Soft Power in International Relations: Japan’s State, Sub-state and Non-state Relations with China (Volume 2)

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Chapter 6

The activities of the Japan-China Friendship Association in China

Introduction

NGOs in their modern form have become important actors in international relations, whether acting independently of governments, or cooperating with them to pursue the NGOs’ goals. Due to their flexibility and general independence from the state, they are also important agents of a country’s or society’s soft power resources.

NGOs differ from state level or sub-state level governmental agents in that they are theoretically independent from any government in terms of their aims, and the methods they use to achieve them. They are generally only accountable to their members or sponsors in their actions (although these can be governmental bodies), and for this reason their purposes are usually quite narrowly defined, unlike governmental agents or local governments, which have broad remits. This in turn means that their efforts are directed in a focussed manner in the fields in which they work, making them potentially influential in those narrow fields.

NGOs which operate internationally are often called ‘transnational’ actors, meaning that they are not truly based in one country. These actors can affect the international relations of any country in which they operate. Well known examples of these truly global actors are Amnesty International, Medicins Sans Frontieres,
Greenpeace,\textsuperscript{87} and so on. They can affect international relations by making decisions on where and how to spend their resources, which can be substantial. Most NGOs are, however, based inside one or two countries and concentrate on local issues. These groups can also affect international relations, by pressurising their governments to change policies.

NGOs which specialise in promoting relations between two or more countries have a substantial role in most advanced industrial countries. In some cases they work closely with governments, and in some cases they are completely independent, with many groups positioned somewhere between these two extremes. They tend to concentrate on promoting peaceful relations, such as cultural exchanges, language programmes, and creating personal links between countries. These groups can be said to act most directly as agents of a country’s soft power in other countries.

In Japan, non-state groups have historically tended to be viewed with suspicion and suppressed. However, in the last two decades, NGOs have begun to flourish, including internationally active groups (Takao 2001, Itō 1996, Menju 2002). Cultural exchange oriented NGOs have also bloomed, in many cases encouraged by governmental bodies. In Japan’s relations with China, there has been a particularly useful role played by these groups, due to the often difficult nature of the two countries’ relations, in forming links between people in both countries. Among the many NGOs which attempt to promote relations between Japan and China, the Japan-China Friendship Association is a prominent example of a group which operates at the local and the national level, and which through its activities creates links between Japan and China and therefore acts as an agent enabling Japan’s soft power to function.

In this chapter, the meaning of the term 'NGO' will first be outlined, and the development and role of NGOs in international relations broadly. The development of NGOs in Japan, and their international role will then be considered. Next NGOs' roles in Japan-China relations, in particular in the post-war era will be reviewed. This will lead on to an examination of the case of the Japan-China Friendship Association, in terms of its development, international activities, and role as an agent of Japan's soft power. Finally, these findings will be used to analyse the broader role of Japan's NGOs as agents of the country's soft power.

**NGOs: Definitions and origins**

a) *What is an NGO?*

The concept of an NGO embodies a wide variety of organisations. Not only are the limits of the term often disputed, but also the use of the term itself is sometimes argued over. The term 'non-governmental organisation' at first glance seems to cover too wide a body of groups for there to be any meaning in putting them into one category. Questions which arise include whether companies, private military organisations, political parties, or religious cults could come under this heading. Additionally, the term seems to imply a complete lack of any governmental interference or involvement in groups commonly seen as NGOs, despite this clearly not always being the case.

Other terms have been used in order to describe these groups, which try to circumvent these problems. Terms such as 'non-profit organisations (NPO)', 'the third sector', 'private voluntary organisations' (O'Neill 1989), 'civil society
organisations', 'the independent sector', 'interest groups', 'pressure groups' and even 'new social movements' (Willets 1996) have also been used to describe similar concepts. While some of these may have merit depending on the context of the discussion, there are many objections raised against all of these terms. The 'third sector' can be seen as an addition to the 'public sector' and 'private sector' terms commonly used to indicate government activities or business activities, implying a sector which is non-governmental and not-for-profit, although it may have links with government or business. 'Private voluntary organisations', often used in the USA, has overtones of religion, and excludes the many groups which employ full-time staff. 'Interest' and 'pressure' groups seem to narrowly define the purpose of the groups, while 'NPO' has similar problems to 'NGO' in that it covers too vast a range of groups. 'Civil society organisations' and the 'independent sector' are too 'terminally vague' (Simmons 1998: 83) to be useful terms.

Nevertheless, there is a need to study the activities and influence of groups, nationally and internationally, which are nominally independent of governments and are not operating with the specific intent of making economic gains for themselves or shareholders. Hence, the term 'NGO' has come to be the most widely used to describe such groups; this chapter will therefore use the term 'NGO' while keeping in mind their diversity and the effect this may have on their role as agents of soft power.

The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which deals with accreditation of NGOs to the UN, in Article 12 of its latest resolution regarding NGOs, states that

The organisation shall have a representative structure and possess appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall
exercise effective control over its policies and actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent decision-making processes. Any such organisation that is not established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement shall be considered a non-governmental organisation for the purpose of these arrangements, including organisations that accept members designated by governmental authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organisation (UN 1996).

The resolution goes on in Article 13 to stipulate that NGOs should receive the main part of their funds from affiliates or members, with any voluntary contributions or governmental funds to be openly declared and explained satisfactorily to the UN Council Committee on non-governmental relations. In this way the resolution implies or assumes that NGOs will not be commercial, for-profit organisations. The Council of Europe, in its Convention 124 (European Convention on the Legal Personality of International Non-governmental Organisations) specifically states that such groups should have a 'non-profit making aim' (Council of Europe 1986).

In sum, it is widely agreed among diplomats and academics that 'an NGO is any non-profit making, non-violent, organised group of individuals or organisations' and that in the case of international NGOs (operating in more than one country), members may consist of companies, political parties or other NGOs in addition to individuals (Willets 1996: 5).

b) Development of International NGOs

Religious and academic groups, both local and more widespread, have clearly existed for thousands of years in some form or another in and across many cultures around the world. The missionary groups formed by Europeans in the middle ages to spread
Christianity around the world are one example (O’Neill 1989). However, the modern form of formally organised international NGOs seems to have begun to appear around the last part of the 19th century. Groups such as the World Alliance of YMCAs (founded in 1855) were created to campaign on a wide variety of issues such as the slave trade, treatment of prisoners, human trafficking and other human rights issues (Seary 1996).

A group called the Société Internationale d’Étude, de Correspondance et d’Échanges was established in Paris in 1895 specifically to help develop good relations and exchanges across borders. The International Red Cross (1859), Save the Children (1920) and International Youth Hostel Association (1932) are other examples of early international NGOs, generally formed in order to provide relief from conflict, or otherwise to promote friendly relations between states at the grassroots level. From their origins, these kinds of international NGOs were created with the purpose of forming links between countries and in order to enable information about different ways of life and organising a society to cross into other countries – basic elements of the soft power theory outlined in Chapter 3.

Seary (1996) cites the reasons that the first international NGOs began to form as being related to the development of suitable legal systems which would provide a structure for such groups, and the ability of people to travel and communicate over longer distances to gather in committees and societies in Europe in the 19th century. Additionally, the growth of the middle classes meant that more people had time and resources to worry about other people’s situations, even including peoples in other countries. The whole idea of internationalism was dependent on the growth and strengthening of the concept of the nation state.

With the development of the League of Nations, and then after World War
Two, the United Nations, international NGOs were recognised as legitimate contributors to the international system, including international relations, although there was some dispute between countries as to how far they should be allowed to participate. Finally in Article 71 of the original UN Charter, acknowledgement of their role was given, in limited terms, but in vague enough language so that international NGOs would be able to participate widely in the following years.

In the last few decades, in particular, the influence and activity of NGOs has reached new levels. In the post-war years, the number of international NGOs exploded, this phenomenon being 'quite clearly... in reaction against the traditional system of interstate relations that was considered to have brought about the unprecedented tragedy' of the Second World War (Iriye 1999: 425). In 1948 there were 41 international NGOs accredited by the ECOSOC at the UN (Simmons 1998) whereas by 2005 there were 2613 NGOs accredited, with varying levels of access to UN proceedings (Global Policy Forum 2005).

These days, international NGOs' activities are often highly visible, with the larger groups conducting professional public relations campaigns on television and through other media, as well as other kinds of promotion, to achieve their aims and reach a wider audience. International NGOs have clearly become important creators of links, and carriers of information and ideas, and therefore soft power, whether it is the soft power of a country, a culture or a set of values.
International NGOs in Japan

a) The development of NGOs in Japan

The concept of an NGO, especially an international NGO, has become mainstream only relatively recently in Japan. In Japanese the term NGO is sometimes translated literally, and sometimes left in roman letters even in Japanese language texts. The word ‘NGO’ first became widely used in the mass media during the early 1980s. At the beginning, when the Japanese transliteration hiseifu soshiki was used, it generally gave a negative impression, with the feeling that the organisation in question was unauthorised, or rather ‘passive’ (JANIC 2004: xiv) and so of dubious quality.

This led to the coining of other terms, to impart a more positive image of these groups. One such term, published in the 1988 edition of the JANIC NGO Directory, was minkankōeki dantai, literally ‘private group for public benefit,’ a term which implied a group which was formed by ordinary citizens working together for society. In 1998, when the Japanese Diet finally passed a new law relating to NGOs, it used the term hieiri, or ‘non-profit’ to describe these groups. Hence the acronym ‘NPO’ (Non-profit Organisation) began to become used widely by the mass media. This difference between an NPO and an NGO is still disputed, but in general, an NGO is seen as a group which carries out aid and economic assistance, whereas an NPO is a group which is usually seen to act for other social needs. It is certainly not inconceivable that the Japanese Government, in promulgating the NPO law, did not want to rule out government involvement with these groups if necessary. Additionally, the term NGO came from the UN, and consciously excludes the involvement of governments, while the term ‘non-profit’ (hiei) is consciously meant
to exclude for-profit (eiri) organisations, i.e. companies. Notwithstanding these points, there is still much confusion about the distinction between these terms.\(^{88}\)

In addition to this plethora of terminology, the term ‘CSO’ (Civil Society Organisation) is also used. Other Japanese, English or hybrid terms are also used according to the writer’s preferences, such as gurasuritsu soshiki (grassroots organisation), minkan dantai (private group), and shimin soshiki (citizens’ organisation).

Before the US occupation of Japan after the Second World War, NGOs were not generally a part of Japanese society. This has been attributed to Japan’s Confucian tradition of a strong state (and so a lack of non-state organisation) and the lack of an evangelical tradition in Japanese Buddhism (JANIC 2005b). In pre-Meiji times, associations called buraku were common at the village level; these organisations had originally been formed to help improve agricultural production, but also developed into groups helping with community services. However, with the dawning of the Meiji period of strong central government, the associations were controlled and used by the state to implement its policies, leading to popular suspicion of them (Takao 2001).

The only law which dealt with NGOs until 1998 was Article 34 of the Civil Code created in 1896, which specified that permission to set up a non-profit organisation was to be controlled by the relevant local or national government office. Usually barriers to setting up a legal NGO were high, meaning that only ‘an extremely limited number of organisations could qualify’ (Asahi Shimbun Chikyū Purojekuto 21 1998: 203). NGOs were required to have a large endowment and

\(^{88}\) In this chapter, the term ‘NGO’ will generally be used. However, when specifically referring to groups incorporated under the Japanese NPO law, the term ‘NPO’ may be used.
annual budget, and a ‘board consisting of publicly esteemed individuals’ (Menju and Aoki 1996: 150). Even if these conditions could be satisfied, the requisite documentation required in addition to this was substantial. Organisations had to submit financial reports to the relevant government ministry, which had to adhere to strict accounting guidelines. In short, it was a near impossibility for a small NGO to acquire legal status and the relevant tax advantages and general recognition. In 1994 only 28 NGOs had managed to acquire this status.

Despite the difficulty in obtaining legal recognition, small groups of citizens did manage to form in response to societal problems and gaps in provision of services. The first NGOs were formed mainly by Christian groups. In 1938 a group of Christian doctors was formed to care for refugees from the Japan-China war which had started (JANIC 2004). During the US occupation, the authorities tried to encourage the formation of trade unions and other associations to encourage democratisation. One citizens’ movement was created to promote the establishment of UNESCO, in order to ensure to promote intellectual and moral exchanges between countries to prevent wars in the future. Associations were formed throughout Japan to promote this goal, firstly in Sendai in 1947, reaching 170 groups by 1972. The Japan-America Student Conference was also relaunched (it had existed before the war) in 1947, and other exchanges were initiated by Swiss and US NGOs to help Japanese citizens reconcile with these countries. These initiatives were to have a strong impression on the Japanese who were able to participate, leading to regional and local groups starting their own exchange programmes or encouraging their local governments to start programmes (Menju 2002b).

Many associations and informal NGOs were also later formed in response to the problems of rapid economic growth which brought with it environmental and
social problems; ‘by 1970 there were as many as 3000 local citizens’ groups
dedicated to protesting pollution problems’ (Takao 2001). Christian groups were
again at the forefront of setting up international NGOs in the 1960s and 70s, firstly
with the Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service being set up to
provide medical services in poor Asian countries in 1960. In 1979, after an influx of
refugees from Vietnam and the surrounding countries to Japan, many NGOs were
created by citizens to help manage the refugees’ problems. This proved to be
something of turning point, with the number of internationally oriented NGOs
increasing quickly afterwards.

Economic growth and the increase in individuals’ wealth and mobility also
enabled them to turn their attention to issues outside of their own daily lives (Itô
1996). Since the late 1980s, the number of international NGOs spurted again, with
the advent of such terms as ‘internationalisation’ (kokusaika) and in the 1990s
‘globalisation’ (gurōbaruka) catching the media’s and the general public’s
imagination. Increasing numbers of small local groups dealing with international
exchange and co-operation came into existence. Many of them started out as
organisations helping out foreign residents and students, numbers of whom were
steadily increasing. Many of these local organisations were started by or with the
help of local governments. It is therefore difficult to call them completely
non-governmental; although many of them are independent of their local
governments, they often co-operate closely on policy. In addition to this, each
prefectural government and city government has set up an ‘International Exchange
Association’ which acts as an NPO, although policy is usually directed by the local
government, and officials are often civil servants.

There were already 850,000 legally registered foreigners living in Japan in

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1985, and this increased to 1.32 million by 1993. Through contact with these immigrants or ex-pat workers, Japanese people grew more aware of human rights problems in their own country, as well as in others. Not only did Japanese people come into closer contact with foreign cultures at home, they also travelled to other countries in greater numbers, thus increasing interest in other countries, their problems, and their relationships with Japan (Menju and Aoki 1996).

The development of the Internet, television news organisations and the increase in mass media outlets generally during the 1990s also increased the Japanese people’s exposure to international news, such as natural disasters, civil wars and environmental problems in nearby countries. The 1991 Gulf War led not only the Japanese Government to try to increase its ‘international contribution (kokusai kōken)’ (Itō 2003: 97), but also led ordinary Japanese citizens to think more about how to assist people in other countries. A volcanic eruption in the Philippines in the same year, the ‘UN Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (well attended by Japanese NGOs), and the Rwanda refugee crisis caused by civil war in 1994 were all reported widely in the Japanese media, leading to increased awareness of international problems among Japanese people. The Japanese Government also introduced new policies which encouraged citizens to donate money to NGOs, or to volunteer themselves. Nevertheless, this increase in interest and NGO activity was tempered by the economic depression being experienced in Japan during the 1990s.

The increase in awareness and activity led to campaigning by NGOs and individuals to reform the law relating to NGOs, resulting in the ‘NPO law’ in 1998 (See Fig. 11, p.248). This was also spurred on by the 1995 Kobe earthquake, where large numbers of citizens and volunteer groups helped and provided relief where the government had been slow to act. NGOs which had gained experience in disasters in
foreign countries were also quick to help (JANIC 2004). The government (though initially needing to be spurred on by opposition parties) realised it needed to change the law to make it easier for people to set up and run NGOs. The new law stipulated twelve fields such as health, welfare, social education, local community building (machizukuri), promotion of culture and sports, environment, fire prevention, regional security, human rights and peace promotion, international co-operation, gender equality and networking among groups to achieve these aims (Asahi Shimbun Chikyū Purojekuto 21 1998). A qualifying NPO must have more than 10 members, with less than one third receiving remuneration. The groups must not promote religious or political ideas or campaign for or against the candidates of any political party or public office. Individuals or companies contributing funds to an NPO may be eligible for tax deductions, although this depends on the individual NPO and its arrangements with the tax authority. NPOs themselves do not have to pay tax on non-profit economic activities, and for-profit activities they can receive special rates, according to their individual status (US International Grantmaking 2005).

![NPO growth in Japan](image)

**Fig. 11 – NPO growth in Japan**

Source: RIETI (2005)
In recent years, difficult financial conditions for international NGOs in Japan have continued. However, they have persevered in improving their management, and in developing new strategies to achieve their objectives. Many have joined international networks of NGOs to gain expertise, and cultivated ways of working with the Japanese government. In 1996, the first NGO-Ministry of Foreign Affairs meeting was held and in 1998 the first NGO-JICA (Japan International Co-operation Agency) meeting was organised (JANIC 2004). Even though the government’s ODA budget was cut every year from 1998, the amount of support received by international NGOs through the ODA budget increased.

The NPO law and the tax system were further reformed in 2001 and 2002 to make it easier for NPOs to receive donations. Additionally, Japanese international NGOs’ work in Afghanistan and Iraq has increased awareness of their activities further among Japanese people (Itō 2003).

b) NGOs in Japan-China relations

Analysing the role of NGOs in Japan’s post-war relationship with China is a useful way to demonstrate the way in which they have acted as agents for Japan’s soft power, in particular because this relationship has been characterised by minimal governmental contact for long periods of time. Firstly, from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, until the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1972 and the establishment of a treaty in 1978 there were few government-to-government relations, and in this atmosphere NGOs were able to provide some vital links to maintain relations and allow the flow of Japan’s soft
power to China. Secondly, in more recent times since Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō came to power in Japan in 2001, contacts between government leaders have been minimal mainly due to China's protests against the Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Therefore, NGOs again have been able to provide at least some avenues for the relationship between the two countries to continue at the grassroots level, and provide channels for the flow of information and ideas; in fact the lack of government relations has allowed NGOs to assume a larger role (Kutsuki, interview, 2006).

In the years after the Second World War, it was Japanese people who had studied or worked in China who led the way in the development of grassroots exchange organisations, and the same was true of Chinese people who had studied in Japan. In particular, business people knew that it was vital to keep some kind of relationship going between the two countries. In 1949, the 'China-Japan Trade Promotion Association' and then the 'China-Japan Trade Promotion Diet Members' Union' were formed with this aim in Japan. The first organisation consisted of small and large businesses, and other associations and individuals interested in promoting links with China, including many linked to the Japan Socialist Party or the Japan Communist Party. Many of these businesses had operated in China before the war, but had been damaged by the hostilities and were interested in re-establishing commercial links. The second organisation was a cross-party group of politicians, including members of parliament from several parties such as the Democratic Liberal Party (Minshujiyūtō) the Democratic Party (Minshutō), Socialist Party (Shakaitō), Communist Party (Kyōsantō), Agricultural Workers' Party (Rōnōtō) and the Conservative Party (Hoshutō) (Furukawa 1988: 24). In the 1950s and 60s, non-governmental cultural exchanges were continued by local NGOs and academics.
Groups set up during this time included the Japan-China Friendship Association in 1950 (see p.256), the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association in 1952, and the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association in 1955. At the time, the Chinese government encouraged these links, as it was hoping to encourage anti-US elements in Japanese society and neutralists to push for stronger links between Japan and China (Iriye 1992).

As a result of the politicians’, enthusiasts’ and businessmen’s activities, in 1952 the first ‘Japan-China Private Trade Agreement’ was negotiated. The Japanese Government did not have relations with China, mainly due to US pressure, but it was able to encourage this link-building by private citizens. In the next year a further trade agreement was negotiated by this group with China.

Also, in 1953 the Japanese Red Cross Society, along with its Chinese counterpart the Chinese Red Cross Society, arranged for the return of forty thousand Japanese who had been stranded in China by the war, and for the return of the remains of many thousands of Chinese who had died in Japan. Two other organisations were given special passports by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help with this work; the Japan-China Friendship Association, and the Japan-China Peace Communication Association (Katagiri 1995).

Non-governmental exchanges between China and Japan were further encouraged by the cease-fire agreement between North and South Korea in 1953. In the same year the Japan-China Fisheries Co-operation Association was formed by several fishing companies from Fukuoka, Shimonoseki and Nagasaki, in co-operation with people close to the Ministry of Agriculture, to negotiate a fishing agreement. Although these negotiations necessarily involved representatives from the two countries’ military forces (China’s People’s Liberation Army and Japan’s Self
Defence Forces) due to security concerns, the association managed to seal an agreement with the Chinese Fisheries Association (formed to respond to the Japanese proposals) in 1955, which was honoured by both sides despite the 'Nagasaki Flag Incident'\(^{89}\) in 1958.

In 1955, the former Prime Minister of Japan, Katayama Tetsuo, went to China as the head of the 'Constitutional Protection People's Union Representative Group' in order to negotiate a cultural exchange agreement with the Chinese People's Cultural Association. This was to lead to the first Japan-China Cultural Exchange Agreement, and the forming of the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association. From this point on, the number of cultural exchanges increased; dance, kabuki, ballet and other performance groups travelled to China under this agreement. The Japan Academic Council was also active in inviting Chinese scholars to Japan (a rich source of new links for ideas and hence soft power to flow from Japan to China), in particular when Japan hosted important international conferences, such as the Asia-Pacific Health Convention, and the Humanities and Social Sciences Academic Convention in 1956 (Katagiri 1995). These non-governmental exchanges were, however, brought to a halt by the Nagasaki Flag Incident. In addition, the Chinese side were against Japan's security treaty with the USA, and continued to encourage the pro-Communist elements in Japanese society.

Due to the sensitive nature of these moves to form new links and to restore old links between Japan and China, NGOs tended to be heavily influenced by governmental policies or restrictions, and members of these groups also tended to

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\(^{89}\) In this incident, a PRC flag was torn down and trampled upon during a trade promotion exhibition in a Nagasaki department store in May 1958. The police did not respond to the incident, and the Japanese government's attitude was that it was not an official flag (as they did not recognise the PRC), and so did not require a response. This attitude was to lead to protests and ill-will in China against the Kishi government.
have close links to government politicians or other political parties. The groups were also often viewed with suspicion by the occupying US authorities, in particular after China had intervened in the Korean War in opposition to the US. NGOs, political parties and other associations were suspected of harbouring Chinese spies, and often harassed as a result. However, the groups had managed to utilise some of Japan's soft power attractions by forming links with the Chinese, who wanted access to Japanese technology and products, in addition to their interest in influencing Japan's domestic politics.

From 1966, when the Cultural Revolution began in China, the number of exchanges dropped due to suspicion of foreign influences and spies by the Chinese authorities (Iriye 1996). However, after normalisation of Japan-China diplomatic relations was achieved in 1972, several new NGOs sprang up to take advantage of the thaw in relations. One of the first to do this was the Japan-China Economic Association which was set up by a range of companies keen to do business in China (JCFA 2000). Others included the Japan-China Science and Technology Exchange Association set up in 1977 which organises exchanges of scientists, engineers and other technicians, and the Japan-China Junior Training Association set up in 1979, which gives scholarships to young people from China to study in Japan and organises workshop exchanges and technical exchanges, in particular related to business skills.

As sister city relations developed between local governments in Japan and China (see Chapter 5), local NGOs were set up in Japan, often with the help of the local governments, which served to maintain and deepen the relationships between citizens in both countries (in addition to maintaining sister city relationships with cities in other countries). These groups and others also assisted foreign students, as the number of Chinese students going to study in Japan (and thus absorbing Japanese
ideas and taking them back to China) increased along with the growth of the Chinese economy and education system in the 1980s and 90s.

In addition, with the growing awareness of environmental problems and poverty in China, and the development of civil society and NPO laws in Japan during the 1990s, a number of NGOs were established to help citizens contribute to dealing with these problems. One example of these is the Japan-China New Century Association,90 an NPO set up in 2001 to contribute to the solution of environmental problems in China, and to carry out youth exchanges between the countries using environmental themes. A few other examples include the World Greening Club,91 the Afforestation and Prevention of Desertification in Inner Mongolia Association,92 and the Green Earth Network,93 an environmental NPO which is active in Shanxi Province in China. These NGOs, acting as agents of Japan’s soft power, create links between Japan and China, through which flow Japanese ideas of and information about environmentalism. These ideas in turn stimulate further activity in China which in the future will help to reduce the environmental impact of China’s economic growth. This can be expected to directly and indirectly benefit Japan’s own environment, which is currently threatened by dust storms and acid rain emanating from China; a clear example of the soft power of ideas and information being transmitted by NGOs.

Other NGOs have been created to try to deal with the problems created by the difficult relationship between the two countries’ governments. One such NGO is the Asian Network for History Education, Japan,94 set up in 2001 to oppose a

90 http://www.jcnca.org/index.html (Accessed 9/7/06)
91 http://www.ryokukaclub.com/ (Accessed 9/7/06)
92 http://www2.neweb.ne.jp/sergelen/desert.html (Accessed 9/7/06)
93 http://homepage3.nifty.com/gentree/ (Accessed 9/7/06)
94 http://www.jca.apc.org/asia-net/index.shtml (Accessed 9/7/06)
controversial new nationalistic history textbook approved by the government for use in schools. It is clear that many groups have been spurred by the unreliable nature of government to government relations between Japan and China, and by the general realisation during the 1990s that the Japanese government was unable to deal with all of the country's problems. Another NGO which has tried to build links between the two governments is the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, through its Sasakawa Japan-China Friendship Fund (SJCFF). This fund has in recent times (since 2001) focussed upon bringing officers from the PLA (People's Liberation Army) and others from the Chinese defence establishment to Japan to study about Japan, its culture and to even visit bases; the level of knowledge about Japan in the PLA is said to be very low (Kobayashi, interview, 2006), and so this is viewed as a vital step towards future understanding. It also enables new information links to be created between these officers and Japan, allowing the transfer of Japanese ideas and information, and so for the action of soft power. The SJCFF also brings young history scholars from China and Japan together for discussions on interpretations of history, and has funded regional Chinese officials' visits to Japan for over twenty years (Kobayashi, interview, 2006).

All of these NGOs have demonstrated their usefulness in creating conduits for Japan's soft power. They all contribute to the transmission of ideas and information between Japan and China, and therefore enable Japan's soft power to reach and attract Chinese people. Each NGO can only act on a small scale in such a large country as China, but the growing number of Japanese NGOs in China can only increase their overall value as agents of Japan and its people's soft power.

95 http://www.spf.org/ (Accessed 9/7/06)
The Japan-China Friendship Association

In order to investigate more deeply how Japanese NGOs create links which enable Japan’s soft power to be transmitted to China, the case of the Japan-China Friendship Association will now be examined. This NGO has a long history of working as a promoter of Japan-China relations, and the manner in which it has enabled, and still enables, ideas and information to cross between Japanese and Chinese citizens is representative of the many NGOs which now operate between the two countries. Firstly the history and development of the NGO, secondly its recent activities, and finally the organisation’s structure will be considered and analysed with regard to its role as an agent of Japan’s soft power.

a) History and development

In order to analyse the manner in which the JCFA is able to create links between Japan and China and so act as an agent which enables Japan’s soft power to flow into China, it is instructive to examine the difficult circumstances in which it was originally formed, and the subsequent development of relations with the Japanese and Chinese elite which helped it become an influential voice in Sino-Japanese relations, and put it into an ideal position to create information links between the two countries.

The first meeting to prepare for the formation of the JCFA was held in Kanda, Tokyo in October 1949, just ten days after the Communist Party had taken power in Beijing. One year later, it held its first conference, to mark the first anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. Attending this meeting were 212
representatives from the organisation's branches in the regions, representatives from political parties, trade unions, from the academic world and the artistic world, and business representatives; a wide range of people all of whom were interested in creating links with the new China. These delegates elected council members of the JCFA, and voted on policy plans (Furukawa 1988).

The Association itself stated its aims as including the need to reflect on Japan's invasion of China, and to consider how to stop any wars from occurring between the two countries again in the future. It aimed to promote peace and mutual benefit between the two countries. In its original statement of intent as an organisation, the JCFA stressed the following points:

(1) This Association, reflecting deeply upon the Japanese people's mistaken view of China, will make efforts to correct this.

(2) This Association, in order to establish mutual understanding and cooperation between the Japanese and Chinese peoples, will make efforts to undertake cultural exchange between Japan and China.

(3) This Association, in order to contribute to building Japan's and China's economies, and to improving Japanese and Chinese people's lives, will make efforts to promote Japan-China trade.

(4) This Association, using Japanese and Chinese peoples' friendship and cooperation, and by striving for mutual security and peace, will contribute to world peace (JCFA 2000: 314).

Having recently emerged from the effects of the Second World War, the leaders of
the movement to establish the JCFA were determined to try and avoid such events ever happening again, in common with many Japanese people. In addition, the Japanese economy had been devastated by the war, and many people saw no hope for a recovery unless trade with China was re-established as quickly as possible (Dower 1995, JCFA 2000).

Soon after being formed, and despite its wide range of members from different political backgrounds, the Association was labelled a 'red' organisation, seen as being pro-Communist by the authorities in Japan at the time. Japan, under pressure from the US, had become embroiled in the Korean War as a supporter of the US, while China took the side of North Korea against the US-backed South. Therefore, the JCFA was seen as a supporter of the enemy, and quickly subjected to harassment and a crackdown by the occupying US authorities (GHQ), as well as by the Japanese police (JCFA 2000).

Shortly afterwards, GHQ began encouraging the 'purging' of all suspected Communist elements from public office or large companies. The JCFA was labelled as a harbourer of Communist elements, and all members were excluded from working in government and large companies. This environment, and in addition the fact that the US authorities would not recognise the new People's Republic of China in favour of the regime in Taiwan, effectively stopped the JCFA from conducting activities to further Japan-China exchanges, as had been its original aim.

Nevertheless, the Association gradually tried to resume its activities. Although it was unable to gain permission to visit China to set up a conference, in 1952 it organised a 'Japan-China Friendship and Culture Conference' in Tokyo, and gathered 300 people, including leading members of the arts and academic worlds, to discuss how to continue their efforts. In 1953, the JCFA organised gatherings where
new Chinese films could be watched, and Chinese music and dance studied. The JCFA further sponsored authors to write essays on the need for restoring normal relations between China and Japan. In its newsletter, ‘Nihon to Chūgoku’, the JCFA detailed the latest developments in China and its economic growth. In 1954, JCFA was able to organise an academic conference which supported its calls for the normalisation of relations between Japan and China. The Japan Academic Conference had already in 1952 issued a statement to the government outlining the need to restore academic exchanges with China and the Soviet Union.

An important result of the JCFA’s maintenance of contacts and links in China was its role in the return of Japanese who had been stranded in China during the war. In response to pleas for help from relatives in Japan, the Association was able to use its contacts in China to search for and find these stranded Japanese nationals, so-called zaikahōjin. It was also able to receive many requests from Japanese people in China to inform their families in Japan that they were safe, or of people who had not survived. Finally, the JCFA contacted Beijing Broadcasting to send the message to Japanese in China that the Red Cross, Japanese Government and other NGOs including the JCFA would help them to return to Japan. Representatives from these groups then obtained permission from MOFA to travel to China, and help those who wished to return to Japan (Asahi Shim bun, 12 April 1953). By 1958, the JCFA, in cooperation with other NGOs and the Japanese government, had helped to return about thirty-five thousand people to Japan (JCFA 2000).

In a similar manner, this time without cooperation from the government, the JCFA was able to help locate and return the remains of over five thousand Chinese who had died in Japan to their relatives in China, an activity which was continued until 1964. Partly as a result of these activities, the JCFA quickly gained admiration,
in China (thereby acting as an effective agent of the values and ideals of its members in Japan) as well as in Japan, and the number of members grew. Notable among these was the support of the largest fisherman’s union in the country, the Hokkaido Fisheries Union (with a membership of two hundred thousand people), which hoped to encourage links between Japan and China in order that the Japan-China fish trade could grow.

Following these activities of the JCFA, there was a surge in exchanges between Japan and China. In 1954 the first notables from China to go to Japan since the war had ended were ten members of the Chinese Red Cross, despite the Japanese government’s initial resistance. Continuous pressure from the JCFA, local governments and later, members of the Diet eventually pushed the government into allowing the visit. Finally, against a background whereby Japan had regained independence from the US occupiers, and Prime Minister Yoshida (who had strongly supported the US authorities’ aims) had been pushed from office, the delegation from the Chinese Red Cross were allowed into Japan in 1954.

In the years after these accomplishments, the JCFA continued to push at the obstructions to exchange between Japan and China. Along with other organisations, it helped to organise the despatch of cultural groups such as traditional Japanese kabuki groups (*Asahi Shimbun*, 17 September 1953), while also supporting members in regional areas who wanted to establish trade links or exchange links with China, for example helping Nagano prefecture to sell silkworm larvae to, and import wheat flour from, China (JCFA 2000: 83).

The Association also kept consolidating its own organisation, with branches in all but five prefectures of Japan by 1956. Its branches kept organising film festivals and Chinese lessons in the regions, and other cultural exchange events,
although the organisation as a whole experienced some financial difficulties and stagnation in the number of members due to the continued general wariness of Chinese communism and the ‘red’ label which had been attached to the organisation by the authorities.

The activities and efforts on the part of the JCFA during the 1950s undoubtedly improved its standing with the Chinese authorities and contributed towards its later efforts to convey Japanese ideas and soft power to China. By engaging with the new Chinese administration rather than ostracising it, the JCFA had set up a situation where it could build links with China which would prove to be invaluable in the following decades, not only in acting as channels for Japan’s future soft power resources, but also useful in the inevitable task of normalising relations.

Despite the organisation’s optimism regarding the resumption of ties between Japan and China, relations between the two countries became worse due to the ruling LDP’s anti-communist, pro-US stance, and China’s reluctance to countenance increased trade and economic links without diplomatic normalisation. The Nagasaki Flag incident of 1958, as touched on above, also contributed to the Chinese cancelling previous trade agreements at this time.

In the 1960s, the JCFA became split by factionalism, in particular a faction connected to the Japan Communist Party and therefore against relations with the Chinese Communist Party, and another faction close to the Japanese Socialist Party, which was pro-Beijing. The organisation also started to become more activist, staging demonstrations and protests against the US-Japan alliance in Tokyo and

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96 A small but significant amount of trade between Japan and China had restarted since 1949, and Japanese non-governmental business groups had concluded an agreement in 1952 with their Chinese counterparts regarding this (Iriye 1996).

97 The JCP objected to the CPC’s anti-Soviet stance and ideals (see Kuroyama 1976, Lee 1978 for the background to this).
elsewhere. Through the 1960s, the organisation’s leaders continued to keep in contact with leading figures in the Chinese administration (see e.g. China Quarterly 1960: 132), in opposition to the anti-China stance of the government during those times. In 1962, members of the LDP and the government who supported reopening trade links with China, acting as negotiators between the two countries, were able to help bring about a resumption in trade whereby payments were deferred on both sides (known as ‘LT Trade’ after the first letters of the Chinese and Japanese officials who devised the idea, and later ‘memorandum trade’) in order to maintain a façade that no actual trade was taking place, and so placate the US and Taiwan (Sun 1987, JCFA 2000). The JCFA and other Japan-China exchange NGOs were to be given the role of recommending ‘friendly trading companies (yüköshösha)’ to conduct the trade. The JCFA was hesitant about the usefulness of this kind of contact, which was well short of formal trade ties, but was persuaded that the Chinese side had high expectations of the arrangement after they sent representatives to Beijing to inquire about it. When the ‘China-Japan Friendship Association (CJFA)’ was set up by the Chinese authorities to implement the LT trade deal, the JCFA received a communication from the CJFA asking for its cooperation and help. Again, the JCFA was to be instrumental in the creation of links between Japan and China.

In 1964, the trade was cut short, due to China’s opposition to the Japanese government’s decision to support the US’ military intervention in Vietnam. However, in 1965, the Chinese authorities revived a previously considered plan (which had been shelved after the Nagasaki Flag incident) to conduct a youth exchange with the cooperation of the JCFA. The Chinese plan was to invite five hundred youths, which the JCFA was asked to select from a variety of youth cultural exchange groups in Japan. Eventually, the JCFA managed to select 473 representatives from thirty-nine
groups, and despite some official Japanese reluctance to send so many youths to China at once, obtained visas for all of them. Because of the resistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice, the selected youths had to be split into two groups. One was sent to China in August 1965, while the other was sent in November. Both groups were formally met by Chairman Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, and were able to conduct exchange activities with a total of over ten thousand Chinese youths (JCFA 2000), in nine cities (Beijing, Dongbei, Xian, Yanan, Luoyang, Wuhan, Changsha, Hangzhou and Shanghai). This kind of exchange would have been useful in creating links between the two countries; the Japanese economy had entered its period of high-speed growth, and its soft power resources were increasing. Therefore, the more information about Japan’s new success could be transmitted to China, the more its soft power could affect events there. Of course, it is important to remember that the Chinese administration was also eager to maintain some contacts with Japan in the hope of influencing it in an ideological and political manner, and the JCFA was a useful tool for this from their point of view (Sheldon 1968).

The youth exchange was planned to be carried out again the next year, when an invitation for eight hundred youths to visit China was passed to the JCFA. However, by this time, there had been an argument between the Japan Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party over the latter’s denouncement of the Soviet Union’s ‘socialist imperialism’ and the split in ideology between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties. Therefore, the Japan Communist Party had stopped all exchange with its Chinese counterpart. As the Japan Communist Party had infiltrated the leaderships of the various cultural exchange groups in Japan, including the JCFA, it was able to exert enough influence to prevent the youth exchange occurring, as the
Japanese government was in any case reluctant to agree to give permission for it (JCFA 2000).

Incidents such as these gradually led to the JCFA to split into two groups, one of which was allied with the Japan Communist Party, and did not want to conduct exchanges with the Chinese Communist Party, while the other group (largely consisting of Socialist Party sympathisers) vowed to continue to maintain a non-partisan agenda concentrating on continuing exchanges between Japan and China. In October 1966 the issue came to a head within the JCFA at a conference, leading eventually to a formal separation of the two camps (Asahi Shimbun, 26 October 1966). The non-partisan section relaunched the JCFA, moved its offices and reregistered members. The Communist Party-allied section continued to use the same name, and so the relaunched organisation, for a number of years, added the label ‘legitimate (seito)
\footnote{The term JCFA will hereafter refer to the ‘legitimate’ group unless otherwise stated: the group allied to the Communist Party conducted no subsequent exchanges, and had no further relations with China until a recent reconciliation with the CPC, and so is not considered relevant to this study of Japan’s soft power in China (see http://www.jcfa-net.gr.jp/home/ (Accessed 28/8/06))} to its name in order to differentiate itself.

The Chinese side at the CJFA immediately acknowledged the new JCFA setup, sending a message of support to the ‘legitimate’ group, and by sending representatives to their annual conference in 1967 (Asahi Shimbun, 17 June 1967). However, struggles within the organisation continued, with some members protesting against the recommendation by the JCFA governors of ‘friendly trading companies’ which had links to the Defence Agency (JCFA 2000). The Association was also affected by the Cultural Revolution which had begun in China; its official stance was to support its ideals, although it declined to carry out any overt activities to further them. The infighting between factions who were in favour and those against the
CPC's policies became stronger, and the confusion, which also spread to many regional branches, led to the group failing to carry out any exchange activities in 1969 (Asahi Shimbun, 30 August 1969).

The JCFA was also unable to contribute to the process leading to normalisation of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972, mainly due to the fact that its more left-wing members were fundamentally unable to come to terms with the fact that the LDP government was conducting the negotiations. However, after normalisation had been realised, the CJFA invited the JCFA, along with other NGOs which had traditionally supported Japan-China exchanges, to a celebration of the achievement of normalisation. Representatives of the JCFA and the other groups were thanked for having contributed to the maintenance of exchanges between Japan and China, and asked to keep working for Japan-China friendship.

The JCFA decided in 1973 at its national conference, that it would accept the historical significance of the normalisation, and orient itself to working in the new situation. It also pledged to go back to its original aim to encompass members of all political persuasions or professions to promote friendship between Japan and China (JCFA 2000: 270). In the same year, the JCFA in cooperation with the CJFA, helped the governors and mayors of two prefectures and five cities in Japan to visit China. They were introduced by the JCFA to the head of the CJFA (an influential member of the Communist Party leadership, Sun Pinghua), and held a meeting to discuss the setting up of sister city arrangements with selected Chinese local governments. In the following visits to China in June 1973 by the mayors of Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe, representatives from their local branches of the JCFA joined them to help organise their relations with Xian, Shanghai and Tianjin respectively.

Another development where the JCFA worked in cooperation with other
NGOs and local governments was the use of ferries to carry youths to and from China. The JCFA worked in cooperation with the Japan Young People's Association (Nihon seinendan kyōgikai) to contact authorities in China and prepare the ground for these exchanges. Aeroplanes were also chartered to conduct these youth exchanges; in 1975 the first of these was organised by Sendai City in cooperation with the JCFA, called the ‘Youth Wing (Seinen no tsubusa)’ (JCFA 2000: 273). These activities showed the value of the links which the JCFA had built up with China over the years, in particular with respected members of the Chinese elite. The links were now being used constructively and actively to create channels through which soft power could flow, in this case from Japan's regions.

Negotiations towards a 'Peace and Friendship Treaty' were proceeding apace. However, in 1975, the Soviet Union began to interfere in the process, warning Japan against strengthening relations with China (Barnds 1976), implicitly threatening Japan against this by its military activities (Falkenheim 1979), supporting people in Japan who opposed the treaty (Park 1976), and causing the already hesitant leaders of the LDP, including Prime Minister Miki Takeo and others who had links to the Taiwan regime, to slow down the negotiations (JCFA 2000). Leaders in the JCFA and other interested NGO groups began to press for the quick negotiation of a treaty. In 1976 the Association held a conference in Tokyo with 23 other NGOs, in addition to their own group's regional representatives, to promote the need for a treaty. The regional groups of the JCFA in turn held meetings throughout Japan, in 60 locations for the same purpose. Another conference was held in Tokyo by the JCFA in 1977 in conjunction with the Japan-China Friendship Diet Members League, which attracted over two thousand politicians, businessmen and other interested people to push for a treaty, and regional chapters again held regional promotion meetings. The
Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty was finally ratified in 1978, in part influenced by US and Japanese fears of Soviet dominance in East Asia (Falkenheim 1979).

These activities by the JCFA in cooperation with other interested NGOs (see e.g. Renmin Ribao, 26 November 1977) show most clearly the effectiveness with which non-governmental bodies can create links between countries with poor relations. While the external international environment may have been the more important factor in Japan and China's final rapprochement, organisations like the JCFA played a crucial role in forming links between the two countries and thereby enabling Japan's by then considerable soft power resources to begin affecting China in a much more significant manner than had been possible without the Treaty.

Undoubtedly due to the legitimisation of links brought about by the 1978 treaty, the next decade was to see an explosion in exchanges between Japan and China, many of which the JCFA was involved in. In May 1979, the head of the CJFA (Liao Chengzhi), in cooperation with the JCFA, gathered a group of 600 Chinese officials, including representatives from each department of the Chinese government, and 15 provinces and cities. The officials were taken on a ferry (named the 'Japan-China Friendship Ferry') around the Japanese archipelago, stopping at numerous cities around the coast over a period of one month. The representatives were shown and taught in detail about the current state of affairs in Japan, including its industrial characteristics, education, transport and healthcare systems (JCFA 2000).

The JCFA central office in Tokyo acted in cooperation with its regional offices around Japan, and local governments, to help organise the trip. They organised trips to almost 250 cities and towns, including activities and welcoming
ceremonies, and made sure that the mayors of each city or prefecture were there to greet the visiting Chinese first. This project was certainly among the most important ways in which the JCFA had acted as an agent for Japan’s soft power, by creating a vast multitude of links between Japanese and Chinese officials and ordinary people, and would not have been possible without the organisation’s long-term, close involvement in Japan-China relations. The contacts made by Chinese and Japanese people created communications links between the two countries through which soft power was able to flow. For the Chinese officials, learning directly about Japan’s social, economic and technological achievements and seeing them with their own eyes was undoubtedly a powerful influence on their ideas regarding China’s own future development, and the possibilities demonstrated by Japan.

At around the same time, the JCFA took the opportunity to reorganise its structure. Until 1978, the organisation had basically been controlled from the central office in Tokyo, which had issued directives to the regional offices as required. The reorganisation, announced at the twenty-second and twenty-third national conferences in 1979 and 1980, involved devolving more responsibilities to the regional offices. This reorganisation was designed to take advantage of the newly opened possibilities of exchange between Japan and China; with more independence and responsibility for their own affairs, local offices could quickly devise and organise exchange activities according to their situations. It was also hoped that the regional offices would be able to expand their own memberships with these reforms, and work closely with their local politicians and businessmen. In addition, the development of the numerous sister city relationships gave the regional offices an opportunity to ‘act independently, according to their region’s special characteristics’ (JCFA 2000: 287).
Offices from each city or town were to gather together under a prefectural federation, and each prefectural federation would in turn gather under a federation covering the whole country. The system was meant to be more democratic, with each level electing representatives for the federal level groups, and it was hoped that the reforms would revitalise the organisation. At the same time, the JCFA dropped the term 'legitimate' from its name, in view of the fact that the Communist Party-allied group of the same name still did not have any relations with China, and so the two would not be confused.

In 1983, to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Peace and Friendship Treaty, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (Hu Yaobang) arrived in Japan. At a conference for young people arranged at his request by the JCFA and other related groups, he announced China's intention to invite three thousand young people from Japan to spend a week in China. The JCFA, along with other related groups, organised the trip by splitting the chosen three thousand into four groups, and sending each group to a different part of China. In return in 1985 the JCFA and other interested groups, with help from the Japanese government, invited five hundred Chinese youths to Japan, including in the programme home stays with Japanese families. Since 1983, the JCFA has held conferences with the CJFA to discuss how to promote further exchanges between Japan and China in the new environment. These activities created links between Japan and China across which soft power could flow. Naturally, the links were two-way, enabling ideas and information to flow in both directions. However, the fact that a Japanese NGO was asked to arrange the activities shows how existing links made by the JCFA enabled this further building of links, and enabled more soft power to flow from Japan to China (as well as the opposite).

Arguably, since the normalisation of relations between Japan and China in
1972, the JCFA began to behave more like a modern NGO in terms of its approach to its activities and more neutral political stance. The organisation now specifically denies being influenced by political groups (Kutsuki, interview, 2006). However, the base of communications links and channels it has built up between China’s leaders and notables and itself have served it well in the following decades, when it has more freely been able to construct links which carry Japan’s soft power in the form of ideas and information to China.

b) Recent activities

The JCFA continued to expand its cultural exchange activities between Japan and China in the following years. In 1990, the JCFA celebrated its fortieth anniversary by holding a ‘Japan China Sister City Table Tennis Carnival’ in Beijing in cooperation with the JCFA and other groups (JCFA 2000, Asahi Shimbun, 26 January 1989). Seventy-six cities from Japan with sister city connections in China sent table tennis teams to the event. A similar event was held in Beijing for a ‘Junior Table tennis tournament’ in 1997. Additionally, the JCFA has been organising similar sister city table tennis tournaments in recent years; these involve each Japanese and Chinese city with a sister city partnership creating a table tennis team of young people. Each team then enters the competition to play against other Japan-China sister city teams. At the last event in 2005, roughly 100 sister city teams competed from across China and Japan, and in 2006, 150 teams are expected to compete (Kutsuki, interview, 2006). This is approximately half of all sister city relationships which exist between Japan and China. Each team consists of young people and their families who travel to Beijing (in total about ten members per team), and so about 1500 people are expected
to participate in 2006. This kind of activity fosters many thousands of new links between Japan and China, through which soft power can flow. Many Chinese children are fascinated by Japanese youth culture (see e.g. Iwabuchi 2002, Wang 2005), and so it is likely that Japanese youths' cultural ideas are transmitted through these kind of relationships.

In 1995-98, the JCFA contributed to the renovation of Nanjing city's castle walls, which had been designated a World Heritage Site (JCFA 2000, Asahi Shimbun, 7 April 1995). The president of the organisation, Hirayama Ikuo (a famous artist in Japan), wanted to contribute to helping relations between the two countries by aiding the project in Nanjing, which as the site of the Nanjing Massacre during the Japan-China war, as a gesture of friendship and reconciliation. The JCFA national federation supported his proposal to carry out the project, and raised funds. Hirayama also visited the reconstruction site, and painted pictures there, which he later exhibited in Japan to increase the project's profile. The collection raised over 80 million yen, while donations at the exhibitions raised 4.7 million yen, which were attended by 230,000 people. Over two thousand volunteers also contributed directly by going to the site to help the construction. The completion ceremony in Nanjing was attended by many notables including former Prime Minister Murayama Tomoichi among others. This kind of activity creates links between Japanese people and Chinese people through which ideas and information flow. In this case the soft power of particular ideas about conservation of heritage, and reconciliation between the two countries through cooperation was being transmitted through the JCFA's agency.

In 2005, the JCFA cooperated with JICA to bring 80 students from China to Japan for a one week seminar. Out of the 80 people who were brought by JICA, the
JCFA supervised 23, organising seminars related to 'regional promotion' (Nihon to Chūgoku 2005). Another kind of activity which has been implemented in recent years is the carrying out of exchanges with less developed, inland areas of China, in particular the ethnic minority areas. Firstly representatives were invited from and sent to Tibet in 1996, then to Xinjiang (Uighur minority area), Qinghai (Tibetan minority), Inner Mongolia (Mongolian minority) and Guizhou (Miao minority) in the following years. These visits helped the locals learn about Japan, and vice versa, creating links between the two countries which allow soft power to flow. In addition, the JCFA's regional branches raise money in order to provide funds for the education of poor children in these areas. Money is granted for the building of schools, provision of textbooks, and for scholarships. In this manner, the JCFA emphasises the building of links between people in both countries in order to transmit the ideas of cooperation and friendship which are espoused by its members and other people who work with it (Kutsuki, interview, 2006).

In addition, the JCFA continues to attract the attention of important members of the Chinese leadership, for example in 2000 when Zhu Rongji (the Premier of China from 1998-2003) attended a reception held by the JCFA in Tokyo, which was also attended by the Japanese Prime Minister at the time, Hashimoto Ryūtarō (Renmin Ribao, 14 October 2000). This ability of the organisation to access the highest leaders is particularly useful when relations between the Japanese and Chinese governments are not so smooth. In 1989 the JCFA hosted a meeting between Chinese and Japanese officials in Tokyo, despite the lack of official diplomatic contact at the time due to the G7 countries' isolation and sanctions against China following the Tiananmen Square incident in the same year (Renmin Ribao, 24 November 1989). More recently, in 2004 the Chief Governor of the JCFA, Muraoka
Kyūhei, attended a ceremony in Heilongjiang Province, China, commemorating the first anniversary of an incident where a left-over wartime Japanese chemical weapon belatedly exploded in that area in 2003 (Renmin Ribao, 22 February 2004).99 At a time when Japan-China relations were said to be at their worst in decades due to rising nationalism on both sides, this kind of activity enabled links to be maintained between people in Japan and China, reminding Chinese through widely read media such as the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) that many Japanese people are remorseful about the nation’s actions in China during the Second World War. In this case the JCFA acted as an agent of Japan’s soft power by providing a link through which Japanese ideas of pacifism could be transmitted.

c) How the national and local structure of the JCFA increases its efficiency as an agent of soft power

In its early years, the JCFA was a centralised group, with a head office based in Tokyo which gave instructions to regional branches, which were established in most prefectural capitals around the country. This was partly due to the heavy emphasis on anti-government protests in its early years, which required a centralised organisation to instigate.

However, after normalisation of Japan-China ties occurred, and with the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978, its primary function returned to its original aims, that is to encourage cultural and business exchanges between Japan and China. To this was added its function of supporting the new sister city programmes which were springing up between Japanese and Chinese cities.

99 See Rose (2005) regarding the scale and details of the abandoned chemical weapons problem.
Therefore, it enacted reforms to its structure, in order to devolve more responsibility to its regional branches, and to give them more independence. This was to enable them to respond to their local situations and work with their local governments.

In 2000, the JCFA incorporated itself as kind of NGO under Japanese law, specifically as a shadanhōjin (a legal person incorporated for the public benefit). The organisation therefore now has a well-organised structure, with a board of governors, an auditor, and external and honorary directors, all of whom have had long careers involved in Japan-China relations, whether as politicians, academics or business people. The organisation consists of a federation of affiliated organisations, which are the regional branches and offices. Some of these are incorporated themselves as NPOs, and others are run by individuals. The governors are elected at the general meeting held twice a year, and the head governor is elected at the governors' meeting held twice a year.

The JCFA's budget in 2004 was about 140 million yen (£700,000 at 2004 rates). It obtains the largest part of its income through its commercial activities, such as teaching Chinese and Japanese, and holding cultural or business seminars. Other income derives from members' fees, conference fees, grants and a small amount from an endowment (JCFA 2005a). The federal, decentralised organisation of the JCFA contributes to its effectiveness in creating communications links with Chinese regions and smaller organisations. If all decisions and activities were being organised by a larger, centralised office, the links through which ideas and information could flow may be stronger, but would likely be much fewer than having each regional branch endeavouring to form its own links. Additionally, regional branches can adapt to their own needs, and the needs of their target organisations or areas in China much more nimbly, and so increase the efficiency of their links, and so the effectiveness of
the soft power which flows through them.

The units which make up the JCFA consist of over 450 city, town and village bodies, which are grouped into regional bodies such as the ‘Hokkaido and Tohoku’ group, the ‘Kansai’ group or the ‘Chugoku and Shikoku’ group and so on. Each local group independently acts as an agent of its members’ and the surrounding region’s soft power ideas and values. A typical example of a local JCFA group is the Osaka Prefecture Japan China Friendship Association (OJCFA),\(^\text{100}\) incorporated as an NPO under the new law mentioned earlier (see p.243). The branch was originally established in October 1950, and was the first location to host a Japan-China Trade Promotion conference in 1952. It has also successfully held exhibitions showing Chinese products, the first of which in 1955 attracted 1.2 million visitors, at the time far surpassing interest in similar exhibitions in Tokyo (OJCFA 2000), thus creating a significant number of new links between businesses and people in the two countries through which ideas and information flow.

It runs an attached Chinese and Japanese language school; the Chinese classes were first set up in 1971 for local people, and now teaches 300 students. It also sends students to China, runs speech contests and administers the official Chinese language test (Chūgokugo kentei shiken). Japanese language lessons have been provided since 1989 for about 100 students a year for a two year course, most of whom go on to study in universities or colleges after graduation. Additionally the school has been providing Japanese lessons for Japanese returnees from China (for example Japanese children born in China).

The OJCFA has worked closely with Osaka city in establishing and running the city’s sister city relationship with Shanghai. In 1974 the OJCFA was the leading

\(^{100}\) http://www.kaigisho.com/jcf/ (Accessed 14/7/06).
organiser of a ferry trip carrying 400 delegates to make the first official sister city visit to Shanghai (OJCFA 2000). The organisation has also maintained links with the Shanghai People’s Foreign Friendship Association (Shanghai Renmin Duiwai Youhao Xiehui) since 1981. Under this arrangement, the OJCFA cooperates with the Shanghai group to undertake several activities. For example, it sends people to Shanghai and receives visitors, invites taijiquan (a popular Chinese exercise based on martial arts) specialists to come to Osaka, and organises taijiquan sports exchange events in cooperation with the Osaka Taikyokuken Association and the Shanghai group. It also administers a foundation scholarship for one research student to come to Osaka every year; this foundation was established in memory of a Chinese student who died in the Kobe-Hanshin earthquake of 1995. Finally other exchange activities are carried out in cooperation with the Shanghai organisation, including school exchanges, calligraphy exchanges and medical exchanges. The OJCFA in 1992 organised the ‘Osaka-China Year’, where festivals were held in Osaka, and Japanese films and musical events were organised in Shanghai. The OJCFA carries out exchanges with six other provinces and cities in China. It also helps and cooperates with districts and towns in Osaka prefecture which carry out their own exchanges in China. Finally, it publishes its own newsletter, ‘Osaka and China’ six times a year.

The OJCFA, in its capacity as a member organisation of the JCFA federation, is typical of the other member organisations in its activities, and in the way it provides channels for the transfer of ideas and information between a local area in Japan and an area in China. This transfer of soft power enables the growth of personal and working links between Osaka and Shanghai businesses, organisations, and individuals in a subtly different, but no less important manner to the cities’ own official links. The manner in which these local JCFA organisations conduct activities
concurs with the model of soft power proposed in Chapter 3, i.e. they acts agents of the pools of soft power resources created by the people and organisations in their regions, by creating links with China to allow ideas and information to flow between the two countries. They also demonstrate the mutual quality of soft power, as they also undeniably allow Chinese ideas and information to flow into their own regions.

**Japan’s NGOs as agents of soft power**

The international NGO as it is known in modern times has had a relatively short history in Japan. Although independent groups have theoretically been able to develop relatively free from government interference since the end of the Second World War, in practice an unfriendly legal environment and a lack of information hindered their development until the last two decades. During the 1980s and 1990s, a growing awareness of global issues and problems amongst Japanese citizens, the establishment of branches of NGOs from Western countries in Japan, and finally some action by the government to enact laws enabling the easy establishment of NPOs has gradually created an environment where international NGOs both large and small flourish.

In the case of groups dealing with China, the lack of any official relations between the two countries in some ways helped the development of NGOs such as the Japan-China Friendship Association, but in other ways such as the inability of individuals and groups to obtain permission to travel between Japan and China, or the lack of government interest in facilitating friendly contacts with China, this situation obstructed the development of international NGOs in the past.

After the normalisation of relations between the two countries, openings
appeared for NGOs which were interested in rebuilding and deepening links between the countries in a way which governments could not. However, due to the problems with setting up NGOs in Japan, this activity was limited to large groups with substantial financial backing. Only in the 1990s and 2000s has it become possible for smaller groups to start up viable NGO projects to help link Japanese and Chinese citizens through environmental projects, educational programmes and other cultural exchanges. With growing awareness of how environmental pollution in China affects Japan directly in the form of sand storms and acid rain, as well as a growing recognition of the need to deepen understanding between the two countries’ citizens despite governments’ actions, the number of Japanese NGOs carrying out these projects is growing (Kutsuki, interview, 2006) and likely to continue growing in the future.

How do these NGOs act as agents of Japan’s soft power in China? Agents of soft power work by enabling the free and transparent transmission of ideas and information between countries. NGOs perform these functions in a wide variety of ways. Firstly, they open channels of communication between private citizens at the local level, without the direct interference of government mediators who may have political motives. The transfer of ideas and information can be potent when it occurs between individual people who communicate directly across borders, or even physically by meeting each other. Secondly, particularly smaller NGOs are less likely to have any element of coercion in their activities as they must act together with local people in their target countries to achieve their aims.

Some larger transnational NGOs attract financial backing and members from around the world. In this sense they transmit the soft power of their members’ cultural values, rather than that of a particular country. However, the vast majority of
NGOs are small, local organisations; this is particularly so in Japan, and therefore they inevitably reflect the cultural values of groups within Japanese society (which tend to be Japanese values) and transmit these to countries such as China. The very fact that Japanese NGOs are working in China transmits the idea of non-governmental, cooperative activity to people who they work with on the ground, thus spreading this aspect of Japan’s soft power.

Ideas such as environmentalism, respect for human rights, minorities and education are effectively transmitted by Japanese NGOs working in China in a non-coercive manner. Other NGOs provide conduits for the transmission of technological ideas and management skills, which although, from a narrow point of view, may induce competitive pressures between the countries, from a longer term perspective shape and mould ideas and values in China in a way which can increase understanding between the countries, and thereby increase their potential for working together in the future. It can be seen that it was individuals and non-governmental groups who had created personal links between Japanese and Chinese people before the Second World War, who were among the most enthusiastic to repair ties there. This is due to the fact that they carried their knowledge of each other’s countries’ attractive ideas to other people, and managed to convince groups and governments that it was worth rebuilding ties.

The Japan-China Friendship Association has certainly been representative of how knowledge of each other’s countries’ cultures, ideas and other attractions can help overcome enmity caused by state activities. While it is clear that the group was affected by strongly politically motivated elements for long periods in the 1950s and 1960s, it was also a vital conduit for soft power to help rebuild ties between Japan and China. To some extent it was seen as a useful group by Chinese leaders who
were eager to maintain links with Japan, but it also managed to maintain a profile in China’s official media, such as the *Renmin Ribao*, which suggested to Chinese people that many Japanese people felt friendly towards them. In addition, its own early activities which pushed for the maintenance of ties between Japan and China, despite the seeming indifference of the Japanese government, represented the soft power of a significant segment of the Japanese people who were interested in rebuilding links with China. The attraction of these people’s ideas was transmitted through the JCFA to influential people in China, in particular when its leaders were able to access influential CPC leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Sun Pinghua, helping to bring about the normalisation of relations despite seeming government apathy.

Since normalisation, the JCFA has acted to expand the connections between citizens in Japan and China, utilising sister city relationships in addition to promoting its own exchange programmes. The JCFA’s project to help rebuild Nanjing city’s heritage site is a good example of how a cooperative project helped by a Japanese NGO in China can carry positive, attractive ideas and values directly between citizens and thereby contribute to improving ties between the two countries. The group’s other activities in promoting youth educational exchanges and longer term study are also models of some of the best ways to enable the transfer of soft power, and the groups activities as an agent of Japan’s soft power in general validate the model proposed in Chapter 3.

The JCFA and other Japanese NGOs working with China clearly demonstrate the value of NGOs as creators of links for the transmission of information and ideas between the two countries, and therefore as agents of Japan’s soft power. The challenge for Japan is for the government to continue to improve the environment for such NGOs, and for the NGOs themselves to continue to involve
and educate citizens about the need for exchange of ideas and mutual cooperation between the two countries.
Chapter 7

Conclusions

Introduction

International relations are characterised in the mainstream media, and by many academics, as chiefly consisting of telephone calls and visits by national leaders and other policy makers in government, with traditional realist 'power politics' forming the background to their late-night negotiations and deals. Other actors and other types of power which are relevant to the international system are not given due consideration in these traditional analyses.

This thesis has used theoretical and empirical research in order to show that another type of power, namely soft power, is increasingly relevant in international relations in this globalising age. Moreover, government leaders and states generally are not the only important actors in the global system, even though they may be the actors which are most in the limelight. It has been shown that it is not only important, but clearly essential, that the vital role of sub-state and non-state actors be considered as a matter of course when analysing international relations, and the workings of the global system. Furthermore, the use of Japan's relations with China to provide case studies for the empirical research in this thesis has demonstrated the importance of these two countries and the East Asia region in the global system.

This chapter first summarises and discusses the findings of the empirical data of the case studies. It then goes on to test the empirical findings against the theory, hypotheses and research questions first postulated at the beginning of this
thesis. The chapter next goes on to consider the contributions of the thesis, and the implications of these empirical and theoretical findings, within the larger context of international relations and the global system. Finally, the chapter considers the limitations of this thesis, and possible further areas of research which have been opened by it.

Summary of empirical findings: soft power in Japan's relations with China

On the face of it, Sino-Japanese relations continue to be dogged by narrow political disputes between the leaders of each country. The media in both countries, and many academics, follow the actions of these leaders and then make narrow conclusions based upon them.

Although it is clearly unhelpful that the leaders of two of the most economically significant countries in the world are not on speaking terms, the unrelenting focus upon the issues which are causing this problem does not facilitate deepening our understanding of current Sino-Japanese relations. Occasionally, items in the mass media mention that the economic relations between the two countries are good, but this is played down. The stereotyped metaphor of 'hot economic relations, cold political relations'\(^{101}\) is used widely, without much consideration of the actual situation. The continuing focus on the lack of relations between relatively few actors in the two countries ignores the mass of international links, both trade-related and cultural, at lower levels of government and between regional and non-state actors in

\(^{101}\) See Zhang (2006), Takamisawa (2005) and Ogoura (2006) for various viewpoints on the validity of this phrase.
the two countries. It also ignores the millions of links formed between the countries by individuals, whether tourists, students or business people, who travel between Japan and China every year and in many cases stay for months or years.

This seeming lack of general knowledge regarding the depth of relations between the two countries itself is detrimental to relations, with public opinion polls in both countries showing that people have an increasingly negative image of each others' countries; a fact not surprising considering the media coverage on both sides.

This thesis has demonstrated the necessity of considering the actions of actors other than governments in international relations, and the way in which they enable international relationships not defined by the principles of realism to function, using soft power in the case of this study. In order to demonstrate this point a three level structure was utilised, comparing and analysing a state agent, a sub-state agent and a non-state agent in terms of the manner in which they enable Japan’s soft power to flow through the creation of links between the two countries. The findings from each of these studies will now be summarised.

a) The Japan Foundation: an effective state agent limited by nationalism

The Japan Foundation is a state agent, although not one which is normally high in the public consciousness in the same way as government politicians and departments. It is accountable to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and carries out activities in accordance with MOFA and the government’s stated policies (see

Chapter Four detailed how the Foundation was initially established in order to improve Japan's relations with the USA, following the shock of President Nixon's actions in establishing diplomatic relations with China, and reducing the value of the dollar, without consultation with Japan. Although the idea for such an organisation had been proposed by various figures inside and outside of government for many years before, the 'Nixon shocks' finally pushed Japanese leaders into allocating money and parliamentary time to set up the Japan Foundation.

The Foundation was well established, and also well-placed, to commence the building of links between Japan and China by the time the Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed by the two countries in 1978. After establishing contact with the relevant cultural exchange bodies in China, the Japan Foundation set about systematically creating more links, through which soft power could be transmitted, between groups and individuals in the two countries. It started off by sending kabuki dance troupes, and other traditional Japanese artists to perform shows in China, hence promoting the attractive idea that the two countries shared cultural traditions. The next stage was to help promote the Japanese language in China, where there was already a great demand for it in schools and in universities. Chinese academics and leaders alike recognised the need to be able to access technical knowledge in foreign languages in order to help develop the country's economy and society; the attraction of Japan was in this respect great, due to the country's experiences in developing its own economy through the twentieth century. While the Foundation was responding to demand and requests from China in setting up these links, it was no doubt aware that beneficial effects of this soft power strategy would be felt in Japan (as well as in China) in the future.
Due to the links being created, information regarding Japan and its language flowed into schools and universities around China. Firstly, local teachers of Japanese were trained by the Foundation (genchishidō); these teachers in turn trained other teachers, who taught students. The Foundation eventually made available funds to take the best students to Japan for further language study and other technical training. The next stage of the Foundation’s educational programme was to make available funds for the new generation of Chinese Japan scholars to continue their publishing, debates and conferences in Japan and China.

In these ways, and through the Japan Foundation’s direct support of Japan Studies centres in several universities in China, it was gradually able to create a substantial group of Chinese academics, professionals and leaders who had a deep knowledge of Japanese language, customs and culture (chinichiha). It had used the links it built, enabling information and ideas representing Japan’s soft power to flow into China, thus building a group of people who would be able to act as a kind of bridge between China and Japan in the future. More than twenty years on from the start of these ambitious programmes, numerous young Chinese academics and others are contributing to the quality of exchange and debate regarding Sino-Japanese relations. It is certain that at least some of these individuals will, in the next two or three decades, reach higher administrative positions in government, companies and universities, not only benefiting Japan but also China in terms of their contribution to bilateral relations, and showing the concrete advantages of using soft power methods in international relations.

The Foundation has also tried to reach a larger audience in China by using the media to send information about Japan and its technical skills, culture and society through language programmes and documentaries which were shown on Chinese
television during the 1980s (p. 167). Images of Japan’s capitalism, consumerism and its wealth were sent through the Foundation’s links to a significant number of Chinese people during the 1980s and 1990s. Although the actual effects of these activities are difficult to quantify, it has no doubt contributed to Chinese peoples’ image of Japan as an advanced industrialised country, and their curiosity about the country. As Chinese people have become more affluent, they have in increasing numbers decided to visit Japan (Japan Tourism Marketing Co. 2006), in order to satisfy this curiosity, a fact no doubt supported by their images of the country obtained from watching television, films and perhaps reading books (many of which have been translated with financial support from the Foundation).

The Foundation was clearly successful in past times at helping to channel the soft power of Japan’s ideas and information into China, but its limitations as a state agent have become more obvious in recent times. Although the Foundation has nominally become an ‘independent administrative agency,’ it can be seen from its policies and strategies that it is still unambiguously a unit of MOFA. Hence, problems that the Japanese government has regarding its image in China, and the image of its leaders in China, are to some extent affecting the Japan Foundation’s abilities to function there. For example, the Japan Foundation is not able to advertise its name widely in Chinese universities despite funding several programmes in them; in fact it has been forced to quietly withdraw some support from a university in Beijing (Kobayashi, interview, 2006). Although the reasons for this remain uncertain, it seems that it is at least partly due to the Japanese government’s poor reputation among many Chinese students in recent years (see p.12). The Foundation itself has painted the reduction in support as part of its ongoing restructuring (Japan Foundation 2005), but this does not fit with its aim of trying to ameliorate Japan’s
image problems in China.

In addition to this are the problems caused by being under the control of politicians, many of whom think in uncomplicated realist terms. This can be seen in the debates in the National Diet which occurred when the Foundation was established, and when its budget is debated in committees of the Diet (p.179). Politicians on all sides of the debate tend to see the Foundation purely as a tool to promote Japan’s image in China using methods akin to propaganda (i.e. coercive) rather than emphasising the Foundation’s own broadly successful long-term approach, which has been based on mutual benefit for both countries.

The Japan Foundation has therefore been, in the past, an effective state agent of Japan’s soft power, as it has been able to create strong links with China through which Japanese ideas and information have flowed. This has benefited Japan by helping to create an environment where Japanese people can communicate and trade with Chinese people, and travel to China, often using their own language. The mutual quality of soft power has also been demonstrated, in that Chinese people have benefited through access to Japan’s ideas and information, for example academic, technical and business knowledge. Nevertheless, in an environment where there is a need to progress from these initial link-building programmes, it is questionable whether the Foundation, as a state agent, will be as effective in the future as it has been in the past. In particular, as long as both Japanese and Chinese governments’ images in each other’s countries are poor, and nationalistic tendencies in both countries affect diplomatic relations and public opinion, this will affect the Foundation’s ability to enable soft power to flow. If it can more indirectly support other organisations such as NGOs to carry on its work, it may improve its effectiveness in these respects in the future.
These points could be applied to state agents in any country; as long as state-to-state relations are in good condition and each country’s people has a positive image of the other country, state agents can create links and effectively enable the transmission of soft power to the extent of their available resources.

b) Kobe City: a small but effective sub-state agent

Kobe City was investigated as a representative of a sub-state agent of soft power. Sub-state actors are not widely considered as important in international relations; however, Kobe was found to represent a good example of a sub-state actor which is internationally active as an agent of soft power.

Chapter Five described how the city has built up links with first Tianjin City, on the east coast of China, southeast of Beijing, and then the Yangzi Valley region, from Shanghai inland through Wuhan. At first this was done by establishing official exchanges between Kobe and Tianjin; gradually this grew into more cultural exchanges, such as the exchange of zoo animals, school children, and sports teams. These exchanges were well reported and reflected on in Chinese newspapers and on the radio, spreading goodwill for Kobe throughout the Tianjin area in particular.

Later, scientific and technical exchanges started to take place frequently; of particular note was the technical help given by Kobe to Tianjin to develop its port, which has since gone on to establish itself as one of China’s largest ports. This has enabled trade with Japan to increase rapidly, enabling many Japanese manufacturers to establish operations there, including Toyota and its related companies which set up plants in Tianjin in 1997 (p.217). This creation of links by Kobe City has enabled the soft power of Japan’s ideas and information to act in China.
Additionally, the atmosphere of cooperation between Tianjin and Kobe enabled the latter to use its connections and goodwill to set up relationships in other parts of China. This was to result in the Shanghai-Changjiang Trade Promotion Project, whereby twenty-three cities in the Yangzi Valley basin have set up trade offices in Kobe’s Port Island area, while Kobe has set up an office in Nanjing, in addition to its existing office in Tianjin. This project was put into action after the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in 1995 devastated Kobe and the surrounding region, in order to help with the economic recovery. Due to the development of this project, a myriad of new links have been created which enable Kobe’s and Japan’s soft power to flow into China. Links have also been created due to the successful business matching fairs held regularly by Kobe, which help Japanese and Chinese businesses find partners in both countries to help enter each other’s markets. Positive benefits of these links have included business for Japanese companies in the Yangzi Valley and Tianjin regions of China, giving them a stake in the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy. Additionally, Chinese students attracted to Kobe to study through these links have further gone on to establish businesses in Kobe (see Fig. 10, p. 222) and other parts of Japan, which in turn have created more links for Japan’s ideas and information to flow into China.

From these observations it can be seen that sub-state actors in Japan have much to offer as agents of Japan’s soft power in other countries. One medium-sized city acting alone can create a significant amount of links between Japan and China; if all of the cities in Japan, which have sister city connections or otherwise act internationally to a lesser or greater degree, are taken into account, they will clearly have a significant impact on the transmission of Japan’s soft power, and on Japan’s international relations in general.
In contrast to state agents, sub-state agents are unlikely to be associated with national politicians’ prejudices or biases. Furthermore, they are unlikely to be seen as a threat to actors in other countries due to them not having any military resources or many other ways of using hard power. Hence, their ability to create links in other countries which can effectively transmit their ideas and information is enhanced in comparison to the state as an agent. As long as the state has created an environment where such links can be made without hindrance from the state itself, these sub-state agents can thrive as agents of soft power. In cases where there are no official state-to-state diplomatic relations, as with Japan and China before 1972, cities and other sub-state actors will not be able to create substantial links with other countries. Even in rare cases where this is attempted by a sub-state actor (see p.196), it would be difficult to maintain links without the state’s implicit agreement.

A final but significant problem which the sub-state agent has is financial. The resources which Kobe City can allocate to international activities have been reduced due to national policies being pursued by the state. In the guise of decentralisation, the state is in fact reducing the amount of tax revenue it distributes to local governments, which in practice has meant that the city can no longer sustain many international activities. It has reduced the number of overseas offices it maintains in sister cities, and is trying to delegate many international activities to NGOs or agencies loosely associated with the city; these processes are in large part due to recent budgetary constraints, a problem for sub-state actors throughout Japan.

This highlights a difficulty which sub-state actors can face in creating links with other countries – their degree of autonomy. Clearly, sub-state actors are ultimately controlled by the state; however, the amount of leeway they have to collect their own taxes and thereby fund international activities is crucial. In the case
of Japan, only 34 per cent of expenditure is covered by taxes local governments can collect themselves (MIC 2005), with the rest being controlled by the central government or other sources. Therefore, their ability to decide whether to allocate money towards international activities is curtailed by national policies. This autonomy question will be different in each country, but by their very nature, sub-state agents' activities may be limited in this way.

Despite these problems, it can be seen that, if they are allowed the freedom to act, sub-state actors can be effective agents of soft power in international relations.

c) **NGOs and the Japan-China Friendship Association: the flexibility of non-state agents**

The final case study (Chapter Six) examined the role of NGOs as non-state agents of soft power, and in particular the Japan-China Friendship Association as a representative of a non-state agent. The role of non-state agents in the global system has become more widely acknowledged in recent years, although it is less studied in the context of international relations. The JCFA and other NGOs were found to have contributed to the building of links between Japan and China, in a highly flexible manner not limited by diplomatic problems, and thereby enabling the flow of information and ideas from Japan to China.

The JCFA established its position as one of the leading non-governmental organisations with a role in exchanges between Japan and China, in 1950. During the years prior to normalisation of relations between the two countries, the JCFA carried out numerous cultural exchange activities, and helped to build people-to-people links between Japan and China, thereby creating goodwill in China, despite the difficult
atmosphere which had been created by Japan's violent invasion of the country.

One activity the JCFA was able to use its links for was the finding of the remains of over 5000 Chinese people who had died in Japan during the war and before, and returning them to their families in China. It also helped to organise the return of about 35000 Japanese people stranded in China after the war in cooperation with other NGOs. The contacts and goodwill the JCFA had built up were further utilised to organise exchanges of sports teams, arts groups, and films between the two countries. The organisation was also able to maintain links through which information about both countries passed to contacts, for example through Hong Kong (at that time a British territory).

After a period of factional splits and disorganisation during the 1960s and early 1970s, the JCFA reorganised itself and managed to use the links it had maintained to assist with the building of new sister city relationships between Japanese and Chinese cities. In the following years it reorganised itself into a more decentralised structure in order that local chapters could pursue their own activities, using old links and creating new local links with Chinese regions to facilitate people-to-people exchanges and the flow of information between the two countries. One particularly notable activity it organised which enabled the flow of Japanese soft power into China was when the JCFA invited the officials from the central government of China and from the regions to make a trip around Japan, so they could view for themselves the advanced societal, industrial and technological progress which had been made in the previous decades. Another activity, which clearly shows the ability of the JCFA to transfer the soft power of its Japanese members' values and ideals, was the contribution of funds and Japanese volunteers towards the restoration of the Nanjing city walls in 1995-8. This activity created people-to-people links
between thousands of Japanese and Chinese, in addition to transmitting Japanese ideas of conservation, heritage and cooperation to people in China through the direct links and through the media coverage.

The JCFA is an example of how NGOs in Japan have been able to act as agents of Japan’s soft power. Various other Japanese NGOs (as described in Chapter Six) act in similar ways to create links between Japan and China, through which information and ideas flow, enabling the action of Japan’s soft power. A wide variety of NGOs act at different levels of society, with some links being formed between government officials, regional government officials, companies, institutions, and all sorts of private interested citizens with the help of these NGOs. The JCFA has created links at all of these levels, while some other NGOs focus on just one level. NGOs such as the JCFA and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (see. p.200) make a point of creating links between individuals, enabling them to meet face-to-face and exchange opinions and ideas. In the case of the state agent and even the sub-state agent there seemed to be an air of formality covering exchanges, which usually involve formal letters, ceremonies or agreements, whereas NGOs appear to have more ability to create less formal relationships between people in both countries, thus enabling the smoother transmission of ideas and information between people. If two people are communicating informally, and perhaps meeting face-to-face, it seems more likely that a wide variety of ideas and information will pass between them than if communication is carried out only through formal letters.

The number and variety of NGOs is a key point; this flexibility enables them to create a multitude of different kinds of links between the two countries. They are certainly not as restrained as state or sub-state agents by circumstances. Even during the period when no formal diplomatic relations existed between Japan and
China, NGOs were able to bridge the gap between the two countries, and build links between people on both sides. This can equally be seen in recent years in terms of Sino-Japanese relations. The last four or five years has been characterised by an unusually low level of contact between leaders in Japan and China due to political differences between the two regimes, such as Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the Chinese government's apparent encouragement of anti-Japanese sentiment in China on several occasions. Despite these problems, which have certainly affected state agents' ability to maintain healthy links between the two countries (see p.152), NGOs' activities have been almost totally unaffected. In fact, it seems that the lack of governmental contact has actually stimulated NGOs to increase their activities, and even increased the number of NGOs working on building links between the two countries; for example, the Japan-China Friendship Fund was created by the SPF as a result of the diplomatic breakdown caused by the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989.

These findings about NGOs in Japan could be applied to NGOs in any other country. As communication between groups of people, in various locations near and far from each other, becomes cheaper and even almost cost-free, it becomes increasingly feasible for like-minded individuals to form their own organisations which deal with issues of concern to their members. Governments in many advanced industrialised countries have deregulated or currently are deregulating their economies, leading to this kind of organisation being cheaper to set up, and freer from state interference than may have been the case in past times. Japan is a case in point, where the state did not regard non-state organisations favourably until relatively recently; however, this can be said of many countries both presently and in the past. Hence, in this age of globalisation and liberalisation, NGOs seem to be the
ideal agents of soft power. They do not usually have the means or inclination to act coercively; they create countless links between people and organisations across borders through which ideas, information and peoples’ values can flow. This soft power which is transmitted necessarily reflects the values of the NGOs’ members, but such is the variety of NGOs that a wide variety of people’s ideas is transmitted, that is, no one NGO in a country has a monopoly over the ideas which are transmitted to another country.

Research questions and hypotheses revisited

Having summarised the findings of the empirical research in this thesis, it is now necessary to consider the answers to the original questions posed, and the validity of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter One.

a) What is soft power?

As explained in Chapter Three, soft power is the transmission of a country’s or group of people’s attractive ideas and information to another country by an agent, in a non-coercive or cooperative manner. As the non-coercive nature of soft power is an important point, the issue of who can decide what ideas or information is transmitted is also important. For the best effect, the receiver of the ideas decides what ideas to absorb; however the mutual quality of soft power is also important, i.e. it is most likely that both sides will benefit from the information transmission. In the case of the Japan Foundation, students want to learn Japanese, and the Foundation wants to encourage take-up of the language in China. For Kobe City, Tianjin wished to learn
about port technology, and Kobe wished to help Tianjin and its port develop due to the prospect of good ties (both for business and other reasons) in the future. Hence, the transmission of soft power has been shown to often be a two-way process.

In the case of Japan, a large pool of such ideas and information are available to be transmitted. A few examples of these ideas and information which were found in the case studies examined in this thesis will now be considered.

i) Traditional and contemporary popular culture

As related in Chapter 4, the Japan Foundation’s first activities in China included sending traditional kabuki dance troupes to perform in Beijing and other cities. Traditional musicians, such as koto players and taiko drummers have also been sent to China; the JCFA has also supported this kind of activity, for example, by supporting an exhibition about the Silk Road in 2002 and various other art exhibitions and shows promoting the idea of shared cultural tradition (JCFA 2006). It seems that many Chinese people are interested in such performances and exhibitions, perhaps because they were not seen in China for many decades after the Second World War, until the resumption of diplomatic contacts. Additionally, Japanese traditional culture is seen as strongly linked (or even derived from) traditional Chinese culture, and so the perceived common cultural roots attract audiences (p.172).

The Japan Foundation was also found to have sent modern films from Japan, depicting its contemporary culture, to China for display in film festivals and on television. These films attract Chinese who wish to know about modern Japanese people, society, trends and values, as again the ways in which Japan has changed
since the Second World War were not widely known about in China until recently, partly due to the lack of material in the education system on this (p.12). Furthermore, the Japan Foundation has supported performances in China by popular Japanese ('J-pop') musicians whose music often attracts many fans there, contemporary dance groups and exhibitions which attract many interested Chinese. These Japanese soft power resources are attractive to Chinese people, as they represent ideas of modern style, fashion, and consumerism in addition to their intrinsic artistic value.

ii) Language and technical knowledge

The Japanese language was found to be very attractive to Chinese people for a wide variety of reasons. The Japan Foundation is a major provider of Japanese language training and scholarships both in China and Japan for Chinese students. NGOs also often offer scholarships for Chinese students to go to Japan to study the language at universities and schools.

The Japanese language is attractive due to the wealth of knowledge available in Japanese; in particular scientific and technical knowledge is very sought after by Chinese people who wish to find good jobs in the highly competitive job market in China. As Japan has been through its own period of rapid industrialisation, Chinese people are keen to learn from its experiences, in terms of technological, environmental and social issues (p.162,223). The vast majority of knowledge relating to Japanese experiences is only available in Japanese, which means that it is necessary to learn the language to take advantage of this. The attraction of Japan's technical skills and academic knowledge is also demonstrated by the success of the many conferences and discussion meetings which have been sponsored by the Japan
Foundation, the JCFA and many other NGOs.

In addition, much Western knowledge has been translated into Japanese, and the Japanese language is thought by Chinese to be easier to learn than English, due to both languages using similar ideographical characters which originated in China. Many Chinese are also interested in Japanese literature, which reflects Japanese society and experiences.

Thus the language, for the various reasons detailed above, is an important Japanese soft power resource.

iii) Ideas and ideals

Japanese society’s modern ideals are attractive to Chinese people; in particular those which seem relevant to China’s own current development and its related problems. For example, environmentalism is starting to become important in China, as leaders and citizens become more aware of the environmental degradation which is occurring at an increasingly rapid pace throughout the country. Chinese local governments have appealed to their sister cities (including Kobe City) in Japan for ideas and assistance in dealing with environmental problems, based on the fact that Japanese local governments have had to deal with similar problems in the recent past (p.202). Many Japanese NGOs are also active in China in this area, cooperating with locals to solve their environmental problems.

Also linked to the problem of rapid industrialisation is the ideal of conservation of heritage. The JCFA’s programme in Nanjing (p.254) is one good example of how Japanese ideals and experiences of heritage conservation are attractive to Chinese, as more and more old buildings and neighbourhoods are being
demolished, in particular by local governments keen on building new industry and commercial areas in China.

Many Japanese NGOs, by working in China, transmit ideas about international cooperation, civil society and human rights to locals; the JCFA's programme of work in ethnic minority regions of China is just one example of this. In addition an example of a state agent which transmits these kinds of ideas is JICA, an agency of MOFA.

Another ideal which has been attractive to the rising middle classes of China is affluence, together with consumerism and its attendant ideas. Students, who are sponsored to come to Japan by grants from various government departments and agencies including the Japan Foundation, NGOs, and through educational and sports exchanges organised by local governments and their schools, are exposed to the full force of a particularly Japanese style of consumerism, with its rapidly changing fashions, trends and imagery which are pushed by a bewildering variety of media outlets. These (not necessarily universally admired) values are also transmitted through the popular culture sent to China by the Japan Foundation and other organisations which support this kind of exchange.

These ideas and ideals collectively represent a vast pool of soft power resources for Japanese agents to utilise in dealing with other countries.

b) How is soft power instrumentalised? How does it benefit the acting country?

It was hypothesised in Chapter One that agents were involved in transferring the information and ideas outlined above into other countries. This was expanded into the theory of soft power detailed in Chapter Three. This proposed that agents create
links between two countries, (such as information links, physical links, people to people links) and transmit the ideas and information across these links from one country into the other country. These attractive ideas then diffuse into the society and culture in the receiving country, causing a range of benefits for the transmitting country. For example, people in the receiving country may feel encouraged to create further links with the transmitting country, or to put ideas into practice which may enable the two countries to interact in a more mutually beneficial way.

In the case studies, evidence was found to support these hypotheses. For example, the Japan Foundation, in providing ways for the Japanese language to be taught in China, has enabled the language to become more widely known there. Students use their Japanese language skills to interact with Japanese people, whether in China or when working in Japan. This clearly makes interactions such as trade and communication easier for Japanese people.

Kobe City, in creating its links with Chinese cities such as Tianjin and in the Yangzi Valley, has sent information about its investment environment and attractions to Chinese local governments and companies, which have then set up offices in Kobe to facilitate trade and investment in the region. Kobe City’s long cultivation of links with Tianjin has also enabled information about itself, and Japan to become well diffused in Tianjin which has attracted students to come and study there. Some of these students in turn have been successfully encouraged by the city to set up businesses in Kobe and other parts of Japan, further strengthening ties with China.

The JCFA, in contrast, has concentrated on creating personal links between its members (and their communities) and Chinese people by organising sports events in which both participate, cooperative environmental and heritage projects and home stays for young people. With these activities, the JCFA has enabled the Japanese
ideal of cooperation and information about Japan’s people and society to disseminate among Chinese people. While it is difficult to evaluate in concrete terms the benefits of these individual links, it is likely that these ideas have some effect in the minds of their Chinese recipients, which will be reflected positively in their future views of and dealings with Japan and its people.

c) Which agents best enable soft power to be transmitted?

The empirical research conducted in this thesis provides some ideas regarding the way in which different agents can transfer ideas and information between countries.

The Japan Foundation, as a state agent specialising in cultural exchange, was found to be well-resourced and connected, and so is able to create a large number and variety of links in a well-coordinated manner. Its funding programmes and directly administered activities in China all target slightly different methods of creating links in order to be as efficient as possible in this goal. Kobe City, on the other hand, has a much more restricted budget for its international activities, and therefore has had to use these resources carefully; this was demonstrated by its need to close offices in non-priority cities abroad, in order to concentrate on Seattle, Tianjin and other Chinese areas (p.200).

Nevertheless, the city has been able to build up long term, good quality links between Japan and China. Individually, cities and other sub-state agents cannot compete with a state agent such as the Japan Foundation in terms of the number of links they create, but the sheer number of sub-state agents more than makes up for this, and the quality of the links can be as good as those of the state agent. As has been noted previously, the state agent is also affected by problems between Japan and
China’s governments much more than the sub-state agent, which in turn can affect the quality of its links. NGOs, perhaps even more so than sub-state agents, are almost unaffected by government policies. They can create links even when there are no state-to-state relations, as shown by the JCFA before 1972, after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, and during the time Prime Minister Koizumi has been in power in Japan since 2001.

Despite the clear fact that NGOs (and other non-state actors) are becoming more and more important in international relations, the Japan Foundation, as a state agent, has had some difficulty in working with Chinese NGOs (see p. 176), whereas non-state agents such as the JCFA and the SPF routinely work with them. Kobe City does not have many dealings with NGOs in China, but has created links with other Chinese non-state actors, that is, companies.

Hence, if it is accepted that globalisation is proceeding apace, and therefore that non-state actors are becoming more important within the global system, it can be seen that non-state agents of soft power, and sub-state agents, have an advantage in terms of the links they can create across borders. With more links, there is more potential for soft power in the form of ideas and information to flow into other countries, thus benefiting the transmitting country.

Thus, the hypotheses proposed for each of the research questions in Chapter One have validity according to the empirical findings in the case studies.

**Contributions of this thesis**

This thesis has contributed to various academic fields. It has discussed new ways of viewing the idea of soft power. A theoretical explanation of how soft power actually
works has been created and tested empirically, using the idea of agents and their role in the transmission of the attractive ideas and information which are the base of soft power. Constructivist precepts have been used to test how soft power works by looking not purely at central governments and their actions, but at another kind of state agent, a sub-state agent and additionally a non-state agent. This is the first attempt to create a comprehensive theory of soft power using these ways of thinking.

The use of such concepts as ideas, information, non-state actors as well as state actors as a central part of this theory has contributed to the development of constructivism as an important part of the international relations literature. While constructivist precepts are now widely debated and accepted within the Western international relations academic community, this way of looking at the global system is not yet widespread among the more realist-leaning academics of Japan and China, where little attention has been paid to non-state actors.

In terms of theories of power in international relations, this thesis has also contributed towards the recognition of non-realist ways of looking at power. The simple view that power is always a selfish and purely realist part of international relations has been countered with an explanation of different types of power which evoke mutual benefits and advantages for the user gained in a non-coercive manner, and empirical data to show how these processes can work.

Contributions have been made to the understanding of the role of cultural exchange oriented state actors in international relations, including the way in which they act as agents of soft power, and their advantages and disadvantages in doing so. The role of sub-state actors in international relations has also been explored and detailed in a way which contributes to this field. The importance of these actors in international relations has been highlighted in a way which is not often found in the
current international relations literature, and their role as agents of soft power within the global system has been explored in practical terms. This thesis has also contributed to the literature on NGOs in international relations, again a relatively sparse area. NGOs' work across borders is often commented upon in the recent literature, but their actual role as actors in the international system is rarely discussed. Here, their role as agents of soft power has been explored.

Finally, this thesis has contributed to area studies literature, including the understanding of Japan-China relations and Japan's international relations more generally. Regarding the case studies used, the Japan Foundation as a primary grantor of research funds in the field of Japanese studies is not often analysed or criticised inside or outside Japan; this thesis has brought to light information allowing the Foundation to be understood more deeply. There is little academic literature specifically examining the Foundation, and other agencies in Japan engaged in cultural diplomacy or international exchange, and so this study has contributed towards rectifying this situation. Sub-state local governments as independent actors in Japan have also been studied by very few academics writing in English, and the case study of Kobe City has therefore contributed towards this field. Finally, little has been written about the Japan China Friendship Association in Japanese or English, and little is known outside Japan about Japanese international NGOs or how they operate in China; this thesis has served to provide information and analysis of these NGOs and how they relate to Japan's international relations and soft power.

A comparison of these three types of actors has also not previously been undertaken with regard to their effect on Japan's international relations; hence this

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103 An important and recent study which has examined this field is Jain (2005).
thesis has contributed to a deepening of knowledge about Japan’s international relations in this respect.

Vernacular Japanese information (including interviews with relevant Japanese officials) has been used extensively to back up arguments and in all three case studies, and Chinese language sources have also been used for these purposes. The importance of Japan’s and China’s bilateral relations in the global system has been emphasised, in the light of their growing political and (especially in the case of China) economic roles in the world. It is imperative that academics and others in the West realise the significance of these trends, and this thesis has contributed to this process.

Limitations of this study and possible areas for further research

This thesis has provided an outline of a new way of looking at soft power, and how it works. However, due to considerations of time, space and resources, there are some areas of interest which it has not been able to include, and which could provide the basis for further research questions and hence further study.

This thesis has taken as its empirical focus a Japanese perspective on the workings of soft power. In other words, the agents studied were Japan-based, and on the whole the case studies were studied from a Japanese point of view. A change of perspective on the soft power process would provide interesting further study. In this case, a focus on the country on the receiving end of the soft power, China, would be instructive and further enable the investigation of the soft power theory proposed, to be tested in terms of the impact of soft power, which was not covered in this thesis empirically.
Following on from this, a more detailed study of how the ideas and information transmitted from one country to another country actually become embedded in the society and culture of the receiving country would be of great interest. This would require the use of opinion polls, or in the case of ideas which have been embedded in the past, a study of exactly where an idea was received and began to become a part of the receiving country’s stock of ideas and information. After this, how the idea led to changes in the receiving society, and in the identities of the receiving actors would be considered. The level of detail and close investigation required for such research would make it challenging; however the outcome would certainly add to the model of soft power presented.

Another obvious avenue of further research would be to consider the cases of more, and different kinds of agents. While this thesis has identified the categories of state, sub-state and non-state agents, these categories could be sub-divided further. For example, with regard to the case of Japan, different kinds of state agents could be compared; a government department such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could be compared with an independent agency such as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Equally, independent agencies in different departments could be compared for example, JICA with the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). It could even be possible to consider individuals in the government themselves as agents of soft power. With regard to sub-state agents, different regions, cities and towns are likely to have slightly different ways of utilising soft power; for example a city such as Tokyo is often regarded as being more oriented towards creating links with the USA, while cities further south in Japan, such as Fukuoka are more Asia-oriented. The size of cities and regions also affects the way in which they utilise soft power. While these issues have been touched upon in this thesis, a more
comprehensive comparison of different sub-state agents' soft power would add to extant knowledge. NGOs can also be separated into different types and their use of soft power compared.

It has also not been possible to study a completely different variety of non-state agent in this thesis, namely companies. While it was noted that companies are not thought to use soft power due to their tendency to distance themselves from national identities, there are many exceptions to this. Different Japanese companies operating in China are likely to utilise different aspects of Japan's soft power resources; Toyota uses Japan's reputation for manufacturing expertise, while banks use the country's reputation as having deep financial expertise. Additionally, in the past this was not as clear an issue as now; more companies purposely identified themselves with a national image, and used this to promote their products in other countries. Hence, it would be instructive to carry out research on these issues, and to investigate how companies have acted as agents of soft power in different countries.

Temporal considerations have also been mentioned in this thesis. It was noted that soft power has become more relevant in recent times due to technological and political developments leading to more porous boundaries between countries. This could be further explored by a study which considers how the processes behind soft power have changed over the years and centuries. The types of agents, and the ways in which soft power is transmitted and received have conceivably changed considerably over time.

Finally, comparisons between different countries and agents within different countries would be useful to validate or modify the soft power theories proposed in this thesis. Agents in different countries may use soft power in different ways, transmit it in different ways, and they would have different types of soft power.
resources to call upon. Whether these differences would necessitate changes in the underlying theories need to be tested in order to make the contribution of this thesis even more robust.

Nevertheless, this thesis has provided a start towards a more detailed analysis of soft power and the processes behind it in the case of Japan's relations with China, and it is hoped that these lines of inquiry will be pursued further in the future.
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Appendix I

Interviews


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Appendix II

Map of Japan and China

(Map adapted from Microsoft Encarta 2004)
The Japan Foundation Law (No. 48, 1 June 1972)

Article 1
The purpose of the Japan Foundation will be to contribute to the advancement of the world’s culture and human welfare by deepening other countries’ understanding of our nation, increasing international mutual understanding, and in order to promote international friendship, carrying out effective international exchange activities.

...  

Article 23
The Foundation will, in order to carry out the purpose as stated in Article 1, carry out the following activities:

1. Despatch and invite individuals who have the purpose of international exchange
2. Aid Japan studies overseas, and help the spread of the Japanese language
3. Execute, support or act as an intermediary for and join in events which have the purpose of international exchange
4. Create, collect, exchange and distribute materials for the purpose of introducing Japanese culture, and for other international cultural exchange as required
5. Carry out research or other investigations necessary for international cultural exchange
6. Supplementary activities to the above mentioned activities
7. In addition to the above articles, activities which further international cultural exchange.

**Article 24**
The Japan Foundation, when starting an activity, must gain the permission of the Foreign Minister. It must do the same when altering activities...

**Article 36**
The Foundation will be directed by the Foreign Minister.
The Foreign Minister can order the Foundation to carry out activities under his direction, when he considers it necessary in order to execute this law.
Appendix IV

The Japan Foundation Law 2002 (translation of selected articles)

The Japan Foundation (Independent Administrative Agency) Law (No. 137, 6 December 2002)

Article 3

The Japan Foundation (hereafter 'Foundation') will have the purpose of deepening the understanding of other countries, increasing international mutual understanding and contributing to the world in cultural and other areas, while keeping a good international environment, maintaining harmonious foreign relations for, and contributing to the development of our nation, by carrying out comprehensive and efficient international cultural exchange activities.

Article 12

The Foundation will, in order to carry out the purpose as stated in Article 1, carry out the following activities:

1. Despatch and invite individuals who have the purpose of international exchange
2. Aid Japan studies overseas, and help the spread of the Japanese language
3. Execute, support or act as an intermediary for and join in events which have the purpose of international exchange
4. Create, collect, exchange and distribute materials for the purpose of introducing Japanese culture, and for other international cultural exchange as required.

5. Help the preparation of institutions with the purpose of international cultural exchange, as well as help to purchase goods which can be used for international cultural exchange, or donate these goods (limited to donations of goods which have been received by the Foundation as contributions).

6. Carry out research or other investigations necessary for international cultural exchange.

7. Supplementary activities to the above mentioned activities.

Article 17

When the Foreign Minister, due to sudden changes in the international situation, or upon receiving requests and so on from foreign governments or international organs (including international conferences or other international cooperative frameworks), considers that it is urgently necessary to accomplish foreign policy, he can request the Foundation to take necessary measures to execute activities covered by Article 12, or to instruct its overseas offices accordingly.

The Foundation, upon receiving such a request as stipulated above from the Foreign Minister, unless there is a legitimate reason, must respond to the request.
Appendix V

Selected Japanese NGOs engaged in Japan-China exchange activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>English name (translation)</th>
<th>Internet address (All accessed 2/9/06)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>日中友好協会</td>
<td>Japan China Friendship Association</td>
<td><a href="http://www.j-cfa.com/">http://www.j-cfa.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日本国際貿易促進協会</td>
<td>Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade</td>
<td><a href="http://www.japit.or.jp/index.html">http://www.japit.or.jp/index.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中文化交流協会</td>
<td>(Japan China Culture Exchange Association)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.kanlema.com/inpaku/events/jiaoliuxiehui/index.html">http://www.kanlema.com/inpaku/events/jiaoliuxiehui/index.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中経済協会</td>
<td>Japan China Economic Association</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jc-web.or.jp/">http://www.jc-web.or.jp/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中協会</td>
<td>The Japan China Society</td>
<td><a href="http://jcs.or.jp/">http://jcs.or.jp/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中友好会館</td>
<td>Japan China Friendship Center</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jcfc.or.jp/">http://www.jcfc.or.jp/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中農林水産交流協会</td>
<td>(Japan China Agriculture, Forestry and Water Industries Exchange Association)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中科学技术文化センター</td>
<td>Japan China Science, Technology and Culture Center</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jcst.or.jp/">http://www.jcst.or.jp/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中技能者交流センター</td>
<td>Japan China Skilled Workers Exchange Center</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jcsec.or.jp/">http://www.jcsec.or.jp/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中医学交流センター</td>
<td>Japan China Medical Communication Center</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jcmcc.or.jp/enter.html">http://www.jcmcc.or.jp/enter.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中法律家交流協会</td>
<td>(Japan China Lawyer Exchange Association)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中友好元軍人の会</td>
<td>(Japan China Former Soldiers Friendship Association)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日中友好宗教者懇談会</td>
<td>(Japan China Religious People Association)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日本武術太極拳連盟</td>
<td>(Japan Wushu Taichi Federation)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jwtf.or.jp/">http://www.jwtf.or.jp/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPO法人日中新世紀協会</td>
<td>Japan China New Century Association</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jcnca.org/index.html">http://www.jcnca.org/index.html</a></td>
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<td>日中科学技術交流協会</td>
<td>Japan China Science and Technology Exchange Association</td>
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<td>日中医学協会</td>
<td>Japan China Medical Association</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jpcnma.or.jp/">http://www.jpcnma.or.jp/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>日中放送人懇話会</td>
<td>(Japan China Broadcasters Association)</td>
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<td>日本中国料理協会</td>
<td>Japan Association of Chinese Cuisine</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jaccc.or.jp/">http://www.jaccc.or.jp/</a></td>
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<td>宋慶齡基金国際善隣協会</td>
<td>(Japan China Joint Projects Section, Sō Kei Rei Foundation)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sokeirei.org/support.html">http://www.sokeirei.org/support.html</a></td>
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<td>国際善隣協会</td>
<td>(International Good Neighbours Association)</td>
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<td>(Japan China Young People's Travel Foundation)</td>
<td><a href="http://homepage3.nifty.com/jcy/">http://homepage3.nifty.com/jcy/</a></td>
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Appendix VI

Japan-China Friendship Association Articles of Association (translation of selected articles)

Article 3

This association, observing the spirit of the Japan-China joint declaration and the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty, has the purpose of promoting mutual understanding and friendly relations between the people of Japan and the People’s Republic of China, and in addition contributing to the peace and development of Japan and Asia as well as the world.

Article 4

This association will carry out the following activities to accomplish the purpose of the previous article.

1. Domestic and foreign cultural, artistic, educational, scientific and sports exchanges which contribute to the promotion of mutual understanding and friendly relations between the Japanese and Chinese peoples
2. Cooperation and support of exchanges between Japan-China sister cities
3. Despatch and support of Japanese students and acceptance and support of Chinese students and researchers
4. Despatch and support of Japanese groups visiting China, and acceptance and support of Chinese groups visiting Japan

5. Promotion of Chinese language in Japan, and promotion of Japanese language in China

6. Cooperation and communication with relevant organs and groups

7. Publication and support for publication of an Association newsletter, pamphlets and relevant books

8. Other necessary activities in order to accomplish the purpose of this Association.