The Evolution of Nazi Ideas on Foreign Policy, 1919-28

with particular reference to Adolf Hitler

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INTRODUCTION

In view of the amount of research that has been devoted to investigating the history of the Nazi Party and the life of Adolf Hitler in particular, any new study needs to justify itself. This work has been written in an attempt to remedy a serious, if understandable, imbalance in previous studies of the evolution of the Nazi foreign policy programme, \textsuperscript{1} namely the tendency to concentrate unduly on the ideas of Adolf Hitler to the consequent neglect of the contribution of other Nazi theorists. \textsuperscript{2} This tendency undoubtedly derives, in part, from the belief, current for a long period, that the Third Reich was a monolithic, totalitarian entity, in which the only views that mattered were Hitler's. \textsuperscript{3} The relative neglect of other Nazi thinkers in the 1920s is probably due also to the conviction that early Nazi political thought - especially the ideological ruminations of men such as Dietrich Eckart and Alfred Rosenberg - had little impact on decisions taken by the Nazis once they were in power. \textsuperscript{4}

Whatever the reason, Adolf Hitler has been portrayed as the prime mover in the development of a Nazi foreign policy programme in the 1920s. However, since the main sources for Hitler's ideas before 1923 are short police reports or newspaper reports on speeches lasting between two and three hours, one cannot be entirely confident about conclusions based on this evidence. \textsuperscript{4} This study, however, assesses Hitler's ideas within the broad context of views expressed by the party as a whole in order to present a more comprehensive and hopefully historically valid analysis

\textsuperscript{1} The term 'programme' will be used throughout this study to distinguish the party's conceptual views on foreign affairs in the 1920s from the actual policy of the Third Reich after 1933.
of the evolution of the party's foreign policy programme. This will also serve to isolate Hitler's own contribution to this process and enable us to assess more accurately the influence which other Nazi propagandists may have exerted on the construction of the programme.

As the foreign policy programme may, of course, have been influenced by the views of political theorists outside the Nazi party during the 1920s, it will be necessary to compare the party's emerging outlook on foreign affairs with those of influential individuals and groups with whom the party came into contact in the early 1920s. It will be necessary, for example, to sketch in the political philosophy of the Pan-German League and to delineate as clearly as possible the extent of contact and collaboration between its Chairman, Heinrich Class, and the Nazi Party. At times, these contacts, as for example Hitler's notable confrontation with Moeller van den Bruck, may have left little discernible mark on the party's developing philosophy; at other times they may have produced, as perhaps in the case of the party's flirtation with the geopolitical theories of Professor Karl Haushofer, a substantive modification of that philosophy. But whether their influence was great or small, it is hoped that an investigation of these individuals and groups, and the contrasting of their opinions with those of the Nazis will help to throw into clearer relief the foreign political concepts of the party and of Hitler.

No attempt has been made to relate the party's philosophy to long-term trends in German intellectual history or to investigate in any detail Hitler's own intellectual development before 1914, since these tasks have already been accomplished by more capable hands. The first chapter examines the ideas which were current in Munich in 1918 and 1919 amongst
the men who provided the youthful German Workers' Party with the bare bones of a political philosophy before Adolf Hitler arrived on the scene. The second chapter investigates the extent to which Hitler brought with him, and sustained, a Pan-German outlook on foreign affairs. The third chapter assesses the impact of the antisemitic and anti-Bolshevik ideology on that outlook. The fourth chapter scrutinizes the motivations behind Hitler's evolving alliance strategy and the different concepts with which he came into contact. The fifth chapter attempts to lay bare the nature and extent of Hitler's territorial ambitions for Germany and the degree to which they can be fairly attributed to geopolitical inspiration. The sixth chapter shows how Hitler's foreign policy programme was challenged from within the Nazi Party and how it was refined, partly as a result of this challenge, by the time Hitler wrote his second book in 1928.

It is hoped that the thesis as a whole will make a small contribution to the continuing debate about various aspects of the Nazis' foreign policy programme. Though it may be objected that, despite the author's good intentions, the finished product is still 'Hitlo-centric', the first objective of this study is to place Hitler's views in the context of prevailing political philosophy in the Nazi Party as a whole; it attempts, therefore, to elucidate the 'pluralism of conceptions' within the party to which recent historians have referred. Since the publication of Eberhard Jäckel's excellent analysis of Hitler's Weltanschauung, it has been customary to pay lip-service to the influence of ideological factors on the formulation of Nazi policy on foreign affairs; it is usual, for example, to note how neatly Hitler's self-proclaimed crusade against 'Jewish' Bolshevism dovetailed with his desire for an empire in Eastern Europe;
nevertheless, there has been no systematic attempt to assess the extent to which ideological preconceptions shaped initial Nazi approaches to foreign affairs. (7) The second objective of this study is to fulfil this need as well as to provide an analysis, which some have called for, of the crucial question as to "whether it was considerations of racist ideology or pure power politics which decisively influenced Hitler". (8) Finally, it will attempt to determine whether Hitler's foreign policy programme was essentially restricted to the European theatre or whether he envisaged - however distantly - German world domination. (9)
1. BEFORE HITLER: IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY

Any examination of the development of Nazi attitudes on foreign affairs has to take into account the work of the three earliest theorists of the German Workers' Party: Dietrich Eckart, Gottfried Feder and Alfred Rosenberg. In the spring of 1919 the party was still a small, insignificant political group with vague anti-capitalist, anti-democratic, and antisemitic leanings but without a clearly defined or distinctive programme. During the summer of 1919, however, it attracted the support of Dietrich Eckart, the editor since December 1918 of a virulently antisemitic periodical, Auf gut deutsch, and Gottfried Feder, an outspoken opponent of finance capitalism. This seems to have been a turning-point in the party's development. On 14 August 1919 Eckart addressed an audience of thirty-eight people at a meeting held under the party's auspices. By 12 September, when Feder, standing in for Eckart who was ill, spoke to an audience of about forty people, the party had engaged the attention of the Bavarian Reichswehr, who sent along Adolf Hitler to report on the nature of the party. (2)

It should be emphasised that Feder and Eckart had been collaborating since the beginning of 1919; they probably met via the Thule Gesellschaft, the Bavarian branch of the Germanic Order, a fiercely nationalist and antisemitic political club, at the end of 1918. (3) In March 1919, Agd carried a long extract from an article by Feder; (4) in April, Eckart distributed a leaflet, entitled An alle Werktätigen!, which reiterated Feder's attacks on 'interest-slavery'; (5) and in May, Agd carried an article by Feder himself. (6)

On 22 August, the two men spoke on the same platform in Nuremberg on the
subject of 'Loan Capitalism: its international power, and how to combat it'. (7) Earlier in 1919, Eckart had been joined by Alfred Rosenberg, a Baltic German émigré, who became a regular contributor to Agd after February 1919. These three men - Eckart, Feder and Rosenberg - had begun to fashion the political outlook of the German Workers' Party before Hitler's fateful first encounter with the party on 12 September 1919.

All three were to exercise some influence over the new recruit, a fact noted by contemporary observers as well as by Hitler himself. Ernst Hanfstängl, an early recruit to the party in the 1920s, believed that Hitler was "deeply under the spell of Rosenberg". (8) Konrad Heiden, the author of the first major analysis of the Nazi Party, wrote with reference to Rosenberg and Eckart that "Hitler was little more than their mouthpiece for some years to come. Rosenberg taught him facts. Eckart polished his style." (9) In May 1921 Hitler described Rosenberg and Eckart as "leaders of the antisemitic movement". (10) Mein Kampf is, of course, dedicated to Eckart, but in it Hitler also acknowledged the impact on him of Feder's lecture on the 'breaking of interest-slavery' delivered during a political indoctrination course organized by the Reichswehr in June 1919, when he wrote:

"I knew at once that this was a theoretical truth, which would be of immense importance to the future of the German people." (11)

In view of these remarks, it may seem surprising that Eckart, Feder and Rosenberg have, until very recently, been poorly served by historians. (12) However, there are a number of reasons for this relative neglect. The most obvious reason is the fairly rapid eclipse of the three men by the meteoric rise of Adolf Hitler; Eckart's death in 1923 - very early in the Nazi Party's history - has limited his appeal to biographers; Feder also
slipped into obscurity once his anti-capitalist ideas proved to be an inconvenience to Hitler when the latter was trying to attract the support of powerful industrialists in 1932;\(^{(13)}\) and Rosenberg's rather inconspicuous career in the Third Reich has, perhaps, encouraged the belief that he possessed only limited intelligence and that, therefore, his contribution to Hitler's development can only have been marginal.\(^{(14)}\) Another reason for the relative lack of attention paid to the early ideologists of the Nazi party is an understandable reluctance to analyse abhorrent and irrational prejudices in a systematic way for fear of endowing Nazi ideology with an unwarranted intellectual veneer. A further problem is the belief, still shared by many historians, that political theory is largely irrelevant to an understanding of the Third Reich, which they regard as motivated solely by the pursuit and exercise of power. The early ideas expressed by Nazi theorists are, therefore, usually dismissed as mere propaganda.\(^{(15)}\) These obstacles should not, however, be allowed any longer to impede serious research into the origins of Nazi foreign policy.

Indeed, it is impossible to present a coherent picture of the evolution of Nazi foreign policy attitudes without an understanding of the rudiments of Nazi ideology. For in the immediate post-war period, neither the German Workers' Party, under the initial direction of journalist Karl Harrer, nor 'völkish' writers such as Eckart, Feder and Rosenberg were really interested in articulating a carefully worked out foreign policy. What interested them was the unmasking of those responsible for the outbreak of the First World War and for Germany's defeat; in both cases, the Jew was found to be the main culprit, with England a close second.\(^{(16)}\) It was on the basis of this antisemitic platform designed initially to explain Germany's internal collapse, that the framework of a foreign policy was slowly to emerge.
It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the early ideology of the German Workers' Party as it was evolving in 1919 and to examine its relationship to foreign affairs before Hitler appeared in order to throw into greater relief Hitler's own later contribution.

This chapter, therefore, sets out first of all to examine the early ideas of Rosenberg and Eckart about the Jews, secondly, to outline the conspiracy theory of history central to these beliefs, and thirdly to relate these ideological concepts to questions of foreign policy.

A native of the Baltic city of Reval and a product of a middle-class family, Alfred Rosenberg found himself at the end of 1918 in a defeated Germany, having fled in face of the Red Army which was sweeping through the Baltic Provinces. (17) An exile in an alien environment, he arrived in a Munich still suffering the shock waves of defeat and revolution. In these circumstances, even as a trained architect, there was little prospect of his obtaining employment and, in retrospect, antisemitism appears to have been his salvation. This has led Barbara Miller Lane to suggest that Rosenberg's antisemitism was neither sincere nor consistent but merely "a cynical concoction used whenever he found a favourable market". (18) As this interpretation challenges the generally accepted view that "Rosenberg, in contrast to the unscrupulous cynicism of most of his later political comrades and rivals took his principles and ideas seriously", it is necessary to look at it carefully before proceeding any further. (19) It is certainly true that antisemitism was Rosenberg's passport into Munich society and ultimately into Nazi government; his antisemitic articles for Eckart's
Auf gut deutsch and later the Völkischer Beobachter\(^{(20)}\) gave purpose and direction to his life in Munich in the period before he received German citizenship in 1923. However, it would be wrong to suggest that his writing invested him with any degree of financial security. Rosenberg wrote later that "Dietrich Eckart paid me occasionally for my articles, but this did not stretch to securing my life in the long-term."\(^{(21)}\) In fact, he seems to have survived by eating at a communal kitchen and by obtaining, through a relief committee, free accommodation with a Bavarian family.\(^{(22)}\)

A more important criticism which can be made of Lane's thesis is that before 1919, before he became a stateless émigré in Germany, Rosenberg appears already to have been a pronounced antisemite. Lane's comment that Rosenberg's early articles written in 1917-18 before he came to Germany "contain little antisemitism" is misleading.\(^{(23)}\) It is true that most of these articles, published in 1943, are mainly concerned with art, architecture and aesthetics; but there are three overtly antisemitic tracts as well.\(^{(24)}\) Rosenberg's interest in the other subjects mentioned (an interest which he maintained throughout his life and is particularly apparent in his editing of the VB) did not in any way interfere with the development of his antisemitic ideas. The three antisemitic tracts dating from between May and July 1918, for example, already contained many of the views which he was to reproduce later on. Since they were written at a time when he did not have a 'favourable market' and, perhaps, did not need one – he was working as a teacher for the German administration at Reval at the time\(^{(25)}\) – the argument that his antisemitism was motivated primarily by materialistic considerations must be regarded with some scepticism. This view is reinforced by Rosenberg's account of two other incidents. He later claimed to have addressed fellow students on the Jewish question at the Technical
University in Riga (where he studied architecture between 1910 and 1915) and, on the day of his departure for Germany, he is supposed to have spoken at a public meeting on the steps of Reval town-hall on the same topic. (26) It is tempting to dismiss both stories as part of Rosenberg's attempt to present an image of himself as an experienced and committed antisemite but there is some corroborative evidence - albeit again originating from Rosenberg - for, at least, the second of these two exploits. (27)

The most persuasive evidence, however, that Rosenberg was already a committed antisemite before he came to Munich is contained in his article, Der Jude, dated 10 July 1918 (one of the three referred to above). In it, he argued that every nation had to have an idea to fight for, but Europe was currently witnessing a struggle "for and against the Jewish idea". Germany, he believed, was in the forefront of this struggle and the Jews sought to devalue her achievements and individuality and to create 'chaos' in the country. (28) Rosenberg went on to describe three Jewish characteristics, which, if not combatted, would see this goal realised. Firstly, parasitism; the Jews, he maintained, always lived off other people - living in houses, which they had not built, and eating food grown in fields, which they had not cultivated. Whilst Aryan peoples were concerned with matters of art and science, the Jews were preoccupied with "trade and usury"; the Jewish spirit, thus, reflected a "passion for exploitation". The use of the term 'Aryan' as a counterpoint to the 'Jew' at this early stage is significant; it shows that already Rosenberg's view of the Jew was overwhelmingly biological; 'Jewishness' constituted not simply a different religion or philosophy, but a distinctive racial characteristic. (29) This alien presence inside German society had, therefore, to be eliminated:
"A spirit, which has a texture intrinsically foreign to us, which lives amongst us like a parasite feeding upon us, but which has not one single progressive achievement for our culture to show for itself, must be exorcised." (30)

The second characteristic, with which Rosenberg endowed the Jews, was religious intolerance; "the Jew", he asserted, "was the father of all religious hatred and fanaticism". The origins of this intolerance lay in the Jews' belief in their own exclusiveness, in the belief that they were God's chosen people and that they would eventually rule the world. They had disowned the messiah as the "son of a whore" because he did not conquer the world for them. The Jewish desire for Weltherrschaft, of course, clashed head-on with the forces of nationalism all over the world. This led the Jews to concoct or adapt doctrines of internationalism to undermine national unity. International socialism was, in Rosenberg's view, a "battering ram", which was being propelled against Germany's "national freedom of conscience". The ultimate result of socialist ideas - of the class war, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the tyranny of the masses - would be, in Rosenberg's opinion, a "racial catastrophe", leaving the Jews triumphant. (31) Jewish intolerance, therefore, bred political radicalism and would result in racial disintegration.

The Russian Revolution illustrated the third main Jewish characteristic identified in Der Jude - his destructiveness. After the overthrow of the Czar in March 1917, the Jews, Rosenberg claimed, led the socialist agitation against the provisional government of Kerensky. Accordingly, following the October Revolution, Jews such as Trotsky, Zinoviev and Stecklov had taken leading positions in the new government. Instead of feeling grateful to the Russian people, who had suffered as much, if not more,
than the Jew from Czarist oppression, and who had carried out the revolution, the Jew "placed himself...at the head of a movement, which had aimed consistently - either consciously or instinctively - at the destruction of Russia as a state." All this led Rosenberg to conclude that "wherever one allows the Jews to come to power, the most relentless exploitation, the most relentless intolerance towards other ideas and customs, and the most relentless destructive frenzy...grips everything, which we regard as valuable in moral and artistic culture." (32) Germany was, to Rosenberg's mind, now threatened by this three-pronged Jewish assault on her life-style.

On the evidence of Der Jude, it is difficult to sustain the argument that Rosenberg's commitment to antisemitism was opportunistic, as Lane suggests. It is also difficult to accept without reservation Werner Maser's assertion that "unlike Hitler, in the year 1918 Rosenberg did not yet have at his disposal concrete political notions". (33) The remarkable feature of Der Jude is the early evidence which it provides of ideas which Rosenberg was to repeat so often in the 1920s and 1930s. The conspiratorial worldview, later adopted by the Nazi Party, was clearly present in outline in Rosenberg's arguments in 1918; the association of marxism and international socialism with Jewry and the 'revelation' of the leading role played by the Jews in the Bolshevik Revolution are clearly discernible in this early essay. Although Rosenberg admitted in his memoirs that it would be untrue to suggest that he had grasped immediately the full significance of the October Revolution, he does appear to have formulated the basic framework of a political philosophy by the middle of 1918.

Furthermore, it seems clear that Rosenberg had decided before his departure
for Germany at the end of 1918 to propagate his ideas in his new homeland. Werner Maser, however, in an attempt to prove that Rosenberg was a political novice in 1918, has quoted (out of context) the latter’s comment in his memoirs that "he had never thought of getting involved at any time with politics". (34) In fact, in his memoirs, Rosenberg explained his decision to go to Germany partly in terms of his ability to "contribute in the Reich to the clarification of questions concerning Bolshevism, which were then appearing in their full magnitude there." (35)

And the full context of Rosenberg’s comment about not getting involved in politics suggests that his early indifference to politics had been eroded by his experience of the Russian Revolution:

"So I came to the Reich. Originally a man devoted completely to art, philosophy and history, who had never thought of getting involved in politics at any time. But I had observed the present; it too would be history and tradition one day. I had seen many forces pushing their way in to positions of leadership and had been able to witness the course of a revolution." (36)

The Russian Revolution, it seems, was all the political education which Rosenberg deemed necessary. Perhaps one might dismiss Rosenberg’s implied sense of a mission to clarify to the Germans the danger posed by Bolshevism as a retrospective glamourisation for the benefit of his memoirs; but, on the other hand, it should be stressed that, as early as 1928 (before the Nazi Party had emerged from relative obscurity), he was already writing in the same vein. In his brief biography of Dietrich Eckart, published in 1928, Rosenberg explained that, on arriving in Munich, he sought out (on the recommendation of a friend) a man (Eckart), "who had already begun here a similar struggle to the one I had before me." (37) If this account is trustworthy, it would seem to dispel any lingering doubts
about his commitment to antisemitism in 1919.

Rosenberg's meeting with Eckart was far more crucial for the former than the latter. Dietrich Eckart, born on 23 March 1868 the son of a lawyer in Neumarkt, Oberpfalz, was a playwright and sometime literary critic, who had already gained a certain notoriety in literary circles for a rather free translation of Peer Gynt. Though he was not a great success either as a playwright or as a critic, his artistic temperament and air of sophistication (his predilection for hard-drinking and drug-taking seemingly being the main outward signs of this) must have impressed a youthful and rather reticent Rosenberg. A month before he met Rosenberg, Eckart had begun to publish the journal, Auf gut deutsch, as a vehicle for his literary skills and his antisemitic views.

Eckart's biographer, Margarete Plewnia, suggests that his antisemitism probably derived from his failure to achieve real recognition as a playwright; Jewish theatre-owners and critics, he felt, had been responsible for the boycotting of his plays. Whether or not this was actually the case is impossible to determine, but he certainly seems to have been a fervent anti-semite during the First World War. The suggestion that Eckart was a Jew-baiter in the mould of Julius Streicher, the later Gauleiter of Middle Franconia, is, as has recently been pointed out, completely inaccurate. Though by no means identical to those of Rosenberg, Eckart's views on antisemitism do share the former's intellectual rather than physical abhorrence of Jewry. In fact, Eckart's antisemitism was highly distinctive. 'Jewishness', by which he meant at root the preoccupation with worldly or material considerations, resulting from a religious denial of
immortality, was, according to Eckart, a spiritual rather than a racial characteristic. 'Jewishness' was not, therefore, the preserve of one race - the Jews - but was visible in all races. In essence, Eckart's antisemitism was metaphysical not biological (as Rosenberg's was) and in theory at least, it bore little relation to policies of persecution, expulsion, let alone extermination of the Jews as a race. As he wrote in 1919, "it is not a question of fighting the Jew as a person, but of fighting the Jewish spirit."(41)

What made his ideas different from those of other antisemites, as Eckart explained in an early contribution to Agd, was "the desire for self-knowledge". Everyone has 'Jewishness' in him and Eckart aimed to spotlight, as the title of his first series of antisemitic articles indicated, "the Jewishness in and around us". Early in this series, he used a simple analogy to elucidate his views:

"Jewishness belongs to the organism of mankind like...certain bacteria on the human body, and indeed just as essentially as these....Our body contains, as we know, a mass of tiny lifeforms without which, despite the fact that they feed on it, it must perish." (43)

'Jewishness' (and therefore hence the Jew) was a necessary evil, a necessary counter-weight to Aryan values. It seems very likely that Eckart's views on the duality of the human character were derived from Otto Weininger's book Geschlecht und Charakter (published in 1903); it is certainly of interest that Eckart referred to Weininger's work early in the series.(44)

These rather esoteric philosophical ideas, however, did not prevent Eckart from treating the Jews as an identifiable racial group when he reviewed Germany's contemporary political situation. In the first edition
of Agd, Eckart attributed Germany's misfortunes not, as one might expect, to the Jews but to "the representatives of capitalism, the uncrowned kings of the stock exchange and its offices". However, in January 1919 Eckart clearly laid the blame for Germany's destruction at the door of the Jews:

"Whatever way an empire is destroyed whether (it be) by means of Christianity as with Ancient Rome, or by means of Bolshevism as with the German state, matters little to the Jew: every tool, even if it is more odious in itself than the plague, is to him suitable so long as it has done his bidding." (46)

It is interesting to note that Eckart referred to Bolshevism in Germany, but made no reference to Russia, suggesting that he had not yet uncovered any link with the Jews there. He did, however, believe that the Jews were supporting the powers of the Entente; "behind Wilson's policy, behind the entire Entente policy", he wrote, "stands no other than Jewry, not just literally but in spirit also"; Germany's decline had been determined long before the war by "the entire Anglo-Jewish world of capital". (47) Eckart was also claiming that the ultimate aim of Jewry was world conquest. St. Paul, according to Eckart, had never fully freed himself of his 'Jewishness' and, therefore, had worked instinctively "to unseat the Roman Empire, the overmighty rival of his people for world-rule". (48) So before their first meeting early in 1919, Eckart possessed in outline a conspiratorial world-view similar to Rosenberg's, the initial premise of which was the belief that the Jews were out to conquer the world.

Eckart welcomed Rosenberg as a fellow "warrior against Jerusalem" and was impressed - according to the latter - by the draft speeches and articles which he had brought with him from Eastern Europe. (49) Rosenberg's
A distinctive contribution to the development of Nazi theory was his interpretation of the Bolshevik Revolution. His first article in Agd in February 1919 was entitled Die russisch-jüdische Revolution and it provided the basis of the Nazi interpretation of events in Russia in 1917 repeated again and again during the 1920s. The article, whilst reflecting the general philosophy revealed in his essay Der Jude, is more informative and helps to isolate the essence of Rosenberg's contribution to the later Nazi Weltanschauung.

Rosenberg began by repeating the view that Jews were determined to destroy European culture, and that the Russian Revolution provided an ominous warning example. What emerges most clearly from Rosenberg's account of the February Revolution is his opposition to Czarism:

"Whoever witnessed this type of government (Czarism) must acknowledge that any kind of self-assertiveness, whether it be in the economic or communal or intellectual field, was impeded by every means and that the rule of the corrupt officialdom was oppressive." (51)

The February Revolution was, therefore, welcomed by the Russian people and by Rosenberg - later he was to refer to it as a "liberation". The second striking feature of the article is Rosenberg's sympathy for the Russian people - a stark contrast to the hatred of Russians so often attributed to Rosenberg as a Baltic German. In Die russisch-jüdische Revolution, Rosenberg related how the initial optimism of the Russians evaporated into bitterness and disillusionment, once "centrifugal forces set in in the form of the soldiers' councils", which quickly came to be dominated "by a number of Jews who streamed together from all corners of Russia and from abroad." (54) The October Revolution of 1917 was, according to Rosenberg, secretly inspired and led by Jews and financed
from abroad and once the Bolshevik seizure of power was secured, "they let the mask fall and constructed an almost entirely Jewish 'Russian' government". The use of inverted commas around Russian signified that the government was not genuinely Russian; indeed, given Rosenberg's views it could not be if it was also Jewish. In fact, to Rosenberg's mind the new regime was consciously anti-Russian. For example, he argued, the new government now introduced a censorship stricter than anything known under Czarist rule and fostered class war against the Russian bourgeoisie:

"The entire Russian intelligentsia which, for decades, had taken care of the Russian people and which had been hanged or forced into exile for its well-being, was simply exterminated."

The National Assembly, "the long-cherished aim of all Russian patriots", was dispersed by the Red Guards. The Bolshevik Revolution was, therefore, at odds with Russia's traditions and current aspirations and its success was not yet assured:

"One can see, and every piece of recent news confirms it, that the hatred against the Jews in Russia...is attracting ever wider circles. The most weak-willed and the most tolerant Russians are now as imbued with it as any former Czarist official. If the present regime falls, then no Jew would remain alive in Russia." (55)

Rosenberg felt, therefore, that there was still hope for the Russian people.

The most significant aspect of Rosenberg's interpretation of the Russian Revolution, as far as Eckart was concerned, was the identification of Bolshevism with Jewry. Bolshevism in Russia as well as in Germany was evidently the tool of Jewry. Introducing Rosenberg's article in the Agd, Eckart displayed his excitement at the new 'revelation':
"Whoever reads the report on the Russian Revolution will realize what the final goals (hidden from us) of Jewish Asiatic blood are....The conformity of revolutionary developments in Russia with those here no longer leaves anything to be desired as far as clarity is concerned." (56)

Clearly then by the beginning of 1919 before either came into contact with the German Workers' Party, Eckart and Rosenberg had an antisemitic worldview, albeit one which was sketchily drawn in places. To Eckart's belief that the Jews were manipulating the capitalist western world, Rosenberg added evidence of Jewish abetment of Bolshevism in Eastern Europe. As yet, no evidence was adduced to prove that the two activities were directly connected in a coordinated, clandestine conspiracy to advance the Jewish cause and to realise the goal of Jewish world domination. Nevertheless, Rosenberg's references to the financing of Bolshevism from Jewish sources abroad and to the Jewish adoption of socialism in Western Europe could be seen as pointers in this direction. (57)

The second task of this chapter is to show how the 'world conspiracy theory', so central to Nazi ideology thereafter, evolved effectively between 1919 and 1921. By 1921 the Nazis had 'unearthed' a vast web of Jewish intrigue; the relationship between the Jewish capitalists and Jewish Bolsheviks had been substantiated; and three other components had been worked into the conspiracy theory - namely, Zionism, Freemasonry and Jesuitism. An explanation of how these developments occurred is essential for an understanding of the relationship between this ideology and foreign affairs as well as for an accurate assessment of the contributions of individuals
Much of the credit for the development of this theory must go to Alfred Rosenberg; which is not to say that his ideas themselves were particularly original. Karl Harrer, the first chairman of the DAP, for example, used many of the themes, such as Jewish control of the press and Jewish collaboration with the Freemasons. (58) It was Rosenberg who investigated these themes further and synthesized them in his articles for Agd and presented most of the 'evidence' later used to build up a composite picture of the secret machinations of World Jewry. Eckart acknowledged Rosenberg's growing expertise in these matters by quoting him extensively. For example, in July 1919 in an article on the German poet, Heine, Eckart allowed his "Baltic friend", Alfred Rosenberg, "to say a few words in a short study of the relationship of the Jewish spirit to European culture". (59) Rosenberg took the opportunity to expound his later notorious theory about the lack of creativity shown by the Jews.

In June 1919, Rosenberg published his first detailed examination of the role of Jewry in politics, particularly in foreign affairs, entitled Judenheit und Politik. Rosenberg noted, first of all, the Jews' peculiar aptitude for foreign affairs:

"The Jews were dispersed (note, of their own volition) throughout the whole world, but they not only maintained the closest-knit community where they lived together abroad, but they also remained in constant contact with their countrymen in the most distant lands: trading ships and caravans brought news of all kinds from all quarters of the globe and took the same back again." (60)

These international contacts meant that the Jews were well-equipped to be advisers on foreign affairs; they were, therefore, in a position to render
great service to the state in which they lived. However, as a community, the Jews chose to live a separate existence in whatever state they settled; they remained "a self-contained people, which never, ever, showed the slightest inclination to have any dealings with the inhabitants, other than those necessary for trade. They regarded other peoples as inferior and fit only to serve their purposes." Thus the loyalty of the Jews, even those in the highest offices, might be suspect, though this was not necessarily the case, for "the interests of the land could coincide with those of their (that is, the Jewish) nation, then they would be supported; if not, they were abandoned without scruple." (61) As we shall see, Rosenberg's assessment of the status of a country would depend in part upon the degree of identification, which he perceived between its national interests and those of the Jews.

The loyalty of the Jews was unpredictable, according to Rosenberg, because of a certain duality in their nature:

"In every cold appraisal of the Jewish manner it is necessary to differentiate between two different impulses: between national drives and those of a more emotional nature. To the former belongs the clear pursuit of personal as well as national interests and the assessment of the same when interfering in the politics of states; to the latter, the passions of hatred against other peoples, which often disturb such assessments."

As a result, Rosenberg argued, even the most dispassionate Jewish businessman or politician could easily be transformed into a rabid xenophobe by the basic Jewish desire to destroy other peoples. (62) Hence the Jewish politician was a most dangerous political animal, who could easily subvert policies dictated by national interest for his own ends or those of Jewry. It followed then that in assessing a prospective ally
(or enemy), one had to establish not only which policies were in its national interest, but also how far the leadership of the country concerned had been infiltrated by the Jews, for this 'fifth column' might prevent their policies from being pursued.

The Jews also played a role in foreign affairs at another level, according to Rosenberg in *Judenheit und Politik*. They could build up and lead an international alliance against the powers who opposed Jewish ambitions; Rosenberg felt that at that time such a vendetta was being directed (for reasons which will be dealt with later) "primarily against two peoples: against the Russian and the German."(63) The First World War, Rosenberg maintained, had divided the world into two opposing groups of powers, consequently dividing the Jewish people into two camps also. However, since the richest and most influential Jews in the world lived in France, England, Italy and North America and opposed German policies, most Jews supported the Entente powers against Germany in the war. The reasons for the opposition to German policies were self-evident for Rosenberg. Firstly, the German Empire opposed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine; the Entente powers, and especially England, did not. Therefore, "all Jews gradually came to agree with the English orientation, whether they were zionists or anti-zionists." The other main reason for the collaboration between the "Jewish world speculators" and the Entente powers was that the leading statesmen of the Entente nations, Poincaré, Briand, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Balfour, Orlando and others, were all freemasons. Like the Jews, they were members of "the lodge, whose effectiveness extends over the whole world, and without whose knowledge and assistance, no political event occurs."(64) The anti-German coalition, had, therefore, been orchestrated by Freemasonry. Hence, in this very early article on the
Jewish question in June 1919 - much earlier than has hitherto been suspected (65) - Rosenberg identified Zionism and Freemasonry as two major instruments of Jewish influence and control, both of which gave the Jews the ability to manipulate international diplomacy against opponents of their ambitions and were thus important considerations in the formulation of foreign policy. Thus it was Rosenberg's conviction that the Jews could determine the course of international diplomacy at two points: firstly at the national level, by preventing the implementation of policies in the national interest, and secondly at international level, by forming hostile coalitions of powers through their zionist and freemasonic contacts.

While the role of the freemasons in this judeo-masonic conspiracy remained largely unexplored at this point, Rosenberg's ideas on the zionist component of the conspiracy had already begun to crystallize as his article <i>Judenheit und Politik</i> shows. Scrutinizing the early history of the zionist movement, Rosenberg found evidence to support his view that the Jews were a distinct race. He quoted the programme drawn up by Theodor Herzl for the first zionist congress in Basle in 1897, which called upon delegates "to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law". (66) Rosenberg noted that in the programme "the Jews were expressly designated a people", hence they could not claim immunity as a "religious community", as they had done in the past when under attack. Quoting the claim of Chaim Weizmann, Herzl's successor as leader of the zionist movement, that "the existence of the Jewish nation is a fact and not a question for dispute", Rosenberg concluded that "the Jew cannot be a citizen in any state" (other than his own, presumably). (67)
Correspondingly, Rosenberg's solution to the Jewish question, formulated somewhat later and publicized in *Die Spur des Juden im Wandel der Zeiten* - a detailed exposé of Jewish machinations past and present - was based on the assumption that the Jews were a foreign community inside Germany. The Jew should not, therefore, be allowed to hold public office or to serve in the German army, or to manage cultural establishments such as theatres, art galleries etc, or to hold posts (teaching or professional) in German schools and universities or to represent Germany in economic negotiations or to direct banks. Rosenberg reached the perhaps surprising conclusion that "Zionism must be supported", however only "in order to get rid of a certain number of Jews each year to Palestine or over our frontiers."(68)

Such a solution was perfectly consistent with his view of Zionism and his recommendations for the treatment of Jews in Germany as aliens. Yet the fact that he had to oppose Jewry and yet support Zionism, perhaps, indicates that Rosenberg had some problems fitting Zionism into his conspiratorial thesis. The zionists were, as Rosenberg was forced to admit, "Jewish nationalists" (Nationaljuden), wanting to create a nation state in Palestine.(69) How then was this aim compatible with the internationalist aspirations (Jewish world rule, world revolution etc) attributed to the Jews in general? In 1920, apparently aware of this dichotomy, Rosenberg claimed that the Jews only pretended to be nationalistic, whilst in fact harbouring internationalist pretensions, because, after all, he argued, "Jewish internationalism is anti-national, and that means, in principle, civil wars in all nations."(70) But how, Rosenberg asked, could a nation which had preserved strong nationalist tendencies for a 1,000 years support internationalism? His answer was that "the call for internationalism in the sense of anti-nationalism is (my italics) the call of national
Jewry, the call for class conflict in the sense of civil war is the call of the exploiter who recognises no classes." (71) The contorted logic of Rosenberg's argument indicates that he found it difficult to accommodate the zionist demand for a nation state in Palestine into the general theory of 'world conspiracy'.

When Rosenberg examined the attitude of the allegedly 'Jewish-Bolshevik' government to Zionism, again he found the conspiracy theory a little difficult to sustain. That government 'predictably' condemned antisemitism as "counter-revolutionary"; but it also, as Rosenberg had to concede, condemned the zionist movement on the grounds that it was sponsored by capitalist forces and was a nationalist movement. (72) This stance was quite in accord with Marxist-Leninism but did it mean that the Bolshevik Jews condemned Zionism? If so, Rosenberg could scarcely argue that Bolshevism and Zionism were two arms of a Jewish world conspiracy. Perhaps, because he perceived this flaw in his argument, Rosenberg maintained that whilst Zionism had been denounced by Marxist theorists, the zionist organisation had not been declared counter-revolutionary "by any single decree of the Russian government." (73) Thus the Jews, and not the Marxist intellectuals, were holding sway in Bolshevik Russia.

In this way, Rosenberg tried to disguise the fact that the 'Jewish-led' world revolution and Zionism were incompatible bedfellows in a conspiracy theory. However, whilst Zionism was difficult to assimilate into his conspiracy theory at this level, at another it could be put to good use. The fact that Zionism had its supporters in all the major states furnished plentiful evidence in Rosenberg's eyes of an international Jewish menace, which cut across national frontiers. It should not be forgotten, of course,
that it was the zionist conference in Basle in 1897, which later provided antisemites with 'proof' of the existence of a Jewish plot to achieve world domination as laid bare in the famous tract *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Zionism was, therefore, according to believers in the Protocols, a front for aspirations of a more ominous nature than the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

There can be little doubt that Rosenberg was responsible for incorporating Zionism into the world conspiracy theory, despite Barbara Miller Lane's belief that Eckart may have inspired Rosenberg's early anti-zionist tracts. In fact, Eckart's views on Zionism differed markedly from Rosenberg's. Eckart, as has been seen, regarded 'Jewishness' as a metaphysical rather than biological attribute and as a necessary counterweight to Aryan qualities. Indeed, early in the series of articles entitled *Das Judentum in und ausser uns in Agd*, he prophesied that "if...the Jewish people perished, there would be no more nations...the end of all time would come", but added that "that would also be the case if the zionist idea were to be realised, that is, if the whole of Jewry amalgamated into one unified state, whether it be in Palestine or elsewhere." This was because the Jews had always been dispersed, living amongst the Gentiles and it was precisely this cohabitation between Jews and Gentiles, which maintained the natural balance; "the world could not exist", he argued, "if the Jews lived alone by themselves." Eckart doubted, in any case, whether the Jews possessed the ability to create a state of their own, but his opposition to zionist aspirations was unequivocal. Rosenberg would have endorsed the former argument, but would not have accepted the need for Aryans and Jews to live in close proximity. Significantly, it was Rosenberg's views on Zionism, which seemed to commend themselves to the Nazis of a later generation. So, it seems fair to credit
Rosenberg with ferreting out damning evidence about the zionists and with its incorporation in the overall synthesis.

Another example of Rosenberg's contribution to Nazi theory was the idea of masonic complicity in Jewish plans, which he introduced to readers of *Agd* in 1919. Rosenberg was not the first to suggest a possible link between the Jews and the freemasons; as he readily admitted, writers before him like Dr. F. Wichtl, from whose *Weltfreimaurerei, Weltrevolution, Weltrepublik* he quoted often, had investigated this relationship. However, Rosenberg did the spadework for the *Agd* and later the *VB*, collecting information from often obscure secondary sources to support the claim that the Jews had infiltrated the ranks of the freemasons.

As early as June 1919, Rosenberg had alluded to this idea when he accused the Jews of having used the lodges in order to increase their influence over the Entente powers by means of secret consultations with high-ranking government officials, who were allegedly freemasons. In 1920 he summed up Freemasonry in his pamphlet, *Die Spur des Juden in Wandeler Zeiten*, as "a secret order with the aim of erecting an anti-religious World Republic." The similarity between this goal and that of the Jews was, probably, in Rosenberg's view, the main reason for judeo-masonic collaboration. Other reasons soon became apparent. For example, the methods used by the freemasons were compatible with the subversive tactics of the Jews. Every revolution since 1789 was, in Rosenberg's opinion, attributable to the influence of the freemasons; the French Revolution had been only the first step towards control of the world. (The fact that the battle-cry of 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' was an axiom of the freemasons was sufficient proof for Rosenberg of masonic inspiration behind the French Revolution.)
The hostility towards monarhism was another point of contact between the Jews and the freemasons; from the middle of the nineteenth century, Rosenberg alleged, the socialist International and Freemasonry had formed the two wings of the anti-monarchical movement. The Alliance Israélite Universelle, in reality a purely philanthropic society formed to reprint basic Jewish texts, became, in Rosenberg's scenario, a central agency coordinating Jewish subversive activities, and providing a link with judaicized freemasons.

Rosenberg held the freemasons responsible for all the major assassinations since 1789; even Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria had been a victim of a freemasonic plot - a 'fact' which enabled Rosenberg to claim that the world war had been unleashed by the Jews and freemasons as a tactic to foster revolution and that it was the first stage towards the creation of a New Jerusalem; "world war, world revolution, world republic, this was the freemasonic programme", Rosenberg concluded. Freemasonry, therefore, became a second arm (along with Zionism) of the world conspiracy to secure a "cosmopolitan world empire".

There can be no doubt that the period between his publication of his initial observations on Freemasonry in June 1919 and the appearance of Die Spur des Juden im Wandel der Zeiten early in 1920 was a formative one for Rosenberg. By wide reading he was slowly accumulating a store of knowledge and propaganda material on the freemasons; Dietrich Eckart, in fact, testified to this fact in August 1919, when he referred in an article entitled Das fressende Feuer, to one of "the many books of recent times, which my tireless friend Alfred Rosenberg has collected for an understanding of Freemasonry." Eckart began to treat Rosenberg as an expert on the freemasons; in the
same article, Eckart wrote that "wherever one looks, one finds traces of planned subversive activity. Let us follow them...with the sure hand of Alfred Rosenberg." (88) Eckart went on to quote Rosenberg at some length and many of the arguments and evidence (quoted above) which later appeared in Die Spur des Juden made their first appearance in this article. On another occasion, Eckart quoted Rosenberg as his authority on the freemasons, pointing out that "our Baltic friend Rosenberg...advises us not to condemn the masons as a whole." (89) Rosenberg believed that most freemasons were ignorant of the Jewish connection and were being duped. He developed this idea further in a series of articles, entitled Das Verbrechen der Freimaurerei, published in Agd during 1920 and 1921 and later as a pamphlet. (90) Introducing the series, Eckart welcomed this exposition of the internal character of Freemasonry in the interests of the German lodge brothers, "who are moved by the best human and national interests" and "who have no idea that they are serving the enemies of our people by belonging to this 'Ideal' World Association." (91) Eckart had, it would seem, adopted Rosenberg's view of the rank-and-file freemasons as misguided people and paid this tribute to his work:

"My friend Rosenberg has undertaken by the most careful scrutiny of the pertinent sources, in a thankfully most professional way, to reveal, even to the most prejudiced eye, a clear picture of the criminal order." (92)

However, apart from the addition of greater detail in the Das Verbrechen der Freimaurerei series, Rosenberg's conclusions on freemasonic influence had changed little since 1919.

However, Rosenberg's series on Freemasonry did spawn another 'enfant terrible' to be slotted into the world conspiracy theory: Jesuitism. The idea that
freemasons and jesuits could be allies appeared, at first sight, even
to Rosenberg, to be ludicrous. He freely admitted this early in one
installment, remarking that the fact that "the freemasons and jesuits are
deadly enemies is a truism."(93) "By their very nature", he continued,
"Jesuitism and Freemasonry are two rivals for one and the same prize: world
rule"; the jesuits wanted a universal, spiritual monarchy or the Roman
Papacy under their control, the freemasons a "social, theocratic world
republic." These were on the face of it incompatible aims. The way in
which Rosenberg managed to reconcile two seemingly irreconcilable elements
in his conspiracy theory provides some insight into the infinite malleability
of a conspiratorial ethos as well as into the fertility or perversity of
Rosenberg's mind. He began by pointing out that, even if the freemasons
and jesuits were poles apart, the Jews and the jesuits were not; they
could agree on their opposition to Germany because "Jesuitism is by its
very nature intrinsically anti-germanic"; throughout its history it had
worked against Germany until "in the fateful years from 1914 to 1918
the Roman (Catholic) party (the Centre Party) under the leadership of
Matthias Erzberger went through the thick and thin with the enemies of
Germandom: the judaicized Democrats and Social Democrats."(94) Jewry and
Jesuitism also shared "the principle of absolute intolerance", which
Rosenberg called the "Jewish-Roman spirit"; "in the Jesuit order, the
Roman-Old Testament spirit fused with a cunningly-constructed semitic
poliaco-religious secret organization with hypnotic methods of attraction." (95)
Hence Rome and Jerusalem were identical in their politico-religious claims
to power, each believing that it represented the chosen people. (96)

To 'prove' that the Jews and jesuits have similar outlooks and aspirations
would not appear to help in resolving the problems posed by the deadly
rivalry between the Jesuits and the Freemasons (the third element in the supposed conspiracy). Indeed, Rosenberg acknowledged in the sixth installment of *Das Verbrechen der Freimaurerei* "that nothing stands further from the principles of Jesuitism than the ideas of the Freemasons. On the one side intolerance, on the other absolute freedom, there hatred, here brotherhood."

(97) Similarities, however, were evident in their methods; Freemasonry aped Jesuitism. As in the Jesuit order, the majority of Freemasons were harmless and ignorant of the conspiracy behind the scenes; "just as the Jesuit order strives for world tyranny from a despotic base, so in the same way the league of Freemasons strives for a world republic from a despotic base." "The relationship between Jesuitism and Freemasonry", Rosenberg concluded hopefully, "ought now to be clear. Jesuitism (like Judaism) aimed directly at subjugation — spiritual as well as physical — and held the picture of Christ before one's face and preached 'humility'; Freemasonry originated in a generous and thoroughly un-Jewish movement, which had to become, however, because of its immoderation and foggy notions, a tool of intriguers. Its mask was called freedom and brotherhood. The more Jews penetrated it, the more the practices, the goals of Freemasonry approached not only the Semitic and Basque methods and goals of the Jesuits but also the principles of the Talmud." The tyranny and absolutism of all three: Freemasonry, Jesuitism, and Jewry — were inimical to the political and cultural ideas of the Germans. (98) Hence in the final analysis, they were compatible allies in the conspiracy directed against the Germans.

Rosenberg, therefore, managed in face of evidence of the perennial hostility between the Papacy and Freemasonry, to make it appear as if the Jesuits and the Freemasons had something in common, which made them co-conspirators. This semantic feat was a tribute to the adaptability of the
conspiracy theory, and, of course, the secrecy surrounding the affairs of the freemasons gave Rosenberg plenty of scope for his extravagant claims. Once again, the 'credit' for the assimilation of Jesuits and Freemasons into the world conspiracy must go to Rosenberg alone, although he was not the only antisemite to broach the same subject; Eckart referred in an early article on Erzberger, the leader of the Catholic Centre Party, to the cooperation between the Catholic Church and Jewry: "Rome and Jerusalem", he wrote, have "found each other once again; in common vengeance on the German character, in whose genuine Christian profundity, they sense at all times the greatest danger to their world rule." (99) Clearly, the central idea may not have been originally Rosenberg's; indeed, the alliance between the Catholic and Jew was quite a familiar one in antisemitic circles, but his unique contribution was its development and incorporation into the conspiracy theory. Rosenberg has, therefore, the dubious distinction of being the dedicated, hard-working researcher who unearthed the 'evidence' needed to give the conspiracy some plausibility.

The final link in the chain of conspiracy was provided by the capitalists of Western Europe. The evolution of this particular element in what became the Nazi Weltanschauung is more difficult to unravel than some of the others because the capitalists were commonly held to be responsible for the German defeat in 1918 in view of America's financial aid to the Entente powers during the war. As early as December 1918, Dietrich Eckart in an article, entitled Der grosse Krumme had identified the representatives of "stock exchange capitalism" as the main cause of Germany's misfortunes. (100) Germany, he continued, had been defeated not by military might but by usury, "by the supra-state rule of money, the financial militarism". The capitalists
or the "Princes of Gold" as he called them were exploiting nations by playing one off against another, "creating Empires here, Republics there, chaos with us, as it suits them...they promote and combat Bolshevism in one and the same land." The tactics of the capitalists and their crucial instruments of power, the banks, were, therefore, very unpredictable, but their subversive influence was never in doubt. Capitalism was growing ever more powerful according to Eckart, because "its many banks suck up the millions of our savers." (101)

At this point, Eckart did not equate capitalism with Jewry and, indeed, the emphasis on the growth of capitalism as a result of private investment suggests that Eckart might be drawing on the ideas of Gottfried Feder, the third of the Nazi theorists whose ideas have to be examined in this chapter, and the only one to concern himself seriously with economic affairs. In 1919, Gottfried Feder was a thirty-six year old civil engineer and manager of a small firm of building contractors. (102) There can be little doubt that the difficulties which he experienced during the First World War in obtaining credit for building projects first instilled in him a distaste for high interest rates on loans. The near-bankruptcy of Germany in 1918 as a result of war loans probably inspired him to launch his campaign for "the breaking of the slavery of interest"; in 1919 he published his pamphlet Manifest zur Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft des Geldes (103) and though somewhat outside the parameters of a study of foreign policy concepts, his ideas are not without relevance for the development of the folkish Weltanschauung.

To put it in a nutshell, Feder wanted state socialism; he wanted the state to extend its control over the system of banking and transportation, and into private enterprise; he wanted the state to own land and to regulate rents and in some cases to abolish mortgages (ways of destroying the power
of 'Interest'). In the financial field he wanted to abolish non-productive 'finance capital' – that is, capital not directly devoted to the production of goods – and to lift restrictions on 'industrial capital', which was so used. (104) These economic demands coloured Feder's approach to foreign affairs, it seems.

For example, he optimistically referred to Bolshevism as an "acute reaction against this mammonistic enslavement". (105) He was also very disappointed with the outcome of the German Revolution of November 1918, which, he had hoped, would lead the new German state to a similar rejection of the values of Western Europe. "The underlying significance of the Revolution" had been in his view, "the liberation of active labour from the international economic enslavement to the Golden International"; but this had not been followed through and, as a result, "the economic subjugation of productive capital to the interest-slavery of the mammonistic powers" was now sealed. (106) The limited endorsement of the Bolshevik Revolution should be noted as a significant pointer at an early date to divergent views on foreign policy amongst the D.A.P.'s main propagandists. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that Feder identified the great evil of finance capitalism with the Jews; indeed, he stated that it could NOT be identified with any particular section of the community. (107) It would seem, therefore, that the initial inspiration behind the attack on capitalism was not antisemitism, and that, in Feder's case at least, Bolshevism was a praiseworthy attempt to liberate Russia from the 'bondage of interest'.

How then did the alleged alliance between 'Jewish' capitalists and 'Jewish'

* the collective name used by early Nazis (and others) for the powers of international capitalism. Rosenberg was frequently to refer to the collaboration between the Red (i.e. socialist), Black (i.e. Roman Catholic), and Golden (Jewish) internationals; these terms were popularised by the Pan-Germans; D. Frymann, Wenn ich der Kaiser wär (Leipzig, 1913), pp. 192-93.
Bolsheviks - the lynch-pin of the Nazis' conspiratorial world-view - emerge? The answer lies in the collaboration between Eckart, Feder, and Rosenberg in 1919. Feder began to work with Eckart early in 1919 at about the same time as Rosenberg and the latter later recalled these days in his memoirs; he remembered that Eckart "picked up the ideas (on interest-slavery) in a spirited fashion and advocated the idea of the nationalisation of all credit." (108) However, Rosenberg himself remained rather cautious about Feder's ideas, perhaps out of jealousy, perhaps out of a genuine conviction (as he later claimed) that Feder had mistaken the symptom of a disease for its cause. Nevertheless, Rosenberg did recognise the propaganda potential of Feder's attack on finance capitalism; it provided, as he admitted in his memoirs, "an additional piece of verification for so many a theory." (109)

And it was probably Rosenberg who mixed Eckart's bitterness towards capitalism and Feder's phobia about interest-slavery with the prevailing antisemitism into the heady brew which Hitler was to find so appealing. In October 1919, Rosenberg pointed out that "everywhere the Jew was the master of interest (Zinsherr)," (110) adding later that "whoever knows the Jewish nature, knows that the Golden International will move mountains to bring empires to ruin." (111)

However, whilst Rosenberg had helped to establish a fairly obvious link between Jewry, international high finance and the fairly novel slogan of 'interest-slavery', there seems to have been no clearly defined link between the Jews of the capitalist West and those of Bolshevik Russia. It is true that in Der Jude Rosenberg had played down the significance of the class struggle, epitomized by the conflict between the proletariat and the capitalist, as a major factor in history, but this is not proof that he had already adopted the standpoint, so consistently maintained later, that there was no
real dichotomy between capitalism and socialism. (112) However, the fact that Rosenberg's ideas were approaching this conclusion is undeniable. He had already argued, as has been seen, that socialism had become stronger in the West because of Jewish backing. (113) Furthermore, in June 1919 Rosenberg denied that there was any significant difference between the 'democratic' and the 'revolutionary' Jews; both, he felt, wanted to weaken Germany:

"What separates the 'democratic' and the 'revolutionary' Jews from one another are questions of tactics and personal egotism: their goal is the same, namely Jewish rule in Germany, and it can really be immaterial to the German whether the Mark is gradually sucked out of him...or whether he is abandoned immediately to anarchy." (114)

These comments, whilst showing awareness of what Jews of different political persuasions had in common, fall short of a clear commitment to the proposition that 'Jewish' capitalists and 'Jewish' Bolsheviks were actively engaged in a conspiratorial exercise.

The missing link in the chain of international conspiracy was, of course, the suggestion that the Jewish capitalists supported the Bolshevik regime and that they had financed the Russian Revolution. It is not easy to determine when this missing link was 'discovered'. (115) By 1920 Rosenberg certainly seemed to have decided that a connection existed between the representatives of international capitalism and the formative influences on communist ideology, for he described "the Black, Red, and Golden Internationals" as "the dreams of the Jewish philosophers from Ezra, Ezekiel, and Nehemiah to Marx, Rothschild, and Trotsky." (116) The key to an understanding of the Jewish world conspiracy was, therefore, that the 'Jewish Stock Exchange capitalists' like the Rothschilds were in league with the Jewish advocates of anti-capitalist revolution, like Marx and Trotsky. In an article in
February 1921, when he clearly felt the message ought to have sunk in, Rosenberg complained that "still today, many Germans have not got it into their heads that...High Finance Jewry has long ago conferred with the Jewish revolutionaries and in 99 out of 100 cases, have come to an agreement." (117)

Furthermore, he claimed, Jewish money had often financed revolution, for example, that of 1870-71 in Paris; such facts 'proved' incontrovertibly the destructive power of "a close amalgam of Jewish-led radicalism and Jewish High Finance." (118) In March 1921 Rosenberg stated explicitly that the February Revolution of 1917 had long been "prepared by liberal-socialist Russians and Jews and paid for with English money." (119) Hence Rosenberg claimed that world communism and world capitalism were not deadly enemies as was so often claimed; the Soviet regime was in fact supported by the Jews of Western Europe:

"Bolshevism is the continuation of Jewish usury by other, more savage, means." (120)

Hence, in Rosenberg's view, world communism and world capitalism were merely two devices by which the Jews sought to undermine the nation states of the world and to lay the foundations of their own world domination.

Barbara Miller Lane is perfectly correct, therefore, when she maintains that "the equation between the Jews, bankers, and bolsheviks, which appears in Mein Kampf, stems from the combined influence upon Hitler of Feder, Eckart, and Rosenberg." (121) Nevertheless, Rosenberg's central role in the development of an overall synthesis of these various contributions must be emphasised. Eckart and Feder had their own idées fixes, which may have produced impressive-sounding slogans such as 'the breaking of interest-slavery' or 'Jewishness in and around us' but, doctrinally, were not easily
accessible to rank and file Nazis in later years. It is Rosenberg again who has the dubious distinction of having incorporated the gist of their ideas into a self-contained and, given the insane premises on which it rested, reasonably coherent philosophy, which became the stock-in-trade of the Nazi movement.

By 1921, therefore, the delicate web of intrigue, in which the Jews were allegedly enmeshed, had been successfully unravelled - principally by Rosenberg. One question remains: what part was played in this dénouement by The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the famous forgery which purported to reveal evidence of the machinations of this vast subterranean conspiracy? This is the subject of some debate amongst historians. A recent biographer of Rosenberg assigns to the 'Protocols' a prominent part in his account of Rosenberg's political education, repeating Konrad Heiden's colourful account of how the 'Protocols' were left on Rosenberg's desk by an unknown visitor in the summer of 1917. Most historians have, without any substantial evidence, faithfully followed this line, and refer to Rosenberg as bringing the 'Protocols' to Germany 'under his arm'. This interpretation is far from convincing. There is certainly no concrete evidence in his articles in 1919 to suggest that Rosenberg was well-acquainted with the text of the 'Protocols'. If the 'Protocols' did make a great impact on Rosenberg, it is strange that he never mentioned the source of his inspiration, especially since the 'Protocols' would clearly have added weight to his arguments and also because Rosenberg was in the habit of disclosing his sources. Doubts about the reliability of the 'Protocols' are unlikely to have prevented him from using them in 1919 since the fact that they were revealed as a forgery in 1921 did not prevent him from
later publishing a commentary on them. Furthermore, Rosenberg did not write a review of the 'Protocols' until February 1921, over a year after their publication in Germany which again seems unusual if they were the source of his ideas.

It would appear, therefore, that Rosenberg may not in fact have been aware of the existence of the 'Protocols' when he came to Germany and that the conspiratorial ideas about which he wrote in 1919 were culled from other sources; the belief in the existence of a Jewish plot was hardly a novel idea and, as we have seen, recent publications had 'uncovered' masonic complicity in Jewish plans. The case for Rosenberg's ignorance of the 'Protocols' is further strengthened by his article, *Judenheit und Politik*, published in June 1919, in which he referred to the existence of a "world conspiracy to secure a Jewish cosmopolitan world empire", and also to the first zionist conference in 1897, but made no connection between the two. This would be very surprising if Rosenberg had been familiar with the 'Protocols' because they 'revealed' that the conference in Basle was the venue at which the plot was hatched. In fact, Rosenberg mentioned the conference only to highlight the programme of the zionist movement, formulated there, and its goal - the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The most likely explanation of Rosenberg's failure to make use of the 'evidence' of the world conspiracy being plotted at the 1897 zionist conference is quite simply that he had no detailed knowledge of the 'Protocols' at this time.

This interpretation seems to be confirmed by Eckart's apparently accidental discovery of a related source of evidence for these alleged Jewish intrigues. In October 1919, Eckart published an extract from the *Evangelische Vierteljahreshefte aus dem Syrischen Waisenhaus in Jerusalem*, entitled *Der Bote von Zion*. This described a Russian Jewish Lodge fraternity, 'Die Weisen von Zion', which in 1911 published a small pamphlet bearing the same title.
In it, according to Eckart, the Jews were referred to as the chosen people "whose triumph over Christianity would lead to a Jewish world-rule". The pamphlet predicted that Russian Czarism, the German Empire, and militarism would be overthrown and that all nations would be "driven to ruin". (127) Although, in retrospect, this document can be seen as deriving from a source related to the 'Protocols', significantly Eckart made no mention of the 'Protocols' in the article. He seemed unaware of their existence and later when he reviewed the 'Protocols' in November 1920 after they had been published as Die Geheimnisse der Weisen von Zion by Auf Vorposten, he was at pains to point out that his earlier article had been composed "without (my) having the slightest inkling of the undertaking planned by this publisher". (128) He was, he argued elsewhere, in "no doubt that the book published by 'Vorposten' and the pamphlet of the Lodge brotherhood, circulated amongst those in the know, stemmed from one and the same source."

It is possible, therefore, that Eckart, like Rosenberg, was unaware of the contents of the 'Protocols' before their publication in December 1919. Eckart's description of the impact on the publication of the 'Protocols' on him suggests that they came as a kind of revelation; he wrote in his review that he had believed himself adequately informed about the deceitfulness of Jewry but he realised now that he had been wrong:

"I have truly grasped the entire scope of its deception only since the book 'Die Geheimnisse der Weisen von Zion' (began to) weigh upon me like the most frightful nightmare." (129)

It is, of course, a common ploy when trying to establish the authenticity of a claim to assert that one has been swayed by the weight of the evidence and the extent of the revelations. It is conceivable, therefore, that
Eckart was merely feigning ignorance of the 'Protocols', whose existence had been made public by Auf Vorposten in April 1919, and that in October 1919 he 'stole a march' on Auf Vorposten by publishing Der Bote von Zion in advance of the 'Protocols' and then after the publication of the 'Protocols' proceeded to make the maximum political profit out of their disclosures.

The truth about this may never be known. But what seems almost certain is that Rosenberg did not bring the 'Protocols' to Germany. In all probability, Rosenberg, like Eckart, was ignorant of their contents, if not their existence, until the end of 1919. Indeed, Lane argues that "the first hint of familiarity with the Protocols in Rosenberg's work comes in Die Spur des Juden (1920) in which Rosenberg's references to Tolstoy echo the writings of Fyodor Vinberg, one of the purveyors of the Protocols". Claims of textual conformity between two writers are difficult to substantiate at any time and it is doubly difficult in this case if one is persuaded by the evidence that Rosenberg's conspiratorial view of the Jews was well-established before the 'Protocols' were published. Rosenberg certainly referred in 1920 to some of the tactics, which, according to the 'record' in the 'Protocols', were discussed at the conference in Basle; the idea, for example, that the Jews encouraged class conflict then withdrew into the background when the fighting started, only to reappear once it was over, is certainly in line with the tactics outlined in the 'Protocols'.

However, it would be pointless to pursue this line of investigation further, listing all possible comparisons, since it is impossible to pinpoint exactly when Rosenberg began to take cognizance of the 'Protocols' and the results would, in any case, be inconclusive for the reasons given above.
One either believes that Rosenberg knew of them in 1917 and derived most of his ideas from them or that he first learned in detail about the 'Protocols' in December 1919 when they confirmed his earlier suspicions about Jewish machinations. The evidence certainly favours the latter interpretation.

Perhaps Rosenberg's own commentary on the 'Protocols', written in 1922, provides a key to an assessment of their impact. He did not assert that the 'Protocols' were genuine; "as matters stand today", he wrote, "it is impossible to furnish juridically conclusive proof either for their absolute authenticity or for their fabrication."(133) This circumspection was obviously an acknowledgement of the evidence presented in 1921 by The Times' correspondent, Philip Graves, to show that the 'Protocols' were a forgery. Nevertheless, Rosenberg was undaunted; he still maintained that the "intrinsic authenticity of the plans of the Protocols" was "beyond doubt".(134) He could, he claimed, produce documents, either older or more recent than the 'Protocols', which conveyed the same ideas as the 'forgery' and "every expert on Jewry maintains that the thoughts and plans of the 'Protocols' signified nothing unprecedented in Jewish history, but can be illustrated in Jewish literature throughout the centuries up to the present day."(135) Rosenberg had been engaged since 1919 in collecting just such illustrations so that even if the 'Protocols' were discredited, his interpretation of Jewish affairs remained unaffected.

So it would seem that the 'Protocols' only reinforced what Rosenberg (and other convinced antisemites) had felt for some time - that a Jewish conspiracy to achieve world domination really did exist. The 'Protocols' provided him with further ammunition relevant to the present world situation,
but Rosenberg's researches had already traced its progress through the ages.

The third and final task of this chapter is to examine how the ideological concepts outlined above affected the way in which Rosenberg - and to a lesser extent Eckart, who showed little interest in the Jewish question outside Germany - approached questions of foreign policy.

The Jewish problem, because of the all-embracing nature of the world conspiracy, affected all nations. In earlier times, Rosenberg explained in Judenheit und Politik, Jewish policy had been restricted to fewer states and had been far less "purposefully planned" than today; today, however, all the nations of the world were held in its embrace. Since the Jews as members of a distinct race formed a 'state within a state' or, as Rosenberg preferred it, a "state above the state" and since they always pursued their own interests, in every country there ought to be evidence of two probably - but not necessarily - divergent policies - one 'Jewish' and one reflecting the priorities of the host nation. Rosenberg felt that the fluctuating relationship between the corrupting influence of the Jews and the assertion of national interests was the quintessential guide to political action. If a nation's interests coincided with the ambitions of the Jews, the Jews "would render service to the state concerned"; if they clashed, the Jews would attempt to alter its political course (as explained above) either by influencing the process of decision-making in foreign affairs or by constructing a combination of hostile powers against it. Hence, Rosenberg's appraisal of a nation, at least in the short term,
seemed to be determined by his perception either of the degree of compatability between the national aspirations and those of the Jews or of the extent of Jewish influence in governmental circles.

This approach to foreign policy is, perhaps, best illustrated by Rosenberg's assessment of England in 1919. In *Judenheit und Politik*, he argued that London had developed into the centre of the anti-German camp, not only for the allied powers of Britain, France, Italy, and America during the First World War, but also for most influential Jews in the world: "outwards ...(i.e. from London) extended the activities of the Jewish confederation, and here lay, and lies even today, the kernel of the Jewish question". The main reason for this, in Rosenberg's view, was the fact that "the internationally-led national goals of Jewry are to be regarded as coinciding with those of the English Empire". Because of the compatibility between English and Jewish policies, he argued, the British Empire had been acclaimed as "the protector (Schutspatron) of the Jewish people". This led Rosenberg to refer to an "Anglo-Jewish world dominion (Welthermchaft)".

The main area where English and Jewish interests coincided, according to Rosenberg, was Palestine. The zionist dream of creating a Jewish state in Palestine required the support of a major power to stand any chance of realization. More specifically, the Jewish people wanted "to depend on a strong state, which represents a force in the East, powerful enough to be able to afford to the Jews the maximum of national security." Fortunately for the Jews, to play this role would be in accordance with British imperial strategy and wartime diplomacy. "At that time", as Rosenberg pointed out, "England possessed Egypt, India, and footholds on the Persian coast; (and) lacked a territorial connection between these lands, and there Palestine fell into place excellently as a link in the chain", while during
the First World War, "Turkey was the enemy (of England) and to promise her land to the Jewish people as state territory, meant acquiring their sympathy." (141) So British scruples were overcome and Zionism became "thoroughly English-orientated". (142) The inevitable result of this community of interest to Rosenberg's mind, was the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, which affirmed the British government's support for the creation of a home for the Jews in Palestine. In return, England had received financial aid from Jewry throughout the war; in particular, Rosenberg claimed, the Jewish National Fund, set up in 1901 to help to purchase land in Palestine, was placed at the disposal of the English government. (143)

By 1920 Rosenberg had located another area where English and Jewish policies might be compatible: Russia. In a lengthy extract quoted by Eckart in an article, entitled Zwischen den Schächern, Rosenberg claimed that British foreign policy was misunderstood in Germany; few grasped "why big business Britain, instead of stretching every nerve to annihilate Russian Bolshevism, looks on to the whole affair as if powerless, so that she seems unable even to protect General Yudenich (one of the White Russian leaders), who was equipped by her, from defeat." (144) The reason was, Rosenberg revealed, that the destruction of Russia worked to the advantage of the 'stock exchange speculators' and the capitalists in the short term and the maximum amount of destruction could be guaranteed by ensuring that civil war between the bolsheviks and nationalists continued. However, "the key to England's policy towards Russia", in Rosenberg's opinion, was that "the localization of the contagion (Bolshevism) is desired for the moment, hence some support for the Russian nationalists. Since, however, a complete victory of this party would result in the annihilation of the Russian Jews, without the
English Jews being able to prevent it, so both forces must be played off against one another." So the British did not pursue an anti-Bolshevik line wholeheartedly because, according to Rosenberg's information, "the goals of the English Empire are identical to the goals of the Jewish people" and the Jews in England feared for the safety of counterparts in Russia if the nationalist forces were to triumph; "therefore", he concluded, "the Soviets are not allowed to fall". Here, then, was another example of Anglo-Jewish cooperation.

The inference to be drawn from this description of two cases of Anglo-Jewish collaboration is, of course, that Rosenberg rejected Britain as a possible ally for Germany. However, one cannot conclude that Britain was ruled out as a suitable ally simply because of her adoption of the Zionist cause - that is, because of the synchronization of the interests of the British Empire and World Jewry. In Judenheit und Politik Rosenberg also stressed the extent of Jewish influence over policy-making in Britain. He noted, in particular, the stranglehold on the British press held by the Jewish press magnate and wartime Propaganda Minister, Lord Northcliffe, to whom "three-quarters of the most influential English newspapers belong". Jewish influence was not restricted to newspapers either; "besides Northcliffe", Rosenberg insisted, "a dozen ennobled Jews of the Upper House steer the ship of English politics". So was Britain eliminated as a prospective ally for Germany because the interests of her empire momentarily coincided with those of the Jews or because the Jews were determining British foreign policy? In the absence of an unequivocal statement from Rosenberg, it is difficult to say for certain.

Indeed, it is possible, of course, that his antipathy towards Britain had entirely different roots. It may have been simply the continuation of wartime
hostility towards an intractable enemy - this would be quite feasible, if impossible to prove from the evidence available - or even the result of racial prejudice. There is certainly a hint of this in his estimation of Britain and France in Judenheit und Politik. In this article, Rosenberg made it clear that, given their desire to dominate the world, the Jews had eventually to "debilitate all nations"; but, he argued, the Jews did not treat all the nations in the same way:

"The Jew has always hated the German people. Indeed, he does not exactly love the French or Anglo-Saxon either but he feels closer to them, and they provide him with far more points of contact than the Germans. The vain and ever more superficial Frenchman, the Anglo-Saxon, sensible and at the same time prone to bigoted superstition, both increasingly divorced from their original race, can become at any time far more approachable characters for the Jews than the German, despite all attempts at amity." (147)

Hence the declining racial quality of the British and the French made them particularly susceptible to Jewish influence. Two other nations, Russia and Germany, had, however, proved more resistant to the Jewish tactics of friendly collaboration and subtle control and, for this reason, the hatred of the Jews was directed primarily against those nations. (148) So the actual reason for Rosenberg's hostile view of Britain is far from clear from these antisemitic meanderings; but it is, at least, possible that racial considerations played a part.

In sharp contrast to Rosenberg's essentially negative attitude to England was his positive evaluation of Russia as a potential ally for Germany. In Judenheit und Politik, Rosenberg described the German and the Russian, whose
soul was "closely related to the German", as "intrinsically the spiritual antithesis of the Jews". (149)

In terms of contemporary politics, this polarity manifested itself not only in German but also in Russian opposition to Zionism and in the prevailing antisemitism in those countries. German and Russian national interests were therefore frequently at variance with the interests of the German Jews. As he remarked:

"When the war (1914-1918) broke out, the zionists found themselves in two opposing camps. It could be that a section of the German Jews at the outset conceived the struggle as one conducted against the antisemitic Russian government, (and) that the zionists, in part, believed that they could identify their interests with those of a German Eastern policy."

However the situation for German zionists proved increasingly difficult, more especially because Turkey - the power which controlled the land of their dreams, Palestine - was still Germany's ally. Ultimately, according to Rosenberg, they were forced to look to the Entente and especially England for support since neither the German nor the Russian government was enthusiastic about zionist plans. (150)

Germany and Russia were therefore the arch-enemies of the Jews, and this was the reason, in Rosenberg's eyes, for the Jewish-led Russian Revolution. Jewry was plainly determined to destroy Russia and the Russian people, accordingly the 'Jewish-Bolshevik' government had unleashed a 'pogrom' against the Russian people, even against "the Russian patriots, who under the czarist regime lay in prison or had gone into exile because they openly opposed a rotten system, these same people are now being cold-bloodedly
murdered or pushed out of Russia by the new rulers". (151) Tens of thousands of people were being eliminated just for being good Russians; no state had ever been laid so low, in Rosenberg's view and now the Jews were longing "to help Germany...to a similar fate". (152) Thus, Germany and Russia were perceived as being in the forefront of the battle against Jewry.

As one might expect from this analysis, Russia was in Rosenberg's opinion a fitting ally for Germany on the basis of their mutual interest in resisting Jewish machinations. As Rosenberg argued in an article in March 1919:

"German politics has scarcely any alternative than to make an alliance with the new Russia after the elimination of the Bolshevik government, and no indication of a possible approach ought to pass unutilized." (153)

So Germany and Russia were drawn together by their national interests - that is, their mutual hostility towards the Jews - but they were for the time being kept apart by the 'Jewish-Bolshevik' regime in Russia. But was this projected alliance simply, as it seems at first sight, the product of Rosenberg's ideological outlook? Or did racial considerations or observations of a power-political nature affect his decision?

Historians have generally assumed that Rosenberg's rejection of Bolshevik Russia as a potential partner for Germany was the prime example of how ideological considerations could determine alliance strategy. After all, Rosenberg did write in 1920 that "it is absolutely certain that in the event of fraternization between the present Germany and the present Russia, the men of the USP and KPD (the left-wing socialist and communist parties) would come to power" in Germany; (154) in other words, an alliance with Bolshevik Russia was out of the question because it would serve only to
promote Jewish influence in Germany. But the fact of the matter is that an alliance with the same country would be welcomed by Rosenberg, once Jewish influence had been eliminated. In other words, the present position occupied by a country in the contemporary world ideological conflict was NOT a decisive bar to a future alliance with Germany. If Rosenberg applied this guideline consistently, then the alleged current predominance of Jews in British politics did not automatically rule out the prospect of an Anglo-German alliance at some future date (provided that the Jewish influence were removed). Indeed, as we shall see below, (155) Rosenberg appeared to take a more favourable view of Britain when he perceived a clash between her interests and those of the Jews. This seems to suggest that, perhaps, the degree of infiltration achieved by the Jews in a particular country or the degree of compatibility between its interests and those of the Jews did not determine the long-term attractiveness of that country in Rosenberg's eyes, though they might well prevent an agreement in the short term. Clearly, whilst Rosenberg did attach great importance to a nation's attitude towards the Jewish question as a yardstick by which to measure its political reliability, it was certainly not the only criterion which he used.

Strategic considerations, for example, were also evident in his appraisal of an alliance between Germany and a non-Bolshevik Russia. In March 1919 Rosenberg was afraid that the Entente Powers were about to curtail their intervention in Russia and to abandon the nationalist cause in the Russian civil war. This would have serious consequences for Germany; as he observed:

"alone, unless all appearances are deceptive, she will have to share the role as outcast Cinderella with Russia and the same fate must lead both empires together." (156)
Evidently, Rosenberg believed that the balance of political power in Europe was also pushing Russia into the German orbit. But, even here, power politics was indistinguishable from ideology in Rosenberg's analysis because he believed that the policy of the Entente powers was being determined by the Jews of the London and New York stock exchanges, who "reckoned the size of their profits...in direct proportion to the degree of Russian bankruptcy". (157) On another occasion, Rosenberg pointed out that Jewish politicians were supporting the new Polish state in order "to build her into a breakwater between Russia and Germany". (158) So it would seem that considerations based on the balance of political power in Europe may have affected Rosenberg's judgement on the Russian issue but they appear to have been inseparable in his mind from the ideological struggle.

Another factor, which cannot be ignored when piecing together Rosenberg's attitude towards Russia, is the possible influence exerted by racial considerations; in other words, his policy towards Russia may have been inspired by a predilection for the Russian people or, at least, by the feeling that the Russians and the Germans shared some kind of spiritual affinity, rooted in their racial origins. The latter thought had clearly crossed Rosenberg's mind because in April 1919 in an article entitled Russe und Deutscher he set out to examine whether the similar fates of the two countries after the First World War corresponded to similarities in national character. In fact, Rosenberg argued that the Russian and German psyches were very different, moving on different planes and in different directions. Whilst the German could be characterized as a "man of action", the Russian displayed a marked propensity for a "brooding preoccupation with the infinite"; "just as his land is limitless, stretching out like an unending plain before him", Rosenberg explained, "so the Russian spirit
easily loses itself in uncertainty, resulting in the most unproductive musing and doubts". (159)

However, the Russians and the Germans did share one common characteristic in Rosenberg's opinion; that was a "toleration - so basic to their nature - of foreigners, even those (who are) outspokenly hostile". In the Russian case, "the pampering of non-Russians...had, without question, caused much humiliation" and, as a result, there had been an increase in Russian nationalism. Dostoevski, for example, had attempted to endow Slavism with a positive mission - the renovation of Christianity - and, predictably, wanted to see all the Slavs united in one state. In the German case, toleration of foreigners had led to "national disaster", with Germans constantly being "at daggers drawn with each other, not infrequently blaming themselves for everything unpleasant and presupposing...idealistic motives amongst the enemies". Since the end of the First World War, Germans had been far too servile with regard to their victorious opponents. (160)

However, whilst it is true that Rosenberg felt that excessive tolerance towards foreigners was a characteristic which the Russians and the Germans shared, there can be little doubt that he believed the Russians to be inferior to the Germans. In an untitled essay, dating from 1917, for example, he listed the good and bad qualities of the Germans and Russians as follows:

"One attributes to the first (the Germans) as good features fidelity, sincerity, honesty, perseverance (leaving aside intellectual qualities), as bad, coarseness and arrogance; to the latter friendliness and humanity on the one side, insincerity, inconsistency and inactivity on the other." (161)

The Russians definitely fare worse in Rosenberg's comparative analysis, especially when he sought to identify the source from which these traits
of character derived; those of the Germans derived from a "physical, intellectual and moral strength", those of the Russians from a "physical and intellectual strength and moral frailty". "In a nutshell", Rosenberg concluded, "the German has character, the Russian is characterless". (162) There is clearly, therefore, some justification for the claim that Rosenberg at this early stage, at least, articulated "a certain resentment of the Russo-Germans towards the Slavs". (163) Nonetheless, even though Rosenberg did regard the Russians as inferior to the Germans, one cannot assume that he viewed them as sub-humans or that he wanted Germany to expand at Russian expense; in both the articles quoted, Rosenberg was concerned merely to refute the case made by Dostoevski for the Slavs as a 'chosen people'. The denial of Russian superiority, therefore, did not invalidate the argument for a Russo-German alliance on racial grounds.

For all their differences, Rosenberg stressed in Russe und Deutscher, both countries seemed to face the same fate: the destruction of the framework of the state and its culture at the hands of the Jews. This was the ultimate consequence of their tolerance towards aliens - "chaos amongst the host people" fostered by the Jews. (164) It would appear, therefore, to have been their suffering at the hands of the Jews (itself the result of a shared weakness) rather than any feelings of close racial or cultural affinity, which persuaded Rosenberg that Germany and Russia should become allies.

So, once again, Rosenberg's antisemitic ideology seems to have determined his approach to foreign affairs. But was this simply what Rosenberg wanted his readers to believe? Were his ideological ruminations merely a cover for convictions which were, in fact, based on power political
considerations (or even racial prejudice)? On the evidence surveyed so far and, in particular, on the basis of his early essays dating from 1917 and 1918 which were not originally intended for publication and, therefore, perhaps not written for effect, this seems unlikely. For the moment one would have to conclude firstly that the degree of Jewish predominance in a particular country, for example Britain, and the extent to which its national interests coincided with those of the Jews, do appear to have affected Rosenberg's evaluation of that nation and do appear to have determined its attractiveness as a prospective ally for Germany, at least in the short term. The provisional support for a German alliance with a post-Bolshevik Russia would seem to confirm this as well as perhaps suggesting the possibility of change in the long run. Secondly, from the limited evidence available in this early period, it seems likely that racial bias did not decisively colour Rosenberg's attitude towards a particular country. Thirdly, power political considerations were evident in his writings but were not easily separated from the ideological frame of reference. In Rosenberg's case, perhaps, the dichotomy between a conspiratorial vision of world politics and the realities of world politics is a false one. His ideological flights of fancy seemed to have been stimulated by one or two concrete events, in particular the Balfour Declaration by the British Government and the prominent role played by a number of Jews in the Russian Revolution. These facts are almost certain to have influenced the response of an already committed antisemite to Britain and Russia.

Despite the world-wide ramifications of the Jewish question, Rosenberg's interest in foreign affairs was restricted essentially to the European
Dietrich Eckart, on the other hand, did take an interest in American affairs, perhaps because of his preoccupation with the power of capitalism and the evils of 'interest-slavery'. In Eckart's view, America was Germany's "deadly enemy", who had been neutral at no time during the First World War; she had wanted Germany's annihilation throughout. The reason for this was that America was very much the tool of "Anglo-Jewish world capitalism", which was also determined that Germany should be defeated. In 1919, however, Eckart believed that Woodrow Wilson had prevented the complete destruction of Germany in order to forestall French ambitions to become "master of the continent"; to do this, Germany had, therefore, to retain "at least the semblance of a certain dangerousness". Eckart's interpretation of American foreign policy in 1919 was clearly a mixture of strategic and ideological preconceptions.

In general, Eckart referred rarely to foreign affairs. When he did, it is fair to say that his comments were more outspokenly racist than Rosenberg's but, nevertheless, reflected a very similar outlook. For example, Eckart described England as "the arch-Pharisee amongst the Aryan people" and France as "the Gallic Jezebel, this embodiment of feminine vanity and vindictiveness". He agreed with Rosenberg that Britain was "our chief enemy inside the Entente", and that Russia and Germany would be natural allies once the 'Jewish' regime in Russia had been removed.

Hopefully this chapter has demonstrated that between the end of 1918 and the end of 1919, Rosenberg, Eckart, and to a lesser extent, Feder, were
publicizing a number of ideas (none of them particularly original), which collectively would become the Weltanschauung of the young Nazi Party. Eckart expounded on the nature of 'Jewishness'; Feder warned about the excesses of 'interest-slavery'; and Rosenberg revealed the 'Jewish' manipulation of the Bolshevik Revolution. It was Rosenberg, however, who seemed to recognize the need to weave these fairly disparate ideas into a coherent antisemitic philosophy — in effect, to substantiate a Jewish world conspiracy theory by reference to back-stage intrigue in the twilight world of Freemasonry, Jesuitism and Zionism and to secret agreements behind the closed doors of the world's Stock Exchanges. Though we cannot be absolutely certain, the resulting Weltanschauung appears to have pre-determined Rosenberg's and Eckart's assessment of the major foreign powers. How far it would permit of subsequent modifications and what would cause such changes are questions to which we will return in Chapter 4.
2. HITLER AND HIS DEBT TO THE PAN-GERMANS

What political philosophy did the young Adolf Hitler bring to the German Workers' Party, when he attended its meeting on 12 September 1919? The generally accepted answer is that Hitler was 'Pan-German' in outlook; that his ideas were gleaned from the publications of the Alldeutscher Verband (the Pan-German League) and especially from its long-serving chairman, Heinrich Class. Recently Hellmuth Auerbach, reviewing the period of what he called "Hitler's political education" (1919-23) concluded that "his notions in these early years largely corresponded to the watchwords of the Pan-Germans". (2) Alfred Kruck, analysing the organisational and ideological contact between the ADV and the NSDAP, has gone further, suggesting that the Pan-Germans' influence on the NSDAP was "until 1923 almost decisive". (3) In the area of foreign policy in particular, Axel Kuhn has noted that in 1920 Hitler seems to have been markedly influenced by Pan-German goals. (4) The 'special relationship' which is reputed to have existed between the ADV and the NSDAP came to an end, it has been argued, after the Munich putsch, which the ADV condemned as the work of a "prima donna", and Hitler's attempt in retaliation to implicate Class in the treasonous plot against the state. (5) Finally, during his imprisonment in 1924, Hitler, according to accepted opinion, seems to have thrown off the intellectual heritage of the Pan-Germans when writing Mein Kampf which laid down his own anti-Russian Lebensraum ideology. (6)

Several elements in this historical record, however, need careful re-examination. Did a 'special relationship' exist between the ADV and the infant NSDAP in the early 1920s? When did Pan-German influence cease to affect Nazi fortunes? How far was Hitler influenced by Pan-German ideas on
foreign affairs at the beginning of his political career? Only the latter
question is strictly within the purview of the present chapter and it
is also the most important in view of the frequent, and often unsubstantiated,
attribution of Hitler's views to Pan-German sources. But clearly
an adequate answer to this crucial question is impossible without some
general consideration of the relations between the ADV and the Nazi Party.
Close and frequent collaboration could have led to direct organisational
as well as ideological guidance by the ADV. What is more, fuller examination
of the entire subject of relations between the ADV and the Nazi Party is
possible now that Class's second and unpublished volume of memoirs about
the 1920s is available. Therefore, the nature and political purpose
of the ADV and its contacts with the NSDAP will be examined before we
assess Hitler's debt to Pan-German ideology.

The ADV was one of the most significant and durable non-parliamentary political
associations in recent German history. Between 1890 and 1939 it formed a
kind of unofficial 'National Opposition' to governmental policy. Foreign
affairs was the original inspiration behind the ADV and, until the defeat
of Germany and the outbreak of the German Revolution in 1918, remained its
abiding pre-occupation. The ADV originated in the hostile response by
right-wing opinion to the Anglo-German treaty of 1890, which transferred
the North Sea island of Heligoland to Germany. Though impressed by the
island's strategic value, Pan-Germans opposed not only the reciprocal
concessions to Britain in East Africa but also the very idea of an agreement
with Britain, which represented the main obstacle to the creation of a
This desire for empire, which the Pan-Germans fully endorsed believing (perhaps mistakenly) that they were following the advice and ambitions of their great mentor Bismarck, led them to urge the German government to pursue an anglophobic colonial policy and to construct a large navy to compete successfully with Britain's. According to one recent authority, there is no doubt that the ADV managed to "influence a considerable portion of the German middle class in an anti-English direction and indeed to stir up feelings of hatred in times of national excitement during the Boer War 1899-1901 and the Agadir crisis 1911".

Bismarck's dismissal as chancellor in 1890 ensured, however, that the ADV did not concern itself solely with foreign affairs. At home, successive chancellors attempted - without much success - to emulate Bismarck's feat of balancing the often conflicting forces within the German political system: the landed aristocracy, the increasingly powerful industrialists, the Emperor, and the popularly-elected but relatively impotent Reichstag. Bismarck himself, out of office and aggrieved, orchestrated the chorus of criticism of the new regime until his death in 1898; this led Heinrich Class to dub him "the father of the National Opposition". Class, a lawyer from Mainz who joined the ADV in 1897, became its deputy chairman in 1904 and chairman in 1908, felt compelled to take up Bismarck's mantle and to build up the 'National Opposition' to official government policy. Most of Class's invective was reserved for Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, whom he considered "had none of the qualities needed to lead the German people in time of crisis".

The ADV sustained its dual role of criticising the lack of effective leadership at home and of advocating a more dynamic and expansionist policy
abroad through the pages of its weekly paper, the *Alldeutsche Blätter* (founded in 1894) and through the writings of its adherents, in particular Class himself. In 1909 he published an ideosyncratic interpretation of German history, *Deutsche Geschichte*, which was apparently "successful beyond all expectations", and in 1912 *Wenn ich der Kaiser wäre*, the book for which he is best remembered, appeared. In it, Class enumerated his grievances against the existing government (its failures, the absence of great personalities and especially the growing power of the Reichstag) and called for a dictatorship. The 'Kaiserbuch', as it later became known, was tremendously successful, going through five editions before the start of the First World War.

The First World War gave a great boost to the fortunes of the ADV and, more especially, to those of Class himself. In the field of foreign affairs, the sweeping victories in August and September 1914 whetted German appetites for territorial expansion, and the Executive Committee of the ADV quickly produced on 28 August a memorandum on German war aims, later published by Class under the title *Zum deutschen Kriegsziel*; its proposals for expansion at the expense of Belgium, France and Russia went far beyond those of Bethmann Hollweg's September Programme. The civilian government was afraid of alienating both neutral opinion abroad and socialist opinion at home, which supported the war (as far as it did) only as an act of self-defence. Therefore it tried to prohibit public discussion of expansionist ambitions and to prosecute Class, whose memorandum, circulating widely in Germany in December 1914, had stirred up considerable public interest. The courts, however, supported Class and he was able to organise a War Aims Movement in 1915 making contact with leading German industrialists such as
Alfred Hugenberg, then a director of Krupps, who felt, like him, that the war was Germany's opportunity to establish herself in Central Europe and to achieve autarchy. (21) The ADV, therefore, proved to have a powerful voice during the war aims controversy, helping to fashion public opinion and influencing governmental policy.

On the home front, the war, as Class later recalled, only reinforced his conviction that a real dictatorship was required, not the so-called 'silent' dictatorship of the German High Command, which had evolved out of wartime necessity by 1916; the best place for Hindenburg and Ludendorff, in Class's view, was directing the war effort and their involvement in domestic affairs was a needless distraction. (22) This arbitrary separation of domestic politics from the coordination of the war effort, showing little understanding of the nature of total war, led Class predictably to demand the removal of Bethmann Hollweg. But the Pan-German campaign to discredit the German Chancellor received little support, mainly, Class surmised, because a change of leadership in wartime might be construed by the enemy as a sign of weakness. (23) A series of controversies first over the suspension of unrestricted submarine warfare in face of the American threat of intervention, then over the future of the Polish state, which was re-emerging from the ruins of the Russian Empire and finally over the Hilfsdienstpflicht - the Auxiliary Service Law which required all men not in uniform to work in designated occupations - convinced Class that he must try to persuade General Ludendorff of the need for a fully-fledged military dictatorship. He apparently wrote to Ludendorff in 1917 pointing out that the High Command was suffering because of its involvement in politics and offering to discuss his proposals with him. (24) Perhaps surprisingly, Ludendorff seems to have agreed to meet Class in Kreuznach on 5 October 1917. The meeting proved fruitless; Ludendorff agreed that the High Command required a
political adviser (presumably eliminating the need for a civilian chancellor!) to prevent its impromptu and improvised excursions into politics in times of crisis; but he firmly rejected the idea of a formal dictatorship, preferring the existing position of nominal subordination to the German Emperor. (25)

With typical immodesty, in his memoirs, Class attributed the collapse and defeat of Germany to the fact that his advice had been ignored ("If only Ludendorff had taken my advice at Kreuznach"). (26) Writing in 1936, Class saw no reason to alter his conviction that Germany had been 'stabbed in the back'; the German Army had not been defeated in the field but by the very forces which he had warned against in the 'Kaiserbuch' - the Jews and the Socialists. (27) Defeat and revolution, therefore, brought no fundamental change in Class's outlook but they did galvanise and radicalise the ADV because after the collapse of the Empire the last Pan-German qualm about constitutional change - loyalty to the Emperor - was now removed. The ADV became a subversive force working for the overthrow of the Weimar Republic. The Bamberg Declaration issued by the ADV on 16 February 1919 was a virtual declaration of war on the new republic. (28) It is noteworthy that it insisted that a prerequisite for the reconstruction of Germany was the restriction of the influence of the Jews; antisemitism, so long advocated by Class, was now accepted for the first time as part of the official Pan-German programme of reform. (29) The events of 1918 evidently made antisemitic ideas more acceptable to the ADV. The result of this change was the creation in February 1919 of the Deutschvölkische Schutz- und Trutzbund, a sister organization designed to promote popular antisemitism. (30)

In the 1920s the ADV and, more especially, Heinrich Class engaged in various
forms of covert and subversive activity designed to overthrow the hated republic. Class opposed all suggestions for gradual reform, fearing the perpetuation of the November Revolution. Instead he worked for the establishment by force of the 'folkish dictatorship' outlined in the 'Kaiserbuch' in 1912. Class, whose ideas were notoriously hazy, appears to have envisaged a two-stage plan for the rejuvenation of Germany: a military dictatorship following a putsch, to be succeeded by a political dictatorship, probably exercised by the Hohenzollern Prince, Frederick William, a man who was very susceptible to Pan-German influence. (31)

But how was this process to be set in motion? The ADV did not attract the support of the masses. It had, however, always attracted men of experience and position, as the war aims controversy had shown. After 1919, Class began to cultivate a number of new collaborators, some of whom could call upon their own private army of supporters, others who could place their financial resources at his disposal. In 1920 the ADV helped to establish the Norddeutscher Ordnungsbloc{k} (NOB) to coordinate ties between the counter-revolutionary forces. (32) In 1920 Class collaborated briefly with the Bavarian counter-revolutionary, Georg Escherich, (and his Orgesch militia) but personality clashes led to an early breach. (33) The ADV seems to have played little part in the Kapp putsch in March 1920. Though Kapp had visited an ADV meeting in 1919, close contact had not been established, and though Class's friend, Dr. Paul Bang, was offered a post in Kapp's short-lived government, the ADV appears to have kept its hands clean on this occasion. (34) In 1922 Class formed a 'Dreibund' with Organisation Consul, the successor to the more famous counter-revolutionary group Brigade Ehrhardt, and with Dr. Otto Pittinger, leader of Bund Bayern und Reich who was working for the restoration of the Bavarian royal house,
the Wittelsbachs. Predictably this misalliance proved unreliable and short-lived; conflicting aims and petty jealousies were the main stumbling-blocks to successful collaboration. (35)

Opposition to the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr in 1923, however, seemed to impose on right-wing circles a much-needed unity of purpose and a cause to which personal ambition might be subordinated. Class, sensing an opportunity, began to cast his net further afield. In February 1923 he approached General von Seeckt, the head of the Reichswehr, with talk of a war against the French invaders and the establishment of a military dictatorship. Von Seeckt, though seemingly sympathetic to Class's ideas, rejected military action. (36) Undeterred, Class made contact with a number of Ruhr industrialists, notably Baron Heinrich von Thyssen (brother of Fritz Thyssen) and Willy Scheidt; both were keen to curtail the disruption of the Ruhr industries wrought by the occupation and even promised financial support for a private army against the French if one could be raised. But this support proved to be as elusive as the 'people's army' rumoured to exist in the Ruhr and on which Class pinned his hopes for a short time. (37)

As his previous undertakings had come to nought, Class again looked to Bavaria for support because this Land under the benevolent rule of Minister-President and later State Commissioner, Gustav von Kahr, and Munich Police President, Ernst Pöhner, was becoming a haven for counter-revolutionary forces. In mid-October, after one last effort to win the support of von Seeckt and the Reichswehr, (38) Class arranged several meetings with von Kahr and Pöhner in an attempt to organize a national uprising. Their plans were, apparently, to come to fruition on the night of 8-9 November 1923, but the action of the Hitler-Ludendorff group forestalled and ruined a
more widespread rising. Whether this rising would have been any more successful than any of the other hair-brained schemes in which Class had been involved over the years is at least doubtful.

The history of the ADV's and Class's machinations under the guise of a 'National Opposition' shows a remarkable, not to say fanatical, consistency of purpose combined with a considerable degree of unreality. Until 1918 they did have some success in influencing public opinion and, perhaps, even in modifying governmental policy; but after the Revolution the chances of success for a right-wing counter-revolution were extremely slight even without the intervention of Hitler and his followers in November 1923. This, of course, raises the question to which we must now turn of the relationship between the ADV and the NSDAP, and in particular between Class and Hitler before the rather abrupt parting of ways after 9 November 1923. (39)

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In 1928 Eckart Kehr remarked perceptively that the ADV was a "sort of political ideological holding company, which delivered intellectual armaments to other agitation associations". (40) That one of the beneficiaries of this ideological arms trade was the youthful German Workers' Party is clear. (41) However, the ADV influenced the development of the party quite substantially on a political and financial as well as on an ideological level. This claim has often been made but until now it has been difficult to substantiate it. The full extent of the ideological debt of National Socialism to the ADV will always remain the subject of speculation, since
few of the Nazi leaders revealed their sources of inspiration. But it is now possible on the basis of Class's admittedly partisan memoirs to be a little more precise about the nature of the contacts between the ADV and NSDAP and about the former's political and financial aid to the latter.

In a sixty-three page memoir, written in October-November 1936 and recently made available in full for the first time, Class gave a fairly detailed account of his relationship with Hitler and his party before 1933. (42)

As a historical source, this document has, of course, to be treated with care for several reasons. Firstly, Class felt, like many Pan-Germans, that the debt of gratitude owed by the Nazis to the ADV had never been adequately acknowledged and he clearly intended to set the record straight for posterity. (43) It is, therefore, quite likely that Class may have exaggerated his own and the ADV's importance and belittled Hitler's.

Secondly, as the account was written in 1936, some sixteen years after the earliest events which it describes, allowance has to be made for lapses of memory; these are most evident in Class's recollections of his first meetings with Hitler which include observations, which were evidently only made later. (44) The third reservation is the difficulty of locating corroborative evidence for these meetings, when quite often only Hitler and Class were present. Despite these important limitations, the document does provide a fascinating, if largely unsubstantiated, account of the financial and political assistance given by the ADV to the infant Nazi party.

It seems likely that Class first met Adolf Hitler in March 1920 and on at least two further occasions in that year. (45) Class's impression of Hitler was, as he recalled in his memoirs, to say the least, mixed. After being addressed like a public meeting - a fate shared by many of Hitler's
visitors - Class labelled Hitler "a political savage" and a "pronounced hysteric". Nonetheless, Class was impressed by Hitler's powers of political observation and his apparently genuine beliefs and, perhaps, recognised his true potential; "if he could manage to make contact with the Marxist following, it seemed probable that he could be capable of at least loosening the bonds that tie them to that party". Since Hitler offered the prospect of a more popularly-based 'National Opposition', Class decided to keep in touch with him. He asked his friends in the Bayerische Ordnungsblokk (BOB), the political arm of the Bavarian counter-revolutionary group Organization Escherisch (Orgesch), to keep him informed of the progress of the DAP. Dr. Helmut Hopfen, Class's associate in Bavaria, helped to publicize the DAP in the Pan-German press. Hopfen also facilitated contacts between the Nazis and the Austrian Pan-Germans as well as apparently persuading Hitler of the folly of supporting the Bavarian separatist movement led by Dr. Georg Heim. Following the Salzburg meeting of Austrian and German folkish groups from 7-8 August 1920, Hitler was in fact induced to undertake a speaking tour of Austria during which he attacked Heim's ideas for a Danubian confederation which would unite Bavaria and German Austria. The tour was probably paid for by the ADV.

Whether this was the first occasion on which the ADV rendered financial assistance to the Nazi cause is a matter of some debate. Several historians have claimed that the ADV gave the DAP considerable material assistance in its early years but, as Franz-Willing has pointed out, none has produced the slightest piece of solid evidence to substantiate this. It has been claimed that the ADV came to the party's financial aid during the Kapp putsch, that Class gave Hitler 100 marks after their meeting in August 1920, and that in December 1920 Hitler requested 60,000 marks to buy the
Völkischer Beobachter (VB) as a party newspaper. (52) Class's memoirs make no mention of these transactions but he does mention Hitler's request in the middle of 1921 for 60,000 marks to cover the cost of establishing a party cell in Berlin - a development, which he had probably suggested to Hitler through the offices of the BOB in an attempt to bring the party more directly under Class's influence. Class promised to raise 30,000 marks, but Hitler, according to Class, rejected the idea on the grounds that he could not afford to spend three or four weeks in Berlin, setting up the cell; since he had no-one to represent him in Munich and there was no other speaker of note in the party, his first duty was to remain and build up the Munich party base. (53) One wonders whether Hitler suspected the ulterior motive behind Class's offer or whether he was more influenced by the fear of an impending leadership crisis within the party in the middle of 1921. Since it now seems likely that Hitler did not plan the leadership crisis beforehand, the probable explanation is that his negotiations with Class were curtailed by events in Munich. (54) There can be no doubt, of course, that the leadership crisis made Hitler aware, if he was not aware already, of the danger of creating an alternative focus of authority in Berlin. (55) However, one assumes that no money changed hands on this occasion since Hitler abandoned the Berlin project.

According to Class's account, his next meeting with Hitler was on Whit Sunday 1923, but meanwhile Pan-German money had begun to flow into Nazi Party coffers. In 1922 Class apparently intervened reluctantly to save the VB from bankruptcy by raising two installments of 15,000 marks to pay off the paper's creditors. Class complained in 1936 that he had not received any thanks from the paper or the party for this assistance. (56) Though this was Class's usual grievance and the main reason why he claimed more credit than
he had been given for the rise of Hitler, it is probable that this story or one quite like it is genuine. On occasion, even Hitler admitted privately his financial indebtedness to the ADV; in 1923, for example, when Bruno Wenzel, the founder of the party cell in Hanover, asked Hitler whether he should accept an offer of over a million marks from the business manager of the ADV, Freiherr von Vietinghoff-Scheel, Hitler replied: "if you can get 10 million so much the better. Those are the sources from which I also in part draw". Clearly the ADV did give financial succour to a party, which, it felt, might attract the mass support which the ADV itself could not attract. Equally clearly, Hitler had no qualms about accepting such assistance provided his leadership and freedom of manoeuvre remained unimpaired.

The political assistance given by the ADV to the NSDAP was, of course, indistinguishable from the financial. ADV recommendations undoubtedly helped to open doors for Hitler in the difficult early years of the 1920s. But Class's recollections make it clear that the NSDAP was only one of many recipients of ADV patronage. This, of course, conflicts with Alfred Kruck's suggestion that a "special relationship" existed between the ADV and the Nazi party, a claim which he bases primarily on the ADV's recommendation that members of the Deutschvölkische Schutz-und Trutzbund - dissolved in 1922 in the aftermath of the murder of Walter Rathenau - should join the NSDAP. This episode should perhaps be seen as an illustration of the cynical pragmatism of Class's dealings with extremist groups rather than as a display of firm commitment to the Nazi party. Such groups were vehicles for Pan-German propaganda and were abandoned as soon as they created problems. When the Trutzbund was dissolved, the NSDAP was its natural 'heir', since it was of very similar character, the only difference being "not in forms of organization or structure and methods but in energy". The NSDAP, therefore, enjoyed no special relationship
with the ADV, and certainly the ADV had no great control over the Nazi party as the events of 1923 were to show.

Indeed in 1923 when Class was trying to coordinate the counter-revolutionary forces of North and South Germany, he was reluctant to approach Hitler since, as Class recalled in his memoirs, Hitler "had lost contact and gone his own way". (61) Hitler obviously felt under no obligation to flatter his benefactors with attention. Nevertheless, when Class did meet Hitler on Whit Sunday 1923 in Berlin to brief him on a projected national rising, Hitler promised to cooperate and indeed to go with Class "through thick and thin". However, only two days later, Hitler indicated the depth of his personal commitment to Class's cause by failing to attend an important meeting of the counter-revolutionary leaders in Munich, sending Göring instead. (62) Class speculated on the reasons for Hitler's absence; perhaps his attitude to the Pan-German leadership had been poisoned by Class's enemies or perhaps Hitler considered the contact to be "politically useless". (63) A simpler explanation might be that Hitler, since he had sent Göring and had not therefore completely abandoned the project, was merely maintaining his freedom of action. Later, as Class revealed, Hitler learned of everything discussed at the meeting but "committed himself to nothing". (64) Thus even before the abortive putsch of 8-9 November 1923 - Hitler's attempt to pre-empt the counter-revolution plotted by von Kahr and Class - Hitler had displayed what the Pan-German Deutsche Zeitung was later to call "the vanity of a prima donna". (65)

It would be wrong, therefore, to suggest that a special relationship existed between the ADV and the Nazi movement. Their political goals may have been compatible but their personalities were not. At his trial following the Munich putsch, Hitler did his best to implicate Class and the ADV in a plot
to overthrow the Republic, a ploy which, as Class rightly perceived, could do nothing to help his own case and could only damage the reputation of the ADV. Class escaped indictment but relations with Hitler were permanently embittered and Class felt justified in labelling Hitler a 'homo afidelis', a man incapable of keeping his word. (66)

However whilst Hitler's actions certainly did not imply any gratitude towards the ADV leadership, his appreciation of the political significance of the Pan-German League is discernible in isolated references in his speeches and letters. Early in his career, Hitler was very much inclined to spring to the defence of the ADV, which was frequently under attack in the Weimar Republic. In September 1921, for example, Hitler berated a Bavarian separatist, Otto Ballerstedt, for dwelling on the old question of Prussian-Bavarian rivalry, which distracted attention from the real struggle between the Germans and the Jews, and for "putting the blame on the Prussians, Pan-Germans and Junkers for things for which today the Jews are exclusively accountable". (67) The most common criticisms levelled at the ADV were that it had caused the First World War and then prolonged it by its virulent propaganda. (68) On various occasions, Hitler defended the ADV on both charges; "one always blames the Pan-Germans for 'war guilt' but who", he asked in April 1920, "conducted German policy in the last years before the war? It was not the Pan-Germans but the Pan-Jews". (69) In April 1923, Hitler denied that the Pan-Germans were responsible for prolonging the conflict: "the guilty ones...are not Ludendorff, Wilhelm II, not the Pan-Germans but those who always prevented Germany from creating a strong Wehrmacht" (i.e. those who fought the military budget and militarism). (70) So most certainly Hitler was inclined to defend the pre-war record of the Pan-Germans.
Nonetheless, Hitler's attitude towards the Pan-Germans after the war was always rather ambivalent; he respected what they had tried to do before the war but felt that they had had their chance and had failed to take it. Hence in 1923 he remarked that "we all depend politically on the All-deutscher Verband about which we can only complain that, despite its correct analysis and the long existence of such an influential organization, up to now it had done no practical work. But we can make up for that by using its resources". (71) These comments may help to explain Hitler's reluctance to commit himself whole-heartedly to Class's cause in 1923. Certainly after the failure of the planned counter-revolution in 1923, Hitler's attitude towards the ADV became more critical. During his imprisonment in 1924, the Nazi party had to respond to several proposed political alliances; in March 1924, Otto Wenzel, chairman of the Hanover party cell, received the following communication from party headquarters: "in order to prevent continued misunderstandings, it is once again reiterated that all kinds of special alliances with the 'Deutschnationale Volkspartei', with the 'Bund Wiking' and with the 'Alldeutscher Verband ', with the 'Vereinigte Vaterländische Verbände' are out of the question". (72) In May 1926 Hitler was particularly disparaging about the "frightful danger" posed by the recently uncovered plot by the "bloodthirsty society of the Pan-German Leagues and Class" to murder von Seeckt and to overthrow the government; "we all know", Hitler commented, "that they will not launch a coup....You know that we have nothing to do with the agents of the Pan-Germans". (73) Hitler's main criticism of the ADV, therefore, seems to have been of its continued failure to put its principles into practice by means of a seizure of power.

Heinrich Class complained in 1936 that Hitler made no reference to himself
or the ADV in *Mein Kampf*. (74) Whilst it is true that they are not mentioned by name, Hitler did, in fact, discuss, or to be more accurate, launch a verbal assault on the activities of the ADV in his autobiography. Hitler described how he had often to warn the young Nazi party "against the deutschvölkisch wandering scholars whose positive accomplishment is always practically nil, but whose conceit can scarcely be excelled". His description of these people leaves little doubt as to their identity, "people whose sole recommendation for the most part lies in the declaration that they have fought for thirty and even forty years for the same idea. Anyone who fights for forty years for a so-called idea without being able to bring about the slightest success, in fact, without having prevented the victory of the opposite has, with forty years of activity, provided proof enough of his own incapacity". (75) Surely only Class and the Pan-Germans and a few others could claim forty years in service of the folkish idea? If one accepts that the Pan-Germans, amongst others no doubt, were being attacked in *Mein Kampf*, then it is possible to analyse in more detail Hitler's attitude towards the ADV. "The danger above all lies in the fact that such natures do not want to fit into a movement as links, but keep shouting off their mouths about leading circles in which alone, on the strength of their age-old activity, they can see a suitable place for further activity". Hence Hitler was suspicious of their claims to leadership; in his view a new movement should not be led by proven failures. A second danger was their resistance to new ideas: "they do not want to benefit the idea of a new doctrine, they only expect it to give them a chance to make humanity miserable with their own ideas". Almost equally reprehensible in Hitler's view was their cowardice; "they rave about old
German heroism...but in reality are the greatest cowards that can be imagined". (76) These were Hitler's main grievances against the ADV; they were all implicit in his dealings with Class before the Munich putsch but emerged with greater virulence after it.

In short then, there was no special relationship between the ADV and the infant Nazi party, but one built on mutual reticence and suspicion. Contact between the two groups was intermittent, if at times financially beneficial to the Nazis. The Munich putsch proved to be the occasion not the cause of the rupture; it confirmed Class's worst fears about Hitler; it proved to Hitler that he, unlike Class, was a man of action. Nevertheless, despite the growing disillusionment of Hitler with Class and the Pan-Germans in the 1920s, Hitler clearly embarked on his political career full of veneration for the pre-war achievements of the ADV in particular in the field of propaganda and ideology. And contacts with the ADV in the early 1920s enabled Pan-German thinking to influence the ideological development of the Nazi party. Hitler was most certainly interested in their ideas on foreign policy; during the meeting on Whit Sunday 1923 for example, Hitler asked Class for his views on the international impact of the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. (77) This incident shows that Hitler still respected Class's opinion on international affairs in 1923 and it raises the crucial question, to which we must now turn, of how far Hitler's outlook on foreign affairs had been fashioned by Pan-German influences.

At his trial in 1924 Hitler claimed that he had left Vienna in 1913 "as an absolute antisemite, as a deadly enemy of the whole Marxist outlook and as
a Pan-German in my political persuasion". (78) It must be emphasized at this point that Pan-Germanism was not entirely synonymous with the ADV and it is clear from Hitler's fulsome praise of the Austrian Pan-Germans in Mein Kampf that they, rather than Berlin-based ADV, were responsible for his early (pre-war) political education. (79) However, as we shall see, Hitler was well-acquainted at the end of the First World War with the major pre-war publications of the ADV leadership. So what ideas did the Pan-Germans propagate before 1914? And did the First World War transform the Pan-German outlook? In attempting to answer these questions a composite picture of Pan-Germanism can be built up as an essential prerequisite to an assessment of the extent to which Hitler shared these views.

It is less difficult than one might imagine to isolate the essential characteristics of pre-war Pan-Germanism because the members of the ADV were in fact committed to a distinctive approach to domestic and foreign affairs, one fashioned in conscious imitation of what were felt to be Bismarck's guidelines and in opposition to the 'New Course' followed by his successors. (80) There were, of course, differences of opinion and emphasis but general agreement existed on the broad outlines of policy. The basic aim of the Pan-German movement was the defence and fortification of the German race throughout the world. Inside Germany this meant the re-animation of national consciousness and the curbing of threats to it within the country. (81) Outside Germany this entailed, firstly, the protection of the Germandom of German communities in foreign lands (with their eventual re-unification with the German Reich as a distant objective) and secondly, the expansion of German influence abroad. (82)

Heinrich Class in the most famous Pan-German publication, Wenn ich der
Kaiser war, written in 1912, gave the clearest exposition of the policies behind these principles. In order to preserve Germanism at home, Class recommended, for example, the expropriation of Polish property to limit Polish influence in Upper Silesia, Posen, and West Prussia. Similar measures were envisaged for the population of Alsace-Lorraine which remained "curiously" pro-French and anti-German, though here measures to limit French influence might, he felt, follow another war with France. (83) In foreign affairs the Pan-German creed was expansionism. "All the states surrounding Germany, who had not lost their 'will to power' " , Class pointed out, "are gaining ground and widening their spheres of influence." If ever a state had cause to increase its sphere of influence, Class argued, it was the German Empire "because her population figures are rising so quickly, her industry needs new markets, her whole economy (needs) land for the production of tropical and semi-tropical products of all kinds, the supply of which has brought us into an unbearable dependence on others". (84) Hence, to Class, German expansionism was justified by the need to avert demographic catastrophe and to promote economic self-sufficiency.

As Class realised that his plea that Germany was overpopulated would fall on deaf ears because of clear evidence of underpopulation in some areas, he acknowledged the need for internal colonization: "the correct colonial policy lies in the East of the Empire", he wrote, but this was "not sufficient argument against overseas colonization. It means doing one and not neglecting the other - the government, on the other hand, is neglecting both". (85) There was no mistaking Class's preference for overseas colonies, however; they would provide not only markets for German industry and supply vital raw materials, but also a reservoir of "land for the settlement
of Germans for whom some day the fatherland will have no more room". (86)
Behind this fear of future overpopulation lies Class's horror of Germans emigrating and his determination never again to allow a "loss of people through emigration to foreign states". (87)

The German government remained unimpressed by Pan-German logic and declared that Germany was 'satiated' as far as territory was concerned, and, much to Class's evident disgust, concentrated on the defence of German economic interests during any international crisis that arose. (88) However, the government's reaction to successive Moroccan crises in 1905, 1908, and 1911 seems to have led Class to re-examine his arguments for overseas colonization. Whilst Class believed that West Morocco was "aptly suited to meet all (Germany's) needs, industrial and demographic", the government chose to give up its claims to it in return for concessions in the Congo basin. This compromise, Class felt, was an "offence against the future of our people", (89) presumably because settlement of the Congo basin by Germans was out of the question and links with the fatherland would be extremely tenuous. (90) It seems he now felt it preferable to acquire colonies nearer home in Europe rather than overseas. However, he did recognise the difficulties involved in colonization on the European continent, not least of which was that "any expansion in Europe from now on is only to be brought about by successful wars since neither France nor Russia will be so humanitarian as to cede parts of their country to us". (91) Even if land were acquired by war, there was the problem of what to do with the indigenous population; evacuation was one solution but it contravened the laws of "historical development and modern rights of citizenship"; it was, therefore, Class argued, only to be adopted as an expedient in case of extreme necessity. (92) It should be noted though that some of
Class's colleagues expressed no such qualms about territorial expansion inside Europe, nor, of course, did Class once the First World War began; but in the 'Kaiserbuch', he maintained that the only realistic choice facing an increasingly overpopulated Germany was between overseas colonies suitable for settlement by Germans and "deciding again to allow emigration of Germans into foreign states". However, once war began in 1914, a war which Class welcomed incidentally as "the greatest piece of luck that could have happened to us", the ADV rapidly produced its programme of war aims, published somewhat later by Class as Zum deutschen Kriegziel. This programme called for extensive annexations in both Western and Eastern Europe at the expense of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland, and Russia. So it would seem that Class's stated preference for overseas colonization as the main goal of the ADV was purely tactical. It was geared to the requirements of a period of international peace and did not imply a commitment to uphold the territorial status quo in Europe.

Such foreign policy objectives either determined or derived from the ADV's assessment of the major powers as the 'Kaiserbuch' again shows. Overseas colonization, for example, raised problems, especially with England. In Class's view, England regarded the development of Germany's economic and naval potential as a direct threat to her security and generally "feared for the basis of her own position as a world power (Weltmachtstellung)". To these existing economic and naval tensions was added a third: "the German striving for land overseas and the English decision not to allow such acquisitions". English fears were unfounded in Class's opinion; "we have no political plans that will be dangerous to England"; there were, therefore, "no grounds for rivalry, even less for enmity, if only England were willing to recognise that 65 million people can
live in Germany proper (Stammdeutschland), perhaps even 75 if necessary, but not 80 or 90 million". (98) In short, then, if England accepted the demographic argument in favour of German colonial expansion, the "two germanic blood cousins" could "shape the fate of the world together". (99) So whilst he hoped for Anglo-German collaboration, realistically Class anticipated a struggle to establish German colonies overseas.

The second power, with whom Germany was likely to have trouble, was France. Once again, Class felt Germany to be blameless. Frenchmen were motivated by the desire to avenge the defeat of 1871 and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, but in reality they were now "in the tow of others - Russia and England" and hence had become the enemies of Germany. (100) Since 1871 the French had provoked Germany on many occasions, now she was prepared to take the offensive if provoked again; in such a situation, Class considered that "France would have to be destroyed", part of her territory would have to be taken as "lasting security" and her colonial possessions to help to meet Germany's needs. (101) This seems to confirm Class's determination to seize territory in Europe should conflict occur.

As far as Russia was concerned, Class stressed German passivity and moderation towards her; "viewed from the German standpoint", he wrote in the 'Kaiserbuch', "no sensible reasons are to be found which ought to alienate the two (powers)". (102) The Russians, he believed, saw things very differently because "the Russian hates the German with the instinctive hatred of one who is an absolute inferior in face of his superior". Hatred of Germany was, according to Class, the driving force behind Pan-Slavism and Russia was likely to go to war to protect the Slavs in the Balkans; he saw "nothing tempting but also nothing to be feared" from a war with Russia or even Russia allied to France, since the enormous potential of the Russian army was more than offset by the indiscipline of the Slavs.
In the event of a German victory in such a war, Russia should be "required to make territorial concessions which give us a better frontier as well as land for settlement, a process in which evacuation cannot be avoided". (103) So, once again, Class seems to have been arguing that Germany should not risk war to win land for settlement inside Europe - overseas colonies prevented far fewer problems - but if war broke out, she should take the opportunity to acquire land in Europe.

In effect, therefore, Class was already elaborating Pan-German war aims in 1912. These plans also included Belgium and the Netherlands towards whom Class believed his Pan-German colleagues had been too patient. He applied the law of the jungle to these states; "such small states", he argued, "have already lost their right to exist, for only the state, which can carry it through with the sword in the hand, can assert its right to independence". (104) Should war occur, they would be presented with a choice between limited national independence in alliance with the German Empire or cooperation with England and France, in which case "they would be annexed". (105) So Pan-German policy made no secret of the fact that it intended to neutralize possible opponents either by agreement or by conquest.

How then did the Pan-Germans regard Germany's allies in the Triple Alliance? Class's views on both Austria-Hungary and Italy in the 'Kaiserbuch' were equivocal. On the whole, he supported the Aistro-Hungarian alliance "because it corresponded to the needs of both allied powers and carried with it the security of permanence". (106) He did have doubts about the internal strength of a state in which the two halves were mutually antagonistic but, ultimately, he put his faith in the alliance because of the Austrian army:
"the alliance with Austria-Hungary has value for us only if her army is strong and efficient; should the army decay because of the further internal disintegration of the states, then any interest in this alliance will disappear." (107)

In brief, Class felt that Germany should continue to aid Austria-Hungary in maintaining her great power status, just as she had done during the Bosnian crisis in 1908, when German support had, he believed, forestalled hostile intervention by Russia and possibly France. (108)

It should be stressed at this point that Class's views were not shared by the Austrian Pan-Germans, whom Hitler admired so much or even by all members of the ADV inside Germany. The Austrian Pan-Germans were very critical of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a racial conglomeration and in 1906, their leader, Georg von Schönerer, published the Alldeutsches Zukunftsprogramm, which called for preparations for a 'German-Austrian' Anschluss with Germany. (109) This was to be accomplished by a German agreement with Russia. This anti-Hapsburg and pro-Russian stance became the object of considerable controversy after 1912 with the emergence after the Balkan Wars of a Russian-backed Serbia as a direct challenge to the security of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This polarized Pan-German opinion in Austria-Hungary and Germany; in 1913 Reismann-Grone, one of the leading members of the ADV inside Germany, criticized Class's commitment to the Hapsburg alliance, claiming that "if we were tied to this cadaver any longer, it would bring us to ruin". (110) After a trial of strength in September 1914 the pro-Austro-Hungarian and anti-Russian line of Class and his friends carried the day. But it is important to emphasize once again that Hitler was in all probability exposed to the anti-Hapsburg, pro-Russian propaganda of von Schönerer in the years immediately prior to the outbreak of the First World War.
Of Italy Class was more critical; from her, he argued in the 'Kaiserbuch', "we may expect nothing and we have nothing to fear". Italy lacked weight in the power-political sense and was really in the Anglo-French orbit; "she is not our ally but plays at being it". Class predicted that Italy would not fulfil her duties as an ally in the event of war with Britain and France.

Of the other powers, only America received due consideration from Class. Whilst she was overtly hostile to Germany, America would, Class forecasted, be neutral in an Anglo-German war since none of her interests would be in jeopardy. Indeed, America would exploit all the economic advantages that war in Europe would bring and "afterwards exploit all the political advantages which would accrue from the necessary weakening of Europe". Class also thought that Germany should limit her economic dependence on America for certain goods by colonizing areas "in which we could produce those products ourselves in order to liberate ourselves from American suppliers". So the Pan-German attitude towards America was, it seems, primarily determined by the drive for autarky.

It is interesting to examine the criteria by which Class formulated Pan-German foreign policy. At first sight it might appear that Class's views were dictated by Realpolitik or Machtpolitik. It was usually power-political considerations - such as England's fear of Germany's economic and imperial rivalry, or the French desire for revenge or America's economic pre-eminence - which led to his conclusions. However, there is evidence of ideological motivation behind some of his suggestions. At root, of course, the whole Pan-German credo was racially inspired; it aimed at the preservation, and extension of the influence of the Germanic race. Class's assessment of the English seems coloured by admiration for the achievements
of his 'Germanic cousins'. There is a suggestion of racial arrogance in his condemnation of Russia and the Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He regarded America's blatant rejection of German wooing as typical of an American "Unkultur". (114) The Belgians and the Dutch meanwhile suffered from the common ailment of "lower-quality German blood". (115)

In all these cases, it is difficult to estimate the relative contributions of racial and power-political factors to Class's assessment of the power concerned; but, in the case of Japan, racial characteristics appear to have been of decisive significance. Despite his admiration for the "heroic patriotism of the Japanese", Class rejected the idea of exploiting Russo-Japanese tensions in the event of a war between Germany and Russia because this "contradicted the German racial conscience (Rassegewissen)"; for if, he explained, "we want to build our whole internal policy on race and want to make (it) sound again by establishing the rule of idea of race, then external policy must be subordinated to the law of race". (116)

This law, Class explained, "prevents us from joining with a coloured race against a white race...from joining with any other race against a white race". On these grounds, therefore, an alliance with Japan was out of the question, a decision which Class himself recognized would cause a "so-called Realpolitiker" to smile. (117) It is difficult not to accept Class's words at their face value, since the common hostility of Germany and Japan towards Russia certainly provided tactical grounds for cooperation; but this was rejected because of racial scruples.

At this point, there does not appear to have been any link between Class's antisemitism and foreign policy. Whilst he identified Jewry as a force at work behind social democracy and the press in Germany, he did not yet
see any international coordination behind Jewish policy.\(^{(118)}\) Indeed, when he argued that the Jews were pursuing the moral and political destruction of Germany not "according to a plan and intentionally" but instinctively, this seems to preclude any suggestion of an international conspiracy.\(^{(119)}\)

Such then was the Pan-German outlook on foreign affairs with which Hitler was probably acquainted before the outbreak of the First World War. Pan-Germanism was expansionist ostensibly in the colonial rather than the European sphere; it assumed English, French and Russian hostility to German ambitions, though its own attitude towards Britain was not unfavourable; a majority of Pan-Germans supported the alliance with Austria-Hungary but not with Italy; its strategy was a combination of Realpolitik and racial prejudice.

Was the Pan-German view of the world transformed by the First World War? The answer seems to be in the negative. Events appeared to confirm Class's predictions; Germany stood by Austria-Hungary and Italy proved to be an unreliable ally. The only prediction which went sadly astray concerned the outcome of the war; Germany's defeat was a terrible blow to Pan-German pride. Yet when with the publication of the Bamberg Declaration of 16 February 1919 the ADV announced its return to political life, the old optimism about saving Germany (if the right steps were taken) had returned. Despite a greater emphasis on measures to combat Jewish influence, the ADV's prescription for Germany's ills was very much in line with the pre-war formula; the build-up of the army and the revival of national spirit;
in essence, the goal which the ADV set itself was the political education of the German people. Foreign affairs remained of crucial importance to the ADV since it believed that "the explanation of the fundamental questions of external policy" would be "the most significant way" of achieving this goal. (120)

According to the Bamberg Declaration, little had changed in foreign affairs during the war; the ADV placed no faith in the League of Nations or in hopes of a lasting peace and was more than ever convinced that Germany's enemies were out to destroy her. (121) In fact, Europe had been transformed by the war and the ADV could not escape the consequences of Germany's defeat. For example, the re-emergence of a Polish state meant the loss of territory in West Prussia acquired at the time of the partition of Poland; this, the ADV was not prepared to accept; "the Imperial region in the East as far as it encompasses portions of the earlier Polish state, belongs because of the facts of history to Germany; also the parts settled by the Poles have become through German endeavour the genuine possession of the German people which can never be renounced". The same principle applied to the Nordmark and to Alsace-Lorraine; this, according to the ADV's Bamberg Declaration, was all German land. (122) The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the November Revolution in Germany in 1918 also changed the ADV's attitude towards Germanism in Austria. The ADV now supported the Anschluss of German-Austria with the German state, and demanded "that the whole of German-Austria including the German western area of Hungary as well as the ancient German colonial area of the Baltic lands be taken into the National Federation". (123) In addition, the war deprived Germany of her overseas colonies and not surprisingly, the ADV wanted the return of these "stolen" territories. (124)
As well as changes brought about by the defeat of Germany and her allies, the Pan-Germans had to adjust to changed circumstances in Russia. The two revolutions of 1917 had been unexpected but, in the short term, helped to realize Pan-German ambitions. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed by Germany and the new Bolshevik government in March 1918, seemed to satisfy the requirements laid down by Class in the 'Kaiserbuch' and again in his pamphlet on Pan-German war aims in 1917. The Alldeutsche Blätter wrote in March 1918 of the treaty:

"if we compare what the German sword has gained for us in the East with the war aims of the Alldeutscher Verband, as our League's chairman Heinrich Class has presented them in the belief of a German victory in his pamphlet 'Zum deutschen Kriegsziel', then it shows that the armistice has in the main realized what we hoped for from the fates.... In the East our goals have become facts." (125)

Class, speaking at an ADV conference in Berlin on 14 April 1918, expressed his satisfaction with the Brest-Litovsk Peace; in 1912 he had wanted the greatest possible weakening of Russia, who had for so long threatened Germany's eastern frontier, and, in his opinion, the war had to be "waged until Russia's alien border states had been detached and she was divorced from her economically productive areas.... This goal had been reached. The eastern flank is relieved, Russia is destroyed and will not in the foreseeable future pursue a policy of conquest". (126) Of course, Germany was very rapidly deprived of the fruits of victory over Russia in 1918. But it seems likely that the ADV kept the 'solution' of March 1918 in mind as its policy aim for the future.

Class believed that Russia under Bolshevism was no longer a serious threat to Germany. In a speech on the general international situation at an ADV conference in Frankfurt in late September 1920, Class suggested
that "of Russia (it) need only be said that it is languishing in frightful decay...dangerous for our fatherland only if it succeeds in assisting Bolshevism to victory on German soil". (127) The identification of Jewish leaders behind the Bolshevik regime did not, therefore, significantly alter what was already an anti-Russian outlook; it merely reinforced it. (128) In general, however, Class was worried about Germany's position "being reliant on the goodwill of her enemies, of whom the strongest at present, like France and England, want our complete destruction, or like the United States who watches our fate with heartfelt indifference, of whom the basest, like the Poles, pursue the policy of naked robbery which conforms to their character and their history". (129)

Though the political constellation of Europe had been transformed by the First World War, the Pan-German outlook changed very little; the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire made the Anschluss with German-Austria a more urgent demand; the loss of overseas colonies and territory in Europe merely reinforced Pan-German arguments about Germany being overpopulated; the Pan-German view of the major powers remained essentially the same, since events seemed to have borne out Class's forecast about them. But much as the Pan-Germans tried to suggest that Germany faced an external situation similar to that of 1912, they could not ignore the changes which had occurred; Germany was now defeated, weakened, and isolated - a fact of life as unpalatable to the ADV as it was to a young Austrian-born orator just beginning his career in politics in 1919.

How far was the young Adolf Hitler a 'typical' product of Pan-Germanism?
How far did he accept the general approach to foreign affairs? How far did he agree with Pan-German assessments of individual great powers? Accurate answers to these questions are very difficult to find because relatively little is known in any detail about the early, and presumably politically formative, years of Hitler's life in Linz, Vienna, and Munich before 1914. This has in fact led to some highly inventive interpretations. (130)

Unimpeachable sources for Hitler's early political development are few in number and limited in content. Among them, the recollections by August Kubizek of a youthful friendship with Hitler, *The Young Hitler I Knew*, and a number of letters and postcards from Hitler to his friends are the most valuable and act as an essential corrective to Hitler's idiosyncratic account of his early life in *Mein Kampf*. (131)

As noted above, Hitler declared in 1924 that he had been a Pan-German before he left Vienna in 1913. In *Mein Kampf* he went even further suggesting that when he arrived in Vienna in 1907, his "sympathies were fully and wholly on the side of the Pan-German tendency". (132) But whilst he fully accepted the ideas of the Austrian Pan-Germans, he was critical of their methods; "the Pan-German movement", he wrote, "was right in its theoretical view about the aim of a German renascence but unfortunate in its choice of methods. It was nationalistic, but unhappily not socialistic enough to win the masses. But its anti-semitism was based on a correct understanding of the importance of the racial problem, and not on religious ideas. Its struggle against a definite denomination (Schönerer's campaign against the Catholics), however, was actually and tactically false." (133) Kubizek confirmed that Hitler was both an enthusiastic supporter of Pan-Germanism - he suggests that Hitler was influenced by his history teacher, Leopold Pötsch (134) - and a critic of its tactics; "the Schönerer movement would have needed much stronger socialist tendencies to capture Adolf fully". (135)
The most obvious effect which Austrian Pan-German propaganda had on the young Hitler was his hatred of the Hapsburg Empire. When Kubizek received his call-up for Austrian national service, Hitler urged his friend, if he was passed as fit, to cross into Germany secretly and avoid the draft because "this moribund Hapsburg Empire did not deserve a single soldier". (136) Hitler, like his fellow Austrian Pan-Germans, despised Austria-Hungary because it was a 'racial menagerie' in which Germans were no longer predominant. "Was this Vienna", Hitler evidently asked himself, "into which streamed from all sides, Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Poles, Italians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, and above all, Galician Jews, still indeed a German city?" Hitler clearly felt not; as Kubizek recalled later: "in the state of affairs in Vienna, my friend saw a symbol of the struggle of the Germans in the Hapsburg Empire....I hated this state which ruined Germanism". (137) On 5 February 1915 writing from the front to his friend Ernst Hepp, an assistant judge in Munich, Hitler revealed in one cryptic remark that his opinion of his homeland had not changed during the war; "Austria will fare", he wrote, "as I have always said she will". (138) It seems likely that Hitler as early as 1914 wanted the Anschluss of German-Austria with Germany after the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire; this desire was shared by most Austrian Pan-Germans, whose anti-Hapsburg sentiments Hitler so adequately mirrored. (139)

The other assertion about Hitler's politics before 1914 that can be made with some certitude is that he was already a confirmed antisemite. In Mein Kampf Hitler claimed that he had not really noticed the Jewish question before he arrived in Vienna; and that there had been few Jews in Linz and even they were so assimilated that he did not know that they were not Germans. (140) But Kubizek later recalled that "when I met
Adolf Hitler first (in Linz in 1904), his antisemitism was already pronounced". (141) There seems less reason to doubt Kubizek than Hitler on this matter; in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler seems to have been trying to suggest that the large numbers of Jews in Vienna led to his conversion to antisemitism - this lent more justification as well as drama to the story of his political awakening. Would he have been justified in becoming an antisemite in Linz with so few Jews around? In November 1921, for example, Hitler wrote to an unidentified 'doctor': "though I came from a fairly cosmopolitan family, the school of harsh reality turned me into an antisemite within a year (of arriving in Vienna)". (142) There can be no doubt, of course, that Hitler's experiences in Vienna deepened his convictions. Even Kubizek noticed how Hitler's "accumulated hatred of all the forces which threatened the Germans was mainly concentrated on the Jews, who played a leading role in Vienna". (143)

Whether Hitler picked up his antisemitism and anti-Hapsburg sentiments from the Austrian Pan-Germans or whether they sprang from inner conviction or from another source will perhaps never be known for certain. Once formed, however, his outlook remained constant; indeed, this is hardly surprising if, as Kubizek claimed, Hitler's "attitude towards books was the same as his attitude towards the world in general...He was a seeker certainly, but even in his books he found only what suited him". The vast amount of reading which Hitler started in Vienna was self-educating only in the narrowest sense; "I never felt", Kubizek recalled, "that he was seeking anything concrete in his piles of books, such as principles and ideas for his own conduct; on the contrary, he was looking only for confirmation of those principles and ideas he already had". (144) Whilst accepting Kubizek's
central observation, it must nevertheless be stressed that it is
unlikely that Hitler's opinions on all subjects were fully formulated by
1908, by 1914 or even by 1918. Hitler did learn from his studies even
though his frame of reference remained the same. There can be little doubt
that the period in Vienna and especially in Munich after 1912, was the
period of Hitler's political education as he himself later admitted:

"from the age of 20 to 24 years (1909-13), I became
more and more involved in politics, not so much
through meetings as through a thorough study of
practical economics and also of all the available
antisemitic literature. From my 22nd year onwards,
I applied myself with special fervour to military
writings and throughout these years I never missed
a chance of studying general history." (145)

Just what Hitler read and was affected by is very difficult to determine
since Hitler very rarely quoted his sources or acknowledged a guiding
influence on his political development. This was undoubtedly due to his
own self-image of a self-taught tribune of the people, which did not allow
him to acknowledge publicly an intellectual mentor. Privately, however,
and especially in the early years of his political life, when he regarded
himself as a Trommler drumming up mass support for his ideas rather than as
the Führer who would eventually lead the German people, (146) Hitler displayed
a fawning and almost sycophantic reverence towards his spiritual guides.
This is likely to have been his attitude towards Heinrich Class and
the ADV with whose work he must have been acquainted before the outbreak of
war in 1914. According to one account, when Hitler met Class for the first
time in 1920, he "kissed the hands of the Justizrat and acknowledged
himself to be his faithful pupil. He had read with inner excitement the
'Einhart' and after reading 'Wenn ich der Kaiser wär' was convinced that
in this book was contained everything important and necessary for the
German people". (147) This account cannot be corroborated but it does accord with accounts of other encounters between Hitler and his mentors. (148) Hitler was very reluctant to pay tribute in public to the contribution of the ADV to his early political education. Class described in his unpublished memoirs a meeting of the executive committee of the ADV in Potsdam on 18 May 1930, in which closer relations with the Nazi Party were proposed. The proposal was rejected on the grounds that "the leader of the party had let it be known that he did not intend such a move". (149) It seemed that Hitler wanted little close contact with the ADV, which surprised one of the members of the committee (identified only as Landgerichtsdirektor R) who, as Class recalled, knew Hitler quite well and "from many conversations knew how highly Hitler valued the work of the ADV, my Deutsche Geschichte, and the Kaiserbuch, he followed the Deutsche Zeitung and the Alldeutschen Blätter closely. He could say that the philosophy with which he, Hitler and his party were working stemmed in the main from the ADV". When asked why he did not express his debt to the ADV publicly and win Pan-German support, Hitler had evidently replied: "that I cannot do. A Führer can never admit that what he advocates he has got from others". (150) This story, if true, and one has to remember that Class was hardly the most objective of chroniclers, would suggest that the ADV's publications were a formative influence on Hitler's political development.

If Hitler's debt to Pan-Germanism cannot be fully established in the period before he embarked on a political career in 1919, it is somewhat easier to do so after 1919. Hitler's earliest speeches in 1919 and 1920 revealed his thoughts on the goals of a future German foreign policy as well as
his impressions of the major powers and it is possible by comparing these to Pan-German sources such as the 'Kaiserbuch' and Deutsche Geschichte to estimate Hitler's indebtedness to Pan-Germanism.

The foreign policy goals pursued by Adolf Hitler at the start of his political career were those summarized in the first three points of the DAP programme in February 1920:

"1. We demand the unification of all Germans in a Greater Germany on the grounds of the right of national self-determination.  
2. We demand equal status for the German people with regard to the other nations, the abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.  
3. We demand land and soil (colonies) for the sustenance of our people and the settlement of our surplus population." (151)

Elaborating on the first demand in a speech on 24 September 1920, Hitler described it as the duty of the post-war German generation "to agitate for the unity of all Germans in Europe" which, he argued, would "make possible the achievement of freedom from the fetters of slavery". (152) He urged his audience to agitate in particular for the Anschluss; he wanted to go to Austria himself and to speak because "the border posts must disappear". (153) Clearly the Anschluss with German-Austria was only part of the task of uniting all Germans in one empire. Hitler's concept of Grossdeutschland was linguistic not racial in inspiration: it was to contain all German-speaking peoples; as he put it in a speech on 5 September 1920, "as far as the German tongue is heard, we want to strengthen continually the feeling of belonging together". (154) These views clearly bear the imprint of the ADV.
This linguistic concept of **Grossdeutschland** may indeed be the most obvious intellectual legacy of Pan-Germanism to Hitler. But the ADV claimed a more direct and tangible role in Hitler's political education. Dr. Helmut Hopfen, Class's contact in Bavaria, claimed to have persuaded Hitler not to support the Bavarian separatist movements led by Otto Ballerstedt, Georg Heim, and Graf Bothmer during the meeting of folkish groups in Salzburg in August 1920. On the whole, this claim seems rather dubious; Hitler's commitment to **Grossdeutschland**, proclaimed in many of his early speeches, makes it unlikely that Hitler would consider cooperation with Bavarian separatist movements (except for purely narrow tactical purposes). Indeed, on 6 July 1920 (before the Salzburg meeting) Hitler had attacked the idea of a Danubian Confederation - the main separatist scheme advocated by Ballerstedt - for two reasons. Firstly, he disapproved of the House of Hapsburg, which might be restored to rule such a confederation; this, he argued, was the "dynasty of the criminals who bear the greatest responsibility for our collapse". Secondly, he questioned the anti-Italian rationale behind the proposed confederation; he believed that for Germany "the enemy stands on the other side of the Rhine, not in Italy or elsewhere". The Bavarian separatists could, therefore, expect little succour from Hitler. Nor did he need any Pan-German persuasion to condemn attempts to divide North and South Germany. In September 1920 Hitler's attacks on the separatists did become more frequent, possibly because of Pan-German advice or because of the increased prominence of the separatist themselves but Hitler's opposition cannot be attributed with any certainty to direct ADV intervention.

The demand for the unification of all Germans in a Greater Germany was, of course, very closely related to the second demand of the DAP's programme,
the abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, which deprived Germany of areas with German-speaking populations. Hitler in his speeches, therefore, called for the protection (and eventual return) of Germans in the South Tyrol which had been ceded to Italy, in the Sudeten part of the newly created Czechoslovakia, and in Upper Silesia, whose ultimate fate awaited a League of Nations plebiscite. (159)

It is a point often overlooked that Hitler opposed the Versailles Settlement on economic as well as folkish grounds. On 24 September 1920, he put his case most succinctly: "the shameful and humiliating peace of Versailles has robbed us of all our economic powers. The three main supports, coal, iron, and potash have for the most part been taken from us". (160) Germany, he claimed, had a 55 million mark deficit, mainly for payments made to coal producers for the free export of coal in the form of reparation payments, a deficit which would increase over the years because of interest payments (here the influence of Feder is perhaps apparent). In short, he argued, Germany would be economically enslaved by the Versailles Settlement. (161)

The needs of Germany's economy and her people dovetailed also into the third point of the DAP's programme - the demand for colonies. "The confiscation of the colonies", Hitler declared in an early attack on Versailles, "signifies for us an irreparable loss. We are compelled to take our raw materials from the Allies and indeed at so high a price that we are eliminated as competitors on the world markets". (162) The DAP also demanded the return of Germany's colonies "for the sustenance of our people and the settlement of our surplus population". Hitler referred very rarely to these arguments in the first few months of his political career and the relative weight attached to each is uncertain. In August
1920, however, Hitler pointed out that "because of the loss of our colonies our industry stands at the point of collapse. Either we get back market outlets or 20 million Germans must emigrate". It would seem from this that, like Class, Hitler saw the return of German colonies as a way of averting emigration by boosting the economy; in other words, colonies for Hitler were primarily an economic boon and only secondarily land for settlement. The ideal solution seemingly favoured by Hitler at this time, was a strong Germany with colonies which supplied her raw materials and bought the products of German industry, thereby sustaining the 90 million Germans in Europe.

This solution would appear to be entirely compatible with the aims of the ADV, which, as we have seen, also abhorred the idea of Germans emigrating. But did Hitler share Class's pre-war reservations about expansion in Eastern Europe or was he already in 1919-20 dreaming of a large continental empire? From the available - admittedly fairly sparse - evidence, this latter suggestion has to be rejected. The only hint of imperialist pretensions in Eastern Europe is a vague, equivocal statement in a speech on 19 November 1920 when Hitler, after describing the measures designed to restore Germany internally, declared, "and thus, when we are strengthened internally, we can also turn towards the East". Other accounts of this speech, however, give the impression that Hitler was referring to liberation of German areas lost in 1919 (perhaps Upper Silesia and the Sudetenland). The VB, for example, reported Hitler as referring to "the emancipation from foreign servitude which is only possible when the Germans pursue shoulder-to-shoulder internal reconstruction". This would certainly suggest, as reports of other speeches at that time do, that Hitler was calling for the liberation of "German brothers" in areas lost in 1919, rather than the conquest of non-German territory in Eastern Europe.
Hitler did express resentment of the inequitable distribution or maldistribution of land in Eastern Europe. "Is it right", he asked in an early speech, "that 18 times more land is available to each Russian than to every German?" (168) Speaking on the same theme in September 1920, Hitler asked: "What remains of the most natural of rights of men that of nourishment, when one reckons on 20 million too many (people) in Germany?" (169) Here Hitler cleverly used Clemenceau's famous statement that there are 20 million Germans too many as evidence of German overpopulation (not Clemenceau's point at all). However, there is no evidence to suggest on either occasion that Hitler was advocating a redistribution of European territory by force as a solution to Germany's spatial problems. The return of Germany's lost territories seems to have been the preferred solution at this time; as Hitler put it on 27 April 1920: "We are hoping that a united German Reich may soon arise again which reaches from Memel to Bratislava and from Königsberg to Strasbourg". (170) To be accurate, here Hitler was advocating slightly more than the resurrection of Germany's 1914 frontiers but not the conquest of non-German areas in Eastern Europe.

We may conclude, then, that Hitler and the DAP were aiming to restore Germany's Weltmachtstellung, her position as a world power, which had enabled her to follow an expansive economic and colonial policy before 1914. All this, of course, suggests a close acquaintance with pre-war Pan-German propaganda. Not only that, Hitler on occasion showed that he fully appreciated the role of the ADV in attempting to warn Germany's leaders about the mistakes which they were making. In April 1923 for example, Hitler admitted, when commenting on the erosion of the German Army's morale by pacifist ideas during the war and its tragic outcome, that "no-one except the Pan-Germans
has the right to protest, they alone have consistently warned against this policy". (171) He continued that "only the party of the National Socialists, which is free of all guilt, has the right to rescue Germany from her misfortune"; it would seem, therefore, that Hitler saw the NSDAP as assuming the mantle of the Pan-Germans. As early as November 1919, Hitler appeared to recognize the need to construct a kind of 'National Opposition' and was clearly aware of the Pan-German precedent; he declared:

"The present government cannot govern because it has not the faintest idea how to govern. When people criticise, one calls it reaction, one calls them Pan-Germans. We want to inculcate the people with defiance." (172)

It is, perhaps, therefore, not surprising that Hitler, like the ADV, gave the highest priority to internal reform as a prerequisite to the revitalization of German fortunes abroad. "Nations", he stressed in a speech in November 1920, "are first capable of a great rise when they have carried through internal reforms, which enable them to convert the whole race completely to foreign policy goals". (173) Again, Hitler reflected Pan-German thinking when he argued that Germany's revival must be generated from within and that she could count on no external assistance: "Germany can only help herself; she has to expect nothing from abroad". (174) In July 1920 Hitler criticized those in government who "ogle at France and England" and who hoped thereby "to glean concessions from abroad". (175) On the face of it, this would appear to be a specific rejection of international alliances but, in reality, Hitler was suggesting that the initial surge of national revival had to come from within, quite unassisted, and that only evidence of this could make Germany attractive to prospective allies; 'first awaken national feeling, then win power in order to become
alliance-worthy and to throw off the yoke", Hitler exclaimed on another occasion. (176) As we shall see, this approach did not prevent Hitler (or the ADV) from discussing prospective alliance partners.

Above all else, Hitler's early ideas on German expansion to meet the needs of a growing population - the key goal of his foreign policy - seems to hark back to the Pan-Germans and in particular to Heinrich Class's Wenn ich der Kaiser wär. Axel Kuhn has compared the 'Kaiserbuch' with Mein Kampf - a misleading comparison which tends to stress how far Hitler had moved by 1924 from Pan-German aims, rather than how close they were earlier. (177)

If Hitler's early speeches in 1919-21 are compared with the 'Kaiserbuch', however, they reveal that Hitler was aware of four alternative policies outlined by Class before the war from which Germany had to choose in order to deal with the increasing problem of overpopulation. Internal colonization - increasing the output of existing German land - was the first possibility discussed by Class. "But is it possible", Hitler asked, "to increase the yield of the land indefinitely?" (178) Like Class, he felt not, this was only a temporary solution; Germany had to acquire land - the second alternative. (179) This raised the question of territorial acquisition in Europe or overseas. As has been seen, in 1920 at least Hitler did not seem to be thinking of expansion in Eastern Europe and so there are no indications whether or not he shared Class's scruples concerning the annexation of inhabited territory in Europe. Evidently, Hitler, like Class, preferred (or at least pretended to prefer) colonial expansion. (180) If this second alternative was not chosen there remained, in Hitler's view, only emigration or world trade as solutions to Germany's demographic problems. Hitler was concerned about "the export of people" - the third alternative - as a solution, feeling like Class that Germans who emigrated were lost to
Germandom: "Our emigrants were only slave workers, they were fertilizer (Kunstdünger) for the nations". (181) The fourth alternative - "world trade" in Hitler's shorthand (182) - denoted the policy actually followed by the German government before the war - one which ignored colonization in favour of commercial development. Class called the policy "politically disinterested" - one which required of Germany in any crisis "only the guarantee of her economic interests" and which eventually would result in Germany's being reliant for food supplies on foreign countries. (183)

It would seem therefore that Hitler was indebted to the ADV or the Austrian Pan-Germans for the general goals of his foreign policy, but were his impressions of the major world powers derived from the same sources? The power most likely to oppose Germany's aspirations in the colonial field was - as before the war - England. For this reason, England was portrayed in Hitler's early speeches as one of Germany's "absolute enemies". (184)

The reasons for English enmity towards Germany were spelt out by Hitler:

"England, for centuries the world power, possessing all world monopolies. After the English had first sent out her own trading ships into the whole world, we succeeded later in making ourselves independent of her and in competing with her. Germany had gained a footing on every continent and was about to emerge as the head of the world powers. That was also the reason for the English to make war on us." (185)

Hence in Hitler's view, the threat of German economic competition heightened by German colonial expansion, which aroused British envy, had led to Anglo-German enmity - precisely the explanation offered by Class in the 'Kaiserbuch'. (186)

It is also significant that Hitler obviously admired the English and felt that Germans had something to learn from them. "The English", he declared in one speech, "have, as a people, reason to be proud." (187) The reasons for this admiration are not difficult to establish: "England with a few
million (people) rules practically one fifth of the whole earth. English naval power! English colonial power, the greatest in the world! England controls world trade", he declared on another occasion. Clearly, on naval, colonial and economic grounds alone, England was a model state which Hitler's Germany was to emulate. Hitler was also impressed by England's skilful diplomacy - in particular the use of alliance strategy. On the one hand, she had the ability to turn conquered enemies to allies and, with them, to conquer other lands; on the other she played with great dexterity the game of divide and rule. Hitler supplied a few examples: "the annihilation of Spain with the help of Holland, the latter's annihilation with the help of France, the latter's annihilation in 22 years with the help of other peoples and recently the annihilation of Germany". This cynical policy, Hitler admired as an example of "might making right" and one which ought to be followed. England was also quite capable of using "objectionable means" other than war, for example, the annihilation of the indigenous population of North America with whisky, the attempt to do the same in China with opium, the starvation of Indians by the export of corn and cultivation of cotton and rubber, and the use of concentration camps for Boers. Where did Hitler acquire this sort of information? One possible source is Einhart's (i.e. Class's) Deutsche Geschichte, which described, in some detail, the ways in which cynical British statesmanship defeated Spain, Holland and France. Though the similarities are often striking, clearly this was not Hitler's only source. In all probability, Hitler was synthesizing themes gleaned from a wide variety of folkish sources.

Certainly, the Pan-Germans respected the English for the same reasons as Hitler - the strength of the British Empire and the skilful diplomacy
and often underhand methods by which they maintained British primacy in the world. There can be no doubt either that, like the Pan-Germans, Hitler envisaged in 1920 English opposition to his own foreign policy plans; in so far as they were precisely those which had led to conflict in 1914 and therefore contravened the Versailles Settlement of which Britain was a staunch defender, this was inevitable. England in 1920, in Hitler's view, was one of Germany's "absolute enemies" and he would have fully endorsed Class's assertion in a speech in September 1920 that "England (along with France) wanted our complete annihilation". If Hitler did harbour secret designs of a future Anglo-German alliance in 1920 (indeed if Class did also), it was not the time to make a public avowal of this alliance policy.

Hitler's hostile attitude towards France was one of the constant elements in his foreign policy analyses between 1919 and 1945. France was, in his view, the hereditary enemy, traditionally seeking to annex the left bank of the Rhine and so obtain her 'natural' frontier. France's Rhenish aspirations must have been common knowledge at the time, so it is unlikely that they can be traced to one source, Pan-German or otherwise. The events of the First World War and the Versailles settlement, of which France was seen as the arch-defender, only reinforced Hitler's contempt for France. Hitler would support a war of revenge against the French at any time: "we are suppressed but even if we were defenceless, we would not avoid a war with France". The extent of his hatred for the French can be gauged from a comment rejecting the idea of a Danubian Confederation which, he felt, would make southern Germany dependent on French and Czechoslovakian coal: "rather a Bolshevik Grossdeutschland than a South Germany dependent on the
This comment is interesting also for the light it throws on Hitler's feelings towards Bolshevik Russia. National Socialism was to be so self-consciously moulded as the antithesis of Bolshevism that it is natural to assume that Hitler's hatred of Bolshevik Russia was an all-consuming passion from the start. Yet here he clearly expressed a far deeper hatred of France. So what was Hitler's attitude towards Russia and towards Bolshevism in 1919? In 1919 and early 1920 Hitler seems to have been quite favourably disposed towards Russia if one can rely on his retrospective analysis of Germany's pre-war foreign policy. In one of his earliest speeches, Hitler placed Russia in the category not of Germany's "absolute enemies" but of "nations, which as a result of their own unfortunate situation or as a result of special circumstances became our enemies". He identified two reasons why Russia had become Germany's enemy in the First World War. Firstly, her traditional desire for an "outlet to the sea" had brought Russia into conflict with various nations". Secondly, Germany's diplomacy - in particular the failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty - had alienated the Russians; "since Bismarck", Hitler explained, "we have pursued a Poland-policy (Polen-Politik). The so-called Reinsurance Treaty ran out in 1892 (sic), it was not renewed." This led to the Franco-Russian alliance of 1893 and ultimately the outbreak of war. It would seem therefore that, in Hitler's view, no real conflict of interests had existed between Germany and Russia. One might suggest that Russia's drive to the sea (the Baltic) ultimately threatened German interests but the fact that Hitler played this down indicates a certain predilection for cooperation with Russia on his part.
This apparent dichotomy in Hitler's belief in the compatibility of Russian and German aims before the war and his awareness of Russia's drive to the sea which clearly impinged on German interests in the Baltic states, clearly calls for clarification. It may be explicable in terms of Pan-German philosophy; in fact, Class's exposé of Russian foreign policy in the post-war edition of Deutsche Geschichte may have provided the framework of Hitler's own analysis. Class referred to Russian ambitions to gain access to the sea at Constantinople and in the non-Russian coastal areas of the Baltic. But these ambitions were not grounds for Russo-German opposition because they were not a threat to the Reichsdeutschen, i.e. to the Germans living within the Empire, but only to the Volksdeutschen, i.e. those Germans living outside the Empire, for example, those in the Baltic provinces. Hence Class could conclude that "the Reich German and Russian national interests ran nowhere contrary to one another but rather coincided in many places with each other". Class was arguing in 1919, as he had in 1912, that the Baltic Germans should not be allowed to spoil Russo-German relations, and it is possible that Hitler adopted the same line. Alternatively, Hitler may have considered Russia an Asiatic power, whose predominantly "Asiatic policy of conquest" posed no real threat to German ambitions.

What ultimately had spoilt Russo-German relations and led to confrontation in the First World War had been Germany's decision to support Austria-Hungary; as Class put it, "only the reichsdeutsch need that we protect the Austro-Hungarian empire stood between Russia and our fatherland. Over that it came finally to the breach." Hitler certainly on the basis of evidence dating from 1923 agreed with this interpretation of events. It has to be remembered, of course, that in 1913 Class supported the pro-
Hapsburg policy of the German Empire in face of criticism from the Austrian Pan-Germans, who were pro-Russian and he had revised his views after the war in a new edition of Deutsche Geschichte. Hitler seems to have been unaware of this controversy because in April 1923 he argued that Germany "had counted on Austria, against which the Pan-Germans would always have advised; by so doing Germany was greatly mistaken." (206) This would suggest again that Hitler had been a disciple primarily of Austrian Pan-Germanism, unless of course his views were simply gleaned from one of the postwar ADV publications such as the later editions of Deutsche Geschichte. There is some evidence to support the latter interpretation; Hitler's reference to Germany's support for Austria-Hungary's "Polen Politik" - that is the policy of stirring up Polish demands for independence within the Russian Empire - may betray his indebtedness to Class's own analysis. (207)

Hitler's favourable view of Russia, therefore, may have derived from pre-war Austrian Pan-German propaganda, though it may have been reinforced by Class's postwar re-evaluation of the Dual Alliance. The surprising point about Hitler's analysis is that he made no reference to Russian hatred of Germans, which breathed life into the Pan-Slav movement before the war. Perhaps this omission is itself attributable to Hitler's eagerness to show that Germany and Russia ought not to have been on opposing sides in 1914. Curiously enough, during the course of 1920 when Hitler's previously friendly attitude towards Russia became tinged with distaste for 'Jewish Bolshevism', he 'discovered' a Pan-Slavic threat to Germany, for he declared that "the ones who bear arms in Russia, are not fighting for Bolshevism, but for Pan-Slavism, if also with the help of Bolshevism. The Pan-Slav wave will soon wash away Bolshevism. An alliance with Russia would be impossible without the precondition of complete national solidarity in Germany." (208)
Possibly, therefore, Hitler's use of the Pan-Slavic threat was opportunistic; he either exaggerated or ignored it according to his own needs. On the whole, it seems that, at the start of his political career, Hitler saw Russia as a possible ally for Germany, a not altogether surprising attitude in a man steeped in Pan-German veneration for Bismarck and Bismarckian diplomatic expedients such as the Dreikaiserbund and the Reinsurance treaty, which had kept Germany and Russia together for so long in the late nineteenth century.

Italy also belonged to Hitler's second category of powers, who were not absolute enemies of Germany but who fought against her in the First World War. In the Italian case, the problem had been caused once more by Austria; "originally Italy had nothing against Austria", Hitler pointed out in a speech in December 1919, but then hatred of Austria began to be taught in the schools (just as French hatred of Germany was) though it took fifty years to erupt. Hitler also stressed the limited advantage of the Italian alliance to Germany before 1914; "men like Höltzendorf (sic), Bismarck and Ludendorff had long seen that Italy would not be on Germany's side if she took an active part in the war". Once again, Hitler's retrospective analysis was strictly in accordance with Pan-German propaganda; Class, as has been shown, questioned Italian reliability as an ally in the 'Kaiserbuch'.

Axel Kuhn has argued that the idea of an alliance between Italy and a Nazi Germany emerged in Hitler's statements in 1920; it was the first element in the foreign policy programme to emerge. This would certainly appear to have been the case. As we have seen, on 6 July 1920, Hitler argued that Germany's enemy lay on the other side of the Rhine and not in Italy. This rather negative expression of pro-Italian feeling soon
received positive reinforcement. On 1 August, in the knowledge that France and Italy were in conflict over the port of Fiume, which Italy had been denied at Versailles, Hitler declared:

"Away with the peace treaty! To this end we must use all means at our disposal: chiefly to make use of the conflicts between France and Italy so that we can get Italy on our side." (213)

Clearly Hitler saw that Italy would be useful in destroying the Versailles Settlement. But did this mean that an Italian alliance was now part of his own foreign policy programme? Or was Hitler simply giving contemporary politicians a piece of advice, namely, to exploit Italo-French tensions? It is impossible to say with certainty which interpretation is correct.

However, if an Italian alliance was now part of Hitler's own foreign policy programme, as Kuhn suggests, it must be emphasised that Hitler had not yet fully thought out his attitude towards Italy. The question of the return of South Tyrol from Italian to German rule had certainly not been resolved. This was a problem which seemed to affect Hitler deeply. The DAP's party chairman, Anton Drexler, first noticed Hitler in a meeting in August 1919 when this subject was being discussed: "A guest, a Professor Baumann, had said that 'Tyrol wants to join Bavaria but not Germany'. Thereupon Hitler answered so sharply that I gave him my book, 'Mein politisches Erwachen', "; Drexler later recalled. (214) In November 1920 Hitler referred to a comment by the German Foreign Minister Dr. Simons who had disclaimed any desire on the part of Germany to relieve the Germans in South Tyrol of Italian rule as "proof of a national incompetence": "the German state", Hitler went on, "must intervene every time for every single German". (215) The South Tyrol was clearly an obstacle to Italo-German friendship and Hitler had clearly not thought through at this time the political consequences of the alliance
with Italy, which he was advocating.

It is often said that Hitler was too narrowly European in his approach to foreign affairs and, even in the first year as a political speaker, a relative neglect of extra-European powers is evident. Japan, for example, received short shrift from Hitler: in the pre-war period, in Hitler's view, she had been one of the powers with no conflict of interest with Germany, she wanted merely "to keep the whites out of East Asia". (216) Significantly again this was in line with Pan-German opinion. America received rather more frequent attention. She, with England and France, was one of Germany's "absolute enemies". (217) Her prime preoccupation, however, was business and as "a land of money she had to intervene in the war in order not to lose her loans. It was also America who had the lion's share of the profits of war". (218) It should be noted once again that Hitler's interpretation of American intervention in the First World War was precisely the same as the one given by Class in the postwar edition of Deutsche Geschichte, and which denied the significance of submarine warfare, which is usually regarded as a major factor in bringing the USA into the war. (219)

In 1920 Hitler displayed a curious mixture of hatred and respect for American President Wilson; hatred because he believed that Wilson had raised the hopes of the German people for a just settlement with his talk of the 'Fourteen Points' and the League of Nations - the gap between the high ideals of the 'Fourteen Points' and the Versailles treaty was plain to see: "the Versailles treaty...is the work of the lowest secret diplomacy", he declared. (220) On the other hand, Hitler seemed to admire what he regarded as Wilson's cunning; "although this criminal Wilson was a great rascal,
one has to respect him because, by these means, he acquired advantages
for his people". (221) "Wilson", he declared on another occasion, "is
without doubt a genius". (222) This verdict seemed, to Hitler, to be
vindicated by the Senate's rejection of the Versailles Settlement and the
League of Nations and elicited from Hitler grudging respect for the United
States; "she is mighty enough and does not need the help of others,...
and she feels restricted in her freedom of action", he commented. (223)

In conclusion, then, it must be said that during his first year in politics
in 1919 and 1920, Hitler's outlook on foreign affairs was one largely
derived from Pan-German literature. He seemed to endorse the goals of
the ADV - the recreation of Germany's boundaries as of 1914, the Anschluss
of German-Austria with Germany and the pursuit of an overseas empire. He
may have harboured secret designs on territory in Eastern Europe but, if so,
these were certainly not aired in public. In the main, Hitler's views on
the major world powers can be gleaned only from an occasional retrospective
analysis of the diplomatic origins of the First World War but they certainly
bear the hallmark of pre-war Pan-German propaganda. Hence Britain, France
and America were described as "deadly enemies" of Germany since they
opposed her ambition to become a major world power. The only differences
were Hitler's total lack of respect for the old Austro-Hungarian Empire
and his corresponding belief that Germany and Russia had no major conflicting
interests in 1914 and it seems likely that these were attributable to
Hitler's exposure to the anti-Hapsburg propaganda of the Austrian Pan-
Germans before 1914. In 1920, however, Hitler began to recognise the need
to utilize Italian dissatisfaction with the postwar settlement as a way
of advancing the cause of Germany's recovery. This may indeed have been
the first sign of Hitler's emerging foreign policy programme; it was, perhaps, also the first sign that he was no longer satisfied with the old platitudes of the ADV.

In short, whilst Hitler does appear to have been profoundly influenced by Heinrich Class and Pan-Germanism in the formative stages of his political development, Hitler, as his postwar dealings with the ADV leadership after 1920 show, was increasingly inclined to go his own way. Just when and how Hitler outgrew his Pan-German heritage will be examined in later chapters.
3. **THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY ON HITLER'S OUTLOOK ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1919-20.**

During the first few months of his collaboration with the German Worker's Party, Adolf Hitler's comments on foreign affairs seemed largely to reflect Pan-German convictions, probably acquired before the First World War. The Versailles Settlement, by depriving Germany both of German-speaking lands in Europe and of her colonial possessions overseas, appeared to legitimize again the Pan-German demands for the unification of all Germans in one empire and the creation of an overseas empire. Furthermore the attitude of the major powers to the Versailles Treaty seemed to confirm the correctness of Hitler's diagnosis of foreign affairs mainly derived from Wilhelmian Pan-German propaganda. Britain and France, the two powers most hostile to Germany before the war were the settlement's chief defenders; America, rather disinterested in German affairs before 1914, proved unwilling to sign the treaty; Italy and Russia, whose enmity, Hitler believed, could have been averted by more skillful German diplomacy before 1914, opposed the treaty; the former was dissatisfied with her share of the spoils, the latter had not been consulted even though Russian territory had been disposed of.

However, it was not long before Hitler's analysis both of the pre-war diplomatic scene and the postwar diplomatic settlement began to show a subtle change. In his early speeches, for example, Hitler had argued that Russia and Germany had come into conflict only because of Germany's failure to renew Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and because of Germany's commitment to Austria-Hungary. By April 1920 Hitler was arguing that before the war only "the international Jewish press concern" had prevented an alliance between the two powers. (1) This comment, implying as it did that the Jews had been undermining Germany's international position before the
First World War, represents the first modification of Hitler's outlook on foreign affairs. Deeply rooted antisemitic prejudices were seemingly beginning to colour his assessment of world affairs.

Historians have been pre-occupied, quite understandably in view of later events, with the origins of Hitler's antisemitism. The debate over the timing and inspiration behind Hitler's original 'conversion' to antisemitism has already been referred to. It could be argued, however, that just as important is the date when he adopted an antisemitic world-view, that is when he ceased to regard the Jewish question solely as an internal problem for Germany and began to accept its international ramifications. At this point, arguably, Hitler might have begun to look beyond the mere expulsion of the Jews from Germany for a global solution to the "Jewish question"; the road to Auschwitz and the policy of extermination would then be clear. However that may be, the emergence of an international dimension to Hitler's antisemitism is clearly of relevance in the evolution of Nazi attitudes towards foreign policy and this chapter will attempt first to explain its origins and, secondly, to assess its impact on Hitler's approach to foreign affairs.

It has been argued that Hitler's ideas underwent an ideological transformation in the early months of 1920. Both Günther Schubert and Fritz Dickmann have tried to establish a causal connection between the emergence of a Jewish dimension in Hitler's references to foreign affairs and the publication of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. However, since no such change is discernible in Hitler's speeches before April 1920 and the 'Protocols' had
been published in Germany in December 1919, some have found this interpretation unconvincing. (4) Certainly this time-lapse needs explaining.

One explanation, of course, could be that Hitler's attitude towards antisemitism changed early in 1920. Heinrich Class, in fact, claimed in his memoirs that the party programme proclaimed by Hitler on 24 February 1920 came as a shock to him since Hitler had, in private, given him to understand that the Jewish question would not feature prominently in it. (5) Alfred Kruck has explained that Hitler was afraid of losing the "majority of his support, if he made his party antisemitic". (6) Since the party programme was overtly antisemitic, Kruck believes that Class must have convinced Hitler that antisemitism, far from alienating support, would in fact attract it on a large scale; thus, Kruck concludes, the ADV had pressurized "the NSDAP into becoming an anti-Jewish shock-troop". (7) This theory that Hitler was uncertain whether to commit the party wholeheartedly to an antisemitic course might, of course, explain Hitler's failure to make use of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion early in 1920.

However, in fact, it does not stand up to serious scrutiny. Heinrich Class's determination to stress his own contribution to the Nazi Party's success story has been noted already and though he was, perhaps, justified in drawing attention to the similarity between the antisemitic clauses of The Twenty-Five Points and his own demands in the 'Kaiserbuch', his claim that he effectively persuaded Hitler to commit the DAP to an overtly antisemitic course is a little difficult to accept. (8) After all, it seems very likely that Hitler had been a committed antisemite at least since he left Vienna in May 1913. (9) Furthermore, in a letter to Adolf Gemlich written in September 1919, Hitler had criticized the "emotional
antisemitism", which took the form of spontaneous pogroms and suggested instead a more rational and legal campaign against the Jews. "Antisemitism as a political movement should and can not be determined by the feelings of the moment", he argued, "but only by knowledge of the facts."(10)

Since the Jews were a distinct race and not a religious community and, therefore, formed a state within a state inside Germany, Hitler advocated an antisemitism based on reason, not emotion, which "must lead to the systematic legal opposition to and elimination of the rights of the Jew, which he alone of the foreigners living amongst us possesses (a law for aliens)".

The final goal of such a policy, Hitler concluded, "must however be the removal of the Jews altogether".(11) This letter, written four months before the party programme was publicized, would appear to leave little doubt about Hitler's commitment to a political campaign to limit Jewish rights in Germany.

Finally, it is difficult to accept that Hitler had 'soft-pedalled' on antisemitism in his speeches to the DAP between October 1919 and February 1920. On different occasions, he accused the Jews of being responsible for the Versailles Treaty, fratricidal strife in Germany and the American decision to intervene in the First World War.(12) All told, therefore, it is extremely unlikely that doubts about the adoption of an aggressively antisemitic programme prevented Hitler from exposing in public the international machinations of world Jewry.

A second explanation could be that Hitler was well aware of the international ramifications of the Jewish question in the period before April 1920 but chose for tactical reasons not to exploit the issue. It is quite evident, for example, from his letter to Gemlich that Hitler believed that the
effects of Jewish influence were felt throughout the world. He wrote of the Jewish preoccupation with materialism as follows:

"His power is the power of money, which in the form of interest effortlessly and endlessly multiplies itself in his hands and establishes over nations that most dangerous of yokes, the sad consequences of which are so difficult to perceive because of the initial glitter of gold....His activities produce a racial tuberculosis among nations." (13)

Hitler clearly believed that the Jews intended to undermine not only the German state but also other nations as well. Jewish methods varied from one state to another; "in an autocratically governed state he whines for the favour of the 'Majesty' of the prince and abuses it to batten on to his subjects like a leech. In a democracy he courts the favour of the masses, grovels before the 'majesty of the people' and yet knows only the majesty of money". (14)

Since Hitler clearly recognised in this letter and his earlier speeches that the Jews represented a world-wide menace why did he fail to make use of the 'evidence' of a world-wide Jewish conspiracy at this time? One possible reason is that in his early speeches he was primarily concerned with explaining Germany's problems and calling for a German national revival and, perhaps, felt that propaganda about an international Jewish menace would divert attention from the task at hand - a national revival. "The revival", Hitler wrote to Gemlich, "was being prepared for not by political leadership of irresponsible majorities under the influence of particular party dogmas (or) of an irresponsible press, not by phrases and slogans of international coinage, but only through the ruthless action of personalities with the capacity for national leadership and an inner sense of responsibility". (15)
In other words, perhaps, Hitler played down the international aspect of the Jewish question lest it reinforce the tendency to look for international solutions, a trend which Hitler had long abhorred. (16)

A third explanation, of course, would be that Hitler was ignorant of the supposed world Jewish conspiracy until the publication of Die Geheimnisse der Weisen von Zion in December 1919 and that this book gradually wrought the transformation of Hitler's antisemitism evident in his speeches after April 1920, as Schubert and Dickmann suggest. (17) However, the view that Hitler was ignorant of the world conspiracy theory at the beginning of 1920 is a little difficult to accept. Such theories had been circulating in antisemitic circles throughout 1919 and, as has been seen, Eckart had published extracts from a document very similar to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in October 1919 and had previewed the 'Protocols' in December 1919 in Agd. (18) Furthermore, Alfred Rosenberg asserted in a later aide-mémoire that "Adolf Hitler had already read Dietrich Eckart's periodical" and knew of his own articles in it before they met at the end of 1919. (19) It would, therefore, have been quite remarkable if Hitler had not been aware at least of the alleged Jewish manipulation of the Bolshevik Revolution.

One final explanation is worth exploring; namely that Hitler was fully briefed on the subversive activities of the Jews around the world at the beginning of 1920 and that he made full use of this potent propaganda material in his early speeches. The problem is that the reports which we have of these speeches drawn up by the Munich Police or Reichwehr observers do not reveal this. It should be remembered that these reports are very incomplete records of what Hitler said; they are short accounts of speeches lasting in fact between one and two hours and what was recorded depended very much on the interests of the recorder. (20) The latter argument should not,
perhaps, be carried too far. The police observer at the DAP meeting on 24 February 1920 was evidently waiting for antisemitic comments from Dr. Johannes Dingfelder, a physician and racist writer, who delivered the opening address, but was disappointed because, as he noted, "the word Jew never came into his mouth". (21) This might suggest, therefore, that the political intelligence services were on the look-out for expressions of antisemitic prejudices. Also it should be remembered that after April 1920 references to the role of international Jewry were recorded in similar reports. Even so doubts about the nature of the accounts of his earlier speeches should prevent confident assertions about what Hitler did not say.

In addition one piece of evidence from February 1920, in fact, suggests that the DAP was already exploiting the propaganda value of the international Jewish menace and the supposed world conspiracy. This is a neglected report of a speech by Dietrich Eckart to the DAP on 5 February 1920 on the subject of "German Communism". "The links between the German type of communism and the desires of the Jews for world-rule through capitalism are so clearly evident", Eckart claimed, "that it is not possible to avoid referring to them." (22) "All in all", he continued, "the communism fomented by the agitation of foreign alien races is in the last resort merely the means of realizing the goals of the supra-state plans of world capitalism." The German Workers' Party was, therefore, already making propaganda out of the alleged collaboration between 'Jewish' communism and 'Jewish' capitalism - the pivot of the conspiracy theory - nearly three weeks before the proclamation of the party programme and over two months before Hitler's first recorded and unequivocal invocation of the Jewish 'factor' in international diplomacy.
Eckart's emphasis is, however, undoubtedly on the threat from "German Communism" to the German state so, perhaps, the most judicious, if tentative, conclusion to be drawn, since Hitler seems at this time to have shared Eckart's preoccupation with the domestic threat from communism, (23) is that Hitler was well acquainted with the international dimensions of the Jewish question early in 1920 but was afraid of reinforcing the very internationalist trends which he saw as causing Germany's current problems. And, perhaps, it was the widespread interest generated by the publication of the 'Protocols' and their serialization by several right-wing journals which convinced Hitler after April 1920 that more political capital was to be made out of exploiting the world-wide Jewish menace. Ultimately Hitler and his party could not ignore the appeal of an all-embracing conspiracy theory.

If we accept that the publication of the 'Protocols' may have encouraged Hitler to exploit the supposed Jewish world conspiracy as propaganda for the Nazi cause, this does not mean that the ideas which Hitler now espoused were taken from the 'Protocols'. We should, therefore, examine the nature of Hitler's revised antisemitic philosophy and the likely origin of the revisions.

It should be stressed again at the outset that the fragmentary records of many of his speeches do not permit a full analysis of the change in Hitler's outlook. Nonetheless, on 17 April 1920 Hitler referred to two components of the Jewish world conspiracy - "the international Jewish press concern", which had prevented an understanding between Russia and Germany and eventually turned the whole world against "the model German state" in 1914, and "international high finance", which had robbed Germany of victory. (24) On 31 May Hitler declared that the ultimate aim of Jewry was to destroy
individual nations and to establish its own world-rule. (25) On 27 July, Hitler argued that the Jews were already in power in Bolshevik Russia. (26) These isolated recorded comments, whilst showing Hitler's awareness of the supposed goal of Jewish activity and some of their tactics, do not reveal whether Hitler as yet recognised how the various component parts of the Jewish conspiracy were subtly connected.

On 13 August 1920, however, he delivered a speech entitled "Why are we antisemites?", a fairly full account of which has survived and which succinctly illustrates the evolution of Hitler's antisemitism since his letter to Gemlich in September 1919. He began by establishing the differences between the Aryan and the Jew; the Aryan, hard-working, racially pure, spiritually vibrant and possessing state-building capacity was "the father of all later culture"; the Jew, work-shy, racially weak, and lacking spiritual or cultural creativity was materialistic, parasitic and, above all, instinctively driven to destroy other states. (27) Conflict between the Aryan and the Jew was, therefore, inevitable. Whilst the emphasis on Aryan qualities was a novel departure at least compared to the letter to Gemlich, this list of Jewish characteristics is a familiar one.

He went on, however, to expose the weapons and tactics which the Jews used to destroy other states. The first major weapon was international (loan) capitalism; its aim, according to Hitler, was to undermine the work ethic and to destroy national economics. "The Jew", Hitler revealed, "had learned how to acquire wealth without lifting a finger, without sweat and blood, by means of money-lending at huge rates of interest and of the manipulation of stock exchanges. In short they accumulated loan and stock exchange capital." (28) The influence of Gottfried Feder's ideas on 'interest slavery' is unmistakable here, but, unlike Feder, Hitler identified the
money-lenders with a particular race or races. "Interest slavery", he declared on another occasion, "must be broken; we are fighting the races who are the representatives of money." However, Hitler did draw a distinction - one carefully elaborated by Feder in his manifesto on the breaking of the slavery of interest in 1919 - between 'industrial' capital and 'loan' or 'finance' capital. 'Industrial capital' - money invested in tools, places of work and factories and working capital to tide a business through bad times - was, in Hitler's view, indispensable to production and a sound economy and should not be attacked. This had been the mistake of the past according to Hitler; attention had been diverted from the real enemy - 'loan' or 'finance' capital. This was an international form of capital primarily "because its bearers, the Jews, are international by their dispersal over the whole world" and it worked to "destroy whole states, annihilate whole cultures, to neutralize national industries, not in order to socialize them but to throw everything in to the jaws of international capitalism".

So international capitalism was one weapon used by the Jews to realize their ambition to rule the world; it undermined the economic independence of individual nations. Significantly, Hitler stressed that the new international element in the anti-Jewish struggle did not require an international response; this would be foolhardy since the Jews were behind international movements as well. Hitler was convinced that "one cannot put out fire with fire but only with water, that one will only break international capital, which belongs to the international Jew, by national strength". Once adopted, the international dimension to the DAP's antisemitism was evidently not allowed to dilute the demand for a national revival and clearly Hitler was sensitive to the danger of a campaign
directed against an international threat and this may explain his initial reticence about utilizing the Jewish world conspiracy.

The second tactic of the Jewish conspiracy which Hitler identified in his speech on 13 August was internal subversion; its aim was to weaken the national purity of a people which was the source of its strength: "in order to be able to organize, build up, and maintain his definitive world-rule", the Jew needed, Hitler explained, "the lowering of the racial level of other peoples so that he as the only racially pure (one) is able in the last resort to rule over all the others". The methods used to achieve this were many: the control of food supply via trade enabled the Jews to cause famine; they encouraged moral laxity and "the destruction of productivity and... when necessary, of the people's means of production as well". This, Hitler claimed, had happened in Russia, where the Bolshevik Revolution had brought the Jews to power; the factories had been destroyed not because they were not needed anymore but because they were. Another method was to destroy national culture; this, Hitler pointed out elsewhere, had also been attempted in Russia with "the mass murder of the intelligentsia". A final way of destroying national unity was by fostering class conflict; under the guise of extending democracy, the Jews would divide and rule a people. Once again, Russia provided the evidence. In short, therefore, the two main weapons in the Jewish armoury were international capitalism and world-wide revolution: "the revolutionary Jew makes the revolution and destroys everything", as Hitler once put it, "the bank Jew then rebuilds in order to fill his pockets". The link between Jewish-led revolution and international capitalism was most obvious in post-revolutionary Russia; "it was the intention of Jewish high finance to ruin Russia completely in order to increase profits". But the problem was not confined to Russia: "the Jew sits in Russia exactly as in Berlin or
Vienna, so long as capital is still in the hands of this race, there can be no question of reconstruction because the Jews are working hand in hand with the international capitalists, who are likewise Jews and (they) sell out us Germans". (39)

By the end of 1920 Hitler had evidently adopted the idea of a Jewish world conspiracy. It is true that many of Hitler's notions about the Jews - their lack of creativity, materialism, their destructiveness - can be traced back to the antisemitic writings such as those of Heinrich Class. (40) The difference was that in 1920 Hitler now identified an orchestrated plan behind Jewish activities whereas Class (and Hitler too in 1919), had regarded them as instinctive. This brings us to the crucial question: where did Hitler get these ideas from?

It is interesting to note that Class's first reaction to the apparent change in Hitler's attitude on antisemitism as revealed in the party programme was to suspect that "Dietrich Eckart's influence had been decisive". (41) Indeed, point 24 of the programme seemed to echo Eckart's own 'spiritual' antisemitism when it stated that the party "is fighting the Jewish-materialistic spirit in and around us". (42) One historian has objected that, according to Eckart's own account, his relationship with Hitler grew closer only during the Kapp putsch in March 1920 and that therefore Eckart could not have influenced Hitler's antisemitism. (43) However, this ignores the fact that Hitler knew of Eckart's work in Agd and indeed knew Eckart well enough at the end of 1919 for the latter to arrange an introduction for Alfred Rosenberg in his home. Whilst it would be wrong to suggest, as Eckart's biographer has done, (44) that he 'pushed' Hitler into antisemitism
(Hitler needed no external propulsion in that direction), it is possible that Eckart may have exerted some influence over Hitler and Drexler - the two main authors of the party programme. (45) Eckart had spoken on at least two occasions prior to 24 February 1920 at DAP meetings and on 5 February, as has been seen, he delivered a lecture on 'German Communism' which contained the main ingredients of the conspiracy theory - the secret manipulators, the power of the Jewish press, and the chaotic state of Russia as an example of the impact of direct 'Jewish' rule were all mentioned. (46) Eckart's influence on the DAP should not therefore be discounted.

Nevertheless other evidence suggests that there can be little doubt that Hitler's ideas on Jewish machinations bore the imprint of Alfred Rosenberg, who took a special interest in uncovering various facets of the Jewish conspiracy. It would be erroneous to suggest that Rosenberg supplied Hitler with all his ideas since Hitler probably kept abreast of current antisemitic literature in general at the time, as well as the output of Eckart and Feder. We have already referred to Hitler's adoption of Feder's views on interest-slavery, (47) but it is, perhaps, significant that Hitler chose to follow Rosenberg's line, ascribing loan capitalism to the influence of the Jews and that he chose to use Rosenberg's favourite euphemism for the powers of world-wide high finance "the black-red-gold international." (48)

This, of course, may be pure coincidence. However, it is very probable that Hitler drew on Rosenberg's revelations about the 'Jewish' Bolshevik Revolution and the involvement of the Freemasons in Jewish plans and, perhaps, also on Rosenberg's interpretation of Zionism. Hitler argued that Bolshevism was "completely a Jewish affair" (49) and held the Jews entirely
responsible for the famine and misery from which the Russian people were currently suffering. (50) Almost certainly, Hitler relied for information about Russia on the reports written by Alfred Rosenberg for Agd in 1919 and 1920. (51)

By the middle of 1920, Hitler had also accepted Rosenberg's explanation of how the Jewish conspiracy was being coordinated inside Russia; as he argued in his 'fundamental speech' on antisemitism on 13 August 1920, behind the few Jewish millionaires who were running the state stood "another organization, which is not even inside the state: the 'Alliance israélite' and its grandiose propaganda organization and driving force ... Freemasonry". (52) Though Rosenberg was, by no means, the only anti-semitic to investigate these organizations, Hitler's frequent contact with Rosenberg and his knowledge of the latter's writing make Rosenberg the likely source of these ideas. (53)

On the issue of Zionism, it is again quite possible that Hitler had merely imbibed Rosenberg's arguments first aired in Agd in 1919. It was, of course, difficult for Hitler to avoid taking a stance on the issue of Zionism since he was constantly advocating the expulsion of the Jews from Germany. This, of course, raised the question of basic human rights, for which Hitler had a suitable answer: "he (the Jew) ought to seek these where he belongs in his own state in Palestine". (54) So, like Rosenberg, Hitler supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine but, in common with Eckart too, he doubted the ability of the Jews to create a viable state of their own. In view of the Jews' alleged lack of creative ability, Hitler believed that the attempt to erect such a state would be "nothing more than a comedy". (55) Were it to succeed, however, it would
be an "academy for international dirty tricks" and a centre for the
direction of Jewish affairs. (56) Not only did Hitler endorse Rosenberg's
qualified and expedient approval of zionist aspirations, he also attempted
to explain away the apparent contradiction between this evidence of Jewish
nationalism and the alleged Jewish commitment to internationalism in the
same way as Rosenberg:

"the Jew exists as a state within a state...and
nevertheless represents the most nationalistic
race. Nationalism and religion complement one
another and push him towards world-rule." (57)

Like Rosenberg, Hitler believed, therefore, that Zionism was merely a cover
for aspirations of a more international if not global nature. There is
no indication that Hitler had accepted Eckart's rather more esoteric view
that Zionism had to be combatted since the cohabitation of Jews and Gentiles
was necessary to preserve the national order.

It seems probable, therefore, that the international dimension to Hitler's
antisemitism may have derived as much from the work of Alfred Rosenberg
as from the publication of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Indeed, the
contribution of Alfred Rosenberg to the evolution of the entire Nazi
Weltanschauung seems to have been seriously underestimated by recent
historians. (58) Rosenberg's later career in the Third Reich may have been
relatively inconspicuous; he failed in his ambition to become German
Foreign Minister in the 1930s and was not a particularly successful
Governor-General of the Eastern Occupied Territories during the Russian
campaign. But this did not mean that in the earliest years of the party's
existence he was a mere 'disciple' of Hitler.

Indeed, such an assessment flatly contradicts the view of well-informed
contemporaries, whether friendly, hostile, or indifferent to Rosenberg. Kurt
Lüdecke, who joined the party in 1922 and later became a friend of Rosenberg's, was advised by Hitler to get to know Rosenberg better; "he is the only man whom I always listen to. He is a thinker. His large conception of foreign policy will interest you."\(^\text{(59)}\) At the other extreme, Ernst Hanfstängl, a savage critic of Rosenberg in party circles, bemoaned the fact that "Rosenberg wielded tremendous influence over Hitler and his associates when it came to propagating this anti-bolshevist, anti-Russian line."\(^\text{(60)}\) Even the Berlin Police President, who in 1931 requested further information on Rosenberg's activities at the end of the First World War, formed the same impression: "Rosenberg is said to exert a strong influence on Hitler."\(^\text{(61)}\) The interest of the police had in fact been roused by a claim made by Otto Strasser, another of Rosenberg's opponents within party circles that the young Baltic German had spent the latter months of the war in Paris engaged in espionage for the Entente powers.\(^\text{(62)}\) The reason for this attempt by his own party colleagues to discredit Rosenberg was clear to the (unnamed) police investigator at the time; they acted, he claimed "out of envy of Rosenberg's influence on Hitler".\(^\text{(63)}\) That party colleagues should stoop so low indicates the apparent strength of Rosenberg's hold over Hitler during the Kampfzeit. The relationship between the two men, therefore, merits close investigation.

When the two men first met is a little difficult to date accurately. Rosenberg's memoirs refer to a meeting at Eckart's house at a time when Hitler had already delivered several speeches to the DAP.\(^\text{(64)}\) However, a short aide-mémoire written by Rosenberg in 1934 is more specific. According to this, Rosenberg first heard Hitler's name mentioned when Eckart had agreed to deliver a speech on "Bolshevism and the Jewish Question"
to the DAP in the autumn of 1919. (65) He did not actually see Hitler until the latter spoke at the 'Zum deutschen Reich' tavern on 10 December 1919 and it was "shortly afterwards" that Rosenberg met Hitler for the first time with a small circle of party colleagues at Eckart's house. On the strength of these two encounters with Hitler, Rosenberg decided in December 1919 to join Hitler's cause. As he wrote in 1934; "so this first acquaintance with Adolf Hitler as a speaker and then the further meeting shortly afterwards became for me the decisive turning-point of my political and intellectual life, the concrete affirmation of that which had once driven me thousands of kilometers from my home". (66)

In his memoirs written under the shadow of the gallows at Nuremberg, Rosenberg claimed, rather more honestly perhaps, that he had not been very impressed by his first discussion with Hitler at Eckart's house but it did lead to a subject which interested them both; they had "a not very detailed conversation about the Bolshevik danger". (67) Rosenberg recognised at their first meeting a remarkable similarity between their political ideas: "it only needed a few words to discover that in a most remarkable way (our) entire outlooks coincided so much that there were really no problems of substance". (68) Both were perhaps attracted to each other as 'self-taught' men; as Rosenberg put it later, "there, I found suddenly in another man the same opinions which I had formed through study in various areas". (69) Even in his memoirs, Rosenberg was still intrigued by the degree of agreement between Adolf Hitler and himself; they did, he admitted, have their "small controversies" but it was "uncanny how similar our opinions frequently were". (70) He remembered Hitler remarking after reading Rosenberg's notes for a speech at a party conference that "this is as much like mine as if we compared notes beforehand". (71) The cynic might
put down this similarity of ideas to mutual intellectual impoverishment but it was this cerebral compatibility which cemented the relationship between Hitler and Rosenberg in the Kampfzeit. Ideological affinity, however, did not breed intimate friendship or personal warmth between the two men, probably because Rosenberg was too serious and introverted for Hitler (possibly even too much like Hitler in some ways); Hitler seemed to prefer the company of more light-hearted acquaintances, men of the mould of Eckart or Max von Scheubner-Richter, a soldier of fortune, who entered Nazi circles in 1921. Hence, as Rosenberg rather bitterly remarked in 1945, Hitler "valued me highly, but he did not love me". (72)

Hitler's respect for Rosenberg was the result of the latter's tireless contribution to the ideology of the party which he chose to join late in 1919. During 1920, Rosenberg was busy publishing his first pamphlet and writing two more. (73) At the same time, he was contributing articles to Eckart's Auf gut deutsch and producing the journal himself "whenever the idleness of the poet came over Eckart and he felt incapable of political work". (74) When the NSDAP managed to purchase its own newspaper at the end of 1920, Rosenberg initially contributed only an occasional article (the first being in February 1921) because of his work for Agd. (75) However, once Eckart abandoned his own journal recommending its readership to transfer their allegiance to the VB and Eckart became its editor in chief with Rosenberg working as an assistant, very soon the cycle of events on Agd repeated itself: Eckart found himself incapable of sustained periods of regular work and Rosenberg "relieved him, in practice, of the entire editorial work-load". (76) During 1923 Eckart's attendance at the VB offices in the Schellingstrasse in Munich became so intermittent that Hitler declared that since Rosenberg was doing all the work he should get all the credit;
accordingly "on 10 March 1923 he became the editor responsible for politics in the VB". (77)

As Rosenberg was deeply involved in the day-to-day running of the VB, he was particularly well placed to exert considerable influence on the interpretation of current events. He did not shirk his responsibilities, accepting regular punishment in the form of fines or imprisonment meted out by the local courts for libellous articles published in the paper. (78)

It has, of course, to be admitted that there were limits to Rosenberg's value to the party. He delivered relatively few speeches to Nazi gatherings since he evidently lacked Hitler's ability to sense the mood of his audience; his first talk at the Rosenheim Ortsgruppe taught him that religion (and in particular Jesuitism) was far too sensitive an issue to discuss in Bavaria. (79) Also Rosenberg was not a rousing public speaker in the mould of Hitler or Hermann Esser. In June 1922 the VB reported on several speeches by party officials but tactfully commented that Rosenberg's was "a longer, tactical lecture dealing with the fundamentals". (80) Another possible reason for Rosenberg's reluctance to speak in public was his desire to keep a low profile until he gained German citizenship; as he commented in his memoirs, "until then (February 1923) I could easily have been deported as an 'undesirable alien' ". (81) How serious a threat this was is difficult to establish, but Rosenberg, in retrospect, made a lot of it, claiming that on receiving German citizenship he "called Eckart and told him that...all our former caution was now superfluous". (82) Whatever the truth of this, Rosenberg's talent evidently did not lie in oratory but rather in the day-to-day political editorship of the VB and in the painstaking culling of useful snippets of antisemitic information from folkish literature and current affairs.
Nevertheless, on the eve of his arrest following the failure of the Munich putsch, Hitler sent Rosenberg a note which read quite simply: "Dear Rosenberg, lead the movement from now on." (83) The reasons for Rosenberg's selection as party leader have intrigued historians ever since. Many have assumed that Rosenberg was chosen because he would not be a serious rival to Hitler himself when he returned after a short imprisonment. (84) Robert Cecil, Rosenberg's latest biographer, however, has argued that, since Hitler could not have anticipated a prison sentence of barely a year, Rosenberg may have been chosen on merit, admittedly given that the Munich putsch had narrowed Hitler's options considerably. (85) Now it has to be conceded that Hitler could not have predicted how leniently he would be treated by the German courts but the idea that Rosenberg was selected on merit to lead the rump of the Nazi Party is difficult to accept. Hitler had little choice; Eckart's health was deteriorating rapidly; Scheubner-Richter had been killed during the putsch; Ernst Röhm was in hiding; and Herman Esser and Hermann Goering had fled the country. (86) Furthermore, Hitler must have realized that Rosenberg had in Esser and Ernst Hanfstaengl strong jealous critics within the party. (87) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Hitler must have appreciated that Rosenberg did not possess the qualities of leadership; his undoubted achievements as political editor of the VB and his status as resident party philosopher did not equip him for party leadership. He was aloof and uncharismatic and, what is more, as Rosenberg acknowledged later, totally ignorant of "questions of an organizational nature". (88)

Hitler's appointment of Rosenberg was largely the product of necessity; Hitler had little choice but to commit the movement to a solid, competent, but uninspired leadership and hope it might survive his imprisonment.
Rosenberg, of course, proved unequal to the task of keeping the banned party together. This was partly because Hitler undermined Rosenberg's position, receiving and encouraging visits from Rosenberg's rivals in Landsberg, denouncing Rosenberg's decision to contest the Landtag and Reichstag elections in 1924 and the suggested fusion of the rump of the Nazi Party with the Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, which finally led to Rosenberg's relinquishing the party leadership. Nevertheless, Hitler still valued Rosenberg's collaboration; in April 1925, Hitler wrote to Rosenberg to persuade him not to proceed with libel actions against his two rivals, Esser and Hanfstängl, and though Hitler did have this ulterior motive for flattering Rosenberg, the letter is worth quoting:

"I know you, Herr Rosenberg, and regard you not only as one of the most valuable collaborators with our movement, chief editor of my former VB, to whom was due the main share in developing the paper so far as content was concerned, but also a man of whose integrity of personal intention I am absolutely convinced. In the difficult period in which, unexpectedly and without explanation, you took over the leadership of the movement, you tried to advance the cause of the movement as much as possible - with me, this conviction goes without saying; in the process, mistakes have crept in, as can happen with you as with anyone else. But it is not my object to give an opinion on mistakes, but solely on intentions and goodwill. For this I must give you the highest credit in everything." (90)

For a man who was ever grudging in his praise of others, this letter bears witness to the contribution which Hitler felt Rosenberg had made to the party in the period 1921-25. Evident in the letter, also, is a certain coolness and formality which characterized their relationship. Hitler needed Rosenberg's collaboration but did not have to make a friend of him. Rosenberg's contribution to the Nazi Party was, therefore, limited to the development of its ideology but the full extent of Hitler's indebtedness to Rosenberg in matters of ideology will become clearer as we now examine the
impact of the ideological transformation of 1920 on Nazi thinking on foreign affairs (and later when we trace the development of Hitler's alliance strategy).

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The usefulness of the alleged world-wide Jewish conspiracy to Nazi propagandists should not be underestimated. It enabled Hitler and others to utilize current events abroad in their antisemitic campaign; it enabled them to criticize the diplomacy of successive Weimar governments; and, finally and perhaps most important, it enabled them to interpret foreign affairs for their followers. Put another way, Nazi propagandists were able to give the impression that the Nazi Party had a foreign policy of its own (even when it did not). Pan-German analyses of pre-war diplomatic change were of limited use in formulating a day-to-day response to postwar developments; the Jewish world conspiracy provided an adaptable frame of reference.

Jewish influence in foreign affairs could, as Rosenberg had explained in 1919, be traced at several different points and, as 1920 wore on, Hitler began consciously or otherwise, to illustrate these in his speeches. At a national level, the Jews were shown to be impeding foreign policies dictated by national interest and the popular will, for example, on 6 July Hitler claimed that "all Germans want the Anschluss, only the Jews do not because otherwise too many antisemites would come into the Reichstag". In the same speech Hitler complained bitterly about the Jews who were representing Germans at the Spa conference. At an international level, the Jews were manipulating internationalist ideas to their own advantage: "the League of Nations", Hitler claimed in June, "is there only to guarantee
the relentless execution of this 'peace' which means the enslavement of the German people under the authority of international world-capitalism". (93) These 'revelations' about the Jewish manipulation of foreign affairs were, of course, very much in line with Rosenberg's earlier analysis in Agd. (94)

But did such observations bring about any real change in Hitler's outlook? Were the goals of his foreign policy or his view of the major powers fundamentally altered by the revelation of the hidden hand of international Jewry in world affairs?

Turning firstly to Hitler's foreign policy goals, it has been suggested recently that Hitler began to harbour dreams of eventual German world conquest in 1920 "as a reaction against Jewry's presumed goal of world-rule". (95) In other words, his own dreams of German "world-rule" were fired by the propaganda about similar Jewish ambitions. This seems to imply that Hitler may have mapped out his long-term goals for Germany before he formulated his intermediate goals of European hegemony and "the claim to world-rule he hid behind the fight against Jewry with its supposed striving for world-rule". (96) This is a neat and attractive theory, which acknowledges the significance of the antisemitic ideology to Hitler's foreign policy. Unfortunately it is pure speculation.

There is in fact no evidence to suggest that in 1920 Hitler's crusade against Jewish imperialism concealed his own dreams of world conquest. All one can say with certainty is that by the end of 1920 Hitler had developed a two-stage strategy for defeating the Jewish menace: firstly, a new revitalized Germany was to eradicate the power of the Jews inside Germany, then the struggle was to be carried out beyond Germany's frontiers. This
latter stage, by which the Jews would be rendered harmless, would
certainly be carried out through the medium of an imperialistic foreign
policy, but whether the result was to be a German world-dominion or
simply the re-emergence of Germany as a 'world power' (amongst others) is
nowhere made clear at this time. (97) On 13 August in his 'fundamental
speech' on antisemitism, Hitler explained that "should we succeed (in
the struggle against Jewry), and of that we are convinced, then we may
perish wholly destitute - we will nevertheless have assisted in the greatest
movement, which will now stretch over Europe and the whole world". (98)
One might read into the word "assist" the idea that Germany would not be
alone in the struggle and the possibility of Germany "perishing" (though
undoubtedly included in part for purposes of rhetoric) did not suggest
that German world domination would result from the defeat of the Jews.

So the only legitimate conclusion to be drawn from the evidence available
is that the introduction of an international dimension to Hitler's anti-
semitism, though pregnant with possibilities, did not alter his basic
foreign policy goals. Indeed, the goals as outlined in the party programme
were treated after the spring of 1920 as part of the ideological struggle
against Jewry.

As far as the first goal of the programme - that is the creation of a
Grossdeutschland - was concerned, the Jews in Germany were now seen by
Hitler as opponents of the Anschluss with Austria. (99) As Hitler described
Austria as being "almost completely in the hands of international high
finance", the need to effect the Anschluss was even more urgent. (100)
The Anschluss was, of course, only the first stage in the re-creation of a
German Empire which would "stretch from Memel to Bratislava and from
Königsberg to Strasbourg". (101) Significantly, Hitler now labelled the
various separatist schemes mooted in 1920 as "Jewish humbug"; that is as Jewish attempts to destroy German unity in accordance with the principle of divide and rule. (102) Clearly the acceptance of an antisemitic world-view did not alter but merely complemented Hitler's basic Pan-German aspirations.

Also, in accordance with the second and third points of the Party Programme, Hitler continued to demand the dismantling of the Versailles Settlement and the return of Germany's colonies. (103) It is interesting to note that the post-war settlement was now portrayed as part of the Jewish intrigues against Germany; reparations payments were designed to keep Germany permanently in debt, as Hitler explained: "international capitalism only wants to use us as a source of interest, and to make us slaves". (104) The struggle against the Jews thus became an integral part of Hitler's scheme to revive Germany's fortunes abroad; as he put it in May 1920:

"(The) precondition for any German recovery is however (the) revision of the peace, (the) precondition for this is (the) regeneration of our internal national solidarity. (This) can only be achieved by the struggle against the destroyers (Jews)." (105)

However, Wolfgang Horn has argued that the influx of ideas about an international Jewish conspiracy caused not just a revision of Hitler's attitude towards foreign affairs but brought about a complete volte-face. Ideology, so Horn argued, achieved pre-eminence over power politics in Hitler's assessment of foreign relations. (106) One can best examine this claim by tracing the impact of ideological considerations on Hitler's appraisal of individual nations. It is an obvious point, but one which needs to be made, that the implications of the 'world conspiracy' were global; in theory, at least, therefore, the conspiracy affected all the major powers, not just Bolshevik Russia which was overtly (in Hitler's eyes at any rate) in Jewish hands. On 22 September 1920, for example, Hitler
described the First World War as "nothing more than the endeavour on the part of international loan capitalism to destroy the national economy in Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, in order to make these countries colonies of international interest capital". (107) On the other hand, those countries which Hitler regarded as Germany's deadly enemies - Britain, France, and America - were, significantly, already "practically ruled" by international loan capitalism in Hitler's view. (108) Hence every nation was at risk; some had already succumbed, others were still under attack. But did this identification of a world-wide Jewish 'threat' seriously modify Hitler's views on the attitude of foreign powers or did he cynically adapt the conspiracy theory to reinforce his earlier convictions which were based on power political considerations?

Despite his reference to the control which finance capitalism exerted over Britain, France, and America, there is little to suggest that Hitler's view of these 'deadly enemies' had altered.

Hitler still combined an implacable hostility towards Britain with a sneaking respect for her empire. His main criticism and at the same time the quality which he, perhaps secretly, most admired about Britain was that her strength was built on the ruin of other states; the British Empire was built on the suffering of indigenous peoples - the North American Indians were destroyed by guns, the Chinese by opium, the Indians by mass murder and the Boers by concentration camps. (109) In each case, 'Might made Right', a principle with which Hitler had complete sympathy; but this same British might could, of course, also be applied against Germany. England, "the expert destroyer of the health of nations", had been doing just that in the First World War; the conclusion of the peace, so Hitler claimed in
November 1920, made it clear that the object of the war had been "the economic and political annihilation of Germany". Hitler identified no ideological motive behind British policy - it was not explained in terms of Jewish machinations - but he did observe that the destructiveness of the British mirrored that of the Jews, referring to the British on one occasion as "almost a second Jewry". This, of course, was the worst possible insult and indicates a deepening hostility towards England and heralded his adoption of the idea of an identity of interest between British and Jewish imperialism, which Rosenberg had already been at pains to stress. However, Hitler's attitude towards England seems still to have been based primarily on a historical analysis of her desire to remain the foremost power in the world; the main cause of Anglo-German hostility, in Hitler's view, was the rise of Germany as a commercial and colonial rival to Britain.

Hitler's attitude to France also remained unaffected by the ideological revision of 1920. France and Germany were eternal enemies for purely tactical reasons: the French wanted to control the left bank of the Rhine and were willing to espouse any cause, as for example, that of separatist movements inside Germany, to achieve this goal; on one occasion he claimed that the French Chamber of Deputies had raised 300 million francs to finance German separatists. On other occasions, he did ascribe precisely the same tactics of 'divide and rule' to the Jews, but once again Hitler did not at this stage attribute French policy to Jewish influence in Paris, but simply and solely to French Weltpolitik, which aimed to destroy Germany.

The uncovering of a Jewish world conspiracy had little impact also on Hitler's assessment of America, the third of Germany's deadly enemies, since American foreign policy had long been associated with the power of high
finance in folkish circles. Hitler had argued in December 1919, like the Pan-Germans before him, that America had intervened in the First World War not because of Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare but "as the land of money... in order not to lose her loaned wealth". (116) It was a small step for Hitler to lambast President Wilson as "the representation of high finance", whose conciliatory Fourteen Points had been deliberately designed to deceive the German people. (117) Clearly, America already had a well-defined place in Hitler's outlook as a result of folkish propaganda about America before and during the war. After the war, Germany's need for American loans to finance her recovery provided plentiful ammunition for Hitler's attacks on 'interest-slavery'; on one occasion, he estimated that "new loans from America, which are worth only 1300 milliard (marks), (would) devour 65 milliard in interest". (118)

So initially at least, Hitler's view of the three powers, whom he considered to be Germany's most clear-cut opponents, seemed to have been little affected by the adoption of a more conspiratorial antisemitic world-view. But what of the powers whom Hitler considered to have become Germany's enemies only because of the failings of German diplomacy before the First World War?

Italy had joined the Entente powers against Germany, Hitler argued, only because of her hostility to Germany's ally, Austro-Hungary. (119) Italy and Germany had no conflicting interests before the war and, after it, they shared an intense antipathy towards the Versailles Settlement. In 1920 at any rate, Hitler did not produce any ideological motive to justify his support for future Italo-German collaboration. The same applied to Japan; Hitler believed that before the war Japanese Weltpolitik, which
consisted of establishing her own predominance in East Asia by excluding the white races, did not conflict with Germany's ambitions.\textsuperscript{(120)} In 1920 Hitler did not publicly advocate German-Japanese collaboration nor did he appear to trace a Jewish factor in Japanese policy-making.

The situation is far more complex with regard to Hitler's appraisal of Russia, the other power in this category. His view of Russia seems to have undergone a very marked ideological revision in the course of 1920. Hitler's sympathetic treatment of Russian foreign policy has already been noted; in December 1919, he claimed that Germany and Russia ought to have been allies before the war: Russia's policy of Asiatic conquest did not infringe upon German interests and her search for an outlet to the sea ought not to have brought her into conflict with Germany if German diplomats had not shortsightedly discontinued Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty with the Russians.\textsuperscript{(121)} By April 1920, however, Hitler had uncovered another force which had kept Germany and Russia apart: "an understanding between us and Russia could not take place because the international Jewish press concern had prevented it".\textsuperscript{(122)} This new "insight" was, undoubtedly, the product of Hitler's introduction to the world conspiracy theory: Germany and Russia, as Alfred Rosenberg had revealed in 1919, were the arch-enemies of the Jews and, therefore, these natural allies had to be kept apart and indeed the two states had to be destroyed.\textsuperscript{(123)} The Jewish-led Bolshevik Revolution was, therefore, an attempt to subjugate the Russian people, a fate which Germany would soon share. Armed with this knowledge, Hitler began to devote more and more time to descriptions of Russian conditions in his speeches. On 27 April 1920, Hitler talked about Russia "which is economically destroyed, about the 12-hour-day there, about Jewish terrorism, about the mass murder of the intelligentsia"; the same, Hitler predicted,
was likely to happen in Germany. (124) On another occasion he claimed that Russia had fallen "into the clutches not of the Russian proletariat but of capital". (125) It is important to emphasize that most of Hitler's comments on Bolshevik Russia can be traced to the writings of Alfred Rosenberg; Hitler's revised view of Russia seemed to rest on the 'fact', constantly reiterated by Rosenberg, that the revolutionary Jews in Russia were secretly in league with the capitalist Jews in the West. (126)

There can be no doubt that this reflected a changed attitude towards Russia as a prospective alliance partner. When a brave 'Communist' at a Nazi party meeting on 6 July 1920 suggested that Germany should ally with England's arch-enemy in Asia, Soviet Russia, Hitler "spoke against Soviet Russia where hunger and misery reigned". (127) Later that month, Hitler was even more explicit: "an alliance between Russia and Germany can only come about when Jewry is removed". (128) An alliance between the two states had therefore in the course of 1920 become conditional on the removal of 'Jewish' Bolshevism.

However, whether this change was entirely the product of Hitler's adoption of the world conspiracy theory is difficult to say because Hitler also perceived in Russia in 1920 the resurgence of Pan-Slavism, which had, he believed, been revived by the Russo-Polish war of 1919-20. This could signify the launching of an expansionist phase in Russian foreign policy which could endanger German interests; Bolshevism, Hitler suspected, was "only a pretext for the construction of a great Russian Empire". (129) He was clearly opposed to Russian imperialism; in a meeting on 19 November 1920, he answered a critic in the audience who blamed the absence of genuine reconstruction in Russia on the latter's continuing need to fight her enemies, by arguing that "the Russians were responsible for the fact that
they had not achieved peace. If they were to bother only about the purely Russian areas, then no Ukrainian, no Pole, no Latvian etc. would dare to take a stand against Russia.  

(130) So it is possible that Hitler's caution about advocating German-Russian collaboration resulted from the perceived revitalisation of Russian imperialism.

On the other hand, Hitler's comments on Pan-Slavism were rarely divorced from his ideological broadsides against Bolshevism.  

(131) And it seems as if Hitler welcomed the revival of Pan-Slavism as a sign of the imminent collapse of Bolshevism; in other words, Pan-Slavism might accelerate the progress towards Russo-German collaboration. As Hitler argued on 27 July:

"The nationalistic wave will wash away Bolshevism. An alliance with Russia can be of use to us only when we are ourselves a single, strong, nationally aware nation."  

(132)

It is possible, therefore, that Hitler was postulating an alliance between a future Pan-Slavic Russia which had liquidated Bolshevism and a future National Socialist Germany.

What is clear is that a Russo-German alliance was not possible in the circumstances of 1920. Hitler left his audience in no doubt about this point:

"If we wanted today to conclude an alliance with Russia, England and France would come along and, with the utmost ease, we would be smashed. Germany must not be made into a battlefield."  

(133)

Here contemporary diplomatic alignments, the weakness of Russia and simple facts of geography seem to underlie Hitler's analysis, but it is important also to note the difference between what one might call an emerging Nazi Party foreign policy programme and Hitler's comments on contemporary
international affairs. A future Russian alliance was certainly conceived of as part of a Nazi programme in 1920, but it was not a course recommended by Hitler to the diplomats of Weimar Germany.

Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that Hitler's view of Russia did alter in 1920. Several obstacles to the collaboration between Germany and Russia, which Hitler had favoured in his analysis of pre-war diplomacy, had emerged. It is impossible to say whether the charge was brought about solely by revelations about the "Jewish" nature of Bolshevism; certainly this possibility cannot be ruled out. The rise of Pan-Slavism, which Hitler identified in the Russo-Polish campaign, could have been responsible, but then again Hitler appeared to welcome the revival of Russian nationalism as a sign that Bolshevism was on the wane, which suggests that Russia's Soviet régime was the real stumbling-block to Russo-German collaboration.

By the end of 1920, therefore, Hitler's aspirations for Germany in foreign policy and his attitude towards the major powers were being increasingly caught up in an antisemitic world-view, pieced together largely by Alfred Rosenberg. The first three points of the party programme - the union of all Germans in one empire, the dismantling of the Versailles Settlement, and the return of Germany's colonies - were now seen as essential stages in the conflict against the two arms of the Jewish world conspiracy - international high finance and revolutionary socialism. These strove to keep Germans divided, to enslave the German economy through reparations and to deprive Germany of world-power status and the land to feed her population.
It must be stressed that the initial impact of an international antisemitic ideology seems to have been to reinforce Hitler's prior conceptions of the party's aims and existing prejudices towards the major powers (with the exception of Russia). If ideology did revolutionise Hitler's outlook on foreign affairs, as Horn argues, then the transformation was incomplete in 1920. Indeed, it should be emphasised once again that Hitler's first priority in 1919-20 was the revival of Germany's internal fortunes. He did not want to be side-tracked into discussions of alliance policy; as he told an audience in Nuremberg in August 1920, "a people, which relies on foreign assistance is lost....We Germans must decide whether we shall be slaves forever or whether we want to be free. For freedom, we need in the first instance solidarity in our own land." (134) In 1920, therefore, Hitler devoted little time to the construction of an alliance strategy. Gradually between 1921 and 1924, one would emerge and attention must now be given to how and why this occurred and the role (if any) played by ideology in this process.
4. IDEOLOGY AND ALLIANCE POLICY, 1921-23

Between 1921 and 1923 Hitler's thoughts on foreign policy crystallised into a full-blown alliance strategy. How this occurred is a matter of considerable interest to historians. Most have argued, in the first place, that Hitler's choice of allies and enemies was not conditioned by ideological considerations. Even Eberhard Jückel, who has emphasized the importance of ideology in Hitler's Weltanschauung, believes that "the politics of alliance were for him (Hitler) always simple power politics". His pupil, Axel Kuhn, has reached a similar conclusion. Secondly, recent historians have also maintained that Hitler's decisions to advocate an Anglo-German alliance and a campaign of expansion largely at Russia's expense were his alone; not only that, but the choice of England as an ally, reversing as it did the general trend of previous Nazi propaganda, was, it is claimed, taken in the teeth of opposition from within the party; whilst the anti-Russian stance, which had vocal supporters within the party, was also "Hitler's solitary decision". One must question the validity of these unequivocal interpretations. Did ideology have no effect on Hitler's choice of allies? Were the decisions really Hitler's alone? These are the two key questions, which will be examined in this chapter.

In fact, the entire treatment of the evolution of the Nazi Party's alliance policy up to the present needs re-examination since previous studies have concentrated almost exclusively on the speeches and writings of Hitler himself. It is absolutely essential that Hitler's views are placed in the context of a representative cross-section of party opinion, for Hitler was never its sole spokesman on foreign policy. After January 1921 when the VB became the official party newspaper, it provided a forum, in the absence of any clear 'party line' on foreign affairs, for writers of
varying points of view. By careful scrutiny of this paper it is, therefore, possible to assess the extent of support for any emergent alliance strategy as well as to chart more accurately changes in Nazi attitudes. Furthermore, in order to explain how Hitler reached his decisions on alliance policy and, indeed, to throw light on some of the concepts, which underlay those decisions, it is necessary to describe Hitler's response to the ideas of the leading political theorists, with whom he came into contact at this time.

What is more, Hitler's ideas need to be examined within the context of Nazi ideology, which, as stressed above, did not constitute a static corpus of rational ideas but was essentially a way of looking at the world, a framework of reference, by which any event could be judged. So even if the party's antisemitic ideology did not determine the nature of Nazi foreign policy but merely reinforced convictions based on other considerations, it would still reflect any changes of emphasis. The study of the Nazi Party's ideological statements would be justified on these grounds alone.

But Hitler's own comments in Mein Kampf on the evolution of the party's outlook on foreign affairs makes it absolutely essential not to neglect the ideological factor. For Hitler admitted frankly that, apart from fulminations against the Versailles Settlement, foreign policy had been neglected by the party at first. There were, he explained, two reasons for this: firstly because as long as the party "possessed only the scope of a small little-known club, problems of foreign policy could possess only a subordinate importance in the eyes of many adherents" and, secondly, because the Nazis believed that a successful foreign policy was conditional upon a position of internal strength:

"Only the elimination of the causes of our collapse, as well as the destruction of its beneficiaries, can create the premise for our outward fight for freedom." (5)
Later as the party grew in stature, Hitler went on, "the necessity arose of taking a position on the questions pertaining to the developments in foreign affairs. It became necessary to lay down guiding principles, which would not only not contradict the fundamental views of our world concept, but actually represent an emanation of this line of thought." (My italics) The inference is quite unmistakeable: the foreign policy programme had to be compatible with the Weltanschauung of the party. This does not necessarily mean that Nazi foreign policy was merely an outgrowth of the ideology, though some believe it may have been, because the latter was continuously evolving and was extremely flexible and could easily accommodate some preconceived notions. What is certain, however, is that one must not neglect ideological developments when studying the origins of the party's alliance policy.

It is difficult to discern at which point in time the NSDAP became aware of the need for a clearly-defined foreign policy. The young party certainly had to comment on the contentious issues arising from the Versailles Settlement - reparations, disarmament, and the coming plebiscite in Upper Silesia - but during 1920 it is fair to say that, whilst the French occupation of Frankfurt in April in response to the German army's incursion into the demilitarised zone caused a predictable outcry in Nazi circles, generally the party did not pay too much attention to foreign affairs. However, the acquisition at the end of the year of a party newspaper (appearing twice weekly at first) meant that the party had to comment on foreign affairs on a regular basis. But it was at this point that the value of a flexible Weltanschauung became clear. All events on the world stage were
readily explicable in terms of the world conspiracy by the Jews to liquidate Germany as the next step on the road to world domination. So it is likely that the malleability of this ideology postponed the need to design a more stratified alliance policy. Certainly as a means of explaining the solidly anti-German policies of the major powers, it was an ideal device in a world in which Germany was diplomatically isolated. Perhaps, therefore, the turning-point would come when that isolation ended. How would the Nazis explain gestures favourable or friendly towards Germany? Perhaps, such a change in the diplomatic scene would require the NSDAP to produce its own alliance programme.

Early in 1921, this prospect was not really on the horizon. Despite British protests against the French occupation of Frankfurt and their rejection of persistent French demands for the occupation of the Ruhr district to force Germany to fulfil her treaty obligations, the world still seemed hostile to Germany. However, if we trace Nazi attitudes towards first Britain, then Italy and finally Russia over the next two years, the process by which the NSDAP acquired an alliance policy will become clearer.

In the early months of 1921 the Nazi attitude towards Britain remained unremittingly hostile. As we have seen, Hitler was fond of listing the crimes committed by the British Empire in order to expose the hypocrisy of talk of British respect for the rights of smaller nations. On 3 February Hitler added the British persecution of the Irish people and "the extermination of half (of them)" and "the crushing of the ancient state of India" to his catalogue of criminal acts perpetrated by the British against peaceful nations. (8) Furthermore, at this time, Hitler and other writers in the VB still believed that the overriding aim of the
British was the enslavement of Germany. (9) The negotiations in the early months of 1921 were seen as an attempt to do just this by forcing Germany to accept the huge reparations bill, and Hitler reproached the German government "for courting the allegedly available favour of England and France at a time when she really ought to have realised that one cannot negotiate with the motivating force which has activated these Western democratic states" - this "force" was the Jewish Stock Exchange, which Hitler regarded as the ultimate recipient of German reparations payments. (10) Thus, British attempts to find a more equitable solution to the reparations issue were not appreciated as such by Hitler.

British efforts to find an acceptable solution to another intractable problem, that of Upper Silesia, an area rich in mineral resources and vital to the economies of both claimants, Germany and Poland, initially met with a similar lack of appreciation in Nazi quarters. On 15 March 1921 Hitler predicted that the Entente - including "perfidious Albion" - intended to give Upper Silesia "wholly or partly to Poland", irrespective of the results of the plebiscite promised in the Versailles Treaty which was to be held on 21 March. (11) When disturbances occurred between Poles and Germans in Upper Silesia after the indecisive plebiscite (roughly 60% of the vote went to Germany, 40% to Poland), Hitler discounted reports of English protests to the Polish government. (12) It is, of course, true that France was trying to ensure that Poland, her ally since the treaty of February 1921, gained possession of the disputed province. But Hitler gave no credence to news of British opposition to these plans. When the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, delivered a speech criticizing the Polish rebels, Hitler was concerned to correct both the impression gained by "many Germans" that the attitude of the English had changed fundamentally
and the belief that "if we ourselves do not disturb our decent image, but remain respectable and well-behaved, and deliver all that is to be delivered, then England will become very shortly a 'friend' of ours". (13) This was a deception; the Jews were behind "Lloyd George's honey-sweet words". (14) However, when an army of German volunteers clashed for the first time with the Poles on 22 May 1921, the British troops in the area — far from turning on the Germans — appeared willing to collaborate with them, as Hitler admitted. (15) Nevertheless, Hitler did not take this as evidence of a genuine change of heart by the British government towards Germany but simply as proof of what he had been saying all along, namely that if Germany showed a fighting spirit and proved that she was worthy of support, she would get it. It is doubtful, therefore, that evidence of British sympathy for the German cause on this occasion had drastically altered Hitler's view of the British. In fact, further conciliatory moves by Lloyd George led Hitler to label him the new "Pied Piper" enticing Germans to ruin; "an intrinsic change in England's attitude towards Germany was impossible", Hitler explained, "because the same society of Jewish press bandits directs the state there as it does here." (16)

It is interesting to note here that Hitler resorted to an ideological observation to question the motives behind Britain's pro-German stance. The Upper Silesian question obviously posed problems of interpretation for the Nazis. For the first time a split had occurred in the ranks of Germany's enemies and they were obliged to comment on pro-German policies. However, the world conspiracy theory enabled Hitler to discount Lloyd George's friendly words as a "Jewish trick" designed cruelly to raise the hopes of the German people, only to dash them again later, thereby "accelerating the internal destruction of the final remnants of her ability to resist." (17)
Thus Hitler invoked the Jewish factor to explain away Britain's seemingly pro-German policy and to dispel any illusions about a meaningful revision of British foreign policy. (18) Thus Hitler remained very critical of Britain early in 1921 and he used ideology to discredit actions apparently inconsistent with the previously established interpretation of British foreign policy. (19)

Hitler's view that Britain remained fundamentally hostile to Germany coincided with that of Alfred Rosenberg. As has been seen already, Rosenberg believed that, on the whole, British interests were compatible with those of the Jews - at the moment at least. In Russia, Britain's intermittent support for the White Russian forces against the Bolsheviks ensured the continuation of a civil war, from which both the Jews (out to destroy Russia) and the British (the arch-enemy of Russian imperialism in Central Asia) drew comfort; in the Near East, British support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine not only warmed the hearts of the Zionists but offered Britain the prospect of another base in the area. All this, in Rosenberg's eyes, made Britain the protector of Jewry and London the centre of Jewish activities; hence, by inference, she was no friend of Germany's. This basic scenario was often repeated during 1921. In his first article in the VB, Rosenberg claimed that British money from Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, had helped to destroy Czarism. (20) Early in 1921 a trade treaty signed by London and Moscow provided Rosenberg with 'proof' that British industrialists were working hand-in-glove with the Bolsheviks. (21) In March Rosenberg noted the steady advancement of Jews in England: "step by step one Jew after another is stepping into the highest positions in the land." (22) On 1 May Rosenberg drew attention to the opening of a Bolshevik bank in London as further evidence that world capitalism and world revolution were collaborating: the trade treaty, he
claimed, was "no more and no less than a political treaty". (23)

It is significant that two days later Hitler referred to Lenin as "the mass murderer who is now turning towards England in order to establish trading relations to ease the economic distress of Russia." (24) Clearly Hitler shared Rosenberg's belief in the compatibility of English and Jewish policy. In preparing a speech entitled Arbeiter und Friedensverträge, delivered on 31 May, Hitler jotted down the following key words:

"England's goal
Judah's goal

The Means
the peace treaty of Versailles". (25)

On another occasion Hitler suggested that the English and the Jews had both been behind the attempt to starve Germany to defeat in the First World War. (26) So it would seem that in 1921 Hitler and Rosenberg both felt that Germany should not pin any hopes on Britain since British and Jewish interests were so alike. At this stage, therefore, the party's ideology confirmed Hitler's continuing prejudice against England (if it did not give rise to it), and evidence of apparent British sympathy towards Germany was ignored.

However, this attitude began slowly to change. The first signs of change occurred during the continuing crisis over Upper Silesia, which may, indeed, in retrospect, have been the turning-point. Though Hitler still dismissed England's pro-German policy as Jewish trickery, Rosenberg reacted to it differently. On 18 August 1921 he wrote:

"There is now, without question, in England a strong group, who want to pursue only an English national policy (englisch-nationale Politik). This can only consist of the European balance of power, not the creation of an absolute predominance of France or Germany....These circles have already established multifarious trade
relations with Germany, and however much they welcome the German Empire as a helpless victim they cannot want, in their own interests, her complete destruction. Consideration of this English realpolitische thinking has, without doubt, caused Lloyd George to advocate officially and very forcefully a partly German Upper Silesia." (27)

Nationally-minded British politicians and businessmen - not the Jews - were now seen as the instigators of Lloyd George's pro-German policies; such policies were at odds with the interests of the Jews. But Rosenberg was cautious about the prospects for a decisive change of policy; world Jewry still wanted to destroy Germany and if Lloyd George were to act against the wishes of the London Stock Exchange, "he would be a political corpse at that very moment." (28) Nevertheless, for the first time, a basis for possible Anglo-German collaboration emerged (provided, of course, that Jewish influence in Britain was eradicated). It should be noted that it was the traditional British policy of maintaining a balance of power in Europe, which would provide the basis for Anglo-German co-operation although the needs of the British economy were a secondary, if still significant, factor. For Rosenberg, evidence of Anglo-French dissension over Upper Silesia was of some importance, this was not a Jewish trick but a sign that the national interest was beginning to assert itself in England.

Rosenberg's conviction that true British interests could be reconciled with those of Germany appears, in retrospect, to have been the embryo, from which the party's later support for an Anglo-German alliance grew; but, at the time, there was no question of a public endorsement of such a strategy. The only noticeable sign of a change was the henceforth ambivalent attitude towards Britain shown by Rosenberg and, occasionally, by other writers in the VB. On the one hand, they showed increasing
sympathy with British needs and a tendency to explain away anti-German policies as the result of Jewish influence; on the other, they were markedly critical of the current British government and of past British diplomacy.

The first trend was evident in Rosenberg's interpretation of the Irish question in an article in September 1921. Whilst, like Hitler, he felt that the Irish were "one of many oppressed peoples", whose "folkish" struggle for freedom ensured them the support of the Nazis, Rosenberg had grave doubts about their leader, de Valera, who was, he claimed, "laden with American money" and also "half-Jewish"; moreover, his programme bore comparison with Bolshevism. (29) Rosenberg concluded, therefore, that "Ireland is the Jewish stock exchange's means of fashioning the policy of Great Britain." (30) In other words, the Jews were manipulating the Irish question to make difficulties for the British and to maintain their own influence over British policy-making. Another illustration of this trend was the apparent shift in the location of the centre of Jewish activities from London to New York, which is evident in Rosenberg's writings. In January 1921 he identified the centre of the conspiracy against Germany as London with the rider "(and) recently perhaps in New York". (31) In February 1921 he wrote that "next to England, the United States had the honour of being the stronghold of Jewish high finance". (32) By August 1921 America had replaced Britain as the focus of Jewish activity and Jewish financiers were beginning to exert pressure on the American government by means of financial blackmail: "over America hangs the sword of Damocles. In case gold were to trundle across the Pacific Ocean, as it now threatens to leave the British Isles, which until now has been such a trusty land." (33) The Washington Naval Conference from November 1921 to February 1922 seemed
to confirm to Rosenberg the relocation of Jewish headquarters; "today", wrote Rosenberg on 26 November 1921, "Washington has become the centre of this thieving world conspiracy".\(^{34}\) So whilst the Jews retained control of British policy-making, the British were no longer, in Rosenberg's view, the patrons of the Jews.

This barely discernible moderation of Rosenberg's anti-British stance was taken up by some writers in the VB, which by January 1922 was under Dietrich Eckart's editorial control. One wrote that genuine British interests were in line with Germany's and required an anti-French posture:

"If the 'England' ruled by the Hebrews were really Great Britain, then there would be reason for such hopes (those pinned on recent conferences). Then the English representatives would give weight only to English national interests, which would have of necessity to consist of a vigorous cooking of the French goose." \(^{35}\)

However, the same writer criticised the German government for expecting that the present British regime would follow such a policy.\(^{36}\) This illustrates the second theme running through the paper's treatment of Britain - a marked scepticism about British overtures to Germany allied with criticism of the present British government and past British diplomacy. On 14 August 1921, for example, Rosenberg, referring to "apparent tensions between London and Paris", had written that "we Germans have not the slightest hope that it could come to a final breach between the Entente powers in the foreseeable future. A policy based on this hope alone would be without firm foundation."\(^{37}\) In February 1922 Rosenberg criticised the Frankfurter Zeitung for welcoming the outcome of the Washington Conference; the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the increase in Anglo-American collaboration brought about by the conference were not
to be applauded, in Rosenberg's view, for they laid the foundations of an "Anglo-Saxon world-rule", behind which stood, inevitably, the Jewish stock exchange. (38) At the end of February 1922 Rosenberg was still prepared to challenge those who praised the League of Nations' humanity in searching for an equitable solution to the problem of Upper Silesia by questioning the humanity of England's "hunger blockade" during the First World War and by suggesting that the English were hardly innocent of charges of "war guilt". (39)

Hence the first sign of a moderation of Nazi hostility towards Britain was Rosenberg's ambivalent attitude towards her in his articles in the VB. To the untrained eye, he remained highly critical of Britain, particularly of her past record and present government, but occasional references to signs of life amongst nationalist circles in Britain and to the compatibility of British and German national interests betrayed Rosenberg's belief in the feasibility of future Anglo-German cooperation. Furthermore, since British interests were increasingly out of step with those of the Jews, Britain became, in theory, as suitable an ally for Germany as Russia, once of course - a rider which applied to Russia also - Jewish influence had been removed. The question is: did Hitler's ideas undergo the same change at this time? Did Hitler enjoy the same freedom of choice when he came to formulate an alliance policy?

On the whole this seems likely. It is true that in his 1921 analyses of pre-war German diplomacy, Hitler consistently appeared to favour a Russo-German over an Anglo-German alliance; the failure to achieve the former alliance was, in Hitler's opinion, the "first huge error" made by Wilhelminian diplomats, whilst an alliance with England was considered to have been "impossible in the long run". (40) Admittedly when Hitler discussed
the projected Anglo-German alliance against Russia, mooted between 1898 and 1900, he did remark that "that would have been the opportunity to achieve territorial expansion", but he went on to say that "the other alternative would have been an alliance with Russia against England! Thereby an unlimited possibility for expansion towards the East would have been created." (41) Exactly how an alliance with Russia could result in extensive German expansion eastwards will be explained later but if one reads into these retrospective observations Hitler's own ideas on Nazi alliance policy, then an English alliance was obviously less attractive to him than a Russian one in 1921. (42) It should be stressed that such comments were, in fact, substitutes for an alliance policy, opinions in the main culled from Pan-German literature and rooted in the pre-war diplomatic environment. In all probability, Hitler had not yet considered a foreign policy strategy to encompass postwar diplomatic realities. As we have seen, foreign policy was not the party's first priority in its early years.

What is certain, however, is that by the middle of 1922 Hitler had adopted the antisemitic world-view, popularised by Alfred Rosenberg, which would prove to be a very flexible instrument when he did begin to consider a concrete foreign policy programme. In a speech on 28 July 1922, Hitler delivered his own account of the international menace of world Jewry:

"We all feel today that two worlds are struggling with one another and not only at home, but everywhere we look in the now oppressed Russia and in Italy, in France and in England etc. The poor struggle inexorably between the ideals of those who are nationally folkish-minded and the intangible supra-state International. It is a struggle, which stretches back already now about 120 years. It began at the moment when the Jew obtained the right of citizenship in the European states." (43)

In the nineteenth century, Hitler continued, Europe stood at the cross-roads.
Western Europe became industrialised and a relatively small number of "fully Europeanised" Jews established themselves as captains of industry and founded and manipulated political parties, ostensibly in the name of democracy but in reality to establish their own rule; "on the whole, England and France have already put on the chains of slavery. These states will lie in Jewish fetters...as long as the Jew himself does not sense the need and the expediency of a change in this situation. This change will occur there in the foreseeable future." In Eastern and Central Europe, things developed differently; industrialisation took place at a slower pace; there were more Jews and therefore more antisemitic sentiment but the Jews came to positions of power by manipulation of left-wing socialist ideals and revolution first in Russia and now it seemed likely to happen in Germany.

Quite clearly by July 1922 Hitler was, at the very least, paying lip-service to a Weltanschauung, according to which all nations were suffering or about to suffer under the Jewish yoke. All these nations, therefore, became theoretically candidates for association with a Nazi Germany in the struggle against world Jewry. The important point is that, by adopting this world-view, Hitler acquired absolute flexibility in his eventual choice of allies; whichever power he chose could be given ideological sanction by merely citing evidence of antisemitic inclinations. This did not mean that Hitler was likely, for example, to choose France as an ally since her desire for a Rhenish frontier still, in his view, motivated her foreign policy. Essentially what the ideological world-view gave Hitler was complete freedom to exercise his own and his colleagues' in-built prejudices and ideas about foreign relations. Thus, Hitler may not yet have drawn up his "guiding principles" in foreign affairs, but
when he did, it was clear that they could be presented as an "emanation" of the party's Weltanschauung.

In the winter of 1922–23 Hitler made two statements, which committed him in public for the first time to a foreign policy programme of alliances with Britain and Italy. At a party discussion evening in Haidhausen on 14 November 1922, Hitler talked about the creation of a nationalist régime in Germany on the Italian Fascist model; to survive, Hitler argued, it would need success and "in the political field, there is only one possibility of achieving a big increase for Germany: the Anschluss of Austria with Germany. The precondition for this Anschluss would be the agreement of England and Italy." Then at the party conference on 27 January 1923, in the wake of the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr, which brought the reparations crisis to a head, Hitler asked his audience which powers had an interest in the further existence of the German state. Hitler answered his own question thus:

"Of course, not France and not Russia and not even America, who would like to look on Germany's internal conflicts with the impassioned partisan sympathy of a prospective bull-fighter in order to learn the specific methods of combatting Marxism and Bolshevism. England and Italy, however, probably." (48)

These two isolated remarks are usually taken as indicating the emergence of a pro-English strategy in Hitler's programme. If this was so, why did Hitler choose England (not Russia) as a prospective ally and why did he give notice of this late in 1922?

The most obvious explanation of Hitler's adoption of the English alliance is that the Ruhr crisis revealed once again that Britain could not support France's aggressive policy towards Germany. For, although Hitler's first statement supporting collaboration with England and Italy was delivered
before the actual invasion of the Ruhr on 11 January 1923, \((49)\) the French premier, Raymond Poincaré, had been threatening to take this step since the summer of 1922 and Britain's opposition to it was well-known. The German-Russian agreement at Rapallo in April 1922 had resurrected French fears of a German revival and had made her more adamant that Germany should pay reparations in full. In mid-July 1922 Germany had requested a full moratorium on payments and Britain, fearing that Germany genuinely could not afford to pay, felt inclined to agree. The French did not, afraid that, once stopped, payments would not be resumed. Since the United States refused to consider cancelling allied war debts, the French could not afford to waive their claim to German reparations. \((50)\) Clearly, Hitler had adequate warning of the general thrust of French policy and the probability of British opposition to it before January 1923.

It is also true that Hitler's alliance strategy hinged on the existence of Anglo-French tension; in December 1922, Hitler pointed out, in a private discussion of his strategy, that "England has an interest in seeing that we do not go under because, otherwise, France would become the greatest continental power in Europe, whilst England would have to be content with the position of a third-rate power." \((51)\) The Ruhr crisis was, therefore, important to Hitler; in \textit{Mein Kampf}, he wrote that it "for the first time really alienated England basically from France." \((52)\) However, it needs to be emphasised again that there were signs that Britain was being rehabilitated in articles in the \textit{VB} dating back to the middle of 1921; certain writers clearly perceived even then that British interests really dictated opposition to French policies in Europe. It is more likely, therefore, that the culmination of the reparations crisis at the end of 1922 and beginning of 1923 merely reinforced the trend towards support for a future Anglo-German alliance.
In fact during 1922 the hints that Britain was about to be rehabilitated appear (in retrospect) to have been stronger. Certainly in Rosenberg's ideological diatribes against world Jewry, the softening of the earlier anti-British tone is quite marked. In his pamphlet, Der staatsfeindliche Zionismus, written between May and September 1922, several changes in the relations between the British and the Jews (some intimated earlier) emerge with greater clarity. Firstly, the alleged compatibility of the aims of world Jewry and British imperialism, a feature of Rosenberg's earlier writings, had disappeared; for example, the zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann, is quoted as saying in March 1922 that "Palestine is useless for England from the strategic (and) military point of view." Secondly, Rosenberg noted that an anti-Jewish faction in England was growing larger and more vocal. Thirdly, he argued that the Jews were undermining British interests in India and Ireland; in India they were encouraging the articulation of anti-British sentiments, whilst in Ireland "a threat by Jewish finance to support the Irish has induced the English to make many concessions". Fourthly, British foreign policy, which was "co-determined (mitbestimmt) by the Jewish bankers and journalists" was running counter to Britain's best interests; at the Washington Naval Conference, for example, England had capitulated to the Americans:

"for centuries, England had fought ruthlessly for her naval supremacy...and always realised the need to drive the strongest from the field. In Washington, this England gave up her position with a great gesture and without a struggle and renounced the alliance with Japan and transferred the leadership of world politics to the United States." (57)

In Pest in Russland, also published in 1922, Rosenberg quoted another example of Jewish distortion of British foreign policy:
'England' herself is doing what she can to maintain the Soviet government as a negotiating partner. Despite the fact that the real Great Britain would have had every cause to fight tooth and nail against supporting a revolution which is spreading towards Afghanistan and India, the opposite happens." (58)

Hence, Rosenberg believed, the Jews were pushing the British towards extinction because they had acquired a new patron in the United States; the relocation of the centre of Jewish affairs from London to New York was complete, America was now "the stronghold of Pan-Judaea", (59) "the newly chosen cherub of Israel". (60)

This account of the growing disenchantment between the British and the Jews seems in retrospect to have heralded the new attitude towards Britain. The fall of the British prime minister, Lloyd George, in October 1922 encouraged Rosenberg to present the case for potential British aid to Germany. "Against all British tradition", Rosenberg argued, "Lloyd George had abandoned, or rather had to abandon (in face of Jewish pressure) the policy of the European balance of power", thereby playing into the hands of the Jewish stock exchange and the French. (61) Lloyd George's resignation, Rosenberg felt, was the opportunity for the British to stand up to the Jews but he was not confident that it would be taken; however, he did believe that the British would soon face "an invincible France" and "in this situation", he concluded, "assistance for Germany would, of necessity, have to result." (62)

Rosenberg was not the only writer in the VB to suggest a growing disparity between the interests of the British and the Jews and the compatibility between the interests of the British and Germans. On 5 August 1922, an unsigned article in the VB argued that England's policy was dictated "not
by British powers but by the same powers of high finance which (dictate) that of France"; (63) "If, on the other hand", wrote another unidentified writer on 4 October 1922, "England were ruled by the British, then the hostile stance towards Germany after Versailles would have had to have ended." (64) In ideological terms, Germany and England could, therefore, be allies in the fight against international Jewry.

Thus the way had been prepared for an Anglo-German alliance to be included in a Nazi foreign policy programme over a year before Hitler first referred to it in November 1922. The Ruhr crisis of 1922-23 is, therefore, not likely to have been the reason for Hitler's conversion from his previous anti-British outlook. It is possible that British support for Germany in the Upper Silesian crisis had been crucial but other factors may also have affected Hitler's decision and we will return to this question later.

However what has also to be stressed is that Hitler's adoption of the English alliance does not appear to have been a "solitary decision against the opinion in the party", as Axel Kuhn has argued. (65) Kuhn has suggested that "the party" was sceptical about the prospects of a transformation of British foreign policy. That is true, (66) but it is also true that Hitler expressed similar doubts about current British diplomacy in public after November 1922. One has to distinguish between comments about the emerging (and for the most part concealed) Nazi foreign policy programme, which was intended for future use, and the party's commentary on current developments in the diplomatic arena. The adoption of an Anglo-German alliance as part of the foreign policy programme did not mean that Nazi propaganda could suddenly abandon its criticism of contemporary British diplomacy. Hence when Rosenberg wrote in July 1923 that, despite Anglo-French tensions over the invasion of the Ruhr, "England is not contemplating
a serious break with France at all", this did not mean that he was questioning the assumptions behind Hitler's alliance strategy but merely commenting on the current state of Anglo-French relations. Indeed Rosenberg shared Hitler's assumptions; he argued again in July 1923 that "England was always the opponent of the strongest state on the European continent" and, as a result, was bound at some time to challenge the emerging French hegemony in Europe. He simply felt that "under present conditions", with Germany so weak that she was not alliance-worthy (bündnisfähig), "we can expect no advantages from the eventual breach in Anglo-French relations." This was precisely the same argument used by Hitler in 1923; "in view of our lack of energy", he pointed out on one occasion, "England will not feel obliged to do anything for us, even if it is not at all in her interest that France attain predominance in Europe. The same goes for Italy." In short, therefore, Hitler and Rosenberg argued that England and Italy would aid Germany only when she was worthy of assistance, in other words when a National Socialist government had taken over. Hence, criticism of current British policy would continue, despite the incorporation of an English alliance in the Nazi foreign policy programme.

This dualism was probably a deliberate attempt by the Nazi party to camouflage its ambitions in foreign affairs. The need to comment regularly on current events posed problems, as Rosenberg revealed on one occasion when he wrote in the VB that "we want to hold back our positive appraisal (of foreign affairs) for the time being...and we will wait reservedly on events (and) not lapse into daily cackle over every piece of news." The reasons why the Nazis were concerned to avoid public disclosure of their long-term foreign policy schemes will become clear later but this smokescreen, of course, makes it difficult to gauge the extent of opposition
within the party to Hitler's thinking on the English alliance; there is
evidence, however, that Rosenberg and other writers in the VB supported
Hitler.

In view of the relative secrecy surrounding the emergent alliance policy,
one wonders why Hitler was tempted to make the remarks he did in November
1922 and January 1923. On the first occasion at a local party discussion
evening in Haidhausen, it was significant that Hitler was discussing a
National Socialist state on the Italian Fascist model. It is important
to recognize the impact of the emergence of Fascist Italy in October 1922
on the Nazi Party; the success of a movement with similar aims must have
been an encouraging sign for the NSDAP but, in the field of foreign affairs,
coinciding as it did with the political demise of Lloyd George, the last
of the main architects of the hated Versailles Settlement to lose office,
it amounted to a considerable diplomatic revolution. (71) This may have
tempted Hitler to speculate about the future in November 1922. His comments
at the party conference in January 1923, on the other hand, were in all
probability a response to the Ruhr invasion and the renewed evidence of
Anglo-French tensions. It has to be stressed, though, that Hitler's
remarks on both occasions were not presented as part of a Nazi Party
alliance strategy; they were isolated comments, in which historians have
identified things to come. In other words, Hitler probably did not take
any conscious decision to reveal parts of his emerging strategy for foreign
affairs in public at this time.

To sum up, therefore, the emergence of an English alliance as part of the
NSDAP's foreign policy programme was not an isolated or a sudden decision
taken by Hitler late in 1922; the Umwendung with regard to England had
been evolving for over a year, judging by the changes in the party's antisemitic world-view. (72) It is, of course, difficult to accept that changes such as the alleged disparity between British and Jewish ambitions and gradual transfer of Jewish allegiance from London to New York could have wholly determined Hitler's choice of alliance partner. However, this is not quite so implausible as it appears, if one bears in mind that concrete developments could have given rise to such fantasies: for example, the British disagreement with the French over reparations and the American insistence on full repayment of allied war debts. Nevertheless, a more likely reason for Hitler's choice of England would be the mounting evidence of British sympathy for Germany, which the Nazis interpreted as a sign of the resurgence of Britain's traditional balance of power strategy. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that Hitler turned to England as a direct result of his re-evaluation of Germany's other prospective ally, Russia, which we will examine shortly.

The rise of Mussolini's fascists in summer and autumn of 1922 might well have contributed to the evolution of Hitler's alliance strategy late in that year. The presence of a regime ideologically akin to National Socialism in Italy could not be ignored by Hitler and his friends. But historians are agreed that as the origins of Hitler's alliance ideas date back to 1920 at least, these can have had little to do with the success of the Fascists in Italy. (73) In 1920 Hitler had made it clear that Italy had not been one of Germany's "deadly enemies" before the war; Italian grievances had been directed against Austria-Hungary not Germany; Hitler had dismissed Bavarian separatism and a Danubian Confederation on the grounds
that Germany's real enemy lay across the Rhine not in Italy; and in August 1920 he argued for the exploitation of Franco-Italian differences over Fiume in order to win Italian support for the German campaign against the Versailles Settlement. Obviously, therefore, the alliance was a product of strategic considerations.

However, it needs to be stressed that, as in the case of England, it was never intended that an Italian alliance should be the immediate objective of Weimar diplomats; in the speech in which he first called for Italo-German cooperation, Hitler criticised those who suggested that "there must be a union (Anschluss) carried out with a strong state. For this plan it is now too late; our view would still be the same if we had not given up our weapons, but had continued to fight. We are mere cannon fodder and defenceless. We in Germany lack national solidarity." (74) International agreements, therefore, were of no use until Germany had been revived internally. Since Hitler almost certainly associated the resurgence of Germany with the rise to power of the Nazis, the Italian alliance could only be implemented when the National Socialists were in power in Germany and the nationalists in Italy.

Because the alliance lay in the future, therefore, the policies of the present Italian government could still be criticised. Once again, there was the duality in approach to foreign nations noted above. So despite the talk of possible German-Italian collaboration in August 1920, the Nazi Party remained critical of Italian policy and indeed of Germany's conciliatory stand towards Italy. In November 1920, for example, Hitler accused German foreign minister, Walter Simons, of lacking national feeling because of a statement on the South Tyrol, the Austrian province transferred
to Italy by the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which evidently did not hold out any hope of its return to Germany; "Simon's declaration over the Tyrol", said Hitler, "is proof of national incompetence, otherwise the German state would have to intervene for every single German at any time. Nations are only capable of a great ascent if they have carried through internal reforms, which make it possible to convert the whole race - united - to foreign policy goals."(75) Clearly, therefore, Hitler remained publicly committed to his Pan-German ambitions of uniting all Germans in one Reich.

In February 1921, the VB published an article entitled Deutschland und Italien which criticized those "harmless souls who are still always dreaming of a re-awakening of German-Italian friendship."(76) The article made it quite clear that Italians were very much afraid of a German-Austrian Anschluss because, it was felt, Germany would "acquire an Austrian outlook with regard to Italy. Italy, therefore has no interest whatever in encouraging a union."(77) Whether Hitler realized it or not, Italy could be expected to oppose two of the Nazi Party's most fervent demands: the Anschluss and the return of German territories lost at Versailles. There would seem to have been, therefore, an inherent contradiction between Hitler's support for an Italo-German alliance and his stated grossdeutsch ambitions for Germany: in all probability, Hitler had not fully thought out his ideas on the Italian alliance at this stage; he merely had an instinctive feeling that Italy and Germany were compatible because of their mutual hostility towards the Versailles Settlement.

Perhaps surprisingly the rising fortunes of Mussolini and his movement received a hostile reception in the VB. An unnamed writer on 29 July 1922 attacked the idea of building a party on Fascist lines in Germany because of Mussolini's background; he had wanted a war against Germany in
1914 and "for this reason every folkish-minded German ought already to have most keenly shunned contact with the trickster Mussolini." (78)

Worse than that, the Fascist movement had no antisemitic aims, indeed it had been founded with Jewish money; honourable Fascists had been seduced by Jewish capital, and the fault lay with their leader, Mussolini, who was "a hired traitor". (79) A further article on 2 August stressed the similarities between National Socialists and the best Fascists; the Fascists were believed to be in the front line of Italy's struggle against Bolshevism, but, once again, Mussolini was criticised because his struggle was not directed against "the world's enemy". (80) The absence of antisemitism in Mussolini's programme seemed to damn him in Nazi eyes until on 17 August, with Mussolini's ultimate victory still far from certain, Hitler made it clear (without mentioning Mussolini) that the new Italy would be ideologically akin to National Socialism: he referred again to the struggle between nationalism and internationalism, "the struggle which up to today only the Italian state is willing to carry on, we also must fight and this struggle must emanate from Bavaria." (81) However, in the same speech Hitler reasserted the need for the Anschluss with German-Austria, showing that he had still not seriously thought about the implications of a future German-Italian alliance. (82)

Hitler would, undoubtedly, have let the thorny issues of the South Tyrol and the Anschluss remain unresolved for the time being if the rapid success of the Fascists had not altered the situation drastically. And this is the sense in which the Italian alliance was ideologically fashioned (if not originally ideologically motivated). The presence of a nationalist leader in Italy, whose success the Nazi party could emulate as well as exploit for propaganda purposes, and from whom, perhaps, direct aid might
be forthcoming, brought Hitler's theoretical speculation about future allies down to earth. If Italian aid were to materialise, there could be no obstacles to Nazi-Fascist collaboration. It was this situation which moulded the Italian alliance in Hitler's programme.

At precisely this moment, a new face appeared in the ranks of the NSDAP: Kurt Lüdecke, the son of a manager of a chemical works in Oranienburg (Berlin), who had worked as a travelling salesman after the war. Lüdecke's arrival in the party coincided not only with the emergence of Mussolini in Italy, but with Hitler's own maturing as a political leader, which Mussolini's success only accelerated. The summer of 1922 had seen Hitler conspiring with Heinrich Class and associates to launch a national revolution and he was clearly beginning to display "the arrogance of the primadonna", which so offended his Pan-German associates. The newly self-confident 'Führer', according to Lüdecke, quickly agreed with his proposal to try to establish contact with Mussolini, for "to have an ally who was succeeding, even though the alliance was purely one of mutual sympathy, would be encouraging." Hence Lüdecke set off for Paris (to test the strength of antisemitic movement there) and for Italy, if possible, to visit Mussolini. In the resulting interview, almost certainly in September 1922, Mussolini made quite plain his position on the South Tyrol: "No discussion about that ever....Alto Adige is Italian and must remain so." So the South Tyrol was clearly revealed as the stumbling block to possible collaboration between the Fascists and the Nazis and also to Hitler's alliance plans for the future. According to Lüdecke, on his return "a serious discussion of Mussolini and Italy" ensued, "in which, for the first time Hitler was really considering the ultimate possibilities of his
 programme in relation to the rest of Europe". Whether it was, in fact, the first time Hitler had spelt out his alliance plans is uncertain. If it was, then this would suggest that Mussolini's rise was a major factor in determining the timing of the evolution of Hitler's alliance policy. Lüdecke's account of the discussion is interesting for the light it sheds on Hitler's foreign policy as a whole:

"The natural future alliance of our new Germany, we agreed, should be England and eventually the northern European states, therefore, our logical effort - when we had the power - would be to alienate England from France. As a corollary of our organic growth, a German-English alliance was imperative. Forces currently dominant in England were and would indefinitely remain opposed to Nazi Germany, that we envisioned. With France holding a military trump card, and Germany isolated politically and economically, we were in no position to bargain with England. If we had any hope of understanding amongst the major powers, we should find it in Italy, - if Mussolini came to power." (My italics) (87)

Hitler's argument clarifies a number of points. Firstly, it illustrates precisely the approach to alliance policy indicated above; namely that the alliances were meant for a future (Nazi) Germany and a future English or Italian government. The present government policy in England was opposed to this and would remain so for an indefinite period. Secondly, the English alliance was vital to the process of German expansion, but Hitler knew already that it would be difficult to obtain. Thirdly, the Italian alliance was the most practicable prospect but it too was dependent on Mussolini's rise to power. For this reason, therefore, Hitler decided, "the Tyrol was not too great a price to pay for Mussolini's friendship". (88) Hitler also felt that an Italo-German alliance would "create a spirit of cooperation in Austria." (89)
One has to say that Lüdecke's recollection in his memoirs of discussions with Hitler some sixteen years earlier was remarkable but, nonetheless, his account of Hitler's thinking does seem to be borne out by other evidence. When on 14 November 1922, following Mussolini's rise to power, Hitler argued that the only way to increase German power was by executing the Anschluss with Austria, he stressed that prior Italian (and English) agreement would be necessary and continued that "Germany must collaborate with Italy, which is experiencing her national re-birth and has a great future. For that a clear and binding renunciation by Germany of the Germans in South Tyrol is necessary. The idle talk over South Tyrol, the empty protests against the Fascists only harm us since they alienate Italy from us. In politics there is no sentiment, only cold-bloodedness. Why should be suddenly get excited over the closure of a dozen German schools in South Tyrol, when the German press keeps quiet over the closure of a thousand German schools in Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, and Czechoslovakia?" (90) Clearly Hitler believed that the renunciation of the South Tyrol would make the Anschluss palatable to the Italians.

Though Hitler might still argue in private that "the South Tyrol question is, perhaps, more simply solved later by way of compensation", there was no denying his public commitment to the renunciation of the province or the fact that it flatly contradicted his Pan-German outlook. (91) It has to be admitted, though, that the ADV itself rather 'soft-pedalled' the issue following Mussolini's rise to power, announcing on 20 October 1922 that "if the Italian government and the Italian people wish to live honourably in peace with us and on good terms: we are ready. A precondition, however, is that the national life of our South Tyrolean fellow-countrymen is not disturbed further and that the damage done so far is made good and
atoned for. Otherwise, consequences could arise, which could cause a violent end and not only for many of the Fascists...but also for many others in the decaying Italian states." (92) It should be noticed that the Pan-Germans were not insisting on the return of the South Tyrol either. Nonetheless, Hitler's outright public abandonment of the South Tyrol was markedly different and he had to have good reason to specify in advance the concessions, which a National Socialist government would be prepared to make to secure an alliance.

This, of course, was the possibility of direct financial assistance from Mussolini or, at least, of association of some kind with his government, which, itself, would greatly enhance the prestige of the Nazi movement. To this end, Lüdecke made further visits to Italy in 1922 and 1923. (93) Probably as a result, Mussolini commissioned Tedaldi, the Italian representative on the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, to report on the political situation in Bavaria. In November 1922, Tedaldi, having heard Hitler expound his ideas on the Italian alliance and place the South Tyrol in the context of more oppressed German communities elsewhere, could tell Mussolini that only Hitler's party could be relied on not to lay claim to the South Tyrol. (94) In any event, as the German Embassy officials, who were monitoring these events in Rome concluded, Mussolini was "too clever to compromise himself by an agreement to loan money which is being sought openly by the Hitler people." (95) But whilst the search for short-term pecuniary gain proved fruitless, Hitler's alliance policy was, in no way, impaired by Mussolini's refusal to commit himself, the Nazi Party's renunciation of South Tyrol did at least bring it to Mussolini's attention and provide a common link; that was all Hitler could reasonably hope for at the time.
It would seem, therefore, that the accession of Mussolini to power in many respects crystallized Hitler's thoughts on an alliance with Italy. Though he may have noted earlier the advantages of exploiting Italian dissatisfaction at the Treaty of Versailles against France, the prospect of Mussolini as ruler of Italy forced Hitler to relate his alliance theories to reality and to confront the issue of the South Tyrol. To suggest that the rise of Mussolini played little part in fashioning the Italian element in Hitler's alliance policy is at least misleading. The presence of a Fascist government with a compatible ideology, (albeit short of antisemitism), was something which Hitler could not ignore. The rise of Fascism may also, as has been suggested, have been the crucial factor in the timing of the evolution of Hitler's alliances; it may have forced him, as Lüdecke suggested, in the autumn of 1922 to relate his instinctive convictions to a real life situation perhaps for the first time.

The decision on the Italian alliance does seem to have been Hitler's alone. Rosenberg had little to say about Italy before 1923, though no doubt he, along with others, noted with regret the absence of antisemitism from the Fascist programme. He may also have had qualms about the renunciation of the Germans in the South Tyrol; in a revealing article on Nazi attitude towards Fascist Italy in June 1923, Rosenberg implied that the South Tyroleans would not be abandoned in perpetuity. He made it quite clear that the final aim of Nazi policy was the unification of all Germans in one state but, in Germany's present parlous state, she needed allies, principally Italy, and sacrifices had to be made accordingly. Hence, he stressed, "the South Tyrolean question is not be be allowed to become a casus belli between the German and Italian people." However, once Germany had recovered her true diplomatic standing, then it might be possible
"to incorporate our separated brothers in the new German Empire. For there are many (other) places more valuable to Italy than the possession of the South Tyrol." (99) Clearly, whilst accepting Hitler's renunciation of the South Tyrol as a temporary expedient, Rosenberg refused to abandon all hope. This may have been the result of his own genuine grossdeutsch convictions or an attempt to soften the blow of the abandonment of German-speaking people, which so transparently contradicted the grossdeutsch orientation of party propaganda. (100) What does seem likely is that Hitler made the decision and the party, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, concurred.

As far as Russia was concerned, Hitler continued during 1921 to stress the pre-war compatibility of Russia and Germany and to criticize the Imperial government's failure to ally with her eastern neighbour before or during the First World War. He also claimed, of course, that Germany and Russia were the two greatest enemies of world Jewry and that the Jewish-led Bolshevik Revolution was the prelude to a similar onslaught on Germany. So, although Bolshevik rule prevented it at the time, a Russo-German alliance did seem likely to form part of a National Socialist alliance programme for the future.

By the time Hitler was writing Mein Kampf in 1924, however, Russia was no longer a prospective ally, but had been decisively relegated to the ranks of Germany's foes. When and why did this dramatic change occur? The obvious answer would be in 1921 or, at the latest, 1922, when the Bolsheviks, victorious in the civil war, were clearly unlikely to be unseated in the foreseeable future. But historians have, in general, been unwilling to
accept this simple explanation of Hitler's alliance strategy. This is due to the lack of unambiguous evidence to this effect and also, it must be admitted, to a reluctance by historians to take seriously the possibility that Hitler was genuinely motivated by an antisemitic ideology, in other words that the survival of 'Jewish' Bolshevism made a German-Russian alliance unthinkable as anything other than a temporary expedient. Instead it is argued that Hitler remained undecided as to his position on Russia until 1924 when, at his leisure in Landsberg gaol following the Munich putsch, Hitler finally thought through his alliance strategy and saw that the Anglo-German and German-Italian alliances would be equally applicable against Russia as against France. (101) Most historians do at least pay lip-service to the view - frequently supported by contemporaries - that on Russian affairs Hitler listened to Alfred Rosenberg. Nevertheless, the latest researcher has concluded that Hitler made a "solitary" decision in 1924. (102) A re-examination of Hitler's alienation from Russia should begin, therefore, by discussing to what extent Hitler relied on Rosenberg's ideas and then proceed to analyse exactly when and why Hitler changed his mind about Russia.

That Hitler's view of the Russian Revolution was coloured by Rosenberg's accounts, especially with respect to the liaison between the capitalistic Jews of the West and the revolutionary Jews of the East has been illustrated already in the last chapter. As time went by, Hitler, who knew no Russian, would rely even more on information which Rosenberg gleaned from Russian newspapers. That Hitler fed off others in this way was apparent at the time. Konrad Heiden wrote in the 1930s that Hitler "sucked up information which he could use hurriedly and greedily, as a dry sponge
Ernst Hanfstängl, a close collaborator in the early 1920s, also recalled Hitler's receptivity: "I had been feeding him ideas and items of news culled from the foreign press and had been agreeably surprised to find them cropping up in his speeches." Rosenberg must have had the same experience: indeed, Hanfstängl's reason for trying to enlighten Hitler, particularly with regard to America was to counteract Rosenberg's influence on Hitler, which he considered to be too narrowly eurocentric.

In 1921 with the publication of the party newspaper, the unmistakeable similarity between Rosenberg's and Hitler's view of Russia became more evident as the paper and the party leaders began to comment on current events abroad. A change soon emerged. In 1920 Hitler's fear of Bolshevism seems to have been heightened, in part at least, by the danger of a resurgence of Pan-Slavism in Russia, and a revival of Russia's expansionist ambitions already visible in the Russo-Polish war. With the conclusion of the war, this primarily strategic consideration soon disappeared and in January 1921 Hitler wrote that "the threatening Bolshevik flood is not so much to be feared as a consequence of Russian-Bolshevik victories on the battlefields as of a systematic destruction of our own people (by Bolshevik ideas)." As pressure on Germany from the Entente countries over reparations was being stepped up, Hitler, writing in the VB on 6 March 1921, criticized those Germans who were calling for a Russian alliance to counterbalance the Western threat. Whilst re-stating his conviction that an understanding between Russia and Germany would have been the latter's salvation in 1915 or 1916, he firmly rejected one with a "Russia, which represents, at least in power-political terms, little more than a cripple
compared to the former Czarist state." (107) In the same issue, Rosenberg revealed the reason for Hitler's low estimate of Bolshevik Russia when he commented that "the whole of Russia is in revolt against the terror of the Jews. We do not know whether it will now be finally broken... (but) the days of Jewish Bolshevism in Russia are numbered." (108) On the other hand, if Germany were to accept a diktat on reparations, then she too would face the Jewish terror "as in Russia carried out by foreign troops. In Russia, it is the Latvians and Chinese who 'pacify' the workers... with machine guns." An alliance with the Bolsheviks, however, was not the solution; the Germans, according to Rosenberg, had to resist both the Jewish bankers in London (who were behind the reparations issue) and "the enticements from the East." (109)

Significantly enough, nine days later, Hitler repeated not only Rosenberg's general assessment on 6 March of the situation in Russia but also many incidentals as well. "After an unprecedented 3 years of bloody dictatorship", Hitler wrote, "the Bolshevik regime is beginning to totter." The Russian worker, Hitler continued, was turning against "the Jewish bloodhounds, which lay him low with knouts and machine guns", and against the torture administered by "the Chinese and Latvian terror-guards"; finally the Russian proletariat was being moved to revolt against Bolshevism and in Russia this could only mean, in Hitler's view, "the rooting out of the Jews." (110) The close correlation between Hitler's and Rosenberg's accounts is too striking to be coincidental.

On 3 May 1921, Hitler referred to the fact that Lenin was trying to establish trading relations with England to alleviate Russia's economic problems, a fact which Rosenberg had highlighted as evidence of collusion between capitalism and communism only two days earlier in the VB. (111) On
4 August, Hitler spoke disapprovingly of attempts to collect food in Germany for the starving Russian people because "all relief aids not them, but their tormentors, the Jewish commissars, (the) Latvian and Chinese troops". Once again, this repeated a news item published by Rosenberg in the VB the same day that supplies of bread were not reaching the Russian people. (112) The Nazis continued to predict the downfall of Bolshevism for some time and clearly Hitler seems to have followed Rosenberg's line and to have drawn snippets of information from Rosenberg's articles on Russia.

Alongside the day-to-day criticism of events in Bolshevik Russia, ran the frequently expressed sympathy for the Russian people (though this did not extend to helping them fend off starvation!) and for those nationalist forces which were working to overthrow Bolshevism. As Rosenberg had written on several occasions, if these - predictably anti-semitic - forces were to succeed, then they would be the natural allies for Germany. In January 1921 he expressed the hope that his revelations about a Judeo-Masonic conspiracy against Czarist Russia would lead to "a German-Russian national (that is, anti-Jewish) united front". (113) Hitler seems to have accepted this ideological scenario claiming that a German-Russian alliance could only come into being when Jewry had been overthrown. In August 1921, Hitler claimed that the only assistance which the German people could give the Russians was in "the annihilation of the present rulers of Russia." (114) These ideological comments seem to indicate that Hitler and Rosenberg would not have been averse to having a Russo-German alliance as part of a future Nazi Party foreign policy programme. Further indications to this effect can be found in their discussions of pre-war German diplomacy. As has been shown, Hitler felt the two countries had been natural allies. Interestingly, Rosenberg followed the same line in a rare excursion out of the
ideological field; he criticized German diplomats for maintaining a dialogue with Britain in the last years before the war and for "counting on Great Britain's 'magnanimity' instead of - as sound German interests dictated - uniting also with Russia, in my opinion at the expense of Austria-Hungary". (115) It is not altogether clear whether Rosenberg was really suggesting German alliances with both Russia and England here; if so, then he evidently did not share Hitler's view that the two alliances were mutually exclusive alternatives.

Nevertheless, Hitler and Rosenberg seemed to agree on what pre-war German diplomats ought to have done and though these comments had little immediate relevance to Germany's postwar position, taken with the outspoken support for the Russian people, it seems fair to assume that when the Nazis finally decided to formulate an alliance strategy of their own, a Russo-German alliance would form part of it. There are no signs of the belief in Slav inferiority which was to underlie later anti-Russian policies. Rosenberg did make, as has been seen, some ambivalent statements about the Russians in 1919, but, though the Russians were regarded as inferior to the Germans, the two peoples were felt to have a natural affinity; they were "the noblest peoples of Europe", who would be assigned to one another "not only politically but also culturally". (116) Nor was there concrete evidence of a desire to see the break-up of the Russian Empire. It is true that Hitler had hinted that Russia would have had fewer problems if she did not try to keep control of non-Russian areas but Rosenberg, though later a supporter of Ukrainian separatism, seemed to feel that demands for national self-determination inside the Russian Empire had fatally weakened the anti-Bolshevik cause and that German politicians, instead of trying to unite
Russians behind the nationalist regime, had in fact mistakenly preached "deliverance from the Czarist yoke" and stressed differences between Ukrainians and Greater Russians: the treaty of Brest Litovsk had been the result. (117)

Thus Hitler and Rosenberg were broadly in agreement on the Russian question, judging by their ideological commitment to the Russian people in the struggle against Bolshevism, their observations on pre-war German diplomacy, and the absence of any extreme racial elitism towards the Slavs. As in the case of Britain and Italy, they continued to criticize the actions of the current government in Russia, whilst retaining their belief in the possibility of collaboration with a future nationally-orientated government. On Russian affairs, Hitler seemed willing to accept Rosenberg's interpretation of events and to go along with his prognosis. After the leadership crisis in July 1921, when Hitler's own contributions to the VB became fewer and after Eckart took over editorial control of the VB in August, Rosenberg's influence over the party's interpretation of foreign affairs grew even more. He became the most regular contributor to the paper and did the bulk of the editorial work during Eckart's periods of indolence. As unofficial editor of the VB, Rosenberg was in a good position to sway opinion in the party. The VB became preoccupied with Bolshevik Russia, as Ernst Hanfstängl discovered when he tried to interest the VB in some newspaper clippings; "all Rosenberg wanted were articles and news items dealing with his particular anti-Bolshevist, anti-clerical, anti-semitic prejudices", Hanfstängl later complained. (118) Though Hanfstängl must be treated as a hostile witness, the substance of his criticism is borne out by a reading of the VB in 1921 and 1922. Rosenberg had established
himself as a party authority on Russian affairs and was in a position of considerable influence. As the editor of a collection of Rosenberg's writings put it later, from his articles and speeches, "the editors, speakers, and politicians of our movement collected material for their struggle, and indeed material which was not only sharply honed but also true and incontrovertible." (119)

The signing of the treaty of Rapallo on 16 April 1922 by representatives of the Russian and German delegations to the Genoa economic conference provided a test of Nazi convictions on foreign affairs. As always, developments, which suggested that Germany might have friends abroad, posed problems of interpretation for Nazi audiences used to hearing that Germany was surrounded by hostile conspiratorial powers. In December 1921 Rosenberg's instinct had been to explain the limited trade agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union of 6 May 1921 as a pretext for Bolshevik intervention in German internal affairs: "The Moscow government of Hebrews has promised non-interference in non-Russian affairs in every treaty but not kept to it", he had declared. (120) And even before the news of the signing of the treaty of Rapallo broke, Hitler and Rosenberg had been suspicious of Russian offers of economic concessions to the capitalist West, fearing that the West might recognize the Soviet Union. (121) As it happened, it was Germany, not the Western powers, who bestowed de facto recognition on the Soviet regime by signing the Rapallo treaty. How would the Nazis react?

The VB's first reaction on 19 April was to denounce it as a "great trick": 
"Germany will be allowed to build up Soviet Russia with her technical science, her labour and her sweat, so that the stock exchange Jews from the rest of the world can take over the administration without risk... The German-Russian treaty is the continuation of Pan-Jewish-Anglo-Saxon world policy and the exploitation of German impotence." (122)

On 21 April Hitler condemned the treaty because it furthered the destruction of the German as well as the Russian state which was the aim of the world stock exchange; "in Russia", he declared, "the Jews and their Chinese-Latvian security guards rule... Arrangements for the same are being made for us. Genoa means the lasting enslavement of Germany." (123) "Russia", he concluded, "is not the last straw, which Germany, like a drowning man, can clutch, but a lead weight, which pulls us immediately down into the depths". (124) The ideological nature of Hitler's rejection of the Rapallo treaty is quite apparent; an alliance with the Bolsheviks was out of the question, but an alliance with the Russian people was still desired: "What can help us?", he asked, "Not to negotiate with the despoilers of Russia, but to call upon the Russian people to shake off their tormentors, in order then to draw nearer to them (the Russian people)." (125)

Hitler's response to the Rapallo treaty does not appear to indicate any change in his attitude towards Russia. However, when Rosenberg expounded his analysis of Rapallo on 3 May 1922, the real significance of the treaty for the Nazis became clear. Rosenberg was very concerned with the Comintern's response to Rapallo, which was to call for a Russian alliance against France, a call, of course, which found a ready echo in many German nationalist circles. (126) This was the test of the strength of Nazi views on Russia, for if the destruction of the arch-enemy France had been of paramount importance, then surely even a 'pact with the devil', the
Soviet Union, would have been an acceptable short-term price to pay. Significantly, Rosenberg did not agree: "We declare it to be the greatest crime against the German people if one called them, moreover with the decaying Soviet Russia, into an active military struggle against France." He noted that Germany had no weapons and that France would (with some difficulty) win such a conflict but he saw behind such an idea, which the Jewish press was propagating in France, an attempt by the stock exchange and Soviet Jews to reduce Germany to a state of prostration. From Rosenberg, this was entirely predictable. More surprising, in view of his stated preference to die in a Bolshevik Germany than to live in a frenchified Germany, was Hitler’s repetition of precisely the same argument two days after the publication of Rosenberg’s article: "Whilst internationalism is being preached in Germany and today plans for a campaign against France are being worked out in communist lairs", Hitler claimed, "the same frivolous game is being played in France the other way round, with extreme 'nationalism'"; only high finance, Hitler concluded, could profit from such events.

It is, of course, true that Hitler was unlikely to admit in public that he supported an alliance with Russia against France, even if he did so privately. Nazi propaganda, as ever, required the sharpest condemnation of government policies - in this case, that meant the treaty of Rapallo. So one cannot argue that Hitler’s response to Rapallo necessarily showed that Hitler was moving away from the concept of a German-Russian alliance in the future. What is significant about Rapallo is that it seems to have brought home to Hitler the central importance of Bolshevik Russia to his party’s Weltanschauung. On 21 April, in the immediate aftermath of the news of the Rapallo agreement, Hitler declared that "the greatest task for
our people still stands before it: to be (the) leader in the coming
struggle of the Aryans against the world-wide Jewish threat."(129) For
Hitler and the other party leaders,(130) Rapallo seemed to symbolize the
partnership between capitalism and revolutionary socialism; in a speech
on 22 June, Hitler described the Soviet representatives and the Western
bankers walking arm-in-arm through the streets of Genoa and spoke of
the need for a new Weltanschauung:

"Bolshevism is the final consequence of materialistic
Marxism. To rise against this is the mission of the
German people. The goal: the Germanic Empire of the
German Nation. The deadly enemy: Jewry." (131)

As yet, it must be stressed that little had seemingly changed in Hitler's
outlook in foreign affairs; he still condemned collaboration with the
Soviet Union and promised support to the Russian people and a future
nationalist government. Perhaps, however, Hitler was now beginning to
accept Soviet Russia as a permanent feature of the diplomatic scene and
was making opposition to Bolshevism the pivot of Nazi ideology. The struggle
against the Versailles Settlement (and the war of revenge against France)
were only part of that ideology and no longer the main rationale behind the
party. Perhaps, the treaty of Rapallo helped to crystallize the change,
but there is evidence that this change was under way earlier in 1922.

Early in 1922 Hitler went on a long tour of Germany trying to attract support
from nationalist circles and from reports of one of these private
encounters, Hitler's current assessment of the Russian question can be
determined. During the tour - probably in March 1922 - Hitler delivered
a speech to the Juniklub, an association whose name commemorated the signing
in June 1919 of the abhorred treaty of Versailles, and met its leading light, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. Moeller was, by all accounts, a quiet serious man, a political writer and cultural historian; he was not a gifted public speaker but wielded great influence over his associates by his prowess in discussion. His major achievements were a new edition of Dostoevski's novels and the famous book often mistakenly taken because of its title Das Dritte Reich as anticipating the Nazi period. Hitler's usual beer-hall tirade on the 'Breaking of Interest-Slavery' left the intellectually sophisticated, and by the end somewhat depleted, audience at the Juniklub quite unmoved, but a private conversation then ensued between Hitler and Moeller, later recounted by Rudolf Pechel, editor of Deutsche Rundschau and a member of the club, during which Moeller tried to establish Hitler's views on the problems of the day. Hitler emerged from the ensuing discussion greatly impressed by Moeller, reportedly exclaiming: "You have everything I lack. You create the spiritual framework for Germany's reconstruction. I am but a drummer and an assembler. Let us work together." Unfortunately, the admiration was not mutual; "that fellow will never grasp it", Moeller is said to have commented after Hitler's departure.

Hans Grimm, the poet and later author of the influential novel Volk ohne Raum who was a close friend and associate of Moeller has related the latter's account of the encounter with Hitler. According to this account, the two men quarrelled over foreign policy; "it seemed to me", Grimm recalled, "that Russia and Bolshevischism and its significance for Germany had been touched upon by both men, and this had led to a basic difference of opinion." Moeller saw in Bolshevischism hope for Germany; he expected that Russian nationalism would emerge, of necessity, from Russian Bolshevischism and that
it would incline towards Germany. Hitler rejected this 'National Bolshevism' argument quoting a remark by Karl Radek, a member of the executive of the Comintern, to the effect that what the right-wing New Order in Germany and Europe needed was the addition of "squadrons of Asiatic Bolsheviks". (137)

The full implications of this disagreement can only be grasped within the context of Moeller's overall views on foreign policy. Central to Moeller's whole outlook was his belief in the existence of 'young' and 'old' nations. The distinction between the two groups was apparent in Moeller's book, Die Deutschen, published in 1906: "today the earth belongs to the nationalities", he wrote, "...humanity is no longer divided into young and old races but into young and old peoples"; (138) it was a distinction based principally on political longevity, cultural performance and population growth. The 'young nations' - Germany, Russia, and America - were newly-formed states, culturally prolific with expanding populations, whilst the 'old' nations - France, England, and (perhaps surprisingly) Italy - were in decline. (139) The similarity with Oswald Spengler's ideas on the decline of the West is obvious. (140) From this early stage Moeller argued that Germany should "conquer a political share of the empire of the world, daily she conquers her civilizing (share) from Hamburg to Salonica". (141) This imperialistic expansion was justified by Moeller in terms of geopolitics: "as soon as the space has become too confined for the people", he wrote, "it breaks over its borders and leads us to a point where we must adopt a world policy (Weltpolitik) in order to become a world people." (142)

These ideas, first set out in 1906 underwent little modification over the years; Moeller's rejection of the Western European powers and his belief in the natural community of interest between the 'young nations', particularly Germany and Russia, survived the First World War, during which Russia and
America were at odds with Germany. During the war, the direction of Moeller's proposed German expansion became evident; he declared that "we must take a share of the East, to which we, in our own way, half belong and on which we border, if we want to have a share in the future: air to breathe, space for movement, time for development." (143) This expansion could only take place at the expense of Russia, so how could Moeller hope for Russo-German collaboration at the same time? The answer was that Russia would turn her back on Europe after her defeat and resume her proper role as an Asiatic eastward-looking power, abandoning her non-Russian land in the West: "(in 1914) Russia was too large for Russia and Germany too small for Europe", Moeller remarked. (144) In August 1918, Moeller wrote that "Russia is returning to her natural frontier, spatially as well as spiritually. That is the result for Russia, for Europe. It is signified by the reciprocal action which is not pushing Russia towards the West, but rather (pushing) Europe towards the East." (145) For Moeller, such expansion was not naked imperialism, but a resumption of the natural course of European development, which had been impeded only by Russia's claim to be a European power and which with the fall of Czarism was now possible. The areas to be acquired by the West (that is, Germany) were "the former Russian border areas, which, like the Baltic States, like Finland and Poland, have already been for a long time 'culturally' part of Central Europe. The same, however, applied to Russia itself." (146)

After the war Moeller's attitude appears to have moderated. He produced what he called a "socialistic foreign policy" which consisted primarily of "adopting an association with Russia and playing off the revolutionary East against the capitalistic West." (147) Historians have been unable to agree whether Moeller's 'eastern orientation' was, in fact, a post-war rejection of expansion at Russian expense in favour of genuine German-
Russian collaboration. The majority have taken this more charitable view of Moeller's philosophy, that he expected Russian nationalism to become part of Russian Bolshevism and the creation of a cultural community in Eastern Europe. (148) Fritz Stern, for example, acknowledges an imperialistic streak behind Moeller's ideas but feels that it was "the vision of an aesthete", not based on an appraisal of the objective political situation but on aesthetical judgements. (149) On the other hand, others have seen the old imperialistic ideas hidden by the high-sounding talk of peaceful expansion, federations and so on; it was, according to one writer, simply the implementation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk by other methods. (150) Though it is all too easy to indict others as imperialists on the basis of their writings, there is surely some justification for this charge. The whole trend of Moeller's writing before and during the First World War indicated a desire for German expansion eastwards; in the post-war period, he remained committed to the idea of imperialism, only the direction that it would take is in doubt. On the one occasion after the war when he was specific about his territorial ambitions for Germany in the East, Moeller showed that he had grossdeutsch ambitions at the very least; he wanted "the frontiers of nationality" not the "frontiers of the map". (151) In all probability, Moeller hoped, as he had done before the war, that Germany would expand eastwards and an 'Asiatic Russia' would cooperate with Germany's spatial requirements. What is certain is that if there was to be cooperation between Germany and Russia, it was to be very much on German terms. As Moeller explained in August 1920: "cooperation with Russia was only possible with independence from Russia"; the Russian revolutionaries, therefore, had to recognize that "each land has its own socialism" and they were not to try to impose Russian socialism on Germany. (152) The Bolsheviks had to abandon their international aspirations: "Bolshevism
is Russian. And it is only Russian" declared Moeller. Lenin had only

to accept that Bolshevism was meant only for Russia and, in Moeller's

view, Russo-German collaboration against their common enemies, France and

England, could begin. (153)

This was evidently the point over which Moeller and Hitler were at odds
during their discussion. Hitler could not accept that the Bolsheviks would

resist the temptation to extend Bolshevism to Germany. As a result, Hitler's

verdict on the Treaty of Rapallo differed decisively from Moeller's.

Whilst Hitler saw it as a fatal error to ally with Soviet Russia, for

Moeller, "the decision of Genoa does not signify a goal...it signifies a
direction....The direct result of this decision is for Russia at the

moment perhaps great, for Germany perhaps only small. But the indirect

result is incalculable, because this decision is the first step on the way
to a grouping of nations which want to live." (154)

In fact, the dispute with Moeller van den Bruck may reveal a change that

had occurred in Hitler's outlook during 1922. In October 1921 as has been

seen, Hitler had endorsed the view that a pre-war German alliance with

Russia would have allowed Germany to expand eastwards - precisely the

argument with which Moeller (and the Pan-Germans) had been associated at the
time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. (155) So it might be

assumed that his disagreement with Moeller showed that Hitler had abandoned

the idea of eastward expansion with a Russian alliance. This could mean

either that Hitler was now taking very seriously the party's anti-Bolshevik

ideology and would not consider an agreement with Soviet Russia or that he

had more excessive demands to make on Russian territory. It needs to be

stressed that, given the scanty evidence for the encounter between

Hitler and Moeller, this suggestion of a modification of Hitler's outlook
remains fairly speculative at this stage.

The treaty of Rapallo and the encounter with Moeller van den Bruck seem to show that Hitler may have been seriously affected by the party's antisemitic, anti-Bolshevik philosophy. The hardening of his attitude towards Soviet Russia evident in his reaction to both events was, of course, already occurring before this. The increased virulence of Hitler's anti-Bolshevism and his rejection of 'National Bolshevism' may have been attributable to the influence of a more critical view of Russia propagated by Rosenberg during 1921-22 and perhaps also to Hitler's association with Dr. Max-Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, who had contacts with a group of Russian nationalists in exile in Southern Germany. The latter not unnaturally were opposed to any form of collaboration between Germany and the Bolshevik rulers of Russia. Certainly the changing views of Rosenberg on Russia and the influence of Rosenberg and Scheubner-Richter on Hitler deserve closer examination.

Hitler's rejection of Moeller's arguments for Russo-German cooperation on the grounds that Germany would be subjected to the invasion of "squadrons of Asiatic Bolsheviks" seems clearly to have been influenced by Rosenberg's interpretation of Bolshevism as an "Asiatic pestilence". (156) 'National Bolshevism' was impossible in Russia, according to Rosenberg, because Bolshevism was the product of an alien, non-Russian, culture. Rosenberg, by no means always a Russophobe as some have suggested, was a great admirer of Russian culture, particularly of the works of Dostoevski and Tolstoy; at first, therefore, he had denied that the Bolshevik leaders
were Slavs at all and claimed that the Bolshevik regime had been destroying everything that was genuinely Russian. (157) However, as the Russian people proved incapable of overthrowing Bolshevism during the Russian civil war, Rosenberg's view of Bolshevism and the Russian people very gradually began to change. The change was most apparent in his pamphlet, *Pest in Russland*, published in late June or early July 1922. Although Bolshevism was still regarded as a disease originating in the East, it was no longer totally alien to the Russian people. There was, Rosenberg now argued, a "dormant anarchistic impulse" in the Russian character, which surfaced occasionally, in the reign of Ivan the Terrible and in the Strelzi rising in Peter the Great's time, for example, and which formed a direct link with the 'anarchism' of Bakunin and Trotsky and Zinoviev. (158) This was quite a dramatic volte-face since Rosenberg had criticized the Russians in 1919 for their indolence and lack of aggression. Dostoevsky had shown, Rosenberg argued in 1922, that "even the most genial Russian for no accountable reason can suddenly become a criminal and murderer." (159) On the other hand, the Russians were still not capable of systematic and cold-blooded torture and murder. The horrors and blood-letting, the rejection of western influence and, indeed, of the achievements of Russians themselves, epitomized by the Bolshevik Revolution were, in Rosenberg's view, the result of "a profound blood-mixture" during the period of Tartar domination of Russia. This also explained the tensions within the Russian character up to the present; the European and the Asiatic elements in the Russian character were constantly at odds with each other. Bolshevism, therefore, represented a resurgence of Asiatic blood, Rosenberg claimed in 1922; "a new deployment of the Near Eastern spirit against Europe". (160) The Jews, of course, were orchestrating this new 'Mongol' advance. (161) Nevertheless, though Rosenberg's view of Bolshevism and the Russians had
changed, he had not abandoned the idea of a German alliance with a future non-Bolshevik Russia and, indeed, in the foreword to the second edition of *Pest in Russland*, he maintained that anti-bolshevik forces were gaining in strength. (162) However, his doubts about the racial quality of the Russian people represented a marked lowering of his estimation of Germany's would-be ally.

This change was also reflected in the appearance of a different attitude to separatist movements inside Russia. In May 1921, as has been seen, Rosenberg criticised the Berlin government at the time of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk for having encouraged separatist movements inside Russia, instead of trying to unite all Russians behind a nationalist government representing a united Russian Empire (*Gross-russland*) against the Bolsheviks. (163) But in 1922 Rosenberg showed he recognised the value of separatism, especially Ukrainian separatism, as a means of undermining the Bolshevik state. In *Pest in Russland*, he pointed out that the ruthless centralisation followed by Czarist officials had been the foundation of the Russian empire but that this policy pursued by the Great Russian advocates of empire was also a source of weakness; the Polish and Finnish officials of the empire were strongly opposed to St. Petersburg. (164) On two occasions he stressed the strength of Ukrainian demands for separate statehood without, it should be admitted, openly expressing support. (165) Once again, the modification was slight but significant; Rosenberg still opposed the granting of independence to Poland and the Baltic states which had contributed to Bolshevik success, but now he was beginning to recognise the usefulness of the unsatisfied nationalism of the Ukraine in his anti-Bolshevik crusade.
This had wider implications. Emerging in Rosenberg's mind at this time was a vision of a future Russia as a nation-state. Rosenberg, as he explained in his memoirs, had come to appreciate that the Russia of 1914 or 1917 was "not a nation state in the sense of Germany or France. If one leaves aside the vexed question of the Ukraine or White Ruthenia, it was clear that Finland was not Russian. Neither the Balts, nor the Estonians, nor the Latvians, were Russians. All Caucasians were old peoples, Georgia was a state almost a thousand years old. The people of Turkistan were completely different from Russians. Russia was, therefore, despite the natural predominance of the Russians, a state of nationalities (Nationalitäten-Staat)." (166) Just when Rosenberg began to draw this distinction between the Russian Empire and other nation-states is difficult to pinpoint. But in Pest in Russland the unspoken assumption was that one of the reasons for the Russian Revolution of March 1917 was that Czarism prevented the emergence of a "truly national Russia", that is a Russia devoid of its alien nationalities. (167) So Rosenberg's concept of the Russia of the future seems to have been of a truncated Russia, a recreation of the Moscovite Russia of the pre-imperial period.

If this was the case, it was but a short step to argue that Germany might benefit territorially from the dismantling of the Russian empire. It has to be emphasised, however, that Rosenberg did not suggest this explicitly at this time. However, Rosenberg in his analysis of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in May 1921 had criticised its mildness; the preoccupation of the Germans with the rights of Poland and the Baltic states, had, in his words, "undermined the possibility of a strong far-reaching policy in Russia"; the result was "the historically unnatural and, in comparison to that of Versailles, positively mild peace of Brest-Litovsk." (168) The implication
here surely is that a settlement more in tune with history would have been harsher, possibly splitting Russia into nation-states.

Further evidence of Rosenberg's interest in German annexations in Europe can be found in his commentary on the party programme, *Wesen, Grundsätze und Ziele der NSDAP*, written early in 1923. There he criticized the democratic parties of pre-war Germany for "preventing a systematic German colonial policy" which would have enabled Germany to absorb her growing population without the resort to emigration. It would not have been so bad if these parties which opposed a "colonial world policy" had at the same time, Rosenberg went on, "at least represented the German people forcefully on the European continent, but here too the Danes, Poles, etc. were protected and every attempt at a large-scale settlement in the East ran into the stiffest opposition". (169) Rosenberg, clearly, was interested in territorial expansion in Europe. When he referred to "settlement in the East" he did not have in mind simply the re-settlement of the depopulated eastern provinces of Germany as he revealed:

"it is not possible under the present circumstances to indicate more clearly the European and extra-European areas in question which must come in consideration for colonisation. The imperialistic (Weltpolitik) opportunities of today can change in time." (170)

Despite the vagueness of this final comment, his elaboration of point three of the party programme - the demand for "land and sēil (colonies)" to feed the German people - revealed Rosenberg's support for territorial annexation inside Europe as well as outside; Russian territory is not specified though there can be little doubt as to Rosenberg's ideas on the future of the Polish state, for which he had not the slightest respect. (171)
So all the indications are that Rosenberg's attitude towards Eastern Europe was changing: he was beginning to recognise the usefulness of the Ukrainian separatist movement; he seemed to envisage a "decolonized" Russia reduced to its original Muscovite core; finally, it seems possible that he felt Germany ought to benefit territorially from this process and then establish a firm alliance with this reorganised Russian state, when it was liberated from its Bolshevik leadership. These changes occurred at a time when Rosenberg's influence on Hitler was probably at its greatest. Hitler seems, for example, to have used Rosenberg's Pest in Russland as a sourcebook for his anti-Bolshevik tirades. (172) Hitler also seems to have been pleased with Rosenberg's pamphlet Wesen, Grundsätze und Ziele der NSDAP taking time at the party conference in January 1923 to thank Rosenberg publicly for "his resolute collaboration and the theoretical amplification of the party programme". (173) So Hitler was fully aware of the development of Rosenberg's ideas, if indeed, they did not merely reflect his own.

At the same time as these changes were occurring, the Nazi party was in contact with Russian émigrés, who had fled from the Bolsheviks in Russia and settled in southern Germany. There can be no doubt that they, too, reinforced Hitler's more virulent anti-Bolshevism. The man who acted as an intermediary between Hitler and the Russian émigrés was Max-Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, a Baltic German, who was killed at Hitler's side at the Feldherrnhalle on 9 November 1923 at the climax of the Munich putsch. (174) Scheubner-Richter's political career and contribution to the Nazi party is difficult to reconstruct due to his liking for backstage intrigue and secret diplomacy, nevertheless an attempt must be made to investigate the
role of the man, of whom Hitler said when referring to the "martyrs of 9 November 1923", "all are replaceable but not he". (175)

Scheubner-Richter's expertise on Russian affairs was rooted in his wartime experiences with the German Army in Eastern Europe. After apparently having had a command in Turkey and having led a political expedition to Persia and Afghanistan, Scheubner-Richter found himself in early 1918 in Riga in charge of the press office of Oberost, the German government of occupation in Latvia. (176) There he worked in close collaboration with August Winnig, the German commissioner in the Baltic provinces, who, after initial doubts, found him to be a "reliable and honourable character". (177) Already in evidence were the political views and personality traits, which were to characterize Scheubner-Richter until his futile death on 9 November 1923.

He told Winnig in 1919 that he was a "national socialist with no party affiliations"; he regarded himself as a "loner, mistrusted and rejected by one (party) as a reactionary, and by the others as a red". (178) He hoped that within five years Germany could recover from defeat. According to Max Boehm, an expert on the Auslanddeutsche (Germans living abroad), who also met Scheubner-Richter in Riga in 1918, "his outlook was in no way radical, but clever and cautious. In Baltic politics, we both represented a tolerant line against the Latvians and Estonians and found ourselves at odds to a certain extent with the reactionary and Pan-German tendencies especially in the Baltic aristocracy." (179) Scheubner-Richter saw his own mission clearly enough: to defend the Germans in Latvia and, as the war continued to go badly for Germany during 1918, to defend Latvia against the obvious enemy, Russian Bolshevism. (180) In 1918, it seems, therefore, Scheubner-Richter was a moderate German nationalist, who rejected Pan-German ideas about annexing the Baltic States and understood the separatist feelings of Estonians and Latvians; his abiding fear,
however, was that Bolshevism would manage to spread its infection into Germany.

In 1918 Scheubner-Richter was also displaying a taste for personal adventure which would remain with him till the fateful march to the Feldherrnhalle. As the Germany Army prepared to withdraw from the Baltic provinces at the end of 1918 in face of the approaching Red Army, Scheubner-Richter volunteered to remain in Riga as Winnig's representative to negotiate with the Bolsheviks and the Latvian authorities. Scheubner-Richter, as the last German consular official in Riga, tried to protect the German inhabitants and their property and to organise transportation for any German troops remaining in Riga. This put Scheubner-Richter's life in considerable jeopardy from the Latvians, resentful of German rule, and the oncoming Bolshevik troops. In fact on 14 January 1919, Scheubner-Richter was arrested and sentenced to death, only to be reprieved in circumstances which are still far from clear.

Not surprisingly, his experiences in Latvia in January 1919, especially his own personal treatment and the daily executions which took place during the Soviet occupation, reinforced Scheubner-Richter's anti-Bolshevik convictions. On his return to Germany, he rejoined August Winnig, now Reichskommissar for East and West Prussia, in Königsberg, where he helped to disseminate anti-Soviet propaganda. At Scheubner-Richter's instigation in February 1918, the Wirtschaftspolitische Aufklärungsdienst (WAD), an economic policy information service for the East, was established to publicize the destructive consequences of Bolshevism for economic life and to work for economic cooperation between Germany and the border states. On 18 February 1919 the Ostdeutsche Heimatsdienst (OHD), the
Max Boehm, who had dealings with Scheubner-Richter as chairman of the OHD, asserts that Scheubner-Richter, in no way, pursued "a radical nationalism, but organised the resistance of the threatened borderland against the danger from the East, which, for him, had become a pivotal phenomenon." Boehm fails to mention that Scheubner-Richter was also worried about another threat, felt particularly acutely in East Prussia, namely the threat from Poland.

In 1919, the OHD organized mass protests against the transfer of West Prussia to Poland, and on the issues of Danzig and Memel; in May 1919, it was decided to build the permanent head-quarters of the OHD in Danzig, the aim being "to convince the Reich government as well as the Entente of the need to support the Ostmark economically and militarily as a bulwark against Russian Bolshevism and not to cut it off from the Reich." Hence by the end of 1919, Scheubner-Richter's hostility towards Poland and Bolshevik Russia was well honed by personal experience.

Scheubner-Richter's activities in Königsberg were abruptly curtailed by the Kapp putsch in March 1920. August Winnig was involved in the conspiracy to overthrow the Weimar Republic and was suspended from office in the aftermath and, predictably, Scheubner-Richter had not been able to resist the lure of a conspiracy. The decision to move from Königsberg to Munich was, in retrospect, the turning-point in his life. Arno Schickedanz, a friend of Rosenberg's whom he had known in Riga in 1918, apparently got Scheubner-Richter interested in a project being organized by Rosenberg in Munich to establish trading links between Bavarian businessmen and the White Russian forces under General Wrangel in the Crimea.

Moving to Munich, Scheubner-Richter met Rosenberg and was introduced to leading industrialists and Russian émigrés and eventually led a commission...
to the Crimea in May 1920. The visit convinced him that White Russian forces, if properly supported from Germany and under united leadership, could rid Russia of Bolshevism. (193) Thus, Scheubner-Richter had found a new challenge - to foster friendly contacts between White Russians and German nationalists, and to this end, with his friend, Dr. Nemirovich-Danchenko, Wrangel's former press chief, he established the Neue deutsch-russische Gesellschaft. (194) By May 1921 it had 150 members and was re-formed as Aufbau. Wirtschaftliche Vereinigung für den Osten with its own journal Wirtschaftspolitische Aufbau-Korrespondenz (WPA), its aim being to attract German economic circles and unions in order to "advise them how reconstruction in the interests of Germany and Russia is possible." (195)

Scheubner-Richter's mission to the Crimea, though fruitless, and the establishment of Aufbau and his undoubted charm, (196) had established his credentials in the eyes of the Russian émigrés in Southern Germany, so much so that he was entrusted with the organization of the Russian monarchist conference at Bad Reichenhall in Bavaria in May 1921. The fortunes of the Russian émigrés were at their lowest ebb at the beginning of 1921 since General Wrangel had abandoned his resistance to the Red Army at the end of 1920. Also, the émigrés were united only in their opposition to Bolshevism; the supporters of the democratic parties opposed the monarchists. The democrats themselves were divided between the supporters of the Kadets under Milyukov and the Mensheviks under Nabokov. (197) The monarchists were also divided into supporters of a restored Czarism and constitutional monarchists and were further splintered into francophile and germanophile factions. Then, of course, when it came to choosing a new Czar, opinion was divided between three possible candidates: Grand Dukes, Cyril Vladimirovich and Dmitry Pavlovich and the elder statesman Nikolai Nikolayevich. (198)
Not surprisingly, therefore, Scheubner-Richter made little progress at Bad Reichenhall towards his goal of uniting the Russian monarchist movement: the conference had to content itself with vague statements of principle which all could accept. (199) Scheubner-Richter persevered but the dwindling fortunes of the White Russian cause only seemed to aggravate the disunity of the émigrés. The German signature of the treaty of Rapallo seemed to vindicate the arguments of the francophiles, and the German-based émigrés split into francophile and germanophile factions, the former supporting the candidature of Nikolai Nikolayevich, the latter that of Cyril Vladimirovich. (200)

Meanwhile, of course, Scheubner-Richter had already established contact with the German Workers' Party. He met Adolf Hitler through Alfred Rosenberg in October 1920 and joined the party the following month and, according to the VB's retrospective on Scheubner-Richter, he found himself "in the following years, in ever closer collaboration with Adolf Hitler and his movement". (201) Most historians assert that Hitler and Scheubner-Richter only became very close collaborators in 1923 in the build-up to the abortive putsch, when Scheubner-Richter was secretary of the Kampfbund, the league of extreme right-wing groups, which Hitler came to lead in September 1923. However, it seems more likely that Scheubner-Richter had been in close contact with Hitler for some time and that they had, in fact, become personal friends; certainly Scheubner-Richter was involved in the planning which led up to the Munich putsch. (202) He had evidently come to feel that only a national revolution in Germany could change governmental attitudes towards Russia and Bolshevism; Scheubner-Richter saw in Hitler the tribune, "the new prophet" who would win over the masses to the idea of revolution. (203)
But did Scheubner-Richter exert any influence over Hitler's developing ideas on foreign policy? Contemporaries and historians alike have tended to play down Scheubner-Richter's contribution to Nazi ideology, especially in comparison with that of Alfred Rosenberg. (204) But at least one contemporary, Arnold Rechberg, believed that in 1922 Scheubner-Richter was the "foreign policy adviser of the National Socialist movement". (205) Rechberg was a committed advocate of a French alliance and blamed Hitler's anti-western stance on the influence of Scheubner-Richter "who represented the interests of a group of Russian emigrants". The party leadership denied Rechberg's claims firmly in the VB; "it did not correspond to the facts that Dr. von Scheubner-Richter, whose personality and work is, of course, known to the leadership of the party and who, because of this, and his anti-bolshevik operation is valued, is foreign policy adviser of our party." (206) The party leadership also denied that Scheubner-Richter's Aufbau was exclusively a Russian organisation but consisted of Germans "who work for the revival of Germany in cooperation with a future national Russia, and Russians, who see the rise of their fatherland in the future in cooperation with a national Germany". (207) Though Scheubner-Richter also publicly denied being the party's adviser on foreign affairs, Rechberg refused to budge claiming that he was "considered as such". (208)

Two things need to be stressed here: firstly the tact with which the party leadership managed to deny the role attributed to Scheubner-Richter whilst indicating how highly they valued him and the Aufbau organisation - without doubt, Scheubner-Richter and his Russian émigré friends were important to the leadership of the party. Secondly, the party was rather sensitive on the issue of 'advisers'; "the party had had no need so far
of a foreign policy adviser", the VB commented. The reason was that, in the wake of Mussolini's 'seizure of power' in Rome in October 1922, Hitler was being consciously groomed by the party as the "German Mussolini"; the 'Fuhrer image' was already being cultivated and Hitler could not publicly acknowledge someone else's advice on foreign affairs. In view of all this, it is as well to treat the party's riposte to Rechberg's suggestions with some caution. The fact remains that Scheubner-Richter and his Russian friends may have helped consciously or unconsciously to shape Nazi attitudes towards Russia.

The views of Scheubner-Richter and his Russian emigrés can only have strengthened Hitler's anti-Bolshevism; they were devoted to the idea of a German alliance with a revitalised post-Bolshevik Russia which Hitler's party was advocating in 1921-22. But did Scheubner-Richter also argue for the "annexation of areas of Western Russia as the indispensable granary of Germany" as Ernst Hanfstangl suggests? Did he, in other words, encourage Hitler's territorial ambitions in Russia? This is a crucial and difficult question to answer.

Although Max Boehm has claimed that in 1918, as a member of the German occupation forces in Latvia, Scheubner-Richter had no Pan-German ambitions, it seems likely that he may have favoured the retention of Estonia and Latvia within the German Empire. As the war went badly for Germany, Scheubner-Richter was involved in negotiations with the Latvian government, which aimed at giving German soldiers volunteering to fight to save Latvia from the Red Army the right to citizenship and to acquire land for settlement, which suggests that he wanted to maintain German influence in the area. When the German army withdrew from Latvia, Scheubner-Richter
did offer to recommend that the German Foreign Office recognise Latvian independence, but, since Scheubner-Richter was fighting for the lives and property of remaining Germans (including himself) in Latvia, the offer can not be readily accepted as a commitment in principle to Latvian independence. Later in 1919, Scheubner-Richter established branches of the Wirtschaftspolitische Aufklärungsdienst in Riga and Reval to agitate for "a close, economic collaboration between Germany and the border states", which suggests he may have accepted the loss of the area but recognised the importance of maintaining trade with it. Scheubner-Richter's views on the fate of the Baltic Provinces are, therefore, difficult to establish with any certainty since they seemed to change with successive stages in Germany's declining influence there.

As Scheubner-Richter became involved with the Russian émigrés any annexationist designs which he may have had on the Baltic States had to be concealed. The Reichenhall conference revealed how sensitive the émigrés were to the issue and also how divided they were; opinions were so divided that a discussion of the subject of the Baltic States was avoided, the conference lamely agreeing in principle that all states which took an active part in the re-building of Russia should have a right to join the Empire. A majority at the conference wanted the Baltic States to be part of Russia but enjoying a degree of autonomy. Whether this corresponded to Scheubner-Richter's real wishes is unknown; his stated aim was, certainly, to unite all Russian forces opposed to Bolshevism and this included not only the Baltic States but also the other border regions, of whose separatist inclinations he was critical. In July 1922, Scheubner-Richter identified what he considered to be the fatal weakness in the anti-Bolshevik cause in the civil war as "the conviction that the Ukraine,
the Don region, the Kuban region, Georgia, the Crimea and Armenia on the borders of Russia could co-exist with aspirations of Bolshevism in the centre. The Ukrainians, for example, had said that they were not concerned about what happened in Greater Russia; in short, the border states had been selfish and this had accelerated the Soviet victory, in Scheubner-Richter's view. So it would seem that Scheubner-Richter would have no truck with separatist ideas either. Of course, even if he did think that Russia should be de-colonised, he could not express such views publicly and retain the support of his émigré friends. Indeed, the fact that Scheubner-Richter had friendly contacts not only with exiles from Greater Russia but also with Ukrainians such as Colonel Poltawetz-Ostranitzza, Hetman Skoropadski's former Chancellor, and General Biskupski would suggest that Max Boehm's more charitable assessment of Scheubner-Richter's motives is perhaps closer to the truth, that is that in the 1920s he was genuinely concerned to overcome the many rivalries and intrigues in émigré circles and to unite the anti-Bolshevik forces abroad rather than to encourage the fragmentation of the Russian Empire and German territorial expansion.

All the evidence suggests that Scheubner-Richter genuinely desired a German alliance with a post-Bolshevik Russia. In September 1923, when reviewing his own career, Scheubner-Richter left no doubt about the evolution of his views on Russia; in 1918 he had criticised German diplomats for negotiating with the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk: "the one correct attitude towards the Eastern question would have been the installation of a Russian national government friendly to us, which (in) 1918 would have been relatively easy". In 1919 after his release from prison in Riga, he had continued to warn the German Foreign Office about the
Bolshevik danger; both France and Russian Bolshevism were, he said, "tools in the hands of the Jewish International". The way forward for Germany was crystal clear to Scheubner-Richter:

"in the future Germany and Russia, the German and Russian people must go together. It is obvious because both people are assigned to each other and complement each other. But before this can happen, a struggle will first have to be fought between the people and the oppressors, the deputies or representatives of the International. And the outcome of this struggle will afford the opportunity of a partnership between the two peoples." (219)

One of the first tasks of such a partnership, of course, would be the revival of Russia; however, as Scheubner-Richter explained at the Bad Reichenhall conference, "Russia can only be reconstructed by means of the surplus intellectual and technical power which we have in Germany", and to this end, Germany had to "lead the streams of emigration to Russia." (220)

Did this talk of Germans colonizing Russia imply settlement on the lines which Hitler was to advocate in Mein Kampf? To be fair to Scheubner-Richter, there seems to have been no suggestion of settlement after territorial conquest. What he wanted was to restore the dominant influence which German settlers had in Russia in pre-revolutionary days; in 1918 the demand for settlement rights for German soldiers staying on to defend Latvia against the Red Army was probably directed at the same goal. It was, one might argue, the natural dream of a Baltic German to want to revive Germanic influence in Russia rather than the desire for conquest of a Pan-German. (221)

So, in public at least, Scheubner-Richter was a consistent supporter of a pro-Russian, anti-Bolshevik policy, untarnished by any dreams of German territorial expansion inside Russian territory. However, Scheubner-Richter
probably did have aggressive designs on Polish territory. In 1918-19, as has been seen, he opposed the transfer of West Prussia and the Polish Corridor to Poland and had feared Polish aggression towards East Prussia. According to one source, the Reichenhall conference had considered a German-Russian partnership whereby, in return for German assistance in the overthrow of Bolshevism, "Russia (would) guarantee the revision of the Versailles treaty, the economic strangulation of Poland, and economic concessions for Germany in Russia." (222) In September 1923 when 'National Bolshevism' was being mooted, Scheubner-Richter indicated that the essential precondition of a German alliance with Bolshevik Russia against France would be a Soviet declaration of war on France's ally, Poland, and the latter's destruction and occupation by the Red Army. (223) That Russian and German nationalists should want to eliminate Poland should come as no surprise in view of the long-standing German and Russian attitudes towards her.

This outlook on foreign affairs could only confirm the Nazi party's anti-Bolshevism and hostility towards Poland, whilst sustaining its interest in future Russo-German collaboration as opposed to an alliance with England. In February 1922, the WPA was arguing that Germany's condition was such that "Russia signified for the German Empire the only real chance of the restoration of her power"; for in negotiations with England one always had to beware of her ally, France "at our backs and behind her, the bayonets of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia". (224) Scheubner-Richter did feel some sympathy towards England; whilst France was plainly out to destroy Germany, England could only suffer from the decline of Germany, which, at present, she was too weak to resist: "the British policy in the East and her acquiescence in the destruction of Germany will blow up the
British Empire which today appears so strong." (225) In fact, like Rosenberg and Hitler, Scheubner-Richter began to recognise that France's harsh fulfillment policy on the reparations issue was at odds with the "more peaceful" line advocated by England and Italy, (226) and even to identify a more aggressive British stance towards the Soviets on the Eastern question. (227)

However, Scheubner-Richter would not have suggested, as the Nazi leaders were to do, a future Anglo-Italo-German alliance. Indeed, Scheubner-Richter was critical of Mussolini after his rise to power. Whilst he admired the Fascists' attack on Bolshevism, he did not regard Fascism as a probable friend of Germany because of the Germans of the South Tyrol for whom he predicted "difficult days will come". (228) Hitler, of course, was willing to overlook the South Tyrol question for the sake of Italian friendship, so clearly Scheubner-Richter did not agree with him on all matters of foreign affairs.

They did agree, however, that France and Bolshevik Russia were Germany's two deadly enemies and it was on these subjects that Scheubner-Richter's voice may have been influential. It is possible, for example, that Scheubner-Richter helped to orchestrate the Nazi response to the Treaty of Rapallo. A German treaty with Bolshevik Russia, of course, realised all the worst fears of the Russian émigrés for the future. Scheubner-Richter was the first to respond to the treaty on 21 April 1922, arguing that Russia and Germany were natural allies; "that, normally, a state in Germany's position would be grateful for any valuable ally but a partnership with a state (Bolshevik Russia), which was directed by such leaders, would only be possible without danger for Germany, if the German people were led by a strong national government. Unfortunately this is not yet again the case, and one would have to be blind, to ignore the dangers which a close
partnership between Germany and Soviet Russia for the present could occasion." (229) This, of course, is precisely the same argument that Hitler used in a speech the same day and that Rosenberg was to use in Pest in Russland; (230) both felt that a future (for this, read National Socialist) Germany could ally with Bolshevik Russia; but for Weimar Germany this might be fatal. All three men used the opportunity to condemn Rapallo which was, to quote Scheubner-Richter, "a further step towards the Bolshevisation of Germany" and urged Germans to consider an alliance only with a nationalist Russia. (231)

One cannot say unequivocally that Hitler and Rosenberg followed Scheubner-Richter's lead; indeed their response to Rapallo was entirely predictable in view of what they had said and written already but certainly Scheubner-Richter's view must have reinforced their determination to reassert their support for a post-Bolshevik Russia. It is equally clear that Rosenberg utilised Aufbau's resources; from the middle of 1921 articles on Russia from WPA began to appear in the VB. (232) In Pest in Russland, Rosenberg recommended WPA to those interested in reliable information on the Eastern question. (233) Rosenberg freely tapped WPA for information derogatory to the Soviet image; in Pest in Russland, he quoted evidence from WPA of the extravagant life-style of Soviet ambassadors in Constantinople to highlight the contrast with the starving Russian people. (234) It is also likely that details of Soviet persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church and the pillage of its wealth given by Rosenberg in Pest in Russland were taken from an article in WPA earlier in 1922. (235)

Clearly, Scheubner-Richter helped to provide the Nazis with ammunition for their anti-Bolshevik propaganda. But several points need emphasising.
Firstly, the WPA was only one of several sources. Secondly, since Rosenberg collaborated with Aufbau, it is difficult to determine exactly who was responsible for collecting information. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, Scheubner-Richter provided ammunition to reinforce existing ideological convictions rather than exerting a formative influence upon Nazi ideology. Scheubner-Richter continued to stress the need for a partnership between a nationalist Germany and a nationalist Russia until his death in November 1923; by this time Hitler was already harbouring sweeping territorial designs on Russian territory, of which Scheubner-Richter could never have approved, at least publicly, because of his commitment to the émigré cause.

What made Scheubner-Richter such an 'irreplaceable' loss to Hitler after the Munich putsch was not so much his expertise on foreign affairs as his connections with not only Russian monarchists but also leading figures in German political life. "He opened all doors for me", Hitler is supposed to have told Scheubner-Richter's widow. The link with the Russian monarchists may have brought much-needed cash into the party coffers but more important to Hitler's cause in 1922 was the respectability which personal contact with General Ludendorff and the Bavarian royal house - the Wittelsbach - brought to it. Although Scheubner-Richter had not introduced Hitler to Ludendorff, Scheubner-Richter was "in close contact" with the German war hero throughout 1923, and acted as an intermediary for Hitler and Ludendorff who met several times at Scheubner-Richter's house to discuss the progress of the national revolution planned in 1923. It is possible that contact with Ludendorff might have affected Hitler's Russian policy as well. Ludendorff had, of course, imposed on a reluctant
German Foreign Office the extensive territorial demands which were eventually put to the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. Ludendorff had decided that "for the future of Germany it was all-important that the whole Eastern problem should be be solved in a manner which satisfied the interests of Prussia and Germany and, as far as possible, removed the danger threatening from Poland." (243) This meant that Germany had to receive a protective belt of agricultural land in Western Russia, which would ensure that Germany would be able to survive any future blockade, and a German union with the Baltic States of Courland and Lithuania, whilst Estonia and Latvia would be independent of Russia. In addition, Ludendorff wanted to weaken the Russian Empire by supporting separatist movements and so the German terms, eventually accepted in March 1918 by the reluctant but impotent Bolshevik leadership, also included recognition of Ukrainian and Finnish independence. (244) Ludendorff later claimed that "it was no desire of mine to destroy Russia or to weaken her so that she could no longer exist" but there seems little doubt that his aim was to remove the threat from the East in any future war by reducing Russia to her Moscovite core by the establishment of a number of puppet-states and by supporting the demands of non-Russian nationalities for self-determination. (245)

Hence this was close to the concept of a future Russia which Alfred Rosenberg was cultivating in 1922. So it is possible that Ludendorff's presence added weight to Rosenberg's argument for creating a national Russia when he was brought into contact with the Nazi movement at the end of 1922. (246)

During 1922, therefore, Hitler's anti-Bolshevism was undoubtedly fed by his closest associates. Rosenberg argued that whilst Bolshevism was alien to Russia and that therefore 'National Bolshevism' was a chimera, it did correspond to a weakness in Russian blood; Scheubner-Richter urged him to
back the idea of collaboration with a 'post-Bolshevik' Russia, the dream of the Russian émigrés; and Rosenberg and Ludendorff from their different standpoints theorized about a truncated decolonized Russian state. But what effect did they have on Hitler?

As has been indicated in this chapter, Hitler's views on Russia had begun to change during 1921 and 1922. Hitler still argued, however, in public in 1922, that a Russia purged of Bolshevism would be a suitable ally for Germany. But by the time Hitler was writing _Mein Kampf_ in 1924, Russia had, of course, been finally relegated to the ranks of Germany's foes and there was no mention of a future national Russian government. The vital questions are, therefore, when and why did this change occur?

In October 1921, as has been seen, Hitler had stressed that before the war, Germany had had the choice of allying with England or Russia; either would have, in his view, facilitated German expansion. (247) At that time, Hitler appeared to favour a Russo-German agreement as a "natural alliance". (248) These comments on pre-war German diplomacy can be taken as Hitler's instinctive, Pan-German preferences in foreign affairs but they also seem to suggest (in the absence of any other evidence) that Hitler had not yet formulated an alliance strategy of his own for the postwar world.

In November 1922, however, Hitler publicly referred the possibility of German alliances with England and Italy in order to implement the _Anschluss_ with Austria. This was the first indication that Hitler had a strategy to deal with postwar realities. It has been thought that Hitler did not make up his mind about the role of Russia in his foreign policy programme until 1924. (249) But, in fact, a secret report on the Nazi Party dating from
December 1922 shows quite plainly that Hitler had already abandoned all ideas of an alliance with Russia at this time. Eduard Scharrer, the co-owner of the Munich daily Münchener Neueste Nachrichten and the rich proprietor of Schloss Bernried in Bavaria, submitted three reports on the Hitler movement to the chancellor of the day, Wilhelm Cuno. One of the reports was Scharrer's account of an interview which he had arranged with Hitler in December 1922. During this interview, Hitler made it clear that he regarded England, above all others, as the power which had an interest in the further existence of the German people: "England has an interest in seeing that we do not go under, since, otherwise, France would become the greatest continental power in Europe, whilst England would have to be satisfied with the position of a third-rate power." English assistance would be forthcoming, Hitler told Scharrer, when Germany showed herself to be a viable economic proposition and an effective counter-weight to France, and provided, of course, "she posed no threat to England herself". This meant, as far as Hitler was concerned, that Germany would have to avoid overseas commercial and colonial rivalry with England, which had caused problems before the First World War, but if she did so, English cooperation against Russia as well as France was possible:

"Germany would have to adapt herself to a purely continental policy avoiding harm to English interests. The destruction of Russia with the help of England would have to be attempted. Russia would give Germany sufficient land for German settlers and wide field of activity for German industry. Then England would not interrupt us in our reckoning with France." (253)

Scharrer's account, whose authenticity there seems little reason to doubt, shows that Hitler had fully thought out his alliance strategy in 1922: he felt that England could be enticed into an alliance against Bolshevik Russia as well as against France, though interestingly, he
seemed to expect British non-intervention rather than active assistance in the campaign against France. Thus, despite his continued public commitment to a future nationalist regime in Russia, Hitler had already eliminated this as a serious consideration in his foreign policy programme.

To sum up, one can say that the relegation of Russia to the ranks of Germany's foes cannot be seen as a belated afterthought, a year or so after the decision to opt for an English alliance. Indeed, it is possible that Bolshevism's steadily increasing grip on Russia after 1921 persuaded Hitler to look to Russia's long-time imperial rival, Great Britain, as a future ally. That English policy was at the same time beginning, in Hitler's eyes, to assert its independence from France and to criticize her former ally's rigid stance on the question of Upper Silesia and of German reparations payments probably encouraged Hitler further in the belief that Britain was now once again following her traditional balance of power strategy towards Europe.

To return to the first of the two questions posed at the beginning of this chapter - that is, what effect did ideology have on Hitler's alliance plans? It must be emphasized that, if the relegation of Russia to the ranks of Germany's enemies was the pivot of Hitler's alliance scheme, then more weight ought to be given to the influence of the party's antisemitic and anti-Bolshevik ideology; the success of 'Jewish' Bolshevism in the Russian civil war and the threat of the Bolshevization of Germany were probably the decisive factors in persuading Hitler to abandon the idea of an alliance with Russia. It can be objected, of course, that Hitler rejected Russia as an ally simply because he wanted territorial aggrandisement
at Russian expense in the form of the resurrection of the settlement reached at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. However, it should not be forgotten that in 1921 Hitler had been arguing like Moeller van den Bruck that an alliance with Russia before the war would have facilitated unlimited German expansion eastwards. So it is quite possible that an abhorrence of Bolshevism did help to determine Hitler's foreign policy design.

It is also quite apparent, to return to the second question posed at the outset, that Hitler's decisions were very probably not - with the exception of the one on the Italian question (and even there Lüdecke's involvement seems likely) - taken by him alone and in the teeth of party opposition. There were hints of a realignment with Britain in Rosenberg's ideological diatribes, which showed that British national interests were increasingly at odds with those of the Jews and compatible with those of the Germans, while Russian interests were increasingly determined by the Jews and directed against Germany. But, and this must be stressed, neither Hitler nor Rosenberg made any unequivocal public statements about their anti-Russian, pro-English foreign policy at this time. The Scharrer interview was confidential; Hitler often disguised his views in public analyses of pre-war diplomacy, whilst Rosenberg's were barely discernible amongst his revelations of the subterranean machinations of the Jews. The reasons for these precautions will be investigated later but one may have been the desire to keep the support of influential and often rich Russian émigrés, who would not look favourably on an anti-Russian as opposed to an anti-Bolshevik Nazi foreign policy.

Finally, the exact point at which Hitler formulated his alliance strategy is difficult to establish. If one believes Hitler's comments in Mein Kampf and accepts that foreign policy guidelines were drawn up which would
represent an emanation of the party's Weltanschauung, then a Russian
alliance was out of the question as soon as the Bolsheviks were firmly
entrenched in Russia and anti-Bolshevism firmly established as the keynote
of Nazi ideology. The treaty of Rapallo and the party’s reaction to it
suggests that both of these preconditions had been fulfilled, so, perhaps,
Hitler produced his blueprint for a Nazi foreign policy in the summer of
1922. Certainly the fall of Lloyd George and the rise of Mussolini in
October 1922, added to the continuing tension between Britain and France,
amounted to a veritable diplomatic revolution, which might, as Lüdecke
suggests, have forced Hitler's hand.

The formalisation of a party alliance strategy did not represent a sudden
innovation, however, but merely confirmed changes that had been evolving
for some time. Nonetheless, as early as December 1922, the alliance
scheme, which Hitler was to elaborate in Mein Kampf, and, some would say,
to follow in the 1930s, had already been determined.
5. HAUSHOFER, HITLER, AND EXPANSIONISM

Recently, historians have generally regarded the scheme of territorial expansion delineated in Mein Kampf as the result of Hitler's choice of possible allies; in other words, his alliance strategy determined the direction of Hitler's expansionism. (1) But one has to doubt whether Hitler chose his allies - and indeed his enemies - without consideration of the likely consequences of such a choice, especially when one remembers that, in his retrospective analyses of pre-war German diplomacy, Hitler assessed the attractiveness of England and Russia as allies in terms of the territory which might be acquired as a result. (2) In short, it is far more likely that the choice of goal determined or at least helped to determine the selection of allies. So what did inspire Hitler's dream of eastward expansion? Was the pursuit of living-space in Eastern Europe part of Hitler's Pan-German heritage? Or was it the logical corollary of an ideological crusade against a 'Jewish-dominated' Soviet Russia? Or was Hitler influenced by the geopolitical theories of Karl Haushofer, the man usually blamed for feeding Hitler's territorial fantasies? (3) A great deal of rumour and speculation has clouded judgements about Haushofer over the years; it should now be possible with the aid of Haushofer's private papers and other newly accessible sources to evaluate more accurately Haushofer's likely contribution to Hitler's thinking. (4)

At first sight, it is difficult to imagine a more unlikely ally for the Nazi Party than Karl Haushofer. Born in 1869 into an intellectually and artistically gifted Bavarian family, his military and academic career placed him in the higher echelons of Bavarian society, into which Adolf Hitler could make only brief and usually inglorious incursions under the patronage of the adoring and tolerant Frau Bruckmann. (5) After 21 years in the
German army, Haushofer was sent to study the Japanese army which had acquitted itself so well against the Russians in 1904-05; his mission, which took him through India, China, Korea as well as Japan between 1908 and 1910, seems to have been a crucial turning-point in his life; much of his undoubted expertise and interest in Far Eastern affairs, which was to characterise his later work, was acquired during this visit.

Haushofer retired from the army in 1919 as a major-general and began to lecture in geography at Munich University. In some ways, Haushofer's outlook conformed to that of the archetypal German officer, who valued honour and respect for law, order, and the German Emperor above all else. In other ways, he was exceptional. He displayed a hard-headed political realism which made acceptance of the Weimar Republic easier for him than for many of his former colleagues in the Imperial army. He was a conservative, but never a reactionary: he believed that one could never turn back the clock. So, although still a monarchist at heart, he came to terms with the existing government. In 1919, for example, during the 'Red Revolution' in Bavaria, he established and participated in a soldiers' and workers' council in his division. Though critical of the Weimar Republic, Haushofer refused to participate in or condone rebellion against the government. Following the Munich putsch in 1923, he advised a fugitive Rudolf Hess to surrender to the authorities and accept punishment. In fact, Haushofer engaged - albeit briefly - in parliamentary politics of the Weimar period following the family's Liberal political tradition and joining the Deutsche Volkspartei. The experience of party politics was, unfortunately, a short and evidently distasteful interlude for Haushofer; he drifted away from the party after barely a year, apparently unable to treat people whom he knew to be dishonest as friends simply because they were party
colleagues. From that point on, he kept free of party political commitments.

Haushofer proceeded to devote himself to his teaching and to his writing. A veritable stream of articles flowed from his pen in the early 1920s; he became a regular contributor to the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten and to several well-known periodicals including Rudolf Pechel’s Deutsche Rundschau. The family collection of his larger articles fills six weighty volumes. His appointment as honorary professor at Munich University in 1921 and the accompanying reduction in his teaching duties facilitated this prolific outpouring. Haushofer used this opportunity to further what he by then considered to be his life’s work: the establishment of the new ‘science’ of geopolitics.

His interest in geopolitics, which claims to study the relationship between political events and the natural environment taking into account such factors as the influence of soil, population pressure, frontiers and waterways on political development, was already evident during his visit to the Far East. His observations on that journey provided material for his doctoral dissertation on Japan, Dai Nikon, Betrachtungen über Grossjapans Wehrmacht, Weltstellung und Zukunft, which, according to his later colleague and friend Erich Obst, "betrayed on every page the developing geopoliticalian". Haushofer himself later claimed that he gained his first insight into "the world-wide interconnections of political affairs" at the end of the Boer War, whilst visiting London: "after much striving for geopolitical knowledge, I first came to realize the contrast between the present state of Germany and the possible future of Germany in her living-space and in her world-relations." During the First World
War, he maintained his interest in the subject by reading the works of the Swedish political scientist, Rudolf Kjellen, who is credited with coining the term Geopolitik. He exchanged letters with Kjellen and at one stage contemplated doing research under him at the end of the war.\(^{(14)}\)

However, the outcome of the war altered Haushofer's attitude towards geopolitics; in the words of a friend, "he recognised more fully and earlier than very many others the deficient education of the German people in world politics as one of the reasons why our opponents could triumph over us."\(^{(15)}\) He was determined to remove this deficiency by producing a body of geopolitical learning - essentially a synthesis of his experiences in the Far East and the lessons of the First World War - which would provide Germans with an accurate picture of the world. In 1929 Haushofer explained the rationale behind his work: "when a nation after enormous sacrifices... experiences such a senseless dissection and mutilation of her living-space as the German people...then it has a right to ask what was lacking in those who were appointed, in the first instance, as protectors of this unit of life (Lebensform) in its living-space."\(^{(16)}\) Men of insufficient insight should not be allowed to secure such positions again and "out of this elementary craving for better scientific protection of the political unit and of the folkish and cultural base originated the challenge of Geopolitics".\(^{(17)}\)

In 1924 Haushofer established with the young publisher Kurt Vowinckel the Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik (ZfG), which became the main vehicle for geopolitical ideas and the focal point of Haushofer's attempt to make geopolitics "the geographical conscience of the state".\(^{(18)}\) Despite occasional ridicule of its scientific pretensions from the geographical
profession, the journal developed an international reputation. The journal might have been destroyed by dissensions between the various editors, had it not been for Haushofer's patience and willingness to compromise. (19) He was no longer a young man (he was 55 years old in 1924) and he pinned all his hopes on the survival of the journal. This may be a key to his relationship to the Third Reich in the 1930s. A note of anxiety verging on desperation can be discerned in a revealing letter to a co-editor in 1931: "I believe that my relationship with geopolitics is, after all, even more close than yours.... You can nail your flag any day to a new fighting journal sailing towards similar goals without your fighting spirit undergoing the slightest change. My flag will remain struck forever if it is hauled down from the mast, at which it is now flying. Anyone of your age, who stumbles or falls, can jump up again; he who falls at my age, runs the risk of staying on the ground forever, because he is unable, perhaps, to muster either the desire or the energy to start building up his life's work from scratch for the third time." (20) Here, perhaps, is, in essence, the tragedy of Karl Haushofer's later career - an old man, lacking immutable political conviction and willing to swim with the prevailing tide, a man who recognised the shortcomings of the Nazi regime, but who was prepared to overlook them (he steadfastly refused to sanction the idea of rebellion) (21) in the hope of securing a life-long ambition.

However in the early 1920s, Haushofer's social and academic background made him an unlikely fellow-traveller for the politically and intellectually impoverished party. To understand how Haushofer came to the notice of the youthful Nazi Party, one has to examine his political activities at this time.
Two events bridged the chasm which separated Haushofer from the Nazi Party and, for that matter, the vast majority of the German people. The defeat of Germany in the First World War and the ensuing political disillusionment hardened by the Versailles Settlement created a kinship born of acute disappointment, which cut across economic and social barriers. "How much the unfortunate outcome of the Great War weighed on a man of his ilk can be truly understood only by those who were near him at the time", wrote Erich Obst in 1929. Haushofer was galvanised into action not only by the need to correct the deficiencies which had led to Germany's defeat but also by the desire to expose the injustice of the Versailles Settlement. The principle of national self-determination, closely associated with President Wilson's famous '14 Points', could safeguard peace only, Haushofer argued, if it were applied to all nations, both victors and vanquished. The rights of Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, South Tyrol, Upper Silesia and Danzig had been overlooked at Versailles. The question of German 'War Guilt' - the basis of the treaty's punitive measures against Germany - irritated Haushofer perhaps more than anything else. In a speech in June 1924, he declared:

"I say with complete conviction: conscious guilt was nowhere on our side...on the contrary, evidence of the terrible guilt of our enemies is at hand. Where is it written that of all the great nations of the earth ours alone should be so bruised and maimed in her living-space, and that we alone should not have the right to breathe freely?" (24)

Haushofer refused to accept the Versailles Settlement as a fait accompli and his political energies were devoted to an attempt to keep alive the sense of burning injustice felt towards the treaty in the hope of bringing about its revision. He delivered speeches regularly for the Deutsche
Kampfbund gegen die Kriegsschuldliüge (25) and the Akademische Arbeit-

sausschuss gegen Friedensdiktat und Schuldliüge (AA) (26) during the 1920s.

Another way of thwarting the settlement was to maintain contacts with the
areas lost in 1919. Haushofer was very concerned lest the Germans now cut
off from the fatherland should abandon their cultural heritage, and he
was soon involved in cultural propaganda for the Verein fuer Deutschtum im
Ausland (VDA). (27) In a speech in September 1922 he admonished the govern-
ment for having damaged relations with the Auslanddeutschen by not
supporting their claims for compensation for war damages. (28) In 1923
he was elected chairman of the Bavarian branch of the VDA (29) and his
appointment as head of the Praktische Abteilung of the new Deutsche Akademie
in May 1925 gave him further scope to work with Germans living abroad. (30)
These contacts, Haushofer hoped, "would contribute to a little to breaking
the chains of the peace treaty", and to the eventual reunion of the lost
areas with the fatherland. (31) Haushofer and the VDA, accordingly, opposed
anything which might hinder such a reunion; in 1925, for example, the
Gauileiters of the Bavarian branch of the VDA declared that a treaty between
the German and Czechoslovakian governments, then being mooted in the after-
math of the Locarno agreements, would be "tolerable only if the right of
the Sudeten Germans to self-determination is in no way impaired by it.
Not only the Bavarian but the whole German people would reject even a
temporary abandonment of the right of the Sudeten Germans to a reunion
with the German motherland as a betrayal of the fate of almost 4 million
Germans and would never recognise it." (32)

Clearly Haushofer's political views were quite consistent with his volkdeutsch
activities. (33) Furthermore his endeavours evoked a sizeable response.
Awareness of Germany's humiliation in the eyes of the world was so keenly felt amongst all classes of German society that academics, such as Haushofer, attracted large audiences for lectures on the Versailles Settlement. So it is likely that, even without his friendship with Rudolf Hess, Haushofer would have come to the notice of the NSDAP. His collaboration with Bund 'Oberland' (BO) - a pressure group, whose leaders were well-known to the Nazi leadership - made this almost inevitable. (34)

BO's grossdeutsch orientation, together with its party political non-alignment must have appealed to Haushofer. The three aims of BO effectively summarized his own political ambitions for Germany:

"1. The external liberation of Germany, which is the precondition for self-determination and self-styling of Germany's life and future.

2. The creation of a Greater Germany.

3. The construction of a Third Reich." (35)

It seems probable that Haushofer never actually became a member of BO, but he was certainly an active supporter in the early 1920s, regularly attending the annual conference at Burg Hoheneck, delivering speeches, and writing articles for the association's periodical, Das Dritte Reich. (36)

Haushofer's relationship with Bund 'Oberland' helps to identify his position in the political spectrum. BO represents a kind of half-way house between Haushofer's academic and volkdeutsch activities and the NSDAP. The membership of BO was undoubtedly of a very different calibre from the rank and file of the Nazi movement; (37) nevertheless, the two were cast in very similar ideological moulds. Gustave Sondermann, one-time editor of Das Dritte Reich, thought that the two were "very basically different forms of our movement." (38) Friedrich Weber, leader of BO at this time,
wrote in 1927 that "on the level of ideas, the National Socialist movement stands especially close to us". Though Weber was often criticized by his colleagues for his pro-Nazi standpoint, his observation seems to have been substantially accurate. This perhaps explains Haushofer's refusal of an executive post in BO in 1925; his own explanation was, of course, different; he wrote in April 1925 rejecting the offer of such a post "with sincere regret that this attempt at a connection with the association has, against my wishes, been undertaken - since the role of vice-chairman or even committee member would lead to a situation unsuitable to my age and to my personality, and an alternative can scarcely be considered, so it must remain, after all, a free relationship." Age and personality were not, however, the most important reasons for Haushofer's reluctance to commit himself, as he revealed privately to a close friend:

"As you know, I am completely absorbed in helping to establish in the German Academy a centre for Germandom..., the success or failure of which depends very much on whether men take me seriously." Evidently he did not intend to destroy his credibility by vouching "with my name for personalities, for whom, after recent experiences, I can give no such guarantee." The essential problem was BO's association in 1925 with the newly re-formed Nazi Party. As Haushofer put it, "the flag of Oberland by Hitler in the Bürgerbräukeller, the name of Friedrich Weber at the head: that signifies a programme that I could not argue away with the tongue of angels." Clearly Haushofer appears to have little sympathy with the Nazi Party programme and he had apparently "opposed steadfastly the participation of the BO in the Kampfbund" before the Munich putsch. This evidence hardly supports the view that Karl Haushofer was
the 'éminence grise' behind the Nazi party at this time. In 1925, at least, his overriding concern was to avoid associating with right-wing extremists at what was a vital stage in his career. So how close was Haushofer's contact with the Nazi Party?

As might be expected, there is little solid evidence of close and continuous contact between Haushofer and the Nazi Party in the 1920s. What evidence there is, revolves around Haushofer's close friendship with Rudolf Hess. "My friendship with Rudolf Hess", Haushofer wrote later, "began in 1918 and is, like his attendance at my lectures at the university, four years older (sic) than the foundation of the Nationalist Socialist Party."(45) Hess became Haushofer's favourite pupil, even though Haushofer recognized that "his heart and his idealism were greater than his intellect."(46) Later, following the Munich putsch, Haushofer sheltered Hess and, after Hess's release from Landsberg gaol, he secured him a post at the German Academy. He was justifiably infuriated by his friend's eventual decision to quit it to become Hitler's secretary.(47)

When Haushofer first met Hitler is not clear. A few months before his death, Haushofer claimed that he had first seen Hitler in 1922. However, his memory seems to have let him down. (48) Hess already knew Hitler very well in the summer of 1921 and supported him publicly during the leadership crisis. (49) Early in 1922, Haushofer was in a position to arrange - at short notice - through Hess an interview with Hitler for Rudolf Pechel, the editor of Deutsche Rundschau. (50) Without doubt, Haushofer was known to the party and, indeed, was kept informed by Hess of developments within it. (51)
The *Völkischer Beobachter* first began to take an interest in Haushofer's activities in 1922; his lectures were thought to be instructive for party members and, according to one reporter, 'proved that knowledge is not there to be stored in books, but it also provides us with weapons in the struggle for the right to live.'\(^{(52)}\) In 1924 Haushofer made regular visits to Landsberg gaol to see Rudolf Hess — at the very time when Hitler was dictating *Mein Kampf* to Hess — and it is commonly believed that Hitler's ideas received their geopolitical colouration as a result of these visits and Hess's own influence.\(^{(53)}\)

It is difficult to establish what sort of relationship existed between Haushofer and Hitler; the former later claimed that he had had little to do with Hitler until the 1930s and this is probably true but the evidence suggests that Haushofer was aware of the attractiveness of his ideas to Hitler and that the Nazis were willing to make use of those ideas. In 1938, for example, Haushofer wrote a confidential letter to the Dean of Natural Science at Munich University, explaining his relationship with the Nazi Party. He had been "well acquainted and friendly with significant personalities in the NSDAP since 1919" but he had not become a member of the party, he explained "for reasons of camouflage".\(^{(54)}\) He also revealed that several books and articles had been written "at the suggestion of the Führer's representative" (Hess); he mentioned several from the 1930s but also two from the 1920s: an article, *Nationaler Sozialismus und soziale Aristokratie* published in 1924 and a book, *Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung* published in 1927.\(^{(55)}\) It is a little difficult to believe that these works were written at Hess's instigation; certainly Haushofer had been studying the frontier problem for quite some time before he wrote *Grenzen*. Nevertheless, there is no obvious reason why Haushofer should invent such a story to impress the Dean and, even if there was,
why did he chose to include the titles from the 1920s? Possibly Hess in a private capacity did suggest the subjects to Haushofer; an article on National Socialism, though it did not deal with the NSDAP, would obviously be of interest, as would an analysis of the frontier problem, which loomed large in Nazi foreign policy discussions. At the very least, the letter shows that Haushofer had identified those writings, which were of some relevance to the Nazi party, and which, perhaps, conformed with Nazi thinking.

This impression is reinforced by a second document. In June 1924, the Grossdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft (GDVG), to which most of the former members of the then banned NSDAP belonged, issued a leaflet, urging its followers to attend an address on 'Living-space and the War Guilt Lies' to be delivered by Haushofer for the Deutsche Kampfbund gegen die Kriegsschuldüge. (56)

This was an unusual step, one perhaps partly explicable in terms of Hitler's own absence from the scene, but one which nonetheless suggests that Haushofer's views met with the approval of the Nazi leadership. The address, which the Nazi rank and file duly attended, certainly introduced them to the concept of German Lebensraum, which was to be crucial to the foreign policy programme outlined by Hitler in Mein Kampf. (57)

Contacts between the leading geopolitician and the Nazi Party in the 1920s may have been 'camouflaged' because Haushofer wanted to conceal his relationship with right-wing extremists. But one should not exaggerate the significance of this; contact between Haushofer and the Nazi Party was probably very infrequent. Haushofer was a friend of Rudolf Hess, not of the party. He had no reason to take the party at all seriously in the mid-1920s; he could not have predicted Hitler's spectacular rise to power.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that by the time Hitler did come to power in 1933, the Nazi party had been paying, at least, lip-service to geopolitical ideas for several years and one has, therefore, to assess their impact on Nazi thinking.

During the Second World War, it was claimed that Haushofer was the 'brains' behind the Nazi party; he had masterminded Hitler's foreign policy. (58) Such exaggerated claims are at least understandable when Haushofer's ideas are studied. It is difficult even now to believe that Haushofer could conceive that his plans were realisable without the likelihood of war. This is not simply because of the difficulty of forgetting what happened between 1939 and 1945. It is also due to the fact that geopolitics, as popularized by Haushofer, was itself a child of conflict, a product of the First World War. As he admitted himself later, "a doctrine, evolving at a time of such emergency for one's own country, must show traces of the circumstances and the place of its origin as well as the shortcomings"; a German 'scientist' could not, he claimed, "disregard the inadequacy of the distribution of living-space in Central Europe" after the Versailles Settlement. (59) It was the deep commitment to the redistribution of the world's living-space, together with Haushofer's pugnacious and often fairly opaque style, which led to the conviction that geopolitics was synonymous with Nazi imperialism. But how justified was this belief? It is important to remember that geopolitics was not an individual tour de force from the pen of Karl Haushofer; it drew heavily on earlier work by political geographers and to understand fully the nature of geopolitics one has to examine its evolution.
Though Haushofer was greatly impressed by the works of the Americans, A.T. Mahan and Brooks Adams, and by the British geographer, Halford J. Mackinder, his ideas on geopolitics were derived mainly from the German scholar, Friedrich Ratzel. Rudolf Kjellen, Haushofer's Swedish correspondent and mentor, appears only to have rationalized Ratzel's rather diffuse observations. Ratzel was a distinguished political geographer, who studied the dependence of a state on climate, geographical location, water-bodies, soil and physical resources. He compared the state to a living organism, capable of growth, stagnation and decline. States were always vying with each other for space. Hence, it followed that no people had originated in the land which it now inhabited; nor would it remain on this land forever. Since peoples expand, contract, and migrate, frontiers are only temporary phenomena or, as Ratzel put it, "the frontier as the periphery of the nation belongs to the nation... (but)... the frontier is, by its very nature, always changing." In short, nations have no natural rights to the land, which they inhabit. Viewed out of context and bearing in mind German history since 1900, Ratzel's ideas can easily be interpreted as encouraging disregard for the boundaries of other nations, and hence as a justification of aggression. Though Ratzel was not averse to political polemic or immune to the germs of German nationalism, it would be unfair to label him as the geographical sponsor of German imperialism. He was a serious scholar attempting to classify observations about the impact of earthbound phenomena on political decision-making.

Karl Haushofer, on the other hand, wanted to utilize the fruit of exhaustive analyses of individual regions as the 'scientific' basis for forecasts of future developments and for prescriptions for future policy. Geopolitics, therefore, was (to give its official definition) "the theory of the close..."
relationship between the soil and political events. It is based on the wide basis of geography, especially political geography, as the theory of political organisms and their structure. The character of regions or areas of the world dealt with by geography provides the framework, within which political events must take place if they are to have lasting success. The politicians (Träger des politischen Lebens) will, of course, on occasion exceed the framework, but, sooner or later, the close tie with the soil will reassert itself. Recognizing this fact, geopolitics wants to provide the tools for political action and wants to be a signpost in political life. In this way, it becomes an applied theory, capable of directing practical policies up to the necessary point of departure from firm ground." (62)

Hence, geopolitics was less concerned with the observation and classification of geographical information for its own sake and more concerned to discover the geopolitical determinants of political action. Haushofer admitted that geopolitical forces constituted only twenty-five percent of the historically-active forces which determined political events, but this twenty-five percent was worth knowing; the disaster of 1918 might have been averted by such knowledge. (63)

The assumption that scientific investigation could provide some insight into the mysterious workings of political destiny effectively marked the boundary between political geography and geopolitics. Ratzel's comparison of the state to a living organism was treated as a fact of life by Haushofer and his colleagues and the state was considered to be "a supra-individual living being". (64) Once this 'leap of faith' had been taken, the dividing-line between objective analysis and political propaganda became very blurred. As Haushofer himself admitted later, "the borderline between pure science and practical science is easily crossed in such times of tension."
It happened, therefore, that I overstepped those borders occasionally." (65)

In fact, of course, Haushofer's 'science' was a "practical science" by definition (propaganda might have been a more accurate description). By trying to furnish the 'scientific' basis for successful government policy-making, Haushofer allowed his own political views to dictate the field of his research - he resented the reorganization of the frontiers of Central Europe at Versailles and set out to assess the settlement by examining it in geopolitical terms. The verdict, of course, preceded and, therefore, determined the analysis: Germany's living-space was inadequate and the new frontiers were geopolitically unjustifiable.

At this point it would appear that Haushofer was very much on the same wavelength as Adolf Hitler and the other right-wing radicals determined to overthrow the Versailles Settlement. However, Haushofer would have pointed to one significant difference between geopolitics and the outlook of the Nazi Party: namely that geopolitics did not purport to be an ideology. It was not a 'secular religion', a system of beliefs designed to mobilize people into action, but an eclectic hotch-potch of principles drawn from social darwinism and geographical determinism. Geopolitics was also free from any party political bias. Every party and every individual had something to learn from this new 'science'; every political leader would perform his duties better "if he possesses geopolitical experience and knowledge than if he lacks it, irrespective of his ideological or party background." (66) Haushofer seemed to think that this non-partisanship alone guaranteed the objectivity of geopolitics. Furthermore, the self-confessed mission of the German geopoliticians was to educate their masters, to emancipate them from a narrow world-view and to enable them to
think in terms of large spaces; it did not aim to provide its own political programme. As Haushofer's son, Albrecht, wrote when asked for an unequivocal statement of a geopolitical foreign policy, "one does not refer ideological fanatics to an educational scheme in order to allow a new pseudo-ideology to be offered by geopolitics." (67) Geopolitics, it was claimed, did not offer a ready-made foreign policy programme to Germany's leaders.

But did it? Certainly the geopoliticians did draw attention to the "geographical foundations of foreign policy", the most important of which was the need for the state to extend its living-space - the land available to it - in order to keep pace with an increasing population. As Karl Haushofer put it:

"The main duty of foreign affairs is always at least to maintain and take care of the living-space bequeathed to it by past generations and to extend it when it has become too narrow, without creating a threat to the life and existence of the people, yet meeting any unavoidable danger with the full power of the nation, for the sake of the continued existence of the nation." (68)

This assessment, though written in 1926, effectively summarized the gist of Haushofer's thinking over several years and closely resembles, of course, Hitler's own analysis of a völkisch foreign policy in Mein Kampf. (69) Haushofer made use of up-to-date figures on population density to argue that only two advanced nations could prove undeniably that they were overpopulated; "only Germany and Japan have to settle, feed, and clothe more than 130 people on one square kilometer (of land)" (regional variations could, he pointed out, push this figure up to 800 per square kilometer in the Ruhr area, and the quality and fertility of the soil also affected the
Such arguments could certainly be seen as providing the framework of a foreign policy programme.

Haushofer also had a definite conception of the existing balance of world power. A gradual polarization was taking place, he believed, between on the one hand, the "oceanic" powers, the "space-owning imperialists" of the western hemisphere (England, France and the United States), and on the other, the oppressed "continental" powers of "Eastern Eurasia" (China, Japan, India and Russia). The "oceanic" powers were the opponents of Germany as well as the nations of "Eastern Eurasia"; they were "the great predatory powers", "the attackers and disturbers of overseas lands and the exploiters of Eurasia". The Germans were, therefore, not alone in "striving for the right to self-determination and the freedom to move at will within our own living-space or, at least, to wander through the earth's unused spatial resources; three-fifths of the human race", he claimed, "are striving for the same goal." Germany could, therefore, find support against the "space-owning" powers "not just in the Far East, in the rising Pan-Asiatic movement, but also in Japan... and in intelligent cooperation with the spatial requirements of the Russian homeland (Volksboden).") Cooperation with the "Pan-Asiatic movement", most apparent in China and India, was possible because the Chinese and the Indian peoples were, like Germany, suffering from exploitation by the Western powers and were beginning to show signs of resistance. Germany had, therefore, to decide whether she belonged alongside the "space-owning imperialists" or alongside the "oppressed" nations. In 1925 the negotiations of the Locarno treaties and German entry into the League of Nations, Haushofer felt, brought matters to ahead: "it is up to us to
decide whether we want to join the League of Nations in the only way possible to-day - burdened with the hatred of the suppressed, the deprived, the humiliated, and the wronged and with their curse." (76) The German signature on the Locarno Treaty obviously disappointed Haushofer, but he continued to hope for German support for the nationalist movements of India and China. Common interests also drew Japan and Germany together; both had been threatened by the same powers (Britain and France) since the 1890s and "more than once" Germany had rejected the preferred hand of Japanese friendship. (77) Furthermore, Japan had faced similar spatial problems to Germany, and had successfully extended her Lebensraum with the seizure of Korea after a press campaign had highlighted Japan's shortage of space and mobilized public opinion. What is more, Haushofer had witnessed all this first-hand and obviously hoped for similar success in Germany. (78)

Most interesting of all in Haushofer's and the geopoliticians' outlook was the position occupied by Russia. She was neither economically exploited by the Western powers nor short of space; nevertheless, she was to be the mainstay of the "Eurasian" alliance against the West. This may have been because of the Soviet denunciation of Western imperialism; (79) but this seems unlikely since Haushofer advocated spatial cooperation with the needs of the Russian homelands "irrespective of whether they be organized by the Soviets or any other power". (80) Neither ideological nor racial prejudice appears to have clouded Haushofer's judgement of the unchanging geopolitical realities: "the worse the situation appears", he wrote, "the more reason for a nation to think in planetary terms without regard for mistaken racial prejudices." (81) Even so, it is quite evident that Haushofer did not trust the Russians; in 1925 he noted that they had not yet shown themselves to be reliable allies; (82) and two years later, he was clearly disillusioned by the results of Russian collaboration with the Chinese nationalist forces.
It was, he said, "a sad lesson for all those who believe that one can cooperate in foreign affairs with Russia without being betrayed and sold out by other Russians." (83)

Such disappointments did not, however, shake his conviction of the need to work with Russia because, as he explained, "geopolitics judges daily events not according to their sentimental value, but on the firm foundation of interests, which arise with a degree of permanence from the land and living-space and are dictated by its broadness or narrowness and the stern demands of self-maintenance." (84) To understand why these 'interests' necessitated a Russo-German alliance, in Haushofer's view, one has to consult the ideas of the English geographer, Halford J. Mackinder, which seem to have made a great impression on Haushofer. Mackinder believed that the 'Heartland', roughly the area controlled by Russia at the time, was "the pivot region of world politics"; it was potentially a vast economic world in itself and only the backward state of the Russian economy prevented it from dominating the rest of the world. (85) A German alliance might tilt the balance of world power in favour of the 'Heartland' and then, Mackinder argued, "the empire of the world would be in sight." (86) Whether Haushofer was intoxicated by this dream of a 'world-empire' is a question to which we shall return shortly, but clearly he was impressed by Mackinder's general scenario; "the greatest of all geographical world-views", he called it. (87)

In particular, Haushofer picked up Mackinder's forecast of a confrontation between Russia and the 'oceanic powers' and this seems to have been the main basis for his concept of a Eurasian alliance between Germany, Russia, Japan and the emerging nationalist movements of India and China. (88)

Russia's vast resources of land and population, together with her pivotal geographical position could relieve the pressure of the 'Anglo-Saxon
It is quite evident from the above analysis that, whatever the geopoliticians might have claimed, Karl Haushofer, at least, had developed, in broad outline, a foreign policy programme of his own; he had devised an alliance strategy for the German state. But how and where did Haushofer envisage the extension of Germany's living-space - the prime goal of German foreign policy - taking place? Was he simply an impractical and irresponsible idealist, who furnished arguments for indiscriminate territorial expansion? This judgement would, on balance, be a little harsh. Haushofer was aware of the difficulties which his scheme faced. However, he believed that the time was right for territorial changes; "the redistribution of power on the earth has not come to an end with the world war", he wrote, "but has only just begun." Germany could convince world opinion of her need to expand if she could demonstrate that "a cultivatable area (Kulturboden) can support no greater density of population without endangering the surrounding areas". He felt that Japan and Italy had achieved this already.

Figures showing population density, the number of inhabitants per square kilometer, were, he felt, "the weightiest weapon of geopolitics in this process of persuasion." The fact that peaceful persuasion had realistically little chance of success does not necessarily mean that Haushofer was insincere in seeking a non-violent solution to Germany's spatial problems. Whether he would have supported more violent means if persuasion failed is another question and, of course, whether force would be necessary would depend largely on the direction and extent of German expansion.

Like Hitler, Haushofer thought that a future 'Third Reich' should solve its spatial problems by expansion in Europe; "the ideal of the Third Reich", 

he wrote, "is an ideal ratio of settlement to the land. With such a
density of settlement there will be no room for foreigners."(92) The
return of her overseas colonies lost at Versailles would be insufficient to
correct the imbalance between population and land; "the old colonial area
itself", he argued, "could only accommodate 3 to 4 million German settlers
at most."(93) The European continent and, in particular, Germany's border-
lands, had more to offer:

"It is much more important to strive towards the borderlands...
in which every German field is defended, even if at first
under a foreign flag or under foreign control. We must
place much more emphasis on a conscious widening and
retention of our frontier area and on a strong balanced
internal structure than on questionable overseas possessions." (94)

However, Haushofer seemed reluctant to explain how such expansion was to
occur and, more importantly, to specify which areas made up the 'borderlands'.
Only very rarely did he tackle these questions. On one notable occasion in
1925, in an essay entitled Die geopolitische Betrachtung grenzdeutscher
Probleme, he did point out several ways in which a peaceful devolution of
the borderlands to Germany might be facilitated. The first - a logical
extension of Haushofer's work with the VDA - was by maintaining contact
"between separated and endangered areas and the whole body of the larger
unit...in cultural, economic and political affairs."(95) A second way was
to sustain "the strong awareness of regional unity, especially in those
lands, which our enemies are seeking, with good reason, to divide admin-
istratively, like Eupen-Malmedy, Alsace-Lorraine, Tyrol and the regions of
the Vistula." Thirdly the publication of geopolitical studies could
create a "community of feeling with all the people around the world, who
are oppressed like us."(96) Such methods, it was hoped, would prove
successful not only in forging ties between Germany and her borderlands
but also in convincing world opinion of Germany's right to absorb them.
Haushofer made no mention of the possibility of using force to achieve this goal and it is, perhaps, significant that the areas which he considered to be the 'borderlands' all had either sizeable German-speaking communities or historical ties with Germany; in this same revealing essay, he mentioned "North Schleswig, Eupen-Malmedy, the Saar, the Palatinate, Lorraine, Alsace, Vorarlberg and Tyrol, Carinthia, Styria, Burgenland, Moravia, the Austro-Hungarian diaspora, the old duchies of Auschwitz and Zator, Eastern Upper Silesia, Austria (Ostmark), Danzig, and Memelland." (97) Though these areas were all beyond German control at that moment, Haushofer does not appear to have publicly advocated the absorption of territories with no German connexion. He did suggest on another occasion, however, that Germany should be allowed "freedom to wander (Wanderfreiheit) through the unused reserves of space in the world." (98) As has been seen, he also argued that Germany could benefit from "intelligent collaboration with the spatial needs of the Russian homelands (Volksboden)." Precisely what these cryptic remarks meant was never made clear. Did it mean a peaceful transfer of land? A possible clue can be found in an article published in the ZZG in 1925, in which Haushofer expressed a hope that a lasting settlement be found of the conflicting claims of China, Japan and the Soviet Union to Manchuria - referred to as part of "the empty spaces of the Soviet Union"; such spatial collaboration, he thought, might reduce diplomatic tensions around the world and, in the long run, might help to "alleviate the frightful position of Central Europe." (99)

Despite the prolific outpouring of books and articles, Haushofer's actual proposals remain vague and imprecise and this was, perhaps, his greatest failing. He constantly reiterated the need for Germany to expand her living-space but only very rarely did he make plain his belief in a
peaceful transfer of territory, to which she had some claim on the basis of past history or linguistic or cultural identity. As a result, many believe that he may have fired Hitler's lust for expansion.

How justified is one in attributing Hitler's expansionism to the influence of Haushofer and geopolitics? This question poses complex problems. In addition to the ever-present difficulty of ascribing one man's ideas to the influence of another, there is, in this case, the uncertainty about the exact nature and frequency of contacts between the two men in the early 1920s. As more information has come to light on this matter, historians have become more circumspect about what they attribute to Haushofer's inspiration, so all judgements must remain speculative. These problems are compounded by the fact that many of Haushofer's ideas were similar to those expressed in Pan-German propaganda before, during, and after the First World War, which Hitler may already have absorbed. Distinguishing geopolitical ideas from the traces of Pan-Germanism in Hitler's speeches and writings is, therefore, especially problematical. It is quite possible that Hitler's expansionist outlook had taken shape before he came across Haushofer. As has been shown earlier, Hitler's awareness of Germany's supposed overpopulation and the possible solutions to it—evident in early speeches in 1920-21—can be traced to Pan-German literature. Hence, even when Hitler jotted down in his notes for a speech in 1921 the phrase "population increase implies increase in territory", one cannot, with certainty, point to a geopolitical influence. Even when he asked in a speech in May 1921 if it was fair that every Russian adult had eighteen times as much land available as every German, he could just as easily have been drawing on Pan-German propaganda as Haushofer's geopolitics, since both waxed
indignant about the inequity of land distribution in Central Europe. (102)

However, such comments were infrequent in Hitler's speeches before 1922; thereafter, Germany's spatial dilemma seemed to acquire greater significance and prominence. It is possible (though this is only conjecture) that Hitler's heightened awareness of the problem was attributable to his acquaintance with Haushofer's ideas and work. This would certainly coincide with the interest which the VB began to show in the latter's activities. On 2 November 1922, for example, Hitler declared that "all political economy is subject to the natural conditions of growth and death, depending upon whether its proprietors, the people, the state survive the crises or collapse in order to create room for new forces." (103) This comment may simply reflect the recurrent theme of Social Darwinism in Hitler's thought, but it may also reflect the geopolitician's treatment of the state as a living organism. On 10 April 1923 in a survey of pre-war policy, Hitler revealed how he would utilise any geopolitical observations:

"Geographically speaking, the situation of the fatherland was one of the most unfavourable in Europe; (she) could not subsist on her own land and soil alone and had to fight to gain new soil. However Germany had wanted peace....Since she did not want to fight, she was compelled to industrialise. We have to conquer the world peacefully (said the sirens). Economic well-being, however, is the product of military might. Today we no longer have the sword, therefore, nor well-being either. Behind the plough, the sword must be held ready." (104)

The assertion of the interdependence between economic prosperity and military strength leaves little doubt about the way in which Hitler wanted to solve Germany's problems. As he put it on another occasion, "the conditions necessary for the life of the nation (Lebensbedingungen) will be improved only by the political determination to expand." (105)
As has been seen, as early as December 1922, Hitler had decided that
such expansion should occur primarily at Russia's expense; "Russia would
provide sufficient land for German settlers and a wide field of activity for
German industry." (106) But can one really see such ambitions as the product
of a geopolitical 'education' during 1921 and 1922? This seems unlikely
on the whole. Since relations between Hitler and Haushofer were at best
fairly 'distant' before their meetings in Landsberg gaol in 1924, it
seems probable that Hitler's dreams of imperial conquest had other origins. (107)
In fact, his scheme of eastward expansion flatly contradicted Haushofer's
conviction of the need for 'collaboration' with Russia over the question of
space, which was to be the basis for his larger design of an 'East Eurasian'
alliance. Indeed Haushofer's views bore a strong resemblance to those of
Moeller van den Bruck, with whom Hitler had clashed in 1922. (108) Both
argued that Germany's future lay in the East, but not, seemingly, as a
result of a campaign of conquest: both believed that Russia and Germany were
somehow drawn together by destiny and that, together, they could solve each
other's problems. Moeller put this rather ethereal relationship down to
a cultural affinity, Haushofer to rather more concrete geographical realities.
Accordingly, both refused to accept political changes, such as the emergence
of a Bolshevik government, could alter this destiny. By 1922, Hitler,
of course, felt differently. Hitler may originally have shared the outlook
of Haushofer and Moeller; it will be recalled that he had argued that
a Russo-German alliance before the war would have enabled Germany to
expand eastwards (presumably at Russian expense). And again he seemed to
regard the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as having implemented this strategy;
the treaty, Hitler argued on 29 May 1921, had secured Germany's future
"by the acquisition of land and soil, by access to raw materials, and
by friendly relations between the two lands". (109) (My italics). However,
Hitler's original enthusiasm for a Russo-German alliance was evidently based on far less immutable conviction than Haushofer's or Moeller's and seems to have been eroded during 1921 and 1922 by his growing aversion towards Bolshevik Russia. By the end of 1922, Hitler was planning "the destruction of Russia with the help of England". (My italics). (110) This was quite a different matter and would not have received Haushofer's approval.

Haushofer's geopolitics, in short, did not supply the model and the inspiration for Hitler's campaign of conquest and destruction at Russia's expense in Eastern Europe and the disparity between the political philosophies of Hitler and Haushofer should not be underestimated. (111) Nevertheless the arguments of the geopoliticians were to be grist to Hitler's mill. The foreign policy sections of Mein Kampf leave little doubt that he found geopolitical theories highly useful. Haushofer later claimed that the Nazis had "misused" and "misinterpreted" geopolitics, but does this claim stand examination? (112)

When interrogated by the Allies in 1945, Haushofer denied any part in the composition of Mein Kampf; it is, perhaps, significant though that he argued that "a scientific comparison of my style of writing and the style of the book" would prove this. (113) Haushofer was defending himself against the charge that he actually helped to write Mein Kampf, conveniently avoiding the issue of whether he influenced the trend of its argument. In addition, since the Allied interrogators knew that Haushofer had frequently visited Rudolf Hess in Landsberg gaol in 1923 and 1924 and that he had, on occasion, spoken with Hitler there, Haushofer argued that
he had never seen Hitler "alone". (114) This was an attempt to conceal the fact that he had had discussions with Hitler and Hess, who had been reading Ratzel's Politische Geographie, and that he supplied them with further geopolitical literature. (115) There can be no doubt that this exchange of ideas and information bore fruit in Hitler's autobiography and that Haushofer knew it. (116)

In chapter four of the first volume of Mein Kampf, published on 19 July 1925, Hitler reviewed pre-war German diplomacy and four options open to it in dealing with Germany's growing population. He had discussed the same subject in a speech on 29 May 1921 and it is interesting to see how this essentially Pan-German analysis had developed in the intervening years. (117) Hitler rejected birth control - the first option - on pseudo-Darwinistic rather than geopolitical grounds:

"While Nature, by making procreation free, yet submitting survival to a hard trial, chooses from an excess number of individuals the best as worthy of living, thus preserving them alone and in them conserving the species, man limits procreation, but is hysterically concerned that, once a being is born, it should be preserved at any price." (118)

In short, whilst nature intervenes occasionally to limit the size of population and only the fittest survive, birth control breeds weakness. Hitler's conclusion that "anyone who wants to secure the existence of the German people by a self-limitation of its reproduction is robbing it of its future" is perfectly consistent with Ratzel's definition of Realpolitik as "the policy which secures for a growing people the land indispensable for the future" but also with the ideas of Heinrich Class and the ADV, which Ratzel helped to found. (119) One cannot, therefore, point unequivocally to direct geopolitical influence here.
Evidence of the impact of geopolitical ideas is more easily traceable in Hitler's assessment of the usefulness of internal colonization - the second option. Admittedly, Ratzel, Class and, in his turn, Hitler accepted that Germany should make maximum use of her own land before external colonization was undertaken and all doubted whether this alone would be sufficient in the long term to feed a growing population. However, in \textit{Mein Kampf}, Hitler developed one further argument against internal colonization, which seems clearly attributable to his reading of Ratzel's \textit{Politische Geographie}. In the book, Ratzel stressed that one of the advantages of territorial expansion was that a larger area simplified foreign relations by reducing the number of possible neighbours. In other words, the size of a state materially affected its security. Hitler turned this argument around to suit his own purposes when he stated that:

"The limitation to a definite small area of soil, inherent in internal colonization,...leads to an exceedingly unfavourable politico-military situation in the nation in question.

The size of the area inhabited by a people constitutes in itself an essential factor for determining its outward security. The greater the quantity of space at the disposal of a people, the greater its natural protection." (122)

Whilst a large amount of territory acted as a deterrent against frivolous attack, a small amount acted as "a positive invitation to seizure" in Hitler's view. (123) Ratzel's geo-military deliberations clearly proved useful to Hitler in his attempt to discredit the idea of internal colonization.

Hitler's arguments concerning the third and favoured option - the acquisition of new soil for settlement of the excess population - reflect a variety of influences. The first argument, namely that such a policy would help to rectify the balance between the agricultural and industrial
sectors of the economy and make "the subsistence of the people as a whole more or less independent of foreign countries", repeated almost verbatim the analysis of Heinrich Class in the 'Kaiserbuch'. (124) However, these goals could not be met, in Hitler's view, by overseas expansion but by aggrandisement "almost exclusively in Europe". (125) Writing before the First World War, Ratzel and Class believed that expansion in Europe could only be achieved by resort to war and, therefore, both preferred colonies overseas; (126) Hitler, writing after the war, had no qualms about starting another. Perhaps drawing on Ratzel's exposition on the transient nature of political frontiers, Hitler then argued that "we must not let political boundaries obscure for us the boundaries of eternal justice. If this earth really has room for all to live in, let us be given the soil we need for our livelihood." (127) Hitler's final argument in favour of territorial aggrandisement in Europe seems to derive from Ratzel's observations on the fleeting success of trading powers, who acquire colonies but whose homeland is insufficient in size to warrant such an empire, for he asserted that:

"Many European states are like pyramids stood on their heads. Their European area is absurdly small in comparison to their weight of colonies, foreign trade etc. We may say: summit in Europe, base in the whole world; contrasting with the American Union, which possesses its base in its own continent and touches the rest of the earth only with its summit. And from this comes the immense inner strength of this state and the weakness of most European colonial powers." (129)

Hitler dismissed the fourth alternative, that is the policy of sustaining Germany by commercial exchange and overseas colonization which had been followed by the imperial government before 1914, because it was based on two fallacies. The first was that peaceful economic conquest of the world, which the German politicians sought, was feasible; "if we chose this road", Hitler wrote, "England would some day inevitably become our enemy"; indeed,
the history of the British Empire itself showed that economic conquest could not be achieved peaceably. The second was the belief, encouraged by Germany's successful technological and industrial revolution, that "the state itself primarily represented an economic institution...that its very existence depended on economics." This heresy Hitler attributed to the insidious influence of the Jews. The state, in fact, was "a national organism not an economic organization", Hitler pointed out. In discrediting both fallacies, Hitler seems to have drawn, consciously or otherwise, on the arguments of his precursors; Class for his critique on Imperial Germany's commercial policy and Ratzel for the biological roots of statehood.

In developing his analysis of pre-war German foreign policy for Mein Kampf, Hitler, therefore, seems to have rifled Ratzel's Politische Geographie in search of 'scientific' justification for a campaign of conquest in Eastern Europe, which was already implied in his speech on 29 May 1921 by his support for the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and probably inspired originally by Pan-German propaganda. It should be stressed that Hitler used Ratzel's ideas out of context and conveniently overlooked the latter's own political opinions.

In the second volume of Mein Kampf, published on 11 December 1926 and presumably written after his release from Landsberg gaol, Hitler felt obliged to defend his views on eastward expansion, which had not received wholesale acceptance from within the ranks of the Nazi party. Now Hitler described the Russian question not only as probably "the most decisive concern of all German foreign affairs", but also as "the touchstone for the political capacity of the young National Socialist movement to think clearly and act correctly." Faced with the challenge to his
conception of a future German foreign policy, Hitler looked again at the ideas of the geopoliticians in search of positive reinforcement. It seems he was not disappointed. His observations on the strategic and military significance of a larger territory and on the validity of Europe's frontiers seem to show that he had again pilfered geopolitical ideas.

In particular, Hitler appears to have drawn on Karl Haushofer's developing views on military geography (Wehrgeographie). In an unpublished article in 1926 comparing Germany's living-space with those of her neighbours, Haushofer found that Germany's had become "highly unfavourable from a military-geographical standpoint." (137) It was threatened "along deep inroads" by Poland and Bohemia in the east and France in the west. To make matters worse, the population was maldistributed, tending to accumulate in the "exposed areas" of the Upper Rhine, Upper Silesia and Saxony. Furthermore "over 160 km of coastal frontier belongs to East Prussia, (which is now) cut off (from Germany) and the whole Baltic coast cannot be protected as it is unusually accessible by sea (leicht angesegeilt), as the appearance of the English fleet off Swinemünde before the war showed."

In total, Germany had "3,305 kilometers of wholly unprotected land frontier and 1,440 kilometers of open coastal frontier." (138) In addition, Haushofer stressed that Germany's shortage of raw materials, such as oil, copper, tin, zinc, not to mention coal and iron, and the situation of her limited resources in vulnerable areas would have deleterious effects on Germany's ability to resist attack. Hence, Haushofer concluded gloomily, the German Empire is "an over-industrialized industrial state without a chance of feeding its population from its own land, and therefore, in its present form, mutilated and split into two, particularly susceptible to aggression." (139)
Whilst there is no evidence to suggest that Hitler had access to this unpublished article or that he had discussed 'military geography' with Haushofer, it does seem probable that he was acquainted with the subject when he wrote the second volume of *Mein Kampf*. Hitler shared Haushofer's concern for the "extremely unfavourable situation of the Reich from the viewpoint of military geography." "The coastline especially", Hitler observed, "was unfavourable from a military standpoint for a fight with England; it was short and cramped, and the land front, on the other hand, disproportionately long and open."(140) Like Haushofer, Hitler believed France's position to be more secure - whilst Germany suffered from centrifugal tendencies, France was "rigidly centralised".(141) Again, like Haushofer, Hitler now considered access to food and raw materials to be a vital part of Germany's state security; his projected Anglo-German-Italian alliance would, he argued, free Germany from her "unfavourable strategic position" by ensuring "the most powerful protection on our flank on the one hand" and the "complete guarantee of our food and raw materials on the other."(142) These strategic arguments led to the somewhat predictable conclusion that "only an adequately large space on this earth assures a nation of its freedom of existence."(143)

If Haushofer's findings helped to justify Hitler's expansionist programme on the grounds of self-sufficiency and military security - and the congruence between their ideas is, at least, remarkable - Ratzel's analysis of the geopolitical value of frontiers also proved attractive to Hitler. Here again, Haushofer may have been an important intermediary, drawing attention to the results of Ratzel's deliberations in order to cure what he saw as the ignorance of Germans (from "the man in the street" to the Member of the Reichstag) of the 'true' nature of frontiers.(144) Hitler
seems to have been one of Haushofer's most receptive students. In Politische Geographie Ratzel argued that a frontier was "organic", "a peripheral organ", that it was subject to growth and contraction according to the state of a particular nation. As a result, frontiers were "by their nature inconstant (veränderlich)"; "the apparently rigid frontier" was, in fact, "only the resting-point of a movement"; in short, there were "no absolute frontiers". These views were echoed by Hitler in the second volume of Mein Kampf when he stated that:

"Just as Germany's frontiers are fortuitous frontiers, momentary frontiers in the current political struggle of any period, so are the boundaries of other nations' living-space. And just as the shape of our earth's surface can seem immutable as granite only to the thoughtless soft-head, but in reality only represents at each period an apparent pause in a continuous development, created by the mighty forces of Nature in a process of continuous growth, only to be transformed or destroyed tomorrow by greater forces, likewise the boundaries of living-spaces in the life of nations." (146)

Hitler, however, used such arguments for his own ends, firstly to undermine respect for the existing frontiers:

"For no people on this earth possesses so much as a square yard of territory on the strength of a higher will or superior right....State boundaries are made by man and changed by man " (147)

and secondly, to discredit the idea of limiting German ambitions to the restoration of the frontiers of 1914: those frontiers were "neither complete in the sense of embracing the people of German nationality, nor sensible with regard to geo-military expedience. They were not the result of considered political action, but momentary frontiers in a political struggle that was by no means concluded." (148)
There seems little doubt, therefore, that in the second volume of his autobiography, Hitler marshalled Haushofer's arguments concerning Germany's lack of self-sufficiency and military security to add greater conviction to his expansionist programme and Ratzel's observations on the transient nature of frontiers to overcome any moralistic reservations which his followers might have about such a programme. Though both these were not without significance in the later foreign policy of the Third Reich, it has to be remembered, however, that they were used to bolster a decision which had already been taken; they did not determine that decision to expand nor, moreover, the direction which that expansion was to take. In Mein Kampf geopolitics were harnessed to an antisemitic, anti-Bolshevik racial ideology, which reinforced Hitler's already evident interest in an eastward course of territorial aggrandisement. (149) Haushofer's claim that the Nazis 'misused' or 'misunderstood' geopolitics is, at best, a half-truth. Hitler certainly misused geopolitical arguments. They were meant to convince world opinion of the need for a peaceful redistribution of territory in Europe; they were used to justify the resort to force in the pursuit of the same goal. Nevertheless, Haushofer's ideas (and to a lesser extent Ratzel's) were open to the interpretation which Hitler put on them. Haushofer's assertions of Germany's need for more living-space had an obvious political implication, when, as so often, they were unaccompanied by a rider urging peaceful territorial change.

Some historians now believe that the extension of Germany's Lebensraum may not have been Hitler's ultimate goal. The conquest of territory in
Eastern Europe may have been only the first of several 'stages' in the creation of a German world dominion. After the successful establishment of European hegemony with the defeat of France and the conquest of Russia, Germany would try, so the argument runs, to acquire a colonial empire in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic in preparation for a confrontation with the United States, which would result in world domination by Germany. (150)

But how convincing is the evidence that Hitler was mulling over such fantastic schemes in the early 1920s when he was a largely unknown orator and even the first step in the realisation of such ambitions — gaining power in Germany — appeared to be a pipe-dream? Lowly status does not, of course, preclude grandiose dreams and, if such notions were in Hitler's head, what inspired them?

Some historians have found evidence of Hitler's interest in German world dominion, and perhaps the inspiration behind it, in the antisemitic ideology, which he adopted after 1919. The belief in an international Jewish conspiracy to take over the world instilled the idea that the Aryan race had a mission, a world-wide life-and-death struggle against the Jews and it is, therefore, conceivable that Hitler envisaged an Aryan-dominated world if the Jews were defeated. It has been argued that Hitler accused his arch-enemy - the Jew - of pursuing world conquest in order to disguise his own ambitions for Germany. (151) If this is true, then Hitler was dreaming of world dominion as early as 13 August 1920, when he claimed in a speech that the Jew was trying to "lower the racial level of other peoples" in order to "organise, build up and maintain his definitive world dominion (Weltherrschaft)." (152) However, this interpretation is, of course, highly speculative. One can, with some justification, argue that Hitler stressed the world-wide nature of the Jewish threat merely to provoke a
national response and ultimately a national revival in Germany. In the same speech in August 1920, for example, he went on to suggest that one could not "fight fire with fire" and that the grip of international Jewish capitalism could only be broken "by national strength". (153) Indeed, the slogan of nationalism versus internationalism was constantly reiterated in Nazi propaganda at the time and the party's main ideologues had since 1919 belaboured those institutions, which were seen to have universal aspirations: the Catholic Church, the Freemasons, as well as the Communist Party. (154) So one wonders if a national revival was not the extent of Hitler's ambitions in 1920 and antisemitic propaganda was geared solely to that end.

Some historians have suggested, however, that by the time he wrote Mein Kampf, Hitler's antisemitism had 'hardened' or 'sharpened'; in 1920, it is pointed out, the Nazi party was calling for the treatment of Jews in Germany as aliens and, at worst, for their expulsion; by 1924 Hitler was writing of the need to eradicate the Jewish bacteria in the German body. (155) One might, therefore, assume a causal connection between the increasing violence of Hitler's solutions to the Jewish question and an emerging preoccupation with the idea of German world dominion. However, this interpretation also has to be treated cautiously for several reasons. Firstly, Hitler had, in fact, been using the violent language of Mein Kampf in private discussion of the problem since 1920; in a letter in July 1920, Hitler referred to the Jews as "baccili", which must be combatted "by the annihilation of its germs (Erreger)". (156) In December 1922 he told Eduard Scharrer in a confidential interview that "a solution to the question of the Jews has to come. If it is solved sensibly, this will be best for both parties. If this is not achieved, then there are only two
other possibilities, either the German people will become a nation like the Americans or the Levantines, or a bloody showdown (Auseinandersetzung) would result."(157) So one has to question whether there was any hardening of Hitler's attitude towards the Jews between 1920 and 1924 and hence any corresponding increase in his interest in German world dominion. Secondly, one should resist the temptation to see in Hitler's talk of "showdowns" and the "annihilation of germs" the origins of the 'Final Solution' attempted in the gas-chambers of Auschwitz in the Second World War. It may have been pure rhetoric and certainly, as Hitler himself admitted, other more "sensible" solutions, such as creating a national home for the Jews, were possible. Alfred Rosenberg suggested the re-settlement of the Jews in Uganda; but Madagascar and even Southern Russia were mooted as possible locations.(158) So there are grounds for questioning the assumption that in the early 1920s Hitler saw in the physical destruction of world Jewry the route to German world dominion.

However, in Mein Kampf, Hitler did speculate on the long-term implications of a carefully considered racial policy. In the first volume he suggested that "a racially pure people which is conscious of its blood can never be enslaved by the Jews."(159) In the second volume he implied that such a people might actually come to dominate the world itself:

"A state which in this age of racial poisoning dedicates itself to the care of its best racial elements must some day become lord of the earth." (160)

Indeed, this might be a necessity:

"We all sense that in the distant future humanity must be faced by problems which only a highest race, become master people and supported by the means and possibilities of the entire globe, will be equipped to overcome." (161)

What he meant by all this, Hitler never made clear. One question, above
all others, however, needs an answer. Was it the German state or the Aryan race which was so destined? The evidence supports both interpretations. On one occasion, he argued that "if the German people in its historic development had possessed that herd unity which other peoples enjoyed, then the German Reich would doubtless be mistress of the globe."(162) On another, he called upon "the Germanic states" to halt the bastardization of the race. (163) It is, perhaps, interesting to note that Alfred Rosenberg, who probably introduced Hitler to the concept of the Aryan race and the Jewish world conspiracy, did not identify the Aryan solely with the German. He wanted "the organic grouping of the states of Europe and other continents according to race and nationality" in readiness for a racial confrontation. (164) He recognized England and the United States as potential defenders of the Nordic race. (165) If Rosenberg did look forward to a future world dominion — and this is unlikely as he described the idea of a "political world dominion (Weltherrschaft)" as 'both immoral and inorganic" — it was likely to be achieved by a group of Nordic powers, not by Germany alone, in his view. (166) So it is possible that Hitler assigned the future dominance of the Aryan race to the German people alone by mistake. Equally feasible, however, is the conclusion that these racial theories made Hitler crave such an exalted destiny for the German people alone.

Signs of Hitler's interest in the concept of German world dominion are not to be found exclusively in his antisemitic and racial theorizing. It is quite tenable to suggest that the ideas may have evolved from his observations on power politics. Hitler's occasional references in Mein Kampf to the terms 'world power' (Weltmacht) and 'world dominion' (Weltherrschaft) have led some historians to conclude that Hitler had a vague, but fairly concrete, long-term strategy by which Germany could come to dominate the world. However, the obliqueness of Hitler's hints and
a certain confusion over the meaning of the terms which Hitler used, may have misled historians as to the actual goals envisaged. There appear to be three stages in Hitler's foreign policy programme in *Mein Kampf.* Firstly, he sought to secure the continued existence of the German nation:

"Today we are not fighting for a position as a world power (Weltmacht); today, we must struggle for the existence of our fatherland, for the unity of our nation and the daily bread of our children." (167)

This was to be achieved in alliance with England and Italy against the French.

The second stage would see the establishment of Germany as a world power, primarily by the acquisition of more Lebensraum in Europe largely at the expense of Russia. Though Germany had 'supposedly' been a world power in 1914 with her far-flung imperial possessions, in reality she had not been; but as Hitler said:

"If the German nation in 1914 had had a different relation between area and population, Germany would really have been a world power (Weltmacht)." (168)

What was needed, in the first instance, was not colonies overseas but "exclusively...the acquisition of a territory for settlement, which will enhance the area of the mother country and hence not only keep the new settlers in the most intimate community with the land of their origin, but secure for the total area those advantages, which lie in its unified magnitude....And for world power she needs that magnitude." (169) Hitler hinted, though, that whilst overseas colonies had low priority at the moment, they might be valuable later; in a retrospective assessment of pre-war German policy, he argued that the strengthening of Germany's continental power by territorial aggrandisement in Europe "seemed to place
a completion by later acquisitions of colonial territory within the
realm of the naturally possible." (170)

The third stage and - in the view of this writer - the ultimate ambition
harboured by Hitler at this time was to make Germany the dominant world
power. It is here that the looseness of Hitler's language may have created
confusion. Hitler claimed that the lack of racial unity amongst Germans
had robbed them of 'world dominion' (Weltherrschaft); but for this, Germany
would have been 'mistress of the globe' (Herrin des Erdballs); Germans would
have enjoyed 'the right of masters' (Herrenrecht). (171) All three terms -
Weltherrschaft, Herrin des Erdballs and Herrenrecht - seem to imply world
conquest or world mastery by Germany. But this may be misleading. Hitler's
usage of these terms needs clarification. For example, in Mein Kampf,
Hitler referred to the "reinforcement of British world dominion (Weltherrschaft)"
as the goal of British foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth
century. (172) Clearly in this context Weltherrschaft did not mean world
mastery; by no stretch of the imagination could Britain be said to have
enjoyed such a position. Britain did have a world-wide empire, which
gave her a predominant influence in world affairs; she was, as Hitler put
it elsewhere, "the greatest world power on earth". (173) On another occasion,
he referred to a "British world hegemony (britische Welt-hegemonie)", one
that had been challenged by a "Germanic world hegemony" in 1914. (174) The
result had been war. Hitler's terminology was evidently inconsistent, but
it seems likely that he wanted for Germany what Britain currently enjoyed.
Whether he called it Weltherrschaft or Welt-hegemonie, he meant not actual
world conquest, but a position of predominance or pre-eminence amongst
the world powers.
An analysis of Hitler's use of the term "Herr" leads to the same conclusion. America, Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf, "seems to be growing into a new mistress of the world (neue Herrin der Welt)". The implication here is again not that America was about to conquer the world but that she would become the foremost world power amongst the other world powers. Hitler seemed to believe that it was 'natural' or 'instinctive' for the world powers to vie with one another for predominance. In brief, Hitler's ambition was to make Germany the foremost world power, the dominant influence in world politics; in this sense, Germany would be Herr der Erde. This interpretation is a tentative one - of necessity, given the paucity of the evidence and the ambiguous nature of Hitler's global fantasies - and does not apply to Hitler's later 'plans' when in power.

It is perhaps worth considering finally the origins of Hitler's fascination with the concept of 'world power status' (Weltpolitik) and 'world dominion'. The example of the British Empire was obviously of paramount importance. As early as December 1919, he had described England as "the world power (who) possesses every world monopoly". These monopolies had, in his view, been challenged in the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War by Germany, who had "in recent years gained footholds on every continent and was in the process of emerging at the head of the world powers". In a speech on 17 April 1920 Hitler expressed interest in how a country with such a small population could rule "a fifth of the entire globe" and control world trade. What emerges from these speeches is that Hitler seemed to regard 'world dominion' as consisting of the possession of a world-wide empire serviced by a mighty navy and sustained by great commercial strength; hence the German challenge to Britain's pre-eminence amongst the world powers emerged when she acquired
those attributes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These views, without much doubt, had been consciously or unconsciously absorbed from Pan-German literature; Heinrich Class, as has been seen, laid great emphasis on overseas colonies; he described the British fleet as "the basis of her position as a world power". Perhaps most interesting of all, Class was prone to the same kind of hyperbole as Hitler later on when describing Britain's power; Class argued, for example, that with the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, "England became master of world affairs (Herr der Weltlage)".

So it seems possible that the concept of 'world dominion' (Weltherrschaft) - so vital in understanding Hitler's 'Stufenplan' - was a legacy from Pan-Germanism. However, between 1920 and 1924, the idea did undergo some refinement. In particular, it should be noted that in 1919 Hitler felt that Germany, with her empire, navy and growing commercial strength, had been a 'world power' in 1914. In Mein Kampf, as has been seen, he denied this. The change was evidently wrought by his growing conviction that expansion into contiguous areas in Europe was preferable to overseas expansion. In May 1921 he argued that, since Germany had entered the colonial race too late, Germany could only attain an "importance in the world" commensurate with the size of her population by acquiring land in Europe along the lines indicated by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The change was reflected in Hitler's emphasis on the need for an army rather than a navy; in a critique of pre-war policy in August 1922, he described the creation of a German army as a "necessity of life" if Germany were to maintain her "position as a world power (Weltmachtstellung)". Significantly, he was not yet denying Germany's world power status, which tends to confirm what has been suggested above, namely that Hitler began to take note of
geopolitical ideas only when he was writing Mein Kampf; and that his conversion to a policy of continental aggrandisement was affected before then by a heady mixture of Oestpolitik, as sponsored by Ludendorff in 1918, and antisemitic and anti-Bolshevik prejudice, as supplied (interminably) by Alfred Rosenberg.

It is only in Mein Kampf that Hitler dwells at any length on the concept of Weltmacht and his observations bear the stamp of Ratzel's ideas. In Politische Geographie Ratzel identified two types of great powers - those with a large landed base and those with an imperial base - and estimated that an area of 5 million square kilometers was an adequate foundation for genuine great power status. (185) The British Empire, in Ratzel's view, was the only genuine 'world power', a power which "is represented through her own possessions in all parts of the known world and particularly in the decisive places also". For Ratzel, Weltmachtstellung was a position of pre-eminence which one power attained and retained until she was supplanted by another; as he commented:

"What England is today, Spain used to be, and Rome before that." (186)

Karl Haushofer called it a "Wanderpokal" - a kind of trophy which passed from one nation to another. (187) Size alone, however, did not, in Ratzel's view, assure a state real power; it must have an adequate population as well:

"Alongside the increase in the amount of space, the number of people must also grow, and it must be realised how the value of one determines the value of the other." (188)

Furthermore, newly acquired land had to be settled to be of value.

Hitler's comments in the second volume of Mein Kampf seem to reflect this
argument quite faithfully. He accepted both of Ratzel's criteria for
great or world power status. He identified America, Russia and China as
the "giant states" and the imperial powers, England and France as "power
states", "whose area above all is the chief support of the political power". (189)
As has been noted above, since 1919 Hitler had spoken of Britain's pre-
eminent position in world affairs using the term Weltherrschaft; Ratzel's
use of the term Weltmachtstellung may, in part, explain some of the
confusion in Mein Kampf.

Certainly, Hitler's denial of Germany's status as a world power in the
pre-war period seems attributable to Ratzel's comments about the amount of
territory required and its location; Germany did not qualify because the
"mother country is limited to the absurd area of five hundred thousand square
kilometers". (190) To become a world power, Germany had not only to expand
her territorial base but also, in apparent conformity with Ratzel's views,
to increase her population to settle the new land acquired. As Hitler wrote:

"This foreign policy will be acknowledged as correct only
if, after scarcely a hundred years, there are two hundred
and fifty million Germans on this continent, and not living
penned in as factory coolies for the rest of the world, but:
as peasants and workers, who guarantee each other's livelihood
by their labour." (191)

So it seems possible that Ratzel's work may have provided Hitler with a
doctrine of self-perpetuating expansionism in the pursuit of world power
status for Germany since any territorial expansion would require a
population increase, which, in turn, would necessitate further territorial
expansion. (192) It has to be emphasised again, though, that what Hitler
had done was to rifle Ratzel's work in search of scientific arguments to make
a preconceived policy of crude expansionism more respectable; he ignored
much which did not suit his purpose.
One other concrete legacy of the geopoliticians to Hitler may have been their larger conception of foreign affairs; they may have taught him to think in terms of continents, instead of nations. (193) The polarization of world power was a frequent theme in geopolitical writing and it is conceivable that Hitler's vague notions about a future confrontation between a Europe under German hegemony and America derived from this source. Rather surprisingly Hitler seemed to think that Britain would not side with America in such a tussle and he may have been swayed in this direction by the regular accounts of a growing alienation between Britain and America in geopolitical publications. Though the geopoliticians were obviously not the only ones to note this, their arguments are worth examination. Haushofer, for example, described on several occasions how Britain's commercial monopoly was being undermined by America's commercial expansion and how the Americans were "visibly annoyed" at British (and French) imperial policies in the Far East. (194) Erich Obst, the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik's correspondent on European affairs, described the emerging conflict thus:

"The world war unleashed in part by England gave the Americans the opportunity which they knew very well how to exploit and which will first begin to bear fruit in a few decades. Then will the fateful hour in its truest sense approach for Great Britain and her economy, and she is preparing herself for the coming confrontation with the United States. Whether the struggle will be decided on power-political or politico-economic grounds, England needs allies against America in any case." (195)

It may be a coincidence but it is one worth mentioning that Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf that "no ties of kinship can prevent a feeling of envious concern in England towards the growth of the American Union in all fields of international economic and power politics. The former colonial
country, child of the great mother, seems to be growing into a new master of the world. It is understandable today that England re-examines her old alliance with anxious concern and British statesmen gaze with trepidation towards a period in which it will no longer be said: 'Britannia rules the waves'. But instead: 'The seas for the Union'. He also believed that, in the last resort if it came to a confrontation, England would be doomed without allies.

In short, therefore, the geopoliticians encouraged the idea that America would increasingly challenge Britain's pre-eminence as a world power and it is possible that Hitler saw the chance for Germany, once she was dominant in Europe, to seize that position herself by exploiting Anglo-American tensions.

All told, therefore, it seems likely that Hitler had a rather ill-defined scheme in mind by which Germany, by stages, would recover her strength and become a world power again. His ultimate ambition at this time was to make Germany the predominant world power. His interest in this concept was, undoubtedly, aroused initially by Pan-German propaganda about the pre-eminence enjoyed by Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth century, but it was fed by the geopolitical preference for a large block of contiguous territory rather than a world-wide empire as the basis of 'world dominion'. It is possible that Haushofer taught Hitler to "think in terms of continents" and encouraged the latter's musings about a distant confrontation between a German-dominated Europe and America, in which Great Britain would probably be forced to side with Germany.
Two conclusions, arising out of this chapter, need to be reiterated. Firstly, there is no substance in the claim that the geopoliticians helped, wittingly or unwittingly, to determine the goals of Hitler's foreign policy. Hitler merely utilized geopolitical arguments to reinforce his own pre-determined schemes and remained quite immune to the Weltanschauung underlying much of German geopolitics. Ultimately, Hitler found accounts of Russian racial inferiority and the invidious power of the Jews in Bolshevik Russia more convincing - or perhaps simply more useful in buttressing his own territorial ambitions - than geopolitical assessments of the value of future Russo-German collaboration. (197) Certainly it would seem that, for Hitler by 1925, racial questions were of primary importance and geopolitical insights were a secondary consideration; as he wrote in Mein Kampf:

"However much the soil, for example, can influence men, the result of the influence will always be different depending on the races in question. The low fertility of a living space may spur the one race to the highest achievements; in others it will only be the cause of the bitterest poverty and final undernourishment with all its consequences. The inner nature of peoples is always determining for the manner in which outward influences will be effective." (198)

This was the crux of the difference between Haushofer and Hitler. Haushofer's respect for other races prevented him from advocating large-scale annexations of alien territory. His solution to Germany's spatial problems was to develop her 'borderlands'. His geopolitical researches and his practical work for the German Academy and the VDA were designed to hasten the devolution of these areas to Germany by peaceful means. His long-term ambition was to see a mature Germany predominant amongst the great powers. (199) Like so many Germans at this time, Karl Haushofer shared the same dream.
as Hitler of a resurgent Germany as a leading world power, but not his ruthlessness in the pursuit of its realization.

Nevertheless, a second conclusion is inescapable. Haushofer's ideas were a positive encouragement to Hitler. The popularization and development of the concept of Lebensraum and, in particular, its emphasis on the pursuit of autarky as a military necessity, was Haushofer's main legacy to the Nazis. It was to be of crucial importance in the formulation of and justification for Hitler's foreign and domestic policies in the 1930s. Hitler may already have been aware from Pan-German literature of the term Lebensraum and of the argument that the absence of self-sufficiency had been Germany's Achilles' heel in the First World War, but the geopolitical theorization about Lebensraum elevated the problem to a pseudo-scientific level and, as a result, made Hitler's solution more palatable. That Hitler chose to pursue 'autarky by conquest' was not Haushofer's fault, but the latter does deserve a share of moral culpability for making - albeit inadvertently - Hitler's mission more respectable. Even so there is no reason to question the judgement of the Allied interrogators in 1945, who decided not to put Haushofer on trial at Nuremberg.
Hitler's alliance strategy seems to have been formulated and discussed in private, for example with Eduard Scharrer, as early as December 1922. But, although Hitler dropped hints about Germany's future allies during 1923 expressing the hope that England and Italy would agree to a German-Austrian Anschluss and describing England and Italy as the only powers with an interest in the continued existence of the German state, nevertheless he was silent about the use to which these allies would be put in relation to Russia. In fact, not until 1925 when the first volume of Mein Kampf was published, did he unveil his full strategy in public and even then only by implication.

As late as the spring of 1924 Hitler remained reticent about his alliance policy. In an article published in April 1924 entitled Warum musste ein 8 November kommen? he repeated what he saw as Germany's foreign policy options before the First World War, stating that:

"Either she decided to win farm land by renouncing overseas trade and colonies, and by renouncing over-industrialization etc., in which case the German government had to recognize that this was only to be achieved in alliance with England against Russia; or she wanted sea-power and world trade, in which case only an alliance with Russia against England could be considered." (1)

Though there can be little doubt that Hitler believed that post-war Germany faced the same choice, he still gave no clear indication of his own preference. The rest of the article went on to emphasize the likelihood of future Anglo-German collaboration against the French. The English, in his view, would oppose the French goal of annihilating, or "Balkanizing", Germany because it would create French hegemony in Europe and destroy
the balance of power, which England considered to be the guarantee of her "world hegemony":

"Hence England was once the enemy of Spain, then of Holland, then finally of France, now of Germany, and will in future again be the enemy of the power which undertakes to strive for the forbidden hegemony in Europe."

As proof of the correctness of his analysis, Hitler pointed to the French decision, following the partition of Upper Silesia in the autumn of 1922, to "inflict the same fate on the Ruhr area". This step, Hitler argued on 28 February 1924 during his trial, caused England to reverse her policy so that "at the start of the Ruhr conflict, England took, in effect, a pro-German stance and did not want the Ruhr to pass to France." So, whilst Hitler indicated fairly plainly the alliance strategy which Germany should adopt against France, he did not suggest that it might also have been applied against Russia. In fact, Hitler avoided making a choice in public between expansion overseas and territorial aggrandisement in Europe, even though some of the geopolitical arguments about the state as a "folkish organism" and the duty of the state "to give to a people the nourishment and political power which was its due", which were later to justify the pursuit of Lebensraum in Eastern Europe, were in evidence at his trial. Clearly, Hitler's failure to reveal in public until July 1925 the second stage of his alliance strategy, which had been determined as early as December 1922, requires explanation.

One possibility is that Hitler had not finally decided upon the goals of his foreign policy. Alfred Rosenberg argued in January 1923 that it was not possible to be specific about the party's foreign policy because "the present conditions in world politics can change in time" and the makers of foreign
policy would have to adjust to such changes. However, given the unequivocal nature of Hitler's comments to Scharrer in December 1922, and his unbending commitment to his chosen course later in life, it is doubtful whether Hitler was affected by such qualms. Indeed, one wonders whether Rosenberg was not himself covering up either the absence of a coherent party stance on foreign affairs or the existence of a concept which would alienate support if it were made public at that time. Axel Kuhn favours the first of these interpretations: in his view, Hitler was still uncertain about his attitude towards Russia; nor had he as yet connected the Anglo-Italian-German alliance against France with his territorial ambitions; furthermore as Hitler still aimed at securing the return of Germany's overseas colonies, a policy which he admitted that England would oppose, he had clearly not resolved an inherent contradiction to his strategy. However, the records of Hitler's conversation with Scharrer show quite conclusively that Kuhn is mistaken: there was, in fact, no contradiction because Hitler had already decided to acquire land at Russian expense, and to abandon any colonial ambitions overseas thus "avoiding any damage to English interests". In short, Hitler's alliance scheme already took note of his territorial ambitions and, though in need of refinement, it was essentially complete in 1922.

A more likely explanation of Hitler's and Rosenberg's reticence is that disclosure of these foreign policy goals would antagonise their supporters. The revelation of Hitler's territorial ambitions in Russia would certainly alienate the support of the fiercely nationalistic Russian émigrés, which Scheubner-Richter had attracted to the Nazi movement between 1921 and 1923. It was expedient, therefore, to continue to pay lip-service to the idea of a future German alliance with a post-Bolshevik Russia for which Scheubner-Richter and the émigrés were working.
However, it might be thought that Hitler's arrest and imprisonment following the Munich putsch and Scheubner-Richter's death during it had eliminated the prospect of further assistance from the Russian nationalists, thus the need for caution on Hitler's part would have been removed. In fact, during his imprisonment in 1924 and in the first six months of 1925, Hitler remained silent in public about his vision of conquest in Eastern Europe. Perhaps, with the party in a state of collapse, Hitler preferred to cling to faint hopes of renewed émigré support. A more likely explanation was that the anti-Russian concept and its presumed architect, Alfred Rosenberg, were unpopular inside the Nazi party.

It is difficult to assess the extent of the opposition in the party to the anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian line at this time; Ernst Hanfštängl, an influential American recruit, who figured prominently in Hitler's social life, may have been an isolated critic. However, the personal animosity between Alfred Rosenberg and other leading Nazis, jealous of his influence over Hitler, was unmistakeable; Hanfštängl regarded him as a "charlatan" and claimed later that Dietrich Eckart regretted having introduced Rosenberg to the party. When Hitler appointed Rosenberg to lead the party in his absence after November 1923, the resentment towards Rosenberg burst forth. Herman Esser and Julius Stieber accused him of having partly Jewish ancestry and of having spied for France during the war and set about undermining his leadership of the rump of the Nazi Party. Hitler refused to be drawn into this internecine conflict and it is conceivable, therefore, that he was unwilling to endorse publicly a russophobic foreign policy, closely associated with Alfred Rosenberg, because it would compromise his studied impartiality in the party rivalries of 1924. In 1925, after his release from prison and his re-formation of the party under his own leadership, it
would matter far less.

One further consideration deserves mention. Hitler's only public utterances in 1924, which consisted of his speeches at his trial and his article *Warum musste ein 8 November kommen?*, were designed to show that the Munich putsch had been the only rational step for a German patriot. The invasion of the Ruhr conveniently justified rebellion against a German government which preferred passive to active resistance against the French, and also provided evidence of potential English and Italian support.\(^{(13)}\)

Hitler could not produce an equally compelling case for a programme of territorial conquest in the Soviet Union; a diatribe against the Soviet Union based solely on antisemitic and anti-Bolshevik prejudices would scarcely have enhanced his stature as a patriotic politician defending the fatherland.

The absence of a convincing justification for his imperialistic designs may have concerned Hitler all the more because of the opposition which his anti-Russian line would arouse within the party.

By the time he was writing the first volume of *Mein Kampf* in the summer of 1924,\(^{(14)}\) however, he was beginning to find justification for his views by drawing upon the arguments of the geopoliticians. In chapter four of the book he again posed the alternative solutions to pre-war Germany's problem of overpopulation: "either a territorial policy, or a colonial and commercial policy". This time he made his own preference clear by stating unequivocally that:

"...the healthier way would, to be sure, have been the first. The acquisition of new soil for settlement of the excess population possesses an infinite number of advantages, particularly if we turn from the present to the future."
An increase in the area under cultivation would help to preserve a healthy peasant class, and maintain a healthier balance between industry, commerce and agriculture, and thus secure virtual self-sufficiency. In addition, Hitler now argued - again as a result of his perusal of geopolitical literature - that a small European home base was a source of weakness for a power with world-wide colonies, consequently for Germany "the only possibility for carrying out a healthy territorial policy lay in the acquisition of new land in Europe itself." Furthermore, Hitler observed that "the size of the area inhabited by a people constitutes in itself an essential factor for determining its outward security. Greater size meant greater depth of defence and deterrence against frivolous attack." For all these reasons, expansion on the European continent was preferable to the acquisition of colonies. Such land, Hitler felt, could be obtained, by and large, only at the expense of Russia, "and for such a policy there was but one ally in Europe: England." With England to protect her rear from attack, Germany could take on the Russians. Though Hitler did reiterate that the alternative colonial strategy of alliance with Russia against England had been an option for the diplomats in pre-war Germany, the less easy and slower process of colonizing land in Europe would have been his choice since it offered "gradual, yet solid, and continuous growth." In short, it had greater long-term potential.

So it was only with the publication of the first volume of Mein Kampf on 19 July 1925 that the second phase of Hitler's foreign policy - the conquest of more Lebensraum in Eastern Europe with English assistance - was revealed in public for the first time by implication in his analysis of pre-war diplomacy. This strategy had been discussed in party circles at least as early as December 1922 but because of the party's reliance on
support from Russian émigré sources and, later, because of tensions within the party following the Munich putsch and, perhaps, also because of the absence of a rational and pseudo-scientific pretext for Hitler's naked imperialism, Hitler chose not to endorse it publicly before 1925.

If there had been opposition within the Nazi Party before 1925 to the pro-English and anti-Bolshevik line advocated by Hitler and Rosenberg it was certainly either muted or subsumed within clashes of personality. However, the publication of the first volume of Mein Kampf and the diplomatic negotiations throughout the summer of 1925, which culminated in the signature of the Locarno treaties in October 1925, brought previously hidden differences of opinion within party circles to the surface. For if Gustav Stresemann's offer of security treaties, guaranteeing the Western European frontiers laid down by the Versailles Settlement was accepted by the major powers, it was likely to be followed by Germany's entry into the Anglo-French dominated League of Nations. This would clearly lead to a western orientation of German foreign policy. To Gregor Strasser, his brother Otto, and later Joseph Goebbels, this development seemed like an unwarranted reversal of the trend signified by the Treaty of Rapallo with the Soviet Union in 1922.

The emergence of this dissenting group reflected the growth in power and influence and, indeed, the relative independence of Gregor Strasser. Strasser, a pharmacist from Landshut in Bavaria and later Gauleiter of Lower Bavaria, rose to prominence following the Munich putsch. He had organised and commanded the Landshut battalion of the SA, which secured the Wittelsbacher Brücke during the night of 8-9 November, and he had marched his men
back to Landshut and disbanded them successfully on 9 November. On the strength of these exploits, it has been argued, he was elected to the Bavarian Landtag in May 1924 as a member of the Völkischer Block, the parliamentary group representing the then-banned Nazi Party, and soon became its chairman. Membership of the Landtag provided Strasser not only with a political platform but also free rail travel throughout Bavaria, an important asset, which enabled him to keep in regular contact with the scattered local branches of the party. During 1924 he attempted to mediate between the warring factions within the former party, principally between Rosenberg, head of the Grossdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft, the official rump of the party, and Herman Esser and Julius Streicher. With Ludendorff and Albrecht von Graefe, leader of the North German-based conservative and antisemitic Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, Strasser established the Nationalsozialistische Freiheitspartei in an unsuccessful attempt to re-unite the disintegrating movement. In December 1924, Strasser was elected to the Reichstag which gave him a national platform and, of more immediate and practical value, free rail travel nationwide. During the year and a half following Hitler's trial, Strasser was the most prominent spokesman of the Nazi hierarchy even after Hitler's release in December 1924, since Hitler was banned from public speaking in many important Länder for over two years. In October 1925 the VB acknowledged Strasser's tireless devotion to the party, noting that he had addressed thirty meetings in the previous two months and a total of 216 meetings in the nineteen months since March 1924. By October 1925, the re-formed Nazi Party was no longer merely a Bavarian pressure group; it now possessed an embryonic national organization and this was largely Strasser's achievement. Hitler paid tribute to Gregor Strasser's efforts at a conference of party representatives on 19 October 1925; "it was", he
said, "thanks to the activities of Strasser that a wide area of Germany had been opened up for National Socialism." (24)

What emerges from even a brief examination of Gregor Strasser's activities is that he had become an extremely valuable asset to the party and that he enjoyed, by virtue of his membership of the Reichstag and the freedom of movement which it gave him, a degree of independence from the Munich headquarters of the party. However, it is also clear that he was committed to Hitler's leadership and was unlikely to have harboured thoughts of leadership himself. (25) Hitler's attitude towards Strasser suggests that he perceived no challenge to his own authority in the first instance. Indeed, the fact that the party leadership reacted with no great alarm when Strasser began to express opinions at variance with Hitler's and Rosenberg's would tend to confirm this. In fact, Alfred Rosenberg published the articles by Strasser and later Goebbels in the VB, usually with his own counter-arguments appended, and, on one occasion at least, appeared to welcome the debate, commenting that "through argument and counter-argument, the viewpoints will be clarified." (26) Hitler himself did not issue any public refutation of Strasser's views though they were clearly not in line with his own observations in Mein Kampf. But how different were the ideas of the 'Strasser group' and what effect did the emergence of dissenting voices have on the development of Hitler's own ideas? It is to these questions which we must now turn.

It should be stressed at the outset that all the party's leading spokesmen condemned Stresemann's Locarno policy for various reasons. Firstly, it was believed that the security treaties, by tying Germany more closely to
the Western European powers would, as Strasser put it, "complete what the Dawes Plan had introduced, the economic enslavement of Germany and the German working class to Jewish-international capitalism". (27) Secondly, the treaties would confirm the legitimacy of the territorial settlement in Western Europe effected at Versailles, which was, needless to say, totally unacceptable to the Nazis, who would, again in Strasser's words, "never renounce Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen and Malmedy, the Saar and (Germany's) colonies". (28) Thirdly, the Nazis feared that since negotiations were being conducted concurrently with Poland and Czechoslovakia, there was a danger that Germany's acceptance of the western frontiers imposed by the Versailles Settlement would be accompanied or followed by a similar agreement about Germany's eastern frontiers. Thus all hopes of reversing the post-war settlement by negotiation would be crushed. (29)

So Strasser was in agreement with Hitler and the rest of the party over the need to oppose Stresemann's policies and to hold out for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Where Strasser parted company with Hitler was, firstly, in his assessment of some of the major powers and, secondly, in the extent of his ambitions for German foreign policy.

The contrast between Strasser's evaluation of the major powers and Hitler's is most apparent in his appraisal of England. As far as Strasser was concerned, England was one of the "moneyed" capitalist powers who had an interest in shackling Germany; as he put it:

"The profit economy of the moneyed powers, England and America, requires a pacified Europe; this pacified Europe is only to be secured when Germany can be moved to abjure the natural desire for vengeance against France produced by the agony of the Versailles Treaty, and (when she) comes to terms with the politico-military rule of France over Europe...and by giving up all national political desires and enrols in the huge profit business of world finance." (30)
Though Rosenberg had often written in similar vein about Western capitalism, he regarded such policies, when pursued by the English, as mere aberrations, attributable to the distorting influence of the Jewish stock exchange; in May 1925, for example, he wrote that nine-tenths of the policies of "England" (as well as "France" and the "United States") were "determined today by the supra-state powers and in the first instance by international high finance."(31)

Rosenberg and Hitler, armed with this ideological corrective, could still present the English as suitable future allies for a National Socialist Germany, whilst condemning Stresemann's current collaboration with the English. Strasser, it seems, had no time for such sophistry; for him, England remained one of the capitalist powers, and a 'Western orientation' of German foreign policy was ruled out.

Furthermore, Strasser did not share Hitler's predilection and respect for the British Empire and certainly did not regard its interests as compatible with Germany's. "English imperialism", he wrote in an article entitled Russland und wir in October 1925, "is not only indifferent to us - it is our enemy, which will always deny us every opportunity for activity around the world."(32) Significantly, in his reply to this article, Rosenberg made no criticism of this comment on British imperialism.(33) The explanation is simple; Rosenberg and Hitler agreed that the English would oppose Germany's overseas ambitions but, unlike Strasser, they were prepared to sacrifice (at least for the foreseeable future) those aspirations for the sake of English friendship.

Essentially, the difference between Strasser and Hitler and Rosenberg arose from the greater emphasis placed by Strasser on the socialistic elements in National Socialism. The radicalism of the Strasser group has, undoubtedly, been exaggerated, in particular by Otto Strasser, in retrospective
apologia; in fact, whilst Gregor Strasser campaigned for the abolition of large landholdings, the socialization of large corporations and the nationalization of parts of German industry, he also supported the "maintenance of private enterprise" and "regard for the rights of property". (34) Yet, though more anti-capitalist than genuinely socialist, his 'radicalism' nevertheless coloured his outlook on foreign affairs. In his view, the postwar world was characterized by a "vertical division" between "victor and vanquished, oppressor and oppressed, exploiter and exploited" and since all the "oppressed nations" (he included India, Persia, Morocco and China as well as Germany in this category) had the same aim - the overthrow of the status quo created by the peace settlement - they should form a League of Oppressed Nations to confront the League of Nations and the capitalist world. (35) Perhaps predictably, Strasser regarded Germany as "the natural champion and ally" of the exploited in their struggle against "French despotism, English imperialism and American financial exploitation". As he put in in July 1925:

"Germany, not Russia who uses such movements only for selfish purposes, Germany which has the same suffering, the same hopes, the same struggles and the same will to victory - this Germany is the natural leader of the League of Oppressed Nations." (36) The concept of such a League may have been a pure abstraction - and it is noticeable that Strasser did not present any concrete proposals for making the union a reality - nevertheless, it clearly reflected a profound distrust of the Western capitalist powers. This outlook explains not only his hostility to both Stresemann's 'Western orientation' of German foreign policy but also to Hitler's projected Anglo-German alliance.

As if this were not a serious enough departure from the party line, Strasser
also believed that the best guarantee of Germany's future lay in collaboration with a non-capitalist Russia. However, he claimed to support an entente with Russia "not out of love for Russia, least of all out of love for Soviet Russia, but solely in the interests of winning back German freedom". (37) Furthermore, in Russland und Wir, he explicitly rejected "international Russian communism" and "Marxist international socialism" because they could not secure "the foreign policy freedom of Germany or the economic emancipation of the German workers". (38) The securing of these freedoms, Strasser maintained, "determines our attitude to all foreign policy problems, to all forces and constellations on the political stage", and, since the Versailles Settlement was the greatest single obstacle to the realization of this goal, every power which opposed the settlement was Germany's natural ally. On these grounds, he concluded, Russia, even Bolshevik Russia, could be a fellow-traveller of the Germans - provided that she refrained from interference in Germany's domestic affairs. (39)

No matter how Strasser might qualify his support for an alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union, (40) it was impossible to disguise the fact that his views flatly contradicted those of Hitler and Rosenberg. It was precisely the danger of Soviet meddling in German affairs that eliminated Soviet Russia from their alliance considerations. Collaboration with the Soviets might be conceivable, Rosenberg admitted, for a strong National Socialist Germany but the Soviets would not be interested in it because the spreading of Soviet propaganda - the real purpose of such collusion from the Soviet standpoint - would be cut of the question because Marxism would already have been eradicated in a National Socialist Germany. (41)

To counter such views, Strasser and his friends stressed that the Soviets no longer wanted to export socialism; nationalism, not internationalism, was
now pervading the rank and file of the Bolshevik movement. The Soviet system survived, in Goebbels's view, not because it is Bolshevik, Marxist or internationalist, but "because it is nationalist, because it is Russian". (42) Goebbels even went as far as to suggest that there was an awakening "National Socialism" in Russia. (43) These 'National Bolshevik' ruminations must have had a familiar ring in Hitler's ears; he had clashed in 1922 with Moeller van den Bruck over the latter's prediction that Russian nationalism would eventually supersede the internationalism of Bolshevism, and there can be little doubt that the ideas of the Strasser group owed a great deal to Moeller's inspiration. (44)

The significance of the challenge posed by the Strasser group's observations should not be underestimated. The concept of 'National Bolshevism' threatened to undermine the entire antisemitic and anti-Bolshevik ideology, pieced together principally by Alfred Rosenberg, by questioning one of its initial premises, namely, that Bolshevism was "by its very nature anti-national". (45) Goebbels touched a very sensitive nerve when he suggested on one occasion that "the Jewish question, that is Bolshevism, is more complicated than one imagines. It is, by no means, certain that the capitalist and the Bolshevik Jew are one and the same thing. Perhaps in the last resort (Endeffekt) but never in actual practice." (46) No doubt aware that he was on dangerous ground, Goebbels avoided questioning the belief that Jewish capitalism and Jewish Bolshevism were two inter-related weapons in the Jewish conspiracy to take over the world but merely asserted that, at the present time, nationalist forces were far stronger in Russia than the internationalist or "mercantile interests" of the Jews. (47) Rosenberg, replying to Goebbels's article in the VB, admitted that there had been differences of opinion between the Moscow, New York and London Jews, but insisted that "Russia's" policy remained "Jewish"; to talk of
"National-Bolshevism" was a "nonsense" because Bolshevism combined Jewish Marxism and a "Russian nihilism" derived from the inter-mixture of Nordic Russian with Tartar and Mongol blood. (48) Bolshevism, therefore, remained essentially alien to Russia, and, even if the Soviet government did pursue a nationalistic and Pan-Slavic foreign policy, it was still in the hands of the Jews. This tortuous reply revealed the vulnerability of Rosenberg's central tenet when exposed to the thrust of the Strasser group's argument.

So the Strasser group favoured a Russian alliance in order to destroy the shackles of the Versailles Settlement and to free Germany from her enslavement to the capitalist West. Though Gregor Strasser reminded his readers that this policy was "a temporary one and negative in terms of its objective", (49) the fact remains that Strasser's assessment of England and Russia quite clearly contradicted the ideological creed of Alfred Rosenberg and the alliance strategy tentatively put forward by Hitler in the first volume of Mein Kampf.

The objective of Hitler's strategy was to acquire living-space in Eastern Europe, thus reviving Germany's Ostpolitik of 1918 and destroying Russia at the same time. But what were the goals of the Strasser group in foreign affairs apart from restoration of Germany's freedom of manoeuvre? They were, perhaps, most succinctly formulated in the programme produced for the Arbeitsgemeinschaft of North and West German Gauleiters of the NSDAP between December 1925 and January 1926, which eventually provoked Hitler to move against the dissenting group. The programme seems to have been the product of compromises; significantly the concept of Ostorientierung was soft-pedalled, and the programme also reflected the views of the group rather than
one individual; Goebbels certainly revised Gregor Strasser's original draft. (50) Four foreign policy objectives were set out in the programme.

The first objective was the restoration of "the frontiers of 1914, including colonies, and the unification of all the Germans of Central Europe in a Greater German Empire (including Austria, Sudetenland, South Tyrol)." (51)

As has been seen, Strasser objected to the Locarno treaties because they were based on acceptance of Germany's losses in Western Europe, and he feared an 'eastern Locarno', which would entail "the renunciation of Danzig and Memel, the renunciation of the recovery of the Corridor, of Posen and Gnesen and Thorn, that is the recognition of the theft of Upper Silesia". (52)

Strasser was prepared to contemplate forcible revision of Germany's eastern frontiers, since he considered the prospect of peaceful revision, under the auspices of the League of Nations to be "utopian" and that of alterations in the frontiers of Poland by voluntary agreement to be a "fantasy". (53) In addition, he believed that France had undertaken at Locarno to defend the frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia. (54)

The group's first goal was attainable, therefore, only by forcible means and, in Gregor Strasser's view, that meant conflict, first and foremost, with Poland; as he declared bluntly:

"Our eastern enemy is Poland, not Russia on whom we do not even border." (55)

Hitler and Rosenberg were unlikely to quibble with the idea of a confrontation with Poland; Hitler's Ostpolitik almost certainly envisaged the elimination of Poland and this, perhaps, had always been Rosenberg's highest priority. Rosenberg even conceded that a temporary Russo-German alliance against Poland might be necessary, although he insisted that only a National Socialist Germany would make "pacts - albeit temporarily -
with the Devil". Nevertheless, while the *grosseutsch* aspirations of the 'Strasser programme' were largely compatible with the 'Munich line' on foreign affairs (the return of the South Tyrol excepted), on their own they would be insufficient to satisfy Hitler's appetite.

The second goal of the North German Nazi programme was "the establishment of a customs union with Switzerland, Hungary, Denmark, Holland and Luxemburg". This was clearly linked to the programme's third goal, the creation of a 'United States of Europe', described in the programme as:

"A European league of nations with uniform measurement and coinage systems. Enlargement by tariff union with France and the other European states, otherwise complete reciprocal preference."

The idea of a 'United States of Europe' was reminiscent of Richard Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi's *Pan-Europa* scheme, which had already been pilloried in the Nazi press as racially destructive and Jewish-inspired. Though never explained fully, the Strasser conception appears, however, to have differed in, at least, two important respects from *Pan-Europa* and indeed to have owed more to Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa*. Firstly, as we have seen, a precondition of Strasser's scheme was the restoration of the frontiers of 1914 whereas Coudenhove-Kalergi's *Pan-Europa* was to be based on the postwar territorial settlement. Secondly, Gregor Strasser insisted on Germany being the dominant force in the United States of Europe; the programme called for "the organic arrangement and the powerful racial concentration of the German nation in a Greater German Reich"; this new Reich was to be "the centre of gravity for a Central European customs union and a dominant force (Schwerpunkt) in the United States of Europe". Or, as he put it less ambiguously elsewhere:
"Central Europe under German leadership....From Memel to Strasbourg, from Hamburg to Vienna - the German Central Europe as heart and head, as supreme power and backbone of Europe." (63)

It is unclear whether Strasser envisaged unashamed German hegemony in Europe or merely a federated Europe with Germany as primus inter pares, but even this second, less ambitious, design clearly differed from that of Coudenhove-Kalergi's. (64)

Otto Strasser, perhaps the author of this concept, revealed the raison d'être of a united Europe, as being:

"to achieve that political and economic consolidation, which alone enables it (Europe) to sustain itself economically against the great economic powers, such as the United States of America, the British Empire, Russia with Siberia, Japan with China and Mongolia, and which alone enables it to endure in face of the great political problems of the next century: defence of the white race against the rejuvenated Asia, (and) the awakening Africa." (65)

This concept did not, of course, meet with the approval of Hitler and his Munich clique. Indeed it was criticized sharply from within the ranks of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft when it met on 26 January 1926 in Hanover to discuss the draft programme. (66) However, whether it visualized outright German hegemony or not, it certainly aimed at restoring Germany's pre-eminence in Europe and, therefore, avoided the internationalism which damned Coudenhove-Kalergi's conception in Nazi ideas. Furthermore, Rosenberg conceded on one occasion that he could conceive of a united Europe, provided that it was united under the banner of National Socialism and organised in defence against the yellow and black races. (67) So whilst the Strasser group's vision of a united Europe was not shared by the rest of the Nazi Party, it did, at least, have the virtues of a nationalistic inspiration and a racial rationale.
The final foreign policy goal specified in the Strasser programme was the creation of "a central African colonial empire (former German colonies, the Congo state, Portuguese colonies, in part French colonies)". This raises further doubts about the supposedly radical and socialistic nature of the group's outlook, and also about Otto Strasser's later claim that "we had no territorial demands". In July 1925 Gregor Strasser had described colonies as "a vital interest for a politically self-sufficient, independent Germany". In the same month, Otto Strasser wrote approvingly about Russian support for those nations suffering at the hands of Anglo-French imperialism but added that, whilst Germany should be sympathetic to those oppressed nations who were, after all, "the enemies of our enemies", "economic and political pressures" prevented Germany from taking over Russia's role. So it would appear that the Strasser brothers supported colonialism in the pursuit of autarky and would even consider a German seizure of Belgian, Portuguese and French colonies in Central Africa.

What is clear from this analysis of the outlook and goals of the Strasser circle in foreign policy is that the group was not as radical and socialistic as was once believed. Its approach to foreign policy was not as selfless and lacking in national chauvinism or imperialistic designs, as Otto Strasser would have posterity believe. However, its commitment to overseas empire and a federated Europe under German leadership, as well as to an albeit temporary alignment with Soviet Russia against the Western powers did amount to a serious alternative programme to that briefly sketched by Hitler in the first volume of Mein Kampf.
The relationship between the Strasser circle and Hitler and his Munich acolytes is a fascinating example of factional opposition in a party, otherwise seemingly characterised by authoritarian control and rigid ideological conformity. Not surprisingly, some historians have suggested that what was at issue was not differing opinions, so much as "the principle of absolute leadership". In other words, Hitler was more concerned that party members were loyal to his leadership than that they conform absolutely to his ideas. Hence, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft of the North and West German Gauleiters and its journal, the Nationalsozialistische Briefe, could receive Hitler's "express approval" despite the views which they expounded. It was only when the Strasser group produced an alternative to the party programme of 1920 and directly challenged Hitler's status as the party's chief Programmatiker that he was stung into action and summoned the dissenters to a meeting in Bamberg on 14 February 1926 and forced them to withdraw their draft programme. That Hitler did not discuss the alternative programme seems to lend weight to the view that he was disturbed not so much by its contents as its very existence. It may well be accurate to argue that the mere formulation of an alternative programme was sufficient to draw Hitler into a confrontation with the Strasser circle; nevertheless it is misleading to imply that Hitler was relatively unconcerned about the views as expressed by the group in speeches and articles. Other evidence points to a quite different interpretation.

Firstly, the foreign policy section in the second volume of Mein Kampf, written by Hitler's own admission in August 1925, reveals his awareness of opposition within the party's ranks to his proposed alliance policy and his attempts to defend himself against criticism. He admitted, for example, that "even for us, of course, it is hard to represent England as a possible
future ally in the ranks of our movement". This difficulty he attributed to agitation about the loss of Germany's colonies and the destruction of German seapower by the British, which prevented the Germans from recognising that "what we have to fight for today is not 'sea power' etc." (77) Germany needed to re-establish her position on the European continent first and, for that, English support was vital. Hitler also tried to discredit the Strasser group's strategy of supporting "oppressed nations" against the British; as he commented:

"It just so happens to be impossible to overwhelm with a coalition of cripples a powerful state that is determined to stake, if necessary, its last drop of blood for its existence. As a folkish man, who appraises the value of men on a racial basis, I am prevented by mere knowledge of the racial inferiority of these so-called 'oppressed nations' from linking the destiny of my people with theirs."

The idea was not simply unrealistic; it was also "catastrophic" because it distracted the German people "again and again from the practical possibilities, making them devote themselves to imaginative, yet fruitless, hopes and illusions." (78)

Turning to the Russian question which he felt to be "the touchstone for the political capacity of the young National Socialist movements to think clearly and to act correctly", (79) Hitler restated his case for the conquest of more Lebensraum at Russian expense, but again admitted that "not only in German-National but even in folkish circles, the idea of such an Eastern policy is violently attacked." (80) In all probability, this was another reference to the Strasser circle. When Hitler criticised the restoration of the frontiers of 1914 as a suitable goal for German foreign policy, he was again attacking views expressed "even in so-called folkish
circles" - that is by the Strasser group. The restoration of Germany's pre-war frontiers was insufficient justification for a further letting of German blood. Only a policy which aimed "to secure for the German people the land and soil to which they are entitled on this earth" - that is the conquest of more Lebensraum - would justify that. (81) Hitler also considered the proposal put forward by the Strasser group, of a Russo-German alliance against the West but found it wanting in several respects. Firstly, it would mean that the ensuing war would be fought on German soil; secondly, Russia would have to subdue Poland before she could render assistance to Germany; Germany, in other words, would have to fight the war almost single-handedly; and finally, there was the unreliability of the Bolshevik leadership and the risk that such an alliance would spread the debilitating influence of Bolshevism inside Germany. (82)

In short, therefore, it appears as if Hitler wrote the foreign policy section in chapters thirteen and fourteen of the second volume of Mein Kampf, in part at least, to refute the arguments originating, mainly but not exclusively, from the Strasser faction. That he wrote, at least, the chapter on Germany's postwar alliance policy in August 1925 - months before the draft programme was formulated - is unmistakeable evidence that Hitler was perturbed by the dissenting views of the North German group even before they openly challenged his authority by drawing up an alternative party programme.

A second piece of evidence to be borne in mind when assessing Hitler's reaction to the emergence of dissenting voices in the party is the content of his speech at Bamberg on 14 February 1926. The speech was devoted to three issues: the defence of his alliance strategy; the question of whether the land of the German princes, confiscated in 1918 should be returned to
then or expropriated; and, finally, the inadvisability of public discussion of religious issues by National Socialists. Hitler was concerned primarily to reiterate his own views on Germany's alliance strategy and to discredit the Eastern orientation propagated by the Strasser group in the Nazi press but omitted from the draft programme. This, once more, seems to suggest that he was worried as much by the general outlook of the group as by the content of their programme. Gottfried Feder, who attended the meeting of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft on 26 January which discussed the Strasser programme, shared this concern; he wrote later of his "increasing astonishment" at the outspokenly pro-Russian and pro-Soviet line in the Nationalsozialistische Briefe and said of Joseph Goebbels that "even a communist agitator could speak no differently".

In discussing the question of the expropriation of the princes, Hitler overruled the resolution of the North German group on the 26th January which favoured expropriation, arguing that the princes "should have nothing that they do not own, and lose nothing that they do own". This second rebuke probably reflects Hitler's growing fear that the socialistic stance of the North German faction and in particular its hostility to the sanctity of property, could well jeopardise the support already enjoyed by the party in conservative circles as well as his hopes of attracting support in business quarters in the future. Hitler was also determined to avoid getting the party embroiled in religious controversy, which, he argued, would "undermine its political effectiveness". These comments may have been directed at the anti-clerical propaganda which his former ally, Ludendorff, had drummed up after 1924, though they are more likely to have been directed against Alfred Rosenberg. What linked all three elements in Hitler's speech together was his disquiet over the ideas being expressed within the party. And his speech represented, as the VB's report emphasized, "directives on the position which National Socialism takes on the most important issues of the day". So, whilst
Hitler might well have been stirred into action by the appearance of the draft party programme, his anxiety was more general in nature.

This interpretation is confirmed by a third piece of evidence: Hitler's decision in February 1926 to publish a pamphlet, Die Südtiroler Frage und das deutsche Bündnisproblem. This later became chapter thirteen of the second volume of Mein Kampf and was probably composed in August 1925.

It is true that the South Tyrol problem was again in the news following the Bavarian Minister-President Held's public condemnation in January 1926 of Italy's oppressive measures in the province and talk of a possible retaliatory economic boycott against Italy. However, there can be little doubt that the decision to publish it at this time was affected by the controversy within the party. The Strasser group had, of course, called for the return of the South Tyrol as part of a Großdeutschland, but the pamphlet had a purpose other than simply the refutation of this anti-Italian stance of the North German Nazis and of those in German nationalist circles. It was intended to re-establish Hitler's reputation as the party's leading spokesman on foreign affairs:

"Mussolini has spoken! Stresemann has also spoken. The League of Nations is in confusion!" (89)

So ran the advertisement of the pamphlet in the VB clearly implying that where other statesmen had tried and failed, Hitler had the solution to the thorny problem of the South Tyrol.

These arguments are not intended to cast doubt on Goebbels's allegation that Hitler was enraged by the formulation of a new party programme. But the foreign policy sections of the second volume of Mein Kampf, his
speech at Bamberg, and the publication of his pamphlet taken together do suggest that Hitler was already very disturbed at the opinions being voiced at meetings and in the Nazi press. The publication of an alternative party programme simply brought matters to a head and Hitler determined to lay down an official party line on current issues. Once this had been done and the draft programme had been officially rejected and withdrawn, Hitler did not force the party to speak with one voice. To have done so might have forced Gregor Strasser and Joseph Goebbels to leave the party which was clearly not in its best interests; the organisation of the party in North and West Germany was the most, and perhaps the only, encouraging development in the gloomy year following the party's reformation in February 1925. So Hitler tried instead to heal the wounds of the conflict by wooing Strasser and Goebbels over to his side in long discussions and by invitations to Munich. This strategy produced dividends with Goebbels, who was soon doubting - if one believes the entries in his diaries - his previous convictions about Russia; the 'National Bolshevik' line disappeared from his speeches and articles and in March 1926, apparently impressed by Hitler's "amazingly lucid" pamphlet on the South Tyrol, Goebbels wrote an article advocating the sacrifice of the Germans in the area to the needs of an Italian-German alliance.

Gregor Strasser proved less willing to compromise his ideals. When the Treaty of Berlin was signed by Russia and Germany in April 1926, for example, Strasser admitted that he "more than any other circles in the party had emphasised the need for Germany to look eastwards". On occasion, he was to express his fears about the alliance strategy favoured by Hitler; it was a mistake, he insisted in November 1926, "to keep Russia in a state of impotence, for Russia sits on the flank of Poland and our eastern
enemy is Poland not Russia". Following what he described as a "geo-political" maxim of "always choosing one's friends so that they sit on the flanks of the next enemy", Strasser added that he could approve of a German alliance with Italy because Italy was situated on the French flank and though he admitted that "geo-politically, this also applied to England", he added that "here limitations of another kind come into play". (94)

Strasser's cause was further bolstered by Count Ernst Reventlow, who joined the NSDAP in February 1927 and proved to be another vocal and influential critic of British foreign policy. (95) Thus Gregor Strasser adhered to his vision of a Grossdeutschland based on Central Europe as the most sensible goal of the future Nazi foreign policy, whilst his brother, Otto, continued to expound the notion of Mitteleuropa with Germany as "the leader of Europe, not the ruler", rejecting a Pan-European solution in favour of an exclusively German one. (96)

Despite these displays of heterodoxy, Gregor Strasser continued to control the party's propaganda department until January 1928 when he was given control of the organisation department, which he retained until 1932; Reventlow became the party's leading spokesman on foreign affairs in the Reichstag and was invited to speak on the subject at the party rally in 1927. (97) Both were invited regularly to speak in Bavaria. In all probability they refrained on these occasions from overt criticism of Hitler's foreign policy programme. Rosenberg certainly sought to avoid "unpleasant debates" by refusing to publish a number of articles written by Gregor Strasser. (98) Nevertheless their continued defiance of the party's guidelines was well-known to observers inside the party and outside. (99) That Hitler was prepared to tolerate and even to promote members of this dissenting group, who were joined in 1927 by Hermann Goering, was probably due to three
considerations: firstly, Hitler considered these men to be useful in attracting support to the movement; secondly, he recognised that their views, though heterodox, were basically moderate and inspired by the spirit of German nationalism and did not explicitly contradict the movement's ideological tenets; and finally, and most surprisingly, Hitler was relatively indifferent after February 1926 to evidence of dissension. It would seem, therefore, that the confrontation at Bamberg occurred primarily because the Nazi leadership had not yet established a coherent outlook, especially in foreign affairs. In 1925 Hitler began to fear that party members and potential supporters would be confused by the conflicting opinions being expressed particularly in the Nazi press. Hitler, therefore, sought in Mein Kampf, in his foreign policy pamphlet and in his speech at Bamberg, to establish the party's official line. Once that was firmly established, dissent was not welcome but could at least be recognised for what it was. One can say, therefore, that it was concern about the Strasser group which probably forced Hitler to include the first serious rationalisation of a future Nazi foreign policy in the second volume of Mein Kampf in August 1925. (100)

Hitler's foreign affairs programme was virtually complete when he finished the second volume of Mein Kampf in 1926. However, he was not satisfied with its elaboration in Mein Kampf, which he admitted later had been "structured on general national socialist insights as a premise"; in the time and space available, it had not been possible to give "a real fundamental proof of the soundness of our national socialist conception of foreign
For this reason he chose to write a second book between May July 1928, but eventually decided not to publish it. Between 1926 and 1928, however, the foreign policy programme had been amplified and its main assertions substantiated. An analysis of these modifications may serve to highlight the hidden assumptions behind Hitler's approach to the foreign powers.

First of all, in relation to Italy, the South Tyrol issue stubbornly refused to remain dormant for long. In February 1928 it was again in the forefront of political debate after the revelation that the Italian language was to be used in religious instruction in the schools of the province. The Austrian chancellor, Ignaz Seipel, had declared that there could be no question of friendly relations between Austria and Italy until the problems of the province had been resolved. Mussolini responded on 4 March by threatening to use force against the Austrians if they continued their agitation in the province.

In his pamphlet on this issue, Hitler had argued that the regaining of lost German territories was less important than the restoration of the political power and independence of the mother country and to the latter goal, "the interest of the lost territories must be ruthlessly subordinated". Since Germany's recovery required Italian collaboration, in his view, the South Tyrol had to be sacrificed. This argument may have impressed Joseph Goebbels but other Nazi writers on foreign affairs - Hitler, Rosenberg and even Hermann Goering in a rare series of articles - strove to give it greater conviction. They were not prepared, of course, to condone Mussolini's oppressive measures in the province, but they questioned why the South Tyrolean Germans should be singled out for special commiseration.
from the millions of oppressed Germans under French, Polish and Czech rule, and also why the South Tyrol should become the determinant of German foreign policy. In his second or Secret Book, Hitler asserted that, since two-thirds of the inhabitants of the province were Italian, if it were to become a German territory, then an even greater injustice would have been done to Italy. This rare concern for justice only serves to emphasise Hitler's commitment to an Italian alliance at any cost.

Judging by the pamphlet on Germany's post-war alliance policy and by Mein Kampf, the case for Italo-German collaboration rested on two assertions: the continuation of the rivalry between Italy and France, and the alleged compatibility between Italian and German ambitions. As evidence for the first, Hitler referred briefly in Mein Kampf to Franco-Italian competition in the Adriatic; in his speech at Bamberg on 14 February 1926 he also noted Italo-Franco tensions over the Riviera. These rivalries were more fully documented by Alfred Rosenberg in articles in the VB and later in his book Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik; in this book, published in the autumn of 1927, Rosenberg pinpointed the causes of the troubles on the Riviera as the frenchification of 500,000 Italian immigrants in the Tolouse-Nice area as well as the changes in statehood experienced by this area and by Corsica in previous centuries. He also stressed Franco-Italian rivalry in North Africa. Rosenberg also traced the evolution of France's relations with the 'Little Entente' in the VB and felt that Franco-Yugoslav cooperation was particularly menacing for Italy given her Adriatic ambitions. Significantly this point was reiterated by Hitler in his Secret Book.

On the other hand, Italian interests were not seen as conflicting with those
of Germany, "not in the most essential points, at least", as Hitler put it. He failed to elaborate further on this point in Mein Kampf but in the years following he and Alfred Rosenberg seemed readily to appreciate that Italy, like Germany, was over-populated and needed to expand her living space. However, since the land available to the two countries lay in different directions: "Italy to the south, widening to the south-west and the south-east, Germany to the east and north-east", as Rosenberg phrased it, then Germany and Italy need not become rivals. "The east coasts of the Baltic Sea are for Germany what the Mediterranean Sea is for Italy"; this was how Hitler summed up the position in his Secret Book. Hitler and Rosenberg also seemed to have examined the strategic realities of the Italian position in more depth. In a speech on 30 March 1927, Hitler explained that because of her exposed coastline, Italy could never afford to take on the British in view of the latter's naval strength whilst Rosenberg later cautioned the Italians against risking conflict with the British by expanding eastwards along the North African coast towards Egypt because of Britain's naval strongholds in the Mediterranean and because of the superiority of her fleet. Hitler concluded in the Secret Book that Italy had, of necessity, to be inclined to collaborate with the English; this, and not her unreliability as an ally, explained her withdrawal from the Triple Alliance when Austro-Hungarian policy provoked conflict with Britain in 1914.

Mussolini's opposition to the Anschluss with Austria was the only real bone of contention and, whilst Hitler thought Mussolini should recognise the advantage of having a smaller Austria on the Italian frontier, Rosenberg could appreciate Mussolini's resistance to the scheme as long as a pro-French government was in power in Berlin; but a folkish government might
make the prospect more appealing. (116) Both Hitler and Rosenberg seemed to have been curiously blind to the fact that Italy might well be apprehensive about exchanging Austria for Germany as her northern neighbour. Hitler's support for an Italian alliance, which in the Secret Book he repeatedly insisted dated from 1920, seems to have been based primarily on Italy's dissatisfaction with the territorial settlement of 1919/1920 and her consequent hostility towards France, its main defender. (117) This together with the rise of Mussolini convinced Hitler that he should overlook Italy's oppressive policy in the South Tyrol and her opposition to the German-Austrian Anschluss.

Secondly, as far as France was concerned, the "spirit of Locarno" sparked off considerable discussion in some right-wing circles in Germany about the possibility of Franco-German collaboration. Arnold Rechberg, a sculptor and member of a wealthy family of industrialists, who had long been a passionate advocate of a Franco-German understanding, was profoundly disappointed with the Locarno treaties. He urged the signing of an economic treaty between the two countries, to be followed by a military alliance provided France agreed to a rapid withdrawal from the occupied territories and to the revision of Germany's eastern frontier. (118) These ideas were adopted by the Jungdeutscher Orden under the leadership of Arthur Mahraun as its foreign policy programme. (119) This programme, perhaps because of its revisionist as well as anti-Bolshevik and anti-parliamentarian platform, soon came to the attention of the Nazi Party. It was discussed at a meeting of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft of North and West German gauleiters on 22 November 1925. Later Gregor Strasser published an article criticising the scheme on the grounds that France (along with Britain) had a "vital interest in keeping Germany politically and economically weak". (120)
The signing of an international steel agreement by Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg on 26 September 1926 and of a Franco-German commercial treaty a week later naturally revived interest in the idea of Franco-German cooperation and also in the Jungdeutscher Orden's programme. In November 1926 Rosenberg published a series of articles, which were later published in a pamphlet Nationalsozialismus und Jungdeutscher Orden. Eine Abrechnung mit Arthur Mahraun, and in which he listed the reasons why Franco-German collaboration was out of the question. (121) Firstly, the French were "a nation in racial decay" because of the onset of democratic ideals since the French Revolution and because of "mulattoization" of her population caused by immigration from her African Empire. Secondly, the French, despite Mahraun's optimism, had not abandoned their "thousand year ambition" of securing the Rhine as a frontier; because of her "immutable geographical position", bounded to the north and west by the Atlantic Ocean and to the south by the mountains of Spain, France could only ever expand eastwards in Rosenberg's view. Thirdly, there was no possibility that France would accept German military equality as a basis for an agreement; France's preoccupation with security, as illustrated by her alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia, excluded this possibility. The most serious fault which Rosenberg identified in Mahraun's proposals, was the absence of any provision to deal with the problem of Germany's over-population; in fact, with the French as an ally, a solution to that problem was impossible because a Franco-German agreement would alienate the British and thus rule out the acquisition of overseas colonies on the one hand, whilst, on the other, expansion eastwards was "feasible only after a confrontation with the Poles and Czechs", who were, of course, allies of France. Rosenberg concluded, therefore, that it was not the duty of a German foreign minister to draw up an agreement with the French but rather "to strengthen the prevailing French 'angoisse' by all diplomatic means, by stirring up Spanish-French,
Italian-French and British-French tension". (122)

The Nazis evidently were more impressed by French construction of an alliance system in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe than by the "spirit of Locarno". France's alliances with Poland (1921) and Czechoslovakia (1924) and later with Rumania (1926) and Yugoslavia (1927) served to reinforce Nazi fears of French opposition to any revival of German power and even prompted them to consider other potential allies. In September 1926, in another article on Arthur Mahraun, Rosenberg included Spain (along with England and Italy) as one of the powers interested in "hindering the growth of French power"; the following month he observed that Germany would prefer Spanish rather than French control of Morocco. (123) Soon Hitler, too, was talking about a possible alliance between Germany, England, Italy and Spain "to encircle France". (124) The same criterion of making allies of France's enemies also brought Hungary into the reckoning; the 'Little Entente' of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania had originally been formed to resist Hungarian revisionism; now French support for the 'Little Entente' powers drove the Hungarians into the welcoming embrace of Benito Mussolini, who initialled a ten-year treaty of friendship with the Hungarians in April 1927. The Nazis welcomed this development and reiterated their call for Germany to join the emerging anti-French coalition. Hitler put it quite succinctly in his Secret Book:

"that already today probably Spain and Hungary are also to be reckoned as belonging to this (anti-French) community of interests, even if only tacitly, lies grounded in Spain's aversion to French colonial activity in North Africa as well as in Hungary's hostility to Yugoslavia, which is at the same time supported by France." (125)

Though Spain and Hungary can, at best, be described as potential junior partners in Hitler's projected alliance system, their inclusion does show
that, on some occasions at least, Hitler's selection of allies against France was determined primarily by considerations of power politics unaffected by racial prejudice or personal predilection. The incident also seems to confirm Alfred Rosenberg's continuing influence on the development of Nazi policy; as editor of the VB which obliged him to comment every day on current events, he was ideally placed to help the shape of Nazi attitudes on foreign affairs.

Thirdly, Nazi attitudes towards England underwent some modification between 1926 and 1928. The case for an Anglo-German alliance was, perhaps, the weakest part of Hitler's programme. In the second volume of Mein Kampf, Hitler asserted that England had opposed and still opposed the French bid for hegemony in Europe and, as a result, would be amenable to a revival of German power to counter this threat. He also asserted that England would allow Germany to dominate the European continent provided that the latter renounced her ambitions to be a world-wide colonial and commercial power. As proof of the first assertion, Hitler had been able to point in Mein Kampf to British opposition to the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr; for the second assertion, Hitler had offered no proof whatsoever; on the face of it, one could be forgiven for wondering whether an England, which was fighting against French hegemony in Europe, might not do the same to prevent German hegemony. Not surprisingly, therefore, Hitler and Rosenberg looked around for further evidence to substantiate these two claims because, without it, the case for collaboration with Russia against Western European powers might seem more attractive and tangible.

The evidence of alleged British interest in a German revival uncovered by
Hitler and Rosenberg arose out of what they saw as the growing threat to the security of the British Empire and the British mainland and Britain's relative impotence to deal with it. In a five-part series called *Englands Schicksalsstunden* published in the VB in June 1927 and later reproduced as part of the *Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik*, Rosenberg catalogued Britain's difficulties. (127) First and foremost, Rosenberg assured his readers, England was on the verge of war with the Soviet Union following the deterioration of relations over the Zinoviev letter, Russian meddling in various parts of the empire - particularly in India - and Russian support for the anti-imperialist movement in China, developments which culminated in the breaking-off of diplomatic relations in 1927. Britain, therefore, needed allies. Furthermore, Rosenberg recognised signs that British foreign policy was now beginning to reflect real British interests as opposed to those of the Jewish stock exchange; since the return to power of the conservative government in 1924, a trend away from the internationalist ideas associated with the League of Nations and towards English imperialism was discernible. A new difficulty faced by the British was presented by "the politics of oil"; the British pursuit of oil supplies brought her into conflict with the interests of the American oil industry all over the world and was also another source of friction between the British diplomats and the "Jewish" City. What was even worse, England, for financial reasons, had had to abandon the "two-fleet standard" and allow naval parity with the United States, to whom she was also heavily indebted. Rosenberg concluded in *Zukunftsweg* that, looked at realistically, Britain was not in a position on her own to mount a military campaign against the Soviet Union; she would have to rely on either "anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia itself, be they nationalistic Greater Russians or peoples with separatist inclinations", or on the Baltic nations in order to defeat the Moscow regime. (128) But
even then, as Rosenberg had written earlier, success was not assured; England needed German support for such a venture and this would require "a change of the policies heretofore of both sides: a rejection on the part of England as well as Germany of all ties with France." (129)

Hitler had already noted in Mein Kampf the vulnerability of the British Isles to air attacks from France and of her shipping lanes to a submarine campaign orchestrated by the French in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. In his Secret Book, he repeated these observations referring also to the abandonment of the two-power standard and concluding that at that time France was "the state that is most dangerous to England". Hitler also acknowledged the Russian threat to India and Russia's possession of oil resources "which today have the same importance as once possessed by iron and coal mines in past centuries". (130) Hitler devoted less time than Alfred Rosenberg to "ideological" evidence of Britain's growing need of German support; his reference to the "decisive influence which world Jewry also possesses in England" in the penultimate paragraph of his chapter on England in his Secret Book looks like an afterthought; (131) nevertheless, towards the end of the book he clearly thought it worthwhile to include the comment that:

"If the Jew were to triumph in England, British interests would recede into the background....On the other hand, if the Briton triumphs then a shift of England's attitude vis a vis Germany can still take place." (132)

Rosenberg, predictably, placed Anglo-German relations in a more apocalyptic, racial perspective. The threat to the British Empire from national self-determination was only part of a more widespread challenge from the "coloured nations" to white Nordic supremacy. There was only one solution in his view; England had to "undertake, along with Germany, the protection of
the white race: England on the sea, Germany on the continent". (136) In Rosenberg's scenario, England was to protect the white race in Africa, India and Australia; North America to protect it on the American continent; and Germany - in alliance with Italy who was to control the Adriatic - was to isolate France and defeat her attempt to lead black Africa against a white Europe. (134) Thus racial considerations were also driving England and Germany together.

Hitler did not resort to racial theories to illustrate this argument; in fact, in the Secret Book, he was more concerned to prove his second assertion that England would allow Germany to dominate Europe, provided the latter abandoned her hopes of becoming a major commercial and colonial power.

It looks as if someone had pointed out the contradiction in his alliance strategy, for at one point he remarked that:

"There is a very erroneous and widespread notion, especially in Germany, according to which England would immediately fight against any European hegemony. As a matter of fact this is not correct. England actually concerns herself very little with the European conditions as long as no threatening world competitor arose from them, so that she always viewed the threat as lying in a development which must one day cut across her dominion over the seas and the colonies." (135)

He pointed out that England had fought Spain, Holland and later Napoleonic France only because they were, or aspired to be, overseas powers.

Furthermore, England's friendly relations with Prussia in the eighteenth century, he felt, proved that she did not automatically oppose the pre-eminence of a military power in Europe, as long as "the foreign policy aims of this power are manifestly of a purely continental character". Once Germany began to build a fleet and to conquer overseas territories, the English attitude altered dramatically and the result
was the First World War. (136) This rather strained argument did not convince all the doubters. (137) What it all suggests is that Hitler was trying to rationalize, in retrospect, a concept of Anglo-German friendship, based partly on personal predilection, partly on a misreading of British history, and perhaps even partly on a prior decision taken about Russia.

Fourthly, as regards Russia, Hitler had still some way to go before all opposition to his new policy was overcome. Whether his hostility was inspired primarily by the belief that her Bolshevik government was controlled by the Jews or by the conviction that Germany needed to annex Russian territory may still be uncertain. But what is certain is that both premises had been questioned by the Strasser circle, which believed that nationalist sentiment was gradually weakening Jewish influence over the Bolshevik government, and which, in any case, favoured a more limited revisionist and Grossdeutsch solution to Germany's territorial problems. On both counts, Russia appeared a feasible ally for Germany against the capitalist West. Not surprisingly, therefore, after 1926 the Nazi leadership sought to discredit this pro-Russian stance and the limited territorial conception which accompanied it.

In the Secret Book, Hitler discussed the possibility of a German-Russian understanding but repeated that it would be folly "as long as a regime rules in Russia, which is permeated by one aim: to extend into Germany the Bolshevik poison". (138) He devoted more time to showing how "incomprehensible" it was to consider waging a war against the capitalist West in alliance with this Russia; "present-day Russia", he argued, "is anything but an anti-capitalist state"; though the Bolsheviks might have destroyed
Russia’s national economy, it was only in order to place the country in the hands of international finance capitalism; this and the fact that the German capitalists supported the idea of a Russo-German agreement revealed, to Hitler’s mind, the fraudulence of Soviet anti-capitalism. Hitler also discussed the possibility to which the Strasser group had referred, that nationalist elements were "crowding out" Jewish elements and turning Bolshevik Russia into a genuinely anti-capitalist state. This, Hitler conceded, was conceivable but, even if such a development occurred, it would provoke an attack by the capitalist nations of Western Europe. In these circumstances, a German-Russian alliance would be "complete insanity", for two main reasons. Firstly, the alliance could not be kept secret and Germany would not be allowed time to re-arm for this conflict; secondly, strategically Russia would have to defeat Poland before she could aid Germany because Russian troops could not bypass Poland and land troops in Germany from the sea because of Anglo-French naval control of the Baltic.\(^{139}\)

Over and above this, of course, was Hitler’s fervent belief that any kind of Russo-German alliance was incompatible with his solution to Germany’s problem of over-population. Hitler ruled out the idea of settling Germany’s surplus population in overseas colonies because, unless they could be kept in a "close political and governmental relation with the mother country", this was equivalent to allowing Germans to emigrate.\(^{140}\) Since colonies had no longer been available even in the late nineteenth century, a solution had to be found in Europe. In Mein Kampf, Hitler had made it clear that this meant the acquisition of Russian territory; in the Secret Book, he was more explicit:
"The thinly settled western border regions which already had once received German colonies as bringers of culture could likewise be considered for the new territorial policy of the German nation." (141)

No Russian government would ever concede this territory voluntarily as the price of German friendship. Indeed Hitler was convinced, anyway, that the dream of creating a Pan-Slavic empire was a perpetual enticement for all Russian governments to pursue expansion westwards. (142) In short, Russia and Germany were set irreversibly on a collision course.

Hitler's arguments in his Secret Book were designed to make his anti-Russian stance impregnable irrespective of any current or future developments inside the Soviet Union. In view of this, one wonders whether he and his associates in the Nazi Party would ever have seriously considered in the 1920s an alliance with Russia even if Bolshevism had been overthrown. Was the talk in 1922 and 1923 of an alliance with a nationalist Russia merely a deceit designed to solicit support under false pretences from the Russian émigrés? In Hitler's case, the revelation of his lust for Russian territory to Eduard Scharrer in December 1922, makes this extremely likely. But can the same be said of Alfred Rosenberg, the chief advocate of an alliance with a post-Bolshevik Russia?

It has long been assumed that Rosenberg was in full accord with Hitler's territorial ambitions. (143) However, this cannot be substantiated from Rosenberg's books, pamphlets and articles. In fact, in all his comments on the settlement of Germans in the East, Rosenberg, with notable consistency, declared that the land necessary was to be acquired "from the Poles and the Czechs". (144) In September 1926, furthermore, Rosenberg cautioned against the cultivation of "utopian plans of conquest" when he remarked that:
"We had no cause to spin out plans beyond the essentials as if there were an empty Lebensraum in the east. The direction of this impulse is towards the Poles and the Czechs. Beyond that we can, in no sense, reflect in any practical way." (145)

Not once before 1927 did he publicly argue that Russian land should be settled by the Germans; he could, therefore, argue (without contradiction) in favour of future alliance between Germany and a nationalist Russia. As he saw it, Germany needed Polish territory and this necessity "in no way hinders friendship with Russia, which, likewise, can have no interest in a strong Poland. This necessity must, however, be recognised as absolutely legitimate by nationalist Russia." (146) If she did not accept the German claim, then Russia could expect German hostility. Rosenberg's public utterances, therefore, sustained the notion of a "national Russian alliance" long after the prospect of support from the Russian émigrés had disappeared. This suggests that, in his case, the notion may well have been based on genuine conviction.

Rosenberg's attitude towards the separatist movements inside Russia reinforces this impression. He believed that one day the Russian empire would disintegrate into its component parts; the Soviet empire was a "great bluff" and was being torn apart by separatist movements in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. (147) If Germany were to assist the Ukraine movement actively, she would not simply weaken the Soviet Union; she would also "discover new foreign policy opportunities" in the shape of an ally against the Poles, since the Ukrainians were "the deadly enemies of Poland". (148) Rosenberg summed up his strategy in Zukunftsweg as follows:

"If we now accept that the removal of the Polish state is Germany's first priority, then an alliance between Kiev and Berlin and the creation of a common frontier becomes a folkish and a national necessity for a future German policy."
So it would seem that Rosenberg did not envisage, in the first instance at least, German annexation of the Ukraine, the vital grain-producing area, a vision which probably fascinated Hitler. (149)

However, Rosenberg did not want another partition of Poland and Czechoslovakia between the great powers. In March 1927 he wrote that, if a future nationalist Russia was prepared "to give up her right to land in the struggle against the Czechs and the Poles, so that a 100,000,000 Germans can feed themselves well", then "nothing would stand in the way of good political relations". (150) In other words, it seems that Rosenberg hoped that a nationalist Russia would allow Germany to absorb the Polish and Czechoslovak states in their entirety. In Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Außenpolitik, however, Rosenberg reluctantly admitted that a nationalist Russia was not a realistic prospect "at least not in the foreseeable future, which comes into consideration for a practical German foreign policy" and that, even if it were, it would be unlikely to pander to Germany's wishes concerning Ostsiedlung. (151) This change could mean that Hitler had finally browbeaten Rosenberg into accepting his own Ostpolitik or that the idea of seizing Russian territory had always been Rosenberg's secret dream. However, it is more likely that Rosenberg had entertained unrealistic hopes that a future nationalist Russia would prove to be amenable to Germany's territorial requirements and that these hopes were finally shattered by the publication in July 1927 of Archduke Cyril Vladimirovich's book, Mit oder gegen Moskau. Archduke Cyril, a descendant of the Czar and the choice of most Russian émigrés as leader of a post-Bolshevik Russia, recognised that Germany was over-populated but was interested only in attracting German technicians to help to rebuild Russia; though he urged Russo-German collaboration, he had no intention of allowing Germany to expand eastwards. (152) The pre-condition for Rosenberg's German alliance with a nationalist Russia had, therefore, been eliminated. The fact that Rosenberg repeated his support for Ukrainian independence in
his analysis of the future of German foreign policy would seem to suggest that he was still committed, however, first and foremost, to an anti-Polish eastern policy. Whether this was only to be the first step along the path which led to the annexation of Western Russia is unknown; Rosenberg merely indicated that, after the Ukrainians had achieved independence, Germany's attitude towards the truncated Moscovite state would depend on English policy towards Germany. (153)

Though after 1927 Rosenberg's conception of Ostsiedlung may well have come into line with Hitler's, it is important to realize that, previously, they differed. Rosenberg was working for the annexation of the whole of Poland and Czechoslovakia with Ukrainian assistance and, if possible, with a guarantee of Russian neutrality. His aim, therefore, was not as limited as the revisionist policy favoured by the Strasser brothers but nor was it as extensive as the Ostpolitik favoured by Hitler.

Fifthly, Hitler's views on America also underwent some change in the period 1926-28. In general, America continued to be neglected in Nazi appraisals of foreign affairs. This was hardly surprising in view of the limited involvement of the United States in European affairs in the 1920s and the necessarily eurocentric conception of a Nazi foreign policy, geared to removing the Versailles Settlement. Hitler had, however, begun to appreciate the enormous potential of the United States in geopolitical terms; in Mein Kampf, he had described America as "a giant state" and was clearly impressed by the very favourable relationship between the amount of land available and the size of the American population; America was now beginning to challenge the pre-eminence of Great Britain in both the naval and the economic spheres. (154)
In his *Secret Book*, Hitler added a racial dimension; the Americans, he said, were "a young and racially select people", who had "for centuries received the best nordic forces of Europe by way of immigration". Furthermore, they were conscious of the need for racial purity, having already introduced selective immigration control. (155) Hitler did, however, see one cloud on the horizon; the second wave of immigrants from South-Eastern Europe and the Far East were not being as easily assimilated as the first, racially similar wave; as he commented:

"the American union has not been able to fuse people of an alien blood, who are stamped with their own national feeling or race instinct." (156)

Nevertheless, Hitler identified in America an albeit long-term threat to the economic well-being of Europe and to the established balance of world power. He believed that England, provided she remained "true to her great world-political aim", would join the "new association of nations", which would eventually stand up to the threat of American world domination. (157)

Thus, Hitler hoped that competition with the United States would drive England into a German alliance. Hence Hitler showed some awareness of the long-term potential of the United States, but he clearly did not consider her likely to be an active opponent of the re-establishment of German power in Europe — his first goal.

Alfred Rosenberg also omitted America from his deliberations on Germany's eastern policy. He certainly noticed the signs of increasing Anglo-American competition in naval and economic affairs, but tended to see the hand of the "Jewish" financiers of Wall Street behind the machinations of U.S. foreign policy. (158) In fact, Rosenberg regarded Nordic America as a valuable ally in the racial confrontations of the future; in the First World War, America and Britain had been on the wrong side and had aided
France, "the champion of the black racial pestilence"; but in future, America along with Britain and Germany, would defend the white race against the emerging challenge from Africa. (159)

So, Rosenberg, like Hitler, did not expect the United States to play an important part in the restoration of Germany's position in Europe. However, unlike Hitler, Rosenberg did not appear to appreciate fully the danger which North America would present in the future to the established balance of world power. He seems also to have had fewer doubts about the racial purity of Nordic America or about her willingness to orchestrate the defence of the white race on the American continent.

Finally, Japan also received relatively short shrift from the National Socialists. She did not feature prominently in the alliance systems of the Strasser circle or of Hitler and Rosenberg. Nevertheless, Japan was not overlooked entirely. Indeed, Ernst Hanfstängl claims that during a discussion with Hitler in Landsberg gaol, "late in 1924", Hitler had insisted that "only in alliance with the hard-working, martially aware, and racially unspoiled people, the Japanese, which is 'without space' just like the German people and consequently our natural partner in the struggle against Bolshevik Moscovitism, can we lead Germany into a new future". (160) If this story is true, one has to ask what lay behind this judgement and why Hitler chose not to reiterate it in Mein Kampf or even in his unpublished second book.

When Hanfstängl heard Hitler's argument, he at once attributed it to the influence of Karl Haushofer, who, through Rudolf Hess, had the ear of Hitler during his imprisonment. This seems quite likely, as Haushofer, a keen advocate of German-Japanese co-operation, considered Japan to be the rising
Asiatic power and frequently compared Japan's demographic and spacial predicament with Germany's. Significantly, Rosenberg's appraisal of Japan was based on the same criteria. In June 1926 he welcomed the emergence of Japan at the head of a Pan-Asiatic movement and hoped that she would succeed in pushing the Russians out of China. He also noted Japan's surplus population and her consequent need to expand and find an outlet in East Asia. (162) He recognised that this "folkish imperialism" pursued in China had incurred for Japan the hostility of America and Britain; this had, in fact, driven her to look for support from the Bolsheviks whom she distrusted. (163) Rosenberg's admiration for the Japanese was obvious; he described Japan as "almost the only nation state opposed to the international stock exchange". (164) However, even though Japan's interests and outlook were evidently compatible with those of Germany, Rosenberg stopped short of advocating an alliance.

Hitler showed similar restraint. In Mein Kampf he argued that the Jews were determined to destroy the Japanese nation state, but, unable "to mimic" the "yellow Asiatic races" and to assimilate amongst them and to undermine them from within, as they had done in Europe and America, the Jews were forced to incite the other powers against Japanese militarism and imperialism. Hitler also commented on the strained relationship between Japan and the United States. (165) Nevertheless, though he had established both an ideological and a strategic pre-condition for German-Japanese collaboration, Hitler did not proceed to advocate this. It is possible that racial antipathy towards the Asiatics prevented him; however, there is no concrete evidence to support this view and, indeed, since Alfred Rosenberg, the party's racial theorist, found the Japanese unobjectionable on racial grounds, it is unlikely that Hitler did. It is more probable that British abandonment
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922 and signs of increasing disenchantment between the two powers, which Hitler attributed in Mein Kampf to the British-Jewish press and evidence of Russo-Japanese collaboration in the Far East, prevented him from including Japan alongside Britain as Germany's allies in the future campaign against the Russians. (166) Since Hitler was not usually deterred by evidence of a country's current stance in foreign affairs, one should, perhaps, retain an open mind on this issue. But the omission of Japan, for whatever reason, must indicate a lack of conviction on Hitler's part. Suffice it to say that Hitler as early as 1924 - if one believes Hanfstängl - was aware of the potential usefulness of the Japanese in realising his programme of conquest at Russian expense, but chose not to include Japan in his publicised alliance programme.

What emerges from an analysis of Nazi literature during the years 1924–28 is that the Nazi Party, despite the virulence of its francophobic and anti-Bolshevik propaganda, had not delineated a coherent programme on foreign affairs publicly and unequivocally before the publication of Hitler's pamphlet on the South Tyrol question in February 1926. This omission reveals not the absence of such a programme in the mind of leadership; one certainly existed in fairly concrete outline in Hitler's mind at least, but Hitler refused to publicise it. This decision was dictated partly by tactical necessity - for it would alienate the support of the émigrés - partly by the fear that it would stir up opposition within the party and partly by the absence of an even superficially convincing justification for the extensive territorial ambitions contained in it.
The reaction of the Strasser group to the negotiation of the Locarno treaties in the winter of 1925-26 challenged the assumptions, still largely concealed from the public, behind Hitler's new alliance strategy. This forced Hitler in February 1926 to reveal his foreign policy programme which by this time was embellished by the pseudo-scientific reasoning culled from geopolitical literature. However, Hitler established the authority of his proposals primarily by relating them to the ideological tenets of the Nazi movement. He, therefore, offered very little objective data to confirm the correctness of his analysis. Consequently, after the publication of the second volume of Mein Kampf in December 1926, Hitler and Rosenberg, who sympathised with the broad outline of Hitler's proposals, set about finding the necessary corroborative evidence. In 1927 Alfred Rosenberg published findings accumulated in his day-by-day editorial work for the VB in his Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik, while Hitler planned to produce his own version in a second book. Why Hitler chose ultimately not to publish this book is uncertain. It could be, as has been suggested, that Mein Kampf was not selling well and Hitler did not want to produce a book which would compete with it, particularly one which was concentrated almost entirely on foreign affairs;\(^{(167)}\) or it may be that the developing association with the orthodox right-wing in its campaign against the Young Plan in 1929 compelled him to reconsider the publication of what was an embittered attack on bourgeois politicians. Perhaps, also, Hitler decided that the publication of a more detailed analysis of foreign policy - like the publication of an expanded party programme - would only encourage more debate within the party and expose Hitler to harmful counter-attacks. In any case, Rosenberg's book had elaborated the main arguments most conveniently without associating Hitler with them by name.
The observations of Hitler and Rosenberg were intended to establish the immutability of Franco-German and Russo-German hostility. Thus, France, despite the absence of any need for more territory, was said to be unshakeably determined for reasons of security and by the facts of geography to obtain a Rhineland frontier with Germany and to dissolve Germany into a multiplicity of small states. Russia, irrespective of changes in her government, was depicted as being driven westwards by the impetus of Pan-Slavism and would not, therefore, peacefully accommodate the territorial requirements of an over-populated Germany. Their arguments about Italy and England were designed to substantiate the belief that these two powers would collaborate with Germany in the first instance against the French (in this fight, they might be assisted by Spain and Hungary) and then, in the case of England at least, against the Russians, and finally, if need be, perhaps also against the distant threat of American world hegemony. To give credence to these arguments Hitler and Rosenberg employed racial and geopolitical theories as well as observations about power politics.
CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to examine the evolution of Nazi ideas on foreign policy between 1919 and 1928 by considering the views of Adolf Hitler within the context of those of the Nazi Party as a whole and of those of the political circles, in which the Nazi Party leaders moved. Four broad issues have been discussed: firstly, who influenced the foreign policy concepts of the party and, more especially, who influenced Hitler's emerging programme on foreign affairs? Secondly, how important was the racist and antisemitic ideology in fashioning that programme? Thirdly, what was the full extent of Hitler's territorial ambitions? Finally, how uniform was the Nazi Party's outlook on foreign affairs in the 1920s? The threads can now be drawn together and some tentative answers to these questions formulated.

1. Who Influenced Hitler?

When Hitler first encountered the infant German Workers' Party in September 1919, his political outlook had largely been fashioned by Pan-German literature, probably absorbed over many years. The resentment, which he felt towards the former Austro-Hungarian empire, suggests that it was the Austrian Pan-German Movement under Georg von Schönerer rather than the Berlin-based Alldutschen Verband, which first left its imprint on Hitler's mind. (1) However, it also seems quite clear that by 1919 Hitler had read and internalized much of the literature produced by the ADV in Germany, especially items written by its long-serving chairman, Heinrich Class. The similarities between Hitler's comments on foreign policy between the years 1919 and 1921 and the views expressed in Class's books Wenn ich der Kaiser wür and Deutsche Geschichte are too similar to be entirely coincidental. In some case, the cryptic records of Hitler's early speeches are fully
intelligible only by reference to pre-war Pan-German propaganda. \(^{(2)}\) It is, of course, all too easy to attribute all of Hitler's ideas to Pan-German inspiration. Nevertheless, Hitler's emphasis in his early speeches on Germany's need to expand because of her alleged overpopulation together with his discussion of the relative merits of overseas expansion and aggrandisement in Europe are so reminiscent of Class's earlier analysis in *Wenn ich der Kaiser war* that one rightly suspects plagiarism. \(^{(3)}\) Both men favoured overseas colonisation on the grounds of practicality but secretly harboured designs on territory in Eastern Europe. Both felt also that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 provided all that Germany needed and both were drawn towards the idea of a Russo-German alliance since, they argued, the two powers had few conflicting interests. It may seem remarkable that they believed that Russia would accept the transfer of territory on the lines of Brest-Litovsk and remain amenable to collaboration with Germany; but, as has been seen, Hitler and Class were not alone in sharing this pipe-dream. Finally, both considered Britain, France and America to be Germany's irreconcilable enemies.

Though Class established and maintained contact with the NSDAP between 1920 and 1923, it is possible that Hitler outgrew his Pan-German mentality; certainly Hitler's renunciation of the South Tyrol showed that he was not committed to carrying out the Pan-German creed to the letter. But generally, it is more likely that his Pan-Germanism only appeared to have been overshadowed by the onrush of new ideas. Hitler retained a certain sympathy and respect for the ADV largely on the basis of its initially correct and far-sighted analysis of the mistakes of Wilhelminian politicians; as he remarked in the *Secret Book*: 
"We cannot think of those men without a deep compassion, men condemned by fate to foresee a collapse for twenty years, and who now, having not been heeded and hence in no position to be of help, had to live to see their people's most tragic catastrophe." (4)

However, Hitler was also increasingly critical of the ADV's inability to reach the masses and to do anything concrete; by their training, the Pan-German leaders were geared too much "to a purely literary treatment of the problems". (5) Hitler's lack of patience with the slow-moving backstage machinations of Heinrich Class may explain, in part, the Munich putsch of 8-9 November 1923, which was seen by Class, at least, as an attempt at a 'pre-emptive strike' by Hitler.

In terms of Hitler's ideological development, Class's influence had already been supplanted in 1920 by that of Dietrich Eckart, and, more especially, Alfred Rosenberg. Whilst Eckart's relationship with Hitler and the German Worker's Party should not be overlooked - his early support was instrumental in attracting larger audiences and his ideas on the "Jewish-materialistic spirit in and around us" did stimulate discussion and found their way into the party programme of February 1920 (6) - it did not contribute as much in terms of the development of ideological and foreign policy tenets as the collaboration between Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg.

Rosenberg was largely responsible for providing Hitler and the NSDAP with an international perspective on the Jewish question. The idea of the existence of a world-wide Jewish conspiracy to overthrow established nation-states, which Rosenberg continually postulated, was of tremendous value to the new party, for it explained not only Germany's remarkable internal
collapse in 1918, but also the hostile international environment which she then faced. The threat of left-wing revolution inside Germany after 1918, the menacing power of Bolshevik Russia and the danger of Germany's economic enslavement to the victorious capitalist nations of the West were all traceable to the same source. This scenario (by no means Rosenberg's own creation) had the effect of reducing a very complex national and international scene to a delightfully simple and infinitely adaptable formula. This formula was easily understood by mass audiences and provided an indisputable guideline for international affairs; all developments, which looked likely to harm Germany, could be attributed to the execution of the plans of world Jewry: all those which favoured Germany could be presented as evidence either of Jewish trickery or of the existence of nationalistic groups, concerned to combat the prevailing tide of Jewish influence in their country. This antisemitic ideology, therefore, served as an essential sheet anchor for Nazi analyses of foreign affairs.

It seems very likely that Hitler moderated his early support for the idea of a Russo-German alliance because of Rosenberg's revelations about 'Jewish' Bolshevism. From September 1920 onwards, Hitler argued that such an alliance would only come about when Jewry was deposed in Russia. How far Hitler's eventual plan for the conquest of Russian territory was the direct result of this ideological transformation in Hitler's stance on foreign affairs will be considered more fully below. But, first of all, it is necessary to determine just how similar Rosenberg's concepts on foreign affairs were to Hitler's. There were, perhaps, two main areas of disagreement between the two men, which were largely hidden from contemporaries.

Firstly, some disparity is evident on the question of policy towards Russia. Rosenberg's real attitude towards Russia had been the subject of
much debate. Walter Laqueur regards Rosenberg as being distinctly anti-Russian because of his Baltic German heritage, whilst Ernst Hanfštangl (quoting Eckart) described Rosenberg as a 'National Bolshevik' — that is, one who favoured a Russo-German alignment once concern for national interests superseded the internationalist aspirations of early Bolshevism; an interpretation also advanced by Wolfgang Horn. Both interpretations fail to understand Rosenberg's perception of Russia. Laqueur's view is based on Rosenberg's comments on the racial inferiority of Slavs to Germans; but, as has been shown, Rosenberg nonetheless did regard Russians and Germans as compatible in some ways. The Slavs were not the equals of the Germans but they were not subhuman either. Horn's view of Rosenberg as a 'National Bolshevik' is rooted in a misunderstanding of his consistent avowal of support for a 'national Russia'. This 'national Russia' was to be not a 'National Bolshevik' Russia, but a post-Bolshevik Russia; a Russia freed from her 'Jewish' Bolshevik government would be an attractive ally for Germany.

Rosenberg remained publicly committed to this line long after the Bolshevik victory over the nationalist forces in the Russian civil war eliminated all realistic hope of the overthrow of Bolshevism in the near future. So Rosenberg was neither virulently Russo- nor Slavophobic nor a supporter of 'National Bolshevism'. In the first instance, he simply opposed a Bolshevist-ruled Russia.

However, Rosenberg was violently opposed to the existence of the Polish and Czechoslovak states created at Versailles out of the ruins of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German empires. From the outset, he was determined that Germany should destroy these states. It seems likely, however, that
This revisionist impulse was overtaken by a growing preoccupation with the need for Germany to expand her Lebensraum in Eastern Europe. (11) This may have been the result of Hitler's impact on him. It did not, however, produce an eastern policy identical to Hitler's. Nowhere did Rosenberg express his support for a campaign of territorial expansion at Russian expense. For Rosenberg, Poland was the main enemy and he hoped that a future German foreign policy would eliminate Poland and Czechoslovakia and incorporate the territory of these two states within a German Empire to furnish the necessary Lebensraum. Russia, of course, would not be easily persuaded to accept this German annexation of what was, in part, formerly Russian territory; therefore Rosenberg wanted Germany to support the separatist movements, especially that of the Ukrainians, inside Russia. These movements could tear Russia apart and ensure her inability to oppose German plans. (12) Rosenberg envisaged the shrinkage of the Russian Empire, as a result of the establishment of new nation-states by the separatist movements, to its former Muscovite core; Hitler envisaged a similar outcome but by different means – that is, as the result of a German conquest of Western Russia.

The second area, over which a certain disparity, perhaps, existed between Rosenberg and Hitler, was about the role of England in their plans. Both, though initially hostile to England, were advocating by the end of 1922 an Anglo-German alliance as part of a future National Socialist strategy, designed to defeat first France, then Russia. The reasons for this volte-face will be examined below; the important point at issue here is the level of commitment of Hitler and Rosenberg to the proposed alliance. Klaus Hildebrand has argued that Hitler's commitment to an English alliance was based essentially on power politics, whilst Rosenberg's was based
mainly on racial grounds; hence Hitler believed in long-term, but not indefinite, Anglo-German cooperation, whilst Rosenberg believed in an eternal alliance. (13)

This interpretation may be slightly misleading. Essentially, the English alliance would serve two purposes, as Rosenberg explained in Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik, one short-term, the other long-term. In the short run, it would facilitate German acquisition of land in "an easterly - Polish - direction" - that is the acquisition of Lebensraum. Significantly, Rosenberg explained why England would be willing to cooperate in this action - admittedly unconvincingly - in terms of power politics. England wanted to combat the Russian threat to her empire and would, therefore, support Germany, the Baltic States, and the Russian separatist movements against Moscow; this might initially only produce "interim solutions" (Zwischenlösungen) to Germany's problems but would eventually ensure her acquisition of living-space. (14) Rosenberg's short-term alliance strategy was, therefore, as follows: a combination of Germany, England, Italy and the Ukrainian separatists in opposition to France and Russia; the same combination was capable also of destroying "the Jewish world state" showing that Rosenberg had not abandoned his ideological frame of reference. (15)

In the longer term, Rosenberg was horrified by the spectre of the rising challenge of the black races to white supremacy; he wanted England and America to join Germany as "stalwarts against the black racial pestilence"; England was to protect the white race in Africa, India and Australia; America to defend it on the American continent, and Germany and Italy to defend it in Europe. (16) So, whilst Rosenberg's long-term vision of Anglo-German cooperation was based on racial considerations, and there is, perhaps, the implication that these were immutable, his short-term strategy
did owe much to calculations based on alleged strategic realities.

Certainly, one can appreciate that Rosenberg's conception of foreign affairs was identical only in broad outline to Hitler's. The differences in their policies towards England and Russia do not, of course, preclude Rosenberg's having exerted considerable influence over Hitler's thinking on foreign affairs, not merely on the Russian question but, perhaps, on the whole issue of alliance strategy.

Certainly, Rosenberg did not allow his differences of opinion with Hitler to surface in public and, after the publication of the second volume of Mein Kampf, he strove hard to substantiate the foreign policy programme endorsed by Hitler. The fact that Rosenberg failed in his ambition to become German Foreign Minister after 1933 and that he was later given the unpleasant job of Commissioner for the Eastern European Regions should not be considered as in any way diminishing his early contribution to Nazi ideology. If (and this has to be proven) he was relatively overlooked in the 1930s and 1940s, it was, in part, because Rosenberg had powerful enemies within the party, who, jealous of the high esteem in which Rosenberg was held by Hitler, had been working for some time to undermine his standing. It has to be admitted, though, that Rosenberg's main asset to Hitler and the party was his ability to uncover useful antisemitic propaganda and to comment on current events, especially in the field of foreign policy.

Once a foreign policy programme had been constructed, and the conduct of foreign policy was largely in Hitler's own hands, Rosenberg, a poor public speaker and rather withdrawn character, could not seriously claim a place amongst the foremost party officials on merit or personality.

In 1922 and 1923 Hitler came into contact with a number of political
theorists who had either established political or academic reputations in, or practical experience of, foreign affairs. Whether these encounters left any indelible imprint on Hitler's approach to foreign policy is debatable. His meeting with Moeller van den Bruck in March 1922 forced Hitler to come to terms with the concept of 'National Bolshevism'. His rejection of it was probably not a turning-point in the refinement of Hitler's programme, but showed, instead, the firmness of his anti-Bolshevik convictions at this fairly early stage in the construction of his alliance strategy. (118)

His increasingly close association with Max-Erwin von Scheubner-Richter in 1922 and 1923 reflected Hitler's desire to attract the support of the nationalist Russian émigrés, with whom Scheubner-Richter was in regular contact, and provided substance to his claim to support an alignment of Germany with a future post-Bolshevik Russia. Hitler and Scheubner-Richter became fairly close friends, so it is possible that the latter's early career in the Baltic States in 1918, when he was engaged in negotiating with the Latvian government an agreement which would give German soldiers the right to acquire land for settlement in the area, may have revitalised Hitler's interest in a policy of conquest in Eastern Europe along these lines. It is curious, for example, that, in his second book, he should write that the sole aim, which would justify the horrific slaughter of a world war, "could consist only in the assurance to German soldiers of so and so many hundred thousand square kilometers to be allotted to frontline fighters as property, or to be placed at the disposal of a general colonisation by Germans". (19) It is more than likely, however, that Hitler had already reached this conclusion before he grew particularly fond of Scheubner-Richter and, of course, such a scheme would cut across
the type of Russo-German collaboration, for which the latter was working with the Russian émigrés in the early 1920s.

A great deal of attention has been devoted to the part played by Professor Karl Haushofer's geopolitical theories in the formulation of Hitler's foreign policy schemes. Klaus Hildebrand has argued, for example, that in 1923 Hitler's alliance strategy was evolving but one ingredient was missing: a spatial policy; this Hitler acquired through his contact with Karl Haushofer, especially during the former's imprisonment in Landsberg gaol between November 1923 and December 1924. This analysis cannot now be accepted in view of the conclusions already reached in this thesis. Hitler had already adopted a spatial policy involving expansion at Russian expense by December 1922, as he revealed to Eduard Scharrer. Haushofer's role is likely, therefore, to have been far less crucial than has been hitherto imagined, since Hitler's original scheme of conquest in Eastern Europe predates any substantial contact with Haushofer and was probably a revival of the Ostpolitik advocated by the ADV and executed by the High Command in the early months of 1918. Nevertheless, Hitler's introduction to geopolitics proved extremely fruitful in the sense that it furnished a pseudo-scientific justification for his nakedly imperialistic impulses. The second volume of Mein Kampf and Hitler's second book drew heavily on the geopolitician's strategic, autarkic, and demographic arguments in favour of larger living-spaces. In fairness to Haushofer, it has to be stressed that, whilst his continued talk of the need to expand German living-space was irresponsible and open to mis-use, Hitler did deliberately pervert Haushofer's theories for his own ends. In Hitler's hands - and it does seem to have been Hitler's own concoction - Lebensraum became the key
concept in Nazi philosophy. An increase in Germany's living-space would ensure a healthy Volk and, hence, as Hitler put it in his Secret Book:

"A healthy foreign policy therefore will always keep the winning of the basis of a people's sustenance immovably in sight as its ultimate goal." (22)

It would also secure for Germany a greater supply of food and raw materials, thus making her less dependent on foreign trade and more self-sufficient. (23) Greater space would also guarantee greater strategic security for the German state. (24) Since such space was to be acquired primarily at Russian expense, the pursuit of Lebensraum also neatly dovetailed into the anti-Bolshevik stance which had been developed since 1920. (25) That none of this was anticipated by Karl Haushofer is certain; the one intentional piece of advice on foreign affairs which Haushofer undoubtedly prof erred - that is, a careful appraisal of the rising power of a Jap which, allegedly, had similar problems and appetites to Germany - was taken up but, in the short-term at least, not to great effect as far as the party's alliance structure was concerned.

Such were the main influences on Hitler's emerging Weltanschauung. The early ingestion of Pan-German propaganda and Hitler's introduction by Rosenberg to the subterranean workings of the Jewish world conspiracy appear to have been genuinely formative experiences. Hitler was always adept at imbibing and assimilating useful concepts and theories; his exploitation of geopolitical ideas illustrated his skill at maximising the political gain from a relatively small imput.
2. How important was the racist and antisemitic ideology in fashioning Hitler's programme?

Attempting to unravel the motivations behind Hitler's decision-making is particularly difficult. The first question one has to pose is: which came first - a decision about the goals of Nazi foreign policy, which determined the selection of suitable allies, or the selection of allies, which determined the goals of Nazi foreign policy? According to Hitler's view after 1922 (adopted from the Pan-Germans), Germany could either expand overseas (by regaining her former colonies or acquiring new ones) or in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, in order to avoid a repetition of the disastrous two-front war, which had eventually defeated her in 1918, Germany had to ally either with Britain or with Russia. Since Britain would, in his view, oppose a revival of Germany's overseas ambitions, and Russia would oppose German territorial expansion in Eastern Europe, the choice appeared to be clear-cut; the choice of one ally or one territorial goal would almost automatically predetermine the rest of the programme. So which was the decisive selection? The answer to that question will largely determine the answer to the second question: what part (if any) did the party's racist or antisemitic ideology play in that decision?

Axel Kuhn attempted to resolve these dilemmas in a study of Hitler's foreign policy programme published in 1970. He decided that Hitler had espoused the concept of an Anglo-German alliance in order to be able to fight a revisionist war against the arch-defender of the Versailles Settlement, France. Hitler had noted England's emerging distaste for French pre-eminence in Europe as shown by her increasing disengagement from France's harsh policy towards Germany, which culminated in the disagreements over the Ruhr invasion in January 1923. Hence Hitler's decision, according to
Kuhn, was based on strategic considerations and had nothing to do with Nazi ideology. (27) Having taken the crucial first decision and opting for an alliance with England, Hitler belatedly - two years later in fact - produced a corresponding set of foreign policy goals: the conquest of territory in Eastern Europe at Russian expense. (28) Leaving aside the question of the two-year period of gestation following the initial decision (which Kuhn does not adequately explain), does his interpretation stand up to close scrutiny?

The first question one has to ask is whether the desire to fight a revisionist war against France was, by itself, sufficient cause for Hitler to abandon his previous view of England, which as expressed in 1919-20 was that she was one of Germany's 'deadly enemies' on the grounds of the naval, colonial and commercial rivalry, which underlay the outbreak of the First World War. (29) Furthermore, Hitler's argument that England opposed French hegemony in Europe and would, therefore, help Germany to destroy it and not oppose the resulting German hegemony was, at best, tenuous, if that was its full extent. But, in fact, as Eduard Scharrer's record of his interview with Hitler in December 1922 indicates, Hitler revealed that his projected Anglo-German alliance aimed not merely at revising the Versailles Settlement but also at the conquest of Russian territory, and, furthermore, that he hoped Germany's express renunciation of an overseas colonial policy would prevent England from opposing German ambitions in Eastern Europe. (30) At first sight, Scharrer's evidence might appear to make more plausible Kuhn's argument that Hitler's choice of England determined his attitude towards Russia; it makes it quite clear that Hitler was fully aware of the implications in Eastern Europe of a decision in favour of an English alliance and that he envisaged a way to avert British
hostility from German hegemony in Europe. On closer inspection, however, this evidence can be seen as further weakening Kuhn's interpretation. In fact, it suggests an entirely different interpretation, which is worth considering, namely that the English alliance was merely a response to a prior decision whether that be a negative one, that is the rejection of a Russo-German alliance, or a positive one, that is the adoption of a plan for aggrandisement at Russian expense. (31)

Each of these alternative explanations of the original motivation behind Hitler's alliance strategy is tenable. The first is explicable in terms of Hitler's progressive disillusionment with Russia following the revelations about 'Jewish' Bolshevism and the increasing likelihood of a Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil war. This interpretation is attractive since Hitler's qualification of his support for a Russo-German alliance in 1920 (that it could only come about after Jewry had been removed) is the first overt and concrete change in his outlook after 1919. Later, it is true, Hitler argued that the westward ambitions of Pan-Slavism put Russia on a collision course with Germany. (32) But since, only a few months earlier, Hitler had declared that Germany and Russia had no conflicting interests, this is unlikely to explain Hitler's altered stance on the Russian question. It is feasible, therefore, that Hitler did take seriously the anti-Bolshevik and antisemitic propaganda of his party and that, as the Soviet regime looked increasingly likely to remain in power, so Hitler was encouraged to take an increasingly virulent anti-Russian line. The fact that during this same period, 1921 to 1922, there was a rehabilitation of England's standing in Rosenberg's antisemitic world view is also interesting. Until 1921, England was portrayed as the "patron saint" of world Jewry; after 1921, Rosenberg began to identify signs of English
resistance to Jewish plans and he began to argue that the centre of Jewish activity was considered to have moved from London to New York.\(^{(33)}\)

No real explanation for this rehabilitation is given, though a possible one would be the more lenient attitude of the British government in its relations with Germany. However, since the signs of such a moderation in British policy were fairly intermittent in 1921, one could suggest that Britain was being rehabilitated in the ideological field because of Hitler's emergent anti-Russian policy and in preparation for the announcement of a future Anglo-German alliance, which would be vital in its execution. This interpretation is advanced tentatively in the knowledge that it carries with it the suggestion that, perhaps, Hitler believed that the Russian Revolution was the first step in the Jewish world conspiracy or, at least, that Bolshevik leadership of Russia made an alliance with her out of the question.

However, it is possible to argue that the second alternative to Kuhn's interpretation, that is that Hitler's alliance strategy was primarily motivated by his adoption of a plan of territorial acquisition at Russian expense, is also plausible. It is known that Hitler approved of Germany's Ostpolitik in 1918; and in June 1921 he declared that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed by Russia and Germany in March 1918, and the consequent land transfers to Germany, would have met the latter's requirements. One problem with the argument is that Hitler may have desired territorial expansion at Russian expense all along. And, until 1922, Hitler did not regard an English alliance as a necessary prerequisite for this; as has been seen, he seems to have believed that a German-Russian alliance before the war would have allowed Germany to expand eastwards and that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk could have been followed by Russo-German
Thus, until 1922, Hitler seems to have thought that his territorial ambitions for Germany in Eastern Europe could be realised without the need for an alliance with England. During 1922 Hitler abandoned the idea of Russo-German collaboration in solving Germany's spatial problems in favour of the conquest of Lebensraum in the East and the destruction of Russia. The most likely reason for this change is Hitler's acceptance of anti-Bolshevism as the corner-stone of Nazi philosophy. So whilst Hitler may have been drawn towards England (and Italy) by their evident opposition to French policies, it seems possible that it was Hitler's alienation from Russia under its Bolshevik leadership, which determined his eventual alliance strategy.

The purpose of this section has been to indicate that interpretations of the evolution of Hitler's alliance strategy, other than that advanced by Axel Kuhn, are possible, although admittedly impossible to prove beyond all doubt. It has, hopefully, also served to re-instate with some force the possibility that Hitler's schemes were inspired originally by genuine anti-Bolshevik convictions, though not entirely, of course, as the supposed dichotomy between Britain and Russia, on which Hitler's choice of allies rested, was also based on his reading of the strategic realities of Europe. If, once the alliance strategy had been published, Hitler seemed rather to neglect ideological factors, it may only have been because of his need to convince the doubters in his own party by more rational arguments. This is certainly one explanation of his opening remarks in his Secret Book, written in 1928:

"During the last two years, of course, it has become clearer to me that my writing of that time was in fact structured on general National Socialist insights as a premise. It also became clear that many do not follow us, less out of ill-will than because of a certain inability. At that time, within the narrowly drawn limits, it was not possible to give a real fundamental proof of the soundness of our National Socialist
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conception of foreign policy. Today I feel compelled to make up for this." (35)

3. **What was the full extent of Hitler's territorial ambitions?**

Hitler's alliance strategy was, of course, only one part of his overall foreign policy programme. The entire programme, it is fair to say, was justified by Hitler in terms of race. The ultimate goal, it was claimed, was the defeat of the Jews and the survival of the Aryan race, hence in Alfred Rosenberg's view:

"In the final analysis, all history is racial history." (36)

The role of this racial ideology should not be overlooked in any assessment of the Nazi programme. In the last resort, the racial values of a people, not its geopolitical position, would, it was believed, determine its fate. (37) For this reason, the preservation of the quality of the race was absolutely vital. To ensure this, the pursuit of greater living-space was crucial; as Hitler said in the **Secret Book**:

"The compulsion to engage in the struggle for existence lies in the limitations of the living-space; but in the struggle for this space lies also the basis for evolution." (38)

A healthy people, he argued, would secure the necessities of life by expanding its living-space; a healthy people also would expand in number continuously; therefore, the acquisition of living-space would permit further population growth, which would, in time and in turn, necessitate further territorial expansion. The heady mixture of race and **Lebensraum**, therefore, produced, as Martin Broszat has argued, a doctrine of apparently self-perpetuating expansionism. (39)

But did Hitler seriously envisage the eventual German conquest of the world?
The evidence for this has already been discussed above, but a few final comments might be useful. (40) It is certainly true that implicit in Hitler's racist theorizing is the idea that one race, the Aryan race, could eventually dominate the world; it can be argued that his attribution to the Jews of schemes of world conquest merely disguised his own. But it has to be borne in mind that Aryan world domination was not necessarily synonymous with German world conquest. The Aryan race extended beyond Germany's frontiers and was likely to remain that way indefinitely. Though Hitler might talk of defeating the mighty American Union in some future apocalyptic battle, this did not necessarily entail the physical conquest of the United States by Germany. What Hitler initially envisioned for Germany was, perhaps, the securing of a position of pre-eminence as the leading world power, a position which Hitler, like his Pan-German mentors before him, thought that Britain had enjoyed at the turn of the century. Later, Hitler realized that Britain's pre-eminence amongst the world powers had not been unchallengeable and, perhaps, then Hitler's ultimate ambitions for Germany were pushed even higher. It is probable that, at this time at least, these still stopped short of physical conquest of the world and the elimination of the other world powers. As Rudolf Hess wrote in December 1928:

"World peace is certainly an ideal worth striving for; in Hitler's opinion it will be realizable only when one power, the racially best one, has attained complete and uncontested world supremacy." (41)

"Uncontested world supremacy", not global conquest, was probably the extent of Hitler's publicized fantasies for his new Germany in the 1920s.
4. How uniform was the party's outlook on foreign affairs in the 1920s?

Klaus Hildebrand in *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich* has identified "four different positions" on foreign affairs within the Nazi Party during the Weimar Republic. (42) Two of them, the "Wilhelmine imperialists", represented by Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp and Hermann Göring, and the Agrarian Radicals, led by Walter Darré, are outside the chronological scope of this study, though Hitler shared many of the views of the first group in the early 1920s. The views of the other two: the "revolutionary 'Socialists' " of the Strasser group and Hitler himself have, hopefully, been adequately explored. It should now be clear, however, that there were more than four conceptions represented within the Nazi party and its immediate environment. The differing ideas of Alfred Rosenberg, Max-Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, Karl Haushofer (shared by Rudolf Hess before he fell finally under Hitler's spell), Ernst Hanfstaengl, and Kurt Lüdecke have all surfaced during this study. There was, in short, a wide range of viewpoints represented within the party, which Hitler largely tolerated because, with the notable exception of the controversy in January and February 1926, the groups or individuals concerned were either not organised sufficiently to pose a threat to Hitler's authority or were unwilling to risk a public confrontation with Hitler over foreign affairs. The clash with the Strasser group probably convinced him of the need to assert more clearly the 'official' party line but, thereafter, the same laissez-faire attitude towards dissenting voices reasserted itself. Before the plebiscite on the Young Plan and the Great Depression changed its fortunes, the Nazi Party could not afford to alienate its most able and articulate propagandists by insisting on strict conformity on all issues.

One should not conclude from this that the flexibility of Hitler's actual
foreign policy in the 1930s was, necessarily, a result of unresolved conflicts of opinion which became institutionalised in the government of the Third Reich. But it is certainly a possibility. Nonetheless, when Hitler chose to exert his power in the area of foreign policy-making as he did especially at the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938, there is no doubt, as in February 1926, that Hitler got his way. The crucial question, which is beyond the scope of this thesis, then arises: did he then try to implement the foreign policy programme formulated in the 1920s?
NOTES

Introduction


4. Many of these reports have recently been published in E. Jäckel and A. Kuhn, Hitler. Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen 1905-1924, (Stuttgart, 1980). See also R.H. Phelps, 'Hitler als Parteiredevern im Jahre 1920' Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (henceforth VfZG) 11 (1963), pp. 274-330 and E. Deuerlein, 'Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr' VfZG 7 (1959), pp. 177-227. With the publication of fuller accounts of his speeches in the Völkischer Beobachter after 1922 and of E. Boepple's collection, Adolf Hitler Reden (Munich, 1925), one can argue with greater authority.

5. On Hitler's youth see W. Daim, Der Mann, der Hitler die Ideen gab, (Munich, 1958); W. A. Jenks, Vienna and the Young Hitler (New York, 1960); B.F. Smith, Adolf Hitler: His Family, Childhood and Youth, (Stanford, 1967).

6. K. Hildebrand has identified four different foreign policy conceptions within the party, op. cit., pp. 13-23. W. Michalka correctly points out that there were more, op. cit., pp. 55.


Chapter 1

1. Henceforth Agd.

2. For details of the attendance, see Hauptarchiv der NSDAP 3/80. (The Hoover Institution has microfilmed the surviving documents from the Nazi Party archives; they will be referred to below as 'HA' with the reel and folder number. The originals are now available in the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz as collection NS26 and where they have been consulted, they will be referred to as BAK NS26 with the folder number.) Hitler's account of the meeting can be found in Mein Kampf (London, 1969), pp. 197-99. See also E. Deuerlein, Hitler. Eine politische Biographie (Munich, 1969), p. 48. Rosenberg revealed later that he and Eckart had met Anton Drexler in May 1919 and that he had requested that Eckart deliver a talk on Bolshevism to the DAP; A. Rosenberg, 'Meine erste Begegnung mit dem Fuhrer' (1934) BAK NS 8/177 (Kanzlei Rosenberg).


4. See the article by Karl Graf von Bothmer, 'Der grosse Volksbetrug' Agd 28 March 1919, pp. 138-41.

5. A. Tyrell, op. cit., p. 54.


7. The speeches were delivered in Nuremberg to the Deutschvölkische Schutz- und Trutzbund, another right-wing pressure group sponsored by the Aldeutschen Verband, see D. Eckart, 'Mittendurch' Agd 29 August 1919, p. 417.


10. Hitler criticized a newspaper report of a meeting attended (it was claimed) by the "leaders of the antisemitic movement" because neither Eckart nor Rosenberg had been in attendance: 'Sie kennen ihre Pappenheimer' Völkischer Beobachter (henceforth VB) 12 May 1921.

11. A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 194. Feder and Rosenberg soon joined the party; their names are included in the first list of members drawn up in February 1920; BAK NS 26/111.

12. This has been corrected by two recent biographies, R. Cecil, The Myth of the Master Race. Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology (London, 1972) and M. Plewnia, Auf den Weg zu Hitler. Der 'völkische' Publizist Dietrich Eckart (Bremen, 1970). Feder still awaits a biographer, though A. Tyrell's recent article, op. cit., is a useful survey.

14. N. Cohn, for example, has written of Rosenberg that he was "a simple soul and he really believed the balderdash he wrote"; Warrant for Genocide. The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Harmondsworth, 1967), p. 217. W. Maser maintains that Rosenberg was Hitler's disciple and that the latter learnt nothing from Rosenberg; Die Frühgeschichte der NSDAP (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), pp. 181-85.

15. On this tendency, see B.M. Lane and L. Rupp, op. cit., p. ix.


17. For further biographical details, see R. Cecil, op. cit., pp. 5-9.

18. B.M. Lane, op. cit., p. 16.


20. Henceforth VB.

21. A Rosenberg, Letzte Aufzeichnungen: Ideale und Idole der nationalsozialistischen Revolution (Göttingen, 1955), p. 74 (henceforth LA). Rosenberg's memoirs have to be used with care since three versions are available. The first, published in 1949 as The Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg (New York, 1949) - henceforth Memoirs - has a hostile commentary by S. Lang and E. von Schenk. In 1955 LA was published by H. Haertle, a former Nazi official, who was clearly sympathetic to Rosenberg. Haertle has been accused of 'doctoring' the text, an accusation tacitly accepted when Haertle published a second version in 1970, Großdeutschland: Traum und Tragödie (Munich, 1970) - henceforth GTT. The latter omits the first 75 pages of LA, which deal with his early career. For further details on this, R. Cecil, op. cit., pp. 231-32.

22. BAK NS 8/20. It is likely that Eckart did not pay Rosenberg very regularly, given his financial difficulties; M. Plewnia, op. cit., p. 34.

23. B.M. Lane, op. cit., p. 16.

24. A. Rosenberg, Schriften und Reden I (Munich, 1943) contains the three essays: 'Der Jude', ibid., pp. 88-115; 'Eine ernste Frage', ibid., pp. 75-78; 'Staat, Sozialismus und Personlichkeit', ibid., p. 75. It is unlikely that Rosenberg altered the dates; the articles display the hallmarks of youth and contain arguments developed much further later on.

25. Rosenberg seems to have been employed as a teacher between June and September 1918; see R. Cecil, op. cit., p. 20.

27. In an undated and untitled memoir on the early history of the Nazi Party, Rosenberg referred to a speech in the Marienplatz in Munich in 1919, as "my first public speech in the world"; NS 8/20. On the other hand, in a letter to his lawyer, Lorenz Roder, on 17 March 1931, he pointed out that he had come to Germany from Reval on 30 November 1918 "after I had given another speech on Bolshevism and the Jewish question"; NS 8/120. One tends to attach more credibility to this second piece of evidence since it was not destined for the party archives as was the first.


29. Rosenberg's views on race derived, in all probability, from Houston Steward Chamberlain's Grundlage des 19 Jahrhunderts, which Rosenberg admitted later was "the greatest impetus, I received"; LA, p. 274. The book, which he read in 1912, opened new vistas for him; in particular Chamberlain's references to the fate of the Greeks who intermarried with the Asians made him an opponent of racial intermixture; ibid., pp. 274-85. See also his views on miscegenation in 'Der Jude', loc. cit., pp. 104, 108.

30 'Der Jude', loc. cit., p. 95.

31. Ibid., pp. 105-11.

32. Ibid., pp. 111-14.

33. W. Maser, Frühgeschichte, pp. 183-84. Maser is here criticizing G. Schubert's claim that Rosenberg was a forceful influence on the development of early Nazi ideas; G. Schubert, op. cit., p. 126.

34. W. Maser, Frühgeschichte, p. 183.

35. A. Rosenberg, LA, p. 64.

36. Ibid., p. 65.


38. M. Plewnia, op. cit., p. 28; cf. R. Cecil, op. cit., p. 23 makes the point about the 'Jewish boycott'.


40. B.M. Lane, op. cit., p. 12.

41. Quoted in M. Plewnia, op. cit., p. 57.


43. D. Eckart, 'Das Judentum in und ausser uns' (henceforth 'Das Judentum') Agd 7 February 1919, p. 95. This series of articles began on 10 January 1919 and was unfinished. Whether Hitler's description of the Jews as bacteria on the human body was borrowed from Eckart is uncertain; what is certain is that he did not share Eckart's opinion that they were a necessary evil.
44. Eckart cited Otto Weininger, a Jew, as one (perhaps the most important) of his three sources on the Jews (the others were Schopenhauer and Voltaire) and referred specifically to the chapter on Jewry in Geschlecht und Charakter; 'Das Judentum' Agd 17 January 1919, pp. 45-48. See also B.M. Lane and L. Rupp, op. cit., p. 17.


46. 'Das Judentum' Agd 10 January 1919, p. 31.


49. A. Rosenberg Dietrich Eckart, p. 45.

50. 'Die russisch-jüdische Revolution' Agd 21 February 1919, pp. 120-23. As a result it was reprinted on several occasions with some additions, e.g. in Die Spur des Juden im Wandel der Zeiten (Munich, 1920), 115-17. B.M. Lane refers to Rosenberg's introduction to Eckart's Totengräber Russlands (Munich, 1921) and to his 'Der jüdische Bolschewismus in Russland', VB 26 November 1921 and to Rosenberg's introduction to his Pest in Russland, Der Bolschewismus, seine Haupter, seine Handlanger und Opfer (Munich, 1922) as further reprints; op. cit., p. 15 fn. 40. However, there are in fact important differences (to be discussed later) and in some, a different framework is used.

51. A. Rosenberg, 'Die russisch-jüdische Revolution' Agd 21 February 1919, p. 120.

52. A. Rosenberg in 'Russe und Deutscher' Agd 4 April 1919, p. 187.


54. 'Die russisch-jüdische Revolution', loc. cit., p. 121.

55. Ibid., pp. 122-23.

56. Ibid., p. 114.

57. For the first claim, ibid., p. 122; for the second, see A. Rosenberg 'Der Jude' loc. cit., p. 108-10.


60. A. Rosenberg, 'Judenheit und Politik' (henceforth 'Judenheit') Agd 13 June 1919, p. 263. This article was published as part of Die Spur des Juden im Wandel der Zeiten (henceforth Die Spur).

61. 'Judenheit', loc. cit., p. 265.
62. Ibid., p. 266.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., p. 271.
65. B.M. Lane, op. cit., p. 15. notes 41 and 42.
67. Ibid., p. 274.
71. Ibid., p. 159. Later Eckart was to argue that the Jews were neither nationalist nor internationalist. Zion was not to be a national home but a base where no one could keep an eye on them; D. Eckart, Der Bolschewismus von Moses bis Lenin: Zwiegespräch zwischen Adolf Hitler und mir (Munich 1924), p. 17. There has been considerable debate over the authorship of this book but M. Plewnia presents a persuasive case in favour of Eckart; op. cit., pp. 102-10.
73. Ibid., pp. 703-04.
74. On the origins and publication of the 'Protocols' - published in Germany in 1920 as Die Geheimnisse der Weisen von Zion (Munich, 1920), see N. Cohn, op. cit., pp. 138-63.
75. B.M. Lane, op. cit., p. 13.
77. Ibid., p. 80.
78. 'Das Judentum' Agd 7 February 1919, p. 96.
79. The Nazi Party programme of February 1920 does include the call to combat "the Jewish-materialistic spirit in and around us", but the theme of the 'Twenty-Five Points' is the treatment of the Jews as aliens, which seems to derive far more from Rosenberg's proposals in Die Spur, pp. 160-61. For the party programme, see W. Hofer, (ed), Der Nationalsozialismus. Dokumente 1933-1945 (Frankfurt am Main, 1957), pp. 28-31.

82. A. Rosenberg, Die Spur, p. 89.

83. Rosenberg is quoted by Eckart as saying that "the revolutions from 1789 to today are for the most part the fruits of freemasonic influence"; 'Das fressende Feuer' Agd 22 August 1919, p. 407.

84. Die Spur, p. 99.

85. For the real purpose of the organization, see N. Cohn, op. cit., pp. 60-62; cf. 78. Many of the ideas used by Rosenberg can be found also in Paul Tafel's Das neue Deutschland. Ein Rätestaat auf nationaler Grundlage (Munich, 1920), pp. 39-42. Tafel, the chairman of the anti-republican Bayerischer Ordnungsblock, who became a member of the DAP, clearly had similar interests to Rosenberg. Given that Rosenberg's views were first published in 1919, he is unlikely to have drawn on Tafel's work. The latter does show, however, how unoriginal were the notions which Rosenberg was trying to popularize. For more on Tafel; A. Tyrell, Vom 'Trommler' zu Führer' (Munich, 1975), p. 197.

86. Die Spur, p. 106.

87. D. Eckart, 'Das fressende Feuer' loc. cit., p. 402. The work concerned was E.E. Eckart's Magazin der Beweisführung für Verurteilung des Freimaurer-Ordens (Schaffhausen, 1855); for more on this, see N. Cohn, op. cit., p. 37.

88. 'Das fressende Feuer', loc. cit., p. 405.

89. D. Eckart, 'Wer nicht mit uns ist....' Agd 31 October 1919, p. 554.

90. A. Rosenberg, Das Verbrechen der Freimaurerei: Judentum, Jesuitismus, deutsches Christentum (Munich, 1920). This idea was first mooted by Rosenberg in 'Judenheit' loc. cit., p. 271.

91. Eckart's introduction to the series, Agd 3 December 1920, p. 440.

92. Ibid.


94. Ibid., pp. 31-32; 'Das Verbrechen', Agd 31 January 1921, p. 39-49.

95. Ibid., pp. 51-55.

96. Ibid., pp. 60-63.

97. 'Das Verbrechen' Agd 15 February 1921, p. 75.

98. Ibid., pp. 76, 79, 80-81.

100. D. Eckart, 'Der grosse Krumme' Agd 7 December 1919, p. 5.

101. Ibid., p. 7.

102. For more on Feder's background, see A. Tyrell, 'Gottfried Feder and the NSDAP' loc. cit., pp. 48-87 and Vom 'Trommler' zum 'Führer', p. 192.

103. Manifest (Munich, 1919); see also G. Feder, 'Innere Geschichte der Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft' VB 12 August 1920.

104. B.M. Lane, op. cit., pp. 9-12. Eckart applied this distinction to politics: "The proprietors amongst us must renounce interest. I call that German Bolshevism, whilst I call the other Jewish. One of the two has inevitably to come." Only the sacrifice of interest could, he believed, save Germany; 'Deutscher und jüdischer Bolschewismus' Agd 16 August 1919, p. 389.


106. Ibid., p. 220.


108. A. Rosenberg, LA, p. 76.

109. Ibid. Rosenberg obviously regarded Feder as a rival for the position of party philosopher - both produced commentaries on the party programme. In his memoirs, Rosenberg criticized Feder for demanding large advance payments for his lectures and for having plagiarized Thoeder Fritsch's 'Hammer' publications in 1917, which he believed to be the source of Feder's ideas on 'interest-slavery'; ibid., pp. 76-77.


112. 'Der Jude', loc. cit., pp. 107-08.

113. Ibid., pp. 109-10.

114. 'Judenheit' loc. cit., p. 272.

115. As early as March 1919 Rosenberg had talked of the stock exchanges profiting from Russia's ruin, but there was no suggestion of 'Jewish' finance for the Russian Revolution; 'Russische Stimmen' Agd 28 March 1919, p. 146. Rosenberg recalled in 1928 that the workers in the DAP "succeeded as time passed...to deeper insights into the character of the competing forces in world politics and realized that Marxism was simply a system of usury organized by the world banks...These insights developed into principles and ideologies when Adolf Hitler entered the circle of this little troop"; Dietrich Eckart. Ein Vermächtnis, p. 51. Perhaps this comment reveals Rosenberg's assessment of Hitler's impact on the party - the cementation of certain ideas into rigid convictions.

117. A. Rosenberg, 'Börsenjuden und Revolution' **VB** 22 February 1921; this article is unattributed but Rosenberg later claimed it as his own in 'Schicksalswende in London' **VB** 6 March 1921. Most of Rosenberg's articles in the **VB** bear his initials.

118. 'Börsenjuden und Revolution' **loc. cit.** It would be interesting to discover the source of Rosenberg's ideas. He was certainly so impressed by *Le Juif, le judaïsme et la judaïsation des peuples chrétiens*, written by a French antisemite, Gougenot des Mousseaux, in 1869 that he translated the book into German in 1923 and quoted from it often. The book, according to Rosenberg, predicted 'the present events...with peculiar confidence' **ibid.** For further information on des Mousseaux, N. Cohn **op. cit.**, pp. 49-50.


120. **Pest in Russland** (Munich, 1924), p. 85.

121. B.M. Lane, **op. cit.**, p. 11, note 25.

122. R. Cecil, **op. cit.**, p. 17; cf. M. Plewnia, **op. cit.**, p. 36; K. Heiden, Der **Fuehrer** (London, 1944), p. 9.

123. A. Rosenberg, *Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion und die jüdische Weltpolitik* (Munich, 1923).


125. 'Judenheit', **loc. cit.**, pp. 272-74.


127. **Ibid.**

128. D. Eckart 'Jewry über Alles' **Agd** 26 November 1920, p. 411. N. Cohn claims that the 'Protocols' were published in mid-January 1920; **op. cit.**, p. 147. But this seems unlikely since Eckart reviewed the new publication in 'Die Midgardschlange' **Agd** 30 December 1919, pp. 680-93. Rosenberg wrote that the 'Protocols' appeared in German "at the end of 1919"; 'Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion', reprinted in **Schriften und Reden**, p. 253.

129. 'Die Midgardschlange' **loc. cit.**, p. 681.

130. See N. Cohn, **op. cit.**, p. 146.

131. B.M. Lane, **op. cit.**, p. 16 note 43. The first direct reference to the Protocols I have been able to find in Rosenberg's writings - apart from the 1921 review - appears in **Pest in Russland** where, to illustrate the Jewish domination of Soviet Russia, he alleges that 447 out of 550 People's Commissars are Jewish. "This whole bunch of Jewish criminals is welded together by instinct and plan...this instinct has already solidified into a plan. I need not refer to the condemned 'Protokolle der Weisen von Zion'." **Ibid.**, p. 24.


140. *Ibid.*, p. 270. The phrase is repeated in the first edition of *Die Spur* (Munich, 1920), p. 87, but is significantly omitted from later editions because of a change in attitude towards England, which was either caused by, or resulted in, the perception of areas of conflict between the British and the Jews (see below). Eckart, for example, noted Anglo-Jewish tensions over Ireland: 'Jewry über Alles' *Agd* 26 November 1920, pp. 402-05.


144. Eckart quotes a passage from Rosenberg entitled 'Die bolschewistische Gefahr' in his article 'Zwischen den Schächern' *Agd* 5 March 1920, p. 106.


146. 'Judenheit', *loc. cit.*, p. 269.


152. 'Jüdische Zeitfragen', *loc. cit.*, p. 539.

153. 'Russische Stimmen', *loc. cit.*, p. 146.


155. See below, pp. 152-55.
156. 'Russische Stimmen', *loc. cit.*, p. 146.


158. 'Judenheit', *loc. cit.*, p. 268.

159. A. Rosenberg, 'Russe und Deutscher' *Agd* 4 April 1919, p. 185.


165. America received only passing mention, see 'Jüdische Zeitfragen', *loc. cit.*, p. 534.

166. D. Eckart, 'Immer lachen, und doch ein Schurke' *Agd* 7 February 1919, p. 82.


169. D. Eckart introducing an anti-British diatribe by Rosenberg in his article 'Zwischen den Schächern' *Agd* 5 March 1920, p. 106.

Chapter 2


7. Ibid., p. 56. See also, W. Maser, Die Frühgeschichte, p. 208 note 250.

8. H. Class, Wider den Strom, volume II (henceforth 'Wider II') is an unpublished manuscript, dealing with the period 1912-33, which takes up the story of the ADV where the first published volume of reminiscences, Wider den Strom. Vom Werden und Wachsen der nationalen Opposition im alten Reich (Leipzig, 1932) left off. (Henceforth 'Wider I'). It has only recently been made available to historians by the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz. In fact, there are two documents, one a 955-page volume of memoirs (Wider II), the other a sixty-three page analysis of Class's contacts with the Nazi Party (of which pages 1 to 7 inclusive are missing and hence the title page) and written, according to the marginal notes, between 29 October and 17 November 1936 (henceforth referred to as 'Class und die NSDAP'). Extracts from this memoir were published in F. von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler (London, 1966) and I am grateful to Herr von Schlabrendorff for his help in locating this document and for details about its provenance. The documents were, it seems, deposited in a Swiss bank vault by Class during the war and retrieved by von Schlabrendorff at the request of Class's daughter. On her death in 1973 they were deposited in the Bundesarchiv and became available to historians in 1977; letters from von Schlabrendorff to the author, 2 January and 7 February 1974.


14. Class was born in Rheinhessen in 1868 and studied in Berlin, Freiburg and Giessen. He attended lectures by von Treitschke, whom he later described as his "master, the man who guided my whole life", Wider I, p. 15. For further biographical details, see B.S. Chamberlin, op. cit., passim.


18. The role of Class and the ADV in the build-up to the outbreak of the First World War has been admirably clarified by Fritz Fischer in War of Illusions. German Policies from 1911 to 1914 (London, 1972), passim.


21. Ibid., p. 167. Hugenberg had been a founder member of the ADV. Together Class and Hugenberg were to argue against a "peace without annexations'.


23. Ibid., pp. 10-14.

24. Ibid., p. 228. No evidence has been found to corroborate this story.

25. Ibid., pp. 236-38.


27. Ibid., p. 386; cf. pp. 403, 428.


31. Wider II, pp. 511-14, p. 488. G. Franz-Willing suggests, however, that in 1923 Class was looking for a Wittelsbach emperor; possibly this was a sop to his Bavarian associates, Krisenjahr der Hitlerbewegung 1923 (Oldendorf, 1975), p. 299.


38. Ibid., p. 715. Von Seeckt refused, threatening to fire onputschists of whatever persuasion.

39. Class and the ADV continued to work secretly for the overthrow of the Weimar Republic, hatching another plot in 1926, which again proved stillborn; B.S. Chamberlin op. cit., pp. 342-91; J.A. Leopold, Alfred Hugenberg. The Radical Nationalist Campaign against the Weimar Republic (Yale, 1977), p. 31.


41. E. Hartwig, op. cit., p. 23.

42. Class und die NSDAP.

43. An ADV situation report dated 3 February 1934, p. 9 complained that "we have for many years, even decades, championed the national revolutionary demands and goals which are now rightly being followed as main aims"; quoted in H.A. Jacobsen and W. Jochmann, Ausgewählte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus (Bielefeld, 1960), vol. 2, p. 3.

44. On this see A. Tyrell's comments on the extracts published earlier, Vom 'Trommler' zum 'Führer', p. 224, note 393.
45. The date and venue of their first meeting are the subject of some dispute. March and August 1920 are the most canvassed dates and Berlin and Munich the venues; B.S. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 220. It is clear from Class's unpublished memoir that several meetings may have taken place, the first being in Berlin, the second in Munich. Unfortunately the first seven pages, which may have detailed the first encounter, are missing; at a second meeting, Class noted that the marked antisemitism of the DAP's programme stood "at variance with what Hitler had explained to me a short time before in Berlin", Class und die NSDAP, p. 8. Thus the first meeting could have taken place before 24 February but it is more likely to have been in mid-March. K.A. von Müller, a distinguished historian close to folkish circles, recollected that Hitler (with Eckart) visited the Pan-Germans during a trip to Berlin during the Kapp putsch, that is between 13-17 March; Im Wandel der Zeit. Erinnerungen Bd. 3, 1919-32, (Munich, 1966), p. 143, cf. A. Kruck, op. cit., p. 192. Class then paid Hitler a return visit in Munich somewhat later, the meeting described in his memoirs, Class und die NSDAP, p. 10. A third meeting may have occurred in Berlin in December 1920, when Hitler was on a fund-raising trip in North Germany, B.S. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 222-23.

46. Class und die NSDAP, pp. 8-9.
47. Ibid., pp. 9-11.
49. B.S. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 216.
50. G. Franz-Willing, Die Hitlerbewegung, p. 185 and note 40. Amongst those who have claimed that the NSDAP was financed by the ADV are A. Kruck, op. cit., p. 193; W. Görlich and H. Quint, Adolf Hitler. Eine Biographie, (Stuttgart, 1952), pp. 143, 158.
53. Class und die NSDAP, pp. 10-11.
54. On the leadership crisis, A. Tyrell, Vom 'Trommler' zum 'Führer', pp. 116-31; G. Franz-Willing has calculated that Hitler spent six weeks in Berlin in the summer of 1921 trying to raise money; Krisenjahr, p. 203.
55. Dietrich Eckart was soon to argue that Hitler had prevented the centres of gravity of the movement from being moved from Munich during the leadership crisis; 'Der Gaunerstreich gegen Hitler' VB 4 August 1921.
56. Class und die NSDAP, p. 11.
57. Quoted in G. Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, p. 204. This seems to confirm the story that the ADV offered the party 1 million marks in 1923 (not such a sizeable sum in the year of hyper-inflation) in return for its non-cooperation with Class's enemies, Reinhold Wulle and Albrecht von Graefe; B.S. Chamberlin op. cit., p. 229. Wulle, a Pan-German from Westphalia,
had been editor of the ADV journal Deutsche Zeitung from 1918 to 1920 but had been sacked for neglecting his editorial duties after having been elected a member of the Reichstag representing the Deutschnationale Volkspartei led by von Graefe. From this point on, Wulle and von Graefe attacked Class in the press and in 1923, so Class believed, von Graefe alienated Ludendorff from the ADV by convincing him that Class was an enemy of the Hohenzollern dynasty. A further problem was that von Graefe's new party, the Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei tried to dominate the völkisch movement in 1923. Wider II, pp. 603-21.

58. A. Kruck, op. cit., p. 195. The DVSTB was banned after its leader, Alfred Roth, made a speech glorifying the murder of Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau; U. Lohalm, op. cit., p. 274.


61. Class und die NSDAP, p. 15.

62. Ibid., pp. 17-20.

63. Ibid., p. 21.

64. Ibid., p. 23.


66. Class und die NSDAP, pp. 34-36.


68. W. Class, Wider II, p. 3; cf. 'Die alldeutsche Schuld' Alldeutsche Blätter 18 January 1919 or the Bamberg Declaration; W. Jochmann, op. cit., p. 12.


70. Report of the Munich police to the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior on speech by Hitler on 13 April 1923, Bayerische Haupstaatsarchiv (BHStA) Sonderabgabe I Folder 1755.

71. A. Hitler to Otto Wenzel, quoted in J. Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921-33 (London, 1971), p. 32. Rosenberg claimed that the NSDAP was "no great friend" of the ADV which had become "a jolly tea-club" even though it contained men who had been Germany's "most honourable advisers" in the past; 'Deutsche Worte' VB 14 September 1921.

72. Rolf Eidhalt (anagram of 'Adolf Hitler' used by Alfred Rosenberg in 1924 when the Nazi Party was banned) to Wenzel 18 March 1924, HA 42/843.

74. Class und die NSDAP, p. 41. Hitler did refer to the Austrian Pan-Germans, of course; Mein Kampf, (henceforth MK), (London, 1969), pp. 89-112.

75. MK, pp. 326-27.


77. Class und die NSDAP, pp. 17-18.


79. See note 75. A. Kruck, op. cit., p. 108 makes the point that many Austrian Pan-Germans were members of the ADV and that they are often, mistakenly, equated with the ADV.

80. H. Class, Wider II, pp. 1-3; cf. p. 10. Fuller criticism of the 'New Course' can be found in D. Frymann, op. cit., p. 6-7, 9-10.

81. See the original programme of the ADV, quoted in A. Kruck, op. cit., p. 10.

82. Ibid.


84. Ibid., p. 5.

85. Ibid., p. 8.

86. Ibid., p. 9.

87. Ibid., p. 144.

88. Ibid., p. 5.


90. Einhart, op. cit., p. 318.

91. D. Frymann, op. cit., p. 140.

92. Ibid.

93. See, for example, General von Gebsattel's letter to Class dated 23 July 1914, quoted in F. Fischer, The War of Illusions, p. 456.

94. D. Frymann, op. cit., p. 141. Class did see South-Eastern Europe as a possible area for German settlement within Europe but it was to follow internal colonization and be guaranteed by an eternal alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, Ibid., p. 142.


96. On this see F. Fischer, Germany's Aims, pp. 107-08.

98. Ibid., pp. 145-46.

99. Ibid., p. 147.

100. Ibid., p. 149.

101. Ibid., pp. 151-52.

102. Ibid., p. 168. Class refused to accept that the difficulties experienced by Germans, particularly Baltic Germans, at the hands of Czarist officials were sufficient reason for hostilities. These Germans should, he felt, return home to the Reich, a sign that the protection of Germans abroad was subordinate to the needs of Realpolitik.

103. Ibid., pp. 169-70.

104. Ibid., pp. 152-53. Class claimed to have learned this lesson from Bismarck, Wider II, pp. 392-93.


106. Ibid., p. 157.

107. Ibid., p. 165.

108. Ibid., p. 11.

109. For further details, A. Kruck, op. cit., p. 112.

110. Ibid., pp. 110-11.


112. Ibid., pp. 173-74.

113. D. Frymann, op. cit., p. 175.

114. Ibid., p. 148.

115. Ibid., p. 153.

116. Ibid., pp. 176-77.

117. Ibid., p. 177.

118. Ibid., pp. 71-72, 38.

119. Ibid., p. 37.

120. See the Bamberg Declaration, W. Jochmann, op. cit., pp. 14-17.

121. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

122. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
123. Ibid., p. 19. It should be remembered that before the war, Class had supported the Hapsburg Empire and in 1919 he came under criticism from Reismann-Grone in his book, Der Erdenkrieg und die Alteleutschen (Munheim-Ruhr, 1919); Class was accused of having encouraged the imperial expansionist ambitions of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand and of having thereby spoiled Russo-German relations. Class, reviewing the book in the Alteleutschen Blätter (A. Bl.) 22 November 1919, denied both charges; he had given no encouragement, he claimed, to Hapsburg ambitions and had not agitated for war against Russia; "we did nothing other than draw our own conclusions from the wealth of unfriendly, even hostile, measures of the Russian government." He would always have preferred, he asserted, to return to the Bismarckian policy of alliance with Russia, but events had prevented this.


125. 'J.D.' A. Bl. 16 March 1918.

126. Report in A. Bl. 20 April 1918. 'V' - von Vietinghoff-Scheel, another leading Pan-German agreed, see A. Bl. 30 March 1918.


129. A. Bl. 2 October 1920.


131. The Young Hitler I Knew (New York, no date) paperback edition. Though written after Mein Kampf it is unlikely that Kubizek was influenced by Hitler's account since this version clashes with Hitler's on many occasions. The majority of Hitler's letters and notes are available in BAK NS 26. Some have been published with a commentary by W. Maser (ed.) Hitler's Letters and Notes (New York, 1976). This book has to be used with care because of errors made in the transcription of Hitler's handwriting, see 'H.A.' 'Hitler's Handschrift und Masers Lesefehler' VfZG 21 (1973) pp. 334-36, for corrections. Recently a comprehensive set of documents from Hitler's early life has been published; E. Jäckel and A. Kuhn, Hitler Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen 1905-1924 (Stuttgart, 1980).

132. MK, p. 90.

133. Ibid., pp. 111-12.

134. A. Kubizek, op. cit., p. 75.

135. Ibid., p. 223.

136. Ibid., p. 195.

137. Ibid., p. 224.

139. A. Kubizek, op. cit., p. 221 recalled Hitler in a tirade demanding the creation of a "Reich of all the Germans" which would put the "guest nations" as he called the other races within the Hapsburg Empire, "where they belonged". In a speech on 17 April 1923, Hitler pinpointed what he saw as the great error of pre-war diplomacy, namely the reliance on Austria-Hungary. The Pan-Germans alone, he explained, had warned against this policy. Note once again Hitler's support for the Austrian Pan-Germans who opposed Class's pro-Hapsburg line; report of the Munich police to the Bavarian ministry of the Interior, BHStA I/1755.

140. MK, p. 48.


144. Ibid., p. 168.


146. A. Tyrell, Vom 'Trommler' zum 'Führer' traces this change in Hitler's self-image and in the party's propaganda about Hitler between 1921 and 1923.


148. When Hitler visited Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the English author of the antisemitic tract, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, and son-in-law of Richard Wagner, the first words apparently were: "Greetings to you, spiritual father, trailblazer, pioneer", quoted in H. Reiber (ed.), The Early Goebbels Diaries, p. 83. On Hitler's reaction to meeting Moeller van den Bruck, see below, p. 185.

149. Class und die NSDAP, p. 41.

150. Ibid.

151. In W. Hofer, op. cit., p. 28.


155. B.S. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 216. Otto Ballerstedt, a well-known advocate of a Danubian Confederation uniting Austria and Bavaria, was one of Hitler's bitterest rivals (he was eliminated when other 'old scores' were settled on 30 June 1934). In January 1921 Hitler was found guilty of having slandered Ballerstedt and fined 1000 RM, VB 3 February 1921. In January 1922 Hitler was sentenced to three months imprisonment for having disrupted a meeting chaired by Ballerstedt in September 1921, VB 14 January 1922.

Dr. Georg Heim, leader of the Bayerische Volkspartei, was accused by Hitler of being in league with French and English politicians in a speech on 6 July 1920, report in R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 305.

Karl Graf von Bothmer was, as has been seen, one of Eckart's collaborators on AgD. A Bavarian monarchist and federalist, Bothmer soon clashed with Hitler over his interpretation of French foreign policy; see Hitler's speech on 10 December 1919, report in R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 290.

It has been suggested that Bothmer parted company with Eckart on personal grounds and because of disagreements over antisemitism, U. von Hasselbach, Die Entstehung der nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-partei, 1919-23 diss. univ. Leipzig 1931. After 1920, when he took up an extreme federalist position on the future of Germany and began to write for the Bayerischen Königsboten, organ of the Bayerischen Königspartei, further collaboration was out of the question; R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 290, note 1.

156. See, for example, the speech on 23 January 1920, reported in VB 28 January 1920.

157. Speech on 6 July 1920, see R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 305.

158. See Hitler's speech on 5 September 1920, account in R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 316; at this time, the party began to agitate in earnest for German minority groups abroad, see the reports on Hitler's speeches in VB 22 August, 9 September, and 12 September.

159. See Hitler's speeches respectively on 19 November, reported in VB 25 November; 14 August, account in E. Deuerlein, Hitlers Eintritt, p. 214; and 20 September 1920, ibid., p. 216.


161. Ibid.

162. Speech on 10 December 1919, ibid., p. 209. He had already complained about the loss of Germany's colonies on 13 November, ibid., p. 206.


164. On 20 September 1920 Hitler declared that "Germany had a right to exist like others, not only on grounds of number (90 million in the whole of Europe) but also on the grounds of culture", report in E. Deuerlein, Hitlers Eintritt, p. 216.


167. See note 158.


169. 20 September 1920, ibid., p. 318.

170. Ibid., p. 300.


174. Speech on 7 May, VB 15 May 1920; for Pan-German view see A.Bl. 10 September 1921, 26 January 1923.

175. Speech on 6 July, VB 11 July 1920.


177. A. Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 118-21. The influence of the 'Kaiserbuch' has been the subject of much speculation; A. Kruck feels it was "indispensable" to the Nazi Party's political development, op. cit., p. 60; W. Maser traces specific points in the party programme back to the book, Die Frühgeschichte, p. 208, note 250; however, as A. Tyrell points out, the programme was culled from many völkisch sources; Vom 'Trommler' zum 'Führer', pp. 83-84. Nonetheless the congruence between the 'Kaiserbuch' and Hitler's views on foreign affairs appears to be more than a coincidence.


179. Ibid. The speech was delivered on 29 May 1921; the report in the VB 5 June 1921 makes no reference to internal colonization. For Class's views, D. Frymann, op. cit., p. 142.

180. Speech on 29 May, report in VB 5 June 1921; for Class's views, D. Frymann, op. cit., p. 139.

181. Speech on 17 April 1920, account in R.H. Phelps, Parteirendner, p. 297. The term 'Kunstdünger' may have derived from Pan-German literature. H. Class referred to German emigrants as "Kulturkünder", Deutsche Geschichte, pp. 368, 377. It is quite possible that the police observer at Hitler's speech on 17 April misheard him since Hitler had used the term 'Kulturdünger' on an earlier occasion on 18 January, report in VB 20 January 1920.

183. D. Frymann, op. cit., p. 5; Hitler criticized the socialists who had "rejected the colonial policy which would have been so beneficial to us"; speech on 24 June 1920, PND report in BAK NS 26/81.


186. For Class's views, see above, pp. 78-79 and Einhart, op. cit., p. 301; see Hitler's speeches on 13 November 1919, E. Deuerlein, Hitlers Eintritt, p. 206 and on 6 July, VB 11 July 1920.


188. Speech on 17 April 1920, ibid., p. 297.

189. Ibid.


191. Ibid.

192. Class wrote as follows on the conflicts of the late 17th and early 18th centuries: "of greatest significance was that at the same time as England's power had increased enormously, she had prepared herself to become the greatest colonial power in the world surpassing Spain, Holland, and France; her statesmen had learned during the continuous warfare to let others fight for her - so England could at this time...acquire an overseas empire of immeasurable richness, we will see the English statesmen did not forget these lessons of political selfishness and that they have followed them until today with unswerving cold-bloodedness and with the greatest skill"; Deutsche Geschichte, p. 149.

193. See the notes for a speech entitled 'Arbeiter und Friedensverträge' BAK NS 26/49.


198. Speech on 5 September 1920, R.H. Phelps, *Parteiredner*, p. 314. Cf. speech on 16 January 1920, *BAK NS 26/81*. Konrad Heiden long ago suggested that the basis of Hitler's early alliance system was an alliance between Germany and France; *A History of National Socialism* (London, 1971), pp. 43-44, but no evidence has been found to support this strange claim.

199. MNN 7 September 1920. Two reports reprinted by R.H. Phelps indicate the danger of relying too heavily on police accounts; both describe Hitler's speech on 5 August 1920; the first reports Hitler as saying that it was better to be a "German vagabond than French counts", *op. cit.*, p. 314, the second refers to "French slaves", *ibid.*, p. 316. The difference is quite important.


205. "Russia, like Italy, became our enemy only because of Austria", Hitler explained on 13 April 1923; PND report No. 406, *BHStA I/1755*; Einhart, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

206. Speech on 17 April 1923, PND report No. 407 *BHStA I/1755*.


214. A report given during a visit to the party archives by Drexler on 23 January 1936, *BAK NS 26/82*.


218. The same speech in E. Deuerlein, Hitlers Eintritt, p. 209.


222. PND report on speech on 5 November 1920 in BHStA I/1478.

Chapter 3

1. Speech on 17 April 1920; R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 287.

2. See above pp. 89-90 and note 141.


4. In particular, W. Horn, 'Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers aus dem Frühjahr 1924' VfZG 16 (1968), p. 287. The VB did review the 'Protocols' on 22 April 1920, but this is unlikely to have influenced Hitler since he referred to international Jewish machinations on 17 April.

5. Class und die NSDAP, p. 8.


8. Class und die NSDAP, p. 8. Class was apparently astonished to read the party programme which so closely echoed his own programme of 1912: "I have never imagined that I had contributed in any way with my explanations of the fundamental significance of the struggle against Jewry", ibid.

9. See above, pp. 89-90. This is confirmed by Hitler's comments on Theodore Fritsch's Handbuch der Judenfrage, one of the few sources, which Hitler publicly acknowledged. In January 1931, Hitler welcomed a new edition of the Handbuch saying: "I have already studied it thoroughly in my youth in Vienna, I am convinced that this had had the effect in a special way of preparing the ground for the National Socialist movement", quoted in R.H. Phelps, 'Theodore Fritsch und der Antisemitismus' Deutsche Rundschau 87 (1961), p. 442.

10. Letter to A. Gemlich, dated 16 September 1919, re-printed in E. Deuerlein, Hitlers Eintritt, pp. 203-05. Hitler was chosen because of his outspoken views on the subject to answer an enquiry about antisemitism from Gemlich by Captain Karl Mayr, head of the Reichswehr Information Section, who organized a course of political indoctrination, which Hitler was attending; W. Maser, Die Frühgeschichte, p. 154.

11. Letter to Gemlich, op. cit., p. 204.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.
16. As early as 5 February 1915, Hitler had written from the western front to his friend, Ernst Hepp, expressing the hope that "our domestic internationalism will...collapse. This will be worth much more than any gain in territory", re-printed in W. Maser, Hitler's Letters, pp. 88-89. See also his speeches on 24 February 1920, R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 295, and 24 September 1920, E. Deuerlein, Hitlers Eintritt, p. 218.

17. G. Schubert, op. cit., p. 27; F. Dickmann describes the 'Protocols' as "the most influential book of his (Hitler's) life", op. cit., p. 935.


20. A. Kuhn discusses this; op. cit., pp. 31-32. The Munich Police reports are located in BHStA Abt.I, Sonderabgabe I, the Reichswehr reports in BHStA Abt. IV, Gruppen Kommando 4, Band 46.


22. Report on the meeting on 8 February 1920, drawn up by Ferdinand Wiegand, who was for a short time a member of the DAP's executive committee; HA 4/11 (Akte Wiegand), pp. 1-5.

23. Hitler himself argued that "the Communists (in Germany) do not know that they are serving high finance", speech on 16 January 1920, PND Report BHStA I/1478.


27. R.H. Phelps, 'Hitlers'grundlegende' Rede über den Antisemitismus' VfZG 16 (1968), pp. 400-06.


29. Speech on 10 December 1919, R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 281. Hitler, of course, had been mightily impressed by Feder at the political indoctrination course organised by the Reichswehr at Munich University between 6 and 12 June 1919: "for the first time in my life I heard a principled discussion of the international stock exchange and loan capital. Right after listening to Feder's first lecture, the thought ran through my head that I had now found the way to one of the most essential premisses for the foundation of a new party", Mein Kampf, pp. 189-91.

30. See above, pp. 33-34.

31. "One could perhaps see to it that it was not misused", Hitler said; R.H. Phelps, Hitlers 'grundlegende' Rede, p. 409.
32. Ibid., pp. 409-410.

33. Ibid., p. 410, cf. speech on 17 April 1920, R.H. Phelps, Parteiredeiner, pp. 297-98; cf. speech on 24 April, ibid., p. 299.

34. R.H. Phelps, Hitlers grunlegende Rede, p. 411.


37. Speech on 18 October, R.H. Phelps, Parteiredeiner, p. 323.

38. Ibid.


40. For Class's views on the Jews, see D. Frymann, op. cit., pp. 30-39.

41. Class und die NSDAP, p. 8.

42. W. Hofer, op. cit., p. 30. Eckart did not, of course, have a monopoly on the term - R.J. Gorsleben had contributed an essay on 'Die Uberwindung des Judentums in uns und außer uns' to Paul Tafel's Das neue Deutschland (Munich, 1920), see R.H. Phelps, Hitlers grunlegende Rede, p. 396 - but it is more likely that the party adopted it from Eckart's usage.

43. A. Tyrell, Vom 'Trommler' zum 'Führer', p. 85.

44. M. Plewnia tends to exaggerate Eckart's influence on Hitler, attributing the increased aggressiveness of Hitler's antisemitism to Eckart; op. cit., pp. 55, 66.

45. A. Drexler has specifically denied that anyone other than Hitler and himself was responsible for the "material content" of the party programme, though he did admit that they included Feder's point about "breaking the slavery of interest" because it was "so useful"; letter from Drexler to the party archives, 24 February 1940, HA 4/110. Whilst one might suspect the influence of Eckart in the reference to Jewishness "in and around us" in Point 24, it is generally very difficult to ascribe individual theses from the programme to particular people with any accuracy since the phraseology used was in such common currency in right-wing and antisemitic circles. See, for example, A. Drexler, Mein politisches Erwachen or the programme announced at the DAP meeting on 13 November 1919, E. Deuerlein, Hitlers Entritt, p. 207.

46. For the speech on 5 February 1920, see HA 4/111; E. Deuerlein, Hitlers Eintritt, pp. 210-11; for the speech on 14 August 1919, see A. Tyrell, Vom 'Trommler' zum 'Führer', p. 23.

47. See note 29 in this chapter.

48. Speech on 6 July, report in VB 11 July 1920. The report actually uses the phrase "the black-red-gold government". As we have seen the phrase is likely to have been of Pan-German coinage; D. Frymann, op. cit., pp. 192-93.


51. These were re-published in A. Rosenberg, Die Spur des Juden im Wandel der Zeiten (Munich, 1920), pp. 82-84, 115-22.


53. Hitler may have learnt of the activities of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) from the 'Protocols' themselves, see N. Cohn, op. cit., pp. 60-65, or from Paul Tafel's Das neue Deutschland, pp. 39-42. Since Tafel stressed the differences between the Jews and the freemasons, he is a less likely source than Rosenberg, who, as has been seen, stressed the compatibility of their aims, see above, pp. 27-29.

54. Speech on 6 July 1920, R. H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 305.

55. R. H. Phelps, Hitlers 'grundlegende' Rede, p. 405. For Rosenberg's views, see above pp. 23-27.


57. On 31 May, report in VB 5 June 1920; for Rosenberg's views see above, p. 24.


62. A summary of the controversy in which both Hanfstängl and Herman Göring tried to portray Rosenberg in the worst possible light is given in Vorwärts 14 November 1931. Rosenberg successfully sued Vorwärts, 8 Uhr-Abendblatt, and Münchner Post for libel but not Der Nationalsozialist which first published the accusation. See also, VB, 29 June 1932.

63. A brief biography of Rosenberg without date or author, HA 53/1259. After consulting the files of the War Ministry, the Munich Police were able to report on 19 December 1931 that in November 1918 Rosenberg had been employed as a German teacher with the German Government in Estonia; ibid.

65. A. Rosenberg, 'Meine erste Begegnung mit dem Führer' (1934) in BAK NS 8/177. See also LA, p. 80 and an undated memoir in NS 8/20. Eckart first spoke to the DAP on 14 August 1919 but Hitler did not visit the DAP until 12 September. On this occasion, Eckart was due to speak again but was prevented by illness and Feder took his place; A. Tyrell, Vom 'Trommler' zum 'Führer', p. 23. It is therefore very likely that Rosenberg heard Hitler's name for the first time on the latter occasion.

66. A. Rosenberg, 'Meine erste Begegnung', loc. cit.

67. LA, p. 91.

68. Undated memoir, NS 8/20.

69. 'Meine erste Begegnung', loc. cit.

70. LA, p. 22. Rosenberg quoted as an example of the "small controversies", an argument over whether the trees planted in the Odeonsplatz ruined the view of the monument.

71. LA, p. 325; Memoirs, p. 202. Rosenberg recalled that both he and Hitler once wrote articles on alcoholism for the VB without each other's knowledge and that they were so similar that Rosenberg decided not to publish his own. Hitler, however, insisted that both be published in the same issue. See VB 31 March 1926, Hitler's was entitled 'Zur Frage der Trockenbewegung', Rosenberg's 'Alcoholverbot'.

72. LA, p. 325; Memoirs, p. 202; GTT, p. 278.

73. Die Spur des Juden im Wandel der Zeiten (Munich, 1920), Unmoral im Talmud (Munich, 1920), Das Verbrechen der Freimaurerei (Munich, 1921).


75. LA, p. 99. Rosenberg's first article in VB 'Der Zionismus' appeared on 17 February 1921. Most of Rosenberg's articles in the VB carry his initials at the end.

76. LA, p. 100; Memoirs, p. 70.

77. Undated biography drawn up by the Munich police, HA 53/1259; on Hitler's decision, see A. Rosenberg, LA, pp. 105-06.

78. Rosenberg's record was impressive:
   1. One week imprisonment 1 October 1921 (reason unknown)
   2. 21 June 1923 sentenced to 100,000 mark fine or 20 days imprisonment for libel.
   3. 7 January 1924 120 DM fine or 10 days imprisonment for slander.
   4. 11 April 1924 100 DM fine or 10 days imprisonment for libel.
   5. 22 March 1926 1 month imprisonment for libel.
   6. 25 September 1926 1 week imprisonment for libel.
   14 June 1927 300 DM fine or 30 days imprisonment for libel.

Clearly, Rosenberg paid his dues for the party! Details can be found in the undated biography drawn up by the Munich police, HA 53/1259.

79. LA, p. 102.
80. VB 21 June 1922.

81. Memoirs, p. 49. With the record of libel cases quoted above, deportation might have been a genuine threat without German citizenship.

82. Ibid., p. 70.


86. J. Fest, Hitler, pp. 204-05. Ernst Hanfstängl, a hostile witness, claimed that Hitler appointed Rosenberg party leader but did not intend to establish a "Rosenberg regency", letter to Heinrich Hoffmann, dated 1 February 1924 in HA 33/636. According to Hanfstängl, Hitler wanted Rosenberg to work in closer collaboration with Max Amann, Esser and Julius Streicher; E. Hanfstängl, Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus. Memoiren eines politischen Aussenseiters (Munich, 1970), p. 49.

87. E. Hanfstängl, Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus, pp. 78, 64, 105; A. Rosenberg, Memoirs, p. 70.

88. LA, p. 107. Interestingly enough, when interrogated in 1924 by the Munich police about the illegal continuation of the now banned party, Rosenberg denied being its leader arguing that he "had not previously been active in an organisational capacity in the party", report dated 30 May 1924 in HA 68/1497A.

89. LA, pp. 107-8; on this, see W. Horn, Führerideologie und Parteiorganisation in der NSDAP (Düsseldorf, 1972).

90. Quoted in R. Cecil, op. cit., p. 51.

91. Speech on 6 July 1920, R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 305.

92. Ibid., p. 308.


94. See above, pp. 20-23.


96. Ibid., p. 44. At this point, Thies seems to be arguing that the global dimension entered the conflict between the German race and the Jews in 1922, but his conclusion puts it in 1920. He quotes no evidence to support such a conclusion.


98. R.H. Phelps, Hitlers 'grundlegende' Rede, p. 416.

99. See above, p. 132.


106. W. Horn, 'Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hiters aus dem Frühjahr 1924' *VfZG* 16, (1968), p. 287. G. Schubert, *op. cit.*, p. 35-36 does not agree: "the Ideologisierung of Hitler's foreign policy outlook at least for the period up to 1923 altered not at all the view that England and France and to a lesser degree also America were to be seen as Germany's 'absolute enemies'". Its impact was first felt in April 1923, according to Schubert, *ibid.*, p. 59.


112. See above, pp. 44-47.


119. See above, pp. 106-07.


121. See above, p. 103.


123. See above, pp. 48-49.

124. Speech on 27 April 1920, R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 299; see also Hitler's speeches on 11 June 1920, E. Deuerlein, Hitlers Eintritt, p. 214 and 20 September 1920, ibid., p. 216.


127. The Communist was identified as 'Branz' by the police observer, R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 306. It is perhaps worth noting that folkish opinion was not united on the question of Russia, the VB, at this time still the organ of the Deutschsozialistische Partei, favoured conciliation with Soviet Russia; a Soviet offensive against British colonies would force Britain, so the DSP argued, to leave her European allies in the lurch, a development which would undoubtedly benefit Germany, see VB 28 February and 13 March 1920. However, Arnold Rechberg, a regular contributor to the VB and well-known francophile, did consistently warn against the danger of Bolshevism's commitment to world-wide revolution, see his 'Bolschevismus in Russland', VB 26 and 29 April 1920. Rechberg was well-known for his appeal to the entente nations to lead a campaign against Bolshevism, see Graf Rudiger von der Goltz, Meine Sendung in Finnland und im Baltikum (Leipzig, 1920), p. 260. Rechberg was later to cross swords with the Nazis over his pro-French line and in November 1922 he was to warn General Ludendorff against co-operating with Hitler, see his letter to Ludendorff of 18 November 1922, re-printed in Ursache un Folgen Bd.5, pp. 417-18. For further information on Rechberg, see E. von Vietsch, Arnold Rechberg und das Problem der politischen West-orientierung Deutschlands nach dem Weltkrieg (Koblenz, 1958).

128. Speech on 27 July, R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 308. On another occasion, he appealed to the nationalism of the 'strong' Russian revolutionaries, calling upon them "to place their power at the disposal of their own fatherland" as opposed to Jewry, PND report 24 June 1920, NS 26/81.


130. Report in R.H. Phelps, Parteiredner, p. 329. It is not clear whether Hitler harboured secret designs on these Russian territories.

131. A. Kuhn agrees with this, op. cit., pp. 52-55.
132. Report of the same speech in MNN 29 July 1920, BHStA I/1478. A further report quotes Hitler as saying that "an alliance with Russia would be impossible without the precondition of complete national solidarity in Germany", Bayerische Zeitung 29 July 1920.

133. Speech on 1 August 1920, account in H. Preiss (ed.), Adolf Hitler in Franken, Reden aus der Kampfzeit (no place or date of publication), p. 11.

134. Ibid.
Chapter 4


7. Albert Speer suspects that it might have been; "the hatred of the Jews was Hitler's central conviction; sometimes it even seems to me that everything else was merely camouflage for this real motivating factor"; *Spandau. The Secret Diaries*, (London, 1977), p. 373.


9. Speech on 3 February, report in *VB* 6 February 1921. This line was repeated in an article entitled *'Das Bündnis mit Sowjet-Russland'* (no author given) *VB* 3 March 1921: "the English interest is in the ruin of her great enemies, Russia and Germany".

10. A. Hitler, *'Deutschlands letzte Hoffnung'* *VB* 22 May 1921. See also A. Rosenberg, *'Schicksalswende in London'* *VB* 6 March 1921.

11. A. Hitler, *'Staatsmänner oder Nationalverbrecher'* *VB* 15 March 1921 (text also in *HA* 2/46).

12. A. Hitler, *'Pollackenbüttengemeinheiten'* *VB* 15 March 1921; cf. further articles in *VB* 8 May and 12 May 1921.

13. A. Hitler, *'Der ewige Gimpel'* *VB* 22 May 1921.

14. *Ibid*. For further evidence of Hitler's mistrust of Lloyd George, see his article *'Rathenau und Sancho Pansa'* *VB* 13 March 1921 (text in *HA* 2/46).

15. A. Hitler, *'Lumpenrepublik'* *VB* 26 May 1921.

16. A. Hitler, *'Oberschlesiens Schicksal'* *VB* 29 May 1921.

17. *Ibid*.

18. The same obstacle now stood between a German-English alliance as stood between a German-Russian one: rule by international Jewry. A. Kuhn argues that Russia was seen in 1921 as having the best chance of overthrowing Jewry and Hitler, therefore, still preferred the eastern alliance to one with England; *op. cit.*, pp. 65-66. This ignored the fact that England was being considered as a possible alliance partner for the first time.
19. Hitler provided further evidence of his hostility towards Britain when he argued that "under the threats of France on the one hand and the string of accursed British lies (told) by Lloyd George on the other the final remnants of German independence were broken", 'Beginn der Judendiktatur' VB 5 June 1921.


21. 'Börsenjuden und Revolution' VB 22 February 1921, an unsigned article claimed by Rosenberg as his own in 'Schicksalswende in London' VB 6 March 1921: cf. A. Rosenberg, 'Der grosse Weltbetrug' VB 1 May 1921 which spelt out the British betrayal of the nationalist forces in Russia. Anton Drexler also felt that the major powers could have defeated Bolshevism if they had really wanted to; 'War hat die Revolution bis jetzt erreicht?' VB 21 August 1921.

22. A. Rosenberg, 'Schicksalswende' VB 6 March 1921.

23. 'Weltbetrug' VB 1 May 1921.

24. Hitler's speech on 3 May, report in VB 8 May 1921.

25. Hitler's notes in NS 26/49. The date is given in a list of the most important NSDAP meetings from February 25 1920 until May 1922 in HA 68/1405. The VB report on 5 June 1921 corresponds very closely to Hitler's notes though the reference to the identity of interest between England and Jewry is not mentioned.

26. "Hunger im Krieg Rathenau England

Innen Aussen

Kriegsgesellschaften Hungenblockade",

Untitled speech notes in NS 26/49.


28. Ibid.

29. A. Rosenberg, 'Das irische Problem' VB 14 September 1921.

30. Ibid. Eckart had already argued that the Irish independence movement was led by the Jews and that success would mean the end of English power. 'Jewry uber Alles' Agd 26 November 1920. This was an early sign of sympathy for the British; if this was an indication that Eckart, at least, favoured collaboration with England as early as November 1920, it has been impossible to find any evidence to corroborate this.

32. A. Rosenberg, 'Amerikanische Neuigkeiten' _Asg_ 15 February 1921.

33. A. Rosenberg, 'Antisemitismus III' _VB_ 7 August 1921.


35. Unsigned 'Politische Rundschau' _VB_ 21 January 1922. Eckart took over editorial control of the paper on 12 August 1921.

36. Ibid.


38. A. Rosenberg, 'Wirth bleibt: Deutschland fault weiter' _VB_ 18 February 1922; Rosenberg saw the establishment of an alliance of America, Great Britain, Russia, and China against Japan in the Four-Power Pact but this was a complete misconception since Russia did not even attend the Washington Conference and Japan, not Russia, was the fourth member of the Pact.


40. Notes for speech entitled 'Dummheit oder Verbrechen' _NS_ 26/49 delivered on 4 January, see _VB_ 9 January 1921.

41. Report on a speech on 21 October in _Verlag Bayerisches Wochenblatt_ 22 October 1921 in _BHStA I/1480_.

42. A. Kuhn, _op. cit._, pp. 66-67.

43. Text of the speech re-printed in E. Boepple (ed.) _Adolf Hitlers Reden_ (Munich, 1923), p. 22, see also report in _VB_ 6 August 1922. Rosenberg too traced the origin of the recent Jewish problem to 1789 and the ideals of the French Revolution which led to the emancipation of the Jews, '1789-1517' _VB_ 22 February 1921.

44. E. Boepple, _op. cit._, pp. 23-24.

45. Ibid., pp. 24-36; cf. Hitler's speech on 17 August reported in _Augsburger Abendzeitung_ 19 August 1922 in _BHStA I/1480_ and speech on 10 September, report in _VB_ 13 September 1922.

46. Hitler's speech reported in _Münchener Zeitung_ 22 November 1922, _BHStA I/1480_.


49. A. Huhn's evidence corrects G. Schubert's view that a change took place only after the Ruhr invasion; Schubert, op. cit., p. 74.


52. MK p. 617.

53. A. Rosenberg, Staatsfeindliche Zionismus auf Grund jüdischer Quellen erläutert (Munich, 1922), re-printed in Schriften und Reden p. 75.

54. Staatsfeindliche Zionismus, p. 52; cf. Schriften und Reden, p. 90.

55. Staatsfeindliche Zionismus, p. 53; Schriften und Reden, p. 92.


57. Staatsfeindliche Zionismus, p. 53. The last phrase about the leadership of world politics passing to the US is omitted from the 1943 edition, Schriften und Reden, p. 92.

58. A. Rosenberg, Pest in Russland, pp. 63-64.

59. Staatsfeindliche Zionismus, p. 54; Schriften und Reden, p. 82. "North America is today another name for Israel" wrote Rosenberg in 'Der Antisemitismus' Deutschlands Erneuerung 6 (1922) p. 367.

60. Staatsfeindliche Zionismus, p. 50; Schriften und Reden p. 87. R. Cecil, op. cit., p. 73-74, has suggested that the main reason for Rosenberg's relocation of the Jewish headquarters to New York was that the United States was now the crux of the reparations issue; America's refusal to write off allied war debts meant that France and Britain had to insist on German payment of the reparations account. This makes sense since, to Rosenberg, German money was finding its way into the hands of the New York stock exchange but one should not overlook the eclipse of British economic and strategic power after the war which caused the 'capitulation' at the Washington conference and the imperial problems of which Rosenberg was aware.

61. A. Rosenberg, 'Lloyd Georges Rüchritt' VB 21 October 1922.

62. Ibid.

63. Unsigned article, 'Untergang oder Widerstand; entweder oder' VB 5 August 1922.

64. Unsigned article, 'Jüdische Weltpolitik' VB 4 October 1922. The writer acknowledged several quotes from Rosenberg's Staatsfeindliche Zionismus.

65. A. Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 91, 84-88.

67. A. Rosenberg, 'Der neue Gimpelfang' VB 14 July 1923. The same is true about the article which A. Kuhn cites, in which it was suggested that the upcoming elections in England would not bring about any immediate or decisive change; (unsigned) 'Politische Rundschau' VB 15 November 1922.


69. Hitler's speeches on 20 March, reported in VB 22 March, and 25 July, reported in VB 27 July 1923; America would not lift a finger to help either, according to Hitler; speech on 5 September, reported in VB 7 September 1923.

70. He did point out that the party's "positive appraisal" could be gauged by "reading between the lines"; 'England, Frankreich und Alljudaan' VB 5 July 1923. Elsewhere, Rosenberg argued that a daily paper was not the place for disputes over dogma, 'Erklärung' VB 30 March 1923.

71. It was a turning-point in Hitler's own fortunes; "a few weeks after the march on Rome, I was received by Minister Schweyer. That would never have happened otherwise"; H.R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler's Table Talk (London, 1953), p. 10. Hitler was immediately portrayed in party propaganda as the 'Bavarian Mussolini'; see W. Horn, Führerideologie und Parteiorganisation in der NSDAP (Düsseldorf, 1972), pp. 79-81 and A. Tyrell, Vom 'Trommler' zum Führer, p. 274.

72. This revises G. Schubert's view that the introduction of ideology into Hitler's foreign policy "changed nothing at least for the period up to 1923"; op. cit., p. 36.

73. W.W. Pese, 'Hitler und Italien 1920-1926' VfZG 3 (1955), pp. 113, 116; cf. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 43, 72; Jäckel, op. cit., pp. 33-34. Hitler did not forget when the first piece of his alliance puzzle fell into place. In a letter to Colonel von Reichenau on 4 December 1932, he recalled that he had argued for an Italian alliance for "about the last twelve years". On 1 July 1940 he told the Italian ambassador to Germany that he had foreseen the alliance "as early as twenty years" ago, both recollections quoted in E. Jäckel, op. cit., p. 33 note 12.

74. Speech on 1 August 1920 reprinted in H. Preiss, Adolf Hitler in Franken, pp. 9-10.


76. Submitted by 'R. (Innsbruck)', VB 17 February 1922.

77. Ibid.

78. Unsigned article, 'Wulle-Mussolini' VB 29 July 1922.

79. Ibid.

80. Unsigned article 'Fascismus und Nationalsozialismus' VB 2 August 1922.

82. Ibid. Point 8 of an eight-point programme for a Bavarian government would be, he said, that "the question of the Anschluss of German Austria must be tackled by every means".

83. Lüdecke heard Hitler speak on 11 August 1922 and, after meeting Hitler, decided to join his cause. Biographical details are contained in a report from the Munich Police to the Ministry of the Interior, dated 5 February 1923, BHStA I/1755, and also in a report from the German Foreign Office to the Staatsministerium des Aussern dated 21 December 1923, re-printed in E. Deuerlein, Der Hitlerputsch, pp. 543-47. This contains reports from the German Embassy in Rome on Lüdecke's activities. For more on Lüdecke's background, G. Schubert, op. cit., pp. 138-143.

84. K. Lüdecke, op. cit., p. 63. Lüdecke also wanted to foster good German-American relations in view of the enormous potential which the latter possessed; ibid., pp. 270, 287-8, 295-97.

85. Historians have often doubted if this mission actually took place but it seems clear that it did; the Munich Police knew of it as did the German Embassy officials in Rome, one of whom, Count Prittwitz, had been visited by Lüdecke, see the report as detailed in note 83.

86. K. Lüdecke, op. cit., p. 73. It is clear from Lüdecke's recollections that Mussolini was not yet in power; "within a few weeks or months, Italy might mean - Mussolini"; ibid., p. 80.

87. Ibid. pp. 80-81. The reference to the "Northern European states" - presumably the Scandinavian countries - was not followed up at this time.

88. Ibid. p. 81.

89. The alliance would receive a favourable reception in Hungary and Bulgaria also, it was argued, because of its anti-French orientation; ibid., p. 81.

90. Hitler's speech on 14 November 1922, report in Münchener Post 20 December 1922, BHStA I/1766. It has been suggested that Hitler mentioned the Anschluss in order to convince doubters in the party; G. Schubert, op. cit., p. 77.

91. Report by E.A. Scharrer to Chancellor Cuno, BAK R431/2681. Hitler admitted to Scharrer that Italian aid to Germany would depend on the latter's attitude towards the Anschluss and the South Tyrol question.

92. Alldeutscher Blätter 20 October 1922; cf. A.Bl. 31 January 1920; A.Bl. 14 January 1922.


95. Report by the German Ambassador in Rome, Neurath, to the German Foreign Office, 29 March 1923; E. Deuerlein, Hitlerputsch, p. 543.

96. Unnamed writer 'Die weltpolitische Lage Ende 1922' VB 30 December 1922; cf. 'Politische Rundschau' (unsigned) VB 15 November 1922.

97. Rosenberg later implied that he disagreed with Hitler on occasion over foreign policy - possibly over the Italian alliance, though this is not clear from the text of Rosenberg's memoirs, LA, p. 318; G. Schubert believes that this was so, op. cit., pp. 134-35.

98. A. Rosenberg, 'Deutschland und Italien' VB 17/18 June 1923; he used almost identical words a few days earlier in an editorial comment on an article, entitled 'Der Faschismus' VB 14 June. Rosenberg believed Mussolini would collaborate with Germany to oppose French hegemony; see his articles 'Italiens auswärtige politik' VB 3 March and 'Englische Hohn und all-jüdische Weltpolitik' VB 15 May 1923.

99. 'Deutschland und Italien' loc. cit.; Rosenberg added "we do not want to go into this further today".

100. Rosenberg concluded so "conscious policy and passion can, indeed, must go side by side", ibid. This could be criticizing Hitler's view, quoted above p. 171, that "in politics, there is no sentiment, only cold-bloodedness".

101. A. Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 99, 102-03; W. Horn, 'Ein unbekannter Aufsatz', loc. cit., p. 280; K. Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich (Munich, 1969), p. 75. All three argue that until 1924 there is a missing ingredient in Hitler's view of Russia - Raumpolitik. J. Düller, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. Reichspolitik und Flottenbau, 1920-1939 (Düsseldorf, 1973), p. 207 also puts Hitler's decision after the Ruhr crisis, but does argue (reversing Kuhn's sequence) that the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia caused Hitler to think in terms of an English alliance.

102. A. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 115.


104. E. Hanfstängl, The Missing Years, p. 52.

105. Ibid., p. 64 cf. 43. Hanfstängl tried to get Hitler to think about America but Hitler felt she was too far away to affect his foreign policy in the short term, ibid., pp. 90, 121.


108. A. Rosenberg, 'Schicksalswende in London' VB 6 March 1921. He criticized the Münchener Zeitung for its 'National Bolshevism'.


110. A. Hitler, 'Staatsmänner oder Nationalverbrecher' VB 15 March 1921. In the same edition in a report on a speech by Rosenberg on 11 March, the VB described him as "a particular expert on the Russian national spirit".

111. Hitler’s speech on 3 May, reported in VB 8 May 1921; A. Rosenberg’s article, 'Der grosse Weltbetrug' VB 1 May 1921. Of course the Anglo-Russian negotiations must have been fairly common knowledge so there is no proof that Hitler picked this up from Rosenberg.

112. Report on Hitler’s speech on 4 August in VB 11 August 1921; A. Rosenberg’s article 'Der Pogrom am deutschen und am russischen Volke' VB 4 August 1921; cf. 'Die jüdische Seele' VB 25 August 1921.

113. 'Das Verbrechen der Freimaurerei' Agd 15 January 1921, pp. 8-9; D. Eckart, 'Zwischen den Schächtchen' Agd 5 March 1920, p. 105.

114. Hitler’s speech on 4 August, report in VB 11 August 1921.


116. A. Rosenberg, 'Das Verbrechen der Freimaurerei' Agd 28 February 1921, p. 120.

117. For Hitler’s comment on the Russian empire, see above, pp. 140-41. Rosenberg’s comments are from 'Vom Brest-Litovsk nach Versailles' VB 8 May 1921. They differ from Hitler’s assessment of Brest-Litovsk which overlooked the fact that it was signed by a Soviet government, Hitler’s speech on 31 May, report in VB 5 June 1921.


119. Thilo von Trotha’s introduction to Kampf um die Macht, p. 13. He is referring to Rosenberg’s articles from 1923-25, but the comment is even more appropriate to earlier articles.

120. A. Rosenberg, 'Regierungsbolschewisimus in Reich' VB 3 December 1921.

121. Hitler’s speech on 12 April 1922 in: E. Boepple, op. cit., pp. 8-9; cf. A. Rosenberg, 'Genova' VB 15 April 1922.
122. Unsigned article, 'Genua' VB 19 April 1922. Note that it is 'Pan-Jewish Anglo-Saxon world-policy' rather than the more usual 'Anglo-Jewish' policy, further evidence of America's supposed involvement with Jewish affairs.

123. Report in VB 26 April 1922.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

126. A. Rosenberg, 'Frankreich in Genua' VB 3 May 1922. The Pan-German response, however, was almost identical to that of the Nazis. The Pan-German press railed against a "pact with the devil" and "with an already decomposing corpse", unsigned article 'Zur Zeitgeschichte' A.B. 22 April 1922. These arguments had been rehearsed for many months in the Pan-German and Nazi press, so their similarity is not so surprising.

127. 'Frankreich in Genua' loc. cit.

128. Hitler's speech on 5 May, reported in VB 13 May 1922.

129. Hitler's speech on 21 April, report in VB 26 April 1922.

130. Eckart and Hermann Esser, perhaps the party's best orator after Hitler, followed the same line; see Eckart, 'Ein neuer Weltkrieg in Sicht' VB 17 May 1922 and 'Das bayerische Orakel von Genua' VB 24 May 1922 and a report on a speech by Esser in the same edition. A. Rosenberg, 'Gegen die jüdische Bankenpest' VB 31 May 1922.


132. The Juni-klub, the core of the Ring movement, attracted leading German nationalists, including Eduard Stadtlter of the Anti-Bolshevik League, Hans Grimm, the poet and novelist, and Max von Scheunber-Richter, later to be one of Hitler's associates; H.J. Schwierskott, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck und der revolutionäre Nationalismus in der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, 1962), p. 87. Hitler's encounter with the Juni-klub must have occurred between the end of February, when Hitler gave his last speech before going off around Germany, and 1 April, when the VB announced Hitler's return to Munich. The main source for the meeting is Rudolf Pechel, a Juni-klub member and editor of Deutsche Rundschau, who, in fact, on learning about Hitler from Professor Karl Haushofer, the geopolitician, early in 1922 met and invited Hitler to speak in Berlin; R. Pechel, Deutscher Widerstand (Zürich, 1947), pp. 277-80.

133. I rely here on the recollections of his friends, P. Fechter, Menschen und Zeiten, Begegnungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten (Gütersloh, 1949), pp. 329-33, see also his Moeller van den Bruck, Ein politisches Schicksal (Berlin, 1934); H. Grimm, Warum - Woher - Aber Wohin - vor, unter, und nach der geschichtlichen Erscheinung Hitlers (Lippoldsberg, 1954), pp. 95-101, 108.

1957), p. 10; O.E. Schüddekopf, *Linke Leute von Rechts. Die national-
revolutionären Minderheiten und der Kommunismus in der Weimarer
103-14.

135. R. Pechel, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-80. According to another witness, Moeller
added that "if Hitler were to abuse his concept of the Third Reich for
purposes of power, he would commit suicide", quoted in K. von Klemperer,
*op. cit.*, p. 194.

136. Grimm and Moeller had been close friends since the war when they both
served in the Military Department of the German Foreign Office; they
were in close contact until Moeller's death in 1923; P. Fechter, *An der
Wende der Zeit* (Gütersloh, 1949), p. 390. Grimm claims to have first
heard of Hitler when Moeller visited him in 1920: Hitler's declarations
had not been well-received and Moeller pinned no hopes on him", H. Grimm,
*Warum-Woher-Aber Wohin*, p. 108. It is probable that Grimm is mistaken
about the date, but it is just possible that there was a meeting in 1920
as well as the one in 1922; this would explain Moeller's anger at
On the whole, however, this is unlikely since Grimm's account of the
encounter in no way conflicts with Pechel's.


138. 'Die Deutschen' reprinted in H. Schwarz (ed.) *Das Ewige Reich. Bd. I Die
politische Kräfte* (Breslau, 1933), p. 331.

139. Ibid., pp. 337-38.

140. Moeller described Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* as "the fateful
book of our whole generation", quoted in H. Schwarz (ed.) *Das Recht der


142. Ibid., p. 336.

143. A. Moeller, 'Unser Problem ist der Osten', first published 10 May 1916,
reprinted in H. Schwarz (ed.), *Rechenschaft über Russland* (Berlin, 1933),
p. 137.

144. A. Moeller, 'Der Aufbruch nach Osten' first published 3 April 1918,
reprinted in H. Schwarz (ed.), *Der politische Mensch* (Breslau, 1933), p. 156.

145. A. Moeller, 'Die einzige Gewissheit', first published on 8 August 1918,
reprinted in *Rechenschaft*, p. 175.

146. Ibid.

147. A. Moeller, 'Deutsche Grenzboten', first published on 19 May 1920,
reprinted in H. Schwarz (ed.), *Sozialismus und Außenpolitik* (Breslau,
1933), p. 65.
148. R. Adam, Moeller van den Bruck (Königsberg, 1933), p. 11; K. von Klemperer, op. cit., p. 159; K.O. Paetel, 'Der deutsche Nationalbolschewismus 1918/1932: Ein Bericht' Aussenpolitik 3 (1952), pp. 229, 232; all three supported the view that Moeller was anti-imperialist.


153. A. Moeller, 'Sozialistische Aussenpolitik', first published on 11 February 1920, reprinted in Sozialismus und Aussenpolitik, pp. 77-82. As Moeller explained, "when Bolshevism pushed towards India, then it meant England. And when it pressed against Poland, then it meant France. It meant our enemies. That unites the Russian and the German socialism." When, in the wake of the Ruhr occupation in 1923, Karl Radek, a leading representative of the Comintern, tried to establish cordial relations with German right-wing groups, National Bolshevism was briefly in vogue again. The VB, however, agreed with the negative response of Moeller van den Bruck and Graf Reventlow to Radek's idea of collaboration against Western imperialism; 'Bolschewismus in Nationalsozialismus' VB 8 August 1922. Moeller, in fact, insisted that Bolshevik Russia recognise that German socialism had its own national character and was not based on class conflict; O.E. Schüddekopf, op. cit., p. 151. It may be that Radek's concrete proposals intruded awkwardly upon Moeller's purely intellectual Russophilism and the latter was forced, as Fritz Stern put it, to escape "Radek's threatened embrace", op. cit., p. 252.


155. See above, p. 165.

156. The title of an article by Rosenberg in Agd 12 December 1919.


158. Pest in Russland, p. 38. For the first hint of this, see Das Verbrechen der Freimaurerei (Munich, 1922), p. 41 in which Rosenberg attributed the Russian Revolution to the world conspiracy, "allied to the anarchistic impulse of the Russian people and Jewish hatred."

159. Pest in Russland, p. 38.
160. Ibid., pp. 93-94.

161. Ibid., p. 81.

162. Foreword to the 2nd. edition, dated March 1924, Ibid., p. 6. In the first edition, Rosenberg wrote: "The fate of Germany is dependent in the first place on which Russia she seeks to have relations: whether she - like some circles - regards the present Russia as a given and immovable fact... or whether the present ruling system in Moscow is to be viewed as an unnatural dictatorship, which is hostile to, and forced upon, the Russian people, and which will be wrecked by the vital forces of a great nation, which can never be completely quelled"; foreword dated May 1922, Ibid., p. 5.


165. Ibid., pp. 14, 56.


167. 'Von Brest-Litovsk nach Versailles' loc. cit.

168. A. Rosenberg, Wesen, Grundsätze und Ziele der NSDAP (Munich, 1923) in Schriften und Reden, p. 135. His foreword is dated January 1923.

169. Ibid., p. 136. R. Cecil seems to imply that Rosenberg was interested only in the resettlement of Germany's eastern provinces, op. cit., p. 165.

170. 'Wesen', loc. cit., p. 135.

172. Hitler had been in prison from 27 June until 26 July during which time Rosenberg's book had been published. His first speech on 28 July after his release showed clearly that Hitler had read it. He described the destruction of the Russian national economy by international finance and the elimination of the Russian intelligentsia; account in E. Boepple, op. cit., pp. 27-28; cf. Pest in Russland, pp. 30-31, p. 18 (page numbers from the second edition). Hitler repeated Rosenberg's observation that, having rooted out all remnants of Czarist absolutism, the Soviets had had to seek out former Czarist officials to improve administrative efficiency; E. Boepple, op. cit., pp. 29; Pest in Russland, p. 39. Hitler also dwelt on the seizure of the land of the Russian aristocracy and the death of millions of Russians by execution or from starvation; E. Boepple, op. cit., p. 30; Pest in Russland, pp. 19-20, 46-49. Though it should be remembered that little of Rosenberg's book was new, the similarities are too marked to be coincidental; cf. W. Laqueur, Russia and Germany, p. 56, note 10.

173. Report of Hitler's speech at the party conference, VB 31 January 1923. Rosenberg claimed later that he had talked over the pamphlet with Hitler before publication, LA, p. 104. Kurt Lüdecke recalled Hitler expanding the party programme one evening, "using Alfred Rosenberg's pamphlet, Character, Principles and Aims of the Nazi Party, fresh from the press....", op. cit., p. 98.
174. Born in Riga in 1884, the son of a German musician, Max-Erwin Richter grew up in Reval. At school he met Otto von Kursell, a later associate in the Nazi movement, and they both went to the Technical University at Riga, where they were members of the Corps Rubonia, the student organization to which Alfred Rosenberg and Arno Schickedanz, two other later Nazis, were to belong. In Munich in 1905 he married, and acquired the aristocratic double-barrelled name 'von Scheubner-Richter'. In 1914 he joined a cavalry regiment of the German Army and served with Paul Leverkuehn, whose valedictory biography of Scheubner-Richter is perhaps the most valuable, if at times slightly suspect, source; Posten auf ewiger Wache. Aus dem abenteuerlichen Leben des Max von Scheubner-Richter, (Essen, 1938); M.H. Boehm's article 'Baltische Einflüsse', loc. cit., is also useful.

175. Quoted in W. Laqueur, 'Russia and Germany' Survey (October, 1962), p. 94.


178. Ibid., p. 52.

179. M. Boehm, op. cit., p. 58.


181. A. Winnig, op. cit., p. 94.


183. Scheubner-Richter offered no explanation for his last-minute reprieve. M. Boehm, op. cit., p. 58 attributes it to a trick played by Scheubner-Richter's old friend Schickedanz; C. Grimm, op. cit., p. 296 credits the intervention of Scheubner-Richter's wife and the German Embassy officials; whilst A. Winnig, op. cit., p. 130 credits the German Foreign Ministry intervention alone.


186. See the letters from the WAD to legations' councillor von Dirksen at the German Foreign Ministry, 3 October 1919, GFM 21/432 Wk bd. 41 and Scheubner-Richter's report to the Foreign Office, Vom Kampf um die deutschen Ostmark. Tätigkeitsbericht des Obmanns des Ostdeutschen Heimatsdienstes für die Zeit vom 1 Februar bis zum 1 Juni 1920 dated May 1920, reprinted in P. Leverkuehn, op. cit., p. 202.

188. M. Boehm, op. cit., p. 58.


190. Ibid., pp. 204-08; cf. pp. 9, 221.


195. Scheubner-Richter's speech at Bad Reichenhall, report in Der Kampf, 7 June 1921, HA 51/1197; cf. P. Leverkuehn, op. cit., p. 185; H.E. Volkmann, op. cit., p. 51 wrongly dates the inception of Aufbau from October 1921.


199. For example, "firstly that the only way to rebuild Russia was with a monarchy, with a Romanov monarch and secondly that the monarchical movement be led by a legal heir to the imperial throne", M. Scheubner-Richter, 'Bund der russisch-legitimistischen Monarchisten' WPA, 20 July 1923.

200. Scheubner-Richter organised the second monarchist conference in Budapest in June 1922 and he found himself in trouble with the German Foreign Office for having welcomed the assassination of Walther Rathenau. Though he denied this, it seems likely that he did express the hope that this might mean the end of Germany's pro-Bolshevik foreign policy; letters from Fürstenberg to the German Foreign Office, dated 30 June and 18 July 1922, AA Abt. IV Russland POSA Innere Politik bd. 3. Interestingly, von Maitzan at the Foreign Office warned the Embassy in Budapest on 27 July that "experiences with Scheubner-Richter here recommend the greatest care and caution", Ibid.

202. There is considerable dispute whether Scheubner-Richter was the brains behind the planning of the Munich putsch. K. Heiden, Der Führer (London, 1967), p. 150, H.H. Hoffmann, Der Hitlerputsch (Munich, 1961), p. 96 and E. Hanfstängl Zwischen Weissen und Braunen Haus, p. 122 believe that he was. W. Laqueur, 'Hitler and Russia 1919-23' Survey (October, 1962), p. 102 calls this an unsubstantiated legend; cf. M. Boehm, op. cit., pp. 61-63. It seems most likely that Scheubner-Richter was involved in planning a putsch earlier in November 1923, which failed to materialize, and it was Hitler who re-galvanized a disheartened Scheubner-Richter with the 8 November scheme; see the interview with Scheubner-Richter's wife on 3 April 1936 in HA 53/1263 and the report by his adjutant, Johann Aigner, 'Als Ordonnanz bei Hochverrätern. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der nationalen Erhebung in November 1923' HA 5/114II.


204. E. Hanfstängl described Scheubner-Richter as "a crony of Rosenberg's", The Missing Years, p. 87; whilst W. Laqueur concludes that "ideologically Scheubner-Richter's impact on Hitler was negligible; Rosenberg was a far greater influence during the early years", 'Hitler and Russia', loc. cit., p. 104.

205. A. Rechberg's article in Bayerische Staatszeitung 26 November 1922 in BHStA I/1474.

206. 'Erklärung' VB 6 December 1922.

207. Ibid. The VB also denied that it hoped for a conflagration with the Entente powers; unsigned articles, 'Herrn Rechbergs Selbstenthüllung' VB 2 December 1922.

208. Both Scheubner-Richter's statement and Rechberg's reply were published in Bayerische Staatszeitung 5 December 1922, loc. cit.

209. VB 6 December 1922.

210. E. Hanfstängl, Zwischen Weissen und Braunen Haus, p. 122; as did Rosenberg and Ludendorff according to Hanfstängl.

211. M. Boehm, op. cit., p. 58. P. Leverkuehn, op. cit., pp. 169-72 says that Scheubner-Richter felt that the Baltic provinces could not return to Russia but with only a 9% German population could they really remain inside Germany. Such scruples were not in evidence in the discussion between August Winnig and his advisers (perhaps including Scheubner-Richter), "The East! Here we must stand fast"; A. Winnig, Heimkehr, p. 49.

212. A. Winnig, Heimkehr, p. 50. The Latvians did not agree to the settlement clause.


217. M. Boehm denies that Scheubner-Richter's outlook was in any way anti-Russian, op. cit., p. 60. On Scheubner-Richter's contacts with the Ukrainians, see R.C. Williams, op. cit., p. 174; H. Volkmann, op. cit., p. 51; M. Boehm, op. cit., p. 60.


219. Ibid.

220. Report in Der Kampf 7 June 1921, HA 51/1197.

221. R.C. Williams, op. cit., p. 175.

222. A discussion of the Bad Reichenhall resolutions by a group of Russian monarchists in Geneva on 16 June 1922 in preparation for a second conference in Vienna in July (it actually took place in Budapest), reported by one Adolf Miller in Berne to the German Foreign Office on 3 July 1922, AA IV Russland P05 A, bd. 2.


226. WPA 9 August and 30 August 1922.

227. Britain, he wrote, was beginning "to question Soviet Russia's equality of rights in the East and the Black Sea", WPA 18 October 1922.

228. M. Scheubner-Richter, 'Die Faschisten als Herren in Italien' WPA 1 November 1922.


230. Hitler's speech on 21 April, VB 26 April 1922; A. Rosenberg, Pest in Russland, p. 86.

231. M. Scheubner-Richter, 'Rapallo' WPA, 5 May 1922; for Rosenberg and Hitler see above, pp. 181-82.

232. The first article seems to have been 'Der kommunistische Kapitalismus', VB 28 July 1921; it bore the prefix 'AWP', though 'WAP' was to be the usual prefix. The articles continued to appear until October 1923.

233. Pest in Russland, p. 29.
234. Ibid., p. 70; taken from 'Höchster Zynismus' WPA 10 February 1922. See also Rosenberg's use of WPA findings on the falling acreage under cultivation in the Samara region since the Bolshevik Revolution, Pest in Russland, p. 49, taken from WPA 24 March 1922.

235. Pest in Russland, pp. 19-21, see 'Kirchenplünderung' WPA 14 April 1922.

236. Rosenberg also acknowledged the help of 'A.B.C. Korrespondenz', the journal of Eduard Stadtler's Anti-Bolshevik League in Berlin; Pest in Russland, pp. 29, 34, 46-49.

237. Scheubner-Richter wrote in WPA 26 July 1922 on the publication of Pest in Russland: "Every author, every writer, every politician who wants to express an opinion on the Russian problem must come to grips with this acutely written, for the most part unfortunately unimpeachable work." In Pest in Russland, p. 77, Rosenberg described Dzerzhinsky, head of the Russian secret police, the Cheka, as a "cold fanatic, in private almost an aesthete". On 11 October 1922, the VB carried an article from WPA entitled 'Der Fall Dzerzhinsky' in which he is described as being "of almost aesthetic disposition and... (of) an intelligence of unusual measure allied to an unbending fanaticism."

238. See Scheubner-Richter's articles, 'Bolschewisierung Deutschlands' WPA 21 September and 'Der Bolschewisierung sprungbereit?' WPA 29 September 1923, which criticized "National Bolshevik dreams".

239. Quoted in M. Boehm, op. cit., p. 57. The VB acknowledged that Scheubner-Richter had attracted several businessmen and politicians to the anti-Bolshevik cause, 'Herrn Rechbergs Selbstenthüllung' VB 2 December 1922.

240. G. Franz-Willing believes that money from Russian emigré circles was probably very intermittent, Die Hitlerbewegung: der Ursprung 1919-1922, pp. 191-96.

241. Rudolf Hess arranged the first meeting in 1921 between Hitler and Ludendorff according to the latter's recollection; Vom Feldherrn zum Weltrevolutionär und Wegbereiter deutscher Volksschöpfung. Meine Lebenserinnerungen von 1919 bis 1925, (Munich, 1940), p. 161.


244. War Memories, pp. 534, cf p.561. "The peace should have brought Germany secure frontiers in the East, agricultural areas and, especially in Courland, areas of settlement for German soldiers"; E. Ludendorff, Kriegführung und Politik (Berlin, 1922), p. 282. Otto Strasser claimed in 1926 that Ludendorff had popularized the idea of settlement with his wartime references to Courland; O. Strasser, 'Fortschritte in der Bauernsiedlung', Der nationale Sozialist, 15 August 1926.
245. "I hoped rather that the restoration of the Empire would be the work of the Ukraine, and I should have preferred a Russo-Polish solution to the Polish question to any other. Lithuania and Courland are not of vital importance to Russia, any more than Batum or Kars. The loss of Estonia and Livonia would be painful. I therefore supported, in all sincerity, the formation of a Baltic littoral"; E. Ludendorff, War Memories II, p. 562.

246. E. Hanfstängl claimed, of course, that Scheubner-Richter, Ludendorff and Rosenberg all "pleaded for an annexation of Western Russian areas as (the) indispensable granary of Germany", Zwischen Weissen und Braunem Haus, p. 122.

247. Report on speech by Hitler on 21 October in Verlag Bayerisches Wochenblatt, 22 October 1921, see above, p. 156.

248. Speech on 4 August, report in VB 11 August 1921. Hitler and Rosenberg were convinced that Germany could choose to use either Britain against Russia or Russia against Britain because the two powers were such irreconcilable enemies; see the speech by Hitler on 13 April 1923, reprinted in E. Boepple, op. cit., p. 44 and A. Rosenberg, Pest in Russland, p. 63.


250. BAK Reichskanzlei R43t/2681. Scharrer seems to have acted as a political agent for Cuno, though he was favourably disposed towards the Nazi Party, having apparently supported it financially, see K.H. Harbeck (ed.), Akten der Reichskanzlei: Das Kabinett Cunos (Boppard, 1968), p. 360. See note 51 in this chapter.

251. Report headed 'Bericht nach Hitlers persönlichen Ausführungen. Ende Dezember 1922' p. 3 in BAK R43t/2681. America and Italy would also be favourably disposed but America had only a 'secondary interest' in the struggle in Germany, to learn the methods to combat Marxism and Bolshevism; Italian aid depended on German attitudes towards the Anschluss with German-Austria and the South Tyrol question, ibid., pp. 3-4.

252. Ibid., p. 3.

253. Ibid., p. 4.

254. Scharrer had several meetings with Hitler about possible financial assistance and he may have requested a frank exchange of views as a condition for support; on another occasion, for example, he asked for assurances that Hitler would take no moves to jeopardize the present Bavarian government, see G. Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr der Hitlerbewegung 1923 (Munich, 1975), p. 24. See Hitler's comments on Scharrer and his wife on 21 February 1942, H.R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler's Table Talk 1941-44, pp. 326-28. Scharrer was the Bulgarian consul in Munich; for further details, see E. Matthias, "The Western Powers in Hitler's World of Ideas" in: A.J. Nicholls and E. Matthias, German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler, (London, 1971), p. 124.
Chapter 5

1. A. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 121. K.H. Hildebrand also argues that in 1923 Hitler's alliance strategy had emerged but Raumpolitik was still missing; Vom Reich zum Weltreich, p. 75.

2. Speech by Hitler reported in the VB 13 January 1921. The repetition of the England-Russia alternative in an article, 'Warum musste ein 9 November kommen?' Deutschlands Erneuerung 8 (1924), p. 199 has led Axel Kuhn to conclude that Hitler was still undecided op. cit., pp. 102-04. The evidence presented in chapter 4 suggests this was not so.


4. Most of Haushofer's papers (Haushofer Nachlass) were seized at the end of the Second World War by American officials in preparation for the Nuremberg trials. The material was microfilmed in the National Archives, Washington (Microcopy numbers T-253, T-81 and T-92. See Guides to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, Virginia) and returned to the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz during the 1960s. A somewhat smaller collection is housed at the family home at Hartschimmelhof bei Ammersee, Bavaria. Unfortunately the writer was unable to examine this collection as it was being arranged by Professor Jacobsen of Bonn University. This chapter, completed before the publication of the latter's two-volume biography, Karl Haushofer - Leben und Werk, (Boppard, 1979), draws on the large BAK collection and selected rolls of National Archives microfilm. (For the sake of clarity, the folder numbers common to both collections are cited here. A list of microfilms used appears in the bibliography.) The present study is in no way invalidated by Professor Jacobsen's excellent biography.

5. Karl Haushofer's son, Heinz, recalls seeing Hitler for the first time at a soirée at the Bruckmann home, which Karl Haushofer also attended; interview between Heinz Haushofer and the author on 16 August 1975.

6. Stefan Zweig described a meeting with Haushofer on the River Irrawaddy in 1910 as providing his "first insight into the extraordinary qualities and breeding of an officer of the German General Staff" Die Welt von Gestern (Stockholm, 1947), p. 217.

7. Interview with Heinz Haushofer.

8. Ibid.

10. Dr. Tim Klein, who was in charge of 'Literature and Art' for the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten (MNN), invited him to write a regular 'Ostasiatische Rundschau', which appeared from February 1921; Klein's letter of 7 January 1921 to Haushofer in Haushofer Nachlass folder 823 (d).

11. S. Zweig described Haushofer's behaviour on the trip: "he worked on the ship the whole day, following every detail (of the region's geography) with field glasses, writing reports, studying encyclopaedia", op. cit., pp. 217-18.

12. E. Obst, 'Karl Haushofer zum 60. Geburtstag' Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (ZfG) 6 (1929), p. 711. The degree was awarded in 1913 by the University of Munich.


14. Copy of letter from Haushofer to Kjellen, 10 October 1917, Nachlass 955(d).


17. Ibid.


21. Interview with Heinz Haushofer. This later led to quarrels between Karl Haushofer and his eldest son, Albrecht, who was involved with the resistance to Hitler and was executed following von Stauffenberg's unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life. See also Ursula Lasack-Michel, Albrecht Haushofer und der Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart, 1974).


24. Extract from a speech by Haushofer on 29 June, report in MNN, 30 June 1924.

25. The Kampfbund grew out of the obscure Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Wahrheit, Recht und Ehre e.V. and was organized by Richard Graf du Moulin-Eckart, Professor of History at the Technische Hochschule in Munich; NS 26/1679. Details of Haushofer's work for the group can be found in his correspondence with du Moulin-Eckart, Nachlass 840 (b). See also Nachlass 894.
26. This group appears to have offered its first course of lectures at Munich University in 1924; see MNN 14 September 1924. The scheme continued in the following years; Haushofer lectured twice in 1925, once in 1927 and again in 1928 by which time its name had changed to the Akademische Arbeitsausschuss für deutschen Aufbau, see MNN 2 June 1928.

27. The VDA was established in 1881 and by the 1920s it had a strong national organization. The Nazis followed its activities with interest; see for example VB 26 May 1921. Haushofer was its president between 1938 and 1941. The Nazis renamed it the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland.


29. VDA circular, June 1923, Nachlass 940 (b).

30. Haushofer had special responsibility for 'Volk und Boden' in Section IV of the Academy. See the report on its activities in 1925/26 in Nachlass 898. Haushofer became president of the Academy in 1934.


33. Haushofer was also a member of the Deutscher Schutzbund, which was organized by his friend and colleague, Karl von Loesch, and whose aim was to foster "community feeling between all Germans and the protection of the endangered German folkdom especially in the border areas of the German states and abroad", Satzungen des Vereins Deutscher Schutzbund in Nachlass 898.

34. Bund 'Oberland' appears to have grown out of the Freikorp Organisation Orgesch, which fought against the 'red rebellion' in Munich in 1919. After a somewhat chequered career, BO emerged in December 1921 under the chairmanship of Dr. Friedrich Weber, a veterinary surgeon. It was banned in 1923 after its involvement in the Kampfbund and the Munich putsch. Weber was imprisoned with Hitler in Landsberg; HA 32/642 and was clearly attracted to Hitler and after his release found it difficult to combine his admiration for the Nazi Party with BO's declared political non-alignment. See also H. J. Kuron, Freikorps und Bund 'Oberland', doctoral dissertation, Munich University, 1960.

35. Oberland. Ziele und Wege des Bundes 'Oberland' e.V. (Munich, 1926), pp. 1-4. Haushofer contributed an essay to this fundamental statement of BO policy, entitled 'Das Dritte Reich' ibid., pp. 5-10. A copy can be found in HA 35/699.

36. F. Weber to K. Haushofer, 10 October 1923, Nachlass 955 (b). Dr. Alois Alzheimer, who introduced Haushofer to BO and was later its vice-chairman, is convinced that his friend was never a member. He contributed to its activities because of its grossdeutsch orientation and out of friendship for Alzheimer; letter from Dr. Alzheimer to the author, 22 October 1975.


40. An investigation by the German Ministry of the Interior in 1926 concluded that BO's political goals were the same as the Nazi Party's; Ministry of the Interior to Dr. Schetter, director of the State Judiciary, 17 March 1926, HA 35/701. The BO appears to have shared Hitler's antisemitism; ibid., and H.J. Kuron, op. cit., p. 156.

41. K. Haushofer to F. Weber, 19 April 1925, Nachlass 940 (b); see also Weber's letter of 10 April proposing the appointment, ibid.

42. K. Haushofer to Alzheimer, 8 March 1925, Nachlass 945 (b).

43. Ibid.

44. Information from Dr. Alzheimer, 22 October 1975.

45. K. Haushofer, 'Defense of German Geopolitics' in: E.A. Walsh, Total Power. A Footnote to History, (new York, 1948), p. 351. Haushofer met Hess at a reunion of Hess' wartime squadron, to which Haushofer had been invited, interview with Heinz Haushofer. Karl Haushofer was mistaken about the date of the first meeting - 4 April 1919 seems the most likely; see H.A. Jacobsen, op. cit., I, p. 22.


47. Interview with Heinz Haushofer.

48. 'Defense of German Geopolitics', loc. cit., p. 351. W. Schwarzwälder argues that Haushofer and Hess saw Hitler at a meeting in May 1920 in the Sterneckerbräu (there was one held there on 10 May), 'Der Stellvertreter des Führers'. Rudolf Hess. Der Mann in Spandau (Vienna, 1974), pp. 72-74. H.A. Jacobsen, op. cit., I, p. 225 note 3, shows that Haushofer certainly attended a DAP meeting on 6 July 1920 with Rudolf Hess and heard Hitler speak.

49. See R. Hess, 'Zum Flugblatt gegen Hitler', VB 11 August 1921.

50. Pechel recalled Haushofer "asked me whether I was interested in getting to know Adolf Hitler", Deutscher Widerstand (Zurich, 1947), pp. 277-78.

51. See, for example, Hess' account of party affairs in a letter to Haushofer, 6 October 1923, Nachlass 955 (c).

52. Report by 'D' on Haushofer's lecture 'The Thousand Year Struggle for the Rhine' Völkischer Kurier (VK) 4 June 1924 - the VK was the main Nazi paper when the VB was banned after the Munich putsch. The lecture for the AA provided 'scientific' proof of France's age-old ambition to expand eastwards. Haushofer first came to the attention of the Nazi press with a lecture on 'Das Auslanddeutschum nach dem Friedensvertrag', in which he noted the racial awareness of 'eastern peoples' (the Chinese and the Jews), enabling them to resist the pressure from the English and the Japanese. The VB stressed that "what was said in the lecture about racial pride and the resistance of the Asiatic people could serve as a lesson for us", VB 20 September 1922. Thereafter the Nazi press followed Haushofer's activities with interest; the VB reported his lectures, VK 1 July, 11 December 1924, reviewed his articles, VK 31 August 1924 and publicized his lectures for the AA, VK 28 August, 13 October and 17 November 1925. The VB on its return did likewise, see for example, the reports and reviews
of the ZfG, VB 28 May, 8 and 12 December 1925.

53. On 8 May 1934 Haushofer wrote to an unnamed recipient that Hitler "had not forgotten that I was at Landsberg every week", quoted in D.H. Norton, op. cit., p. 83.

54. K. Haushofer to the Dean, 24 December 1938, Nachlass 931(a).

55. Ibid., in 'Nationaler Sozialismus und soziale Aristokratie' ZfG 1 (1924), Haushofer argued for "rule by the fittest" but with equal opportunity for all, irrespective of class or race; a very different concept, therefore, from the racial exclusivity of Nazi ideology.

56. Leaflet in HA 42/857.

57. The lecture took place on 29 June and at the end there were cries of "Free Hitler" and du Moulin-Eckart asked that the celebrations not be disrupted "since this was surely not Hitler's intention"; report in MNN 30 June 1924. "We must use everything in our fervent love of the fatherland in order to contradict the war-guilt lie and to fight to recover our living-space around us", Haushofer told his audience; report in VK 1 July 1924.

58. See note 3 of this chapter.

59. 'Defence of German Geopolitics', loc. cit., p. 345.

60. Leading Geopolitician Otto Maull wrote that "Kjellen has basically only given the name to geopolitics and has applied ideas in a systematic and extremely plausible way but containing hardly anything essential, which had not already been thought of by Ratzel", ZfG 6 (1929), p. 617.


62. K. Haushofer et al., "Über die historische Entwicklung des Begriffs 'Geopolitik' ", loc. cit., p. 27.


64. K.H. Harbeck, op. cit., p. 9.

65. 'Defence of German Geopolitics', loc. cit., p. 346.

66. K. Haushofer's unpublished essay 'Was ist Geopolitik?', Nachlass 834.

67. Albrecht Haushofer writing to Kurt Vowinckel (on behalf on his father), 22 February 1936. Nachlass 955(b).


69. Hitler wrote: "The foreign policy of the folkish state must safeguard the existence on this planet of the race embodied in the state, by creating a healthy, viable, natural relation between the nation's population and growth, on the one hand, and the quantity and quality of its soil, on the other." Mein Kampf, p. 587.


72. K. Haushofer, 'Berichterstattung aus der indo-pazifischen Welt' ('Bericht') *ZfG* 1 (1924), p. 656. He attributed the success of the British Empire to her ability to produce leaders of great skill, 'Sprache der Tatsachen. III. Inselreiche und Revolverpolitik', *MNN* 15 July 1923. The French colonial system, he felt, was the "most despotic and imperialistic" in the world and existed to bolster the declining power of France in Europe; see the speech by Haushofer to AA, *MNN* 2 December 1925. The United States, in his view, was a master of "concealed imperialism"; hence in 1903 she had instigated a revolution in Panama ostensibly in the name of national self-determination, but, in reality, to secure the right to build an isthmian canal: 'Sprache der Tatsachen. II. Die Ausbreitung der Vereinigten Staaten', *MNN* 12 June 1923. His interest in American economic imperialism was evident in his introduction to the German edition of S. Nearing and J. Freeman's *Dollar Diplomacy* (New York, 1926), published in Berlin in 1927. See also his review, 'Bericht', *ZfG* 4 (1927), p. 191.

73. 'Geographische Grundzüge', *loc. cit.*, p. 260.

74. Ibid. This analysis was not without its contradictions; surely, Japan's island status made her an 'oceanic' rather than a 'continental' power and her policy in China was certainly 'imperialistic'. Haushofer was aware of this, of course, but felt that the Japanese were faced with a choice between a Pacific or a continental future and that ultimately national interests would lead them to join a German-Russian-Chinese bloc: 'Japan an der Schwelle des "Leuchtenden Friedens"' *MNN* 1 January 1927.

75. *Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung* (Munich 1927), pp. 245-46. He frequently compared Germany's present position with that of China, 'Ostasiatische Rundschau' *MNN* 3/4 December 1921 and 15/16 July 1922, 'Kalte Blut' *MNN* 26 July 1925. He placed great hopes on the nationalist movement of Sun Yat-sen, whom he described as "the embodiment of inherent geopolitical ideas"; 'Bericht' *ZfG* 2 (1925), p. 357. He also wrote an introduction to the German edition of G. Amann's *The Legacy of Sun Yat-sen* (New York, 1929). He was also impressed by the Indian movement for independence from the British Empire: 'Ostasiatische Rundschau' *MNN* 2/3 April 1921 and 5/6 August 1922. In 1923, following the invasion of the Ruhr, he saw Gandhi's policy of passive resistance as an example for Germany: see 'Ein deutscher Gandhi gesucht!' *MNN* 18 February; 'Passive Widerstand' *MNN* 11 March; 'Scheidet Euch von Bösen' *MNN* 31 March 1923.

76. K. Haushofer, 'Weltpolitische Rundschau' *Das Dritte Reich* 15 August 1925. By joining the League, Germany was becoming implicated in western imperialism; 'Frankreichs Kolonialpolitik' *MNN* 2 December 1925.

77. 'Geographische Grundzüge', *loc. cit.*, p. 260.

81. Ibid.
82. K. Haushofer, 'Interessengemeinschaft der Selbsterhaltung' MNN 1 February 1925.
83. K. Haushofer, 'Politische Umschau' Das Dritte Reich, 15 October 1927.
84. K. Haushofer, 'Interessengemeinschaft', loc. cit.
86. Ibid., p. 262.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
96. Ibid., pp. 188-90.
97. Ibid., pp. 188-89; cf. K. Haushofer, 'Europaisches Rassenproblem' MNN 4 January 1925.
100. D.H. Norton argues that Haushofer "never possessed" any influence over Hitler's thinking because he did not take the Nazi Party seriously until after 1933; op. cit., p. 191. U. Laack-Michel admits that Haushofer took geopolitical literature to Landsberg for Hitler, but finds it difficult to reproach Haushofer for the fact that Hitler profited from it; op. cit., p. 12. The most recent and the most comprehensive survey has concluded that Haushofer cannot be regarded as "the spiritual father" of Nazi war aims, though he did do much to prepare the ground intellectually for the rise of the National Socialist system; H-A. Jacobsen, op. cit., I, pp. 451-52, 464.


103. Report on the speech, VB 4 November 1922.


105. Account of a speech on 27 April 1923 in E. Boepple, op. cit., p. 61. See also VB 29/30 April 1923.

106. E. Scharrer, 'Bericht nach Hitler's persönlichen Ausführungen' loc. cit., p. 4; see above p. 212.


108. See above, pp. 187-89.

109. Hitler's speech on 31 May, report in VB 5 June 1921. See also above p. 156.


111. Hitler was a realist, Haushofer an idealist. This difference is well illustrated by Hitler's willingness to sacrifice the interests of the Germans in the South Tyrol in order to attract Mussolini's support, a betrayal which Haushofer could not contemplate; 'Defense of German Geopolitics', loc. cit., p. 348. Cf. H-A. Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 276.

112. 'Defense of German Geopolitics', loc. cit., p. 351. In his own account of his interrogation by the Allies on 23 August 1945, Haushofer argued that the Nazis, including Rudolf Hess, had misunderstood geopolitics. He admitted, though, that they had used the autarkic elements of the Lebensraum concept, H-A. Jacobsen, op. cit., I, p. 336.

114. 'Defense of German Geopolitics', loc. cit., p. 350. On 8 May 1934, Haushofer wrote to an unidentified friend that Hitler "had not forgotten that I was at Landsberg every week at a time when many, who chase after him today, were not yet his faithful followers"; quoted in D.H. Norton, op. cit., p. 83.


116. Heinz Haushofer quoted in 1946 the following remarks by his father:
"In the 1920s I entered into a kind of ideological alliance with the Nazis. I had taken Rudolf Hess as a friend and assistant. Through him I became acquainted with Adolf Hitler. I visited the Führer then in the Landsberg fortress on various occasions. In 1923 and 1924 the prisoner merely thumbed through what he found of geopolitical literature in the fortress. Now certainly, I stimulated the people, counselled (them). In certain parts of Mein Kampf there are strong traces of this. But then they popularized my train of thought falsely and for the purposes of propaganda. I could no longer oppose this kind of dissemination and application."
'Ratgeber und Opfer des Dritten Reiches' Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung 26 June 1946, newspaper clippings, Wiener Library.

117. VB 5 June 1921, see chapter 2. It is a moot point when Hitler began to write Mein Kampf. Alfred Rosenberg published his pamphlet on the party programme in January 1923, "since Adolf Hitler's book...is not yet so far advanced that it is likely to be in print in the near future"; Wesen, Grundsätze und Ziele der NSDAP, foreword. If Hitler was writing Mein Kampf during 1923, it would explain the book's almost verbatim repetition of several speeches delivered at that time. See for example, his argument against land speculation, MK p. 124 and his speech on 27 April, VB 29/30 April 1923; and E. Boepple, op. cit., p. 61; and his critique of the idea of peaceful economic conquest, MK, pp. 131-32 and his speech on 10 April 1923, E. Boepple, op. cit., pp. 40-41. It is of course possible that he used the Boepple edition of his speeches, published in 1925, as a reference work in the final draft.

118. MK, p. 121.


121. Ratzel also, however, pointed out the disadvantages, for example the tendency in large states towards the localization of authority and the danger of inter-racial clashes; Politische Geographie, pp. 274-75; cf. Erdenmacht, p. 28.


125. A. Hitler, MK p. 127.


128. Politische Geographie, pp. 23-25. Ratzel used Greece as an example on this occasion, but Great Britain on another; ibid., p. 252 (as did Hitler, MK, p. 128). Ratzel also made the point that overseas empires were vulnerable to the emergence of a new navy, but "who will take Siberia from Russia?", he asked; ibid., p. 115.

129. MK pp. 127-8. Since overseas colonies in the nineteenth century could no longer be acquired by peaceful means, it was better, in Hitler's view, to use force to gain land on one's home continent. Interestingly, Hitler added that "all alliances, therefore, should have been viewed exclusively from this standpoint and judged according to their possible utilization"; ibid., p. 128; cf. p. 594. In other words, foreign policy goals dictated the choice of one's allies, not vice-versa; see A. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 121.

130. MK, pp. 131-32.

131. Ibid., pp. 137-38.


133. Hitler's analysis was also similar to Alfred Rosenberg's, published early in 1923. Germany could only absorb the annual population increase of "almost 900,000 people" - noticeably the figure used in Mein Kampf, p. 120 - in Rosenberg's view, by the colonization of "European and extra-European areas", unless she encouraged emigration; Wesen, Grundsätze und Ziele, pp. 134-36.

134. Ratzel believed in some kind of European unity. The details remain vague but what is clear is his belief that "Europe's disunity can no longer be healed by conquest"; Politische Geographie, p. 308.

135. See chapter six.

136. MK p. 586.

137. K. Haushofer, 'Vergleich des Lebens-Raumes Deutschlands mit dem seiner Nachbarn unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der wehrgeographischen Lage der Vergleichs-Staaten', Nachlass 923a. This important article has now been reprinted in H. A. Jacobsen, op. cit., I, pp. 324-36.

138. Ibid.
139. Ibid. Haushofer's concern for autarky can be traced in his article, 'Zur Geopolitik des fernen Ostantens' Wissen und Wehr (1920), pp. 333-46.

140. MK, p. 563.

141. Though Hitler referred to France's centralization in a political context, to contrast with Germany's "young federative state", MK p. 614 whilst Haushofer used it in a geographical context to contrast with Germany's divided Lebensraum, 'Vergleich', loc. cit., nevertheless a connection seems possible.


143. MK, p. 587.


146. MK, p. 596.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid., p. 593.

149. See especially MK pp. 595, 598, 604.


153. Ibid., p. 410.

154. See chapters one and two and also K. Lüdecke, 'Völkische Weltanschauung und völkische Weltpolitik', Der Weltkampf 2 (February, 1925), p. 3 and Alfred Rosenberg, Der völkische Staatsgedanke. Untergang und Neugeburt (Munich, 1924), pp. 31-33 for attacks on internationalism.
155. E. Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung. Entwurf einer Herrschaft (Tübingen, 1969), p. 66. Jäckel mistakenly asserts that in 1924 "Hitler...made antisemitism the central focus of his personal as well as his political evolution." In fact this had been the case for quite some time. In December 1922, for example, Hitler described the importance of "the struggle against the Jews" for his movement in his interview with Eduard Scharrer; it was, he said, "one of the main points in the orientation of the mass of the National Socialist party. This slogan cannot be abandoned because what results from it is that the masses see in every enemy, which is identified, their deadly foe and adapt themselves accordingly"; E. Scharrer 'Bericht nach Hitlers persönlichen Ausführungen' loc. cit., p. 6. This extract is interesting, of course, as a rare objective analysis of the political expediency of antisemitism by Hitler, which casts doubt on the sincerity of his antisemitic convictions. J. Thies, op. cit., pp. 42-43, has argued that the struggle between the German race and the Jews acquired its global dimension in 1922. This seems to overlook the identification of Jewry with the power of internationalism as early as 1920.

156. Hitler's letter to Hierl, 3 July 1920, quoted in A. Tyrell, Vom 'Trommler' zum 'Führer', pp. 214-15. See also his speech on 18 November, VB 22 November 1922.


158. A. Rosenberg, 'Die Raubvögel-Kongress in Budapest' VB 20 October 1925. An unidentified Englishman is credited with an article, 'Madagascar' VB 29 June 1926, which suggested three alternatives to the settlement of the Jews in Palestine:

"Extermination" (which would be inhuman and involve persecution and death)

"Assimilation"

"Compulsory Segregation" (which meant, according to the author, resettlement on Madagascar.

The VB editor (Rosenberg) in an introduction commented that the author's alternative to Palestine as the 'final solution' of the Jewish question was "much better". Another writer 'G.J.' suggested Southern Russia "in the heart of communism" would be an appropriate spot for a Jewish colony (Uganda had also been mooted); 'Weder Uganda noch Palästina sondern - Südrussland' VB 27/28 October 1926.

159. MK, p. 295.

160. Ibid., p. 629.

161. Ibid., pp. 348-49.

162. Ibid., p. 360. Germany, if she pursued racial purity would inevitably become "lord of the earth", ibid., p. 629.

163. Ibid., p. 365. Nothing should, in Hitler's view, overcome the ties of "common blood or the great line of a kindred culture", which bound the Aryan nations; ibid., pp. 584-85. In the last resort he would defend the British in India because he "as a man of Germanic blood, would, in spite of everything, rather see India under English rule than under any other"; ibid., p. 601.
164. A. Rosenberg, 'Der Schlag der Wentenuhr' VB 10 July 1925.

165. A. Rosenberg saw England along with Germany "taking up the defence of the white race", 'Gegen die weisse Rasse' Der Weltkampf 4 (May 1927), p. 216. Though America was largely in the hands of the Jews of Wall Street, Rosenberg believed that she might yet get involved in "securing the nordic race against degeneration, foreign infiltration"; 'Drohender Kriegszustand zwischen Nordamerika und Mexico' VB 15 January 1927.

166. A. Rosenberg, 'Weltpolitische Rundschau. Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa', Der Weltkampf 2 (August 1925). European style imperialism reflected a blindness to the racial qualities not only of the subjugated peoples but also of one's own; cf. 'Jüdische Weltpolitik' Der Weltkampf 1 (June 1924), p. 15. He was not, however, the apostle of world peace and international brotherhood, but he wanted simply "to release our European racial awareness against the other races of the earth", ibid., cf. Der völkische Staatsgedanke, p. 31.

167. MK, p. 565.

168. Ibid., p. 588. To re-create the boundaries of 1914 would not, therefore, be sufficient to improve "the relation in which we, at present, find ourselves towards the other world powers, or, better expressed, the real world powers"; ibid., p. 595.

169. Ibid., pp. 597-98. Hence in the 1920s Germans should not advocate the restoration of 'seapower' before Germany's position in Europe was secure; ibid., p. 571.

170. Ibid., p. 558.

171. Ibid., pp. 360-61.

172. Ibid., p. 561. Elsewhere Hitler referred to Britain's "world empire", ibid., p. 566, and this seems more appropriate. Interestingly, Rosenberg referred to the existence of a "Russian world empire" under the Tsars, Pest in Russland, p. 12. Elsewhere Rosenberg applied the term "world empire" to the Russian Empire, Der völkische Staatsgedanke, p. 4, cf. p. 6. The term "world empire" was clearly used fairly indiscriminately to cover great size.

173. MK. p. 608.

174. Ibid., pp. 561., p. 563. See also 'Warum musste ein 8 November kommen' Deutschlands Erneuerung 8 (1924), pp. 203-04.

175. MK p. 582.

176. Hitler wrote about "the striving of the Jewish people for world domination (Weltherrschaft), a process which is just as natural as the urge of the Anglo-Saxon to seize domination of the earth (Herrschaft der Erde). And just as the Anglo-Saxon pursues this course in his own way and carried on the fight with his own weapons, likewise the Jews"; ibid., pp. 604-05. One wonders whether Hitler was making a genuine distinction here between the Jewish desire for a 'world dictatorship' (Weltdiktatur), ibid., p. 605 and the somewhat more modest Anglo-Saxon aspiration of pre-eminent world power status. Elsewhere, for example, he referred to the 'Jewish machine for world conquest (Welteroberung)'; ibid., p. 428 and was critical of those Germans before the war, who believed that "they were on the path
to world 'conquest' "; \textit{ibid.}, p. 137.


179. \textit{Ibid.}

180. \textit{Speech on 17 April 1920, R.H. Phelps, 'Parteiredner', loc. cit., p. 297.}

181. H. Class had written in 1913 that "England looks with mistrust upon our fleet and fears for the basis of her own position as world power"; D. Frymann, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 144.


183. \textit{Speech on 29 May 1921, reported in VB 5 June 1921.}

184. \textit{Speech on 11 August, reported in VB 16 August 1922.}


187. \textit{Interview with Heinz Haushofer.}

188. \textit{Politische Geographie}, pp. 302-06.


193. 'Denken in Kontinenten' was one of the catch-phrases adopted by the geopoliticians; see K. Haushofer, 'Geographische Grundzüge ', \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 260. A review by 'K.B.' of Rosenberg's monthly \textit{Der Weltkampf} in \textit{VK} 20 June 1924 recommended it to those who could get used to "thinking not only in German terms, not only in European terms, but in terms of continents." This may, of course, be mere coincidence.


196. MK. p. 582.

197. This was made clear in Hitler's Secret Book, pp. 104-05, where he argued that it was wrong to believe that "human values can be replaced by human numbers...If the importance of the American Union...lay in the size of the population alone, or else in the size of the territory, or in the relation in which this territory stands to the size of the population, then Russia would be at least as dangerous for Europe." Racial impurity, however, made Russia weak, in Hitler's view. One could scarcely hope for a more revealing assessment of the relative importance of the geopolitical and racial facts of life.

198. MK, p. 262.

199. Albrecht Haushofer wrote shortly before his execution: "it is true that my father wanted through his writings to make Germany a mature great power", quoted in Rainer Hildebrand, Wir sind die Letzten (Berlin, n.d.), p. 33.
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2. Ibid., pp. 203-04.

3. For the text of this speech, see G. Bonnin, Le Putsch de Hitler à Munich en 1923, (Les Sables d'Olonne, 1968), p. 151. The speech rehearses many of the arguments later used in the article in Deutschlands Erneuerung.


5. Ernst Hanfstangl recalls a conversation in April 1923 in which Hitler said that "in the next war the most important task will be to take possession of the grain-producing areas of Poland and the Ukraine"; Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus, p. 78.


9. W. Horn, 'Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers' loc. cit., p. 291, argues that Hitler's refutation of the claim that Scheubner-Richter was the Nazi Party's foreign policy adviser (see chapter 4) was a disavowal of the émigré foreign policy. However, it is more likely that Hitler was either covering up his links with émigré circles or objecting to the idea that he and the party needed a foreign policy adviser.

10. Manfstangl may have exaggerated his opposition to Rosenberg in his memoirs, Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus, pp. 47-48, 78.

11. Ibid., pp. 47, 105.


13. "When we realised that the Ruhr area would be lost, our movement came into a great conflict with the bourgeois world"; Hitler's speech on 26 February 1924, Der Hitlerprozess, pp. 18-19.

14. Hitler was writing about the outbreak of the First World War "with the tenth anniversary of the mighty event approaching"; Mein Kampf, p. 150. Presuming that he dictated the book in the order in which it now appears, chapter four containing the section on foreign policy must have been written around June/July 1924.

15. MK, pp. 126-27. He had already dismissed birth control and internal colonisation as solutions.
17. Ibid., p. 125.
21. U. Kissenkoetter, op. cit., p. 17. All sections of the party met in Weimar between 15 and 17 August 1924 under Gregor Strasser's chairmanship but unity proved elusive; Rosenberg feared that von Graefe intended to take over the Nazi Party and replace Hitler as leader; A. Rosenberg, 'Nationalsozialismus und Deutsch-Völkische Freiheitspartei' (no date) in HA 53/1259 and 'Bericht des Herrn Rosenberg auf der Vertretertagung der NSDAP an 2 Juli 1924 in Weimar' HA 42/872; see also K. Lüdecke, op. cit., pp. 211.
22. For example in Bavaria between 9 March 1925 and 5 March 1927; in Prussia between 25 March 1925 and 29 September 1928; in Hamburg between 8 October 1925 and 23 March 1927; dates taken from U. Kissenkoetter, op. cit., p. 20 note 31.
23. 'Aus der Bewegung' VB 8 October 1925.
25. K. Lüdecke, op. cit., p. 306 confirms this impression. Strasser was, however, to be used by those who resented the dictatorial control of Munich; Goebbels described him as "our battering-ram against the Munich bosses"; diary entry of 20 September 1925, H. Heiber (ed.), The Early Goebbels Diaries. The Journal of Joseph Goebbels from 1925 to 1926, (London, 1962), p. 38.
26. A. Rosenberg's postscript to the article by von Nemirovich-Danchenko, a Russian émigré friend of Scheubner-Richter's, 'USSR, Deutschland und Russland' VB 5 November 1925.
29. G. Strasser, 'In letzter Stunde', VB 22 September 1925 and 'Abrechnung', loc. cit.; A. Rosenberg expressed similar fears, 'Einkreisung', loc. cit.
30. G. Strasser, 'Abrechnung', loc. cit.
32. G. Strasser, 'Russland und wir', VB 22 October 1925. Strasser considered Western capitalism and English imperialism to be Germany's deadliest enemies and "viewed in the long term, even more deadly enemies than French militarism, which is indeed the closest and also the weakest of our enemies"; 'Zu den aussenpolitischen Zielen des Jungdeutschen Ordens' NS Briefe 15 January 1926.

33. See A. Rosenberg's postscript to the article by von Nemirovich-Danchenko, 'USSR, Deutschland und Russland', loc. cit.

34. 'Dispositionsentwurf eines umfassenden Programms des nationalen Sozialismus' NS 26/896. Otto Strasser attempts in later writings to distance himself and his brother from the views of the Nazis. See in particular M. Geis, (alias Otto Strasser), Gregor Strasser, (Leipzig, 1933), O. Strasser, Hitler and I (Boston, 1940) and his Germany Tomorrow (London, 1940). In fact, though it called for the compulsory combination of small farms into local cooperatives, the programme was fairly conservative and is based on the '25 Points' with its emphasis on the corporate organisation of society. It repeated the antisemitism and the anti-Marxism of the original party programme. See 'Dispositionsentwurf', loc. cit. U. Kissenkoetter op. cit., pp. 22-24, presents Gregor Strasser as a radical figure whilst B.M. Lane and L. Rupp are inclined to present him as a more conservative character, Nazi Ideology before 1933 (Manchester, 1978), pp. xvi-xix.

35. G. Strasser, 'Für einen Bund der unterdrückten Völker' VB 12/13 July 1925.

36. Ibid.; see also Ulrich von Hutten (Otto Strasser) 'Deutschland und der ferne Osten' VB 22 July 1925.


38. G. Strasser, 'Russland und wir', loc. cit.

39. Ibid. See also G. Strasser, 'Für einen Bund der unterdrückten Völker' loc. cit. and 'Das Verbrechen Stresemanns' VB 11 September 1925.

40. Strasser also argued that Britain by inviting Germany to join the League of Nations was enlisting her support for an anti-Bolshevik crusade, which would weaken the threat posed by Russia to the British Empire. His conclusion was unequivocal: "We National Socialists have no interest in a war with Russia. We do not intend to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for English and French chauvinism. The old wives' fear of Bolshevism no longer counts for anything with us"; speech on "Locarno or Moscow" on 21 January reported in VB 27 January 1926; see also 'Immer wieder: Fort mit Locarno' VB 18 November 1925 and 'Zielen des Jungdeutschen Ordens' loc. cit. Rosenberg also opposed an anti-Bolshevik crusade on the grounds that it would make the Soviet government the defender of the fatherland and, therefore, more popular at home; 'Westeuropa gegen Osteuropa' VB 14 October 1925.

41. A. Rosenberg 'Ostorientierung' VB 18/19 April 1926; cf. Pest in Russland, p. 86.

42. J. Goebbels, 'Nationalsozialismus oder Bolschewismus' NS Briefe 15 October 1925; cf. G. Strasser, 'Zielen des Jungdeutschen Ordens', loc. cit. Both pointed to evidence of Pan-Slavic policies as proof.

44. Gregor Strasser adopted as his central tenet that a growing population indicated the "youthfulness" of a nation; 'Mehr Aussenpolitik' NS Briefe 15 November 1926. Otto Strasser described Moeller as "the purest of the pure" amongst the writers of the right wing; Hitler and I, pp. 38-39. Goebbels described Das Dritte Reich as "shatteringly true" and wondered why its author "was not one of us?", The Early Goebbels Diaries, pp. 55-57 - entries of 18 and 30 December 1925.

45. A. Rosenberg, ' "Western" und "Osten" ' VB 20 March 1927.

46. J. Goebbels, 'Nationalsozialismus oder Bolschewismus' loc. cit.

47. Ibid. Neither Goebbels nor Gregor Strasser abandoned antisemitism. Strasser described Marxism and capitalism as forming "spiritual unity, only with reverse signals"; 'Gedanken über Aufgaben der Zukunft' NS Briefe 15 June 1926.

48. A. Rosenberg's postscripts to Goebbels' article 'Nationalsozialismus oder Bolschewismus' loc. cit.

49. G. Strasser, 'Zielen des Jungdeutschen Ordens' loc. cit.


51. 'Dispositionsentwurf' loc. cit.

52. G. Strasser, 'Nun erst recht! Kampf der Unterwerfungspolitik' VB 21 October 1925.


54. Ibid.

55. G. Strasser, 'Mehr Aussenpolitik' loc. cit.

56. A. Rosenberg 'Ostorientierung' VB 18/19 April 1926; on his preoccupation with Poland see 'Wesen, Grundsätze und Ziele der NSDAP' Schriften und Reden, pp. 135-37.

57. 'Dispositionsentwurf' loc. cit.

58. Ibid. In fact this is the fourth goal in the order of the draft programme.

60. Though Friedrick Naumann was by no means the only German advocate of a united Central Europe, his book, *Mitteleuropa* (Berlin, 1915) was one of the most widely read texts during the Great War. Naumann had been interested in economic rather than political unity but, as with Strasser's conception, historians have puzzled over whether its ultimate aims were essentially expansionist or defensive. H.C. Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action*, (The Hague, 1955), pp. 198-199 and K. von Hiemperer, *Germany's New Conservatism. Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 55-56, favour the latter view, whilst F. Fischer, *Germany's aims in the First World War* (London, 1967), p. 176, has found evidence of Naumann's advocacy of the partition of Belgium and German domination of Poland.


62. 'Dispositionsentwurf', loc. cit.

63. G. Strasser, 'Zielen des Jungdeutschen Ordens' loc. cit.

64. Coudenhove-Kalergi wanted a German-French agreement to provide the basis for Pan-Europa; R. Frommelt, op. cit., p. 14; whilst Gregor Strasser in fact opposed the proposed trade treaty between the two countries in July 1925 because it was the first step towards a united Europe under France; 'Instinktlose Geschäftemacher' VB 10 July 1925. Otto Strasser later claimed that they had wanted a federation on the same principles as the German Confederation in the nineteenth century; Hitler and I, p. 93.

65. O. Strasser, 'Aussenpolitische Rundschau' VB 3 October 1925.

66. J. Noakes, *The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony 1921-1933* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 74-75. Noakes relies on Ludolf Haase's account, 'Aufstand in Niedersachsen'; Haase was a hostile critic of the Strasser programme, considering the frontiers of 1914 to be insufficient; the concept of Greater Germany he felt to be "arbitrary" and "not organically founded"; a central African empire could not be maintained in agreement with England; and Pan-Europa would be "superfluous"; Haase's essay 'Der Nationalsozialismus. Göttinger Antwort auf die Denkschrift von Herrn Strasser', HA 44/896.


68. 'Dispositionsentwurf' loc. cit.

69. O. Strasser, *Hitler and I*, p. 93. K. Hildebrand shows that they dropped this colonial facet of their programme in 1929, *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich*, pp. 16-17.

70. G. Strasser, 'Instinktlose Geschäftemacher', loc. cit., cf. his article 'Trommelfeuer der Lügen' VB 1 October 1925.

71. U. von Hutten, 'Deutschland und der ferne Osten' loc. cit. Rosenberg also advocated the use of the colonial peoples against international high finance but was against supporting them in principle; "'Westen" und "Osten" ' loc. cit.
72. Heinz Seibert, a regular contributor to the Strasser newspapers, argued that French coastal possessions in West Africa, though unsuitable for settlement, would provide the necessary raw materials, 'Fragen des dritten Reichs-Kolonialpolitik' NS Briefe 1 October 1926. On autarky, see G. Strasser 'Immer wieder. Fort mit Locarno' loc. cit.


74. Report by Goebbels on the meeting of 22 November in NS Briefe 1 December 1925. See also the party circular to local branches of the party, dated 11 December 1925, and signed by Rudolph Hess; A. Tyrell, Führer befiehlt, pp. 116-117.


77. Mein Kampf, pp. 570-571.

78. Ibid., p. 600-02.

79. Ibid., p. 588.

80. Ibid., pp. 598-599.

81. Ibid., pp. 593-98. Hitler's comments were not directed exclusively at members of the Strasser group, he had other critics of course.

82. Ibid., pp. 602-04.

83. See the record of his speech in 'Die Bamberger Tagung' VB 25 February 1926.

84. G. Feder to the party leadership, 2 May 1926, reprinted in A. Tyrell, Führer befiehlt... pp. 124-125. Rosenberg was also concerned about these views; see his letter to Gregor Strasser dated 24 February 1927 in NS 8/143.

85. 'Die Bamberger Tagung' loc. cit. For Otto Strasser's views on this, see his letter to Goebbels dated 26 January 1926 in W. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, pp. 221-22.

86. 'Die Bamberger Tagung' loc. cit. For Ludendorff's opposition to the Catholic church, see R. Parkinson, Tormented Warrior, p. 223; for Rosenberg's anticlericalism see above, pp. 28-32; Ernst Hanfstengl considered both men to be liabilities in a Catholic Bavaria; Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus, p. 169.

87. 'Die Bamberger Tagung' loc. cit.

89. VB, 19 February 1926.

90. "Hitler is in a rage about the programme"; The Early Goebbels Diaries p. 65, entry of 6 February 1926.

91. See Hitler's treatment of Goebbels in April 1926, The Early Goebbels Diaries, pp. 74-79, 93. Gottfried Feder complained that "the Bamberg Conference had worked excellently but as an isolated phenomenon it cannot fulfil its purpose, since still many unresolved questions remain open"; his letter to the party leadership dated 2 May 1926 is in A. Tyrell, Führer befiehl, p. 127. Feder presumably wanted total conformity.

92. The Early Goebbels Diaries, p. 72, entry of 13 March 1926. See also his article, 'Der Apfelsinenkrieg' NS Briefe 15 March 1926. Goebbels's defection to Hitler's side led to conflict with Gregor Strasser; see The Early Goebbels Diaries, p. 89 entry of 10 June 1926 and ibid., p. 107, entry of 25 August 1926 and Strasser's letters to Rudolf Hess dated 15 and 18 June 1927 complaining about Goebbels's attacks on him, reprinted in ibid., pp. 132-34.

93. G. Strasser, 'Die politische Lage' Der nationale Sozialist 9 May 1926.

94. G. Strasser, 'Mehr Aussenpolitik' NS Briefe 15 November 1926. Strasser did not accept Hitler's views on the South Tyrol; on 13 April 1927 following a speech by Hitler, Strasser tabled the motion that a German-Italian understanding was in the best interests of the province, VB 15/16 April 1927.

95. Reventlow argued that German foreign policy was being conducted in the interests of Great Britain; 'Zwischen den Stühlen' VB 6/7 March 1927, cf. 'England - Russland - Deutschland' NS Briefe, 15 September 1927. Both he and the Strasser brothers stressed the need for German neutrality in the event of a Russo-British war; see Reventlow's speech in the Reichstag, VB 2 July 1927; Gregor Strasser's speech in Leipzig, VB 10/11 July 1927; Ulrich von Hutten 'Der Krieg zwischen England und Russland' Der nationale Sozialist 5 June 1927. On Reventlow's career see H. Boog, Graf Ernst zu Reventlow. Eine studie zur Krise der deutschen Geschichte seit dem Ende des 19 Jahrhunderts, Dissertation University of Heidelberg, 1970.

96. G. Strasser, 'Deutschland in Trauer', 11 July 1926, reprinted in his Kampf um Deutschland. Reden und Aufsätze eines Nationalsozialisten (Munich, 1932), pp. 141-43; see also his speech in Munich on 10 June, VB 12/13 June 1927. On Mittelueropa see Ulrich von Hutten, 'Wir und "paneuropa"' Der nationale Sozialist 23 October 1927.

97. VB 23 August 1927.

98. Rosenberg's letter to Gregor Strasser dated 24 February 1927, NS 8/143. Rosenberg wrote that he had "avoided beginning a polemic with you personally in the VB over the last few years, although this would have been natural in view of your outlook on the Russian question and perhaps also many other foreign policy matters".
99. There were complaints about Reventlow's views; see, for example, Dr. Hanny Grohé to Rudolf Hess, 13 April 1930, Sammlung Schumacher 260. On 17 September 1928 Hitler had to warn the editors of the NS Blätter not to get involved in "the fighting out of any kind of clashes of opinion inside the movement", ibid. An unsigned letter dated 30 July 1931 revealed that several émigré Russians, who were seeking to change the Nazi Party's Ostpolitik, had decided to use the offices of Goering and Reventlow in an attempt to combat the influence of Alfred Rosenberg over Hitler; NS 8/121.

100. Rosenberg, reviewing the foreign policy section of the second volume of Mein Kampf urged every National Socialist to "hold out these considerations to the people who reproach us with the lack of a foreign policy programme"; 'Der Zweiter Band: Adolf Hitler: Mein Kampf' VB 10 December 1926.


103. Mein Kampf, pp. 557, pp. 571-75.

104. See, for example, H. Goering's three rare articles; 'Zum deutsch-italienische Konflikt' VB 3, 6, 9 March 1926; A. Rosenberg 'Mussolinis Südtiroler Rede' 6 March 1928; Hitler's Secret Book, p. 189.

105. A. Rosenberg, 'Mussolinis Südtiroler Rede', loc. cit.; see the reports on Hitler's speeches in VB 1 April and 10/11 April 1927; Hitler's Secret Book, pp. 180-1, 190.


111. Mein Kampf, p. 566.

112. A. Rosenberg, Zukunftsweg, p. 57; cf. his 'Reise nach Tripoli' loc. cit.


118. Articles in Éclair, 6 & 8 August 1925; see also E. von Veitsch, Arnold Rechberg und das Problem der politischen West - Orientierung Deutschlands nach dem ersten Weltkrieg (Koblenz, 1968), p. 98.

119. The Jungdeutscher Orden was a personal tour de force by its East Prussian founder, Arthur Mahraun. It was independent politically, and, whilst being critical of Weimar democracy, it avoided the excesses of the right-wing extremists. Encouraged by industrialists in France and Germany, the "Jungdo" adopted a pro-French line in foreign affairs and was strongly criticised for it; see K. D. Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Berlin, 1965), pp. 139-42.

120. G. Strasser, 'Zielen des Jungdeutschen Ordens', loc. cit. The issue was raised by Ludolf Haase, founder of the Göttingen branch of the Nazi Party and later Gauleiter of Hanover-South, NS Briefe, 1 December 1925.


122. Ibid., p. 29. Hitler agreed with this, "hence for Germany any coalition, which does not signify a binding of France, is by itself impermissible", Hitler's Secret Book, p. 132.

123. Alfred Rosenberg, 'Abrechnung mit Mahraun' VB 14 September 1926; Rosenberg's postscript to an article by Dr. Herbert Albrecht 'Tanger auch eine deutsche Frage' 1 October 1926. See also A. Rosenberg Zukunftsweg, p. 29; on one occasion, he mentions Spain and Scandinavia as junior partners of the Anglo-German-Italian bloc, which would defend the white race; speech by Rosenberg on 16 January reported by VB 18 January 1928.

124. Hitler's speech on 13 April reported in VB (Sondernummer) 15/16 April 1927.

125. Hitler's Secret Book, p. 209. See also the unsigned article 'Der italienische-ungarische Vertrag' VB 9 April 1927 and A. Rosenberg's postscript to the article by Dr. Eduard Melkus, 'Deutschland und Italien' VB 11 April 1928.


128. Ibid., p. 78. Rosenberg had noted as early as 1924 British abandonment of the "two-power standard"; 'Der Niedergang des britischen Imperiums' Der Weltkampf 1 (1924), p. 25.


130. Hitler's Secret Book, pp. 156-157; Mein Kampf, p. 563; Rosenberg noted in Zukunftsweg p. 83 that the development of the aeroplane meant that Britain was "no longer an island, whose sea girt is her defence".

131. Ibid., p. 159.
132. Ibid., p. 215.


137. Graf Reventlow felt that this overlooked the fact that "Great Britain has for 100 years always taken the most serious offence at Germany's expansion into continental markets. Besides, a revived Germany is seen in London as more dangerous than present-day France"; 'Nationalsozialismus und Umwelt' NS Briefe, 1 January 1929.


139. Ibid., pp. 132-33.

140. Ibid., p. 71.

141. Ibid., p. 74.

142. Hitler's speech on 30 March, report in VB 1 April 1927; cf. Hitler's Secret Book, pp. 136-37. Hitler also argued that there was an "infinite chasm" separating the German and the Slavic "folk souls", ibid., p. 137.


144. A. Rosenberg, 'England Schicksalsstunde. 5' VB 26/27 June 1927; see also 'Wesen,Grundsätze und Ziele der NSDAP' loc. cit., pp. 135-6; 'Der freigegebige Rechberg' VB 12 May 1926; 'Deutschland und der Osten' VB 22 September 1926; 'Um den deutschen Osten' VB 13/14 December 1926; 'Der Diebstahl des Raumes'VB 22 March 1927; and Rosenberg's speech 16 January reported in VB 18 January 1928.

145. A. Rosenberg 'Deutschland und der Osten' loc. cit.

146. Ibid.

147. A. Rosenberg, 'Aufkläricht und deutsche Aussenpolitik' VB 29 March 1927; cf. 'Bolschewistische Judenbluff' VB 15/16 April 1927.

148. A. Rosenberg's editorial comment on the unsigned article 'Die ukrainischen Kosaken und ihre politischenBestrebungen' VB 8 September; cf. his postscript to an article signed "N", 'Der Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus in der Ukraine' VB 16 September 1927; and 'Englands Schicksalsstunde. 5' VB 26/27 June 1927.
149. Zukunftsweg, p. 97. Rosenberg thought that the Ukrainian agreement would open up export possibilities for German industrial products, ibid.

150. A. Rosenberg, 'Aufklärung und deutsche Aussenpolitik' loc. cit.


152. See Rosenberg's review of Mit oder Gegen Moskau, (Dresden, 1927), in 'Eine nationalrussische Annäherung' VB 17/18 August 1927. The article is unsigned but repeats verbatim whole sections of Zukunftsweg.

153. Zukunftsweg, p. 97. Rosenberg called for "the winning of space in the European east as far as is necessary in order to feed at least 100,000,000 Germans", ibid., pp. 84-5.


155. Hitler's Secret Book, pp. 100-01; see also Mein Kampf, p. 400.

156. Hitler's Secret Book, pp. 107-08.

157. Ibid., p. 209; on the American threat, ibid., pp. 93, 98.

158. On Anglo-American tensions, see Zukunftsweg, pp. 73-74; for Rosenberg's views on US policy in Mexico, see his 'Drohender Kriegszustand zwischen Nordamerika und Mexiko' VB 15 January 1927; cf. 'Der Abrüstungsbetrug' VB 13/14 February 1927.


163. On "folkish imperialism" see 'Verwirrung der Begriffe. 2. Imperialismus' VB 8 June 1927; on tensions with the British and Americans, see 'Weltpolitische Rundschau' Der Weltkampf 2 (15 January 1925), p. 178 and 'Nationale Realpolitik. 3' VB 8 December 1925.


165. Mein Kampf, pp. 582-4.

166. Ibid., p. 584.

167. See G.L. Weinberg's introduction to Hitler's Zweites Buch, pp. 36-7 and H. Rothfel's introductory remarks, ibid., p. 9; also T. Taylor's introduction to Hitler's Secret Book, pp. xix-xx. All three note the need for revision as a factor.

Conclusion

1. See above, pp. 88-90.
2. Ibid., pp. 103-05.
3. Ibid., pp. 99-100
5. Ibid., pp. 38-39. Class may well have eased the way to Hitler's alliance with Alfred Hugenberg's German National Party in 1929, if Kurt Lüdecke is to be believed; I Knew Hitler, p. 311.
7. See above, pp. 118-119.
10. See above, pp. 178-80.
11. On this, see R. Cecil, op. cit., pp. 183-64.
12. See above, pp. 304-07.
16. Ibid., pp. 84-5.
17. For details of the opposition of Goering, Hanfstängl and Otto Strasser to Rosenberg's relative pre-eminence in the 1920s, see various items in HA 53/1259.
20. K. Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich, p. 75; see above, pp. 241-42.
22. Hitler's Secret Book, p. 34.

25. Ibid., pp. 32-35.

26. This is most clearly shown in A. Hitler 'Warum musste ein 8 November kommen?', Deutschland Erneuerung 8 (1924), p. 199; see above p. 265.

27. A. Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

28. Ibid., pp. 102-04.

29. See above, pp. 100-02. It was, of course, sufficient for Hitler to endorse a German-Italian alliance in 1920; see above, pp. 106-08. Nevertheless, it is clear from Hitler's discussion with Lüdecke that he had no illusions about the difficulty of attracting British support for Germany; I Knew Hitler, p. 81.


31. Josef Henke has also considered this; England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 1935-1939, pp. 28-29, note 46.

32. See above, pp. 140-41. Later Hitler argued that Slav inferiority made a Russo-German alliance unthinkable; Hitler's Secret Book, pp. 134-35. But this is unlikely to have been the main reason.

33. See above, pp. 160-61.

34. See above pp. 155-56; cf. p. 241.


38. Ibid., p. 6.


40. See above, pp. 250-62.


42. K. Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 13-23.

43. On this, see W. Michalka, 'Die nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik', loc. cit., p. 58.
Bibliography

Abbreviations

ADV  Allddeutscher Verband
Agd  Auf gut deutsch
A.Bl. Alldeutsche Blätter
BAK  Bundesarchiv Koblenz
BHS TA Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München
DAP  Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
HA  Hauptarchiv der NSDAP (National Archives Microfilm)
IfZ  Institut für Zeitgeschichte München
LA  Letzte Aufzeichnungen (Rosenberg's memoirs)
MK  Mein Kampf
MNN  Münchner Neueste Nachrichten
NS 26 Hauptarchiv der NSDAP (BAK Documentation)
NSDAP  Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
PRO  Public Record Office London
VB  Völkischer Beobachter
VfZG  Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte
VK  Völkischer Kurier
WPA  Wirtschaftspolitische Aufbauten: Korrespondenz
ZfG  Zeitschrift für Geopolitik

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