from early in the first Civil War. By 1647 he was a Captain in Fairfax's horse and was quite active in resisting Parliament's proposals for the Irish service and in organising opposition to it (Clarke Papers, I, p. 45). He was clearly trusted by the soldiery but it would be inaccurate to describe him as "president of the council of adjutators" (D.N.B.; Berry and Lee, A Cromwellian Major General, pp. 30-31. This description of Berry emanates from Baxter (Reliquiae Baxterianae, p. 57)). In about August 1647 Berry was made Major of Philip Twisleton's regiment (late Rossiter's who had adhered to the Parliament and left the army (Firth and Davies, p. 165). Berry and Lee (A Cromwellian Major General, p. 33 + n.4) argue that he had become a member of Rossiter's regiment before this). In 1651 he became Colonel of Haselrig's horse regiment (Haselrig had only been a nominal Colonel). The regiment saw service in Scotland. Berry was said to have helped draw up The Instrument (Reliquiae Baxterianae, p. 72). In 1655 he became Major General of Hereford, Shropshire and Wales. In 1656 he was M.P. for Worcestershire. He opposed kingship but was nominated to the Other House. He was quite an important figure in army politics during the last years of the English Revolution and a prominent member of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. He was one of the officers cashiered by the restored
Rump in October 1659, the immediate cause of the coup, and after the second return of the Rump he was ordered to leave London. He was subsequently imprisoned in Scarborough Castle. He refused to give any acknowledgement of guilt and remained a prisoner for many years. He died in 1691.

(D.N.B. which has to be modified by his biography, Berry and Lee, A Cromwellian Major General; Firth and Davies, index.)

**BRAY, WILLIAM, fl. 1647-1659**

In November 1647 Bray was Captain-Lieutenant in Robert Lilburne's foot regiment, and without authority led the regiment to Cockbush Field. He was the only officer of this rank or above to side with the soldiery. He was arrested but after a trial in December he was restored to his regiment. He fell foul of Lt. Colonel Henry Lilburne and was suspended shortly afterwards, but returned to the army during the second Civil War, with a troop he raised in Kent and which was attached to John Reynolds' regiment. When the soldiery refused Reynolds's inducements to get them to serve in Ireland they moved that Bray be made Colonel. In March 1649 he was expelled from the General Council of Officers for supporting the Leveller attack on the Council of State and Council of Officers. Despite pleas by himself for release he remained in prison until October 1651. On 13 September 1655 a pass was issued to one William Bray to travel to Amsterdam. In 1659 the nominating committee received a recommendation for commissions preferably in the horse on behalf of Bray and Captain Robert Everard. (The divines of Newcastle had complained to Cromwell in 1652 about Everard's extreme religious
views. Everard, a member of Charles Fairfax's regiment, was said to be supported by his Lt. Colonel, John Mason.) Neither in fact received commissions. Later in the year Bray published a tract in which he attacked Harrington's Political Aphorisms. He laid great emphasis on the law, favouring "good ancient laws" and "successive parliaments". On religious matters he refers to a tract by Robert Everard, Nature's Vindication, which appeared in 1652 (B.M. 4257. a. 40).

(Clarke Papers, I, pp. 411-412n. and sources therein cited; C.S.P.D. 1655, p. 597; ibid., 1655-59, pp. 249-50, January is evidently a mistake for June; E763(7), A Plea for the Peoples Good Old Cause, or the Fundamental Lawes and Liberties of England ...; Firth and Davies, index, pp. 502-503.)

**BRAYFIELD, ALEXANDER**

In 1647 Captain Brayfield was an elected officer in Hewson's regiment but his political views and activities are unrecorded. During the summer months of 1648 he acted as governor of Dover Castle (Bodl. Tanner Ms., 57, f. 102; S.P. 28/56, f. 221). In 1649 when the regiment was selected by lot to serve in Ireland Brayfield went with it. In 1650 he left the regiment to become Major of Axtell's regiment (Firth and Davies (pp. 409, 626, 628) are muddled on this). In 1653 he was Lt. Colonel and when the regiment was disbanded in 1655 he was transferred to Henry Cromwell's, although it is possible that this transfer took place earlier. At the time of the Three Colonels' Petition he was a confidant of Ludlow's but when examined by Fleetwood he reported the former's involvement in distributing subversive literature. Fleetwood thought highly of him (Thurloe, III, p. 567).
In 1657 Henry Cromwell court martialled Brayfield. He associated Brayfield with the Baptist critics of his government and accused him of promoting seditious papers. Brayfield was sentenced to be cashiered but Oliver disapproved of Henry's action and urged that Brayfield should be reinstated. In 1659 he was given his own regiment (Firth and Davies, p. 670) and in October, like many of his fellow officers serving in Ireland, acquiesced in the coup (Mayer, 'Inedited Letters', pp. 264-266). In December his garrison, Athlone deserted him in favour of Coote and those who had seized Dublin Castle. He was one of the 30 persons whom the Irish Parliament proposed to except from the Act of Indemnity in 1661, (Firth and Davies, p. 670).

**BREMEN (BRAMEN), JOHN**

In 1647 Bremen was one of the original agitators of Rich's regiment and by December 1647 he was a Cornet (S.P. 28/49, f. 276). He was cashiered for his part in Overton's 'plot', by which time he was a Lieutenant, but reinstated to the regiment in 1659 as a Captain. He acquiesced in the October coup but was instrumental in ensuring the defection of the regiment to the Rump leaders in Portsmouth which it had been sent to reduce. He disapproved of the re-admission of the secluded members and was arrested in April 1660 on suspicion of participating in Lambert's rising. From 1679 to 1681 he was M.P. for Chichester. He was arrested in 1683 for alleged involvement in the Rye House Plot. After the Glorious Revolution he was Major of a regiment of 400 London citizen volunteers whose Colonel was King William.
In February 1690 he was a member of the Honourable Artillery Company and in 1692 he was appointed deputy governor of the Isle of Wight. In 1700 he became receiver of the customs at Plymouth.

(Bright and Davies; N. Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation, IV Vols., Oxford, 1857, index.)

BRIGHT, SIR JOHN (1619-1688)

b. 1619, son of Stephen Bright of Ecclesall and Jane dau. of George Westby of Whaley.

By 1643 Bright was a Colonel of foot and in 1648 his regiment was serving in the north. Bright had scruples about the army's proceedings especially about the King's execution. He left the army in 1650. His regiment was designated for Monck but the soldiery rejected this crying "a Lambert, a Lambert", to whom it finally went. Bright remained a respected figure in the eyes of his ex-colleagues and in 1654 Lambert wrote to him twice asking him to return to the army in a senior command, either to succeed Harrison or Rich, or even as a Major General of foot. Bright in fact became nominal governor of Hull, a position he held until February 1658. He was M.P. for the East Riding in 1654. He supported the Restoration and was knighted by Charles II on 16 July 1660.

(Firth and Davies, pp. 525-526, 555; Sir Henry Slingsby and Captain John Hodgson, Original Memoirs written during the Civil War, Edinburgh, 1806, pp. 127, 139-140; B.M. Add. Ms. 21, 417, f. 28; Sheffield City Library, Bright Papers, 78, ff. 1, 2; D.N.B.)
CHILLENDE, EDUARD (fl. 1637-1678)

Origins unknown but probably a button seller; early Civil War service. He was acquainted with John Lilburne but denounced him to the Star chamber in 1637 (E689(32), Lt. Colonel John Lilburne revived). In 1647 Chillenden, a Lieutenant in Whalley's regiment, was an elected officer and played an active part in army politics during that year showing quite a lot of sympathy with the agitators (Clarke Papers, I, index). In August John Lilburne used him as an intermediary between himself and the agitators over the question of trying to get his case heard at the Council of the Army (E406(26), The Just Man's Justification). However, he did not support the Leveller mutiny at Ware and Major Thomas Scott, the M.P. for Aldborough, was sent up to London in Chillenden's custody. In 1647 and 1648 he was involved in a polemical controversy in which he advocated the right of all persons to preach (Whitley, Baptist Bibliography, index). By 1650 Chillenden was a Captain in the regiment. In the autumn of 1653 he was cashiered from the army, or possibly was allowed to resign. The reason for this is unknown but by this time he had become a Fifth Monarchist. He was expelled from his Church at St. Paul's for immorality shortly afterwards (Firth and Davies, pp. 226-227; Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, p. 304n. Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A8, f. 127). He did not actively oppose the Protectorate and was quite willing to offer his services as an informer (Thurloe, IV, p. 365). He was not re-instated in 1659, but remained on the public stage after the Restoration.

(D.N.B., which is rather unsatisfactory); Capp, Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 245 and index (it is perhaps a bit misleading to call Chillenden
an "agitator" as Dr. Capp does. He was an elected officer); Brown, Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men, index; Whitley, Baptist Bibliography, index; Aylmer, State's Servants, p. 65.)

CLARKE (CLERKE), JOHN

In 1647 Clarke was an elected officer for Hardress Waller's regiment. He was vocal at Putney, and spoke of property qualifications as being at the root of voting rights. In 1651 he became Colonel of a regiment destined for Ireland but he spent most of his time in London. He was a member of Barebones and sat in the two Protectorate Parliaments and probably in Richard Cromwell's. He was appointed a commissioner of the Admiralty in December 1653. He retained his commission in the summer of 1659 despite being mistrusted by Ludlow as a Protectorian and by the Rump as being a member of the emerging Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. He adhered to the faction in October and was a member of the Committee of Safety. He was ordered to leave London in January 1660.

(Clarke Papers, I, index; Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 61, 81; Firth and Davies, pp. 449-450, 634-635, which is a bit muddled; Aylmer, State's Servants, p. 129.)

COBBETT, JOHN (fl. 1647-1657)

In 1647 Cobbett, a Major, acted as an elected officer for his regiment, Skippon's foot which was garrisoned in Newcastle. He tried to promote the Agreement at Ware and was court martialled in December and ordered to be cashiered. But the sentence was not carried out and Cobbett
remained in the army and fought in the second Civil War. In June 1649 was in trouble again, probably for trying to whip up support or sympathy for the Leveller rising. He was court martialled and this time he was in fact cashiered. However, the following year he was back in favour and held the rank of Adjutant General of foot in the invasion force against Scotland. He remained in the army and became a Lt. Colonel of Lambert's foot. He died in Scotland in January 1657.

Firth and Davies, Firth's edition of The Clarke Papers and Haller and Davies (The Leveller Tracts) muddle the identities of the three Cobbetts who were prominent at this time. The other two were Ralph, Lt. Colonel of Barksted's regiment in 1647 and afterwards a Colonel serving mostly in Scotland but adhering to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and Robert, a civilian and Leveller in 1647 but with the courtesy title of Major who went on to become a contractor for army clothing, and in the summer of 1659 Major of Ralph Cobbett's regiment. It seems very likely that the three were brothers. John Cobbett's will, made in 1656 and proved in 1657, names his brothers as Ralph and Robert (I am grateful to my supervisor Professor G. E. Aylmer for this information).

(Firth and Davies, index. (There is no Roger Cobbett, the reference to p. 473 is to Robert. The reference to C.S.P.D. 1649-50, p. 59 likewise refers to Robert, not John); Clarke Papers, I, pp. 407-408n.; ibid., II, p. 265 refers to Robert not John.)

COOPER, THOMAS (fl. 1651-d. 1659)

Said to have been a shopkeeper or salter in Southwark and an erstwhile member of Thomas Goodwin's Independent congregation (A Second Narrative
of the Late Parliament). His regiment was probably raised in London in 1650 or 1651 for service in Scotland. The regiment continued to serve in Scotland after the battle of Worcester but Cooper was not with the regiment all of the time. In December 1654, along with others, he presented proposals to advance reform to Cromwell which were looked upon as a great boost to the Protectorate at a time of difficulty in the face of opposition in Parliament and the Three Colonels' Petition. (Clarke Papers, III, p. 11). In the summer of 1655 he was appointed one of the Council of Scotland but in December of that year he was sent to command the forces in Ulster; his regiment in Scotland passed to the Lt. Colonel, Roger Sawrey (Firth and Davies, pp. 478-479; Brown, Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 157, ff) Cooper, a Baptist, was a supporter of Cromwell's Protectorate. In the disagreement between Henry Cromwell and the Baptist officers in Ireland Cooper acted as a mediator (Thurloe, IV, pp. 422-423, 433). His talents as a mediator were also employed in Ulster where he helped reconcile the Presbyterian ministers with Henry's government (Firth and Davies, pp. 668-669). Cooper opposed kingship, but was willing to accept it for reasons of state (Thurloe, VI, p. 157). He was one of the influential officers who met at Wallingford House in the spring of 1659 and supported the return of the Rump (Clarke Papers, III, pp. 143, 196). In the summer of 1659 he was given command of Fleetwood's horse regiment in Ireland and his old foot regiment passed to Alexander Brayfield. He returned to Ireland and was there in October when the coup against the Rump took place. Like most of his colleagues there he acquiesced in the coup and disapproved of Monck's reactions (Mayer, 'Inedited Letters', pp. 264-266, 272-273. Firth and Davies (p. 125) are inaccurate to
call him a "thoroughgoing supporter of the army" (i.e. the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction). He died on 21 December 1659 (ibid., p. 126).

COURTNEY, HUGH (fl. 1649–1666)
Origins unclear, but possibly a gent. of Cornwall. M.A. Oxford 1649 probably for part in suppressing the Levellers. In the early 1650's he held positions in the army as deputy governor of Beaumarais and governor of Anglesea. In 1650 and 1651 he was Quarter Master General. Under Barebones he was a member of the Council of State. He became a prominent Fifth Monarchist opponent of the Protectorate, although it is not clear whether he was still a member of the army at the time of his imprisonment in 1655 for allegedly encouraging armed rebellion against the Protectorate; probably he was not, but if so then only in a formal sense. He was detained and arrested on subsequent occasions including one in February 1658 for possessing subversive literature for distribution to disaffect the army. On 14 July 1659 Colonel John Jones requested the nominating committee to make Courtney governor of Beaumarais, of which Jones was then governor, but nothing came of this. In April 1660 a warrant was issued by the Council of State for the arrest of Courtney and William Allen for endeavouring to disaffect the soldiery. He was in prison until 1663 and was reported to be stirring up trouble in Essex and Hertfordshire in 1666.

(W. R. Williams, The Parliamentary History of the Principality of Wales, Brecknock, 1895, p. 3; Capp, Fifth Monarchists, p. 247 and index.)
DEANE, RICHARD

1647 Captain and elected officer in Robert Lilburne's foot regiment. He remained active in army politics until at least 1650 by which time he was more involved in non-army administrative work. He should not be confused with his more famous namesake and cousin, Admiral Richard Deane (q.v. below), who was an Adjutant General and Grandee in 1647. Firth and Davies (index sub Deane, Richard) confuse the two. Their entries on pp. 456, 460 refer to the future Treasurer at War not to the Admiral. In the 1650's Deane acted as more of an administrative official than as a member of the army, but he probably still kept his commission and most certainly his title. By February 1659 he was closely involved in the inner army circles in London and in May he became clerk to the Council of State. In the autumn of that year he sided with the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and was employed as an intermediary between them and Monck. The latter accused Deane of trying to disaffect his forces. At the Restoration Deane was banned from holding public office for life. (Firth and Davies, pp. 456, 460; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 161, 176, 413, 145; ibid., II, pp. 156, 224, 272; ibid., III, pp. 5, 183, 187; ibid., IV, pp. 105, 107, 142, 149, 174, 300; Aylmer, State's Servants, pp. 99, 244, 277, 393, 419.)

DEANE, RICHARD (1610-1653)

b. 1610, y. son of Edward Deane of Temple Guiting, Gloucestershire. Probably entered a mercantile career in London under the patronage of his close relation Sir Richard Deane, Lord Mayor in 1623-29. Possibly became a ship owner.
Deane fought in the Civil War for Parliament and in 1647 was Adjutant General. When Thomas Rainborowe was appointed Vice-Admiral in September 1647 Deane took over command of his foot regiment which he kept until early 1649. Deane was a regicide. In February 1649 he was appointed one of the three 'Generals at sea' and gave up his army command. However, in his subsequent career until his death in 1653 he alternated between spells in the navy and spells in the army. Interestingly, his marriage to Mary, daughter of John Grymesditch of Knottingly, Yorkshire on 21 May 1647, was witnessed by Robert Lilburne and Thomas Rainborowe. (D.N.B.; Firth and Davies, index sub Deane, Richard, except pp. 456, 460, q.v. above; Clarke Papers, II, index, sub Deane, Richard, Adjutant General and Colonel.)

ESSEX, SIR THOMAS (fl. 1647)

Headed a list of 14 signatories to a Presbyterian petition presented to both Houses of Parliament on 22 March 1647 (L.J., IX, pp. 95-96). Although the signatories have military titles this petition should be distinguished from a totally different petition circulating in the army at this time. The identity of Essex is a bit of a mystery. A Colonel Essex was governor of Bristol in 1643 and was arrested by Nathaniel Fiennes for misconduct (D.N.B., sub Fiennes, Nathaniel). A London pedigree of 1568 of the Essex family has an undated addition showing a grandson called Thomas Essex who might be the same man as the Colonel of 1647 (I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor G. E. Aylmer, for this and the previous reference). There appear to be no other references to Colonel Essex other than the petition dating from 1647.
EVELYN, ARTHUR

In July 1647 Evelyn signed a letter from various agitators and elected officers to Wales. He attended the Council of War at Reading in the same month. He appears to have left the regiment by July 1648 but he remained in the army with the title of Adjutant General and the position of governor of Wallingford Castle in Berkshire. Whetelocke found him very "civil". In November 1648 he was one of the officers on the committee to prepare a final draft of the Remonstrance. In the course of 1648 and early 1649 he commanded his own troop, an unattached troop, possibly belonging to the Berkshire militia, which was intended to be incorporated, along with other loose troops into a regiment under Henry Marten. This regiment was never formed. Evelyn remained governor of Wallingford Castle until it was demolished in 1652. He seems to have fiddled some of the money provided for the demolition of the castle and on 13 May 1653 he was ordered to pay back some money to the Exchequer. By July 1659 he had his own militia troop in Berkshire and in August he was appointed commander of the guards for Parliament but was dismissed by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction after the October coup. In February 1660 Monck made him Colonel of Salmon's regiment, a post he held until the following June.

EYRES, WILLIAM

In 1647 a member of the army. He was arrested for his part in the War's mutiny. In 1648, along with Henry Marten, he raised a regiment in Berkshire. The following year, as a civilian, he was detained after the Leveller mutiny in May and imprisoned in Oxford where he helped provoke the revolt in September. He was released in August 1650 (C.S.P.D. 1650, p. 263). In January 1655 he was arrested on suspicion of involvement in Wildman's plot in Dublin where he had gone on personal business. In April, still a prisoner in Dublin he was reported to be growing physically and mentally ill and to be demanding either a trial or that he be allowed to take part in the Western Design (Thurloe, III, pp. 124, 126, 364). In January 1660 the restored Rump gave him command of Lambert's former regiment, but he was soon ousted from this by Monck. His origins are unknown but it is possible that he came from a rural middle class background (G. E. Aylmer, 'Gentlemen Levellers?', Past and Present, 49, 1970, pp. 124-125). There were three other Eyres (or Ayres) active during the English Revolution who are apt to be confused. A different William Eyre was the recruiter M.P. for Chippenham, Wiltshire. He also sat in the first Protectorate Parliament and in Richard Cromwell's Parliament. He was the son and heir of Sir William Eyre of Neston, Wiltshire (Yule, Independents, p. 96; H.M.C. Duke of Buccleuch and Queensbury, I, p. 311; Underdown, Pride's Purge, index. Underdown (p. 186) confuses William Eyre the M.P. with Thomas Eyres the governor of Hurst). It is possible that he also served in the army in two
capacities, namely as Colonel of a foot regiment which was disbanded early in 1648 and the following year as governor of Malmsbury, Wiltshire, hence his title of Colonel in Richard Cromwell's Parliament (S.P. 28/49, f. 46; S.P. 28/50, f. 292; S.P. 28/51, f. 36; S.P. 28/60, f. 426; Burton, IV, index). Thomas Eyres was governor of Hurst Castle in November 1648 and again from September 1659 (Clarke Papers, II, pp. 61, 66; S.P. 28/60, f. 144; S.P. 23/61, f. 634; C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 226). The third Eyres was also called William, son of Giles Eyres of White in Wiltshire. He was a minister and pastor of a church in Salisbury and published several tracts. He was also an assistant commissioner for the ejection of scandalous ministers in Wiltshire. (Peck, Desiderata Curiosa, II, p. 493 + n.; Wing, Short Title Catalogue)

GREGORY, JOHN

the 1646 trooper in Rich's regiment. Reported to Council of War for erroneous doctrines. 1655 Quarter Master in the regiment and cashiered for implication in Overton's 'plot'. He was reinstated in 1659.

GRIMES (GRIME), MARK

1647 Lt. Colonel of Lambert's foot regiment. He was suspected of having a hand in promoting the March petition. In January 1648 pay for Constable's regiment was issued through him. In December of that year he received payment for Gloucester garrison of which he was deputy-governor. In April 1649 some of his fellow officers arrested Grimes on various, unknown, charges probably to do with alleged dis-
orders in the garrison. The Mayor of Gloucester wrote to Fairfax on Grimes's behalf. The outcome of the charges is unknown but Grimes was out of the army in the 1650's. However, in 1659 he returned to the army as governor of Cardiff (C.J., V, p. 128; S.P. 28/45, f. 452; S.P. 28/50, f. 129; S.P. 28/57, f. 327; N.M.C. Leyborne-Popham, p. 16; Firth and Davies, p. 40; C.S.P.D. 1659–60, pp. 36, 221).

**HACKER, FRANCIS** (d. 1660)

third son of Francis Hacker of East Bridgford and Colston Basset, Notts.; m. Isabella dau. of Gabriel Brunts of East Bridgeford, 5 July 1632.

Despite the fact that the rest of his family were Royalists Hacker fought for Parliament from early on in the Civil War. His part in army politics between 1647 and 1649 is largely unrecorded but he was one of the three officers to whom the warrant for the King's execution was addressed and he supervised the execution itself. His regiment saw service in Scotland and England. Hacker attended the meetings prior to the drawing up of the Three Colonels' Petition (Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A41, f. 360). One modern historian says that Hacker was a government spy (N. Ashley, John Wildman, London, 1947, p. 86). He arrested Lord Grey of Groby in 1655 (Thurloe, III, p. 168) which at least indicates a degree of commitment to, or acquiescence in, the Protectorate. The case for him being a spy is not proven and yet it cannot be denied that he was involved in the meetings and that no action was taken against him. His subsequent career adds to the mystery. He was closely associated with Haselrig allegedly to the point whereby "he
was more diligent in obeying Sir Arthur's than God's commands" (Hutchinson, Memoirs, II, p. 179). In late 1657 he was a member of Wildman's Republican club whose other members included Haselrig and Okey (Walker, 'Secret Service', p. 235). At Haselrig's instigation, he was also the first Colonel to receive his commission directly from the Speaker in the summer of 1659. Haselrig wanted to see him in command of the Nottingham militia but withdrew this. One Royalist observer described Hacker as "a dear creature" of Haselrig (Clarendon State Papers, III, p. 530). Also during the summer Royalists made approaches to Hacker in the hope of winning him over to Charles Stuart with the promise of a pardon but Hacker informed the authorities of this (C. Clar. S.P., IV, pp. 232, 265, 346). Hacker remained loyal to the Rump in October and was purged by the Lambert/Bisborowe/Fleetwood faction. He worked for the return of the Rump and was re-commissioned. He remained in service until after the Restoration, and although technically not a regicide he was excepted from the Act of Indemnity, tried and executed. He put up little defence at his trial commenting "truly, I have been no Councillor, no Adviser, nor Abetter of it (high treason), but in obedience to the Command over me I did act. My Desire hath been ever for the Welfare of my Country, and that Civil Power might stand" (State Trials, II, p. 386)

a fitting description not just of Hacker's own role in politics but also for a great many of his colleagues.

(E. Young, 'A History of Colston Bassett, Notts.', Thoroton Society, 9, 1942; C. Brown, Lives of the Nottinghamshire Worthies, London, 1882; A. E. Lawson Lowe, 'Some Account of the Hacker Family', Old Nottinghamshire, 1st Series, 1881, pp. 130-133; D.N.B. (Firth is perhaps a little misleading in describing Hacker as "a strict presbyterian". He was no political Presbyterian); Firth and Davies, index.)
HOBDSON, PAUL (fl. c. 1643-c. 1666)

Origins obscure but either a tailor or surgeon. Hobson was denounced by Thomas Edwards for his alleged religious extremism. He served in Robert Lilburne's foot regiment and in 1647 was Major. Sir Lewis Dyve recommended him as an intermediary between Charles I and John Lilburne. There is no evidence to suggest that he was a Leveller. John Lilburne respected him personally. In December 1647 Haselrig took over command of the regiment from Robert Lilburne (who returned to his horse regiment) and was appointed governor of Newcastle. Hobson acted as his deputy. He became Lt. Colonel of the regiment in 1648 after the death of Henry Lilburne, governor of Tynemouth who declared for the Royalists but was killed in the subsequent storming of the castle. He remained in the north during the revolution of 1648-1649. It is unclear when he left the army but during the 1650's he devoted his energies to ministerial work in the north where he was very influential in Baptist circles. He was critical of Cromwell's assumption of the Protectorate. After the Restoration he was constantly under suspicion and was arrested twice. Eventually he was released on condition that he emigrate to Carolina where he appears to have died in 1666.

JONES, JOHN (c. 1593-1660)
b. c. 1593, y. son of Thomas Jones of Maesygarnedd and Ellen, dau. of Robert Wynne of Taltrenddyn; educ. unknown but apprenticed in London to the Middleton family of Denbighshire and London; m. (1) Margaret, dau. of John Edwards of Stansty, Denbighshire, died 19 November 1651 in Dublin, (2) Catherine Whetstone, widow and sister of Oliver Cromwell, 1656.

Jones fought for the Parliament in the first Civil War and became M.P. for Merioneth in September 1647. He was also a regicide and commanded at this time a troop of horse which despite the confusion in Firth and Davies (p. 189) became a part of Harrison's regiment. Jones himself served in various important posts under the Commonwealth as a member of the first two Councils of State and as one of the Irish Commissioners. He disapproved of Cromwell's assumption of the Protectorate but possibly because of his marriage to the Protector's sister became reconciled to it. In 1657 he was summoned to the 'Other House'. At this time he was also governor of Anglesey. The restored Rump trusted him enough to make him one of the new Council of State. In July 1659 he arrived in Ireland as one of the commissioners for the government of Ireland and when Ludlow returned to England after the coup against the Rump in October Jones was appointed acting Commander-in-Chief. Jones acquiesced in the coup but in December was ousted from his command in the seizure of Dublin Castle by officers sympathising with Monck. He was charged with high treason on 19 January 1660 but released on giving an assurance not to act against the existing government. In June he was arrested and tried and executed as a regicide.

KESEY, THOMAS (fl. 1645-1680?)

Origins obscure but possibly a button-maker in London.

By 1647 Kelsey was a Major in Ingoldsby's foot regiment and in the following year he was Lt. Colonel (Firth and Davies, pp. 374-375.
The D.N.B. is muddled on this). He became deputy governor of Oxford and was quite active in army politics in late 1648 and early 1649, but firmly committed to the official line. In 1651 he became governor of Dover Castle in succession to Algernon Sydney and thus left Ingoldsby's regiment. He supported Cromwell's assumption of the Protectorate and along with Lambert and Berry was said to have persuaded many of the Barebones assembly to give up their power. He was an M.P. in the two Protectorate Parliaments and in Richard Cromwell's. As Major General of Kent and Surrey he tried to secure the return of members favourable to Cromwell and The Instrument to the second Protectorate Parliament. He opposed kingship. In 1659 he supported the restoration of the Rump which confirmed him in his office as governor of Dover on 18 July (C.J., VII, pp. 669, 723). It was probably because of this that some of his opponents in Kent drew up Articles of High Crimes and Grand Misdemeanors against him accusing him of playing a leading part in
helping promote The Instrument in December 1653, of being disaffected to the Commonwealth and rights and liberties of the people, of arbitrary behaviour as Major General, of trying to secure the return of malignants as M.P.s, and even of supporting the Treaty of Newport in 1648. The charges are fanciful and were considered to be so at the time as no action was taken against Kelsey. The accusation of too much commitment to the Protectorate implicit in the charges could just as easily have been levelled at many of the other officers including Lambert, Disborowe and Fleetwood themselves. Kelsey was an active member of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and was one of those officers cashiered by the Rump in October 1659, the immediate cause of the coup against it. With the return of the Rump Kelsey was ordered to leave London. In March 1660 he engaged himself to live peacefully to the Council of State, but at the Restoration he fled abroad returning in 1666 and may well have lived out the rest of his years as a brewer.

(D.N.B.; Firth and Davies, index; Everritt, Community of Kent, index; E993(8) Articles of High Crimes and Grand Misdemeanors exhibited against Lt. Colonel Thomas Kelsey ... (28 July) 1659.)

KINGDOM, RICHARD (fl. 1647-1659)

Kingdom was one of the agitators of Cromwell's horse regiment in 1647. He is probably the same man as the Captain Richard Kingdom whom Alured was recommended to contact when he went to Ireland in 1654 but whom Fleetwood considered "a very faithfull servant" to Cromwell. On 12 March 1656 a Captain Richard Kingdom was appointed comptroller of the
prize goods and on 8 July 1659 a Richard Kingdom was suggested as Judge Advocate of the army in Ireland. It is not clear if these two men were the same. On 13 October the Army Committee was instructed on the direction of Haselrig and Colonels Walton and Morley, three of the seven commissioners appointed by the Rump to govern the army before its dissolution to pay Captain Richard Kingdom £200 for army contingencies out of the 12 months assessment.

(Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A.41, f. 561; Thurloe, III, p. 183; C.S.P.D. 1655-56, p. 220; ibid., 1659-60, pp. 13, 251 (there are plenty of references to Richard Kingdom, comptroller of prize goods in the State Papers Domestic); Clarke Papers,II, pp. 92, 166, 438.)

LAMBERT, JOHN (1619-1684)
Son of Josias Lambert of Calton and Anne dau. of George Pigott of Hesketh; educ. possibly Trinity, Cambridge and then one of Inns of Court; m. Frances, dau. of Sir William Lister of Thornton in Craven, Yorkshire.

After distinguished service on behalf of Parliament, Lambert was by 1647 Colonel of foot in the New Model. He returned from the north early in 1647 and played an important part in events between March and July assisting Ireton to draw up the Heads of the Proposals. He took over command of the Northern Brigade in August and possibly became a Colonel of horse as well (Firth and Davies, p. 253; but c.f. Bodl. Tanner Ms. 56, f. 1). Thus, he only played an indirect role in the important political developments leading up to the trial and execution of the King, although it is possible that he returned for brief visits to army headquarters in the south on army business (The Moderate, 7-14 November 1647; B.M. Add. Ms. 36996 (Fairfax transcripts), f. 148). He
was in London from June 1649 and from then on began to emerge as an important political figure in the army and in national politics.


LILBURN, ROBERT (1613–1665)

b. 1613, first son of Richard Lilburne of Thickley Poucherdon, Durham and Margaret, dau. of Thomas Hixon, yeoman of the wardrobe to Queen Elizabeth; m. Margaret dau. of Richard Beke of Hadenham, Bucks.

Entered the Parliamentary army at the start of the Civil War and was a Colonel in foot in 1647. He played an important part in opposing the Presbyterian attempt to disband the army in that year. His regiment was one of those which marched to Corkbush Field in November without authority. In 1647 he returned to the north and to his old regiment of horse. He served in the north as one of the seven commissioners charged with the management of the northern forces and remained there until January 1649. He was a regicide. From 1652–1654 he was Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, a post in which he felt himself out of his depth. He supported the expulsion of the Rump and Cromwell's establishment as Lord Protector. He acted as Lambert's deputy Major-General mostly in Yorkshire and Durham. He was a member of the second Protectorate Parliament and opposed kingship. In the autumn of 1659 supported the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. He was Lambert's
stauncest ally when both faced Monck in the north. With the collapse of the faction Lilburne's political and military career was over. After the Restoration he was tried and sentenced to death, but this was commuted to life imprisonment. He died in 1665 a prisoner in St. Nocholas Island, near Plymouth. The connections between Robert and his younger brother John are interesting. According to John (E400(55), Jonah's Cry Out of the Whale's Belly) Cromwell invited him to join the New Model in a letter of 9 December 1645, delivered by John. There appear to have been no contacts between the brothers in the crucial period from March 1647 to May 1649, although Paul Hobson, Robert Lilburne's Major, was recommended as an intermediary between the King and the Leveller leader by Sir Lewis Dyve. In October 1647 John's The Innocent Man's Second Proffer made unto his present Adversaries (B.M. 669 f. 14 (28)) was delivered "unto them by his loving brother Col. Robert Lilburne". Robert was also present at John's trial in the same month. In May 1651 John acted on behalf of his brother in the discovery of delinquents.

(D.N.B.; H. L. Robson, 'George Lilburne, Mayor of Sunderland', Antiquities of Sunderland, XXII, 1960; Gregg, Freeborn John, index; M. James, Family, Lineage and Society, Oxford, 1974, pp. 89-90; S.P. 19/22, ff. 201, 208, 213; C.C.A.M., pp. 1064, 1339, 1344, Firth and Davies, index.)

LILBURRE, THOMAS (1622-1665)

b. 1622, first son of George Lilburne of Sunderland and cousin of Robert and John.
In 1644 Thomas was a Captain in Robert Lilburne’s regiment of horse. In February 1650 he successfully defended himself against charges of stirring up the soldiery against the officers and of being over-zealous in making enquiries about whether the soldiers had paid for their quarters. The latter charge seems curious. Perhaps he was suspected of trying to make the army unpopular in the eyes of the people by drawing attention to free quarter. In 1656 he was M.P. for Durham and in 1658 for Newcastle. He was a keen supporter of the Protectorate and made his views quite clear to Thurloe. In the summer of 1659 he was purged, but was instrumental with Fairfax and others in securing York in January 1660. On 8 February he was restored to the regiment by Monck with the rank of Major but after the Restoration, when the regiment passed to Aubrey de Vere, Earl of Oxford, Lilburne became a Captain again. The regiment was disbanded on 15 November 1660. In 1663 Lilburne and his father were implicated in a supposed rising.

(H.N.C. Levborne-Popham, pp. 56-57; Clarke Papers, IV, p. 239; Robson, 'George Lilburne', pp. 120, 122 (Robson is wrong to suggest that Lilburne was a part of Monck's force that came from Scotland); Firth and Davies, pp. 273-277.)

NICHOLS, FRANCIS

Origins unknown. In April 1647 Nichols was an Ensign in Robert Lilburne's regiment and was arrested for distributing the army petition of the previous month. He was released by the Commons the following month (q.v. Chapter One, Section 1). By November 1649 he
was a Lieutenant and by 1650 he was a Captain and served in Scotland in the 1650's. He adhered to Monck in 1659 and was made a Major. He became Surveyor of the Ordnance of the Tower at the Restoration and resigned his Majority in March 1662. (E417(15), Remonstrance from Colonel Lilburne's Regiment; Firth and Davies, pp. 535-545. Firth and Davies wrongly suggest in the index that Ensign Nichols and the future Major are two different people.)

OKEY, JOHN (c. 1606-1662)
of London, origins unclear but probably a citizen of some substance. After service early in the war Okey was appointed Colonel of the New Model dragoons. He was quite active in army politics between 1647 and 1649, and was a regicide. In 1650 Okey was involved in a dispute with one of his Lieutenants, Francis Freeman, whom he tried to get to resign. Freeman was a Ranter. He drew attention to Okey's shortcomings as a politician saying he was apt to "hear with other men's ears, see with other men's eyes and speak the language of other men". Okey had qualms about the dissolution of the Rump and went on to oppose the Protectorate actively with the Three Colonels' Petition for which he was cashiered. His recently acquired landholdings in Bedfordshire involved him in local affairs there. He was arrested in 1656 and 1658. In the late 1650's he was a member of Wildman's Republican club in London which met at Nonsuch in Bow Street. Other members included Henry Marten, Haselrig and Colonel Francis Hacker, a serving officer. Okey like Saunders, but unlike Alured, was restored to the army before the restoration of the Rump in May 1659 but adhered to the Parliament
in October. In 1660 Okey remained consistent to his Rumper Republicanism and emerged to challenge Monck over the slide towards a Restoration. He was purged in late March and joined in Lambert's ill-fated rising in April after which he escaped to the Netherlands only to be captured in 1662 by George Downing. He was tried and executed along with Darksted and Miles Corbet, fellow regicides. There were reportedly 5,000 Quakers and Fifth Monarchists at his funeral. 


OVERTON, ROBERT (c. 1609-1668)  
Son and heir of John Overton of Easington in Holderness, Yorkshire; edu. St. John's, Cambridge, Gray's Inn; m. Anne, dau. of Jeremy Gardiner of Stratford, Dow, 1632.  
Early service in the Civil War in the north. He probably became Colonel of Herbert's foot regiment in July 1647. Firth speculates either June or July, but he was in the north at the time when the agitators of the northern regiments seized Major General Sydenham Poyntz in July; although he had been in London in May (B.M. Add. Ms. 18979, f. 236).  
Earlier in 1647 Ferdinando Fairfax had written to his son Thomas urging him to give Overton a command in the army. Thomas Fairfax replied on 23 March saying that he would be glad to have "so deserving a man into the army" but for the moment that was not possible. However, judging from Overton's wife's letter to Ferdinando Fairfax he was reluctant to serve in the south. It could be that he felt piqued at Lambert, being
chosen as northern commander rather than he. On 22 October 1647 Cromwell wrote to Thomas Fairfax mentioning that a commander was needed for Hull and that the townsmen and soldiery had expressed a desire for Overton to be governor. Cromwell supported this and recommended that Overton be sent down to command the existing units there rather than take his own regiment there. Fairfax was still technically governor of Hull, but in practice the command had been held by a deputy, John Maleverer, who appears to have been popular with the corporation of Hull. Overton became governor of Hull early in 1648. His foot regiment passed to George Fenwick in May 1649. At Hull Overton became involved in a dispute with the local Presbyterian ministers one of whom was said to have prayed against the army and Overton. Overton was supported by Fairfax. He served in Scotland for some of the time during the 1650's and was cashiered and imprisoned for his part in the 'plot' which bears his name. He was considered a Republican hero and victim of arbitrary government by a single person and restored to the army in 1659 and until the Restoration he maintained quite an independent attitude towards the political crises, but he remained firmly committed to the 'good old cause'.

(Clarke Papers, I, p. 88n; Firth and Davies, pp. 529-530, 546-561; Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, II, p. 333; Cary, Memorials, I, pp. 298-299; B.M. Add. Ms. 18, 979, ff. 236, 253 pr. in Bell, Fairfax Correspondence, II, pp. 10-12; B.M. Sloane Ms. 1519, f. 170; H.N.C. Portland, I, pp. 468, 471, 473; Venn (eds.), Alumni Cantabrigienses, Part I, III, p. 239; D.N.B.)
READE, THOMAS

1647 Lt. Colonel in Herbert's regiment. On 18 July 1647 he was appointed a member of the committee of officers to advise Fairfax upon matters concerning the army. At Putney he said that participation in the election of a representative was a privilege but felt that there was no reason

"why any man that is a native ought to bee excluded that priviledge, unless from voluntaric servitude."

However, he seems to have shed his somewhat radical sympathies. In 1651 he took over the command of Sexby's regiment after the latter was cashiered. The regiment remained in Scotland throughout the 1650's. In 1659 he adhered to Monck and worked closely with him. His regiment was one of those which marched with Monck into England. The regiment, and its Colonel, were disbanded in October 1660.

(Clarke Papers, I, pp. 52, 217, 341-342; Firth and Davies, pp. 563-568.)

REYNOLDS, JOHN (1625-1657)

Third son of Sir James Reynolds, of Castle Camps, Cambridgeshire; edu. St. Catherine's, Cambridge, M. Temple. Brother of Sir Robert Reynolds, Solicitor-General to the Commonwealth, 1650. Reynolds joined the parliamentary army quite early. He became a Captain in Cromwell's horse regiment and until 1648 was a strong Leveller sympathiser. He was cashiered in April 1648 for trying to promote a petition in the army which contained all the tenets of the Leveller programme in considerable detail (Perfect Occurrences, 21-28 April 1648, 23 April-4 May 1648; The Moderate Intelligencer, 27 April-4 May 1648. Firth
and Davies (pp. 202, 606) are wrong about the cause for Reynolds leaving the regiment. During the second Civil War he became commander of a volunteer regiment of horse made up of many radicals, but by the latter part of the year he was beginning to work his passage and to conform much more with the official army line, and he played a leading part in the suppression of the Levellers at Durford for which he earned the opprobrium of his erstwhile sympathisers. He served in Ireland in the early 1650's and was one of the Irish M.P.'s in 1654 and 1656. He was a keen supporter of Cromwell and the Protectorate, supported kingship and was a confidant of Henry Cromwell's. He was knighted by Oliver in 1655. In May 1657 he was appointed Commander of the British expeditionary force to Flanders, an appointment with which he soon grew disillusioned. He died in a shipwreck while returning to England in December 1657. The argument that Reynolds was suspected of traitorous behaviour after a meeting he had had with the Duke of York is refuted above (Chapter Six, Section I).

(D.N.B.: Clarke Papers, I, II and III, index sub Reynolds, John; Venn (eds.), Alumni Cantabrigienses, III, p. 445.)

ROLPH, EDMUND

1647 an elected officer in Robert Hammond's regiment. In 1648 was accused of plotting to kill the King. By 1654 he appears to have been unfit for military service.

(Clarke Papers, I, p. 436; ibid., II, pp. 55, 64; C.S.P.D. 1654, p. 352.)
ROSE, JAMES

April 1647 Ensign in George Weldon’s troop, Robert Lilburne’s regiment. Gave evidence of attempts to co-ordinate discontent over pay arrears. Remained in service and became a Captain in March 1650. He died the following year on active service in Scotland.

(Firth and Davies, pp. 460, 535-536.)

SANKEY (ZANCHY), JEROME (HIEROME)

Son of Richard Sankey of Shropshire; edu. Trinity and Clare Colleges, Cambridge; Fellow of All Souls, Oxford, 1648, Proctor 1649 (Venn (eds.) Alumni Cantabrigienses, IV, p. 20 where his christian name is wrongly given as Jeremy).

Sankey saw service in the Civil War as a Captain in Sir William Ireton's horse regiment. His troop was disbanded early in 1648 by which time Sankey had become a Major (S.P. 28/51, ff. 118, 126). In 1649 he went to Ireland as a Major in the first division of Cromwell's double regiment (S.P. 28/60, f. 356). In January 1650 on the death of Thomas Horton, Sankey transferred to his regiment and became Colonel. He was active in the Irish campaigns. He was an assignee of Bridget Ireton and administrator to Henry Ireton for money due to him as Lord Deputy (S.P. 28/90, ff. 418, 420). Sankey became a Baptist in 1653 (N.L.W. Ms. 11440D, ff. 145-146. Mayer ('Inedited Letters', p. 216) wrongly gives the year as 1652). Henry Cromwell regarded him as an enemy but Sankey was subsequently knighted by him. He served in all three Protectorate Parliaments which meant that he
was in England for long periods of time. In Richard Cromwell's Parliament Sankey accused Sir William Petty of extortion and corruption among other things, while the latter had been Surveyor-General in Ireland. He commanded the cavalry unit of the Irish brigade and was mainly responsible for the Derby petition and adhered to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. He was purged at the return of the Rump. After the Restoration he retained some of the lands he had acquired in Ireland and died in 1687 (Firth and Davies, pp. 90-91). Sankey's nephew, Richard, was a Captain in Fleetwood's horse regiment but left it in October 1651 (ibid., pp. 91, 97; B.M. Add. Ms. 18986, f. 40).

SAUNDERS, ROBERT

1645-1647 Major in Robert Hammond's regiment. In 1647 Saunders was quite active in opposing the Irish service and at the end of April was summoned before the Commons for his activity in this respect. By November 1648 he was Lt. Colonel of the regiment (now Ewer's). He helped secure Carisbrooke and the Isle of Wight and probably went with the regiment to Ireland in 1649. In Ireland he eventually commanded his own regiment. In 1659, as governor of Kinsale, he supported a restoration of the Rump and adhered to Ludlow after the coup against Dublin Castle in December. He kept his lands at the Restoration. Firth (Clarke Papers, I, p. 19n.) confuses him with Thomas Saunders one of the Three Colonels. (Firth and Davies, pp. 659-660.)
of Ireton and Caldwell, Derbyshire, armigerous.

Saunders had been one of the first in his county to take a commission to raise forces to fight under Sir John Gell. In 1644 Saunders was involved in a dispute with Gell. He was accused by Gell of being a Brownist which Saunders denied, accusing Gell in turn of nepotism. Early in 1645 Saunders was confined by Gell and ordered to resign his commission by Essex. He was charged with refusing to obey orders and for refusing to give up his old commission and accept a new one, possibly because it would reduce his freedom to appoint officers to his troop. There were also charges of being a separatist, of heavy-handedness in raising money, fraud and cowardice. Saunders was able to get testimonials refuting these charges, and said that his men had petitioned that he might be made Colonel without his knowledge. In effect, Saunders was unhappy with the way Gell, and ultimately Essex, had been conducting the war. He applied to the Fairfaxes to intervene, and Sir Thomas Fairfax and Sir William Constable spoke favourably of him but did not want to get involved in a clash with Essex. The affair took place in the period just after the New Model ordinance had been passed and Fairfax had been appointed Lord General but before Essex resigned his command early in April. However, Ferdinando Fairfax wrote to Gell asking for Saunders' enlargement. Saunders saw active service over the summer and autumn of 1645. He also appears to have drawn up counter-charges against Gell of advancing cavaliers and dissolutes, scoffing at Godliness, military incompetence and fraud. Saunders was given permission by Sir William Brereton to
absent himself from the siege of Chester to attend the House of Commons. On 5 March 1646 Nathaniel Barton, a fellow Derbyshire man who at one stage Gell had appointed interim commander of Saunders' men, wrote to Saunders from Liskeard where Fairfax and the New Model were on service to inform him that Fairfax had told him that he was loath to pay any attention to what Gell had said about Saunders and that he, Cromwell and Ireton had talked about Saunders and that they would try to get Saunders and his men incorporated into the New Model as soon as possible. If this could not be done, they promised that Saunders and his officers would get commands in existing New Model regiments. Barton himself got a commission in Graves' regiment with which he was happy. On 20 April he wrote again to Saunders urging him to wait upon Fairfax at Oxford. In the end Saunders became an officer in Thornhaugh's regiment, which became a part of the New Model in June 1647. The energy expended by Saunders, and especially by Barton, to become part of the New Model shows how prestigious that body had become. In 1648 Saunders succeeded Thornhaugh as Colonel (Thornhaugh was killed at the battle of Preston). Mrs. Hutchinson claimed that he was a Cromwellian appointee and that the men would have preferred her husband, but as we have seen Saunders was popular with Fairfax and Ireton as well. Saunders was politically unimportant between 1647 and 1649. He was cashiered for his part in the Three Colonels' Petition. Like Okey, but unlike Alured, Saunders returned to the army before the restoration of the Rump in May 1659. He supported the Parliament in October. However, his actions over the summer in Derbyshire during Doth's
rising put him under suspicion. He was suspected of not being forceful enough against the Royalists and even of complicity in the rising. Barton also fell under suspicion. The Commissioners for Sequestration considered there was enough evidence for Saunders' goods to be seized and Saunders was urged by his friends to defend himself. Investigations continued even after the coup, although they were hampered by the political insecurity of these months. The charge of complicity was unfounded, that of laxity against the Royalists had perhaps more truth in it, but the reasons for this laxity are impossible to determine. Both Saunders and Barton appear to have vindicated themselves from the charges, or else they were dropped. Both were active in the Midlands for the return of the Rump. In January 1660 Major James Fulwood, county sequestration commissioner for Derby, reported that Saunders had ordered two well-known figures in the county who had favoured Booth's rising and even a restoration of the Stuarts, to secure all arms in Derbyshire and to send home the militia but there is nothing to suggest that Saunders was himself a Royalist. The two were said to be threatening the sequestration commissioners. Fulwood feared that the Rump was in danger of loosing the county because of this. However, Saunders and Barton were made Colonel and Major of Swallow's late regiment (Monck had filled their places in Saunders' old regiment, part of which was serving in Scotland because the two did not join it). Phillips suggests that both men inclined towards re-admitting the secluded members in February 1660. Saunders helped suppress Lambert's rising in April. In June 1660 Lord Falkland was appointed Colonel of the regiment and Saunders disappeared from the
national stage. Unlike Okey and Alured he had easily shed his earlier commitment to the good old cause.


STYLES, WILLIAM

1647 Captain of Lambert's regiment and active in opposing the Irish service for which he, and others, were summoned before the Commons in late April. By October 1651 he was a Major in the regiment then under Constable. After Constable's death in 1655 he probably became Lt. Colonel of the regiment which passed to John Biscoe. He retained his commission in the summer of 1659 and was dropped from the regiment in June 1660, which tends to imply that he remained loyal to the Rump in October. He was of no importance in army politics.

(C.J., V, pp. 154, 184; Firth and Davies, pp. 401, 402, 404.)

SEXBY, EDWARD (1616?-1658)

Origins unclear; in his testimony before the Commons at the end of April 1647 Sexby said he was a Suffolk man but it seems very likely that he was Edward, son of Marcus Sexby of London, gentleman, and was apprenticed to Edward Price of the Grocers' Company in 1632 (Clarke
Papers, I, p. 431; Aylmer, 'Gentlemen Levellers?', pp. 120-121).

In 1647 he was a trooper in Fairfax's regiment and one of the original agitators. In September he was employed on official army business in Kent, examining several garrisons (Clarke Ms. 66, f. 30v; E. Kitson (ed.), 'Some Civil War Accounts', p. 143). It is possible that he left the army sometime towards the end of 1647, although this is not known for certain. The evidence usually cited in this respect is his employment by John Lilburne to take a letter to Cromwell at Preston in August 1648 in which Lilburne undertook to stand by Cromwell in the face of Major Robert Huntingdon's attacks (Clarke Papers, I, p. 254), and the fact that he bore news of the victory at Preston to the House (C.J., V, p. 680). By May 1649 he can definitely be said to be in the army, with the rank of Captain and as governor of Portland Castle (C.S.P.D. 1649-50, p. 140). In June 1650 he was given the task of raising a foot regiment for service in Ireland but which was sent to Scotland. Sexby became a Colonel. In June 1651 he was cashiered on charges which included false musters. There is no evidence that the case against him was a frame-up. After a short spell as an emissary of the Council of State to the Frondeurs of Bordeaux, Sexby became an opponent of the Protectorate and took up his Leveller association again. He was the author of Killing No Murder and was involved in Sindercombe's plot. He died a close prisoner in the Tower in 1658.

(D.N.B.; Aylmer, State's Servants, pp. 155-156.)
STAINES (STANE), WILLIAM

An Essex man of a minor county family, educated at Cambridge and in 1641 a fellow of the Royal College of Physicians (Holmes, Eastern Association, p. 128). By 1647 he was Muster Master of the army and with Scout Master Leonard Watson played an important part in the negotiations between the King and the Grandees, during which he came to be distrusted by both his army colleagues and by the Levellers. But he remained in the army until at least the end of 1648. Eventually he returned to his medical career and received a high post in the Royal College of Physicians after the Restoration.

(Holmes, Eastern Association, index; S.P. 23/57, f. 445 (payment to Dr. Staines, Muster Master General of the Army, for himself, eight deputies and two clerks, 29 December 1648). He might be the same man who advised Fleetwood in 1655 that his estate was suffering by his absence in Ireland (B.M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff. 40–41 and above Chapter Five, Section IV.)

TULIDAH, ALEXANDER

Origins unknown. In March 1647 he was arrested for involvement in the Levellers' 'Large Petition' along with Nicholas Tue (Tew). He was styled 'Major' at this time but his regiment is unknown. He was subsequently bailed and after being summoned before the Commons in early May to give an account of his actions proceedings against him appear to have been dropped. In the army he was soon given promotion. By July 1647/Adjutant General of the horse, Tulidah attended the Council of the Army at Reading where he spoke in favour of marching
on London and using force as a once and for all means of taking "the sword out of those hands that are enemies to justice, to equity".

In September 1647 the committee of general officers discussed requesting Fairfax to appoint Tulidah governor of Hereford. Nothing seems to have come of this and by November he had left the army. In November 1650 he was licensed to stay in England till further notice upon taking the Engagement, which he might well have had scruples about.

(The Moderate Intelligencer, 18-25 March 1647 said he was a Scot; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 176, 178, 203-205, 210; Clarke Ms. 66, f. 15v; S.P. 28/48 f. 402, payment to Tulidah "late Adjutant General of horse" for his men, 12 November 1647; C.S.P.D. 1650, p. 565.)

**VEMON, JOHN** *(fl. 1644-1667)*

Origins unknown. By 1647 he was a Lieutenant in Philip Twisleton's regiment, in Major James Berry's troop (S.P. 28/47, f. 414). He opposed the civil authority having any say in religious matters and wrote a tract to this purpose in December 1648, at the time of the Whitehall debates (E477(3), The Sword's Abuse Arrested, (19 December 1648). In this tract he describes himself as late of the army. He says that he was present at consultations about the Agreement and would be sorry if it floundered because of disagreement over the magistrate's power over matters of conscience. He does not mention in what capacity and when exactly he participated in the discussions about the Agreement. He had returned to the army by the early 1650's and was serving in Ireland with the rank of Captain. His return might have had something to do with the fact that William Allen, the Adjutant
General of horse in Ireland, was his brother-in-law. Alured was recommended by the contrivers of the Three Colonels' Petition to contact him in Ireland and was told that he could speak against the Protectorate to him (Dodl. Rawlinson Ms. A.41, f. 561). It is unknown if Alured contacted him. For his subsequent behaviour under the Protectorate q.v. above Chapter Four, Section III and Chapter Five, Section IV. He resigned his commission in 1656 and drifted into the Fifth Monarchists. He was not re-commissioned in the summer of 1659. Despite being banished after the Restoration he lived near London as a physician and died in 1667.

(Whitley, Baptist Bibliography, index; Capp, Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 267 (which is misleading about his early army career) and index; Brown, Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men, index. At Langstone Court, Llangarron, Herefordshire there is a seventeenth century miniature portrait of Vernon with the following inscription on the back "General (sic) John Vernon, of Clontar (near Dublin), 1655. ob. 1667". I am most grateful to my supervisor, Professor G. E. Aylmer, for this information.)

WALCOTT, THOMAS (fl. 1654-1683)

Origins unknown.

By 1654 he was a Captain Lieutenant in Ludlow's horse regiment in Ireland. According to Ludlow, Walcott assisted him to distribute anti-Protectorate literature including Some Momentos. Walcott does not appear to have been questioned for this. In 1655 when Ludlow's regiment was disbanded Walcott was one of those ordered by Ludlow to
look after his arrears (Ludlow, *Memoirs*, I, p. 407; *ibid.*, II, p. 416). Walcott disappears from the public eye until 1659 when he re-emerges in command of one of the troops which formed the Irish Brigade sent over in August to help suppress Booth's rising (C.S.P. Ireland 1647-1660, p. 686); presumably in the intervening years he had been transferred to another regiment, or alternatively he had left the army and was brought back by Ludlow in 1659. After the dissolution of the Rump in October he supported, or acquiesced in, the coup (Clarke Papers, IV, p. 146) but appears to have turned against Lambert and with some others to have worked against him (C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 294). Ludlow suggests that Walcott tried to influence the Irish brigade in favour of the Rump in February 1660 which he says aroused the anger of Redman its commander and Monck. However in May he was allowed to return to Ireland (Ludlow, *Memoirs*, II, pp. 238-238; C.S.P.D. 1659-60, p. 375). He was subsequently involved in the Rye House Plot for which he was tried and executed (C.S.P.D. January-June 1683, *ibid.*, July-September 1683; State Trials, III, p. 683 ff.).

**WATSON, LEONARD**

Origins obscure but possibly a goldsmith of Lincoln.

Was Treasurer to Lord Willoughby's force and then Scout Master General of the Eastern Association army and subsequently held the same post in the New Model. Together with Dr. William Staines, the Muster Master General, he was employed as an intermediary between the King and the Grandees in 1647. He came to be mistrusted by both the army leadership and the Levellers, but he still remained active in army
politics and was on the committee to draw up a declaration to be read to the regiments at the November rendezvous (Clarke Papers, I, p. 413). He was no longer in the army by the early 1650's and in 1651 he and his family lived in Paris where they appear to have acted in some form of official capacity for the Commonwealth. (Holmes, Eastern Association, p. 174; Dell, Fairfax Correspondence, p. 111; H. G. Tibbutt (ed.), The Letter Books of Sir Samuel Luke, The Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, XLII, 1963, index; Nicholas Papers, I, pp. 227, 303.

WHITE, FRANCIS

1647 Major and elected officer in Fairfax's foot regiment. In September 1647 he was expelled from the Council of the Army but not from the army for asserting that there was no authority in the kingdom but that of the sword. He was re-admitted to the Army Council in December. He remained a Leveller sympathiser in 1648 and opposed the idea of executing the King. In May 1649 White was used as an intermediary to try to urge the revolting troops of Ireton's and Scrope's regiments to return to their obedience, but it is unlikely that he betrayed them as was alleged at the time. In the course of the 1650's he appears to have shed his radical political sympathies. In April 1653, along with Colonel William Goffe, he evicted the Rump and continued to serve in the army under the Protectorate. In October 1657 he was made Governor of Mardyke and on his way back from Flanders he was drowned at sea along with John Reynolds another erstwhile radical.
The Copy of a Letter to his Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax; Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes, pp. 45-46; Hill, World Turned Upside Down, pp. 52-53, 56, 57; Wor. Co.AA. 2.4.(53); E571(11), The Levellers (Falsly so-called) Vindicated, repr. in Morton, Freedom in Arms, pp. 304-306; Firth and Davies, pp. 326-332; Clarke Papers, I, p. 436.)
I. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

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A Copy of two Letters from divers Officers of the Army in the North to Lord Fairfax, 1648.
The Copies of two Petitions from the Officers and Soldiers of Colonel Charles Fleetwood's Regiment, 1648.

A Copy of the Pretentment and Indictment Found and Exhibited by the Grand Jury of Middlesex, 1660.

A Declaration of the Armie to his Excellency the Lord General Cromwell for the Dissolution of this present Parliament, 1652.

The Declaration of the Army under Sir Thomas Fairfax as it was lately presented at Saffron Walden, 1647.

A Declaration of the Engagements, Remonstrances, Representations, Resolutions from His Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax and the General Council of the Army, 1647.

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G., E. A Copy of a Letter from an Officer of the Army in Ireland, (1656).

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The Kingdoms Weekly Account of Heads of Chiefe Passages in Parliament (1648)
The Kingdoms Weekly Post (1648)
The Man in the Moon (1649, 1650)
Mercurio Volpone (1648)
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Mercurius Elencticus (1647-1649)
Mercurius Militaris (1648)
Mercurius Politicus (1650-1660)
Mercurius Publicus (1660)
Mercurius Pragmaticus (1647-1649)
The Moderate (1648-1649)
The Moderate Informer (1659)
The Moderate Intelligence (1649)
The Moderate Intelligencer (1647-1649)
The Moderate Mercury (1649)
The Moderate Messenger (1649)
The Moderate Publisher of every daies Intelligence (1653-1654)
A Modest Narrative of Intelligence (1649)
The Monethly Intelligencer (1660)
The Observator (1654)
The Parliamentary Intelligencer (1659-1660)
A Particular Advice from Foreign Parts (1659)
A Perfect Account of the Daily Intelligence (1651-1655)
A Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament (1647-1649)
A Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages and Proceedings Of, and in relation to the Armies (1649-1655)
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Perfect Passages of Every Daies Intelligence (1650-1655)
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The Publick Intelligencer (1655-1660)

The Royall Diurnall (1648)

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