Franciscan Soteriology at the University of Paris to 1300

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Abstract

This work charts the evolution of soteriology among Franciscan friars working at the University of Paris up to 1300. It examines in turn each of their extant soteriological works from this period to demonstrate the development of a distinct and uniquely Franciscan approach to soteriology. This study considers the written forms in which these Franciscan theological opinions were expressed, the scholastic genres of commentaries upon the Book of Sentences along with quaestiones disputatae, quodlibets and summae. It situates those soteriological innovations and their genres of expression in their historical context, the developing engagement of the Franciscans with the University of Paris and the tensions that came with this, especially the secular-mendicant controversy of the 1220s to 1250s and the Aristotelian conflict with Stephen Tempier in the 1270s.

These three elements, Franciscan theological ideas, the literary forms in which they were articulated and the historical setting in which they were expressed, played upon each other to produce theology particular to the Franciscans. The friars discarded much of the soteriology inherited from Anselm of Bec and marginalised the significance of satisfaction and divine punishment for the fall. Figures like Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta and Richard of Middleton gave greater emphasis to human fulfilment in a plan unrelated to the events of the fall. Despite obstacles to their theological work from both the university and the wider church, the Franciscans were not dissuaded from their ideas, adjusting the expression of those notions to ensure their acceptance.
This interplay of ideas, genres and events provides evidence that supports a claim for the existence of a distinctive ‘Franciscan school’ of theology in operation in Paris in the thirteenth century. This school recast the doctrine of redemption as more than the appeasement of a God angered by disobedience and demanding a suitable sacrifice. The Franciscans advocated instead for salvation as God generously furthering and advancing the final culmination of human creation.
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Notes on the text


2. The names of historical figures have, wherever possible, been anglicised. Thus, for example, the usage of ‘Eudes Rigaud’ and ‘Stephen Tempier’ has been preferred to ‘Odo Rigaldis’ and ‘Étienne Tempier’.

3. Unless otherwise noted, translations are the author’s own.
1 The Locus and Genres of Thirteenth-Century Theology in Paris

The last words in the life of Francis of Assisi were, according to Thomas of Celano, directed to his brothers. ‘I have done what was mine to do, now do what is yours to do’.¹ The friars gathered around his expiring body certainly took that injunction to heart. Whatever Francis may have done in his life, in short order the Friars Minor forged new directions and developments in his order that Francis himself had neither anticipated nor even, in some instances, desired.

The account of how his group of ill-educated wandering lay preachers observing strictest poverty transformed, in the space of scarcely a generation, into an urban order of clerics and scholars making use of property has been told in other places and with far greater detail.² This work looks rather at intellectual changes in theology among the Franciscans and specifically at how those changes developed in the context of this reorientation by the disciples of Francis. It does so through a consideration of their soteriology, the Christian theories of salvation, and it explores how soteriology changed and how such changes occurred. In tracing those theological developments, it considers whether it is truly possible to speak in the thirteenth century of a

‘Franciscan school’ of theology. Such a school would need a stable, institutionalised continuity making it possible for ideas to pass and develop among its members even across generations. Members of such a school would manifest a shared and identifiably common approach to particular topics. In later centuries, the Franciscan assertion that Christ did not become incarnate for the salvation of humanity was a distinctive element of their teaching. An examination of the initial shift in their understanding of the doctrine of salvation thus is a useful area to test for such a school and also to observe how Franciscan theology was shaped and fashioned by the time and setting in which it took place.

The thirteenth century saw the first flowerings of the Friars Minor but it was equally a time that brought about great upheaval in Franciscan life. The friars were beleaguered with internal issues around their own identity, such as whether to be itinerant or sedentary, clerical or lay and seeking a common understanding of poverty. Similarly, external issues came to bear upon them such as their corporate engagement with the universities, the episcopal condemnations against teaching or employing certain ideas of non-Christian thinkers and the secular-mendicant controversy, a coalition of opponents arrayed against the order and agitating for its suppression. Much of what has later been identified as particular to Franciscan theology, such as the unfettered sovereignty of God, the intrinsic goodness of creation, Christ’s

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absolute primacy and the relationship of the will and freedom, arose from these struggles.⁴

Conversely, that which the friars believed and taught theologically had consequences for their understanding of themselves and God and how they engaged with the secular world in which they ministered, preached and studied. Otherwise put, what they believed moulded how they engaged with these questions and issues. Unlike much of the rest of the Church, they came to eschew ideas of divine punishment and asserted a more optimistic conception of fundamental human nature. This brought about quite different conceptions of what it means to be human, of the human relationship with God and of humanity’s place in the cosmos.

The best location in the thirteenth century to witness this mutual shaping of Franciscan history and theology is Paris. Paris was where the order dispatched for study the best minds it possessed and it was Paris that enjoyed the uncontested premier faculty of theology in Christian Europe, enticing in the greatest theologians of the age. Paris was the heart of that movement within the order that favoured the move to educated and ordained friars in conventual settings. Paris was the birthplace of the secular-mendicant controversy, which later was to spread across Europe.⁵ Paris produced the most significant theological works of the era and it was Paris that was the centre of the theological world at this time.⁶

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⁴ See, for example, Kenan B. Osborne, A History of Franciscan Theology (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1994) or Michael Blastic, “It Pleases Me that You Should Teach Sacred Theology”: Franciscans Doing Theology, Franciscan Theology, 55 (1998), 1-25.
⁵ See pages 84-86 below.
⁶ As to the significance of Paris as a theological location, see William Courtenay, “The Parisian Faculty of Theology in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries”, in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts – Studien und Texte, ed. by Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery,
Within that theological world, soteriology is a particularly useful field for this type of study because, unlike its closely related doctrines of Christology and the Incarnation, soteriology in the thirteenth century had never been beset by definitive dogmatic decrees, such as those of the Christological councils. This left scholars in the field greater freedom to innovate and develop ideas of their own. Accordingly, Franciscans were at greater liberty to advance ideas such as the absolute primacy of Christ, that Christ’s incarnation was not contingent upon any human act and, of course, in soteriology. Many of these ideas later became defining elements of Franciscan theology. This present study concludes prior to the 1302 formulation by John Duns Scotus of Christ’s absolute primacy. It was in that period and in Paris that the elements were put in place that enabled a genuine and identifiably Franciscan theological school to emerge. Jacopone da Todi may have been correct in his lament that ‘Paris had destroyed Assisi’ but if so then it is also true that Paris constructed an impressive edifice in its place. Through the lens of soteriology, this present work examines that new intellectual endeavour raised not in Assisi but in the University of Paris. The intellectual mortar in this new constructions was the approach to instruction that throve in the nascent universities, scholasticism.

The examination of these various elements commences with a review of this scholasticism. It considers the scholastic context for early Franciscan intellectual activity before examining the scholastic geography and genres that both shaped and were shaped by this activity. It looks at the institutional

structures of the new Franciscan educational centre at the Grand Couvent des Cordeliers in Paris, where this learning took place and it proceeds to discuss the forms of output of that intellectual activity, the principal genres of scholastic theological writing. Four of these will be of particular important to this essay: the sentence commentary, the *summa*, disputed questions and quodlibets.

1.1 Scholasticism

Scholasticism was less a set of beliefs as it was a pedagogical method by which learning was transmitted. As its name suggests, it was the favoured technique ‘of the schools’ and it was especially in these schools, those of the cathedrals and monasteries, that it first flourished. It was through scholasticism that Franciscans received and passed on their intellectual formation.

Cathedral and monastic schools of prior centuries gave pupils exposure to the theological learning and insight of ‘authorities’, the great thinkers and influential writers, along with the decrees and resolutions of synods and councils. Students applied themselves to the study and understanding of these authorities and what they had taught. A consequence of this method was that such education therefore tended to be rather retrospective and to place lesser value on the creation of new knowledge; the

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great and mighty thinkers were in the past and a true scholar was one who assiduously mastered and knew these past authorities.¹⁰

This became less so as, through better and expanded use of dialectic and rhetoric, scholasticism evolved among the schools. As much as to know what was held by past authorities, scholastics met a desire to understand how authorities came to hold what they did. This was a period of eagerness to learn why, as well as what, authoritative figures believed. This was passed to students and scholasticism, as its name suggests, was the development of a means of doing so in these cathedral and abbey schools and their descendants, the universities. These were schools that had grown into autonomous corporations, enforcing and implementing their own educational standards.¹¹

Scholasticism brought with it a greater use of philosophy and especially dialectic in teaching. Philosophy received more attention both as a discipline for itself and even more as a tool for the advancement of other disciplines, particularly theology.¹² Concepts were analysed and evaluated through such philosophical means such as disputation and argument,
employing skills from dialectics and logic. A scholastic writer's assertions had to be capable of withstanding counter-argument that probed and tested not only the knowledge of authority but the ability to reason from it. Hence authority came to play a somewhat different role in the theological exercise of the scholastic classroom than it had in early pedagogy. Since all knowledge derived from the realm of ultimate truth, scholasticism strove to demonstrate the harmonious unity of all knowledge. Its great goal was to display the concord among seemingly different and even contrary authorities, as well as their agreement with the conclusions of reason. Truth could be verified by this great work of bringing all knowledge to the same point. While earlier ages had tended to choose the ‘correct’ or at least the superior answer to an issue, scholasticism sought to show that all answers were but the one answer and that all the authorities of the past could be brought into consonance.13

Such heavy reliance upon dialectic meant that scholastic pedagogy was typified by an analysis of issues through use of questions and answers. The subject matter of a proposition was posed as a question admitting only of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer and then broken down into ever smaller and more precise questions to be considered in ever narrower bounded terms.14 For example, in his commentary on the Book of Sentences, Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio considered the topic of the Incarnation of the Word and human redemption.15 To do so, he broke his consideration of the third book into

15 Bonaventure, ‘Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum’ in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), III (1887), d. 19, a. 1, q. 4.
forty distinctiones of which one, the nineteenth, looked at ‘our redemption done through the passion of Christ’. This in turn he considered in two articula of which the first looked at the efficacy of Christ’s passion. This was addressed through four quaestiones and it is the last of these that asks if Christ’s passion absolved humanity from the penalty of sin. In some instances these quaestiones would be broken into even smaller membra and capitula but, at whatever level or field, the process of considering proposition through ever narrower questions obtained through dialectical analysis of a problem, a process known as tranching, remained the same. Two consequences of this process were that even important and broad questions were always considered as an accumulation of smaller, finer questions. The other is that this process allowed, even before the common use of indices in books, the ability to pinpoint a particular argument with great precision in the text through this tranching.¹⁶

Having arrived at a suitably narrow and manageable question, the enduring influence of the educational system of the cathedral schools made itself felt as the scholastic author would adduce an array of authorities from scriptural, patristic, conciliar, saintly and other sources. These authorities would be arranged into arguments for and against a possible answer to this now narrowed question and, in the light of these authorities, the author would make a response, his own resolution of the question posed. He would set forth his reasons for his position and then would return to the authorities that were counter to his resolution. With each in turn he would resolve any inconsistencies, either by showing that, once properly read, there was no

¹⁶ Thus, the reference to Bonaventure’s text above can be cited precisely in a taxonomy of tranched questions: Bk. III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1. Any reader could locate an exact point and argument in the text, whoever the copyist had been.
actual disagreement among them or by showing that the two authorities were dealing with different matters. Thereby all would be brought back once more into concord. Such an approach expanded emphasis in the classroom from the mere transmission of past learning established in older authority to include the acquisition of philosophically and dialectically tested insight derived from these authorities.17 Where once it had been sufficient to say that something had been written by Augustine, now it was necessary to show how that which Augustine had written was harmonious with all other authority. This pursuit of concord between authority and reason came to be a significant characteristic of scholasticism.18

It is possible to see scholasticism evolving over time. In its earliest period, scholastics were content to transmit the knowledge of the past. As mastery of dialectics and rhetoric deepened, to this familiarity with the knowledge from the past was added an effort to synthesise it, unifying the corpus of authority. Thence it moved to a further point, the addition of new knowledge, especially the new insights of contemporary authors. This process was abetted by the recovery of Aristotelian material into western thought and the integration of its reclaimed techniques and approaches.

It should not be thought that this exercise was solely one of university lecturers in their chairs before students. This was a pedagogical usage that extended to educational settings from the cathedral and monastic schools to the university and then beyond, finding expression in written as well as verbal forms. As such, these written scholastic forms were the vectors of

transmission for the intellectual advances of the later Middle Ages.

Understanding these settings and forms of scholastic expression is fundamental to comprehending Franciscan thought in this period and how such Franciscan thought to evolve.

1.2 STUDIA AMONG THE FRANCISCANS

For the Franciscans, this scholastic trend was driven forward by primarily two institutions in the newly constructed Grand Couvent des Cordeliers in Paris, their house of studies. The earlier of these with which the Franciscans engaged was the studium. A studium, an institution modelled on an idea of the Dominicans, was an internal school of the order, designed to provide an education for new friars to meet the practical needs of their life and ministry. Studia gave young friars the fundamentals of scripture study, philosophy and theology and what was practically necessary for preaching, hearing confessions and providing pastoral care. The scholastic tools used in studia like disputation and oral argument well met the needs of an order directed to popular preaching and missionary activity. Studia covered such basics as learning to read and write where that was necessary. Such education lasted approximately four years until the lector, or teacher, of the studium and the friar’s Minister Provincial were satisfied the student had

19 The Franciscans had finally settled there in 1231 on land donated by the Abbey of St Germain des Prés and held on the friars’ behalf by the king. John C. Murphy, ‘The Early Franciscan Studium at the University of Paris’, in Studium Generale: Studies Offered to Astrik L. Gabriel, ed. by L. S. Domonkos and R. J. Schneider (Notre Dame, IN: The Medieval Institute of the University of Notre Dame, 1967), pp. 159–204 (p. 168)


sufficient knowledge and competence to be entrusted with an appointment of his own. Such a studium was not limited to Paris and the 1260 General Chapter of Narbonne mandated the presence of studia in every province of the order. In reality, this statute was extending a practice that had already been in existence in many provinces, including France, as early as the 1220s.

These were the studia provincialia, a network of schools across the order for the training of young friars, each with its own lector to undertake this training and employing the methods of scholasticism to do so. These lectors were themselves trained and educated for that role by a second and higher class of studia, the studia generalia. The brightest and most promising of the students in a studium provinciale were selected for a further four years of training as lectors and given additional education at these special higher schools, of which that of Paris was an example.

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22 Chapter 9 of the Franciscan Rule permits only those examined and licensed by the Minister General to preach publicly: ‘Et nullus fratum populo penitus audeat praedicare, nisi a ministro generali huius fraternitatis fuerit examinatus et approbatus, et ab eo officium sibi praedicationis concessum’. (‘And no friar should dare to preach on the interior life to the people unless he has been examined and approved by the Minister General of this brotherhood and been approved and received from him a commission to preach’.) This faculty was swiftly extended to Ministers Provincial and in practice served, and still serves, as a general assessment of a friar’s competency to minister.


24 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, pp. 65-87. In the case of Paris it is not clear at what date its studium was raised to general status but the general statutes of 1239 already spoke of the studium of Paris as holding that status. Cesare Cenci, ed., ‘De Fratrum Minorum Constitutionibus Praenarbonensibus’, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 83 (1990), 50-95, Article 82 (p. 93). As to the duration of study, see Art. 13 of the 1279 general constitutions. ‘Taliter autem missi studeant qua tuor annis ad minus, nisi adeo fuerint provecti quod merito iudicentur idonei ad lectoris officium exsequendum’. (‘In such a cases those sent should study for four years at least unless they be judged so advanced that they...
These general studia were established over the course of the thirteenth century in major centres and often, but not exclusively, in towns already possessing a university. Studia generalia were to be found in Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, Bologna and Padua but also in Rome, Münster and Florence. Thus the friars constructed for their own needs a network of schools that trained both friars for general ministry and lectors for those schools, all of them educated in the new pedagogy of scholasticism and trained to think, argue and express themselves in scholastic fashion.

1.3 UNIVERSITY OF PARIS

The second institution that promoted the use of scholasticism in Franciscan theology, and the more significant for the purposes of this study, was the university. These first appeared at the end of the twelfth century and Paris was one of the first of these. In contrast to the studia, these university schools did, especially in Paris, have a greater focus on abstract speculation.

A further element that distinguished them from the studia, and from the cathedral schools, was the granting of degrees. A degree was simply a formal and verifiable public attestation by an acknowledged and learned master that a person had undergone a defined course of study, met the requisite standards and had reached the required competency in a
discipline’s skills and knowledge.\textsuperscript{28} With the development of the university degree, the acceptance of credentials was no longer a matter of whether a particular scholar’s teacher was known and considered competent.\textsuperscript{29} The new degree structure meant that university qualifications were readily transferrable and accepted across the continent. As such, even though a theology degree, for example, was never formally required for ecclesiastical office or even ordination, the possession of a degree advanced acceptance into ecclesial positions across Europe, a most useful feature in an order of itinerants like the Friars Minor.\textsuperscript{30} The Franciscans made use of these degrees for their best students but the requirements of these degree could be onerous.

Meeting the degree requirements constrained students to express their ideas in certain defined forms and to undertake precise tasks. Writing theology for the grant of a degree in theology demanded of them that they made use of particular scholastic genres. For example, from the 1230s onwards every Franciscans candidate for a higher degree was required to compose a commentary upon the \textit{Book of Sentences} by Peter the Lombard.\textsuperscript{31} All of these formal commentaries had to address the matters that had been raised by Peter the Lombard and to do so in the sequence and manner laid out by him. As a consequence, students were habituated to the scholastic

\textsuperscript{29} See, for example, Southern, ‘The School of Paris and the School of Chartres’ pp. 113-37.
\textsuperscript{30} Courtenay, ‘Institutionalization of Theology’, p. 254. A Parisian degree swiftly became a necessity \textit{de facto} for any prelacy. During the later secular-mendicant controversy in the 1250s, the secular masters of the university prepared an apologia for their actions in the dispute, addressing it to the prelates of Christendom. It reminded them that they were formerly ‘sons of the university’ and remained so in ‘paternal affection’, Denifle and Chatelain, \textit{Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis}, I (1889), No. 30, pp. 257.
\textsuperscript{31} Peter the Lombard, \textit{Sententiarum Libri Quatuor}, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4-5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii Sancti Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81).
form of expression and manner of conducting theology, approaches that lingered with them even after their university studies. Further, due to the transferability of these new degrees that enabled graduates to be readily accepted in posts throughout Europe, scholars could carry their ideas and also their way of expressing them all across the continent. A common academic discourse in the language and genres of scholasticism came into being and it facilitated a growth in the internationality of theological endeavour. To engage in academic theology in that age of universities required the ability to do so in the manner and form of the discourse of the age of universities. Participants in this system, Franciscan thinkers found themselves expressing their theological ideas in scholastic terms and similarly, these scholastic terms shaped how they thought about theological questions. They wrote less of how humanity was saved and more of what St Anselm had said about humanity being saved and how that could be reconciled with what St Ambrose and St Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius had said on the matter. Beyond ideas of one’s own, scholastic emphasis lay upon bringing together ideas already in existence.

1.4 A FRIARY WITH BOTH STUDIUM AND UNIVERSITY CHAIR

Scholasticism was employed in both halves of the Franciscan educational system: the lectoral programme of the studia and the degree programme of the university. These two programmes came together in a unique way in Paris. Needing to engage an outside lector to train the first generation of students through the studium before they had produced a suitable lector of their own, the Franciscans engaged the services of the Englishman Alexander of Hales, a secular master within the faculty of theology. He agreed to provide
this service until the friars had sufficient lectors of their own to undertake such training themselves.32

Alexander took it upon himself to go significantly further. Despite being in his fifties, in 1236 Alexander surrendered his benefices and professed the Rule of St Francis and joined the Franciscan order.33 This was more than just an act of personal piety for it had substantial consequences. When Alexander joined the order, he retained his university chair and transferred it and his students to the Grand Couvent. With that act it became possible for the friars not only to control their own studium but also to engage in university instruction and even to obtain degrees under their own regent master.34 The structural changes did not cease there for it was the usage of the university that regent masters chose their own successors, selecting them from among the most promising of their students. In the case of the now professed Brother Alexander, he could pass his chair to a fellow Franciscan who in turn could do the same when he came to retire. The effective result of this was that the Franciscans had acquired for themselves, in perpetuity, one of that faculty’s twelve chairs.35

34 Bert Roest, Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission c. 1220-1650: Cum sciential sit donum Dei, armature ad defendam sanctam fidem catholicam, Medieval Franciscans, 10 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 32.
35 Chairs similarly passed into the control of the Dominicans and the effective loss by the secular masters of these chairs to the mendicants was one of the critical issues in what became known as the ‘secular-mendicant controversy’ that endured for a quarter of a century and threatened to end those orders. See pages 84-86 below.
Accordingly, when Alexander of Hales came to retire, he nominated a friar, John of La Rochelle, to succeed him.\textsuperscript{36} The development of continuity in Franciscan control of that chair coupled with the presence of both Franciscan and secular students under their regent master resulted in the effective creation for the Franciscans of their own ‘school’ of theology, based at the Grand Couvent and within the University of Paris but with an institutional permanency that no secular master working for himself could ever achieve. Hereafter, there was a fixed locus of Franciscan theological education.

The influence of this new school extended considerably further than Paris. At the General Chapter of Narbonne in 1260, it was decided that every province in the order was entitled to send two students to the \textit{studium} in Paris, the cost of whose education would be borne by the general order. Furthermore, provinces were free to send additional students if that province were prepared to meet the expense itself.\textsuperscript{37} Under these provisions, the order gathered together in one place those considered to be the brightest minds of the order and, to train them, it naturally employed its finest lectors. The one complex now housed candidates for degrees and, from across the whole order, the best candidates for lectorships in the \textit{studia} of the order.

This centralisation of these thinkers in Paris came to shape those scholars of the future. As well as the fine education the \textit{studium} could provide, the mixing of friars from so many provinces was a unique chance for many of them to know and be known by the future leaders of the order. The

\textsuperscript{36} Palémon Glorieux, \textit{Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII\textsuperscript{e} siècle}, Études de philosophie médiévale, 17-18, 2 vols (Paris: Vrin, 1933) pp. 25-30. See pages 64 and 87 below concerning the historiographical issues concerning the subsequent fate of Alexander’s chair.

\textsuperscript{37} Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis’, Constitutiones Narbonenses, art. 19, p. 72.
influence of this factor of the Paris studium was profound; from 1240 until the Great Schism, regardless of his home province, every Minister General of the order had been a student in Paris. Even though few men became Minister General, the lectors of the provinces were largely drawn from the studium generale in Paris and so its influence was diffused around the entire order. This Parisian influence was not limited to ministers, masters and lectors of the order but touched the rank and file of the brothers also.

Whether a student in Paris or not, due to the influence of all these Parisian trained lectors, friars across the order were being trained and formed in ideas and methods that flourished in Paris.

Theological study likewise tended to centralise in Paris. Far fewer friars undertook university studies than were in the studium but the prestige and pre-eminence of the Parisian faculty gave those few great prominence. At this point in history, there was no finer school of theology in Europe and here were to be found the best theological teachers. So popular was the course among the order despite its rigour that it proved necessary to limit the number of students who could embark on a university degree course. By the close of the thirteenth century it had been established by the order that only one friar could be matriculated annually into each of the Parisian faculties (i.e. arts and the higher faculties of law, medicine and theology) and each third year these positions were reserved for French candidates. That meant

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40 This statute of the General Chapter of Paris in 1292 governing the Paris studium provided: ‘Placet tamen generali capitulo quod illorum qui Parisium sunt lecturi Sententias vel ad
a maximum of four positions each year, and often less as the order frequently chose not to sponsor friars for degrees in arts or medicine. As significant and influential as this cadre of graduate friars was, they were only ever a small minority of the total student body.

Their small number is borne out by a census of the Grand Couvent conducted in 1303 at the request of Philip IV of France, the ‘spiritual friend’ who owned the friary for the benefit of the order. The census discloses that 173 friars were living in the Grand Couvent in that year. Of these about thirty were engaged in the work of the house itself (cooks, chaplains, teachers, handymen and quaestors to beg for the sufficient resources to sustain the rest). About fifty were friars from around France studying in the school in its capacity as studium provinciale of the French province. Eighty friars from beyond France studied at the studium generale under the provisions from the General Chapter of Narbonne subsidising foreign friars.41 Only ten friars were actually matriculated into the university and formally pursuing a

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41 Neslihan Şenocak, ‘The Franciscan Studium Generale’, p. 234, identifies a third type of student who is neither preparing for a degree nor student training as a lector and hopes for greater attention to understand what this group might be doing in Paris. Bert Roest has proposed that this third group were those pre-empting their eventual matriculation: Roest, *Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission*, p. 55. Rather than see these students as a third group, they are surely those who, in their earlier lectoral studies in some studium generale other than Paris, had been identified as being likely to profit from completing their preparation in Paris. Here they could benefit from participating in the exceptional opportunities for education that being in the heart of the university allowed as well as from access to the best teachers of the order. Naturally, fitting students for this training could only be identified after they had had this lectoral training elsewhere. Such transfers to Paris seem to be anticipated by Art. 15 of the 1292 General Chapter. Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis Edita in Capitulis Generalibus’, Paris 1292 (Art. XV), p. 78.
degree.\textsuperscript{42} The actual number of Franciscans at the university, even at the close of the thirteenth century, was quite small and at no stage had ever been substantial.\textsuperscript{43}

Though few in number, these graduates certainly exerted a considerable influence on the development of Franciscan theology. Being identified as the brightest of the young friars gave them a certain standing among their Franciscan peers but they had also a wider influence. Obliged as they were to compose specific texts to meet the requirements of their degree courses, they thereby also generated a number of formal theological academic works that entered into circulation among friaries. This circulation of assessment tasks was not something that commonly occurred among those enrolled in the studium.

Unlike older orders and institutions, the Franciscans tended to have younger and poorly equipped libraries and so they appear to have made use of what they had to hand: the notes and texts of their recent graduates of Paris, filled with all the latest ideas.\textsuperscript{44} For example, Eudes Rigaud studied at Paris in the late 1230s and is generally today not numbered amongst the foremost of theologians; indeed his sentence commentary is yet to be published.\textsuperscript{45} Nevertheless, that same commentary survives in seventeen extant manuscripts which attests to a quite liberal distribution and


\textsuperscript{43} Roest argues that at no time in the thirteenth century did the total number enrolled in the university among the Parisian friars number beyond six to ten. Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 17.


\textsuperscript{45} For further on Eudes, see page 84 below.
diffusion.\textsuperscript{46} These texts from the graduates had a life beyond mere assessment tasks in the university; they also moved around the provinces and were read by young impressionable minds at the \textit{studia provincialia}.

Libraries were not the only point of difference between the friars and other students in Paris. Certainly both groups followed the same established syllabus from the faculty of theology. Students began with a first phase, which lasted for about four years, and was focused on the study of sacred scripture and led at its completion to the status of ‘Biblical Bachelor’. It is to a degree misleading to describe it as the study of the Bible. The impetus of older pedagogy from the cathedral schools and the influence of the new scholastic techniques were frequently as concentrated upon the study of commentaries and glosses on the scripture as on the biblical text itself.\textsuperscript{47} In this phase the student was to show himself adept at the knowledge, exegesis and interpretation of scripture but also the writings of the significant authorities in the field. He pursued that great scholastic goal of bringing those authorities into agreement and he demonstrated this by participating in a formal academic disputation in scripture over which his master would preside and also by preaching a formally assessed sermon. A student who satisfactorily completed those tasks would then move into the second phase, that leading to the status of ‘Sentence Bachelor’.

At this point a student would be trusted to ‘read’, that is teach, comment and expound upon scripture to the students of a master under his


supervision.\textsuperscript{48} While that was taking place, he proceeded with his own studies in dogmatic theology. Again, the emphasis lay on the ability to master the opinions and reasoning of the important authorities in each branch of theology. The standard work for theology had come to be in the scholastic period the \textit{Book of Sentences} of Peter the Lombard, a former bishop of Paris, and each student was required to compose his own commentary on the work as an exercise to master the material. In this the student amassed a body of authorities for each ‘sentence’ or proposition in the work and showed how these authorities could be reconciled.\textsuperscript{49} This period was generally of about two year’s duration, meaning that each semester was given to the study of one of the four \textit{Books of Sentences}. Once again, the candidate was obliged to participate in a formal academic disputation on theology over which a master presided. Should he meet all those requirements, a candidate moved to the third phase of his studies, that of a ‘Formed Bachelor’.

There was no longer any formal class and reading for the student to attend. Rather this period, of roughly three to four years, was spent in completing an array of assessment tasks and in demonstrating that a candidate possessed the skills and knowledge needed of a master.\textsuperscript{50} As he had done with scripture, the candidate now read the sentences to his master’s


\textsuperscript{49} Courtenay, ‘Institutionalization of Theology’, p. 250. It was Alexander of Hales who not only established the \textit{Book of Sentences} as the standard medieval text for the study of theology but also began the practice of requiring of students their own commentary upon it. Both these practices remained in observance until the Reformation. Philipp Rosemann, ‘The Tradition of the Sentences’, in \textit{Mediaeval Commentaries of the ‘Sentences’ of Peter Lombard}, ed. by Philipp W. Rosemann, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2002-10), II (2010), pp. 495-523 (pp. 496-8).

\textsuperscript{50} Roest, \textit{A History of Franciscan Education}, p. 99.
students and used this time to complete the lengthy exercise of completing his own commentary on the Book of Sentences. As the responsibility of admitting a student to the degree of master fell to the faculty as a whole but to this point only his own master was in any way familiar with him, the statutes required that formed bachelors were to dispute twice before each master of the faculty in turn.\footnote{Palémon Glorieux, ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge: techniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris, au XIIIᵉ siècle’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 43 (1968), 65-186 (pp. 124-5) and Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, II, p. 691, No. 1188, art. 18. While this is a later, and much more demanding, statute, it clearly is codifying existing practice: ‘Item, nota, quod bachalarii in theologia tenentur respondere de questione in locis publicis aliis bachalariis quinquies ad minus, antequam licencientur’. (‘Note that bachelors in theology are bound to dispute in some public place with other bachelors at least five times before being licensed’.) See further A.G. Little and F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians c. A.D. 1282-1302, Oxford Historical Society, 96 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), p. 33.} Above that, he was to participate in a public quodlibetal disputation, give another assessed public sermon and finally, obtain the approving vote from each regent master.\footnote{Quodlibets are discussed in greater detail on pages 46-50 below.} He could then be presented to the bishop or the chancellor of the university for the grant of a \textit{licentia docendi}.\footnote{Or, more formally, \textit{licentia ubique legendi, disputandi, praedicandi et quoslibet actus excercendi theologica facultate} (‘license for reading, disputing, preaching and carrying out in all places any act whatsoever of the faculty of theology’).} This full process of obtaining a master’s degree in theology, to which must be added the prior arts degree, resulted in a statutory minimum age for licensing of thirty-five.\footnote{Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I (1889), p. 79, No. 20. See too Courtenay, ‘Programs of Study’, p. 330 and Gordon Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History, New Dimensions in History: Essays in Comparative History (New York: John Wiley, 1968), p. 164. Theology was a ‘higher faculty’ and needed first to obtain a degree in arts before entering.}

The friars’ experience was somewhat different at the university. Firstly, in recognition of their preparation in a \textit{studium} and generally greater age before starting university study, mendicant candidates were permitted to
matriculate directly into the higher faculty of theology. The lectoral course provided a respectable and competent initial level of instruction to prepare friars for theological studies in a university but it was not the same grounding in philosophy, logic and dialectics that the arts graduates had obtained. In contrast, the studia, and the preparation they offered their students had greater focus upon the pastoral and missionary needs of the order.

A second distinction was that while a secular student would have proceeded directly from his arts degree to his theological studies, a typical mendicant student would have entered the order, completed his time of probation, undertaken some initial academic preparation in a studium provinciale, then travelled to Paris to participate in the lectoral programme in the studium generale there before returning to his home province and been appointed to some ministry of his own, quite often a post as lector in a studium provinciale, for some time. Only then would he have been eligible for selection for the degree programme in Paris. Accordingly, such a mendicant candidate was normally older than a typical secular student and possessed of more experience beyond the university environs. Lectors normally were aged between twenty-four years and twenty-nine, thus after a

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55 This was a privilege granted by the university and not a right and it could be withdrawn, as indeed it was during the more contentious moments of the secular-mendicant controversy. Little, ‘The Franciscan School at Oxford’, p. 825.
57 As early as the Constitutions of Narbonne in 1260 it was legislated (Art. 12) that friars should spend two or three years ‘in aliquo studio suae provinciae vel viciniae, nisi adeo fuerint litterati’. Exceptional cases could be dispatched directly to Paris. Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis’, p. 72. Benedict XII in November 1336, codified this practice and formally mandated a period of teaching in a studium prior to enrolling in the degree programme in Paris – in the decree Redemptor Noster of 28 November 1336 reproduced in Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, II, No. 1006, p. 469. See too Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, pp. 102–3.
standard term, the earliest age at which a friar could ordinarily commence degree studies was twenty-seven.59

This period as a lector meant that these Franciscan degree candidates had, in effect, been ‘reading’ both the Bible and the sentences to students in a studium provinciale for some time prior to coming to Paris. These former lectors would often have independently prepared some comments on the Bible and sentences for this role. It follows that a Franciscan candidate’s initial thoughts and comments on the sentences had originated in a quite different setting to his secular counterparts and, to some degree, had been formed even prior to his formal university studies commencing in Paris. The initial direction of his thought was laid down before even his first formal lecture.

One further obvious but often overlooked difference between secular and mendicant students should also be recalled. In the thirteenth century, secular students would have possessed their own lodgings and have attended classes and other events as they needed and have done so in such locations as their master could provide. Mendicants, on the other hand, lived, slept, ate, prayed and worked with their teachers in the same, albeit large, dwelling which also served as their place of instruction. Thus they would generally have had far greater interaction and contact with their masters than was common for a secular student and so tended to be more greatly influenced and intellectually fashioned, for good or ill, by those masters.

59 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, p. 92. The General Chapter of Lyons in 1325 put an upper age limit of 40 for students to be sent to Paris, which would suggest that some earlier students had exceeded that age. A. Carlini, ed., ‘Constitutiones Lugdunenses’, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 4 (1911), 527-36 (p. 530).
A chronology of a ‘typical’ progression to a master’s degree by a friar minor can be reconstructed. Of course, no friar is truly typical nor did any follow a truly ‘standard’ progression but the exercise is both illuminating and helpful. Following St Francis’ death, the trend continued for younger men to enter the order and the late teens was common for entering the order although oblation was never practiced among the friars. As the vows of a friar could not be received until his canonical majority and the time of probation had since 1220, been fixed at one year, the earliest a young man would be accepted into probation in the order was fifteen, although there were many older friars.

Franciscans habitually had brief tenures as regent masters and then were moved so that their expertise would be used in other places while a new graduate was appointed as regent master. The appointment could be to anywhere but was usually an academic role. It followed that former masters in Paris rarely returned to regular pastoral tasks, for their training was considered too useful to the order and they frequently were appointed to a string of higher teaching posts around the order.

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**PROGRESSION TO A DEGREE IN THEOLOGY AMONG FRANCISCANS IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Minimum Age</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Novitiate</td>
<td>Novice</td>
<td>Evaluation by Minister Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Profession of vows followed at age 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>Studium Provinciale</td>
<td>Studies</td>
<td>Lector of Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Covered the intellectual preparation needed for life as a friar, from learning to read to such skills as preaching, hearing confession and cure of souls. Most friars go on to take up such roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>20-23</td>
<td>Studium Generale</td>
<td>Studies</td>
<td>General Lectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gifted candidates were sent to a studium generale for preparation as lectors. At completion the candidate returned to his province to serve as a lector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>24-26</td>
<td>Studium Provinciale</td>
<td>Lector</td>
<td>The new lector reads to his own students. If sufficiently capable, a candidate may be chosen for degree studies in Paris or elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-16</td>
<td>27-30</td>
<td>Faculty of Theology</td>
<td>Studies</td>
<td>The Master of the Franciscan School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A candidate begins with four years of biblical studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-18</td>
<td>31-32</td>
<td>Faculty of Theology</td>
<td>Biblical Bachelor</td>
<td>He ‘reads’ scripture to younger candidates, usually one year on each testament. Takes part in a scriptural Disputata Ordinaria. Gives one assessed sermon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>He aids his master in the teaching of scripture while studying dogmatic theology through the sentences. He begins preparing his own Sentence Commentary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-21</td>
<td>33-35</td>
<td>Faculty of Theology</td>
<td>Sentence Bachelor</td>
<td>‘Reads’ sentences to younger students. Is participant once in a theological Disputata Ordinaria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>He aids his master in teaching theology to students while he works on his own assessment tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Faculty of Theology</td>
<td>Formed Bachelor</td>
<td>He completes his commentary on the Book of Sentences and gives a public lecture and disputes twice before each other master. He gives one Disputata Quodlibetale and another Ordinaria. He gives an assessed sermon and obtains a final approval from each master.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>His instruction is completed but he is required to perform a number of assessment tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-25</td>
<td>37-39</td>
<td>University of Paris</td>
<td>Regent Master</td>
<td>He now has a license to teach and is engaged in instruction of higher candidates and assessing those of other masters. He has some administrative roles within the faculty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.5 Sentence Commentaries

The key elements of a sentence commentary and how Alexander of Hales began the practice of requiring from theological degree candidates a commentary upon the Book of Sentences have already been noted.63 The Book of Sentences had been a well known and established work but by no means dominated theological education when Alexander became a regent master of theology in Paris in 1221. He was greatly impressed by its breadth of coverage and its clear and systematic argumentation so readily adapted to scholastic pedagogy.64 Alexander did some of this adaption himself and in about 1224 took the broad chapters of Peter the Lombard and broke them down into the familiar smaller distinctions, articles, questions and membra used in studying the book ever after.65 It was in this form that the work became familiar to theology students. By the time that Alexander entered the order and moved to the Grand Couvent in 1236, the use of the sentences, and the composition of a commentary upon them, was already becoming well established pedagogic practice.66

The Book of Sentences itself (actually four books) was a systematically arranged series of propositions, or ‘sentences’, traversing the full ambit of

Each proposition was considered in typical scholastic fashion: issues were phrased as questions, arguments both for and against each proposition were considered, a resolution proffered, and possible arguments opposing the solution were distinguished or reconciled. All this produced an answer to the question that was in accord with existing authority and with reason. A ‘commentary’ on the sentences is a mildly deceiving name as the work produced did not truly comment on the text as much as expand upon it. Commentators added to the array of authorities already assembled by Peter the Lombard and reconciled their new material with the arguments already assembled. Additionally, it was commonplace for commentators, while adhering to the broad structure of the topics that had been set out by Peter the Lombard, to alter the precise wording of questions in the commentary. They would shift the emphasis of questions, introduce new questions in areas of interest to them and expand or contract sections depending on their own particular interests and ability.68 Such tinkering with the received text provides opportunities to see an author’s individual ideas and emphases in his theological work.

This preparation of a commentary on the sentences met the needs of the theological faculty well for it attested to a student’s theological knowledge in all its branches.69 It showed both that a student had covered the wide breadth of theology and that he possessed a good command of earlier authorities.70 As a benefit, the completed commentary frequently served as

68 Appendix 1 below provides an example of this sort of adjustment to the Book of Sentences but some Franciscan commentators, page 317-28 below.
70 Russell Friedman, ‘The “Sentences” Commentary, 1250-1320: General Trends, the Impact of Religious Orders and the Test Case of Predestination’, in Mediaeval Commentaries of the Sentences of Peter the Lombard, 2 vols, ed. by G. R. Evans (Leiden: Brill, 2002-10), I
the author’s future lecture notes for use both when reading theology to
candidates as a bachelor and later, when a master, to students of his own.

It is not entirely clear how a student’s commentary was assessed but it
does not seem to have been the case that a board of examiners read it or
directly evaluated it as being of a suitable standard, as in the manner of a
modern doctoral thesis, although individual masters may have done so and
Alexander himself certainly did. It seems clear that a student’s master bore
the responsibility to ensure that the commentary was prepared in the course
of instruction in systematic theology. The mere coverage of so many topics in
a commentary ensured the breadth of his study. As for the assessment of its
quality by other masters, the requirement in university statutes for each
formed bachelor to dispute before each master provided the principal
opportunity for their skill and knowledge to be evaluated.71 As the subject
matter in these exercises was chosen by the master concerned, and would be
at least in part drawn from some proposition from Peter the Lombard’s
sentences, the quality of a student’s preparation in his commentary could
then be tested.72

As genres of scholastic discourse, there was evolution in these
sentence commentaries especially in their earliest phases. The initial
sentence commentaries, such as those of Alexander himself and his first
pupils like Eudes Rigaud, amounted to little more than glosses on the Book of
sentences. The emphasis of these earliest commentaries was upon the expansion and further exposition of concepts that are already present in the original of Peter the Lombard, in the style of a gloss, rather than on the development of new ideas or even in the improved quality of argumentation behind a commentator’s own opinions. Initially, the exercise concentrated upon adding to what was in the Book of Sentences and not upon developing it with new ideas or taking it in new directions, although this did eventuate later.

As an instance of this, Peter the Lombard’s third article of the eighteenth distinction of the third book of sentences asks whether Christ had the capacity to merit in his earthly life. Alexander’s commentary on this question, composed in the late 1220s, is of sixty-four lines in length, made up of twenty-four lines discussing three new arguments in favour of that proposition and twelve lines setting out two new opposing arguments, along with twenty-eight lines resolving the inconsistencies between them all. Alexander gives no response of his own to the argument at all and only amends the conclusion to accommodate his new authorities. Eudes Rigaud in his commentary from about 1240 is similar. He allocates thirty-two lines to his consideration of the question: fourteen giving three new arguments in favour of the proposition, six lines giving two new opposed arguments and he provides ten lines as setting out his reconciliation of those arguments, meaning that what he identifies as his own opinion fills but two lines.

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73 When Alexander’s commentary was eventually published in the 1950s, the editors gave it the title Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi.
76 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III., d. 18, a. 3, q. 1; see Appendix 2, pages 341-42 below.
The thought and opinion of a commentator himself were considered of much less importance than developing further what was already present in the reasoning of the *Book of Sentences*. The emphasis lay upon the ability to adduce further authorities and, thereafter, to bring them into harmony with existing material in the *Book of Sentences*. Consequently, this process was as much an exercise in dialectic and scholastic method as ever it was about the philosophical and theological conclusions reached. The ideas of the commentator are present, but subjected to little attention and frequently discoverable only in the choice of new authorities and the manner in which the commentator goes about resolving apparent discord.

It follows then, that an author’s opinions can be derived not from what he says, much of which will be a recapitulation of the material assembled by Peter the Lombard, but from the new material added to it, the favoured writers quoted and the direction of argumentation. How a commentary alters the *Book of Sentences* can reveal much of an author’s thought. It was previously noted that from the beginning, commentators felt quite at ease in slightly altering individual questions in the sentences, adding, deleting or rewording them. Observing the manner in which a particular author does this, the matters omitted or expanded and developed, also discloses an author’s interests and manner of argumentation. As can be seen in Appendix 1 below, it is uncommon for an author to ask exactly the same questions as those posed by Peter the Lombard or even other commentators. Observing

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77 For example, Appendix 1, pp. 317-28 below, reveals that many authors greatly elaborated the question in chapter 51 of the *Book of Sentences* so it could be considered in greater detail. That of chapter 54, by contrast, was moved around and pondered in different contexts.

78 See page 28 above.
how successive generations of commentators phrase the question to be addressed about the same topic is enlightening.\textsuperscript{79}

However, the nature of these early sentence commentaries altered substantially in less than a generation and they took on a quality quite different to the quasi-glosses that they had once been. As an example, in answering that same question concerning Christ’s capacity to merit in his earthly life, Bonaventure in his commentary, written in the early 1250s, almost trebled the size of the treatment by the earlier commentators like Alexander and allocates 189 lines to his discussion. Thirty-six of these present five new arguments in favour of the proposition and twenty-five lines deal with five new opposed authorities. The real differences occur in what follows, in which Bonaventure’s own opinion and the reasons for it consume sixty-three lines of text and the reconciliation of all this new material cover sixty-five. Significantly, that reconciliation is not merely to resolve discord among the added authorities but also between Bonaventure’s own opinion and the authorities.\textsuperscript{80} There is an interval of only about fifteen years between the composition of Eudes’ commentary and that of Bonaventure but in that time, the sentence commentary has moved from merely adding new authorities to a pre-existing argument and now taken on the additional function of being a means for a commentator to convey his own opinion while still remaining within the structural framework of a commentary.\textsuperscript{81} The ideas of the author came to engage with authority and this new approach remained a feature of sentence commentaries thereafter.

\textsuperscript{79} See page 317-28 below.
\textsuperscript{80} Bonaventure, \textit{Opera Omnia}, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii Sancti Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), III (1887), \textit{Sent. III}, d. 18, a. 1, q. 1.
\textsuperscript{81} Friedman, ‘The “Sentences” Commentary, 1250-1320’, p. 84.
This is a swift and substantial change in the nature of these commentaries and a number of factors were significant in this evolution of the genre.\textsuperscript{82} The first of these was the expanding practice of scholastic disputation in the university. As new times brought with them new questions which the authorities of the past were ill suited to address, it proved necessary at times to provide more modern and even personal solutions to these areas brought to light through disputation. Not only were there the ‘new logic’ and new philosophical tools acquired through the recovery of the works of Aristotle but there were rapid developments in the natural and social sciences which theology had now to incorporate and with which much of the theology of the preceding millennium, dominated as it had been by Neoplatonism and Biblical exegesis, was ill-equipped to contend.\textsuperscript{83} Holding qualifications in the ‘queen of sciences’ created an expectation of ability to address issues in fields that might not strictly fall in the purview of theology. As an instance, the friar Roger of Marston took part in a series of quodlibetal disputations in England in about 1281 in which questions were put to him on topics as diverse and novel as the taxes upon doctors and lawyers, whether Edward the Confessor should be considered a martyr, the nature of rainbows and if it ever would be permissible for an indigent father to sell his son. None of these were questions for which the traditional authorities provided satisfying answers, if any at all, and Roger, like all disputants of the era, however much he may try to ground it upon the usual authorities of the


Christian tradition, was obliged by the nature of the questions to be creative, to adduce his own reasoning and to express his personal opinion. Likewise, a consideration of Appendix 1 below shows many new or altered questions in Franciscan sentence commentaries. Among them are speculative consideration that had received scant attention from earlier generations of scholars.

In like fashion, as skills grew in the art of disputation and disputation became increasingly public events, both masters and students seeking to shine desired to move outside the known and anticipated authorities. They became more innovative and creative in their argumentation, developing newer ideas of their own with which to outshine opponents. This development also operated as a legitimation of the expression of personal opinion in sentence commentaries. Such new opinions became both necessary, because of the newer questions being posed, and more common as disputants vied with each other. Early commentaries like that of Eudes Rigaud reconciled ideas of authorities; later commentaries like those of Bonaventure and beyond did the same but the ideas of the author himself often became an opinion to be reconciled. The great undertaking of writing a sentence commentary moved from being a task merely to comment on the Book of Sentences to become an exercise to integrate a scholar’s own ideas, logically and philosophically derived, with the existing corpus of established

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84 Roger of Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, ed. by Ignatius Brady and Girard Etzkorn, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 26 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1968). Utrum advocati et medici de salario debeat decimas dare?, Quodlibet 3, Question 20 (p. 349), ‘Utrum sanctus Eduardus debeat haberi pro martyre?’ Quodlibet 4, Question 34, (p. 439), ‘Utrum apparitio iridis sit instituta propter diluvian non-futurum?’ Quodlibet 4, Question 23 (p. 414), ‘Utrum pater in necessitate constitutus potest vendere filium?’, Quodlibet 2, Question 3 (p. 298). As to the incorporation of new material into these commentaries, see Friedman, ‘The “Sentences” Commentary, 1250-1320’, p. 84.
authorities and in this integration it is possible to reveal something of the author’s own thoughts.

The swiftness of that change had consequences for Franciscan ministry and academic endeavours. At just the time in which the friars were assembling libraries and establishing their network of educational institutions, their best scholars were creating theological texts that not only brought together the most important theological ideas of the past but they coupled to them ideas and insights that were novel to the earlier scholars. Quite early after the establishment of the school in Paris, new Franciscan students were witnessing the production of texts that incorporated an author’s own opinions. It was acceptable to create one’s own material in a way that had not been so a few generations earlier.

Such use of novelty happily coincided with a belief shared by many in the order that God had favoured the friars and was creating something new in them. There was a conviction among friars that they had been divinely given a ‘new’ way and a ‘new’ vocation in the Church as they followed the ‘new’ type of saint, Francis of Assisi. Many Franciscans took to heart Francis’ affirmation from his Testament that ‘Nemo ostendebat mihi quid deberem facere, sed ipse Altissimus revelavit mihi’ and that they were to be unlike what had preceded them. They believed that this choice of a new way

86 ‘No one showed me what I should do, but the Most High himself revealed it to me’. Kajetan Esser, ed., Die Opuscula des heiligen Franziskus von Assisi: neue textkritische
had received divine approbation in the imprinting of the stigmata upon St Francis.\textsuperscript{87} It followed that it would seem only appropriate, then, that they should bring with them a ‘new’ way of undertaking theology as well.\textsuperscript{88}

This attitude in writing theology seems consonant with the documentary records of sentence commentaries. William Courtenay has noted that nearly every surviving sentence commentary of the thirteenth century is from a mendicant theologian and that those of secular masters do not appear with any frequency until after 1350 and that, even then, they never exceeded the numbers of surviving commentaries coming from mendicant sources.\textsuperscript{89} The secular masters produced quodlibets, disputed questions and other types of scholastic tracts but their sentence commentaries seem to have been kept only for their own use and to have been little published; it is the mendicants who seem to have seized upon the sentence commentary as a favoured vehicle for distribution of their new ideas.\textsuperscript{90} While all candidates for a degree produced a commentary and lectured from it when reading the sentences, it would seem to have been peculiar to the mendicants, at least in the thirteenth century, to exploit the broader possibilities of the genre as a vehicle for the reproduction and

\textsuperscript{88} This ‘novelty’ in which the friars prided themselves was one of the grounds of complaint in the secular-mendicant controversy of the 1250s. See pages 84-86 below. It is, of course, a separate question whether the friars were actually as ‘new’ as they considered themselves to be.
\textsuperscript{90} Friedman, ‘The “Sentences” Commentary, 1250-1320’, p. 100.
distribution of their own ideas. They copied, distributed and circulated sentence commentaries in great number and Stegmüller’s data relating to extant manuscripts from this period testifies to this practice.\footnote{Cf. the thirteenth-century authors listed in Stegmüller, \textit{Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi}, and the paucity of non-mendicant authors among them.} Filling the void in the new libraries being created in their \textit{studia}, the friars made do with what literary resources were at hand; namely, the sentence commentaries which returning friars brought with them from their studies in Paris; either their own if they had proceeded to a degree, or a copy of one in the Paris collection if they had been there in the lectoral programme and were on the way to teach.\footnote{Courtenay, ‘The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris’, pp. 84-5.}

Thus commentaries are texts serving a number of different functions. From the perspective of the writer, these commentaries were composed in order to meet the requirements for a degree and to serve as private notes for his own subsequent teaching, but not principally for dissemination in a published form. That was the work of later scholars, ‘secondary authors’, who came frequently to reproduce these works for the purposes of their own study and teaching, making use of the authorities given therein, reviewing the manner in which they were reconciled and studying the personal insights of the original author. This often occurred in a setting far distant from Paris, as can be seen from the publication of the commentary of the Parisian graduates Richard of Middleton in Naples, and Matthew of Aquasparta in Florence.\footnote{Lampen, ‘Liste alphabétique des manuscrits de Richard de Mediavilla’, p. 73 and Doucet, ‘L’Enseignement parisien d’Aquasparta’, p. 568.} Manuscripts of Bonaventure’s commentary were produced across Eastern
Europe in areas into which Bonaventure himself never went.\textsuperscript{94} Thus, in these written commentaries we deal with what one writer may have held but was not prepared to publish, preserved in a work produced by others who may not necessarily have held the same beliefs but who did wish to say it in published form. Even further, for the mendicants with their early meagre libraries, these commentaries in newer styles with expanded sections in which an author might express his own opinions and ideas, came to function as more than a simple commentary to assist in the understanding of the \textit{Book of Sentences}. It would appear to be a common event for students to lack a copy of the \textit{Book of Sentences} and yet possess a commentary upon it, frequently written by one of their own confreres. The commentaries became theological sources and textbooks in their own right, providing opportunities to study the theological thought and insight of eminent Franciscan teachers and well-regarded friars who were marking out the trail of this ‘new’ path of the mendicant way of life and along which the student hoped to follow.\textsuperscript{95} Sentence commentaries served well as such text books; they were comprehensive, systematically structured assembled for readers all requisite authorities for ease of reference.

A further factor advanced the development of sentence commentaries. As noted, while secular students proceeded directly from their first degree to theology and thus the work of composing sentence commentaries, this was


\textsuperscript{95} Consider, for example, the \textit{Abbreviatio} of Bonaventure by Richard Rufus of Cornwall, pages 169-72 below. There is considerable work yet to be done on the reception of sentence commentaries beyond the theology faculties of the universities. Some interesting first steps in this investigation can be found in Sylvain Piron, ‘Franciscan Quodlibeta in Southern \textit{Studia} and at Paris 1280-1300’, in \textit{Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century}, ed. by Christopher Schabel, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 403-38, especially pp. 406-13; and Roest, \textit{A History of Franciscan Education}, pp. 87-97.
not so for friars whose statutes mandated a term of ministry, usually as a lector, before going to university.\textsuperscript{96} Even so, when a lector, they did need to teach systematic theology of an appropriate level and often prepared a sort of ‘proto-commentary’ on the sentences for their own teaching needs. While secular students prepared their commentaries under supervision of a master while studying the sentences, friars often did so in a \textit{studium} of their own far from Paris, without the supervision of a master, forming their own ideas on the sentences well before they began their formal studies and with a practical outlook more suited to their audience in the \textit{studium}.\textsuperscript{97} Accordingly, if and when a former lector went to Paris, he did so with this ‘proto-commentary’ under his arm.\textsuperscript{98} This explains how mendicants often produced sentence commentaries \textit{before} matriculating, the most famous of which is Duns Scotus’ Oxford commentary, commenced before he went to Paris for his degree. Similarly William of Ware and Peter of John Olivi and the Dominicans Durand of St Pourçain and James of Metz all worked upon such ‘proto-commentaries’ before they had yet begun their university studies.\textsuperscript{99}

These practices by the mendicants advanced the primacy of systematic theology in the university at the expense of biblical studies. It was the former that grew in this period to become the pre-eminent activity of the Parisian theologian.\textsuperscript{100} In a further development, by the century’s end, the composition of a sentence commentary had ceased to be exclusively an

\textsuperscript{96} See page 23 above.
\textsuperscript{97} Roest, \textit{Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission}, p.52.
\textsuperscript{98} Courtenay, ‘The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents’, pp. 81, 84.
exercise for students readying themselves for a degree. These commentaries had begun to evolve into a favoured genre of theologians generally to give expression to their own ideas and theories. An interplay of these trends caused commentaries, as the century ended, less frequently to expound upon the entire Book of Sentences but only certain distinctions. However, since in the early part of the century every master produced a sentence commentary and it covered the same material laid out in the same pattern, sentence commentaries provide a superb point of comparison between authors. Soteriology will regularly and predictably be treated in the third book of the sentences, somewhere between distinctions seventeen to twenty-one, although individual authors may shift their treatment about within those bounds. Such constancy lets one compare expositions on soteriology with relative ease. Yet further, this commonality allows a comparison of texts from one generation of scholars, and in this case even from master to student, so as to trace the evolution of ideas. Sentence commentaries can shed light on how theological concepts are moving over time.

This feature can also be a weakness in sentence commentaries obscuring the understanding of soteriology. Because the matters to be treated in a commentary were fixed, the mere presence of a topic in a commentary signifies little. Equally, as authors are always building upon and synthesising existing knowledge in their commentaries, it can prove very hard to distinguish save in the case of fresh material what an author himself actually

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102 An instance of this trend can be seen in William de la Mare, Quaestiones in Tertium et Quartum Librum Sententiarum, from the end of the 1270s. See also Schabel, ‘Reshaping the Genre’, pp. 73-6.
103 See, for example, the comparison in Appendix 1, pp. 317-28 below.
held and what he was merely reproducing because it was in the corpus of
authority he had inherited.

1.6 Quaestiones Disputatae

The sentence commentary was a genre that made clear the
comprehensiveness of an author’s theological knowledge and his ability to
assimilate new arguments into existing reasoning. Other genres aimed less at
displaying the breadth of knowledge and more at its depth in a particular
topic and of these the most significant were the quaestiones disputatae.
Another form that arose from the classroom, the core of disputed questions
was still a dialectical exercise that demonstrates an ability to muster
authorities and to reach a reasoned and philosophically defensible
conclusion. However, in the case of disputed questions, this is done in a
much narrower field and in far greater detail.

In quaestiones disputatae, as before, a broad question is analysed
dialectically and tranched into smaller questions but in this instance this is
done not to surmount the broad expanse of material to be covered but rather
to establish a chain of sequential reasoning to support a complex final
conclusion. For example, Bonaventure in his disputed questions De Scientia
Christi asks first whether the uncreated Word possessed infinite
knowledge. On reaching the conclusion that it did, he next asks whether
God knows a thing through its likeness to similar things or through its own
essence. Concluding it is the latter, he goes on to ask whether anything can be
known with certainty in its own self, and yet further questions then follow.
None of these, of course, directly consider what knowledge the Incarnate

Jesus Christ possessed but it does allow Bonaventure to pose a sequential series of questions that lay the necessary groundwork for his ultimate answer. Eventually his chain of reasoning leads to his seventh and final question: whether the incarnate Christ understood all things. Each question in its turn observes the scholastic pattern of argument and counter-argument and a resolution of apparently discordant material. In *quaestiones disputatae* these resolutions build upon each other enabling a more complex conclusion to be reached than in a sentence commentary or *summa*. It also makes it possible to develop a conclusion in much more detail than the far briefer answers of those other genres.

By means of illustration, Bonaventure considered this same issue in his sentence commentary, Book III, d. 14, a. 2, q. 3, where he asked whether Christ, the incarnate word, knew what he had known as Christ, the uncreated word. In the course of his answer, Bonaventure cites sixteen authorities and gives his complete answer in five pages of text. By way of contrast, the disputed question considers and reconciles 240 distinct authorities in the course of forty-three pages of text, permitting a much more detailed and thorough consideration of the topic. In many ways the disputed question was the zenith of the dialectician’s art and so became a fixed and public feature of the academic year, required of both students and masters. It became the most common and most widespread of all the academic disputations, often going by the name of the *disputata ordinaria* when publicly conducted.105


Disputed questions evolved hand in hand with the university and well predated the coming of the friars. They had their origin in the classroom as simple dialectic exercises of a master with his students as a useful way to demonstrate certain points. Often these questions were employed to resolve seeming theological contradictions among the authorities considered in class. Thence it was a small step to formalise them in a more scholastic fashion where both sides of an argument would adduce authorities in support of their position and reconcile apparently contradictory authorities to show that one position had the support of better argument. In the classroom this was frequently done with a master presiding over a group of bachelors who did the disputing and then he would offer his magisterial determinatio or even, at times, participate as a disputant himself. A single exercise displayed all at once skills in the knowledge of authority, dialectics, rhetoric, reasoning and philosophy. It did this so well that, as has been seen, each student at Paris was required to engage twice in a disputata ordinaria in front of each master in turn, on topics of that master’s choosing, so that the masters might assess a student’s fitness to be licensed.

Masters also engaged in the production of disputed questions. Lent and Advent each year had periods for public disputations by the masters and.

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107 The earliest published disputed questions are from 1190 and oral disputations must have preceded that. Bernardo Bazàn, ‘La Quaestio Disputata’, p. 34.
109 Bazàn et al., Les Questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques, p. 25.
110 Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, pp. 36-42.
regular classes were suspended.\footnote{Bernardo Bazàn, ‘La Quaestio Disputata’, p. 40. These were the times for the disputata ordinaria.} Frequently these disputations were put into writing by scribes and then reviewed for publication by the master. These are the bulk of the \textit{quaestiones disputatae} passed now to us. As well as public academic exercises and examples of the art for the benefit of students, they also served something of an ‘advertisement’ for masters.\footnote{A solemn form of this genre, the vespery, was conducted when a new master assumed his chair in a precursor of the modern inaugural lecture, Little and Pelster, \textit{Oxford Theology and Theologians}, pp. 44-5.} As students chose their own master and paid him directly, for many secular masters their income reflected their ability to attract students through their reputation and performance.

The pervasiveness of disputed questions may well be due to this threefold purpose of the genre: it was well suited, better than a sentence commentary, to providing a detailed examination and instruction on a particular issue, it provided useful practice for a young scholar and it could also work as validation of professional competence on the part of a master.\footnote{Bernardo Bazàn, ‘La Quaestio Disputata’, p. 32. See also Bazàn et al., \textit{Les Questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques}, pp. 93-98.}

Beyond purely academic writing, disputed questions also lent themselves to more polemical purposes. A master was free to choose the topic of these disputations and so the topics chosen could reflect his own particular interests and fascinations.\footnote{Matthew of Aquasparta’s \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae de Cognitione} (Matthew of Aquasparta, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae Selectae}, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, vols 1-2 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1903-14)) and Roger of Marston’s \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima} (Roger of Marston, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae}, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 7 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1932) are both examples of such topics.} On some occasions the topic chosen was a response to earlier arguments of other scholars or they engaged with the topics of the day. For example, Bonaventure’s \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae de}
Perfectione Evangelica and de Paupertate, composed at the height of the secular-mendicant controversy in the University of Paris are at least as much political pieces against William of St Amour and those opposed to the friars as they are theological discussions on the evangelical counsels. Nevertheless, whatever prompted their composition, they remain genuine efforts to resolve theological issues by the rigorous application of the scholastic tools of philosophy and dialectics.

Disputed questions provide a number of benefits to the task of attempting to understand the thought of authors. Foremost among these is that they are the product of the author’s own choice. A sentence commentary demanded the treatment of all topics but there was no such compulsion in the case of disputed questions. The mere presence or absence of a topic reveals something of an author’s attitude to an issue.

Further, disputed questions allow for much greater depth of treatment of a topic and more subtle argumentation. So much had to be covered in a sentence commentary or summa that authors were unable to provide detail in argument at a level similar to quaestiones disputatae. The disadvantage of the disputata ordinaria is that while they did provide far better coverage of a topic, this was only so if the author chose to consider the topic. A given author may not engage in this format with many topics, soteriology included, at all. Matthew of Aquasparta has quaestiones disputatae on soteriology multiple times but Bonaventure never. The usefulness of this genre depends on the topic of the questions and hence the interest of the author in the field.
1.7 **QUAESTIONES QUODLIBETALES**

Similarly, the choice of question is again a factor in the usefulness of the next genre of scholastic discourse relevant to this study, *quaestiones extraordinarieae* or more commonly, *quodlibetales*. These too were born in the classroom, for naturally questions arose from students there that they put to the masters and bachelors. Questions of greater complexity might even at times be disputed in dialectic fashion with bachelors taking either side and then the presiding master offering a final *determinatio* and solution.

Having come from the students and not the masters, the questions were often not strictly confined to those in the *Book of Sentences*. Rather they were expressions of the students’ curiosity and often reflected greater speculation on their part. In time, this questioning too took on a public character as the *quaestio quodlibetalis*, in which students, other masters and even members of the public could pose questions of their own choosing on any topic, as the name of the genre indicates. Quodlibets further acquired a public nature by their being recorded in written form and their subsequent circulation. These written quodlibets survive in varied form. The majority are notes, either private or official, taken during the disputation in the manner of a transcript but there also exist redacted accounts of quodlibetal proceedings that show the editing hand of a disputant, as questions have been sorted into themes rather than left in the haphazard order in which they were asked. These also show signs of editing in the use of fuller quotations from authorities and a greater polish to the finished text.

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118 Makdisi, ‘Scholastic Method in Medieval Education’, p. 653.
Whether edited or not, the object of the quodlibet lay less in the comprehensiveness of theological knowledge, as with a sentence commentary and *summa*, nor in the detailed depth of knowledge, as in the *quaestio disputata*. With quodlibets the object lay rather in the expanse of knowledge over many fields. ‘All subjects, near and far, touching on sacred knowledge can be seen here: Sacred Scripture, theology, canon law, philosophy, ethics, casuistry etc.’

In *quaestiones quodlibetales* the format of the answer was again given in the standard scholastic pattern of argument *pro* and *contra* but, as befitted the nature of the exercise, all of the review of authorities, resolution of contrary material and final determination were substantially more succinct. This exercise evolved to manifest a disputant’s ability to think swiftly and to display the range of knowledge that he had acquired.

As can be readily imagined, these quodlibetal disputations demanded considerable skill in dialectic and theology, as well as a trained memory; it is ‘scholastic thought at its full state of maturity’. Quodlibets swiftly became a statutory requirement for any candidate hoping to become a master and,

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120 ‘Tous les sujets qui de près ou de loin touchent à la science sacrée, peuvent s’y voir aborder: Écriture Sainte, théologie, droit canonique, philosophie, morale, casuistique etc.’ Glorieux, ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge’, p. 128.


122 These requirements were ‘scilicet in aula Episcopi Parisiensis, quando fit ibi alius novus magister in theologia, item in vesperis alicuius magistri, item semel in aula Conbertarum, tempore quo magistri in theologa non legunt, scilicet inter festum apostolorum et festum exaltacionis Sancte Crucis; item semel de Quolibeto in Adventu vel circiter; item semel in disputationibus generalibus, antequam permittantur sibi legere sententias’, ‘namely in the hall of the Bishop of Paris when one is made a new master of theology, at the Vespers of certain masters, likewise in a Sorbonica at the time in which masters in theology are not lecturing, that is between the feast of the apostles [29 June] to the exaltation of the Holy Cross [14 September]; likewise at the Quodlibets in Advent or thereabouts; likewise at the general disputations before lecturing on the Sentences in permitted’. Denifle and Chatelain, eds., *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II (1894), Charter 1188. As to the other formal
due to their public character, became significant events in civic life. Nevertheless, and one is not without sympathy for their decision, on attaining their degree some masters declined ever to take part in a quodlibetal disputation again and the Dominicans eventually placed limits on the sorts of questions that they were prepared to answer in this format.

Generally, though, the quodlibet was enthusiastically embraced by the mendicant orders and there is some evidence that the quodlibet had its origin in the mendicant studia rather than the university itself, however ardently it came later to be embraced there. The earliest quodlibet we possess is one from the Dominican studium of Paris dated about 1230 and composed by the friar Gueric of Saint-Quentin. Not only did the mendicants seem to originate the quodlibet but they seemed to dominate its production as a written genre; over half of all surviving quodlibets are by mendicant friars, it was the Franciscan John Pecham who spread the custom of quodlibets beyond Paris to Oxford and the only surviving texts of quodlibeta outside Paris, Oxford, Cambridge and Rome are from mendicant studia.

questioning. Little and Pelster attribute the mendicant predilection for the quodlibet to the orders’ poverty; their libraries were smaller and less endowed than those elsewhere in the university and the high cost of skins meant that friars were less able in the thirteenth century to engage in bookwork than their secular counterparts and so made greater use of oral activities such as these disputationes. While those are credible possibilities, it seems more likely that the determining factor for both orders was the skills in preaching in the ministry for which the student friars of both orders were being prepared. Whether that preaching be popular preaching in towns or combatting heresy, the ability to think on one’s feet, to adduce clear argumentation that can be followed by those outside as well as inside academia and to respond with composure to challenges from an audience, the quodlibet showed itself a most useful practical and pedagogic tool.

Rather like disputed questions, its usefulness in this present work is dependent on whether an appropriate question is posed by an audience member. Even when such a question was posed, the recorded answer was brief and tended to be expressed in terms readily comprehended by the nature of the audience being addressed, which is to say at a lesser academic level than something like a summa. Quodlibets do, however, admirably disclose what an author thought on a topic when under pressure, with little time to marshal his thoughts and under pressure to express himself succinctly. The shortcoming of the quodlibet was its brevity and that it did

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130 Piron, ‘Franciscan Quodlibeta in Southern Studia and at Paris’, p. 435. One must, of course, explain why the Dominicans chose to admit public questions but only in certain topics.
131 Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, p. 29.
not disclose the interests and favoured topic of a master but rather of an audience.\textsuperscript{132}

1.8 Summa

The final genre to be considered is the \textit{summa}. It is less closely tied to the classroom and unlike the preceding forms was not a compulsory form asked of all students. The composition of a \textit{summa} was the free choice of an academic, usually well established in their careers. The \textit{summa} like the sentence commentary was a broad and comprehensive coverage of theology, arranged in systematic fashion.\textsuperscript{133} It too, gave expression to the personal insights of the author but it differed from a sentence commentary in that it sought not to comment or to gloss upon the \textit{Book of Sentences} but to imitate it; to produce a comprehensive system giving a complete overview of theology but in a pattern different to that set out by Peter the Lombard.\textsuperscript{134} In a commentary, an author’s own ideas enhanced but did not supplant established authority, in a \textit{summa} his own ideas lay at its heart. It did everything that the \textit{Book of Sentences}, or a commentary upon it, did but in a structure entirely of the author’s choosing. In a \textit{summa}, the author was free to arrange the discussion of theology however its author saw fit. A second significant distinction lay in the maturity of an author; a sentence

\textsuperscript{132} For example, Friar Roger of Marston considers fallen human nature in the thirteenth question of his second set of quodlibets. It is three pages long and raises one authority on either side of the argument: Roger of Marston, \textit{Quodlibeta Quatuor}, II. xiii, pp. 190-3. In contrast, in his \textit{Quaestiones de Lapsu Naturae Humanae}, the analysis is fifty-two pages long and raises forty-three arguments \textit{pro} and sixteen \textit{contra} the proposition: Roger of Marston, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae}, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 7 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1932) pp. 148-200.

\textsuperscript{133} Roest, \textit{A History of Franciscan Education}, p. 126.

\textsuperscript{134} Colish, ‘From the \textit{Sentence} Collection to the \textit{Sentence} Commentary and the \textit{Summa}’, p. 11.
commentary was generally the work of a bachelor before obtaining a license to teach, but a *summa* was generally produced by a seasoned master.

There had certainly been precursors to the *summa* that were similarly ambitious in attempting to traverse systematically all of theology and give a commentary on each element; Peter Abelard’s *Theologia Scholarium* and Honorius of Autun’s *Elucidarium* are among the better known. However, it is not until the 1240s that the *summa* regularly appears as a distinct genre of scholasticism regularly employed by authors. Not every theological scholar wrote a *summa* but it was frequently encountered among the ‘professional’ theologians of the universities, well into their careers, as an expression of their own approaches to theology. One of the earliest, and one of the first under the name of *summa*, was that of Alexander of Hales from about 1245. That of Thomas Aquinas is probably the most famed but others had also been produced by Ulrich of Strasbourg, Albert the Great and, in a highly condensed form, by Bonaventure in his *Breviloquium*.

In the case of Alexander’s *summa*, his hand was, at best, but one among many in its composition. If he wrote any of it at all, it was a small portion, and the bulk of it was composed posthumously by his students and disciples, principally John of La Rochelle, William of Meliton and Eudes Rigaud, though quite clearly drawing upon Alexander’s own ideas, notes and

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lessons.\textsuperscript{137} While it may seem strange to modern readers to do so, the work from its earliest times was attributed to Alexander and known variously as the \textit{Summa Halensis}, \textit{Summa Halesiana} or the \textit{Summa Fratris Alexandri} and yet was equally known to have been written by other authors. In 1255, Pope Alexander IV issued \textit{De Fontibus Paradisi} in which the summa of Alexander of Hales was commended to the friars and the pontiff praised the brilliance of Alexander’s scholarship in the text, noting ‘in tanto verborum agmine, quod immensa videtur divinae profunditatis eloquia continere’.\textsuperscript{138} Nevertheless, Pope Alexander then went on to acknowledge and thank William of Meliton and his colleagues without whose efforts the work would never have been accomplished!\textsuperscript{139}

It is an intriguing question to ask how such a text came to be, especially as it is the peculiarly personal approach to organising theology of a man whose name was made through the establishment of Peter the Lombard’s structure as normative for theological education. Much remains to be done in this area; for example, it remains unclear whether the initiative for this work came from Alexander himself or from his close disciple John of La Rochelle. John does not appear to have left a sentence commentary or


\textsuperscript{139} ‘… dilecto filio fratri Guillelmo de Milletona, huic sollicitudini deputato, sedule assistentes ipsumque ac se mutuo adiuvenes sine dilationis dispendor praedictae \textit{Summae} opus finaliter exequantur.’ Alexander IV, \textit{De Fontibus Paradisi}, p. 351. ‘… to our beloved son Brother William of Meliton, to whose meticulous care and attentive aid and with his help on it, without inconvenience of delay, the work of the aforementioned Summa was finally brought to completion’. 
summa of his own and it is arguable that his energies were instead poured into the editing of the Summa Fratris Alexandri, later to co-opt his confreres into assisting him. Whoever may have been responsible for initiating the project, it is equally difficult to know their reason for doing so. It is, however, possible to say with certainty that it was viewed as an important project to see through to completion, as the task was picked up following the deaths of both Alexander and John of La Rochelle and completed by others. Perhaps it was the case that Alexander saw the great advantages and merits in such a systematic approach to theological education as the sentence commentary, but that he felt a text specifically written for that purpose might serve better than the Book of Sentences. It may also be the case that, confronting the death of a teacher as influential and so foundational to their own studies to that point as Alexander, the friars were moved to capture and preserve, as well as they could, his ideas and instruction. They may also have wished to preserve a record of the instruction from Alexander, a former secular master, to validate the orthodoxy of Franciscan positions during the secular-mendicant controversy which was still raging at the time of the work’s production. The scholarship is presently lacking to say with certainty.

A summa came to be viewed as the magnum opus of a scholar and a chance to show his thought in the fullness of its development. The two instances to be considered in this work, the Summa Fratris Alexandri and

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140 See pages 128-29 below, discussing Bonaventure invocation of Alexander’s name for just this purpose.

141 The Prolegomena to the Summa Fratris Alexandri (Vol. IIIA) prepared by Victorinus Doucet and the other editors of the summa remain still the only thorough consideration of the origins of the work. Pages lix-lxxi provide a good overview of the historical issues around its composition and the status quaestionis is summarised on pp. lxxx-lxxi. Their view as to the scholarship that remains to be done is set out on p. ccclxx and most of that remains valid today. Like the bulk of scholarship to date on this topic, we understand how the work was composed far better than why it was composed.
the *Breviloquium* of Bonaventure, are somewhat atypical. The former is only partially the work of its putative author and the latter is uncharacteristically succinct.\(^{142}\) Despite this, they both possess the strength of the *summa*. All material is covered so an author’s thoughts on soteriology can readily be considered. Moreover, since the structure used in a *summa* is unique, it offers a fresh aspect through which to consider an author’s writing. It is also a useful point of contrast with an author’s sentence commentary, revealing the matters an author thought of greater or lesser importance in his exposition.

Thus, while Anselm’s *Cur Deus Homo* had found itself at the core of the treatment of soteriology in the *Book of Sentences* and its commentaries, including Bonaventure’s sentence commentary, when Bonaventure wrote the *Breviloquium*, he omits reference to Anselm’s works in his discussion of salvation in favour of an approach of his own. His *summa* helps give a better sense of Bonaventure’s true thoughts on Anselm.

Like a sentence commentary, the mere presence of a consideration of soteriology in a *summa* signifies little as its inclusion is obligatory. Yet further, the *summa* itself was not compulsory and far from every academic author composed one, so even its existence cannot be presumed. The greatest utility for the purposes of this present study in *summa* lies, if it were composed, in demonstrating how a theologian would argue a position free of the strictures of the *Book of Sentences*.

Amid this array of genres and forms, none of the authors to be considered here wrote a text expressly and solely on the topic of soteriology. What they

\(^{142}\) Bonaventure’s text amounts to 110 pages of text. The *summa* of Thomas Aquinas, his contemporary, is thirty times that length and runs to five volumes.
believed about that topic will need to be gleaned from their theology as it was
couched in these various genres of scholastic writing. Two issues arise from
this. Firstly, in the absence of explicitly soteriological texts, none of these
works to be considered expresses the full thought of any author on the topic
of salvation. At best, we know only some part of their ideas. It follows that at
times it will prove necessary to extrapolate from such writings as are
possessed what would be a reasonable expression of their thinking on the
topic.

Secondly, just as the development of these scholastic genres evolved to
meet the needs of the scholars employing them, so too did what these
scholars wish to say find itself shaped by the format of the specific scholastic
genre in which it was expressed. What Alexander of Hales had to say on
salvation in his disputed questions is expressed in terms quite different to
what was said in his *summa*. The mere fact that he says much less on an issue
in the former does not, in the light of the nature of a *quaestio disputata*,
necessarily mean that Alexander had grown less interested in a topic or had
less to say. The genre itself must be understood if the thought expressed in
that genre is to be fully appreciated.

As has already been seen, when that first generation of Franciscan
lectors and graduates, like Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, came
to write works of their own, they were doing something familiar and
established but doing it in a setting and context that was fresh and
unfamiliar. Theologians had always written tracts on Christian belief and had
even couched those tracts in scholastic terms for generations.\textsuperscript{143} These first Franciscans were, however, carrying on this tradition in a brand new foundation that, employing scholastic pedagogy, united the practical goals of a \textit{studium} with the more theoretical interests of an institute \textit{de facto} of the university’s faculty of theology. This creation had been born of the evolving needs of the Franciscans for better training for their preachers, missionaries and teachers and it channelled the production of that education into formalised expressions of their understanding.\textsuperscript{144} The Franciscans eagerly embraced the genres and forms of academic discourse and it was those genres, from sentence commentary to quodlibet and the rest, that were the manner in which they said what they believed. So enthusiastic were they and the other mendicant friars at doing so that they advanced and helped entrench the use of these genres not only in the university but in schooling elsewhere, in public disputations, in polemical quarrels and in popular instruction. There was a hylomorphic mutuality of influence as the form and the substance of this learning shaped each other.

The literary setting for the Franciscan expression of their ideas about salvation prompted the friars both to adduce and to reconcile new opinions about salvation. This process gave rise to new ideas far less centred on human fault and sin. Likewise, these new Franciscan notions drove those textual forms to be used in new ways: sentence commentaries ceased to be works simply for the evaluation of students and quodlibets spread to settings well outside the classroom. Much of the formalisation of those scholastic

\textsuperscript{143} See, for example, the overview of scholars and works of this period in Herman-Emiel Mertens, \textit{Not the Cross but the Crucified: An Essay in Soteriology}, trans. by Gert Troch, Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs, 11 (Louvain: Peeters, 1990), pp. 63-84.

\textsuperscript{144} Roest, \textit{Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission}, p. 51.
genres, of the institutionalisation of Franciscan education and of the interest in soteriology are all due to the figure of Alexander of Hales and in his activities can be seen the interplay of these forces.
2 Alexander of Hales and the Legacy of Anselm of Bec

To appreciate the novelty that Franciscans were introducing into the systematic consideration of soteriology, an appreciation of what had preceded it is needed. The starting point in the scholastic era for soteriology were the theories of St Anselm of Bec in his *Cur Deus Homo*, written in 1098 and later incorporated into the *Book of Sentences*.¹ While still a secular master, Alexander of Hales had further championed the use of Anselm in soteriology.² In theology, soteriology was in some respects the ‘poor cousin’ of Christology and had received scant patristic attention. No major text in the west were composed on the topic after Irenaeus of Lyons in the late second century until Anselm.³ A combination of Anselm’s own considerable intellect and of relatively little competition in the field of soteriology meant that Anselm’s theories dominated the topic and could not readily be ignored by any writer in the field. This was so even though the expressed purpose of the *Cur Deus Homo* was not soteriology but as an apologia for the Incarnation.

Anselm declares in the work’s preface that the purpose of the book is to show
that ‘naturam humanum ad hoc institutam esse, ut aliquando immortalitate
beata totus homo id est in corpore et in anima fruetur; ac necesse esse ut hoc
fiat de homine, propter quod factus est; sed nonnisi per hominem Deum,
atque ex necessitate omnia quae de Christo credimus, fieri oportere’. The
later reception of the work at times obscured that this was the purpose of
Anselm’s work and not the creation of some text of soteriology. There was
often quite a distance from the original intent of the Cur Deus Homo to its
reception.\textsuperscript{5}

Put crudely, Anselm’s reasoning in the work was understood thus: God
is all-powerful, all good and all just. Any transgression against such perfect
goodness must therefore offend the divine dignity in an infinite way. The
perfection of justice, therefore, demanded either penalty for that wrong or
satisfaction in recompense to be made for that fault. Yet the great and infinite
price to be paid for that infinite wrong was beyond the ability of a finite
humanity. All humanity could do, at best, was to return to an observance of
God’s laws but this is what it was already bound to do. Justice required some
recompense beyond that which humanity was bound to do yet unable to
accomplish. Humanity was thus trapped in its own fault. Because it had

\textsuperscript{4} That ‘human nature was established in order that the whole human being, both body and
soul, should at some time enjoy blessed immortality and that it was necessary that the
purpose for which human beings were made should, in fact, be achieved but only through the
agency of a God-Man and that it was necessary that everything we believe about Christ
should take place’. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, praefatio.

\textsuperscript{5} John McIntyre, Saint Anselm and his Critics: A Reinterpretation of the Cur Deus Homo
(Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1954); Inos Biffi, Anselmo d’Aosta e dintorni: La Construzione
della teologia medievale’ (Milan: Jaca, 2007); Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Twenty-Five Years
1994) of Anselm Studies: Review and Critique of Recent Scholarly Views, ed. by Frederick
wronged God, humanity must pay a price but the price was so great that only God was able to pay it. Humanity should give the satisfaction but could not; God could give the satisfaction but should not. The solution was therefore a God-Man: Jesus Christ. As a man, he could atone for the wrongs of his fellow human kind and, as God, he was capable of paying the price required for the transgression against the Father.6

Anselm: Hoc autem fieri nequit, nisi sit, qui solvat Deo pro peccato hominis aliquid maius quam omne, quod praetor Deum est.
Boso: Ita constat.
Anselm: Illum quoque, qui de suo poterit Deo dare aliquid, quod superest omne, quod sub Deo est, majorem esse necesse est quam omne, quod non est Deus.
Boso: Nequeo negare.
Anselm: Nihil autem est supra omne, quod Deus non est, nisi Deus.
Boso: Verum est.
Anselm: Non ergo potest hanc satisfactionem facere nisi Deus.
Boso: Sic sequitur.
Anselm: Sed nec facere illam debet nisi homo. Alioquin non satisfacit homo.
Boso: Non videtur aliquid justius.
Anselm: Si ergo, sicut constat, necesse est, ut de hominibus perficiatur illa superna civitas, nec hoc esse valet, nisi fiat praedicta satisfactio, quam nec potest facere nisi Deus nec debet nisi homo, necesse est, ut eam faciat Deus homo.
Boso: Benedictus Deus!

6 McIntyre, Saint Anselm and his Critics, p. 76.

7 Ans: But this work cannot be accomplished unless there be someone who pays to God for humanity's sin, something greater than all things existing outside God. Boso: This is established. Ans: Further, whoever can give to God something of his own which surpasses everything that is less than God, must be greater than everything that is not God. Boso: I cannot deny this. Ans: But there is nothing that surpasses everything that is not God – except God. Boso: This is true. Ans: Therefore, no one can make this satisfaction except God. Boso: That follows. Ans: But no one ought to do this except a human being. Otherwise humanity would not be making satisfaction. Boso: Nothing seems more just. Ans: If therefore, as has been settled, it is necessary that the Heavenly City be completed from among humanity, and if this can occur only if the aforementioned satisfaction be made, and if no one but God can perform this satisfaction and no one but a human ought to perform it: then it is necessary that a God-man perform it. Boso: Blessed be God!, Anselm of Bec. Cur Deus Homo, II. 6.
This neat and satisfying solution came to be known as the penal-substitutionary model of salvation and, for medieval minds at least, attractively gave explanations to both the Incarnation and salvation in one theory, frequently summarised in a catchphrase drawn from the work: ‘Ipse factus est homo ad hoc ut moreretur’.  

2.2 Alexander of Hales and the Incorporation of Anselm

Alexander incorporated this Anselmian model into his own teaching and writing. In many ways, even though he saw and corrected what he perceived to be shortcomings in the approach in Cur Deus Homo, Alexander was responsible for raising Anselm to the status of an ‘authority’. He achieved this even though Anselm lacked the antiquity of many others of equal status. Yet further, it has already been seen that Alexander established the Book of Sentences as the principal text for the university study of systematic theology. As place and genre came together in the instance of Alexander, he produced a particular expression of his teaching in theology, one in which he was prompted to make greater use of Anselm’s ideas. Certainly Peter the Lombard had given prominence to the Cur Deus Homo in the sentences, but Alexander’s redaction of that work with a greatly expanded discussion of soteriology and greater use of Anselm in it, made Cur Deus Homo the principal soteriological work for students of the discipline for the remainder

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8 ‘For this was he made man, that he might die.’ Anselm of Bec, Cur Deus Homo, II. 16.
11 See page 22 above.
of the Middle Ages and beyond. Scholastic soteriologists began with Anselm even if, like Alexander, they would move on from his ideas.

Alexander’s own starting point was with his birth some time between 1180 and 1186, possibly in the village of Hales Owen in Shropshire or, alternatively, in Hailes in Gloucestershire while some scholars have argued that he merely received his initial schooling in Hailes and that any attempt to locate his birthplace is a work of pure speculation. He appears to have begun his studies in Arts at Oxford, supported by a canonry of St Paul’s in London, but it is recorded by Roger Bacon that by 1210 he was at the University of Paris and lecturing there in the Faculty of Arts. He established a considerable reputation for himself in both the content of what he taught and, as noted, in his use of the Book of Sentences, as an innovative pedagogue.

In 1231, after some years of having taught them, Alexander chose to enter the Friars Minor and famously moved his chair to the Grand Couvent, effectively establishing the Franciscan school within the University of Paris. He remained there a teacher and lecturer for the remainder of his life until his death on 21 August 1245. During his time there he influenced and taught such significant figures as Bonaventure, Eudes Rigaud, Roger Bacon and John of La Rochelle, as well as others in the wider Faculty of Theology and, through his use of the Book of Sentences as both text and assessment, he

15 See page 15 above.
established a pattern for theological education that would be normative for the remainder of the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{16} He earned for himself such medieval epithets as the Doctor Irrefragabilis, the Doctor Doctorum and the Theologorum Monarcha.

2.3 The Works of Alexander of Hales

Alexander left three major works of theology. The first, making use of the Book of Sentences, was his Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi written between 1223 and 1227.\textsuperscript{17} This gloss is a comparatively concise and by no means an exhaustive gloss. There are numerous chapters of the Sentences on which Alexander makes no comment at all nor is it a comprehensive commentary upon all of the Book of Sentences, thoroughly and systematically treating each of theological issues raised. Rather it is, as it proclaims, merely a gloss on the sentences. The second of Alexander's works is a series of disputed questions, now gathered together and published as the Quaestiones Disputatae 'Antequam Esset Frater' but composed over the decade prior to 1231.\textsuperscript{18} Finally, Alexander began composition on a Summa, known variously as the Summa Halensis or Summa Fratris Alexandri yet, despite its name, it is at best only partially the work of Alexander's hand. The majority of it was completed following Alexander's death in 1245 by students and protégés of his, principally John of La Rochelle, William of Meliton and

\textsuperscript{17} Alexander of Hales, Glossa Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 14 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1951-57), III (1954).
\textsuperscript{18} Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae 'Antequam Esset Frater', ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 3 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19-21 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960).
Eudes Rigaud. The editors of the *summa* considered that the internal stylistic evidence was compelling for the view that its Book III, which deals with Christ and salvation, was unlikely to have been written directly by Alexander, although they did concede that certain early portions may have been overseen by Alexander. Their conclusion was that Book III was predominantly the work of John of La Rochelle but it nevertheless does reflect Alexander’s thought more or less faithfully.

Ipse Alexander quodammodo Summam fecit (critica externa), sed collaborantibus aliis (critica interna); item, ex propriis maxime scriptis, sed etiam ex alienis. Quare et authentica et halesiana quodammodo Summa dici potest, non autem simpliciter.  

This was not the first *Summa* to have been composed but was still uncommon. Whoever the authors may have been, they were certainly moved to preserve Alexander’s teaching in this particular genre. The *Summa* did come into being during one of the increasingly acrimonious phases of the secular-mendicant controversy and it is quite possible that its compilation facilitated the friars’ ability to gird their theological positions with the ideas of a genuine Franciscan scholar but one who had also been a secular master and so less likely to be criticised by his former colleagues. Whether its composition was for that purpose or not, the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* shows itself to be an instance of interplay between locus and genre in his soteriological study. Brought together into the one place of the Grand

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19 See further the discussion on pages 51-53 above and the references there of the work of Doucet. For further on the authorship of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, see also Ignatius Brady, ‘The *Summa Theologica* of Alexander of Hales (1924-1948)’, *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 70 (1977), 437-47 (p. 444) and Colish, ‘From the Sentence Collection to the Sentence Commentary and the *Summa’*, pp. 17 and 26.

20 ‘In a certain way, Alexander himself created the *Summa* (external analysis), but by means of other collaborators (internal analysis); this is especially so for certain passages but even so by extrinsic material. In a certain way, the *Summa* can be called authentic and Halesian, but not absolutely’. *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, III A, Prologomena, p. CCCCLXIX.

21 As to the secular - mendicant controversy, see pages 84-86 below.
Couvent, these Franciscan scholars assembled a text that perpetuated a distinctly Alexandrine theological approach. Further, possessing such a text, it was used not only by scholars generally, but it also served new Franciscans specifically for the purposes of their training there. Having a common course of studies, drawing on a common theological compendium, fostered a common approach and trajectory to their theological activities.\footnote{Alexander IV, De Fontibus Paradisi, exhorts just such activity among Franciscan scholars.}

\section*{2.4 The Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi}

The soteriological sections of the \textit{Book of Sentences} itself appear in distinctions 18 to 21 of Book III and observing which and in what fashion these passages were glossed by Alexander reveal something of his approach to the topic.\footnote{Of course, the precise distinctions in various commentaries could vary from author to author. See page 40 above.} It discloses Alexander’s marked reliance on the works of Anselm. With the exception of one reference to Bernard of Clairvaux, Alexander’s only cited author after the patristic age is Anselm. He is all but the lone ‘modern’ voice. Moreover, Alexander’s generous use of him would indicate that, in this topic at least, he considers Anselm to be an authoritative voice and he sets aside more established patristic figures in this topic as John Damascene and Gregory the Great. Furthermore, in the material that Alexander introduces to these soteriological sections, no author is used more frequently than Anselm, whom he cites in these distinctions eighteen times, ahead even of Augustine.

In none of those references does Alexander disagree with the reasoning or conclusions of Anselm; each of the references made to his writing is for the purpose of employing them as authority for Alexander’s
argument. The densest concentration of reliance on Anselm is in Distinction 20, *De Christi Passionis Congruentia*.\(^{24}\) In it, Alexander agrees with Anselm that it was fitting for humanity to pay the price of redemption since it was humanity that had sinned.\(^{25}\) He sides with Anselm against Augustine in noting the congruence of the way in which humanity was redeemed:\(^{26}\) mortality sprang from disobedience but was restored by Christ’s obedience, sin arose from a woman saying yes to Satan but salvation arose from a woman saying yes to God, and Satan wrought suffering through offering the fruit of a tree, while Christ conquered death and suffering by offering himself as fruit upon the tree of the cross.\(^{27}\) Alexander employs Anselm as authority for the proposition that human suffering does not derive from any power of Satan over humanity but merely that this suffering is permitted in God’s omnipotence and that, likewise, Christ’s death at the hands of the wicked did not mean that evil prevailed over good.\(^{28}\) Alexander again prefers Anselm over Augustine in discussing whether Jesus’s persecutors knew that he was the Son of God. Alexander quotes Augustine’s observation that, ‘Maiores

\(^{24}\) ‘Concerning the appropriateness of Christ’s passion’.


\(^{26}\) Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum*, III, d. 20, n. 3. ‘Sicut per hominis inobedientiam mors in humanum genus intraverat, ita oportebat ut per hominis obedientiam vita restitueretur; et quemadmodum peccatum, quod fuit causa nostrae damnationis, initium habuit a femina, sic nostrae iustitiae auctor nasceretur de femina; et sicut diabolus qui, per gustum ligni quem persuasit, hominem decepit et vicerat, sic per passionem ligni quam intulit ab homine vinceretur’. ‘Just as through human disobedience death entered into the human race, so it was fitting that through an obedient man life be restored; and in like fashion sin, which was the cause of our damnation, has its origin in a woman for the author of our justification was born of a woman; and just as the devil deceived humanity and succeeded, through the taste of the tree which tempted, so through the passion upon a tree victory was brought about through a man’. See also Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, I. 3.

\(^{27}\) Alexander of Hales, *Glossa III*, d. 20, n. 5 and n. 8(i), ‘Quamvis homo iuste a diabolo torqueretur et Deus iuste permetteret, non tamen diabolus iuste eum sed inuste torquebat.’ ‘Although a man is justly tormented by the devil, and God justly allows this, yet the Devil not justly but unjustly torments him.’
Iudaei, ut scribae, cognoverunt ipsum esse Christum et in lege promissum’, but dismisses it in favour of Anselm’s reasoning that, ‘Nullus homo unquam potuit scicnter velle occidere vel interficere Deum’. On the basis of that, Alexander notes approvingly Anselm’s reasoning that Jesus died not through the efforts of his persecutors or even through his own desire to die but rather through his pursuit of true justice, whereby the original sin is redeemed by original justice. Anselm is Alexander’s authority for the proposition that the Second Person of the Trinity was the fitting person to act as redeemer and mediator and that human redemption in the manner in which it occurred was the product of God’s will rather than of necessity.

This pattern is consistent throughout all those occasions in which Alexander employs Anselm’s writings; on matters dealing with human redemption, Anselm is the favoured authority and in any disagreement among the authorities, Anselm is preferred even over figures like Augustine, whom Alexander even omits at times. The significance of this for future theological consideration of soteriology is marked, for no subsequent theological student could or would consider the workings of salvation without addressing the theories of Anselm. Alexander’s actions had effectively ‘canonised’ the penal–substitutionary theories of Anselm about

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29 Alexander of Hales, Glossa III, d. 20, n. 8(ii). ‘The leaders of the Jews, like the scribes, knew he was the Messiah, the one promised in the Law’... ‘No one would ever be able knowingly to want to kill or slay God’.

30 Alexander of Hales, Glossa III, d. 20, n. 10, 235. ‘Non coegit Deus ipsum mori, in quo nullum fuit peccatum; sed ipse sponte sustinuit mortem; non per obedientiam deserendi vitam, sed sequendi iustitiam, in qua perseveravit’.

31 Alexander of Hales, Glossa III, d. 20, n. 11, 235 and n. 13, 236. ‘Est necessitas quae beneficienti gratiam auert vel minuit. Est etiam necessitas qua maior gratia beneficienti debetur. Cum enim aliquis ex necessitate cui subiacet invitus facit, aut nulla aut minor gratia debetur; cum vero sponte necessitati beneficiendi se subdit, maiorem beneficii gratiam meretur, ut cum quis vovet sponte conversationis sanctae propositum. Improprie tamen de Deo dicitur necessitas’.

32 For example, in just the twentieth distinction, Alexander in his gloss makes use of the Cur Deus Homo in nn. 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 17, 19, 22, 23 and 24. Augustine De Trinitate in contrast is listed among the authorities ‘contra’ in n. 3
salvation as a topic with which future theologians working in soteriology had to contend.

2.5 Quaestiones Disputatae 'Antequam Esset Frater'

Alexander’s Glossa is useful to discover how he incorporated Anselm’s thought into his commentary on the Book of Sentences but to discover Alexander’s own soteriology requires a consideration of his other works. It has already been observed that the Summa Fratris Alexandri is the work of a number of other hands such as John of la Rochelle and William of Meliton but only minimally of Alexander, if at all.33 For this reason, it is proposed not to consider the Summa Fratris Alexandri directly as ideas from the Summa cannot be attributed to Alexander with sufficient certainty. Instead, consideration of Alexander’s ideas will be through use of the earlier but incontestably authentic work of his, his Quaestiones Disputatae.34 These will be the primary source for reading Alexander’s approach and use of the Summa Fratris Alexandri will instead be confined to verification of these ideas. Nevertheless, before putting aside the Summa, there is merit to be gained from examining the structure of the questioning within it, especially in the areas that the Summa expands.

Appendix 1 below reveals that Alexander includes nearly everything soteriological that Peter the Lombard had previously raised; with the exception of the hypothetical questions dealing with possible alternate means of salvation, everything that Peter the Lombard considers, so too does

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34 Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, specifically questions 15 and 16.
Alexander.\textsuperscript{35} The great difference is not in the omissions from the Summa but rather in the additions to it. Alexander introduces greatly expanded discussions on how exactly Jesus Christ earned merit, how and where it was that Christ suffered and the necessity for Christ’s suffering. Put in other terms, while he broadly accepts Anselm’s model, Alexander displays a particular interest in exploring in greater detail \textit{how} Christ suffered, \textit{why} Christ suffered and \textit{to what end} Christ suffered.

For Anselm, it is only the divinity of the God-Man that is capable of making the satisfaction that achieves salvation: ‘\textit{redemptio hominis non potuit fieri per aliam quam per Dei personam}’.\textsuperscript{36} It can be said that the function served by his humanity is simply to be present as a nature of the God-Man so that satisfaction can be attributed to it. In the words of McCord Adams, ‘his identification with us is for legal purposes – to make satisfaction without being a middle man’.\textsuperscript{37} In the questions that Alexander poses and in the structuring of the Summa, he demonstrates discontent with this notion, greatly expanding the role and place for Christ’s humanity and what that humanity endures in making satisfaction for the fall.

Alexander begins by establishing that Christ was passible. He argues that the human flesh in which the Word was incarnated was not the perfect humanity of the initial creation but the humanity of the time and place in which it took flesh. Thus it suffered from what Alexander termed the ‘\textit{defects of punishment}’ and was frail and mortal as a result of the fall. However, being sinless, Jesus was free of the ‘\textit{defects of guilt}’ and so enjoyed the

\textsuperscript{35} See page 2317-28 below.
\textsuperscript{36} ‘\textit{Human redemption could not have been brought about by other than a divine person}’, Anselm of Bec, \textit{Cur Deus Homo}, I. 5. See further pages 68-69 above.
communion with God proper to the human state. Thus any passibility in Christ came as a result of the nature that he assumed and not from any action by him. Further, as an incarnate being, he was subject to both ‘defects of the body’, such as hunger and fatigue, and to ‘defects of the spirit’, such as fear and sorrow. Unlike the defects of punishment which were of the nature of what he had assumed, these latter defects were ones he freely chose to accept.\textsuperscript{38}

In considering how it was that satisfaction was wrought, Alexander reasons from the general experience of human contrition:

Quia in contritione, quando homo plene satisficat pro peccato, tria exiguntur: poenalia opera exteriora; praeter hoc etiam exiguntur sensus huiusmodi poenae in sensualitate; et praeter hoc oportet quod sit sibi voluntas dolendi et patiendi in ratione. Ergo ista requiruntur ad perfectam satisfactionem illius peccati quod corruptit totum genus humanum vel naturam. Ergo oportuit in passione Christi, quae fuit satisfactoria, esse poenalia opera exterior, et sensum horum in sensualitate, et voluntatem dolendi in ratione.\textsuperscript{39}

Alexander is clear that unless all three are present, no true satisfaction is made and thus that Christ’s human nature must play a role in the making of Anselmian satisfaction, beyond merely being present. He says that there is great glory in making satisfaction for the fall of humanity but states explicitly that ‘haec gloria aufferetur nisi essent illa tria, quia alter non esset sufficiens

\textsuperscript{38} Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’}, q. 15, d. 2, m. 2; cf \textit{Summa Fratris Alexandri} III, i. 1, t. 1, q. 4, d. 3, m. 3, c. 1.

\textsuperscript{39} ‘Because when in contrition a person fully makes satisfaction for sin, three things are needed: outward works of penance, further the feeling of this penalty is needed in the person’s senses and further it is fitting that there be a choice to sorrow and suffer in the will. Thus, these are required for the perfect satisfaction of that sin which corrupts the entire human race and human nature. Therefore, it was proper in Christ’s passion, which did make satisfaction, that there were outward works of penance, a feeling of them in the senses and a choice to sorrow over them in the will.’ Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’}, q. 16, d. 2, m. 5.
satisfactio’. He argued that if Christ merely went through the necessary motions of dying on the cross and rising again to effect human redemption, then that would have been insufficient. As true man, Christ had to have been emotionally involved in his affect as well, lest the agent of human redemption be something less than a true human and so inadequate, in Anselm’s terms, to pay the recompense for human sin. As a human, it was essential that Christ felt contrition for human sin: ‘Licet patiar poenam in corpore, et compatiar illi poenae in anima, nisi adhuc sit dolor de peccato, non est vera satisfactio.’

Moreover, these three elements are not things that divinity alone is able to provide; such emotional engagement is proper solely to the humanity of Christ. Such a conclusion creates, however, a complication for Alexander. If Christ knew that his act would bring about human redemption, surely in his reason there was then no ‘voluntas dolendi’ as Alexander stipulated but rather immense joy from human salvation. To surmount this problem, Alexander proceeds to distinguish two elements in the higher part of the will (i.e. that which is not shared with animals nor concerned with primal drives such as the need for shelter, food, self-preservation, etc.): reason as nature, which Alexander says apprehends through its union with flesh and innate knowledge and so governs matters such as health and self-discipline, and reason as reason which apprehends through choice and deliberation. Reason as reason knew of its union with divinity and so of the satisfactory purpose of

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40 ‘this glory will be borne away unless all three are present, since otherwise it is not sufficient satisfaction.’ Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 2, m. 5.

41 ‘For even if he suffered punishment in his body and suffered that punishment in his soul as well, unless there was also sorrow for sin, there would not be true satisfaction’. Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 4, m. 5.
suffering; it was disposed to the ‘passibility that was joy’. Reason as nature, however, suffered with the body and willed to sorrow.

Dico ergo quod secundum superiorem partem ratio unibilis est carni, quia secundum omnem partem unibilis est ei. Sic, secundum quod est natura quaedam, compassibilis est. Secundum vero quod ratio unita est deitati, ex illa ordinatone non est compassibilis dolore mortis, sed necessitatem habet ad gaudium. Aliter, enim non congrue satisfaceret Christus, nisi esset in eo summum gaudium de summa poenalitate.  

Alexander has thereby advanced matters. Beyond active engagement in satisfaction and the feeling and desire for suffering, Alexander now insists that Christ’s humanity must have some engagement with the ‘summum gaudium de summa poenalitate’.

2.6 The Role of Human Affectivity in Salvation

Alexander reasons that joy must have a soteriological significance, for if Christ did not exult fully in his making of perfect satisfaction then either the satisfaction was imperfect or Christ was no true man, in which case, again, the satisfaction for the sin of the first parents was incomplete. He argues that all of Christ must participate in the salvation, act, will and affect, or no true human has paid the price of human salvation. Alexander, it can be said, is unwilling to let the rendering of satisfaction be reduced to the mere fulfilment of some divine formula for aggrieved dignity and justice. If Anselm is right and it does indeed fall to humanity to pay the price of the fall, then, Alexander maintains, it must be the fullness of humanity that pays. The act

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42 “Thus I say that it follows, since the higher part of the will is joined to the flesh, each part is so joined with it. Thus, that part according to nature suffers with it. But that part which is reason united to divinity, by virtue of that arrangement, does not suffer under sorrow of death but has a need to rejoice. For otherwise it is not fitting that Christ make satisfaction unless there be in him the highest joy over the highest penalty’. Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’*, q. 16, d. 2, m. 3. Cf. membra 6 and 7 also.
alone is insufficient and humanity must engage with what was done. Christ’s humanity must feel the pain of the fall, the guilt of the wrong, the contrition for the sin, the desire for reconciliation, the agony of the cost and the joy of what was accomplished.

It is worth noting here the subtle but profound novelty that Alexander has introduced into Anselm’s ideas. By drawing a distinction between the ‘ratio ut ratio’ and the ‘ratio ut natura’, Alexander has made it possible for that part of Christ’s soul that was aware of the union of natures in him to rejoice with the greatest joy at the redemption that his suffering and death has brought about while, at the same time, that part of Christ’s soul that was not aware of the union was able to suffer with his body and will to apply it as penitential satisfaction. The significance of this is that the latter function is capable of being performed by Christ’s humanity alone.

As Alexander argued, there must be in him the ‘highest sorrow’ in this act or no satisfaction is made.\textsuperscript{43} Anselm had, conversely, been explicit that ‘redemptio hominis non potuit fieri per aliam quam per Dei personam’ and reasons that:\textsuperscript{44}

\begin{quote}
Nullus unquam homo moriendo praeter illum Deo dedit quod aliquando necessitate perditurus non erat, aut solvit quod non debebat. Ille vero sponte Patri obtulit quod nulla necessitate unquam amissurus erat, et solvit pro peccatoribus quod pro se non debebat. Quapropter ille multo magis dedit exemplum, ut unusquisque quod aliquando incunctanter amissurus est, pro se ipse redere Deo cum ratio postulat non dubitet, qui cum nullatenus aut pro se indigeret aut cogeretur pro aliis, quibus nihil nisi poenam debeat,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{43} Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’}, q. 16, d. 2, m. 3. See page 73 above.

\textsuperscript{44} ‘Human redemption could not have been brought about by other than a divine person’, Anselm of Bec, \textit{Cur Deus Homo}, I. 5.
tam pretiosam vitam, immo se ipsum, tantam scilicet
personam tanta voluntate dedit.\textsuperscript{45}

For Anselm, the ability to make the satisfaction required for redemption is
exclusively within the capacity of a Divine person; no human was capable of
it. This is not the case for Alexander, who argues instead that there is an
aspect of the satisfaction that a divine person cannot make and that is unique
to humanity, namely the will to sorrow:

\begin{quote}
In poena satisfactoria duo sunt: voluntas et poena; non
oporet ergo quod poena Christi maior sit quam illa pro
qua satisfecit. Fuit enim in Christo separatio animae a
carne, et compassio separationis; et praeterea dolor pro
peccato humani generis, sine quo non esset satisfactum
etiam cum aliis duobus, sicut patet in vera contritione.
Licet patiar poenam in corpore, et compatiar illi poenae
in anima, nisi adhuc sit dolor de peccato, non est vera
satisfactio. Licet autem poena Christi non fuit maior
quam poena pro qua fuit satisfactum, tamen voluntas
Christi excellebat poenam originalis peccati, quae fuit
in separacione a Deo. Voluntas autem haec secuta est ex
coniunctione humanae naturae cum divina; unde
congruerit fuit satisfactoria pro separatione humanae a
divina. Dico ergo quod haec satisfactio non tantum fuit
properti separacionem quae fuit in carne, vel properti
compassionem separationis; sed properti voluntatem
Christi, quae fuit ex coniunctione humanitatis cum
divinitate, fuit satisfactum pro separatione. Haec enim
voluntas fuit nobilissima.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{45} 'In dying, no man ever gave something to God that he was not going of necessity to lose
anyway, nor repay what he did not owe. Yet he [Christ] by his will offered to the Father what
was never going to be lost through any necessity and repaid for sinners what he did not owe
for himself. On account of which he gave much more than an example, so that each person
that is going to lose something might not hesitate but give it over to God for himself without
delay when reason requires. Without needing anything at all for himself or being obliged for
others to whom he owed nothing but punishment, he surrendered so precious a life, or
rather his very self, which is to say he yielded so great a person with so great a will.' Anselm

\textsuperscript{46} 'In satisfaction of a penalty there are two things: the penalty and will. It follows therefore
that it is not fitting that Christ suffer more than is necessary to make satisfaction. Now, there
was in Christ separation of the soul from the flesh and suffering at this separation and,
moreover, sorrow for the sin of the human race, without which there was no satisfaction
even with those two elements, just as is clear in genuine contrition. Granted, I might suffer
some penalty in my body and I might suffer with that penalty in my soul, but unless there is
also sorrow for sin, it is not true satisfaction. But Christ’s penalty was not more than the
penalty for which he made satisfaction, yet Christ’s will exceeded the penalty for the original
sin in which there was separation from God. Fittingly, it follows that this will, from the
conjunction of the human nature with the divine, made satisfaction for the separation of the
human nature from the divine. I therefore say that this satisfaction was enough not due to
Put simply, if Christ did not will to sorrow, an act that could only be done by the ‘ratio ut natura’ and was thus unique to his human nature, no true satisfaction was accomplished.

### 2.7 Summa Fratris Alexandri

In the light of the foregoing and the heightened role given to the humanity of Christ, it is possible now to turn to the questions posed in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* and appreciate the theological context in which are posed questions such as ‘Whether Christ suffered according to his senses?’ and ‘Whether the passion in Christ was according to his entire will?’ The answers to these questions are all instances of the reasoning that Alexander had demonstrated in his disputed questions.47

In the first question of the fifth tractate, the *Summa* establishes that Christ was capable of suffering and then establishes where Christ experienced this suffering. It poses four questions about the necessity for Christ’s passion and in answering these, itborrow directly from Anselm and the *Cur Deus Homo*.48 The following question asks if Christ’s passion was in accord with divine justice and, as to be expected, the *Summa* again quotes from and concurs with Anselm that it was so.49

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47 Respectively *Summa* III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 2, c. 1, a. 1 - which holds that Christ did suffer in his senses but as this was part of his lower nature, it was a result of his assumption in power and not from weakness (see pages 70-71 above), and *Summa* III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 2, c. 1, a. 3 which reaffirms that Christ suffered in his natural will but not his deliberative will.

48 *Summa* III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 3: De necessitate passionis Christi. De necessitate passionis Christi quantum ad causam inferiorem vel formalem? De necessitate passionis Christi quantum ad inferiorem causam finalem. De necessitate passionis Christi quantum ad causam superiorem efficientem.

49 *Summa* III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 4, c. 1, a. 1. Alexander’s replies quote generously from *Cur Deus Homo* I, chapters 7-9.
At this point, the text takes a new tack in posing two questions not put by Peter the Lombard: Whether Christ’s passion was in accord with divine mercy and whether it was fitting for us. For the answer to neither of these does the Summa turn to Anselm but reasons rather, after Augustine, that sin arises from human desires looking to be fulfilled other than in God and in the human appetites for riches, sweetness and honours. Alexander puts forward that the Incarnate Word despises these things and chooses instead poverty, worthlessness and subjection. Divine mercy seeks the happiness of an object and this, in turn, requires freedom from sin. Had the Word chosen the common human path of prosperity, that could not be said to be in accord with mercy since it would in no way draw humanity back from sin. However, it did not so choose and humanity was drawn back from sin. Thus, Christ’s death was both effective and in accord with divine mercy. While this is a notion not seen previously in Alexander’s disputed questions, its harmony with the reasoning employed in them is readily apparent. It is insufficient for Christ merely to die; to save Christ also ‘appetivit paupertatem, vilitatem et subjectionem’. Once again Alexander goes beyond Anselm in arguing that there must be some affective engagement with the humanity of Christ beyond the mere act of satisfaction in order for it to be efficacious.

2.8 The Role of the Human Nature of Christ

The Summa then turns to a consideration of the efficacy and consequences of Christ’s passion and death in which, broadly speaking, it adheres to the

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50 Summa III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 4, c. 1, a. 2 and c. 2, a. 1. Utrum passio Christi conveniat divinae misericordiae; De Convenientia passionis Christi quoad nos.
52 Summa III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 4, c. 1, a. 2. ‘... he hungered for poverty, worthlessness and subjection’.
established patristic authorities. Its principal innovation is in respect of human engagement with the making of satisfaction.

The *Summa Fratris Alexandri* leaves a quite different depiction of the Jesus Christ who makes the sacrifice upon the cross than had been left by Anselm. As did Alexander, it affords an active role to Christ’s humanity in the economy of salvation. Anselm left himself open to the interpretation that it was enough merely for humanity to be present in the agent of redemption, so that justice could be fulfilled by a divine being rendering the satisfaction. Anselm explicitly denies a broader part for humanity in the work of redemption.53

Alexander argues rather that the humanity of Christ must do more than merely be present; it must actively engage with the making of the satisfaction. Jesus’ will must choose to render satisfaction, his body must feel it and his emotions must be moved by it; if he does not, it cannot be said that a real human truly and fully made the satisfaction as Anselm’s reasoning demands. Accordingly, Alexander does not hesitate to insert an entirely new section into the structure of the *Book of Sentences* dealing with the nature and locus of Christ’s passibility and suffering.54 He thereby becomes the first writer of the thirteenth century to offer a systematic treatment of Jesus’s passions.55 While preserving the divinity of Christ necessary to render adequate satisfaction as Anselm has explained it, Alexander goes to great lengths to provide the means whereby the humanity of Christ can interact

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54 *Summa* III, i. 1, t. 5, q.1, m.3. Taylor Coolman, ‘Salvific Affectivity of Christ according to Alexander of Hales’, *The Thomist*, 71 (2008), 1-38 (p. 4).
with the experience of the passion and so contribute to the making of satisfaction.

While Alexander himself does not explicitly make this criticism, he does appear to be wrestling with an apparent shortcoming in Anselm’s model, that of an ill-developed understanding of the true fullness of human nature in Christ. Anselm’s presentation leaves him open, like a sort of Apollinarist monophysite, to the accusation that he has portrayed Christ as a Divine being inhabiting a human form. The humanity of Christ is present but it does little.

‘Divinam enim naturam absque dubio asserimus impassibilem, nec ullatenus posse a sua celsitudine humiliari, nec in eo quod vult facere laborare. Sed Dominum Iesum Christum dicimus Deum verum et verum hominem, unam personam in duabus naturis et duas naturas in una persona. Quapropter cum dicimus Deum aliquid humile aut infirmum pati, non hoc intelligimus secundum sublimitatem impassibilis naturae, sed secundum infirmitatem humanae substantiae quam gerebat.’

This ‘human substance that he bore’ is all too frequently in Anselm’s depiction like a frail garment in which the Second Person clothed itself. Whatever the outward vesture, what is within remains divine. In fairness to Anselm, he does not deny that Christ suffers in the passion but for him it is of secondary importance and certainly of no salvific significance. For Anselm, it is Christ’s death and his death alone that renders adequate satisfaction. Yet

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56 ‘For we claim that the divine nature is without doubt impassible, that it cannot in any way be brought down from its lofty heights and that it expends no effort in anything it wills to do. But we say that the Lord Jesus Christ is true God and true man, one person in two natures and two natures in one person. So when we say that God endured lowliness or weakness, we do not understand this according to the sublimity of his impassible nature but according to the weakness of the human substance that he bore’. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I. 9.

57 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II 14, in which Anselm establishes that Christ’s death outweighs human sin and so is the means by which redemption is achieved. ‘Vides, igitur, quomodo vita haec vincat omnia peccata, si pro illis detur.’ ‘You see, therefore, how this may overcome all sin, if it is given for them.’
even that death and experience of mortality has value for Anselm only inasmuch as it pertains to Christ’s divinity. Unlike Alexander, Anselm argues that the human nature assumed in the Incarnation was a pure one and thus immortal and not a corrupted mortal one; it therefore was not subject to death. The death that Christ experienced was a generous act of divine omnipotence choosing to lay down life and then take it up again. Anselm reasons that since he was divine, ‘poterit igitur nunquam mori si volet et poterit mori et resurgere. Sive autem animam suam ponat nullo alio faciente, sive alius hoc faciat, ut eam ponat ipso permittente: quantum a potestatem nihil differt’. Even the suffering of the passion is immaterial, the vileness of his betrayal and death has no part and the resurrection plays no role at all; it is enough simply that Christ wills to die in order to carry out the justice needed to offer recompense for the fall.

In contrast, Alexander of Hales, while preserving the broad framework of Anselm’s penal substitution, has a portrayal of Christ in which his human nature is more authentically depicted and now invested with salvific significance. For Alexander, Jesus Christ must experience genuine fear, must actually suffer and feel pain and his human will, without the benefit of divine foreknowledge, must freely choose to undergo these. He accepts Anselm’s reasoning that justice requires that humanity must offer recompense for the wrong done by it, but goes further than Anselm in, while still accepting that the aid of divinity is needed to render adequate satisfaction, identifying and explaining just what it is that the human nature of Jesus Christ can and does

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58 ‘He thus will never be able to die but if he so wills, he will be able to die and rise again. Now it makes no difference to his power whether he lays down his life with no one else causing him to do so or he permits someone else to cause him to lay down his life.’ Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II. 11.
59 Summa Fratris Alexandri III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 1-2. Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’, q. 16, d. 2, m. 3.
offer in the making of that satisfaction.\textsuperscript{60} Alexander’s innovation is to establish that actions of Christ’s divinity alone are insufficient satisfaction. Acts of his humanity are also essential. Further and consequent upon this, Alexander disagrees with Anselm and states that the mere death of Christ is insufficient; it is necessary also that Christ should suffer and suffer most grievously at the hands of human kind.\textsuperscript{61} It is in this suffering that Christ’s humanity engages with the act of salvation and this is essential for human redemption.\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, not just human passibility is required but so too is human affectivity and human will to join with the acts of the divine nature in order to make sufficient satisfaction.\textsuperscript{63}

Put otherwise, Alexander does not accept Anselm’s claim, ‘For this he was made man, so that he might die’.\textsuperscript{64} Christ must be human, in Alexander’s reasoning, to interact with the experience of his passion and death and thereby have humanity truly participate in rendering the satisfaction upon which Anselm’s model insists.

Making findings such as these were not simply the fruit of Alexander’s ponderings. Answering the questions posed in the \textit{Book of Sentences}, even if they had been revised by Alexander himself, obliged him to turn his mind along particular paths and address issues about the redemption effected by the Incarnate Word of which Anselm had never previously written. Alexander shaped the \textit{Book of Sentences} and gave it the form by which it would ever

\textsuperscript{60} Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’}, q. 15, d. 3, m. 1; \textit{Summa Fratris Alexandri} III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 3.
\textsuperscript{61} Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’} q. 16, d. 2, m. 3; \textit{Summa Fratris Alexandri} III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 5, c. 1; m. 4, a. 2, c. 2.
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Summa Fratris Alexandri} III, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 3, c. 2. Cf. \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’}, q. 16, d. 3, m. 5.
\textsuperscript{63} Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae ‘Antequam Esset Frater’}, q. 16, d. 4, m. 5.
\textsuperscript{64} ‘Ipse factus est homo ad hoc ut moreretur’. Anselm, \textit{Cur Deus Homo}, II. 16.
after be studied but that format moulded Alexander’s theological conclusions also.\footnote{Ignatius Brady, ‘The Distinctions of Lombard’s Bok of Sentences and Alexander of Hales’, \textit{Franciscan Studies}, 25 (1965), 90-116.}

These new conclusions spread from Alexander, who was both lector and the first regent master at the Grand Couvent. His eminence as a scholar was such that the brothers of the ‘Doctor Doctorum’ chose to commit his thought to writing in the \textit{Summa Fratris Alexandri}. These two systems, that of the \textit{studium} preparing lectos for every province of the order and that of the university preparing for degrees the foremost minds of the order and its future leaders, both institutionalised by the operation of the Franciscan educational system of Paris, gave a durability and prominence to his ideas that his colleagues in the faculty of theology did not possess. No Franciscan could subsequently undertake studies in theology without engaging with the ideas and insights of Alexander of Hales. The confluence of his own abilities and the operation of Franciscan education gave longevity to his thinking and instruction. Franciscan students hereafter possessed a starting point in soteriological study common to them all: Alexander’s development of Anselm’s model of penal-substitution.

That development by Alexander was a greatly expanded emphasis on the place of Christ’s human nature in the furnishing of satisfaction. Christ’s ‘sensualitas’ must endure the pain of the passion, his ‘affectus’ must experience grief at this suffering, his ‘ratio ut natura’ must will himself to feel sorrow at the human sin for which Christ suffers and his ‘ratio ut ratio’ must will him to exalt with the greatest joy at the redemption which these acts have fashioned.
3 Eudes Rigaud and the Secular-Mendicant Controversy

The first Franciscan student in Paris for whom we possess one of those sentence commentary upon which Alexander insisted is Eudes Rigaud. He was a pupil of Alexander while the latter was yet still a secular master. Unlike many of his confreres, in the case of Eudes there is some certainty of the details of his life. He had been born around the year 1210 in Brie-Comte-Robert to a house of minor nobility, the seigneurs of Courquetaine, an estate about thirty kilometres south east of Paris.¹ His family had many members entering the service of the Church and in the early 1230s, while still a student at the University of Paris, Eudes followed them, joining the Friars Minor.² He was an accomplished student and in 1241 was one of the ‘four masters’ who wrote the first commentary on the Franciscan Rule.³

By 1244 he was teaching in Paris but in 1246 he was sent to Normandy as guardian of the friary in Rouen and as lector in its studium.⁴ After just a year he was chosen as Archbishop of Rouen. There he showed himself a most able and diligent pastor and the meticulous records he kept on episcopal visitation have ever since been a rich resource for historians.⁵ He was a

² Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae, p. 87-88. Eudes’ brother Adam also joined the Franciscans and his sister Marie entered the convent of the Paraclete in Paris, becoming its Abbess in 1249. His nephew, also Adam, was dean of the chapter of Rouen.
⁴ Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae, p. 88.
strong supporter of and counsellor to Louis IX of France and, as archbishop, he attended the Council of Lyons. He died shortly afterwards on 2 July, 1275.6

Eudes has a small but well attested and diffused theological output, producing sixteen sets of disputed questions. Most of these are in metaphysics but also deal with divine providence and grace. He also has sermons and a sentence commentary, his only work to deal with soteriology in any detail. They have received scant scholarly attention and one set of disputed questions is his only theological work ever to have been published in full.7

3.1 SECULAR-MENDICANT CONTROVERSY

Eudes’ academic career took place in the context of the secular-mendicant controversy, which ran from the 1220s to late 1250s. In essence, the dispute was over how to fit the new phenomenon of the mendicant orders into the settled ecclesiological structures. The mendicants were seen as neither quite fish nor fowl and did not readily fall into familiar categories. They enjoyed many of the privileges and exemptions of monastic orders but lived, worked and ministered in the secular world. The mendicants were not entrusted with parishes or the cure of souls, but they still performed many of the functions of secular parochial clergy and, to the irritation and financial loss of that clergy, received recompense for those services. Into the neat and established

6 Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae, p. 89.
division of the secluded monks who prayed and the secular clergy who taught and ministered to the laity intruded the mendicants fulfilling parts of both roles. Those secular clergy who objected to the loss of work and income to the friars, those burgesses who resented the constant burden of the mendicancy of these new orders and those who objected to the ministry of the mendicants being beyond the control of the bishops and prelates all came together in a coalition of forces opposed to the very idea of the mendicant orders. For many, these mendicants were the undisciplined and greedy vagrant monks wandering outside obedience against whom St Benedict had warned in the prelude to his Rule. At their mildest, this coalition urged greater limitation on the work of the friars, preserving the income of the seculars and the authority of the bishops. Harsher voices called for the complete suppression of the mendicant orders. Forceful among these voices were the secular masters teaching at the University of Paris who had their own grievances against the friars.

Their quarrel with the mendicants boiled over in 1229 when the university masters went, effectively, on strike to protest the illicit punishment of students by the civic authorities of Paris. The Dominicans remained and continued to teach, weakening the effectiveness of the university protest. They also submitted students of theirs to the chancellor for degrees despite the absence of a positive vote from the other members of the faculty and even filled a vacant chair with one of their own friars while the faculty was taking

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part in this ‘great dispersion’ from Paris as part of their protest.\textsuperscript{9} The Franciscans later became similarly embroiled when they too acquired one of the chairs of the secular masters, incensing the masters. This occurred when Alexander of Hales entered the order in 1237 and transferring his chair to the Grand Couvent, effectively establishing the Franciscan school in Paris.\textsuperscript{10}

Since 1218, it had been established that there would be twelve regent masters of theology, three of whom were to be drawn from the canons on Notre Dame but the remaining nine were for the secular masters.\textsuperscript{11} When the mendicants took possession of such chairs it posed a difficulty for the secular masters because it was the usage of the university that masters appointed their own successors from among their students. The mendicants naturally chose members of their order. Effectively, the mendicants now controlled those chairs in perpetuity and they were lost to the seculars.

The masters returned to the university and work at the beginning of 1231 but resentment remained that the mendicants seemed happy to enjoy the benefits and privileges of the university and claim its chairs but were unwilling to accept the obligations that came with them, such as defending those privileges or following the university’s statutes. Moreover, from once having controlled the faculty, the secular masters were now left no longer

\textsuperscript{10} See page 15 above.
possessing the majority of chairs and the ability to determine policy in the faculty.  

3.2 Franciscan Chairs at the University of Paris

It is possible that the situation was even graver for the seculars, as there is some historical uncertainty whether the Franciscans had obtained a second chair. Some scholars maintain that Alexander of Hales passed his chair to his protégé, John of La Rochelle. Others hold that John obtained a chair in his own right and so the Franciscans had two chairs and that Eudes had acquired this second chair from John.

Salimbene de Adam (1221-1290?), in his chronicle written in the 1280s, holds with the latter situation. He records that in about 1254, during a subsequent eruption of hostilities between the seculars and mendicants, the Franciscan Minister-General, John of Parma himself, came to Paris to meet with the secular masters. In an act of conciliation, John told the faculty that he accounted himself and the brothers in his charge as their servants and servants.

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12 Honorius III had in 1218 fixed the number of regent masters in the Parisian faculty of theology at twelve, three of which were reserved for the canons of Notre Dame. Denifle and Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, I (1889), p. 85, No. 27. With two of these chairs being claimed by the Dominicans and one by the Franciscans, only six were left for the secular masters.


According to Salimbene, John then yielded to the faculty the second chair of the Franciscans and promised that the Friars Minor would never seek to hold any more than a single chair. In return, he asked only for an undertaking from the secular masters that the Franciscans could retain this remaining chair.

Salimbene’s chronicle is an important source of information from that period about events that are recorded nowhere else, but Salimbene has acquired a reputation as a gossip monger and many details in his chronicle are less than completely reliable. Moreover, Salimbene is acknowledged as a firm supporter and defender of the friars and of John of Parma especially. When the friars are portrayed as possessing the academic ability to attain two chairs, like their Dominican confreres, but excelling them in the virtue of Christian humility, a certain wariness is to be observed in relying upon Salimbene.

The argument that there was only ever a single master is also not without historiographical difficulties. Palémon Glorieux compiled his list of Franciscan regent masters in 1933 and many authors have uncritically

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16 ‘Ego sum generalis minister Ordinis Fratrum Minorum quamvis insufficiens et indignus et contra voluntatem meam vos estis domini et magistri nostri, nos vero servi filii et discipuli’. ‘I am, although inadequate and unworthy and contrary to my will, the minister general of the Order of the Friars Minor, and you are our master and teachers, we are but loyal sons and students.’ Salimbene, Cronica, p. 436-37.


18 Salimbene’s admiration for John of Parma can be seen in the next three entries in Salimbene’s chronicle, all of which are in praise of John and his leadership as he combats various detractors.
repeated it subsequently. Sylvain Piron has identified numerous factual errors in Glorieux’s list of masters and their years in office. He also points to some problems in Glorieux’s methodology and a tendency to presume that all *magistri* were regent master, when the term could also mean simply teacher. Confusingly, the term ‘master’ among Franciscans could mean, as well as regent master or simple teacher, the friar in charge of the Franciscan school of Paris who oversaw the provision of training to students there, both in the lectoral and university programmes who was also termed the ‘magister’. Yet further, it was also a title of courtesy for any scholar. In 1241 Eudes Rigaud was reckoned among the ‘four masters’ of the commentary of that name, even though he had no degree then and was certainly not regent master. Deceived by this erroneously inflated list of masters, Piron notes a tendency by Glorieux then to adjust dates of the tenures of these ‘masters’ to accommodate the list he had compiled.

Neither approach to the status of Eudes’ chair offers compelling evidence but it seems strange that in the midst of the polemical interchanges with the secular masters, when the latter made many accusations against the friars both factual and otherwise, that the acquisition of a second chair is not levelled against them. Such silence seems telling. Further, it seems improbable that when there was such resentment about the loss of their teaching chairs, that one of the secular masters would willingly transfer to

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21 Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’ *Apologia of 1254*, pp. 18-22.
the Franciscans a second chair to be held by John of la Rochelle, only for it promptly to be sought back again. The better case seems to be that there was only ever a single Franciscan chair. Whatever the case may have been, by the end of Eudes’ academic career in 1246 and his departure to Rouen, it is certainly clear that Franciscans then possessed a single chair.

Whether it then be five or six chairs held by the secular masters, many resented their loss to the mendicants and the prospect of new orders seeking similar entitlements. These chairs were more than a matter of prestige for the secular masters; they carried with them the chance of income from students, gave control of the standards and courses of the faculty and great opportunity for advancement to prelacies. Moreover, with fewer prospects for attaining a chair and thence ecclesiastical office, the appeal to study under the secular masters was lessened and fewer students constituted fewer teaching fees. The mendicants had their own reasons for coveting these chairs; they provided them with secure access to degree qualification, a constant supply of potential teachers for the mendicants’ burgeoning network of studia and university posts and a hand in the shaping the direction of Christendom’s theological centre.

In contrast to their secular colleagues, mendicant masters were regularly transferred after only brief tenures of about two or three years. This practice opened the mendicants to the accusation that they were using the chairs as tools for the rapid advancement to the highest academic levels for their members. Such actions were said to be encroaching upon the livelihood

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22 Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’, p. 14. The Cistercians, Trinitarians and Carmelites were but the first of these orders seeking chairs.
of secular masters and hampering the advancement of scholarship.\textsuperscript{23} This, coupled with the comparatively young age at which mendicant became regent master because of their rapid turnover of personnel, led some secular masters to accuse mendicants of poor levels of instruction, laxity in standards and of choosing masters according to the needs of the order rather than the best interests of the university.\textsuperscript{24}

This was an inimical setting in which to teach and do theology. Eudes had to confront not only umbrage from secular masters that as a friar he held one of ‘their’ chairs but also their reservations about his suitability and merit for the post anyway, since he was chosen by his order to meet its own needs and not by the free and proven choice of his predecessor. Those needs of the order were perceived often to conflict with the independence and autonomy of the university, as had happened at the time of the university strikes. The Franciscans showed greater interest in giving a steady flow of friars the chance to hold the office of regent master and to preparing suitable friars for roles at the other universities and studia they needed to staff. Paris did not rank as the Franciscans’ sole concern. Accordingly, Eudes was in a novel and awkward position. While there had been earlier Franciscan masters, Alexander of Hales had attained his chair while still a secular master and in the usual fashion and even prior to his entry into the Franciscans it was clear that he was grooming John of La Rochelle as his protégé and successor.

\textsuperscript{23} Roest, \textit{A History of Franciscan Education}, p. 16. Although the Franciscan school was principally for members of the order, other students were free to attach themselves to the Franciscan masters and did so – William J. Courtenay, \textit{Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century: A Social Portrait}, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, Fourth Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 111.

\textsuperscript{24} Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’ pp. 9 and 13. The selection of the Franciscan regent master in Paris was never a free choice of the sitting master. Initially it was the prerogative of the general chapter but such swift turn over in office meant it was left to the Minister General in practice and this usage was ratified and confirmed in the \textit{Diffinitiones Argentinae} of 1282, art. 137. Geroldus Fusseneger, ‘Diffinitiones Argentinae’, \textit{Archivum Franciscanum Historicum}, 26 (1933), 127-40. Roest, \textit{A History of Franciscan Education}, p. 102.
Eudes was arguably the first Franciscan friar to have been appointed in the manner to which the secular masters were so opposed. When Eudes took up his chair in 1244 and was composing his theological works, his credentials to sit in his chair were in question. He was young and only about thirty-five when appointed, the minimum age for graduation and was made a regent master immediately.\textsuperscript{25} He faced antagonism and adverse reception of his theology just for being a mendicant regent master, at a time when Franciscans needed no further provocation of the secular masters. The way in which Eudes could carry out his theological work was constrained by the locus in which he did it.

\textbf{3.3 The Chirographum}

Appreciating the theological works that Eudes produced in this period and conflict is hampered by so little of it having been published. For the purposes of this study, reference is made principally to Eudes’ unpublished sentence commentary, a transcription of the soteriological sections of which is provided in Appendix 2. It is not a critical edition but a simple transcription of MS 824, held in the Médiathèque d’Agglomeration Troyenne, selected for its completeness, accessibility and legibility.\textsuperscript{26}

Eudes began composition of his sentence commentary around 1241 and so his is a fairly early example of the genre. His text lacks the expansive personal treatment of particular propositions in the style of, for example, Aquinas or Bonaventure that would later become the norm. It is more similar to the style of Alexander of Hales. The bulk of his commentary is concerned

\textsuperscript{25} Denifle and Chatelain, \textit{Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis}, I (1889), p. 79, No. 20.
\textsuperscript{26} See pages 329-96 below. In cases of doubt, MSS 825 and 1862 of the same collection and MS 208 of the Bruges Municipal Library have also been consulted.
with adducing new authorities for and against existing propositions and with their integration into the arguments of Peter the Lombard. Typical of these earliest sentence commentaries, Eudes’ own responses to questions are frequently a terse few lines and but a fraction of a full treatment of a topic.

Like his teacher Alexander, Eudes adhered to a soteriology that was broadly Anselmian and accepted the fundamental structure of penal substitution as the mechanism by which human salvation occurred. As would be expected, like Alexander, he developed a greater role for the humanity of Christ in the work of salvation but he does not develop it in quite the same direction that Alexander had done nor adopt any division of the higher part of the will into a ratio ut natura and a ratio ut ratio. Alexander had explored the contribution to the satisfaction of God that was uniquely human and that could not be rendered by the divine nature of Christ alone. Eudes’ soteriological contribution was to look beyond the effect of Christ’s death and resurrection and how satisfaction was rendered. Rather, he considered what effect that act had directly upon humanity itself. Eudes is at least as interested to examine how humanity was changed by Christ’s sacrifice as he was to discuss how that act brought about change in divine justice.

Distinction 19 of the Book of Sentences dealt with how Christ’s death redeemed humanity from sin and the devil. In the hands of Eudes, this is broadened into a more expansive consideration also investigating how humanity was changed: ‘Dicendum quod passionis Christi potest considerari

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27 As to these earlier commentaries, see pages 30-32 above.
28 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 18, a. 3, q. 1 (fol. 214.r). In the soteriology sections of Eudes’ commentary, he makes thirty-one explicit uses of Anselm as authority.
29 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1 (fol. 213.v); d. 18, a. 1, q. 1 (fol. 213.v).
30 ‘Qualiter a diabolo et a peccato redemit nos Christus per mortem’. 
in re ut in quo est in anima sed consideratur in re ut sic passio fuit meritoria genere omnibus hominibus cooperantibus quem ad effectum’.\textsuperscript{31}

Principally there are for Eudes two ways in which Christ’s passion had a direct consequence for humanity, both of them achieved through the action of grace. The first of these is through the deletion of the ‘chirographum’ which is ‘washed in the blood of Christ’.\textsuperscript{32} The chirographum was a term derived from Greek and Roman law and referred to a hand-written document that a debtor gave to a creditor, acknowledging a debt. The creditor could then trade that document with others in the manner of a modern bill of exchange.\textsuperscript{33} In the context of soteriology, it had been used by St Paul in Colossians 2:14 where he spoke of Christ as ‘erasing the record that stood against us with its legal demands. He set this aside, nailing it to the cross’.\textsuperscript{34} From this, ‘chirographum’ came to encompass the record of the debt of human sin transferred by God to the devil that he might have power over humanity because of the fall.\textsuperscript{35} ‘Deletion of the chirographum’ thus meant liberation from servitude to the devil.

Curiously, Eudes professes himself to be following the line of reasoning established by Anselm.\textsuperscript{36} However, Anselm only makes mention of the chirographum in the \textit{Cur Deus Homo} to explain how God could in justice permit some limited dominion over humanity by the devil and he certainly

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{31} ‘It must be said that Christ’s passion can be considered in the manner in which it is in the soul or be considered as a matter in which it was generative of merit for all people working with it’. Eudes Rigaud, \textit{Sent} III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1 (fol. 215.r).}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{32} Eudes Rigaud, \textit{Sent} III, d. 19, a. 2, q. 1 (fol. 215.r-v). Cf Revelations 7: 14.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{34} ‘... delens quod adversum nos erat chirografum decretis quod erat contrarium nobis et ipsum tult de medio adfingers ilud cruci’.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{36} Eudes Rigaud, \textit{Sent} III, d. 19, a. 3, q. 1 (F. 215 v).}
\end{footnotes}
does not discuss the deletion of the chirographum, let alone how that was to occur.\textsuperscript{37} Anselm did not address the change in humanity, if any, wrought in the wake of Christ’s self-offering. In the course of the text, Anselm does address the question of recompense and forgiveness for sin but he does so as a rationale for the union of natures in Christ.\textsuperscript{38} This idea is not developed but soteriology was not Anselm’s principal concern. He provides no discussion at all about how humanity might be changed by Christ’s coming and, despite the claims of Eudes, certainly does not discuss any deletion of the chirographum.

This raises the intriguing question of why Eudes should claim that Anselm argued otherwise. While it may have been the case that Eudes had a flawed understanding of Anselm or perhaps generously attributed to the scholastic doctor more than his actual writings justify, this seems improbable in a scholar of Eudes’ accomplishments. This consideration by Eudes of the chirographum and its removal is a novelty and it had not appeared in the works of Alexander of Hales nor even of Peter the Lombard. Even so, it is equally clear that Eudes’ treatment of the issue is thoroughly orthodox and very much in keeping with the line of reasoning of both those theologians; Eudes’ argument is merely the logical consequence of their reasoning and is simply tantamount to saying that humanity was freed from sin by Christ’s salvific work, a position little open to dispute. As a good scholastic, he was

\textsuperscript{37} Anselm, \textit{Cur Deus Homo}, I. 7. This is the only reference to ‘chirographum’ in all Anselm’s authentic writings. The pseudo-Anselmian \textit{Meditatio Super Miserere} 8, does have a further reference to the chirographum and Eudes may have ascribed this to Anselm but once again, while the text explores the deletion of the chirographum, it does not explain how this is to be done. Pseudo-Anselm, ‘\textit{Meditatio Super Miserere}’, in \textit{Patrologia Cursus Completus}, Series Latina, ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne (Paris: Migne, 1844-75), 158 (1863), pp. 13-16.

\textsuperscript{38} Anselm, \textit{Cur Deus Homo}, I. 11 and 12.
integrating into the corpus of authority from Peter the Lombard the Pauline concept of the chirographum.

In the face of his detractors, Eudes could not be reproached for aligning the accepted authoritative position of Anselm and integrating into it biblical material from Paul. Facing both suspicion and hostility, it is not hard to see Eudes vesting his ideas with a greater reliance upon Anselm than the latter’s texts might justify. Arguably, there is a timidity on the part of the young Eudes writing his sentence commentary that shies from being seen as too innovative and creative, lacking a more venerable tradition and line of authorities behind him. The aid of Anselm affords to Eudes’ ideas greater gravity, firmer foundations and sounder scholarship than they might otherwise have possessed.\textsuperscript{39} Likewise, when Eudes does go in new directions, such as the human consequence of divine salvific action, he does so in paths that Alexander of Hales had already traversed and made acceptable.

3.4 The ‘Door’

The chirographum was not Eudes’ sole soteriological metaphor. He argued that grace also affected humanity directly by opening the ‘door’ and that this was a second consequence upon humanity. Another specialised theological term of the time, this referred to the ability to access heaven and enjoy the beatific vision. It had been held that, prior to Christ’s coming, the ‘door’ was shut and that the rewards of paradise were unattainable to anyone, however holy and venerable, and even the patriarchs and prophets of Israel were

barred entry until the harrowing of hell.\textsuperscript{40} Christ was popularly expressed as having ‘opened the door’ to paradise through his sacrifice on the cross.\textsuperscript{41} Thereafter, attainment of paradise was possible for all people. Where Eudes goes further than most commentators is in arguing not only that Christ ‘opened the door’ but that his salvific act made available both the grace that opened the door and also that by which one might cross the threshold of that door. The consequence of Calvary was not a single benefit. Eudes has a much broader discussion about the attainment of this door than was common.\textsuperscript{42} The salvation wrought by Christ had an impact not only upon God, causing God to admit humanity to paradise, but it had influence too upon humanity, enabling it to reach and pass through the ‘door’ which Christ’s sacrifice had caused to open.

He first refers to the door in the third article of the eighteenth distinction, in which Eudes considers why the door might not be opened through some means other than the sacrifice of Christ. Eudes’ ingeniously concedes that God could, in charity, have opened the doors for some deserving souls prior to the coming of Christ, such as the biblical patriarchs and other individuals of great merit. However, Eudes reasons that to have opened the door in such cases would have been offensive to divine justice. Since, Eudes asserts, only a chosen few knew of the covenant and the law of God and thereby the means to earn merit for themselves, while most people laboured in ignorance, it would have been unjust to give additional privileges

\textsuperscript{40} See, for example, Milton McC. Gatch, ‘The Harrowing of Hell: A Liberation Motif in Medieval Theology and Devotional Literature’, Variorum, 82 (2000), 75-88; McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology, pp. 51-54; Sheets, The Theology of the Atonement. pp. 14-18.

\textsuperscript{41} Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 18, a. 1 (ff. 214.r-v). Eudes here has a fairly standard consideration of how it was that Christ merited that the doors be opened to humanity. As to the ‘door’, see, for example, Rivière, Le Dogme de la rédemption, p. 115.

\textsuperscript{42} Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1 (fol. 213.v); d. 18, a. 2, q. 1 (fol. 214.v); d. 18, a. 3, q. 1 (fol. 214.r); d. 18, a. 4, q. 5 (fol. 215.r).
to those few. The doors must be opened for all or shut for all. Instead, for those meritorious few, they were sustained by the knowledge and hope of the coming of the redeemer through whom they could attain salvation.43

From this it follows that, for Eudes, it is not enough for God merely to open the doors at the time of Christ’s offering or that same injustice persists, that only those with the knowledge of God might make use of the open door. Hence Eudes argues also that, with the salvation of Christ, there is an outpouring of grace, through Christ’s merits, for the benefit of all humanity so that all might be saved and attain paradise.44 Pursuing his line of argument further, alone among the Franciscan masters of this period, Eudes has a discussion of the soteriological implications upon ideas of limbo.45 He thinks of those unable to make use of the salvation won for them. Eudes posits that even in the absence of knowledge of God, the action of grace can move individuals to the knowledge of wrong doing, sorrow and contrition for sin and to a consciousness that people have the capacity to be more than they currently are. This, he suggests, is sufficient to achieve the joy of limbo even if not the fullness of paradise. Eudes makes himself the first Franciscan not only to consider the place of limbo in soteriology but to detail the possibility of a salvation for those outside the Christian faith.

43 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 18, a. 3, q. 1 (fol. 214. r).
44 Eudes has a fairly standard understanding of Christ’s ability earn merit and he treats this in distinction 17; in essence he holds that Christ was capable of earning merit in all his acts and could do so from the moment of his conception.
45 Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 19, a. 2, q. 1 (fols. 215.v – 216.r). Limbo existence was postulated to address the issue of those who, due to ignorance, were unable either to choose or reject God and so deserved neither heaven nor hell. They experienced instead to limbo, a place without either penalty or beatific vision. Jérôme Baschet, ‘I mondi del Medioevo: I luoghi dell’aldilà’, Arti e storie in Medioevo: Tempi, spazi e istituzioni, ed. by Enrico Castelnuovo and Giuseppi Sergi (Turin: Einaldim 2002), pp. 317-47. See also Christopher Beiting, ‘The Idea of Limbo in Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure’, Franciscan Studies, 57 (1999), 3-56.
A further discussion unique to Eudes was his consideration of the role played by the resurrection in the salvation of humanity. The University of Paris in the 1240s was neither the time nor the place for ambitious creativity and Eudes played well the role of non-contentious scholar. He did so once again in his consideration of the resurrection. Despite Paul’s frequent insistence that it was Christ’s suffering, death and resurrection that brought about human redemption, the latter featured little in the legacy of Anselm passed to Eudes. There the emphasis lay on the need for sacrifice to make satisfaction for what had been done by humanity. This was not so with Eudes who introduced a fresh question to the sentence commentary as to whether the resurrection of Christ was necessary for redemption and he concluded that it was.

Eudes argues that with human beings redeemed through Christ, they were released from the baleful consequences of sin, just as Paul had argued in the Letter to the Romans; they were ‘set free from [the] bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God’. As such, resurrection and glorification are the necessary culmination of redemption and the resurrected Christ is indeed the ‘the first fruits of those who have died’. Put otherwise, for Eudes, the absence of the resurrection means that

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46 See, for example, Romans 5: 10; 10: 9; I Corinthians, 15: 16-17; Ephesians 2: 6 or Colossians 2: 12. It is noteworthy that Alexander of Hales does not mention the resurrection once in the soteriological section of his sentence commentary. As to the neglect of the resurrection in medieval soteriology, see Sheets, *The Theology of the Atonement*, p. 200 and Rivière, *Le Dogme de la rédemption au début du moyen âge*, p. 422.
47 Eudes Rigaud, *Sent* III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 2 (fol. 216.r).
48 Romans 8:21.
49 I Corinthians 15:20.
the act of salvation is incomplete and that there is yet more to accomplish; the death of Christ is but part of the salvific act.\textsuperscript{50}

This idea of the resurrection as the consummation of salvation reappears again in the following question where Eudes considers whether or not the resurrection had a role in the remission of sins.\textsuperscript{51} Here Eudes speaks of a twofold purpose for the resurrection. The first is, as he had previously posited, the natural completion of the act of salvation. The other is a contribution to Christ’s ongoing role as saviour, the resurrection physically glorifying, changing and marking him as the ‘signum culpae remissionis’, the model, as it were, of what humanity should and would be.\textsuperscript{52} So much was he changed that Eudes speculates that this was the reason that Christ was not recognised by his disciples following the resurrection.\textsuperscript{53} Yet in seeing Christ’s glorified body they could see and know what it was to be released from the consequence of sin.

3.6 Incarnation in the Absence of the Fall

These concepts of the chirographum, door and the resurrection were hardly contentious additions to soteriological discourse. They may have been new additions that Eudes was making to the soteriological sections of the \textit{Book of Sentences} but it could not be denied they all had incontestable biblical foundations. Safe from criticism from the secular masters, Eudes pursued the grand scholastic project of integrating all authority together. Yet Eudes showed daring in one area of soteriology. In the twentieth distinction, Eudes

\textsuperscript{50} Eudes Rigaud, \textit{Sent} III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 2, (fol. 216.r).
\textsuperscript{51} Eudes Rigaud, \textit{Sent} III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 3 (fol. 216.r).
\textsuperscript{52} ‘The emblem of the remission of sins’ - Eudes Rigaud \textit{Sent} III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 3, (fol. 216.r).
\textsuperscript{53} For example, Luke 24: 16, 37; John 20: 15.
inserts a new question to ask whether Christ would have become incarnate if humanity had not sinned.\textsuperscript{54} In the next century, it is the affirmative answer to this question that would set the Franciscans apart and the first of the Parisian masters of the order to turn his mind to this question was Eudes.\textsuperscript{55} Eudes concedes that there is no explicit authority that has settled this question but he does extrapolate some reasoning in favour of the proposition from a rather broad array of authorities. As usual, Eudes does not give a lengthy response at all and it is dwarfed many times over by his treatment of the authorities but his answer is nevertheless illuminating:

\begin{quote}
Respondeo dicendum quod nisi videam rationem ut auctoritatem magne expressam non credo quod filius Dei esset factus homo nisi homo peccasset. Et in hoc debemus ei infinitas gratiarum actiones, omne quod fecit pro peccatoribus quod non fecisset nec fuissemus iusti.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

In reaching that conclusion, Eudes rejects a number of reasons in favour of it but in the course of doing so, raises many arguments that will prove significant for later generations of Franciscan theologians. The essence of his answer is that it declines to hypothesise about a situation that never occurred and so refrains from engaging with the earlier reasoning that denies that the incarnation was contingent on the fall. These include arguments from Hugh of St Victor based on the self-diffusive nature of God, a teleological argument

\textsuperscript{54} ‘Supposito igitur ex praedictis quod decrevit Filium Dei incarnari ad reparandum naturam lapsam, quaeritur utrum fuisset incarnatus so homo non fuisset lapsus’. Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 20, a. 3, q. 2 (fol. 218.r–v).


\textsuperscript{56} ‘I respond: It must be said that, unless I see a more explicit reason or authority, I do not believe that the Son of God would have been made human unless humanity had sinned. And in this we ought to render him boundless thanks when he did for sinners what he would not have done if we had been righteous’. Eudes Rigaud, Sent III, d. 20, a. 3, q. 2, (fol. 218.r–v).
based on the universe being created to have union with its creator, St Paul’s argument that Christ is the head of humanity and so must come to be, a Pseudo-Augustinian argument from *De Spiritu et Anima* that humanity remains incomplete in the absence of a union with Christ, St Bernard’s claim that the limitation of human happiness is a frustration of the divine will and also Scripture’s claim that Christ was destined from the start to become incarnate for humanity.\textsuperscript{57} A number of these arguments will be among those to persuade subsequent generations of friars that Christ *would* have become incarnate even if humanity had not sinned. Eudes’ answer, however, is ‘No’; Christ would have become incarnate only as a result of the fall. He can therefore be counted in a separate and smaller group from his Franciscan successors. He does, however, share with them a desire to consider the relationship between the fall of humanity, its redemption and the incarnate coming of Christ. In fact, Eudes is the earliest Franciscan masters to pose a question in these terms, the first to ask if Christ would have come only if humanity sinned.

This question shows a willingness to contemplate the possibility that any human need for salvation was not contingent upon the fall. The mutual engagement of humanity and divinity could be founded upon much more than human shortcomings. Notwithstanding Eudes’ answer to this question, the possibilities of this notion were to be taken much further by Bonaventure and the Franciscans to follow Eudes. He both reflected and contributed to a changing sense of the human place in the cosmos, beyond seeking a celestial repairman.

\textsuperscript{57} Eudes Rigaud, *Sent* III, d. 20, a. 3, q. 2, (fol. 218.r–v).
3.7 The Reception of Eudes’ Theological Writing

The unpublished state of Eudes’ works has already been noted, despite his creativity. To some degree, that can be explained by his being a ‘modern’ thinker whose ideas and reasoning could hardly be considered on a par with established authorities for use in a sentence commentary. Further, the rise of sentence commentaries was fairly recent to Eudes and there was yet limited interest in such texts beyond the author. Nevertheless, that did not preclude the works of other contemporary figures such as Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent from circulating works and frequently being referenced by writers of their time. Further, while it is true that there was a reticence to cite recent authors as authorities, it was far from uncommon to make use of their ideas even if those were not expressly attributed to them. In this instance, resented by the secular masters, Eudes appears also to have been little cited by his own brothers.\

François-Marie Henquinet has argued for the influence of Eudes’ writings upon the theology of Bonaventure yet even he has been unable to give a single reference where Bonaventure expressly makes use of the writings of Eudes.\(^5\)\(^9\) The editors of the critical edition of Bonaventure’s sentence commentary have recorded no use of the writings of Eudes nor references to him, even though Bonaventure was quite comfortable in making use of other more recent authors, especially other Franciscans like

\(^5\) It is, however, true that Eudes is cited in a ‘prior’ work, the Summa Halensis. However, as has been shown, not only was this a work composed after the death of Alexander of Hales but Eudes himself was one of the team of editors working on its completion. Making references to his own thought does not challenge the allegation that he is rarely employed by later authors.

\(^9\) Henquinet, ‘Les Manuscrits et l’influence des écrits théologiques d’Eudes Rigaux’, p. 324-50. Henquinet asserts further that ‘in the production of numerous distinctions of the commentary, it is Rigaud himself who manifestly serves as his model’ (p. 349) yet again Henquinet gives no instance of this in operation.
Alexander of Hales. At best, it can be said that the thought of the two friars might coincide at times but a claim that there is a direct use of Eudes’ ideas cannot be substantiated.

It can be argued that the theology of Eudes had a greater effect upon the Cistercians than ever he was on his own order. Eighty per cent of the manuscripts of Eudes’ theological output comes to us from Cistercian sources and all but two of the extant copies of his sentence commentary come through them. In 1245 the Cistercians opened their own house of studies in Paris to enable young monks to study for degrees at the university and those were the year after Eudes began his regency. Given that the Cistercians would have yet had no master of their own, they would have needed to attend some existing school for instruction, just as the Franciscans had done at first engaging Alexander of Hales. Their strong use of Eudes suggests that they came initially to the Franciscan school and that their initial generation of university trained scholars were formed and instructed by Eudes. In contrast, for his own Franciscan brothers, the recently deceased Alexander of Hales seemed to have greater significance.

Eudes’ theology may not have influenced the Franciscans as greatly as some but he was not without influence on his brothers. His tempered approach to his theology in the face of the opposition from the secular masters made matters far less contentious for those who followed him, like William of Meliton and Bertrand of Bayonne. One can wonder if the creativity of

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60 Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio, Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907).
62 Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie, pp. 34-36, 52.
Bonaventure in the 1250s would have been so easily achieved without the restraint of Eudes in the 1240s. As a Neoplatonist who adhered to an epistemology of divine illumination, Eudes was well behind the Aristotelian fashions of his age, left aground as that philosophical tide withdrew. Eudes flourished in a period in which there was lessening interest to know and understand theology in this fashion, however well Eudes may have done it. Perhaps his uniquely negative answer concerning the coming of Christ in the absence of the fall is emblematic of this. Subsequent generations of Franciscans favoured methods and answers other than those of Eudes.

None of this is to say that Eudes’ soteriological ideas were not insightful, illuminative or even useful; it is simply to say that they do not appear to have been much used by subsequent Franciscans of Paris, whether they be his own students, such as Bonaventure, Bertrand of Bayonne or Gilbert of Tournai, or whether they be later generations of friars who no longer favoured Neoplatonism upon which Eudes’ ideas rested.

Even so, not all of Eudes’ ideas passed into nothingness. He furthered the theological trajectory of Alexander of Hales in moving soteriological attention more in a direction that considered the change it wrought in

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humanity rather than solely the furnishing of satisfaction to God. In keeping with this broader approach, Eudes frequently appeared to struggle with an understanding of soteriology that focussed the whole of salvation upon the solitary act of the crucifixion, an idea taken up by later friars who accord a salvific role to other events in the life of Christ, especially the incarnation. Finally, even though Eudes does not believe that the incarnation was an event that would have occurred in the absence of human sin, in reaching that conclusion he adduces a line of argument that contemplates a broader salvific role for the incarnation of the Word. That role was more than simply bringing into being the future victim of the crucifixion. However briefly, Eudes does entertain the possibility that there is a greater role for the incarnation and in that he shares a common and identifiable thread with later Franciscans of the University of Paris.
4 Bonaventure and an Alternative to Penal-Substitution

Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio was another of the students of Alexander of Hales at the University of Paris who proceeded in time to occupy his master’s chair. He had been born as Giovanni di Fidanza in 1221 in the small commune of Bagnoreggio in Latium, not far from Viterbo. Bonaventure appears to have made his way to Paris in about 1235 and undertaken studies in arts. Unlike his teacher who had become a friar much later in life, Bonaventure entered the Franciscans while a youth in 1243 and joined the province of France. Following his year of probation, he started his theological studies at the University of Paris.¹ There he encountered and studied under both Alexander of Hales and Eudes Rigaud.

There are few details of his early studies but he appears to have flourished in the university and was a formed bachelor by 1251. He was eligible for the degree of Master in 1253 but the conclusion of his studies coincided with the renewed turmoil of the secular-mendicant controversy in the university.² The circumstances around the reinvigoration of the conflict are dealt with more specifically in the account of Richard Rufus of Cornwall but it is sufficient for now to note that as a punitive measure, the secular masters of the university had declined not to admit otherwise qualified masters from the mendicant orders to their degrees and Bonaventure was

² Moorman, A History of the Franciscan Order, pp. 132–33. More is said of this renewed and second phase of the secular-mendicant controversy on pages 161–65 below.
among these students. When the masters relented at the end of 1256, he finally attained his licentia. The act was largely symbolic for in that February, the General Chapter of Rome, convened early and hurriedly to deal with the resignation of the Minister General, John of Parma, after his denunciation as a Joachimite, elected in his absence Bonaventure as seventh Minister General of the order at only thirty-six years of age.

A flurry of academic works from Bonaventure’s pen appeared in the next two years in which it would seem that Bonaventure hastened to complete works he had already commenced at Paris. The bulk of Bonaventure’s later writings dealt with the governance of the order. Despite twice rejecting the offer of a bishopric, in 1273 Gregory X successfully prevailed upon him to accept the see of Albano and created him a cardinal. This obliged Bonaventure to resign as Minister General but he lived only a further year and died on 15 July 1274 while participating in the Council of Lyons. Sixtus IV canonised him in 1482 and he was declared a Doctor of the Church in 1557 by Sixtus V.

A substantial and well attested body of his texts survive, including some writing on the topic of soteriology. While Bonaventure lacks any recorded specific quodlibets or disputed questions touching directly on salvation, his complete Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum is known to us, as well as other general works that do deal with the issue of salvation, his Breviloquium and Collationes in Hexaëmeron.

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3 See further page 162 ff. below.
4 Roest, A History of Franciscan Education p. 264.
6 Respectively, Bonaventure, ‘Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum’ in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), I-IV (1887); Bonaventure, ‘Breviloquium’, in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), V
4.1 THE COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF SENTENCES

A comparison of the questions posed in the Book of Sentences and Bonaventure’s commentary on it, set out in Appendix 1, provides some preliminary insight into Bonaventure’s particular concerns in soteriology. An initial consideration discloses that Bonaventure did not slavishly follow the questions of the Sentences. In many areas, Bonaventure either omits some topics altogether or inserts new sections of his own.

Bonaventure commences with a fairly standard consideration of merit in Christ, which is to say the earning of supernatural reward through good deeds. In an orthodox discussion, he accepts that Christ could merit from the moment of his conception and through acts done after that moment. In this he agrees with Anselm and, equally, like Anselm he accepted that Christ merited not only in what he did but in what was done to him. Bonaventure concedes that ordinarily one merits only for positive acts but he notes that in the case of Christ, who from his love for others was punished for their sins, he also merited passively.

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7 See page 317-24 below.

8 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 1. There was a long history of speculation as to what degree Christ could earn merit. If he could not sin, does he gain anything for doing good, since that is only his nature; could he then merit? Could reward be given to him who was God and so already possessed all things? See, for example, Augustine, In Evangelium Ioannis Tractatus Centum Viginti Quatuor, ed. and trans. by John W. Rettig (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1988-95), XVII. 1; Gregory the Great, Homilia in Ezechielis, ed. and trans. by Charles Morel, Sources Chrétienes, 360 (Paris: CERF, 1986), VI. 8.

9 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 1. 2.

10 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3.

11 ‘Dicendum, quod Christus non tantum meruit in actione, sed etiam in passione. Non enim passus fuit frustra, sed ex rationabili causa; nec passus fuit propter demeritum culpae, sed propter amorem veritatis et iustitiae’, Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3 – ‘It must be said that Christ merited not only in what was done, but also in what he suffered. For he did not suffer in vain, but for a reason; nor did he suffer due to the debt of sin but for the sake of the love of truth and justice’. Cf. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, pp. 37-133, I. 9.
In the following distinction, Bonaventure affirms the efficacy of Christ’s passion in making satisfaction. He writes of Christ’s role as both mediator for, and redeemer of, humanity. In the twentieth distinction, Bonaventure addressed himself to the congruence of Christ’s manner of redeeming humanity. These notions are all theologically commonplace.

In fact, there is much where Bonaventure presents himself as being thoroughly in keeping with Anselm. The following could easily have been written by Anselm himself:

[...] planum est quod impossible est aliquam puram creaturam Deo satisfacere pro humano genere, pro eo quod tam gravis est iniuria, quae infertur Deo, ob excellentissimam eius dignitatem, quod nulla pura creatura potest recompensare aliquid illi aequale [...] Et ideo, cum pura creatura non posset pro toto genere humano satisfacere, nec alterius generis creaturam deceret ad hoc assumi, oportuit ut persona satisfacientis esset Deus et homo. 12

This situation of aligning with Anselm alters markedly in the sixth question of that twentieth distinction: 'Whether God would have been able to save the human race by some other means'. 13 In it, Bonaventure boldly becomes the first Franciscan writing on soteriology openly to disagree with Anselm, listing him among the authorities opposed to his own position.

Contra: 1. Super illud ad Hebraeos secundo: ‘Decebat auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummari’; Glossa ‘Nisi [sic.] Christus moreretur, homo non redimeretur, et non redemptus periret, et frustra essent omnia facta’: si ergo hoc est impossibile, restat, quod primum est impossibile, scilicet Christum non mori pro

12 ‘...[I]t is clear that it is impossible that some wholly created being could satisfy God on behalf of the human race for so serious was the injustice done to God, due to God’s most excellent dignity, that no wholly created being is able to make a recompense in any way commensurate to it... And thus, since neither a wholly created being is able to make satisfaction for the whole human race nor would it be appropriate that another type of creature take on that role, it was proper that the person making the satisfaction be God and man.’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3.

13 ‘Utrum alio modo potuerit Deus genus humanum salvare.’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6.
salute generis humani. Et si hoc, impossibile fuit, alio modo genus humanum liberari quam per mortem Christi.

2. Item, Anselmus in libro Cur Deus Homo: 'Non potuit transire calicem, nisi haberet, non quia non posset vitare mortem, si vellet, sed, sicut dictum est, impossibile fuit aliter salvare mundum': redit ergo idem quod prius.14

Despite Anselm and the Gloss, Bonaventure concludes that humanity could have been restored by some way other than Christ’s death, if God had so chosen.15 He directly responded to the former argument:

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de Glossa et de Anselmo, dicendum, quod auctoritates illae intelliguntur, quantum ex parte nostra, praesupposita dispositione divina, qua nos sic, et non alio modo, liberare decrevit. Per hunc etiam modum intelligenda est auctoritas Ambrosii, quae posita fuit supra distinctione decima octava, capitulo ultimo. ‘Tantum, inquit, fuit peccatum nostrum, ut salvari non possemus, nisi unigenitus Dei Filius moreretur pro nobis debitoribus mortis’; hoc, inquam, intelligendum est, quia Deus nos aliter non decrevit salvare. Per hunc etiam modum intelligendae sunt auctoritates similares.16

14 ‘Contra: 1. The Gloss on this text: “For it became him to perfect the author of their salvation by his passion” from the second chapter of Hebrews has “Unless Christ had died, humanity would not have been redeemed, and, if unredeemed, it would have perished and all things done in vain”: if therefore this is impossible, it remains that it was impossible from the first, that is to say, Christ was not to die for the salvation of the human race. And, if so, it was impossible for the human race to be freed by another means than through the death of Christ.

2. Again, Anselm in the book Cur Deus Homo had said, “It was not possible to take the cup from him, unless he drank, not since he was unable to evade death if he so chose, but, as it is written, it was impossible to save the world otherwise”: thus it is the same as that before.’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6.

15 ‘Genus humanum ex parte Dei reparantis et liberantis potuit alia via quam per mortem Christi reparari; licet ex parte generis humani reparati non potuit salvari nisi hac via a Deo determinata.’ Bonaventure, III Sent, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6: ‘The human race could be restored and set free on the part of God by some means other than restoration through the death of Christ; although the human race could be neither restored or saved unless this was a means set forth by God’.

16 ‘But to this it is objected that it is contrary to the Gloss and to Anselm, saying that those authorities are understood, as far as it pertains to us, that it was decreed to free us by reordering of the divine plan and by no other means. Yet the authority of Ambrose, which had been argued above in distinction eighteen in the last chapter, should be understood in this way, “Our sin was such that we could not be saved unless the only begotten Son of God died for us under the debt of death”; this, I say, is to be understood that God did not decree to save us otherwise. Yet through this means the authorities are understood to be alike.’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6. Bonaventure’s quotation is of Ambrosiaster and not Ambrose. Ambrosiaster, Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanos, ed. by Academia
Bonaventure is arguing, in essence, that humanity was to be saved through whatever means God decreed and that it just so happened that the means that the Divine Will chose was through the death of Christ. It was open to God to have chosen some other means, in which instance that would have been sufficient to save humanity. Humanity was saved in the manner in which it was simply because God did not choose some alternative. Whereas Anselm argued that it was intrinsic to the nature of the God-Man and his sacrifice that made it capable of attaining salvation for humanity, Bonaventure does not accept this, saying that this sacrifice was efficacious because God had willed that it be so. The crux lay for Bonaventure not in the nature of the God-Man but rather in the will of God.

Bonaventure does not expressly declare Anselm to have erred but distinguished his argument saying rather that Anselm was misconstrued due to a failure to have been interpreted with due reference to Ambrosiaster’s writings. Of course, the goal of a sentence commentary was not to pick and choose the ‘correct’ authorities among the available sources in order to justify a particular idea but rather to demonstrate a mastery of all those sources by bringing into concord even those that appear seemingly opposed, and this Bonaventure did, albeit with some textual legerdemain involving Ambrosiaster’s text. While not completely abandoning the fundamental structure of the Anselmian explanation for human salvation, Bonaventure supplanted the union of natures in the God-Man as the sine qua non of redemption, arguing instead for the choices of the Divine Will.

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17 Bonaventure’s reference to Ambrosiaster is from his Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanos, I, IX. 15.
4.1.1 The Absolute Freedom of God in Salvation

This twentieth distinction shows a quite fundamental difference between Anselm and Bonaventure. Although Anselm had intended the *Cur Deus Homo* to be in the nature of an apologia for the incarnation:

‘[M]onstratur [...] naturam humanam ad hoc institutam esse, ut aliquando immortalitate beata totus homo, id est in corpore et anima, frueretur, ac necesse esse ut hoc fiat de homine propter quod factus est, sed non nisi per Hominem-Deum, atque ex necessitate omnia quae de Christo credimus fieri oportere’.  

Anselm wished to show how humanity had to be fulfilled and so had to be redeemed and therefore, in Anselm’s reasoning, it had to be a God-Man who achieved this.

This is not the case with Bonaventure for whom there was no necessity upon God. For Bonaventure, that redemption occurs only because God wills that a certain price of satisfaction be acceptable. God could have willed that a person, or angel or non-incarnate person of the Trinity render satisfaction and that would have been sufficient. To this end, Bonaventure introduces a whole new question into his commentary to address this: ‘Utrum aliqua creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano’. He concludes that it was fitting for the God-Man to be the agent of redemption, but that it not essential: ‘Oportuit ut persona satisfacientis esset Deus et homo’. The shift was that Bonaventure no longer held that the incarnation of Jesus Christ was intrinsic to salvation, but rather whatever price God may have

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18 ‘It is shown that human nature was established so that the whole human nature, that is in both body and soul, might enjoy blessed immortality and, since humanity was made for this, that it was necessary that this should happen but only through the Man-God and that everything which we believe about Christ should come to pass out of necessity’. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, Preface (pp. 42-43).

19 Bonaventure, *Sent.* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3, ‘Whether some other wholly created being would have been able to make satisfaction for the whole human race’.

20 ‘It was appropriate that the person making satisfaction be both God and man.’
chosen. The consequence of this was that the two doctrines of incarnation and salvation become uncoupled from each other. No longer was the incarnation, of its essence, required to ensure that salvation occurred nor was redemption necessarily the principal reason for the incarnation. For Bonaventure, those doctrines were now free to be considered independently.

Bonaventure differed further with Anselm. He argued that divine justice did not necessitate satisfaction by the God-Man either:

\begin{quote}
Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Deus non potest facere contra suam iustitiam, et iustitiam non potest praeter satisfactionem culpam dimittere, responderi potest per interemptionem duarum propositionum quas proponit, quarum prima haec, quod non potuit liberari genus humanum nisi per viam iustitiae: potuit enim liberare per viam misericordiae; nec in hoc fuisset factum praedictum iustitiae, si hoc facere voluisset. Potuisset enim omnia demerit delere et hominem in priori statu constituere, nec remansisset aliquid inordinatum in universum nec etiam impunitum. Peccatum enim fert secum poenam, per quam ordinatur; et ita si sine satisfactione genus humanum liberasset, non propter hoc contra iustitiam fecisset. Potest etiam responderi per interemptionem illius quod nullo alio modo potuit satisfacere nisi per mortem. Quamvis hoc esset magis congruum, fortassis modicum supplicium in tam nobili persona suffecisset ad humani generis reparationem; sed Dominus in liberando supererogavit, propter quod dicitur: ‘Copiosa apud eum redemptio’.²¹
\end{quote}

²¹ To this it is lastly objected that God is not able to act contrary to God’s justice and that this justice cannot forgive wrong beyond the satisfaction made. It can be responded that in this regard there are two propositions put forward of which the first is this: that God could not free the human race unless by way of justice; yet God could set it free by way of mercy – and this would not be an act prejudicial to justice if God had wished to do this. For God was able to remove all faults and to restore humanity to its original state and this would retain neither some disorder nor unpunished fault within the universe. For sin carries its own punishment with itself and it was ordained thus, and if the human race were set free without satisfaction, not for this reason would it be done contrary to justice. To the objection that by no other means could satisfaction have been made save through death, it can be responded: however fitting this might have been, perhaps moderate suffering for such a noble person would suffice as reparation for the human race. But God did more than was demanded in freeing us, for thus it is said: “With him there is plentiful redemption”, Bonaventure, Sent III d. 20, a. 1, q. 6. The quote is Psalms 129: 4.
Bonaventure maintains that it was entirely possible for God to have proposed an alternate path for human redemption and that, had God so chosen, it would have been no offence against divine justice. Contrary to Anselm, Bonaventure argues that the justness of God did not fully delimit God’s manner of interacting with humanity.

4.1.2 From Necessity to Fittingness

Nonetheless, salvation through Christ’s sacrifice was not some mere act of divine caprice for Bonaventure; there are good reasons for God to have chosen this means. In the above passage and in numerous other answers in the commentary, Bonaventure points out that it was ‘congruus’ or ‘conveniens’ for God so to have acted: ‘Genus humanum reparari, congruum et decens est tum ex parte Dei, tum ex parte hominis’, ‘Magis fuit congruum et ex parte Dei et ex parte nostra, genus humanum reparari per satisfactionem’, ‘Modus nostrae satisfactionis, factae per Christum, fuit congruentissimus et maxime a Deo acceptandus’. In fact, he entitled the whole twentieth distinction, ‘De Christi Passionis Congruentia’. Consistently and studiously, Bonaventure avoids using any terms of obligation, opting rather for what was ‘seemly’, ‘apt’ or ‘fitting’. For Bonaventure, alternative means of salvation are possible and he refrains from predicating any

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22 Respectively, ‘It was fitting and seemly that the human race be restored both on the part of God and on the part of humanity’, Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 1, ‘On the part of God and of us, it was more fitting that the human race be restored through satisfaction’, d. 20, a. 1, q. 2, ‘The means of our satisfaction done through Christ was the most fitting and greatly accepted by God’, d. 20, a. 1, q. 5. See further Zachary Hayes, ‘The Meaning of “Convenientia” in the Metaphysics of St. Bonaventure’, Franciscan Studies, 34 (1974), 74-100.
necessity of God, even in the context of salvation. All divine action stems from God’s good pleasure and will.

In the first article of this twentieth distinction, Bonaventure sets out why he believes that this arrangement, while not necessary, at least was fitting.

Homo peccaverat per superbam et gulam et inobedientiam, sicut dicit Gregorius et in secundo libro fuit ostensum; voluit enim assimilari Deo per scientiae sublimitatem, gustare ligni suavitatem et transgredi praecepti divini limitem. Et quoniam curatio habet fieri per contrarium, ideo modus satisfaciendi congruentissimus fuit per abiectionem, humiliationem et divinae voluntatis implentionem.

As Bonaventure sets forth matters, he accepted that humankind bore already the image and likeness of the Son, yet it hungered for more and a closer union with God. It was dissatisfied and sought to liken itself to God by means of its own, employing ‘pride and greed and disobedience’, the self-same things that were to keep it from God. As Bonaventure noted above, sin carries its own punishment within itself and thus humanity fell by act of its own and not of God; no greater punishment could there be for a being destined to enjoy the image and likeness of God and longing to enjoy union with God, than to have that image and likeness disfigured and to be thwarted.

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23 ‘Utrum alio modo potuerit Deus genus humanum salvare’. *Sent* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6 – ‘Whether God could have saved the human race by some other means’. Bonaventure concludes that God was not obliged to but one means of salvation.

24 ‘Humanity sinned through pride and greed and disobedience, as Gregory said and was shown in the second book. For it wished to become like God through sublime knowledge, to taste the sweetness of the tree and transgress the limit of the divine precepts. And because the treatment must be opposite to the cause, for that reason the most appropriate means for making our satisfaction was through meekness, humility and the fulfilment of the divine will’. *Sent* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 5. The reference is to Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job*, ed. by Marcus Andriaen, Corpus Christianorum – Series Latina, 143 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 5. v. 31.

25 Bonaventure, *Sent* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 5.
in its desire for union.26 ‘Si consideremus hominis lapsum, videbimus quod lapsus fuit appetendo falsam Dei similitudinem et aequalitatem’.27

4.1.3 Pseudo-Dionysius and Hierarchies

This sin carries within itself consequences not only for humanity. Bonaventure was deeply influenced in his theology by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and borrowed much from him, including the idea of cosmic hierarchies.28 For Pseudo-Dionysius, God had established a perfect order with each creation in its perfect place, arrayed in hierarchy according to its ability to know and love God. When humanity reached beyond itself and sought to know God in a way improper to its nature, it disordered not only itself but also the established hierarchy, introducing discord all around itself and marring the perfection established and arrayed by God.

Si autem aliquis salvationem laudet et sicut ex peioribus tota salvatorie abripientem omnino alicubi et hunc nos laudatorem largissimae recipiemus salvationis.
Et hanc primam salvationem totorum rogabimus ipsum diffinire, qui omnia in seipsis intransmutabilia et non pugnantia et fortia contra peiora salvat; et omnia custodit non pugnantia et non bellantia, singularis sui ipsorum rationibus ordinate; et omnem inaequalitatem et alienam operationem ex totis exterminate et proportiones uniuscuiusque constituit, non volentes cadere ad contraria nec transire.
Quoniam et ita salvationem aliquis laudabit non longe ab intentione sanctae Theologiae, sicut omnia existentia salvatoria omnium bonitate, a casu propriorum bonorum liberantem, secundum quod uniuscuiusque eorum quae salvantur suscipit natura.

26 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6. See page 114 above.
27 ‘If we consider the fall of humanity, we shall see that the fall took place by desiring a false likeness and equality to God’. Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 1, a. 2, q. 3.
Propert quod et liberationem ipsam nominant theologi, inquantum non sinit vere existentia ad nihil esse cadere et inquantum, et si aliquid ad peccatum et inordinatum fallatur et minorationem quamdam patiatur perfectionis prorigorum bonorum, et haec a passione et infirmitate et privatione liberat, implens minus habens et paterne infirmitatem supportans et suscitans a malo; magis autem, statuens in bono et percussum bonum adimplens et ordinans et statuens et ornans inordinate ipsius et inornatum et integrum perficiens et ab omnibus maculis solvens.²⁹

Bonaventure described a humanity bearing the image and likeness of the Son and so destined to enjoy something of the relationship shared between the Father and the Son. Yet it hungered for more and covetously strove to elevate itself in the hierarchy and so fell. Bonaventure finds it ‘congruentissimus’ that the Son, who truly does enjoy that relationship, surrendered it to take upon himself the form of those wrongly claiming it, and redeemed those who elevated themselves by abasing himself and so was exalted.³⁰

As Bonaventure conceived of the fall, then, this ‘wish to become like God’, is almost a usurpation of the hierarchic place of Christ. Humanity

²⁹ 'And if any one praises salvation as the saving power which rescues all things from the influence of evil, we would accept him as one who praises the greatest part of salvation. But we shall ask him to define this first salvation of all things as that which preserves all things in themselves without change or conflict and strong against wicked things and keeps them without strife or struggle, each ordered in their own rules, and banishes all inequality and foreign interference from everything, and establishes the proportions of each so that they are not able to fall or pass over into their opposites. For anyone who will praise salvation thus is not far from the intention of sacred theology, just as all saving existence is by the goodness of all things, due to the redemption of their own good virtues according to which each of them which are saved and take up their nature. On account of which, theologians call it “redemption” inasmuch as it does not permit things truly existing to fall into nothingness and also because, if anything stumble into sin or disorder and suffer some lessening of the perfection of its proper virtues, it also redeems from the suffering, weakness and loss, filling up what is lacking and paternally supporting weakness and rousing from evil; yet more, establishing it in goodness and fulfilling stricken virtue, and ordering, establishing and furnishing its disorder, wholly perfecting its disarray and freeing it from all faults.' Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Περὶ θεῖων ονομάτων - De Divinis Nominibus, ed. and trans. by Beate Regina Suchla, Corpus Dionysiacum, 1, Patristische Texte und Studien, 33 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), VIII. 9.

wished to know and experience God in a way that is proper only to the Son.\textsuperscript{31} It blighted the Divine order by reaching beyond its proper place in the cosmic hierarchy, seeking to intrude even into the communion of the Trinity, ‘to be like God’ in the language of Genesis 3: 5. Disfigured through sin, humanity becomes other than itself and can no longer love and experience God as fully as it was created to do.

\begin{quote}
[Mens humana] concupiscentiis illecta, ad se ipsam nequaquam revertitur per desiderium suavitatis internae et laetitiae spiritualis. Ideo totaliter in his sensibilibus iacens, non potest ad se tanquam ad Dei imaginem reintrare. Et quoniam, ubi quis cederet, necesse habet ibidem recumbere, nisi apponat quis et adjiciat, ut resurgat; non potuit anima nostra perfecte ab his sensibilibus relevari ad contuitum sui et aeternae Veritas in se ipsa, nisi Veritas, assumpta forma humana in Christo, fieret sibi scala reparans priorem scalam, quae fracta fuerat in Adam.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

As Bonaventure portrayed matters, humanity had longed to ‘be like God’ and reached beyond itself in ‘pride and greed and disobedience’ and sinned, disordering creation and disfiguring itself in the process, such that it could no longer even enjoy the communion with God that was proper to it. The most apt way to restore creation was by its opposite. Rather than humanity attempting to become like God, God would truly become human. In lieu of humanity’s ‘pride and greed and disobedience’ despoothing its relationship with God, Christ’s humility, poverty and obedience would heal humanity and restores it to its proper relationship with God. In other words,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Hayes, \textit{The Hidden Center}, p. 171.
\item \textsuperscript{32} ‘[The human mind] is seduced by disordered desires and therefore it does not in any way return to itself through a desire for inner sweetness and spiritual joy. Thus totally immersed in matters of the senses, it is unable to reoccupy itself as the image of God. Just as when a person falls, the person must lie there until someone approaches and reaches out and to raise up the fallen one, so our soul cannot perfectly be lifted up again from things of the senses to consider itself and the eternal Truth within itself unless the Truth, assuming a human form in Christ, should become a ladder for it, repairing the first ladder that had been broken in Adam’. Bonaventure, \textit{Itinerarium Mentis in Deum}, 4: 1-2.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
while for Anselm and even for Alexander of Hales, salvation had been about rendering adequate satisfaction to undo the offence that humanity did to God, for Bonaventure it was much more about undoing what the nature of sin had done to humanity.

4.1.4 Locus of Suffering

Appendix 1 also reveals that Bonaventure shares with Alexander a desire to investigate much more closely the nature and locus of Christ’s suffering in the passion. Bonaventure broadly follows Alexander’s argument with respect to the place of human suffering in salvation but in doing so he never expressly quotes Alexander. This is not startling; a sentence commentary was to harmonise authorities and Alexander had been dead less than a decade when Bonaventure was writing his own commentary. Alexander was a learned and revered scholar to be sure but did not enjoy the same authoritative status as St Augustine, St Gregory or even the Glossa Ordinaria. It would have been presumptuous for Bonaventure to have quoted his former teacher and used him as an authority on a par with the patristic sources.

Nonetheless, Bonaventure, without expressly referring to Alexander, does use his former teacher’s ideas in yet another open departure from Anselm. In dealing with the question of whether Christ took upon himself the obligation to suffer, Bonaventure lists Anselm among those with whom he disagrees.33

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33 'Utrum Christus assumserit necessitatem patiendi.' Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 1, q. 3. It will be recalled that Anselm had believed that the human body assumed by the Word was a perfect one as enjoyed by humanity prior to the fall. Alexander had believed that it was a human body of the time of the incarnation and so marred by the sufferings consequent to the fall. See pages 70-71 above.
Contra: 3. Item, Anselmus in libro Cur Deus Homo: ‘Quoniam voluntas Dei nulla necessitate facit aliquid, sed sola potestate; et voluntas Christi fuit voluntas Dei: nulla igitur necessitate mortuus est, sed sola potestate.’

To this Bonaventure responded:

Ad illud Anselmi de voluntate Christi iam patet responsio; non enim excludit necessitatem simpliciter, sed necessitatem respectu voluntatis divinae. – Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur, quod omnis necessitas aut est prohibitionis, aut coactionis; dicendum enim, quod hoc intelligitur de necessitate, quae repugnant voluntati, sicut dicit idem Anselmus; de ea autem necessitate, quae voluntati subest, non habet veritatem. Ideo ratio illa non probat, quod nulla fuit in Christo necessitas patiendi, sed quia non fuit aliqua eius voluntati contraria.

In other words, Bonaventure, in an effort to harmonise the objection of Anselm, accepts that it is not possible to posit an obligation of God, yet points out that it is possible for God, in God’s utter freedom of action, voluntarily to assume an obligation and that this is what occurred in the incarnation of the Word. On the basis of this, Bonaventure ultimately concludes in this question that there is an obligation upon Christ to suffer but that this obligation was assumed in freedom and not contracted of necessity, just as Alexander had reasoned previously.

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34 ‘Opposed: 3. Anselm in the book Cur Deus Homo: “Since the will of God does nothing from any need but only from power, and the will of Christ was the will of God: therefore he died not from need but only from power.”’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 1, q. 3.

35 ‘To that of Anselm concerning the will of Christ, the response is now obvious: for it does not simply exclude obligation but obligation in respect of the Divine Will. And, through that, the response to the following is obvious: to which it is objected that all obligation is either a prohibition or a limitation; for it must be said that that which is understood about obligation is repugnant to free will, just as the same Anselm said concerning that obligation which is subject to free will, does not have truth. For the same reason it does not prove that there was no obligation in Christ for him to suffer but that there was nothing contrary to his will.’ Bonaventure’s reference to Anselm’s text is drawn from Cur Deus Homo II. 17: ‘Et si vis omnium quae fecit et quae passus est veram scire necessitatem, scito omnia ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse voluit. Voluntatem vero eis nulla praecessit necessitas.’

36 ‘In Christo fuit necessitas patiendi, sed assunta, non contracta.’ Sent III, d. 16, a. 1, q. 3. See pages 80-81 above.
Artfully, Bonaventure not only brings Anselm’s idea into concord with his own but again preserved God’s freedom in respect of human salvation. Neither the act of rendering satisfaction nor the means by which it occurs are necessarily so, other than by a free election of God’s will.

Again, like Alexander of Hales, he establishes the reality of the suffering in Christ in the passion, thus he can argue that there was true suffering of Christ’s sorrow and that this sorrow was the bitterest and sharpest of all sorrows. However, he does not connect this as forcefully as Alexander had done with his idea of full human engagement in the work of salvation. Rather, in Bonaventure’s reasoning, the authenticity of Christ’s sorrow was simply a matter of established dogma: ‘Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut Evangelium dicit, et fides catholica sensit, vera doloris passio fuit in Christo. In ipso enim fuit caro passibilis et perforabilis, fuit etiam virtus sentiendi, secundum quam anima compatitur corpori laeso’. However, when it came to a consideration of the precise locus of that suffering and sorrow, Bonaventure elected to adhere to what Alexander had established. Like his teacher, he drew a distinction between the ‘ratio ut ratio’ and the ‘ratio ut natura’ and locates different experiences of the passion in each. In addressing whether Christ suffered according to his reason or his senses, Bonaventure gives a very Alexandrine response albeit, once again, without expressly naming him. He notes that the soul can suffer in and of itself and it can also sorrow as a result of what occurs to the body to which it is

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37 ‘Vera doloris passio fuit in Christo’, Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, ‘Dolor passionis Christi inter ceteros Dolores fuit acerbissimus et acutissimus’, Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 1, q. 2.

38 ‘It must be said that, without doubt, just as the Gospel states and the catholic faith senses, there was a genuine experience of sorrow in Christ. For, in him was a passible and vulnerable flesh, strength that could yet experience things and in accordance with all this, a soul that suffered with the wounded body’. Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 15, a. 1, q. 1.

39 See pages 73-76 and following above.
conjoined. As to the former, he said that in Christ, his soul genuinely sorrowed and suffered for human sins and this feeling proceeded from the rational mind. He then turns to the suffering of the natural mind:

De alio autem dolore, qui inest animae ex carne, non est usquequaque evidens. Distinguunt tamen magistri nostri communiter, quod ratio dupliciter habet considerari, videlicet ut ratio et ut natura. Si consideretur ut ratio, sic passionis, quae ei attribuuntur, sunt consequentes ipsam deliberationem; et hoc modo anima Christi corpori patienti non compatiebat, immo multum gaudebat et gratulabatur; vehementer enim placebat ei pati pro salute generis humani. Si autem consideretur ratio ut natura; sic, cum habeat naturalem appetitum et inclinationem ad corpus, ut potius perfectio ad perfectabile, patiebatur, corpore patiente.

Bonaventure has adopted Alexander’s position and paraphrased it for his response. Nevertheless, the passage shows a less than wholehearted commitment to those ideas on the part of Bonaventure. He did not choose to present it as his own position but merely as what ‘nostri magistri communiter’ had taught previously. Moreover, again unlike Alexander, Bonaventure refrains from positing any necessity of God, nor any need that Christ should suffer, in either his human or divine nature.

Nevertheless, Bonaventure persisted with this distinction of the rational and natural reason. In the very next question, Bonaventure considers whether Christ’s soul suffered according to the higher part of its

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40 This was a distinction well established in the patristic sources. As his authority for the proposition, Bonaventure gives Augustine, *De Civitates Dei*, ed. by Bernhard Dombart, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana - Scriptores Graeci, 1 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1928), XIV. 15.

41 ‘Yet concerning the other sorrow, which is in the soul by virtue of the flesh, that is not entirely clear. Our teachers commonly make the distinction that the reason is to be considered in two ways, namely “as reason” and “as nature”. If it is considered “as reason”, then the sufferings attributed to it are those that follow from a choice; and by this means Christ’s soul did not suffer with the body as it suffered but rather it rejoiced greatly and gave thanks; for it was exceedingly pleased to suffer this for the salvation of the human race. If, however, reason “as nature” be considered; then since it has the natural appetites and tendencies of the body, and inasmuch as what is perfect can be made perfect, it suffered as the body suffered.’ Bonaventure, *Sent* III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 1.
reason, the ‘ratio ut natura’, and again he repeats the ideas of another author, rather than advancing arguments of his own.42

Dicendum, quod secundum communen sententiam magistrorum passio Christi non solum stetit in sensualitate nec tantum pervenit ad rationem inferiorem, sed extendit se usque ad superiorem portionem. Sicut enim anima nostra ex coniunctione sui ad corpus infectum tota corrumpitur et tota inificitur secundum omnem partem, scilicet tam superiorem quam inferiorem; sic anima Christi ex coniunctione sui ad corpus patiens et afflictum tota patiebatur et affligebatur, ut per illam passionem et dolorem illum tota peccatrix anima curaretur. Et sic dolor fuit et passio in Christo secundum supremam rationis partem, quamvis in ea fuerit gaudium fruitionis. Licet autem hoc teneatur tanquam verum, difficile tamen est ad intelligendum, qualiter in anima Christi secundum eandem potentiam et secundem eundem statum potentiae fuerit dolor et gaudium, nec dolor superveniens discontinuaverit gaudium, immo fuerunt simul, nec iterum, quod maius est, dolor intensus valde fecerat, gaudium esse minus perfectum.43

Bonaventure is clear that he is content to follow the line established by Alexander. It is also clear that Bonaventure harbours some reservations concerning it and does not quite understand how joy and sorrow can simultaneous be in Christ’s soul. Although Alexander laid emphasis on the human engagement with the experience of the passion so that the whole of the God-Man might participate in the experience, Bonaventure adopts a

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42 ‘Utrum anima Christi passa fuerit secundum superiorem portionem rationis’. Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 2 – ‘Whether Christ’s soul had suffered according to the higher part of reason’.
43 ‘It must be said that according to the common opinion of the masters, the suffering of Christ happened not only in the senses nor did it settle just in the lower reason, but it stretched itself into the higher part. For just as our soul from its union to the tainted body was wholly being corrupted and infected according to each part, that is to say the higher as much as the lower; thus Christ’s soul, from its union to a suffering and afflicted body, suffered and was afflicted wholly so that through that suffering and that sorrow, the whole sinful soul might be cured. And thus sorrow and suffering were in Christ according to the upper part as much as there was pleasure from enjoyment. Although this is held to be true, yet it is difficult to understand how in Christ’s soul, according to the same potential and according to the same state of potential, there was both sorrow and joy and not an overpowering sorrow separating off joy, or rather, they were together not in sequence so which is greater, a sorrow made very intense or a joy made less perfect.’ Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 2.
differing stance. He prefers to stress the importance of all that was tainted and afflicted by the fall to be in full union with Jesus Christ in order that he might heal it. 44 Alexander, adhering to Anselm’s model of penal-substitution, was at pains to ensure that all the God-Man might truly render satisfaction, but Bonaventure wishes all the experience of humanity to be embraced by Christ so it might participate in his redemption. The distinction is that Bonaventure writes of salvation as an act of healing humanity marred by the circumstances of the fall, in contrast to Anselm and Alexander who depict salvation as furnishing adequate satisfaction to God.

4.1.5 Passion and Compassion

It is in this sense, Bonaventure’s preference for healing over satisfaction, that perhaps the final question of article two is best understood. Bonaventure asks whether the sorrow was more intense in the rational part of Christ’s soul or in the sensual part. 45 In answering, Bonaventure draws a distinction between the suffering (passio) that is experienced in the sensual part and the ‘suffering with’ (compassio) that is experienced in the rational part. Since the former is sourced in Christ’s own experience but the latter derived from a loving solidarity with the whole human race, Bonaventure concludes that the compassion in the rational part of his soul was the more intense sorrow.

Quamvis magna causa esset dolendi in sensualitate propter separationem ipsius a carne, magna etiam esset dispositio ad dolendum propter optimam complexionem; in dolore tamen compassionis amplior erat ratio dolendi propter inhonorationem Dei et separationem nostram a Deo, maior etiam erat

44 This notion, ‘recapitulation’ or ‘anacephaleosis’, had a pedigree stretching back to Irenaeus of Lyons. See, e.g., Irenaeus of Lyon, Adversus Haereses, III. 18. vii. See Sheets, The Theology of the Atonement, p. 12.
45 ‘Utrum dolor fuerit intensior in parte rationali animae Christi, an in parte sensuali’. Bonaventure, Sent IIeusI, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
Again, Bonaventure and Alexander arrive at similar conclusions but by quite different paths. For Alexander, the suffering in the rational part of the soul was essential both in order to apply the suffering to the satisfaction of the price for redemption and to ensure full engagement by the humanity of Christ. In the case of Bonaventure, declining to predicate any necessity of God, he holds that the Son freely chose in love to reach out to the human race in which he had freely chosen to become incarnate and ‘suffer with’ it in love, and the Father freely chose to accept this *compassio* as the adequate price of human redemption.

Incorporating these ideas from Alexander was not completely successful and the reasoning seems somewhat strained; the reason for the incarnation appears as both an expression of divine love and a precondition to human redemption. This blending of reasons can be ascribed to the scholastic nature of sentence commentaries.

A young scholar’s commentary on the *Book of Sentences* was ordinarily his first major composition and was written at the start of his academic career. Its purpose was to demonstrate sufficient command of authorities, to expound on their concord and to manifest proficiency across the breadth of the discipline of theology. More fundamentally, its purpose
was also to demonstrate to the faculty of theology sufficient ability on the part of the author to be admitted to his degree. As was seen in the case of Eudes Rigaud, keenness of mind and sharpness of intellect were admired skills but there was a risk in straying too far from the established paths of scholarship and orthodoxy. Something of this prudence can be seen in Bonaventure’s treatment of the thought of Alexander of Hales. Bonaventure duly noted that the division of the upper will was something that his teachers had taught and which Bonaventure accepted but he admitted that he did not understand how it could be so! Wrestling within him is, internally, a desire to express his own opinion and, externally, the pressure from observing the form of a sentence commentary along with the suspicious oversight of the secular masters of the faculty, during a rekindled secular-mendicant controversy, the circumstances around which are considered in the following chapter.

4.1.6 The Secular-Mendicant Controversy and Bonaventure

The constraints of the secular-mendicant controversy upon the Franciscans manifested themselves upon Bonaventure in two significant fashions. Due to the masters’ ban on degrees for mendicants, Bonaventure was unable to teach other than as a formed bachelor. This afforded him time to compose a large number of theological works. All of his Quaestiones Disputatae, the Breviloquium, De Reductione, De Triplici Via and a number of others were

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49 See pages 21-22 above.
50 See pages 91-92 above.
51 Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 2.
52 As to the renewed hostilities in the controversy, see pages 161-65 below.
53 Roest, History of Franciscan Education, p. 54.
composed in the 1250s. His election as Minister General in 1257 ended his
time as an academic and, but for the dispute, Bonaventure would have lacked
the liberty to compose many of these works. They would never have come
into being.

The second of these constraints, also arising from the secular-
mendicant controversy, was that against excessive novelty. Bonaventure was
composing during a rather contentious phase of the controversy in which
secular masters, keen to undermine the influence of the mendicants with the
papacy, scrutinised attentively mendicant works for signs of errors, especially
Joachism. They had successfully ousted from the university the friar Gerard
of Borgo San Donnino on such grounds and were seeking others, placing the
mendicants under considerable suspicion.

Synthesis was, as for all in the scholastic era, the prudent goal of a sensible student, not novelty. Even so, the Franciscans may at this time have felt a greater sensitivity to such scrutiny.

Bonaventure left evidence of this pressure. Some manuscript
traditions of Bonaventure’s commentary included an initial prologue to Book
Two in which Bonaventure refers to comments that other scholars had made

54 Bonaventure, ‘Quaestiones Disputatae de Scientia Christi’ in Opera Omnia, ed. by
Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-
1907), 5 (1891), pp. 3-43; ‘Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Sacrosanctis Trinitatis’ in
Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S.
Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), V (1891), pp. 45-115; ‘Quaestiones Disputatae de Perfectione
Evangelica’ Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia
Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), V (1891), pp. 117-98; ‘De Reductione Artium ad
Theologiam’, in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi:
Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), 8 (1898), pp. 3-27. See too Sanctus
Bonaventura 1274-1974, ed. by Collegio S. Bonaventura, 7 vols (Grottaferrata: Typographia
Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1974), II: De Vita, Mente, Fontibus et Operibus, pp. 15-16.

55 As to Joachism, see page 162 below.

56 Gerard of Borgo San Donnino, Introductorium in Evangelium Aeternum, ed. by J. G. V.
Engelhardt (Erlangen: Kunstmann, 1828). See also Marjorie Reeves, The Influence of
Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: A Study in Joachimism (Oxford: Oxford University
on his first book. These masters had apparently indeed scrutinised
Bonaventure's work upbraided him for his creativity. He complains that he
was accused of travelling much further in his thought that Peter Lombard
had established and of departing from his instruction. As a result of this
criticism, Bonaventure bemoaned that he was obliged to revise what he had
said previously, in some cases needing to edit his position while, in others,
having to change his whole arguments.

At quemadmodum in primo libro sententiis adhaesi et
communibus opinionibus magistrorum, et potissime
magistri et patris nostri bonae memoriae fratris
Alexandri, sic in consequentibus libris ab eorum
vestigis non recedam. Non enim intendo novas
opiniones adversare, sed communes et approbatas
retextere. Nec quisquam aestimet, quod novi scripti
velim esse fabricator; hoc enim sentio et fatoer, quod
sum pauper et tenuis compilator.57

It would seem clear that Bonaventure was being accused of innovation and
was attempting to defend himself by proclaiming his adherence to Peter
Lombard and to the other masters including Alexander of Hales. As he puts
it, ‘In hoc igitur Magistro non contradixi, sed potius verbum eius iuxta
veritatis regulam, ut aestimo, explicavi’.58

The precise nature of this so-called *Praelocutio* is unclear. Some have
opined that it is a *Principium* of Bonaventure's; the formal lecture given at
the start of term to open new topics in the *Sentences* for consideration.59 It
seems too retrospective for that and is more a ‘foreword’ in which

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57 ‘And just as in the first *Book of the Sentences*, I clung to the general opinions of teachers
and especially of the Master [Peter Lombard] and to our good father of happy memory,
Brother Alexander [of Hales], so in the following books, I shall not draw back from their
paths. For I do not strive to invent new opinions but retrace what are commonly held and
endorsed. Nor let anyone consider that I want to be the maker of new writings; for I realise
and admit that I am a poor and weak copyist’. Bonaventure, *Praelocutio, Sent.* II.
58 ‘In this, therefore, I did not contradict the Master [Peter Lombard], but rather I
expounded his words truthfully, as I reckon it.’ Bonaventure, *Praelocutio to the
Commentary of the Book of Sentences.*
59 This, for example, is the opinion of Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book*, p. 72.
Bonaventure first resolves some outstanding issues that had circulated about his treatment of Book I before moving to his second book.

For all his eloquence, it should not be forgotten that Bonaventure was scarcely in his thirties when he was composing his commentary. Unlike many of his later works, composed for the order, this had been prepared for an academic audience, some of whose members had been quite vociferous in their hostility to the mendicants. The readership and acceptance of this commentary were quite different to that which read the later *Breviloquium* and *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*. His answers in *Sent* III, d. 16, a. 2, as one set of examples, reveal a writer who clearly possesses reservations about the answer he is proposing but who has elected to adhere publicly to the way of greater prudence and uses positions adopted by his masters. Even so, Bonaventure seems dissatisfied with his response and returns to it in later works. Similarly, although Bonaventure argues against a divine obligation upon Christ to suffer and die, he fails to provide a satisfactory alternative to penal substitution. Yet further, if human salvation was not the principal purpose of the incarnation, the commentary is unclear about the alternate reason for it.

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60 *Et sic dolor fuit et passio in Christo secundum supremam rationis partem, quamvis in ea fuerit gaudium fruitionis. Licet autem hoc teneatur tanquam verum, difficile tamen est ad intelligendum, qualiter in anima Christi secundum eandem potentiam et secundem eundem statum potentiae fuerit dolor et gaudium, nec dolor superveniens discontinuaverit gaudium*. Bonaventure, *Sent* III, d. 16, a. 2, q. 2, ‘And thus sorrow and suffering were in Christ according to the upper part as much as there was pleasure from enjoyment. Although this is held to be true, yet it is difficult to understand how in Christ’s soul, according to the same potential and according to the same state of potential, there was both sorrow and joy and not an overpowering sorrow separating off joy’. See pages 124-25 above.

61 See page 141 below.
4.2 Breviloquium

The response to these issues is found in Bonaventure’s later works. The *Breviloquium* is one of the works that Bonaventure completed in about 1257 as he departed Paris to begin his term as Minister General, putting it roughly seven to ten years after the sentence commentary. It was written in lieu of a *Summa*. Rather than a typically systematic and comprehensive theological treatment within some structure of the author’s choice, Bonaventure opted for a systematic but briefer and far more concise text suited to the needs of itinerant friars, especially popular preachers, wanting something more in the nature of a short summary or enchiridion of theology. Part IV of the work, entitled *De Incarnacione Verbi*, deals with Christ’s life and work, including the work of redemption.

That part opens directly with a restatement of the soteriological position that was seen in the commentary on the sentences:

> Restat nunc aliqua breviter dicere de incarnatione Verbi, per quod quidem Verbum incarnatum facta est salus et reparatio generis humani, non quia aliter Deus non potuerit humanum genus salvare vel liberare, sed quia nullus alias modus erat ita congruus et conveniens ipse repartori et reparabili et reparationi.  

Although less than a decade older than his sentence commentary, this work has a greater directness and self-assurance with which the older and more experienced Bonaventure now expresses himself. No longer the deferential young scholar of the sentence commentary writing, in a sense, for his first public audience, Bonaventure is now quite comfortable in openly and

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62 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, Prologus, 6. The *Breviloquium* survives in 251 manuscripts, attesting to its popularity in use.  
63 *Breviloquium*, IV. 1: ‘It remains now to say something briefly about the incarnation of the Word, through which Incarnate Word the salvation and restoration of the human race occurred, not because God could not save or set free the human race by some other means, but because no other means would have been as apt or suitable for repairing, restoring or renewing it.’ Cf. Bonaventure, *Sent* III, d. 20, a. 1.
unapologetically writing for his own community. With the change in locus and genre comes a change in Bonaventure’s theological output. For example, he now plainly contradicts Anselm, who had held that there was no other way in which humanity could have been saved than Christ.\textsuperscript{64}

In Book IV Bonaventure addresses how it was that human salvation was wrought. He identifies the consequences of the fall and notes that humanity was corrupted in its fleshly, animal and sensual natures, and thus it was beset with weakness, ignorance and malice, respectively, and so no longer, by itself, able to imitate virtue, to know the light or to love goodness. It follows that the best remedy for the consequence of sin is therefore that which is perfectly imitable, knowable and lovable. For Bonaventure, that role was best performed by the incarnate Word.

Homo, cadens in culpam, averterat se et recesserat a principio potentissimo, sapientissimo et benevolentissimo; ideo corruerat et in infirmitatem, ignorantiam et malignitatem, ac per hoc de spirituali effectus est carnalis, animalis et sensualis; et ideo ineptus erat ad divinam virtutem imitandam, ad lucem cognoscendam, ad bonitatem diligendam. Ad hoc igitur, quod homo ab isto statu repararetur congruentissimum fuit, ut ei condescenderet primum principium, reddendo se illi noscibile, amabile et imitabile. Et quia homo carnalis, animalis et sensualis non noverat nec amabat nec sequebatur nisi sibi proportionalia et consimilia; ideo ad eripiendum hominem de hoc statu Verbum caro factum est, ut ab homine, qui caro erat, et cognossci posset et amari et imitari ac per hoc et homo Deum cognoscentis et amans et imitans remediaretur a morbo peccati.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{64} Anselm, \textit{Cur Deus Homo}, I. 25. ‘Quod ex necessitate per Christum salvetur homo’.
\textsuperscript{65} ‘Humanity, falling into sin, turned itself away and fell back from its most powerful, wise and benevolent cause. Thereby it stumbled into weakness, ignorance and malice and through this there was a carnal, animal and sensual effect on the spirit. It was unsuited for imitating divine virtue, knowing the light or loving goodness. It was most fitting that humanity be restored from that status and so the First Cause came down to humanity, making itself knowable, lovable and imitable for humanity. And since humanity is carnal, animal and sensual, it does not know nor love nor follow anything unless it be like and similar to itself, therefore, to snatch humanity from this condition, the Word became flesh so that it might be known and loved and imitated by humanity which is flesh too. Thus humanity, knowing and
In this healing of humanity from the consequence of the fall, the central function of salvation, it is noteworthy that Bonaventure makes no mention of Christ’s passion, crucifixion or resurrection. Likewise, he makes no provision at all for the rendering of some satisfaction to God. Instead, for Bonaventure, the human encounter with the divine self-utterance in the incarnate Word is in itself salvific. It is in that encounter that humanity learns to know God, love goodness and imitate virtue. Put in other words, for Bonaventure, the incarnation does not occur in order that Christ might go on to redeem humankind, the incarnation is itself redemptive for humankind.

4.2.1 A New Role for Satisfaction

The making of satisfaction, which had been, in penal-substitution, the pivotal element in human salvation, is not utterly abandoned by Bonaventure. It is instead relegated to a lesser role. Bonaventure was notoriously fond of Trinitarian triads: God is ‘knowable, lovable and imitable’, humanity is ‘restored, repaired and renewed’ and so on. Each of these latter three cures has, in turn, three aspects. Humanity is restored through its return to excellence, relationships and innocence. Of these, innocence is restored by erasing human guilt, done by making satisfaction.

Innocentiam vero mentis recuperare non poterat, nisi dimissa culpa; quam dimittere non decebat divinam iustitiam nisi per satisfactionem condignam; et quia satisfacere non poterat nisi Deus pro toto humano genere, nec debeat nisi homo, qui peccaverat: ideo congruentissimum fuit humanum genus reparari per Deum-hominem natum de genere Adae.66

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loving and imitating God, might be healed from the sickness of sin.’ Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 1.

66 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 1: ‘Yet [humanity] cannot recover innocence of soul unless set free from guilt; which it was not proper for divine justice to discharge unless through fitting satisfaction. Because none could make satisfaction for the whole human race
The argument is clearly that of Anselm and the reasoning also. Nevertheless, for Bonaventure, its significance is no longer as a recompense to God for some offence done against God’s dignity. Rather, it is something done for the benefit of humanity, that it might be freed from its own guilt and thereby be ‘restored’ to its lost innocence. They differ in that, for Bonaventure, salvation is not about ‘placating’ God so God might lift God’s punishment from humanity, for Bonaventure maintains that God did not mar humanity nor disfigure any creation in spite. Bonaventure writes rather of ‘repairing, restoring, renewing’ humanity so it might fulfil its place in the Divine plan, believing that once the harmful consequences of human sin are stripped away from humankind, it would recapture the perfection in which God had created it.

It was the harmful effect of sin to cause humanity to fall into weakness, ignorance and malice. Loving, knowing, and imitating Christ is the ideal counter to these. This is done through the action of the Word who is the most excellent man (Christ the man), God’s love made flesh (Christ as God incarnate) and the satisfaction that erases human guilt (Christ as God-man). In Bonaventure’s depiction, Christ saves not because he suffers and dies but because he is ‘noscibile, amabile et imitabile’, he is the medium, mediation and mediator in, of and for creation and he is, in Bonaventure’s terms, the uncreated, incarnate and inspiring Word.

Renewing, repairing and restoring humanity each had three steps and each hinges on the person of Christ. Unlike his predecessors who looked to save God, nor ought any make it save humanity who had sinned, thus it was most fitting that the human race be restored through a God-man born of the race of Adam.

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68 Bonaventure, Breviloquium IV. 1.
69 Bonaventure, Breviloquium IV. 1; cf. Sent I, d. 27, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1.
the shortcomings of humanity needing to be saved, or to the penalties inflicted by the Father aggrieved by human sin, Bonaventure focussed upon Christ. It was Christ’s nature that he should be both salvific and redemptive and the very act of Christ’s incarnate entering into the world brought about salvation, as he made clear in the conclusion to this chapter:

‘Congruentissima fuit nostrae reparationi incarnatio Verbi, ut, sicut genus humanum in esse exierat per Verbum increatum et in culpam ceciderat deserendo Verbum inspiratum; sic a culpa resurgeret per Verbum incarnatum’. 70

Bonaventure’s handling of Anselm’s legacy is artful. On the one hand, he did not brusquely dismiss Anselm’s ideas which were by then well established in the teaching of the universities. On the other, Bonaventure saw a greater soteriological role for the incarnation that Anselm’s model did not accommodate. Bonaventure’s solution was not openly to disagree with Anselm’s reasoning but to reduce the importance and significance of satisfaction and take from it its former centrality in the workings of salvation. This is a centrality that it will never again reacquire among Franciscans for whom salvation will ever after be about more than satisfaction.

In some respects, Bonaventure clarified and restored Anselm’s argument to its proper place. As noted earlier, Anselm had written the Cur Deus Homo not as a soteriological text but rather one that attempted to explain the reasons for the incarnation, namely to prevent frustration of the divine plan for humanity. As Anselm famously declared, ‘He was born that he

70 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 1: ‘The incarnation of the Word was the most fitting for our restoration so that, just as the human race had emerged into being through the uncreated Word and fell into sin by abandoning the inspiring Word, so it rose again from sin through the incarnate Word.’
might die’. Later authors, including Alexander of Hales, had taken his reasoning and applied it in soteriological contexts not intended by Anselm, to explain how salvation occurred. By reducing the significance to salvation of Anselmian satisfaction, Bonaventure could be said to have allowed Anselm’s theory to operate more closely to the manner in which the latter originally had intended, to explain why the incarnation occurred.

4.2.2 Christ as Middle, Medium and Mediator

Such a move also left Bonaventure free to develop the place of Christ in his approach. For him, Christ is the centre, of whose engagement with humanity the pivot is the incarnation. In the threefold nature of the uncreated, incarnate and inspiring Word, Bonaventure beheld the perfect medium. The Word is the middle person of the Trinity and, through its union with humanity, it is the centre of creation, being the medium between creator and created. The central act of this central figure is the incarnation, in which the first of creation is joined to the last, and creation itself culminates; as Bonaventure put it in the Itinerarium:

Respice ad propitiatorium et mirare, quod in ipso principium primum iunctum est cum postremo, Deus cum homine sexto die formato, aeternum iunctum est

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71 See page 81 above. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II. 16.
72 John McIntyre, Saint Anselm and His Critics, pp. 62, 77.
73 John 1: 2. This idea recurs in Bonaventure’s writings. See, for example, Bonaventure, Sent I, d. 27, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1; Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, I. 5 and IX. 1-4; Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, IV. 3; Breviloquium V. 6. For a more detailed consideration of this see Hayes, The Hidden Center, pp. 87–90; Alexander Gerken, Theologie des Wortes. Das Verhältnis von Schöpfung und Inkarnation bei Bonaventura (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1963), pp. 238–56 or Wayne Hellmann and Jay Hammond, Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure’s Theology, Theology Series, 15 (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2001), pp. 121-28.
74 See, for example, Bonaventure, Sent III, d. 19, a. 2, q. 1-2; Breviloquium I. 6 and IV. 4; Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, II. 7; De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam 23; Collationes in Hexaëmeron I. 1. For a more detailed consideration of this see Ewert Cousins, Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978), pp. 131-60; Cullen, Bonaventure, pp. 128–33, and Hayes, The Hidden Center, pp. 192–214.
cum homine temporali, in plenitudine temporum de Virgine nato, simplicissimum cum summe composito, actualissimum cum summe passo et mortuo, perfectissimum et immensum cum modico, summe unum et omnimodum cum individuo composito et a ceteris distincto, homine scilicet Jesu Christo.75

Naming the incarnation as the centrepiece of the universe was metaphysical and not metaphorical for Bonaventure.76 It was the medial act of him who is both medium and mediator that brought creation to fulfilment.77

To return to the question posed earlier concerning the purpose of the incarnation, Bonaventure does not accept that it was simply to enable Christ to come into the world so that he might make the satisfaction by which humanity is saved and set free.78 Rather, the incarnation was salvific in itself, for it was to be what Bonaventure called ‘the sublime remedy’.79 He affirms just this in chapter III of this part:

Quoniam ergo incarnatio est a primo principio reparante modo congruentissimo; et congruus modus est, quod medicina ex opposito respondeat morbo, et reparatio lapsui, et remedium nocumento; cum genus humanum lapsum fuerit per diabolicam suggestionem et per consensum mulieris deceptae et per generationem concupiscentiale, transfundentem originale in prolem: oportuit quod e contrario his esset Angelus bonus suadens bonum, et virgo credens et consentiens in bonum susum, et caritas Spiritus sancti sanctificans et fecundans ad conceptum immaculatum; ut sic ‘contraria contrariis curarentur’.80

75 ‘Look upon the Mercy Seat and marvel, that in him the first principle is united with the last, God with man formed on the sixth day, eternity is united with a man in time born in the fullness of time from a Virgin, the simplest being with the most compound, the most actual with one who suffered greatly and died, the most perfect and immeasurable with the insignificant, the highest and all-encompassing unity with a compound individual distinct from all others, in a man, namely, Jesus Christ.’ Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, VI. 5. Cf. Breviloquium, IV. 1.
76 Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, I. 17.
77 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, II. 12.
78 See page 133 above.
79 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 4.
80 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, IV. 3: ‘Thus it follows that the incarnation is the most fitting means from its first restorative cause and, since medicine that is opposite responds to an
The incarnation is not a means to an end but, for Bonaventure, an end in itself but this then leaves unclear the role of Christ’s passion.

4.2.3 Remedy by Opposites

Chapters 8-10 of Part IV of the *Breviloquium* consider the role of the passion. Bonaventure established that God is just, blessed, impassible and immortal, in contrast to fallen human nature as sinful, wretched, passible and mortal.  

Jesus Christ, the perfect mediator, shares elements of each, and is just and blessed but also passible and mortal. Thus, for Bonaventure, it was possible for Christ in his passion to pray to the Father that the cup of suffering might be taken from him.  

This was an act not of fear nor unwillingness to suffer but because it might offend justice that an innocent carry the penalty of another’s fault.

Having established Christ’s ability to suffer, he explores what place the events of Calvary played in salvation and again, it is about remediation through opposites.

_Ideo per remedium convenientissimum reparavit._
_Convenientissimum autem est, ut contraria contrariis currentur._ Quia ergo homo, volens esse sapiens ut Deus, peccavit, in ligno vetito volens delectari, ita quod inclinatus est ad libidinem, erectus in praesumptionem; ac per hoc totum genus humanum infectum est et perdidit immortalitatem et incurrít debitam mortem: hinc est quod ad hoc, quod homo reparetur convenienti remedio, Deus factus homo voluit humiliari et in ligno

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In this account, nothing in Christ’s passion and death was intrinsically necessary for human salvation. It is salvific not because of the great price rendered by the passion of the God-man, as Anselm and even Alexander of Hales maintained, but simply because it was the opposite to what humanity had done in the fall and so the most fitting remediation. If an arrogant humanity succumbed to the lure of a tree in order to be as gods and thereby was involuntarily subjected to suffering and death, then the apt response was a humble God becoming human and freely embracing a tree in a voluntary subjection to suffering and death. The events of Calvary had a place but not a necessary one; being opposite to the fall, they were only the best suited to being its remedy.

Bonaventure is setting out an alternative to the Anselmian depiction of the role of Christ’s passion. It has already been noted that Bonaventure does not portray the events of Calvary as a satisfaction made to God but an action restorative of humanity. He now adds that those acts were apt, but not essential, even for that restorative purpose. In Bonaventure’s depiction, the focus is neither upon God nor upon appeasing divine justice. The need is humanity’s, and satisfaction serves simply to free humanity from its own

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84 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, IV. 9: “Therefore he restored it through the most fitting remedy. The most fitting is that opposites be healed by opposites. So therefore humanity, desiring to be as knowing as God, sinned by wanting to taste the forbidden tree, became misshapen in its desires but forthright in its presumption. Through this the whole human race was infected and forfeited immortality and incurred the debt of death. Because humanity should be restored by a fitting remedy, this is that for which God wished to be humbled and become man and suffer upon a tree. Against the infection of the whole world, he wished to suffer the most general passion, against lustfulness, to suffer the most bitter passion, against presumption, to suffer the most ignominious passion, against the unwanted obligation of death he wished a willing but undeserved death’.

85 See page 137 above.
sense of guilt. Bonaventure omits a sense of wronged divine justice insisting on recompense so that humanity might be redeemed.

The development of Bonaventure’s thought and reasoning from the commentary on the Book of Sentences to the Breviloquium can therefore be described as more a change in degree than a change in substance. All of the notions in soteriology that have been discussed in the Breviloquium are to be found at some stage of development in his earlier work, such as reluctance to predicate necessity of God, salvation through restoration of humanity rather than satisfaction to God and the salvific nature of the incarnation. What differs is that the older and more confident Bonaventure of the Breviloquium is much more explicit in expressing these opinions and demonstrates less willingness to defer to the thought of his former teachers and elders. He is now bolder and of greater conviction in his ideas and with less that he had to prove to the secular masters of the university. Composing the work out of the context of the faculty of theology and the events of the secular-mendicant controversy, Bonaventure reveals a less reserved approach to his soteriological work.

The Breviloquium had been written when Bonaventure was about thirty-seven years of age and had already become a master himself and Minister General of the order. Such positions gave him greater intellectual freedom and independence certainly. Bonaventure’s lesser circumspection and caution is clear throughout the text. Moreover, the text was written for an internal audience of the order and not for public consumption by fellow academics.

Yet Bonaventure knew too that in writing a text as this, its ideas would come to the attention of university authorities and risk provoking problems
for the friars there. This would then become very much a problem for the Minister General. To some degree the different genre of the *Breviloquium* addressed this problem. It was comprehensive enough to still contain the broad framework of Bonaventure’s ideas but sufficiently brief and accessible to the average friar to omit details that could be used to further rancour with the Franciscans. This change of setting for Bonaventure brought about a change in pressures upon him and so a different sort of theological expression and this was very apparent in his final major work touching soteriological.

4.3 Collationes in Hexaëmeron

The *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* show a new dimensions to Bonaventure’s soteriology. It was Bonaventure’s final work, composed in the year of his death in 1274. He had been created a cardinal the preceding June and subsequently appointed to a preparatory commission for the Ecumenical Council of Lyons that was to open that summer. Since the commission was to be based in Paris, Bonaventure lodged with the friars there at the Grand Couvent and, during his stay, was invited by the friars to give a series of collations to the community.\(^{86}\) Bonaventure accepted and took as his theme the six days of creation but did not conclude the series before leaving for Lyons. It was there that Bonaventure died, never to return to Paris to

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\(^{86}\) A collation was, strictly speaking, the light evening meal served to monks. In time, it frequently came to be accompanied by a brief spiritual talk that thereby acquired the same name.
complete the collations, which end abruptly with a partial consideration of the fourth day.\textsuperscript{87}

The \textit{Collationes in Hexaëmeron} exist only in two \textit{reportationes} but the substantially longer of which is so detailed and so replete with Bonaventure’s characteristic cursus and style that it is difficult to conclude that it is not a \textit{reportatio examinata}.\textsuperscript{88} The \textit{Hexaëmeron} had a small circulation and only ten manuscripts survive of which, surprisingly, none are in France. It was not well known until first published in 1891.\textsuperscript{89}

The text is not one specifically on the topic of soteriology and, moreover, the passages which were most likely to be relevant to a consideration of salvation, those concerning humanity, were never composed. It is a text that is not readily described or compartmentalised within a single genre. It is certainly a far less methodical and systematic work than his sentence commentary or \textit{Breviloquium}. There are parts of it that are an exhortation to young friars, parts an exposition of scripture, parts a treatise on epistemology and yet other parts a polemic against the use of pagan authors in the university.\textsuperscript{90} It is clear when reading the work that, as Bonaventure moved from collation to collation, he altered his themes. Nevertheless, in the whole work, Bonaventure artfully presented a particular view of the cosmos and God’s engagement with it that shows integrity and consistency. From that, as well as Bonaventure’s distinctive numerological structuring, it is possible to extrapolate with some confidence certain


\textsuperscript{88} Bonaventure, \textit{Opera Omnia}, V, xxxvi–xl.

\textsuperscript{89} Bonaventure, \textit{Opera Omnia}, V, xxxix.

\textsuperscript{90} Bonaventure, \textit{Collationes in Hexaëmeron}, II. 3, XIII. 8–9, XII. 1–3 and VII. 1, respectively, are examples of these. See the comments on the general nature of the text in Roest, \textit{Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission}, pp. 76–77.
approaches to salvation by the mature Bonaventure in the fullness of his
days.

An initial observation is that the Bonaventure writing here is a
different man to the author of commentary on the sentences and the
*Breviloquium* twenty years earlier. In this work Bonaventure presents as
older, more experienced and now lacking a strictly academic audience to
address. Accordingly, Bonaventure approaches his topic in different way in
this instance.

From outset it is clear that the notion of hierarchy is deeply ingrained
within the *Hexaëmeron*. Bonaventure wrote of hierarchy thus: ‘Est autem
hierarchia ordo divinus, scientia et actio ad deiforme, quantum possibile est,
assimilata, et ad inditas ei divinitus illuminationes proportionaliter in Dei
similitudinem ascendens’. He goes on to explain that God is, in a sense,
hierarchic inasmuch as God is ordered in a way proper to each divine Person,
with order corresponding to the Father, knowledge to the Son and action to
the Spirit, although no person was subordinate to another. The universe, too,
is ordered into a hierarchy because it is created of the self-effusive fecundity
of God and reflects God, from whom it came and with whom it is imprinted.
In the *Hexaëmeron*, ‘hierarchy’ is more than a mere static occupation of
one’s place in the divinely instituted order; there is a dynamism in
Bonaventure’s depiction of hierarchy and it included a concept of ascending
to a greater likeness to God proper to each being, as in the quote above.

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91 ‘Yet the divine order, knowledge and action is a hierarchy of similarity, as much as
possible, to deiformity and divinely taking on enlightenment, proportionally to its rising in
likeness to God.’ Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, XXI. 17.
There is a hierarchic nature that was given to creatures by the mere fact of their creation from the Father, but also a richer form flowing from ‘ascending to the likeness of God’ under the influence of grace.

‘Haec autem influentia non est simpliciter quid increatum; nec ex hoc sequitur, quod influentiae sit influentia, quia haec influentia reducit in Deum; dicit enim continuationem cum primo principio et reductionem in ipsum; non sicut res distans. Unde vera est influentia, quae egreditur et regreditur, ut Filius exivi a Patre et revertitur in ipsum’.92

Hierarchy, as Bonaventure is using the term, encompasses a being striving for a deiformity proper to the degree to which it shares likeness and image with God. God’s own quasi-hierarchic nature is displayed in God’s order, knowledge and action, and these were most potently manifested in creation itself, the physical emanation of divine fecundity, in which God’s all-knowing wisdom, the Word, acted to bring forth the cosmos, rendering order from chaos. Since the Word returns to the Father, so too do the beings imprinted with the Word’s likeness, striving for deiformity. This notion of egressio and regressio is encountered throughout the collations for, in Bonaventure’s thought, the act of the creation of the cosmos was not completed in the six days, for that was but a part of the egressio; the fulfilment of creation is yet to occur and awaits the full regressio to the Father of all that was made.93 Thus, for example, in describing the twelve fruits of the study of scripture, Bonaventure says, ‘Imaginor illas duodecim illustrationes primas sive

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92 ‘This influence is not simply what is uncreated, nor does it follow from this that what is of influence is this influence, since this influence leads back to God. Rather, it declares a continuation with the first principle and a return to it, not just something standing apart. Thus this is the true influence, which goes out and returns back, just as the Son goes forth from the Father and returns to him’. Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, XXI. 18.

ascendentes, quae fluunt a Deo ad Deum terminantur et currunt per totam
Scripturam’. Again, in *Hexaëmeron* XX. 22, Bonaventure likens the souls of
the *humanae hierarchizatae* to the stars which follow their orbits across the
heavens, always to return in proper course to their origin. Similarly, as
Bonaventure pondered each day of creation across the collations, he wrote of
the rays of light emanating from the Father of Lights, shining down upon the
creation of that day and then reflecting it back in *recessio* so that God might
say that God ‘saw that it was good’.  

Relating this, then, to what has already been observed concerning the
incarnation, it is apparent that Christ’s coming into creation was not solely
some remedial act but, for Bonaventure and many later Franciscans too, the
culmination of creation’s *egressio* and the climax of God’s self-giving in
creation, the giving of God’s own self as part of that creation. Creation, more
than simply made by God through the Word, was ennobled and
consummated by the entry of the Word into it and conjunction to it, as both
the perfection and perfecter of that creation.

Just as Christ is the middle Person of the Trinity, so he is the perfect
medium and mediator. More than the climax to the *egressio*, he is at the
same time also the beginning of the *recessio*, first to return to the Father;
the pivot of the act of creation. A marred and disfigured humanity sees in
Christ both its source and its destiny, the true nature of which it is the image

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94 ‘I visualise those first twelve lights as if rising up, those which flow from God and end in
God and run through the whole of Scripture’. Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*,
XVIII. 32.
95 Genesis 1: 31. Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, IV. 1-2; XI. 1; XVIII. 1-2; XXI. 1-3.
The ‘Father of Lights’ is a title for God much favoured by Bonaventure and drawn from
James 1: 17, ‘Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from
the Father of Lights, with whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration.’
96 See, for example, Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, III.
97 Cf. Colossians 1: 12-23 which speaks of Christ as ‘the firstborn of all creation’, in and
through whom all things had been made and are now remade free of sin and able to enter the
and likeness. It beholds that, in Bonaventure’s terms, which is knowable, lovable and imitable. It finds in Christ its restoration and the means too to attain its proper hierarchic place in a return to the Father.

4.3.1 ‘Moral-Legal’ or ‘Physical-Mystical’ Soteriology

While this depiction builds upon ideas of Bonaventure present in his earlier works, it is intellectually a considerable distance from the presentation in the sentence commentary. Once again, a shift in context in which Bonaventure was writing has meant a shift in theology. Romano Guardini, in Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura von der Erlösung in 1921, noted two differing approaches to soteriology in the more mature Bonaventure and dubbed them the ‘moral-legal’ and the ‘physical-mystical’.

The former was more heavily influenced by Anselmian notions and the legalistic concepts of reparation and satisfaction for wrongs done and were more common in the sentence commentary. The latter model owed more to Greek thought, especially the ideas of Pseudo-Dionysius and recapitulation from Irenaeus of Lyons, and contended that just as each person shares in the mystical body of Christ, when that was renewed and fulfilled through Christ’s death and resurrection, so too was each of its members. Christ’s saving work restored the cosmic hierarchy and humanity, no longer disfigured by sin, is restored to its original state of grace. This happens both inwardly and, by virtue of humanity’s participation in the mystical body of Christ, outwardly, by reoccupying its proper place in the cosmic hierarchy.

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98 Guardini, Erlösungslehre, pp. 72, 119.
101 Guardini, Erlösungslehre, pp. 136-147.
In 1938, Rufinus Šilić considered the relationship of those two approaches and proposed that Bonaventure shifted to the physical-mystical approach later in life, as it was much more pronounced in the *Hexaëmeron*.\(^{102}\) Certainly, there Bonaventure discussed human salvation in cosmological terms, but this is to be anticipated in a work so imbued with mystical theology. Scholastic courses of theology at universities, in contrast, were much more exercises in systematic theology. Writing in his later years, after a long break from academia, to young minds well sated with scholastic texts of systematic theology, Bonaventure offered an alternate way to consider Christian salvation from the perspective of mystical theology or, in Guardini’s language a ‘physical-mystical’ perspective. That did not necessarily mean that this displaced Bonaventure’s earlier soteriological ideas, just that he expressed them in a different theological context. A different audience, place and genre demanded a different theological expression.

A consideration of Bonaventure’s ‘sermons’ may be useful guide to disclose any shift in approach, if they show Bonaventure speaking of salvation in ‘physical-mystical’ terms. A certain prudence is to be observed in what has been gathered by the Quaracchi editors as Bonaventure’s sermons in Volume 9 of his *Opera Omnia*.\(^{103}\) Firstly, they are not true sermons in the sense of a text preached by Bonaventure but rather they are *exempla*, taken down by a third party and circulated for the use of others to develop their own sermons and skills in preaching. At best, a few may have been revised by

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\(^{102}\) Rufinus Šilić, *Christus und die Kirche: Ihr Verhältnis nach der Lehre des heiligen Bonaventura* (Breslau: Müller und Seiffert, 1938), p. 34. See also Gerken, *Theologie des Wortes*.

\(^{103}\) Bonaventure, *Opera Omnia*, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura (Quaracchi: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1884-1907), IX (1907).
Bonaventure but many never received even this level of attention. Further, these are not fully developed theological expositions. They were designed for a very specific purpose with a particular audience in mind. These are much more in the nature of moral exhortations and simple catechesis than detailed theological treatise.

Mindful of those limitations, there are eight surviving sermons of Bonaventure that deal with soteriologic matters: the twentieth sermon for the first Sunday of Advent, the first sermon for Good Friday, the second sermon for Easter Sunday, the second and fifth sermons for the second Sunday of Easter, the third and fourth sermons for the feast of St Francis, and a sermon of an unnamed occasion simply entitled De Nostra Redemptione. While we have the liturgical occasion for nearly all, we lack details of the date on which each was composed save for the first and last which are recorded as having been given in Naples and Munich respectively, places Bonaventure visited only as Minister General and so must be dated after 1257.

The content of all these sermons broadly fits within Guardini’s moral-legal model of salvation. Moreover, there does not appear to be any marked movement in soteriological expression from the evidence of these texts beyond what had been said in the Breviloquium. Broadly speaking, their content is in accord with the general presentation within that text. They offer no firm evidence that would support an assertion that that Bonaventure

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changed his mind and shifted to a physical-mystical approach to soteriology later in life. As far as they go, these sermons show a persistent employment of a moral-legal approach to soteriology used by Bonaventure.

The better characterisation is that Bonaventure’s soteriological approach remained generally constant while he changes his expression of it to suit the place and occasion of his argument. There is no serious suggestion that when Bonaventure in the *Hexaëmeron* spoke of the Trinity’s divine activity in terms of order, knowledge and action, that he thereby necessarily rejected older formulations of the Trinity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit that had come from more traditional theological expressions and his own *Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Sanctissimae Trinitatis*. Rather, it is understood that for him this is merely another, but equally valid, way of speaking of the mystery of the Trinity and likewise in his conception of salvation. The change probably lay rather in the place and genre in which that theology is being expressed.

### 4.3.2 Non-Christian Authors in Theology

One change that Bonaventure did not wish to embrace was that in theological method being encountered in the universities. In contrast with his earlier pains not to provoke the university masters in Paris, Cardinal Bonaventure now quite explicitly wants to spark a disagreement with them. The *Hexaëmeron* is strewn with criticisms on the use in the universities of pagan authors, amongst whom he includes both Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, and the Islamic commentators upon Greek works, the most

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105 Bonaventure, ‘Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Sacrosancti Trinitatis’, qq. 3 and 5.

106 See pages 126–30 above.
significant of whom were Averroës and Avicenna. Bonaventure’s opinions on these are clear from their titles: ‘Errores philosophorum circa Deum’, ‘Errores Aristotelis et excusatio eius’, ‘Triplex defectus in virtutibus philosophorum fide carentium’ and ‘Sola fides divisit lucem et tenebras’. While Thomas Aquinas eagerly integrated Aristotelian philosophy into Christian thought, Bonaventure strove to keep pagan writers out of Christian philosophy: ‘Descendere autem ad philosophiam est maximum periculum.’

It was not for him a matter of simple religious bigotry. Bonaventure doubted that the theological opinions of those who had not been enlightened by the Christian faith could ever be superior to those of scholars who had been so illumined. Those who did not know God were unable, in Bonaventure’s mind, to speak authoritatively of God. Nonetheless, the tide was against Bonaventure in this, as there was great enthusiasm for the writings and Aristotle, while Bonaventure would be among the last great exponents of Christian Neoplatonism in the universities.

However unsuccessful he was in the university generally in this endeavour, he had greater success among Franciscans. A combination of factors worked to ensure a long influence for Bonaventure among them. A man of great academic abilities and intellect, he was, quite simply, the most gifted theologian yet to join the order. To this was coupled considerable

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108 ‘The philosophers’ errors concerning God’, ‘Aristotle’s errors and his excuse’, ‘The threefold failing in the virtues of philosophers lacking the faith’ and ‘Only faith separates light from darkness’. Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, VI. 1, VII. 1, VII. 3-4 and VII. 12 respectively.

109 ‘Yet to descend to philosophy is the greatest peril of all.’ Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, XIX. 12.
personal sanctity; when nominating Bonaventure as his successor, the Minister General, John of Parma, reportedly said that, ‘it is as if in him Adam had not fallen’. Also, Bonaventure was a man of considerable status; although a bishop and cardinal only briefly, he had been an active and energetic Minister General for an extremely long period and had stamped himself upon the order. He had led the order and shaped it longer even than St Francis and it is not until the fifteenth century that a Minister General had a longer term in office. During that lengthy term, the influence of Bonaventure touched and shaped the entire order; Bonaventure established a sole and authoritative version of the life of Francis (his own *Legenda Maior*), in the constitutions of Narbonne he established his own juridical structuring of the order and in his control of admissions to the order and the erection of new houses, he controlled the type of friar for the future and where and how they would work. There is much solid foundation to calling him the second founder of the order. The confluence of all these factors produced a reluctance by contemporary friars to depart from a Bonaventurian style of theology and many would persist with a Neoplatonic approach into the later fourteenth century, well after it had fallen from intellectual favour in the universities and elsewhere. The General Chapter of Narbonne, held in 1260 under Bonaventure’s presidency, expressed mistrust at too frequent a use of

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111 Enrico Alfieri was Minister General from 1387 to 1405 but his term was during the turmoil of the Great Schism and he led only the friars of the Roman obedience.
Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica* in the order’s *studia* because of its heavy reliance on non-Christian philosophers. The Chapter insisted that henceforward the *Summa* was always to be read in conjunction with the Franciscan William de la Mare’s *Correctorium Fratris Thomae*. Moreover, even as late as 1331, the General Chapter of Perpignan was warning students and teachers not to dabble in this new philosophical speculation in theology when it was at the expense of preparing friars for their practical ministerial needs. By the latter half of the thirteenth century, the standard syllabus of philosophical texts was fairly settled in the University of Paris and was dominated by works of, or attributed to, Aristotle along with commentaries upon them, both Christian and pagan. In contrast, these were largely shunned at the Franciscan *studium* in Paris, favouring instead compendia of earlier Christian works that had been prepared by Franciscans such as the *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York.

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116 The use of the following Aristotelian or Pseudo-Aristotelian works is recorded: *De Anima, Parva Naturalia, De Generatione et Corruptione, De Caelo et Mundo, De Meteoris* and *De Causis*. The only other philosophical texts were *De Plantis* (by Nicolaus of Damascus, a Greek pagan), *De Differentia Spiritus et Animae* and *De Consolatione* (by the Christians Constabulus and Boethius). Alfonso Maiéri, *University Training in Medieval Europe*, ed. and trans. by D. N. Pryds, *Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 12.

This caution did not mean that Bonaventure faded in time into intellectual irrelevance. While he did not favour the use of Aristotle or the new philosophy, he certainly knew them and was well skilled in employing them in what he considered to be their proper place, a place which did not include theology already illuminated by divine self-revelation. Even if his methods fell from favour, he gave expression to concepts of enduring significance in Franciscan theology.

Bonaventure advocated that the fall was not a punitive work of God but a self-distorting act that humanity inflicts upon itself which God, in love, freely elected to restore and redeem. Bonaventure characterised Christ as lovingly choosing to heal humanity in the most effective means, that which was opposite to the harmful choices that humanity had made, unlike Anselm who portrayed Christ as born that he might die, as fated by his conjoined natures. Bonaventure maintained the unfettered sovereignty of God, insisting rather that all was done solely by free choice of the divine will. The Cur Deus Homo was taught in a way that argued that the act of human sin dictated the necessity of the incarnation and obliged the Father to hand the Son over to suffering and a shameful death. Bonaventure displaced sin as the centre point of divine engagement with humanity, placing in lieu God’s choice in love to become incarnate and to employ human restoration as the most effective means to counter the fall. These ideas persisted in Franciscan

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118 The fourth of Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexaëmeron not only sets out his objections to the new approaches to philosophy and theology but also skilfully turns those same techniques on themselves to argue his position.
theology long after Bonaventure’s objections to the new philosophy were deemed obsolete.\textsuperscript{119}

Such methodological conservatism could and did cause other similar authors of that era to fade into irrelevance and for many secular masters of this time scarcely a trace is left of their work. To some degree, Bonaventure escaped from such theological obscurity through the operation of the Franciscan education system. His ideas were recorded and preserved in written and highly systematic forms of scholastic texts. These were encountered by students coming from across the order to study in Paris and then diffused by them on their return back into the order’s network of \textit{studia}. The structure of the Parisian Grand Couvent provided a place and a written form for Bonaventure’s ideas to retain a currency after the Neoplatonism foundations on which they rested slipped away. Bonaventure’s opinions endured and were studied by generations on Franciscan students, even when many texts of St Francis were unknown to them. Their theological formation was shaped by ideas of Bonaventure but not solely because of the scholarship or appeal of those ideas. It was at least as much due to the physical setting in the Grand Couvent and to the scholastic forms in which those ideas were couched.

This process is apparent in the case of Richard Rufus of Cornwall, a scholar who came from Oxford to Paris, composing only a single work there. Rather than create new texts that added his own ideas to the Franciscan school in Paris, he gathered Bonaventure’s ideas to take back to England. The Franciscan theology done in England would thereafter be shaped by Parisian ideas of Bonaventure, because of the operation of Franciscan educational

\textsuperscript{119} Bianchi, ‘Aristotle Among Thirteenth-Century Franciscans’, p. 239.
structures and the genres in which that theology was expressed by Bonaventure.
5 Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Revival of the Secular-Mendicant Controversy

Richard Rufus of Cornwall is in some respects an anomalous candidate for consideration in this study. He is markedly less well known than Bonaventure or even Eudes Rigaud and such renown that he does possess has been due more largely to his philosophical than his theological work.¹ Unlike so many other friars in this study, we do possess a number of historical details concerning him but making some sense of these details is not without complexity.

Richard is first encountered in Thomas of Eccleston’s chronicle, which recounts that he was a secular master of arts in the University of Paris. Thomas says that he then chose to enter the Franciscans and joined the English province, returning from Paris to do so. According to Thomas, this occurred just a few days before Abbot John of Reading left the Benedictines also to join the friars, a date known to be September 1235.² This would mean that Richard was born some time about the year 1200. Nothing more is heard of him until Adam Marsh, a Franciscan scholar at Oxford, records that in 1248, when Richard was ‘reading the sentences’, the Minister General, John of Parma, conducted a visitation of the English province and that, in the course of that, gave Richard written permission to ‘continue his studies’ in

² Thomas of Eccleston, De Adventu Fratrum Minorum, III, p. 18.
Paris. For reasons of his delicate health, Richard elected to remain in England. It is known that he wrote a sentence commentary during his time at Oxford and thus no later than 1253 when he departed for Paris.

A subsequent but undated letter from Adam Marsh to Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, discloses that Richard later changed his mind and chose to go to France, availing himself of his minister's permission.

While in Paris, he is again described as 'reading the sentences'. It was in doing so that he caused Roger Bacon to form a rather low opinion of him.

Et optime noui pessimum et stultissimum istorum errorum autorem, qui vocatus est Richardus Cornubiensis, famosissimus apud stultam multituidinem; set apud sapientem fuit insanus et reprobatur quando solemniter legebat sentencias ibidem postquam legerat sententias Oxonie ab anno Domini 1250.

During his time in Paris, he composed a further work that bears the title of sentence commentary but has for most of its existence been known as the *Abbreviatio Bonaventurae*. It has never been published and the soteriological sections of this work are transcribed as Appendix 3 below.

They are drawn from the only surviving complete copy of the text and the sole manuscript containing his material on Book III of the sentences, now

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6 ‘I best know the author of the worst and most stupid of these errors, who was called Richard of Cornwall, most renowned among the stupid throng; but among the wise he was absurd and written off when he was solemnly reading the sentences, after he had read the sentences in Oxford from the year of the Lord 1250’. Roger Bacon, *Compendium Studii Theologie*, ed. by H. Rashdall (London: British Society for Franciscan Studies, 1911), pp. 52-53.
7 See pages 397-428 below.
held in Assisi at the Biblioteca Sacro Convento, Fondo Antico Communale, as MS 176.\(^8\)

In 1256, he returned to England to take up the post of Franciscan master in Oxford and he then fades back into obscurity, dying somewhere around 1260. He left behind him a series of important philosophical works that include the oldest existing commentaries in Latin on Aristotle’s *Physica*, *Metaphysica*, *De Generatione et Corruptione* and *De Anima*. Of his theological writings, it is unclear during which of his periods at Oxford they were composed and, further, whether they can all be reliably attributed to him.\(^9\) His Parisian output is clearer and it can be said with confidence that his sole Parisian theological work was the *Abbreviatio*.\(^10\)

5.1 THE WORKS OF RICHARD RUFUS

On the strength of a fragmentary colophon, ‘Introitus in libros sententiarum secundum fratrem R ... rdum ...nubiensem’, the *Abbreviatio* has formally been known as his ‘Sententia Parisiensis’ but that perhaps does not accurately indicate the content of the work for it is not a true sentence commentary.\(^11\) Had Richard already composed a sentence commentary in Oxford, and this is expected as it was Oxonian practice for theology students to commence with study of the sentences before proceeding to Biblical

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\(^8\) Incomplete copies are held in the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, MS Theologie Q. 48 (markedly edited at some later date), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Borghese 362 and Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vaticanus Latinus 12993.

\(^9\) See the review of these dubious works in Raedts, *Richard Rufus of Cornwall*, pp. 64-114 and Wood, ‘The Works of Richard Rufus of Cornwall’.


\(^11\) Colophon on Vat. lat. 12993, fol.2.r.A.
studies, then there was no need for Richard to compose a second version.\footnote{12 Little and Pelster, \textit{Oxford Theology and Theologians}, pp. 33-34.}

Equally, nor was there a need to write a text based on Bonaventure’s work, a man who, even when Richard returned from England in 1256, was not yet a master nor had he ever held any office in the order. It is true that the \textit{Abbreviatio} is very like a sentence commentary; it covers the whole field of theology, it follows the structure and sequence of arguments from the \textit{Book of Sentences} and argues in the familiar scholastic fashion. It differs from other commentaries in that it frequently fails to develop those arguments fully, ending abruptly with the note \textit{ergo et cetera} and advancing to the next point. It reads more as notes for personal reference or teaching than as a text to be read or presented in satisfaction of requirements for a degree. This would explain the work’s very small circulation with only one complete text and three smaller fragments extant.\footnote{13 Wood, ‘The Works of Richard Rufus of Cornwall’, pp. 67-8.} The soteriological material quoted in Appendix 3 below is overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, from Bonaventure.

Despite possessing a commentary of his own in which Richard had developed his positions on each question, in the \textit{Abbreviatio} he has developed little new material and even his ‘conclusions’ are taken from elsewhere. It is neither a true sentence commentary nor a ‘revised edition’ of Richard’s Oxford commentary. This is rather a select précis of Bonaventure’s commentary, prepared for reference and teaching purposes.

Richard’s own status is also less than completely clear. We are certain that Richard, on his return in 1256, took up the Franciscan chair at Oxford and so by then must have held the rank of master. Despite being described as ‘reading the sentences’ on his arrival in Paris in 1253, Richard does not
necessarily have to have been a bachelor then, for masters could and did regularly read scripture and the sentences to their students, especially sections of particular interest to them. Moreover, it would seem improbable that Richard would change university halfway through a theological course. Such a transfer was not impossible but rare, as the course structures in Paris and Oxford were quite different. Additionally, 1253 was at the height of the secular-mendicant controversy in Paris and, as a punitive measure, the secular masters had refused to recommend any mendicants for degrees. It seems implausible that Richard would abandon a half completed course of study in Oxford to transfer to Paris where there was no certain prospect of ever securing that degree.

5.2 THE SECULAR-MENDICANT CONTROVERSY REVIVES

The conflict in the university re-ignited in 1253 when, once again, it embarked upon a strike to protest the death of students while in the custody of the Parisian civil authorities. Again, the mendicant schools, both Preachers and Minors, defied the suspension, infuriating many among the secular masters. They retaliated with the promulgation of a new enactment requiring all masters to swear an oath of obedience to the statutes of the university as a way to be able to compel the mendicants to observe the strike. Any master who failed to swear within fifteen days, i.e. by 17 April 1253, would be expelled from the university and forfeit his license to teach. The mendicants

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14 Courtenay, 'Institutionalization of Theology', pp. 248-9, 253.
16 It was this same ban that delayed both Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas from obtaining their degrees for a number of years. See pages 107-08 above.
17 Chartularium, n. 219, pp. 242-44.
declined, objecting that, by virtue of their profession of religious vows, their wills were no longer their own and that to swear an oath such as was being demanded would be inconsistent with the evangelical counsels which they had assumed. They declined the oath and were duly cast out of the university.\textsuperscript{18}

The dispute widened when the aggrieved friars appealed to Innocent IV since the papacy had juridically established both the university and the mendicant orders. Innocent ordered the immediate reinstatement of the friars and their schools. The university responded that it would do so as soon as the friars swore obedience to its statutes. Until then, mendicant inceptions would be blocked and no degrees would be recommended for their students.\textsuperscript{19}

The dispute continued with many of the secular masters attacking the very right of the orders to exist, publishing tracts that questioned the merits of evangelical poverty, the notion of mendicancy itself, the absolute poverty of Christ and the incursion of mendicants into the divinely established roles of the secular clergy.\textsuperscript{20} They accused the mendicant orders generally of holding the heretical beliefs of Joachism and desiring the overthrow of the Church.\textsuperscript{21} Disobedience was a further charge levelled at the mendicants; since

\textsuperscript{18} Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{19} Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’, pp. 13-14.

\textsuperscript{20} Roest, \textit{A History of Franciscan Education}, p. 56. This re-ignition of the secular-mendicant controversy has not wanted for more detailed considerations of its events and motivations. See especially Michel-Marie Dufeil, \textit{Guillaume de Saint-Amour et la polémique universitaire parisienne 1250-1259} (Paris: Picard, 1972) and Traver, ‘Rewriting History?’.

\textsuperscript{21} Joachim, Abbot of Fiore (c. 1135 – 1202), had published apocalyptic works of scriptural exegesis. Among his many teachings was a coming third age, the ‘Age of the Holy Spirit’ in which the Church and Gospel would be supplanted by newer more spiritual versions. The harbingers of this new age would be ‘two poor men’ living and preaching in simplicity, figures by many readily identified with Francis and Dominic. Much has been written on Joachism, see especially Bernard McGinn, \textit{The Calabrian Abbot: Joachim of Fiore in the History of Western Thought} (New York: Macmillan, 1985). As to Joachim’s works, the most pertinent to this consideration is Joachim of Fiore, \textit{Enchiridion Super Apocalypsim}, ed. by
the university’s power to legislate and to suspend classes both derived from papal authority expressed in the bull *Parens Scientarum* of Gregory IX in 1231, the mendicants were reproached for defying the papal authority.²²

The friars felt the tide move dramatically against them when, in 1254, Innocent IV issued the bull *Etsi Animarum*, substantially curbing the privileges of the mendicant orders and obliging them to subscribe to the university oath.²³ They averted the consequences of that through what was for them the convenient death of Innocent and his succession by Alexander IV, a pontiff strongly supportive of the mendicant orders. To the friars’ relief, he reinstated their privileges and exemptions and, shortly after, they were reinstated in the university without condition by Alexander’s decree *Quasi Lignum Vitae*.²⁴

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²⁴ Their privileges were restored in Alexander IV (Rinaldo di Jenne), *Nec Insolitum*, Papal Bull of 22 December, 1254, reproduced in Denifle and Chatelaine, *Chartularium*, I, No. 244, pp. 276-77; *Quasi Lignum Vitae*, Papal Bull of 12 April 1255, reproduced in Denifle and Chatelain, *Chartularium*, I, No. 247, p. 279-85. It may be significant that Alexander was a nephew of Gregory IX who had canonised Francis and Dominic. Gregory, as Cardinal Ugolino di Segni, had been the first Cardinal Protector of the Franciscans and had a hand in the writing of their rule. He was, in turn, the great nephew of Innocent III who had granted approval to both mendicant orders. Alexander, like Gregory IX, had served as Cardinal Protector of the Franciscans.
The mendicants found that the combination of this papal support along with that of Louis IX, a devoted benefactor of both orders, was more than their opponents in the university were able to withstand. In 1256 the resolve of those opponents weakened and they begrudgingly accepted the presence of the friars in the university.

The period of that ban, 1253 to 1256, were the very years in which Richard was in Paris. It is Peter Raedts’ contention that in 1253 Richard had fallen out with Thomas of York when the latter was appointed as Franciscan regent master of theology at Oxford in preference to Richard. Richard in resentment invoked the permission that the Minister General had given him to go to Paris and wiped his hands of the English friars.25

Certainly Adam Marsh records in a letter to his Minister Provincial, William of Nottingham, that Richard’s change of mind in favour of Paris was decisive and sudden:

Proinde, cum ante dies aliquot ob vehementiores perturbationum occasiones dictus Frater Richardus inexorabile concepit propositum transferendi se, secundum concessionem ministri generalis olim indultam, in provinciam Francie.26

Raedts posits that when Thomas of York was moved to Cambridge in 1256, Richard was at last offered the post of regent master in Oxford and he hastily returned to take it up his long coveted post. This account does fit the known events, but for a lack of any evidence of some acrimony between Richard and Thomas of York.27 This feud is only speculation and, moreover, a

25 Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, pp. 5-9.
26 ‘Likewise, several days ago, due to instances of quite vehement agitation, the said Brother Richard reached a firm decision to transfer himself to the French province, in accord with the permission that the Minister General previously gave him’. Adam Marsh, Letters, cciii, p. 496.
27 Raedts himself concedes the dispute with Thomas of York is but a ‘hypothesis’: Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, p. 8.
simple dislike of Thomas of York and wounded pride seem insufficient reasons to drive one into exile and embark on the composition of the Abbreviatio.

A simpler explanation can be found in the events of a reopening of hostilities in the secular-mendicant controversy. Unable to produce its own lectors and masters, the Franciscan school in Paris temporarily needed to import teachers from elsewhere. Richard, a former master of arts in Paris, was a logical choice for such a role. Such an account would also explain why Richard is described as ‘reading the sentences’ in Paris as masters were pressed into service for teaching when no more bachelors could be obtained.

In 1256 the Franciscans were again able to fill teaching posts that had been blocked since the early 1250s. Rather than seeing Richard Rufus’ return to England as a cooling of temper in a hypothetical quarrel with Thomas of York, when in 1256 French masters like Bonaventure, Eudes of Rosny and Gilbert of Tournai were all able to assume teaching posts in the Grand Couvent, they freed the ‘borrowed’ personnel in Paris for posts in England and elsewhere. Thus Bertrand of Bayonne was released to go to Rome and Richard Rufus for Oxford.28

When Richard returned to England, he brought back with him the latest ideas and developments from Parisian theology to use in his new Oxford post. He drew these from the writing of the new shining light of the Parisian school, Bonaventure, who in that November would be elected Minister General of the order.

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28 Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle, II, p. 52.
Richard’s use of this material is significant because among the Franciscans, differing methodological approaches to theological teaching had emerged in those two biggest schools of the order, Paris and Oxford. This was largely due to the influence of their initial teachers, Alexander of Hales in Paris and Robert Grosseteste in Oxford. Speaking broadly, the school in Paris placed a greater emphasis upon speculative theology and was inclined to make a greater use of such philosophical tools as logic and dialectics. In contrast, theologians at Oxford were marked by a tendency to engage more with natural philosophy and the observance of the world about them, abstracting their theology from those sources. This latter approach would quite naturally appeal to Franciscans of an Aristotelian bent but this theological method traces back to their English secular master and teacher, Robert Grosseteste.

The origins of the Franciscan school in Oxford parallel those of Paris. The friars came to Oxford in 1224 or 1225, even before London, originally as a base for their preaching ministry but soon became involved in the work of the university, receiving undergraduates as vocations to the order and

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making use of the university for the theological education of Franciscan students, in time opening a studium in the city.\textsuperscript{31} As in Paris, at the establishment of the school the friars yet lacked a teaching master and so a secular master, Grosseteste, was engaged for that purpose. Like Alexander of Hales, Grosseteste grew extremely attached to the friars and deeply admired their spirituality. He surrendered all but one of his benefices and embraced a life of great simplicity.\textsuperscript{32} It was widely anticipated that Robert too would join the order but in 1235 he was appointed Bishop of Lincoln.\textsuperscript{33} Nevertheless he retained, even as bishop, a very close connection to the friars and especially to his protégé, Adam Marsh, to whom he passed his chair on his appointment to Lincoln.\textsuperscript{34} As in Paris, the Franciscans would thereafter control that chair and Grosseteste had effectively created a Franciscan school in Oxford. Grosseteste maintained a lifelong correspondence with the Franciscans and, at his death, bequeathed his books to the Franciscans as the foundation of their Oxford library.\textsuperscript{35}

Like Alexander of Hales, Grosseteste’s theological approach had an enduring influence upon his Franciscan school. Theologically, Grosseteste was rather conservative and, like the Parisian Franciscans, had deep misgivings about the growing popularity of the use of Aristotle, Averroës and other non-Christian writers in theology. This was not because they were pagan; for Robert the source, soul and summit of theology was the study of the Bible. He believed that all theology was to be found in its pages and for

\textsuperscript{31} Eccleston, \textit{De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam}, II (p. 9) and XI (p. 64).
\textsuperscript{33} McEvoy, \textit{Robert Grosseteste}, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{34} Little, ‘The Franciscan School at Oxford’, p. 836.
\textsuperscript{35} Raedts, \textit{Richard Rufus of Cornwall}, p. 118; Thomas of Eccleston, \textit{De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam}, XI (pp. 48-49).
that reason, he was opposed to the excessive intrusion of philosophy into theology and disapproved of the use of Peter Lombard and Peter Comestor in theology as much as Aristotle and Averroës. In his view, using the Book of Sentences was a helpful enough exercise but it could divert a student away from the true work of theology, the analysis and exposition of Sacred Scripture.\textsuperscript{36}

Even so, Grosseteste knew the works of both of Peter Lombard and Aristotle well and could use their methods when the need arose. He made substantial contributions to the development of dialectics, writing one of the first commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.\textsuperscript{37} For him, that need lay principally in the better comprehension of the Biblical texts. Scripture, of necessity, can speak of God only through analogy and so variously likens God to familiar analogies like a hen, a shepherd, the sun and a lamb amongst many other objects.\textsuperscript{38} Grosseteste considered that the better that one understood the nature of such objects, that is to say ‘the divine law’, the better would be understood the analogy and hence the truth that is being communicated.\textsuperscript{39} In this lay Robert’s enthusiasm for the understanding and use of natural philosophy in theology and, to the degree that Aristotle or any other writer was able to assist in that task, Grosseteste was not slow to employ such authors. Hence, he composed treatises on light, mathematics, tides, rainbows, geometry and astronomy among others. Similarly, in Grosseteste’s own Hexaëmeron, he has a standard literal, anagogical and


\textsuperscript{39} McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, pp.17-19, 26; Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, p. 132.
allegorical exegesis of the Biblical account of each day of creation but each is followed by a substantial exposition on the nature of the things created on that day for the purpose of better understanding the theological points that he had made.\textsuperscript{40}

These Parisian and Oxonian approaches did not exist in conflict with each other and the actions of Richard Rufus in moving between both centres and in writing commentaries in both styles attest to this.\textsuperscript{41} Richard clearly was aware of the work and standing of Bonaventure, even as a formed bachelor and he played a role in the circulation of Bonaventure’s ideas through the \textit{Abbrevatio}. Likewise, it should not be forgotten that Richard had studied and taught in Paris previously, as had a number of Oxford mendicants and the Franciscans demonstrated a keenness to move their best scholars to schools all over the order, regardless of provincial boundaries. Richard shows evidence of participating in a Franciscan trans-national network of scholarly activity, including Paris and Oxford, that was in operation even before the 1250s.

\textbf{5.4 ABBREVIATIO BONAVENTURAE}

Richard’s own academic journey commenced at Oxford for his studies and where he composed his own sentence commentary in that Oxonian tradition. In Paris, his sole composition was the \textit{Abbreviatio Bonaventurae} and it is within this that will be found his Parisian soteriology.

The first is that, despite the title \textit{Abbreviatio Bonaventurae}, and it does indeed rely heavily upon Bonaventure’s writings, it does not do so

\textsuperscript{40} Robert Grosseteste, \textit{Hexaëmeron}, ed. by Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben, Auctores Britannica Medii Aevi, 6 (London: Oxford University Press, 1982).

\textsuperscript{41} Raedts, \textit{Richard Rufus of Cornwall}, p. 63.
exclusively. Richard reproduces from Alexander of Hales the idea of a division in the upper part of the will that Bonaventure has eschewed and while the seraphic doctor did not have a lengthy discussion of the chirographum, Richard Rufus does, taking it from earlier sources like Eudes Rigaud. Richard seems, in composing his work, to have attempted to gather much to which he had not been exposed in Oxford. The work repeatedly leaves arguments in outline only, sufficient merely to refresh a reader’s memory. These two factors suggest that the *Abbreviatio* was written primarily as notes for personal reference and teaching on the sentences.

The second observation is the significance of the very heavy reliance placed on the ideas of Bonaventure. The *Abbreviatio* must have been composed no later than 1256, the year in which Richard departed Paris and so when Bonaventure was still a bachelor. He was but a rather precocious student who had never held any office in the order and, since becoming a friar, had never left Paris. Aquinas was writing at exactly this time but Richard does not quote from him at all. This speaks greatly about Bonaventure’s reputation but also about a nascent sense of a common Franciscan theological outlook.

Richard, in collecting ideas for his own teaching, draws neither from the latest nor most established Parisian contemporaries. He did not show interest in the ideas of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Eudes of Chateauroux and in most of the masters around Paris at the time. Rather, he brings together exclusively what other Franciscans are teaching in Paris, even if that material is astonishingly novel and from scholars with little reputation.

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It would seem that Richard considered this most suitable and useful for his own teaching and for his Franciscan students.

Richard demonstrates a consciousness that the Franciscans were, in some fashion, doing theology differently and reaching conclusions unlike those of other theologians. Richard also evinces a desire that Franciscan students should be taught this material. The way in which he assembles his soteriological material, collected from and delivered to fellow Franciscans, exhibits a belief that there existed a distinctly Franciscan school of theology in development. The creation of works like the *Abbreviatio* served to further that process.

Because of the way in which Richard chose to compile the *Abbreviatio*, there is little that is new of his own in his argumentation and, in much of it, he does no more than paraphrase and abridge the material he found being taught at the Grand Couvent. A comparison of even the questions in the soteriological sections of the *Abbreviatio* and Bonaventure’s sentence commentary displays the closeness of the texts. With few exceptions, Richard uses the same questions as Bonaventure and in the same sequence.\(^{43}\) The content of the commentary similarly parallels Bonaventure closely in its arrangement.

There are sometimes instances in which Richard supplements the material he reproduces from Bonaventure’s commentary but not in the soteriological sections.\(^{44}\) At best, Richard might shift emphases in Bonaventure’s argumentation. For example, it has been noted that

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\(^{43}\) These questions can be seen in Appendix 1 below.

the higher will but expressed reservations about the idea.\textsuperscript{45} Richard’s text has no such reservations and reproduces Alexander’s argument, albeit mediated through Bonaventure.

Mostly, however, Richard’s prefers to confine himself to material from Bonaventure but freely condenses it and omits many of the latter’s passages. Richard tends to discard commonplace and readily accessible material but favours retaining new and unfamiliar ideas or authorities. For example, in distinction 17 in discussing the dual wills of Christ, Bonaventure adds some fresh arguments from the \textit{De Fide Orthodoxa} of John the Damascene and Richard reproduces these.\textsuperscript{46} Even so, he frequently does not expound fully on these new arguments and leaves off with his customary ‘ergo, et cetera’. In just the four soteriological distinctions transcribed in Appendix 3 below, Richard truncates Bonaventure’s argument with this ‘ergo et cetera’ on fifty-five occasions. In other words, the title \textit{Abbreviatio Bonaventurae} is quite apt.

Such an approach suggests that reaching a final conclusion to a question was frequently not Richard’s primary interest but rather the new ideas and arguments that he had located and that lead to that answer. There is no evidence in the text that in anything Richard changed his mind, but rather in reaching his unchanged conclusions he now made use of a more abundant array of authorities and reasons.

\textsuperscript{45} Richard Rufus, \textit{Abbreviatio Bonaventurae}, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, 3. See page 127 above. Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae Antequam Esset Frater}, q. 16, d. 2, m. 3; Bonaventure, \textit{Sent III}, d. 16, a. 2, q. 1.

5.5 Richard’s Soteriological Writing in the Franciscan School

It follows that much of soteriological interest in Richard’s text has been discussed previously in considering Bonaventure’s works. The most illuminative material from Richard lies where he differs from Bonaventure but this happens only once in his soteriological section, in the twentieth distinction, dealing with the aptness of human redemption occurring through Christ’s passion.47

Richard, after having faithfully reproduced the structure of Bonaventure’s commentary and even, unconventionally, his very questions, in the twentieth distinction alters that pattern. In this distinction he deletes all but the first two questions.48 The eliminated questions had asked whether some other true creature could have made satisfaction, whether that creature could have done so with the aid of grace, whether God ought to have accepted Christ’s passion as the sufficient satisfaction and whether God could have accepted some alternative.

A possible explanation for this omission is that all of these questions deal with hypothetical situations that may possibly have afforded salvation to humanity. Like Eudes Rigaud before him, Richard was possibly little interested in speculative postulations. Equally, it may have been the case that Richard, with his strongly Oxonian background, was simply disinclined to engage in conjecture of this sort when humanity had already been saved in a particular fashion.

After the Abbreviatio Richard wrote very little further in soteriology. When he returned to England and took up his chair at Oxford, he wrote no

48 A scribal error will not account for this. The entire rest of the folio is left blank before starting a fresh skin with distinction 21.
works on soteriology. He continued to demonstrate interest in Bonaventure’s work and incorporated reasoning of his in some of his own disputed questions but these texts reflected Richard’s philosophical interests and were largely limited to considerations of material in Book 1 of the sentences. In terms of developing further soteriological ideas of the Franciscans and building upon the work of the friars who had preceded him, Richard had little to say other than simply to repeat in part what others had said before him. It would, however, be wrong to dismiss Richard as simply a copyist with nothing of his own worthy of study.

Rather, Richard’s production of the *Abbreviatio* shows some level of interest among English Franciscans in the directions being followed in Paris. It shows that, even while still a bachelor, the eminence of Bonaventure was apparent to many, an eminence that would propel him to the leadership of the order, despite his youth and even his absence from the General Chapter that elected him. Richard shows an interest in Bonaventure’s ideas that he displays in none of the other celebrated contemporary Parisian figures of the time. He thus attests to a growing consciousness of a distinctive Franciscan approach that he wishes to nurture and cultivate among his students in both France and England. Richard may not add to Bonaventure’s contributions but nor does Richard reject his newer ideas in soteriology such as seeing salvation as bringing creation to culmination rather than solely undoing some human distortion of a divine plan. That idea may have been quite novel and even contradict Anselm’s teachings, but Richard liked it, copied it and circulated it, both reproducing Bonaventure’s conclusions and rewriting

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49 Raedts, *Richard Rufus of Cornwall*, pp. 57-60.
them in his own style.50 These notions did not remain exclusive to Bonaventure and would appear in the works of Franciscan authors to follow.51

Richard also attests to more than these ideas themselves but to the manner in which they arose and spread. He shows Franciscans participating in more than just the academic networks within the University of Paris. They engaged in networks stretching between their various schools, be they other universities or studia. Such connections were furthered as the friars acquired other institutionalised foundations for their teaching, such as the schools in Cambridge, Cologne, Bologna and others, but also as the order acquired a larger number of friars with the degree of master that could be and were transferred among these schools. They diffused ideas among universities and also built up a sense among themselves of belonging to a body of scholars wider than just their own university, that of Franciscan scholars. They were writing ideas and reaching conclusions that set them apart and they were teaching these to other Franciscans. Richard Rufus of Cornwall is a witness to what might be considered as the embryonic appearance of a distinctly Franciscan school of theology.

50 For example, Richard Rufus, Abbreviatio Bonaventurae, d. 18, a. 1, q. 1 is an abridgement of Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 1 but Richard in the next question composes his own paraphrase to the answer. He agrees with Bonaventure’s answer and the reasons for it but expresses his answer quite differently. See pages 406–08 below.
51 See, for example, Matthew of Aquasparta, page 184 below, and Richard of Middleton, page 221 below.
6 Matthew of Aquasparta and the Reworking of Anselm

Matthew of Aquasparta had a career parallel in some ways to that of Bonaventure. He too was a scholar in Paris, from about 1266 onwards, later to be regent master of the Franciscan school there from 1279. He too needed to leave that role when he became Minister General of the order in 1287. Again, like Bonaventure, he left that office in 1289 on becoming a cardinal.

Matthew of Aquasparta came from the old Roman spa town of Aquasparta, around fifty kilometres from both Bagnoreggio and Assisi. His family, the Bentivenghi, were of the lesser nobility and prominent in local ecclesiastical affairs. His uncle Peter was the local bishop, and another kinsman, Bentivenga, also a friar, was a cardinal who succeeded Bonaventure as bishop of Albano, rising to become dean of the College of Cardinals from 1279. In such an area and with such a family, his entry in 1260 into the Assisi province of the Franciscans is not surprising. He was selected in 1263 for study in Paris and was taught there by such figures as John Pecham and

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1 There is an extant Franciscan soteriological text from Paris that precedes Matthew, the sentence commentary of John Pecham who was regent master in Paris 1269-1272 and who taught Matthew. He went on to be regent master at Oxford also and later Master of the Sacred Palace in Rome. His sentence commentary has never been published and survives in a sole manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS Latin 16407. The poor and deteriorated quality of its skins, the unclear scribal hand, John’s personal symbol codes and copious abbreviation all combine to render the text nearly impenetrable.


William de la Mare. He completed his sentence commentary and studies in 1273 and was then sent to Bologna to teach theology in the Franciscan studium there. This was an important post; while it did not have the prestige in theology that Paris enjoyed, the University of Bologna was Europe’s foremost school of law and the Franciscan studium there attracted students from beyond the Romagna and Veneto as well as the order’s most promising canonists. These friars required instruction in theology as well as law and Matthew’s role was to provide this.

6.1 THE WORKS OF MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA

In 1276, Matthew was sent back to teach theology in Paris and in 1279, he succeeded to the Franciscan chair in the university and also to John Pecham’s role as lector sacri palattii. It was during this period that Matthew produced a number of sets of Quaestiones Disputatae but in 1287 he was forced to abandon teaching. The Franciscan Minister General, Jerome of Ascoli, had been appointed a cardinal and was obliged to resign the leadership of the order. At the ensuing General Chapter of Montpellier, Matthew was elected as Minister General. As he had been in his theology, Matthew proved a conciliatory Minister General and lifted the censures that had fallen upon his predecessor John of Parma and also John of Peter Olivi. He held office for barely two years, for in 1288 Cardinal Jerome of Ascoli was

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5 Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie, I, p. 102.
6 Auer, Matteo d’Acquasparta, p. 6.
7 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia, p. xv. The master of the sacred palace was the theologian to the papal court.
elected as Pope Nicholas IV and in 1289 appointed Matthew to fill the vacancy in the College of Cardinals that Jerome’s election had created. Matthew was, at the same time, also appointed Bishop of Porto and created the Major Penitentiary. With such duties, he undertook no further concerted academic work up to his death in Rome in 1302.

Inherited from Bonaventure, Pecham and de la Mare, Matthew held a lingering Franciscan misgiving about the use of non-Christian authors in theology. Much of what survives of Matthew’s scholarly output centres on disputes with those in favour of Aristotelian methods in metaphysics and tracts on cognition and epistemology; none of which topics relate closely to soteriology. While parts of his sentence commentary survive, all of the third book, which treats of soteriology, has been lost. In contrast, twenty-one sets of *Quaestiones Disputatae* have survived to today.

Three of these, *De Incarnatione*, *De Christo* and *De Gratia*, contain soteriological material and give some guidance to Matthew’s thoughts about salvation. The dating of these disputed questions has been the subject of scholarly discussion but of all his disputed questions, the only ones that can be firmly dated are his *Quaestiones Disputatae de Cognitione*. These quote from a 1277 decree of Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris and so must be after

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9 His kinsman, the assonant Cardinal Bentivenga de Bentivenghi, had once held the same post of Major Penitentiary, the papal office in charge of absolutions and forgiveness.
11 William de la Mare was the author of the *Correctorium Fratris Thomae*, a supplement to Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica* removing its dependence on pagan writers like Aristotle. See pages 149-53 above.
13 The *Questiones de Incarnatione* and *de Christo* were published as Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones Disputata Selecta*, Biblioteca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 2 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1914), pp. 1-176 and 176-223 respectively. The publication details of the *Quaestiones Disputata de Gratia* are given in fn. 1 above.
that date. Victorinus Doucet, in his study, concludes that the likely sequence of composition were the questions *De Christo*, then *De Cognitione* (not earlier than 1277) followed by *De Incarnatione* and finally *De Gratia*.

6.2 *Quaestiones Disputatae de Christo*

The earliest, then, of the questions to be considered here were what was published as *Quaestiones Octo de Christo*. Preceding the 1277 condemnation, it would thus seem likely that they come from Matthew’s time in Bologna. While they are predominantly concerned with the nature of Christ’s body in the sacrament of the Eucharist and in the tomb, the initial question does have a soteriological relevance: ‘Utrum Filius Dei fuisset incarnatus, si homo non fuisset lapsus’.

In a surprisingly brief and cursory overview of the authorities for and against that proposition, handled in just ten lines, Matthew cites a sole authority in favour of it, Augustine, and only one in opposition, the anonymous *De Spiritu et Anima*. In his response to them, even though Matthew could be said to have straddled the fence, his answer does display a certain audacity:

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17 ‘Whether the Son of God would have been made incarnate if humanity had not fallen’. *Quaestiones Disputatae de Christo* I, p. 177.

18 The Augustine reference is to his Sermon 174, *De Verbis Apostoli* which Matthew misquotes saying, ‘Si homo non pecasset, Filius Dei non venisset’, when Augustine had written ‘Si homo non perisset Filius hominis non venisset.’ Augustine of Hippo, *Sermons*, ed. by Michele Pellegrino and John E. Rotelle, trans. by Edmund Hill, 11 (Brooklyn, N.Y.: New City Press, 1990-97), V (1994), Sermo CLXXIV. 7. The other reference is to *De Spiritu et Anima*, 6, a twelfth-century compilation of numerous texts. It had initially been attributed to Augustine but the error of this was realised by the mid-thirteenth century and certainly Matthew refers only to its ‘auctor’, giving no name. See Leo Norpoth, *Der pseudo-augustinische Traktat ‘De Spiritu et Anima’* (Cologne: Institut für Geschichte der Medizin, 1971).
In other words, incarnation was always to take place. The occurrence of the fall only changed the nature of the flesh to be assumed but some form of incarnation was certain, whether humanity fell or not. Nevertheless, Matthew notes, like Eudes Rigaud, that this is a speculative question and so does not require a definitive answer. His reasoning is that the incarnation is so that Christ might attain a threefold perfection of nature, grace and glory.  

19 'In the absence of other opinions, I say without prejudice that we can speak in two ways about the incarnation of the Son of God or about his assumption of flesh. One way is to speak about the assumption of an impassible and immortal flesh, the other is of the assumption of a passible and mortal flesh. If we speak about the assumption of a passible and mortal flesh, then it is true that, if humanity had not sinned, the Son of God would not have assumed flesh; for he assumed passible and mortal flesh so that, dying in assumed flesh, he might free humanity from sin. Yet if we speak of the assumption of impassible and immortal flesh, then I conscientiously believe and strongly concur in this opinion, that if humanity had not fallen, the Son of God would nonetheless have taken flesh'. Quaestiones de Christo I, p. 178.

20 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Christo I, p. 178.
achievement of this is actual physical union with Godhead and therefore incarnation leads humanity to its true nature.\textsuperscript{21}

Matthew declares that there was also the attainment of the perfection of grace. Such merit as Christ earned, Matthew says, cannot have been for himself as he stood in no need of anything. Rather, he merited for the benefit of humanity, and applied his merit freely to it. Quoting St Paul, Matthew identifies Christ as the head of the church and humanity as members, not just of the church but of the mystical body of Christ participating in the abundant grace flowing from Christ, the perfect mediator between God and humanity.\textsuperscript{22} Through Christ’s taking flesh and being united to human nature, humanity had access to his grace: ‘of his fullness we all have received; grace for grace’.\textsuperscript{23} The incarnation made such perfection of grace possible.\textsuperscript{24}

Matthew proposes that the incarnation attains the perfection of glory since humanity, gifted with both an intellective and a sensitive nature, can behold in Jesus Christ the union of God and humanity. The greatest, most satisfying and most glorious possible object of both the intellect and the senses is therefore the beatific vision. In Christ’s fullness this is manifest, uniting divinity to humanity. In Matthew’s words, ‘Quis enim possit capere, quantum sit vel erit gaudium beatorum contemplari naturam suam, naturam creaturam unitam naturae divinae in persona Filii Dei, in persona Verbi aeterni?’\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{22} Ephesians 4: 22.
\textsuperscript{23} John 1: 16.
\textsuperscript{25} ‘For who could grasp how great is, or will be, the joy of the blessed to contemplate their own nature, a created nature, united to the divine nature in the person of the Son of God, in the person of the eternal Word?’ Matthew of Aquasparta, \textit{Quaestiones de Christ}, I, p. 180.
\end{footnotesize}
There are two important soteriological observations to be drawn from the material of this text. The first is that this attainment of perfection of nature, grace and glory is in Matthew’s explication derived solely from Christ having become incarnate; neither sacrifice nor offering of satisfaction is even mentioned in Matthew’s argument. Ideas of penal substitution derived from Anselm do not appear in his reasoning. In a quite Bonaventurian fashion, Matthew posits that the benefit of salvation, the full attainment of humanity, flows from the incarnation of Christ without any further act on his part, neither passion nor resurrection. The work of creation is brought to its consummation and fulfilment through the entry into it of divinity, the juncture of created and creator. In that act, humanity is more fully realised by that union with divinity and this would be so, and is so, quite independently of whether humanity had sinned and fallen or not. It is, from this, a small but obvious step in the argument to then say that a perfect God does not leave creation imperfectly created and thus had always intended the perfection of creation and, so, had always intended the incarnation. Nonetheless, tellingly, Matthew does not go so far as to take that step in the text and halts himself before reaching that point.

Matthew notes in conclusion that all the earlier authorities have considered this question with the presupposition that the fall had occurred. They did not speculate on this theoretical question of what would have happened in the absence of the fall. Matthew declares that he, too, declines to consider a hypothetical situation, such as a world in which humanity had not sinned, despite all the speculation he had done to this point. It is to be remembered that he was composing a set of questions looking at the nature

of the body of Christ, so speculation on hypothetical worlds without human
sin are some distance from his principal goal but Matthew has, *obiter dicta*,
laid all the groundwork for such a consideration. He provides reasoning that
establishes Christ would have become incarnate without the fall, explains
how Christ could have come without the fall and what would have occurred if
Christ had come without the fall but he declines actually to say that Christ
would have come without the fall. There are bounds to how far Matthew was
willing to go.

The second important observation is that, given that the fall did occur,
these perfections of nature, grace and glory are inadequate in themselves for
the salvation of humanity; ‘[… ] ideo enim carnem passibilem et mortalem
assumpsit, ut, in carne assumpta moriens, a peccato hominem liberaret’.27
There is still for Matthew a place for Christ’s passion and death in human
redemption. Matthew does not develop here whether that is done through
the making of satisfaction or through some other means but he does
maintain that it should occur as an integral part of human redemption.28
Thus Matthew has a two-fold element to soteriology: a perfection of
humanity wrought by the incarnation and a restoration and redemption
brought about by Christ’s passion, death and resurrection.

6.3 Christ’s Obligation to Die

Some clearer sense of this latter element can be observed in the seventh of
this set of question: ‘Utrum Christus alias fuisset necessario mortuus, si non

27 ‘[…] for he assumed passible and mortal flesh so that, dying in assumed flesh, he might
fuisset occisus?’ Matthew proposes that it was essential that Christ die for three reasons, all derived from the incarnation: because of the divine person who assumed humanity, because of the nature that was assumed and because of the reason for that assumption. The nature of Christ was to love humanity and since he had the ‘power to lay down his life and to take it up again’, his loving nature disposed him to embrace mortality so as to share humanity’s state. Matthew argues further for Christ’s death because the nature that Christ assumed was mortal, passible and human, it followed that, like any human, he must die, even if not slain.

In terms of why the assumption of human nature meant that Christ had to die, Matthew gives a twofold response:

Supposito enim lapsu humani generis, ideo assumpsit naturam humanam, ut per mortem indebitam a morte debita liberaret, et per mortem destrueret eum, qui habebat mortis imperium, scilicet diabolum, ut ostendit Augustinus, IV et XIII De Trinitate, in multis locis. Propterea dicit Gregorius, quod ‘nihil nobis nasci profuit, nisi redimi profuisset’. Utterius ideo naturam humanam assumpsit, ut esset mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus: ideo debuit habere similitudinem carnis peccati quantum ad mortalitatem ut ‘factus particeps mortalitatis nostrae, faceret nos participes Divinitatis suae’, ut dicit Augustinus, IV De Trinitate, cap. 2; non ergo esset verus mediator, nisi esset in eo similitudo carnis peccati. Si autem naturam non haberet mortalem, nec caro peccati esset in eo, nec similitudo carnis peccati.

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29 ‘Whether it was necessary that Christ die by some other means, if he had not been slain?’ Quaestiones de Christ, VII, p. 198.
31 ‘Presupposing the fall of the human race, therefore he assumed human nature so that, through his unowed death, he might free it from the debt of death, and through his death he might destroy him who had the command of death, namely the devil, as Augustine demonstrates in parts IV and XIII of De Trinitate in many places. Because of this, Gregory says that “being born profits us nothing, unless it profits us to be redeemed”. Finally, therefore he assumed human nature so that he might be the mediator of God and humanity, the man Jesus Christ. Thus he ought to have sufficient likeness to sinful flesh for mortality so that, “made a participant in our mortality, he might make us participants in his Divinity” as Augustine says in IV De Trinitate, chap. 2; therefore he is not a true mediator unless there is in him a likeness to sinful flesh. For if his nature does not have mortality, sinful flesh is not
The first reason is that Christ’s death facilitates the destruction of the
dominance of death and its master, the Devil. Matthew gives no details about
how this is accomplished but presumably he draws upon that
understanding’s lengthy Neoplatonic tradition, going all the way back
through Augustine to St Paul, in which the humanity in which Christ
participated, shared in Christ’s overcoming of death. Matthew’s invocation
of this reasoning of how the incarnation meant that Christ had to die was
orthodox and well established scripturally in tradition.

In contrast, what is novel is that while Matthew argues that Christ
must die, that is not, as Anselm for example had argued, for the purpose of
undoing the fall or rendering satisfaction. Rather, Matthew is explicit that
Christ’s death is to overcome human death. As Matthew sets out his
argument, the death of Christ deals with a consequence of the fall but not
with the fall itself.

Thus secondly, Matthew proposes an aspect of Christ’s mission that is
concerned with undoing the consequences of the fall. It frees passible and
mortal human flesh from the burden of death and its subjugation to the devil.
There is also another aspect that involves the perfection and fulfilment of
humanity through uniting it to Divinity. It has already been noted in the first
of these questions that Matthew was of the opinion that some form of
incarnation was always to occur. This could not have been for the former

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32 For example, Romans 5: 12, 6: 4, I Corinthians 15: 21, II Corinthians 4: 10. For further on
this Neoplatonic tradition in redemption, see Mertens, Not the Cross but the Crucified, pp.
68-70 and Rivière, Le Dogme de la rédemption, pp. 152 and 321. This notion is the
foundation of the predominant soteriology of the Eastern Church, recapitulation or
anacephaleosis. Cf. pages 125 and 146 above.

33 See page 181 above.
purpose of redressing the fall, since such a fall would be contingent upon human sin. It must therefore have been for the latter purpose of perfecting humanity in Christ, which Matthew thought always was to come to pass. In Matthew’s understanding, as for the later Bonaventure, the coming of Christ was for the purpose of the culmination of humanity, achieved through the union of divine and human natures in Christ. However, in addition to that and independent of any design of God, humanity had chosen to sin and had been marred by that sin, so that the perfective work of Christ also undid the consequences of that sin, but this redemptive activity of the incarnation was an ancillary and contingent consequence.

6.4 Quaestiones Disputatae de Incarnatione

This manner of conceiving of salvation continued when Matthew returned to Paris in 1277. There he composed a set of nine disputed questions on the incarnation in which he advanced and developed this approach. He commences by establishing that humanity could be disfigured by its own sin and that this disfigurement would pass from the first parents to their posterity. He also establishes that this disfigurement was, in God’s omnipotence, reparable. Matthew then asked a question common in sentence commentaries: ‘Supposito quod natura humana sit lapsa reparable quaeritur, utrum potuerit reparari per puram creaturam.’ He gives what had become, by now, a fairly standard Franciscan response: God’s

Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Incarnatione, I-IV, pp. 1-80.

‘Assuming that human nature could be restored from the fall, it is asked whether it could be restored through a wholly created being’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Incarnatione VI, p. 100. The question frequently appeared in d. 20, a. 1 of sentence commentaries. See page 324 below.
omnipotence is such that any means and any agent would have been sufficient for the restoration of humanity, including the use of a being that was wholly created, had God so chosen.

Ad intelligentiam istius quaestionis et aliarum materiam possent quae
ter et quae
terrunt inferius suo loco, praenotandum est, quod omnino alius modus fuit Deo possibilis liberationis et reparationis generis humani et hoc ostendit 'divinae potentiae immensitas, quam non aequat opus, et divinae sapientiae incomprehensibilitas, quam non aequat sensus et divinae bonitatis immensitas, quam non aequat virtus'.

The use of Christ as that agent of redemption was the most fitting way to effect that restoration and so it was the means chosen. The innovation in Matthew’s answer is to claim Anselm as an authority for that proposition. That is a striking move, as Anselm was generally considered to be an authority for the very opposite position. The passage from which Matthew cites, *Cur Deus Homo* I. 5, says expressly, ‘Quod redemptio hominis non potuit fieri per aliam quam per Dei personam’. Matthew reasons that, while it is true that God’s omnipotence means that the restoration of humanity could have been effected by any means, none would have been as fitting or efficacious as Jesus Christ. He cites Hugh of St Victor in acknowledging that it was open to God to choose any means of redemption but that the use of the God-man ‘iste infirmitate nostrae convenientior fuit’.

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37 ‘To the proper understanding of this and other questions that can be asked and are asked below, it must be noted that any other means was open to God for the liberation and restoration of the human race and this showed “the immensity of divine power that toil could not match, the incomprehensibility of divine wisdom that sense does not match and the greatness of divine goodness that virtue does not match”. Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de Incarnatione* VI, p. 105. The quotation is drawn from Hugh of St Victor, *De Sacramentis*, ed. by Roy J, Deferrari, Mediaeval Academy of America, 58 (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1951), I. ii. 22.

38 ‘That humanity’s redemption could not have occurred through any other than a Divine person’.

takes up Anselm. It would be contrary to God’s nature, Matthew argued, for God to fail to choose the means best suited to the goal of human restoration. He notes that ‘Anselmus multum eleganter deducit I libro Cur Deus Homo impossibile est, genus humanum reparari per aliquam puram ceaturam’. It follows for Matthew that God would choose Christ to effect human restoration, just as Anselm had said, and for the reasons that Anselm had given. Matthew then proceeds to subsume Anselm’s arguments into his own, using him to establish why a wholly created being would not be chosen rather than prove that God was bound not to choose a wholly created being, the original argument of the Cur Deus Homo.

Manifestly, Matthew displays much less reticence about positing necessity of God than his earlier confreres had shown, since his arguments appear to suggest that God was bound to act in a certain fashion. Nevertheless, by constructing the argument in this manner, this reasoning permits him to reject Anselm’s conclusions while still adopting, as his own, Anselm’s argument for a special role for the God-Man. Matthew laboured to reduce the distance between the Franciscan position and Anselm as the established authority in the consideration of the sentences in soteriology. After a period of considerable creativity and soteriological innovation, even if coyly expressed at times by figures such as Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta labours to reintegrate these novelties into the more standard and received theological tradition, especially that of Anselm. He chooses not to create a new path for the Franciscans, as

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40 ‘Anselm very correctly deduces in the Book 1 of Cur Deus Homo that it is impossible that the human race be restored by some wholly created being’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Incarnatione VI, 106.
41 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Incarnatione VI, p. 106-10.
Bonaventure could be said to have done, but to weave such new Franciscan developments into the mainstream. Among a faculty of scholars and teaching from such established authorities, Matthew does not keep the recent Franciscan insights separate from them but labours to fit those two approaches together.

As authentic scholasticism sought to show the unity and harmony of all positions, each of them displaying a facet of the truth, Matthew makes an admirable effort in bringing together the Anselmian and Franciscan traditions. Matthew presents himself as so properly aligned with the theological mainstream that he follows even Anselm, whom in fact he employs to argue the reverse of Anselm’s own stated position, and he manages to preserve the novel and particular understandings that the Franciscans had brought to the development of soteriology. Matthew advances the great scholastic goal of bringing different ideas and reasons into concord.

6.5 THE BENEFITS OF SALVATION THROUGH THE INCARNATE

This same tendency to make Franciscan theology broader and more comprehensive by reaching concord between the Franciscan soteriological position as it had evolved and the theological mainstream is apparent in his answer to the next question of this set: ‘Quaeritur, dato quod genus humanum per puram creaturam non potuerit reparari, utrum oportuit reparari per hominem-Deum’. Matthew provides a very detailed and sevenfold answer to this question that affirms it was apt for this to be done by

42 ‘Given that the human race would not be restored by a wholly created being, it is asked whether it was apt that it be restored through the man-God.’ Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de Incarnatione* VII, p. 117.
the man-God. His reasoning discloses insights into what Matthew understood to be entailed in salvation. He begins by claiming that there can be no perfect restoration in the absence of ‘satisfactio sive solutio debiti’. Where Bonaventure had reduced the significance of satisfaction to a mere element in overcoming the human sense of guilt, Matthew restores the significance of satisfaction that it had enjoyed in the writings of Alexander of Hales and Anselm, whom Matthew explicitly cites in his answer and whose reasoning he adopts.

Second, Matthew says that there must be a ‘curatio morbi’, a healing of the corruption flowing from the fall. Matthew makes clear that, notwithstanding the first part of his answer, he is not rejecting Bonaventure’s approach to salvation as a healing and restoration of humanity. Rather, Matthew co-opts Bonaventure’s reasoning and argues that the best medicine is that opposite to the illness it cures. Thus, while Matthew insists that a satisfaction must be made and a debt paid for wrongs done, he does not agree with Anselm in holding that this is the totality of what constitutes salvation. There must also be a healing and a restoration of humanity, curing the ill that derived from the fall. Both elements are integral to salvation. Matthew seeks to hold together both the older Anselmian tradition and the newer insights produced among the Franciscans and Bonaventure especially.

In the third reason, Matthew claims that perfect restoration also requires ‘liberatio potestate et servitute diaboli’. Matthew this time draws upon rather older theological theories that spoke of the sacrifice of Christ as a

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43 ‘Satisfaction or recompense for debt’. Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de Incarnatione* VII, p. 123.
45 See pages 119, 138-41 above.
ransom paid to the devil to buy humanity’s freedom from the power of Satan. These ideas can be found in writers as far back as Origen and Athanasius. Matthew broadens further his depiction of salvation as not just a satisfaction made to God nor just a healing of humanity but also a liberation from the dominion which the devil had exercised over humanity since the fall. Matthew does not reason that a ransom (Christ’s blood) must be made to free humanity but simply that there is a rupture in diabolical control over humanity. Such a sanguinary payment, Matthew believes, would be ineffective. ‘Liberari autem non poteramus nisi diabolo superato, diabolus autem non potentia aut violentia superandum fuit, sed iustitia, quia diabolus diligit potentiam et exosam habet iustitiam’. Matthew, it is fair to say, gives more clarity about what is not to occur in this liberation from the devil than about how the devil is overcome.

Fourth, Matthew seeks a ‘relevatio lapsi’ and again in this he is assimilating prior reasoning. This time it is the conception of the celestial hierarchies drawn from Bonaventure and Pseudo-Dionysius. Human restoration, reasons Matthew, cannot happen if the saviour abandons his place in the hierarchy rather than merely bending to raise up the fallen. ‘Qui autem vult relevare iacentem, necesse habet se inclinare, sed non prostrare sive deicere cum illo, sed manere in sua rectitudine, alias iacentem relevare

48 ‘But we were not able to be freed unless the devil be overcome, but not by power or violence was he to be overcome but by justice, since the devil loves power and has a hatred for justice’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Incarnatione VII, p. 125.
49 This depiction of overcoming Satan is what Gustav Aulén called the ‘Christus Victor’ theory and these first three reasons given by Matthew are what he refers to as the three main ideas of atonement. Aulén, Christus Victor.
50 See pages 117-20 above.
Having raised the fallen, they are restored to their proper hierarchic place and the cosmos is once again ordered as the divine will had intended. Humanity, occupying its proper place, is no longer misshapen but again stands erect.

Matthew continues with a ‘reconciliatio aversi’ and this demands a perfect mediator who can interpose himself between the sinner and the sinned against, between humanity and divinity. To this no one is better suited than the God-man, Jesus Christ. This could not be called a specifically Franciscan idea and Matthew is not co-opting some earlier Franciscan’s thought here; the discussion of Christ as the perfect mediator effecting reconciliation and salvation long pre-dated the friars and was well established in the Book of Sentences and was regularly considered in sentence commentaries.52

In his sixth reason, Matthew again looks further afield beyond both the Franciscans and the Book of Sentences. He argues that full human restoration requires ‘reductio seu directio devii’.

Reductio autem et directio devii est per informationem et imitationem exemplorum; nescit enim, quo vadat in via, quam ignorat, nisi sequatur eum, qui viam novit. Nullus autem potest sequi eum, quem non videt; nec aliquis praebet perfecte exemplum ad se imitandum, nisi qui nullum alium sequitur, alias posset deviare. Si igitur homo devius reduci debet, et directione et informatione indigebat; nullus autem erat, quem sequeretur, qui nullum alium imitaretur, nisi Deus; Deum autem sentire et videre non poterat; ergo oportuit, quod Deus visibilis et sensibilis fieret, quem sequi posset et quem sequi deberet.53

51 ‘Yet he who wants to lift the fallen up again must bend himself but not lie down or fall down with the fallen, but remain in his upright position, otherwise he cannot lift the fallen up again’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Incarnatione VII, p. 127.
52 For example, Bonaventure III Sent., d. 19, a. 2.
53 ‘Leading back and directing the wayward is through instruction and the imitation of examples; for he who has fallen from the way and is ignorant, knows nothing unless he follows him who knows the way. But no one can follow him whom he does not see; nor can
Matthew here assimilates what is known as exemplary salvation; that ignorant humanity can be freed from the ills and injury that flow from sin by imitating the example of Christ. The great medieval champion of this approach had been Peter Abelard.\textsuperscript{54} He, too, had not favoured Anselm’s idea of penal substitution, arguing that a greater evil cannot remedy a lesser one for if the Father claims such satisfaction for the commission of the lesser sin of consuming the forbidden fruit of Eden, what price might be sought for the murder of the Son?\textsuperscript{55} This approach considers that human salvation lies chiefly in the change and conversion within the human will which, under the influence of the teachings and example of Christ, is moved to abandon its former sinful ways.\textsuperscript{56} Because sin is always an act of the will, it is here where repentance must occur and, it is reasoned, some external act of a third party will not by itself bring about true redemption.

This approach had never truly enjoyed great popularity among medieval theologians and had not fared well at the Council of Sens when it was denounced along with a number of other ideas of Abelard. In the pursuit of integration and, no doubt, comprehensiveness Matthew nevertheless included a modified instance of exemplary salvation here.\textsuperscript{57} The usual medieval criticism of this approach was that, contrary to the Biblical texts, it

\textsuperscript{54} See, for example, Peter Abelard, Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos, III. 26. ccxii. For exemplary salvation generally, see Rivière, Le dogme de la rédemption au début du Moyen-âge, pp. 355-58.

\textsuperscript{55} Mertens, Not the Cross but the Crucified, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{56} Aulén, Christus Victor, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{57} Mertens, Not the Cross but the Crucified, p. 77. See also Thomas Williams, ‘Sin, Grace and Redemption’, in Cambridge Companion to Abelard, ed. by Jeffrey E. Brower and Kevin Gulfoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 258-78.
afforded no salvific role to Christ’s death and resurrection, for it claimed all
must happen in the human will. For Matthew, this does not arise as a
problem as he discards the exclusivity argument of Abelard; it is but one of
Matthew’s seven facets to occur in salvation.

The final factor Matthew gives for perfect restoration is ‘erectio spei et
inflammatio amoris et desiderii’.58 It is difficult to see from the text how
these fit into Matthew’s conception of salvation. In his exposition, Matthew
has very little to say on this point and instead he quotes heavily from
Augustine’s De Trinitate, repeating about two pages from Book XIII on the
capacity of Christ to rouse hope, love and desire.59 Presumably, if Christ had
given satisfaction for the debt of humanity, released it from its corruption
and performed all the other preceding six tasks that Matthew has set forth,
they would in themselves have kindled hope, love and desire without the
need for further action on Christ’s part. Yet again, while Matthew does briefly
set out what hope, love and desire are, and how Christ incites these, he fails
to show how they are salvific. They surely make humanity yearn for salvation
more passionately and predispose humanity to be open to the gift of salvation
but Matthew does not set out how, in themselves, they bring about human
restoration.

Matthew himself appears to think little of this argument. Having set
out all these reasons, Matthew proceeds in standard scholastic fashion to
address each authority previously raised as contra to his own position to
reconcile it with his response. There are nineteen such opposed authorities to

58 “The arousal of hope and kindling of love and desire”. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestione
de Incarnatione VII, p. 129.
59 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Incarnationed VII, pp. 130-1 quoting Augustine,
De Trinitate, XIII.
which Matthew responds and he makes use of all his reasoning to do so except this seventh and final argument, which he never employs. Its presence may well be due more to numerological or rhetorical reasons than theological ones, as seven was well established as the number of perfection and completeness.  

6.6 Matthew the Scholastic

Considering his response to this question as a whole, a reader could be forgiven for looking upon Matthew as something of a soteriological magpie, gathering together the ideas of many others who preceded him and arraying them as his own. A careful reading discloses that this may not be true. Matthew deserves greater praise as a skilful master of the scholastic practice of bringing knowledge into concord. Unlike many of his predecessors, including even Bonaventure, Matthew drew upon a much broader field of soteriological notions, of which he discards none but instead artfully assembled them to bolster his arguments in favour of restoration by the God-man.

It is to be remembered that all this reasoning is within the context of a disputed question asking whether it was fitting for humanity to be restored through the God-Man. Clearly and from the very outset, Matthew establishes that he conceives of salvation as not some atonement or recompense rendered to God but as centred upon humanity and the return of it to some prior condition from which it had fallen.

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Nor is Matthew as accepting of the earlier theologians as he may appear. He cites Anselm and speaks of ‘satisfactio debiti’ but he introduces into Anselm’s thought the more tempered idea of ‘solutio debiti’, an expression never used by Anselm. Like Origen, he speaks of freeing humanity from servitude to the Devil but in Matthew’s treatment this is not through some blood price given at Christ’s death but by acts of justice, an idea that Origen had never propounded. Similarly, while he does use Pseudo-Dionysius’ concept of humanity creating discord through its usurpation of a place not its own in the hierarchy of the cosmos, nowhere in Pseudo-Dionysius’ writings is Matthew’s idea of Christ keeping his own place while ‘bending down’ to another to reach humanity and restore it to its place. In only one instance does Matthew make use, without emendation, of an earlier idea: that of Bonaventure and the ‘curatio morbi’. Matthew may well, in this, disclose his own Franciscan leanings.

Matthew portrayed himself as being thoroughly in keeping with the accepted theological mainstream while at the same time making novel adaptations of his own to that received tradition. After the theological creativity of Bonaventure, Matthew declines to be quite as overtly at the forefront of such innovation. The scholastic setting in which Matthew was working inclined him to conduct and fashion his theology in a scholastic manner, striving to unite and bring together all reasoning, especially the burgeoning body of Franciscan material. While Matthew may have all the requisite reasoning established to claim that the incarnation would have occurred in the absence of the fall, he declines to make that claim. Although he has in place sufficient reasons to postulate a claim that the primary purpose of Christ’s coming was the fulfilment of humanity, he declines to go
so far as to state that explicitly. He patently believes that Anselm used the right ideas to reach the wrong conclusion but Matthew does not openly make that claim. He is a theologian who in his work is willing time and again to go very close to the edge but never further. He falls afoul neither of the Church nor of the secular masters as his theological style is to integrate widely around him. He is a model of what scholasticism seeks to achieve.

This makes Matthew a great integrator of past theological idea. While he does amend the ideas and expressions of his Franciscan predecessors, he does not reject what had preceded him in the development of soteriology among them. He did not create new ideas and approaches to soteriology but his achievement was in championing the process of integrating those Franciscan developments with the accepted positions of Anselm and other prevailing theological notions of the day. His accomplishment was in managing to hold them all together without contradiction.

6.7 Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia

This fervour for integration is evident in the final set of disputed questions touching on salvation, his Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia. In the second of those questions, ‘Queritur utrum a defectu culpae possibile sit quemquam resurgere ad statum iustitiae sine auxilio gratiae’, Matthew again gives an extended and lengthy array of reasons in his response.\(^61\) The accepted answer to this question was very well established: Grace was necessary and to hold

\(^{61}\) ‘It is asked whether it is possible for someone to rise again from the defect of guilt to the state of justice without the aid of grace’. Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia II. 32.
that people could restore themselves through their own efforts without the aid of grace was the ancient and anathematised position of Pelagianism.\footnote{That matter had been settled at the Councils of Diospolis (418) and Ephesus (431). See generally Rebecca Weaver, \textit{Divine Grace and Human Agency: A Study of the Semi-Pelagian Controversy}, Patristic Monograph Series, 15 (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1996).}

In the course of his answer to the question, Matthew explores what is meant by ‘restoring someone to a state of justice’ and again gives many explanations as he sets out why grace is needed for humanity:

\begin{quote}
Ergo versa vice iustificatio sive ad iustitiam reditio, resurrectio a culpa, necessario ista sex claudit, scilicet peccati detestationem et iustitiae desiderium vel dilectionem, spiritualem vivificationem, naturae reformationem vel reordinationem, virtutem generationem, conversionem ad Deum et peccati sive culpae remissionem.\footnote{‘Therefore justification or the return to justice, the rising again from guilt, must in turn encompass six things, namely a hatred for sin and a desire or love for justice, a life-giving spirit, a reforming and reordering of nature, a generation of virtue, a conversion to God and a remission of sin and guilt’. Matthew of Aquasparta, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia} II, p. 44.}
\end{quote}

As Matthew explores each of these elements in turn, he again draws on many sources. There are to be heard echoes of Anselm in the remission of sins, of Bonaventure in the reordering of human nature, of Abelard in the generation of virtue, of Origen in the detestation of sin and so forth. Matthew expounds on each of these elements in his answer and certainly maintains each with vigour.

This trend to synthesise endured throughout Matthew’s academic career. According to Doucet, the \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia} were written about 1285.\footnote{Matthew of Aquasparta, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia}, pp. cxxxiv–cxxxv.} It would be followed by only two other works, yet even at this point in his life, Matthew continues to favour a very broad and comprehensive approach to soteriology. He discounts little of what preceded and was reluctant to opt for one conception over another but preferring to
bring those ideas into harmony in a more comprehensive coverage of what salvation signifies. As well as can be judged from Matthew’s extant works, this had been his approach throughout his academic career.

It is not unjust to make the observation that there were parts of theology that clearly attracted Matthew far more than soteriology. He produced twenty-one sets of disputed questions on a wide array of theological topics of interest to him but none of them deals specifically with salvation. On the basis of the topics of his other works, the evidence is that Matthew’s interests lay elsewhere and he only treated of soteriology when it strayed into some other topic of interest to him. When he does speak of soteriology, Matthew can frequently appear the very opposite of originality in that he seems merely to amass together all the theories of which he is familiar. However, inasmuch as he succeeds in holding them together as one non-contradictory whole, in a way in which none of his confreres had thus far managed, he makes his own contribution of Franciscan soteriology and serves as an exemplary scholastic.

The consequence of Matthew’s actions is that the Franciscan innovations derived from Bonaventure were not lost to soteriology generally. Matthew did not force his readers and students into a choice between either the Anselmian or Bonaventurian traditions. The scholastic nature of the genre of disputed questions in which Matthew wrote nurtured and furthered his all-embracing approach to soteriology. His efforts to bring these two traditions together, meant that the insights of both would continue. By broadening the coverage of Bonaventure’s approach, Matthew was cementing a place of the new Franciscan ideas. This more inclusive Franciscan approach

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65 Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia, p. cix.
is picked up by later Franciscan authors whose works carry on Matthew’s labours in integrating Franciscan soteriology with the theological mainstream. 66

To conceive of Matthew as uncritically repeating past views is a poor characterisation, for Matthew made his own contributions. No Franciscan preceding him had yet established so thoroughly and well the grounding for an understanding of the incarnation that was not contingent on human sin. While a number of friars had wrestled with reconciling the ideas of Anselm with the developing Franciscan theories of fulfilment in Christ, only Matthew brought exemplary salvation into consideration also. It is true that Matthew assembled a very broad approach to understanding salvation but he did so while avoiding contradictions in that broad array of material. Impressively, he accomplishes all this in the context of works that were composed on topics other than soteriology and his discussions of the mechanics of salvation were at best tangential to his actual concerns in fields such as epistemology and cognition. Matthew’s soteriological achievement was to root the Franciscan innovations more firmly into the scholastic theological mainstream.

66 See, for example, pages 222-26 below.
Richard of Middleton and the Episcopal Condemnations of the 1270s

Such moves toward closer alignment of the Franciscans and the rest of the faculty of theology continued in the work of Richard of Middleton, an Englishman working in Paris between 1276 and 1287. His career thus overlapped with that of Matthew of Aquasparta.

His arrival in Paris in the autumn of 1276 was only a few months before Stephen Tempier, the bishop of Paris, issued an extensive list of philosophical propositions that were no longer to be taught in the university and this event had repercussions for the careers of many scholars, including Richard. The battle between the university scholars impeded by Tempier’s decrees and the ecclesiastical authorities enmeshed the Franciscans in their conflict. At the heart of the dispute was the degree to which the philosophy of non-Christians could be used in theological instruction.

7.1 The Tempier Decrees

For some time there had been swelling tension between the masters and the bishop about the influence within theology of the writings of Aristotle and the non-Christian commentators on those works, as well as others from beyond Christianity. This was not new; Bonaventure had bemoaned the same issue in the Hexaëmeron.1 As the full corpus of Aristotle’s works became available to the Latin-speaking world over the course of the thirteenth century, his texts and their commentaries were widely and avidly studied by scholars in the universities. In particular, the integration of this new philosophical material

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1 See pages 149-53 above.
gave rise to an impetus within the arts faculty in Paris to pursue and to teach philosophy as an end in itself, as it had been in the classical era, rather than as a means to an end in support of the disciplines within the higher faculties of the university. At the forefront of this trend were teachers of philosophy from the arts faculty in Paris, figures such as Boethius of Dacia, Bernier of Nivelles, Gosvin of La Chapelle and, especially, Siger of Brabant. Making use of non-Christian philosophers and commentators, these masters began expounding conclusions in not just natural philosophy but also theology which were at variance both with accepted Christian doctrine and with the conclusions of the theologians.

Among the more notorious instances of this was the question of individuation of the intellect. Siger of Brabant, relying heavily on the writings of Averroës, taught that there was but one created intellect in the cosmos, eternally caused by God, and that all other beings merely participated in it to some greater or lesser degree, according to their nature, and as an accident to their being. However, if there were but one intellect and it were but an accident to being, then the idea of individual souls becomes problematic and so too does the possibility of personal salvation or damnation. This put it at

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3 Siger reiterated this proposition many times: *De Aeternitate Mundi* I. 38-41, *De Necessitate* I. 29-32, 48-51, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, I. 31-38, *De Anima Intelectiva* I. 3-7 all of which are found in Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones de Anima, de Anima Intelectiva, de Aeternitate Mundi*, ed. by Bernardo Bazàn, Philosophes Médiévaux du Centre de Wulf-Mansion, 13 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1972). His arguments are also in his commentary of the *Liber de Causis*, a work erroneously attributed to Aristotle at this time, Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones super Librum de Causis*, ed. by Antonio Marlasca, Philosophes Médiévaux du Centre de Wulf-Mansion, 12 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1972), I pp. 29-33. As to the genesis of this material in Averroës, see Averroës, *Commentarrium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros*, ed. by Stuart Crawford, Corpus Commentariorum in Aristotelem, 6. 1, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, 59 (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), pp. 159-60.
4 As to the question of individuation of the intellect, see further Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés*, Philosophes Médiévaux, 22 (Louvain: Publications
deep variance with traditional Christian belief and counter to one on the foundations of Christian anthropology.

At stake in this disagreement over the use of the texts of Aristotle, Averroës and the others was the issue of the degree to which the reasoning of non-Christian writers, even ones as eminent as Aristotle, could be authoritatively relied upon in reaching theological conclusions. At the dispute’s heart was whether philosophy alone, unguided by divine self-revelation in the scriptures or the person of Jesus Christ, could attain theological truth. Like Bonaventure, the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, clearly thought not, and on 6 December 1270 he issued a condemnation of thirteen propositions held by these philosophers and forbade their being taught in the University of Paris, which existed under his jurisdiction.5

The response of the masters in the Faculty of Arts was to change their approach in class. Rather than Aristotle’s conclusions, they came frequently to investigate in class his methods and techniques and those of his commentators as ‘instances of their reasoning’ but not, they claimed, their conclusions from that reasoning. The philosophers expressly claimed that this use of Aristotle and the others was not for the purpose of illustrating universal truths. ‘We seek the mind of the philosophers rather than the truth,

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5 Wippel, ‘The Parisian Condemnations’, p. 65. There had been an earlier general prohibition against all teaching from the works of Aristotle back in 1210 made by the Archdiocese of Sens, of which Paris was suffragan, but it had been little observed. It was fruitlessly renewed in 1231, Denifle and Chatelaine, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, No. 473, pp. 543-58. As to Bonaventure, his attacks on the use of non-Christian philosophy in his Collationes in Hexaëmeron was produced only three years before in 1274.
since we are proceeding philosophically’, as Siger himself put it.\(^6\) Nevertheless, students were now faced with what was labelled at the time as a ‘double-truth’ of what had been reasoned by Aristotle and the pagans and what had been established by the Christian theologians, with the conclusions of each being frequently both defensibly true within their own systems and yet contradictory to each other.\(^7\) Scholasticism sought to show the common end of all learning but this double-truth was the antithesis of that ideal.

As the philosophers in the arts faculty gained greater access to, and greater proficiency in, the philosophical, dialectical and logical tools of the classical era, they became less content to be the mere ‘handmaids of theology’ and sought to advance philosophy as a discipline in its own right. They reached conclusions of their own, even in areas that fell within the purview of other faculties. The difficulty lay not so much in what those conclusions were but in that those conclusions were all too often theological yet reached without the use of the authoritative sources of theology, scripture and tradition. Yet worse in the eyes of the theology faculty, they were reached without the use of theologians.\(^8\) The response of the Faculty of Arts was judged to be insufficient and a further round of condemnations followed in 1277.


\(^7\) John F. Wippel, ‘The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris’, *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 7 (1977), 169-201, pp. 175-78. See this same article for a good overview of the more contentious philosophical points in which controversies arose such as individuation of the intellect, divine immediacy of action and divine foreknowledge of future contingents.

News of the problems arising from the use of these non-Christian sources by the arts faculty came to the attention of Pope John XXI. He wrote to Tempier on 18 January 1277, seeking an investigation into what was being taught in the university, such as this problem of so-called ‘double-truth’. Stephen acted swiftly and assembled a commission of sixteen theologians to examine the works and teaching of the Faculty of Arts at the university. They worked quickly and on 7 March 1277, the bishop issued a further and greatly expanded condemnation of 219 propositions derived from Aristotle, Averroës, Moses Maimonides and other non-Christian commentators upon Aristotle, as well as some more modern but heretical works. As part of the decree, the bishop threatened the excommunication of anyone who defended these propositions, supported them or even listened to them unless, within seven days of the occurrence, the offender came forward to the bishop or the chancellor of the university for the imposition of a lesser sentence.

The official response of the Faculty of Arts was not to protest its orthodoxy nor to defend its use of these sources. Rather, it passed a new statute prohibiting its masters from teaching theological propositions. Clearly, the understanding of the arts faculty concerning the condemnations was that they set out the bounds delimiting how far philosophy might go without the aid of theology before it courted error.

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12 Hissette, *Énquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris*, p. 11.
This response seems not to have satisfied the diocese and numerous investigations were conducted. Famously, even Thomas Aquinas in his great project to synthesise Aristotle's philosophy with the Christian tradition ran afoul of the condemnations in numerous places and was subjected to investigation for multiple breaches of the decrees.\textsuperscript{14}

The event of the condemnations came to be seen by many as a pivotal point in the development of science and philosophy. Even though, strictly speaking, the condemnations did not extend beyond the boundaries of the diocese of Paris, they came to take on a life of their own far beyond those borders both geographically and temporally.\textsuperscript{15} Infraction of its articles was the formal accusation levelled against Galileo in his trial three hundred and fifty years later and they were invoked as late as 1705 during the investigation into the writings of René Descartes.\textsuperscript{16} A number of dioceses across Europe adopted the condemnations as their own and, significantly for the purposes at hand, in 1292 the General Chapter of the Franciscans bound all the friars,

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\textsuperscript{16} Bianchi, ‘1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?’ p. 96. 
\end{flushright}
wherever they dwelt, to the same rulings. The Friars Preacher were great enthusiasts for Aristotelianism and had avidly embraced the possibilities opened by this new philosophy and the commentaries upon it but the Friars Minor were considerably more diffident. As early as the 1250s, Bonaventure had publicly criticised the excessive use of these authors and this wariness towards them continued among his successors at the Franciscan school in Paris. There was for them a basic question of methodology to surmount: how can one speak confidently about God if God is not the starting point of investigation? The same 1292 chapter that imposed the Parisian condemnations of 1277 on all Franciscans also decreed that the friars were not to make use of the writings of Thomas Aquinas, because of their heavy dependence on Aristotelianism, without using the Correctorium Fratris Thomae of the Franciscan William de la Mare to ‘purge’ those texts of objectionable material. Even more significantly, it was a public declaration that the Franciscans had sided with the diocese against the embrace of Aristotelianism.

This is not to be construed as competitive rivalry between the two mendicant orders but part of differing reactions to Tempier’s decrees. Among the propositions condemned was that a thing’s substance and essence could be separated. Thomas Aquinas had taught that this was not the case and argued, for example, that for the three days in the tomb, Christ was in a sense

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17 Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis’, p. 80. The decree was Art. 22 of the General Chapter of Paris in 1292.
18 Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, p. 222.
19 See page 150 above.
20 William’s Correctorium is available only through the reconstruction from four responses from Aquinas’ Dominican defenders, texts known as the Correctoria ‘Quare’, ‘Sciendum’, ‘Circa’ and ‘Quaestione’.
21 ‘Quod substantiae separatae sunt sua essentia, quia in idem est quo est et quod est’. Hissette, Énquete sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris, Article 46, pp. 92-94.
lessened as his substance and essence separated with the division of his soul and body at death. Investigated for breach of the condemnations, Aquinas had to then argue that Christ was a special and unique case, due to his dual natures. In other words, Thomas was pressed to reconceive the agent of salvation in his soteriology.

The Franciscans, by contrast, had been at pains since the writings of Alexander of Hales to strengthen and expand the role of the human nature of Christ in the work of salvation to balance it better with the dominant role of divinity that was the legacy of Anselm’s model. While Richard of Middleton was not himself accused of transgressing the condemnations, their spectre was part of the context in which he was creating his soteriology.

As Bianchi has noted, the decree did more than just punish those teaching unorthodox positions derived from Aristotle. It punished those who attended class and unwittingly heard erroneous propositions, unless they came forward and reported the matter to the bishop or chancellor. In other words, it was designed to foster a practice of denunciation of those transgressing the condemnations. Bianchi identifies such denunciations as but one part of a subtle, but nevertheless pervasive, atmosphere in which academics operated in the university. As well as the denunciations, there operated also pre-publication censorship, requisitions of books, restrictions on teaching and the imposition of doctrine. Richard and his colleagues wrote, studied and taught in a climate that demonstrated considerable

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24 See page 69 above.
hostility towards what might be called free-ranging philosophical and theological speculation. This had consequences for soteriology.

The Franciscans did not face a simple choice to side with the bishop or the masters, with the hope that they had chosen the winning side. They had obligations of obedience to the bishop and against that must be set that they had to live and work in the university among its masters who were making their own demands of loyalty. It was well within living memory that a failure to take the side of the university masters and support them in their conflict with the provost and civil authorities of Paris had sparked the secular-mendicant controversy that had endured for decades and whose embers were not yet completely extinguished. The Franciscans found themselves pressured to accommodate both religious and academic authorities in this matter. Beginning his studies as these condemnations were made in 1277, these events had a bearing upon Richard as a scholar. The task that Richard faced was to write of soteriology without contravening the episcopal decrees but yet still to engage with an audience of scholars who more and more had come to embrace Aristotle and the lessons of the commentaries upon his writings.

7.2 **Paris at the Arrival of Richard of Middleton**

The years preceding Richard’s taking up the post of master in Paris had quite a surfeit of controversy around the Franciscans. While the worst of the secular-mendicant controversy in the university may have subsided, at Richard’s arrival in 1276 the friars had still not yielded to the secular masters nor sworn an oath to observe the statutes of the university; what may well be

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27 See pages 84-85 above.
described as a cold war still existed between the two parties.\textsuperscript{28} The works of figures like Gerard of Borgo San Donnino had already attracted to Franciscans no dearth of questions about their orthodoxy due to their toying with Joachism.\textsuperscript{29} The 1270s saw also the first appearance of figures who would become later become significant among the Spiritual Franciscans: 1272 saw Peter of John Olivi enter the order, 1273 Ubertino da Casale and 1274 Angelo Clareno.\textsuperscript{30} There was a limit to how frequently the friars could display defiance to the various secular and religious authorities.

Beyond political considerations, Richard’s religious motivations should not be discounted, since Francis of Assisi forcefully insisted on the obedience friars owed to the clergy.\textsuperscript{31} Richard was yet a further son of Francis that had to strike a balance between what he believed and the Poverello’s exhortation to submission to episcopal authority. The ultimate fate of the


\textsuperscript{29} See page 128 above. It was accusations of Joachism that led to the resignations of the Franciscan Minister General, John of Parma, in favour of Bonaventure.

\textsuperscript{30} Richard served on the commission formed to investigate the writings of John Olivi. Sharp, \textit{Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century}, p. 212 and Moorman, \textit{A History of the Franciscan Order}, pp. 114, 188. A detailed consideration of the Spiritual movement among the Franciscans is beyond the scope of this project but it was a movement, flourishing especially in central Italy and southern France, which felt that the observance of the Franciscan rule had been compromised by the numerous exceptions, interpretations and indulges given by the papacy over the years. It wished to return to the ‘spirit’ of the original observance and this tended to be marked by greater asceticism and a strong resistance to obeying the later papal interpretations of the rule. See further David Burr, \textit{The Spiritual Franciscans: From Protest to Persecution in the Century after Saint Francis} (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), especially pp. 43-44 for the rise of the Spirituals in the 1270s.

\textsuperscript{31} For example, ‘And if I possessed as much wisdom as Solomon had and I came upon pitiful priests of this world, I would not preach contrary to their will in the parishes in which they live. And I desire to fear, love, and honour them and all others as my masters. And I do not wish to consider sin in them because I discern the Son of God in them and they are my masters’, Francis of Assisi, ‘Testament’ in \textit{Francis of Assisi: Early Documents}, ed. and trans. by Regis J. Armstrong, J. A. Wayne Hellman and William J. Short, 3 vols (New York: New City Press, 1999), I: \textit{The Saint}, pp. 124-27 (pp. 124-25). Similarly, ‘Blessed is the servant who has faith in the clergy… Woe to those who look down upon them; for even though they be sinners, no one should judge them’, Francis of Assisi, ‘Admonitions’ in \textit{Francis of Assisi: Early Documents}, ed. and trans. by Regis J. Armstrong, J. A. Wayne Hellman and William J. Short, 3 vols (New York: New City Press, 1999), I: \textit{The Saint}, pp. 128-37 (p. 136).
Spirituals in choosing not to comply with that authority shows just how forceful those pressures were.\(^{32}\)

Richard was moved to Paris from England in 1276 amid this turmoil. He came probably from the village of Middleton in Northamptonshire.\(^{33}\) He joined the English province of the Franciscans at some time no later than 1267.\(^{34}\) As the statutes pertaining to the theology faculty by the 1280s had established that one could not be admitted to the degree of master prior to the age of thirty-five, and as Richard was admitted to his degree in 1284, he could have been born no later than 1249.\(^{35}\) After some initial studies at the Franciscan school in Oxford where he was taught by figures such as William of Heddele, Thomas of Bungay, Robert Crouche and John Pecham, Richard was sent for study in Paris.\(^{36}\) Wadding records this to have occurred in 1278 but, as Hocedez has shown, that date is too late for Richard to have completed his studies in sufficient time to have taken up a chair, as he did, at

\(^{32}\) A number of the Spirituals were handed to the Inquisition and later put to death while others were separated from colleagues and scattered across the provinces of the order. Burr, The Spiritual Franciscans, p. 218.

\(^{33}\) Johannes Trithemius, De Scripturibus Ecclesiasticis (Cologne: Peter Quentel, 1546), p. 216. Richard’s origins are confused by the existence of another English cleric named Richard of Middleton of this same era, who became Lord Chancellor of England under Henry III from 1269 to 1272. Their biographies have become muddled at times. For a discussion of the various sources for the origins of friar Richard of Middleton, see Hocedez, Richard de Middleton, pp. 63–71.

\(^{34}\) Hocedez, Richard de Middleton, pp. 69–70.


the end of 1284.\(^{37}\) For this reason, Hocedez’s alternate chronology that has Richard travel to Paris in 1276 is to be preferred.\(^{38}\)

In Paris, he came under the influence of Matthew of Aquasparta and William de la Ware, both of whom were reading the sentences when Richard began his Parisian studies. He composed his own commentary on the *Book of Sentences* between about 1281 and 1283 and then succeeded to the Franciscan chair in theology at the University of Paris as regent master in 1284, or possibly 1285, where he remained until 1287.\(^{39}\)

In keeping with the usual Franciscan custom, after that point Richard was reassigned to other works of the order.\(^{40}\) In Richard’s case, he was dispatched to the court of Naples to undertake the education of the sons of King Charles II. Following the defeat of Charles by the Aragonese in the War of the Sicilian Vespers, Charles was in 1288 allowed his freedom upon condition that his sons were kept in Aragon as hostages. They were held in Barcelona until 1295 and Richard elected to share with them their captivity and to continue their education.\(^{41}\) There is an argument to be made that he had considerable influence on the princes; the elder, Louis, renounced his birth right and became a Franciscan himself and later bishop of Toulouse and was canonised in 1317 by John XXII.\(^{42}\) The younger, Robert, succeeded to


\(^{38}\) Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton*, pp. 72-75.

\(^{39}\) There are complications in the dating of his sentence commentary. Richard, as was common, later revised his commentary but subsequent editors have confused the two versions. For an account of the disentanglement of them, see Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton*, pp. 49-55, 76.

\(^{40}\) See page 25 above.


Louis’ inheritances and acceded as King of Naples in 1309. Following their release, Richard found himself back in France where he was elected as minister of the Franciscan province there and, like Bonaventure in Rome before him, administration seemed to consume his energies thereafter, right up to his death on 30 March 1302 in Rheims.

7.3 The Writings of Richard

Plunged amid the tumult of the condemnations from Tempier, Richard decided that his stance was to be quite expressly of observing the episcopal decrees. Richard is an instance of a scholar explicitly citing from the 1277 condemnations in his writings to demonstrate his compliance with them. For example, Richard considers whether the universe can be physically moved or not by God. The philosophers, drawing on Aristotle’s natural philosophy, said that it cannot, as such motion would create a vacuum, while the traditional theological response had been that it could, since all things are possible to an omnipotent God. Richard answers one aspect of their argument thus:

Alii dicunt quod celum movetur ab intelligentia solo imperio voluntatis, sed hoc est falsum. Videmus enim quod in motu quo anima movet corpus suum localiter est intellectus dirigens, et voluntas imperans et alia potentia a voluntate mutum exequens secundum imperium voluntatis prout potest. Ita ergo, et in motu quo angelus movet celum, non tantummodo est

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45 See, for example, Richard of Middleton, Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, 4 vols (Brescia: Vincentium Sabbium, 1591), II, d. 14, a. 1, q. 6 or d. 14, a. 2, qq. 3-4 in which he treats of Christ’s knowledge of individuated intellects.
intellectus dirigens et voluntas motum imperans, sed etiam alia potentia motum exequens secundum imperium voluntatis intelligentiae\textsuperscript{46} prout potest, unde hic articulus, scilicet, quod angelus sola voluntate movet celum a domino Stephano Episcopo Parisiensis et sacrae theologiae doctore excommunicatus est.\textsuperscript{47}

Not content merely to observe Bishop Tempier’s decrees, Richard wishes to be seen as incontestably orthodox and thus he takes the step of unashamedly signposting that fact through explicit reference to the condemnations. Acts such as this attest to Richard’s strong desire, both for himself and his order, to be seen as orthodox and above reproach. It would, however, be wrong to account Richard as an unassertive thinker, reticent to innovate.

He composed, aside from his sentence commentary, about eighty extant series of quodlibets of which most remain unpublished and, sadly, none treated soteriology. They reflect instead Richard’s interests in epistemology, cognition and the relationship between the affect and will and, intriguingly, his fascination with hypnosis and bioluminescence on both of which he appears to have been one of the world’s first specialists.\textsuperscript{48} Thus, it is to the sentence commentary alone that attention must be given in order to discover his approach to the topic of salvation.

That sentence commentary puts forward a cluster of novel questions that had not been previously seen among Franciscans, dealing mainly with

\textsuperscript{46} Sic. \textit{Intellectivae} is perhaps intended?

\textsuperscript{47} ‘Others say that heaven is moved by the intelligence through a simple command of the will but this is false. For we see that the spirit which moves its body around is the directive intellect, and the commanding will and other powers moved by the will following along, according to the direction of the will as they can. Thus, the spirit by which heaven is put in motion is not merely the directive intellect and the will ordering motion, but the other moving powers as well according to the direction of the intelligent will [\textit{will of understanding}?] as it can hence that article, namely, ‘that a spirit by will alone moves heaven’, condemned by Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, and doctor of sacred theology.’ Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sent. II}, d. 14, a. 1, q. 6. The transgressed article in question is 119.

the entombed Christ. They look also at Christ’s passion and redemptive work and their role and interrelationship in the light of the two wills of Christ. Further, Richard does away with the distinctions in the human will of Christ introduced by Alexander of Hales and, in lieu, gives a greatly expanded role to what he terms Christ’s sensual appetites.

7.4 The Will of Christ

Richard accepts the standard understanding that there were, in one sense, two wills at work in Christ, namely the human and the divine. However, he also notes that Aristotle, in this instance arguing scientifically and not philosophically, would say that if one speaks of the will as a power, there are three: namely the divine will, the will of a rational mind and the sensual appetites.49 Having established this, Richard never again speaks of the ‘will of a rational mind’ and instead hereafter favours the term of the ‘deliberative will of reason’.50

With this tripartite conception of the will, Richard discarded the distinctions that Alexander of Hales had introduced into the will of Christ and with which a number of his successors had grappled. This was the division of the higher part of the human will into two, the ratio ut ratio and the ratio ut natura.51 For Richard, the ‘deliberative will of reason’ is unified and, in the case of Christ, was never at variance with the divine will,

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50 ‘Voluntas rationis deliberativa’.
51 As to this distinction, see pages 71-76. See also pages 120-23 above for Bonaventure’s tepidity towards this idea.
apparently always wanting whatever the divine will desired and, likewise, desiring these things for reasons of charity, as did the divine will.\(^{52}\)

Respondeo quod in Christo voluntas rationis deliberativa numquam in aliquo discordavit a divina voluntate, imo concordavit cum ea, et in volito, quia volebat quicquid videbat divinam voluntatem velle, et in forma volendi,\(^{53}\) quia quicquid volebat, volebat ex charitate et sic volebat, sicut Deus volebat eam velle.\(^{54}\)

Alexander had placed what was unique to Christ’s humanity in the \textit{ratio ut natura} but Richard opted rather to locate it in the sensual appetites. The ingenuity in this, and the reason for it, is perhaps appreciated best by hypothetically considering the alternative of a Christ in the absence of these sensual appetites.

It was accepted and received tradition that Christ was both truly God and truly human. He was also an individual capable of independent action. Since the time of Alexander of Hales, Franciscans had been at pains to ensure that the humanity of Christ made its own choices and contributions to the act of salvation rather than the ancillary role it had played in Anselm’s model. Had that uniquely human role been located not in the sensual appetites but in Christ’s human will, Richard would have had a portrayal of Christ in which either his wills were in perfectly balanced conflict with each other, wherein Christ would be rendered incapable of action as the two wills warred within him, or one will subordinated the other, in which case Christ would be possessed of only one directive will and no longer truly be both human and divine.Employing sensual appetites, Richard permits Christ’s two wills to be

\(^{52}\) Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sent. III}, d. 17, a. 1, qq. 2-4.
\(^{53}\) Sic. Presumably ‘volenti’.
\(^{54}\) ‘I reply that in Christ the deliberative will of reason was never on any matter in conflict with the divine will, rather it was in agreement with it both in what it desired, since it wanted whatever the divine will wished, and in the manner of willing, since whatever it wanted, it wanted from charity just as God wished it to will.’ Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sent. III}, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2.
in that perfect concord needed for action, preserves the authenticity of the
two natures of Christ and yet still allows for a unique and distinct identity for
the human Christ that is not shared with his divine nature. He also obviates
the confusion of a division of the human will where one half was aware of the
existence of the divine will and the other not, which had been the
problematic solution of Alexander of Hales.\textsuperscript{55} In Richard’s abandonment of
this somewhat artificial division, it can be argued that he improved upon
what Alexander was attempting to do. The sensual appetites fulfil the role of
Alexander’s \textit{ratio ut natura}; a human power within Christ that was not
shared with divinity. Moreover, being, by definition, more carnal than
Alexander’s \textit{ratio ut natura}, the sensual appetites are more suited to fulfilling
greater engagement with what was specifically fleshly and human in Christ in
the work of redemption.

With this portrayal, Richard is able to resolve the long-standing issue
of why Christ prayed.\textsuperscript{56} The conundrum had been that if Christ were
omniscient and so knew the will of God, why then would he pray, since
knowing the will of God and thus how God would act, he had nothing to gain
from his prayerful petition? Yet Christ did clearly pray for himself, as in
Matthew 26: 39, Mark 14: 36, Luke 22: 42. However, the sensual appetites do
not share this divine knowledge and so can desire to pray. Richard points out

\textsuperscript{55} See pages 71-76 above. As to the struggles of later Franciscan theologians with this idea of
Alexander’s, see pages 120-23 above.

\textsuperscript{56} One can go back at least as far as Apollinaris of Laodicea in the fourth century for
consideration of this point: Hélène Grelier, ‘Comment décrire l’humanité du Christ sans
introduire une quaternité en Dieu? La controverse de Grégoire de Nyssa contre Apollinaire de
Laodicée’, in \textit{Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on Trinitarian Theology and
Apollinarianism}, ed. by Volker Henning Drecoll and Margitta Berghaus (Leiden: Brill, 2011),
pp. 541-56. See also Hans Lietzmann, \textit{Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule} (Tübingen:
Mohr, 1904).
that it is a fitting and meritorious act for the body to desire to pray. In fact, the prayer from Christ’s agony in the garden Richard describes as being, in substance, an act of the sensual appetites and, in form, an act of his human will.

This solution also handles neatly the issue of how Christ could change his mind, an act hard to explain in the case of a being both perfect and immutable. Once again, scriptures clearly attest that Christ did so: e.g., Mark 7: 26-29, John 2:3-7. This was a matter that had grown complicated because among Bishop Tempier’s condemnations in 1277 were the following:

21. Quod a voluntate antiqua non potest novum procedere absque transmutatione praecedente.
22. Quod Deus non potest esse causa novi facti, nec potest aliquid de novo producere.

These are, in the case of the former, a conclusion of Aristotle himself and, in the case of the latter, a corollary deriving from that reached by Siger of Brabant. Proposition 21 is reached by simple reason but the difficulty, and the objection to it, arises when this is applied to the concept of a perfect, and therefore immutable, God. Since this would lead to the conclusion that either the will of God is not omnipotent or that God is mutable, and is thus imperfect, Tempier condemned this notion. The latter proposition was objectionable on the same grounds as it follows from the former, applied in this instance to deeds rather than to the will. Had Richard clung to the

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57 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 17, a. 2.
58 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 17, a. 2, q. 3.
59 ‘21. That from an ancient will a new cannot proceed without change to what went before. 22. That God cannot be the cause of new deeds nor produce anything new.’ Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris, articles 53 and 55.
61 It also contradicts the established understanding of the Divine nature as being pure act, having no potential. For further discussion on this point, see Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris, p. 55, and the other works cited there.
traditional sense of the two wills in Christ and wished also to argue, as he had done, that these never disagreed, then he would not have been capable of explaining how Christ could change his mind without contravening the condemnations of 1277, since Christ’s divine will is immutable and Richard claimed that his human will was in perfect accord with it.

Richard solves his problem through use of the sensual appetites. These sensual appetites are clearly intrinsic to the human body and are also manifestly mutable in nature. Since this change is not a *voluntate antiqua*, in the language of the 1277 decree, by using these sensual appetites Richard can explain change in Christ and his desire to pray, can avoid contravening Tempier’s decrees and can explain that concord between Christ’s human and divine wills which permits his actions. Richard may use an approach different from Alexander’s but, like him, he ensures that there is an authentic engagement in the work of salvation by the human nature of Christ. His use of these sensual appetites arguably gives an even greater, or more easily understood, prominence to the place of Christ’s humanity.

### 7.5 Distinguishing Redemption and Salvation

Resolving the issue of Christ’s will, Richard proceeds in the next distinction of his commentary to establish Christ’s ability to earn merit and to do so from the time of his conception, both in his manner of life and in his enduring the passion.62 Interestingly, Richard introduces a new way of approaching the issue of merit at this point. He posits that it was not possible for any of that merit to be applied to the glorification of Christ’s soul since in the case of Christ, being God, the fullness of glory and the most intimate relationship

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with God was already his.\textsuperscript{63} It was possible to apply some merit to the glorification of his body, as was done after his resurrection (e.g., Luke, 24: 16; John 20: 14; 21: 4; I Corinthians 15: 38-54) but such excess merit as Christ did earn was free to be applied elsewhere.\textsuperscript{64} Richard identifies that this grace was applied in two ways: firstly it opened the doors of paradise that had been held closed against humanity because of the fall and, secondly, the residue, as it were, was applied to humanity as ‘grace freely given’.\textsuperscript{65} In other words, in Richard’s conception there is both an external consequence to the fall that Christ’s merit redresses, namely that humanity was barred from attaining the reward of paradise, and an internal consequence, in that humans had access only to such merit as each had earned individually. Christ’s sacrifice enabled access to his ‘grace freely given’ irrespective of a person’s own merits, and to the possibility of attaining paradise.

The importance that Richard assigns to this meriting by Christ, and his understanding of soteriology, is demonstrated more clearly by looking ahead briefly at the next distinction in the commentary, the nineteenth, which he labelled, ‘Hic qualiter a diabolo et a peccato nos redemit per mortem’.\textsuperscript{66} It is significant that, as Richard has arranged matters, he says that \textit{this} is the distinction that sets out a consideration of ‘redemption’, not distinction eighteen: ‘Si Christus meruit sibi et nobis, et quid sibi et quid

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sent.} III, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1.}
\footnote{Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sent.} III, d. 18, a. 2, q. 2.}
\footnote{Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sent.} III, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3-4. This \textit{‘grace freely given’ (gratia grata faciens)} is an ancient but infrequently used notion first championed by John Cassian. John Cassian, \textit{Collationes Patrum in Thebaide Aegypti Consistententum}, ed. by Michael Petschenig, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 13 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2004), XIII. 9 and XV. 1.}
\footnote{‘Here is the manner he redeemed us from the devil and sin through death’. Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sent.} III, d. 19.}
\end{footnotes}
For Richard, there is a difference to be drawn between on the one hand undoing the consequences, both internal and external, of the fall, which he treats as salvation, and on the other, the liberation from the power of evil, which he terms redemption. ‘Salvation’ and ‘redemption’ are not for Richard simply interchangeable synonyms but, rather, discrete and different topics and the titles he assigns to the distinctions reflect this. In Richard’s mind, undoing the consequences of the fall and extending grace to all humanity are salvific works, as distinction eighteen establishes, but not redemptive ones, as distinction nineteen argues. Such a division is not found in Richard’s Franciscan predecessors nor in Anselm.

For Richard, one element of Christ’s salvific work opens humanity to a richer and more profound experience of God. Inasmuch as Bonaventure had held that the incarnation brought humanity to the fullness of its proper position in the hierarchy and of its role in the work of creation, there are similarities to be found here between the two writers. Yet Richard goes further and, much like Matthew of Aquasparta before him, revives an ancient, if not Old Testament, understanding of redemption in the sense of a ransom for property held that had attracted scant attention from Bonaventure or any of the Franciscans yet considered.

67 ‘If Christ merited for himself and for us, and what he merited for himself and what for us’.
68 Compare, for example, Anselm, ‘Cur Deus Homo’, Opera Omnia, ed. by Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 6 Vols (Rome: Sansaini et Soc., 1940) II, II. 19; Alexander of Hales, Summa Fratris Alexandri, i. 1, t. 5, q. 1, m. 3, c. 2 or m. 4, c. 1, a. 2; Eudes Rigaud, Sent. III, d. 18, a. 3, q. 4; Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 19, a. 1 or Breviloquium IV. 1.
69 Biblical precedents for this understanding of redemption can be found, for example, in Exodus 21: 30, Leviticus 25: 24-32, 48-54 or Numbers 18: 15. It should be noted that Bonaventure does, in fact, have one reference in which can be read such an approach to redemption, although this is one of the dubia on the Book of Sentences: ‘Ideo Christus, in offerendo sanguinem suum Deo, redemit nos a servitute diaboli, peccati et supplicii’. III Sent., d. 19, Dubium iv. (‘Thus Christ, in offering his blood to God, redeemed us from servitude to the devil, sin and punishment.’) For further on this, see, for example, Rivière, Le Dogme de la rédemption au début du moyen âge, p. 302. Also compare the similar development by Matthew of Aquasparta in the preceding chapter, on pages 190-91 above.
7.6 Diabolic Power

The manner in which Richard speaks of redemption, even in the light of the nineteenth distinction’s title, suggests that Richard is drawing upon a much older tradition, predating even Anselm, in which the understanding was that, like goods redeemed back from bailment, humanity had to be redeemed from a third party through a payment made, namely the death of Christ.  

Classically, that redemptive payment had often been understood to be owed to the devil and certainly Richard seems to hold this, at least in part, although he also maintains that this payment serves ‘to free humanity from sin’.

Confirmation that this is how Richard approaches the question of redemption is found in the actual text of this distinction, where he considers whether or not humanity had been freed from the power of the devil.

Respondeo, quod per passionem Christi sumus a potestate diabolica liberati. Unde Augustinus IV De Trinitate 13: Christus occisus innocens, diabolum iure aequissimo superavit, nosque liberavit captivitate facta propter peccatum, suo iusto sanguine effuso inuiste, quod non est sic intelligendum, quod per passionem Christi sit a diabolo ablatam totaliter potestas nocendi, et tentandi, sed quod per eam potestas detinendi animas iustorum nihil habentes purgabile totaliter ab eo est ablata et potestas nocendi, et tentandi sibi est restricta quod signatum est Apoc. 20 per ligationem diaboli, secundum quod patet per glossam ibidem. Per passionem etiam Christi virtus nostra multipliciter est adiuta, quia per eam gratiae adiutorium nobis abundantis infinitus et veritas patet manifestius, et angeli nos custodiunt diligentius. Et ideo diabolus non ita potest humana corpora violentare, sicut ante. Nec ita vehementer potest nos per suas tentationes, ad

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peccatum inclinare, nec ita faciliter decipere hominum intellectus.\textsuperscript{71}

Richard here shows that he is not in full concord with Bonaventure on the working of salvation. Both agree that Christ’s incarnation has salvific consequences. Bonaventure accepted that Christ performed further salvific acts but argued that these were done not for the sake of satisfying God but for the benefit of humanity, to ‘repair, restore and renew’ it. Richard takes a different path: he claims that these further acts of Christ beyond the incarnation were not directed towards God or humanity but instead toward Satan, to free humanity from diabolical power and to restrict the devil’s activities and influence in the future. While Bonaventure seeks, through Christ’s self-sacrifice, to undo the consequences of sin, Richard gives greater attention to the effect of that self-sacrifice on what he sees as the origin of that sin, the devil.

Bonaventure had written of sin as that which disfigures humanity, distorting it from how it had been created by God and causing it to occupy a place that was not its own in the hierarchy of creation.\textsuperscript{72} This disfigurement

\textsuperscript{71} ‘I reply that through Christ’s passion we are freed from devilish power. Hence Augustine says in Book IV of De Trinitate 13: “Christ the innocent victim overcame the devil through the fairest law, and freed us from the captivity that came about on account of sin, by his just blood flowing out for the unjust” but this is not to be understood that, through Christ’s passion, the power to harm and to tempt was completely taken away from the devil. But through the passion, the power to imprison the souls of the just who have nothing from which to be purged, is taken away completely from him and his power to harm and to tempt is curtailed, as is indicated through “the bond of the devil” in Apocalypse 20, as is clear in the Glossa on the same place. Moreover, through Christ’s passion, our virtue is aided in manifold ways since through it the aid of grace is infused in us more abundantly, the truth is apparent more clearly and the angels care for us more diligently. And thus the devil cannot harm human flesh as previously nor, through his temptations, can he so vehemently bend us to sin nor so easily deceive the understanding of humanity’. Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 2. The reference to the gloss is: ‘Sciendum quod similiter in Abraham et aliis fidelibus diabolus fuit ligatus in istis praesentibus sed in illis ligavit spes futuri Christi, in istis ipse Christus adveniens ligavit’. ‘It should be noted that, likewise, in case of Abraham and others of the faithful, the devil was bound in keeping with those matters, but he bound in them the hope of Christ yet to be, the coming Christ bound it in his very self’ – Glossa, Revelations 20: 2.

\textsuperscript{72} See page 114 above.
was such that not only did it mar humanity but it prevented humanity from enjoying that relationship with God that was proper to it. Impeded in that divine relationship, it could not attain without aid the grace necessary for its own restoration.\textsuperscript{73} That aid came from Jesus Christ to ‘repair, restore and renew’ humanity. The harm from sin flows from its own nature not some external punishment. The figure of the devil scarcely appears in Bonaventure and certainly not as a propagator of evil.

In contrast, for Richard the harm of sin and its sway over humankind is much more closely identified with the figure of the devil. Prior to the coming of Christ, Richard holds that humanity was subjected to diabolical power which extended to holding back even the innocent from the attainment of paradise.\textsuperscript{74} With the shedding of Christ’s blood in the passion, this situation changed; the devil’s power abated and his future influence was fettered. Although Richard does link this to the pouring out of Christ’s blood, nowhere does he expressly state that it is \textit{paid to the devil} as the price of human redemption.\textsuperscript{75} Richard clarifies his understanding of ‘redeeming’ thus:

\begin{quote}
Propter peccata nostra iuste permittebant Deus nos esse in diaboli servitute; per peccatum etiam eramus obligati poenae aeternae et alienati, non a Dei potestate cui cuncta subjecta sunt, sed a clara Dei visione ad quam familiares admittuntur. Dico quod Christus in hoc, quod moriendo visit diabolum, redemit nos ab eius servitute, sicut aliquis sacrificiens iudici pro culpa
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{73} See, for example, Bonaventure \textit{Sent.} III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6 or \textit{Breviloquium} III, 5.

\textsuperscript{74} Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sent.} III, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3.

\textsuperscript{75} Earlier authors had argued that due to human sin, humanity had been ‘handed over’ to the devil to enjoy as he wished until the coming of Christ, then humanity would be liberated. This is not Richard’s notion. John McIntyre, \textit{Studies in the Doctrine of the Death of Christ} (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1992), pp. 29-32 or Sheets, \textit{The Theology of the Atonement}, pp. 14-15. Anselm had not accepted this either and it would seem to have been to disprove this notion was part of Anselm’s motivation to compose the \textit{Cur Deus Homo}. Anselm, \textit{Cur Deus Homo}, Praefatio. See further Richard Southern, \textit{Saint Anselm and his Biographer} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 94-96.
homicidae, redemit illum homicidam a morte. In hoc etiam quod summo Patri seipsum moriendo pro nobis obtulit sacrificium, quo nos reconciliavit et ianuam ad vivendum Deum nobis aperuit, vere dicitur nos redemisse quia redimere est illud, quod suum erat vel esse debeat, sibi restituere, maxime pretio interveniente. 76

Note that in this conception of redemption, the sacrifice of Christ is not completely efficacious; the devil’s power is merely diminished by the shedding of Christ’s blood but not extinguished. This permits Richard to explain conveniently the enduring presence of sin and misery in the world notwithstanding the redemption by Christ but, frustratingly, he does not make entirely clear how or why this power of Satan endures, albeit in a weakened form. This contrasts with the answers that he gives to the other questions within this article of the commentary. In a truly thorough example of the dialectician’s art, he explains how Christ’s passion freed humanity from its guilt by considering the effect of it on the formal, efficient, dispositive, instrumental and sufficient causes of human guilt. 77 Similarly, he gives a detailed threefold explanation of how it is that humanity is freed from both temporal and eternal punishment for its faults. 78

Despite the lack of explanation for only a partial inhibition of satanic power, it is clear that Richard clung tenaciously to the Anselmian idea that a sacrifice to the Father on the part of Christ was an essential element in the

76 ‘On account of our sins, God justly permitted us to be in servitude to the devil; and further, due to sin, we were bound to eternal punishment and estranged, not from the power of God to which all things are subject, but from the bright vision of God to which the beloved are admitted. I say that, in dying, he overcame the devil and Christ in this redeemed us from his servitude, just as someone making an offering to a judge for the guilt of a murderer redeems that murderer from death. In this case, he offered his very self to the Father Most High, by which we were reconciled and the door to the living God was opened for us - truly it is said that we are redeemed, since this is to redeem: to restore to him that which what was his, or ought to be, through a substantial payment as bailment’. Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 19, a. 2, q. 1.
77 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1.
78 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 3-4.
attainment of human salvation. This was not so for all his Franciscan predecessors. At the forefront of those stands Bonaventure who located the key salvific event in the incarnation of Christ, not in Christ’s passion and death.\(^79\) For Richard, a sacrifice by Christ to make satisfaction to God in order to attain human liberty remained an important element in soteriology.

This does not signify that Richard saw no salvific role for the incarnation. Not in the soteriology section of his sentence commentary but in earlier distinctions dealing with the incarnation, Richard walks in the footsteps of Eudes Rigaud and also considers, ‘Utrum congruum fuisset Dei filium incarnari si natura humana permansisset in statu innocentiae’.\(^80\) Richard shows himself to be yet another Franciscan willing to entertain the possibility of the incarnation even in the absence of human sin and to find some other reason for it. ‘Sine praedicio concedi potest, etiam si natura humana permansisset in statu innocentia adhuc congruum fuisset Dei filium incarnari’.\(^81\) As Bonaventure had done in the *Hexaëmeron*, Richard’s reasoning is derived from a reading of I Corinthians 12 in which Paul speaks of humanity as members of the mystical body of Christ, with Jesus as its head.\(^82\) Richard asserts that it would be absurd for God to have created humanity as God had done, and yet not provide it with its head unless humanity might sin. It would be nonsensical to gift humanity with union to the divine only if it did wrong, rewarding humanity with nothing lest it sin.

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\(^79\) See pages 132-33 above.
\(^80\) ‘Whether it was fitting that the Son of God become incarnate if human nature had remained in a state of innocence.’ Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* III, d. 1, a. 2, q. 4.
\(^81\) ‘Without prejudice, it can be conceded that even if human nature had remained in a state of innocence, even so it was fitting that the Son of God become incarnate’. Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* III, d. 1, a. 2, q. 4.
\(^82\) See page 146 above.
Richard reasons that thus God must have intended the incarnation from the beginning of creation and for reasons independent of the human fall.83

7.7 THE CONGRUITY OF SALVATION FOR GOD

This does not signify that Richard abandoned Bonaventurian notions of salvation entirely. Richard not only accepts this but makes his own addition to this approach.

Congruum fuit naturam humanam reparari et ex parte Dei et ex parte hominis. Ex parte Dei, quia in reparatone humanae naturae manifestata est Dei potencia, quia per hoc patet ipsum omnem defectum nostrum per suam potentiam vicesse. Manifestata est etiam Dei sapientia, quia per hoc claruit ipsum nullam creaturam frustra fecisse. Manifestata est etiam eius misericordia, quia per hoc patet ipsum proprii plasmatis infirmitatem non despexit."84

Like Bonaventure, he acknowledges that it was ‘fitting’ that humanity be restored but whereas Bonaventure wrote exclusively on how this was ‘congruus’ for humanity, Richard goes further and points out that it was fitting also for God that God do such a thing, in that it enabled the manifestation of God’s power, wisdom and mercy.

In making that claim, Richard is not just adding to what Bonaventure had said but, philosophically, straying into areas that Bonaventure had studiously shunned. If it is accepted that God is a perfect being and one argues that a certain course of action is more fitting to God than some other, then it can be said with confidence that God, the perfect being, is bound to

83 Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 1, a. 2, q. 4.
84 ‘It was fitting that human nature be restored both on the part of God and on the part of humanity. On the part of God, since in the restoration of human nature the power of God was made visible, and because by this it is clear that our every fault has been overcome by his power. Also, God’s wisdom was displayed, since through this it made clear that no creature was made in vain. Yet further, it showed forth God’s mercy, since through this it is clear that God did not disdain the frailty of his handiwork’. Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 1.
choose the more apt course of action and bound to act in a certain way. In
other words, Richard had arguably posited necessity upon God. Richard,
conscious of this, creates a new question in his sentence commentary
specifically to address this: ‘Utrum necessarium fuerit naturam humanam
reparari’.

Respondeo quantum ad praesens sufficit, potest
distingui duplex necessitas, scilicet absoluta et conditionata.
Primo modo non fuit necessarium naturam humanam reparari, nec ex parte Dei, nec ex parte humanæ naturæ, quia Deus nihil producit extra se tali necessitate, nec reparatio tali necessitate humanæ debeat naturæ.
Secundo modo loquendo de necessitate necessarium fuit naturam humanam reparari et ex parte Dei et ex parte naturæ humanæ, quia ex praesuppositione divinæ ordinationis qua Deus ordinaverat naturam humanam reparare, necessarium fuit non necessitate coactionis, sed inmutabilitas, quod eam repararet. Si etiam natura humana perventura erat ad suum finem, scilicet ad claram Dei visionem, necessarium fuit causa reparari, quia aliter ad illam visionem pertingere nullatenus potuisset.85

Richard is attempting to assign predictable behaviour to God without
actually predicating necessity of God. In essence, he argues that if in God’s
wisdom, God has already ordained a particular end for humanity, then God’s
unchanging perfection means that God will continue to ordain such an end
for humanity. Put otherwise, God predictably restores humanity not from

85 ‘Whether there was a necessity that human nature be restored’. ‘I reply that it is enough for present purposes, that there can be distinguished a twofold necessity, namely an absolute and a conditional.
In the former, it was not necessary that human nature be restored, neither on the part of God nor on the part of human nature, since God for God’s self produces nothing beyond what is necessary, and the restoration of human nature ought not to have been so necessary.
In the latter manner of speaking of necessity, it was necessary that human nature be restored both on the part of God and on the part of human nature since it flows from presupposition of the divine ordering that God had ordained that human nature be restored. It was necessary, not by constraint of necessity but of immutability, that it was restored. For if human nature was going to reach its end, namely the brilliant vision of God, for this reason it was necessary that it be restored, since otherwise it would not by any means at all have been able to reach that vision’. Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 2.
strict necessity or obligation but rather as part of the process of carrying out what God had already decided to do.\textsuperscript{86}

It is not an entirely satisfying solution and it is ill-equipped to deal with, for example, human free will and Richard is unwilling to go further. He concurs with Bonaventure that human nature was to be restored and that this was not through Christ’s passion because of some necessity. Any other means could have been chosen by God and have been sufficient.\textsuperscript{87} However, Richard distinguishes himself from Bonaventure in the remaining question in the soteriological section of his commentary.

7.8 Satisfaction

The third question of the twentieth distinction had normally been one that examined whether it was Christ who had to make satisfaction for humanity.\textsuperscript{88} Richard uniquely alters that question and asks instead, ‘Utrum per satisfactionem conveniens fuit naturam humanam reparari’.\textsuperscript{89} For him the focus of the question is not if the restoration should be done through Christ but whether satisfaction is the way in which such restoration ought to have been brought about.

Given his line of argument to this point, expecting a substantial reliance upon Anselm and an emphasis on the place of satisfaction in

\textsuperscript{86} Further, God as an atemporal being possessed no potential and is pure act; the result of a decision by God to act in a certain way, such as save humanity, is instantaneous. This is so even if human beings, as temporal beings, experience that decision as sequential in time. Thus for God there is no sequence of events to which God is obliged. This argument is developed further in the context of human salvation most famously in John Duns Scotus, \textit{Opera Omnia}, ed. by Commissio Scotistica, 12 Vols (Vatican City: Typis Vaticanis, 2004), X, ‘Reportatio Parisiensa III, d. 7, q. 4.

\textsuperscript{87} Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 4. Cf pages 112 ff. above.

\textsuperscript{88} For example, ‘Utrum aliquid creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano’, ‘Whether some other wholly created being was able to make satisfaction for the entire human race’, Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3. See page 324 below.

\textsuperscript{89} ‘Whether it was fitting that human nature was restored through satisfaction’. Richard of Middleton, Sent. III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3.
salvation is justifiable. Richard makes no less than five references to the *Cur Deus Homo* in the course of his answer. However, the answer that Richard gives is much closer to Bonaventure than Anselm and he expressly argues against the latter. Richard begins by accepting that human restoration could have been achieved by any means of God’s choosing and did not, from necessity, have to be through some satisfactory act. Like Bonaventure, he believes satisfaction by Christ was merely the most fitting way in which it could be done but, unlike Bonaventure, it was not because it was opposite to what had occurred in the fall and therefore the best remedy for it. Richard gives his attention again to the degree to which it was fitting for God so to have acted and he holds that satisfaction was the most fitting because it was the best manner for God to show forth God’s mercy and justice. Richard argues that if ‘all the ways of the Lord are mercy and justice’ then the manner which shows these forth best is the most fitting. Had God merely restored human nature, Richard argues that this would have been merciful but without satisfaction it would not have shown justice, since the wrong of the fall would have been unexpurgated. Likewise, if only satisfaction had been rendered, this would have demonstrated justice but not mercy without restoration. The most fitting response is thus restoration attained through satisfaction. Equally, for humanity, it was the most fitting act for, if it were to make satisfaction, nothing could be greater than the offering of that perfect man and highpoint of creation, the instance of humanity to whom was joined divinity. Richard’s genius is to utilise the solution of Anselm,

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90 See pages 138-41 above.
91 Richard alludes to a number of Psalms in which that expression or close cognate appears: Psalms 24:5, 84:11, 88:11 and 102:13.
92 Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3.
93 Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3.
that humanity *ought* to make satisfaction but only God *can* make satisfaction and so a God-man is needed, but to clothe it in a distinctly Franciscan approach to the issue. Anselm is driven to his answer because of the shortcomings of human nature but Richard attains his through a more fitting and perfect expression of the divine nature.

Considering Satan in soteriological discussions and revisiting the topic of satisfaction can cause Richard to be read as somewhat conservative. However, the episcopal decrees of the 1270s, the continuing aftermath of the secular-mendicant controversy, the errors of the Joachites and the swelling discord around the Spirituals all inclined Richard to give refinement to the ideas in his theology that had already passed to him in his training at the Grand Couvent. He adds the idea of divine congruity to Bonaventure’s notions of how apt salvation is to humanity. Origen’s statement on payment to Satan for human liberty is recast as overcoming diabolic power. Alexander of Hales championed a role for Christ’s humanity in salvation but it was Richard who devised a better explanation of how this occurred. He artfully did this while still portraying himself as meticulous in his observance of Bishop Tempier’s decrees, thoroughly orthodox and very much the upholder of the tradition which he had received. He may appear conservative in his thinking but the comprehensive nature of the genre of a sentence commentary and the theological continuity that the Franciscan education system in Paris fostered all inclined Richard to produce his theology in the manner in which he did.

With all these approaches and traditions, Richard synthesised the new soteriological material coming from the Franciscans. Both he and Matthew of
Aquasparta wrote during the transition from the Neoplatonism favoured by Bonaventure but waning from fashion in the university to the newer interest in Aristotelianism. Both authors evidence a desire to hold on to the earlier Franciscan insights and, in good scholastic fashion, to blend them with what is being acquired through the new Aristotelian approach. Richard’s particular gift was to clarify the content of both traditions by distinguishing the ideas of redemption and salvation. That simple step achieved two things. Firstly, it aligned the Franciscan approach to salvation more closely with the New Testament conviction on the place of Christ’s passion in human redemption, doing so in a way that Bonaventure with his marginalisation of satisfaction had not, and preserved a soteriological role for satisfaction. It also kept Franciscan teaching in step with the Anselmian tradition being taught elsewhere and that still prevailed within the university approach to soteriology. Arguably, without the corrective moderation that Richard brought, the Bonaventurian impetus on Franciscan teaching would have caused it to travel ever further from the mainstream of teaching in the university whose theology adhered to Anselm’s theories. Such a state of affairs would only have increased suspicion of the friars’ orthodoxy and led in time to further storms. Sensitive to this, Richard produced theological texts that were capable of being ‘all things to all people’ and satisfy Franciscan innovators, vigilant episcopal agents and colleagues in the faculty of theology. Richard’s teaching anchored the Franciscan tradition, and the Franciscan school in Paris, amid the theologically orthodox. The content of

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94 For example, Romans 6:4 or 8:2, Philippians 2:30, Hebrews 2:9. For Bonaventure and the passion, see p. 133 above.
95 1 Corinthians 9:22.
Richard's output in soteriology arose from the Parisian setting and genre of his theological activity.
Roger Marston and Peter Falco, authors of the decade that followed Richard of Middleton, continued the process of bridging the Franciscan insights to the older tradition they had received. In the case of Roger and Peter, however, the older tradition that they received was of the Franciscan approach to theology favoured in Oxford, a legacy of Robert Grosseteste. The meeting of the Franciscan traditions with this Oxonian influence showed itself in their interest in how one might understand the physical effects of the fall and the consequences of that for soteriology. Sadly, from neither does a sentence commentary survive but their thought is accessible through disputed questions and quodlibets.

These two friars shared obscure origins. Peter’s work has frequently been confused with that of other authors and even today there is some doubt that he ever existed or, if he did, that he was a Franciscan.¹ In the case of Roger Marston, we can at least be confident in his existence and in his status as an Englishman of the English Franciscan province but further details are harder to establish.²

Tradition has placed Roger’s birthplace in Marston, Oxfordshire.³

Because of the university statutes governing the minimum age for masters,

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² Thomas of Eccleston, De Adventu Fratrum Minorum, ed. by Andrew G. Little, p. 147.
³ England in the thirteenth century had thirty-two locations called ‘Marston’: Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, ed. by Gerard F. Etzkorn and Ignatius C. Brady, Bibliotheca Franciscana Medii Aevi, 26 (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1968), p. 8*. Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventurae, Bibliotheca
Roger can have been born no later than 1239 but an earlier birth is more likely. Roger went initially to the provincial studium in Oxford, and was then sent on to Paris for further study. Uncharacteristically for theologians of this era, he provided historians with some personal comments about his time there. He notes that he was personally present at a famed disputation in Paris involving such prominent figures as Gerard of Abbeville, John Pecham, Thomas Aquinas and some two dozen other masters of the university. As John Pecham became regent master in Paris in October of 1269 and Gerard of Abbeville left office in the middle of 1271, Roger must have been present in Paris between those dates. That dating would mean that he was probably a student of Pecham and a fellow pupil with Matthew of Aquasparta. It is known that Roger successfully concluded his studies in Paris by 1276, for in that year Roger is recorded as being back in Oxford teaching there. In 1285 he took up a post at Cambridge where he stayed until his election as Minister Provincial of England in 1292. He died in 1303 in Norwich, where his tomb survives.

Three Quaestiones Disputatae have survived, namely Quaestiones De Emanatione Aeterna, De Statu Naturae Lapsae and De Anima, as well as
four sets of quodlibetal questions.\textsuperscript{10} There are three extant manuscripts of the *De Statu Naturae Lapsae* and two of these are accompanied by John Pecham’s *Quaestiones Disputatae de Peccato Originali*, which suggests that they had a common origin, most likely Paris where Pecham was then master.\textsuperscript{11} Etzkorn and Brady have noted that the questions *De Anima* seem to have provoked a response from Adam of Lincoln, a Franciscan friar of Oxford, who published his own opinion on very similar questions. This has prompted them to place those questions from Roger’s time at Oxford.\textsuperscript{12} In the case of *De Emanatione Aeterna*, the text makes reference to the other two sets of disputed questions which would mean that these were the earliest composed.\textsuperscript{13} Thus the sequence of the questions upon which Etzkorn and Brady settled was *De Statu Naturae Lapsae* first, prior to 1276, and probably originating in Paris, then *De Anima* coming later and probably from Oxford and finally *De Emanatione Aeterna* from Roger’s time at either Oxford or Cambridge.\textsuperscript{14}

Of the quodlibets, the earlier two sets survive in two manuscripts both including the disputed questions from Roger’s time in England so it would seem that the quodlibets are also from his time in England.\textsuperscript{15} The third and fourth set of quodlibets are more confidently identified as having originated in Oxford, as all manuscripts of them are included in codices containing works of Oxford scholars such as Thomas Sutton and Richard Clive.\textsuperscript{16} Thus Quodlibets I-IV are probably in chronological order and all derive from

\textsuperscript{10} Roger Marston, *Quaestiones Disputatae*, pp. xxxv-xlii.
\textsuperscript{12} Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, p. 39*.
\textsuperscript{13} Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, pp. 36*-37*.
\textsuperscript{14} Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, p. 40*.
\textsuperscript{15} Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, pp. 44*, 69*.
\textsuperscript{16} Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, p. 45*. 
Roger’s time teaching in England, and quite probably from his period at Oxford.¹⁷

8.1 Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae

Thus, Roger’s oldest work to be encountered that pertains to soteriology is his *Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae*, a work of just two questions but both relevant to this discussion. He sets out the first question thus:

Postquam quaesitum est de rebus divinis, prosequendum est de humanis; et quia totius religionis christianae praecipuum fundamentum est lapsus humani generis, quia ex eo ponitur Incarnationis necessitas, quaesitum fuit utrum sit in nobis aliquis defectus veniens per originem. Et haec quaestio duos habet articulos. Nam primo probatum fuit quod isti defectus, qui sunt in nobis, ut ignorantia et difficultas, mortalitas et concupiscencia, non insint nobis ab origine vitiosa, sed a creatione. Secundo, dato quod tales defectus sint in nobis ab origine, quod non habeant rationem culpae.¹⁸

Roger’s answer adheres to the now established Franciscan position: there was no intrinsic defect in humanity needing the incarnation for its ‘correction’. Roger does, however, show ingenuity in his new reasoning behind these conclusions.

As well as demonstrating a typically Oxford preference for the use of natural philosophy in engaging in theology,¹⁹ Roger also discloses a quite

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¹⁷ Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, pp. 45*-6*.
¹⁸ ‘After inquiring of divine matters, it must follow to ask of human matters; and since the fall of the human race is the foundation of all religion and especially the Christian religion, since the need for the incarnation is posited from this, it had been asked whether there be in us some defect coming through our origin. And this question has two articles. Firstly, it is discussed whether these defects which are in us as ignorance and hardship, mortality and concupiscence, were not ours from the source of wrong-doing but from creation. Secondly, given that such defects were in us from our origin, that they are not the reason for our guilt’. Roger Marston, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae* I, p. 149.
¹⁹ See pages 166-69 above.
sophisticated classical education in his answer, employing Plato, Homer and even Pythagoras in the course of his reasoning.  He considers in turn each of those four identified ills from the fall. In the case of mortality, Roger notes that Providence has endowed all beings with the ability to overcome the afflictions of the world: wounds will heal, fevers will break and bones will knit, since this is the way of nature. Roger observes that this is not so with death and against it there is no protection. This, Roger proposes, is evidence that it was not part of nature from its beginning but rather was introduced later. In the case of concupiscence, Roger again turns to nature and observes that our very bodies react to disordered desires. Not only do humans feel the displeasure of an offended conscience but the flesh itself changes colour, going red with shame, a response it never makes when doing good in accordance with divine law and the regular workings of nature. From this, Roger again reasons that concupiscence must be foreign to authentic human nature.

Again, nature is the source for his argument that ignorance too is not native to humanity. ‘A parte vero cognitivae sensibilis hoc idem patet, quia homo, cum sit dignissima creaturarum, est ceteris animantibus magis hebes in sensibus’. Roger notes the excellence of the human mind and intellect that far exceeds all other beings and yet wonders how it is that humans cannot see, hear or smell as much of the world around it as other creatures can. This appears to Roger as a disordering of nature and a sign that humanity was placed into ignorance after the perfect creation of the world.

23 Roger Marston, ‘On the part of the cognitive senses, this matter is clear, that humanity, even though the worthiest of creatures, is duller than other creatures in the senses’. *Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae* I, p. 159.
Finally he considers the matter of hardship. For Roger, there is a clear scriptural establishment in Genesis 3: 17-19 of hardship as a later infliction upon humanity and not its own from creation.\textsuperscript{24} He also draws once more upon natural philosophy in establishing this, for he observes that animals have no trouble in knowing what is necessary for their own well-being but that the human mind is frequently ignorant of what is needed and so brings hardship upon itself.\textsuperscript{25} Against the pattern seen elsewhere in nature, humanity is observed often to make decisions that are harmful to itself. Displaying once again his classical education, Roger notes that even though both Plato and Aristotle, and numerous of their disciples, wrote about and argued for the existence of but one God, they continued to offer sacrifices to the various and multitudinous deities of the Greek pantheon. He even quotes Cicero’s observation that ‘[homo] non ut a matre, sed ut a noverca natura editum in vitam corpore nudo, fragili et infirmo, animo autem anxio ad molestias, humili ad timores, molli ad labores, prono ad libidines in quo tamen inesset tamquam obrutus quidam divinus ignis ingenii’.\textsuperscript{26} Roger concludes that this is evidence that hardship is not humanity’s natural state and was a later imposed.

The second half of Roger’s initial question inquires as to the cause of culpability in the generations after Adam. Roger concedes that this is a

\textsuperscript{24} ‘And to Adam he said: Because you have hearkened to the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded you, that you should not eat, cursed is the earth in your work: with labour and toil will you eat thereof all the days of your life. Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to you, and you shall eat the herbs of the earth. In the sweat of your face shall you eat bread till you return to the earth out of which you were taken: for dust you are, and into dust you shall return.’ Genesis 3: 17-19.

\textsuperscript{25} Roger Marston, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I}, p. 159.

\textsuperscript{26} ‘A man is not brought forth into this life by his mother but by nature, his stepmother, in a naked, frail and weak body and with a spirit as much subject to anxiety with worries, abasement with fears, weakness from labours, susceptibility to lusts as the divine spark of genius is overwhelmed’. Roger Marston, \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae I}, 160. The quotation is drawn from Marcus Tullius Cicero, \textit{De Re Publica}, ed. by J. G. F. Powell, Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), III. 1.
difficult matter and notes that even Augustine struggled to resolve this perplexity: if these ills of hardship, ignorance, mortality and concupiscence were introduced as a result of the fall, how can it be that later generations were visited with the punishment of the fault of some other person from centuries earlier? There is much to say of Roger’s approach to original sin but for the purposes of understanding his soteriology, it is enough to make the following observations. Roger is adamant that guilt lies upon the soul but also that each soul is created afresh by God and uniquely infused into each new person. To argue that the guilt was transmitted to each new person is to claim that God creates imperfect and tainted souls and Roger rejects this.

Roger also resists a view of the punishment for the fall as some sort of congenital defect passed through birth from Adam to his posterity. Rather, he argues that as a result of the sin of Adam, that first sin subjected the body to those ills of ignorance, hardship, concupiscence and mortality. As a result, the confounded body makes poor and harmful choices, affecting others in turn, inducing them also to sin, just as happened between Eve and Adam. Having sinned, these others were then also beset with the four flaws that Roger had identified. He maintains that the soul began as perfect but it, too, became misshapen and disordered by the effect of those four ills of the body in which it is embodied. Misinformed by its deficient senses, befuddled in its ignorance and so on under the influence of these ills, the human will was obstructed in its desire to do right. The bewildered soul thereby falls into sin and offends against what Roger terms the ‘original justice’ of God. The soul

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27 See, for example, Roger Marston, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae* I, p. 162.
28 Roger Marston, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae* I, p. 162-66. It takes little extrapolation to see readily how such reasoning could provide fertile soil for Scotus’ ideas on both liberation from sin and thus immaculate conception.
and its powers begin as perfect but become deceived, confounded and so then become misled.

Roger’s novelty is that he says that sin neither harms nor perverts the soul directly. Rather, sin introduces disorder and weakness into the body and the body misdirects the soul, making the soul prone to sin. Both for the individual concerned and those nearby, there is a cascading chain of consequence from that first sin.

The significance to soteriology in what Roger has expressed here is in his conviction that the ongoing ill of the fall flows not from some direct punishment from God but from the fourfold elements to marred human nature. Any salvation of humanity must, therefore for Roger, redress these defects. It is from these that humanity must be rescued and liberated if it is to be saved from the effects of the fall.

8.2 Peter Falco and the Source of Human Suffering

Roger was not alone in pondering the origin of human suffering derived from the fall. Peter Falco considered this also during his time in Paris, probably in the late 1280s. Peter, now generally considered to have been a friar of the province of Aquitaine, left only a solitary set of disputed questions and one set of quodlibetal questions.

Of these, just one question is pertinent to this study: ‘Utrum peccatum originale sit in essentia animae vel in potentia ut in subjecto primo?’ Like

31 ‘Whether original sin be in the essence or the potential of the soul in the first subject’. Alexandre-Jean Gondras, ‘Pierre de Falco: Quaestiones Disputatae de Quolibet’, Archives
Roger, he turned his mind to the issue of the origin of sin so as to understand how humanity might be set free from it. Roger held that the punishment of sin directly affected only the mind and body but not the soul. The harm to the soul was indirect and had to be inflicted individually to each soul as they all began in perfection. Peter Falco explored whether the influence of that sin was of the essence of the soul, from its very origin, or did the soul possess only the possibility of sin, which may or may not arise later? If the former, then any salvation must involve a remaking of the soul in some fashion, but if the latter, then what is required soteriologically is only a restoration of the physical body to its original state.

As a quodlibet, the list of authorities in Peter’s answer is typically brief. Peter gives no authority, arguing that the origin of sin does lie in the soul’s essence other than common observation and against the proposition he cites only the *Retractationes* of Augustine. Peter’s own response, though, is very much of the mould of Roger Marston.

Peter makes use of the philosophical distinction between an event having active and proximate causes. Just as the sun is the active source of heat but we are actually warmed by the air around us, the proximate cause, that has been warmed in turn by the sun. Likewise, he argues, original sin was the active cause of the soul’s suffering but what Peter terms the ‘infected body’ was the proximate cause of that suffering; sin affected the body which

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*d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 33 (1966), 105-236 (p. 163). This is Part IV, Question 1 of the quodlibet.

32 ‘Peccatum autem quod nusquam est nisi in voluntate, illud praeceipue intelligendum est, quod justa damnatio consecuta est’. ‘But because sin be nowhere save in the will, it is chiefly to be understood that damnation is a just consequence’. Augustine of Hippo, *Retractationes*, ed. by Almut Mutzenbecher, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 57 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1984), XV. 2.
in turn affected the soul. This is an argument very close to that of Roger
Marston. Peter’s addition to what Roger had established is to look closer at
what was the nature of the change wrought upon the soul through its
infusion within an ‘infected body’.

Peter proposes that original sin is the actual cause of a deprivation of
justice while the proximate cause was concupiscence in the will, the ‘tinder of
sin’.

In other words, the fall wrought in humanity a loss of the sense of
original justice, the right and proper ordering of the cosmos, and this loss
found expression in humanity’s disordered desires and impaired ability to
reason and make moral choices. Hence, Peter argues, there is not an array of
different sins but just one: the human desire for that which is harmful to
itself.

Nec tamen sunt multa peccata, sed unum. Sicut enim in
pluribus actibus virium inferiorum est unum peccatum
actuale, quando una numero est inordinatio vel aversio
in voluntate, ut patet in homicidio vel adulterio, ad
quae concurrunt actus multarum potentiarum, tamen
unum peccatum faciunt, quia imperantur ab una
voluntate, ita in peccato orginali est multiplex
inordinatio potentiarum inferiorum, tamen unum
peccatum originale constituunt, in quantum
conjunguntur uni aversioni habituali voluntatis, scilicet
carentiae justitiae orginalis.

From a soteriological perspective, Peter concurs with Roger: human
salvation requires the healing of the ills of the body so that a soul might be

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33 Gondras, ‘Pierre de Falco’, p. 164, being Question IV. 1 of Falco’s quodlibet.
34 In medieval moral theology, ‘concupiscence’ was understood in the broader sense of
‘disordered desire’. See, for example, Bonaventure, Breviloquium, III. 5.
35 Peter Falco, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, IV. 1; Gondras, ‘Pierre de Falco’, pp. 165-66.
36 ‘For there are not many sins, but one. For just as in the many deeds of lesser people is
actually one sin, so disorder or distortion in the will is to be reckoned as one in number, as is
clear in murder or adultery, in which acts many possibilities run together yet make one sin
since they are ordered by the one will. So in that the original sin is a disordered composite of
lesser possibilities but making up one original sin, inasmuch as they are joined into one
habitual disorder of the will, namely the want of original justice’, Peter Falco, Quaestiones
Quodlibetales, IV. 1; Gondras, ‘Pierre de Falco’, p. 166.
freed from the influence of the flawed body and thereby become
unencumbered and ordered once again to original justice.

This is not a completely new idea of Peter or Roger and this approach
to sin had been used by others before them. For example, this same idea had
been present in the writings of Bonaventure:

Mirum autem videtur, cum ostensum sit, quod Deus sit
ita propinquus mentibus nostris, quod tam paucorum
est in se ipsis primum principium speculari. Sed ratio
est in promptu, quia mens humana, sollicitudinibus
distracta, non intrat ad se per memoriam;
phantasmatis obnubilata, non redit as se per
intelligentiam; concupiscentii illecta, ad se ipsam
nequaquam revertitur per desiderium suavitatis
internae et laetitiae spiritualis. Ideo totaliter in his
sensibilibus iacens, non potest ad se tanquam ad Dei
imaginem reintrare.  

For Bonaventure, as much as for Peter and Roger, the soul remains the image
of God and a thing of intrinsic goodness, but it is united to a body corrupted,
distorted and enfeebled by the effect of sin, and so becomes deceived and
bewildered. What Peter and Roger do that is new is take this idea and
integrate it into their soteriology. For them, were these physical ills to be
lifted, these ‘matters of the senses’ as Bonaventure termed them, then the
soul could be reset aright and salvifically.

8.3 Human Restoration

Roger goes further once he has identified these ills of the fall. He turns to the
second and final disputed question in his set to consider human capacity to

37 ‘It seems amazing, when it has been shown that God is so close to our souls, that so few
should be aware of the First Principle within themselves. But the reason is at hand: because
the human soul, distracted with worries, does not enter into itself through
memory; befuddled with phantasms, it does not return back to itself through understanding;
enticed with wayward desires, it in no way returns to itself through a desire for inner
sweetness or spiritual joy. Thus, lying completely amongst matters of the senses, it cannot
enter again into itself as into the image of God.’ Bonaventure, Itinerarium Mentis in Deum,
IV. 1.
be freed from that ill: ‘Supposito lapsu humani generis, quaeritur utrum homo possit ex puris naturalibus acquirere rectitudinem voluntatis. Et probatum fuit primo quod sic, primo per auctoritatem, secundo per rationem’. To suggest, as this question does, that humanity was capable of re-attaining uprightness of will from its own resources, is at first glance, a rather unexpected position. He appears to be very close to the heresy of Pelagianism, the belief that people could attain their own salvation without divine assistance, a position ultimately condemned at the Council of Ephesus in 431.

Roger is quite cognisant of the possibility of accusations of Pelagianism, for he opens his response to the question thus:

Circa istam quaestionem aliter delirat haeretica pravitas, aliter somniat philosophica vanitas, aliter determinat catholica veritas. Nam haeretici Pelagiani, Dei gratiam impugnantes, dixerunt quod homo ex puris naturalibus potest sibi acquirere perfectam iustitiam et mereri Dei gratiam ad facilius implenda praecepta Dei, quae potest homo ex naturalibus tantum perfecte implere, quamvis difficilius quam opitulante gratia.

Roger goes on to endorse emphatically the condemnations of Pelagianism by Augustine, leaving himself in the curious position that he denies Pelagianism yet asserts that humanity can attain rectitudo voluntatis by itself.

38 ‘Given the fall of the human race, it is asked whether humanity could, from its own nature, acquire uprightness of will. And it is proven that this is so, firstly by authority and secondly by reason’. Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae II, p. 174.


40 ‘Heretical perverseness babbles about this question one way and philosophical vanity fantasies about it in another and catholic truth determines in yet another way. For the Pelagian heretics, assailing God’s grace, say that humanity from its own nature can gain for itself perfect justice and merit God’s grace and quite readily fulfil God’s precepts, which humanity, by its own nature, can fulfil perfectly however much more difficult it may be than with the aid of grace’. Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae II, p. 182.
Roger takes as his starting point Ecclesiastes 7: 30: ‘Deus condidit hominem rectum et ipse se infinitis miscuit quaestionibus’.\(^{41}\) Roger says that there was a threefold rectitude originally in humanity: one directed to itself that opposed all obliquity, one directed to those beings lesser than itself to order them for their better life, and one directed to God that God might be loved perfectly. These he identifies, respectively, as the rectitudes of the rational soul, of original justice and of grace.\(^{42}\) Roger then proceeds to consider the consequence of the fall:

> Igitur homo lapsus in peccatum, quod est carentia debitae justitiae, iure aequissimo spoliatus est gratia, qua fuit acceptus et proficere potuit, et incurririt Dei offensam ut nihil operari posset Deo gratum aut quod sibi prodesset ad meritor, nisi prius sanaretur per gratiam liberum arbitrium, et sic esset Deo reconciliatus homo qui sponte se subdidit miserie servitutii.\(^{43}\)

By this reasoning, Roger argues that the fall impeded the flow of grace, which he had already established as being necessary for humanity to enter into perfect love of God. Without that grace, and hence the ability to love as it should, humanity was unable to enter into its proper relationship with God. This argument disposes of Pelagainism but it has other consequences. This deficiency in the rectitude of grace affects only humanity’s relationship with God, but says nothing of the other two rectitudes. The rectitude of a rational soul, which avoids obliquity, flows from human nature but is not dependent

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\(^{41}\) ‘God made man right, and he has entangled himself with an infinity of questions.’ The Vulgate text actually reads ‘Fecerit Deus hominem rectum et ipse se infinitis misuerit quaestionibus’.

\(^{42}\) Roger Marston, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae* II, p. 183.

\(^{43}\) ‘Thus humanity fallen in sin, which is a lack of that owed to justice, was deprived by a most just law of grace, which humanity had received and by which it was able to advance. Humanity caused offence to God so that nothing might be done pleasing to God or advance itself in merit, unless first it be healed through the grace of free will and so humanity, which willingly subjected itself to the misery of servitude, was reconciled to God.’ Roger Marston, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae* II, p. 184.
upon grace since it derives from the manner in which human beings and their souls were created. Likewise it also follows that it is possible for a rational human soul to deal justly with fellow human beings and so attain ‘rectitudo voluntatis’ by itself.44

The soteriological consequence of Roger’s reasoning is therefore that divine intervention is not needed for humanity to avoid obliquity, for that it can achieve for itself. Likewise, the rectitude that is directed to lower beings, being grounded in original justice, is unaffected by the fall and needs no remedy. That which must be restored to humanity is solely that rectitude directed towards God ‘secundum perfectissimam caritatem’.45 Grace is needed if humanity is to be able to redress its impaired relationship with God.

Considering both parts of this disputed question as a whole, Roger is significant for addressing two aspects of fallen humanity, the physical and the spiritual. The former, in particular, is an aspect that had been much neglected by the Franciscan writers to this point. While Bonaventure had indeed written of humanity being ‘repaired, restored and renewed’, it is Roger Marston who sets out what it would entail, in a physical sense, to place humanity back into the state that it had occupied prior to the fall: a liberation from hardship, mortality, ignorance and concupiscence. He brings also a specificity to the human nature that is spiritually required in order to be ‘saved’. Roger acknowledges that there is a great deal that is beneficial for humanity that can be done but notes that much of this does not strictly require the intervention of the divine. Divine engagement is, however,

44 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae II, pp. 184-6.
45 Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae II, p. 183.
essential in the restoration of human rectitude toward God and in the reinstatement of the ability, proper to human nature, to love God.

8.4 INCARNATION IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FALL

These ideas return in Roger’s arguments in his later series of quodlibets. These quodlibets were composed in Oxford and, as shall be seen, show arguments accommodating an English audience but they also demonstrate the influence of the Parisian approach which Roger carried back with him to England. Three of these questions pertain to soteriology:

- Quodlibet II, Question 5: Utrum Filius Dei incarnatus fuisset, si homo non pecasset?
- Quodlibet II, Question 13: Utrum si Adam restitisset primae tentationi, statim fuisset in gratia confirmatus?
- Quodlibet IV, Question 13: Utrum [Christus] nobis meruerit vitam in morte vel post?²⁴⁶

Roger’s answer to the first of these questions appears to reflect a recurring Franciscan interest in the relationship between the incarnation and the after-effects of the human fall, exploring whether the latter brought about the former. Despite Roger’s very Anselmian stance to this point, he concludes that the incarnation was not contingent of the fall. In doing so, he acknowledges that this is contrary to many early patristic authorities:

‘Sacri doctores antiqui studiose in hanc quaestionem laborantes, persuasiones pulchras et plurimas adduxerunt quibus conati sunt ostendere Dei Filium incarnandum fuisse, lapsu hominis circumscripto’.²⁴⁷

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²⁴⁶ ‘Whether the Son of God would have become incarnate if humanity had not sinned?’, ‘Whether, if Adam resisted the first temptation, he would have been confirmed at once in grace?’ and ‘Whether [Christ] merited life for us in his death or after?’ Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, pp. 153, 190 and 392 respectively.

²⁴⁷ ‘The holy teachers of old, studiously labouring at this question, proposed numerous beautiful arguments which attempted to show that the Son of God would have needed to become incarnate, simply put, on account of the fall of humanity’. Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, II. v, p. 154.
This does not daunt Roger and he adduces three arguments as to why he believes that the incarnation was to happen independently of the fall. The first argues from the nature of God: God is the highest good and no greater good than God can be imagined and so it follows that, in the act of creating the universe, God would create all things as well as God was able and nothing would be deprived of some greater good that, according to its nature, it was capable of enjoying.48 Yet the highest good of which the universe was capable was to enjoy union with its creator and perfection itself, through having the Son as part of it in the experience of the God-man. If this be the highest good of which the universe is capable, Roger argues that it is irrational for the entry of this greater good into the cosmos to be both conditional and to be brought about by a deed, the fall, that actually lessens the universe’s goodness. Rather, Roger claims, the incarnation must have been intended in the very creation of the universe, without reference to any possible fall of humanity.49

His second argument proceeds thus:

Secundo declaratur idem ex parte perfectionis universi et connexionis. Qualiter enim, ne desit pulchritudo universi et ne universitas sit imperfecta et minus decora, non omittit Deus naturam vermiculi et omitteret Christum, universitatis decus maximum? Licet enim Christi persona semper fuerit, non tamen semper Iesus Christus nominatur, scilicet ante ‘Verbum caro factum est’.50

48 Defining God as that greater than which cannot be imagined is some rhetorical adroitness on the part of Roger. This is part of Anselm’s own definition of God from his Proslogion 3.
49 This argument is not Roger’s own and in the course of it he draws quite liberally on the work of Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium. On the influence of Grosseteste in such topics and especially on the Franciscans of England, see Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Oxford Tradition of Theology; Little and Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians and Michael Robson, ‘Robert Grosseteste, His Memory Among the Greyfriars, his Cult in Lincoln Cathedral and the Petition for his Canonisation’, Miscellanea Francescana, 104 (2004), 306-23. See also pages 166-69 above.
50 ‘Secondly, it is also proven on the basis of the perfection and wholeness of the universe. For how, lest he be missing from the beauty of the universe and the universe be unfinished and less adorned, does God not leave out a grub’s birth and yet omit Christ, the universe’s
As an argument, this proposition that it would be absurd for a perfect God to have made the universe to be imperfect and incomplete is defensible enough. However, in the hands of Roger, it is but one premise in a more sophisticated philosophical argument he develops. Roger argues that inasmuch as God can be said to be the cause of all things, there is a way in which one can speak of God as having a role within the universe, but since God’s nature shares nothing with the created nature of the cosmos in genus or in species, it cannot be said that the universe participates in any unity according to genus. Since it lacks that factor of commonality, the universe is deprived, says Roger, of a wholeness and unity. If the universe is to possess these, it must do so through some means other than unity according to genus. ‘Non est enim rationi consonum quod universum, cum sit pulcherrimum et perfectissimum, participet unitatem debilissimam, cum perfectio et pulchritudo universi in unitate consistat, et maior pulchritudo in maiori unitate’.\footnote{For it is not harmonious with reason that the universe, when it is most beautiful and utterly perfect, enjoy a most fragile unity, when the perfection and beauty of the universe consist in greater beauty and unity. Roger Marston, \textit{Quodlibeta Quatuor}, II. v, p. 155.} This unity is achieved in Christ, whom Roger calls the ‘genus generalissimum’, for according to John 1: 3, ‘All things were made by him and without him was made nothing that was made’.\footnote{Cf. the Nicene Creed which speaks Christ as him ‘through whom all things were made’.} In Christ’s union of natures, there is achieved a preservation of God’s role as ‘principium omnium’ but there is achieved also a unity with, in and through creation, by means of Christ’s participation in that creation. That participation allows the attainment of unity and perfection by the cosmos.

greatest splendour? For although the person of Christ always was, not so is he always named Jesus Christ, that is before “The Word became flesh”. Roger, Marston, \textit{Quodlibeta Quatuor}, II. v, p. 155.
The third argument that Roger presents is based on the nature of the adoption of humanity through the Incarnate Word and draws on St Paul’s depiction of redeemed humanity as the adoptive children of God. In arraying the authorities, Roger cites the usual counter-argument that humanity’s capacity to be the adoptive children of God must be more than a simple matter of conformity of will with Christ but needs something more physical also, an actual sharing of something of Christ’s natures. In this way, humanity might be freed from death, share in Christ’s divinity and be ennobled. If this were to occur, there then would logically need to be the human fall to bring about this ‘filiation’ by Christ. Roger response is Oxonian in method but unexpected in rejecting such an answer:

Nam valde videtur magnum inconveniens ut summum quod habemus per gratiam, videlicet quod ‘filii Dei nominemur et simus’,\textsuperscript{54} et creatura excellentissima, videlicet anima Christi, occasionata sit tantummodo per peccatum. Sacramentum etiam matrimonii fuit signum coniunctionis Christi et ecclesiae, iuxta illud Apostoli Eph. 5: 32; loquens de matrimonio primorum parentum, dicit: ‘Sacramentum autem hoc magnum est, dico autem quod in Christo et Ecclesia’. Ergo cum hoc sacramentum fuerit ante lapsum, aut fuit falsum signum, aut necesse fuit Christum incarnari, licet homo non peccasset.\textsuperscript{55}

Since marriage was understood as a sign of Christ’s union to his Church, in essence Roger is arguing that it must always have intended that Christ come in flesh and wed his Church, since otherwise there was no way for Adam and

\textsuperscript{53} See, for example, Romans 8 and Galatians 4.

\textsuperscript{54} 1 John 3: 1.

\textsuperscript{55} ‘Now this seems greatly inappropriate, that the greatest thing which we can have through grace, namely that we “be called and be the sons of God”, and that the most excellent creation, namely Christ’s soul, be brought about only through sin. Now the sacrament of marriage was a sign of the union of Christ and the church, just as the Apostle says in Ephesians 5: 32. Speaking of the marriage of the first parents he says, “This is a great sacrament, and I refer to Christ and the Church”. Therefore, when this sacrament existed before the fall, either it was a false sign, or there was a need for Christ to be incarnated, although humanity had not yet sinned’. Roger Marston, \textit{Quodlibeta Quatuor}, II. v, p. 157. He has borrowed this use of marriage from Robert Grosseteste, \textit{De Cessatione Legalium}, c. 3.
Eve to have wed before the fall. Roger concludes that this is evidence that Christ’s coming was not contingent upon the fall. Roger does not stop there and proceeds then to adduce reasons why the incarnation occurred independently of that fall.

Firstly, Roger points out that although many ancient authorities, whom he terms ‘sacri doctores antiqui’, quite rightly had shown that the coming of Christ enabled the restoration of the human race, it does not follow that this was for them the *reason* for the incarnation, just a result of it.⁵⁶ He repeats an argument of Matthew of Aquasparta that the fall was not without consequence for the incarnation for it affected the nature of the flesh that was taken in the incarnation, its passibility or otherwise, but it did not effect the certainty of its occurrence.⁵⁷

Finally, Roger sets against his ‘sacri doctores antiqui’ a set of newer ideas being held more commonly among ‘moderni doctores’: that Christ freely assumed flesh so that corrupted humanity might be restored, which would suggest that Roger is reckoning the Franciscan authors in soteriology among these ‘modern teachers’. Roger enthusiastically sides with them and embraces this idea of theirs:

Et opinionem hanc aestimo magis piam. Plus enim movere debet homines miseris ad Deum diligendum quod propter ipsos reparandos carnes assumere voluit, quam propter aliam quamcumque quid poterit concerere rationem. Licet enim Christi incarnationem comitata fuerit universi completio, et gradus naturae sublimatio, et per gratiam adoptio, non tamen sequitur quod istae fuerint incarnationis rationes praecipuae.⁵⁸

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⁵⁶ Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, II. v, p. 158.
⁵⁷ Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, II. v, p. 158. See pages 181-82 above.
⁵⁸ ‘And I consider this opinion much better. For God ought to move wretched humans to the love of God more because God chose to take flesh for their restoration, than for some other reason or another that God could put together. For although the fulfilment of the universe was accompanied by the incarnation of Christ, and sublimation of the order of nature, and
It can be seen that Roger sees a number of salvific benefits that flow from the coming of Christ: restoration of humanity and a consequent greater love for God on humanity’s part, reordering of nature and a fulfilment of the universe. These notions had been amassing a considerable Franciscan heritage to them by this point, stretching back to Bonaventure. Notably, Roger makes all of this attainable in the absence of any sacrifice of Christ or the rendering of any satisfaction; as Roger treats the matter, these benefits are all attained by the incarnation alone and need, for example, no sacrifice upon the cross. This is not because Roger rejected that concept but because his argument was largely determined by the genre in which he was writing. The question which Roger was answering was concerned with whether the incarnation was contingent on human sin and Roger confined himself to this topic. Nevertheless, this answer shows that whatever good may have flown from the satisfactory acts by Christ at Calvary, Roger believes that the spring for soteriological consequences derived from the incarnation alone.

Roger’s answer here makes clear that he agrees with Matthew of Aquasparta: the incarnation of Christ had salvific consequences for humanity and that these would have occurred regardless of any triggering sinful act on the part of humanity. Roger expressly states that the incarnation was not contingent upon those sinful acts. From this, it also follows that the act of humanity coming into being was not, for Roger, the completion of the act of humanity’s creation. That act was but part of a process that would reach its culmination in the union of human nature with divinity in the Incarnate adoption through grace, it does not thus follow that these were the principal causes of the incarnation’. Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, II. v, p. 158.
Roger concurred with a number of the more recent Franciscan masters from Paris that to speak of human salvation is to speak of two functions: one aspect that brings human creation to its fulfilment and completion, an act always pre-ordained, and a second aspect that undoes the disfigurement that humanity has wreaked upon itself through sin, an intervention elicited by sin and the fall of humanity.\(^{59}\)

### 8.5 If Adam Had Resisted Temptation

The next of Roger’s quodlibetal questions with soteriological relevance asks whether, if Adam had resisted that first temptation, he would instantly have been strengthened in grace.\(^{60}\) The question asks whether the fall and the passage of punishment to Adam’s descendants could only have happened at that first temptation or whether the fall could have occurred at any point. If Adam had been strengthened in grace at that moment, the reasoning ran that he could not thereafter have sinned and no fall would have ever occurred; Eve and Adam had only to resist that initial temptation in the garden. This was the position adopted by Anselm and others such as Hugh of St Victor.\(^{62}\) If Adam were not strengthened then, it was open to him to sin at the next temptation and the fall could have occurred then or at any subsequent point.

Roger takes a position leaning more to the latter but with reservations. Roger is critical, as he had been in the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Statu Naturae Lapsae*, of viewing the taint of sin and its consequences as a sort of hereditary imperfection passed congenitally to the offspring of Adam. All that

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\(^{59}\) Cf Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, XXI. 18 and see page 143 above.

\(^{60}\) See pages 222-23 above.

\(^{61}\) Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, II. xiii, p. 190.

Adam can pass to his descendants, argues Roger, are physical properties, for the body engenders the body. As seen above, Roger had previously established in *De Statu Naturae Lapsae* that the physical ills of ignorance, mortality, hardship and concupiscence were what passed from Adam to subsequent generations. But spiritual matters, grace and strength of soul, are all a free matter for God who infuses a soul into flesh that is engendered by humanity. Each soul is created afresh and perfect by God, although it may later change under the influence of the human experience of sin. Even if, Roger reasons, Adam had been strengthened in grace if he had resisted that first temptation, it would have made no difference to the descendants of Adam who could not, thereby, share in that confirmation of grace.63

Even though Roger is dealing with a hypothetical situation, since Adam did not resist that first temptation, once more he demonstrates that there is for Christ an ongoing salvific role in perfecting creation. This was so even if Adam had not sinned or if he had received some special grace through electing not to sin. Whatever may have happened to Adam’s legacy, that legacy would not benefit from Adam’s choice and would remain in need of divine aid. Moreover, Roger argues that this need for divine aid would exist independently of any further harm that may or may not be done to humanity in the fall, as a consequence of Adam’s failure to resist that temptation.64

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**8.6 THE SALVIFIC ROLE OF CHRIST’S DEATH**

In the final relevant quodlibet, Roger turns to the other end of the life of Jesus Christ and considers whether Christ merited life for humanity in his

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63 Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, II. xiii, p. 192.
64 Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, II. xiii, p. 192.
death or afterwards. It is a very brief discussion and he deals with it all in less than twenty lines, noting that on the one hand, Christ’s death itself was seen to be the price to be paid for human salvation but also noting that after the death of Jesus, blood and water flowed from his side and that this too had been said to be for the benefit of humanity. Roger’s answer is sufficiently succinct to set forth in full:

Quamvis minima iniuria illata personae Christi, eo quod fuit infinita, suffecisset ad redemptionem generis humani, sicut probat Anselmus, Cur Deus Homo, solutio tamen pretii facta est in morte Christi, secundum quod competebat nostrae infirmati. Unde vere in morte facta est nostra redemption, a qua morte omnia sacramenta designantia efficaciam habuerint. Et patet utcumque ad utraque argumenta: nam sanguis ille qui fluxit de latere Christi, non praestitit virtutem sacramentis, nisi quatenus innitebantur morti sacrae Filii Dei, qua sumus perfecte redempti.

Roger’s reply makes it clear that for him, too, the incarnation is not the sum total of the redemptive work of Christ. He firmly states here that it is only through Christ’s death that humanity is fully redeemed. He artfully makes use of Anselm’s reasoning so that, just as the initial offence against God rendered infinite dishonour, so the suffering in Christ’s passion rendered infinite satisfaction. Following Matthew of Aquasparta, Roger holds that there is still a role for Anselmian notions about salvation but, again following him, he believes that these ideas only partially explain salvation. For Roger,

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65 Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, IV. xiii, p. 392.
66 John 19: 34.
67 ‘However slight the wound inflicted on Christ’s person, since for him it was infinite, it was sufficient for the redemption of the human race just as Anselm proves in Cur Deus Homo, and so the payment of the price was made in Christ’s death, by means of which he made up for our weakness. Thus truly our redemption was made in his death, from which death every sacrament has its designated efficacy. And this is clear for both arguments: for that blood which flowed from the side of Christ, is no greater than the virtue of the sacraments, save inasmuch as they were supported by the death of the holy Son of God, by whom we were fully redeemed’. Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, IV. xiii, p. 392. The reference to Anselm is Cur Deus Homo, II. 20.
68 See pages 186–87 above.
the death of Christ serves to pay the price of redemption, to undo human weaknesses and to become the source of sacramental power yet, as discussed above, there are also the perfective aspects for human salvation, which sees humanity brought to its completion and fulfilment, and this derives from the incarnation alone.\(^{69}\)

It is possible to observe two significant trends in the soteriological work of Roger and both are of a unifying nature shaped by the places in which Roger was working. The first is that he, rather like Richard Rufus before him, was a graduate of Paris and trained in the studium there but his English, and more precisely his Oxonian, training also found expression in his writings and he manages to bring his learning from both places together. Much of his approach to theology had been shaped by his masters in England such as John Pecham and Robert Grosseteste. This manifested itself in such interests as a consideration of the physical nature and consequence of sin and the fall and in his approach these questions with a greater emphasis upon natural philosophy than speculative theology.

The second unifying trend apparent in both Roger and Peter is that they further trends that had been apparent in Richard of Middleton and even Matthew of Aquasparta. Bonaventure had been a considerable innovator and had greatly advanced Franciscan soteriology, and its theology generally, in quite novel and fresh directions. Even if he were right in doing so, the

developments in these directions were ones being made by the Franciscans alone and they had not truly been embraced by either the wider church or even leading theologians in Paris. Propelled by Bonaventure, the Franciscans were at risk of going off along unfrequented paths of their own.

The Franciscans that followed, while at no time repudiating the new ideas of Bonaventure, certainly more closely and more explicitly integrated into his thought the more established soteriological understanding of other authorities. Bonaventure may indeed have woven a new and shiny theological cloth but it was friars such as Matthew of Aquasparta, Richard of Middleton and now Roger Marston and Peter Falco who took up the task of securely sewing that new cloth to that which was already established and had preceded it. Franciscan ideas, such as salvation through the completion of creation and a non-contingency incarnation, were now joined to a reimagined role for satisfaction. This unifying work certainly served to temper a surfeit of Franciscan novelty but it also enriched soteriology of the thirteenth century generally by more firmly integrating these newer Franciscan insights into the tradition.

Following the Averroïst condemnations of the 1270s, Roger and Peter were not willing to set the satisfaction ideas from the soteriology of Anselm and the restorative ideas from the soteriology of Bonaventure into opposition against each other. Like their post-Bonaventurian confreres, they wished to maintain both traditions. For them, Anselm’s idea of the infinite price of Christ’s self-offering in his passion and death making satisfaction for the offence against divine justice at the fall remains a valid and useful description of one aspect of soteriology. Perhaps because of their interest in detailing what might be called the psychology of fallen human nature, they articulate
more clearly than many of other Franciscans that this work of Christ only heals humanity from the weaknesses introduced into human nature by its fall: ignorance, hardship, mortality and concupiscence. In other words, the passion and death of Christ reverses what had happened to humanity from its own actions and not those of God and, secondarily, they provide the source of the sacraments to sustain that healed humanity.

Yet they also adhere to a more Bonaventurian notion that this does not exhaust the entire scope of the salvific work of God. Even in the absence of the fall, humanity would still have to be renewed, perfected and fulfilled, as would all creation, through the union of creator and creatures within the bounds of creation when the Word took flesh. They continue this decidedly Franciscan approach to soteriology by allocating a salvifically critical role to the incarnation that benefits humanity, whether that humanity fell into sin or not.

The stance that they adopted, then, furthers the effort to use the more recent innovations of Franciscan soteriology to enhance and expand the Anselmian approach to salvation, rather than to supplant it. It can be viewed as a harmonisation of the two and enriches each with the advantages of the other, the scholastic ideal. Roger and Peter were not the first to have done so but they do express a shift in the understanding of what it is to be saved. Richard of Middleton and even Matthew of Aquasparta to a degree had drawn a distinction in their writings between salvation, the perfection of flawed fallen humanity, and redemption, payment of the debt of sin incurred at the fall.70 In the case of Roger Marston, there are again two aspects to the perfecting of humanity. He, too, reserves use of the term ‘redemption’ to

70 See pages 222-23 above.
discussions of Christ’s sacrifice at Calvary as recompense for the offence rendered at the fall. Where Roger takes a new position is in the role of the incarnation. In Roger’s conception, the incarnation is depicted as always going to occur so that the work of creation might be brought to its completion and humanity be fulfilled and perfected. If that is so, then it would seem that the only ‘salvation’ of humanity is to be from its own incipient creation, an occurrence yet to reach its culmination. It is the reasoning of Roger that this final stage of the process was already in train when humanity appeared.

Creation was making its way to its consummation with the entry into it of the Creator. For Roger, it follows that there is nothing to be undone nor from which humanity must be ‘saved’ but its own inchoate state.

In that conclusion of Roger’s can be detected the amount of movement of not just Franciscan soteriology but also its conviction about human nature. In its initial steps with Alexander of Hales, Franciscan soteriology had wrestled with how to make adequate recompense to God for the sin of the fall, so that humanity might be ‘repaired’ and ‘restored’ to a pre-lapsarian state. By the time that Roger Marston and Peter Falco were writing, such works of rectification had come to be considered in Franciscan soteriology as a coincidental by-product of the true work of salvation. Humanity was fundamentally and intrinsically good and unafflicted by a God who demanded satisfaction to undo the fall. Salvation was rather to culminate the divine work of creation that had but only commenced. Begun in Christ, it would move forward to reach completion in Christ. Roger Marston and Peter Falco give expression to the belief to which many Franciscans were coming: the study of the divine salvation of humanity revealed that humanity was neither intrinsically wicked nor punitively afflicted by God.
9 Conclusion

At the close of the thirteenth century, the Franciscan had managed to create for themselves quite a vibrant centre for theological activity in Paris. This activity operated in a purpose-built structure, housed one the chairs of the faculty of theology, conducted two parallel programmes of instruction to meet the needs of the order for both competent lectors in the provinces and scholars for the whole order, and it was producing a steady stream of trained friars drawn from the best students of the order. They were versed in and by the scholastic methods of the day and, on their departure from Paris, these friars carried with them back to order’s various provinces what in time became a common theological patrimony of ideas, methods and approaches of the order.

The development of this academic activity would have been hard to foresee at the order’s origins. In 1223, the Rule of Francis warned the friars against the perils of learning and instructed the friars who were unable to read to take no care to learn to do so.¹ Just seventy years later, the General Constitutions of the order prepared at the General Chapter of Paris in 1292 felt obliged to place limits on the number and qualifications of friars wishing to take up degree courses, in an effort to curb the rush into the universities.² It was a swift and dramatic change for those who in so many other areas were punctilious in their observance of their Rule. This was no subtle or half-hearted change either, for in that seventy years, the Franciscans went from

¹ ‘Moneo vero et exhortor in Domino Jesu Christo, ut... non curent nescientes litteras litteras discere’. ‘Indeed I warn and exhort in the Lord Jesus Christ that those not knowing letters not bother to learn to read’. Regula Bullata, X.
² Bihl, ‘Statuta Generalia Ordinis’, Paris 1292, Arts. XI.11 and XX (pp. 77 and 79).
the demolition of libraries to the building and filling of them. As had happened in the case of the Dominicans friars, Franciscan history became entwined with that of the rise of universities. In hand with this change in attitude to study among the friars there was a corresponding change in how they engaged in theology, and the content of their soteriology is a prism through which to observe this development.

To consider adequately that Franciscan theological content, one must consider the specific time and setting of their theological activity. More than being, in part, created by that specific time and setting, those Franciscan conclusions are improperly understood in the absence of a concomitant understanding of the historical circumstances from which they sprang and which, in turn, they fashioned. For example, Franciscan thinkers worked in a university exploiting the learning of Aristotle, while being juridically bound by prohibitions of their bishop not to teach many of Aristotle’s conclusions. These prohibitions shaped the way in which they did theology, but equally it was their own theology that had contributed to this polarisation of attitudes to Aristotelianism. Likewise, in the first half of the thirteenth century, the Franciscan confronted overt hostility from secular masters to their work in the university and this prompted a certain circumspection in Franciscan theology for a time but, conversely, the friars also contributed to and shaped the work of the university, providing some of its most influential and eminent figures.

On returning from the Holy Land, St Francis was dismayed to find the brothers in Bologna possessing buildings, including a library, and personally tore down the offending structures. Thomas of Celano, ‘Desiderio Animae’, Ch XXVIII and XXIX, p. 286. Cf. Bonaventure, *Legenda Maior*, VII. 2.
This process is seen well in Franciscan soteriology, which had reached by the close of the thirteenth century a conception of salvation as not a rectification but as a culmination of humanity. This understanding had been in evolution among them throughout that century and each of the authors that has been considered in this present study furthered that process.

The highpoint and a turning point of that process can be seen in the work of Bonaventure. More clearly and explicitly than any Franciscan scholar before him, Bonaventure expressed the Franciscan dissatisfaction with the Anselmian tradition that had passed to scholars through its incorporation into and canonisation within Peter the Lombard’s *Book of Sentences*. Bonaventure argued against satisfaction for the fall as a cause for either the incarnation or salvation. Directly counter to Anselm, Bonaventure argued that neither penal substitution nor satisfaction had a soteriological pertinence to God at all. Rather, satisfaction served only the minor role of easing the human sense of guilt for the fall.

Bonaventure instead argued forcefully that the fall had not resulted in some divinely imposed penalty upon a disobedient humanity. Convinced of a loving God unwilling to afflict or encumber humanity, Bonaventure insisted that the harm of the fall arose from the nature of sin itself and the sundering it wrought between God and humanity. Any adverse consequence of the fall was one of human making and, for Bonaventure, soteriology was a study of how God reaches beyond that breach between God and humanity brought about by the fall so as to undo its consequences. Bonaventure came to see salvation not as a deed to correct a broken humanity but rather as the completion of the act of creating humanity, a work still in progress. It enabled humanity to occupy its proper place in the cosmos and to enjoy the
relationship with God that was proper to itself. That proper role was to be
that with which divinity united itself. Hence, for Bonaventure, the great
salvific act was not Christ’s passion and death upon Calvary, but rather his
incarnate union with human kind at Bethlehem.

These were not positions at which Bonaventure arrived
independently. Alexander of Hales, the first regent master among the
Franciscans, had his own difficulties with the understanding of salvation that
was a legacy of Anselm. In particular, Alexander resisted a depiction of
salvation in which so much, both the penalty of the fall and the release from
it, was due to the action of divinity. Alexander argued for a distinctly human
role in soteriology, maintaining that the divine nature by itself was incapable
of saving humanity.

Likewise, Eudes Rigaud was dissatisfied with the Anselmian legacy,
struggling to reconcile it with the biblical tradition. He broadened it to
explain the erasure of the chirographum, the opening of the doors of paradise
and the place and role of Christ’s resurrection in human salvation. It is Eudes
who first among the Franciscans pondered whether the fall was essential to
bring about the incarnation or whether these two events were independent of
each other.

For each of them, Alexander, Eudes and Bonaventure, as well as their
contemporary, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, the way in which university and
Franciscan education were operating played a role in shaping their
theological conclusions. Alexander was not only the founder of an
institutionalised Franciscan school de facto within the University of Paris but
also primarily responsible for bringing increased standardisation to
theological education across the universities of Europe, especially the use of
sentence commentaries. Use of the *Book of Sentences* gave students training in dialectic and scholastic method and a common course of progress through systematic theology. It served as a principal means of evaluating a student’s fitness to be advanced to the rank of master.

In the Grand Couvent des Cordeliers, as students considered similar questions and material, they naturally exchanged resources and approaches, and drew upon the models and solutions of friars who had preceded them, including their masters. These scholars lived together, studied together, were assigned the same books and heard the same lessons. Obliged to consider near identical questions, drawing upon a like array of authorities and reading similar conclusions, they tended to produce considerable commonality in their writings. They travelled theologically in a similar direction, producing works that showed this shared origin.

In the 1250s, when the first wave of Franciscan sentence commentaries were appearing, the Franciscans found themselves embroiled in a further eruption of the secular-mendicant controversy. Many secular masters objected to what they perceived to be the mendicants making use of all the benefits and privileges of the university without submitting to its obligations and discipline. Both the Franciscan and Dominican friars found themselves labelled as disloyal and lacking concern for the university’s best interests. Wishing to deprive the mendicants of their papal exemptions and to subject them to university discipline, many secular masters accused them of questionable orthodoxy and inadequate training. The mendicants found themselves often portrayed as seed beds of error whose curbing would be to the benefit of the university and the Church generally.
The events of the controversy had consequences for both the friars and for their theological activity. Facing such accusations, these first generations of Franciscan scholars retreated to defensible terrain. They vigorously asserted their conformity to the teachings of Alexander of Hales, himself a former secular master and so less readily impeached by his former peers. Eudes and Bonaventure make a great show of adhering to his instruction and the posthumous composition of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* can be understood as just such a defensive act by the Franciscans. Likewise, their soteriology stayed within common bounds and this can be seen very clearly in the case of Richard Rufus who produced no material of his own in Paris but abridged the arguments of Bonaventure. Brought to Paris by the events of the secular-mendicant controversy, Richard produced there his *Abbreviatio Bonaventurae*, a work which displays the presence of a trend to harmonise thinking among Franciscan educational institutions. The controversy caused Richard to be sent to Paris, exposed him to the Parisian approach to soteriology and facilitated his diffusion of those ideas among other Franciscan schools in England upon his return there. How and where he was working shaped what Richard was teaching.

Richard was not the only author of works spreading this new material and even today there remain forty-six extant copies of Bonaventure’s sentence commentary dating from the thirteenth century. In contrast, only a single sentence commentary from the thirteenth century

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4 See pages 64–66 above.
survives from a Parisian secular master. The Franciscans were spreading their own commentaries around Europe and the locations of extant Franciscan sentence commentaries reproduced in that century are shown in Map 1 below, giving some indication of the degree of dissemination of these texts.

By the end of 1257, some level of peace had been achieved in the secular-mendicant controversy and the climate had improved between the two sides. The main protagonists had left Paris, the papacy had shown itself

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as a firm protector of the mendicants and there was an end to punitive measures in the conflict. That is not to say that the experience was without consequence and among them was that the Franciscans showed markedly less theological creativity and novelty thereafter. Bonaventure had marked the zenith of that early stage of Franciscan theology in the thirteenth century and the phase that followed would be marked by a shift to the coadunation of that legacy with the more established theological heritage.

A further reason marking Bonaventure as a turning point in this development in Franciscan soteriology is that at the time of his departure from Paris in 1257, Aristotelian approaches assumed ever greater importance in theology, even among the Franciscans. Throughout the century to that point, the long dominance of Neoplatonism in theology and philosophy had been yielding to the ideas of Aristotle and the classical, Islamic and Jewish interpreters upon his works, such as Averroës and Moses Maimonides. This shift was more than a matter of a whole new philosophical system, substantial as that change was. The move to Aristotelianism altered the relationship between philosophy and theology and demanded of the latter a re-expression in new terms of much of what it contained. Theological reasoning had thereafter to happen in new ways. The rise of Aristotelianism posed the question of the degree to which one could rely in theological matters upon the thought and reason of thinkers who had not been guided by, in Christian terms, the light of divine truth expressed in the word of scripture and Jesus Christ. It was an issue to which Bonaventure turned on numerous occasions and wrestling with this issue and its consequences became significant for the scholars that followed him. As Aristotelianism came to be embraced more widely and approvingly by theologians of the
faculty, friars after Bonaventure came to adapt to the new approach. They showed greater confidence in the new approach and no Franciscan scholar would ever again be so staunch a Neoplatonist as Bonaventure had been.

More than a philosophical choice, this was also a political matter. The bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, had issued in the 1270s a substantial array of Aristotelian contentions which he forbade to be taught in the university. This set him and many of the Faculty of Arts into conflict and the Franciscans found themselves caught up in the clash. The scholars of the Grand Couvent could see, notwithstanding the opinion of many friars of Bonaventure’s generation and of Bishop Tempier, that this new fashion for Aristotelian reasoning was the way of the future. It was popular among students, it was where innovation and development in both philosophy and theology was occurring and, like many scholars, newer Franciscans students could see that they ran the risk of being left behind in irrelevance and disconnected from contemporary scholarship if they did not find a way to engage with the new theological trends. Tempier’s decrees obliged the Franciscans once again to have to make a choice to follow the masters of the university or to side with their opponent. The events of the secular-mendicant controversy seemed about to repeat.

The Franciscan solution was to present themselves as loyal and dutiful adherents to the decrees of Stephen Tempier, while proceeding to keep up in fact with the most recent developments in philosophy and theology. They explicitly gave effect to the decrees and enacted them but also quietly and, with little ruction, they laid aside much of the Neoplatonism so favoured by earlier friars. Significantly, figures such as Matthew of Aquasparta, Richard of Middleton, Roger Marston and Peter Falco did not
abandon the conclusions of Bonaventure, just his method and reasoning for reaching them. With those conclusions they favoured the blending of established and more mainstream approaches to theology. The result was a more comprehensive soteriology that was sufficiently orthodox to satisfy the Tempier decrees, to serve the university and to be adequate new and creative material to build upon the more recent Franciscan insights.

Thus Matthew of Aquasparta wrote in his soteriology of a broad array of ways in which humanity can be saved. He included in this list a number of ideas distinctly Franciscan, such as salvation as the furthering of creation, but also more established theological notions. He showed his work to be a blend of newer ideas with older and trusted traditions. In particular, he portrayed the received ideas of Anselm as arguing in favour of the Franciscan new directions and reincorporated an Anselmian dimension into Franciscan soteriology.

In like fashion, Richard of Middleton also worked to bring together the more recent Franciscan ideas with older traditions. Richard revived attention to a soteriological role for Christ’s passion, death and resurrection and, refining the ideas of Alexander of Hales, he displaced the latter’s division of the upper part of the will with a role for human, sensual appetites. Moves such as these served to remove much of the distance between the two traditions. Richard drew a far clearer distinction than his Franciscan predecessors between the two parts to soteriology: redemption, the retrospective element which redressed the consequences of the fall, however conceived, and salvation, the prospective element which looked to the fulfilment of humanity. Like Matthew of Aquasparta, he faithfully observed Tempier’s decrees yet still explored new theological possibilities, including
those that sprang from this closer marrying of Franciscan innovation with the established theological tradition.

Roger Marston and Peter Falco engaged in similar unifying work, melding the Oxonian interest in natural philosophy and its impact on Franciscan theology with the more speculative Parisian approach. The result was a broad purview given to Franciscan soteriology that, by the end of the thirteenth century, avowed that there was in soteriology both a consequence to the fall to be undone and humanity’s nature to be fully realised.

Such a policy of adhering to the Tempier decrees while still advancing Franciscan innovation had its successes. While the Franciscans, in soteriology at least, were free to pioneer, write and discuss their new approaches, the Dominicans, quite public and explicit enthusiasts for the new Aristotelian method, found themselves the subject of numerous investigations and censures at the hand of episcopal authorities, hampering their work in the universities.⁷

Beyond evading censure, this approach also served to bring a greater comprehensiveness to Franciscan soteriology and a greater precision about the role of the incarnation in the economy of salvation. The Franciscan theologians of Paris had been refining that position across the course of the thirteenth century. Eudes Rigaud had asked whether the fall of humanity was necessary for the incarnation to occur. Bonaventure and Richard Rufus saw a distinct salvific role for the incarnation itself, independent of any act that the incarnate Son might perform. Matthew of Aquasparta reasoned that

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⁷ Dominicans like Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Lessines were among a number investigated. Sara Uckelman, ‘Logic and the Condemnations of 1277’, *Journal of Philosophy*, 39 (2010), 201-27 (p. 213). While the Franciscans enjoined the 1277 Tempier decrees upon all members of the order, the Dominicans instead took punitive steps against Edward Kilwardy OP, for imposing the decrees upon England when he was Archbishop of Canterbury. *Ibid.* pp. 218-19.
humanity could be and was perfected by the incarnation alone and Richard of Middleton concluded that the divine plan for the incarnation of the Word was in place before, and independent of, the fall. In like fashion, Roger Marston stated expressly that Christ would have become incarnate even without the fall. All of them accepted that it was the nature of Christ, the ‘first born of all creation’, to have a role to play in bringing humanity to its culmination.\(^8\) That role would be carried out whether humanity fell or not. Undoing the fall came to be seen as a fruit of the incarnation, but not its cause.

This distinctly Franciscan position was reached in a location, the Grand Couvent des Cordeliers in Paris, in which the Franciscans’ best scholars came to study and through which the order maintained a steady stream of its foremost lectors and teachers to train those scholars. Many of these teachers had, in their turn, been students there and so the place also possessed a certain continuity of instruction across generations, as students were trained and moved on to teaching posts. A number of these would then return to teach in Paris, reinforcing this intellectual tradition.

This place and the content of Franciscan theology played upon each other. Because the Franciscans retained the control of their teaching chair in a way that was not possible for secular masters, it gave a certain corporate institutionalisation to Franciscan theological education in Paris, imparting to it a stability of structure and content in its training notwithstanding the brevity of term of its regent masters. This caused certain approaches to theology to manifest themselves in the way in which Franciscans undertook the discipline. Each of the writers that has been considered here showed himself reticent to fetter divine sovereignty, consistently avoiding any

\(^8\) Colossians 1: 15.
predication of necessity upon God. More than a simple agent for human
salvation, they each concurred in portraying Christ as the medium and
mediator of that salvation. Each expressed in his own way discontent with
the received understanding of satisfaction from Anselm and sought a better
depiction of the working of redemption, especially one that gave a greater
place to the workings of the human nature of Christ. They each maintained
the fundamental goodness of humanity and disputed a human nature that
had been marred and misshapen by God. These were positions to which they
clung even in the face of pressure from the secular masters and episcopal
prescriptions, finding a variety of ways to maintain their positions.

In converse, this theological activity shaped the Franciscan presence in
Paris. More than just a studium of the order, it was its foremost studium
generale and it came to be granted privileges beyond all the other houses of
study, according subsidised tuition for the best of the order’s students, those
who would be the order’s lectors in the future. The academic theological work
of the order had its heart not in Assisi nor Rome but in Paris. Those who
aspired to such theological work congregated in this one friary in Paris and
there moulded and were moulded by the Franciscan theological activity in
the Grand Couvent. More than that, in an order constituted so that its
members did not normally leave their provinces nor meet brothers from
other provinces, this academic elite in assembled in Paris was a conspicuous
exception. These were a pool of friars who became known to each other
despite provincial borders and who also shared experiences and a common
formation. It is no marvel that in short order that the Franciscan scholars of Paris took control of the order and held it for three centuries.⁹

The Franciscans therefore enjoyed a stable location, an institutional continuity and permanence, a growth in thought across successive generations that built upon the work of earlier friars within the Parisian school, a similarity of approach to certain theological issues and produced a series of theological conclusions that was identifiably common to them all. Put otherwise, they showed all that one would expect of a theological school of thought, and were doing so at least by the time of Roger Marston in 1276.

These features of the Franciscan school and the soteriological conclusions that they enabled were in place well before the ‘classical’ formulation concerning Christ and salvation made by John Duns Scotus in 1302, to whom the credit for their creation has long but erroneously been attributed. These ideas had been refined a generation earlier among the Franciscans of Paris. The existence of a Franciscan school has long been presumed, or merged with a Scotist school, but the characteristics of such a school have been expressed in only nebulous terms with little rigorous examination.¹⁰ This present review shows that there was a Franciscan school in operation in the thirteenth century and identifies the elements of that school evident in Franciscan soteriology.

By the next century, many of these elements and beliefs became commonplace within the order and distinctive features of Franciscan theology. These ideas such as the absolute primacy of Christ and the non-

⁹ On the Parisian led overthrow of Elias of Cortona as Minister General, see Şenocak, The Poor and the Perfect, pp. 25-75; Brooke, Early Franciscan Government, pp. 137-67.
contingent nature of the incarnation were to be points of enduring contendion and argument between the Franciscans and the secular masters and even the Dominicans in the century to follow. The Parisian Franciscans of the 1200s set forth the issues for the coming arguments but their fraternal heirs were to be the ones to argue and defend them.

Within the living memory of St Francis, the Friars Minor had grown from indigent begging preachers to masters of expansive university schools, exceeding those of any secular master. Once preaching simply, in the words of the Rule, of ‘vice and virtue, punishment and glory’¹¹, the Franciscans now possessed learned masters of philosophy, dialectics, rhetoric and theology who were engaged in producing scholarly tracts. This transformation can be witnessed in the evolution of their soteriology, which proclaimed a human creation that was still being wrought by the creative work of Christ and which they integrated with an older tradition of remedying the ills from the fall. All this they understood and affirmed as part of creation’s perfecting.

Est etiam in hoc verbo [caro facto refectio] perfectio magnificentiae consummantis et complentis omnia; quia figura sphaerica attestur perfectionem in corporibus maioris mundi et minoris... Ista figura non est in universo completa. Ut autem perfectissima esset figura, universitaslinea curvata est in circulum; primum enim simpliciter Deus, ultimus in operibus mundi homo. Cum ergo Deus factus est homo, Dei perfecta sunt opera. Ideo ipse Christus, Deus-homo vocatur alpha et omega, id est principium et finis, et ideo, quia audistis, quod finis omnium, homo, dicitur etiam primus et novissimus... Ut nobilissima omnium potentiaram receptivarum, quae erat in humana natura plantata, scilicet unibilitas cum divina in unitate personae, non esset otiosa, est in actum reductia; per hoc autem, dum in actum reducitur, omnis creaturae

¹¹ ‘...vitia et virtutes, poenam et gloriam...’. Regula Bullata, Ch. IX.
perfectio ultimatur, et in illo uno tota unitas consummatur.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} ‘Yet the perfection of splendour in the consummation and fulfilment of all things is in this word [made restorative flesh]; for a spherical shape is evidenced by the perfection among the greater and lesser bodies of the cosmos... This shapes is not complete within the universe but if the shape be utterly perfect, the line of the universe is curved around in a circle; for God is simply the first, and humanity is the last among the works of the world. When therefore God became human, God’s work was made perfect. Thus, Christ himself, the God-man, is called ‘alpha and omega’, that is, the beginning and the end, and hence, as you have heard, the end of all things, humanity, is thus called the first and last. The noblest of all the recovered powers which was given to human nature, namely the ability to be joined in unity with a divine person, was not idle but is lead back in that act. By this, as it is lead back in this act, the perfection of every creature is realised, and in that single person all unity is brought to perfection.’ Bonaventure, ‘In Nativitate Domini, Sermo II’ in Opera Omnia, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventura, 9 vols (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1884-1907), IX (1901), pp. 106-10 (pp. 109-10).
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### Appendix 1  Comparative Table of Soteriological Discussions in Sentence Commentaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cap 50</th>
<th>Did Christ merit anything for himself and for us - and what was it for himself and for us?</th>
<th>t5, q1, m4, c2</th>
<th>Concerning the appropriateness of Christ’s passion with respect to us.</th>
<th>d18, a1, q1</th>
<th>Whether Christ merited for himself.</th>
<th>d18, a1, q1</th>
<th>Whether Christ merited anything.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cap 51</td>
<td>What did Christ merit for himself through his conception and through his passion?</td>
<td>t4, q3, m2, c1</td>
<td>Whether Christ merited from the moment of his conception.</td>
<td>d18, a2, q1</td>
<td>From what time was he able to be merited?</td>
<td>d18, a1, q1</td>
<td>Whether Christ merited from the moment of his conception.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>t4, q3, m2, c2</td>
<td>Whether Christ could not be merited in life.</td>
<td>d18, a3, q1</td>
<td>Whether Christ could merit through what he did.</td>
<td>d18, a1, q2</td>
<td>Whether Christ merited after his conception.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>t4, q3, m3, c1</td>
<td>How did Christ merit in love?</td>
<td>d18, a3, q2</td>
<td>Whether Christ could merit in love.</td>
<td>d18, a1, q3</td>
<td>Whether Christ merited in his way of life.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In the case of Alexander of Hales the comparison is with the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*.

2 The questions posed and their sequence in the commentary of Richard Rufus of Cornwall are identical to those of Bonaventure save the last four questions in Distinction 20, which Richard omits.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Peter the Lombard</strong></th>
<th><strong>Alexander of Hales</strong></th>
<th><strong>Eudes Rigaud</strong></th>
<th><strong>Bonaventure and Richard Rufus of Cornwall</strong></th>
<th><strong>Richard of Middleton</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>t4, q3, m3, c2</td>
<td>How did Christ merit through action?</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t4, q3, m3, c3</td>
<td>How did Christ merit through what was done to him?</td>
<td>d18, a3, q3</td>
<td>Whether Christ could merit in the passion.</td>
<td>d18, a1, q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d18, a4, q3</td>
<td>Whether Christ merited in his impassibility.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>t4, q3, m4, c1, a1</td>
<td>Did Christ merit to be exalted according to his divine or human nature?</td>
<td>d18, a4, q1</td>
<td>Whether Christ merited exaltation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t4, q3, m4, c1, a2</td>
<td>Did Christ merit a glorified body?</td>
<td>d18, a4, q5</td>
<td>Whether Christ merited substantial merit, namely, glory.</td>
<td>d18, a2, q2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>d18, a2, q1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter the Lombard</td>
<td>Alexander of Hales</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cap 52</strong></td>
<td>Concerning what was written of him: He gave him the name that is above all other names.</td>
<td>t4, q3, m4, c1, a3</td>
<td>To what degree did Christ merit for himself the name which is above all other names?</td>
<td>d18, a4, q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cap 53</strong></td>
<td>If Christ was without any merit, was he capable of possessing what merit he obtained?</td>
<td>t5, q1, m5, c1</td>
<td>Whether Christ’s suffering was the greatest.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>t5, q1, m5, c2</td>
<td>Whether Christ’s passion was sufficient to make satisfaction.</td>
<td>d18, a2, q1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cap 54</strong></td>
<td>Concerning the reason for the passion and death of Christ.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cap 55</strong></td>
<td>How did Christ through his death redeem us from the Devil and sin?</td>
<td>t5, q1, m6, c1,</td>
<td>Concerning the effect of justification from sins.</td>
<td>d18, a4, q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap 56</td>
<td>Why did God become man and die?</td>
<td>Peter the Lombard</td>
<td>Alexander of Hales</td>
<td>Eudes Rigaud</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cap 57</td>
<td>In what way did Christ redeem us from suffering?</td>
<td>t4, q3, m4, c2, a1</td>
<td>To what degree did Christ merit the removal of guilt universally?</td>
<td>t4, q3, m4, c2, a1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>t4, q3, m4, c2, a1</td>
<td>To what degree did Christ merit the remission of eternal punishment through the passion?</td>
<td>d19, a4, q1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>d19, a1, q4</td>
<td>Whether we were absolved from the penalty of sin through Christ’s passion.</td>
<td>d18, a1, q3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>t4, q3, m4, c2, a1</td>
<td>Whether Christ merited remission of temporal punishment.</td>
<td>d19, a3, q1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter the Lombard</td>
<td>Alexander of Hales</td>
<td>Eudes Rigaud</td>
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<td>d19, a3, q2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Whether through the passion we were free from temptation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cap 58</td>
<td>How did Christ bear our suffering?</td>
<td>t5, q1, m2, c1, a1</td>
<td>d16, a2, q1</td>
<td>d17, a2, q3</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether the passion in Christ was according to the senses.</td>
<td>Whether Christ had suffered according to his reason or his senses.</td>
<td>Whether Christ's prayer in the passion came from his sensual appetite.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>t5, q1, m2, c1, a2</td>
<td>d16, a2, q2</td>
<td>d17, a1, q2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Whether the passion in Christ was according to his higher or lower reason.</td>
<td>Whether Christ's soul suffered according to the higher portion of his will.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>t5, q1, m2, c1, a3</td>
<td>d17, a3, q1</td>
<td>d16, a2, q3</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Whether the passion in Christ was according to his whole will.</td>
<td>Whether Christ wished only to save sinners or was there another reason?</td>
<td>Whether the natural will in Christ was at variance with his deliberative will.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d17, a3, q1</td>
<td>d16, a2, q3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter the Lombard</td>
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<td>d17, a2, q3</td>
<td>d17, a2, q2</td>
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<td>Whether the prayer, which Christ prayed in his passion, that the cup be taken away, was from his reason or his senses.</td>
<td>Whether Christ prayed for himself.</td>
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<td>d17, a2, q1</td>
<td>d17, a2, q4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Whether it was fitting for Christ to pray.</td>
<td>Whether the prayer of Christ was always heard.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>d17, a1, q1</td>
<td>Whether there were contrary wills in Christ.</td>
<td>d17, a1, q1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether there were multiple wills in Christ.</td>
<td>Whether there were multiple wills in Christ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>t5, q1, m2, c1, a4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether Christ’s suffering was according to his absolute or conditional will.</td>
<td>d17, a2, q1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Whether Christ’s will for all sinners was fulfilled.</td>
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<tr>
<td>t5, q1, m2, c1, a5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether Christ’s soul suffered according to what is soul and what is spirit.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Peter the Lombard</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cap 59</td>
<td>t5, q1, m2, c2, a1</td>
<td>Whether Christ had all forms of bodily suffering.</td>
<td></td>
<td>d19, a2, q1</td>
<td>Whether the Trinity redeemed us.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap 59</td>
<td>Should it be said that only Christ is redeemer as mediator?</td>
<td>t5, q1, m6, c1, a2, p1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cap 60</td>
<td>Concerning the mediator.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Whether Christ was mediator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap 61</td>
<td>According to which nature was he mediator?</td>
<td>t5, q1, m6, c1, a2, p2</td>
<td>According to what is Christ said to be mediator?</td>
<td>d19, a2, q2</td>
<td>Whether Christ was mediator according to his human nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t5, q1, m6, c1, a2, p3</td>
<td>How is Christ mediator?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter the Lombard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dist 20, Cap 62</td>
<td>By what other means was it possible to set us free?</td>
<td>d20, a1, q1</td>
<td>Whether human nature could or should have been saved in some way other than satisfaction.</td>
<td>Whether God could have saved the human race by some other means.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d20, a2, q3</td>
<td>Whether angels could have made satisfaction.</td>
<td>Whether some other true creature was able to make satisfaction for the human race.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d20, a2, q1</td>
<td>Whether a man could make satisfaction for himself.</td>
<td>Whether someone, with the aid of grace, could have made satisfaction for himself.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d19, a2, q1</td>
<td>Whether the passion was sufficient and proper to effect redemption.</td>
<td>Whether God ought to have accepted this means of satisfaction through Christ’s passion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap 63</td>
<td>Why was this means better?</td>
<td>d20, a3, q1</td>
<td>Whether it was fitting to make satisfaction through the passion.</td>
<td>Whether it was more fitting that the human race be restored through satisfaction than some other way.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Richard Rufus omits this question.

4 Richard Rufus omits this question.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peter the Lombard</th>
<th>Alexander of Hales</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d20, a3, a2</td>
<td>d19, a1, q3</td>
<td>d19, a1, q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap  64</td>
<td>By what right might the devil be overcome?</td>
<td>t5, q1, m6, c1, a3</td>
<td>Concerning the effect of the removal of the Devil's power.</td>
<td>Whether we were freed from the Devil's power through Christ's passion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d19, a1, q3</td>
<td>d18, a2, q2</td>
<td>Whether we were freed from the Devil's power through Christ's passion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap  65</td>
<td>Concerning the dispute between God, humanity and the Devil.</td>
<td>t5, q1, m6, c1, a4</td>
<td>Concerning the effect of opening the doors of paradise.</td>
<td>Whether Christ merited the opening of the doors for us.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d19, a1, q1</td>
<td>d18, a2, q3</td>
<td>Whether Christ merited the opening of the doors for us.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap  66</td>
<td>Concerning the handing over of Christ done by Judas, God and the Jews.</td>
<td>t5, q1, m1</td>
<td>Concerning the truth of Christ's passion.</td>
<td>d20, a1, q6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap  67</td>
<td>Whether the passion of Christ is a work of God or of the Jews.</td>
<td>t5, q1, m1</td>
<td></td>
<td>d21, a1, q1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dist 21, Cap  68</td>
<td>Was the Word separated from the soul of the flesh in the dead Christ?</td>
<td></td>
<td>d21, a1, q1</td>
<td>Whether the soul of Christ was separated from the Godhead in death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter the Lombard</td>
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<td>d21, a1, q1</td>
<td>Whether deity separated from the flesh in Christ's death.</td>
<td>d21, a1, q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d21, a1, q2</td>
<td>Whether the Christ's divinity was separated from the flesh in death.</td>
<td>d21, a1, q2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>d21, a2, q1</td>
<td>Whether Christ's soul was rendered impassible after the moment of separation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d21, a2, q1</td>
<td>Whether after that separation from Christ's flesh he had died or after it had life.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>d21, a2, q3</td>
<td>Whether death is to be attributed to the Person of the Word on account of the death of the flesh.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap 69</td>
<td></td>
<td>d22, a1, q1</td>
<td>Whether Christ in the triduum was man.</td>
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<td>d22, a1, q1</td>
<td>Whether Christ was man in the three days of death.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d20, a2, q4</td>
<td>Whether it was fitting that God become incarnate to make satisfaction.</td>
<td>d20, a1, q1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Whether it was fitting that human nature be restored by God.</td>
<td>d20, a1, q1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>d21, a2, q1</td>
<td>Concerning the order and union which was in Christ.</td>
<td>d21, a1, q3</td>
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<td>Inq 1, t4, q2, m1</td>
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<td>Whether the Word was united to the flesh and soul in a twofold union.</td>
<td>d21, a1, q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t5, q1, m3, c1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether divinity was united to the soul and flesh in a twofold union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>t5, q1, m3, c2</td>
<td>How much of the necessity of Christ's passion was due to a lower final cause?</td>
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<tr>
<td>t5, q1, m3, c3</td>
<td>How much of the necessity of Christ's passion was due to a higher efficient cause?</td>
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<tr>
<td>t5, q1, m4, c1, a1</td>
<td>Whether Christ’s passion was in accord with divine justice.</td>
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<td>t5, q1, m4, c1, a2</td>
<td>Whether Christ’s passion was in accord with divine mercy.</td>
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<td>d20, a1, q2</td>
<td>Whether it was necessary that the human race be restored.</td>
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Appendix 2 Excerpt from the Commentary of Eudes Rigaud on the *Book of Sentences*

There is as yet no published edition of the commentary on the *Book of Sentences* by Eudes Rigaud. The following is provided merely as an aid to accessing his text and to complement the material written above. It by no means purports to be a critical edition of the text and covers only the soteriologically relevant portions of his commentary on Book III of the sentences, distinctions 17-20.

*It is based principally upon MS 824 of the Médiathèque de l'Agglomération Troyenne, selected for its accessibility, completeness and relative legibility. The pagination given below is of that manuscript. In cases of doubt, MSS 825 and 1862 of the same collection and MS 208 of the Bruges Municipal Library have also been consulted. All of these were originally housed in the library of the Abbey of Clairvaux.*

*The original spelling has been preserved throughout although the substantial abbreviation of the text has been expanded for ease of reading. Paragraph breaks as marked in the manuscript have been observed and the original paucity of punctuation retained.*

*In the transcription that follows, [?] indicates that a word is of dubious accuracy and [...] an indecipherable word.*

*The schema of the soteriological questions is as follows:*
Distinctio 17: Post praedicta considerari opportet et cetera.

   Articulus 1: Utrum voluntates contrarias fuerunt in Christo?

   Articulus 2: Utrum omnis petitionis eius et voluntas fuerit impleta?

   Articulus 3: Utrum haec petitio transeat et cetera et fuerit voluntatis vel rationis?

Distinctio 18: De merito autem Christi et cetera.

   Articulus 1: Utrum Christus meruit aliquid sibi?

   Articulus 2: Ex quo tempore cepit mereri?

   Articulus 3: Per quid meruit?

       Quaestio 1: Utrum habuit potentiam libero arbitrio ad merendo?

       Quaestio 2: Utrum meruerit in caritate?

       Quaestio 3: Utrum meruerit passione?

   Articulus 4: Quid meruit?

       Quaestio 1: Cuius sit illa exaltationem quem meruit?

       Quaestio 2: De morte quam meruit.

       Quaestio 3: De merito impassibilitatis.

       Quaestio 4: De clarificatione nominis.

       Quaestio 5: Utrum meruit meritum substantiale scilicet gloriam?

   Articulus 5: Utrum illa quod meruit habere sine merito?

Distinctio 19: Ad quid pati voluit et cetera

   Articulus 1: De aperitione ianuae factam per Christum

       Quaestio 1: Utrum sit facta per passionis meritum?

       Quaestio 2: De verbo Ambrosiano quod addunt Magister baetus probationem.

       Quaestio 3: De conclusione quem concludit.

   Articulus 2: De effecto quam est justificationis.
Quaestio 1: Utrum sit efficiens passionis?
Quaestio 2: Utrum sit efficiens rationis?
Quaestio 3: Cuius magne proprie?
Articulus 3: De liberatio potestate diabolica qui est talis efficiens
Quaestio 1: De liberatione a potestate puniendi.
Quaestio 2: De liberatione a potestate temptandi.
Articulus 4: De effectu qui est liberatione a poena.

Distinctio 20: Si vero quaeritur et cetera

Articulus 1: Utrum natura humana potuerit vel debuerit aliter liberari
quam per satisfactionem?
Articulus 2: De satisfacientem.

Quaestio 1: Utrum homo posset per se satisfacere quantum ad actuale?
Quaestio 2: Utrum quantum ad originale?
Quaestio 3: Utrum angelis potuerit satisfacere?
Quaestio 4: Utrum decuerit quod Deus purus vel incarnatus
satisfaceret?

Articulus 3: De modo satisfaciendi

Quaestio 1: Utrum congrue per passionem redemerit?
Quaestio 2: Utrum Deus fuisset incarnatus si homo non fuisset lapsus?
Quaestio 3: De carnis passionis quas tangit Magister

[fol.213 v. A] Distinctio 17, Articulus 1, Quaestio Unica: Post praedicta
considerari oportet et cetera. Ad intelligendam huius partis quaeritur utrum
in Christo fuerint contrarie voluntates. Secundo, utrum omnis petitionem
eius sine voluntas rationis fuerit exaudita ut impleta. Tertio, utrum huius
petitionem transeat a me calix iste et cetera. Fuerit sensibilitas aut rationis.
Circa primum sit Augustinus super genere. Ad litteram dicit quod omnia alia fuerit parata in arca Noë id est omnes sensuales motus in Christo ergo in illius motus sensualitatis ibat in congruum rationem ergo non fuit in Christo voluntas congruetas.

Item sensibilitas erat subjecta ratione aut rebellis si rebellis ergo in Christo caro concupiscebat ad usus spiritu, quod factum est fuit ergo subjecta ergo nichil volebat contra rationem ergo in Christo non fuit congruitas voluntatum.

Contra: voluntas humana per fragilitatem carnis recusabat passionem sed voluntas divina parumper erat pericere dispositionem ergo videtur quod in ea voluntas divina congruitur humane et aequo quaequ etiam quid appellantur ibi voluntas humana quare si non erat confortes divinem videtur fuisse inordinata.

Item sicut dixit Augustinus de tertium voluntates, sunt congrue quae sunt congruarum sed voluntas rationis erat ad moriendo sensualitatis ad non moriendo ergo in eo erat congruitas voluntatum.

Item sensualitas volebat unire et contra mori.

Item ratio volebat hoc ut nostra aut ergo motus ille ordinatur autem inordinatus si inordinatus non ergo omnia fuerunt pacatum Christo. Si ordinatus ergo placebat rationi cui placet omne bonum ergo ratio conformatur illi sed voluntas divina volebat congruum ergo in Christo fuit congruitas voluntatis rationalis ad divinam.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod in Christo fuerit divinas voluntates sed non congrue diversitas aut voluntatum consuerat quam dupliciter distinguui primo sicut in Christo ratione nostra distinguui voluntas divina et voluntas humana. Rursum humana distinguui in voluntatem rationem parte vel capitis
et ratione membrorum. Rursum voluntas capitis distinguitur in voluntatem rationis et sensualitas rursum voluntas rationis distinguitur in voluntatem rationis ut rationis et ut nec contingit [__] Christum velle diversa et opposito sed diversas voluntates ne tamen voluntates sunt congrue per quid quare congruetas est igitur eiusdem. Secundo quia si congruitas est in voluntate tamen confortas in ratione volendi nam sensualitas in Christo nec omnino voluit nec quod ratio voluit eam velle.

   Ad aliud quod primo obiicitur per voluntas humana recusabat mori dicendum quod voluntas humana vocantur ibi voluntas sensualitas sive rationis ut nec quod recusabat mori nec tamen congruebatur diem quod divina volebat eam sic velle.

   Ad aliud quod omnia quod voluntates sunt congrue quod volita. Respondetur unde dupliciter, primo quod hoc intelligitur de congruitate volitorum in genere moris quam necesse est altum esse malum non aut de congruitate in genere nec qui utique pars post unum appeti hoc est congruitas quod genere scilicet vivere et mori quorum utique bonum ut aliter intelligitur hoc quod idem genus voluntatis quia sit dictum est congruetas est respectu eiusdem liberum arbitrium enim intingo et [__] non congruant.

   Ad illud quod obiicit tercio utrum ille motus sensualitas esset ordinatus dicendum quod erat ordinatus in quam erat illius vis quam non tenebatur conforti voluntati divino uno ratio consentiebat et volebat quod ita appeteret sed tam rationem appetebat illo inquisitum ratio sic enim portaret tam ipsa teneatur in quam unum ratio inhabens quod Deum velle conforte se voluntati divinæ voluntas a nullis astingitur ut conformet in volito sed de habens latius habitum est in fine per liberum arbitrium requirire.
Articulus 2. Quaestio Unica: Secundum quaeritur utrum omnis petitio eius sit exaudita et in quod sic Heb 5 exauditus est in omnibus per sua reverenitur.

Item pars voluntate labiorum eis non fraudasti eum ergo quicquid ore petat exauditum est.

Item pars impleat dominus omnis peccatores tuas.

Item ratione sic ipse in omnibus peciat pie et inste et quod petendus erat ergo in omnibus fuit exauditus.

Item ipse erat summus sacerdos sanctus innocens et in pollutus sit Heb 9 ergo debuit in omnibus in impetrare quoque voluit.


Item petivit calicem tulire a se non tunc fuit exauditus sicut habetur in littera non ergo fuit exauditus in omni peccatonem\textsuperscript{2} sua.

Item quae utrum omnis voluntas eis omnis fuerit impleta et loquor de voluntate rationis et utrum quod sit quia illa fuit per omnia conformis voluntati divinae.

Contra Luc 19 vidit Jesum et flevit ergo si fletus non fuit falsus volebat illud voluntate interiori sed illa voluntas cum esset respectu fuit non potuit esse sensualitas fuit ergo rationis et tamen non fuit impleta ergo et cetera.

Ad primum dicendum quod quicquid petit peccatorem rationis fuit exauditus sicut ostendunt rationes prime illud ergo primus mellius de membris tercio de calice fuit sensualitas tamen et de illa fuit exauditus quod forma verborum quia petit conditionaliter?

\textsuperscript{1} Sic.
\textsuperscript{2} Sic.
Ad aliud dicendum quod quicquid voluit voluntate rationis utrum ratio est loquendo de voluntate absoluta impletum est sed voluntas quia compatiebatur non fuit absoluta sed conditionale sine velleitas. Hugo aut distinguueret in Christo voluntate quadrupliciter scilicet dicatis rationis pietatis et sensualitas duas primas semper dicit fuisse impletas duas ultimas non et voluntas qua flevit fuit voluntas pietatis et hoc in idem redit. Hoc aut voluntas pietas rationis est quia in solis hominibus reperitur et hoc est quod dixit Hugo in Christo fuit voluntas dicatis voluntas rationis et voluntas pietatis et voluntas carnis. Voluntas dicatis per iustitiam servitiam dictabat. Voluntas pietatis per virtutem per obedientiam [__]. Voluntas pietatis per compassionem in alieno malo suspirabat. Voluntas carnis per compassionem in malo propositio in [__]. Hoc aut voluntas pietas ut dictum est id est quod velleitas.

Articulus 3, Quaestio Unica: Tercio quaeritur utrum illa petitionem fuit rationis aut sensualitatis et videtur quod rationis quia sicut dicit dictum oratio est alius intellegenter in Deum ergo partis intelligenter sine rationis est orare non ergo sensualitatis. Ergo illa oratio fuit rationis non sensualitatis.

Item oratio est pius interioris affectus in Deum directus sed sensualitas non dirigitur in Deum ergo sensualitas non est orare sine petere peccato ergo illa fuit non sensualitas sed rationis.

Item solius rationis est conferre non sensualitas sed illa peccato fuit cum collationem cum dixit non mea voluntas et cetera. Ergo fuit rationis et non sensualitatis.

Contra magister dixit in littera quod fuit sensualitas.
Item nullius petit congruum est quod ulti facere si Christo quod rationem volebat viverem calicem ergo quod rationem non petebat calicem tulere.

**Respondeo** quod petitio illa fuit rationis et sensualitatis sed sensualitatis ut monentis sive per quo rationis ut proponita tamquam advocati et quia advocatus format libellum quod iudicium suum ratio faciunt illam petitionem sub condigne debita et sic patet respondendum ad tam prima objecta.

Ad illud aut quod quia quaed stepo rationem petit hoc cum nominibus[?] hoc et sciret se non exaudiri dicendum quod petitionem illam expressit duplici rationes prima est ut ostendetur se timere ex parte sensualitatis ut martyres timentes non desperarentur secundam rationem est quam quis licitum fit secundam sensualitatem velle quod Deus non vult non Deus rationem ipsam sequi sed liberationem se voluntati divinæ.

**Distinctio 18, Articulus 1, Quaestio Unica:** De merito autem Christi et cetera.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis quaed stepo de merito Christi quo meruit scilicet hoc primo quaed stepo utrum Christus meruerit aliquid. Dato quod secundo ex quo tempore cepit mereri utrum ab instanti conceptionis. Tertio quaed stepo per quod meruit et quarto quid meruit. Quinto utrum illa quod meruit potuit habere sine merito nam hoc omnia tanguntur in littera primo igitur quaed stepo utrum Christo meruit ad quod secundo videtur quia hoc dicit Magister in littera.

Item Augustinus claritas est meritum dari humanitas est primum vult igitur quod meruit humiliando se pari ratione et in aliis operibus.
Eph 2 humiliavit et cetera. Propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum.

Propter hoc non potest dicere merito ergo Christus meruit.

Item in libro De Regulis Fidei mereri apud Deum quod nulla necessitate compassionis libentis facit Deus quod facere debet sed Christus obediebat per omnia libentis et hoc decebat facere inquam homo ergo merebatur.

Contra: mereri est de indebito facere debitum quia sicut dicit Augustinus illud meretur quis quod ex debito ei redditur sicut dicit Apostolus 2 Thes ultimo de reliquo reporta est in corona justitiae sed Christus ab instanti conceptionis fuit dignus omnia gratia ergo erat ei non debitum ergo nichil meruit.

Item quoque meretur perficit in melius sed Christus non potuit perficere sicut dicit Gregorius et habetur scilicet sicut non habuit omnino quo potuisse ergo Christus non potuit mereri.

Hilarius dicit et habetur ultimo dicitur praecedentis quod Christus non sibi oravit sed suis ergo pari ratione non meruit sibi sed suis.

Item Christus statim ab instanti conceptionis fuit in statu comprehensoris sine beatudine sed illuc [fol.214.r.A] taliter meretur necesse est in statu merendi ergo Christus nichil meruit in quam viatorium inest in quam comprehensore.

Contra caritate illud ratione cuius attenditur meritum sed caritas est in anima quantum ad inferiorem partem contra sit infinens ergo caritas erit in quam comprehensorum quod aut quod comprehensorum non merebatur ergo simpliciter non merebatur.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod ista aperio quod dixit quod Christus solemniter membris et non sibi est abolita est sicut enim dicit Magister
tenetur quod ad sibi meruit ut mortalitatem corporis impassibilitatem in anima et rationis manifestationem sive exaltationem.

**Articulus 2, Quaestio Unica:** Ad intelligiam praedictorum notandum quod mereri Magister primo modo in praepare sive interpretative post existens in mortali peccato facit bonum sed mala intentionem quare Deus reverbuit ei magise quem faciat et ideo mereri dicitur id est interpretatur ac si meruisset.

Secondo Magister dicitur alias mereri de congrue sicut existens in mortali facit bonum in genere intentionem bona talis dicitur mereri gratiam de congruo.

Tercio modo dicitur mereri proprie de indebito facere debitum.

Si quod modus mereri est ex gratia existente in liberum arbitrium vitam aeternam sicut dixit Apostolus ad Thes 4 quis mereri ex debito facere magne debitum quod quem modus dicere quis mereri ex sequentibus operibus factis in caritate quod dixit Augustinus ad benefactum igitur merita Augustini ut aucta mereatur et perfici quinto modo dicitur mereri de debito habetur facere debitum actus sine usus hoc ultimo modo dicitur Christus meruisse quia ab instante conceptionis deebatur ei perhibitum plenitus gratiae quem habebat omne donum pressum aut temporalis excellentibus operibus debetur ei illud idem ex actu ut usu propter hoc patet respondendum ad duo prima quia ipsissima non praecedit de merito sed suam acceptionem secunda verba procedit de merito quod quaesitam acceptionem tunc etsi Christo in posset proficere in gratiam ut quantum ad partem superiorem tam poterat esse in meliori statu ratione carnis sicut in statu impassibilitatis et immortalis et quantum ad hoc exaltari et hoc meruit.
Ad illud quod obicitur quod non sibi oravit non est generati
intelligenter pecat enim prope propriae clariatem sed hoc intelligenter
quantum ad peccatum de transitu calicis de ista enim loquitur Hilarius.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod erat in statu comprehensoris dicendum
quod sicut dicitur quod in angelis est vita contemplativa quod quam
contemplantur Deum et hanc non meretur est unum vis [\_] quod quam
serviunt nobis et meritur aliquid praemium acceptabile sed Christus et
animam habuerint dupliciter operam unam et quam congruebatur ad
contemplandam deitatem et quam fovebatur et erat in statu beati alia habuit
et quam ordinabatur ad dispensationem nostrem redemptionis et quod hanc
erat in statu viatoris et merebatur et sic patet illud quod merebatur in quem
viator.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod caritas erat eis in quem comprehensorum
dicendum quod dicitur est motus caritatis scilicet in Deum et proximum
caritas quantum ad motum in Deum respicit superiorem partem rationis et
est ipsius in quem comprehensorum. Quantum ad motum in Christum
respicit partem inferiorem rationis et est ipsius in quantum viatore et
quantum ad hunc motum nichil perhibebat eum mereri.

Secundo quaeritur utrum meruit ab instanti conceptionis et videtur
quod sic. Jer 31 membris circumdabit virtum ergo ab instanti conceptionis
fuit perfectus omni gratiam ergo si poenes illam attenditur meritum ab
instanti conceptionis meruit.

Item Gregorius dicit et habetur tertia enim non sibi plus meruit
Christus per crucis patibulum quem a conceptione per gratiam virtutum.
Ergo meruit ab instanti conceptionis.
Contra prius est esse quem operari sed mereri est operari ergo prius est se quam mereri ergo prius fuit quam mereretur non ergo ab instanti conceptionis meruit.

Item de angelo dicitur quod non potuit esse malus in primo instanta conceptionis quia oporteret quod prius esset quam aduceretur ergo super est per conversionem oportuit ergo quod Christus prius esset quam meretur non ergo ab instanti conceptionis.

Item nullis meretur nec divisus ab utero nullis enim post baptizari in utero materno sed aperio conceptionis non erat divisus ab utero non ergo meruit aperio conceptionis.

Respondeo dicendum quod mereri dicere dicitur utrum ratione usus et ratione dignitatis ratione usus si alias meretur per opera ex caritate factam ratione dignitatis quod alias gratiam habens sine opera habeant sive non dicitur mereri vitam aeternam quia dignus est vita aeterna sicut pervulus loquendo igitur de merito dignitas ab instanti conceptionis meruit quia similiter fuit conceptus perfectus ut vir in gratiam et dignus omni bono. Si non loquamur de merito usus sive operis sic distinguuntur quidam quod post tenemur inclusive et exclusive hoc quod ab instanti si inclusive dicunt quod falsa est qui primo instanti si meruit si exclusive volita est et est sanctus Spiritus quod statim post primum instans meruit quia habuit usum liberum arbitrium et caritatis et per hoc solent ad obiri tunc si [fol.214.r.B] diceretur quod in primo instanti conceptionis sit fuit conceptio et unio et per gratiam visionis ficio et usus liberum arbitrium visum fuit quibusdam probable quod aut dicitur quod substantia procedit operum dicunt quod usum est non tempore sed nata ad matrem illam substantiam quam statim omni completorie et dignitate fuit completa simpliciter illud mali angeli non est.
similem quia ipse habuit motum per quod ad usus est et ideo quia pius erat conversus ad bonum aliquod modo non potuit hoc fieri in primo instanti unum non est similem patet solo ad sequens quia in ipso instanti conceptionis quo ad gratiam et scientiam fuit aeque perfectus sicut quem habuit Amos XXX.

Articulus 3, Quaestio 1: Tercio quaeritur per quid meruit et cum contingat mereri liberum arbitrium contingat et caritate et opere elicito a caritate. Quaeruntur [__] hoc tamen primum utrum habuit potentiam libero arbitrio ad merendo. Secondo utrum meruit caritate. Tercio utrum passione meruit.

Item primi sic solutio contingit mereri nisi potentiae rationali hoc ante ut dicit philosophus est ad oppositum ergo non contingit mereri per liberum arbitrium nec in quem est ad oppositum sed in Christo fuit confirmatum ad bonam caritatem ergo non habuit potentiam anime qua posset mereri.

Item non contingit mereri nec per liberum arbitrium nec in quem liberum potest facere quod facit nam si necessitate faceret ad nullum esset meritum propter hoc cum ergo liberum arbitrium esset in Christo determinatum ad bonum et necessitatem esset semper ipsum per eligere bonum et numquam malum ergo in Christo non fuit liberum arbitrium quod statum merendi ergo non meruit anime potentiam quod est liberum arbitrium.

Contra libertas arbitrius attestatur nobis caretur ut non possit cogi ad faciendo ad nolens. Sed Christus quod humanam naturam fuit nobilissima creaturarum omnium ergo in Christo fuit quia maxime liberum ergo maxime idoneum ad merendi quantum est de se.
Item hoc videtur de Anselmus de liberum arbitrium quod passibilitas nec libertas paciendi nec pars libertatis.

Respondeo dicendum de liberum arbitrium in Christo quod fuit potentiam idonea ad merendi.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod erat determinationem ad bonum dicendum quod est determinationem respectu finis et eorum quae sunt ad finens determinationem respectu finis non repugnant liberum arbitrium qui liberum arbitrium habet in [ ] respectu eorum quod finit ad finem sed attendo quod in habens post esset in Deum ut quantum ad oppositum in genere moris ut quantum ad oppositum in genere nec ut quem ad conditione opposita liberum arbitrium non dicitur liberum quia sit indifferens ad oppositum in genere moris, scilicet ad bonum et malum quia sic in Deo non esset liberum arbitrium sed dicitur liberum quia indifferens ad oppositum in genere et contradictionem ad facere quid parti caritatis et non facere et sic fuit indifferens in Christo et ideo fuit partis rationali quia ad oppositum liberum non ad omnia.

Quaestio 2: Secondo quaeritur utrum meruit ad caritatis et videtur quod non quia illius meretur ad beatudine et ex parte beatudinis ergo caritas Christi esset ipsa beatitudo eius et pars beatudinis eis cum per illam frueretur ergo melius per illam meruit.

Item omne meritum ordinatur ad melius quia Deus semper verberavit vel remunerat simpliciter condignum sed caritate Christi nobilius ut maius creaturam nichil est ergo caritas Christi non fuit ordinabit ad primum ergo per illam non merebatur.
Contra omni operam factam voluntarie de beati laus ut in superiorem laus tum recte facta vituperium indirecte. Si ergo opera Christi quae fuerunt neccese facta debetur eis laus ergo et praemium ergo illa opera ad merebatur sed constat opera quae fecit fecit ex caritate ergo caritate ad merebatur.

Item omni operanti digne Deo debetur primum sed Christus operabatur digne Deo et hoc ex caritate meruit ergo aliquod primum.

**Respondeo** dicendum est ex Christus meruit per opera facta ex caritate et caritate meruit tanquam radice.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod caritas eius erat personas beatitudinis vel ipsa beatitudo.

Respondendum est sicut dictum est super quod caritas quantum ad motum in Deum quod quem attendebatur fruitionem beatitudinis erat pars sed quantum ad motum in proximum erat ipsius in quem viator et hoc modo caritate merebatur.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod meritum ordinatur ad nobilius dicendum quod meritum habet comparationem ad potentiam liberum arbitrium et ad gratiam per quam liberum arbitrium in fortitudine meretur quod ergo dicitur quod meritum ordinatur ad nobilius hoc in illi racione liberum arbitrium non potentis se devare super se solutio aut hoc racione genere in fortuus maxime cum gratia ista perfectam est sicut fuit in Christo in quo fuit gratiam perfecta.

**Quaestio 3:** Tercio quaeritur utrum Christus ad meruit passione sibi et videtur quod ut quia congruitas meriti accenditur [fol.214,v.A] quod quantitatem caritatis sed in Christo fuit tanta quantitas caritas quem ad fervorem et quem ad intentionem ab instanta conceptionis quanta fuit in propria passione ergo ut meruit in passione si dicas quod meruit quem ad
voluntatum modus scilicet de debito habitus fecit debitem usum hoc nichil est quia aut passionem habuerat usum caritatis et aequalis fusorius qualis ergo prius meruerat si soli habitu sed usu.

Item passio est motus Christi fuit involuntaria sed inhabens quod involuntaria sunt non consistit meritum ergo passione ut meruit sibi.

Item passio solis fuit in carne et sensualitate et ratione ut natura non aut fuit ut ratione sed omne meritum est in ratione ut est rationem ergo passio Christi non fuit meritoria.

Contra sicut dicit Augustinus et habetur in littera humanitas claritatis est meritum claritas humanitatis est praemium ergo passione ad sibi meruit.

Respondeo dicendum quod per passionem ad sibi meruit sicut dicit Magister scilicet istaque super possumus et magister ponit in littera nec tam intelligendum sicut restatur magister quod meruit in passione ad quod non meruisset prius sed illud quod prius meruerat per caritatem et iustitiam perfectam meruit postea per passionem. Unum non magne meruit intensive sed pluribus quia sicut Magister dicit in virtute meriti per intensionem non poterat at perficere.

Ad illud ergo quod obiecit primo respondeo quia non dicitur in passione ad meruisse sibi in debitum ut quod de debito faceret magne debitum sed de debito per caritatem et per passionem faceret debitum alio modo scilicet per passionem et ita pluribus modis non intensione.

Ad aliud quod obiicitur de passione dicendum est quod in passione est considerare tamen passionis agentis est considerare passionis substantialiter ratione primum passio non est voluntaria in aliis a Christo sed ratione sciendi scilicet substantiae fuit meritoria et voluntaria in martyribus in Christo aut utque modo fuit voluntaria quia illi non potuissent cogere si non
voluisset et postea voluntarie et libenter sustinuit et ideo maxime fuit eius passio voluntaria.

Ad aliud dicendum quod passio esse in aliquo dicitur vel tamquam in paritate sive comparitate ut per comtemplationem licet igitur passio non esset in rationem ut non est tanquam in patiente erat tunc per comtemplationem et hoc facit meritum scilicet voluntas rationis.

**Articulus 4, Quaestio 1:** Circa quarto quaeritur principale quid meruit sibi et dicit Magister quod exaltationem quae consistit in immortale corporis et impassibilitate et nostris manifestationem primo igitur quaeritur fuit illa exaltationem. Secondo quaeritur de merito immortalis. Tercio de merito in passibilitate. Quarto de nominis clarificatione. Quinto quaeritur utrum meruit sibi meritum substantiale scilicet gloriam.

De primo sic quaeritur quantum ad quantum intelligatur Christus exaltaritur utrum quantum ad humanam an quantum ad divinam probatur quod quantum ad divinam eis enim est exaltari fuit humiliari quod patet Phil 2 ex inanivit[?] semetipsum forum sive accipiens accipere forum sive congruit Filio Dei ergo cum quem ad divinam naturam fuerit humiliatus quem ad divinam fuit exaltatus.

Item quod non fuit exaltatus per passionem quantum ad humanam naturam videtur quod natura humana in caritate fuit exaltata ad unionem cum divina sed non poterat humana magne exaltari sicut dicitur Augustinus et habitum fuit sic nullum donum majus illo ergo per passionem non fuit exaltata humana natura ergo divina.

Contra Augustinus dixit et habetur in littera enim in quam forma unitus est in ea formae exaltatus est sed hoc fuit in formae [__].
Item Anselmus de Incarnatione Verbi inquit in incarnationem factum non fuit natura divina humiliata sed solus humana exaltata ergo non divina. Quaestio est igitur ratione cuius dicatur natura humana exaltata.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod sicut dixit Heb 2 Christus quod humanam naturam minoratur est Paulo minus ab angelis propter passionem et morte dicitur igitur fuisse exaltationem impassibilitas et immortalitatis quam consecuta est in ratione.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod divinam fuit exaltata dicendum quod si intelligitur minorationem aliquem facta fuisse in naturam sed rem iste intelligitur non solum factus est sed etiam beatifico sed Deus intelligitur exaltato in quod ex tunc et habitum fuit quam ad reputationem in animam posset Dei exaltata in Christo quia potens non reputabatur esset Deus sed postea propter passionem cogantur est [fol.214.v.B] a nobis et laudatur et glorificatur.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod humana natura non potuit exaltari dicendus quod illa exaltationem non attenditur quantum ad pars substantiale ut per comparisonem ad divinam naturam cui uniebatur quia per illam unionem erat comprehensor et beatus statim in ipsa incarnatione sed hoc intelligere rationem partis inferioris in quem viator et passio sicut exponitum est.

**Quaestio 2:** Quaeritur de secondo scilicet de merito in mortalis et videtur quod illam non meruit quia meritum est per motum caritatis sed maius non ordinatur ad [__] cum ergo caritas sit animae et in mortalis corporis manifestum quod non contingit mereri per caritatem in mortalitatem corporalis.
Item corpus Christi de sive natura non habebat debitum mortis ergo suum omni merito habuisse in mortalitatem ergo non est unum quod meruit in mortem corporalis.

Contra nos mereri non solum doces anime sed etiam corporis ergo multe magis Christus.

Respondeo dicendum quod meruit in mortalitatem.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod illud quod est anime non ordinatur ad illud quod est corporis respondent quidam quod immortalitas licet dicatur esse duos corporis tunc magne est ipsius anime quia mori est poena magis anime quam corporis et non ordinatur quod est anime ad illud quod est corporis in merito sed ad illud quod est anime sed illud non soluit quia caritas est maius bonum anime quam in mortalitas carnis et propter hoc dicendum quod ordinari ad aliud est dicitur aut tanquam ad finem ultimum et sit maius non ordinatur ad minus aut tunquam ad terminum et sic maius bonum ordinatur ad minus et meretur etiam unius unum per caritatem meretur quis calicem et huius et sic patet illud quod imm mortalitas non est finis ultimus caritatis immo ipsa beatitudo.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod debetur ei immortalitas via nec dicendum quod non est incongruens ut illud quod purus debebatur via via naturae postea debetur via mereri et ita pluribus modis post divina tum quod licet per naturam corpus illi debetur immortalitas tam per gratiam et passionis meruit accelerationem immortalitatis.

Quaestio 3: Tercio quæritur de impassibilitate quem collata est anime et videbatur primus numquam quod in mortalis carnem anima enim erat [...] secundum unionem ergo illa duo concortantur se passibilitas anime et
mortalitas carnis genere et oppositum debent se confortari tunc igitur collata est anime impassibilitas quem corpori immortalitas sed hoc in tercia die ergo et cetera.

Contra anime [___] prius dotantur in se quam in suis corporibus ergo cum anima Christi dignorum fuerit omni anima alia statim ut exalta est dote impassibilitas debuit dotari ergo in passione facta est impassibili.

Item in statu innocentie impassibilitas anime influebat in mortalitatem in corpore ergo si Christus fuit vere reparator prius deberet anima eis fieri impassible quam immortalis.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod quia adventum partem sunt auctores utrum licet potest quis suffici per isto opinari sed tamen hodie tamquam probabilius tenetur quod in ipsam solutione anime a carne facta est anima impassibilis ut quid enim in ipsa ultra remaneret impassibilitas non videtur tamen quod per ergo obicit quod passibilitas meruit anime secundum mortalitatem ex parte carnis ergo etiam impassibilitas per mortalitatem addendus est ut quod separationem a carne mortale et ideo in ipsius solutionem potuit fieri impassibilitas.

**Quaestio 4:** Quaeritur quarto de nobis manifestationem facta per passionem sicut Magister dicit et quaeritur de quo nomine intelligitur qua vocatus est Jesus vocatus est Christus vocatus est Dei filius quod non meruit manem alicuius haec videtur quia hoc nomen filius Dei fuit manifestum demonibus ante passionem unum Magister unum quid vobis est etiam filius Dei gloria tamen innocuit quem opportuit non sicut angelis per hoc quod est vita et lux sed eis [___] per quaedam virtutis est tam.
Item Luc iv scio quod Spiritus Sanctus Dei gloria Dominum in tria videntes se continuo indicandos causae credebant sed sciebant quod non debeat indicari nec a Deo ergo faciebant quod esset filius Dei. 

Item super illud id est corpus[?] enim si cognovissent gloria maiores iudei qua ad cognitationem tenebantur sciebant quod esset Christus minores vero et simplices nescierunt ergo demones et iudei scierunt quod vocaretur etiam Jesus sciebant quod esset Christus sciebant quod esset filius Dei ergo ante passionem omni erant[_] facta non ergo per passionem meruit manifestationem nominis.

Contra super illud primo enim si cognovissent per quod de demonibus exponitur numquam dominum gloriae crucifixissent et crucifigi suggestissent per quod de iudeis numquam crucifixissent et crucifigi promisissent ergo neuter cognoverit quod esset filius Dei.

Item quaeritur differentiam est horum[_] et qualiter differunt hoc nomen Jesus et hoc nomen Christus et utrum quoniam impositum fuit ei nomen Jesus quod fi Jesus dicitur salvator a salvando et hoc fecit in passione ergo non ad debuit vocari hoc nomine sed in passione. 

Item super illud Magister id est vocatus nomen eius Jesum gloria ab aeterno habuit huius nomen. 

**Respondeo** dicendum quod per passionem meruit nominis clarificationem maxime quantum ad hoc nomen filius Dei quia et si primum sciretur ab aliquibus per revelationem spiritualem ut ab apostolis inde post passionem ab apostolis praedicantibus passionem[_] est in omnis generes quod ipse est vere filius Dei et licet prius sciretur vocari nomine Jesus tunc post scitus est quod ipse vere salvator est et quod ipse vere fuit Christo.
Quaeritur ergo objecta quod demones scierant ipsum esse filium Dei dicendum quod non cognoverint sed soli dicebant ex quadam suspicione videntes virtutes eis et sic intelligende sunt rationes ad utrumque partem et hoc est quod dicit gloria id est corporis enim si cognissent gloria quod dicunt demones in esse magne ex suspicione quam ex cognitione dicere adendi sunt. Ad illud quod quaeritur de iudeis dicendum quod ipsi nescierant quod esset Deus sed tunc maiores bene cognoscebant quod erat ille qui fuerat eis permissio in lege quia praetextum sive per litteram legis noscebant quod mellias corporum[?] esset dominus et quem ad hoc solvitur congruetas illa.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de differentiam illorum nominum dicendum quod filius Dei nominat ipsum in divina soli substantiale aut et Christus sue nomina per in duabus naturis sed Jesus primam in utrumque natura magna tunc in comparatione ad divinam quia eius est salvare Christo aut aequo quia naturae humane est tingi.

Ad illud quod quaeritur quia hoc nomen Jesus impositum fuit dicendum quod Jesus id est salvator salvator post dicere potentiam ad salvandus et sic ab aeterno fuit nomen filius Dei aut habitum et sic ipse incarnationis aut actum et sic per passionem sive in ipsa passione debuit Dei salvator.

Quaestio 5: Quaeritur quinto utrum meruerit gloriam suam sive primum liberale et quod non utrum quia ab instanti conceptionis habuit tantam delectationem in fruitionem dicatis quod maiorem habere non potuit ergo cum meritum procedat praemium quod nec gloriam Augustinum gloriae meruit.
Ad gloriam visionis in mediante et inseparabiliter et sit tempore sequebatur gloriam fruitionis unum cum non sit ponere ex meruerit gratiam visionis similiter non est ponere ipsam beatudinem sine fruitionem.

Contra Christus meruit per caritate sicut super probatum est licet qui meretur ex caritate quanto maiorem habet caritatem tanto magnum meretur et maius cum igitur alii homines ex caritate mereantur beatudinem et nichil maius sit beatudine ergo Christus ex caritate summa meruit maximum primum sed illud primum erat summum illius quia ipsum habuit maius primum omnis ergo Christus sibi meruit beatudinem.

Item in angelis similiter tempore fuit gratiam et gloriam et tum dicuntur meruisset gloriam ergo similiter videtur esse ex parte Christi ergo ___ in quam dicendum quod Christus meruit sibi gloriam.

Respondeo dicendum quod Christus non dicitur meruisse propriam gloriam substantiale praemium quia ab instante conceptionis illud habuit nequid dicat quod mereri contingit habitum sicut fuit quondam opinio tunc illud non approbatur communiter ideo dicitur quod meritum antecedit praemium.

Ad illud ergo quod obicitur de caritate Christi quod mereri debuit maximum primum per illam dicendum quod caritate sua non meruit sibi primum substantiale quia iam illud habebat unum hoc non fuit propter in completionem sed propter summam perfectionem solutio aut sua caritate magne meruit et maius quam caritas alcius quia meritum fuit substantiale et congrue et sive illo non sufficerent merita nostra ad operandum vitam aeternam ipsum enim meruit ianue operationem sicut infra melius patebatur.

Ad aliud quod obicitur de merito angelorum soluit quidam per interemptionem et dicunt quod angeli non solum nec sed tempore habuerit
prior gratiam quam gloriam cum etsi sit tempore habuissent gratiam et
gloriam tamen non est silere quia temporis prior fuerit quam esset glorificati
unum possibiles fuerit ad gratiam et gloriam per ordinem ut prior ad gratiam
et per gratiam in gloriam per ordinem ne Christus aut cum fuit statim sive
naturam humanam beatus fuit propter unionem ad Deum statum enim fuit
beatus fuit quia non fuit ille homo nec verbo unitus et ponita unione necesse
fuit per partem superiorem poenere fruitionem et ita beatudinem et ideo non
est silere.

**Articulus 5, Quaestio Unica:** Quinto quaeritur utrum ista scilicet
impassibilitatem et immortalitem et nominis maiorem potuit habere sive
merito et constat sicut dicit Magister in litteram quod potuit accipere
humanam naturam gloriosam sine merito procedente sed postquam
assumpsit passibilitatem et mortalitatem per statum in quo fuit quaeritur
utrum necessitatem fuit ipsum mereri et videtur quod non quia mereri est
voluntarium omne aut voluntarium potest fieri ut non si fieri [fol.215.r.B]
ergo Christus potuit mereri ut non mereri.

Item per [__] baptisti consecuti sunt praemium substantiale sine
merito operationis ergo multo forus qui habitum divinitatem habuit gratiam.

Contra: Christus ab instanti conceptionis fuit dignus omni bono ergo
meruit omne bonum ergo nichil potuit habere boni post qui esset ex meritis.

Item habebat liberum arbitrium confirmatum ad bonum ergo
necessitatem erat ipsum bonum facere ergo et mereri ergo necessarium fuit
illum mereri illa.

Item nobilius ex merito habetur ad quam sine meritis sed [__]
ponendum in Christo ergo necessario ponendus est ipsum meruisse.
Item impossibile est gratiam in eo fuisse [___] ergo merebatur recte igitur accepta et sibi merebatur et aliter esse non poterat. Ergo necessarium fuit Christum mereri.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod sicut dicit Magister per statum illum passibilem quem assumpsit necessitatem fuit ipsum mereri sicut ostendunt rationes.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod mereri est voluntarium dicendum quod est mereri simpliciter sine contingitur et est mereri hoc opera ut illo mereri simpliciter in Christo fuit necessitatem et tam necessitatem voluntarium quia necessitas illa est necessitas in unitis quod sicut dicit Anselmus. Non repugnat voluntati mereri aut hoc merito ut illo fuit quid voluntarium non necessitatem si enim praedicare bis vel tam vel amplius ut minus potest sine incongrue concedi quod utique modo poterat esse et hoc concludit ista non quia liberum arbitrium in Christo erat deteriatum ad bonum non tam hoc bonum ut ad illud.

Ad illud quod obicitur parvuli possunt optime vitam aeternam sive merito dicendum quod non sive merito dignitas tunc possunt sive merito usus vel operationis in se tunc processit in Christo et tam huius quia non habent usum liberum arbitrium sed in Christo fuit liberum arbitrium et gratia completa et perfecta quae nullo modo poterat esse otiosa et per haec patent obiecitur.

**Distinctio 19, Articulus 1, Quaestio 1:** Ad quid pati voluit et cetera.

Ad intelligendum huius partis in quo agitur quod nobis meruit Christus per suam passionem intelligendum quod sicut Magister deteriat quadruplex consecuti sumus bonum per eius passionem. Prium est ianue
aperatio, secundo peccatorum abolitio, tercio est a potestate diaboli liberatio, quarto aut est a poena absolutio per hoc [__] quod dicta sunt incidunt inquirenda et prime quaecumque de ianue aperationem per passionem Christi facta et hic quaeruntur tamen primo utrum aperationem illa facta fuit per passionis meritum. Secundo de verbo Ambrosii quod adducit ut videtur ad probationem huius. Tercio de conclusione Magistri quam concludit.

Circa primum sit tota videtur merendi consistit corporale[?] sed Christus ab instanti conceptionis fuit aequaliter caritatis et aequale ferventis sicut in passionem ergo in instanti conceptionis meruit nobis aperationem ianue. Ergo si numquam fuisse passus ianua fuisse aperta non ergo per passionem.

Item Christus quolibet motu suo merebatur nobis vitam aeternam ergo si merebatur magne et [__] congruus maius sit bonum vita aeterna3 quam ianue aperationem quia hoc ordinatur ad illud Christus quolibet motu et aacceptione meruit ianue aperationem.

Item qui meretur ad meretur illud sine quo non potest habere quod meretur sed aperationem ianue est annexa vitae aeternae quia sine ista habueri non potest vita aeterna ergo Christus quodlibet motu suo motu nobis aperationem ianue non ergo solum per passionem.

Item nos modo per caritatem meretur aditum regni et iturum regni haereditatem sed aeque bona fuit caritas in Abraham sicut et in nobis ergo Abraham meruit igitur in regni caelestis ergo ianue aperationem non ergo passio Christi.

3 Sic. Presumably ‘vitae aeternae’.
Item Deus promissit beatitudinem aeternam ab [__] et non potest mentiri ergo postquam Abraham decesserat in caritate necessitate fuit ipsum introire in regnum ergo sive Christus pateretur sive non ianua aperiretur non ergo per passionem.

Contra Ambrosius dixit et habetur in littera tantum fuit partem nostrum ut salvari non possemus nec unigenitus Dei filius pro nobis meretur debitoribus mortis similiter magister per aliam non potuit nobis aperatione aditus regni si igitur in passionem regni ianua est aperta cum aperta dicitur fuisse in baptizo et ascensione quae apertura quod differentius dixit enim Beda super aliud se baptisato Jesu aperti sunt caeli quod in baptiso aperta est ianua et nichil enim dicere ascendat eorum pandens tunc ante.

**Respondeo** dicendus ad intelligendum praedictorum quod aperationem [__] intelligi pro intelligendo quid sit ianue clausio. Clausio ante ianue sicut invitis Magister in littera fuit decreta regnum Dei quia deceret ut nullus intraret in regnum Deus nec factus satisfactionem [fol.215.v.A] per humanitatem quae omnibus perficeret sicut superbia prioribus[?] hominis omnibus hominibus nocuit ianue igitur aperationem est per satisfactione quem non naturam consistit in indice caritatis sed in humiliationem et poenalitate quem ad opus exterius et ideo non dicitur Christus meruisse nobis ianue aperationem nec per passionem quem non tam fuit meritoria sed etiam satisfactoria ut nulla posset esse tanta et talis satisfactionem hoc ut visis patet.

Respondeo ad objecta quod enim obicitur quod meritum consistit in caritate dicendus quod in merito est considerare utrum meriti et effectum. Vis quid meriti tota consistit in caritate efficerens a non totaliter sed etiam in opere exteriori sicut vis convivendi in igne efficerens a non solus in igne sed
etiam in lignis intelligendum autem est in hoc opere per satisfactionem sine in merito satisfactionis in quo requiritur poenalitas tale autem fuit meritum aperationis ianue.

Ad duo sequentia patet, respondeo ad aperationem ianue non tamen requirebatur motus caritatis sed et satisfactionem et quia satisfactionem non fiebat per quodque opus sive motum sed per passionem nec sicut in facta melius patebit ideo illud argumentum[?] nobis valet quia aperatio ianue addit super meritum simpliciter satisfactionem excellentissimam.

Ad aliud dicendus quod Abraham aeque bene meruit regnum caelorum sua caritate sicut et nos nostram nec nos meremur ianue aperationem sicut nostra ipse sed quia modo est aperta ianua possimus statim ingredi tempore ante Abraham non erat aperta et ideo non poterat statim ingredi nec per mortem Christi removeretur [__].

Ad aliud quod obicitur quod Deus promisit Abrahe dare regnum si perseveraret in bono intelligendum est quod promisit dare sic determina cui ianuam aperiiri per mortem filii unum promisit regnum dare et ingressum post mortem Jesu et sic patet quod ista permissio non tollit meritum passionis.

Ad ultum dicendus quod aperationem ianue dicta est fieri in baptismo quantum ad figuram [__] natum est enim quod illi esset aperienda qui esset consempulta in morte eius per baptisma in passione quantum ad virtutem sed in ascensione quantum ad effectum.

**Quaestio 2:** Secondo quæritur de illo verbo Ambrosium tantum fuit peccatum nostrum ut salvari non possemus nec unigenitum moreretur per nobis debitoribus mortis. Quaeritur primo de qua morte intelligit esse
debitores aut illud temporali aut de aeterna si de aeterna hoc falsum est quia Abraham et alii facti non sunt debitores mortis aeterne immo sunt digni vita aeterna ergo sine morte unigeniti potuerit non solis liberarī a morte sed etiam consequi gloriam si dicas quod intelligit de morte temporali hoc est falsum. Anselmus in litteram Cur Deus Homo si nullatenus potest se homo magne dare ad Dei honorem qui cum se tradit morti ad illius honorem ergo si [...] tanto minus grata quanto magne coacta sicut dicit Augustinus. Non omnis homines sunt vel fuerunt mortis debitores ergo cum debitum illud solutum sit per passionem Christi non ergo intelligit de morte temporali.

Item videtur quod Christus fuerit debitor mortis et hoc probat Anselmus enim Cur Deus Homo duplici ratione, quia ipse debebat obedire patri sed pater praecipiebat Jesum mori ergo fuit debitor mortis operat.

Item si debuit redimere quia ad hoc venerat debebat [...] meliori modo enim dicebat sed hoc erat per mortem ergo erat debitore mortis.

Item quid est quod dixit quod nullo alio modo possimus salvari numquam intelligit dicere quia non erat alius modus possibilis quod est contra Augustinum.

**Respondeo** dicendus quod mors dicitur magister uno modo mors est separato anime a corpore et sic omnis fuerit debitores mortis primum Christum. Secondo modo mors est separatio anime a Deo per peccatum et sic peccatum mors. Tercio modo mors est irrecuperabile separationem anime ab aeterna beatudine et hoc modo mors est damnationem aeterna. Quarto modo mors est separationem a Dei contemplatione sicut antiqui parens in limbo aut adventum Christi non ut ibi meritum essent sed usque ad liberationem primo igitur modo et quarto omnis fuerunt debitores mortis per peccatum primi parentis unde Abraham debitor erat utriusque mortis praeter Christum
quia nullius mortis fuit debitor quod obicitur quod Abraham erat dignans vita aeterna. Respondetur quod intelligitur fuit dignus vita aeterna per proprium meritum intervenit merito Christi. Unde merita nostra sunt merita cooperationis Christo enim omnibus meruit beatudinem quantum ad sufficentiam sed quod habuit effectum in uno non in alio hoc est inquam unius cooperatur alter vero non.

Ad illud quod obicitur de morte temporali quod non omnis fuerit debitores respondendum quod immo omnis fuerit praeter Christum illud verbum Anselmus intelligit de Christo licet sit debitum cum si [fol.215.v.B] quis velit ex caritate pati mortem ad gloriam Christi hoc ipso quod ex caritate sustinet facit illam Deo gratiam sicut maxime fuit in martyribus.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod Christus fuit debitor mortis respondens quod est debitum bonitatis sive caritas et debitum necessitas debitum bonitatis sive caritas et debitum necessitas debitum bonitas hoc non est debitum nec absque obnoxietas sed unita liberalitas talis fuit in Christo debitum aut necessitas in nobis fuit in ipso non et sic intelligitur illud.

Ad aliud dicendus quod illud verbum Ambrosii intelligendum de congruo quod non poteramus ita congruent salvare sicut per mortem unigeniti tam alio modo poteramus simpliciter verbum magnum quod non per aliam hostiam poterat ianua aperi sedit hoc intelligitur.

**Quaestio 3:** Tercio quaeritur de illa congrua quam intelligit Magister magnus ergo in morte unigeniti perfecta sunt nobis et quaeritur utrum maior fuit Christum mori pro nobis quam dari vitam aeternam et aequo et quod maior sit dare vitam aeternam patet quia propter quod uniquesque tale et
illud magnum sed mortuis est ut daret vitam aeternam ergo maius fuit dare
vitam aeternam quam mortem.

Item minus ordinatur ad maius non aut minus sed mors Christi
ordinatur ad vitam aeternam ergo et cetera.

Contra: Super illud ratio uni quando non omnia nobis tradidit gloria
minus est tradere omnia scilicet iustitiam in praesenti et in [___] vitam
aeternam quem vitam aeternam quam unigenitum tradere morti.

Item prius in te Domine spiritualem inclina aurem tuam super gloria
quam mai[or [__]] quem filium unigeniti tradere morti quidem nulla.

Respondeo dicendus quod datum unum prius divinam maius alio
aut in comparatione ad illud quod datur aut in comparatione ad quomodum
illius est datur. In comparatione ad illud quod datur sic comparatur hoc duo
vitam Christi et vitam aeternam naturam vitam Christi maius est quid
propter unionem personalem ad deitatem quae est in Christo qualis unio non
erit ad Deum in vita aeterna et ita maius est quid vita Christi et maius omni
creato quod post excogitari hanc vitam nobis et pro nobis tradidit in morte et
sic maius dedit in morte quam sit vita aeterna si autem consideremus
utilitatem eius cui datur vita aeterna quia aufertur omnis miseria omnis
potentia ad peccandum quod non conferebat mors Christi statim immo
moriebatur quantum ad hoc maius donatum est nobis in vitae aeternae
collationem et sic procedunt rationes ad partes oppositas maximum quid est
collatum nobis in passione Christi sed parum valeret nobis nec ulterior
daretur nobis vita aeterna exemplum si quis [___] martyrnum auri parum
valeret illi nec propter illam vellet dare si frustrum panis nec ali unde posset
habere.
Articulus 2. Quaestio 1: Nunc igitur quaeramus et cetera. Sequitur de iustitia effectum qui est absolutionem culpae sive iustitia et primo quaeritur utrum iste sit efficiens passionis iustitia utrum sit efficiens rationis. Tercio cuius magne proprie.

Circa primum sic Isaiah 44⁴: Ego sum qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me ergo remittere culpam est solius Dei non ergo remittere non ergo creaturae non ergo peccata remissio est per passionem.

Item dicitur quod maius est de impio facere factum pium quam caritate caelum et naturam sed creationem est solius Dei ergo et peccatorum remissio ergo et cetera.

Item remission peccata est solis per gratiam sed gratiam est a solo Deo ergo et cetera. Et bono medie Bernardus absit ut perfectionem animae tribuamus caritate Deo aut eius creationem cum maius sit esse perfectum quam factum sed anima perficitur per gratiam ergo illa a solo Deo est ergo et remissionum peccatorum non ergo propter passionem Deus enim gratiam infundit in mente.

Item passio Christi est corporaliter sed peccata sunt in anima spiritualiter corporale non agit in spirituale ergo passionem Christi peccata non delet.

Item passio Christi non attingit animam in qua sunt peccatum ergo illam non lavat a sordibus peccatorum.

Contra Apostolus est lavit nos a peccatis unius in sanguine suo ergo sanguis Christi qui effusus est in passione lavit peccata ergo et cetera.

⁴ The quotation is actually Isaiah 43: 25 – ‘Ego sum ego sum ipse qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me et peccatorum tuorum non recordabor’.
Item Heb 9 sanguis Christi qui per spiritum sanctum semetipsum obtulit emendavit conscientiam vitam ab operibus mortuis sed illa sunt peccata.

Item ibidem sanctus sanguis effusione non est remissio peccatorum.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod passio Christi potest considerari in re ut vel in quem est in anima si quid consideratur in re excellentia sic passio fuit meritoria genere omnibus hominibus cooperantibus quem ad effectum si enim sum per suam orationem merentur gratiam aliis multo magne passio Christi fuit satisfactoria poenae et in hoc dicitur portasse languores nostros quam potest in peccato Domino considerantur scilicet martyria quod deletur per gratiam et reatus poenae aqueo quis absolvitur per satisfactionem poenale comparatur ergo passio Christi in re ad peccata ut illa delens ratione martyrie et reatus ut tanquam efficiens eam sed tanquam meritoria vel satisfactoria.

Si a consideretur passio Christi ut est in anima quia Deus in esse per fidem caritatem pietatem compassionem et imitatorum duobus primis modis delet culpam quia sum fide impossibile est placere Deo et iustus est per fidem et caritas operit multitudinem peccatorum duobus [fol.216.r.A] aliis modis sequentibus delet ipsum reatum habens visis facile est. Respondeo ad objecta quod enim obicitur est enim in quod solius Dei est dare gratiam et remittere culpam verum est tanquam creaturae effectis et principalis passionis autem est mereri gratiam et tam meritoria genere potest esse creada simpliciter patet.

Respondeo ad duo sequentia quia quis esset caela quia tam eius sustinentia per voluntatem qui est spiritualis erat tam meritoria bonum spiritualis et inundabis spiritualis et attingebat animam per modis merita
fides a passionis in anima et amor inundat etiam efficientis quia hoc dixit ipsum gratiam quem inundat ipsum animam id est Deus per gratiam.

Quaestio 2: Secundo quaeritur utrum resurrectio Christi necessario sit eam inest iustificationis sine remissionis peccatorum et videtur quod sit.

Ratio item mortuus est propter delicta nostram resurrexionem propter iustificationem nostram ergo resurrectionem iustificatam.

Contra constat quod resurrectio Christi non est tam nostram iustificationis efficiens per ratione spiritum superdictans de passione obicitur ante quod non sit tam meritoria quia Christus resurgens non erat in statu merendi ergo resurgendo ut nobis meruit.

Item meritum iustificationis attenditur quantum ad gratiam in praesenti si ergo resurrectio ordinatur ad gloriam in futuro manifestum est quod non fuit tam meritoria in est iustificationis nec alio modo ut videtur ergo nullo modo fuit tam nostrum iustificationis.

Respondeo dicendus quod sicut Deum est de passione sic de resurrectione dicendus quod potest considerari dicitur vel in re vel in anima considerata in rei nec est tam iustificationis praesentis per praesentem gratiam et tam iustificationis perfectam per praefiguratam gloriam tam in quam iustificationis praesentis non efficiens nec meritoria sicut objectum fuit sed motiva et exempl! Successo motiva quia sicut incarnationem scilicet unio dictatis ad humanitatem monebat Deum ad conferendus gratiam nec sibi unite et disponebat quodam modo ipsam naturam sic etiam in ratione tam exemplaris sicut dixit Apostolus est tam nostrum iustificationis. Rom 5 sicut resurrexit a mortuis per gloriem prius ita et nos in voluntate vitae [_] tam iustificationis quae erat perfectam gloriam in resurgentibus est exemplaris
quia resurrectio est exemplar nostrum resurrectionis est et efficiens quia sua resurrectio est tam efficiens resurrectionis aliorum tamquam cooperans vel ipse Christus resurgens per quod consideratur in anima sit tam iustificationis in quem objecta amata et separata sic mortuo est Christus propter delicta resurrexit propter iustificationem.

**Quaestio 3:** Tertio quaeritur cum illud sit iustificare et peccata remittere utrum ergo quod passio iustificet et quod resurrection delent peccata quaeritur igitur quia sic apparat\(^5\) apostolus.

Item quaeritur super illud mortuus est gloria utraque mors et resurrectio Christi delicta tollunt et utraque iustificant ut quid ergo apparat\(^6\) sic.

Item ratio modo iustificati per fidem in sanguine ipsius ergo videtur quod deberet dicere mortuus est propter iustificationem.

**Respondeo** dicendus sicut dixit glossa super locum illum dictum mors Christi sola in totum vitae necessis figurat et in resurrectione Nova vita figuratur quem ad significationis diversitatem verba divisit ex hac gloria colligitur sole quod passio potest considerari in quantum tam vel in quantum et signum primo modo est tam remissionis culpae et iustificationis in quem a signum sic est signum remissionis culpae simpliciter dicendus de resurrectione et ideo apparat\(^7\) in quem signum non in quantum tam et sic patet respondet ad objecta.

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\(^5\) Sic. Presumably ‘apparat’.

\(^6\) Sic. Presumably ‘apparat’.

\(^7\) Sic. Presumably ‘apparat’. 

Ad illud quod quaeritur quoniam differentis sit tam iustificationis passio et resurrectio dicendus quod iustificato potest considerari ratione termini initialibus et sic eius tam passio ratione termini initialis sive confirmationis resurrectionis.

**Articulus 3, Quaestio 1:** Sequitur de tercio effectum quem est liberationem a potestate diabolica et tantum hoc merentur duo primo de liberatione a potestate [__] a potestate redemptandi de primo quaeritur sic magister dicit in litteram quod liberationem a potestate divina fuit facta per passionem Christi sive per sanguinem Christi quo deleta sunt chirographa culparum quibus debitores a divina aut tenebam quaeritur igitur primo quid intelligitur nomine chirographi et utrum debitores essemus divina per illa chirographa et videtur quod non quia ipse nullum vis habebat in nobis ergo nec chirographum videtur habuisse nec potestatem.

Item de isto verbo Augustini quod tempore suo delevit chirographa omnium culparum quia si parcens qui erant in limbo non habebant peccatum actuale nec originale ergo erat deletum chirographum non ergo passionem vel sanguine deletum fuit.

Item si omnium culparum chirographa delevit ergo videtur quod nullius fuit dampnatur quod tamen falsum est immo multi dampnatur.

Item dicitur Lucam 2 quod positus est in utinam multorum ergo videtur quod non omnium culparum chirographa delevit immo fuit multis occasionem peccatorum quis deleverit chirograoha non videtur quod aliquos eripiuntur de potestate quia illi qui erant in limbo non puniebantur nec erant in eius potestate illos ergo non erupit similiter nec illos qui erant in inferno solutio videtur ergo aliquos exprimisse de potestate divina.
Per Anselmum opportet ostendens quod passio Christi sufficit ad delenda peccatorum omnia enim Cur Deus Homo sic inquaeers putas ne tam bonum et tam amabile sufficere ad solvendus quod debetur [fol.216.r.B] per peccatis totius mundi et respondet quod immo plus in institutionem videtur igitur quod hoc vita [...] omnia peccata si pro illis detur si ergo dare vitam est accipere mortem sicut dato vitae pervalet omnibus peccatis ita et acceptionem mortis.

Sed contra Anselmus si tam malum est occidere Christum quam bonum est eius vitam servare quoniam post vitam eius superiorem et delere peccatorum eorum quid eum occiderunt aut si alitus peccatorum eorum delet quo quorum aliorum horum peccatorum delere autem quod multi ex eis salvati sunt et innumerabiles alii salvantur sic ergo videtur quod mors Christi non sufficeret ad delendum omnem culpas sive chirographa at per hoc nec ad liberandum omnis a potestate divina.

**Respondeo** ad praedictorum intelligiam quod glossa Col 2 dicitur exponit illud verbum chirographum decertum[?] primo modo sic decertum mandatum Dei quo [__] homini ne commederet chirographum autem dicit memoriam esse transgressionis Adae per quam omnis postis obligabantur ad carentiam visionis Dei. Secundo modo sic decertum datur divinam finam quam Dominus dixit homini morte monerit chirographum autem est ipsum peccatum Adae possimus autem intelligere illud verbum Augustini deletis omnium culparum chirographa id est omnium culparum reatus reatus enim est quo quis est debitor poenae per huius aut chirographum nullum vis aequiter divina nec potestas in hominem. Unde diabolicus fuisse detinebat hominem sed tam homo per illud chirographum in sic detinebatur erat enim debitor poenae sive carentiam nec omnis quantum ex Adam natus est per
propriam sanitatem unde obligatur Deo et iuste promittebatur quo usque per mortem factam est satisfactionem et illius chirographum deletionem et sic patet respondeo ad primum.

Ad aliiud quod quaeritur quoniam delevit chirographa omnium culparum dicendus quod quantum sollutet omnibus et quem est de se omnis illineret tamen non omnis illinerentur sic passio Christi sufficiens fuit ad omnia delenda chirographa quod aut non sunt omnia deleta hoc est propter hoc quod aliqui disponunt se ad congruus unde illud verbum intelligendus quantum ad sufficientiam non quantum ad efficientiam quod ergo obicitur quod partes sive in limbo non habebunt aliiud delendus immo dicendus erant debitores careri visionis quoque solutum est partum quod illius potuit solvere nec Christus Dei filii ad sequens patet respondeo quia mors illa sufficiens fuit pars eius ad delendus omnem culpam et omne chirographum quod positus est in iustitiam hoc dicitur per accidens quia multi deebantur scandalizari in Christo tamen ipse nullum scandalizavit immo quem in se fuit ponibus satisfecit.

Ad hoc quod obicitur quod nullos videtur eripuisse de potestate divina dicendus quod illi qui in carcere limbi custodiebantur ad divina etiam licet et non posset eos congrue tam usurpabatur sibi potestatem detinendi eos et promittebatur non quia haberet iuste in eos sed illi inste detinebantur ibi.

Ad illud Anselmus respondet ipse idem et summa responsionis sue est quod peccatorum illorum per ignorantiam exultatur a tanto quia si cognovissent numquam Deum crucifixissent et ideo non debent puniri nec sicut de morte unius altius hominis tamen posset dici quod illa fallit ad hunc quia gratiam potentiorum omni culpa quantumque fit magna et deletionem
peccata est per gratiam secundo passionem Christi adjuncta genere sufficiens erat ad satisfaciendi per quoque est quantoque peccata.

**Quaestio 2:** Secondo, quaeritur de potestate nocendi et temptandi in hanc vita qua simpliciter dicimur liberari per passionem et obicitur quia in nullo per passionem sit potestas illa minorata quia sicut dicit Gregorius *Super Psalmos* non habebat potestatem auferendi unam nec promissis et simpliciter modo ergo videtur quod tanta habet potestatem modo quantam tunc.

Item habet vim orandi corpus humani et vexandi et necandi corporaliter ergo in nullo videtur diminuta potestas divina in nocendo hominibus.

Item si dicas quod huius est in reprobis quia post corporaliter nocere non soluit quia legitur quod demones flagellabant Antonium corporaliter.

Item quantum ad potestatem temptandi in illo videtur divinita partas quia librum arbitrium erat litteram ante coactione sicut et nunc ergo non poterat coegi a divina sicut nec nunc ergo non habuit maiorem potestatem temptandi quam modo.

Contra: Apoc 20 vidi angelum descendem de caelo qui apprehendit draconem et alligavit eum et constat per angelum intelligo Christum per draconem divinam sicut exponit a sanctis ergo divinam ligatur est a Christo non ergo potens ut prius innocendo.

Item divinus aut passionem in [__] adorabatur ut Dominus modo autem non ergo mutata est potestas temptandi.

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8 Some manuscripts ascribe this to Augustine’s Commentary on Job.
Item sive Anselmus magne veneretur naturam humanam quantum [fol.216.v.A] aut passionem quia prius permittebant se adorari sed potestas non sicut patet de Ioannem ergo diligentius modo hominem quem ante ergo magne arcent congruas pares non ergo tamen post divinus in homines quantum potestas poterat nec cooperare suggestionibus nec etiam corporaliter nocendo.

Respondeo dicendus quod potestas divina quam habebat in temptando homines et corporaliter flagellando unitare passionis debilitata est tam quia ipse non permittitur temptare sicut prius permittebatur immo per Christum ligatus est tam etiam quia si permetteretur inventent homines fortiores ad resistendum propter scutum fidei quo sunt salvari sicut dicitur Eph ultimus in omnibus summentes[?] scutum fidei in quo possitis omnia tela nequissimi extinguere et etiam propter caracterem crucis quo insignati sunt de quo dicitur Apoc 7: nolite nocere et cetera quibus signem et illud est signemus et illud est signum crucis quia est [__] qua percutitur divinus et secondo timet agredi quod dicitur Psa 27 promovit [__] per custodem non modo audet ita aggressi et postest partas eius quiaadorabatur in [__] totum mundus fide passionis ad nichil est per illam autem habebat et nocendi corporaliter potentiam adorantes se et temptandi spiritualiter.

Ad illud quod obicitur quia ante incarnationem non poterat nocere nec promissus patet respondeo quod non tamen permittitur modo quantum permittebatur prius. Prius enim poterat et permittebatur nocere et vexare corporaliter et etiam necare et post in rebus nocentamenta facere nec esset de aliquo per spiritualitatem gratiam sicut de Job dicitur quod Deus vallantum domum eius modo aut non sic unde quod objectum quod modo poterat negare et vexare dicendus quod vexare permissus est psalmos ab ecclesia in
emendationem fidei Christiane sicut dicitur de illo formatore quod Paulus tradidit Satane in meritum carnis 1 Cor 5 vexari permittantur a fideles sed hoc vel propter satisfactionem praeteriti peccata in propter maiorem est gloriam. Unum Dominus Jesus dixit Antonio quod aderat quem vertabantur et modo permittebat quia expectabat eius triumphum.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod liberum arbitrium numquam potuit cogi dicendus quod est coactionem sufficiendi est etiam coactionem in ducens non ergo potuit cogi coactionem sufficiente tamen cogi poterat quodam modo coactione adjacente et hoc modo cogere poterat divinus quantas non faceret omni modi violenter sed multo fora impellebat tamquam nunc.

Articulus 4, Quaestio Unica: Sequitur quarto de quarto effectum qui est liberationem a poena et [___] hoc essent contenda utrum poena illa poena fuit sufficiens ad delendam omnem poenam et utrum [___] omni poena hoc aut disscussa sunt ut quaeget distinctio XV et XVI in fine utusque.

Sed quaeritur a qua morte nos liberavit.

Respondeo a morte aeterna liberavit qui in eum [___] omnis a quem ad sustinentiam spiritualiter a morte culpae quod est per peccatum et a morte careretur visionis Dei a morte etiam a Domino mortis divina a morte et temporalis in mortus temporalis in morte sicut patet in sciens martyribus.

Ultimo incidunt priore quaerenda circa humanam sed sufficiat hoc scilicet quia magnum sit mediator per naturam humanam quam sed divinam et videtur quod non per humanam quia medium dicitur aut per abnegationem et sic non erat mediator a non per participationem et sic simpliciter si erat mediator quia per naturam humanam solis participabat alterum extremum.
Item in quod humanam naturam fuit extremum et non medium.

Respondeo dicendus quod meum post divina dupliciter aut ratione proprietatis aut ratione nostrarum quod ergo dicitur quod Christus per humanam naturam est mediator non intelligitur ratione natarum sed ratione peccatum quia erat iustus et mortalis iusticia communicabat cum domino morte cum hominibus congruo non potuit esse nec esset congruens mediator si intelligitur praeterea debebat enim supplicare et differre ab extremis hoc per humanam naturam.

**Distinctio 20, Articulus 1, Quaestio Unica:** Si vero quaeritur et cetera.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis supposito quod humana natura fuerit temporalis et reparanda ad inquirendam huius reparationis in congruitatem. Quaeritur utrum humana natura poterit vel debuit aliter reparari quod per satisfactionem. Secondo dato quod magne congrue per satisfactionem quae ruitur de satisfactione. Tercio de modo satisfaciendi.

Circa primum quod potuerit et decuerit humanam naturam reparari sive satisfactionem videtur misericordia Deum excedit naturam humanam in infinitum cum [fol.216.v.B] ergo misericordia humana commendetur in hoc quod tantum condonat multo fortius misericordia Deum est commendatus si totum condonet homini ergo non videtur quod augetur debuerit exigere satisfactionem pro culpa.

Item Deus praecessit homini totum condonare primo si ergo nichil praecessit nec bonum et congruens ergo bonum et congruens est totum condonare sine poena aliquam sed omne bonum et decens et decens ponendus est in Deo ergo videtur quod sine omni satisfactionem debuit hominum liberare.
Item magne benignitas est condonare offensam et maioris magne
codonare et maxime benignitatis totum condonare sed Deus est summae
benignitatis ergo decuit ipsum totum condonare ergo aliter decuit liberari
sive salvari genus humanam quam per satisfactionem.

Item Deus nullius legi subjetus est ergo si condonaret totum nullius
facere etiuria ergo nulla est indecentia maxime cum omne quod vult sit
bonum et decens.

Contra Anselmus supposita quod peccatum ordinatur in poena arguit
sed si peccatum damnaretur et punitum ad remaneretur in universo
inordinaturm sed indecens est quod Deus relinquit ad inordinatur in
universo ergo indecens est ut peccatum damnatur horum sine satisfactione
ergo non debeat hominem [_] liberari quam per satisfactionem.

Item si peccatum non punitur nulli legi subest ergo eadem liberior est
malitiam quam iustitia sed hoc est maxime indecens ergo non decet peccata
divinitate sine satisfactione.

Item si peccatum non punitur ergo est eodem modo apud Deum
impius et peccatorum ergo non pensat merita sed hos est maxime indecens
[_] sapiente Domino ergo non decet peccatum dimittere sine satisfactione.
Iste sunt rationes Anselmi.

Item super illud enim 2 Tim 2 intus se ipsum non potest negare alius
cum sit iustus non potest negare iustitiam sed iustus est peccata puniri ergo
non decet immo impossible est ut videtur relinqui peccatum inpunitum ergo
nec humanum naturam reparari nec per satisfactionem.

Respondeo dicendus quod sicut dixit Magister in littera et
Augustinus potuit Deus liberare hominem per potentiam potuit etiam per
iustitiam maluit tamen iustitiam quia magne congruebat per hoc intelligendo
quod Deus humanam naturam potuit eripere de prae[?] divina et inferre
in regnum aliter scilicet quam per satisfactionem sufficientem quae fuit in
morte Christi sed non ita congruebat nostram miseriam et argumenta ergo
Anselmi facta ad probandum quod non scilicet ita congrue intelligendus aliter
enim non concluunt quia peccatum est quod Deus liberasse alio modo
tamen peccatum non remaneret impunitum quia sicut dixit Augustinus.
Peccatum secum fert poenam et non promittit Deus deletus peccatum sine
decore iustiae propterea si deleret peccatum totum non remaneret
inordinatum concludunt ergo rationes iste quod magne congrue facta est
redemptio per satisfactionem et quod ita decebat.

Ad illud quod prima obicitur in congruum quod Deus est summe
misericors dicendus quod Deus non est tam misericors sed etiam iustus et
non tam decet ipsum de mente[?] miseriam quia et iustius et ideo magne est
decens est decens si auferetur et miserendo punit quam si tam puniret aut si
tam misereretur quo ergo obiicitur de miseria humana dicendus quod non
est silere quia homini nullo modo debetur vindictam iniuria sua per quod
dicit dicens in vindictam Deo autem maxime convenit[?] vindicare et ideo
quis decens sit omne miseria humanam totum condonari non propter hoc
sequetur quod ita sit in divina et per hoc malum est respondere ad sequens
quia Deus hoc praecepit homini decet enim hominem non sic aut decet cum
rationem iam dictam.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod est benignus patet respondeo quia sit cum
hoc iustus est unde benignitas tanta Deus esse ut tamen iustitiam non
desciret et non sic remissionem debet quia puniat aliquo modo maximum aut
Christus benignitas ostenditur in hoc quod homo peccet in eum qui est bonus
infinitum infinita est offensa et ideo poena deberet esse infinita ipse aut
ponendo commutat poenam aeternam in temporalem constat quod aeternum
excedit temporale in infinitum et in hoc infinita Dei ostenditur miseria et
benignitas.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod quicquid vult Deus iustum est hoc
intelligitur de hunc quae sunt possibilia benefici quia possibile est ipsum
velle nam ea quod per se mala sunt impossibile est ipsum velle sive qui non
decent Deum. Et ideo cum hoc non deceat eum quin ipse aliquo modo punit
peccatum non est dicere quod decens esset si vellet sed quia indecens
impossibile est ipsum velle sicut respondet Anselmus. Non tamen Dominus
quod impossibile sit ipsum velle peccatum dimitti sine sufficienti
satisfactione sine condigna quia possibile est quod modica sit conceptus et
reliqua suppleat ex miseria et sic patet quod utrum potuit esse scilicet salvari
sine satisfactionem passionis [fol.217.r.A] quia alius erat modus passibile sed
ita magne congruebat.

**Articulus 2, Quaestio 1:** Secondo quæritur de satisfactionem et primo
quaeritur utrum homo posset satisfacere per se quantum ad actuale Deum
quem ad originale et dato quod non quaeritur utrum angelis potuit
satisfacere et dato quod non quaeritur utrum aliquid alia creatura potuit
satisfacere et dato quod non eum ergo ex hoc sequatur quod Deus debuit
satisfacere quaeritur utrum purus Deus an Deus incarnatus sive humanae
naturae unitus.

Primo igitur quaeritur utrum homo potuit satisfacere actuali quod sic
videtur dicit apostolus 2 Thess qui fidelis est se ipsum negare non post ergo
cum ipse sit summe misericors non post se ipsum negare reverendi homini
miseretur ergo reverenti homini sed homo post per se ad Deum contingere ergo per se satisfacere.

Item hoc videtur auctoritate locus simpliciter illud de filio prodigo nulla maior Dei iustitia quem ignoscere penitenti et ad penitentiam reverenti misere sine aperire ergo si non potest facere cum iustitiam suam necesse est quod hominem venientem recipiat ergo homo potest per peccata satisfacere.

Item a nullo exigitur simpliciter ratio illud quod post nec per legem humanam nec divinam unde locus dicit quod anathema sit qui dixit Deum praecepsisse impossibile igitur quod si facit homo quod [___] est Deus non exigit ab eo plus ergo videtur quod sufficientis faciat.

Contra peccatum factum cum sit infinitum infinite est offense sed omnis poena hominis est finita ergo nullus homo potest satisfacere.

Item Anselmus in littera *Cur Deus Homo* congruit voluntatis divinae factum ab aliquo nullo damno est comparabile quia sicut ipse dicit potus deberet homo dare totum mundum quam facere contra divinam voluntatem ergo contra peccatum, faciat quis contra divinam voluntatem nulla poena hominis est illi comparabilis compensabit ergo nullis homo potest per se satisfacere.

Item dicit Anselmus quod satisfactio non solum attenditur in ablati restitutionem sed etiam recompensationem iniuriae [___] ergo quod satisfaciens ad reddat per iniuria quod non debebat primus sed totum quod possumus debemus Deo omni peccato circumscripto ergo nullius potest Deo satisfacere.

Item quod impossibile satisfaciendi non excuset videtur impossibile eum qui ex culpa sua est tam impossibilem non excusat sed talis fuit homo
ergo non excusatur per impossibilam quin teneatur ad condignam satisfactionem.

Item per hoc divinus excusaretur et esset minus culpabatur.

Item Beda quia homo noluit abstinere dum potuit in fluctum est ei ut non possit abstinere dum vult et tamen non excusatur ergo impossibilia non excusat ergo quis homo faciat quod in se est non tum satisfacit ergo impossibile est hominem satisfacere per se [\_].

**Respondeo** dicendus quod si intelligatur quod homo per se id est non adiutus a gratiam potest satisfacere falsum est omnino quia impossibile est quod homo satisfaciat in peccato mortali nec prius accepta gratiam accepta aut gratiam dixerunt quidam quod non erat hominis satisfactionem sufficiens etiam per actualis nisi ad vitam a passione Christi satisfaceri quodam modo et influente in omnis satisfactiones vel per fidem vel per satisfacta et ad hoc videntur conari rationem anselmi tamen quod homo accepta gratiam Dei non sit potens satisfacere per actuali in tam quem non sit dignus poena sensuali ergo etiam quod Christus non esset incarnatus illud non auderem assere tamen verbum est quod satisfactiones inest plurimum adiuvantur a passione Christi rationes aut ostendentes quod homo potest satisfacere per actuali non valent quia quantum faciat nichil meretur nec de congruo ante gratiam habeat gratiam potius gratiam autem acceptam habet potentiam satisfaciendi per actuali simpliciter illud valet de impossibilem quia tamen est in mortali non potest satisfacere sed quia in hanc impossibilam ille indiget propria culpa ideo non excusatur exemplum potest Anselmus de suo qui imperio Domini iturus erat ad non divinas et ex propria voluit se iactavit in foveam tamen cum accept gratiam potest facere per alios adiutus a passione per alios ut dicunt non [\_] quis ita sit.
Ad illa ergo quae obiciuntur incongruum patet respondeo quia homo dignus erat ex culpa poena aeterna sed per gratificationem absolvitur et gratiam ad hoc est miseria manente tamen obligationem ad poenam temporalem verti nec inrueret Dei miseria bona valeret illud argumentum.

Simpliciter respondi ad sequens ad illud quod obicitur quod omne bonum quod quis facit Deus facere etiam si non portasset Deus id est dignum est quod faciat sed quod necessario teneatur ad opera poena ad quod tenetur si velit satisfacere hic quales intelligendi rationes sequentes sunt concedere et si quod impossibilium non omnino excusat sicut peccatum sicut dixit Anselmus.

**Quaestio 2:** Secundo quaeritur utrum homo adiutus gratiam possit satisfacere per originali et videtur quod sic quia maius peccatum est actuale quem originale sed homo adiutus gratiam potest satisfacere per actuali ergo potest satisfacere per originali.

Item facti dicunt quod approbationem est a Deo separare veniam in parte Deus enim tam consanat totum sanat ergo cum reunitat actuale simpliciter originale cum igitur contingat satisfacere per actuali ergo et per originali simpliciter potest homo per se satisfacere.

Item gratiam se habet ad peccatum sicut lux ad tenebram sed lux coeliter adveniens in aerem [fol.217.r.B] totaliter tenebram expellit ergo super gratiam de anima omnem peccatum simpliciter cum actuali originale ergo sicut contingit satisfacere per actuali ita etiam per rationem originali.

Item satisfactionem non est per rigorem iustiae sed secundum temperamentum misere sed miseria non exigit ab homine ultra quam possit
videtur ergo quod homo possit satisfacere per originali si habeat gratiam et faciat quod in se est.

Item in Adam idem fuit per substantiam actualem et originalem sed potuit ut prius dictum est per gratiam satisfacere per actuali ergo et per originali.

Item per Hugonem et alios sanctos semper erit morbus cum medecina ergo idem faciebat destinationem et [...] quod modo facit baptismus ex baptizante absolvitur quis ab originali et quantum ad martyrium et quantum carentiae visionis ergo et prius satisfaciebat per originali ergo ante passionem.

Contra non contingit satisfacere nec restituatur ablatum sed per originalem naturam humana tota corrupta est ergo nullius potest satisfacere quod originali nec ille cuius satisfactionem sit equivalens toti naturae sed hoc non potest esse aliquis homo singularis ergo nullis potuit satisfacere pro originale.

Item satisfactionem est actus egrediens a liberum arbitrium gratiam informata sed gratiam respicit persona in singularem ergo satisfactionem per quod huius est persone singularis sed originale respicit ipsam naturam manifestam ergo manifestam quod nullis potuit satisfacere per originali nec etiam quales pro se.

Item est iniustitia quam quis facit sibi et quam alius facit alii ergo pro iniustitia quam quis facit sibi Deus de congruo et ipse satisfacere ergo simpliciter per iniustitia quam facit alius alii Deus alius satisfacere sed per originale non potuit Adam satisfacere respectu omnem quia non satisfaciebat nisi per gratiam singularis persone ergo operiunt quod alius satisfaceret qui posset influere in omnis spiritualiter talis autem non est homo purus sed
originale antecedit morum licet aut ergo cum satisfactionem sequatur
morum liberum arbitrium nullis homo potest satisfacere per suo originali.

Respondeo dicendus ad intelligendam praedictorum quod in
originale duo considerantur scilicet culparum et reatus poenae loquendo
igitur de originale ratione culpae bonum concedo quod gratiam aut auftert -
actuale simpliciter et auftert originale sed quia actus reatus originalis respicit
totam naturam ex peccato enim primi parentis obligata fuit tota natura
humana ad carentiam visionis Dei satisfactionem aut accentur[?] quantum
ad reatum peccati nulla per singularis per gratiam singularem potuit
satisfacere quantumque esset prius et bonus dum modo esset purus homo
quia non poterat contra totam naturam unde et Johannes Baptista qui fuit
satisficatus in utero descendit ad limbum et hoc est quod nec Deus expresse
dicit Anselmus nec artamus in aliquo divinam potentiam sed potentiam
singularis hominis humanitas ut tanta non esse ut per gratiam acceptam
posset illud efficere.

Ad illud quod dicitur quod actuare est maius originali dicendus quod
magnum potest dici dicitur vel in offendo et sic actuare vel incorrumpendo et
sit originale et quia originale totam corrumpit nam actuare tam singularem
personam ideo et cetera. Tam praedici quod illud non valet quam alterius
servis et alterius modi est originale quem actuare et alio modo contrahitur et
ideo alio modo satisfacere contingit.

Ad illa dua qui sequitur quod Deus sanat totum et simpliciter gratiam
dicendus quod illud verum est ratione culpae unum cum auftur originale
simpliciter et auftur actuare in baptizo et aequo quem auftur actuale et
originale quantum ad culpam quod respicit hanc animam sed non sic quem
ad reatum.
Ad illud quod obicitur quod satisfactionem non est secundum rigorem iustitiae dicendus quod verbum est tam consideratur miseria et cum miseria consideratur iustitia et iustum erat ut per tota nec talis satisfaceret qui equivaleret toti nec et tum in illa satisfaciens factam est humanae naturae summa miseria sicut iustum melius patebit.

Ad aliud patet respondeo quia si in Adam fuisset actuale et originale id tam actuale respiciebat primam originale aut respicit vel respiciebat totam naturam sicut deteriatum fuit in hoc.

Ad ultum dicendus quod illa medicina erat quantum ad culpam ut non aeternam puniretur sed numquam ad reatum absolvens quod patet quia omnis descendebant ad limbum donec factam est satisfactionem per mortem Christi secus aut est de baptista quia habet virtutem delendi culpam se et absolvendi a poenam propter virtutem passionis quod fuit satisfactionem per peccato originali.

Quaestio 3: Supposito igitur quod homo non potuit satisfacere per se sed alio indigeret satisfacite quaeritur utrum ille potuerit vel debuerit esse angelis quod sic videtur ita dicit scriptura iustum est ut quid cecidit [fol.217.v.A] alio impellente alio relevante resurgat sed homo cecidit angelo impellente ergo angelo relevante debuit resurgere.

Item Augustinus dicit et habetur in littera quod quia divinus nichil dignum morte invenit in Christo et tamen illum occidit ideo dignum fuit ut illos praediceret et sic fieri reparationem per angelum ergo et cetera.

Contra reparationem per satisfactionem est opus iustitiae sed iustum fuit quod qui peccavit satisfaciat sed homo peccavit ergo homo debuit satisfacere non ergo angelus.
Item si congruens est reparationem [__] quod in eandem dignitatem homo restituatur in quem fuisset si non cecidisset sed sicut dixit scriptarum[?] erant angelis equivalentes nam ordines angelorum supplenderant ex hominibus si aut per angelum fieret reparationem homines essent obnoxium angelis non ergo restituerentur in priorem dignitatem ergo non debuit fieri per angelum.

Item sicut supra ostensum est per talem debuit fieri reparationem qui perponderaret toti naturae humanae nullis aut angelus fuit talis ergo per angelum non debuit et cetera.

**Respondeo** dicendus quod Deus bonum potuisset hominem [__] angelico eripere de potestate divina sed tam loquendo de satisfactionem et reparatione satisfactoria angelus satisfacere non potuit sicut ostensum est nec quod ergo obicitur quod homo cecidit angelo suggerente ergo debuit resurgere angelo relevante dicendus quod non potuit angelus facere hominem eadem nec suggerendo malum nec relevare nec quodam suggerendo bonum aut sicut in [__] divinus suggestis malum et cui consensit sit in reparationem angelus suggessit et benedicta virgo consensit.

Ad aliud dicendus quod illa non est tam sufficiens sed cuncta et quaedam adaptationem tam autem erat quia tantus et talis erat qui bonus toto congruum homini satisfaceret poterat.

**Quaestio 4:** Supposito quod angelus non potuit satisfacere quaeritur utrum per aliam creaturam de uno factam potuit genus humanam reparari et videtur quod sic Augustinus dicit solutionem plus exigitur in iusta poena quem commistum fuit in culpa sed creatura peccavit ergo videtur poena creatura sufficiens poterat esse ad satisfactionem.
Item bonitas totius servis humani finita est ergo Deus cum possit in omnem finitum potuit facere creaturam equivalentem toti humano gratiam ergo si illa pateretur videtur quod sufficiens fieret satisfactionem aut per hoc congrua reparationem.

Contra maius est de impio facere pium quam creare caelum et creatam sed per reparationem similius[?] iustificati ergo maius est hominem reparare quem caelum et terram creare sed opus creationis impossibile est fier per aliquam creaturam ergo nec reparationis.

Item Gregorius nichil nasci profuit nec redimi per fuisset sic ergo maius benefactum est redimi quam nasci si ergo Deus nos fecisset et alia creatura nos redimisset magne tenemur alii creaturae quam Deo quod absit.

Item plures testatur et sancta scriptura confirmat nos esse finem omnem creaturarum unde Isaiah XXX erat lux lunae gloria omnia propter hominem facta sunt et cetera sed si alia creatura fieret de novo ad redimiendum hominem illa esset homine nobiliorum ergo homo non esset finis omnium creaturarum non ergo restitueretur homo in personam dignitatem.

Item creatura non poterat satisfacere per tota natura humana nec influeret in totam naturam humanam sed hoc tale quod influeret in omnis non potuit esse nec personam omnem hominem humanam sed hoc non est nec Deus vel Adam aut tam non potuit esse ergo opportuit quod esset Deus et nulla creatura.

Respondeo dicendus quod non debuit alia creatura esse quem satisfaceret per homine per rationes iam dicans.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod plus non exigitur in poena dicendus quod in peccato non solis consideratur peccans[?] sed etiam ille in quo peccatur et
ratione alius offensa sit infinita et ideo non sequitur quod creatura pura quae finita est possit satisfacere prima ille qui [__] fuit creatura et cetera hoc prium cuius naturae non ergo qualet creatura potest satisfacere nec talis esset primum quod esset prium omnem hominem in quod influeret in alios sanitatem sicut ille quid influerat corruptionem non potuit esse creatura de novo creatura et per hoc patet.

Respondeo ad aliud quia [__] quod praeponderaret tum iniquitatem[?] creatura non est influere in totum genus humanum quia non esset primum solus ante Deus vel Adam fuit prium sed Adam non potuit satisfacere ex praedictis ergo colligitur quod solus Deus potuit satisfacere.

**Articulus 3, Quaestio 1:** Supposito ante reparationem suis humanam per satisfactionem esse [fol.217.v.B] domini quaeritur utrum in divina natura animi humana et quod in divina videtur creavit enim Deus sine medio hominem ergo sine medio debuit reparare.

Item solo verbo dicere et facta sunt ergo simpliciter videtur quod solo verbo debuit dicere et reparata essent.

Item reparationem est per gratiam gratum autem a Deo immediate ergo Deus non assumpta natura humana creatura genus humanum debuit reparare.

Item non est sapiens quem non vult vitare cum potest in decentias sed exitum miserie passiones et in talia non decent divinam naturam ergo non debuit talia assumere sed sine habens humanam naturam reparare.

Contra homo peccavit ergo homo debuit satisfacere qui non excusabatur propter ignorantiam et solus Deus potuit facere sic ergo debuit ille reparator esse qui deberet et posset satisfacere operant ergo quod ille
esset Deus et homo et maxime congruum fuit et in eadem potest ut unius et idem esset qui satisfaceret ex habens ergo rationibus rectis ab Anselmo in litteras Cur Deus Homo concedentur quod nullo alio modo congruit facere reparationem sicut per Deum incarnatum et hoc est quod dicit magister in littera quod ergo obiciit quod sine medio creavit et solo verbo dicendus quod non valet quia creationem fuit opus potentiae sed reparationem fuit opus iustitiae et ideo debut si in illa naturam quem erat satisfacere sed hoc est humana et ideo reparans naturam assumpsit illam de eodem genere cum aliis hominibus.

Ad aliud dicendus quod ad reparationem duo congruent generem infusio ad delendo culpam et hoc est a Deo immediate et satisfactionem et poena et hoc est facta per passionem quem pertulit in assumpta creatura. Ad aliud patet respondeo quod illa non decebant divinam naturam et ideo non assumpsit illa in divina natura sed in humana et in humana non erant in deceretur sed maxime congruentia ad reparationem servis humani et ideo congruentissime assumpsit illa. Ex praedictis collitur quod congruentissime factam est reparationem generis humani per Deum incarnatum et quia decentissime facit omnia et licet alius modus esset ei possit decuit tam bonam salvare per Christum et ideo omnis qui salvati sunt ille auctores quae adducuntur ad ostendum quod non erat alius modus possit molli de fuit id est ita congruens miseriae nostrae. Consueverint autem adduci super illud personas firmetur manus tua et cetera. Gloria tam diu potuit salus isti donec Christus venit.

Item super illud titulus? enim apparuit gratiam gloria non essemus participes dicatis eis nec esset particeps naturae mortis.
Item ratio vult per unius iustificationem gloria illa fides sana est qua credimus nullum hominem sive per minime erans sive maiori liberari a contagione mortis antiquam et obligationem quam congruit a prima nativitate maxime per unum mediatorem Deum et hominem Jesum Christum.

Item super illud Hebraeis decebat eum et cetera. Gloria nec Christus incarnaretur homo non redimeretur et non redemptus partiret.

Ad oppositionem fuit auctores factorum qui dicunt quod alius modus fuit posset quam per Deum hominem factum dicendus quod ad hoc sicut tactum fuit quod iste auctores intelligendum sunt hoc supposito quod Deus decuisset salvare genus humanum per satisfactionem et intelligitur non quod nullus alius esset possit sed isto debebat esse quod Deus redimeret quia hoc immutabiliter Deus decerneret sicut Deum fuit et quod hic modus inter alios omnis fuit congruentior scilicet ut per Deum hominem repararemur.

Supposito igitur ex praedictis quod satisfactionem congruentissime fieret per Deum hominem quaeeritur de modo satisfactionis utrum congruentissime satisfecerit per passionem et videtur primo quod nullo modo debuit Christus sic satisfacere nec Deus istum modum satisfaciendi per ordinare Anselmus primo Cur Deus Homo c.8 opponit sic quae iustitia est hominem iustissimum morti tradere per peccatorem quis homo si innocentem condamnaret et nocentum liberaret damnandus non iudicaretur ex habens verbis conclusi videtur quod non tam Deus non debuit hoc acceptare sed natura etiam promittere. Si respondens sicut Anselmus solutionem iniustum[?] eum coegit ad mortem aut occidi permisit sed ipsam mortem suam sponte sustinuit ut homines salvaret opponit Boso quod videtur eum coegisse suo praeccepto et adducit auctores multas quia dicit
Apostolus faciens est obediens usque ad mortem et qui praeposito filio non propter pepercit et alias multas auctores et iterum solutionem mea sed tua voluntas fiat et concludit in omnibus videtur magis obedia cogente quem spontanea voluntate mortem subire.

Item Deus fecit mortem nec deliberatur in nostra afflictionem ergo multo minus in morte filii ergo non videtur quod Deus aliquo modo debuisset ei praecipere morti ut illud velle.

Item si mors satisfecit sed constat quod vita eius erat multo melior morte et nobilior ergo multo magno vivendo quam moriendo potuit satisfacere [fol.218.r.A] non ergo videtur quod modo congruo satisfecerit.

Item ex quo per mortem debuit satisfacere cum multo melius sit satisfacere tali modo quod nullius laedatur quem ita quod alii produntur videtur quod non debuit ita ordinari ut occideretur a iudeis et gentibus in occidentum damnationem aeternam.

Ad oppositum quod iste modus decentissimus sit trahuntur rationes ex Cur Deus Homo c. 11 et primo sic satisfactionem est quin homo supererogat ei quod debebat ad honorem illius cui satisfacit Christus homo non erat debitor mortis cum esset iustus. Iustus enim non det mori debebat tamen servare iusticiam ergo quicquid faceret non poterat minus debitum et magnam gratiam observare Deo quam mortem ergo si illa satisfactionem fuit summa debuit esse per mortem et passionem.

Item quod mortem et tali genere mortis fuit congruum satisfacere videtur per verba Anselmi dicentis anno decet si homo per suavitatem peccavit per asperitatem satisfaciat et formatur non sic debebat hominem satisfacere per [___] ergo per factum satisfacere per maximam [___] sed hoc est asperitas mortis crucis ergo et cetera.
Item Anselmus si tam facile est victus adeo ut Deum peccando congruaret ut facilius non posset nomine iustum est ut homo satisfaciens per peccato tanta difficultate vincat divinum ad honorem Dei ut maiori non possit arguitur ex hoc ulterius quod decentissimus modus satisfactionis sive per difficultatem sed inter omnia difficultate fuit sustinere asperrimum congruus mortis quod etiam in cruce est ergo et cetera.

Item Anselmus an non est dignum ut quia sic se abstulit Deo praetendo ut magne auferre non posset sic se det Deo satisfaciendo ut magnus dare non posset compleatur rationem sic et in morte se totum dat homo Deo ut magis dare non possit ergo congruentissimus modus satisfaciendi fuit per hoc genus mortis.

Item Anselmus addit aliam rationem quia per illum modum non solum factam est satisfactionem sed exemplum datum est nobis quis inquit explicit quem necessarie quem sapienter factum est ut ille qui homines erat redempturus et de via mortis et praedictoris ad viam vitae et beatudinis aeternae docendo reducturus cum hominibus conversaretur et [___] conversationem cum eos doceret verbo qualiter unire deberent se ipsum exemplum probaret exemplum autem quo se ipsum daret infirmis et mortalibus ut propter injurias autem contumelias aut dolores aut mortem a iustitia non recederent ergo mori docuit Christum et non statum mori sed primus conversari ad nostram instructionem.

Respondeo dicendum quod ille modus satisfactionis inter omnis qui possunt esse vel ex cogitari fuit Deo acceptabilior fuit morbo sanando congruentorum fuit hominibus beatificandis efficaciorum et utilior Deo acceptorum ratione praedicta quia sicut dixit Anselmus Cur Deus Homo 2. 11 [___] asperius nichil difficilius potest homo pati ad honorem Dei sponte et non
ex debito quam mortem et nullatenus se ipsum potest homo magne dare Deo quem cum se morti cecidit ad honorem illius in morbo sanando congruentiorem quia creato det fieri per congruum primus homo superbierat et suaviter peccaverat et se totum Deo abstulerat et [___] satisfaciens humiliatur vilissima morte [___] se totum Deo terruit moriendo fuit et nobis salvandis efficaciorum quia Christus quis pateretur per omnibus quantum ad sufficientiam tamquam ad efficationem solum patiens est per hunc sequentiam iustus sectavitur et super omnia Deum diligunt in sua passione pervocant nos servandam iustitiam et per illa agonizandus usque ad mortem per exaltavit in nobis caritas affectam ostendo nobis suam caritatem eundum et hoc est quod dicit Hugo De Arrha Sponse ut ostenderet tibi[?] quantum te diligeret non nec moriendo a morte liberare voluit ut non tamen pietatis impenderet benefactum verbum etiam caritas monstrans affectum.

Ad illud ergo quod obicitur primo quod Deus videtur ei fecisse iniquitiam respondet de Anselmus quia Deus non coegit ad hoc illum hominem immo homo ille sponte se obtulit et quanto nimis debeat mori tanto sanorum fuit illa obligatio nec Deus debuit perhibere cum per hoc salvaretur gratus humanum immo esset magna debitat[?] si ille homo vellet et posset satisfacere et Deus nollet recipere quod ergo obicitur Boso quod videtur coactus diligenter soluit Anselmus ix capitulo primo libro Cur Deus Homo tamen ista est summa quod Deus filius in nullo fuit coactus sine homo et quod dicitur pater eum tradidisse hoc intelligitur quia exposuit eum morti et hoc voluit ut moriendo satisfaceret simpliciter quod dicit filius non mea voluntas sed tua fiat exponitur de voluntate sensualis aut si de voluntate rationis tunc intelligitur sicut illud mea doctrina non est mea quia suam voluntatem dixit primis quia illam dederat illi.
Ad illud quod obicitur quod Deus iam [fol.218.r.B] debuit velle mortem filii respondet Anselmus dicitur exponens primo sic intelligendo non quod voluit poenam illius hominis sed voluit optimam voluntatem quam poenam sibi iusti nec placuit sicut in nobis contra videmus aliquos per amore Dei poenas sustinentes vel etiam voluisse cum posset dicitur quia cum posset per bibere noluit perhibere et rationem iam dictam est unde voluntatem Christi voluit etiam liberationem naturam per illam poenam.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod si mors satisfecit multo magne vita respondetur quod illud non unit quia satisfactionem respicit poenam et opus poenale et summa satisfactionem summa poenam quia ergo illa erat in morte numquam ita bonum satisfecissent vivendo quam moriendo.

Item in morte tradidit temporum quod erat vivendo nunquam tamen dedisset ad Dei honorem.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod Deus debuit providere modus in quo fieret salus sum damnationem aliorum dicendus quod est providentia per acceptationem et sic providet Deus bona quia illa facit et est providentur per concessionem et sic providet Deus mala non quia illa faciat sed quia ex illis elicit bona sit etiam dicendus quod Deus naturam dedit illam voluntatem malam occidi Christum sed quia ipsi erant habituri illam malam voluntatem Deus qui non cogat liberum arbitrium hoc providit et ex hoc salutem naturam maximam operatus est et in hic ostendit eius sapientia et bonitas quia de malo novit eicere bonum si aut quaeratur sic esto quod illi non occidissent quia hoc erat in libertate corporum[?] tunc ergo non esset reparatam genus humanum dicendus quod illa potest nulla est quia Deus providerat et bonum faciebat quamvis haberet liberum arbitrium ad faciendis hoc si faciendis quod ipsum esset occiditur quod ergo tu dicis ponatur quod
illi non occidissent hoc est ponere ponatur quod Deus alio modo decuisset
salvare et dicunt tamen aliquid quod etiam hoc non fuit [__] mortuus quia sua
modica passionem satisfecisset sed tamen quicquid fit ex praedictis
concluditur quod modus iste satisfactionis inter omnis modos
congruentiorum et hoc fuit et hic fuit qui in principius quaeestionis propositus
inquirendum sed posset quia hic de sufficientia satisfactionis huius de qua
super quaesitum est quem ad culpam delendam dicit per Christum
praecedente simpliciter quem ad poenam dicit xv sed tum in sufficientia
dicendus dicit xv huius satisfactionis tam sunt adiutanda sicilicet ipse
satisfaciens et hic est Deus aeternis qui omnibus praeponderat simpliciter
consideratur pro quid est passio quia per optima naturalia et ideo poena
acerbissima et per omni poena potest satisfacere. Tercio considerandus quod
non habent effectum nec humanis qui habent gratiam quia sine gratia nullius
salvatur habentes aut gratiam quicumque peccatores digni sunt vita aeterna
et poena corporali solum et ab illa vel absolvuntur a tota per passionem ut in
baptismo vel in parte ut in aliis sacramentis.

**Quaestio 2:** Supposito igitur ex praedictis quod decrevit filium Dei
incarnari ad reparandum naturam lapsam quaeritur utrum fuisset incarnatus
si homo non fuisset lapsus. Et videtur quod sic: Bonum enim est diffusivum
sui et maxime bonum et maxime diffusivum. Cum ergo post primum
diffusionem quae est in generatione Filii ab aeterno maxima effusio bonitatis
Dei sit in illam creaturam unitam Deitati in unitate personae non esset
manifesta sua diffusio si hoc non fecisset. Decebat igitur Deum hoc facere
esto quod homo non pecasset.
Item tribuit unicuique beatudinis quantum erat capax sed alia
creatura erat Deo unibilis ergo videtur quod ab ipso sit relegata omnis invidia
et hoc fecisset, si homo non peccasset.

Item sicut dixit apostolus 1 Cor xi: Caput mulieris vir, caput viri
Christus, sed constat quod homo est creatura completissima in universo,
omnia enim ordinanda ad hominem. Sed caput hominis est Christus, ergo si
Filius Dei non esset incarnatus, remaneret universum incompletum, sicut
pictura sine capite. Sed hoc alius modo decebat Deum ergo si numquam
homo pecasset Deus fuisset incarnatus.

Item est reperire tres personas in una natura ergo igitur videtur quod
sit reperire tres naturas in una persona. Aut hic non congruit et non est tunc
universum esset incompletum ergo si ho non peccasset ad completionem
universi debebat Deus incarnari.

Item tota natura humana erat beatificabilis ergo si homo stetisset tota
beatificaretur in visone Dei corporalis et in visione hominis hominis Christi
ergo si homo non peccasset Deus debuit incarnari alioquin non perfectione
beatificaretur homo quod est inconveniens. Et hoc est verbum augustinus de
spiritum et anima factus est Deus homo ut totum hominem beatificaret.

Item Bernardus dixit quod angelus primus vidit in verbo creaturam
vivendam Deo et invidit.

Ergo si illa [fol.218.v.A] quae videntur in verbo immutabiliter videntur
esto quod angelus numquam peccasset, nihilominus creatura uniretur Deo.

Item Apostolus dixit primo ad Romanos quod homo ille erat
praedestinatus esse filius Dei ergo si praedestinatio est aeterna hoc fuit
praevisum ab aeterno et immutabiliter praevium est illud constat ergo sive
homo peccasset sive non Filius Dei esset nihilominus incarnatus.
Contra: Hoc est auctoritas Bernardus qui dixit quod non esset mater Dei nisi peccata fuisset. Non tenemur nos peccatores tantas gratias agere Deo quantas tenemur si Filius et esset alias hoc facturus non principaliter propter nostrum peccatum sed hoc est contra fidei pietatem et ideo non solum falsum est sed etiam non dicendum.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod nisi videam rationem vel auctoritatem magne expressam non credo quod filius Dei esset factus homo nisi homo peccasset. Et in hoc debemus ei infinitas gratiarum actiones, omne quod fecit pro peccatoribus quod non fecisset nec fuisset iusti.

Quod ergo obicitur de diffusione dicendum quod ratio diffusionis sive bonitatis non exigit quod faciat omnia bona quae potest sed illud solum tenet in diffusione aeterna de creatura nichil valet nam potuit facere meliorem istum hominem ut illum minus bonum et in hoc nulla est involuntaria. Sufficenter aut manifestatur diffussivimi boni aeternaliter in generatione Filii et temporaliter in creatione mundi. Potuit etiam plures mundos facere sed tamen non oportuit simpliciter nec in proposito.

Ad aliud dicendum quod nullo modo intelligendum quod universum non fuisset completum esto etiam quod Deus non esset unitus creaturae, nec hoc desiderabat universum nec Deus ad hoc se abstraxerat nec etiam Christus dicendus est esse de universo sed supra totum universum. Unde etsi non esset factam illa unio non esset universum incompletum quia non est caput eius quem ad primam completionem ipsius universi nec illa congruitas quam adducit spectat ad necessitatem universi. Et ideo rationes ille non valent.

Ad aliud dicendus quod tota natura humana fuisset beatificata etiam si non fuisset unio factum et natura corporaliter beatificaretur per influentiam
factam a superiori. Beatitudo enim influeret in corpus unitum et quod dixit Augustinus intelligendum est per quadem adaptationem, quia sine dubio nulla est necessitas quod visus beatificaretur eadem enim ratione posset obici de auditu et gustu et aliis sensibus unde non [__] quod beatificentur in propriis obiectis. Verum est tum quod magnum est gaudium non essentiale in visione praeclarissimae et formosissimae humanitatis Christi Domini nostri.

Ad illud de Bernardo dicendus quod falsum ei inponitur quia numquam ipse voluit dicere asserendo. Praetera argumentum non valet quia Deus praeviderat ab aeterno se facturum hominem et illum peccatorum et reparatorum unde esto quod vidisset in speculato illud quod ultimo dictum est scilicet Deum incarnandum sive creaturae uniendum non tamen sequitur quod hoc fuisset si homo non peccasset.

Simpliciter respondendum est ad sequens de praedestinatione quod praedestinavit quia providit casuram et si non providisset casum hominis non praedestinavisset.

Illa aut qui volunt dicere quod fuisset unitus creaturae dicunt quod nihilominus deberemus ei gratiarum actiones quia tunc non assumpsit naturam passibilem et mortalem sicut fecit post peccatum et ideo nihilominus tenemur ad gratiarum actiones sed tamen non ad tota. Et quia tam hoc nobis dicere amabilius dicere et non est auctoritas expressa adducta in congruum melius est dicere quod ad peccatum delendum et naturam reparandum et non aliter fuisset Deus homo factus.

**Quaestio 3:** Ultimo quaeritur esse hanc partem de hic quod magister tangit in litteram quod tam passionis fuit in scilicet Deus ipse filius Judas et etiam
Judei circum hoc obicitur sit congruarum creaturarum [...] congruis sunt efficiens sed voluntas Dei erat bona voluntas inde et Judeorum mala ergo non congruerunt[?] sit in unum effectum ergo passio quod sit opus Dei non est opus Judeorum.

Item unius efficiens una est creatam in uno genere iste sunt talis passionis aut ergo per diversa genera creatarum aut per idem non ergo videtur possibile.

Item de passione Christi quaeritur utrum videtur bona vel mala et loquendo de ipsam in se quia si loquamur per compassionem ad Deum bona est si autem per compassionem ad Iudeos vel Iudam constat quod vel de meritoria sed in se loquendo videtur quod sit indifferens dicenda quia passiones per quod huius sunt in voluntate et illis non laudatur homo nec vituperatur ergo passio Christi sic absolute loquendo non det Dei bona nec mala.

Item videtur quod det divina mala simpliciter quia occidere hominem est malum in generatione ergo videtur simpliciter quod Christum mori vel occidi cum occidatur in quem homo sit malum in generatione [fol.218.v.B] potest effectus recipit esse et denominationem a tam per Christum sed causa per Christum passionis fuit actionem[?] [...] sed illa actionem [...] fuit simpliciter mala ergo passio simpliciter.

Item videtur quod sit simpliciter dicenda bona quia sicut dicit [...] mors sanctorum est preciosa immo preciosissima in conspectu Deum ergo simpliciter loquendo det dici bona.

**Respondeo** ad peccatorum intelligentiam est notandis quod est opus operans et est opus operatum loquendo igitur de opere operante qui est actus ipsius volutans de necessitate si necessitas bona voluntas et actus bonis et
aequo et unius talis operis voluntas unita est personam. Loquendo autem de opere operato plures voluntates possunt conterere in illud opus et unus meretur in illo et altus de meretur sicut patet [__] praecepit dari elementam[?] ex caritate servus dat eam cum [__] huius elere bona est Domino sed nulla est servo simpliciter in praeposita passio dicit opus operatum et ideo similiter ad illud efficiendum concurrunt diversa efficientia et passio quid ad diversas voluntates comparata recipit denominationem per illas unde meritoria est Christo et de meritoria Iudeis [__] autem respectu ad opera operantia sicut dicit magister et tradidit et Iudeis tradidit et simpliciter Iudei tradere bonum Dei fine quia voluntas s bona tradere autem Iudeorum malum quia voluntas mala quod ergo obicit quod congruarum carum congrentarum sunt efficiens dicendus quod illud non tenet nec in effectum [__] sua tam sed opus operatum non quaeiratur cum sua tam supradictum est quadam est in proposito quia unius operati multae sunt caritatem.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod unius [__] est tam in uno genere [__] dicendus quod per Christum et in medita una est sed tamen plures possunt esse ad adiuvantes vel cooperantes sicut iste. Iste hortatur dummodo ad dandam eleemosynam et Dominus praecepit maiori servo et ille minori et morem dat eleemosynam plures sunt hic tam in genere caritatem efficientis secundum alium et alium modis simpliciter Deus Pater fuit eam passionis inspirando illi homini voluntatem paciendi et ille homo ostendo se sicut Iudas fuit tam tradendo Iudei [__] milites crucifigendo et licet congruent in unum opus operatum non tum conformabuntur in voluntatibus quia pater hoc volebat ex caritate simpliciter Christus Iudas ex cupiditate Iudei ex invidia et ideo non valet quod quia licet unius effectus esset illarum
voluntatum quod conformes essent conformitas enim voluntatum non tam accenditur in voluntate sed etiam in modo volendi.

Ad illud quod obicitur de passione Christi absolute loquendo utrum sic dicenda bona vel indifferentes dicendus quod si loquimur respective circum dicemus quod bona fuit in operatione ad sustinentionem in se autem loquendo dicendus quia sustinuit eam ex caritate sed malam incomparationem ad inherentem in se autem loquendo dicendus quod ponitum est indifferentes hoc autem hominem occidi dicit malum in genere hoc autem martyrem occidi dicit bonum meritorum quia martyrem occidi hoc est hominem in honorem et testimonium Jesu Christi. Unde bona est passio martyrnis quia ad bonum finem ordinata est similiiter de hac videndus est quia Christus non potest pati nisi ex bona causa et ordinata et ideo simpliciter loquendo contradicendus est quod passio Christi fuerit bona quod ergo obicit quod passionibus non laudamus nec vituperamur verum est inquam sunt passiones sed in quantum voluntate sunt vel non voluntate laudabiles sunt vituperabiles sicut enim patet velle enim pati per Domino bonum est et laudabile et qua passione Christi non potuit esse nec voluntaria simpliciter loquendo potest concedi esse bona vel fuisse.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod efficiens recipit denominationem a causa proxima. Responsum quod Christus non potuit pati nec volens et ideo agens exterius numquam reliquisset passionem in contra nec eius volitans fuisse et ideo passionis Christi per Christum tam indicanda est eius voluntas quod fuit bona.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod hominem occidi est malum in genere dicendus quod hoc est quia tamen si actus super naturam indebitam et non adducitur a constancia debita vel relationem ad finem debitum secus autem
est cum dicitur peccatum pati cum quia passio non est laudabilis nec inquam
volutatur et non dicitur voluntaria nisi per comparationem vel ad agentem
vel ad sustinentem melius est nichil [__] addere deteriationem ut decus fuit.
Appendix 3  Excerpt from Sententia Parisiensis of Richard Rufus of Cornwall

The Abbreviatio Bonaventurae

This is a transcription from the only extant complete manuscript of the unpublished so-called Paris sentence commentary of Richard Rufus of Cornwall. It is taken from MS 176 of the Biblioteca Sacro Convento in Assisi, folios 42.v to 50.r and covers distinctions 17-20 of the commentary. It is provided not as a definitive edition of the text but is offered simply to facilitate access to the text of Richard Rufus and his arguments discussed in the main body of the thesis above.

The original spelling has been preserved throughout although the substantial abbreviation of the text has been expanded for ease of reading. Paragraph breaks as marked in the manuscript have been observed. All other punctuation, however, is my own and provided purely for legibility.

The schema of the distinctions within this excerpt is:

Distinctio 17: De voluntate et oratione Christi

Articulus 1

Quaestio 1  Utrum in Christo fuerit voluntatum pluralitas.
Quaestio 2  De numero et sufficientiam voluntatum dividit.
Quaestio 3  De concordia voluntatum Christi

Articulus 2

Quaestio 1  Utrum decuerit Christum orare?
Quaestio 2 Utrum Christus in omni oratione fuit exauditus?
Quaestio 3 Utrum oratio in quam oraverit ut calix transiret ab confuerit rationis ut sensualitas?

Distinctio 18: De Merito Christi

Articulus 1
Quaestio 1 Utrum Christus meruerit ab instanti conceptionis.
Quaestio 2 Utrum Christus meruerit post conceptionem?
Quaestio 3 Utrum Christus aliquid meruerit in passione?
Quaestio 4 Utrum Christus meruerit sibi praemium substantiale?

Articulus 2
Quaestio 1 Utrum Christus meruit corporis glorificationem?
Quaestio 2 Utrum Christus meruit nobis ianuae apertum?

Distinctio 19 De Redemptione

Articulus 1
Quaestio 1 Utrum per passionem Christi fiat remissio peccator?
Quaestio 2 Utrum per passionem Christi facta fuerit chirographorum deletio?
Quaestio 3 Utrum per passionem liberati simus a potestate diabolica?
Quaestio 4 Utrum per passionis Christi absolvamur a poena peccata?

Articulus 2
Quaestio 1 Utrum solus Filius sit redemptor?
Quaestio 2 Quaeritur secundum quam naturam Christus sit mediator?
Distinctio 20 De Christi Passionis Congruentia.

Articulus Unicus

Quaestio 1 Utrum congruum fuit humanam naturam a Deo reparari?

Quaestio 2 Utrum magis congruum fuit genus humanum per satisfactionem reparari quem per aliam viam?

[fol.42.v.A]Distinctio 17, Articulus 1, Quaestio 1: Item quaeritur utrum in Christo fuerit voluntatum pluralitas et videtur quod sic. Damascenum ‘Habere enim dicimur in duabus numeratis duplicia ea quod sunt duarum naturam naturalia, duas voluntates naturales et divinam et humanam’ ergo et cetera.

Contra. Damascenus, ‘Quorum substantia est eadem, eorum et voluntas eadem’, sed divina et humana natura uniuntur in Christo in unitatem personae, ut ypostasis quae est substantia individua, ita quod in Christo non fuit sic plures hypostases sed una ergo et cetera.

Item voluntas facit volentem, ergo plures voluntates plures volentes, sed Christus est unicus volens, ergo et cetera.

Respondeo dicendum est in Christo fuisse plures voluntates.

Ergo ad primum contradicendum quod uno modo dicitur substantia idem quod essentia natura; alio modo idem quod suppositum. Damascenus ergo accipit substantiam primo modo in argumento non quod est ad contrarium secundo modo sumitur.

Ad aliud dicendum quod hoc, per se loquendo intelligitur de natura, per consequens de persona et quoniam plures naturae possunt esse in una persona. Hinc est, quod ad pluralitatem voluntatum etsi sequitur pluralitas
[fol.42.v.B] naturarum non tamen personarum et ideo non sequitur. Plures voluntates ergo sic plures qui volunt sed bene sequitur, sunt plures naturae, secundum quas, quis insunt. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus, ‘Quia duas naturas Christi duas eius naturales voluntates et naturales actus aimus. Quoniam una duarum naturarum est hypostasis, unum aimus et volentem et agentem naturali secundum ambas.

**Quaestio 2** enim quaeritur de numero et sufficientia voluntatum dividit enim videtur voluntes Christi in tria membra, quorum unum sed voluntas divinitatis, aliud voluntas rationis, tertia verum voluntas carnis seu sensualitatis. Sed quod ista divisio sit superflua. Materia primo auctoritate: Damascenus, ‘Duas, inquit, naturas Christi, duas eius naturales voluntates et naturales actus aimus’, ergo si divisio Damasceni est completa, quae est per dua membra, patet et cetera.

Item Philosophus dicit in terto ‘De Anima’ quod ‘voluntas est in sola rationali’ ergo nulla voluntas videtur esse sensualitatis ergo et cetera.

Item contra quod et fuit plures quam tres videtur: Hugo tali quem fecit ‘De Voluntatibus Christi’ ait ‘Fuit in Christo voluntas divinitatis et voluntas rationis et voluntas pietatis et voluntas carnis’ ergo sunt quatuor differe voluntatis.

Item sicut Christus habuit sensualitate ita habuit synderesis et sicut sensualitatis est appetere bonus carnis, ita synderesis appetere bonus honestatis. Ergo sicut ponitur aliqua voluntas in Christo secundum sensualitatem, ita videtur quod deberat poni secundum synderesis et ita quatuor erunt voluntatis differe.

**Quaestio 3** enim quaeritur de concordia voluntatum Christi utrum scilicet essent in ipso conformes vel repugnantes et videtur quod repugnantes. Augustinus super Ps. 32 ‘Quantum distat Deus ab homine tantum distat voluntas Dei a voluntate hominis, unde homines gerens Christus ostendit privatam quandam hominis voluntatem’, ergo si privata voluntas est voluntas repugnans divinae voluntati patet et cetera.

Item videtur contrariae sunt voluntates quod sunt contrariorum volitorum sed voluntas rationis volebant mori, voluntas sensualitatis et rationis erant voluntas contrariae ergo et cetera.
Contra voluntas humana secundum rectum ordinem debet esse subjecta divinae. ergo si in Christo repugnabat videtur quod in Christo pro esset repugnantia et culpa.

Item, omnis motus qui adversatur voluntati divinae est motus ad illicitum et omnis [fol.43.r.B] talis est peccatum sed in Christo non fuit peccatum ergo et cetera.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod conformitas voluntas\(^1\) in duobus consistit, scilicet in volito et in ratione volendi. Conformitatem in volito\(^2\) dicitur quando in diversae voluntates unum et idem volunt. Conformitas in ratione volendi quando idem eodem modo volunt, vel altera eorum vult illud eo modo quo superior vult eam velle. Sic volebat etiam ratio sicut divina voluntas volebat eam velle.

Ergo ad primum contra dicendum quod Augustinus intendit ibi ponere distantiam quantum ad diversitate voluntatum et distantiam volitorum non aut quantum ad subiectionis ordinem in volendo et ideo illa distantia non ponit contrarietem.

Ad aliud dicendum quod illud intelligitur de contrariarite in gratie moris quando necessitatem est alteran esse malum non autem de contrarietate in genere moris quando necessitatem est alteram esse malum non autem de contrarietate in generis nec quia utraque post bonum appeti hic aut est contrarietas secundum genus humanae naturea sumere et mori.

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\(^1\) Sic. ‘voluntatis’?
\(^2\) Sic. ‘volitio’?
Articulus 2, Quaestio 1

enim quaeritur utrum decuerit Christum orare et videtur quod genus nulli magister competit orare quam ei qui est pontifex et sacerdos sed Christus talis fuit ergo et cetera.

Item nullum magis decet orare quam qui est dignior exaudiri sed nullus est dignior exaudiri quam Christus ergo et cetera.

Item, contra aut ‘De Correptione’ et gratia ‘Nemo quaerat ab alio quod per se potest sed Christus omnia poterat per se’. Ergo nichil debeat ipsum ab alio petere ergo nec orare.

Item orare sed actus persone inferioris respectu eius quem orat sed persona Christi est aequalis Patri ergo ipsum orare non decuit.

Respondeo dicendum [fol.43.v.A] quod Christum orare decuit.

Ad primum contradicendum quod illud est verum secundum quod peccato attribuitur eidem ratione eiusdem naturae, sic autem non est in proposito, quia ratione alterius naturae orabat et ratione alterius naturae implere poterat.

Videlicet dicendum quod illud habet unitatem quam quis orat propter suppleendum propriam indigentiam animam eum non orat quis propter suppleendum indigentiam alterius et maximum quem est descens idoneitatis in eo per quo ... Dominum potuit petere ab alio quod ipse per se potest.

Ad aliud dicendum quod illud est Christum attribuendo inferioritatem personae ratione illius naturae secundum quem competit materia quamvis ergo persona Christi ratione divine naturae sic aequalis

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3 Sic. ‘decens’?
Patri tamen secundum humanitatem secundum qui ei orare competit minor
est Patre iuxta illud Joannis 244 ‘Pater maior me est’.

**Quaestio 2**, enim quaeritur utrum Christus in omni oratione fuit exauditus
et materia quod sic.

Johannes 11: ‘Ego autem sciebam, quod semper me audis’ sed illud
audire non est aliud quam exaudire’, ergo et cetera.

Item Christus magis dignus est exaudiri quam membra in eius
nomine petentia, sed Johannis 135 dicitur, ‘Quicumque petieritis in nomine
dabis’ ergo multofortius, quidquid petiit ipse, obtinuit.

Contra, in Psalmo, ‘Deus meus, clamabo per diem et non exaudies’ et
cetera.6

**Respondeo** dicendum quod quaedam oratio fuit in Christo
procedens a voluntate rationis, quaedam a voluntate carnis prima oratio per
omnia fuit in Christo exaudita secundum tertia non in haec ratio quia hac
voluntate pietatis et carnis non conformabatur Deo in omni volito7 quis in
materia volendi sicut ascensum est super [fol.43.v.B] et etiam quia illa petitio
potius ordinabatur ad nostram instructionem quam ad divina exauditionem.

Et ex hic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et ad rationes ad
utramque partem.

Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur de auctoritate Psalmi, dicendum quod
illud intelligitur de capite ratione membrorum, sicut Glossa ibidem exponit.

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4 Sic. The reference should be to John 14: 28.
5 Sic. The reference should be to John 14: 13.
6 Psalms 21.
7 Sic. ‘volitio’?
Quaestio 3 enim quaeritur utrum oratio in qua oraverit ut calix transiret ab eo fuerit rationis ut sensualitas et quod sensualitatis videtur per Magistrum in littera, ‘Secundum affectum sensualitatis Christus mori noluit, nec optimuit quod secundum istud modus petit’, ergo et cetera.

Item nullus sapiens petit vel orat contrarium eius quod vult, sed ratio volebat mori. Ergo petitio de evasione mortis non erat rationis et erat rationis vel sensualitas, ergo et cetera.

Contra, Damascenus: ‘Oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum’. Sed sensualitatis non est ascendere in Deum. Ergo non orare.

Item solius rationis est futura praecognoscere sed oratio illa ex factorum praecognitione. Ergo non erat sensualitas, sed rationis.

Respondero de dicta oratione est loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad materiam, aut quantum ad formam. Si primo modo loquamur cum materia omnis respietat desiderium petentis, talis petitio fuit sensualitatis, cuius desiderium erat de non moriendum. Si autem secundo modo loquamur de ipsa cum forma petitionis respieat discretionem petitionis. Et talis modus proponendi sit discretione rationis. Dicendum quod talis oratio fuit rationis. Non est simpliciter concedendum, quod talis oratio fuerit istius vel illius sed sensualitatis quantumcumque ad materiam rationis, quantum ad formam. Sensualitatis ut manentis, rationis ut proponentis sensualitatis ut pro quo rationis ut a quo et ideo consuevit [fol.44.r.A] dici, quod ratio fuit advocatus sensualitatis. Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et etiam ad rationes ad utramque partem. Sed restat quaestio; cum ratio sciret, sensualitatem nec exaudiendum nec dignam exaudiri, quia petebat contrarium voluntati divine quomodo hanc petitionem proponit.
Et dicendum ad hoc, quod huius ratio fuit triplex. Prima ad manifestationem veritatis naturae assumptae, quae naturaliter conrefutabat passionem. Et in hoc erudivit nostram fidem.

Secunda ad confirmandam nostram imbecillitatem, ut non diffidam, si passionum pericula exhorremus. Et in hoc ex erexit nostram spem.

Tertia, ut ostenderet, voluntates nostram voluntati divinae esse per omnia subiiciendam, quod ostendit in conditione apposita, ‘non sicut ego volo’ et cetera. Et in hoc ordinaverunt in nobis talis caritatem.

**Distinctio 18:** De merito Christi. Supra egit de voluntate Christi. In hac vero parte agit de usu ipsius qui consistit in exercitio merendi. Dividitur autem ista pars in duas. In quarum prima agit de merito Christi in se. Secundo de ipso ordinato ad nostram utilitate, ibi: Ad quid ergo voluit... Prima pars dividiturs in quatuor partes secundum quartuor quaestiones, quas determinat. Primi ut ostendens, quod meruit aliquid sibi in quando mereri incepit, ab instantia conceptionis ibi: Nec solum hoc meruit... In tertia, quid meruerit, ostendens quod non tantum gloriam impassibilitatis sed etiam nominis exaltationem, ibi: Nec tantum gloriam impassibilitatis... In quarta, qua necessitate meruerit, ibi: Si vero quaeatur, utrum Christus et cetera.


**Articulus 1, Quaestio 1** Quaeritur primo utrum Christus meruerit ab instanti conceptionis et videtur quod sic. Auctoritate Gregorii et Magistri in
littera ‘Non solum meruit Christus quando Patri obediens crucem subiit sed ab ipsa conceptione ex quo homo factus est’.

Item lux propter suam nobilitatem et actualitatem in eodem instanti incipit esse et lucere. Ergo si anima Christi multo nobilior et potenter et deiformior est, videtur quod ab eodem instanti, in quo incepit esse, incepit habere operationem sibi debitam, sed talis est operatio merito, ergo et cetera.

Contra, prius est esse quam agere ergo prius est esse quam mereri, ergo prius habuit esse completum quam meruit, ergo et cetera.

Item meritum est a voluntate deliberativa in quantum deliberativa est, et ubi est, deliberatio, ibi est collatio, ubi autem haec est, ibi est temporis successio, ergo et cetera.

**Respondeo** ad perfectionem meriti duo concurrunt, scilicet habitus gratuitus et eius usus. Si primo modo loquamus de merito Christi concedendum quod a principio suae conceptionis meruit quia omni bono et principio dignus propter gratiae plenitudinem.

Si autem secundo modo loquamus sic est duplex modus dicendi unius quia Christus statim post principium conceptionis et ideo aut in primo instanti et hic ideo quare operatio debet sequi esse et ideo si alicubi dicatur a primordio sue conceptionis meruisse [fol.44.v.A] conceditur secundum quod littera a dicit ordinem ad principium sumptum non mira.

Alius est modus dicendi quod quantum ad usum virtutis meruit in ipso primordio conceptionis et hoc datum est ei de plenitudine gratiae ut in primo instanti in quo incepit esse non tamen haberet habitum virtuti sed actum et uterque horum modorum probabiles est sed pervius est contrarius et secundum illum plana est responsio.
Ad objecta quia primum verbum est quantum ad habitum et hoc innuit verbum beati Gregorius dicit, ‘Non solus meruit,’ et cetera.

Ad secundum responditur quod in omni creatura ita esse praecedit operari tam in corporali quam in spirituali, tam in actu naturae quam in actu gloriae. In suo preiudicio videtur secundus modus. Modus meliorum, et ad primum contra patet.

Respondeo duplicitur nullus est esse prius ut natura ut tempori prius ergo est esse quam agere sed necessitatem est quia prius tempor. Ad secundum responditur quod quamvis secundum processum naturae deliberatio indigeat successione et tempore, tam secundum plenitudinem gratiae et gloriae possibile fuit animae in instantia discernere, quod alia anima non posset facere sine continuo et tempore.


Et donavit quod verbum tractans Augustinus dicit, ‘Humilitas claritatis est meritum, claritas humilitatis est praemium.’ Si ergo humiliatio fuit post conceptionem patet et cetera.


Contra mereri est facere opus causae de genere et laudabilium, sed potentia determinata ad unum tantum non habet laudem in suo actu, sicut patet in potentiss naturalibus et liberum arbitrium Christi ab instanti
conceptionis determinatum fuit ad bonum, ergo non potuit exire in opus de
genere laudabilium ergo nec mereri, ergo et cetera.

Item, quicumque meretur, proficit in bonis animae gloria, scilicet et
gratia, sed Christus non potuit proficere supra id quod accepit a conceptione,
gratia nec mereri gratia, et cetera.

**Respondeo** tripliciter contingit mereri, scilicet merito
multiplicativa et sic meretur qui facit bonum opus mala intentione aut tamen
cui tamen Deus plus retribuit merito congrui. Et sic meretur qui facit opus de
genere bonorum et bona intentione, non ex caritate talis enim de congruo se
disponit ad gratiam. Merito condigni sicut ille qui facit bonum opus et bona
intentione et ex caritate. Et habet post esse tripliciter. Uno modo mereri ex
condigno, est ex indebito facere debitum, sicut meretur quis in gratiae
infusione et motu liberi arbitrium. Alio modo ex debito facere magis
debitum, sicut contingit de profectu in profectum [fol.45.r.A], de virtute in
virtutem. Tertio modo debito uno modo facere debitum alicui modo, ut debito
per habitum facere debitum per usum. Meruit gratiam Christus merito
condigni et tertio modo debito tamen quia id idem quod meruit ab instanti
conceptionis per habitum virtutum meritum post per usum eorum.

Ergo ad primum contra, dicendum quod determinata potentia ad
unum potest esse dupliciter, scilicet per necessitatem naturae et per
confirmationem gratiae. Primo modo tollit dignitatem et secundo modo non.
Et hic secundo modo fuit liberum arbitrium in Christo determinatum ad
unum, scilicet ad bonum.

Ad aliud dicendum quod proficere in bono est dupliciter, scilicet
quantum ad virtutem merendi et quantum ad numerum meritorum. Primo
modo non procedit. Profecit Christus et secundum modo profecit.
Quaestio 3 enim quaeritur utrum Christus aliquid meruerit in passione, et videtur quod sic. Ad Philippenses, ‘Humiliavit se ipsum usque ad mortem, propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum.’ Quod verbum tractans magister dicit, ‘Aperte dicit apostolus, propterea Christum exaltatum’ per impassibilitatis gloriam quia humiliatus per passionis obedientiam, ergo et cetera.

Item nihil satisfactoriun habet sicut meritorium, sed passio Christi fuit satisfactoria, sicut dicunt sancti. Ergo et meritoria gratia, et cetera.

Contra sicut dicit Philosophus, passionibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur, sed per omne, per quod meremur, laudam gratia passionibus non meremur, ergo non Christus meruit.

Item nichil est meritorium, nisi quod est secundum naturam, sed passio est motus [fol.45.r.B] contra naturam sicut dicit Damascenus. Ergo impossibile est passione fieri, ergo et cetera.

Respondeo mereri duo contingit considerare in passione, scilicet passionis causam et passionis sustinentiam. Primum est a violentia agentis. Secundum voluntate patientis. Quantum ad primum passio non est meritoria nec demeritori, quia est ab extra; quantum ad secundum potest esse demeritoria, si quis eam perferat ex voluntate bona. Et demeritoria, si ex mala igitur quoniam Christus ex optima, voluntate passionem pertulit habuit est quod ipsam valde meritoria fuit.

Ad primum contra dicendum quod illud est verbum secundum quod sunt purae passiones: prout aut est eis bona voluntas, convicta ut mala sic habent rationi meriti et demeriti laudis et vituperii.
Ad aliud dicendum quod contra naturam est dupliciter. Aut quia est contra rationem, aut quod est contra naturam hoc modo, est vitium nisi forte sit supra naturam, sicut est in assensu fidei.

Alio modo dicitur contra naturam quia est contra naturalem appetitum salutis et quod est contra naturam. Habet modo potest esse meritorium, quamvis sit poenale, et hoc modo accipit Damascenus, cum dicit, quod passio est contra naturam.

**Quaestio 4** Enim quaeritur utrum Christus meruerit sibi praeium substantiale, videtur quod sic. Quia gloriosius est habere praeium per merita quam sine meritis. Sed Christi praeium excellit omnium sanctorum praeemia, ergo videtur quod per meritum sicut et alii sancti illud habere debuerit.

Item angeli sancti per merita habuerit praeium substantiale, secundum communem opinionem omnium. Sed [fol.45.v.A] angeli simul habuerunt gratiam et gloriam, si ergo gratia non fuit minoris efficaciae in Christo, patet et cetera.

Contra, Augustinus Enchiridion dicit quod ‘nullis praecedentibus meritis, homo ille copulatus est Deo’, sed illa copulatio non potuit causae sine Dei fruitione, quod est praeium substantiale. Ergo videtur quod per aliquod meritum habuit Christus praeium substantiale.

Item meritum naturaliter antecedit praeium, usus non ut actus virtutis naturaliter sequitur habitum, cum ergo habitus gratiae et gloriae simul fuerit in Christo. Videtur quod merita subsecuta fuit substantiale praeium.

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* Sic. ‘Non videtur’?
Respondeo dicendum quod anima Christi non esset necessitas ad unionem idonea, nisi esset beatissima et deiformissima, quod quidem fit per gloriae influentialiam. Si ergo necesse fuit, unionem illam antecedere omnia merita secundum ordinem naturae, necesse etiam fuit, deiformitatem gloriae in Christo praecedere omnem usum gratiae, et ideo gloria in Christo praecessit omnia merita.

Ergo ad primum dicendum quod illud habet veritatem solum in illis qui miri habent Deo solus per conformitatem affectionis. Christus assumpsit hunc unitus Deo etiam unione personali.


Aliis aliter videtur secundum Augustinus quod Deus sanctis angelis simul fuit naturam et gratiam. Verum in primo instanti sui esse habuerit gratiam et non praemium praecessit in eis usus libero arbitrio infusionem genere. Dicendum ergo id illud argumentum quod falsa est potest nihil meruerunt gloriae haec est praemium substantiale. Sed confirmationi in gloria per hic quid aliis cadentibus ipsi perseveraverunt.

Articulus 1, Quaestio 1 Enim quaeritur utrum Christus meruerit corporis glorificationem et videtur quod sic. Auctoritate magistri in littera, ‘Merito humilitatis et anima impassibilis factam est et caro immortalis’. Ergo meruit immortalitatem carnis, ergo glorificationem.
Item efficacius meretur quis sibi quam alii et habet non hoc instantiam in his quae cadunt subjectum merito, sed Christus meruit aliis resurrectionem et glorificationem. Ergo multofortius sui, ergo et cetera.

Contra anima Christi beatificata fuit absque meritis propter unionem ipsius ad deitatem. Ergo videtur quod pari ratione et corpus, ergo et cetera.

Item in corpus nunquam qui habuit meritum mortis, ergo gloria videtur quod per se deberetur ipsi corpori gloria immortalis gratia. Videtur quod per merita eam non acquisierit.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod Christus meruit sibi corporis glorificationem, non solus in agendo verbum et in patiendo sicut expresserat magister in littera.

Ad primum contra dicendum quod non est simile, quia unio divinae naturae ad humanam potius patiturs imperfectione carnis quod est in carentia minoris boni.

Ad aliud dicendum quod ex hoc non potest [fol.46.r.A] concludi, quod Christus gloriis corporis non meruerit, nisi eo modo dicendi meritum, quo quis de indebito fiere debitum. Hoc autem modo Christus sibi non meruit, sed illo modo dicendi meritum quo quis de debito uno modo factum debitum alio modo.

**Quaestio 2** Enim quaeritur utrum Christus meruerit nobis ianuae apertionem et videntur quod sic. Auctoritate magistri super Epistolam ad Ephesios, 'Per aliam hostiam non potuit nobis aperire aditus et fieri salus nisi
per mortem unigeniti, aut tanta fuit humilitas et patientia, ut eius merito
pateret in eum credentibus aditus regem’, ergo et cetera.⁹

Item si aliqui per Christi merita potuissesmus introire in gloriam.
Ergo sine morte Christi et passione potuissesmus salvari, et si hoc, Christus
mortuus esset gratis, ergo et cetera.

Contra omne meritum consistit in radice caritatis. Caritas aut in
Christo non crevit, ergo omne quod Christus meruit, ab initio meruit. Nobis
adituum regni alio qui non opportuisset eum pati, ergo videtur quod
numquam nobis nullum meruit.

Item caritas meretur gloriem ex condigno sed Abraham habuit
caritatem, sicut nos habemus, ergo aut Deus injuste cum eo egit, aut eum in
gloriam introduxit et si hoc aditus regni ante Christo adventum patuit.

Respondeo dicendum quod paradisus caelestis est aperta visio Dei;
clausio autem ianuae huius fuit impossibilitas videndi Deum facie ad faciem,
quae cosurgebat ex merito peccatam¹⁰ Adae et ex decreto divinae sententiae,
quo decreverat neminem ad sui apertum [fol.46.r.B] admittere, nisi esset
facta emenda et satisfactio pro illo peccato. Et quoniam emenda et
satisfactionem facta est ei per Christum, hinc est, quod per meritum Christi
patuit nobis aditus in caelum.

Ergo ad primum contra dicendum quod est meritum Adae peccato
vitae aeternae et est meritum dimissionis poenae. Primum consistit in radice
caritatis, secundum non tamen in haec, sed etiam in acerbitate poenae.

Apertio non ianuae principaliter consistebant quantum ad meritum

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⁹ Sic. Peter Lombard was actually commenting on the Letter to the Hebrews, Sent. III, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3. Bonaventure had also misattributed this reference, ascribing it to Augustine. Thus Richard corrected the author and then erroneously altered the work upon which he was commenting.

¹⁰ Sic. ‘peccati’?
dimissionis poenae, quod illa apertio fieri habebat per opus satisfactionis. Satisfactio autem fit maxime per opera poenalia.

Ad aliud dicendum quod caritas non meretur nisi praemabulo motu fidei. Post lapsum hominis fides autem absoluta non sufficit, nisi sit fides creatoris et mediatoris, sine qua nemo potest iustificari et ideo efficacia omnis meriti fundata est super merita Christi. Et propraea non sequitur, quod caritas mereatur gloriam circumscriptionis meritis Christi, vel introducat in ipsam, quod meritum caritatis nostrae non excludit meritus, Christi sed potius includit.


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11 Sic. The reference is presumably to Distinctio XXI.
Similiter secunda pars principaliter quatuor habet partes. In quarum prima determinat, quare dicitur redemptor. In secunda, quaeritur mediator, 
ibi, ‘Qui solus dicitur mediator.’ In tertia, quaeritur solus Filius dicitur mediator, ibi, ‘Sed cum sola peccata deleat non solus Filius’. In quarta, quam naturam dicitur mediator, ‘Unde et mediator dicitur.’ Subdivisiones partium in littera satis apparent.

Item quaeritur primo utrum per passionem Christi fiat remissio peccatorum et videtur quod sic. Hebraeos 9: ‘Sanguis Christi, qui per Spiritum Sanctus semetipsum immaculatum obtulit Deo, emundabit conscientias nostras ab operibus mortuis.’ Sed opera mortua propter peccata, ergo et cetera.

Item, Sacramenta quod iustificant habent iustificationem a passione Christi, ergo multo fortius Christi passio est efficax in iustificando.


Item, iustificatio a culpa est per gratiae infusionem sed solus Deus potest gratiam infundere. Ergo solus Deus potest culpam delere, ergo et cetera.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod in peccato duo sit, scilicet macula quae deletur per gratiam et reatus poene qui deletur per satisfactionem poenalem. Passio vero Christi dupliciter potest considerari, ut nec est in re exeunt, ut est in anima. Si primo modo consideretur, sic passio Christi fuit meritoria gratiae omnibus cooperatibus per quam deletur macula peccati. Fuit et satisfactionem poene et in hac dicitur praecare nostras languores et per hac absolvitur reatus peccati. Si aut consideratur secundo modo cum anima
debeat habere fidem et caritatem. Compassionem et mutationem quicum ad prima duo dicitur delere culpam, quia sine fide impossibile est placere Deo et caritas operit multitudinem peccatorum, quicum vero ad alia duo dicitur delere ipsum reatum. Convenit ergo remissio peccatorum passioni Christi. Sicut causae meritoriae quo ad culpam et sicut satisfactoriae qua ad reatum, gratia ad primum contradicendum quod illud est bonum per modus efficientis per hac tamen non excluditur qui alii possit convenire per modum merentis.

Ad aliud dicendum quod quis gratia a solo Deo habeat infundi nihilominus tamen Christus per suam passionem potuit eam nobis mereri et sic dicimur a passione iustificari.

**Quaestio 2** Enim quaeritu utrum per passionem Christi facta fuerit chirographorum deletio, etiam videtur quod sic. Colossenses: ‘Donans nobis delicta [fol.47.r.A] et delens quod adversum nos erat chirographi decreti,’ et hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Augustini in littera.

Item, omnia merita et demerita scribuntur a iusto iudice, iuxta illud quod dicitur Jeremiae 17, ‘Peccatum Judae scriptum est stylo ferreo in ungue adamantino,’ sed passio Christi nos liberavit ab ira ventura, ergo delevit culparum chirographa.

Contra, adhuc sunt aliqua peccata, per quae diabolus detinet homines, et hic et in futuro ad luenda supplicia. Ergo per Christi passionem non omnia sunt deleta.

Item, chirographum decreti aut est culpa, aut poena. Si culpa, ergo idem est delere chirographum et delere culpam, ergo male distinguit Apostolus, inter haec duo, ad Colossenses, dicens, ‘Donans nobis delicta et
delens chirographum.’ Si poena, contra chirographum obligat sed poena vero non. Ergo videtur non potest stare sed passio Christi non est nisi contra poenam vel culpam. Ergo chirographa non delevit culparum.

Iuxta hoc, etiam quae sit differentia inter chirographum decreti et chirographum culpae, cum uno nomine nominet Augustinus alio nominet Apostolus, et quae sit scriptura et qualiter per passionem Christi affixa sit cruci.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod sermo iste methaforicus est, quo dicitur per passionem Christi deleri chirographa culparum. Secundus est sciendum quod chyrographum culpae dicitur esse memoriale, quo anima tenetur astricta et obligata alicui poene, sicut quando aliquis obligat se alteri, facit ei chirographum. Et hoc innuit Augustinus in littera, cum dicit, ‘Culparum chyrographa [fol.47.r.B] deleta sunt quibus debitores ante a diabolo tenebantur.’ Et dicitur illud chirographum, quia talis obligatio consurgit ex nostra culpa tanquam ex decreto. Et sic chirographum illud dicitur memoria illud, quo peccatum manet quantum ad reatum, ratione cuius divinam iustitia habet nos punire, diabolica autem malitia potest et detinere et conscientia nostra potest contra remurmurare. Et illud chirographum adversus nos habet inscribi non solum. Pro peccato primi parentis et ratione huius diabolus habet in nos aliquam potestatem vel simpliciter, vel ad tempus.

Quoniam aut Christus per passionem suam impetravit non solus remissionem culpae quantum ad maculam sed etiam quantum ad reatum. Hinc est, quod dicit Apostolus et Augustinus, quod Christus passionem suam delevit chirographa culparum sed Apostolus dicit singulariter delens chirographum decerti, quia loquitur de memoriale transgressionis primi
parentis. Augustinus vero pluraliter, quia loquitur de remissione omnium peccatorum quantum ad reatum, ut perfectum exprimat ipsius passionis effectum.

Concedendum est igitur quod per passionem Christi delentur chirographa culparum.

Et ad primum contra dicendum quod dupliciter est loquii de efficatia passionis Christi, aut quantum ad sufficientiam, aut quantum ad efficaciam. Primo modo se extendit ad omnes secundam ad eos solummodo qui baptizantur in eius nomine, qui absolvuntur a reatu originalis et actualis, ita quod a diaboli non possunt amplius teneri, nisi forte se ei voluntarie subiiciant et nova [fol.47.v.A] contra eos scribantur chirographa.

Ad aliud dicendum quod est proprie loquendo culpa, nec poena, sed est reatus consequens culpam, qui est obligatio ad poenam, quae quidam dicitur chirographum, in quantum tenet obligationem respectu poenae et rationem memorialis respectu culpae praeteritae. Culpa enim frequenter transit actu et remanet reatu sicut pater in sanctis Patribus, qui detinebantur in limbo, in quibus delendum erat originale quantum ad culpam sed adhuc remanebat in eis reatus propter quod janua erat eis clausa.

Ad illud vero quae ultimo quaerentur patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt in principio huiuc responsionis, sicut patet pertractantis.

**Quaestio 3** enim quaeritur utrum per passionem liberati simus a potestate diabolica et videtur quod sic. Apocalypsis 20: 'Vidi angelum descendentem de caelo et apprehendit draconem, qui est diabolus.' Sed per istum angelum, sicut sancti exponunt intelligitur Christus. Si ergo ab isto angelo in eius passione est religatus diabolicus, videtur quod amiserit super nos posse.
Item quando diabolica superavit primum hominem per consequens superavit totum genus humanum. Ergo pari ratione videtur, cum superatus est a Christo, superatus sit a toto genere humano. Ergo per passione Christi totum genus humanum liberatum fuit a potestate diabolica.

Contra Ephesios 9, ‘Non est nobis colluctatio adverus carnem et sanguinem sed adversus principes et potestates sed adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum’. Ergo adhuc daemones nos impugnant, ergo a potentate diaboli liberati non sumus.

Item, potestas diaboli in duobus consistit, scilicet in obsessione corporum et excaecatione mentium, sed post Christi passionem adhuc multi a diabo fuerunt obsessi, multi etiam fuerunt gravissime excaecati, ergo et cetera.

Respondeo dicendum quod diabolum ante passionem Christi duplicem habebat manum, scilicet attrahentem qui erat potentas trahendi ad limbum etiam iustos et impellentem quod erat potestas praecipitandi in malum sive per [fol.48.r.A] astutiam sive per violentiam. Prima manus, omnino fuit ei amputata per passionem, quia nullem iustum potest ad limbum trahere, nam per passionem Christi deletum est chirographum peccatum Adae. Debilitata est per passionem Christi est per quam lumen caritatis contra fraudulentiam diabolicam astutiam et adiutorium virtutis contra diabolicam violentiam.

Ad primi contra dicendum quod quamvis nobis incumbat pugna non tamen elongamur a victoria, nisi interveniat nostra negligentia, secundum quod dicitur in 1 Corinthios 10, ‘Fidelis Deus, qui non patietur, vos temptari’.

12 Sic. The reference should be Ephesians 6: 12.
Super id quod potestatis, sed faciet cum temptatione etiam preventum ut possitis sustinere.

Ad aliud dicendum quod hoc non potest quis nisi ex culpa sua vires tribuat, sicut faciunt illi qui faciunt Christi conceperint qui non humili sacramentis et sacramentalibus se subiiciunt, quae a passione Christi habent virtutem, non formidant diabolicam potestatem.


Item in tolerantia poenae plus ordinatur ad relaxationem poenae quem ad delectationem culpae si ergo per passionem Christi sic iustificatio a culpa sicut super ostensum enim multo fortius fit poenarum relaxatio.

Contra, ‘Resurrectio resurrectio Christi est causa nostrae resurrectionis’, ut dicitur in Glossa, ad 1 Corinthios 15 III, sed per resurrectionem nostram habemus liberari a poena et miseria. Ergo videtur quod Christi resurrectio, non passio, liberet nos a poena.

Item omnis prima poenalis est, si ergo per passionem Christi liberati sumus a poena, videtur, quod non iam sit poenitentia, sed hoc falsum, ergo et cetera.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod passio Christi liberavit nos a poena temporali et ab aeterna et ab ea quae est inter utramque media. A temporali, dum virtute illius donantur nobis peccata, non solum quantum ad culpam et

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13 Sic.
reatum poenae aeternae, sed etiam quantum ad dimissionem poenae satisfactoriae, sicut fiat in sacramento baptismi. Ab aeterna quia dum per passionem Christi gratia nobis impetratur, enim per quam culpa demittitur, debitum mortis aeternae nobis relaxatur. A media inter utramque etiam liberat, scilicet a carentia visionis Dei, quod etiam si fuerit ad tempus propter gratiam repertam in eis qui detinebantur in limbo, deberet tamen habere aeternitatem, habito ad peccatum Adae. Unum quantuncumque passio fuisset ei subtracta, nisi Deus ad remisset aliam viam.

Ergo ad primum contra dicendum quod sicut [fol.48.v.A] iustificationem, potest attribui passioni ratione termini a quo, scilicet amotionis mali et resurrectioni ratione termini ab quem, scilicet collationis boni. Sic etiam glorificatio, quae est liberatione a poena utrique potest attribui sed ratione liberationis a poena attribuit passioni.

Ad aliud dicendum quod passio Christi quicum est de se liberat a tali poena quia secundum quid dicitur in littera, ‘in baptismo omnis poena quae pro peccato deletur, penitus relaxatur,’ sed cum homo peccata iterat, reddit se indignum tanto beneficio, et ideo per passionem non remittitur ei tota poena sed minoratur, sicut dicit magister in littera. quantum decet et expedit, salva divina justitia.

**Articulus 2, Quaestio 1** enim quaeritur utrum solus Filius sit redemptor, et videtur quod sic. Apocolypsis 5, ‘Redemisti nos, Deusm in sanguine tuo.’ Si ergo solus Filius pro nobis sanguinem nobis fudit, solus filius nos redemit.

Item ille solus nos redemit, qui pro nobis satisfecit, sed filius pro nobis satisfeceit, ergo et cetera.
Contra magister in littera, ‘Redemptor etiam aliquando Pater et Spiritus Sanctus dicitur in scriptura,’ non dicit nisi verum ergo et cetera.

Item illius enim redimere, cuius est per redempta per cuius dare. Sed Pater dedit Filium suum pro redemptione generis humanam, secundum quod dicitur Johannes III, ‘Sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret.’ Ergo Pater nos redemit nos, ergo solus filius est redemptor.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod opus redemptionis dupliciter alicui acu it attribui, aut sicut principali auctori, aut sicut exsequenti. Et utroque modo competit Christo, [fol.48.v.B] inquam, Deo competit sicut auctori, Christo vero homini sicut exsequenti et cum ergo dicitur redemptor, hoc potest dupliciter dici. Aut ab auctoritate redemptionis, aut ab auctoritate simul et executione. Si primo modo, sic non tantum competit Filio, sed etiam Patri et Spiritui Sancto, quod indivisa sunt opera Trinitatis. Si secundo modo, sic respicit humanitatem, quae assumpta est a solo Verbo, et hoc modo competit soli Filio et hoc est quod dicit magister in littera, ‘Redemptor aliquando Pater et Spiritus Sanctus dicitur, sed hoc propter usum potestatis, non propter exhibitionem humilitatis. Nam secundum potestatis simul et obedientiae usum Filius proprie redemptor dicitur,’ et post concluditur.

Est igitur redemptor, in quantum Deus potestatis usu, in quantum homo, humilitatis effectu. Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et ad rationes ad utramque partem.

*Quaestio 2* enim quaeritur secundum quam naturam Christus sit mediator et quod secundum humanam videtur. Augustinus, De Civitate Dei, ‘Mediatorem inter nos et Deum mortalitatem oportuit habere transeuntem et
beatitudinem permanentem,’ sed utrumque horum competit Christo secundum humanam naturam, ergo et cetera.

Contra Christus est mediator non per privationem sed per positionem, sed medium per positionem medium per participationem utriusque exivi. Ergo non potest esse mediator et nostri nisi per hoc, quod est Deus et homo. Ergo mediator est secundum utramque natunam.

Respondeo cum mediator dicat officium reconciliationis et mediator debeat differre ab illis quos reconciliat et Christus secundum divinam naturam sit ille cui fit reconciliatio, dicendum quod non potest Christus esse mediator secundum divinam naturam, sed secundum humanam, in qua potest reconciliare [fol.49.r.A] diversas proprietates, in quibus communicat cum homine. Habebat enim iustitiam et innocentiam, in qua communicat cum Deo et mortalitatem, in qua communicat cum homine, et dum mors conjungitur iustitiae, in eodem confoederatur homo peccator et mortalis Deo iusto et immortali. Reconciliati enim sumus Deo per mortem hominis innocentis. Concedendus est igitur quod Christus est mediator secundum humanam non.

Et ad contra, dicedum quod medium et mediator non dicitur solum per participationem utraque naturae et etiam per convenientiam in proprietate et Christus secundum humanam naturam, hic proprietates convenientes divinae naurae pariter et humanae

Distinctio 20, Articulus Unicus, Quaestio 1 enim quaeritur utrum alio modo et cetera. Supra egit de passionis efficacia. In hac vero parte agit de passionis congruentia. Dividitur autem ista pars in duas. In quarum prima comparat passionem Christi ad causam, propter quam passus est. In secunda
ad causam, a qua fuit passio Christi. Christus ergo et sacerdos, idemque hostia et cetera.

Prima pars dividitur in duas, in quarum prima ostendit, quod modus istae redimendi, scilicet per passionem, valde fuit congruus et rationabilis, ostendens, quare isto modo, scilicet per passionem humani, genus redimere voluit. In secunda ostendit, quod alio modo. si voluisset redimere potuisset, si enim illi tres in causa veniant et cetera.


Ex prima arguitur sic: si non decet Dei propositum infirmari et Deus proposuerat hominem perducere ad beatitudinem, et perduci non habet, quamdiu manet in statu ruinae. Ergo indecens est, hominem in tali statu reliqui. Ergo ab oppositis decens est, ipsum reparari.
Ex secunda arguitur sic: non decet summam posteritatem sempiternaliter dampnari pro peccato unius hominis, sed tota sempiternaliter dampnaretur, nisi reparationem interveniret. Ergo, et cetera.

Ex tertia arguitur sic: non decet summam sapientiam permettere, universaliter nobilissimam creaturam fine suo fraudari, sed nisi reparatio interveniret, omnes homines essent fine suo fraudati. Ergo, et cetera.

Ex quarta arguitur sic: non decet summam virtutem permettere, servo suos iniuste et violenter ab adversario detineri, sed nisi reparationem interveniret. Ergo, et cetera.

Contra, si indecens fuisset, genus humanum non repararo et inconveniens, et quodlibet minimum inconveniens, sicut dicit Amselmus in primo Cur Deus Homo, [fol.49.v.A] est Deo impossibilis, ergo fuit impossibile, Deum genus humanum non reparare. Ergo ut Deus non reparavit genus humanum propter misericordiam, sed potius propter indecentiam, quod non reparavit ex liberalitate, sed ex necessitate. Quod si verum est, non tenemur ei ad tantas gratiarum actiones, quod inpium est dicere.

Item, nobilior creatura est angelus quam homo, et est propter beatitudinem factus, sed non decuit Deum relevere a suo lapsu. Ergo nec decuit reparare genus humanum. Ergo, et cetera.

**Respondeo** dicendum quod, per omnen modum, congruum fuit genus humanum reparari. Ex parte opificis, cum ex parte operis. Sed congruitas ex parte operis pura congruentia est, ita quod non ponit necessitatem. Necessitatem sed non inevitabilitatis, quae dividitur in coactionem et prohibitedionem, sed necessitatem immutabilitatis, quae consurgit ex stabilitate et immutabilitate divinae dispositionis. Haec autem
non arctat divinam potentiam ad oppositum, sed eam determinat ad tale propositum. Unde Anselmus in secundo Cur Deus Homo, ‘Cum dicimus, aliquid Deum facere, intelligendi est, quod hoc facit necessitatem servandi honestatem, quod necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis’.

Secunda, ex his quae dicta sunt, patet responsio ad propositam quaestionem. Si enim quaeritur, utrum congruum sit, reparari genus humanum. Concedendum est simpliciter, quod si vero quaeratur, utrum necessarium non est simpliciter respondendum sed distinguendum, ut supra patet.

Ergo ad primum contra dicendum quod non sequitur si Deus reparat ex necessitate suae immutabilitatis, quod propter hoc non [fol.49.v.B] reparat ex liberalitate suae benignitatis, haec enim simul possunt stare.

Ad aliud dicendum quod quamvis angelus nobilior sit creatura, non est tamen adeo ad reparationem idoneus, sicut homo, propter modum labendi et propter statum hominis lapsi. Homo enim poenituit, angelus vero obstinatus fuit; homo totaliter, angelus particulariter cecidit. Homo per alium, angelus non per se ipsum et haec sunt quae faciunt angelum ad redemptionem unius idoneum.

Quaestio 2 enim quaeritur utrum magis congruum fuit genus humanum per satisfactionem reparari quam per aliam viam et videtur quod sic. Illa via magist conveniens fuit ad reparationem generis. In quam servatur ordo divinae iustitiae et divinae sapientiam et praesidentiam divinae potestatis. Et honorificentia divinae magestatis.¹⁴ Haec aut omnia magis sequuntur cum malum punitur, quod cum malum reliquitur impunitum sed cum peccatorum

¹⁴ Sic. Presumably ‘maiestatis’.
reparatum per satisfactionem. Malum punitur cum satisfactione relinquitur impunitum ergo haec via magis fuit conveniens. Ergo, et cetera.

Contra modus ille magis convenit reparationi generis humanam in quo homo magis astringitur ad amandum et laudandum Deum sed si Deus culpam hominis reliquisset absque omni satisfactione et poena. Esset magis laudandus ab homine. Ergo, et cetera.

Item modus ille magis congruit reparationi generis humani. In quo magis eruditur homo ad executionem divini mandati et immitationem. Sed homo decet remittere et condonare alii et poenam si ergo Deus debuit dare homini exemplum perfectionis [fol.50.r.A] patet et cetera,

Respondeo dicendum quod si Deus culpam non dimisisset sed medicam exequisset non manifestetur eius miseria. Si vero omnio dimisisset nec satisfactionem exequisset non manifestare eius iustitia, si ergo iste divinae condonet sunt in divina opera secunda de magis congruebat humanam naturam reparari, per satisfactionem, quam per aliam naturam.

Ergo ad primum contradicendum quod illud falsum est. Plus nullum nos astringitur ad amorem et laudem Dei hic quod dedit unigenitum suum per nobis, quem si absque hic condonavisset nobis culpam et poenam. Multo nullo magis fuit quod Deus per nobis mortem subiret, quantum quod poenam nostram condonaret.