'NATIONALISM' AND THE COLONIAL SITUATION
IN ALGERIA UNDER FRENCH RULE 1830-1962

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IV. UNDERADMINISTRATION AND THE COLONIAL SITUATION

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
I. THE CONCEPT OF UNDERADMINISTRATION

From the early 1950's, it became commonplace in colonizer circles to observe that Algeria was 'underadministered'. According to the Gouverneur-Général in 1950, the twin characteristics of French rule were "underadministration" and "excessive centralization".¹ "The territory is underadministered and underequipped", declared the last Gouverneur-Général in 1955.² "The underadministration of Algeria remains an undeniable fact", admitted the Director General of Administrative Personnel and Affairs in January 1960.³ Commissions of Enquiry from the Metropolis,⁴ the Army Command,⁵ and international journalists,⁶ concurred in this diagnosis. The apparatus of colonial control appeared to have suffered from gross neglect, with a resultant breakdown in the maintenance of law and order. This had apparently given encouragement and room for manoeuvre, which could otherwise have been denied, to the small band of guerrillas which opened a campaign of violence on the night of October 31st and November 1st 1954 proclaiming itself the Front de Libération Nationale.

As the seriousness of the position began to dawn, practical measures were hastily taken to repair this neglect. Long-postponed plans for reorganizing local government machinery, as suggested in the last chapter, were speedily brought down from the shelf. Financial expenditure was quickly stepped up. Finally, military manpower was increasingly imported, not merely to reconquer Algeria by force, but also to fill gaping holes in the administrative network. These measures manifestly failed to prevent an inexorable process of decolonization over the following seven and a half years, which
culminated in the forced French withdrawal from independent Algeria in 1962. It has therefore been generally assumed that awareness of underadministration came too late, and that the programme to counteract it was not sufficiently imaginative or large-scale. That the problem was a technical one in the first place, and thus susceptible to remedy by the injection of physical resources, has never been thoroughly challenged. Yet close examination of the concept of underadministration itself begins to raise basic questions about colonial dynamics which go far beyond mere considerations of finance, personnel or organizational efficiency.

The concept of underadministration entails at least three criteria of administrative efficiency: density of coverage, ability to mobilize resources, and adaptation to operating environment. The density of coverage is the most clearly quantifiable of these. The ratio of Europeans to natives in a colony, the ratio of administrators to administrees, and the physical size of each administrative unit, are all measurable. Other things being equal, it appears, the denser the network of colonial control and interaction, the more effective it will be; the looser it becomes, the more it will be characterised by 'underadministration'.

The ability of the system to mobilize resources is a second criterion, closely related. However dense, the success of colonial administration varies with its capacity to channel and coordinate the authority and will of the colonizer. This is partly a question of resources, including money, made available for administrative activities. It is also a question of the quality of personnel involved and the effectiveness with which they are deployed. This is assessable, if not directly amenable to measurement. We can examine, for example, the
recruitment, training, inspection and control of manpower; the nature of their workload, and the technical efficiency of communications. Another important consideration is the degree to which responsibility within the structure of control is concentrated at its centre or devolved to its perimeter.

A third category of analysis is the degree to which the machinery, however well endowed with organisational resources, adapts itself to the local environment. Without a modicum of adaptation, the colonial structure will be of superficial impact, unable to link the two communities within one system, and unstable. Thus, we need to examine the congruence between imported structures and traditional institutions and processes, the colonizer's awareness and acceptance of indigenous customs and norms, and the participation of native personnel in the machinery of administration. Deficiencies in these fields would provide evidence of 'underadministration' also.

We thus appear to have several criteria by measurement or assessment. The relative significance of each, however, is arguable. The degree of centralization within an administrative hierarchy, for instance, is the inverse of the degree of devolution. Precisely what balance is desirable between these two rival criteria of efficiency is not susceptible to concrete demonstration. Conflict between categories of assessment may be even more fundamental. The criterion of 'density', for example, implies that a system becomes more effective as the ratio of European personnel to native population becomes higher, whereas the criterion of 'adaptation' suggests that a system becomes more effective as the proportion of native personnel involved in it becomes higher.

We can thus glimpse the point, on the one hand, where 'indirect
administration' shades into elimination of the colonizer's control, and, on the other hand, where 'direct administration' begins to obliterate the special status of a colony vis-à-vis the Metropolis. Many such areas of confusion and ambiguity open up when we try to calculate the effectiveness of colonial regimes.

The first part of this chapter nevertheless attempts to assess the performance of the Algerian colonial administration according to the three main criteria outlined above. The assumption is temporarily made that failure to score highly in a significant number of them indicates a problem of 'underadministration', and that, as a corollary, such a problem, because measurable, is remediable by technical intervention and adjustment. In severe cases, it may be that such intervention would have to be on a massive scale, but the problem then reduces itself to the physical resources of the French state, and its political will. This attempted assessment, is an instructive exercise, for it provides a backcloth against which to understand French policy in the 1950's. Nevertheless, its chief purpose is to highlight the inadequacy of viewing 'underadministration' simply as a technical problem. The second part of the chapter examines the belated French attempt, from this inadequate perspective, to recover control through the large-scale injection of military resources. In practice, this served only to prove that the question of underadministration was inseparable from central contradictions of the colonial situation, and thus an inherent feature of the colonial problematic. Attempts to extrapolate it from that context simply reflect and perpetuate the myopia characteristic of the colonizer.
II. ASSESSMENT OF ALGERIAN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

-i. Density of administrative structure

a. Ratio of moslems to Europeans

Various yardsticks may be used to assess the 'density' of colonial implantation. European settlers in Algeria themselves often measured the strength of their presence by a crude rule of thumb: the overall balance between their numbers and those of the colonized population. Figure 1 provides a statistical profile of the years 1833-1954.

Figure 1: Total Population of Algeria 1833-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Moslems</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td>24,812</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>32,061</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>55,374</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>114,011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>152,283</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>2,307,349</td>
<td>180,330</td>
<td>8,388</td>
<td>4,960,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>2,732,851</td>
<td>220,843</td>
<td>13,142</td>
<td>3,066,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>2,652,072</td>
<td>251,942</td>
<td>17,232</td>
<td>3,021,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>2,125,052</td>
<td>279,691</td>
<td>11,482</td>
<td>2,416,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>2,462,936</td>
<td>344,749</td>
<td>59,941</td>
<td>3,267,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>2,842,497</td>
<td>412,435</td>
<td>55,480</td>
<td>3,410,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>3,287,217</td>
<td>464,820</td>
<td>65,269</td>
<td>4,017,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>3,577,063</td>
<td>530,924</td>
<td>16,745</td>
<td>4,124,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>3,781,098</td>
<td>578,480</td>
<td>69,843</td>
<td>4,439,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>4,089,150</td>
<td>633,850</td>
<td>16,331</td>
<td>4,839,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>4,477,788</td>
<td>680,263</td>
<td>73,799</td>
<td>5,331,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>4,740,526</td>
<td>752,043</td>
<td>71,259</td>
<td>5,563,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>4,923,186</td>
<td>791,370</td>
<td>89,719</td>
<td>6,804,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>5,150,756</td>
<td>833,359</td>
<td>82,265</td>
<td>6,066,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>5,588,314</td>
<td>881,584</td>
<td>83,553</td>
<td>6,553,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>6,201,144</td>
<td>946,013</td>
<td>87,527</td>
<td>7,234,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>7,679,078</td>
<td>922,272</td>
<td>80,435</td>
<td>8,681,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>8,448,199</td>
<td>984,048</td>
<td>96,363</td>
<td>9,528,607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total population of Algeria thus virtually quadrupled in the century between 1856 and 1954. However, the demographic patterns traced by the two communities were markedly different, as Figure 2 graphically illustrates.
Figure 2

Demographic Growth of Mississippi and European Communities, 1856-1954

Population (in millions)


Mississippi Population

European Population
The two major influences on European demography were the rate of immigration and the birth rate. During the first forty years of colonization, there were actually more deaths than births among Europeans. The relative paucity of women, the conditions of hardship and insecurity, and such epidemics as cholera in 1859-60, help to explain this. The steady growth in European numbers during these years was entirely due to the arrival of over a quarter of a million immigrants. As conditions in the colony became more stable, a steady natural increase in the European population set in, but immigration nevertheless remained the dominant factor in demographic growth throughout the Nineteenth Century. Between 1872 and 1901, the number of European inhabitants more than doubled, from 279,691 to 633,850. The 1870's in particular were a boom decade for immigration; the population jumped by 133,000, the biggest ten-year increase of the whole colonial era. Immigration came particularly from recently-conquered Alsace-Lorraine, from southern France and from Spain, attracted by prospects of work and land. From 1901, the rate of influx slowed down; after the First World War it dried to a trickle. The European birth rate had taken over as the principal generator of growth, for by the early Twentieth Century European colon fertility was far higher than in Metropolitan France. However this too slowed down between the Wars. There was actually a recession in the size of the settler community between 1936 and 1948, due both to exigencies of war and to a net outflow of 80,000 settlers, notably to Morocco and Metropolitan France. Numbers began to recover up until the insurrection of 1954.
Moslem demography responded to a different set of stimuli. The initial impact of the French invasion seems to have been disastrous, disrupting the native economy and spilling large quantities of blood. From an estimate of up to 3,000,000 in 1830, the indigenous population appears to have fallen by about a quarter in twenty-five years. After a brief rally, there was a further slump between 1861 and 1872. The six years after 1866, in particular, witnessed a 20% loss due to the combination of cholera in 1867, drought and famine in 1868, typhus and smallpox in 1869-72, and violent repression of the 1871 revolt in Kabylia. As a result, the colon press began to speculate that the native might succumb to a fate similar to that of the North American Indian. That this was also the golden era of European immigration reinforced this kind of conjecture. Such projections were confounded by a steady recovery in moslem numbers during the last quarter of the Century, virtually doubling in thirty years. This was not sustained beyond 1911, however, for the mobilization and dislocation of the First World War was followed by a serious drought, famine and typhus in 1920. Demographic growth slowed down markedly for a decade. Then, from the mid-1920's, the moslem fertility rate accelerated. Soon at 46 per 1,000 per annum, it was 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) times as rapid as that of the settlers. The result was a yearly increase of about 2%, sustained up until the end of the colonial era. Indeed a significant net emigration of moslems began, in search of work, to France. While there were already 40,000 Algerian moslems in the Metropolis in 1936, there were 200,000 by 1948 and up to 400,000 by 1960. The terms of the demographic question had radically changed.
The effects of these twin demographic trends on the overall balance between the two communities is spelled out in Figure 3.
During the third quarter of the Nineteenth Century the decline of the native population and the rapid European immigration slashed the moslem/European ratio by half. This trend continued less dramatically but quite perceptibly between 1872 and 1911. During those 39 years, although the moslem population registered a sizeable growth of 12.3%, it was outstripped by a 16.9% rise in the European population. The former represented an annual increase of about 3.1%, and the latter 4.2%. The hardships of the decade 1911-21 hit both communities badly, but moslems more seriously. Whereas settler growth during the period was cut to 5.2% (down to 0.5% p.a.), moslem growth was even further stunted, at 3.9% (or 0.4% p.a.). By 1926, as a result of this superior demographic trend, the overall balance between the indigenous and European communities (about 6:1) tipped more favourably towards the latter than at any previous time. Each colon faced exactly half as many natives as had confronted him just 65 years earlier. It was against this confidence-inspiring background that French Algeria celebrated its centenary in 1930.

The euphoria was short-lived, however. The 1931 census revealed, for the first time, that the moslem community was expanding at a faster rate, and subsequent enumerations only confirmed its acceleration. The moslem rate of increase established itself at 2.6% p.a. between 1936 and 1954, as the European rate dwindled to an average of 0.2% p.a. Inevitably, the intercommunal ratio swung firmly and unmistakably back in favour of indigenous society. In terms of this kind of 'density' alone, colonial implantation was clearly weakening by 1954.
b. Distribution of population

The raw moslem/European ratio is an extremely inadequate index of administrative 'density', however. One major reason is that the population of Algeria was far from uniformly distributed, and there were wide variations and stark contrasts in the character of the intercommunal balance. Three maps in the Appendix show this clearly. Map 1 shows in detail the density of the total population in 1948 of civil Algeria. 23 It breaks this down according to communes and communal sections, not distinguishing between moslem and European inhabitants. It reveals that by far the largest densities of population were concentrated on the littoral plains and Tell highlands within fifty miles of the Mediterranean. Even more significant however, were the differing distribution patterns of the two communities. Map 2 illustrates this with broad strokes, 24 showing that the arrondissements of highest settler density in 1931 did not correspond to those of highest native density. Finally, Map 3 depicts in dramatic detail, the wide contrasts in both density and distribution which characterized the bifurcated communal structure of Algeria in 1954. 25

The nature and development of distribution patterns is susceptible to statistical examination, also. Figure 4, for example, highlights important features of European settlement.

Figure 4: Distribution of Europeans between rural and urban areas 1886-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% rural</th>
<th>% urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The European population was always predominantly urban in character. The stock caricature of the 'pied noir' as a prosperous farmer isolated in the 'bled' was something of a myth. Not only was most agricultural settlement confined to the Cheliff and Mitidja valleys and to the coastal plain (Sahel), and there agglomerated around small townships, but most Europeans had no contact with the soil whatsoever. Even in 1866, approximately 30% of the settlers were living in the two major towns of Algiers and Oran alone. This feature became steadily more accentuated. From the early Twentieth Century, the growth of the European community was strictly an urban phenomenon. There was a gradual in-gathering, or drift, of Europeans from more remote settlements in the interior towards towns and townships. By 1926, the two towns of Algiers and Oran excluding their growing suburbs, accounted for 34% of the colonizer population, and by 1948 this had risen to 38%. By 1954, over half the Europeans of Algeria were located in the four major conurbations of Algiers, Oran, Constantine and Bone. By then, as Map 3 indicates, European settlement was confined to a very small part of the Algerian territory.

At the same time the moslem population was overwhelmingly rural in character, as Figure 5 shows.

Figure 5: Distribution of moslems between rural and urban areas 1886-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% rural</th>
<th>% urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This meant, in a sense, that moslems and Europeans occupied different space, but also that they occupied them with differing intensity, for the majority of moslems were not agglomerated into townships. As a result of
these features, the ratio of moslems to Europeans varied markedly from
one area to another. In the arrondissement of Oran, for example, with
its chief town predominantly European and the Cheliff valley densely
occupied by settlers, moslems outnumbered colonizers by a relatively
small margin. 32 By contrast, in Kabylia, with its scattered, but densely
populated Berber hamlets, such Europeans as were present found themselves
swamped demographically. 33 By way of further contrast, in large tracts
of the interior, though the moslem population was far less dense,
Europeans were almost totally absent, and drawing up a ratio is a purely
abstract exercise. 34

Although lack of agglomeration was an enduring characteristic of
moslem society, another striking feature indicated by Figure 5 is the
rapidity of migration to towns and townships in the Twentieth Century.
The speed and dimensions of this process were more dramatic than the
fairly leisurely European drift. It was a universal phenomenon, most
marked in but not confined to big towns. Isolated rural centres began
to take on the characteristics of small townships as they drew in moslem
population from the surrounding countryside. M'Sila, in the Hodna, was
fairly typical, its population rising from 5,846 in 1936 to 8,102 in
1948, an increase of 40%. 35 By 1948, there were 64 aggomerations in
Algeria with a population of over 5,000. 36 Big towns were affected
above all. Algiers which had sheltered 10,000 moslems in 1866 and
55,300 in 1926, contained 304,000 moslems by 1954. 37 Oran, a town with
only 3,000 moslems in 1866 and 25,000 in 1926, was inhabited by
121,000 moslems by 1954. 38 This upheaval caused major social problems
and brought to a head crucial contradictions within the colonial
situation. It also had implications for the 'density' of colonial
implantation. Figure 6 points to some of these.
As a result of this accelerating trend, towns which had been predominantly European in the late Nineteenth Century became predominantly moslem by the mid-Twentieth Century. Even such former bastions of colon society as Oran and Algiers became half moslem. Yet despite superficial appearances, this dramatic movement of moslems into towns did not establish a more even balance in the 'density' or distribution of the two communities. It did not foster interaction or integration. What happened was that quite separate moslem towns grew up within these burgeoning agglomerations. On the one hand, the old native quarter, or 'medina', walled off from the more recent European town, became crammed to overflowing. Even more typically, outside both this crowded traditional quarter and the European town, big sprawling shanty-towns sprouted up. The pattern of development, in other words, was marked by "extremely profound spatial segregation". The life of the European quarters, with their wide streets and spacious buildings, was wholly separate from that of moslem quarters. In 1954, for example, three-quarters of the European and of the moslem population of Algiers were living in sectors of a completely homogeneous ethnic composition. Symptomatic, perhaps, was the fact that between 1939 and 1953, in the four major towns of Algeria, a grand total of only 733 mixed marriages took place.
Throughout Algeria, real contact between the communities was infinitely less than even the raw population statistics suggest. Both in towns and in rural areas, the gross intercommunal ratio gives little indication of true administrative 'density'. As Morizot remarked in 1962 of the (former) arrondissements of Tizi-Ouzou, Setif and Batna: "If from the 46 500 Europeans...we subtract all those who live in the towns, it is only a few hundred men whose daily existence puts them in contact with the 2 616 000 moslems who surround them". 44

c. Administrator ratio

A more fundamental weakness of using population ratios as an index of colonial implantation is that 'administration' or 'control' implies more than mere 'presence' or passive juxtaposition of people. It implies organized activity, by a corps of specialists, in relation to natives specifically. If at all, this can be gauged only by an 'administrator ratio'. The possibility of such a calculation was indicated by Buell in 1928. 45 He discussed the nature of different African colonial regimes in terms of the ratio of administrators to administrees. By dividing the total population of each colony by the total number of officials employed in its administration, he drew up a list of ratios for different territories. In French West Africa these ranged from 1: 12 464 in Mauretania and 1: 24 050 in Guinea, to 1: 48 745 in Upper Volta. 46 According to similar procedures the density of Belgian administration in the Congo was measured as 1: 17 800. 47 British African colonies generally had less dense ratios, ranging from 1: 22 300 in Kenya, and 1: 49 000 in Uganda, to 1: 70 000 in Southern Nigeria and 1: 100 000 in Northern Nigeria. 48 Equally
interesting, perhaps, was Buell's calculation of the average area of
territory covered by each administrator, by dividing the total area of
the colony by the total number of administrators. For example, he
produced the figure of 1: 823 sq. miles for Dahomey and 1: 10 032 sq.
miles for Niger. 49

The possibility of using this kind of information was also
hinted at by Hailey in 1938, 50 and similar ratios were explicitly
employed by Delavignette in 1946. 51 There are immense complications
and ambiguities in such procedures, however, as a cursory comparison
of the figures of Buell, Hailey and Delavignette reveals. There are
big discrepancies between the three sets of results. Delavignette
estimated the average administrator ratio for the whole of French West
Africa as 1: 4 100, far higher than that for any individual territory
quoted by Buell. 52 For the whole of British Nigeria, Delavignette's
ratio is 1: 15 200, whereas Hailey's figures suggest 1: 51 625; both
densities are far higher than those quoted separately for North and
South Nigeria by Buell. 53 Buell's calculation for the Belgian Congo
falls half way between Delavignette's high density (1: 4 000) and
Hailey's low density (1: 38 324). 54 On the other hand, Hailey's
figures for Kenya and Uganda, 1: 18 445 and 1: 42 830 respectively, are
fairly close to Buell's. 55

That the source of these major differences lies in the definition
of administrator is indicated by Delavignette's calculation that there
were 887 'European' officials for the 3 200 000 inhabitants of French
Equatorial Africa, giving a ratio of 1: 3 600, whereas Hailey's, for
the same population, found only 206 'administrative officials', implying
a ratio of 1: 15 534. 56 Similarly, while Hailey listed 287 officials in
the Belgian Congo, Delavignette counted 2 384. 57
In any case, administrator ratios of this kind tell only a small part of the story, for it does not really follow that the effectiveness or stability of a regime increases as the density of its structure becomes higher. Buell is quick to point out that 'indirect' administration, entailing a hardly low density of European officialdom, may produce a more 'effective' system of control than 'direct' administration. At this point, in terms of the three suggested criteria of underadministration, analysis should shift from the sphere of 'density' to that of 'adaptation'.

To measure the Algerian regime in terms of the 'administrator ratio' nevertheless still has some interest. Although the ratio has no absolute status in indicating the depth of colonial control, it provides concrete data about its organizational nature. Moreover, changes in the ratio from one time to another may point to a growing problem, or a significant shift of policy, in this specific colonial situation. Unfortunately the undertaking proves difficult. Partly this is a result of the problems of definition already hinted at. Partly also it is because Algeria, unlike most of the colonies examined by Buell, contained a large number of European settlers.

The definitional question revolves around the nature of administration, and, more generally, the kind of occupation which is significant in terms of contact and control. Hailey, for example, casts his net very widely, and suggests that the number of Agricultural Engineers, Educationalists, Lawyers and Judges, Health and Medical Workers, Soldiers and Police, Transport Personnel, and Public Works Officials, may be as revealing an index of colonial implantation as that of 'Administrators Proper'. The precise importance of these different specialisms in Algeria is difficult to determine. In certain colonial situations, for example, it would
doubtless be valid to include Christian missionaries among the 'administratively significant sector.' However, moslem Algeria was impervious to the action of the Church, and early proselytizing ventures were rapidly abandoned. Apart from a few White Fathers in Kabylia and Algiers, the Christian Church 'serviced' the European community exclusively. This latter point indicates two of the central complications encountered in quantifying the density of Algerian administration: the problem of large-scale European settlement and of the distribution of administrative personnel. It could be argued that doctors were significant agents of colonial implantation in Algeria, for example, yet to draw up a ratio of doctors to patients requires extreme caution. Aron calculated that the number of qualified doctors in Algeria had risen from 1.033 in 1939 to 1.356 in 1946 and again to 1.855 in 1954, and by dividing the last figure into the total population of the time — both moslem and European — he produced the statistic that there was one doctor for every 5.137 inhabitants in Algeria. This rather disingenuously obscured the fact that the vast majority of them were treating the settler population alone.

Teachers, likewise, could conceivably be classed as significant, if not of administrative control at least of culture contact. Yet again great caution is required in interpreting figures. Algeria had 15.408 European and 1.978 moslem teachers in 1954, a figure which excluded those moslem teachers in Koranic schools who, it can be safely assumed, contributed little to fostering the values of the colonial system. However, this total did include those who, primarily or exclusively, were teaching the children of settlers. Undoubtedly the majority, these should somehow be disentangled from the gross
calculation. It could also be debated whether moslem teachers in European-run schools should, as moslems, be excluded from the total, or whether, as European-trained, they should be included. With such complications, to approach colonial implantation from the point of view of personnel perhaps confuses rather than clarifies matters. It would be simpler, in the case of education, to calculate the number of moslem children attending 'European' schools. 62

Even when we enter the field of 'administration proper', calculation remains extremely hazardous. There are many ways of defining administrative work. As an illustration, Amin estimated that Algeria had 95,000 administrators in 1954, 63 while Bromberger's tally was 1,800 for 1958; 64 the Algerian administration's own figure for 1960, after its expansion programme, was 74,768. 65 Examination of the 1954 Census returns, which listed 91,000 persons as involved in 'Public Administration', helps to locate potential points of divergence. 66 That the criteria of classification are often dubious is suggested by the fact that this official figure excluded such services as hospitals, post and telephones, electricity, gas, water and railways, yet at the same time included 15,000 military personnel not attached to combat units.

A further difficulty concerns the level of work performed. The great majority of these Public Administrators were engaged in routine clerical or petty tasks. 67 But in what sense, it must be asked, was the role played by office boys and chauffeurs of real weight in terms of colonial implantation? Conversely, it could be argued that 'higher' administrators, because remote from direct contact with the population, performed less significant work than middle rank administrators who
were more immediately in touch with the outside world. An additional question hangs over the one-third of these Public Administrators, almost all at the lowest levels, who were of native extraction. Should they be included in any ratio which purports to measure the impact of a European regime on the moslem population?

Furthermore, two-thirds of the global total given by the 1954 Census were employees of the central administration, the Gouvernement-Général. This raises the vital question of distribution. It is not enough to count the heads of administrators, and divide them into the number of available administrees. We need to know where they were located, and what their mode of operation was. An official sitting behind a desk in European Algiers, communicating with other officials by means of files, letters, notes, statistical summaries and phonecalls, offered a rather 'abstract' kind of contact with the population of the interior. Algerian administration was notoriously "hydrocephalous" in this sense. From the point of view of administrative density, a man in the bush was worth at least two in the capital.

Another fundamental problem arises in relation to the colon population. An administrator ratio is implicitly a measurement of contact between the European regime and the autochthonous population. Yet the majority of administrative personnel in Algeria were engaged in the servicing of settler affairs and interests. Very few could be said to be exclusively concerned with the moslem community. Thus the numerical size of the bureaucracy bore little relation to the real density of its impact on the native society.
d. The pattern of local administration

This welter of complications suggests that, in seeking a significant administrator ratio, we should at least confine our calculations to the one-third of personnel involved in local government. Buell and Delavignette cast their figures exclusively in terms of this 'interface'. However we still encounter the difficulties touched upon above, albeit in a mitigated form. The nature and level of administrative functions, the role of moslem personnel, the centralization of work, and the servicing of settlers rather than natives, were crucial considerations in local as well as central administration. The latter problem, the preoccupation of colonial administrators with the interests of colons, was a deep-seated feature of Algerian local government, for the major proportion of personnel was employed by Communes de Plein Exercice rather than by Communes Mixtes. As the previous chapter suggested, although most inhabitants of Communes de Plein Exercice were moslem, the activity of the Mairie was systematically geared to the European inhabitants and to their interests. The neglect of the moslem was far greater than a raw administrator/administree ratio could indicate. Computation is a slightly simpler matter in Communes Mixtes. It is thus impossible to draw up one balance-sheet of the density of native administration which embraces both types of Commune. Nevertheless, the attempt to unravel the separate strands in the overall situation proves enlightening.

Maps 4 and 5 in the Appendix show how the Civil Zone of Algeria was divided between Communes Mixtes and Communes de Plein Exercice in 1894 and 1948 respectively. By far the largest area of territory, 82% in 1894 and 84% in 1948, was covered by Communes Mixtes. Although there were far more Communes de Plein Exercice, they were far less extensive
than Communes Mixtes. More revealing than this, however, was the distribution of the two communities between the two types of Commune. Figure 7 outlines the pattern of European distribution.

Figure 7: Distribution of Europeans between Communes Mixtes and Communes de Plein Exercice, 1881-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EUROPEANS IN C.M.s</th>
<th>EUROPEANS IN C.P.E.s</th>
<th>ALL EUROPEANS (C.M.s and C.P.E.s)</th>
<th>% EUROPEANS IN C.M.s</th>
<th>% EUROPEANS IN C.P.E.s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>41,880</td>
<td>484,018</td>
<td>525,898</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>59,330</td>
<td>549,364</td>
<td>608,694</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>63,325</td>
<td>607,999</td>
<td>671,324</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>75,183</td>
<td>666,373</td>
<td>741,556</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>90.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>66,099</td>
<td>717,325</td>
<td>783,424</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>91.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>64,549</td>
<td>764,031</td>
<td>828,580</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>57,238</td>
<td>818,398</td>
<td>875,636</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>52,650</td>
<td>886,993</td>
<td>939,643</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>38,214</td>
<td>871,465</td>
<td>909,679</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>35,412</td>
<td>936,126</td>
<td>971,538</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The vast majority of settlers thus lived within the administrative framework of Communes de Plein Exercice. From the outset, the number dwelling in Communes Mixtes was very small. This is perfectly understandable since any concentration of Europeans, even ones with fewer than 200 inhabitants, rapidly fought for the institution of a fully-fledged Commune. As such creations progressed steadily during the Twentieth Century, moreover, even those Europeans already in Communes Mixtes began gradually to drift towards established townships. The result was that the proportion of the colonizer community to be found in Communes Mixtes fell from almost 10% to less than 4% between 1911 and 1954, and the absolute number fell by more than half. Although the 35,000 Europeans still scattered in Communes Mixtes at the outbreak of the 1954 rebellion undoubtedly exerted an influence on the administration which far
exceeded their numerical weight, it is nevertheless fairly legitimate
to treat Communes Mixtes as purely 'native' institutions. They provide
the simplest material for the analysis of administrative density.

However, Figure 8 indicates that the converse was far from true;
Communes de Plein Exercice were never exclusively European in composition.

Figure 8: Distribution of Moslems between Communes Mixtes and
Communes de Plein Exercice, 1881–1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MOSLEMS IN C.M.s</th>
<th>MOSLEMS IN C.P.E.s</th>
<th>ALL MOSLEMS IN C.M.s and C.P.E.s</th>
<th>% MOSLEMS IN C.M.s</th>
<th>% MOSLEMS IN C.P.E.s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1,854,000</td>
<td>569,000</td>
<td>2,423,000</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>2,323,710</td>
<td>771,263</td>
<td>3,094,973</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2,615,236</td>
<td>901,525</td>
<td>3,516,761</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2,843,522</td>
<td>983,384</td>
<td>3,826,906</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>2,986,634</td>
<td>1,072,785</td>
<td>4,059,419</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>3,109,157</td>
<td>1,205,761</td>
<td>4,314,918</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>3,285,703</td>
<td>1,330,078</td>
<td>4,615,781</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>3,482,983</td>
<td>1,543,412</td>
<td>5,026,395</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>3,788,806</td>
<td>1,781,209</td>
<td>5,570,015</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>4,214,562</td>
<td>2,662,850</td>
<td>6,877,412</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>4,390,000</td>
<td>3,250,000</td>
<td>7,640,000</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even by the turn of the century, over a quarter of the moslem
population of Algeria was living under the rule of the Mairie. For
reasons discussed earlier, settlers actively sought the annexation of
neighbouring moslem communities to their Communes de Plein Exercice.
As more were created, and as moslems began to migrate towards
agglomerations in the Twentieth Century, the moslem population of
Communes de Plein Exercice rose rapidly, in both absolute and relative
terms. By 1954, when two-fifths of all moslems were contained within
this administrative framework, it constituted an extremely significant
sector of their colonial experience. For this reason, we cannot
examine the 'effectiveness' of native administration without considering
Communes de Plein Exercice as well as Communes Mixtes. Though each institution presented peculiar features, and has to be examined separately, both have to be weighed in the balance.

e. Density in Communes Mixtes

During the life of Communes Mixtes, as Figure 9 shows, the population administered by them grew considerably.

**Figure 9: Communes Mixtes - Moslem and European Inhabitants, 1881-1954**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF C.M.s</th>
<th>TOTAL MOSLEM POPULATION</th>
<th>TOTAL EUROPEAN POPULATION</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION (MOSLEM AND EUROPEAN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,854,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>1,889,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2,323,710</td>
<td>41,880</td>
<td>2,365,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2,615,236</td>
<td>59,330</td>
<td>2,674,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2,843,522</td>
<td>63,325</td>
<td>2,906,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2,986,634</td>
<td>75,183</td>
<td>3,061,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3,109,157</td>
<td>66,099</td>
<td>3,175,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3,285,703</td>
<td>64,549</td>
<td>3,350,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3,482,983</td>
<td>57,238</td>
<td>3,540,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3,788,806</td>
<td>52,650</td>
<td>3,841,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4,214,562</td>
<td>38,214</td>
<td>4,252,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4,390,000</td>
<td>35,412</td>
<td>4,425,412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1870's saw the wholesale transfer of predominantly moslem territories formerly administered by military Bureaux Arabes to the authority of civil administration. The institution of Commune Mixte was devised in 1874 to help to parcel out these areas. By 1881, over 37,000 square miles and almost 2,000,000 people had been brought within this framework. The first 10 civil Communes Mixtes were established in 1874; by 1879 there were 44, and by mid-1881, 77.

Over the following four decades, the transfer of area and population from military to civil jurisdiction continued steadily, but the creation of new Communes Mixtes to administer them did not.
For reasons already discussed, settlers nursed strong misgivings about both the nature and potential cost of these bodies. To halt their proliferation, they pressed for mergers and reallocations of the new populations within the existing number of Communes Mixtes, and opposed new creations. Between 1884 and 1891, in fact, the number of these Communes fell from 79 to 73. Thereafter, as its coverage continued to expand, the density of the administrative structure changed little. Despite the carving out of 25 Communes de Plein Exercice between 1891 and 1926, almost one million more moslems joined those already in Communes Mixtes. Yet only 5 new Communes Mixtes were created to cater for this influx.

During the next quarter century, from 1926 to 1954, the situation grew even worse. The further creation of 34 Communes de Plein Exercice, and the migration of many moslems to towns and townships, did not prevent a further increase of 1.1 million in the number of moslems crammed within the Commune Mixte framework. During that time, with the status of the institution extremely uncertain, not a single new Commune Mixte was created to accommodate them. Instead of recasting the whole system, there was an endless, piecemeal and makeshift process of redrawing boundaries.

The inevitable consequence of this, a rapid rise in the size of each Commune Mixte, is spelled out in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Communes Mixtes - Average Moslem and European Population
1881-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF C.M.s</th>
<th>AVERAGE NO. OF MOSLEMS PER C.M.</th>
<th>AVERAGE NO. OF EUROPEANS PER C.M.</th>
<th>AVERAGE TOTAL POPULATION PER C.M.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>24.078</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>24.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>31.832</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>32.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>35.825</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>36.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>37.914</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>38.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>40.360</td>
<td>1.016</td>
<td>41.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>40.810</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>41.779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>42.124</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>42.951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>44.653</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>45.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>48.574</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>49.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>54.032</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>54.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>56.284</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>56.734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a little over seven decades, the average size of a Commune Mixte rose by 131%. Barika, in the Hodna, was one very typical example, increasing from 25,000 inhabitants in 1886, to 41,700 in 1926, and 59,245 in 1948. This growth was entirely due to the increase in moslem population, for there was a gradual shrinkage in the number of settlers to be found in these communes. As a result, the 'intercommunal ratio' in each Mixed Commune swung even more decisively in favour of the moslem population. As Figure 11 shows, by 1954 there were over three times as many moslems per European as there had been in 1911.

Figure 11: Communes Mixtes - Ratio of Moslem to European Population 1881-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MOSLEMS FOR EVERY EUROPEAN IN C.M.s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>110.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>127.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The calculation of average population sizes, moreover, conceals major variations from one Commune Mixte to another. In 1936, for example, the largest and smallest Communes Mixtes in terms of population were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Département</th>
<th>Population of biggest C.M.</th>
<th>Population of smallest C.M.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algrois</td>
<td>La Chelif</td>
<td>108,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td>La Soummam</td>
<td>125,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oranais</td>
<td>Ammi-Moussa</td>
<td>56,790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The span of this kind of variation is indicated in more detail for 1948 by Figure 12.

Figure 12: Communes Mixtes - Variations in Population Size, 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Population Size</th>
<th>No. of Communes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120,000 - 130,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110,000 - 120,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 - 110,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90,000 - 100,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80,000 - 90,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70,000 - 80,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,000 - 70,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 - 60,000</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000 - 50,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 - 40,000</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 - 30,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 - 20,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1948, the largest of these communes, La Soummam, had over 129,000 inhabitants, and over 145,000 by 1954. The situation appears quite clearly to have been worsening, i.e. the density of administration was weakening, but it is important to emphasize that such manifestations of 'underadministration' were not an exclusive feature of the years 1936-54. La Soummam, when created in 1875, already had a population in excess of 100,000, and over 110,000 by 1914.
Although these statistics are suggestive of 'underadministration', they do not prove it, for the swollen size of communes could conceivably have been offset by increasing the corps of administrators attached to each. To put the picture in clearer focus, therefore, it is desirable to sketch an administrator/administree ratio of the type used by Buell.

Colonial authority in each Commune Mixte was concentrated in and embodied by the 'administrateur'. He was part of a special corps, recruited exclusively for service in Algerian Communes Mixtes. In addition to principal administrators, this corps also comprised a number of assistant administrators. Usually between one and three assistants were assigned to the principal administrator of each Commune Mixte, according to its size. This small team also had a handful of gendarmes at its command, plus possibly one or two French clerical aides and such native auxiliaries as an interpreter or 'chaouch' (factotum). In addition, caïds were appointed to help with liaison with native douars. The principal and assistant administrateurs, however, were the only real agents of direct authority, and an administrator ratio is most intelligible in terms of them alone.

Economy was invariably the keynote with regard to the administration of Communes Mixtes, and this affected the appointment of personnel. Expansion of the corps was frequently restricted for budgetary reasons. In any case, poor pay and poor prospects often made it difficult to fill even those posts available. Nevertheless, during the first fifty years of its existence, the corps did expand to meet the increasing population. The number of administrators in post rose from 60 in 1877, to 199 in 1888, and to 268 in 1913. By 1922, there were 300 of them. This, however, was the peak. Thereafter, despite a
steady rise in the population of Communes Mixtes, the number of
administrators and assistants in post began actually to fall. By
1939, there were only 280, and by 1954, 257. Partly this was due
to the perennially tentative status of Communes Mixtes, and the acute
post-war slump, in particular, was caused by the "Statut de l'Algérie"
passed by the French National Assembly on September 20th 1947. This
announced the dissolution of Communes Mixtes but did nothing concrete
to bring it about. The consequence was a total cessation of the
appointment of Commune Mixte administrators from 1946 onwards. Yet
these institutions doggedly survived for another ten years, while
natural wastage through retirement, and resignation of those seeking
a healthier basis for a career, brought about a shrinking and ageing
of their establishment. This was a decision which the Maspétiol
Commission of 1955-6 excoriated as extremely short-sighted: the
multiplicity of new communes which were supposedly to replace Communes
Mixtes would have required many more, not fewer administrators, and
above all, would desperately have needed experienced officials. Soustelle later denounced this halting of recruitment as a typical
attempt to "administer on the cheap".

Far from expanding to meet the needs of a rising moslem
population, then, the administrative personnel of Communes Mixtes
actually declined over the three decades before the outbreak of
insurrection. Figure 13 sketches this process and its effects:

Figure 13: Communes Mixtes - Ratio of Administrators to Moslem
inhabitants, 1881-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NO. OF C.M.s</th>
<th>NO. OF ADMINISTRATORS</th>
<th>TOTAL NO. OF MOSLEMS</th>
<th>ADMINISTRATIVE RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1,854,000</td>
<td>1 : 11.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>2,323,710</td>
<td>1 : 11.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>2,986,534</td>
<td>1 : 11.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3,109,157</td>
<td>1 : 10.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>1 : 14.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>4,390,000</td>
<td>1 : 16.800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During the first fifty years of Commune Mixte organization, the appointment of additional administrators appears to have kept pace with the growth of population. Indeed a slight improvement in the administrative ratio is indicated. Yet underadministration was a feature of Communes Mixtes even at this period of 'peak' density. "Even supposing elite administrators conscious of their responsibility to the native population", Ageron asks, "how could they really have done anything with the mass of people given to them, which varied from 30,000 to 60,000 and might even exceed 100,000, when they themselves had the help of only one or two assistant administrators, plus a few French clerks or moslem khodjas"? The administrative infrastructure was always skimpy, but it is also clear that things were deteriorating from the 1920's onwards. The administrative ratio fell rapidly, over three decades, from 1 : 10,400 to 1 : 16,500. To put this another way, the average Commune Mixte administrator in the 1920's had three assistants to help him with 40,000 administrees, but by the outbreak of the 1954 rebellion he had one fewer assistant and 15,000 more administrees.

It could thus be argued that a situation of crisis proportions was developing on the eve of the insurrection. Bromberger, a French journalist, discovered with amazement in 1954 that the Commune Mixte of Arris, in the Constantinois, with its population of over 60,000, was being supervised by only one administrator, two assistants, and seven gendarmes. But this was far from abnormal. At that time, 44 Communes Mixtes with over 40,000 inhabitants had only one administrator and one assistant administrator, and two of these had well over 100,000 inhabitants. Indeed, the Commune Mixte of Akbou,
in the Constantinois, with a population of over 80,000, remained for many months with only one administrator. If the chain was as strong as its weakest point, it was clearly in need of repair.

Moreover it should be remembered that this situation, with an average ratio of 1 : 12,500, prevailed in a colony often regarded as an epitome of 'direct' administration. The whole weight of administration was borne by the 'administrateur' and his aides. Beneath them, there was virtually no involvement of traditional authorities in colonial administration. Caids, as suggested in the previous chapter, were small, artificial and dislocated cogs. In this context, the ratio acquires acute significance.

The physical area covered by Communes Mixtes is another important consideration in assessing the density of colonial implantation. A small population which is widely scattered, particularly over difficult terrain, is likely to be more difficult to supervise than a bigger population agglomerated in the immediate vicinity of the administrative headquarters. Figure 14 permits some discussion of this question.

**Figure 14 : Communes Mixtes - Physical area covered, 1881-1948**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF C.M.s</th>
<th>TOTAL AREA (sq. miles)</th>
<th>AVERAGE AREA (sq. miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>37,646</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40,461</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>54,411</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66,427</td>
<td>874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>70,274</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69,682</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Communes Mixtes were huge. Even the earliest creations covered about 500 square miles each, and were 'municipalities' only in name. Successive extensions of civil rule involved even more widely scattered populations, and in addition the general
practice was to merge them within the framework of existing communes. As a result, the average area covered by Communes Mixtes increased by about 80% during the forty years between 1881 and 1921. Thereafter the physical size of Communes Mixtes remained fairly stable with additions of former military territory almost offset by the creation of new Communes de Plein Exercice. By 1948, the average area of a Commune Mixte was about 900 square miles, equivalent to two-fifths of a typical département in contemporary France, or one and a half times as big as the modern Greater London conurbation. The result, as Figure 15 indicates, was that each colonial official was given an impossibly large area to 'directly' administer.

Figure 15 : Communes Mixtes - Area per Administrator, 1881-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATORS</th>
<th>APPROX. TOTAL AREA OF COMMUNES (sq. miles)</th>
<th>AREA PER ADMINISTRATOR (sq. miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>69,000</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a short time, between 1881 and 1891, the recruitment of extra administrators more than offset the expansion of Commun Mixte territory. However the ratio of administrator to area quickly deteriorated, thirty years earlier than the similar turnaround in administrator/population ratio. Each administrator was expected to cover an extra 70 square miles of territory between 1891 and 1954, a 35% increase. As Soustelle pointed out ironically in 1956, "these giant communes..., as vast as départements in the metropolis, extending from the high plateau as far as the Sahara across cyclopean piles of lunar mountains, with
tens of thousands of inhabitants scattered in the wild bled, could not be administered by a single man, even with one or two assistants".  

Even more than with population, average areas conceal extremely wide variations in actuality. Some of the southernmost civil Communes Mixtes were immense. In 1936, for example, the largest and smallest Communes in terms of physical area were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departement</th>
<th>Area of biggest C.M.</th>
<th>Area of smallest C.M.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alger</td>
<td>Bou Saada 3,813 sq. m.</td>
<td>Djurdjura 128 sq. m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantine</td>
<td>Tebessa 4,334 sq. m.</td>
<td>Taher 204 sq. m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oran</td>
<td>Djebel-Nador 4,532 sq. m.</td>
<td>Ain Temouchent 59 sq. m.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 16 shows the range of actual variation in more detail for 1948.

Figure 16: Communes Mixtes - Variations in Physical Area, 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (Sq. miles)</th>
<th>No. of Communes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>over 4,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 - 4,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 - 2,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700 - 1,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600 - 700</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 - 600</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 - 500</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 - 400</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 - 300</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under 200</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population densities in Communes Mixtes also varied considerably, as Map 1 suggests. Some Communes, particularly those covering the crowded mountainsides of Kabylia, had extremely high densities considering their large area. Already by 1936 both Fort-National and Djurdjura boasted densities of over 630 persons per square mile, and were sources of large-scale emigration to Algiers and France. At the same time, by contrast, the big pre-Saharan Commune of Djebel Nador had a density of fewer than 10 persons per square mile.
f) Density in Communes de Plein Exercice

For Communes de Plein Exercice, it is virtually impossible to devise an administrator/administree ratio which has any real meaning. The European Maire, responsible for administration in each municipality, was a politician much more than an official, and lacked professional training. Above all, he was a representative of the settler community. In smaller Communes, he was often little more than a part-time dignitary. Frequently the Maire shared his workload with two or three deputies, and even with as many as seven in the largest communes. The number of municipal employees, including a secretariat, was often quite numerous; big towns like Algiers, Oran and Constantine had a veritable machine. In the smallest communes, however, professional assistance was virtually non-existent. In a sense, the members of the Municipal Council carried out supervisory tasks also.

However, only a small proportion of the functions performed by these various agencies related specifically to the moslem population; settler affairs were invariably their chief concern. As for the Caid or Native Adjoints theoretically responsible for liaison with the indigenous community, many Communes made do without one, and even those appointed were not treated as real agents of administrative authority. In any case, their place in any overall administrative ratio would be dubious given their moslem status. For all these reasons, attempting to measure the density of native administration in Communes de Plein Exercice using the yardstick of personnel employed is a pointless undertaking.

Nevertheless, as Figure 8 indicates, and as is shown equally clearly by Figure 17, Communes de Plein Exercice provided a growing slice of indigenous experience, and it is necessary to trace some indices of their administrative density.
The number of moslems under the regime of Maires rose almost sixfold between 1881 and 1954. Partly this is explained by the steady establishment of Communes de Plein Exercice, incorporating more and more moslems. The 195 Communes of 1881 increased to 271 by 1911, representing a formation rate of 2.6 per year, and further to 330 by 1954, indicating a rather slower rate of 1.4 per year. The rise was also partly attributable to the rapid acceleration of moslem fertility after 1930, and to the steady migration of moslems from rural Communes Mixtes to aggomerated Communes de Plein Exercice, particularly big towns. The experience of the Commune of Blida was typical; its population rose from 40,000 to 56,800 in the space of the twelve years from 1936 to 1948, due almost entirely to the influx of moslems from the surrounding bled.96

As moslems crowded into and bred within existing Communes de Plein Exercice, new municipalities were created at a rate insufficient to counteract the increase in population. As Figure 18 indicates, the effect was virtually to triple the average size of Communes de Plein Exercice between 1881 and 1954.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF C.P.E.s</th>
<th>TOTAL MOSLEM POPULATION</th>
<th>TOTAL EUROPEAN POPULATION</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION (MOSLEM &amp; EUROPEAN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>569,000</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td>934,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>771,263</td>
<td>484,012</td>
<td>1,255,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>901,525</td>
<td>549,364</td>
<td>1,450,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>983,384</td>
<td>607,999</td>
<td>1,591,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>1,072,785</td>
<td>666,373</td>
<td>1,739,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>1,205,761</td>
<td>717,325</td>
<td>1,923,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>1,330,078</td>
<td>764,031</td>
<td>2,094,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>1,543,412</td>
<td>818,398</td>
<td>2,361,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>1,781,209</td>
<td>886,993</td>
<td>2,668,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>2,662,850</td>
<td>871,465</td>
<td>3,534,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>3,250,000</td>
<td>936,126</td>
<td>4,186,126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Figure 18: Communes de Plein Exercice - Average Moslem and European Population, 1881-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF C.P.E.s</th>
<th>AVERAGE NO. OF MOSLEMS PER C.P.E.</th>
<th>AVERAGE NO. OF EUROPEANS PER C.P.E.</th>
<th>AVERAGE TOTAL POPULATION PER C.P.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>2.918</td>
<td>1.872</td>
<td>4.790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>3.073</td>
<td>1.928</td>
<td>4.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>3.454</td>
<td>2.105</td>
<td>5.559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>3.683</td>
<td>2.277</td>
<td>5.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>3.959</td>
<td>2.459</td>
<td>6.418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>4.359</td>
<td>2.600</td>
<td>6.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>4.561</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>7.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>5.077</td>
<td>2.692</td>
<td>7.769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>5.783</td>
<td>2.880</td>
<td>8.663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>8.269</td>
<td>2.706</td>
<td>10.975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>9.848</td>
<td>2.830</td>
<td>12.678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This increase in the number of Commune de Plein Exercice inhabitants caused the loss of any resemblance, which in any case had never really existed, to the French municipalities regulated by the same Law of 1884. By 1948, the average Algerian Commune was eleven times bigger than its supposed French counterpart. The major factor in this general expansion was clearly moslem demography, for the number of natives in the typical Commune de Plein Exercice rose by over a third between 1881 and 1911, more than doubled between 1911 and 1948, and increased by a further 20% in the six years between 1948 and 1954. At the same time, the European community was also rising, due partly to natural increase and partly to the marginal drift of Europeans from the bled to aggregations. The statistics show a 15% increase in the average European population between 1881 and 1954.

Much more than with Communes Mixtes, the average population of a Commune de Plein Exercice is a statistical abstraction disguising enormous actual variations. Figure 19 shows this for 1948.
Figure 19: Communes de Plein Exercice - Variations in Population Size, 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CPEs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CPEs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000-5,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>over 300,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000-4,000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10,000-15,000</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500-3,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>100,000-110,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-2,500</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Total 162</td>
<td></td>
<td>60,000-70,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500-2,000</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50,000-60,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40,000-50,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under 1,500</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30,000-40,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000-40,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000-30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000-30,000</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly we have to differentiate in kind between big urban communes and small rural communes. The biggest dozen Communes de Plein Exercice were comparable in population size to Communes Mixtes. The largest, Algiers, had 308,300 inhabitants by 1948. These Communes, as indicated earlier by Figures 4 and 5, experienced the most dramatic effects of urbanization in the second quarter of the Twentieth Century. They had little in common with the one-third of Communes with fewer than 4,000 inhabitants, which typically comprised a small colon centre surrounded by scattered moslem douars. Of these, the smallest, El Achour, had a total population of only 533 in 1948, and many were demographically stagnant.

Communes de Plein Exercice were transformed not just in terms of global population during the colonial period, but also, because of the relatively faster increase of their moslem population, in terms of ethnic balance. This change is charted by Figure 20.
Figure 20: Communes de Plein Exercice - Ratio of Moslems to Europeans, 1881-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MOSLEMS FOR EVERY EUROPEAN IN C.P.E.'s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The earliest Communes had been predominantly European institutions. By 1884, however, as legislation was entrenching unshakeable European power in the Municipal constitution, moslems were already in a slight majority. This 'anomaly' became more and more striking in successive decades. By 1936, the average commune had twice as many moslems as Europeans, and by 1954 3\frac{1}{2} times. Inevitably there were wide disparities in this intercommunal ratio. In rural communes, there were considerably more moslems per European than in the big towns. In these smaller municipalités, huge imbalances were not confined to the years after the Second World War. In 1914, for example, the commune of Mekla had 9,098 moslem inhabitants and 140 Europeans, Camp du Maréchal had 9056 moslems and 214 Europeans, Charon had 5105 moslems and 197 Europeans, Sidi Merouane 6,600 moslems and 318 Europeans, and Randon 4,978 moslems and 561 Europeans. These ratios ranged from 64:1 to 9:1 in favour of the moslem community. Given the fundamentally colon-dominated nature of administration in these areas, such disparities are highly suggestive of underadministration.
In the more urbanized Communes, the ethnic balance was far less lop-sided, and there was a much denser juxtaposition of the two populations. However, as was hinted earlier, it by no means followed that physical proximity brought administration truly 'closer' to the moslem population. Paradoxically, the administrative personnel of big urban Communes could become even more remote. Isolated in a separate European quarter, they were usually confined to 'pure' administration, and thus cut off from intimate political contact with the indigenous community.100

Finally, statistics indicate that the physical dimensions of Communes de Plein Exercice manifested virtually no variation over time, as might be expected.

Figure 21: Communes de Plein Exercice - Physical area covered, 1881-194891

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NO. OF C.P.E.s</th>
<th>TOTAL AREA OF C.P.E.s (sq. miles)</th>
<th>AVERAGE AREA PER C.P.E. (sq. miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>6.689</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>9.152</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>9.591</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>9.754</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>10.666</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>11.245</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Communes created in the mid-Twentieth Century had essentially the same territorial configuration as those established a century earlier, spreading over an average of approximately 35 square miles in both cases. However this meant a perpetuation of large-scale administrative units. At the same time, the average French Commune covered only 52\frac{1}{2} square miles.101
-ii. Resource Mobilization Capacity

However dense on the ground, the 'effectiveness' of colonial administration in Algeria may also be judged by the quantity and quality of resources made available to it, and by its capacity to deploy them efficiently.

a. Finance

One area of assessment which appears eminently quantifiable is that of financial expenditure. However, no systematic research has been conducted into this aspect of French Algeria, and, without it, it is difficult to do more than impressionistically indicate potential problems. Global figures are full of ambiguities and virtually unusable. Amin, for example, calculates that 1.5% of the Algerian G.N.P. in 1955 was devoted to administration, which appears an extremely large outlay. However, it is clearly of paramount importance to have a precise breakdown of what this money was spent on. Obviously an expensive but wasteful and parasitic bureaucracy may coexist with very real 'underadministration'. Half of Amin's total, for example, was swallowed up by debt charges and by military costs. Equally fundamental, of course, is the question of how resources were distributed between the administration of settler and moslem interests. The Administration's own claimed per capita expenditure of 125 NF in 1955 rising to 274 NF in 1959 for instance, is a meaningless statistic without clarification of this issue.

One aspect of finance which deserves particular attention is the distribution of resources between Central and Local administration. The Algerian system acquired a reputation, particularly in later years,
of being 'top heavy' or 'over-centralized'. Some financial statistics appear to confirm that an expensive bureaucratic machine operated in Algiers while relative economy reigned at the local level. With only three Departements and fewer than twenty Arrondissements for most of the colonial period, not merely local but also intermediate levels of administration were neglected. There thus was not only an imbalance but an enormous gap between administrative activity in Algiers and in the interior. Only after 1954 were serious attempts made to re-jig these intermediate linkages according to a "human scale".

It is at the purely local level that thorough examination of administrative expenditure would be most useful, and moreover in the Communes Mixtes rather than in the Communes de Plein Exercice. There seems to have been a pattern of fairly generous spending in the latter, and austerity in the former. In 1891, for example, the global expenditure of Communes Mixtes amounted to 7,880,034 francs, or an average of 3.3 francs per inhabitant. In the same year, Communes de Plein Exercice spent 14,293,719 francs, which, spread over all inhabitants, would represent a per capita average of 11.4 francs, but which, given the attested neglect of moslem administration, probably meant an outlay in excess of 25 francs per head for the 484,012 European inhabitants.

b. Quality and Deployment of Personnel

Native administration in Algeria may also be assessed in terms of the quality of personnel engaged, and the effectiveness of their deployment. In these respects, the strongest symptoms of under-
administration were presented by Communes de Plein Exercice. Not only did they concern themselves chiefly with settler affairs, but they were totally lacking in trained or specialized officials for native administration. This indifference was compounded by the absence of control from above. In the name of assimilation, special structures to direct, coordinate or supervise native policy in these areas were deliberately eschewed. The failure of such short-lived experiments as Départemental Bureaux Arabes, or of schemes similar to that adumbrated by Cambon at the turn of the century, suggests that this sector of the colonial apparatus was designed to paralyse rather than mobilize resources which might have furthered effective implantation.

This was far less blatantly true of Communes Mixtes. The quality of native administration there appears nevertheless to have been much inferior to that provided in other French colonies. Algeria's special status as an extension of the Metropolis was partly responsible. Throughout most of the French empire, native affairs were the responsibility of the unified Service of "administrateurs des colonies". In principle, its personnel were transferable from one territory to another within the empire, though in practice, certainly at lower echelons, they remained within one of the 'sections' into which the service was organized - Indo-China, for example, or Tropical Africa. This corps of colonial officials was recruited and trained in Metropolitan France. All were graduates of the prestigious Ecole Coloniale, later Ecole Nationale de la France d'Outre Mer, in Paris. Their preparatory course required three years study of such subjects as colonial
legislation and history, and administrative law and procedure, in addition to providing a grounding in the languages, cultures and customary law of the areas to which initial assignment was sought. One common pay structure, one conditions of service framework, one promotion system, and one supervisory apparatus governed this entire colonial service. In terms of material benefits, professional standards, and morale, it had the standing of an elite corps. To supplement its efforts locally, a number of 'agents de service' were recruited in each colony often including indigenous personnel for more routine work. Although their quality and conditions of service varied, some minimum qualifications were laid down for them also.111

In contrast to these "administrateurs des colonies", the "administrateurs des Communes Mixtes de l'Algérie" were separately recruited and organized, with their own conditions of service. The vast majority were Algerian rather than Metropolitan Europeans, and recruited locally. To a large extent this was a result of the limited career prospects offered by the service. Deprived of access to posts in other parts of the French Empire, the horizons of its personnel stretched no further than the 78 Communes Mixtes of Civil Algeria. At the very peak of organizational density, this opened 300 potential posts to a prospective entrant.

Nor was there a real ladder of responsibility inside this narrow framework. Despite the introduction of a few career 'grades',112 the internal promotion structure was extremely flat. The minimum age for appointment as Assistant Administrator was 25. The recruit was then required to spend several years shuffling
between Communes until an opportunity for promotion presented itself, usually through seniority. The position of Principal Administrator was rarely attained before the age of 40, and retirement was obligatory at 55. Above Principal Administrator there was nothing; even the 'inspectorate' established in 1911 consisted of only one post. Access to posts at Arrondissement or Département level within Algeria in particular, was completely blocked. The senior personnel of Préfecturat and Sous-Préfecturat belonged to the corps of French "administrateurs civils" controlled by the Ministère de l'Intérieure, and as such were all graduates of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration in Paris. Essentially they were Metropolitan executives given a temporary posting in Algeria in order to acquire the experience required for promotion back in France. The pay, prestige, and advancement opportunities open to them were closed to those entering the ranks of Commune Mixte administration. By the time a decision was finally made to assimilate the two corps in 1948, the Commune Mixte had already received its kiss of death.

The remuneration of 'administrateurs' was determined by the Gouvernement-Général, and thus prone to settler pressure to hold down administrative costs. Considering the rigours of an isolated life in the bled, and compared with other French colonies or even with other administrative officials in Algeria, they do not seem to have been overgenerously paid. At the turn of the century, for example, they were receiving only 50-75% of the salary accorded to officials with comparable responsibilities in neighbouring Tunisia. In addition, the status of Communes Mixtes themselves was chronically tentative, so that uncertainty hovered over even the limited horizon
which the service offered. This was a particularly marked feature of the last two decades before 1954.

In view of these job prospects, recruitment was often a problem. For native Algerians, the loneliness of such posts had few compensations to offset the attractions of more sedate employment in Algiers or Oran. Paucity of candidates, and vacant posts, were a feature from the outset, and were not only to be found in later years. This in turn rendered it impossible to impose high entry standards. Nothing remotely resembling the requirements of the Ecole Coloniale could be demanded. Though a few relevant courses were eventually organized by Algiers University, certification was purely voluntary. In fact no diplomas of any kind were made obligatory. The vague emphasis in recruitment was on "relevant qualities or experience" rather than on concrete standards. Entrants, accordingly, appear not to have been of the highest ability; the initial intake was of particularly dubious standing. On the basis of their written reports, one observer described early Twentieth Century Administrators as generally less efficient, less energetic, and "of much lower intellectual quality" than their equivalents in other French colonies.

Another fundamental weakness of Commune Mixte administration was the lack of supervision and direction from above. In-service training was virtually unknown. Experience was essentially acquired on the job, through trial and error, initially as an assistant to an established administrator. The workload was such that new entrants were quickly plunged into deep responsibilities and given considerable power with the skimpier of guidance and control. Administrators were left to their own devices in many respects. The sous-Préfet of each
arrondissement, and even the Départemental Préfet, were theoretically required to make regular tours of inspection, but this exhausting undertaking seems to have been more honoured in the breach than in the observance. Arrondissements were considerably larger than départements in France, and during the Twentieth Century the sous-Préfet increasingly found himself tied to headquarters by the burden of paperwork. In addition, these were Metropolitan personnel on a fairly brief spell of duty in Algeria, lacking either a detailed knowledge of local conditions or a motive for acquiring it. They were "fonctionnaires de passage". 124

As much as control and inspection, what was missing was leadership from above. Since the demise of the Bureau Arabe, there had been no strong central organization to determine the direction of native policy in Algeria. Its work had been watered down and distributed among non-specialist bodies. The "Direction des affaires musulmanes" established in the late Nineteenth Century was poorly equipped, and concerned itself above all with the Military Territories. 125 In this sense, Commune Mixte Administrators were "almost abandoned". 126 Many of them were at a loss to fathom the direction and purpose of events, particularly in later years. "The administration", wrote the head of the Commune Mixte of Palestro in the mid-1950's, amid unconfirmed rumours of the imminent elimination of his corps, "is a vast apparatus which reveals itself almost always by chance. Its results are as unpredictable as a fruit machine. It's best to expect nothing from it, to bottle up your hopes, to harden yourself...to avoid any illusions". 127

Yet paradoxically this remoteness and abandonment was combined with the infliction of a mass of petty bureaucratic work. Despite
the onerous tasks of community contact and promotion which the administrator was supposed to undertake - at least six days per month, for example, were to be spent on tour six miles or more from his residence\textsuperscript{128} - Algiers "drowned everything in dossiers"\textsuperscript{129} and hampered his performance. The widespread feeling of impotence in the face of this trend was voiced by one administrator in 1946: "Contact with the indigenous population is made through files... In other words, contact has been lost and is being lost increasingly every day".\textsuperscript{130}

In such circumstances, the energy and morale of Administrators inevitably suffered. They were considered by others, and by themselves, to be the "poor cousins" of Algerian administration.\textsuperscript{131} Dismayed by evidence of their flagging sense of commitment, Soustelle blamed French Algeria's "desire systematically to discourage" a corps which, he felt, could have become the "elite" architects of a truly French Algeria.\textsuperscript{132} "When what was needed," Ageron concurs, "was apostles shining with the faith to move mountains and to break the resistance of local sceptics; when a noble character and strict professional discipline were indispensable if they were to resist the dizzy temptations of a poorly-defined and often extra-legal authority, there was only a group of poorly-recruited, untrained and virtually unsupervised officials, men unequal to the countless demands of a noble task".\textsuperscript{133}

Periodic drives to improve the standards and performance of administration, for example by such reform-minded Gouverneurs as Cambon, Jonnart, and latterly Soustelle, were rare and invariably stifled by apathy or active opposition. In the short-term, proposals
of this kind came up against the problem of recruitment, since it was
difficult enough to attract sufficient candidates into the service
even with minimal entry requirements. This problem might have been
remedied by serious attempts to better the pay, conditions of
service and career potential of the corps, and by the simultaneous
investment of resources in comprehensive programmes of training and
inspection. However, to suggest something on this scale was to arouse
active opposition on the grounds of cost; the settler-controlled
Delegations Financières were resistant even to schemes of a piecemeal
or cosmetic nature.

The question of cost could evidently have been resolved had there
been the political will, or even a feeling that reform would vitally
affect the future of French Algeria. These were notably lacking. A
constant argument used to waylay reform proposals was that Communes
Mixtes were merely "a passing phase on the path to true municipal
life" and "special territories which will one day disappear".134
To seriously refurbish the corps of administrators was tantamount to
accepting the permanence of Communes Mixtes. This, for different
reasons, neither colons nor Metropolitan liberals were happy to do.
The dogged survival of 'provisional' Communes Mixtes was thus a
functionless of their effectiveness and strength than of the inability
of French Algeria to come to grips with their deficiencies.
Fundamental ambiguity in the direction of native policy and in the
nature of the colonial enterprise translated itself in a paralysis
of political will which seriously hampered the "resource mobilization
capacity" of local administration.
iii. Adaptation to the indigenous environment

Whatever the density and mobilization capacity of the machinery of colonial control, its effectiveness also depended on its adaptation to the context in which it was required to operate. It is perhaps in terms of this criterion that the French administration of Algeria was most deficient, although little of the evidence is measurable.

Local administration did not really provide specifically indigenous administration at all. The structures which developed during the Nineteenth Century were makeshift devices hardening into rigid forms, which above all translated the interests and pressures of the alien minority. The contrast between this framework of control, and the subtle processes of indigenous political life, is so striking that it is as if a whole dimension were missing. This discordance was most marked in Communes de Plein Exercice, institutions which were imported wholesale from Metropolitan France and delivered locally into the firm custody of small groups of settlers. Moslem groups were divided up among these Procrustean beds to facilitate the development of colon municipal life. In the name of assimilation, but in the real interests of exploitation, autochthonous social structures were deliberately by-passed, neglected or attacked. No role was found within the Commune for the customary institutions of moslem Algeria; even such distorted representations of indigenous reality as the Douars and Jemaas identified by the 1863 Senatus-Consulte were systematically ignored. No attempt was made to locate or to carve out a meaningful 'intermediary' role for traditional leaders or representatives of traditional authority; even the anomalously conceived colonial Caids were stripped of utility.
The norms and methods of administration in Communes de Plein Exercice were fundamentally Eurocentric. Their operation in the totally alien indigenous context ensured the de facto exclusion of moslems from a system which offered them a theoretical, albeit novel, role. The personnel of the Mairie had no grounding in moslem culture at all. They rarely had even a minimal knowledge of Arabic or Berber, nor was it customary for the Mairie to employ an interpreter. The fact that most employees were Europeans born in Algeria rather than France actually hindered instead of enhanced their comprehension of the indigenous world, for they inherited the stock of stereotyped colon preconceptions.

The structure of Communes Mixtes, though at one remove from direct settler control, was also fundamentally dislocated from the pattern of indigenous socio-political life. The administrative units were far too large to come into direct contact with the intimacy of autochthonous communal groupings, and their territorial, quasi-municipal cast bore no relation to the segmentary dynamics of native society. Communes Mixtes were designed as instruments of direct administration in the sense that the Administrator was the bottom-most rung of authority recognized by the colonial regime. There was no machinery for collaboration or even consultation with native 'authorities', as was more clearly the pattern in the Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia. Almost as much in Communes de Plein Exercice, the Commune Mixte Caid was confined to menial tasks and lacked legitimation from below. Although in later years colonial Douars and their Jemmas were accorded a marginally more prominent place in the Commune Mixte, hesitation over the direction of native policy hamstrung their evolution
at the stage of token responsibility. In any case, they were too large and static to correspond in more than name to forms of traditional segmentation.

Commune Mixte administrators were also extremely Eurocentric. Even in such a basic matter as language, they did little to come to terms with the indigenous environment. When the corps was first set up, there was an attempt to make a simple oral or written test in Arabic or Berber a condition of entry. However, the shortage of personnel made this unworkable and, by 1897, it had been abandoned even in theory. Learning the local language was left to individual initiative. As an incentive, the Government's practice was to offer a small bonus to those holding a certificate of proficiency. Its effectiveness can be gauged from the fact that in 1888, only 18 of the 199 administrators were receiving this payment. The proportion had improved to 62 out of 261 by 1911, but this state of affairs appears to have grown worse rather than better during the Twentieth Century. By 1956 Soustelle was denouncing the situation as "deplorable". In practice, most administrators relied heavily on an official interpreter, or on amenable French-speaking moslems. Grievance sessions (Chikaya), at which the administrator listened to the pleas and settled the complaints of his administrees, were usually conducted in French, with the aid of an interpreter.

In more general terms of understanding the native milieu, Administrators were ill-equipped. They were European without exception, yet rarely received any formal training in moslem law or customs. The knowledge which they acquired through experience
was skimpy and empirical. The rapidity with which administrators were rotated from post to post did not encourage intimate acquaintance with the surrounding community. The average length of stay in post was between one and two years. The enormous area to be covered and the growing workload also contributed to the lack of close and regular contact with administrees. Thus the administrator of Miliana, tending perhaps to romanticize his past, complained in 1954:

"Before I used to make tours on horseback. Sometimes they lasted four or five days. We had to sleep in the villages and share the peasants bowl of couscous. We did less paperwork, but a far better job than now, with our jeeps, taking us back to the bordj (fortified quarters) every evening". 

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141
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III. THE MILITARY ASSAULT ON UNDERADMINISTRATION, 1954-62

Judged by the various criteria outlined above, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, by 1954 if not long before, the colonial regime in Algeria was suffering from a massive problem of underadministration. It took the outbreak of coordinated guerrilla attacks in late 1954, however, and the subsequent manifest collapse of colonial structures in several parts of the territory, to concentrate the attention of both Metropolitans and settlers upon this fact. The deficiencies were perceived as technical ones, and there followed a flurry of hastily-improvised efforts to resolve them by technical means. However, the growing insecurity made it impossible to implement reform through conventional channels. Increasing call had to be made upon the French army to restore order. The 50,000 troops on Algerian soil in October 1954 were increased to 83,000 by the following February, and again to 190,000 by February 1956. A further massive influx of military personnel was required in subsequent years, including the drafting of conscripts. By 1960 there were well over half a million. This process of militarization brought, above all, the use of repressive force on the moslem community, but it also entailed a final and belated attack on 'underadministration' through the injection of massive new physical resources. The character of this effort, and its ultimate failure, highlight the basic features of 'underadministration', and the narrowness of any perspective which treats it purely as a problem of material equipment.
a. The roots of military strategy

In its initial attempts to restore 'order', particularly in the Aures and Kabylia, the French army found the existing administrative, police and judicial apparatus to be so hard pressed as to be unable to provide channels of contact with, or basic information about, the moslem population. Troops were faced by "an almost complete administrative void", which greatly hampered the effectiveness of their operations and facilitated those of the F.L.N. This swiftly persuaded the army command of the need to adopt 'unconventional' methods aside from the field of battle proper. It came to regard its function as not simply the stiffening of an existing colonial framework by the assertion of armed force, but rather the reconstruction of that framework, or the building of a new one of its own. Two recent experiences in French military history helped to prepare the army for this 'new' role.

The cradle of the first experience was located elsewhere in the Maghreb, in neighbouring Morocco. The conquest of Morocco had been finally completed only two decades earlier, following a lengthy and arduous campaign, and the army of occupation had conserved an important role in local administration there. From the earliest days of the French 'Protectorate', the pattern of government set by Maréchal Lyautey centred around the need to respect, support, and work with customary institutions and authorities in 'traditional' rural areas. Ostensible 'indirect rule' of this kind was administered under the protective eye of military "Native Affairs" officers. Morocco had been the scene of such developing dissidence, since the Second World War, that the French had been obliged to sign the treaty recognising its
independence in early 1955. However, the prevailing wisdom was that these forces of Moroccan 'nationalism' had been purely urban, and that the Bled had remained "faithful to France". "Moroccan methods" thus still retained an aura of success at the very time when the officers responsible for implementing them were becoming redundant. Their transfer to Algeria brought a revival of nostalgia for the pre-1870 golden days of Military Rule, for in a sense the "Armée de l'Afrique" had resumed in Morocco the kind of role developed earlier in Algeria by the Bureaux Arabes. However this represented not simply a return to the past, but rather a re-activation of inherent problems and constant strategies in the colonial situation.

The other source of inspiration for army operations in Algeria was at once more distant and, apparently, more forward-looking. This was the French experience in Indo-China, where the vain battle against the Vietminh had just been abandoned. The army turned to Algeria with the dramatic 'new' lessons of Dien Bien Phu ringing in its ears. Whereas the Moroccan experience tended to cast much of the blame for Algerian insecurity upon the inadequacies of 'direct' civil administration, the Vietnamese experience tended to explain it in terms of advanced techniques of warfare recently developed by the enemy. According to this view, a handful of F.L.N. leaders were deliberately seeking to weaken the colonial administration, by depriving it of contact with the masses, and establishing, 'parallel hierarchies' of their own. "The rebellion", as the Ministre-Résident suggested in 1957, "is trying everywhere to set up a clandestine politico military infrastructure with the aim of seizing the real power, pulling the whole population into a campaign of general
subversion, and annihilating the French presence". The facts of 'underadministration', by this view, had merely given them an opportunity to exploit. Essentially the guerrilla attacks of October 31st/November 1st 1954 had "suddenly cut off the administration from the population". Algeria had become the latest testing-ground in the new era of 'revolutionary war', ushered in by such skilled practitioners and theorists as Mao Tse Tung, and of which the French had just tasted the first bitter fruit. From this defeat, the army felt that it had at least salvaged a first-hand knowledge of modern methods of revolutionary warfare. Some of its officers were eager to demonstrate this expertise, and to put it to practical effect, by devising strategies of counter-revolutionary warfare.

b. The establishment of Specialized Administrative Sections

The first use of military resources in this 'counter-revolutionary' role was made under Soustelle. Shocked by the situation in the Aures, scene of some of the worst initial violence of the rebellion, he brought across General Parlangé from Morocco, along with a number of experienced "Affaires Indigènes" officers, and established a special army unit at the sous-Préfecturat of Batna. Its brief was to "re-establish broken contact". Special sectors of military command were set up, in coexistence with the regular civil authorities.

The "Aures experiment", allegedly fairly successful, was rapidly extended to counter growing insecurity in other parts of Algeria. An arrêté of 26th September 1955 created a special military "Service des Affaires Algériennes". Into this were drafted a large number of combat
officers who were now neither old Morocco hands nor Algerian experts. By October, over a hundred of them had taken up their special duties, and by the end of the year almost 350 were scattered in eleven 'pacification zones'. They were organized into a network of what were called "Sections Administratives Spécialisées" or S.A.S. There were 192 such units by January 1956. Each section was commanded by a Capitaine, responsible to a Commandant des Affaires Algériennes at Arrondissement level. The latter's function was to supervise the work of the S.A.S., and to liaise with the civil administration through the sous-Préfet. Above these Commandants were 13 Colonels, one for each of the new Départements created in 1956; in turn they were expected to work closely with the appropriate Préfet. The elaboration of this network, which continued after Soustelle's departure, is sketched out by Figure 22.

Figure 22: The Development of Specialized Administrative Sections 1955-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NO. OF S.A.S. POSTS</th>
<th>NO. OF OFFICERS</th>
<th>NO. OF N.C.O.s</th>
<th>ATTACHED FRENCH TROOPS</th>
<th>ATTACHED NATIVE 'MOKHAZNIS'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1955</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1956</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1957</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1958</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1283</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1958</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1959</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>2596</td>
<td>18.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 1960</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1287</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>2921</td>
<td>19.642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1960</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By early 1960 there was thus virtually one S.A.S. unit for every two of the 1500 'new communes' set up by the civil deconcentration programme of 1956. Each Sector Head had a variety of military personnel at his disposal, including an Assistant Head (usually a Sous-Lieutenant),
an N.C.O., three or four military attaches (for example, secretary-accountant, interpreter, social assistant, and radio operator), and a squad of about 30 native troops (mokhaznis). 158

At first, S.A.S. were designed to supplement and advise the existing Civil Administration, not to replace it. The dissolution of Communes Mixtes in 1956, however, and the withdrawal of their administrators, left an even greater void in this framework than already existed. Few of the 'new' Communes could be translated from paper to reality, and many of the long-established Communes were plagued by insecurity and the arrival of displaced populations. Inevitably, therefore, the S.A.S. played an increasingly direct role at the local level, and soon became the only effective means of contact with the moslem population. Although Préfets and sous-Préfets still retained nominal authority at the higher echelons of Civil Administration, the State of Emergency declared in April 1955 and the special authority accorded to Général Massu in Algiers in January 1957 were two of many steps in a general process of militarization throughout the territory. The administration was experiencing serious difficulties in attracting sufficient civilian personnel - Metropolitan, colon, or moslem - to fill either existing posts or those created by reform programmes, and increasing call had to be made on the army for specialists. 159 Finally, the decree of 28th June 1958 gave extensive powers to the army at Arrondissement, Départemental, and 'Regional' levels. In zones of insecurity, army officers became acting Préfets and sous-Préfets, with civil assistants. 160 A few short years had witnessed "a gradual military takeover, throughout a huge territorial area, of virtually the whole of administrative authority and responsibility, certainly at the local level". 161
c. The role of Specialized Administrative Sections

This takeover was not merely a change of personnel, but constituted a wholesale attack on the phenomenon of 'underadministration'; "it brought about the installation of a new administrative network". The density of colonial control rose almost overnight after the major injection of personnel. The investment of military resources and the new structure of command transformed the 'mobilization capacity' of the colonial regime. Serious new efforts were also made to intensify contact with and adaptation to the indigenous environment.

The work which the S.A.S. were called upon to perform was extremely varied. They found themselves obliged to take over many of the routine tasks supposedly performed by the regular civil administration: adjudication of disputes, collection of taxes, civil registration, census, issuing licences, and processing various documents. But their activities went far beyond such passive concerns.

Schemes were devised for the urgent fostering of contact with the moslem community and S.A.S. personnel threw themselves into the effort in a manner which differed qualitatively from that of their civilian predecessors. The military conception of the task was summarized by Général Allard in 1957. "The mass of the people", he suggested, "are either willingly, or above all forcibly, controlled, shut in, indoctrinated, pressurized by, and caught in a tightly-meshed net (of F.L.N. manufacture)...from which they cannot escape. To snatch away that net, to destroy that tentacular organization, is to give back the population its liberty". Vigorous armed action was the vital priority in those areas already under F.L.N. control, but in the marginal areas the S.A.S. considered mere counter-terror to be counter-productive. Instead their ambition was in a more positive sense to "seek support", "organize", and "involve" the indigenous population.
With this end in view, the political organization ('encadrement') of the moslem community was of prime importance. Efforts were made to stimulate the formation of "civic associations" of various kinds, as vehicles for moral and political education. "Veterans Societies", "Youth Houses", and "Centres for Douar Notables" combined recreational facilities with attempts to promote discussion and group organization. In towns, 'block warden' schemes were introduced, and 'self-defence leagues' were given encouragement and equipment in strategic hamlets. Particular attention was paid to Women's Groups, partly because of the relative absence of adult males, and partly also because the "emancipation" of moslem females was seen as a method of implanting "Western" values and weakening the unity of indigenous resistance.166

These aspects of S.A.S. work were supplemented by the operations of the 5th Bureau of the 10th Military Region, the army's propaganda outfit. Newsheets and pamphlets were issued, loyalty parades were organized, and speakers went on tour. Films and radio were widely employed as means of persuasion.167 Coordinated propaganda drives were conducted in key areas. "Psychology" - the manipulation of hearts and minds - became a key term in military vocabulary.168

The S.A.S. were also active in more conventional attempts to "repair the inadequacies of education".169 By May 1957, 418 soldier teachers were working in Algeria, with 23 000 moslem children in 477 army schools. By January 1960, there were 950 such schools. Apprentice Schools were organized to train youngsters in industrial skills, and workshops were established and protected by military personnel.170
Social welfare was another major field for enterprise. S.A.S. frequently assumed responsibility for distributing food and clothes, and for providing better housing. Many had soldiers specially assigned to social work. Medical services were also developed for local communities. By 1960, over 700 military doctors were at work, and numerous army field hospitals were catering for the sick. A wide range of Technical Services were developed to "win the confidence of reserved and hostile populations", to "promote the moslem masses", and to "introduce new ways of life and thought". Civil engineering of various kinds was undertaken. S.A.S. officers found themselves "talking bulldozers, bridges and highways", and helping to "build roads and sink wells". Agricultural improvement, in particular, was of great concern, in order to facilitate 'self-sufficiency', provide employment, and counteract the social distress caused by the widescale "uprooting" of whole swathes of population. Considerable energy, much of it rather haphazard, was thrown into different projects. As one participant remarked, somewhat ironically, "we have exchanged military boots for farm clogs".

The other face of social engineering was less pacific, and meshed closely with operations of ruthless repression in combat zones. One feature of the latter was the incarceration of large groups of 'suspect' population in big concentration camps. These provided a setting not only for physical torture, but also for various techniques of "psychological re-orientation" and "re-education". Moreover, the forcible transfer or "evacuation" of the inhabitants of "forbidden" or "insecure" zones took place on an unprecedented scale.
The purpose of this was partly to intimidate, but partly also to "protect" certain communities from the "contagion" of rebellion, and to deprive guerrilla forces of physical support and cover.

The corollary of these operations closely involved the S.A.S. This was the resettlement of populations in areas of easier access, usually in proximity to army posts. S.A.S. were responsible for implementing the military plan called "One Thousand Villages", announced in 1957. Its aim was not merely to transfer, but also to regroup ('regrouper') and agglomerate ('reserrer') communities which, in their customary locale, had been widely dispersed. "The dissemination of the population", de Planhol explained, "put an obstacle in the way of any attempts at social equipment or coordinated development of the area and its inhabitants". 180

"Reasoned reorganization" rather than haphazard tradition was the express goal. 181 Such settlement, it was argued, was less prone to subversion and insecurity. Accordingly, the S.A.S. supervised the construction of whole new camps or hamlets, complete with solid houses, regular streets, shop, and civic amenities. They became miniature town-planners, many manifesting extreme symptoms of what Bourdieu and Sayad diagnosed as "morbid geometrism" and "schizomorphic longing for symmetry, blueprints, and formal logic". 182

As part of this construction, schemes were devised to establish a viable economic environment around these artificial settlements. Often this was in the face of heavy odds. Around one S.A.S. camp in the Chiffa valley, for example, there was no agricultural land available at all. Little daunted, the army proposed to transform it into a 'handicraft village' where a maximum of twenty families,
devoting themselves to pottery ("s'adonnant à la poterie"!), could support themselves. Such plans were blissfully elaborated in pro-spectus-like detail. In the instance quoted, folk arts were to be supplemented by "domestic bee and bird-keeping, and a communal flock of sheep"; which together would attract "a few merchants (grocery, bakery, Arab café)". Its location at a crossroads furthermore would "encourage the development of a market, provide a magnet for nearby mountain populations, and eventually justify the construction of a railroad halt. The potential of forests and tourism, the busy main highway nearby, and the subsequent creation of an artificial lake for the water supply of Medea, might complete these resources".

The S.A.S. began uncannily to 'rediscover' the Bureau Arabe strategy of community development as a means of establishing security and of "Westernizing" the whole of moslem life and thought. "The new villagers", wrote de Planhol optimistically, "are plunged not only into an unaccustomed natural context, already plain more than mountain, but above all into a quite different economic atmosphere. They are leaving the zone of sparse cereal fields clinging to the side of ravines, and of delapidated forests abandoned to goat herding, and are entering the zone of vineyards and regularly ordered vegetable plantations. They are leaving an area of archaic economic life, and entering decisively into the orbit of European colonization. This 'plunge' into the modern economy has important consequences. The attraction of new forms of activity, which are infinitely more profitable, is proving irresistible. This mixture of surviving ancient ways of life and partial integration into a superior economy, dominates the whole life of the new villages". It was a return to an old colonial dream.
The audacity of many intervention schemes was at first glance astounding, and their range, in principle, virtually limitless. One is reminded of Balandier's summation of the Colonial Situation as "a gross sociological experiment". Every aspect of moslem life seems to have been challenged by some development programme somewhere. By mid 1958, "the army had not only supplanted civil administration in huge sectors where it had proved physically unable to perform its traditional functions...With its newspapers, its cadre schools, its teams of social assistants, its youth groups and women's clubs, the army was tending to become a veritable encadrement party, and in some parts of Algeria it held a virtual monopoly of public authority". Much of the time, this assault appeared ruthless; at others, its ambitions were almost amusing. "If this carries on", one Kabyle peasant observed, "the French will be sending us functionaries to look after our goats".

**d. The difficulties of Specialized Administrative Sections**

Despite the apparent scope of its commitment, and the injection of major new resources and spirit into local administration, the S.A.S. did not have a revolutionary impact on the colonial situation. At best, its successes were patchy, partial and deceptive, and constituted little more than a holding operation. At worst, its failures were dispiriting, and created even greater problems. Many seemingly petty or short-term difficulties help to explain this, though they were symptoms of basic weaknesses and long-term contradictions.
One seemingly short-term problem experienced by S.A.S. was conflict within the army itself over its role and methods. The enthusiasm of many army officers was no doubt a factor in some initial S.A.S. success, but grassroots community work and administrative tasks were not accepted by the whole army as a valid employment of its time and training. There was often tension between S.A.S. units and the regular army command, particularly on the margin of combat operations. On the one hand, the 'regular' army tended to regard the S.A.S. as a diversion from proper military functions, those alone for which personnel had been trained: the waging of physical war. Many in the S.A.S., by contrast, considered their "principal task" to be "contact with and taming of the population". They fought against efforts to impose on them duties which they felt would jeopardize this: security sweeps and punitive searches, for example.

Education and experience might in time have cleared up some of these 'misunderstandings', but they are suggestive of a basic incompatibility in the army's twin purposes of "pacifying with the one hand...and striking with the other". Military operations sowed disorder and disaffection at the same time as they sought to eliminate it. "Under colour of purging, organizing, and winning back", Bernard points out, "pacification has proceeded to partially destroy the nerve centres of the population. Under the pretext of restructuring and resuming control, it has effected population regroupments which constitute marked assaults on the existing social structure. Under cover of response, it has waged counter terror on the masses....The theory supposed that the indigenous
population would rally to a more efficient and just political organization than the revolutionary organization. The practice prostrated the masses through harassment, segregation and terror. The effect was to strengthen grassroots activists". 191

The problem of training and expertise, though temporary in appearance, also disguised fundamental contradictions. The establishment of S.A.S. considerably multiplied administrative resources at the local level. The mobilization capacity of the army seemingly eliminated overnight an age-old difficulty in recruiting manpower. Men were simply drafted into Algeria and assigned to the remotest parts of the interior. Many, indeed, welcomed the attendant rigours either as a natural extension of, or as an unnatural relief from, military duties, bringing with them "youth, energy, and a taste for contact". 192

However, despite the initial contribution of Moroccan veterans and the presence of men with Vietnamese experience, this influx of manpower could not be termed specialist. In 1959, in fact, only 35% of S.A.S. Heads were even regular officers; the remainder were reservists. 193 Of auxiliary staff, in the later years, some were conscripts. At best, S.A.S. personnel were enthusiastic amateurs with an ability to adapt quickly to a wide range of tasks. They were rushed in to assume considerable responsibilities. Their training programme lasted precisely four weeks. The gross inadequacy of this preparation was readily acknowledged, 194 but the situation was too urgent to permit the leisurely acquisition of relevant skills. As a consequence, the typical S.A.S. officer was no more than a stop-gap, "a sort of Jack-of-all-Trades who carries out his functions
until he can be replaced by more qualified personnel".\textsuperscript{195} This inevitably reduced his 'adaptative effectiveness'. Partiot's claim that 15\% of S.A.S. officers spoke Arabic or Berber, and that half of them could at least 'control' their interpreters, seems to have been an exaggeration.\textsuperscript{196} The majority, certainly, had to make do with the 40 hours of elementary Arabic squeezed into their month of initial training. Ignorant of the moslem environment,\textsuperscript{197} and equipped with sketchy psychological stereo-types, their bolder projects often foundered through a miscalculation of indigenous responses.\textsuperscript{198}

Whether the insufficiencies of preparation could have been remedied within a military framework again raised doubts about the army's proper function. Conversely, it posed the question of how long the military intervention was to last and thus what the present and future role of Civil Authorities was to be. The latter welcomed the army's endeavours to restore order, and accepted its predominance as a short-term inevitability, pending the effective establishment of the new Communal pattern of 1956. However, they were chary about even a temporary surrender of powers and the slowness of pacification and the deepening involvement of the army undoubtedly aroused concern and irritation. Established settler Communes, in particular, chafed at the partial loss of former authority,\textsuperscript{199} and some of the earlier distrust between army and colonists began to stir beneath the surface. At Arrondissement and Départemental level, too, civil officials resented their impotence; "You're nibbling away at my power" was one not untypical reaction to S.A.S. activities.\textsuperscript{200} S.A.S. officers themselves found it somewhat difficult to serve two masters, civil and military.\textsuperscript{201}
These minor conflicts were largely drowned amid the heightening 'interference' of the Algerian war. But although the question "What happens after pacification?" was shelved in the meantime, it remained of fundamental importance. The army assumed that 'one day' it would be called upon to transfer its responsibilities back to civilians, yet was acutely aware of the crisis that such a 'normalization' would recreate. The problem of recruitment had been postponed rather than solved. The withdrawal of the S.A.S. would resurrect the perennial difficulty of inducing qualified personnel to serve in the bled, to ensure the performance of "the most delicate task - that of contact and social promotion".\textsuperscript{202}

The Préfectoral corps could never be persuaded to 'descend' to this level of work, yet more junior civilian staff in Algeria lacked either the required training or the basic orientation. In any case, the attraction of high quality candidates would prove impossible if the S.A.S. level were the highest career rung to which they could aspire. The army provided far wider horizons and promotion possibilities, and fewer inhibitions about grassroots work, but the problem was precisely to find a successor for its interim caretakership.\textsuperscript{203}

Nor were the operations of the S.A.S. free from the 'small' matter of costs. The establishment of each Section post cost an estimated 390,000 NF, or about £35,000 at the contemporary exchange rate, plus running costs of about 150,000 NF per year (£14,000).\textsuperscript{204} For 700 sections, this represented a minimum initial outlay of £25 million, and annual costs approaching £10 million. To this had to be added special credits for Capital Works (Travaux d'intérêt communal) and
various Technical Services, which together were consuming over £27 million p.a. by 1960.\textsuperscript{205} This, of course, represented only a fraction of total military spending in Algeria.

Possibly even greater expenditure on S.A.S. projects could have been justified. However, a financial brake was imposed on them, just as it had been on previous programmes of administrative reform and deconcentration. According to former Gouverneur-Général Naegelen, the resistance of Metropolitan financiers had torpedoed his 1949 scheme to overhaul local administration. Writing with the advantage of hindsight, he claimed to have vainly pleaded that "planes, tanks and machine guns are more expensive than buildings, and leave only ruins and mourning. Officers and troops will cost more than Préfectoral employees, and, once they have restored peace, we will then again have to establish an administrative staff which is sufficiently numerous to be effective".\textsuperscript{206} Even as these 'planes, tanks and machine guns' were beginning to cross the Mediterranean, six years later, Soustelle's requests for additional credit were falling on ears which were almost as deaf. Despite his insistence that a few specific projects would eliminate the insurrection overnight in key areas, Parisian officials whittled down his proposals.\textsuperscript{207}

Five years later, at the height of confrontation, the S.A.S. met with similar discouragement. Requests for further infrastructural investment were turned down precisely on the grounds of the army's future role vis-à-vis the civil authorities. A ceiling of 700 Sections was imposed in order to prevent unnecessary duplication of
the work of existing and projected municipalities. "The problem", explained the S.A.S. Inspecteur-Général, "is seen in different ways by the military and by financiers... The reasoning of the financial services is as follows: since the S.A.S. are designed to facilitate the development of new municipalities, it is quite reasonable to endow new communes with them; but the same is not true, for example, of local authorities in the Mitidja, which have long been mature and whose Maîtres are sufficiently experienced to carry out their duties by themselves; in such areas, why not let the same S.A.S. cover a dozen Communes, rather than only two?" For his part, the Inspecteur-Général attacked this reasoning as short-sighted, since even established and 'secure' Communes were being overwhelmed by the problem of new arrivals of migrant or refugee populations.

Yet there was a certain justification for the scepticism of the financial services, precisely because the potential task facing the S.A.S. was so gigantic. The commitment of resources which would have been required to make a real impact on socio-economic problems was so huge, that in a sense not really grasped by even the financiers, to spend less would have been a waste. The injection of capital needed to pursue a real policy of 'dynamic exploitation' would have imposed a crippling burden on Metropolitan France. Since the colonial situation presented the essential characteristics of a holding operation, with the French army as its last instrument of tenure, the escalation of its costs called into question the very nature of the enterprise. Beyond a certain point, the expenditure of money and manpower
required to retain the French position became unacceptably high, and further injections of finance would have implied a major transformation of politico-economic goals. It is in this sense that we should understand the post-mortem made by one army officer: "We lost the revolutionary war because at no moment did we conduct a revolutionary war...That would have presupposed an army with truly revolutionary objectives. It could not have these because it served a state which was not revolutionary". 209

Seen in this setting, the work of the S.A.S. with their limited and inexperienced resources, did little more than scratch the surface. They were "brutally confronted with the immensity of the economic, social, administrative and moral problems of contemporary Algeria". 210 Their perspective was limited, not moving beyond a dim desire to improve the lot of "those who have been exploited without our realizing it". 211 The result was a multiplicity of projects, some of which were fairly imaginative and others of which were perversely short-sighted, but which as a whole were piecemeal and uncoordinated. Some of the undertakings seem little more than exercises in primitive magic; buildings were erected, and streets were paved in an unconscious attempt "to make reality exist by creating what is only its sign or symbol". 212 Despite, or perhaps because of their initial ambition, S.A.S. officers met endless frustration, and were "constantly faced with evidence of the pointlessness of their action and the vanity of their picture of reality". 213 Inevitably this gnawed away at one of their prime assets: morale and energy. In the later phases of the war, the weariness of nomadic existence, the strain of
lengthy expatriation, and the unceasing attrition of guerrilla attacks, wore down their enthusiasm. A sense of futility set in. The conviction dawned "that it was a hopeless struggle, that the task was essentially unrealizable and would have continuously to be taken up and begun all over again - an absurd pursuit of a quarry which slipped away as soon as it seemed to come within grasp". Some of this confusion and anguish was translated into a feeling that the real fate of Algeria would be decided by 'the politicians', irrespective of local army efforts. In a sense, the policy goals of the army were of a neutral kind. Essentially, its contribution to the colonial situation was its power to freeze internal contradictions by the importation of organised force. It sought to shore up the system, but was unable to move beyond it. Its strategy centred around three bare idées fixes, the first of which was that Algeria should remain French, that there should be 'integration', though in a rather vague sense, not tied to any specific institutional pattern. The second was that the moslem population should be convinced of this, either by a show of force, or by programmes of community 'promotion', and the third idea was that a ceasefire by the enemy was a precondition for the 'normalization' of life. The political content of this 'programme' was of marginal significance. At most, it confused the issues, without offering to resolve them. "Unable to destroy colonization in terms of facts, the practice of pacification was largely content to destroy
it in terms of words, by employing the formula of integration. This was merely to change the vicious circle. Either integration would be seriously sought, which could only lead to the election of nationalist leaders, and thus, at the first serious difficulty, to secession— that supreme disaster which integration strives precisely to avoid; or integration would have no other purpose than deception, in which case it would resolve nothing." 218 Its efforts to 'solve' the problem of underadministration, without coming to terms with this basic contradiction, inevitably failed.
IV. UNDERADMINISTRATION AND THE COLONIAL SITUATION

Underadministration cannot be treated as a matter of 'neutral' or 'technical' efficiency. To use the term is to accept certain assumptions. It implies the existence and/or the desirability of a particular political unit. Only if we accept the premise of an Algerian colony controlled by, or part of, Metropolitan France, for example, can we speak with seeming objectivity of the density, mobilization capacity, or adaptation of machinery whose goal is to consolidate that arrangement. To those with a different perspective, or commitment - those springing from the indigenous political experience of the Maghreb, for example - the 'problem' of underadministration is of quite different significance. Conflict was not simply a question of opposed interests within a shared political framework, but rather one of radically opposed frameworks. What appeared to be a crisis of 'underadministration' to the colonial authority became, from the indigenous perspective, a question of the survival and renewal of traditional political processes. 219

Translated more crudely and imperfectly into the language understood by the colonizer, the reverse side of the crisis of underadministration was a positive struggle for 'national liberation'.

The concept of 'underadministration' implies the existence not merely of a central authority, but also of a centralizing authority. In other words, it implies certain political goals. As a 'problem', it troubles only a regime which seeks systematically to penetrate and control all levels of the polity which it takes as its frame of
reference. In other words, it is generally associated with the perspectives of the 'nation state'. The Turkish regency of Algiers, for example, in the sense that its occupation goals were clearly limited, was not troubled by underadministration. Not only did it not control an effectively centralized state apparatus, but it showed few signs of seeking to establish one.

This matter of the goals of the central authority takes us close to the heart of the question of underadministration in Algeria: the nature of the colonial situation. It has been suggested that the project of the colonizer is deeply contradictory or ambivalent. Part of his enterprise appears to involve totalitarian nation-building; yet another, equally significant part deliberately restrains and hampers such tendencies. Since the goal is ambivalent, the attitude of the colonizer towards the 'fact' of underadministration is also ambivalent. For long periods, for example, it may not be considered a 'problem' at all. In Algeria, the colonial structure, which so horrified certain observers in the years after the Second World War, resulted from determined pressure and had been regarded as a fairly desirable outcome over a far longer period of time. The seemingly technical matter of administrative 'efficiency' thus begins to dissolve into the more general question of what, at different times, were the goals of the colonizer in Algeria, or, to be a little more precise, what were the varying goals of such different and often conflicting groups as the army, settlers, metropolitan capitalists, and local administrators. The discovery of the problem of under-administration was less an indication of changed effectiveness in
pursuing fixed strategies than of modified strategies in the face of a constant (but developing) crisis. Although it appears from certain measurable data that the colonial administration was becoming 'objectively' less effective during the last decades of French rule, it is equally evident that this merely aggravated what was a constant feature of the colonial situation for over a century.

Underadministration was thus 'built in' to the colonial situation. Partly it was deliberately built in by the colonizer. Equally important, however, it reflected the survival of indigenous political processes. Bifurcation between two radically different socio-economic systems was a fundamental characteristic of the colonial system, of which underadministration was but one symptom. The dynamics of 'national' survival and renewal, which are touched on in the final chapter, are in this sense its obverse.

Yet the colonizer had only a limited and schematic understanding of this bifurcated world. At the height of its expression, the Algerian Rebellion, these conceptions were compressed into a myopic military demonology. The F.L.N. was "a handful of agitators".\textsuperscript{221} It used selective terrorism to detach the masses from the framework of French Algeria, a task unfortunately rendered simpler by underadministration. Once the masses were detached, the F.L.N. "sheltered behind them", "manipulated them", and "interposed them between itself and the forces of order".\textsuperscript{221} This view assumed the existence of 'uncommitted moslems'. Indeed, it postulated "the essential neutrality of the masses, considered a priori as an inert quality".\textsuperscript{222} It failed to perceive in the F.L.N. an expression of surviving mass commitment and renewed mass energy.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

6. Algeria was characterized by a "vacuum of administration" according to S. Bromberger: LES REBELLES ALGERIENS (Paris 1958) p. 6.
7. A useful starting point in analysing the phenomenon of underadministration is provided by J-L. Quermonne: "La sous-administration et les politiques d'equipement administratif" in REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE (9) Sept. 1959 p. 623-666. The three criteria which he suggests are 'density', 'integration' and 'adaptation', although there is some confusion between the last two of these. His theoretical perspective is extremely narrow, and avoids fundamental questions concerning the character and dynamics of particular kinds of regime, but is suggestive nonetheless.

A French government report on the Algerian situation in 1960 suggested that the three main features of underadministration were 'insufficient resources', 'overcentralization of structure', and 'lack of adaptation'. It argued that these weaknesses were the "main cause" of the 1954 rebellion. Republique Francaise, Delegation Generale en Algerie: RAPPORT SUR L'ACTIVITE DE L'ADMINISTRATION EN ALGERIE AU COURS DE L'ANNEE 1959 (1960).
8. Although Quermonne's article ostensibly concerned other countries, particularly 'newly-independent nations', it appeared at the height of the Algerian insurrection and made many direct references to the situation there. He had previously contributed a number of articles on the Algerian situation, e.g. J-L. Quermonne: 'Les perspectives institutionnelles de la decolonisation en Algerie' in REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE (7) July-Sep. 1957 p. 83-111.
9. Quermonne, for example, moved on from diagnosing ill-health to prescribing palliatives of a technical nature. Intensive programmes for the recruiting and training of cadres, the utilization of political party machinery, and, significantly,
9. the deployment of military personnel and resources, were among the strategies which, he suggested, a central government might adopt. J. Guernonne: "La sous-administration et les politiques d'équipement administratif" (1960) loc. cit. p. 654-66.


These figures include both the population in the Civil Territories of Northern Algeria and that in the Military Territories of the South. The inhabitants of the latter, almost exclusively moslem, numbered 487,465 in 1881, 548,409 in 1921, and 822,413 in 1954. Only the population of the civil zone is referred to in the statistics from Figure 4 onwards.

A census was conducted every five years in Algeria from 1836 onwards, with interruptions during the two World Wars. The first four censuses counted the European population only; the moslem population was first included in 1856. Some of the results, particularly in the early years, need to be treated with caution. A brief discussion of the methodology of previous censuses is provided in Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: RESULTATS STATISTIQUES DU DENOMBREMENT DE LA POPULATION EFFECTUE LE 31 OCTOBRE 1948 (?1950) Vol. I p.i-xviii.

11. Included in the moslem total are a few thousand inhabitants from other moslem countries, particularly Morocco and Tunisia. There were 40,214 in 1936, for example.

12. The total European population includes a considerable number of Europeans with a nationality other than French. These numbered 126,722 in 1936, for example. Moreover, a large proportion of the remainder were not of truly French extraction. Prior to the law of 1889, which conferred automatic French nationality on foreign Europeans born on Algerian soil, almost half of the settlers were from outside Metropolitan France, particularly Spain.

Full French nationality was granted to the entire Jewish population of Algeria by the so-called Crémieux decree of 1870. The European totals listed here for 1833-66 include the Jewish population, although it was classified separately at the time.

13. Each census listed the 'non-municipalized' population as a separate category. The French army of occupation, moslem as well as European, was the main element in this; it numbered upward of 50,000 for most of the colonial era. The inmates of such institutions as prisons and hospitals make up the balance.

Figures marked by an asterisk(*) do not include military personnel, omitted by the census of that year.


17. C-R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 116-6 estimates that approximately 173,000 moslem Algerians fought with the French army during the Great War, or 3.6% of the population. He estimates those killed as 25,000-55,000.


23. Map 1 is reproduced from M. Larnaude: "La carte de la répartition de la population dans l'Algérie du nord" in Comité des travaux historiques et Scientifiques, Section de Géographie: BULLETIN (64) 1951 p. 87-93.

24. Map 2 is based on Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, Service de la Statistique Générale: RECENSEMENTS QUINQUENNAUX DE 1926 ET DE 1931 (Algiers 1932) p. 64, 65. The densities of the two communities are charted on separate maps in the original.


   The definition of 'urban' is that of all agglomerated populations of over 2,000. cf. Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: RESULTATS STATISTIQUES DU DENOMBREMENT DE LA POPULATION EFFECTUE LE 31 OCTOBRE 1948 (†1950) Vol. I p. xxvii-xxxii.


32. The ratio was 1.8 : 1 in 1931. Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: RECENSEMENTS QUINQUENNAUX DE 1926 ET DE 1931 (1932) p. 66.

33. The ratio in the arrondissement of Tizi-Ouzou was 45:1 in 1931. Ibid. p. 66.

34. The ratio in the arrondissement of Batna (Aures) was 15:1 in 1931, although moslem density was low. Ibid. p. 66.


36. M. Larnaude: "La carte de la répartition de la population dans l'Algérie du nord" in Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, Section de Géographie: BULLETIN (64) 1951 p. 89. These townships are those marked on Map 1.


38. Ibid.


40. Ibid. p. 39.

41. cf. F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) p. 30: "The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers....The settler's town is a strongly-built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly-lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage-cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown, and hardly thought about....The town belonging to the colonized people...is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal,
41. of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire....This world divided into compartments, this world cut in two, is inhabited by two different species".


44. J. Morizot: L'ALGERIE KABYLISEE (1962) p. 11.


46. R.L. Buell: THE NATIVE PROBLEM IN AFRICA (1928) Vol. I p. 984. Here Buell outlines his method of calculation. He appears to have included both 'District Administrators' and some of their clerical assistants in calculating his ratios. However he excluded administrators on leave, whom he estimated as one-third of those on duty.


50. M. Hailey: AN AFRICAN SURVEY (London 1938) esp. p. 226, p. 108. Hailey provides lists of colonial personnel, total population and total area in different territories during the period 1930-5. He implies that variations are significant, but does not himself reduce these to comparative ratios.

51. R. Delavignette: FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA (Oxford 1950) (trans. from his SERVICE AFRICAIN (Paris 1946). Delavignette offers gross ratios from time to time, but gives little indication of their source nor of their date.


57. R. Delavignette (op. cit.) p. 18.  
M. Hailey (op. cit.) p. 244.

58. Buell hinted at this problem. He explained Kenya's relatively high administrative density, compared with Uganda or Nigeria, by the fact that it contained a large number of European settlers to be administered. Moreover, he suggested, "a firmer control over the native is needed in a White Settlement Colony than in a native state". R.L. Buell: THE NATIVE PROBLEM IN AFRICA (1928) Vol. I, p. 361.


61. This figure is given by the 1954 Census - République Française, Délégation Générale en Algérie: RESULTATS STATISTIQUES DU RECENSEMENT...1954 (1959) Vol. III, p. 137. However, the ANNuaire statistique de l'Algérie, Année 1954 (Algiers n.d.) p. 70-75 lists a total of only 13,447 European primary and secondary school teachers.


67. According to S. Amin: L'ECONOMIE DU MAGHREB (1966) p. 153, out of the total of 95,000 Civil Administrators in 1955 there were 33,000 at 'Middle' and 'Higher' levels, and 62,000 at 'Lower' levels.

68. According to S. Amin: L'ECONOMIE DU MAGHREB (1966) p. 153, 31,000 of the 95,000 administrators were moslem, but only 1,000 at the 'Middle' and 'Higher' levels. The Algerian Administration in 1960 listed moslems as occupying 5.2% of 'Category A' posts (the highest level), 11.8% of 'Category B' posts, 19.4% of 'Category C' posts, and 53.7% of 'Category D' posts. It also indicated that half of these moslems were employed at communal level. République Française, Délégation Générale en Algérie: RAPPORT SUR L'ACTIVITÉ DE L'ADMINISTRATION (1960) p. 16.


M. Larnaude: "La carte de la répartition de la population dans l'Algérie du nord" in Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, Section de Géographie: BULLETIN (64) 1951 p. 87-93

There are some small inaccuracies and ambiguities in these somewhat sketchy sources which I have been unable to resolve.

72. Sources: 1881 - République Française, Bureau de la Statistique Générale: RESULTATS STATISTIQUES DU DENOMBREMENT DE 1881 (Paris 1883) and Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie: STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE L'ALGÉRIE, ANNÉES 1879-1881 (Paris 1882) See note 74

1891 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE L'ALGÉRIE, ANNÉES 1891-3 (Algiers 1894)

1901 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE L'ALGÉRIE, ANNÉE 1900 (Algiers 1901)

1906 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE L'ALGÉRIE, ANNÉE 1905 (Algiers 1906)

1911 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE L'ALGÉRIE, ANNÉE 1910 (Algiers 1912)

1921 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: TABLEAU GÉNÉRAL DES COMMUNES EN ALGÉRIE...SITUATION AU 6 MARS 1921 (Algiers 1922)

1926 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie, Service de la Statistique Générale: TABLEAU GÉNÉRAL DES COMMUNES DE L'ALGÉRIE...SITUATION AU 7 MARS 1926 (Algiers 1927)

1931 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie, Service de la Statistique Générale: REPERTOIRE STATISTIQUE DES COMMUNES DE L'ALGÉRIE (RECENSEMENT DE LA POPULATION AU 8 MARS 1931) (Algiers 1932)

1936 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie, Service de la Statistique Générale: REPERTOIRE STATISTIQUE DES COMMUNES DE L'ALGÉRIE (RECENSEMENT DE LA POPULATION ALGÉRIENNE EN 1936) (Algiers 1937)


73. This figure excludes 'non-municipalized' Europeans in the North, and all those inhabiting the Military Territories of the South. See notes 10 and 13.
Because the 1881 Census does not give a fully detailed breakdown of population according to ethnic origin and type of Commune, these figures have been worked out from internal evidence. The resultant figures, though within a fairly close margin of accuracy, are rounded rather than precise.

Due to growing insurgency, an earthquake, and other disturbances, the figures employed for statistical analysis by the 1954 Census underestimate the moslem population by an average of about 3%. These figures have been adjusted by that margin to give a true picture. Analysis of the European population was also affected but this was more than offset by the practice of double registration, so that the unchanged European total used here is probably a slight overestimate. Cf. Republique Francaise, Delegation Generale du Gouvernement en Algerie: RESULTATS STATISTIQUES DU RECENSEMENT DE LA POPULATION DU 31 OCTOBRE 1954 (1959) Vol. II p. 75-90.

This figure excludes 'non-municipalized' moslems in the North, and all inhabitants of the Military Territories of the South. See notes 10 and 13.

These figures refer only to Communes Mixtes in Civil Territory. A few analogous institutions, also called Communes Mixtes, continued to exist in the Military Territories of the South.


Gouvernement-Generale de l'Algerie...REPERTOIRE STATISTIQUE DES COMMUNES...1936 (1937).


1891 - Ibid. p. 195
1911 - Ibid. p. 614
87. This figure includes both Principal and Assistant Administrateurs. It should be emphasized that numbers are based on secondary sources, and may not be precisely accurate.

88. C-R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 621. He was referring to the situation at the turn of the century.


   1891 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algerie: STATISTIQUE GENERALE DE L'ALGERIE, ANNEES 1891-3 (Algiers 1894)
   1911 - M. Champ: LES COMMUNES EN ALGERIE (1930) p. 34-5
   1921 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algerie: TABLEAU GENERAL DES COMMUNES...1921 (1922)
   1936 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algerie: REPERTOIRE STATISTIQUE DES COMMUNES...1936 (1937)
   1948 - Gouvernement-Général de l'Algerie...RESULTATS STATISTIQUES DU DENOMBREMENT...1948 (1950).


93. Gouvernement-Général de l'Algerie...REPERTOIRE STATISTIQUE DES COMMUNES 1936 (1937).

94. Gouvernement-Général de l'Algerie...RESULTATS STATISTIQUES DU DENOMBREMENT...1948 (1950).


98. Ibid. p. xxvi.


100. This point is made clearly by 'Un African': "Notes de politique musulmane" inAFRIQUE FRANCAISE (March 1933) p. 159, with particular reference to Morocco.


104. The Administration itself admitted that overcentralization was an even worse problem in Algeria than in Metropolitan France. Ibid. p. 37-62.

105. During the period 1949-51, for example, 45,580 million francs were spent by the Gouvernement Général, compared with 5,065 million francs by Départements and Arrondissements, and 16,117 million francs by all Communes. Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE DE L'ALGERIE, ANNEE 1950 (Algiers 1952) p. 235ff. In addition to this ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE some details of expenditure are also provided by the annual series of volumes published by the Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie-COMPTES DEFINITIFS DE L'EXERCICE-from the late Nineteenth Century onwards.

106. J. Soustelle: L'AMÉE ET SOUFFRANTE ALGERIE (1956) p. 84.


108. Cambon proposed the appointment of "administrateurs-adjoints" to supervise native administration in each Commune de Plein Exercice or in each group of them. To still settler fears, he suggested that the Commune retain revenues from its erstwhile administrees. Nonetheless, his scheme was stifled in its cot by colon opposition. J. Cambon: LE GOUVERNEMENT-GÉNÉRAL DE L'ALGERIE 1891-7 (Paris 1918) p. 282.

109. A description of this Service is provided by M. Hailey: AN AFRICAN SURVEY (1938) p. 236-241.

110. Up until 1927, the required course of study lasted two years.

111. M. Hailey: AN AFRICAN SURVEY (1938) p. 240 implies that the baccalaureat was a general requirement for 'agents de service'.

112. There were 3 grades of Assistant, 5 grades of Administrator, and 3 grades of Principal Administrator in 1903, with salaries ranging from 2,100 to 6,000 francs per annum. C-R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 613n.


116. In 1880, for example, salaries were cut by 25% as part of an austerity programme. C-R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 164.

117. C-R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 613. At the same time, their remuneration was similar to that of departmental chiefs in sous-Préfectures.


119. For example, a certificate of Arab legislation and moslem law was made available by the Ecole de Droit in the 1890's. C-R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 194. Cf. also p. 620.

120. Of 75 Principal Administrators in 1888, only 18 were bacheliers and 6 had a university licence. C-R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 195.

121. The Circulaire from the Gouvernement-Général to Préfets on June 15th 1882 was deliberately vague about entry standards in order to facilitate increased recruitment. Gouvernement-Général de l'Algerie: STATISTIQUE GENERALE DE L'ALGERIE, ANNEES 1879-1881 (1882) p. 335-6.


123. Ibid. p. 613.


126. This phrase was used by the Maspétol Commission in 1956, cited by R. Aron: LES ORIGINES DE LA GUERRE D'ALGERIE (1962) p. 299.


128. This requirement was laid down by the arrêté of 25th April 1891. Cf C-R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 612.


140. Ibid. p. 614.

141. Ibid. p. 195. This also had its positive aspects, in that it prevented the acquisition of local proprietorial interests or the formation of special contacts of a corrupt nature. That the problem of rotation of officials was a general problem of colonial administration is suggested by M. Hailey: AN AFRICAN SURVEY (1938) p. 231-2.

142. Cited by J. Servier: DANS L'AURES SUR LES PAS DES REBELLES (Paris 1955) p. 35. That this kind of complaint is a perennial theme in colonizer history is suggested by Ch. 2, note 42 above.


144. That this was an extremely mistaken view has been argued by L.-J. Duclos: "Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain" in L.-J. Duclos et al: LES NATIONALISMES MAGHREBIENS (1966), and "The Berbers and the rise of Moroccan nationalism" in E. Gellner & C. Micaud (eds.): ARABS AND BERBERS - FROM TRIBE TO NATION IN NORTH AFRICA (1973).


147. P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964)


The French in Algeria were, in a sense, still fighting the Vietminh. In 1958, numerous soldiers still referred to the F.L.N. as "les viets"! J. Servier: ADIEU DJEBELS...(Paris 1958)p.97-8

149. R. Lacoste, cited by R. Girardet al: LA CRISE MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE (1964) p. 188.


151. During a conversation with an army officer on active duty in Algeria, Servier claims, "he unbuttoned a good dozen pockets of his camouflaged jacket before finding a small, thin book, half rolled up, smeared with dried sweat and covered by tobacco stains. I deciphered the title, "PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE", and the name of the author, MAO TSE TUNG. With his finger he ran along certain passages already underscored by a fingernail, hammering them out with his voice: "The army is nothing without the people", "The revolutionary army which conducts guerilla warfare, and the regular army, are two fists of the same assailant"...." J. Servier: ADIEU DJEBELS...(1958) p. 99. Thus it was not the guerrilla alone, as suggested in Ch. 2 p. 122 above, who was supposed to have "engraved in his mind, or tucked in his pocket, the writings of the great postwar guerrilleros", but also his pursuer!

M. Déon: L'ARMEE D'ALGERIE ET LA PACIFICATION (Paris 1959)
J. Hogard: "Guerre révolutionnaire et pacification" in REVUE MILITAIRE D'INFORMATION (280) Jan. 1957
A. Souyris: "Les conditions de la parade et de la riposte à la guerre révolutionnaire" in REVUE MILITAIRE D'INFORMATION (281) Feb.-Mar. 1957

154. General Partiot: "Organisation et activité des S.A.S."
   in République Française, Délégation Générale en Algérie: ALGERIE D'AUJOURD'HUI no. 11 (1960) p. 5.

155. Analogous Sections d'Administration Urbain (S.A.U.) were established in major towns. Cf. M. de Montalembert: ACTION DES S.A.S. EN ALGERIE (CH.E.A.M. doc. 3264) 1959


   République Française, Délégation Générale en Algérie: ACTION DU GOVERNEMENT EN ALGERIE, MESURES DE PACIFICATIONS ET REFORMES (Algiers 1956, 1957)


160. Ibid. p. 23.

161. R. Girardet et al.: LA CRISE MILITIALE FRANCAISE (1964) p. 188.

162. Ibid. p. 188.

163. First-hand impressions of the operation of S.A.S. are given by:
   J.-Y. Alquier: NOUS AVONS PACIFIE LE TAZALT (Paris 1957)
   R. Leulliette: ST MICHAEL AND THE DRAGON (London 1964)
   P. Mus: GUERRE SANS VISAGE (Paris 1961)
   J.J. Servan-Schreiber: LIEUTENANT IN ALGERIA (London 1958)


165. R. Girardet et al: LA CRISE MILITIALE FRANCAISE (1964) p. 188.
   According to the Délégation-Générale, the tasks of the S.A.S. officer comprised:
   "-Firstly, establishing contacts with reliable elements in the population, and then, through them, with the overall masses.
   -Keeping himself informed about all local needs, observations, demands and suggestions, and transmitting them to the administrative authority to which he is attached.
   -Seeking intelligence in all quarters - military, social and cultural - and utilizing it in the manner appropriate for each case.
   -Waging continual psychological warfare in order to reverse the climate of insecurity, to limit and then paralyze rebel action, and to prepare judiciously for the return to normal life."  
   République Française, Délégation Générale en Algérie: ACTION DU GOVERNEMENT, MESURES DE PACIFICATION ET REFORMES (1957) p.33
At festival time, for example, the S.A.S. Head at Bouilef (near Batna) decided not to offer the quasi-traditional public feast for his administrées. Instead, he provided bras, skirts and bottles of perfume for their wives, in order to cultivate a taste for European commodities and thus bring them "into the production-consumption cycle" M. Déon: L'ARME D'ALGERIE ET LA PACIFICATION (1959) p. 126. This was a counterpoint to the stress placed by the FIN on the role of women. Cf. Chapter 2 note 241 above.

Servier, for example, witnessed the arrival of a convoy of army trucks in one Berber village, bringing a mobile cinema unit. Two films were shown to the assembled population: firstly, a Donald Duck cartoon (in English), and secondly a Government documentary (in French) entitled "Wash Your Hands". The rationale behind this choice, according to an attendant military 'psychologist', was "first a film to relax, then a film to shock". J. Servier: ADIEU DJEBEL (1958) p. 49-52.

That it was used with a certain amount of irony in many cases is suggested by Servier, Ibid. p. 179-83.


Ibid.


P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964) passim.


A. Benzine: LE CAMP (Paris 1962)

P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964),
H. Keramane: LA PACIFICATION: LIVRE NOIRE DE SIX ANNEES DE GUERRE EN ALGERIE (Lausanne 1960),


181. Ibid. p. 59.


183. X. de Planhol: NOUVEAUX VILLAGES ALGEROIS (1961) p. 49.

184. Ibid. p. 49. Equally instructive in his concluding remark: "This seductive project does not seem to have aroused any enthusiasm among the potential inhabitants, and not a single family from nearby valleys has volunteered as yet".


189. Gen. Partiot: "Organisation et activité des S.A.S." (1960) loc. cit. p. 10. "...building relations with Arabs as an enemy of (new) and methods. There are no exceptions. We will be following military schools with some men to train..." (accepting training course in 1962) but the army does not punish so much as it accepts. On Saturday, after a two-hour talk on the regime of Marocain, we went out to meet the courtijere and receive unclaimed stores. There is nothing like the old recipes for keeping the blacks in line." P. MUS: GUERRE SANS VISAGE (Paris 1961) p. 157.


195. Ibid. p. 9.

196. Ibid. p. 22.

197. Only 15 of the 700 S.A.S. Chiefs in 1960 were moslems. Ibid. p. 25.

198. A small example is that of an S.A.S. officer who showered free bags of grain on his administers, only to awake next morning to find the path to his office lined with his rejected charity. J. Servier: ADIEU DJEBELS (1958) p. 69.
199. For example, the Maire of a Commune near Ténes was enraged that the tricolors displayed by the army had not paid the local stamp tax! J. Servier: ADIEU DJEBELS (1958) p. 182.

200. Ibid. p. 183.


203. Gén. Partiot, p. 20-22. In his Press Conference of 24th May 1960, Général Partiot speculated about the possibility of retaining the S.A.S. organization "in a pacified Algeria". He confessed that the army's role had actually contributed to social and political disequilibrium, but as to what were the alternatives he said "I confess I don't know". In 1959, 164 posts as Secretaries of Communes were offered to S.A.S., and S.A.U. personnel. République Française Délégation-Générale en Algérie: RAPPORT SUR L'ACTIVITE DE L'ADMINISTRATION...1959 (1960) p. 42.


213. Ibid. p.


216. This does not mean that a passionate concern for Algeria's political future was not shown by a wide span of army opinion. Cf. Sources cited above, in addition to the following:

M. Challe: NOTRE REVOLTE (Paris 1964)
J.M. Darboise et al.: OFFICIERs EN ALGERIE (Paris 1960)
C. Dufresnoy: DES OFFICiERS PARLENT (Paris 1961)
X. Grall: LA GENERATION DU DJEBEL (Paris 1962)
E. Jouhaud: Oi MON PAYS PERDU (Paris 1968)
A. Juin: "Où en sommes nous en Algérie?" in REVUE DE POLITIQUE PARLEMENTAIRE June 1959 p. 530-41


219. N.N. Miller: "The political survival of political leadership" in JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES (6) 1968 p. 183-201 in one sense analyses the 'problem' of underadministration from the opposite vantage point to Quermonne's: not that of the centralizing power but that of the local traditional authorities it seeks to supplant. (See note 7 above). He examines various factors which made allowed traditional institutions to conserve their role. Their survival is treated less as a 'problem' than as a positive strength. In a comment on Miller's paper, E.P. Skinner reasserts the centralizing perspective: "It was as much the inability of the new states to provide and employ modern institutions as it was the syncretizing ability of the local chief, that was responsible for the survival of traditional leaders" Ibid. p. 200.

220. J-L. Quermonne's article - "La sous-administration et les politiques d'équipement administratif" in REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE (IX) Sept. 1959 p. 629-666 is a general review of the administrative aspects of 'political underdevelopment' in 'newly-independent countries', and Miller's article (Note 219) similarly concerns itself mainly with a post-colonial situation. Both adopt the perspective of the 'new nation builders' in the post-colonial era, but neither sees the colonial situation as qualitatively different. Both assume a certain continuity of the problem from one era to the next. This is instructive, for many 'elites' in 'newly-independent' nations adopt a centralizing perspective analogous to that of the former colonial regime. They too treat the problems of 'nation-building' and 'resistance of tribal elements' as essentially technical in nature, explicable in terms of lack of cadres, lack of education and lack of resources. Thus the literature of 'underdevelopment' broadens out many of the assumptions in colonial
220. writings about 'underadministration'. In fact the real continuity is one of political power struggle between the perspectives of 'central government' and local, autochthonous political systems. Some interesting material on this question is suggested by F.G. Burke: "Public Administration in Africa: the legacy of inherited colonial institutions" in JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATION (1) Nov. 1959 p. 345-378. Cf. also J. Favet's article on post-independence Algeria: "Le traditionalisme par exces de modernité" in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (3) 1967 p. 71-93.

221. M. Deon: "Qu'est-ce qu'une guerre révolutionnaire?" in REVUE DES DEUX MONDES April 1959 p. 578-581.

CHAPTER SIX REACTIONS TO THE COLONIAL SITUATION AND THE ROLE OF THE F.L.N.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX 624
- REACTIONS TO THE COLONIAL SITUATION AND THE ROLE OF THE F.L.N.

Indigenous political processes in Algeria were not pulverized overnight by sledgehammer blows from the colonial administration. Their survival and continued evolution was ensured not only by the insouciance of the colonizer, but by various forms of inertia, determined resistance and shrewd adaptation on the part of the colonized. The bifurcation at the heart of the colonial situation, extremely complex in its local detail, so far from diminishing actually intensified. Behind the facade of colonial institutions, and within the special conditions which they imposed, autochthonous political dynamics continued to elaborate themselves. In certain areas, they operated with unimpaired, even heightened effectiveness. In other areas, they adapted themselves to the new experience by activating dormant inner potentialities. In yet other areas, they underwent severe crisis, only to reconstitute themselves in novel forms. These strongpoints of resistance, adaptation and energetic revival provided the foundations and fabric of Algerian 'nationalism'. The nature and outcome of the 'F.L.N. rebellion' between 1954 and 1962 are only comprehensible in relation to them.

I. SURVIVAL OF WITHDRAWN STRUCTURES

The pattern of native political 'persistence' was extremely complicated. Partly this reflected the lack of homogeneity in the local 'bedrock'. Traditional segmentary dynamics in Algeria were neither single-stranded nor unidirectional, but multiplex and in a state of flux. These unevennesses have been viewed, by some commentators, as the outcome of confrontations between local 'custom' and Islamic orthodoxy, but this is overschematic.
"Custom" as a universally valid description of social action was unknown in the Maghreb; there existed only particular usages of each segmentary grouping or locality, which themselves contained conflicts between major and minor potentialities. Moreover, Muslim law itself—the Shari'a revealed in the Koran and Sunna, and its interpretation in the Fiqh—was riddled with ambiguity and alternative applications. Thus the relative weight of these 'two' realities was, as Berque suggests, impossible to calculate: "In this land, no reality is so secret or intact as not to have proceeded in some way from Islam, or at least interpreted itself according to its modes. Nor is there any application of the law so rigorous as to have been able to divorce itself from the forces of the soil." Instead, over geographical space and time, there was a wide range of specific social formations resulting from the interplay of many different factors.

The complexity of indigenous 'survival' also reflected unequal opposition or adaptation to the colonial experience. The general impact of the French military presence and the opening up of internal routes of communication eroded the bases of the widest political groupings such as tribal confederations and religious brotherhoods, and at the same time threw enhanced emphasis on the more intimate cells of political solidarity, such as family and clan. In a sense, this implied fragmentation, but at the same time it forced segmentary communities back upon their common cultural ground and shared political experience, thereby providing a springboard for 'nation-wide' revival. But within this global reaction to the colonial situation, there were certain 'strong points' and certain 'weak points'. This is best understood by examining a few specific areas.
-i. Kabylia

Dynamic continuity was most striking in the densely populated mountains of Kabylia, to the east of Algiers. The heartland of this resistance was 'Greater Kabylia', centred on the Djurdjura massif, whose Berber-speaking inhabitants, known as Zouaoua, occupied compact hilltop villages, living chiefly from the cultivation of olive and fig trees. But resistance of a similar character was also offered by 'Lesser Kabylia', which included the largely Arabic-speaking communities of the Bibans and Babor ranges east of the Soummam valley. Together, the Kabylias, barely penetrated by either Turks or French, comprised about a fifth of the total Muslim population of Algeria.

Social organization among these sedentary communities was characterized by small segmentary clans operating as basic units of solidarity within villages of a few hundred inhabitants. Soffs and holy men provided cross-cutting levels of division and unity. A highly developed code of social honour (nif) regulated conflict and cooperation, An elaborate system of communal solidarity and mutual aid was built upon this. Loans, trade contracts and cooperative labour projects — ranging from house and road construction, irrigation and harvesting, to joint purchase of livestock — were accompanied by religious rituals which made them collective celebrations. The honour of the blood family, from which the individual's personal sense of honour was inseparable, was paramount. Disputes between families could involve a panoply of arbitrators in the search for settlement, including relatives, neighbours, neutral third parties and holy men. Often, however, the family took justice into its own hands: insults, theft, sexual transgressions, assaults or murder were avenged by vendetta (rekba). In certain cases,
inadvertent injuries to family honour were expiated by payment of a 'blood price' (diya); in other cases, revenge killing was the only appropriate compensation, and occasionally hired assassins were called in.12

The ultimate focus of communal life was the assembly (jemaa). Far more, perhaps, than in any other area of Algeria, this was the centrepiece of a sophisticated system of clan (or 'gentilitial') democracy.13 The special status and stability of the Kabyle jemaa was indicated often by the construction of a permanent assembly-house to accommodate its meetings.14 Each clan, and at the higher level of segmentation the village, settled serious disputes and orchestrated celebrations of solidarity through its own jemaa.

Jemaa deliberations were conducted by respected elders, as heads and 'delegates' of their family groupings.15 A president (amine) was chosen for a certain duration to preside over these sessions. Debate culminated in 'unanimous' decisions in the sense that the jemaa simply provided a forum where parties could discuss problems and differences; failure to reach a consensus simply caused postponement of discussion, or recourse to alternative arbiters.

Through the jemaa, certain matters of a 'civil' nature were settled: marriage and divorce, inheritance and boundary disputes, irrigation, forest, and pasture rights. Here the jemaa 'interpreted' or formulated community custom, an important role since Islamic judges (cadi-s) were never established, at least in Greater Kabylia.16 Through the jemaa, also, communal undertakings were regulated and various social rituals such as weddings, circumcisions, funerals and festivals.
Matters of a 'criminal' nature were likewise often settled by or through the jemaa which had "the duty of defending the collective honour", whenever it was compromised by disturbances of the peace. Petty offences, such as washing laundry in the communal drinking well, were usually punished by an agreed list of fines. Executive agents of the assembly (tamen-s) were appointed to ensure that its will was carried out. Fines, as well as 'taxation' of social duties, formed the basic for a communal treasury. More drastic breaches of honour, such as assault and murder, also often came before the jemaa. The latter did not deny the right of families to pursue 'private' justice, but simply supervised such 'arrangements' when called into do so; even in the most serious cases, when vendetta appeared to threaten communal peace, "the assembly often limits itself to exhorting the two parties to come to an agreement".

During the colonial period, the vitality of the Kabyle jemaa did not flag. Any administrator who, like Morizot in the 1950's, was transferred to the region, "soon discovered that those whom he called his administrees administered themselves, and that despite a hundred years of French presence, zouaoua country had either retained or regained the essential part of its past autonomy". "The Kabyle jemaas...." he reported, "...built up their own funds from clandestine fines,...had executive agents, and...regulated local affairs quite freely". Bousquet's analysis in 1950 was similar: "Kabylia still consists of miniscule republics with a few hundred inhabitants. Our own administration has merely established itself alongside what already existed, and often artifically, without managing to make it disappear....The old system continues to function".
Some 'documentary' evidence of the continuing vigour of Kabyle assemblies was provided by their written regulations or decisions (qanouns). Typically such decisions were retained in the minds of successive generations - the Berber tongues of Kabylia were in any case unwritten - but occasionally they were recorded in Arabic. They listed assorted social obligations, charges levied on individual families for social celebrations, and also details of standard fines for petty and serious infringements of the social peace. Early French soldiers, administrators and ethnologists sought to unearth these qanouns as a basis for drawing up a definitive picture of 'custom'. Hanoteau and Letourneux's "La Kabylie et les coutumes Kabyles", published in 1873, became the standard work of reference for French courts and administrators.

At one stage indeed, the Colonial Administration developed the 'Napoleonic' ambition of establishing a 'Code' of Kabyle law. This was to distort the nature of qanouns because they indicated the practice of one village only, without transcending the concrete confines of the segmentary groups which gave them birth. Moreover, rather than skeleton legal codes, qanouns were miscellaneous, cumulative records of periodic communal decisions, and not even necessarily of the fundamental ones. Thus reading between these lines was as important a guide to social behaviour as deciphering them.

The jemaa was not an institution analogous to a European municipal corporation or tribunal. "Rather than a court of law", Bourdieu pointed out, "in the sense of a specialized organism charged with pronouncing verdicts in conformity with a system of formal, rational and explicit norms, the assembly is in fact a council of arbitration and perhaps even a family
council". Each segmentary group, he observed, "has no other court of law than public opinion; each individual passes sentence on himself in accordance with the common and inwardly felt code of the group, and without interference from any power placed outside and above". By the same token, qanouns bore no resemblance to statutes or by-laws; they were mere by-products of thriving segmentary dynamics.

The enduring vigour of qanouns, and thus of the communal self-government to which they attested, was a fact that slumbered fitfully in the consciousness of the colonial administration for several decades. The official view implicitly assumed that qanouns had fallen into disuse, or that they were being superseded by European positive law. However, after the First World War and the establishment of 'official' douar jemaas, the administration showed increasing awareness of the 'problem' of unofficial jemaas. One reminder in 1922 was the rare circumstance of a complaint to the administration by a native of Kabylia about a decision made by his (unofficial) jemaa; subsequent investigation brought to light a document, drawn up in French between 1912 and 1919, listing various qanouns in effect in his village (Tassaft Guezra). The administration deemed this to have infringed the jurisdiction of colonial courts, and brought the 'unofficial' jemaa president to trial. The circumstances of this case sparked further searches which provided clear evidence that, throughout Kabylia and beyond, jemaas were actively and systematically regulating both criminal and civil matters.

The decision of the colonial administration to establish official jemaas at douar level did not undermine the traditional Kabyle jemaa. At most it drove clan and village jemaas underground, throughout Algeria.
"The bait was clever", Charnay suggests, "proposing to the natives that they keep their ancestral framework, hopefully renovated by the modern democratic principle of at least wide, if not universal suffrage. But the moslems drew back their organs of activity, and burrowed themselves even more deeply into their traditional institutions". The administrative douar was too remote from traditional levels of segmentation in Kabylia to tap the roots of communal solidarity. The reform experiments of the late 1930's and 1940's, which divided a few douars up into Centres Municipales, showed some conception of this weakness, but indigenous withdrawal into unofficial channels continued "even where Centres Municipales have been created, even those which comprise no more than one village".

Thus, Lauriol wrote in 1957, "The replacement of the old active and all-powerful village jemaas by official jemaas has merely resulted in 'doubling' this spontaneous organization. It has remained clandestine and, in practice, all-powerful". The situation of split authority deepened. By the outbreak of the 1954 rebellion, Morizot attested, "there existed in most centres two organizations - one traditional and the other official - which often backed each other up and complemented each other - but which were often ignorant of each other's existence or even fought. There were generally two assemblies, two treasuries, and two sets of regulations". "In practice", Charnay concurs, referring to Algeria as a whole, "these elected jemaas rarely coincided with the occult jemaas, which consisted, as of old, of wise elders.....They had little desire to reveal their powers and activities to the inspection of an Administration which expected them to be compliant, and which treated them with a certain disrespect". Consequently, "the elected jemaas at douar level were often
mere facades, carrying out the directives of the secret village jemaas". According to one eyewitness, "this seemed to have entered into custom so well that in many villages people believe there are two jemaas, one responsible for relations with the French Administration, and the other continuing to occupy itself with the real life of the thaddart (village)".

In this bifurcated situation, the clandestine jemaa was not vestigial; it was the more powerful, authentic voice of indigenous politics. Civil justice, which officially devolved upon the distant French Justice of the Peace, was far more frequently dispensed by the clandestine jemaa. In matters of criminal justice, similarly, "it was apparent that in everyday life the qanouns were put into operation much more than the articles of the penal Code".

The official guardians of colonial authority accepted this duality by turning a blind eye. Partly this stemmed from ignorance of the jemaa's actual role, compounded by the collusion of intermediary agents: "the caids themselves", Parant pointed out, "do not dare to infringe the decisions (of the secret jemaa). Between an order of the administration and a contrary decision of the jemaa, they do not hesitate to fall in with the decision of the jemaa". In as far as the administration was aware of this as a problem, it was resigned to the impossibility of resolving it overnight. Indeed, clandestine jemaas were tacitly accepted as useful contributors to social stability. Their vitality, so far from being distrusted as evidence of "regression... or resistance to our sway", was often welcomed for "relieving the courts of minor offences and 'moralizing local life". Some French officials
openly proclaimed this opinion. Others even established lines of communication with the 'clandestine' assembly in order to ensure the attainment of mutually desirable objectives: the administrator at Azazga, for example, which was a European centre rather than a remote village, was obliged to contact the 'unofficial' jemaa before he could control the rowdiness of moslem youths in a local café.

The vigour of the Kabyle jemaa was not that of an institution, but more fundamentally that of a political culture. The communities withdraw as a group behind their shields of individual, family and collective *nif*. The traditional defence of 'face' was extended in the colonial situation to mean that whoever stepped outside the accepted community procedures for the settlement of disputes, in particular by calling in the colonial administration, was violating the honour of the whole group. "The village spirit, its sense of autonomy and above all of honour" thus took on heightened significance. Kabyle communities determinedly strove to settle their own accounts. The efforts of the French authorities to uncover and punish offences met with a conspiracy of silence. "By the age of five", Bousquet observed, "little children are already impregnated with it (the village spirit). Like adults they know how to hide the 'village secret' from central government representatives who come, for example, to investigate a crime about which the village had decided to stick to a certain story". This secrecy was both an affirmation of group solidarity and an expression of an alternative set of values; what was a serious wrong in the eyes of the colonizer was often trivial in those of the colonized, and vice versa. In particular, the right of the family to exact its own
vengeance was fiercely defended in the face of French justice: "the Kabyle nif forbids any betrayal of rekba adversaries to the French". 44 As Charnay points out, "although nothing - apart from a little influence - could impede the French judicial machine when the guilty party had been apprehended, its real problem was to find him". 45

Violations of this code of silence were rare. Apart from a few cases of physical intimidation, what prevented them was the global pressure of the segmentary group. Social ostracism was inflicted upon any individual who stepped outside understood procedures. 46 Such renegades were not spoken to; their presence was generally shunned. They could not attend jemaa sessions, nor participate in such communal activities as the distribution of meat (timechret). Fellow villagers would neither celebrate marriages with them, nor bury their dead. In this tightly-controlled environment, such a boycott or quarantine was of devastating impact. "It is impossible to live in a Kabyle village", Milliot affirmed, "when all backs are turned and all doors are closed at your approach. You must either give way or go away". 47

More effectively, perhaps, than other Algerian communities, the Kabyles thus mobilized themselves to defend their traditional political structures in the colonial situation. Withdrawal and clandestinity were central to their strategy of survival.

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The Aures 48

If Kabylia was the strongest kernel of resistance to the French impact, it was far from unique. Its strategy of survival was echoed throughout Algeria, particularly the oases on the Saharan fringe and
the other massifs of the Tellian Atlas stretching across northern Algeria: the Oran highlands in the West (near Nedroma and Marnia) the Dahra and Ouarsenis highlands in the Centre, and the Aures mountains to the South East. Of these zones, the Aures was the most significant in terms of population size and socio-political tenacity.

The Aures was a huge rugged region, although less densely populated than Kabylia. Its more fertile north-western valleys had fairly large sedentary hamlets engaged in cereal and tree cultivation, but its south-eastern valleys were wild, near-desertic and inhabited by scattered semi-nomadic pastoralists. As with Greater Kabylia, the population, known as Shawia, spoke a Berber tongue, and there was virtually no European settlement.

Socio-political life in the Aures revolved around the clan; its honour was the focus of group rivalries and solidarities. Indeed the clan jemaa was often the ultimate political unit, for villages (or tribal fractions) were less cohesive than in Kabylia. The colonial presence did not interrupt this segmentary system. Throughout the region, Marcy reported in 1938, "the rhythm of the old political life persists unaltered, though on the quiet; to detect it, one needs only to listen attentively. It must be stressed that the establishment of French domination has not in any way caused the traditional political organization to disappear, any more than in any large Berber area".

Segmentary rivalries and solidarities continued to find their traditional outlets. "The council of the clan", Bourdieu suggests,
"retained until 1954 the main judicial powers (in spite of the reforms of 1865)". In addition to handling almost all marriages and divorces, it arbitrated civil differences by using the traditional mode of proof, the collective oath; it imposed penalties, presided over the rulings of the diia (blood purchase) which were made in accordance with strict ritual, tried cases relating to inheritance, etc." 51 In particular, as Servier attested in 1957, vendetta continued to operate under a veil of secrecy. 52

The thin facade of colonial institutions did not impede these processes. As in Kabylia, parallel structures were established. Marcy observed sadly that "alongside the official douar jemaas, created by us and given modest administrative responsibilities, unofficial jemaas of tribe, fraction and village survive in practice. Although at the moment they are obliged to operate in clandestinity, these unofficial councils retain most of their traditional attributes, with the tacit consent of all". 53 With a clear note of alarm he added that "the judicial function, the main function of any State and of great importance in this region with its chronic thirst for justice, almost completely escapes French control in the Aures", and he drew an ominous inference for the colonial enterprise: "Only political control proper - assumed by the French - escapes them, but they are obviously quite ready to take it over again at the earliest opportunity". 54

-iii. The Mzab 55

An original form of survival, less significant than the Aures and Kabylia in terms of population numbers, but of enormous structural
interest, was in evidence in the Mzab. In this small cluster of seven oasis townships, centred on Ghardaia in the Military Territories of the South, lived what Morizot called "the most coherent, best organized and richest Moslem collectivity in Algeria, if not North Africa". The settlement had been created in the eleventh century on a rocky Saharan platform, and maintained for centuries in open defiance of the natural world around it, its gardens sustained by dint of human labour and an intricate network of dams, collecting basins and irrigation channels. It was the last redoubt in Algeria of the Ibadites, a strict Islamic sect who rejected the prevalent Malekite orthodoxy. Its inhabitants, Mozabites, were 'egalitarian rigorists' who insisted that "all believers are equal and that every action is either good or bad, arbitration as to the rightness or wrongness of these acts being allowed only in exceptional circumstances". The denounced all intermediaries between God and man, including saints. Their social life was puritanical, eschewing such profanities as tobacco, alcohol, perfume, dance and music, and it was predicated upon the virtues of hard labour and good works. The Mzab was the base for vigorous commercial enterprise, tightly organized by family groups, whose tentacles reached throughout the Central and Eastern Maghreb. The proceeds of this permitted the upkeep of the otherwise impractical oasis cultivation.

The Mozabites, isolated in a hostile human and natural environment, developed an extremely strong sense of their own identity and a fierce determination to survive. The French quickly classified them as xenophobic. They jealously guarded their unique set of socio-political
institutions. The base unit of solidarity was the clan, each of which had its own treasury and assembly house. Every clan in turn sent elders to the jemaa of laymen (acuane), the 'secular' assembly. This council exercised legislative and judicial responsibilities, but for all matters of major importance it assembled at the mosque in the presence of the circle (halaa) of clerics (azzaba). The latter, 'spiritual' body was the purest voice of authority within a society organized strictly according to the Ibadite rite. In the sense that all Mozabites were equal before God, and the clerics were neither a hereditary caste nor the agents of a bureaucratic church machine, this could be called a "theocracy".

The whole system of government survived intact during the eight decades that followed the French annexation of the Mzab in 1882. A special statute was accorded to the community, respecting its judicial customs, particularly the role of the jemaa of laymen. Although the latter alone was given official sanction, in practice its decisions continued to be controlled by the circle of clerics, which was forced to operate in clandestinity but retained its unchallenged authority in the Ibadite community.

The decisions and regulations (tifagat) made by the jemaa of the Mzab were drawn up in Arabic, many of them surviving from as far back as the 15th Century. They were extremely comprehensive: a vast range of social obligations, moral injunctions, laws of inheritance and punishable breaches of the communal peace were outlined in successive documents. Much more than the qanouns of Kabylia, Mozabite tifaqat resembled statutes. Indeed they were less a collection of local customs
than a whole juridical system, based upon "a conscious doctrine, jurisprudence and written expression". They reflected a unique social formation characterized by "internal cohesion, stability, considered evolution, control of external influences and an effort towards transaction and elaboration". As during previous centuries, the French presence, and the danger of social disintegration, was warded off by means of "purposeful rigorism and an exclusivism based on high awareness of its own originality and excellence". The community ensured fidelity to its traditional institutions, where threatened from within, by ostracism, temporary banishment and, most feared of all punishments, excommunication.

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iv. Other modes of survival and bifurcation

Similar patterns of endurance and parallel structure can be traced throughout Algeria, just as they characterized other parts of the Maghreb under French rule. Withdrawal and clandestinity in the face of colonial administration were instinctive. In the Djebel Amour, for example, to the south of the Département of Oran, Hirtz reported in 1945 that the traditional channels of segmentary politics - heads of family, holy men and jemaa - still effectively operated. "The Administrator's door is open to everyone", he claimed, but "even when the French chief is personally liked and has a reputation for independence, high-mindedness and disinterestedness", the population persistently clung to its own structures of government. "In reality", he concluded, "in many respects a protectorate has developed in this Commune Mixte".
However, 'withdrawal' had many modes, and loyalty to indigenous political processes could not entail a total boycott of colonial institutions. The possibilities offered by the latter were often exploited as part of the indigenous political process, and in order to protect its socio-economic base. Charnay, for example, shows that a 'mass of litigation' was brought before colonial courts by natives to protect their landholdings - and thus the social organization based upon them - from alienation and other forms of deterioration. Similarly, ambitious individuals or rival segmentary groups often manipulated the colonial superstructure to a greater or lesser degree to further their position within the traditional 'game'. Such individuals provided the 'collaborationist' caids and elected members of municipal councils or jemaas. Although beyond a certain point they left the 'game' entirely, and could be termed renegades, collaboration with central government was an important tactic in the traditional interplay of tribal politics. In any case, even renegades facilitated the survival of indigenous political processes in the sense of providing a screen behind which the latter could continue to operate unmolested.

Whole groups occasionally conducted their segmentary rivalries in terms of a struggle to draw advantages from the colonial framework. It was not uncommon for them to enter the colonial arena openly, during elections for official jemaas for example, even in later days adopting the devices of 'national' political parties. Paradoxically, tactical participation of this kind can be regarded as a form of withdrawal and is best understood in relation to the indigenous value system, rather than seen as an adoption of European norms. Instead of abandoning traditional
channels, they were deepening them by exploiting additional tools of segmentary struggle.73 The Commune Mixte of Sedrata, in the North-Eastern corner of Algeria, provides an illustration.74 Between 1947 and 1953, elections for the official jemaa of douar Mouladheim were fought out between segmentary clans, and its members were chosen on an 'ascriptive' rather than 'proscriptive' basis. They then exploited their 'official' status both to pursue their rivalries and to discomfit the colonial administration, which was obliged to suspend certain members in an effort to retain authority. Yet even the purged 'official' jemaa persisted in holding unofficial sessions, hidden from representatives of colonial government, at which communal decisions were made prior to official consacration.

What the colonial situation thus provided was a set of alternative channels for political action. The French administration was little more than a stand-by. It provided what Hirtz called "a reserve of justice".75 In Bousquet's words, it was "only a complement (to traditional justice); one has recourse to it if the latter has not given satisfaction".76 Charnay cites an example from the neighbourhood of Ain M'lila, between Constantine and the Aures mountains.77 A woman was shot in the thigh by her brother-in-law after a disagreement with his wife. The two sides of the family could not agree on the appropriate blood-price, so the victim's sister denounced the attacker to the French authorities. Frightened, he agreed to pay the sum demanded. The whole family then told the investigating magistrate that the wound was accidentally self-inflicted, and proceedings were dropped. In this case, the French administration was used as "a means of pressure and threat
against a debtor who is being intransigent in paying the compensation demanded by custom". 78

The provision of an alternative referee was not in itself a novel departure. The traditional segmentary process was "a ballet of opposition, rapprochement, and pecuniary and social compromise" 79 which depended on a wide range of arbiters in the search for a settlement satisfactory to both parties in a dispute. The validity of one source of arbitration depended not only on its 'inherent prestige' but also on the substantive decision which it offered. "What is of juridical status", Charnay explains, "is indicated both by the established authority which affirms its validity and, above all, by the multiplicity of individual psychical processes which conceive of its finality. But the finality of the law also lies precisely in the satisfaction of personal interest". 80 As an extension of this, Algerian communities were not dogmatic, but flexible and instrumental, in their hostility to the colonial administration. 81 There were occasions when it proved useful in settling traditional conflicts, particularly when it consciously adapted itself to the local moslem environment. In areas like Kabylia, indeed, where the role of cadi justice had never been established as against that of jemaas and holy men, there were some signs of resistance to French application of the fich and a preference for French law or at least French interpretations of local custom. 82

Although the colonial administration was called in during certain disputes, the French were mistaken in treating this as proof of impregnation by their norms or decay of traditional structures. As
Charnay suggests, it amounted to "the use of a technique, not a spiritual adhesion". Only traditional moslem structures were imbued with both kinds of legitimation, and their role remained primary. "Virtually no civil case", wrote Bousquet in 1950, "comes directly to our judges... When our judges are brought into a case, it is only after the failure of a whole series of attempted 'settlements' - through the intermediary of relatives, notables, marabouts and, finally, the jemaa". Nor was the eventual involvement of the French administration necessarily decisive: "often the judgement made by French courts was regarded merely as one phase in a continuing quarrel, not the end to that quarrel which it liked to think itself". "French justice is not regarded as a superior instance", Bousquet affirmed, "but as parallel to other instances. It is not unheard of for a new settlement to be reached after the French have ruled in favour of one party to a case".
II. ADAPTATION OF STRUCTURES

Social structures which 'withdrew' or 'survived' in the colonial situation were not inert. They continued to evolve under the pressure of internal tensions and conflicts. The release of subdued potentialities, or their operation in a new context, fired energetic responses to the colonial situation. Kabylia and the Mzab are two of the geographical areas which provide illustrations of this dynamic process.

- Kabylia

The flourishing political life of Kabyle villages, for all that it generated a fierce sense of autonomy, was not predicated on sheer economic self-sufficiency or isolation from the rest of the world. Long before the arrival of the French, Kabylia played a special role in the Maghreb economy, an integral feature of which was an extensive network of internal exchange. Kabylia was a major producer of olive oil and forest products. It had also developed into a centre of small-scale industry and crafts. Its carpenters, iron-mongers and stonemasons provided a wide range of agricultural and household implements for the pastoral tribes and township-dwellers of the plains. Its tanners and weavers produced high-quality clothing and blankets. It was a famed centre for the manufacture of knives, swords, guns, gunpowder and ammunition. In return, Kabylia was dependent on the coastal plains for cereals, wool and various animal products. It could be argued that, in the Central Maghreb which had virtually no real towns, "in effect the role of the city was played by the whole of Kabylia". As Boyer suggests, "the only thing that falsified the
'town-country' relationship was that the fellah (rural peasant) did not come to Kabylia to make his purchases; instead the Kabyle pedlar went to the fellah". The exchange of products was conducted above all by itinerant petty traders, who dispersed from Kabylia throughout northern Algeria.

Apart from these 'commercial travellers', Kabylia was also an important source of labour migration to the plains, particularly when the economy of these densely-populated highlands hit bad years. Seasonal harvesters worked on the corn-fields of the sahel. Peripatetic masons and tinkers roamed widely, and other Kabyles gained employment as domestic servants in the coastal townships. There was also military emigration; the zouaoua provided famed mercenary soldiers for the Turks.

The nature of this emigration was temporary, however, and closely integrated with the social structure of the Kabyle 'homeland'. Indeed the strength of the latter depended on this emigration. Individual migrants were not exercising a personal option away from the family group, but rather obeying its demands. "All those remained in the village", Morizot suggests, "who had a precise function to perform, plus all those marked out by their age, sex or physical and intellectual incapacity; the others were more or less delegated to go away to ensure the group's needs by their work". The emigration was of individuals, not families, and it was exclusively male. Often, moreover, "custom demanded that migrants should marry before their first departure, thus ensuring their return". At the same time, the strict patriarchal structure of Kabyle villages provided a dependable platform for emigration. Exheredation of females - not found outside Berber areas - protected family holdings from fragmentation. Husbands knew that the
activities of their wives and daughters left behind would be strictly supervised; custom, as defended in the jemaa, ensured that they could never leave the house alone, and then only for specific purposes and by clearly designated routes.96

The advent of the French did not shatter this basic socio-economic pattern. Indeed it proved extremely responsive to the new situation. There was a rapid decline of Kabyle industry and crafts in the face of European competition,97 but on the other hand the emigration of traders, artisans and labourers underwent "an extraordinary growth, taking over the key role where before they were merely complementary".98 Facilitated by improvements in transport, there ensued what has been termed a "Kabylization" of Algeria.99 Kabyle share-croppers, wage-labourers and shepherds played a key auxiliary role in the European colonization of the coastal plains around Algiers.100 Kabylia provided the core of recruits to the French army.101 As the role of pedlars declined, in the face of developments in communications, Kabyle merchants began to set up permanent shops in urban and semi-rural centres. Such external outposts were established methodically by family groups, which avoided unnecessary competition. Each Kabyle village had its 'pitch' tacitly respected by rival villages.102 Artisans and labourers began to flock into the growing European towns, changing the character of their traditional moslem quarters. By 1911, already over a third of the moslem population of Algiers was Kabyle, and its Casbah was derisively nicknamed 'Tizi-Ouzou' by native townspeople.103

However, as with previous Kabyle emigrations, this was 'temporary' in the sense that it was confined to males, earnings were remitted to the home village, and individual members of the family periodically returned to the home village and spent their last years there.104
The 'Kabylization' of Algeria was followed within a generation by a similar trans-Mediterranean process. Growing pauperization and unemployment at home forced Kabyles to look beyond the frontiers of Algeria. The first large-scale mobilization of labour occurred during the First World War, when about 80,000 Algerian moslems, mostly Kabyles, were recruited to work in French arms factories and mines. Between the wars, labour demand from France aroused colon fears of a labour shortage in Algeria itself, and restrictive decrees periodically interrupted the flow of Kabyles to France. By the outbreak of the Second World War, however, these controls had been lifted, and there were about 100,000 Algerians working in France. With peace again restored, the rate of emigration accelerated considerably. The 1948 Algerian Census estimated that over 200,000 were resident in France; by the outbreak of the rebellion in late 1954, this figure had almost doubled again. 15% of all adult Algerian males were then to be found on Metropolitan soil.

As with 'internal' Algerian migration, this flow of population across the Mediterranean was first and foremost a Kabyle phenomenon. Two thirds of those Algerians living in France in 1954 were Kabyles. Among these, the two main groups were Zouaoua from Greater Kabylia and Beni Abbes from Lesser Kabylia. Compared with Kabyle emigration emigration from other parts of Algeria - from the mountains of the Aures and North-West Oranais, from the Saharan oases, and from the High Plains of the Algérois and Constantinois - started later, was smaller-scale, and was less successful in terms of employment. At the same time, the 'Kabylization' of Algeria itself levelled off after the Second World War; the main drift to the towns came from these other
areas, while Kabyles directed themselves towards France. By late
1954, between a quarter and a half of all adult Kabyle males were in
the Metropolis.

This exodus of population attested not to the disintegration of
Kabyle society but rather to its persistent strength and powers of
adaptation. "Paradoxically", as Montagne suggested, "temporary
emigration...develops chiefly among the most permanently settled
sedentary populations....(It) develops among the Berbers because among
them is found a certain type of social structure which makes it
possible". Those from Kabylia left behind a close knit, patriarchal
society, based on small landholdings, which had long proved a stable
platform for temporary departures. "The strong cohesion and solidarity
of the agnatic group", noted by Bourdieu, "guarantees to the emigrant
that the family he has left behind on the communal property - which
provides subsistence for each member of the group - will be protected
in his absence by those of his male relatives who have remained on
the land".

The interests and needs of the home village were the sole deter-
minants of this exodus. Usually its annual timing was dictated by the
state of the local harvest. Those who left were almost exclusively
male, and the majority were married. Their stay abroad was extremely
short; approximately 90% returned home after an absence of between 1½
and 2 years. An individual emigrant was liable, at a moment's
notice, to abandon his French job and return to Kabylia if his presence
there "as member or head of family" was urgently required. In any
case, certain males were delegated each winter to stay behind and
supervise the sale of the local harvest.
Those who left went with the specific purpose of earning money. Kabyles obtained secure jobs; their unemployment rate in France was little more than 5% in the early 1950's, compared with other emigrant groups which had rates approaching 50%. They obtained better paid jobs, chiefly in big factories. A high proportion of their wages was saved and transmitted back to Kabylia. Thus their activities, rather than divorcing them from their village economy, were an integral part of it. Indeed they alone were responsible for its growth and development. "The men leave", Montagne observed, "not only to earn from outside the resources which are indispensable for the survival of women, children and old men, but also to buy mortgaged lands and even to enlarge the small lot of land handed down from their ancestors." "Emigration itself", Montagne pointed out, "gives the collective conscious of the village or social group an occasion to manifest itself. A rural community that is strongly organized in its own country will organize itself no less solidly in emigration - within Algeria or to France". What he termed the 'colonization' of France was not haphazard but extremely methodical. Each village or group of allied hamlets deliberately chose separate locations for the construction of its 'beach heads'. Typically there would be more than one of these to offset initial risks of failure. Employers in these towns then found that the most effective way to recruit immigrant labour was through the intermediary of existing employees, who contacted other members of their particular family or village. Thus a distinctive pattern of employment grew up, with particular jobs in particular French towns.
'cornered' by particular Kabyle villages. A handful of douars from Dra-el-Mizan, for example, dominated immigrant in the engineering factories of Lyon, and whole douars of the Upper Sebaou and Mizrana virtually monopolized employment in the Marseille docks. In this sense, the political topography of Kabylia was exported to France, complete with intestine rivalries: "two neighbouring but enemy villages in Kabylia turn their backs on each other in France and their offspring never dare to meet each other. On the other hand, alliances between villages seem to be re-formed in associations of interest within France itself".

The life of Kabyle emigrants invariably centred around and radiated out from a café or hotel owned by a family from the home village. As Morizot observed, "they only left (Kabylia) after noting the address(es) of establishments run by people from their own village; they went there on arrival, obtained credit, lodged there and fed, at least temporarily. There they immediately found out about job possibilities and were helped to make their first moves". Once established, most of the social life of these emigrants was focused around this centre; it provided an umbilical cord connecting them with the Kabyle womb. It functioned as bank and friendly society, post-box and discussion room; "there...they regathered, exchanged news about home, helped each other in case of need, and expressed their spirit of mutual assistance in all kinds of ways".

Links with the home village were thus never broken, and few ties with the surrounding French inhabitants could develop. In Michel's words, they were 'migrants' camped precariously in a society into which they refuse to assimilate themselves." Kabylia, not France, was their psychological reference point and the stimulus of their efforts.
"It is the thought of the family", Bourdieu suggested, "that sustains (the Kabyle) during the exile, that inspires him to work desperately hard to save his money. When they joined together in France to form communities which are patterned on the family structure and which recreate that system of solidarity and mutual support which animates Kabyle life, the emigrants will undergo severe privation in order to send back to their families the greater part of their earnings".

In fact the dynamic political spirit of Kabyle society was exported along with its corps of personnel. With up to half of the adult males from the village absent in France, in many cases the emigrant café functioned as a virtual 'jemaa-in-exile'. "From a distance", Michel suggested, "the masculine emigration of a village takes the decisions about municipal life. Whether they concern the building of a fountain, the construction of a road or bridge, or the financing of a Koranic school, these questions are discussed in France within the minuscule collectivity of 'native sons', a faithful reconstitution of the jemaa which polarizes the social life of the villagers of Kabylia". Far from withering, the traditional political concerns and processes took on a new vitality among emigrant groups.

-ii. The Mzab

The traditional society of the Mzab also proved extremely receptive to the conditions imposed by the colonial situation. Rather than threatening it, the latter provided favorable opportunities for the flourishing of potentialities already strongly active within it.
Since its foundation, the Mzab had been an important link in the Maghreb-wide web of trade. In the exchange of products between the stockbreeders and oasis-cultivators of the Saharan fringes and the townspeople and plainsdwellers of the coast, Mozabite families had typically acted as intermediaries - wholesalers, financiers and underwriters. In Algiers under the Turks there was a small nucleus of Mozabites established as traders in flour, meat, coal and fruit, and as bankers for other traders. A prosperous, close-knit, religiously exclusive bourgeois group, they were somewhat distrusted by the Malekite Moslems around them.

Far from being incompatible with the puritanical religiosity of their Ibadite beliefs, involvement in commercial enterprise was closely bound up with them. Industriousness and mutual aid, the twin motors of their mercantile success, were moral duties. Hard work was part of the ascetic way of life, and the sumptuary restrictions which were another aspect of this code facilitated the accumulation of capital: "since he cannot spend on luxuries the money he has amassed, the Mozabite has no other recourse but to reinvest it". At the same time, this entrepreneurship was not individualistic. Mozabite enterprise was closely bound up with the kinship group. Its strength and durability lay in the spirit of solidarity and mutual aid which reigned within and between the families of the Mzab. Partnerships, joint-stock undertakings, mutual loans, buying cooperatives, and the exchange of information about products, prices and market conditions, were concrete manifestations of this. Thus there was a close congruence between the injunctions of religion and the rationale of capital accumulation. "Worldly success", as Bourdieu indicated, "can
be based only on hard work, piety, and respect for the precepts of the Koran; it is therefore regarded as a sign of election, especially when the accumulated wealth is devoted to praiseworthy ends (legal almsgiving, charity). At the same time, these two poles of life—financial astuteness and moslem piety—did express a tension at the heart of Mozabite society, the resolution of which was never entirely simple or static. The two worlds were, in many respects, kept physically separate. "The cities of the Mozabites, like the life of the people", Bourdieu pointed out, "have two very distinct centers: the mosque and the market-place."

In the colonial situation, the dynamic tension between these potentialities in Mozabite society was provided with new opportunities of release. "Fidelity to the precepts of tradition", in Bourdieu's words, "far from being an obstacle to their adaptation to the world of competitive capitalistic economic system, rather favors it and makes it easier". Improvements in transport, communications and security enabled the network of Mozabite commerce to extend and intensify. By 1930 there were well over a thousand Mozabites in the town of Algiers. "Today", wrote Morizot of the late 1950's, "scattered to the tune of a few thousand in the towns of Algeria, they exercise, as they have for a long time, the trades of grocers, merchants of cloth, meat and coal, and transport entrepreneurs...In recent times, some have become 'specialists in big business and finance'. The total number of emigrants was small, compared with the Kabyle movement for example. However, their relative impact on Maghreb life was considerable, in view of their capital reserves and energy. The small world of the Mzab was intimately
bound up with the fate of its 'external' population; one-third of its male population was outside the 'seven towns' by the mid-1950's. 150 In this sense "the real Mzab is not in the Mzab" but was scattered throughout Algeria. 151

Paradoxically, despite this exodus, the Mzab remained a tightly-knit, closed society, and the expectations of the Ibadite rite remained central to the life of its emigrants. The latter departed not as individuals but as designated representatives of their family, and in the service of the family's needs. 152 Only men were sent out; a tifaqat of 1928, itself expressing an age-old tradition, forbade any Mozabite woman to travel outside the city limits. 153 Emigration was temporary; to return was a sacred duty, and to die outside the holy cities was an unthinkable fate. Journeys were not lightly undertaken; departures from and returns to the Mzab were accompanied by rituals of deconsacration and re-consacration. 154 Journeys also had a specific purpose; "the end of emigration is not emigration in itself, but the conservation of the group, the necessary condition for the survival of the religious community". 155

The potential dangers of such mobility to the integrity of the group were understood, as the jemaa ruling of 1928 suggests. Perhaps it is for reasons of instinctive self-protection that no significant Mozabite presence was established in France. 156 The Maghreb was sufficient stage for Mozabite enterprise; beyond it, the pressures of the group and the bonds of family, community and religion, might not be sufficient to maintain the strict discipline by means of which the Mzab had tenaciously guarded its special character. Despite the apparent threat of disintegration posed by the colonial situation, the
Mzab survived and prospered. "This religious society", Bourdieu concluded, "-tightly closed upon itself, anxious to assert itself as being different - has been able to participate in a completely modern economic system without letting itself be affected or impaired in any way, and at the same time preserve its own originality intact". 157
III. RENEWED DYNAMISM OF ISLAM

Local varieties of 'persistence', 'evolution' and 'adaptation' were underscored by a general process of upheaval and reassessment within moslem society. Far from atrophying in the colonial situation, Islam took on heightened significance. Initially it provided a rallying point for determined survival; eventually it became a springboard for energetic revival. In Berque's phrase, it transformed itself from a refuge into a cradle of revolution.158

This transformation was expressed particularly in the Islamic reformist movements, which is of key importance in understanding the Algerian response to the colonial situation. As yet, however, it has received little systematic study. Apart from one lengthy treatise,159 we are dependent on piecemeal sketches160 which tend to approach the subject from an angle which obscures significant features. One tendency has been to treat reformism (islah) or fundamentalism (salafiyah) merely as movements of ideas. Their emergence in Algeria during the first few decades of the Twentieth Century has been treated as part of a theoretical debate between Islamic theologians which directly affected only a small intelligentsia. The genealogy of the various ideas at play has been traced in the work of various thinkers throughout the moslem world during the previous century, notably Djamal-eddine el-Afghani, Mohamed Abdou, Rachid Rida, and the 'neo-Wahhabites'.161 Thus, it is sometimes implied, the movement originated or was inspired from outside Algeria - from Tunisia, from Egypt, from Arabia, from 'the Orient'.162
Another tendency has been to discuss reformism in strictly institutional terms. One of the first concrete manifestations of the growing upheaval was the foundation, in 1931, of the "Association of Algerian Ulema" by certain doctors of law (ulema) to promote their reformist beliefs. The moving spirit of the organization, until his death in 1940, was Abdelhamid Ben Badis, energetically seconded by a small group of like-minded proselytizers, notably Bachir el-Brahimi, Tewfik el-Madani, Mbarek el-Mili, Tayeb el-Oqbi and Larbi el-Tebessi. Originally based in a few major towns - Constantine and Algiers in particular - they subsequently build up a dense network of cult associations, schools and social clubs throughout Algeria. Accordingly the nature of reformism has often been described exclusively in terms of this structure, which first developed among the traditional urban bourgeoisie, was then pushed outwards into the countryside, and strove successively to convince and organize the popular masses. Circulation figures of Association newspapers, membership of Association branches, and numbers of students in Association schools seem to be the significant clues to reformist influence from this perspective. The movement appears initially to have been detached from the mainstream of Algerian society, and its subsequent success due to a missionary campaign by a corps of dedicated and persuasive individuals.

In certain respects, the work of the Association of Algerian Ulema undoubtedly was socially elitist and narrowly intellectual. Nevertheless the organization was chiefly significant and only successful to the extent that it responded to, canalized, and summoned
up forces already at work deep within Algerian life. These forces, rather than abstract ideas or the vicissitudes of a particular pressure group, constituted the fundamental set of responses to the colonial situation; they were part of a global process which brought to the surface and attempted to resolve, conflicting pressures and potentialities within indigenous society.

In the Maghrebi past, major processes of social change and renewal frequently clothed themselves in doctrinal disputes. Broad swings in the 'pendulum' between forces of integration and disintegration, between unity and segmentation, between desert, town, mountain and plain, commonly found expression in puritanical or revivalist movements which attacked the heresy and moral laxity of the existing order, enjoined a new reign of orthodoxy and asceticism, yet eventually, in their turn, lost their cutting edge and became targets for overthrow. Twentieth Century reformism similarly, despite its purely theological aspects and despite the shallow social roots of its initial institutional base, was part of a deeper socio-political upheaval. Lacking sufficient information to discuss in detail the linkages between the ideas, the organization and social change, we can only guess at their tread outlines. The ideology of reformism and the targets in its political struggles are broadly indicative of aspects of life where this upheaval was taking place.

-i. Purification of doctrine and practice

Reformist ideology voiced a sense of humiliation in the present, a consciousness that moslem society had fallen into decline. Conquest by Europe was both sign and consequence of this decay; Algeria had been and was still colonized, in Bennabi's phrase, because
it was "colonizable". The duty of conscientious moslems, accordingly, was to arouse the people to awareness of this condition, to overthrow the shackles of social, moral and intellectual paralysis, and to restore Algerian Islam to its rightful place in the world. The community needed to summon up its own inner resources. The most fundamental of these was Islam, which needed to be refurbished and transformed into a source of strength. An alien and secular modernism was an unthinkable solution.

The remedy proposed by reformists was fundamentalist. Islamic renaissance in the modern world, they argued, necessitated a return to first principles. The way forward into the future was a return to the spirit of the past, to the 'pure' sources of Islam, free from subsequent encrustations. The only reliable foundation for social enterprise was the message recorded by Mohamed, the Koran, and the authoritative custom derived from it, the Sunna. Heretical interpretations and practices which had gained later acceptance were superstructures to be demolished. Thus the journal 'Maghreb' asserted in 1930: "The Koran contains all the truths which bring happiness and success in this world and the next. Our fathers conquered the world by applying its precepts; if we had acted in conformity with the Holy Book and the Sunna, we would be masters of the world".

The movement concentrated its attack on bidaa, blameworthy innovations, which had stifled and diverted the vital spirit of Islam. This was not a new undertaking, for tension and interaction between the complexities of 'orthodox doctrine' and 'customary practice', between the abstract and the concrete, between unity and diversity, were enduring features of Maghrebi Islam. The islahist movement was
itself riven by inner tensions of this kind, and the attack on *bidaa* was combined, sometimes uneasily, with positive respect for the devotional forms which gave Maghrebi Islam its special character and strength. In any case, this more disciplined reassessment of innovations belonged firmly to the mainstream of Maghrebi Islam, which was more 'rigorous' in its daily practice, and historically more open to and productive of purificatory movements, than much of African, Middle Eastern and Asian Islam.

Many of the *bidaa* attacked were not innovations in the literal sense, but pre-Islamic survivals. Those of a naturist character included beliefs in spirits (*djinn*), and such practices as the dressing of trees and wells, the sacrifice of animals, the performance of agrarian rites, and the celebration of seasonal festivals. Those of a superstitious character included beliefs in bad omens and the evil eye, the use of magic charms, amulets and spells, and the consultation of fortune-tellers and healers. All, in the eyes of reformism, were obstacles to true Islamic consciousness.

Other *bidaa* were later encrustations which had diverted the faithful from sober worship. The accompaniment of religious ceremonies by 'profane' music and dancing was one area of concern, as was the ostentatiously lavish celebration of family events such as circumcision and marriage. Severe condemnation was also directed at public festivals which interwove demonstrations of religious fervour with mass ordeals of self-flagellation and self-mortification, or with such exotic spectacles and sideshows as juggling, conjuring, fire-eating, snake-charming and acrobatics.
In identifying these targets, the islahist movement appears to have reinforced a general social reflux towards austerity in individual devotional practice and greater restraint in communal manifestations of Islamic identity. Until the middle of the century at Tebessa, for example, "immemorial custom made weddings and burials into barbarian and burlesque manifestations. Islah gave back a bit more dignity to our marriages and funerary processions". 179

Whereas the attack on many exotic deformations represented a cleansing of popular urban Islam, 180 the reformists also questioned the validity of many practices customary in rural areas. They emphasized the importance of Koranic Law, the Sharia, and the need for it to be directly interpreted by Islamic judges (cadi-s) rather than to be applied, in the light of 'local custom', by holy men or jemaa-s. "Those who do not judge in accordance with the truth sent down from God on high are infidel" was a much quoted Koranic text, which implied not only a boycott of colonial courts but also strict local adherence to the Sharia. 181

The reformists' assault on local custom - or rather the pointed debate which they initiated as to what was fundamental in Islamic orthodoxy - was measured rather than precipitate. Instead of seeking a wholesale confrontation which could have provoked resentment and resistance, the movement tacitly accepted many non-canonical practices such as the collective oath and the exheridation of women which were deeply rooted in Berber-speaking areas like Greater Kabylia and the Aures. 182 No doubt this involved the tactics of gradualism as well as sincere acknowledgement of the devoutness of rural Muslims. By the end of the colonial period, however, the
influence of cadi-s was perceptibly growing throughout Algeria.\textsuperscript{183}

Such signs of growing uniformity should be attributed less to the effective preaching of abstract ideas than to social evolution and to the heightening of Islamic consciousness by the pressures of the colonial situation. In this sense, the reformists advanced only as fast as they were allowed to go.

Islah also called into the question the role of holy men. It rejected the validity of intermediaries between God and Man. "As the prophet has said, prayer is an act of adoration". Ben Badis declared, "Adoration can be addressed only to God. Thus one can pray only to God; one cannot pray to anyone else together with God".\textsuperscript{184} The concept of sainthood was tainted with superstitious beliefs in magical powers - those attributed to living 'saints', to their relics, or to their descendants - and with superstitious practices such as the building of shrines around tombs (koubba-s) to which pilgrimages were made.\textsuperscript{185} Nevertheless, 'holiness' and 'blessing' (baraka) were deeply engrained notions in Maghrebi Islam and they remained acceptable to reformists chiefly in the sense of respect for the devoutness, and power of example, of individual men, living or dead. Often, indeed, the devoutness of past 'saints' entailed an asceticism and strict fundamentalism which was highly congruent with the spirit of reformism. Ben Badis himself was endowed with immense 'baraka' of this kind.\textsuperscript{186} Ignorant encrustations thus had to be carefully distinguished from something which was part of the lifeblood of Islam.\textsuperscript{187}

More open scorn was poured by reformism upon religious fraternities. These organizations already showed signs of decay by the 1920's.\textsuperscript{188} Pacification eroded their role as mobilizers of
inter-tribal solidarities, as arbitrators of segmentary conflicts, and as providers of sanctuary. Changing patterns of agriculture and trade weakened their economic foundations, with transport improvements rendering obsolete their role as protectors and warehousers of long-distance trade. Developments in communications robbed them of vitality as centres of teaching and social welfare. Emigration to towns and to France weakened their hold on many former adepts. 189 Zawiyas, in short, were no longer those isolated beacons of Islamic enlightenment and organization in a turbulent sea that they were in the middle ages; their lamps had been dimming for centuries. In the colonial situation, some individual zawiyas prospered, but to retain an effective socio-political role many of them were driven into tacit collaboration with the French authorities. Thus, reformism was an ideological affirmation of what already appeared on the ground to be growing moribundity.

The positive role which brotherhoods had played in the past in extending the faith and organizing the faithful was acknowledged by reformists. 190 Many founders of sufi orders in the past had been instigators of major movements of doctrinal purification. However, reformists were scornful of their sclerotic condition in the present and of their continuing pretension to play a meaningful role in the future. Their association with sainthood was a prime area of criticism; petty local saints, sizeable independent zawiyas, and major Maghreb-wide brotherhoods were lumped together deprecatingly under the term 'maraboutism'. 191 All committed the error of claiming to provide a channel between man and God. Ben Badis declared roundly that "the institution of brotherhoods, the erection of cupolas on
The claim of fraternities to provide a special path (tarik) of understanding and worship was also treated with scorn. "To purify the soul, to maintain good habits, to channel the fervour and sincerity of devotion", Ben Badis asseverated, "the role of acceptable Sufism is confined to these. As for the assertions of those masters who have written about it, as with those of any other master of Islamic science, they must be founded on authentic texts from the Holy Book and the Sunna".

The religious orders were castigated specifically for deforming forms of worship. Their personnel was assailed for bringing Islam into contempt: "the meddah, chanting in a corrupt tongue for the street populace, the taleb, like a jackal, howling his funerary chant behind the coffin-laden barrow, and the iqqach, jumbling together obscure Koranic quotations to forge magic talismans, and thus perpetuating in moslem society the role played by the griet (a peripatetic caste of wizards) in primitive days". The education provided by zawiya schools - which consisted of little more than rote learning, without understanding, of Koranic phrases - was charged with breeding ignorance and superstition. Zawiya worship was derided, particularly the ritual prayers (dikr) which the brothers (ikhwan) often recited to the point of oblivion. Public celebrations orchestrated by the brotherhoods were dismissed as generative of mass hysteria rather than of sincere fervour; certain orders - the Aissaoua were notorious - indulged in grotesque forms of 'whirling' and self-mutilation. Processions and pilgrimages accompanied by music, dancing, dispensation of 'miracle-cures', and, inevitably, the solicitation of gifts (ziara), were compared to circuses. Islamists sought to unveil the zawiya
chiefs who thus exploited the ignorance of their adepts, often for their own gain. It was no justification to plead that such manifestations were inevitable in 'popular' Islam: "the ignorant man who participates in such practices", they declared, "must be educated about his error. The educated man who tolerates them is a heretic and imposter".198

By the second quarter of the Twentieth Century, maraboutic extravaganzas of this kind were on the decline, and increasingly regarded as anachronistic. Bennabi suggests that the islahist critique simply coincided with "the living modernism of popular will".199 To this extent, indignation could often be mingled with condescending amusement. At Laghouat, for example, a Saharan oasis200 where reformism found fertile soil by mid-Century, "maraboutism, condemned by natural progress, had long disappeared from usage. But one morning the population was surprised to witness a curious procession wound through the streets of the town: a maraboutic cortège. This reminder of the long-lost past, overtaken by evolution along with the rest of post-Almohad society, displeased many people. The local scout leaders hit upon the idea of immediately organizing a march of their members to escort this grotesque parade through the streets. Laughter and jokes rang out as the procession went by. It broke up in disorder, with the realization that the hour of phantoms had passed".201

Many zawiyas were assailed as centres of personal and social vices. Some had considerable wealth, with sizeable endowments of land, lavish buildings and a big income from their followers.202 Their heads lived almost as feudal lords.203 Such sumptuary excess
did not square with the piety and asceticism expected of those with any pretension to provide moral leadership for the moslem community. Other leaders were accused of greed and ambition, patent venality, and exploitation of superstition and segmentary conflicts for personal gain. Vanity, pride and laziness were other defaults for which maraboutic leaders were frequently arraigned. A few were notorious drunkards and womanizers. In general, reformists charged them with lack of integrity and dignity.

Finally, brotherhoods were castigated as lackeys of the French. "The Marabouts", Ben Badis asserted, "are the domesticated animals of colonialism. They are the hand that executes its calamitous orders and the bridge that opens the way for it. They have never ceased to contradict God by showing themselves proud towards the people and servile towards colonialists and the despotic administrative chiefs".

In reality, what the reformists polemically described as "the maraboutic party" was not homogeneous and unified. Not all holy men and brotherhoods were active collaborators with the French authorities, or indeed opponents of reformism. Julien, for example, offers a distinction between local holy men and the heads of major zawiyas: "The petty marabouts, living miserably near the tomb of a local saint, constituted a proletariat which was inclined to opposition (to the French) and were not left unmoved by the ulema's preaching. Grand Maraboutism, on the other hand, formed a landed aristocracy which had gained new power with the decline of the 'nobility of the sword'. Between these two notional extremes, the reaction of individual 'holy families' varied. Many of them, adversely affected by socio-economic change - 'proletarianized' in Julien's terminology - were incapable of
activating their 'baraka' and disappeared. Others actively embraced the reformist cause, with which their devoutness predisposed them to sympathize. Others perceived that the islahist movement was too strong to resist, and cooperated with it in an attempt to retain their clientele. Others openly associated themselves with the French administration; still others attempted to balance between the various forces at play.

In many areas, reformists sought and obtained the adherence of 'maraboutism'. Marcy, for example, noted that reformism had made great strides in the Aures by 1938 by means of its "apparently paradoxical" alliance with holy men and zawiya chiefs. Estimating that half the zawiyas had "gone over to the reformist cause", he judged this to be a tactical move. Similarly Menaut was surprised to observe in 1935 that, despite what he claimed was their historic role of 'berberizing' and 'disorientalizing' Islam, many marabouts were closely associated with "neo-wahhabism" (a polemical term he reserved for islah). "If some of them are going over to the rival camp", he suggested, revealing his committed stance "it is because they feel it is powerful. This is a serious matter, for these depositaries of Berber divinity are subtle psychologists. They possess to a supreme degree the art of following the crowd in order to lead it. If they are abandoning us, it is because for them the masses have already abandoned us".

It is also difficult to generalize en bloc about the attitude of the major brotherhoods. Many of them originally provided foci of resistance to French implantation, while others patently founded their fortune upon collaboration. By the Twentieth
Century, some were clearly in decline in terms of membership and influence, while others attempted, with varying success, to rejuvenate themselves, to renovate their structure and purify their forms of worship. From the outset, some orders were violently hostile to the reformist ulema; some were well-disposed. Rival brotherhoods sometimes pursued their struggles for influence in terms of alliance with and opposition to the islahist cause. In Laghouat during the 1930's, for example, the wealthiest brotherhood, the Tijaniya, linked to one of the two moieties (soffs), was actively hostile to reformism, while the Qadriya brotherhood, linked to the other moiety, attempted to further its influence by supporting the islahist ulema. Moreover, the structural looseness of each brotherhood often created internal divisions and inconsistencies; in Mila during the 1930's, for instance, reformist interests made headway with the support of a mogaddem of the Rahmaniya zawiya, despite the bitter obstruction of the French-appointed caid, who was a sheikh of the same Rahmaniya order.

Initially, reformism appeared to seek some kind of understanding with "Grand Maraboutism". Ben Badis, according to Merad, "always retained his ambition of winning the esteem of the great maraboutic houses and of establishing a fraternal dialogue with them". The leadership of the Algerian Association of Ulema, as originally constituted, included a number of major brotherhood heads. From 1932 onwards, however, they were expelled and there was an open breach between islah and most of the big religious orders. Partly this took the form of an acerbic propaganda war, the battlefield for which ranged from the pulpit to the pages of rival journals.
However, mounting tension in the 1930's periodically found outlet in explosions of violence. Two incidents suffice to illustrate the degree of bitterness which the issue was able to generate within the moslem community. In September 1933, Sheikh Mouloud el-Hafidi, the major spokesman of organized anti-reformist maraboutism, attempted to preach at the Grand Mosque of Bône. An unusually large crowd was present, heckled him with cries of "Fakou!" (the character in an Arab play who was a traitor and deceiver), bombarded him with tomatoes, and forced him to abandon his sermon. El-Hafidi fled to the zawiya of the Alliouya Order, which was notoriously anti-reformist, followed by an angry crowd. Fighting broke out with fraternity members, and police and troops had to be called in to stop the rioting. Three years later, in Constantine, by then the hotbed of islah, outspoken criticism of reformist ulema by el-Habibatni, moqaddem of the Aissaoua Order, led to his attempted assassination.

In the face of the reformist tide, the French administration encouraged Zawiya leaders to join together in an organized fashion. A rival association, modelled on that of the reformist ulema, was formed; and a newspaper published. This development sharpened the confrontation considerably, in the sense that "Grand Maraboutism" became irrevocably tarred not only with all that was retrogressive in Islam, but also and above all with overt collaboration with the Christian colonizers. The attack on them by reformists became ever more wholesale. In any case, despite encouragement from the French, the small congerie of zawiya heads was riddled with "apathy and disunity" and constantly torn by intestine rivalries.
"Unable to surmount their personal quarrels and unite for common action", and with their grass-roots support shrivelling, they offered little real resistance to the "discipline and cohesion" of the islahist movement.222

-ii. Purification and reconstruction of society

The reformist movement was not merely concerned with theological fundamentalism; it was associated with a general process of social purification and reconstruction in Algeria.

The 'puritanism' of islah pointed up a new, or renewed, trend towards tighter social discipline. The Association of Algerian Ulema, according to its Statutes, had as a major aim "the combatting of social afflications - alcoholism, gambling, debauchery, idleness - as well as everything forbidden by religion, disapproved by morality, and prohibited by the laws and decrees currently in force".223 It waged an insistent campaign within the moslem community - and especially in the major towns - to raise standards of public morality. Gambling and crime were attacked not only as gross spiritual blemishes but as social scourges.223 The 'diseases' of pornography and prostitution were viewed with similar alarm.225 Women were enjoined to contribute to the defence of public decency by staying indoors when possible and by always wearing the veil when outdoors.226 Western dress, Western music and Western entertainments were actively discouraged as anti-Islamic.227 Conspicuous consumption was frowned upon, and an informal boycott of Western goods and shops was encouraged. "Boycott", declared
the journal 'Nadjah' in December 1933, "is the holy war of our century".\textsuperscript{228}

Attitudes of fatalism, laziness and moral laxity, and all practices which gave rise to them, were subjected to withering assault.\textsuperscript{229} The smoking of hashish or of tobacco, and the drinking of alcohol, were strictly forbidden.\textsuperscript{230} Rigid observation of fasting regulations during Ramadan was pressed for.\textsuperscript{231} Heightened stress on these Koranic requirements thus helped to mobilize social awareness. Communal self-help and self-confidence were preached.\textsuperscript{232}

By the middle of the Twentieth Century, the stiffening of social discipline was quite perceptible. Moslems such as Bennabi noted that "a miracle was happening", as consumption of liquor dwindled and mosques began to fill.\textsuperscript{233} This 'miracle' was also visible to European observers such as Noel. "Since 1934", he wrote from the small town of Mila, between Constantine and Lesser Kabylia, "the cafés have had fewer customers, apart from a handful of anisette devotees. The natives have returned to a long-abandoned purity of morals. They have made great efforts to shake off their traditional laxity; greater personal cleanliness has been achieved; greater vestimentary elegance has emerged. Children are sent to school more regularly and in greater numbers".\textsuperscript{234} In the Aures, on the eve of the 1954 rebellion, Servier attested similarly to growing puritanism in public behaviour. "Their name", he observed of reformist ulema, "was linked with a host of bans and restrictions and secret directives which rendered these mountain people inaccessible even more than their pink granite cliffs could do.... If I spoke of moslem saints, they replied that the ulema had
forbidden such worship, as they also banned ritual prayers and dances. Already I recognized the fiercest of their partisans by their refusal of my cigarettes and abstinence from drinking coffee. This strengthening of social fibre was effected by the arousing of a puritanical streak which was a characteristic trait, albeit previously dormant, of Maghrebi Islam. At the same time, it constituted a reaction to the colonial situation, and sharpened contradictions within it. Since so many of the social vices and psychological weaknesses attacked by reformism appeared to facilitate colonial control, their elimination promised to make moslem society better equipped to confront its colonizer. Servier's criticism of the reformists indicates an instinctive grasp of this: "By an insidious propaganda, they poisoned relations which until then had been cordial. All this created around me, in this village, a heavy climate of distrust."

The most strenuous efforts at social reconstruction by the reformist movement lay in the field of education. From the 1930's, the Association of Algerian Ulema threw its energies into the establishment of a network of 'free' Koranic schools. These were free in the sense that they were not subject to direct control by the colonial administration, but also they represented a deliberate break from the traditional Koranic education already provided, in rudimentary fashion, by various zawiya and independent teachers (tolba) attached to mosques.

Typically, reformist Koranic schools were founded after a local 'cult association' had been set up by sympathizers. This raised money for the building and running of a small elementary school,
with perhaps 50-100 pupils and two or three teachers. These began to proliferate throughout Algeria with notable rapidity. The Ulema claimed 90 such establishments by 1947, and double that number by 1955, many of them providing secondary education also. Institutes for more advanced study were opened in Constantine and Tlemcen.

The Ulema, essentially teachers themselves, emphasized the importance of scholarization for several reasons. It was the key to raising consciousness and generating a sense of self-sufficiency among moslems. It provided a channel for reformist values. It trained future teachers. It provided a focus for community development schemes.

The curriculum of 'free' education, though most of it remained at a fairly elementary level, was more wide-ranging than that of traditional Koranic education. It centred around study of the Holy Book. However, whereas pupils of traditional Koranic schools learned to chant phrases parrot-fashion, reformist pupils in addition had to translate and comment upon their meaning. The aim was to bring the Koran to life, to generate a genuine religious fervour. Marcy remarked on the apparent success of this form of study in 1938: "The present prosperity of the Koranic schools gave the Aures, when I passed through it, the appearance of a bustling hive; the Ghoufi canyon, where I stopped one day, echoed all day long with the recitation of the Koran to the accompaniment of the flute; from valley to valley it was one single murmur of prayer. The religious renaissance in the Aures thus seemed well under way".

Another important part of the curriculum was the teaching of the Arabic language. Bennabi praised reformism for "attacking the
mortal weed of the post-Almohad world - illiteracy". The promotion of literacy, a skill basic to human dignity was not confined to children; "it is very moving", Marcy reported, "to see the evening classes in grammar for adults which the Ulema have organized at Haidous, and which the nearby peasants (fellah) fervently attend after a day's work in the fields".

The spread of the Arabic language was a major ambition of the reformists. Concerned with the threat of Franch, they demanded that Arabic be declared an official language. By purifying and 'modernizing' it, they strove to strengthen its status as a written language. In particular, they sought to extend its currency in areas where Berber tongues predominated. This campaign appears to have achieved considerable success well before the Second World War; Marcy, for example, among the Berber-speaking peoples of the Aures, "nevertheless overheard - a sign of the times - young pupils at the Arris Koranic school talking among themselves in Arabic during their games".

Arabization was sought not merely as an end in itself, but as the key that would unlock the riches of Arabic culture. A third major ingredient of the 'free' curriculum thus taught the rudiments of literature, mathematics, science, geography and history. It sought to revive knowledge of and pride in Arab achievements in these fields. The importance of history - which el-Mili called "the mirror of the past, the stairway to the present, the birth certificate of the nation, the archives of its titles to nobility, the memorial to its genius, the bond of its unity, and finally the ladder to its revival" - was particularly stressed.
The 'patriotic' spirit of this historical interest is indicated by the tripartite motto adopted by the Association: "El Islam - ou - dini/El Arabiet - ou lourati/El Djezair - ou - ouatani" (Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my nation).\textsuperscript{251}

The spread of new Koranic schools was part of a more general programme of community development fostered by the ulema. Islahist 'circles' and 'cult associations' also gave birth to cultural organizations (nadi-s). Youth clubs and sports associations were developed.\textsuperscript{252} The Ulema were active in establishing Scout troops.\textsuperscript{253} All these organizations, in their turn, were active in raising funds for the building of new mosques and schools.\textsuperscript{254}

The quantitative impact of these phenomena, which were largely confined to towns, should not be exaggerated. They merely indicate a growing spirit of self-help among a smallish sector of the moslem community. Although many reformist ulema were remote from the ordinary population, although many suffered from an "upper class mentality",\textsuperscript{255} and although their organizational activities were pitched at the level of culture rather than everyday social welfare,\textsuperscript{256} their methods of socio-religious propaganda - teaching, preaching and raising funds - were typical of many fundamentalist movements in the Maghrebi past.\textsuperscript{257} The "Arab Renaissance" which they proclaimed nevertheless corresponded to socio-political realities with deep roots in Maghreb soil,\textsuperscript{258} and with structural importance in the colonial situation.
-iii. Islamic identity and the colonial situation

Reformism constituted an internal upheaval within the moslem community, signifying the emergence of certain potentialities and the decay of others. The relationship of these developments to the colonial situation was complex. In one sense, the colonial situation provided only an occasion for the upheaval, for the forces at issue had their roots deep in prior Algerian history. The colonial context was significant, however, in the sense that it revealed, or brought to a head, certain problems (which Bennabi summarized as 'colonizability') within indigenous society. Nevertheless, the basic message of reformism was addressed not to the colonizer but to the colonized. 259

The colonial regime was indirectly affected, however, since the forces released through reformism, by heightening the sense and reality of Islamic identity in indigenous society, exposed and widened basic contradictions in the colonial situation, and threatened ultimately to undermine the colonizer's position. The colonial regime became directly implicated in the reformist debate at the point when, correctly, it perceived these developments to be prejudicial to the maintenance of that position. It then classified them, somewhat misleadingly, as a 'politically inspired' and 'nationalistic' directly addressed at the colonizer but sheltering in theological garb. Accordingly, it took steps to obstruct the free development of the movement. With certain routes to their progress blocked, the reformists were thus brought inevitably into direct confrontation with the colonizer. They mobilized the population around their attempts to clear specific obstacles - the total effect of freeing themselves from
which would have eventually undermined the colonial regime. Only when and where these attempts failed, did they work in a more direct sense for the overthrow of the alien colonial regime.

The primary effect of Algerian reformism was, nevertheless, essentially to develop contradictions within the colonial situation rather than to focus overt struggle against the colonizer. As Merad suggests, "the reformists went further than the (bourgeois nationalist) moslem politicians. They were not content with harassing the administration with demands, generally of a purely platonic kind. They strove to do something, if not to improve the material conditions of the native population, then at least to bring about its moral revival and give it a taste of its 'Algerianity'." The essence of reformism was the heightening of the sense of uniqueness and separateness which 'Algerianity' entailed. This meant greater awareness of Arabism as one's culture, of Islam as one's religion, and of the Central Maghreb as one's homeland. Although these three overlapping loyalties might appear, in principle, to impose conflicting demands, in the minds of Algerians they were complementary stimuli of an instinctive patriotism; like three radar beacons, they locked upon one source and established its shape and direction.

One result, noticeable during the 1930's, was the increased sensitivity of the moslem community to affronts to its Islamic personality. This boiled over in otherwise inexplicable explosions of public violence. Pockets of the Jewish population in Algeria, more accessible than the Christian colonizers, became scapegoats in these aggressive assertions. Scattered
incidents - pillaging, boycotts, minor riots, lynching - broke out in several townships of the interior, including Tlemcen, Setif and Bou Saada, during the mid 1930's. In August 1934 there was a wholesale pogrom in Constantine, where, following the intervention of troops, at least 23 people were killed and 48 wounded.  

Another result of reformism, was a heightened sense of unity and fraternity between the various regions and communities of Algeria. Reformism stressed what all moslem Algerians had in common, and represented an urge for unification and integration and a struggle against fragmentation, differentiation and division. The spirit of reformism is suggested by a meeting held in 1932 at Akbou, in the heart of Kabylia, addressed by the reformist sheikh Mohamed Kherréidjine. Preaching on the text "Help ye one another for the sake of well-being and piety", he stressed the need for Kabyles and Arabs to express solidarity and avoid rivalry. "After this", according to the Ulema journal 'Nadjah', "conversations began in the assembly concerning the revival of the country, a common task which can only be accomplished by the union of hearts, the forgetting and permanent extirpation of causes of dissension....God has ordered us to unify ourselves: "Attach yourselves all together with the link of God"....As for the prophet, he has said: "One believer alongside another is like the wall with lead clamps whose blocks hold firmly together". "Be brothers among yourselves if you are the servants of God", he has also said. Is it not time for us to seize hold of ourselves.... to understand at last that our happiness can only rest on mutual
aid and profound union?! The factual progress of reformism in Kabylia and the Aures attested to the growing relevance of this message, and to the effectiveness both of Islam and of the prestige of Arabism in mobilizing patriotism in all parts of Algeria, whether Berber- or Arab-speaking.

At the same time, there were signs of greater entente between Malekite Algeria and the Ibadites of the Mzab. This entailed a major change of atmosphere. Reformism, in its ascetic fundamentalism and its anti-maraboutism, awoke certain echoes of sympathy in the Ibadite community, particularly that section of it outside the Pentapolis itself. Reformism, and particularly Ben Badis, stressed the prime importance of Islamic brotherhood which required a spirit of tolerance for rites other than Malekite. The leader of Mozabite reformism, sheikh Ibrahim Bayoud, was on the inaugural committee of the Association of Algerian Ulema. Ibadite reformists published a journal, 'el-Omma', which expressed general uniformity of view with the Malekite reformist movement. In 1932, in a show of solidarity which caused considerable comment in the moslem press, Ben Badis visited the Ibadite school at Relizane, was warmly welcomed, and made a speech stressing fraternity among moslems in the Maghreb. The improvement in relations did not undo the centuries of suspicion between the communities, for conflict between the two reformist wings continued to occur, but the unificatory tendency was unmistakable.

The stress on what Algerian moslems had in common inevitably sharpened the consciousness of separateness of the whole community from France. The basic 'message' of reformism - despite certain
activities of the Association of Algerian Ulema from the mid-1930's onward - was that separateness, independence, or nationhood was not a right to be asked or demanded of the colonial power; rather it was an existing fact. "History has taught us", Ben Badis declared in 1936, "that the moslem people of Algeria have been created like any other. It has its history, illustrated by glorious facts; it has religious unity, its own language, its culture, its customs, its manners good and bad. This moslem people is not France, cannot be France, does not want to be France. It is a population made very distinct from France by its language, its customs, its religion. It has no desire whatsoever to be incorporated by it". Algeria already existed, in this sense, and the issues around which the Algerian Association of Ulema became engaged in overt struggle with the colonial authorities were not ones where new rights were sought, but rather ones where it endeavoured to mobilize existing moslem consciousness to ensure that factual separateness was not obscured, obstructed or threatened by the colonial regime.

One of the major issues of this kind involved attempts to keep Islamic worship free from colonial interference. This was one area where intervention by the infidel government was guaranteed to provoke outrage and furious reaction among the colonized. Mosques, symbolically, were the sanctuary where the colonizer's footprint was not permitted to step. Accordingly, in 1830, the colonial regime promised to allow full freedom to the moslem cult. In any case, Islam did not lend itself to hierarchical control; it was not a 'church' in the organized sense. There were no ordained 'clergy'; its leaders were simply the most faithful, as sanctioned by the
respect of the community of believers. Each community built and maintained its own mosque. "Officials", such as muezzins and tolba, were chosen by prominent local devotees, organized in a 'cult association', and sustained by donations or religious trust property (habous).

However, from the outset the colonial regime did exercise an indirect supervision. Firstly, it immediately took control of all habous property. This in itself was a continuing source of scandal, which reformists frequently denounced. However, the regime had gone further. Partly to compensate for this loss to the cult of a major resource, the secular state had taken upon itself to grant 'subsidies' to certain recognized cult 'agents' - particularly muftis and imams at major mosques in major towns. The state claimed that nevertheless moslems retained complete 'confessional' independence. Certainly these 'ministers' were irreproachably orthodox moslems, and even in terms of administrative control, they were never directly chosen by the colonizer; they continued to be designated by each 'cult association'. However, by the very act of "approving" them, the colonial regime exercised an influence on their quality. In effect, these 'official' cult agents were always tainted in the eyes of the moslem community. "The functionaries", wrote an observer in 1910, "a salaried clergy maintained by the state and thus tied in with the Christians, have always been regarded without sympathy, and indeed despised, by true moslems. Their influence has always been negligible". In this respect, the moslem community defended its Islamic identity by withdrawing legitimation from dubious spokesmen. This 'clergy' according to Merad, "had no other support than
the administrative structure which was their raison d'être...

(They were) a phantom social body whose audience was derisory compared with that enjoyed by the two great moral and religious forces of maraboutism and reformism.\(^{278}\) Reformism, in dismissing the 'official' cult agents as "valets of the administration",\(^{279}\) and in even suggesting that prayers said with them were worthless,\(^{280}\) merely heightened a sense of detachment which already clearly existed.

The colonial regime was generally content, and indeed anxious to stress its desire, to leave the administration of purely 'confessional' matters to these official agents and to the other representatives of the moslem cult. In the light of this committment, it accepted the rising tide of reformism, initially, as 'purely confessional'. However, it was driven rapidly to modify this stance when it perceived the imminent collapse of certain props in the colonial situation. As reformism spread, not only did the authority of official 'agents', as moslems, further suffer, but also, with the heightening of Islamic consciousness, attendance at mosques - both 'state' mosques and 'free' - began to take on a new meaning.

Reformist ulema, committed to pedagogy and proselytism, introduced more energetic and socially-relevant forms of worship into the mosque. In particular, the khotba, the weekly sermon pronounced on the Sabbath, was accorded an importance unparalleled in recent centuries. By this means, "by making the Friday prayer meeting an occasion to reflect together about their particular problems, as well as about the general problems of the Islamic community of which they were conscious members", reformist preachers were able to win popular support and persuade the growing numbers who attended that, in Merad's
phrase, "they were playing a genuine part in a restoration of Islam". This was the 'miracle' to which Bennabi referred, and the 'subversion' of which colonists increasingly complained. Merad analyzes this particular development in an illuminating fashion:

"The celebration of the Friday prayer by the reformists became an exalting solemnity, whereas with the official imams it continued to be a sort of pious routine. From being a monotonous and often insipid homily, as it invariably was in the so-called 'official' mosques, the Friday prayer was transformed by the reformists into a dignified communitarian act of exceptional importance; its religious nature did not deprive it of what, in the full sense of that word, was its political nature. Through their new technique in the weekly prayer, the reformists achieved a double goal: on the one hand, they revived this ancient Islamic practice (glorying in the return to an era when Islam was sovereign) in conformity with the salafiyyah tendency of which they were partisans; on the other hand, they rehabilitated the political side of life by integrating it with religious celebration.".

The colonial authority came to view this trend with increasing alarm. Like Merad, it adjudged the purpose of this preaching to be 'political', but in a sense that implied veiled hostility. To begin with, the regime attempted to use the official clergy to rally the faithful against 'division' and 'heresy'. The problem here was its lack of respect in the Muslim community. The need to strengthen this, and to extend administrative control over its activities, led in 1930 to the establishment, by the Gouvernement-Général, of 'consultative cult committees' in each département. Subsequently, since the reformist ulema sought to use the pulpits in every mosque to
preach their ideas, the administration sought to persuade the 'official' clergy, and through it the cult associations, to ban reformist speakers from 'state' mosques. Some obliged; in February 1933, for example, preachers from the Association of Algerian Ulema were banned from using the Grand Mosque at Tlemcen. Many official agents were concerned with the potential threat which reformism posed to their remaining authority, and even, in many cases, to the attendance of their congregations.

Thus, a few joined with the 'maraboutic party' in openly calling for islahist meetings to be banned. The attitude of the majority, however, was ambivalent. In speaking out against a movement which was patently gaining in popularity, they risked further discredit, and in particular they risked exposing themselves to the bitter hostility which identification with the colonizer on such an issue would inevitably bring. They were, in general, men of little fight.

A dramatic example of the tense atmosphere which this administrative pressure and the suspicion of collaboration could provoke arose in Algiers in the summer of 1936. In July the Grand Mufti of the Malekite rite in Algiers, sheikh Mahmoud Ben Dali, known as Kahloul, together with the Grand Mufti of the Hanefite rite and other prominent mufti-s and imam-s, sent a telegramme to the administration denouncing the reformist ulema as "representing only a handful of agitators trying to sow trouble in the country". A Commander of the Légion d'Honneur, and an editor of the Gouvernement-Général's 'Journal Official', Kahloul had long openly sided with the French administration in its campaign to
Two weeks after the telegramme, while the first Algerian Moslem Congress, organized by the ulema, was in session, Kahloul was assassinated in the street. The murderer, apprehended by the police, denounced the reformist leader, sheikh Tayeb el-Oqbi, as his instigator. El-Oqbi was imprisoned. Angry demonstrators filled the streets. The murderer, confronted with el-Oqbi, recanted the story. El-Oqbi was released.

The colonial authorities, in seeking to stem reformism, had the apparent option of taking more direct control over the management of the moslem cult. However, this was likely to enflame the combustible sensitivity of indigenous society and thus to open up antagonisms within the colonial situation even wider. The alternative seemed simply to watch 'subversion' grow. An illustration of the dilemma occurred early in 1933, which saw the beginning of a systematic campaign to block islahist progress. The Préfecture pressurized the Algiers 'cult association' to prevent sheikh el-Oqbi from preaching in the Djemaa Djedid mosque, on the grounds that he was sowing public dissension. The synod refused to bow to this demand, was suspended by the Gouvernement-Géneral. The secretary of the Préfecture, Michel, then issued on February 16th and 18th, two circulars to all Maires and administrateurs. The terminology amounted to a declaration of war on the Association of Algerian ulema, as the following extracts suggest:

"The object of this propaganda is generally to spread Wahhabi ideas in moslem circles, under the pretext of returning to dogmatic purity and of purging religion of age-old customs exploited by religious fraternities and local marabouts; in reality, it seems,
it has political purposes which seek to harm the French cause.

"Most of the heads of the fraternities and many of the
maraboutic families who are most revered by the natives are
sincere supporters of our administration and see themselves
threatened by a movement which, as a result of active and skilful
propaganda, is daily gaining recruits, especially among young people
educated in Koranic schools.

"This situation calls for our most active vigilance. It is
not possible to tolerate propaganda which conceals, beneath the
mask of Islamic culture or religious reforms, a pernicious
orientalism from which the natives under our administration would
be the first to suffer....

"I have been informed that on various occasions, sermons,
courses of instructions, and lectures, have been delivered in
mosques with the formal or tacit consent of the religious authorities,
by individuals who do not belong to the regular personnel.

"I will be glad if you will, as a matter of urgency, remind
the authorities responsible for mosques in your territory that
they must not allow any manifestation other than religious
observances to take place in these buildings without having first
referred to me and obtained my permission.

You will kindly ask the proper officials in your district to
take careful note of these instructions and to conform to them in
future, for I shall not hesitate to ask the Gouverneur-General to
take severe measures against any religious authorities who have
infringed them".
Three arrêtés accompanying these "Michel Circulars" effected a clamp-down by the Algérois administration. The first disqualified the Algiers cult association from the use of any state mosque. The second restricted the right to preach in state mosques to 'official' mufti-s and imam-s, thus interrupting the Islamic tradition that any literate moslem had the right to speak or comment on the Koran in a mosque. The third regulation appointed Michel himself as president of a new Consultative Cult Committee. The nomination of a non-moslem directly to supervise the exercise of religious worship caused particular outrage; a French Minister of the Interior was later to call it "a supreme blunder...tactless...a moral error and a great mistake". 294

The new blatant attack on the sanctity of the Islamic cult provoked a furious response in Algiers. A huge crowd formed in the streets; Desparmet was horrified by such an unprecedented "revolutionary tactic of street demonstrations and popular protest". 295 It was dispersed by police and troops, and a wave of arrests was made. The following Friday, demonstrators filled the Djema Djedid mosque to 'await' the banned el-Oqbi. His non-appearance provoked serious rioting in the surrounding streets, a large-scale military intervention, and the first appearance of a tank to help quell civil disturbance. 296 By such a process of escalation, the identification of reformism with Islam, and of Islam with communal self-defence, was greatly reinforced.

A further hardening of 'separateness' centred around the freedom of Koranic schools. The development of the reformist educational movement was viewed with a certain serenity by the colonial administration at first; it was considered to be an internal matter for the moslem community, and indeed some colonizers welcomed it for relieving the
administration of a potential educational burden. However, from 1933 onwards, colon-influenced journals such as 'L'Afrique française' began to term these schools "subversive" and "seedbeds of nationalism"; they voiced concern at the ease with which they were being allowed to spread. Finally convinced that free Koranic schools were straying beyond education into 'politics', the administration closed those institutions already set up at Tlemcen, Sig, Sidi-Bel-Abbes, Mostaganem, Perregaux, Relizane, Saida, Ain Tembouchent and certain other townships. It refused permission for several new proposed schools to open. It claimed the right to inspect and supervise those which remained. In effect it began a campaign of harassment. "If something still vibrates in the moslem soul", Bennabi sardonically observed, "something making it capable of transforming itself and going beyond itself, it is clearly Islam. Therefore colonialism everywhere attacks this power of resurrection. Islam becomes the object of all kinds of restrictions and surveillance. It is today infinitely easier to open a gambling house or a café than a Koranic school." As a result, many new Koranic schools became semi-clandestine institutions. Nevertheless, their numbers continued to increase.

The cherishing of Islamic identity expressed itself more generally in the rejection of cultural assimilation by moslem Algerians, and specifically in the refusal of 'naturalization' and the maintenance of moslem 'personal status'. Reformism tried to purge moslem society of any tendencies which obscured the real division between the two communities; these included not merely active collaboration with the French administration, but adoption of a 'European' life style. Scorn was poured on 'mimics' who thus denied their roots. "The first
fruit of our propaganda”, Ben Badis declared, "will be the suppression of de facto assimilation brought about by certain worthless functionaries who cause harm to Islam and to Arabism in order to please the authorities. It will also bring about the suppression of that spiritual assimilation of certain Europeanized elements who are unaware of the nobility of their race...to the extent that we can no longer tell them apart from their masters". 305

The propaganda campaign waged by the Association of Ulema in the 1930's against the adoption of French citizenship was one aspect of this. 306 From 1919, the technical requirement for any native who wished to become naturalized, and thus to acquire certain rights including suffrage, was the abandonment of his or her 'moslem personal status'. This 'personal status' gave a person the right to be treated under moslem civil law and the rationale for requiring its abandonment was that nobody should be subject to two legal codes. In fact to abandon it was far from a technicality, for it was tantamount to abandoning both one's religious beliefs and one's membership of the moslem community. Islam, a contemporary journal observed, "is not merely a belief or collection of dogmas based solely on the conscience of the individual; it is also, and above all, a revealed civil law which must govern any community attached to Islam". 307

In fact, moslem Algeria always staunchly resisted the temptation or the implicit threat of naturalization when it appeared in the colonial situation. The number of individuals who took the step of applying for naturalization each year, rarely rose, throughout the colonial era, beyond a derisory few handfuls. 308 When in 1938 Ben Badis issued his pronouncement (fetwah) that to acquire French
nationality, or to appeal from a cadi to French courts, or to marry a non-moslem, was apostasy, \textsuperscript{309} he was merely defining sharply in words a belief that the vast majority of moslem Algerians affirmed daily in practice; indeed they had no occasion consciously to 'affirm' it, for only in very exceptional conditions – for a few moslems in certain professions in European towns – could it even be deemed a matter for consideration. Where it was made into an issue by the colonial power, moslems instinctively responded as if 'personal status' were the shell around their social personality. As the significantly titled reformist newspaper, 'La défense', pointed out in 1936: "If the whole moslem people supports the demands of the ulema, do you imagine that this is merely to maintain polygamy and rights of succession? No, personal status is quite another matter.... It is because it is the guarantee of their ethnic existence and the assurance that they will return to what they were, a free people. As long as a people keeps its language, its religion, and its customs, it is alive, even if enslaved". \textsuperscript{310}

What the Algerian Association of Ulema did between the World Wars was simply to give voice to these survival instincts when they were ostensibly under attack, and to help mould them into forces for revival. Its press poured vituperation and scorn on the heads of those few moslems who had become naturalized; its favourite epithet for them was m'tourni, or turncoats. \textsuperscript{311} Social ostracism was preached against such renegades; they had made their choice and must take the full consequences. They had no remaining claim to be treated as moslems. Their fate in the colonial situation aroused no pity. The reformist organ 'Chihéb', for example, simply reprinted the
following anguished complaint from the president of the Association of Naturalized Frenchmen as a contemptuous warning: "They have become naturalized in the hope of advancing themselves, in the path of progress and in their social condition, braving the disapproval and insults of their brothers.... These naturalized individuals now find themselves between the European world which refuses to open its door to them through racial prejudice, and their blood brothers who consider them without honour and as anathema, so that they belong neither to the one milieu nor to the other". The reformist response was to reiterate that anathema.

The excommunication pronounced by reformists did not stop short at the grave, for they aroused and supported expressions of outrage whenever the relatives of naturalized moslems sought to have them buried in moslem cemeteries. To reformists, a 'naturalized moslem', by the act of naturalization, ceased to be a moslem, and they sought to ban the practice. Fuel was simply added to the flames if the French authorities attempted to interfere, as when, in 1937, the Gouvernement-Général decided to remove from office the imam, the moudden, and the hazab of the mosque at Delya, because they had refused to pronounce ritual prayers at the funeral of a naturalized moslem.

However, the paucity of moslem naturalizations was also a direct result of colonial policy and signalled a contradiction in the colonial situation. Any mass naturalization of moslems - and their accession to full rights of French citizenship - would have threatened the position of the colonizer minority. Consequently the colonial authority had various devices to ensure that it never took place.
Central among these was its insistence that naturalization be tied to the abandonment of moslem personal status — in the secure knowledge that this presented an impossible obstacle — and the allied insistence that such political rights as suffrage be linked to naturalization. Thus the denunciation of reformist Ulema by certain colonizer spokesmen, for asserting the absolute sanctity of moslem personal status, was paradoxical: at best naive, at worst disingenuous.

The Blum-Violette project of 1936-7,\textsuperscript{315} and the reaction of the reformist ulema, shed interesting light on this contradiction. The Popular Front government in France proposed to grant the vote to various categories of the moslem population in Algeria without requiring them to abandon their personal status. The scope of the scheme was itself extremely limited, offering to enfranchise only a token number of moslems — perhaps 20,000 — who by other criteria were deemed 'assimilated'.\textsuperscript{316} It was viewed with great suspicion by many reformists, who termed it "disguised naturalization"\textsuperscript{317} and an attempt to sap moslem solidarity.\textsuperscript{318} Other reformists, including eventually the leadership of the Association of Algerian Ulema, cautiously welcomed the proposal as a guarantee of the integrity of moslem status. At a time when they were attempting overt 'political' manoeuvres, they saw tactical advantage in supporting the measure, and hoped for political capital were it ever implemented.\textsuperscript{319} Colon interests, on the other hand, saw the plan as the thin end of a wedge which would transfer power to the moslem community in Algeria\textsuperscript{320} and, due to their pressure, the measure failed to pass the French Assembly. Its demise left the moslem community unshaken in its adherence to 'personal status'. The \textit{ordonnance} of 7th March 1944 and the 'Statut d'Algerie'
of 1947 finally granted the franchise to 'evolved' moslems, without loss of personal status, but a device remained to block the threat to the colonizer minority's position: separation of the two communities into two electoral Colleges.

-iv, Regional roots of reformism

Reformism has been discussed as a global reassessment within Algerian Islam. However, the processes at work in certain areas of Algeria had a different character and impact from those in other areas. The pattern on the ground gives some guide to the significance of reformism as a reaction to the colonial situation. However, this is not easy to trace except in terms of the history of the Algerian Association of Ulema, and we should not judge the extent of socio-religious upheaval purely from this. "The influence of moslem reformism in Algeria", as Merad suggests, "cannot be evaluated solely in terms of the number of mosques, classes of cult circles created, the number of pupils introduced to Arab studies, nor even how many marabouts rallied to islahist doctrine".\(^{321}\) It extended far more deeply, he points out, at the psychological and moral level. Moreover, reformism was part of a general socio-political evolution which extended far beyond the vicissitudes of the ulema organization; it affected far more than the literate, bourgeois readership of its journal 'Chiheb' - "about two thousand subscribers already converted to reformist ideas".\(^{322}\)

The organizational strength of the Association of Algerian Ulema was very firmly rooted in the Eastern half of the country.\(^{323}\) The cradle of reformism between 1920 and 1930 was the Constantinois. The chief town of the département, Constantine, was rapidly
established as the spiritual and organizational fountainhead of the movement. In this traditional intellectual and religious centre, Abdelhamid Ben Badis was born and began his preaching. Two other towns, Setif, on the southern fringes of Lesser Kabylia, and Biskra, an oasis on the edge of the Sahara south-west of the Aures mountains, were also early bases of reformist preaching and organizing. The triangle of territory formed by these three townships in the Constantinois interior was the hearthland for later expansion.

Almost all the schools, circles and clubs established in the late 1920's lay in this region. In fact the entire leadership of the Association of Ulema came from and performed their early work in old-established Constantine townships. Ben Badis was from Constantine. Kheireddine and Zahiri were from Biskra. El-Aid was from Ain Beida, between Tebessa and Constantine, but spent most of his subsequent life at Biskra. El-Oqbi was born in Biskra, spent the first thirty years of his life in the Arabian Hedjaz, and returned to work in Biskra between 1920 and 1930. El-Brahimi was born at Bougie, a town near the mouth of the Soummam, and established himself in Setif between 1924 and 1931. Maiza also came from Setif. El-Mili, born at El-Milia, in Lesser Kabylia, became a student at Mila and then Constantine, finally returning to Mila between 1933 and 1940. El-Tebessi, as his name suggests, was reared and worked in Tebessa. For all these towns, Constantine was a natural intellectual pole. Most of these early leaders also spent some time at the Zitouna
mosque-university, a centre of reformist ideas, at Tunis, which was only 200 miles east of Constantine. One of the Association's leaders, el-Madani, was a native of Tunis. Although their influence rapidly expanded into other areas, most of the early work of these teachers and organizers was done, for reasons of familiarity and economics, in their native region. The Constantinois always remained the home plate for reformism.

The strength of implantation in the Constantinois offers some insight into the socio-political roots of reformism. First of all, this was an area where traditional indigenous structures were relatively intact. European settlement in the region was the least dense there of all the provinces. Secondly, in a sense reformism's roots were primarily urban, but these were traditional townships retaining close economic links with the surrounding countryside. Thirdly, these parts of the Constantinois, including Lesser Kabylia, were Arabic speaking; Constantine in particular was a centre of Arabic culture. Fourthly, the region had socio-economic and cultural links with Tunisia, and in this sense was more open and responsive to the influence of the Islamic East. Finally, the religious brotherhoods were less well-organized in this region than in the West of Algeria.

Apart from the Constantinois, one of the two other locations of ulama activity before 1930 was the town of Algiers itself, where the Nadi-el-Taraqi (Circle of Progress) was established in 1927. There the Association established its headquarters in 1931, and from 1930 onwards el-Oqbi was the most important influence in the town. The oasis of Laghouat, on the Saharan fringes of the Algérois, was another base; el-Mili worked there very effectively between 1927 and
1933. The trade route between these two towns was the major axis for the expansion of reformism in the Algeroïds in the 1930's. Organized reformism began to make itself felt outside these areas during the early 1930's. Greater Kabylia soon became a zone of considerable reformist strength. By August 1930, Ben Badis was able to make a successful contact-, preaching- and inspection-tour throughout the Kabylias, in turn visiting Setif, Bordj, Tazmalt, Akbou, Beni Ouâlis, Delys, Sidi Aïch, Bougie, Azazga, Tizi Ouzou, Tighzirt, Assefoun, Fort National and Michelet. A large number of native Kabyles became active in spreading reformist ideas and setting up reformist institutions. The special feature of islah in Kabylia was that it did not spread simply by establishing centres of influence in the larger townships and radiating out into the countryside. It achieved its progress above all by gaining the adhesion of large numbers of local zawiyas in the remoter villages; there was a network of alliances between marabouts and reformists.

A feature shared with the Constantinois was that Kabylia had minimal European settlement. Its traditional social structures survived the colonial experience virtually intact, and indeed were evolving energetically. What also survived was a deep moslem piety which provided fertile ground for the fundamentalism and asceticism of islah. The Kabyle tongue and Berber customs did not prove a barrier to reformism's emphasis on the Arabic language and on the Shar'ia. In this respect, we should bear in mind the prestigious aura which attached to Arabic as the written language of the Koran. We should also remember the prestige and potential unifying force of Arab civilization in Berber areas, as expressed in the (usually bogus) myths of Arab racial ancestry.
Reformism also played a growing role in the life of Kabyle and other migrants in coastal towns and in France; there, according to Julien, the Association set up educational centres to prevent brothers from "drowning themselves in vice in the streets".\textsuperscript{328}

Another main region of expansion during the 1930's was also Berber-speaking: the Aures.\textsuperscript{329} Another remote area without European settlement, and where social structures had suffered little erosion, it was even closer to the Constantinois bases of reformism than Kabylia. In the Aures mountains, too, much of the expansion of reformism was effected by the adhesion of local maraboutism.\textsuperscript{330}

In the West of Algeria, reformism always remained noticeably weaker. The Association of Ulema had less success in founding schools, mosques, clubs and associations in the department of Oran than in either of the others. None of the prominent ulema were indigenous to the West. Even in 1934, Merad notes, the Institut Ben Badis in Constantine - the 'seminary' of Algerian reformism - had not a single student from this part of Algeria.\textsuperscript{331} Nevertheless there were considerable efforts to stimulate a response in the region. Ben Badis himself made a grand tour in 1931 which encompassed Miliana, Mostaganem, Arzew, Oran and Tiaret. Again in 1932 he covered most of Oranie, from Aflou, Trézel, Tiaret, Frenda, Mascara, Saida, Géryville and Sig, to Sidi-Bel-Abbes, Tlemcen, Marnia, Nemours, Nedroma, Arzew, Perrégaux, Mostaganem and Relizane.\textsuperscript{332} Despite certain successes, the implantation was of limited depth. The main exceptions were Oran, where Zahiri was active from 1931 onwards, and Tlemcen, where el-Brahimi did achieve great influence from 1931 to 1940.
The weakness in the West may be attributable to the more active opposition and greater strength of religious fraternities in this part of Algeria. Moreover, this was the area, particularly the Cheliff valley, where the physical presence of the colonizer was at its most pressing, and where indigenous social structures had weathered the colonial experience least effectively. Tlemçen is the exception which appears to prove the rule, for, with Constantine, it was the major traditional Islamic capital to survive in Algeria, and an intellectual centre of the West. Surrounded by fairly inaccessible mountains, where segmentary societies still functioned, it was relatively free from European influence.

Although the impact of the Association of Algerian Ulema was thus not evenly distributed throughout the Central Maghreb, few areas were unaffected to some degree. By 1954, signs of the new 'puritanism' were observable in most parts of Algeria. The unificatory stress in reformism was particularly important - the very ease with which Ulema made their long tours indicates changes in the pattern of transport and communication and corresponded to a significant socio-economic evolution.

In the early morning of 1st November 1954, in a handful of places scattered across Northern Algeria, a series of small but coordinated acts of violence occurred. Broadcasting on Radio Cairo, a group calling itself the 'National Liberation Front' (F.L.N.) claimed responsibility, and proclaimed its aims and intentions. "Our national movement", it declared, "is overwhelmed by years of immobility and routine, wrongly directed, deprived of the indispensable support of popular opinion, and overtaken by events - is gradually disintegrating, to the great satisfaction of colonialism, which thinks it has won its greatest victory in the struggle against the Algerian avant-garde. The moment is grave! Faced with a situation which threatens to deteriorate beyond repair, a team of young leaders and conscientious militants, gathering around them the majority of those who still remain committed and uncorrupted, has decided it is time to lift the national movement out of the impasse into which it has been driven by struggles for personal power and influence, and to launch itself, alongside our Moroccan and Tunisian brothers, into genuine revolutionary struggle..." 

This 'team of young leaders and conscientious militants' had emerged from within the P.P.A.-M.T.L.D. (Party of the Algerian People - Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties), a predominantly urban party, which had been led since its foundation in 1937 by Messali Hadj, and which openly campaigned for independence from France. The organization was riven in the early 1950's between various rival tendencies and leadership factions.
Some elements fought to extend 'legal' activities and participation in colonial institutions, while others had gone underground or abroad to prepare for a campaign of all-out violence. Some were eager to develop the party's mass base by deepening its rural and popular urban roots; others were content to establish alliances with the bourgeois-nationalist elite - still quasi-assimilationist in its outlook - and to seek talks with sympathetic 'liberal' representatives of the colonial power. Certain militants sought to enshrine Messali's personal form of charismatic leadership, while others were determined to counteract it with an assertion of collective control. Many of these intestine disputes appeared to stem from the ambition and distrust of individuals; others were allegedly 'regionalist' in nature. Thus by 1954 Algerian 'political nationalism' showed signs of considerable disarray, especially when compared - as it frequently was by its leadership - with the Neo-Destour party of Tunisia and the Istiglal party of Morocco.

Most accounts of the 1954-62 insurrectionary movement have felt obliged to fall in with the pattern of charting its origins through the turbulence of these disputes, divisions and alliances in the 'nationalist movement'. The events which stimulated many of the disagreements - the campaign of 1943 centred around the 'Algerian Manifesto', the slaughter of tens of thousands of moslems by French troops in the Setif area in May 1945, the establishment of an Algerian Assembly in 1947 and the subsequent participation and non-participation of nationalist groups in those and other elections - are given due emphasis. The foundation, in 1947, of the clandestine O.S. wing (Special Organization) in preparation for maquis action,
together with its partial dismantling in 1950 with the discovery of the 'Bône plot', are treated as particularly significant milestones in the formation of the 'historic leadership' of the F.L.N.

These were extremely important developments in their own right and much research remains to be done into them; the rural roots of PPA-MTLD activity deserve particular study. However, it is dangerous to narrow one's perspective and treat these events as if they provided a total description of what constituted 'nationalism' after the Second World War. This approach to socio-political change often contributes no more to our understanding of the colonial system than does regimental history to the analysis of war. In particular, an approach which overemphasizes the role of leadership - whether that of the nascent FLN, or that of the 'national movement' against which it ostensibly revolted - or which concentrates purely on party structure and methods of organization, tends to obscure those special characteristics of the colonial situation, and those enduring features of the indigenous response to it, which have been the subject of earlier parts of this thesis.

One major theme in the 'narrow' approach has been the novelty of the FLN's enterprise. Its advent tends to be greeted as a firm break with the past, with what Quandt calls "the politics of failure", and as the emergence of a new form of political organization and warfare. The ultimate success of the eight year war of independence tends to be attributed to the special new range of weaponry which its leaders dared to manufacture.

Both the French administration and the FLN leadership were predisposed to advance this interpretation. In the crude version of
the colonial analysis, the FLN was a handful of agitators which was able, partly through lack of French vigilance, to detach 'the masses' from the colonial framework, to "shelter behind" and "manipulate" them, and to "interpose them between itself and the forces of order". 344 According to the more 'sophisticated' school of French military theorists, 345 the new breed of 'revolutionary nationalists' took it as their task "to substitute the FLN order to the political, administrative and social structures consacrated by a century of French presence, over the whole territory of Algeria...." 346 They set about it in stages. 347 The first opened on November 1st 1954, with the use of sporadic violence to disturb the political climate, to create insecurity, and symbolically to "pose the problem". A second phase followed during the ensuing months: the use of selective violence and propaganda. Targets were carefully chosen to bring about the severance of ties between the moslem community and the colonial order. This surgical operation was aimed almost exclusively at the colonized population. Moslem collaborators were assassinated both as a punishment for their individual 'betrayal' of the FLN cause, and as a general deterrent to others. At the same time, a climate of fear was sustained in order to persuade other moslem participants in the colonial system to abandon their dual loyalty; the mass resignation in 1956 of indigenous elected representatives at communal, départemental and national levels was an example of this. 348 The third stage of the struggle entailed systematic and generalized violence, and the organization and coordinated control of a guerrilla army, namely the A.L.N. (Army of National Liberation). This stretched colonial resources, by mounting widespread and mobile campaigns of
sabotage and harassment, eventually causing the collapse of the conventional civil apparatus of the colonial state, at first in 'liberated zones' and then more widely.

According to many French military observers, this phase of the struggle had virtually been accomplished by the end of 1956. Suddenly, according to Déon, the French and Moslem communities were "no longer linked by those thousand and one little daily interpenetrations, (and) lost sight of their mutual interests". In vast tracts of Algeria, he reported, the colonial machinery had been abandoned: "petitioners stopped appearing before justices, whom they had formerly flooded with requests for action (chikayas); villagers no longer sent their sick to see the travelling doctor; children ceased attending school". "One fine day", wrote Bromberger in similar vein in 1958, "the local French administration found that it was functioning in a void, that it no longer had any grip on a population which, until then, it had administered from afar. At this point, the courts stood empty, visiting tax collectors could no longer locate people, and gendarmes received no calls for help".

According to these analysts of 'revolution', the destructive phase was accompanied by the parallel construction and installation of a new administrative apparatus controlled by the FLN. The latter set up "political and military structures able to rival those of the de facto authorities". A carefully articulated set of institutions, at local, regional, national and international levels, including specialized bodies for workers, women, students and youth, was built. When the army learned of the plans drawn up by the FLN's Sounimam
Congress in August 1956, it identified these as the blueprint.\(^{353}\)

As a further phase, the FLN was considered to be working for the seizure of power through a general insurrection, once France had been sufficiently weakened and wearied, in the manner of Dien Bien Phu. This failed, according to these experts; what developed was a stalemate which caused France ever more unbearable losses of material, manpower and international prestige, and the resultant political pressures eventually forced the colonial power to withdraw.\(^{354}\)

This line of interpretation received some support from the FLN side. Its statements and documents, too, depicted a novel strategy in operation.\(^{355}\) The 1954 proclamation of insurrection promised to work for national independence by combining political and armed action; these had the triple aim of destroying existing links with the colonial regime, 'gathering together and organizing all the healthy energies of the Algerian people', and mobilizing world opinion against the French government.\(^{356}\) By September 1955, one of the FLN leaders could announce that "our military objectives have so far been fully achieved. After the phase of spectacular insurrection (1st November), and of general insecurity in a region (20th August), we will begin the third phase as soon as our material means allow: creation of a free zone in a whole portion of the territory..."\(^{357}\) By November 1956, the official mouthpiece of the FLN, 'El-Moujahid' claimed that this phase, too, had been largely completed, for in sizeable stretches of Algeria "the general and municipal councils have disappeared, a void emphasized and amplified by the resignation of many functionaries and auxiliaries of the
colonial authority: caid-s, fraction heads, rural police. Lacking replacements, or even applicants, the French administration has been dislocated; its structure, seen as inadequate, finds no support among the people. The same journal, a year later, reported further progress in "the dismantling of the French administrative apparatus". "The French civil administration", it claimed, "has fled the countryside and villages and taken refuge in the towns, sheltered by garrisons; all that remains is the army of occupation.... The FLN decisions on political non-participation - necessary complements to armed action - have provoked Algerians to desert all bodies set up by France, from jemaa to defunct Algerian Assembly, thus precipitating the collapse of the colonialist administration". It mocked the remaining 'phantom' structures of the S.A.S. and of the 'special delegations' which supposedly replaced communes.

The FLN regularly reported its progress in the construction of new politico-administrative structures to replace those it had undermined. "In almost every region", 'El-Moujahid' asserted in late 1956, the colonial authority already "coexists with FLN authority. This slow but profound disintegration of French administration has permitted the birth then development of a duality of power". The framework sketched by the Soummam Congress 'Plateforme' of August 1956 was to be the structure of the future. By the end of 1957, 'El-Moujahid' declared, "the People's Assembly - consisting of five elected members - administers the village. It depends hierarchically on sector, region, zone and wilaya. Thus the installation of an independent Algeria is a living, daily, progressive reality". Other decisions taken after the Congress - proclamation of independence,
constitution of a provisional government, call for the internationalization of the Algerian question - were trumpeted as successive realizations of projections made in the master plan of 1954/5.

However, we must be wary of the wish fulfilment, schematic thinking and special pleading which sometimes lay behind this congruence of perspective between the French military and FLN militants. In one respect it overestimated the task faced by the FLN. An administrative vacuum did not have to be created, since in many areas under-administration had already brought it about; also parallel authorities did not have to be assembled ex nihilo, for the survival of withdrawn traditional structures presented ready-made foundations. The 'masses' were not "neutral", "uncommitted" or "inert". In another respect, this perspective understated and oversimplified the task faced by the FLN. It had to adapt itself to concrete and energetic local institutions; the 'revolutionary' ambitions of many of its militants met with the real limitations of segmentary politics and localized, albeit 'patriotic', consciousness.

The FLN, more perhaps than 'movement-parties' in other similar colonial situations, was not the disciplined, centrally-directed, out-spreading politico-administrative network which appeared on neat maps and organigrams at the headquarters of the party or of the colonial army itself. The mere planting of a flag or symbol in a hamlet on such a chart tells little about the real nature of interaction between 'party' and 'population' on the ground. From 'below', the FLN had much more the appearance of a heterogeneous assemblage, coming to terms with and moulded by local alliances and conflicts. From this viewpoint, it looked far less like a novel
experiment launched into a void by a small group of dedicated and far-sighted young leaders, and far more - this being the source of its strength - a reflection and expression of habitual forms of response to the colonial situation.

-i. Regional roots of the F.L.N.

A brief survey of the topography of FLN implantation indicates that the soil was more fertile in certain areas than in others. Its strongest roots were not in those regions where indigenous communities had been drastically subjected to the influence of the colonizer, either by their proximity to European settlement or by the experience of 'modern' urbanization. Its strength lay in precisely those regions where Algerian society had most successfully weathered the colonial experience. It had "anchorage in the most ancient structures of Algerian society". It linked up naturally with, and helped to foster, those forces of survival, withdrawal, evolution, adaptation and upheaval which have been outlined earlier in this chapter.

The events of November 1st were dramatic because unexpectedly far-flung and coordinated and accompanied by the FLN proclamation. However they far from amounted to a general uprising. In the town of Algiers itself a few bombs were planted but failed to explode; at nearby Blida and Boufarik there were minor explosions, abortive attacks on police barracks, and some petty arson. In the North Constantinois, gunfire rang out and there was some sabotage at Condé-Smendou and at Khroub. In the département of Oran, at Cassaigne and Ouillis, farms were attacked, and one European was killed. A rash of attacks hit a more widely-dispersed series of targets in
Kabylia; some serious damage was caused by fire, a few bombs were detonated, a group of policemen was fired upon, and there was a well-planned operation of cutting telegraph poles; one Moslem night-watchman was killed. By far the most serious outbreak occurred in the Aures: a daring assault by thirty armed men on the Batna army barracks, which left two soldiers dead; another assault on military targets in Khenchela which killed one soldier and captured some weapons; the surrounding and blockading of a small group of Europeans in the remote township of T'Kout; and finally the cutting off of all roads around Arris by a well-organized group of maquis, with two French teachers and a caid gunned down as they were forced to leave their car. Barracks were also attacked at Biskra.

Before this attack, the FLN had divided up Algeria for strategic purposes into five operational zones, known as wilaya-s, each with a designated head and second-in-command. The subsequent fortune of each wilaya varied.

Wilaya One, the Aures, where Mustapha Ben Boulaïd, Bachir Chihani and Adjel Adjoul were the leaders, staged by far the most dramatic opening few months. Militarily it appears to have been best prepared; with its proximity to the rugged terrain of the Tunisian border, the Aures did not suffer quite as acutely as the other zones in the early years from shortage of weaponry and explosives. The tortuous scrub-covered landscape, with which the maquis were familiar, made it difficult for the French to carry out their repressive campaign, despite a considerable injection of troops under Général Parlange. Guerrilla activities continued to harrass them, ranging elusively from the outskirts of Batna and Arris to the remote
fastnesses of the Nementcha and Tebessa mountains. The French very rapidly lost all effective control in the area. What immediate advantages the FLN organization in the Aures enjoyed in these respects, however, were somewhat offset within two years by growing signs of factionalism and localism among its leaders. Concerted action of a wide scope or long duration often generated or brought to the surface latent conflict between clans and districts. This proved to be an abiding problem; no Aures representative was present at the Soummam meeting of 1956, for example, because of a deep crisis in its leadership following the death of Ben Boulaid five months earlier.

Wilaya Two, the North Constantinois, was initially ill-prepared for guerilla undertakings. Not until the spring of 1955 were FLN operations there, led by Youssef Zighout, systematic enough to threaten security. Once the supply of arms from the exterior was better organized, however, the wilaya rapidly 'took off'. On August 20th, 1955, a massive guerilla attack, the first such in Algeria, was successfully launched. At 39 points throughout the province, from Lesser Kabylia to the Tunisian border, including the towns of Constantine and Phillipieville, bombs were detonated, fires started, troops attacked, and assassinations carried out; a total of about a hundred Europeans were killed. The sequel to August 20th was a brutal retaliatory campaign of repression, and the rushing in of thousands more French troops. For the first time, the confrontation took on the character of a really full-scale war, for which the North Constantinois provided one of the principal theatres.

Greater Kabylia, covered by Wilaya Three, was not the scene of major military operations in the first few months after November
1954, again due largely to lack of arms. Nevertheless it was by far the most advanced zone in terms of politico-administrative organization. Kabylia was deeply steeped in traditions of clandestine self-government, and maquis had busily entrenched themselves in the region for almost a decade, having survived the dismantling of the O.S. in 1950. The PPA had established strong local roots there. Belkacem Krim, one of its most experienced militants, and formerly a corporal in the French army was already by 1954, in collaboration with Amar Ouamrane, one of the leaders of a seasoned organization. When he entered into negotiations during that summer with Boudiaf, Ben Boulaid, Didouche, Bitat and Ben M'Hidi - the 'internal' leaders chiefly responsible for planning the November uprising, hitherto suspicious of Krim for his loyalty to Messali Hadj - he was able to offer them a base for operations which was virtually ready-made. Arguing from strength, he was able to insist that Kabylia be treated as a separate Wilaya.

Krim was an expert and energetic military and political tactician, but Kabylia's strength during the war, at leadership level, derived from the discipline and spirit of collective decision-making of a large number of militants. The plans for intensifying FLN organization which were adopted at the meeting of wilaya representatives in August 1956, in the Soummam valley in the heart of the Kabylias, represented the extension to other wilayas of what was already well on the way to construction in Greater Kabylia. It remained the best coordinated wilaya throughout the war.

Eastern Algeria - the Aures, the North Constantinois, and Kabylia - always constituted the major platform for FLN activity. In the other wilayas, political organization and military operations remained far
more rudimentary throughout the war. Apart from the town of Algiers itself, which was rapidly established as an "Autonomous Zone", the Algérois - Wilaya Four - had a comparatively weak organization. Until late 1956, it was the scene of only sporadic operations, and much of the gradual extension of these was due to the importing of Kabyle leadership, notably Ouamrane.

The town of Algiers itself provided a 'point of contact' for leaders from the wilayas, and a headquarters for the 'internal' leadership of the FLN. Despite this, or perhaps partly because of it, it was not an active theatre for sabotage or armed action until late in 1956. Nevertheless, FLN roots were quickly implanted among its moslem inhabitants, especially in the Casbah. By the end of 1956, according to Courrière, "all the Algerian population of the capital was won over to the FLN, either by fear or conviction. Money collectors, leaflet distributors, informers, providers of shelter - all were perfectly organized into watertight cells. Every cog functioned perfectly". The sheer 'military' value of urban guerrilla operations there was long regarded as doubtful, perhaps even as counter-productive. However the FLN leadership came to appreciate the impact that bombings and assassinations there had on the European community and the colonial authorities, and their likely effect in convincing world opinion of the determination of moslem Algerians. A systematic campaign of this kind was therefore organized by Saadi Yacef from September 1956 onwards.

The upshot, in January 1957, was a massive invasion of the Casbah by the French Tenth Parachute Division, under Massu, and the so-called "Battle of Algiers", which temporarily destroyed the FLN network in the city. Although the scene of sporadic explosions thereafter, and
increasingly the stage for reprisals and demonstrations by the colon
O.A.S. (Secret Army Organization), Algiers never again attained the
same central importance in the guerrilla campaign.

The fifth Wilaya, the Western province of Oran, was extremely slow
in organizing itself, partly due to a chronic lack of armament. FLN
control there was always weaker than in the other Northern Wilayas,
and French control least under challenge. The only persistent
kernels of effective activity were the Trara mountains in the vicinity
of Tlemcen, Marnia and Nedroma, and in close proximity to the Moroccan
border.378

After a year of fighting, the FLN also attempted to organize a
sixth Wilaya, to cover the vast Saharan zone. This, however, was a
sprawling, ill-coordinated region, fairly easily kept under surveillance
from the air. Its leadership was fragmented, and it remained the poor
relation among FLN zones. It was also plagued by the operations of
the MNA, 379 a rival organization set up by Messali Hadj and led locally
by Bellounis, which with French connivance tried to divide the
resistance movement, though with limited success.

In summary, the roots of the FLN were in the East. Its campaign
began chiefly in the Aures, and then took hold in the North Constantinois
and Kabylia. The bulk of these regions had already been established as
'liberated zones' - or, in French army parlance, as 'rotten zones' by
1958. The dominance of the East is illustrated by Map 6, 380 which
charts the French assessment of the military situation in 1957. The
rebellion, in other words, took off principally in those areas where
colonial settlement was least common, and which were most marked by
'under-administration'. It 'dug itself in' in the more remote areas,
with tortuous terrain, where "the economic and social structures, the persistence of traditional factors....the profound influence exercised by the reformist ulema, a deeper responsiveness than elsewhere to events in the Arab world....all helped to make the population...the principal reserve of mass support and area of recruitment for the A.L.N." The revolt occurred in rural areas, where segmentary tribal structures had survived rather than decayed. "In its origin, its mass recruitment, and its organization," as Delisle suggests, "the Algerian liberation movement can be defined sociologically as 'peasant', if we accept the special meaning of that word in Algeria". It was based in areas where indigenous socio-political life most effectively survived, withdrew from and adapted to the colonial situation, those same areas where islah had its strength.

The rebellion did not originate, nor did it centre upon the big, modern towns; its major support was not among a 'Westernized' elite, nor in a disaffected proletariat or 'lumpenproletariat'. Such dramatic sequences as the 1957 "Battle of Algiers" and other confrontations between units of the FLN and the French army or the OAS in the big towns (including those of France itself), should not obscure the basic structure of the insurrection. "No doubt", Delisle pointed out, "it often found expression in the organization of urban cells - at least in its more visible manifestations - but this spectacular aspect of its activities must not distort our understanding....Although there were nationalist manifestations in towns from 1936 onwards, the crucial phenomenon - albeit less noticeable to agents of the French administration - was nevertheless the politico-religious evolution of the rural population, and of the inhabitants of small agricultural hamlets in the interior".
In any case, much of the 'urban' resistance has to be explained in terms of the recent rural emigration to the towns. "That very urban population", Delisle added, "from 1920 onwards contained large numbers who came from the countryside; this settlement of landless fellahen in the major conglomerations is one of the essential features of contemporary Algerian history". The Casbah of Algiers itself contained an enormous percentage of Kabyles and of other recent emigrant groups. The role of the F.L.N. in France should be viewed in this light also. The participation of emigrant groups in the struggle was an assertion of the vitality and adaptability of traditional socio-political structures, rather than evidence of their replacement by a new 'modernism'.

The regional strength of the guerilla struggle was also reflected in the provenance of its initial leadership. This was drawn almost exclusively from Eastern Algeria. The following table, for example, lists the native regions of the 27 men most clearly responsible for the launching of the F.L.N. offensive in 1954. These comprise the seven members of the 'Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action' (C.R.U.A.) - a loose grouping established in the spring of 1954, of 'external' leaders, based in Cairo to obtain supplies and international support, and 'internal' leaders, planning the overall organization of the insurrection in Algeria - and the twenty known members of the 'Committee of 22' - the prominent revolutionaries, all working inside Algeria, who met together in the summer of 1954 to finalize the timing and joint arrangements for the action of November.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Town/Commune of birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mokhtar BADJI</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td>Souk Ahras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramdane BEN ABDELMALEK</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostefa BEN AOUDA</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td>Conde-Smendou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustapha BEN BOULAID</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td>Arris (Aures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larbi BEN M'HIDI</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lakhdar BEN TOBSAL</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rabah BITAT</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed BOUDIAF</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
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<tr>
<td>Said BOUALI</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdelhafid BOUSSOUF</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td>Mila</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdesalem HABZI CHI</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
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<tr>
<td>*Mohammed KHIDER</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td>Biskra</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Constantinois</td>
<td>Setif</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali MELLAH</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Mohammed NECHTATI</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youssef ZIGHOUT</td>
<td>Constantinois</td>
<td>Conde-Smendou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoubir BOUADJADJ</td>
<td>Algérois</td>
<td>Algiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed BOUCHAIB</td>
<td>Algérois</td>
<td>Blida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athmane BELOUIZDAD</td>
<td>Algérois</td>
<td>Algiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mourad DIDOUCHE</td>
<td>Algérois</td>
<td>Algiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed MERZOUGI</td>
<td>Algérois</td>
<td>Algiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boudjemaa SOUIDANI</td>
<td>Algérois</td>
<td>Blida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Ramdane ABANE</td>
<td>Kabylia</td>
<td>Fort-National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Hocine AIT AHMED</td>
<td>Kabylia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>*Belkacem KRIM</td>
<td>Kabylia</td>
<td>Dra-el-Mizan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of these leaders, only one originated in the Western province, Ben Bella, and his influence on events was limited since he spent the whole of the war outside Algeria: from 1950 to 1956 as one of the 'external' delegation in Egypt and from 1956 to 1962 as a prisoner in France.388 On the other hand, well over half of these leaders, sixteen in all, originated from the Constantinois. The Constantinois and Kabylia (with four) together provided three-quarters of this leadership group. This regional balance can be compared with that calculated by Quandt for two other FLN leadership groups, and should be contrasted with the distribution of the total moslem population in the Algerian regions.

Figure 24. Regional balance of F.L.N. leaders 1954-7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Leadership Group</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Region of origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%Constantinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>'The 22' + CRUA</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>'The 22' + CRUA</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ 'other revolutionaries'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>'Revolutionaries' on CNRA</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Total moslem Census population</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Though they must be treated with caution, these figures suggest that the département of Oran was consistently 'under-represented' and the département of Constantine 'over-represented' in the FLN leadership.

Moreover, these leaders did not originate from big towns in each département. The following table provides interesting information about the background of 24 of the 'revolutionary' leaders on the C.N.R.A. in 1957.

Figure 25. Size of birthplace of FLN 'revolutionary' leadership 1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population in town/village of birth</th>
<th>No. of leaders</th>
<th>% of leaders</th>
<th>% of total moslem population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under 3,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000-30,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000-100,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 100,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These somewhat incomplete statistics seem to indicate that FLN leaders typically came from villages or small townships. There were fewer from very tiny agglomerations than was typical of Algeria as a whole, but about the same overall proportion - 85% - came from localities with fewer than 30,000 inhabitants. This is congruent with Delisle's assessment that "most of the nationalist leadership were not rural in the 'strict' sense, but from small hamlets which were closely tied to the life of the countryside"; in this sense he classifies them, as well as their followers, as "peasant". Quite clearly they did not originate, any more than the Algerian population as a whole, from big towns.
ii. Organization of the FLN

The rebellion did not proceed according to a master plan closely controlled and directed by a homogeneous and centralized team of leaders. The FLN was not a tightly-organized and seasoned cadre party. From the outset, command within Algeria was heavily decentralized.

Partly this reflected deliberate policy. The group which launched the offensive in 1954 was highly conscious of its own lack of preparedness. Arms were few, militants were disorganized, and the political climate was not especially favourable. In fact the rationale of November 1st was the creation of the local conditions, physical and psychological, that would later render possible such preparation and growth. The aim was to act as a catalyst, to stimulate people to organize themselves. "We knew our financial and material resources were inadequate," Krim explained later, "but we also knew that the revolutionary potential of our people was an inexhaustible force." The ALN, according to Ben Tobbal, "did not then have either important organic bases within the population or auxiliary support services...Our tactic was simple: by means of raids to harass enemy posts and to maintain our presence for a certain time in a given region...By showing (the people) in concrete fashion that Algerians could with impunity attack colonialist forces, we gave them proof of the vulnerability of the enemy, and of the course to be followed. Their age-old dream took on body and became a reality...After unleashing the armed operations of 1st November, our groups, entrenched in the massifs, were given the task of causing the people to rally to them as quickly as possible, and
The leaving of a great deal of local initiative to these groups was thus vital and inevitable.

Moreover, the original leaders deliberately eschewed the concentration of excessive power in too few hands. Reacting against the 'autocracy' and 'cult of personality' with which they reproached their former leader, Messali Hadj, they deliberately shared out responsibilities amongst a large number of militants. Firstly, certain leaders—notably Khider, Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed and Yazid—were designated to remain outside Algeria, to arrange for the purchase and transport of supplies and to generate diplomatic support. A separate group of leaders, particularly designated wilaya heads, was to be responsible for managing the campaign on the ground. Overall coordination of these, and liaison with the 'external' leaders, was to be provided by other representatives; originally Boudiaf was given this all-important role. Later, with the establishment of the Committee for Coordination and Execution (C.C.E.) and the National Committee of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA), and finally the formation of a Provisional Government (G.P.R.A.), all of which involved the bourgeois nationalist elite, the 'leadership' of the FLN also included a separate group of 'political spokesmen' such as Ferhat Abbas, Lamine-Debaghine, Saad Dahlab and Benyoussef Ben Khedda, who had no direct experience of the maquis nor of the early planning of the revolution. Finally, the establishment of regular army units on the frontiers, inside neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia, led to the growth of a separate leadership group centred on the Military High Command, dominated by Houari Boumedienne. The urge to ward off 'personal power' and to assert 'collective leadership' thus led, in effect, to an absence of overall leadership, or to a divided and somewhat uncoordinated command.
This decentralization was also forced upon the FLN by circumstances. Periodic meetings between the various wilaya leaders had been planned, but the exigencies of the struggle and the severe pressures which French security operations imposed made it impossible to have large-scale or regular gatherings. Only a few occasional contacts between leaders of neighbouring zones proved possible, to clear up confusions about territorial limits, plus rare visits to Algiers, mainly by the Kabyle and Oranais chiefs. Communications were very poor; it was many months, for example, before other wilaya commanders or even leaders in Algiers learned of the separate deaths of Didouche and Ben Boulaid. Many initiatives, such as Zighout's 20th August offensive in the Constantinois, were taken without any consultation of other leaders. Most serious of all, perhaps, was the difficulty of communications between the 'internals' and the 'external' delegation; this made it extremely difficult to sort out the supply problems, particularly of arms, which plagued the FLN in its early years.

After almost two years of fighting, it was felt imperative to arrange a general meeting of the FLN leadership to review the overall politico-military situation, to ensure greater coordination of hitherto dislocated and disorderly activity, and to adopt a strategy for ensuing months. In fact the conference which was arranged, the Soummam Congress, itself constituted a major security risk. The originally planned venue, the Bibans, had to be abandoned at the last minute when the entire Kabyle delegation almost fell into a French ambush; they fled, leaving behind documents which gave detailed information about the place, purpose, proposals and participants of the planned parley.
The Soummam talks came to important decisions about the future organization of the FLN effort. The major principles were agreed upon. Firstly, the interior needs of the revolution were to take primacy over the exterior, and the internal leaders were to organize themselves to ensure this. A five man C.C.E. (Committee for Coordination and Execution) was established to direct political and military strategy inside Algeria. At the same time, it was agreed that political activity in the future should have primacy over military activity. In practice this required strengthening the political party structure of the FLN, particularly by developing a coherent hierarchy of institutions at local and national level, and by training cadres in common methods and ideology. This was an attempt to impose order on the political revolution. Finally, the collegiate nature of leadership was stressed over against any pretension to personal authority.

The attempted reorganization, impressive in design, had inherent weaknesses and met with concrete obstacles in its implementation. One problem was that, as a result of tight security and difficulties in communication, and also possibly by design, the Soummam meeting itself was not properly representative. It was dominated by Kabyles, with Ramdane Abane especially influential, and took less account of the difficulties and perspectives of the other zones. The Aures, in fact, did not send a single representative, and the only spokesman present for the Oranais was Ben M'Hidi. Most noticeable was the total absence of the 'external' leadership. The unrepresentativeness of Soummam, together with the decisions taken, were issues which brought to a head latent rivalries within the leadership, particularly between Abane and Ben Bella. In particular, the creation of a 5-man CCE which
contained four Kabyles and only one member - Ben M'Hidi, the Oranais leader - from other wilayas, and which comprised two bourgeois nationalists, provoked great resentment.

Most important in the fragmentation of FLN leadership was the continual toll imposed by death, arrest, and enforced flight. In the Aures wilaya, for example, the first leader, Ben Boulaid, was captured in February 1955. His replacement, Chihani, was killed in October 1955, probably by his second-in-command Adjoul, who was subsequently captured. Ben Boulaid escaped in November 1955, and attempted to resume the leadership. However he was killed by a bomb in March 1956.

In the North Constantinois, the first leader, Didouche, died as early as January 1955. His replacement, Zighout, was killed in September of the next year. Command was less grievously undermined in Kabylia. Belkacem Krim, however, having moved to Algiers to assist in the nation-wide coordination, was forced by the security situation to escape over the border to Tunisia in November 1956. Ramdane also went to Tunisia at the end of the year. When returning briefly in May 1958, he was killed, probably by his own rivals in the FLN. In the Algérois, Rabah Bitat was captured in March 1955, and his second-in-command, Bachir Soudani, died the same year. Ouamrane was drafted in to take over the leadership, but was one of those leaders who fled to Tunis in November 1956. The first day of operations in the Oranais brought the death of its second-in-command, Ramdane Abdelmalek. Ben M'Hidi, though officially at the head of the wilaya, was increasingly involved in a central leadership role at Algiers; he was arrested there in February 1957, during the 'Battle of Algiers' and subsequently, according to the official version, "hunged himself
in his cell". One of the few effective organizers in the weak and fragmented Saharan wilaya, Ali Mellah, also was killed in 1957. Thus, within little more than two years, "the top leadership of the zones fell apart". All of the ten wilaya leaders originally designated were 'hors de combat' by 1957. Seven were dead, one was in jail, and the only two still at large - the Kabyles Krim and Ouamrane - were over the border in Tunisia. A final blow was struck on 22nd October 1956. A plane which was carrying the external leaders of the FLN - Khider, Ben Bella and Ait Ahmed, plus Boudiaf, the liaison agent between internal and external leaders - from Rabat (Morocco) to Tunis was diverted to Algeria by the French and its passengers arrested. These men were obliged to languish behind bars in France for the next six years. Under such circumstances, continuity and decisiveness in planning, within or outside Algeria, was rendered impossible.

Within Algeria, a great deal of autonomy thus came unavoidably to be exercised by each wilaya commander, within each wilaya by each section commander, and within each section by local militants. The nature of leadership varied from one wilaya to another and from one time to another; in Kabylia, considerable unity in command was preserved, whereas in the Aures leadership was fragmented, localized and often divided; attempts to impose firm authority there frequently provoked dissidence. In general terms, each wilaya chose its targets and organized its initiatives in its own independent manner, a situation which lasted right through the eight years of the war. The result, as Boudiaf suggests, was "the growth of veritable feudalities within the FLN". In the absence of a united, structured, and ideologically disciplined organization, the autonomous personal
followings which each leader built up were perhaps the sole means of continuing the resistance to the colonizer, and,"in spite of their faults...played an important role in the struggle". 415

However the FLN, and Algeria, ultimately paid very heavily for this "parcellization of sovereignty", 416 and "lack of any political process for conflict resolution". 417 In July and August 1962, after the recognition of Algeria's independence, bitter competition and a fierce, armed struggle for power broke out between the various constituent parts of the resistance movement. 418 The broad lines of a very complex battle were drawn up between a so-called "Tizi-Ouzou group" - a loose alliance between the GRFA (Provisional Government); the leadership of Wilayas Two, Three and Four; the Algiers Autonomous Zone; and the French Federation of the FLN - against the "Tlemcen group" - which rallied together the leadership of Wilayas One, Five and Six; the 'externals' Ben Bella and Khider; the 'liberals' Ferhat Abbas, Ahmed Francis and Ahmed Boumendjel; and the High Command of the armed forces of the exterior. Certain 'historic leaders' - particularly Ait Ahmed and Boudiaf 419 - remained apart from both factions. Eventually it was the physical power of the external military command, under Boumedienne, which brought the 'Tlemcen group' to victory in September. By that time, in effect, "the FLN existed only in name". 420

Given these problems of central direction, the organizational structure of the FLN could not maintain tight control at the local level during the eight-year struggle. In theory, according to the plans approved at the Soummam conference, 421 each hamlet was controlled by a FLN "Committee of Three", whose purpose was to supervise its
contribution to the struggle. Its members—a political commissioner, an administrative assistant, and the 'fraction head'—were nominated by, and responsible to, the political commissioner of the next highest party instance (douar or sector). In its work, the three-man party control unit was officially 'assisted' by an executive body, the 5-member "People's Assembly", elected by the local inhabitants. Meetings of the whole adult population of the fraction—known usually as "cell meetings"—were periodically to be arranged to publicize issues, listen to problems, and arrange for the payment of contributions. At these, the political commissioner and the members of the "People's Assembly" were to play the role of guides.

In reality, however, this organization was far less coherent and rigorously implanted from above than appeared on paper. The insurrection was organized through contact with the existing withdrawn institutions—clandestine but thriving—of traditional rural life. The way in which these two "clandestinities" met is summarized in Feraoun's brief report of the arrival of FLN leaders at a Kabyle hamlet early in 1955: "At A.K. they were welcomed by the village assembly, at night, in the mosque. The men listened cordially to their guests and received them well". The mosque, the cover of night, and the clandestine assembly were essential ingredients for implantation. The mosque, the impenetrable sanctuary par excellence, was an important centre for contact and communication. The darkness of night-time always provided an important shelter for FLN action, as indicated by Courrièrè's description of Amar Cuamrane's infiltration of the Algérois djebel (mountains) in the spring of 1955: "With the seven men of the Lakhdar group..., he arrived at night in a
dechra (hamlet) where one or several militants already existed. With them, he made a list of the families and an estimate of their resources. Then he made the djounouds (AIN regulars) circulate around the village, lighting fires on the hill-tops and making as much of a stir as possible to make it believed that an imposing number of maquisards had surrounded the dechra. 'Move one way, move back the other, turn round and round', he ordered. Then he brought the population together, and with Lekhdar explained the revolution, nationalism and independence...

Contacts were rarely made between complete strangers. The FLN political commissioners were local men in many cases and often the clandestine jemaa, and even the official jemaa, contained members who had had prior contact with the PPA, CS or FLN. In douars M'Kira and Oula Yahia, for example, the area of Dra-el-Mizan from which Krim originated, the clandestine jemaa had already been infiltrated by the PPA in 1947, and included four members of the official jemaa. Even more often, the key 'militants' with whom liaison was made were simply more or less well-known and experienced defenders and organizers of the local population against the colonial regime. A typical example was at Mechta Tagma, in the Tlemcen mountains near Sebdou. One of the political commissioners active in the area, Abdelhamid Benzine, recorded in his diary in August 1956: "I am with Choaib, the father of six children and member of the administrative jemaa, who became a political commissioner when his house was burned down....Aged 39, Choaib's only passion before 1st November 1954 was hunting. He had never belonged to a political party. An honest patriot, he was pushed by the repression to devote himself entirely to the Revolution". At this point in the struggle, the FLN could not impose experience as a militant
in a political party, or ideological training, as requirements for adhesion, for these would have prevented, or at the very least slowed down, the establishment of mass community support. The simple criterion of adhesion to the party, in Boudiaf's words, was "a firm patriotic faith, personal courage, and a strong spirit of discipline".

Rather than importing new methods, institutions and ideology, early FLN activity chiefly sought to encourage the expression of, and to coordinate, traditional modalities of 'withdrawal' in the colonial situation. Assassinations and armed raids in the Aures, for example, slotted in naturally with the traditional clandestine manifestations of 'social banditry', to the extent that the local French authorities had difficulty in distinguishing between them. In the areas of FLN strength, "parallel authorities", notably jemaas, already existed, so that its task was less to construct politico-military machinery in a void than to capitalize upon, adapt itself to, and try to guide existing traditions of organization. Its very strength derived from the fact that the 'party apparatus' was grafted on to healthy segmentary community structures. Often, one suspects, FLN implantation simply involved the renaming of existing jemaas as 'cells', with the injection of perhaps an occasional outsider. In liberated zones, in particular, there seems to have been little distinction between membership of the FLN and membership of the clandestine jemaa. It was the aim of the FLN, in fact, to make the two congruent; "The organization is good", Benzine reported from Mechta Tala in August 1956, "- all adults, men and women, are in the cells".

An enormous amount of initiative was devolved upon these local 'cells', partly though force of circumstance, and partly through
conviction as to the desirability of broadening the revolution's roots and ensuring the community's wholehearted support. "We are far from the simplistic conception of the colonialists," Ben Tobbal claimed in 1958, "according to whom Algerian resistance is the work of a minority.... The people of their own accord sought our contact. The masses thus mobilized and organized themselves, often by their own efforts, and constituted their own armed units, liberating ours for other regions.... Showing confidence in their revolutionary capacities and creative spirit, we limited ourselves either to communicating our needs to them by explanation, or listening to their suggestions, or, finally, informing ourselves about their initiatives." 435

The attempts to set up a politico-administrative organization after the Soummam congress really constituted an urge to tighten hierarchical control over the multiplicity of local initiatives rather than an effort to supplant them. However, even this met with only limited success, due to the vicissitudes of the war. The 'People's Assemblies' which were established in fact dealt with traditional issues in much the traditional manner of the tribal jemaa-s. "Circumstances," Benzine wrote in 1956, before the official constitution of 'People's Assemblies', "have made us into cadis, mayors, police chiefs and justices", and he cited the discussion and settlement of complicated questions of marriage, divorce and inheritance. "Wherever possible," he added, however, "we render justice with the aid of the jemaa, in other words, with the assembly of the most active, devoted and respected leaders of the village". 436 By 1957, according to 'El-Moujahid', the People's Assembly "rendered justice, settled private litigation and exercised
all the functions of a municipality - maintaining civil registers, establishing shops and storehouses, building schools, opening workshops, searching for wells, etc., but these traditional functions seemed almost invariably to be carried out by involving the whole population in a general meeting. In 1958, for example, a reporter from the Italian newspaper 'Avanti' was able to describe a jema meeting in a zone controlled by the FLN. It was attended by all one hundred inhabitants of the village. The topics discussed and settled ranged from such ostensibly 'revolutionary' matters as the levying of contributions for the FLN struggle, the housing of refugees, and the distribution of welfare assistance, to more general discussions about local farming problems and a petty dispute over whether a smallholder had adequately compensated those who had done work on his land. In this, as in similar cases, the foreign journalist - parachuted into an unfamiliar landscape - was apt to attribute to the organizational capacity and all-embracing imagination of the FLN what was better understood in the context of age-old traditions of clandestine self-government.

-iii. The FLN and Islamic revival

FLN activity was closely bound up with those reactions to the colonial situation associated with the moslem reformist movement. Despite certain interpretations of the 1954-62 revolution in purely 'modernist' terms, the ideology and action of FLN forces was strongly Islamic in nature. It was not a 'secular' reaction within the colonial situation; its roots lay deep in traditional social structures, and thus in their moslem character, entrenched as a refuge from the colonizer.
Even the more 'modernist' ideologists among the FLN militants accepted that the specific Maghrebi setting of the revolution necessitated the mobilization of and respect for Islamic structures and beliefs. Amar Ouzegane, for example, a former Communist Party militant, argued that "the religious question is for us a social and political fact which has nothing mysterious about it". He denounced the 'atheism' and 'anti-clericalism' of the French left as a manifestation of Eurocentrism. "Paradoxically", he argued, "fidelity to Islam, which is mocked and persecuted by colonialism, was objectively more revolutionary in the long term, in both historical and dialectical terms". Similarly, 'El-Moujahid', less self-consciously Marxist, proclaimed in its first issue that "in Algeria, Islam was precisely the last refuge of those values which were attacked and profaned by relentless colonialism. Is it then surprising that, donning a national conscience, it should contribute to the triumph of a just cause?"

More typical than these ideological positions of the affective ties between Islam and the 1954-62 war was the unreflexive belief expressed in practice by the majority of the population that "patriotism is inseparable from religious faith. This faith justifies and gives impulse to our struggle". One acknowledgement of this was the choice of 'El-Moujahid' as title for the official FLN newspaper, established in June 1956. 'El-Moujahid' means "the combattant" or, literally, "the fighter in the jihad (holy war)". The concept of holy war is important in understanding Maghrebi, indeed all moslem history, for it gives a specific focus to 'national' or 'patriotic' feelings. Rather than a form of religious and racial xenophobia, which was the "narrow and restrictive sense given to it
by the Christian West, because of an anti-Islamic prejudice dating back to the Crusades", it should be understood, as the opening editorial of 'El-Moujahid' argued, simply as a patriotic reflex, as "a dynamic manifestation of self-defence, which aims to preserve and restore a heritage of higher values which are vital for the good of the individual and of the society". Thus the choice of the words 'jihad' and 'moujahid' was designed to forge a link with the struggles and glories of the Maghrebi past. In the mid-Twentieth century, it evoked "the unshakeable will, the concentrated effort, and the supreme spirit of sacrifice, even martyrdom, which is needed for the utter destruction of the present retrograde system".448

The FLN was able to rally the population through its instinctive yearning - what Ben Tobbal called "its age-old dream" - to rise up and restore the moslem patrimony against its alien despoliators. Thus it worked in furrows already ploughed by the reformist ulema, in developing a heightened sense of Arabism, Islamism and nationhood, and in kindling a sense of initiative in Algerian society. Not surprisingly, the areas of strongest reformist implantation also became those of strongest FLN implantation. In the 'weak' Oranais sector, for example, Launay suggests that those villages where reformist medersas had been established were those which responded best to FLN efforts. Although none of the top FLN leadership had a purely reformist education, apart from Houari Boumedienne, the free Koranic schools provided many of the middle cadres of the guerrilla struggle. From 1956 many reformist students left to join the maquis as mufti-s, cadi-s, political commissioners, judges, administrative assistants, and organizers of information and
recruitment. Courriere cites the instance of the taleb (teacher) of a Koranic school near Teniet-el-Abd, in the Aures, who translated Radio Cairo broadcasts from literary Arabic to the local Shawia tongue for the benefit of the assembled villagers. In the more general sense, the reformist upheaval, in stressing the specific moslem identity of Algerians, prepared the population psychologically for armed confrontation with France. "All of the Algerian 'revolution'," Delisle suggests, "was already implicit in that teaching", and he argues that, whatever the individual attitudes of Ben Badis and other reformist ulema towards armed struggle and political organization, "the very logic of (their) enterprise could end, historically, only in national uprising".

The Algerian Association of Ulema, in fact, rapidly came out in support of the FLN. Abbas Bensheikh Hocine, for example, preaching at the Grand Mosque of Constantine in April 1955, declared that "We must liberate our mosques, along with our country....If ten of you must give their lives, ten more will come to replace them, until the desired end is achieved...It is from our mosques that our generals, our war leaders, our army will depart". At about the same time, students at the Institut Ben Badis in Constantine, with the assent of its directors, issued a fetwah (pronouncement) which declared: "The rebels are combattants for the moslem cause. Their action will gain divine recompense, and their death will be rewarded with paradise". From late 1955, the Ulema began systematically to collect funds for the FLN, to distribute aid to rebel families, and to speak out for the FLN cause in mosques and schools. El-Brahimi, in particular, argued for a total commitment
to the FLN struggle. The Association's support was expressed in statements to the world press; el-Tebessi declared at a conference in February 1956, for example, that: "The Algerian dispute is not between moslems and Christiahs, between Africans and Europeans. It is a conflict between oppressed and colonialists....To end the present situation, France must accept the principles of an independent Algeria and negotiate with the heads of the ALN". At the end of 1956, one of the principal Ulema spokesmen, Tewfik el-Madani, became president of the external delegation of the FLN.

This commitment was not entirely without reservations. Kheireddine, in particular, voiced doubts as to the wisdom of open political involvement. There was concern that the pressures of war and demands of the FLN effort might eventually cause the Association itself to lose its leadership, its organization, its schools and its financial resources; in short that it would disarm itself. There was also constant vigilance lest the revolution deviate from its Islamic orientation. Nevertheless, the Association of Algerian Ulema continued actively to lend its support to the FLN until the end of the war.

The FLN was not only appreciative of the Ulema's contribution to the war effort, but generally sympathetic to the work of reformism in stimulating the renaissance of Arabic and Islamic consciousness. "Moslem culture", El-Moujahid noted in February 1958, "is experiencing a profound transformation in this world. This phase began with the appearance of the moslem reformist movement and is continuing before our eyes. It is tending to establish a culture which, while adapted to the needs of our epoch, will safeguard its own originality".
In particular, the FLN shared with reformism its sense of the importance of reviving consciousness of, and pride in, the Algerian people's Arabo-Islamic past. Like reformism, FLN propaganda sought to sharpen national identity by asserting the fact of a national past. "The Algerian nation", declared El-Moujahid in 1958, "is not a recent creation; it is not an artificial rope ladder constructed by the Algerian people to liberate themselves from the hideous exploitation of colonialism....The Algerian nation was formed by the upheaval created thirteen centuries ago by the arrival of the Arabs and the Islamization of the Maghreb peoples". In evoking this past, FLN ideology consciously rejected the colonial version of Maghreb history: "'The nation being formed', 'the new Algeria', 'the unique historical event' - all these have been done away with by the FLN position....Between a break with the Algerian past...and fidelity to a nation temporarily enchained, the Algerian people have chosen; there is no new entity...By insisting on this national reality, by making the Revolution of 1st November 1954 a phase in the popular resistance which began with AbdelKader, we deprive French colonialism of its legitimacy, its claimed insertion into Algerian reality. Instead of integrating colonialism into Algerian history, and regarding it as the birth of a new world, we have also made it an unfortunate, execrable accident, whose sole significance was the retarding, in inexcusable fashion, of the coherent evolution of the Algerian nation and society".

This ideological position, so close to that of reformism, did little more than acknowledge an accomplished fact: the 'patriotic' nature of its grass-roots support, Historical consciousness - an instinctive
grasp of the historical continuity of 'jihad' - already existed in the countryside; the FLN did not create it. Benzine's FLN detachment in the North-West Oranais, for example, was regaled by the local Berber populations with campfire stories and epic poems full of references to former struggles against the Turks and to the glorious campaigns of AbdelKader. The FLN simply provided an opportunity for this patriotism to express itself, and harnessed it to a concrete struggle in the present.

The FLN sought to safeguard what was unique in moslem life, as a mark of separateness from the colonizer. It saw the need for more Koranic education, for more study of Arabic language and literature. Accordingly, in 'liberated zones' it organized the construction of new schools in the same way as reformist ulema had done. In the same spirit, it favoured the building of new mosques. A mosque was the focus of communal identity. In addition to a centre of religious worship, "the destruction of a mosque", Ouzegane pointed out, "meant the loss of a medersa (school), a library, a meeting centre, a village hall, a consultative or deliberative assembly...and a music conservatory". It also meant the loss of a sanctuary. The actual construction of a mosque, moreover, served as a focus for communal self-help, and the FLN actively encouraged such efforts. In late 1954, for example, in the Aures countryside around Batna, Arris and Khenchela, militants ordered every village to build a new mosque. "Everyone without exception", Courrière reported, "was to take part in this, and the population responded with enthusiasm...a veritable campaign of religious fanaticism was under way in Shawia country".
The cherishing of Islam as the stamp of identity and separateness was evident in the FLN's approach to the wearing of the veil by women. Far from enjoining greater 'modernism', and encouraging transgression of traditional socio-religious taboos, the FLN called for women to veil themselves more often in public.\footnote{471} Similarly, the expectation that moslem men should wear the traditional red skullcap (chéchia) was reinforced rather than weakened; it became a badge of solidarity.\footnote{472} The wearing of European clothes was strongly discouraged. "The veil, the chéchia..." Bourdieu suggests, "had been in the traditional context mere vestimentary details endowed with an almost forgotten significance, simple elements of an unconsciously devised system of symbols. In the colonial situation, however, they took on the function of signs that are being consciously utilized to express resistance to the foreign order and to foreign values, as well as to pledge fidelity to their own system of values".\footnote{472}

This heightened stress on the 'worth' of traditional dress served also, as Fanon pointed out,\footnote{473} as a practical weapon in the anti-colonial struggle, for not only did it in the general sense conceal from the colonizer what was happening in colonized society, but it also facilitated the carrying of hidden weapons and bombs.

The fierce anti-assimilationism of the Ulema movement was echoed by the FLN. Not only the wearing of European dress, but also the patronage of European stores, cinemas and cafés was expressly forbidden by various FLN directives.\footnote{474} This served to widen the gulf between the two communities. Amar Ouzegane, for example, enthusiastically praised El-Tebessi's pronouncement that "He who marries a French woman introduces colonialism into his home".\footnote{475}
In its social programme, the FLN, like the islahists, exuded puritanism and asceticism. Its aim was to "adapt Koranic principles to the demands of the modern world", and in this spirit it issued strict bans on smoking, on drinking, on gambling, and on the frequenting of any profane centre of entertainment. Transgressions were occasionally punished by mutilation, or even death. It sought to stamp out all practices which were of an 'anti-Islamic' nature and which led to 'laziness and dissipation'. Criminals were punished; prostitutes were driven out of towns. Instead, the virtues of honesty, hard work, austerity and thrift were preached. Obligations to family, society, and 'the cause' were emphasized. A rigorous "revolutionary discipline" was enjoined. The FLN was associated with a whole series of proscriptions and codes of conduct. Feraoun made an ironical sketch of the spirit of their 'rule' early in 1956. "They have suppressed everything: snuff, cigarettes, games. In any case, all these things are proscribed by Islam. And for them, that's it: Islam and nothing else. Are you moslem or not? Satan must be hunted out from every corner, from every heart. Let him look for refuge somewhere else! You are going to the café? Empty your cup, talk with your friends, then go home. God has made you a moslem and you wish to ignore it still! You won't be allowed to. Oh! we're satisfied, sure. Even jokes seem out of place to us now, irreverent. In any case, our heart isn't in them...".

The impact on moslem life was noticeable. Although European propaganda tended to attribute obedience to these directives to fear, it appears that they actually functioned to boost morale. Feraoun observed in 1955, for instance, that the atmosphere inside
Kabylie townships had considerably changed. The streets were filled with "silent and busy people... A 'Ramadan' crowd where no one smokes or takes snuff. One feels this crowd draped in a new dignity, stiff like new clothes". 483

This 'imposition' of public morality and discipline, although slaking a traditional thirst for abstinence, also had its pragmatic aspect in the anti-colonial struggle. The boycott of European stores, goods, shows and cafés constituted forms of local political pressure. 484 Occasionally they were reinforced at the national level by the calling of a one-day or even week-long general strike as a gesture of protest, mourning, or commemoration; on such occasions, the whole moslem population was enjoined to stay indoors. 485

"Five o'clock in the evening" Feraoun wrote from Fort-National (Kabylia) during the strike of 5th July 1956 which commemorated the conquest of Algeria by France. "The town is empty. That's all. It has been empty all day... People have walled themselves up at home, shutters closed... A few people have timidly opened the shutters of one window. One only. Or half a one. Terror is in the air..." 486

All such actions - boycotting of elections shared the same spirit - helped to emphasize the isolation of the moslem experience and underlined the need for self-reliance. The ban on the provision of photographs for identity documents similarly used a religious taboo (against representing the human face) in an attempt to sabotage French efforts at population control. 487

At the same time, the FLN reinforced much of the 'religious fundamentalism' associated with the reformist upheaval. Bidaa were viewed with unreserved disapproval. In 1955, for example, the FLN
banned the ritual sacrifice of sheep which customarily took place during the festival of Aid-el-Kebir. The FLN also poured scorn on 'maraboutism'. It was accused of perpetuating ignorance and dissipating popular energies; it had no place in a moslem society which was in the process of reclaiming its proud heritage. Pilgrimages to saints' tombs were forbidden on these grounds. At the same time, marabouts were assailed as allies of the French regime. Ouzegane applauded the ulema campaign for example, because "by attacking maraboutic fanaticisms, one attacked the power of colonialism and of fat landed property". This attack was more than verbal. Fifteen zawiya chiefs were assassinated between August 1955 and August 1956. The most prominent of them all, Sheikh Kassem Ben Tekkouk of Mostaganem, head of the Algerian Sanusiya and a bitter enemy of the Ulema since the 1930's, was assassinated by the FLN in August 1957. "The sheikh is said to have been pious", commented Radio Tunis, "but his prayers and devotions were not addressed to God; they were addressed to colonialism, for which he acted as a propagandist...In fact all the fraternity heads influence simple minds by showering them with advice that works to colonialism's benefit".

Nevertheless, there were nuances in the FLN's assault on maraboutism, for it respected the specific values of Maghrebi Islam and was reluctant either to fuel the anti-moslem propaganda of the colonizer or to create unnecessary divisions among the colonized. "The FLN steered clear of the dangers of sectarianism", Ouzegane declared, "by avoiding any schematic thinking which might lead to vulgar anti-clericalism". Although critical of the role of
maraboutism in contemporary moslem society, he went on to explain, "we never forgot...that our zawiyas had not always been, as they are today, communities of whirling dervishes...snake charmers....and manufacturers of magical talismans...In the past there were religio-military fraternities, like the al-Mourabtin, who founded the Almoravid Empire...During the resistance to the French invasion of 1830, soldier-brothers (ikhwan-djounoud), as with those earlier monk-warriors, were the first death-volunteers to answer AbdelKader's call...Dissident religious sects and secret associations have always existed who would accept initiates...only when their faith was mingled with hatred of the colonial administration".495

FLN militants self-consciously assumed the role of religious and moral preceptors for the general population. Despite the war, the population were exhorted to perform their Koranic obligations strictly. War, in fact, made solidarity in these matters all the more vital. The performance of daily prayers, regular attendance at mosque, and the distribution of alms for the poor - especially those rendered destitute by the war - was rigorously enjoined; the collection of funds for the FLN cause often had undertones of this religious duty.496 Fasting during Ramadan - despite a pronouncement by Ulema, in accordance with Koranic law, which dispensed jihad fighters and those assisting them from this obligation - was strictly observed.497 A severe campaign against back-sliding in these respects took place. "Thus", Feraoun commented, with considerable irony, "the people of Tizi-Hibel, formerly the most miscreant in the land, have rediscovered their faith, pay a muezzin, and attend mosque assiduously. God is great!"498
As moral guides of the moslem community, FLN militants generally strove to set high standards of Islamic piety themselves. Meetings of militants often opened with prayers. Oaths were sworn on the Koran. Mosques were used as gathering points. Battles were launched with religious invocations. "They are good moslems" Mouloud Feraoun was told by a relative who had attended a meeting of Tizi-Hibel villagers called by the FLN, "The leader was admirable. He began by reciting the Koran. A whole fatiha in Arabic. You should have seen the way he did it: the accent, the tone, the ardour. We didn't need to understand, it was impressive. Really, we can respect those people..."
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. Michaux-Bellaire was one such commentator (see Ch. 3, note 5 above). The clash between the two systems is best regarded as "mythology", according to J. Berque: 'Problèmes initiaux de la sociologie juridique musulmane en Afrique du Nord' in STUDIA ISLAMICA (1) 1953, p. 160.


G. Marcy: 'Le problème du droit coutumier berbère' in LA FRANCE MEDITERRANEENNE ET AFRICAINE (1) 1939.

3. J. Berque: ESSAI SUR LE METHODE JURIDIQUE MAGREBINE (Rabat) 1944.


5. There were approximately 1,600,000 inhabitants of Kabylia by 1954. Studies of the region include:


For a subtle and witty evocation of Kabyle life, Mouloud Feraoun's: *JOURS DE KABYLE* (Paris 1968) is irresistible.

6. The use of the term 'Kabylia' is often confusing: frequently it denotes Greater Kabylia only, sometimes it covers both Greater and Lesser Kabylia. In this study, the latter sense is adopted. Cf. J. Morizot: *L'ALGERIE KABYLISEE* (1962), pp.32-7.


10. "The Kabyles are extremely touchy; anything that affects their honour - individual, family, or collective - stirs them profoundly." G.H. Bousquet: *JUSTICE FRANCAISE ET COUTUMES KABILES* (1950), p.32. "The sense of solidarity ... is indissociable from the feeling of real fraternity, the sentiment of existing only in and through the group, of existing only as a member of the group and not in his own right .... The group knows no other code than that of honour, which demands that the crime, whether murder, insult or adultery, should contain within itself its own punishment." P. Bourdieu: *THE ALGERIANS* (1960), pp.20-1.


15. There are verbatim records of Kabyle jemaa sessions in the following works:


22. ganoun is an Arabic word meaning positive law emanating from the sovereign. In Kabylia, however, it was used to describe customary regulations emanating from the jemaa. Lists of ganouns are to be found in the following works:


G. H. Bousquet: 'Un qanoun kabyle contemporain' in REVUE AFRICAINE (3e.trim 1936).


L. Milliot: 'Les nouveaux qanouns kabyles' in HESPERIS (Archives Berbères) 6 (1926), pp.365-418.


Other analyses of their content and function include:


G. Marcy: 'Le problème du droit coutumier berbère' in LA FRANCE MEDITERRANEENNE ET AFRICAINE (1) 1939.

J. P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE ... (1965), pp.238-40.


26. Ibid., p.21. "Matters affecting the essential nature of this society," he points out, "are not dealt with in these qanouns because they are accepted as unquestionable, such essential matters being the sum total of values and principles that are affirmed by the community through its very existence, the implicit norms on which are based the acts of jurisprudence, customs that have been instituted and formulated as circumstances demanded." (p.20).

27. L. Milliot: 'Les nouveaux qanouns kabyles' in HESPERIS (Archives Berberes) 6 (1926). The complainant, Said Adjili, had been fined 125 francs because his son had assaulted a woman. The amin of the jemaa was convicted of substituting himself for French justice, but subsequently acquitted by the appeal court on the grounds that he had had no criminal intent. Adjili's son was then fined 16 francs by a French court for insulting the woman, and the jemaa was ordered to restitute the 125 francs.

28. L. Milliot: 'Les nouveaux qanouns kabyles' in HESPERIS (Archives Berberes) 6 (1926), pp.404-8. He stresses that this was not a case of a revival during the early Twentieth Century but simply one of survival and French discovery: "the old qanouns never ceased being applied" ('Les institutions kabyles' REVUE DES ETUDES ISLAMIQUES 1932, p.155).


32. J. Morizot: L'ALGERIE KABYLISEE (1962), p.117. According to him, two levels of government operated at Fort-National: "At the highest echelon, there was the official body, the French municipality, which looked after the general interests of the circumscription. At the lower echelons, the village level, there were occult bodies, Kabyle jemaas, which built up their own funds from clandestine fines, which had executive agents, and which regulated local affairs quite freely."

33. J. P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE ... (1965), p.228.
During the late 1940s in Kabylia, for example, the real power in the home village of the future F.L.N. leader, Krim, was wielded by a secret jemaa which itself contained several representatives from the officially elected assembly. Cf. C. H. Favrod: _LE FLN ET L'ALGERIE_ (Paris 1962), p.282.

Bousquet mentions one village in Kabylia where not a single case was brought before a French judge in decades. _JUSTICE FRANÇAISE ET COUTUMES KABILES_ (1950), p.38.

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48. There were approximately 150,000 inhabitants of the Aures by 1954. Studies of the region include:


G. Marcy: 'Le problème du droit coutumier berbère' in LA FRANCE MEDITERRANEENNE ET AFRICAINE (1), 1939.


49. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962), p.34. In her article 'Les sociétés berbères de l'Aures meridional' (1938, loc.cit.), Tillion argued that although the extended family was still the hub of socio-political life in the Aures, and its honour vigorously defended by vendetta, the clan fraction was of growing importance. Conflicts at this level were not always regulated through the jemaa, however, as the following observation suggests: "During my stay in one of these villages of the North, I was awoken every morning at dawn by the noise of a battle. The owners of two adjoining fields were insulting each other about who should have the crop of apricot tree growing right on the boundary. The two fractions to which those involved belonged strongly took the side of their member, and insults were exchanged all morning throughout the vicinity. Occasionally a man would throw himself at the enemy camp, a stick or stone in his hand. Immediately a tiny old man would intervene, grab hold of him, and shout out appeals for calm. At about ten o'clock, the whole village, immobilized by the flies and the heat, would disappear indoors, and next day the conflict was resumed in the same form and at the same point." (p.50).


Germaine Tillion was struck by the considerable socio-economic change which had taken place in the Aures between 1938 and 1957. Nevertheless, she suggested, even such noticeable trends as sedentarization constituted an acceleration of endemic processes. "Since distant antiquity," she wrote, "villages have been entrenched alongside tent-dwelling tribes. History has sometimes favoured the former, sometimes the latter, and in fact has shaken both in turn". ('Dans l'Aures' in ANNALES July-Sept, 1957, pp.394-5).


52. J. Servier: DANS L'AURES SUR LES PAS DES REBELLES (Paris 1955), Ch.1.


54. Ibid., p.135.

55. There were approximately 60,000 people living in the cities of the Mzab by 1954. Studies of the area include:


M. & E. Gouvion: LE KHAREJDJISME - MONOGRAPHIE DU MZAB (Casablanca 1926).


J. P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE ... (1965), pp.228n, 239-40.

Though not a major contribution to Ibadite sociology, I cannot resist recording the comment of Bodley - an old Etonian, ex-army, and fearless Twentieth Century Gulliver - on visiting the Mozabite city of Beni Isguen in the early 1920s: "An atmosphere of an old world, long past and forgotten, is before us, and as one looks at the faces of the men as they sit, one cannot help being reminded of scenes from the Bible, and the legend of the lost tribe springs up unconsciously. At times one is almost inclined to cry out: 'But this can't be real, this is got up for me, it is part of Wembley; in half an hour all these men will be settling down to chops and beer in the nearest pub!' But it is not so ...". R.Y.C.Bodley: ALGERIA FROM WITHIN (London 1926), p.219. ("I know the Arabs", he remarked later, "I know them intimately, but I have not the remotest idea what they think of me, and I never shall have." p.320).


57. The Ibadites were involved in the 8th century Kharijite dissidence against the Omayyad Caliphate. In many ways this constituted a form of secondary resistance by Maghrebi Berbers against their Arab conquerors. They established a 'kingdom' in the central and eastern Maghreb which stretched along the Saharan Atlas from Tiaret to Tripolitania; one of its strongpoints was the Aures. Its power rapidly shrank from the 10th century onwards. The capital, Tahert, was captured by the Fatimids in 911. Sedrata, near Ouargla, was its next focus of power, and the cities of the Mzab were built as the final refuge of Ibadites in the early 11th century. Remnants of Ibadism also survived on the Tunisian island of Djerba. cf. C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (London 1970), pp.19-33, 42-3, 57-63.


59. Ibid., pp.40-45.

61. Ibid., p.43.


65. Ibid., p.153. "On the vast field of reception of Islam and the fiqh," he concludes, "different ensembles emerge which, by the unequal vigour and originality of their elaboration, manifest the diversity of processes in which all sorts of factors have played." He suggests that in this field of interaction, the Mzab constituted a 'strongpoint'.


J. P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE ... (1965), p.239.

68. Similar evidence of survival and bifurcation was to be found in Tunisia. In 1938 Chastel gave a detailed account of the ways in which clandestine tribal assemblies (called miyaad) continued to regulate socio-economic affairs and developed strategies of resistance to colonization. (Chastel: LES TRIBUS ET LE PROBLEME DU PAYSANAT DANS LE C. C. DE GAFSA. C.H.E.A.M. doct. 282, 1938).

From the same country, in 1946, Payre reported that tribal assemblies secretly retained their political functions, even though "Tunisian gouverneurs and controleurs-civils constantly hide their activity." He described how two miyaad-s, when in disagreement, would turn to a third miyaad for arbitration rather than to the Protectorate administration; they maintained "a conspiracy of silence in the face of regular justice". Those who threatened to breach this code of silence, to turn to the French authorities, were ostracized or, occasionally, coerced; "the general idea is to right against whatever weakens the cohesion of the fraction and the integrity of its patrimony. Against an outsider, a defensive reflex always occurs". Attempts by the colonial power to absorb this segmentary process within its official framework inevitably failed because "there is no way of bureaucratizing it without denaturing it and giving birth to another parallel and occult body". (G. Payre: DEMOCRATIE ET TRADITION EN TUNISIE, C.H.E.A.M. doct. 885, June 1946, esp. pp.2-4.)

From Morocco, also, alert administrators periodically drew attention to the widespread survival and vitality of tribal jemaa-s:


De Falguerolles (p.6) warned that these "invisible or ghost jemaas ... constitute the best centres for the spread of nationalism".


70. J. P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE ... (1965) Ch.2. "La lutte pour la terre", pp.110-206.

71. For the balance between collaboration and dissidence at group level, cf. R. Montagne: LES BERBERES ET LE MAKhZEN AU SUĐ DU MAROC - ESSAI SUR LA TRANSFORMATION POLITIQUE DES BERBERES SEDENTAIRES (Paris 1930). Instances of individual collaboration did not alter the basic structure of relationship between the moslem community and the French regime, for, as Norès suggests, "the moslem world opposes the efforts of civilization not as isolated individuals but as compact groups". (E. Norès: L'OEUVR e DE LA FRANCE EN ALGERIE - LA JUSTICE (Paris 1931)).

72. One example was provided by J. Morizot: L'ALGERIE KABYLISEE (1962), pp.117-8.

73. In "the rural milieu", Charnay notes, "the perpetrators of theft, if originating from the area, were rarely betrayed (to the French), except when the wise men considered it better to bring sense to a hothead who threatened to cause harm to the community". LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE ... (1965), p.241, emphasis added. In other words, French law (or the threat of it) could be used by indigenous communities to strengthen their traditional channels of self-control.


78. Ibid., p.242.

79. Ibid., p.238.


83. Ibid., p.190.


85. J. P. Charnay: 'Droit, Langage et Comportement dans l'Algérie coloniale' (1965) loc.cit., p.188.

86. G. H. Bousquet: JUSTICE FRANÇAISE ET COUTUMES KABILES (1950), p.37. He summarized the reasons why the impact of French law was less than it might have appeared, thus: "Firstly, where there is no litigation or conflict with authority, people behave as they wish. Secondly, even a French judgment may not be put into practice." (p.40).

87. For social evolution in Kabylia, cf. especially:


88.


91. Ibid., p.330.


94. Ibid., p.57.


99. The title of Morizot's book is, literally translated, 'Kabyl-ized Algeria'.

100. P. Annanou: 'Les populations musulmans du Sahel d'Alger' in REVUE AFRICAINE 3-4 trim, 1953, and 102 trim, 1954, calculated that, by mid-20th Century, 60% of the moslem population of the coastal plains near Algiers were born outside the area, mostly in Kabylia. The settlement of these plains is also charted in detail by P. Boyer: L'EVOLUTION DE L'ALGERIE MEDIANE (Ancien departement d'Alger' 1830-1956 (1960).

101. According to Boyer, the 'vast majority' of those moslems who volunteered for the French army before service became compulsory, i.e. 1830-1912, were Kabyles, with Dra-el-Mizan and Boghni particularly fertile sources. 'Les zouaves' (derived from zouaoua) was a term applied to French North African troops.

102. "Their implantation took place with the discipline and method which characterized their earlier peripatetic tours." J. Morizot: L'ALGERIE KABYLISEE (1962) p. 82.


105. A wealth of material has been published on the emigration of Algerian workers to France. The most noteworthy contributions include:


L. Massignon: 'Carte de la répartition des kabyles dans la région parisienne' in REVUE DES ETUDES ISLAMIQUES (2) 1930.


R. Montagne: 'L'émigration des musulmans d'Algérie en France' in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (22) 1953, pp. 5-20.


110. Ibid., p.xviii.


113. A. Michel: LES TRAVAILLEURS ALGERIENS EN FRANCE (1956), pp.171-2. They had the most lucrative jobs and earned well over two-thirds of Algerian emigrant earnings.


115. Ibid. Emigration from the Aures and N.W. Oranais mountains, as well as from the oases of Biskra, Touggourt and Ouargla which Montagne described as "Berber ... not in race or language, but in social structure", began after the Second World War. Like that of Kabylia, it was 'traditional' in character and well-organized. Montagne contrasted it with the more disorganized flow of population from the High Plains of the Algerois and Constantinois; this Morizot termed "the emigration of despair and hunger". (p.106).


117. By the end of 1954, 29% of male adults from the arrondissement of Tizi-Ouzou (Greater Kabylia) were absent in France, but this figure concealed considerable variations from commune to commune, and douar to douar. The Commune Mixte of Djurdjura, for example, had an 'absentee rate' of 50%. Similarly, 24% of the arrondissement of Bougie (Lesser Kabylia) were absent, but within it the Commune Mixte of Soummam had an 'absentee rate' of 49%. Institut National des Etudes Démographiques: LES ALGERIENS EN FRANCE (1955), p.50.

118. R. Montagne: 'Rapport provisoire sur l'émigration des musulmans d'Algérie en France' (1954), loc.cit., p.8. According to Morizot, this emigration "continues ... to insert itself normally into the life of the highlanders; it makes it evolve without profoundly disturbing it. Far from weakening the communities in which it develops, it permits them to increase the number of their members, while raising their standard of living". L'ALGERIE KABYLISEE (1962), pp.107-8.
Montagne suggests that this was virtually a sine qua non. "Rapport provisoire sur l'émigration des musulmans d'Algérie en France" (1954), loc.cit., p.15.


132. This is illustrated graphically by the maps which accompany all the studies in Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: ETUDE SOCIOLOGIQUE DE LA MIGRATION DES TRAVAILLEURS MUSULMANS D'ALGERIE EN METROPOLE (Algiers ?1955).


136. Ibid., p.86.


144. Ibid., p.48.

145. Ibid., p.47.

146. Ibid., p.40 (also pp.54-5).

147. Ibid., p.48.


151. Ibid., p.39.

152. Ibid., p.49.


155. Ibid., p.46.

157. P. Bourdieu: *THE ALGERIANS* (1962), p.39. "Never perhaps", Bourdieu adds later, "has the interaction between permanence and change been presented so clearly and distinctly. The maintenance of stability, far from excluding change, presupposes the capacity to modify oneself, to adapt to new situations. But these adjustments ... must be accompanied either by a clear or an obscurely felt awareness of values and norms, whose permanence must be maintained at all costs, as opposed to those which can be modified or re-interpreted in order to assure the stability of really important values. It is in this context that the material success of the Mozabites and their almost miraculous adaptation to forms of economic activity that are foreign to their strict tradition take on their full significance." (p.54).


159. A. Merad: *LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE DE 1925 A 1940* (Paris 1967). This is an excellent study, based on both French and Arabic sources, of the ideology and growth of the Association of Algerian Ulema. It does not, however, rigorously analyse the socio-political evolution which provides the background to this.

160. General articles on the Algerian reformist movement include:


J. Desparmet: 'Les guides de l'opinion indigène en Algérie' in *L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE* (Jan 1933) pp.11-16.

J. Desparmet: 'Un réformateur contemporain en Algérie' in *L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE* (March 1933), pp.149-56.


L. Jalabert: 'La fermentation algérienne' in *ETUDES* 1935 (1), pp.721-44.

L. Jalabert: 'Dans le maghreb qui bouge' in *ETUDES* 1938 (2), pp.164-78, pp.342-60.
- 'U.D.M.A.' in NOTES DOCUMENTAIRES ET ETUDES (333) 22-6-1946 Annexe 9 'Les oulemas'.


Studies of the ideological genealogy of reformism include:

H. Lacout: 'Le réformisme orthodoxe des 'salafiyah' et les caractères généraux de son orientation actuelle' in REVUE DES ETUDES ISLAMIQUES (1932), pp.175-224.


A. Merad: 'L'enseignement politique de Muhammad 'Abduh aux Algériens' in ORIENT (28) 4e trim. 1963, pp.75-123.

162. Desparmet, for example, accused Ben Badis of seeking, "with the temerity and disdain for reality which blind faith inspires ... to impose wholesale, on a population whose nature has been stable for centuries, a system of reforms thought out in a distant clime - the Wahhhabite deserts - and modernized by the intellectual élite of Islam in the universities of Cairo and Tunis. " ("Un réformateur contemporaine en Algérie" in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (March 1933) p.155).

Other elaborations of this theme can be found in:


"There is a general tendency", Bennabi wrote, "to link this (islahist) movement with modern oriental sources, with Djamal Eddin and Abdou as initiators. This is an abusive tendency, which does not take enough account of the local tradition". N. Bennabi: MEMOIRES D'UN TEMOIN DU SIECLE (1965), p.75.


J. Desparmet: "Un réformateur contemporaine en Algérie" in *L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE* (March 1933), pp. 149-56.


J. Desparmet: "Les guides de l'opinion indigène en Algérie" in *L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE* (Jan 1933) pp. 11-16.

166. Deschamps accused the Association of representing "a bourgeois and confessional reaction ... lacking social concern". ('Les oulémas algériens' in *DOCUMENTS NORD-AFRICAINS* 21-4-1956, p. 7). Bennabi, though critical, was rather more circumspect in his judgement. To him, salafiyah was "a reform among the learned, which affects the human masses little or not at all", but nevertheless "the case of Algeria was an exception due to the remarkable personality of Ben Badis, the brilliance of whose character was able to penetrate popular consciousness." (M. Bennabi: *VOCATION DE L'ISLAM*, Paris 1950, p. 140).


168. Malek Bennabi portrayed an Algeria inhabited by "post-Almohad man" - struck down by socio-political and moral paralysis. The Almohad dynasty, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, was marked by intense religiosity and built up a unified central Maghreb empire; it was the peak to which many reformists looked back. Bennabi, though detached from the Ulema Association, and highly critical of its orientation from 1936 onwards, was nevertheless profoundly influenced by reformism. He shared its urgent desire to overthrow the decadent encumbrances of the past, and to breathe new life into Islam. His major works are:

- *MEMOIRES D'UN TEMOIN DU SIECLE* (Algiers 1965).

169. "To an extent", he believed, "colonization is the most fortunate effect of colonizability, because it reverses the social evolution which gave rise to the colonizable individual: he only becomes conscious of his colonizability once he has been colonized. He then finds himself obliged to 'dis-nativize' himself, to become uncolonizable". *VOCATION DE L'ISLAM* (1950), p. 83.

170. Both A. Merad: *LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE DE 1925 A 1940* (1967), pp. 401-4, and M. Bennabi: *VOCATION DE L'ISLAM* (1950), pp. 44-65, contrast reformism with 'modernism'. Despite its opposition to secular rationalism, reformism was far from obscurantist. It sought "a rethought and relived Islam ... a social Islam". (M. Bennabi: *LES CONDITIONS DE LA RENAISSANCE ALGERIENNE* (1948) p. 54.) It represented a rational purification. According to Ben Badis, for example, "Islam is the religion of God, and must be, par excellence, that of Humanity. It honours and glorifies Reason, and recommends that all actions in life should be based on reasoning .... It is essentially democratic,
and refuses all absolutism, even by the most just of men."
(cited by -: 'Les ulémas algériens réformistes' in LA NOUVELLE

Cited by J. Desparmet: 'La résistance à l'occident' in L'AFRIQUE
FRANÇAISE (May 1933), p.266.

Two different conceptions of bidaa, for example, are discussed by
Merad: LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE DE 1925 A 1940 (1967),
pp.228-235. "Historical Islam is quite the opposite of a monolithic
reality", Bourdieu emphasizes, "and ... in it there may be
distinguished profoundly different and even contradictory tendencies
(modernist, traditionalist, secularist, reformist). Thus it would
seem as if the actual religion of a civilization were the result of
a selection, a selection which would illustrate the totality of
choices (conscious or unconscious) that this civilization is
making by the very fact of its existence. Without denying that each
religious message has its own structure, and presents an original
system of meanings and values which is offered as 'objective potent-
ialities', without denying that among these potentialities there are
some which offer themselves with greater urgency and which seem to
have greater claim to existence, one must nevertheless admit that
everything seems to indicate that every civilization, at each period
of its development, "was making a choice", by reference to the system
of its fundamental choices (a culture being a system of choices which
no one makes) of those aspects of the religious message which were to
be turned into reality, while the others would be discarded." P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962), pp.11-111 (cf. pp.107-118 'Islam
and North African Society').

The rich variety of choices and potentialities in North African
Islam is analysed in the following works:

A. Bel: LA RELIGION MUSULMANE EN BERBERIE (Paris 1938).

J. Berque: 'Ca et là dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au
Maghréb' in ETUDES D'ORIENTALISMES DÉDIÉES A LA MEMOIRE DE LEVI-

J. Berque: 'Quelques problèmes de l'Islam maghrébin' in
ARCHIVES DE SOCIOLOGIE DES PEUPLES (5) 3 1950, pp.299-306.


R. Le Tourneau: 'L'Islam nord-africain' in ANNALS DE L'INSTITUT

"We knew when we founded our Association," Ben Badis wrote in
'Chiheb' in August 1932, "that despite favourable auspices it would
- like all great undertakings - encounter difficult periods and
uphill stretches; but we imagined that the accumulated difficulties
it was fated to meet would come only from the outside. In actual
fact the opposite was true; the obstacles and conflicts which it
had to confront came from within itself". Cited by J. Desparmet:
'Un réformateur contemporain en Algérie' in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE
(March 1933), p.152.


176. That the lines of opposition were not clearcut is suggested by Bourdieu: "... A great number of local customs have been incorporated into the (orthodox Islamic) penal and civil law, although they were not officially recognized as legal obligations. Against this background, because the 'marginal' folk religion, for its part, is at all times referring to the universal religion for guidance, there is an inextricable mingling of reciprocal attitudes: certain animistic or magical practices are translated into the language of the universal religion: for example, it is frequently the case that sacred springs, grottoes and rocks are placed under the protection of a holy personage; precepts of the universal religion are redefined in terms of local customs; thus there is both an obstinate defence of the rural religion's individuality and a unanimously felt recognition of the fact that it is a part of Islam. The secret feeling of shame inspired by contact with the orthodox religion is always counteracted by the sometimes exaggerated assertion of irreducible uniqueness. The interaction of reinterpretations, oppositions, and compromises has made Algerian Islam into a singularly complex whole, in which no distinction can be made, except arbitrarily, between what is peculiar to Islam and what has been contributed by the local stock, and in which agrarian beliefs cannot be distinguished from the strictly religious beliefs ...". P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962), pp.116-7.

The reformist movement represented a reworking and reinterpretation of this stock of potentialities rather than the importing of 'new' potentialities and consciousness.


cf. R. Brunel: ESSAI SUR LA CONFÉDÉRATION DES AISSÁOULS AU MAROC (1926).

180. Bennabi argued that the real decadence was not that of "the tribesman, the nomad, the shepherd, the mountain peasant" but that of "the town-dweller, the unemployed, the grocer, the chaouch, the cadi, and the occasional lawyer or chemist". LES CONDITIONS DE LA RENAISSANCE ALGERIENNE (1948) p.44.


182. Marcy in 1938 questioned a reformist activist about the continued practice of collective oath and exheredation of women in the Aures. He replied: "Yes, we apply Koranic law in its entirety here, but we maintain these two 'errors', for the Berbers of the Aures are very attached to them." 'Observations sur l'évolution politique et sociale de l'Aurus' (1938), loc.cit., p.141.

183. After the Second World War, there were clear signs that Kabyle customs were being steadily impregnated by the Shari'a, through the intermediary both of marabouts and of cadi-s. (G. H. Bousquet: JUSTICE FRANÇAISE ET COUTUMES KABILES (1950), p.40). A similar trend was noted by Marcy in the Aures. (G. Marcy: 'Le problème du droit coutumier berbère' in LA FRANCE MEDITERRANEENNE ET AFRICAINE (1) 1939). This growth of orthodoxy, in Boyer's words, "had its source as much in the social affirmation of a community as in the renewal of religious fervour." (P. Boyer: L'EVOLUTION DE L'ALGERIE MEDITAN ... de 1830 à 1956 (1960), p.275). Cf. also J. Roussier: 'L'application du Chra' au Maghreb en 1959' in DIE WELT DES ISLAMS (6) 1-2 1959, pp.25-55.


185. Pilgrimages seem to have markedly declined in importance by the mid-20th Century. Theqiyaya of the Ammari brotherhood at Ain Defla, near Guelma, for example, formerly the shrine for daily visits by pilgrims, was reduced to annual visits by the time of the Second World War (Sultana: LA CONFRERIE RELIGIEUSE DES AMMARIA ET LA ZAOUIA D'AÎN DEFLA (C.H.E.A.M. doct.22 bis) n.d.). Ziara did not disappear altogether, however; Boyer suggests that local pilgrimages survived better than large-scale ones. (P. Boyer: L'EVOLUTION DE L'ALGERIE MEDITAN ... (1960), p.372.

186. Cf. the description of Ben Badis by the journal 'Nadjah' in 1932: "This magician of the spoken word gets a hold on his listeners and plays with them at will. The richness of vocabulary, the intensity of impression, the beauty of expression, the art of rendering his thoughts in philosophical form and in an easily-followed dialectic - he has all these to an unrivalled degree. When he rises to deliver a sermon or a speech, one sees the crowd press around him, craning their necks, pricking up their ears and eagerly opening up their hearts to the seeds which fall upon them from the wisdom of his mind and the holy sorcery of his words." Cited by J. Desparmet: 'Un réformateur contemporain en Algérie' in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (March 1933), p.150. J. Berque, in DEPOSESSION DU MONDE (1964), p.22 noted that portraits of Ben Badis could still be seen on display in houses and shops, twenty-five years after his death and despite the rival fame of the FLN leadership.


189. This is stressed by Merad, (ibid., pp.63-4). However, maraboutism also established some roots among these migrants. Sultana, for example, suggests that the First World War brought prosperity to the Zawiya of Ain Defla; conscripted muslims sent gifts to purchase immunity from bullets, and the brotherhood nominated mogaddem-s in several indigenous fighting units. (Sultana: LA CONFRERIE RELIGIEUSE DES AMMARIA ET LA ZAOUIA D'AIN DEFLA (C.H.E.A.M. doct. 22 bis)).

190. Merad argues that the attitude of reformists gradually hardened during the early 1930s, until eventually they did not discriminate between different brotherhoods and became wholly negative in their assessment of their contribution to Islamic life. (LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE DE 1925 A 1940 (1967), p.434...). Bennabi stresses that the roots of reformism and sufí orders were closely intertwined. Both claimed the loyalty of his Tebessa grandfather, for example: "In his person, he combined the two opposed tendencies which later were to play such a large role in the formation of the Algerian conscience. I mean what were later called 'salafism' and 'maraboutism'. My grandfather supported sheikh Ben Mahanna, late 19th Century precursor of Algerian Islam, and was attached with equally strong conviction to the Aissaoua fraternity...". (MEMOIRES D'UN TEMOIN DU SIECLE (1965), pp.36-7.)

191. "The refutation of maraboutism was the dominant part of the action of the Algerian reformists in the sphere of religion proper." Merad Ibid., p.434.


Julien identifies the three major prongs of reformist attack as the heresy of honest marabouts, the superstition of dishonest marabouts, and the servility of administrative marabouts. C-A. Julien: L'AFRIQUE DU NORD EN MARCHE (Paris 1952), p.103.


196. The Tijaniya claimed that the recitation of their special short prayer, Salat al-Fatih, was of immense efficacy, equivalent to 6,000 recitations of the Koran and to hundreds of pilgrimages. The reformist leadership in 1936 denounced the Order's head as 'dajjal' (false prophet) and infidel. J. M. Abun-Nasr: THE TIJANIYYA (1965), pp.163-85....

Most forms of brotherhood worship, Merad points out, were "based on the principle of respectful submission, a survival of the Sufi rule according to which the adept must be like "a corpse in the hands of the washer of the dead" before his spiritual master. Hand-kissing or forehead-kissing, and prostration, were some of the external marks of the veneration due to marabouts and to men of God generally."


202. Several zawiya heads still exercised immense religious sway and temporal power over surrounding rural populations. Mustafa Qasimi (at El Hamel), Ben Hamlaoui (in the Constantinois), Ghalam Allah (at Tiaret) and Ben Tekkouk (at Mostaganem) were among the most prominent. R. Montagne: 'La fermentation des partis politiques en Algérie' in POLITIQUE ENTRANGERE (April 1937), p.129.

203. The intrepid Bodley visited the residence of the head of the Tijaniya zawiya at Kourdane in 1926, in the company of a caid, and described it thus: "A broad staircase built of rosy stone led up to a terrace pillared and tiled in delicate shades. An impression of majesty, of far-away power, of magnificence. We mounted the stairway and were led into the dining room, which was quite simple in spite of its size, and then into a drawing room. An array of superb Arab furniture filled the room .... Chests of drawers, cupboards, brackets inlaid with mother of pearl, priceless carpets on the floor, and lovely hangings over the doors, swords and daggers of all periods, festooned the walls. We passed out of the drawing room on to a gallery running all the length of the building, and on to which opened the guest-rooms. As we entered the first, I was struck by the richness of the setting, by the real Arab bed hung about with brocade curtains, then I realized that I was not in one room but in a series. I turned in surprise to the caid. He smiled at my astonishment and explained that at Kourdane every guest had his private suite ...." R. V. C. Bodley: ALGERIA FROM WITHIN (1926), pp.279-87.

204. According to Sultana, Si Ahmed Cherif, head of the Ammaria zawiya at Ain Defla, was very partial to alcohol and a frequenter of brothels. His saintly reputation and influence only survived in places far from the mother zawiya. (LA CONFRERIE RELIGIEUSE DES AMMARI ET LA ZOUA D'AIN DEFLA (C.H.E.A.M. doct. 22 bis).


209. The Rahmaniya, for example. Merad demonstrates that the French administration remained extremely suspicious of marabouts and brotherhoods right up until the mid-20th Century. They regarded them as 'foyers de revolte', as 'cradles of fanaticism', and as 'those who lie in wait'. A. Merad: Le Réformisme Musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940 (1967), pp.54-8.

210. El Hadj M'Barek, for example, founder of the Ammariya Order, assisted the French conquest of the North Constantinois. In return for services rendered, the French general Youssouf in 1836 built a zawiya for him at Ain Defla, and this became the platform for the expansion of his influence. (Sultana: La Confrérie Religieuse des Ammariya et la Zaouia d'Ain Defla (C.H.E.A.M. doct. 22 bis), n.d.) The Tijaniya became especially associated with 'collaboration'. However, rather than a departure from the 'traditional game', this can be regarded as an attempt to safeguard its integrity. J. Abun-Nasr: The Tijaniyya (1965) pp.98-9, argues thus: "The fact that Muhammad al-Saghir al-Tijani made overtures for alliance with the French in 1839 should not suggest that he was favourably disposed towards the French per se .... He seems to have considered it of paramount importance to the Tijanis of Ain Madi ... to rule themselves. In so doing, not only would the Tijanis avoid molestation in the future, but would substantiate their claim to be superior."

211. The Derkawa and Taibiya were powerful in the Algerois during the early years of French implantation, but had declined greatly by the mid-Twentieth Century. By contrast, the Rahmaniya grew in strength from the late Nineteenth Century onwards and seem to have been by far the biggest brotherhood by the mid-Twentieth Century. Figures for membership of fraternities seem to be little more than guesses. - : "Les Confréries Religieuses au Maroc" (C.H.E.A.M. doct. 28 bis) p.8 gives the following figures for Algeria in 1937: Total membership of brotherhoods - 400,000; Rahmaniya - 210,000; Qadriya - 55,000; Tijaniya - 45,000; Taibiya - 40,000; Derkawa - 10,000. By contrast, the total number of adepts calculated by Comité Méditerranéenne: Les Grands Courants d'Opinion dans l'Islam Nord-Africain (C.H.E.A.M. doct. 23) 1937, p.46 was only 260,000, of which the Rahmaniya were said to have 135,000. Cf. P. Boyer: Evolution de L'Algérie Médiane (1960), p.371.

213. J. Noël: 'L'évolution religieuse à Mila' in Centre d'études de politique étrangère: ENTRETIENS SUR L'ÉVOLUTION DES PAYS DE CIVILISATION ARABE (Vol.2) 1937, pp.34-9. Bennabi cites the instance of a mogaddem of the Qadriya at Tebessa who was won over to reformism, closed down the fraternity's zawiya on his own initiative, and became an ordinary koranic teacher at the local school. MEMOIRES D'UN TEMOIN DU SIECLE (1965), p.226.


215. Ibid., pp.126-33.


The 'maraboutic' press - notably the journal 'Ikhlas' - accused the reformists of heresy, of secularism, of dabbling in politics, and of splitting the moslem community.


El-Hafidi was president of the "Society of Sunnite Ulema", and director of its newspaper 'Ikhlas'.


219. At the opening of the headquarters of the newly-founded "Society of Sunnite Ulema", on 1st June 1933, a large number of French dignitaries were present. The gathering was addressed by Belhadj, a French-educated teacher, on the theme of "our nation is France" and "our religion has nothing to do with our nationality, which can only be French". Desparmet noted with regret that the speech was delivered in French. (J. Desparmet: 'Deux manifestes indigènes' in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Dec 1933) pp.782-3). A typical instance of belated and half-hearted French flirtation with the maraboutic movement occurred in Constantine on 10th October 1936, when the Préfet and various other colonial officials joined in the maraboutic zerda (Festival involving processions and distribution of food), along with a motley assemblage of mufti-s, heads of fraternity families, minor urban mogaddem-s, and zawiya sheikh-s from the interior. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Oct 1936), pp.533-4.

220. A "Society of Sunnite Ulema" was established in September 1932, along with its newspaper, 'Ikhlas'. A headquarters was set up opposite the reformist 'Circle of Progress' in Algiers. The Society was moribund by 1937, and was replaced by the "Association of Heads of Religious Brotherhoods". This again proved short-lived, and there was a further attempt to resuscitate it in 1948 as the "Union of Brotherhoods of North Africa".


Although organized Grand Maraboutism was a manifest failure by the end of the Second World War, the general reformist struggle against the religious orders "certainly did not precipitate the collapse of this adversary." (A. Merad: LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE ... (1967), p.440. Cf. L. P. Pauque: 'Où en est l'Islam traditionel en Algérie?' in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (55) 3e trim 1961, pp.17-22.


225. Ibid., p.28. The ulema led a campaign to banish such baudy street-shows as Caracous (shadow puppets) which were associated with prostitution. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Dec 1935), p.780.

226. This attempt to impose 'discipline' on moslem women was not confined to towns. Even in the countryside, where women traditionally went unveiled and worked outdoors, the reformists preached a new modesty. They also frowned on the Berber practice of tattooing. Cf. G. Marcy: 'Observations sur l'évolution politique et sociale de l'Aures' in Centre d'études de politique étrangère: ENTRETIENS SUR L'ÉVOLUTION DES PAYS DE CIVILISATION ARABE (Vol.3) 1938, pp.142-3


228. Cited in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Sept 1934) p.542; the journal attributed this attitude to the contagion of Gandhi's ideas. However, at Mila, boycott was equally employed as a technique to pressurize local moslem merchants into joining the reformist association. J. Noël: 'L'évolution religieuse à Mila' in Centre d'études de politique étrangère: ENTRETIENS SUR L'ÉVOLUTION DES PAYS DE CIVILISATION ARABES (Vol.2) 1937, p.38.

229. Malek Bennabi was shrill in his attacks on all attitudes and activities that made moslem society "vegetate", that encouraged "the old Turk spirit, the spirit of disenchanted males, of hookah smokers, of oblivion-seekers", and thereby closed "the magic circle trapping moslems in decadence". LES CONDITIONS DE LA RENAISSANCE ALGÉRIENNE (1949), pp.72 and 26. He argued that Algerian moslems spent too much time on 'futilities' - cinemas, circuses, cafés and social ceremonies, many of which caused "terrifying budgetary haemmorages" - and very little time on 'utilities'. VOCATION DE L'ISLAM (1950), p.81.

231. P. Boyer: L'ÉVOLUTION DE L'ALGERIE MEDIANE ... (1960), p.375. According to Bennabi: MEMOIRES D'UN TÉMOIN DU SIECLE (1965), pp.204-5, reformists in Tebessa during the late 1920s pinned up on the mosque door a list of all those who broke fasting regulations during Ramadan.

232. Among the main 'social' themes in islahist preaching, according to Desparmet's analysis, were: self-confidence, union of wills, excommunication of renegades, refusal of foreign protection, boycott of foreign goods, moral separatism, unflinching faith in the future, confessional patriotism, maintenance of symbols of differentiation, and, finally, the overthrow of fatalism. All centre around the theme of self-sufficiency and resumption of initiative. J. Desparmet: 'La résistance à l'occident' in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (May 1933) pp.268-9.


236. Ibid., pp.8-9.


In these schools, according to Kessous, "the teachers are miserable tolba whose expertise consists of a formal knowledge of the Holy Book, which they are incapable of understanding or commenting upon. Usually they are even ignorant of grammar, and once away from Koranic texts they commit unbelievable mistakes of syntax. It should be added that from the material point of view their situation is pitiful". M. A. Kessous: LA VERITE SUR LE MALAISE ALGERIEN (Algiers 1935), p.90. In 1936, Ladreit de Lacharrière estimated that there were 3,000 such schools, with about 50,000 students. (L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (July 1938) p.307). Another estimate in 1955 put the number of schools at 5,000. ('Les ulémas algériens réformistes' in LA NOUVELLE REVUE FRANÇAISE D'OUTRE-MER (47), 1955, p.334.

239. The reformist paper 'El-Bassair' reported a typical development at Kalaa des Beni Abbes, near Bougie, in 1936: "With the authorisation of the administration, an 'education society' has just been created. Its head is a teacher, renowned for his talent and modern teaching methods. A meeting was held on 13th March to start a fund for a school building. Gifts and 16,700 francs were collected". Cited in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Nov 1936), p.584. Scholarization was part of
239. an overall process of community development, as the experience of the Aures illustrates: "On leaving Djama Sidi Lakhdar (the main reformist mosque in Constantine), a few of these disciples of Sheikh Ben Badis - sons of marabouts who had passed over to the anti-traditionalist camp - were able to establish a section of the Association of Ulema. In a few months, they created ten or so circles, nadi-s (cultural societies), cult associations and schools, and attracted into them large numbers of Shawia sympathizers who henceforth obeyed their every order...." (失落：LES ETABLISSEMENTS D'ENSEIGNEMENT DES OULEMAS REFORMISTES A CONSTANTINE (C.H.E.A.M. doct. 198 bis) March 1938).


J. Carret: 'L'association des oulama réformistes de l'Algérie' in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (43) 3e trim. 1958, p.34.


241. The 'Institut Ben Badis' in Constantine was the reformist 'seminary'. Its most successful students went on to complete their training at the Zitouna mosque in Tunis. Cf. - : LES ETABLISSEMENTS D'ENSEIGNEMENT DES OULEMAS REFORMISTES A CONSTANTINE (C.H.E.A.M. doct. 198 bis), March 1938.


J. Carret: 'L'association des oulama réformistes de l'Algérie' in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (43) 3e trim. 1958, p.34.


249. Bennabi insisted that reformism was still too concerned with the past, and that the curriculum in its schools was excessively tied to the 'classical themes' of theology, law, philology, scholastic literalism and aesthetics. Reformist teaching, he argued, still needed to shake off "post-Almohad residues" which frequently ensured that "the programme of an islahist medersa does not essentially differ from that of a traditionalist school." VOCATION DE L'ISLAM (1950) pp.70-79. Learning, he argued, must "recapture its sense of social function".


For reformist historiography, the following articles provide an introduction:


Cf. also A. Merad: LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE ... (1967) pp.312-315.

254. A Fund-raising campaign for a mosque at Saint-Eugène, near Algiers, brought in 50,000,000 francs during the two months of 1947.


256. "Islahist thought aims at the reform of men, but one never sees the reformer where he should be acting as spokesman of his idea, where the very object of his reform is to be found; in the cafés, in the marketplace, indeed everywhere where the social evils which he seeks to correct are to be found. They are content to give lessons to
256. children whose content has nothing to show that 'reform' is at issue; or they preach from a pulpit (minbar) to a public which they have never gone to see in its surroundings in an everyday atmosphere, but which has come to the foot of their pulpit." M. Bennabi: VOCATION DE L'ISLAM (1950), p.75.

257. The difference, Deschamps suggests, was that the Twentieth Century Ulema "substituted concerted action for amiable anarchy." 'Les oulémas algériens' in DOCUMENTS NORD AFRICAINS 21.4.1956, p.4.

258. The patriotic themes in reformist propaganda were deeply rooted in popular consciousness. "All the uprisings which have broken out, from that of Ben Zamoun the year of the capture of Algiers, to that of the Aurès in 1916-17, prove that the vanquished have never lost the hope of reconquering their independence. Popular poetry also has always celebrated and revived this profound sentiment; satires, epic ghazaouat (ballads), hymns to regional saints, all abound with patriotic allusions and are simply inspired with love of liberty .... It is the sentiment inherent in the race which Reformism cam to exult by importing the theories of the current Arab Renaissance ..." (J. Desparmet in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Dec. 1937), pp.557-8.) Similarly, Desparmet argued that the historical ideas of El-Mili and El-Madani "are no more than the literary translation of popular oral themes, whose germs are easy to find in folklore; they respond to the general aspiration and pride of the Maghreb character". (L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE July 1933, p.391).

259. "The condition of post-Almohad man is that of colonized man and colonizable man. The subject-object relationship here is that of colonized to colonizable man, and not that of colonized man to colonizer." M. Bennabi: VOCATION DE L'ISLAM (1950), p.66.

260. Merad argues that this development was inevitable, that reformism began as purely "confessional", but, in defining itself and in meeting French hostility, was gradually driven into 'politics'. (LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE 1967, p.433.) Bennabi, on the other hand, regarded the first phase of reformist organization in Algeria (1925-1936) as 'heroic', whereas the year 1936 had tempted its leaders into an unnecessary diversion of activities into "mountebankism" and "the fatal furrow of the political caravan." This process "undermined the doctrinal base of the Algerian movement. It no longer was led by an idea, but by idols." M. Bennabi: LES CONDITIONS DE LA RENAISSANCE ALGERIENNE (1948), pp.15-27.


263. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE Sept. 1934, pp.541-2; Feb.1935, pp.94-7; July 1936.

264. On the events at Constantine
Cf. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Sept 1934), pp.519-25
B. Vallet: LES EVENEMENTS DE CONSTANTINE 5 AOUT 1934 - QUELQUES DOCUMENTS (Algiers 1934)
265. Reformist historians tended to glorify the great 'unifiers' of the Maghrebi past. The Twelfth Century Almohads, for example, won el-Madani's praise because "they unified religion by worshipping only God, to the exclusion of any other; they unified the nation by gathering under their power the totality of North Africa; they unified Maghrebi society by abolishing all heterodox books and by ordering people to return to the Book of God and the Sunna, which the Mahdi and founder of the dynasty had summarized in the code he drew up." Cited in L'AFRIQUE FRANCAISE (July 1933) pp.390-1.

266. J. Desparmet: 'Un réformateur contemporain en Algérie' in L'AFRIQUE FRANCAISE (March 1933) p.152. Marcy quotes a similar sermon delivered to the Shawia of the Aurès, urging them to end their internal segmentary conflicts: "For centuries you have been divided among yourselves by clan and jeff quarrels, which have humiliated you in the eyes of the dominator. It is ignorance which divides you and plays into the hands of those who exploit you; so educate yourselves and rally to the directives of the uléma, the learned men!" G. Marcy: 'Observations sur l'évolution politique et sociale de l'Aurès' (1938), loc.cit., p.146.


268. The gradual impregnation of Mozabite tifaqat by Malekite jurisprudence was noted by L. Milliot: 'Receuil des délibérations des djema'a du Mzab' in REVUE DES ETUDES ISLAMIQUES (1930), pp.171-230.

On the convergence between Ibadites and Malekite reformists, cf.:


270. In the Mzab itself, the city of Guerrara was the centre of reformism. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962), p.40.


272. Lafage, for example, reports a boycott of Mozabite shops ordered by reformist ulema in 1936, after they refused to pay more funds to the association. (C.H.E.A.M. doct.3981). A major source of disagreement seems to have been the involvement of the A.A.U. in political negotiations with the Popular Front Government during 1936-7; the Mozabite 'el-Omara' denounced the Violette plan, in particular, as assimilationist. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Aug-Sept 1937), p.424.

274. "For the reformists, the destiny of the Algerian moslem people as such seemed to depend less on the accession of natives to the right to vote than on the freedom of Arab culture to spread and the independence of the moslem cult in Algeria". A. Meradi: LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE ... (1967), p. 415.

275. On the issue of freedom of worship from colonial control, cf:


A remark by Burdeau in the French National Assembly in 1892 reveals a potential contradiction in the colonial situation. Noting that the colonial budget for the upkeep of the moslem cult in Algeria was far less than that put aside for Protestant, Catholic and Jewish worship, he complained: "The result is that the number of ministers of the cult - mufti-s and imam-s - whom we place at the disposition of moslems is less than one hundred, and the vast majority of mosques have none to serve them .... There has thus formed a semi-clandestine clergy, all of whose resources escape our control, who are tied to us by no obligations, and who, to ensure their popularity, sometimes stir up fanaticism, along with the brotherhoods." (Cited in C-H. Favrod: LE FLN ET L'ALGERIE (1962), p. 94.) This was to attribute the survival of Islamic consciousness to a form of 'under-administration', and thus to imply an enormous burden, a totalitarian role, for the colonial regime. In 1955 there were 182 'official cult agent' posts, including 34 vacant.

(J. Carret: 'L'association des oulama réformistes de l'Algérie' in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (43) 1958, p. 35).


"This hierarchy," Boyer concurs, "however satisfactory in our own eyes, does not thereby achieve any authority over the faithful .... The moving force in the community continued to be that ill-defined class of doctors of Islam, the ulema, who included a good number of fraternity chiefs and marabouts". P. Boyer: L'EVOLUTION DE L'ALGERIE MEDIANE ... (1960), p. 370. (Cf. also pp. 369-71).


282. Ibid., p.162.


285. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Apr 1933), p.239.

286. At Mila during the early 1930s, for example, the 'official' imam, Boufema, after losing much of his congregation to the reformist el-Mili, spearheaded a fierce attempt to disrupt his work. J. Noël: 'L'évolution religieuse à Mila' in Centre d'études de politique étrangère: ENTRETIENS SUR L'ÉVOLUTION DES PAYS DE CIVILISATION ARABE (Vol.2), 1937.

287. In October 1932, the campaign was opened by Mbarek Ben Allal, a maraboutic leader from Kolea and member of the colonial Financial Delegations, who called publicly on the administration to curtail reformist activities. A. Merad: LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE ... (1967) pp.148-9.


290. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Sept 1936), p.465. In a funeral speech, Louis Milliot, Director of Affaires Indigènes, called Kahloul "one of our most loyal and faithful servants .... Right up to his last breath, he never ceased collaborating with our civilizing mission." A few days later, an attempt was made on the life of the moslem who pronounced the ritual prayer at Kahloul's interment. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Nov 1936), pp.587-8.


292. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Apr 1933), p.239.


294. C-A. Julien: L'AFRIQUE DU NORD EN MARCHE (1952), p.116. This new Consultative Committee, Ferhat Abbas wrote at the time, "applies itself to ensure that religion - among whose agents it inserts police and maraboutic elements - should more than ever become the opiate of the people. It reduces the teaching of the Arabic language to its simplest expression and, in its few dozen Koranic schools, gives it a folkloric, mediaeval, and scholastic character." Cited in C-H. Favrod: LE FLN ET ALGERIE (1962), p.93.
295. J. Desparmet: 'Manif estations en Algérie 1933-4' in L'AFRIQUE \FRANÇAISE \(\text{Sept 1934}\), p.539.

296. Ibid., pp.537-547, and L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE \(\text{Apr 1933}\), pp.239-40.


298. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE \(\text{Nov 1936}\), p.584.

299. A. Merad: LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE ... \(\text{1967}\), p.149.

300. The Tlemcen medersa was set up in 1931, and the statutes of the 'education society' which managed it were lodged with the administration. Six years later, wishing to remove a 'subversive' teacher, the administration refused to authorize the statutes. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE \(\text{July 1938}\) p.303.

301. The 'Commission des affaires musulmanes', a consultative body meeting in Paris in May 1934, claimed that free Koranic schools were straying beyond education and into politics, and pressed the need for close supervision of their curriculum and of the professional competence of their teachers. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE \(\text{June 1934}\) pp.346-50. A decree on "Unauthorized opening of Koranic schools" on 8th March 1938 imposed sanctions not only for the setting up of schools without permission, but also for non-observance of a set of regulations concerning hygiene, morality, and 'conformity with the constitution and laws'. L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE \(\text{July 1938}\), pp.302-8. Cf. also L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE \(\text{Nov 1935}\) pp.665-7, on colonial pressure to control these schools.

302. At the Institut Ben Badis in Constantine, after the Second World War, "the ulema were obliged, due to lack of space, to turn away 700 pupils; they demanded that the Institute be allowed to utilize religious buildings in the town which were used only for the Friday Prayer. The administration refused. Yet these buildings belong to the whole moslem community. The mosque is meant for teaching as well as for worship; the Arab word d Jama means both mosque and school, and the most famous mosques of Islam are at the same time the most famous universities — for example, el-Azhar in Cairo, ez-Zitouna in Tunis, and al-Karawiyin in Fez." C-H. Favrod: LE FLN ET L'ALGERIE (1962), p.92.


308. The precise figures are not clear. Saadia et Lakhdar: L'ALIENATION COLONIALISTE ET LA RESISTANCE DE LA FAMILLE ALGERIENNE (Lausanne 1967) pp.43-4, gives a total figure of naturalizations, between 1865 and 1934, as 2,500, or an average of 36 per year. A. Merad: LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE ... 1967), p.406, quotes the following statistics for moslem naturalizations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1903</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1911</th>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1936</th>
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<td></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J. Desparmet, on the other hand, cites the following figures for applications for naturalization: 1928 1929 1930 (L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE May 1933, p.267).


313. During the 1920s and 1930s, in Tunisia, opposition to the inhumation of 'naturalised' in moslem cemeteries was a major rallying point for the Destour Movement. French insistence caused rioting in Bizerta (Dec.1932) and Tunis (Aug.1933), for example. Cf. C. Micaud: TUNISIA - THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION (1964).

314. The deceased was eulogized by a group of 'fellow-m'tourni as "our late lamented comrade Oussaada, caretaker (chaouch) of the Dellys mairie, an old servant of proven loyalty, and a pious and practising moslem, whose only fault was that he had acquired French citizenship." L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Dec 1937), p.567.

315. The Popular Front period in France was the high point of what Bennabi termed the deviation of reformism into politics. 1936 was a "baleful year" in his view, for "electoralism, which should be led, had become the leader. The Algerian movement was turned upside down; it walked with feet in the air and head down". LES CONDITIONS DE LA RENAISSANCE ALGERIENNE (1948), pp.25 & 19. Along with various 'nationalist' groups - notably the Federation of Elected Representatives (Fédération des Elus), the North African Star (Etoile Nord-Africaine), and the Algerian Communist Party - the Association of Uléma organized a Moslem
315. Congress in Algiers which formulated a series of demands to present to the colonial power. Delegations were sent to the Gouvernement-Générale and to Metropolitan France, demonstrations were organized, and contact was established with political parties on the French left. At this point, we must distinguish between these vicissitudes of the A.A.U. and the broad socio-political reactions to the colonial situation which reformism 'represented'.


J. Desparmet: 'Contribution à l'histoire contemporaine de l'Algérie' (Aug-Sept, Nov, Dec 1937)


A. Merad: LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE ... (1967), pp.185-91.

316. In the preamble to his proposal, Violette stated that "experience has shown that it is impossible to continue to treat as subjects without essential rights those French natives of Algeria who have assimilated French thought but who, nevertheless, for family reasons or on religious grounds, cannot abandon their personal status. Algerian natives are Frenchmen .... But it seems impossible immediately to call the whole indigenous population to exercise political rights, the vast majority of them being as yet far from desirous of using these rights, and also not having shown themselves capable of doing so in a normal and considered manner .... The right of suffrage seems, to our mind, to be a reward, either for services rendered or for intellectual effort achieved." Cited by L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (March 1937), pp.140-8.


320. Colon spokesmen used all manner of jesuistry in opposing the plan. "Is it French, republican, democratic," one of them asked, "to fight privileges north of the Méditérranée and to set up new ones south of it?" He claimed that to maintain personal status was to insist on a choice between two legal systems, which was "contrary to the principles of republican equality and laicity." Ladreit de Lacharrière: in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (March 1937), pp.143-4.


322. Ibid., p.138.

323. Ibid., pp.137-44, and pp.192-8 on "the geography of reformism."

325. A. Merad: LE REFORMISME MUSULMAN EN ALGERIE ... (1967), pp.87-118.


In the oasis of Aflou, according to Hirtz: EVOLUTION SOCIALE DU DJEBEL AMOUR (C.H.E.A.M. doct.744) Oct 1945, p.19, the spread of reformism was due chiefly to the influence of Kabyle traders.


328. C-A. Julien: L'AFRIQUE DU NORD EN MARCHE (1952), p.114. "Faithful to the traditional models of Islamic civilization", Michel reported in 1956, "the nationalist leaders in France directed Algerian workers towards respect for the practice of fasting during Ramadan, the ban on drinking wine, and even the restriction of cigarettes." A. Michel: LES TRAVAILLEURS ALGÉRIENS EN FRANCE (1956), p.211. "This was not", she added interestingly, albeit introducing a misleading dichotomy into the Islamic personality, "a religious manifestation, but a wholly secular urge of the Muslim group, faced with the attempted dissolution of its culture under the pretext of assimilation, seeking to prove its heterogeneity."


330. Ibid.


332. Ibid., p.197.

333. Ibid., p.197.

Little systematic study on the MTLD/PPA has been made. There is some fragmentary information in the following sources:


Messa li Hadj was one of the founders, and subsequently became the leader, of the 'North African Star' (Etoile Nord-Africaine), which was established in Paris in 1924 among the emigrant Algerian population. No organizational roots were established in Algeria until the mid-1930s, but in many respects the E.N.A. was the 'fore-runner' of the P.P.A. On the E.N.A., in addition to the sources cited for the PPA, cf.:


For the divisions within the leadership of the M.T.L.D., cf.:


General accounts of the early development of the FLN include:

Y. Courrière: LES FILS DE LA TOUSSAINT (Paris 1968)
Y. Courrière: LE TEMPS DES LEOPARDS (Paris 1969)
J. Gillespie: ALGERIA - REBELLION AND REVOLUTION (1961)
A. Humbaraci: ALGERIA - A REVOLUTION THAT FAILED (London 1966)
R. Le Tourneau: L'EVOLUTION POLITIQUE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD MUSULMANE 1920-61 (1962)
T. Oppermann: LE PROBLEME ALGERIEN (Paris 1961)


344. "The mass of the population", General Allard declared in 1957, "is either willingly or, above all, forcibly controlled, shut in, indoctrinated, pressurized, terrorized and caught in a closely-meshed net from which it cannot escape. To snatch away this net, to destroy this tentacular organization, is to render the population its liberty". Cited in M. Déon: *L'ARMEE D'ALGERIE ET LA PACIFICATION* (Paris 1959) p.77.

345. Representative are:

M. Déon: 'Qu'est-ce qu'une guerre révolutionnaire?' in *REVUE DES DEUX MONDES* 15.4.1959, pp.577-94.
P. Mus: *GUERRE SANS VISAGE - LETTRES COMMENTES DU SOUS-LIEUTENANT EMILE MUS* (1961)


350. Ibid., p.580.


The decisions of the Congress were exhaustively analyzed by L. Poirier: 'Un instrument de guerre révolutionnaire' (Jan 1958), loc.cit., pp.69-93. The French army captured documents relating to this organizational structure before the Congress. See Note 403 below.

This is the scenario sketched by Edgar O'Ballance: THE ALGERIAN INSURRECTION 1954-1962 (London 1967). He argues that the French military strategy of establishing long electrified fences across the border areas (the 'Morice Line' and the 'Challe Line'), the setting up of a dense network of fixed garrisons ('quadrillage'), and the seizure of the Casbah of Algiers by paratroops, had effectively halted the FLN's military advance by 1960. Thereafter there was stalemate. This view was later confirmed from the FLN side by Zerdani. "It must be frankly recognized", he admitted, speaking of French military strategy, and specifically of the building of electrified barriers, "that it achieved its objective, namely to separate the different elements of the Revolution from each other, whilst the 'regroupment' policy ... uprooted hundreds of thousands of Algerians." The result, he suggested, was the reversal of the 'Soummann Congress principle': the Exterior gained priority over the Interior. (H. Zahouane & A. Zerdani interviewed in DEMOCRATIE NOUVELLE (June 1965), p.36)

The most striking example is that of L. Khelifa: MANUEL DU MILITANT ALGERIEN (Lausanne 1962).


Amar Ouamrane ... interviewed in FRANCE-OBSERVATEUR 15.9.1955.

Extract from the "Soummam Plateforme" in EL-MOUJAHID (4) Nov 1956, p.63.

EL-MOUJAHID (14) 15.12.1957, pp.221-3.

EL-MOUJAHID (4) Nov 1956, p.63 (Extract from the "Soummam Plateforme")

EL-MOUJAHID (14) 15.12.1957, p.222.

Typical of the 'crude' view is the assessment of the causes of the war made by Beyssade, a commune mixte administrateur: "The apolitical mass of the douars remained fixed in millenary immobilism, but a few intellectuals could no longer bear to be ruled by men whose equals they could be"; they stirred up the masses with their "bitterness, hatred, and typically African hysteria." P. Beyssade: LA GUERRE D'ALGERIE 1954-62 (Paris 1962), p.15.

Detailed, methodical, neat, symmetrical organigrammes of FLN structure - at fraction, douar, sector, wilaya and 'summit' levels - were carefully reproduced by L. Poirier: 'Un instrument de guerre révolutionnaire' (Jan 1958) pp.75,76,77,78,81,82,83,85.

365. On the strength of these events alone, Urbani, Assistant Commissioner General to the Government, was rash enough to declare to the Algerian Assembly in November 1954: "There is no doubt now that the so-called 'All Saints Day' (Toussaint) plot was abortive. It was abortive because ... it did not mean to limit itself to a few acts of terrorism in a few points of Algerian territory. Its organizers intended it to be followed by a movement of generalized insurrection ...". Gouvernement-Générale de l'Algérie: LES EVENEMENTS D'ALGERIE (1954), p.28.

366. Y. Courrière: LES FILS DE LA TOUSSAINT (1968), pp.287-438, gives details of the events of the early morning of November 1st, 1954. His account, though journalistic in style and even semi-fictional in places, appears to be based on thorough interviewing of participants.


372. On the organization of Kabylia before 1954, cf.:

The operations against the O.S. did not have any success in this area, Gillespie suggests, and "the Kabyle organization was ... intact at the outbreak of the rebellion." (ALGERIA - REBELLION AND REVOLUTION (1961) p.76).


375. "The maquis seem solidly organized," wrote Feraoun at the end of 1955, "to the point where they have won the confidence and esteem of the Kabyle populations. They have become the depositories of all our illusions, all our wildest hopes; the redressers of all the wrongs which we have suffered for a century, and the avengers of both individual grievances and collective humiliations." JOURNAL 1955-62 (1962) pp.52-3.


S. Yacef: SOUVENIRS DE LA BATAILLE D'ALGER (Paris 1962)


381. R. Delisle: 'Les origines du FLN' in LA NEF (Numero spécial Oct 1962-Jan 1963), p.26. Morisot's assessment is similar: "With few exceptions, insurrection since 1948 has developed exclusively in those areas where the French are weakly implanted, and where there is little or no colonization. It is always the same sectors which start to move and join in: the Algeria of migration villages, the Kabylia, the Aurès, the oases. Only when the revolt takes on a generalized character does it finally spread into colon country. This was seen in 1871 as in 1945. The present revolt only really affected the West, especially the Oranais, two years after it began." L'ALGERIE KABYLISEE (1962), p.140. "In the mountains and oases," he added, "there have survived remote communities among whom the flame of independence has never ceased to smoulder; the fire which was soon to reach them was already alight."


383. Cf, the film "La bataille d'Algier" (1966), directed by Pontecorvo.


385. Ibid., p.25.

386. T. Belloula: LES ALGERIENS EN FRANCE - LEUR PASSE, LEUR PARTICIPATION A LA LUTTE DE LIBERATION NATIONALE, LEURS PERPERSPECTIVES (Algiers 1965)

387. Sources for Table include Rabah Bitat: 'La preparation de Novembre' in REVOLUTION (1963) p.7. He lists Soudani as from North Constantinois and Bouchaib as from the Oranais, though other evidence suggests that they both originated from Blida in the Algerois. Other prominent FLN leaders not among those listed were:
387. Ait Amirouche, Benyoussef Ben Khedda, Ahmed Boumendjel, Saad Dahlab, Slimane Dhiles, Ali Mellah, Said Mohammedi, and Amar Ouzegane - all from Kabylia; Ferhat Abbas, Taieb Boulharouf, Houari Boumediene, Mahmoud Cherif, Bachir Chihani and Abdelhafid Mehri - all from the Constantinois (Taher, Bone, Guelma, Tebessa, Khemchela and Khroub respectively); Ali Mahsas and M'hammed Yazid from the Algerois (Algiers and Bliida respectively); finally, the only other major figure from the Oranais was Ahmed Francis, a bourgeois intellectual.


389. Source for Table 24: W. B. Quandt: REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP - ALGERIA 1954-1968 (1969), pp.69 and 151. The overall regional distribution of the moslem population of Algeria, which Quandt gleans from the 1948 Census, are recorded by him as: Constantinois - 22%; Kabylia - 15%; Algerois - 23%; and Oranais 40%. These are clearly mistaken, and I have provided figures from the 1954 Census in their place.


392. A number of works discuss the structure of the FLN, and the problems of organization for a vanguard party:

H. Ait Ahmed: LA GUERRE ET L'APRES GUERRE (Paris 1964)
R. Bitat: 'La préparation de Novembre' in REVOLUTION (3) 1963, pp.5-7.

H. Boumediene: 'Le parti n'a jamais réellement existé.' in JEUNE AFRIQUE (278) 24.4.1966, pp.6-7.
W. H. Lewis: 'The decline of the FLN' in MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL (Spring 1966)
N. B. Miller (pseud.): 'Social Revolution inthe Arab world' in MONTHLY REVIEW (Feb.1958)
P. J. Vatikiotis: 'Tradition and political leadership in Algeria' in MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES (2) 4(July 1966).
H. Zahouane & A. Zerdani: 'Le FLN, de la lutte pour l'indépendance à la construction du socialisme' (interview with A-P. Lentin) in DEMOCRATIE NOUVELLE (June 1965) pp.33-44.
393. "Within the FLN there existed a mentality or state of mind which tended to say: action first, organization and programme later. In short, its militants wanted to reverse the classical process, the familiar schema, of "first organize yourself, then make revolution". As this old schema had resulted in failure, they tended to say: "let us first make revolution, let us act, let us fight - the rest, notably political organization, will follow afterwards." This explains why the first serious 'platform' could not be provided for the revolution until two years after the first shots ...". Hocine Zahouane, interviewed by A-P. Lentin: 'Le FLN de la lutte pour l'indépendance à la construction du socialisme' in DEMOCRATIE NOUVELLE (Numéro Spécial June 1965), p.34.

394. C-H. Favrod: LE FLN ET L'ALGERIE (1962), p.279. Cf. also R. Bitat: 'La préparation de Novembre' in REVOLUTION (3) 1963 pp.5-7, and Y. Courrière: LES FILS DE LA TOUSSAINT (1968) pp.1-283. "Two solutions were possible for the 'group of 22':" according to the GPRA, "to organize first and launch ourselves afterwards, or to launch first and organize afterwards .... We were obliged to choose the second solution, in other words to fire the first shots in order to create a psychological climate favourable to the organization of the revolution on a national scale." A. Ouzegane: LE MEILLEUR COMBAT (1962), pp.200-1.


396. The split within the MTLD in 1953/4 partly revolved around Messali's demand for 'full powers' (cf.: references at note 337 above). The 'Plateforme' approved by the Soummam Congress of August 1956 proclaimed "the abolition of personal power and the installation of the cult of personality". (EL-NOUJAHID (4) Nov.1956, p.62). This was partly directed at Ben Bella, then part of the External Delegation, whose views on revolutionary leadership differed from those of Abbane. The latter wrote in the following terms to Ait Ahmed, captured along with Ben Bella in October 1956; "Whether you agree or not - and I and all the brothers of the Interior are convinced of it - Ahmed (Ben Bella) wanted to be, and did all he could to appear, the supreme leader of the revolution .... For us, my dear Hocine, the cult of idols has gone for ever. We have no leader, we have leaders, and anyone who tries to emerge from the bunch will find us against him." S. Bromberger: LES REBELLES ALGERIENS (1958) p.135. Ironically, the probable murder of Abbane by his Interior colleagues seems to have been provoked by concern over his growing predominance within the leadership.


The shortage of arms became a great source of tension between the exterior and interior leadership of the FLN. "If you can do nothing for us on the outside, " Abbane wrote to Ben Bella in April 1956, "come back and die with us. Come and fight. Otherwise, consider yourselves traitors!" Cited by Y. Courrière: LE TEMPS DES LEOPARDS (1969) p.300.

405. Exactly who did attend the Soummam Valley Congress is not clear. Quandt at one point mentions the figure of 50 delegates (p.99), but elsewhere (p.288) he specifically lists only twelve: Abbane, Ben M'Hidi, Krim, Ouamrane, Zighout, Benaouda, Ben Tobbal, Mahmoud Cherif, Dhiles, Mellah, Merzhoudi and Mohammedi. (REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1969)). Of these, five were Kabyles, six originated from the Constantinois, and one from the Algerois - although Ben M'Hidi and Mellah, respectively, represented the Oranais and Saharan wilayas. Courrière specifically writes of 13 representatives (LE TEMPS DES LEOPARDS, p.371). He adds Amirouche - from Kabylia - to those mentioned by Quandt. He excludes Cherif, Dhiles and Mellah, and adds the names - real or aliases - of Ali Kafi, Hocine Rouiba, and Kaci (the latter from Kabylia, the former two from the North Constantinois)

at the Tunisian frontier; Quandt hints that the external delegation may have "sensed that they would be ineffective and remained absent". W. B. Quandt: REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1969) p.99n.

The three major decisions of principle taken by the Soummam Congress - primacy of the interior over the exterior, primacy of the political over the military, and the importance of collective leadership rather than cult of personality - alarmed Ben Bella in particular. He also claimed that the 'Plateforme' "call(ed) into question such fundamental doctrinal points as that of the islamic character of our future political institutions", and that the importance of external support, notably from Egypt, had been ignored. (L. Poirier: 'Un instrument de guerre révolutionnaire - le FLN' (1956) loc.cit. pp.88-9). Tension over the difficulties of arms supply, and possibly elements of personal rivalry, inflamed this dispute. Cf: Y. Courrière: LE TEMPS DES LEOPARDS, pp.406-8 W. B. Quandt: REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP .... (1969) pp.100-1,114. W. B. Quandt: 'The Berbers in the Algerian Political Elite' in E. Gellner & C. Micaud (eds.) ARABS AND BERBERS (1973) (pp.285-303) pp.291-2.

The five members appointed by the Soummam Congress were: Abbane, Ben Khedda, Ben M'Hidi, Dahlab and Krim. In August 1957, the CCE was reconstituted, and its nine members became Abbane, Krim, Ouamrane, Lamine-Debaghine, Ben Tobbal, Boussouf, Abbas, Cherif and Mehri.

M. Lebjacoui: VERITES SUR LA REVOLUTION ALGERIENNE (1970) ch.12 'L'assassination d'Abane Ramdane', pp.151-162 demonstrates conclusively that, despite an official report in EL-MOUJAHID (24) 25.5.1958 of Abbane's death 'in action', in fact he was murdered on the orders or with the connivance of a group comprising Boussouf, Cherif, Krim, Ouamrane and Ben Tobbal.

This turn of events had important consequences for the conduct of the guerrilla war. "In the short term, obviously", Lebjacoui suggests, the capture of the external delegation "put an unexpected stop to the latent conflict between the Interior and the Exterior which the Soummam Congress had just revealed. But it also deprived the Revolution of four major leaders, while at the same time raising their prestige and preventing them from becoming too closely immixed with the internal difficulties which were to split the FLN, often tragically. This made itself felt quickly when the leadership of the Front set itself up outside the country - but with a quite different team from that of the Soummam - and again when Algeria achieved its independence." M. Lebjacoui: VERITES SUR LA REVOLUTION ALGERIENNE (1970) p.139.


    A. Humbaraci: ALGERIA - A REVOLUTION THAT FAILED (New York 1966)
    W. B. Quandt: REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ... (1969), pp.148-174

419. Both subsequently - but separately - organized opposition to Ben Bella and Boumedienne, and went into exile. Both have published accounts of their views:
    M. Boudiaf: OU VA L'ALGERIE? I. NOTRE REVOLUTION (Paris 1964)

Krim, and later Khider, opposed both Ben Bella and Boumedienne. Bousso and Ouamrane withdrew from the political arena. By August 1965, only Bitat of the earliest FLN leaders still had a role in Algerian government.

420. H. Boumedienne: 'Le parti n'a jamais réellement existé' in JEUNE AFRIQUE (278) 24.4.1966, p.7. The FLN, according to Boudiaf, was "embryonic, bureaucratic, not to say non-existent"; OU VA L'ALGERIE? (1964), p.150.


422. "Certainly it (the People's Assembly) is advised and guided by the political commissioner when he visits the douar, and receives directives from FLN central command via the three-man liaison committee. But it remains fully responsible on the local level; it's task is to manage the collectivity's affairs, and it retains all initiative in this sphere." EL-MOJAHID (9) 20.8.1957. In fact the People's Assembly raised important issues through the jemaa - or 'cell meeting' - of the whole hamlet. EL-MOJAHID (19) 28.2.1958, pp.352-4.


424. Similarly, at Tizi-Hibel, "the rendez-vous was at night, in a mosque". Ibid., p.43.


427. In the present state of knowledge, it is impossible to generalize about the provenance of FLN organizers, except to say that the way the insurrection was prepared, and the subsequent vicissitudes of the war, did not permit the training, dispersal and centralized control of a disciplined team of seasoned cadres. A great deal of responsibility for action and organization devolved inevitably upon local activists. Even where prominent maquis personnel were not
indigenous to the precise region where they operated, they relied heavily upon support from the local community and its traditional leaders for their effectiveness and cover.

Benzine, born near Setif in Lesser Kabylia, was an outsider to the Oranaïs highlands where he worked as Political Commissioner. He appears to have taken some time to acclimatize himself to local customs and practices; "In the future", he resolved to himself, "I'll have to get to know the history of these regions" (p.53). He was dependent on the hospitality, assistance and guidance of the native-born hamlet-dwellers, and especially of their older, respected spokesmen. On the other hand, the three other Political Commissioners with whom he worked most closely all came from nearby douars. Supply agents, liaison agents, and informers were all necessarily native to the region. (pp.48-9) A. Benzine: JOURNAL DE MARCHE (1965).

Feraoun's account of the insurrection in Kabylia suggests that the maquis were partly local men, and partly 'outsiders' (which in this area often meant someone from the neighbouring hamlet). At Tizi Hibel, first direct contacts with the FLN moujahidin were established through a local inhabitant who, after spending some years in France, returned specifically for this task; in this partial sense, he was an outsider. The pattern in most villages was that "the population was invited to create cells directed by a few (local) militants, who were to remain in constant liaison with the outsider chief." (p.43) The relationship between villagers and moujahidin - as seen through Feraoun's always sharp but often jaundiced eyes - was based on love-hate: "We, who are so distrustful of outsiders, look how we have adopted these valiant men, who are determined to die for the good cause, and to drag us with them, after having had our houses burned and perhaps our wives raped." (pp.43-4) Many maquis leaders were feared and their decisions resented, although often this was rather due to their involvement in local segmentary disputes than to their remoteness from them. "As for forcible provision of lodging (for maquisards)", Feraoun observed, "the leader is often suspected of treating his own fraction (kharouba) and friends lightly. We told ourselves that they were 'brothers' and we were happy to welcome our brothers. Happy and anxious. Especially when the leaders have imposed them on you ..." (p.147)

Yet the heightened pressure (oppression) of the colonial situation made it difficult to express these anxieties, and drove the villagers into close alliance with whatever elements in the FLN organization they considered 'foreign'. "The outlaws are our people," Feraoun declared, "they behave like Kabyles, and take care not to wound us. According to circumstances, they flatter our fanaticism, our pride, our hopes, or they share our ideas, our democratic conceptions of society, our humanitarian feelings .... Anyone would feel at ease in the maquis ... because he knows that he will find himself among brothers there, and will be able to discuss, argue his point, confront other points of view. Everyone has an imperative desire, an ideal: to be free, to feel liberated, the equal of all men. In the maquis, they have already achieved this ideal." (p.44) M. Feraoun: JOURNAL 1955-62 (1962).


The FLN was torn between the twin demands of adapting to local circumstances in order to enlist widespread community support, and asserting centralized direction in order to coordinate efforts and establish radical socio-political objectives. In its attempts to orchestrate reactions to the colonial situation, it faced two dangers: that of bureaucratic centralism - if not neo-colonialism - and that of localism.

The danger of 'localism' was described in 1928 by Mao Tse Tung: "In party organizations in the villages, it often happens that a branch meeting virtually becomes a clan meeting, since branches consist of members bearing the same family name and living close together. In these circumstances, it is very hard indeed to build a 'militant Bolshevik party'. Such members do not quite understand when they are told that the Communists draw no sharp line of demarcation between one nation and another, or between one province and another, or that a sharp line should not be drawn between different counties, districts and townships.... In eliminating localism, reasoning can at best produce only limited results, and it takes White oppression, which is by no means localized, to do much more." THE SELECTED MILITARY WRITINGS OF MAO TSE-TUNG (Peking 1966), p.41.

The opposite danger is described by Fanon: the bureaucratic centralism of a certain type of Third World nationalist political party: "This instrument of modern political warfare is thrown down just as it is, without the slightest modification, upon real life with all its infinite variations .... Instead of using existing structures and giving them a nationalist or progressive character, they mean to try and destroy living tradition in the colonial framework .... From the capital city they will 'parachute' organizers into the villages who are either unknown or too young, and who, armed with instructions from the central authority, mean to treat the douar or village like a factory cell .... The traditional chiefs are ignored, sometimes even persecuted. The makers of the future nation's history trample unconcernedly over small disputes, that is to say the only existing national events, whereas they ought to make of village history - the history of traditional conflicts between clans and tribes - a harmonious whole, at one with the decisive action to which they call on people to contribute. The old men, surrounded by respect in all traditional societies and usually invested with unquestionable moral authority, are publicly held up to ridicule...." F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967), p.85, pp.89-90.

In fact, during the Revolution, the FLN had neither the depth of political experience, nor the physical and human resources, nor the breathing space from the French counter-insurgency, to impose itself on the population as a 'militant Bolshevik party'. Despite Soummam, attempts to build such a party were left until after the War. (Cf. references at note 392 above). A considerable degree of 'localism' seems to have been inevitable, although French military operations - what Mao termed 'white oppression' - had an inestimable unifying effect.


432. S. Bromberger: LES REBELLES ALGERIENS (1958), pp.23-4, 32, 36. The situation was similar in Kabylia: "From childhood, the people of High Kabylia breathed in clandestinity. They lived in a society
where private vengeance was still the rule, where questions of honour were settled in blood, where it was natural one day to take to the maquis and become an outlaw, and where finally there existed professional killers prepared to work for a few banknotes, but who nevertheless scrupulously observed certain rules."


From Kabylia in 1957, Russinger reported that, far from imposing a new regime (of terror), the FLN was encouraging and seeking to influence the activity of existing jemaas. He noted, significantly (p.55) that the FLN were pressing these assemblies to judge according to the 'Shari'a rather than customary law. A. Russinger: "En marge de la pacification. Justice francaise et justice tribale en Kabylie" in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (40) 4e trim. 1957, pp.55-66.

A. Benzine: JOURNAL DE MARCHE (1965) p.59


A. Benzine: JOURNAL DE MARCHE (1965), p.44.


A. Benzine: JOURNAL DE MARCHE (1965) p.44.


Two reprinted in el-Moujahid were:
J. Kraft in SATURDAY EVENING POST (?n.d.); this report came from the maquis in the Oranais. (cited el-Moujahid (19) 20.2.1958)

One of the foremost of these interpretations, in a sense, is Frantz Fanon's. He wrote regularly for EL-MOUJAHID; some of these articles were collected in his TOWARDS AN AFRICAN REVOLUTION (Harmondsworth 1970). Significantly, J. Daniel argued that Fanon and his disciples ignored the essentially Arabo-Islamic reality of mass involvement in the Algerian Revolution (in LA NEF - Numéro spécial - October 1962 -January 1963, pp.130-1) Lacheraf also asserted that Fanon, though well-meaning, never understood "even the most obvious motivations and mechanisms of the political and cultural sociology of Algeria" (in REVOLUTION AFRICAINE 19.12.1963).

R. Vallin: 'Socialisme musulman en Algérie' in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (69) 1r.trim. 1965.
C.-R. Ageron: 'De l'Islam à la Revolution' in REVUE SOCIALISTE (1956)

A. Ouzegane: LE MEILLEUR COMBAT (Paris 1962), p.70,p.28. A similar analysis is provided by Mohamed Lebjouci: "In a struggle for national liberation, a revolutionary militant's primary duty is not to cut himself off from the masses. To ensure this, he must above all respect the values to which his people are traditionally attached. Islam is the religion of the Algerian people." VERITES SUR LA REVOLUTION ALGERIENNE (197), p.236.
444. EL-MOUJAHID (1) June 1956, p.8.


446. EL-MOUJAHID first appeared in Algiers in June 1956, with both Arabic and French editions. It then appeared every 1-2 months until the discovery of its clandestine press during the Battle of Algiers. Nos. 6-10 were published at Tetouan, in Morocco, and Nos. 11-91 (Nov 1957-June 1962) were published in Tunis. The whole series, apart from issues 5-7, was republished in 1962.

447. EL-MOUJAHID (1) June 1956, p.8.

448. Ibid., p.9. Jihad, it claimed, was "the quintessence of liberal and open patriotism".

449. "Everyone who spent any time in Algeria during the war years", wrote J.K. Cooley, "knows the very large part Islam played in arousing national feeling. It crystallized the vast but vague discontent of the mass of people." BAAL, CHRIST AND MOHAMMED (London 1965), p.301. Desparmet's citations from "Present-day Arab poetry in Blida" in 1905 suggest that this yearning was deeply ingrained in popular thought: "Crush our enemies, 0 powerful one, in such a disaster as will break their fetters and annihilate their fortune. Undo their schemes, frustrate their efforts, put their armies into disarray, blind their policy, and hasten the hour when you will take your revenge on them, for they cannot withstand your power!" (''Sabbath prayer of schoolchildren'' - quoted to 14th Congress of Orientalists, Algiers 1905 - repr. in J. Desparmet: 'Le nationalisme et l'école indigène en Tunisie et en Algérie' Pt. 2 in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (April 1935) p.231.


456. Ibid., p.337.

458. Ibid., p.41.


462. Cf. APPEL DES ULEMAS DE L'ISLAM ET DE LA LANGUE ARABE, 22 Aout 1962, C.H.E.A.M. doct. 50,789. This appeal by the Association of Ulema announced its opposition to the separation of cult and state proposed by the 'Fédération de France', the Metropolitan-based branch of the FLN. The paradox of this position, in the light of the AAU's demand for such a separation in the 1930s, is more apparent than real, for the colonial regime, or 'state', was not Islamic.

463. EL-MOUJAHID (17) 1.2.1958, p.291.

464. EL-MOUJAHID (17) 1.2.1958, pp.289-91 'National resurrection and democratic revolution'.


466. Cf. notes 258 and 449 above.


472. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962), p.156. "B. came up to me", Ferroun recorded in his diary for 5th January 1956, "wearing a wide smile and a tall chéchia, a big scarlet cone from whose tip stiff tassles spill cut on one side. From this moment, the chéchia is to become de rigueur for us. A visible sign of support." JOURNAL 1955-1962, p.36.
473. F. Fanon: *A DYING COLONIALISM* (Harmondsworth 1970) ch.I
'Algeria unveiled', pp.21-49.

474. "Especially during the early years of the war, the FLN frequently ordered boycotts, based on both national and religious motives, of such French-produced and controlled products as tobacco. One prominent moslem citizen of Constantine showed me a tract he had received in the mail forbidding him to play cards or dominoes (both made in France); to use 'discs of dishonesty' (phonograph records of 'profane' popular music, recorded in France; Egyptian jazz records if they could be found were all right); to drink alcoholic drinks (revival of traditional Koranic prohibition); or to frequent cafes, cinemas, or football games managed by Europeans."


476. E. Mannoni: 'Qu'est-ce que le FLN?' in *LA NEF* (10) Oct 1957, p.28.


478. M. Feraoun: *JOURNAL 1955-62* (1962) p.73. Two of Feraoun's relatives were assassinated by the FLN (in France), one for having smoked and the other for having drunk liquor.

479. "I learn that Moorish Cafés have been ordered to ban games: dominoes, cards, lotto, etc. Yes, first of all the practice is contrary to Islam. And then, of course, games are notoriously conducive to laziness, dissipation, and the neglect of family duties. One must be honest and hard working, concerning oneself with one's children's food. Alcohol, bad; tobacco, bad; games, bad. Bad! Bad! It is the time of austerity. Blind obedience to the decalogue is an imperative duty."


481. Ibid., pp.72-3.

482. Ibid., p.48.

483. Ibid., p.41.

484. Cf. note 474 above. The economic consequences in certain neighbourhoods were considerable. "Since June 20th," Feraoun wrote in November 1955, "the French population of Fort-National has been unhappy because the Kabyles have stopped going into cafés and inebriating themselves publicly. An age-old pattern is suddenly threatened with overthrow. The Wednesday receipts are evaporating, and proprietors who have built their future on the tottering shoulders of the disloyal Kabyle are now haunted by the spectre of bankruptcy .... Every time I go out to drink, I am welcomed with sighs of relief, and both my hands are shaken."
485. There was a 5-day strike-boycott in late October/early November 1956, for example, to commemorate the second anniversary of the launching of the FLN offensive. (Feraoun: JOURNAL (1962) pp.157-9). The atmosphere of 'community withdrawal' which such initiatives imposed was reinforced by the curfews simultaneously imposed by the French. "For those who have permits," Feraoun wrote in November 1956, "freedom to travel about is allowed between 8 o'clock and half past eleven in the morning, and between half past four and 6 o'clock in the evening. Outside those hours, we must stay at home." JOURNAL 1955-62 (1962) p.168.


489. cf. EL-MOUJAHID (12) 15.11.1957 p162-4
EL-MOUJAHID (17) 1.2.1958 p289-91


491. A. Ouzegane: LE MEILLEUR COMBAT (1962) p.44.

492. - : 'Le FLN et la communauté musulman' in PERSPECTIVES (554) 2.2.1957, p.3.


495. Ibid., p.22.


499. Ibid. p72
500. In meetings in Aurès hamlets just before the uprising of November 1954, Chihani made his local militants swear a joint oath of loyalty on the Koran. S. Bromberger: LES REBELLES ALGERIENS (1958) p.27.


502. The war-cry of ALN units was "Allah ou Akhbar!" (God is Great!) A. Benzine: JOURNAL DE MARCHE (1965), p.96.

CONCLUSION

Although the two processes can never be fully distinguished, this thesis has aimed less at unearthing new information than at developing a theoretical framework for the interpretation of known facts. It has attempted to establish a context within which the process of decolonization in Algeria - particularly the independence struggle of 1954-62 - can be intelligibly situated. In so doing, there has been a constant need to separate 'ideology' from 'structure' - in some measure, to isolate the interpretative preconceptions of participants in that process and to relate these to their material interests and the objective significance of their role - although treatment of this theme has been piecemeal rather than rigorously methodical. The tension between 'fact' and 'value' which this indicates has unfortunately been heightened by reliance on secondary, mostly European, sources. For all these reasons, it is not possible to offer a satisfactory set of factual 'conclusions' as a serene postscript. One can merely restate, in broad terms, what are the limitations and potentialities of certain approaches to research.

The orthodox interpretation of nationalism, as outlined in Chapter One, sheds little useful light on the decolonization process in Algeria. It concentrates narrowly on certain events and superficial trends, and ties them into a tightly self-contained dialectic of change which implies a radical departure from, and indeed a supersession of, previous patterns of indigenous political behaviour. The basic assumptions behind such an approach ignore a large body of evidence. The 'phoenix' view of socio-political change, which posits the necessary disintegration of traditional structures and the ultimate integration
of surviving individuals within a new, 'modern' set of structures, proves singularly inappropriate in coming to terms with the specificity of local reality. Reducing this to caricature, it spins out an abstract and mechanistic logic. The 'traditional' structures and processes of Algerian politics did not, in fact, collapse in any real sense; in major respects, as the first half of Chapter Six suggests, they remained intact in all their complexity, and developed new strength. Moreover, the resurgence of indigenous spontaneity eventually associated with the F.L.N. was strongest in precisely those areas where such survival and mutation was most marked. In any case, the French colonizers did not seek to implant a complete new set of 'modern' social structures among the moslem community, as Chapter Four suggests, and certainly did not succeed in doing so. Nor, as Chapter Six indicates, was the pursuit of such developments (a 'nation-to-be') a significant feature of the indigenous movements which led to decolonization. Far more significant in the dialectic of decolonization was the obstinate refusal of 'traditional' institutions to disintegrate, and their resistance to integration within the 'modern' colonial framework.

Nor did the most powerful processes at work within indigenous society have their source in modern urban areas. The roots of F.L.N. success lay in the countryside, far from the European conurbations. The involvement of the moslem population of large, new towns was not of the same structural importance, nor was it, in any case, of the 'modern' character suggested by orthodox theory. Similarly, the fulcrum of F.L.N. success was not a small, influential, 'Westernized' elite group, but the combined solidarities of 'traditional' segmentary groups. Sociological evolution forced the latter into the forefront of the independence struggle, not some decision to 'mobilize' them made by an elite, or at a political party headquarters. The novel political forms and language
which such an elite or political party tended to adopt were marginal to
the principal dynamic of change — that whereby the established Maghrebi
political 'game' persisted and evolved under changing circumstances.
So far from being cut off from their past, adrift on an uncharted
current leading to an unknown future, Algerian communities remained
highly conscious of their links with and debt to their inherited culture,
which extended back well before the arrival of the French colonizers.

After the elimination of many of these orthodox preconceptions,
certain characteristics of 'nationalist' manifestations in Algeria emerge
more clearly. Firstly, they were not describable as one thing, as a
coherent, consistent, single-stranded movement. Indigenous political
behaviour, as Chapter Three suggests, could only be grasped in terms of
a variety of conflicting potentialities interacting at several levels.
The traditional 'game' or dynamic comprised an intricate pattern of
fission and fusion of segmentary lineage groups, interplay of alliance
and opposition in competition for economic resources, impositions and
bonds generated by the authority of 'central' hegemones and dynasties,
a combination of struggle and solidarity around the symbols of 'sanctity'
and unifying and divisive pressures imposed by membership of the wider
moslem community. The repercussions within this total game caused by
the colonial presence were multifarious and often contradictory; they
cannot be neatly packaged together under one label.

Secondly, the nature of these manifestations was extremely
localized. They expressed the everyday solidarities and divisions of
small-scale groups, not a new, blinding consciousness of one overriding
'nation-to-be'. Nor were they coordinated, orchestrated or effectively
directed 'from the top down' by a central group which had such a vision.
On the other hand, however, these extremely diverse localized reactions
were those of segments of a shared political culture, of units in a
shared political game, and awareness of this was an important motivating
force. This shared 'code', or common point of reference, precisely because it was so fundamentally understood and intimately experienced, was not explicitly articulated or 'ideologized', at least in terms comprehensible to the colonizer. It had to be deduced from behaviour, from observation of the institutions and values around which communal defence was organized and of those which gave rise to reactions of resistance and withdrawal.

Above all, the logical consistency underlying much of this intricate complex of behaviour patterns can most effectively be brought out when they are related to the threats and opportunities imposed by the colonial situation. The traditional 'game' did not simply persist, but was obliged to elaborate itself within a special framework imposed by the colonizer. The structure of colonial situations, as Chapter Two argued, necessarily entails deep socio-political bifurcation. The dominant colonizer group in Algeria did not have the resources to 'assimilate' the moslem population within its social, political and economic culture, and, equally important, at one level had a clear interest in not attempting to do so. As Chapter Four indicates, the French settlers were more interested in establishing a holding arrangement which accepted bifurcation, and indeed enshrined it legally, and hoped vaguely for a peaceful coexistence which would facilitate exploitation of certain resources. One result was the deliberate pursuit of 'underadministration', as outlined in Chapter Five.

At the same time, however, this fundamental, built-in bifurcation was inimical to the survival of the colonial situation. The existence and evolution of self-contained socio-political life among the colonized, escaping colonial control, constituted a standing challenge to the stability of the colonizer's supremacy. The French chose for a long time to ignore it, because of the limited goals of their conquest, and only a few local agents periodically pointed out its dangers or attempted to defuse the threat, but from the outset it was there. Rather than diminishing through being ignored, in fact the explosive potential of this separateness developed.
as indigenous groups began in various ways to retake the initiative. 'Birnam Wood' began to move towards 'Dunsinane'. When the French were eventually aroused to the dangers of this situation, and did attempt to attack the defensive walls around moslem society, the latent 'nationalism' implicit in these communities' strategies of avoidance and inertia quickly transformed themselves into more overt 'nationalisms'. Thus the colonial situation, as a system, contained and fostered the seeds of its own ultimate destruction. It had at its heart a basic contradiction between the need to integrate two societies in order to eliminate the explosive potential of duality, and the need, perceived by both constituent societies, to stop such integration short of the point where their special interests and identities were threatened.

The F.L.N. contribution to the destruction of the colonial situation must thus be related to the various strategies which indigenous society adopted from the beginnings of French control. As the latter half of Chapter Six suggests, the violent aspects of activity associated with the F.L.N. - guerilla warfare, for example - were most deeply embedded in those areas which had previously been characterized by primary resistance, post-pacification revolt, feud and social banditry. Similarly, the withdrawn aspects - those entailing retreat, physical elusiveness and bogus 'submission' - were most effectively pursued in remote areas which the French had, part willingly and part reluctantly, long left largely to their own devices rather than rigorously implanted and controlled. Strategies of institutional duplication and social avoidance, also, rather than novel features of the F.L.N. campaign, had in fact been deeply entrenched as features of indigenous political behaviour from the earliest years of the colonial presence.

Thus the F.L.N. deepened and exploited existing channels of resistance and assertion rather than manufactured new ones. The effect
of adopting this perspective is not acceptance of the view that nothing changes under the sun. To suggest, for example, that the socio-political character of the 1954-62 war was not essentially different from Abdel Kader's campaigns in the 1830s and 1840s would be a manifest absurdity. It is rather a matter of acceptance that change must be related to, seen as emerging from within, the indigenous context — its pressures, conflicts and potentialities — rather than related to the mechanical logic of externally-inspired forces.

The 'modern'-seeming ideology of the F.L.N. — its claims, expressed in novel terminology, for the novelty of its strategies and goals — has to be understood in terms of this perspective. It cannot be accepted as a straightforward reflection of the structure of the 1954-1962 struggle. One problem is that, for various reasons, many Europeans have assessed this ideology in terms of their own distorting preconceptions, ignoring or misrepresenting certain 'traditional' elements within it, and over-emphasising or misconstruing other 'modern' elements. The way in which the same message was understood by the indigenous participants in the struggle was often very different; different parts of it had different emotional 'weight'. Moreover, the way in which it was conveyed varied according to its audience. Many of the F.L.N. claims in pamphlets, press interviews, conference resolutions and chalked slogans — were designed for European consumption, and thus cast in terms comprehensible to Europeans; quite other kinds of channel were used to communicate within indigenous society, and often, indeed, explicit articulation was unnecessary or of marginal impact. The ideological utterances of the F.L.N. were designed to have an effect, and those directed at the colonizer inevitably exaggerated certain features of what they purported to describe. To the extent that some F.L.N. leaders believed their own utterances, however, we have to allow for self-deception. The excitement of wartime made for hasty generalizations; wish-fulfilment made for exaggerated claims; divorce from the day-to-day struggle of traditional
communities fostered a distorted, centralizing perspective. Whatever
the claims, the F.L.N. was not, in practical terms, a well-structured,
experienced, deeply-rooted or ideologically coherent vanguard party,
either at the outset or at the conclusion of the 1954-62 struggle;
the contrast with the Chinese, Vietnamese or even the Cuban Communist
parties is quite striking. The building of such a party was a task
which remained to be undertaken.
This thesis constitutes a review of published literature. It is not based on any form of 'fieldwork'. A 12-month stay in Tunisia and Algeria in 1965-6 stimulated my original interest in the subject, and a 2-month visit to Algeria in 1971 gave me an opportunity both to travel (especially in Kabylia) and to visit libraries. Although these experiences provided some 'feel' of Maghreb life, no systematic field research, investigation of primary data, or interviewing, was undertaken.

I. C.H.E.A.M. documents

The published material consulted consists mainly of 'secondary' works, themselves inspired by other published material, although some were inspired by direct observation, or by participation in events. Of the latter, a few sources were 'unpublished' in the sense of belonging to the archives of the Centre des Hautes Etudes sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Moderne (C.H.E.A.M.) in Paris. This Institute, founded by Robert Montagne after the Second World War, ran courses and seminars for French colonial administrators, and its archives include a miscellany of reports and discussion documents used in that connection.

The following proved to be of particular interest:

Un Africain: LE NATIONALISME EXTREMISTE EN ALGERIE, SES FORCES, SES FAIBLESSES (Oct 1952)
Col. Betbéder: LE REFORMISME ALGERIEN ET L'ASSOCIATION DES ULEMAS (1947)
Charavin: LA COMMUNE MIXTE D'ALGERIE (Doc.415) Oct 1941
Chastel: LES TRIEUS ET LE PROBLEME DU PAYSANNAT DANS LE C.C.DE GAFSA (Doc.282) 1938
Comité Méditerranéen: LES GRANDS COURANTS D'OPINION DANS L'ISLAM NORD-AFRICAIN (Doc.23) 1937
Dupléssis-Kergomard: LA VIE MUNICIPALE EN KABYLIE - LE CENTRE MUNICIPAL D'OUMALOU (Doc.376) May 1938
C. Faivre: UNE REVOLUTION ADMINISTRATIVE EN ALGERIE - LA REFORME COMMUNALE (Doc.3740) 1959
de Falguerolles: LE JEMAA AU MAROC ET EN MILIEU RURAL (Doc.2091) Nov.1952
Fraisse: SYNTHESE DES RENSEIGNEMENTS SUR LE M.T.L.D. (Doc.1715) 1950
Hirtz: EVOLUTION SOCIALE DU DJEBEL AMOUR DEPUIS 1830 (Doct.744) Oct 1945
Hirtz: LA PORTEE POLITIQUE DU SENATUS-CONSULTE EN 1863 (Doct.737) ?1945
R. Holstein: LA FIN D'UNE COMMUNE-MIXTE ALGERIENNE (Doct.2909) 1957
Jammes: LES ECOLES REFORMISTES OULEMAS D'ALGERIA (Doct.1328) May 1958
J. Laburthe: L'EVOLUTION DE LA DJEMAA KABYLE DANS LA COMMUNE MIXTE DE FORT-NATIONAL (1947)
M. Lauriol: LE REGIONALISME INTERNE EN ALGERIE (Doct.50.523) March 1957
R. Le Tourneau: EVOLUTION POLITIQUE DE L'ALGERIE (Doct.3768) 1952
Capt. Meric: ETUDE SUR LE BUREAU DES A.I. DE TATTA (Doct.541) 1935
Merlet: EVOLUTION DE L'ORGANISATION ADMINISTRATIVE DE L'ALGERIE (Doct.2911) 1957
R. Montagne: LA FERMENTATION DES PARTIS POLITIQUES EN ALGERIE (Doct.609) March 1937
R. Montagne: LE POUVOIR DES CHEFS EN BERBERIE (Doct.18) Oct 1941
M. de Montalembert: ACTION DES S.A.S. EN ALGERIE (Doct.3264) 1959
R. de Monts de Savasse: LES JEMAAS DANS LE SAHRO (Doct.1887) Nov 1951
Parant: LES CENTRES MUNICIPAUX D'ALGERIE (Doct.796) ?1946
G. Payré: DEMOCRATIE ET TRADITION EN TUNISIE (Doct.885) June-1946
A. Piquet: VILLAGES ET TRIBUS KABYLES (Doct.32) ?1937
de Préville: ORIGINS POLITIQUES ET SOCIALES DE LA REBELLION DANS LE DOUAR MOULADHEIM (BONE) (Doct.3072) 1959
Capt. Rohard: L'EVOLUTION SOCIALE ET POLITIQUE DANS LE GUERROUMA (ARRONDISSEMENT DE PALESTRO) (Doct.3334) 1960
Sultana: LA CONFRERIE RELIGIEUSE DES ANMARIA ET LA ZAOUIA D'AIN DEFLA (Doct.22 bis) ?1937
J. Veillet: MONOGRAPHIE DE LA S.A.S. D'AIN-BOUCIF (Doct.2870) 1958
J. Vialatte de Pémille: LE P.P.A. ET LE M.T.L.D. Dec 1951
Lt. Vincent: MONOGRAPHIE DE LA COMMUNE DE GUELT-ET-BEIDA (Doct.3546) 1961
Zanetacci: L'INFLUENCE DE LA POLITIQUE DE L'EAU SUR LA LUTTE DES DEUX SOFFS A LAGHOUAT (Doct.411) 1938
- : LES CONFRERIES RELIGIEUSES AU MAROC (Doct.28 bis) ?1937
- : LES ETABLISSEMENTS D'ENSEIGNEMENT DES OULEMAS REFORMISTES A CONSTANTINE (Doct.198 bis) March 1938
- : L'ORGANISATION PPA-MTLD EN ORANIE (Doct.1797) ?1951
II. Publications of the Gouvernement-Général d'Algérie

Also consulted on a number of points were certain official publications of the Gouvernement-Général d'Algérie. Some were periodical, notably:

- ANNuaIRE STATISTIQUE DE L'ALGERIE ....
- COMpte DEFINITIF DE L'EXERCICE ....
- DOCUMENTS ALGERIENS - SYNTHESE DE L'ACTIVITE ALGERIENNE ....
- JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE L'ALGERIE ....
- STATISTIQUE GENERALE DE L'ALGERIE ....

For official census returns, the following were consulted:

- RESULTATS STATISTIQUES DU DENOMBREMENT DE 1881 (République Française, Bureau de la Statistique Général: Paris 1883)
- STATISTIQUE GENERALE DE L'ALGERIE, ANNEES 1879-81
- STATISTIQUE GENERALE DE L'ALGERIE, ANNEES 1891-3
- STATISTIQUE GENERALE DE L'ALGERIE, ANNEE 1900
- STATISTIQUE GENERALE DE L'ALGERIE, ANNEE 1910
- TABLEAU GENERALE DES COMMUNES EN ALGERIE ... SITUATION AU 6 Mars 1921
- TABLEAU GENERALE DES COMMUNES DE L'ALGERIE ... SITUATION AU 7 Mars 1926
- RECENSEMENTS QUINQUENNAUX DE 1926 ET DE 1931
- REPORTEIRE STATISTIQUE DES COMMUNES DE L'ALGERIE (Recensement de la population au 8 Mars 1931)
- REPORTEIRE STATISTIQUE DES COMMUNES DE L'ALGERIE (Recensement de la population en 1936)
- RESULTATS STATISTIQUES DU DENOMBREMENT DE LA POPULATION EFFECTUE LE 31 OCT 1948
- RESULTATS STATISTIQUES DU RECENSEMENT DE LA POPULATION DU 31 OCT 1954

Other special publications of the Algerian administration referred to include:

- L'ALGERIE D'AUJOURD'HUI (République Française, Délégation-Générale en Algérie - 1957-1958)
- ACTION DU GOUVERNEMENT EN ALGERIE, MESURES DE PACIFICATION ET REFORMES (République Française, Délégation-Générale en Algérie 1956, 1957, 1958)
- ETUDE SOCIOLOGIQUE DE LA MIGRATION DES TRAVAILLEURS MUSULMANS D'ALGERIE EN METROPOLE (Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie, Bureau d'étude des mouvements de main d'oeuvre - 1955)
- LES EVENEMENTS D'ALGERIE (Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie - 1954)
- RAPPORT SUR L'ACTIVITE DE L'ADMINISTRATION EN ALGERIE AU COURS DE L'ANNEE 1959 (République Française, Délégation Générale en Algérie - 1960)
- QUELQUES ASPECTS DE LA VIE SOCIALE DE L'ADMINISTRATION DES INDIGENES EN ALGERIE (Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie, Direction des affaires indigènes 1922)
III. Journals relating to North Africa

A number of journals relating to Maghreb society and affairs were consulted fairly systematically, in particular:

L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (Quarterly, published from 1947 by the Centre des Hautes Etudes sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Moderne, Paris)
L'AFRIQUE FRANCAISE (Monthly, published from 1909 by the Comité de l'Afrique française, Paris)
EL-MOUKAHID (Published by the Front de Libération Nationale from 1956, at varying intervals)
HESPERIS - ARCHIVES BERBERES (Quarterly, published from 1921 by the Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines, Rabat)
IBLA (Quarterly, published from 1937 by the Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes, Tunis)
REVUE AFRICAINE (Quarterly, published from 1856 by the Société Historique, Algiers)
REVUE DES ETUDES ISLAMIQUES (Published three times per year from 1927, Paris)

IV. Books and articles

The books and articles referred to during the preparation of this thesis fall into three main topic areas. The first group covers the general theoretical debate about nationalism, colonialism, social change and political development in the third world within which the Algerian experience is situated. The second group concerns the establishment and organization of the French colonial presence in Algeria. The third group deals with indigenous Algerian society and its response to that presence.

(i) NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD

(a) Books

D. E. Apter: GHANA IN TRANSITION (London 1965)
D. E. Apter: THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION (Chicago 1965)
D. E. Ashford: POLITICAL CHANGE IN MOROCCO (Princeton 1961)
S. Avineri (ed.): KARL MARX ON COLONIALISM AND MODERNIZATION (New York 1968)
G. Balandier: POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (London 1970)
E. C. & L. F. Banfield: THE MORAL BASIS OF BACKWARD SOCIETY (Glencoe 1958)
J. A. Barnes: POLITICS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (London 1954)
M. Barratt-Brown: AFTER IMPERIALISM (London 1970)
G. D. Bearce: BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS INDIA 1784-1858 (Oxford 1961)
J. Beattie: OTHER CULTURES (London 1964)
R. N. Bellah (ed.): RELIGION AND PROGRESS IN MODERN ASIA (New York 1965)
R. Bendix: NATION-BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP (New York 1965)
S. Bernard: LE CONFLIT FRANCO-MAROCAIN 1943-1956 (Brussels 1963)
J. Berque: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (Paris 1964)
H. Bienvenu: TANZANIA - PARTY TRANSFORMATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
           (Princeton 1967)
P. Bonnefie: LE NATIONALISME AFRICAIN (Paris 1964)
K. A. Busia: THE POSITION OF THE CHIEF IN THE MODERN POLITICAL SYSTEM
           OF ASHANTI (Oxford 1975)
W. Cartey & M. Kilson (eds.): THE AFRICAN READER - COLONIAL AFRICA
           (New York 1970)
G. von Clausewitz: ON WAR (Harmondsworth 1969)
J. S. Coleman: NIGERIA - THE BACKGROUND TO NATIONALISM (California 1958)
J. S. Coleman & C. G. Rosberg (eds.): POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL
           INTEGRATION IN TROPICAL AFRICA (California 1964)
M. Crowder: WEST AFRICAN RESISTANCE (London 1971)
P. D. Curtin: THE IMAGE OF AFRICA - BRITISH IDEAS AND ACTION 1780-1850
           (London 1970)
R. Debray: REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION? (Harmondsworth 1968)
R. Delavignette: FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA (Oxford 1950)
L.-J. Duclos, J. Duvignaud, J. Leca: LES NATIONALISMES MAGHREBINS (Paris 1966)
D. Easton: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS (New York 1955)
D. Easton: THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (New York 1953)
R. Emerson: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION (Harvard 1960)
E. E. Evans-Pritchard: THE Nuer (Oxford 1940)
E. E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (Oxford 1949)
L. Faures: BANTU BUREAUCRACY (Cambridge 1956)
F. Fanon: BLACK SKINS, WHITE MASKS (London 1968)
F. Fanon: A DYING COLONIALISM (Harmondsworth 1970)
M. Fortes: THE DYNAMICS OF CLANSHIP AMONG THE TALLEDOSI (Oxford 1945)
M. Fortes & E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.): AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS
           (London 1940)
W. H. Friedland & C. G. Rosberg (eds.): AFRICAN SOCIALISM (Stanford 1964)
J. S. Furnivall: COLONIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE (Cambridge 1948)
L. H. Gann & P. Duignan: WHITE SETTLERS IN TROPICAL AFRICA (Harmondsworth 1962)
L. H. Gann & P. Duignan (eds.): COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960
C. Geertz (ed.): OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES (Glencoe 1963)
V. N. Glaz: PEOPLE'S WAR, PEOPLE'S ARMY (New York 1962)
M. Gluckman: CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (Oxford 1956)
M. Gluckman: THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE (Manchester 1955)
M. Gluckman: ORDER AND REBELLION IN TRIBAL AFRICA (London 1965)
M. Gluckman: POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY (London 1965)
C. Guevara: GUERRILLA WARFARE (Harmondsworth 1969)
A. Guillaume: LES BERBERES MAROCAINES ET LA PACIFICATION DE L'ATLAS
           CENTRAL 1912-1933 (Paris 1946)
A. Gunder Frank: CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
           (Harmondsworth 1971)
A. Gunder Frank: SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF
           SOCIOLOGY (London 1971)
E. E. Hagen: ON THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE (Illinois 1962)
M. Halpern: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
           AFRICA (Princeton 196 )
S. A. Hanna & G. H. Gardner (eds.): ARAB SOCIALISM (Leiden 1969)
O. Heilbrun: PARTISAN WARFARE (New York 1962)
E. J. Hobsbawm: PRIMITIVE REBELS = STUDIES IN ARCHAIC FORMS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT (Manchester 1959)
E. J. Hobsbawm: BANDITS (Harmondsworth 1972)
T. Hodgkin: AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES (Harmondsworth 1961)
T. Hodgkin: NATIONALISM IN TROPICAL AFRICA (London 1956)
B. F. Boselitz (ed.): THE PROGRESS OF UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS (Chicago 1952)
A. Huré: LA PACIFICATION DU MAROC = DERNIÈRE ETAPPE 1931-34 (Paris 1952)
International Institute of Differing Civilizations: DEVELOPMENT OF A MIDDLE CLASS IN TROPICAL COUNTRIES (Brussels 1956)
G. Jonescu & E. Gellner (eds.): POPULISM (London 1969)
E. Kedourie: NATIONALISM (London 1961)
E. Kedourie: NATIONALISM IN ASIA AND AFRICA (London 1971)
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H. Kuper: AN AFRICAN ARISTOCRACY - RANK AMONG THE SWAZI (London 1947)
J. La Palombara (ed.): BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Princeton 1963)
J. La Palombara & M. Weiner (eds.): POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Princeton 1966)
E. R. Leach: THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (London 1964)
E. R. Leach: RETHINKING ANTHROPOLOGY (London 1961)
L. S. B. Leakey: MAU MAU AND THE KIKUYU (London 1952)
V. I. Lenin: LENIN ON THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTION (Peking 1967)
D. Lerner: THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (Glencoe 1958)
P. C. Lloyd: AFRICA IN SOCIAL CHANGE (Harmondsworth 1969)
D. C. McClelland: THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY (Princeton 1961)
L. F. Mair: NATIVE ADMINISTRATION IN CENTRAL NYASALAND (London 1952)
B. Malinowski: CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (London 1926)
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O. Mannoni: PSYCHOLOGIE DE LA COLONISATION (Paris 1950)
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R. Maunier: THE SOCIOLOGY OF COLONIES - INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF RACE CONTACT (London 1949)
T. N'Goya: FREEDOM AND AFTER (London 1963)
A. Memmi: PORTRAIT DU COLONISE PRECEDE DU PORTRAIT DU COLONISATEUR (Paris 1957)
J. Middleton & D. Tait: TRIBES WITHOUT RULERS (London 1958)
E. Mondlane: THE STRUGGLE FOR MOZAMBIQUE (Harmondsworth 1969)
P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (Paris 1952)
P. Nettl: POLITICAL MOBILIZATION (London 1967)
P. M. Osanka (ed.): MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE - FIGHTING COMMUNIST GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS 1941-61 (New York 1961)
T. Parsons: SOCIETIES - EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (New Jersey 1967)
L. W. Pye: ASPECTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Boston 1966)
L. W. Pye: POLITICS, PERSONALITY AND NATION-BUILDING - BURMA'S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (New Haven 1962)
L. W. Pye (ed.): COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT (Princeton 1963)
L. W. Pye & S. Verba (eds.): POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS (Princeton 1966)
A. Richards (ed.): EAST AFRICAN CHIEFS (London 1960)
M. D. Sahlin: TRIBALISM (New Jersey 1968)
R. Schachter-Morgenthau: POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRENCH-SPEAKING WEST AFRICA (London 1965)
I. Schapera: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN TRIBAL SOCIETIES (London 1956)
E. Shils: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW STATES (The Hague 1962)
R. Sklar: NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES (Princeton 1963)
M. G. Smith: GOVERNMENT IN ZAZZAU (London 1960)
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W. Warboy: HO CHI MINH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AN INDEPENDENT VIETNAM (London 1972)
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A. R. Zolberg: ONE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE IVORY COAST (Princeton 1964)

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G. Balandier: 'Le contexte sociologique de la vie politique en Afrique noire' in REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE (9) Sept 1959 pp.598-609
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G. Balandier: Les mythes politiques de colonisation et de décolonisation en Afrique' in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1962)
G. Balandier: 'Réflexions sur le fait politique: le cas des sociétés africaines' in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1964)
G. Balandier: 'La situation coloniale - approche théorique' in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (11) 1951 pp.44-79
J. A. Barnes: 'Indigenous politics and colonial administration' in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY (2) 1960

F. Barth: 'Segmentary opposition and the theory of games' in JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE (89) 1959

R. Bastide: 'Messianisme et développement économique et sociale' in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (31) 1961

J. Beattie: 'Awareness of group and self in small-scale societies' (paper presented to the Joint Conference of the European Association for the Study of Experimental Psychology and the International Social Science Association, Cannes 1969 mimeo)


L. Binder: 'National integration and political development' in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (58) 1964 pp.622-631

B. Charles: 'Un parti politique africain - le Parti Démocratique de Guinée' in REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE (12) 2 1962 pp.312-359

E. M. Chilver & P. M. Kaberry: 'From tribute to tax in a Tikar chiefdom' in AFRICA (30) 1 1960


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L-J. Duclos: 'The Berbers and the rise of Moroccan nationalism' in E. Gellner & C. Micaud (eds.): ARABS AND BERBERS - FROM TRIBE TO NATION IN NORTH AFRICA(London 1973)


S. N. Eisenstadt: 'Modernization and conditions of sustained growth' in WORLD POLITICS (16) July 1964 pp.576-594

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L. A. Fallers: 'The predicament of the modern African chief' in AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST (57) 2 1955
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E. A. Gellner: 'Nationalism' Ch.7 in E. Gellner: THOUGHT AND CHANGE (London 1964)
M. Gluckman: 'Analysis of a social situation in modern Zululand' in BANTU STUDIES (June 1940)
M. Gluckman: 'Malinowski's 'functional' analysis of social change' in AFRICA (17) 1947 p.106-121
M. Gluckman; J. C. Mitchell, J. A. Barnes: 'The village headman in British Central Africa' in AFRICA (19) 1949
J. S. Gusfield: 'Tradition and modernity - misplaced polarities in the study of social change' in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (72) January 1967
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T. Hodgkin: 'The African middle-class' in CORONA (7) 1956
J. Hogard: 'Guerre révolutionnaire et pacification' in REVUE MILITAIRE D'INFORMATION (280) Jan 1957
S. P. Huntington: 'Political development and political decay' in WORLD POLITICS (17) July 1965
J. Iliffe: 'The organization of the Maji-Maji rebellion' in JOURNAL OF AFRICAN HISTORY (8) 1967
M. L. Kilson: 'African political change and the modernization process' in JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES (1) 1963
M. L. Kilson: 'Nationalism and social classes in British West Africa' in JOURNAL OF POLITICS (1958)
E. R. Leach: 'The political future of Burma' in FUTURIBLES (Geneva) 1963
R. Levine: 'The internalization of political values in stateless societies' in HUMAN ORGANIZATION (19) pp.51-8
M. J. Levy jr.: 'Patterns (structures) of modernization and political development' in ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (358) March 1965 pp.29-40
M. J. Levy Jr.: 'The vulnerability of the structures of relatively non-industrialized societies to relatively industrialized ones' in B. F. Hoselitz (ed.): THE PROGRESS OF UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS (Chicago 1952)

J. Lombard: 'La vie politique dans une ancienne société de type féodale: les Bariba du Dahomey' in CAHIERS D'ETUDES AFRICAINS (3) Oct 1960 pp.5-45


D. J. McCrone & C. F. Cnudde: 'Towards a communications theory of democratic political development' in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (61) March 1967


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K. R. Minogue: 'Nationalism: the poverty of a concept' in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (8) 2 1967


C. H. Moore: 'Politics in a Tunisian village' in MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL (Autumn 1963)

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(ii) THE COLONIAL REGIME IN ALGERIA

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S. Amin: L'ECONOMIE DU MAGHREB (Paris 1966)
D. Amrani: LE TEMOIN (Paris 1960)
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P. Azan: L'ARMEE D'AFRIQUE DE 1830 A 1852 (Paris 1936)
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