Britain’s policy towards the EU’s enlargement process from 1975 to 2014

YILMAZ KAPLAN

PhD

University of York

Politics

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Abstract

This thesis has examined Britain’s continuous support for the EU’s enlargement process in the period from 1975 to 2014 utilising a Liberal Intergovernmentalist (LI) perspective. The research has mainly confirmed the usefulness of LI as a theory, especially its conception of national preference formation and its two-level depiction of the EU decision-making process. However, the findings below also highlight some challenges for LI. Enlargement has continually proved to be a complex issue, which significantly constrains the ability of governments (including successive British governments) to make decisions about it using a rational, cost-benefit analysis. LI gets around this problem by arguing that in such cases of complexity, national policy-makers may fall back on ideological or geopolitical preferences and arguments for enlargement, and the evidence from the case studies below, confirm this point. But this ‘multi-causal’ approach also appears to both undermine LI’s parsimony as a theory, and to raise questions whether it is, in fact, capable of anything more than a ‘thick description’.
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Author's Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.
1 Introduction: Britain and EU Enlargement

1.1 Introduction

Britain has a reputation for being an ‘awkward’ partner within the EU (George, 1996). For example, just after her membership, Britain held a referendum about her EEC membership in 1975, and interestingly an EU referendum is still on Britain’s political agenda after almost 40 years of membership. In other words, Britain’s relationship with the EU is still uncertain (Allen, 2013, p. 109). Therefore, Britain has always been an interesting topic in the EU studies, and it is still important to understand Britain within the EU. However, the focus of this thesis is not the response of the successive British governments to the deepening of the EU, but British policy towards the EU’s enlargement waves since the mid-1970s.

This chapter firstly reviewed the existing literature on Britain’s relations with the EU (plus related academic work on enlargement) and through this, made two claims. Firstly, that the topic of British policy towards EU enlargement has been largely neglected by scholars: indeed, this thesis represents the first fully-fledged study of this subject. Secondly, that not only has it been neglected, but that the story of British policy towards EU enlargement contains some very interesting questions and intellectual puzzles.

1.2 Literature Review: Puzzling the Research

1.2.1 Britain as a Eurosceptic Member


In the literature, Euroscepticism is used as a term particularly to define member states and other actors who do not want any further supranational political and economic integration and prefer an intergovernmental governance system within the EU (Phinnemore and McGowans, 2004, p.210, Alexandre-Collier, 1998, cited in: Forster, 2002, p. 2). However, there are many variables that make it impossible to have a clear-cut definition of Euroscepticism. For example, as Baker and Seawright (1998, pp. 2-3) highlighted, the main British political parties were not distinct blocks in terms of being Eurosceptic or Europhile. Both the Conservative and Labour parties had members who were strongly for and against Britain’s EU membership/the EU’s further economic and political integration, and even pro-Europeans might have negative attitudes towards some specific aspects or policies of the EU (ibid.). Additionally, Forster (2002) argued that the reasons behind British Euroscepticism might change over time. For example, the British anti-Marketeers in the 1970s in time evolved into the British Eurosceptics opposing attempts for further political, economic and monetary integration within the EU. From this perspective, the latest and current anti-immigration sentiments felt in Britain could also be seen as a newly emerging dimension of British Euroscepticism.

At the same time, when it comes to defining the position of actors towards the European integration process, the word ‘Eurosceptic’ is used in contrast to the term ‘pro-European’, although again the relationship between these two terms might change according to the context, in which they gain meaning. To illustrate, although Margaret Thatcher was recognized as one of the most famous Eurosceptics especially after her Bruges speech in 1988 as a reaction to the increasing supranational projects on the European integration, there are many studies defining her government’s position on the European integration in the first half of the 1980s as (lukewarm) pro-European (e.g. Jones, 2007, Geddes, 2013, Hollowell, 2003, Bradbury, 1996, Garnett and Lynch, 2009, and Vinen, 2009) since she supported the European integration process with the aim to drive it in a neoliberal intergovernmental way (Schmidt, 1999, p. 188, Worth, 2015, p. 93). As another example, Tony Blair was defined as a ‘pro-European’ British leader, but his EU policy also aimed to establish an enlarged, outward-looking and intergovernmental European integration
(Johnson and Steinberg, 2004, p. 242, Watts and Pilkington, 2005, p. 277, Hyde-Price, 2007, pp. 99-100), which was similar to the one followed by the former Conservative governments (Dorey, 2005, pp. 85-86). Therefore, when ‘pro-European’ as a term is used in this research to define British governments’ positions towards the European integration process, it mainly represents a support for an outward-looking intergovernmental European integration, but not for an inward-looking supranational integration.

According to the literature, the main reason behind British Euroscepticism was Britain’s having a different national structure and national interests from the EU’s continental members (see: Painter, 2000, and Spiering, 2004). Particularly, a strong sense of sovereignty emerged as the most influential structural factor behind British Euroscepticism (e.g. Gifford, 2008, George, 2000, Bulmer and Burch, 1998, Baker, 2001, Wilks, 1996, Spiering, 2004, Wellings, 2010, Diamond and Liddle, 2008, Kim, 2005, Gibbins, 2014). The literature mainly puts emphasis on the issue that Britain was less enthusiastic than some of the other EU member states in terms of directly transferring sovereignty to the EU or sharing sovereignty with the EU in many areas. In this regard, Nugent (1996, p. 4) even argued that there were other Eurosceptic member states within the EU but none of them had as strong an “anxiety about loss of sovereignty” as Britain did. Therefore, as Gifford (2010) argued, sovereignty constituted one of the most sensitive issues in Britain’s relations “with, and within, the European Union”.

The literature also contains several arguments trying to explain the reasons why Britain had a strong sense of sovereignty regarding her relationship with the EU. Firstly, many studies in the literature highlight the importance of British identity as the most influential factor behind her strong sense of sovereignty. In short, according to the literature, a supranational EU was perceived as a threat to British identity; thus, this perception supported the idea of national sovereignty against the supranational attempts within the EU (Holmes, 2001, Gifford, 2008, Wall, 2008, Gowland et al., 2009, Geddes, 2004, 2015, Schmidt, 2006, Spiering, 2004, 2015, Risse et al., 1999, Crowson, 2007, Cinnirella, 1997, Hamilton, 2007). For example, Crowson (2007) found that the British Eurosceptics perceived the replacement of the British national currency with the euro as a British national identity crisis.

In this context, British identity could be defined as a unique identity without any connection with Europe unlike, for example, French or German identity, which accepts
European-ness as an upper identity (Spiering, 2015, p. 20). In this regard, according to the literature, Britain’s having a separate geographical location and history from that of continental Europe played a dominant role in the differentiation of the British identity from a common European identity (Powell, 2002, Schweiger, 2007, Smith, 2006, Dedman, 2009, Daddow, 2006, Rovisco, 2010). To elaborate, being an island country caused Britain’s identity to evolve independently from that of continental European nations (Schweiger 2007, Powell, 2002); therefore, it may be paradoxical to be both British and European (Powell, 2002). Moreover, Schweiger (2007) also argued that Britain’s imperial past contributed a global perspective to the modern British identity; thus, a European identity can be part of the British identity but cannot form an upper-identity for Britain. Additionally, according to Dedman (2009), there is a strong relationship between Britain’s Second World War experiences and her scepticism towards any federal model for Europe in the following post-war era because Britain continued to fight against Germany alone until the end of the war, prevented a potential German invasion, and maintained her national institutions during the war. Therefore, this experience strengthened the sense of national pride and independence/sovereignty in the British system, unlike the continental countries, and Britain would be more sensitive than continental Europe about her sovereignty.

Furthermore, the literature also considers the adversarial British political system as another structural factor in generating British Euroscepticism (e.g. Geddes, 2004, Spiering, 2004, Wallace, 1995). This system simply means “a political system dominated by adversarial competition between government and opposition” (Moran, 2005, p. 130). In this regard, until the Coalition government between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, Britain experienced single party governments constituted by either the Labour Party or the Conservative Party since the WWII. Consequently, this bipolar party system resulted in an adversarial political structure between the ruling and opposition parties, and many domestic and foreign policy issues were discussed by these competitors in zero sum terms (Budge, McKay and Newton, 2007). As a result, the main British political parties tried to benefit from British Euroscepticism to get an advantage over one another. For example, Geddes (2004) argued that although the Labour leader Wilson made a second application for the EEC membership, he used the EEC membership as a means to challenge the
Heath’s Conservative government by criticising the way Heath negotiated during the accession process and pledged a renegotiation with the EC in the early 1970s.

Last but not least, according to the literature, the Eurosceptic British media had also a significant influence over British Euroscepticism (Page, 1996, Gavin and Sanders, 2003, Gavin, 2000, Gavin, 2007, Anderson and Weymouth, 2014). According to Geddes (2013, p. 36), the Eurosceptic British media especially increased its influence over the British political landscape after the 1990s. Carey and Burton (2004) also found that when both a British political party and the British newspapers released a similar message about the EU at the same time, this common message had a significant influence on the British people. For example, according to Liddle (2014, p. 98), the Eurosceptic British media played an important role in the waning of Blair’s pro-euro policy in the late 1990s.

However, the story of European integration involves a widening, as well as a deepening process. Viewed from this perspective, Britain emerges as a fervent supporter of the widening of the European integration (the EU’s enlargement waves) despite her Euroscepticism towards the deepening of the integration. Interestingly, the literature review for this thesis could find no book or article dedicated solely to the analysis of British policy towards EU enlargement. That said, the more general literature on British foreign policy provides some clues as to why Whitehall has been such a keen advocate of EU widening. Historically, Britain has adopted a global perspective, most notably through the management of her colonies. The British economy has been an ‘open’ one since the nineteenth century, in that the manufacturing sector was dependent on international trade and the City of London was a global financial centre (Hirst and Thompson, 2000, Schmidt, 2002; Daddow, 2010, Martell, 2008, Wallace, 1991). In the immediate post-war period, the successive British governments failed to join the ‘Common Market’ partly because Europe was viewed as one (and arguably the least important) of its three diplomatic ‘circles’ (the others being the Empire/Commonwealth and the ‘special’ relationship with the US) (Dedman, 2009, Young, 1998, Mauter, 1998, Hollowell, 2003, Williams, 2005, Casey, 2009, Crowson, 2007). When Britain did join in the 1970s, this globalist perspective generated a view that the EU should be governed according to free market principles and that its market should be further integrated into the global market by removing/preventing

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1 In addition to this adversarial bipolar party struggle, UKIP’s increasing power also started to force the Conservative Party to increase its Eurosceptic tone (Ingle, 2008).
regulative and protectionist policies within it unlike the continental plans favouring a statist, protectionist and regulated market model for the European integration (Geddes, 2013, pp. 30-31, Fioretos, 2012). At this point, Hooghe (2001, p. 166) also empirically found that there was a significant rift between the Anglo-Saxon capitalist model and the continental capitalism in Europe.


First, the explanation above emphasizes continuity: British support for enlargement essentially has not altered over the last 40 years. Clearly EU enlargement has not happened in one go: it has progressed in successive waves, namely, the Mediterranean enlargement (Greece, Portugal, Spain in the 1980s), the EFTA enlargement (Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1996); the Eastward enlargement\(^2\) (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007), and the ongoing further enlargement process (the Western Balkans\(^3\) and Turkey). However, the period between 1975 and 2014 has witnessed a range of changes, both in British politics and in the UK’s external environment. For example, the leftist Labour government in the 1970s and the right-wing Conservative government in the 1980s might have had different ideological motivations for supporting the Mediterranean

\(^2\) This term has been used interchangeably with the big bang enlargement.

\(^3\) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Croatia, but Croatia became a member in 2013.
enlargement. Additionally, successive British governments supported the EU’s enlargement waves in different economic and geopolitical international environments, which might have affected the reasons behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards every single enlargement wave. In other words, the Mediterranean enlargement happened in the Cold War context, the EFTA and the Eastward enlargement in the post-Cold War/globalized era, and Turkey’s accession process is mostly associated with the era of the War on Terror (Seldon, 2008); thus, these different international environments should also have an effect on Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. Bearing these changes in mind, it would be surprising if British policy towards EU enlargement was driven by precisely the same motivations throughout this period. Therefore, this research aimed to comprehensively analyse the reasons behind Britain’s support for every single enlargement wave.

A second problem with the argument that British support for enlargement was just a method for watering down European integration (widening undermines deepening) is that since the 1990s the enlargement process has generated pressure for further European integration. Faced with the prospect of a significant increase in membership, EU states have attempted to reform their governance structures to cope with this new influx of countries. As later chapters will make it clear, the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Treaty of Nice (2000) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009) have increased the number of policy areas subjected to qualified majority voting (QMV) and co-decision making; have centralised (on paper at least) power in the hands of a new EU President; and have reduced British representation on the European Commission. Put in a different way, British political elites should realise, certainly by the end of the 1990s that enlargement (as a dilution strategy) might be counter-productive (see also: Wyplosz, 2007, Sjursen, 2006b, Elvert and Kaiser, 2004, Magone, 2008, Cameron, 2004a, Tatham, 2009, Preston, 1997, Blockmans and Prechal, 2007). If so, why did successive British governments persist with this policy?

In short, this thesis aims to fill a significant gap in the literature by attempting to answer the question: *why has Britain, as a leading Eurosceptic member, continuously supported the EU’s enlargement process from 1975 to 2014?* Additionally, the attempt to answer this question also implicitly or explicitly answers a number of related questions: Is Britain’s support for EU enlargement the result of elite preferences, pressure from societal groups or some other factor? Does this constant support reflect similar motives, or have Britain’s reasons for backing enlargement changed over time? If Britain’s reasons for supporting
enlargement have changed over time, how might we make sense of this change? Before discussing the appropriate theory and research methods for tackling these questions, this section concludes by discussing some of the broader literature on EU enlargement to see if it offers any clues in answering these questions.

1.2.2 EU Enlargement and Britain: Arguments in the Literature

Studies on EU enlargement have been dominated by the theoretical debate between rationalism and constructivism (Schimmelfennig, 2010, p. 45). The constructivist approach mainly argues that a common European identity shared by all the member countries drives old members to accept new members to the Union (e.g. unification of the European family) (Sjursen, 2006, p. 10, Müftüler-Bac and Mclaren, 2003, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002, Grabbe and Sedelmeier, 2010). For example, Sjursen (2002), Riddervold and Sjursen (2006), Fierke and Wiener (1999), Lundgren (2006), Risse (2012), O'brennan (2001), Eder and Spohn (2005), Sedelmeier (2005), and Piedrafita and Torreblanca (2005) argued that a common European identity played a crucial role in the old members’ support for the EU’s enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European countries. In other words, according to this constructivist understanding, old members felt a moral obligation to re-unite Europe after the conflict and devastation of the Second World War, and this feeling persisted beyond the end of the Cold War and into the 1990s (Caporaso and Madeira, 2012).

Contrary to these constructivist explanations, rationalist studies argue that old members’ economic and political considerations, which were determined according to their national cost-benefit calculations, played a dominant role in their support for EU enlargement (e.g. Skalnes, 2005, Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2002, Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2005, Grabbe and Hughes, 1997, Vachudova, 2005). These costs and benefits are usually conceptualised in material terms, and include items such as increased prosperity from access to an enlarged ‘home market’; increased power in international trade deals as a result of being part of a larger regional bloc; direct financial aid, especially in the form of budgetary transfers; and more legal protection and certainty, especially in the area of property rights and corporate law (Grabbe and Sedelmeier, 2010, Baldwin et al., 1997). Of these rationalist approaches, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), associated especially with the work of Andrew Moravcsik, has undoubtedly been the most influential theoretical framework.
On the face of it, constructivist explanations do not appear suitable for understanding British motives for continually supporting EU enlargement. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Britain is widely understood to be a Eurosceptic country, sceptical towards any notion of a common European identity and hostile to any increase in the EU’s supranational competence. Therefore, any theoretical approach which puts a common European identity at the centre of its analysis cannot sufficiently explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. However, LI, giving high priority to the nation state and its national interests while explaining the European integration process (see: Moravcsik, 1993, 1994, 1995), emerged as a theoretical approach which could make the research question more understandable and workable. In particular, this thesis is about British policy towards EU enlargement, and the research aimed to understand why policy-makers and other groups in a particular country (Britain) behave in a particular way over a long period of time (their pro-enlargement positions). This is precisely the analytical focus adopted by Moravcsik (1998) in his influential book ‘The Choice for Europe’. With these observations in mind, LI would appear to be a more suitable choice of theory for investigating the subject matter of this thesis.

The existing literature not only suggested that LI might become an effective theory for the research as it puts the interests of member states at the centre of its analysis but also suggested that a pro-enlargement policy might be a beneficial one for Britain regarding her national interests. In this regard, it could be expected that any explanation of the continual British support for EU enlargement must be consistent with her broader sceptical position on the European integration. Related to this argument, as the previous section showed, Britain’s Euroscepticism is against any attempt/project aiming to create an inward-looking supranational European integration. However, Britain evolved as an outward-looking nation state, thus also aimed to drive the European integration process towards an outward looking intergovernmental way (see also: Parr, 2006, Gibbins, 2014, DTI, 2004). In this regard, the EU’s enlargement towards new members has a potentiality to not only make the European integration process more intergovernmental but also more outward-looking (global). Therefore, it was possible for Britain to develop a pro-enlargement policy in parallel with her sceptical position.

Moreover, many studies in the literature define enlargement as the EU’s best foreign policy tool because it has a capacity to solve the security problem in Europe, export democracy and liberal market economy principles further, and strengthen the EU as a global actor (e.g.
Sjursen and Smith, 2004, Vachudova, 2005, p. 247, Dunay and Łachowski, 2006, p. 36, Petrovic, 2013, p. 167, Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, pp. 55-56, Mehlihausen, 2014, p. 178). Therefore, the EU’s enlargement towards new members might provide increased opportunities for Britain to achieve her broader foreign policy objectives (as a foreign policy tool) rather than being a simple dilution tool, used to prevent supranational tendencies within the EU.

Firstly, British foreign policy was institutionalized on a collective security understanding after the First World War (Turner, 2010, Stoddart, 2012, Sanders, 1990, Clarke, 1998, Kavanagh et al., 2006) and the EU’s enlargement towards new members might strengthen this collective security policy (see also: Sweeney, 2005). To illustrate, when the authoritarian regimes collapsed in the Mediterranean countries in the 1970s, enlargement was a highly strategic tool to stabilize and keep those countries under the Western collective security system. For example, after a leftist military coup in 1974, Portugal’s future became a big security concern in the Cold War context despite its NATO membership (Pinto and Teixeira, 2004, Preston, 1997). In another instance, Greece withdrew from NATO in 1974 in response to Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus (Ifantis, 2004). Thus, the EEC’s enlargement towards those countries would become a strategic measure to keep them within the Western bloc. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc at the beginning of the 1990s, the EU’s enlargement policy played a crucial role in filling the security gap in Central and Eastern Europe (Cameron, 2007). The EU’s enlargement towards the region was also followed by NATO’s expansion. However, the EU’s enlargement did not trigger any serious security problem with Russia, compared to NATO’s enlargement (Sjursen, 1998, p. 100, Šleivyte, 2010, p. 94). Moreover, as NATO’s hard power was limited in solving the civil wars in the ex-Yugoslavian countries; the EU’s enlargement policy emerged again as a better solution (O’Brennan, 2006, Juncos, 2005). As another important example, Turkey’s EU membership became more important after the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks to prevent a clash between the West and the Islamic World (Arvanitopoulos, 2009).

Secondly, another British foreign policy objective was to expand liberal market economy principles further (see: Gilpin, 1981, p. 138, Eliassen, 1998, Mccormick, 2012, Peterson, 1999). Related to this objective, the EU also exports liberal market principles to other European countries via enlargement. Particularly, the member states formed a set of conditionalities at the Copenhagen European Summit in 1993 known as the Copenhagen
Criteria, which made the transition of applicant countries to liberal democracies and market economies compulsory for full membership (Barnes and Barnes, 2007, Phinnemore and Mégowan, 2004, Pusca, 2004, Grabbe, 2006, Bieler, 2006). At first glance, this ambition might seem to be related to constructivist arguments. However, LI also argues that if nation states share the same/similar geopolitical ideology (e.g. liberalism), this decreases security risks and increases the chance of economic integration/cooperation among them (more economic gains) (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 27). Therefore, according to this perspective, nation states might have a tendency to export their geopolitical ideologies further.

Thirdly, as noted in the previous section, Britain has a tendency to perceive herself as a global actor. And thus, as enlargement strengthens the EU’s global role (Cosgrove-Sacks, 2006), Britain might increase her global influence within/via a globally more influential EU. In this regard, according to the literature, the EU was a ‘soft power’ in international politics (Peterson and Sjursen, 1998, Cameron, 2007, Dannreuther, 2004, Laidi, 2008, Telò, 2006, Gamble and Lane, 2009, Bindi, 2010, Moravcsik, 2010), and as a soft power, the EU had a potentiality to extend liberal democracy and free market economy principles to the rest of the world (in parallel with Britain’s above-mentioned foreign policy objective) (Nye, 2004, Matlary, 2004). At this point, the further enlargement of the EU could strengthen the EU’s soft power capacity in world politics (Nye, 2004, Gavin, 2005, Hill, 1998, Whitman and Wolff, 2010, Maier, 2002).

In addition to its soft power, according to the literature, enlargement could also strengthen the EU’s power in the global realpolitik, which was also beneficial for Britain regarding her above-mentioned foreign policy objectives. The EU’s enlargement towards new members was one of the main dynamics behind its becoming the largest economy in the world, and the EU effectively used its economic power to shape global economics according to free market principles via bilateral and multilateral agreements (Bava, 2008, Heisenberg, 2006). For example, the EU became the main initiator of the Doha Round, which was launched in 2001 to develop a more liberal international trade regime through the WTO (Ahnlid, 2005, Laidi, 2008). Furthermore, having more members made the EU more influential within international organizations (Dedman, 2009). For instance, the EU

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4According to Nye (2004), soft power is an ability to affect other countries’ preferences by using attractive mechanisms rather than coercion.
with its 28 members became a strong bloc in the UN and the WTO. Additionally, enlargement contributed new capabilities in foreign affairs to the EU (Smith, 2002). To illustrate, the Mediterranean enlargement (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) made the EU more active in the Mediterranean region (Gomez, 1998, Tanner, 2004). In the same vein, Marshall (2007) argued that the Swedish membership increased the EU’s global influence in terms of dispute settlement, environmental issues and human rights. The Eastward enlargement also opened a gate for the EU to become more influential in Eurasia, which was historically under Russian hegemony (O’Brennan, 2006).

All in all, the literature on EU enlargement has suggested that LI, with its state-centric assumptions, might become a more fruitful theoretical approach for the research rather than any EU-centric constructivist approach because, again according to the literature, Britain should have her own national reasons for a pro-enlargement policy as a leading Eurosceptic member. In this regard, the literature on EU enlargement has also showed that the EU’s enlargement waves might be beneficial for Britain in a foreign policy context. However, despite this tentative finding, there might be specific reasons behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards every enlargement wave. Therefore, the research aimed to reveal these potential specific reasons (if any) behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy by studying every enlargement wave in detail. At this point, LI’s methodological individualism would also be helpful to design the research to separately study the EU’s enlargement waves (see: Moravcsik, 2003, p. 162, Schieder, 2014, p. 109).

1.3 Conclusion

The aim of the research is to deeply understand/explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EU’s enlargement waves from 1975 to 2014. Therefore, the research started with an in-depth literature review which searched for useful clues about the research topic. Firstly, the literature review showed that there is not any research directly studying this topic; therefore, this research has filled a significant gap in the literature. Secondly, according to the literature, one tentative answer to the question of why Britain has persistently supported the enlargement of the EU is because the successive British

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5 For example, the EU formed a dialog based policy on Iran’s nuclear programme as an alternative to Israeli/American militarist doctrine.

6 However, the literature also highlights the point that enlargement resulted in a heterogeneity regarding the EU’s priorities in the foreign policy, which might limit the EU members’ ability to form coherent common positions in the foreign policy area (e.g. the Iraq war) (Niblett, 2007).
governments were motivated to water down the deepening of the European integration process. But as noted above, there are reasons for thinking this story might be more complex and nuanced. For a start, there have been a number of enlargement waves over a period of time, during which British politics and the international environment have experienced significant changes. It would be surprising if British politicians supported each candidate accession for precisely the same reasons. Moreover, the enlargement of EU has actually generated pressure for the further deepening of the integration, seemingly undermining the rationale for the policy. Additionally, the literature on EU enlargement suggested that enlargement might become a tool for Britain to achieve her foreign policy objectives, rather than only a dilution tool to prevent the further deepening of the integration. As a result, the literature review showed that it was intellectually interesting to study the question: why did Britain as a leading Eurosceptic member continuously support the EU’s enlargement process from 1975 to 2014?

Moreover, the literature review has suggested that, at this stage, a theoretical approach putting the nation state and its national interests at the centre of its analysis might provide a fruitful theoretical framework for the research because as a leading Eurosceptic member, Britain should have her own national reasons for a pro-enlargement policy. In this sense, LI with its influential intergovernmental arguments emerged as an appropriate theoretical approach to develop an effective theoretical framework, which would make the research question more knowable and workable.

Therefore, the task of the next chapter is to develop an effective theoretical framework, in which firstly LI is deeply analysed as a European integration theory, secondly the critiques of LI by other approaches are comprehensively studied, and thirdly more specific theoretical assumptions derived from LI as a potential answer to the research question are formulated, and finally some alternative assumptions about the points where LI is limited are also discussed in order to strengthen the theoretical framework. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on the aim to develop an effective methodological strategy for the research.
2 Theory and Methodology

2.1 Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to develop a sufficient theoretical framework and methodological strategy for the research. As noted above, the literature review has suggested that a theory which gives analytical priority to member states within the EU could provide a sufficient theoretical framework, through which it would be easier to understand and analyse the research question: *why Britain as a leading Eurosceptic member continuously supported the EU’s enlargement process from 1975 to 2014*. In this regard, LI emerged as an appropriate theory within the EU studies to develop a sufficient theoretical framework that would make the research question more knowable and methodologically more workable.

Particularly, the research used a hypothetico-deductive reasoning to answer the research question (see: McNeill and Chapman, 2005). Therefore, at the beginning of the research, a theoretical framework was developed according to LI’s assumptions and it played a key role in making the complexity of the case more intelligible/knowable (Hancké, 2009, Cresswell, 2009, Neuman, 2007, Bryman, 2008). In line with this purpose, the first section of the chapter focuses on the analysis of LI, in which the main arguments of LI were analysed, the potential limits of them were discussed, the appropriateness of LI to explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy was examined, and finally a set of hypothetical assumptions derived from LI as potential answers to the research question were formulated. While doing so, the potential limitations of LI were also taken into consideration and some historical institutionalist explanations were used to strengthen them. In the second section, considering LI’s methodological strengths and weaknesses, a methodological strategy was designed. As the research aimed to test the theoretical assumptions derived from LI as potential answers to the research question, the research needed empirical in-depth data. Therefore, the research was designed as a qualitative case study, which provided the necessary in-depth data, used to test the above-mentioned theoretical assumptions (or to deeply analyse Britain’s pro-enlargement policy on the EU’s enlargement waves from 1975 to 2014). Moreover, the research case was not only a social but also a historical phenomenon; thus, the archival research was chosen as the main data collection method to collect the necessary in-depth data.
2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI)

The European Union is not a fully-fledged system but still an ongoing integration process. Thus, the position/condition of the nation-state in this integration process is one of the main discussion points of the EU studies, and the literature on the EU studies mostly concentrates on the question: whether the European integration weakens, strengthens or transforms the nation-state (Börzel, 2002, p. 7). In this regard, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), which is mainly formulated by Andrew Moravcsik, argues that the European integration is mostly shaped under the control of the member-states and it strengthens the nation-state in the interdependent world system (Moravcsik, 1994).

Particularly, Stanley Hoffman’s (1966) intergovernmental approach constitutes a theoretical background for Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) (Kaiser, 2007, p. 4, George, 1996a, p. 19, Schieder, 2014, p. 115); however, Moravcsik also successfully embedded state-centric/intergovernmental explanations in “a liberal theory of international relations and a rationalist analysis of international institutions” (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2005, p. 79). At this point, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s (see: 1989, 1998, 2001) Neoliberal Institutionalist ideas highly affected Moravcsik’s LI (Schimmelfennig, 2007). For example, according to Moravcsik (2009), Keohane was highly successful in analysing the factors that cause changes in the behaviour of nation-states in the international system. In this sense, Keohane’s main arguments affecting LI could be given as follows:

Keohane (1984) argued that nation-states try to maximize their interests by doing cost-benefit calculations in the international arena like firms in a competitive/free market and this makes them rational actors. Moreover, they are egoists like firms because they mainly focus on maximizing their interests (absolute gains) rather than considering other nation-states’ relative gains in order to cooperate with other nation-states and their utility based actions are independent from each other. From this micro-economics logic, although Neoliberal Institutionalist accepts the main realist argument that international system is anarchic, which causes uncertainty and disorder for nation-states (Keohane, 1983, Waltz, 1979), it refuses the relative-gains problem as a realist argument showing why cooperation among nation-states is very hard. Particularly, by using Prisoner’s Dilemma Game model, Keohane (1984) argued that nation-states as absolute gain oriented rational egoists rationally calculate that cooperation is more profitable than non-cooperation causing considerable costs due to the problem of transaction costs originating from nation-states’ sovereignty (e.g. customs duty) and the interdependent nature of the international system (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, Keohane, 1983, 1984, 1988).

According to realist assumption, nation-states have a tendency to consider the relative gains of other states as a security problem in an international cooperation due to the anarchic nature of the international system in which today’s partner could be tomorrow’s enemy (Glaser, 1998, Grieco, 1988, Glaser, 2010).
With regard to this influence, Moravcsik (2009) mainly benefited from the concept of *interdependence*\(^8\), which was developed by Keohane and Nye (1989, 1998, and 2001), while formulating LI. From an economic interdependence perspective, according to LI, the European integration could be seen “as a means of co-ordinating policy to manage flows of goods, services, factors of production and economic externalities more effectively than unilateral policies” (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 484-485).

More specifically, Moravcsik (1993) used a ‘two-level game’ model to explain the relationship between member states and the EU. According to this model, nation-states domestically determine their preferences and then bargain with other states to preserve these preferences at the international level (Putnam, 1988). Moreover, Moravcsik (1995, 2005, and Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999) added one more angle to this two-level game model within the EU context, namely, institutional lock-in to maintain the outcomes of the EU level negotiations as a third level in addition to the formation of national preferences and the EU level negotiations. Thus, LI uses a multi-causal reasoning to explain the relationship between member states and the EU (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 68).

At the first level, the member states domestically determine their national preferences. Although Moravcsik (1995) put more importance on economic interests, he also benefited from geopolitical and ideological concerns while explaining the national preference formation level. For example, he argued that “national preferences are constrained by microeconomic interests, to be supplanted by geo-political and ideological motivations where economic preferences are diffused, uncertain or weak” (Moravcsik, 1995, p. 612).

Moreover, LI puts a dynamic state-society relationship at the centre of its analysis rather than limited interstate relations (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481, Moravcsik, 1999, p. 270). Particularly, Moravcsik (1994, p. 4) used “a principal-agent model” that categorizes domestic political actors as two groups, namely, executive power and societal groups. According to this model, societal groups put pressure on the executive in line with their interests, and in doing so constrain the executive’s behaviour. In turn, the executive

\(^8\) As Knorr (1979) argued, interdependence presents mutual dependence between nation-states on different things, and these things are valued by nation states; thus, they could be abstract like peace, security, power, and knowledge or concrete things like trade goods. On the other hand, interdependence is a dynamic process, and nation-states have little or no control on this process despite its being a product of them (Crawford, 1996).
aggregates domestic groups’ ideas/priorities on given issues and arrives at a common national preference by finding an optimum point between their interests (if they are different) (Moravcsik, 1993, 1997).

At this point, Moravcsik benefited from Keohane and Nye’s concept: ‘issue-specific interdependence’ in order to deeply explain the domestic stage of his two-level game approach. According to this understanding, every societal group might have different sensitivity or vulnerability regarding a specific issue and this sensitivity or vulnerability might push them to put pressure on the executive to protect their interests. In other words, domestic interest groups pressure governments “in response to international policy externalities” (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999, p. 61), and governments “develop preferences based on issue-specific concerns about policy externalities […]” (ibid., p.82).

As a result, issue-specific interdependence might create different motivations for different societal groups to decide to support or reject any development in the European integration process according to their specific interests. For example, the financial and business service sectors were the main supporters of the Single European Act in Britain but the industrial and capital-goods exporters were in Germany as a result of their issue-specific interests (Moravcsik, 1991).

On the other hand, if the expected costs of any policy to interest groups are inconsiderable or unclear, the executive/government has more autonomy both in the national preference formation process and at EU level negotiations (Moravcsik, 1995, together with Schimmelfennig, 2009). For example, Moravcsik (1993, p. 494) argued that

The difficulty of mobilizing interest groups under conditions of general uncertainty about specific winners and losers permits the positions of governments, particularly larger ones, on questions of European institutions and common foreign policy, to reflect the ideologies and personal commitments of leading executive and parliamentary politicians, as well as interest-based conceptions of the national interest.

Furthermore, ‘issue-specific interdependence’ has a dynamic nature, and the priority of a nation state might change according to the accumulation of different dynamics (endogenous and exogenous changes). For example, Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis (1999) pointed out that when the government changed from the Conservatives to the Labours, Britain’s position on the Social Charter changed as well in the 1990s. Additionally, Moravcsik (1999) accepted that transnational interest groups might also have an effect on domestic decision making process due to increasing globalization (interdependence)
although the EU system still keeps member states as the sole representatives in the history-making negotiations at EU level (Moravcsik, 1994).

At the second level, member states bargain to achieve their national preferences determined at the national level. According to Moravcsik (1993, p. 499), the EU level negotiation setting is non-coercive and information rich, and the transaction costs of the negotiations are low; thus, member states could carry out a deliberative negotiation strategy to achieve an efficient outcome according to their national preferences. Moreover, as noted above, Moravcsik (1993, p. 499) argued that EU level negotiations could be viewed as a co-operative game through which member states try to eliminate the alternative costs of co-operation (the negative externalities of non-cooperation). However, despite this benign environment, the potential outcomes of the EU level negotiations might pose negative policy externalities to some member states, and this might make the EU level negotiation process tougher. For example, Germany was more vulnerable to the immigration from Eastern Europe compared to Britain, who had a stronger control over her borders (the negative externalities of the Eastward enlargement to Germany). As a result of this, Germany demanded a supranational immigration policy in order to make the return of the immigrants to transit countries possible; however, Britain opposed this proposal because she had less vulnerability and it was not necessary for Britain to share her sovereign power on the immigration issue at the EU level (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999).

In this regard, according to LI, ‘asymmetric interdependence’ between member states is quite influential in determining the outcomes of EU level negotiations (Moravcsik, 1995, Moravcsik, 1999b). Particularly, if a member state has a greater advantage over others at EU level negotiations, it is highly possible that its preferences would shape the outcomes of the negotiations. On the other hand, according to their relative powers (asymmetric interdependence), member states might rationally choose a unilateral position or to form a coalition with other members to affect the outcomes of EU level negotiations in line with their national interests. However, when uncertainty about the breakdown of negotiations or time pressure emerges within the negotiation process, “concessions tend to come disproportionately from governments for which the failure to reach agreement would be least attractive” (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 504-505). Moreover, reciprocal concessions (as a linkage strategy) become more likely if member states have different interests in the negotiation process because it would be easier for them to make concessions on issues with
low costs, and where the outcome of the negotiation process is decided as a trade-off, which might increase the gains of all member states, consolidating a better position compared to unilateral and coalitional alternatives. However, according to Moravcsik (1993, p. 505), “[t]he major limitation on linkage strategies is domestic opposition” because, as noted above, if a potential concession threatens one domestic group’s issue-specific interests, this group generates political pressure on the executive power to prevent it at the domestic level.

At the third level, member states pool their sovereignty within the EU legal system in order to maintain the outcomes of the EU level negotiations. To elaborate, according to LI’s principal-agent model, the main function of the EU legal system is to implement and protect the outcomes of the negotiations concluded by the member states (Moravcsik, 1995, 2008). At this point, Moravcsik (1999) distinguished treaty-amending (history-making) decisions from daily routine decisions within the EU system, and according to him, the daily routines could be carried out by the EU institutions after getting authorization from the member states. Thus, the EU institutions only implement their daily routines according to the agreements between member states and their supranational power is limited and under the control of member states. According to Moravcsik (2008, p. 168), for example, qualified majority voting (QMV) mechanism was designed for daily policy decisions as an outcome of intergovernmental negotiations. Moreover, if future decisions in a field are uncertain, member states could prefer to cooperate further (further sovereignty pooling); otherwise, the cost of uncertainty will be higher. For example, the autonomy of the European Central Bank or the increasing power of the European Court of Justice could be seen in line with this purpose (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999, p. 76).

Additionally, LI accepts a limited supranational influence of the EU institutions on the European integration process “only where two conditions are met: national governments face high ex-ante transaction costs and significant informational (or ideational) asymmetries favour supranational entrepreneurs” (Moravcsik, 1999a, p. 173); however, the EU’s institutional set-up is still reversible according to member states’ interests (Paul, 2012, p. 142).

In conclusion, LI attaches great importance to the interdependence between member states while explaining the European integration process; however, according to LI, it does not result in unintended outcomes for member states through spill-over effects, as argued by neo-functionalist theories (Moravcsik, 2005). Contrary to this functionalist argument,
interdependence presents the purposive choices of member states within the EU structure, and as mentioned above, the asymmetric nature of interdependence determines who gains what from the outcomes of the EU level negotiations. As a result, the European integration process is governed by member states, and the deliberative EU level institutionalization even strengthens national governments’ executive power over domestic interest groups at the domestic level (Moravcsik, 1994, p. 47) because “where domestic interests are weak or divided, EC institutions have been deliberately designed to assist national governments in overcoming domestic opposition”. In other words, in their two-level game, national governments not only try to use the European integration to achieve their national interests but also try to benefit from it to increase their executive autonomy at domestic level where domestic groups’ interests are weak or divided (Cram, 2005, p. 23).

2.2.2 The Critiques of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI)


Although the supranational approach accepts the initial efficiency of LI’s two-level game model (see: Caporaso, 1998), it argues that this model is limited in explaining the complexity of the European integration. Firstly, as noted above, LI focuses on domestic interest groups as the main influential group affecting national governments. However, the supranational governance approach argues that transnational interest groups have an ability to organize better than domestic groups; thus, they might present their interests better than
domestic groups to affect national governments (Cowles, 2003, p. 104). Moreover, as a result of the expansion of transnational exchange (e.g. trade, investment, the development of Euro-groups, networks, and associations), domestic groups (e.g. firms) might demand a decision making process at the EU level (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998, p. 2). For example, Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) argued that business groups bypassed national governments and collaborated with the Commission to achieve the Maastricht Treaty, and this collaboration played a role in the finalization of the treaty. Hooghe and Keating (1996) also argued that the Europeanization of domestic groups and regionalization might decrease the importance of the national level decision making (or nation-state).

At the EU level, the supranational approach argues that LI ignores the influence of the EU institutions on the European integration process; thus, its belief in the full control of member states over the European integration process is wrong. For example, the European Commission has an independent agenda-setting power influencing the integration process (Kassim and Menon, 2003, p. 127). According to Pollack (1998, p. 221), weak or conflicting preferences among member governments, asymmetrically distributed information between member governments and the Commission, and a potential cooperation between the Commission and subnational/transnational groups on a particular issue might strengthen the Commission’s agenda-setting power in the EU level decision making. Additionally, although the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was established by member states with a set of expectations, it has a capacity to evolve into a more powerful supranational institution beyond member states’ expectations (Kassim and Menon, 2003, p. 127). In concrete terms, the ECJ gradually set up a body of case law which “transformed the European legal order in a supranational direction” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. 26)\(^9\).

The discussions between rationalism and constructivism in the IR discipline have also affected the EU studies (Hansen, 2002, p. 4, Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001, p. 219). In the IR literature, these discussions are carried out between Rational Choice Institutionalism (RI) versus Historical and Sociological Institutionalism (new institutionalist approaches)\(^9\).

\(^9\) In addition to the supranational approaches, Institutional Intergovernmentalism also argues that the decision making at the EU level is more sophisticated than LI’s formulation although it accepts the supremacy of nation-state in the European integration process (Kassim and Menon, 2003, p. 129, Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001, Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996b, Tsebelis, 1994, Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996a). For example, Garrett and Tsebelis (1996b, p. 279) highlight the importance of the EU Commission’s agenda-setting power as an important variable that affects the EU level decision making system despite member states’ dominance over it. In other words, according to Institutional Intergovernmentalism, nation-state is not the only actor in the EU level decision making process unlike what LI argues (Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001, p. 386).
(see: Hall and Taylor, 1996, Hall, 2009). In general, Sociological Institutionalism (SI) (or Constructivism) poses deeper meta-theoretical and epistemological challenges to Rational Choice Institutionalism rather than just theoretical challenges (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000). Historical Institutionalism (HI) has also a different meta-theoretical reasoning (more constructivist) although it accepts the rational epistemological background of Rational Choice Institutionalism (Pollack, 2009). In this regard, Sociological Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism also challenge LI as a rational choice institutionalist approach.

To elaborate, the Sociological Institutionalism (SI) (or Constructivism) challenges LI as a rational choice oriented institutionalist approach due to its cost-benefit rationality (logic of micro-economics), the principal-agent model, and methodological individualism (Pollack, 2009, 2006, 2005). Firstly, SI argues that institutions (e.g. business associations, trade unions, the NGOs and even nation-states) are social actors; thus, their rationality is constrained by the complex social structure in which they exist. Therefore, as Scharpf (1997) argues, the complexity of social structure (real life) affects actors’ micro-economic oriented cost-benefit calculations. In other words, according to this approach, rationality is actually socially constructed and culturally and historically contingent (Schmidt, 2010, p. 51). Therefore, SI uses the logic of appropriateness10 as an alternative to the logic of micro-economics/logic of consequentialism (March and Olsen, 2008).

From this point of view, LI’s principal agent-model (two-level game model) is limited in explaining the European integration process because it ignores the structures in which principals and agents exist. For instance, according to Moravcsik’s two level game model, at the domestic level, a national preference should be shaped by domestic interest groups and the nation-state as an agent should follow this preference at the EU-level; however, the nation-state is not only an agent but also a structure in which domestic interest groups exist and their rationality is shaped by its historical, ideological, normative institutionalization. In the same way, at the EU level, the EU institutions are not just agents through which nation-states govern the European integration process, but also a structure in which nation-states and subnational groups are undeliberately socialized/Europeanised. In the EU studies literature, for example, many studies benefit from this constructivist epistemological/meta-

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10 The logic of appropriateness simply assumes that “people behave according to ‘social norms’ rather than in pursuit of individual utility” (Barkin, 2010, p. 55)

Thirdly, LI’s principal agent-model also uses methodological individualism while analysing the EU-member state relationship. In general, this approach puts individuals at the centre of its social analysis and tries to explain a social behaviour as an aggregation of individual choices (Pollack, 2006). In other words, LI has a tendency to understand the European integration and its institutions as an output of causal relations between rational member states. However, the Constructivist approach argues that as a result of its methodologically individualist approach, LI focuses only on member states’ rational actions to explain the whole European integration process; that however, it lacks a holistic perspective considering member states’ collective behaviours and ignores the EU’s institutional structure which also affects member states’ behaviours. As a result, the generalizability of its findings is limited (Risse, 2009, Risse, 2000, O'brennan, 2001).

Historical Institutionalism accepts Moravcsik’s rationalist assumptions (Pollack, 2005, p. 19); however, it argues that political actors are not only rational but also history dependent and embedded in historically evolved institutions (e.g. formal rules, policy structures, or social norms). Thus, rational actors form institutions but institutions also affect rational actors’ behaviour in a longer time (Zysman, 1992, comments at Conference of Europeanists, Chicago; cited in: Thelen, 1999, p. 379). From this perspective, LI’s micro-economics oriented cost-benefit calculation is limited in a longer term; thus, the rational actions taken for short-term political reasons (short-term cost-benefit calculations) might produce long-term unanticipated institutional consequences in the European integration process (Pierson, 1998). In addition to this, national preferences might change in time due to ‘path-dependency’ in the European integration process (Pierson, 1998). According to this logic, after rational actors start to follow a new institutionalization as a new path (e.g. from the ECSC to the EC to the EU), following this institutionalization becomes less costly compared to other alternatives in time. Therefore, this new path is punctuated/locked by increasing returns, and in this way, this integration results in dependence for actors to follow this new path (path dependence) (Pierson, 1998, 2004, p. 22, 2001, p. 415, 2000, p. 251, 2003, p. 195). As a result, an early level intergovernmental institutionalisation might

As noted above, although “political science critiques of Moravcsik’s LI focus on its assumption of non-changing state preferences and its inability to explain either the autonomy of the EU institutions or the de facto use of power in day-to-day EU politics” (Warleigh-Lack, 2009, p. 216), a set of historians are also sceptical about Moravcsik’s historical analyses from a political science perspective. For example, Kaiser (2010, pp. 55-56) argued that although Moravscik’s emphasis on the economic dimensions of integration is useful up to a point, it ignores “the role of non-state political actors at supranational and transnational level within the Community”. Moreover, Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen (2009, p. 8) also argued that Moravcsik’s historical evidence selection is theory-biased and methodologically flawed due to having a weak EU historiography. In other words, according to this critique, Moravcsik collected only the historical data which was useful in proving his theory and ignored the rest of it; thus, his historical findings are methodologically not reliable (see also: Kaiser, 2007, 2009, 2010, Lieshout et al., 2004).

There are also neo-realist critiques arguing that LI’s issue-specific pluralist analysis is not enough to explain national preference formation process because the nation-state is an actor in the anarchic international system with the comprehensive foreign policy concerns (e.g. the maximization of state autonomy, security and influence) that dominate specific domestic sectors’ economic interests (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2005, p. 80). From this perspective, security concerns could limit a specific domestic sector’s pressure on a nation-state while determining national preferences (see also: Mearsheimer, 1994, 1995, Grieco, 1988, Feaver et al., 2000, Gilbert, 2004). In a similar vein, Helen Wallace also argued that there should be more attention on geopolitical considerations in LI’s analysis on member states’ national preference formation strategies (Wallace et al., 1999, p. 156).

In conclusion, the critiques of LI constellate on the point that LI leaves little room for the importance of “structure” in its analysis on the relationship between the nation-state and the EU. At domestic level, it does not devote enough attention to the nation-state as a structure (state ideology, geopolitics, identity etc.), and at the EU-level, it ignores the influence of the EU structure on the European integration process. As a response to these critiques, Moravcsik accepted that structure might impose limits and possibilities for state
action but does not determine everything (Sánchez, 2009). For example, Moravcsik reiterated that “supranational influence is possible only where two conditions are met: national governments face high ex-ante transaction costs and significant informational (or ideational) asymmetries favour supranational entrepreneurs” (Wallace et al., 1999, p. 173). Moreover, Moravcsik accepted that “[g]eopolitical ideology is more important where issue-specific consequences are essentially incalculable […] or where core national economic interests are already satisfied” (ibid., pp. 173-174). He also accepted that economic concerns might be less important in non-economic issues (e.g. foreign policy) and “economic interests do not tell the whole story” because geopolitics (security) and ideology might have an impact on the European integration process (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 70). For example, in his magnum opus: “the Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht”, by analysing fifteen different cases in Germany, France and Britain, he argued that “geopolitical ideology” might have played a secondary or parallel role to economic concerns in eight of the fifteen cases (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 474). In one of his recent studies, Moravcsik (2013, p. 776) also argued that “geopolitical and related ideological factors” have an important impact on member states’ national preference formation processes.

In terms of the constructivist critiques, Moravcsik partly accepted the influence of ‘collective ideas’ on the national preference formation process; however, he defined them as “causally epiphenomenal” and “transmission belts for interests” (Moravcsik, 1999b, p. 675). In concrete terms, LI accepts the essential role of collective ideas in social life. For example, Moravcsik argued that “we observe individuals and governments sincerely espousing ideas consistent with their rational interest and strategies” (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001, p. 229). Therefore, according to him, “both rationalist (LI) and constructivist theories predict a correlation between ideas and policy outcomes” (ibid., p. 230). However, he argued that collective ideas are endogenous to fundamental underlying factors shaping state behaviour, and they cannot be an exogenous variable directly affecting state behaviour (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001, p. 229). As a result, “in the LI account of integration, ideas are present but not causally central” (ibid.). From this point of view, Moravcsik also claimed that collective ideas are ubiquitous and they cannot be tested through empirical scientific methods. Therefore, the constructivist studies putting collective ideas at the centre of their analyses are actually ‘meta-theoretical’ and their
capacity to empirically challenge LI’s findings is limited (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001, Moravcsik, 2001).

Additionally, LI’s rational understanding accepts a deliberative learning process. Particularly, as noted above, LI benefits from Rational Choice Theory to explain how cooperation is possible among rational actors in uncertainty. This approach mainly uses the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and argues that rational actors consciously learn from their previous iterated actions to decide how to behave in uncertainty (see also: Axelrod, 1984, 1997, Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, Oye, 1986, Tsebelis, 1990). In other words, according to this understanding, rational actors might deliberately benefit from their previous experiences especially when there is uncertainty to make a cost-benefit calculation according to the logic of micro-economics (Farkas, 1998, p. 23).

Last but not least, most of LI’s assumptions were formulated by Moravcsik in the 1990s; thus, they might be considered as outdated to explain the current developments within the EU. However, the developments in the 2000s (e.g., the crisis of the Constitutional Treaty, the Eurozone crisis, increasing Euroscepticism) has showed that LI’s main assumptions putting the nation-state at the centre are still valid in explaining the European integration process. For example, the number of studies focusing on Europeanization was in decline especially after the Eurozone crisis (Blavoukos and Oikonomou, 2012). Coman and Crespy (2014) also argued that the studies in the 2000s exaggerated the effect of Europeanization on the member states’ national structures11. In addition, Puettter (2012, pp. 58-59) argued that “[s]upranational institutions largely fail to benefit from the current expansion of joint EU decision making and activity”; thus, intergovernmental activity within the EU governance increased.

2.2.3 Enlargement: LI’s Assumptions and Limitations

As noted in chapter 1, LI emerged as a more appropriate theory than supranational/constructivist approaches for this research mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the literature review found that Britain was a Eurosceptic country refusing an upper European identity and any increase in the EU’s supranational competence. Therefore, any

11 Even in 2003 when supranational approach was relatively more popular in the EU studies, Featherstone (2003, p. 5) acknowledged that “[Europeanization’s] structural effects are not necessarily permanent or irreversible”.

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theoretical approach, putting a common European identity at the centre of its analysis, cannot sufficiently explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. Moreover, it could be expected that Britain should have its own national reasons to support the EU’s enlargement waves as a leading Eurosceptic member. Thus, LI emerged as a more appropriate theory for this research as it puts member states’ national interests at the centre of its analysis while analysing the European integration process. In concrete terms, this research aimed to understand the behaviour/attitudes of policy makers and other societal groups’ in a particular member state (Britain) towards an issue of the EU (enlargement), and this aim is in compliance with the analytical focus adopted by LI.

Secondly, this research aimed to separately and deeply analyse the reasons behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EU’s enlargement waves (the Mediterranean enlargement, the EFTA enlargement, the Eastward enlargement, and the ongoing further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey). In conjunction with this, LI’s methodological individualist approach (Moravcsik, 2003, p. 162, Schieder, 2014, p. 109) provided an efficient theoretical framework to separately study Britain’s pro-enlargement position on every single enlargement wave. For example, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009, p. 80) argued that “LI predicts that members will calculate the advantages of enlargement in terms of the costs and benefits of socioeconomic interdependence of various types”. Moravcsik (1998, p. 23) also argued that

State preferences need not necessarily be uniform across issues, countries, or long periods of time. They vary in response to exogenous changes in the economic, ideological, and geopolitical environment within which European integration takes place…

From this point of view, Britain’s pro-enlargement policy might have emerged as an output of a national decision making process (a specific cost-benefit calculation) for every enlargement wave, and it might have become the best choice for Britain (regarding her national interests) in accordance with the situational conditions of the enlargement waves (e.g. different economic, ideological, and geopolitical environments within which the enlargement waves took place). Therefore, the reasons for a pro-enlargement policy might have changed from one enlargement wave to another when their situational conditions changed. To illustrate, as noted above, at the beginning of the 1980s, a pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean applicants might have become the best choice for Britain according to the early 1980s’ international conditions (e.g. the Cold War). A pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries and the CEECs might have been shaped
according to the post-Cold War conditions (e.g. the post-Cold War security problem in Europe, the rise of neoliberal ideas and globalization etc.). As another example, a pro-enlargement policy towards Turkey might have become more important after the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks.

Moreover, from LI’s micro-economics oriented logic (see: section 2.2.1), it could be expected that the outputs of economic cost-benefit calculations might have become the main incentive for Britain to support the EU’s enlargement waves, and according to LI’s pluralistic decision making understanding, British interest groups might have also played an active role in the national preference formation process (for a pro-enlargement policy) in addition to the successive British governments.

However, Moravcsik (together with Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 80) acknowledged that enlargement is a hard case for LI; thus its above-mentioned assumptions might fail to sufficiently explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EU’s enlargement waves. Firstly, in the light of Moravcsik’s (1993, 1995, together with Schimmelfennig, 2009) arguments, the complexity of enlargement might have limited LI’s pluralistic decision making assumption because it would be harder for societal groups to make calculations on complex issues compared to governments, especially if those issues are not directly related to their issue specific interests; thus, the successive British governments might have become the dominant actor in the national decision making process. More interestingly, the complexity of enlargement (uncertain outcomes and externalities of it) might limit LI’s economic interest centred rational choice assumption. In other words, British actors might not have made precise cost-benefit calculations on EU enlargement due to its complex nature. In this regard, to compensate for this potential limitation, LI formulates a multi-causal reasoning to explain how actors may behave in uncertainty\(^\text{12}\) (in a complex case like enlargement). More specifically, according to Moravscik (1995, p. 612, 1998, p. 7, together with Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 76), if economic interests are weak, diffused or indeterminate, geopolitical concerns and ideological motivations might become equally or more dominantly influential in member states’ national decision making mechanisms. Moreover, LI also accepts that economic concerns might be less important in non-economic areas (e.g. foreign policy) (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 70). Despite this acknowledgment, LI strongly argues that governments cannot follow a

\(^{12}\) Uncertainty refers to any situation in which actors cannot make clear cost-benefit calculations.
geopolitical or/and ideological ambition at the expense of significant economic interests (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 317).

According to LI, ideological motivations might also affect actors’ geopolitical and/or economic calculations in case of any uncertainty. In other words, as noted in the previous section, according to LI, ideological motivations might become “transmission belts for interests” (Moravcsik, 1999b, p. 675). For example, according to Moravcsik (1998, p. 27), “[e]conomic integration is not an end in itself but a means to manipulate ‘high politics’”; therefore, if nation-states share a common geopolitical ideology, they also have a tendency to develop economic cooperation with each other. From this point of view, the motivation to expand liberal ideals (e.g. market economy) might have also affected British actors’ economic and geopolitical calculations about the EU’s enlargement waves. In other words, as noted in the literature review, *the successive British governments might have aimed to expand liberal norms/ideals to new members; through which, they might have expected to have more allies regarding security and more economic partners.* However, LI strongly argues that governments cannot follow an ideological ambition at the expense of economic interests (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 317). More specifically, Moravcsik and Vachudova (2005, p. 205) argued that ideological motivations (e.g. liberal ideals) can be influential in member states’ support for enlargement “when measurable economic and geopolitical benefits push policy in a similar direction” and/or “when the economic costs are marginal, or have already been paid.” As a result, from LI’s perspective, *it is highly possible that the successive British governments were not willing to sacrifice Britain’s major/significant economic interests even if the enlargement waves became geopolitically and/or ideologically desirable.*

At this point, LI’s rational perception of ideology/liberal ideals should not be confused with the constructivist understanding. As noted above, shared common liberal norms/ideals among member states are used by the constructivist arguments as a proof of a post-national European identity. However, as the literature review clearly showed, they were actually Euro-Atlantic ideals, significantly embedded by Britain as a part of British identity and foreign policy principle, and Britain’s ambition to extend liberal norms/ideals further via enlargement cannot be a proof showing that a common EU identity has an influence in Britain’s pro-enlargement policy.
The research also considered the potential limitations of LI in its theoretical assumptions/explanations on Britain’s support for the EU’s enlargement waves. Particularly, although LI acknowledges the limitation of its economic oriented explanations in the case of enlargement and gives more attention to geopolitics and ideology (a multi-causal reasoning), it still has a difficulty in explaining how geopolitics and ideology affects member states’ behaviour in uncertainty (e.g. the enlargement case). To deal with this limitation, the research considered both the findings of the literature review and the theoretical critiques of LI. As noted in the previous section, the main theoretical critiques of LI focus on the point that LI’s explanations ignore the influence of ‘structure’ over actors’ behaviour; thus, the research benefited from this critique in order to overcome LI’s above-mentioned limitation. In addition to this, the literature review also suggested that Britain’s foreign policy principles (as a structure) might have constituted a rationale for the successive British governments to formulate a pro-enlargement policy. In other words, the British foreign policy principles, covering intertwined geopolitical, economic and ideological priorities/expectations, might encourage British actors to support the EU’s enlargement waves when they could not make precise cost-benefit calculations on the enlargement waves.

To make this point clearer, by considering the theoretical discussions in the previous section, it could be argued that Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist arguments might contribute a deeper explanation about how British foreign policy, as a structure, might have provided a rationale for Britain’s pro-enlargement policy (see: Pierson, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004). First of all, Paul Pierson’s arguments might complete the above-mentioned limitation in a theoretical consistency with LI because Pierson’s HI understanding accepts the initial rational premises of LI. For example, Pierson (2004, p. 9) argued that rational choice theory should not be rejected, “but that its scope should be placed in proper perspective”. More specifically, according to Pierson, decisions are made by rational actors in a structure; thus, a potential effect of this structure on these rational actors could be expected. In other words, common norms/ideals/collective experiences might influence national actors’ choices. To put in another way, according to this assumption, actors learn from their historical experiences, and they benefit from these collective experiences while deciding on a complex issue, especially if they cannot make precise cost-benefit calculations on it (see: Pierson, 2004, p. 126). In this regard, as noted in the previous section, LI’s rational choice assumption also accepts that “rational actors
consciously learn from their previous iterated actions to decide how to behave in uncertainty” (see: section 2.2.2). Therefore, as a response to LI’s above-mentioned limitation, it could be argued that ideological motivations (e.g. liberal ideals) might penetrate in decision making process and affect economic and geopolitical concerns via a deliberative learning process. In a concrete manner, British actors might deliberately have learnt that the expansion of democracy and open market economy supported Britain’s geopolitical and economic interests. From this perspective, it could be expected that the historically institutionalized British foreign policy principles (liberal ideals) might have supported British actors’ economic and geopolitical benefit expectations about the EU’s enlargement waves as they could not make clear cost-benefit calculations on the enlargement waves, and in this way, a pro-enlargement policy might have emerged as an output of a multi-causal reasoning. In uncertainty, according to this approach, British actors’ experiences from a former enlargement wave (e.g. the Mediterranean enlargement) might have also affected their attitudes towards a later one (e.g. the Eastward enlargement).

Despite Paul Pierson’s (potential) historical institutionalist contributions to deal with the LI’s above-mentioned limitation, this research will utilise the LI theoretical approach mainly for two reasons. Firstly, as noted in the previous section, HI gives more importance to the EU structure rather than member states while explaining the European integration process. But, this research dominantly aimed to understand Britain’s pro-enlargement policy on the EU’s enlargement waves. As a result, this case study needed a theoretical approach that downplays institutions and emphasises actors (member states). Secondly, by considering HI’s potential contributions, the researcher also tried to synthesize LI with HI to develop a theoretical framework at the initial stage of the PhD project. However, this attempt resulted in significant theoretical and methodological inconsistency, and if the PhD project had devoted to solving this inconsistency, there would not have been enough time and space to answer the research question. For example, the research would have needed to propose a good solution to agency-structure debate/problem; however, it would have been far beyond the scope of this problem-based PhD project because even there is not a single answer to this debate in the literature (e.g. rational choice institutionalism versus historical and sociological institutionalism) (see: Hall and Taylor, 1996, Pollack, 2009, Peters, 2011). As a result, the research mainly benefited from LI to develop a consistent theoretical framework to make the research case more knowable. However, in the light of the findings from the following case studies, the conclusion chapter also discusses again to what extent
Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist arguments can be explanatory as a complementary approach, providing further explanations about the points where LI is limited.

In conclusion, LI emerged as an appropriate theoretical approach to make Britain’s pro-enlargement policy more knowable. In this sense, the research also acknowledged that LI has some potential limitations in explaining this case; however, it is clear that there is not any European integration theory as a panacea for a perfect theoretical explanation of the European integration process and member states’ behaviour in it. Moreover, as enlargement is a hard case for LI, it would be interesting to see to what extent LI’s theoretical assumptions are explanatory in a hard case. Additionally, the research also synthesised an original methodological strategy by benefiting from LI’s methodological strengths and by trying to strengthen LI’s methodological weaknesses and the next section focuses on this original methodological strategy.

2.3 Methodology

This research was designed as a qualitative case study. This means that it put words at the centre of its analysis rather than statistical numbers because the research case was intentionally chosen and it could not be sufficiently explained by using enumerated frequencies originating from surveys derived from random samples (Bryman, 2008). Furthermore, this method was an effective methodological strategy for this research for several reasons. Firstly, as Hancke (2009) and Stark and Torrance (2005) argued, the case study method selects an example of an action/issue/fact and collects extensive data from several sources in order to deeply explain it, thus putting it forward as a robust methodological approach. In a similar vein, Berg (2007, p. 283) argued that the qualitative case study method involves “[...] systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions”. In this regard, the research case (Britain’s pro-enlargement policy on the EU’s enlargement waves) was not randomly chosen, and the case study method provided a systematically gathered, extensive data about the research case, through which the effects of several independent variables (e.g. economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns, the position of domestic groups, the outputs of EU level negotiations, international developments) on the dependent variable/investigated phenomenon (Britain’s pro-enlargement policy) was deeply analysed.
Secondly, as Eckstein (2000) argued, the case study method can be effectively used in theory testing because it provides a framework through which in-depth data can be collected to test a theoretical assumption in a real-life context. Thanks to its capacity to collect in-depth empirical data form real-life, a case study might also compel political/social theoreticians to revise their theoretical hypotheses and help to falsify theoretical assumptions in social science (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 235). In this sense, Moravcsik (2013, p. 790), the main theoretician of LI, also accepted that “[q]ualitative studies offer great potential to revise our conventional understandings of world politics”.

Thirdly, the case study method was also in conformity with the theoretical framework of the research. Particularly, in his monumental research (The Choice for Europe), Moravcsik (1998) also used the case study method and analysed five historical cases (the negotiations on the Rome Treaty, the Common Market, the EMS, the SEA, and the Maastricht Treaty) which played a crucial role in his formulation of LI. In a similar way, this research focused on EU’s four enlargement waves/cases (the Mediterranean enlargement, the EFTA enlargement, the Eastward enlargement, and the ongoing further enlargement process towards the Western Balkans and Turkey) to deeply analyse/understand Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. As a result, the case study method enabled this research to test the above-mentioned assumptions derived from LI and to contribute new empirical findings to the EU studies literature, which could be used for further theoretical discussions on the European integration process.

However, the literature also carries a common critique of the case study method arguing that the findings of a case study cannot be generalized (lack of generalizability) (Herriott and Firestone, 1983, Stake, 2005, Flyvbjerg, 2006, Yin, 2003). In this regard, it could be argued that this limitation did not pose a significant challenge to this research. Firstly, the aim of the research is to understand/explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy from 1975 to 2014 but not to explain all member states’ positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves. Moreover, this research aims to test a set of theoretical assumptions derived from LI in order to answer the research question; thus, it is a question-based study rather than theory-based. In line with this understanding, this research does not aim to generalize its findings and develop a new theory. Secondly, as Maxwell (2012, p. 137) argued, generalizability as a scientific criterion could be categorized as external and internal generalizability. Although external generalizability needs generalizability beyond a case study, “internal generalizability refers to the generalizability of a conclusion within the case”; thus, the
validity of a case study depends on its internal generalizability. Therein, the research tried to achieve the internal generalizability of the findings. Additionally, replication is a more important scientific criterion than generalizability for a case study (Dul and Hak, 2008, p. 9); thus, this case study aims to achieve the replication of the findings to minimize the limitations in the external generalizability of them. In line with this methodological strategy, this research deliberately designed an empirical data collection method to strengthen the replication and internal generalizability of the findings as much as possible.

2.3.1 Data Collection

There is no doubt that data collection is one of the most important steps of a scientific research. If a research does not design its data collection method in an efficient way, although it may have a strong research question or theoretical framework, it cannot maintain validity, reliability and replication of its findings. Therefore, this research tried to collect various and in-depth data from multiple sources by using an effective data collection method to make the findings more compelling and accurate (see also: Yin, 2003).

To this end, the theoretical framework of the research also helped to determine an effective data collection method. Firstly, as noted above, LI assumes that if member governments need to decide on a complex issue, they might become more dominant in their national preference formation processes at the expense of other domestic societal groups13 (see: Moravcsik, 1993, 1995, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009). Related to this assumption, as enlargement is a complex issue, the research focused on the successive British governments as the main actors shaping Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. The main political parties in opposition were also considered as other important political actors affecting Britain’s enlargement policy. In addition to them, in line with LI’s pluralistic decision making understanding, the research also considered British societal groups as other actors affecting Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. However, it was impossible to analyse all of the British societal groups’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves. In this regard, the research benefited from further assumptions of LI. In particular, as LI suggests (see: Moravcsik, 1993, 1997), the research assumed that if any British societal group was sensitive to any enlargement wave, it should try to access the national decision

13 As noted in section 2.2.1, it would be hard for societal groups to make calculations on complex issues, especially if those issues are not directly related to their issue specific interests.
making process via the House of Commons or other governmental bodies (or at least they should express their ideas when the House of Commons or other governmental bodies asked). Therefore, as noted below, the research mainly benefited from the official documents published by the House of Commons and other governmental bodies in order to detect which interest groups were sensitive to the EU’s enlargement waves. To demonstrate, thanks to one of the House of Commons’ Business and Enterprise Committee’s reports (HC 367-i, 2008), the researcher accessed the information that more than ten different interest groups submitted their evidence to the committee in 2008, explaining their position on Turkey’s EU membership. The research also accessed the official documents released by other governmental bodies (e.g. the FCO) to access more data on British societal/interest groups’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves. For example, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013) asked more than sixty different interest groups about their position on the EU’s further enlargement (as a Call for Evidence question), and then, the concerned interest groups submitted their evidence on the issue. Therefore, this document became an important data source to access the sensitive British societal groups’ attitudes towards the EU’s further enlargement.

In addition to this strategy to access the British societal groups, who were sensitive to the EU’s enlargement waves, the research also devoted special attention to the attitudes of the Confederation of British Industry (the CBI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) towards the EU’s enlargement waves as they are two peak/umbrella organizations representing numerous interest groups in Britain. Firstly, when the Mediterranean enlargement process started in the second half of the 1970s, they were particularly influential in the national decision making process (Cortell, 2006, p. 118, Grant, 2003, p. 365). Secondly, despite their declining influence over the national decision making process in time, the literature still recognizes them as two large influential interest groups, which are interested in all the policy areas affecting the British economy (including enlargement) (Williams, 1998, Garnett and Lynch, 2009, Watts, 2007, Baggott, 1995, Coxall, 2001, Grant, 2000). In addition to them, the research also took other influential interest groups into consideration like the National Farmers' Union (NFU), the Institute of Directors (IoD), and the British Chambers of Commerce (the BCC).

After determining the main British actors shaping Britain’s pro-enlargement policy, LI was still helpful in determining variables affecting those actors’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves. In this sense, as LI proposes, economic, geopolitical, and ideological
concerns were considered as the main variables that might have affected the attitudes of the aforementioned British actors towards the EU’s enlargement waves (see: section 2.2.3). Additionally, while determining an effective data collection method, the research also considered the fact that the EU witnessed different enlargement waves in the period from 1975 to 2014, namely, the Mediterranean enlargement, the EFTA enlargement, the Eastward enlargement\(^{14}\), and the ongoing further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. Therefore, it was clear that the EU’s enlargement waves were not only social but also historical phenomena, and as LI accepts, every enlargement wave needs to be analysed in its own historical context. As a result, this research benefited from an archival research data collection method to collect empirical data to test the above-mentioned theoretical assumptions derived from LI.

2.3.1.1 The Archival Data Collection

As noted above, LI also affected the research’s methodological strategy. Particularly, the archival research was chosen as the main data collection method for this research because, as Goodwin (2009, p. 388) argued, the archival data collection method provided sufficient empirical in-depth data to test the aforementioned theoretical assumptions derived from LI. As Moravcsik (1998) did, the research collected the archival data to empirically understand how a pro-enlargement policy emerged as an output of national preference formation process for every enlargement case and how the successive British governments defended Britain’s enlargement-related national preferences at EU level negotiations. To this end, the research mainly used six digitalised online archive datasets/resources: ProQuest’s House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk), LexisNexis (http://www.lexisnexis.com), Hansard (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com), the National Archives (www.nationalarchives.gov.uk), the House of Commons’ official webpage (www.parliament.uk), and the Archive of European Integration (http://aei.pitt.edu/)\(^{15}\), as well as two archive centres: The Modern Records Centre (The University of Warwick) and the Trades Union Congress Library Collections (London Metropolitan University).

To analyse Britain’s national preference formation process for every enlargement case, the research mainly focused on the publications of the House of Commons as it is the hub of

\(^{14}\) This term has been used interchangeably with the big-bang enlargement in the following chapters.

\(^{15}\) The European Council’s official webpage (http://www.consilium.europa.eu) was also used to access the presidency conclusions of the EU summits, published after 2006.
the British policy making system, in which societal groups (e.g. the CBI, the TUC and the NFU) also try to present their specific interests in addition to the British political parties. To this extent, ProQuest’s digital archive dataset: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers was a great data source to access important official documents published by the House of Commons. Particularly, those documents included the House of Commons select committees’ reports, the successive British governments’ official position on the EU’s enlargement waves, and several memoranda and evidence given by British societal groups (e.g. the CBI, TUC and NFU) and professionals on the EU’s enlargement waves from 1975 to 2014. Therefore, this dataset provided the main data through which Britain’s national preference formation for every enlargement case was analysed. Throughout the thesis, an extensive reference to those publications was given with the abbreviations: HC, CM, and Cmnd (as in-text citations). The documents starting with the abbreviation ‘HC’ presented the publications of the House of Commons’ select committees, and they were arguably the most reliable documents to access the successive British governments’ and other societal groups’ positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves in this research. In addition to them, the documents, starting with the abbreviation ‘CM’ (it was ‘Cmnd’ before 1986), represented the Command Papers16, which were produced outside the parliament (mostly by other governmental bodies) but were brought before it. In this thesis, most of the documents starting with the abbreviation ‘CM’ were produced by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs17, and they provided further data on the official positions/strategies of the successive British governments towards the EU’s enlargement waves.

The House of Commons’ official website also provided similar data about current developments (mostly after 2008). Moreover, Hansard, the official transcripts of parliamentary debates, provided detailed parliamentary discussions about the EU’s enlargement waves from 1975 to 2014; thus, the research collected further data from Hansard about the British political parties’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves. The National Archives also provided governmental documents related to the Mediterranean enlargement (related to the late 1970s). In addition, LexisNexis is a great digital print media dataset covering many newspapers, journals and news agencies; 

16 “Command Papers include major government reports, reports of Royal Commissions, statements of government policy (‘White papers’), the U.K. Treaty Series and reports of tribunals of enquiry” (http://libwww.essex.ac.uk/Information_Skills/parlpapers.htm, accessed on 23.08.2015.
17 In the reference list, the producers of these documents could easily be found.
therefore, it provided extensive day-to-day factual news reports on the national preference formation processes for the enlargement waves, domestic groups’ (e.g. the CBI, NFU) positions towards the enlargement waves in general and their reactions against the outcomes of the EU level negotiations in particular. In addition to the digital archives, the researcher also visited the Modern Records Centre (The University of Warwick) to access further data on the CBI’s and TUC’s positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves, and the Trades Union Congress Library Collections (London Metropolitan University) to access further data about TUC’s position on the EU’s enlargement waves\textsuperscript{18}.

In terms of the EU level intergovernmental bargains, as noted in the theory section, Moravcsik is mainly criticized for using theory biased historical data to prove his theoretical arguments (see: Kaiser, 2007, 2009, 2010, Lieshout et al., 2004, Kaiser et al., 2009, Wincott, 1995). To deal with this criticism, the research aimed to screen all of the EU level negotiations related to the EU’s enlargement waves as much as possible. In this regard, the print media emerged as an important data source because it covers factual daily news reports, which was used to access detailed evidence regarding EU level negotiations. In particular, the research focused on the EU summits, where enlargement-related negotiations were carried out. However, many informal meetings were also organized at the EU level to achieve rapprochement between member states prior to the summits; thus, the research also tried to access data about those informal meetings. At this point, daily factual news reports provided data not only about the EU summits but also about those specific informal meetings, and helped the researcher to screen any enlargement-related EU level negotiation in its historical context.

On the other hand, the research also considered the potential limitations of this data collection method. In this regard, the potential subjectivity of the print media emerged as the main bottleneck (Franzosi, 1987), and some measures were taken to strengthen the objectivity of the data extracted from news reports. Firstly, thanks to LexisNexis, the research had a chance to access almost all of the news (published in English) on enlargement published from 1970s to 2014. As a result of this rich data source, the research mainly used factual news reports but not columns. Secondly, the research only used the news reports confirmed by different sources; thus, if a news report was only

\textsuperscript{18} The research also benefited from their official websites to access further data on their positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves.
published by a single newspaper (e.g. the Daily Mail), the research did not use that news report as a data source. The research also tried to check the news reports released by the national newspapers (e.g. the Times, the Guardian, or the Independent) with foreign media sources (e.g. Agence France Presse, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, and Xinhua News Agency). By doing so, the research aimed to increase the internal consistency/reliability of the data extracted from news reports (Woolley, 2000). Thirdly, the research accessed almost all of the presidency conclusions of the relevant EU summits via the Archive of European Integration (http://aei.pitt.edu/) and via the European Council’s official webpage (http://www.consilium.europa.eu), which were the official documents used to check the validity of the data on the EU summits, collected from the print media19. The FCO’s special reports on the developments in the EU were also useful in screening the outcomes of the EU summits.

In the literature on social/political science methodology, the print media/newspapers is also recognized as a data source (Monroe, 2000, Bucy and Holbert, 2011, Statham and Trenz, 2013, Powner, 2014, Klotz and Prakash, 2008). Especially, newspapers might emerge as an alternative data collection method if researchers cannot access political elites, because newspapers have relatively more power than individual researchers to access elites (Gibson and Brown, 2009, p. 75). At this point, the target group of this research was the British elite (politicians, civil servants, businessmen, officials from different societal groups); thus, it was really hard to access them. For example, as noted below, the research tried to carry out interviews, but failed to access most of the potential interviewees. Therefore, the newspapers emerged as a tool to compensate for this limitation. For example, The Times published an article by Robin Cook, in which he as Shadow Foreign Secretary expressed his position on the Eastward enlargement in 1995 (Cook, 1995). In addition to this, as noted above, the research topic was a historical phenomenon (particularly the Mediterranean and EFTA enlargement cases) and several actors who played a role in the decision making process for a pro-enlargement policy were not alive; thus, newspapers provided archival data about those actors’ attitude towards the EU’s enlargement waves. To demonstrate, The Times published a letter by the Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan (1977), through which the research accessed his attitude towards the Mediterranean enlargement. Last but not least, LexisNexis is used as a dataset in political

19 The in-text citations starting with ‘The European Council’ cites these documents.
science in order to analyse political processes (see: Pennings et al., 2006, Green and Ernest, 2005), and this research also used it for a similar purpose (to analyse the enlargement-related EU level negotiation processes, containing several summits/meetings).

As Moravcsik (1998) did, the research also tried to conduct interviews and access the main political actors’ bibliographies, autobiographies and memoirs; however, the data collected via those methods was limited and became supplementary to the data collected through the archival research. Firstly, the researcher tried to access around 35 potential interviewees from British politicians, civil servants, and officials from British societal groups (e.g. the CBI, the TUC and the NFU). However, they were inaccessible for the large part, and the researcher managed to conduct telephone interviews with just two of them, namely, with Malcolm Rifkind, who was the Minister of State for Europe from 1983 to 1986, and Charles Garret, who was the Head of EU Enlargement Team in the FCO from 2001 to 2005. On the other hand, interviews as a data collection method were not an effective strategy to collect in-depth data. For example, one of the members of the Select Committee on European legislation in the 1990s acknowledged that he could not give detailed information about the discussions in the Committee about the EU’s enlargement towards the EFTA. As another example, a civil-servant from the FCO gave a very short written answer to the interview question: ‘what is the Coalition government’s position on Turkey’s bid for full EU membership’.

Additionally, the research tried to benefit from the bibliographies, autobiographies and memoirs published by the British political actors; namely, James Callaghan (Callaghan, 2006, Morgan, 1997), Anthony Crosland (Crosland, 1982), Geoffrey Howe (Howe, 1994), Francis Pym (Pym, 1984), Douglas Hurd (Hurd, 2003), John Major (Anderson, 1991, Seldon, 1997, Major, 1999), Margaret Thatcher (Young, 1989, Campbell, 2003, Thatcher, 1995, Thatcher, 1993), Jack Straw (Straw, 2012), Gordon Brown (Seldon, 2011, Peston, 2005, Lee, 2007), Robin Cook (Cook, 2004), Derek Scott (Scott, 2004), Tony Blair’s adviser, Tony Blair (Stephens, 2004, Seldon, 2004, Richards, 2004, Blair, 2011, Rentoul, 2013, Seldon, 2007), Percy Cradock (Cradock, 1997), the Prime Minister’s foreign policy adviser from 1984 to 1992, and David Hannay (Hannay, 2013), the Ambassador to the European Communities from 1985 to 1990. However, the research found that those actors rarely mentioned the enlargement or enlargement-related developments; thus, the data derived from bibliographies, autobiographies and memoirs was also limited and supplementary.
2.3.1.2 The Data Analysis

As most of the archives were online, the study accessed a considerable volume of documents from 1975 to 2014 through investigating online datasets by using the concepts related to the EU’s enlargement like “enlargement”, “accession”, “widen(ing)”, “applicant”, and “expansion” as keywords (see: Yakel, 2010). In this way, this archival research benefited from a thematic analysis strategy because the enlargement-related concepts (enlargement terminology) were used to extract relevant data from the above-mentioned datasets. During the data analysis process, the available data extracted from the datasets were segmented, categorized, and finally different data from different datasets were linked to each other to synthesize original knowledge/evidence to test LI’s assumptions as potential theoretical answers to the research question (a conceptual link between the data derived from different documents) (see also: Ayres, 2008, Trochim and Donnelly, 2001, Brewerton and Millward, 2001, and Crano and Brewer, 2002).

The initial aim of this comprehensive archival research was to capture all of the relevant data as much as possible. In this regard, when the keywords: “enlargement” and “Europe” were entered, ProQuest’s House of Commons Parliamentary Papers provided 4243 official documents from 1975 to 2014, and when the keywords: “enlargement”+ “Europe”+ “Britain” were searched in LexisNexis, it provided more than 15,000 news related to the research topic for the same period. To make this extensive data more manageable, the research tried to use NVivo, which is a qualitative data analysis (QDA) computer software, but it failed for two reasons. Firstly, most of the documents accessed via ProQuest’s House of Commons Parliamentary Papers were recognized by NVivo as pictures; thus, it was impossible to do further analysis on them. Secondly, there were hundreds of documents and some of them were even more than 500 pages; therefore, this mass not only technically limited the ability of NVivo as a computer program but also blurred the historical/political context of those documents. As a result of this, the research needed to manually carry out the data collection and analysis process, and it took more than two years to complete this process.

However, the above-mentioned datasets’ being online was highly helpful in making this manual data collection and analysis process less time consuming. In a concrete manner, the research mainly benefited from their online search functions. More specifically, by using the online archives’ search functions, the research firstly segmented the available data
according to the EU’s enlargement waves and then specifically categorized them according to the incumbent British governments. To illustrate, the study searched the archives to access data on the Mediterranean enlargement from 1975 to 1979 (the Labour government period) and from 1979 to 1985 (the Conservative government period); on the EFTA enlargement from 1989 to 1995 (the Conservative government); on the Eastward enlargement from 1989 to 1997 (the Conservative government) and from 1997 to 2007 (the Labour government); on the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey from 2004 to 2010 (the Labour government) and from 2010 to 2014 (the Coalition government). Secondly, as noted above, by using enlargement-related concepts as keywords, the researcher directly accessed the online documents related to the EU’s enlargement waves. Thirdly, as the search functions of the online archives highlighted the searched keywords in the online documents, the researcher had a chance to easily access the relevant parts of the online documents. For example, by using the above-mentioned keywords, the research accessed the British Footwear Manufacturers’ position on the Mediterranean enlargement in one of the House of Commons Industry and Trade Committee’s documents (46 pages), which was mentioned in just one paragraph (HC 442-xi, p. 326). In a similar vein, LexisNexis had also a search function and highlighted the searched keywords in texts, which helped the researcher to extract the relevant data from the news reports (mostly by using skimming reading technique). In addition to the online archives, the researcher also used online catalogues of the Modern Records Centre (the University of Warwick) and the Trades Union Congress Library Collections (London Metropolitan University) before visiting them; thus, the researcher easily accessed the data on the CBI’s and TUC’s positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves on arrival.

Finally, all of the data, which was extracted from the datasets and then classified according to the Enlargement waves, was coded in a word document to see the whole picture. Subsequently, the possible intellectual linkages between the collected data were studied with the help of the theoretical framework of the research. While doing so, firstly, the collected data was analysed to understand the successive British governments’ positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves. In this sense, the research analysed the collected data to see how geopolitical, economic and ideological concerns affected the successive British governments’ positions towards the enlargement waves. In addition to this, the research also analysed the collected data to see the attitudes of other political parties and societal groups towards the enlargement waves. Secondly, the collected data was analysed
to see how the successive British governments defended Britain’s enlargement-related national preferences at the EU level negotiations.

The research also considered scientific criteria during the data collection and analysis process. As Jackson (2012, p. 88) and Mcburney and White (2010, p. 228) argued, the archival research made the limited interaction between the researcher and the data collection process possible. Especially, as noted above, thanks to the online nature of the datasets, all the documents that contained the target keywords were studied, and this strategy remained the researcher’s bias towards the collected data limited. As a result, it is highly possible that by using the same data collection method from the same theoretical perspective, any researcher will collect similar documents and do similar analysis on them. Therefore, this data collection method strengthened the replication of the research’s findings; and in this way, supported the reliability and validity of the research.

2.4 Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to develop an effective theoretical framework, which would make the research case more knowable and an original methodological strategy, which would help to collect sufficient data and to systematically analyse this collected data. At this point, LI appeared as a more appropriate theory than the rest of the European integration theories because the literature review suggested that as a leading Eurosceptic member, Britain should have her own reasons for a pro-enlargement policy and LI, with its member state centred analysis, might provide an effective theoretical framework to understand/explain these reasons.

More specifically, LI’s two-level game approach enabled the research to specifically analyse how Britain formed a pro-enlargement policy as a national preference for every enlargement wave, and how the successive British governments defended Britain’s enlargement-related national preferences at the EU level negotiations. At the domestic level, LI suggested that a pro-enlargement policy might have emerged as an output of a national preference formation process for every single enlargement wave under different domestic and international conditions (different situational conditions). In this process, according to LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice approach, economic interests might have become the main reason behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. In addition to this, according to its pluralistic decision making understanding, British societal groups
might also have become influential over Britain’s national preference formation process. LI also assumes that the successive British governments should defend Britain’s enlargement-related national preferences at the EU level negotiations.

Moreover, as LI acknowledges, the issue of enlargement is a hard case for LI; thus, this research is also theoretically interesting to see the extent to which LI’s theoretical explanations are successfully explanatory in a hard case. In particular, LI acknowledges that its economic interest oriented rational choice assumption might be limited in explaining the issue of enlargement as it is a complex case for actors to make precise cost-benefit calculations on. To compensate for this limitation, LI suggests that a multi-causal reasoning, covering economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns, might have affected Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. At this point, it is also interesting to study a topic on which LI needed to back down from its strong economic interest oriented rational choice position (the logic of micro-economics) and gave more reference to geopolitics and ideology. On the other hand, the research also considered that LI’s multi-causal reasoning explanation might be descriptive. Thus, to deepen its analytical capacity, the theoretical framework also benefited from Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist assumptions to explain this multi-causal reasoning as a significant variable which might have affected British actors’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves.

The research also synthesized an effective methodological strategy by considering LI’s methodological strengths and weaknesses. Firstly, as Moravcsik did, the research was designed as a qualitative case study, which enabled the research to deeply focus on each individual enlargement wave and to collect extensive data to test the theoretical assumptions derived from LI. Additionally, the EU’s enlargement waves are not only social but also historical phenomena; thus, the archival research was chosen as the main data collection method in order to collect empirical in-depth data directly from its historical context. While doing that, the research mainly benefited from the official documents (through online datasets), covering the successive British governments’, British political parties’, and other societal groups’ positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves. Moreover, the literature mainly criticizes Moravcsik for only selecting data from historical documents, supporting his own theory. To deal with this criticism, this research tried to screen all EU level negotiations related to enlargement with the help of the daily news reports extracted from LexisNexis (online dataset). In addition to this, as Moravcsik did, the research also tried to benefit from interviews and biographies; however, the
research could not access extensive data via those methods, and thus the obtained data became supplementary. As a result, the research also synthesized an original methodological strategy, trying to compensate for LI’s weaknesses and to enrich the methodological strategies used in the European integration studies.

All in all, the research is original in that it was designed to contribute new knowledge and theoretical/methodological dimensions to the literature. Firstly, as noted above, the research question was not studied before; thus, the research filled a gap in the literature. Secondly, it was theoretically interesting to test LI’s assumptions on EU enlargement as it is a hard case for LI. Thirdly, the research synthesized an original methodological strategy, which helped to collect extensive empirical data and to compensate for LI’s methodological weaknesses.

In line with this original theoretical framework and methodological strategy, the research collected empirical data and analysed it to test to what extent the theoretical assumptions derived from LI as a potential answer to the research question are correct, by sequentially focusing on the EU’s enlargement waves: the Mediterranean enlargement, the EFTA enlargement, the Eastward enlargement and the ongoing further enlargement process towards the Western Balkans and Turkey.
3 The Mediterranean Enlargement

3.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses Britain’s policy towards the Mediterranean enlargement from an LI perspective. The Mediterranean enlargement process took 10 years from 1975 to 1985\(^{20}\), and both the Labour Party (1975-1979) and the Conservative Party (1979-1985) governed the process during that time. However, this chapter analyses the Mediterranean enlargement process as a whole rather than separately examining the Labour and Conservative parties’ periods in government to prevent the repetition of findings/arguments.

LI’s two level-game approach is practically useful in systematically analysing how a pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries emerged as an output of a national preference formation process at the domestic level and how the Conservative government defended Britain’s enlargement-related national preferences at the EEC level negotiations. In this regard, the findings support LI’s main intergovernmental assumption that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries was shaped according to Britain’s national interests, and the Conservative government did not accept any significant cost (e.g. the budgetary cost) for the sake of the enlargement at the EEC level negotiations. However, the research has found that LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice explanation and pluralistic decision making assumption are limited in explaining the national preference formation process in this case.

Firstly, the research has found that LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice explanation could not sufficiently explain this case because the Mediterranean enlargement was a complex issue for the successive British governments to make a precise cost-benefit calculation on, and geopolitical concerns were the main reason behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries. On the other hand, the research has found that economic expectations and ideological motivations were also other

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\(^{20}\) Greece made its application in 1975, the substantive accession negotiations started in February 1978 and concluded in April 1979, and finally the Treaty of Greek Accession was signed in Athens in May 1979. As a result of this agreement, Greece became a member of the EEC in 1981. On the other hand, Portugal and Spain made their formal applications in 1977, Portugal started the accession negotiations in October 1978 and Spain started in February 1979. The negotiations took around 6 years and finally ended in 1985 (Cmd 7489, 1979, p. 3, Cmd 7361, 1978, p. 3, Cmd 8365, 1981, p. 7, Cmd 9627, 1985, p. 8, Cmd 7780, 1980, p. 4).
influential factors in the decision making process. Therefore, the latter finding supports LI’s multi-causal argument that geopolitical concerns and ideological motivations might be more or equally influential over actors’ decisions when they face complex issues to make precise economic cost-benefit calculations on. Despite this explanation, as noted in chapter 2, LI does not provide further explanations about this multi-causal reasoning. In this sense, the findings have supported the literature review’s suggestion that the influence of geopolitical concerns, economic expectations and ideological motivations on the British actors might be understood better if the national preference formation process for the Mediterranean enlargement is analysed within the British foreign policy structure. More specifically, the research has found that the complexity of enlargement limited British actors’ rational choice, and that the pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries depended on the British actors’ economic and geopolitical benefit expectations rather than a precise cost-benefit calculation. In this regard, the findings show that the British governments perceived the Mediterranean enlargement as a security measure to strengthen Britain’s collective security policy within the Cold War context and as a chance to expand market economy further, which would provide more economic benefits to Britain in the long-run. Thus, the British foreign policy structure (e.g. the aim to strengthen Britain’s collective security policy and to expand free market principles) affected the British actors’ attitudes towards the Mediterranean enlargement in the Cold War context.

Secondly, unlike LI’s pluralistic assumption, the research has found that the successive British governments were the main actors in the decision making process. Despite this fact, there are also some findings supporting LI’s assumption that the domestic interest groups (e.g. steel, textile, agricultural, fishery sectors), which were sensitive to the Mediterranean enlargement, tried to lobby the British government to protect their interests against the negative externalities of the enlargement at the EU level negotiations. As a response to this, the Conservative government considered those domestic demands and negotiated at the EEC level to eliminate the negative externalities of the enlargement to Britain.

To systematically present these findings in detail, this chapter firstly focuses on the national preference formation process. In this section, the research analyses the collected data to answer the questions: how the British executive and relevant societal groups formed Britain’s national preferences, and how economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns affected the national preference formation process. Thereafter, the chapter
focuses on the question: how the Conservative government defended the enlargement-related national preferences at the EEC level negotiations.

3.2 National Preference Formation

3.2.1 Political Concerns

The research has found that the Mediterranean enlargement was a complex issue for the successive British governments to make clear cost-benefit calculations on (e.g. Hansard, 1977d, Hansard, 1978d, Hansard, 1978h, Hansard, 1978b, Hansard, 1980, HC 15-i, 1985, p. 2). For example, John Tomlinson, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, argued that it was premature to try to put a precise figure on the costs of the Mediterranean enlargement to Britain in 1978 (Hansard, 1978d, p. 1821). Michael Meacher, the Under-Secretary of State for Trade (1976-1979) also accepted the difficulty in estimating the effects of the Mediterranean enlargement on the trade balance between Britain and the Mediterranean countries (Hansard, 1977f, p. 8). In the same vein, David Owen, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1977-1979) highlighted the unpredictable nature of forthcoming developments in the European integration process and argued that the effect of the Mediterranean enlargement on the Community would be clearer in the upcoming detailed accession negotiations (Hansard, 1978b, p. 1389). In addition to David Owen, the new Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also accepted that it was not possible to make a precise cost-benefit calculation on the Mediterranean enlargement in 1980 (Hansard, 1980c, p. 713). Interestingly, even in 1985 just before the accession of the Iberian countries to the EEC, the Conservative government could still hardly make a calculation with any precision (HC 15-i, 1985, p. 2).

Despite this complexity, as LI argues, the successive British governments had a tendency to evaluate the Mediterranean enlargement issue according to Britain’s national interests. In this sense, the research has found that a multi-causal reasoning shaped British actors’ attitudes towards the Mediterranean enlargement. Firstly, the successive British governments perceived the Mediterranean enlargement as a security measure to strengthen Britain’s collective security policy in the Cold War context, and secondly as a long-run investment, which would provide economic gains for Britain in the long run.
The Labour government highly supported the democratization attempts in the Mediterranean countries in the 1970s in the Cold War context (especially it played an active role in the democratisation of Portugal) (Callaghan, 2006, pp. 360-362, Morgan, 1997, p. 434). Therefore, when the Mediterranean enlargement came to the EEC’s agenda in the second half of the 1970s, the Labour government (1975-1979) declared its strong support for the Mediterranean enlargement. For example, in 1977, the British Prime Minister Callaghan, argued that

The Government and the Party have always supported the concept of enlargement. We have a strong political commitment to the support of democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and the Community should use its democratic political strength to buttress these new democracies (Hansard, 1977a, p. 1309, The Times, 1977c).

The main motivation behind the Labour government’s support for the Mediterranean enlargement was political. For example, Anthony Crosland, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, clearly argued that “enlargement [was] an investment in the democratic future of Europe; and in the long run the benefits [would] far outweigh the costs” (The Economist, 1977). In the same vein, David Owen, the successor to Crosland, argued that the Community had an economic institution but a political future; therefore, politics was “the decisive factor behind further enlargement” (Hansard, 1977c, p. 200). According to this political understanding, the further unification of Europe via enlargement was critically important in the Cold War context (see also: Cp(74) 5, 1974). To illustrate, in the party conference in Scarborough in 1967, the Labour party declared that the party perceived “the enlargement of the EEC as a first step towards the creation of a wider and more unified continent” in a time when Europe was sharply divided as the West and East Europe (cited in: Hansard, 1975a, p. 1166). In this context, the Labour government also argued that an enlarged Community would be attractive to the Eastern European countries, who were seeking to free themselves from Soviet domination (C(76) 9, 1976, p. 4).

In this political picture, the Labour government had also a tendency to tolerate the Mediterranean enlargement’s short-run costs. Frank Judd, the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1977-1979), repeatedly argued that there were some economic costs of the Mediterranean enlargement but political gains would outweigh the costs of the enlargement (Hansard, 1978e, pp. 1734-1735, Hansard, 1978g). Regarding those short-run costs, according to him, the Mediterranean members would be net receivers from the EEC budget, which would pose an economic cost to Britain due to her being a net contributor to the EEC budget, and the Mediterranean enlargement would make the decision making
system within the EEC harder, which would pose a procedural cost to all the members (Hansard, 1978d, p. 1734).

Moreover, the Labour Prime Minister Callaghan tried to pragmatically benefit from a pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries in domestic politics. In particular, an important number of leftist party members and the TUC were against Britain’s EEC membership in the second half of the 1970s, arguing that the EEC was a capitalist club which ignored the interests of the working class21 (e.g. the EEC was pushing up food prices) (The Economist, 1975b, Harper, 1975). When the leftist members within the Labour Party took control of the National Executive Committee (NEC), an alternative voice to the leader of the Labour Party (Kavanagh, 1998, Beer, 1982, p. 157), they increased their pressure on Callaghan against his pro-European policy in the second half of the 1970s. As a reaction to this pressure, as a talented pragmatist politician (Deveney, 2010, p. 2, Bogdanor, 2004), Callaghan needed to form a new strategic position through which he could both continue his pro-European policy and appease the leftist members’ concerns about the EEC. In this regard, the chance of a second renegotiation with the EEC (on Britain’s terms of entry) was weak especially after the limited success of the first renegotiation prior to the 1975 referendum (Dinan, 1999). Therefore, a pro-enlargement policy emerged as the best option for Callaghan to appease the leftists within the Labour Party and the TUC, as the enlargement of the EEC had a potentiality to dilute supranational ambitions within the Community and to drive the European integration process forward in an intergovernmental way (Evans, 1977, Cornwell, 1977a, Raphael, 1977, The Times, 1977b, Jenkins, 1976, The Economist, 1977a, Harper, 1977, Jenkins, 1977). For example, Callaghan (1977) wrote a letter to the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, arguing that the enlargement would automatically dilute the federalist ambitions for the European integration22 (see also: Harper, 1977).

On the other hand, Callaghan’s pro-enlargement policy was in conformity with the ideological background of the leftist Labour members and TUC. For example, the leftist

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21 The TUC and the leftist members of the Labour Party also voted ‘no’ at the 1975 referendum, and the main reason behind that decision was to protect Britain’s sovereignty (The Guardian, 1975c, Aitken, 1975b, Hatfield, 1975). Furthermore, the TUC had much more power at the domestic level to affect the decision making system according to its interests; therefore, the British sovereign power should not be transferred to the EEC as a capitalist club.
22 Although European leaders strongly criticized Callaghan’s enlargement description as a dilution tool (Hornsby, 1977, Palmer, 1977).
Labour Party members were supportive of the leftist Portuguese government’s bid for the EEC membership (Pridham, 2005), and the TUC had already declared its solidarity with the Spanish working class against the authoritarian Franco government (The Times, 1975). As a result, Callaghan pragmatically used the dilution rhetoric as a tool to get political leverage at the domestic level.

The Conservative Party also supported the Mediterranean enlargement in the opposition (1975-1979). Therefore, there was a consensus between the British government and opposition on a pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries. For example, Edward Heath in 1977 (Cornwell, 1977b, The Times, 1977), and Margaret Thatcher in 1978 (Hornsby, 1978), declared their support for the Mediterranean enlargement by using the similar reasons with the government. In addition to them, Douglas Hurd repeatedly argued that Britain should support the applicants (Greece, Portugal and Spain) for the sake of the democratization of Europe, and that this political interest would outweigh the potential economic costs of the enlargement (Hansard, 1978g, Brown, 1978). Geoffrey Rippon also supported Anthony Crosland’s argument that the Mediterranean enlargement would be an investment in the democratic future of Europe and that the long-run benefits of it would far outweigh the short-term economic costs (Hansard, 1978g).

When the Conservative Party came into government in 1979, their support for the Mediterranean enlargement continued (Tonge and Parkes, 1979, Hansard, 1980c, p. 713), and the political concerns were still increasingly the dominant factor behind this support. The Conservative government perceived the Mediterranean enlargement as an important collective security measure in the Cold War international system. To illustrate, in its 1979 European election manifesto, the Conservative Party mainly used the Western European collective security as the main reason behind its support for the Mediterranean enlargement (The Guardian, 1979). Moreover, according to Margaret Thatcher, the European Community’s political mission was “to anchor new and vulnerable democracies more securely to freedom and to the West” (Thatcher, 1995, p. 476). After analysing her several speeches on the Mediterranean enlargement, it has also been found that Thatcher repeatedly used the expansion of liberal democracy to the Mediterranean countries via enlargement as a collective security measure, which was highly important in the Cold War context (e.g. 27.11.1981: Press conference after London European Council, 07.06.1982: Radio Interview for BBC World Service, 25.02.1983: Joint Press Conference with Italian Prime Minister, 04.07.1983: Interview for Director Magazine, 06.12.1983: Press
Conference after Athens European Council, 04.12.1984: TV interview for BBC Dublin European Council, and 30.03.1985: Radio interview for BBC (Collins, 1999)). Therefore, according to Thatcher, it was worth spending “a little bit money” to guarantee the Mediterranean countries’ place in the democratic Western system (Owen, 1984a). This argument was also reiterated several times by Malcolm Rifkind, the Minister of State for Europe from 1983 to 1986 (Clough, 1983) and Ian Gilmour, the Lord Privy Seal (Hansard, 1980a, p. 571, Hansard, 1979a, p. 1042). Moreover, Lord Carrington, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, asserted that the Mediterranean enlargement was highly important for the collective security of the Western Europe (Brown and Langdon, 1979); thus, according to him, “the question of enlargement must be seen on two levels, the political first and the economic second” (Spanier, 1980). There is also a government memorandum arguing that cooperation within the Western world was the best way to defend the collective interests (liberal democracy) of Western Europe in the Cold War, and the Mediterranean enlargement was particularly noteworthy in this context (HC 57-ii, 1985, p. 14). In this regard, as Geoffrey Rippon argued, the enlargement of the EEC towards the Mediterranean countries would be a special “Marshal plan” to assist/accelerate the integration of the Mediterranean countries in the Western liberal democratic system in the Cold War (The CBI, 1978a). Malcolm Rifkind (01.12.2014, interview), the Minister of State for Europe from 1980 to 1983, also confirmed that the main reason behind the Conservative government’s support for the Mediterranean enlargement was the expansion of liberal democracy to the Mediterranean countries as a security measure in the Cold War context.

The Gibraltar case is also a good indicator to see how the successive British governments strongly associated Britain’s collective security understanding and the Mediterranean enlargement. More specifically, Spain blockaded the Gibraltar border in 1969 and challenged the British sovereignty over Gibraltar (Jordine, 2006). Therefore, this was an important national security problem for Britain. As a result, Britain could have demanded the settlement of the Gibraltar problem as a precondition for the Spanish membership; however, the successive British governments did not follow this opportunistic strategy. On the contrary, they believed that a permanent settlement on the dispute would be easier with the inclusion of a democratic Spain in the EEC. Consequently, the EEC would not only stabilize Spanish democracy but also automatically force Spain to end its blockade on the Gibraltar border (via the principle of free movement). Therefore, the Labour government
declared that the Gibraltar dispute was not a precondition for the Spanish accession to the EEC (Hansard, 1977, Hansard, 1978f, Hansard, 1978g, Hansard, 1978c, CM (78) 31, 1978).

The Conservative government also followed this policy (HC 166, 1981, p. 91). A case in point, a military intervention attempt in Spain in February 1981 proved the fragility and importance of the newly emerged Spanish democracy. On the other hand, military-run Argentina was a good example of how an authoritarian government might be a threat to British sovereignty over overseas territories (e.g. the Falklands islands) (The Economist, 1982). As a result, the Conservative government preferred to solve the problem of Spain’s blockade on Gibraltar’s border within the EEC’s democratic mechanism. Particularly, the EEC’s free movement principle would make it compulsory for Spain to lift the border restrictions on Gibraltar in order to become a Community member, and the Conservative government repeatedly pointed out this principle to solve the dispute (Hansard, 1982a, Hansard, 1982c, Hansard, 1982b, Hansard, 1983, Hansard, 1984, Hannay, 2013). For example, Malcolm Rifkind argued that

It is the British Government's desire that Spain should become a member of the Community. If it wishes to do so, it must recognise that Gibraltar is part of the Community and that it would be inconceivable if Spain, as a member of the Community, did not allow movement across its frontiers with Gibraltar similar to that which it would provide for other member countries (Hansard, 1983, p. 371).

In addition to the main political parties, the attitudes of the CBI and the TUC towards the enlargement were also important, because they were an important part of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC), which was established in 1962 as an institutional framework in which the TUC and the CBI could discuss the macroeconomic policies of Britain with the government (Cortell, 2006, p. 118). Moreover, this council was increasingly influential over the British executive especially in the 1970s (Grant, 2003, p. 365). In this regard, the CBI and the TUC also pointed out the expansion of liberal democracy to the Mediterranean countries as the main reason behind their support for the Mediterranean enlargement. The CBI issued its qualified support for the enlargement of the EEC in 1977 (Elliott, 1977) and accepted the priority of the political reason (democracy) to support those countries’ membership (The CBI, 1977a). Subsequently, the CBI also declared that “accession of Portugal and Spain to the EEC is welcomed as a means of strengthening their democratic institutions and contribution to the political stability of Western Europe” (The CBI, 1981a, p. 2). In the same vein, the TUC called the
British government to help the democratization of the Iberian Peninsula by supporting their accession to the EEC (The TUC, 1976).

3.2.2 Economic Concerns

As noted above, the Mediterranean enlargement was a complex issue, on which it was hard for the British actors to make a precise cost-benefit calculation. However, despite this limitation, the British actors had some long-run economic benefit expectations from the Mediterranean enlargement. According to the British actors, the main economic benefit of the Mediterranean enlargement would be that it would offer new market opportunities for British business. For example, according to the Department of Trade and Industry, the Iberian enlargement would increase the European market from 270 million to 320 million people, and thanks to the enlarging European market, the British manufacturing sector would export more to Europe, which would increase the profits of British companies and create more jobs in Britain (HC 329-i, 1984, p. 2). Moreover, according to the CBI, the enlargement would provide British business an opportunity to access the Mediterranean markets (The CBI, 1981a), and after the enlargement, the influence of the EEC would increase in the competitive world market (The CBI, 1978b), which was important in a time when Britain’s global competitiveness was in decline (Brown, 1975).

In addition to those long-run economic benefit expectations, the British executive and British business also considered the potential economic costs of the Mediterranean enlargement in the national preference formation process. According to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Mediterranean enlargement would increase the EEC’s budgetary expenses (mostly due to substantial farming spending), and this would also increase Britain’s contribution to the EEC budget (C(76)37, 1976). HM Treasury also accepted that the Mediterranean enlargement would increase the burden on the EEC budget (and so on Britain) by increasing expenditure in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (HC 10-vii, 1978, p. 7). Moreover, relatively poor Mediterranean countries would also reduce the British share in the Regional Development Fund (RDF) (C(76)37, 1976, p. 5). The RDF was established in 1975, and Britain was its main beneficiary (Helen Wallace in: HC41-xiii, 1977, pp. 82-83); thus, the Fund was arguably a substitution for the British contribution to the EEC budget/the CAP (Thody, 2002). However, the Mediterranean enlargement would dilute this substitution unless further reforms were adopted in the EEC’s financial system. For example, Britain’s share of the quota section of
the Fund for 1981 reduced from 27.03 per cent to 23.34 per cent (according to GPD per head of population) in 1981 due to the Greek accession (HC 159-xlvi, 1980, p. 5). As a result, the Mediterranean enlargement would worsen Britain’s existing unfair contribution to the EEC budget; thus, a correction mechanism covering the British rebate from the EEC budget and a limitation on the agricultural spending should be implemented before the enlargement.

In terms of the necessary CAP reforms, Peter Walker, the Minister of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, proposed a gradual reform of the CAP over five years in which the “absurd cost of financing surpluses” would be reduced; and that otherwise, the existing CAP system would not endure a dramatic cost increase after the Mediterranean enlargement (Walker, 1980). For example, as David Curry (1980), MEP for Essex NE, argued, the Mediterranean enlargement might pose new surplus threats (e.g. olive oil) due to the applicants’ mass agricultural productions. To prevent further burdens of the CAP on the EEC’s budget after the Mediterranean enlargement, Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1979-1983), argued that the CAP should be reformed according to three principles: the reduction of European subsidies for farm products in surplus, the domination of open-market forces in the EEC’s farming sectors, and strict controls on the EEC’s spending on farm support (Blake, 1981).

On the other hand, there were also potential economic costs of the Mediterranean enlargement to Britain but they were tolerable and not a precondition for the Iberian enlargement. Therefore, Britain highlighted the point that a transition period and special arrangements between the EEC and the Iberian countries were necessary to minimize the costs of the enlargement to British business in the horticultural, textile, steel related, and fishery sectors.

As John Silkin, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, pointed out, the Mediterranean enlargement would not result in any significant competition against the British agricultural industry except for horticulture (Hansard, 1977b). The Conservative government also accepted that although the Iberian enlargement would provide potential markets for the British producers (e.g. cereals) and cheap foods for British consumers, the large and competitive Spanish horticultural sector might damage the British horticultural sector at the domestic market after the Iberian enlargement (Hc 15-I, 1985). The Central Horticultural Committee (British) was also quite sensitive to this issue, and Peter Pearson,
the chairman of the Central Horticultural Committee, warned the Conservative government that Spain might over-supply the British domestic market with its horticultural products after the enlargement; thus, that some EEC level measures ought to be taken to prevent potential bankruptcies in the British horticultural sector (HC 41, 1982, p. 292). In addition to horticulture, wine production was perceived as another British farming sector that the Iberian enlargement could negatively affect. Particularly, Spain wanted to reserve the label: “sherry” for a particular Spanish wine but this condition would negatively affect the demand for British products using the name: “British Sherry”. Therefore, the Conservative government would also insist on a satisfactory solution to this problem at the upcoming EEC level negotiations (HC 15-i, 1985, p. 9). Therefore, these cases are good examples confirming LI’s theoretical assumption that if a societal group’s interests are in danger, they have a strong tendency to affect the executive power to defend their interests at the EEC/EU level negotiations.

The enlargement also had a potentiality to negatively affect Britain’s older industries: textile and steel (C(76)37, 1976, p. 5). In this period, the textile and steel sectors (and related minor sectors such as footwear23 and shipbuilding) emerged as the most vulnerable ones that the British government needed to consider particularly during Portugal’s and Spain’s accession negotiations (Hansard, 1977f, Hansard, 1978a, Hansard, 1978i, Hansard, 1978g, Hansard, 1978c, Hansard, 1979). In fact, by the middle of the 1970s, Britain had lost her competitiveness (mostly in the textile and steel related sectors); therefore, the CBI and TUC issued a joint memorandum calling the government to take adequate measures to protect British industry (Carvel, 1976). The TUC also demanded that the government take necessary measures to protect the sensitive manufacturing sectors: textile-clothing-footwear, iron-steel products, and motorcars (The TUC, 1978). In addition to the TUC, the CBI also pointed out that the interests of the mentioned sectors (textile, steel, and motor industry) should be considered by the British government during the Iberian enlargement negotiations (The CBI, 1981b). Moreover, according to the CBI, Spain and Portugal were required to modify their import restrictions and textile export policies according to the EEC standards as soon as possible to smoothly integrate into the EEC system. Moreover, the CBI called Spain to lower tariffs, to repeal the Buy Spanish act, to introduce VAT, to

23 For example, Anthony Clothier (Clarks shoe firm) perceived Portugal as a serious problem against the British shoe industry; thus, according to him, the British government should consider this fact during the EU level negotiations (HC 442-xi, 1980, p. 337).
end its import licensing system (adopt the EEC customs methods), to adopt the Community’s steel policy, to accept a transition period for Britain’s textile industry, and to end limits to EEC investment in Spain (Andrews, 1981, Townsend, 1981). There were also specific British sectors (e.g. the British Footwear Manufacturers Federation (HC 442-xi, 1980, p. 326) and British Leyland Limited (HC 109, 1981, p. 534)) arguing that the Mediterranean countries’ protectionism made the British firms’ accession to those countries significantly harder; thus, they urged the British government to eliminate those trade barriers at the accession negotiations. The director of British Independent Steel Producers' Association also asked the British government “to watch the Spanish steel industry like hawks” in order to take the necessary measures at the accession negotiations to protect the British steel industry against the subsidised Spanish steel24 (HC 478-iii, 1984, p. 87). As LI assumes, these examples also show that the interests groups, which were sensitive to the Mediterranean enlargement, tried to affect the British government to defend their interests at the EEC level negotiations.

However, the successive British governments did not consider protectionism as a measure against the Iberian competitiveness in textile and steel. In this regard, according to them, a reasonable transitional period for the fragile British sectors would give enough time to take the necessary measures. For example, Frank Judd, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from the Labour Party, argued that a transition period regarding the Mediterranean enlargement would be necessary (Hansard, 1978i, p. 1377), and that the transition issue should be higher on the accession negotiation agenda (Hansard, 1979, p. 1131). The Conservative Nicholas Winterton also argued that British textile industry, which employed 6000 people, faced a severe competition from Greece, Portugal and Spain; however, the rejection of their membership or any protectionist policy was not a solution. The solution was to have a transition period in which the weak British sectors could take adequate measures to protect themselves against the enlargement (HC 647-iii, 1978, p. 916). Additionally, the CBI also argued that a reasonable transition period for the Iberian accession would be a good solution (Elliott, 1977).

24 Related to this request, the Department of Trade and Industry also accepted that unauthorised state aids/subsidies were a more serious problem than non-tariff barriers against Britain’s trade balance in manufacturing goods with other member states (HC 329-i, 1984, p. 19). As a result, this case also confirms that LI’s theoretical assumption that if a societal group’s interests are in danger, they have a strong tendency to affect the executive power to defend their interests at the EU/EC level.
Moreover, the British actors also considered Spain’s large fishing sector as a challenge to the British fishery sector. For example, the Expenditure Committee warned that the EEC member states take the necessary measures against Spain’s large fishing fleet and that the Iberian enlargement should not decrease the fishing opportunities available to existing members (HC 356, 1978, p. 67). Winifred Ewing, one of the leading members of the Scottish National Party, also warned the British government about the potential threat of the Spanish fishery sector against the British fishery sector after the enlargement and argued that in case of any bankruptcy in the sector, there was not any alternative to the employment held in the fishing sector; therefore, that necessary measures ought to be taken to protect fish stocks and therefore jobs in Britain before the Iberian enlargement (Hansard, 1978g, p. 143). The Sea Fish Industry Authority also warned that a special measure\textsuperscript{25} should be arranged in the accession negotiations to protect the British fishery sector against Spain’s large fishing fleet (HC 15-viii, 1985, p. 180).

In terms of the potential effects of the enlargement on the British labour market, according to the Home Office, it was difficult to estimate any potential immigration flow to Britain from Greece, Portugal and Spain during the initial stages of their accession process. However, according to the available data, the immigrants from the applicant countries substantially preferred to emigrate to the continental European countries (mostly to France and West Germany) rather than Britain (HC 410-i, 1978, p. 5). Therefore, the Home Office did not forecast any serious immigration flow that could be a big burden on the British labour market (ibid.). In addition to this, according to the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), the social security cost of the Mediterranean enlargement to Britain would be modest (DHSS, 1977).

As LI assumes, the research also found that specific societal groups who were affected by the Mediterranean enlargement tried to lobby the British executive to protect their interests at the EEC level negotiations. For example, according to the UK food industry, the EEC regime for tomato concentrate needed to be changed; as otherwise, the existing regime would not be sufficiently flexible for further enlargement (HC 29-xiii, 1978, p. 27). The Merchant Navy and Airline Officers’ Association also warned the British government that the cheaper labour force of Greece, Portugal and Spain might put the labours from the developed members in a disadvantaged position regarding the “manning of EEC ships”;\textsuperscript{25} For example, a long transition period for Spain to access the Community’s Pond.

\textsuperscript{25} For example, a long transition period for Spain to access the Community’s Pond.
thus, that some measures needed to be taken before the accession of those countries to the Community (HC 29-xxi, 1978, p. 44).

All in all, as LI assumes, Britain shaped a pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries according to her national interests. The successive British governments benefited from a multi-causal reasoning while evaluating the issue, and economic expectations and ideological motivations also affected the national preference formation process in addition to the dominant geopolitical concerns. In this process, in addition to the geopolitical and economic benefits of the enlargement, the potential costs were also considered by the British governments. Moreover, the interests groups, which were sensitive to the enlargement also tried to affect the decision making process and the Conservative government also considered their specific economic interests in the national preference formation process. In other words, as LI assumes, the Conservative government was not willing to sacrifice Britain’s significant economic interests for the sake of the geopolitical benefits of the Mediterranean enlargement. As a result, Britain’s rebate from the EEC budget and the interests of Britain’s old industries (steel and textile), horticultural sector and fishery sector emerged as the main issues which the British government tried to defend at the EEC level negotiations.

### 3.3 Intergovernmental Bargains

The initial finding of the research at this level has been that the old members carried out tough negotiations at the EEC level to maintain their national interests despite their political commitment to the Mediterranean enlargement. Thus, this finding confirms LI’s basic intergovernmental assumption that member states are the main actors within the EC/EU system, and their national interests are the main factor affecting their behaviour within it.

The Greek accession did not significantly challenge the old members’ interests; thus, it happened in a fast and smooth way in 1982\(^{26}\) (Tsoukalis, 1981, see also: The CBI, 1977b). However, the Iberian enlargement (particularly Spain) posed some significant challenges to the old members’ national interests; thus, the Iberian accession negotiations took six years as a result of the tough intergovernmental negotiations. In this regard, the main

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\(^{26}\) The EC signed the accession agreement with Greece on 28\(^{th}\) May 1979, and Greece was allowed a five-year transition period to align itself with most EEC rules (Jonquieres, 1979).
problem was that the Iberian enlargement forced the existing EEC system to change, wherein the old members tried to sustain their national interests within the new EEC system that would be created after the Iberian enlargement. As a result, the Iberian accession and the structural reform negotiations went hand in hand in the early 1980s (The Times, 1980b).

In this long negotiation process, as LI assumes, the British executive determined a national position by considering the significant national interests and the relevant domestic groups’ interests related to the Mediterranean enlargement. At this point, Britain’s contribution to the EEC budget was already a big problem and the Mediterranean enlargement would worsen it (Davidson, 1979, Smith, 1981). Thus, according to the British government, this problem needed to be solved prior to the enlargement. In addition to this, the Mediterranean enlargement might have posed a significant threat to Britain’s old industries (steel and textile), horticultural sector, and fishery sector. Therefore, according to the British government, a satisfactory transition period in which Britain would take the necessary measures to protect the above-mentioned sectors should be arranged before the integration of the Iberian countries into the EEC’s free market mechanism. In addition to this, as the British manufacturers demanded, the Conservative government needed to negotiate in order to accelerate the liberalization of the Iberian markets in the accession process.

As noted above, from Britain’s point of view, the Iberian countries had large agricultural sectors which would increase the EEC’s spending on agriculture (the CAP) from which the benefit to Britain was negligible. To compensate for this cost, Regional Development Fund (RDF) had been designed but the poorer Iberian countries would also shift the flow of the Fund from north to south. As a result, a direct rebate mechanism (from the EEC to Britain) was the only solution to compensate for Britain’s overspending on the EEC budget before the Iberian enlargement. On the other hand, France and Italy (and later Greece) demanded an increase in agricultural spending because their share in the EEC’s agricultural spending would decrease after the Iberian enlargement (as Spain and Portugal had large agricultural sectors). Like Britain, Germany was against the growth of the agricultural spending but
less willing to accept Britain’s claim for a rebate from the EEC budget\(^\text{27}\) (HC 480, 1984, pp. xxi-xxiv). For example, Helmut Schmidt, the Chancellor of West Germany, argued that the EEC could not finance the Mediterranean enlargement “without the indispensable adjustments to its agriculture policy and without a more balanced distribution of burdens” (Clough, 1980). Subsequently, Greece also made its support to the Iberian enlargement conditional on the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs), which would compensate for the decreased EEC aids to Greece as a result of the Iberian enlargement (Cmnd 9485, 1985, p. 4).

When the accession negotiations started in 1979, Geoffrey Howe declared that Britain’s overspending on the EEC budget problem needed to be solved before the Mediterranean enlargement (Palmer, 1979a), after which, the British rebate issue became one of the main negotiation topics in addition to the EEC’s agricultural spending and the potential institutional reforms (Palmer, 1979b).

On the other hand, as a reaction to the increased demand to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the French President Giscard d’Estaing suggested slowing down the enlargement process (Ellman, 1980, Hargrove, 1980) just after the commencement of the accession negotiations. Raymond Barre, the French Prime Minister, even hinted that the Iberian countries might have a different status in the EEC system other than full membership (The Times, 1980a). Particularly, the French government was not willing to start the tough negotiations including farming before its national elections (1981), due to the anxiety of French farmers about the potential competitiveness of the Spanish farming sector (Palmer, 1981b). As a result, France insisted, at the foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels on 21 July 1980, that the Iberian enlargement not take place before reaching an agreement between the old members to reform the EEC budget and the CAP, although January 1983 had been decided as the date for the Iberian accession to the EC (ibid.). In reaction to France’s unenthusiastic position, Peter Walker, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food reiterated the British governments’ support for the Iberian accession to the EEC and that the negotiations should be finished as soon as possible as the Iberian enlargement would economically, militarily and politically strengthen the EEC’s global leadership capacity, which member states greatly needed in the 1980s (Debelius, \(\text{27}\) From an LI perspective, the southern French farmers did not want to lose this privilege in the CAP as a result of the Mediterranean enlargement. On the other hand, the West German taxpayers were not willing to pay increasing burden on the EEC budget due to the Mediterranean enlargement or the CAP (Palmer, 1980).
Furthermore, he criticized France by arguing that Britain’s contribution to the EEC budget as a result of the Iberian enlargement would be much more than France’s but that Britain never hesitated to support a “greater Europe” (Burns, 1980).

When the Conservative government assumed the EEC Presidency in July 1981, the Mediterranean enlargement was one of the main objectives of the British Presidency in addition to the structural reforms of the EEC (e.g. the EEC budget and the CAP) (Lewis, 1981, Spanier, 1981). Despite this priority, the enthusiasm for the enlargement started to wane among the member states because of the difficulties in the negotiations over the EEC budget and the CAP (Palmer, 1981a). As a result, the leaders failed to agree on a final reform of the CAP and budget at the London Summit (26–27th November 1981) under the British Presidency (Palmer, 1981c, Spanier and Murray, 1981).

The EEC level negotiations started to get tougher in 1982. The discussions mainly focused on the question: how to finance the Iberian enlargement. In particular, France demanded an increase in the EEC’s budget (the EEC’s own resources); however, Britain insisted that the Iberian enlargement could be financed by using the existing EEC budget if the agricultural expenses were cut/controlled (Wyles, 1982a, Palmer, 1982). For instance, in November 1982, the British government blocked the revenue increase in the EEC budget as a response to the deadlock in Britain’s rebate demand, and the Foreign Secretary Francis Pym also argued that if the EEC’s farm spending was reduced, the EEC’s existing own resources would be sufficient for the EEC’s expenses (and even after the Iberian enlargement) (Palmer, 1982). As a reaction to this, France clarified that it would block Portugal’s application until the budget and CAP problems were resolved (ibid.). As a result of this deep division between the member states, the EEC could not give a target date for the Iberian accession to the EEC in 1982 (Wyles, 1982b).

At the same time, at the domestic level, pressure on the Thatcher government was increasing prior to the 1983 national elections. As a result of this, the British rebate issue started to emerge as a condition on the Iberian enlargement. Particularly, the Labour Party and the TUC started to demand Britain’s withdrawal from the EEC. For instance, the TUC launched a campaign in 1981 for the British withdrawal by arguing that the renegotiation policy failed to solve the problems between Britain and the EEC (e.g. the EEC budget burden on Britain, the CAP system resulting in inefficiency and higher food prices, the trade deficit in the manufacturing sector, restrictions on state aid to industry etc.) (The
TUC, 1981). The TUC’s withdrawal campaign also increased the domestic pressure on the Conservative government to renegotiate the CAP and Britain’s unfair contribution to the EEC budget (see: The TUC, 1982). At the NEDC meeting in 1981, in addition to the TUC, the CBI also accepted that the EEC budget was one of the major difficulties for Britain within the EEC system (Smith, 1981). Additionally, the NFU (1981) also underlined the point that a substantial resource transfer would take place towards the Iberian countries; thus, the existing budget problem needed to be solved before the Iberian enlargement.

As a result, the Conservative government strongly reiterated that it was against any increase in member states’ contribution to the EEC budget and that if agricultural expenses were controlled, the saved money would be sufficient to finance the Iberian enlargement (Owen, 1983). Furthermore, Thatcher hinted that Britain might unilaterally withhold her budgetary contribution if a long-term settlement for the British rebate was not reached (Palmer, 1983). At this point, the Conservative government hoped that the Iberian enlargement would force the EEC members to accept a longer-term deal for the British rebate (Brown and Tonge, 1982). For example, Howe openly argued that the expected enlargement needed a durable budgetary arrangement for the British rebate to prevent budgetary discussions recurring every year or two (Bevins, 1983).

In 1983, the German Presidency tried to initiate a rapprochement between the member states to reach an agreement on the EEC budget, the CAP and the Iberian enlargement. For example, in June 1983, the EEC commission released a proposal suggesting a 12-year transition period for some Iberian farm products to ease the pressure of the Iberian enlargement on the CAP (The Guardian, 1983). Despite this attempt, the division continued between the Mediterranean members (France, Italy and Greece) and Germany and Britain. The Mediterranean members were demanding a special “Mediterranean” measure to protect their farming sector before the Iberian enlargement. For example, Pierre Mauroy, the French Prime Minister, made it clear that the Iberian enlargement was not possible without additional funds for Mediterranean fruit and vegetable producers (Housego, 1983). On the other hand, Britain and Germany argued that if a special measure was taken to protect the Mediterranean agriculture sectors without considering the cost of the Iberian enlargement, the new Mediterranean members (Spain and Portugal) would put significant burden on the EEC budget (via increasing surpluses in the agricultural products) (Doyle, 1983, The Times, 1983b).
After long negotiations, finally, the member states broke a two-year deadlock on 18 October 1983 under the Greek Presidency and reached an agreement on this dispute. In particular, the agreement met most of France’s demands: a new price support system was designed to protect EEC farmers from low cost competition (the French farmers from the cheaper Spanish products) and a transitional period for Spanish olive oil was accepted (Brown, 1983b). However, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands were still uneasy about the potential costs of the new agricultural agreement (ibid.).

As a reaction to this, Britain tried to prioritize the EEC’s budget problem (and thus Britain’s unfair contribution to it) before the Athens Summit (4–6th December 1983) (Bevins, 1983). In this regard, Geoffrey Howe accepted that the Iberian enlargement was an urgent priority; thus, that it might be necessary for member states to increase the EEC’s resources. On the other hand, the European Commission proposed that the VAT ceiling be raised from 1 per cent to 1.4 percent to finance the Iberian enlargement; however, West Germany and Britain set the reforms in agriculture and the calculation method of national contribution to the EEC budget (related to the British rebate problem) as two preconditions for the Commission’s proposal (Boland, 1984d). Particularly, according to the Conservative government, an effective control on the EEC’s expenditures (e.g. agricultural expenditures) needed to be designed and the unfair burden of the EEC budget on Britain be removed, to increase the EEC’s resources (The Times, 1983a). However, the member states failed again to agree on the EEC budget at the Athens Summit (4–6 December 1983). Particularly, the Thatcher government demanded a truly long-term EEC budget mechanism to act as a “safety net” linking member states’ contributions to their relative prosperities; however, France opposed this proposal (Brown, 1983a).

In 1984, the Iberian enlargement process and the British budgetary problem were closely linked to one another during the negotiations, as obtaining the extra funds required to finance the Iberian countries’ entry without solving the British rebate problem was implausible (The Economist, 1984, Dinan, 1999). However, when the British rebate problem was solved at the Fontainebleau Summit28 (25–26th June 1984), the British government conceded to the Commission’s proposal to increase the VAT ceiling from 1

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28 According to Geoffrey Howe (1994, p. 398), before the Fontainebleau Summit, the French President Mitterrand also recognized the significant relationship between the need to increase the Community sources prior to the Iberian enlargement and the settlement of the British rebate problem.
per cent to 1.4 per cent\textsuperscript{29} (Kennedy and Boland, 1984, The European Council, 1984b). Therefore, as LI assumes, the British government strongly negotiated at the EEC level to diminish the negative externalities of the Mediterranean enlargement to Britain, and the British rebate from the EEC budget was achieved.

After solving this financial obstacle in the Iberian enlargement process at the Fontainebleau Summit, 30\textsuperscript{th} September 1984 was determined as the date for the accession agreement with Spain and Portugal, however, the member states failed to find a common position on the issues: the Mediterranean wine and oil production and the adaptation of the large Spanish fishery and steel sectors into the EEC system (The Financial Times, 1984a).

For example, according to the British government, the high Spanish tariffs on British goods (e.g. cars) needed to be decreased (Murray, 1984b), the Iberian countries needed to accept the EEC’s fishery regime (together with Ireland) (Pyle, 1984), and a quota system needed to be implemented to prevent olive oil surplus\textsuperscript{30} (together with West Germany and The Netherlands) (Boland, 1984c). Additionally, the British government made it clear that Spain needed to open the Gibraltar border as soon as possible upon accession to the Community (Murray, 1984a). On the other hand, France insisted on a quota system in the wine sector to protect its own wine sector against other cheaper Mediterranean wines (Boland, 1984c); however, Italy opposed this proposal (Boland, 1984a).

In the autumn of 1984, the accession negotiations gained momentum\textsuperscript{31}. Firstly, the member states agreed that the Community’s “blocking minority” decision system would require 23 out of 76 total votes (previously 15 out of 63 total votes) (Peel, 1984a). Subsequently, on 1\textsuperscript{st} October 1984, the member states agreed on a new system of budgetary control placing particular limits on agricultural expenditures (Boland, 1984a). The deal was a triumph for Britain, according to Lawson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as the British government had been trying to achieve it for years (Boland, 1984a). On 19\textsuperscript{th} December 1984, the EEC

\textsuperscript{29} But Thatcher declared that the decision on increasing the EC’s own resources (increase in the VAT ceiling) would not be ratified until the Finance Ministers took appropriate measures on agricultural expenditure.

\textsuperscript{30} The main position of the British government during the negotiations was that the rise in agricultural spending should be less than the Community’s revenue (Boland, 1984a).

\textsuperscript{31} The West Germany and the Netherlands insisted that the EC’s own resources should be increased after the enlargement. Thus, without the completion of the Iberian enlargement, the EC would face a budget crisis in 1985, and this was a strong incentive forcing the member states to accelerate the enlargement negotiations (Peel, 1984). For example, in September 1984, the finance, foreign and agriculture ministers held meetings side-by-side to break the deadlock in the enlargement negotiations (The Financial Times, 1984). In terms of Britain, the British rebate from the EC in 1985 depended on the confirmation of the EC budget for 1985; thus, the completion of the enlargement was also important for the British government to get the rebate (Ecu 1 billion) in 1985 (Peel, 1985).
and Spain also agreed on the steel industry and the Spanish import tariffs on industrial goods. According to the deal, Spain would gradually decrease the tariffs on industrial goods in the first seven years after it gained EEC membership. According to Paul Channon, the Minister for Trade, the new deal would annually increase the British car exports to Spain from 2,250 to 5,000 (Peel and Dawnay, 1984); therefore, the British government managed to protect the British’s car industry’s interests. In addition to this, a transitional period limiting the Spanish steel industry’s exports to the EEC countries were guaranteed as the British steel industry demanded (Peel and Dawnay, 1984).

On the other hand, at the Dublin Summit (3–4th December 1984) Greece declared that it would veto the Iberian accession unless it got more financial aid from the EEC (Brown, 1984, The European Council, 1984a). As a result, the negotiations were extended to 1985, and the Greek aid issue also became another problem in the negotiations in addition to the fishery issue. However, the Brussels Summit (29–30th March 1985) managed to settle those problems (The Irish Times, 1985, Hawkes, 1985, The European Council, 1985), and the accession agreement was signed with Spain and Portugal on 12th June 1985 (Conney, 1985).

Margaret Thatcher described the agreement on the Iberian enlargement as “good for Britain and good for democracy to have a greater area of stability in Europe, in a very troubled world” (Hawkes, 1985). Furthermore, the British government was satisfied with the outcomes of the accession negotiations of the Mediterranean enlargement as it had managed to decrease the cost of the Iberian enlargement to Britain through the EEC level negotiations. In particular, the Conservative government achieved its two main aims, which would decrease the cost of the enlargement: the British rebate from the EEC budget and the necessary restrictions in the EEC’s agricultural expenses. Moreover, the British government guaranteed a transition period to protect its horticultural sector, as “85 per cent of Portuguese agriculture and the Spanish fruit and vegetable sector” were to be incorporated into the relevant CAP regimes over the following 10 years. The negotiations also reached an agreement to use the name “British Sherry” for a period of 10 years, and later the parties would review the agreement according to their interests (Cmnd 9627, 1985).

32 Greece was demanding an Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs), an ECU 7.331 billion special funding programme for the Mediterranean regions of the EEC, which would compensate for Greece’s lost due to the Iberian enlargement in terms of the EEC’s aids (Boland, 1984b, Ierodiaconou, 1984). On the other hand, Margaret Thatcher openly criticized Greece’s veto threat against the Iberian enlargement (Owen, 1984).
Moreover, Spain would be a full member of the Common Fishery Policy (Dawnay, 1985) and “the number of Spanish and Portuguese vessels fishing in United Kingdom waters [would] continue to be strictly controlled”, and “there [would] be no Spanish and Portuguese access to the North Sea” (Cmnd 9627, 1985). Additionally, as British business demanded, Spain would decrease its tariffs and quotas on industrial goods (Dawnay, 1985), and Spain’s steel exports to the EEC countries would also be limited.

Last but not least, the settlement of the Gibraltar dispute occurred in parallel with the Spanish accession negotiations. On 10th April 1980, Britain and Spain agreed on the Lisbon Statement “desiring to strengthen their bilateral relations and thus to contribute to European and Western solidarity” (HC 166, 1981, p. xvi). The bilateral negotiations on the Gibraltar problem that followed were tough; however, according to Malcolm Rifkind (01.12.2014, interview), the Conservative government, owing to its collective security understanding, never considered using its veto power against the Spanish accession to the EEC in an opportunistic manner. Finally, the Brussels Agreement was signed by Britain and Spain in 1984, an agreement that lifted the Spanish blockade on the Gibraltar border (Jordine, 2006). Consequently, the Conservative government had successfully managed to solve the Spain-Gibraltar border problem within the EEC’s democratic mechanisms prior to the Spanish accession to the EEC, in conformity with its collective security understanding.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter analysed Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean enlargement from an LI perspective. The chapter has showed that LI’s two-level game approach has been an efficient method in analysing/understanding how Britain developed her pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries under the situational condition of the enlargement (the domestic and international realities belonging to the late 1970s and early 1980s), and how the Conservative government defended Britain’s national preferences at the EEC level negotiations. In particular, the findings support LI’s basic intergovernmentalist assumption that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy was shaped according to Britain’s national interests at the domestic level, and the British government did not accept any significant negative externalities of the enlargement to Britain at the EEC level negotiations. For example, the Conservative government did not accept the Commission’s proposal to increase the VAT ceiling from 1 per cent to 1.4 per cent, which
was a necessary measure to achieve the Iberian enlargement, before solving the British rebate problem.

On the other hand, the research has found that LI’s two main assumptions on national preference formation process are limited in explaining this case. Firstly, as noted in chapter 2, LI assumes that a pro-enlargement policy should emerge as an output of a rational decision making process, in which economic concerns should be dominant. However, the research has found that the complexity of the Mediterranean enlargement limited the British actors’ rational choice capability. For example, the Labour government and then the Conservative government repeatedly argued that it was hard for them to make a precise cost-benefit calculation on the Mediterranean enlargement. In addition to this, unlike LI’s strong emphasis on economic interests, the research has found that geopolitical concerns were the dominant factor behind Britain’s support for the Mediterranean enlargement. For example, in addition to the successive British governments, even the CBI and TUC, which were interest groups looking for their specific interests, gave priority to the political importance of the Mediterranean enlargement.

Moreover, the research has found that economic expectations and ideological motivations also affected the decision making process in addition to the dominant geopolitical concerns. Therefore, this finding supports LI’s assumption that a multi-causal reasoning, containing economic interests, geopolitical concerns and ideological motivations, might affect actors’ decisions if they face a complex issue, such as EU enlargement, on which they cannot make precise cost benefit calculations. Furthermore, according to the findings, those factors were intertwined with each other. For example, the expansion of democracy (liberal ideals) towards the Mediterranean countries via enlargement was perceived by the British governments both as a security measure in the Cold War context and as an economic investment, which would provide economic benefits to Britain in the long-run.

However, although LI points out that a multi-causal reasoning is a tool that actors use to make decisions on complex issues, LI does not provide further explanation for it. At this point, as the literature review suggested, the findings support the argument that Britain’s foreign policy priorities might have constituted a rationale for the successive British governments to formulate Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries in the Cold War context. More specifically, according to the findings, Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries depended on the geopolitical
and economic benefit expectations of the successive British governments but not on precise calculations. Thus, the above-mentioned expectations as an output of a multi-causal reasoning were rational within Britain’s foreign policy structure according to the enlargement’s situational conditions (e.g. the Cold War). To put in another way, in parallel with Britain’s collective security understanding, the EEC’s enlargement towards the Mediterranean countries would provide more security for Britain in the Cold War context. Moreover, from this point of view, it was also not rational for the successive British governments to issue a veto threat against Spain in order to solve the Gibraltar dispute in the Cold War context. Particularly, there was a consensus among the Conservative and Labour Parties on the assertion that issuing a veto against Spain’s EEC membership would not be a solution to the Gibraltar problem, but that it would be easier to solve this problem with a democratic Spain within the EEC system. Secondly, the British actors expected that the enlargement would expand the European market, which would provide more economic wealth for Britain, and this expectation was in compliance with the liberal principles, which were historically embedded in British foreign policy structure. With regard to this point, as discussed in the literature review, the empirical findings of the chapter have also supported the argument that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy was not just a dilution tool against the deepening attempts in the European integration process, but was shaped in a broader foreign policy context to provide more security and economic wealth for Britain. Interestingly, the ‘dilution’ rhetoric was mainly used by the Prime Minister Callaghan as an opportunistic domestic policy tool to lessen the anti-Marketeers’ pressure on him in the late 1970s.

Secondly, unlike LI’s reference to a pluralistic decision making assumption about national preference formation process, the research has found that the successive British governments were at the centre of the national decision making process. More specifically, as Moravcsik (1995, together with Schimmelfennig, 2009) also accepted, the findings support the argument that if the expected costs of any policy to interest groups are inconsiderable or unclear, governments have more autonomy both in the national preference formation process and at EEC/EU level negotiations. On the other hand, as LI assumes, the Conservative government was responsive to British actors’ sensitivity/issue-specific interests. Particularly, the Conservative government tried to protect the interests of the old British industries (textile and steel), agriculture sector (horticulture), and the fishery sector at the EEC level negotiations. In parallel with the CBI’s demands, it also negotiated
at the EEC level to accelerate the liberalization of the Iberian countries’ markets as early as possible in the accession process. As a more specific example, the Conservative government even considered protecting British products using the name: “British Sherry” at the EEC level negotiations as Spain wanted to use the label “sherry” exclusively for a particular Spanish wine.
4 The EFTA Enlargement

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses Britain’s policy towards the EFTA enlargement from an LI perspective. The EFTA enlargement was put on the EU’s agenda in the late 1980s and was achieved in 1995. In this period, the Conservative Party was in power; thus, the research mainly focused on the Conservative governments (the Thatcher and Major governments).

The main findings of this chapter are similar to the findings of the Mediterranean enlargement case. As found in the Mediterranean enlargement case, this case has also confirmed LI’s intergovernmentalist assumption that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries was shaped according to her national interests. Moreover, the chapter has also showed that LI’s pluralist decision making and economic interest oriented rational choice assumption are limited in explaining Britain’s national preference formation process for the EFTA enlargement. Firstly, unlike LI’s pluralistic decision making assumption, the Conservative government played an entrepreneurial role in encouraging British business to exploit potential opportunities in the EFTA markets. Secondly, according to the findings, unlike LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice explanation, ideological concerns were the dominant factor behind the Conservative party’s support for the EFTA enlargement, in a time when the history-making negotiations started to shape the future of the European integration in the post-Cold War era. However, economic expectations and geopolitical concerns, which were actually intertwined with those ideological concerns, also affected the national preference formation process. Therefore, this finding supports LI’s assumption that actors might benefit from a multi-causal reasoning when they face complex issues such as enlargement, on which they cannot make precise cost benefit calculations. As another interesting finding, in line with LI’s logic of micro-economics, the research has found that the British government continued to support the EFTA enlargement by considering her comparative advantage in the finance sector although it was aware that Germany would make bigger gains than Britain regarding the manufacturing sector.

As LI assumes, the chapter has also found that the Conservative government tried to defend Britain’s national preferences at the EU level negotiations. In this sense, the main motivation of the British government was to complete the EFTA enlargement prior to the
1996 intergovernmental conference. Thus, the government focused on this goal at the EU level negotiations, and the EFTA enlargement was achieved in 1995. However, the extension of the QMV emerged as an unanticipated outcome of the EU level negotiations, which would result in a political cost to the Major government at the domestic level.

To systematically present these findings in detail, the chapter firstly focuses on the national preference formation process. In this section, from an LI perspective, the research analyses the collected data to answer the questions: how the British executive and relevant societal groups formed Britain’s national preferences towards the EFTA enlargement, and how economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns affected the national preference formation process. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on the question: how the British government defended Britain’s national preferences at the EU level negotiations.

4.2 National Preference Formation

4.2.1 Political Concerns

As LI assumes, the research has found that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries was shaped according to her national interests. In the national preference formation process, ideological concerns were the dominant factor behind the Conservative government’s support for the EFTA enlargement; however, this ideological motivation was also supported by the economic benefit expectations and geopolitical concerns.

Particularly, the discussions on the future of the European integration process were stimulated in the second half of the 1980s. The discussions generally focused on two main projects to shape the integration: the European integration would evolve into a supranational structure or it would continue as a more intergovernmental polity by covering other European countries as much as possible (deepening versus widening) (Usborne, 1990, Pinder, 1992). Within this debate, France was the leading country who wanted to create a more supranational European integration by developing deeper economic, monetary and security policies (Palmer, 1989, Hoagland, 1989, Jaconson, 1989). There were also other countries in sympathy with the French project (e.g. Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and eventually the West Germany) (Riding, 1990).

On the other hand, the Conservative government supported an intergovernmental and wider European integration project (as a wider free-trade association of sovereign states)
(Riding, 1990, Hilton, 1990, Jenkins, 1991b, Watts, 2008, p. 39, Gowland et al., 2006, p. 304). According to Thatcher (1988), the European Community needed to have an outward looking free market (rather than a deeper and inward-looking protectionist market), play a full role in the wider world (but a deeper EC/EU would become more regional and thus more isolated), and not have any security measures (like the Western European Union - WEU-) as an alternative to NATO. At this point, it is clear that the Conservative Party’s ideological background played an important role in this position. More specifically, Adam Smith’s laissez-faire economic model constituted the essence of Thatcherite Conservative governments’ economic understanding33 (Soffer, 2009, Blundell, 2008, Thatcher, 1990b, Evans, 1997, Leach, 1983, Leach, 2002, Gillingham, 2003, p. 151), and according to the Conservative Party, this economic model also needed to be extended to Europe (Schmidt, 2001, p. 256).

To this end, “[t]he Single European Act appeared to fit neatly into the Thatcherite free market ideology and its programme of flexible economic modernisation” (Gifford, 2008, p. 94). Therefore, the Thatcher government perceived the Single European Act (SEA) as a chance to evolve the European integration process towards greater market liberalism in Europe (Schmidt, 2001, Bradbury, 1996). Thus, Thatcher became one of the main initiators who made the SEA the Community’s priority34 (Wall, 2008, Gillingham, 2003), and “[s]he found little difficulty in signing the Single European Act” (Leach, 1995, p. 25). Moreover, the SEA would help to redefine the Europe 1992 Project in a neoliberal way unlike the EC President Jacques Delors’ corporatist and protectionist aim (Overbeek, 1993). For example, Thatcher argued that the SEA would “get the Community back on course, concentrating on its role as a huge market” (in: Turner, 2000, p. 99). For the sake of the expansion of free market, Thatcher (1988) even had a tendency to tolerate increasing qualified majority voting (QMV) and boost the legislative powers of the European Parliament with the SEA.

Interestingly, the SEA project also forced the EFTA countries to form closer relationships with the EEC. The EFTA economies mostly depended on trade with the EEC (HC 347, 33 Although Thatcher resigned in November 1990, the Major government continued to follow the neoliberal economic principles designed by her (Thatcherism) (Black et al., 1999, p. 404, Bradbury, 1996, p. 79). In the same vein, both leaders were also among the most enthusiastic supporters of the EFTA enlargement within the Community (Van Oudenaren, 1992, p. 124).
34 According to Jenkins (2007), Thatcher assumed that the SEA would be an important step in forming “Euro-Thatcherism”.

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1990, p. viii); thus, their exclusion from the EEC’s internal market would result in significant costs to them. For example, the SEA would reduce the costs of trade between the EEC members by removing trade barriers, harmonizing trade regulations, and establishing common standards for trade (ibid., p. 9); but, the EFTA countries could not benefit from them. At this point, the European Economic Area (the EEA) emerged as a solution for the EFTA countries because it would provide them with an opportunity to participate in most of the benefits of the Single Market (HC 347, 1990, p.10, Watts, 2008, p. 39). In particular, according to the EEA:

The Community’s Single Market would be extended to the seven EFTA states (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) from 1 January 1993. The EFTA states would take on most of the economic rights and obligations of Community membership created by the relevant Community legislations (the “acquis”) without being full members with votes in the Council of Ministers (HC 24-vii, 1992, p. vii).

The Conservative government strongly supported the formation of the EEA between the EEC and the EFTA; however, the Conservative government had a tendency to perceive the EEA as a step that would drive the EFTA countries to full membership. For example, when the negotiations for the EEA started in 1989, Douglas Hurd, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, highlighted the point that the EEA might be “a staging post” for further integration of the EFTA countries into the EEC (HC 82, 1990, p. 95). In 1992, the Conservative government also argued that the EFTA countries would adopt a substantial body of the Community legislation thanks to the EEA agreement and this legislative adaptation would “facilitate the accession of those EFTA states who wish to join the Community” (HC 24-vii, 1992, p. x).

In this regard, the expectation of the Conservative government was that the expansion of the Single Market towards the EFTA countries would also expand free-market forces towards the EFTA countries, which had strong social democratic systems (as an alternative to free-market model). For example, Douglas Hurd argued that creating a liberal Europe and “bringing down barriers to trade wherever they exist” were Britain’s two longstanding objectives and the enlargement of the EU towards the new European countries would “cement democracy and free-market” in the continent (Cm 2798, 1995, p. iii). In parallel with this purpose, it was good news for the British government when Swedish business put pressure on the Swedish government to apply for the EU membership at the beginning of

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35 Thus, as LI argues, this case also shows how interdependence between nation-states affects their rational behaviour.
the 1990s (Agius, 2006, p. 136) although “Sweden’s social-democratic governments had previously rejected membership of the EC on the grounds that the free-market orientation of the organization would jeopardize the Swedish model of capitalism” (Bache et al., 2011, p. 538).

Furthermore, the Conservative government was facing difficulty in finding allies within the EC/EU to drive the integration process towards an outward-looking intergovernmental way. For example, at the Hanover EEC summit (27–28 June 1988), Thatcher was the only leader supporting a European integration (the 1992 vision) as a free market system (abolition of barriers and creating new trade opportunities) (Owen, 1988). At this point, the Conservative Party also perceived the EFTA countries as natural allies in the EC/EU to establish a more intergovernmental European Union (Jenkins, 1992). For example, the Conservative MP Kenneth Warren argued that the EFTA enlargement would shift the centre of gravity within the EC/EU towards the Northern tier countries with which Britain had more common values, and that in this way, Britain would no longer be on the perimeter of the European integration process (Hansard, 1992, p. 56).

The security concerns also affected the ruling Conservative Party’s attitude towards the EFTA enlargement. In the Cold War context, the neutrality of the EFTA countries was a problem for Britain. For example, when Austria applied for the EC membership in July 1989, the Conservative government was sceptical about the Austrian application due to its neutrality in the Cold War context (McEwen, 1990, Hoagland, 1989). In other words, Austria was a neutral country, and “[it was] therefore regarded as a potential brake on the creeping process of military and political integration” (Binyon, 1989). In July 1989, Edward Heath even argued that Austria should give up its neutrality as a condition in order to enter the Community (Hansard, 1989). However, the end of the Cold War relaxed this concern (McEwen, 1990). To illustrate, in 1990, Margaret Thatcher argued that the issue of neutrality was no longer a relevant conditionality on the EEC membership (McEwen, 1990).

Despite this fact, the Conservative government continued to perceive the European integration as a part of its collective security understanding, taking NATO at the centre. At this point, the Conservative government strongly supported the idea that any security measure taken by the European Union should be complementary to NATO (not an alternative to it) (Hansard, 1991, p. 1011). In this regard, Douglas Hurd argued that both
NATO and the EU were needed in order to maintain stability and prosperity in Europe (Cm 2798, 1995, p. iii). As a result, according to the British government, the EU should not get any supranational authority in terms of security as France demanded; however, it needed an intergovernmental security body complementary to NATO that would also make the integration of the neutral EFTA countries into the Western security system possible. That’s why, Garel-Jones, the Minister for Europe (Hansard, 1993, p. 527) argued that “[n]o one has been stauncher than Britain in advocating the admission of those EFTA countries that wish to join the Union or in defending their right as neutrals to join”.

4.2.2 Economic Concerns

The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) removed all tariffs on industrial goods in trade between its members in the mid of the 1960s when Britain was still one of its members. In addition to this, a free trade agreement between the EEC and EFTA came into force after 1973, when Britain became a member of the EEC. As a result of those agreements, there was a well-developed trade relationship between Britain and the EFTA countries in industrial goods (HC 666, 1990, p. v), and the British government expected that the EFTA enlargement would not result in any significant cost to Britain (HC 347, 1990, HC 24-vii, 1992, p. x). On the other hand, according to the British government, the EFTA enlargement would be economically beneficial for Britain in several ways.

Firstly, a European Union with the EFTA countries would become the world’s largest single market with a GDP of nearly $7,000 billion; thus a wider Single Market via the EFTA enlargement would provide increased opportunities for British business and benefits for British consumers, and would promote growth in Britain (HC 262, 1992, p. xxxiv, Cm 2525, 1994, p. 5). A stronger EU with the EFTA enlargement would also provide benefits to Britain in the globalizing world market. For example, after the EFTA enlargement, 40 per cent of the world trade would be controlled by the EC/EU (HC 216, 1993, p. 14); thus, an enlarged EU would be more attractive to foreign investors (Aristotelous and Fountas, 1996). At this point, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) estimated that the EFTA enlargement would make the FDI flows to the EU 26 per cent faster, and Britain was the main

36 In a supranational EU security system as France demanded, the EFTA countries’ neutrality would not be possible.
beneficiary of the FDI flows to the EU\textsuperscript{37}. Furthermore, the EC/EU as the largest Single Market after the EFTA enlargement would give the member states more power to govern the globalising world market. In this sense, the British government hoped that an enlarged EU would help Britain to expand free-market principles further. For example, the EFTA countries supported the British government’s position on further liberalization of public procurement at the multilateral GATT negotiations (HC 666, 1990, p. v). In the same vein, the CBI also shared this expectation with the British government because the GATT negotiations were the top priority for the British industry lobby (The Times, 1991a).

Secondly, although the above-mentioned agreements between the EEC and EFTA eliminated tariff barriers to trade, non-tariff barriers remained in a number of sectors, which were frustrating the free flow of goods, services, capital and labour. For example, there were still restrictions on foreign ownership of companies (including banks) and civil aviation sectors in the EFTA countries (HC 666, 1990, p. v). In this regard, the integration of the EFTA countries into the Single Market would mean the extension of the four freedoms (goods, services, capital, people) to the EFTA countries and the adaptation of the acquis communautaire by them (HC 347, 1990). Therefore, the EFTA countries would make the necessary harmonization and liberalization in their domestic markets according to the EEC’s trade regulations. At this point, the British government expected that the liberalization of the EFTA markets (mostly in the public procurement and service sectors) and the harmonization of trade regulations between the EFTA and the EC/EU would provide new opportunities for British business (HC 347, 1990, HC 24-vii, 1992, HC 262, 1992, p. xxxiv, HC 666, 1990, p. iv).

Regarding this expectation, there was a strong consensus among the relevant British actors. For example, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Committee of Trade and Industry (the House of Commons), and the CBI agreed on the expectation that further liberalization of the EFTA markets would provide better opportunities for British business (HC 347, 1990). Moreover, specific British firms/companies had a similar benefit expectation from the EFTA enlargement. For example, Lucas Automotive Ltd, Imperial Chemical Industries PLC, the Wellcome Foundation, Crosfield Electronics Limited, Chemical Industries Association, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, BEAMA Federation

\textsuperscript{37} As of 1993, “Japan has almost twice as much investment in Britain as in other EC countries while the UK's share of US investment within the community amounts to more than the combined totals recorded by Germany, the Netherlands and France” (Cassell, 1993).
(the British electro-technical manufacturing sector), the British Insurance and Investment Brokers’ Association, British Aerospace plc, the Food and Drink Federation, Barclays Bank Plc, and National Westminster Bank Plc also expected that further harmonization of the trade regulations between the EEC and the EFTA and the liberalization of the EFTA markets would provide new opportunities for British business (HC 347, 1990).

As LI assumes, there were also some British societal groups, which evaluated the enlargement according to their issue-specific interests. To illustrate, according to the Food and Drink Federation, further liberalization of trade in food and drink industry in the EFTA countries would create significant trading and investment opportunities for the British food and drink industry. Moreover, according to the Association of British Insurers, the insurance markets in the EFTA countries were dominated by domestic companies; therefore, further liberalization of the sector in the EFTA markets would open up opportunities for the British insurance industry. Additionally, the Department of Trade and Industry hoped that the integration of the EFTA countries into the Single Market would eliminate the remaining discrimination against the export of British alcoholic beverages to the EFTA countries (HC 666, 1990, p. iv). The Department of Transport also expected that the liberalisation of the EFTA markets would create significant opportunities for British aircraft carriers (HC 11-Xvi, 1990, p. xxiii).

On the other hand, as the Department of Trade and Industry (HC 347, 1990, p. 83) argued, Germany was Britain’s major competitor in the EFTA markets and it had greater advantage over Britain regarding the manufacturing sector due to Germany’s geographical proximity to the EFTA countries. However, as LI’s absolute-gain oriented microeconomics logic assumes, British actors mostly focused on Britain’s absolute gains from the EFTA enlargement. For example, the principal beneficiary of the extension of the Single Market to the EFTA countries would be the finance sector in Britain thanks to its higher competitive power (Whitebloom, 1991). Margaret Thatcher started to transform the British economy according to the emerging post-industrial global economy in the 1980s (Leach, 2002, p. 191). In this era, “a profound shift from a state-dominated to a market-dominated world” took place (Gilpin, 2000, p. 18), and increasing global integration offered a new strategic role for major cities (including London). In the new era, the major cities could become the governance centres of the globalized world economy by specializing in finance and service sectors instead of manufacturing (Sassen, 1991). Thus, Thatcher considerably deregulated and liberalized the British financial market in order to
strengthen the position of the City of London as a global financial centre (e.g. the Big Bang in 1986) (Hay and Farrall, 2011, Green, 2004, Jeremy, 1998), and those measures increased “the pace of the globalization of the London capital markets” (Green, 2004, p. 173). As a result, “[a]lthough Britain has lost ground in the export race, primarily to the Germans, across the EFTA zone, [the EFTA enlargement] could give the City of London a useful fillip, as financial services should be the main growth area” (The Times, 1991a). In this regard, Alison Wright, the Director General of British Invisibles\(^{38}\) also argued that doing business in a wider Europe should not be “a zero-sum game”, and that the integration of the EFTA countries into the Single Market was a real opportunity for the City despite the German dominance in visible trade (e.g. manufacturing) (Narborough, 1991).

Interestingly, unlike LI’s pluralistic understanding, the Conservative government was the main actor in the decision making process, and even played a more dominant role by increasing British companies’ awareness of the economic opportunities in the EFTA markets. In this regard, a report by the Trade and Industry Committee indicated that the apathetic attitudes within the British companies towards the EFTA markets was an important reason behind Britain’s loss of her potential market share to other Western competitors (HC 347, 1990, p. xxv). According to the report, for instance, just few British companies visited the Austrian Trade Fairs in 1990, and they also regarded Finland “as a relatively unimportant country with a difficult language”. As a reaction to the apathetic attitude of British business towards the EFTA markets, the DTI launched British Overseas Trade Board Forward Plan (BOTB), which determined the Western Europe as the number one priority market. Specifically, the European Trade Committee (the ETC) was formed within this structure (BOTB) as an Area Advisory Group, and the ETC launched several initiatives in order to increase British companies’ awareness of the EFTA markets. For instance, a “Look Nordic” campaign was conducted between 1986 and 1988. In addition to this, the ETC organized several seminars in different parts of Britain in order to encourage British companies to become more active in the EFTA countries (HC 347, 1990, p. 4).

Last but not least, according the Conservative government, the enlargement would also decrease the EC budget burden on Britain because the EFTA countries would be net contributors to the Community budget (HC 48-xiv, 1994, p. xv). For example, the

\(^{38}\) A lobby group for the service sectors in Britain
European Commission estimated that “Sweden’s total contribution would account for approximately 3.2 per cent of Community expenditure” (HC 79-vi, 1992, p. xlv). Additionally, the EFTA countries would be net contributors to the Community cooperation programmes, and in this way, Britain (e.g. Northern Ireland) would get more from the EC/EU’s cohesion funds after the EFTA enlargement (HC 24-vii, 1992, p. x).

4.2.3 The Position of Other Domestic Actors

There was a political consensus on a pro-enlargement towards the EFTA countries at the domestic level; therefore, as LI argues, this domestic consensus strengthened the Conservative government’s pro-enlargement position at the EC/EU level negotiations and played an important role in Britain’s becoming one of the main initiators who launched and governed the EFTA enlargement process at the EC/EU level.

Firstly, the Labour Party, as the main opposition party, supported the EFTA enlargement (Wintour, 1990, Oakley, 1990, Jonea and Grice, 1991). For example, in its 1992 election manifesto, the party declared that “[the Labour Party] shall make the widening of the Community a priority, and shall advocate speedy admission for Austria, Sweden, Finland and Cyprus, whose membership applications have been or are about to be lodged”39. However, unlike the Conservative government, there was not a direct/strong relationship between the Labour Party’s support for the EFTA enlargement and the wider Europe thesis as an alternative to the deepening thesis. For example, George Robertson, who would become the Secretary of State for Defence from 1997 to 1999, declared that “[t]he Labour Party has set out its agenda for a deeper, wider, more accountable and more relevant Community” (Hansard, 1990a, p. 99). In this context, in addition to its strong support for the EFTA enlargement, the Labour Party also backed further extension of the QMV mechanism (e.g. towards environmental and social issues), but this did not mean that the Labour Party supported a federal Europe (Jonea and Grice, 1991). Moreover, like the Conservative government, the Labour Party supported the idea that enlargement should have a priority over full monetary integration; otherwise, the entry conditions would be harder for the applicants (not only for the EFTA countries but particularly for the Eastern European countries) (Timmins, 1992). To illustrate, Austin Mitchell, a Labour Party politician, argued that a deeper European integration would erect a bigger barrier against


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the applicant states but that the main aim of the European integration should be “to bring Europe together” (Hansard, 1991, p. 1077). The Labour Party also argued that a military role for the EC would make the membership of the neutral EFTA countries (Austria, Switzerland and Sweden) impossible; and that therefore, Britain should rule out any possibility of the European Community taking on a defence or military role (Hansard, 1990, p. 509, Hansard, 1990c, p. 38).

In terms of the CBI and the TUC, there was a dramatic change in their capacity to influence the national decision making mechanism under the Conservative Party rule in the 1980s and early 1990s. Thatcher tried to institutionalize a strong state authority instead of the previous corporatist system (Watts, 2006). “The National Economic Development Council was marginalised, its monthly meetings being reduced to quarterly ones in 1984, and it was axed with effect from 1 January 1993” (Wrigley, 2002, p. 74). At this point, Thatcherism perceived trade unions as a reason behind the British uncompetitiveness (they resulted in increasing cost of goods and services), a catalyst deteriorating the unemployment problem, and a serious impediment to a free market economy (ibid.). As a result, the TUC’s accession to the government was decreased (Mcilroy, 2009), “the law being tilted strongly against trade unions [e.g. outlawing the closed shop, curtailing the ability of unions to strike and removing the support for collective bargaining (Gospel and Wood, 2003)] and, in the private sector, many trade union activists being made redundant in the early 1980s” (Wrigley, 2002, p. 28). In 1984, Thatcher identified the trade unions even as “the enemy within” the country (Undy, 2008). In addition to the TUC, the influence of the CBI on the Conservative government also relatively decreased in the second half of the 1980s because the CBI was also seen as a part of the corporatist system (NEDC) (Burgess, 1998, Grant, 2001), and “particularly under Thatcher, preference was given to more ideologically congenial organisations such as the Institute of Directors” (Grant, 2001, p. 339).

As a reaction to the Conservative government’s pressure on it, there happened a dramatic change in the TUC’s attitude towards the European Community. Especially, Delaros’ (1988) speech to the TUC at Bournemouth played an important role in this shift. Delors pointed out that the 1992 programme for completing the Community’s internal market

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40 In addition to the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats as another opposition party in the House of Commons also backed the EFTA enlargement (The Times, 1992, Travis, 1991, Mason, 1991).
would have a social dimension through which “the TUC's voice would carry weight in Brussels, even if it was effectively ignored by Mrs Thatcher's government”\textsuperscript{41}. In parallel with the sympathy of Delors towards trade unions, as Denis MacShane (1992) pointed out, the unification among the European trade unions after the Maastricht Treaty would become more important in the globalizing world. As a result, a deeper cooperation with the European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC) was a rational option for the TUC in order to counterweight neoliberal attacks against trade unionism at the domestic level (Rigby, 1999, p. 29, Van Der Maas, 2006, p. 167, Mitchell, 2012, Rosamond, 1998, p. 139). In addition to this, as Ken Jackson (the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union) argued, the TUC supported the idea that trade unions should act together in order to have a real influence in globalization, and thus, the European Union/ETUC was very important for the TUC (The TUC, 1996). In this context, the ETUC (and so the TUC) supported the EFTA enlargement (European Social Policy, 1992) because the Scandinavian countries had strong trade unions and those countries’ integration into the EU would also strengthen trade unionism within the EU system (HC 676-i, 1994, p. 583).

In addition to the British government, the CBI was one of the fervent supporters of the European Single Market. For example, it launched \textit{the Initiative 1992} at the end of the 1980s with the aim of helping the completion of the European Single Market by 1992 (The CBI, 1990). In this context, the CBI favoured a larger Single Market including the EFTA countries (Harris, 1991). However, the CBI favoured their full membership to the Community rather than maintaining the EEA as a final institution (The Times, 1991). The main reason behind this position was that the EFTA countries would be outside the responsibility of the common policies and not be subject to the rules of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) unless they became full members of the Community. Particularly, they would not be subject to the common rules on subsidies and competition, which would decrease British companies’ chance to be in fair competition with the domestic companies in the domestic markets of the EFTA countries. Moreover, those countries would also not be a part of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP); thus, border controls on agricultural products between the EEC and the EFTA countries would not totally be abolished. Additionally, the CBI was worried that the EFTA countries might continue to hold reservations about free capital movement and free movement of people. As a result, the

EEA might not provide free movement of goods, services, capital and people as perfectly as what full membership provided. On the other hand, according to the CBI, if the EEA would be maintained, the benefits enjoyed by the members of the EEC should not totally be offered to the EFTA countries, and they should also not be allowed to get involved in any decision making procedure, which could lead to delays in the Community’s legislative system (HC 347, 1990, p. 120). In other words, according to the CBI, an economic integration under the EC system via full membership would be less problematic and more profitable compared to the EEA. Therefore, Brain Corby (1992, p. 5), the President of the CBI argued that the European Community must become wider and that British business should support the early accession of the EFTA countries to the Community. In addition to those economic concerns, the CBI also had some political concerns behind its support for the EFTA enlargement. In line with the Conservative government’s expectation, Dick Eberlie (1992, p. 23), the Director of the CBI’s Brussels Office, argued that the EFTA enlargement might form a better balance between the North and South (the rich and poor members) within the EU. He also argued that the CBI’s support for the enlargement depended on the conditionality that “the negotiations neither impede nor delay […] progress towards economic and monetary union” (ibid.). As a result, in terms of the EMU, the CBI positioned itself in a different place than the Conservative government despite its support for the government’s pro-enlargement policy.

All in all, as LI argues, this section has showed that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries was shaped by her national interests. When the discussions on the future of the European integration were stimulated after the mid-1980s, the Conservative government aimed to create an outward-looking intergovernmental European Union in line with its ideological background. Within this context, the Conservative governments’ ideological motivations emerged as the main reason behind Britain’s ambition to swiftly achieve the EFTA enlargement in addition to the economic and geopolitical benefit expectations. Moreover, there was a common consensus among the main British actors on a pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries, which enabled the British government to become more active within the EC/EU in order to accelerate the EFTA enlargement process. In this regard, at the EC/EU level negotiations, the main concern of the British government was to achieve the EFTA enlargement prior to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which would result in important structural changes in the EU.
4.3 Intergovernmental Bargains

As noted in the previous section, the Conservative government aimed to create a Single Market in accordance with liberal market principles, and widen it further. In this regard, in the 1990s, the main motivation of the Conservative government was to institutionalize neoliberal principles via the Maastricht Treaty within the EU system, and expand them further via enlargement. In this context, the British government targeted to achieve the EFTA enlargement prior to the 1996 IGC (through which member states would make structural changes to the EU system), and thus increase heterogeneity among member states within the EU (via the EFTA countries) in order to prevent potential supranational outcomes of the 1996 IGC.

In particular, the Conservative government put liberalization of trade at the top of its presidential agenda when it assumed the Presidency of the EEC Council of Ministers in 1986 (Owen, 1986). Therefore, the British Presidency re-affirmed the importance of the Joint Luxembourg Declaration, which was signed by the EEC and the EFTA to promote trade between the two parties in 1984, and this declaration gave political impetus to further cooperation between the EEC and the EFTA (Cm 122, 1987, p. 32). In the wake of this initiative, the European Commission and the EFTA countries met in Interlaken on 20th May 1987 to work on further harmonization of trade regulations between the EC and the EFTA countries (Cm 205, 1987, pp. 26-27). In December 1989, the EC and EFTA officials agreed to extend the Single Market to the EFTA countries by creating a European Economic Area (EEA) (Cm 1023, 1990, p. 39), and in June 1990, the Community began the negotiations with the EFTA countries on the establishment of the EEA. As a result, an agreement on the EEA was signed on 2nd May 1992, and the EEA entered into force on 1st January 1993 (Cm 2065, 1992, p. 30).

When the EEA negotiations started in 1990, Austria was the only country that had applied for full membership (in 1989). The other EFTA countries intended to enjoy the benefits of the Single Market via the EEA without full membership, which would impose extra burden on them (Tatham, 2009, p. 59). Therefore, during the negotiations on the EEA, they tried to get derogations from the acquis communautaire to guarantee special institutional arrangements for the EEA, through which they could maintain their national interests, and to form special legal frameworks, through which they could get involved in the decision making procedure within the EC/EU. However, the EC/EU members opposed the EFTA
countries’ demand for permanent derogations from the acquis (e.g. the free movement of capital and foreign ownership of shares) (Preston, 1997, pp. 94-95). In this regard, the Conservative government also opposed this demand, arguing that the negotiated derogations needed to be restricted to short-term transitional arrangements, in a small number of specific sectors overall (HC 262, 1992, p. xxxiv).

Moreover, the old members offered the EFTA countries a limited voice in the EC/EU’s decision making procedure (a weak influence over the policy making process in the EC/EU); thus, full membership emerged for the EFTA countries as the only option through which they would have an equal voice in the EU’s decision making mechanism (Tatham, 2009, p. 59). As a result, the EFTA countries needed to apply for full membership: Sweden made its application in July 1991, Finland in January 1992, Switzerland in May 1992, and Norway in November 1992 (later Switzerland and Norway withdrew their applications) (Preston, 1997).

The applications of the EFTA countries for full membership fulfilled a long-term policy objective of the British government (Cm 2369, 1993, p. 2). However, as LI assumes, the accession negotiations were difficult due to the difference in national interests. More specifically, in addition to Britain, Denmark and Germany also welcomed the applications of the EFTA countries; however, there was less enthusiasm for the EFTA enlargement among the rest of the members since they wanted to give priority to the deepening of the EU (Preston, 1997, p. 90). In this regard, France was the least enthusiastic leading member within the EC/EU for several reasons. Firstly, from a geopolitical perspective, the EFTA enlargement would strengthen Germany’s position within the EU. Secondly, the neutral EFTA countries would dilute an independent European defence policy that was strongly supported by France. Last but not least, the EFTA countries with their export-oriented economies might transform the EU into a free trade zone in line with the British preference, which France did not want (Krotz and Schild, 2013, p. 145). In addition to France, the poorer members of the EC/EU also considered that the EFTA enlargement might result in a power shift from poor south to rich north within the EC/EU, and that as a result of this power shift, they might benefit less from the EC/EU. Particularly, they were worried that “enlargement might weaken the EC's commitment to ‘social and economic cohesion’, from which they are substantial beneficiaries” (Hutton, 1992). As a result, at the Brussels Summit (11 May 1992), Spain, Portugal and Ireland even expressed their
intentions “to veto any decision on the inclusion of the four EFTA countries until a satisfactory agreement on the cohesion funds had been achieved” (Piedrafita, 2006, p. 54).

When the discussions on the future of the Community (the Maastricht Treaty) were heated at the beginning of the 1990s, John Major argued that Britain would be “at the centre of that debate as an enthusiastic participant” to lead the Community to an outward looking future (Cm 1457, 1991, p. vi). According to him, the main challenge was not the Community’s internal developments but the dramatic events (e.g. the collapse of the Eastern Bloc) taking place around the Community; thus, it needed to focus on those events (Moncrieff and Meade, 1991). In this context, when the European Council reached an agreement on the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, the British government declared that it was a success for Britain because firstly that it limited the supranational power of the EU institutions, secondly that it created a Common Foreign and Security Policy that would not become an alternative to NATO, and lastly, that Britain did not make any commitment to a single European currency and obtained an opt-out from the Social Charter (Cm 1857, 1992, HC 223, 1992, p. 15, Gifford, 2008). At this point, as LI assumes, the exclusion of the QMV mechanism from the social issues (e.g. minimum wages, working time) was one of the main concerns of the CBI about the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, and the British government met the CBI’s demand at the EU level negotiations (Harris, 1991).

At the Maastricht Summit, member states also agreed on the enlargement of the Community towards the EFTA countries and Eastern Europe in principle (Jenkins, 1991a, The European Council, 1991)\textsuperscript{42}. After this decision, in the following era, the British government tried to expedite the pace of the EFTA enlargement and achieve the membership of the EFTA countries prior to the 1996 IGC, which would re-arrange the institutional structure of the EU. In doing so, Britain hoped that the EFTA enlargement would make the federalist/centralist projects for the future of the EU unworkable (Riddell, 1992). To illustrate, Douglas Hurd, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, emphasized his belief that the enlargement would make federalist trend inevitable within the EU on the eve of the discussions on the 1996 IGC (HC 28-ii, 1994, p. 34).

\textsuperscript{42} Regarding the outcomes of the Maastricht Summit, the most consensual point was the recognition of the enlargement in principle at the domestic level (Riddell, 1992). For example, according to John Major, an outward looking Community would need the further enlargement towards the EFTA and Eastern European countries (Moncrieff and Meade, 1991), and in the same vein, the Labour Party’s leftist Tribune group also argued that “[t]he issue of enlargement should be raised quite genuinely as a question of priority over full monetary integration” (Timmins, 1992).
However, as the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was an important conditionality to the EFTA enlargement, the Danish veto on the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 stalled the process and put the completion of the EFTA enlargement prior to the 1996 IGC in danger (Walker, 1992). In this political atmosphere, when the British government assumed the Presidency of the Community in July 1992, it mainly focused on completing the Single Market and preparing the Community for the EFTA enlargement (Cm 1857, 1992, p. v). Additionally, the British government also aimed to use the EU Presidency as a strategic tool to promote “an outward looking Community based on free enterprise” (The Conservative Party, 1992).

In parallel with this purpose, just before Britain’s Presidency, the Prime Minister John Major put early start of the accession negotiations with the EFTA applicants on the agenda of the Lisbon European Council (26-27th June 1992) in the hope that an early enlargement of the EFTA countries would appease the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty (Xinhua General News Service, 1992). At the summit, Germany supported Major’s proposal to start the accession negotiations with the EFTA applicants without the need for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by all the member states (Murray, 1992, European Report, 1992). However, the other actors did not support this proposal. For example, the Commission President Delors argued that “the EC should not consider allowing in new members until the Maastricht mess is cleared up and the treaty ratified” (Davis and Greig, 1992). France and the poorer members (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland) also demanded a new budget deal (extra money) as a condition to cooperate on the EFTA enlargement43 (Parkhouse, 1992, Palmer, 1992, Lambert, 1992, Hutton, 1992). As a result, John Major could not get full support from other members to start an early accession negotiation with the EFTA countries (Moncrieff and Meade, 1992, Palmer, 1992a, Gillespie, 1992), and the Council just agreed that “official negotiations with the EFTA countries which had applied for membership could begin as soon as the Treaty on European Union [the Maastricht Treaty] had been ratified and an agreement had been

43 The Commission President Jacques Delors arranged a budget package proposing to increase the Community’s spending ceiling to 87.5 billion European currency units ($ 116.5 million) from 66.6 billion ECU ($ 88.5 billion), a large portion of which would go to cohesion and structural funds in which the main beneficiaries were poor members (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland). However, Britain and Germany were against this proposal, which would increase their contribution to the EC budget. As a response, the poorer members tried to use the increase in the EC budget as a condition for the EFTA enlargement. For example, “Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales has threatened to veto any enlargement unless the package is approved” (Rockwell, 1992a).
concluded on the second package of structural and financial measures [an increase in the EC budget]” (The European Council, 1992).

At the Birmingham Summit (16th October 1992), the main concern of Major was to decrease the differences between member states in order to increase the chance of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by all the members especially after a narrow ‘yes’ in France (Millar et al., 1992). Therefore, the issue of the EFTA enlargement was not prominently discussed at the summit (Millar, 1992). However, at the Edinburgh European Council (11-12 December 1992), after giving some concessions in order to increase the EC budget, as the poorer members demanded to allow the EFTA enlargement, Major managed to convince the other members to start the accession negotiations with Austria, Finland, and Sweden at the beginning of 1993 (Lambert and Goodwin, 1992, Macintyre and Marshall, 1992, see also: The European Council, 1992a). In addition to this, it was agreed that Norway would start accession negotiations as soon as the European Commission released its opinion on the Norwegian application (Cm 2168, 1993). However, Switzerland was out of the accession negotiations process since the Swiss rejected the EU membership in December 1992 (Bache et al., 2011).

The accession negotiations started with Austria, Finland and Sweden in February 1993 and with Norway in April 1993 (Cm 2502, 1994, p. 13). Compared to the Mediterranean enlargement, the accession negotiations with the EFTA countries were more systematic. Particularly, the Copenhagen European Council (21-22nd June 1993) systematized the accession conditionality, which must be met by any applicant country to become an EU member. At this point, the Copenhagen criteria were in conformity with the British ambition to create a liberal Europe. Moreover, those criteria would force the EFTA countries to open their domestic markets to the other members, and this would automatically meet Britain’s expectation to access the EFTA markets. Therefore, the Conservative government declared that Britain would support any candidate who met all

44 According to the Copenhagen Criteria, a candidate country should have stable democratic institutions and a working market economy, and it should commit itself to totally adopting the acquis communautaire (Yesilada, 2012). In addition to this, the acquis was divided into different chapters (29 chapters), and the Commission would carry out the accession negotiations by following those chapters to have applicants adopt the acquis (Hillion, 2004). In this process, a candidate did not have any negotiation alternative except for adopting the acquis, and the Commission had a duty to monitor its adaptation process. In other words, an accession negotiations process became a more bureaucratic and fixed process in which the member states were less active compared to the Commission although they were still the main actors who decided to start and approve accession negotiations.
the conditions of membership (the Copenhagen criteria) (HC 79-xx, 1992/93, p. xix). Tristan Garel-Jones, the Minister of State for Europe, also described the accession negotiations with the EFTA countries as a technical and bureaucratic process, and according to him, Britain’s main priority was their accession to the EU by 1st February 1995 prior to the 1996 IGC (HC 79-xv, 1993).

As given in the previous section, one of the main political concerns of Britain on the EFTA enlargement was the neutrality of the EFTA applicants (except Norway). In general, Britain had a tendency to see the European integration as part of the Western security system; therefore, the integration of the neutral EFTA countries (Sweden, Austria, and Finland) to the Western security system was important for Britain. At this point, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (the CFSP) was designed in an intergovernmental way at the Maastricht Treaty as a complementary structure to NATO (mostly because of Britain’s strong Atlanticist position) (Smith, 1999, p. 53). Moreover, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was a part of the acquis, with which the EFTA countries would comply (HC 48-xiv, 1994, p. xii). As a result, the neutral EFTA countries would be integrated to the Western security system via the CFSP, and Britain was satisfied with this security arrangement.

At the same time, the Copenhagen Summit (21-22nd June 1993) gave impetus to the accession negotiations with the EFTA countries and re-affirmed 1st January 1995 as a target date for the enlargement (The European Council, 1993). Subsequently, a special European Council (29th October 1993) set 1st March 1994 as a target date to complete the accession negotiations with Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway (Cm 2525, 1994, p. 4). The accession negotiations between the EU and the EFTA were in general smooth, and “the most difficult negotiating chapters were agriculture, fisheries, regional policy, the budget and institutions” (Cm 2675, 1994, p. 22).

However, the need to reform the EU’s qualified majority voting (QMV) mechanism was a paradoxical issue for the British government at the EU level negotiations because it did not want to increase the power of the QMV mechanism in the EU decision making system despite its ambition for the EFTA enlargement. According to the existing QMV mechanism, there were 76 votes in total in the Council of Ministers and 23 votes out of 76 (the threshold of blocking minority) were sufficient to block any decision. However, according to a reform proposal arranged by the European Commission, the total vote
number would increase to 90 and the threshold of blocking minority would increase to 27 votes from 23 votes after the EFTA enlargement (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway).

Douglas Hurd refused this proposal at a foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on 23\textsuperscript{rd} March 1994. Britain was against this proposal because it would strengthen the central power of the EU at the expense of Britain’s sovereignty (Brown, 1994, Major, 1999, p. 588). In other words, this proposal would limit Britain’s ability to block any EU decision that was against Britain’s interests (Ellingsen, 1994). Another reason behind Britain’s refusal of the new proposal for the blocking minority (27 votes out of 90) was that if the arithmetic used in this proposal was implemented to future enlargements (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic), the large members (including Britain) would lose their power in the EU decision making system despite their overwhelming resource contribution to the EU (Young, 1994).

In the wake of the Commission’s proposal, the Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party also forced Major and Hurd to refuse it (Ames, 1994, Major, 1999, pp. 588-589). In this regard, according to Preston (1997, p. 106), the Eurosceptic Conservative members were influential because a further intensified Eurosceptic backlash might overturn the Conservative government’s small majority in the Parliament. As a result, Major tried to block this proposal at the EU level negotiations and even declared that “he was willing to think about delaying EU enlargement if the proposed voting system weakened Britain's say in decision-making” (Duncan, 1994, see also: Young, 1998, p. 454 and Lippert, 2006, p. 114) although the EFTA enlargement was a priority for the British foreign policy. Therefore, from an LI perspective, when the negative externalities of the EFTA to Britain became significant, her support for the EFTA enlargement correspondingly diminished.

To resolve the deadlock, an informal foreign ministers meeting was arranged in Ioannina (Greece) on 26-27\textsuperscript{th} March 1994. At the meeting, Britain and Spain insisted that the minority blocking continue with 23 votes after the EFTA enlargement until the 1996 IGC, where there would be a final negotiation to determine the EU’s decision making mechanism. In other words, according to them, one small and two large EU members should continue to have a veto power even in a 16-nation EU \textsuperscript{45}(Wielaard, 1994).

\textsuperscript{45} According to the existing system, there were 76 votes (Britain, France, Germany and Italy got 10 votes; Spain, 8; Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal, 5; Denmark and Ireland, 3 each, and Luxembourg,
However, Britain’s position was weak at the Ioannina meeting (Major, 1999, p. 589). Firstly, there was just Spain as an ally supporting Britain’s position (23 votes as the threshold of blocking minority); however, its support waned in time (Macintyre and Marshall, 1994a). Secondly, the other 10 members strictly supported that the necessary vote number should be 27 out of 90 in order to block any decision in the Council of Ministers after the EFTA enlargement (Barnard, 1994a). Thirdly, the European officials also supported the proposal and refused any concession in a way that Britain wanted. For example, Jacques Delors refused to accommodate the proposal in parallel with the British demand and argued that a crisis would be better than a poor compromise (Wise, 1994). Fourthly, some of the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) argued that “they [would] vote enlargement down if Britain and Spain [were] allowed to weaken EU authority” (Brown, 1994). In addition to this, a group of the MEPs from the Conservative Party sent John Major a message urging him to find a solution to the crisis (Macintyre and Marshall, 1994b). Last but not least, March 1994 was a vital deadline to finalise the accession negotiations with the EFTA countries, as the enlargement treaty needed the approval of the European Parliament; however, the Parliament would be dissolved for the elections in June 1994, and if the member states missed this deadline, it would be hardly possible to achieve the accession of the EFTA countries to the EU on 1st January 1995 (Mclaughlin, 1994).

As a result, Britain had to accept an increase from 23 to 27 votes in order to block any decision at the Council of Ministers after obtaining some concessions. According to the compromise, “the blocking minority [would] be set at 27 votes, but countries that muster 23 to 26 votes can delay decisions for a ‘reasonable’ period of time” (Barnard, 1994b). Moreover, the new rule would not be implemented in the issue of labour legislation in order to guarantee Britain’s opt-out from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty (ibid.). Additionally, John Major highlighted the point that the agreement on the QMV was only acceptable until the 1996 IGC, which would re-organize the EU’s governance (HC 48-xiv, 1994, p. xix).

After solving the QMV crisis, the Accession Treaty with the EFTA countries was signed at the Corfu European Council (24-25th June 1994) (The European Council, 1994).

2) The vote to achieve the blocking minority was 23 out of 76; therefore, one small and two large members could reach 23 votes and veto any decision.
Subsequently, Finland, Sweden and Norway held referenda on EU membership in the fall of 1994. Although the Finnish and Swedish people voted in favour of membership, the Norwegian people voted against it (Cm 2798, 1995). Additionally, Austria had already held a referendum in favour of membership on 26-27th March 1994 (Cm 2675, 1994, p. 22). As a result of those referenda, Austria, Finland, and Sweden became full members of the EU on 1st January 1995 prior to the 1996 IGC; therefore, the British government achieved to fulfil one of its long-term policy objectives on the European integration (Cm 2369, 1993, p. 2). For instance, John Major argued that

Enlargement [would] bring into the Union countries which share Britain’s open trading instincts, and which will be net contributors to the budget. It will be another step towards the wider, less centralised, open trading Europe for which [the members of the Conservative government] have been working” (HC 48-xiv, 1994, p. xix).

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter analysed Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries from an LI perspective. As found in the Mediterranean enlargement case, this chapter has also found that LI’s two-level game approach was an efficient method in analysing how Britain developed her national preferences over the EFTA enlargement and how the Conservative government defended them at the EU level negotiations. Particularly, there was a strong consensus among the main domestic actors on a pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA enlargement, which made the British government one of the main initiators of the EFTA enlargement at the EU level. Related to this, the findings have also supported LI’s intergovernmentalist assumptions. In concrete terms, a pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries was shaped according to Britain’s national interests and the Conservative government tried to defend those interests at the EU level negotiations. For example, the accession of the EFTA countries to the EU before the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was very important for the British government to drive the European integration process towards an outward-looking intergovernmental system. Therefore, the Conservative government tried to accelerate the EFTA enlargement process in the early 1990s, and firmly rejected the EFTA countries’ demand for some permanent derogation from the acquis at the negotiations on the EEA (otherwise, it would be an alternative to full membership).

However, the findings showed that LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice assumption is limited in explaining this case because, firstly, the ideological concerns were
the main driving force behind the Conservative government’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries, and secondly the economic motivation of British actors for a pro-enlargement policy mostly depended on expectations rather than clear-cut cost-benefit calculations due to the complexity of the issue. As noted above, the EFTA enlargement coincided with the EU level history-making negotiations, and the Conservative government with its neoliberal motivations perceived the EFTA enlargement as a chance to drive the European integration towards a more outward-looking intergovernmental way and also as a chance to export liberal market economy principles to the EFTA countries. However, despite this limitation, LI’s logic of micro-economics (rational choice assumption) convincingly explains an interesting behaviour/attitude of the British government in this case. More specifically, the Conservative government was aware that Germany would gain more than Britain from the EFTA enlargement in terms of the manufacturing sector; however, British government did not perceive this as a threat and focused on the finance sector in which Britain had a comparative advantage over other members including Germany. Therefore, as LI’s logic of micro-economics assumes, the British government mostly focused on the absolute gains of the EFTA enlargement to Britain rather than other members’ relative gains from it.

In addition to this finding, the chapter has also found that economic expectations and geopolitical concerns, which were actually intertwined with the above-mentioned ideological concerns, were also other variables which affected Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries. As noted above, the Conservative government aimed to liberalize the EFTA markets via enlargement according to its neoliberal ideology. However, this ideological ambition was also in conformity with the economic expectation that the liberalization of the EFTA markets would offer new economic opportunities to British business. In this sense, there was a common consensus between the Conservative government and numerous British companies on this benefit expectation. For example, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Committee of Trade and Industry, and the CBI agreed on this expectation in addition to several other interest groups/companies such as Chemical Industries Association, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, BEAMA Federation, the British Insurance and Investment Brokers’ Association, the Food and Drink Federation, and Barclays Bank Plc.

In addition to economic expectations, geopolitical concerns also affected the British government’s attitude towards the EFTA enlargement. For example, when Austria applied
for full membership in 1989, the Conservative government perceived its neutrality as a problem in the Cold War context. However, in the post-Cold War context, the neutrality of the EFTA countries was not a problem but a chance for the Conservative government to thwart France’s ambition to create an independent European security system (as an alternative to NATO).

Therefore, as LI assumes, it could be argued that the British government benefited from a multi-causal reasoning, containing ideological motivations, economic expectations and geopolitical concerns, while formulating its pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries as it was hard to make precise cost-benefit calculations on the EFTA enlargement. However, as noted in the theory chapter, LI does not have further explanation about this multi-causal reasoning. At this point, if the findings from the literature review are considered, the Conservative government’s ideological ambitions, economic expectations, and geopolitical concerns about the EFTA enlargement appeared more consistent and rational within the general British foreign policy framework. In other words, the Conservative government’s ambition to liberalize the EFTA markets via enlargement (and economic benefit expectation from it) was in conformity with the British foreign policy priorities. Thus, the British foreign policy priorities as a structure might have constituted a rationale for Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries.

The findings from the chapter have also showed that, unlike LI’s pluralistic decision making assumption, the British government was not only a dominant actor in the national preference formation process but also an entrepreneur trying to increase British business’ awareness of the economic opportunities in the EFTA markets. For example, the Conservative government established the European Trade Committee (the ETC) to raise British companies’ awareness of the EFTA markets and to help them to access those markets. However, as LI argues, the Conservative government was still responsive to the demands of British societal groups despite its domination in the national preference formation process. For example, as noted above, by refusing the EFTA countries’ any permanent derogation from the acquis at the negotiations on the EEA, the British government also met the CBI’s demand, which was against any EU level agreement diluting liberal trade principles (see: HC 347, 1990, p. 120).

In this regard, when the issue of the extension of the QMV was raised at the EU level negotiations, the influence of the domestic dynamics on the Conservative government
became more apparent. More specifically, although the British government strictly negotiated to prevent any further extension of the QMV within the EU decision making system, it failed to achieve this despite getting some concessions. As a result, the outcome of the negotiations was a lukewarm result for the Conservative government and would result in further clash in the Conservative Party between the pro-Europeans and the Eurosceptics. In this regard, in his memoirs, Douglas Hurd (2003, pp. 438-440) argued that he accepted this deal because of Britain’s broader interests in the EU but he also admitted that the main fault of the Foreign Office was to leave the negotiations on the QMV late in the tight timetable of the EFTA enlargement (1st January 1995) (Theakston, 2004, p. 220). In his autobiography, John Major also defined the outcome as a mistake, which could have been avoided (Major, 1999, pp. 589-590). Therefore, the extension of the QMV was an unanticipated consequence of the EFTA enlargement for the Conservative government and resulted in further domestic criticism against the government in the following era.
5 The Eastward Enlargement

5.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses Britain’s policy towards the Eastward enlargement from an LI perspective. The Eastward enlargement was a highly complex and detailed process, which took place over a long period from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, during which both the Conservative and Labour governments held power. Moreover, the Eastward enlargement went hand in hand with two history-making intergovernmental conferences (the 1996 IGC and 2000 IGC). Therefore, to deeply analyse this complex process, the chapter separately focuses on the Conservative government (1989-1997) and the Labour government (1997-2007) periods.

LI’s two level-game approach is a useful method in analysing how Britain developed her national preferences over the Eastward enlargement at the domestic level and how the successive governments (the Conservative and Labour governments) defended them at the EU level negotiations. As found in the previous cases (the Mediterranean and EFTA enlargements), the findings of this chapter also support LI’s intergovernmental assumption that a pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs was shaped according to Britain’s national interests. In this regard, there was a strong consensus on a pro-enlargement policy among the main domestic actors, which made the successive British governments the influential initiators of the Eastward enlargement at the EU level. However, despite their strong pro-enlargement position, the successive British governments were not willing to sacrifice Britain’s crucial interests (e.g. the British rebate) for the sake of the Eastward enlargement during the enlargement-related reform negotiations.

Moreover, as found in the previous cases, this case has also showed that LI’s pluralistic decision making and economic interest oriented rational choice assumption are limited in explaining Britain’s national preference formation process for a pro-enlargement policy. Firstly, unlike LI’s pluralistic decision making assumption, the findings have showed that the British governments were the dominant actor in the national preference formation process. Secondly, unlike LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice assumption,

46 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and later, Romania and Bulgaria.
geopolitical concerns were the dominant reason behind the British governments’ support for the Eastward enlargement. Yet, the research has also found that those geopolitical concerns were interconnected with the economic expectations and ideological motivations of the British governments. Therefore, this finding supports LI’s multi-causal reasoning that geopolitical concerns and ideological motivations might be more or equally influential over actors’ decisions when they face complex issues to make precise cost-benefit calculations on. But, as noted in the theory chapter, LI’s actor oriented logic does not provide further explanation about this multi-causal reasoning. In this regard, as the literature review suggested, the British foreign policy structure might have constituted a rationale for the British governments because their expectation that the expansion of democracy and liberal market principles to the CEECs via enlargement would bring more security and prosperity to Europe and to Britain was in conformity with the main British foreign policy objectives.

To systematically present the analyses/findings in detail, this chapter firstly focuses on the Conservative government era, and then on the Labour government era. In both cases, from an LI perspective, the chapter analyses the collected data to answer two questions: firstly, how the British executive and the relevant societal groups determined the national preferences with regard to the Eastward enlargement, and secondly, how political and economic concerns affected the national preference formation process. Subsequently, the research focuses on the question: how the British executive (the Conservative and Labour governments) defended Britain’s national preferences at the EU level negotiations. These negotiations consisted of successive sessions. Therefore, the domestic reactions to these successive sessions were also taken into consideration, as it is true that domestic reactions to the outcomes of former sessions might have affected Britain’s national preferences at subsequent sessions during the long negotiation process.

5.2 The Conservative Party Period (1989-1997)

5.2.1 National Preference Formation

5.2.1.1 Political Concerns

As found in the previous cases, this case has also confirmed LI’s intergovernmental assumption that the Conservative government’s pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs was shaped according to Britain’s national interests. Firstly, the research has found
that geopolitical concerns were the dominant reason behind the Conservative government’s pro-enlargement policy (see also: Lippert et al., 2001). However, according to findings, ideological motivations and economic expectations were also the other factors affecting British actors’ position on the Eastward enlargement. Therefore, Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Eastward enlargement was an output of a multi-causal reasoning.

On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe, Britain’s main concern was that the emerging power vacuum in the region might result in new security risks in Europe. According to the Conservative government, this was a security problem that could not be solved by bilateral measures. For example, any bilateral involvement in the region might unfavourably provoke the Soviet Union or the authorities of the Eastern European Countries, which would weaken the reform attempts in the region (HC 16, 1989, p. xxx). Moreover, bilateral arrangements to fill the mentioned security vacuum might also pave the way for new unexpected and dangerous security problems on the continent (HC 82, 1990, p. 34). Therefore, according to the British government, a collective policy was needed to guarantee the democratisation of the CEECs (Cm 708, 1989, p. 10). At this point, the EU would be the best multilateral framework to form a collective policy towards the region. Particularly, the Community’s enlargement policy could be effectively used to achieve the transition of the CEECs from authoritarianism to democracy (Bevins and Bulloch, 1989). The Conservative government’s experience from the Mediterranean enlargement also encouraged it to give the EC/EU’s enlargement policy a central role to manage the democratization of the CEECs. For example, both Margaret Thatcher (1993) and John Major (1993a) argued that the enlargement policy could be used as an effective tool to create a democratic and free market oriented Central and Eastern Europe, as the Mediterranean enlargement achieved in Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 1980s.

47 The Conservative government also believed that the extension of NATO towards the CEECs should be a complementary security measure in addition to the EU’s enlargement towards the region because the EU’s enlargement might not be a panacea for every security problem that Europe faced (Cm 2800, 1995, p. 22). In parallel with this, when the 1994 Brussels Summit welcomed the enlargement of NATO towards the democratic countries from the Central and Eastern Europe, the Conservative government was “one of the foremost proponents of enlargement, and played a full part in the preparation of the NATO Enlargement Study” (Cm 3781, 1997, p. 4). Moreover, Britain strongly supported NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the WEU’s Associate Partnership programme and also launched the Outreach programme as a bilateral co-operation with Central and Eastern Europe in order to integrate CEECs into the Western security system (HC 215, 1996, p. vi, Cm 2800, 1995, p. 22).
In parallel with this motivation, the Conservative government played an active role within the Community to promote relationship between the EC/EU and the CEECs (Cm 2369, 1993, p. 19). For example, when the Soviet bloc started to crack, Thatcher (Moncrieff, 1990) and Hurd (Cm 1023, 1990, p. 7) proposed that the EC/EU needed to develop its relationship with the CEECs to govern the rapid and dramatic change in the region. Especially, the political stability and economic development of the CEECs should be achieved to maintain “the long-term peace and prosperity of the continent” (Cm 2369, 1993, p. 19). To achieve this, according to the British government, the enlargement policy needed to be used as a “carrot and stick” policy. Thus, at the first level, the Central and Eastern European countries would be separately considered according to their unique conditions (Cm 708, 1989, p. 7). Secondly, the integration of the CEECs into the EC/EU would gradually happen in a period, in which important but painful reforms would be achieved step-by-step according to the conditionality of enlargement. As a result, according to the Conservative government, firstly trade and cooperation agreements, secondly association agreements, and finally full membership of the CEECs into the EC/EU would be achieved (HC 35-i, 1991, p. 7, Major, 1992).

According to Douglas Hurd, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the association agreements with the CEECs would be the most effective interim arrangements (HC 335, 1990, p. 12). By using this arrangement, the Community would be able to fully get involved in the transition process in those countries and would be able to screen the reform processes country by country. In this way, the Community would also be able to accelerate the transition process and to keep the economic and political reforms in the CEECs in the way the Community wanted. In other words, the Conservative government assumed that those agreements would tremendously increase the asymmetric economic tie between the EC/EU and the CEECs in favour of the Community (Cm 641, 1989, p. 6), and the EC could use this asymmetric economic interdependence to promote the democratization process in the region. For example, the Community used this power by suspending the negotiations of a trade and cooperation agreement with Romania as a reaction to Romania’s poor human rights policy in 1989 (Cm 801, 1989, p. 6). As a result, as Hurd argued, the association agreements would be a bridge to eventual full membership but not a guarantee since full membership would depend on the condition that the CEECs have a democratic political system and a working market economy (HC 77-i, 1990).
The ideological motivation of the Conservative Party was also influential in the Conservative government’s adopting this position. In particular, the Conservative government’s ideological motivation and security concerns were spirally intertwined and they co-existed. The party believed that the expansion of liberal democracy would not only bring prosperity but also perpetual peace on the continent. For example, John Major (1993b) argued that the association agreements would substantially liberalise trade in Central and Eastern Europe, and trade liberalization was the most effective and permanent means to consolidate political stability, economic growth, and peace in the region. In addition to Major, Francis Maude, the Minister of State for Europe, also argued that “a market economy goes hand in hand with genuine democracy”; therefore, the political reforms in the Central and Eastern European countries needed to be sustained by liberal economic change (Hansard, 1990b, p. 334). In parallel with this expectation, the Conservative government even had a tendency to tolerate the short-run costs of the Eastward enlargement48. Both Margaret Thatcher (1993) and John Major (1993a) continued their support for the Eastward enlargement even though both accepted that the Eastward enlargement might result in some short-run costs to Britain. However, the British government also rationally considered that if Britain did not tolerate the short-run costs and did not help the CEECs, the alternative cost (e.g. high security risk with the unstable CEECs) would be much higher (see: Thatcher, 1993).

On the other hand, Thatcherism as an economic model was highly popular in the Central European countries (Castle, 1990). For example, Vaclav Klaus, the leader of the Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic, was highly inspired by the Thatcherite ideas (Hanley, 1999, Williams, 2003, Rutland, 1992). According to Morawski (1997, p. 298), the Polish reform policy was also mostly shaped in a neoliberal paradigm (particularly in the period between 1989 and 1993); thus, it was “an attempt to implement the prescriptions of Thatcherism […]”. Additionally, Poland also followed the Thatcherite privatization model after the collapse of the communist regime in the country (Jasinski, 1997). As a result, the Eastward enlargement would give the Conservative government a chance to increase its ideological influence over the region.

48 The Eastward enlargement would put extra burden on the EU budget, as the CEECs would become net receivers from the EU budget, and would result in procedural costs regarding the governance of the EU. In addition to this, the CEECs needed to achieve an economic transition from socialist economy to liberal market economy prior to their full membership, which needed economic help and trade/export privileges provided by the EU’s rich members.
Moreover, as Tristan Garel-Jones (Hansard, 1993a, p. 928) and Douglas Hurd (HC 77-i, 1990, p. 13) pointed out, the Conservative government expected that the Eastward enlargement would become a catalyser to form an outward-looking intergovernmental Community because the Eastward enlargement would make the EU more heterogeneous (HC 51-xxviii, 1996, p. 9). Thus, as John Major argued, the Conservative government favoured an early Eastward enlargement as soon as possible (Hansard, 1992a). On the other hand, the ruling Conservative Party was against the thesis that the EC needed a massive institutional change (in a supranational way) in order to increase the EC’s magnetism/attractiveness to the Central and Eastern European countries. For example, Douglas Hurd (HC 82, 1990, p. 80) argued that changing the balance of power within the institutions of the Community would not help to increase the magnetism of the EC. According to him, “the EC’s attractiveness to East Europe was because of progress it had made towards the single market”; thus, “he scorned attempts to move further to a single bank and common currency” (Usborne, 1989). Thatcher also argued that power transfer from member states to the (bureaucratic) EC institutions (e.g. a European Central Bank) would make the EC democratically less accountable, and this would be ironic while the EC was “encouraging the countries of East Europe to move to full democracy and human rights” (Usborne and Bevins, 1989). In the same vein, Micheal Howard, the Secretary of State for Employment, argued that “it would be ironic if at a time when the workers of Eastern Europe are being freed from bureaucracy and collectivism, the European Community began to impose on its own employers and employees new obstacles to freedom of choice at work [the Social Charter]” (Cm 1810, 1992, p. 6). Moreover, according to Thatcher (1990), the Central and Eastern European countries had a very strong feeling of the national identity and “they [would] want to preserve that while also cooperating with the Community”. Therefore, a more intergovernmental EC/EU with a less centralised and looser structure imposing fewer obligations on its members would be more useful/effective in integrating the CEECs into the EC/EU. Otherwise, a supranational integration in Western Europe would be worthless if some of the CEECs would slip back into authoritarianism due to their inability to meet the higher expectation of a potential supranational Union (Thatcher, 1993). At this point, according to Francis Maude, the Minister of State for Europe, the rules of the Community should not be changed in a way (more bureaucratic/supranational) that might prevent any applicant from being able to join (HC 188-iii, 1990).
A pro-enlargement policy would also become a strategic position regarding the Conservative Party’s inner party politics. As noted in the previous chapter, the issue of the European integration resulted in a division within the Conservative Party (e.g. Eurosceptic Thatcher versus pro-European Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Geoffrey Howe, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) (Heppell, 2007, p. 77). This division even became one of the main reasons behind Thatcher’s resignation. Subsequently, when John Major came to power, the issue of European integration was still a division reason within the Conservative Party. Particularly, Major was mostly supported by the Conservative/Thatcherite Eurosceptics against Heseltine and Hurd for the party leadership; thus, the Eurosceptic Conservative Party members would have a power to destabilise Major’s party leadership in the 1990s (Heppell, 2007, pp. 92-93, Crowson, 2007, p. 55). Moreover, after the Maastricht Treaty, the division within the party on the issue of European integration became more apparent between the Europhiles (e.g. Michael Heseltine) and the Eurosceptics (e.g. Michael Portillo, Peter Lilley and John Redwood). At this point, John Major tried to use a consensual and pragmatic leadership to prevent a further split in the party (Heppell, 2007, p. 96). In this regard, the aim to create an outward-looking and intergovernmental Europe would be acceptable for both groups, and the EU’s further enlargement would help to achieve this aim. For example, according to a survey carried out in 1994, the majority of the backbench Conservatives perceived the enlargement of the EU as the best defence against deepening/supranational attempts within the EU (Baker et al., 1995, p. 222). Thus, a pro-enlargement policy would also help John Major to prevent any further division in the Conservative Party.

5.2.1.2 Economic Concerns

As LI assumes, the chapter has found that the British actors also tried to consider the potential economic outcomes (benefits and costs) of the Eastward enlargement in addition

49 Despite Major’s consensual and pragmatic leadership attempts, when the Major government accepted the Ioanninan compromise (1994) on the new QMV system at the Council of Ministers (the increase in the blocking minority vote from 23 to 27), which was necessary for the EFTA enlargement, the Eurosceptic Conservatives strongly criticized John Major and they demanded that the QMV blocking minority should be restored to 23 at the 1996 IGC (Baker et al., 1995, p. 229). Even a Conservative backbencher (Tony Marlow) called Major’s resignation as a response to the increasing power of the QMV system (Crowson, 2007, p. 60). In the same year (October 1994), Norman Lamont, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, also argued that the possibility of withdrawal from the EU should be openly discussed (Forster, 2002, p. 110). As a response to the increasing power of the Eurosceptics within the party, Major tactically resigned and then maintained his leadership until 1997. However, from an LI perspective, increasing Euroscepticism within the party limited the Major’s government flexibility at the EU level negotiations on the EU reforms that were necessary for the Eastward enlargement.
to the political outcomes. In particular, the Conservative Party's security/ideology dominated pro-enlargement policy had also an economic dimension. In general, the Conservative government expected that the expansion of the Single Market towards the CEECs would create more prosperity for all the members. In particular, the Eastward enlargement would provide new markets for British goods and new investment opportunities for British firms (Cm 1969, 1992, p. 3, HC 21, 1992, p. xvi). For example, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) defined the extension of Single Market laws to the CEECs as a significant beneficial development for the British traders, investors and consumers simply because the enlarging Single Market would provide new markets for the EU exporters, improve access of CEE-produced goods to the Community markets, attract inward investment, and contribute to the competitiveness of the EU in the global market (HC 378, 1995, p. 6). Additionally, the Conservative government also wanted to benefit from the Eastward enlargement as a tool to consolidate London as a financial centre in Europe and in the world. For example, the British government managed to make London EBRD’s (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 50) headquarter in 1991 (Cm 1234, 1990, p. 36).

Moreover, the economic expectations of British business mainly focused on the potential benefits from the liberalisation/modernization of the markets of the CEECs. For example, the DTI advised that the British companies’ emphasis should be on “modernisation and refurbishment at enterprise level, particularly through co-operation, joint ventures etc.” instead of capital intensive projects (HC 51, 1988, p. 5). Some specific British companies also perceived the liberalization of the CEECs’ markets as an economic opportunity. For example, one of the DTI’s interviews carried out with 17 British firms in the computer and telecommunication sector showed that most of the firms perceived the reforms in the CEECs as an opportunity that would stimulate their exports (HC 231, 1992, p. 61). Communication and Control Engineering Co. Ltd. also expected that the CEECs would modernise and improve safety standards in their mining industries, and this would create “a considerable market for mining equipment” (HC 216, 1993, p. 118). In a similar way, Ravenscraig expected that the liberalization would develop the economies of the CEECs; therefore, the demand for higher quality strip steel products that were not locally available would increase in the region (HC 63, 1991, p. 13). The British Insurance and Investment

50 It was initially designed to build market economies in the CEECs.
Broker’s Association also expected that the liberalization of the CEECs’ markets would develop their economies; thus, the brokers’ role would increase in those developing and liberalizing markets (HC 216, 1993, p. 63). As a result of this expectation, according to the Association, the major British brokers already opened offices in many of those countries at the beginning of the 1990s (ibid.). In the same vein, British Airways Plc argued that the liberalization of the CEECs would offer new market opportunities. In addition to this, according to the company, the reduction in military forces and unification of European airspace would provide extra opportunities for civil air transport in general (HC 147, 1992, p. 71).

However, the extension of the Single Market towards Central and Eastern Europe was not seen as an opportunity for all the British sectors. The integration of those countries into the Single Market was particularly seen as a potential threat to the British agriculture and food sectors mostly because of their low-cost products. Thus, according to the Conservative government, the reform of the CAP and the Structural Funds would be necessary to make enlargement a success (Cm 3441, 1996, p. 8). Particularly, the MAFF argued that the reforms in the CAP were needed not only for the potential Eastward enlargement but also for the next round of international trade negotiations (the WTO round negotiations on agriculture in 1999) because “EU agricultural policies must operate within the framework of the Union’s international trade commitments” (Cm 3604, 1996, p. 5). Other relevant domestic actors also shared the idea that the CAP should be reformed for a successful Eastward enlargement. For example, the NFU declared its support for the Eastward enlargement, but according to it, the enlargement should not undermine the long-term viability of the EU horticulture industry (HC 61-ii, 1995). According to the British Poultry Meat Federation (BPMF), the EC should not open its market to imports from the CEECs without necessary internal reforms to reduce the cost of agricultural inputs; otherwise, it would penalise the EC poultry and meat industry (HC 112, 1992, p. 217). MD Foods Plc also argued that further enlargement towards the CEECs required a change in the existing CAP regime because the average price of dairy products in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland was half of the EU members according to the 1993 statistics (HC 40, 1996 p. 177). According to Milk Marque, the Central and Eastern European countries also needed a long transition period before full integration into the CAP mostly because of their low cost and hygiene standards (ibid, p. 115).
As found in the EFTA enlargement case, the findings in this case also shows that the Conservative government had more enthusiasm than British business to invest in Central and Eastern Europe in the second half of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. To illustrate, in 1988, a report of the DTI (HC 51, 1988, p. 4) argued that

Many UK companies [were] put off the markets of Eastern Europe simply by their instinctive dislike of the Communist system, not without some reason. Too few even of our largest exporters [had] however made a serious study of the opportunities for their products though fortunately some have found that they can be very worthwhile.

In 1989, according to the DTI, the process of British companies’ involvement in the Central and Eastern European markets was still slow. For example, there were only “some half dozen British joint ventures in Poland, and slightly more in Hungary” (Cm 708, 1989, p. 5). In another report, Alan Smith, a Specialist Adviser, argued that the insufficient performance of British companies in the Central and Eastern European countries became a greater urgent problem in 1991. For example, Britain’s share in the OECD exports to the Central and Eastern European countries gradually decreased from 6 per cent in 1987 to 4.9 per cent in 1990 (HC 262, 1992, p. liv).

As a result, unlike LI’s pluralistic assumption, the Conservative government became the main initiator and tried to encourage British business to increase their trade relations with the CEECs due to the British societal groups’ apathetic position towards them (Cm 708, 1989, p. 5). In particular, the British government used the relevant governmental institutions to create an attractive atmosphere in which British business would increase their investments in Central and Eastern Europe. In this sense, the main responsibility was given to the DTI with a major help of the FCO and other institutions, including the Export Credit Guarantees Department (ECGD), and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) (HC 16, 1989, p. 186). In 1989, the DTI argued that trade with the CEECs needed “a high level of participation by governments” because of the tradition of state control in trade in the region. Thus, the DTI devoted more financial resources and staffs to assist the British companies which were to do/doing business in those countries (HC 16, 1989, p. 186). Moreover, John Vereker, the Permanent Secretary for the Overseas Development Administration, also argued that the government arranged a number of pre-investment schemes that were designed to create an environment where British investors would want to go in the Central and Eastern European countries (Hc 370, 1996, p. 102). In 1990/1, in parallel with this purpose, the CBI also launched the Eastern European
with a budget of £ 2 million in order to develop British companies’ trade relations with the CEECs (Jones, 1991, Preston, 1990).

In addition to those institutions, the Government also supported the activities of the BBC and the British Council in the region in order to create an efficient cultural framework in which it would be easier for the British companies to do business. For example, the main mission of the British Council was determined as “to maximise the visibility, impact and availability of British creativity and expertise” in Central and Eastern Europe (HC 516-i, 1991, p. 21). In parallel with this mission, the British Council arranged English language programmes in the Central and Eastern European countries to spread the usage of English in the region; and according to the Council, the increasing usage of English would help British companies in the region (Cm 3573, 1997, p. 8).

On the other hand, it was hard for the British government to calculate the potential costs of the Eastward enlargement to Britain especially in the first half of the 1990s. To illustrate, Douglas Hurd accepted that it was impossible to predict the consequences of the enlargement although the Conservative government expected that the liberalization of the CEECs would provide opportunities for British business (HC 223, 1992, p. 15). However, the Conservative government had a tendency to tolerate the potential short-run economic burdens originating from the process of the Eastward enlargement. For example, regarding the British farming sector’s pressure on the British government to limit the accession of the agricultural products of the CEECs to the Common market, Douglas Hurd declared that “we must open up our markets more to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as they make the difficult transition to full market economies” (Cm 2525, 1994, p. III). As a more specific example, in 1995, the NFU lobbied the MAFF to renegotiate the minimum import prices system, which had been negotiated between the EC and the CEECs as a part of the Europe Agreements, since the NFU was not happy with the cheap Polish blackcurrants in the EC market as a result of the Europe Agreement with Poland. However, despite the NFU’s pressure, the MAFF reiterated that the Europe Agreements were valuable in liberalising trade in the CEECs; thus, NFU should also see the Europe Agreements from this perspective (HC 61-ii, 1995, p. 32).

In addition to its tendency to tolerate the short-run costs, the Conservative government had also a tendency to spend money in order to guarantee the transition of Central and Eastern Europe towards a full market economy. Particularly, the Conservative government
launched ‘Know How Fund’ for Poland in 1989 and subsequently extended the Fund to the rest of the region (23 countries of the former Soviet bloc) (HC 262, 1992, p. xx). “Priority sectors for the Fund include[d] energy, financial services, management training, food distribution, small business and public sector reform” (Cm 2202, 1993, p. 51). In 1991, the Fund was also extended to the environmental issues (Cm 2068, 1992, p. 23). The purposes of the Fund were to transfer British skills and expertise, to promote the CEECs’ transition to a free market economy and the development of democratic institutions in the region, and to encourage the British companies’ investment in the region (Cm 2502, 1994, p. 54). To achieve those ends, for example, the British government spent £15 million in 1990/91 (Cm 1902, 1992, p. 42) and £ 54 million in 1993/94 (Cm 2502, 1994, p. 54).

5.2.1.3 The Position of Other Domestic Actors

Like the Mediterranean and EFTA enlargement cases, there was also a clear consensus among the main British actors regarding the government’s pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs. As a result, from an LI perspective, the consensus among the main British actors on a pro-enlargement policy made the British government one of the main initiators of the Eastward enlargement at the EU level.

The Labour Party, as the main opposition party, strongly supported the Community’s enlargement towards the CEECs. The economic, political and security concerns, similar to what the Conservative government had, also made the Eastward enlargement a high priority for the Labour Party (Hansard, 1992, p. 49). Like the Conservative government, the Labour Party also believed that the East European problem needed to be solved in a multilateral framework (HC 446-iii, 1989, p. 52). For example, when the authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe started to dissolve in the late 1980s, Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Labour Party, supported the Community’s aids to stimulate the emergence of democracy in the Central and Eastern European countries (Oakley and Webster, 1989).

In 1990, the Labour Party agenda also promised to “welcome eventual membership from new democracies in central and Eastern Europe [...] to provide the best framework for building new relations across continent” (Wintour, 1990a). Robin Cook (1995), the Shadow Foreign Secretary, also pointed out that “peace for our country depends on stability on the continent, for which the best guarantee is enlargement of a healthy EU to support the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe”. As a result, the enlargement
towards Central and Eastern Europe was a priority not only for the Conservative government but also for the Labour Party (Riddell, 1992a).

Moreover, like the Conservative Party, the Labour Party supported the idea that the Eastward enlargement needed to be achieved as soon as possible. For example, Peter Shore argued that the Eastward enlargement needed to be fast like the German unification (The Times, 1990). In this context, the Labour Party supported the Conservative government’s position that the vertical integration attempts (e.g. monetary integration) might become an obstacle for the Eastward enlargement (Timmins, 1992). For instance, Robin Cook, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, maintained that “[w]e should take no steps to deepen the bonds of the European Union which [would] make it more difficult to widen access” (Cheeseright, 1994). In the same vein, Joyce Quin pointed out that the European Economic Agreement with the EFTA countries should not delay the Association Agreements with the CEECs (Hansard, 1992, pp. 49-50). However, like the ruling Conservative Party, the Labour Party also accepted that the CEECs needed to meet the accession conditionality (e.g. having a democratic political system and a working market economy) to become full members of the EU (Rockwell, 1992).

The Liberal Democrat Party also supported the enlargement of the EC/EU towards the Central and Eastern European countries. The party highly welcomed liberalization attempts in the CEECs and backed assistance used in reforming those countries (Gow and White, 1989). However, contrary to the ruling Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats perceived deepening and widening of the EU as complementary to each other (Hansard, 1990e, p. 330, Hansard, 1992b, the Liberal Democrat Party, 1992).

As the biggest British business interest group, the CBI supported the enlargement of the EU towards the CEECs because of both political and economic reasons. In terms of the political reasons, the CBI argued that the Eastward enlargement would bring greater security and stability on the continent and strengthen the EU’s competitiveness in the world (The CBI, 1996, The CBI, 1996b). Moreover, regarding the discussion on a deeper versus wider Europe, Brain Corby (1992, pp. 4-5), the president of the CBI, argued that the EC might become deeper but “it must become wider”.

In terms of the economic concerns, as noted in the previous chapter, the CBI favoured a wider European Single Market covering not only the EFTA countries but also the CEECs
(Harris, 1991, The CBI, 1996b). For example, a CBI survey in 1991 showed that the most of big British companies thought that the CEECs should be able to join the EC/EU within 10 years (Bowen and Fagan, 1991). In addition to this, the CBI also perceived the liberalization of the CEECs’ domestic markets as a great opportunity and that the enlargement process would guarantee continuation of this liberalization (in addition to stabilization of their newly democratic political systems) and make accession of the British business to those markets easier. To illustrate, the CBI launched *its Eastern Europe Initiative* in 1990 in order to encourage the British firms to invest in the Central and Eastern European countries (Preston, 1990). According to Alan Lewis, the chairman of the CBI's Eastern Europe Initiative, the CEECs were offering many opportunities for British firms in the sectors like “the refurbishment of factories, food processing, agricultural equipment and for the communications and energy industries as well as for health care and financial services and tourism” (Jones, 1991). Additionally, Adair Turner, the Director-General of the CBI, argued that the CEECs were a dynamic market for British business because the labour costs were four times lower than the Western European countries and the Central and Eastern European markets were within only three hours’ drive of each other (Flanagan, 1996).

However, the CBI underlined three conditions for a successful integration: the applicant countries need to meet the Copenhagen criteria, the relevant Community policies like the CAP and the Structural Funds needed to be reformed, and the EU’s structure and institutions needed to be rearranged (ibid.). In particular, the first condition would guarantee that the CEECs would become democratic countries with functioning market economies. Secondly, the CAP and the Structural Funds were absorbing 80 per cent of the Community budget and the newcomers would be the main recipients without any reform in those programmes. Thus, this condition was not acceptable. Thirdly, the CBI supported a European Union with efficient, transparent and effective institutions; however, a Union with around 20 members would not be able to have efficient, transparent and effective institutions under its existing structure; therefore, they should be reformed (The CBI, 1995, 1996, 1996a, and 1996b).

The TUC also supported the enlargement of the EC/EU towards the CEECs. At the beginning of the 1990s, it could be argued that ideological motivation of the TUC highly affected this position. Particularly, “the solidarity among workers” was used by the TUC as the main rhetoric to support the Eastward enlargement. When the authoritarian regimes
collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe, the TUC accepted it as a principle to promote independent and effective trade union organizations in the CEECs through educational and organisational help (The TUC, 1991, p. 119). Moreover, the TUC called on the British government and the European Commission to effectively support the democratization of those countries. In the same vein, the TUC criticized the PHARE programme for concentrating too much on the economic and commercial liberalisation in the following sectors: agriculture, training, environment, energy, and industrial and economic structuring, but less on the need for strong and effective trade union organizations in those countries (The TUC, 1991, p. 512).

In addition to its ideological concerns, materialistic concerns also affected the TUC’s position on the Eastward enlargement. Firstly, as noted in the previous chapter, as a part of the ETUC, the TUC aimed to strengthen the position of the trade unions at the EC/EU level as an alternative to its decreasing power in Britain under the Conservative government. For example, at the annual meeting of the TUC in Brighton (11-15th September 1995), one of the TUC officials argued that the TUC looked to the EU to get protection and support for 15 years as “an antidote to counter the effects of a poisonous national government [the Conservative government]” (The TUC, 1995). In this regard, the Eastward enlargement would help to establish a larger and stronger unification among trade unions in Europe. Secondly, the TUC had also some economic concerns over a potential Eastward enlargement. On the one hand, the TUC pointed out that the CEECs would not cause any immediate competitive threat against Britain because of “the collapse of industrial production in many of these countries, and the moves to abolish state pricing of exports which previously made them artificially competitive” (Hc 216, 1993, p. 82). On the other hand, the TUC highlighted the point that Britain might pay more for the Structural Funds but receive less when the poor CEECs joined the EC/EU unless the Funds were fairly reformed (Dorman, 1996, p. 5).

5.2.2 Intergovernmental Bargains

As LI assumes, the Conservative government firstly determined its national position towards the Eastward enlargement at the domestic level. In this sense, a pro-enlargement policy was not only a priority for the Conservative government but also for other main

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51 The EU’s (financial) pre-accession instruments to assist the CEECs.
British interests groups. As a result of this strong consensus among the British actors on a pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs, the Conservative government became one of the main initiators of the Eastward enlargement. On the other hand, the Conservative Party was also quite sensitive to Britain’s national interests during the negotiations and tried to defend them especially when the enlargement-related EU reform negotiations started (e.g. the reforms in the CAP, the Structural Funds and EU decision making system).

As noted above, the transition of Central and Eastern Europe from authoritarianism to liberal democracy was crucial for the Conservative government. Thus, to guarantee this transition, it tried to use the EC/EU as an effective tool as much as possible in the first half of the 1990s. For example, when the Soviet bloc began to dissolve, the Conservative government started to play “an active role within the Community to promote the negotiation of trade, commercial and economic co-operation agreements with the Soviet Union and most Eastern European countries” (Cm 708, 1989, p. 7). The Conservative government was also one of the main initiators of the Associate Agreements with the CEECs (Cm 1857, 1992, p. 34) because those agreements, as the first step of enlargement, would link the CEECs to the Western system and would impose liberal norms (e.g. establishing multiparty systems, free and fair elections, respect for human rights, economic liberalisation, rule of law and freedom of the press) on them52 (HC 431, 1990, p. 4).

The British government achieved this goal in 1991 when the Association Agreements with Poland, Hungary, and the Czechoslovakia were signed on 16th December 1991 (Cm 1857, 1992, p. v) despite the extension of the negotiation process. In this sense, the French reluctance on the agreements was the main reason behind this delay. Firstly, unlike Britain, France was giving a priority to deepening the Community. For example, the French President Mitterrand asserted that “the strengthening of the EC by means of political and monetary union should take precedence over moves to admit new members from East Europe” (Eisenhammer, 1991). Secondly, France was reluctant to give trade concessions to those countries in the agricultural sector (Drozdiak, 1991). As a result, France slowed down the negotiations for the association agreements.

When Britain assumed the EC Presidency in 1992, one of the main objectives of the British Presidency was to develop the EC’s relationship with the CEECs further (HC 205, 1992, p. 52)

52 A failed Soviet coup in 1991 also showed how it was important to link the Central and Eastern European countries to the Western European security system (Cm 1857, 1992, p. 34).
80). In parallel with this purpose, as the EC president, Britain arranged a summit with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in October 1992 to enhance cooperation and political dialogue (Cm 2202, 1993, p. 10). Under the British Presidency, the Community also started to negotiate the Associate Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria\(^{53}\). Additionally, the Community signed the Trade and Cooperation Agreements with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Albania (Cm 2065, 1992, p. 30).

At the Copenhagen European Council (21-22\(^{nd}\) June 1993), the member states agreed that the Central European Associate countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania) should become members of the European Union once they could meet the economic and political conditions of membership (Cm 2369, 1993, p. 2, The European Council, 1993). In addition to this, the Conservative government continued to deepen the Community’s relationship with the CEECs. For example, together with Italy, it launched an initiative in December 1993 with the aim to shape a framework that would give the CEECs a closer involvement into the EU’s intergovernmental pillars (the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs), and this framework was accepted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 7\(^{th}\) March 1994 (Cm 2675, 1994, p. 5).

At the Essen European Council (9-10\(^{th}\) December 1994), the EU members adopted “a pre-accession strategy” for the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe (The European Council, 1994a), which was one of the Conservative government’s foreign policy objectives in 1994 (Cm 3203, 1996, p. 25). Subsequently, at the Madrid Summit (15–16\(^{th}\) December 1995), the EU leaders agreed to treat all the applicants equally to start accession negotiations\(^{54}\) and the negotiations with them could start six months after the end of the Inter-Governmental Conference (the 1996 IGC) (Smyth, 1995, Euro-East, 1995, The European Council, 1995). This decision also met the Conservative government’s demand to start the accession negotiations with all of the Eastern European applicants in addition to Cyprus as soon as possible (Hutton, 1995). This development was a success for the British government because when the negotiations started at the Madrid Summit, most of the members were reluctant to start the accession negotiations before clearly knowing the cost of the Eastward enlargement. For example, Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok argued that

\(^{53}\) According to the FCO, those agreements would bring Bulgaria and Romania closer to the EC and recognize their eventual full membership (HC 262, 1992, p. xxiii).

\(^{54}\) However, later on, differentiation might occur according to assessments of individual applicants’ capacity.
“[w]e need to know what Eastern Europe will cost us […]” (Ames, 1995). On the other hand, Germany intended to give a priority to its neighbouring countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and the Scandinavian countries put an emphasis on the Baltic countries to start the accession negotiations (Agence France Presse, 1995, Smyth, 1995).

However, the process of the CEECs’ further integration into the EU started to become harder when the enlargement-related EU reforms started to come to the EU’s negotiation table, because as LI assumes, Britain and other members tried to defend their national preferences at the EU level negotiations. Firstly, the CEECs’ huge agricultural sectors were a big problem for further integration. In 1994, there emerged two proposals clashing with each other to deal with this problem. According to Britain, the CAP should be reformed to decrease the potential burden of the CEECs’ mass and poor agriculture sectors. However, France supported the proposal that the CEECs’ agricultural sectors should be made compatible with the existing CAP system. In this context, when the Commission proposed to extent the farming aids to the CEECs, the British government rejected this proposal (Robertson, 1994), and the CAP reform issue remained as a big problem in front of the Eastward enlargement. At this point, as noted above, many British interest groups in the agricultural sector were demanding a reform in the CAP prior to the Eastward enlargement, and as LI assumes, the British government’s rejection was in conformity with this domestic demand.

Secondly, the discussions on the question whether the EU should be firstly deepened or widened were also stimulated in 1995. For example, the Commission President Jacques Santer warned the member states that a success of deepening was an important condition for a success of widening (Mackinnon, 1995). Although Britain rejected this argument, France strongly supported it (Frankland, 1995). On the other hand, Germany also supported the deepening of the EU in addition to its strong support for the Eastward enlargement. For example, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl argued that

I would regard it as a disaster if Europe’s strength were to diminish with its enlargement. However, I would find it disastrous if Europe were only able to ensure its strength by keeping others out (Palmer, 1996).

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55 At this point, as LI assumes, the Eastward enlargement was a rational issue for the members because geopolitical concerns affected their attitudes towards the enlargement. For example, both Germany and the Scandinavian countries tried to give a priority to their neighbouring countries in the enlargement process.
Therefore, the main position of the Conservative government was to encourage the widening of the EU but limit the deepening of it as much as possible when the Intergovernmental Conference (the 1996 IGC) started in Turin (Italy) on 29\textsuperscript{th} March 1996. In this sense, the main concern of the Conservative government was that the QMV mechanism in the EU decision making system should not be expanded any further (Mackinnon, 1996). Particularly, as noted in the previous chapter, the Conservative government accepted to extend the QMV mechanism within the EU decision making system on the condition that it would be re-negotiated at the 1996 IGC. As a result of this, at the domestic level, as LI assumes, the Eurosceptics within the Conservative Party became highly sensitive to the issue of the QMV and put more pressure on the government not to give any further concession on the issue at the IGC\textsuperscript{56} (Mason, 1996). Therefore, the Conservative government reiterated that the QMV mechanism after the EFTA enlargement was an interim process, and the QMV should be discussed at the 1996 IGC again to make the EU system more democratic (HC 48-xiv, 1994, p. xix). Moreover, according to the British government, the upcoming Eastward enlargement would bring many small countries that would become net beneficiaries from the EU budget; but, they would outvote more populous member states (including Britain) that were net contributors to the EU budget under the existing QMV system. Thus, the over-domination of the small member states over the EU’s decision making system would undermine the democratic legitimacy of the EU. As a result, the Conservative government was determined to press at the IGC “for a reweighting of votes and an appropriate voting threshold” (Cm 3441, 1996, p. 4).

However, the influence of the Conservative government was limited when the 1996 IGC started (Cm 3437, 1996, p. 8). As mentioned above, the Major government had a fragile majority in the parliament and the Eurosceptic Conservative members were putting a pressure on him (Hamilton, 1996). In this atmosphere, it was hard for the Conservative government to negotiate on sensitive topics like the issue of QMV just before the upcoming national election (1\textsuperscript{st} May 1997) (Euro-East, 1996). Moreover, the Conservative government was also more isolated in the EU to find allies at the IGC negotiations. For example, its tough position against the extension of the QMV mechanism was seen contradictory with its pro-enlargement policy by other member states like Germany and France (Mackinnon, 1996). In addition to this, the mad-cow crisis also damaged already

\textsuperscript{56} This example confirms LI’s assumption that, if domestic groups are sensitive to a topic, the executive cannot easily negotiate it at EU level.
problematic British-EU relations (Associated Press, 1996). As a result, the Conservative government’s flexibility was limited during the IGC negotiations, and soon after the IGC started, it lost the national election on 1st May 1997.

In conclusion, from an LI perspective, there was a common consensus among the main British actors on a pro-enlargement policy, which made the Conservative Party an influential initiator at the EU level to start the Eastward enlargement. However, regarding the 1996 IGC, the mentioned consensus collapsed and the domestic actors were highly sensitive to the negotiation topics. Therefore, from an LI perspective, the Conservative government lost its flexibility and influence at the EU level negotiations. Finally, it lost the 1997 national election, and most of the Eastward enlargement negotiations were carried out by the forthcoming Labour government.

5.3 The Labour Party Period (1997-2007)

5.3.1 National Preference Formation

5.3.1.1 Political Concerns

The Labour government continued to support Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs. As LI assumes, despite the Labour government’s more pro-European rhetoric, Britain's pro-enlargement policy was still an output of the national interest oriented evaluations. The chapter has found that the security concerns continued to dominantly affect the national preference formation process, but economic expectations and ideological motivations were also other significant variables affecting the Labour government’s position on the Eastward enlargement. As a result, it could be argued that the rationale behind Britain’s support for the Eastward enlargement did not change despite the governmental change in 1997.

Firstly, the Labour government had an ideological motivation similar to that of the former Conservative government towards the Eastward enlargement. In particular, Tony Blair adopted the main neo-liberal tenets of Thatcherism into his “new Labour” doctrine (Kavanagh, 2005, p. 15, 2010, p. 19, Tonge, 2009, p. 302, Williams, 2005, Hall, 2003, Avis, 2005, p. 549, Painter, 2000, p. 230, Heath et al., 2001, p. 120). According to new synthesis, “a liberal global economy necessitated a neoliberal response” (Williams, 2005, p. 103), and related to this position, British foreign policy should be more multilateral (and
thus more European). In this context, Tony Blair had also an ambition to put Britain in a leading position within the EU (Buller, 2004, p. 198). However, like the former Conservative government, the Labour government needed an outward-looking intergovernmental European Union (Taylor, 2005, pp. 205-206). For example, Tony Blair openly argued that the driving force behind the European integration should not be supranationalism, which would create an unaccountable power centre within the EU, but intergovernmentalism, which would create a Europe of sovereign nations (Cm 5763, 2003, p. 34). To this end, he followed a persuasive policy\(^{57}\), firstly to convince British people, secondly to increase British influence over the European integration process (Riddell, 2005, p. 362). At this point, a pro-enlargement position towards the CEECs emerged as a strategic part of Blair’s persuasive European policy. To illustrate, Tony Blair argued that

I believe that constructive membership of the European Union is in Britain’s fundamental national interest. That is why I wholeheartedly support the enlargement of the European Union, and the reforms necessary to bring it about (Cm 4595, 2000, p. 1).

Moreover, the Labour government believed that the Eastward enlargement would make the reforms in the EU compulsory and those reforms would automatically give Britain a chance to shape the European integration process according to her national interests (Cm 5763, 2003, p. 34). Particularly, the Eastward enlargement would make the reforms necessary in the EU’s decision making system, the EU budget, the CAP, and Structural Funds. Therefore, if the Labour Party became influential in the EU level negotiations, it could drive the European integration process towards an outward-looking and intergovernmental way (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 21).

Secondly, the Labour government had also the security concerns over the Eastward enlargement similar to those of the former Conservative government. The Labour government believed that a political stability/security in Europe was the sine qua non of economic prosperity, and the Eastward enlargement was needed to maintain the mentioned political stability/security. That’s why; the Labour government continuously and strongly used the rhetoric showing the strong relationship between peace, prosperity and enlargement during the Eastward enlargement process (Cm 3603, 1997, p. viii, HC 155-

\(^{57}\) According to Johnson and Steinberg (2004), Thatcherite neo-liberalism could be termed as social authoritarian neo-liberalism but Blairite neo-liberalism was statist/managerialist neo-liberalism depending on persuasion.
Like its predecessor, the Labour government also supported the idea that the CEECs should be integrated into the Western system not only via the EU enlargement but also via NATO enlargement. For example, Tony Lloyd argued that “the process both of European Union enlargement and the process of NATO enlargement [was] not only consistent with, but actually helpful towards developing a climate of greater security throughout the whole of Europe” (HC 138, 1998, p. 191).

5.3.1.2 Economic Concerns

The Labour government’s pro-enlargement policy had also an economic dimension. According to the Labour government, it was hard to make the exact cost-benefit calculation of the Eastward enlargement (HC 86, 1999, p. 3). However, like the Conservative Party, the Labour government had a tendency to evaluate the Eastward enlargement by considering Britain’s long-term economic interests. At this point, according to the British government, the discussions on the EU enlargement should be done by putting the principle of openness/liberalization at the centre, which would promote the trade both within the Single Market and with the rest of the World (Cm 3804, 1998, p. 36). From this perspective, the Labour government (HC 86, 1999, p. 3) had a set of expectations from the Eastward enlargement as follows;

- The Eastward enlargement would make the EU the largest single market for trade and investment in the world. An enlarged Single Market towards the East would stimulate demand, growth and jobs in the EU. Thanks to the enlargement, British business would have access to a new market with 100 million customers. Britain already started to export around £ 3 billion of goods and services each year to the first five Central European applicants.
- The extending free trade and investment to the seven biggest Central European economies would raise overall incomes in the EU by about 0.2 per cent, of which Britain would get around a 14 per cent share. This meant that Britain would benefit roughly £ 1.5 billion a year according to 1999’s GDP.
- A potential CAP reform in parallel with the Agenda 2000, which would decrease food prices, would provide £ 1 billion a year for British consumers.

As a result of its long term positive expectations, like the former Conservative government, the Labour government gave a high priority to trade with the CEECs and launched initiatives to encourage British business to become more active in the region. For example,
in January 1997, the DTI launched the initiative: “Open for Business in Central Europe” (Cm 4348, 1999, p. 3). The main aim of the campaign was “to double UK exports to the region and to initiate 100 new investments in the agribusiness, automotive, consumer goods/retailing, electronics/telecoms and healthcare sectors” (MTI Econews, 1996). According to Richard Petersen from the journal of Retail Week, the government’s initiative paid off because the British retailers (e.g. Debenhams, BHS and Mothercare) started to invest more in the region even though they were lagging behind the German, French and Dutch retailers (Petersen, 1999). Subsequently, in 1999, the government launched its second initiative: “Opportunities in Central Europe” to help the British companies to find export and investment opportunities in specific sectors (Cm 4348, 1999, p. 3). Therefore, it could be argued that the British executive was still dominant while determining Britain’s economic policy towards the CEECs compared to British business.

In terms of the costs of the Eastward enlargement to Britain, the Labour government argued that a potential cost could be calculated better after finalising the reforms in the CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the EU budget (Britain’s budget rebate/abatement) (Cm 4348, 1999, p. 3). Thus, the Labour government perceived the Intergovernmental Conferences (the 1996/7 IGC and the 2000 IGC), which would reform the EU’s governance, the CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the EU budget as a crucial negotiation platform to decrease the potential costs/negative externalities of the Eastward enlargement to Britain (Cm 3905, 1998, p. 27).

Particularly, the Agenda 2000 prioritized the reforms in the CAP and the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and according to the Labour government, those reforms were essential for a successful enlargement (HC 155-xix, 1998, p. xx). Moreover, the Agenda 2000 aimed to carry out the mentioned reforms within the existing EU budgetary ceilings (1.27 % of GNP); in other words, the Eastward enlargement would not have a significant impact on the EC budget until the period after 2006. Thus, the Labour government supported this proposal outlined in the Agenda 2000 and declared that “it would not be acceptable to deal with the costs of enlargement by increasing the ceiling” (HC 155-ii, 1998, p. xviii). Furthermore, the Labour Party calculated that the enlargement would not affect the British abatement/rebate from the EU budget because “more prosperous states would probably

A package of proposals made by the European Commission in 1997 to prepare the EU and the applicant countries for the Eastward enlargement, (Cm 3905, 1998, p. 27)
still be contributing less to the budget than the UK” although Britain would become more prosperous than the Union average after the enlargement (HC 155-vi, 1998, p. xx). In addition to this, the unanimity rule in the EU’s Own Recourses should not be changed because the principles of the British abatement from the EU budget were set out in the Own Resources Decision, and the unanimity rule in its decision making procedure was a guarantee of the British abatement.

Regarding the Structural and Cohesion Funds, although the Labour government accepted that it was too early to estimate the impact of the Eastward enlargement on Britain; it determined a position for the coming IGCs as follows (HC 155-vi, 1998, p. x):

- The overall cost of the Structural and Cohesion Funds should be contained below 0.46 % of EU GNP, both before and after the enlargement
- The Funds’ effectiveness should be improved, and substantial administrative simplification is needed.
- The reform of the Funds should be durable, and fair to acceding new Member States.
- All existing Member States should expect cuts in their receipts if costs are to be contained
- While recognising that there will be a drop in receipts, the new regime should be fair to the UK in comparison with other States

On the other hand, the reform of the CAP was a top priority for the Labour government (Cm 3804, 1998, p. 36) because the government perceived the EU’s agriculture regime in a broader context. For example, according to Nicholas Brown, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the reform of the CAP was a priority of the MAFF because the EU needed to meet its obligations to the WTO (HC 125, 1999, p. 72). Moreover, the Labour government expected that the prospective Eastward enlargement would create strong impetus for further change in the CAP (HC 34-xxiv, 1999) since a successful enlargement needed a reform in the CAP (HC 310, 1998, p. 17). Additionally, from an LI perspective, there was a clear consensus among British interest groups over the reform of the CAP, and this made the British government a persistent member demanding the reform of the CAP (HC 231-I, 2003, p. Ev4). For example, the NFU supported the reform of CAP as the leading interest group in addition to other small groups (e.g. the Crop Protection Association, Cadbury Schweppes) (HC 550-ii, 2002, p. Ev282). In this sense, MacShane, the Minister of State for Europe, even advised that the NFU could lobby its sister organisations in other member countries to implement necessary reforms in the CAP (HC 231-I, 2003, p. Ev4). In addition to the NFU, the Food and Drink Federation also perceived
the enlargement-related reforms in the CAP as an opportunity to improve the competitiveness in the sector (HC 421, 2004, p. ev82).

In particular, the Labour government wanted to improve the competitiveness of European farmers by making the sector more market-oriented and reducing dependency on subsidies (HC 907, 2000). Thus, regarding the reforms in the CAP, the Labour government (HC 34-xxiv, 1999, p. xxiv) determined its objectives as follows:

- a progressive reduction in beef and cereal support prices to –or close to- world levels with less than full compensation to farmers;
- a reform in the dairy regime;
- a reduction in the CAP direct payments over time (the principle of degressivity);
- a more integrated policy approach to the agri-environment and rural development;
- to stabilise the CAP spending at its present real-terms level by 2006;
- to avoid measures which unfairly discriminate Britain.

5.3.1.3 The Position of Other Domestic Actors

After losing power in the 1997 national election, there happened a dramatic shift in the Conservative Party’s official position from pragmatic Europeanism to Euroscepticism (Crowson, 2007, p. 127, Lynch, 2003, p. 148). However, the party continued to support the Eastward enlargement despite this shift (Lynch, 2003, p. 153). For example, William Hague, as the new leader of the party, argued that enlargement was the key priority of the European Union, and it was a historic mission for the EU to accept the countries of Eastern Europe as new members (Agence France Presse, 1998b). However, the rhetoric behind the support for further enlargement mostly focused on the thesis that enlargement would dilute the supranational attempts within the EU (Leach, 2002, p. 230). For example, the delegates of the Conservative Party at Blackpool in 1997 agreed to struggle for a minimum control of Brussels over member states; and a potential Eastward enlargement would help this purpose (Johnson, 1997). In the same vein, Stephen Dorrell (1997) argued that Britain needed to be in favour of enlargement, and in terms of the EU arrangements for the Eastward enlargement, Britain needed to develop/propose more flexible (intergovernmental) structures despite the federalist tendencies because an enlarged EU cannot become as uniformed as the first Community with six members. In the 1999 European Election Manifesto, the Conservative Party also declared that enlargement should be the top priority of the EU as “a historic opportunity to advance free trade, free markets, deregulation and co-operation” (Landale, 1999). In other words, at the end of the
1990s, the Conservative Party tried to use enlargement as an alternative policy to the deepening of the Union (Sylvester, 1998).

However, when the reforms that were necessary for the Eastward enlargement began, the vertical integration of the EU became intertwined with the horizontal integration (enlargement), and this made the Conservative Party’s position towards the reform process more unstable. For example, Michael Howard, the shadow Foreign Secretary, criticized the Blair government for eroding British sovereignty in general and for side-lining enlargement for the sake of deeper integration in particular at the Amsterdam European Council (16-17 June 1997) (Johnson, 1997). William Hague also called for a referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty (Riddell, 1997). More dramatically, in October 1999, Hague increased his Eurosceptic tone and promised to renegotiate the terms of Britain's membership to secure an a la carte/intergovernmental European Union if he won the election. To achieve this goal, he declared that a new Conservative government would veto even the outcomes of the 2000 IGC, which were crucial for the Eastward enlargement (Brogan, 1999, Jacobs, 1999, Wilson, 1999, Macintyre, 1999). As a result, from an LI perspective, the increasing Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party put a pressure on the Labour government at the EU level negotiations on the enlargement-related reforms.

The CBI as a pro-European interest group continued to support the Eastward enlargement with the expectation that the enlargement would provide British exporters with new economic opportunities (The European Parliament, 1999). Moreover, the CBI expected that the enlargement of the Single Market would increase trade and the EU’s competition capacity in the world as well (Belfast News Letter, 2004). After the candidate countries began the accession negotiations at the Luxembourg European Council (12–13th December 1997), the CBI (1998) also underlined the importance of the necessary reforms in the EU governance, the CAP, and the Structural Funds to realise the political and economic benefits of the Eastward enlargement. Thus, the issue of the EU reforms was one of the CBI’s five key business objectives in the second half of the 1990s (Bassett and Collcutt, 1997). At this point, the CBI’s guiding principle was as follows: “the European Union

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59 William Hague’s stronger Eurosceptic tone also worsened the ‘civil war’ between Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans within the Conservative Party, and John Major, Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clarke strongly criticized William Hague’s position (Wilson, 1999).

60 “completing and enforcing the EU single market, redefining European social legislation priorities, preparing for European enlargement, reinforcing Europe's commitment to liberalising world trade, and preparing for EMU” (Bassett and Collcutt, 1997).
should have effective powers to deliver a truly Single Market, but action beyond this point must be built on consensus between national governments [an intergovernmental decision making mechanism]” (The CBI, 2002). In the same vein, the Institute of Directors (IoD) also argued that the British government should support the Eastward enlargement, “but not at any price”, and its support for enlargement should be conditional on necessary reforms of the CAP and Structural Funds, the EU budget, and no extension of QMV (Leach, 2000, p. 7). Additionally, it warned that the actual benefit of enlargement might be less than the expectations (Walsh, 2003).

The TUC also maintained its pro-enlargement position towards the CEECs in the Labour government era. It continued to use its “solidarity among workers” rhetoric to support the Eastward enlargement. For example, John Monks (2002), the head of the TUC, reiterated the TUC’s support for the Eastward enlargement because the enlargement would spread trade unionism in the CEEC. In this sense, as a part of the ETUC, the TUC highlighted the point that the applicant countries should meet social acquis to be able to become full members of the EU (The TUC, 1998). On the other hand, according to the TUC’s collective unionism understanding, the Eastward enlargement would also require “the gradual extension of QMV to all social issues (with the exception of social protection) together with EP co-decisions powers” (The TUC, 2001). Additionally, the TUC did not perceive any potential immigration influx from the CEECs after the enlargement as a threat against the British labour market (mostly because of the low unemployment rate at the beginning of the 2000s) (Davis, 2000, The European Parliament, 1999).

As noted above, agriculture was one of the most complicated issues of the Eastward enlargement. Thus, as the main influential interest group in agriculture, the position of the NFU on the Eastward enlargement was also important. In this regard, the NFU had a tendency to rationally calculate the costs and benefits of the Eastward enlargement despite a lack of enough data to evaluate how the Eastward enlargement would affect the British farming sector (HC 421, 2004, pp. ev67-ev70). According to the NFU, the new members would not pose any significant direct competitive threat against British farmers because an acute lack of technology and know-how would prevent those countries from challenging British farmers despite their cheap land and labour in the short and mid-term. On the other hand, the expected high growth rates in those countries as a result of the EU membership might provide a new and growing market for British products. In the longer run, according to the NFU, the enlargement would result in a larger degree of specialisation within the
EU’s farming market and this might push British agriculture to specialise further as a result of the increasing competition in the EU; however, the NFU believed that “this structural change should improve rather than threaten profitability and farm incomes” (ibid.). In a similar vein, in 2004, the NFU president Tim Bennett also reiterated that the NFU perceived the Eastward enlargement as an opportunity rather than a threat against British farmers (The Journal, 2004).

5.3.2 Intergovernmental Bargains

The Eastward enlargement was achieved after a long and tough EU level negotiation process because it was a history-making issue, which would significantly affect the future of the European integration process. For example, the old members needed to organize two Intergovernmental Conferences to make the EU ready for the Eastward enlargement. That is, the Eastward enlargement process was intertwined with the enlargement-related reforms within the EU system, which would also deepen the integration. In this long process, the Labour Party carried out the negotiations from the Amsterdam European Council (16–17th June 1997), after winning the 1997 national election, to the Copenhagen European Council (12-13th December 2002), when the Eastward enlargement was achieved. Particularly, the Labour government tried to expedite the Eastward enlargement process despite the complexity of the negotiations on the enlargement-related reforms, but on the other hand, it also tried to defend the above-mentioned national preferences during the enlargement-related reform negotiations.

The Labour government regularly used the rhetoric: a strong Britain in a strong EU during the negotiations (Cm 3903, 1998, p. vii) and tried to play an active/constructive role within the EU to accelerate the Eastward enlargement process as much as possible. On the other hand, the Blair government was highly responsive to domestic Euroscepticism; thus, it cautiously behaved at the EU level negotiations in order to prevent any serious domestic criticism and electoral damage. In parallel with this, the Blair government determined well-defined red-lines related to the reforms in the domestically sensitive issues (e.g. the QMV) and became tough on those issues during the negotiations. However, it tried to become more constructive on domestically non-sensitive reforms, which were necessary for the Eastward enlargement (see also: Nugent and Phinnemore, 2010, pp. 71-75). Additionally, the Blair government tried to find allies within the EU or benefited from the divisions between other members to achieve its goals.
At the Amsterdam European Council (16-17th June 1997), the Labour government determined a strong national position against the proposals for a deeper European integration and vowed “to keep sensitive areas such as foreign policy, immigration and defence under national control” (Meyer, 1997a). In this regard, Britain was against the proposal for a gradual merger between the EU and WEU, which would transform the EU into a defence club and would undermine NATO; thus, Britain cooperated with Denmark, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden to block this proposal (Mackinnon, 1997, Meyer, 1997c). Moreover, Britain allied with Ireland to be exempt from the common policy on asylum, immigration and visa (ibid.). On the other hand, Britain benefited from the dispute between France and Germany over the Employment policy and managed to put “flexibility” as a liberal term into the general objectives of EU’s employment policy at the Amsterdam Summit (Meyer, 1997b, Agence France Presse, 1997b, Cunningham, 1997, The Herald, 1997, Helm, 1997, Webster, 1997).

However, the member states were far away from a consensus on the issue of the QMV at the Amsterdam Summit. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Ioannina agreement on the QMV mechanism paved the way for the EFTA enlargement; however, it was not a solution to the Eastward enlargement. As a result, at the Corfu European Council (24-25th June 1994), the EU leaders had decided to settle the EU institutional reform questions at the forthcoming IGC (Sedelmeier, 2000, p. 222). Despite this purpose, at the Amsterdam Summit, the EU leaders failed to agree on a new decision making system that was necessary for the Eastward enlargement (European Report, 1997). Particularly, there was a dispute between the big members (Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain) and the small members over the QMV system. Although the big members were willing to give up one of their two commissioners (mostly for the sake of the Eastward enlargement61), they insisted that the QMV system should be reweighed in favour of them (Bremner, 1997, Whitney, 1997). In this context, reweighing the QMV was also a top priority for the Labour government. For example, the Labour government argued that the existing QMV was undemocratic and unsustainable mostly because “a majority of the population of Europe would not themselves be able to muster a blocking minority on the qualified majority weighing; therefore, it should be changed” (HC 305, 1998, p. 12).

61 They wanted to make room for the newcomers within the executive Commission system.
The EU leaders failed to agree on an institutional reform at the Amsterdam Summit as a result of the deep division between the big and small members. Therefore, they agreed that a new IGC to reform the EU’s governance should be organized at least one year before the Eastward enlargement (the 2000 IGC) (Cm 4595, 2000, p. 34). In addition to this, the differences between the member states’ preferences regarding the crucial issues: the EU’s financial system, the CAP, and the Structural and Cohesion Funds were also too deep to reach an agreement (Sedelmeier, 2000, pp. 218-221). As a result, the member states needed a special platform to negotiate those sensitive issues. At this point, the Commission published the Agenda 2000 in July 1997 as a roadmap of a series of reforms including the CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and future financing of the EU to prepare the EU for the Eastward enlargement (Cm 3961, 1998, p. 9, The European Commission, 1997), and the following negotiation sessions followed this roadmap.

At the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, the main position of Britain was to start accession negotiations with the applicant countries that were ready in the spring of 1998. Therefore, the Labour government supported the Commission proposal to start formal accession negotiations with only the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus, which had relatively better political and economic conditions compared to Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, because as Robin Cook argued, to wait for the second track applicants would slow down the enlargement process (Wielaaard, 1997a, Xinhua News Agency, 1997). However, Denmark, Greece and Sweden opposed this proposal since it could discourage the second track applicant countries from continuing their political and economic reforms (Agence France Presse, 1997a).

Regarding the enlargement-related EU reforms, the EU leaders could not reach a consensus on the reforms in the CAP, Structural funds and the EU’s decision making system at the Luxembourg Summit. For example, Spain and Portugal were less willing to start the accession negotiations with the CEECs because they were worried that they might lose the money from the EU funds to the CEECs; therefore, they tried to increase member states’ contribution to the EU budget from 1.27 per cent of each member’s GNP to 1.37 per cent (Associated Press International, 1997). However, Britain, the Netherlands and Germany favoured the existing percentage (1.27 per cent). As a result of this difference between the member blocs, no progress on this issue could be achieved. However despite the stalemate in the negotiations on the EU reforms, the EU leaders agreed to open the accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and

As a result of the Luxembourgeois Summit, the Labour government achieved its aim to start accession negotiations with the CEECs under Britain’s EU Presidency in the first half of 1998, and the British government devoted its Presidency to making important progress in the accession negotiations and to pushing the reform agenda forward (the Agenda 2000) (Agence France Presse, 1997c). Under the British Presidency, the EU opened the official accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, and an examination of the acquis with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia to prepare them for the accession negotiations. However, there was little progress in the institutional reforms under the British Presidency even though the Blair government gave priority to the institutional reforms at the Cardiff European Council (15-16th June 1998) (Burner, 1998, see also: The European Council, 1998). On the other hand, from an LI perspective, the slow progress in the EU reforms increased domestic pressure on the Labour government. Especially, the Conservative Party increased its pressure on the Labour government and criticized it for ruining Britain's Presidency of the European Union (Watts, 1998). Additionally, the European Central Bank was created under the British Presidency; thus, the Eurosceptic British tabloids also criticized the Blair government for focusing on the single currency rather than on its historic mission: “enlargement of the Union and the reform of its institutions” (Mcelvoy, 1998).

In 1998, the enlargement process was slower than the planned schedule because of the difference between member states’ national preferences; thus, the final accession year was slipped from 2000 to 2002. For example, as of the late 1998, only Britain, Denmark and Sweden remained more enthusiastic about enlargement (Walker, 1998, Mackinnon, 1998b). However, Greece, Spain and Portugal were worried that they would get less aid from Brussels as a result of the Eastward enlargement. France was considering the economic costs of the enlargement and the enlargement’s potential impact on the EU’s cohesion. Austria, who was holding the EU Presidency, was also worrying about an immigration flow from neighbouring candidates like the Czech Republic and Hungary (Mackinnon, 1998b). Additionally, even newly elected social democrat German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder accepted that the enlargement process was "more difficult and more complicated" than the expected (Mackinnon, 1998b).

As a response to waning enthusiasm for the Eastward enlargement among member states, the Labour government urged the other members to keep the EU's enlargement policy towards the CEECs, Cyprus, and Malta (Mackinnon, 1998a, Agence France Presse, 1998c). In this sense, Robin Cook argued that enlargement was not a matter of altruism but a project for a bigger, stronger, and more globally effective Union whose growth would be in the interests of all members in the present and future (The Herald, 1998). However, when the discussions on the EU reforms started to cover the issue of the British rebate from the EU budget, the Labour government also got a tougher position, as the British rebate was a sensitive national issue. In particular, the Commission released a document in October 1998 arguing that the British rebate would be unfair after the Eastward enlargement and “demanded an end to Britain's special GBP 2 billion-a-year rebate from the European Union” (Byrne, 1998). In line with the Commission’s document, France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands also demanded to open a question for Britain’s rebate from the EU budget at a finance ministers meeting in Luxembourg (12th October 1998) (Castle, 1998a). As a reaction to this demand, as LI assumes, the British national sensitivity on the issue increased. For example, the Conservative Party argued that the Labour government should veto any move to alter the existing rebate system gained by Thatcher (Castle, 1998b). As a result, the Blair government put the continuation of the British rebate on its red line list as an important national preference at the forthcoming EU level negotiations.

At the Vienna European Council (11-12th December 1998), the negotiations on the financial reform became tougher. Particularly, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer implicitly gave the message that Germany might hold up the process of the Eastward enlargement “if it did not get a deal to cut its payments to Brussels” (Mackinnon, 1998c). The German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder also argued that the financial problems related to the Eastward enlargement would not be solved with a German check book (Ulbrich, 1998, Copley, 1998). As a result, Germany proposed to freeze the EU spending at the existing levels (1.27 per cent of GDP to the EU budget) until 2006, and this proposal was

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62 In 1998, it was around £ 2.85 billion.
63 This case also confirms LI’s assumption that if the domestic actors are sensitive to an issue, the executive cannot easily negotiate this issue at the EU level.
supported by Britain, France, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden but opposed by the poorer members: Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland (Mackinnon, 1998c, Ames, 1998). On the other hand, France and Germany increased their pressure on Britain to renegotiate the British rebate from the EU budget (The Times, 1998, Castle, 1998c). As a reaction, the Labour government strongly vowed that the rebate gained by Thatcher was not negotiable and the government would keep its veto right as a last resort to prevent any change in the existing rebate mechanism (Aberdeen Press and Journal, 1998, Brogan, 1998, Smith, 1998).

In this political atmosphere, it was hard for the Labour government to balance the domestic expectations and its negotiation strategy at the EU level. At the EU level, Britain tried not to be isolated despite the harsh discussions on the British rebate issue (Walker, 1998). Particularly, Blair tried to side with Schroeder in order to implement the necessary financial reforms (ibid.). In parallel with this purpose, Blair pointed out that the problem of German contribution to Brussels could be solved through the stabilization of the EU budget and by radical reforms of the CAP, which accounted for almost half of the EU spending, rather than reforming the British rebate mechanism (Agence France Presse, 1998a). Additionally, Blair conceded that Britain was also ready to share the cost of the Eastward enlargement (Castle and Sylvester, 1998). Despite the Labour government’s negotiation attempts at the EU level, it continued to face strong criticisms at the domestic level. For example, the Conservative leader Hague accused Blair of failing to protect Britain's national interests at the Vienna Summit (White, 1998, Brogan and Watson, 1998, Watson, 1998). According to Hague, Blair’s EU policy failed three crucial tests; to create a flexible and unregulated EU, to make enlargement the EU’s priority, and to limit political integration of the EU (White, 1998).

After getting the EU Presidency in January 1999, Germany aimed to complete the targets of Agenda 2000 (the enlargement-related reforms in the CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and future financing of the EU). However, the negotiations were highly complicated. Firstly, the social democratic German government aimed to decrease German contribution to the EU budget mostly because of the domestic pressure (Walker, 1999b). The Netherlands, Sweden and Austria were also pressing to decrease their payments to the EU budget as other net contributors (Castle, 1999a, Bates, 1999, European Report, 1999).

64 Despite the French rejection against the reform of the CAP
At this point, the German Presidency focused on three main options; to freeze EU spending until 2006 (85 billion euros a year), to introduce radical CAP reforms (national co-financing and cutting farm subsidies), and to cut the British rebate from the EU budget (Agence France Presse, 1999b, Staunton, 1999). However, regarding those options, there were deep divisions between the members to reach a consensus. More specifically, France was against the radical CAP reforms, the poorer members (Greece, Portugal and Spain, and Ireland) were against freezing EU spending since this would decrease their benefit from aid funds, and Britain was against any change in the existing rebate mechanism gained by Thatcher in 1984 (Mackinnon, 1999a, Webster, 1999).

In this political atmosphere, the Labour government continued to try not to isolate Britain within the negotiation process. Although Britain had a veto power to prevent any decision related to the British rebate, the Labour government primarily tried to convince other members about how the British rebate was fair and reasonable (The Herald, 1999). For example, at a finance ministers meeting (8th February 1999), when Oskar Lafontaine, the German finance minister, reiterated that the British rebate needed to be re-arranged in order to share the burden of the Eastward enlargement equally (Castle, 1999b), the British officials claimed that every British was already paying nearly a pound a week for Europe despite the rebate (Walker, 1999b). At the Petersberg Summit (26th February 1999), Blair also argued that even after the abatement/rebate, Britain was the second largest net contributor to the European Union, and after the enlargement, Britain would still be a very large net contributor despite the abatement (Agence France Presse, 1999c). In the following negotiations, the Labour government continued to use this argument to legitimate the British rebate. Moreover, the Labour government tried to convince Germany (and other members) that a sufficient CAP reform and freezing EU spending would be enough (without cutting the British rebate) to arrange the EU budget for the Eastward enlargement, through which the decrease in the payments of the net contributors to the EU budget would also become possible (Bates, 1999) because farm subsidies and regional aids already accounted for over 80 percent of the total EU budget (Wielaard, 1999).

65 According to Germany, responsibility for some parts of the agricultural budget should be transferred from Brussels back to national governments.
The Labour government also tried to find allies within the EU to manage to reform the CAP and the Structural and Cohesion funds. As a free-market oriented CAP reform was a historical ambition of Britain, the Labour government gave a priority to it during the negotiations. For example, at the Oxford Farming Conference (5th January 1999), Nick Brown, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, argued that a more liberalised CAP would help the EU’s farming industry to become more competitive and prepared against the challenges that further global liberalism and EU enlargement would pose (Birmingham Post, 1999, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 1999b). The NFU also supported the Labour government’s aim to make the CAP more free market oriented. For example, Tony Pexton, the deputy president of the NFU asserted that “The NFU […] has been at the forefront of calls for [the CAP] reform. Enlargement of the EU, liberalisation of world trade and growing surplus production mean that such changes are now urgently needed” (Aberdeen Press and Journal, 1999a). To achieve a sufficient reform in the CAP, the Labour government needed to ally with Germany (Watson, 1999b). Especially, the newly elected social democrat German government was a potential ally for the Labour government because the powerful Bavarian farm lobby was less influential on the Social Democrats unlike the Christian Democrats (the CSU/CDU) (Journal of Commerce, 1999, Walker, 1999a). In addition to Germany, Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands also wanted to decrease the economic cost of the CAP to the EU budget. As a result, France needed to accept that the CAP should become more market-oriented to integrate the poorer Central and Eastern European countries despite France’s historic interventionist/protectionist position on the CAP (Casert, 1999). Particularly, France needed to make the concession that “the level of compensation paid to farmers should be progressively reduced after 2003”66 (Mackinnon, 1999).

On 11th March 1999, the EU agriculture ministers also agreed on a draft that compromised to decrease the subsidies on beef, cereals (20 per cent cut) and dairy (15 per cent cut), and dairy quotas would also be phased out by 2006. However, direct aid payments would be arranged for farmers to compensate for those changes (Meade, 1999b, Meade et al., 1999). At this point, it should be underlined that global pressure/considerations also played a role in this compromise, which would make the CAP more market oriented. For example, agriculture would be on the agenda of the forthcoming WTO negotiations (Western

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66 Despite this concession, France was strongly against the German proposal to increase national co-financing for the CAP
Morning News, 1999); and in this context, one of the aims of this reform was to make Europe’s farmers more self-supporting and competitive in world markets “without the crutch of a farm policy currently costing Stg 30 billion ($ A77.02 billion) a year” (Meade, 1999b). After the draft, Nick Brown argued that the Labour government protected national interests because the cutbacks would not unfairly target Britain’s relatively more efficient farming sector while making the CAP more market oriented. In parallel with this argument, Ben Gill, the President of the NFU, also supported the draft (Meade, 1999b, Meade et al., 1999, Western Morning News, 1999).

Finally, at the Berlin European Council (25-26th March 1999), the EU leaders managed to reach a consensus on the necessary reforms in the CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and future financing of the EU (The European Council, 1999a). Therefore, the Agenda 2000 reforms, which were necessary for the Eastward enlargement, were completed after two years negotiations (Cm 4531, 2000, p. v, Ames, 1999), and the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force on 1st May 1999.

In particular, at the Berlin Summit, the Labour government managed to convince Germany to preserve the British rebate from the EU budget despite France’s rejection67 (Meade, 1999a, Walker and Traynor, 1999). As a result, the British government achieved to maintain the British abatement/rebate from the EU budget (worth about £ 2 billion a year) (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 90). Secondly, the EU leaders agreed to freeze EU spending until 2006. To do this, the overall financial ceiling would remain as 1.27 percent of the EU GNI (the Own Resources ceiling) (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 90). In terms of the CAP, Britain pushed for further cuts in the CAP spending during the negotiations (Carrell, 1999), but France prevented a radical reform of the CAP (World Markets Analysis, 1999, Castle and Butler, 1999). However, the EU leaders agreed that the EU would reduce spending on the CAP from 2002 onwards. According to the agreement, the prices of milk, cereals, and beef would be cut (to bring them to world level) and a new integrated rural development policy, including agri-environment measures to protect the countryside, would be introduced.

67 Just before the summit, there occurred two important resignations, which decreased the German Presidency’s governance capacity to end the Agenda 2000 negotiations before the Berlin European Council (25-26th March 1999). Firstly, the German finance minister Oskar Lafontaine resigned on 11th March 1999 (Agence France Presse, 1999a), and later Commission President Jacques Santer resigned together with his team (all the 20 European commissioners) as a reaction to fraud and mismanagement allegations on 16th March 1999 (Thompson, 1999, Walker, 1999c). As a result, it could be argued that the weakened German Presidency was also an advantage for the Labour government to keep the rebate from the EU budget at the Berlin Summit.
According to the Labour government, an average British household would save about £64 per year as a result of the mentioned arrangements in the CAP (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 90). Last but not least, the Labour government argued that Britain “secured its best ever regional funding deal” at the summit (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 86). Particularly, the Structural Funds for 2000-2006 would provide over £ 10 billion for Britain. Thus, Britain would become the sixth largest beneficiary of the Structural Funds compared to the previous period (1994-1999) in which Britain was the seventh. To illustrate, the new deal increased the proportion of British population who lived in British regions covered by Objective 1 of the Structural Funds by two-thirds. The Labour government also managed a special deal for Northern Ireland and the Highlands and Islands through which the mentioned regions would be able to get funds at a level equivalent to Objective 1 (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 90) although they lost their Objective 1 status within the Structural Funds under the new rules (Watson, 1999a).

Despite this progress in the enlargement-related reforms, the necessary reforms in the EU’s decision making system remained unresolved. Therefore, at the Cologne European Council (3-4th June 1999), the EU leaders agreed to start another intergovernmental conference (the 2000 IGC) to achieve the necessary reforms in the EU’s governance prior to the Eastward enlargement (Agence France Presse, 1999, The European Council, 1999b). However, the reform of the EU’s decision making structure was a highly sensitive issue for member states. Particularly, the Labour government was under domestic pressure even before starting the negotiations because the Conservative Party leader, William Hague, strongly reacted against the 2000 IGC and declared that a Conservative Party would veto the outcomes of the 2000 IGC despite its support for the Eastward enlargement and pledged to renegotiate Britain’s terms of entry (Brogan, 1999b, Grice, 1999). William Hague also fiercely criticized the Labour government for selling Britain’s national interests in Brussels (Jacobs, 1999). Moreover, when the European Commission released a report on 18 October 1999 arguing that the member states should give more power to the Commission to govern an enlarged EU, the domestic Eurosceptic pressure on the Labour government increased further (Castle, 1999c, Watson, 1999c).

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68 The IGC would be convened in the first half of 2000 under the Portuguese Presidency.
At the Helsinki Summit (10-11th December 1999), the EU leaders confirmed that a new Intergovernmental Conference\(^69\) would be convened in February 2000 to solve the institutional issues which needed to be settled before the Eastward enlargement (the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council, and the possible extension of qualified majority voting) (The European Council, 1999c). Additionally, the EU leaders decided to open the accession negotiations with further six candidate countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria (Cm 4762, 2000, p. 14). In other words, the Helsinki Summit accelerated the Eastward enlargement, and thus the enlargement-related negotiations on the EU’s decision making system. At this point, as LI assumes, since the British Eurosceptics were highly sensitive to any change in the EU’s decision making system, the Labour government needed to carefully prepare its position for the forthcoming IGC negotiations. Firstly, on 4th February 2000, the Labour government agreed with the Liberal Democrats to set out a common pro-European position for the coming IGC negotiations, and in this way the Labour government aimed to decrease the national Eurosceptic pressure (The Herald, 2000, Macleod, 2000, Macaskill, 2000). However, according to this pro-European position, the extension of QMV should be done case by case, and the member states’ veto right should be retained for the key national issues: treaty changes, taxation, social security, defence, border controls, and own resources\(^70\). On the other hand, according to the Labour government, the extension of the QMV could be acceptable in other areas, if the extension would make the governance of them more liberal (Macaskill, 2000).

However, when France took the EU Presidency in July 2000, there emerged a significant problem for the Labour government in the enlargement-related negotiations. In particular, France started to push for a two-tier European Union in which 11 members who adopted the single European currency might move to harmonise taxation and budgetary policy (Jackson, 2000, Black, 2000b). Especially, after the Danish rejection of euro on 28 September 2000, the Franco-German ambition for a two-speed European Union arose (Castle, 2000, Mather, 2000). Alternatively, the Labour government tried to prioritize the

\(^{69}\) The 2000 IGC was a set of negotiations carried out from February 2000 to December 2000 (the Nice European Council).
\(^{70}\) This position was also acceptable by other domestic actors except for the Eurosceptics. For example, the Head of European Affairs of the CBI, Karen Clements (1999, p. 24), argued that the extension of the QMV should be examined case by case and the extension should be done in the areas related to the effective working of the Single Market. In this regard, the QMV mechanism should not cover taxation. Moreover, David Owen, the Chairman of New Europe, also argued that Britain should retain “the national veto on taxation, social security, border controls, defence and treaty changes” (Kirk, 2000b).
Eastward enlargement over the issue of single currency in the EU agenda (Black, 2000c, Fletcher, 2000c). For example, in his visit to Poland on 5th October 2000, Tony Blair called for the acceleration of the Eastward enlargement (Agence France Presse, 2000b). In this regard, Tony Blair was the first EU leader demanding that the Eastward enlargement should be completed prior to the European Parliamentary elections in 2004 (HC 318, 2001). In his speech, Tony Blair implicitly criticized France and Germany for slowing the enlargement process and warned that “[s]upporting enlargement in principle but delaying in practice is no longer good enough” (Black and Watt, 2000). Related to the enlargement issue, he also highlighted the importance of a multi-tier Union in which member countries could co-operate on a looser basis where they have a mutual interest instead of a two-tier Union with a “pioneer group” constituted by the euro-zone countries (mostly Germany and France) (Baldwin and Fletcher, 2000a, European Report, 2000b, Young, 2000). In his words;

Europe is a Europe of free, independent sovereign nations who choose to pool that sovereignty in pursuit of their own interests and the common good, achieving more together than we can achieve alone. Such a Europe can, in its economic and political strength, be a superpower, not a superstate71 (United Press International, 2000)72.

At the Biarritz European Council (13–14th October 2000), the member countries tried to trash out the differences among themselves in order to complete the institutional reforms necessary for the Eastward enlargement. Firstly, Britain and France had a tendency to agree on the doctrine: ‘enhanced cooperation’ (Cook, 2000a, Fletcher and Webster, 2000, European Report, 2000a). For example, according to Tony Blair, flexibility within the EU governance system was needed under two conditions: “no two-track Europe and no undermining of the Single Market” (European Report, 2000a). Unlike the previous proposal: two-tier Europe that would contain a “pioneer group” within the EU, ‘enhanced cooperation’ model would permit any members to further cooperate in a field but this cooperation should not discriminate other members and would not constitute a part of the acquis73. In other words, this model was closer to the model of “multi-tier Europe” the

71 Blair’s definition of the EU as a superpower not a superstate could also be seen as an alternative policy against the Conservative Party’s Euroscepticism. As a reaction, Francis Maude, Shadow Foreign Secretary criticized Blair’s policy by arguing that “How can the EU be a superpower without being a superstate? This is dangerous, grandiose stuff from (him), it will damage our relationship with Nato, damage our relationship with the US and undermine our nation state” (Baldwin and Fletcher, 2000).  
72 At the domestic level, the Conservative Party negatively reacted to Blair’s plan by defining it as “a federal strategy for a federal EU superstate”. But, the CBI supported Blair’s plan because it did not want to be restrained by “unnecessary EU-wide legislation” (Rice-Oxley, 2000).  
Labour government wanted. On the other hand, at the summit, the division between smaller and larger members on the reweighing of votes in the European Council’s decision making system could not be settled. Briefly, the five largest members (France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain) demanded to strengthen their voting power within the Council’s decision making system in exchange for giving up one of their two commissioners, but the smaller members were not willing to accept this proposal (Kirk, 2000a, Agence France Presse, 2000d, Nacheman, 2000).

As the Biarritz European Council failed to make an important progress on the EU reforms (Associated Press International, 2000), the Nice European Council (7–9th December 2000) emerged as the last chance to complete the 2000 IGC’s targets (the institutional reforms which were necessary for the Eastward enlargement) (HC 318, 2001). At this point, the Labour government (HC 23-xvii, 2000, p. xvii) determined its position as follows:

- **Size of the Commission**: the British government was willing to give up its additional Commissioner (along with the other larger Member States) in exchange for a re-weighting of votes in the Council in larger Member States’ favour.
- **Re-weighting of votes**: the voting system should not be proportional to population in order to maintain the sovereign equality of Member States. Moreover, the enlargement would include many smaller Member States within the EU; thus, a redistribution of votes should be done in favour of the more populous Member States. Otherwise, small Member States with less population might outvote the majority and this would result in a democracy deficit within the EU system. Therefore, the British government preferred a simple re-weighting of votes within the current system instead of a dual majority system.

Furthermore, from an LI perspective, the Labour government continued its two-level game strategy to achieve its goals at the Nice Summit. At the domestic level, the Labour government formed a relatively more nationalist position74 (Fletcher, 2000d, Schofield, 2000a) and guaranteed the British people that it would save Britain’s national interests. For example, Tony Blair announced that he would “fight to retain Britain's veto on tax, social security, defence, asylum and immigration, treaty changes and EU funding” at the Nice European Council (7-9th December 2000), and he would not give any concession on Britain’s veto right over the mentioned issues for the sake of the enlargement (Hughes, 2000).

74 In general, the British Eurosceptics strongly blamed the Labour government for having a secret agenda to establish a European superstate (Hibbs, 2000, The Guardian, 2000a). In particular, they harshly criticized the Labour government for giving up veto rights on a set of issues that would dilute Britain’s sovereignty (e.g. industrial policy) (Porter, 2000). Additionally, the coming general elections also played a role in the increasing tension between the pro-European Labour government and Eurosceptic Conservative Party and press.
Additionally, the Labour government promised that it would only accept the extension of the QMV in the areas (e.g. world trade, financial services and free movement for professional workers) supporting further liberalization of the EU market (Grice, 2000).

On the other hand, the Labour government tried to challenge the criticisms of the Conservative Party and Eurosceptic press at the domestic level (Schofield, 2000a). To illustrate, the Labour government correspondingly launched a propaganda against the Conservative Party and the Eurosceptic British press just before the Nice European Council and criticized them for focusing on the ideological myths (e.g. European super-state) rather than the facts (Gow, 2000, Cook, 2000b, Webster, 2000). By using this propaganda, the Labour Party also aimed to win over the public opinion and decrease the Eurosceptic domestic pressure before the negotiations at the Nice Summit (Agence France Presse, 2000, Black, 2000a, Watson, 2000, Castle and Grice, 2000, Fletcher, 2000b). Additionally, there emerged an inner party division in the Conservative Party. Lord Brittan, Lord Hurd, Kenneth Clarke and Chris Patten (the party’s heavyweights) criticised William Hague’s Eurosceptic tactics for being useless (Percival, 2000, Mcelderry, 2000a), and this division within the Conservative Party also helped to decrease the domestic pressure on the Labour Party at the Nice Summit75.

At the EU level, the British government tried to follow a balance of power strategy to achieve its national preferences. In this sense, firstly, Britain constituted a block with the rest of the larger members to demand more voting power in the QMV mechanism at the expense of the smaller members (Fletcher, 2000d). Secondly, Britain allied with the Nordic countries to prevent the doctrine of ‘enhanced cooperation’ from creating an inner-core and periphery structure within the EU (Schofield, 2000b). Thirdly, the Labour government tried to benefit from the division between France and Germany on the re-weighing voting system76.

As a result of this strategy, when the summit ended, the Labour government declared that it achieved all of its goals and saved Britain’s national interests at the negotiations. Therefore, according the Blair government, the result of the Nice Summit was a victory for

75 For example, despite its strong position not to give up the veto in six key areas centred on taxation, social security, border controls and defence, the Labour government prepared itself to concede Britain's veto in 17 other areas in favour of qualified majority voting (Agence France Presse, 2000c).
76 Germany was demanding more power in the decision making system due to its higher population (83 million), but France was resisting this idea (Adler, 2000, Kirk, 2000c).
Britain\textsuperscript{77} (Xinhua General News Service, 2000). Firstly, the Nice Treaty paved the way for the Eastward enlargement. Secondly, Britain increased her voting strength within the EU decision making system since Britain joined the EU. In detail, thanks to vote re-weighting, Britain gained more power in the European Council because Britain’s vote would increase from 10 to 29 (making Britain more powerful compared to the small and medium sized members). Within the QMV system, any decision would need 62 % of the EU’s population (without vote re-weighting, it would be just over 50 % after the enlargement). Therefore, the three largest members would have the ability to block any decision after the Eastward enlargement. Additionally, Britain managed to retain her veto power over the areas: social security, taxation, border controls, treaty change, own resources, and defence, which were crucial to Britain’s national interests. However, Britain accepted the extension of QMV to the areas like liberalizing external trade in services or industrial policy (Cm 5110, 2001, p. 80). Furthermore, Blair managed to keep the issue of defence out of the ‘enhanced cooperation’ clause and the European rapid reaction force remained under the umbrella of NATO (Agence France Presse, 2000e, Mcelderry, 2000b).

After concluding the enlargement-related EU reforms, at the Copenhagen European Council (12-13\textsuperscript{th} December 2002), the EU leaders finally agreed that ten candidate countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia) would join the European Union on 1\textsuperscript{st} May 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (The European Council, 2002). Therefore, the Labour government achieved its foreign policy objective, and the CEECs (plus Malta and Cyprus) became EU members before the 2004 European Parliament elections after a long and complex negotiation process (HC 151, 2003, p. 18).

\textsuperscript{77} Despite the Labour government’s “victory” rhetoric, the Conservative Party and Eurosceptic press criticized the results of the summit. For example, William Hague pointed out “three more major steps to a European superstate” by dropping several rights to veto, agreeing to a charter of fundamental rights and accepting the creation of a European army. Therefore, he declared that if the Conservative Party won the next election, it would not ratify the Nice Treaty. Additionally, he called on the Labour government to conduct a national referendum on ratification of the treaty (Xinhua General News Service, 2000, Agence France Presse, 2000a, Smith, 2000). As an example to the position of Eurosceptic British press, the Daily Mail published several news items challenging the Labour Party’s victory rhetoric and arguing that what the Labour government called “victory” was actually “surrender” (Amory, 2000, The Daily Mail, 2000, Glover, 2000). As a result, the Nice Treaty became one of the hot topics of the coming general election (7\textsuperscript{th} June 2001). Overall, the Nice Treaty was approved by the House of Commons by a vote of 392 to 158 on 17\textsuperscript{th} October 2001 (Associated Press International, 2001).
5.4 Conclusion

This chapter analysed Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs from an LI perspective. Compared to the previous enlargement cases, the Eastward enlargement was a more complex and longer process, as it went hand in hand with the important enlargement-related reforms in the EU system (e.g. the EU’s budget, funds, governance system, and the CAP). In this regard, LI’s two-level game approach was useful in systematically analysing how Britain’s national preferences about the Eastward enlargement were determined at the domestic level, and how the successive British governments (the Conservative government and then the Labour government) defended them at the EU level negotiations.

First of all, the findings support LI’s intergovernmental assumption that a pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs was shaped according to Britain’s national interests. As noted above, there was a strong domestic consensus on a pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs, which made the successive British governments influential initiators of the Eastward enlargement at the EU level. However, as LI assumes, this consensus did not mean that the successive governments were willing to sacrifice national interests for the sake of the Eastward enlargement. Particularly, the Eastward enlargement process went hand in hand with the two Intergovernmental Conferences (the 1996 IGC and the 2000 IGC), owing to the need for the structural reforms of the EU in order to make the Eastward enlargement possible. Therefore, despite the domestic consensus on a pro-enlargement policy towards the Eastward enlargement, the British domestic actors (especially the British Eurosceptics) were highly sensitive to the outcomes/externalities of those enlargement-related reforms. As a result, as LI assumes, this domestic sensitivity narrowed the British governments’ room for manoeuvre at the EU level negotiations. For example, as noted in the previous chapter, the expansion of QMV method in the EU decision making system emerged as a negative externality of the EFTA enlargement to Britain, and as a result of this, the Conservative government was under the pressure of the Eurosceptic groups at the domestic level. Thus, when the 1996 IGC started, the main position of the Conservative government was to try to limit supranational proposals as much as possible and to prevent the expansion of the QMV method any further. In the same vein, in spite of its more active/constructive position within the EU, the Labour government was also responsive to the increasing Euroscepticism at the domestic level; thus, they tried to determine well-defined red-lines (saving national interests) in the enlargement-related reform negotiations (e.g. the QMV). To illustrate, when Germany and France demanded
the renegotiation of the British rebate from the EU budget in the negotiations on the EU financial system, the Labour government strongly declared that the rebate gained by Thatcher was non-negotiable. In addition to this, during the negotiations on the EU’s institutional reforms (the 2000 IGC), the Labour government gave the domestic groups a clear message that it would not give any concession on Britain’s veto right over the nationally important issues (e.g. tax, social security, defence, asylum and immigration, treaty changes and EU funding) for the sake of the enlargement. Additionally, both the Conservative and Labour governments considered Britain’s specific interests in the reform negotiations on the CAP, the EU’s budgetary system, and the Structural and Cohesion Funds. For example, they tried to convince other members to reform the CAP according to market economy principles (in compliance with the WTO agreements). Moreover, the Labour government negotiated to achieve Britain’s specific interests regarding those issues and declared that it saved the British rebate from the EU budget and arguably managed a better deal on the CAP (e.g. an average British household would save about £64 per year according to the new deal) and the Structural Funds (e.g. Britain would become the sixth largest beneficiary of the Structural Funds instead of being the seventh) at the end of the EU level negotiations.

However, as found in the previous cases, the findings of this case have also showed that LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice and pluralistic decision making assumptions are limited in explaining Britain’s pro-enlargement policy as an output of the national preference formation process. Firstly, as noted above, the Eastward enlargement was a relatively complex issue for member states due to the complicated enlargement-related reforms in the EU system (e.g. the EU’s budget, funds, governance system, and the CAP), and this complexity limited the British governments in making a clear cost-benefit calculation on the issue. To illustrate, the Labour government could not estimate the level of immigration influx from the new members to Britain; thus, they did not take any restrictive measure against it. In his memoirs, Jack Straw (2012, p. 423), the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2001-2006) confessed that a research paper of the Home Office on the potential immigration from the CEECs to Britain misguided the government; otherwise, they would have adopted a restrictive policy against the immigrants from the new members as many other members did. In the same vein, in the telephone interview, Charles Garret (19.11.2014), the Head of EU Enlargement Team in the FCO (2001-2005), also said that they did not estimate that immigration would become
a problem after the big bang enlargement. Secondly, unlike LI’s economic interest oriented assumption, the research has found that security concerns emerged as the main reason behind the successive British governments’ support for the Eastward enlargement under the situational condition of the enlargement. Particularly, both of the governments perceived the emerging power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a crucial security problem. According to the Conservative government, any bilateral security measure might make the situation worse in the region; therefore, a multilateral framework immediately needed to be designed to integrate the region into the Western democratic system. Subsequently, the Labour government also strictly followed this strategy for the similar reasons.

Moreover, the research has also found that the above-mentioned geopolitical concerns, as the main reason behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy, were also interconnected with the ideological motivations and economic expectations of British actors. To demonstrate, several British societal/interest groups (e.g. the CBI, the NFU, The British Insurance and Investment Broker’s Association) agreed with the British governments on the expectation that liberalisation and modernization of the markets of the CEECs via enlargement would also offer new economic opportunities to Britain. In terms of ideological motivations, both of the successive British governments expected that the Eastward enlargement would help to drive the European integration process towards an outward-looking intergovernmental way. However, there was a subtle difference in the successive governments’ political/ideological motivations. In terms of the Conservative government, the Eastward enlargement also represented the expansion of Thatcherism further, since the Central European Countries sympathized with the Thatcherite economic model. Additionally, this reasoning would help the Major government to prevent any further division within the Conservative Party on the EU. On the other hand, the Blair government aimed to put Britain in a more central/leading position within the EU, and a strong pro-enlargement policy would help the Blair government to achieve this goal.

By taking these points into consideration, as LI assumes, it could be argued that the British governments benefited from a multi-causal reasoning while developing Britain’s national preferences over the issue of the Eastward enlargement as they could make precise cost-benefit calculations on it. However, as noted in the theory chapter, LI’s actor oriented theoretical position does not provide further explanation about this multi-causal reasoning. To further elaborate on this finding, as the literature review suggested, the British foreign
policy structure (e.g. the aims to strengthen Britain’s collective security and to expand liberal ideals) might have constituted a rational ground for Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs. More specifically, within the general British foreign policy framework, it might have been rational for the British actors to expect that the democratization/liberalization of the CEECs via enlargement would provide more security and wealth for Britain in the long-run. As a result of this expectation, the successive governments had even a tendency to tolerate any possible short-run economic cost of the enlargement. For example, to guarantee the democratization of CEECs, the Conservative government launched national assistance programmes for the CEECs in addition to the EU level economic aid. Additionally, the success in the Mediterranean enlargement to integrate the former authoritarian Mediterranean countries into the Western democratic system also empirically supported this expectation.

Last but not least, as noted in the theory chapter, LI uses a pluralistic decision making approach while explaining national preference formation process. However, unlike this approach, this chapter has provided considerable evidence that both the Conservative and Labour governments were not only the dominant actors in the decision making process for a pro-enlargement policy, but also played an entrepreneurial role in encouraging British business to exploit the potential economic opportunities in the CEECs’ markets. For example, the Conservative government used the governmental institutions (e.g. DTI, FCO, and MAFF) to create an attractive atmosphere, through which British business would increase their investments in Central and Eastern Europe. The Labour government also launched two initiatives (namely, “Open for Business in Central Europe” in 1997 and “Opportunities in Central Europe” in 1999) to encourage apathetic British business to invest more in Central and Eastern Europe.
6 The Further Enlargement: The Western Balkans and Turkey

6.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses Britain’s policy on the EU’s further enlargement process towards the Western Balkans and Turkey from an LI perspective. The EU’s further enlargement process officially started at the beginning of the 2000s and was still an on-going process as of 2014. In this period, the Labour Party governed the EU’s further enlargement process until 2010, and the Coalition government was carrying out the process as of 2014, when the research ended. To clearly analyse this long period, the chapter separately focuses on the Labour government and the Coalition government periods.

As found in the previous cases, LI’s two-level game approach provided a sufficient analytical perspective to explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. Particularly, this case has also confirmed LI’s intergovernmental assumption that a pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey was shaped according to Britain’s national interests. The chapter has found that the Labour government did not face any significant domestic challenge while determining its pro-enlargement policy at the beginning of the 2000s; therefore, it was highly active at the EU level in launching/stimulating the enlargement process towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. However, when the British people became increasingly more sensitive to the issue of enlargement-related immigration, the Labour government lost its room for manoeuvre/effectiveness at the EU level. Subsequently, although the Cameron government started with a vigorous pro-enlargement policy in 2010, the increasing anti-immigration sentiments at the domestic level forced the government to demand an EU level structural reform to limit the EU’s free movement of people principle. To this end, in 2014, David Cameron even declared that the British government would veto any further enlargement without solving the enlargement-related immigration problem.

As with the previous cases, this case has also showed that LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice and pluralistic decision making assumptions are limited in explaining the national preference formation process for a pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. Firstly, unlike LI’s economic interest oriented assumption, the research has found that security/geopolitical concerns were the main driving force behind the successive British government’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans
and Turkey. For example, as found in the Eastward enlargement case, both of the governments perceived that Britain’s security and prosperity depended on the prosperity and stability of Europe; and in this regard, the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey was essential to maintain perpetual peace and prosperity in Europe in the globalized world. Moreover, according to the British governments, Turkey’s EU membership also gained a special meaning in the era of War on Terror. Additionally, the governments also expected that the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey would make the EU more Atlanticist in line with Britain’s collective security understanding. However, economic expectations and ideological motivations were also intertwined with the above-mentioned security concerns. To illustrate, not only the successive British governments but also British business (including the CBI, NFU and TUC) agreed on the expectation that the liberalization of Western Balkans and Turkey’s markets would provide further economic opportunities for British business. At this point, British business (e.g. the CBI and Balfour Beatty Plc) also perceived Turkey not only as a geopolitical but also as an ‘economic bridge’ to access the new markets surrounding Turkey (e.g. the Middle East).

On these grounds, as LI assumes, it could be argued that despite the dominance of geopolitical concerns, a multi-causal reasoning (containing geopolitical concerns, economic expectations and ideological motivations) affected British actors’ attitude towards the EU’s further enlargement as it was hard to clearly calculate the costs and benefits of this open-ended process. However, as it has been repeatedly argued, LI’s actor oriented logic does not provide deeper explanation for this multi-causal reasoning. At this point, as the literature review suggested, the British foreign policy structure might have provided British actors with a rational ground for the expectation that the EU’s further enlargement would offer greater security and prosperity to Britain. In addition to this, the success of the Mediterranean enlargement and the Eastward enlargement waves in expanding democracy and market economy principles to authoritarian European countries also empirically supported British actors’ expectation that the EU’s further enlargement would provide Britain with greater security and prosperity in the long-run.

The findings have also showed that the successive British governments (the Labour and the Coalition governments) were the main actors in forming Britain’s pro-enlargement policy unlike LI’s pluralistic decision making assumption. However, as noted above, they were also responsive to the domestic demands at the EU level negotiations. For example, the
Labour government was attentive to British companies’ demands (e.g. the Scotch Whisky Association) that Turkey should adopt the acquis communautaire in full in order to liberalize the Turkish market in its accession process. As a more prominent example, both of the successive governments were sensitive to the increasing enlargement-related anti-immigration sentiments at the domestic level and the Cameron government even issued the solution of the immigration problem as a condition for its support for the EU’s further enlargement.

To systematically present the analyses/findings in detail, the chapter firstly focuses on the Labour government era, and then on the Coalition government era. In both cases, the chapter analyses the collected data from an LI perspective to answer the questions: how the British governments and the relevant societal groups determined Britain’s national preferences about the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, and how political and economic concerns affected the national preference formation process. Subsequently, the research focused on the question: how the British governments defended Britain’s national preferences at the EU level negotiations. At this point, as noted above, the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey did not have a clear negotiation framework and timescale as of 2014; therefore, the EU’s further enlargement process was generally carried out as a part of broader structural negotiations (e.g. the Lisbon Treaty) at the EU level.

6.2 The Labour Party Period (2004-2010)

6.2.1 National Preference Formation

6.2.1.1 Political Concerns

The research has found that the concerns driving the Labour government to form a pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs also constituted the main reason behind the Labour government’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. As happened in the Eastward enlargement case, security concerns played a dominant role in the Labour government’s forming a pro-enlargement policy; however, this security understanding had ideological and economic dimensions as well.

As found in the previous chapter, according to the Labour government, a peaceful and prosperous Europe was an essential condition to underpin Britain’s security and prosperity
In this regard, the democratization of Europe was an essential necessity, and the EU’s enlargement policy was an efficient tool to achieve this goal. For example, the Mediterranean enlargement guaranteed the democratization of Greece, Portugal and Spain. The Eastward enlargement also achieved the democratic transformation in the Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, it was possible that the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkan countries and Turkey would guarantee the democratization of those countries.

Particularly, the Western Balkans remained highly unstable and was posing a serious threat to the continent’s peace since the early 1990s (HC 507, 2000, p. 58, Cm 4209, 1999, p. ix, Cm 6413, 2005, p. 36). As a result, after the integration of the CEECs into the EU, the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans emerged as the best strategy to solve Europe’s Western Balkans problem. For example, Tony Blair argued that the Western Balkans should be transformed in a place “where rising prosperity, economic interdependence, diversity and tolerance make war almost unthinkable” (HC 23-xv, 2000, p. 81). However, unlike the CEECs, the Western Balkan countries were mostly the failed states, which were heavily suffering from ethnic conflicts. Under this condition, it was impossible to implement the standard enlargement policy, which was implemented to the CEECs, to those countries. Thus, the Labour government formed a security framework to achieve democratization and integration of the Western Balkans into the EU system at two levels.

Firstly, ‘Euro-Atlantic structures’ would be used to maintain stability in the region, through which the Western Balkan countries were able to make necessary political and economic reforms. In other words, cooperation between NATO and the EU was needed to stabilize the region. Secondly, the EU’s pre-accession policy would be implemented, and as a result of it, the region would finally be integrated into the EU (HC 23-xv, 2000, p. 52, Cm 5220, 2002, p. 16, HC 1195-i, 2003, p. ev19, HC 87, 2005, p. ev58, Cm 6533, 2006, p. 50, Cm 7305, 2008, p. 22).

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78 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.
79 For example, when NATO decided that its Stabilisation Force (SFOR) had achieved its mission of ensuring stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU agreed to replace SFOR with an EU Force (EUFOR) (Cm 6533, 2006, p. 50).
This framework was also in conformity with the Blair government’s new security understanding. As noted in the previous chapter, according to the Blair government, Britain needed not only “hard power” but also “soft power”\textsuperscript{80} to maintain her security and prosperity in the newly emerged global system\textsuperscript{81} (Cm 7291, 2008, Dorman, 2009, p. 10, Brown, 2013, p. 70). In this sense, as Nye (2006, p. 33) argued, the EU emerged as a big soft power in the flux of the post-Cold War period, and its soft power could be used to help the NATO’s hard power. Thus, the Blair government tried to form a security policy that would benefit from both the EU’s soft power and the NATO’s hard power (Hodge 2006, p. 146, Seldon, 2007, p. 616). In parallel with this security understanding, a combination of hard power and soft power would firstly stabilize the Western Balkans, and then the EU’s soft power would be used as a carrot and stick to totally integrate the region into the EU system. Additionally, to guarantee peace and prosperity in Europe, it was also necessary to make the Western Balkan countries NATO members in addition to their EU memberships (HC 16-xxii, 2008, p. 68).

Moreover, according to the Labour government’s security understanding, the EU’s enlargement was not only a successful instrument to democratize the Eastern European countries (Cm 7340, 2008, p. 62) but also an opportunity to make the EU more Atlanticist, which was another security ambition of the Labour government. In this regard, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Baltic States had a strong Atlanticist outlook (Liddle, 2014, p. 226). For example, Treverton (2006, p. 45) argued that the 2004 enlargement increased the number of the countries in the EU who had greater tendency to cooperate with the USA. For example, unlike the Franco-German axis, the whole of Eastern and Central Europe and much of the Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania) supported the Anglo-American military campaign against Iraq and “pledged to take part in military action to disarm Saddam Hussein” (Evans-Pritchard, 2003). Therefore, the EU’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey would also strengthen the increasing Atlanticist tendency within the EU in line with Labour government’s new security understanding.

\textsuperscript{80} In Joseph Nye’s (2004) words, soft power was as important as hard power within the complexity of an interdependent world for the nation state. Therefore, a successful security policy should be supported by “soft power” oriented measures like economic measures.

\textsuperscript{81} According to Clarke (2007, p. 643), the global interdependence meant that the West could no longer ignore chaos and inhumanity beyond its border and this reality was understood by Blair better than most of his colleagues. In this general framework, the Blair government immediately replaced the Major government’s non-involvement/appeasement policy over the Western Balkans with a pro-active/interventionist foreign policy after coming to power (Bogdanor, 2005, p. 447, Dyson, 2009, p. 240).
This security reasoning also ascribed a special meaning to Turkey’s EU membership. As the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued, enlargement was not only an internal issue but also EU’s “single most successful external policy” through which security, prosperity and democracy could be spread further (Agence France Presse, 2004). In this sense, Turkey’s EU membership would significantly become important to export democratic principles to the Middle East, especially at a time when ‘War on Terror’ was declared against Islamic radicals. Therefore, the Labour government repeatedly highlighted the point that Turkey as an EU member would play the role of a bridge between the West and the Muslim world (Associated Press International, 2004, Cm 6823, 2006, p. 48, HC 768, 2006, p. 12, HC 606, 2002, p. ev56). In addition to this, Turkey would also strengthen the EU’s energy security as an important energy corridor (HC 166, 2006, p. ev6, HC 367-ii, 2008, p. ev5, HC 367-i, 2008, p. 33).

The Labour government’s security framework for the further enlargement had also an ideological background. If the EU’s enlargement policy would be used to democratise the Western Balkans, the democratic norms needed to be institutionalized in the region during the pre-accession process. Therefore, the punishment of the war crimes in the Western Balkans was highly important to achieve this aim. As a result, the Labour government repeatedly argued that the countries in the region must fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a condition to start the accession negotiations (Cm 6735, 2006, p. 27). For example, Britain refused to start the accession negotiations with Croatia before the country surrendered the war criminal Gen. Ante Gotovina to the ICTY (Harding, 2003). Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapter, the Blair government adopted the main neo-liberal tenets of Thatcherism. Therefore, the Labour government also supported privatisation as a means to transform the Western Balkan countries into liberal democratic systems (HC 87, 2005, p. ev103). Additionally, the Labour government reiterated that Britain aimed to achieve “a modern, outward-looking European Union, enabling member states to respond to the challenges of globalisation and deliver opportunity, fairness and prosperity for all [European] citizens”. In this regard, enlargement was still an effective tool to create an outward-looking EU, which would enable member states to deal with the challenges of globalization (The House of Lords, 2007).

As LI assumes, by taking those political concerns into account, the Labour government tried to make a rational decision. In particular, it had a tendency to tolerate the short-run
costs\textsuperscript{82} of the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey by considering its higher alternative costs. For example, Jack Straw argued that “[w]e have to spend a bit but we get much more back” regarding the EU’s further enlargement (HC 768, 2006, p. ev16). Otherwise, according to Blair, “[…] western Europe [would] always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders” \textsuperscript{83} (Rice-Oxley, 2000, The Guardian, 2000). In line with this calculation, the Labour government also supported the EU’s financial assistance to the Western Balkans and Turkey via the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), which delivered € 11.5 billion in assistance to the Western Balkan countries and Turkey for the period from 2007 to 2014 “to support economic and social development and assist in implementing the necessary reforms to move closer towards EU membership” (HC 19-i, 2009, pp. 28-29).

\subsection*{6.2.1.2 Economic Concerns}

The process of the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey did not have a definite timescale and was open-ended; thus, it was hard for the British actors to clearly estimate the economic impact of the enlargement. For example, the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)\textsuperscript{84} acknowledged that the lack of a definite timescale for the Turkish accession was a big problem to predict the precise economic impact of Turkey’s EU membership on Britain (HC 367-i, 2008, p. 10, see also: HC 42-xxxiv, 2004, pp. 10-11). Despite this complexity, the economic concerns of the British actors also played a role in determining a pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey.

From an LI perspective, as discussed in the previous chapters, both the Labour government and the former Conservative government had a tendency to behave as an \textit{absolute gain oriented rational egoist} while determining their position towards the EU’s enlargement.

\textsuperscript{82} As noted in the previous chapter, the short-run costs of the EU’s eastward enlargement present extra burden on the EU budget, as the Western Balkan countries and Turkey would become net receivers from the EU budget (via the CAP and the Structural and Cohesion Funds), and would result in procedural costs regarding the governance of the EU (especially Turkey). In addition to this, they (especially the Western Balkan countries) needed significant economic help from the EU even at the pre-accession level (Sarisoy-Guerin and Stivachtis, 2011, p. 8).

\textsuperscript{83} From this point of view, the Blair government also initiated to form a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) because the new EU after the Eastward enlargement also needed to encourage its new periphery to make democratic political and economic reforms if Europe would become a peaceful and economically prosperous continent (Cm 6174, 2004).

\textsuperscript{84} The department was created on 28\textsuperscript{th} June 2007 after the disbanding of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
waves, and they expected that the extension of the liberal Single Market via enlargement would result in a positive-sum effect for all the member states including Britain. With regard to the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, this reasoning continued to be influential in the national preference formation process. For example, the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued that Britain would gain in the future from the EU’s further enlargement like what happened after the Mediterranean enlargement. For example, according to him, Britain’s trade with Spain increased 400 per cent since the accession of Spain to the EEC/EU, and the immigration flow from the Iberian Peninsula to the richer members reversed in time (Hansard, 2002, p. 169). The early outputs of the Eastward enlargement also supported the Labour government’s positive attitude towards the EU’s further enlargement. For example, the Labour government indicated that British merchandise trade with the CEECs (except Bulgaria and Romania) increased by 392 per cent between 1992 and 2005, which was “nearly ten times as fast as with the rest of the world” (The House of Lords, 2007, p. 6). Moreover, according to the Department of Work and Pension, the impact of the Eastward enlargement on the British labour market was positive, because as a research of the Bank of England also confirmed, it boosted the available pool of labour and helped to ease the shortage in the British labour market (ibid.).

British business had also a similar tendency to perceive the EU’s further enlargement as an opportunity. To illustrate, a survey carried out by the Business for Europe showed that 64 per cent of the British companies joined the survey thought that the Eastern European countries offered “the potential for high economic growth and a skilled labour force for the EU”, and 67 per cent of them declared their support for the EU’s further enlargement (e.g. Turkey) (Essen, 2008).

More specifically, the Western Balkan countries had many economic and political problems; thus, they could not provide stable and working markets for British business in the short-run (Hc 87, 2005, p. ev63). However, according to the Labour government, Turkey offered significant opportunities for British business because of the fast growth in the Turkish economy, its need of infrastructure investment as a result of the fast growth, and the privatization of the key sectors in the Turkish economy (HC 360, 2001, pp. 1-5, HC 197, 2002, pp. xlv-xlvii). In line with this expectation, the British Trade
International (BTI) also launched a three year business campaign in 1998 to encourage British business to invest more in the Turkish market (ibid.). The CBI also expected that the Turkish membership to the EU would offer significant economic opportunities for British business in the sectors: environment, water, education and training, financial and legal services, police and security, power, transport infrastructure, ICT/Telecommunications, and agribusiness (HC 367-ii, 2008, p. ev101). According to the CBI, Turkey could also become a bridge for British business to access new markets in the Middle East, the North Africa, the Black Sea area, and the Central Asia by forming trilateral collaborations among British companies, Turkish companies, and the local companies of those regions (HC 367-ii, 2008, p. ev102). In line with this expectation, for example, Balfour Beatty Plc stated its intention to use Turkish contractors as its arm “for attacking opportunities in Bulgaria, Romania and neighbouring former CIS states” (HC 360, 2001, p. 28). Therefore, from an LI perspective, this finding shows that the definition of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ by the British government presented not only the security concerns but also the economic ambitions of British business.

However, some of the British interest groups (e.g. the UK Steel Association, the British Music Rights, the Scotch Whisky Association-the Gin and Vodka Association of Great Britain, and the Publishers’ Association) also warned that Turkey needed to adopt/implement the *acquis communautaire* in full in order to create a fair competition environment in the Turkish market; thus, that the British government should strictly screen the adaptation of the acquis by Turkey in the accession process (HC 360, 2001). As a response to this request, the British government also accepted that the structural reforms in Turkey in line with the Community’s acquis would create a more fair competition environment and more opportunities for British business, 330 of which including the major British companies such as BP, Shell, Unilever and Lucas Industries, were already operating in the Turkish market (HC 197, 2002, p. xlv). In terms of the discussions on a potential mass immigration influx from Turkey to Britain after Turkey’s accession to the EU, both British government and the Business and Enterprise Committee agreed on the point that “it was too early to make any robust assessment of the impact of the free movement of Turkish workers to the rest of the EU” (HC 1070, 2008, p. 4).

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85 The joint DTI and FCO body, responsible for helping UK business trade overseas.
On the other hand, the British actors took lessons from the Eastward enlargement about the fact that British business needed to be more active in pre-accession processes to exploit the emerging economic opportunities in applicant countries. For example, the Trade and Industry Select Committee argued that British business was relatively slow to take advantage of the opportunities as an output of the liberalization of the Central and Eastern European markets compared to its competitors like those in Germany, France, Italy and Spain; thus, it argued that the same mistake should not be repeated regarding the EU’s further enlargement (HC 592, 2007, pp. 26-27). In this regard, the British government also took into account that the competitors of British business might use their historical links with Turkey (as happened in the CEECs). To deal with this potential problem, the Labour government decided to use the UKTI as much as possible to raise the awareness of British business of the opportunities in Turkey and to determine the most profitable sectors in the Turkish market for British business (HC 1070, 2008, p. 11). British companies were also aware of this problem. For example, Stephen Radley, the chief economist of the EEF (the Manufacturers’ Organization), acknowledged British companies’ mistake in the Central and Eastern European markets and argued that British business should be more active in the pre-accession processes of the Western Balkan countries and Turkey, because those countries needed to make essential restructuring and liberalization reforms, which would offer significant opportunities for British business (HC 592, 2007, p. ev7).

6.2.1.3 The Position of Other Domestic Actors

As LI assumes, the domestic consensus on a pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey continued among the main British actors, and this consensus helped the Labour government to become more active in stimulating the enlargement process towards the Western Balkans and Turkey at the EU level. However, the increasing anti-immigration sentiments among the British people gradually decreased/limited the Labour government’s capacity to accelerate the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey.

First of all, as the main opposition party, the Conservative Party continued its support for the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey despite its increasing Euroscepticism. As Michael Ancram, the Shadow Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2005, and Richard Spring, the Conservative MP, argued, the Conservative Party continued to perceive enlargement as a great way to promote peace and prosperity in
Europe (Hansard, 2003, p. 1113). In this sense, the party’s experiences from the 1990s also solidified this perception (Hansard, 2002, p. 172). For example, when David Cameron became the new leader of the Conservative Party, Douglas Hurd (2005) advised him that the Conservative Party needed to continue to support the EU’s further enlargement because from a Thatcherite perspective, a pro-enlargement policy was still important to create a liberal Single Market in Europe. Subsequently, David Cameron, as the new leader of the Conservative Party, also declared his support for the EU’s further enlargement (Associated Press International, 2007a).

However, when a mass influx of immigration from the East Europe to Britain started after the 2004 enlargement, the situation started to change. Particularly, the Labour government expected that around 13,000 workers would come from the CEECs per year after the 2004 enlargement, but 600,000 workers came between 2004 and 2006 (Kirk, 2006, Kubosova, 2006b, Agence France Presse, 2006b). As a reaction to this, a strong anti-immigration sentiment emerged among the British people, which started to negatively affect Britain’s pro-enlargement policy (Agence France Presse, 2004d, Agence France Presse, 2004a). For example, in August 2006, a Mori poll for the Sunday Times revealed that 77 per cent of the British people wanted strict annual limits on the immigration from the Eastern members of the EU (Woodward, 2006). On the other hand, the increasing anti-immigration feelings started to strengthen UKIP in the British political arena and the party gradually became more influential in domestic politics by using an anti-immigration rhetoric (Agence France Presse, 2006a). For instance, UKIP increased its seats in the European Parliament from 3 to 12 in the 2004 European Parliament election. Unlike the consensus among the mainstream British parties (the Conservatives, the Labours and Liberal Democrats) on a pro-enlargement policy, UKIP had also a tendency to see/present the EU’s further enlargement as a growing immigration threat to Britain (Herald Express, 2004). In parallel with this perception, the UKIP MEPs even voted against the 2004 enlargement at the European Parliament unlike the Conservative, the Labour and the Liberal Democrat MEPs (Express & Echo, 2004). As a result of the increasing anti-immigration sentiments among the British people and the increasing power of UKIP at the expense of it, the Conservative Party also started to put more pressure on the Labour government to limit the immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania when those countries got their EU membership in 2007 (Associated Press International, 2006b, Kubosova, 2006b). In addition to the Conservative
Part y, the Liberal Democrats also supported a transitional arrangement to control the immigration from the new members to Britain (Macleod, 2006, Millar, 2006).

The issue of immigration also made the EU’s further enlargement a topic causing a split within the Labour Cabinet, namely, between the Home and Foreign Secretaries. While the Home Secretary John Reid and the Work and Pensions Secretary, John Hutton were supporting putting a limit on the immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania when those countries became EU members on 1st January 2007, the Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, and the Europe Minister, Geoff Hoon were against any radical protective measure in the British labour market against the Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants because this could damage Britain’s leadership in the EU’s enlargement process (Murphy, 2006). The former Europe ministers, Denis MacShane and Keith Vaz, were also against any limitation on the EU’s free movement of labour/people principle (Hinsliff, 2006, The Guardian, 2006). Finally, the Home Secretary won the Cabinet dispute and the Labour government officially decided to put a restriction on the immigration from Romania and Bulgaria in October 2006 (Webster, 2006). According to the decision, high-skilled professionals, such as doctors or computer scientists from Bulgaria and Romania were welcomed but unskilled jobseekers could only work in the food processing and farming sectors (Kubosova, 2006a). As a result, although Tony Blair reiterated that Britain would continue to support the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey (Associated Press International, 2006a), he (2006) also needed to accept that the increasing British concern over the immigration from the new members would put the EU’s further enlargement (e.g. Turkey) in a fragile position. As a result, as LI’s two-level game approach assumes, increasing anti-enlargement sentiments among the British people, as a significant domestic change, directly affected the Labour government’s pro-enlargement policy although the rationale behind this policy still existed.

The CBI also maintained its pro-enlargement position towards the Western Balkans and Turkey in this period. In particular, the CBI continued to perceive the EU’s further enlargement as further extension of the Single Market (The CBI, 2007a). Regarding the discussion about the immigration issue, the CBI remained “fully supportive of the free movement of workers within the European Union” (The CBI, 2007). For example, the CBI Director-General Richard Lambert (2007) argued that a very rapid increase in the immigration from the EU to Britain after the big bang enlargement had “a strongly positive effect on [Britain’s] macroeconomic performance, helping to boost output and eliminate
bottlenecks in the labour market”. However, the CBI also accepted that there might be a limit on the immigration from the new EU members to Britain “in the interests of maintaining a balance between integration and economic performance” (The CBI, 2007). In addition to the CBI, the British Chambers of Commerce (the BCC) also called for a limit on the immigrants from the forthcoming EU members. For example, the Director General of the BCC, David Frost, argued that "[w]e need a pause after the huge influx from Poland and the significant impact it has had” (Fagge and Whitehead, 2006).

As another influential British interest group, the TUC supported Blair’s ambition to expand democratic zone by using the EU’s soft power towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. At this point, the TUC supported not only the EU’s further expansion but also a closer relationship with the Mediterranean area and Ukraine (The TUC, 2006). For example, the TUC (2013) argued that:

Enlargement has expanded the internal market and extended the reach of EU rules to new countries; with it came economic growth and opportunities for business to access new markets. These are the reason why the UK has supported enlargement and should continue to do so.

Regarding the immigration problem, the TUC argued that if the EU strengthened its social dimension, the unfair competition in the labour market would be demolished and that all of the EU citizens could benefit from the wealth created in the EU. Thus, the TUC was against any limit on the immigration from other EU countries to Britain and supported the EU’s free movement of people/labour principle (ibid).

All in all, as LI argues, this section has showed that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey was an output of a national preference formation process, which was shaped by a multi-causal reasoning. In particular, security concerns played a dominant role in the decision making process; however, economic expectations and ideological motivations also affected the British actors’ attitude towards the EU’s further enlargement. Moreover, there was a common consensus among the main British actors on a pro-enlargement policy. However, unlike the previous enlargement cases, the British people’s support for a pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey gradually decreased due to the increasing anti-immigration sentiments. Therefore, although the Labour government was initially influential in accelerating EU’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, it gradually lost its effectiveness at the EU level negotiations towards the end of its term of office.
6.2.2 Intergovernmental Bargains

In parallel with the above-mentioned national position, the Labour government tried to play a leading role in the stabilization of the Western Balkans, and then in the acceleration of the enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. However, the research has found that the Labour government gradually lost its effectiveness as a driving force behind the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey despite its initial success in the stabilization of the Western Balkans. From an LI perspective, according to the findings of this chapter, in addition to the decreasing domestic support for a pro-enlargement policy, France and Germany’s relatively less enthusiasm for the EU’s further enlargement was another reason behind the decline of the Labour government’s effectiveness at the EU level negotiations. More specifically, as the EU’s further enlargement intertwined with the deepening of the EU, it was really hard for the Labour government to separately achieve any development in the issue of the further enlargement without any progress in the deepening of the EU. Moreover, France and Germany had a tendency to use the deepening of the EU as a condition for the further enlargement. However, the high domestic sensitivity to the issues related to the deepening of the EU limited the Labour government in making any concession to France and Germany in order to accelerate the further enlargement. Last but not least, as LI assumes, member states’ varied and sometimes contradictory national interests in the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey were another important factor slowing the enlargement process.

Firstly, the stabilization of the Western Balkans was a crucial priority for the Labour government, and it effectively implemented its above-mentioned stabilization policy at the EU level. Particularly, in addition to the EU’s failure in the Bosnian War, the USA’s reluctance to use its ground forces in the Kosovo conflict convinced the Blair government that the EU needed a new defence initiative (Feedman, 2007, p. 625, Dover, 2007, p. 27). As a result, Tony Blair tried to form a security framework for the region as a synthesis of hard and soft power measures. In line with this aim, he focused on forming a defence capacity for the EU (in conformity with NATO) to intervene in any potential conflict and
to maintain stability in the Western Balkans (Wall, 2008, p. 169). Consequently, the Blair government achieved this aim with the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which would be under the CFSP pillar governed according to intergovernmental principles (Jones, 2007, p. 72). Moreover, as the Blair government aimed, the new security structure would stabilize the Western Balkans in cooperation with NATO (Sjursen, 1998).

After taking necessary measures to guarantee the stabilization of the Western Balkans, the Blair government focused on the question: how to integrate the Western Balkans into the EU system deeper. At this point, the British government perceived the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which was launched in 1999, as an important step to increase the EU’s influence over the Western Balkans (HC 28, 2000, p. 176). Especially, the SAP would be designed as a carrot and stick policy to encourage and help the Western Balkan countries to make deep and painful structural changes, which were necessary to integrate the region into the EU system (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). More specifically, the EU would firstly carry out its bilateral relations with the Western Balkan countries on a contractual basis (the Stabilisation and Association Agreements). Secondly, the EU would provide trade concessions and financial assistance to these countries, which would increase the dependency of the region on the EU. Thirdly, the EU would improve interdependence among the Western Balkan countries, through which they would need to develop good relations with each other.

In this regard, the Thessaloniki Summit (20-21 June 2003) became a historical turning point in the European integration process. Firstly, the EU leaders promised the Western Balkan countries full membership when they fulfilled the necessary reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Secondly, they agreed on a Draft Constitution to make the EU’s governance easier after the big bang enlargement (the EU’s enlargement towards the CEECs, Malta and Cyprus) (The European Council, 2003). As a result, the EU’s widening and deepening processes intertwined with each other again after the Thessaloniki Summit (Jenny et al., 2006, p. 200, De Sousa and Moury, 2009, p. 4, Piris, 2006, p. 40, Castiglione

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86 According to Wall (2008, p. 172) and Hodge (2006, p. 146), the failure to enter in the EMU limited Blair’s ambition to get a leading role in the EU; at this point, the defence issue emerged as another chance for Blair to get a leading role in the EU.


88 This promise was a good indicator showing that the EU’s approach towards the region shifted from “post-conflict stabilisation (security) to European integration (enlargement)” (Prifti, 2013, p. 7).
et al., 2008, p. 67, Carbone, 2010, p. 2, Church and Phinnemore, 2006, p. 9), and the EU level complex negotiation process covering both deepening and widening issues started.

In this complex negotiation process, it was hard for the Labour government to achieve progress in the EU’s further enlargement without any development in the deepening of the EU. In this sense, France emerged as a major obstacle to the further enlargement. Particularly, a majority of the French (about 55 %) were opposing the Eastward enlargement and the 66 per cent of them were against Turkey’s EU membership (Gentleman and Black, 2004). In addition to the immigration influx from the new members, their being more pro-American (e.g. the Iraq invasion) also decreased France’s willingness for the further enlargement (Agence France Presse, 2004b, Agence France Presse, 2004e). As a result, France gave priority to the Draft Constitution over the further enlargement, and according to it, the finalization of the EU Constitution was a condition for the EU’s further enlargement. On the other hand, at the domestic level, the intertwining of the deepening and widening of the EU with each other also made the British Eurosceptics more sensitive to the EU level negotiations. For example, when the Labour government accepted that a reform might be needed in the EU’s governance as a result of the big bang enlargement, the domestic Eurosceptic pressure on it automatically increased although the government tried to guarantee that the EU Constitution would not threaten Britain’s national interests within the EU system (Johnson, 2004, Webster, 2004, The Guardian, 2004, Auger, 2003). For example, the Conservative Party declared its strong objection against the Draft Constitution and even tried to find allies within the EU to increase its Eurosceptic influence at the EU level (Hughes, 2003).

In 2004, the Labour government tried to shift the EU’s focus from the deepening to the widening, and launched a vigorous campaign to start the accession negotiations with Turkey (Agence France Presse, 2004c). However, the Labour government faced a strong resistance at the EU level. At the Brussel Summit (16-17th December 2004), a sceptical group, led by France and Austria (including Cyprus, Denmark, Slovakia and Hungary), demanded that the accession negotiations with Turkey start at the end of 2005 and be “open ended”, which might pave the way for a “privileged partnership” rather than full membership (Bianchi, 2004a, The Irish Times, 2004). In addition to them, the German opposition (the CDU would take power in November 2005) also supported the privileged partnership with Turkey instead of full membership (Bianchi, 2004b). As a result, Britain
needed to make some concessions to encourage France to give the green light on the accession negotiations with Turkey (Maddox, 2004, Watt, 2004).

At this point, unlike France, there was not intense resentment in Britain against the EU’s further enlargement (Maddox, 2004). For example, according to a European Commission opinion poll, the majority was in favour of Turkish membership in Britain in 2004 (Harding, 2004), but a Figaro poll showed that 67 percent of the French voters were against it (Watt, 2004). Additionally, the British media was also supporting Turkey’s accession to the EU (Carmichael, 2005). As a result, from an LI perspective, the British government was more flexible compared to the French government at the EU level negotiations to make concessions; thus, the British government made some proposals to France. Firstly, Britain offered a get-out clause in the negotiations instead of “privileged partnership”89. Secondly, Britain accepted to start the accession negotiations in the second half of 2005; thus, France could hold its referendum on the EU Constitution prior to this. Thirdly, Britain promised to reform the EU’s governing system to ensure that Turkey would not dominate the EU’s chambers (ibid.). However, the French (29th May 2005) and Dutch (1st June 2005) rejections of the Constitutional Treaty dramatically impaired the Labour government’s plan to shift the EU’s agenda towards the further enlargement. Particularly, the French government associated the increasing anti-enlargement sentiments in the EU with the French and Dutch rejections90; thus, it suggested that the EU should slow the speed of the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey.

Despite this unexpected problem, the Labour government put enlargement at the centre of its EU presidential agenda (July-December 2005), and Blair argued that Europe needed to see enlargement “not as a threat, as if membership were a zero sum game in which old members lose as new members gain, but an extraordinary opportunity to build a greater and more powerful union […]”91 (Agence France Presse, 2005c). To achieve its presidential goal, the British Presidency arranged an EU foreign ministers meeting on 2nd October 2005 “to remove the final hurdle to opening membership negotiations with Turkey on October 3 [2005]” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2005d). From an LI perspective, this

89 According to the Labour government, the EU would start the accession negotiations with Turkey; however, if Turkey failed to meet the acquis during the negotiations, the EU would have the right to stop the negotiations.
90 There was a positive correlation between the NO votes and anti-enlargement sentiments (particularly against Turkish membership) (Piris, 2006, p. 22).
91 This speech could also be seen as a response to France’s unwillingness to the EU’s further enlargement.
meeting was a good case showing how member states’ national interests shaped their position towards enlargement. Particularly, Austria insisted that a privileged partnership be negotiated with Turkey instead of full membership (Popham, 2005). Furthermore, it used the French and Dutch rejections as a proof showing how “quickness” of enlargement increased anti-enlargement sentiments among EU people (Stoullig, 2005). However, beyond this rhetoric, according to Austria’s position, restarting the accession negotiations with Croatia was a condition to start the accession negotiations with Turkey (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2005a, The Irish Times, 2005b, Agence France Presse, 2005e, The Daily Telegraph, 2005b, Brcic, 2005a). However, the accession negotiations with Croatia were frozen in March 2005 due to its failure in the cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague. In this sense, Britain was against resuming the accession negotiations with Croatia without its full cooperation with the UN (Watt and Smith, 2005). To break the deadlock in the negotiations, the International War Crimes Tribunal confirmed that Croatia accepted a full cooperation with the UN on 3rd October 2005, and this confirmation made the reopening of the accession negotiations with Croatia possible. Therefore, Austria agreed to start the accession negotiations with Turkey (Watt and Smith, 2005, Castle, 2005a, Browne, 2005, Smyth, 2005b), and Britain achieved one of her most important EU Presidency goals.

However, starting the accession negotiations with Turkey triggered the discussions about the deepening of the EU. Particularly, France perceived the progress in the enlargement process towards Turkey as “an example of the increasing dominance of a British-led vision of the EU” (an outward-looking liberal EU as an alternative to France’s inward-looking social model) (Agence France Presse, 2005i, Ash, 2005). For example, the former French president Valery Giscard d’Estaing argued that “[f]urther enlargements [...] are obviously going to transform Europe into a large free trade zone. That’s what I regret”. At the same time, France reopened the row with Britain over the British rebate from the EU budget, and

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92 From a geopolitical perspective, Austria perceived Croatia “as a country within its own sphere of influence” unlike Turkey (The Irish Times, 2005a).

93 The EU members cancelled the start of membership negotiations with Croatia on 17th March 2005 following a report by Del Ponte criticising Croatia for failing to hand over war crimes suspect Ante Gotovina to the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2005d).

94 As noted above, Britain wanted to use the EU’s enlargement as a “soft power” to further extend liberal doctrines. At this point, the EU should not make any concession regarding the accession conditionality (the Copenhagen Criteria and cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal for the Western Balkan countries).

95 The war criminal Gen. Ante Gotovina was finally arrested on 8 December 2005, which removed a major obstacle to Croatia’s accession to the EU (Brcic, 2005b).
reiterated that Britain should give up the rebate to share the enlargement burden on the EU budget (Agence France Presse, 2005g, Xinhua General News Service, 2005b). Particularly, France demanded to firstly freeze the British rebate (around 4 billion euro) and then phase it out. However, the Labour government declared that it could negotiate the British rebate on condition that there was a complete budget overhaul including a big cut in the CAP spending (as a quid pro quo) (Staunton, 2005). As a response, France blocked the FYR of Macedonia’s getting candidate status by showing the stalled negotiations on the EU budget 2007-2013 as an excuse in December 2005 (Euronews, 2005, Xinhua General News Service, 2005a, Castle, 2005b, Agence France Presse, 2005h).

Therefore, the EU budget issue emerged as another obstacle to the EU’s further enlargement process (Waugh, 2005, Rennie and Helm, 2005, Smyth, 2005a). As LI assumes, member states’ national interests dominated the negotiations on the EU budget. In particular, the Labour government was in a relatively weak position at the EU level negotiations on the 2007-2013 EU budget (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2005b), because most of the EU members supported the idea that Britain needed to share the burden of enlargement by accepting to decrease the amount of the British rebate from the EU budget (Gow, 2005). Even the Eastern European members allied with France in order to get more money from the EU budget, although they were a natural ally of Britain on foreign policy (pro-American) and against the Franco-German domination over the EU. More specifically, they allied with France in order to put pressure on the Blair government to make it accept a cut in the British rebate as an alternative to the potential reductions in the EU budget (from 1.06 per cent of the EU’s gross national income to 1.03 per cent), which would mean fewer financial resources for them from the CAP and Social Cohesion Funds (Simon, 2005, Tammerk, 2005, Castle and Brown, 2005, Agence France Presse, 2005a). After the tough negotiations at the December 2005 summit, Tony Blair needed to accept a cut in the British rebate in exchange for other members’ commitment to reform expensive farm subsidy system, which France was staunchly defending for the 2007-2013 EU Budget (Agence France Presse, 2005f, see also: The European Council, 2005).

The agreement on the 2007-2013 EU budget alleviated the EU level problems in the enlargement process; however, it increased the domestic pressure on the Labour government. Although Blair tried to convince the domestic actors about the fact that all the richer members would pay their fair share of costs to integrate the CEECs into the EU (e.g. British contribution by 63 per cent, the French contribution by 116 per cent, and the Italian
by 130 per cent would increase) and that a compromise on the budget was also needed for the further enlargement, the agreement was not welcomed at the domestic level (Agence France Presse, 2005b, Cracknell and Smith, 2005, Cusick, 2005). The Conservative Party, UKIP, and the Eurosceptic media accused Blair of surrendering to France at the summit and defined the deal as a defeat for British interests (Agence France Presse, 2005d, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2005c, Agence France Presse, 2005b, The Daily Telegraph, 2005a, Grice and Castle, 2005, Watt, 2005).

Angela Merkel’s coming to power in Germany in November 2005 changed the power dynamics within the EU. In addition to France, the German Chancellor Merkel had also a tendency to give priority to the deepening of the EU (the Constitutional Treaty) over the further enlargement (Islam and Mangasarian, 2006, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2007). For example, at the December 2006 EU summit, in addition to France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, Germany also insisted that the Constitutional Treaty be completed before any further enlargement, that the accession criteria for the applicants be stricter, and that the absorption capacity of the EU be considered before any further enlargement (The Irish Times, 2006a). Moreover, Merkel declared that starting accession negotiations with a candidate was “no guarantee for later membership” (Ames, 2006).

At the December 2006 summit, it was also decided that the EU’s enlargement process would be made tougher (The Irish Times, 2006b, The European Council, 2006). Firstly, setting a target date for a candidate’s admission was dropped because as it would diminish the EU’s ability to enforce reforms in the candidate countries96. Secondly, the EU leaders agreed to implement justice and corruption tests for EU candidates at the early stages of their accession negotiations97. Finally, the EU would also implement ‘an absorption capacity test’98 to accept new members (Watt et al., 2006, Islam and Mangasarian, 2006). In parallel with the EU’s new tougher enlargement policy, the EU leaders also endorsed freezing the eight chapters of the accession negotiations with Turkey to punish it for refusing to open its ports and airports to Cyprus at the summit (Sliva, 2006).

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96 Setting a target date was implemented in the 2004 Eastward enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria.
97 There was a belief that Romania and Bulgaria had been accepted before those subjects were clearly examined.
98 According to this principle, even though a candidate successfully completed the accession negotiations, it would not get an automatic accession right. However, the European Commission would evaluate whether the EU could absorb it or not, and if the result of the evaluation was positive, the applicant would become a member.
In this regard, despite the Labour government’s continuous support for the further enlargement; the support for enlargement was also waning at the domestic level. According to a survey of the Eurobarometer, the level of support for the EU’s further enlargement among the British people dropped from 44 per cent to 36 per cent in 2006 (Triomphe, 2006, Waterfield, 2006). Therefore, from an LI perspective, the decreasing popularity of enlargement at the domestic level also drove the Labour government to accept a tougher policy on the EU’s further enlargement (Waterfield, 2006).

In addition to Angela Markel, Nicholas Sarkozy’s coming to power in France in May 2007 significantly limited the Labour government’s ambition to accelerate the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. Particularly, Sarkozy became a powerful ally of Merkel to prevent Turkey’s full accession to the EU (Hughes, 2007, Mahony, 2007, Associated Press International, 2007b). Moreover, Sarkozy was also sceptical about the liberal Anglo-American economic model for the European integration (The Daily Telegraph, 2007b). For example, in his election campaign in May 2007, he declared that the EU needed to be a protection against globalization, not a Trojan horse posing neoliberal doctrines to member states (Freedland, 2007). As a result of his ambition to establish a more inward-looking EU, it would be hard for the Labour government to find common points with him in the forthcoming negotiations.

When Germany assumed the EU Presidency, it launched a new campaign for a new EU treaty at the June 2007 EU summit (The European Council, 2007). Correspondingly, the Labour government formed a set of “red lines” to protect Britain’s national interests at the summit. Firstly, the British government was against the federal vision of the former Constitutional Treaty. Thus, it persisted in maintaining Britain’s national sovereignty over foreign affairs, labour and social legislation, social security system, common law system, police and judicial processes, and taxation (Miliband, 2007, Hurst, 2007, The Business, 2007, The Times, 2007, Cm 7174, 2007, p. 7). In the same vein, the new treaty should not have any inward-looking tendency. For example, according to the new British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the EU leaders should end inward-looking institutional debates on the new treaty (the Reform Treaty), and focus on creating an “open and flexible Europe” and making the EU “a genuinely global player” (Agence France Presse, 2007a, Smith, 2007). The Foreign Secretary David Miliband also argued that the EU should be a model power for the rest of the world (not a super state) by becoming open to the world; thus, he
argued that the further enlargement should continue to become a top priority for the EU (Penketh, 2007, Traynor, 2007).

When the EU leaders agreed on a final draft of the treaty at an informal EU summit on 18-19th October 2007, David Miliband declared that all of the above-mentioned red lines were achieved in the final draft (HC 16-iii, 2007, p. ev57). According to him (2007a); the Common Foreign and Security Policy guaranteed foreign policy “as a matter for unanimous decision-making”, the European Court of Justice would not have a jurisdiction over national security issues, Britain would have the right to choose whether or not to participate in justice and home affairs measures (to protect Britain common-law system and criminal and judicial processes), the Charter of Fundamental Rights would not change the status quo in Britain (to protect Britain’s social and labour legislation), and Britain would be able to reject any social security measure, which she did not want. Although the Labour government tried to present the results of the EU level negotiations as a big success at the domestic level, the British Eurosceptic press and the Conservative Party put strong pressure on the government to conduct a national referendum on the new treaty (The Daily Telegraph, 2007a, Agence France Presse, 2007b, Thurston, 2007). A YouGov poll also showed that 69 per cent of the British people wanted a referendum as well (The Guardian, 2007). Furthermore, some of the Labour backbenchers (e.g. Kate Hoey) also wanted to conduct a referendum on the Reform Treaty (Kirkup and Waterfield, 2007, Peev, 2007b, Traynor and Wintour, 2007). However, despite the strong domestic pressure, Gordon Brown signed the Reform Treaty at the EU summit in December 2007 and ruled out a referendum on the Reform Treaty by arguing that Britain’s national interests had already been secured; thus, there were not "fundamental changes" or a constitutional idea in the new treaty that might make a referendum necessary (Meade and Churcher, 2007, Peev, 2007a, Stringer, 2007).

After the agreement on the Lisbon Treaty (the Reform Treaty) in December 2007, France swiftly changed its negative position against the EU’s further enlargement in 2008 (except for Turkey) (Agence France Presse, 2008c). Therefore, the Labour government had a chance to achieve progress in the further enlargement; however, different national preferences on the enlargement issue prevented the EU members from taking effective decisions. For example, the EU leaders concentrated on the Kosovo problem (European Report, 2008, Agence France Presse, 2008b), but could not develop a common EU policy on it due to their different national preferences. While Britain, France, Germany and Italy
supported the independence of Kosovo from Serbia; Spain, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Slovakia did not want an independent Kosovo due to their own territorial integrity concerns (Harrington, 2008, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2008). On the other hand, the difference between France and Britain on Turkey’s bid for full membership continued. French President Nicolas Sarkozy released a “Mediterranean Union” plan as an alternative project against Turkey’s full membership; however, the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband refused this plan and reiterated that the accession negotiations with Turkey should continue with full momentum (Agence France Presse, 2008a, Fraser, 2008).

In addition to the different national preferences, the Irish rejection of the Lisbon/Reform Treaty in June 2008 became another factor preventing satisfactory progress in the enlargement process. In the wake of the Irish rejection, French President Sarkozy declared that any further enlargement would be impossible without the Lisbon Treaty, and his position was supported by the German Chancellor Merkel at the EU Summit on 19-20th June 2008 (Cook, 2008, Smyth, 2008a). At the summit, Poland was the main opponent against Germany and France’s anti-enlargement position, and the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was strongly against any linkage between enlargement and “the fiasco of the referendum” (Rigillo, 2008, Smyth, 2008a).

Interestingly, despite the Blair government’s strong ambition to make Britain ‘the main initiator of enlargement’, the new Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown followed a midway position between that of France and of Poland at the summit. To illustrate, Brown argued that enlargement could still proceed despite the Irish rejection but the EU needed the Lisbon Treaty, which would make provisions for the enlargement and other surrounding arrangements (Federal News Service, 2008). On the other hand, the Conservative Party started to become more influential at the EU level. The party was against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty although Sarkozy and Merkel imposed the same on the EU’s further enlargement as a condition (Hennessy and Stares, 2008). Just before the European Parliament election (4th June 2009), David Cameron increased his Eurosceptic tone and argued that the Conservative Party would withdraw its members from the main centre-right bloc in the EU parliament, which contained Sarkozy’s and Merkel’s parties, and that it would form new Eurosceptic alliances with the Czech and Polish parties99.

99 It is highly possible that the increasing Euroscepticism in Britain played an important role in increasing the Eurosceptic tone of the Conservative Party. For example, according to an Economist magazine/YouGov poll
He also declared that if the Conservative Party won the national election in 2010, they would hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty although it was ratified by the House of Commons (if the treaty was not yet enacted by all the members). Additionally, Cameron reiterated the Conservative Party’s full support for Turkey’s EU membership, which Sarkozy and Merkel were opposing\(^{100}\) (Vucheva, 2009, Agence France Presse, 2009a). As a result, Merkel strongly reacted against Cameron’s tough stance by arguing that “[w]e refuse to stretch out our hand to those who oppose the Lisbon Treaty […]” (ibid.).

Finally, Ireland (via a second referendum) and the Czech Republic approved the Lisbon Treaty, and it entered into force on 1\(^{st}\) December 2009. In this period, the EU members also negotiated on the key posts created by the Lisbon Treaty. In this regard, according to the Labour government, the new EU President and High Representative should try to make the EU a global actor and avoid any inward-looking policy in the EU foreign affairs (Woodcock, 2009); therefore, they were important posts. After the negotiations, Britain guaranteed the new High Representative post, and the Labour government welcomed the appointment of Cathy Ashton as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy because the government hoped that Ashton would put a global agenda for the EU foreign policy and “she would also shape the EU’s voice on the bloc's enlargement in the Balkans and Turkey” (Agence France Presse, 2009).

After breaking the stalemate on the Lisbon Treaty, some progress in the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans was achieved. For example, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia got a visa-free travel right within the Schengen zone in December 2009 (Pop, 2009b). Serbia also submitted its application for the EU membership in December 2009 (Marier, 2009). However, different national preferences were still a big obstacle to the further enlargement. To illustrate, although the FYR of Macedonia had met all the criteria for opening the EU accession negotiations, Greece blocked the negotiations due to

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\(^{100}\) As Korski (2009) argued, the enthusiasm for further enlargement was also waning in Britain due to the fear of immigration influx. Even the Minister for Europe Glenys Kinnock confessed that the British people were not convinced of the benefits of the EU’s enlargement (States News Service, 2009). In other words, in addition to federalism, immigration became another important factor increasing Euroscepticism in Britain. However, it is highly possible that, just before the national elections in 2010, Cameron preferred to “widening” over “deepening” to form an alternative discourse to Sarkozy and Merkel’s discourse demanding a deeper EU.
a dispute on the name: ‘Macedonia’, which was also a Greek region’s name (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2009). Cyprus also tried to block the opening of the negotiations with Turkey on the environment chapter, which was an important positive step after the EU’s freezing the eight chapters in 2006 over Turkey's refusal to open its ports to Cypriot vessels (Pop, 2009a). Last but not least, Germany and France were still strongly against Turkey’s full membership. As a result, although the Labour Party aimed to accelerate the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, the EU was facing an “enlargement fatigue” just before the Labour Party lost power in the May 2010 national election.

6.3 The Coalition Government (2010-2014)

6.3.1 National Preference Formation

6.3.1.1 Political Concerns

When the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition government in 2010, those parties had different positions towards the EU. The influence of pro-European figures (Heseltine, Clarke and Patten) waned in the Conservative Party and David Cameron consolidated Euroscepticism as the mainstream position of the party; however, the Liberal Democrats maintained their pro-European position (Gifford, 2014, p. 155). Despite this difference, they continued Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. The research has found that the reasoning behind the new government’s pro-enlargement policy was similar to that of the former Labour government. As LI assumes, national interests dominated the decision making process, and security concerns played a dominant role in the Coalition government’s support for a pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey; however, this security understanding also had ideological and economic dimensions as well.

The Coalition government continued the assumption that Britain’s security and prosperity depended on the prosperity and stability of Europe in a globalized era. In this sense, the EU’s further enlargement (towards the Western Balkans and Turkey) was essential to maintain perpetual peace and prosperity in Europe (HC 83-xx, 2013, p. 60, Daily Hansard, 2012b). In parallel with this understanding, according to the Cameron government, the EU’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans needed to be supported by the NATO’s enlargement towards the region as well. At this point, Turkey was already a NATO
member; however, according to the British government, its EU membership was still geopolitically important for Britain because “Turkey has a strong network of relationships and influence in regions where UK interests are significant: North Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan-Pakistan and the Western Balkans” (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev52). For example, Turkey within the EU could become a geopolitical bridge for the Western powers to access the Islamic World, which was important at a time when the Western world was struggling with the radicalization of Islam (Hague, 2010). The British government also highlighted that Turkey within the EU could become a regional energy hub and energy transit corridor to the other EU members\(^\text{101}\) (HC 83-xx, 2013, p. 75).

As LI assumes, the Coalition government also learned lessons from the previous big bang enlargement. For example, it supported the idea that the conditionality of enlargement should become tougher and institutionalization of “rule of law” in the applicant countries of the Western Balkans should be at the heart of the accession process (HC 83-xx, 2013, pp. 60-61, HC 83-xxx, 2014, p. 90). Moreover, after the 2004 enlargement, the immigration from the new members started to become an important problem for the old members. Correspondingly, the Coalition government strongly supported the idea that the EU should put some restrictions on the free movement of people across the EU to control the immigration from the new members, which also became the main reason behind the tension between the British government and other members in the forthcoming EU level negotiations. Furthermore, the immigration control needed to be implemented for the future enlargements. For example, the Coalition government supported transitional immigration controls on the Croatian nationals after Croatia’s EU membership in 2013 (Daily Hansard, 2012a). Additionally, the British government called for the applicant countries' consolidated efforts “to tackle illegal migration and improve border management” (HC 219-xvi, 2014, p. 32). However, the British government did not perceive the EU’s further enlargement as a threat with regard to the trans-national issues like illegal migration and cross-border crimes. Contrary to this, according to the British government, the enlargement process was an effective tool to tackle such trans-national issues because the EU accession process was helping to form better functioning candidate states around the EU (HL Paper 129, 2013, p. 62).

\(^{101}\) Turkey’s importance as an alternative energy corridor increased when the EU-Russian relationship started to deteriorate because of the dispute over Georgia and then Ukraine.
6.3.1.2 Economic Concerns

As the previous British governments did, the Coalition government also expected that the further extension of the Single Market would bring more prosperity for all the EU members. To illustrate, David Liddington, the Minister for Europe, (2011), argued that enlargement was a clear way of strengthening the Single Market from which British economy would benefit. More specifically, according to the British government, Britain’s exports of goods and services to the twelve new member states increased from £ 4.5 billion to £ 11.6 billion in ten years (as of 2011) and the further enlargement would support this positive trend. Furthermore, even the pre-accession procedure of the EU’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey would provide new opportunities for British business because the necessary reforms that should be made according to the acquis would make investments in the candidate countries easier and more profitable (HL Paper 129, 2013, p. 61).

In addition to this general expectation, the British government had also specific economic concerns. For example, although the Western Balkan countries were a small market, the rapid growth potentiality in their GDP could make this market more profitable for British business. In this sense, Liddington argued that Croatia’s integration to the EU Single Market could provide British business with more trade and investment opportunities in the fields like; port sector, tourism, and agriculture (Glaze and Hughes, 2011). However, the slow reform progress in the Western Balkans was a problem for British business to invest in the region. For example, Sir John Randall, the Conservative MP and an expert on the region, argued that the Western Balkan countries did not have well-functioning company laws, which might discourage British business from investing in the region (Daily Hansard, 2014).

On the other hand, according to the Coalition government, the Turkish membership would be significantly beneficial to the old members at a time when the EU was facing severe economic problems, because Turkey became the World’s 18th largest economy with a rapid GDP growth in 2011; thus, “Turkish membership would boost the European Single Market and would play a major part in Europe’s long term prosperity by adding significant clout to its common external trade policy” (HL Paper 129, 2013, p. 121, see also: Cm 8370, 2012, see also: Cm 8370, 2012.

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102 The European Commission’s progress report (2014) also confirmed that 2014 was a year of fitful progress in the region in terms of the necessary reforms to strengthen the rule of law (HC 219-Xvi, 2014, p. 24).
p. 17). More specifically, according to the UKTI, the Turkish membership would also provide best export and high value opportunities for British business in the sectors such as energy and environment, information and communications technology, infrastructure, financial and professional services, education services, life sciences, and defence and security (Cm 8370, 2012, p. 16). In addition to this, the British government also expected that Turkey would provide new economic opportunities in the energy sector for British companies (especially for BP) as an energy corridor country (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev56).

British business had also some economic expectations about the EU’s further enlargement similar to that of the British government. For example, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013) carried out a survey in 2013 asking British business groups about their ideas regarding the EU’s further enlargement, and many business groups defined the EU’s further enlargement as an opportunity for British business (e.g. the NFU, TheCityUK, the TUC, Llyods’, and the CBI), and the main reason behind this support was that an enlarged Single Market would create a more competitive EU in the global market, which would boost growth and jobs in Britain. Additionally, according to Business for New Europe (BNE) (2013), “[t]rade between the old and new member states grew almost threefold in less than 10 years (from € 175 billion in 1999 to approximately € 500 billion in 2007)”; thus, it also expected that the further enlargement would have a positive contribution to the increasing trade volume within the EU, in which British business would greatly benefit.

As found in the previous section, British business also continued its special interest in Turkey. For example, “the CBI has designated Turkey as a priority market for increasing UK exports and for attracting inward investment into the UK economy” (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev137). The CBI also perceived Turkey as a bridge for business to access the abovementioned regions. For example, the CBI pointed out that one in four of the largest companies in the Middle East and North Africa was Turkish, and that Turkish contractors were amongst the biggest companies across the Middle East, North Africa and former Soviet states. Under these circumstances, it was attractive for the CBI to form trilateral business networks among British, Turkish and the local companies of these regions (the Middle East, North Africa and former Soviet states) in order to access those markets (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev138). Moreover, the CBI also highlighted the importance of Turkey as an energy corridor country; thus, the energy sector was one of the key sectors to collaborate with Turkish companies (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev137). In the same vein, TheCityUK also
declared Turkey as one of its priority markets in the world, not only because of the big size and scale of the Turkish economy but also because of Turkey’s dynamic private sector offering significant opportunities for British business (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev135). As a result, as LI assumes, these findings clearly show that not only geopolitical but also economic concerns shaped Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards Turkey.

6.3.1.3 The Position of Other Domestic Actors

In the Coalition government era, the Labour Party’s Europeanism was muted and became more pragmatic compared to that of the Blair government (Gifford, 2014, p. 168). Moreover, the Labour Party, in the opposition, continued to support the Coalition government’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. For example, Keith Vaz, the former Minister for Europe and Emma Reynolds, the Shadow Minister for Europe defined Britain’s pro-enlargement policy as an output of the cross-party consensus (Daily Hansard, 2011). Moreover, the Labour Party also supported the Coalition government’s position that the enlargement conditionality should be tougher (e.g. the institutionalization of the rule of law) (ibid.).

In addition to the Labour Party, the CBI (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev138), the TUC (The TUC, 2006), and the NFU (HL Paper 129, 2013, p. 269) as the main influential interest groups also continued to support the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. Therefore, from an LI perspective, the continued consensus among the British actors on a pro-enlargement policy helped the Coalition government to continue Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey when it came to power. In this regard, William Hague, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, also argued that the national consensus on a pro-enlargement policy played a crucial role in Britain’s being one of the main initiators behind the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey (Daily Hansard, 2010).

However, the increasing Euroscepticism among the British people started to dominate the British political landscape. For example, according to an ICM poll conducted in 2001, 68 per cent of the British people were in support of EU membership and 19 per cent were against; however another ICM poll conducted in 2011 showed that 49 per cent were against EU membership and just 40 per cent were for it (Alexander, 2011). In parallel with the change in the British peoples’ attitude towards the EU, the United Kingdom
Independence Party (UKIP) gradually increased its power in British politics at the expense of the Conservative Party by using an anti-immigration rhetoric, which was also covering an anti-enlargement position (Cohen, 2014). For instance, UKIP effectively used a propaganda about a potential immigration influx from Bulgaria and Romania both in the local and EU Parliament election campaigns in 2014 (both held on 22nd May 2014) (Morris, 2013). Consequently, at the EU Parliament elections, while UKIP became the first party with 24 seats, the Conservative Party lost its 7 seats (BBC, 2014b). On the other hand, at the local elections, UKIP won 163 seats but the Conservative Party (-236 seats) and the Liberal Democrats (-310 seats) suffered from a big loss (BBC, 2014a). Subsequently, UKIP won its first Parliamentary seat at the Clacton by-election (at the expense of the Conservative Party) on 9th October 2014 and the second one at the Rochester and Strood by-election on 20th November 2014 (BBC, 2014d, BBC, 2014c). Additionally, the increasing anti-immigration sentiments in Britain even forced the Labour Party to take a tougher position against the immigration from the new EU countries (Settle, 2014, Grice, 2014, Chorley, 2013, Dannreuther and Lightfoot, 2014, p. 176).

As a result of the increasing anti-immigration sentiments among the British people and the increasing power of UKIP, the Coalition government needed to formulate a more Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant policy towards the EU (Richards et al., 2014, p. 259), and gradually become less supportive of the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey (The Economist, 2014, Ker-Lindsay, 2014). In other words, as LI assumes, the Cameron government needed to respond to the changing domestic preferences by shifting its focus from enlargement to immigration at the EU level negotiations.

6.3.2 Intergovernmental Bargains

In its first year, the Coalition government tried to follow an active role within the EU to accelerate the EU’s further enlargement. For example, after taking power in 2010, David Cameron strongly urged the EU to speed up the accession negotiations with Turkey (Meade, 2010). Moreover, the Foreign Minister William Hague (together with his colleagues: Carl Bildt, Franco Frattini, William Hague and Alexander Stubb) launched a
campaign to change the inward-looking tendencies in the EU\textsuperscript{103} and to revitalize “the vision of an open Europe”. To achieve this goal, the foreign ministers also urged the EU leaders to restate their “strong commitment to further enlargement” (Bildt et al., 2010, Agence France Presse, 2010, Pop, 2010). In parallel with this aim, when the EU decided to put Iceland on its enlargement agenda in June 2010, the British government did not consider blocking the accession negotiations with Iceland despite the dispute between Britain and Iceland over the compensation of the British savers’ money in the bankrupt Icelandic banks (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2010, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2010a).

However, the year 2011 became a turning point in the relationship between the British government and the EU when a new wave of deepening negotiations started to dominate the EU’s agenda at the expense of the enlargement, and the enlargement issue mostly became a part of those negotiations. Particularly, in November 2011, as a result of the Eurozone crisis, France revived the proposal for a “two-speed Europe”, in which there would be a “federal” Eurozone as a core and the rest of the members might constitute a “confederation” around it (Agence France Presse, 2011). The Coalition government immediately refused this proposal but reluctantly accepted that a narrow treaty change might be acceptable if it was agreed by all the 27 members and if it did not threaten the City of London’s financial interests. In this discussion, Germany located itself between France and Britain and supported the idea that there should be a deepening in the EU finance system but that it should be agreed by all the 27 members (Watt, 2011). On the other hand, although the non-Euro members (mostly new members from the East Europe) were allies of Britain related to the issue that if there would be a financial change in the EU, it should be decided by all the members (as an alternative to France’s “two tier” plan), unlike Britain, they had a tendency to become a part of a deeper financial system. Thus, they supported Germany’s above-mentioned position (Euobserver.com, 2011, BBC, 2011, Castle, 2011). As a result of the negotiations, the British Prime Minister Cameron vetoed a full treaty proposal applying to all the 27 members\textsuperscript{104}; however, the other 26 members agreed to negotiate to deepen the EU’s financial system according to the German proposal relying on a more central oversight over national budgets to enforce greater fiscal discipline (Erlanger and Castle, 2011).

\textsuperscript{103} The failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the financial crisis highly triggered inward-looking tendencies within the EU.

\textsuperscript{104} Because there was not a sufficient guarantee saving the City of London’s financial interests.
In addition to the increasing tendency among member states to deepen the EU, the anti-EU sentiments among the British people also started to significantly increase in 2012. Thus, the Eurosceptic Conservative backbenchers increased their pressure on David Cameron to promise a referendum on Britain’s EU membership (Grice, 2012). For example, in June 2012, 100 Conservative backbenchers signed a letter to the Prime Minister Cameron demanding an EU referendum after the next general election (Kirkup and Waterfield, 2012). As a response to this pressure, David Cameron promised to re-shape the British-EU relations in a way that would support Britain’s national interests (e.g. free market)\(^{105}\) (Prince, 2012). Therefore, David Cameron (2012) focused on a potential new settlement with the EU and increased the Eurosceptic tone of his voice at the forthcoming negotiations (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2012). On 23\(^{rd}\) February 2013, David Cameron declared that he would renegotiate the British-EU relations, and in the wake of the renegotiations, a referendum would be held by the end of 2017 to give the British people the choice of staying in or leaving the European Union if the Conservative Party won the next election in 2015 (Agence France Presse, 2013d). At this point, the main purpose of the renegotiations would be to push the European integration towards an outward looking/intergovernmental/liberal democratic way (Cameron, 2013). From an LI perspective, with this re-negotiation plan, David Cameron aimed to appease the Eurosceptic concerns at the domestic level. In addition to this, British business also mostly supported Cameron’s demand to renegotiate the British-EU relations after the continental attempts to deepen the Eurozone. For example, John Cridland, the CBI Director General, argued that “[t]he EU single market is fundamental to Britain's future economic success, but the closer union of the Eurozone is not for us […]” (Wintour, 2013, The Independent, 2013).

In the beginning, David Cameron’s re-negotiation plan was in conformity with the EU’s four freedoms principle (the free movements of goods, services, capital, and people across the EU) (Mailonline, 2013, States News Service, 2013). Therefore, despite France’s rejection of it, Germany was willing to discuss Cameron’s re-negotiation plan (Agence France Presse, 2013c, Agence France Presse, 2013e). However, the increasing anti-immigration sentiments in Britain forced Cameron to put the EU’s free movement of

\(^{105}\) However, he also left an open door for a referendum on the new EU that would be decided according to the results of the deepening attempts of the other members in banking, fiscal and political union (Grice, 2012).
people principle in his re-negotiation agenda, and he argued that it should be changed to solve the immigration problem (Gradner, 2013). In concrete terms, in November 2013 just before lifting the restriction on the Bulgarian and Romanian peoples’ right of free movement across the EU, David Cameron outlined a proposal which suggested a ban on the claims of people from new EU members (especially from Bulgaria and Romania) for housing benefit, a three-month wait before the claim for jobseeker's allowance and then only for six months, and the deportation of beggars/homeless immigrants and one year restriction on their return to Britain (Mason, 2013, Agence France Presse, 2013a). Moreover, according to Cameron, a prospective new member state's GDP, income or wage level should be used as a condition for its workers to get the right to work in other EU countries (Grice and Mcdonald-Gibson, 2013).

From an LI perspective, there was also a strong domestic pressure behind this proposal. For example, the Fresh Start group of Conservative backbenchers issued a manifesto demanding “to limit the free movement of people across the EU” (Winnett and Kirkup, 2013, Agence France Presse, 2013b). Theresa May, the Home Secretary, also warned about another potential immigration influx from Bulgaria and Romania when the limits on the movement of Romanian and Bulgarian workers were lifted in January 2014 (Savage and Gray, 2013). In addition to the Home Secretary, the Eurosceptic Conservative members also put a strong pressure on Cameron to limit welfare benefits before Bulgarian and Romanian workers started free travel across the EU in January 2014 (Singh, 2013, Chapman, 2013). On the other hand, UKIP started to use a potential immigration influx from Bulgaria and Romania in its election campaigns (the local and the EU parliament elections in 2014). For instance, it argued that an influx of 350,000 to 400,000 Romanians or Bulgarians might come to Britain (Morris, 2013).

To put this plan into practice, Cameron needed the consent of the other members. Thus, he tried to ally with Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, which had also a positive tendency towards a more intergovernmental regulation on the issue of immigration (Coates, 2013, Hope and Dixon, 2013, Shipman, 2013, Brown, 2013). However, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria were not willing to accept Cameron’s plan because according to them, the free movement of people was one of the untouchable principles of the EU.

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106 From an LI perspective, this case is a good example showing that national sensitivity is highly influential in the foreign policy making process.
Moreover, the Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) also criticized Cameron’s restrictive plan on immigration and declared that they would be against any change in the EU’s free movement of people principle (Kennedy, 2013). Additionally, the Scandinavian countries also perceived the free movement of people as a core EU principle; therefore, they did not support Cameron’s plan, either (Tisdall, 2014).

As a result of his failure to find allies within the EU, Cameron toughened his position at the December 2013 EU summit and declared that he would veto any further enlargement unless the other EU members agreed to reform the EU’s free movement of people principle to prevent “benefit tourism” from poorer members to richer members (Meade, 2013, Waterfield, 2013). According to Cameron (2013), the EU’s enlargement towards the East was a success but transnational controls were needed to cope with the side effects of it such as uncontrolled immigration (see also: Waterfield, 2013, Savage and Bremner, 2013). Therefore, this case confirms LI’s assumption that national interests were the main driving force behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. In concrete terms, when the EU’s further enlargement’s negative externality (e.g. uncontrolled immigration) became intolerable at the domestic level, the British government correspondingly decreased its support for the EU’s enlargement, and the solution of it (uncontrolled immigration) became a condition for a stronger support.

Furthermore, Cameron’s failure to achieve a reform in the EU’s free movement of people principle to cope with the uncontrolled immigration problem increased the domestic pressure on him. For example, 95 Conservative MPs wrote a letter to Cameron and demanded a legislation change that would “re-establish a national veto over current and future EU laws and enable Parliament to disapply EU legislation, where it is in [Britain’s] vital national interests to do so” (The Telegraph, 2014). However, the Cameron government did not support this unilateral “zero-sum” game tactic. According to the Foreign Secretary William Hague, this proposal would make the Single Market unworkable (and everybody would lose in it) (The Guardian, 2014). Therefore, the British government continued to try to convince its partners within the EU to reform the principle

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107 It was highly possible that Cameron’s anti-enlargement position was more of an output of his short-run tactic to force other members to accept a reform in the principle of free movement of people to control inner immigration within the EU. For example, despite this tactical position, he reiterated that there was not any change in his support for Britain’s longstanding pro-enlargement policy towards Turkey when he visited Turkey in December 2014 (Cohen, 2014).
of the free movement of the people. For example, David Cameron continued to look for Germany’s support to make an EU level reform in the EU’s inner immigration policy in the first half of 2014 (Sky News, 2014).

In the second half of 2014, UKIP’s significant success in the EU Parliament elections and the local elections and winning two seats in the House of Commons via the by-elections shocked the Conservative Party and highly limited David Cameron’s freedom of manoeuvre at the EU level negotiations. Correspondingly, at the domestic level, Cameron made a major cabinet reshuffle to form a more Eurosceptic Cabinet before the 2015 national election. For example, arch-Eurosceptic Philip Hammond was appointed as the new foreign secretary (Agence France Presse, 2014a, Agence France Presse, 2014b, Morris, 2014). At the EU level, Cameron increased his voice about the necessity of a reform in the EU’s free movement of people principle (Maddox, 2014) and also suggested an “emergency brake” mechanism\(^{108}\) to control the inner immigration movements within the EU (Chapman, 2014). Moreover, he reiterated that the British government would veto any further enlargement unless a new deal on the immigration issue was renegotiated (Chapman, 2014, Waterfield, 2014, Chorley, 2014). Interestingly, the Eurosceptic Conservatives also started to strongly associate enlargement with immigration as of 2014. For example, Cameron’s support to start the accession negotiations with Albania was criticized by the Eurosceptic Conservatives (Shipman and Grimston, 2014).

However, the other members were strongly against any change in the EU’s free movement of people principle despite the Cameron government’s increasing efforts to achieve it (BBC, 2014e). For instance, France and Germany repeatedly declared that the EU’s free movement of people principle was at the core of the EU and was non-negotiable (Dominiczak, 2014, Islam, 2014, Elks, 2014, Pancevski and Shipman, 2014).

In conclusion, from an LI perspective, the domestic consensus on a pro-enlargement policy collapsed in Britain due to the increasing anti-immigration sentiments, and the domestic demand for a solution to the uncontrolled immigration from the EU members forced the Cameron government to attempt to renegotiate one of the EU’s core principles (free movement of people) with other members. However, this demand was non-negotiable for the other members. Therefore, this unsettled problem might trigger a bigger crisis in the

\(^{108}\) This mechanism would also help the Conservative Party to reduce net migration to under 100,000 people by 2015, which was a big promise given in its 2010 general election manifesto.
British-EU relations if the Conservative Party, who already promised an EU referendum, won the general elections in May 2015.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter analysed Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey from an LI perspective. As found in the previous enlargement cases (the Mediterranean, the EFTA, and the Eastward), this case has also showed that LI’s two-level game approach was useful in systematically analysing Britain’s national preferences over the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, and the British governments’ defence of them at the EU level negotiations. As with the previous chapters, the findings of this chapter also confirm LI’s intergovernmental explanation that Britain’s support for the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey was mainly shaped according to her national interests.

The existing national consensus on the support for the EU’s enlargement process continued for the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey at the beginning of the 2000s, and this national consensus made the Labour government one of the main initiators of the EU’s further enlargement at the EU level. The Labour government was highly active to achieve the stabilization of the Western Balkans and to stimulate the enlargement process towards the Western Balkans. For example, at the Thessaloniki Summit, the Labour government tried to convince the other members to promise the Western Balkan states EU membership if they fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria despite France’s reluctance. In 2004, the Labour government also aimed to shift the EU agenda from the deepening of the EU (the Draft Constitution) to the widening of it, and launched an EU level campaign to start the accession negotiations with Turkey. As a more prominent example, the Labour government did not need to take a measure to restrict any potential immigration flow from the new members at the accession negotiations. However, the increasing anti-immigration sentiments at the domestic level started to limit the Labour government’s pro-enlargement policy after the Eastward enlargement. In 2007, this domestic pressure even resulted in a split within the Labour Cabinet (between the Home and Foreign Offices) while taking an immigration restriction measure against Romania and Bulgaria. More dramatically, when the Coalition government came to power in 2010, it energetically tried to stimulate the EU’s further enlargement; however, the increasing domestic pressure on it to find a solution to the immigration influx from the new members
forced David Cameron to demand to renegotiate the EU’s free movement of people principle. Subsequently, as other members (e.g. France and Germany) rejected this demand, Cameron declared that the British government would veto any further enlargement unless a permanent solution to the immigration problem was found. As a result, as LI assumes, the successive British governments (the Labour and the Coalition governments) did not sacrifice any significant British interest (or any significant domestic demand) for the sake of the EU’s further enlargement.

As found in the previous cases, this case has also found that LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice approach was limited in explaining Britain’s national preference formation process for a pro-enlargement policy. Firstly, the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey began as an open-ended process. As of 2014, most of the applicants (except Croatia) had failed to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In addition to this, after the big bang enlargement, the EU started to suffer from an ‘enlargement fatigue’. In addition to this, the further enlargement process was regularly connected to further deepening projects (e.g. the Lisbon Treaty) (mostly initiated by France), which posed complicated externalities to member states. As a result of these factors, it was hard for the British governments to clearly estimate the costs and benefits of this open-ended process. Secondly, unlike LI’s emphasis on economic reasons, the chapter has found that geopolitical/security concerns were the main reason behind Britain’s support for the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. According to the successive British governments, the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans would be a real solution to the Balkans conflict, which was threatening peace and prosperity in Europe. On the other hand, attaining EU membership would consolidate the institutionalization of democracy in Turkey, and a democratic Turkey would become a geopolitical bridge to access the Islamic world, which was strategically important for the British governments in a time when Britain was involved in the ‘War on Terror’ against Islamic radicals. Additionally, the British governments hoped that the EU’s further enlargement would make it more Atlanticist in line with Britain’s NATO centred collective security understanding.

Despite the domination of the security concerns in the national preference formation process, ideological motivations and economic expectations, intertwined with those security concerns, also affected the decision making process. There was a common consensus among many British actors (the Labour government, the Coalition government,
and several British interest groups) on the expectation that the EU’s further enlargement would strengthen the EU’s Single Market in the globalized competitive world market. In addition to this, they also anticipated that the further expansion of the market economy principles in Europe via the EU’s enlargement would create more prosperity for the entire continent in the long-run. More specifically, the Western Balkans’ markets were not so attractive due to governmental/structural problems in the region; however, the booming Turkish market was attractive to British business. For example, as noted above, the CBI argued that Turkey’s EU membership would provide significant economic opportunities for British business in many sectors (environment, water, education and training, financial and legal services, police and security, power, transport infrastructure, ICT/Telecommunications, and agribusiness) (HC 367-ii, 2008, p. ev101). British business also perceived Turkey as an economic bridge to access the markets surrounding the country (e.g. the Middle East, North Africa, the Central Asia).

Therefore, as LI assumes, it could be argued that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkan countries and Turkey was an output of a multi-causal reasoning, covering economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns, as it was a complex issue to make clear-cut cost-benefit calculations on. However, as repeatedly argued in the previous chapters, LI does not propose any further explanation about this multi-causal reasoning. In this sense, as the literature review suggested, Britain’s foreign policy structure might have provided a rationale for the successive British governments’ support for the EU’s further enlargement. More specifically, the British governments’ pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey depended on their expectations rather than precise cost-benefit calculations, but those expectations might have been rational within the broader British foreign policy framework. For example, the expectation to institutionalize democracy and market economy principles in the Western Balkans and Turkey via enlargement was in parallel with the broader British foreign policy objective aiming to create a global market economy. As another example, the expectation to solve the Western Balkans security problem via enlargement was also in compliance with Britain’s collective security strategy. Additionally, the positive feedback from the Mediterranean and Eastward enlargement waves also empirically supported the British governments’ expectations about the EU’s further enlargement.

The findings have also showed that LI’s pluralistic decision making assumption is limited in explaining this case. Similar to the previous cases, this case has also showed that the
British governments were the dominant actors in the national preference formation process for a pro-enlargement policy on the EU’s further enlargement. For example, the British Trade International (a joint DTI and FCO body) launched a campaign in 1998 to encourage British business to invest more in the Turkish market. In addition to this, after the failure of British business to sufficiently benefit from the opportunities in the CEECs, the Labour government employed the UKTI to raise the awareness of British business of the opportunities in Turkey. Despite the domination of the British executive/governments in the decision making process, as LI assumes, the British interest groups which were sensitive to the enlargement also tried to affect the British governments according to their specific interests. For example, several interest groups (e.g. the UK Steel Association, the British Music Rights, the Scotch Whisky Association-the Gin and Vodka Association of Great Britain, and the Publishers’ Association) asked the Labour government to strictly screen Turkey’s adaptation of the acquis, which would further liberalize the Turkish market and thus British business would more easily enter this market. More notably, as noted above, the increasing enlargement-related anti-immigration sentiments among the British public limited the British governments’ autonomy/flexibility in the decision making process for a pro-enlargement policy on the EU’s further enlargement. As a result of this domestic pressure, David Cameron even declared that Britain would veto any further enlargement unless the immigration problem was solved. Therefore, these findings support LI’s assumption that the British governments could not ignore increasing/significant domestic demands even if the EU’s further enlargement was desirable in terms of the British foreign policy objectives.
7 Conclusion

7.1 The Summary of the Findings

The European Union is not a fully-fledged system but still an ongoing process, which is continuing through deepening its organizational system and through widening its borders towards new members. Within this complexity, as discussed in the first chapter, the literature on the Britain-EU relations defines Britain as a Eurosceptic member by placing the deepening dimension of the integration process at the centre of its focus. On the other hand, when the widening dimension of the integration process is considered, Britain, as a leading Eurosceptic member, emerges as a staunch supporter of the EU’s enlargement waves from 1975 to 2014. At this point, Britain’s continuous support for the EU’s enlargement waves emerged as an interesting academic case to study (especially to understand a Eurosceptic member's behaviour within the EU system). In addition to this, the literature review showed that there is not any direct research on this topic; thus by studying it, the research also filled a gap and contributed an original study to the literature.

To develop a deeper analytical framework, firstly, the research extended the literature review on Britain’s relations with EU (including related studies on EU enlargement). According to the existing literature, the main reason behind Britain’s continuous support for the EU’s enlargement might be her ambition to dilute supranational attempts in the European integration process. While this argument is plausible bearing in mind Britain's traditional concerns about the integration process, there are two reasons why we should not be satisfied with this explanation and why we need to further probe the reasons for this policy. Firstly, even a cursory knowledge of the EU reveals that at times, the enlargement process has acted as a catalyst for the deepening of the EU. For example, the EU needed to make structural reforms to prepare itself for the Eastward enlargement, which also deepened the EU’s governance (e.g. QMV). To put it another way, Britain's support for enlargement, certainly over the last twenty-five years, has ended up producing the sorts of outcomes that British governments were trying to avoid. Why persist with enlargement if it was having these counter-productive results? Secondly, the dilution of integration argument suggests that Britain supported enlargement over a forty year period for largely the same reasons. However, the different waves of EU enlargement took place in widely different international contexts and were supported by British governments with varied ideological and political complexions. Therefore, it is highly possible that these changes
had an effect on Britain’s pro-enlargement policy, and that different British governments supported enlargement at different times for different reasons. Additionally, the literature review showed that Britain aimed to drive the European integration process towards an outward looking intergovernmental way in line with her foreign policy objectives as an alternative to the inward-looking supranational projects. Thus, this finding from the literature suggested that EU enlargement might have become a tool for Britain to achieve her broader foreign policy objectives rather than a simple dilution tool used solely to prevent supranational tendencies within the EU. As a result, the literature review showed that it would be scientifically interesting to study the question: *why Britain as a leading Eurosceptic member continuously supported the EU’s enlargement from 1975 to 2014*. 

To systematically answer this question, the research benefited from a hypothetico-deductive reasoning. In concrete terms, the research used a set of theoretical assumptions as a potential answer to the research question and then tested their correctness in the four different enlargement cases (the Mediterranean, the EFTA, the Eastward and the Western Balkans/Turkey) by analysing the empirically collected data. In this regard, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) emerged as a potential theory, which could make the research question more knowable and methodologically more workable. First of all, as noted above, the literature review showed that Britain is a leading Eurosceptic member with a tendency to take decisions on the EU related issues according to her national interests. Therefore, LI’s member state centred intergovernmental approach would be helpful. Secondly, it is highly possible that a pro-enlargement policy for every enlargement case might have been shaped according to their situational conditions (according to different domestic and international dynamics). In this regard, LI’s methodological individualism made it possible to separately study Britain’s pro-enlargement policy on every single enlargement wave in the relevant situational conditions/historical contexts (British actors’ positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves). Thirdly, LI’s two-level game approach provided an analytical framework, through which potential reasons behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy became more knowable, since this approach enabled the researcher to study how a pro-enlargement policy for every enlargement wave emerged as an output of a national preference formation process and how successive British governments defended domestically determined preferences at EU level negotiations.

LI also helped to develop a methodological framework to collect empirical data. Firstly, in line with LI’s methodological individual approach, the research was designed as a
qualitative case study, through which every enlargement wave was separately analysed by focusing on relevant British actors’ positions on the EU’s enlargement waves. Secondly, Moravcsik gathered historical evidence while formulating his LI. For example, in his prominent book: ‘the Choice for Europe’, Moravcsik (1998) analysed five historical cases: the Rome Treaty, the Common Market, the EMS, the SEA, and the Maastricht Treaty. In line with this method, this research also collected historical evidence as the studied enlargement cases are historical phenomena as well. More specifically, archival research was chosen as the main data collection method, and thanks to this method, extensive in-depth data was collected about the British governments’ and numerous British societal groups’ positions on the EU’s enlargement waves. In the data collection process, the research mainly benefited from the publications of the House of Commons (the documents starting with the abbreviations: HC, CM, Cmnd), which provided comprehensive empirical data about the official positions of the successive British governments, other British political parties and societal groups towards the EU’s enlargement waves (via http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk). Moreover, Hansard (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com) was another source providing official documents about the parliamentary discussions on enlargement. Additionally, further data about the CBI’s and TUC’s positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves was acquired through visiting the Modern Records Centre (The University of Warwick) and the Trades Union Congress Library Collections (London Metropolitan University).

The research also considered the criticisms on Moravcsik’s methodology. As noted in chapter 2, the main point of the critiques is that Moravcsik’s historical evidence selection is theory-biased (that he mainly collected data that supported his own theory) (see: Kaiser, 2007, 2009, 2010, Lieshout et al., 2004, Kaiser et al., 2009). To deal with this drawback, the research tried to analyse all of the enlargement-related EU level summits/meetings (from 1980s to 2014) to as great an extent as possible. In this regard, factual news reports from the print media appeared as a rich data source of the enlargement-related EU level negotiations, and the research accessed this data via LexisNexis, a rich print media online dataset (http://www.lexisnexis.com). To strengthen the validity of the data collected from LexisNexis, the researcher strictly evaluated news reports by crosschecking the news reports obtained from different sources (e.g. newspapers or news agencies). In addition to this, the research also benefited from the officially released conclusions of the EU summits (via the Archive of European Integration (http://aei.pitt.edu) and the official website of the
European Council (www.consilium.europa.eu)). In doing so, this research synthesised a new/original data collection method to deal with the LI’s above-mentioned methodological limitation. Additionally, as Moravcsik had also done, the research also tried to collect data via interviews and memoirs/biographies/autobiographies of the leading British actors; however, the collected data via those methods was limited and became only supplementary data for the research.

After collecting comprehensive data on Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EU’s four enlargement cases (the Mediterranean, the EFTA, the Eastward and the Western Balkans/Turkey), the research had sufficient empirical evidence to test LI’s assumptions on Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. Firstly, all of the cases confirmed LI’s intergovernmental approach that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy for every enlargement case was shaped according to her national interests. In other words, the British governments did not sacrifice significant national interests for the sake of the EU’s enlargement waves, and whenever the prospect of enlargement put Britain’s national interests at risk, the successive British governments tried to guarantee significant British interests at EU level negotiations. For example, in the case of the Mediterranean enlargement, the Thatcher government did not tolerate the increasing burden of the EU budget on Britain for the sake of the enlargement and strongly negotiated to get the British rebate at the Fontainebleau Summit in 1984. In the EFTA enlargement case, the Conservative government refused to give any derogation from the acquis to the EFTA countries at the negotiations on the EEA. In the Eastward enlargement case, the Labour government tried to save Britain’s national interests at the enlargement-related reform negotiations despite having a more pro-European position than its predecessor. In terms of the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, the Cameron government even declared that it would veto any potential EU enlargement unless the immigration problem was solved, because the enlargement-related immigration problem began to be seen as a big problem at the domestic level. This finding also supports the argument that LI’s two-level game approach is highly effective in understanding member states’ behaviour within the EU system, and that as LI argues, domestic consensus/consent is still dominantly influential over member states’ behaviour within the EU, unlike other approaches which give more importance to the EU level dynamics.

Secondly, as noted in the theory chapter, LI assumes that economic concerns might have become the main driving force behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. However, none of
the four cases could access any significant empirical data supporting this assumption. To demonstrate, it has been found that geopolitical concerns were the dominant factor behind Britain’s support for the Mediterranean enlargement, the Eastward enlargement, and the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. In terms of the EFTA enlargement, ideological concerns were the dominant factor behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. Despite this finding, the empirical evidence has also showed that economic concerns were still an important variable affecting British actors’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves in all of the four cases. More specifically, in all four cases, it has been found that economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns, which affected British actors’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves, were actually intertwined with each other, and it is hard to totally separate them from one another. For example, if geopolitical concerns alone are used to explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards Spain, it is hard to explain why Britain did not use her veto power against Spain in order to gain advantage over the Gibraltar dispute, which was one of the most crucial geopolitical/security concerns of Britain in the 1980s. If economic concerns alone are used to explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the neutral EFTA countries, it is hard to explain Britain's reduced enthusiasm for their EC members in the Cold War context. If geopolitical concerns alone are used to explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Eastward enlargement, it is hard to explain why Britain did not perceive Germany’s having greater economic and geopolitical gains as a threat. Additionally, the research has found that many British actors perceived Turkey as a bridge between the West and the Middle East not only because of geopolitical reasons but also because of their expectations of economic benefits; therefore, the arguments using only geopolitical reasons to explain Britain’s support for Turkey’s EU membership are deficient and oversimplified.

In addition to this finding, the research has also showed that LI’s microeconomics oriented rational choice logic is limited in explaining Britain’s national preference formation processes at the every enlargement wave. In concrete terms, the enlargement cases were too complex for the British actors to make precise cost-benefit calculations on. All of the cases have showed that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy actually depended on British actors’ expectations rather than being an output of a precise cost-benefit calculation. From time to time, the British governments even faced unexpected externalities of the enlargement waves. For example, the Major government could not clearly anticipate the increasing power of QMV mechanism in the EU decision making system as a negative
externality of the EFTA enlargement. More dramatically, the Blair government miscalculated the effect of immigration on Britain as a side effect of the Eastward enlargement. However, this logic sufficiently explains why Britain did not perceive Germany’s having more economic and geopolitics gains from the EFTA and Eastward enlargement as a threat although the successive British governments were already aware of this fact.

Related to this limitation, the research has also found that the successive British governments were the main actor in the national preference formation process and even played an entrepreneurial role through encouraging British business to exploit economic opportunities in the new member states, unlike LI’s pluralistic decision making assumption. Especially in the 1990s, both the Conservative and Labour governments tried to attract the attention of British business to the economic opportunities stemming from the EFTA and the Eastward enlargement waves. However, as noted in the theory chapter, to compensate for this limitation, LI argues that if a member state needs to decide on a complex issue, its government might be more dominant in the national preference formation process compared to societal groups because societal groups are limited in making decisions on complex issues. Related to this argument, the research has also observed that there was a general consensus on a pro-enlargement policy between the successive British governments and societal groups. However, whenever societal groups perceived any of the enlargement waves as a risk to their specific interests, they tried to affect the successive British governments and the governments were responsive to those demands. For example, the Conservative government considered the British horticulture, textile, steel, and fishery sectors’ concerns at the EEC level negotiations on the Mediterranean enlargement. In parallel with the CBI’s demand, the Conservative government also refused to give any privilege to the EFTA countries during the negotiations on the EEA. In terms of the Eastward enlargement, there was a consensus between the Labour government and several societal groups (e.g. the CBI, the Institute of Directors, and the NFU) on the point that the EU needed structural reforms including the CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds and the EU governance system prior to the enlargement. Therefore, the Labour government strictly followed EU level negotiations to achieve those reforms. As for the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, as noted above, the Cameron government was highly responsive to the increasing
enlargement-related anti-immigration sentiments at the domestic level; thus, this issue became one of the main points on its EU agenda (as of 2014).

To deal with its above-mentioned limitations, as noted in the theory chapter, LI proposes a multi-causal reasoning, containing economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns, which might affect British actors’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves. More specifically, despite LI’s logic of micro-economics, Moravcsik (1995, p. 612, 1998, p. 7, together with Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 68) accepted that if actors cannot make a clear cost-benefit calculation on an issue, geopolitical and/or ideological concerns can affect their decisions on it, to an equal or greater extent than economic concerns would. However, although Moravcsik’s multi-causal reasoning is useful in understanding the (more) specific reasons behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards every enlargement wave in practice, his adaptation of multi-causal reasoning in LI also contains some theoretical problems. On the one hand, although Moravcsik accepted that ideological motivations might influence economic and geopolitical concerns, especially under uncertainty, he defined them just as a “transmission belt” for economic and geopolitical interests (see: Moravcsik, 1999b, p. 675); however, this attempt still seems descriptive and cannot satisfactorily explain how ideological motivations might affect actors’ attitudes. On the other hand, it could be argued that it undermines the parsimony and arguably the distinctiveness of LI. If rational decision making capable of identifying the overall material gains/losses from a particular decision is not possible (because of its complexity), and LI then falls back on other factors (political and/or ideological), what are the limits to LI as an explanatory theory? Under what conditions might we be able to specify that LI (or at least its rational choice assumption) is not that helpful, or is falsifiable? Put a different way, is LI really a theory in the way that it wants to claim? Is it just another political science approach which, because of the complicated nature of life in politics, is only really capable of ‘thick description’?

One criticism of LI that appears to have real resonance is its neglect of the importance of structure. Many of the case studies have stressed the importance of broader foreign policy principles/objectives rooted in the past that have influenced Britain’s stance towards enlargement. In particular, as noted in chapter 1, British foreign policy was institutionalized on a logic aiming to strengthen Britain’s collective security policy and to expand democracy and market economy principles further as it is believed that it provides more prosperity and peace to Britain; therefore, within this framework/structure, it might
have been rational for British actors to expect that the EU’s enlargement waves, which would unify Europe and expand democracy and market economy principles further, would provide Britain with more prosperity and peace. Moreover, the British foreign policy objectives as a structure might have helped the successive British governments (actors) to evaluate the EU’s enlargement waves according to the “situational conditions” surrounding the waves (see also: Tversky and Kahneman, 1990, p. 85). In this regard, it is not clear how LI, with its stress on actors and their preferences, can accommodate the importance of this ideational structure, yet it has proved to be influential throughout the forty years of British diplomacy in this area.

In this context, it could be argued that Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist arguments might aid our understanding of this structure and its influence on British policy towards EU enlargement (see: Pierson, 1998, 2001, 2000, 2003, 2004). As noted in the theory chapter (chapter 2), this approach argues that if actors cannot make precise cost-benefit calculations on a complex issue, they might benefit from the structure/institution in which they exist. From this perspective, the findings from the case studies support the argument that the historically institutionalized British foreign policy principles (liberal ideals) supported British actors’ economic and geopolitical expectations as they could not make clear cost-benefit calculations on the enlargement waves, and in this way it is highly possible that those principles (ideological beliefs) affected British actors’ attitudes towards the enlargement waves.

As Pierson (2004, p.126) argued, the research has showed that all of the enlargement waves were exogenous developments to which Britain needed to respond. In other words, the applications of the Mediterranean countries, EFTA countries, the CEECs, the Western Balkan countries and Turkey were not an output of Britain’s national preferences, but rather, Britain needed to react to their applications. To put it another way, the EU’s enlargement waves started with other European countries’ applications; thus, old members were under a selection pressure (either to support or veto). Therefore, this selection pressure might have limited the British governments’ rational choices about the enlargement waves and driven them to choose the best one among the existing options. For example, Germany and France tried to develop a privilege membership formula regarding Turkey’s integration to the EU, which would become alternatively the optimum option regarding their national interests. However, when this option was brought to the EU’s
agenda, Turkey strongly refused it and it failed. Yet, Britain was against this option (see: HC 367-i. 2008, p. 19).

Pierson’s (1998, p. 39, 2004, p. 125) historical Institutionalist approach also argues that if the gap between an action and its outcome is wide regarding a political issue, it will be harder for actors to precisely estimate outcomes and externalities at an initial stage. In line with this argument, the research has found that it took years to complete the enlargement waves, and this might have made it harder for the British governments to make a precise cost-benefit calculation while developing Britain’s national preferences over the enlargement waves. As a result, from this point of view, it is highly possible that the successive British governments might have benefited from historically institutionalized British foreign policy priorities/principles, covering geopolitical, economic and ideological concerns, to develop an optimal response (national preferences) to those waves. For instance, the Conservative government perceived the EFTA enlargement as a part of its bigger project to design the European integration according to neoliberal principles in the wake of the global/post-Cold War era. Both Conservative and Labour governments tried to use the Eastward enlargement to institutionalize liberal democracy and market economy principles in Europe to maintain perpetual peace and economic prosperity in the continent in the post-Cold War era. In a similar vein, the EU’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans was perceived by the successive British governments (Labour and Coalition governments) as a permanent solution to institutionalize democracy and peace in the continent. More interestingly, according to them, Turkey’s EU membership was very important for the West to access the Islamic world in the era of the ‘War on Terror’. Additionally, according to Pierson’s historical institutionalist assumption, positive feedback from previous experiences (historical learning) might affect actors’ future decisions in uncertainty (see: Pierson, 2004). In this regard, the research has found that while evaluating the Eastward enlargement, the success in the democratization of the Mediterranean countries via enlargement became a positive feedback for the British governments and then the Eastward enlargement for the Western Balkans.

According to Pierson (1998, 2004), the gap between action and outcome not only makes rational calculations harder but also it results in unanticipated consequences in time. In this sense, the research has found that the EU negotiations on the enlargement waves had ‘high issue density’, which increasingly covered other issues like the EU budget, the CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, the EU’s decision making mechanisms, and immigration.
Therefore, according to this assumption, it is highly possible that the successive British governments could not estimate all the possible negative externalities of the enlargement waves to Britain although they might have had a tendency to eliminate any potential externality that they detected. For example, as noted above, the increasing power of the QMV mechanism was an unanticipated consequence of the EFTA enlargement for the Major government, and the immigration flows from the new members was an unanticipated consequence of the Eastward enlargement for the Blair government. However, unlike Pierson’s (1998) arguments, those unanticipated consequences in the enlargement process did not lead to a ‘path-dependence’, but as LI assumes, the British governments tried to eliminate those unexpected negative externalities at the forthcoming EU level negotiations. To illustrate, as of 2014, the Cameron government had a renegotiation agenda, containing the above-mentioned unanticipated consequences, and Cameron also promised to hold an EU referendum on the outcomes of these renegotiations with the EU (see: chapter 6).

In a nutshell, HI (particularly Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist approach) has provided further explanations for the points where LI’s rational choice assumption is limited. More specifically, it contributes further explanations about how/why the issue of enlargement is a complex issue (its being an exogenous development and relatively a long process) and how the British foreign policy structure might help British actors to make decisions on this complex issue as they cannot make precise cost-benefit calculations on it. However, this does not make HI a better theoretical approach than LI to explain the research case. Put in another way, HI has its own limitations in explaining this case.

Firstly, as noted in the theory chapter, if this case is studied through a ‘structure’ centred approach (HI); it methodologically needs to put more emphasis on the EU as a structure and less on Britain as an actor; thus, it is highly possible that it might miss/omit some important findings revealed via LI’s intergovernmentalist approach. More specifically, if Britain’s pro-enlargement policy is mainly defined as an output of the British foreign policy structure, this perspective cannot answer the question: why/how did Cameron as an actor swiftly change Britain’s pro-enlargement policy in the same foreign policy structure? Alternatively, rational choice institutionalism (including LI) also accepts that actors deliberately/strategically benefit from ‘structure’ (as a ‘strategic context’) in the pursuit of their interests (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 7, Checkel, 2001, p. 20). From this point of view, British actors might deliberately have benefited from the British foreign policy
structure to decide on the complex enlargement issue for a long time as enlargement did not actually pose any significant threat to British actors’ interests (or the successive British governments successfully eliminated them at EU level negotiations). However, when British actors started to perceive the immigration influx from new members to Britain as a significant threat and the Cameron government failed to eliminate this problem at EU level negotiations, the government could change its behaviour even in the same structure. From this perspective, therefore, the swift change in Cameron’s enlargement policy as a reaction to the immigration problem is more explicable.

Secondly, as noted above, thanks to LI’s two level game approach, the research has found that the successive British governments not only formed a pro-enlargement policy as a domestic position but also they were highly effective actors at EU level in accelerating/achieving the EU’s enlargement waves. For example, Tony Blair was the first EU leader who declared that the Eastward enlargement should be completed before the 2004 European Parliamentary elections. As another example, the Labour government played an influential role at EU level by convincing other members to start the accession negotiations with Turkey. However, a structure centred HI approach might omit these important findings (related to actors’ behaviour). In addition to this, as HI cannot sufficiently explain ‘change’ in actors’ behaviour (see: Schmidt, 2010, p. 50, Mahoney and Thelen, 2009, p. 1, Peters, 2011, p. 77), it may not clearly explain tactical changes in member states’ behaviour at the EU level negotiations, but LI’s two-level game approach sufficiently presented them in all of the four enlargement cases. In addition to its two level game approach, as noted above, LI’s intergovernmental approach was highly effective in explaining how a pro-enlargement policy for every enlargement wave emerged as an output of a national decision making process. In this regard, the influence of the British foreign policy, as a structure, in Britain’s pro-enlargement policy might challenge LI’s rational choice assumption; however, as a domestic factor affecting Britain’s position towards EU enlargement, it cannot refute LI’s state-centric intergovernmentalist position (realist side of LI) \(^\text{109}\).

As a result, the author defends his use of LI as a theory for explaining British policy towards EU enlargement. As noted in chapter 2, all theoretical approaches have their

\(^{109}\) As noted in the theory chapter, LI is a synthesis of state-centric intergovernmentalism, rational choice institutionalism and liberal IR theory (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2005, p. 79).
detractors: no theory is perfect. What matters is that the choice of theory was appropriate at the time it was made (i.e. before the research for the case studies was conducted). As noted in chapter 2, because LI’s analytical focus was on member states and their role within the EU, LI was deemed suitable as a theory for a thesis that was also focusing on a member state (Britain) and its policy towards the EU (specifically enlargement). In addition to this, the findings from the four enlargement cases have also clearly confirmed that LI’s two level game approach and intergovernmental assumptions are sufficiently explanatory in this research. However, the findings have also showed that LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice logic and pluralistic decision making understanding were limited in explaining the research case. At this point, the research welcomes more research utilising HI in this area, which might compensate for LI’s above-mentioned limitations (in this regard, as noted in the theory chapter, the attempt to integrate HI into the theoretical framework was far beyond the scope of this problem oriented PhD project).

7.2 Further Implications of the Findings

As noted above, the European integration is still an ongoing process, which makes it hardly predictable, but at the same time, an interesting case for political scientists. Therefore, there are numerous studies trying to understand/explain this process from different theoretical perspectives. At this point, two basic questions are still important in the EU studies; namely, whether the European integration is reversible or irreversible and whether member states are melting/will melt in a European supranational pot or not. Many brilliant studies were devoted to answering these questions, and several theoretical approaches were developed to answer them. For example, according to Haas and Lindberg’s neofunctionalist assumption, the European integration process was irreversible (Börzel, 2006, p. 29); however, Stanley Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalist approach challenged this assumption by arguing that the integration process was actually reversible (Hoffmann, 1966). The acceleration of the integration process after the late 1980s also heated up the discussions on these questions (Tallberg, 2003). As deeply discussed in chapter 2, LI continued Hoffmann’s intergovernmental approach (e.g. Moravcsik, 1998, see also: Bomberg et al., 2015 ), but there emerged an influential supranational/constructivist block arguing that the European integration was becoming increasingly irreversible (via Europeanization) and that member states were melting in the EU’s supranational pot (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2001, Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989). However, recent developments such as the euro crisis, the decreasing popularity of the EU among its nations, and the
increasing power of the far right parties in the member states using an anti-EU rhetoric have opened another phase in the discussions on these questions in the literature. Particularly, the popularity of supranational arguments has been in decline after the euro crisis (2008) (Blavoukos and Oikonomou, 2012, Coman and Crespy, 2014). For example, even Hooghe and Marks (2009), who could be considered as the founders of the Multilevel Governance approach, accepted that there happened a shift in the EU nations’ attitudes from “permissive consensus” to “constraining dissensus”; thus, domestic concerns have become a more constraining/influential factor in member states’ behaviour at the EU level. Moreover, new theoretical syntheses have emerged in the literature, putting more emphasis on member states and intergovernmentalism in their arguments (Bickerton et al., 2015, Puetter, 2014). For example, according to Uwe Puetter’s (2012a, p. 161) deliberative intergovernmentalism, member states “have resisted the further transfer of formal competences to the EU level” in spite of the growing interdependence among themselves and aimed to achieve “greater policy coherence through intensified intergovernmental coordination”. In the same vein, Chris Bickerton (2012) argued that there are no “grand leaps towards supranationalism” in the European integration process despite the deepening cooperation between member states. Additionally, there are several studies, published after the euro crisis, arguing that the European integration might be reversible (e.g. Zimmermann and Dur, 2012, Hayward and Wurzel, 2012, Zielonka, 2014, Webber, 2014, Giddens, 2013).

Regarding this long-lasting discussion, the empirical findings of this research support the argument that the European integration is reversible once the outputs of it turn negative regarding member states’ significant national interests although the complex interdependence among member states and global uncertainty, pushing them to cooperate, make this option less possible. To put it another way, the research has provided considerable evidence supporting the assertion that the European integration is a deliberative process for member states despite the complex interdependence among them. Therefore, member states and their national interests are still the main factor shaping the future of the integration process. At this point, it is highly possible that their attitudes towards the integration might change from one case to another in line with their changing national interest priorities according to different situational conditions, and this makes the European integration not only an ongoing but also an open-ended/unpredictable process (see also: Zimmermann and Dur, 2012). As a result of this, it is hardly possible to develop
a theoretical approach overgeneralizing member states’ behaviour within the integration process. For example, the empirical findings from this research do not support Frank Schimmelfennig’s (2001) community trap/rhetorical action approach, which tries to generalize old members’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement in the case of the Eastward enlargement. In particular, by synthesizing a mid-way between LI and SI (the constructivist approach), Schimmelfennig argued that the member states supporting enlargement (drivers) used and manipulated liberal norms to force the opponent member states (brakemen) to accept new comers by criticizing them for diminishing liberal norms to achieve their narrow self-interests. As a response to this criticism, the opponent members did not want to behave against the liberal community values, and the Eastward enlargement was achieved (Schimmelfennig, 2001, see also: Lazea, 2011). However, after analysing the four enlargement cases, this research has argued that Schimmelfennig’s ‘rhetorical action’ approach is not generalizable to explain member states’ behaviour towards enlargement, because according to the findings, not only Britain but also other members did not hesitate to block EU level enlargement negotiations to protect their significant national interests for the sake of the EU’s common values. To illustrate, France implicitly or explicitly issued its veto threat several times in different enlargement cases, Greece used veto threat against the Iberian enlargement in 1984, and Spain did against the EFTA enlargement in 1992. Austria used its veto power against Turkey’s membership in order to force other members to resume the accession negotiations with Croatia as its membership was more important for Austria. More dramatically, in 2014, the Cameron government swiftly changed Britain’s long-lasting pro-enlargement policy, when domestic dynamics pushed it to solve the immigration problem, which started to be seen as one of the most significant negative externalities of the EU’s enlargement to Britain. In parallel with these findings, Icener and Phinnemore (2015, p. 47) also argued that “[m]ember [s]tates are feeling free to express their reservations and opposition and to act accordingly”. Additionally, Lasas (2010, p. 6) also argued that the EU’s democratic ideals/norms (or the Copenhagen Criteria) might also be used by reluctant members as a strategic tool to slow down new members’ enlargement via extending accession negotiations.

As a result, the research suggests that future studies on the European integration process should give more attention to member states (their national interests/structures). In other words, the EU studies need more case studies putting different member states at the centre of their analyses from different perspectives (e.g. security, trade, environment) to provide
more empirical data on the member state behaviour within the EU because the accumulation of this empirical data might make the ongoing and open-ended European integration process more knowable.

7.3 Scientific Concerns and Limitations

This study was designed to explore an intellectual puzzle, namely, why Britain as a leading Eurosceptic member continuously supported the EU’s enlargement process from 1975 to 2014. To scientifically answer this question, the research formulated a set of theoretical assumptions as a potential answer to this question, and then tested them via empirically collected data. In this sense, the findings are not unquestionable ‘absolute truths’, but they represent one possible scientific answer to the research question, which is not perfect and might change (see also: Audi, 2003, Rescher, 2003). However, the findings are an output of a scientific research process and comply with the main scientific criteria. That said, the findings depend on comprehensive empirical data, and this makes them replicable. In this way, the findings are also falsifiable because any political scientist could replicate the research by using the collected empirical data to test the theoretical assumptions derived from LI. Moreover, this empirical data was systematically analysed and this systematic analysis process also benefited from the previous findings in the relevant literature. Therefore, in addition to its replicability, the systematic analysis of the empirical data by considering the previous findings in the literature also strengthens the reliability and validity of the research (Pennings et al., 2006, Yin, 2003, Neuman, 2014, Newman and Benz, 1998, Berg, 2007). Nevertheless, as the research was designed as a case study deeply focusing on Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EU’s enlargement waves, the generalizability of the findings might be limited (see: Yin, 2003). In concrete terms, the findings of this case study might not be applied to specifically explain other member states’ enlargement policies although these findings improve our knowledge of the complex behaviour of member states within the EU. Therefore, as noted above, this research suggests that the EU studies literature needs more case studies focusing on different member states to develop a more comprehensive understanding of member state behaviour within the EU system.

The research also accepts that social life is highly complex and human being’s cognitive capacity is limited in fully comprehending this great complexity. Thus, social theories could be useful tools to make social phenomena more knowable and social research more
workable. However, none of them is a panacea for a full understanding of social life, and all have their limits in explaining a social phenomenon. Therein; this research accepts that Hegelian epistemological dialectic might be helpful to know social phenomena better (see: Westphal, 2003). In other words, if a social phenomenon is studied through a theoretical thesis and its anti-theses, the accumulation of the findings of these different studies (potential syntheses) could help to consolidate and increase our knowledge on this phenomenon. Therefore, as noted above, this research welcomes new studies trying to analyse Britain’s pro-enlargement policy from an HI perspective since they might discover new findings that this research has not detected and the accumulation of the findings from this research and these future studies can provide us with a deeper knowledge on this topic.

In general, this research also welcomes other studies producing counter arguments against intergovernmentalism in terms of the future of the European integration. For example, Jurgen Habermas (2012) insisted on the necessity of a cosmopolitan integration model for Europe after the euro crisis. As another example, Jolyon Howorth (2012) argued that the decision making in the EU’s security and defence policy, which is legally under the intergovernmental rules, is actually close to a supranational model in practice (an intensive network of expert committees in the EU’s security and defence policy). Thus, according to Howorth (2010), “[a] supranational culture is emerging from an intergovernmental process”, and he conceptualized this finding with a new term, namely, ‘supranational intergovernmentalism’.
Abbreviations

CAP    Common Agricultural Policy
CEECs  Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP   Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS    Commonwealth of Independent States
EC     European Community
ECJ    European Court of Justice
ECSC   European Coal and Steel Community
EEA    European Economic Area
ECC    European Economic Community
EFTA   European Free Trade Association
EMS    European Monetary System
EMU    Economic and Monetary Union
ETC    European Trade Committee
EU     European Union
FCO    Foreign and Commonwealth Office
HI     Historical Institutionalism
ICTY   International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IGC    Intergovernmental Conference
IR     International Relations
LI     Liberal Intergovernmentalism
MAFF   Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
MEP    Member of the European Parliament
QMV    Qualified Majority Voting
RDF    Regional Development Fund
SEA    Single European Act
SI     Sociological Institutionalism
UKTI   UK Trade & Investment
WEU    Western European Union
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